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Alliance, Activism, and Identity Politics in the Indigenous Land Rights Movement in Taiwan

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Alliance, Activism, and Identity Politics in the Indigenous Land Rights Movement in Taiwan

A thesis submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Anthropology of the McMicken College of Arts and Sciences 2017 by

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ABSTRACT

This study addresses the post-colonial identity politics entangled in the indigenous land rights movement in modern democratic Taiwan. While “The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law” was passed in 2005, Taiwan indigenous peoples still strive for land rights and autonomy in Taiwan’s Han-dominated political society; yet, increasingly many young Han are voicing support as allies and collaborators in these movements. Most studies on land rights focus almost exclusively on minority movements and minority involvement in these politics. Few studies have looked at the role of majorities as allies and collaborators in these justice movements. Consequently, this thesis will discuss why and how majority Han increasingly collaborate as allies in the indigenous land rights movement and explore Han perceptions of indigeneity. Drawing on two months of ethnographic fieldwork in Taitung, Taiwan and interviews with both indigenous and Han activists as well as local residents, this study demonstrates that Han consume and internalize anthropological representations of indigeneity through the higher education system, an outgrowth of Taiwan’s colonial past and Han privileged status as majorities. Enabled young Han formulate their identities as allies and collaborators around these representations; however, indigenous people critique Han allyship as a remnant of colonial misrepresentation and domination. In conclusion, this paper will discuss more integrated paths forward for future collaboration that privileges indigenous voices.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the course of Taiwan’s colonial history, Taiwanese “indigenous traditional territories” have been plundered and infiltrated by several colonial powers and on multiple occasions. Now, these territories have largely become privatized or state-owned lands. While “The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law (原住民族基本法)” in Taiwan was passed in 2005 shortly before the United Nations passed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2007, issues of indigenous land rights have become increasingly intense during the past decade fostering a radical politics regarding land and development. As a consequence of this intensification, there are an increasing number of people joining the indigenous land rights movements to combat unjust land usage by the government, to protect local environments, and to accompany indigenous peoples in sustaining their cultures and values. Interestingly, it is surprising that the primary participants of these movements are largely Taiwanese youth, including a substantial number of non-indigenous.

In this study, I aim to explore the pathways to indigenous and non-indigenous allyship in the context of the Taiwanese indigenous land rights movements. There is, of course, a

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1 In Taiwan, the term “indigenous traditional territory” was originally used as a concept to claim indigenous peoples’ sovereignty in the context of the indigenous movement. The government changed its concept to traditionally used land around individual settlements while implementing the Indigenous Traditional Territory Survey (ITTS) (Kuan, 2010). Later, the privately owned lands are being excluded from the “indigenous traditional territory” by the government. An intense debate over the indigenous traditional territory is still ongoing in Taiwan.

2 Starting from 1624, Taiwan has been colonized by the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Kingdom of Tungning (1662-1683), Qing Empire (1663-1895), Empire of Japan (1895-1945) and then Republic of China (ROC) (1945 to the present).
large body of literature on post-colonial oppression and indigenous land rights issues focusing almost exclusively on minority movements and minority involvement. However, only a few studies have looked at the role of majorities becoming allies and collaborators in these justice movements. Since Taiwan is a post-colonial immigrant society, indigenous peoples and immigrants/settlers have long-held divergent positions concerning the political, economy and legal nature of the outstanding indigenous land rights issues. In this study, I examine the politics of identity between the majority/settlers and indigenous peoples highlighting in particular the importance of majority support in these political alliances. As I argue, It is critical to explore how and why the majority Han\(^3\) settlers increasingly support, cooperate, and become allies in indigenous justice movements because in most indigenous rights movements, it is incumbent on the majority to give up, make space for, or at a minimum recognize these rights. More specifically, I focus on what I call ‘allyship pathways’ or the processes and practices that lead to decolonizing forms of allyship. In what follows, I develop a model for these pathways that can elucidate constraining and enabling factors on the path to allyship.

Following the analysis of data gathered during fieldwork in Taitung, Taiwan with indigenous and non-indigenous activists, I target specifically the catalyst role of

\(^3\) Anthropologists usually refer to the Chinese ethnic groups collectively as “Han.” Even Taiwanese of Chinese descent fiercely debate whether they are ethnically Chinese, civically Chinese, both, or neither (Simon, 2010).
anthropological education. Anthropological education plays a dual role in the identity politics of contemporary Taiwan. By framing indigeneity through anthropological representations, Han majority perceptions of indigeneity are crafted around an orientalist and essentializing discourse of “authenticity” in indigenous cultures, a legacy both of contemporary multi-culturalism and colonial and autocratic governments. Yet, at the same time, it is anthropological training and education that generates awareness and promotes encounters with indigenous peoples and voices. These experiences, themselves a result of educational and democratic reforms, form the locus of ideological conversion within the allyship pathways for Han activists. Though these experience propel potential allies to both become aware of indigenous issues and encounter indigenous peoples and voices, Han activists confront what I call the paradox of intimacy – in other words, as activists confront the reality of indigenous lives and the faultiness of a discourse of “authenticity” they also become increasingly self-aware of their own identities including their own detachment from land and their role in the systematic oppression of minorities. As I demonstrate in the case studies below, this paradox became the most prominent barrier to forming effective and long-term, sustainable allyship. In conclusions, I argue that anthropology has a role to play in crafting creative and collaborative fields of learning that enable to students to cope and contend with the multiple barriers to allyship and re-invigorate the disciplines roles in forging decolonization in Taiwan and elsewhere.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK MODEL

In this section, I briefly review anthropological theories of identity, highlighting the entanglement of power/knowledge within identity politics between indigenous peoples and settlers under post-colonial circumstances. To properly frame my research question on identity negotiations, I further build up an allyship pathways model that draws on social behavior change theories and models. While post-colonial education reformation accelerates the decolonization processes, the articulation of identity politics with the indigenous land rights movements serves as a potential collective awareness platform for learning and communication.

a. Identity, Ethnics Boundary, and Post-colonialism

In addressing my research problem centered on an ongoing alliance between Han and Indigenous peoples, I rely on anthropological approaches to identity politics, broadly, and ethnicity, more narrowly, to unveil the dynamic processes involved. First of all, the concept of “identity” is difficult to define. As Hall (1994) points out identity is “a ‘production,’ which is never complete, always in process, and always constituted within, not outside, representation” (p.392). Consequently, the concept of identity is now commonly recognized as situational, rather than stabilized. Further, identity “becomes something spoken about in the plural ... something always changing in space-time” (Tilley, 2006, p.8). In this vein,
identity implies a fluid subject whose demarcation is constantly produced through negotiation and renegotiation. Political, sociocultural, and historical forces compel boundary shifts, or the material and ideological barriers of subjective possibilities, and create new identity formation dynamics. One way of theorizing the connections between these structural-historical boundary shifts and subject identity is through articulation (Hall, 1986). Following Hall (1986), articulation is a process of creating connections between contingent relationships that cultivate identity under certain conditions. Therefore, unpacking how identity formations interact within boundary shifting could help better analyze the ethnic relationships.

To have a better theoretical understanding of identity articulations, especially involving indigenous peoples, it is important to discuss a substantial body of post-colonial theory that addresses the politics of knowledge. In particular, post-colonial studies challenge the ideas of essentialism and the stability of identity. As the famous critique by Said (1978) argues, Western colonial regimes essentialized non-western identities through categories of knowledge created by and for the purpose of colonial power. Furthermore, because knowledge was critical to the constitution of identities and the exercise of power, colonial states sought to manipulate and reproduce this knowledge in order to extend their control over colonial subjects (Foucault, 1980). However, any change in the knowledge dynamics that mobilize and bound identities could also possibly create new sources of power for
colonial subjects while decreasing colonial sources of power (Mahadevan, 2011). For example, a change in the power dynamics that materialize identity recognition could lead to renegotiation of identities. “In this way, power relations are constantly changed, renegotiated, reversed or at least changed” (Mahadevan, 2011, p.63). While exploring indigenous and non-indigenous relationships within post-colonial contexts, the land they inhabit becomes inscribed with the social relations of “power/knowledge;” hence, in conjunction with the “body,” land serves as the most critical material representation through which identity is negotiated. For indigenous peoples in post-colonial societies, land claims and identity negotiations are often deeply entangled.

b. Indigenous Activism and Indigeneity

The concept of “Indigèneitude,” raised by James Clifford (2013), reflects a process of rearticulation similar to “Négritude.” It tends to be a radical performance by indigenous peoples in recognizing their own achievements in social, cultural, and other aspects that are largely denied by colonial powers. It is seen as “a vision of liberation and cultural difference that challenges, or at least redirects, the modernizing agendas of nation-states and transnational capitalism” (Clifford, 2013, p.16). In the past decades, the growing global boom of the claims and concerns of indigenous peoples has prompted anthropology to take a much closer look at the discourse of “indigeneity.” While these claims to indigenous status seem suddenly to carry so much currency, the most significant, determinative context of
contemporary indigenous claims is still the long-term historical dynamics of state power (Dombrowski, 2002). “As it always has been, indigenism today is a process; a series of encounters; a structure of power; a set of relationships; a matter of becoming, in short, and not a fixed state of being” (De La Cadena & Starn, 2007, p.11). That is to say, indigeneity, emerging from the entanglement of history, sociocultural and political discourses, is relational, strategic, and dynamic. There have been several attempts to define indigeneity along the following four criteria: (1) genealogical heritage (i.e., historical continuity with prior occupants of a region); (2) political, economic, or “structural” marginalization (i.e., non-dominance); (3) cultural attributes (i.e. being “culturally distinct”); and (4) self-identification (Sylvain, 2002, p.1075). The most significant site for the formation and articulation of global indigenism is the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations. Over two decades of meetings and negotiations, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was adopted by the 61st General Assembly of the United Nations in 2007. Since then, “the concept of indigeneity is regularly invoked as a strategic tool in indigenous political movements, advocacy, and legal claims” (Merlan, 2009; as cited in Gomes, 2013, p.8). However, while indigenous peoples often use “indigènitude” to perform their particularity and claim for their sovereignty, they sometimes fall into the “authenticity trap.” In these struggles, indigenous peoples strategically essentialize their identity and representations in order to make claims; yet, as Clifford (2013) points out, they sometimes
have difficulties proving “how much of the performance of identity reflects deep belief, how much a tactical presentation of self” (p.16). These sorts of “authenticity traps” can inadvertently perpetuate stereotypes across indigenous and non-indigenous peoples and influence how people interact.

c. Indigenous Land Rights Movement and Decolonization

The basis for indigenous struggles is against colonial dispossession that problematizes the different identity of peoples and systematically produces material domination and oppression. In colonial states, identities are often fictionally “solidified and objectified through the mechanisms of colonial administration,” in which “everyone only [has] one identity” (Tilley, 2006, p.12). For most settlers, their identities are deterritorialized from any local reality and bound to imaginary homelands, while indigenous identities pertaining to land are fundamentally a “place-based existence” (Barker & Pickerill, 2012). The claim of land restitution to indigenous peoples articulated under post-colonialism thus disputes the colonial state’s “imagined geography” (i.e., Teng, 2004) and challenges the cohesion of nations as “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006). Given this heterogeneity, perceptions of land and value construction of both indigenous peoples and settlers, post-colonial “imagined communities” in turn become “heterotopias” (Foucault, 1986) where plurality is progressively integrated around multiculturalism. Amid diasporas and migration in the context of globalization, many indigenous peoples and settlers start to put an effort into
breaking down colonial identities and transcending interpretations of their identity from the roots to the routes of identity formation. A myriad of “new kind of people,” who have “their own emerging self-definitions, understandings of the world, and ecological ideologies and behaviors” (Robbins, 2012, p.22) often congregate in the surge of the indigenous land rights movement around the world. Indigenous land rights movement thus becomes a “decolonizing space” (Bhanda, Fumia, & Newman, 2008). No matter how the metaphysical belief in the unity of the identity will be involved, there are more and more majority/settlers, particularly the younger generation, supporting the indigenous land rights movement.

During the past decade, there are increasing multidisciplinary studies highlighting the relationship between settlers and indigenous activism, emphasizing the importance of decolonization and the possibilities of allyship (e.g. Davis, 2010). The concept of decolonization is “a historical process, not a single event that occurred at the end of colonial rule and the newfound sovereignty that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s” (Clifford, 2012, p.425). It is a process of liberation from assumed principles of knowledge and authorities. Within anthropology, historically a colonial discipline, decolonization has emerged as “an ongoing project that seeks to apprehend and, ultimately, displace a ‘logic of coloniality’ that undergirds the experiment of Western modernity” (Allen & Jobson, 2016). Within a multicultural context, decolonization becomes the key to develop effective and sustainable indigenous and non-indigenous allyship.
In this study, I focus on the identity negotiation of majority ethnic Han in the context of indigenous land rights movement activism – a key element of the decolonizing process in Taiwan. Since decolonization is an iterative and recurring process, it is argued that the experience of decolonization is best framed as a type of conversion or transformation. In this vein, I build a model around the concepts of decolonization and identity (trans)formation in ethnic relationship, to explore what I call allyship pathways. The pathways experienced by indigenous land rights movements’ supporters occur primarily through anthropological education and training as well as personal experiences. I will begin by briefly describing core features of my approach and the ideas on which the approaches are based, and then elaborate on what it means for allyship pathways depicted in Figure 1.
d. Models of Behavioral Changes and Allyship Pathways Model

Theories and models of human behavior change in social science are normally about the conversion and transformation of specific social practices, such as public health beliefs or green consumption, for example. Moreover, as Morris, Marzano, Dandy, & O’Brien (2012) state social science theories and models of behavioral change “attempt to isolate the key controlling factors, processes or causes of behavior” (p.3). To unveil why and how an increasing majority Han engage in and identify with the indigenous land rights activism, it is critical to investigate, track, and analyze through their locus of behavior change going
beyond the Taiwan society. Following this thinking, the review article by Morris et al. (2012) provides considerable guidance while developing a model of what I call ‘allyship pathways.’

In my model of allyship pathways, there are two phases: ‘before activation’ and ‘after activation,’ both of which are pertinent to the cognitive process of individuals, such as belief, attitude and perception. The ‘before activation’ phase is a process in which supporters experience a series of identity-shifting encounters. This process consists of a series of stages in which their identity as allies becomes ‘active.’ To track this phase, I first focus on individual narratives of belief/behavior change; therefore, the performers here are the people who are movement participants and/or supporters that will potentially become an ally. As noted, the stage models are particularly useful for understanding the different social/ cultural factors that may trigger individual choice and behavior at certain points on their life journey (Morris et al., 2012). Incorporating the concepts of the “stages of change model,” which has widely been applied in psychotherapy on people’s transition between stages when they are modifying own behavior (Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992), I categorized three stages: ‘awakening,’ ‘encountering,’ and ‘deepening’ in my model according to my data. As an illustrating example for the Figure 1, participants/supporters starting from the ‘before activation’ phase to become an ally in the indigenous land rights movement will often experience both ‘awakening’ and ‘encountering’ stage. They will have a certain level of abstract awakening (ideological change) and/or material encountering (practical change),
regardless of whether it happened before or during movements. The ‘deepening’ stage follows from an active decision to participate and precedes the commitment to allyship.

This process of staged transition is similar to the idea of conversion often used in studying people’s religious change and, consequently, is helpful in constructing my model as well, as it is focused on the ideological transformation. Normally, the conversion process happens when people’s value transform. These transformations could be activated by some predisposing conditions and/or situational contingencies, namely: social tensions, attempts at problem-solving, decision turning points, pursuits of affective bonds, and intensive interaction, etc. (Lofland & Stark, 1965). In light of the above, I indicate in my model that when participants/supporters are transitioning through each stage, their pathway is marked by these conditions and contingencies, which impact what they might later experience. Additionally, these stages might occur concurrently and/or repeatedly and are not necessarily distinct, but rather they blend into one another. The degree of allyship depends on the frequency and intensity of turning points they pass by in each stage and is more likely to be sustained “as the amount of reflection about specific behaviors or issues increases” (Morris et al., 2012, p.22).

These conditions, contingencies, and reflexive spaces are also articulated with a broader set of historical conditions and situate identity transitions in them. Clearly, social structure plays a significant role in creating potential for behavioral changes (Morris et al.,
Understanding how individual behavior, as an indicator of identity transition, articulates with the material and social contexts promotes “new routes in understanding and explaining behavior and a similarly broad range of potential responses” (Morris et al., 2012). In my study, educational reform is key to this background. In post-colonial societies, educational systems function as ideological state apparatuses that could largely construct, direct, and influence one's ideology (trans)formation. A number of scholars have explored the role of schooling and education in crafting ideas of citizenship and belonging (Banks, 2008) and other forms of identity (Kaplan & Flum, 2012). However, education can also further stimulate people to think critically, in such a way that it may inspire innovations as well foster reflection.

In post-colonial contexts where socio-political discontent and calls for justice seek to undermine colonial authority and knowledge producing system, schools of higher education become key sites for cultivating for the intellectual labor of such movements and could play an even greater role. Just as the impetus for education reformat originated in the social atmosphere of democracy, national awakening, and self-determination, educational reforms could also foster more than awareness and instead provide skills for students to confront oppression and pursue liberation in ways that create sufficient space not just for self-experience but a more complete embodiment of ideological transition. As Paulo Freire (1976/1992) points out, education becomes the “practice of freedom,” that its practice is
“an adventure in unveiling” and “will always be an experiment in bringing out the truth” (p.1). Restructuring higher education in this way flips the traditional idea of a teaching and learning environment and implements education practices beyond the classroom. Constantly, educational field sites engaged in indigenous land rights movements could rapidly motivate a diverse set of people with varying values to take actions and accelerate the decolonizing process by forging allyship possibilities.

III. BACKGROUND – HISTORY OF TAIWAN COLONIALISM, INDIGENEITY, AND EDUCATION

In this section, I review Taiwanese colonial history and highlight the connections between the politics of land and identity. In particular, I address colonial land grabs as a key issue for contemporary activism among Han and indigenous peoples. In order to explore the role of anthropology and ethnic studies on crafting pathways for supporters of indigenous land rights and indigenous representations in public discourse, I lay out how the political identity and ideology of both Han and indigenous peoples were shaped by educational reform. In what follows I aim to make it evident that identity is critical to understanding the land rights activism in Taiwan and the potential for non-indigenous allyship.

Ethnic groups in Taiwan are generally classified into four identities: Hoklo, Hakka, mainlanders, and Taiwanese indigenous peoples. The first three categories are part of a much larger ethnic majority—Han Chinese, which make up over 95% of the population.
These groups came to Taiwan through two waves of Han Chinese migration to the island. The first wave of immigration occurred in the 17th century, and was made up of the Hoklo and Hakka peoples from Southeast China. The second wave occurred when the Republic of China (ROC) government brought its bureaucratic system to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War (1945-1949). This migration was made up of a large, geographically diverse population of mainlanders. Taiwanese indigenous peoples (about 2% of general population), on the other hand, belonging to the Austronesian⁴ linguistic family group and have inhabited Taiwan for more than 5000 years (Bellwood, Fox & Tyron, 2013). Until the Han settlers and several foreign regimes came, these indigenous groups occupied all of the regions of the island. By 2014, there are 16 indigenous groups being officially recognized, and though indigenous peoples live in urban areas, they are predominantly concentrated in the sparsely populated mountain areas and eastern edge of the island.

Politically, the island has a long history of colonial occupation and political control and has greatly impacted national identity and land politics. Since 1624, Taiwan was partly or wholly colonized by the Dutch (1624-1662), the Spanish (1626-1642), the Kingdom of Tungning (1662-1683), the Qing Empire (1663-1895), the Empire of Japan (1895-1945) and the Republic of China (ROC) (1945 to the present). Over time, both Han settlers and foreign

⁴ Austronesians are peoples who speak languages of the Austronesian family. Geographically speaking, the language group covers a wide area in Oceania from Taiwan in East Asia to Madagascar, New Zealand, and Easter Island.
regimes have step by step wrested control of indigenous peoples’ “traditional territories.”

For those of the western plain, this was accomplished through treaties, missionary tutelage, and military force. In contrast with the indigenous peoples living in the central high mountain regions and eastern Taiwan, the western plain indigenous populations were culturally assimilated into dominant society. During the Qing Empire, diverse indigenous societies were categorized according to their degree of “civilization” as “barbarians/savages” (Fan番). The terminology used for indigenous peoples ranged from “shengfan (生番 raw savages)” to “huafan (化番 naturalized savages)” and “shoufan (熟番 cooked savages).” Those indigenous peoples who lived in central and eastern Taiwan remained independent from the Qing Empire, since the central high mountains acted as a natural barrier to the outsider. Since in Japanese colonial period, those plains indigenous people who could no longer be easily distinguished from the Han Chinese have been called Pingpuzu (平埔族 Plains dwelling aborigines). After the Japanese invasion in 1895, imperial authorities later in 1935 replaced the term “shengfan (raw savages)” with Takasagozoku (高砂族). The term was meant to treat the indigenous peoples as equal nationals and eliminate discrimination; however, this did not, in effect, carry out much improvement of their status. In reality, the Japanese colonial government was sowing discord between the Han majority and indigenous peoples for their own benefit. Additionally, the stereotypes and labels of indigenous have remained until today. Based on the Republic of China's legal distinction of
indigenous legislative composition, the official recognized indigenous peoples are categorized into “mountain indigenous people (山地原住民)” and “plains indigenous people (平地原住民).” These designations limit individual electoral participation to their ethnic identity rather than residence, so that indigenous can only legally elect among and for indigenous peoples’ themselves. The history of colonialism in Taiwan has profoundly influenced nation/national identity of Taiwanese people, who experienced first a Japanese national identity in the period 1895-1945 and then KMT Chinese Nationalism in the period 1945-1987. After democratization and the lifting of martial law in 1987, an alternative Taiwanese identity advocated by both elites and opposition has emerged. Yet even today, a “Taiwanese” imagined community is still being negotiated in Taiwan civil society as it confronts the principles and realities of liberal multiculturalism.

The concept of a “nation-state” was first introduced to Taiwan in the Japanese colonial period. This new political mode weakened Taiwan’s local factions from the Han majority and it was not until 1933 that the last indigenous group surrendered to the Japanese. Since that time, Taiwan has been completely dominated as a single sovereign state. The Japanese colonial government—Taiwan Sotofuku (台灣總督府), brought in the core features of Meiji Restoration. This accelerated industrialization and modernization in Japan including expanding control over land and natural resources as well as though the “education” of

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5 Taiwan Sotofuku is the highest government in Taiwan during Japanese colonial period.
Taiwanese, especially through military discipline and social ethics norms. In order to comprehensively rule Taiwan, Sotofuku made considerable effort to conduct land and cadastral surveys, censuses, and anthropological investigations of Taiwan’s local customs and practices. During the early years of Sotofuku, for example, anthropologists Ino Kanori and Torii Ryuzo investigated the Taiwan Aborigines. They devised the first academically influential overviews of Austronesian peoples in Taiwan and consequently built the paradigm for the modern classification of Taiwanese indigenous peoples. This arrangement of colonial power and knowledge in the Taiwanese contexts reflects the broader pattern of the linkages between colonialism and anthropology.

Moreover, throughout the ruling of the Japan Empire, much of the forest, minerals and other natural resources became state-owned, limiting indigenous peoples to “mountain reservations” (Simon, 2005). The Taiwan Sotofuku limited Taiwanese indigenous peoples’ traditional territories of 2 million hectares down to 24,000 hectares and resettled them, which further violently forced them to change their ways of living into a modern state system with new systems of property rights (Simon, 2005). When the Republic of China (ROC) government retreated to Taiwan in 1945, without consulting the island population, they inherited the Japanese geographic divisions as an effective apparatus in setting up its own system of territorial governance. Consequently, the Chinese Nationalist Party (also known as Kuomintang 國民黨 or KMT) government re-colonized Taiwan and Taiwan became a
one-party hegemonic state called the Republic of China (ROC). Soon after, happened the February 28th Incident (二二八事件) in 1947, in which over 20,000 people, including indigenous peoples, were massacred by the government (Simon, 2005). The outbreak of this incident reflected strong resentment towards the corrupt KMT authority and mainlanders, who saw themselves as conquerors. It then sparked off a wider purge of government opponents that marked the beginning of the White Terror, in which tens of thousands of Taiwanese were mysteriously disappeared, died or imprisoned.

In 1949, Taiwan officially entered a 38 year-long martial law period. Taiwan land issues continued to be a major subject of contention under the Republic of China, development-driven land grabs and the assertion of territorial authority (Chen, 2017). In order to consolidate its power influence and interests, the government promoted the idea of “development equal to progress,” in which their land-related policies are often favorable to economic and industrial development (Huang, Hsiao & Hsu, 2016, p.231). Early land reform policies were trumpeted as exemplar of equality and fair redistribution, which are reflected in official Taiwan history textbooks as key to Taiwan’s modernization and economic development. However, the “land reform policy and their implementation were, in actuality, riddled with inconsistencies and nepotism” (Chen, 2017, p95). Yet, it also resulted in the dissolution of the landlord class, and consequently there were no powerful private interests that could influence the government strongly. Many lands were forcibly confiscated by the
government from landholders who had retained the land ownership for generations (You, 2014). Additionally, most of them were not sufficiently compensated and some were never compensated by the government. To make matters worse, a high percentage of these disgruntled citizens chose to stay silent because of their fears of the legal and political repercussion under the White Terror atmosphere at the time. Even after Taiwan democratized in 1987, these sort of institutional oppressions still deeply impact Taiwanese identity and livelihood.

Additionally, over time, the government has fundamentally divided indigenous peoples from general administration and legislative direction of land policy. However, most citizens rarely know the reality of these divisions, primarily because they are seldom or never included in the dominant education curriculum and in social media. Yet, brutal forms of oppression that threaten the very survival of indigenous peoples have been perpetuated since the KMT regime took over Taiwan. For example, the government has primarily turned the “state-owned” lands, taken from indigenous peoples, into national parks, reservoirs, industrial zones and other spaces of development. They have extended those inherited “state-owned” lands by constantly relocating entire indigenous communities. As a result, indigenous peoples have been forced to relinquish their traditional territories, hunting grounds and ritual sites, etc, and gradually lost their culture and identity. Although the government has begun registering indigenous territories as legally recognized Aboriginal
Reserve Land (原住民保留地) since 1968, it is, in fact, simply another land expropriation being euphemistically referred to as ‘for the protection of indigenous livelihoods’ (Simon, 2005). The policy rigorously restricts indigenous peoples’ ability to sell, transfer, mortgage or rent the lands to outsiders. Yet, ironically, the government can “rent” indigenous land ceding as state property to outside commercial interests, unless indigenous people cultivate the land and sign “rental” agreements for the property in question (Simon, 2005). There remain several loopholes in the policy of Aboriginal Reserve Land, which allows outsiders to underhandedly obtain the lands over time as well. Nowadays, there are many outside entrepreneurs and “build–operate–transfer (BOT)” projects that have acquired spaces for factories, villas and recreation sites on reserve lands. In the meantime, ongoing activism aimed at indigenous transitional justice is trying to pass “The Indigenous Peoples Land and Ocean Law (原住民族土地及海域法)” and “The Indigenous Peoples Autonomous Law (原住民族自治區法);” however, there is still no consensus for the reserve land-use policy between indigenous peoples and the government.

In the 1980s, triggered by the Democracy’s Third Wave (see Huntington, 1993), protests and movements fighting against the KMT hegemony and its Greater Chinese (dazhonghua大中華) national ideology\(^6\) indoctrination surged forward, and consequently, Taiwan began

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\(^6\) This ideology is originally a geographic concept based on the inherent territory proposed by the Republic of China (ROC) government. Nowadays, it mainly refers to the places where ethnic Chinese comprise the majority of the population, such as the People's Republic of China (PRC or mainland China), the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan), Hong Kong and Macau.
moving toward a multicultural society and entering the education reform era. Lee Teng-hui’s (李登輝) presidency from 1988-2000 largely promoted the Taiwanese localization movements. This government policy direction provides communication platforms for central and local governments, and moreover sets the foundation for the future development of local community-based social movements. The concept of community development was promoted under this trend by the anthropologist Chen Chi-nan, the then-deputy chairperson of the Council for Cultural Affairs. Guided by the New Hometown Community Building Project\(^7\) (新故鄉社區營造計畫) in community development, communities and universities later recruited many students into the “new hometowns” for community service and learning. After living under the KMT propaganda for so many years, many younger Taiwanese born and raised in Taiwan started to realize how little they knew of their homeland compared to the “mainland China.” In this sense, these shifts in land and policy following democratization have been coupled with equally complex and dynamic issues surrounding identity.

Identity issues have long been a core debate amongst Taiwanese. After suffering through Japanese colonial oppression and the White Terror, it is common for Taiwanese to conceal their identity to survive. Yet, with the lifting of martial law in 1987, Taiwanese were allowed to contest this strictly controlled ideology as they faced deep structural crises.

\(^7\) “The New Hometown Community Building Project was all about using state power to encourage the public to dream and act so as to create the perfect place to live” (Ministry of Culture, 2011).
Consequently, during this period Taiwanese learned to not only become democratically self-reliant, but also increasingly vocal about their identity in civil society. In the 1990s, along with the development of Taiwan democratic practices, there were increasing calls to modify the ROC constitution. By the fourth modification in 1997, the constitution affirmed multiculturalism and rectified “indigenous people (原住民)” to “indigenous peoples (原住民族).” Additionally, the concept of “Four Ethnic Groups in Taiwan” was proposed and fostered increased pan-Hakka and pan-indigenous consciousness. Indigeneity was promoted as a strategic tool by indigenous peoples themselves during this period. The cooperation between Taiwanese elites from Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and indigenous elites have later led to the signing of the “A New Partnership between the Indigenous Peoples and the Government of Taiwan” agreement asserting that relations between the state and indigenous peoples should be “quasi nation to nation relations” during Chen Shui-bian’s presidency in 2002 (Simon, 2010). Based on this agreement, “The Indigenous Peoples Basic Law” in Taiwan has been passed in 2005, although its enforcement is rather slow and full of obstacles due to the Han-dominant bureaucracy. Simultaneously, to emphasize that Taiwanese should learn their history and view the world through “Taiwanese” values rather than from Chinese perspectives, the

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8 The Four Ethnic Groups in Taiwan refers to Hoklo, Hakka, Mainlanders and Indigenous Peoples.
9 It is a treaty-like document signed by the then-presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian in 1999. Later in 2002, President Chen Shui-bian reaffirmed this protocol, which becomes the official indigenous policy for Chen’s Government.
government promoted the concept of “concentric circles historical view”\(^{10}\) (同心圓史觀),” which has greatly influenced academia and Taiwan’s subsequent educational policies on ethnic relations curriculum. This also exemplifies the increasing tensions regarding national consciousness, identity, and the “Greater China” ideology. Many, for example, criticize Taiwanese elites from the DPP for wanting to construct a Taiwan nationalism based on Taiwanese independence. And as KMT later regained the presidency they re-asserted their Greater Chinese national ideology by proposing a number of pro-PRC policies, which has triggered the social/justice movements once more.

Even though Taiwan's educational reform faces debates and critics on sensitive identity issues and ethnic politics, the subsequent two largest student movements, Sunflower Movement (太陽花學運) (2014) launched by college students and the Anti-Black Box Curriculum Movement (反高中課綱微調運動) (2015) initiated by high school students, emerged from the controversial predicament of reforms based on liberal multiculturalism and democracy. As Taiwan's university acceptance rate has increased significantly in the past twenty years, the university system has also reformed to provide a more diverse educational environment for students. For example, the popularization of the general education curriculum, the establishment of the College of Hakka Studies, College of Indigenous Studies and Indigenous Specialized Class programs, that now spread contemporary, post-colonial

\(^{10}\) This concept is promoted by academician Tu Cheng-sheng from the Academia Sinica in the 1990s.
forms of anthropological knowledge, have spurred on broader social changes and reforms.

Recently, the “No one is the outsider (沒有人是局外人)” movement launched by indigenous activists and supported by many college students, has harshly critiqued the newly elected government for not keeping their commitment to indigenous traditional territory delineation announced in its first official apology to indigenous peoples on August 1st, 2016. This ongoing movement is using hit-and-run guerrilla-style occupation of the Ketagalan Boulevard (凱達格蘭大道) in front of the presidential office building; The activists have gathered stones from all over Taiwan to remind everyone who live on this island should not forget its land grabbing history.

Nowadays, owing to well-developed public transportation in this long and narrow island, and rapid dissemination of information among its dense population, various social movements have become a recurrent scene of unscripted performances rooted in practices dedicated to liberal multiculturalism and civic education. Led and advocated by many university professors, Han and non-Han students who are used to the traditional exam-oriented education, have been encouraged to be socially active, participate in democracy, and to think critically. Universities have become sites also for the acquisition of both colonial and post-colonial forms of anthropological knowledge and methods. As universities have emerged as key spaces for reconfiguring post-colonial, democratic Taiwanese identity politics, they have also become key to the construction of pathways of
allyship for indigenous rights movements. Therefore, civic educational field sites such as universities are gradually being constructed through activism as places of potential allyship and liberation as they provide the social space for ‘awakening’ and ‘participating’ to experiencing ‘self-reflection.’ Universities build up a learning, communication, and negotiation platform that incubates the potential pathways for future cooperation between peoples.

IV. RESEARCH SITE AND METHODOLOGY

In addressing my research questions, I have completed two months (June and July 2016) of ethnographic fieldwork in Taitung coastal areas including Taitung City, Beinan Township, and Donghe Township, where several well-known indigenous land rights movements have taken place. During my fieldwork, I conducted participant-observation by visiting and living in a few tribal communities. I focused on searching for the occurrence of demonstration and historical memories experienced by different kinds of participants and neighboring residents, observing and recording the rhetoric of activists and movement participants, and participating in some local routines, rituals, and land rights movements/activities. Additionally, I collected my data through unstructured and semi-structured open-ended interviewing focusing on personal narratives of their participation, non-participation, or resistance against the movements.
Overall, I gathered my data from both Han and indigenous locals and outside participants/supporters in order to gain a better understanding of local ideologies, political articulation, and activism. I further categorized the total number of thirty-three participants by doing stratified sampling within their age, as shown in Table 1, to understand different generations' education background and their ideology formation differences. The older generations are the people who are over 46 years old having experienced the Kuomintang (KMT) authoritarian education, while younger generations between 18-45 years old are people who entered college after the lifting of martial law. In this study, I am particularly focusing on the younger generation’s college experience in highlighting how higher education, especially anthropological education, became the catalyst for increasing the majority Han support for indigenous land rights in recent years.

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<td>Younger generation (18-45 yrs)</td>
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P /NP: Movements Participants/Non-Participants

The primary undertaking in the data analysis centered on assessing and collating themes that arose from the field notes and interviews. Its procedures included field

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11 The college experience mentioned here includes both participant's education system experiences and their college life.
note-taking, interview recording and transcribing, then coding the data with Nvivo and organizing them into themes. My overall impressions during the fieldwork serve an important role in my data analysis as well. Drawn from Smith’s work of “Decolonizing Methodologies” (2013), it states that decolonizing research “is about centering our [indigenous] concerns and world views, and then coming to know and understand theory and research from our own perspectives and for our own purposes” (p.41). From the turn of “decolonizing generation” (Allen & Jobson, 2016) onwards has emerged alternative paradigms to traditional anthropological methodologies. Being a non-indigenous and non-activist anthropology student doing research with indigenous peoples and activists in the tribal areas, I often encountered many critiques and challenges, which kept me continuously reflecting on my position and trying to “get the story right, tell the story well” (Smith, 2012).

V. RESULTS

In my results, I explore contemporary identity politics in Taiwan and more specifically, majority Han pathways to indigenous land rights movement allyship. The influences of education are illustrated by what has happened, on the whole, not only to indigenous representation and social awareness, but also to articulations of indigeneity and Han participants’ identity struggles. In the past decades, Taiwanese indigenous land rights movements have largely turned from pan-indigenous collaborations to more local grassroots
communities focused on local issues. My fieldwork data indicate that these local movements have gathered increasing numbers of supporters, regardless of ethnic groups from around Taiwan, who are neither directly vulnerable to the outcomes of these issues nor are they generally related to those who are, such as indigenous communities or NGO members. It is clear from the data that education, and more specifically anthropology and related fields, formed a critical role in conditioning their pathways to support and allyship. For future development, I further reflect on indigenous activists’ critiques of majority Han’s pathways to allyship and consider ways to extend the pathways from ‘awakening’ to ‘deepening’ stages and the role that anthropology might continue to play. Drawing on this study, I contend that the current surge of allyship in indigenous land rights movements foreshadows a new Taiwanese identity to come.

a. Overview of Han Pathways to Allyship Identification

There are several pathways that foster majority Han allyship in indigenous land rights movements. From my interview data and field notes from participant observation, these pathways are inspired by the stages of change models outlined in detail above, which consists of three key stages: 1) personal encounter, 2) personal awakening, and 3) deepening commitment.

The first stage of the pathways, which has become increasingly popular in recent years
in Taiwan, is personal ‘awakening’ (or awareness) to the social issues. Pathways in this stage could be fully cultivated in terms of education and social media in light of the concept of “imagined communities” (Anderson, 2006). Here, education and social media play key roles in transforming social organization and are complementary to each other in forming allies to various social issues. Along with the advent of the Internet generation, people show more awareness to social/political issues. As education policies in Taiwan were starting to emphasize local awareness, indigenous land rights issues are increasingly relevant and discussed more frequently. In turn, there is an increased number of majority Han support and cooperating in indigenous land rights movements. This prevailing phenomenon could largely be attributed to an ‘awakening’ civic consciousness.

The second stage, personal encounter, creates pathways for a person from their material experiences. These pathways are often affective bonding, which include friendship, marriages, and other personal connections built on common interest with indigenous peoples, such as through business and occupations, fieldtrips and field studies. Usually, these people are closely connected in their daily routine or have had either an intense personal encounter or a long-term relationship with each other. They often have built up their relation before the initiation of movements, or even advocated action. In these pathways, people gain trust from each other and build up allyship faster and more sustainably.
Although growing public awareness of social issues could lead to a wide range of effects on those issues and create temporary alliances, it has its shortcomings in maintaining a long-term allyship. Most of the time, retaining these kinds of coalitions may still need to rely on personal interests and later career connections to each social issue. In this case, it will depend on how deep the majority Han interest is to know or learn about indigenous peoples and indigeneity and support indigenous causes. People may be stimulated by the call of indigenous cultures, traveling, or rural environments, etc., that makes them encounter “authentic” indigeneity and consequently begin supporting the indigenous issues. However, because the success of public awareness largely relies on each person’s own interests, larger indigenous issues might be overlooked. Moreover, for most Han majority, it is difficult and painful to become an ally owing to the fact that they often would struggle between their self-identity while realizing themselves as an oppressor. Consequently, these paths normally are limited and unstable. People may come across many criticisms such as disrespect and ethnocentrism, and face self-identity issues recurrently in the middle of their path, which might even cause people to quit becoming an ally and limit their ability to access the second stage of ‘encounter.’

The third stage of the pathways, ‘deepening commitment,’ is in a way an evolution of the above two stages. People on these pathways are usually on their road to becoming an activist or a lifelong supporter, amid continually experiencing the ‘encountering’ and
‘awakening’ by intensive interaction with both the everyday lives of indigenous as well as the temporal limits of issue-focused activism. This cycled pathway from ‘awakening’ to ‘deepening commitment’ is critical to forging lasting and sustainable allyship and achieving decolonization.

b. Education as Catalyst for Allyship Pathways

About three-quarters (15) of the participants, whether majority Han or indigenous peoples in my fieldwork, embark on the road to supporting and/or cooperating in indigenous land rights movements for at least an education-related reason. Organized from my fieldwork data, the kickoffs pertinent to education are: majoring in related disciplines; taking related selected courses; attending related lectures, salons/forums and activities; joining related student clubs and educational camps, etc. Furthermore, these participants are mostly higher educated and/or working in education-related professions. Yet, because education is a highly structured social field, it is also critical to unpack the historical connections between colonialism, education, and anthropology. In doing so, we can contextualize allyship pathways in the historical production of indigenous representation through educational experience.

Most of the Han participants were not aware of or had not encountered indigenous peoples or cultures before college. Some of them shyly noted that “Before college,
‘indigenous people’ in my mind was very stereotypical, black skin and alcoholic,” and “By learning from the textbook, it seems that they are a special group of people who lived in the ancient period, and are already being assimilated.” While genetics are responsible for skin pigment, exposure to the sun is more responsible for dark skin. Some indigenous groups' skin color are in fact lighter than Han Chinese; however, indigenous people are generally stereotypically assumed to have darker skin in representing their “backwardness” or belonging to a lower labor class that works in the sun. Furthermore, drinking was never an essential feature of indigenous culture in terms of the everyday lives. Wine is being sacredly used for ritual or as a representation of kindness to others in indigenous society, but it is being stereotypically assumed by Han society that indigenous people are alcoholic. These kinds of racist stereotypes images remain deeply held in many Taiwanese minds partly because compulsory education has indirectly strengthened them. Activists calculated that there were only three hours regarding indigenous peoples during the total compulsory 128 hours of high school history class (Mata • Taiwan, 2015). Much like Native Americans, Taiwanese indigenous peoples are usually categorized in the pre-historical section of the curriculum, which only discusses their archaeological connection, regional distribution, and some distinguishing cultural characteristics. The culmination of this systemic racism is that these public stereotypes make many indigenous people choose to hide their identity in a Han-dominated society.
However, beyond high school, college was a turning point of life for many movement participants. It is common that many Han participants’ ‘awakening’ and ‘encountering’ stages happened when they went to college. Though the younger generation in Taiwan grew up in the education reform era, they still struggle against the conservative test-oriented compulsory education system and in that sense, college becomes a liberating space. In general, the higher education system is at the front line of social reform where the younger generation is encouraged and empowered by faculty and educators to become leaders and to right wrongs, erase inequalities and secure the future of our society. Because of this shift in university education, younger generations are more aware of the necessity of education in a liberal multicultural society.

Like many younger generations of activists around the world, their ‘awakenings’ happen mainly in college, from where they acquire knowledge and experience of indigenous cultures both in the classroom and outside of it. They may be enlightened from course work and/or peer groups, which are the most common resources on campus. The participants frequently declared that during their college years, “I’ve attended many social issue lectures,” in-class or on campus. In particular, some of the participants mentioned experience ‘awakenings’ by joining the school indigenous clubs to learn about indigenous issues. One of them shared, “even though I’m not an official member, just participating in their club meetings I learned lots of indigenous current issues and made indigenous friends,” while
another participant pointed out, “our club will organize learning trips to the tribes from time to time.” These indigenous clubs in the university are not only a social club but also a study group as well. They regularly bring up current local/global indigenous issues to discuss during their club meetings. Moreover, these clubs often attract many urban indigenous people, who grow up in the Han dominated society and thus are not familiar with their own culture, or have just discovered their indigenous identity. Occasionally, resembling anthropological fieldwork methodology, these clubs will arrange some tribal visit to collect oral histories, interact with the elders to learn traditional knowledge, or discuss the current issues at stake with the tribe, etc. Consequently, these university clubs have united to form a strong frontline for indigenous youth activism. Additionally, some students might have experiences with school charity and volunteer services at the tribes for health care, tutoring, and daycares, etc. For example, one of them told me, “I have once joined a volunteer service for indigenous tribes, and then I realized that rather than ‘helping’ them, I’ve learned more from them.” Despite most of these services portraying indigenous peoples as the “people in need”, students have clearly been impacted by these experiences whether through cultural learning, activism, or reflections on the indigenous representation. Thus, as depicted above, it clearly demonstrates that college, as a critical site, could not only stimulate the ‘awakening’ but also ‘encountering.’
Student activism also included the experience of representing or drawing awareness to indigenous issues openly at (non-indigenous) student club meetings, salons or forums for social issues; writing blogs sharing their reflections on indigeneity or indigenous realization; broadcasting information through social media like Facebook to mobilize more friends to become aware of indigenous issues, etc., and in some cases, frontline activism in protest on campus and/or cross-campus. These students come from diverse backgrounds. Some of them identify as indigenous or Han, while others might have lost their identity through colonial history, such as the Pingpuzu descendants and urban indigenous people, which are still struggling and debating about self-recognition. For Han students, immersion in indigenous activism can also trigger peoples’ self-reflection and thus cause some participants to feel a paradox of intimacy and encounter their own identity struggles. This phenomenon reveals that closeness illuminates distance, in which people may more clearly see differences and feel more like an outsider rather than less. For example, many Han participants will constantly reflect on whether and how indigenous groups accept them, such that they can determine how deeply they could get involved with the group activities, while simultaneously struggling with their identity as an ethnic Han. Nonetheless, as I will depict in the case studies shortly, many students have already put one foot into indigenous activism and continue their road on “deepening” pathways for allyship.
c. Case Studies

In my case studies, I draw attention to those Han majority participants who have experienced educational reforms in their pathways to allyship. While discovering how to become aware of indigenous issues and encountered indigeneity, these Han supporters are frequently fine-tuning their position to situate their identity. Depicted below are four examples of Han majority supporters in the indigenous land rights movements. Exploring how they embarked on their journey on the allyship pathways will concretely illustrate their potential to become an ally.

The first case of John demonstrates the transformation from a Greater Chinese ideology focused education to multicultural liberalism. John’s experiences convey elements of ‘awakening’ and ‘encountering,’ though his portrayals of indigenous are also problematic reflecting part of the paradox of intimacy and the difficulties of ‘deepening’ allyship.

John

John was born in the 1980s during late martial law period. During his early teens, he did not learn much about Taiwanese history and geography; instead, he learned about “mainland China.” Regarding this education, he states, “they [the KMT government and education system] work very hard to separate us from our land.” From the lifting of martial law in 1987 onwards, Taiwanese society was freed from political taboos as
liberalization fostered the development of democracy. Soon after John entered college, he began to revise his thinking. Following the promotion of “localization” by the government, John joined school hiking clubs to learn more about the diversity of Taiwan’s peoples and places and began traveling around Taiwan. In contrast, he had rarely visited the countryside before college, as he has lived in his urban hometown for decades. While hiking around Taiwan, he visited many communities and tribes and talked to local people to explore local history that he never learned from “the textbook.” Overall, his impression of indigenous communities was of peaceful, quiet, and quaint “tribes” that are not savage and backwards as the textbook portrayed (image 1). Instead, indigenous peoples offered him customary hospitality and kindness as a way of honoring interpersonal relationships and visitors. He listened to indigenous elders sharing their old tribal life and talking about how they lost their land and how children left them for the city to search for a better income rather than living in remote villages. He sighed noting that these stories make him reflect on himself as a Taiwanese who barely knew what has happened in his own country. He noted being ashamed of his own ignorance and that he felt sorry for being a Han Chinese. Right now, he is a schoolteacher engaging in teaching public school for more than 10 years. Although he teaches science, he often shares his ‘encounters’ of indigenous peoples with his students. He believes that people living on this land should know their own history and
have the right to tell their own stories. He continuously hikes and joins volunteers and social movements to maintain his support for social justice. He also acts as a messenger teaching multiculturalism to a new generation and continues to stay aware of new discourses of indigenous movements, especially recent recurring “return our land” movements, regarding the issues of the huge gap between the recognition of indigenous land rights and its implementation.

Image 1: The illustrations appearing in an elementary curriculum depicted the “Wu Feng” legend, which was once popular in the Japanese colonial period and KMT ruling period until 1989. It spread the savage and backwards images of indigenous peoples, who maintained “horrifying” headhunting practices until a charismatic government official named Wu Feng (吳鳳) sacrificed himself educating the indigenous peoples to give up headhunting practices forever.

Even though multicultural liberalism is a widely held value in contemporary society and included in the education-reformed process, the education system in Taiwan remains bureaucratically conservative in a test-oriented educational environment. In Mia’s case, I demonstrate how the conflicts between the old and new education system influences the potential for self-reflection in new generations and that allyship requires wrestling with
Mia was born after the lifting of martial law. She grew up in a multicultural, multiracial, democratic, liberal society. However, she states that she used to have a very stereotypical view of indigenous peoples. Before college, she thought indigenous peoples all had darker skin and lived in the mountains and she reported being frequently mistaken as indigenous due to her darker skin and large eyes. She admitted that she actually could not recall any other indigenous images or impressions she would have learned during high school, since “it seldom correlates with achieving high scores on tests.” Her high school years were tedious due to the 14 hour-long school day and test-oriented class work. There was not much time for her to explore what she liked or wanted, not to mention caring for social issues. After entering university as a student in the College of Indigenous Studies, she quickly became aware of the complex nature of identity and her own Han Chinese identity, which she never contemplated before. For example, she mentioned that her indigenous friends seem very clear about their own ancestry, while she never thought about her ethnicity or family tree. The awareness of the ethnic and cultural differences makes Mia reflect more on her self-identity. Among school courses, Mia said she enjoys cultural anthropology, sociology, social psychology, etc. Although she did not find them useful at the time, they inspired her in some ways.
and made her pay attention and become more sensitive to social issues, particularly indigenous issues. Amid numerous indigenous classmates in a multi-ethnic college, she sensed the power shifting dynamics, in which she was a minority in terms of the class population there. She admitted that she sometimes felt awkward and uncertain of her position when discussing some indigenous issues with her indigenous classmates. For example, when talking of the indigenous land right movements, she mentioned that she supports the Anti-Nuclear Waste more than the Anti-Meiliwan (反美麗灣 Movement protesting the Beautiful Bay Resort). While both issues relate to local indigenous land rights, in contrast to the localized Anti-Meiliwan case, the Anti-Nuclear Waste is already a nationwide issue in Taiwan, which Mia said she feels more comfortable in supporting a topic that has already reached a certain consensus. In other words, the Anti-Nuclear waste movement has a low bar for participation and support. For Mia, local indigenous movements emphasize her feeling as an outsider and make her feel awkward for being neither a local nor an indigenous person. She often has problems finding her position in local indigenous land rights movements, which are entangled with locals, activists, and institutional power dynamics. In short, Mia is sort of an idealist supporting the indigenous land rights movement but is limited in her engagement. She has been convinced that social justice is a primary value to pursue, but she sees herself outside of these activism conflicts. She might not be an active,
vocal advocate, but she is one of the potential supporters that will stand up when needed.

While it is common to see people like Mia restrain their impulses, it illustrates that the shared values of multicultural liberalism and multicultural education are deeply engrained in the minds of young people. Zoe's case shows how she put institutional knowledge into activist practice in constructing communication and negotiation platforms for the issues currently being discussed. However, even though Zoe was able to move beyond her Han majority identity, upon graduation she encountered distractions that prevented her from continuing as an engaged activist and ally.

Zoe

Zoe also grew up in the education reform era like Mia, though she had a different high school life. Led by her class advisor, she joined the scouts club during high school, and participated in several social charity/volunteer activities, such as the “World Vision Taiwan 30 Hour Famine.” These favorable experiences in high school clubs made her later actively participate in various college student groups. However, she emphasized that, before college, she was never aware of any social issues through her own initiative, and barely knew about indigenous peoples and their cultures. Until then, she thought indigenous people were a special group of people that had already been assimilated and do not exist anymore as indigenous peoples are always mentioned in the
pre-history part of the textbook. She recalled that she actually had some indigenous classmates in high school, but they never mentioned their identity in public.

Later, Zoe attended university becoming one of the students in the College of Indigenous Studies. Similar to Mia, Zoe immediately recognized herself as ethnic Han, and felt herself as a minority in the college. Yet, she was extremely motivated and engaged deeply with the practical courses that included field trips to the tribes and/or arranged activities and displays during the semester. She likes to put knowledge into practice. In doing so, she reinforced her organizing ability to arrange several issues-focused activities. In addition to that, she states that critical thinking skills are the most important learning outcome for her higher education. She says that critical thinking intuitively becomes a common practice in her daily life. In her sophomore year, Zoe became a member of the Student Rights Section of the University Student Council. She helped arrange several university events, such as “Lunch with the university president,” and later cooperated with some students from other departments hosting social-issue-based activities on campus. It turns out that more and more students became aware of these activities promoted by her group. Following the support of professors, the university has a space dedicated to a social issue salon, which is held on a regular basis. During these salons, “various groups of people who care about different social issues will gather at the place, making friends, sharing information, and learning
different perspectives.”

Off campus, there are many cafés cooperating with NGOs that provide platforms for the social issues salon as well. Zoe highlights that these information platforms help her think more thoroughly about the issues. These platforms provide extended stages for academic discussions, in which the professionals, activists and locals give speeches and raise new issues. These allow Zoe to learn more about the topic and understand other people’s perspectives. She states, “I try my best to understand their background before taking action.” In addition, she participated in several social movements, such as the Sunflower Movement, the Anti-Nuclear Movements, the Anti-Meiliwan Movements, and some other local anti-BOT movements. However, after graduating, she says there is not much free time for her to participate in a movement anymore. She said she had skipped classes to join in a movement before but right now, it is hardly possible for her to skip her work as she needs to support herself. Meanwhile, she has built social networks with those who also participate in activism, using social media, such as Facebook, to constantly trace the social issues. She says she might join those salons and social movements once again when her job is more stable.

These communication and learning platforms provide a space to combine professional, academic knowledge with strategic activism. And although these platforms gather supporters easily, the alliances are created through assumptions of coherent aims, goals,
and understandings regarding indigeneity. However, as with John, Mia, and to some extent Zoe, there are underlying dynamics that result in a temporary or disjunctive allyship. In other words, their pathways have been constrained or limited by factors preventing them from deepening their allyship. In the following case of Ava, I highlight again the struggles Han majorities experience bridging their allyship to the ‘deepening’ stage which is key to fostering a more sustainable allyship that privileges indigenous peoples.

Ava

Like Mia and Zoe, Ava was also born after the lifting of martial law and grew up in the education reform era. She recalled her very first ‘awakening’ to a key social issue in her last year of high school. Ironically, her ‘awakening’ originated from a personal experience regarding a conflict between her father and grandfather on a state development project. Her father supported this state development, because it could raise the land value; however, her grandfather stood up and fought for his farmland. She points out, “although my father grew up there, he is no longer living there, and did not make his living out of farming; therefore, he sees the land as a symbol of money.” Although later she did not put much of her attention on this issue due to lengthy and tedious high school work, she retained her awareness during her gap year vacation to Taitung, which is the site of a development project—The Meiliwan Resort, one of the famous indigenous land rights issues in Taitung. While she was in Taitung for the
indigenous harvest festivals as a tourist, she wanted to learn more about this project. Luckily, she met activists of the movement during her traveling; however, she did not have a good impression of it. The activists judged her for being too young and too naïve, and questioned her intention of wanting to know about indigenous perspectives on the project. The unpleasant situation she met is like an anthropologist meeting a gatekeeper in the field who is very suspicious of outsiders. This experience had a marked impact on her, because she sensed the tension and wrestling between insiders and outsiders. Starting her sophomore year, she had the chance to attend several classes within the Indigenous Specialized Class program in her university. From that time onwards, she paid close attention to indigenous issues. Since the program is designed for indigenous students, she learned about various cultural values and languages.

Ava mentioned one of the classes that inspired her most was to take a class at a local Amis tribe. Once a week they spent an afternoon with the tribe, joining in their daily routines and, in effect, practicing the traditional knowledge with the tribal elders. She described, “we sometimes do not have any particular learning plans, just participating and we were able to learn a lot from their daily routines: working together to build something, going out for gathering, cooking dishes, making clothes for harvest festival. ...That is living, that is life! ...The whole tribe treats us more like family.” Since
then, she constantly travels to different indigenous communities in Taiwan alone or with friends and participates in some of the indigenous movements. She recalled that there was one time she was able to help her activist friend with some documenting work and entered the court with some tribal people who were sued because of protesting. She said it was a sad experience, she felt awful. “It felt like your whole identity has been deprived. The feeling was one of being violated. ...They did not treat you like a person but more like a file. It feels like you are already in jail. I felt so shocked by the scene that it even made me cry.”

At the end, she mentioned that this is her fourth year coming back to Taitung for harvest festivals; however, she is still struggling with her tourist identity. She does not deny that she was sometimes jealous of her indigenous friends for their identity. Their appearance, names, bond with relatives, and common cultural behavior help them gain trust and get involved easily. Reflecting on her own identity, she noted, “I cannot deny that I am Han and I grew up in a different cultural background.” Although she is now friends with many of the locals, indigenous peoples, and activists, she often feels like an outsider. Sometimes, indigenous people will use stereotypes to make an ironic remark such as “you know we indigenous people love to drink, why didn’t you bring beer?” In addition, she said that every tribe has faced different issues, even though they are all Amis, and the relations and power dynamics between them are even more complex.
than expected. Despite being accepted as one of the age-set group members in an Amis tribe\textsuperscript{12}, Ava mentioned that sometimes she still feels very self-aware like an outsider. Frequently, she is fully aware of insiders’ critiques and fears that it will be hard and risky to get involved, which takes time and effort. Ava recently graduated from college, and she is searching for a job now. However, she mentioned she would continue doing her best to keep in touch and get involved within the indigenous circle and the locals, as well as their activism. She believes that action could speak louder than words.

These four cases exemplify the different ways that allyship pathway articulates with higher education, multiculturalism, and liberal reforms. Each of these cases also concretely demonstrates how multicultural values are being experienced and shared by the younger generation through the college experience and how those experiences shape their awareness of colonialism, localization, and indigenism. Yet, as we also see, not every participant progresses through all three stages, with some of them reaching only the ‘awakening’ or ‘encountering’ stage, while others appear to be primed to move into deepening their allyships and to confront barriers and limitations. A particularly important barrier seems to occur while encountering indigenous people themselves. Here students bring their abstract, conceptual awareness of indigeneity formulated primarily through

\textsuperscript{12} The age-set system and matrilineal kinship organization are two main characteristics of Amis communities. Amis communities are mainly centralized villages. The age-set organization was indeed an important political organization for the operation of traditional Amis communities. In this organization, the elders are endowed with political powers by the tribe. It can be said that the Amis is an elder-respecting society (Digital Museum of Taiwan Indigenous People, n.d.).
anthropological training into material and communicative encounters with actual indigenous peoples who may challenge these potential allies’ perceptions, images, and ideas of indigeneity. Overcoming this obstacle is key to both deepening allyship and the critical decolonization necessary for more just outcomes.

Even though there is growing sociopolitical attention to indigenous rights and the promotion of liberal multiculturalism, many majority Han have a positive though problematic view of indigenous peoples and cultures, especially younger Taiwanese, who see indigeneity as a more “authentic” and “sustainable” lifestyle. During my fieldwork in Taitung, I heard people comment that visiting indigenous communities “is like traveling abroad, experiencing different living values, feeling myself as a human again.” They often mentioned that indigenous communities are “unlike other rural places in Taiwan, the tribe has a slower pace of living.” In addition, they noted, “because of its slow pace lifestyle, I have more time to reflect on myself.” Furthermore, for some people with wanderlust, “the tribal community is a place full of music and art, rich in its culture,” for them to enjoy a relaxed lifestyle and to spend their time “meaningfully.” Contrasting indigenous lifestyle with the crowded, noisy, fast-paced urban life, some other people further pointed out that they think, “indigenous peoples seem to live in a more sustainable way. ...They seem to have a stronger community, combined with their traditional culture system. People will help each other in the community.” However, these idyllic descriptions are simply reworkings of the
old stereotypes that indigenous people living in remote areas were “uncivilized” akin to the “noble savage” trope of Native Americans. It remains a colonial way of thinking by describing indigenous communities as utopias or places of recreational or therapeutic bliss. These sorts of representational architectures echo key tenants of modern leftist ideology by counterpoising rural idylls as anti-capitalist forms of resistance.

The other component of this allyship barrier is the increasing awareness of a majority, non-indigenous ethnic identity as Han and the lack of a core national identity as Taiwanese. Another Han participant mentioned that the root cause of these chaotic values could originate from Taiwan's education system and bureaucratic system under its long-term colonial status and ideological control. He notes that Taiwan imported almost every knowledge-building system from foreign countries, and there is a loss of curiosity about historical identity:

“...People do not support, and do not agree [even] with ourselves. ...Taiwan has come to the point of self-flagellation. ...This kind of self-identity problem is very deep and serious. It is so deep that many people do not even care to take time to know themselves. If you do not see your self-identity clearly, then, it is very hard... [to change anything]!”

It is critical that allies contend with and overcome this paradox of intimacy. In other word,
for majority Han, the conundrum that as potential allies increase their interaction with and support for indigenous peoples, they become increasingly self-aware and must wrestle with their own identity issues. For some, this creates a sense of distance as Mia, Zoe, and Ava experienced. Moreover, it creates additional threats to indigenous support. For example, as majority Han wrestle with identity issues they encounter division with themselves as well. Scholars, for instance, think that over 85 percent of Taiwanese are descendants of the Pingpu or non-Mainlanders (Liu, 201). This complicates Taiwanese identity issues as the intertwining context of Taiwan’s colonial history and international political tension between China, majority Han, especially descendants of the Pingpu, may divert from and consume the indigeneity concept for their identity and political purposes as well. As I demonstrated in the previous sections, many Han participants ‘awaken’ to reflect their identity during the pathways to allyship.

d. Indigenous Perspective and Critiques on Han Majority Allies

Ally experiences are produced through institutional knowledge, strategic activism, local reality, and self-reflection. Ally-based activism is also a process comprised of meanings-in-action (Blee, 2012), in which ideological discourses operate through practical action and becomes a source of representational politics itself. Meaning-making by activists through this process unveils the shifting power of who has the right to speak and represent the movement. It is this struggle over representation that often brings up tensions among
people that may deepen their paradox of intimacy. As I will elucidate in the following, the hegemonic essentializing portrayals of indigeneity produced and distributed by colonial regimes cultivates a disjuncture in representation where stereotypes, images, and ideological structures do not match local perceptions of indigeneity. These portrayals at times can superficially forge alliances created through the assumption of coherence of meanings in the context of Taiwan as well as produce a kind of disjunctive allyship in which allies and indigenous peoples fundamentally disagree about the meaning of indigeneity.

Liberal multiculturalism and indigeneity concepts in Taiwan have been politically, legally and culturally constructed through anthropological expertise and knowledge and have been absorbed by the public through government policy, promotion and action. Yet, in many ways, these concepts do not necessarily adhere to indigenous perceptions of themselves or their own cultures and lifeways. Many indigenous activists whose interviews as part of this research severely criticized anthropological knowledge and indigenous representations, which they feel often have strengthened stereotypes of indigenous peoples and perpetuated the colonial relations of oppression. The unbalanced power/knowledge shifting between institutional knowledge, strategic activism and local reality is the main reason behind this irritating failure. While ethnic studies and anthropology educate students under the shared values of liberal multiculturalism, the practical value of that learning is viewed as largely superficial, static, and without substance. Many public indigenous representations are highly
essentialist and decontextualized. As one of the indigenous elder points out, “the higher you have been educated, the further you are away from the tribal reality.” Many politically correct concepts conveyed in the education system remain essentially doctrinal instead of reflecting lived realities. Overwhelmed by this educational dilemma, one indigenous activist denounces academia as one of the culprits:

“It is really nonsense that academia keeps talking of ‘indigenous subjectivity.’ …I think Taiwan should abolish these so-called ethnic studies. Originally, Taiwanese indigenous peoples did not have the concepts of ‘ethnic groups.’ It was not until the Japanese colonial period that anthropologists developed the concept. Then, scholars said they are going to use this concept to distinguish identity or nationality. ...What is the meaning of being educated? Is there still a meaning for education? Have they ever asked the tribe if it is better like that? I will say there is no difference between scholars, governments, and nations.”

Here the activist highlights that Taiwan’s education has made indigenous peoples into “issues” rather than living human, as objects of study rather than as dynamic, self-determining, political actors in their own right.

From indigenous activist perspectives, the best allyship for local activism is strategy-based and simply “down to earth.” On the one hand, some tribes that remain
solidly connected focus on self-reliance and tend to decline external assistance. They mentioned that the tribal consciousness awakening process is essential for claiming their collective land rights. This attitude de-centers allyship making it secondary to tribal empowerment. There is also division and diversity within indigenous communities which is rarely captured or perceived by non-indigenous. In realistic circumstances, many local indigenous people believe that large tourism development projects could promote local business and increase incomes and might help young indigenous people who are seeking opportunities in the big cities, to come back home. These tribes intend to stand up by themselves before any outsiders who try to obscure their claim, though many also appreciate the vigorous support from the outside. They realize that, in order to fight for their rights under the state system, some expertise would be required though many of them are reticent about “help” from outsiders. They prefer rediscovering their own traditional mechanism in fighting for themselves. As one indigenous activist said:

“We can acquire knowledge ourselves. Sometimes this is even faster and more efficient. ... We do not need experts to tell us what to do. We should not rely on them.”

Indigenous activists, though varying from person to person, also seem rather conservative while talking about young Han supporter participation in their movements. Overall, many indigenous activists see the phenomenon of increasing Han support as a trend that is simply “fashionable” – a kind of virtue signaling – rather that a pathway to robust support in the
long term. Some activists are very critical of this phenomenon which they thought might become a dominant ideology guiding public perception of indigenous social movements and thereby deepen ignorance of and bias toward indigeneity: in other words, a continuation of colonial hegemony. They denounce people who tend to blindly follow the crowd, and disregard local indigenous voices once again. Many participants perceive these protesting sites as simply another recreational Facebook Check-in place.

The activism that I saw during my fieldwork clearly revealed the connections between representational politics and shifting strategies of activism in the movements. Local grass-root activists tend to perform direct activism focusing on local issues, while the activism industry often emphasizes the broader social awareness of the public to support and spread social justice and human rights. Anthropologist and other experts often serve a bridging, translation function between local struggles and broader social movements, and though this “translation” is critical to creating alliances, it also hides the potential for a kind of disjunctive allyship whereby non-indigenous and indigenous, though fighting for the “same thing,” fundamentally misunderstand the goals, intentions, and desires at the heart of political struggle. These disjunctures of representation emerge when the power relations are imbalanced and as people tend to simplify both knowledge of self and the other, in order to make social reality more comprehensible and actionable. Yet, this too can become a barrier as evidence by the case studies describe above.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The contemporary politics of ethnic and cultural identity in Taiwan have deep roots in an oppressive colonial past and articulate with a range of current geopolitical realities. From the 1980s onwards, a broad social commitment to multiculturalism, forged in the gradual democratization and localization of post-colonial Taiwanese society, has increased people’s awareness of social issues and brought indigenous rights to the fore. Yet, intensive land development projects by the government during the past decade have exacerbated processes of land dispossession, especially on “indigenous traditional territories”. The result of this entanglement of multiculturalism and land-based social movements has been an increasing commitment from young majority Han to support indigenous land rights movements.

To unpack these controversial indigenous-settler relationships, I have explored the potential pathways and possibilities of non-indigenous allyship as a step to thinking about a future imagined community beyond colonialism and multiculturalism. Yet, “being an ally means more than just offering our support to aboriginal peoples’ struggles—it means making changes in our own lives” (Vernon, 2010, p.290). This thesis has tracked the transformation of Han participants through the three stages of allyship from ‘awakening,’ ‘encountering,’ and, in rare cases, to ‘deepening.’ Considering the post-colonial social context, I draw attention to the influences of anthropological education and knowledge,
which increasingly leads young students to experience a transformation from ignorance to awareness and encounter. Some also may be on the path to ‘deepening,’ the key stage to an effective and sustainable decolonizing process and allyship. But this is complex. By digging through the roots of allyship, Han majority perceptions of indigeneity and indigenous peoples’ critique of Han allyship highlights the tense politics surrounding the (re)negotiation of identity boundaries. Han for instance stereotypically perceive indigeneity through so-called authentic indigenous representations, while the indigeneity concept already strategically acts as a tool for indigenous peoples to promote their own interests and create alliances internationally. Yet, at the same time, indigenous also reject the “authenticity trap” while Han struggle with their own identities and the disjuncture created by experiencing the reality of indigenous lives. Despite the unsure performances of identity and uneven indigenous experiences amid the sociocultural and the political entanglements, each layer of the indigenous land rights movement critically represents the articulation and re-articulation of post-colonial power/knowledge, and thus to some extent, it sheds light on the future potential of allyship from different scales.

While focusing on the participants rather than the activities of movements, this paper primarily depicts the participants’ starting and turning points of their ideological decolonization and pre-alliance practices, much of which occurs during college. Following participants along these pathways, there are a few conclusions we can reach about the
constraints and barriers to effective and sustainable allyship. As I set “education” as my angle of analysis, I emphasize the experience and importance of participants’ ‘awakening’ stage since it affects the potential for most people to become consciously aware of social justice and movement goals and activities. However, education could also strengthen the assumption of coherence for peoples’ representations that eventually lead to what I call disjunctive allyship – where ally representations of indigeneity do not match the realities of indigenous lives or desires. In reality, although education could rapidly aggregate the most supporters in the ‘awakening’ stage, its influence as an abstract commitment declines as participants reach ‘encounter’ and ‘deepening’ stages, in which participants tend to support particular acts but not broader systematic goals (see Graph 2). There are plenty of reasons for people to dropout from allyship pathways, while short-term allyship still largely depends on supporters’ interests related to a specific act, longer-term allyship depends on a broader web of connections attached to everyday life, such as friendships, marriages, and other consistent, meaningful interactions. And though Taiwanese peoples continue to searching for a vision of living together, becoming an ally must go beyond just recognition and coexistence (Neyeu, 2010). As indicated by Jones & Jenkins (2008), rather than trying to learn “about” the other, the essence of collaboration is to learn “from” the other. Consequently, extending to the formation of active alliances, it is critical not only to examine the possibilities and directions of systematic transformation, but to explore deeply
participants’ routine practices of supporting and interaction to forge visions of sustainable cooperation.

Clearly, Taiwanese people, whether Han, indigenous or otherwise, hold different ideas and perspectives about their common homeland, and they dream and pursue diverse kinds of mutual futures. Yet, in 2016, for the first time in Taiwanese history, the first female President Tsai Ing-Wen (蔡英文) formally apologized to all Taiwanese indigenous peoples for the past four centuries of “pain and mistreatment” on Indigenous Peoples Day (Tsai, 2016). Though this apology is critiqued as a reproduction of colonialism by some indigenous activists who have expected more than policy and are demanding the nation’s recognition of their presence through a call for an equal or “nation-to-nation” dialogue, President Tsai gives out a vision of future Taiwan:

“I call upon our entire society to come together and get to know our history, get to know our land, and get to know the cultures of our many ethnic peoples. Let us work
towards reconciliation, a shared existence and shared prosperity, and a new future for Taiwan” (Tsai, 2016).

Around six months after the apology, in 2017, a new land rights movement—“No one is the outsider”—once again unveiled the tensions between the government and indigenous peoples as it draws public's attention to the hegemonic portrayals of indigeneity and the colonial histories of misrepresentation and dispossession, even though civil society, municipalities, and communities across Taiwan continue to actively (re)negotiate and reconcile both land claims and identity concerns.

Although there is still no consensus on defining this “New Taiwan,” and lots of Taiwanese still debate the legitimacy of the ROC constitution, the recent call for transitional justice in Taiwan might be an opportunity for Taiwanese to decolonize institutions and ultimately the state. However, as the research described here demonstrates, decolonization requires struggles not just over laws and policies but also within ourselves as we pursue more effective and sustainable forms of allyship. In that space, the institutional reforms with education and more targeted educational practices that prepare students and future activist to wrestle with the barriers and constraints to a deeper form of allyship could configure a mutually shared and just future.
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