I, Kyle Helms, hereby submit this original work as part of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classics.

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Student's name: Kyle Helms

This work and its defense approved by:

Committee chair: Daniel Markovic, Ph.D.
Committee member: Duncan MacRae, Ph.D.
Committee member: Peter Van Minnen, Ph.D.
Masters of Eloquence and Masters of Empire: Quintilian in Context

A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Classics of the College of Arts and Sciences by

Kyle Helms

A.A. Santa Fe Community College
B.A. University of Florida
M.A. University of Iowa
M.A. University of Cincinnati

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Committee Chair: Daniel Marković, Ph.D.
Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the curious situation of the Latin rhetor Marcus Fabius Quintilianus (b. ca. 35 CE). In the early 70s CE, Quintilian received an annual *salarium* of 100,000 HS from the emperor Vespasian. As a result, Quintilian is commonly cited in classical scholarship as Rome’s “first public professor of rhetoric” or “first state professor.” But while this feature of Quintilian’s biography is often repeated, it is seldom explained. Essentially, previous scholarship has offered two interpretations of Quintilian’s situation, either creating a genealogy for public higher education in the first century CE, or emphasizing imperial euergetism and *liberalitas*. While the latter approach is on the right track, it does not explain why a Latin rhetor in particular should have been the object of such benevolence, and nearly all scholarship on the topic emphasizes the novelty of Quintilian’s situation, but without sustained inquiry into historical precedents. This study reconsiders this problem by examining the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power diachronically, beginning with the advent of Latin rhetors in the 90s BCE and concluding with Quintilian himself. I advance the *status quaestionis* with two central arguments. First, I argue that Quintilian’s situation was conditioned by over 150 years of close connections between Latin rhetors and Rome’s governing aristocracy. Second, I argue that the advocates of Latin rhetoric successfully positioned their discipline to appeal to Rome’s ruling elite by constructing a justificatory narrative that claimed that technical rhetoric was crucial for political success and civic flourishing. These arguments combine to provide a more complete and contextualized account of Quintilian’s relationship with Vespasian and the accompanying
salarium, and they correct previous interpretations by emphasizing the reciprocity involved in this connection. Methodologically eclectic, I integrate close readings of Cicero’s *rhetorica* and Quintilian’s *Institutio* with prosopographical analyses that uncover dense networks of connections between rhetorical educators and Rome’s rulers. This project thus contributes to a new phase in the history of rhetoric, focused less on cataloging rules and tropes, and more on seeing rhetoric as a social and cultural phenomenon embedded in a particular historical context. Taking a broader perspective, this study reveals how rhetoric in this period positioned itself as the master discipline for Rome’s masters.
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Abbreviations

Ancient authors and works

Ancient authors and works are abbreviated according to the OLD and LSJ, except for the following.

Aphth. = Aphthonius

Prog. = Progymnasmata (Patillon 2008)

Arist. = Aristotle

Protr. = Protrepticus (Düring 1961)

Auson. = Ausonius

Works cited according to abbreviations in Green 1991, lii.

CTh = Theodosiani libri xvi (Mommsen and Meyer 1905)

Dig. = Digesta (Mommsen and Krüger 1868–1870)

DMai. = Ps. Quintilian, Declamationes maiores (Håkanson 1982)

Fortunat. = Consultus Fortunatianus

Ars = Ars Rhetorica (Calboli Montefusco 1979)

Fronto (van den Hout 1988)

ad M. Caes = Epistularum ad M. Caesarem et Invicem libri

ad Ver. Imp. = Epistularum ad Verum Imperatorem Aurelium Caesarem libri

GL = Grammatici Latini (Keil 1855–1923)

HA Pius = Scriptores Historiae Augustae: Iuli Capitolini Antoninus Pius (Hohl 1927)
Scholarly corpora, instrumenta, and reference works

Standard scholarly corpora, instrumenta, and reference works are cited according to Hornblower and Spawforth, eds. 2012. The Oxford Classical Dictionary. 4th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press = OCD^4—except for those listed below. Papyrological editions are cited according to the Checklist (see http://papyri.info/docs/checklist), though I cite Herculaneum papyri as PHerc. The bibliography in the back matter includes full citations of all articles, monographs, and edited collections referenced.


Introduction: The Strange Case of Quintilian

Sometime after April 71 CE, the Roman emperor Vespasian established an annual “salary” (salarium) of 100,000 HS for Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, the premier Latin rhetor at Rome. Our sources tell us that this was the first time that a Roman emperor provided a rhetorical educator with a salarium.¹ Quintilian’s connection to Vespasian and his related emolument combine to form one of the most repeated highlights of Quintilian’s biography. The following remarks, drawn from standard histories and handbooks, are illustrative (all emphases mine):

Quintilian war der erste öffentliche Lehrer der Rhetorik und erhielt als solcher aus dem Fiskus eine Besoldung. (Schanz-Hosius 2:745)

He was a man of wealth and influence, favoured by the ruling dynasty, and probably the first to obtain a state chair of Latin rhetoric (Vesp. 18). (Goodyear 1982, 674)

His teaching was very successful… so much so that in 78 [sic] Vespasian appointed him the first state professor, with an annual salary of a hundred thousand sesterces. (Conte 1994, 512)

¹ These sources are discussed at length below on pp. 235–244.
Jugé comme le meilleur représentant de l’art oratoire, il est choisi par Vespasien lorsque celui-ci décide d’instituer deux chaires publiques d’éloquence, l’une de langue latine, l’autre de langue grecque, chaires rétribuées sur le trésor publique. (Grimal 1994, 436)

One feature of it [Vespasian’s reforms following his ascension] was the appointment of Quintilian to a chair of rhetoric supported by the state treasury, the first such appointment ever made. (Kennedy 1994, 177)

He returned to his homeland and, in 68, followed Galba, governor of Hispania Tarracoensis, back to Rome. There he would teach for twenty years as the first professor of rhetoric paid by the state. (von Albrecht 1997, 2:1254)

Investi de l’Empire en 68, Galba l’emmène avec lui à Rome où il enseigne pendant vingt ans, premier à qui l’État, en l’occurrence Vespasien, offrait un traitement officiel. (Laurens 2014, 411)

As this parade of passages reveals, Quintilian’s salarium from Vespasian has been an eye-catching detail, and one not to be passed over when summarizing his life.² Here, Quintilian’s situation is presented as something quite novel, and although he belongs to the first century ce, these passages also give an impression of familiarity. Public chairs of rhetoric and state professorships, after all, sound like common institutions in the modern

² For another sample of such passages, see Kraus 2014, 126–27.
Western world—all the more surprising to find such a thing in ancient Rome, nearly two thousand years ago. Quintilian’s situation, in short, seems remarkable.

However, although this detail is commonly cited, it is seldom explained. But why do we find Vespasian associating with Quintilian and establishing a salarium? Answering this question is the goal of the present study. Previous works devoted to understanding Quintilian’s situation are rare, particularly in English. There has never been a monograph-length treatment of the problem, although, as will become evident from the discussion below, this seems to be needed in order to more fully understand this state of affairs. Yet, while previous studies have not been many, those that do exist have played a significant role in conditioning the argument that I advance in these chapters. Accordingly, while I situate my arguments within the relevant scholarship in each chapter, an outline of the status quaestionis can be offered here.

Essentially, interpretations of Quintilian’s situation can be divided into two camps. On the one hand, there has been a modernizing group that sees in Quintilian’s salarium the genealogy of educational institutions familiar to the modern West. Such an interpretation is powerfully presented, for example, in the opening of Corrado Barbagallo’s 1911 Lo stato e l’istruzione pubblica nell’ impero romano, which, though neither about rhetoric nor Quintilian, is perhaps the closest thing to a monograph on the topic. Barbagallo seeks to demonstrate that “l’istruzione pubblica in Europa è tutta creazione italica.” In the same vein, one can place John W. H. Walden’s 1909 The Universities of Ancient Greece, in which Quintilian’s “appointment to the Latin chair” is briefly considered in his chapter entitled “Establishment of University Education in

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3 On this scholarship, see further discussion in §4.3.2 below.
4 Barbagallo 1911, 5.
The lingering effects of such approaches are, I believe, manifest in the acclamations of Quintilian as the first ever “state professor” and the first to hold a “state chair” of Latin rhetoric that is so common in standard treatments of Quintilian’s life, like those quoted above.

A development of this approach seeks to explain Vespasian’s action as part of a calculated policy designed to develop human capital. According to this view, this was a subsidy for higher education that aimed to produce an efficient civil service, practical administrators for Vespasian’s empire. The germ of this idea seems traceable to Rudolf Herzog’s 1935 publication of an inscription from Pergamon. Herzog believed that this inscription preserved Vespasian’s “Magna Charta für Hochschulen,” a “Freibrief der antiken Universitäten.” In the influential diachronic “Vorgeschichte” that he included with his study of the inscription, Herzog argued that rhetors like Quintilian provided a certain utilitas publica. Though Herzog himself seems to have believed that the utilitas publica of teachers of artes liberales, like rhetors, amounted to an educational program that promoted civilized conduct towards others and political virtue, in the Nachleben of his study the phrase utilitas publica has been interpreted quite differently. Within a decade of Herzog’s publication, Mario Attilio Levi and M. St. A. Woodside had expanded his utilitas and found in Herzog support for interpreting Vespasian’s salarium as part of a broader policy of economic development and investment in human capital.

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5 Walden 1909, 81.  
7 See in Herzog’s reconstruction of lines *7–9 of the inscription, together with his commentary on pp. 985–86. Again, Herzog and his work are discussed further below in §4.3.2 and §4.3.3.1. The appropriateness and meaning of artes liberales in the early Roman Empire has been the subject of considerable inquiry and debate since Herzog: see Christes 1975; Hadot 2005; Shanzer 2005.
after the decadent finale of the Julio-Claudians and the turmoil of 68–69 CE. George Kennedy, in his standard 1972 *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, presented this interpretation for an audience well beyond specialists in Flavian cultural policy. In a similar vein, Johannes Christes, author of “the most serious attempt to come to grips with the problem of the place and function of education in Roman society,” writes on this issue of the emperor’s interest “an der Ausbildung einer qualifizierten Beamtenchaft.”

But not all interpretations have sought to make this situation seem so modern and familiar. An alternative camp has emerged that puts greater emphasis on the ancient contexts of Vespasian’s grant to Quintilian. This began with Henri-Irénée Marrou’s masterful 1948 *Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité*. Marrou argued that imperial actions towards educators, like the case of Quintilian, should be interpreted as part of the emperor’s role as an “évergète.” Marrou was, in fact, one of the first scholars to use the term to describe the behavior characteristic of Greek and Roman aristocrats including Hellenistic kings to Roman emperors, now commonly referred to as “euergetism.” For Marrou, “l’empereur comme évergète,” was not trying to control the operation of some public service, but was acting as a private benefactor and patron. More recently, Konrad Vössing, in a series of works beginning with his 1997 *Schule und Bildung im Nordafrika*

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10 The characterization of Christes’s work is from Wallace-Hadrill 1983, 29 n. 4, discussing Christes 1975. For the latter quotation, see Christes 1988, 72. Note that the education of a bureaucracy may be more valid as an imperial motive for a later period of antiquity, beyond the scope of the present study: see Kaster 1988, 225 with n. 115 (including further references). Kaster notes that modern accounts emphasize this aspect to a much greater extent than ancient sources, and that the first reference to such a motive is from the sixth century CE. On the relationship between Greek rhetorical education and public office in Late Antiquity, see Cribiore 2007, 225–28 and 2009, 240–45.
11 See Marrou 1948, 404–5.
12 For the history of the term, see Veyne 1976, 20, 165 n. 7.
der römischen Kaiserzeit, has provided an update to Marrou’s euergetism interpretation, which stands as the best current explanation for the phenomenon considered in this study.\textsuperscript{13} Vössing combines strong—and compelling, to my mind—arguments against modernizing interpretations with a development of Marrou’s euergetism model, arguing that such imperial actions like Vespasian’s grant should be seen in the tradition of imperial liberalitas, as an ideologically motivated display of the emperor’s εὐεργεσία. Quintilian’s salarium, in this view, was not about an educational policy, or the development of human capital. It was about the emperor himself. This was a demonstration of the emperor’s virtues, legitimizing his benevolent rule while influencing public opinion. On this view, the emperor, supreme euergetist, gave all sorts of things: bread, circuses, a salarium for a rhetor, etc.

Such, then, are the two main kinds of interpretation of Quintilian’s salarium from Vespasian that have hitherto appeared in secondary literature.\textsuperscript{14} The Marrou-Vössing euergetism model will be further discussed in §4.3.2 below. Although I believe that there is much to admire in this explanation, I see two lingering and significant problems with this status quaestionis. First, the euergetism model, as presented by Vössing, is one-sided: it tries to explain a relationship between an emperor and a rhetor by focusing entirely on the actions of the emperor. There is no attempt to explain why a Latin rhetor, like Quintilian, should have become a deserving beneficiary of such imperial liberalitas, and there is no agency on the other side of the relationship, no reciprocity corresponding to the salarium. The second major problem points towards my solution to the first: in


\textsuperscript{14} Note also Kaster 1988, 224–25, who, like Vössing and Marrou, doubts that salaria for educators are goal-directed in the way that the modernizing and rationalizing camp suggests. Believing, instead, that such grants are more likely ad hoc and ad hominem, Kaster might be included with the Marrou-Vössing group, though he does not mention euergetism.
nearly all discussions of Quintilian’s situation and the *salarium*, whether in general treatments from handbooks such as those cited above, or in more specialized studies, the novelty of the support Quintilian received from Vespasian is always emphasized, but claims of newness and unconventionality are never really accompanied by a serious attempt to investigate possible antecedents. However, without understanding the context in which Quintilian’s case appeared, and without understanding the other side of the relationship, that is, what a Latin rhetor could have been doing to merit an imperial *salarium*, it must be admitted that our current understanding of the situation is, in fact, very limited.

In the following chapters, I remedy this situation by undertaking a diachronic study of what I believe lies at the heart of the problem, namely, the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power, starting with the advent of Latin rhetors at Rome in the 90s BCE, and concluding with the case of Quintilian and the Flavians. I argue that Quintilian’s situation was conditioned by two factors. First, I argue that there was a sustained, close relationship between Latin rhetorical educators and the members of the Roman governing aristocracy. This began, I argue, at the advent of Latin rhetorical education in the 90s BCE, and continued after Rome’s transition to empire. The relationship between Quintilian and Vespasian in the 70s CE was neither unique nor particularly innovative, but rather another instantiation of a relationship that had, by that time, over 150-years-worth of precedents. Quintilian’s connection to Vespasian was a continuation of what preceded. Second, I argue that the advocates of Latin rhetoric developed a justificatory narrative to support their discipline. This narrative successfully articulated that rhetoric was useful for the men who ruled Rome due to its ability to foster
political success and civic stability. Latin rhetors thus made their discipline appealing to the men who ruled Rome. The first argument fills in a gap left by earlier studies, where Quintilian’s novelty is highlighted without a sufficient understanding of the historical background that led to such a close connection between a rhetor and an emperor in the first place. The second argument, the justificatory narrative, provides a more complete picture of the relationship that had only been half-explained by the current euergetism model, by revealing how Latin rhetors made a case for their discipline to Rome’s masters. I argue that these two threads enable us to achieve a more complete understanding of Quintilian’s connections to political power under the Flavians and help explain why Vespasian provided Quintilian with a *salarium*.

Before turning to an outline of the chapters that advance this argument, some preliminary remarks are in order, explaining terminology, scope, and methodology. First: terminology. In the paragraph above, I characterized the present work as a study of “the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power.” This is a phrase that will be used a number of times throughout this study. It is a kind of convenient shorthand, but not intended to mislead or confuse readers, and so it is parsed here. By “Latin rhetorical education,” I mean the discipline of technical rhetoric, originally Greek, now rendered in Latin, and, especially, the men who taught this discipline, that is, Latin rhetors. With this group I also include some devotees of Latin rhetoric, who may not have self-identified as *rhetors*, but who were otherwise engaged in promoting the discipline. By “Roman political power” I intend the men who took part in ruling Rome and its empire. Under the Republic, this group was populated by propertied oligarchs and magnates who vied for a share of political power. As Rome transitioned to
empire, political power became centered around the *princeps*. But this does not necessarily mean that power is entirely monopolized: it still needs to be distributed across a group of governing elites, and across a vast empire. Ronald Syme’s observations from *The Roman Revolution* remain worth bearing in mind: “A democracy cannot rule an empire. Neither can one man, though empire may appear to presuppose monarchy. *There is always an oligarchy somewhere, open or concealed*” (emphasis mine).\(^{15}\) So the focus here will be predominately on the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power through their embodiment in actual Latin rhetors and various governing oligarchs.

Next: scope and limitations. Chronologically, the study is bookended by the beginning of Latin rhetorical education at Rome, *ca.* 93 BCE, and Quintilian’s career, ending roughly with the Flavian dynasty, *ca.* 96 CE. The earlier date is necessary because of my commitment to the importance of historical perspective for demonstrating the extent to which Quintilian’s relationship with Vespasian built from earlier relationships between politically powerful figures at Rome and Latin rhetors. As for the chronological endpoint, there is certainly material belonging to later periods of the empire that also speaks to the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power—Fronto and the Antonines, for example, or Marcus Victorinus and Constantius. But, while including such material here would be useful for assessing the legacy of Quintilian’s connection to Vespasian, I think it would do less to help us understand that particular case. As a result, Quintilian marks the end point.

Two additional limits are that this study is focused on Latin—not Greek—rhetorical education, and that it concentrates almost exclusively on Rome. The separation

\(^{15}\) Syme 1939, 346.
of Latin from Greek rhetorical education may seem, *prima facie*, to be artificial. Many Romans, after all, will have pursued eloquence in both languages, and, in fact, the occasional Greek sophist will appear in the second-half of this study. Further, as the quote from Pierre Grimal above mentions, we have evidence that Vespasian in fact created two *salaria*: one for a Latin rhetor and one for a Greek sophist. But this study is not able to be a history of ancient rhetoric *in toto*. Rather, the goal throughout is a new understanding of Quintilian’s particular situation, and Quintilian was a Latin rhetor. In fact, in addition to Latin rhetors and Greek sophists, other technical specialists also received *salaria* from Roman emperors at various times: grammarians, doctors, and architects, for example. But each one of these disciplines, I think, is likely to have had its own particular history of interactions with Rome’s governing elite. And I do not doubt that comparisons between these would be revealing. But focusing on one discipline at a time has, I believe, the virtue of allowing for a more detailed examination of a particular case. Accordingly, the focus here is on Quintilian’s own discipline, Latin rhetoric. The concentration on Rome to some extent follows the same logic. With Latin rhetors in the spotlight, there is little reason to include, for example, the Greek East. Furthermore, the relationship between Quintilian and Vespasian pairs the most illustrious Latin rhetor of his day alongside the most powerful man in the empire. Though there were Latin rhetors teaching and working in other cities in the Latin West, the figures that will be most comparable to Quintilian and Vespasian are the ones that tend to gravitate around the City.

Finally: methodology. One could try to answer the question “Why do we find Vespasian associating with Quintilian and establishing a *sarium*?” in a number of ways.
The manner in which I have approached the question in this study has been driven predominately by two factors: the particular issues that I flagged as deficiencies in current answers to the question, and the nature of the surviving evidence that I think can be plausibly used to produce a more complete answer. Regarding the shortcomings of current accounts of Quintilian’s situation, I was struck, on the one hand, by the lack of historical perspective for the relationship between the rhetor and Vespasian, and the overwhelming emphasis on the novelty of this situation. As a result, it seemed to me reasonable to investigate whether and how Latin rhetors prior to Quintilian had been connected to political power at Rome. Prosopography seemed to me to offer a natural way to investigate such questions, and this mode of research thus forms one thread of the current study.¹⁶ There is no agreed upon definition for “prosopography.”²⁷ Still, Averil Cameron’s summary should be uncontroversial:

Prosopography—‘writing about individuals’, or ‘the recording of persons’—is one methodology which gathers and digests information about the individual persons who are attested in a particular historical period; as well as uncovering specific careers and relationships, it may also provide a tool for the broader detection of historical trends. (Cameron 2003, xiii)

¹⁶ For prosopography as a method of analysis for Roman history, see Eck 2010; the various studies in Eck 1993; Eck 2002; and Eck 2003. For a broader historical view, see the collected essays in Keats-Rohan 2007, with Barnes 2007a; Horster 2007 therein specifically on applications to Roman history; Horster 2007, 231 n. 1 contains further references to discussions of prosopography and its application to Roman historical topics.

¹⁷ On the history of the word and the concept, see Barnes 2007b..
As uncovering relationships and detecting broader historical trends is precisely what is called for here, the method fits the question. To be clear, prosopographical studies come in a variety of forms. Proper prosopographies are research tools: lists of names, dates, offices, family and political connections, uniformly organized and designed to be consulted by a researcher looking to answer a question about a particular population. Such works range from monumental tools for ancient historians such as the *Prosopographia imperii Romani* or the *Prosopography of the Later Roman Empire*, to works focused on a particular work or author, such as G. V. Sumner’s *The Orators in Cicero’s Brutus*, or Debra Nail’s *The People of Plato.* A prosopography of this kind for Latin rhetors does not exist, nor does the present study fill this gap, as Robert Kaster’s *Guardians of Language* provided a prosopography of grammarians to support his studies of the social situation of these educators in late antiquity. But although I do not here provide a prosopographical dataset, I have nevertheless worked *prosopographically*, studying people, connections, families, and careers to illuminate a particular population, Latin rhetors, along the specific axis of their relationship with Roman political power. I have not presented this material exhaustively, but as required to help clarify Quintilian’s situation.

That this has been possible at all bring us to the second factor that has driven my method, namely, the nature of the evidence. Our ancient sources for Latin rhetorical education *ca. 93 BCE–96 CE* needed to contain enough information about Latin rhetors and their connections to make such an approach feasible—and fortunately this is the case. For example, Suetonius’s *de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* provides crucial information for

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the earliest generation of Latin rhetors, while the elder Seneca’s *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores* offers a wealth of evidence for the Augustan and Tiberian periods.\(^\text{20}\) In the chapters below, particularly in chapters one, three, and four, I present the results of my prosopographical investigations, in order to provide the historical perspective hitherto missing but nevertheless important for understanding Quintilian’s relationship with Vespasian. A final comment on the choice to include prosopographical research in this study: there are a variety of significant and successful precedents for using prosopography to understand Roman intellectual figures in their social settings. Studies such as G. W. Bowersock’s *Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire*, C. P. Jones’s *Plutarch and Rome*, Kaster’s *Guardians of Language*, and Peter White’s *Promised Verse*, to take three prominent examples, have embraced prosopographical methods with considerable success.\(^\text{21}\) What is novel about the present study is the application of this method to Quintilian’s situation, and to Latin rhetors at Rome.

Yet prosopography is not be the only methodology that I use here. While the ability to demonstrate that there was a history of connectedness between Latin rhetors and Roman political power prior to Quintilian and Vespasian allows for considerable gains, prosopography does not do much to explain what it was about Latin rhetoric in particular that made it so appealing to men like Vespasian. As mentioned above, the second thread in my argument contends that the advocates of Latin rhetoric justified their discipline by arguing that technical rhetoric offered Rome’s rulers the means of political success. This is a topic for which prosopography offers less help. Accordingly, here I turn

\(^{\text{20}}\) Echavarren 2007b (going well beyond Bornecque 1902, 137–201) has provided a useful prosopographical resource for exploring the people in the elder Seneca’s anthology, but does little analysis beyond onomastics. See further below in §3.1.

to close readings of Latin literary texts that I believe contribute to answering the question of the discipline’s usefulness for Rome’s governing aristocracy. These texts include Cicero’s *de Inventione* and the anonymous *Rhetorica ad Herennium* in chapter one, Cicero’s *de Inventione, de Oratore, Brutus*, and *Orator* in chapter two, Seneca’s *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores* in chapter three, and Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* in chapter four. As part of this thread of my argument, I offer exegeses of select passages in which these authors advance arguments on rhetoric’s behalf. Instead of treating these passages as inconsequentia epideictic exercises, I read these arguments as offering valid explanatory accounts that, following Laurent Pernot’s research on the effects of epideictic rhetoric, had the power to influence the values of society. Again, the question suggests the method, and the available evidence is amenable.

The four chapters that follow are organized chronologically. Chapters one through three each advance part of the main argument, while setting up the concluding, fourth chapter, on Quintilian. Chapter one, “The Beginnings of Latin Rhetorical Education,” focuses on the advent of Latin rhetors at Rome. In the face of the standard view that Latin rhetoric was met with serious resistance and opposition from the governing aristocracy in its earliest period, I argue that there is significant evidence for the contrary view, and that the close relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power began already in the earliest period of the discipline. §1.1 introduces the Latin rhetors known to have been active in the first generation of the discipline at Rome, and tries to reconstruct what their curriculum might have included. This material serves partially also as an introduction to the discipline as a whole, since issues of curriculum will for the most part play a minor role in the three chapters that follow. I suggest that the evidence

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22 Pernot 1993.
points to these early-period Latin rhetors recreating the Greek τέχνη as a Roman *ars* that targeted their particularly Roman audience. §1.2 considers, briefly, the main piece of evidence for the resistance interpretation, namely, the edict of the censors in 92 BCE. I argue that, regardless of the significance of this controversial piece of evidence, the edict should not be allowed to dominate accounts of Latin rhetorical education for this period, and in §1.3 I demonstrate that there already exists evidence for Rome’s governing aristocracy embracing the new discipline during the Republic.

In chapter two I turn to the justificatory narrative that supported technical rhetoric as the critical discipline for political success and civic stability. In “Cicero, *Eloquentia*, and Justifying Rhetoric in the Republic,” I argue that Cicero, adapting the already existing Greek model, created this narrative as a means of providing a theoretical justification for the study of technical rhetoric at Rome. While studies of Cicero’s philosophical works have increasingly demonstrated how and why Cicero wanted to add this Greek discipline to the Roman “cultural arsenal,” there has not been much attempt to examine Cicero’s *rhetorica* from the same perspective.²³ I begin by briefly introducing (§2.1) the works of Cicero that are the focus of this chapter (*de Inventione*, *de Oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator*). Next, I introduce the particular term, *eloquentia*, that Cicero uses most in his arguments to make rhetoric suitable for Rome’s ruling elite (§2.2), part of a lexical strategy that underpins his justificatory narrative. Next, I turn to Cicero’s arguments for rhetoric’s place at Rome. I argue that Cicero first formed this argument in his youthful *de Inventione* (§2.3), and that he reasserted this justificatory narrative in his later, more mature *oratorii libri* (§2.4). §2.5 points to the sustained influence of Cicero’s

²³ “Cultural arsenal” from Baraz 2012, 97.
arguments about rhetoric’s political utility, and how his particular mode of argumentation—chiefly epideictic—might have brought about such an outcome.

Thus, the first two chapters combine to suggest that Latin rhetorical education was already connected to political power under the Republic. Precedents for Quintilian and Vespasian already existed in this early period, and an argument had already been developed that articulated rhetoric’s usefulness for the members of Rome’s governing elite. But the Republic was, of course, a different political situation from the empire. Having seen that Latin rhetorical education had found a place within the *mores* of Rome’s governing elite before the fall of the Republic, was rhetoric able to keep that position when the political conditions at Rome changed? Did this relationship survive the “revolution”? Chapter three argues for continuity by focusing on a little-studied author and work, the elder’s Seneca’s anthology of declamation, *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores*. Here, by means of intensive prosopographical analysis, I pick up the thread first introduced in §1.3 to demonstrate that there were abundant connections between Latin rhetors and the governing aristocracy under Augustus and Tiberius. The evidence reveals that Latin rhetors had not lost their audience, but rather had become part of court life under the early empire. §3.1 introduces Seneca, his work, and the changed nature of political power under the Principate. §3.2.1 then demonstrates how Seneca’s anthology evinces Augustus’s connections to Latin rhetors, together with other members of the aristocracy, and further connections between Rome’s governing oligarchs and Latin rhetors are revealed in §3.2.2 to confirm this picture. The result reveals that Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power continued to go hand-in-hand under the empire, and many of the connections uncovered in this chapter help
elucidate Quintilian’s situation in chapter four. Along the way, I dispel some prominent misunderstandings about the social significance of Latin declamation in this period. My conclusion (§3.3) points to the significance of these findings, while considering what it was about Latin rhetorical education that made it so valuable to the governing aristocracy in this period—looking again toward themes prominent in Cicero’s the justificatory narrative.

The fourth and final chapter then turns to Quintilian. In “Quintilian in Context,” I show how the two threads pursued in chapters one through three help provide a more complete understanding of Quintilian’s connection to Vespasian and the related salarium. After introducing Quintilian and his *Institutio Oratoria* (§4.1), I start with the prosopographical thread (§4.2). By studying Quintilian’s known connections to the governing aristocracy under the Flavians and by comparing these with earlier instantiations of the relationships between Latin rhetors and political power, I demonstrate that Quintilian’s relationships with political power under the Flavians show no radical departure from what preceded, but continue a pattern of such relationships going back to the Republic; frequent claims about the novelty of Quintilian’s situation should, therefore, be qualified. But there was, of course, something new in Quintilian’s involvement with Vespasian, namely the salarium. This is my focus in §4.3. After discussing the evidence for the salarium (§4.3.1), I consider current explanations (§4.3.2) and argue that the euergetism model, while in many ways appealing, is, as it stands, incomplete. Not only does this explanation have little to say as to why the liberalitas of an emperor should have been directed towards a Latin rhetor, but it also fails to take into account the importance of the fact that what Quintilian received was a salarium. Rather
than being some form of arbitrary largesse, I demonstrate that imperial *salaria* were most commonly held by equestrian *procuratores* and others who provided some useful service for the emperor. The fact that Quintilian received a *salarium* is significant, I argue, because it suggests that there is a notion of *reciprocity* at play in the relationship between the rhetor and Vespasian. The question then becomes a matter of understanding why Vespasian might have thought a Latin rhetor was providing some useful service for Rome. And here (§4.3.3) I pick up the second thread of this study, by examining how Quintilian recreates the justificatory narrative for rhetoric, arguing for rhetoric’s utility for the rulers of Rome and civic flourishing. Quintilian’s *Institutio* reveals that the narrative first articulated by Cicero was alive and well under the Flavians. Seeing these two threads together in this chapter helps advance our understanding of Quintilian’s situation. Quintilian and Vespasian’s relationship was conditioned by over 150 years of close connections between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power; the *salarium* was remuneration for an activity that, as Quintilian and his predecessors had emphasized, provided the means for political success and civic stability.

A brief conclusion points towards some of the broader implications of the study, focusing on the social distribution of knowledge at Rome and the *Nachleben* of the combination of institutionalized rhetorical education, power, and politics.
Chapter 1: The Beginning of Latin Rhetorical Education

Latin rhetorical education emerged in the Republic. Accordingly, to understand the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power, it is important to establish a baseline in this formative period. Writing in the early second century CE, the scholar Suetonius, in his *de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus* (hereafter *DGR*), argued that Latin rhetoric had a difficult beginning at Rome. To support his claim, Suetonius cited a censorial edict of 92 BCE.\(^1\) Suetonius’s use of this edict in his emphasis on difficult beginnings has exerted a strong influence on subsequent accounts of Latin rhetorical education and its relationship with the governing aristocracy in this period. Thus, Jean-Michel David, for example, comments on the advent of Latin rhetorical education that “the aristocracy that governed the city could not accept the establishment of such a system of instruction… Their reaction was very hostile.”\(^2\) This perceived hostility towards Latin rhetorical education subsequently casts a long shadow on interpretations of this relationship in later periods. In what is probably the most comprehensive history of Roman rhetoric, George Kennedy writes, regarding Flavian support for rhetorical education, that “the Roman state had taken 163 years to move from an official policy of trying to prevent the teaching of Latin rhetoric to subsidy of it.”\(^3\) But

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\(^1\) *DGR* 25.1–2. Hereafter, all dates in the present chapter are BCE unless otherwise noted.

\(^2\) David 2006, 432. Cf., e.g., David 1979, 163 (aristocracy rejects the students of early-period rhetors); David 1992, 15 (aristocracy not interested in early-period rhetors and their schools).

\(^3\) Kennedy 1972, 489; cf. Gruen 1990, 190–91. Not all treatments of this material are as strong on the censors representing an official policy against rhetorical education (cf. the treatment in Bonner 1977, 65–75), but nevertheless Kennedy’s account remains standard and influential.
was Rome’s governing aristocracy really so hostile towards Latin rhetorical education in the Republic? Did Latin rhetorical education face a difficult beginning?

This chapter focuses on the beginning of Latin rhetorical education at Rome and the Latin rhetors who introduced this discipline. I argue that, contrary to notions of resistance, hostility, or state-sponsored attempts at prevention, the evidence rather suggests that Latin rhetorical education did not face significant practical opposition, but seems to have been rapidly embraced by members of Rome’s ruling elite. The first part of the chapter (§1.1) sets the stage. Following introductory material about the period and one of our chief sources for the early years of Latin rhetorical education, I introduce five rhetors who belonged to this formative period, and who were actively teaching between 93 and the 40s. I also attempt to provide a reconstruction of the curriculum that these “early-period” rhetors offered. Next, I turn to the reactions to these new educators and their new form of education, in two parts. In §1.2, I discuss the edict of the censors of 92, which forms the basis for the “resistance interpretation” that tries to drive a wedge between Roman political power and Latin rhetorical education. Though the edict remains a notorious historical crux, I argue that the edict should not be used as evidence for the widespread rejection of Latin rhetorical education by the governing elite. On the one hand, the peculiar nature of censorial regimen morum ought to discourage such generalization and, on the other hand, the edict also contains implicit evidence for the popularity of such education. This opens the way for §1.3, where I explore the personal connections of these early Latin rhetors in order to show that the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power was far from hostile. The new discipline seems to have been rapidly embraced by the members of Rome’s ruling classes, and
Latin rhetors both taught the scions of the Republic and assisted in the public lives of its more mature political actors. As I argue in chapter three and in §4.2 below, these connections formed the beginning of a sustained relationship. The result is a new baseline: already in this early period, Latin rhetorical education appears to have gone hand in hand with Roman political power. §1.4 summarizes the conclusions of this chapter and looks forward to chapter two. §1.5 is an appendix on the social status of the early Latin rhetors that supports the arguments advanced in §1.1 and §1.2.

§1.1 The introduction of Latin rhetorical education in the Late Republic

Latin rhetoric began to be taught at Rome in 93, entering the final decades of the Republic. As this context is important for understanding the reception of Latin rhetorical education, it is worth considering at least the general features of this political climate, so far as they relate to our purposes. The political culture of the Republic featured a propertied aristocracy that engaged in a fierce competition among its own ranks. This competition was, at times, pacified around a common “consensus” that the competitors’ merit depended on the degree to which they added to Rome’s majesty, served the res publica and the populus Romanus, and that ancestral exempla were models for proper conduct and behavior (mos maiorum). The members of this political elite vied against one another along a number of axes, including but not limited to martial success, family

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4 For a bibliographic guide to the beginnings of rhetoric at Rome, see Suerbaum in HLL 1:547–52 (= §191.2).
5 The overview of Republican politics given here is based on, e.g., Hölkeskamp 1993 and 2010 (both for competition; pp. 98–106 in the latter for “consensus”) and Rosenstein 2006 (for the values that supported the competition). See also North 2006, 273–76 for more on recent debate regarding the Republican political system.
A Roman orator could, for example, address civic concerns in public assemblies or before the senate. He also might speak in Rome’s courts, home to forensic oratory. Here, there was ample opportunity, for example, to win a reputation through successful advocacy in a cause célèbre, to support others and thereby make further alliances and advance one’s own interests, or to publically debilitate a potential political rival by means of this “ritualized combat.”

The discipline that entered this context, Latin rhetoric, was itself an adaption of Greek technical rhetoric (ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη). Greek rhetoric had been taught at Rome starting in the second century, but evidently in a quite limited capacity. Beginning in 93, however, teachers calling themselves Latin rhetors (Latini rhetores) began to teach eager Romans the technical system that had been developed by the Greeks, now in the Latin language (variously rendered ars, artificium, ratio, or studium dicendi, ars rhetorica, rhetorice, or even eloquentia). Before examining how exactly this change in Rome’s educational climate was received, the present section examines who these new teachers were, and what exactly they were teaching. Regarding the identity of these earliest teachers of Latin rhetoric, our knowledge is limited to five individuals in what I refer to as the “early period.” Four of these men are presented among the “illustrious teachers” of rhetoric chronicled by Suetonius in DGR; the fifth was a grammarian who also taught

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6 For the role of speech in Republican political life, see generally Fantham 1997, 111–22; cf. David 2006. See also the recent collection of essays in Steel and van der Blom 2013.
7 On the significance of forensic oratory, note also remarks in Connolly 2007, 233.
8 “Ritualized combat” in Rosenstein 2006, 368.
10 The emergence of the Latin rhetors evidently came in the year preceding the issue of the edict: see Cic. de Or. 3.93 (hoc biennio) with Leeman-Pinkster ad loc. = 3:310.
rhetoric, and is treated in an earlier section of Suetonius’s work.\textsuperscript{11} Suetonius’s \textit{DGR} also provides an important starting point for investigating their curriculum, though in my investigation of this topic, additional ancient evidence will also be examined. Still, given the significance of Suetonius and his text for the present chapter, the man and his work should be introduced just briefly before turning to the Latin rhetors and their curriculum.

Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus was an equestrian and scholar, of uncertain origin, who was born \textit{ca.} 70 CE.\textsuperscript{12} A protégé of the younger Pliny, Suetonius held a number of positions in the imperial secretariat under Trajan and Hadrian: \textit{a studiis}, \textit{a bibliothecis}, and \textit{ab epistulis}.\textsuperscript{13} Suetonius is probably most famous today for his \textit{de Caesarum Vita libri octo}, but he wrote a variety of other learned works, collected in his \textit{Pratum de Rebus Variis}.\textsuperscript{14} Among these was a stretch, \textit{de Viris Illustribus}, covering the lives of famous poets, orators, grammarians, rhetors, historians, and philosophers. From this group, a few lives of poets survive, including a substantial portion of the section known as \textit{de Grammaticis et Rhetoribus}.\textsuperscript{15} This was written probably between \textit{ca.} 107 and \textit{ca.} 118 CE, and includes brief accounts of the most famous grammarians and rhetors that taught, mostly at Rome, between \textit{ca.} 100 BCE up to the Flavian period. Each group of teachers preceded by a short history of their discipline at Rome. Lives of all twenty of the grammarians treated by Suetonius have survived. For the rhetors, only the first four lives of an original set of fifteen have survived transmission, though some traces of lost

\textsuperscript{11} Suet. \textit{DGR} 25.6: \textit{illustres professores}; his accounts of these individuals appears in \textit{DGR} 26–29 and add \textit{DGR} 7 for the grammarian who also taught rhetoric, with 25.4–5 on curriculum. All discussed further below.
\textsuperscript{12} For Suetonius’s life, I have relied on \textit{PIR}\textsuperscript{2} S 959; \textit{BNP} s.v. “Suetonius” 2 (Sallmann); Wallace-Hadrill 1983, 2–8 (see p. 3 n. 4 for further bibliography on the date of his birth).
\textsuperscript{13} On such positions, see further in chapter four below.
\textsuperscript{14} The nature and organization of the \textit{Pratum} is a complex problem: see Schmidt 1991.
\textsuperscript{15} On the \textit{DGR}, see the magisterial introduction in Kaster 1995, xxi–lviii.
portions can be found in Jerome’s translation and expansion of Eusebius’s *Chronicon*. There was very little precedent, in either Greek or Roman literary traditions, for a work with a similar focus prior to Suetonius’s *DGR*. Although brief, and although seriously truncated by transmission in the case of the rhetors, the *DGR* will be a touchstone throughout the present chapter, and will also be important in subsequent chapters of this study. And Suetonius’s pages provide the most substantial collection of information about the earliest Latin rhetors at Rome.

The earliest known Latin rhetor is Lucius Plotius Gallus, probably born *ca.* 120–115 and certainly active in the 90s, at the very emergence of Latin rhetorical education. The same is quite possibly also true for Manius Otacilius Pitholaus, the next rhetor treated in Suetonius’s *DGR*. Gallus was the most prominent among the first Latin rhetors. In addition to his teaching activities, he is cited for his connection to Gaius Marius, whose exploits Gallus celebrated, perhaps in verse. Gallus seems to have still been a well-known figure in 62. The next known rhetor, Pitholaus, had been a slave prior to teaching rhetoric. His manumission, Suetonius tells us, was directly related to his natural talent and his study of literary topics. Like Gallus, Pitholaus was also connected to a significant general, being the author of *res gestae* for one of his students, Pompey.

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16 For Gallus’s dates, see Kaster 1995, 292. Dating Pitholaus’s activity is more difficult. Due to his placement in Suetonius’s *DGR*, he seems to have been active between the Gallus and Marcus Epidius, who was born *ca.* 100 (Kaster 1995, 301). If Pitholaus taught Pompey *ca.* 92–90 and had a career path similar to Gallus, his birth could also have been *ca.* 120–115. But a key problem with dating Pitholaus’s activity is that his rhetorical instruction of Pompey may have come later, perhaps closer to 49, when the magnate was at a more advanced age: see R. G. Lewis 1966, 273; Kaster 1995, 297–99. On Pitholaus, see also *FRHist.* 1:333–34 = no. 29.

17 For Gallus’s prominence among early Latin rhetors, see Cic. *Ep. ad M. Titinium* (apud Suet. *DGR* 26 = fr. 1 Watt). For his Marian connection, see Cic. *Arch.* 20. Cicero’s reference at *Arch.* 20 seems to strongly suggest that Gallus was still well known, and he could cite Gallus’s encomiastic activities as parallel to his client’s without risk of casting a blemish on Archias.

18 Suet. *DGR* 27.1.

19 Suet. *DGR* 27.2.
The next known rhetor, Marcus Antonius Gnipho, was a Gaul who had become enslaved following exposure after birth, only to have been later manumitted, and belongs to the same generation as Gallus and Pitholaus (ca. 116–64).\textsuperscript{20} He was known to have been extremely learned, with an excellent memory, and was associated with Alexandria and the third-century mythographer Dionysius Scytobrachion, though it is far from clear whence this association came.\textsuperscript{21} While better known as a grammarian, Suetonius tells us that Gnipho also taught rhetoric daily, and declaimed on market days.\textsuperscript{22} After Gnipho, we hear of Marcus Epidius, who belongs to a slightly later group, born ca. 100 and active by 70–65.\textsuperscript{23} Probably from Campania, Epidius began his career teaching rhetoric after being convicted for harassing others with unfounded legal actions (\textit{calumnia}). He also claimed descent from a certain Nucerian, Gaius Epidius, who, after a miraculous experience in the Sarno river, was said to have been received among the gods. Finally, the latest of these rhetors was a certain Sextus Clodius, born ca. 80–70, a Sicilian who taught in both Greek and Latin. Aside from his teaching (though not unrelated to it), Clodius is best known for his association with Antony, who bestowed upon him 2,000 \textit{iugera} of the well-irrigated land south of Mt. Etna on the Leontine plain. Cicero vehemently objected to this gift in his \textit{Second Philippic}.\textsuperscript{24} About Clodius’s origins we know very little, though there is

\begin{footnotes}
\item[22] Suet. \textit{DGR} 7.2; Kaster 1995, 121.
\item[24] For Clodius’s dates, see Kaster 1995, 308. For Cicero’s objection to the land grants, which were probably the result of Antony’s manipulation of Caesar’s documents (Ramsey 2003, 225), see Cic. \textit{Phil.} 2.42–43, 101.
\end{footnotes}
reason to believe that all Latin rhetors in this period were freedmen. I return to these rhetors, their students, and their connections in §1.3 below.

As for the curriculum these men offered, again, the starting point is Suetonius, who includes a brief discussion in DGR 25.4–5. Suetonius begins with an acknowledgment of diversity: there was not a single method of instruction among these early rhetors, and even the methods of the same rhetor were quite fluid over time. This claim need not surprise us. In the absence of any formal standards of curriculum and pedagogy, diversity was a standard feature of ancient rhetorical education. Still, Suetonius goes on to list various exercises that formed the beginning of their curriculum. These include, for example, elaborations of fables, expansion and contraction of narratives, translations from Greek texts, encomia and vituperations of famous men, and exercises in refutation and confirmation. All of the exercises included by Suetonius are well known from Greek collections of progymnasmata, save for the exercise in translation—a novel addition to the set. These progymnasmata, now adapted into Latin

25 See §1.5 Appendix below.
27 See Heath 2004, 217–18. Variety in the teaching practices of Latin rhetors was by no means a feature limited to this early period, as can be illustrated also by the various practices of the rhetors who appear in the elder Seneca's anthology of declamation (see Hômke 2002, 22–23), or Quintilian’s remarks (Inst. 1 pr. 1–2) on the diversity of opinions in rhetorical artes.
28 See Kaster 1995, 297–83. The new progymnasma mentioned by Suetonius, the exercise in translation, would remain part of the Latin rhetorical tradition: see Quint. Inst. 10.5.2; Lausberg §1098. Translation as an exercise specifically for an orator may have been an earlier practice as well. In de Orat. 1.155 Crassus cites his habit of rendering outstanding examples of Greek oratory into Latin as dating from the time when he was an adulescens. If taken to be a historical notice, Crassus’s practice can be dated to ca. 125–119 (he is still called an adulescens in Brut. 1.159, when he prosecutes Carbo at age 21). But otherwise our notices for the practice as training for an orator in the Republic appear in Cicero (see for references Leeman-Pinkster 1:260–61). Was the habit, in fact, Cicero’s own, anachronistically applied to Crassus? Cf. the comments in Opt. Gen. 13–15 (cf. 23), where Cicero refers to his translation of Aeschines's Against Ctesiphon and Demosthenes's On the Crown as a laborem utilem studiosis (Opt. Gen. is no longer regarded as spurious: see Gaines 1984, 121 with n. 18; La Bua 2014, 32 with n. 14).
by the rhetors, were the preliminary exercises that were undertaken by rhetoric students in order to obtain the facility in composition and argumentation, as well as command over the literary and cultural tradition, which were required to progress to more advanced stages of rhetorical training. And it is precisely to these more advanced stages that Suetonius turns next. Over time, Suetonius explains, rhetors came to focus on advanced exercises in forensic oratory, later known as controversiae. Together with exercises in deliberative oratory (suasoriae; not mentioned by Suetonius), this kind of exercise would become the advanced rhetorical exercise par excellence, known later at Rome under the general heading of declamation (declamatio). Suetonius provides two examples of these proto-controversiae, derived, he says, from published collections (collectae editaeque). Save for the addition of specific place names (Rome, Ostia, Brundisium), these older cases appear very much like the later manifestations of declamation. Evidence for the early-period rhetors using declamation is also found in Quintilian, who connects the introduction of declamation with Gallus. Suetonius’s notice that Gnipho declaimed on market days—whether offering model speeches for his students or, perhaps, publicly demonstrating his own abilities (anticipating imperial declamation)—further points to the use of this exercise in this period. Indeed, it has been suggested that Pitholaus, Epidius,

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29 For the nature and function of the progymnasmata, see Webb 2001. The surviving Greek textbooks are accessible in translation in Kennedy 2003; for worked models and examples, see C. A. Gibson 2008, with xx–xxii for a concise introduction to the progymnasmata with further bibliography.

30 Corresponding to Greek μελέτη. The best study of the Roman instantiation remains Bonner 1949. On Suetonius’s remarks, see Kaster 1995, 289 with further references. Declamation is further discussed in chapter three below.

31 The passage (DGR 25.5) is not without difficulties: see Kaster 1995, 289; Bonner 1949, 18–20; Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 35–37.

32 Quint. Inst. 2.4.42; see Corbeill 2001, 272 with n. 55; Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 119.

33 Suet. DGR 7.2. For the significance of model declamations in rhetorical education, see Heath 2004, 237–39.
or Clodius may have coined the term *declamatio ca.* 54. There is, therefore, a strong case to be made that the Latin tradition of these later standard exercises—*progymnasmata* and declamations—originated in the milieu of these early-period Latin rhetors. Given the enormous influence that these exercises and this form of education would play in Roman culture, society, and literature, the significance of these rhetors and their inauguration and adaption of this curriculum into Latin would seem to merit more scholarly acknowledgment than is common.

Up to this point, therefore, the curriculum of these early rhetors as documented in our sources resides in their development and use of rhetorical exercises. This is understandable: ancient rhetoric was a practical discipline that aimed at the production of speakers. This process required rigorous training, practice, and exercise—hence the centrality of the exercises in our accounts of the curriculum of the early Latin rhetors.35 Aside from notice of these exercises, other explicit references to the curricula of these rhetors are more limited. For Gallus there is also notice of written works pertaining to rhetoric, but only for him among rhetors of the early period. His treatise on gesture (an important part of an orator’s delivery) was known to Quintilian, and Gallus may have also prepared a copy of the speeches of Gaius Gracchus, though this is uncertain.36 If he were interested in studying the speeches of Gracchus, who in spite of his political fortunes was considered “the first ‘classic’ of Latin oratory,” this would point to an effort to create a specifically Roman form of the curriculum that had been, after all, derived

34 See Stroh 2003, with 31–33 on the possible originators of the term.
35 For the practical and productive orientation of rhetoric (an *ars in agendo*; τέχνη πρακτικῆ), see Quint. *Inst.* 2.19.1–5; cf. more broadly (on classification of *artes*), Lausberg §10. Walker 2011, 280–81, 285–95 also makes this point well, though I would go as far in downplaying the theoretical aspect of the ancient discipline: see, e.g., Quint. *Inst.* 2.19.3.
36 Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.143; Fronto, *ad M. Caes.* 1.7.4. For the speeches of Gracchus, see van den Hout 1999, 40–41 and (very skeptically) Zetzel 1973, 241–42.
originally from Greek circumstances. The presence of Italian place names in the examples of early declamations cited by Suetonius, already mentioned above, point in the same direction, as does some additional, implicit testimony that will be discussed below. It is also sometimes claimed that Gallus taught or emphasized a particularly loud vocal delivery, but the evidence for this view seems to me insufficient.

However, given that the early rhetors exercised their students with *progymnasmata* and forensic declamations, one can, on this basis, actually infer quite a bit more about their curriculum. The Latin rhetors would have needed to prepare their students to succeed in these exercises, and they would have done so by teaching them the principles and rules—*praeccepta* in Latin, rendering Greek θεωρήματα or παραγγέλματα—of technical rhetoric. Indeed, alongside the system of exercises that we have already encountered and the teachers themselves, these rules contained the remainder of the package presented by ancient rhetorical education. *Praeccepta* provided

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37 For Gracchus, see Leeman 1963, 56–58 with quote at 56. For Cicero’s use of the “flexibility” of the Gracchi as *exempla* (anti-establishment revolutionaries v. exceptional examples of Roman eloquence), see van der Blom 2010, 103–107.

38 E.g., Bonner 1977, 72–73 and Bloomer 2011, 48, both relying on Varro, *Men.* 257 Astbury, and the presence of *bubulcitarat* in that fragment. But there are a number of problems with this interpretation. First, the verb *bubulcitarat*, which Bloomer renders “brayed like an ox-driver” (cf. Bonner 1977, 72: “had bawled like an ox-driver”) suggesting a “mix of vulgarity and sheer decibel level,” never carries this meaning elsewhere, where it rather means “to drive or tend cattle, be a ploughman or farm labourer” i.e. to be a *bubulus* (see *OLD* s.v. *bubulus*; *TLL* s.v. *bubulcito*). Granting that the other extant examples of the word are few (only three total in Latin through Apuleius), there is nothing in the isolated and decontextualized fragment of Varro to indicate that it should mean otherwise there (*contra TLL* 2:2223.11–13). Second, the fact that the fragment appears among the genre of satire raises concerns as to whether it should be interpreted as an accurate report of curriculum—all the more so given the lack of context—and at any rate the fragment refers to the behavior of a certain Automedon in Gallus’s school, and not about what Gallus taught.

39 The *praeccepta* could be construed as essentially synonymous with the *ars* itself, as in Cic. *de Orat.* 2.119, where one finds demands for *ingenium*, *exercitatio*, and *ars* and *praeccepta* standing for the usual triad of φύσις, μελέτη, and ἐπιστήμη (on which see further below, p. 81 n. 42). For *praeccepta* as a technical term in Latin rhetoric, see Reinhardt 2003, 15 with n. 19.

40 E.g., Cic. *de Orat.* 1.19: *aut praecupit aut magistris aut exercitationibus.*
the recommendations, guidelines, and the theoretical apparatus that helped students attain the eloquence promised by the discipline. It is through these rules that the art of rhetoric was itself communicable to students, and therefore teachable, whether through reading, lecturing, or exercise. At the time of the advent of Latin rhetors, these rules would have been most accessible via the genre of the Hellenistic Greek rhetorical handbook (τέχνη). Scarcely anything survives of these Greek texts, though the nature of Greek rhetorical handbooks for this period can still be reconstructed to some extent. Such handbooks that focused on the entirety of rhetoric (encompassing the whole τέχνη) would have often been organized either around the successful construction of a speech (prologue, narration of events, argumentation for one’s own position and against one’s opponent, and epilogue) or, alternatively and apparently more commonly, the “activities” of an orator, the steps involved in successfully composing and delivering a speech (discovery of arguments, arrangement, stylistic embellishment, memory, and delivery). These handbooks would have also included (under invention) a version of issue-theory, which had developed during the Hellenistic period, most successfully by Hermagoras of Temnos (ca. 150). Issue-theory provided a system that allowed students to determine

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41 Lausberg §§3–4: “an ars (τέχνη) is a system of instructive rules, gained through experience (ἐµπειρία) but subsequently thought-through logically, for the correct implementation of a perfection-oriented repeatable action that does not belong to the naturally inevitable course of events and should not be left to chance... Every ars... can be taught... and learned... by the communication of the rules... of the ars in question.”

42 For the availability of Greek τέχναι in this period, see, e.g., Cic. de Orat. 1.23 (written in 54): ...quae Graeci dicendi artifices et doctores reliquerunt... cum illa pateant in promptuque sint omnibus...


44 See May and Wisse 2001, 28–38.

precisely what was the critical issue on which a case turned, for example, arguing from
the intent of the law against the letter of the law. That these forms were available at Rome
is confirmed by the earliest two surviving Latin rhetorical handbooks, Cicero’s youthful
_de Inventione_, composed sometime between 91–89, and the _Rhetorica ad Herennium_,
composed by an anonymous author (hereafter Auctor) probably ca. 86–82. The precise
relationship between these texts and the milieu of the early Latin rhetors is uncertain, and
I will return to this question in a moment. The upshot, though, is that part of the
curriculum of the Latin rhetors included teaching rhetorical theory. This seems to me to
be an inescapable conclusion. The lack of explicit testimony of these rhetors teaching
rhetorical theory is, I suspect, simply due to the paucity of sources about this group. For
periods in which there is more extant information about ancient rhetorical pedagogy, it is
immediately apparent that instruction in theory was a standard part of what a rhetor did.
There was an intimate relationship between precepts and exercises. The exercises were,
in fact, one of the central ways that the students learned the theory. Thus, Michael
Winterbottom and Doreen Innes, in their study of Sopatros’s _Division of Questions_
(_Διαίρεσις Ζητημάτων_), summarize one of the major virtues of Sopatros’s text for
historians of rhetoric, namely, that Sopatros

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46 On the date of Inv., see discussion in Corbeill 2002, 32–33 with references in n. 36 (covering
also Rhet. Her.) and, for Rhet. Her., see Calboli 1993, 12–17. I consider both dates to be the least
controversial, but there is not quite a consensus on either. Note, e.g., recent arguments calling for
47 Though it has even been denied: Kennedy 1972, 95–96. The connection between the early
Latin rhetors and rhetorical theory is assumed, but not substantially argued for in, e.g., Wisse
48 See, e.g., Quint. _Inst._ 1 pr. 7 for his lectures that covered the _ars rhetoric_. A suggestive _sermo_
in _DMin._ 320.1 explicitly refers to the rhetor previously instructing his students in issue-theory.
For an account of the _realia_ of ancient rhetorical pedagogy and “technography,” see Heath 2004,
217–76.
lays bare the connection between declamation and rhetorical precept that forms an enduring theme in the story of the genre. What is elsewhere assumed or left to be inferred is here stated. The teacher gives instruction in precepts by showing his students how to apply those precepts in practice speeches. (Innes and Winterbottom 1988, 3)

But given that the Latin rhetors were teaching technical rhetorical precepts, and given that these were available at the time in Greek handbooks, how did the Latin rhetors relate to the handbook tradition? Did they just use and depend on Greek τέχναι? Or did they themselves write Latin artes? This is not clear. On the one hand, the Latin rhetors could have simply adapted lecture material from Greek handbooks and explicated their precepts orally in Latin, leaving it to their students to compile notes as needed. On the other hand, the rhetors might have contributed to the handbook tradition themselves. The question is worth pursuing further, but the answers that I offer here will admittedly be removed by at least one degree of certainty from the conclusions that have preceded.

The tradition of rhetorical handbooks in Latin may have started just prior to the advent of Latin rhetors. Setting aside Cato’s advice on oratory to his son, which in all likelihood was not part of this tradition, the earliest Latin treatise dedicated to rhetoric appears to have been Marcus Antonius’s libellus de ratione dicendi, written sometime ca.

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49 For student notes from rhetorical schools, see Heath 2004, 259–67.
50 Cato’s libri ad Filium, while they did contain precepts on the practices of an orator (= fr. 14–16 Iordan), did not in all likelihood contain anything like a rhetorical treatise. See Astin 1978, 332–40 with 333 on the de rhetorica. Marx 1894, 138–41 argues that Lucius Aelius Stilo also wrote earlier praecepta de orationibus scribendis in Latin, but his point was quickly met with objections: see in Calboli 1993, 21–22. The matter essentially conforms to Quintilian’s testimony at Inst. 3.1.19.
About this work, however, which apparently circulated contrary to Antonius’s wishes, little is known, and from extant testimonia it is unclear just how technical this treatise actually was or how it fit into the tradition of technical rhetorical handbooks that were written in Latin, but according to a Greek model. In his account of this tradition at Rome (Inst. 3.1.19–21), Quintilian leaves room for successors to Antonius’s libellus that could fit chronologically with our period and accommodate the early-period Latin rhetors, but there is no guarantee that these men should be included among Quintilian’s group. These authors, Quintilian says, were “less famous” (minus celebres) in their efforts in the genre. But one wonders whether Quintilian may, in part, have been driven to this characterization due to the position of this less famous group between Antonius, himself a famous orator, and the subsequent, epoch-making author in his catalogue, namely, Cicero. In Quintilian’s words: “indeed, just as he bestowed a unique light on eloquence, so also with his teachings did Marcus Tullius give an example, sui generis among us, of speaking and of teaching the arts of oratory” (Inst. 3.1.20: praeceptum vero

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51 For a discussion of the work and extant testimonia, see Scholz 1962, 96–114. There seems to me to be a significant discrepancy in our sources that report on the libellus, and the entire matter deserves revisiting (cf. Rawson 1985, 146–47). To preview how such a reassessment might proceed: Cicero claims in de Orat. that Antonius, influenced by the arguments of the Academic Charmadas (see Brittain 2001, 312–28), pressed a distinction between men who are merely skilled at speaking (diserti) and those who are truly eloquentes. Antonius is made to claim that he had never seen men truly worthy of being called “eloquent” due to the profoundly broad education and training that such an appellation requires. This position seems suspiciously close to Cicero’s own in de Orat. In the same dialogue, Cicero has Antonius claim that he has read Aristotle’s Rhetoric and his Collection of Handbooks (συναγωγὴ τεχνῶν). Wisse 1989, 150–51 points out that this latter claim is explicitly contradicted by Cicero himself at Brut. 214, where Cicero states that the historical Antonius lacked broad reading and erudition; in the same work Cicero portrays the contents of Antonius’s work as rather insignificant (Brut. 163: exilem libellum, “a meager little book”), though if it were a significant precursor to Cicero’s own positions, it would seem odd to characterize it as such. Furthermore, Quintilian includes Antonius in a discussion of authors that have tripartite issue-theory (Inst. 3.6.45), but it is noteworthy that the terminology Quintilian quotes is decidedly non-technical (factum non factum, ius iniuria, bonum malum), and a practicing advocate like Antonius may well have had his own divisions of types of cases—indeed of issue-theory—yet which nevertheless could be collated against Hermagoras’s theory, as Quintilian does.
lumen sicut eloquentiae, ita praecptis quoque eius dedit unicum apud nos specimen orandi docendique oratorias artes M. Tullius…). Artes, possibly written by Latin rhetors, thus could have been overshadowed between Antonius and Cicero, but this is uncertain.

Related to this question, we might also consider the extant members of the Latin rhetorical handbook tradition that date to the period of the earliest Latin rhetors, namely, Cicero’s *de Inventione* and the Auctor’s *Rhetorica ad Herrenium*. These texts contain many parallels, verbatim correspondences, and divergences, such that their relationship to one another and possible common sources has been a fraught question in scholarship.\(^{52}\) Unfortunately, the problems involved are exceptionally intractable. Among many possible options, it has been proposed that the two works shared a common Latin source, that the two authors shared a common teacher, that the two authors had different teachers who both used a common Latin source, or that the two authors used written notes provided by the same teacher at different times.\(^{53}\) There has also been reason to associate the Auctor’s teacher (*noster doctor* at *Rhet. Her.* 1.18) with the milieu of the early-period Latin rhetors, but the identity of this teacher is yet another fraught question.\(^{54}\) Thus, if a certain combination of these theories turns out to be correct, both the *de Inventione* and the *Rhetorica ad Herrenium* could reflect the theoretical background of a Latin *ars*, coming from one of the early Latin rhetors. On the whole, I would tend to think that there is some relationship between these *artes* and the Latin rhetors: it would seem to me more remarkable if there was no connection between two Latin handbooks that exhibit verbal

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53 See references in preceding note.
54 See, e.g., Achard 1989, xxiii–xxv, 229–33 (arguing for Gallus as *doctor*). For the difficulties involved, see Calboli 1993, 19–25.
and theoretical parallels, suggestive of some common Latin source, and dating within a decade of the establishment of teaching technical rhetoric in Latin at Rome, and the group of teachers that undertook that very project. But, again, certainty on this issue is unattainable. In short: the Latin rhetors trained their students with exercises backed by theory and a set of precepts that they adapted from the handbook tradition. It is unclear whether the rhetors contributed to this tradition themselves.

Before moving on, it is also worth exploring what might be imagined under the heading of “adaptation” of Greek rhetoric to this new, Roman environment. As mentioned already, there is evidence for the Latin rhetors engaging in this process: the new *progymnasma* in translation, the presence of Italian place names in proto- *controversiae*, and Gallus’s possible interest in the speeches of Gaius Gracchus. That the Latin rhetors were not simply translating Greek precepts into Latin, but were attentive to their Roman audiences will be further illustrated below (§1.3). But a certain sensitivity to adapting this Greek discipline for Romans is also consistent with the evidence from *de Inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*.\(^\text{55}\) Indeed, many of the examples and themes in both works are thoroughly Roman.\(^\text{56}\) Without entering into any extended discussion here, we can consider briefly the case of the Auctor.

In his treatment of issue-theory in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, the Auctor frequently illustrates the theory with relatively recent Roman examples. The issue of conflict of laws (*Rhet. Her.* 1.20), for example, is illustrated with reference to a scenario in which an augur convicted of extortion is at odds with the requirements of the *Lex Servilia repetundarum* (dating to 111) and the *Lex Domitia de sacerdotiis* (104). For the issue of


\(^{56}\) See also Corbeill 2002, 34–46; Bonner 1949, 22–25.
assimilation (Rhet. Her 1.23; ratiocinatio), various laws from the Twelve Tables are at issue in a case involving the inheritance of the matricide Publicius Malleolus (ca. 101).57 And for the issue of definition, the Auctor uses the actions and subsequent trial of Quintus Servilius Caepio (Rhet. Her. 1.21).58 The circumstances of the trial are worth briefly considering. In 100, the tribune Lucius Appuleius Saturninus had attempted to pass a grain law against which the Roman senate had already expressed its opposition, on the grounds that such a law would be contrary to the interests of the Republic. After Saturninus ignored the intercession of other magistrates in his attempt to bring his law to a vote, the quaestor Caepio turned to violence in an attempt to block the law’s passage. As a result, Caepio faced trial in 95 on charges of diminishing the majesty of the Republic (maiestas).59 The case depended, the Auctor explains, precisely on the division of issue-theory that focused on interpretation of an ambiguous point of law (constitutio legitima), under the issue of definition (definitio): given that Caepio acted as he did, did his actions in fact constitute maiestas? What is the proper definition of maiestas?60 The historical case resulted in Caepio’s acquittal, thanks to a defense that included Lucius Licinius Crassus, the premier orator of his generation. This case would, of course, still have been quite well known in the 90s and 80s. We know, for example, that at least part of Crassus’s speech Pro Q. Servilio Caepione was still in circulation approximately fifty

58 On this case, see Alexander 1990, 45–46 (= no. 88) and Calboli 1993, 223 with additional notes and bibliography on p. 516.
59 For the crimen maiestatis, see in BNP s.v. maiestas (Gizewski) with further references.
60 On definitio in issue-theory, see Calboli Montefusco 1986, 77–93 (83–84 with n. 61 on the present case and its complications).
years later.\textsuperscript{61} The \textit{Rhetorica ad Herennium}, in short, makes it clear how an originally Greek theory could have been usefully deployed in a Roman context. Providing a systematic means of processing the complexities of legal cases and offering clear guidelines for moving forward could have had a clear appeal to young, ambitious Romans, as they prepared to enter the intense competition of the Republic. And issue theory was, after all, only one component of the system that technical rhetoric could offer in its new Roman and Latin instantiation. Again, the relationship between the Auctor and the early Latin rhetors is not clear, but the examples used by the Auctor are consistent with the interest in adapting Greek technical rhetoric at Rome that we have seen elsewhere. This was the period when Greek rhetoric started to become Roman.

\textit{§1.2 The edict of the censors}

How was this new kind of education received at Rome? As the quotations at the beginning of this chapter suggest, there has been a tendency to believe that Latin rhetorical education was met with broad resistance and hostility in its earliest years. For David, the “aristocracy that governed the city” could not accept Latin rhetorical education and was “very harsh” towards this discipline.\textsuperscript{62} For Kennedy, the Roman state had an “official policy of trying to prevent the teaching of Latin rhetoric” in this period.\textsuperscript{63} That Latin rhetoric faced general “resistance” in this period is also not an uncommon

\textsuperscript{61} See Cic. \textit{Brut.} 162. \\
\textsuperscript{62} David 2006, 432; cf. Sussman 1978, 4: “the conservative aristocracy vigorously opposed and persecuted the newly arrived professors.” \\
\textsuperscript{63} Kennedy 1972, 489; Cf. Gruen 1990, 191: “official doctrine… public policy.”
claim in the scholarly literature. But, if we start from this assumption—that Latin rhetorical education faced opposition from Rome’s governing oligarchs in its infancy—there is scarcely any way to understand Quintilian’s *salarium* from Vespasian other than as a radical shift from Republican practices. In this section, I argue that the “resistance interpretation,” that holds that Latin rhetorical education in this period faced broad opposition from Rome’s rulers, is itself not without difficulties.

The resistance interpretation is itself a kind of heritage position. It descends from Suetonius’s own account at *DGR* 25.1 of the history of rhetoric at Rome:

> Rhetorica quoque apud nos perinde atque grammatica sero recepta est, paululo etiam difficilius quippe quam constet nonnumquam etiam prohibitam exerceri.

Rhetoric too, just like grammar, was received late at Rome, and even with a bit more difficulty, insofar as it is a matter of established fact that it was sometimes even prohibited from being practiced.

Suetonius supports his claim that rhetoric faced difficulties at Rome by referencing its periodic prohibition. He proceeds to cite two documents to support this: a *Senatus Consultum* of 161 that authorized the praetor Marcus Pomponius to remove Greek philosophers and rhetors from the City, and an edict issued by the censors of 92, Lucius Licinius Crassus and Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus. But neither case actually supports

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64 Cf. Corbeill 2001, 271–72; Stroup 2007, 28–33, but note that the position is not invariable: in Boissier 1902, 484–85 = Boissier 1906, 170–72, there is no such emphasis on resistance, and, in fact, his impression of the early period is close to the one that I argue for in §1.3 (e.g. 1902, 484: “c’est justement de cet édit des censeurs que date le triomphe définitif de la rhétorique”).
Suetonius’s claim of prohibition as related to *Latin* rhetorical education, which is the topic that he is ultimately focused on in *DGR*, and the one that Suetonius claims to be addressing here.\(^{65}\) On the one hand, the earlier *SC* was directed towards *Greek* intellectuals and preceded the advent of *Latin* rhetorical education. On the other hand, the censorial edict, while controversial (further discussion below), has been widely acknowledged as not carrying the requisite force to actually ban rhetorical education or exile *Latin* rhetors from *Rome*.\(^ {66}\) The evidence that Suetonius cites, therefore, does not adequately support his claim of periodic prohibition, which, in turn, was supposed to support his assertion that rhetoric faced difficulties at *Rome*.

However, despite the difficulties that accompany Suetonius’s own position, the resistance interpretation argues for much the same thesis and relies chiefly on the most salient evidence that Suetonius offered, namely the edict of the censors. It does so, however, not by assuming that the edict documented an actual ban or the exile of the rhetors, but rather, by reading the edict as evidence for an attempt by the governing aristocracy to restrict or suppress this new kind of education together with the rhetors who were teaching the subject. I start by considering the edict itself, before examining scholarly reactions to it in greater detail. Suetonius quotes the document at *DGR* 25.2:

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\text{De isdem interiecto tempore Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus (et) L. Licinius Crassus censores ita edixerunt:}
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\(^{65}\) See Kaster 1995, 273 on *DGR* 25.2 *de isdem*, who notes that the citation of the *SC* in connection with *Latin* rhetors is “misleading.”

\(^{66}\) On the *SC*, see Kaster 1995, 272; Gruen 1990, 171–74. That the censorial edict did not cause the closure of schools or expulsion of *Latin* rhetors has been generally accepted since Manfredini 1976, 104–12, but cf. Wisse 2002b, 345 with n. 29
renuntiatum est nobis esse homines qui novum genus disciplinae instituerunt, ad quos iuventus in ludum conveniat; eos sibi nomen imposuisse Latinos rhetoras, ibi homines adolescents dies totos desidere. maiores nostri quae liberos suos discere et quos in ludos itare vellent instituerunt: haec nova, quae praeter consuetudinem ac morem maiorum fiunt, neque placent neque recta videntur. quapropter et iis qui eos ludos habent et iis qui eo venire consuerunt visum est faciundum ut ostenderemus nostram sententiam: nobis non placere.

After some time had passed, the censors Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus and Lucius Licinius Crassus issued an edict regarding the same people (i.e. rhetoric instructors, just referred to above), as follows:

It has come to our attention that there are men who have established a new kind of instruction, and that the youth are gathering in their schools; we have learned that these men have called themselves “Latin rhetors,” and that in their company young men are idling away whole days. Our ancestors have established what they wished their own children to learn and into which kinds of schools they wished them to go; these innovations, which are arising contrary to established custom and our ancestral tradition, are not acceptable and do not seem proper. Wherefore, both to those who operate the schools and to those who have become accustomed to go to those places, it has seemed imperative that we make our opinion known: we do not approve.
This edict, apart from its role in the resistance interpretation, has been a source of scholarly controversy for over a century. The focus of this work has been trying to understand the motivation behind the edict.67 The usual starting point in the debate is Friedrich Marx’s 1894 proposal that the edict was intended to counter attempts by Marian sympathizers to democratize the educational process at Rome. Since Erich Gruen’s 1990 contribution, Marx’s view and its later instantiations have been excluded as working possibilities.68 In another prominent take, Peter Schmidt argues that the emergence of schools of Latin rhetors answered increasing demand for rhetorical weapons in the aftermath of the successes of demagogic tribunes in the late second century.69 The censors of 92, and especially Crassus, viewed this new kind of education—divorced from philosophical orientation and more traditional models of education (the so-called tirocinium fori)—as dangerous.70 The edict, in Schmidt’s view, was an attempt to suppress what might otherwise enable the sort of socially destructive demagogy that was still vivid in the censors’ memories from, for example, the actions of the tribunes Lucius Appuleius Saturninus and Gaius Servilius Glauceia in 100. This view too has not escaped from important criticisms from Gruen, who offers his own interpretation, namely that the

67 See Suerbaum in HLL 1:547–52 = §191.2 for collected bibliography on this matter.
68 See Gruen 1990, 180–83 with 180 n. 95.
69 Schmidt 1975, esp. 207–11.
70 This requires accepting, as Schmidt does (1975, 207), that the positions of Crassus in Cic. de Orat., esp. at 3.91–95, represent those of the historical Crassus rather than Cicero. Gruen’s ultimate position requires much the same. But using Crassus’s words at 3.91–95 as evidence for the historical Crassus’s views remains problematic, as the dialogue form offers no guarantees that such positions are not Cicero’s own creations. Bearing on this matter is the point that Crassus’s famous (cf. Tac. Dial. 35) condemnation of the ludus impudentiae at de Orat. 3.94 in fact looks back to earlier strictures against impudentia in de Orat. 1.119–121 and elsewhere (see Leeman-Pinkster 4:311 for additional loci). That is, Crassus’s argument in de Orat. 3.94 appears to be part of Cicero’s broader characterization of Crassus in the dialogue. The character so revealed by Cicero could be an historical one—or maybe not. For this reason and others, in my discussion of the edict in this section, I have followed the advice of Fantham 2012, 286: “let us stick to interpreting the edict rather than the defensive elaboration of Crassus in De oratore 3.93 or Tacitus’ Dialogus or Gellius’ reworking of Suetonius.”
decree was issued to protect the Greek core of rhetorical studies that the aristocracy prescribed for their sons as part of the *mos maiorum*: the use of Latin rather than Greek was an unacceptable shortcut in a thoroughly Hellenized age. In 2007, Sarah Stroup proposed that the edict was reacting against both the new professionalization of rhetoric, whereby independent teachers were (she believes) now liberated from patron-client hierarchies which defined earlier educational activities, as well as against the methods of delivery of rhetorical education, which she characterizes as now predominately textual and theoretical instead of grounded in practice and experience.\textsuperscript{71}

I do not intend to solve the problem of the edict here: the edict remains difficult to understand and there has yet to emerge a scholarly consensus surrounding this particular historical *crux*. That said, I think it is a strange piece of evidence for the resistance interpretation to rely on to support claims like Kennedy’s and David’s above, that Latin rhetorical education was met with resistance from the men who ruled Rome in this early period. Two brief points, I think, discourage us from using it in this way: first, the idiosyncratic nature of censorial actions related to *regimen morum*, and, second, the implicit popularity of Latin rhetorical education that underlies the edict. The former point calls into question using the censorial edict as representative evidence for the opinions and reactions of a larger group, namely, Rome’s governing oligarchs as a whole, while the latter points to a different reaction to Latin rhetorical education at Rome, which will be further explored in the following section.

When the censors first express their disapproval in the edict, they do so with an emphasis on the novelty of the situation in question: young Romans are studying with a new group of teachers and the censors cite this new state of affairs as being in violation

\textsuperscript{71} Stroup 2007, 28–33.
of custom and ancestral tradition (haec nova, quae praeter consuetudinem ac morem maiorum fiunt). Thus, the edict is situated within the censors’ responsibility for the regimen morum, the guidance of the behaviors, (virtuous) habits, and moral conduct proper to Roman citizens, modeled by ancestral exempla. Research has demonstrated that the censors’ interests in this field were circumscribed socially: they did not express concern about the mores of all Roman citizens, but focused on those of the top two tiers, the equestrians and, especially, the members of the senate. Furthermore, even within this more circumscribed set, it has been typical to interpret the actions of the censors as somehow personal and selective. Thus, Alan Astin, concerning the regimen morum, writes:

In the main the censors’ actions in this field… were punitive and directed against individuals. Quite apart from the ample opportunity for variations in criteria and judgment between different pairs of censors, it was impossible for censors to

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72 The phrase regimen morum originates from Liv. 4.8.2, on the first censorship of 443, but many similar passages point to the censors’ authority in this area; see the collection in Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. 2:375–76 n. 3 and, with a wider net, those in Astin 1985, 238 with n. 20 and in the footnotes of Astin 1988 on 14–15 and passim. There are many studies of the regimen morum, e.g., Mommsen, Röm. Staatsr. 2:375–77 (short, but foundational); Suolahti 1963, 47–52; Nicolet 1980, 73–88; Astin 1988; Baltrusch 1989; Nippel 1995, 8–9; El Beheiri 2012. Other actions related by our sources as censorial edicts (as indicated either by the use of edictum or introduced by a form of edicere) from the Republic: Nep. Cato 2.3 (184, restricting luxuria); Liv. 39.44.8 (Cato, 184, restrictions on publicani); Liv. 43.14–16 (Gaius Claudius Pulcher and Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, 169, intentions for legislation in contione, canvassing deserting soldiers from Macedonian legions in Italy, restrictions on publicani); Plin. Nat. 13.24 (Publius Licinius Crassus and Lucius Iulius Caesar, 89, restricting sale of foreign ointments), 14.95 (idem, restricting prices of wines). Cf. Plin. Nat. 8.223 and 36.4, which appear similar in form, but which Pliny calls censoriae leges, though the precise meaning of this is unclear; similarly, Cassiod. Chron. under coss. 115 = pp. 131–32 Mommsen is sometimes cited as a censorial edict (e.g., Astin 1998, 15–16 with n. 5), but there is no indication as to the nature of this restriction on dramatic performances. The closest thing to a comparative study of the edict of 92 that I am aware of is Benner 1975, 35–38, concerned predominately with the language used in such pronouncements.

carry out a detailed examination of the lifestyle, conduct, property and household of each senator and *eques*, let alone of every citizen. They necessarily took up individual cases mainly on the basis of personal observation, common knowledge, and hearsay evidence. (Astin 1988, 26)

Emanuela Zanda, in a recent study of Roman responses to luxury, echoes Astin’s remarks:

In matters of luxury, as in every other field of their activity, the censors did not follow a well-defined policy and their interest was not well defined; their actions were determined by personal opinions and by their attitudes… Clearly a lack of continuity and consistency characterised censorial dispositions: the targets of their actions changed from time to time or better from censor to censor… (Zanda 2011, 43, 45)

It seems, therefore, that a great deal of personal discretion and individual interest lay behind any given censorial action regarding *mores*. And this point seems to oppose the typical way in which the edict of the censors has been used in the historiography of Latin rhetorical education at Rome. Is it really secure to assume that an idiosyncratic action like a censorial edict necessarily reflected the interests of the broader governing aristocracy? Or the Roman state as a whole? I think that by reflecting on the nature of censorial action in the field of *regimen morum* in light of Astin and Zanda’s conclusions, reading the censorial edict as indicative of broader aristocratic resistance seems less secure.
Second, note that underlying the existence of the edict is the fact that Latin rhetorical education was popular among groups other than Crassus and Ahenobarbus. If it were otherwise, after all, there would have not been need for the edict. The students studying under the Latin rhetors and causing the censors concern were clearly very interested in this kind of education. In a passage considered in greater length in the next section, for example, Cicero mentions the “crowd” (*concur*us) that flocked to Rome’s first rhetor, Lucius Plotius Gallus.\(^{74}\) Again, it looks less like a uniformly hostile response to this form of education so much as a hostile response by a pair of censors. A quick comparison with a different censorial edict further highlights this point. In 89, Publius Licinius Crassus and Lucius Iulius Caesar held the censorship.\(^{75}\) The elder Pliny records (*Nat.* 13.24) that while in office this pair took issue with foreign unguents, resulting in an edict, which Pliny cites in his efforts to determine the chronological entry point of unguents at Rome:

Quando id primum ad Romanos penetraverit, non facile dixerim. certum est Antiocho rege Asiaque devictis, urbis anno DLXV, P. Licinium Crassum L. Iulium Caesarem censores edixisse ne quis venderet unguenta exotica; sic enim appellavere.\(^{76}\)

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\(^{75}\) See *MRR* 2:32–33.  
\(^{76}\) So both modern critical editions of the text (Ian and Mayhoff’s Teubner and Ernout’s Budé), despite the fact that in this format the passage does not quite make sense. As it stands, Pliny’s chronology fails. Crassus and Caesar were not censors in the 565th year *AUC*, i.e. 189, but rather the 665th, i.e. 89 (*MRR* 2:32–33). The censors of 189 were T. Quinctius Flamininus and M. Claudius Marcellus (*MRR* 1:360–61). Faced with this inconsistency, it is somewhat striking that no editors of the text have chosen to intervene, but the MS tradition is unanimous in support of *DLXV*. Still it would take minimal editorial intervention to provide the correct date: *D(C)LXV*. And after all, in the very next book Pliny cites another edict by the same censors now with the
When this (i.e. the habit of using unguents) first worked its way in among the Romans, I could not easily say. It is certain that, after King Antiochus and Asia were defeated, in the 565th year after the City’s founding, the censors Publius Licinius Crassus and Lucius Iulius Caesar pronounced in an edict that no one was to sell “exotic unguents”; for that is how they referred to them.

Granted that this censorial edict is rather different than the edict of Crassus and Ahenobarbus in 92, it would, I think, be odd to argue that the governing aristocracy reacted very harshly towards the commercial availability of foreign unguents on the basis of this edict. Would it not be more plausible to argue that the edict is evidence for the popularity of exotic cosmetics, presumably among the aristocracy (imagining a limited body Roman consumers in the market for *unguenta exotica*) and that two censors reacted harshly to their sale? In the case of both edicts, trying to generalize the hostile reactions of the censors to a broader population appears to misconstrue the evidence for the popularity of the targets of these edicts.

In short, there is no real need to try to cut the Gordian knot that is the motivation behind Crassus and Ahenobarbus’s edict. Rather, it seems sufficient to point out that this edict is unsuitable as evidence for the resistance interpretation. Roman censors acted in idiosyncratic and personal ways, and the edict itself betrays the existence of a group of Romans that were, rather than resisting this new kind of education, actively pursuing it,

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*correct date (Nat. 14.95: P. Licinius Crassus L. Iulius Caesar censores anno urbis conditae DCLXV edixerunt...). But if we attribute the error to the elder Pliny’s working methods (as Nicolet 1978, 396), perhaps no correction is warranted. Regardless, the date of the edict is not critical to my discussion here.*
“idling away whole days” (dies totos desidere) in the company of Latin rhetors. Who were these students? Is there evidence that would implicate members of the governing aristocracy beyond young tyros? We need to turn now to what is known about the connections between the early-period Latin rhetors and politically active Romans. As will be clear, these connections point to a very different relationship between Latin rhetoric and Roman political power than is usually supposed.

§1.3 A different reaction: The governing aristocracy and Rome’s rhetors

If the edict of the censors ceases to hold a monopoly of influence on the interpretation of the relationship between Latin rhetoric and Roman political power in this period, we can begin to appreciate what our other evidence suggests. Here, by examining the connections between known Latin rhetors and their students and associates, I offer a new picture for this early period. Rather than being marginalized or suppressed, Latin rhetors appear well connected with the political elite from the outset.

Gallus, the earliest known Latin rhetor, provides a suitable starting point. Concerning Gallus’s students, Cicero provides us with important information via a fragmentary letter partially preserved by Suetonius (Suet. DGR 26 = Ep. ad M. Titinium fr. 1 Watt):

> equidem memoria teneo pueris nobis primum Latine docere coepisse Plotium quendam. ad quem cum fieret concursus et studiosissimus quisque apud eum exerceretur, dolebam mihi idem non licere. continebar autem doctissimorum
hominum auctoritate, qui existimabant Graecis exercitationibus ali melius ingenia posse.

For my part, I remember that during our childhood a certain Plotius first began to teach in Latin. Since a crowd was forming around him and every really serious student was being trained under his auspices, I was saddened that I wasn’t permitted to do the same. But I was being checked by the authority of the most learned men, who used to estimate that natural abilities could be better nourished by Greek exercises.

Though he did not in fact end up studying with Gallus, Cicero’s testimony here is still valuable. It seems unlikely that Cicero, the ambitious son of a wealthy equestrian, would have tried to place himself among a group of students that were of a vastly different social composition (i.e. ambitious equestrians, at least). And Gallus’s connections with the Roman elite are only made clearer by the remaining evidence. As already mentioned above, Gallus was connected with Gaius Marius, celebrating the general, perhaps in verse, presumably prior to his death in January 86. For the period between 80–67, we have indication that Gallus remained an active and noteworthy teacher, well known apparently still in the late 60s, though we know of no more definite associates of his until 56. In that year Gallus appears in our records well connected to the political struggles of the final decades of the Republic. He was the teacher of Lucius Sempronius Atratinus, the

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77 As has commonly been guessed, it is quite possible that Cicero was dissuaded by Crassus himself.
78 Cic. Arch. 20.
79 The range comes from Kaster 1995, 293, on the basis of Varro, Men. fr. 257 Astbury. For the 60s, see Cic. Arch. 20 (dated to 62).
biological son of Cornelius Bestia (aedilis, 57), who would become praetor in 40 and later consul suffectus in 34. But in April 56, at the age of 17 and in his best-known role, Atratinus prosecuted Marcus Caelius Rufus for political violence (vis). Caelius’s defensive battery included speeches by himself, Marcus Licinius Crassus, and, of course, Cicero, whose defense speech on Caelius’s behalf survives as one of the most read classics of Roman oratory.\(^8\) Caelius, in his own defense speech, had attacked Atratinus on the grounds that Gallus had dictated a speech to him, thus suggesting that Atratinus “was no true orator but a mere schoolboy parroting his teacher,” and the rhetor was further maligned later in the speech.\(^8\) But despite these dispersions—predictable from someone in Caelius’s position, being at pains to discredit his prosecutor—it is clear that Gallus, in his function as Latin rhetor, had become involved in the networks of the Republican political competition.

Connections to the political life of the late Republic are similarly evident with the other known Latin rhetors. Pitholaus, for example, manumitted for his talents and learning, proceeded to assist his patronus with a prosecution.\(^8\) This patronus, a certain Otacilius, was part of a family with connections to both Pompeius Strabo and his son, Pompey. It is in connection with the latter that Pitholaus is best known.\(^8\) Pompey was one of his students, perhaps between 92–90 and/or 50–49, when Pompey was reported to have “recommenced his practice of declaiming” (DGR 25.3: repetisse declamandi consuetudinem) to strengthen his opposition to the tribune Gaius Sempronius Curio, who was then advancing Caesar’s interests at Rome. Pitholaus’s verbal jabs against Caesar

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\(^8\) For the case, see Alexander 1990, 134–35 (= no. 275) and Dyck 2013, 1–17.  
\(^8\) The connection is attested from the reports of Suet. DGR 26.2, on which see Kaster 1995, 295–96 (quote from p. 295).  
\(^8\) Suet. DGR 27.1.  
\(^8\) See Kaster 1995, 297–99.
and his legate Gaius Caninius Rebilus (*cos. suff.* briefly in 45), suggest further political connections and involvement. Gnipho, who taught both grammar and rhetoric, included among his grammar students the young Caesar, *ca.* 90. But in his rhetorical teaching he also found important political connections, and it is probably in this area that Suetonius notes that distinguished men (*claros... viros*) used to frequent his school. These included Cicero himself, while he was *praetor* in 66. Thus, even if Cicero did not associate with Gallus in the 90s, he nevertheless was ultimately connected to Latin rhetors. The rhetor Epidius taught, “among others,” both Antony and Octavian, and their training under the rhetor was sufficiently well known that *ca.* 44–41 it could be used against them by Tiberius Cannutius (tribune, 44). Antony was also connected with Sextus Clodius, to whom he provided a major largesse in the form of 2,000 *iugera* of Sicilian land, known to us from Cicero’s *Second Philippic*. As Kaster has noted, the context of Cicero’s comments there suggest that Antony had called on the rhetor Clodius to help him prepare for his rebuttal to Cicero’s *First Philippic*, which the future triumvir delivered on 19 September 44.

These connections demonstrate that these early Latin rhetors, far from being marginalized, appear to have been connected to the political culture of the Republic,

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84 Suet. *Jul.* 75.5 and Macr. 2.2.13, on which, see Kaster 1995, 297–99.  
85 For the date of Caesar’s education, see Kaster 1995, 120.  
86 Suet. *DGR* 7.2. Cf. Macr. 3.12.8; Suet. *DGR* 25.3.  
87 This point bears consideration especially given the tendency to wholly divorce Cicero from rhetors (especially Latin rhetors) and the teaching of rhetoric. I will return to this point in chapter two, but already one ought to be skeptical about claims such as “intellectually, Cicero regarded virtually all rhetoricians, Greek and Roman, and wherever they worked, with equal contempt” (Wisse 2002b, 346). Neither Cicero’s interest in studying with Gallus when he was in his teens, nor his actual presence at Gnipho’s school in his early 40s suggests such an attitude.  
88 Suet. *DGR* 28.1. The attack appears to have been related to Epidius’s *calumnia* and, implicitly, his lower social status in comparison with Publius Servilius Vatia (*cos.* 79). Cf. Caelius’s attack against Atratinus, discussed above.  
89 Kaster 1995, 311–12.
including a number of the central figures involved in politics during this period. On the one hand, Latin rhetors were sought out by young members of the aristocracy looking for a competitive advantage before their emergence in public life. But, in addition, it is also clear that the perceived usefulness of Latin rhetors extended beyond childhood, whence Pitholaus’s aid for his patronus in his prosecution, Cicero’s attendance of Gnipo’s schola even as a praetor, Pompey’s return to declamation in 50–49, and Antony’s enlistment of Clodius in his preparations for his public response to Cicero’s Demosthenian assault. Robert Kaster has noted that our knowledge of the Latin rhetors in this period, largely dependent upon Suetonius’s DGR, does not, in all likelihood, form anything like a representative sample. Suetonius’s ability to report on the rhetors he discusses in DGR was partially due to the connections of these rhetors to such significant political figures as Marius, Pompey, Cicero, Antony, and Octavian, which contributed to their preservation in the historiographical tradition to which Suetonius had access.\footnote{Kaster 1995, xlvi–xlviii.}

There were, no doubt, other less distinguished Latin rhetors who taught less illustrious pupils. But this does not take away from the present point: many significant political figures in the late Republic were connected with Latin rhetors. As I argue in chapters three and four below, this is the beginning of a long-term relationship.

### §1.4 Conclusion: A new baseline, and further challenges

In this chapter, I have offered a reassessment of the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power in its earliest stages. Common interpretations, with debt to Suetonius, have held that the Roman elite met this new kind of education with
hostility and opposed it. I have argued here that the Latin rhetors both recreated the Greek τέχνη by adapting it for their Roman audiences, and found success among the governing elite in the late Republic. Despite the edict of the censors, prosopographical evidence suggests that Latin rhetoric was actually quite successful when it emerged, and included some of the most successful competitors in the Republican political elite among its acolytes.

If this is a preferable interpretation of the evidence—and I think that it is—then we have a new baseline for assessing the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power diachronically. As we saw above, George Kennedy had argued in the case of Quintilian’s salarium from Vespasian, that “the Roman state had taken 163 years to move from an official policy of trying to prevent the teaching of Latin rhetoric to subsidy of it.” Jean-Michel David claimed that “the aristocracy that governed the city could not accept the establishment of such a system of instruction… Their reaction was very hostile.” But if we read the evidence as I am suggesting here, attributing such opposition either to the Roman state as a whole, or, as David prefers, the governing aristocracy at large, seems to go too far. There is sufficient evidence to show that a number of significant and influential members of Rome’s governing aristocracy embraced Latin rhetorical education and sought training and aid from Latin rhetors. And if the governing elite had embraced Latin rhetorical education ab ovo, then Quintilian’s case under the Flavians no longer needs to be read as a radical departure from Republican practice. On the contrary, it could be the continuation of a relationship that began with the discipline itself.
But is there evidence that there was a sustained interest in Latin rhetoric among the Roman aristocracy? This question will reappear in chapter three. But I conclude here by returning to Suetonius’s brief history of the discipline. Following his citation of the edict, Suetonius notes that rhetoric was ultimately appreciated by the elite, and cites Cicero in particular *(DGR 25.3)*:

Paulatim et ipsa utilis honestaque apparuit multique eam et praesidii causa et gloriae appetiverunt: Cicero ad praeturam usque etiam Graece declamitavit, Latine vero senior quoque et quidem cum consulibus Hirtio et Pansa, quos discipulos et grandis praetextatos vocabat.

Gradually even rhetoric itself was perceived as useful and honorable, and many sought it for the sake of defense and for glory: Cicero even declaimed in Greek all the way up to his praetorship, and he also did so in Latin when very old and, in fact, with the consuls Hirtius and Pansa, whom he was wont to call his “students” and “big boys.”

We have already seen above that Cicero was involved in Latin rhetorical education in this early period, both in his composition of the *de Inventione*, the earliest extant Latin *ars*, and in his work with the early rhetor Gnipho. That Cicero exercised Hirtius and Pansa in Latin declamation between 46 and 43 is attested in a number of sources, including Cicero’s own letters; Dolabella can be added to this group, and we find Cicero, in fact,
trying to recruit other friends to join his circle of declaimers.\textsuperscript{91} He would not have called himself a Latin rhetor, but, “in practice, Cicero did indeed teach rhetoric.”\textsuperscript{92} Still, Suetonius’s comment here, that “rhetoric itself was perceived as useful and honorable, and many sought it for the sake of defense and for glory,” raises an important point: there were reasons why rhetoric was pursued by the elite. This, Suetonius suggests, was because of their perception of the discipline (\textit{utilis honestaque apparuit}) and what they believed they could gain from rhetoric’s cultivation (\textit{multique eam et praesidii causa et gloriae appetiverunt}). And about this aspect of rhetoric’s reception among the elite, the present chapter, with its prosopographical evidence, has contributed only a limited amount. But Suetonius’s citation of Cicero here points in the right direction. Not only does the undisputed master of Roman oratory offer important evidence for the practice of Latin declamation and interest in technical rhetoric among Rome’s governing elite in this period, but from his writings we can learn a great deal about what it was that made rhetoric seem like such a valuable discipline to the Romans. And this will be the topic of investigation in chapter two.

\textbf{§1.5 Appendix: Freedmen Latin rhetors (\textit{Sen. Contr. 2 pr. 5})}

There has been some scholarly disagreement about the social status of the Latin rhetors discussed in this chapter. This issue, however, has been predominately discussed \textit{en passant}, and to my knowledge has not yet received any focused treatment. Yet, since it is a matter of some significance for the history of Latin rhetorical education, a brief

\textsuperscript{91} See van der Blom 2010, 311–15 with n. 5; Rawson 1975, 214–16; Steel 2005, 133–34.

\textsuperscript{92} Quote from van der Blom 2010, 312.
assessment seems warranted here. To preview the conclusion: I believe the evidence suggests that Latin rhetors in the early period were freedmen.

The starting point is a passage in the elder Seneca’s preface to his second book of *controversiae* in *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae Divisiones Colores*.\(^3\) Here, as often in the surviving prefaces, Seneca introduces a particularly noteworthy declaimer, in this case the philosopher Papirius Fabianus. In his youth, Seneca explains, Fabianus was as famous for his declamation as he would later be for his philosophical argumentation.\(^4\) He studied with Arellius Fuscus, who ranked among the four finest declaimers (the so-called *primum tetradeum*) that Seneca had ever heard.\(^5\) But Fuscus was not Fabianus’s only teacher:

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habuit et Blandum rhetorem praepceptorem, qui eques Romanus Romae docuit; 
ante illum intra libertinos praepceptores pulcherrimae disciplinae continebantur, et 
minime probabili more turpe erat docere quod honestum erat discere. (Contr. 2 pr. 5)
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He also had the rhetor Blandus as a teacher, a Roman equestrian, who taught at Rome; before that man (i.e. Blandus), the teachers of the finest of subjects were confined to freedmen, and in an absurd fashion it was shameful to teach what it was virtuous to learn.

\(^3\) Seneca and his work are introduced at length in §3.1 below.

\(^4\) *Contr. 2 pr. 1*; Fabianus’s eloquence is also the topic of Sen. *Ep.* 100. For biographical details of Papirius Fabianus, see Borneque 1902, 185–86 and (much more recent and with much fuller bibliography) Echavarren 2007b, 206–207 = no. 206.

\(^5\) *Contr. 10 pr. 13*; For Fuscus, see Echavarren 2007b, 66–68 = no. 37, and Huelsenbeck 2009, 161–175.
Thus, Seneca tells us that Latin rhetors comprised a group that was restricted to freedmen prior to Lucius Rubellius Blandus, who raised the social ceiling for teachers of the discipline.\textsuperscript{96} As for Blandus, scholars have been able to assemble a considerable amount of material about this rhetor and his family.\textsuperscript{97} For example, Blandus, an equestrian from Tibur, was the father of Gaius Rubellius Blandus, who served as proconsul of Crete and Cyrene under Augustus. He was also the grandfather of the novus homo Gaius Rubellius Blandus (\textit{cos. suff.} 18 CE) who married Iulia, granddaughter of the emperor Tiberius in 33 CE; at that time, the historian Tacitus notes that the grandfather was still remembered by many (\textit{plerique meminerant}).\textsuperscript{98} Ronald Syme puts our rhetor’s birth \textit{ca.} 67–63, a range that fits well with our broader knowledge of his family and his rhetorical activity.\textsuperscript{99} This date and Seneca’s testimony combine to suggest that all of the rhetors treated in this chapter (Clodius, the latest, was born \textit{ca.} 80–70), would fall within the chronological period of freedmen Latin rhetors claimed by Seneca. If we assume that Blandus began to teach sometime between, say, age 25–35, that would project his emergence as the first equestrian and non-freedman rhetor sometime \textit{ca.} 42–28—well after our period. So far so good, but should we trust Seneca’s testimony on this point?


\textsuperscript{97} A comprehensive family tree is provided in \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}}, \textit{stemma} 11 (between pp. 82–83); our Rubellius is \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2}}, R 108.

\textsuperscript{98} Tac. \textit{Ann.} 6.27.1; on the marriage, see Syme 1982b = \textit{RP} 4:177–98.

\textsuperscript{99} Syme 1982b, 65 = \textit{RP} 4:180. Other than the evidence for his family that is gathered by Syme, only Blandus’s teaching of Fabianus (b. \textit{ca.} 35: Bornecque 1902, 185) provides a chronological anchor. Syme’s dates are consistent with those proposed for Fabianus’s other teacher, Arellius Fuscus, who was born \textit{ca.} 65–60 (see Huelsenbeck 2009, 166). 45 (Bornecque 1902, 194, followed by Bardon 1956, 85), is too late for Blandus’s birth.
Seneca’s claim in this passage has been called into doubt by Robert Kaster. Kaster argues that Seneca is guilty of overgeneralization in the passage cited above, and therefore his testimony is unreliable as an indication of the social status of the earliest Latin rhetors. Kaster’s objection turns on his belief that Seneca in our passage refers to “all teachers of pulcherrimae disciplinae, not just teachers of rhetoric.” If this were so, Kaster believes that Seneca’s generalization would be disproved by any known earlier case of a freeborn teacher of a subject that might be considered a pulcherrima disciplina. His counterexample is the grammarian Lucius Orbilius Pupillus, the notoriously abusive teacher of Horace, born in 113 or 112, and who was indeed freeborn.

But is it in fact the case that Seneca here refers to “all teachers of pulcherrimae disciplinae”? What emerges from Kaster’s interpretation is that he understands Seneca’s Latin in a different way from the translation presented above, taking pulcherrimae disciplinae instead as nominative plural and praeceptores as an accusative in apposition to libertinos. In a footnote and incidentally, Jakob Wisse has disputed Kaster’s interpretation of the passage, but only briefly, while arguing that it was probably the case that at least most of the early Latin rhetors were freedmen. I do not disagree with Wisse’s overall conclusion, and in fact a bit more can be said on behalf of his point (below). But Kaster’s interpretation is, of course, possible, and at least deserves to be weighed and considered. Pace Kaster, though, his is far and away the minority interpretation of the passage. Only one of Seneca’s four modern-language translators takes the passage in the way that he suggests, and Eduard Norden also understood the

100 Kaster 1995, 292.
101 Wisse 2002b, 345–46 n. 30: “The claim in Kaster (1995): 292 that Seneca’s generalization is unreliable is based on the notion that he ‘refers to all teachers of pulcherrimae disciplinae, not just teachers of rhetoric,’ which is incorrect (the phrase is genitive sing.).”
passage with the majority. Not that majority opinion is necessarily a guarantor of truth. But also speaking against Kaster’s interpretation is that the objective genitive with *praeeceptor* is common, and indeed our passage is included as one such example in Wolfram Euler’s article the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*. Further, in its context, it would be rather odd for Seneca to sandwich a general assertion about all disciplines between two passages specifically devoted to rhetoric (he continues by citing Gallus as the earliest Latin rhetor), and there is no indication that he is trying to expand the discussion beyond rhetoric.

Finally, further support can be found from the known examples. None of the extant evidence disproves Seneca’s claim, and what evidence we do have tends to agree with his picture. First, all of the three earliest known teachers of Latin rhetoric, Gallus, Pitholaus, and Gnipho are identified as freedmen by our sources. There is also nothing incompatible with our knowledge of Epidius and the possibility of him being a freedman. And it is the same with Clodius, the last Latin rhetor whose memory is

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103 *TLL* 10.2.3:424.18–20.

104 Seneca himself, immediately following the passage cited above, refers to Gallus, implicitly classing him among the early freedmen rhetors. Pitholaus is identified as a freedman by Suetonius at *DGR* 27.2, evidently depending on Cornelius Nepos’s *de Viris Illustribus* (= fr. 57 Marshall). Gnipho (Suet. *DGR* 7.1) was originally a freeborn, but his exposure at birth led to his enslavement (Kaster 1995, 117: “regarded as a slave *de facto*”) and thus he was later manumitted and therefore a freedman.

105 *Pace* Kaster 1995, 301, Epidius’s activity in the courts that led to him being condemned for *calumnia* (Suet. *DGR* 28.1) does not suggest that he was freeborn. Freedmen were *sui iuris* (Treggiari 1969, 81), could bring charges in court, and could (presumably) be condemned for bringing frivolous ones. For freedmen in the court, see, e.g., Cic. *Scaur*. 23: “As a boy I seem to have heard that Lucius Aelius, a learned and clever freedman (*libertinum hominem litteratum ac facetum*), when he was attempting to exact retribution for wrongs suffered by his patron, had initiated criminal proceedings (*nomen… detulisse*) against Quintus Mutto, an exceptionally disreputable man.” Epidius’s claimed descent from the apotheotic Gaius Epidius of Nuceria (*DGR* 28.2) seems to me to be indecisive regarding his social status.
preserved by Suetonius and who predates the equestrian Blandus. While it is typically assumed that Clodius was an enfranchised *peregrinus*, the major studies that assert this do so without any indication of engagement with Seneca’s testimony on the matter.¹⁰⁶ In fact, given what little we know about Clodius, he might just as well have been a freedman, like the other recipient of a major Leontine land grant by Antony, Antony’s doctor, with whom Clodius is paired in a passage in Cicero’s *Second Philippic*.¹⁰⁷ The next rhetor in Suetonius’s collection, Gaius Albucius Silus, born *ca.* 60–55, post-dates Blandus and belongs with the later rhetors of the Julio-Claudian period.¹⁰⁸ Seneca’s testimony, therefore, is consistent with our other evidence for the social status of these early Latin rhetors, especially so in the case of the earliest generation (Gallus, Pitholaus, Gnipho).¹⁰⁹ In short, the evidence suggests that the earliest Latin rhetors were probably freedmen.

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¹⁰⁶ Assumption that Clodius was an enfranchised *peregrinus*: Badian 1984, 305; Rawson 1973, 224; Wiseman 1974, 135–37. Much the same assumption might have been made about Marcus Antonius Gnipho, if we lacked his *cognomen* and Suetonius’s account of his origins.

¹⁰⁷ *Cic. Phil.* 2.101: “Three thousand *iugera* for your doctor (*medico*)—what would you have given if he had restored you to sanity?” The identity of Antony’s doctor is unknown. John Morgan’s suggestion of Antonius Musa (*apud* Shackleton Bailey, Ramsey, and Manuwald 2009, 154 n. 131), is attractive. Musa had been a slave of Antony’s family and freed by Antony himself or one of his relations. Even if the doctor was not Musa, it remains likely that he was a freedman: see Treggiari 1969, 130–31.

¹⁰⁸ For Silus, see Kaster 1995, 313–16, and Echavarren 2007b, 50–54 = no. 20, both with further bibliography and additional references. The rhetors of this period are the topic of chapter three below.

¹⁰⁹ Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to suppose that Seneca is guilty of mild overgeneralization (cf. Wisse 2002, 345–46 n. 30: “at most two exceptions are known”), I see no reason to doubt that the state of affairs was at least generally the way Seneca has described it. As to the source of Seneca’s knowledge of Blandus’s status, Fairweather 1981, 92–93, suggests that Seneca may have been depending on Cornelius Nepos’s *de Viris Illustribus*. This is possible, but her argument is more easily accepted by including (as Fairweather does) Friderich Haase’s supplement, *i.e.* *qui (primus) eques* at *Contr.* 2 pr. 5. I follow Håkanson’s text (*qui eques*).
Chapter 2: Cicero, *Eloquentia*, and Justifying Rhetoric in the Republic

In the last chapter, we examined evidence that revealed how Latin rhetorical education was embraced in the late Republic by some of the most prominent political figures of the period. Claims for its wholesale rejection by the aristocracy that governed the City—the resistance interpretation—had gone too far. But that is not quite the whole story of the reception of Latin rhetorical education in the late Republic. If this new kind of education was not banned, repressed, or uniformly rejected by Rome’s rulers, it still faced other difficulties at a more theoretical and intellectual level. And in this respect rhetoric was not unique.

Rhetoric was originally a Greek technical discipline. Toward such subjects there seems to have been a certain theoretical anxiety and aversion that was common to many members of the Roman aristocracy.¹ At stake was the nature of appropriate behavior for the Roman elite. For the Roman aristocrat, success was supposed to be a product of activity (*actio*), and only certain activities were fitting. For example, military success, holding office, representing clients, wielding authority in the senate, governing a province, and augmenting the majesty of the Republic all counted as legitimate pastimes for the Roman elite. But for an aristocrat to spend time on intellectual, and especially Greek pursuits—this seems to have often been viewed as unjustifiable and suspicious.

¹ On this issue see, e.g., Griffin 1989, 12–18; Gildenhard 2007, 45–63; and Baraz 2012, 12–43.
Thus, in his *de Officiis*, Cicero, after discussing Romans who spent time pursuing astronomy, mathematics, and dialectic, explains (1.19)

…quae omnes artes in veri investigatione versantur. Cuius studio a rebus gerendis abduci contra officium est; virtutis enim laus omnis in actione consistit.

…all of these arts are occupied with the inquiry into truth but being led away from conducting affairs by this pursuit is contrary to moral obligation. For praise of excellence entirely depends upon action.²

Thus, Miriam Griffin remarks on the Romans’ “complex attitude to all things Greek”: “they were not to be ruled by something which they had learned from their subjects.”³

The problems faced by a Roman with interests in Greek disciplinae are well illustrated in the preface to Cicero’s *Lucullus*, the second book of his so-called *Academica Priora*.⁴ There, Cicero begins with praising his dedicatee, Lucius Licinius Lucullus. He starts by remarking on Lucullus’s early successes in forensic oratory in support of his father and his ascendance through increasingly prestigious offices: quaestor, aedile, praetor, and finally consul in 74 BCE.⁵ Cicero especially highlights Lucullus’s prudent administration of the province of Asia and his outstanding military

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² See Dyck 1996, 102–106 on this passage, which contains a combination of specifically Roman detail and Greek thought.
³ Griffin 1989, 13.
⁴ On the composition of Cicero’s *Academica*, see Griffin 1997. *Lucullus* (cited here as *Luc.*) is also cited in scholarly literature as *Academica* (Ac.) 2. An introduction to the work as a whole can be found in Brittain 2006, viii–lviii.
⁵ All dates in this chapter are BCE unless otherwise specified. For Lucullus’s life and career, see Keaveney 2009.
successes against Mithridates VI—a body of foreign service judged by Cicero to have been “of great benefit to the Republic” (Luc. 3: magna cum utilitate rei publicae). Cicero next, however, turns to Lucullus’s intellectual interests and his relationship with the Academic philosopher Antiochus of Ascalon.6 At this point, Cicero starts to express concern over how such interests might reflect on his subject (Luc. 5):

Ac vereor interdum ne talium personarum cum amplificare velim minuam etiam gloriam. sunt enim multi qui omnino Graecas non ament litteras, plures qui philosophiam, reliqui qui etiam si haec non inprobent tamen earum rerum disputationem principibus civitatis non ita decoram putent.

But at times I’m apprehensive that, though I’d like to increase the glory of such great figures, I’m actually diminishing it. For there are many who do not care for Greek literary pursuits in any circumstance, more who feel this way about philosophy, and, as for the rest, even if they don’t condemn this material, yet they consider discussion of these matters not very suitable for leaders of the state.

The passage, though in context clearly more focused on philosophy, also illustrates a challenge that rhetoric needed to overcome in order to be fully accepted in Roman political culture. But how was it possible to achieve this objective?

To answer this question, the present chapter focuses on the rhetorical writings of Cicero, where one can find an extended answer in a number of related passages in which Cicero discusses rhetoric’s relationship with Roman political power. I argue that Cicero

6 On the relationship between Lucullus and Antiochus, see Keaveney 2009, 16–19.
provides a justification for studying rhetoric by emphasizing its utility for the Roman aristocracy and for the Republic. In this way, Cicero makes this once-Greek discipline a good fit with the values that underpinned Roman political culture. In §2.1 I discuss the context of Cicero’s argument, introduce his rhetorical writings, and situate his justification of rhetoric within his broader educational and intellectual projects. In §2.2, I introduce the term that will be of particular significance in many of Cicero’s arguments, *eloquentia*. I argue that in Cicero’s thought *eloquentia*, semantically and causally, is very closely connected to rhetoric. In §2.3 I turn to Cicero’s earliest work, *de Inventione* (ca. 91–89), and provide a detailed analysis of the preface of book one (*Inv*. 1.1–5), where Cicero first presents his argument for rhetoric’s position at Rome. §2.4 then considers some of the ways Cicero restates and develops the argument in *de Inventione* in his more mature rhetorical works, *de Oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator*. While a number of his theoretical ideas about rhetoric exhibit considerable development in these works, Cicero continues to press his arguments for rhetoric’s appropriateness at Rome along the lines first introduced in *de Inventione*. In §2.5, I conclude by considering the impact of Cicero’s arguments and their effectiveness as a product of the predominant mode in which they are presented, namely, praise.

§2.1 The context of Cicero’s contributions

We have already encountered the genre of the rhetorical handbook in the previous chapter. As discussed in §1.1, when Latin rhetors initiated prospective orators in the *praecepta* of their discipline, it was very likely that they were doing so by adopting and adapting Greek specimens of this genre. Such handbooks were, evidently, quite common
in the late Republic. In 55, for example, in the prefatory letter to his brother Quintus that opens *de Oratore*, Cicero remarks that the *praeccepta* of Greek rhetoricians “are accessible and available to everyone” (*de Orat.* 1.23: *illa pateant in promptuque sint omnibus*). It is unclear whether the Latin rhetors themselves actually contributed to the tradition by writing their own *artes*. But what is clear, however, is that, with or without the Latin rhetors, the members of the Roman aristocracy made their own contributions to the handbook tradition. Three of these were already mentioned above in chapter one: Marcus Antonius’s *libellus de ratione dicendi* (written *ca.* 102–91, though it is unclear how technical this work was or precisely how it related to this tradition), Cicero’s youthful *de Inventione* (*ca.* 91–89), and the anonymous Auctor’s *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (*ca.* 86–82). The first two works are, of course, written by known members of the Roman aristocracy. Although the identity of the Auctor remains unclear, he almost certainly would have fit alongside these two, an active Roman politician and, in all likelihood, a senator. At least two other authors in our period also contributed: the learned senators Marcus Terentius Varro (at least three books of *Rhetorica*; also covered in his nine-book *Disciplinae*) as well as Publius Nigidius Figulus (writing on gesture, like Gallus).

All of these works testify to how Latin technical rhetoric had begun to fit within the culture of the Roman aristocracy during this period. But among these authors, one individual made far and away the most significant contribution. As recognized by

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7 See, e.g., the Auctor’s intentions (3.3) to write a treatise *de re militari* and another *de administratione rei publicae*. Cf. comments in Achard 1989, xxvi–xxvii.

8 For Varro’s *libri rhetoriciorum* (one fragment), see *GL* 2:489.2; it is unclear how his three books of *Suasiones* might fit into this discussion (on which, see Ritschl 1848, 495–97 = Ritschl 1877, 433–36). For Varro’s *Disciplinae*, about which there has been considerable debate, see Shanzer 2005. For Figulus’s *de gestu*, see Quint. *Inst.* 11.3.143.
Quintilian (Inst. 3.1.20), Cicero’s legacy to rhetoric can be properly understood as bipartite, stemming from his incredible contributions in the separate but, in his case, related spheres of oratory and rhetorical theory. On the one hand, Cicero’s published orations were to become the touchstone to which later Latin rhetorical treatises would constantly turn for exemplary instances of eloquence. Indeed, this process was initiated by Cicero himself: when he turns from citing passages from Ennius and tragedians to passages from his own pro Milone or in Verrem to exemplify stylistic precepts in Orator, Cicero both realizes his own status as a classic, and accurately forecasts one aspect of his Nachleben. Additionally, Cicero did not stop his rhetorical theorizing with de Inventione. The seven works that together form Cicero’s rhetorica—de Inventione, de Oratore, Partitiones Oratoriae, Brutus, de Optimo Genere Oratorum, Orator, and Topica—span his literary career and have left a enduring mark on the way rhetoric was understood and practiced, in antiquity and beyond.

Four of Cicero’s rhetorical works will be considered in the present chapter and can be briefly introduced here. I begin with de Inventione, completed when Cicero was only in his teens. This work is closest chronologically to the advent of Latin rhetorical education at Rome. De Inventione takes the form of a rhetorical handbook (ars), but covers only one of the “activities” of the orator, namely the discovery of arguments, and

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9 Cf. J. Powell and Paterson 2004, 43: “A large part of Cicero’s success should no doubt be attributed to the fact that he was the first Roman orator to assimilate and ponder the theory of rhetoric in the fullest sense. There can be little doubt that in this respect he was exceptional for his generation and, in a Roman context, original, at least as regards to his synthesis of the different strands of Greek doctrine.”

10 See Orat. 164–67, 210, and 232.

11 I follow modern convention in referring to this collection as Cicero’s rhetorica. In antiquity, rhetorica would have designated simply the work now referred to as de Inventione. See, e.g., Quint. Inst. 2.15.6.

12 For the dating of Inv., see Corbeill 2002, 32–33 with references in n. 36
ends before treatment of arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Despite its youth and limitations in scope, this work will receive considerable analysis in the present chapter because the arguments for rhetoric’s political utility that Cicero first presents in *De Inventione*. After *De Inventione*, Cicero did not return to write on rhetorical theory for some three and half decades. Then, late in 55, he composed *De Oratore*. Cicero indicates in the preface of that work that he considered it a suitable and mature replacement for his earlier handbook. But *De Oratore* goes well beyond the ambitions of his youthful foray. Cicero abandons, for example, the treatise format now in favor of dialogue, a genre Cicero essentially creates in Latin literature, and thereby connects *De Oratore* to Plato’s *Gorgias* and *Phaedrus* rather than rhetorical handbooks. The work accordingly operates on a different literary level, as Cicero creates a rival to the Platonic dialogue form via the work’s “special brilliance of vivid characterization and dramatic representation.” At the rhetorical level, Cicero now treats all five of the orator’s activities, in varying degrees of detail, but does so in an innovative manner, proposing an enriched form of technical rhetoric that can provide a more suitable foundation for a Roman orator when it is coupled with a maximalist educational program that embraces the unity of rhetoric and philosophy as well as universal knowledge. In the preface to the second book of *De Divinatione* (written spring 44) Cicero combines *De Oratore* with a pair of his later works, *Brutus* and *Orator*, to form a unit that he refers to as his “oratorical books” (*oratorii libri*). *Brutus* and *Orator* were both written in 46, the

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13 For *De Orat.* as a replacement for *Inv.*, see *De Orat.* 1.5.
14 For introductory material to the *De Orat.*, see May and Wisse 2001, 3–48 and Wisse 2002a.
15 On *De Orat.* its relationship with Plato’s dialogues, see Fantham 2004, 48–77.
16 Fantham 2004, 50.
17 *Div.* 2.4; for the issues involved in dating *Div.*, see Wardle 2006, 37–43.
former finished in the spring and the latter completed by the end of summer. The works are, therefore, closely connected chronologically, and they are also typically considered to be closely related due to their engagement with the Asianist-Atticist controversy. In Brutus, Cicero appears to follow de Oratore in its dialogue form, but the work has been described as a generic “anomaly” and a “hybrid”: it is a dialogue cum history of Roman oratory that proceeds, teleologically, towards the canonization of Cicero himself in the tradition that he presents, and exhibits traits of a philosophical treatise, rhetorical ars, biography (and autobiography), and a laudatio funebris. Orator takes the form of an epistle to Marcus Iunius Brutus, answering the dedicatee’s repeated requests for an account of the best style of speaking. Here, Cicero looks back to his de Oratore insofar as he returns to his vision of the perfect orator. But he similarly looks forward towards the nascent philosophical projects that were to occupy him for the remainder of his life, as he couches his investigation in Academic terms as the pursuit of the Platonic form of perfect eloquence (Orat. 9–10: perfectae eloquentiae speciem... has rerum formas appellat iōeας... magister Plato). Orator treats all of the activities of the orator typical of an ars, at least briefly, but the work is dominated by Cicero’s treatment of style.

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18 For the dates see Douglas 1966, ix–x and Gowing 2000, 62–64 (Brut.) and Yon 1964, vi–ix (Orat.). Convenient introductions to both works with bibliographic guides are available in Narducci 2002a and Narducci 2002b.
19 For a good access-point for the debate between Atticists and Asianists, see Narducci 2002a, 408–412.
20 Drawing on Gowing 2000, 39 and Dugan 2005, 172–74. For another example of the work’s generic exceptionalism, cf. Hendrickson and Hubbell 1939, 260–61 note a, who remark that Cicero’s account of his own education and career at Brut. 301–330 “is the earliest considerable piece of autobiography that has come down to us from antiquity.”
(elocutio). Cicero’s most mature rhetorical work thus concentrates on the most difficult and advanced topic in rhetorical education.\footnote{On style as the most difficult of the orator’s activities, see Quint. \textit{Inst.} 8 pr. 13. For the difficulty of style and its place in ancient rhetorical curricula, see Heath 2004, 226–27.}

It is helpful in considering these works to place them within the context of Cicero’s broader educational projects. In the preface to book two of \textit{de Divinatione}, Cicero explains the motivations for a great deal of his intellectual writing as follows (\textit{Div.} 2.1):

Quaerenti mihi multumque et diu cogitanti quanam re possem prodesse quam plurimis, ne quando intermitterem consulere rei publicae, nulla maior occurrebat quam si optimarum artium vias traderem meis civibus; quod compluribus iam libris me arbitror consecutum.

When I was putting a great deal of effort and time searching and considering how I could be of use to as many people as possible, so that I not fail to keep caring for the Republic, I found no greater means than to hand down to my fellow citizens the methods of the best \textit{artes}—a task which I judge I have pursued already in a very large number of books.

After listing his philosophical efforts—\textit{Hortensius}, \textit{Academica}, \textit{Tusculanae Disputationes}, \textit{de Natura Deorum}, and others—Cicero adds to this catalogue his rhetorical trilogy of \textit{de Oratore}, \textit{Brutus}, and \textit{Orator}, defending their inclusion on the basis of the unity of philosophical and rhetorical investigation that he attributes there to
Aristotle and Theophrastus (Div. 2.4). Indeed, Cicero emphasizes throughout his *rhetorica* that the two disciplines need to be pursued together. After expressing his hopes to treat the entirety of philosophy in Latin, Cicero again gestures towards the civic utility of his project (Div. 2.5):

Quod enim munus rei publicae afferre maius meliusve possumus, quam si docemus atque erudimus iuventutem, his praesertim moribus atque temporibus, quibus ita prolapsa est, ut omnium opibus refrenanda atque coercenda sit? Nec vero id effici posse confido, quod ne postulandum quidem est, ut omnes adulescentes se ad haec studia convertant. Pauci utinam! quorum tamen in re publica late patere poterit industria.

For what service to the Republic can we offer that is greater or better than if we teach and educate the youth, especially in the context of the present *mores* and times, in which the youth has so declined that it must be restrained and corrected by the efforts of all? And I am not, in fact, certain that this—which shouldn’t be demanded at any rate—can be brought about, namely that all young men focus themselves on these studies. If only a few would! Nevertheless, the effort of these few would be able to extend itself far and wide in the Republic.

In these passages from the second preface of *de Divinatione*, Cicero thus sets up his intellectual writings, including his rhetorical treatises, as a means of continuing his
service to the Republic (consulere rei publicae; munus rei publicae) which he hopes could have a broad effect.

Recently, scholars have made significant progress in elucidating some of the complexities and tensions built into Cicero’s project, and how he responded to the challenges presented by this undertaking. In fact, what Cicero does in these works is attempt to turn a foreign body of technical knowledge—Greek doctrinae—into a suitable and salubrious pursuit for a Roman aristocrat. The following statements of Ingo Gildenhard and Yelena Baraz are illustrative:

In his literary works, (Greek) doctrina acquires unprecedented significance. In part, his treatises and dialogues are a strategic attempt at transforming his supreme mastery of Greek knowledge and learning into an enhanced reputation and standing among his aristocratic peers. But he took care to portray his educational revolution as the continuation of sanctioned tradition. The educational scenarios of his dialogues are devised to illustrate the fact that knowledge of Greek (rhetorical and philosophical) doctrina was reconcilable with the social status of a Roman aristocrat, had its place in Roman aristocratic culture, and was of political relevance. (Gildenhard 2007, 30)

Just as the maiores assessed the utility of individual elements of Greek intellectual material for their contemporary cultural and political needs, so Cicero, in assessing his own situation, comes to the conclusion that embedding philosophy
in the Roman cultural fabric will serve the current needs of the state and the
elite…

Cicero’s intention is undoubtedly domesticating: he appropriates and molds the
Greek material, illustrates it with Roman examples, puts it in the mouths of great
Romans of the past and links it, through allusion and rhetoric, to Roman practices
and Roman literature. What he envisions is an incorporation of Greek philosophy,
as reconceived by him, into the cultural arsenal of the Roman elite. (Baraz 2012,
2–3, 97)

Both Gildenhard and Baraz focus on Cicero’s *philosophica*, but one can see Cicero at
work in essentially the same processes in his *rhetorica*. There, Cicero communicates the
precepts of technical rhetoric, enriched, modified, or replaced according to his own
vision, in Latin and for a Roman audience. His vision for rhetoric is transformative and
didactic. Thus, when Cicero sends a copy of *de Oratore* in December 54 to his friend and
ally Gaius Lentulus Spinther, he recommends the work to Lentulus’s young son—thus
educating the youth, as he says is his mission statement in *Div*. 2.5—and points to the *de
Oratore*’s particular value deriving from Cicero’s departures from the standard doctrines
of technical rhetoric (*Fam*. 1.9.23):

> scripsi igitur Aristotelio more, quem ad modum quidem volui, tris libros in
disputatione ac dialogo de oratore, quos arbitror Lentulo tuo fore non inutilis.
abhorrent enim a communibus praeceptis atque omnem antiquorum et
Aristoteliam et Isocratiam rationem oratoriam complectuntur.
I have, therefore, written in Aristotle’s fashion—at least I wanted to do so—three books, structured as a debate and dialogue, entitled *de Oratore*, which I judge would not be without value to your dear Lentulus. For the books shun the standard *praeepta* and embrace the entirety of the ancient theory concerned with oratory, both the Aristotelian and the Isocratean strands.

This passage to Spinther thus tidily encapsulates a number of the issues at play in Cicero’s Latin transformation of Greek *doctrinae*. But as we have seen in *de Divinatione*, Cicero further indicated that he conceived of his intellectual literary activity as being a kind of service to the Republic. In the case of the *philosophica*, Gildenhard and Baraz have emphasized, for example, how Cicero hopes for transformative moral renewal via a newly Roman philosophical education that could help correct what Cicero viewed as the moral failings of the late Republican Roman aristocracy. But what about rhetoric? Given the significance of service to Rome in value system of the Republican aristocrat, understanding Cicero’s position on this issue provides an answer to the question that opened this chapter: how was a technical and originally Greek doctrine accommodated among the ideals of the Roman aristocracy? Why was rhetoric good for Rome? Resolving this point enables us to understand more completely why rhetoric became embraced by the Republican aristocracy.
§2.2 The significance of eloquentia

There are a number of ways that Cicero makes rhetoric suitable for Romans in his rhetorical writings. Many of the strategies he employs are parallel with what scholars have also found in his *philosophica*. For example, in the *rhetorica* too we find Cicero illustrating originally Greek doctrine with Roman examples, and in the *de Oratore* rhetorical theory is expounded from the mouths of some of the most significant and dignified Roman orators from the generation that preceded him. While the historical Marcus Antonius, for example, was in all likelihood not interested or engaged with technical rhetorical theory, nevertheless Cicero presents Antonius discussing a variety of technical precepts, thereby authorizing interest in this material for his Roman audience.

My focus here, however, will be a single argumentative thread in Cicero’s *rhetorica*, in which Cicero conveys his vision for rhetoric and connects it especially to political success and civic flourishing.

In making this argument, Cicero faced a number of complications. First and crucially, Cicero faced the issues of focus and definition, and needed to determine what exactly would be his subject matter. The one term that most frequently appears in the relevant passages is *eloquentia*. In fact, it is through his treatment of *eloquentia* that Cicero chiefly communicates his vision for the role that rhetoric can play in the Republic. These passages become a sort of charter for the political significance of rhetoric, and would continue to play a role in later generations of Latin rhetorical texts. But the relationship is not quite straightforward: Cicero is typically talking not about “rhetoric”

23 Roman illustrations of rhetorical principles are legion throughout Cicero’s rhetorical writings (and cf. §1.1 above on the early Latin rhetors and the *Rhet. Her.*). See, e.g., *Inv.* 2.52 (on Gaius Flaminius on trial for *maiestas*), and *de Ora*. 2.197–204 (Gaius Norbanus, also *maiestas*; see Alexander 1990, 44–45 = no. 86).

24 See Wisse 1989, 150–51, and above, p. 33 n. 51.
(e.g., *rhetorica ars* or *rhetorice*) but rather *eloquentia*. Thus we need to consider the connection between *eloquentia* and rhetoric in Cicero’s thought, in order to clarify how these passages function.

What exactly does Cicero have in mind when he refers to *eloquentia*?²⁵ Predictably, the answer depends on context, but for our purposes two meanings are particularly important. On the one hand, Cicero can use *eloquentia* in a general sense to indicate facility and effectiveness in speaking. This appears to be a basic and early meaning of the term, to judge from the earliest extant uses, an uncertain fragment of Caecilius Statius († ca. 168) and a remark in Terence’s *Phormio* (performed in 161 at the *Ludi Romani*).²⁶ Certainly in the latter case and apparently in the former, *eloquentia* is used to indicate skillful speaking in a judicial context. Somewhat later, *eloquentia* as skillful speaking can be used in the context of Roman aristocratic values, illustrating the quality that enables a Roman to be an orator of consequence. It first appears in this sort of context, in fact, in Cicero’s extended praise of *eloquentia* in *de Inventione* (ca. 91–89)—a point that will be considered further below in §2.3. This use is also found in Cicero’s other works. Thus, the opening of his earliest extant speech, the *pro Quinctio* (delivered spring 81) Cicero begins:

Quae res in civitate duae plurimum possunt, eae contra nos ambae faciunt in hoc tempore, summa gratia et eloquentia; quarum alteram, C. Aquili, vereor, alteram

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²⁵ The use of this word in Cicero and the significance of his extension of its meaning to include “rhetoric” has not been clarified hitherto as much as one might have expected. A work of foundational help in this process is *TLL* 5.2:408.28–412.5 (Kapp and Meyer); still useful too is the treatment in Ernesti 1797, 146–48. See also, diachronically and more wide-ranging, Klein 1994 and Fantham 2001, both with additional bibliography.

The two things that have the most power in our state are both working against us under the present circumstances, namely the highest degree of influence and *eloquentia*. Of these, Gaius Aquilius, I fear the one and dread the other. I am not without anxiety that the *eloquentia* of Quintus Hortensius may embarrass me in speaking, and I am not moderately horrified that the influence of Sextus Naevius may harm Publius Quinctius.

So also later in the same speech (*Quinct. 72*) *eloquentia* appears alongside *gravitas* and *honos* in a brief list of the virtues that make Lucius Philippus “one of the exceptionally distinguished men of the state” (*florentissimus civitatis*). We find this also in later Ciceronian works, but Cicero was not unique in using eloquence in this way during the Republic. Also similar, for example, is the catalogue of virtues that Quintus Claudius Quadrigarius applied in his *Annales* to the vicious but paradoxically admirable traitor Marcus Manlius Capitolinus. In a passage perhaps written not long after *pro Quinctio eloquentia*, Quadrigarius has *eloquentia* appear alongside *forma*, *facta*, *dignitas*, *acrimonia*, and *confidentia*.²⁷ In these cases *eloquentia* appears to play the role by

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²⁷ See F4 in *FRHist.* 2:499 with commentary in 3:301. For the date of Quadrigarius’s *Annales* (after 82 and possibly after 78), see *FRHist.* 1:288–89 with 306–307.
abstraction that the phrase like *optimus orator* might otherwise fill in a catalogue of achievements in the *laudatio funebris* for a departed aristocrat.\(^{28}\)

Importantly, however, *eloquentia* can also carry a more technical meaning, in a sense that appears to have been inaugurated by Cicero himself.\(^{29}\) *Eloquentia* is also used by Cicero as a translation of Greek ἡ ῥητορική τέχνη. In these cases it simply means “rhetoric.”\(^{30}\) In this sense, *eloquentia* finds its place alongside Cicero’s other Latin renditions of Greek technical vocabulary.\(^{31}\) This point can be illustrated from a number of cases in Cicero’s rhetorical writings.\(^{32}\) For example, in his summary of standard rhetorical *doctrina* in *de Orat.* 2.77–84, Antonius describes the rhetors’ characterization of the standard five activities of the orator (invention, arrangement, style, memory, delivery) as “the five “limbs”—so to speak—of eloquence” (*quibus enim ex quinque rebus constare dicitur, earum una quaeque est ars ipsa magna per sese*)—again referring to the five activities of the orator that were a standard part of rhetorical doctrine. In the following section (*Brut.* 26), Cicero continues to describe *eloquentia* as an *ars* (= rhetoric) that was invented by the Greeks. A

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\(^{28}\) As in the speech delivered at the funeral of Lucius Caecilius Metellus by his son Quintus in 221, preserved in Plin. *Nat.* 7.139–40 (*voluisse enim primarium bellatorem esse, optimum oratorem, fortissimum imperatorum*, etc.). On the passage, see Rosenstein 2006, 368.

\(^{29}\) Granted that this is an argument from silence, but Cicero seems to have had particular interest in *eloquentia*. A comparison with the usage in *Rhet. Her.* (written shortly after *Inv.* and somehow of the same lineage) functions almost as a sort of control: while *eloquentia* appears 14x in *Inv.* (predominately in 1.1–5, discussed below), it appears only 1x in *Rhet. Her.* (3.11).

\(^{30}\) Cf. Klein 1994, 1091: “…wird die E(loquentia) innerhalb wie außerhalb der rhetorischen Tradition häufig mit der theoretischen Disziplin ‘Rhetorik’ gleichgesetzt, in der die Regeln zum Erwerb eines solchen Vermögens gelehrt werden.”


particularly clear case of *eloquentia* as ῥητορική is found at *de Oratore* 1.83, where Cicero offers the Stoic definition of rhetoric as follows:

oratorem autem, nisi qui sapiens esset, esse neminem, atque ipsam eloquentiam, quod ex bene dicendi scientia constaret, unam quandam esse virtutem et, qui unam virtutem haberet, omnis habere easque ipsas esse inter se aequalis et paris.

They used to say that no man is an orator except the wise man, and that eloquence itself, which consists of the knowledge of speaking well, is one particular virtue, and the man who possesses one virtue has them all, and the virtues themselves are equal and equivalent among themselves.

Our broader knowledge of the Stoic position represented by Cicero here makes it clear that he is using *eloquentia* in this passage precisely to translate ῥητορική. According to Sextus Empiricus, Xenocrates, who led the Academy 339/38–314/13, defined ῥητορική as the ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἐδ λέγειν, and the Stoics followed him and adopted this definition. And it is this definition that Cicero renders as *bene dicendi scientia*. Additionally, there are also moments when Cicero seems to elide these two definitions, or at any rate use *eloquentia* in a way that fails to provide clear distinction between them. This will be seen further below in §2.4 below, but a useful starting example comes from Cicero’s prefatory remarks in book one of *de Inventione*, where he

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33 Cf., e.g., Adler’s *Index Latinus* in *SVF* 4:171: “*eloquentia s. v. ῥητορική.*”
35 Quint. *Inst*. 2.15.34 ought to remove any doubt: *huic eius substantiae maxime convenit finitio rhetoricae esse bene dicendi scientiam.*
defines rhetoric within the broader boundaries of political science, and rejects exaggerated claims that rhetoric entirely comprehends all aspects of that body of knowledge.\footnote{Cf. Arist. \textit{Rh.} 1356a20–27 = 1.2.7.} A great and fulsome part of political science, Cicero explains, “is eloquence produced by technical means, which men call “rhetoric”” (\textit{Inv.} 1.6: \textit{artificiosa eloquentia quam rhetoricam vocant}). Cicero’s qualification here—rhetoric is \textit{artificiosa eloquentia}—makes it appear that he is distinguishing this particular kind of \textit{eloquentia}, produced according to technical precepts, from \textit{eloquentia tout court}, which would apparently be \textit{eloquentia} as simply “skill at speaking” or similar.\footnote{Already pointed out in Victorin., \textit{Comm. Rhet.} p. 25.20–21: \textit{non eloquentia solum, sed artificiosa eloquentia, quae rhetorica vocetur.}} And in the explanation that follows this statement Cicero uses \textit{eloquentia} again, but \textit{without qualification}: “for we do not agree with those who do not believe that political science needs eloquence” (\textit{nam neque cum iis sentimus, qui civilem scientiam eloquentia non putant indigere}). On its own, it is not obvious that there is any more significant meaning of \textit{eloquentia} here than “skill at speaking.” However, one can detect an elision in the word’s meaning here by realizing that debate that Cicero is entering in this passage hinges on the relationship between rhetoric and political science. As Robert Gaines has noted, this was one chapter in the interdisciplinary Hellenistic dispute between philosophy and rhetoric.\footnote{Gaines 2007, 173–74.} Thus, while \textit{prima facie eloquentia} appears to be used in a non-technical sense, knowledge of the broader intellectual contexts of Cicero’s comments allow us to realize that he is using \textit{eloquentia} here as a placeholder for what in Greek would certainly have been ρητορική. This subtle use of \textit{eloquentia} as a functional substitute for ρητορική will be further
clarified by a number of additional examples when we turn to Cicero’s *rhetorica* in §§2.3–2.4 below.

To return to our point of departure, we can see that, at the level of semantics, the relationship between *eloquentia* and rhetoric is very close in Cicero’s thought. And his contribution to the history of the word is itself significant. Cicero engages here in what J. G. F. Powell has described as a “semantic calque,” i.e. “a word used in an extended sense, modeled on the use in another language of the word for which it normally serves as an equivalent.” Powell explains:

Many Latin words seem to have acquired a new dimension to their meaning in this way. Words like *virtus*, *natura*, *ars*, or *ratio* can never have been quite the same again after the philosophers had used them to translate Greek ἀρετή, φύσις, τέχνη, and λόγος. Much more radical extensions of meaning occurred in other cases, for example that of *finis*, which not only acquired all the connotations of the Greek τέλος, but was also sometimes used as an equivalent of ὁρός or ὀρισμός in the sense of ‘definition.’ (J. G. F. Powell 1995, 292)

Cicero’s adoption of *eloquentia* to render ῥητορική has much the same effect, and had a lasting impact on the subsequent rhetorical tradition. He also uses other terms to express “rhetoric” in Latin—*artificium*, *studium*, *ars*, or *ratio dicendi*, for example. And Cicero

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40 See *Inv.* 1.5; *de Orat.* 1.8, 2.29, 2.161, 3.210; *Orat.* 140; and Pernot 2005, 101–105. May and Wisse 2001, 59 n. 8 would seem to object to my use of *de Orat.* 1.8 here, since they seem to understand the passage differently. May and Wisse qualify their translation of *hanc dicendi rationem* (“this art of oratory”) as follows: “The Latin phrase translated here… means more properly something like “practical oratory based on the understanding of its principles”; “art” in
can also represent (ἡ) ῥητορική (τέχνη) as (ars) rhetorica. But Cicero’s use of *eloquentia* to translate the Greek discipline should, I argue, be understood as part of his domesticating approach to this body of technical knowledge. Cicero harnessed an extant Latin abstract term, built on a Latin root, as part of his project to naturalize Greek technical rhetoric. The theory, rendered in this way and now transferred into Latin, thus seems more at home in a Roman setting.

But the relationship between *eloquentia* and rhetoric in Cicero does not end with semantics. Not only can *eloquentia* refer to rhetoric as the technical Greek art of speaking, but, in Cicero’s view, rhetoric can also be productive of *eloquentia* in its more basic sense of “effectiveness in speaking.” And its ability to help with obtaining eloquence in this sense is precisely one of rhetoric’s great attractions. Thus, at *Inv.* 1.5 Cicero explains:

> Hoc si forte non natura modo neque exercitacione conficitur, verum etiam artificio quodam comparatur, non alienum est videre, quae dicant ei qui quaedam eius rei praecepta nobis reliquerunt.

the sense of theory is certainly not meant.” But *ratio* with a defining genitive is used of “A guiding principle, system, or rule” (*OLD* 11b), and in this case that system would be rhetoric, which was/is an art (ars). Further, *ratio* is used elsewhere in this sense as a synonym of *ars* (cf. e.g., Plin. *Nat.* 36.194–195 [*ratio vitri... vitri arte*]), where it means a systematic and teachable body of knowledge based on rules (cf. Lausberg §§3–4). For rhetoric, those rules were embodied in its *praeecepta*, which were taught, written about, theorized, and inculcated through *exercitationes*. And I do not see why such a system cannot be referred to as a “theory” (cf. *OED* s.v. “theory” 3, 4b). The discussion of other *artes*, like philosophy, that follows in *de Orat.* 1.9 seems also to support understanding *ratio dicendi* in 1.8 as “rhetoric.” Cf. below p. 82 n. 43 on *de Orat.* 1.5.

41 E.g., *Inv.* 2.8, 2.178; *de Orat.* 3.75.
If, perhaps, this (i.e. eloquence) is produced not by nature or practice alone, but also by a certain system, it is not unreasonable to see what those men say who have left for us certain rules of this subject.

Cicero’s words here point to a traditional triad in Greco-Roman rhetoric: natural ability, practice, and a system of precepts. Rhetorical handbooks traditionally cited this triad as a combination necessary for to obtaining success in speech. This system of precepts included in the triad was, of course, technical rhetoric itself (artificio quodam in Inv. 1.5). As Cicero demonstrates in this passage, he believed that this system had a role to play in the formation of eloquentia. His commitment to this principle already in de Inventione is further illustrated, of course, by the fact that he follows this statement with a treatise on inventio. And Cicero’s belief that eloquentia could be fostered by technical rhetoric was not unique to his teenage years. We find the same point made in his later rhetorica as well. Thus, in the epistolary introduction to book one of de Oratore, addressing his brother Quintus, Cicero introduces de Oratore as a replacement for de Inventione, but adds that the work also plays a role in an ongoing fraternal debate (de Orat. 1.5):

solesque non numquam hac de re a me in disputationibus nostris dissentire quod ego eruditissimorum hominum artibus eloquentiam contineri statuam, tu autem illam ab elegantia doctrinae segregandam putes et in quodam ingenii atque exercitacione genere ponendam.

42 The triad is first attested in Plato, Phaedrus 269d (as φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, μελέτη). Cf. de Orat. 1.90–91; further in Leeman-Pinkster 1:211 with bibliography. It can also be represented as a tetrad, e.g., Victorin., Comm. Rhet. p. 3.14–15: etenim si constat quattuor rebus, natura, usu, exercitazione, arte, but in the Latin tradition usus and exercitatio are more commonly collapsed into one term or the other.
And you are accustomed to disagree with me about this matter in our debates, on the grounds that I hold that *eloquentia* is dependent on the *artes* of the most learned men, while you believe that it should be separated from the refinement of education and placed within a certain kind of innate ability and practice.

Again we find the same triad of technical system, natural ability, and practice as in *Inv.* 1.5 and, again Cicero connects the production of *eloquentia* to technical precepts—the *ars*.43

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43 May and Wisse 2001, 58 n. 6, following Leeman-Pinkster 1:33, understand the passage rather differently. They explain:

> Although the well-known triad... theory, natural ability, and practice, stands in the background, Cicero here modifies it, for he replaces rhetorical theory (“art”) with “the intellectual accomplishments of the most learned,” [their translation of *eruditissimorum hominum artibus*] and contrasts this with the other two. This modification reflects the central theme of the work.

Thus, for May and Wisse, Cicero does *not* refer here to rhetorical theory. I disagree. First, Cicero himself refers to the majority of *de Orat.* (books two and three) as precisely a τεχνολογία (*Att.* 4.16.3), that is, a technical and systematic treatise, an *ars.* τεχνολογία refers precisely to technical treatises on rhetoric in, e.g., Phil. *Rh.* 2 col 8.6 Longo Auricchio, and is rendered accurately as “technical manuals” in Chandler 2006, 26. The alternative interpretation presented by May and Wisse seems to be grounded in the fact that Cicero, throughout *de Orat.*, routinely condemns standard technical *artes* as overly simplistic and offering an insufficient basis for the training the ideal Roman orator. This is indisputable (e.g., Antonius at *de Or.* 2.77–84; cf. May and Wisse 2001, 10–11, 26–27). But, in my view, the crucial qualification is that Cicero rejects the “standard” *artes* (cf. *Fam.* 1.9.23, discussed above: [sc. *libri de Oratore*] abhorrent... a *communibus praeceptis*). Cicero’s dissatisfaction with the most commonly available rhetorical precepts and the insufficiency of rules never results in wholesale dismissal of technical rhetoric, but, instead, he enriches and modifies the standard system to create a more satisfying theoretical basis for eloquence. Thus, Tobias Reinhardt, discussing Cicero’s modifications and innovations in his *rhetorica*, writes of “a larger plan of Cicero to promote a type of rhetorical theory which is more sophisticated than the traditional one” (2003, 7). But it was still a rhetorical theory and still a τεχνολογία. On Cicero’s relationship with rhetoricians and rhetorical theory, see Laurand 1907, 5–15, 19, who concludes his discussion: “multis argumentis Cicero et in editis libris et in epistulis ostendit a se artem rhetoricam non plane reici. Quae vero in libris de Oratore, contra rhetores dicta reperiuntur, eo pertinent non ut Latini rhetores potius quam Graeci, neque ut Graeci potius
To summarize the investigation so far: Cicero can use *eloquentia* to designate either a general effectiveness in speaking or technical rhetoric. The latter case in particular establishes a close connection between *eloquentia* and ἡ ῥητορικὴ τέχνη which helps domesticate the foreign art through its representation with a native term. Furthermore, *eloquentia* in the non-technical sense and technical rhetoric have a causal connection in Cicero’s thought: technical rhetoric can facilitate the production of *eloquentia*. And after Cicero, this connection between *eloquentia* and rhetoric is taken as a given. For example, the Neoplatonist rhetor Gaius Marius Victorinus (ca. 350 CE), defines his own profession as follows: “a rhetor is one who teaches literary studies and hands down the *artes* of *eloquentia*” (*Comm. Rhet.* p. 3.18: *rhetor est, qui docet litteras atque artes tradit eloquentiae*). The connection between *eloquentia* and rhetoric is important because in the passages that will be considered below, it is largely through discussion of the former that Cicero’s comments have bearing on the latter. And to understand how that works, we need to turn next to the passages themselves, starting with *de Inventione* (§2.3), which sets the stage, and then tracing the thread in *de Oratore*, *Brutus*, and *Orator* (§2.4).

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44 Even in English, rhetoric and eloquence remain closely connected: Cf. *OED* s.v. “eloquence” (1a) which, provides a general meaning “the action, practice, or art of expressing thought with fluency, force, and appropriateness, so as to appeal to the reason or move the feelings,” but definition (4) demonstrates the technical connection “= rhetoric.” Rhetoric is itself not defined independently of eloquence (s.v. “rhetoric” 1a): “the art of using language effectively so as to persuade or influence others, esp. the exploitation of figures of speech and other compositional techniques to this end; the study of principles and rules to be followed by a speaker or writer striving for eloquence, esp. as formulated by ancient Greek and Roman writers.”
§2.3 Cicero’s vision for eloquentia in de Inventione 1.1–5

Cicero’s de Inventione is the earliest of his rhetorical works, written probably while he was only in his teens. Chronologically, the work is very close to the advent of Latin rhetorical education at Rome that we examined in the last chapter. In the second preface, Cicero describes his design for the work and his method of composition. As Cicero explains, when he decided to write a rhetorical handbook (2.4 artem dicendi), he worked eclectically, and culled the most suitable rhetorical praecepta from a variety of sources. He mentions Aristotle’s analytic summary of Greek rhetorical handbooks, the Συνάγωγὴ τεχνῶν, as well as Aristotle’s own rhetorical works and those of his successors (Inv. 2.6–7). Cicero says he also drew praecepta from the Isocratean rhetorical tradition (2.7–8), and, though unable to obtain a copy of Isocrates’s ars himself, he says he had access to the works of Isocrates’s students and successors. Cicero characterizes these two strands of rhetorical thought as having been very imperfectly combined (2.8), but he notes that later authors (posterioribus) had already taken a unitarian approach and combined the two traditions. Cicero follows in their footsteps. Indeed, the unity of philosophy and rhetoric is an enduring theme in his rhetorical writings, and already finds exposition in de Inventione. Further, Cicero explains, he added his own thoughts where he saw fit (2.8: et ex nostro quoque nonnihil in commune contulimus). In short, in his description of his

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45 As will become obvious from my discussion of Inv., I do not follow the idea of Friedrich Marx (1894, 78), that the prefaces of Inv. are plane aliena on the basis of Att. 16.6.4, in which Cicero testifies to the existence of a collection of pre-composed prefaces from which he could draw. Pace Marx, the existence of this volumen prohoemiorum does not need to suggest any disconnect from the text that follows a Ciceronian preface, and recent work on Cicero’s philosophical prefaces has demonstrated precisely their appropriateness: see Baraz 2012, 5–7. For Inv., at any rate, both prefaces seem perfectly à propos (cf. Giuffrida 1963, 113–40; Lévy 1995, 158).

46 On the possible sources used by Inv., see Kennedy 1972, 126–38. For the bipartite rhetorical tradition, focusing on the Aristotelian, see Solmsen 1941; for the Isocratean tradition, see now Walker 2011, 57–155.

own efforts, Cicero highlights the excitement that lay behind the undertaking of *de Inventione* together with his hopes for the work’s value (2.9):

> quodsi ea, quae in his libris exponuntur, tanto opere eligenda fuerunt, quanto studio electa sunt, profecto neque nos neque alios industrie nostrae paenitebit.

And if the precepts which are laid out in these books were chosen with care equal to the work demanded, our efforts will not be a source of regret for either ourselves or for others.

*De Inventione* is a two-book technical treatise covering the first of an orator’s activities in constructing a speech, the discovery of appropriate arguments for the case at hand. Cicero’s reasons for his enthusiasm for the study of rhetoric are presented in the preface to book one.

As recognized already by Victorinus, the preface to book one is designed to render his audience well-disposed, attentive, and teachable regarding the message being presented here; this is precisely the prescription for an effective rhetorical *prooemium* that Cicero offers later in the treatise.⁴⁸ In fact, in *Inv.* 1.1–5 we can see Cicero plying many of the strategies he recommends therein, and this comparison helps illuminate some of the ways that Cicero presents an appealing case for rhetoric. For example, Cicero explains that if a case under dispute is one that an audience might consider petty or insignificant (*Inv.* 1.20–21: *genus humile*), special care must be taken especially to make

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the audience attentive and remove their potential disinterest for the topic (*contemptio*). Granted that the first preface of *de Inventione* does not belong to a judicial context, nevertheless Cicero could have anticipated just such a reaction from his audience. If the achievements of Roman aristocrats are typically defined through military success, holding offices, wielding authority in the Senate, and augmenting the majesty of the Republic, Cicero’s advocacy for time and energy spent on an intellectual, technical pursuit like *inventio* could well have been met with *contemptio*. But, Cicero explains that such disinterest can be countered (*Inv.* 1.23):

> Attentos autem faciemus, si demonstrabimus ea, quae dicturi erimus, magna, nova, incredibilia esse, aut ad omnes aut ad eos, qui audient, aut ad aliquos inlustres homines aut ad deos inmortales aut ad summam rem publicam pertinere.

We will, however, make our audience attentive, if we demonstrate that we are about to speak about topics that are great, novel, incredible, or that they either affect all men or at least the audience, or that they concern certain famous men, the immortal gods, or the welfare of the Republic.

Cicero will touch on nearly all of these points in *Inv.* 1.1–5. Additionally, Cicero notes that for subjects that can be controversial (*genus anceps*), the point of dispute ought to be raised immediately (1.20–21). The value of rhetoric had been the subject of dispute since at least Plato, and Cicero accordingly opens his discussion in *Inv.* 1.1–5 with a point of controversy (more on this below), raising the stakes for the topic at hand and thus

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49 See above in the introduction to the present chapter.
generating additional audience interest in accordance with his own rhetorical precepts. These parallels between Cicero’s practice and his theory in *de Inventione* should not be taken as an indication that Cicero’s claims in the preface are disingenuous. On the contrary, they are an indication of how carefully he crafted his presentation here.

Cicero’s springboard at the beginning of *de Inventione* is a point of controversy, which he grounds in an historical prospective. Over time, has the capacity for fluent and eloquent expression in speech (*copia dicendi*) and the utmost study of *eloquentia* (*summum eloquentiae studium*) done more to help or to harm humans and their communities? Although at times exceptionally skillful speakers (*diser-tissimos homines*) have been responsible for a variety of ills both at Rome and in other states, Cicero believes that research shows that *eloquentia* has tremendous potential upside (1.1):

> cum autem res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litterarum monumentis repetere instituo, multas urbes constitutas, plurima bella restincta, firmissimas societates, sanctissimas amicitias intellego cum animi ratione tum facilius eloquentia comparatas.

When, moreover, I set out to trace from historical records matters that, due to their antiquity, are remote from our own memory, I discern that many cities have been founded, a great many wars ended, the most secure alliances and most sacrosanct bonds of friendship have been established, not only by means of rational thought, but also—all the more easily—by eloquence.
Starting from these historical records, Cicero works toward a more abstract formulation: wisdom without eloquence (sapiencia sine eloquentia) fails to help states much (parum prodesse civitatibus), but, alternatively, eloquence without wisdom can be exceptionally destructive. Thus Cicero marries the two elements and thereby produces what would be an enduring union in his thought:

quare si quis omissis rectissimis atque honestissimis studiis rationis et officii consumit omnem operam in exercitatione dicendi, is inutilis sibi, perniciosus patriae civis alitur; qui vero ita sese armat eloquentia, ut non oppugnare commoda patriae, sed pro his propugnare possit, is mihi vir et suis et publicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus civis fore videtur.

Thus if anyone devotes all of his attention to the skill of speaking to the neglect of the most upright and most honorable pursuits, he is useless to himself and a citizen is nourished who is fatal to his country; yet the man who arms himself with eloquence, not that he can fight against the interests of his country, but so that he can fight for them—this man in my view seems to be a citizen most useful and most devoted both to his own affairs and to those of his country.

Aside from the significance of the passage in the history of Cicero’s thought, the way that he promotes the benefits of being “armed” with eloquentia is also important. The potential for furthering one’s own self-interest, the ability to advance the interests of the Republic, the apt choice of framing the whole discussion in martial language (sese armat
eloquentia... oppugnare... propugnare)—all help render eloquentia attractive to Cicero’s audience.\(^{50}\) Thus, starting with this passage, which includes what is basically an opening rhetorical thesis,\(^ {51}\) Cicero is committed to the suitability of rhetoric as an object of study for the Roman aristocrat and its benefit for the Roman state—if, that is, we are to understand eloquentia here to be representing rhetoric.

The discussion of eloquentia above helps clarify this point, and allows us to interrogate what exactly Cicero’s subject matter is in these opening passages. His language appears to be non-technical. This is in contrast, for example, with what we saw above in the second preface. There, when Cicero discusses his techniques of composition for de Inventione, he uses unabashedly technical and Greek-derived terms (2.4: artem dicendi; 2.6: scriptores artis; 2.7: in maximis philosophiae partibus... praeeptores dicendi; 2.8: in philosophia... rhetoricae quoque artis). But in the first preface, introducing his work and trying to capture the attention of his Roman audience, Cicero presents his topic in a decidedly domesticating veneer. There is no ars dicendi or the obviously Greek rhetorica ars, but rather copia dicendi, summum eloquentiae studium, exercitatio dicendi and, above all, eloquentia, the term that will go on to dominate the discussion as Cicero continues. So too there is no philosophia in first preface: Cicero here prefers animi ratio, sapientia, and rectissima atque honestissima studia rationis. The difference can be understood as part of a deliberate Romanizing strategy on Cicero’s

\(^{50}\) The martial metaphor was part of the heritage of the Greek rhetorical tradition: see Leeman-Pinkster 4:208 on de Orat. 3.55.

\(^{51}\) A point made already by Victorinus, ad loc. = pp. 21–22 Riesenweber. See too in Lévy 1995, 156. Understanding Cicero’s opening here as a thesis also helps illuminate his motivation for including the historical perspective. In Theon’s recommendations for writing prooemia for the thesis, one suggestion is that the thesis open with a historical report (120.32–121.2: ληψόμεθα δὲ τὰ προϊόμενα τῶν θέσεων ἐπὶ ἄξο... ἱστορίας)—just as Cicero does here (Inv. 1.1: veteres... calamitates coligo... res ab nostra memoria propter vetustatem remotas ex litterarum monumentis repetere instituo).
part. In the introduction to this treatise, therefore, Cicero pursues a strategy that makes his technical and foreign subject matter appear to be at home in Latin. As we shall see, he also argues that his topic coalesces seamlessly with Roman values and the *mos maiorum*.

These lexical decisions thus play a significant role in Cicero’s strategy in the first preface. But Cicero’s uses of *sapientia* and *eloquentia* instead of *philosophia* and *ars rhetorica* do not change the fact that Cicero is participating in a debate that was previously conducted among Greek philosophers and rhetoricians. His opening question—has *eloquentia* done more harm or good to states over time?—and his preliminary conclusion—that the man armed with *eloquentia* and good intentions is “a citizen most useful (*utilissimus*) and most devoted to both his own affairs and to those of his country”—both allude to debates between rhetoric and philosophy that had their origins in Classical Greece and were rekindled during the Hellenistic period. As is clear from our sources, the utility of rhetoric for human society and whether it did more harm than good was a standard feature in the debate, and one not necessarily limited to any particular philosophical school. Academics, Peripatetics, and Epicureans all weighed in. Among the disparate strands of this tradition, it is not difficult to make out the sort of claims that influenced Cicero’s discussion in *de Inventione*. Rhetoricians object, for example, that philosophers do not benefit their country; philosophers respond that, even if they do not hold offices, they help by teaching the young to obey the laws; laws are the soul of a city, without which it cannot survive, and rhetoric, the philosophers claim, is a

52 (*Ars* rhetorica and *philosophia* appear nowhere in *Inv.* 1.1–5, but Cicero does not hesitate to use them beyond these confines. Cf. (*ars* rhetorica at *Inv.* 1.6; 1.7; 1.8; 1.9 *bis*; 2.8; 2.178; and *philosophia* at *Inv.* 1.8; 1.33; 1.36; 1.46; 1.65 *bis*; 1.77; 2.7; 2.8.

wicked τέχνη that tries to subvert and overthrow the laws, and accordingly it cannot be good for the city.\textsuperscript{54} Cicero, while presenting his topic in terms that rather mask its technicality, is weighing in on precisely this debate, and the utility of rhetoric is one of the unifying points throughout Inv. 1.1–5. Further, Cicero’s response to the polemics of these Greek disciplines coincides with his argument for rhetoric’s place at Rome.

After emphasizing the private and public gains available to the man who is both well intentioned and armed with eloquentia, Cicero transitions (1.2) to consider the origin (principium) of “this thing which is called eloquentia, whether it is an ars, a study (studium), some practice (exercitatio quaedam), or some ability perfected by nature (facultas ab natura perfecta).”\textsuperscript{55} According to the vision Cicero develops in the rest of the preface, eloquence was both born from the most honorable reasons and perfected for the best reasons (1.2: ex honestissimis causis natum atque optimis rationibus perfectum).

With his investigation of origins, Cicero presents a kind of mythic anthropology in which he argues that it was only through speech and the ability to persuade one another that humanity was able to advance from a savage and bestial existence to ordered communities.\textsuperscript{56} Originally mankind lived like wild animals (bestiarum modo), roaming vagrantly and eating wild fare (victu fero). Physical strength (viribus corporis) rather than

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{54} These samples from the debate, conveniently both on law, are taken from Phld. Rh. 2:154–55 Sudhaus = 5,β.VII\textsuperscript{2} fol. 161–187 fr. XIII = PHerc. 1078/1080 and S.E. M. 2.31–42 respectively.\textsuperscript{55} Gesturing again towards the familiar triad of φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, μελέτη. See above p. 81 n. 42.\textsuperscript{56} There has been extensive discussion of what Greek sources Cicero might have used in this passage. See Philippson 1886, 417–18 (Posidonius); Pohlenz 1913, 4 (Philo of Larissa); Solmsen 1932, 151–54 (Isocrates); Barwick 1963, 24–25 (Isocrates and an intermediate Latin source); Lévy 1995, 159–61 (Philo of Larissa); Grilli 1997, 174 (Isocrates and Posidonius). Such Quellenforschung in fact constituted much of scholarly interest in the first preface of Inv. in the last century (though cf., aliter, Giuffrida 1963; Kastely 2002), but it is not necessary to resolve this issue for the present argument. At any rate, a number of the central themes that lie behind Cicero’s account predate all of these sources, going back to fifth-century arguments for justification of various τέχναι via civilizing mythology: see Brink 1963–1982, 2:384–86 on Hor. Ars 391–407 with further bibliography.}
reason was the means of managing human affairs. The fundamental characteristics of
civilization were lacking: no religion, no duties or obligations, no marriages, no
expectation of legitimate children, no legal code. In these harsh and primitive conditions,
it was desire (*animi cupiditas*)—a blinding and reckless mistress (*caeca et temeraria
*dominatrix*)—rather than rationality that held sway.

Yet, according to Cicero’s anthropology, this all changed with the arrival of a
great wise man (*quidam magnus videlicet vir et sapiens*), a civilizing hero, who was able
to unite scattered humanity:

> qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam
> compulit unum in locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem inducens
> utilem atque honestam primo propter insolentiam reclaimantes, deinde propter
> rationem atque orationem studiosius audientes ex feris et immanibus mites
> reddidit et mansuetos.

In some way he drove together men scattered through the fields and hidden
among woodland shelters into one place, and gathered them together and,
initiating those men, who were at first shouting back due to their unfamiliarity,
but then listening more eagerly due to his reason and speech, into each and every
useful and noble concern, he rendered them, from their wild and savage states,
gentle and civilized.
But this civilizing moment, Cicero contends, could not have come about through a wisdom that was mute and unable to speak (1.3: nec tacita nec inops dicendi sapientia)—that is, philosophy alone would not have been sufficient. Cicero presses his point, now insisting not only on the importance of rhetoric in the foundation of civilization, but also in its maintenance:

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\text{age vero urbibus constitutis, ut fidem colere et iustitiam retinere discerent et aliis parere sua voluntate consuescerent ac non modo labores excipiendos communis commodi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent, qui tandem fieri potuit, nisi homines ea, quae ratione invenissent, eloquentia persuadere potuissent?}
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Furthermore, once cities had been established, how, after all, could it have come about that men were learning to cultivate loyalty and hold fast to justice, and were growing accustomed to obeying others of their own accord, and were judging not only that efforts should be undertaken for the sake of the common good, but also that they even ought to give up their lives for this—how, unless men had been able to take what they had discovered by reason and make it convincing with eloquence?

Just as wisdom alone was insufficient for the creation of human communities, so too wisdom alone could not have compelled the members of early human communities to drop their wild habits and subject themselves to loyalty (fides), justice (iustitia), and subordinating their own interests to the greater good—even to the point of sacrificing life
for one’s country. Establishing *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* turns out to require rhetoric. *Eloquentia* is thus presented here as the essential component both in the creation of human communities and in the formation of what might be called the first civic ideology that helped maintain these communities.

This was not, however, the end of the contributions of *eloquentia*. Its role in human society, Cicero explains, continued afterwards (*postea*), when *eloquentia* was exercised both in war and in peace “with the greatest advantages towards mankind” (*cum summis hominum utilitatibus*). But, for Cicero, the advantageousness of eloquence is continually tied to proper guidance from philosophy. And since the two disciplines cannot be separated without potentially dire consequences, Cicero turns next to explain the origins of malicious *eloquentia*, arising precisely from the neglect of philosophy (1.4: *omisso studio sapientiae*). In this scenario, men exceptionally skilled at speaking can wrongly be entrusted with the control of the state, which suffers accordingly:

> Hinc nimirum non iniuria, cum ad gubernacula rei publicae temerarii atque audaces homines accesserant, maxima ac miserrima naufragia fiebant.

Hence it is without a doubt not unjustly that the greatest and most lamentable shipwrecks used to occur, when impetuous and reckless men had gained control of the helm of the Republic.

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57 Cicero equates *studium sapientiae* with *philosophia* also in a notorious passage in the preface of *Tusc.* 1.1: see the very thorough discussion in Gildenhard 2007, 97–106.

58 For *iniuria* here (ablatively used adverbially) see *TLL* 7.1.3:1679.30–84, esp. 30–67 (Delz).
Yet Cicero’s discussion of the potential negative consequences of *eloquentia sine sapientia* serves to set up, as a conclusion to his preface, further praise of *eloquentia*, reinforcing its desirability.\(^{59}\) If eloquence was sometimes misused, what was called for was stronger opposition to this abuse in accordance with the historical *exempla* of Roman statesmen (1.5):

\[
\ldots eo studiosius et illis resistendum fuit et rei publicae consulendum. quod nostrum illum non fugit Catonem neque Laelium neque eorum, ut vere dicam, disciplum Africanum neque Gracchos Africani nepotes\(^{60}\): quibus in hominibus erat summa virtus et summa virtute amplificata auctoritas et, quae et his rebus ornamento et rei publicae praesidio esset, eloquentia.
\]

\[
\ldots all the more zealously should these men (i.e. the eloquent villains) have been resisted and the Republic cared for. This point did not escape our Cato nor Laelius nor Africanus, who was, to speak truthfully, their student, nor the Gracchi, the grandsons of Africanus: these men had the utmost virtue, the utmost authority that
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\(^{59}\) Note that Kastely 2002 sees a different significance of malicious *eloquentia* in Cicero’s arguments in the preface. For Kastely, the story of corrupt rhetoric reveals Cicero undermining the myth, and reveals the myth’s “incoherence.” Kastely believes that Cicero solves this problem through issue-theory. Thus “the contribution of *De inventione* is to enact the inherent instability within the traditional Sophistic account of the role of speech in the creation and maintenance of the political community and then to turn to stasis theory as a way of negotiating the incoherence of the myth” (261). I have no objections to this interesting reading of the role of issue-theory in the treatise, as a means of “formalizing and constraining aggression,” but I would tend to think that the problems of malicious *eloquentia* found in the myth are resolved by Cicero’s insistence that *eloquentia*/*ars rhetorica* needs to be guided by *sapientia*/*philosophia*.

\(^{60}\) Text following Ströbel 1915. In his 1994 Budé, Achard follows Friedrich and brackets *neque Gracchos Africani nepotes* on the basis of the incompatibility of the Gracchi within Cicero’s catalogue of Republican orators noteworthy for their *virtus* (Achard 1994, 60 n. 14). But van der Blom 2010, 103–107 has demonstrated that the Gracchi were very flexible *exempla*, and Cicero can use them positively or negatively as his argumentative contexts demand, and so brackets are not necessary. On the textual problems here, see the discussion in Schwameis 2014, 101–102.
was magnified by this virtue, and what served as an enhancement to these things
and a source of protection for the Republic—they had eloquence.

Cicero’s reference to the *maiores* in this passage is significant. Exemplarity and its
authority form an important part of Roman thought generally and in Cicero’s thought and
argumentation in particular, as Henriette van der Blom has demonstrated.61 At the
broadest level the great Romans of the past were an important factor in the creation and
maintenance of the cultural memory of the Roman aristocracy as a whole, among other
things.62 In the present passage, Cicero ascribes to Cato, Laelius, Africanus, and the
Gracchi the possession of *eloquentia*, and he emphasizes that these men deployed their
*eloquentia* to buttress their *virtus* and *auctoritas*, two of the quintessential qualities of the
Roman aristocrat.63 In doing so, Cicero authorizes a Roman interest in *eloquentia*. The
*maiores*, and especially successful ones who had both *auctoritas* and *virtus*, served as
guides for appropriate conduct. That Cicero chose these particular model Romans seems
quite reasonable; all were, after all, famous speakers from the Republic.64 *Eloquentia* in
the general sense could be an appropriate term to describe the attribute that made them
such, though it is noteworthy that Cicero is the earliest extant author, in this very passage,
to attribute the abstraction to Roman *maiores*.

But, as has been argued above, *eloquentia* in Cicero’s discussion in *de Inventione*
does not denote only the ability to be an effective speaker. Instead, in the context of

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61 van der Blom 2010.
62 van der Blom 2010, with 15−17 for a convenient summary of how the *exempla maiorum* fit into
scholarship interested in cultural memory.
64 See Malcovati, *ORF*2 12−97 (Cato), 115−22 (Laelius), 122−34 (Scipio), 145−52 (Ti. Graccus),
and 174−98 (C. Graccus) for *testimonia* and fragments. For a rhetorical analysis of these and
other significant figures of the period, see Leeman 1963, 1:43−58.
Cicero’s broader discussion, *eloquentia* is also representing technical rhetoric. And it is in this respect that we can see Cicero here leaning on the paradoxical flexibility of the Roman *maiores* and their exemplary status to make his point. As van der Blom has summarized, recent work on Roman exemplarity has revealed that the ancestors only *prima facie* provided a fixed and stable tradition that could be used to promote a severe conservatism. In fact, however, the situation was much more nuanced. While the historical individuals were fixed, “the actions and customs of the ancestors could always be reinterpreted. In this way, the Romans looked to the past not only for solutions but also for qualifications for present situations which suited their own particular agenda.”

Cato, Laelius, Scipio, and the Gracchi were all important orators, and, in fact, in the case of Scipio and the Gracchi we find some of our earliest concrete evidence for Romans studying under Greek rhetoricians. But Cicero’s connection between these Roman examples and *eloquentia* within the context of his discussion in *de Inventione* does work in his broader argument to make rhetoric suitable for the Republican aristocracy. The ability of these men to be effective and dynamic orators may well have helped them, as Cicero says, obtain and maintain their *virtus* and *auctoritas*. But by appealing to their abilities as part of an enthusiastic exhortation to the study of *inventio*, Cicero seems to be making a rather different claim. The virtuous *eloquentia* of the Romans of the past, standing in antithesis to the harmful *eloquentia* that could harm the Republic (if uncoupled from *sapientia*), is here connected to the study of *eloquentia* that Cicero is

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65 van der Blom 2010, 12. Cf. Baraz 2012, 3 describing Cicero’s deployment of the same strategy in his Romanization of philosophy: “What he is attempting is much more than a comprehensive presentation of Greek philosophical knowledge to a Roman audience. It is an integration of that knowledge with exempla drawn from Roman history and tradition and the values that he believes lie behind them. For such is the peculiar nature of the *mos maiorum* that it is only the exempla that are stable; no overall conceptual framework restricts their interpretation.”

now considering as his topic in *de Inventione*. Technical rhetoric now becomes productive of the sort of command of speech that enabled the Roman *maiores* to reach such great heights. Cicero here is Romanizing technical rhetoric and fitting it into the aristocratic tradition. Indeed, rhetoric facilitates precisely the qualities so admired in that tradition.

At this point Cicero draws a conclusion, offering a crescendo in a passage that since the fourth century has been known as *laudes eloquentiae*:

> quare meo quidem animo nihilo minus eloquentiae studendum est, etsi ea quidam et privatim et publice abutuntur; sed eo quidem vehementius, ne mali magno cum detrimento bonorum et communi omnium pernicie plurimum possint, cum praesertim hoc sit unum, quod ad omnes res et privatas et publicas maxime pertineat, hoc tuta, hoc honesta, hoc inlustris, hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat. nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium rerum praesto est sapientia; hinc ad ipsos, qui eam adepti sunt, laus, honos, dignitas confluit; hinc amicis quoque eorum certissimum et tutissimum praesidium comparatur.

Therefore, in my view, eloquence should nonetheless be pursued, even if some misuse it both in private affairs and in public matters; but for this reason it should be sought all the more vehemently, in order to keep the wicked from wielding too much power with great harm to good men and the common ruin of all, especially since this is the one thing that is especially connected to all affairs, both private

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and public, and by this life becomes secure, worthy of respect, distinguished, and pleasant. For from this source come a great many benefits to the Republic, if wisdom, the guide of all things, is at hand; from this source praise, high esteem, and distinction come in abundance to the very men who have obtained it; from this source also the most secure and safe protection for one’s friends is obtained.

Here, the Cicero catalogs the public and private advantages produced by rhetoric, driving his message home. Again, the dual potential for rhetoric—able to be used for good or evil—means that there is all the more reason for its pursuit by a good man. This catalogue of benefits that Cicero attributes to *eloquentia* again reveals how the orator makes his subject appealing for a Roman audience. Note, for example, how eloquence produces *laus, honos,* and *dignitas.* Combined with its claims to *virtus* and *auctoritas* that we saw above with the *maiores,* this catalogue of gains available through *eloquentia* begins to appear as a kind of abbreviated index to the very attributes sought by “l’homme politique” of the Republic.68 And if that were not enough, Cicero finishes off this epideictic inventory by appending an argument from comparison: since the power of speech is the unique characteristic of mankind, distinguishing humanity from other animals, there is particular distinction (*praeclarum... quiddam*) to be earned by surpassing others in the quintessentially human ability.69 Cicero concludes:

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68 See in Hellegouarc’h 1963.
69 The spirit of the argument suggests a Peripatetic background. Cf., e.g., the role of λόγος in Arist. *Pol.* 1253a1–29.
hoc si forte non natura modo neque exercitacione conficitur, verum etiam artificio quodam comparatur, non alienum est videre, quae dicant ii, qui quaedam eius rei praecepta nobis reliquerunt.

If, perhaps, this (i.e. eloquence) is produced not by nature or practice alone, but also by a certain system, it is not unreasonable to see what those men say who have left for us certain rules of this subject.

Thus the conclusion brings Cicero’s discourse on eloquentia in Inv. 1.1–5 back to technical rhetoric and its precepts—the focus of the treatise that follows.

What, then, is the sum of Cicero’s argument in Inv. 1.1–5? On what basis should Romans study rhetoric? The driving theme throughout is the utility of rhetoric for the Roman aristocracy and the Republic, with the consistent proviso that it requires moral guidance, provided by philosophy. Throughout, the native terms are used to present the pair. We find eloquentia and sapientia rather than ars rhetorica and philosophia, but this does not change the fact that Cicero’s argument for utility is his answer to the debate between philosophers and rhetoricians on the utilitas of their disciplines. But, Cicero argues, with this union intact, the utilissimus civis has the means to obtain commoda patriae (1.1). Cicero’s mythical anthropology (1.2) demonstrates that rhetoric’s role to create civic advantages is a part of its very origins: rhetoric called together humankind and led them in unam quamque rem utilem et honestam, and provided the sustaining civic ideology that taught them to embrace fides, iustitia, and an ideology that taught men to die for the greater good. In war and peace, rhetoric helps cum summis hominum
utilitibus (1.3). The maiores sanction the cultivation of eloquentia, which they used to buttress their virtue and auctoritas (1.5). And Cicero’s extended laudes eloquentiae, which close his preface by enumerating the personal and public advantages that rhetoric produces: comoda for the Republic, and laus, honos, and dignitas for the man that can master this discipline. In short, the Greek discipline has become ideal for the Roman aristocracy, and a perfect fit for the system of values that supported Roman political power.

§2.4 Cicero’s enduring vision for rhetoric: The oratorii libri

Despite Cicero’s apparent disavowal of de Inventione in his prefatory letter to Quintus at de Orat. 1.5, he never abandoned the vision for rhetoric conveyed in Inv. 1.1–5. While some of the themes therein actually reappear in a wide variety of Cicero’s writings, here I confine this examination to the ways that Cicero reiterates the themes of Inv. 1.1–5 throughout his oratorii libri, that is, de Oratore (written late in 55), Brutus, and Orator (both 46). These are works that, as we saw above, Cicero explicitly connected to his educational agenda in an attempt, later in life, to confront the increasing challenges facing the Republic. But despite the changing political climate and roughly four decades of experience, Cicero’s justification for the study of rhetoric remains grounded in the arguments that he had articulated in his earliest work.

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70 de Orat. 1.5: quae pueris aut adolescetulis nobis ex commentariolis nostris inchoata ac rudia exciderunt. Cf. Lévy 1995, 155 who notes posterity’s tendency to follow Cicero’s underestimation of his own work here.

71 One can also see the development of these themes in, e.g., pro Sestio and de Re Publica. See, Lévy 1995, who focuses on Inv. 1.2–3. The most substantial treatment of the topos in Cicero, taking its starting point from de Orat. 1.30–34, is in Schulte 1935, 9–58.
In *de Inventione*, Cicero’s arguments justifying the pursuit of rhetoric appeared at the beginning of his treatise, where his preface immediately engages his audience, makes the benefits of his topic clear, as well as the high stakes involved in studying what he calls *eloquentia*. In *de Oratore*, on the other hand, the prefaces to the three books are personal and epistolary, apparently owing to Aristotle’s practice in his lost dialogues. Writing to Quintus, Cicero does not include an exhortation to the discipline. But he nevertheless provides his vision for rhetoric early in book one, creatively focalizing the same argument through Lucius Licinius Crassus, one of the dialogue’s main speakers, alongside Marcus Antonius. This comes in a passage where Crassus is addressing two of the dialogue’s young interlocutors, Publius Sulpicius Rufus and Gaius Aurelius Cotta. So positioned, the message is both an exhortation to Crassus’s internal audience, and, as in *de Inventione*, is also designed to capture the attention of Cicero’s external audience at an early stage in the work.

Crassus speech here (1.30–34) is introduced as a “discussion about the study of speaking” (1.30: *sermonem… de studio dicendi*). As in *de Inventione*, technical language, e.g., *ars rhetorica*, is avoided. In fact, Cicero is rather allusive about naming his topic for the majority of the discussion. Only in the conclusion of his *sermo* does Crassus make it clear that what he is talking about: a quality embodied in the ideal speaker he calls the *perfectus orator* (1.34), whose education and identity will be explored in the remainder of

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72 Cf. Janson 1964, 30 (discussing *Rhet. Her.*): “it is only natural that an author should esteem his subject highly. There is enthusiastic praise of the matter to be found in prefaces from all times and in every kind of writing.”
73 Fantham 2004, 17–18.
75 E.g.: 1.30: *tantam… facultatem; haec una res…*; further hints at 1.31: *ornata oratio et polita* and 1.32: *sermo facetus ac nulla in re rudis*; 1.33: *hoc… uno.*
the dialogue. It is only in the response to Crassus that is provided by Quintus Mucius Scaevola immediately following that the special quality that is at the focus of Crassus’s discussion is named: now very familiar from the *de Inventione*, Scaevola refers to Crassus’s subject as *eloquentia* (1.37 bis; 1.38; 1.39). Crassus’s remarks here are often referred to as his *laus eloquentiae*. His *sermo* here can be divided conveniently into five sections, each corresponding to a part of *Inv.* 1.1–5, summarized in Table 1 below:

**Table 1: Corresponding thematic divisions in *de Oratore* 1.30–34 and *de Inventione* 1.1–5**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><em>de Orat.</em> 1.30: opening thesis on the power of the man who controls speech</th>
<th><em>Inv.</em> 1.1: opening thesis on the utility of the man who can unify <em>eloquentia</em> and <em>sapientia</em></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>de Orat.</em> 1.31–32: <em>laudes eloquentiae</em>, its usefulness and its myriad benefits</td>
<td><em>Inv.</em> 1.5: <em>laudes eloquentiae</em>, its usefulness and its myriad benefits—provided it is governed by <em>sapientia</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>de Orat.</em> 1.32–33: the <em>proprium humanitatis</em> argument; speech as fundamental and distinguishing human ability</td>
<td><em>Inv.</em> 1.5: the <em>proprium humanitatis</em> argument; speech as fundamental and distinguishing human ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>de Orat.</em> 1.33–34: the civilizing origins of speech and Cicero’s anthropology</td>
<td><em>Inv.</em> 1.2: the civilizing origins of <em>eloquentia</em> and Cicero’s anthropology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>de Orat.</em> 1.34: conclusion emphasizing the power of the <em>perfectus orator</em>, and his utility both for private affairs and for the Republic</td>
<td><em>Inv.</em> 1.1–5 passim: the utility of <em>eloquentiae</em> both for private affairs and for the Republic</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The relevant sections of *de Inventione* and *de Oratore* both begin with a *thesis* that points to the importance of their subject matter. While Cicero in *de Inventione* had started with a
controversy (has *eloquentia* historically done more harm or good to humanity?), Crassus’s approach in *de Oratore* is more straightforward. The young and promising Sulpicius and Cotta, Crassus explains, should be praised more than exhorted (1.30: *non... conhortandum... sed magis... conlaudandum*) since they have already progressed so much in acquiring the *facultas* in question. Since Sulpicius and Cotta not only outstrip their peers in their abilities, but even rival the *maiores*, Crassus highlights the significance of their achievements and contextualizes their successes politically (1.30):

> “neque vero mihi quicquam” inquit “praestabilius videtur quam posse dicendo tenere hominum mentis, adlicere voluntates, impellere quo velit, unde autem velit deducere. haec una res in omni libero populo maximeque in pacatis tranquillisque civitatibus praecipue semper floruit semperque dominata est.”

> “In fact in my view nothing,” he said, “seems more outstanding than to hold the minds of men by speaking, to win over their dispositions, to move them *towards* and, moreover, to draw them *from* where one wishes. This thing alone among every free people and most of all among peaceful and tranquil states has always flourished in particular and has always ruled.”

Thus, not only does Crassus praise the power of speech, but he also connects its flourishing to stable political conditions.\(^{76}\) This is, of course, a pointed reformulation of

\(^{76}\) Crassus’s remarks here stand in sharp contrast to the crisis theory found in Tac. *Dial.* 36 that posited that political instability was a critical historical condition for rhetoric’s flourishing in the Republic.
the same idea in *de Inventione*, where *eloquentia* has the power to be of great utility to
the state and those who possess it can fight for the Republic and secure great benefits.

The *laudes eloquentiae* that follow Crassus’s introduction explain what he
believes is so outstanding about the power of speech, expressed through a series of
rhetorical questions. “What is so worthy of admiration,” (1.31: *tam admirabile*) Crassus
asks, “as when from a countless multitude one man stands forth, who, whether alone or
with very few others, can exercise that ability which was bestowed to all men by nature?”
In this section (1.31–32) too, there is overlap with the *laudes* from *de Inventione*. Thus
speech is again noted as being exceptionally “pleasant” (1.31: *iucundum*; 1.32: *quid
iucundius*; cf. *Inv.* 1.5: *hoc eodem vita iucunda fiat*), and Cicero again deploys the
metaphor of speech as weapons (1.32: *quid autem tam necessarium quam tenere semper
arma*; cf. *Inv.* 1.1: *qui vero ita sese armat eloquentia*). But the *laudes* in *de Oratore*
are also more detailed than in *de Inventione*, and here Cicero fills in the outline that he
sketched in his earlier work. Thus, whereas in *de Inventione* Cicero merely told his
audience that *eloquentia* enabled Republican politicians to obtain *laus, honos, dignitas,*
that it supported their *auctoritas* and *virtus*, and that it helps keep the state out of the
hands of the wicked, in *de Oratore* Cicero shows us the contexts in which these things
occur:

aut tam potens tamque magnificum quam populi motus iudicum religiones senatus
gravitatem unius oratione converti? quid tam porro regium tam liberale tam
munificentum quam opem ferre supplicibus, excitare adflictos, dare salutem, liberare
periculis, retinere homines in civitate? quid autem tam necessarium quam tenere

77 On this image in Cicero’s works, see Fantham 1972, 155–58.
semper arma, quibus vel tectus ipse esse possis vel provocare improbos vel te ulcisci laecessitus?

Or what is so powerful and so magnificent as when the upheavals of the people, the scruples of judges, or the authority of the senate are overturned by the speech of a single man? Taking it further, what is so kingly or so magnanimous or so munificent as giving aid to suppliants, rousing the afflicted, giving men salvation, freeing them from dangers, and keeping the loyalty of men in the state? What, moreover, is so necessary as always keeping arms with which you can either be shielded yourself or you can challenge the wicked or, when wounded, exact vengeance?

Here, as in de Inventione, we can see how the benefits of speech are envisioned to affect not only public affairs but also private ones as well, and how commanding this potens and magnificum faculty can enable a Roman aristocrat to obtain political success and dominance.

If all of this praise had not made speech sufficiently enticing, the laudes are followed with an argument based on the observation that speech is the distinguishing and particular attribute of human beings, and, as such, achievement in this particular field merits special distinction. The language is at times verbatim with that found in de

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78 Not a common use of retinere (OLD s.v. 7c), but suggested, I think, by the parallels between de Orat. 1.30–31 and Planc. 11 (ferre modice populi voluntates, adlicere alienas, retinere partas, placare turbas), delivered in 54. Aliter May and Wisse 2001, 64: “saving them from exile,” an attractive alternative given Cicero’s recall prior to writing de Orat.
The proprium humanitatis argument then leads Crassus to his conclusion (1.33: *ad illa summa veniamus*), a very compressed version of the same anthropological account that we have met already in *de Inventione*:

What other power could have either gathered men who had been scattered into a single place or led them out of their wild and undomesticated lives to this human and civilized way of life or, when states had been already established, what other power could have established statutes, courts, and legal codes?

Thus, Cicero presents anew the claims from his earlier treatise that had established rhetoric’s originally civilizing role for humanity and its ongoing function (*iam constitutis civitatibus*) in providing the institutional means to ensure the stability of these communities. As with the proprium humanitatis argument, Cicero’s language here is

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79 Cf. *Inv.* 1.5: *ac mihi quidem videntur homines, cum multis rebus humiliores et infirmiores sint, hac re maxime bestiis praestare, quod loqui possunt, quare praeclarum mihi quiddam videtur adeptus is, qui, qua re homines bestiis praestent, ea in re hominibus ipsis antecellat*; *de Orat.* 1.32–33: *hoc enim uno praestamus vel maxime feris, quod conloquimur inter nos et quod exprimere dicendo sensa possumus, quam ob rem quis hoc non iure miretur summeque in eo elaborandum esse arbitretur, ut quo uno homines maxime bestiis praestent in hoc hominibus ipsis antecellat*?
clearly adapted from his presentation in *de Invenitone.*\(^{80}\) Crassus concludes by summarizing his position and returning to his young audience, Sulpicius and Cotta:

\[sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem sed et privatorum plurimorum et universae rei publicae salutatione maxime contineri.\]

For my conviction is as follows: that the control and wisdom of the perfect orator forms the basis not only for his own authority but even the salvation of a great number of private individuals and the Republic as a whole. For that reason, keep on as you are, young men, and press on that study which you are engaged in, in order that you can become a source of honor for yourself, advantage for your friends, and benefit for the Republic.

The words in Crassus’s conclusion clearly look backwards to *de Invenitone,* but they also point forward to the ideas found in the remainder of *de Oratore.* The connection between the power of speech and personal authority, together with the well-being of both the orator’s friends and, importantly, the salvation of the Republic as a whole—all of these issues were touched upon already in *de Invenitone* and emphasized in the concluding

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\(^{80}\) Cf. *Inv.* 1.2: *qui dispersos homines in agros et in tectis silvestribus abditos ratione quadam compulit unum in locum et congregavit et eos in unam quamque rem et eos in unam quamque rem inducens utilem atque honestam... ex feris et immanibus mites reddidit et mansuetos... age vero, urbibus constitutis, ut fidel colere et iustitiam retinere discerent...*
remarks of *Inv*. 1.5. But while in *de Inventione* control over such matters was attributed to *eloquentia* and projected back upon exemplary Romans of the past, Crassus here places this power within the figure he introduces as the *perfectus orator*—the subject of the dialogue itself.\(^{81}\)

Cicero does not confine his reprisal of the arguments from *de Inventione* to this exhortatory passage in *de Oratore*. Later in the dialogue, for example, we can see additional arguments in the same spirit. For example, Antonius’s praises of the power of the *perfectus orator* in *de Orat.* 2.33–38 touch on many points that are now quite familiar to us, including the utility of speech (2.33: *usum dicendi*) and its primacy in peaceful and free states (*in omni pacata et libera civitate dominatur*). *Eloquentia* too is eventually reintroduced in these discussions, but augmented in accordance with the increasingly comprehensive demands on the ideal orator’s knowledge. Thus, in book three during his discussion of the knowledge required of the ideal orator, Crassus defines the scope of *eloquentia*, which, if anything, now has even greater power than in *de Inventione* (3.76):

\[
\text{illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est, ut omnium rerum, virtutum, officiorum omnisque naturae, quae mores hominum, quae animos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat, eadem mores, leges, iura describat, rem}
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\(^{81}\) Probably the most notable absence from *Inv*. 1.1–5 in comparison with *de Orat*. 1.30–34 is the connection between philosophy and rhetoric that was so important in the former passage but which is barely touched upon in the latter—though it does appear there in muted tones (Leeman-Pinsker 1:103). This difference, however, is more the result of Cicero’s new mode of presentation in *de Orat.* than any sharp divergence in thought. Immediately following Crassus’s speech, Scaevola introduces the competing claims of philosophy (1.35–44), part of the dialogic practice of presenting arguments in debate rather than the more straightforward presentation of the treatise. At any rate, the call for the unity of *sapientia* and *eloquentia*—together with the other *artes*—will become one of the main themes of *de Orat.* Cf., e.g., 3.142: *hunc oratorem, quem ego dico sapientiam iunctam habere eloquentiae.*
Moreover that power of eloquence is so great that it holds the origin, the force, and the changes of all things—virtues, duties, and the entire order of things that encompasses the *mores* of men, their souls, and their lives—so great that this same thing establishes *mores*, statutes, and courts of law, it rules over the Republic and speaks with style and fullness about all things on whatever point is at issue.

*Eloquentia* here combines ethics, the foundations and maintenance of institutions essential for civic stability and, of course, speaking well. But also prominent is its role in the Republic, which it rules over (*regat*). Rhetoric and political power, as in *de Inventione*, are on intimate terms.

Nine years later, in 46, we can find Cicero still committed to the same positions. As he opens *Brutus*, Cicero alludes to the arguments he had used in his openings to *de Inventione* and *de Oratore*, but he no longer feels the need to rehash the benefits of *eloquentia* (*Brut. 25*):

Hic ego: laudare igitur eloquentiam et quanta vis sit eius expromere quantamque eis qui sint eam consecuti dignitatem adferat, neque propositum nobis est hoc loco neque necessarium.
At this point I said: “to praise eloquence, therefore, and to expound how great its power is and how much authority it brings to those who have obtained it is neither our intention in this place nor is it necessary.”

As A. E. Douglas comments, revisiting his laudes eloquentiae here is not necessary “dramatically, because the agreement of Atticus and Brutus could be assumed, and in fact because C(icero) had written De Oratore.”\(^8\) That is, Cicero, having now established his position clearly both in his earliest rhetorical work and in the flagship work in his oratorii libri, no longer felt compelled to restate the argument. Cicero could now take his position as a given as he opened his history of Roman eloquence.

The situation is a combination of similar and different in Orator, the other rhetorical work that occupied Cicero in that year. As in Brutus, he does not praise eloquentia or rhetoric in his preface, addressed also to Brutus. But we do find Cicero’s allegiance to the same arguments expressed, and with more elaboration than in Brutus. This comes in Cicero’s self-defense for writing rhetorical treatises, located just past the halfway point of the epistolary treatise (140–148). This apologia presents itself as a response to imagined objections that a Roman as decorated and accomplished as Cicero should not waste so much of his time writing rhetorical tracts (de artificio dicendi litteris tam multa mandare). Clearly underlying this passage are the same anxieties that dogged the study of Greek disciplines by principes civitatis that we met in the Lucullus passage in this chapter’s introduction. Cicero’s apologia in Orator starts with a conventional and evasive answer: since the treatise was spurred by a request from Brutus, a most supportive and preeminent man (amicissimo et praestantissimo viro), this is surely

\(^{8}\) Douglas 1966, 17.
sufficient justification for writing *Orator*. But Cicero does not stop here.\textsuperscript{83} Instead, he leans upon precisely the same arguments we have seen him deploying since *de Inventione* to justify rhetoric for Rome and confront what is at heart of the question that opened this chapter: how was this originally Greek *disciplina* accommodated within the values of the Roman elite? Why pursue rhetoric?

In Cicero’s answer, we see him combining the now familiar arguments based on rhetoric’s utility with the educational program in which he contextualized his *oratorii libri* in the second preface of *de Divinatione*.\textsuperscript{84} Cicero begins with a rhetorical question (*Orat.* 141):

\begin{quote}
    sed si profiterer—quod utinam possem!—me studiosis dicendi praecepta et quasi vias quae ad eloquentiam ferrent traditum, quis tandem id iustus rerum existimator reprehenderet?
\end{quote}

But if I could guarantee—if only I were able to!—that I would hand down the precepts of speaking to students and, as it were, the paths that lead to eloquence,\textsuperscript{85} what reasonable judge of matters could find fault with this?

\textsuperscript{83} Baraz 2012, 13–43 demonstrates that Republican prose prefaces typically address such anxieties by either evading criticism and claiming the work is merely the fulfillment of an obligation to a friend or by trying “to face the difficulty directly and, while explicitly acknowledging the cultural prevalence of values opposing writing, try to overturn the paradigm in the service of one’s project” (42). I argue that in *Orat.* 140–148, Cicero pursues both strategies simultaneously.

\textsuperscript{84} For *Div.*, see §2.1 above.

\textsuperscript{85} Cf. *de Orat.* 1.203 for the same image of the way (*via*) that leads to *eloquentia*. The image was destined to remain in the tradition of Latin rhetorical education, e.g., Petr. *Sat.* 1: *haec ipsa tolerabilia essent si ad eloquentiam ituris viam facerent*. The image is related to the Greek commonplace that portrays education as a difficult climb up a steep road, indebted ultimately to Prodicus’s allegory of Heracles at the crossroads. On this tradition, see, e.g., C. A. Gibson 2012 with further references. Cf. also Quint. *Inst.* 1 pr. 20.
Cicero continues by introducing the contrast between an aristocrat committing time and effort to teach rhetoric versus “teaching” law. In sharp contrast to the former—rhetorical educators in this period were, as I argued above, limited to freedmen⁸⁶—the latter arrangement was considered an acceptable elite activity. But, as Cicero explains, the acceptability of “teaching” law stems from the fact that such legal education does not pose any impediments to the time of the Roman legal expert. Legal education in the sense imagined by Cicero here consists simply in the learned aristocrat giving his expert responsa to clients and others in need of legal clarity; eager students could listen and thus count this as their tuition.⁸⁷ Cicero accordingly uses the contrast with legal education to demonstrate that teaching per se is not necessarily an inappropriate activity, and, given what he argues about the importance of eloquentia in contrast to the other discipline (now targeting law rather than philosophy), a fortiori there should be no objections to Cicero committing so much energy and time to teaching the praecepta dicendi (141–42):

\[
\text{nam quis umquam dubitavit quin in re publica nostra primas eloquentia tenuerit semper urbanis pacatisque rebus, secundas iuris scientia, cum in altera gratiae gloriae praesidii plurimum esset, in altera persecutionum cautumque praecipio, quae quidem ipsa auxilium ab eloquentia saepe peteret, ea vero repugnante vix suas regiones finesque defenderet? cur igitur ius civile docere semper pulchrum fuit hominumque clarissimorum discipulis floruerunt domus: ad}
\]

⁸⁶ See in §1.5.
⁸⁷ Our knowledge of this arrangement is heavily dependent on Cicero’s own experiences: Orat. 142 and Brut. 306 are essential. See Rawson 1985, 201–214, esp. 211–212 and Corbeill 2001, 275–76. For Cicero’s appeals to law in passages involving disciplinary justification, cf. Fin. 1.12; Off. 1.19.
dicendum si quis acuat aut adiuvet in eo iuventutem, vituperetur? nam si vitiosum est dicere ornate, pellatur omnino e civitate eloquientia; sin ea non modo eos ornat penes quos est, sed etiam universam rem publicam, cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere?

For who ever doubted that in our Republic eloquence has always held supremacy in the peaceful affairs related to the City, and that the knowledge of law has held second place, since in the one there was the lion’s share of influence, glory, and protection, while the other consists of instruction in prosecutorial legal actions and in written provisos? At any rate, law itself often seeks help from eloquence, and can scarcely protect its own territories and borders when eloquence opposes it. Why, therefore, was it always honorable to teach law and why were the homes of the most esteemed men richly ornamented with students, but if anyone should sharpen the youth for speaking or offer aid in this, he would be met with adverse criticism? For if it is wrong to speak with style, let eloquence be altogether banished from the state. But if it not only adorns those who possess it, but also the Republic as a whole, why is it a source of shame to teach what is honorable to know, or rather why is it not glorious to teach what it is most splendid to know?

Thus, in his self-defense for writing *rhetorica* Cicero resorts to the same arguments that he had relied upon since *de Inventione*. He can justify his educational project precisely because rhetoric fits so well within the value system of a Roman aristocrat, that it

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88 The self-defense, in fact, goes beyond *writing*, and has clear application also to Cicero’s *teaching* rhetoric to Hirtius, Pansa, and Dolabella in this period. See above in §1.3.
provides gratia, gloria, and praesidium, that it adorns not only its masters, but even the universa res publica. Knowledge of this, originally Greek, disciplina is now honorable (honestum) and teaching it is glorious (gloriosum). The unflagging arguments that span Cicero’s rhetorica reveal how Latin rhetoric’s leading practitioner justified the study of rhetoric for the aristocracy, by arguing that his discipline was perfect for political life, and where it was cultivated, human states flourished. If the prosopography in the last chapter was able to reveal that, at a practical level, Latin rhetorical education had found favor with Roman political power in the late Republic, then Cicero’s justificatory narrative that he developed in his rhetorica shows how this new disciplina was able to fit with political power at the theoretical level.

§2.5 Conclusion: The influence of Cicero’s vision and the significance of praise

In the conclusion to chapter one, we noted Suetonius’s words in DGR 25.3: “gradually even rhetoric itself was perceived as useful (utilis) and honorable (honesta), and many sought it for the sake of defense (praesidium) and for glory (gloria).” We can now see how this transformation of perception occurred during the late Republic. Suetonius’s choice of words to describe rhetoric’s ultimate reception—utilis, honesta, praesidium, gloria—finds strong parallel in the passages from Cicero’s rhetorica that were explored above. It seems quite likely, in fact, that Suetonius had Cicero’s arguments in mind here, as, for example, Orat. 141–42: …cum in altera gratiae gloriae praesidii plurimum
esset... cur aut discere turpe est quod scire honestum est, aut quod nosse pulcherrimum est id non gloriosum est docere?  

This points to the influence of Cicero’s justificatory narrative. And there can be no doubt that this narrative, focused on rhetoric’s fundamentally civilizing origins, its utility for the Roman state, its role in procuring gloria, honos, dignitas, as well as its ability to empower one to rule (e.g., de Orat. 3.76: rem publicam regat), would go on to echo throughout the history of rhetoric in the West. Later Roman rhetorical educators like Quintilian, Fronto, and Victorinus were well aware of Cicero’s arguments that provided justification for their discipliner. But, to take a broader view for a moment, what Cicero articulated first in de Inventione and returned to in his oratorii libri had a far greater reach—even beyond Antiquity. I would like to conclude the present chapter by pointing to the power and reach of this narrative in order to demonstrate that Cicero’s ideas and arguments in these pages mattered to the long-term prospects of this discipline. This will be a point that becomes particularly salient in chapter four, when we turn to consider Quintilian’s situation and salarium with this background in mind.

Here, I would like to point to two later examples that highlight the lasting effects of Cicero’s justificatory narrative. On 15 December 1416, Poggio Bracciolini wrote to Guarino da Verona to announce his liberation of a complete copy of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria from a tower in the Abbey of St. Gall.  

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89 To my knowledge the parallel between Suet. DGR 25.3 and Cic. Orat. 141–42 has not hitherto been noted by scholars; there is no record of the parallel in, e.g., Kaster’s commentary on DGR (Kaster 1995, ad loc.), nor in the standard commentaries on Orator (Sandys 1885 and Kroll 1913, ad loc.).

90 On Bracciolini’s discovery within the history of Quintilian’s reception in the Renaissance, see Classen 1994, 89–90 with n. 43. For the broader Nachleben of Cicero’s justificatory narrative among Renaissance humanists, cf. Apel 1963, 146–48, 179, who cites Bracciolini’s letter.
easily detect the lasting effect of Cicero’s arguments\textsuperscript{91}, and the \textit{proprium humanitatis} argument in particular (\textit{Ep. 1.5 de Tonellis}):

For what, by immortal God, can there be for you or other most learned men that is more pleasant, more welcome, and more pleasing than an understanding of these matters, through the intercourse of which we are made more learned and—a point that seems more significant—more elegant. For when nature, the parent of the universe, gave understanding (\textit{intellectum}) and reason (\textit{rationem}) to the human race (\textit{generi humano}), though both were outstanding leaders to living well and happily (than which she was able to imagine nothing more outstanding), she next—I know not whether that was the most outstanding thing of all (\textit{omnium praestantissimum})—bestowed upon us the use and method of speaking (\textit{usum atque rationem dicendi}), without which neither reason itself nor intellect are hardly of any use. For speech (\textit{sermo}), which we use for expressing the virtues of the soul, is the only thing that distinguishes us from the other living things (\textit{ab reliquis animantibus segregamur}). Thus we owe great thanks to the discoverers of the other liberal arts, but especially to those men who by their own effort and diligence have handed down (\textit{tradiderunt}) to us speaking’s precepts (\textit{dicendi praecepta}) and a certain rule of perfect discourse (\textit{normam quandam perfecte loquendi}).

Another example, even clearer, is the case of Thomas Wilson. In summer 1552, Wilson wrote his \textit{Art of Rhetoric} at the manor of Sir Edward Dymoke, King’s Champion of

\textsuperscript{91} Similarly in the \textit{Institutio} as well: see chapter four below.
Scrivelsby, Lincolnshire. This was among the earliest rhetorical treatises written in the English language and Wilson, not unlike Cicero himself, was thus a pioneer in introducing technical rhetoric into a new language and expanding its audience. When Wilson introduces the art to his audience, at end of his preface, in a subsection titled “Eloquence First Given by God, and After Lost by Man, and Last Repaired by God Again,” he adapts Cicero’s justificatory narrative. While the passage is too extensive to quote in full, the following selection provides a reasonable sample. After the fall of Adam, mankind entered a sinful period corresponding to Cicero’s primitive hunter-gatherers: “all things waxed savage: the earth untilled, society neglected, God’s will not known, man against man, one against another, and all against order.” But from these savage conditions mankind was eventually delivered by God, who

gave his appointed ministers knowledge both to see the natures of men, and also granted them the gift of utterance, that they might with ease win folk at their will and frame them by reason to all good order. And therefore, whereas men lived brutishly in open fields—having neither house to shroud them in, nor attire to clothe their backs, nor yet any regard to seek their best avail—these appointed of God called them together by utterance of speech and persuaded with them what was good, what was bad, and what was gainful for mankind. And... being somewhat drawn and delighted with the pleasantness of reason and the sweetness of utterance, after a certain space they became through nurture and good

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92 See Medine 1993, 2–3.
93 Wilson was preceded only by Leonard Cox’s Art or Craft of Rhetoric (1530) and Richard Sherry’s Treatise of Schemes and Tropes (1550), both considerably more narrow in scope: Medine 1993, 8–9.
advisement of wild, sober; of cruel, gentle; of fools, wise; and of beasts, men. Such force hath the tongue, and such is the power of eloquence and reason…

Neither can I see that men could have been brought by any other means to live together in fellowship of life, to maintain cities, to deal truly, and willingly to obey one another, if men at the first had not by art and eloquence persuaded that which they full oft found out by reason. (41.32–42.22 Medine)

In short: the justificatory narrative for rhetoric created by Cicero endured and flourished even after the Republic and beyond Rome. As we have seen, his arguments—whatever their Greek antecedents might have been—were, in fact, well adapted for the Republic, emphasizing how rhetoric can augment the majesty of the Roman state, and support the virtues and values of the Roman aristocracy. And yet, as illustrated by the Renaissance examples and, closer to Cicero’s time (but still in a different political context) the case of Quintilian (see chapter four), Cicero’s arguments were also sufficiently pliable such that they could be adapted to justify the discipline even when political circumstances had changed.

In considering the reach of Cicero’s narrative, we can conclude here by noting the package he chose for its delivery. In Brutus, when Cicero alludes to the arguments of his earlier works, he points to the epideictic, encomiastic status of these passages (Brut. 24: laudare eloquentiam). As already mentioned, it has, in fact, become commonplace among scholarship since Victorinus to refer to these passages as Cicero’s laudes eloquentiae, his “praises of eloquence.”94 In fact, Victorinus identified only a section of

94 E.g., in post-Victorinus scholarship: Schulte 1935, 10; Barwick 1963, 18; Leeman-Pinkster 1:102–107; May and Wisse 2001, 64; Fantham 2004, 23.
de Inventione as laudes eloquentiae (Inv. 1.5), but generalizing as praise the whole series of arguments for rhetoric presented by Cicero is entirely reasonable. Utility, benefits, origins, importance to human civilization, exemplary practitioners—these are all standard headings prescribed in antiquity for composing a speech of praise for abstractions, like wisdom, law, or, as here, eloquence.⁹⁵ And seen as praise, we can start to appreciate the reach and impact of Cicero’s vision.

Laurent Pernot, in the most comprehensive study of praise in Greco-Roman antiquity, has argued that there was an ideological aspect to ancient praise.⁹⁶ Praise, Pernot contends, performs a social action. On the one hand, it is conservative and cyclical: in praising gods, kings, and cities, the epideictic orator supports and reaffirms the dominant values in society; praise is “le bain de jouvence de l’ordre social.”⁹⁷ But praise is not content just to reflect and reaffirm a monolithic tradition. It also adapts, depending on changes in society and the views of its particular author. Thus, writing of the celebrity Greek sophists of the second century ce, the “idéologues de l’époque impériale,” Pernot explains:

Ils modèlent les consciences et élaborent une vision du monde. Si d’autres catégories de penseurs jouent à la même époque un rôle comparable, la spécificité de l’éloquence épideictique consiste à envisager les choses sous l’angle de ce qui

⁹⁵ For praise of abstractions, see Pernot 1993, 1:238–48. A sample laus of wisdom is preserved in Aphth. Prog. 8.10–15, and law in D. Chr. 75; both passages share numerous similarities with Inv. 1.1–5 and de Orat. 1.30–34.
⁹⁷ Pernot 1993, 2:720. Cf. Quint. Inst. 3.7.23: nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio, ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra quem dicemus ea quae oderunt.
Of course, there are numerous qualifications that might be made before comparing these interesting remarks with Cicero’s laudes eloquentiae. Cicero was not a Greek sophist, Cicero’s context was not the second century CE, and Cicero’s written laudes were not delivered in the same way as a Sophistic encomium, live before a mass audience. But even granting these differences, Pernot’s observations here ring true, I believe, in the case of Cicero’s justificatory narrative. Like the sophists that form the basis for Pernot’s discussion here, Cicero is attempting to shape “les consciences” of his audience. Cicero provides his vision of the world and of the role that he thinks rhetoric should play in that world. His laudes eloquentiae are conservative and cyclical insofar as they focus on the traditional values and valuables of the Roman elite, but they are also adaptive and innovative, since these laudes make technical rhetoric productive of success within that tradition. And throughout, Cicero, like the sophists, focuses on the kalon and koinon. If, as Pernot believes, praise can play a significant role in shaping a society’s ideas and values, we can start to recognize that the influence of Cicero’s epideictic justificatory for rhetoric is not necessarily surprising; this is the expected result of well-articulated praise.

Just how successful was Cicero in shaping “les consciences” of the Roman elite? The answer will become critical for the treatment of Quintilian in chapter four. But Quintilian is a rhetor in a very different political context, the high empire under the Flavians. So far, we have seen that Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power were able to come together practically and theoretically in the late Republic. But what
about in a period of dramatic cultural and political change? Before examining Quintilian and the Flavians, we need to consider the relationship between rhetorical education and Rome’s rulers under the Julio-Claudians.
Chapter 3: “A Noisy Menagerie,” “A Demoniac Legion”?

The title of the present chapter combines two turns of phrase penned by Ronald Syme. The first comes from his *Augustan Aristocracy*, describing the characters that populate the pages of the Lucius Annaeus Seneca’s anthology of declamation: “variegated by origin, habits, and style, the declaimers formed a noisy menagerie.”¹ The second from *History in Ovid*: “the declaimers were legion, a demoniac legion.”² Syme and Seneca combine for a suitable opening to the present chapter: the latter because his anthology is the central piece of evidence considered here, and the former because his contributions and, especially, the methodologies he helped pioneer will be important in our treatment of that material, as we investigate the declaimers found in Seneca’s pages, the members of the noisy menagerie.

In chapter one, it was argued that already under the Republic the governing aristocracy embraced Latin rhetorical education, and that this form of education did not face serious *practical* opposition. Chapter two revealed how Cicero negotiated the *theoretical* difficulties faced by rhetoric at Rome by connecting rhetoric with political power. Cicero, I argued, created a justificatory narrative for rhetoric that highlighted rhetoric’s potential as both *utilis* and *honesta* for Rome and its aristocracy. The present chapter continues our investigation of the relationship between of Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power, now advancing chronologically and into a different political situation: the Principate under the Julio-Claudians. Here, the goal is to

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¹ Syme 1986, 354.
² Syme 1978b, 92.
demonstrate that, despite the political changes, the early Principate evinces continuity in the relationship between Latin rhetorical instruction and political power, maintaining what we saw inaugurated under the Republic. That is, the pair remains closely connected even in this changed environment. This will chiefly be demonstrated by prosopographical means, by connecting figures of political significance under the new regime to Latin rhetorical education. That this is at all possible is due to Seneca who, as mentioned above, looms large in this chapter. Seneca’s fragmentary anthology of *controversiae* and *suasoriae*—collectively titled *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores*—is a rich, if idiosyncratic, source for understanding (among other things) the activities of Latin rhetors and their associates during the Julio-Claudian period, at least for the roughly first two-thirds of that period. Written certainly after 34 CE and possibly between 37 and 41, Seneca’s anthology is essentially limited to informing us about conditions under Augustus and Tiberius. For the situation under Gaius, Claudius, and Nero we would have to turn to other sources. However, by the time we reach the major figure of investigation in chapter four, the great Flavian rhetor Quintilian, there are no indications of undetected rifts between the governing aristocracy and Latin rhetors during the intervening period.

The structure of the present chapter is as follows. The first section (§3.1) contains requisite contextualization: here I introduce Seneca’s anthology, declamation under the Julio-Claudians, and the changing nature of political power in this period. The next

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3 On prosopography as a methodology, see the discussion in the introductory chapter above. As a kind of apology—also applicable to the present chapter—for the presentational difficulties inherent in this *modus operandi*, note the words of Syme 1939, vii: “…the subject almost baffles exposition. The reader who is repelled by a close concatenation of proper names must pass rapidly over certain sections…”

4 In what follows, “Seneca” without qualification refers to the elder Seneca.

5 For the date of the work, see Griffin 1972, 11; Sussman 1978, 23–24; Fairweather 1981, 15.
section (§3.2) then turns to examining the people in Seneca. Many significant figures appear in these pages, but “the method has to be selective: exhaustive detail cannot be provided about every family or individual.” And, at any rate, all that is needed to successfully advance the argument here is to provide a sufficient number of examples that collectively demonstrate that there was continuity with the association between Latin rhetorical education and political power that we found previously established. Since proximity to the princeps is an important part of the arrangement of power in this period (see below), I start from the center by considering the presence of Augustus himself in Seneca’s anthology (§3.2.1). Along the way, it becomes necessary to introduce a number of additional figures, and thus the discussion starts to branch out by association. Here we can begin to see the outlines of patterns, with members of the Augustan and Tiberian governing aristocracies found in the milieu of Latin rhetorical education. The next section (§3.2.2) then provides additional examples of members of Rome's governing oligarchy that help confirm this picture. A conclusion (§3.3) summarizes the investigation, returns to Syme's remarks, and looks forward.

§3.1 Background: Seneca’s anthology, declamation, and political power under the Principate

Seneca’s anthology of declamation is the most important source for rhetorical education under the Julio-Claudians. Suetonius’s De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus, so helpful for understanding the situation of the early-period rhetors (see §§1.1 and 1.3), includes the

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biographical sketch of only one Julio-Claudian rhetor, Gaius Albucius Silus (*DGR* 30), before the manuscript tradition fails us.\(^7\) We know from Jerome’s supplements in his translation of Eusebius’s *Chronicon* that Suetonius had originally included seven additional rhetors.\(^8\) The loss of information about these educators is, of course, lamentable—and no fewer than five of the seven were active under the Julio-Claudians. But two of these missing persons, Cestius Pius (*DGR* fr. 1) and Marcus Porcius Latro (*DGR* fr. 2) are otherwise known from Seneca, the second receiving the most substantial “pen-portrait” in the preface to the first book of *controversiae*.\(^9\) And that is not all. Seneca’s work, in fact, preserves information about no fewer than twenty-three different Latin rhetors, as well as a number of their students, associates, and other figures of interest who participated in their milieu.\(^10\) According to the most recent tabulation, some 164 individuals populate Seneca’s anthology, and many of them are connected one way or another to Latin rhetorical education.\(^11\) These people, their relation to imperial power, and their connections to rhetoric, will be of great interest in the present chapter.

Before beginning that investigation, however, Seneca and his work require introduction.\(^12\) As has been pointed out, Seneca’s *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores* is an unusual work, “a generic anomaly,” “unparalleled in extant

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\(^7\) Though for Silus, Suetonius seems to have relied, probably indirectly, on Seneca’s own treatment of the rhetor (*Contr*. 7 pr.); see discussion in Kaster 1995, 355–59.

\(^8\) Collected as fragments 1–7 in Kaster 1995, 38–39.


\(^10\) As well as thirteen Greek rhetors. See Echavarren 2007b, 361–64; Echavarren 2007a; cf. Kaster 1995, 357.

\(^11\) Echavarren 2007b, 351.

\(^12\) Further introductions to Seneca’s anthology: Sussman 1978, 34–93; Fairweather 1981, 27–49; Fairweather 1984, 529–43; Berti 2007, 17–36; the best study of the man is Griffin 1972; for the state of research on Seneca, see the surveys in Sussman 1984 and Lentano 1999.
The strangeness of the collection will be familiar to anyone who has perused its pages—and seems to have been partially the result of Seneca’s own design (more on this in a moment). But in this respect the anthology is hardly helped by its mutilated transmission, which needs to be considered here before moving to the work’s content and design. The manuscript tradition appears bipartite. One family of manuscripts has preserved the sole book of *suasoriae*, and books 1, 2, 7, 9, and 10 of the *controversiae*, together with the prefaces intact for *Contr.* 7, 10, as well as the beginning of the preface to 9. Meanwhile, a separate family of manuscripts has transmitted a collection of excerpts from the *controversiae*, apparently created during late antiquity, to which was added the prefaces to *Contr.* 1–4, 7, and 10. Thus for *Contr.* 5, 6, and 8 we have only excerpts, and for 3–4 we have an exclusively excerpted body text, but with the addition of prefaces. Add to this maimed tradition the problems with the text that is thereby transmitted: corruptions, lacunae, etc. abound. To provide what seems like a reasonably representative sample, consider that in the standard critical edition of the entire work, over the course of 5.5 Teubner pages the editor Lennart Håkanson had cause to abandon the transmitted text no fewer than 85 times—and “always with good reason,” as one esteemed reviewer commented. The text, in short, is challenging to work with.

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15 The activities of the excerptor responsible for this tradition is variously placed in the fifth century (Texts and Transmission 357) or more generally in late antiquity (Håkanson 1989, v: “exeunte... antiquitate”). The relationship between this excerpted tradition and the excerpted version of Seneca apparently consulted by Suetonius (see Kaster 1995, 355–59) is unclear.
17 Winterbottom 1991, 339. Håkanson’s posthumous 1989 Teubner remains the critical text for the entire work; for the *suasoriae*, see now the edition with generous commentary in Feddern 2013.
But Seneca’s own design—it might be admitted—somewhat adds to the difficulties. In *Oratorum et Rhetorum Sententiae, Divisiones, Colores*, Seneca created an anthology of Roman declamation, predominately judicial in nature, with 10 books of *controversiae*, and with one book of deliberative *suasoriae*. As he explains in his preface to *Contr.* 1—steeped with full prefatory convention—the work was written in response to requests from his sons, Novatus, Seneca, and Mela, the collective addressees of the prefaces. His sons, Seneca explains, had been asking, or rather, demanding (*Contr.* 1 pr. 1: *exigitis… iubetis*), his opinion regarding declaimers he had heard in his earlier years (*quid de his declamatoribus sentiam, qui in aetatem meam inciderunt*). Seneca obliges his sons with the anthology, and does so gladly. On the one hand, Seneca points out that his sons are quite right to look for other examples of *eloquentia*, since, he argues, the more models one studies, the more progress can be made in obtaining *eloquentia* itself. Seneca also commends his sons for not being content with the present state of declamation, which in his opinion falls well short of the higher standards

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18 The abundance of *controversiae* perhaps can be explained by the preeminence of that exercise over the *suasoria*, which—at least during the high empire—was sometimes considered an easier exercise compared with the *controversia*. A solitary ancient locus is usually cited to prove this, viz. Tac. *Dial.* 35.4 (e.g., in Sussman 1978, 11; Winterbottom 1982, 62), but note that the order of the exercises in Quint. *Inst.* 2.10.1 suggests the same sequence (*tempus... adgrediendi suasorias iudicialesque materias*). If this grading is correct also during the Julio-Claudian period, one can imagine that the major declaimers—those followed by Seneca—would have exhibited a preference to demonstrate their prowess with the more difficult variety of declamation. Therefore, Seneca would have had many more examples of *controversiae* at hand for his anthology. The same observation—that *suasoriae* are more basic kinds of exercises—could also help explain why the *suasoriae* are transmitted as the first book of Seneca’s anthology in MS family α even though there is reason to believe that they originally either followed the *controversiae* or were, perhaps, distributed *partim passim* (see Fairweather 1981, 34–37). Thus, the position of the *suasoriae* may be the result of how the later tradition re-organized Seneca’s work by kind and on the basis of pedagogical utility, that is, placing first the easier exercises, the grist for students looking for their first taste of *exempla*. On this theory, the *controversiae*, being more advanced, would follow accordingly.


20 For *iubere* in literary requests, see White 1993, 266–68.
achieved by the declaimers of his generation (Contr. 1 pr. 6–10). Further, Seneca is pleased to answer his sons’ requests because they afford him with an opportunity to preserve the memory of these men, “whom oblivion threatens” (Contr. 1 pr. 11: quibus oblivio imminet):

fere enim aut nulli commentarii maximorum declamatorum extant aut, quod peius est, falsi. itaque, ne aut ignoti sint aut aliter quam debent noti, summa cum fide suum cuique reddam.

For there are extant either no collections of the greatest declaimers or—what is worse—those in circulation are falsely attributed to them. Thus, so that they are neither unknown, nor known in a manner other than they deserve, I will assign to each his own work with the utmost fidelity.

Thus, Seneca pursues a kind of triple agenda, aiming to (1) provide his sons with evaluations of the declaimers that he himself witnessed; (2) offer his sons useful exempla suitable for imitation; and (3) preserve the memory of the maximi declamatores of his generation by providing genuine examples of their work.

The result of this plan is the anthology. It is an anthology built of passages from different declaimers that Seneca heard during his lifetime, spanning from when he was a young student under the rhetor Marullus, perhaps in the 30s BCE, potentially up to the

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21 The theme of decline is almost inevitable in the treatment of any subject by a Roman author. For the theme as applied to eloquence, see Heldmann 1982; cf., e.g., Bonner 1949, 42–43; G. Williams 1978, 6–51; Clarke 1996, 100–108.

22 For the sense of commentarii here, see TLL s.v. commentarius I.B.2 = 3:1858.1–25.

23 On (3) and Seneca’s crusade against forgeries, see McGill 2012, 66–69.
time of composition, ca. 34–41 CE. The work, then, is predominately a collection of excerpts, interspersed with biographical pen-portraits of some of the most significant declaimers (mostly in the prefaces), as well as a variety of commentary, anecdote, and digression by Seneca. Its organization takes the following form: following the preface of each book (where extant), Seneca first provides the *thema* of a declamation, the fictional scenario to be addressed in the exercise, which in the case of *controversiae* is preceded by any relevant declamatory laws that govern that particular scenario; the excerpted tradition also contains titles, some of which are similar to those found in later declamation collections. Following the *thema*, Seneca appends excerpts from declaimers along the structural lines of *sententiae, divisiones*, and *colores* referred to in his title. These terms too require some explanation. In Seneca’s usage, *sententiae* are quotations, introduced with the declaimer’s name in the genitive, that are variable in length, and which do not necessarily represent connected speech. That is, in any given section of *sententiae*, Seneca can include a variety of different excerpts that were originally part of a declaimer’s speech on a given *thema*. This tends to inflict confusion.

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24 Feddern 2013, 60 notes that Seneca may have been excerpting for some 70 years.
25 For *thema* as a technical term in the anatomy of ancient declamation, see, e.g., Sen. *Contr.* 1.2.14, 7.1 in the text of the *thema*; 7.5.12; Quint. *Inst.* 7.1.4 (who references Cicero’s translation as *propositum*; according to Russell 2001, 154 n. 3 Cicero does so at *Top.* 79, but there Cicero uses *propositum* to render *θέσις*, not *θέμα*. Cf. (Spalding 1798–1834, 2:501 n. 17) (*ad* Quint. *Inst.* 6.2.17) “*propositum… apud Ciceronem nequaquam est* thema, verum *θέσις*”; *ad summam*: it is not entirely clear what Quintilian has in mind here); *DMin.* 309.1; and the discussion in Dingel 1988, 16–17. For declamatory leges, see Bonner 1949, 84–132. A selection of classic declamation *themata* from a variety of sources can be found in Winterbottom 1980, 8–10. On titles in declamation collections, see Dingel 1988, 17–20; Imber 2001, 205
27 As has been pointed out (e.g., Huelsenbeck 2009, 12 n. 6), the use of *sententiae* for this section can easily cause confusion, especially since Seneca does not intend here *sententia* to refer to an epigram, as the term is commonly understood in the context of imperial Latin literature, as, e.g., Petr. 1.2; Quint. *Inst.* 8.5.31. Seneca’s discussion of *sententiae* meaning what are typically referred to as *loci communes* (*Contr.* 1 pr. 23) similarly adds to the confusion.
and difficulty on modern readers since Seneca does not indicate when he switches from one excerpt to another. Following these sets of disiecta membra come the divisiones, which refer not to the structural divisions of the declamation, but rather the outlines of the arguments pursued by various declaimers, often corresponding to issue-theory. Finally, Seneca’s treatment of each thema ends with the colores, the imaginative arguments, lines of defense, etc. that the declaimers would marshal to support their side of a given case; this is the “spin” given to a particular case. In short: the thema provides the guidelines and sets the case; the sententiae preserve actual examples, often discontinuous, of things spoken well by various declaimers on that thema; divisiones lay out the basic strategy of argument, usually in accord with to issue-theory; the colores contain the creative tactical details that declaimers used to support their side of the argument.

Save for in the sententiae, Seneca includes in the prefaces, divisiones, and colores a great deal of anecdote, digression, and especially literary criticism and commentary concerning the declaimers and their productions. And literary criticism is what the work is focused on to a large extent. Accordingly, it is unsurprising that a major avenue of modern scholarship on Seneca has been concerned with his literary criticism, the judgments he makes, and the style of the declaimers. Since the 1990s especially, Seneca's work has also been explored as part of the surge of scholarship on Roman declamation. Indeed, in 1999 it was declared that the previous two decades had witnessed

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29 For the terminology, see Bardon 1940; for studies especially interested in literary criticism and style, see, e.g., Leeman 1963, 1:224–37; Fairweather 1981 (esp. 243–327); Berti 2007; Huelsenbeck 2009.
a “tempo felice” for the study of the once marginalized subject.\textsuperscript{30} This research takes declamation seriously as literature and is also often fortified by insights from allied disciplines, like anthropology, sociology, psychology, and literary and cultural theory. As Erik Gunderson puts it, this recent movement contends that “If you would know the Romans, you must read their declamations.”\textsuperscript{31}

Thus, Seneca and his anthology have benefitted significantly from the recent surge in serious literary work on Roman declamation. But the opportunity afforded for literary study is only one aspect of what Seneca’s collection offers. For among Seneca’s \emph{controversiae} and \emph{suasoriae} there appears, as mentioned above, a rich set of names of the people who participated in declamation and were part of the world of the declaimers. Some of these—the biggest names—have been noticed now for some time. Thus, Gaston Boissier, for example, remarked already in his 1902 study on the presence of Marcus Valerius Messalla Corvinus, Gaius Asinius Pollio, and even Augustus himself, together with his “grands ministres,” Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa and Gaius Cilnius Maecenas.\textsuperscript{32} Henri Bornecque’s monograph of the same year similarly includes some brief remarks on the presence of members of old Roman families, consulars, praetors, and senators, among others. Such remarks are typically quite limited, but they have also been generalized. Mary Beard, for example, in her study of Roman myth and declamation can thus write of the people in Seneca’s anthology that

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\item[\textsuperscript{30}] Lentano 1999, 571.
\item[\textsuperscript{31}] Gunderson 2003, 9. For a compelling case for the importance of studying Roman declamation, see Gunderson 2003, 1–25; Lentano 1999 makes it clear that the surge of interest in declamation was already well underway when Gunderson penned his \textit{apologia}.
\item[\textsuperscript{32}] Boissier 1902, 488–89 = Boissier 1906, 171–72.
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...the world of the ‘Controversiae’ is a world not of hack humdrum teenage instruction, but a world of well-known, glamorous rhetoricians, enjoying a sparkling reputation among the Roman elite. These are men, as Seneca depicts them particularly in the prefaces to his various books of ‘Controversiae’, who mixed with the highest circles of Roman society and whose talents in rhetoric could be compared with the greatest of ancient poets and philosophers. (Beard 1993, 53)

It would, therefore, be accurate to say that there is a general impression in some of the literature that some people in Seneca’s anthology are significant. But there is still much that can be done to add nuance and depth to these general observations, and—it should also be noted—this view is not, in fact, an uncontested one. Furthermore, comments like those of Ronald Syme, which the chapter opened with, as well as a number of other remarks scattered in his writings rather call into question the significance of the world of

33 Bloomer 1997 presents a challenge to this view, contending that Seneca wrote his anthology in bad faith, including significant figures in his prefaces with an aim to “set Seneca’s family on the road to social distinction and to elevate what was a schoolroom practice to the status of old-time oratory” (200). Thus it is alleged that Seneca misleads us by including significant persons who were not actually declaimers in order to make his subject seem more important. This, according to the author, is part of “the peculiar distortion that Seneca has worked on Roman literary history” (206). Without considering each point made by Bloomer, this argument faces difficulties. If, for example, Seneca was trying to make himself and his family seem more important by mischaracterizing the social world of declamation, why did he fail to include himself in that allegedly aggrandized world? If a major goal was to try to elevate his sons, why does Seneca disparage the ingenia of Novatus and Seneca the younger in comparison with Mela in Contr. 2 pr. 4? And what is more difficult—and never really addressed in the contribution—what are we to make of the many excerpts of declamations that appear in Seneca’s anthology by figures who, according to Bloomer, were not actually declaimers? For example, if Votienus Montanus “was… not a declaimer” (207), what how should we explain the many excerpts from declamations that are attributed to him, e.g., Contr. 9.1.3, 9.2.11, 9.3.5, 9.4.5, 9.5.3.? On the whole, it seems to me more reasonable to take the majority view and believe that Seneca was operating—at least more or less—along the lines he himself professes: summa cum fide (Contr. 1 pr. 11).
declamation that we find in Seneca’s pages.\textsuperscript{34} We will revisit some of these claims in the conclusion below. Was this “a world of well-known, glamorous rhetoricians, enjoying a sparkling reputation among the Roman elite” or was it the battlefield of a “demoniac legion,” filled with the shrill sounds of a “noisy menagerie”? Remarks like those of Boissier, Bornecque, and Beard point in the right direction, but are probably too brief to answer the challenge posed by those who would endorse Syme’s characterization. On the other hand, the present chapter, advancing the larger argument by considering the connections between figures holding political power and rhetorical education, can also help address this question, and thereby provide some clarity regarding the people in Seneca’s anthology. In fact, the publication of Arturo Echavarren’s major prosopographical resource on Seneca, his 2007 \textit{Nombres y personas en Séneca el Viejo}, containing a rich data source for conducting such an investigation, makes this project more feasible than ever.\textsuperscript{35}

At this point, we should take a moment to consider more explicitly how Seneca’s anthology relates to Latin rhetorical education, since this, after all, is what we intend to find addressed in Seneca’s pages. The connection, in short, is declamation. As already indicated, Seneca’s anthology is composed of excerpts of declamations, mostly the

\textsuperscript{34} Add Syme 1981, 369 = RP 3:1427 to the aforementioned Syme 1978b, 92 and Syme 1986, 353–54—and see further in §3.3 below.

\textsuperscript{35} Echavarren’s prosopography has collected the data, but does not have extensive synthesis or analysis, other than with the case of onomastics. His other prosopographical contributions are also worth noting: Echavarren 2007a; Echavarren 2012; Echavarren 2013. Bornecque 1902, 137–201, had already provided a resource for the study of the people in Seneca’s anthology, but Echavarren benefits, naturally, from the fruits of just over a century of scholarship. One might compare Peter White’s study on the place of poets in Augustan Rome (White 1993), for which he had to create his own prosopographical dataset (pp. 223–65 on “Connections of the Augustan Poets”).
forensic *controversiae*, but also some deliberative *suasoriae*. We have already encountered declamation as part of the investigation of the early-period Latin rhetors in chapter one. Declamation was the most advanced rhetorical exercise (*exercitatio*) pursued in the schools of Latin rhetoric. From what we can tell, it was part of the Latin rhetorical curriculum from its inception at Rome, though the term for it was somewhat fluid until *declamatio* was finally established—very possibly by one of the early-period Latin rhetors—ca. 54 BCE. Further, already during the Republic, we have evidence for the practice of declamation and its embrace by the members of Rome’s governing elite. Moving into the Principate, however, it is generally agreed—following the lead of Seneca himself—that declamation grew significantly in its popularity. At this point, as the usual narrative has it, declamation turned into more than just a school exercise. It became, rather, a “social activity,” and one that attracted participants both older and more talented than the younger students typically instructed by rhetors. In fact, this seems to have been more a development than a major departure from what preceded. After all, as we saw above in §1.3, Pompey was declaiming as an adult, resuming the practice in 50–49 (perhaps with the consultation of the rhetor Manius Otacilius Pitholaus) in order to get a competitive edge on Caesar’s agents at Rome. Cicero too, in between peacock dinners in Puteoli and Tusculum *ca.* 46–43, was practicing declamation with Hirtius, Pansa, and

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36 For declamation, the best general study of the Latin side remains Bonner 1949; also useful as an introduction is Winterbottom 1980; for declamations in Greek, see Russell 1983; a survey of material extending into the Renaissance can be found in Turner 1971.

37 For *declamatio*, see Stroh 2003, 31–33; for the early-period rhetors, see §1.1 above.

38 *Contr.* 1 pr. 12: “this name (i.e. declamatio) has only recently come into existence; moreover the pursuit itself also recently began to be attended in large numbers. For that reason it is easy for me to know a thing that was born after me from its earliest years” (*modo nomen hoc prodiit, nam et studium ipsum nuper celebrari coepit. ideo facile est mihi ab incunabulis nosse rem post me natam*). As Winterbottom 1982, 59–60 points out, however, Seneca’s statements here should not be taken literally.

39 Quote from Bonner 1949, 39.
Dolabela.\(^{40}\) Thus, declamation was *already* an activity in the late republic that was not limited to young students. But with the apparent expansion of interest in declamation under the empire—often connected to the simultaneous rise in practices like the *recitatio*—so it becomes common in secondary scholarship to speak of two or more kinds of declamation, distinguishing “didactic” declamation from “epideictic” declamation or “Schuldeklamation” from “Schaudeklamation” (sometimes also “Hobbydeklamation”).\(^{41}\)

In this view, the one is practiced by students in the schools, the other pursued by the much more advanced adult practitioners. The distinction is fine, but one should not be led to think, as a result, that epideictic declamation and *Schaudeklamation* were accordingly divorced from the educational environment. On the contrary: adult interest in declamation was still interest in Latin rhetorical education. In Seneca’s pages, as we shall see, Latin rhetors declaim alongside adult enthusiasts, together with the rhetors’ finest students and former students. That this material is still a part of the educational environment is also demonstrated by the term sometimes used to characterize these adult practitioners. The mature men who practice declamation and so eagerly attend their performances are not referred to as epideictic orators, but are rather called *scholastici*, clearly connected to the school etymologically, though something along the lines of “declamation-buff” is usually preferred over, say, “schoolmen” as a translation in the literature.\(^{42}\) In short, declamation

\(^{40}\) Pompey’s declamations in 50–49: *DGR* 25.3; Cicero with his *discipuli*: e.g., *Att.* 14.12.2; *Att.* 14.20.4; *Fam.* 9.16.7; *Fam.* 9.18; Suet. *DGR* 25.3; Quint. *Inst.* 12.11.6; van der Blom 2010, 311–15 with 312 n. 5. See also Kennedy 1972, 312–14, who also notes the commonality between adult interest in the late republic and early empire.

\(^{41}\) On *recitationes*, important studies include *RE* 1A.1:435–46 (Funaioli); Dalzell 1955; K. Quinn 1982, 158–65; Dupont 1997; Parker 2009. For didactic v. epideictic declamation, see Winterbottom 1980, 12–13; for *Schuldeklamation*, *Schaudeklamation*, and *Hobbydeklamation*: Hömke 2002, 21–29; Feddern 2013, 3.

\(^{42}\) “Declamation-buff” originating in the discussion of the term in Kennedy 1978, 175. See, e.g., Sen. *Suas.* 6.14: “for the *scholastici* were accustomed to declaim…” (*solent enim scholastici*
remains closely connected to Latin rhetorical education under the empire; its connection to significant figures in Seneca’s anthology provides us with the necessary link to investigate the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power under the Julio-Claudians.

But how did political power work under the Principate? In what senses can we say, for a given person, that he was or was not connected with political power? This requires some discussion before finally proceeding with our investigation of the characters in Seneca. Under the Principate, the distribution of political power changed. In the Republic, this power was distributed among the most successful members of the governing aristocracy, achieved and maintained through, among other things, family connections, military success, winning over the populus Romanus, holding offices, priesthods, etc. In §1.3 above, we saw how, in the early period, Latin rhtors became attached to various prominent members of this group, and how this form of education thereby was embraced by members of the political elite. In the Principate, however, the realities of power were different, as power now ultimately depended on a single individual. And yet the princeps does not rule an empire by himself. Power and authority, in fact, still needed to be apportioned. For our purposes two aspects of this distribution are important. First, the changes that inaugurated the Principate famously did not do away with the political structures and institutions of the Republic. The senate still met, and senators continued to compete among their peers for influence and offices, pass

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43 See, e.g., Crook in CAH 10:113–46.
44 Cf. Syme 1939, 346: “A democracy cannot rule an empire. Neither can one man, though empire may appear to presuppose monarchy. There is always an oligarchy somewhere, open or concealed.”
senatus consultae, govern provinces, etc. On the other hand, success in this body began to depend on one’s relationship with the princeps, who could, for example, regulate the size of the senate, set the number of offices open for competition in a given year, indicate his preferences for candidates in elections and/or appoint them himself, and promote new men from dominoles in Italy or from abroad in preference to the older establishment. And this situation points to another aspect of the distribution of political power and authority under the Principate. Sociologically, a monopoly or near-monopoly of power in complex societies often gives rise to a court, and this also happened at Rome, with the creation of an imperial aula. The dynamics between the princeps and his courtiers varied considerably based on the personality of the monarch and the chronological distance from the beginning of this arrangement under Augustus; things became more formalized over time. In this situation, proximity and access to the emperor were crucial components for achieving power and influence. Thus, membership within the emperor’s family (domus), his household (familia), or his friends (amici), became important means of access to power in the Principate, as these were the chief constituents of the emperor’s court.

In trying to identify connections between political power and rhetorical education among the people in Seneca’s anthology, therefore, we can look along these lines: proximity to the emperor, whether by domus, familia, or amicitia together with holding

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45 On the senate in this period, see Talbert 1984; Brunt 1984b. For the enduring competitive nature of this group, see too the discussion in Eck 2002, 137–43.
46 For the court of imperial Rome, see Paterson 2007 for the early empire and Smith 2007 for the later, both in thoughtful dialogue with research in “aulic studies” relating to the Early Modern period; Winterling 1999; Wallace-Hadrill in CAH 10:283–308; cf. also Wallace-Hadrill 1982 on the emperor’s relationship with his subjects.
47 For the familia, see Weaver 1972; on the amici, see Crook 1955 (cf. Brunt 1965 for Republican background); Millar 1992, 110–22.
offices and other political appointments and thereby sharing in the emperor’s power as a representative of his auctoritas. What the present investigation demonstrates is that Latin rhetorical education in our period retained its position among the governing elite that it had established in the Republic, and that it seems to have become, under Augustus and Tiberius, a cultural feature within the nascent imperial court. Many significant figures appear in these pages. While the present study can here be more extensive and intensive than comments in previous scholarship made en passant, there will be no attempt to be exhaustive. The 164 people in the anthology rule out this possibility. And at any rate all that is needed for the larger argument is a sufficient number of examples to demonstrate that there was continuity with the association with Latin rhetorical education and political power that we found established under the Republic, despite the discontinuity in political system. Syme’s “noisy menagerie,” it turns out, was quite at home in and around the emperor’s court and within the governing aristocracy. Since proximity to the princeps is an important part of the arrangement of power in this period, we will start from the center by considering the presence of Augustus himself in Seneca’s anthology (§3.2.1). In the course of our discussion of these passages, however, it will be illuminating to introduce a number of additional figures, and thus the discussion will start to branch out by association. This will help in establishing some patterns, with members of the Augustan and Tiberian governing aristocracies found having regular connections with the milieu surrounding Latin rhetorical education—and with one another. The next section (§3.2.2) then provides additional examples that help confirm this picture.
§3.2.1 The rhetorical interests of Augustus (as well as Q. Haterius, Q. Varius Geminus, the Passieni, Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and Occius Flamma)

We can start with the princeps himself. We have already touched above briefly (§1.3) on the young Octavian’s interests in Latin rhetorical education. According to Suetonius, Octavian studied with rhetor Marcus Epidius. Epidius, likely a Campanian on the basis of his claimed descent from a certain Gaius Epidius of Nuceria, began teaching Latin rhetoric after conviction for bringing false accusations (calumnia), which would have barred him from subsequent legal advocacy. It has been surmised that Octavian undertook this training early in life, before, for example, delivering the funeral laudatio, for his deceased grandmother at age 11 or 12, ca. 52–51 BCE. At any rate, Suetonius states that Caesar’s heir began rhetorical study early and proceeded eagerly (Aug. 84.1: eloquentiam studiaque liberalia ab aetate prima et cupide et laboriosissime exercuit), and that during the war of Mutina (December 44 to April 43), where the consuls Hirtius and Pansa—both having practiced declamation under Cicero’s supervision earlier in the year—met their ends, the twenty-year-old Octavian was said to have kept up his practice of declamation every day (Mutinensi bello in tanta mole rerum... declamasce cotidie

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48 Suet. DGR 28.1; on Epidius, see Kaster 1995, 301–307 for discussion and bibliography, and above §1.5 on his probably social status.
49 As noted by Kaster 1995, 303, the exchange between the rhetor Asilius Sabinus and the Tiberian declaimer Vallius Syricus (Echavarren 2007b, 262–63 = no. 279) at Sen. Contr. 9.4.18 points similarly to eloquent calumniati subsequently teaching rhetoric.
50 See Wardle 2014, 108; Kaster 1995, 303–304. Nic. Dam. FGrH 90 F 127 III, which seems to refer to the incident, makes him only about nine (περὶ ἐννέα ἕτη), but Quint. Inst. 12.6.1 makes Octavian already eleven-years-old (duodecim natus annos; inclusive reckoning) and Suet. Aug. 8.1 (duodecimum annum agens) places the incident during his twelfth year.
Indeed, the impression given by the whole of Suetonius’s account of Augustus’s interests in Latin speech suggests care and attention: speeches composed in advance, facility with speaking extempore, devoted practice with pronunciation, critiques of the style of Maecenas, Tiberius, etc.⁵² We would, therefore, be reasonably safe to assume that Octavian, later Augustus, was significantly interested in Latin rhetorical education, even without any testimony from Seneca. But Augustus appears in Seneca’s anthology a number of times, and these instances combine to help confirm and strengthen this general impression.⁵³ A few cases can be examined here.

First comes Contr. 2.4.12–13, where Seneca provides an anecdote that places Augustus, together with Agrippa and Maecenas, in the presence of the master rhetor Marcus Porcius Latro. In the case in question, Latro is declaiming a *controversia*, otherwise attested under the title “Grandson, born from a prostitute, adopted” (*nepos ex meretricio susceptus*).⁵⁴ The situation is as follows (Contr. 2.4 *thema*):

Abdicavit quidam filium. abdicatus se contulit ad meretricem. ex illa sustulit filium. aeger ad patrem misit; cum venisset, commendavit ei filium suum et decessit. adoptavit puerum (pater). ab altero [pater] filio accusatur dementiae.

A certain man disinherits his son. Now disinherited, the son goes to a prostitute.

He formally recognized a son born from her. Fallen ill, he sends for his father;

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⁵¹ On these passages, see Wardle 2014, 481–82; Suet. DGR 25.3 with Kaster 1995, 277.
⁵³ For Augustus in Seneca’s anthology, see Gunderson 2003, 102–104; Echavarren 2007b, 159–60 = no. 145 includes a register of all *loci* which reference Augustus.
⁵⁴ See in Calp. Decl. 30 with Sussman 1994, 186. For overlapping declamation themes in extant ancient collections, see Simonds 1896, 81.
when his father had arrived, he entrusted his son to him and died. The father adopted the boy. He is accused of madness by his other son.55

Latro was a rhetor of considerable stature in Augustan Rome, and is the most frequent figure to appear in Seneca’s anthology (his name appears some 141x).56 This makes sense, as he was a childhood friend of Seneca’s (Contr. 1 pr. 13: a prima puerititia), and the pair studied together in the school of the rhetor Marullus.57 Latro was also considered by Seneca to be the most talented declaimer he had heard in his lifetime, the premiere member of his “first tetrad” of declaimers.58 It is also to Latro that Seneca devotes the longest pen-portrait in the extant prefaces, with the majority of Contr. 1 pr. 13–24 dedicated to the preserving the memory of his carissimus sodalis and condiscipulus. In these few memorable pages, Seneca describes, for example, Latro’s prodigious memory, by which he memorized his declamations as he wrote them; his manic swings between hunting expeditions in the mountains and feverish writing sessions; a body hardened by exercise and a voice strong yet dulled from long, nocturnal study and lack of care; and Latro’s mastery of argumentative precision (subtilitas), supreme and foundational among his command of rhetorical virtues.59 As for Latro’s students, casual notice in Seneca

55 For the charge of madness (actio dementiae), see Bonner 1949, 93–94.
56 See in Echavarren 2007b, 221–26 = no. 233, for more on Latro, see PIR2 P 859; Kaster 1995, 329–31; Fairweather 1981, passim.
57 Seneca and Latro studying under Marullus: Contr. 1. pr. 22; for Marullus, Echavarren 2007b, 183–85 = no. 178.
58 For Seneca’s primum tetradeum, see Contr. 10 pr. 13; though apparently ranked first there, Latro falls in close to Marcus Iunius Gallio in Seneca’s subsequent remarks: “Whenever these men had contended, the glory had been Latro’s, the victory Gallio’s” (hi quotiens conflixissent, penes Latronem gloria fuisset, penes Gallionem palma).
59 Subtilitas in this context is not really related to the genus subtile, i.e. the “plain style” (Lausberg §1079.1; cf. Bardon 1940, 56), but connected rather to the Senecan divisio, thus here “a fine precision in the analysis of the questions at issue” (Fairweather 1981, 153).
implicates a certain Florus who may well be Iulius Florus, poet, friend of Horace, and member of Tiberius’s *cohors* in Armenia. Among Latro’s admirers named in Seneca’s pages, we find a poet of a rather higher notoriety, Ovid (*Contr*. 2.2.8: *Latronis admirator*), as well as Lucius Munatius Plancus (*Contr*. 1.8.15: summus amator *Latronis*). Plancus, whom we shall meet again below (§3.2.2), was a significant figure during the late Republic, the revolution, and in the early period of Augustus’s reign. Beyond these famous enthusiasts, other sources similarly attest to Latro's prominence: the elder Pliny knows him as “famous among teachers of speaking” (*Nat*. 20.160: *Porci Latronis clari inter magistros dicendi*) and Quintilian describes him as the “first famous teacher” who had obtained the “utmost reputation in the schools” (*Inst*. 10.5.18: *primus clari nominis professor... summam in scholis opinionem*); Suetonius devoted a chapter to him in a now-lost section of *DGR* (fr. 3). Born probably around the same time as Seneca (ca. 55 BCE), Jerome places his death (a suicide while suffering from fever) in 4 BCE. It is in a digression among the *colores* of *Contr*. 2.4 that we find Latro declaiming before an audience that includes Augustus, Agrippa, and Maecenas—though it happens not to be one of the declaimer’s better moments, as Seneca explains (2.4.12–13):

In hac controversia Latro contrariam rem ⟨non⟩ controversiae dixit, sed sibi. declamabat illam Caesare Augusto audiente et M. Agrippa, cuius filios, nepotes suos, Caesar [Lucium et Gaium] adoptaturas diebus illis videbatur. erat M. Agrippa inter eos, qui non nati sunt nobiles sed facti. cum diceret partem adulescentis Latro et tractaret adoptionis locum, dixit: non asciti ex imo per

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60 For Florus and Latro, see *Contr*. 9.2.23; On Florus, see Echavarren 2007b, 164–65 = no. 152; *PIR*² F 456; *FRP* 424.
adoptionem nobilitati (in)serunt(ur, et) [in hanc] alia in hanc summam. Maecenas innuit Latro(ni) festinare Caesarem; finiret iam declamationem. quidam putabant hanc malignam rem Maecenatis esse; effecisse enim illum, non ne audiret quae dicta erant Caesar, sed ut notaret.

In this *controversia* Latro spoke a point that was not detrimental to the *controversia*, but to himself. He was declaiming that *controversia* (i.e. “Grandson, born from a prostitute, adopted”) while Caesar Augustus was listening together with Marcus Agrippa, whose sons—his own grandsons, that is—Caesar seemed at the time to be on the verge of adopting. Marcus Agrippa was among those men who were not born, but made noble. When Latro was speaking on behalf of the son and he was handling the section on the adoption, he said: “not previously admitted, they are thrust into the nobility by adoption” and other things in this sense. Maecenas gestured to Latro that Caesar was in a hurry, that he should now end his declamation. Some thought that this was a case of spite on Maecenas’s part: for he caused Caesar not to fail to hear what was said, but to notice it.

As Seneca clarifies in the sequel, Latro’s *faux pas* here turns on the sensitivity related to Agrippa’s perceived low birth, illustrated by his own avoidance of his *nomen* Vipsanius—“a symbol, so to speak, of his father’s low status” (*quasi argumentum paternae humilitatis*). The incident can be dated to *ca. 17 BCE* from the reference to Caesar’s impending adoption of Agrippa’s sons, Gaius and Lucius. While the whole episode is remarkable, for our purposes the vignette is chiefly of interest because it points
to a continuity in Augustus’s interest in declamation and Latin rhetors. Now ca. age 46, the princeps commits time to listen to the top rhetor in Rome as he declaims the part of a son prosecuting his father for madness for adopting a child born of his disinherited brother and a prostitute. Nor does he appear alone: Agrippa and Maecenas are alongside him, thus representing perhaps two-thirds of the most significant members of Augustus’s inner circle at the time (Titus Statilius Taurus leaves no traces in Seneca’s anthology). The performance context of the incident is left implicit by Seneca. Maecenas’s ability to call the declamation to an end could suggest a private performance arranged for Augustus in particular (whom Maecenas appears to shepherd here), although presumably the auctoritas of these particular auditores could have also drawn Latro to a finish even if he were declaiming elsewhere. Seneca’s mention of variant interpretations of Maecenas’s actions by others (quidam putabant) at any rate suggests that there was more of an audience than just Augustus, Agrippa, and Maecenas on this particular occasion.

Several other notices in Seneca’s anthology point in the same direction, and indeed provide more details on the ways that rhetorical education had found its place within the mores of the political elite of the period. In his preface to the fourth book of Controversiae, Seneca offers extended introductions to two declaimers, Gaius Asinius Pollio (discussed further in §3.2.2 below) and Quintus Haterius. It is with Haterius that Augustus is involved in the preface (Contr. 4 pr. 7):

Declamabat autem Haterius admisso populo ex tempore; solus omnium Romanorum, quos modo ipse cognovi, in Latinam linguam transtulit Graecam

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facultatem. tanta erat illi velocitas orationis, ut vitium fieret. itaque divus Augustus optime dixit: ‘Haterius noster sufflaminandus est.’

Haterius, furthermore, used to declaim unscripted and with the public given access; he alone of all the Romans—at least those that I myself knew—translated Greek ability into the Latin language. The speed of his speech was so great that it became a fault. Accordingly, the divine Augustus said it best: “our dear Haterius needs to put on the brakes.”

Again, we find Augustus on the audience-side of declamation, now listening to Haterius. Seneca tells us a considerable amount about Haterius as a declaimer, much of it critical.63 For example, Haterius needed to rely on a freedman who accompanied him during his declamations to signal when he needed to transition to a different topic, press on, move to the epilogue, etc. (Contr. 4 pr. 8), and he tended to use words at home in Cicero’s speeches but now out of fashion (Contr. 4 pr. 9). But ultimately Haterius was one of the declaimers that Seneca chose to highlight as an example of the best his generation had to offer: “he made up for his faults with his virtues and he had more that you would praise than that you would forgive” (Contr. 4 pr 11: redimebat tamen vitia virtutibus et plus habebat quod laudares quam cui ignosceres). Especially memorable was Haterius’s performance of Contr. 4.1, “Father dragged away from tombs by a bon vivant” (pater a sepulchris a luxurioso raptus). Having just recently lost his own son, Haterius broke

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63 For Seneca’s treatment of Haterius, see the passages listed in Echavarren 2007b,146–48 = no. 128; comments in Fairweather 1981, passim.
down into tears mid-declamation—and afterwards spoke with greater power (Contr. 4 pr. 
6: tanto maiore impetu) and with more pathos (tanto miserabilius).64

Such was Haterius the declaimer, about whom Augustus had quipped. But 
Haterius the man is also of considerable interest.65 He was an orator rather than a rhetor 
and a well known one beyond Seneca’s pages. In Tacitus’s brief obituary at Ann. 4.61 (27 
ce), the historian notes Haterius’s famed eloquence (eloquentiae… celebratae) as well as 
a his senatorial family (familia senatoria).66 In addition to the various lesser offices 
known from an inscription found on his tomb along the Via Nomentana—quaestor, 
tribune of the plebs, praetor, VIIvir epulonum—Haterius was consul suffectus in 5 CE, 
sharing the consulship that year with, among others, L. Vinicius (also found in Seneca).67 
Haterius was also a part of the domus Augusta, having married a Vipsania, the daughter 
of Agrippa and (as it seems) Caecilia Attica.68 The son of Haterius and Vipsania, 
Decimus Haterius Agrippa, born perhaps in 13 BCE, was consul ordinarius in 22 CE.69 
While there is no means of dating Augustus’s comment on Haterius’s speech preserved in 
Seneca, the moment fits the pattern of the interest in declamation evinced by the 
princeps. Further, the declaimer in question was connected to Augustus by more than just 
his verbal performances; Haterius is himself an example of a member of the governing 
aristocracy with strong interests in rhetorical education. As we shall see, this becomes 
something of a pattern.

64 For miserabilius here representing pathos: Winterbottom 1974b, 1:427.
65 PIR² H 24; Syme 1986, passim; BNP s.v. “Haterius” 2 (Eck).
66 In Syme 1986, e.g., 70, 145, Q. Haterius is himself a novus homo; Wiseman 1971, 234 = no. 
200 has his father in that position.
67 CIL 6.1426, cf. p. 4696; EDR110519; for the tomb: LTUR 4:289–90. For Lucius Vinicius in the 
anthology, see Contr. 2.5.19–20.
68 See Syme 1986, 145.
69 PIR² H 25; BNP s.v. “Haterius” 3 (Eck).
At *Contr.* 6.8, we find Augustus in a similar scenario. As noted above, *Contr.* 6 is part of the Senecan anthology that is preserved only in excerpts, meaning that we lack context for Augustus’s appearance here even more so than in some of the other sections. The *thema* of 6.8 is short and sweet: “A Vestal virgin wrote the following verse: ‘Happy are married women! May I die if marriage is not sweet!’ She is accused of unchastity” (*Virgo Vestalis scripsit hunc versum: felices nuptae! moriar nisi nubere dulce est. rea est incesti*). After excerpts recording unattributed *sententiae*, the manuscript tradition transmits an additional block of text, simply labeled *extra*, in which Caesar’s heir appears:

Varius Geminus apud Caesarem dixit: Caesar, qui apud te audent dicere, magnitudinem tuam ignorant, qui non audent, humanitatem.

Varius Geminus spoke in Caesar’s presence: “Caesar, those who dare to speak in your presence fail to realize your greatness; and those who do not, your humanity.”

Again, because the notice appears in *Contr.* 6, we have no real context. It is possible that the remark came when Caesar, here Augustus, was listening to Geminus declaim on the *thema* of 6.8; alternatively, the notice might have come in a Senecan digression which started from Geminus speaking on 6.8 and meandered to a something Geminus said to Augustus at a different time; or the remark could also have come in the lost preface of *Contr.* 6, which, for all we know, could have introduced Geminus. At any rate,

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70 For charges of unchastity in Roman declamation, see Bonner 1949, 92–93.
71 For further possibilities and discussion, see Balbo 2004, 194–95.
Geminus, like Haterius, was a declaimer. His name appears some 29x in Seneca and many excerpts from his declamations are preserved. Thus it is not unreasonable to think that also in 6.8 Geminus appeared in this function, and that Augustus was in the audience. Unlike the case of Latro in Contr. 2.4.12–13, however, Geminus treads carefully in the presence of the emperor, with kind words on his *magnitudo* and *humanitas*. Geminus’s quip exhibits a kind of adulation not atypical of the sort of behavior found in court societies, where formalities and flattery develop to keep members at safe distances from centers of power. The significance of the anecdote is not just that it continues to support the idea that Latin rhetorical education was among Augustus's interests and habits, his *mos*. As with Haterius above, the identity of the declaimer also speaks to the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power, because Quintus Varius Geminus is another known entity. The inhabitants of Superaequum in Samnium, around perhaps the turn of the second century CE, cut a fresh inscription preserving the memory of their patron, Varius Geminus, recording a substantial list of *honores*: *legatus* of divine Augustus, proconsul, praetor, tribune of the plebs, quaestor, *praefectus frumenti dandi*, *Xvir stilitibus iudicandis*, *curator aedium sacrarum monumentorumque publicorum tuendorum*. As the inscription starts its conclusion, it proudly announces Geminus as the first of all the Paeligni to have become a senator (ll. 11–12: *is primus omnium Paelign(orum) senator / factus est*). That claim, if accurate, means that Geminus

72 Collected references in Echavarren 2007b, 263–64 = no. 280.
73 For such developments, see Paterson 2007.
74 *PIR*1 V 187; Syme 1939, 363 with n. 4; Torelli 1982, 189.
75 *CIL* 9.3306 = *ILS* 932, cf. *SupplIt*. 5:98; *SupplIt*. 22:136; EDR146787; Dressel *apud* *CIL* 9.3306*not.* suggests the date on the basis of letter forms, while *SupplIt*. 5:98 gives a *terminus post quem* of 12 CE on the basis of Augustus’s epithet *divus*. On the significance of *primus omnium* in municipal Italian inscriptions, see Mrozek 1971.
entered the senate by 9 BCE at the latest. Unlike Haterius, Geminus was not connected to the domus Augusta nor was he a consul—or a producer of future consuls. That is, he was not as high as Haterius was in the aristocracy. But he was one of Augustus’s senatorial additions from municipal Italian families that contributed to what Syme referred to as the consensus Italiae. He was also a practicing declaimer, and one who seems to have known how to handle an imperial audience. Thus, whether from a familia senatoria or a new senator, we can find members of the Augustan aristocracy familiar with rhetorical education—and practicing before the princeps.

Before moving on from Augustus and his rhetorical entanglements, we should also consider the case of Contr. 10.5.21–22, which connects Augustus, a Greek rhetor, Craton, and a certain Passienus. The controversia in which the notice appears comes under a disturbing thema:


Let there be means to prosecute on the charge of harming the state.

When Philip was selling Olynthian prisoners of war, Parrhasius, an Athenian painter, bought an old man from their number. He took him to Athens, tortured him, and painted a Prometheus according to his likeness. Amid the torture, the

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76 Wiseman 1971, 270 = no. 463.
77 Syme 1939, 364, a phrase borrowed from Tac. Hist. 3.34.
Olynthian died. Parrhasius places his painting in the temple of Minerva. He is accused of harming the state.\textsuperscript{78}

On this grim theme, Seneca records some remarks against Parrhasius spoken by Greek declaimers, who make fairly regular, if marginal, appearances in Seneca’s excerpts. The remark of a certain Craton leads Seneca into one of his many \textit{colores}-based digressions, cataloguing a number of the Greek rhetor’s humorous remarks (\textit{Contr.} 10.5.20–22):

\begin{quote}
Triarius autem sic vertit: corrupisti duo maxima Promethei munera, ignem et hominem. Sed et Graeci illam subrupuerunt: …Craton furiosissime, qui dixit: Προμηθεῦ, νῦν ἔδει σε πῦρ κλέψαι. hic est Craton, venustissimus homo et [pro homo et] professus Asianus, qui bellum cum omnibus Atticis gerebat. cum donaret illi Caesar talentum, in quo viginti quattuor sestertia sunt Atheniensum more: ἡ πρόσθες, φησίν, ἡ ἀφελ’, ἴνα μὴ Ἀττικὸν ἤ. hic Caesari, quod illum numquam nisi mense Decembri audiret, dixit: ὡς βαύνῳ χρῆ; et \{cum\} commendaretur a Caesare Passieno nec curaret, interroganti, quare non complecteretur tanti viri gratiam: ἡλίου καίοντος λύχνον οὖν ἄπτω.
\end{quote}

And Triarius spun the case as follows: “you have marred Prometheus’s two greatest gifts: fire and man.” But the Greeks also filched that \textit{sententia}… Craton did so with the utmost anger, who said: “Prometheus, you should have stolen fire

\textsuperscript{78} For \textit{laesae rei publicae actio}, see Bonner 1949, 97–98; Philip II captured Olynthus in 348 BCE, after which this incident, were it grounded in historical reality (Winterbottom 1974b, 2:448 n. 3: “sheer fiction”), would have occurred. On Parrhasius and the episode in \textit{Contr.} 10.5, see Morales 1996.
now.” This is the Craton—an exceptionally charming man and a self-proclaimed Asianist—who was at war with the Atticists. When Caesar gifted him a talent, in which there are 24,000 sesterces according to the Attic standard, Craton said: “either add or subtract, so that it not be an Attic talent.” This Craton told Caesar, because he never used to listen to him declaim save for during the month of December: “you use me as a furnace.” And when he was recommended by Caesar to Passienus and paid no mind, he said to someone asking why he did not care for the influence of so great a man: “when the sun is burning, I don’t light a lamp.”

Once again, Caesar here is none other than Augustus. The passage offers a glimpse into Augustus’s interests in Greek rhetoric via his presence at Craton’s declamations and his generosity (valued at one talent) toward that particular rhetor. The relationship between the Roman elite and rhetorical education in the language of the Eastern Mediterranean is an issue that is not treated at any length in the present study. Though a worthy topic, as discussed above (see the introductory chapter), it is my contention that in order to be studied properly, Greek rhetoric should be addressed on its own terms, where ample space is given to account for features of its particular history and trajectory, for example the bilingualism of the Roman aristocracy, travel and “study abroad,” and the other cultural forces behind the paradoxical influence of Graecia capta. Ideally both Latin rhetorical education and Greek rhetorical education will be sorted out and appropriately studied on their own before comparison. But as passages like this indicate, the two fields should not be too far separated either. For our purposes, though, Contr. 10.5.20–22 is of

79 Winterbottom 1974b, 2:469 n. 3 helpfully refers to Otto 1890, 327, who includes a number of parallels for Craton’s pithy answer here.
particular interest because it hints at a network of patronage and support. Craton the Greek declaimer is otherwise unknown from antiquity beyond *Contr.* 10.5. But the passage suggests, on the one hand, a closeness with Augustus that is founded on the basis of his declamation, and a familiarity that leads not only to a monetary *donum*, but also to further support. Augustus’s recommendation of Craton (*commendaretur a Caesare*) points to the operations of patronage in the early empire, where such recommendations were common—as they had been previously in the Republic. Here, we can see that declamatory prowess might lead to such a weighty *commendatio*, though this particular case is tangential to the present investigation, as the prowess in question is Greek. On the other hand, though, *Latin* rhetorical education again appears with the figure to whom Augustus recommended Craton, that is, with Passienus, the important man (*tanti viri*) whose *gratia* here Craton appears disinterested in.

Passienus appears a number of times in Seneca’s anthology, and is another figure of significance in the Augustan aristocracy, and one that sired distinguished progeny. Jerome places his death in 9 CE, a date he would have derived either directly or indirectly from the treatment of Passienus that he had found in Suetonius’s *de Oratoribus*. He may have been born *ca.* 65 BCE, probably to an Italian family from a region north of Rome, perhaps Etruria, Picenum, or Sabinum. As his appearance in Suetonius’s *de

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80 Echavarren 2007b, 119–20 = no. 92; Janiszewski, Stebnicka, and Szabat 2015, 205–206 = no. 594; *PIR*² C 1564.
81 For a good comparison for Craton and Augustus’s *donum* here, see Philostr. *VS* 589 on Marcus Aurelius’ δορεάι and δόρα for the Greek sophist Hadrian of Tyre.
82 Discussed in Saller 1982, *passim* really, but see, e.g., 59–60, 132–34.
85 The estimate of 65 BCE comes from Borneque 1902, 186. Passienus’s son, L. Passienus Rufus, was *cos. ord.* in 4 CE. If we assume age 40 as the most typical age of holding a consulship under
Oratoribus would suggest, it was Passienius’s oratory that made his name. Thus, at Contr. 2.5.17, Seneca describes him as “an exceptionally eloquent man and the foremost orator of his time” (vir eloquentissimus et temporis sui orator).\(^{86}\) At Contr. 3 pr. 14, Passienus is found alongside other Augustan speakers of note, Gaius Asinius Pollio and Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus, but it is Passienus who “stands in first place” (primo loco stat).\(^{87}\) An epigram written for Passienus’s grandson and attributed to the younger Seneca similarly speaks of his dedicatee’s “eloquent grandfather” (anth. 401.9 Shackleton Bailey = 405 Riese: facundo... avo). But Passienus was also a declaimer, and in Seneca’s anthology we find him, for example, disputing on the most advantageous divisiones in “The woman tortured by a tyrant for the sake of her husband” (torta a tyranno pro marito), siding with Latro against the rhetors Buteo and Lucius Rubellius

the Empire (Hopkins 1983, 146 n. 35), that would place L. Passienus Rufus’s birth ca. 36. Assuming that Passienus pater was around 30 at that time seems possible and would suggest that he was indeed born ca. 65. For the family’s geographical origins, I find no explicit testimony, but soon-to-be-consular families of the period with nomina gentilicia terminating in –ienus belong to the regions indicated above Syme 1939, 93 n. 4.


\(^{87}\) In fact, the passage is a bit more complex than that. The comment on Passienus’s abilities is part of an extended speech of Cassius Severus, which Seneca claims records Severus’s response to Seneca’s queries regarding why Severus seemed to falter in declamation compared with his otherwise commendable eloquence (Contr. 3 pr. 1–2: memini itaque me a Severo Cassio quaerere, quid esset, cur in declamationibus eloquentia illi sua non responderet). Later in his answer to Seneca (3 pr. 14), Cassius Severus points out that even the best orators are judged worse at declaiming than certain rhetors: “I would have tried to absolve myself more diligently in your presence, on the grounds that I had not been born for this activity, if I were not aware that both Asinius Pollio and Messala Corvinus and Passienus, who now stands in in first place, appear to speak less well than Cestius and Latro” (diligentius me tibi excusarem, tamquam huic rei non essem natus, nisi scirem et Pollionem Asimum et Messalam Corvinum et Passiunum, qui nunc primo loco stat, minus bene videri (dicere) quam Cestium et Latronem). It is believed that Seneca wrote his anthology between 34 and 41 CE (see §3.1 above); at that point, Passienus would have been dead for ca. three decades, and thus nunc primo loco stat should point to the past. Cassius Severus’s speech in the preface to Contr. 3, therefore, should be understood to refer to an exchange—whether fictitious or factual—between Seneca and Severus before 9 CE. The question regarding whether and the extent to which Seneca relied on written sources for his anthology and the reliability of his quotations has been long debated (convenient summary in Huelsenbeck 2009, 15–16, with references in n. 15), but I find no mention of this interesting chronological marker in the discussion of Cassius Severus in the major study of Seneca’s use of written sources, Lockyer 1970, 168–70.
Blandus (Contr. 2.5.17; for Blandus, see §1.4 above). Among the colores of Contr. 7.1, “The man released by his son, a pirate captain” (ab archipirata filio dimissus), Passienus is included together with the rhetor Albucius Silus, who ranked as the third finest declaimer heard by Seneca (Contr. 10 pr. 13), in a dispute regarding declamation tactics (7.1.20). And with Passienus’s criticism of the way that the rhetor Arellius Fuscus’s handled his defense of Popillius, the murderer of Cicero, in Contr. 7.2.12 (hic color displicebat Passieno), Passienus is found crossing paths with a full three of the four most significant declaimers and rhetors that Seneca had heard (Latro, Silus, and Fuscus).

Passienus’s significance in the aristocracy was due to his oratory; in his case we have no record of military service or membership in the senate. But Augustus’s recommendation of Craton to Passienus (Contr. 10.5.20–22), which served in our discussion above to introduce the man, points to a connection to and relationship with Caesar’s heir. And this suggestion is very much born out when considering the known details of the careers of Passienus’s family. Passienus’s son was Lucius Passienus Rufus, a novus homo who became consul ordinarius in 4 CE.88 Sometime around the turn of the century, he was governor of Africa, honored with the title imperator—the last man to bear the title who was not a member of the domus Augusta. The title similarly appears on his portrait-coins, struck at Thaena; for his services in the province, Rufus was granted ornamenta triumphalia.89 Rufus was one of a number of novi homines elevated by Augustus in the last decade of his reign, who would go on to demonstrate their deserts via

88 PIR² P 148; Crook 1955, 176 = no. 248; Wiseman 1971, 249 = no. 309.
89 For his governorship of Africa, see Thomasson 1960, 2:17–18; for his cognomen, imperator, see CIL 8.16456.2–3 (= ILS 120) and the coinage, for which see Grant 1946, 139–40 (who thought the issue was perhaps from Hadrumentum) and now RPC 1:203–204, no. 808.
military success.\footnote{Syme 1939, 362–63; Wiseman 1971, 177–78.} Thus we can see that the connection between Augustus and the eloquent Passienus pater, attested amid the milieu of declamation in Seneca, went on to mean something in the next generation. Nor did this stop with Rufus. His son, Passienus’s grandson, was adopted by Gaius Sallustius Crispus, the (again, adopted) son of the great Republican historian; he thus became Lucius Sallustius Crispus Passienus Equi[- - -].\footnote{PIR\textsuperscript{2} P 146; Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 326–334 = no. 45.} The grandson was even more successful: \textit{consul suffectus} in 27 CE, governor of Asia in 42/3, \textit{consul II ordinarius} in 44. He held a number of priestly positions, including membership in the \textit{VIIviri epulonum}, the \textit{sodales Augustales}, and the \textit{sodales Titii}. His adopted father was one of Augustus’s closest advisors—and was also heir to the incredible wealth of the historian. Like his biological grandfather, Passienus, Crispus appears to have been renowned for his oratory.\footnote{E.g., Quint. \textit{Inst.} 10.1.24, 6.1.50; cf. Sen. \textit{Nat.} 4a pr. 6; Tac. \textit{Ann.} 6.20.1.} Like his adopted father, Crispus was also close to the \textit{principes} under which he lived. He first joined the \textit{domus Augusta} with his marriage to the daughter of Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus and the elder Antonia, that is, Domitia, Nero’s aunt. That marriage did not last, and—apparently between 41 and 42/3—Crispus remarried, this time Iulia Agrippina, the mother of Nero, and widow of Domitia’s brother, Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus. The declaimer’s grandson thus became Nero’s stepfather—a short-lived relation, however, as he soon fell victim to the \textit{fraus} of his new bride.\footnote{On Crispus’s marriages, see Syme 1986, 159–62; helpful too is the \textit{stemma Ahenobarbum} in PIR\textsuperscript{2} 3:30; the matrimonial chronology is worked out in PIR\textsuperscript{2} 6:50.} Thus, the declaimer, connected already to Augustus as visible through Seneca’s documented networks within the crowds of \textit{scholastici}, sired a family that rose very close to the top over the course of three generations.\footnote{Cf. also the trajectory of the family of L. Rubellius Blandus, discussed in §1.4 above.}
Such are the most significant passages in which Augustus himself appears in Seneca. As we have seen, other members of the governing aristocracy start to appear alongside the emperor in these passages—a consul, a senator, an associate whose descendants ascend under the Principate. It is, in fact, in such characters, members of the governing aristocracy, that we can see that the interests of Augustus in rhetorical education and declamation were not limited to the princeps, and were more widely spread among those who served as representatives of his auctoritas and that held some share in political power. This group will be considered further in the next section, but as a sort of bridge, we can conclude here by adding two more figures, connected via our ultimate example of the Passieni.

Unlike the case of Passienus himself, we lack testimony that explicitly points to the interests of his descendants in Latin rhetorical education, though on the basis of Crispus’s noted skill in oratory, such an interest seems not at all unlikely. Yet, in considering Crispus and the affairs and connections of Passienus’s grandson, two generations from the figure in Seneca’s anthology, we are not actually so distant from the Spaniard's sententiae, divisiones, and colores. As mentioned above, Crispus’s brother-in-law in his first marriage and predecessor in his second was Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, the biological father of Nero.\footnote{\textit{PIR}^2 D 127.} He too appears in Seneca’s anthology.\footnote{Echavarren 2007b, 127–28 = no. 105.} Among the colores of 	extit{Contr.} 9.4, “A man beaten by his son in the citadel” (\textit{a filio in arce pulsatus}), Seneca begins a digression on the rhetor Asilius Sabinus, who was one of the men he recalls declaiming on that particular thema. Among the anecdotes that Seneca reports of Sabinus, he includes the following (\textit{Contr.} 9.4.18):

\footnote{Echavarren 2007b, 127–28 = no. 105.}
et in Domitium, nobilissimum virum, in consulatu cum thermas prospicientis viam Sacram aedificasset (et)\textsuperscript{97} coepisset deinde rhetores circumire et declamare, ‘ego’ inquit ‘sciebam hoc te facturum et matri tuae querenti de tua desidia dixeram: πρῶτον κολυμβᾶν, δεύτερον δὲ γράμματα.’

And against Domitius, a man of very noble lineage, when he had built his baths overlooking the Via Sacra during his consulship and had then begun to visit rhetors, one after another, and declaim, Sabinus said, “I knew that you would do this and I had told your mother, when she was complaining about your laziness: first swimming, second ABCs.”

The consulship of Domitius during which he constructed the baths as part of his \textit{domus Domitiana} along the slope of the Velia, dates the incident to 32 CE or later.\textsuperscript{98} And the appearance of Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus here and his evident interest in visiting rhetors also offers an interesting counterpoint to the examples of Varius Geminus, Passienus, and perhaps also Quintus Haterius considered above. These men held places in the Augustan aristocracy, but their origins and backgrounds meant that they were recent additions to Rome’s governing oligarchy. With the case of Ahenobarbus (as also for Octavian/Augustus and the others discussed in §1.3 above), we find that interest in Latin rhetors was not limited to recent additions. The Domitii Ahenobarbi were an old consular

\textsuperscript{97} Here I depart from Håkanson’s text by including the supplement of Kiessling (adopted also by Winterbottom).

\textsuperscript{98} For the \textit{thermae Domitii}, see \textit{LTUR} 5:58 and cf. 2:92; Carandini and Carafa 2012, 1:293, 2:Tav. 89, 91.
family, with no fewer than eight of its members, beginning in 192 BCE, having held the consulship before Nero’s father; we have already encountered Domitius’s great-great-grandfather, the Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus who held the censorship with Crassus in 92 BCE and who had issued the notorious edict that mentioned the early Latin rhetors and their students (§1.2 above).

That Domitius was interested in declaiming and visiting the Latin rhetors not as a young man necessarily but as an established adult appears in parallel with behavior we saw in chapter one with Cicero and Gniph, Pompey and Pitholaus, and Antony and Epidius—pointing, again, to a continuity with what was established in the late Republic. Nor was Sabinus the only rhetor Domitius frequented (rhetores circumire), but one should note that Sabinus’s behavior towards Domitius, namely his witty quip here, points at least to a comfort level with members of the inner circle of the regime.

But as Seneca notes elsewhere, Sabinus had something of a reputation as “the most charming buffoon among the rhetors” (Suas. 2.12: venustissimus inter rhetoras scurra).

Charming and evidently in demand among the governing aristocracy: we can take the opportunity afforded by Sabinus’s appearance at Contr. 9.4.18 to consider a final example in this section, which, at any rate, directly follows the incident between Sabinus and Domitius in Seneca’s text. There (Contr. 9.4.19), Seneca offers another anecdote that includes more humorous sayings of Sabinus, but for our purposes the context of those remarks are what matters. Sabinus, Seneca tells us “had followed Occius Flamma, the proconsul, into the province of Crete” (secutus erat in provinciam Cretam Occium

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99 See the stemma in RE VI.1:1315–1316 (Münzer).
100 Winterbottom 1974b, 2:301 n. 4 points to the proverb (τὸ λεγόμενον) at Pl. Lg. 689D, “they know not how to spell or swim” (μὴ τε γράμματα μὴ τε νεῖν ἐπίστωνται) as apparently referring to the same idea.
There we learn that Sabinus initially found favor with the locals and was acclaimed in the theater, before he, together with the rest of Flamma’s entourage (comitum cohors) wound up besieged within a temple (Contr. 9.4.20). We know next to nothing about Occius Flamma, apart from his service in Crete and Cyrenaica, which probably occurred under Tiberius, in the mid-20s, perhaps 24/5. It has been conjectured that he may have had origins in Etruria, and was, perhaps, another novus homo. The tradition of a Roman magistrate working abroad taking with him a retinue of trusted friends, advisors, and aides, was one already established in the Republic, and one that continued under the empire. But to my knowledge Occius Flamma is the earliest known example of a Latin rhetor being a member of such an entourage; as we shall see in chapter four, he is not the last.

These final examples thus add to our aristocrats another consul and a governor of a province, both of whom had connections to Latin rhetors; we have also started to see, with the Passieni and Ahenobarbus, some family connections between the members of the aristocracy who appear among the declamatory milieu in Seneca. In the next section, we will see several additional examples that help build confidence in this picture.

\[101\] Interestingly, according to Seeck in RE VI.1:623 cohors comitum “kommt nur in der Poesie vor,” citing Juv. 8.127. *Contr. 9.4.20* indicates that this generalization is not quite correct, but one might note that declamation and poetry are, after all, closely connected (see, e.g., Bonner 1949, 149–67; Berti 2007, 265–310; for satire in particular, see now S. M. Braund 1997, who notes at 151—à propos to Seeck’s observation and *Contr.* 9.4.20—that “rhetoric is Juvenal’s idiom”).

\[102\] *PIR*² O 6; Baldwin 1983, 148–49 = no. 38.

\[103\] Baldwin 1983, 38 (on origin), 45 (on status).

\[104\] See *RE* IV.1:622–28 (Seeck) for comites in the Republic and High Empire; cf. *CAH*².582–83 (Richardson).
§3.2.2: The rhetorical interests of the broader governing aristocracy: L. Munatius Plancus, C. Asinius Pollio and his progeny, Quintilius Varus; the Nonii, and C. Sosius

We can start by considering a number of figures referenced above *en passant* but whose treatment was there postponed. First: Lucius Munatius Plancus. We had encountered Plancus above in the course of our overview of Latro, whom he admired (*Contr*. 1.8.15: *summus amator Latronis*). In fact, that *locus* is the sole appearance of Plancus in Seneca’s anthology, which may seem to suggest that Plancus would make a poor choice for discussion here. But this is not the case. First, the lonely reference in Seneca is in itself revealing. It comes amid *Contr*. 1.8, in which a son, having already exhibited three acts of bravery in battle and therefore exempt from further military service according to declamatory law, wishes to fight for a fourth time, against his father’s wishes. When the son refuses his father’s attempts to stop him, he is disinherited. It is following a quotation of one of Latro’s *colores* that Seneca introduces Plancus (1.8.15):

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Latro vehementer egit a parte patris et adiecit: abdicato quoque non permittam exire: iniciam manus, tenebo, novissime ante limen exeuntis cadaver hoc sternam. ut ad hostem pervenias, patrem calca.

Putabat Plancus, summus amator Latronis, hunc sensum a Latrone fortius dictum, a Lesbocle Graeco tenerius, qui dixit sic: κείσομαι· ὡς τείχος, ἦς τάφρον ὑπέρβηθι καὶ πατέρα.
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Latro pleaded on the father’s behalf with great force and added: “even though he is disinherited, I won’t let him leave: I’ll lay my hands on him, hold him, and after all else I will lay this corpse of mine before his doorway as he leaves. To meet the enemy, tread on your father!”

Plancus, the greatest admirer of Latro, thought that this expression was said more boldly by Latro, more gently by the Greek Lesbocles, who said the following: “I’ll lie down: like a wall, like a trench, scale also your father.”

It only takes one anecdote, but we can see that Plancus appears to be fairly comfortable in the circles of the scholastici; he is an avid fan of Latro’s work, and sufficiently familiar with declamations given on this thema that he notices similarities between different treatments of the same controversia, and provides a comparative assessment. Though an isolated incident in Seneca, the content and context does not lead one to expect that this was Plancus’s only encounter with declamation and Latin rhetorical education—and this point is borne out by considering our other sources. With the case of Passienus, considered above, we saw that he had crossed paths with a number of declaimers: Latro, the premier declaimer of his generation, as well as two of the other members of Seneca’s top-four, primum tetradeum, Albucius Silus and Arellius Fuscus—not to mention Rubellius Blandus and Buteo. So too in Plancus’s case, we find him siding with Latro, but also clearly at least an auditor of the Mytilenean rhetor Lesbocles. And to this

105 Bardon 1940, 57 takes tenere as a term of literary criticism in Seneca to mean “délicatement,” but cf. Winterbottom 1974b, 1:193, who renders tenerius “too feebly.”

picture we can add the famed rhetor Albucius Silus, about whom Suetonius dedicated the final surviving chapter of DGR. Silus and Plancus were connected from the beginning of Silus’s career (DGR 30.1–2): originally an aedile in Novaria, Silus left for Rome after a humiliating incident at the hands of the locals, and found his way into—and out of—Plancus’s service:

quod indigne ferens statim contendit ad portam et inde Romam receptusque in Planci oratoris contubernium, cui declamaturum mos erat prius aliquem qui ante diceret exorare, suscepit eas partes atque ita implevit ut Planco silentium imponeret, non audenti in comparationem se demittere. sed ex eo clarus propria auditoria instituit…

Taking offense at the incident, he (Albucius Silus) immediately made for the city gate and then to Rome, and he was received within the circle of the orator Plancus, who had the habit of getting someone else to speak before him, when he was going to declaim. Albucius took on that role and performed it so completely that he imposed silence on Plancus, who didn’t dare offer himself for comparison. But famous as a result of that incident, Albucius established his own auditoria…

107 For auditoria, see Kaster 1995, 319, who points out that auditoria, in the sense of “a physical space… used for the recitation of literary works and for teaching” would have been a feature of Suetonius’s time but are anachronistic when projected back to the Augustan period. Comparing other passages from Seneca, Kaster can conclude that “Sen.’s report shows that A.’s infrequent ‘public’ declamations, like those of other declaimers Sen. describes, were held in his domus, evidently in a room prepared to accommodate the crowd admitted for the occasion.”
This passage confirms what the Senecan *locus* had suggested: the *mos* of Plancus did indeed involve declamation, and he was himself a practitioner, in addition to being the aficionado we see in *Contr.* 1.8.15. Incidentally, the passage provides a lesson on what can be said from the absence of explicit *sententiae* in Seneca: just because individuals appear in the *colores* but not in the *sententiae*, this does not necessarily mean that they were not declaimers. They may well have declaimed, just not brilliantly enough for Seneca to deem them meriting inclusion in his anthology.108

Plancus is, for our purposes, an example of a kind of bridge figure, who fits into the Augustan milieu we find in Seneca, but who found his place among the aristocracy via his service under Iulius Caesar rather than under Caesar’s heir; his career spans the end of the Republic and leads into the Principate.109 Of equestrian origins, Plancus hailed originally from Tibur, home of the “thick shade” (*densa... umbra*) celebrated by Horace in C. 1.7, Archilochian quatrains dedicated to Plancus himself.110 As for his career, he had obtained the quaestorship before 54 BCE, the year in which Plancus started to serve under Caesar, as his *legatus* in Gallia.111 It was with Caesar that Plancus laid the foundations for his career. Useful and effective, he accompanied Caesar during the civil war, serving also in Spain and then Africa; the *bellum Africum* that survives as part of the *corpus Caesarianum* may well be Plancus’s work.112 *Honores* followed: *praefectus urbis* in 46, *praetor* probably in 45. Plancus was designated by Caesar as the *consul* for 42, together with Decimus Iunius Brutus Albinus. He then returned to the field in 44, now at

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109 On Plancus, see *PIR* M 728; Wiseman 1971, 242–43 = no. 262; Watkins 1997; Morello 1997; *BNP* s.v. “Plancus” I 4 (Eck).
110 White 1993, 232 = Appendix 2A, no. 47.
the head of three legions in Gallia Comata. From September 44 to July 43 we know more details about Plancus’s activities and thoughts from the dossier of 27 letters that have been preserved among Cicero’s *ad Familiares*, all save one dating to this period.\(^{113}\) The two men were connected via Plancus’s father and since prior to Plancus’s birth; Cicero says that his own affection for Plancus dated from the consul-elect’s *pueritia*.\(^{114}\) For our purposes, it is worth noting that Plancus was an orator of repute,\(^{115}\) that his letters to Cicero have often been regarded as among the most eloquent specimens of the collection not written by the *arpinato* himself,\(^{116}\) and that Cicero—though very clearly in the service of his own interests—does not hesitate to speak of *summa eloquentia* (see chapter 2 above) as being in Plancus’s own possession.\(^{117}\) That a shared interest in rhetoric was part of the relationship may also be suggested by Cicero’s mention of their “not insignificant bond, not only of pursuits—a thing which is weighty in and of itself—but also of those pursuits and those arts which in and of themselves overcome with friendship also those who are of the same intention” (*Fam.* 13.29.1: *non mediocre vinculum cum studiorum, quod ipsum est per se grave, tum eorum studiorum earumque artium quae per se ipsae eos qui voluntate eadem sunt etiam familiaritate devinciant*).

From his campaigns in Gallia, Plancus triumphed in 43. It seems to have been from the spoils he accumulated while proconsul in Gallia Comata that Plancus was in a position to finance the construction of the Temple of Saturn, not completed until the 20s

\(^{113}\) *Fam.* 10.1–25, 11.13, 13.29 on which, see Walser 1957 (save for the outlier, 13.29 dating to ca. 46 and not included) and Morello 1997, 98–123; a chronological overview of the letters is set out on Walser 1957, 46.

\(^{114}\) E.g., *Fam.* 13.29.1, 5; 10.1.2; 10.3.2; 10.4.1; 10.5.1–2.

\(^{115}\) Malcovati 1955, 446–47 = no. 149.


\(^{117}\) *Fam.* 10.3.3: *consul es designatus, optima aetate, summa eloquentia, maxima orbitate rei publicae virorum talium.*
Initially siding with Antony, Plancus held his appointed consulship in 42. He then served under Antony in the east, governing Asia and then Syria; he obtained the *cognomen imperatoris* twice. But he managed to switch to the side that was to prevail in the conflict sufficiently in advance of Actium. That he sustained some influence and significance under the Principate can be well enough gauged from that it was none other than Plancus who in 27 proposed that Octavian take the name “Augustus.” Devoted to rhetoric in the late Republic, and frequenting the declaimers under the Augustan period—Plancus, like Augustus, included declamation as part of his *mos*. He is another example of how the Latin rhetors and their discipline had become closely bound with those who had a share of political power.

Also encountered briefly above was Gaius Asinius Pollio, a figure who repays consideration here. Pollio is one of the declaimers for whom Seneca provides a prefatory introduction, in his case at the beginning of *Contr*. 4 (shared with Quintus Haterius). He is also something of a regular in Seneca’s anthology, and the Spaniard reports that he heard Pollio declaim both when he was in his prime and when he was an old man, then offering instruction to his grandson, Marcus Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus (*Contr*. 4 pr. 3: *audivi autem illum et viridem et postea iam senem, cum Marcello Aesernino, nepoti suo, quasi praeciperet*). Combined with Seneca’s report that Pollio refused to declaim in circumstances that were open to the public (*Contr*. 4 pr. 2: *numquam admissa multitudine declamavit*), we might surmise that the two had a close enough relationship for Seneca to witness Pollio’s declamations even when the audience was rather exclusive.

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119 *Contr*. 4 pr. 2–6 covers Pollio.
120 See Echavarren 2007b, 79–81 = no. 45 for a collection of Pollio’s appearances in Seneca. For Aeserninus, see *PIR*² C 928 and further below.
Seneca himself offers two explanations for Pollio’s hesitance on this point: “either because he lacked confidence in his declamations or—an explanation I would put more trust in—because an orator of such caliber regarded that activity as lower than his own ability and though willing to practice with declamation, he had no taste for reveling in it” (sive quia parum in illis habuit fiduciam sive—quod magis crediderim—tantus orator inferius id opus ingenio suo duxit et exerceri quidem illo volebat, gloriari fastidiebat).

But a declaimer Pollio certainly was, and, as mentioned, he also used to practice declamation as means of teaching his grandson. Among the extant sections of Seneca’s anthology, Pollio predominately appears in the colores, as a critic and commenter on declaimers and their work, but Seneca also preserves several excerpts of Pollio’s own material. One might expect that more sententiae of Pollio perhaps appeared in Contr. 4—the book in which he is introduced in the preface—were our manuscript tradition sound there, and not a collection of headless scraps. Like a number of other characters we have encountered so far, Pollio appears in the extant passages to have been connected with a number of different rhetors and declaimers. Among the members of Seneca’s primum tetradeum, we find Pollio crossing paths with Latro, Albucius Silus, and Arellius Fuscus (all rhetors). Also involved is Cestius Pius, a rhetor who taught in Latin but who was originally from Smyrna and whose reputation was sufficient to earn him a spot in a lost section of Suetonius’s DGR. And Pollio is connected with a number of lesser known rhetors and declaimers, often critiquing their work: Triarius, Romanius Hispo,

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121 For Pollio declaiming with Marcellus, see Contr. 4 pr. 3.
122 Excerpts of Pollio’s declamations appear at Contr. 4.2; 7.1.4; 7.6.12.
123 Contr. 2.3.13; 4.6; 7. pr. 2; Suas. 2.10.
124 Contr. 4.6; Suet. DGR fr. 1 Kaster = Jer. Chron. p. 167 Helm.
Pompeius Silo, Buteo, Gaius Vibius Rufus, and Sextilius Ena. Few of these names will be familiar, but like so many of the declaimers and rhetors in Seneca, a number of them are connected with figures of note, like Asinius Pollio. Among this group, for example, Gaius Vibius Rufus was *consul suffectus* in 16 CE and presided over the *curatores riparum et alvei Tiberis*. To take another example, Sextilius Ena invited Pollio to attend his declamation of *Suas. 6*, “Cicero deliberates whether to beg Anthony for mercy” (*deliberat Cicero an Antonium deprecetur*), which he was going to perform at the house of none other than Marcus Valerius Messala Corvinus, a man of considerable distinction (*cos. 31 BCE* with Octavian; *imperator* and recipient of a triumph in 27 BCE after his governorship of Gaul; first *curator aquarum* starting in 11 BCE; proposed granting the title *pater patriae* to Octavian in 2 BCE; and, of course, patron of poets).

Pollio crossed paths with them all. In many respects his career is similar to that of Plancus considered above. Another Italian *novus homo*, this time originating from Teate and the Marrucini, Pollio too served alongside Caesar. He crossed the Rubicon in 49, served under Gaius Scribonius Curio in Africa, and fought for Caesar at Pharsalus before returning for further service in Africa and then probably Spain. Praetor in 45 BCE, well below the typical age (born *ca. 76 BCE*, he was nearly a decade young), and then governor of Hispania Ulterior in 44, while Plancus was in Gallia Comata. We have correspondence between Pollio and Cicero dating from the same time period as that with Plancus, though in less abundance—only three letters—and, at any rate, Cicero and

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125 *Contr.* 2.3.19; 2.5.13; 4.6; 7.4.3; 9.2.25; *Suas.* 6.27.
128 For Pollio, see *PIR*² A 1241 and now *FRHist* 1:430–45 with further bibliography.
Pollio were not on good terms. In the published version of his *Pro Lamia*, for example, Pollio went out of the way to slander Cicero, and his son, Gaius Asinius Gallus wrote a treatise that compared Pollio with Cicero, with the former coming out on top (later rebutted in a work by the emperor Claudius). In 40, the consulship was his, and from his campaigns against the Parthini in Illyricum the following year, Pollio triumphed. Like Plancus, Pollio too contributed to the changing the landscape of Augustus’s Rome, in this case reconstructing the Atrium Libertatis, in which he famously included a library. In short: Pollio is another example of a member of the governing aristocracy who was involved with rhetors and was an avid practitioner and evaluator of Latin rhetoric’s premier exercise, declamation.

We noted above that Pollio played a role in the rhetorical education of his grandson, Marcus Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus. Aeserninus was related to Pollio through his mother; his paternal grandfather was the consul of 22 BCE. Aeserninus was another productive member of the governing aristocracy, though obviously active at a later chronological point. As a boy, he broke his leg in a performance of Augustus’s *Troiae lusus*, the paramilitary athletic demonstration that the princeps felt could be a showcase for the natural talent of noble scions (Suet. *Aug.* 43.2: *clarae stirpis indolem*); Pollio’s vociferous objections to the *lusus* following the event ultimately led to its end.

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129 Cic. *Fam.* 10.31–33.
130 For the attacks against Cicero in the *Pro Lamia*, see Suas. 6.14; for Gallus’s treatise, which once inspired the younger Pliny to pen some hexameters, see Plin. *Ep.* 7.4.3–6; for Claudius’s parry, Suet. *Claud.* 41. For Pollio’s speeches, see Malcovati 1955, 516–28 = no. 174.
131 Many sources mention his triumph (see in *PIR*² A 1241, 1:251 and *MRR* 2:387–388), but there is uncertainty concerning the year in which it fell, 25 Oct. 39 or 38: see in *FRHist.* 1:433 n. 18 with further references.
132 For the structure, see *LTUR* 1:133–35.
133 *PIR*² C 928
134 A *stemma* of Pollio’s family can be found in *RE* II.2:1587.
(Suet. Aug. 43.3). But the boy recovered from his injury to become, first, one of the
_ curatores riparum et alvei Tiberis_—under the supervision of Gaius Vibius Rufus (cos. 16) and later _praetor peregrinus_ in 19 CE. One might expect that this was not the first
time Aeserninus crossed paths with Rufus: we know from Seneca that Pollio had once
subjected to his judgment a _sententia_ by the same Rufus that had been spoken on the
theme of “Flamininus, executing a criminal at dinner” (_Flamininus in cena reum puniens:
Contr. 9.2.25_). When Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso _pater_ was seeking aid for his defense in
20, Aeserninus, by that time an orator of substance, excused himself from the request
(Tac. _Ann._ 3.11). Incidentally, of the five advocates who declined Piso’s request, in
addition to Aeserninus two others—Gaius Asinius Gallus (Pollio’s son) as well as
Publius Vinicius—also appear in Seneca’s anthology. Though a consulship for
Aeserninus is unattested—perhaps he did not survive to that point—still Tacitus’s praises
of the man seem to suggest that he held that office as _suffectus_ at some point under
Tiberius. Thus, we have an aristocrat of a slightly later generation, for whom
declamation was also a part of his education.

The case of Pollio and Aeserninus is also not the sole example in Seneca where
we see the progeny of a prominent political figure in the realm of Latin rhetorical
education. _Contr._ 1.3 concerns a Vestal virgin, condemned for unchastity and hurled from
the Tarpeian rock. She invokes Vesta before she is thrown and miraculously survives.

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135 For Aeserninus the orator, see Balbo 2007, 2:517 = no. 51.
136 On Asinius Gallus (cos. 8 BCE), see _PIR_² C 1229; he appears only briefly in Seneca: see in
Echavarren 2007b, 78–79 = no. 44; for Publius Vinicius (cos. ord. 2 CE), see _PIR_¹ V 446;
Vinicius appears to have been no stranger to declamation, if often unoriginal ( _Contr._ 1.4.11):
additional references collected in Echavarren 2007b, 272–73 = no. 290.
137 Tac. _Ann._ 11.6 includes Aeserninus with three other consular orators as men _ad summa
provectos incorrupta vita et facundia_; _PIR_² C 928 believes he _did_ obtain the consulship, but
Unfortunately for her, survival only means subsequent re-prosecution to face the same penalty yet again. As emerges from Seneca’s quotations, many of the declaimers deployed a particular color in this controversia when speaking against the girl, namely that “if she had been saved by the will of the gods… it was so that she could die more cruelly” (Contr. 1.3.8: si voluntate deorum servata est… ut crudelius periret). So argued many of the declaimers, but not all, as Seneca explains (Contr. 1.3.9):

contra sacerdotem qui(dam) dixerunt videri deos infestos illi, in hoc eam servasse, ut diutius torqueretur; aiebat Cestius malle se casu videri factum quam deorum voluntate; nam si semel illos intervenire huic rei fatemur, manifestius erit a poena servatam se sacerdotem quam in poenam.

Against the priestess, some spoke that the gods seemed hostile to her, and that they had saved her for this purpose: that she be tortured longer; but Cestius said that he preferred that it seemed to have happened by chance, rather than by the will of the gods; for once we grant that they intervened in this matter, it will be rather obvious that the priestess was saved from the punishment rather than saved for the punishment.

Cestius here is the rhetor Lucius Cestius Pius, whom we encountered briefly above in connection with Pollio.\footnote{On Cestius, see PIR$^2$ C 694; Echavarren 2007b, 101–104 = no. 6; Kaster 1995, 327–29; Lindner 1858.} From Smyrna, Cestius taught Latin rhetoric and declaimed in Latin—though Seneca mentions that he was sometimes hampered by the poverty of his
Latin vocabulary (*Contr. 7.1.27: Latinorum verborum inopia*). From Seneca’s notices, we know of a number of Cestius’s students: Argentarius, a Greek who, like his teacher, declaimed in Latin; a certain Surdinus, perhaps to be identified with Lucius Naevius Surdinus (*cos. suff.* 30 CE); Alfius Flavus, a child prodigy of declamation; and the otherwise unknown Aietius Pastor, identified as a senator (*Contr. 1.3.11*), perhaps of Italian extraction. Another was a certain Quintilius Varus, who, when declaiming *Contr. 1.3* on the Vestal hurled from the rock, did not follow his teacher’s *color*, and found himself harshly criticized. Seneca reports the episode (*Contr. 1.3.10*):

Declamaverat apud illum hanc ipsam controversiam Varus Quinti(li)us, tunc Germanici gener, ut praetextatus; cum descripsisset circumstantium (indignationem), quod tam cito oculis poena subduceretur, dixit: exaudierunt dìi immortales publici[vum] voti preces: incestam, ne cito supplicium transcurreret, revocaverunt. Cestius multa contumeliose dixit in istam sententiam: sic, inquit, quomodo quadrigas, revocaverunt? nam et ante posuisti (istam) similitudinem, quia et haec de carcere exierat. cum multa dixisset, novissime adiecit rem, quam

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139 A sort of modification of the usual trope found in Latin authors concerning the poverty of the Latin language versus Greek found famously at, e.g., Lucr. 1.139, *patrii sermonis egestas*—though our passage does not appear in the *Stellenregister* in Fögen 2000.

140 For Cestius’s students, see Lindner 1858, 15–17.

141 See *PIR*² S 1043 “fortasse idem”; for the *cos. suff.*, see *PIR*² N 17;

142 For Alfius Flavus, see Echavarren 2007b, 55–57 = no. 22; Echavarren 55 follows Migliario 2003, 105 and dates Alfius Flavus’s tutelage under Cestius Pius to *ca.* 15–10 BCE, but that chronological range seems problematic in light of our evidence. At *Contr. 3.7*, a *sententia* spoken by Flavus is criticized by Pius on that grounds that the young man had filched the sentiment of his *sententia* from Ovid, and Seneca goes on to supply the *locus* in particular: *Met.* 8.877–78. While we cannot date the publication of the *Metamorphoses* with precision, it seems that they were in all likelihood published sometime *ca.* 1–8 CE (see, e.g., *BNP* s.v. “Ovidius” (Kenney)). This notice effectively pushes forward the time that the two were working together *ca.* 20 years later than the dates given by Echavarren and Migliario. The significance of the *Contr. 3.7* and the *Metamorphoses* for dating Flavius’s activity was noted already by Cichorius 1922, 63.

143 See Echavarren 2007b, 47–48 = no. 18.
Quintilius Varus, then the son-in-law-to-be of Germanicus, had declaimed this very *controversia* as a boy in Cestius’s presence; when he had described the indignation of the bystanders, due to the punishment being so quickly taken away from their eyes, he said: “the immortal gods have heard the requests of your public prayer: they have called back the unchaste girl to repeat her performance, that she not run the course of her execution quickly.”

Cestius inveighed a lot of insult against this *sententia*: “is that how they called her back, like a chariot? In fact you even used that comparison earlier, because this girl has also set out from her “lockup.”” After Cestius had said a lot, he concluded with a comment that we all condemned: “it was due to that kind of carelessness that your father lost his army.” While scolding the son, he insulted the father.

This Quintilius Varus, as Cestius’s insult makes clear, is the son of the infamous Publius Quintilius Varus who had fallen in the so-called *clades Variana* in 9 CE. The exchange between Varus and Cestius is itself revealing regarding the standards of *sententiae*, the use of *similitudo*, and what was likely to provoke the criticism of the rhetor from

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144 The *sententia* depends on the way that *revoco* (*OLD* 2a) and *transcurro* (*OLD* 6b) are used in athletic contests, as Cestius makes clear in his critique.
145 Again, Varus presses his *similitudo* with athletic contests, here relying on the double meaning of *carcer*, both “prison” (*OLD* 1a) and “barriers at the beginning of a racecourse, the starting point of the course” (*OLD* 3a).
146 For the father, see *PIR*² Q 30; Syme 1986, 313–28; Dąbrowa 1998, 22–24; for the son: *PIR*² Q 29. A detailed *stemma* for the family appears in *PIR*² 7.1, between 24–25. For *clades Variana*, see, e.g., Plin. *Nat.* 7.150; Tac. *Ann.* 1.10.4, 12.27.3.
Smyrna—not to mention the confidence of Cestius in his rebuke of a relation the imperial house. It is also the only appearance of Varus in Seneca’s anthology, which was, after all, devoted to the most successful declaimers he had heard.

For our purposes, we should note, once again, what this episode suggests for the behavior of those in power under the Principate. About the boy’s father, of course, we know a great deal. Prior to his death in the Teutoburgiensis saltus, Varus had been an establishment in the Augustan aristocracy, with a storied career: quaestor of Augustus, who travelled in the east with the princeps in 21–19\textsuperscript{147}; a priesthood, either pontifex or augur, before 13 BCE, the year in which he was consul ordinarius together with Tiberius Claudius Nero; governor of Africa, probably in 8/7 where his provincial coinage—as with that of Passienus, mentioned above—bore his portrait and his name\textsuperscript{148}; then legatus Augusti pro praetore in Syria, from 7–4, whence he departed a wealthy man.\textsuperscript{149} But it is the son who is studying rhetoric and declaiming under the supervision of Cestius Pius. About his career, we have less evidence, but it seems probable that this is because it was cut short, a point we will return to in a moment. He was, however, at one point evidently on track to follow in his father’s footsteps and play a role in the Principate: as Seneca’s anecdote makes clear, he was betrothed to a daughter of Germanicus Caesar, generally assumed to have been his youngest, Iulia Livilla.\textsuperscript{150} Seneca’s anecdote is revealing of the education of a young aristocrat who, being of such stature and with these kind of connections, spends time practicing declamation with the rhetor elsewhere described by Seneca as mordacissimus homo (Contr. 7 pr. 8).

\textsuperscript{147} Dąbrowa 1998, 24, 133–34 n. 80.
\textsuperscript{148} RPC 1:198 = no. 776 (Hadrumetum); 1:202 = no. 798 (Achulla).
\textsuperscript{149} So Vell. 2.117.2; for Varus’s time in Syria, see Dąbrowa 1998, 22–24.
\textsuperscript{150} Syme 1986, 315; PIR² Q 29 and I 674.
Varus’s family life connects him to several other declaimers. These relations are worth pursuing here because they help reveal the extent to which aristocratic mos in this period included studying with Latin rhetors. Varus’s second marriage was to a Vipsania, daughter of Agrippa. Another Vipsania had married Quintus Haterius, the declaimer and friend of Augustus that we encountered above (§3.2.1). Varus later remarried but remained in the domus Augusta, this time wedding Claudia Pulchra, the daughter of Augustus’s niece Marcella the younger. It was Claudia who bore Varus the son who studied with Cestius Pius and fared so poorly in the rhetor’s judgment. Varus also had sisters, who married other amici Augusti. One Quintilia was wed to Publius Cornelius Dolabella, a friend of Augustus, who was in all likelihood the son of Publius Cornelius Dolabella, the consul of 44 BCE. This man, as we saw above (§1.4), had practiced declamation under Cicero’s auspices. Varus’s nephew produced by the marriage, also P. Cornelius Dolabella, became consul in 10 CE, governed Illyricum under Augustus and Tiberius, and later became proconsul in Africa in 23/24. He too perhaps had some rhetorical skill, as he later turned on his uncle’s family, and prosecuted his cousin, Quintilius Varus—the student of Cestius Pius—in 27 CE (Tac. Ann. 4.66). In this prosecution Dolabella was assisting (socium delationis) the successful orator and rhetorical author Domitius Afer, under whom the great Flavian rhetor Quintilian had studied as a boy (see further in §4.2.1 below), and who wrote two books on how to

151 See Syme 1986, 314–15; for Claudia Pulchra, see PIR² C 1116.
152 This Quintilia is PIR² Q 33; her husband is PIR² C 1345. That he was the son of the elder Dolabella (cos. 44) is probable but not absolutely certain: see RE IV.1:1296 (Groag: “anscheinend”), 1308 (Münzer: “vielleicht”); cf. PIR² C 1345 (also Groag: “videtur”). There is a stemma Dolabellarum between PIR² 2:318–19. For the consul of 44 BCE, see RE IV.1:1300–1308.
153 PIR² C 1348.
154 See in Balbo 2007, 1:254–58 = no. 14 for what remains of this Dolabella’s oratory.
handle witnesses.\textsuperscript{155} An interesting character, Afer also has ties to the Passieni we considered above, when he appeared as one member of a trio of advocates in the defense of Lucius Volusenus Catulus, in which he spoke alongside Lucius Sallustius Crispus Passienus, the grandson of our Senecan declaimer.\textsuperscript{156} But to return to Dolabella and Afer against the young Varus: in his account of the incident, Tacitus notes that the young man—perhaps only 23 years old—was wealthy and well-connected (\textit{divitem et Caesari propinquum}). But was he also vulnerable? We hear from the historian that the trial was temporarily stayed in the senate, pending consultation of Tiberius, who was then absent from Rome. Tacitus never reports a subsequent outcome; nor do we have any report suggesting that the younger Varus had any subsequent career after falling into the hands of Afer and Dolabella. The year prior, Afer had been responsible for the conviction of the boy’s mother and Varus’s widow, Claudia Pulchra, on charges of unchastity with a certain Furnius, plotting to poison the emperor, and using curses (Tac. \textit{Ann.} 4.52: \textit{crimen impudicitiae, adulterum Furnium, veneficia in principem et devotiones}).\textsuperscript{157} His eloquence may well have finished off her son as well.

So much for Dolabella and Quintilia, but Varus had other sisters. Another Quintilia became the wife of one Lucius Nonius Asprenas. The Nonii pose some prosopographical challenges, but they too are worth considering here.\textsuperscript{158} Quintilia’s husband, it is agreed, was a close associate of Augustus’s (Suet. \textit{Aug.} 56: \textit{Asprenas

\textsuperscript{155} Quint. \textit{Inst.} 5.7.7. For Afer, see Balbo 2007, 2:405–46, with further bibliography.

\textsuperscript{156} Quint. \textit{Inst.} 10.1.24. We lack information about the circumstances of the trial; this Catulus held posts under Tiberius, as a member of the \textit{curatores alvei Tiberis} and the \textit{curatores locorum publicorum iudicandorum}: see BNP s.v. “Volusenus” 2 (Eck); \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{1} V} 647–48.

\textsuperscript{157} The Furnius in question is otherwise unknown: \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2} F} 589. For the prosecution of Claudia Pulchra, see also Tac. \textit{Ann.} 4.66; D.C. 59.19.1.

\textsuperscript{158} For the \textit{stemma Noniorum Asprenatium}, see \textit{PIR\textsuperscript{2} 5}.3:367 and see Eck, Caballos, and Fernández 1996, 85–87, with some significant alterations.
Nonius artius ei iunctus) whose most conspicuous appearance in our records of the early empire involves his trial for poisoning, in which he was prosecuted by the orator Cassius Severus, with Asinius Pollio speaking in his defense.\(^{159}\) Pollio’s connections with rhetorical education we have considered above; Severus—a very interesting figure in his own right—we have not hitherto encountered in our selective survey, but he too is found declaiming in Seneca’s pages.\(^{160}\) The origins of Asprenas’s connection to Augustus are uncertain, but if he is identical with the known Caesarian of the same name, he would more or less parallel Munatius Plancus and Asinius Pollio in terms of career outline (served for Caesar in Gaul, Africa, and Spain; later \textit{cos. suff.} in 36).\(^{161}\) His son, Quintilius Varus’s nephew, also Lucius Nonius Asprenas, was closely connected to his uncle and served as his \textit{tribunus militum} in Iudaea in 4, before being his \textit{legatus} in Germania.\(^{162}\) In between, in 6 CE, the son of Lucius and Quintilia was \textit{consul ordinarius} with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus. When he learned of the loss of his uncle in the \textit{clades Variana}, Asprenas moved his two legions into lower Germania for the winter—actions for which

\(^{159}\) On our sources for the trial, see Deroux 2004.

\(^{160}\) For Severus’s life and career, see \textit{PIR}\(^2\) C 522; among Seneca’s anthology, see Echavarren 2007b, 95–99 = no. 65. Severus is, in fact, something of a complex case in Seneca: the Spaniard features him in the preface to \textit{Contr.} 3, but notes that he was a better orator than a declaimer and thus declaimed infrequently, and only when coerced by his friends (3 pr. 7: \textit{itaque raro declamabat et non nisi ab amicis coactus}; cf. 3 pr. 18). Seneca himself includes what purports to be Severus’s defense of this scenario in \textit{Contr.} 3 pr. 8–18 in a tone that is altogether disparaging of declamation—and yet we catch him in the act at, e.g., \textit{Contr.} 7.3.10, 9.2.12, and 10.4.2. Severus is also a significant figure in discussions of the “decline” of eloquence: see Winterbottom 1964; Heldmann 1982, 163–98.

\(^{161}\) There is a division among prosopographers as to whether or not this identification is correct. It was suggested by Groag in \textit{RE Suppl.} VII:582 (“offenbar”), and also held to be correct in Wiseman 1971, 244–45 = no. 274, and “possibly” so by Fündling in \textit{BNP} s.v. “Nonius” I 1; cf. Badian 1971, 139: “the eminent Asprenates of the early Empire can all be traced back to the Caesarian.” Not all agree, however: see Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 54–55 with n. 48 (“wenig wahrscheinlich”) and also \textit{PIR}\(^2\) N 117 (“nobis non certum esse videtur”).

\(^{162}\) \textit{PIR}\(^2\) N 118.
he receives praise from Velleius Paterculus for their stabilizing effect. His brother was Sextus Nonius Quintilianus, who was consul ordinarius in 8 CE and proconsul of Asia in 16/17. Lucius and Sextus Nonii appear side-by-side in Seneca, who mentions them in a praeteritio at the opening of his final book of Controversiae (10 pr. 2):

Pertinere autem ad rem non puto… quomodo L. Asprenas aut Quintilianus senex declamaverit. transeo istos, quorum fama cum ipsis extincta est.

Furthermore, I don’t think that it is relevant… how Lucius Asprenas or old Quintilianus declaimed. I pass over those men, whose fame perished with them.

Neither appears elsewhere in Seneca, but that is not because they did not declaim, or were not part of this social and cultural milieu. Rather, it is because Seneca did not deem them significant enough to include in the anthology for his sons. In fact, Seneca’s description of Quintilianus as senex may suggest that he continued to practice declamation in the twilight of his life. Furthermore, in considering Sextus Nonius Quintilianus we find still more politically significant Romans who were engaged in declamation and rhetorical education. Quintilianus married Sosia, the daughter of Gaius

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163 Vell. 2.120.3; Asprenas’s role seems less significant in D.C. 56.22.3–4.
164 PIR² N 152; Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 224–27; considered to be the brother of Lucius Nonius Asprenas “sine dubio” in PIR² N 118 (also in Vogel-Weidemann 1982, 224), but only “probably” in BNP s.v. “Nonius” II 17 (Eck) (cf. Vidman in PIR² N 152 “frater videtur fuisse minor L. Nonii Asprenatis, consulis a. 7 p.C.”).
165 For Lucius, see Echavarren 2007b, 197–98 = no. 195; for Sextus, see Echavarren 2007b, 199–200 = no. 197. As noted by Vidman in PIR² F 152, Quintilianus senex here is neither the father nor grandfather of M. Fabius Quintilianus “ut vulgo putabatur” (e.g., Schwabe in RE VI.2:1846; Clarke 1967, 24; McDermott and Orentzel 1979, 10). He should also be distinguished, it seems, from the figure at Contr. 10.4.19: Echavarren 2007b, 200–201 = no. 198.
166 I do not find senex appearing elsewhere for Sex. Nonius Quintilianus.
Sosius. Sosius was a successful agent of Antony during the late 40s and 30s BCE, whom the triumvir set to govern Syria and Cilicia in 38 BCE. While in Syria, it was Sosius who successfully besieged Jerusalem in support of the forces of Herod the Great, resulting in the installation of the client king in Iudaea and the capture and execution of the Hasmonean Antigonos. In 34, Sosius triumphed from his actions in Iudaea, and in 32 he was consul ordinarius. Like Plancus and Pollio above, Sosius contributed to construction in Rome, in his case the temple of Apollo in the Circus Maximus, the so-called Apollo Sosianus. Sosius’s colleague during his consulship of 32 BCE was Gnaeus Domitius Ahenobarbus, the great-grandfather of the emperor Nero, whose biological father, consul in 32 CE, we saw above studying with Latin rhetors after his consulship. That this man, the grandson of the censor of 92 BCE, shared his consulship in 32 with Sosius, a man who was tied to Latin rhetorical education, is revealed by Suas. 2.21, where Seneca describes the rhetor Corvus (unknown beyond Seneca’s pages), as follows:

hic est Corvus, qui, cum temptaret scholam Romae, Sosio illi, qui Iudaeos subegerat, declamavit controversiam de ea, quae apud matronas disserebat liberos non esse tollendos et ob hoc accusatur rei publicae laesae.

This is the Corvus who, when he was trying to be the head of a school at Rome, declared before Sosius, the one who had reduced the Iudaeans to a state of

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167 Sosia: PIR² S 778; her father: PIR² S 776.
168 LTUR 1:49–54.
169 My text here follows Feddern 2013, in which see ad loc., pp. 300–301 for commentary.
170 Feddern 2013, 301 explains temptare scholam as “versuchen, eine Schule zu leiten.”
subjection, the *controversia* about the woman who was in the habit of arguing in the presence of married women that their children should not be raised and for this reason is prosecuted for harming the republic.\footnote{For *declamare* + dative, see *TLL* 5:182.18–19 (Stöger); Feddern 2013, 300 helpfully catalogues parts of extant declamations that contain elements of the *thema* that Seneca describes here.}

Such was the father-in-law of Sextus Nonius Quintilianus: a man who sacked cities and listened to the declamations of rhetors.

§3.3 Conclusion: The noisy menagerie (?) and beyond

We could add additional figures that appear in Seneca’s anthology and were also members of the governing oligarchy. For example, Lucius Vinicius, *Illir vir monetalis* in 16 BCE, and consul with Quintus Haterius in 3 BCE\footnote{Echavarren 2007b, 271–72 = no. 289; *PIR*\textsuperscript{1} V 443; *BNP* s.v. “Vinicius” II 1 (Eck).}; or Publius Vinicius, *legatus Augusti* in Thracia and Macedonia, *consul ordinarius* in 2 CE\footnote{Echavarren 2007b, 272–73 = no. 290; *PIR*\textsuperscript{1} V 446; Syme 1962, 148–49 = *RP* 2:533; Syme 1971, 68–69; *BNP* s.v. “Vinicius” II 4 (Eck).}; or Paullus Fabius Maximus, *amicus Augusti, consul ordinarius* in 11 BCE, before governing Asia ca. 10–8, and later Hispania Tarraconensis\footnote{*PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 47; *BNP* s.v. “Fabius” II 14 (Eck); Syme 1986, 403–420; Echavarren 2007b, 132–33 = no. 110. See further below in §4.2.3.1.}; or Lucius Iunius Gallio, Seneca’s close friend and author of a rhetorical *ars*, who could at one point joke with Tiberius about other declaimers—before he fell from favor and faced expulsion from the Senate.\footnote{Echavarren 2007b, 167–69 = no. 156; *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} I 756; for Gallio’s *ars*, see Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.21 (cf. 9.2.91); for Gallio and Tiberius, see Sen. *Suas.* 3.7. But the larger argument does not demand additional examples. We have already seen a sufficient number of cases—ranging from the *princeps* himself, to new men, to old consular families—of people who

171 For *declamare* + dative, see *TLL* 5:182.18–19 (Stöger); Feddern 2013, 300 helpfully catalogues parts of extant declamations that contain elements of the *thema* that Seneca describes here.

172 Echavarren 2007b, 271–72 = no. 289; *PIR*\textsuperscript{1} V 443; *BNP* s.v. “Vinicius” II 1 (Eck).

173 Echavarren 2007b, 272–73 = no. 290; *PIR*\textsuperscript{1} V 446; Syme 1962, 148–49 = *RP* 2:533; Syme 1971, 68–69; *BNP* s.v. “Vinicius” II 4 (Eck).

174 *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 47; *BNP* s.v. “Fabius” II 14 (Eck); Syme 1986, 403–420; Echavarren 2007b, 132–33 = no. 110. See further below in §4.2.3.1.

175 Echavarren 2007b, 167–69 = no. 156; *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} I 756; for Gallio’s *ars*, see Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.21 (cf. 9.2.91); for Gallio and Tiberius, see Sen. *Suas.* 3.7.
participated in political life under the early empire and who were connected with Latin rhetorical education. In chapter one we saw how the discipline first emerged in 93 BCE, and the first generation of Latin rhetors taught the likes of Pompey, Antony, Cicero and, of course, Octavian. We can see from the present chapter that when Caesar’s heir created a new political reality for Rome and its possessions, the habit—the mos—of working with Latin rhetors remained. As we have seen, familiarity with declamation appears to be nearly a kind of common denominator among many of the men and families that were part of the Augustan and Tiberian aristocracies; rhetorical education looks like a kind of cultural feature of the early imperial court.

Our source for most of this has been a unique and idiosyncratic one. Seneca’s anthology poses endless textual difficulties, and its pages and pages of discontinuous excerpts do not make it an easy text to work with. It is important to note, however, that what survives in Seneca is a very selective sample. The Spaniard just happens to mention, for example, Munatius Plancus, Quintilius Varus, Lucius and Sextus Nonius, and Sosius, and so enriches our knowledge of the connections between these men and Latin rhetors. But, it seems to me, the picture we get from Seneca should be taken to be the bare minimum of involvement and connectivity; if we had more sources and witnesses to this kind of activity, I suspect that we would find many more connections between Latin rhetors and substantial (and insubstantial) political agents during the period. Seneca happens to mention that Occius Flamma included the rhetor Asilius Sabinus as part of his cohors when he went to govern Crete and Cyrene. This might have been the only such example of this during the period—or there may have been many others that did not happen to be noted by Seneca. Certainty naturally alludes us on this point, but to judge
from the rich trail of evidence that was preserved by Seneca, if there were other cases like
that of Plancus and Flamma that did not happen to be mentioned by the Spaniard—and
this seems to me very likely—if we were to suddenly reclaim that lost knowledge, such
connections would probably not come as a major surprise.

We might start to conclude by returning to the remarks of Ronald Syme, which
opened the present chapter. To judge from a number of passages across his learned
oeuvre, one gets the impression that Syme regarded Seneca’s world as an odd one. It was
populated by “a noisy menagerie” and the declaimers were “a demoniac legion.”
Consider too his comment on Vibius Rufus, the consul suffectus in 16 CE, whom we
encountered above briefly in connection with Asinius Pollio. Syme writes:

Unlike most of Seneca’s heroes and martyrs of the schools, Vibius Rufus entered
the senate and had public employment in the end. (Syme 1981, 369 = RP 3:1427)

Elsewhere, Syme appears similarly skeptical of the successes of this group:

Of the performers registered by Seneca, the majority were small town careerists,
with few senators or sons of senators. Many of them were crude and brutal in
style and argument. (Syme 1986, 354)

Syme immediately goes on to qualify this statement—referencing the appearances by
Asinius Pollio, Messala Corvinus, and Quintus Haterius (“a few other senators might be
found”). But this still does not leave a particularly strong impression of the men who had
interests in declamation. Of course, Syme is probably correct numerically in his indication that “most” or the “majority” of the declaimers in Seneca did not play a role in the senate. But his comments seem to me to be less about numerical precision and more about providing a general impression of the characters involved: mostly a demoniac legion, with Rufus and a few others being exceptions that prove the rule. But, as we have seen, as a senator in the schools, Rufus was hardly alone. Such “exceptions” were, it seems to me, not actually all that exceptional. A number of members of the “demoniac legion” were, in fact, the same ones that commanded Rome’s actual legions. In short, to gauge from the people in Seneca’s anthology, interest in Latin rhetorical education among those who had a share of political power did not abate when the Roman world transitioned from Republic to empire. As the political institutions and ideological interests of the empire developed, this had consequences for the sustained, close relationship between the masters of eloquence and the masters of empire—as we shall see in the next chapter.

But before moving on, it is perhaps worth pausing for a moment to consider a question that may well rise from the present discussion. When emperors and provincial governors spend their time on the intricacies of argumentation and the eloquent presentation of cases involving pirate chiefs, fathers accused of dementia, and Parrhasius’s nightmarish art, one may well wonder: why was it that this group of powerful people found declamation so appealing? Put another way: why was declamation so popular under the empire? This question is one that has certainly exercised scholars in the past, and one that is often entangled with questions surrounding the alleged “decline” of oratory under the empire. For example, in 1945 E. Patrick Parks argued—in the face of
claims that that the decline of oratory under the empire “drove the rhetoricians and students into a confined space of uselessness, to exercise themselves in inane babblings as a preparation for nothing”—that declamation was, in fact, suitable preparation for forensic oratory, and that there were still ample opportunities for speaking in the courts under the empire. Thus, rhetorical education and declamation were popular because they provided a pragmatic education for future forensic orators. Bonner noted the “commonly accepted explanation” of declamation’s popularity under the Principate was that the rhetoric schools provided a kind of compensation for loss of political freedom: “oratory betook itself to the safer arena of the schools, where a man might air his Republicanism without fear of consequences, and where one might be recompensed for the loss of political prestige by the plaudits of one’s fellow citizens”—while also partially endorsing Parks’s assessment that the rhetors also offered training that might have practical applications.

Indeed, Syme in The Roman Revolution at one point offers what could point to an explanation for interest in oratory and rhetoric under the empire:

Under the Republic nobility of birth, military service, distinction in oratory or law, these were the three claims to the consulate... Caesar and the Triumvirs changed all that. None the less, though modified, the old categories subsisted... Eloquence and the study of law (‘illustres domi artes’) ennobled their adepts. Under the new order Cicero would have won the consulate without competition, held it without ostentation or danger, and lived secure as a senior statesman, much in demand on

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176 Parks 1945, with the quote from 15–16 (see 16 n. 14 for a annotated bibliography of earlier authors that Parks is trying to rebut).

177 See Bonner 1949, 42–50 (quote from 43).
decorative occasions as a speaker for the government… With peace and prosperity polite arts returned to favour. (Syme 1939, 374–75)

If nobility of birth now provided fewer assurances of success and military service was more restricted by virtue of imperial appointment, might this restriction create a bottleneck of opportunity for elite distinction? Explanations of a more functional bent have also been advanced. It has been argued, for example, that Roman declamation and rhetorical education “articulated and inculcated elite Roman ideology and thereby helped the elite class… to reproduce itself and its dominance in Rome.”178 These explanations contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon, which is, after all, a complex one; as such, we ought to expect that multiple explanations will be necessary to wholly understand why declamation in particular was so favored by this population. That said, I would add something here by holding fast to the ancient sources, and pressing one aspect present in our texts: the perception that declamation and rhetorical education could lead to political success.

In the present chapter, the driving theme has been continuity between the interests of the magnates of the late Republic in Latin rhetorical education—considered in §1.3 above—and the members of the governing aristocracy in the early Principate, specifically focused around declamation. We can start to answer the question, why declamation?, by reflecting on what was it about rhetorical education that the magnates found valuable in the Republic. Of this group, Suetonius, for example, records the following, (DGR 25.31):

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178 Imber 1997, 102. See also, e.g., Kaster 2001 with 325 n. 20.
Cn. Pompeium quidam historici tradiderunt sub ipsum civile bellum, quo facilius C. Curioni promptissimo iuveni causam Caesaris defendenti contradiceret, repetisse declamandi consuetudinem…

Certain historians record that Gnaeus Pompeius returned to his habit of declamation during the civil war itself, so that he might all the more easily speak against the young Gaius Curio, who was defending Caesar’s interests.

According to this account, the question why declamation? is answered by political advantage: Magnus returns to the exercise—for him, a habit (consuetudinem)—in order to gain an advantage over Gaius Curio, Caesar’s agent, as the Republic slid towards its finale. Political success in this scenario demands skillful speech, which in turn is perceived by the agents involved to have been fostered by declamation. Hence its appeal and value. The study of Cicero in chapter two above points in a similar direction. As we saw there, Cicero argued that technical rhetoric fostered eloquentia, which in turn provided the foundation for potential political success—and indeed civic flourishing. Thus, in both cases, rhetorical study found appeal because it was perceived as likely to correlate with favorable political outcomes.

As for the declaimers and rhetorical enthusiasts considered in the present chapter, it seems to me very probable that many of them will have been motivated to pursue rhetorical education and declamation due to a similar belief: that they believed it might give them some kind of political advantage. And it should be noted, furthermore, that this population need not be considered as separate from the Republican figures that pursued
declamation. Why think, for example, that Plancus and Pollio only started declaiming 
*after* the civil war? The question of declamation’s popularity, as seen above in reference 
to Parks, Bonner, and others, is so often a question asked with a focus on the empire—but 
we should remember that this was not the first time that declamation was practiced. 179

The case of Seneca himself offers a suitable stopping point. In the preface to 
*Contr.* 2, Seneca introduces Papirius Fabianus, a philosopher also distinguished in his 
declamation. 180 In the second-half of this preface, Seneca then uses the example of 
Fabianus as a means of protreptic to his youngest son, Mela, who is particularly 
interested, it seems, in philosophical studies. Seneca explains (*Contr.* 2 pr. 3–4):

Haec eo libentius, Mela, fili carissime, refero, quia video animum tuum a civilibus 
officiis abhorrentem et ab omni ambiitu aversum hoc unum concupiscentem, nihil 
concupiscere—ut eloquentiae tamen studeas. facilis ab hac in omnes artes 
discursus est; instruit etiam quos non sibi exercet… Sed proderit tibi in illa, quae 
tota mente agitas, declamandi exercitatio, sicut Fabiano profuit.

I’m all the more happy to report these things, Mela, my dearest son, because I see 
that your heart, which shuns civic duties and all pursuit of advancement, and 
desires one thing only—to desire nothing—I gladly report these things so that you 
study eloquence all the same. Heading off to all arts is easy from this starting 
point; it instructs even those whom it does not train for itself… But the exercise in

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179 Cf. n. 38 above.
180 On Fabianus, see Echavarren, 206–207 = no. 206; Huelsenbeck 2009, 73–160.
declamation will help you in what you are after whole heartedly, just as it did for Fabianus.

While a number of interesting things emerge from Seneca’s words in these sections—not least of all that “it was Mela and not Seneca who was regarded when young as the philosopher of the family”\textsuperscript{181}—we can note in particular the assumptions latent in the elder Seneca’s encouragement here. Even though Mela does not have interest in pursuing a political career, he should nevertheless study *eloquentia* and the *declamandi exercitatio*. Which is to say that these pursuits would be normal and expected if he were interested in politics—as Seneca indeed suggests in the other sections of *Contr. 2 pr.*, when referring to the potentially dangerous political ambitions of his other two sons.\textsuperscript{182} That is, when Seneca wrote this preface, sometime under Tiberius, Gaius, or even the first year of Claudius’s reign, the Spaniard could take for granted that, for Romans seeking political success, rhetorical education and declamation were normal objects of study. This does not look so different from Pompey’s motivations when he studied declamation to resist Gaius Scribonius Curio in 50 BCE—nearly 100 years earlier. Whether dealing with Pompey, Cicero, or Seneca, whether under the Republic or the Principate, we can find a shared belief: that, one way or another, political success depended on the control of *rhetoric*. We will find this idea again as we turn next to Quintilian and the Flavians.

\textsuperscript{181} Fairweather 1981, 14.

\textsuperscript{182} In the section of *Contr. 2 pr.* 4 contained within the ellipsis in the quotation above. On *Contr. 2 pr.* 3–4, see Griffin 1972, 9; Vassileiou 1973; Fairweather 1981, 11–14.
Chapter 4: Quintilian in Context

In chapter one, I argued for a new baseline for assessing the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power at Rome. Rather than being harshly suppressed or rejected wholesale by Rome’s governing aristocracy, we saw how some of the most significant members of the ruling elite embraced the new discipline during its first generation at Rome. This period witnessed the beginning of a close relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power. In chapter two, I explored a different aspect of this relationship. There, I argued that Cicero provided a justificatory narrative for rhetoric that articulated its value precisely for an audience of governing aristocrats. Throughout his *rhetorica*, Cicero held that rhetoric offered the means for the governing elite to advance their own interests and those of the Republic, and where rhetoric flourished, civic society flourished. In Cicero’s hands, rhetoric was presented as the political discipline *par excellence*. But what happened to the relationship between this kind of education and political power when Rome underwent a political revolution? In chapter three, by studying the elder Seneca’s anthology of declamation, I demonstrated prosopographically that Latin rhetorical education maintained a close relationship with Roman political power under Augustus and Tiberius. Thus, the relationship that was inaugurated in the late Republic survived into the empire.

With these arguments in place, we are now in a position to turn to Quintilian situation and his *salarium* from Vespasian. Typically viewed as a novelty and a departure from tradition, we now have the diachronic background necessary to reassess to what
extent Quintilian’s situation was new, and to what extent it was a continuation of what preceded. Furthermore, while the best available explanations of why Quintilian received a salarium focus on the emperor’s generosity, this study has already revealed how the discipline of rhetoric positioned itself to appeal precisely to the rulers of Rome by suggesting that it had a great deal to offer this audience. In the present chapter, I examine these threads in tandem to help understand Quintilian’s situation.

Following a brief introduction to Quintilian and his work in §4.1, in §4.2 I argue that claims about the novelty of Quintilian’s situation ought to be considerably qualified. As mentioned, treatments of Quintilian and his salary typically emphasize that he was the first Latin rhetor to receive state support and a salarium from a Roman emperor.1 But such claims seldom appear alongside investigation of historical antecedents.2 I argue that examining Quintilian within his social context reveals that he is not a particularly exceptional case, but rather appears consistent with previously known examples of Latin rhetors with regard to their links to those who hold political power at Rome. This historical perspective on this relationship—unavailable in previous studies—helps us recognize the continuity involved in Quintilian connections to political power under the Flavians.

Yet the fact remains that with Quintilian and Vespasian there was something new, namely the salarium of 100,000 HS. This is the focus of §4.3. I begin (§4.3.1) by reviewing the ancient sources for the salarium, before turning next (§4.3.2) to examine previous accounts of the salarium in the scholarly literature. The best available explanation draws on euergetism, contending that Quintilian’s salarium should be seen

1 See Kraus 2014, 126–27 for a representative sample of such statements.
alongside other examples of imperial benevolence—bread, circuses, general largesse—as a proclamation of the emperor’s virtues, and above all his liberalitas. Despite the attractiveness of this model I argue that this explanation is incomplete. First, the liberalitas of the emperor is too broad of an explanation, as almost any beneficial public act can be attributed to this; liberalitas is more of a category than an explanation. Further, the particular nature of what the emperor “gave” Quintilian, a salarium, suggests that this was no indiscriminate largesse. Salaria were annual remunerations typically given to those who, like provincial governors and imperial secretaries, performed some useful service for Rome and its emperor. As such, an explanation of a salarium will need to take into account both sides of this relationship—the emperor and the recipient of the salarium. What is needed is a model that accounts for the reciprocity involved in such relationships.

In §4.3.3, I fill this gap by examining in what sense a Latin rhetor might have been perceived as a useful contributor to Rome and therefore deserving of a salarium. Here, I return to the justificatory narrative that was the focus of chapter two, and show how this narrative remained potent at the beginning of the high empire. In Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria we meet Cicero’s justification again, now recreated and fortified at the hands of the Flavian rhetor. This narrative provides an explanation for why teaching rhetoric could be perceived as an activity that merited a salarium. Once again, the rhetoric’s utility for political life becomes central.

Thus, §4.2 and §4.3 combine to further our understanding of the relationship between Quintilian and Vespasian and the related salarium. This relationship continued over 150 years of connections between Latin rhetors and Roman political power. The
salarium came as remuneration for an activity that, as Quintilian and his predecessors emphasized, provided the means for political success and civic stability. §4.4 summarizes the findings in this chapter while offering some further thoughts about the relationship between the two threads of the argument.

§4.1 The life and work of Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, briefly

We can start by introducing the subject of the present chapter, Quintilian, together with his major work, the Institutio Oratoria. Since many of Quintilian’s personal connections are discussed in §4.2 below, these will just briefly be considered here. Despite being a figure of some celebrity in antiquity, and one that has left us with a substantial surviving literary work that includes a number of biographical details, there remain, in fact, many questions concerning Quintilian’s life. He, like the central figure of the previous chapter, had his origins in Hispania, in Quintilian’s case at Calagurris in Tarraconensia. We do not know when he was born, but ca. 35 CE should be close to the truth. Despite frequent

3 Bibliographic surveys of our author can be found in Cousin 1962 (covering 1935–1959, with further references to earlier surveys 1901–1936 in the Jahresberichte über die Fortschritte der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft) and Adamietz 1986. Relevant material also appears in Rayment 1958 and 1964.

4 On Quintilian’s life, see RE VI.2:1845–64 (Schwabe), which includes the relevant ancient testimonia and has naturally been very useful in my account here; PIR² F 59; BNP s.v. “Quintilianus” (Dingel); Kaster 1995, 333–36; Peterson 1891, i–xiii; Colson 1924, ix–xx; Cousin 1931 with Cousin 1975, 1:vii–xxxix; Kennedy 1969, 11–30; Clarke 1967; McDermott and Orentzel 1979; Russell 2001, 1:1–4.

5 Quintilian’s origins were once the subject of some debate, but the alternative, birth at Rome, claimed in the anonymous humanist vita (see in Fernández López 1999, 133–34) and followed by numerous scholars in the nineteenth century (cf., e.g., Driesen 1845, 4–7), has now fallen out of favor. His ascription to Calagurris is grounded in Jerome’s testimony in Chron. 190 Helm = Suet. DGR fr. 7 Kaster, and Contra Vigilantium 1 = Migne, PL 23:355. On Jerome’s knowledge of Quintilian, see Luebeck 1872, 213–20; Hagendahl 1958, 196–202, 294–97, as well as Auson. Prof. 1.7.

6 As in, e.g., RE VI.2:1847; BNP s.v. “Quintilianus”; Kaster 1995, 334. Cousin 1931 argued for the earlier part of that decade, ca. 30 CE and Kennedy 1969, 15 the later part, ca. 40. Cf. Colson
claims to the contrary, we do not know more about his father than what is stated at Inst. 9.3.73, where Quintilian seems to suggest that his father was familiar with declamation. Generally assumed to have been an equestrian, there is evidence that Quintilian hoped to leverage his success and connections to advance his family’s position in Roman society, and position his son for entrance into the senate. There is no evidence that Quintilian ever entered that body himself, but he was awarded _ornamenta consularia_ late in life.

As to his early life and education, a note by the scholiast to Juvenal 6.452 makes Quintilian the student of the grammarian Remmius Palaemon. If correct, this should place Quintilian at Rome at a fairly early age. His stay at Rome seems to have been sustained into his 20s. For example, Quintilian reports that he admired and followed Gnaeus Domitius Afer (see further in §4.2.1 below), when Afer was an old man and Quintilian a youth (Inst. 5.7.7; 12.11.3). Tacitus places Afer’s death in 59 CE (Ann. 14.19). Similarly,

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7 Following Russell 2001, 4:143 n. 147 for the declamation theme. The Quintilianus in Sen. _Contr._ 10 pr. 2, routinely identified as Quintilian’s father since the humanists, is in all probability Sextus Nonius Quintilianus and of no relation to Marcus Fabius: see above on p. 178, n. 165. His disentanglement from the Fabii and reunion with the Nonii should be counted among the advances made possible only by the advent of prosopographical methods.

8 _Inst._ 6 pr. 13: Quintilian’s son was adopted by a consular family and betrothed to the daughter of a _praetor_, who was then also his uncle, meaning that his adopted father was the brother or brother-in-law of the _praetor_. The passage has some textual problems, discussed in Winterbottom 1970, 101–102.

9 Attested only in Auson. _Grat. Act._ VII.31 (on which, see Green 1991, 544). On _ornamenta consularia_, see _RE_ XVIII.1:1110–22 (Borzsák); _BNP_ s.v. _ornamenta_ (Eck); Talbert 1984, 366–70; Stein 1927, 272–75. For intellectuals in this period receiving the _ornamenta_, note also C. P. Jones 1971, 29–30.

10 _Schol. ad Juv._ 6.452: _Pal(a)emonis arte(m): grammatici, magistri Quintiliani oratoris_. The value of this has been doubted by, e.g., McDermott and Orentzel 1979, 10 and Kaster 1995, 230, 334, on the grounds that it could be an inaccurate conjecture by the scholiast, perhaps on the basis of Quint. _Inst._ 1.4.20. Quintilian’s silence in that passage regarding tutelage under Palaemon does not seem to me decisive, since Quintilian is discussing the parts of speech there, not his autobiography. Kaster questions where a late antique scholiast could have found this information, but Schwabe in _RE_ VI.2:1848 offers the (in my view) plausible suggestion that this information might have originated in Suetonius’s treatment of Quintilian at the end of _DGR_.

1924, x: “The commonly accepted date of c. 35 is perhaps good enough for a central point, but ‘circum’ must be interpreted elastically.”
Quintilian seems to attest to having been witness to the *de repetundis* trial against Cossutianus Capito, which took place before the senate in 57 (Inst. 6.1.14; Tac. Ann. 13.33, 16.21).

But at some point Quintilian seems to have gone back to Hispania. He was certainly there when Servius Suplicius Galba brought him back from the province to Rome late in 68 CE. But if Galba’s stay at Rome was brief, Quintilian remained longer. He was presumably still there when Vespasian offered him a *salarium*, apparently sometime after spring–summer 71. If his *salarium* was similar to *salaria* for rhetors under the Antonines, it would have tethered Quintilian geographically to Rome. Regardless, Quintilian was a sufficiently conspicuous figure in the City for Martial to address him as “the glory of the Roman toga” (2.90.2: *gloria Romanae, Quintiliane, togae*), in a book of epigrams that was published probably sometime late in 86 or early in 87, while Martial was himself still at Rome.

While in the City, Quintilian worked as an advocate and a rhetor. Regarding his forensic activities, Quintilian testifies that he was already pleading cases as a young man. He spoke in the trial of a certain Naevius Arpinianus, whose wife had perished from a fall. Quintilian tells us that he published the speech he wrote for this trial, and that this was the only speech for which he produced a published version, driven by a “youthful desire for glory” (Inst. 7.2.24: *iuvenali cupiditate gloriae*). Still, other versions of his

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11 Jer. Chron. 186 Helm = Suet. DGR fr. 7 Kaster: M. Fabius Quintilianus Romam a Galba perducitur—discussed further below in §4.2.3.1.
12 Suet. Ves. 17–18; Zonar. 11.17 = D. C. 61.12.1a, which provides the date; Jer. Chron. 190 Helm = Suet. DGR fr. 7 Kaster. All three passages discussed further in §4.3.1 below.
13 For Antonine salaries and geographical tethering, see Avotins 1975. On Quintilian’s *salarium*, see further in §§4.3.1–4.3.2 below. Colson 1924, xvi wonders whether Quintilian might have split his career between Rome and Hispania.
14 On Mart. 2.90, see C. A. Williams 2004, 269–74, with p. 5 for the date of book two.
speeches, recorded by short-hand writers (notarii), were in circulation, though Quintilian tries to distance himself from these unauthorized versions of his actiones.\(^{15}\) We might imagine that the interest in unauthorized editions of Quintilian’s speeches testifies to his stature in contemporary forensic oratory.\(^{16}\) At any rate, Quintilian’s highest-profile “case” seems to have been his defense of Titus’s lover Iulia Berenice, sometime between 75 and 81.\(^{17}\)

But if Quintilian was regarded as an effective and successful orator, he was more famous, then as now, because of his role as an educator of orators. He tells us at the opening of his monumental treatise on rhetorical education, the Institutio Oratoria, that he had spent twenty years teaching (1 pr. 1: per viginti annos erudiendis iuvenibus). Of his students during this time, we know only the younger Pliny with certainty.\(^{18}\) Two others are known from after his retirement, when he was recalled from quies by Domitian to teach the emperor’s grandnephews, then heirs to the empire.\(^{19}\) We also know that Quintilian wrote at least one other rhetorical work, his lost de Causis Corruptae Eloquentiae,\(^{20}\) and two libri artis rhetoricae were already in circulation under his name when the Institutio was published. These other artes, we hear, were the products of excerpters and enthusiastic students, drawn from different lectures.\(^{21}\) Also ascribed to

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15 Fragments, or rather testimonia, of Quintilian’s actiones are collected in Meyer, ORF\(^2\), 594–98; see also Kennedy 1969, 20–22.
16 Cf. the discussion by Seneca in §3.1 above, concerning the falsely attributed commentarii of declaimers circulating under the Julio-Claudians.
17 Inst. 4.1.19 with further below in §4.2.3.2.
18 See Plin. Ep. 2.14.9 and 6.6.3 together with Sherwin-White 1966, 183, 362. I see no grounds for occasional claims that Quintilian was involved in the education of Tacitus and Juvenal, but a case is made below for adding two students to the roster of known alumni: see below, p. 215 n. 66.
19 Quint. Inst. 4 pr. 1–5; cf. 6 pr. 1. See further in §4.2.3.2 below.
20 See Brink 1989.
21 Inst. 1 pr. 7, following Colson 1924, 5 that pueri here are slave notarii.
Quintilian are the so-called Declamationes Minores. This was a collection of 388 declamation themes (only 244–388 have survived transmission) with model speeches, and, occasionally, accompanying sermones that suggest how a particular thema ought to be handled. This collection, unlike the 19 much longer and falsely attributed Declamationes Maiores, may well have its origins in Quintilian’s teaching practices.22

But it is the Institutio that will be our chief interest in this chapter. It is a work that today is more used than read, although it has had a rich tradition of enthusiasts since its recovery in full by Poggio Bracciolini in December 1416.23 Martin Luther, for example, wrote of the work that “for my part, before nearly all other authors I place Quintilian, who instructs us in eloquence while demonstrating it, that is, he teaches in word and by example with the utmost success” (ego prorsus Quintilianum fere omnibus auctoribus praefero, qui simul et instituit, simul quoque eloquentiam monstrat, id est verbo et re docet quam felicissime).24 Theodor Mommsen judged the Institutio to be among the finest works that have survived from Roman antiquity.25 The date of its composition is uncertain, but Quintilian tells us it took him just over two years, with more time spent reading than writing.26 It is generally thought that it was published before 95 (the fall of

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23 Cf. §2.5 above; for the reception of Quintilian in the Renaissance, see Classen 1994; Colson 1924, lxiv–lxxxix; more specific studies in Galand et al. 2010, 155–396.
24 In a Brief to Georg Spalatin, quoted in Colson 1924, lxxii–lxxiii. For the sentiment, cf. Quint. Inst. 3.1.20.
26 Quint. Ep. ad Tryphonem 1.
Flavius Clemens) or 96 (the death of Domitian), but dates as late as 97 or 98 have been proposed. All things considered, sometime in the early-to-mid-90s seems likely.  

As to the content of the work, the *Institutio Oratoria* presents Quintilian’s plan for the education of the ideal orator, from birth to retirement. It stands partially in the tradition of Cicero’s *de Oratore* and *Orator*, works studied in chapter two above. But the *Institutio* departs from this tradition, as it is neither a dialogue nor an epistolary treatise. Although Quintilian owes much to Cicero’s thought and style, the *Institutio* is his own work, grounded in his experiences in advocacy under the empire, together with countless contact hours with students during his long career. It is unparalleled in its comprehensiveness, which is one of its great virtues; in the words of John Henderson: “the *Institutio* is no bijou.” The work offers not only an extensive and complete ancient rhetorical system (*ars*), but also the educational preliminaries Quintilian deems fundamental to success in that system, as well as recommendations for a trained orator in his later career. Both the early education material and the treatment of retirement are highlighted by Quintilian for their originality. As for the structure of the work, in 1891 W. Peterson remarked that “the plan of the *Institutio Oratoria* cannot be better given than in the author’s own words”—and I do not feel compelled to disagree. In the preface to book one, discussing the pursuit of “perfected eloquence” (*consummata eloquentia*), Quintilian argues that there is nothing about the nature of human ability that *a priori*
forbids its attainment, and he proceeds to lay out the structure of his work (Inst. 1 pr. 20–21)\textsuperscript{31}:

> Quod si non contingat, altius tamen ibunt qui ad summa nitentur quam qui praesumpta desperatione quo velint evadendi protinus circa ima substiterint. Quo magis impetranda erit venia si ne minora quidem illa, verum operi quod instituimus necessaria, praeteribo. Nam liber primus ea quae sunt ante officium rhetoris continebit. Secundo prima apud rhetorem elementa et quae de ipsa rhetorices substantia quaeruntur tractabimus. Quinque deinceps inventioni (nam huic et dispositio subiungitur), quattuor elocutioni, in cuius partem memoria ac pronuntiatio veniunt, dabuntur. Unus accedet in quo nobis orator ipse informandus est: ubi qui mores eius, quae in suscipientis discendis agendis causis ratio, quod eloquentiae genus, quis agendi debeat esse finis, quae post finem studia, quantum nostra valebit infirmitas disseremus.

But if this should not happen, still those men will go higher who strive for the peak than those who, assuming the hopelessness of reaching their objective, will have remained settled at the bottom. For this reason all the more will forgiveness be sought if I do not even pass over those details that are rather small but necessary for the work that we are commencing. For the first book will contain matters that precede the rhetor’s task. In the second book, we will treat the first principles at the school of the rhetor and questions that arise about the very essence of rhetoric. Then five books will be given for invention (for arrangement

\textsuperscript{31} On this passage, see further below in §4.3.3.2.
is also connected to this), and four for style, which includes memory and delivery. One book will be added in which we need to sketch the orator himself: where we will discuss—to the extent that our inadequacy holds out—what kind of habits he has, his rationale in undertaking, studying, and pleading cases, his type of eloquence, what should be the end of his career, and what studies he should pursue after his retirement.

Such is the ambition and structure of the *Institutio Oratoria*. While Cicero’s *rhetorica* helped us understand the relationship between *eloquentia* and political power under the Republic in chapter two, and Seneca’s anthology became our focus under the Julio-Claudians in chapter three, Quintilian’s work will be our guide for the onset of the high empire. Since it is Quintilian’s particular relationship with political power that is of interest, the survival of the *Institutio* is especially fortuitous: we have arguments about this very relationship from a man who was a central part of it. As we will see, Quintilian’s arguments will build on Cicero’s justificatory narrative that we explored in chapter two. But the *Institutio*, combined with other ancient testimony, also provides some information about Quintilian’s social connections, and allows us to build on the prosopographical analyses in §1.3 and chapter three above. Before turning to Quintilian’s arguments in the *Institutio*, we can start by considering his friends.
§4.2 Quintilian and Vespasian: An argument for continuity

It is especially common when discussing Quintilian and his *salarium* to underline the novelty of this situation, Quintilian’s exceptionalism, but there is seldom interest in seeking out historical antecedents.\(^{32}\) This raises the question: is Quintilian’s relationship with the Flavians really something new? Leveraging the diachronic research in the preceding chapters, I argue that, aside from the *salarium* itself (see §4.3 below), there is nothing particularly remarkable about Quintilian’s relationship with the people who wield political power—when the relationship is considered from a historical perspective. Quintilian’s case looks quite comparable to the close-knit connections between Latin rhetors and the governing aristocracy that we have seen previously. What we have, then, is continuity rather than any about-face.

Methodologically, my argument here depends, as in chapter three, on prosopography. By accumulation of examples and comparison with other known cases, we can recognize continuity in Quintilian’s social connections. As in chapter three, I should alert the reader that the prosopographical method makes narrative *perspicuitas* more difficult, and that “the reader who is repelled by a close concatenation of proper names must pass rapidly over certain sections…”\(^{33}\) I have tried to mitigate some of the presentational difficulties by divisions.

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\(^{32}\) The doxography compiled in Kraus 2014, 126–27 seems to me sufficient to demonstrate the first point; the second point is confirmed by checking the original passages of his citations. Even in Kennedy 1969, 19 and Kennedy 1972, 489, where Kennedy expresses interest and acknowledges historical antecedents, there is no attempt at a thorough investigation.

\(^{33}\) Syme 1939, vii.
First, although I argue here for continuity, there is a chronological gap in my overarching narrative between the Tiberian aristocracy in chapter three and the Flavians in the present chapter. In fact, Quintilian’s relationship with one of the premier orators of the previous generation, Domitius Afer, helps bridge this gap (§4.2.1). Having established a direct line of continuity with the Julio-Claudians, I then consider Quintilian’s relationship with Rome’s governing aristocracy. Imagining imperial political power as a kind of circle, with the emperor in the middle, surrounded by concentric rings through which a share of his influence is diffused, I start from the outside and work towards the center. In chapter three, we saw numerous examples of members of the Augustan and Tiberian aristocracies with a strong interest in declamation and connected to Latin rhetors. Was Quintilian connected to such individuals? §4.2.2 answers in the affirmative by examining Quintilian’s connections to two figures, the dedicatee of the *Institutio*, Marcus Vitorius Marcellus, and the younger Pliny, who self-identifies as one of Quintilian’s students. Finally, one of the significant finds of earlier prosopographical work in this study has been to find figures near the center of political power—Cicero, Pompey, Antony, Octavian, later Augustus—also connected to Latin rhetors. Quintilian’s connections very much fit into this mold (§4.2.3). I begin by considering Quintilian’s relationship with Galba (§4.2.3.1), who as a provincial governor is further paralleled by figures we examined in chapter three, followed by Quintilian’s involvement with Titus and Domitian (§4.2.3.2). As the founding Flavian, Vespasian, will be at the center of the investigation of Quintilian’s *salarium* in §4.3, treatment of his connection to Quintilian is postponed until that section. What emerges from this investigation is that Quintilian appears as another example of a Latin rhetor in the imperial court, conforming to the
outlines that I traced earlier in this study. Examined from the point of view of his social context, Quintilian clearly represents continuity with what preceded rather than a major change. Thus, the _salarium_ appears as a further step rather than an about-face in policy.

§4.2.1: A Julio-Claudian connection: Gnaeus Domitius Afer

Though Seneca may have been writing as late as the beginning of Claudius’s reign, the examination of his anthology in chapter three was limited chronologically up to the reign of Tiberius. In moving to Quintilian now, I am, therefore, passing over Latin rhetors under Gaius, Claudius, and Nero. Partially this gap is related to the nature of the evidence. There is no major text for this earlier period that would allow us to interrogate the state of Latin rhetoric in a manner comparable with the _rhetorica_ of Cicero, Seneca’s anthology, or Quintilian’s _Institutio_. That said, on the basis of our surviving evidence, we can expect that the reigns of the last three Julio-Claudians did not witness dramatic changes in the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power. To start with, there were still famous Latin rhetors during this period. We have reason to believe that in Suetonius’s _DGR_ no fewer than six illustrious rhetors bridged the gap between the figures known from Seneca’s anthology and Quintilian: Quintus Curtius Rufus, Lucius Valerius Primanus, Verginius Flavus, Lucius Statius Ursulus, Publius Clodius Quirinalis, and Marcus Antonius Liberalis.  

34 Known from the _index_ to _DGR_, but lost in the text: see Kaster 1995, 2–3, 41–42.

35 For this group, the best and most accessible treatments with further references can be found in Kaster 1995, 331–33, 336–37.
hear, taught the future satirist Persius ca. 46–50 CE and wrote a rhetorical *ars* designed for education that Quintilian sometimes references.\(^{36}\) Without Suetonius’s chapters on these men from *DGR*, we lack information about significant students or political connections, such as we find in the surviving sections of that work. Still, I believe that the patterns we saw in chapter three are unlikely to have changed much in this period. Suetonius in *DGR*, for example, remarks at one point that “in his first year of his rule Nero Caesar gave a public declamation, and had done so twice previously” (25.3: *Nero Caesar primo imperii anno publice, bis quoque antea, declamavit*), a detail that is consistent with Suetonius’s treatment of that emperor elsewhere.\(^ {37}\) The surviving opening of Petronius’s *Satyricon* similarly indicates an interest in declamation under Nero that is consistent with what Seneca presents under the Julio-Claudians.\(^ {38}\)

Furthermore, Quintilian’s own connections allow us to find continuity with the material from early Julio-Claudians. Quintilian’s relationship with Gnaeus Domitius Afer provides the link. His connection with Afer will be familiar from any standard biographical treatment of Quintilian, but since because Tiberian and Claudian orators are not commonly known, we can briefly re-examine the relationship here. By considering Afer, his place in chapter three above, and the evidence for his relationship with Quintilian, we can be confident that the argument for continuity begins with a secure footing.

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\(^{36}\) For the identity of this Q. Curtius Rufus as it relates to *DGR*, see Kaster 1995, 336–37; see further on the dating and identity of the author of the *Historiae Alexandri Magni* in Atkinson 1998, 3451–56. For Verginius Flavus, see *Vita Persi* 4; Quint. *Inst.* 3.1.21; 4.1.23; 7.4.40; 11.3.126; Kaster 1995, 337; cf. Fredrick 2005.


\(^{38}\) Petr. 1–5.
First: Afer. Jerome tells us that Gnaeus Domitius Afer came from Nemausus in Gallia Narbonensis. We know he had a successful political career after coming to Rome: praetor, probably in 25 CE, consul suffectus in 39, and from 49–60 a position as curator aquarum. Afer was also financially successful, and the products of his brickworks have been discovered throughout Latium, and as far south as Pompeii. These brickworks formed part of the inheritance of his adopted sons, who both had distinguished careers under the Flavians. But Afer’s legacy was cemented above all due to his oratory. For example, Quintilian, in his famous “reading list” in Inst. 10, places Afer alongside Iulius Africanus as one of the two “most preeminent” (Inst. 10.1.118: praestantissimi) speakers he had witnessed, and one “whom you would not fear to regard among the ancients” (quem in numero veterum habere non timeas). Quintilian later calls him far and away the greatest orator that he had a privilege to know (12.11.3: longe omnium quos mihi congnoscere contigit summum oratorem Domitium Afrum). It should be noted that Quintilian’s almost uniformly positive assessment contrasts somewhat with that of his younger contemporary Tacitus. Although Tacitus does not deny that Afer was eloquent, in his historical works Afer appears as a vicious delator, and is condemned accordingly.

Chronologically, then, Afer fits with the previous dynasty. And in fact, we have already encountered Afer in chapter three above, among the members of the governing

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39 PIR2 D 126; BNP s.v. “Domitius” III 1 (Schmidt). Significant bibliography on Afer can be found in Balbo 2007, 405, with 405–46 collecting and commenting on testimonia and fragments.
41 Front. Ag. 102; PIR2 C 294; BNP s.v. “Calpurnius” II 21.
44 Syme 1958, 1:327–28; Winterbottom 1964, 92.
aristocracy connected to Latin rhetors by Seneca’s anthology.\textsuperscript{45} There, we met him prosecuting Cestius Pius’s student, Quintilius Varus, in 27 CE, assisted in his attack by Publius Cornelius Dolabella.\textsuperscript{46} Their prosecution may have precipitated the end of Varus’s political career, and Afer had successfully convicted the boy’s mother, Claudia Pulchra, a year earlier. Afer was also connected to Lucius Sallustius Crispus Passienus, the grandson of the Senecan declaimer Passienus. Afer worked alongside this Passienus, together with Decimus Laelius Balbus, in the defense of Lucius Volusensus Catulus, sometime before 37. As Quintilian tells us, their three \textit{insignes orationes pro Voluseno} were in circulation during his youth, and were considered recommended reading (\textit{Inst.} 10.1.24). In short: Afer belonged to the group of rhetors, orators, and political power holders that we met in chapter three.

Quintilian was a follower and admirer of Afer. His relationship with Afer seems to follow the recommendations in \textit{Inst.} 10.5.19–20, that young men, after diligent study of rhetoric’s precepts and sufficient practice in its exercises, should choose a practicing orator as a model to follow and imitate (\textit{oratorem sibi aliquem… deligat quem sequatur, quem imitetur}).\textsuperscript{47} Though Afer is mentioned in the \textit{Institutio} a number of times, two passages from that work and one from Pliny’s \textit{Epistulae} secure their relationship and provide a connection between chapters three and four.

First, at \textit{Inst.} 5.7, Quintilian considers the best way to handle witnesses. The topic is difficult, but important for Quintilian’s ideal of comprehensiveness (5.7.7):

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} See in §3.2 above.
\item \textsuperscript{46} This Dolabella was probably the grandson of the man who studied declamation under Cicero at the end of Republic: see in §§1.3–1.4 above.
\item \textsuperscript{47} Noted by Schwabe in \textit{RE} VI.2:1848.
\end{itemize}
Totum igitur excutiamus locum, quando universam institutionem adgressi sumus.
Sufficiebant alioqui libri duo a Domitio Afro in hanc rem compositi, quem
adulescentulus senem colui, ut non lecta mihi tantum ea sed pleraque ex ipso sint
cognita.

Therefore, let’s examine the whole area, since we have undertaken a complete
education. Otherwise the two books written by Domitius Afer for this purpose
would have sufficed. As a young man I cherished\textsuperscript{48} him in his old age, with the
result that not only have I read these works but I have also learned a good many
of these things from Afer himself.

So far so good: Quintilian was a youthful admirer of Afer and learned from him \textit{viva
voce}, and not through reading alone. Our second passage comes from \textit{Inst.} 10.1.86, where
we find Quintilian, again as a young man, seeking Afer’s literary judgment. The
exchange is suggestive of a disciple-master relationship:

\begin{quote}
Utar enim verbis isdem quae ex Afro Domitio iuvenis excepi, qui mihi
interroganti quem Homero crederet maxime accedere ‘secundus’ inquit ‘est
Vergilius, proprior tamen primo quam tertio.’
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{48} \textit{TLL} s.v. \textit{colo} flags our passage on textual grounds as a \textit{locus incertus}, but it seems well
established in present critical editions (the alternative \textit{vidi} written \textit{in rasura} by a ninth-century
corrector seems to have little to commend itself). This case should probably find its place in \textit{TLL}
V.A.1.a.\alpha: \textit{i. q. venerari, humana, homines vivos, generatim, homines ipsos}. 

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For let me quote the same words which I heard in my youth from Domitius Afer. When I asked him who he believed came closest to Homer, he said “Vergil is second, but closer to first than third.”

This seems to point in the same direction: we can see young Quintilian, clinging to the side of famous orator, cherishing his precepts and recommendations. Our third passage comes from the younger Pliny. At Ep. 2.14.9, Pliny begins to report a story attributed to his former teacher, Quintilian (ita certe ex Quintiliano praeceptore meo audisse me memini), concerning Afer and the uninhibited Larcius Licinus. The opening alone is sufficient to make the point. Pliny begins: “Quintilian was saying: “I used to cling to Domitius Afer…” (Narrabat ille: ‘Adsectabar Domitium Afrum…’). The use of adsector here is indicative of precisely the relationship suggested by our previous two passages, and the significance of this word is well brought out by comparing a passage by Pliny’s friend, Tacitus. Towards the beginning of his Dialogus de Oratoribus, introducing two of his interlocutors, Marcus Aper and Iulius Secundus, Tacitus explains (Dial. 2.1):

…Marcus Aper et Iulius Secundus, celeberrima tum ingenia fori nostri, quos ego utrosque non modo in iudiciis studiose audiebam, sed domi quoque et in publico adsectabar mira studiorum cupiditate et quodam ardore iuvenili…

…Marcus Aper and Iulius Secundus, then the most renowned talents of our forum, both of whom I not only used to eagerly listen to in court, but I also used to cling
to at home and in public, with an incredible desire for my studies and a certain youthful flame…

This passage puts Pliny’s testimony to the relationship between Quintilian and Afer in sharp relief: the force of *adsectabar* in both is clear. As a result, we can see Quintilian with Afer, following him to the forum, asking him questions, studying his speeches and the rhetorical works, trying to learn from the man who had gained such a reputation for eloquence, and who secured for himself “an enduring portion of fame” (Tac. *Dial*. 13.3: *perpetuitate famae*). Domitius Afer was well connected to the so-called “noisy menagerie” that we studied in chapter three, in which we met provincial governors, victorious generals, incumbents with lineages both ancient and yet-to-be-written, and the *princeps* himself. Though Quintilian was not yet an active member of this group, his connection with Afer indicates that we should also not think that young Quintilian was separate from this world. He was there, listening, taking notes, practicing declamation. And our understanding of Quintilian’s relationship with political power after his advent as one of Rome’s practicing advocates and the foremost rhetor in the City should, therefore, be understood in line with the situation that preceded it. Keeping this in mind allows us to see that Quintilian’s relationship with the Flavians did not emerge *ex nihilo*, but was another example of what was already a common arrangement at that point.
§4.2.2: Quintilian, Marcus Vitorius Marcellus, and Gaius Plinius Caecilius

Secundus

In his youth, Quintilian was, therefore, already connected to the world of Latin rhetors and political actors with which we are now well acquainted. But what about during his career as a rhetor? Previously in this study, we have seen Latin rhetors working with a wide range of figures that were seeking to obtain or maintain a share of political power, from consuls to parvenus. Is there a similar population connected to Quintilian? The present section answers this question. It should be noted at the outset, though, that in searching for such connections, we have a significantly different—and more limited—body of evidence at our disposal compared to earlier periods. For example, for the early-period Latin rhetors during the Republic, Suetonius’s *DGR* provided us with notice of their famous students—but Suetonius’s chapter on Quintilian is now lost to us. For the Julio-Claudian period, Seneca’s anthology offered a generous mass of rhetors and oligarchs to explore—but the *Institutio* is different. While Quintilian does mention some personal connections in the *Institutio*, about his students, for example, he seldom offers particulars. References to *boni iuvenes* (1 pr. 7) and the like are typically the best we can do from Quintilian’s treatise. As a result, our evidence is more limited, yet we still have enough to make some progress.

One relationship that Quintilian flags as particularly important is his friendship with Marcus Vitorius Marcellus, the dedicatee of the *Institutio*. Marcellus provides the first case study: I begin by considering his connection to Quintilian, his position in the Flavian aristocracy, and his attainments in eloquence. A very suitable comparison from the Julio-Claudian period is available to demonstrate that Quintilian and Marcellus are
yet another instantiation of the kind of social connections well known now from the “demoniac legion.” Considering the case of Pliny and Quintilian allows us to gain confidence in this picture. As a result, what we find here looks familiar from the results of chapter three above: figures of political ambition and varying degrees of success connecting themselves with masters of Latin rhetoric.

The relationship between Marcus Vitorius Marcellus and Quintilian is established early in the *Institutio*. In the preface to book one, following a brief *captatio benevolentiae* and description of the scope of his project, Quintilian dedicates his *magnum opus* (*Inst.* 1 pr. 6):

Quod opus, Marce Vitori, tibi dicamus, quem cum amicissimum nobis tum eximio litterarum amore flagrantem non propter haec modo, quamquam sint magna, dignissimum hoc mutuae inter nos caritatis pignore iudicabamus, sed quod erudiendo Getae tuo, cuius prima aetas manifestum iam ingenii lumen ostendit, non inutiles fore libri videbantur…

We dedicate this book to you, Marcus Vitorius, whom we judge to be not only our closest friend but also a man burning with an outstanding love of literary work—not for these reasons alone, great as they are, do we judge that you are the most deserving of this symbol of mutual affection between us, but because the books seemed like they would not be without use for education your Geta, whose first period of life reveals already a clear light of natural ability…
Thanks to Quintilian and other sources, particularly Statius, who dedicates book four of his *Silvae* to the same man, we know quite a bit about Marcellus. Quintilian’s dedicatee, born *ca.* 63, hailed from Teate and the Marrucini. At Rome, he made a successful career for himself. Joining the ranks of the senate as *quaestor* in the late 80s, Marcellus was praetor in 95, and in the following year Domitian appointed him as *curator viae Latinae*.

In a poem dedicated to Marcellus, Statius predicts a military position to follow his curatorship (*Silv.* 4.4.61–73), and as H.-G. Pflaum has shown, we have a number of examples from the following century of this post leading to subsequent appointments as *legatus legionis*. But for Marcellus there is a gap in our knowledge of his career until his suffect consulship in 105. It seems likely that he finished his career by governing Africa Proconsularis in 120/1.

Once again, then, we find a connection between a Latin rhetor and a member of the governing aristocracy, now in the high empire. In addition, in Marcellus we find further evidence that his attainment of a share of political influence went hand-in-hand with his attainments in eloquence. Though Quintilian says little about this, Statius goes on at some length about Marcellus’s abilities in oratory. In a verse epistle written to Marcellus, Statius’s comments on the lack of court activity in July bloom into praise of his addressee’s forensic attainments (4.4.39–45):

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49 *PIR* 2 V 763; *RE Suppl.* IX, s.v. “Vitorius” 2 (Hanslik); Pflaum 1967, 343–46; White 1973, 279–82; B. W. Jones 1979, 121 = no. 309; Syme 1980a, 4–6 = *RP* 3:1305–1306; Salomies 1982; Coleman 1988, 135–38; *BNP* s.v. “Vitorius” 2 (Eck); Salomies 2005, 261. Marcellus is mentioned several times in the *Institutio*, especially at significant junctions in the prefaces: *Ep. ad Tryph.* 1; *Inst.* 1 pr. 6; 4 pr. 1; 6 pr. 1; 12.11.31.

50 Coleman 1988, 135–38 plausibly makes Marcellus 32 years-old in 95.

51 I follow the chronology set out by Coleman 1988, 135–38; other proposals will shift the early dates a bit, but not my overall argument.

52 Pflaum 1967, 343–44.

Truly Latin laws no longer quarrel, and the slow year is at peace, and the harvest, come round again, has discharged the forum: nor now is there a mob of defendants in your fore-court, nor do complaining clients demand that you come out; the spear, guide of the hundred judges, is idle, by which already now your most renowned eloquence is eminent with exalted fame, and surpasses your youthful years.

In these verses, we find a relationship between Marcellus’s *facundia* and his *fama*, a reputation won from pleading in the centumviral court. Further, Marcellus’s political ambitions were not limited to his own career. Quintilian’s mention of Marcellus’s young son, Geta, in *Inst.* 1 pr. 6 also points to Marcellus’s efforts to set up his family for sustained political success. This worked in the case of Geta, who grew up to become Gaius Vitorius Hosidius Geta.54 His father had married a certain Hosidia, the daughter of

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54 *PIR²* V 762; *RE Suppl.* IX, *s.v.* “Vitorius” 1 (Hanslik); Scheid 1990, 53, 379–84 = no. 92.
Gaius Hosidius Geta. Grandfather Geta had been granted *ornamenta triumphalia* after his legionary legateship in Britain under Claudius, and his brother Gnaeus had been *consul suffectus* in 47 CE. Marcellus’s son thus had the backing of an already consular family and one that possessed “ancient wealth.” And he did well with these advantages: *quaestor ca.* 114/15, coopted into the Arval Brethren in 118, *praetor ca.* 119/20, *consul suffectus* sometime between 126–30. To what extent the disposal of the *Institutio* in the hands of his father helped the son, of course we do not know; but *facundia*, *fama*, and political success do seem to have been interrelated for his father.

A number of individuals from the Senecan material that we considered in chapter three could be adduced here as parallels for Marcellus and his family. But the most natural comparison is with another *novus homo* from Teate, namely Gaius Asinius Pollio. The comparison is, perhaps, ultimately unflattering to Marcellus, whose career, influence, and *Nachleben* do not match Pollio’s. But there are still enough points of contact for it to be effective. Both Pollio and Marcellus hailed from the lands of the Marrucini and made their way to Rome; both earned a reputation for eloquence and found forensic success; both ultimately climbed the senatorial ladder (albeit Pollio in a rather non-standard way, during the Caesarian years) and became *novi homines*; both capped their substantial careers by governing provinces for Caesars. Both also patronized poets.

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55 See *PIR*² H 217; Birley 1981, 222–24; *BNP* s.v. “Hosidius” 3 (Eck).
56 *PIR*² H 216; *BNP* s.v. “Hosidius” 4 (Eck).
57 Syme 1980b, 72.
59 See in §3.2.2 above.
60 One wonders, without any hope of knowing, to what extent Marcellus’s patronage of Statius might have been related to consciously following in the footsteps of the other major *novus homo* of Teate, Pollio, and his patronage of Vergil, Statius’s Mantuan model (as well as Horace). On Pollio’s poets, see, e.g., White 1993, 226 = Appendix 2A, no. 8 (Horace); 255–56 = Appendix 2E, no. 6 (Vergil).
but what is more important for our purposes is that both crossed paths with the most illustrious Latin rhetors of their day. We found Pollio, for example, alongside the celebrated Latro, Albucius Silus, and Arellius Fuscus, in addition to many lesser rhetors. Marcellus, of course, had Quintilian. Note also that both seem to have regarded Latin rhetorical education as the right choice for their descendants. In Seneca’s anthology, we met Pollio practicing declamation with his grandson, Marcus Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus, and Quintilian’s suggestion that Marcellus might find something of value in the *Institutio* for the education of Geta seems unlikely to have fallen on uninterested ears. Again, Quintilian conforms to the pattern we saw in the Julio-Claudian period (and prior to that) in terms of being a famous rhetor and well connected to politically significant figures.

With the example of Marcellus in mind, we can look for confirmation of this picture by briefly examining the case of Quintilian’s student, the younger Pliny, who very much conforms to this pattern. An equestrian from Novum Comum, Pliny too had come from an Italian town to Rome. After serving as a military tribune with III Gallicae in Syria, Pliny became Domitian’s *quaestor* in 90, *tribunus plebis* in 92, *praetor* in 93, and *praefectus aerarii militaris* from 94–96. He was appointed by Nerva and Trajan to be *praefectus aerarii Saturni* in 98, a post he held until he became *consul suffectus* on 1 September 100; governing Pontus and Bithynia followed.

Like Marcellus, Pliny sought influence and renown through speech, and debuted in the centumviral courts—where Marcellus also made his reputation—at age 18. In terms of eloquence, Pliny surpassed Marcellus. In addition to his extant *Panegyricus* for

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61 For the following, I rely largely on *PIR*² P 490; *BNP* s.v. “Plinius” 2 (Krasser); for more on the relationship between Pliny and Quintilian, see bibliography collected in Whitton 2013, 209.

Trajan, delivered in 100 and the only complete example of Latin oratory between Cicero and Late Antiquity, we have notice of 16 other speeches, with dates between *ca.* 83 (*pro Iulio Pastore*) and 102 (*pro Corellia*).\(^{63}\) While this body of work has had its detractors, it has also certainly had admirers. When Macrobius’s Eusebius, for example, divides oratory into four genres (*Sat. 5.1.7: quattuor... genera dicendi*) and names the best representative of each, *copiosum* goes to Cicero, *breve* to Sallust, *siccum* to Fronto, and *pingue et floridum* to Pliny—though his claims to the title are now, Eusebius says, contested with the advent of Symmachus.\(^{64}\) Similarly, Jerome includes Pliny in a list following Quintilian, Cicero, and Fronto, where the orator from Comum is there highlighted for his *lenitas*.\(^{65}\) At any rate, Pliny is himself not ashamed to boast of his own achievements in the field, citing, for example, his rivalry with Cicero (1.5.12: *est mihi cum Cicerone aemulatio*) and his claims to Demosthenic sublimity (6.33.11, on his *pro Accia Variola: in summa solent quidam ex contubernalibus nostris existimare hanc orationem (iterum dicam) ut inter meas ὑπὲρ Κτησιφῶντος esse*).

Thus, with Marcellus and Pliny we find men eager for a share of imperial power, proud of their forensic successes, and ultimately able to obtain their shares. And, important for the present argument, both were also connected to the premier rhetor of their day.\(^{66}\) Pollio and his rhetorical entanglements offer a particularly apt parallel for

\(^{63}\) On the *Panegyricus*, see, e.g., the studies in Roche 2011 for recent work. For the fragments, see Meyer, *ORF* \(^ {598–604}\) (I have followed the dates given *ad loc.*).

\(^{64}\) One will note that the division does not follow traditional lines: see the generous note in Kaster 2011, 216–217 n. 3.


\(^{66}\) What was the actual relationship between Marcellus and Quintilian? Patron and artist, like Marcellus and Statius? We do not know, and certainty on this issue seems unobtainable. Still, one possibility was suggested in 1962, when Hanslik in *RE Suppl.* IX, s.v. “Vitorius” 2 noted Statius’s praises of Marcellus’s work as a *actor causarum* (attested in *Silv.* 4.4.39–45, quoted above) and wrote of Marcellus: “vielleicht war er Schüler Quintilians.” To his suggestion, I would note that
Marcellus and Quintilian, and Pliny shows that Marcellus’s case is not an isolated one. That we can see such patterns from the little evidence that has survived is telling: more evidence would doubtless lead to more connections. Quintilian, emerging from the world of Latin rhetors and the ruling elite that we examined in chapter three, seems to continue this tradition under the high empire.

§4.2.3: Quintilian in the courts of emperors

The argument now progresses towards the center of Roman political power. In §1.3 above, we saw how Pompey, Antony, Cicero, and Octavian took an interest in Latin rhetors and their discipline. As shown in §3.2.1 above, this interest was then sustained by the juxtaposition of Marcellus with Pliny in the present section adds additional—but still circumstantial—evidence in support of this possibility. Both Pliny (a known student of Quintilian) and Marcellus were originally equestrians from Italian towns who sought senatorial careers. Both were nearly precise contemporaries, with Pliny born ca. 61 or 62 and Marcellus ca. 63. Their ages and objectives would both make it reasonable (but no more than that) to suppose that the two both encountered Quintilian as ambitious prospective orators, seeking training from Rome’s premier rhetor. If that is correct, there are further consequences: Statius in Silv. 4 pr. 10–11 identifies a condiscipulus of Marcellus as a certain Septimius Severus. About this Severus, Statius provides some information in the preface to book four of the Silvae and Silv. 4.5, dedicated to him (see esp. Coleman 1983; 1988, 158–59). Severus was a decorated equestrian, from Lepcis Magna in Libya, who worked as an orator, wrote prose and verse, and had landholdings at Veii. The prosopography is not watertight, but there is reason to believe that this Septimius was the cousin of the grandfather of the future emperor of Rome. Therefore, if one accepts Marcellus as a student of Quintilian, Severus can be added to this group, and Quintilian’s known students increase from 3 to 5. Supposing that much is correct, however, some difficulties remain. For example, it has been noted of Marcellus (Coleman 1988, 135) that although he is a contemporary of Pliny—also active in the centumviral courts, and, just perhaps, one of Pliny’s condiscipuli under Quintilian—it seems strange that he is never mentioned anywhere in Pliny’s letters. If they were condiscipuli and contemporaries, why is there no Marcellus in the Epistulae? Pliny’s letters are not, of course, an objective sample of the people he was in contact with during his career; these are a curated collection, with self-presentation not least among his goals here. And Pliny is very careful about what he says about Domitian, and takes care to keep himself seemingly distant from that regime, despite his role as a participant in Roman government during those years (on this see Flower 2006, 264–70). That Marcellus might similarly have been shunned by Pliny in his published correspondence can be deduced from Peter White’s observation (1973, 281) that “there is no parallel in the Silvae for the way in which Statius speaks of Marcellus’ zeal in serving Domitian.” Marcellus may have been too close to the regime, but, unlike Pliny, not able or willing to write himself out of its history. But, again, certainty on the issue is out of reach.
Augustus, and thus from the very inauguration of Rome’s new political configuration, the emperor had connections to Latin rhetorical education. Nor was Augustus the last emperor to act in this way. His successor, Tiberius, is also connected to rhetorical luminaries in Seneca’s anthology, and the other Julio-Claudian emperors perhaps did not change much in this regard.\textsuperscript{67} Nero’s interests in declamation, for example, have been noted already above. Was this an idiosyncratic fascination limited to Rome’s first imperial dynasty? Or had Latin rhetors obtained a more lasting position in the culture of the imperial court, in the \textit{mos} of the masters of Rome? To demonstrate that the argument for continuity holds even at the nucleus of Roman political power, we need to turn to Quintilian’s connections with emperors.

Quintilian is known to have been directly involved with three \textit{principes}: Galba, Vespasian, and Domitian. Galba will be treated first (§4.2.3.1). This is obviously appropriate chronologically, but, because Quintilian’s involvement with him seems to date from the time that Galba was a provincial governor in Hispania, Galba also provides a suitable bridge between Quintilian’s involvement with men like Marcellus and Pliny, who also obtained provincial governorships, and Roman emperors. In fact, there has been some doubt about Quintilian’s relationship with Galba, and I reconsider that issue here. Following Galba, I turn to the Flavians (§4.2.3.2). However, because Quintilian’s known relationship with Vespasian is entirely connected to the \textit{salarium}, investigation of this pair will be delayed until §4.3 below, the investigation of the \textit{salarium} itself. §4.3.2.3 will thus focus on Quintilian’s relationship with Titus (only briefly as there is no direct connection to Quintilian in our evidence) and Domitian. The argument throughout the

\textsuperscript{67} For Tiberius, see especially in Sen. \textit{Suas.} 3.7; see further in Echavarren 2007b, 161 = no. 148. For imperial interests in eloquence, cf. the opening comments in Orentzel 1981.
section will again be one of continuity: Quintilian’s connections to Galba and Domitian both include features that can be paralleled in the past.

§4.2.3.1: Quintilian and Servius Sulpicius Galba

We can start by considering our source for the connection between Quintilian and Galba. Never mentioned in the *Institutio* or elsewhere, our knowledge of the connection is entirely due to a passage from Jerome’s *Chronicon*, derived from Suetonius’s now-lost chapter on Quintilian in *DGR*. Under the year 68, Jerome notes: “Marcus Fabius Quintilianus is brought to Rome by Galba” (*M. Fabius Quintilianus Romam a Galba perducitur*). But this brief comment well repays careful attention, as it provides a significant parallel for the argument for continuity. As we will see, it has also been the source of some scholarly confusion.

To start: what can we say about the conditions in which Quintilian crossed paths with Galba? Specifics are quite limited. Governing Hispania Tarraconensis as legatus Augusti since 60, Galba was acclaimed emperor on 9 June 68 at Carthago Nova in Hispania Tarraconensis. If Quintilian was, as Jerome indicates, brought back to Rome with the emperor in 68, that means, of course, that Quintilian had been in his native Spain and not at Rome, his last previously known location. Recall that, at Rome, Quintilian says he witnessed Cossutianus Capito’s trial in 57 (§4.1 above). Quintilian further notes that he witnessed Afer speaking in the courts when he was “advanced in old age” (*Inst.* 68 Jer. Cron. 186 Helm = Suet. *DGR* fr. 7 Kaster.

68 See *PIR²* S 1003 on the details of Galba’s life; *BNP* s.v. “Galba” 2 (Eck). For a narrative treatment of the turbulent period 68–69, see *CAH II* 10:256–82 (Wiedemann). For the date of

12.11.3: *valde senem*), and Afer did not live past 59. Accordingly, we have roughly a decade of Quintilian’s life that is undocumented between his last known activity in Rome and his appearance with Galba in Tarraconensis. Many have followed Ludwig Schwabe’s attractive suggestion that Quintilian will have returned to Spain and made himself known to Galba via advocacy work in Tarraco, the provincial capital, rather than actually returning to his hometown, Calagurris.\(^{71}\) This seems quite possible, but is repeated often enough in the literature that it might seem more grounded in evidence than conjectured from silence. We simply do not know Quintilian’s whereabouts and activities during this time.\(^{72}\)

Whatever the precise circumstances that lie hidden behind his notice, Jerome, in showing that Quintilian accompanied Galba as the emperor made the “slow and bloody journey” *(Tac. Hist.* 1.6.1: *tardum... iter et cruentum*) to Rome, seems to place Quintilian among the *comites* that formed Galba’s *cohors* and *consilium*.\(^{73}\) In fact, it has sometimes been thought that Suetonius’s account of the early moments following Galba’s

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\(^{71}\) Cf. Kennedy 1969, 18, who adduces Plu. *Galb.* 4 as evidence for above average litigation in the province in the preceding years.

\(^{72}\) To take one problem with the current best explanation: Quintilian notes that he published his speech in the trial of Nonius Arpinianus because he was “driven by a youthful desire for glory” (*Inst.* 7.2.24: *cuius actionem et quidem solam in hoc tempus emiseram, quod ipsum me fecisse ductum iuvenali cupiditate gloriae fatoer*). This sounds like the youthful action of a rising orator looking to make a name for himself, and it seems to me more plausible that Quintilian would have had the greatest opportunity to earn a reputation by staying at Rome rather than returning to Hispania. Depending on what date we attribute to Quintilian’s birth, he will have been following and working at Rome alongside Afer, the most renowned orator of his day, probably until his mid-20s. If Quintilian was so eager for *gloria*, and had been learning the ropes of the forum with one of its most eloquent figures, what was the motivation to leave Rome for Spain at that point in his career?

\(^{73}\) On Galba’s *iter*, see Murison 1993, 27–30; for his *amici*, see Crook 1955, 48, who does not include our passages, but does quite reasonably make Quintilian “amicus of the Flavians” at p. 164 = no. 145. The presence of Quintilian among the *comites* seems to me to be reasonably inferred here, but without explicit attestation, e.g., *comes Galbae*, he does not appear in the register of *comites Augusti* in Halfmann 1986, 245–53.
proclamation as *imperator* includes notice of this very *cohors*.\textsuperscript{74} At *Galba* 10.2–3, Suetonius describes Galba’s provisioning of local talent in Hispania before setting off. First, Galba conscripted an additional levy of troops that would become the VII Galbiana; he also drew upon local *iuvenes* to form an equestrian bodyguard. But in between, Suetonius reports that “from those foremost in practical wisdom and distinguished by age he formed a body like a senate, to which there could be a referral concerning some important affair whenever need arose” (…*e primoribus prudentia atque aetate praestantibus vel instar senatus, ad quos de maiore re quotiens opus esset referretur, instituit*). Could these men have included Quintilian? At ca. 33 years of age, he presumably would not have been part of those “distinguished by age,” but possibly he could have been numbered among those with *prudentia*. Ronald Syme, at any rate, seems to place Quintilian among this group.\textsuperscript{75} Also perhaps relevant to this point is Plutarch’s notice of Galba’s consultation with his *amici* (4.2: προὔθηκε βουλήν τοῖς φίλοις) following his correspondence with Vindex.

It is at this point where the controversy emerges in the literature. Why would Galba have wanted anything to do with Quintilian? This has remained a minor mystery in previous scholarship on this topic. M. L. Clarke, for example, writes: “…what led him (sc. Galba) to include Quintilian in his train when he set out for Rome we do not know.” Further, for George Kennedy the connection between the two seemed odd enough that he nearly finds grounds for doubting Jerome’s testimony on the matter, and comes close to rejecting the connection as spurious (1962, 134 n. 15):

\textsuperscript{74} E.g., Kennedy 1969, 18; Clarke 1967, 30.
It seems a little strange that so unmilitary a rhetorician would follow Galba in pursuit of empire, and one is tempted to believe that Quintilian came to Rome after the overthrow of Nero and that Jerome or his source has put the facts that Galba was governor of Hither Spain and that Quintilian came from there into a friendship which may never have existed.

Kennedy is clearly cautious here in his language, but his comment raises the question: would negating the existence of a relationship between Quintilian and Galba actually cohere better with our evidence? Contextualizing the relationship helps. I argue here that Jerome’s testimony is absolutely believable.

First, on the basis of the Senecan material in chapter three, we now know that there is no shortage of parallels for men governing provinces and having connections to Latin rhetors. Just using the limited sample of evidence provided by Seneca, it is possible to point to connections with Latin rhetorical education at various times among governors of Gallia Comata, Hispania Ulterior, Syria and Cilicia, Africa, Asia, and Thracia and Macedonia. Two additional cases from the Senecan material are especially apropos, though as far as I know have never previously been adduced as parallels to help understand the relationship between Galba and Quintilian.

Paullus Fabius Maximus was mentioned above in the concluding praeteritio of chapter three (§3.3) as an additional example that could have been explored, but was not considered in detail. Here, let it suffice to say that Maximus, among Augustus’s closest amici, topped off his career with a consulship in 11 BCE before governing Asia between 10–8 and, finally, Hispania Tarraconensis in 3 BCE. Importantly, he too is a known
declaimer in Seneca’s anthology. Thus, not only can we easily parallel imperial provincial governors with connections to rhetors—like Galba—but we can also parallel one who controlled Galba’s province.

The second example is complementary. In the discussion of the rhetor Asilius Sabinus in chapter three, I noted his travel abroad. Seneca explains this as follows: “he (sc. Sabinus) had followed Occius Flamma, the proconsul, into the province of Crete” (secutus erat in provinciam Cretam Occium Flammam proconsulem). The group to which Asilius belonged in Crete is described by Seneca as the comitum cohors. We know next to nothing about Occius Flamma, who seems to have taken up his governorship under Tiberius in the mid-20s. But his case does provide us with a parallel for a provincial governor including a rhetor as part of his entourage. In light of Quintilian’s salarium from Vespasian, to which we shall turn shortly, it is further worth noting of Sabinus that in his function as one of the comites of a provincial governor, the rhetor would have drawn a salarium under normal conditions. Galba’s particular entourage in 68 was

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76 On Maximus, see PIR² F 47; BNP s.v. “Fabius” II 14 (Eck); Syme 1986, 403–420; Echavarren 2007b, 132–33 = no. 110. I consider identification of figure in the Controversiae and Suasoriae with Augustus’s amicus very probable (following PIR² among others), but it should be noted that the identification at Sen. Contr. 10 pr. 10 is doubted in Syme 1978a, 593 = RP 3:1109, though the master of prosopography seems to accept the identification, at least for other loci in Seneca, at Syme 1986, 409. The key passages in Seneca for Maximus’s activity are Contr. 2.4.9; 2.4.11–12; 10 pr. 13.

77 Contr. 9.4.19–20.

78 PIR² O 6; Baldwin 1983, 148–49 = no. 38.

79 Note also that this Asilius Sabinus may have further, relevant, connections to emperors: an Asellius Sabinus appears at Suet. Tib. 42.2, to whom Tiberius gifted (donavit) 200,000 HS “for a dialogue in which he (i.e. Sabinus) had included a contest of a mushroom, a fig-pecker, an oyster, and a thrush.” (in quo boleti et ficedulae et ostreae et turdi certamen induxerat); it is not clear that the reference to a certain Asillius in a letter of Augustus preserved at Suet. Cal. 8.4 should be further related, but this may well be right. See PIR² A 1213.

80 See RE IA.2:1846–47 (Rosenberg); BNP s.v. salarium (de Libero); Corbier 1978, 63–65. The salaries for the comites of governors are typically established with passages like Suet. Tib. 46; Dig. 1.22.4; 50.13.1.8.
organized in anything but normal conditions, but whether that means that remuneration was accordingly ruled out is not obvious.

The result is that contextualizing Quintilian’s connections to political power helps us appreciate the patterns these exhibit with what preceded. Between Maximus in Tarraconensis and Asilius Sabinus in Occius Flamma’s *comitum cohors*, there is nothing particularly unusual about Quintilian being connected to Galba—and certainly no reason to doubt Jerome’s testimony. The argument for continuity accrues additional supporting evidence.

That said, I should address a potential difficulty for this step of the argument before moving on. There have, in fact, been some doubts regarding whether or not Quintilian was in fact *teaching* rhetoric at the time when he joined Galba’s retinue, and if he was not working as a rhetor at this point, this could be an objection against the strength of the parallel with Asilius Sabinus and Occius Flamma. Two considerations, I think, effectively forestall this objection. First, the belief that Quintilian started teaching rhetoric only *after* 68 is grounded in assumptions that are far from secure. Second, the value of a *rhetorical expert*, which Quintilian certainly was, regardless of whether he self-identified as a *rhetor*, can be otherwise paralleled in the service of one of the emperors of 69, and accordingly the question of whether or not Quintilian self-identified as a rhetor in 68 seems less critical. I examine each point in order.

The argument that Quintilian started to teach rhetoric only after 68 can be dealt with briefly and requires no extended discussion. At the beginning of the *Institutio* (1 pr. 1), Quintilian tells us that he retired after twenty years of teaching. Jerome’s *Chronicon* provides entries that discuss Quintilian’s activities at two different chronological points:
in 68, for Quintilian’s arrival at Rome with Galba, and in 88, in a passage that will be considered at length in §4.3.1 below, in which Jerome notes Quintilian’s *salarium*. Among other things, there has been a tendency to note that the interval between 68 and 88 is twenty years, and to consider these dates to be bookends for Quintilian’s teaching career.\(^{81}\) However, it has now been established in the scholarship that Jerome, while he had good reason to date Quintilian’s return to Rome with Galba to 68, probably had no good chronological anchor for the details that he includes in his entry for 88; as a result, he synchronized the latter entry with the entry for 68 by following Quintilian’s own indication of his retirement at *Inst.* 1 pr. 1.\(^{82}\) If that is correct—and I think the evidence is compelling—then the idea that we can date Quintilian’s teaching career between 68 and 88 is based not on any secure evidence, but by Jerome’s unsecured assumptions and convenient synchronization. Thus already over fifty years ago, George Kennedy noted:

Quintilian retired after twenty years of teaching, which would mean between 88 and 90, if one dates from his reported arrival in Rome in 68… *though there is no particular reason to do so.* (Kennedy 1962, 132 n. 10; emphasis mine)

In short, the potential objection that Quintilian was not teaching in 68 is not based on any secure evidence, and therefore has no teeth.

A second point, I think, further secures the argument here. Even supposing that Quintilian did not self-identify *as a rhetor* at the time that he was in Galba’s service, he will still have been a rhetorical expert, with considerable training and facility in

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81 See, e.g., Clarke 1967, 31.
82 See in Helm 1929, 83; *RE* VI.2:1849–50 (Schwabe); Kaster 1995, 334.
eloquentia. And in terms of rhetorical experts finding favor in imperial cohortes, we have an important contemporary parallel for Quintilian’s appearance in Galba’s entourage, namely, Quintilian’s friend and contemporary, Iulius Secundus. If Asilius Sabinus and Occius Flamma provide a vertical parallel for Quintilian and Galba, the relationship between Secundus and another one of the emperors in 69, Otho, provides a kind of horizontal parallel. It has the further virtue of relating to the imminent treatment of Quintilian’s salarium, in §4.3.1 below. We should, therefore, briefly consider the case of Secundus and Otho before moving to the Flavians.

At Inst. 10.3.13, in his discussion of the value of writing for shaping facility, Quintilian includes an anecdote related to him by a certain Iulius Secundus, who is described as “my contemporary and, as is known, dearly loved by me, a man of outstanding fluency and yet boundless care” (aequalem meum atque a me, ut notum est, familiariter amatum, mirae facundiae virum, infinitae tamen curae). Our sources for this Secundus are limited, but consistent. He was among the foremost orators under the Flavians, from a family with a pedigree for eloquence probably originating from Burdigala in Tres Galliae, and Quintilian offers many kind words related to his abilities elsewhere in the Institutio. Apparently equestrian originally, Secundus may have joined the senate via Flavian adlection. This is the same Secundus that we met above in §4.2.1, as one of the orators that Tacitus presents himself clinging to in the opening of the Dialogus. Given his forensic activities, reputation, and floruit, then, it is perhaps not surprising to find Secundus among Quintilian’s acquaintances and friends.

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83 On Secundus, see PIR² I 559; Syme 1958, 2:800; C. P. Jones 1968.
84 For his probable origins in Burdigala, see C. P. Jones 1968, 284–85; for Quintilian’s judgments, see Inst. 10.1.120–21; 12.10.11; cf. Tac. Dial. 2.
85 C. P. Jones 1971, 50.
But Secundus is presently of interest due to his other known associations. For he, like Quintilian, attracted imperial attention in the turbulent years of 68–69. In his Otho, Plutarch discusses Otho’s hurried engagement at Bedriacum against Vitellius’s forces. In one account, Otho’s haste was the product of personal failure: his anxieties were too great to endure, and so he committed himself and his forces to battle. Plutarch cites his source for this version: “Secundus the orator, who had become Galba’s ab epistulis, gave this account” (9.3: τοῦτο μὲν διηγεῖτο Σεκούνδος ὁ ῥήτωρ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν γενόμενος τοῦ Ὅθωνος). As C. P. Jones has demonstrated, it is quite possible that Plutarch met Secundus, perhaps through their mutual friend, Minicius Fundanus, when Plutarch visited Rome under Vespasian. At any rate, Secundus’s position as ab epistulis could have placed him in a unique position to evaluate Otho’s anxieties (through his dispatches) prior to the battle.

Secundus’s position is worth considering here, not because there exists any evidence that proves that Quintilian occupied the same post under Galba, but because it offers a contemporary parallel to Quintilian and Galba, by suggesting how figures like Galba and Otho perceived rhetorical experts like Secundus and Quintilian. The office ab epistulis has itself been the subject of a number of studies, and it is not my intention here to attempt to further uncover its secrets. What is known about it is, in the end, not

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87 For ἐπὶ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν = ab epistulis, see N. Lewis 1981, 160.
89 Looking forward chronologically, note also the case of the Latin rhetor Eumenius of Augustodunum, author of *pro Instaurandis Scholis* = *Pan. Lat.* IX (IV), who drew a *salarium* as the emperor’s *magister sacrae memoriae*. On Eumenius, see Rodgers 1989, with Nixon and Rodgers 1994, 145–50 on the speech.
so much. It was one of a number of “palatine secretariats” that developed from the first century CE onward. At some point, perhaps in the second century, the position may have split into separate offices, *ab epistulis* (*Latinis*) and *ab epistulis Graecis*. As the title suggests, the position seems to have had something to do with the considerable volume of *epistulae* that involved the emperor, but much more than that we can hardly say. Fergus Millar, for example, suggests that the office may have been more concerned with the “custody or dispatch” of imperial communication versus its composition, but also notes of *ab epistulis*: “their role may have been advisory, or supervisory or even essentially honorific… but we do not know.”

While this may seem an unpromising vantage point for understanding the relationship between Quintilian and Galba, *nil desperandum*. Two things that are reasonably secure about the office *ab epistulis* deserve particular mention. First, the imperial secretaries that held positions *ab epistulis* seem to have regularly travelled with emperors. Second, among the known holders of the office, a recurring theme is literary, and especially rhetorical attainments. For the better-attested *ab epistulis graecis*, we also have notice of a number of Greek sophists of the second and third centuries who held

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91 Discussed further below in §4.3.1.
93 There is, in fact, a third parallel with *ab epistulis* and Quintilian, namely changing social rank. The office *ab epistulis* is one of a number of administrative positions that followed a trajectory whereby they were transferred from freedmen to equestrians starting in the later half of the first century CE. As discussed in §1.1 and §1.5 above, early-period Latin rhetors all seem to have been freedmen, but starting with Lucius Rubellius Blandus, born ca. 67–63 BCE, equestrian rhetors emerge; Quintilian is among these.
94 Millar 1992, 79, 224; Stat. Silv. 5.1.75–107, written for Statius’s friend Flavius Abscantus, a freedman of Domitian, describes his dedicatee’s duties in his office *ab epistulis* and is the best description of the actual responsibilities involved, but Statius’s compositional mode there—rather unrestrained and quite enthusiastic, as is not uncommon in the *Silvae*—does not, perhaps, best lend itself to sober reconstruction of official duties. On the poem, see B. Gibson 2006, xxxiv–xxxvi, 71–76 with further commentary *ad loc*.
salaried appointments on the basis of their rhetorical prowess at Athens and Rome. While literary attainments have sometimes been overstated as if they were necessary qualifications for the position, nevertheless literary, and particularly, rhetorical achievement leaves a tangible mark among known incumbents. We do not see any similar cluster of incumbents, for example, whose expertise lies in medicine, philosophy, or agriculture.\footnote{See the clearly argued corrective in N. Lewis 1981.}

Both factors, travelling with the emperor and rhetorical ability, are present with Secundus and Otho and Quintilian and Galba. The result is that we have a parallel for a rhetorical expert working alongside an emperor, whether or not he actually self-identified as a \textit{rhetor} (we have no indication of Secundus falling into this category), and with this further parallel the potential objection seems less critical. But, we should note that the parallel of Secundus and Otho also gestures towards the broader questions to which the present investigation contributes. In Secundus and Otho, we can see what looks like a different manifestation of the way that rhetorical ability and political influence were united at the dawn of the high empire. It is a reminder that Quintilian’s case is not an isolated one, that understanding the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power has the potential, I think, to help illuminate more aspects of antiquity than Quintilian alone. But, to return to Quintilian in the courts of emperors, we need to now consider the survivors of 69.
§4.2.3.2 Quintilian and the younger Flavians

As the case of Quintilian and Galba has already begun to reveal, imperial interest in Latin rhetors was sustained beyond the Julio-Claudian period, and, in fact, what we happen to know about Galba’s connection with Quintilian can be well paralleled on the basis of the investigations in the previous chapters. Does this continuity hold in the next imperial dynasty? What about the Flavians? As noted above, discussion of Vespasian is postponed until §4.3.1 below. Titus and Domitian will be considered here. Titus’s case offers no guaranteed connection, but at least for Quintilian and Domitian, the relationship can be paralleled by previously known connections between Latin rhetors and the governing elite.

We can treat Titus briefly. There is no direct connection between Quintilian and Titus. But there exists an indirect link through Quintilian’s defense of Titus’s paramour, Julia Berenice. The trial in question was mentioned briefly above in the rapid survey of evidence for Quintilian’s advocacy. At Inst. 4.1.19, Quintilian mentions unusual cases where judges preside over cases in which they are themselves somehow implicated (fuerunt etiam quidam suarum rerum iudices). After adducing a parallel in an otherwise unknown actio of Cicero, Quintilian finishes: “and I myself spoke on behalf of Queen Berenice, in the presence of the Queen herself” (et ego pro regina Berenice apud ipsam eam dixi). It is not clear exactly what Quintilian means by this; it is possible that the trial

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97 For discussions of Flavian interests in literature more broadly, see Franchet d’Espèrey 1986 for Vespasian and Titus; Coleman 1986 for Domitian—both with further bibliography. Cf. Bardon 1968, 259–335. For a narrative account of the empire under the Flavians, see CAH² 11:1–83 (Griffin).
98 Berenice’s time in Rome has been the subject of ongoing disagreement in the literature. See, e.g., Crook 1951; Rogers 1980; D. C. Braund 1984; Keaveney and Madden 2003; more recently, Wilker 2016. The key passages are Suet. Tit. 7.2; D. C. 66.15.3–5; 66.18.1 (excerpted by Xiphilinus).
in question involved the emperor’s *concilium* as a judicial tribunal, with Berenice herself included in this body.\(^99\) When did this trial take place? Berenice’s chronology at Rome is somewhat uncertain, but we do have some chronological markers.\(^100\) Left in the East in 71 when Titus hastened back to Rome, Berenice arrived at Rome sometime in 75. There is disagreement in our sources as to what happened next, and scholars are divided as to whether we should reconcile their differences, and how we might do so.\(^101\) Suetonius has Berenice dismissed from the city in 79, when Titus took his father’s place. Dio has her dismissed also in 79, but prior to Vespasian’s death, only to return again after Titus had become emperor (i.e. after 23 June 79). Dio provides no notice of a subsequent departure, but I see little reason for her to have remained in Rome much after Titus’s own death on 13 September 81. Accordingly, relying on the most generous dating of Berenice’s time at Rome, Quintilian could have spoken on her behalf virtually anytime between 75 and 81. At any rate, Berenice was, as it seems, close to Titus—at least before her dismissal from Rome. But any possible connection between Quintilian and Titus must remain indirect, via Berenice—as well as potentially through Titus’s brother and father.

Which brings us to Domitian. Domitian appears in three passages in the *Institutio*, which was composed under his reign.\(^102\) These passages—largely encomiastic of the emperor—have previously attracted significant discussion in the literature. As W. C. McDermott and A. E. Orentzel explain, the controversy that has formed is closely related to a perceived incongruity between Quintilian’s character as revealed by the *Institutio*—

\(^99\) Crook 1951, 169–70; Young-Widmaier 2002; on the passage see also Wilker 2016, 311–14.
\(^100\) For discussions of the chronology, see Crook 1951, 165–72; D. C. Braund 1984; Keaveney and Madden 2003, 39–40. For Berenice, see *PIR*² I 651; *BNP* s.v. “Berenice” 7b (Strothmann).
\(^101\) See literature in preceding two notes, and, on the literary significance of the differences between Suetonius’s account and Dio’s, see MacRae 2015.
\(^102\) On the emperor: *PIR*² F 259; B. W. Jones 1992. The relevant passages of the *Inst.* are 3.7.9; 4 pr. 2–5; 10.1.91–92.
“otherwise invariably manly, honourable, and straightforward” in William Peterson’s words—and the rhetor’s praises of Domitian. Indeed, at least since the end of the 18th century, readers of Quintilian have struggled to accept that this ostensibly morally irreproachable rhetor could have sincerely praised a “bloodthirsty tyrant.” As a result, some have been driven to believe that Quintilian’s political sympathies could not have really resided with the regime. Along these lines, it has been argued that Quintilian was forced to praise Domitian, or that his laudes are so brief that they actually speak against genuine allegiance to the regime, or that “Quintilian’s hyperbole frequently assumes nuances of cool and ironic innuendo.” Of course it is one of the great virtues of literature that it is open to interpretation; ostensibly laudatory passages can therefore be read as covertly subversive or ironic. But the nature of Quintilian’s private thoughts and evaluations of Domitian are less significant for our purposes than Quintilian’s connections to Vespasian’s youngest son. And for these, at least, the evidence is fairly clear.

The crucial passage comes from the preface to Inst. 4. Quintilian opens this book with his second address to his dedicatee, Marcellus. With roughly one quarter of the Institutio complete, Quintilian explains, recent developments have caused there to emerge
“a new cause for care” and “a higher degree of painstaking attentiveness” (4 pr. 1: nova… diligentiae causa et altior sollicitudo). A new charge has raised the stakes of the project (4 pr. 1–3):

Adhuc enim velut studia inter nos conferebamus, et si parum nostra institutio probaretur a ceteris, contenti fore domestico usu videbamus, ut tui meique filii formare disciplinam satis putaremus. Cum vero mihi Domitianus Augustus sororis suae nepotum delegaverit curam, non satis honorem iudiciorum caelestium intellegam nisi ex hoc oneris quoque magnitudinem metiar. Quis enim mihi aut mores excolendi sit modus, ut eos non inmerito probaverit sanctissimus censor, aut studia, ne fefellisse in iis videar principem ut in omnibus ita in eloquentia quoque eminentissimum?

For up to this point we were, so to speak, discussing our studies among ourselves, and if our educational system was little approved by others, we would seem contented by its value in our own homes, since we considered it sufficient to shape the education of your son and mine. But since Domitian Augustus has charged me with the care of the grandsons of his sister, I would not sufficiently recognize this honor of divine judgment, unless I also measure the magnitude of my undertaking from this point. For what should be my limit either in cultivating character, that it be approved of by our most sacred censor, or in cultivating studies, so that in these I do not appear to have failed our sovereign—just as he is so distinguished in all things so also is he in eloquence.
Thus, Quintilian signals that at some point during the composition of the *Institutio* he was summoned out of retirement and charged by Domitian with the care of imperial pupils.\textsuperscript{106} Domitian’s sister in question here was Flavia Domitilla.\textsuperscript{107} The grandsons were the children of her daughter, also Flavia Domitilla, and Titus Flavius Clemens, *consul ordinarius* in 95.\textsuperscript{108} Clemens was Domitian’s cousin, in all likelihood the son of Vespasian’s younger brother. His marriage to Domitian’s niece seems to have been a productive one, producing at least seven children.\textsuperscript{109} But the *nepotes* entrusted to Quintilian are believed to have been the two that Domitian had selected as his successors, called Vespasianus and Domitianus.\textsuperscript{110} Their biological father, Clemens, was executed either during or shortly after his consulship in 95, and their mother was dismissed from Rome.\textsuperscript{111} We do not know what happened to the children after this point. But the upshot is that Quintilian is, once again, found closely connected to the Flavians.

Although the Julio-Claudian material examined above lacks parallels for this exact situation—designated heirs to the empire studying under a Latin rhetor—there are certainly other examples of the progeny of the powerful being shaped by Latin rhetorical education: the son of Quintilius Varus working with the rhetor Cestius Pius, for example, or Gaius Asinius Pollio declaiming with his grandson, Marcus Claudius Marcellus Aeserninus. Seneca himself believed his son Mela should pursue rhetoric, even if his real

\textsuperscript{106} Cf. Giet 1958; Giet 1959.
\textsuperscript{107} *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 417.
\textsuperscript{108} *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 418 (the younger Domitilla); *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 240 (Clemens), on whom, see also B. W. Jones 1992, 47–48. For a stemma Flaviorum, see *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} 3:183 (Stein).
\textsuperscript{109} *CIL* 6.8942 = *ILS* 1839.
\textsuperscript{110} Suet. Dom 15.1; *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 257; *PIR*\textsuperscript{2} F 397.
\textsuperscript{111} Suet. Dom 15.1; D. C. 67.14.1–2. B. W. Jones 1992, 48 with p. 207 n. 118 dates the end of Clemens’s consulship to 1 May 95.
interests lay outside the forum and the *cursus*. In fact, one can even look further back, to the education of young Octavian at the hands of the early-period rhetor, Gaius Epidius. Quintilian, Vespasianus, and Domitianus are now added to these examples; this is another way that Quintilian’s relationship with political power, against a suitably populated backdrop, appears more like a continuation than any radical change.

What then, is the result of our inquiries into Quintilian’s connections with the men who sought to govern Rome’s empire? As we saw in his connection to Domitius Afer, there is personal and historical continuity in Quintilian’s case with what preceded: Quintilian emerged from the Julio-Claudian world in which rhetoric and political power were closely connected, itself a continuation of the relationships between early-period Latin rhetors and the ambitious oligarchs of the late Republic. With Quintilian’s connections to Marcellus and Pliny, we see him connected to the kind of ambitious aristocrats for whom we have more than sufficient parallels with the Julio-Claudian rhetors and the members of the Augustan and Tiberian aristocracies. In the case of Quintilian and Galba, we now can see another example of a Latin rhetor with ties to first a provincial governor and later an emperor. And these imperial connections continue—in familiar ways—with the dynasty that survived the turmoil of 69. We can now start to appreciate the extent to which Quintilian’s relationships with political power were not exceptional. As the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power had matured, and as political conditions changed, Latin rhetors had become a part of the imperial court, and the discipline they taught had secured a position within the imperial aristocratic *mos.*
But there remains one detail from Quintilian’s relationship with political power that does not quite find clear parallels in his predecessors: the salarium. Understanding this will be the next task.

§4.3 Quintilian’s salarium

Why did Vespasian provide Quintilian with a salarium of 100,000 HS? In the first place, seeing the social context in depth (§4.2) helps illuminate the salarium as a further step in a relationship that by the time of the Flavians was already very familiar. But why should Vespasian have taken this further step? This question sets the agenda for the present section. First, in §4.3.1, I lay out the extant evidence for the salarium. In §4.3.2, I then consider current interpretative options for understanding this phenomenon. Even in the current best explanation, which is focuses on euergetism and liberalitas, there exists ample room for improvement, and identifying certain gaps in this model points towards an alternative approach. The alternative account that I present in §4.3.3 focuses more on the reciprocal nature of the relationship between Quintilian and Vespasian, and introduces the justificatory narrative to the present chapter.

§4.3.1: The evidence for the salarium

We can start with the evidence for Quintilian’s salarium, which is coextensive with the evidence for his relationship to Vespasian. The Institutio mentions neither the salarium nor Vespasian. Instead, our evidence for both comes from three passages: (A) a passage

112 For Vespasian’s biographical details and chronology, I generally have relied on PIR² F 398; see also Levick 1999 with further bibliography.
in Jerome’s translation and expansion of Eusebius’s *Chronicon* (190 Helm) which he adapted from Suetonius’s *DGR* (= fr. 7 Kaster);\(^{113}\) (B) a remark from Suetonius’s *Vespasian* (18); and (C) a passage in Zonaras (11.17) which preserves the account of Dio Cassius (D. C. 61.12.1a).\(^{114}\) The trio can be presented together here, followed by comments on some fundamental details, namely how these passages provide evidence for the *salarium*, its recipient, its kind, and its date.

(A) Quintilianus, ex Hispania Calagurritanu, primus Romae publicam scholam et salarium e fisco accepit et claruit. (Jer. *Chron.* 190 Helm = Suet. *DGR* fr. 7 Kaster)

Quintilian, from Calagurris in Spain, was the first to receive a publicly funded chair at Rome and a salary from the imperial treasury, and he won great fame.\(^{115}\)

(B) primus e fisco Latinis Graecisque rhetoribus annua centena constituit. (Suet. *Vesp.* 18)

He (= Vespasian) was the first to establish annual salaries of 100,000 HS for Latin and Greek rhetors, drawn from the imperial treasury

\(^{113}\) On fragments of Suetonius’s *DGR* preserved in Jerome’s *Chronicon*, see Kaster 1995, xxiv–xxv, l–lii.

\(^{114}\) For Byzantine excerptors, including Zonaras, and their significance in the preservation of Dio’s text, see Millar 1964, 1–4.

\(^{115}\) Translation here from Kaster 1995, 39.
After the sack of Jerusalem, both Titus himself, after he returned to Italy, together with his father celebrated a triumph, drawn in war-chariots. Domitian too, who was then consul, celebrated the triumph with them, on horseback. After this, he (i.e. Vespasian) appointed teachers in Rome both of Latin and Greek learning, taking their pay from the public treasury.

To start, evidence for payment appears in all three passages. That this was made to Quintilian in particular is indicated only in (A). But Suetonius knew at least one of Quintilian’s students, Pliny, personally, and presumably could have uncovered this detail during his research for *DGR*, the source for Jerome’s report. As to the kind of payment involved, this is referred to as a *salarium* in (A), *annua centena* in (B), and *μισθός* in (C). *Salarium* is the clearest here, but *annua centena* amounts to the same thing; members of the imperial administration that held annual salaries valued at 100,000 HS were, since at least Claudius, known as *centenarii* (with graded ranks further denoting *ducenarii* and *trecenarii*).\(^\text{116}\) Dio’s *μισθός* is broad, but can be used to denote Latin *salarium* in Greek

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\(^{116}\) How structured and regulated this scale was has been the subject of debate: see Millar 1963a = *RGWE* 2:151–59. These positions are discussed further below.
texts as an alternative to the derivative τὸ σαλάριον. To these three passages should be added the considerable evidence from the corpus iuris civilis, where annual remunerations to rhetors from the second century onward are consistently described with the terms salarium and σαλάριον. All of this, in short, leaves little doubt that a salarium was indeed what Quintilian received from Vespasian. The point is worth emphasizing here, because, as we will see in the next section, this is a critical detail that has fallen through the cracks even in some of the best explanations of Quintilian’s remuneration. Jerome’s publica schola in (A) is an anachronism for Suetonius in the second century and certainly for Quintilian in the first; whatever the term might have meant for the Latin Father, it ought not distract us here.

The actual value of Quintilian’s salarium at 100,000 HS annually is established only in (B) with annua centena. There has been some confusion regarding the relative significance of that figure. George Kennedy, for example, writes of Quintilian’s salarium that “in itself it was adequate, but hardly princely, perhaps the equivalent in purchasing

117 See in Mason 1974, 8, 12, 83; Corbier 1978, 62 on mercers, salaria, honoraria and commoda “tous confondus, en grec, sous le vocable unique de misthos.”

118 RE 1A.2:1846–47 (Rosenberg); BNP s.v. “salarium” (de Libero); Duncan-Jones 1994, 33–46. For salaria/σαλάρια as the mot juste for annual remunerations for later teachers of rhetoric, see Dig. 27.1.6.11; 50.9.2.4; 50.13.1.8; 50.13.4; CTh 10.53.6.1. Note also HA Pius 11.3: rhetoribus et philosophis per omnes provincias et honores et salaria detulit.


120 Note that this value seems consistent with the sliding scale of value and prestige that one discovers in Philostratus. In Antonine Athens, for example, the imperially supported “chair” (Philostr. VS 588: ὁ τῶν σοφιστῶν θρόνος) of rhetoric had a salarium of 40,000 HS (Avotins 1975, 313–15). The comparable position at Rome was regarded as more prestigious (ὁ ἄνω θρόνος: Philostr. VS 589, on the promotion of Hadrian of Tyre). The increased value on the salarium would seem to reflect that increased level of prestige. Note also the vertical metaphor apparently used for these salaried positions (ὁ ἄνω θρόνος = “the high chair”) is paralleled in other equestrian, salaried positions that developed in the high empire: subcuratores, subpraefecti, and subcuratores (see Eck in CAH 11:249).
power to a good professorial salary in America.”

While it is true that other imperial *salaria* amount to 200,000, 300,000, or even 1,000,000 HS annually, such figures should not mislead us into imagining that Quintilian’s emolument was similar to the kind of salaries received by modern professionals. A better perspective, I think, comes from Keith Hopkins’s calculation that Quintilian’s salary would have been the equivalent of 215x the subsistence income for a peasant family. Richard Duncan-Jones has suggested that, as an annual salary, this may have been established with a foundation, in which case *ca.* 1,600,000 HS in capital might have been invested on Quintilian’s behalf. While this figure can be dwarfed next to other Flavian expenditures on, for example, construction in the City, it is no small sum. And for Quintilian, this *salarium* will have been in addition to fees earned from students and other forms of income. Juvenal, for example, suggests that Quintilian’s wealth included land holdings (Juv. 7.188–89: *unde igitur tot / Quintilianus habet saltus*?). Again, the temptation of modernizing interpretations that might relate Quintilian’s situation too closely to modern institutions should be strongly resisted; making the *salarium* “adequate” fails to do justice to the quantity and value of those sesterces.

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121 Kennedy 1969, 19.
122 Cf., e.g., Kraus 2014, 129: “Et si on prend en compte qu’un fonctionnaire de premier rang dans l’administration impériale pouvait bien gagner trois cent mille sesterces par an, cent mille ne paraît pas constituer une somme excessive.”
124 See Duncan-Jones 1994, 41–42 on the costs of construction in Rome under the Flavians. Duncan-Jones estimates Domitian’s expenses on building at *ca.* 900,000,000 HS or *ca.* 60,000,000 HS per year.
125 Note that Juv. 7.186–87 may suggest 2,000 HS was a standard charge, but Courtney 1980, 327 cautions us about placing too much credence in that figure: “it is rash to draw precise historical inferences from this about Quintilian himself, as many have done… his name here serves partly as that of a type.”
126 But see the preceding note with Courtney 1980, *ad loc.*
Where does the money come from? (B) and (C) make it clear that it came from Vespasian, but all three passages add an additional detail about the origin of the sestertces in question. (A) and (B), both the products of Suetonius, are consistent that these funds came from the fiscus (e fisco). Zonaras-Dio in (C) is somewhat different, offering ἐκ τοῦ δημοσίου, “from the public treasury,” apparently referring to the aerarium.127 I will deal with this discrepancy in a moment, but from the outset it should be said that the usefulness of these details for advancing the understanding of Quintilian’s situation is ultimately hindered by the interpretative problems related to the fiscus.

To consider Suetonius first: what might he have meant by indicating that Vespasian established Quintilian’s salarium from funds taken from the fiscus? The answer depends on what one believes fiscus refers to in this passage, but, unfortunately, there is no consensus on the range of financial institutions that the term can refer to.128 On the one hand, A. H. M. Jones and P. A. Brunt have argued that fiscus in the first two centuries CE could be used in three different senses, indicating either (1) the emperor’s private funds, (2) various provincial and specialized fisci containing public money collected from particular provinces or groups (e.g., Vespasian’s fiscus Iudaicus), or (3) “the whole financial administration controlled by the emperor,” also called the “imperial

127 See Mason 1974, 35, s.v. δημοσίου 4 with further passages.
128 The bibliography on the imperial fiscus is extensive. Basic access points can be found in Potter 2010 and Millar and Burton in OCD4, 579, while much fuller discussions of the sources involved are in Rostovtzeff’s articles in RE VI.2:2385–405 (see also Ürögdi in RE Suppl. X:222–30) and in Ruggiero, Diz. Epigr. 3:96–139. Some important modern treatments include A. H. M. Jones 1960, 99–114; Millar 1963b = RGWE 2:47–72; Brunt 1966 = Imperial Themes 134–62; Veyne 1976, 538–46; Brunt 1984a = Imperial Themes 347–53; Millar 1992, 133–201, esp. 189–201, 621–30; Alpers 1995; Lo Cascio 2000, 163–74.
treasury” (in contrast to the “public treasury,” the *aerarium*). Sense (2) would seem a good candidate for exclusion in our case in the absence of any further indications, but it is more difficult to determine whether *fiscus* in (A)–(B) should mean (1), i.e., that Vespasian created Quintilian’s *salarium* out of funds from *his own* pocket, or (3), in which case the revenues brought in from taxation, i.e. public revenues, would have been used to finance Quintilian’s position. On the other hand, another group of scholars contend that the meaning of *fiscus* in the early empire is more restricted, and that when *fiscus* does not refer to (2), it indicates the private wealth of the emperor, otherwise known as his *patrimonium*. This view, which is related to Mommsen’s fundamental contributions on the topic, has in the last century been held by Fergus Millar and, more recently, Michael Alpers. According to this camp, the only option for our passages would be to understand that Vespasian created the *salarium* from his own funds, and “the people’s money” was not otherwise involved. Thus, we have essentially two possible options: Vespasian used public money to create the *salarium*, or his own funds.

The two variant interpretations of the *fiscus*, it should be said, are legitimate disagreements by recognized experts about the proper interpretation of what has been a nearly fixed set of evidence. Reflecting on this debate, Elio Lo Cascio has noted that the central problem seems to be that the *fiscus* was the private wealth of the emperor and that this included revenues that *we* would characterize as public, i.e., that it was private in the ancient sense and public in the modern sense, and that the resulting confusion is more

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129 A. H. M. Jones 1960, 99–114 (quote from 107); Brunt 1966 = *Imperial Themes* 134–62; Brunt 1984a = *Imperial Themes* 347–53, replying to subsequent arguments related to the *status quaestionis*.

ours than antiquity’s. And, in any event, with Roman emperors the boundaries between public and private are not so clearly marked. In the end, it would perhaps just be best to follow Suetonius and say that the money came from Vespasian, from the *fiscus*, without pressing the question further.

On the other hand, Zonaras-Dio in (C) apparently does not quite agree. ἐκ τοῦ δῆμοσίου in that passage would appear to refer to “the public treasury,” i.e. the Republican institution of the *aerarium*. In his study of the *fiscus*, Alpers was content to dismiss (C) as an error, believing that the combination of Suetonius’s claims that the *salarium* was related to Vespasian’s *liberalitas* and his mention of the *fiscus* give clear indication that the money involved originated in the private funds of the emperor. I will return to the relationship between the *salarium* and the emperor’s *liberalitas* in the next section. Alternatively, David Potter has argued that the discrepancy between Suetonius and Zonaras-Dio “may reasonably be explained not as a contradiction but as a sign that “public funds” were now controlled by the emperor’s *fiscus* in all provinces”—a position that seems to fit well with Lo Cascio’s observations above about the overlap between “public” and “private” in imperial finances in this period. Ultimately, the best answer to where the money came from is perhaps just “Vespasian.”

Finally: the date. In passage (A), Jerome connects the *salarium* to 88 CE, but as noted above, this seems to be based on no ancient authority and can accordingly be ignored for the purposes of establishing the chronology of Quintilian’s *salarium*. Suetonius’s (B) comes from a collection of comments on Vespasian’s attitudes and

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132 Cf., e.g., D. C. 71.33.2, where Marcus requests money from the Senate ἐκ τοῦ δῆμοσίου.
134 Potter 2010, 184.
135 Helm 1929, 83; *RE* VI.2:1849–50 (Schwabe); Kaster 1995, 334.
activities designed to illustrate Suetonius’s claim in *Vesp.* 17 that the emperor was “exceedingly benevolent towards all kinds of men” (*in omne hominum genus liberalissimus*), a claim that will be revisited in §4.3.2 below; Passage (B) may follow a reference to earthquakes in Campania *ca.* 76, but there is no indication that the biographer intended to convey any chronological progression here.\(^{136}\) Thus the burden of chronological establishment, if anywhere, rests on Zonaras-Dio in (C). Fortunately, this passage is more informative. First, it follows reference to Vespasian and Titus’s triumph for the suppression of revolt in Iudaea in the previous year. Titus besieged Jerusalem in Sept. 70\(^{137}\); the triumph came in 71.\(^{138}\) It is further specified in (C) that Vespasian and Titus were accompanied by Domitian who was then consul (*ὑπατεύων*). In 71 Domitian was *consul suffectus* April–June.\(^{139}\) Thus, Zonaras-Dio’s indication that Vespasian’s actions regarding educators occurred “after this” (*μετὰ τοῦτο*), should provide us with the *terminus post quem* for the establishment of Quintilian’s *salarium*: sometime after April 71 CE, Vespasian selected Quintilian to be a recipient of 100,000 HS annually. We have no knowledge of the Greek rhetor who also received a *salarium* at this time.\(^{140}\)

This is the extent to which ancient sources inform us about Quintilian’s *salarium* from Vespasian. In light of the place that Latin rhetors occupied within Rome’s imperial courts since Augustus, it is not *per se* particularly remarkable that a Latin rhetor would be connected to an emperor. And in Quintilian’s case, we know that he was already connected to one of Vespasian’s more ephemeral predecessors (§4.2.3.1). But we lack any information comparable to what we had with Augustus, e.g., vignettes about a


\(^{137}\) An account of the siege can be found in B. W. Jones 1984, 47–55.

\(^{138}\) See *PIR*\(^2\) F 398–399.

\(^{139}\) See in *PIR*\(^3\) F 259.

\(^{140}\) For a list of known “chaîres de rhétorique à Athènes et Rome” see Kraus 2014, 142–43.
comparable education for Vespasian, or any indication of interest in declamation. Passages (A)–(C) are, indeed, minimal in detail, and none of them creates a psychology for the emperor, nor do they have much to say about motives. Explanations, therefore, will necessarily be hypotheses that can be tested for fit against our limited set of evidence. I offer one such explanation in §4.3.3 below. But before turning to that, we need to consider previous explanations for the salarium.

§4.3.2 Current explanations and room for improvement

Broadly speaking, explanations for Quintilian and his salarium from Vespasian tend to fall into one of two possible categories. The first kind of approach to Quintilian’s salarium can be fairly characterized as modernizing and rationalizing. Scholars such as Mario Attilio Levi and M. St. A. Woodside followed the paths blazed by John W. H. Walden’s *The Universities of Ancient Greece* and Corrado Barballo’s *Lo stato e l’istruzione pubblica nell’impero romano*, as well as Rudolf Herzog’s belief in a Flavian “educational policy” (Hochschulpolitik). The interpretation that emerges finds Vespasian, as part of policy designed to develop human capital, subsidizing education as a means of producing an efficient class of civil servants, thereby introducing a degree of levelheaded practicality as part of his reestablishment of order in a post-Neronian empire.

141 Walden 1909, 78–96; Barbagallo 1911; Herzog 1935; Levi 1937; Woodside 1942. Herzog’s study is deeply learned and interesting, and much can be gained from it even if the conclusions are not accepted (a point I return to at the end of the present section). As has been noted by others, Herzog went too far in his reconstruction in the opening of the inscription from Pergamon that he publishes there. This inscription, Herzog 1935 = *AE* 1936, 128, cf. Festa 1936–37 = *AE* 1940, which can be found in standard *corpora* as *FIRA* 1:420–22, 427–28 = nos. 73, 77, McCrum and Woodhead 1961, 135–36 = no. 458, and Oliver 1989, 119–23 = no. 38, is in all likelihood not the “Magna Charta für Hochschulen” that Herzog believed, but seems instead to focus on claims to inviolability (ἀσυλία) by certain Asclepiadae. For problems with Herzog’s interpretation, see Hartke 1938; Bardon 1968, 301; Oliver 1989, 119–23.
This idea was then popularized for historians of rhetoric in George Kennedy’s standard *The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World*, and it has also found favor more recently in Johannes Christes’s work.\(^{142}\) Giovanna Coppola’s 1994 *Culture e potere* similarly sees human development and expansion of access as motivating factors in the creation of “la prima scuola di Stato.”\(^{143}\)

An alternative series of explanations have developed that better take into account the socio-political conditions of antiquity. This line of thought began already in Henri-Irénée Marrou’s magisterial *Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité*. Marrou believed that the actions of Roman emperors towards education in this period should be understood in the light of the practices of Hellenistic kings, in the context of patterns of elite behavior now commonly referred to as “euergetism.” For Marrou, “l’empereur comme évergète,” was not trying to control the operation of some public service, but was acting as a private benefactor and patron.\(^{144}\) An explanation with affinities to this has since been developed by Konrad Vössing, in his learned *Schule und Bildung im Nordafrika der römischen Kaiserzeit*.\(^{145}\) Discussing imperial actions directed towards educators, Vössing starts by arguing strongly—and convincingly, to my mind—against a number of modernizing and rationalizing explanations such as the desire to train an imperial civil service. He proceeds to explain that imperial actions towards education should be seen wholly in the tradition of *liberalitas*, one of the central virtues of a ruler

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\(^{142}\) Kennedy 1972, 489–90; Christes 1988, 72.

\(^{143}\) Coppola 1994, with quote from p. 313; pp. 310–17 cover Quintilian. Cf. Hands 1968, 129, who writes of imperial *salaria* for Greek and Latin rhetors that “clearly this must have been of advantage to the sons of parents of modest means, though scarcely to those who had never been able to afford more than the rudiments of education.” But I am not aware of evidence for Vespasian’s action increasing access for either group.

\(^{144}\) Marrou 1948, 404–405.

going back to the Hellenistic period, and the virtue used to convey the quality of a
euergetist in Latin. According to Vössing, the emperor’s actions towards education are
driven by the need for ostentation, and that, in Vössing’s view, these are ad hoc and ad
hominem grants that serve to demonstrate the emperor’s virtues and shape public opinion;
developments in this area further propagate the emperor’s εὐεργεσία. Things like salaries
for rhetors, therefore, did ideological work, but had little effect, for example, in terms of
changing social access to education, much less developing any civil service. They were,
ultimately, more about the emperor than about the rhetors.

Vössing’s view, it must be said, has considerable appeal in the case of Quintilian.
This is well brought out by considering the context of Suetonius’s testimony to
Vespasian’s salaries for rhetors, passage (B) above. In *Vesp.* 17, Suetonius opens as
follows:

in omne hominum genus liberalissimus explevit censum senatorium, consulares
inopes quigenis sestertiis annuis sustentavit, plurimas per totum orbem civitates
terrae motu aut incendio affictas restituit in melius, ingenia et artes vel maxime
fovit.

Exceedingly benevolent towards all kinds of men, he (Vespasian) filled the
senatorial rank, sustained poor consulars with 500,000 HS annually, restored for

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146 Vössing 1997, 620: “Diese steht... ganz in der Tradition der liberalitas, einer der seit dem
Hellenismus wichtigsten Herrschaftstugenden.” On liberalitas and euergetism, see Veyne 1976,
621: “La liberalitas est le nom latin de la qualité qui fait les évergètes.” For liberalitas more
generally, extensive bibliography can be found in Vössing 1997, 620–21 n. 2093; the standard
treatment of liberalitas as it pertains to Roman emperors is Kloft 1970.
the better many cities across the world that has been damaged by earthquake and fire, and was especially well disposed to intellectual abilities and the arts.

It is, in fact, directly following this passage that Suetonius includes the *salaria* that Vespasian gave to rhetors. Since the inclusion of this detail appears, therefore, designed to support Suetonius’s opening claim that Vespasian was *liberalissimus*, it accordingly seems very reasonable to read Quintilian’s *salarium* along the lines of Vössing, that is, that Quintilian’s *salarium* should be seen as part of the tradition of *liberalitas*. It does appear, after all, that Suetonius viewed the grant precisely as demonstrating the emperor’s virtue—much the same way as Vössing urges us to do.

This interpretation, in fact, also has the virtue of fitting well with other recent studies of aspects of imperial euergetism. C. Bossu and Greg Woolf, for example, in two independent studies of the imperial *alimenta* schemes established by Roman emperors throughout Italy, have suggested that these schemes too did important ideological work to promote the virtues of emperors. Here, the emperor loaned money\(^\text{147}\) to private Italian landholders who subsequently paid interest on these loans not to the emperor, but to their towns; the towns, in turn, used the interest to fund payments to Italian children. Although often interpreted as an imperial policy designed to promote agricultural or demographic development, Bossu and Woolf urge us to see these as focused rather on the emperor

\(^{147}\) The precise (e.g., *aerarium*, *fiscus*, *patrimonium*, *res privata*) source of the capital used to finance the *alimenta* schemes seems even less clear than that used for Quintilian’s *salarium*, but simply leaving it simply with the emperor at least seems to represent our evidence. The famous inscription from Veleia (*CIL* 11.1147, cf. p. 1252 = *ILS* 6675 = EDR130843), for example, attributes the scheme to Trajan’s virtue (*l. 1*: *ex indulgentia optimi maximique principis*), and the emperor’s *indulgentia* is similarly cited at Ligures Baebiani (*CIL* 9.1455.4 = *ILS* 6509 = EDR 144345).
himself.\textsuperscript{148} The inscriptions recording the *alimenta* explain these grants not in terms of, e.g., agricultural subsidy and population growth, but as the result of the *indulgentia* of the *princeps*. Why (so the argument goes) should we be dissatisfied with that explanation? Bossu, for example, explains that the act of giving, of demonstrating his generosity, was inherent to the emperor’s generosity, and that the *alimenta* are just another example of this.\textsuperscript{149} Woolf’s account is similar:

The *alimenta* were an example of imperial largess. Over the first three centuries A.D., the emperors extended this largess, in a number of forms, to more and more groups, privileged groups, of course, because that was the way patrimonial empires worked. Gift-giving was an important part of the emperors’ self-representation and legitimation. But they followed no grand plan… The greatest gift-giver was the emperor. Arbitrary action was thus a structural feature of the Roman political system. (Woolf 1990, 227)

The case of the *alimenta* therefore provides a reassuring parallel for the argument that Vössing has marshaled to explain imperial interests in education, like Quintilian’s *salarium*. In both cases, we have: (1) money leaving the emperor’s hands; (2) no real explanation for motives in our ancient sources; (3) a tendency in scholarship to try to explain imperial actions in ways that seem modern in their goal-directedness (development of human capital; training an effective civil service; agricultural subsidy;

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright 148} Bossu 1989; Woolf 1990. For a recent survey of scholarship on the *alimenta*, see Carlsen 1999, 274–78 with further bibliography.

\textsuperscript{\textcopyright 149} Bossu 1989, 382: “L’acte de donner, de se montrer généreux est inhérent à la dignité de l’empereur et les *alimenta* en forment un autre exemple.”
demographic development); and (4) ancient evidence that connects these actions instead to imperial virtues. In fact, Woolf all but connects the two cases himself. Commenting on an inscription\(^{150}\) from the Athenian *agora* recording a list of properties which may have been connected to Hadrian’s endowment of salaries for rhetors and philosophers in Athens, Woolf writes:

> If so, it was only one of a series of gifts that Hadrian made to the city. His munificence answered no political or strategic priority, nor was it a response to any sort of crisis. Hadrian was simply a philhellene and his motive was an idiosyncratic affection for all things Athenian. The Italian *alimenta* could be the product of just such a whim. (Woolf 1990, 227)

The Marrou-Vössing euergetism model appears to be the strongest explanation that has hitherto been offered to address the case of Quintilian’s *salarium*. This explanation grounds the *salarium* in a well-documented feature of antiquity, finds parallels with other current explanations of tokens of (ostensibly) the same type, and has the further satisfying feature of making a *salarium* for a teacher paradoxically more about the emperor and his virtues than about the recipient of the *salarium*. However, while compelling in many ways, this it is not, I think, a complete explanation of Quintilian’s *salarium*. I see two problems in particular with the Marrou-Vössing euergetism model that can help point us in a different direction, and will enable us to press forward with a more complete explanation.

The first problem relates to the role played by *liberalitas*. As the passage from Suetonius’s *Vespasian* indicates, Vössing’s placement of imperial provisions for education within the tradition of *liberalitas* appears to fit well with our ancient evidence, and *liberalitas* was undoubtedly an important imperial virtue. But we should, perhaps, be wary of using *liberalitas* as an explanation for imperial action. This is a point, I think, that is brought out well in the work of Paul Veyne, whose *Le pain et le cirque* is the single most extensive treatment of Greco-Roman euergetism. In his chapter on the euergetism of Roman emperors, Veyne describes what he calls “le style monarchique.”

*Le style monarchique* is the phenomenon whereby the emperor’s public (and private) actions, and indeed, eventually most any action carried out by some organ of the Roman government, were attributed not to Rome or its administrative institutions, but to the emperor himself and, more particularly, his virtues. This played a role in the formation and sustenance of what has sometimes been termed “the beneficial ideology” of Roman imperial rule, which claimed to offer its subjects benefits, material and otherwise; these benefits, in turn, were attributed especially to the virtues of the empire’s good sovereign.

And a particular focus of *le style monarchique* was *liberalitas*. In Veyne’s words:

> le style monarchique attribuait en paroles les actes publics du souverain et aussi bien ses actes privés aux vertus du prince et particulièrement à sa libéralité; ces actes étaient autant de bienfaits. (Veyne 1976, 621)

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That is, *liberalitas* has a kind of, so to speak, explanatory gravity: for any action of a Roman emperor (later: the Roman state more generally) we find these actions attracted to the emperor’s *liberalitas*: whatever their actual causes, the emperor’s actions tend to become a result of the beneficence of the good sovereign. The pull of *liberalitas* on our sources is, accordingly, nearly inescapable, and Veyne himself believed that Quintilian’s salary was one example of this phenomenon:

Quand Vespasien, “par sa libéralité”, crée des chaires de rhétorique sur l’argent du Fisc, c’est-à-dire sur le produit des impôts, il ne se distingue guère d’un ministre de l’instruction publique qui crée des chaires en Sorbonne et il n’est qualifié d’évergète que par un effet de style monarchique. (Veyne 1976, 622)

Veyne, with a grander agenda, does not linger on this particular detail. And one might question whether Vespasian’s action was really analogous to a modern minister of education creating chairs at the Sorbonne. But the upshot of Veyne’s comparison, I think, is rather to suggest that Vespasian’s actions here, whatever the real motivation, become related to his *liberalitas* not as a result of their reality, but as a matter of habit related to *le style monarchique*.

This is, I think, the first issue with the Marrou-Vössing model: *liberalitas* looks more like a very inclusive category than a specific explanation.¹⁵³ Any of the emperor’s actions, if they can be seen as somehow beneficial, can become examples of his

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liberalitas thanks to le style monarchique.\textsuperscript{154} If the emperor provides a salarium, and this is beneficial, then this salarium is related to euergetism, provided by liberalitas. Vössing is, accordingly, quite right that imperial actions related to education are proclamations of his liberalitas, but that does not explain why he did them.

But there is, I think, a further reason to be skeptical that euergetism is the right explanation for Quintilian’s salarium. This is because this particular explanation seems to me to confound the more arbitrary forms of giving that are part of euergetism with the actual thing that was “given” to Quintilian, namely a salarium, which seems to belong to a quite different category. The emperor gave many things, and some of these will have been given arbitrarily, based on his whims or impulses. Veyne, for example, in distinguishing the principal kinds of actions that emperors undertake to provide benefits, includes le “royal caprice” in which “le souverain comble plus ou moins arbitrairement ses favours ou ses partisans de faveurs publiques ou privées.”\textsuperscript{155} Such forms of imperial largesse would indeed seem to discourage any further explanation save for that the emperor, being liberalissimus, is very generous, and sometimes he gives. Belonging to this category would also seem to be the periodic congiaria given by the emperor to his people, as well as the donativa given to his soldiers.\textsuperscript{156} As an example of Vespasian engaging in just this kind of behavior, we might consider the case of the poet Saleius Bassus.\textsuperscript{157} We hear from Suetonius that Vespasian “made gifts to outstanding poets with

\textsuperscript{154} Veyne provides, I believe, ample demonstration of this in his chapter. For another case, also related to Vesp. 17–18 cited above, see, e.g., on p. 635: “les largesses aux sénateurs étaient une nécessité politique tacite et remplissaient une fonction qu’il convenait d’ignorer; il était don commode d’y avoir le fait du prince et de sa libéralité.”

\textsuperscript{155} Veyne 1976, 630.

\textsuperscript{156} See, e.g., Duncan-Jones 1994, 39–41.

\textsuperscript{157} On Bassus, see PIR\textsuperscript{2} S 72; BNP s.v. “Saleius Bassus” (Schmidt). He seems to have been well known in imperial circles: Quint. Inst. 10.1.90; Juv. 7.80; cf., perhaps, Mart. 5.53.
remarkable largesse and large payment” (Vesp. 18: praestantis poetas... insigni congiario magnaque mercede donavit). The Flavian poet Saleius Bassus was one such recipient. About him, Marcus Aper in Tacitus’s Dialogus remarks (9.5): “we have recently praised the outstanding and extraordinary quality of Vespasian’s liberalitas, since he gave Bassus 400,000 HS” (9.5: laudavimus nuper ut miram et eximiam Vespasiani liberalitatem, quod quigenta sestertia Basso donasset). Such a case as Vespasian’s gift to Bassus should, under the Marrou-Vössing euergetism model, provide us with a parallel for Vespasian’s “gift” to Quintilian. Note in particular how the sesterces in question are interpreted as the result of imperial virtue in the Dialogus passage—and liberalitas is indeed the one that gets the nod.

But there is an important difference between this kind of euergetism—le “royal caprice,” congiaria, gifts (cf. above: donavit; donasset)—and what Quintilian received. First, there is a discrepancy in the vocabulary for the two cases. Vespasian did not give Quintilian a large monetary gift as he did Bassus (insigni congiario magnaque mercede donavit). But instead, “he was the first to establish annual salaries of 100,000 HS for Latin and Greek rhetors, drawn from the imperial treasury” (primus e fisco Latinis Graecisque rhetoribus annua centena constituit). A salarium is not the same as arbitrary largesse, and it does not belong to the category of sporadic giving related to imperial liberalitas and euergetism. A salarium is something that is established (constituit), and

158 Which is not to say that masters of rhetoric could not also obtain gifts for their abilities. See, for example, Philostr. VS 589 on Marcus Aurelius’s generous reaction to hearing Hadrian of Tyre declaim at Athens: “Delighted, the emperor exalted him greatly with privileges and gifts” (ἀγασθεὶς δὲ αὐτὸν ὁ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐπὶ μέγα ἰρε δῶραδις τε καὶ δώροις). These “privileges” included provision of food at public expense (σιτήσεις), rights to the front row (προεδρίας), immunities from taxation (ἀτελείας), and more, while the “gifts” included gold, silver, horses, and slaves. But no salarium is offered in this manner: Hadrian already held the imperial θρόνος at Athens prior to his declamation before Marcus (VS 588–89), valued at 40,000 HS. For the θρόνοι
it is recurring remuneration.\textsuperscript{159} Again, recall that above (§4.3.1) it was noted that there is more than enough evidence both from our three sources attesting to Quintilian’s particular situation as well as from the later tradition of emperor’s providing rhetors with \textit{salaria} that indeed a \textit{salarium} is was Quintilian received. Placing \textit{salaria} as part of the whimsical benevolence of the \textit{princeps} seems, therefore, to be something of a category error.

This point is further clarified, I think, by considering other examples of recipients of \textit{salaria} under the empire.\textsuperscript{160} First: senatorial governorships received \textit{salaria}. From a routinely cited passage in Dio Cassius, for example, we learn that the \textit{salarium} for a governor of Africa was set at 1,000,000 HS in the early third century.\textsuperscript{161} Beyond senators, equestrian \textit{procuratores}, working at Rome or elsewhere, gradually became more and more involved in imperial administration, and their positions were compensated with \textit{salaria}: 60,000, 100,000, 200,000, or even 300,000 HS annually.\textsuperscript{162} These included

\begin{footnotesize}

\footnote{For \textit{constituo} in this sense, used for creating things like \textit{salaria}, see \textit{TLL} s.v. \textit{constituo}, II.B.1 = 4:515.57–516.79 (Gudeman): \textit{translate, subest notio rei cuiuslibet instituendae, i.q. facere, creare, condere, sim.} For a parallel in for the use of \textit{constituo} with a \textit{salaria}, cf. Suet. \textit{Nero} 10.1: \textit{Divisis populo viritim quadringenis nummis senatorum nobilissimo cuique, sed a re familiari destituto annua salaria et quibusdam quingena constituit…}}

\footnote{See generally in \textit{RE} IA.2:1846–47 (Rosenberg); \textit{BNP} s.v. “\textit{salarium}” (de Libero); Corbier 1978, esp. 62–68; see also lists of equestrian \textit{officia} in Pflaum 1960–61, volume 3; \textit{BNP} s.v. “\textit{procurator}” 1 (Eck).}

\footnote{Our sources, epigraphic or otherwise, do not tell us the origins of such \textit{salaria}, and so it is not certain whether these were also paid, like Quintilian’s, out of the \textit{fiscus}—though this seems quite possible. As Millar 1992, 200 explains: “…Vitruvius, addressing Augustus in his preface, regards the \textit{commoda} which he received as a personal \textit{beneficium} which the emperor had confirmed on the recommendation of his sister. Thereafter we have no formal evidence of the source of the pay which procurators received.” Therefore, if we accept that Quintilian’s position is truly parallel to those of imperial \textit{procuratores}, the indications by Suetonius that the funds were paid \textit{e fisco} would, in turn, become valuable evidence for understanding these other salaried positions. The only other parallel that Millar can provide is that \textit{advocati fisci} received \textit{salaria} from the \textit{fiscus}, revealed in the fragmentary \textit{Fragmentum de iure fisci} 16–17 (text in \textit{FIRA} 2:629–30). Note that}

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positions like the (procurator) ab epistulis that we encountered above, as well as others, like a libellis Caesaris, adiutor ad census, procurator bibliothecarum ad LX sestertia, procurator ludi magni, and procurator annonaes Ostiae. Establishing the chronology of the creation of such positions is difficult, or rather, impossible given the nature of the evidence (in essentially all cases, only a terminus post quem is available). Still, it seems clear enough that, starting with Augustus, more and more procuratorial positions for equestrians were created over time, a process that seems to have gained momentum heading into the high empire.\footnote{\textsuperscript{163}} It is perhaps significant for the creation of Quintilian’s salarium under Vespasian that, in Werner Eck’s words, “the first evidence for the restructuring of the imperial administration comes from the reign of Vespasian or his immediate successors,” but, as Eck cautions:

...in the majority of cases, we simply cannot tell whether these changes were merely the result of the involvement of an emperor who was extremely interested in the running of the empire, or whether they had been introduced earlier, perhaps under Nero. (\textit{CAH} \textsuperscript{2}, 11:241)

At least in the case of Quintilian’s salarium, we can date its creation to the earlier part of Vespasian’s reign. The emperor’s household, imperial freedmen and slaves, also received salaria; they too assisted with the financial and administrative requirements of empire. Among these, for example, those known as proximi obtained salaria valued at 40,000

\footnote{\textsuperscript{163} See the magisterial treatment of the issue by Eck in \textit{CAH} \textsuperscript{2}, 11:238–65. Cf, e.g., Hopkins 1983, 179–84.}
HS.\textsuperscript{164} Outside of these imperial officials, \textit{salaria} were also paid to members of the army.\textsuperscript{165} And finally: the \textit{salaria} to rhetors, who share company with doctors and, later, others who profess to teach \textit{liberalia studia}.\textsuperscript{166} The \textit{salaria} for doctors and these other \textit{professores} would naturally, of course, seem to offer the best comparison—and the explanation of the present study may, perhaps, be able to offer something useful for those cases in future studies.\textsuperscript{167}

\textsuperscript{164} Duncan-Jones 1994, 38. Note that the value is the same as the \textit{salarium} paid to the imperially-supported Greek sophists in Antonine Athens (see above p. 253 n. 158).

\textsuperscript{165} RE 1A.2:1847 (Rosenberg); Duncan-Jones 1994, 33–35.

\textsuperscript{166} Note Millar 1992, 502: “But limited as they were, these posts by their very existence serve to emphasize the immense importance of \textit{liberalia studia} in ancient society; for they were in fact the only posts outside their households, the equestrian ‘career’ and senatorial governorships for which the emperors paid on a regular basis.” Also significant is the \textit{salarium} of 100,000 HS that Augustus paid to the grammarian Valerius Flaccus (\textit{DGR} 17.2). Flaccus relocated his school to the Palatine and was not supposed to accept further students (\textit{quare ab Augusto quoque nepotibus eius praeceptor electus transit in Palatium cum tota schola, verum ut ne quem amplius posthac disciplum reciperet docuitque in atrio Catulinae domus quae pars Palatii tunc erat et centena sestertia in annum accepit}). This situation is somewhat different from that found with Vespasian and Quintilian, because we find no notice of Quintilian being required to limit his teaching practices after receiving the \textit{salarium}, though geographical limitations (i.e. Quintilian was to stay at Rome) seem likely to have played a roll. But it does not seem that Quintilian’s \textit{salarium} should be accounted for as payment for focusing his efforts on a specific, limited set of students, as Suetonius seems to imply was the case with Flaccus. Quintilian’s focus on Domitian’s grandnephews came \textit{after} retirement. For more on fees in Roman education, see Bonner 1977, 146–62.

\textsuperscript{167} Below, I argue that the justificatory narrative emphasizing utility is an important component for understanding Quintilian’s \textit{salarium}. With regards to \textit{salaria} given to other, non-administrative groups—doctors, rhetors, and philosophers—it is, I think, worth mentioning the case of a particularly apropos declamation \textit{thema} known in several guises from Quint. \textit{Inst.} 7.1.38, \textit{DMin.} 268, Fortunat. \textit{Ars} 1.10 Calboli Montefusco = \textit{RLM} 87.24–26, and \textit{Rhet. Gr.} 8:412.21–23. In \textit{Inst.} 7.1.38, the \textit{thema} is given as:

\begin{quote}
Qui tris liberos habebat, oratorem philosophum medicum, testamento quattuor partes fecit et singulas singulis, dedit, unam eius esse uoluit qui esset utilissimus ciuitati. Contendunt.
\end{quote}

“A man who has three children, an orator, philosopher, and doctor, splits his inheritance into four parts and gives one to each son, and one he wanted to belong to the man who was the most useful to the state. They vie against one another”

On this \textit{thema}, see Winterbottom 1984, 358–59 with further parallels; Mastrorosa 1999; Cf. Herzog 1935, 982–83. Dingel 1988, 110 notes that this \textit{thema} is epideictic.
This is the company that an imperial *salarium* keeps. Such examples, I believe, further warn us against reading imperial *salaria* for rhetors as additional examples of indiscriminate imperial largesse, as simply an example of the emperor’s *liberalitas*. *Liberalitas* can, of course, come into play, a result of *le style monarchique*. But consider yet another parallel: if we were to try to explain why an equestrian *procurator*, say an *ab epistulis*, was paid an annual *salarium* by the emperor, it is true that the emperor’s generosity and beneficence could be part of that explanation. But that would be a decidedly one-sided explanation. Is not the *salarium* also the result of *what its recipient was contributing to the emperor*? It strikes me that all of the more common recipients of *salaria*—whether handling imperial correspondence, overseeing an *ala*, or managing the supply of grain at Ostia—have in common precisely that they were *performing some useful service for the emperor*. The *salarium* is remuneration for these efforts, not an arbitrary largesse. The fact that it is paid can be, and is, related to the virtues of the emperor as a result of *le style monarchique*. But to my mind an explanation of such a *salarium* should include both sides of the relationship: emperor and recipient. In that case, a more balanced approach is needed, one that takes into account the actions of the recipient of the *salarium* and how those actions might have been perceived by the emperor, that is, more emphasis should be placed on the reciprocal nature of this relationship. In trying to understand Quintilian’s *salarium*, therefore, the emperor should not be the exclusive focus of our interests, but we should to also consider Quintilian’s activities and, why those might have been perceived as useful to Vespasian.

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168 Cf. also Coppola 1994, 293–300, who argues that the receipt of a *salarium* is related to “una pubblica funzione.”
§4.3.3 Recreating the justificatory narrative

So we can turn now to the final piece of the argument. Why might Vespasian have perceived a Latin rhetor to be doing something that, like managing imperial correspondence or overseeing the City’s grain supply, merited a *salarium*? Two possibilities, I think, deserve consideration here: first, and briefly, the role of custom and habit and, second—and requiring further investigation—the discipline’s self-justifying narrative.

As for custom, by the time we reach the Flavians and the high empire, there is something to be said for simple habit as supporting a perception that Latin rhetors were contributing something useful to the ruling elite. By tracing the social connections between Latin rhetors up to this period, it has been possible to demonstrate that, since the advent of these educators at Rome, Latin rhetors were closely connected to political power, whether in the form of the magnates of the late Republic or the emperor and his aristocracy. By the time we reach Vespasian, then, Latin rhetors had been a part of the social world of the governing elite for over 150 years. And when Rome transitioned from Republic to Principate, rhetors remained connected to the aristocracy, now part of the court culture of the empire. In short, by the time we reach Vespasian, the masters of eloquence had become a fixture in the *mos* of the masters of empire. Habitual activities, it might be thought, tend to be given the benefit of the doubt in terms of their usefulness. This is a point that I return to in the conclusion to the present chapter.

But the question of how the activities of a Latin rhetor could have been regarded as useful by Rome’s governing aristocracy directs us to another part of the relationship between Latin rhetorical education and political power: the justificatory narrative. In
chapter two above, we saw how Cicero, beginning just shortly after the advent of Latin rhetorical education at Rome and continuing throughout his life, created a series of arguments to support rhetoric as a worthwhile pursuit for Rome’s rulers. Cicero did this by connecting traditional Roman practices and the values and interests of Rome’s governing aristocracy with formerly Greek technical systems, now under the label of *eloquentia*. Rhetoric, it was argued, was the perfect *ars* for underpinning the political values of the late Republic, and its cultivation was correlated with political flourishing and civic success. Rhetoric was held to be immensely useful for political life. As we saw, from *de Inventione* to *Orator*, Cicero followed a consistent mode of argumentation: *laus*, praise. In the conclusion to that chapter (§2.5 above), I pointed to the lasting effects of Cicero’s arguments via their reception, in broad brushstrokes: in Suetonius’s *DGR*, in Poggio Bracciolini’s letters in the Quattrocento, and in the work of Thomas White in the century following. I connected the effectiveness of Cicero’s arguments to his argumentative method. Cicero conveyed his vision for rhetoric’s relationship with political power via his *laudes eloquentiae*. In the most comprehensive study of ancient epideictic, Laurent Pernot contends that praise in the Greco-Roman world performed “a social action” that operated in two ways: it could reaffirm past beliefs but also provide inroads for new values, and it thereby could play a role in shaping the consciousness of a society.\(^{169}\)

In trying to understand why Vespasian might have perceived the activities of a Latin rhetor as providing some utility for the Roman state, I propose to take seriously the possibility that Cicero’s justificatory narrative played a significant role. Cicero argued

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\(^{169}\) Pernot 1993, esp. 1:238–48 (on praise of abstractions, like *eloquentia*), and 2:718–24 for epideictic and ideology (p. 721 for “action sociale”).
that the man who controlled rhetoric and was guided by wisdom would be *utilissimus* for public affairs, that rhetoric provided the means of sustaining human communities, and that it could empower the politically ambitious while augmenting the majesty of the Republic.¹⁷⁰ For the Julio-Claudian period covered in chapter three, we all but lost sight of the justificatory narrative, but even there, in the pages of Seneca’s anthology, we were still able to find evidence for a sustained belief that political success could depend on the control of rhetoric (§3.3). But what about the Flavians? Is there evidence that Cicero’s justificatory narrative was alive and well at the dawn of the high empire?

§4.3.3.1 Quintilian and the usefulness of rhetoric

Quintilian’s *Institutio Oratoria* contains precisely the evidence we are looking for here. In his grand educational treatise, Quintilian develops Cicero’s justificatory narrative, arguing that rhetoric is, once again, a key for political success, and of considerable civic utility. While there are a number of passages where Quintilian’s remarks have bearing on this issue, we can find a clear picture of his commitment to the justificatory narrative by examining, first, his preface to book one, and second, *Inst.* 2.16, a section devoted to the question, “Is rhetoric useful?” His answer is affirmative. By examining the vision for rhetoric expressed in these passages, we will see that the narrative created by Cicero was still in full force under the Flavians, now recreated by that era’s premier rhetor.

But before examining those sections of the *Institutio*, it should perhaps be clarified how this helps answer the question about the perceived usefulness of rhetoric and Vespasian’s grant of a *salarium* to Quintilian. First of all, the arguments in the

¹⁷⁰ See §§2.3–2.4 above.
Institutio that we will examine below are not imagined to be ones that Quintilian used to persuade Vespasian into establishing the *salarium*. The *Institutio* is a Domitianic product, written in all likelihood at least a decade after Vespasian’s death, while the *salarium* seems to have been a creation dating to early during Vespasian’s reign. Note also that the *Institutio* is the product of reflection after a long career, and we have no way of knowing to what extent Quintilian’s sweeping educational vision that he published in the 90s might have already been formed in the early 70s. It has sometimes been thought that Quintilian did, in fact, form his educational views quite early in his career, and for a parallel we might compare how Cicero had his justificatory narrative already articulated in the *de Inventione*. But I see no way to prove this for Quintilian. Instead, I believe it is safer to read Quintilian’s arguments as evidence that the justification that Cicero had advanced on rhetoric’s behalf still had currency under the Flavians. This is not to suggest that literary work simply reflects society or the like; I imagine that things are considerably more complex. Recall Pernot’s view, discussed above, that epideictic—which, as we shall see, Quintilian does not hesitate to deploy on rhetoric’s behalf—operates in two ways, both reaffirming the consensus while also being able to press new ideas that might, if successful, someday join the *status quo*. I believe that Cicero’s justificatory narrative, and Quintilian’s reiteration and reconstruction of that narrative, had a broader impact, culturally and socially. Its central message, that mastery of eloquence via technical rhetoric is the way to political success, seems to have been uncontroversial at least to the members of the Augustan aristocracy whom we met in chapter three—not to mention Marcellus, Pliny, and the emperors of the present chapter.

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171 See Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, xlvi for the view that Quintilian had the outlines of his vision for the orator, already “early in life.”
The passages that we will examine from the *Institutio* further demonstrate how relevant arguments from utility remained under the Flavians. And the idea that rhetoric could be useful for the state dovetails with what we might expect from something that merits an imperial *salarium*. Following Pernot’s analysis of the social effects of epideictic, I think we can see that Cicero in the Republic used the justificatory narrative to introduce new ideas, while Quintilian uses it under the empire to reaffirm the consensus. I will return to this point in my concluding remarks in §4.4 below.

One final note, before turning to Quintilian, on the relationship between the present investigation and previous scholarship: I am not the first to recognize that Quintilian makes rhetoric useful to the state.\textsuperscript{172} R. G. Austin, for example, in his classic commentary on *Institutio Oratoria* book twelve,\textsuperscript{173} is quite clear on this point:

> On its ethical side, Book XII shows that singleness of outlook which one would expect from its author; he is uncompromising in his insistence that his orator must be first and foremost a good man. The function of eloquence is to serve the State, and if it is directed to evil the State will suffer… (Austin 1948, xiii)

Other studies, particularly by Italian scholars, have connected Quintilian to the regime, but these have either been based on passages other than those I will consider below (particularly *Inst.* 12), or focused on more specific issues, such as Domitian’s expulsion.

\textsuperscript{172} On Quintilian and politics see also Morgan 1998, who reads the *Institutio* in the tradition of political theorizing *cum* educational theory, in line with works like Plato’s *Republic* or Aristotle’s *Politics*. While reading “Quintilian’s programme as a theory of government” (257) does allow for many interesting observations and an novel reading of the *Institutio*, for my part I am not as sure that Quintilian was interested in political theory at quite this level.

\textsuperscript{173} On the creation of Austin’s classic, see Henderson 2006, 9–36.
of philosophers or his interests in *correctio morum*.\(^{174}\) I am more interested in the way Quintilian viewed his own discipline rather than the way he viewed specific actions by the regime. That Quintilian continues the tradition of *laudes eloquentiae* inaugurated by Cicero has also certainly been noted; Tobias Reinhardt and Michael Winterbottom state in their comments on *Inst.* 2.16, for example, that this influence is “uncontroversial and obvious.”\(^{175}\) But these passages have not been explored according to the present argument, which aims to demonstrate that Cicero’s justificatory narrative was sustained and developed as an attempt to help understand why a Latin rhetor was deemed suitable for a *salarium*. The passages, that is, have not been taken seriously as pieces of intellectual, cultural, and disciplinary history. The closest parallel to my argument here is, in fact, probably found in Rudolf Herzog’s 1935 publication and study of an inscription from Pergamon.\(^{176}\) While I disagree with Herzog’s belief that this inscription offered something along the lines of a “Magna Charta für Hochschulen”—much less a “Freibrief der antiken Universitäten”—or that somehow *collegia* were involved in Vespasian’s actions, nevertheless in his learned “Vorgeschichte,” Herzog recognized that what he termed *utilitas publica* might be an important factor in imperial actions toward educators.\(^{177}\) Later scholars including Levi and Woodside subsequently interpreted Herzog’s *utilitas publica* as authorizing their views that Vespasian was trying to develop a civil service or skilled bureaucracy, but I am not so sure that this is what Herzog had in


\(^{175}\) Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 279. See further below for the relationship between Quintilian and Cicero in these passages.


\(^{177}\) On Herzog’s work, see above p. 244 n. 141.
mind. Thus, while my argument differs from Herzog’s in its conclusion, methodologies, and substance, I believe he was quite correct to recognize the importance of utilitas. This seems to me to be another example of taking seriously the upshot of Pernot’s argument: epideictic matters.

§4.3.3.2 The place of the justificatory narrative in Quintilian’s project (1 pr. 9–27)

We can start, fittingly, at the beginning, in the preface to book one. As we will see, Quintilian’s most significant engagement with the justificatory narrative appears in book two, in his theoretical account of rhetoric. But it is well worth examining his first preface as well, because it reveals how central the idea of the usefulness of rhetoric to political and civic life was to Quintilian’s vision. It is also the place where we can first see Quintilian developing ideas that will now be familiar from our investigation of Cicero’s justificatory narrative.

Quintilian’s first prohoemium opens with an account of the genesis of the Institutio. He explains that in retirement he was driven by his friends to write “something about the theory of speaking” (1 pr. 1: aliquid de ratione dicendi). Having forestalled their requests for some time, eventually Quintilian acquiesced, despite concerns about the depth and breadth of the rhetorical tradition that preceded him. However, the scope of this tradition was in fact one of the reasons his acquaintances so urged him to undertake the project, “since there was difficulty in choosing between the

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178 See especially Herzog’s restorations in lines 1*–9* on pp. 970–71 and pp. 982–84 on the significance of utilitas publica.
179 On this prohoemium, see Janson 1964, 53–55.
varying opinions of earlier writers—even contradictory among themselves” (1 pr. 2: *quod
inter diversas opiniones priorum et quasdam etiam inter se contrarias difficilis esset
electio*). At first, Quintilian explains, he had intended only to exercise his critical
judgment (*iudicandi de veteribus*), but gradually he resolved to do more, in an effort “to
simultaneously oblige those most dear to me with a fuller indulgence, and at the same
time to escape having set out on the common trail and standing exclusively in the steps of
others” (1 pr. 3: *simul ut pleniore obsequio demererer amantissimos mei, simul ne
vulgarem viam ingressus alienis demum vestigiis insisterem*).

The result of this choice, Quintilian reports, is the widening of the project. Previous authors of rhetorical *artes* took it for granted that they had ideal students ready
to work, but in doing so they neglected early education—an overstep to be rectified by
Quintilian, who does not shirk from making recommendations for these crucial, if too
often hidden, foundations of an orator (1 pr. 4). At the same time, following his
comprehensive treatment of rhetorical *praecепtа*, Quintilian includes an additional book
“in which the orator himself needs be sketched” (1 pr. 22). Book twelve, on the orator’s
career and his retirement, is indeed one of the features that make the *Institutio* such a
departure from the *vulgaris via*: previous *artes* neglected what happens after the orator
left the schoolroom. Working without a predecessor in this area, Quintilian fairly
characterizes book twelve’s relationship with the tradition of *artes* by quoting Vergil’s
words: “sky all around, on all sides the sea” (12 pr. 4: *nunc ‘caelum undique et undique
pontus’*).180

Quintilian dedicates his work to his friend, Marcellus, who is well known to us
now (§4.2.2 above). In addition to Marcellus’s friendship and love of literary works (1 pr.

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180 See Austin 1948, 50; cf. Cole 1906, 49–51; Odgers 1933, 187.
Quintilian notes Marcellus’s current engagement in the education of his son, Geta, as further motivating the dedication. Add to this Quintilian’s concerns about the *artes rhetoricae* that had been excerpted from his lectures and were currently in circulation without his consent (1 pr. 7–8; §4.1 above), and Quintilian finds new urgency for the work he once shunned to compose.

Quintilian, then, offers in his *Institutio* not just *aliquid de ratione dicendi*, but a very fulsome educational plan designed to produce an ideal orator. As noted above (§4.1), this project finds thematic predecessors (though neither similar generically nor in breadth) in Cicero’s *de Oratore* and *Orator*, both of which Quintilian greatly admired. But the educational plan and the ideal orator who is its *telos* are Quintilian’s own in a number of ways. His ideal is introduced first in this *prohoemium*, and from the outset, we can see that Quintilian imagines that the product leaving from a Latin rhetor’s instruction should be absolutely capable of contributing to civil society and political life (1 pr. 9–10):

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Oratorem autem instituimus illum perfectum, qui esse nisi vir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo eximiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi virtutes exigimus. Neque enim hoc concesserim, rationem rectae honestaeque vitae, ut quidam putaverunt, ad philosophos relegandam, cum vir ille vere civilis et publicarum privatarumque rerum administrationi accommodatus, qui regere consilii urbes, fundare legibus, emendare iudiciis possit, non alius sit profecto quam orator.
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\[181\] For an impression of Quintilian’s debt to these works, see, for example, Sehlmeyer 1912 with 91–96.
Moreover the orator we are educating is the perfect orator, who cannot exist unless he is a good man, and for this reason we require in him not only outstanding facility in speaking but all the virtues of the soul. For nor would I concede this point, that the theory of an upright and honorable life must—as some have thought—be consigned to the philosophers, since that man, truly a statesman and prepared for the management of affairs both public and private, a man who can govern cities by his sound advice, secure them with laws, and keep them faultless with his judgments—this man is surely none other than our orator.

A number of important points emerge from Quintilian’s presentation of his ideal here. First: the moral requirement. Quintilian’s orator must be a *vir bonus*. The rhetor’s strong insistence on this moral requirement is indeed one of the aspects that separate his vision from what Cicero presents in *de Oratore*, and in fact we will see one result from that insistence when we turn to Quintilian’s development of Cicero’s justificatory narrative in the next section.\(^{182}\) The reluctance to yield morality to the philosophers is, of course, at home also in Cicero. Indeed, we will recall that moral guidance from *sapientia* was critical for rhetoric to be beneficial for the *res publica* in Cicero’s justificatory narrative. But Quintilian’s moral requirement, that, *by definition*, a man is not an orator unless he is *bonus*, goes considerably beyond the consul’s vision.\(^{183}\)

Related to this moral requirement and particularly apropos for our present discussion is Quintilian’s first unveiling of what activities he imagines the trained orator


\(^{183}\) Although not without precedent, as the concept was attributed to Cato: Quint. *Inst.* 12.1.1; Sen. *Contr.* 1 pr. 9; Plin. *Ep.* 4.7.8. Cf. Austin 1948, 52–53.
was able to undertake. The orator, Quintilian says, is “truly a statesman” (*vir ille vere civilis*), and is “prepared for the management of affairs both public and private” (*publicarum privatarumque rerum administrationi accommodatus*). His further competencies situate him as a potent political actor: governing cities, securing them with laws, and keeping them without blemish through his judgments. It is, accordingly, Quintilian’s belief that the system of rhetorical education that he encompasses in his *Institutio* should be able to produce men precisely able to contribute to managing *res publicae*, and ensuring civic stability. That is, the rhetors, in this view, are the keepers of a technical system of knowledge that, at its best, can empower and enable the masters of Rome’s empire. It is, accordingly, perhaps small wonder that in his survey of definitions of rhetoric in book two, Quintilian at one point notes that “some people moreover have judged that rhetoric is the same thing as politics” (2.15.33: *rhetoricen autem quidam eandem civilitatem esse iudicaverunt*).\(^{184}\) Quintilian thinks the correct definition is more complicated than that, and he ultimately sides with Xenocrates and the Stoics settling on a definition that we have, in fact, seen previously, that “rhetoric is the science of speaking well” (2.15.34: *maxime conveniet finitio rhetoricen esse bene dicendiscientiam*).\(^{185}\) And it seems likely, in fact, that “some people” (*quidam*) that see rhetoric and politics as one

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\(^{184}\) For the meaning of the sentence and its historical antecedents, see in Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 269–70. Commenting on the use of *eandem* here (rather than *idem ac* or *idem qui*), the pair conclude: “what the sense seems to require here is ‘rhetoric is the same as politics’” For *civilitas* meaning “politics” or “political science,” see further references in Reinhardt and Winterbottom’s comments *ad loc.*, as well as TLL s.v. *civilitas* 1, *de regendis civibus* = 3:1219.42–48 (Hey); it is not a common usage, and seems limited to Quintilian, Apuleius, and Ammianus Marcellinus, in passages that are explicitly or implicitly connected to Greek *πολιτική*; one imagines that the *quidam* in the present passage will have been Greek theorists.

\(^{185}\) See in §2.2 above. Cicero, as part of making Greek technical knowledge suitable for Romans, naturally replaces *rhetorice* with *eloquentia*. Quintilian’s debt to Stoic thought is extensive; Raubenheimer 1911 remains useful on this issue.
and the same will have been Greek theorists. So too Quintilian’s use of *civilis* in 1 pr. 10 to mean “statesman” seems to look towards the Aegean. But the fact is that it is with politics and statesmen that Latin rhetors are especially entangled. By now, this has been well demonstrated prosopographically; theoretically, the connection seems to have been inaugurated at Rome by Cicero, but as we can see now, Quintilian advanced it further.

And regarding that continued tradition, the analysis of Cicero’s creation of the justificatory narrative in §§2.3–2.4 offers ready parallels for Quintilian’s first articulation of his ideal orator and his relationship with politics. For Quintilian’s insistence on the double effectiveness of the orator, “prepared for the management of affairs both public and private” (*publicarum privatariumque rerum administrationi accommodatus*), for example, we can look to *de Inventione* 1.1 where the man who “arms himself with eloquence” (*qui... sese armat eloquentia*) with noble intent is judged by Cicero to be “a citizen most useful and most devoted to both his own affairs and to those of his country” (*is mihi vir et suis et publicis rationibus utilissimus atque amicissimus civis fore videtur*) or to *Inv.* 1.5, where it is claimed of *eloquentia*—Cicero’s rhetoric *togata*—that “this is

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186 See penultimate note above.

187 For *vir civilis* in Quintilian, see *ad loc.* in Bonnell 1834, 127–28; *TLL* s.v. *civilis* II.B, *qui bonum (vel simplicem) civem (privatum) decet, de personis (qui boni civis mores habet, maxime modestiam et humanitatem), tam de Scientia rei p(ublicae) gerendae quam de moribus 3:1218.11–16 (Hey). Quintilian alone populates the examples of this use. For its Greek connection, note especially *Inst.* 1.10.15, “Plato believed that music was necessary for a statesman, whom he called *πολιτικός*” (*Plato civili viro, quem πολιτικόν vocat, necessarium musicen credidit*). In his magisterial translation, Russell 2001, 1:57 renders *vir civilis* at 1 pr. 10 as “the man who can truly play his part as a citizen,” but comes around to “statesman” for *vir civilis* at 1.10.15 (=1:221), 12.2.7 (= 5:225), and 12.2.21 (= 5:231). It has been argued that *civilis* was a word with a particularly political significance in the empire, and *civilis* together with its later abstraction, *civilitas*, become related to the emperor himself. That may be, and such a connection would be potentially useful for the present study, but I do not believe that this is the sense of *civilis/civilitas* that Quintilian has in mind in the *Institutio*. See Lana 1972; Wallace-Hadrill 1982.
the one thing that is especially connected to all affairs, both private and public” (*hoc sit unum, quod ad omnes res et privatæ et publicæ maxime pertineat*). Or, even more forcefully, in *de Oratore* 1.33: “for my conviction is as follows: that the control and wisdom of the perfect orator forms the basis not only for his own authority but even the salvation of both a great number of private individuals and the Republic as a whole” (*sic enim statuo, perfecti oratoris moderatione et sapientia non solum ipsius dignitatem sed et privatorum plurimum et universæ rei publicæ salutem maxime contineri*). Thus, we can see how Quintilian’s vision comes in the wake of the justificatory narrative first articulated by Cicero; this will be even clearer when we turn to 2.16.

Quintilian continues his first preface by pressing rhetoric’s claims to the *ratio rectæ honestæque vitae*. He notes, for example, that there is a historical argument to be made for keeping this material united under rhetoric’s auspices: “this pair, as Cicero deduces with the utmost clarity, had at one point been as joined by their natures as they were united in their functions, such that wise men and eloquent men were regarded as one and the same” (1 pr. 13: *fueruntque haec, ut Cicero apertissime colligit, quamadmodum iuncta naturæ, sic officio quoque copulata, ut idem sapientes atque eloquentes haberentur*). His debts to the consul are here made explicit. Quintilian recapitulates his vision for the orator in 1 pr. 18, before including his first protreptic, arguing that his particular ideal is attainable and worth pursuing. As Quintilian explains (1 pr. 20):

Nam et certe aliquid consummata eloquentia neque ad eam pervenire naturæ humæ ingenii prohibet. Quod si non contingat, altius tamen ibunt qui ad summa
nitentur quam qui praesumpta desperatione quo velint evadendi protinus circa ima substiterint.

For it is the case both that perfected eloquence exists and that the nature of human ability does not keep us from reaching it. But if this should not happen, still those men will go higher who strive for the peak than those who, assuming the hopelessness of reaching their objective, will have remained settled at the bottom.¹⁸⁸

Quintilian concludes the preface to book one with a further note on the significance of *ingenium* and what it takes to reach the pinnacle of eloquence. *Natura* and *ingenium* are critical for a student to be able to master rhetoric’s precepts. Again, Quintilian here is following a tradition which goes back to Classical Greece, covered also by Cicero.¹⁸⁹ But within Quintilian’s statement there lies an important requirement that deserves our attention (1 pr. 26–27):

Illud tamen in primis testandum est, nihil praecepta atque artes valere nisi adiuvante natura. Quapropter ei cui deereit ingenium non magis haec scripta sint quam de agrorum cultu sterilibus terris. Sunt et alia ingenita cuique adiumenta, vox, latus patiens laboris, valetudo, constantia, decor, quae si modica optigerunt, possunt ratione ampliari, sed nonnumquam ita desunt ut bona etiam ingenii

¹⁸⁸ Quintilian’s imagery here—rhetorical training as peak bagging—is related to the Greek commonplace that portrays education as a difficult climb up a steep road. See above p. 112 n. 85.
¹⁸⁹ See in Leeman-Pinkster 1:211 with bibliography.
studiique corrumpant: sicut haec ipsa sine doctore perito, studio pertinaci, scribendi legendi dicendi multa et continua exercitacione per se nihil prosunt.

Still, one point must be affirmed first, namely that precepts and technical systems do nothing save for with the help of natural ability. Accordingly, this treatise should be no more directed towards a man who lacks natural talent than an agricultural treatise is intended for sterile fields. There are also other means of aid for any given person that are the products of birth: voice, lungs that can suffer the work, good health, grit, charm. Even if these are present only in small supply, they can be increased by systematic training. But sometimes they are so absent that they even ruin the benefits of innate ability and study: so also these very things (i.e. ingenium and studium) are by themselves of no help without a skilled teacher, unflagging attention, lots of writing, reading, and speaking, and constant exercise.

The rhetorical tradition had claimed that three things were critical to success: natural ability, a system of precepts (the praecepta, the ars), and practice, together represented in the Greek triad of φύσις, ἐπιστήμη, and μελέτη. In 1 pr. 26–27, starting from the insistence in natural ability for the system to have any effect, Quintilian concludes by noting that, in fact, the system is even more connected and interdependent. In fact, Quintilian claims, ingenium and studium are themselves ineffective (per se nihil prosunt) without—not just the traditional practice/μελέτη/exercitatio—but without a “skilled teacher” (sine doctore perito). To conclude the discussion here of the preface to book

190 Cf. Quintilian’s discussion in Inst. 2.19.
one: Quintilian’s vision makes the product of rhetorical training, the orator, a statesman, able and effective in managing res publicae and the cities of the empire. Quintilian further claims that this outcome requires not only natural ability, the precepts of technical rhetoric, and training, but also a skilled teacher. This will be the rhetor. Thus, the connection of Latin technical rhetoric and political power—as well as the rhetor’s central role here—is set from the beginning of the Institutio. But Quintilian does not stop here.

§4.3.3.3 Quintilian’s justificatory narrative (2.16)

As we have seen, in Quintilian’s first announcement of his vision for the ideal orator, the rhetor argues that this ideal is prepared to contribute to res publicae and take a share in governing Rome and its empire. This view is elaborated in the rest of the Institutio. But Quintilian devotes Inst. 2.16 precisely to the question of rhetoric’s usefulness, and this can be considered in detail here. Book two of the Institutio is bipartite and somewhat jarring in its contrasts.191 The first half of the book is overwhelmingly focused on practical considerations for the student just embarking on a rhetorical education, treating questions such as when a student should transfer from grammaticus to rhetor (2.1); what sort of qualities should be sought in a teacher (2.2); the preliminary exercises of rhetorical training, the progymnasmata (2.4); recommended reading for beginners (2.5); and advice related to the teaching (rather than learning) of declamation (2.6–10). But after this point Quintilian transitions and spends the rest of book two on more theoretical questions: his term of choice, rhetorice (2.14); its definition (2.15); whether it is useful (2.16); whether it is an ars and its relationship to other artes (2.17–18); whether it is a

virtus (2.20); and the nature of its materia (2.21). This is considerably heavier going than the first, pedagogic half of the book, and contains much of importance for understanding Quintilian’s view of rhetoric and his educational project.¹⁹² These chapters offer, in effect, the theoretical spine that supports the rest of the Institutio.

While there is much of interest in these sections, our focus will naturally fall on 2.16, where Quintilian considers the question “whether rhetoric is useful” (2.16.1: sequitur quaestio an utilis rhetorice). It is in this section that we can most clearly see Quintilian developing the justificatory narrative that had been advanced on Latin rhetoric’s behalf by Cicero.¹⁹³ This, in turn, provides the positive evidence for the currency of an argument in the Flavian period that in rhetoric there existed a discipline that provided some useful service for Rome and the men that ruled its empire—the kind of service that might warrant a salarium.

We can start with an overview of the structure of 2.16. The chapter breaks down into fairly clear divisions. After posing the quaestio in 2.16.1, Quintilian, as Cicero had done in de Invenzione 1.1, opens with a point of controversy, introducing immediately the charges sometimes leveled against rhetorice, which unlike the case of Cicero, is a term that Quintilian typically uses without hesitation, though even he sometimes speaks of eloquentia in its place.¹⁹⁴ The charges leveled against rhetoric (2.16.1–4) are then

¹⁹² See Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, xxxiv–I.
¹⁹³ For Ciceronian parallels in 2.16, see Sehlmeyer 1912, 16–17; more in Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006 ad loc. Cf. Cousin 1936, 1:144–46. The relationship between the passages has been known at least since Lorenzo Valla: see Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa 1996, 69–70 for Valla’s adnotationes on 2.16 with his notes on 2.16.1, 2.16.7, and 2.16.17 all indicating Quintilian’s Ciceronian heritage.
¹⁹⁴ The similarity in opening was noted already by Valla, in his adnotationes to the Institutio (Cesarini Martinelli and Perosa 1996, 69–70). Interestingly, though, Valla censures both Cicero and Quintilian for this opening (Cicero non prudenter in Rhetoricis et nonnihil in libris De oratore incepit a vitiis rhetorice artis sive criminibus confutandis, quod nunc Quintilianus facti)
answered by Quintilian first by demonstrating that parallel arguments result in absurdity (2.16.5–6) and therefore the objections against rhetoric cannot stand, and, second, by adducing a series of counterexamples (2.16.7–10), demonstrating that rhetoric is, in fact, absolutely beneficial. In these sections, as we will see, Quintilian deploys arguments recognizable from Cicero’s justificatory narrative, as his counterexamples start to shade closer to laudes eloquentiae. Quintilian draws a preliminary conclusion (2.16.10), that absolves the “arms of eloquence” (arma facundiae) of any fault, before advancing a stronger argument (2.16.11), namely that his definition of rhetoric necessarily forestalls any such objections in the first place, and, as a result, rhetoric must be admitted to be useful (utilem certe esse eam confitendum est). At this point Quintilian returns to laus eloquentiae (2.16.12–19), modifying especially Cicero’s proprium humanitatis argument, and ending with an image that once again places rhetoric and political power in close company.\(^{195}\) It will benefit the present argument to consider this section now in detail.\(^{196}\)

\(^{195}\) Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 278–81 make a case for Quintilian advancing two separate and compatible arguments in 2.16 on behalf of rhetoric’s usefulness: first, “defining the problem out of existence,” (279) which Quintilian does by leveraging his particular definition of rhetoric in 2.16.11; and second, an argument that Quintilian’s particular, Stoicizing variation of the proprium humanitatis argument makes rhetoric “conducive to the well-orderedness of the speaker’s soul, thereby enabling us to live in accordance with nature” (279). I have no objections to either of these, but given the interests of the present study, my reading of 2.16 will naturally want to add to these the political utility that Quintilian identifies in rhetoric in this chapter, particularly in 2.16.7–10 and in the finale at 2.16.19. To my mind these passages constitute a considerable additional argument: that rhetoric is useful for Rome and her masters.

\(^{196}\) Questions of influence, reference, and broader parallels are all generously treated for these sections in the recent and excellent comments in Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, ad loc., and I
The charges against *rhetorice* that Quintilian opens with are numerous: *eloquentia* frees the wicked from punishment, while condemning good men (2.16.2: *damnentur interim boni*). Under rhetoric’s influence, deliberations fare worse, while civil discord (*seditiones*), mobs (*turbæ populares*), and inexpiable—that is civil—wars (*bella etiam inexpiabilia*) are incited. And rhetoric is most effective in speaking against the truth on behalf of falsehoods (*maximus sit usus cum pro falsis contra veritatem valet*). The examples become more concrete (2.16.3): Socrates is adduced on the authority of the *comici*; the forefathers of the τέχνη, here Tisias and Gorgias, are similarly incriminated on the authority of Plato. By means of “destructive eloquence” (2.16.4: *perniciosa...eloquentia*), it is alleged that there are examples both Greek and Roman of men ruining the public order of cities (*turbaverint civitatum status vel everterint*). And it is for this reason that the power of speaking (*orandi potestatem*) was expelled from Sparta, and curtailed at Athens.

Such are the charges brought against rhetoric. Quintilian does away with them promptly. He starts by arguing that the accusations are too strong in their generalizations, and that no individual example of damage that was allegedly due to rhetoric should prove its lack of utility:

Quo quidem modo nec duces erunt utiles nec magistratus nec medicina nec denique ipsa sapientia: nam et dux Flaminius et Gracchi Saturnini Glaucae magistratus, et in medicis venena, et in iis qui philosophorum nomine male utuntur gravissima nonnumquam flagitia deprehensa sunt.

 gladly direct readers to their commentary for such matters. Accordingly, footnotes in what follows are spared from bearing this load, save for where such information seems essential.
Indeed, on these grounds neither generals nor magistrates nor medicine nor, finally, wisdom itself will be useful: for Flaminius was a general and the Gracchi and the Saturninuses and Glaucias were magistrates, and there have been discovered both poisons among doctors and sometimes the most serious disgraces among those who misuse the name “philosopher.”

Food causes illness, and roofs sometime collapse—but humans should obviously not forsake this pair (2.16.6). And so on, argues the rhetor. Quintilian then turns to counterexamples, and, in particular, Roman ones (2.16.7):

Num igitur negabitur deformem Pyrrhi pacem Caecus ille Appius dicendi viribus diremisse? Aut non divina M. Tulli eloquentia et contra leges agrarias popularis fuit et Catilinae fregit audaciam et supplicationes, qui maximus honor victoribus bello ducibus datur, in toga meruit?

Then will it be denied that the famous Appius Caecus destroyed the disgraceful peace proposals from Pyrrhus by his powers of speaking? Or did not the divine eloquence of Marcus Tullius, even against the agrarian laws, find popular backing, and did it not fracture Catiline’s temerity and earn him, in his toga, the supplications which are the greatest honors for victorious generals in war?
Quintilian’s move here is one that will be familiar from Cicero’s justificatory narrative. At Inv. 1.5, Cicero had similarly countered the evidence for the destructive results of ill-guided rhetoric with an appeal to glorious Roman exempla, there adducing Cato, Laelius, Africanus, and the Gracchi, men who had summa virtus, summa auctoritas and eloquentia, which was “a source of protection for the Republic” (rei publicae praesidio). Quintilian here modifies the argument with exempla that effectively bookend the tradition of Republican oratory: Appius Claudius Caecus’s speech de Pyrrho, the earliest known Roman speech that circulated as a written text, stands at the beginning of this tradition.\footnote{See in Malcovati, ORF\textsuperscript{2}, 1–4.} Already in these primordial days of Roman eloquence, we find Caecus saving the Republic from disgrace and effectively guiding Rome towards its glorious future by means of his rhetorical abilities. And on the other end Quintilian positions Cicero—“not so much now regarded the name of a man as the name of eloquence itself” (10.1.112: Cicero iam non hominis nomen sed eloquentiae habeatur)—as undoubtedly the fullest development and apex of that tradition, at least until the possible arrival of Quintilian’s perfect orator. And, like Appius, Cicero is displayed in a patriotic tableau, focused on his contributions to Rome (saving her from the tyranny of decemvirs and the villainy of Catiline, respectively), while also demonstrating that rhetoric yielded for him maximus honor. We will recall that in Cicero’s own laudes eloquentiae in Inv. 1.5, Cicero wrote of eloquentia that

\begin{quote}

nam hinc ad rem publicam plurima commoda veniunt, si moderatrix omnium rerum praesto est sapientia; hinc ad ipsos, qui eam adepti sunt, laus, honos, dignitas confluit.
\end{quote}
For from this source come a great many benefits to the Republic, if wisdom, which guides all things, is at hand; from this source praise, high esteem, and distinction come in abundance to the very men who have obtained it.

In Quintilian’s hands, the consul becomes the illustration of his own youthful vision. He had eloquence, provided the benefits to the Republic, and did indeed obtain as a result *maximus honor*. Quintilian’s counterexamples in 2.16 immediately begin to recreate Cicero’s justificatory narrative, which made rhetoric central to political success and civic stability.

Quintilian continues his counterarguments, adducing further ways that rhetoric is useful, while keeping his focus on Rome itself (2.16.8):

Non perterritos militum animos frequenter a metu revocat oratio et tot pugnandi pericula ineuntibus laudem vita potiorem esse persuadet? Neque vero me Lacedaemonii atque Athenienses magis moverint quam populus Romanus, apud quem summa semper oratoribus dignitas fuit.

Does not speech call back from fear the frightened hearts of soldiers and persuade them, as they start into the many dangers of combat, that praise is more valuable than life? Nor in truth do the Spartans and Athenians move me more than the Roman people, among whom there has always been the utmost distinction for orators.
Quintilian first turns here to the martial value of rhetoric. This too we find in Cicero, if less explicit, when, as in *Inv.* 1.3, for example, describing the role of *eloquentia* in the preservation of civic society, Cicero argued that *eloquentia* must have been a critical force in persuading men to cultivate loyalty and justice (*fidem*... *iustitiam*), and to decide “not only that efforts should to be undertaken for the sake of the common good, but also that they even ought to give up their lives for this” (*ac non modo labores excipiendos communis commodi causa, sed etiam vitam amittendam existimarent*). For Quintilian this too is a significant feature of the power of speech, but, as we can see, he ties this patriotic altruism more explicitly to the theater of war. Indeed, he returns to this point in his elaboration of the ideal orator at 12.1.28, where again Quintilian argues that it is through persuasion and the power of speech that men can be convinced to set aside fears of pending battle and embrace rather “patriotic duty, courage, and a vivid representation of honor” (*pietas et fortitudo et honesti praesens imago*). Just as in Cicero, where *eloquentia* was made a critical factor in the development of ideologies that could maintain and preserve cities, so also it plays this role in the vision of the Flavian rhetor.

His second point here, that *dignitas* is what, as a matter of tradition, follows the eloquent at Rome, is also a development of Cicero’s argument, which further highlights the appeal of rhetoric for Rome’s aristocracy. So we find *dignitas*, for example, in *Inv.* 1.5, just cited above, as a position of the eloquent, together with *laus* and *honos*. This argument from tradition, we will recall, was deployed by Cicero in the later instantiations of his justificatory narrative as well. In *Orat.* 141–142, for example, Cicero argues that it is indisputable that *eloquentia* has “always held supremacy in our state” (*in re publica

198 For the orator as *summus imperator*, cf. Fronto, *ad Ver. imp.* 2.20.
nostra primas eloquentia tenuerit semper) and, in contrast to technical knowledge of the law, it was eloquentia that contained the lion’s share of “influence, glory, and protection” (in altera gratiae gloriae praesidii plurimum esset). Accordingly, in Quintilian’s reassertion of the rhetor’s place at Rome, we see that central to his conception is eloquence’s ability to provide men who have obtained it the dignity they seek, as well as its role in preserving and protecting human communities.

And it is to the origins of these human communities that Quintilian turns next (2.16.9):

Equidem nec urbium conditores reor aliter effecturos fuisse ut vaga illa multitudo coiret in populos nisi docta voce commota, nec legum repertores sine summa vi orandi consecutos ut se ipsi homines ad servitutem iuris adstringerent.

Indeed, I do not imagine that the founders of cities would have been able to otherwise get that wandering multitude to coalesce into populations, unless by means of learned speech, nor without the supreme power of speaking could legislators have succeeded in having men bind themselves to slavery under the law.

Cicero had used his anthropological accounts to urge that rhetoric held this civilizing force, and benefitted communities ab ovo, for example in Inv. 1.2 and later in de Orat. 1.33–34. Quintilian similarly establishes rhetoric’s useful credentials already in the
formation of the institutions characteristic of human civilization. Rhetoric is necessary for
the creation of political units as well as for the institutions that provide their stability.\textsuperscript{199}

With such points established, Quintilian feels that he has made his point (2.16.10): \textit{If}—and this is an important qualification—the “arms of eloquence” could be used for either side \textit{(in utramque partem)}, the argument that they are wicked \textit{(malum)} is unreasonable, since rhetoric can “be used for the good” \textit{(quo bene uti licet)} as well. But the qualification is important, since, as Quintilian explains next (2.16.11), under his particular definition of rhetoric, “the science of speaking well” \textit{(bene dicendi scientia)}, rhetoric has a moral carapace, so to speak, that necessarily protects it from such attacks. As speaking “well” and “for the good” \textit{(bene)} is built into Quintilian’s definition, charges that rhetoric is being used maliciously will fail to stick, since, in Quintilian’s view, that will not truly be rhetoric.\textsuperscript{200} Similarly, a man misusing the \textit{arma facundiae} for ill is not to be confused with a true orator, who is, by definition, a \textit{vir bonus}. Again, the strength of Quintilian’s moral insistence is notable. A prominent explanation of this ties it to the political circumstances under which Quintilian wrote, namely the rise of \textit{delatores} under the empire—and I will not be one to discourage seeking explanations through historical context.\textsuperscript{201} But it is also worth noting that, as Quintilian develops Cicero’s justificatory narrative, his conception also effectively prevents attacks on rhetoric or admission of any

\textsuperscript{199} But Quintilian does not believe that rhetoric was brought to human beings by the founders of cities, lawgivers, or a civilizing hero, as Cicero’s account in \textit{Inv.} suggests. Instead, it comes from nature/the divine, as Quintilian explains in his version of the \textit{proprium humanitatis} argument in \textit{Inst.} 2.16.12–19. Indeed, Quintilian explicitly rebuts Cicero on this point, noting that rhetoric is a broader attribute that does not necessarily entail cities and laws, adducing the evidence of nomadic communities in \textit{Inst.} 3.2.4. Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 289–90 believe that Quintilian’s account at 3.2.4 is incompatible with the present one, but I fail to see why that must be so. On 3.2, see comments in Adamietz 1966, 83–85; Taylor 1970, 83–87.

\textsuperscript{200} Cf. Winterbottom 1998, 323.

\textsuperscript{201} Winterbottom 1964.
history of malicious *eloquentia*, as Cicero himself even admits to in his narrative (e.g., *Inv.* 1.4). This possibility, it must be admitted, makes Cicero’s conception of rhetoric morally neutral, and while potentially useful, it is also potentially dangerous. Quintilian’s definition solves this problem, because rhetoric is useful by definition: “if in fact rhetoric is the science of speaking well, the definition which we follow, and the result is that the orator is, first of all, a good man, it must be admitted that it is certainly useful” (2.16.11: *Si vero est bene dicendi scientia, quem nos finem sequimur, ut sit orator in primis vir bonus, utilem certe esse eam confitendum est*).

In the next stretch of 2.16, sections 12–17, Quintilian moves further into *laudes eloquentiae*, arguing that speech is the fundamental and distinguishing characteristic of human beings—even more so than rationality, for which Quintilian finds parallels elsewhere in the natural world. But it is speech that is the greatest bequest to mankind from the gods, the demiurge, and nature (2.16.12 *deus ille princeps, parens rerum fabricatorque mundi*; 2.16.17 *a dis*; cf. 3.2.1 *ab ipsa rerum natura*). The special place of speech for human beings, as Cicero had argued in *Inv.* 1.5 and *de Orat.* 1.32–33, makes rhetoric all the more worth our attention and care. Rhetoric offers the best available means of distinction over other men (2.16.17: *in quo malimus praestare hominibus quam quo ipsi homines ceteris animalibus praestant?*) and provides the greatest return on labor in the form of the fullest gratia (2.16.18: *eo quidem magis quod nulla in parte plenius labor gratiam refert*). And touching again on his optimistic exhortation, which we saw above he had already established in his first preface, there is still room for progress in eloquence (*et adhuc augeri potest*).

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Quintilian concludes his section with a *praeteritio* that unites the *proprium humanitatis* argument with his theme of the usefulness of rhetoric for political life, driving the point home (2.16.19):

Nam ut omittam defendere amicos, regere consiliis senatum populum, exercitum in quae velit ducere, quam sit utile conveniatque bono viro: nonne pulchrum vel hoc ipsum est, ex communi intellectu verbisque quibus utuntur omnes tantum adsequi laudis et gloriae ut non loqui et orare, sed, quod Pericli contigit, fulgurare ac tonare videaris?

And this is to say nothing of how useful it (sc. rhetoric) is, and suitable for a good man, to defend his friends, to direct the senate and people with his sound advice, to lead an army where he wishes: is not this a noble thing, to obtain such a degree of praise and glory from the shared faculty of understanding and the words which all use such that you do not seem to speak and plead, but, like Pericles, seem to flash lightning and thunder?

Thus Quintilian starts with an explicit reference to the usefulness (*quam sit utile*) of rhetoric for political life, and then, opening the floodgates a bit for his finale, ends with a

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203 Punctuating to take *populum* with *regere* (as Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006) rather than with *ducere* (as Russell 2001, 1:377: “to lead a people or an army”); on the problems in this passage, see the discussion in Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 299. Note that *regere consilio/consiliis* is a standard way to say “to direct with sound advice,” and the presence of *regere* does not need to refer to the imperial monarchy. On the use, see *TLL* s.v. *consilium* 4:454.64–67 (Gudeman) and, e.g., *Ter. Eu.* 58 (already); *Cic. Man.* 59 (*Etenim talis est vir, ut nulla res tanta sit ac tam difficultis, quam ille non et consilio regere… possit*); *Sen. Tro.* 358–59 (*…quid iubeat deus / effare, Calchas, nosque consilio rege*); *Tac. Dial.* 36.5 (*cum et populum et senatum consilio et auctoritate regerunt*), looking back to Republican statesmen.
vivid image: the power of speech transformed into lightning bolts and the roar of thunder.\textsuperscript{204} The application of rhetoric for defending friends, obtaining political influence, and even guiding armies will all be familiar now in the justificatory narrative of Cicero, recreated by the Flavian rhetor. So too \textit{laus} and \textit{gloria}, the hopes of the ambitious Roman, we have seen before as the attainments of rhetoric.

Note though, that the image of the thundering eloquence of Pericles, is new to the \textit{an utile} arguments as we have examined them in the present study—but it is not a new image. Thunder and lightning, in fact, had a long tradition of representing the combination of rhetorical power and political power, united, since Attic Old Comedy, around the archetype of Pericles.\textsuperscript{205} Revived at Rome by Cicero, this symbolism seems to have found new popularity in the high empire.\textsuperscript{206} To further clarify that Quintilian here is pointing exactly to the relationship between rhetoric and political power, a pair of related passages can be touched on briefly—one preceding the \textit{Institutio}, one following. First, the elder Pliny, dedicating his \textit{Naturalis Historia} to Titus, writes of the emperor: “in no one does the dictatorial power of eloquence ever flash lightning more truly, the tribunician power of fluency! With such great speech you thunder your father’s praises!” (\textit{Nat.} 1 pr. 5: \textit{fulgurat in nullo umquam verius dictatoria vis eloquentiae, tribunicia potestas facundiae. quanto tu ore patris laudes tonas!}). And further into the high empire, in 164 CE, the orator Fronto writes to the emperor Lucius Verus, stationed on the Eastern frontier following advances in Armenia and Syria (\textit{ad Ver. Imp.} 8–9):

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{204} On the image in Quintilian, see Assfahl 1932, 126, \textit{s.v. fulmen}, and further below. \\
\textsuperscript{205} See Reinhardt and Winterbottom 2006, 300 and, for the Attic context, Olson 2002, 211. \\
\textsuperscript{206} Originating in the extant Roman tradition in Cic. \textit{Orat.} 29, where Ciceroattributes the image to Aristophanes (see \textit{Ach.} 530–31) having mistakenly cited Eupolis in an early version of the work (\textit{Att.} 12.6a.1 = 242 SB): Yon 1964, viii with n. 3.
\end{flushright}
ne fulmen quidem aequae terreret, nisi cum tonitru caderet. ea ipsa tonandi potestas non Diti patri neque Neptuno neque dis ceteris, sed imperatori summo Iovi tradita est, ut fragoribus nubium et sonoribus procellarum, velut quibusdam caelestibus vocibus, altissimum imperium a contemptu vindicaret. Igitur si verum imperatorem generis humani quaebris, eloquentia vestra imperat, eloquentia mentibus dominatur.

Not even the lightning bolt would terrify as it does, if it did not fall with thunder. This very power of thundering was not bestowed upon father Dis, Neptune, or the other gods, but upon the highest emperor, Jupiter, that with the crash of clouds and the sound of gales, with, as it were, certain words from heaven, he could protect his most exalted imperium from scorn. So, if you are seeking the true emperor of mankind, your eloquentia rules, eloquentia is master over minds.

Quintilian’s closing answer to the an utile question is, in short, a kind of masterstroke, uniting the theme of rhetoric’s connection to political power within a potent symbol. We turned to Quintilian as part of our search for evidence: why might rhetoric have seemed useful to a Roman emperor? As we have seen, the justificatory narrative that Cicero crafted for rhetoric, in which he connected it to Roman political life in the Republic, comes roaring back in Quintilian’s Institutio. Like his consular predecessor, Quintilian articulates a vision for rhetoric that connects it to political success, civic stability, and power. The justificatory narrative was alive and well under the high empire.
§4.4 Conclusion: Seeing Quintilian in context

A summary of the argument of this chapter is in order. We started by trying to understand Quintilian’s connection to Vespasian and the related salarium. Current scholarship on this issue nearly always notes the novelty of Quintilian’s situation, and the best available explanation of the salarium makes it a proclamation of imperial virtues, another demonstration of the liberalitas of the empire’s greatest euergetist. By looking back to the diachronic study of Latin rhetorical education and Roman political power that has preceded this chapter, the present chapter has advanced the status quaestionis in two ways. First, Quintilian’s relationship with political power was brought into sharp relief prosopographically (§4.2): his relationship with the Flavians exhibited continuity with what preceded. By the time Vespasian took power, it was not unusual for a leading Latin rhetor and the men who ruled Rome and her empire to be in close company; such was the position of Latin rhetorical education in the courts of imperial Rome.

But in one respect Quintilian’s relationship with political power was exceptional, and this was the salarium. Turning to this point in §4.3, I started by complicating the best available explanation. As any imperial action has a tendency to be referred to the emperor’s virtues, this becomes more of a blanket category than a particular explanation. Furthermore, making the salarium a proclamation of the emperor’s liberalitas and a euergetistic display overlooks the fact that this was no ordinary handout. Salaria, instead, were most commonly given to procuratores, governors, and imperial secretaries. What did these groups have in common? I suggested that one common denominator was the way that these groups all provided some useful service to Rome and its emperor. What about a Latin rhetor? How might he have been useful? Early in the history of Latin
rhetoric, Cicero had provided a justificatory narrative that claimed for rhetoric a place in Roman politics, and made it a discipline crucial for political success and civic flourishing. Now following this track, we find in Quintilian a recreation of this narrative. If providing a useful service for Rome was crucial for being offered a *salarium*, it is clear enough that Quintilian, at least, had arguments that made his discipline just that. The current euergetism model is here modified by emphasizing reciprocity, taking into account that the *salarium* was recompense for the value of the kind of education that was being offered by Quintilian, as justified in the narrative that was inaugurated at Rome by Cicero.

In the end, combining arguments and methodologies is perhaps most useful. Since the late Republic, rhetors and the holders of political power had been closely united. When Rome transitioned from Republic to empire, this relationship transitioned with it, and became part of the culture of the imperial court and its aristocracy. Meanwhile, the masters of rhetoric produced arguments for rhetoric’s place in Roman political life that remained remarkably consistent for over a century and a half. Rhetoric, it was argued, enabled political power, and its cultivation coincided with civic flourishing. Is it likely to be a coincidence that rhetors and the holders of political power had been so connected since Latin rhetoric’s emergence in the late Republic? Or is it more likely the case that Cicero and Quintilian’s message, that rhetors led to political success, was increasingly common currency among the imperial court and its prospective members?

When Cicero originally made the argument in the late Republic, it was at a time when a Roman aristocrat’s engagement with *Graecae litterae* and their ilk may have been perceived of as a problem. But what about Quintilian? After generations of the rulers of
Rome working alongside the masters of rhetoric, are his laudes eloquentiae, perhaps, no longer doing the heavy lifting of creating a theoretically acceptable space for rhetoric within Roman mores, but rather more reaffirming the consensus? To put it a different way, from Cicero to Quintilian, have we, perhaps, shifted from the history of ideas to l’histoire des mentalités—or at least the mentalités of the elite? I think this is quite likely. With a century and a half of close connections between rhetors and the governing aristocracy, the force of mos will itself have by then have suggested that this activity was useful. The justificatory narrative and the long-term connections thus will have operated in tandem to support the belief that rhetoric was useful for ruling Rome and its empire. Long recognized as related rhetorical common places, reading Cicero and Quintilian’s epideictic justifications for rhetoric alongside the social evidence uncovered by prosopographical investigation helps us see that the words of their narratives were not “mere rhetoric,” and that the social action of epideictic, the power of speech, had real consequences. Thus, this is not simply the story of the emperor’s virtue and euergetism: it is the story of the masters of eloquence and the masters of empire. The present study, from the first chapter to the last, in fact takes us beyond Quintilian’s situation. The result is an interdisciplinary disciplinary history, that helps us see how, at Rome between the first century BCE and the first century CE, the art of rhetoric sought to become the master discipline for Rome’s masters. This is a point that I will return to, via a comparison, in the general conclusion that follows.
Conclusion: The Master Discipline for Rome’s Masters

This study began as an attempt to understand a particular part of Roman antiquity, namely Quintilian’s connection to the emperor Vespasian and the related *salarium*. Questions left unanswered in previous treatments of the problem prompted an investigation that has taken us well beyond Quintilian. I have argued that Quintilian’s situation was, on the one hand, conditioned by over 150 years of connections between Latin rhetors and Rome’s governing aristocracy and, on the other hand, that Latin rhetoric as a discipline had successfully positioned itself to appeal to Rome’s rulers by means of a justificatory narrative that contended that technical rhetoric was crucial for political success and civic flourishing. In conclusion, I would like to place the present study in its broader context by discussing how the present work speaks to the social distribution of knowledge in antiquity, and, very briefly, the *Nachleben* of this particular mix of institutionalized rhetorical education, politics, and power.

We can start with a comparison. Rhetoric was one of many Greek *téχναι* that made their way to Rome and became *artes*. It existed alongside, for example, astronomy, medicine, architecture, and philosophy. Among these, philosophy was perhaps the chief intellectual competition that rhetoric faced. The art of wisdom, of course, differed from rhetoric in many ways, but one way worth considering here involves its audience and its inclusiveness. The Hellenistic varieties of philosophy that reached ancient Rome had a certain popularizing element, and promised well being and flourishing to those willing to learn and live by the precepts of their sects. Cicero, for example, writing of the absence
of philosophical writings in Latin by Peripatetics, Stoics, and Academics, describes the writings of a certain Gaius Amafinius,\(^1\) an Epicurean who fostered his sect’s hold in Italy (*Tusc. 4.6–7*):

…cum interim illis silentibus C. Amafinius extitit dicens, cuius libris editis commota multitudo contulit se ad eam potissimum disciplinam, sive quod erat cognitu perfacilis, sive quod invitabantur inlecebris blandis voluptatis, sive etiam, quia nihil erat prolatum melius, illud quod erat tenebant. post Amafinium autem multi eiusdem aemuli rationis multa cum scripsissent, Italiam totam occupaverunt, quodque maxumum argumentum est non dici illa subtiliter, quod et tam facile ediscantur et ab indoctis probentur, id illi firmamentum esse disciplinae putant.

…meanwhile, with the others left silent, Gaius Amafinius appeared speaking, and a crowd, roused by the publication of his books, turned to that teaching most of all, whether because it was simple to understand, or because they were enticed by the seductive allures of pleasure, or even, because nothing better had been brought forth, they were holding on to what was available. Further, after Amafinius, when many of the same zealous bent had written a great deal, they took hold of all of Italy, and they reckon that their discipline’s chief support is what is actually the strongest argument that their precepts are not said with precision, namely, the fact that they are so easily learned and are approved by men of no learning.

\(^1\) On Amafinius, see *RE* I.2:1714 (Klebs); Castner 1988, 7–11.
The Epicureans, the sect that most “approached almost missionary zeal in promoting the spread of its teachings,” were nevertheless not alone in opening their discipline to a wider population.\textsuperscript{2} The equestrian Stoic philosopher Musonius Rufus, for example, lectured to an audience of disciples that included the slave Epictetus.\textsuperscript{3} To take a chronological step back, among the extant sermones of Teles the Cynic, we find a story about his fellow-Cynic, Crates of Thebes. Once, sitting in a cobbler’s workshop and reading Aristotle’s Protrepticus, addressed to the Cyprian king Themision, Crates objected to Aristotle’s notion that wealth somehow provided advantages for the pursuit of philosophy. Rather, looking to the cobbler Philiscus, Crates remarks: “I think, Philiscus, that I will write a Protrepticus for you; for I see that you have more advantages for philosophical thought than the man for whom Aristotle has written” (Teles IV\textsuperscript{B}, p. 46 Hense = Arist. Protr. A1 Düring: ἐγὼ μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Φιλίσκε, γράφειν πρὸς σὲ προτρεπτικῶν· πλείω γὰρ ὀργὸ σοι ὑπάρχοντα πρὸς τὸ φιλοσοφῆσαι (ἡ) ὃ ἔγραψεν Ἀριστотέλης). In fact, the idea that philosophy is best pursued by the poor and common man became something of a Cynic tradition.\textsuperscript{4} On the other hand, we find philosophers like Aristotle encouraging the discipline to seek more distinguished audiences. Plutarch, for example, in his Maxime cum Principibus Philosopho Esse Disserendum, argues that while philosophers indeed offer solace to private citizens, they can do more good by associating with rulers and statesmen (Mor. 776F–777A):

\textsuperscript{2} H. Jones 1989, 64.
\textsuperscript{3} For Epictetus’s servile status at Rufus’s lectures, see Arr. Epict. 1.7.32–33; 1.9.29.
\textsuperscript{4} See Hock 1976.
καὶ μὴν ὁ τοῦ φιλοσόφου λόγος, ἕαν μὲν ἰδιώτην ἕνα λάβῃ, χαίροντα ἀπραγμοσύνη καὶ περιγράφοντα ἑαυτόν ὡς κέντρῳ καὶ διαστήματι γεωμετρικῷ ταῖς περὶ τὸ σῶμα χρείαις, οὐ διαδίδοσιν εἰς ἑτέρους, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ἑνὶ ποιήσας ἐκείνῳ γαλήνην καὶ ἓσυχίαν ἀπεμαράνθη καὶ συνεξέλιπεν. ἂν δ᾽ ἄρχοντος ἀνδρός καὶ πολιτικοῦ καὶ πρακτικοῦ καθάψῃται καὶ τούτῳ ἁναπλήσῃ καλοκαγαθίας, πολλοὺς δι᾽ ἑνὸς ὀφέλησεν, ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας Περικλεῖ Συγγενόμενος καὶ Πλάτων Δίωνι καὶ Πυθαγόρας τοῖς πρωτεύουσιν Ἰταλιωτῶν.

In fact the discourse of the philosopher, if it takes hold of a private individual, rejoicing in his freedom from politics and circumscribing himself with the needs of the body, like a compass point and a measured radius, is not distributed to others, but, having created peace and calm in that one man, it wastes away and perishes together with the individual. But if it takes hold of a ruler and statesman and a man of action, and fills him with nobleness, it benefits many through the agency of one, like Anaxagoras associating with Pericles, and Plato and Dion, and Pythagoras and the chief men of Italy.

Philosophy thus potentially targeted all levels of society: slaves, rulers, rich and poor—even the women in Epicurus’s Garden.⁵

All of this brings rhetoric’s situation into sharp relief. Compared to its competition, rhetoric went in an entirely different direction regarding issues of audience. For rhetoric at Rome, there would never have been a reason to write a treatise like Plutarch’s, encouraging the masters of the ars to reach out to rulers and statesmen. Latin

rhetors were never interested in teaching their *praeeptae* to slaves, the poor, women, or parts of society that were in any sense marginalized. Rhetoric was interested only in the powerful; it sought to rule. While focused on answering a question about Quintilian, this study—though prosopographical networks and justificatory narratives—has revealed how rhetorical knowledge and expertise was socially distributed at Rome. Rhetoric sought to become the master discipline\(^6\) for Rome’s masters.

That the knowledge of rhetoric was so skewed in its distribution in antiquity may, on reflection, seem almost like an obvious point. But in the preceding chapters we have seen that there actually remain a number of misunderstandings about this issue, ranging from claims of widespread aristocratic hostility toward the discipline in the Republic, to declamation as a marginal activity for strange stylists in the Julio-Claudian period, to Vespasian’s supposed break with tradition in supporting a Latin rhetor. This study reveals that rhetorical education and political power went hand in hand at Rome. Furthermore, the contrast with Hellenistic philosophical sects helps us see that the way rhetoric was distributed at Rome was not, in fact, an inevitable result. It was contingent, and one of the special and defining characteristics of the manifestation of the discipline in that particular historical context. The present work, which pursues the history of rhetoric not through catalogues of tropes and arguments, but by seeing rhetoric as a social and cultural phenomenon, makes this feature—rhetoric’s relationship to power at Rome—visible in ways hitherto not possible.

\(^6\) E.g., Cic. *de Orat.* 1.30: *haec una res in omni libero populo maximeque in pacatis tranquillisque civitatibus praecipue semper floruit semperque dominata est*; 3.76: *illa vis autem eloquentiae tanta est ut… rem publicam regat…*; Fronto, *ad Ver. Imp.* 9: *...si verum imperatorem generis humani quaeritis, eloquentia vestra imperat, eloquentia mentibus dominatur.*
I would like to conclude with a further comparison, exploring how the relationship between rhetorical education and Roman political power that we have been examining here impacted the reception of rhetoric beyond Rome. In 1806, the United States witnessed the creation of its first chair of rhetoric, the Boylston Professorship of Rhetoric and Oratory at Harvard College. The Professorship was created by an endowment of £1,500 left to Harvard for that purpose in the will of the late Nicholas Boylston. Boylston had been successful in the Boston mercantile community, and was from a family that had been active in such beneficent contributions in the area. While Boylston had passed away on 18 August 1771, it had taken Harvard until 1806 to establish the professorship intended by his legacy, and then apparently after pressure from the executors of Boylston’s estate. The committee in charge of the appointment finally selected a suitable candidate, and on 12 June 1806, the sitting senator of Massachusetts and future president, John Quincy Adams, was installed as the first Boylston professor, the first professor of rhetoric in America.

Adams gave a series of 36 lectures on rhetoric and oratory while holding the chair, as his duties in the senate allowed. He resigned the chair in 1809 to embark to St. Petersburg as United States Minister to Russia. His lectures, including his inaugural oration, were published the following year as *Lectures on Rhetoric and Oratory*, in two

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7 On the Boylston Professorship, see Goodfellow 1946; Ried 1959; Reid 1959; Auer and Banninga 1963. Rhetoric had previously occupied a place in the curriculum at Harvard, but it was divided among tutors in various disciplines. It seems that in 1794, for example, the Hancock Professor of Hebrew and Other Oriental Languages carried a substantial responsibility in this area (Goodfellow 1946, 375).
volumes. The art of rhetoric that Adams lays out in his lectures is classical. As he explains:

In the theory of the art, and the principles of exposition, novelty will not be expected; nor is it perhaps to be desired. A subject, which has exhausted the genius of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quinctilian, can neither require nor admit much additional illustration. To select, combine, and apply their precepts, is the only duty left for their followers of all succeeding times, and to obtain a perfect familiarity with their instructions is to arrive at the mastery of the art. (Adams 1810, 1:28–29)

While the Lectures offer a great deal of interest for the study of rhetoric in early America, I would here like to close the present study by pointing to two passages of particular interest, both from the inaugural oration. In the first, Adams offers his own commentary on the theme of the relationship between rhetoric and power. Readers of this study will find much familiar here:

There is always a certain correspondence and proportion between the estimation, in which an art is held, and the effects, which it produces. In the flourishing periods of Athens and Rome, eloquence was power. It was at once the instrument and the spur to ambition. The talent of public speaking was always the key to the highest dignities; the passport to the supreme dominion of the state. The rod of

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8 Note that Adams here parted ways with the contemporary Belles Lettres movement: see Rathbun 2000, 176–78. Adams’s Lectures, rather “represent the first attempt by an American to reunite rhetorical theory with classical doctrine” (Auer and Banninga 1963, 119).
Hermes was the sceptre of empire; the voice of oratory was the thunder of Jupiter.  

(Adams 1810, 1:19; emphasis Adams)

Eloquence, power, political influence, and the thunder of Jupiter: all are significant points of rhetoric’s justificatory narrative, as created by its supporters in the Roman world. And Adams’s proposed correlation between perception and effect reminds us of the role that rhetoric’s justificatory narrative played in establishing the discipline at Rome, where, as we have seen, rhetoric was argued to be the “sceptre of empire” and the “thunder of Jupiter.”

But for Adams, the possibilities afforded by rhetoric were not confined to antiquity. Adams provides a brief historical narrative, tracing rhetoric from Rome’s fall into the “midnight of the monkish ages, when with the other liberal arts she slumbered in the profound darkness of the cloister” (1810, 1:20). Rhetoric reawakened with “the revival of letters in modern Europe” (1:21) though it has failed in modern languages to achieve what it was able to in ancient Greece and Rome. In these pages Adams is sensitive to historical changes. He acknowledges, for example, that rhetoric now plays an important role in a field in which it was absent in antiquity, namely religion, the eloquence of the pulpit, and that this played a critical role in rhetoric’s transmission and survival. “The art of embalming thought by oratory,” Adams explains, “like that of embalming bodies by aromatics, would have perished, but for the exercises of religion” (1:24). As he reaches his peroration, Adams addresses his new students and imagines three career paths for the budding orator: the cloth, the bar, or something more patriotic. He saves the most important possibility for last:
Sons of Harvard! You, who are ascending with painful step and persevering toil the eminence of science, to prepare yourselves for the various functions and employments of the world before you, it cannot be necessary to urge upon you the importance of the art, concerning which I am speaking… Is there among you a youth, whose bosom burns with the fires of honorable ambition; who aspires to immortalize his name by the extent and importance of his services to his country; whose visions of futurity glow with the hope of presiding in her councils, of directing her affairs, of appearing to future ages on the rolls of fame, as her ornament and pride? Let him catch from the relics of ancient oratory those unresisted powers, which mould the mind of man to the will of the speaker, and yield the guidance of a nation to the dominion of the voice.

Under governments purely republican, where every citizen has a deep interest in the affairs of the nation, and, in some form of public assembly or other, has the means and opportunity of delivering his opinions, and of communicating his sentiments by speech; where government itself has no arms but those of persuasion; where prejudice has not acquired an uncontroled ascendency, and faction is yet confined within the barriers of peace; the voice of eloquence will not be heard in vain. March then with firm, with steady, with undeviating step, to the prize of your high calling. Gather fragrance from the whole paradise of science, and learn to distil from your lips all the honies of persuasion. Consecrate, above all, the faculties of your life to the cause of truth, of freedom, and of humanity. So shall your country ever gladden at the sound of your voice, and every talent,
added to your accomplishments, become another blessing to mankind. (Adams 1810, 1:29–31; emphasis Adams)

Thousands of miles from Rome, and nearly two millennia separated from Quintilian, rhetoric first entered the educational institutions of a new nation. In this context, Adams looked back to the past, and once again connected rhetorical education with political power.


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