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APPLICATION OF SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION TO
CROSS-BORDER HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN TURKEY

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Drug use and trafficking is one of the most significant problems of today’s society. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control Program, 16 million people are described as problem drug users meaning they are dependent to illegal drugs in their daily life. Problems associated with illegal drugs are not only associated with people’s health but also related to economy, politics and social life. Illegal drug trafficking is a multi-billion dollar industry. When it spreads across society, illegal drug business is highly associated with judicial, political, and socio-economical instability in local communities.

Arguably one of the leading crime prevention theories is Situational Crime Prevention theory. Situational Crime Prevention seeks to reduce opportunities of specific crimes by increasing risk and reducing the awards. Positive effects of situational prevention strategies on street level crimes are well documented in rigorous academic studies. Although the situational approach has been successfully applied to street level crimes, there are few examples of application to macro level cross-border crimes.

This study will test whether international drug trafficking is suitable for application of situational crime prevention. Specifically, this study seeks to locate possible opportunity reduction points in the drug trafficking process. The study has three steps. First the nature and dimension of the drug trafficking in Turkey will be analyzed with specific data provided from Turkish National Police’s archives. Second, this data will be analyzed to identify the situational factors that facilitate drug trafficking. Finally, possible means of blocking opportunities for drug trafficking will be explored.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 9
  Importance of the Study .......................................................................................................................... 13
  Outline of the Study ................................................................................................................................. 14

CHAPTER II: Scope of Global Illegal Drug Production and Illicit Drug Consumption .................... 15
  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 15
  Scope of Global Illegal Drug Production and Illicit Drug Consumption ........................................... 15
  Scope of Opium Production and Opiate Consumption ........................................................................... 17
  Trafficking of Opiates ............................................................................................................................. 19
  Problems Related to Drug Trafficking .................................................................................................... 20
  Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 24

CHAPTER III: DRUG TRAFFICKING IN TURKEY ............................................................................. 25
  Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 25
  Turkey’s Unique Situation in Drug Trafficking ..................................................................................... 25
  The Scope of Drug Trafficking in Turkey .............................................................................................. 29
  Traffickers ............................................................................................................................................... 30
  Summary ................................................................................................................................................. 36

CHAPTER IV: SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION .......................................................................... 37
  Theoretical Development ........................................................................................................................ 37
  Methodology and Techniques .................................................................................................................. 40
  Applications and Effectiveness of Situational Crime Prevention ........................................................... 42
  Possible Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Drug Trafficking ........................................... 43
  Crime Triangle for Drug Trafficking ....................................................................................................... 44
  Places in Heroin Trafficking ................................................................................................................... 45
  Handlers and Managers in Drug Trafficking .......................................................................................... 46
  Summary ................................................................................................................................................ 47
# LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Figure 1</td>
<td>Heroin trafficking routes through Turkey and the region.</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 2</td>
<td>The crime triangle as adapted from Clarke and Eck (2008).</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 3</td>
<td>Drug-transaction triangle.</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 4</td>
<td>Flowchart of heroin trafficking through Turkey.</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 5</td>
<td>Place of birth of arrested traffickers, 2006 and 2007.</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 6</td>
<td>Amount of heroin seized with connections to the Iranian border region.</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 7</td>
<td>Types of vehicles used in domestic trafficking.</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 8</td>
<td>Amount (kg) of heroin seized in different types of vehicles.</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 9</td>
<td>Heroin seizures (kg), by region.</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 10</td>
<td>Heroin seizures (kg) in different trafficking processes.</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 11</td>
<td>Types of vehicles used in heroin exports.</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 12</td>
<td>Average amount (kg) of heroin trafficked by different methods.</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 13</td>
<td>Concentration of drug trafficking in geographic regions of Turkey.</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 14</td>
<td>Types of vehicles used in domestic trafficking.</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 15</td>
<td>Regions of lorry seizures.</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 16</td>
<td>Plate registration of vehicles seized with heroin.</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 17</td>
<td>Location of heroin stashes in cars and vans.</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 18</td>
<td>Location of heroin stashes in lorries.</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 19</td>
<td>Number of arrests in random searches and planned operations.</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 20</td>
<td>Heroin trafficking routes in Turkey.</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 21</td>
<td>Percent of heroin seizures by routes.</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 22</td>
<td>Prices of heroin.</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 23</td>
<td>Heroin seizures according to type of place where the drugs were found.</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Figure 24</td>
<td>Situational decision-making model.</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF TABLES

Table 1  Heroin Seizures in Turkey ................................................................. 30
Table 2  Situational Crime Prevention Techniques ....................................... 42
Table 3  Data Sources and Analysis Matrix for the Three Research Questions ... 51
Table 4  Variables of Interest Derived from Annual Heroin Statistics for Turkey. 52
Table 5  Variables of Interest in Vehicle and Driver Characteristics Data .......... 54
Table 6  Number of interview Subjects by Provinces and Regions .................... 55
Table 7  Number of Heroin Incidents in Provinces in 2006 and 2007 ............... 56
Table 8  Factors That Facilitate Heroin Trafficking ....................................... 101
Table 9  Situational Prevention Strategies at the Import Stage of Heroin Trafficking at Illegal Border Crossings .............................................. 108
Table 10 Situational Prevention Strategies at the Import Stage of Heroin Trafficking at Legal Border Crossings ............................................ 109
Table 11 Situational Prevention Strategies for Storage of Heroin in Eastern Turkey in Villages, Towns and Rural Areas Near the Border ............ 110
Table 12 Situational Prevention Strategies for Domestic Trafficking of Heroin in Turkey along Highways and in Cities from Eastern Turkey to Western Turkey ...................................................... 111
Table 13 Situational prevention strategies for storage of heroin in Urban Areas of Western Turkey ................................................................... 112
Table 14 Situational Prevention Strategies for Exporting Heroin from Turkey via Border Gates, Seaports, and Routes to Border Gates ............. 114
Table 15 Situational Prevention Strategies for Exporting Heroin from Turkey via Airports ................................................................. 115
Table 16 Situational Prevention Strategies by Increasing Efforts ....................... 116
Table 17 Situational Prevention Strategies by Reducing Rewards ..................... 117
Table 18 Situational Prevention Strategies by Reducing Excuses ..................... 118
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This dissertation explores drug trafficking in Turkey from the perspective of situational crime prevention. Positive effects of situational prevention strategies on street-level drug markets are well documented in rigorous academic studies (Clarke, 1997). However, international drug trafficking, which is more complex than street-level drug markets, has not been studied from the perspective of situational crime prevention.

Drug use and trafficking are two of the most significant problems of today’s society (Bagley, 2001). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), approximately 200 million people worldwide between 15 and 64 years of age use drugs at least once a year. This is equivalent to 5 percent of the world’s total population. Among these users, 16 million people are described as problem drug users, meaning that they are dependent on illegal drugs in their daily lives. Eleven million of the problem drug users abuse heroin (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

Problems associated with illegal drugs are associated not only with people’s health but also with economics, politics, and social life (Bagley, 2001; Madi, 2003; Makarenko, 2002; Chris, 2001). Illegal drug trafficking is a multibillion dollar industry. Authorities estimate that the total revenue of the global illegal drug industry ranges from $300 billion to $500 billion (Cakir, 2002). This amount is equivalent of 8% of the entire legal international trade and is greater than the world steel industry or car industry (Madi, 2003). When looking at the United States, approximately 13 million U.S. drug users spent roughly $67 billion for illegal drugs in 1999 (Bagley, 2001).
When it spreads across society, the illegal drug business is highly associated with judicial, political, and socioeconomic instability in local communities (Fenepetov, 2004; Makarenko, 2002; Madi, 2003; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). In countries where drug-related crime is widespread, organized criminal groups gain economic and political strengths that disable the ability of local governments to fight crime and corruption (Fenepetov, 2004; Madi, 2003).

The significant profits related to illegal drug trafficking have attracted organized crime groups, including terrorist organizations, into this illegal market (Chris, 2001). The involvement of terrorist organizations and organized crime groups in drug trafficking has been well documented by official reports and academic studies (Cakir, 2002; Clutterbuck, 1990; Interpol, 1990).

Organized drug traffickers apply various methods to secure their market, including violence, terror tactics, and corruption of local officials (Curtis & Karacan, 2002). In Colombia during the mid 1980s, for example, drug cartels succeeded in establishing their own private armies, intimidating local judicial offices, and corrupting politicians (Bagley, 2001). In Afghanistan, the widespread drug business is one of the major sources of a decades-old conflict along with insecurity and instability in the region (Makarenko, 2002; Chouvy, 2005). During the Afghan civil war between 1992 and 1996, the opium trade was one of the major sources for Afghanistan warlords (Chouvy, 2005). After 1996 when the Taliban movement handed over the country, the drug business became the source of funds for radical terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda (Makarenko, 2002). In addition, local tribal leaders in rural Afghanistan who were involved in the drug business built their own armies to secure their business against rival organized criminal groups and law enforcement forces (Chouvy, 2005). In Mexico, organized
drug trafficking groups are blamed for the recent escalation of violence and the loss of up to 5,000 lives in two years.

Illegal drug trafficking is one of the most serious crimes that Turkish law enforcement addresses. Turkey is located between Asian opiate production (mainly heroin) sites and European drug demand. Heroin is trafficked from Afghanistan to the European the drug market primarily along the Balkan route, which includes Iran, Caucuses, Turkey and Balkan countries. According to the United Nations Office of Drug Control (World Drug Report, 2007), there are approximately 1.5 million heroin addicts in the European drug market. The same report indicates that annually 605 metric tons of opium are produced in Afghanistan. Turkey’s historical, cultural, and economic connection with Central Asian countries and easy access to Europe make Turkey an essential route for any kind of trade—including illegal drug trades. In short, Turkey is the geographic, cultural, and economic bridge between the Asian drug supply and the European drug demand.

Heroin is the primary drug trafficked through Turkey. Turkey and the Balkan route have traditionally been accepted as the major routes between Afghanistan and Europe. The latest United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime report (2007) predicts that 126 metric tons of heroin, roughly equivalent to $2 billion, was trafficked from Afghanistan to Europe in 2006 alone. The average price of 1 kg of heroin is between $15,000 and $20,000 in the European market.

Although heroin trafficking dominates the drug trafficking market, it is not the only drug trafficked through Turkey. Chemical precursors, which are essential for heroin production, flow in the opposite direction of the heroin trafficking routes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007; Turkish National Police, 2006). Moreover, synthetic drugs, which are popular in countries around the Persian Gulf, also are trafficked from Western Europe to the Middle East,
What is an effective way of preventing drug trafficking through Turkey? Arguably one of the leading crime prevention theories is situational crime prevention theory (Clarke, 1997). Situational crime prevention seeks to reduce the opportunities for specific crimes by increasing offenders’ costs and reducing their rewards (Clarke, 1997). The positive effects of situational crime prevention strategies on street level crimes are well documented in rigorous academic studies (Clarke, 1997; Eck, 1998). Although the situational approach has been applied successfully to street-level crimes, there are few examples of its application to upper-level cross-border crimes. Therefore, this study will be the leading study in the field with its application of situational crime prevention to transnational drug trafficking.

This study will test whether international drug trafficking is suitable for the application of situational crime prevention strategies. Specifically, this study seeks to locate possible opportunity reduction points in the drug trafficking process. Clarke (1997) suggested that standard research methodology for experimental situational crime prevention consists of five sequential stages, as follows:

These are (1) collection of data about the nature and dimensions of a specific crime problem, (2) analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crimes in question, (3) systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for these particular crimes, including analysis of costs, (4) implementation of the most promising, feasible, and economical measures, and (5) monitoring of results and dissemination of experience. (p. 93)
This study makes use of the first three steps of the suggested methodology. Therefore, first the nature and dimension of the drug trafficking in Turkey will be analyzed with specific data provided from Turkish National Police archives and interviews with officials working in the Turkish National Police’s Anti Smuggling and Organized Crime Department. Second, these data will be analyzed to identify the situational factors that facilitate drug trafficking. Finally, possible means of blocking opportunities for drug trafficking will be explored. Instead of implementing the findings in the fight against drug-related crime, this study could have policy implications for future studies.

**Importance of the Study**

The present study is important for three reasons. First, it is unique in its application of situational crime prevention to drug trafficking. Although the situational approach has been applied successfully to street-level crimes, there are few examples of its application to macro-level cross-border crimes. A few studies examine cross-border drug trafficking (Van Solinge, 1998; Natarajan and Belanger, 1998), but none had examined the application of situational crime prevention.

Second, this study is the only academic study conducted in Turkey that explores drug trafficking in detail. In this study, the drug trafficking archives of the Turkish National Police are systematically analyzed. Although the Turkish National Police use modern analytical tools to improve their law enforcement capabilities, this study is unique because it provides an up-close look at how drug trafficking happens on a case-by-case basis.

Third, Turkey is an excellent study site for the study of drug trafficking because the country serves as a bridge on global drug trafficking routes. Only a few countries, such as
Mexico, Colombia, and some Balkan countries, affect illegal drug trafficking in the same fashion. Therefore, the results of this study might carry valuable policy implications and crime prevention hints not only for Turkey but also for other countries on drug trafficking routes.

**Outline of the Study**

Chapter I introduced the study by providing background on the global drug trafficking problem and summarizing the purpose of the study. It also outlined the importance of this study and possible policy implications. Chapter II reviews global drug trafficking in terms of drug-related crime and the global drug crime nexus. Chapter III focuses on the drug trafficking problem in Turkey. This chapter provides detailed information about the scope of drug trafficking and the characteristics of drug trafficking in Turkey. Chapter IV describes situational crime prevention and provides information on how to apply situational crime prevention to drug trafficking in general.

Chapter V describes the methodology used in this study. In this chapter, the data gathering process, the method of analysis, and the research questions are provided. Chapters VI-IX report the findings of the analysis. Chapter VII describes the overall profile of heroin trafficking and shows the situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking. Chapter VIII describes possible opportunities for blocking techniques in heroin trafficking. Finally, chapter IX provides a summary of the study, a discussion of the limitations of the study, and implications for future research.
CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND OF DRUG TRAFFICKING PROBLEM IN THE WORLD

Introduction

This chapter describes the drug problem—from trafficking to addiction. This background chapter sets the context for the following chapters. Illegal drugs begin their journey from the production fields and go to street markets through the hands of international drug traffickers after chemical processing in clandestine laboratories. Because drug trafficking is the movement of illegal drugs from drug production areas to drug consumption areas, an analysis of drug trafficking requires some knowledge of the drug production process and drug-consumer markets. This knowledge helps explain why some drug trafficking routes have been established.

Scope of Global Illegal Drug Production and Illicit Drug Consumption

Illegal drug trafficking is a worldwide, multibillion dollar business, and drug abuse is one of the major problems in societies around the world. Four main substances have dominated the illegal drug market: heroin, cocaine, cannabis, and synthetic drugs. Though heroin is mainly produced in Asia, cocaine is produced in South America; and cannabis is produced locally, except in Europe, which imports its cannabis from Northern Africa. The source of synthetic drugs is varied and generally concentrated in regional hubs (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2003; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2006, 2007; International Narcotics Control Board, 2007).

Because the illegal drug business is a hidden activity, there is no precise estimate of the scope of illegal drug markets (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). However,
there are loose estimates. A number of leading organizations that monitor the illegal drug market make general predictions of the scope of the illegal drug market. One of the most rigorous predictions comes from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, in cooperation with local governments and relevant national authorities, conducts “drug crop monitoring surveys” every year to predict global drug production for heroin, cocaine, and cannabis. The organization tracks yearly changes in areas under illegal cultivation.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s prediction, Afghanistan alone produces about 80% of the global heroin supply and dominates the market for this drug. Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia together supply all of the world’s cocaine. Africa is the main source for the European cannabis market but, for the rest of the world, cannabis is produced locally. While the Netherlands and Eastern Europe are regional centers for European synthetic drugs, North America and Southeast Asia produce their own synthetic drugs. Globally, there is almost a continental divide between drug production and demand.

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, about 5% of the world’s population between ages of 15 and 64 use illicit drugs at least once in a year. Approximately 11% of these drug users—equivalent to 200 million people—are considered problem drug users. The main problem drug is heroin, followed by crack cocaine and amphetamines. Despite all of the prevention efforts, the number of drug users still is on the rise globally (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

The location of drug production and drug demand are significantly related to each other. Where production of a particular drug is high, abuse of that drug also is high. For example, opiate addiction is almost epidemic with millions of addicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran

**Scope of Opium Production and Opiate Consumption**

This study focuses on the prevention of Eurasian heroin trafficking through Turkey. Therefore, the focus will be on the production of opium (the raw material of heroin) and the trafficking and consumption of heroin.

Heroin is a highly addictive drug derived from opium through a chemical process (Platt, 1995). Heroin abuse rapidly turns into a strong addiction for users (Carnwath & Smith, 2002). Because of its strong side effects and its ability to make addicts of its users, a prediction of the number of heroin users is easier to calculate than other illegal drugs (Carnwath & Smith, 2002; Platt, 1995).

According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan alone accounted for 82% of global opium-poppy cultivation in 2006. The rest of the world’s opium poppy is cultivated in Myanmar, Laos, and Colombia. The area under poppy cultivation continuously increased in Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006. The area was 80,000 hectares in 2003 and expanded to 131,000 hectares in 2004. Although there was a small declined in 2005 with 104,000 hectares, the area of opium fields increased sharply in 2006 to 165,000 hectares (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

According to the same report, (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007), 6,610 metric tons of opium was harvested from these fields. Ninety-two percent of this opium was
produced in Afghanistan and accounts for roughly 6,100 metric tons. This amount of opium is roughly equal to 610 metric tons of heroin. How much of this heroin reaches the consumer market is unknown. However, when the entire opium, morphine, and heroin seizures of all countries are combined, an average of 123 metric tons of opiates was intercepted by law enforcement agencies around the world from 2004 to 2006 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that approximately 16 million people worldwide use opiates and 60% of this population lives in Eurasia. Approximately 11 million of these abusers use heroin and are counted as problem drug users. The leading market is Eurasia, with 9 million heroin users. The second biggest market is North America with 1.2 million heroin users, followed by South America with 830,000 heroin users (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

Much of the opiate users in Asia are from countries along the trafficking routes of heroin, specifically those that border Afghanistan (Madi, 2003). Heroin abuse is more common in those countries than in any other countries in the world. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2007), there are 1.2 million opiates users living in Iran, including heroin users. In Pakistan, it is reported that there are 640,000 opiates users; 500,000 of them are heroin users (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Paris Pact Initiative, 2008). There is no doubt that the two giant countries, India and China, are the biggest markets for opiates. A study conducted in India in 2004 showed that approximately 3 million opiate users live in India; many of them are heroin users between the ages 15 and 64 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Regional Office of South Asia, 2004). It also has been reported that there are 1.7 million opiate users in China; 700,000 of them are heroin users (Jackson, 2005).
Europe has a relatively small market compared with Asia, but it is much more profitable because of higher heroin prices. According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (2007) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s 2007 annual reports, there are approximately 1.5 million heroin users in Central and Western Europe. In 2005, 585,000 heroin addicts received medical treatment, and 5,250 people died from heroin abuse (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2007). When looking at Eastern Europe, data on drug users is not as accurate as it is in Western Europe. The biggest market for opium consumption in Eastern Europe is Russia with 1.5 million heroin users (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Paris Pact Initiative, 2008).

**Trafficking of Opiates**

Trafficking routes are based on the drug production sites and the highly profitable consumer markets. However, illicit drugs do not always follow direct geographic routes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008). Geographic characteristics are not the only factors that shape drug trafficking routes. Drug traffickers always seek the most efficient and secure way for their shipments (Jackson, 2005; Van Solinge, 1998). Therefore other factors—such as the volume of legal traffic and the degree of law enforcement effort on a given route—also shape illicit drug trafficking routes (Van Solinge, 1998). There also are multiple routes for the same drug. Although historically some routes are more used than others, based on the most efficient rule perspective, alternative routes have been established during the last decades (Van Solinge, 1998; INCB, 1997).

The main trafficking routes for opiates begin in Afghanistan and go through Europe, China, and India. A small amount of heroin is trafficked from Myanmar and Laos through China,
Oceania, and the Americas (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). According to a United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime survey aimed at understanding opiate trafficking from Afghanistan in 2006, about half of the opiates (either as heroin or raw opiates) left Afghanistan through Iran, 33% went through Pakistan, and 15% went through Central Asia and Russia (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

It is believed that much of the Afghan heroin goes to Europe via the Balkan route, which starts in Iran and follows the common transit trade route through Turkey and the Balkan countries (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007; Van Solinge, 1998; INCB, 1997). Although the Balkan route has been considered a major trafficking route for heroin trafficking, alternative routes emerged after the collapse of Soviet Union (International Narcotics Control Board, 2007; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007; Van Solinge, 1998). This alternative route follows Afghanistan, Central Asia, Russia, and Eastern Europe. Recent international reports indicate that traffickers began to choose the northern route to avoid the Turkish-Bulgarian border where border control and law enforcement actions against drug trafficking are strong (UNODC, 2008; INCB, 2007; U.S. Department of State, 2006). It also is possible to take a direct sea route from Pakistani ports to Europe, especially to the United Kingdom (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

Problems Related to Drug Trafficking

The magnitude of the social problems related to drug trafficking is a valuable indicator of the extent and direction of preventive effort needed to counter those problems (Goldstein, 1979). Drug abuse and drug trafficking cause significant harm to individuals and society. While abuse of illegal drugs carries considerable risk of death, disease, and health problems, drug dealing and
drug trafficking bring higher rates of violence, instability, and corruption to society (Bagley, 2001; Cakir, 2002; Chris, 2001; Chouvy, 2005; Curtis & Karacan, 2002; Fenepetov, 2004; Madi, 2003; UNODC, 2008; Thomson, 2002; Makarenko, 2002).

Drug abuse leads to various health problems and to the deaths of abusers (Carnwath & Smith, 2002; Platt, 1995). These effects can be examined as immediate effects and as long-term effects. The most dramatic immediate effects of drug abuse are drug-related deaths of abusers. The term *drug-related deaths* refers to those deaths that occurred immediately after consumption of illegal drugs (Platt, 1995). These deaths include overdoses, poisonings from drugs, death provoked by the consumption of drugs, and acute drug deaths (European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, 2008; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2003).

Transnational-level drug trafficking, on the other hand, causes conflicts and violence in society. These effects come in two forms. First, ideology-based terrorist organizations use illegal drug trafficking as a revenue source. They are either directly involved in illegal drug production, trafficking, or distribution, or they take money from drug trafficking organizations by providing security for those organizations (Bagley, 2001; Cakir, 2002; Carlson, 2005; Fenepetov, 2004; Makarenko, 2002). The second drug-and-terror nexus occurs in the opposite way: drug trafficking organizations use terrorist tactics to secure their trafficking activities (Makarenko, 2002). While the Kurdish separatist terrorist organization (PKK) is a proper example for the first type of narco-terrorism (Sahin, 2002), the violence associated with Colombian and Mexican drug cartels are examples of second type narco-terrorism (Bagley, 2001; Cakir, 2002).

Although the motives for acts of organized crime and terrorism are different in theory, in practice, organized crime and terrorism are indistinguishable. The significant profit to be made from drug trafficking changes the original motives of terrorist organizations; the organizations
begin to act as traditional organized criminal groups (Makarenko, 2002; Chris, 2001; Chouvy, 2005; Cakir, 2002; Van Solinge, 1998). On the other hand, traditional drug trafficking mafias or cartels use political language and motives to get the sympathy of the local society (Bagley, 2001; Chouvy, 2005).

The gains from drug trafficking are enormous. The price of a kilogram (almost two pounds) of heroin is $1,000 in Afghanistan, $6,000-$8,000 on the Turkey-Iran border, and almost $40,000 in the United Kingdom. This price markup generates huge illegal profits for mainly nonstate actors to threaten the state in the form of ethnic separatism, religious extremism, or large-scale criminal enterprises (Cornell & Swanström, 2006).

Another aspect of drug trafficking is investments in legal economies through money laundering. Large-scale money laundering places the financial system under the control of criminal enterprises, depresses the legal means of economic development, and serves as a base for further corruption of social and political institutions.

Drug trafficking also corrupts legal institutions in the developing countries along the trafficking routes. The process starts with the economic power of the drug trafficking groups. When they attain significant financial power, this power turns to a political power in a relatively poor society. The poor local society accepts the power of finance as a power of administration. In those situations, the administrative, financial, legal, and political institutions are unable to bring together the economic and political resources necessary to fight illegality (Makarenko, 2002; Bagley, 2001; Fenepetov, 2004; Madi, 2003).

Street-level drug markets harm society by increasing crime in the neighborhoods. When drug abuse becomes an epidemic in a society or in a neighborhood, it is expected that other crimes also will increase in that society or neighborhood (Harrison, 1992). While drug addicts
commit crimes such as prostitution and property crimes to obtain their addictive substance (Inciardi, 1979), drug dealing also increases violent crime in society several ways. First, drug dealing itself is a serious crime, and dealers tend to commit other violent acts to secure their business. Second, a high cash flow in the drug business makes dealers attractive targets for robberies, which sometimes result in armed assaults and murders. Moreover, street-level drug dealing increases gang violence in neighborhoods. Rival gang groups use violence against each other to maintain their dominance in drug dealing (Newcomb, Galaif, & Carmona, 2001).

The effects of illegal drug trafficking in Turkey are not as disastrous as they are in countries in Central Asia and South America. Nevertheless, illegal drug trafficking, especially heroin trafficking, is an important money-making enterprise for transnational organized crime in Turkey and Europe. These organized criminal groups are responsible for murders, extortion, and street violence both in Turkey and Europe. One of the best known examples is the family-based Baybasin Criminal Organization. The group is blamed for violence in the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. In London, the Baybasin Criminal Organization had approximately 1,000 armed thugs known as bombacilar (bombers) who terrorized northern London from the 1990s to 2003 (Carlson, 2005; Thomson, 2002). Heroin trafficking also is one of the main financial resources of the terrorist organization PKK, an organization that is blamed for taking the lives of more than 40,000 Turkish citizens over two decades (Curtis & Karacan, 2002; Sahin, 2002).
Summary

This chapter first described the global illegal drug problem. After mentioning cocaine, marijuana, and amphetamine problems, the chapter focused on the European heroin problem by examining its scope and threats to regional countries. An analysis of the scope of the illegal drug problem and the scope and direction of the threats and harms it causes can be used to build an effective preventive program (Goldstein, 1979; Clarke, 1997). To eliminate the illegal drug problem around the world, one efficient way is by blocking trafficking routes before drugs reach the street markets. One of the best ways of doing this is by applying situational crime prevention tactics to drug trafficking routes. Thus, the next chapter will provide information about the characteristic of Eurasian heroin trafficking in Turkey, which is one of the essential passageways from drug production sites to drug consumption sites.
CHAPTER III
DRUG TRAFFICKING IN TURKEY

Introduction

The Turkish government has acknowledged that drug trafficking is a major crime and has invested a huge amount of money to enforce drug laws and curtail drug trafficking. Approximately 10,000 officers are working in antismuggling units on regular basis throughout the country. Law enforcement agencies have used sophisticated techniques and technologies to prevent drug trafficking through Turkey (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006). In addition, international cooperation and collaboration with neighboring countries and major countries throughout the world is a cornerstone of the Turkish antitrafficking strategy (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006).

This chapter addresses three topics. First it talks about why a heroin trafficker choses to move drugs through Turkey and examines the possible advantages of Turkey’s geographic, social, and economic conditions for traffickers. Second, the chapter explores the scope of heroin trafficking through Turkey using law enforcement statistics. These statistics are derived from Turkish Drug Reports published by the Turkish National Police. The last part of the chapter profiles the general situational characteristics of heroin trafficking in Turkey.

Turkey’s Unique Situation in Drug Trafficking

The roots of Turkey’s drug trafficking problem are highly related to its unique geographical location, cultural connections, and economic situation (Keser & Ozer, 2008; Van Solinge, 1998; Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006). To better understand Turkey’s
drug trafficking, one must understand the geographical and historical facts of the region (Keser & Ozer, 2008). Turkey is geographically located at the intersection of three continents: Asia, Europe, and Africa (see figure 1). Turkey has been the key connection between civilizations for thousands of years. In the medieval ages, Turkey was the bridge for the most important ancient trade roads: the Silk Road and the Spice Road. Exotic goods from Asia, particularly from China, India, and Iran, were carried by Asian traders to Turkey and were distributed by Turkish traders to Europe (Keser & Ozer, 2008).

![Figure 1: Heroin trafficking routes through Turkey and the region.](http://english.freemap.jp)

However, it is not only Turkey’s unique geographic location that increases the influence of Turkey among the three continents; politics and culture play an important role as well. Until the early 20th century, much of Southeastern Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and North
Africa had been administered by Ottoman Turks. The Ottoman state stretched from the Strait of Gibraltar in the west; to the Caspian Sea and the Persian Gulf in the east; and from the edge of Austria, Hungary, and Ukraine in the north to Sudan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Yemen in the south. Under the Ottoman administration, a new society emerged from different nations. This new society was culturally, linguistically, and politically connected. The secure and stable political conditions in such a large geographical area over the centuries connected an otherwise diverse set of societies with social, cultural, and linguistic ties. Over the years, the Ottoman administration connected the Middle East, Asia, and Europe and served as a bridge between continents. These secure conditions and ties made trade connections much easier for centuries. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the early 20th century, people with different backgrounds continued to have strong ties with each other. Today’s citizens of Turkey have relatives and cultural and linguistic ties with the people living in Caucasus, Balkans, and the Middle East. In addition to these historical ties, a new situation emerged after the collapse of Soviet Union. Turkey increased its political, economic, and social ties with the new former Soviet states in Caucasia and Central Asia, which have a linguistically and culturally common heritage with Turkey (Keser & Ozer, 2008).

Today, Turkey’s position in world trade is still important. Turkish companies export foods and industrial goods to Central Asia, Caucasia, and Iran and bring back raw materials from these countries. Moreover, Turkey is one of the main suppliers of fresh food products for European markets. Every year, tons of fresh vegetables and fruits are exported to Western Europe (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2008).

These geographical, cultural, economic, and political arrangements bring many advantages to Turkey. However, this unique situation also has negative side effects; namely,
cross-border crimes. Turkey has been affected by a variety of organized crimes, including arms smuggling, human trafficking, and drug trafficking. Heroin trafficking from Asia to Europe is only one of several negative consequences of Turkey’s unique geographical and cultural position (Keser & Ozer, 2008; Van Solinge, 1998).

Without a language barrier, geographic proximity, and with close social ties, traffickers from Asian countries and Turkey have no difficulty making arrangements to move drugs through Turkey. For example, Turkish citizens that live near eastern borders have cultural and family connections with the citizens of Iraq and Iran. They occasionally see each other and maintain connections. These connections also are used by drug traffickers. Normally, it is not easy for the average Turkish citizen living in the mountainous regions of eastern Anatolia to get heroin from Afghanistan. However, it is not hard for an Iranian citizen to obtain heroin from Afghanistan because Iran has the longest border with Afghanistan. The Iranians then provide heroin to their Turkish counterparts. A similar system works in the west. There are a large number of Turkish people living in Western Europe, particularly in Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium. They maintain strong connections with their relatives in Turkey. Therefore, a Turkish citizen in eastern Anatolia is in an advantageous position for making connections between heroin production and heroin consumption. This position is not limited to the people living in eastern Anatolia, although drug trafficking is more common in the border regions of eastern Turkey. Increased trade and transportation activities with Iran and Central Asian states spread the advantage to people from other parts of the country (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006; Paoli & Reuter, 2008).
The Scope of Drug Trafficking in Turkey

Approximately 15% of total heroin seizures worldwide were made by Turkish law enforcement agencies (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). The United Nations Drug Control Program estimates that almost 25% of total heroin in the trafficking market is intercepted by law enforcement agencies around the world. According to this logic, each year 32 metric tons of heroin is trafficked through Turkey and, of this amount, 8 metric tons is seized by Turkish law enforcement agencies. However, the general prediction of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime could not be true for some countries. Law enforcement activities are not the same in every country along the trafficking routes. Some countries’ enforcement is stricter than others (International Narcotics Control Board, 2007). This means that some countries, including Turkey, Bulgaria, and the United Kingdom seized a much greater portion of the actual trafficked heroin. Although, no other international agency gives an estimate of the percent of heroin intercepted by Turkish law enforcement agencies, a number of agencies point out that the law enforcement activities against drug trafficking in Turkey are much more professional and effective than other countries along the heroin trafficking routes (International Narcotics Control Board, 2007; U.S Department of State, 2006; United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007).

In Turkey, drug trafficking is not widespread. According to statistics of the Organized Crime Department of the Turkish National Police, between 1990 and 2008, an average of 1,600 people were arrested for drug trafficking, which is 0.0002 of the total population (see table 1). However, drug trafficking is more common among people living near the Iranian borders. Of the 3,000 people arrested in 2006 and 2007, more than 70% (748 offenders and 1,152 offenders, respectively) were from the three regions bordering Iran (i.e., Van, Hakkari and Agri)
The total population of these regions is only 1.7% of the Turkish population (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2000).

Table 1

*Heroin Seizures in Turkey*

<table>
<thead>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of incidents</td>
<td>425</td>
<td>498</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>349</td>
<td>485</td>
<td>533</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>951</td>
<td>1,329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of heroin (kg)</td>
<td>5,230</td>
<td>3,034</td>
<td>2,124</td>
<td>3,546</td>
<td>6,515</td>
<td>6,664</td>
<td>7,380</td>
<td>9,078</td>
<td>10,332</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Traffickers**

Little is known about the structure and profile of drug traffickers in the upper-level drug-trafficking market. Literature is very limited about the distribution process and profiles of traffickers in different countries. One of the main reasons for the lack of academic studies about upper-level drug trafficking is the difficulty of reaching the traffickers. Ethnographic studies also are limited because conducting research among drug traffickers is too risky and exposes researchers to danger (Natarajan, 2000).

A few ethnographic studies suggest two main types of drug trafficking enterprises: structured and loosely structured. Natarajan and Belanger (1998) used prosecution records in New York City to test this idea. They found four main organizational models in drug trafficking rather than the two distinct models. They looked at 39 drug trafficking organizations and classified them as follows: (a) corporations, which are similar to the structured model; (b)
communal businesses; (c) family businesses; and (d) freelancers. A corporation classification refers to large, formal organizations with well-defined organizational roles and labor. The groups defined as communal business are relatively flexible groups that maintain connections with ethnic backgrounds. Family businesses are more cohesive groups centered around a family leader with clear tasks. Finally, freelancers are unstructured groups that work in free-market settings.

Eck and Gersh, (2000) analyzed drug trafficking organizations according to two models: concentrated industry and cottage industry. The concentrated industry model asserts that drug trafficking from production to retail sales is controlled by a few highly organized groups. The cottage industry model asserts that drug trafficking, from production to retail, is managed by a large number of small groups and individuals. There is little empirical research to show that Turkish drug trafficking organizations fit either the concentrated model or the cottage model. Nonetheless, a 2007 Turkish drug report (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2007) showed that most of the drug trafficked from Turkey is organized by a few family-based criminal groups. These groups are may be classified by their role in trafficking. Some of them specialize in bringing drugs from Asia to Turkey, some of them specialize in converting morphine-based drugs to heroin, some of them are experts at transporting the drugs, and others distribute drugs to Western Europe.

Research on Turkish drug trafficking organizations also is limited. The few scholarly articles that do mention Turkish drug trafficking organizations are based on law enforcement reports rather than objective research. The main sources about drug trafficking in Turkey are the official reports of the Turkish National Police. In 1995, the Turkish National Police began a very complex network analysis that included every drug trafficking case in the past 10 years. Those
cases were analyzed by modern network-analysis software and the analysis is updated regularly. The network analysis showed that most heroin traffickers in Turkey are somewhat related to 40 main groups and that there is no clear distinction between trafficking groups. According to the analysis, there are three main types of traffickers in Turkey: (a) traffickers who are members of family-based organizations and work under an informal hierarchy, (b) traffickers who are free of any large and structured organization, and (c) traffickers who work for or pay taxes to terrorist organizations (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2000). This categorization loosely fits the typology found by Natarajan and Belanger (1998).

These 40 groups are identified by their family name and organization and are based on family and tribal connections. It is estimated that these family organizations dominate the illegal bulk heroin trafficking throughout Europe. The family-based groups have specific divisions of labor and responsibilities that cover the entire drug trafficking process. Some of these groups specialize in bringing drugs from the Asia, others provide vehicles for transportation, and still others deal drugs in Europe. They create planned family connections by the marriages of second-generations of the family members. The purpose of making close social ties among different family groups is to maintain secure and trustful drug transactions among different families.

One of the best examples of a family-based drug trafficking organization is the Baybasin family. This family has a Kurdish ethnic background, was from eastern Turkey, and had been involved in drug trafficking since the 1960s. The organization was administrated by Huseyin Baybasin and his four brothers. Each brother was responsible for the family’s drug business in different countries. While, the head of the clan, Huseyin, and his brother, Giyasettin, sat in Holland, another brother, Nizamettin, was responsible for dealing drugs in Germany; Mehmet Sirin and Abdullah were responsible for the dealing drugs in the United Kingdom. The family,
however, was not limited to immediate family members. Baybasin’s cousins were part of the family also. His uncle, Mehmet Emin Baybasin, and his sons and Baybasin’s aunt’s son, Naif Yavuzturk, all worked for the family and shared in the profits (Carlson, 2005; Ozturk, 1998; Milliyet, 1998; Libre News Agency, 2008).

The Baybasin family controlled much of the bulk heroin trafficking in Europe and received some taxes from other traffickers. In England, the Baybasin family also established an armed group referred to as bombacilar (bombers) and extorted Turkish businesses in northern London. All the above named people have been arrested and sentenced for heroin trafficking across Europe between 1998 and 2003; however, it is suspected that the family is still active but under the hands of another generation (Cobain, 2006; Summers, 2006; Ozturk, 1998; Milliyet, 1998; Libre News Agency, 2008).

Also involved in drug trafficking in Turkey are freelancers. The freelancers can be involved in drug trafficking only with the permission of one of the family groups. The freelancers sometimes pay taxes to one of the organizations when they are involved in trafficking in their territory. While major family groups are involved in the whole process of trafficking from the region around Afghanistan to Europe, freelancers are involved in only parts of the process.

The freelancers follow the free-market rules. In the market model, sellers and buyers find each other with the aid of middlemen who take responsibility for ensuring the safety of the freelancers. In most cases, heroin passes through multiple hands on its journey from the eastern border of Turkey to the western border of Turkey and on to Europe (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006; Hignett, 2006; Paoli & Reuter, 2008). The price of a kilogram of heroin rises 10 times throughout the trafficking process. These small groups of freelancers,
which consist of five to 10 people, smuggle small amounts of heroin, ranging from 500 grams to 20 kg. Heroin is bought from available sellers and sold to available buyers. Buyers and sellers generally do not know each other, and one trusted middleman or major trafficking family makes the arrangements.

The market model goes beyond Turkey. These small groups of freelancers also send drugs to Europe. Turkish street drug dealers in Europe sometimes come to Turkey to find direct connections with buyers to increase their profits. In this way, they can eliminate middlemen and buy the heroin in Turkey cheaper than they can in Europe. Social learning and social networks based on ethnic backgrounds are some important factors in this type of trafficking (Paoli & Reuter, 2008).

In the market model, heroin is transported within Turkey by small passenger cars, trucks, or buses. When drugs are sent across a border, human couriers are commonly used. These couriers transport small amounts of heroin with their luggage or use a special strip on their bodies to hide the drugs. In extreme cases, they swallow small heroin capsules and carry them in their stomachs. Traffickers recruit as couriers women tourists from eastern European countries. These couriers generally use fake passports belonging to the destination country.

Another method for border crossing is the use of small cars. This is done primarily to send heroin to Eastern European countries, mostly Bulgaria and Romania. The couriers only drive the car and do not know the details of the trafficking. Some small groups specialize in carrying drugs across borders and charge the owner of the drugs on average about $150 per kilogram of heroin.

The last types of traffickers are those involved in trafficking to provide money for ideological terrorist organizations. The terror and drug nexus is one of the most ambiguous
In Turkey, there is considerable evidence of a relationship between the PKK and drug trafficking (Sahin, 2002). Turkey has suffered from terrorism for decades. During the Cold War era, Marxists terrorist organizations created a civil war. Those conflicts ended with a military coup in 1982. After a few stable years, Kurdish separatist terrorism emerged in 1984 from the ashes of Marxist terrorism. The PKK terrorist group has become one of the most serious terrorist threats in the world. During their 25 years of bloody campaigns, 30,000 people have been killed, including children, women, teachers, doctors, police officers, and soldiers. The Turkish government accuses the PKK of being involved in drug trafficking and provides evidences that the PKK profited from drug trafficking in the eastern region of Turkey. Aside from official Turkish reports, many European and international sources, including the U.S. Department of State, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues of France, and Interpol have accepted PKK’s drug trafficking activities (Roule, 2002; Clutterbuck, 1990; Chris, 2001; Interpol, 1990; Sahin, 2002).

The PKK has funded its terrorist activities with money from a variety of criminal activities, including extortion, smuggling, and the trafficking of drugs and people. Nonetheless, the PKK’s most profitable criminal illegal activity is drug trafficking—specifically, heroin trafficking. In order to determine the terror connection to drug cases, the Turkish National Police looked at three variables. With every case, they checked first whether the offenders had a previous record related to terrorist organizations. Second, they determined whether the offenders
paid taxes to terrorist organizations. Finally, they determined whether there were drugs concealed in hidden terrorist organizations that were found during clashes between law enforcement forces and terrorists. According to the Turkish National Police report, from 1984 (when the PKK begin its terror campaign) to 2000, there were 185 cases in which PKK involvement was discovered. In those incidents, 2,702 kg of heroin and 4,255 kg of morphine were seized. Moreover, 171 kg of heroin and 42 kg of morphine were captured in hidden compounds of the PKK during the clashes between Turkish armed forces and PKK terrorists (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2000).

Summary

This chapter examined heroin trafficking in Turkey by discussing the importance of the location of Turkey in global and regional heroin trafficking, the scope of heroin trafficking, and the profile of heroin traffickers. The details about heroin trafficking will be examined in chapter VI.
CHAPTER IV
SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION

Theoretical Development

Situational crime prevention is built upon the idea that crimes can be prevented by reducing opportunities, increasing the associated risks and difficulties, and reducing the awards (Clarke, 1997). Situational crime prevention is a practical approach in which practitioners work with researchers on certain criminal problems. Situational crime prevention includes a broad range of strategies, including access control of places, increased formal and informal surveillance, and increased control over certain people and places (Clarke, 1997).

Situational crime prevention was developed as a practical product of environmental criminology. Environmental criminology is a movement that differs from conventional criminology in terms of explaining criminality and policy recommendations. While conventional criminology tries to explain why some individuals are involved in criminal acts and seeks criminal roots in the background of individuals and society, environmental criminology tries to explain how crime occurs. Environmental criminology focuses on the effects of the physical and social characteristics of an environment on the decisions of committing crime (Clarke, 1997). Three theories within environmental criminology are particularly important for understanding situational crime prevention: (a) rational choice perspective, (b) routine activity theory, and (c) crime pattern theory.

The rational choice perspective focuses on the proximate motives of offenders and offender decision-making. Routine activity theory, on the other hand, examines the elements that make up the proximate situation within which offenders make decisions (Clarke, 1997). Routine
activity theory also describes the movement patterns and schedules of crime targets. A related theory, crime pattern theory, describes the movement patterns of offenders (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1981).

The rational choice perspective starts with the premise that criminals are rational decision-makers who can choose to commit or not to commit a crime to gain personal benefits. Their decision-making process is highly affected by immediate situational factors. These factors are constrained by time, space, and cognitive limitations. Therefore, criminals cannot make perfect decisions. Rather, offenders engage in what Cornish and Clarke (2000) call “bounded rationality.” The rational choice perspective forms the basis for situational crime prevention. The five factors offenders consider are risk, effort, rewards, excuses, and provocations. The relative importance of these factors varies from crime to crime and from circumstance to circumstance.

Routine activity theory also has contributed to the development of situational crime prevention. This theory describes the situational conditions in which motivated criminals engage in crime. It suggests that the day-to-day activities (i.e., routines) of criminals and targets create opportunities for crime. In the first version of the theory, Cohen and Felson (1979) suggest that three essential elements must converge in a certain time and space for crime to be happen: (a) motivated offender, (b) suitable target, and (c) absence of capable guardians. The likely offender could be anybody. A suitable target might be any person or object that attracts the criminal interest of likely offenders. Capable guardians are people or things that increase the risk of criminal acts for the offender and reduce the attractiveness of a target (Clarke & Felson, 1993). Routine activity theory has undergone several modifications. Felson (1986) added the concept of “handlers,” drawing on the ideas of Hirschi’s (1969) social-bond theory. Handlers are people
who have emotional links with potential offenders. Offenders hesitate to commit crime in the presence of those intimate handlers. Possible intimate handlers are parents, teachers, and friends. However, Felson (1986) suggested that many offenders have few or no intimate handlers that would keep them from committing a crime. Other modifications came in the mid 1990s, when Eck (2003) added the concept of “manager.” Managers are people who are responsible for the functioning of places (Eck, 1994). Eck summarized the latest version of routine activity theory with a set of double triangles (see Figure 2):

![Crime Triangle Diagram](image)

*Figure 2. The crime triangle as adapted from Clarke and Eck (2008).*

While the smaller triangle inside the figure represents elements necessary for a crime to happen, the larger triangle represents the potential controllers for each element. For a crime to occur, a motivated offender and a suitable target must be at the same place at the same time, and one of the potential controllers must be absence or ineffective.

The importance of place in crime prevention has gained much more weight than other elements of the crime triangle. Eck and Weisburd, (1995) defined place as “a very small area reserved for a narrow range of functions, often controlled by a single owner, and separated from
the surrounding area (Eck & Weisburd, 1995). Eck and Weisburd (1995) suggested that place should be the core component of any crime prevention theory. Place theories seek to explain why crime is concentrated in some places more than in others from the perspective of the situation of those places. The situational characteristics of some places make them safer for criminals than others, including the number of available targets, the degree of guardianship, the quality of management, and the importance of the position of the place on criminal patterns (Eck & Weisburd, 1995).

Another theory that has bearing on situational crime prevention is crime pattern theory. Crime pattern theory focuses on how offenders’ routine activities are influenced by the availability of targets. The theory says that crimes occur when suitable targets and offenders converge at the same place; however, this theory emphasizes the way offenders search for targets and places suitable for crime (Brantingham & Brantingham, 1993). Just as normal individuals shop for goods and services along their normal routes, offenders also seek criminal opportunities during their daily activities. Knowing the daily routines of offenders, targets, and handlers or managers provides important information about predicting and preventing crime (Eck & Weisburd, 1995).

Methodology and Techniques

Situational crime prevention methodology consists of five contiguous steps (Clarke, 1995):

1. Collection of data about the nature and dimensions of a specific crime problem
2. Analysis of the situational conditions that permit or facilitate the commission of the crime in question
3. Systematic study of possible means of blocking opportunities for particular crimes (including analysis of costs)

4. Implementation of the most promising, feasible, and economical measures

5. Monitoring of results and dissemination of experiences

Situational crime prevention describes a number of crime opportunity-blocking techniques. These have expanded since Clarke first suggested them. Clarke (1995) listed 12 techniques based on the theory and available studies. Originally, Clarke considered only approaches that increased offenders’ perceived risk, perceived effort, and perceived reward; he considered four techniques under each of these approaches (Clarke 1995). Clarke and Homel (1997) added consideration of perceived excuses and four techniques under this heading, thus expanding the number of situational techniques from 12 to 16. Finally, Clarke and Cornish (2003) added consideration of provocations and expanded the number of techniques under each heading to five, bringing the total number of situational techniques to 25. The current list of situational crime prevention techniques is shown in Table 2.
Table 2

*Situational Crime Prevention Techniques*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technique</th>
<th>Increase effort</th>
<th>Increase risk</th>
<th>Reduce rewards</th>
<th>Reduce provocations</th>
<th>Remove excuses</th>
</tr>
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</table>


**Applications and Effectiveness of Situational Crime Prevention**

Situational crime prevention has been applied successfully to a wide range of predatory crimes such as burglary (Waller & Okihiro, 1979), car theft (Webb, 1994), shoplifting (Poyner & Webb, 1987; DiLonarda, 1996); pickpocketing (Matthews, 1990), drug dealings (Natarajan, Clarke and Johnson, 1995; Eck, 1994), injuries in bar fighting (Shepherd & Brickley, 1992), prostitution (Eck & Spelman, 1987), credit card fraud (Masuda, 1993), check fraud (Knutsson & Kuhlorn, 1981), Internet crimes (Newman & Clarke, 2003), child abuse (Wortley & Smallbone,
There have been numerous studies of situational prevention interventions, and these studies have been reviewed in a number of papers. As part of a report to the U.S. Congress on the effectiveness of a variety of crime prevention strategies, Eck (1998) reviewed the extant literature on place-based prevention. He found that this literature provided strong overall support for the effectiveness of situational crime prevention applied to places, though most of the individual studies used relatively weak evaluation methods.

Clarke (2002) examined more than 100 studies of situational crime prevention and found that opportunity-reducing techniques are effective in reducing crime. These studies ranged from very simple opportunity-blocking techniques (such as implementing transparent barriers on buses to prevent bus drivers from being robbed) to complex citywide camera surveillance systems.

Other reviews found specific positive effects of situational crime techniques including place managers (Eck, 1994; 1998), natural surveillance (Farrington, et al., 1993), formal surveillance (Weisburd & Green, 1995) and closed-captioned television and lighting (Welsh & Farrington, 2004).

**Possible Application of Situational Crime Prevention to Drug Trafficking**

Can situational crime prevention be applied to drug trafficking? In other words, can changing particular situational factors influence traffickers’ perceptions of risk, reward, effort, excuses, or provocations and reduce drug trafficking? This section first describes the theory behind a possible application of situational crime prevention to drug trafficking in general by
modifying the crime triangle for drug trafficking and identifying and describing the crime places, managers, handlers, and guardians.

**Crime Triangle for Drug Trafficking**

The general crime triangle (see Figure 2) needs to be modified to make it specific to drug trafficking. In drug trafficking, there is no visible target or victim. Sellers and buyers need to cooperate to make drug-money transactions, and the general crime triangle implies a conflict between the target and the offender. In the modified triangle (see Figure 3), the target is replaced with another offender. Potentially, the two offenders have handlers (i.e., relatives, friends, and acquaintances) who are not involved in drug trafficking.

![Drug-transaction triangle](image)

*Figure 3. Drug-transaction triangle*

**Places in Heroin Trafficking**

For a drug transaction or a handover to occur, a motivated seller in possession of heroin and a potential buyer in possession of money have to be at the same place at same time and safe from any threats from intruders (i.e., handlers and managers) who may intentionally or
unintentionally give information to law enforcement authorities about the transaction. In the entire process of drug trafficking, there can be several transactions between different sellers and buyers. Between these transactions, drugs flow toward consumption areas. Therefore, drug trafficking also requires safe routes and safe vehicles. Moreover, once an offender (or group of offenders) has the possession of the drug, it has to be stored in a safe place until the owner finds buyers. This suggests that places are important for drug trafficking.

Place refers to small spaces where transactions occur and where drugs are hidden, including mobile places such as vehicles and ships. These places fit the definition of place by Eck and Weisburd (1995): “a very small area reserved for a narrow range of functions, often controlled by a single owner, and separated from the surrounding area.” In drug transactions, one of the most important factors affecting place selection is the security of the drugs and the trust between the parties. If the parties do not know each other well and do not trust each other, they are likely to choose to meet in an open, public place such as a restaurant, café, bar, or hotel lobby. In essence, the offenders are relying on the management and guardianship provided by uninvolved third parties to provide protection. When the parties know and trust each other, they can choose more private places such as a house, a hotel room, or an apartment. Although a specific pattern for these places is hard to find, it is possible that drug traffickers pick places among those in their routines.

Places are not simply used for making transaction. At each stage of the trafficking process, different types of places are used. Places used in the transportation stage are border crossings and certain types of vehicles and animals. At the storing step, the important places are building compounds in which the drugs are hidden, such as homes, apartments, garages, storage units, industrial buildings, stables, and agricultural buildings.
In addition to micro-level places, the general trafficking process can be concentrated in specific geographical regions. These places, however, should not be confused with the micro-level places used in drug trafficking. Geographical places refer to towns, villages, neighborhoods, airports, seaports, industrial sites, and sections of borders where drug trafficking activities are concentrated and are more common. Regions are important for the allocation of preventive resources.

Handlers and Managers in Drug Trafficking

Like the original routine activity theory, offenders are open to the effects of their intimate handlers. However, as Felson (1986) suggested, many offenders have few or no intimate handlers. Tillyer (2008) demonstrated, on the other hand, that intimate handlers do not have to be adults who are seeking to instill moral values in their children; rather, she suggests that potential effective handlers are those who are “(1) physically nearby to potential offender, (2) socially close to potential offender, (3) know the situation and environment of the potential offender and (4) are willing to intervene due to a vested interest” (p. 66). From this new perspective, colleagues, friends and social network members are possible handlers that may be exploited for preventive purposes. Tillyer’s perspective has important implications for drug trafficking. To see how, one must look at what motivates the various drug trafficking participants.

Though drug trafficking often is a loosely structured organized crime (Eck & Gersh, 2000), the situational characteristics are not the same for all participants in the trafficking process. For example, the motivation of an offender who organizes the process and owns the illegal drugs is not the same as that of the truck driver who transports the illegal drugs. Understanding this difference can be helpful comprehending the role of intimate handlers in
prevention. Less professional and less motivated offenders may be more influenced by their intimate handlers.

Where handlers might be effectively used to control lower-level trafficking participants, managers may have more influence on upper-level participants in trafficking. Managers are people who are responsible for managing potential places used for crime (Eck, 1994). Given the importance of places during the trafficking process, place managers could play an important role in trafficking prevention. Possible managers in preventing drug trafficking include owners of lorry companies and bus companies, managers of industrial sites, managers and owners of cafes and restaurants, and owners of rental facilities.

In addition, village government leaders (mukhtars) are key people to cooperate with law enforcement where drug trafficking is high. In Turkey, every village has its own mukhtar. These leaders are responsible for the management of utilities in the villages, but they do not have law enforcement bodies.

In this formulation, guardians were omitted because there are no potential visible targets of drug trafficking. However, police and other law enforcement officers could be considered guardians for some places, especially border crossings and checkpoints on highways. In this sense, law enforcement officials are protecting key sites from illegal use.

**Summary**

Clarke’s (1997) situational crime prevention theory is part of a larger body of theories that emphasizes opportunities for crime. Situational crime prevention advocates have a range of interventions available to them, but these interventions need to be appropriate for the characteristics of specific crimes. The evaluation literature suggests that situational crime
prevention can be quite effective, and this approach to crime prevention has been successfully applied to a diverse range of crimes. However, there have been no systematic inquiries as to how situational crime prevention can be applied at the national level to curb drug trafficking. Chapters VI through VIII offer detailed examinations of the application of situational crime prevention to heroin trafficking in Turkey.
CHAPTER V
RESEARCH METHODS

This chapter outlines the research procedures used to examine possible applications of situational crime prevention to curb heroin trafficking through Turkey. This chapter has four purposes. First, it describes the research questions that guide this research. Second, it explains the data sources and the data collection methods used. Third, it describes the variables used to measure the theoretical constructs. Fourth, it describes the statistical methods used to analyze these data.

Research Questions

The following research questions are addressed in this study:

Question 1. What is the detailed model of heroin trafficking in Turkey from beginning to end?

The following sub-questions were developed to examine this research question:

1.1: How is heroin imported into Turkey?
1.2: Where is heroin stored after being importing into Turkey?
1.3: How is heroin transported within Turkey?
1.4: Where is heroin stored in western Turkey?
1.5: How is heroin exported from Turkey?

Question 2. Which situational factors facilitate heroin trafficking in Turkey based on the model developed in response to question 1? The following sub-questions and hypothesis were developed to examine this research question.

2.1: Which situational factors reduce the risks for traffickers in each step of trafficking?
2.2: Which situational factors reduce effort in heroin trafficking?
2.3: Which situational factors increase the rewards for heroin trafficking?
2.4: Which situational factors increase the excuses for offenders and managers in heroin trafficking?

Question 3. Based on the answers to question #2, what are the possible means of blocking heroin trafficking opportunities? The following sub questions were developed to examine this research question.

3.1: What can be done by increasing risks?
3.2: What can be done by increasing effort?
3.3: What can be done by reducing excuses?
3.4: What can be done by reducing rewards?

Data Sources

Four data sources were used in this research. The first data source is from the Turkish National Police. These data include general information about heroin seizures and offenders. The second data source is heroin trafficking incident reports from the archives of the Turkish National Police. The third data source is information that describes the vehicle and driver characteristics in heroin seizure incidents as collected by Department of Organized Crime of the Turkish National Police for the purpose of law enforcement management. This data set provides variables for situational characteristics of vehicles that are used in heroin trafficking. Finally, the fourth set of data set came from semistructured interviews this researcher conducted with law enforcement officers of Turkish National Police currently working on heroin trafficking. Each data set can be used to address one or more research questions. Table 3 shows how the data sets
will be applied to the research questions (The $X$ indicates that the data set is helpful at addressing a question; the absence of an $X$ indicates that the data set will be of little or no use in answering the question). In the following subsections, each data set will be described fully.

Table 3

*Data Sources and Analysis Matrix for the Three Research Questions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question</th>
<th>Official heroin stats</th>
<th>Incident reports</th>
<th>Vehicle data</th>
<th>Interviews with officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Question 1</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 2</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question 3</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Official Heroin Statistics for Turkey*

These statistics are derived from the publicly available annual drug reports of the Turkish National Police. The annual heroin statistics include details about heroin seizures in Turkey by region. The variables of interest from these data are the number of trafficking cases in each region of Turkey, the amount of heroin seized by region, the number of offenders based on their region of residency, the region of family origin, and the region where the heroin was seized. In addition, the populations of regions from the Turkish census were added to this data set (see Table 4).
Table 4

Variables of Interest Derived from Annual Heroin Statistics for Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data source</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heroin statistics by administrative region</td>
<td>1. Number of cases by region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Amount of the heroin seized by region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Number of offenders by their region of family origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Number of offenders by their region of residency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Number of offenders by their citizenship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. Number of registered vehicle used in heroin trafficking by region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Census data</td>
<td>7. Population of regions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Heroin Seizure Incident Reports

Turkish National Police incident reports describe situational characteristics of places used in heroin trafficking. These reports are the first police reports sent to the headquarters for the Turkish National Police Antismuggling and Organized Crime Department. Because the data are not publicly available, an official letter of permission was received prior to the coding of the police data. The heroin seizure reports include detailed information about the incidents. The files are case specific, in the Turkish language, follow the same format (mostly one to two pages in text form), and summarize the event details.

The variables of interest include: (a) situational characteristics of the event including the source of the drugs, the route that the drugs followed and the geographical region where the
drugs were seized, (b) situational characteristics of the place where the drugs were stored, and (c) situational characteristics of the places where the traffickers met.

A stratified sampling process was used to collect heroin trafficking data from case files for 2006 and 2007 (the only years available for study). Because some of the case files involved street dealing, street heroin dealing cases were excluded before the sampling process began. Trafficking was defined as a case involving at least 2 kg of heroin. All of heroin trafficking cases that includes seizures more than 2 kilogram were selected and coded. A total of 351 incident reports were coded.

The geographic location of the cases corresponds to the different stages of heroin trafficking. Cases from eastern Turkey are more likely to involve importation. Cases from central Turkey are more likely to involve transportation, and cases from western Turkey were expected to involve exporting. Therefore, the case files were stratified by region (i.e., east, central, and west). The situational variables coded from the case files are listed in appendix A.

*Vehicle and Driver Characteristics Data*

These data were collected by the Turkish National Police’s Antismuggling and Organized Crime Department with the purpose of risk analysis on vehicles. The data consisted of 129 incidents of bulk heroin seizures from vehicles. Virtually all of these cases were vehicle-heroin seizures from 2006 and 2007. Only a few cases with a great deal of missing information were dropped from the final data set. These data were obtained with special permission of Turkish National Police’s Antismuggling and Organized Crime Department. The data included the variables shown in Table 5.
Analysis of these data provide situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking associated with vehicle characteristics. In addition, patterns of vehicles used in trafficking provide valuable information for prevention strategies.

Table 5

*Variables of Interest in Vehicle and Driver Characteristics Data*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable group</th>
<th>Variable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>1. Region of event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Region where vehicle registered</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. type of vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. color of vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Brand of vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6. year of vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7. location where drugs hidden in vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8. Amount of heroin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Event</td>
<td>9. Time of the event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Number of occupants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. Ages of vehicle occupants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offenders</td>
<td>12. Regions where occupants live</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. Regions where occupants were from (originally)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Interviews with Police Officers*

Semistructured interviews were conducted with key law enforcement officers working in the Antismuggling and Organized Crime Department of the Turkish National Police. The department is responsible for drug trafficking enforcement. Twenty officials from different
regions of Turkey were interviewed. Interviewing these subjects was important to achieving the
goals of this research, because they play a major role in investigating and analyzing heroin
trafficking in Turkey. Because of the personnel rotation within the Turkish National Police, all of
the interview subjects have worked in the eastern and the western parts of the country and have
knowledge of all stages of heroin trafficking. The officers selected for interviews came from
cities that represent different stages of the heroin trafficking model proposed in chapter V (Table 6). These cities also represent 90% of the heroin trafficking cases in Turkey between 2006 and
2008 (see Table 7).

Table 6

*Number of interview Subjects by Provinces and Regions*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Export Location and number of officers</th>
<th>Second storage Location and number of officers</th>
<th>Domestic transportation Location and number of officers</th>
<th>First storage Location and number of officers</th>
<th>Import Location and number of officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul (4)</td>
<td>Adana (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hakkari (3)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir (2)</td>
<td>Mersin (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td>Van (2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edirne (1)</td>
<td>Gaziantep (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tekirdag (1)</td>
<td>Bitlis (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa (1)</td>
<td>Malatya (1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 7

**Number of Heroin Incidents in Provinces in 2006 and 2007**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent</th>
<th>Officials Interviewed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>757</td>
<td>39.82%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>7.57%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaziantep</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>6.31%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hakkari</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>5.84%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mersin</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>5.05%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edirne</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>3.68%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kocaeli</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>3.26%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatay</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>3.21%</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bursa</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3.00%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malatya</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>2.42%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sakarya</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>2.00%</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>1.95%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diyarbakir</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>1.74%</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bitlis</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1.42%</td>
<td>YES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.21%</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total incidents in other cities</strong></td>
<td><strong>189</strong></td>
<td><strong>9.94%</strong></td>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
All of interviewed officers are ranked officers with at least two years’ experience in heroin trafficking. The officers were selected using snowball techniques. While half of the officers are former colleagues of this researcher, the researcher did know them personally. The other half of the officers were chosen from those colleagues’ referrals and recommendations.

All interviews were done via telephone and in the Turkish language. Each interview took at least one hour. The officers responded to questions with open-ended, narrative-style answers. Some additional questions were asked to expand their answers if it was necessary. Their answers for each question were noted during the interviews, and some quotes were later translated into English.

There were three groups of interview questions. The first group of questions asked about the nature of heroin trafficking in Turkey. The second group of questions elicited descriptions of the situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking. The final group of questions invited the respondents to propose and evaluate possible measures for blocking heroin trafficking.

Confidentiality

This study used three secondary data sets and interview-based data. The secondary data sets do not contain any kind of personal identifiers; therefore, these data do not raise human subjects concerns. Only the fourth data set includes interviews with human subjects. A general permission letter was obtained from the general directorate of the Turkish National Police to interview the police officers. Approval from the Institutional Review Board at the University of Cincinnati was obtained for this data collection. All interviews were conducted in accordance with the protocol approved by this institutional review.
CHAPTER VI
GENERAL MODEL OF HEROIN TRAFFICKING IN TURKEY

This chapter examines the process of heroin trafficking in Turkey by addressing the first research question. Three different data sets were used to describe heroin trafficking in Turkey. The first data set comes from the semistructured interviews of Turkish law enforcement officers. In the interviews, participants were asked about the characteristics of heroin trafficking in Turkey from the entrance of heroin into Turkey to the exit of heroin from Turkey. The model of heroin trafficking in Turkey is based on these of interviewees’ personal experiences in drug investigations.

The interviews began with a description of the nature of heroin trafficking in Turkey and progressed to an examination of whether the drug trafficking model is supported by heroin seizure statistics and quantitative analysis of heroin seizure incident reports of the Turkish National Police. The heroin seizure reports contain information on the general geographic patterns of heroin movement and the characteristics of the offenders involved in trafficking. The analysis of seizure reports allows one to understand the characteristics of heroin trafficking at each stage and in each region.

Based on the interviews with officers, the general model of illegal heroin trafficking consists of several stages that connect areas of production to areas of consumption. According to the interviewed officers, the heroin trafficking process through Turkey has three trafficking steps and two waiting steps. The first trafficking step is bringing heroin into Turkey. The second step is transportation of the heroin within Turkey. The third step is the exportation of heroin from Turkey. The two waiting steps occur just after importation of heroin and before the exportation...
of heroin when traffickers seek potential buyers. The duration of the waiting period varies according to the availability of customers and safe transportation. The interviewed officers also suggested that some traffickers bring heroin directly from countries around Afghanistan and skip the middle steps; however, this technique is not as common as the five-step process (i.e., three trafficking steps and two waiting steps) described above.

Figure 4 shows the general heroin trafficking route through Turkey. The route was developed based on the officer interviews. The details of each trafficking step will be explained in the remainder of this chapter.
Figure 4. Flowchart of heroin trafficking through Turkey.
Importing Heroin into Turkey

The interviewees suggested that heroin is brought into Turkey mostly from Iran and rarely from Georgia. Iran has borders with Afghanistan in the east and Turkey in the west. Iran is a major bridge between Afghanistan and Turkey. The traffickers in Turkey use local connections with Iranian traffickers near the border. Turkey has a 499 km border with Iran that is 25% of the entire land borders of Turkey in east. Because of harsh geographical and security conditions, the Turkish-Iranian border is hard to control. Traffickers use these conditions to their advantage and bring drugs either by foot or by animal through very harsh mountain crossings. In addition, increasing trade activity with Iran through two border gates helps traffickers hide trafficking activities. One officer who worked in the Turkish National Police narcotic unit for more than 10 years said:

As law enforcement officers, our knowledge is limited about the origin of the heroin with the seizure information and the information that we get from offenders after the seizures. My experience in almost 10 years in service, I can say that the most important way to bring heroin is importing heroin through the Iranian border. You can see small-scale border trafficking with mule animals or small cars in border regions, and you can see larger-scale trafficking with TIR [Transport International Routier] trucks in other regions, especially southern Turkey, where more traditional traffickers are located.

Another officer, who is currently working in eastern Turkey and previously worked in Istanbul, said:

The border region of Van and Hakkari is the source of almost 90 percent of heroin trafficked through Turkey. Due to the insecurity in Georgia and Caucuses in the last three or four years, traffickers tend to bring heroin from Central Asia over Iran or directly
provide heroin from Iran. They use every available method, and they use the terror threat to their advantage by cooperating with the terrorist organization PKK.

Traffickers also use two methods to deal in drugs. The first and most common method is providing heroin from Iran to local traffickers who live in provinces on the Turkey-Iran border. The drugs are trafficked into Turkey by small vehicles via border gates or by mules or by foot via irregular border crossings. In the second method, traffickers in southeastern Turkey or in western Turkey import heroin on TIR trucks. The heroin shipments go directly into central Turkey or western Turkey. Iran again is the main source of the heroin in the second method, but traffickers also bring heroin directly from central Asian countries.

Traffickers bring heroin on animals and by foot. Smuggling with animals is common in the region. In May 2009, the gendarmerie captured hundreds of mules used for petrol smuggling. It is very possible that those animals also are used for heroin trafficking (Hurriyet, May 2009).

Heroin seizure statistics and analysis of incident reports support the assessment of interviewees about Iran as the primary source country. Statistical analysis indicates that most of the heroin seized in Turkey could be coming into Turkey through Iran. Three findings lead to this conclusion. First of all, 18.0% of the heroin seized throughout Turkey in 2006 and 2007 was seized in two provinces—Van and Hakkari—on the Iranian border. These two provinces cover most of the Turkish-Iranian border. Secondly, 53.5% percent of the offenders arrested in drug trafficking incidents throughout Turkey are people from these two provinces on the Iranian border and provinces near Van and Hakkari, regardless of where they were arrested in Turkey (see Figure 5). The population of these two provinces is just 1.7% of the total population of Turkey (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2008).
Finally, quantitative analysis of heroin seizure reports indicate that when looking at total heroin seizure incidents in Turkey ($N = 346$), 68% of all heroin seizure incidents contain at least one trafficker from Van and Hakkari provinces on the Iranian border ($n = 234$). The amount of heroin seized in those incidents is 68.8% (10,814 kg) of the heroin seized in all of Turkey (see Figure 6). When considering only those heroin seizures involving imported heroin ($N = 238$), the number of incidents that involve at least one person from one of the border provinces ($n = 198$) accounts for 83% of such cases.

Source: Adopted from Turkish National Police statistics.

Figure 5. Place of birth of arrested traffickers, 2006 and 2007.
In summary, reports from the interviewed police officers along with heroin-seizure statistics, and analysis of incident reports indicate that local traffickers on the Iranian border region of Turkey are the main source of heroin trafficked within Turkey.

Approximately 70% of the heroin trafficked in Turkey enters into Turkey from the Iranian border region in the hands of local traffickers. The remaining 30% of heroin seizures have two possible explanations: (a) The drugs come as shipments from Iran via local traffickers in the Iranian border region and are seized by western traffickers (i.e., the heroin actually comes from Iran, but police did not discover the drugs until the shipment came into western Turkey), or (b) the drugs were imported directly from Central Asia or Iran via other connections.

All of the interviewed officers suggested that while the first, and predominate, method of bringing heroin into Turkey is through the eastern part of the country, traffickers using the second method skip eastern Turkey and import heroin directly to western Turkey via TIR trucks.

Figure 6. Amount of heroin seized with connections to the Iranian border region.
The heroin-loaded trucks follow routes through Central Asia, Russia, and Georgia and enter into Turkey format the Georgian border; alternatively, the trucks follow a route through Central Asia and Iran and enter Turkey at the Iranian border. This method eliminates the middle dealers and increases the traffickers’ profits. However, the high availability of cheap heroin in domestic markets and political instability in Georgia has decreased the utility of this route.

Bringing heroin directly from Iran or Central Asian countries is the method used by organized trafficking groups. Some of the interviewees said these groups are traditional traffickers. Such traffickers generally are based in southeastern Turkey. However, the analysis of incident reports suggests that bringing heroin directly from source countries to western regions in Turkey is rare. The analysis shows that although traditional traffickers are still active in the heroin trade, they mostly provide heroin via local dealers in Iranian border regions.

According to the analysis of incident reports, only 32% (4,922 kg) of total heroin seized in the two-year study period had no connection with local dealers in Iranian border provinces. Of that 4,922 kg of heroin, 37.7% is considered to be shipments seized in import stage of trafficking (1,864 kg). Finally, only 1,150 kg of heroin seized in 20 incidents is believed to be imported by more traditional traffickers located in the southeastern provinces of Turkey (i.e., the provinces of Gaziantep, Kilis, Hatay, Malatya, and Diyarbakir). However, there is no clear indication that those seizures were not connected to local traffickers located on the Iranian border.

Only one example in two years truly fits the second pattern of trafficking. In that case, traffickers from southern Turkey received shipments of heroin from Iran on a TIR truck. In that case, heroin in the TIR truck was discovered by police at an Iranian border gate, but the truck continued on to its final destination in southern Turkey in a controlled-delivery operation. Forty eight kilograms of heroin were seized, and the traffickers were arrested in southern Turkey. It is
believed that the truck would have been sent directly to Europe with new legal cargo without unloading the heroin in Turkey. Moreover, the customs agency in Turkey has made some seizures from TIR trucks along the Iranian border in recent years; therefore, the use of TIR trucks is not used exclusively by traffickers using the second method for importing heroin into Turkey.

These data indicate that the method of importing heroin from Iran or Central Asian countries still continues. However, there is no indication of how much of this heroin is brought directly from source countries by skipping local dealers in Iranian border regions.

**Storing Heroin in Eastern Turkey**

Interviewed police officers suggested that after heroin is brought into Turkey, traffickers hide the drugs until they find an available customer. Sometimes the traffickers sell heroin in advance and wait for the best available situation for delivery. The storage process depends highly on how and where the drugs enter the country. When drugs are brought in from Iran or Iraq across their borders, the drugs are stored in the rural villages and towns near the borders and then shipped to the western cities for proposed shipment to Europe.

If heroin is brought directly into the western Turkey using the second method discussed above, it is stored until it can be transported to Europe. Cities involved in this sort of trafficking are Bursa, Izmir, Antalya, Mersin, Adana, Denizli, Konya, and Kayseri. These are regional commercial hubs and large industrial cities with populations of at least 1 million. Traffickers sometimes wait for available customers and sometimes wait for available transportation. Depending on the situation, the traffickers sometimes send heroin by separate parties. This process requires new packaging. Sometimes, traffickers do not unload the drugs from the truck;
instead, they send the same truck to Europe with another cargo. In this situation, the drug waits hidden inside the truck for a long time.

After importing heroin into Turkey following the primary method from the Iranian border by local traffickers and storing the drugs in safe places, the next step is domestic transportation to western regions where heroin is prepared for shipment to Europe. The next section examines how heroin is trafficked from Turkey’s eastern border area to western Turkey.

Trafficking within Turkey from East to West
(Domestic Trafficking)

The interviewees pointed out that after heroin is brought into Turkey, traffickers hide them until they find a customer. Sometimes they sell the heroin in advance and wait for the best available situation for delivery. The storage process depends highly on how and where the drugs enter to the country.

When drugs are brought from Iran or Iraq, the drugs are stored in rural villages and towns near the countries’ borders and then shipped to western Turkish cities for shipment to Europe. Transportation is generally made by domestic trucks, domestic passenger buses, or small cars.

Along such a route, the principle means of transportation are motor vehicles; large trucks, passenger buses, or small passenger cars. After the drugs cross the border, they are stored in rural areas near the Turkish border for later shipment to western Turkish cities where the drugs are loaded into semitrailer trucks going to Europe.

Analysis of heroin seizure incidents reports provides information about the vehicles used in domestic trafficking. According to the analysis, the most common vehicles for trafficking from border regions to western regions of Turkey are passenger cars (see Figure 7). Figure 7 also
shows the other types of vehicles used in domestic trafficking. Lorries are the second most common type of vehicle used. These vehicles are used only for cargo transportation within Turkey. Minibuses and different types of vans also are used, but they are not as common as cars. Seizures of TIR trucks are rare in domestic heroin trafficking. There were two incidents in two years in which heroin were discovered in a TIR truck. However, in these two incidents, the heroin was brought directly from the source country, not from Turkey’s regions near the Iranian border. Figure 8 shows the total seizures of heroin in different types of vehicles. Of all heroin seizures in domestic trafficking, 72.8% involved passenger cars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>car</td>
<td>72.8%</td>
<td>n=155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorry</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>n=29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>minibus (van)</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>n=17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bus</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>n=10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIR</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>n=2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 7. Types of vehicles used in domestic trafficking.*
All of the interview officers suggested that Istanbul is the distribution center for most of the heroin that is trafficked within Turkey. As explained above, after heroin packages are brought into Turkey from its eastern borders, the packages are sent to western industrial and trade centers. Istanbul is the largest of those centers. With a population of 12 million (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2008), Istanbul is an important industrial commercial center in Turkey. Most industrial products are exported through that region. In addition, Istanbul is on the junction of all roads from Anatolia to Europe. Most of Turkey’s land, sea, and air gates are in Istanbul. Every truck that carries cargo to Europe from other Anatolian regions has to pass through Istanbul. Those heavy trade and transportation activities attract drug traffickers to Istanbul, too. Figure 9 shows the regions of Turkey with the largest amount of heroin seizures.
Analysis of incident reports also supports the idea that Istanbul is the main transaction hub for heroin trafficking. Thirty five percent of total trafficking incidents involving more than 2 kg occurred in Istanbul during the study period. In those incidents, 6,560 kg of heroin were seized, which is 41% percent of all seizures in Turkey in two years.

Most of the heroin trafficked from eastern Turkey comes to Istanbul via domestic transportation vehicles. Analysis indicates that Istanbul is the meeting point for heroin importers and exporters. Figure 10 shows that 47% of heroin seized in Istanbul was seized from importers. In addition, 31% of the heroin seized was from exporters, and 21% percent of the heroin was seized during interactions between importers and exporters.
The southern industrial region, from Gaziantep through Mersin, is another destination where importers and exporters meet. However, the number of incidents and the number of heroin seizures is well below what it is in the Istanbul region. In Turkey’s southern industrial region, 229 kg of heroin were seized from exporters \((n = 5)\), 1,095 kg of heroin was seized from importers \((n = 25)\), and 56 kg of heroin was seized in interactions between importers and exporters \((n = 3)\).

In summary, domestic heroin trafficking in Turkey starts from two regions (i.e., Hakkari and Van) on Iranian border, and most of the traffickers head mainly to Istanbul or, rarely, to southern Turkey (i.e., Gaziantep, Hatay, Adana, and Mersin) where traffickers arrange for exportation or sale of the heroin to other traffickers. Most of the heroin seizures in eastern and central Turkey are intercepted between the Iranian border region and these two western...
destinations. The most common vehicle type used is passenger car; TIR trucks are almost never used in domestic trafficking. Other vehicle types are lorries and vans.

Interview participants suggested that after the heroin reaches Turkey’s western regions (mostly Istanbul), the heroin is handed over to other traffickers who specialize in exportation of the drug and who have connections in Europe or other destinations. Generally, small groups are organized with limited roles. For example, three to four people will organize to buy heroin from importers and then store it and sell it to others who arrange transportation for export or who have connections beyond Turkey’s borders. After the heroin is stored in western commercial centers, traffickers wait for the best time to send it out of Turkey. There are several factors affecting the decision of when to export the drug. The first is the availability of suitable vehicles. Second, the traffickers want to secure the road and the destination in the target country. Finally, they wait for available customers for their products. These activities are not always organized but instead seem to follow normal free-market rules.

Exporting Heroin from Turkey

Heroin trafficking trucks travel through Europe and exit Turkey at three main border gates: Kapikule, a land border port, and Izmir and Istanbul, seaports. Kapikule is the western most point of Turkey where trucks exit and enter Turkey by land to reach Western Europe via Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, or Czech Republic. Small passenger cars and buses, which generally carry passengers from Bulgaria and Macedonia, also use Kapikule. Trucks that use Istanbul and Izmir seaports reach European ports by RO-RO (roll on/roll off) vessels (so named because vehicles carrying cargo can be wheeled on and off sea vessels) include ferries, cruise ferries, and cargo ships. The drugs are loaded into vehicles ranging from passenger cars to
semitrailers and buses. Some of the drugs are loaded into compartments in gas tanks, spare tires, and vehicle panels; however, in most cases, drugs are trafficked in specially built stashes. According to Turkish Transportation Law, all commercial trucks and buses are required to have government authorization for transportation across borders.

After exiting Turkey, the drugs have two destinations: Western Europe via trucks with international transportation permits or passenger cars to Balkan countries where traffickers find more suitable conditions for storing the drugs. The latter option is the double-step method. After the collapse of eastern communist bloc countries in the 1990s, Bulgaria and Romania (and occasionally the Czech Republic or Poland) were used as the initial step for heroin trafficking into Western Europe (Hignett, 2006). Over the years, however, law enforcement activities in these countries have increased dramatically. This led traffickers to seek new safe heavens for their activities. Today, traffickers prefer former Yugoslavian countries as a base for their activities. These new countries have little experience with law enforcement against drug trafficking. They also have strong social, commercial, and cultural ties with Turkey that makes it easier for Turkish traffickers to operate (Csoti, 1997).

The most common vehicles used in the exportation phase are semitrailers that have international transportation permits. These trucks go to all points in Europe, including the United Kingdom and Scandinavia. The second most common vehicles used are passenger cars. Travel by passenger car is common among Turkish workers living in Europe (mostly in Germany, Netherlands, and Belgium) and citizens of Balkan countries.

The analysis of incident reports also support the observation that the most common vehicles used in exportation are trucks with international transportation permits and passenger cars. Figure 11 shows that traffickers tried to use trucks with international transportation permits.
(TIR trucks) in 46.1% of the export attempts intercepted by police. The second most common method is small passenger cars that go to Balkan countries. Of those 20 incidents, 12 were directly connected to Balkan countries; 8 of those would have gone to Europe. The other important method of exportation is the exploitation of human couriers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Method</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TIR trucks</td>
<td>46.10%</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car</td>
<td>25.60%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human courier</td>
<td>21.80%</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Van</td>
<td>3.80%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Postal service</td>
<td>2.60%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 11. Types of vehicles used in heroin exports.*
Another common exportation is the use of human couriers who travel with the airlines. While the human couriers are used mainly by individual traffickers with an average of 8 kg of heroin, some other organizations use regular couriers and export an average of 50 kg to 80 kg of heroin to one party on multiple couriers (see Figure 12).

According to incident-report analysis, human couriers were used in 17 incidents during the study period. During some of the incidents, multiple couriers were arrested. Fifteen of those incidents happened at Istanbul Ataturk Airport. Airline passengers were arrested while they were carrying suitcases or carry-on bags with heroin in them. The other two cases happen in seaports. As was expected, big vehicles were used for large shipments, cars and vans were used for medium shipments, and human couriers were used to transport 10-kg shipments on multiple persons.
Heroin Conversion and Precursor Trafficking

Although heroin trafficking dominates the drug trafficking market, it is not the only drug trafficked through Turkey. Chemical precursors, which are essential for heroin production, flow in the opposite direction of the heroin trafficking routes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007; Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2007). Moreover, synthetic drugs, which are popular in countries around the Persian Gulf, also are trafficked from Western Europe to the Middle East through the Balkan Peninsula and Turkey.

There had been a trend among traffickers to convert morphine into heroin around Istanbul. It was easy to hide laboratory activities in a heavy industrial region; however, during the 1990s, the Turkish National Police cracked down on a significant number of clandestine heroin labs in the rural areas around Istanbul. The big trafficking organizations preferred to produce heroin by themselves to increase their profits. However, recent statistics show that this trend has changed. There have been no laboratory discoveries since 2000. According to the statements from traffickers, purchasing and transporting heroin is more profitable (Organized Crime Department of Turkey, 2006).

There are reasons why traffickers quit converting morphine into heroin in Turkey. First of all, the converting laboratories were more exposed to law enforcement busts than were hiding and trafficking heroin. During the 1990s, a number of clandestine heroin laboratories were raided, and tons of heroin were seized. The high risk of exposure leads traffickers to seek direct heroin sources. Secondly, because of political and industrial developments in Central Asia and China, drug organizations in Afghanistan began to obtain acetic anhydride from non-Turkish sources to produce heroin in Afghanistan and surrounding regions (International Narcotics Control Board, 2007).
Summary

This chapter examined the overall profile of heroin trafficking in Turkey using three data sets. The data indicated that most of the heroin imported into Turkey crossed over the Iranian border and into the Turkish provinces Van, Hakkari, and Agri. The imported heroin was stored in those provinces and trafficked through Istanbul and the southern industrial region mostly by people from Van and Hakkari provinces. When the heroin reached its destination, it is handed over to exporters. The typology of exporters varies based on the method they use. While powerful organizations used trucks with international transportation permits for export, loose and amateur traffickers used local connection in Balkan countries or Europe, sending heroin in small shipments via couriers. Figure 13 shows the overall trafficking on a map of Turkey. Having described how heroin trafficking is conducted, how traffickers use situational factors to improve their effectiveness will be examined in the next chapter.
Figure 13. Concentration of drug trafficking in geographic regions of Turkey.
CHAPTER VII

HOW TRAFFICKERS USE AND CREATE OPPORTUNITIES TO MOVE DRUGS

The model described in chapter VI showed that traffickers choose certain regions, routes, and places. This leads to the following question: Why do traffickers choose those particular regions, routes, and places? Further, how do traffickers behave to take advantage of the opportunities that present themselves? The current chapter answers these questions. Situational factors create opportunities for people to engage in drug trafficking by decreasing the risk and effort and increasing the rewards and excuses. This chapter is organized around these four choices (i.e., risk, effort, rewards, and excuses). How offenders make use of situations to reduce risk and effort or increase reward and excuses at each stage of the heroin trafficking process will be examined. Before that, however, it is necessary to mention the sources of data, review the macro model of trafficking, and examine the facilitators of trafficking.

Three data sets are used in this chapter. The first set includes interviews of Turkish National police officers. The second set includes heroin seizures incident files that capture the details of heroin seizures. The third set includes vehicle and driver characteristics of those seizure incidents in details.

The models in Figure 6 and 15 (see chapter VI) show the macro model of heroin trafficking from beginning to end. The model reflects the general patterns of drug trafficking; the specifics will vary from case to case. Sometimes, the entire trafficking process is completed by a single organization; sometimes several small groups are involved. Each group sells heroin to another group, much like a relay race. The objective of every local trafficker is to sell drugs with some profit to another trafficker. While the objective of the traffickers in Afghanistan is to sell
drugs to a middleman in Iran, the objective of Iranian traffickers is to move drugs into Turkey and sell them to an eastern Turkish trafficker. Similarly, the objective of traffickers in eastern Turkey is to pass drugs to the west and sell them there; the objective of traffickers in western Turkey is to pass drugs to Europe where they can be sold to other traffickers.

Some large trafficking organizations skip the middle transactions and carry their own drugs, form drug-production sites and sell the drugs directly to street dealers. Sometimes organizations specialize in certain tasks. For example, while some groups import heroin only from production sites, others are involved only in exporting activities. This specialization suggests that certain tasks require special expertise and resources. This fact provides an important clue as to the importance of differing situational factors along the drug trafficking process. Looked at from the opposite perspective, if there were no special conditions at different stages of the trafficking process, then any trafficker could move drugs from production to sale.

**Facilitators of Heroin Trafficking**

In this chapter, the situational factors are classified by using reverse application of the typology of situational crime prevention measures developed by Clarke and Cornish (2003). Clarke and Cornish created his typology to show which situational changes would lead to a reduction in crime (2003). These same factors (i.e., risk, rewards, effort, and excuses) can be used to understand the opportunity structure. In general, situations that reduce risk also reduce effort and increase rewards, excuses, or provocations. This mix of circumstances provides greater opportunities for crime. Specifically for this study, Clarke and Cornish’s (2003) situational factors influence traffickers’ decisions about where to cross borders, where to hide drugs, and how to transport drugs.
Myhre (2000) used a similar approach in her research into open-air drug markets in Washington, D.C., public housing complexes. Myhre (2000) called these situational factors drug market precipitators. Drug market precipitators represent situational factors that either provide opportunities for open-air drug dealing or are abused by drug dealers to their advantage.

Reducing risk is the most important feature of drug trafficking, and traffickers give more weight to risk management than they do to other factors. It is the risk that influences the choice of a drug trafficking route. This influence is apparent as traffickers choose less risky but, more costly, routes (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2007). Making less effort has little importance in trafficking because the cost of the effort can be easily covered by the huge amount of reward.

This characteristic of drug trafficking was shown in Table 7. While the facilitators that reduce risk are examined according to a five-step heroin trafficking model, the facilitators that reduce effort and increase rewards and excuses are examined in general.

**Reducing Risks While Importing Heroin into Turkey**

As suggested in the previous chapter, the Iranian border is the key area for importing heroin into Turkey. It has been found by current study that 70% of the heroin imported through border regions is carried by local traffickers who live in the border area. The key province is Hakkari, which is on the intersection of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. While the Iranian border of Hakkari province is subject to heroin trafficking and other kinds of smuggling, the border with Iraq is subject to terrorist infiltration from northern Iraq where a large mountainous area is outside the control of the central Iraqi government (U.S. Department of State, 2006). Heroin trafficking from Iraq is not as common as it is from Iran for two reasons. First, the geographic
characteristics of the region are too rugged, making it unsuitable for walking paths from northern Iraq to Turkey. Second, the conflict between Turkish armed forces and PKK terrorist is a serious threat to traffickers. The other key province is Van, which is north of Hakkari province, and has a long border with Iran. According to interviewed police officers, Van province is affected by a variety of smuggling from Iran, including petroleum and heroin (Radikal, 2009).

The interviewed police officers were asked which situational factors make these two provinces so important to the importation of heroin into Turkey. While the officers who worked in that region \((n = 8)\) gave detailed information about the factors used by traffickers, officers who had not worked in those areas \((n = 12)\) gave overall information that can be found in annual drug reports of the Turkish National Police.

According to the interviewees, the following situational factors were said to be facilitators that make heroin importation easier for traffickers.

*Inadequate Surveillance on Borders*

This factor refers to traffickers using secret mountain crossings to import heroin from Iran and possibly from Iraq. All of the officers \((n = 20)\) said that border control is inadequate. They pointed out that harsh weather and sharp terrain limits formal surveillance. The areas are very mountainous, limiting the transportation capabilities of traffickers, especially in winter.

*Security Threat Created by PKK Terrorists*

This factor refers to the limited law enforcement activity in a region where PKK terrorists are dominant. Officers who currently worked in that border region and who previously worked that area emphasized that law enforcement agencies responsible for rural regions and border
security cannot regularly patrol the area and enforce the laws against heroin trafficking because of the serious threat the PKK terrorist organization causes. Traffickers use this insecure condition to their advantage by paying trafficking taxes to the PKK.

One officer who worked in the region expressed his concerns about the insecurity of the border region and the threat of terrorism as follows:

To say the truth, when the PKK bombs your headquarter or assaults law enforcement on the road with side bombs or mine, your priority would have not been heroin trafficking. Your priority would be your and your officers’ life. PKK randomly set up mines and roadside bombs on rural roads, and they just explode the first government car that they see.

Social and Cultural Connections

This factor refers to the social and cultural connections that exist between the people on Iranian side of the border and those on the Turkish side of the border. Heroin traffickers use their social and tribal connections to provide heroin securely from Iran. The Iranian population near the Turkish border speaks either Kurdish or Azeri Turkish (U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 2009). The Kurdish language also is widely spoken and used on Turkish side of the border. Therefore, language barriers and trust problems are overcome with these social advantages. One officer noted the following:

One of the most important risks in trafficking is the mistrust between two traffickers. In border regions, the traffickers reduce this risk by using their relatives or tribal connection when they are providing heroin in Iran. They use Kurdish as their primary language and use this as an advantage since most of the law enforcement officers do not speak Kurdish.
Inadequate Detection Mechanisms at Legal Border Crossings:

Heroin trafficking relies on high volumes of legal-trade traffic by using transportation companies and their international transportation permits to hide among the large volume of legal trade. There are three border gates between Iran and Turkey. These gates are less secure than gates in western Turkey, and they lack the technical equipment needed to detect traffickers. Traffickers use this insufficient security to their advantage. One officer from the region said the following:

The most important thing for traffickers is to hide heroin when they pass borders and when they pass checkpoints in the country. Therefore, they use every available method. They found less secure border gates and found routes that have less police. They generally store heroin in rural areas out of police responsibility.

These insecure border gates are used actively by small-scale legal import and export activities that are done by small vehicles registered in the border provinces. Traffickers use this high volume of traffic to their advantage to reduce the risk of being captured. The head of the Turkish customs agency said the following in a media interview:

The improvement in border gates affects the trafficking routes; they almost prefer the less secure gates. There are three gates between Turkey and Iran, and Gurbulak has the most improved gates. When Gurbulak got more improved technical equipment, the customs officers doubled their heroin seizures at that gate. And I believe the traffickers now face two other gates. (Soncan, 2009)

Difficulty Searching Vehicles with Legal Cargo
Traffickers hide heroin inside or under legal cargo. To search the entire vehicle, law enforcement agencies must unload the legal cargo fist. This process can cause the fresh products to spoil. Therefore, law enforcement agencies hesitate to search the vehicles unless there is strong, clear intelligence or evidence of illegal substances in the cargo. One officer who previously worked in border region said the following:

Searching large vehicles such as lorries and TIR trucks is not an easy job. First of all, you can search a very limited amount of vehicles in a day. Searching a vehicle sometimes takes five to seven hours. And if the legal cargo is a fresh product, you cannot just open the fridge and unload the cargo.

Use of People Who Need Money for Secondary Roles in Trafficking

These people carry and store heroin without knowing the details of the organization and the owner of the heroin. When law enforcement captures the heroin carrier, only those couriers are arrested, and they cannot or do not give any information about the rest of the organization. The interviewed officers emphasized that most of the time drivers of the vehicle has very limited information about the whole organization.

Reducing Risks While Storing Heroin in Eastern Turkey

As described earlier, most of the heroin is stored just after it is imported into Turkey from along the Iranian border. Interviewed police officers suggested that traffickers use the following factors to facilitate heroin storage in eastern regions of Turkey.

Inadequate Formal Surveillance in Rural Regions
The most important feature of these rural villages is they are almost out of law enforcement sight. They are located in very mountainous areas where transportation capabilities are limited and sometimes impossible in winter. Moreover, the PKK terrorist organization has an active campaign that makes regular patrol very dangerous for law enforcement agencies.

**Inadequate Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Public**

Interviewees said that cooperation between law enforcement and the local people is very limited. They pointed out that the most important reasons for limited cooperation is strong tribal ties among the local people. The local people see cooperation with police or the gendarmerie as treason against their tribes and families.

**Reducing Risks during Trafficking from Eastern Turkey to Western Turkey**

It was pointed out in chapter VI that the most common method of trafficking within Turkey is private vehicles. The vehicle type that traffickers prefer is the passenger car, followed by lorries and vans. Why they use certain vehicles and how they reduce the risks of being captured on the road is still in question. This section examines the tactics and methods traffickers use to reduce the risks involved in trafficking. Two data sets are being used. The first is police officer interview data; the second is data on vehicles that have the characteristics of vehicle seized in heroin trafficking during the study period.

The interviewees noted the following factors as risk-reduction methods for traffickers.
Hiding Activities in Common Traffic

To avoid detection, traffickers try to hide their activities by using small passenger cars in the local traffic lanes. Traffickers generally use passenger cars to avoid looking suspicious to police officers on the roads. Those types of cars are the most common types of vehicles used throughout Turkey and by middle class families. Therefore, not only are these vehicles readily available, they also blend in with the other vehicles on the road. Trafficker may also hope that law enforcement officers will be reluctant to stop these vehicles because they are typically used by middle class families. One officer said the following:

The most common vehicle used in domestic trafficking is passenger cars. I believe traffickers use those cars to mislead law enforcement. Regular officers may avoid stopping passenger cars since they are mostly used by middle class families.

The incident summary data supports this suggestion and shows that in 72.8% of domestic trafficking incidents, heroin is seized in passenger cars (see Figure 14).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Car</th>
<th>Lorry</th>
<th>Van</th>
<th>Bus</th>
<th>TIR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>n</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 14. Types of vehicles used in domestic trafficking.
Most of the lorries were captured when they carried heroin from rural areas of Hakkari and Van to urban areas in eastern Turkey. It is believed that the heroin in these lorries would have been switched to small cars in Van province and then sent to western Turkey. Figure 15 shows that 76% of lorry seizures were in eastern provinces.

![Bar chart showing 76% in eastern Turkey and 24% on the way to Western Turkey (n=22, n=7)]

*Figure 15. Regions of lorry seizures.*

**Using Cars Registered in Western Cities**

To avoid checkpoint stops, traffickers appear to prefer vehicles that are registered in Istanbul, Ankara, or other western cities. The purpose of using mainly vehicles plates from Ankara and Istanbul is that it reduces the risk of being profiled by law enforcement officers.

The incident summary data also support this finding. In 110 cases that include information about the registration of vehicles, 67% of all vehicles captured in domestic trafficking from eastern Turkey to western Turkey had plate numbers from Istanbul and Ankara (see Figure 16).
Figure 16. Plate registration of vehicles seized with heroin.

Hiding Heroin in Vehicles Professionally

Interview participants suggested that traffickers hide heroin in vehicles in ways that require special mechanic operations to detect the illegal cargo. Heroin packages are hidden in secret spaces that are intentionally built into the vehicles. Said one officer:

They hide heroin anywhere in the car. It depends on the creativity of the traffickers.

However, when you analyze every incident, you can find some common tactics. In my experience, they use professional mechanics to build special cells in small cars, and they generally use the normal body parts in lorries, such as gas tanks and rear tires.

When traffickers hide heroin in these secret spaces, they reduce the risk of being captured at regular law enforcement checkpoints in which officers can check the car only from outside. More detailed searches require warrants from prosecutors. Said one officer:
Although traffickers have some particular characteristics, you cannot stop and search every car that you suspect. But if you have a good detector dog, you can find heroin without a search warrant from outside. We do not have enough dogs in regions on the route.

Figure 17 shows the most common areas of secret stashes in small cars and vans ($N = 69$). Figure 18 shows the most common areas of secret stashes in lorries ($N = 41$). While traffickers put heroin in specially built stashes in small cars and vans, they hide heroin in the regular body parts of lorries, such as gas tanks and rear tires and inside legal cargo containers.

![Figure 17](image)

**Figure 17.** Location of heroin stashes in cars and vans.
**Figure 18.** Location of heroin stashes in lorries.

*High Anonymity for Traffickers Even if Drugs Seized*

When the law enforcement seize illegal drugs, most of the time, there is no risk for the upper-level organization members. Either the arrested offenders do not know the real identity of the upper-level organization, or do not give the names of those traffickers.

The most important risk-reducing facilitator is the anonymity of members of organized trafficking. Traffickers keep their identity secret within trafficking organizations and limit the number of people they work with when drugs are transported and hidden. Neither the driver of the vehicle nor the place owner where the heroin is stored knows little about other members of the organization and the owner of the drugs.

In 84 incidents, heroin was seized during random searches on the road. In those incidents only the driver and, if present, his passengers, were arrested. The average number of people arrested in random search incidents is two. The average number of people arrested in planned
operations, on the other hand, is six. Figure 19 shows the total number of arrests in random searches and planned operations.

![Bar chart showing number of incidents and arrests](image)

*Figure 19. Number of arrests in random searches and planned operations.*

**Alternative Routes Used to Avoid Police Checkpoints**

Although traffickers use some common routes, they also use many alternative routes to reduce the risk of being captured. A variety of alternative routes are used to bypass common checkpoints and professional law enforcement agencies fighting heroin trafficking. To find active checkpoints, traffickers use an empty vehicle as a pioneer. If a checkpoint has been set up on that road, the leading vehicle warns the real courier’s vehicle to change the route. One officer said the following:

The heroin trafficking route is flexible. Traffickers use the most secure routes for themselves. If the police focus on one particular road and made some seizures, they
chance the route. However, in general, the alternatives are limited. They have to use either one or another. Their choice is limited with road conditions and legal traffic flow. They choose the heavy traffic in order to hide themselves.

Incident data indicate that traffickers in eastern Turkey mostly use three routes. The first route goes to Istanbul from northern Turkey through Van-Agri-Erzurum-Erzincan. The second goes either to Istanbul or Mersin through Van-Bitlis-Siirt-Batman-Diyarbakir-Sanliurfa-Gaziantep-Adana. The third route goes between these two routes from Van-Bingol-Elazig and Malatya. Traffickers use many alternative routes, despite the road conditions and distances. The only factor that they are concerned with seems to be the possibility of being stopped and searched by police. The possibility of being searched is reduced on busy roads and along routes where local police do not expect trafficking. Among those alternative routes, the southern route is busier than others, and most of this route is highway that skips the city checkpoints. The map in Figure 20 shows the routes and amount of heroin seizures in the provinces on each route.

Northern and southern routes divide when they are reach central Turkey. The northern route reaches Istanbul trough Erzincan-Tokat-Amasya-Ilgaz and Bolu or Erzincan-Sivas-Yozgat-Ankara-Bolu and Istanbul. The southern route has different destinations. On southern route, the heroin goes toward Mersin or Istanbul for export processing. When the heroin goes to Istanbul, traffickers head north after passing Adana and go through Pozanti (Adana)-Ulukisla (Nigde)-Aksaray-Ankara and Bolu and Istanbul. If traffickers are willing to skip Ankara and Bolu, they go through Ulukisla (Nigde)-Konya-Eskisehir-Bursa (or Bilecik) to Istanbul.
Note: ○ Represents cities on the routes, and ▲ represents regions where heroin is stored after import and before export. Main routes are reflected with bold lines. The boxes show heroin seizures in 2006 and 2007.

Figure 20. Heroin trafficking routes in Turkey.
Figure 21 shows that most seizures occur along southern routes, which are the busiest routes linking eastern Turkey to western Turkey. In addition, the southern route also passes through southern provinces where local traffickers bring their heroin from eastern Turkey and sell it in western Turkey. This means that southern regions also are destinations for heroin trafficking, and some of the seizures probably reflect those local activities.

![Figure 21. Percent of heroin seizures by routes.](chart)

Reducing Risks During Storage of Heroin in Western Turkey

Inadequate Formal Surveillance in Crowded Metropolitan Cities

Traffickers choose crowded metropolitan cities to store the heroin when they are searching for export opportunities. They choose mainly Istanbul because it is the busiest trade and financial district in Turkey.
Inadequate Cooperation between Law Enforcement and Place Managers

The heroin is stored in rented houses, apartments, and storage facilities in industrial areas or similar buildings. Generally, the traffickers rent those facilities just for heroin storage using false documents. Heroin trafficking is rare in regular social life, and place managers cannot be aware of the possibility that their estates will be used for heroin storage. Public awareness and more cooperation with place managers of industrial sites and apartments and with house owners would increase the possibility of detecting trafficking.

Reducing Risk During Exporting from Turkey

Inadequate searches in High-Volume Traffic

Turkey’s western border gates and seaports are the busiest ports in Europe. The busiest border gate is Kapikule. On average, 1,500 vehicles exit the Kapikule border gate each day. Traffickers use these heavy traffic areas and customs officials’ limited searching capacity to their advantage.

Difficulty Searching Vehicles with Legal Cargo

When heroin is stashed in a truck, it is mostly hidden under the legal cargo, which typically is fresh vegetables and fruits. The reason for choosing fresh garden products is to avoid lengthy searches at border crossings. Because these products are transported in coolers, any exposure of the product during searches would damage the goods. If the law enforcement officers cannot find any illegal commodity (including heroin) and fresh good spoil, the government is responsible for the cost of the damaged products.
Anonymity of Luggage in Buses

Although heroin seizures on international buses are not common, regular passenger buses are suitable for trafficking in many ways. First of all, there are no strict screening guidelines for buses as there are for airlines. Most of the buses also tow a large trailer for luggage, which is hard to search at border checkpoints.

Low Risk for Upper-Level Traffickers During Exportation

Drivers are selected among financially disadvantaged persons. These drivers have limited contacts with the organization, and most of the time they do not know the other members of the organization.

Human Couriers

One way to export heroin is with human couriers. The amount of heroin transported by this method is relatively low compared to other techniques, but the amount of heroin can be as much as 8 kg. This method is mainly done by individuals who have contact with street dealers in Europe via social networks. Although some people of Nigerian and African origin residing in Istanbul are very active in heroin trafficking, some Turkish citizens who have connections with Turkish populations in Western Europe also are involved with this type of trafficking. One form of this method is to select couriers from among women from Eastern Europe.

In this method, women who look like the European stereotype are used as heroin couriers and are given false travel documents that reflect citizenship of countries in Western Europe. The objective is to hide these women among the enormous flow of European middle-
class tourists who are perceived to be less suspicious in terms of heroin trafficking. These human carriers use airline travel and hide heroin either on their body or in their baggage. The main airport is Istanbul Ataturk Airport, but it is possible to choose southern airports in tourist destinations such as Antalya, Dalaman, and Izmir.

**Facilitators That Reduce Effort**

*Legal Trade Activities*

As explained in chapter IV, Turkey has a unique position between Asian and European commercial activities. Turkish transportation companies have commercial activities in Central Asia, Iran, and Europe. These legal activities help traffickers to conceal illegal heroin transportation and to make connections with other traffickers.

*Easy Access to Legal Permits for International Travel*

In Turkey, TIR trucks require working for a company that has a special international transportation permit. Most companies use two types of trucks: ones that the company owns and ones the company leases. Traffickers either recruit drivers for the company or use their own trucks, which are intentionally given to a company under lease. Most of the time, the owners of the transportation companies do know about the heroin trafficking.

*Social Connections Across Borders*

Traffickers use social and cultural connections to maintain safe heroin exportation.
Using Balkan Countries to Reach Europe

Traffickers also use small passenger cars for heroin exportation. In this method, heroin is first transferred to Balkan countries, such as Bulgaria, Romania, Kosovo, and Macedonia, and then shipped to Europe. This method is referred to as double-step among heroin traffickers.

Heroin seizures showed that of the 83 heroin incidents during exportation, 27 cases of heroin seizures involved small passenger cars and netted a total of 3,930 kg of heroin over two years. In 24 of those cases, the drivers were citizens of various Balkan countries.

Facilitators That Increase Rewards

Huge Price Gap for Heroin in Countries East and West of Turkey

According to price-market data and interviews, 1 kg of heroin is worth $1,000 to $2,000 in Afghanistan, around $3,000 in Iran, $5,000 in eastern Turkey and reaches up to $8,000 in western Turkey (Istanbul). These prices jump to $14,000 in Germany and even more in the United Kingdom (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2008) (see Figure 22).
High Profits for Drivers Carrying Heroin

Traffickers pay almost a hundred dollars for per kilogram heroin to the drivers who carry heroin across borders. This amount of money is an attractive reward for a driver who is regular monthly salary is around a thousand dollar. Interviewees said that the price for heroin transportation from eastern Turkey to Istanbul is $100 for per kilogram and $500 to $800 for Turkey to Europe.

Facilitators That Increase Excuses

Inadequate Rules for Companies

The transportation companies have limited responsibility for illegal substances in their vehicles. The connection between drivers and company management has to be proved by law
enforcement agencies with solid evidence. Otherwise, there can be no sanctions for transportation companies.

*Inadequate Rule for Drivers*

Like companies, the drivers have limited responsibility for the legal cargo. If any illegal substances are seized in or under legal cargo, the driver can make some excuse that he was not aware of the illegal substances and thus avoid sanctions.

**Summary**

This chapter examined the facilitators that help heroin trafficking in multiple ways. Table 8 summarizes the factors of heroin trafficking in the same fashion used by Clarke and Cornish (2003). Although some situational factors are used by traffickers to reduce risk and others are used to reduce effort, the most important element of heroin trafficking is reducing the risk of seizure. Effort is less important, and most of the time it is sacrificed for reducing risk.
Table 8

Factors That Facilitate Heroin Trafficking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limited risks</th>
<th>Limited effort</th>
<th>High rewards</th>
<th>Many excuses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-Difficulty of surveillance on illegal border crossings</td>
<td>-Easy access to communication tools</td>
<td>-Increasing heroin prices from east to west</td>
<td>-Inadequate rules for companies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate detection mechanism at legal border crossings</td>
<td>-Easy access to legal permits for international travel</td>
<td>-High profit for traffickers</td>
<td>-Inadequate rules for drivers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Difficulty of searching vehicles with legal cargo inside</td>
<td>-Access to Central Asia and Iran through legal permits</td>
<td>-High profit for drivers for carrying heroin</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate formal surveillance in rural regions</td>
<td>-Villages close to borders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate cooperation between law enforcement and place managers</td>
<td>-High volume of legal transportation from eastern Turkey to western Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Few checkpoints inside Turkey</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-High anonymity for traffickers even if the drug is seized</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate formal surveillance in crowded cities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate cooperation between law enforcement and place managers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Inadequate detection mechanism at legal border crossings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Difficulty of searching vehicles with legal cargo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-High anonymity cargo on buses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Human couriers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER VIII
APPLYING SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION TO HEROIN TRAFFICKING THROUGH TURKEY

The main purpose of this dissertation is to develop situational prevention techniques for heroin trafficking in Turkey based on the facilitators that traffickers use in different stages of trafficking. A model of trafficking was examined in chapter VI. The facilitators that heroin traffickers use to reduce risk and effort and increase the rewards and excuses were explored in chapter VII. That chapter explored the idea that traffickers make decisions about where to cross borders, where to hide drugs, and how to transport the drugs based on the basis of rewards, effort, and excuses. Chapter VIII will develop opportunity-blocking strategies based on the factors that traffickers use to reduce risk and effort and increase rewards and excuses.

Blocking Opportunities of Heroin Trafficking in Places

Crime places are an important element for blocking crime opportunities (Eck & Weisburd, 1995). In this chapter, the discussion will focus on blocking techniques based on places used in heroin trafficking. As discussed in chapter IV, places of heroin trafficking are both macro-level regions (such as trafficking routes, villages, and neighborhoods) and micro-level places (such as vehicles, buildings, and houses). Based on heroin seizure data from the Turkish National Police, in 79% of the incidents, heroin was seized in vehicles and 21% from buildings (see Figure 23).
The opinions (through interviews) of Turkish National Police officers were solicited about blocking opportunities for heroin trafficking at places. Among the 20 officers interviewed, 70% (n = 14) said that heroin trafficking can be blocked along eastern borders and at highway crossings near eastern border areas if law enforcement sources are directed at certain places. Other officers (n = 6) expressed their concern about the regional production and consumption of heroin and said that combating heroin trafficking on the trafficking route is not enough.

**Cooperation with Handlers, Managers, and Guardians**

Another important feature of situational crime prevention is the use of nongovernmental resources. Cooperation with civilians, especially those who have some influence on either offenders or targets or who have responsibility for places, is important for blocking crime opportunities. In chapter IV, it was theorized that friends and relatives of traffickers, especially those at a low level in a trafficking organization, can be used as handlers. It was further
theorized that owners of transportation companies, managers of industrial sites, managers and owners of cafes and restaurants, and owners of rental facilities, and village mayors (mukhtars) are possible place managers who can help to prevent heroin trafficking.

The interviewed officers were asked about the usefulness of intimate handlers and place managers. The officers were first asked about the possible handlers for drug traffickers. Their answers varied. Some suggested that family members, especially wives and close friends, can be intimate handlers who could prevent or limit involvement in trafficking. One officer gave an example about possible handling involving a family member:

We found heroin in a home where two brothers live in the same compound with their families. One of the women shouted at the others and said, “Your husband ruined our lives and your children’s lives.” In this situation, one of the brothers is not aware of the heroin trafficking and probably is against any such criminal action.

However, other officers suggested that most of the time, drug trafficking is a family business, and family members are aware of trafficking activities and are actively involved in the crime by helping each other. One officer said he heard during a telephone wiring that a trafficker was warned by his mother about being careful in his business when the police were around. Another officer gave an example of a wife who helped traffickers to repackage heroin.

When they were asked about cooperation with place managers, the interviewed officers again gave various answers. Officers working in eastern Turkey were generally skeptical about cooperation with civilians because of the strong tribal and family links among people living in eastern Turkey. However, some of the officers were very supportive of more cooperation with handlers and managers. One officer expressed his concerns about the inadequacy of law enforcement in rural and customs areas. He said that village mukhtars are key people, especially
in villages near Turkey’s eastern border; however, the gendarmerie is not capable of fighting heroin trafficking because of their unprofessionalism, and the police cannot directly contact mukhtars in gendarmerie areas.

Officials working in Istanbul also were skeptical about using place managers because the area is very large, and most people are unaware of the use of rental housing for heroin storage. When the officers were asked about more cooperation with the owners or managers of transportation companies, almost all of the officers said this kind of cooperation would help prevent company assets from being used by traffickers, but it would not help produce information about ongoing trafficking.

**Opportunity-Blocking Strategies by Increasing Risk of Heroin Trafficking in Turkey**

In this section, possible blocking strategies are developed based on the facilitators that traffickers use in different stages of the trafficking process and at different places. Although some of the strategies were taken from interviews with Turkish National Police officers, some were developed assuming that if a particular condition facilitates trafficking, then its removal may help curtail trafficking. There has been no research into what works to curb heroin trafficking in Turkey, so all of these ideas are purely conjectural.

In this section, the five-stage heroin trafficking model developed in chapter VI is followed. For each stage, opportunity blocking opportunities are examined at specific places. For example, at the importation stage, illegal border crossings and legal border crossings are viewed as separate macro-level places, and blocking techniques are developed based on facilitators at these places.

The same logic is followed in other steps as well. The macro places are as follows:
1. Illegal border crossing paths and legal border crossing points for importing heroin into the country
2. Rural areas, villages, and small towns near the border for storing heroin after import
3. Highways from eastern Turkey to western Turkey for domestic transportation
4. Certain industrial regions for storing heroin before export
5. Land border-gates, seaports and airports in western cities for exporting heroin from Turkey.

Importing Heroin into the Country

At the import stage, the most important suggestion was to block the illegal crossings by first determining illegal crossing paths using mapping technologies. A second suggestion was directed patrol activities on mapped border crossings paths. A third suggestion was to use thermal-camera detection technologies to detect illegal crossing. One of the facilitators of illegal crossing is the threat of terrorist attack along much of the border region, and it will be difficult to eliminate in the short term. A solution may be to avoid this threat by blocking trafficking paths near the traffickers’ destinations away from the border. Blocking these pathways may be more feasible closer to villages and towns, which are more secure than open fields.

Another facilitator is the social connections among peoples living along the Iranian and Turkish sides of the border. Greater cooperation with Iranian law enforcement may help address this facilitator. However, even with full cooperation, the social connections will be difficult to address.

Blocking legal crossing also is important. The first and most important opportunity-blocking measure is increasing the risk of being detected. The suggestion is to increase the
technical capacities of detection at legal border gates by using X-ray detection equipment, narcotic detector dogs, and risk analysis techniques.

Table 9 shows specific interventions that may be useful at the importation stage at illegal border crossings. Table 10 shows the same for legal border crossings.

Table 9

*Situational Prevention Strategies at the Import Stage of Heroin Trafficking at Illegal Border Crossings*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate surveillance on borders; traffickers use secret mountain crossings when they import heroin from Iran and possibly from Iraq.</td>
<td>1. Determine illegal border crossing paths. 2. Conduct directed patrol activities on mapped illegal crossings; air patrol is the best option if available. 3. Use thermal cameras that detect body temperature from aircraft to explore illegal crossings of animals and humans.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security threat created by the PKK terrorist organization that limits law enforcement activity in the region</td>
<td>Have law enforcement officers block trafficking near the destination of trafficking routes that are more secure than rural crossing points. These destinations are villages and towns where heroin are stored until it is sent to western Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and cultural connections between people living on the Iranian Turkish side of the border</td>
<td>Cooperate with the Iranian government to block illegal border crossing into Iran where traffickers start their journey.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 10

*Situational Prevention Strategies at the Import Stage of Heroin Trafficking at Legal Border Crossings*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate detection mechanism at legal border crossings</td>
<td>1. Have more-effective equipment at legal border gates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Conduct X-ray searches of TIR trucks and small cars at border gates, which may increase the effectiveness and fairness of border searches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of searching vehicles with legal cargo</td>
<td>Search suspicious trucks after local police have unloaded the legal cargo at the destination.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People who need money being used for secondary roles in trafficking</td>
<td>Conduct public awareness campaigns with target populations to prevent the recruitment of couriers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Storage of Heroin in Villages after Crossing Borders*

Heroin is stored in rural villages near borders. Four types of prevention strategies are recommended for this step. First, special narcotics units must be established in the National Gendarmerie that is responsible for policing the rural areas of Turkey. Second, it is important to determine which villages are most actively involved in heroin trafficking. Third, these special units should use proactive patrol and hot-spot policing in those villages to fight heroin trafficking. Fourth, those special units should make random searches with narcotics detector dogs in villages that have been determined by situational analysis to be potential trafficking locations. Table 11 describes these interventions in greater detail.
Table 11

*Situational Prevention Strategies for Storage of Heroin in Eastern Turkey in Villages, Towns and Rural Areas Near the Border*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Inadequate formal surveillance in rural villages | 1. Determine the most active villages in heroin trafficking.  
2. Establish special narcotics units in the National Gendarmerie, which polices rural areas in Turkey.  
3. Implement proactive patrol and hot-spot policing in villages.  
4. Make random searches with narcotics detector dogs in selected villages. |
| Inadequate cooperation with village officials | Conduct public awareness campaigns in those selected villages to establish cooperation with people who are not involved in trafficking. |

*Domestic Trafficking*

In domestic trafficking, the most important task for law enforcement is to find vehicles carrying heroin and then to find the heroin in those vehicles. As with legal border crossings, a four-step opportunity-blocking strategy is offered for this stage of trafficking. The first step is to determine every possible route for trafficking. The second step is to increase intelligence analysis and situational analysis techniques to identify suspected vehicles. The third step is to increase the effectiveness of searches by improving technical capabilities and the training of personnel. The fourth step is to use situational crime prevention approaches in regions on every possible route on a routine basis. Table 12 describes these strategies for domestic trafficking.
**Table 12**

*Situational Prevention Strategies for Domestic Trafficking of Heroin in Turkey along Highways and in Cities from Eastern Turkey to Western Turkey*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traffickers try to hide their activities in common traffic by using small passenger cars.</td>
<td>1. Use data analysis to profile most used routes and alternative routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Create special checkpoints on busy highways that increase the effectiveness of speedy search activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Train personnel and prove equipment in every city on possible trafficking routes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Use portable X-ray detectors for small cars, which may increase the effectiveness of the searches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffickers use cars registered to western cities in order to avoid checkpoint stops.</td>
<td>1. Use data analysis to profile patterns of vehicle used in trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Use identification matching (i.e., if the plate registration and the driver’s identification do not match, it is highly likely the vehicle is being used in trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffickers hide heroin in vehicles professionally.</td>
<td>1. Use portable X-ray detectors for vehicle searches at checkpoints.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Cooperate with mechanics who are building special stashes into vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffickers enjoy high anonymity even if the heroin is seized.</td>
<td>Use controlled delivery techniques that allow law enforcement to permit vehicles with heroin to go to their final destinations under surveillance. When the drug reaches its destination, police can arrest the higher-ranked member of the trafficking organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They use many alternative routes to skip police checkpoints.</td>
<td>Have trained personnel in cities along trafficking routes conduct random searches.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Improve searching capacities of law enforcement in cities along trafficking routes.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Storing Heroin in Western Turkey

After trafficking from eastern Turkey to western Turkey, heroin is stored in industrial areas near active export ports and land border gates. The first step is to determine the characteristics of places that are used for heroin storage. The second step is to establish cooperation with place managers. The third step is to create and implement public awareness campaigns at industrial sites and free customs areas near busy ports to get information from people working or living near targeted places. Table 13 describes the recommended situation prevention strategies for storage of heroin in western Turkey.

Table 13

Situational prevention strategies for storage of heroin in Urban Areas of Western Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate formal surveillance in crowded metropolitan cities</td>
<td>Use data gathering and analysis to determine where heroin is being stored, who are the people involved in the storage, and who are the possible handlers and managers who can help the police.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate cooperation between law enforcement and place managers</td>
<td>1. After determining the most used areas and buildings, connect apartment managers, site managers, and other possible managers to connect the police when they are faced with suspicious trafficking behaviors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Conduct general public awareness campaigns in industrial sites and free customs areas near busy ports.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

112
Exporting Heroin

Exporting heroin from Turkey is concentrated at the western land border gates, seaports, and airports. A four-step situational crime prevention strategy suggested for this trafficking stage. The first step is to determine which borders and ports are used most frequently. The second step is to analyze the methods of exportation, including types of vehicles, routes, types of legal cargo, and characteristics of couriers and drivers. The third step is to improve detection capabilities with situational risk analysis and technical equipment. The fourth step is to use situational crime prevention approaches on a routine basis. Tables 14 and 15 describe the recommended situation prevention strategies for preventing the export of heroin from Turkey.
### Table 14

**Situational Prevention Strategies for Exporting Heroin from Turkey via Border Gates, Seaports, and Routes to Border Gates**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate searches because of high volume of traffic</td>
<td>1. Increase searches of vehicles with X-ray detectors and detector dogs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Use risk analysis techniques to find suspected vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Use effective container screening.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difficulty of searching vehicles containing legal cargo</td>
<td>1. Require the clearance of vehicles before legal cargo can be loaded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Implement surveillance in TIR truck parks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymity of luggage on buses</td>
<td>Search luggage with X-ray detectors and detector dogs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Conduct more planned operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 15

*Situational Prevention Strategies for Exporting Heroin from Turkey via Airports*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Educate airport personnel about drug trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Use X-ray machines and puffer machines (i.e., trace portal machines) to detect heroin in luggage and handbags.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Opportunity Blocking Strategies by Increasing Effort**

Unlike situational factors that reduce the risk to heroin traffickers, situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking by reducing effort are not specific to single stages of trafficking. Rather, these types of facilitating conditions are generally found throughout the trafficking process. Therefore, opportunity blocking strategies also are developed for the entire trafficking process without dividing them for different stages of trafficking (see Table 16).
Table 16

Situational Prevention Strategies by Increasing Effort

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal trade activities</td>
<td>Increase checkpoints and searches in ports with high traffic.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easy access to legal permits for international travel</td>
<td>1. Revise the process for obtaining travel permits.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Conduct criminal background check for passport holders and commercial drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social connections across the border</td>
<td>1. Increase international cooperation with neighboring countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Deploy officials who know ethnic languages.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkan countries used as leap step to Europe</td>
<td>1. Increase cooperation with Balkan countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Take special actions against courier vehicles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Opportunity Blocking Strategies by Reducing Rewards

The ultimate reward of heroin trafficking is making money. Therefore, opportunity blocking measures that seek to reduce rewards are about reducing the price of heroin, preventing money from heroin sales from reaching traffickers through money laundering (see Table 17). Money laundering is another serious issue; however, it is outside the scope of this research.

Although easy profit is the ultimate rewards in heroin trafficking, different participants in the drug trade may have different types of rewards. While many are rewarded by the drug profits, there may be other rewards. Especially in Eastern Turkey, where drug trafficking accepted as a family business, active involvement in trafficking may be accepted as loyalty to family. Their
reward in this situation is getting positive support and reinforcement from society and family. Other people's rewards might be to avoid negative repercussion from not participating: that is they participate in trafficking due to threats. Unfortunately the current study has little information on the alternative rewards of heroin trafficking. Future research should address reward section with the alternatives. If those different rewards are determined, there could be different reward reducing tactics established.

Table 17

*Situational Prevention Strategies by Reducing Rewards*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Huge price gap for heroin in countries east of Turkey and in countries west of Turkey</td>
<td>1. Lower the price of heroin through demand-reduction strategies in target countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Prevent money from heroin sales from reaching traffickers by preventing money laundering.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High profits for drivers who transport heroin</td>
<td>1. Lower the price of heroin through demand-reduction strategies in target countries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Prevent money from heroin sales from reaching through money laundering.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Opportunity Blocking Strategies by Reducing Excuses**

There are few excuses that facilitate heroin trafficking. The only excuse that facilitates trafficking is inadequate rules because they reduce the responsibilities of transportation companies and drivers. Therefore, opportunity blocking strategies have been developed to increase the responsibilities of those parties. Despite the limited application, transportation
companies and drivers are critical to the internal transportation of heroin within Turkey; therefore, these excuse reduction measures may be quite useful (see Table 18).

Table 18

*Situational Prevention Strategies by Reducing Excuses*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Facilitator</th>
<th>Situational Prevention Strategies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate rules for</td>
<td>1. Write clear regulations about transportation companies’ responsibilities about trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>transportation companies</td>
<td>2. Implement mandatory controls over and responsibilities for transportation companies’ fleets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Search vehicles before loading legal cargo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Implement mandatory fleet monitoring with GPS systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Conduct criminal background checks for the owners of transportation companies and the owners of trucks and buses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inadequate rules for</td>
<td>1. Write clear regulations about who is responsible from what parts of a vehicle.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drivers</td>
<td>2. Exert more control over the activities of vehicle drivers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Monitor drivers with GPS systems.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Increase sanctions on drivers involved in trafficking.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Cancel driver’s licenses and passports of drivers involved in trafficking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Explanation of Suggested Blocking Techniques

Most of the techniques that were developed in this chapter are simple blocking strategies that address factors facilitating heroin trafficking and do not require detailed explanation. However, seven of the more technical blocking strategies need to be explained in greater detail.

Situational crime analysis for vehicle and people stops.

Profiling vehicles, drivers, and passengers at police stops is always controversial because of concerns that police stops are biased (Schafer et al., 2006; Engel & Calnon, 2004). To remove the bias, an alternative method can be adapted to police decision-making at vehicle and people stops. This method is called situation analysis in decision-making and is used in marketing (Roy, 2001). Situation analysis is defined as “a process, the examination of a situation, its elements, and their relations, to provide and maintain a product” (Roy, 2001, p. 3). The situation analysis model consists of four elements: (a) observation of real situations, (b) orientation of observations, (c) decision, and (d) action (see Figure 24).

With police stops, this model can be used for the selection of vehicles and people in heroin trafficking searches. The common characteristics of vehicles and drivers in previous heroin trafficking incidents can help officers decide which vehicles and people to stop and
search. Previous trafficking incidents over period of time are analyzed by relating the facilitators of trafficking and the common strategies that traffickers use.

When the common facilitators and characteristic of vehicles and drivers are found, they are arranged as a list for each stage of trafficking. The results then are disseminated to local police agencies. Local agencies use those lists of elements to check whether a vehicle is suspicious. For example, in the current study it was found that in the domestic trafficking stage from eastern border regions of Turkey to western regions, heroin is transported with passenger cars registered in Istanbul and Ankara and drivers are from those regions. Traffickers use this technique to avoid police checkpoints.

A similar method used by some local police departments of the Turkish National Police is risk analysis; however, no academic studies exist about this method. Local police departments are encouraged to use situational analysis, but it is not used systematically. While some local police departments use situational analysis to stop and search vehicles successfully, others do not use it for that purpose. According to data analysis of incident reports for the current study, in 84 of 350 cases, heroin was seized during random searches. However 20% \((n = 17)\) of those stop and search incidents happened in Bitlis, a small city on domestic trafficking routes; 22% of cases \((n = 19)\) happened in Istanbul. Other incident \((n = 48)\) were evenly distributed in 16 provinces throughout Turkey.

**X-Ray detectors for vehicles.**

X-Ray systems at borders for examining containers and trucks have been used along many European and U.S. borders. Although these systems are used widely, experimental studies on the effectiveness of these systems are very limited.
According to one source, X-ray systems has been found to be effective in detecting drugs concealed in trucks, containers, and other vehicles along U.S. borders (Traver, 2003; Nuth, 2008). In a detailed newspaper interview, the head of the Turkish customs agency said that these large-scale X-ray detectors are installed at some points along the Turkish border and are effective in detecting narcotics in trucks (Soncan, 2009).

Puffer machines for luggage.

A puffer machine, technically known as an explosives trace-detection portal machine, is used in airports to detect explosives and drugs on passengers. These machines blow rapid puffs of air on a person, which displaces trace particles from the person’s skin or clothes. The device then analyzes the air for explosives or drugs. The entire process takes approximately 15 seconds. These machines are a good choice when X-ray machines would not be useful (e.g., when couriers carry drugs on their bodies). In suspected cases of trafficking, a puffer machine can be used to detect drugs in carryon luggage (Kornblatt, 2008).

Controlled delivery operations.

Controlled delivery of seized drugs is a special technique that can be defined as “the controlled movement by law enforcement officers of seized drugs from the point of detection through the distribution” (Kent & Nelson, 2004). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime highly encourages the use of this technique and describes it as “an important measure in the fight against drug trafficking and related crime and that can help to identify the ringleaders of drug trafficking groups, their modus operandi, organizational structure and distribution networks” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2009).
The Turkish legal system has allowed controlled delivery operations since 1996, and many successful operations have been made by the Turkish National Police (Turkish Drug Report, 2008). However, compared to regular drug operations, controlled delivery operations are rare. Officers interviewed for the current study were asked why such use is so infrequent. Two reasons were given. The first reason is a long, complex bureaucratic process to approve controlled delivery decisions, and permission is granted only by the chief prosecutor in Ankara after an application from the headquarter of the Turkish National Police’s Antismuggling and Organized Crime Department has been received and reviewed. The second reason is that narcotic officials in cities do not want controlled delivery operations because such operations are lengthy and risky. The risk of losing vehicles in the operation is high because of inadequate technical surveillance capabilities.

Thus, to increase the effectiveness and the number of controlled delivery operations, first the bureaucratic process of getting approval should be eased. Second, the narcotics personnel in cities must be encouraged to use controlled delivery operations and given the necessary technical support.

*Searching of vehicles before loading of legal cargo.*

When asked in interviews about when and where heroin is concealed in TIR trucks, most of the officials said that heroin is concealed before the loading of legal cargo in safe TIR garages. This tactic reduces the risk of detection of heroin because searching a truck with legal cargo, especially fresh food products, is difficult. Consequently, law enforcement officials avoid searching those trucks unless they have strong suspicions that heroin is being concealed in the vehicle. Therefore, local law enforcement officers must search TIR vehicles before legal cargo
is loaded. Officers can use crime intelligence analysis for their searches, or they can randomly search vehicles.

*Searching suspected TIR trucks at their destination.*

One of the dilemmas of law enforcement officers in border searches is the difficulty of searching large vehicles, especially TIR trucks, when they are loaded. An alternative to searching trucks after they are loaded but in route to their destination is to search suspected TIR trucks immediately after they have unloaded their legal cargo at their destination. This new approach requires strong cooperation between local law enforcement and law enforcement at borders and tight control of the trucks from border to destination.

*Monitoring trucks with GPS tracking systems.*

Transportation companies can easily track and monitor their drivers’ activities with real-time location monitoring. When a truck strays from its planned route and when the truck stops in an unexpected location, a GPS could alert the company and law enforcement officials. These types of GPS tracking systems are widely used in the United States. Recent developments in technology make these systems economical even for tracking individuals.

**Summary**

After the conditions that create opportunities for heroin trafficking have been found, changing those conditions by increasing risks and effort and reducing rewards and excuses could prevent trafficking. Therefore, following the same format of chapter VII, chapter VIII discussed specific
opportunity blocking techniques for every trafficking facilitator. While many of the techniques simply reverse facilitating conditions, others require more technology or changes in regulations and government policy.

Situational crime prevention is a flexible way of preventing crime; therefore, there is no fixed strategy that covers every situation. However, by understanding the specific facilitating conditions at each stage of trafficking, a variety of approaches can be applied. Further, through continuous analysis of when traffickers change their behavior to avoid blocked opportunities, alternative situational measures can be developed. When the traffickers have relatively few options, it may be possible to anticipate traffickers’ attempts at displacement and block these opportunities in advance.
CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

This study examined the process of smuggling heroin into, through, and out of Turkey for consumption in Europe. In particular, the study focused on how situational crime prevention can be used to understand this problem and craft interventions that curtail heroin trafficking through Turkey. Three areas of inquiry guided this study:

1. The heroin trafficking process
2. Situational Factors facilitating heroin trafficking in each step of heroin trafficking

The Heroin Trafficking Process

To determine the process by which heroin is trafficked through Turkey, a detailed model of heroin trafficking was developed. The model showed the eastern flow of drugs—from the Iranian border to western gateways to European destinations. The model allowed for the following four questions:

1. How is heroin imported into Turkey?
2. Where is heroin stored after being imported into Turkey?
3. How is heroin transported within Turkey?
4. Where is heroin stored in western Turkey?

Interviews with drug enforcement officials of the Turkish National Police, information from police records, and the experiences of drug investigator in Turkey helped answer these questions.
Heroin trafficking in Turkey consists of five steps:

1. Importation of heroin into Turkey
2. Storage in eastern Turkey
3. Domestic trafficking from east to west
4. Storage in western Turkey
5. Exportation of heroin from Turkey

There are two basic methods of heroin importation. The first method involves the importation of heroin from Iran through illegal border crossings and sometimes legal crossings by traffickers who live in provinces along the Iranian border. These traffickers use local social connections on the Iranian side of the border to make arrangements for importation. When the heroin comes into Turkey with this method, it follows the five steps listed above. Data show that almost 80% of the heroin seized in Turkey comes by this method.

The second method of importing heroin involves bringing heroin into western Turkey from Central Asian countries or Iran using TIR trucks. There is less reliance on local social connections within ethnic groups because the members of trafficking groups are on both sides of the Turkish border. When this method is used, heroin is not stored in eastern Turkey but is shipped directly to western Turkey.

In the first method, heroin is brought into the country through illegal mountain passages or is smuggled in small vehicles through legal border gates. After crossing the border, heroin is stored in rural villages near the border. It is then sent by domestic trafficking to western Turkey—mostly to Istanbul and surrounding areas. Istanbul is the main hub in the entire trafficking process. The arrangement between importers and exporters are made in Istanbul. While arrangements are being made to export heroin, it is stored in Istanbul, mostly in industrial
neighborhoods. When deals between importers and exporters have been completed, the heroin is handed over in Istanbul where it waits to be exported. Exporters have social and business connections on the other side of the border.

Heroin is sent out of the country by various methods, but three are the most common. First, it is sent in small cars first to Balkan countries and then to other countries in Europe. This is the double-step method. With the second method, heroin is loaded on TIR trucks among legal cargo bound directly to Western Europe. The third method is to send heroin in small packages with airline passengers to Europe or elsewhere.

Situational Factors Facilitating Heroin Trafficking in Each Step of Heroin Trafficking

It is clear from an examination of the heroin trafficking process that heroin traffickers use a set of procedures to facilitate their activities. These procedures help them select border crossings, locations for storing heroin, transportation methods and routes, and methods for exporting heroin from Turkey. This led to the issue of what situational factors at each stage of the trafficking process facilitate heroin movement through Turkey. To explore this issue, four choice criteria were developed within the situational crime prevention model: risk, reward, effort, and excuses. However, instead of using these criteria to design interventions against trafficking, they were used to help understand why traffickers select a particular method of trafficking.

The situational factors facilitating heroin trafficking were examined with the typology developed by Clark and Cornish (2003). They organized opportunity blocking strategies under four headings: increasing risk, increasing effort, reducing rewards, and reducing excuses. Instead of using this typology to develop opportunity blocking measures, it was used to explore
situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking. In other words, the factors that reduce risk, reduce effort, increase rewards, or increase excuses was examined at every step of the heroin trafficking process. As it turned out, the most important factor in heroin trafficking is reducing the risk of being detected by law enforcement officers. Probably more than effort, reward, or excuses, reducing risk shapes heroin trafficking routes, techniques, and regions. This is because the rewards for successful trafficking are very high and unchanged by various alternatives. The high rewards allow traffickers to expend resources to overcome effort and excuses. This leaves risk as the factor they have the most difficult time controlling.

Traffickers import heroin across the Iranian border by using the harsh geographical conditions and security threat posed by the PKK terrorist organization to their advantage. The PKK occasionally assaults government sources on rural roads with mines and roadside bombs. The PKK also operate along the Iraqi border, but the instability in Iraq and fighting between the PKK and the Turkish military make this region too risky for traffickers. Therefore, it is not the presence of the PKK by itself that assists traffickers along the Iranian border; rather, it is the PKK and a relatively stable border environment that does so.

After heroin has been imported into Turkey, it is stored in rural villages near the border. Again, traffickers use the security threat of the PKK to their advantage. Heroin is then trafficked into Western Turkey in domestic vehicles, mainly small passenger cars. In this domestic trafficking, the normal vehicle traffic from eastern Turkey to western Turkey provides traffickers with cover, making their activities difficult for the police to distinguish between legal and illegal commerce.

After heroin reaches western Turkey (mainly the Istanbul region), traffickers store the drug in urban industrial areas. A high volume of commercial activity helps traffickers hide their
goods. They hide heroin mainly in commercial storage facilities in or near industrial sites and apartments in highly populated neighborhoods. In Istanbul, the heroin may be handed over multiple times. During the agreement process, traffickers chose to meet in open public places such as restaurants, cafes, and bars. This, too, makes it difficult for the police to separate the traffickers’ illegal activities from legitimate activities occurring around the traffickers.

When traffickers reached a deal, heroin is sent to Europe. Traffickers reduce the risks by using both commercial vehicles and private vehicles. With commercial vehicles, they reduce the risk by using high volume of trade traffic between Turkey and Western Europe. In private passenger vehicles, traffickers use the high volume of traffic between Turkey and Eastern Europe, mostly Balkan countries, to their advantage.

The situational factors that are used to facilitate heroin trafficking by reducing effort are not as various as they are for reducing risk. Most of the time, traffickers take more effort to reduce the risk and increase reward. However, they use social links across borders, legal trade activities, and legal international travel permits to reduce effort. They also reduce effort by using Balkan countries as a step into to Western Europe.

The other important situational factor is reward. The huge price gap between heroin in countries east of Turkey and in countries west of Turkey attract the traffickers. Because of those high rewards, traffickers can expend more effort and to offset the risk.

Inadequate rules provide excuses for some trafficking activities. This is especially the case with transportation companies and their drivers. When an illegal substance is found in a vehicle belonging to a commercial transportation company, the company management takes very limited responsibility. Similarly, drivers of the vehicles also make the excuse that they are not responsible for illegal cargo in the vehicle.
**Preventing Heroin Trafficking**

The final area of inquiry pertains to how the conditions that create heroin trafficking opportunities can be altered to reduce heroin trafficking. Here the choice criteria of risk, reward, effort, and excuses were applied to the situational crime prevention approach.

After the conditions that create opportunities for heroin trafficking have been found, changing those conditions so they no longer favor traffickers may reduce heroin trafficking. This can be done by applying the situational crime prevention technique to increase risk and effort while reducing rewards and excuses. Therefore, possible opportunity blocking measures were suggested that alter the conditions of trafficking. Some of these suggestions require obvious reversals of facilitating conditions, but others require the application of advanced technology.

For illegal border crossings, crime mapping and directed hot-spot patrol activities were suggested. Air patrols with thermal cameras can help to detect illegal crossings. To detect trafficking at legal border crossings, it was suggested that X-Ray machines, puffer machines, and detector dogs could be useful. These strategies also can be used to search vehicles in domestic trafficking.

The important factor in vehicle and passenger searches is to stop the right vehicles or passengers at borders, airports, and road checkpoints. Situational crime analysis can increase the possibility of stopping the right vehicles or passengers. Other important suggestions for vehicles are encouraging controlled delivery operations at the local level and searching loaded TIR trucks at their destination after the cargo has been unload. Transportation companies also can monitor their fleets by using GPS technology. This strategy helps the companies control their drivers’ actions before and after loading legal cargo.
**Research Limitations**

This study has produced potentially useful findings, but it has some limitations that future research will have to address. The two major limitations involve data and the evaluation of findings. Each is addressed separately, though they are related.

**Data Limitations**

There are three limitations to the data used in this study. First, the Turkish National Police incident reports describing heroin seizures and vehicles involved in trafficking reflect only trafficking detected by the police. This means that there is a hidden side to trafficking that is not available for analysis. However, it is not expected that the hidden side of trafficking is extremely different than the trafficking incidents detected by the police. Although there may be small, innovative trafficking attempts that are not known to the police, when those innovative trafficking methods become common methods among traffickers, then police seizure information will reflect the new methods. In short, it is always expected that police seizures of heroin reflect mainstream and common methods of trafficking, even if there are fewer common or innovative approaches that the seizure data miss.

Second, there is an absence of information on the behavior of ordinary citizens conducting legitimate business with which to compare to the trafficker information. In short, there is no control group. Consequently, it is difficult to determine how much traffickers differ from ordinary citizens in their behavior, and such comparisons may have important implications for prevention. Traffickers in eastern Turkey, for example, use vehicles that are registered to western cities—most probably Istanbul or Ankara—for domestic trafficking; however, it is not known if this behavior also is common among ordinary citizens of eastern regions in Turkey. If ordinary citizens normally register their vehicles in western cities, then the traffickers may not be
doing so to hide their activities; rather, they may be doing so because that is what most people normally do. On the other hand, if most eastern vehicle owners register their vehicles in the east, then it is more likely that traffickers are registering their vehicles in the west to elude the police. Because traffickers can be expected to hide their activities by adopting the characteristics of citizens least likely to be stopped by the police, comparing traffickers’ behavior to the behavior of nontraffickers is critical.

The third limitation is that some aspects of the heroin trafficking process have received limited attention from the police, so less is known about those aspects. While a great deal is known about border crossing locations and methods and methods of transportation, less is known about the micro places for transacting business and stashing heroin. The reason is that some of the trafficking process, especially importing heroin from illegal border crossings and storing heroin in rural areas, happens in the locations outside the responsibility of the Turkish National Police and the other law enforcement agencies, particularly the military, do have not special narcotic forces in rural regions.

Fourth this study mostly focuses on situational factors that facilitate heroin trafficking by reducing risks and effort. Interviews and the literature provided little information on the reward of heroin trafficking. Although the ultimate reward of heroin trafficking accepted as the easy profits, it is possible that there could be different rewards for different people. For example, the reward could be social status for young traffickers from Eastern Turkey where tribal rules are still important. Therefore, future research should consider alternative reward possibilities for different stage of trafficking and different people.
Limitations on Evidence of What Works to Curb Heroin Trafficking

In addition to having limited forms of data from which to describe the heroin trafficking process and the situational aspects that structure trafficking opportunities, there is no scientific research showing what antitrafficking practices work in Turkey. In this study, a large number of interventions were proposed that singly, or in combination, are theoretically capable of reducing heroin trafficking. It is not known which of these interventions, if any, are effective and the circumstances in which they are effective.

Implications for Further Research

This study showed that regions, neighborhoods, borders, places, vehicles, and traffickers differ at each step of the trafficking process. Therefore, to develop an effective crime prevention strategy, future research must focus on a single step rather than examine heroin trafficking as an undifferentiated whole. Focusing on each step and conducting more thorough analysis would result in more detailed findings about the facilitators of heroin trafficking and opportunity blocking techniques.

In addition, rigorous evaluations are needed to measure various opportunity blocking techniques. These evaluations need to measure both the effectiveness and fairness of the implemented strategies. The use of specific strategies can be expanded after rigorous evaluations. Therefore, in every step of the heroin trafficking process, prevention strategies should be measured by rigorous academic studies.

Below, the important features for each step of the heroin trafficking process that future research should address are described.
Importing Heroin into Turkey

The most important feature of situational crime prevention research for import level of heroin is to determine how heroin is brought into the country. Four research questions can explore the situational conditions of the heroin importation process.

Where do traffickers cross borders? Research into this question will help determine the regions where heroin trafficking is concentrated and the micro places where traffickers actually pass, such as border gates and illegal crossing paths. This research would identify the specific features of border crossings that are most desirable to traffickers.

How do traffickers carry heroin? This research should explore the methods of transportation that traffickers use to import heroin. It should address the characteristics of vehicles and couriers and should examine differences between normal vehicles and normal travelers from seized traffickers’ vehicles and arrested traffickers. Systemic interviews of traffickers about their smuggling choices also may be useful.

What situational factors facilitate smuggling across borders? As was done in the current study, but in far greater detail, future research should identify the situations that facilitate trafficking based on macro and micro places. Finding facilitators will help to determine specific opportunity blocking strategies.

How effective are various methods for increasing risks and effort and reducing rewards and excuses at curtailing smuggling? Answering this question requires data about proposed techniques and equipment. Experimental evaluations of antitrafficking interventions would be the most productive. Particular attention should be focused on spatial and method displacement.

Storage of Heroin after Crossing Borders
After crossing the border into Turkey, most of the heroin is stored pending shipment west. At this stage of storage, the most important consideration is the places used to store the illegal product. Therefore, future research should focus on storage places and place management. Three research questions should be addressed:

1. In what regions, villages, or towns do traffickers store heroin? What are the characteristics of these areas that make them more useful for heroin storage than other areas?

2. What kinds of places (e.g., buildings, farms, and gardens) are used for heroin storage? What are the characteristics of these places that make them more desirable to traffickers than other places in the same area?

3. What kind of investigative techniques are most useful for locating heroin storage places?

Domestic Trafficking

In domestic trafficking, the important features are vehicles and roads. The quality of checkpoints also is important for prevention. Five research questions should be addressed at the domestic trafficking step:

1. Which roads are used for heroin trafficking?

2. What kinds of vehicles are used most often?

3. What are the characteristics of drivers engaged in domestic trafficking?

4. Where is heroin stashed in vehicles?

5. What kinds of equipment are necessary to search vehicles effectively and quickly?
Storage of Heroin before Exportation in Western Turkey

When traffickers reach the western regions of Turkey, heroin is handed over multiple times and stored for shipment out of the country. At this stage, places where heroin is stored, where traffickers meet each other, and where heroin is loaded into vehicles for export are important.

Future research must examine the importance of places and the role of place managers in heroin trafficking. An effective role of place managers in preventing crime has been well documented for street-level drug dealing (Eck, 2002; Eck & Weisburd, 1995). In addition, systematic comparisons of similar places that are used in heroin trafficking and which places are not used would help to develop more rigorous strategies based on crime places.

Three multipart research questions should be addressed:

1. In what cities, neighborhoods, or industrial sites do traffickers store heroin? What are the characteristics of these areas that make them more useful for heroin storage than other areas?

2. What kind of places (e.g., apartments, storage facilities, and stores) are used for heroin storage? What are the characteristics of these places that make them more desirable to traffickers than other places in the same area?

3. What kind of investigative techniques are most useful for locating heroin storage places?
Exportation of Heroin

As with the heroin importation process, the most important features are border crossings and vehicles used for exporting the drug. Four multipart research questions can explore the situational conditions of the heroin exportation process:

1. Where do traffickers cross borders? Which border gates, seaports, and airports are used for trafficking? Is there any illegal border crossing?

2. How do traffickers transport heroin? Which methods of transportation do traffickers use to export heroin? What are the characteristics of vehicles and couriers? How do normal vehicles and normal travelers differ from seized trafficker’s vehicles and arrested traffickers? What information and insights about smuggling choices can be gained from interviews of traffickers?

3. What are the situational factors that facilitate crossing border smuggling? What are the facilitators specific to each border gate, port, and airport that can help to determine specific opportunity blocking strategies?

4. How effective are various opportunity blocking methods at increasing risk and effort and reducing rewards and excuses and thus curtailing smuggling?

The proposed techniques and equipment need to be tested, and the test results must shape the deployment of new equipment and the implementation of new strategies. In addition, as with the importation step, particular attention should be focused on spatial and method displacement.
Policy Implications

Situational crime prevention theory suggests that crimes are concentrated at certain places and times and that crime can be prevented by blocking opportunities at the appropriate places and times. The current study shows that heroin trafficking in Turkey is concentrated in some regions and places, and that traffickers follow similar patterns for importing and exporting the drug. This study also suggests that heroin trafficking in Turkey can be prevented by using opportunity blocking techniques focused on places.

Implications for the Turkish National Police and Turkey

To block heroin trafficking in Turkey, a national implementation of situational crime prevention is required. Heroin trafficking is not a single criminal act that is concentrated in a city or in a neighborhood. Rather, it is a series of criminal acts that cross Turkey, starting in the east and ending in the west. The current study found that heroin traffickers appear to search for less risky routes and places. This finding indicates that local or regional application of situational crime prevention strategies for heroin trafficking in Turkey would not be successful if implemented in isolation. For example, when a local law enforcement agency successfully implements situational crime prevention in its region, the trafficker may find another way to go their destination. Instead, systematic and coordinated approaches are needed for a national strategy.

National implementation of situational crime prevention should consist of a series of well-prepared plans for each step of heroin trafficking—from importing heroin to exporting heroin. A national strategy would help to direct resources to the appropriate areas. For example, the current study shows that heroin comes into Turkey in a relatively narrow region and can be
blocked at the import level more easily than the domestic movement or exportation of the drug. Therefore, according to current situations, more law enforcement activity should concentrate at the first two of the five stages of the heroin trafficking process (i.e., bringing heroin into Turkey and transporting it within Turkey). After these initial stages, the heroin and its traffickers are more thoroughly hidden in the normal, legitimate routines of Turkish society.

Another requirement of a national situational crime prevention strategy is that prevention needs to be implemented on a standard, routine basis throughout the country. If one local law enforcement agency implements prevention more successfully than others, heroin traffickers may alter their behavior to take advantage of other less risky opportunities. Standard application also requires standard training, standard equipment, and the routine practice of situational crime prevention throughout the country. However, although a national standard is necessary, local flexibility also is required because situational crime prevention should be developed to solve local problems. Situational crime analysis for vehicle and passenger stops must be used systematically by every local law enforcement agency.

Though it is reasonable to expect traffickers to adjust their behavior in response to situational interventions, this does not mean that displacement will offset all prevention gains, thus making the entire prevention effort useless. There is consistent evidence over many years that displacement, when it occurs, almost never completely overwhelms prevention (Guerette & Bowers, in press). When traffickers are forced to change their activities, it is reasonable to expect that the new methods used will be less productive than the original methods. In other words, their trafficking effort will be prevented (Eck, 1993). If this were not the case, then traffickers would have made use of these alternatives earlier—before they were forced to do by prevention efforts. Further, there is always the possibility that the diffusion of crime prevention
benefits (Clarke & Weisburd, 1994) will increase the effectiveness of the intervention. Diffusion of crime prevention benefits has been shown empirically to be relatively common (Guerette & Bowers, in press). So while displacement may make it impossible to eliminate heroin trafficking throughout Turkey, displacement does no stand in the way of making progress in reducing trafficking.

National application of situational crime prevention requires rigorous evaluations of the strategies developed. Evaluations have to measure both the effectiveness and the fairness of developed interventions. Specific strategies can be used nationwide after evaluation proves them effective. Therefore, the Turkish National Police should support experimental studies in crime prevention not only for heroin trafficking but also for other crimes.

Implications for Other Countries

This study has implications for addressing drug trafficking in other countries. The situational approach followed in this study is not specific to Turkey, even if the results of the study are. The same approach should be applicable to any country facing a drug trafficking problem. The more information available about drug trafficking, the more useful this approach is likely to be. But even with very limited quantitative information, a situational crime prevention approach should provide a useful conceptual model for improving the effectiveness of antitrafficking efforts. Sharing information among countries about the application of situational crime prevention to drug trafficking would be useful for intelligence and strategic planning purposes, and it would allow for the development and spread of innovative approaches among countries.
Other Policy Issues

Heroin trafficking in Turkey is a small part of the world heroin problem. Because of geographic, socioeconomic, and cultural reasons, Turkey has a central role in Eurasian heroin trafficking. However, there are alternatives routes for traffickers, and even an absolute elimination of heroin trafficking in Turkey would have little impact on the global problem. Heroin trafficking will survive as long as there is a high demand and a plentiful supply. Therefore, to eliminate heroin problems in Eurasia, alternative strategies to reduce demand and supply, control the spread of chemical precursors to heroin, and stop money laundering should be implemented along with fighting against heroin trafficking.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX A

VARIABLES CODED FROM HEROIN SEIZURE INCIDENT REPORTS

Situational Characteristics of the Incident

1. Type of drug
   1) Heroin
   2) Morphine

2. Amount of drug (kilograms)

3. Region from which drug seized (one of the 81 provinces in Turkey)

4. Place from which drug seized
   1) Building
   2) Vehicle

5. Location of the Incidents
   1) Village
   2) Town
   3) City
   4) Border gate
   5) On the road
   6) Control point
   7) Other

6. How the drug entered the country
1) By animals or by foot
2) By vehicles
3) Other

7. If entered by vehicle, what type of vehicle used
   1) International truck (TIR)
   2) Lorry
   3) Passenger bus
   4) Private car
   5) Other

8. Which border the drug entered the country
   1) Georgia
   2) Armenia
   3) Azerbaijan
   4) Iran
   5) Iraq
   6) Syria
   7) By Sea
   8) By Air

9. Country of origin
   Open answer

Situational Characteristics of Places Where Drug Stored

1. Type of place (e.g., stable, storage building, house)
1) Stable
2) Hidden underground store
3) House
4) Business store
5) Other

2. Rent or own
   1) Rent for the purpose of drug trafficking
   2) Rent for common purpose

3. If storage is rented, does manager know about drug connection
   1) Yes
   2) No

4. Location of the storage unit
   1) In villages
   2) In rural farms
   3) In wilderness
   4) In metropolis area
   5) In business park

*Characteristics of Places Where Traffickers Meet*

1. Type of place
   1) Hotel
   2) Café (Turkish café)
   3) Bar
4) Restaurant
5) Office
6) House
7) Other

2. Location of the place
   1) In city center
   2) In industrial area
   3) In suburban area

3. Do traffickers have a relationship with place owners?
   1) Yes
   2) No

4. What kind of relationship?
   1) Relative
   2) Friend
   3) Ethnic origin
   4) Other
APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. What is your background in heroin trafficking?

2. Please tell me about your current position and previous positions in heroin trafficking enforcement.

Imports of Heroin into Turkey

3. How do you think heroin comes into Turkey?
   Please explain each method.

4. What kind of factors do you think help traffickers when they import heroin?

5. Why do they choose certain borders and regions?

6. Which factors limit law enforcement agencies to find the heroin in when traffickers passes the border?

7. What kind of vehicle do they use to import heroin into Turkey?

8. Where do they hide heroin in general?

Storage after Import

9. What is the next step after bringing heroin into Turkey?

10. Where do traffickers store the heroin in general?

11. What kind of factors affects their decision in choosing storage places in your region?

12. Which factors limit law enforcement agencies to find the heroin in storage in your region?

13. Do you think other people can help the police, such as neighbors and mukhtars?

Domestic Transportation
14. What is the general route from Eastern Turkey to Western Turkey?

15. What kind of vehicle is mostly used?

16. Where do they hide the heroin inside the truck?

17. Do you think people from certain regions are more involved in heroin trafficking?

*Storage in Western Turkey*

18. Why do traffickers keep heroin in western Turkey?

19. Where do they store heroin in general?

20. How do they meet with the customers?
   
   a. How do they find each other?

21. Where do they meet in general to arrange to deal?

22. How do they hand over the heroin?
   
   a. What kind of places?

*Exporting Heroin from Turkey*

23. How they send heroin abroad?
   
   a. Which border gates?

24. What kind of factors do you think help traffickers when they export heroin?

25. Why do they choose certain borders and regions?

26. Which factors limit law enforcement agencies to find the heroin when it crosses the border?

27. What kind of vehicle do they use to import heroin into Turkey?

28. Where do they hide heroin in the vehicle?

29. Do they plant heroin in the vehicle before or after the legal cargo?
Policy Issues

30. Do you think more cooperation with mukhtars of the villages, neighbors, and company managers increase the prevention efforts?

31. Do you think more legal responsibilities for transportation companies can reduce the trafficking?

32. Do you think law enforcement efforts based on situational factors that reduce the risk of trafficking can increase heroin seizures and reduce trafficking?