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Coordinating Efforts to Achieve Community Safety: A Case Study of Cincinnati, Ohio's HOPE VI Project

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Coordinating Efforts to Achieve Community Safety: A Case Study of Cincinnati, Ohio’s HOPE VI Project

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ABSTRACT

HOPE VI developments are supposed to replace distressed public housing developments with attractive mixed-income developments. A vital factor to the success of any HOPE VI development is its attractiveness to middle-income households. The literature suggests that this group will avoid living in high crime areas, in which HOPE VI developments are typically located. Therefore, to make HOPE VI sites attractive to the middle-income households, HOPE VI developers need to coordinate their efforts with local law enforcement to change the perception of that the site is located in a high crime area. This case study on Cincinnati’s HOPE VI project, City West, investigates how a public housing authority and its HOPE VI developer coordinated their efforts to achieve community safety.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

For much of the 20th Century, the federal government’s policy was to create large-scale public housing developments for the poor. These housing developments often concentrated low-income families in neighborhoods that had limited or no linkages to employment and educational opportunities. Eventually, the developments and subsequently the communities in which they were located became synonymous with crime and violence. In addition, these developments were often in disrepair due to poor facilities, lack of maintenance, and vandalism (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992). In response to the social problems and economic difficulties associated with operating such developments, the federal government, starting in the 1980s, shifted its focus in favor of housing policies that promote income mixing in neighborhoods.

Income mixing is carried out by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in two ways (Freeman 2006). First, vouchers achieve income mixing through dispersing the poor to middle-class neighborhoods. The other way this is achieved is through the HOPE VI program. HOPE VI seeks to combine low-income and middle-class households within the same development. Currently, the idea of the mixed income community is seen by many scholars and policy makers as the best way to approach the nation’s low-income housing problems (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997; Freeman 2006; Joseph 2006; Schwartz 2006).

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1 The Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher is a federal program that provides rental assistance to low-income families in the form of payment voucher that the holder can use to pay rent for a home in the private market. Currently, it is the nation’s largest form of housing assistance (Schwartz 2006).

2 The Housing Opportunities for People Everywhere (HOPE VI) Program is a competitive grant process that provides public housing authorities (PHAs) funding in the form of a grant that they can use to leverage additional funds and resources to develop mixed-income communities in place of derelict public housing structures (Popkin et al. 2004).
Much of the justification for mixed-income strategies, like HOPE VI, is based on the consensus in academia and amongst policymakers that high concentrations of low-income households in a neighborhood lead to negative outcomes. It has led to the belief that mixed-income housing is preferable to housing developments where a large number of low-income residents are clustered together. William Julius Wilson has argued that the isolation of the poor from middle-class institutions and role models promotes and strengthens nonmainstream behavioral characteristics (e.g. low-levels of labor force participation) and, in turn, a culture of poverty (Wilson 1987). Proponents of mixed income housing strategies posit that by breaking up concentrations of poverty the negative outcomes associated with the culture of poverty will be undone (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997). However, our knowledge about the correctness of this assumption and the factors that contribute to successful mixed-income housing is extremely limited and anecdotal at best (Schwartz and Tajbakhsh 1997; Joseph 2006; Varady 2009).

Regardless of whether the benefits of mixed-income communities are tangible or not, they do not stand a chance at success without the middle-class. In order for HOPE VI developments to be successful they need to be attractive to affluent home buyers and renters. One factor working against the attractiveness of HOPE VI sites is that the neighborhoods in which they are located are traditionally high crime areas. Research suggests that a neighborhood’s crime rate plays an important role in shaping its identity. Safety is often a high priority for existing residents and potential new residents (Taub et al. 1984). Many scholars have found that those with the wherewithal (e.g. the middle-class) are likely to avoid living in such neighborhoods (Taub et al. 1984; Freeman 2006).

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3 HOPE VI developments are built at the sites of former “severely distressed” public housing developments. One of the features of “severely distressed” public housing is that they high levels of crime, vandalism, and illegal drug activity (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).
To make a HOPE VI site marketable to more affluent buyers you have to assure them that the development will be a safe. In order for the public housing authority (PHA) and the developer to ensure that their promise of safety is legitimate they must coordinate with local law enforcement agencies. Coordination is crucial to developing a strategy to change the perception of the HOPE VI site and its surrounding neighborhood from being a bastion for criminality.

After the initial perception of the neighborhood has changed (assuming that is the case) and middle-income residents have moved in, the literature suggests that the coordination with law enforcement needs to continue due to increased demand for police services that arise when the middle-class lifestyle clashes with nonmainstream behavioral characteristics (e.g., teenage loitering, profanity, and loud music playing) of some of the poorer residents. Pattillo (2003), in a case study of a gentrifying\(^4\) black neighborhood on the South Side of Chicago, found that the behavior of low-income young black males is a central concern of middle-income in-movers and that these concerns led them to call on the police to increase surveillance of the neighborhood.\(^5\) Freeman (2006), in his study of gentrifying Harlem, came to the same conclusion. He found that what were once acceptable behaviors (e.g., loud music playing and loitering) in the community were no longer acceptable once more affluent residents moved in (Freeman 2006). Both Freeman (2006) and Pattillo (2003) found that in neighborhoods transitioning from exclusively low-income to mixed-income, the incoming affluent residents put pressure on the police to reinforce middle class norms and redefine what was considered acceptable behavior in the neighborhood.

The previous two examples show that in transitioning neighborhoods there is pressure for increased police services. This suggest that it is important for those interested in creating mixed-

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\(^4\) Gentrification is the process of neighborhood change that results in the replacement of lower income residents with higher income ones (Marcuse 1985).

\(^5\) In the Pattillo study, the middle income residents called on the police to increase their efforts toward stopping nonmainstream behaviors of poorer blacks, such as loitering and loud music playing (Pattillo 2003).
income developments (in the case of HOPE VI, the PHA and its selected developer) to collaborate with local law enforcement agencies. If they fail to do so, tensions between middle-class residents and problem low-income households may increase. If these problems are not handled effectively, they will surely reduce the marketability of mixed-income communities. Consequently, HOPE VI sites will be unable to emerge from the public housing stigmatization.

1.1 Purpose of the Study

Thus far, I have discussed the federal government low-income housing policy shift from all-poor public housing developments to mixed-income communities. Income mixing is created through two mechanisms, either through dispersing the poor to middle-class neighborhoods using housing vouchers or through the attraction of middle-class families to poorer neighborhoods. This thesis focuses on an example of the latter mechanism, HOPE VI.

Specifically, the study focuses on one of the many factors vital to the success of any HOPE VI development, making new and established residents feel safe. To make residents feel secure, housing officials need to coordinate their efforts with local law enforcement. The purpose of this study is to investigate how a PHA and its HOPE VI developer collaborate with local law enforcement. This report is a case study of City West, Cincinnati, Ohio’s HOPE VI project. The case study investigates the coordination between the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) and its developer, The Community Builders (TCB), and the Cincinnati Police Department (CPD).

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6 HOPE VI allowed a PHA, a PHA-affiliated entity, or a PHA in partnership with a private developer to construct the housing units. In order to limit PHA liability, the mixed income housing was generally constructed by a private developer, who typically receives a contract to serve as the property manager once the new units were occupied (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998; Hunt et al. 1998).
1.2 Research Questions

I seek to answer four questions. First, to what extent was changing the perception of the West End being a high crime area a goal of the City West HOPE VI project. Second, to what extent is crime still a problem at City West? Third, to what extent housing officials coordinated with the Cincinnati Police during the planning and implementation stages? Fourth, what barriers (if any) hindered successful collaboration between CMHA and the CPD? How (if it all) were these hurdles overcome?

1.3 Implications of the Study

The results of this study may be used to assist CMHA and CPD (as well as PHAs and police departments in other cities) to further improve on their coordination. Results of this study will be helpful in that it will show what factors contribute to effective collaborations between the two entities and what factors can potentially act as barriers to coordination. Through an in-depth case study of City West, I hope to address the lack of literature about police-PHA coordination in HOPE VI.

1.4 Limitations of the Study

Firstly, this study was conducted in the City of Cincinnati and the results may not be generalizable to PHAs that operate in different sociopolitical environments. Secondly, the police-PHA relationship described here may be specific to CMHA and CPD. Other localities may not have the same organizational structure as CMHA. For example, whereas, CMHA does not have its own police force and other housing authorities do (e.g. the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, in Cleveland). Third, the core analysis is based on five key informants. These may not reflect the opinion of all those involved in the collaboration between CMHA and the CPD.
1.5 Methodology of the Thesis

Robert Yin provides the best definition of case study analysis; “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used” (Yin 1994, 13). Yin (1994) argues that case studies are best suited for situations where the researcher focus is on contemporary events, ones in which the researcher has little control over events, and where the researcher is seeking to answer questions of “how and why”.

Yin (1994) argues that case study research is “an all encompassing” research strategy that relies on multiple sources of data that corroborate one another. Case studies can include a variety of data. Specifically, quantitative, qualitative or historical data can be used to analyze a case study. The strength of case study’s findings lies in the researcher’s ability to triangulate data from several different sources (Patton 1987). In sum, case study analysis is a methodological approach combining different types of data and that examines and evaluates interactions within a particular context (Gerring 2007).

This case study focuses on the collaboration between the City of Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) and the Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) during the City West Project. This study is intended to be exploratory, qualitative, and descriptive in nature. In this study, I will provide insight into the complex issue of City-PHA coordination by focusing specifically on the collaboration between CPD and CMHA during the City West HOPE VI project. Construction stopped on City West in the fall of 2008, 100 homeownership units still need to be built (Mitsch 2009).
This study utilizes multiple data sources. (1) Documents such as the City West HOPE VI grant applications, (2) City of Cincinnati internal correspondence, (3) neighborhood urban design and comprehensive plans, (4) journal articles and professional papers written about the City West project, (5) newspaper accounts, and (6) semi-structured key informant interviews.

1.5.1 Key Informant Interviews

Key informant interviews were used to obtain firsthand accounts of how the Police Department and CMHA communicated with one another during the City West project. Selection of the interviewees were based on a small non-probability sample using the key respondent technique, which uses individuals “whom the researcher considers to be particularly knowledgeable about the subject [in question] to be selected for interviews” (Rea and Parker 2005, 173). My target population are employees of CMHA, The Community Builders (TCB), Inc (the HOPE VI developer and property manager), and CPD who have knowledge of the HOPE VI development and the issues regarding safety its safety. My aim in conducting these interviews was to better understand collaboration between the Police Department and CMHA during the HOPE VI process.

The snowball sampling technique was utilized to identity key informants that could add insight about the collaboration between CPD and CMHA. Snowball sampling is a technique for finding research subjects where one subject gives the researcher the name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on (Vogt 1999, 303). The interviews lasted approximately one hour and were tape recorded and then transcribed.

Participants’ responses were coded and then grouped into sections based on the themes of the interview guide (Appendix A). The participants’ responses to the same question were
compared in order to identify emerging patterns. I conducted a reality check on conclusions emerging from the interviews using published documents.

1.5.2 The Key Informants

A total of five persons were interviewed for this project. The five key informants were employees of CMHA, CPD and TCB. The persons interviewed from CMHA were Michael Herald, Manager of Security Operations, and Jackie Davis, Resident Services Manager. 7 Prior to holding this position, Jackie Davis was CMHA’s HOPE VI Project Coordinator. The CPD interviewees included District 1 Neighborhood Liaison Officer Timothy Eppstein and Citizens on Patrol (COP) Coordinator Princess Davis. 8 Prior to this position Princess Davis was the Beat 3 patrol officer. 9 For the Community Builders (TCB), Lou Mitsch, Vice President and Director of Cincinnati Operations, was selected to be interviewed. 10 These individuals were selected for their knowledge of the HOPE VI project and their involvement in the coordination between CMHA and CPD. In addition, I corresponded via email with Dr. Mahyar Arefi, a professor of community planning and City West resident, about what it is like to be a resident of City West and the concerns of homeowners. We corresponded via email because he was unable to meet for an interview.

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7 In addition, to serving as CMHA’s full-time Security Operations Manager, Michael Herald is also employed as a Police Officer for a township located in Hamilton County, Ohio.

8 The officers in the study are line officers and not necessarily the key decisions makers in the department. Attempts to interview decision makers in the Police Department (e.g. district commanders and higher) were not successful.

9 The Beat 3 Patrol Officer is responsible for patrolling the portion of the West End which includes the City West development (Eppstein 2009; P. Davis 2009).

10 TCB is the developer and property manager of the City West development. They were responsible for hiring the architects, construction contractors, and selecting two Cincinnati-based project managers (Curnutte 1999b; J. Davis 2009; Herald 2009).
Before the interview, each interviewee was asked to sign a consent form stating that they agreed to participate in this study.\textsuperscript{11} The form briefed the interviewee on how the information they provided would be utilized. Prior to starting the interview, I obtained permission to record the interview in accordance with published guidelines of the University of Cincinnati’s Institutional Review Board (IRB). Four of the interviews occurred in an office setting at the key informants’ work place. While conducting my interview with Officer Princess Davis, I was given a tour in a police patrol car of the West End neighborhoods and the HOPE VI site.

I transcribed each of the interviews and e-mailed them to the interviewees for feedback and comments before I used the data for analysis. Each participant was interviewed once. I did ask follow-up questions of the key informants via email to get clarification of statements made in during the interview or to get additional information on certain subjects (e.g. the number of housing units in City West that are considered public housing).

1.6 Chapter Outline for the Thesis

Chapter One provides the background and the purpose for this study and discusses the methodology. Chapter Two provides a brief history of HOPE VI, its purpose and goals, and an update of the current status of the program. Chapter Three examines the literature available on HOPE VI coordination and interorganizational collaboration. Chapter Four gives an overview of HOPE VI in Cincinnati, key characteristics of the City of Cincinnati, CMHA, CPD, the West End, and the City West development. Chapter Five uses the key informant interviews to discuss CMHA-CPD coordination. Lastly, Chapter Six provides the conclusions of this study and makes

\textsuperscript{11} Prior to conducting the interviews, I had to request approval from the University of Cincinnati (UC) Institutional Review Board (IRB). The purpose of the IRB is to ensure that researchers treat human participants ethically and that UC affiliated studies do not adversely impact human participants (See Appendix B for IRB approval letter).
suggestion of what PHAs and police departments do to make HOPE VI projects and their surrounding neighborhoods safer.
CHAPTER TWO – HOPE VI: HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND GOALS

In 1992, the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing (NCSDPH) found that prior public housing policies had led to more than six percent of the nation’s public housing units to be considered severely distressed. Severely distressed public housing were considered obsolete because of poor building facilities that failed to meet building codes due to a lack of maintenance and poor design. They also were located in areas with severe socioeconomic problems (e.g. high levels of poverty and unemployment among the resident population, crime and illegal drug activities). The federal government sought to address this problem with the HOPE VI program (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).

HOPE VI program was enacted into law on October 6, 1992 as a demonstration program. It allowed eligible public housing authorities (PHAs) to compete for a limited number of categorical grants each year, to be used for demolition and to leverage additional funds from private and public entities. HOPE VI encompassed many of the National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing recommendations (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). PHAs were also required to earmark a certain percentage of the grant for Community and Supportive Services (CSS). CSS was intended to assist residents become self sufficient (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998).

12 The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing, established by Congress in 1989, was charged with identifying the nation’s “severely distressed” public housing developments, assessing strategies to improve them, and preparing a national action plan for dealing with the problem (Popkin et al. 2004).

Severely distressed public housing means a public housing project that: 1) requires major redesign, reconstruction or redevelopment, or partial or total demolition, to correct serious deficiencies; 2) contributes to the physical decline and economic disinvestment of the surrounding neighborhood; 3) is occupied predominantly by families who are very low-income, are unemployed, and dependent on various forms of public assistance; 4) is located in neighborhood that has high rates of vandalism and criminal activity in comparison to other housing in the area; 5) cannot be revitalized through assistance under other programs because of cost constraints and inadequacy of available amounts (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).
2.1 The National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing

The NCSDPH was created in 1989 to study the problem of severely distressed public housing and to make recommendations on how to remedy the problem. The commission suggested that the federal government’s emphasis on the physical conditions of public housing developments failed to take into account the social needs of residents. NCSDPH found that it was impossible to expect public housing developments to be successful when they are exclusively located in neighborhoods that have no linkages to employment and educational opportunities (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).

The NCSDPH identified three problems with severely distressed public housing developments. First, residents living in severely distressed public housing were isolated from mainstream America due to the absence of economic resources and opportunities in their communities. The NCSDPH recommended extensive social and supportive services to help residents secure the education and employment skills required to overcome economic isolation (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).

Second, severely distressed developments suffer from extensive physical deterioration, obsolete building facilities, maintenance problems, and vandalism. These problems could not be abated through existing federal programs that funded the renovation of public housing. The NCSDPH found that the cost associated with maintaining severely distressed public housing developments depleted the operating budgets of PHAs (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).

The third problem identified with severely distressed neighborhoods was the conditions of the neighborhoods in which they were located. These neighborhoods suffered from economic
disinvestment, lacked the resources to provide public housing residents with jobs, health care, education, and other services. Crime was cited as a major problem in severely distressed public housing and their surrounding communities (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992; Hays 1995).

The NCSDPH advocated for the creation of policies to eradicate severely distressed public housing by 2000. The Commission suggested that any policy aimed at addressing severely distressed public housing should provide funding for social and supportive services to empower public housing residents. It was also recommended that federal policies target economic development, home ownership, housing construction, and rehabilitation programs (National Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing 1992).

2.2 The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA)

The Quality Housing and Work Responsibility Act (QHWRA) of 1998 introduced considerable changes to the laws covering public housing and Section 8 programs. It combined both Section 8 programs (the Certificate and the Rental Voucher), thus creating the Housing Choice Voucher Program. In addition, the act officially recognized the HOPE VI program and authorized it until 2002 and specifically outlined what a HOPE VI project should entail (Hunt et al 1998; U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a). A HOPE VI project should feature: 1) demolition and the replacement of severely distressed public housing with productive residential and commercial centers; 2) a deconcentration of poverty, and 3) social services that encourage public housing residents to become self-sufficient (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a).

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13 Prior the QHWRA, HOPE VI was considered a demonstration program (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a).
initial HOPE VI language promoted rehabilitation over demolition, but by 1994 demolition became the preferred method (Keating 2000).

2.3 The HOPE VI Program

The HOPE VI program permitted PHAs to demolish severely distressed and obsolete public housing developments and replace them with mixed income housing. HUD set a goal to demolish 100,000 public housing units that were severely distressed by fiscal year 2000 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). In 1996, HUD mandated a mixed finance rule for HOPE VI developments, which enabled PHAs to utilize “private and/or public funding sources for the purpose of developing public housing that may be owned by an entity other than a PHA” (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). The mixed finance concept ended the long history of the federal government providing full funding for the construction of public housing (Popkin et al. 2004).

HOPE VI called for the construction of mixed income housing on sites where severely distressed public housing once stood. HOPE VI projects were to consist of newly constructed public housing, market rate rental units, and owner-occupied housing affordable to low-, moderate-, and middle-income households. Federal regulations required the public housing units within the developments to remain as public housing for ten, twenty, or forty year periods, and permitted these units to be privately owned and managed (Hunt et al. 1998, U.S. General Accounting Office 2003a).

In order to limit PHA liability, the mixed income housing was generally constructed by a private developer, who typically receives a contract to serve as the property manager once the new units were occupied. The mixed income housing is funded through the PHAs capital or
operating revenues, the private developer's funding, and federal low-income housing tax credits (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998; Hunt et al. 1998). PHAs may provide a grant, loan, guarantee, or another type of capital investment to develop the mixed finance housing (Popkin et al. 2005; Hunt et al. 1998).

2.3.1 HOPE VI Guidelines

The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was the designated federal agency responsible for overseeing the HOPE VI program. HUD did not adopt regulations for HOPE VI from 1993 to 1998 due to the absence of HOPE VI authorizing legislation, which did not come till the passage of QWHRA (Hunt et al. 1998). To ensure that the HOPE VI requirements were meant by local PHAs and their partners, HUD utilized two federal documents, the notice of funds availability (NOFA) and the HOPE VI Grant Agreement (Popkin et al. 2004).14

2.3.2 HOPE VI and Resident Displacement and Relocation

Demolition at HOPE VI sites led to the displacement of public housing residents. PHAs are required to abide by the provisions of the federal Uniform Relocation Act (URA), which applies to temporarily and permanently displaced households and businesses (Turbov and Piper 2005). They are required to pay for relocation costs and brief displaced residents about their housing options. To meet the URA mandate, PHAs are allowed to use HOPE VI funds to provide

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14 The HOPE VI guidelines for each fiscal year were contained in the NOFA. The HOPE VI Grant Agreement served as a binding contract between HUD and the respective PHA that set forth the requirements for policy implementation. The NOFA and the HOPE VI Grant Agreement were intended to aid PHAs and their partners achieve the HOPE VI programs goals (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003b).
relocation benefits to the affected residents and businesses (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2001).

The HOPE VI guidelines mandate that displaced public housing residents should be given priority over others to lease or purchase a new apartment or home in the mixed-income community once it is completed (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). However, to reoccupy residents must meet the strict eligibility criteria.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, not all displaced residents were able to move back once the HOPE VI site was built (U.S. General Accounting Office 2003b). Furthermore, since HOPE VI sites usually had fewer public housing units than were demolished some residents who qualify for reoccupation cannot. On average only 12.5 percent of displaced residents typically return after the neighborhood is transformed (Popkin et al. 2004). Displaced residents were offered a range of relocation options from low-income home-ownership, Section 8 housing vouchers, other public housing, to low-income housing tax credit (LIHTC) units (Schwartz 2006; Hunt et al. 1998).

One of the goals of HOPE VI is to promote self-sufficiency and upward mobility of public housing residents. All PHAs were required to implement Community and Supportive Service (CSS) plan. The Community and Supportive Services (CSS) plan was to show how the PHA was going to improve the public housing residents’ employment and educational prospects. It was not stipulated how much of the HOPE VI grant funds should be allocated to CSS programs. PHAs were given tremendous freedom to determine the scope of CSS programs, but they were required to submit a CSS Work Plan to HUD for approval (Popkin et al. 2004). The

\textsuperscript{15} To improve the quality of life for residents of HOPE VI communities, PHAs required public housing residents to sign strict lease agreements, which barred any involvement in criminal behavior and illegal drug activities (Hunt et al. 1998; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). Some lease agreements even contained provisions that required reoccupying residents to perform community service, enroll in job training or an education program, or have gainful employment while residing in the HOPE VI development (Popkin et al. 2004).
QHWRA linked CSS requirements with federal welfare reform goals and, thus, sought to reduce public housing residents’ dependence on public assistance programs (Hunt et al. 1998).

2.3.4 HOPE VI and Public/Private Partnerships

The mixed-finance provision required PHAs to enter into partnerships with local governments and the private sector to leverage the additional funds needed to transform severely distressed public housing neighborhoods (Bacon 1998; Popkin et al. 2004). This requirement created a sense of shared responsibility in achieving HOPE VI’s goals. PHAs were also supposed to partner with existing social service entities to achieve its CSS goals. They were allowed to enter partnership agreements with governmental and nonprofit social service agencies without conducting a competitive bidding process (Bacon 1998; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998).

HOPE VI required the creation of a Community Task Force (CTF), a partnership of community stakeholders (e.g. public housing residents, public officials, nonprofit organizations, businesses, and neighborhood groups). PHAs were to collaborate with CTF participants to develop and implement the HOPE VI Revitalization Plan, the CSS work plan, and building plans (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998; U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009).

To ensure HOPE VI was a collaborative effort, HUD required the HOPE VI grantee (the PHA) utilize a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), which details each party’s distinct role and responsibility. The parties in the MOA are, typically, the PHA, local government agencies, the public housing residents’ council, community organizations, and non-profit CSS providers (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1998). Even though HUD required the
establishment of partnerships, the PHA had the sole responsibility to implement the HOPE VI program and to achieve the programs’ goals (Popkin et al. 2004).

2.4 Recent History and Current Status of the HOPE VI Program

In 2002, the final year for HOPE VI, Congress reauthorized the program for an additional two years. In 2003, the Bush administration reduced funding for the program. Prior to 2002, yearly funding for the HOPE VI averaged approximately $575 million dollars. By 2006, the program’s funding dwarfed to just $100 million (Joseph 2006; Foong 2006). The Bush Administration did not allocate funding for the program for fiscal year 2007 and asked congress to eliminate the program for fiscal year 2008 (Northeast - Midwest Institute 2007).

In 2007, congress showed it was committed to HOPE VI by passing the HOPE VI Improvement and Reauthorization Act. The act authorized a total of $600 million to be allocated to the program for fiscal year 2008 through 2013 (Govtrack.us 2008). This adds up to an annual appropriation of approximately $120 million to the program, which is still remarkably less than pre-2002 funding. As of 2005, the program had distributed $5.8 billion through 446 grants to cities across America for the redevelopments of severely distressed public housing communities (San Francisco Planning + Urban Research 2008).

2.5 Conclusion

What is evident from this chapter is that HOPE VI is a tremendous departure from traditional public housing policy. It is the federal government’s attempt to rectify the problems of severely distressed public housing that resulted from previous housing policies. HOPE VI’s foundation is based on the notion that through income mixing and the provision of supportive services, the socioeconomic problems associated with the most distressed public housing
communities will disappear. However, as previously mentioned, our knowledge about the correctness of this assumption and the factors that contribute to successful mixed-income housing is limited.

The HOPE VI policy raises issues of equity concerns. For example, how does HOPE VI benefit those public housing residents displaced from the site? Whether or not HOPE VI is an appropriate policy tool is not the premise of this thesis. One thing that is certain about HOPE VI is that its goals are too much for a PHA to accomplish on its own. For a HOPE VI development to be successful, the perception of the site being a high crime area needs to be changed. This perception will not change without effective coordination with the Police Department. A review on the literature concerning coordination is presented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER THREE – LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter 1 discussed the benefits of HOPE VI mixed income communities and the difficulties of creating such communities. To make these communities successful, they need to be attractive to middle class homebuyers. To do this, the public’s perception of former public housing sites has being havens of crime need to change as well. This perception will not change without a collaborative effort between housing authorities and local law enforcement. This chapter examines the research available on HOPE VI and interorganizational collaboration.

3.1 Collaboration in HOPE VI Literature

To date there has been no study that focuses specifically on the coordination between Police Departments and a public housing authority (PHA) during the duration of a HOPE VI project. A lot of the writings deal with the issue of crime and how it relates to HOPE VI, but does not broach the subject of police-PHA coordination. These writings tend to discuss whether relocating former public housing residents displaced by HOPE VI to neighborhoods with lower levels of criminality improve their lives (Goering and Feins 2003; Orr et al. 2003; Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum 2000; Popkin et al. 2004).

However, the issue of HOPE VI collaboration between PHAs and public schools has been addressed in a comparative case study on four HOPE VI sites. In that study, it was found that collaboration between PHAs and public schools is extremely important for improving the link between housing and schools (Varady et al. 2005). This research differs from that study in that it will focus on the collaboration between the City of Cincinnati Police Department and CMHA.
3.2 HOPE VI’s Impact on Neighborhood Crime

Several studies find that crime rates decrease at former public housing sites and in the adjacent communities where HOPE VI developments are located (Popkin et al. 2004; Brophy and Smith 1997; Ceraso 1995; Turbov and Piper 2005). None of the literature mentions what factors led to the decrease. Was the crime rate decrease attributed to an increased police presence at the HOPE VI site? If so, how did the PHA and the police department collaborate to increase the role of the police at the site?

3.3 The need for PHA-Police Collaboration

It has been pointed out that there is a need for different agencies, including “agencies in the criminal justice system”, to collaborate with local housing authorities in order to effectively provide the variety of services public housing communities typically need (Turner et al. 2009, 202). Furthermore, while there is a need for different agencies to collaborate with PHAs, agencies may have different goals that prevent them from doing so (Turner et al. 2009). This thesis seeks to investigate how a PHA and local police coordinated to meet the safety needs of a HOPE VI community?

3.4 Literature on Inter-organizational Collaboration

Lack of interagency collaboration is often a major obstacle preventing public sector organizations from delivering efficient and effective public services. The realization of the ineffectiveness of the uncoordinated approach for handling complex societal problems has led scholars to the view interagency collaboration as the essential missing ingredient to fixing organizational problems. There are a variety of benefits associated with interorganizational
collaboration outlined in the literature. Collaboration provides diversity in perspectives, improves relations amongst organizations, leads to more successful plan implementation, reduces conflicts, fosters innovative solutions to problems, improves efficiency and delivery of services or products to clients (Basolo 2003; Day and Gunton 2003; Gray 1989; Wright 2004; and Yuksel et al. 1999). Besides its savior status and its obvious qualities, in reality interagency collaboration is “conceptually elusive and perennially difficult to achieve” (Hudson et al. 1999, 236).

3.4.1 Problems Associated with Organizations Acting Individually

Before dealing with the issue of collaboration, it is vital that I present reasons why organizations acting autonomously provide suboptimal results. Organizational individualism is an inadequate approach for solving multi-faceted problems (Alter and Hage 1993). Society’s problems are very complex and often the scope of societies’ problems covers several different organizations’ areas of influence, this necessitates the need for solutions to come from more than one organization. Under these circumstances, organizations acting individually are incapable of providing acceptable solutions.

There are several problems associated with organizations’ acting individually:

1. *Repetition* – this occurs when several organizations individually carry out an action or task which could be carried out effectively and efficiently by one organization.

2. *Omission* – this occurs when no organization carries out a certain objective, because they assume that another organization is responsible for that task or activity.

3. *Divergence* – this occurs when the actions of various organizations are not focused on a common goal, but instead are spread across a range of activities.
4. *Counter-production* – this occurs when organizations working separate from one another take actions which clash with those taken by other organizations (Huxham and MacDonald 1993).

Organizational individualism is an inappropriate means to carry out the functions of the public sector (Metcalfe and Richards 1990). It is contradictory to the very essence of what working in the public sector entails. The very role of the government is to allow individuals to collectively achieve things that individuals cannot achieve. Therefore, it should be the hallmark of the public sector to achieve success through “co-operation among many organizations with interdependent functions” (Metcalfe and Richards 1990, 237).

### 3.4.2 Defining Inter-organizational Collaboration

Collaboration, in regards to organizations, is a term that is overused, hardly ever achieved, and rarely defined (Aiken et al 1975). In political and management circles coordination is discussed as if “everyone knows precisely what it means, when in fact it means inconsistent things and occasionally means nothing at all” (Weiss 1981, 41). Collaboration is a “process of concerted decision-making wherein decisions or actions of several organizations are made simultaneously with some deliberate degree of adjustment to each other” (Warren et al 1974, 16). In addition, collaboration is a “process through which parties who see different aspects of a problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go beyond their own limited vision of what is possible” (Gray 1985, 5).

### 3.4.3 Reasons why organizations choose to collaborate?

There are several explanations for the development of collaborations between organizations in the scholarly literature. Transaction cost theorists assert that it is in the self-
interest of organizations to form collaborations. Organizations act according to their own self-interest and seek to form collaborations in order to reduce uncertainty, share risk, and gain access to new markets, and for other reasons that may benefit their members (Osborn and Hagerdoorn 1997; Ring and Van de Ven 1994; Williamson 1985).

Researcher Victoria Basolo (2003), in a case study of the cooperative agreement reached among four PHAs in Orange County, California, found that protection of organizational self-interests played a key role in the decision to collaborate. In the study, the PHAs collaborated in order to find an effective and efficient way to administer the federal Housing Choice Voucher Program (HCVP), commonly known as Section 8, across geopolitical boundaries. (Section 8 is a federal program that provides rental assistance to low-income families in the form of a voucher that the holder can use to pay rent for a home in the private market.) The desire to reduce administrative transaction costs was the primary reason why the PHAs decided to collaborate.

Protecting self interests plays an important part, but it is not the only motivating factor propelling organizations to enter into collaborations. Institutional values can influence the development of interorganizational cooperation. Underlying values such as the desire to contribute to the public interest is identified as an important key to collective decision making or the formation of collaborations (Etzioni 1988). In other words, shared ideals explain why organizations decide to collaborate. In fact, several studies indicate that values such as altruism, justice, and trust motivate organizations to collaborate for certain endeavors (Alter and Hage 1993; Knoke et al. 1996; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998). Both the protection of self interest and underlying values often explain why organizations choose to collaborate for an endeavor. The merging of the two perspectives may provide the most complete explanation for cooperative behavior among organizations since both self interest and moral commitments are
involved in the choices of organizations then the merging of the two perspectives is the best approach for understanding why organizations may choose to collaborate (Alter and Hage 1993; Basolo 2003).

3.4.4 Potential Barriers that may prevent Inter-organizational Collaboration

One of the main reasons why interagency collaboration is difficult for governments to implement is that there is little hard evidence of its benefits. Consequently, government is left to rely on the concepts of rationality and altruism has the primary justification for forming collaborations (Hudson et al. 1999).16 Reservation about the applicability and practicality of the aforementioned assumptions in real world settings has created a desire, in both academia and government, to find more realistic ways for justifying the interagency collaborations (Webb 1991).

There are five main barriers to interagency collaborations. These five barriers make it difficult for governments to use collaboration as a policy. The five barriers are:

1. Structural – This occurs when agencies fall under the jurisdiction of different tiers of government; when there is fragmentation of service responsibilities across interagency boundaries; when there is fragmentation of service responsibilities within agency boundaries; and inter-organizational complexity.

2. Procedural – This occurs when agencies have different procedures and budgetary cycles.

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16 Rationality assumes that organizations will work together when they can accomplish the same ends more efficiently by working together rather than separately (Hudson et al. 1999). The concept of altruism assumes that organizations chose to collaborate simply because it is in the best interest of the community they serve (Alter and Hage 1993).
3. Financial – This occurs when agencies have different funding mechanisms and funding resources.

4. Professional – This stems from differences in ideologies, values, and objectives; professional self-interest; threats to job security; and conflicting views about user interests and roles.

5. Status and legitimacy – this barrier is the result of organizational self-interests; concerns of threats to autonomy and domain; differences in authority between elected and appointed agencies (Hardy et al. 1992).

Sometimes collaborations may be viewed as a threat. There are two major difficulties organizations face when forming collaborations: (1) each individual agency loses some of its autonomy, when staff may prefer to have control over their own affairs; and (2) each individual agency must invest scarce resources, such as time and funds, into developing relationships with other organizations and the potential return on the investment is often intangible or unclear (Hudson 1987). In addition, organizations in collaborative relationships may experience a “loss of glory” (Huxham and MacDonald 1993, 22). Collaboration entails the sharing of credit for achievements and even the possibility of letting another organization take all the credit for an achievement. Organizations may not be willing to share or surrender the limelight to other institutions. In the aforementioned environment “collaborative initiatives will not arise easily nor [will they] be self-perpetuating” (Hudson et al. 1999, 242).

It is difficult for organizations to collaborate if they are operating in an environment where there is prior historical and political confrontation between would-be collaboration members (Gray 1989). A record of historical and political conflict may create tensions between partners. In order to be effective, collaborations need to operate in an environment of
understanding and respect (Bramwell and Sharman 1999). When member organizations respect
the traditions and values of each other, barriers will be broken and effective collaboration will
take place.

3.4.5 Environments where Collaborations will be Successful

Members in a partnership need to understand that they are mutually dependent on each
other in order to achieve a shared goal or objective (Gray 1985). Organizations that possess
similarities but operate in different sectors are able to develop strong and stable collaborations
(Alter and Hage 1993). Conversely, when organizations have similar functions and more or less
produce the same service or product collaboration is not likely since this would put organizations
in competition with one another.

In addition, for a collaboration to be successful members must have a degree of
independence (Alter and Hage 1993). Each organization in the collaboration should possess a
scope of work that is solely their domain and that can only be achieved through their expertise.
In collaborations there must be an understanding that each organization needs to understand what
will be done collectively and what will be done individually by each agency (Hardy et al. 1992).

A trusting environment is an essential ingredient of any successful collaboration. Trust is
the “subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents
will perform a particular action” (Gambetta 1988, 217). Organizations, as with people, will
always be ignorant and uncertain about the actions of others. Therefore, in order to facilitate
collaboration, attempts should be made to establish an environment of trust amongst would-be
collaborators (Hudson et al. 1999).
Typically, in interagency collaborations trust is achieved through contracts where certain actions are ruled out and others made more costly (Hudson et al. 1999), thus increasing the likelihood that member organizations will act in a manner that benefits the collaboration. Formal agreements, such as contracts, can successfully, in certain contexts, ensure that member organizations carry through with their stated commitments (Basolo 2003).\textsuperscript{17} When trust is achieved among the member organizations, the collaboration will experience perseverance, stability, and viability (Cropper 1995).

In addition, trust is derived from already having familiarity or a relationship with another (Hudson et al. 1999; Basolo 2003). Therefore, an environment where there is high employee turnover will not be conducive to collaborations (Mattesich and Monsey 1992). Similarly, Hardy et al. (1992) found that effective collaborations are heavily dependent on having “the right people in the right place at the right time” (p. 213). When trust is achieved among the member organizations, the collaboration will experience perseverance, stability, and viability (Cropper 1995).

For collaborations to work in hierarchical organizational structures, such as those found in the public sector, upper-management must take the lead. They must persistently push lower-level employees to work within the collaborative agreement (Pettigrew et al. 1992). The same proposition holds true when looking at different tiers of government. Without a strong push from the higher tier of government collaborative initiatives are not likely to gain any traction

\textsuperscript{17} For example, one of the major provisions of the cooperative agreement reached among four PHAs in Orange County ensured that a household’s voucher met the payment standards, utility allowances, rent reasonableness, and housing quality standards of the receiving PHA’s jurisdiction. This provision legally obligated the sending PHA to ensure that their voucher holders living in a member PHA jurisdiction voucher complied to same standards as the host PHA (Basolo 2003).
(Goodman 1982). This suggests that a collaborations success depends on those in position of authority reaching out to those below them to work within the framework of collaborations.

3.4.6 Communication and Interorganizational Coordination

Organizations that use informal communication channels to disseminate information are more likely to achieve effective coordination. Informal communication occurs outside formal lines of organizational structure (Robbins and Coulter 2004). This type of communication is spontaneous, interactive, and adaptive, and information is circulated through emails, phone calls, impromptu meetings, and other casual communications (Shockley-Zalabak 2008). In contrast, formal communication channels follow a strict and rigid organizational structure or hierarchy. This type of communication is organized according to pre-established plans and schedules, and information is circulated through memos, reports, and other standardized communications. This type of communication often fails in the face of new or unplanned events (e.g. the changing patterns of crime in a particular public housing development) (Shockley-Zalabak 2008). Whereas formal communication often fails to adapt to changing environments, informal information is typically faster and more efficient (Kraut et al. 1990; Robbins and Coulter 2004).

3.4.7 The Phases of the Collaboration Process

Table 1. Three Phases of Collaboration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1: Problem setting</th>
<th>Phase 2: Direction setting</th>
<th>Phase 3: Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Define the problem</td>
<td>Establish ground rules</td>
<td>Deal with constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment to collaborate</td>
<td>Set the Agenda</td>
<td>Build external support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify of stakeholders</td>
<td>Research the problem</td>
<td>Ensure compliance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification of resources</td>
<td>Explore options</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reach agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Gray 1989, 57)
There are three distinct phases in the organizational collaborative process (see Table 1). Phase 1 is identified as the most critical. This is the stage when the desire to enter into collaboration is expressed, when the nature of the problem is diagnosed, and when the legitimate stakeholders (or members) are identified. The goal of Phase 1 is the development of mutual recognition of the legitimacy of all members; all participants concerns and interests should be heard. Legitimate stakeholders “include all individuals, groups or organisations that are directly influenced by actions others take to solve the problem” (Gray 1989, 5). Stakeholders should have authority, ability, or influence to operate in a certain realm where it has valid support for its activities and has the power to define what is considered “proper practice within its realm” (Hudson et al. 1999, 245).

Decisions on who should participate in the collaboration are usually not straight forward (Hudson et al. 1999). Some of the members will be determined based on expertise and skill, others based on control of needed resources, while others will be involved due to their ability to stop the collaboration process if they are not included. Nevertheless, the number of stakeholders should be enough to equal the complexity of the problem at hand, but should not be so great has to render the collaboration unmanageable.

Collaboration is about shared responsibility and shared power. If they are obvious imbalances of power in the relationship between the would-be collaborative partners, some collaboration may not take place at all (Gray 1989). In the case of power imbalances often there is no actual sharing of power. In this case, the rhetoric of “collaboration” may be used to “promote vested interest through the manipulation of and capitulation by weaker partners” (Clegg and Hardy 1996, 678). Bramwell and Sharman (1999) suggest that power imbalances are unavoidable in our society and that they will “always affect the nature of the collaboration” (p.
Still others believe that through the process of collaboration power imbalances will be overcome by “involving all stakeholders in a process that meets their needs” (Reed 1997, 567).

Phase 2 is the vision-setting phase in which some type of policy consensus is achieved. Here group policies are formulated, a mission and vision is agreed upon, and agreements are reached. During this phase the participating organizations deal with how they should best approach the problem. It is also in this phase that the stakeholders assess their preferred outcomes and the alternatives available for reaching them. The emphasis in this phase is on the development of mutually acceptable courses of action (Gray 1989).

Phase 3 is the implementation phase. During implementation, the groups adopt some formal structures to guide the implementation of the agreed upon action. In this phase, member organizations accept specific roles and tasks. Constituencies that are not directly involved in the planning effort are supposed to be continually informed of the collaborations efforts and the rationale leading to the chosen course, to prevent surprises and resulting drops in support from the larger public. During this phase, the collaborating agencies should monitor and assess whether their implementation strategies are achieving the desired objectives (Gray 1989).

3.5 Historical Example of City-PHA Collaboration in mid-20th Century Chicago

Meyerson and Banfield (1955) report on the struggles between the City of Chicago and Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) over the location of public housing projects. The study focused on the decisions made by CHA and on the related decisions made in the local political structure, particularly by the City Council, the Mayor, the Plan Commission and influential opinion interest groups, during the 1940s and 1950s.
In 1949, CHA presented the Mayor and City Council with a proposal which called for the building of 40,000 public housing units over a six year period. Following the proposal, CHA submitted to City Council sites for the initial 10,000 units for City Council to approve. After a public hearing, Council refused to approve five of the seven sites (Meyerson and Banfield 1955).

City Council was initially for the building of public housing, because it would help solve the housing problem in Chicago and raze the slums in the inner-city. They opposed CHAs initial proposal because the plan called for building public housing in vacant land in white neighborhoods outside of the traditional inner-city ghetto. Council feared that by supporting the initial proposal they would in effect be bringing “slum-dwellers”, the vast majority of whom were African-Americans, into white neighborhoods. After council blocked CHA’s initial site proposal, the two entities engaged in a battle over where to site the public housing units. CHA promoted racial integration and the City Council and other key decisions makers in the City seemed opposed to it (Meyerson and Banfield 1955).18

Aside from the ideological conflict over segregation and desegregation, structural reasons, also made it difficult for the City and CHA to coordinate effectively. The City had no direct control over the Authority, which received its funding from the federal government and not from the city. The Mayor appointed five unpaid commissioners to oversee the Authority, but had no power to remove them. Furthermore, since CHA was formally independent of the Mayor and the City Council, it was unclear who the authority was accountable to. In addition, the fact

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18 The Chicago Superintendent of Schools charged that CHA’s plan to construct housing on vacant land would require large expenditures on building new schools at a time when the Board of Education was nearing its statutory limit of indebtedness and there were still vacant classrooms in the City. The Superintendent suggested that CHA build in areas where there were vacant classrooms. This was unlikely since the vacant classrooms tended to be located in areas that were already built out. Opponents of CHA’s plan (e.g. City Council) used these arguments to support their agenda of maintaining the status quo in their communities (Meyerson and Banfield 1955).
that the authority was perceived to be a federal entity constituted a barrier to coordination between the City and CHA.

The federal government created CHA as an entity independent of city government in order to ensure that they would carry out their mission of providing affordable housing free from the corrupt political machines, such as the one in Chicago (Meyerson and Banfield 1955). The assumption that local politicians were corrupt party loyalist does not foster a relationship of trust between PHA staff and local government. Without trust and respect between would be collaborators, collaborations are not likely to take place (Bramwell and Sharman 1999; Hudson et al. 1999).

Furthermore, it was not in the politicians’ professional self-interest to work with CHA. Aldermen from outlying white neighborhoods were hostile toward CHA, fearing that public housing would be located within their communities. The aldermen feared that if they supported CHA’s integration plan they would be voted out of office (Meyerson and Banfield 1955). This scenario in the outlying neighborhoods highlights the fact that differences in professional ideologies, values, and objectives are barriers to forming collaborations (Hardy et al. 1992). CHA’s pro-integration strategy conflicted with Council’s emphasis on meeting each alderman’s political needs (i.e. promoting stable, homogeneous neighborhoods).

CHA enjoyed greater status during the Mayor Kelly’s administration because of a personal relationship between CHA staffer, Milton Shufro, CHA’s executive director’s most trusted advisor, and Mayor Edward Kelly. With a change of personnel through the election of a new Mayor, the relationship between the CHA and the City soured. When Mayor Kelly left office CHA lost the City’s sponsorship and protection and, as a result, it “no longer had access to
the mayor’s office” (Meyerson and Banfield 1955, 85). Without support from the primary executive office in the City it’s hard to develop a good working relationship.

The Chicago case study supports, the argument that personal connections among key decision-makers are vital for creating the culture of trust needed to foster collaborations. In addition, the turnover of personnel, which occurred with the voting out of Mayor Kelly and his staff, negatively impacted interagency collaboration. The Chicago case study also illustrates the claim that collaborations are heavily dependent on having “the right people in the right place at the right time” is accurate (Hardy et al. 1992, 213).

Finally, the Chicago study shed light on the relationship that we can expect should exist today between PHAs and City governments. The study suggests that the city-PHA relationship is very contentious and their behavior, as it relates to one another, is often motivated by suspicion, thus leading to efforts to protect one’s own turf. This is not the ideal collaborative environment. It is difficult for organizations to collaborate if they are operating in such an environment (i.e. where there is prior historical and political confrontation between would-be collaboration members) (Gray 1989). A record of historical and political conflict may raise the tensions between the collaborations members and entrench different groups in the partnership into traditional camps with each seeing the other as the enemy. In addition, the fact that these organizations are separate from one another (City government has no authority over PHAs and do not fund them) and there is no mechanism in place requiring them to work together may act as barrier to collaboration.
3.6 Chapter Conclusion

The review of the collaboration/coordination literature provides insight into the nature of interorganizational collaboration. Organizations chose to collaborate both to protect their self-interests and because of underlying values, such as altruism, justice, and trust. The benefits of collaborations are many and they far outweigh the negatives. Yet, there exists many barriers that can deter organizations from collaborating.

Based on the Chicago example there exists a host of potential barriers that stand in the way of the coordination between City leadership (i.e., the Mayor and City Council) and housing authorities. Does this dynamic hold true for the relationship between other City departments (e.g. the Police Department) and PHAs? Chapter 5 will provide insight into the coordination between CMHA and the Police Department during Cincinnati’s HOPE VI project, City West. The following chapter, Chapter 4, will introduce the case study site.
CHAPTER FOUR – THE CASE STUDY SITE

The 2006 Census population estimate for the City of Cincinnati, the largest municipality in Hamilton County, is 332,252. Cincinnati is located in the southwestern corner of Ohio and borders Kentucky and Indiana. The City is made up of fifty-two distinct neighborhoods and has a geographic footprint of approximately 77 square miles (U.S. Census Bureau 2009). One of the unique features of Cincinnati is the number of Fortune 500 companies headquartered there. Six Fortune 500 companies are headquartered in Cincinnati: Procter & Gamble (23), Kroger (26), Macy’s (76), Fifth Third Bancorp (299), Western & Southern Financial (460), and Chiquita Brands International (488) (Fortune Magazine 2009).

The city's population is 52 percent White, 46.5 percent Black or African American, 2 percent Asian, and 1.7 percent of the total population are Hispanic or Latino (of any race). There were 148,095 households and the average household size is 2.15. The median income for a household in the city is $29,493. Twenty-eight percent of the population is below the poverty line. Eighty-one percent of people 25 years and over had at least graduated from high school and 30 percent had a bachelor's degree or higher (U.S. Census Bureau 2009).

19 There are two types of neighborhood boundaries that are recognized by the City of Cincinnati. The first type are the 52 neighborhood boundaries drawn by each neighborhoods community council. The City government recognizes the boundaries as defined by the neighborhood councils. There are disputes about overlapping areas, but the City does not resolve boundary disputes. The second type are the 48 Statistical Neighborhoods Areas (SNAs) which are defined by the City. The SNAs are based on the census tract defined by U.S. Census Bureau and are used to compile and maintain socio-economic data. In addition, the SNAs are used to meet eligibility criteria for the distribution of federal funds (e.g. Community Development Block Grants) (City of Cincinnati - City Manager 2007).
4.1 The Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA)

The Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA), established in 1933 under the Ohio Housing Authority Law, owns and manages twenty-three public housing developments (eleven for low-income households and twelve for senior households). In addition, the authority has several single- and multi-family homes located in various communities throughout Hamilton County (i.e. scattered site public housing). CMHA is the 17th largest housing authority in the United States. It is the only Public PHA in Hamilton County and its programs, including Housing Choice Vouchers, serve the entire county (Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 2009).

Since 2001, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has consistently designated CMHA as a high performer. The organization provides rental subsidies for 10,600 households participating in the Housing Choice Voucher (HCV) program and provides 5,200 senior and low-income households with public housing units. In 2007, the HCV Program scored 86 points on HUD’s Section Eight Management Assessment Program (SEMAP), four points short of high performer status (Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 2008).

CMHA does not operate its own police force. In Ohio, all metropolitan housing authorities are authorized under the Ohio Revised Code to employ a police force with full arrest powers to perform any police function within the authority’s specified jurisdiction (Law Writer 1999). For example, the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, located in northeast Ohio, operates a state-certified and nationally accredited law enforcement agency of 70 sworn police officers. The Cuyahoga-PHA’s sworn police officers are certified by the Ohio Peace Officers Training Commission and have full police arrest powers to enforce all city, state, and federal
laws, as well as agency policies and procedures (Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority 2009; U.S. Department of Justice - Office of Justice Programs 2009).

Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority officials identify budget constraints and the high cost of maintaining a police as the two main reasons why CMHA has not created its own police force (Herald 2009; J. Davis 2009). Therefore, policing of CMHA sites falls under the jurisdiction of local law enforcement agencies responsible for the community where public housing site is located.

CMHA, through its Security Operations Department, works with local law enforcement to ensure that their sites are as safe as possible. Security Operations is responsible for all of CMHA’s security issues including: crime prevention, investigation of CMHA employees and residents, and physical security assessment. The department assists local law enforcement with investigations and security issues pertaining to CMHA sites. To facilitate coordination between CMHA and local law enforcement agencies, the manager in charge of the Security Operations Department have been retired or current police officers (Herald 2009; J. Davis 2009).20

4.2 The Cincinnati Police Department (CPD)

The Cincinnati Police Department (CPD) is the primary law enforcement agency of the City of Cincinnati. CPD’s primary responsibilities are: prevention of crime, protection of life and property, suppression of criminal activity, apprehension and prosecution of offenders, and the preservation of public peace. CPD currently has 1057 law enforcement officers, plus an additional 281 support employees (City of Cincinnati 2009).

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20 The previous manager of Security Operations was a retired Cincinnati Police officer. The current manager of Security Operations, Michael Herald, is an active police officer for a township in Hamilton County (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Herald 2009).
The Police Department’s operation is divided into five Bureaus: Administration, Patrol, Resource, Information Management, and Investigations. Cincinnati is divided into five geographically distinct districts. The West End neighborhood, in which City West is located, falls under the jurisdiction of District 1. In addition, the Police Department’s main headquarters is located in the West End, a block away from the City West development (see Figure 1).

Since the early 1990s, CPD has used the Community Oriented Policing (COP) approach to policing the City (City of Cincinnati 2009). COP advocates interaction with the community. It is assumed that through partnerships, the community will become an active ally in identifying and solving policing problems. To cultivate this strategy, CPD has implemented such programs

21 The image used for Figure 1 is a Google Earth image. The image was taken in 2004. As of May 1, 2009, this was the most current Google Earth photo of the site. The point of Figure 1 is to show how close City West is to the District 1 station.
as: DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education), Mountain Bike Patrol, Citizens Police Academy, Student Police Academy, and Cincinnati Neighborhood Action Strategy (CNAS).

Currently, CMHA and the City jointly operate an Administrative Liaison Officer (ALO) Program. The ALO program fits within the COP approach. The ALO program seeks to increase police presence in public housing developments by having police officers reside in CMHA owned developments rent free. To ensure that officers take an active role at the public housing site, participating officers are required to perform five-hours of community service every month in a CMHA development (Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 1998; Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 2007).22

Figure 2. Location of the West End

Source: (The Author)

22 I was not able to obtain information about the scope and the size of the ALO program.
4.3 The West End neighborhood

The West End is located northwest of the Central Business District (CBD) and west of the Over-the-Rhine neighborhood (see Figure 2). The West End borders Over-the-Rhine on Central Parkway and the CBD on Eighth Street (Department of Community Development and Planning 2002). The Union Terminal Museum Center borders the West End on the West and the historic Cincinnati Music Hall borders it on the East. The Museum Center is a converted train station that houses three museums, the Cincinnati Historical Society Library and Museum, Cincinnati Museum of Natural History and Science, and the Children’s Museum. The Cincinnati Music Hall is home to the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra and the Cincinnati Opera (Langsam and Weston 2008).

In the 1880s, the West End experienced an exodus of its affluent White population and the subsequent arrival of lower income Blacks. At the end of the 19th Century, the West End was one of Cincinnati’s most densely populated neighborhoods and was home to 85% of the City’s black population (Murley 1982). Starting in the 1930s, City officials, looking to lower the density and improve the housing stock in the West End, began a push for the creation of public housing. A 46 block area was razed to make way for Laurel Homes (completed in 1938) and Lincoln Court (completed in 1942). The two complexes when complete consisted of 82 four-story public housing apartments. The razing of the previously existing structures led to the displacement of hundreds of black households, yet the first of the projects to be completed, Laurel Homes, was designated solely for whites (Davis 1991).

During the 1950s, and 60s, White flight from the area combined with housing discrimination against Blacks effectively made the West End an almost exclusively Black
community (Davis 1991). The urban renewal projects of the 1950s (e.g. Queensgate I and II) sped up the decline of the neighborhood and led to the relocation of its low-income African American residents to other neighborhoods, including Over-the-Rhine (Jenkins 1982).

The construction of Interstate-75, in the 1960s, displaced a substantial portion of the West End population and effectively split the neighborhood into two sections. By the mid 1960s, a substantial portion of the Black middle-class population of the West End had moved out of the areas to other neighborhoods, such as Evanston, Mt. Auburn, Avondale, and Walnut Hills. Between 1960 and 1980, the West End had lost more than 70 percent of its population. In 1960, the population stood at 42,000 by 1980 the population dropped to around 12,000 people (Giglierano and Overmyer 1988). As the middle-class population fled from the area, the businesses and retail started to follow suit. By the 1970s, the West End had no major grocer or retailer located within its limits (Alltucker 2002). As of 2007, the West End’s population stood at 6,331 inhabitants of which 87 percent are African Americans (City of Cincinnati - Economic Development 2009).

Even with the noticeable change in the physical environment created by City West, the West End remains a community plagued with many social ills. In 2007, 45.4 percent of the neighborhoods inhabitants were below the poverty level compared to 21.9 percent for the City as a whole. The 2007 poverty rate represents an almost 6 percent improvement from the year 2000 poverty rate for the West End, which was 51 percent (City of Cincinnati - Economic Development 2009; Hamilton County, Ohio 2009).  

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23 The West End’s poverty rate improvement is probably the result of demolishing Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes to make way for the City West HOPE VI project and is not necessarily the result of spillover effects from the development.
Table 2. West End Part 1 Crime Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Part 1 Crimes</th>
<th>Murder</th>
<th>Rape</th>
<th>Robbery</th>
<th>Aggravated Assault</th>
<th>Burglary</th>
<th>Larceny</th>
<th>Auto Theft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>890</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>838</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>927</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>776</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>449</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>446</td>
<td>103</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>770</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>112</td>
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<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>708</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (City of Cincinnati 2009; Ogilvie 2009)

The West End is a high crime area. Of the 52 neighborhoods tracked by the CPD, the West End ranks fifth in terms of violent crimes with 2,060 such crime occurring between 1998 and 2008 (Ogilvie 2009). Table 2 shows the distribution of Part 1 crimes that have occurred in the West End between 1999 and 2008. By the CPD’s definition, Part I Crimes include murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and auto theft as Part 1 crimes. Table 2 shows that even with the demolition of Lincoln Court (1999) and Laurel Homes (2000) the West End’s crime statistics have remained consistently high from year to year. This contradicts the

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24 Crime statistics are not readily available for the development area that makes up City West. The available crime data were either at the district level, patrol beat level, or the neighborhood level (i.e. the West End). The first two data levels were far too large. District 1 consists of six different neighborhoods and Beat 3 (i.e., the beat which City West falls under) covers two different neighborhoods, the West End and Queensgate. Therefore, the best source of data was the neighborhood statistics for the West End since it most closely matches the boundaries of the HOPE VI site.
findings from other HOPE VI sites where crime in the surrounding neighborhoods have declined dramatically after HOPE VI redevelopment has taken place (Turbov and Piper 2005; Brophy and Smith 1997).

**Figure 3. Empty Retail Space**

City West’s housing options has attracted new households to the West End, but so far that success has not spread to the retail component of the project (Demeropolis 2008). Much of the 20,000 square feet of retail space incorporated in the development remains without tenants (see Figure 3). Currently, the only business establishment in the development is a bank and a regional cellular phone carrier, Cricket Communications, that caters to low income residents.\(^25\) Plans call for the inclusion of a grocer and an ice cream parlor (Demeropolis 2008).

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\(^{25}\) Cricket communication uses a flat rate billing method and offers monthly rate plans from $30 to $60 per month by way of month-to-month contracts only. Cricket does not require credit checks or long-term service contracts as other service providers in the U.S. (Cricket Communications, Inc 2009).
4.4 Overview of the City West Grant Process

Cincinnati’s HOPE VI development replaced two former public housing projects, Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes. The project was funded in part by two HOPE VI grants awarded to CMHA to demolish and redevelop each site. The Lincoln Court grant was approved by HUD in 1998. The Laurel Homes grant was approved in 1999. Since both the sites are adjoined to one another and redevelopment occurred almost simultaneously it makes sense to view City West as one project, which is exactly what was done. In 2000, CMHA decided to market the two development sites as one, under the name City West (Davis 2009). The following two sections are a summary of the history of each development project.

4.4.1 History of the Lincoln Court Development Process

Prior to 1998, when HUD approved the Lincoln Court HOPE VI grant application, CMHA unsuccessfully tried on two separate occasions to secure HOPE VI funding to redevelop Lincoln Court. CMHA’s initial failures stemmed from the fact that the initial development plans called for limited (rather than full) demolition and the plan lacked a homeownership component (Sturmon 1998b). The original plans for Lincoln Court were in essence a makeover and modernization of the public housing site. It did nothing to improve the appearance of the community or to attract middle-income families to the site (McWhirter 1998).

The initial plans did not meet HUD’s expectation for what a HOPE VI funded project should accomplish: to physically revitalize public housing, greater the self-sufficiency for public housing residents, and improve living conditions for both public housing residents and those in the surrounding community. One of the main goals of the HOPE VI program was to turn the

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26 CMHA chose to name the HOPE VI development City West to disassociate the development from the negative stigma associated with the two former public housing projects, Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes (J. Davis 2009).
former public housing sites into new mixed income communities that contained rental and owner-occupied housing for all households (Schwartz 2006). Realizing this, CMHA’s revised plan included total demolition of all 53 buildings on the 22 acre site and their replacement with attached townhomes, some of them homeownership units.

CMHA’s grant proposal was initially opposed by the Lincoln Court Resident Council, which represented the 2,000 residents living in the public housing project. The council’s opposition was caused by resident uncertainty about the relocation plan (McWhirter 1998). In addition, the Archdiocese of Cincinnati, Housing Opportunities Made Equal (HOME), Greater Cincinnati Coalition for the Homeless, and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), opposed CMHA’s plan. They supported creating a mixed-income community in the West End but were concerned that the plan would remove too many affordable housing units from the County’s housing stock (Sturmon 1998c).

On June 22, 1998, after weeks of negotiations, the resident council and CMHA reached an agreement that guaranteed that those who wanted to return could do so and others would be given Section 8 vouchers to locate elsewhere (McWhirter 1998). With the resident council’s approval, CMHA passed the Lincoln Court grant proposal on to the Cincinnati City Council for their approval. The support of the City Council was a requirement stipulated by HUD for approval of any HOPE VI project (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1999).

Five days before to the June 29, 1998 deadline to submit the grant proposal to HUD, City Council voted 5-3 in support of the Lincoln Court redevelopment. Council also agreed to contribute $6.2 million dollars over four years and City staff assistance to help facilitate the

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27 I was unable to get any information about how many former residents of Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes were able to move back once City West was constructed.
redevelopment. The total cost of the project was estimated at $78 million (Sturmon 1998a). In August of 1998, HUD awarded a $31.1 million HOPE VI grant to CMHA (United States General Accounting Office 2003; Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 2001).

The demolition of Lincoln Court started on April 5, 1999. Two months later, the West End Community Council and a Lincoln Court resident filed suit (on June 16, 1999) in the U.S. District Court against CMHA to stop the demolition of Lincoln Court based on the lack of specifics in the plan related to the return of residents once the project was finished and the fact that CMHA, supposedly, did not consult with the West End community council about the HOPE VI project (Curnutte 1999d). The district court dismissed the suit in November of 1999 (Kaufman 1999).

In August of 1999, CMHA selected The Community Builders, Inc. (TCB), a Boston non-profit housing developer, to manage the Lincoln Court redevelopment. Prior to City West, TCB had developed and/or managed several HOPE VI mixed-income communities in cities across America. TCB was also charged with carrying out the Community and Supportive Services (CSS) component of the HOPE VI project, hiring the architects, construction contractors, and selecting two Cincinnati-based project managers. In addition, TCB will serve as the sites property manager for 15 years, after which CMHA will take control of management or contract to another property manager (Curnutte 1999b; J. Davis 2009; Herald 2009).

\[28\] HOPE VI earmarked that a certain percentage of the funding for Community and Supportive Services (CSS), which offered public housing residents supportive services such as job training and placement, child care, and GED programs. These services were intended to assist residents become self sufficient and to offer residents some upward mobility (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 1997; Bacon 1998).

Congress did not stipulate how much of the HOPE VI grant funds should be allocated to CSS programs. PHAs were given tremendous freedom to determine the scope of CSS programs. However, they were required to submit a CSS Work Plan to HUD for approval (Popkin et al. 2005).
4.4.2 History of the Laurel Homes Development Process

The Laurel Homes redevelopment process was less controversial than Lincoln Court’s was. Nevertheless, it was not without its share of obstacles. Laurel Homes was the nation’s second oldest public housing project; therefore, it was listed on the National Register of Historic Places. This meant that before any redevelopment could take place at Laurel, the Historical Register tag had to be removed from the site (Abt Associates 1999). In April of 1999, CMHA sought a $35 million HOPE VI development grant from HUD to redevelop the Laurel Homes site (Curnutte 1999a).

Right out of the gate, the Laurel Homes redevelopment plan was greeted favorably by all stakeholders. In March of 1999, both the Laurel Homes Resident Council and the West End Community Council supported the plan29; City Council approved the project shortly after. In addition, Council agreed to contribute $9 million toward the Laurel Homes project, which carried an estimated price tag of $93 million (Curnutte 1999a). HUD approved funding for the Laurel Homes HOPE VI project in September of 1995 ("$35 million to redesign public housing" [Editorial] 1999).

In November 1999, developer Concorde/Mid-City Urban, of Columbus, Ohio and Baltimore, Maryland, was selected to develop the Laurel Homes redevelopment. Similar to TCB, Concorde/Mid-City Urban was to serve as the site’s property manager for 15 years. In April of 2000, CMHA terminated its contract with Concorde/Mid-City Urban, stating that the developer missed deadlines, refused to provide documents, made a $12 million math error, and failed to get work done in a timely manner (Anglen 2000; Bronson 2000; Osborne 2000b; J. Davis 2009).

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29 I was not able to get any information as to why the Laurel Homes Resident Council and West End Community Council supported this plan.
Concorde/Mid-City Urban claimed it was fired for political reasons – former Cincinnati Mayor Dwight Tillery served as the company’s consultant. While serving on City Council, it was reported that Tillery was often at odds with Donald Troendle, CMHA’s then executive director (Osborne 2000b; Anglen 2000). In May 2000, TCB was named the principal developer of the Laurel Homes HOPE VI project, thus making TCB the developer of both HOPE VI sites.  

The firing of Concorde/Mid-City Urban angered members of the Laurel Homes Resident Council. The Resident Council felt that CMHA breached their agreement by not consulting with them prior to terminating Concorde/Mid-City Urban. The resident council took their complaints to City Council. In response to the firing and Laurel residents concerns, in June of 2000, City Council held up removing the historic designation from Laurel Homes (a critical step for the project to proceed) until CMHA addressed the resident council’s grievances. In addition, City Council created a governing board to serve as a mediator until CMHA and the resident council reached a solution (Osborne 2000b; J. Davis 2009). In September of 2000, Cincinnati City Council removed the historic designation from Laurel Homes, thus allowing the project to continue (“Thumbs up -- Laurel go-ahead” [Editorial] 2000; Alltucker 2000).

4.1.8 Overview of the City West Project

In 1998 and 1999, CMHA received two HOPE VI grants to redevelop the Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes housing projects. CMHA selected The Community Builders (TCB) to lead the redevelopment efforts of Lincoln. After some controversy, TCB was named the developer of Laurel Homes as well. The City of Cincinnati provided approximately $15.2 million in total

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30 After terminating Concorde/Mid-City Urban, CMHA elected to award the contract to the next highest rated bidder in the procurement process. (The highest rated bidder is not necessarily the lowest bidder, but the bidder that scores the highest according to bid amount and other criteria established by the entity in charge of the procurement process.) TCB was the next highest rated bidder. Therefore, TCB was awarded the contract for Laurel Homes (Davis 2009).
funding for the project and CMHA, through HUD funding, provided approximately $66 million
dollars more toward the project (City of Cincinnati 2002 ; City of Cincinnati 2004). Additional
money for the estimated $180 million project came from Hamilton County, private mortgage
funds, utility funds, private investors, and the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC)
program (Rao 2001).

The final redevelopment plan created for the two sites called for the construction of
approximately 1,085 housing units. A total of 835 were designated as mixed-income rental units
and 250 homeownership (Growth Management Institute 2006). 31 The project was scheduled to
be completed in late 2003 or early 2004. However, the project, which is still incomplete, was
officially halted in the fall of 2008 (Alltucker 2000; Monk 2007). 32 To date, the City West
development includes 897 housing units, 686 rentals and 211 homeownership (Cincinnati
Metropolitan Housing Authority 2008; Demeropolis 2008). This was less than the 1,085 units
initially proposed. The residential component has been fairly successful, based on the 90 percent
occupancy rate for the homeownership units; 95 percent for the rental units. The retail-office
component has not fared as well and to date there are only two businesses located in the
development, a bank and a regional cellular phone carrier (Demeropolis 2008).

Like other HOPE VI developments, City West follows a New Urbanist design theme and
is built on a pedestrian oriented scale. It features treelined streets that are laid out in a walkable
grid pattern. The streets are lined with handsome brick three story rowhouses. A majority of the

31 Of the 686 rental units, approximately 15 percent are considered public housing, 40 percent are considered
affordable (i.e. subsidized), and 45 percent are market-rate. Of the 211 homeownership units, 40 percent are
considered affordable and 60 percent are market-rate (Mitsch 2009).

32 The City West project is not complete. According to City West’s developer, TCB, the project was halted because
of the housing finance crisis. Specifically, investors are no longer investing in Low Income Housing Tax Credits
(Mitsch 2009).
buildings incorporate ornate cornices with brick and limestone facades. All resident parking is situated in the rear of the units and can be accessed by publicly owned alleys behind the units (Torti Gallas and Partners 2008).

Similar to other HOPE VI projects across the country, City West uses low-rise townhouses to promote “defensible space” (Newman 1996) and is part of a strategy known as Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) (Herald 2009). The notion behind CPTED is that design features can reduce crime rates. Primarily, City West achieves this by providing each unit with private entrances and exits. This gives residents a sense of ownership over a designated space, in which they can limit access to legitimate users. In addition, City West’s use of high-quality building materials is believed to encourage pride in the space and a desire to keep things in good condition. This, theoretically, mitigates vandalism (Newman 1996).

4.5 Conclusions

City West has definitely changed the physical appearance of the West End. It has replaced two monolithic eyesores with attractive brick rowhouses and treelined streets. The development as received several notable award for its build quality and use of New Urbanism design principles (The Community Builders, Inc. 2008). However, this improvement appears to only be skin deep. The West End still remains a high crime area, which is surprising considering that other neighborhood’s receiving HOPE VI sites experienced significant declines in their crime statistics (Turbov and Piper 2005; Brophy and Smith 1997). The following chapter will provide the insider’s perspective on the effort to increase safety in this community.
CHAPTER FIVE - COORDINATING EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE COMMUNITY SAFETY AT CITY WEST: AN INSIDERS’ PERSPECTIVE

The purpose of this chapter is to explain how CMHA and TCB collaborated with CPD to improve the safety of City West. A total of five interviews were conducted with employees of CMHA, CPD and TCB. The persons interviewed from CMHA were Michael Herald, Manager of Security Operations, and Jackie Davis, Resident Services Manager. The CPD interviewees included District 1 Neighborhood Liaison Officer Timothy Eppstein and Citizens on Patrol (COP) Coordinator Princess Davis. For the Community Builders (TCB), Lou Mitsch, Vice President and Director of Cincinnati Operations, was selected to be interviewed. These individuals were selected for their knowledge of the HOPE VI project and their involvement in the coordination between CMHA and CPD. The following are the findings from the interviews.

5.1 Partnerships between the Cincinnati Police Department and CMHA prior to City West?

CMHA and CPD have worked together prior to City West. As mentioned in the previous chapter, CMHA and CPD jointly operate an Administrative Liaison Officer (ALO) Program which allows police officers to reside on CMHA properties for free or at a reduce cost. The ALO program has been in operation since 1998 (Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority 1998; Herald 2009).

In addition, between the mid 1990s and late 2003, CMHA used its Public Housing Drug Elimination Grants (DEG) to create Cincinnati Police substations in several public housing developments, including Laurel Homes (City of Cincinnati 2003; Herald 2009; J. Davis 2009; P. }
Davis 2009). The DEG funds were also used to hire off-duty Cincinnati Police to provide a security presence, in addition to the substations, in public housing neighborhoods. From January 1997 to November 2002, CMHA spent nearly $2.5 Million dollars to hire Cincinnati Police Officers for CMHA communities (City of Cincinnati 2003).

Historically, Cincinnati Police have been actively involved with the resident councils of each CMHA development. The police have a long standing arrangement with the resident councils to provide at least one police officer to attend monthly resident council meetings (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009; Herald 2009; Mitsch 2009). CMHA’s HOPE VI Coordinator, Jackie Davis states that the police realize it is important to attend resident council meetings because it helps them become familiar with and gain the trust of the residents in the development. Similarly, Police Officer Princess Davis speaks of the value of attending resident council meetings:

If I go out to any of the resident council meetings, I am likely to run into a police officer. We do this so the people can become familiar with us and learn to trust us. The people when they get to know you [the Police Officer] are more likely to report something or trust you with information (P. Davis 2009).

As is evident from the response from Officer Davis and from responses from other key informants, CMHA and CPD already had a history of working together prior to City West. In

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33 The Drug Elimination Grant (DEG), funded U.S. Department of Housing Urban Development, provides funding to PHAs to plan and implement a variety of activities to combat crime and drugs. The program was eliminated in 2003 (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2005).
addition, they realize that to effectively police the site they must work together. As mentioned in Chapter Three, a successful partnership is dependent on the member organizations acknowledgement that they are mutually dependent on each other in order to achieve a shared goal or objective (Gray 1985).

5.2 Communication between the Police Department and the HOPE VI Development Team.

The key informants primarily relied on informal means to communicate with one another. Although, formal channels of communication were utilized only occasionally. They were used during the planning stage when CMHA first presented the grant application to CPD’s District 1 for their approval. Formal means were also used whenever the HOPE VI Community Task Force (CTF) covered issues that required input from the CPD.34

CMHA’s Manager of Security Operations, Michael Herald, claims that there are no formal guidelines governing communication between CMHA and CPD employees, such communications usually occur informally.

There is absolutely no chain-of-command in terms of communication in my department, and I don’t think there is one over at CPD. Any officer, if he or she notices something going on at any of my developments can call me any time day or night. If I don’t respond immediately they can leave a message, email me, text me, and they’ll know that I will contact them as soon as possible, so we can work together to solve the issue. If

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34 The CTF is comprised of affected public housing residents, local service providers, community groups, local officials, public agencies, and other stakeholders. The CTF’s role is to provide advice, counsel and recommendations to the PHA on all aspects of the development process (U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 2009). The CPD is not a member of the CTF, but they have met with the taskforce on several occasions (J. Davis 2009)
you look in my cell phone, I got [have] numbers of pretty much all of
the Neighborhood Officers, including District 1, and I am pretty sure
they all have mine. No, there are no organizational barriers to
communication over here; any officer can call me at any time day or
night (Herald 2009).

Similarly, Officer Princess Davis adds:

If ever I have a problem, I don’t have go through hoops or set up an
appointment to contact CMHA. It has always been that way, even
before Mike [Michael Herald]. There used to be a retired Cincinnati
police officer in that position and I think he may have set the standard
[created the atmosphere for informal communication between CMHA
and CPD], but for as long as I been here it has always been understood
that if you had a problem at Lincoln and Laurel just call their [CMHA’s]
security department and they’ll help you work it out (P. Davis 2009).

Based on the key informants’ accounts, communication between CMHA and CPD is not
hindered by a rigid organizational hierarchy. Instead, CMHA’s midlevel staff and the
Neighborhood Police Officers were given the freedom to communicate directly and exchange
ideas on how best to approach problems. As discussed in Chapter Three, informal
communication is the most effective way to coordinate (Kraut et al. 1990).
5.3 Changing the Perception of the West End as being a High Crime Area

Changing the perception of the West End as being a high crime area was a goal of the City West project. Jackie Davis mentioned that it may not have been stated, but it was understood that one of the goals was to not only revitalize the West End, in a general sense, but more specifically, to rid it of crime (J. Davis 2009). One of the requirements set by City Council before they would approve funding for the HOPE VI project was that CMHA had to get all affected city departments, including the CPD, to sign off on the plan. Cincinnati Police gave their support to the plan because they believed that the new development would increase the safety and security of the West End (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).35 In addition, during the planning stages, the members of the Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes Community Task Force (CTF) identified crime at the site and in the surrounding West End community as a key concern that should be addressed (J. Davis 2009).

Lou Mitsch, Vice President of Cincinnati Operations for TCB, stated that changing the West End’s reputation as a high crime area was extremely important to attracting middle-income households to City West:

Without changing the perception that it was still public housing and that it’s in a high crime area, the market-rate renters [and owners], who make up roughly 40% of these units, would never locate here. Your public housing residents would come back because it would be the best public housing that they could find,

35 In the Laurel Homes HOPE VI grant application, the CPD praised the plan for its inclusion of such elements as defensible space and through streets that would give police patrols greater accessibility to the site (Abt Associates 1999, Attachment 19).
but somebody that has the ability to live in the suburbs or in any community they want it would be a tough sell. To get HOPE VI to work you better be able to convince them [market-rate households] that this is a safe and clean neighborhood (Mitsch 2009).

Changing prospective residents’ perception of the West End as a high crime area was a priority of the project. Furthermore, this suggests that collaboration with District 1 Police for the HOPE VI project should have been easy to facilitate since the development team (CMHA and TCB) had a similar goal, which was to reduce the crime in the West End. Having similar goals is an important ingredient to interagency collaboration (Hardy et al. 1992).

5.4 Coordination during the Planning Phase

Besides presenting the proposed development to CPD to get their support of the project, as required by City Council, there was not much of an emphasis placed on CMHA-CPD collaboration during the planning stage (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).

Other than getting the [police] department to support the project, so we could get Council’s approval, there was not a lot of involvement of the police in the planning stage. They were not involved in the design or anything of that nature. The architects and the developers do that. We do need them to state that they would like the project to happen. Otherwise, City Council is not going to support it. It’s the same with all the
other stakeholders, like the school district and fire department. We need them to buy into it, but they are not really involved in the planning of it (Mitsch 2009).

Surprisingly, the police were not involved in the discussions about the project’s design or consulted on the use of CPTED principles. The project’s architect, Torti Gallas and Partners, and outside consultants were responsible for integrating CPTED elements into the design of City West (Mitsch 2009). The Cincinnati Police played a very limited role during the planning of the project, which is hard to understand considering that CMHA and CPD already had a history of working together prior to City West. One would expect that CMHA-TCB would have included CPD considering that crime prevention is law enforcement’s area of expertise.

5.5 Coordination during the Construction Phase

Figure 4. Broken Windows (Left) and Styrofoam Window (Right) at City West

Source: (Building Cincinnati 2007)
During the construction phase, TCB hired a private security company to monitor the development after working hours. The private security force was an ineffective crime deterrent. During their tenure, the site experienced significant amounts of vandalism (See Figure 4) and theft of construction equipment and materials (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009). Most contractors expect to experience a certain degree of theft and property loss during construction, but the losses that Drees, City West’s builder, experienced were above the norm.

In any construction site you’re going to lose some equipment and have some vandalism, but Drees was experiencing some serious, serious losses. There were certain buildings that you couldn’t keep the windows in. As soon as the windows went in someone would knock them out. Drees would replace them and, as soon as the next night, someone would come right back and knock them out again. They had to start using fake temporary Styrofoam windows in place of real ones until the unit was occupied to keep from losing money (See Figure 4) (J. Davis 2009).

Similarly, Lou Mitsch of TCB adds:

Anything that was of value, such as copper piping, you could not leave uncovered. If you put copper in you better put dry wall over it that same day. If you didn’t they would just tear it right out of the wall and take the metal to the scrap/salvage
yard. They [Drees] started putting in plastic piping in place of copper for the rest of the homes because it had less value on the street (Mitsch 2009).

Looking to curb these losses, Drees and TCB officials met with high ranking District 1 Police to request additional policing for the site (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009; Mitsch 2009). They wanted District 1 to increase police presence at the site by having officers drive thru the project when making their routine patrol runs.

Because West End police resources were stretched thin CPD was unable to respond to this request (P. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).

After Lincoln and Laurel were demolished, the site no longer was a high priority. A lot of times the department is spread too thin and we have to prioritize. No one was living there to demand service. It was no longer the preferred crime destination, like it was when the projects were there. When they demolished them [Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes] crime switched to other areas in the District, so naturally, resources were focused on the areas of greatest need (P. Davis 2009).

Although, the officers were not able to increase patrols at the HOPE VI site they provided the builder with a portable motion-activated surveillance camera to use as a crime deterrent (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009). In addition, District 1 Police periodically met with Drees staff to go over general crime prevention tactics (e.g. how they should secure their
equipment after the close of the workday). The surveillance camera was not a sufficient substitute for police presence, crime and vandalism at the site remained a problem. In hindsight, the HOPE VI development team could have better coordinated with CPD by coming to a formal agreement about increasing police patrols during the construction phase. Formal agreements, such as contracts, can help facilitate collaborations by holding collaborators to clearly defined commitments (Basolo 2003).

5.6 Coordination at City West once Households moved in

When families started moving into City West, TCB again approached CPD about using their officers as an off-duty security force for the development. CPD turned down TCB’s request citing that it did not have enough manpower to commit to a security detail in City West (J. Davis; Mitsch 2009). After failing to get CPD, TCB then approached the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department with the same proposition. The Sheriff’s department was more receptive of the idea and committed two sheriff deputies to serve as the off-duty security force for the development (Eppstein 2009; Mitsch 2009).

In 2006, Hamilton County and the City of Cincinnati created the Over-the-Rhine (OTR) Taskforce to combat the high crime rate in OTR (Hamilton County - Department of

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36 In the case of using Cincinnati Police Officers for off duty details, the employer does not hire the individual, but the uniform, badge, gun, and authority of the officer. All rules, regulations, policies, procedures, and directives applicable to officers in an on-duty status also apply to officers engaged in extension of police service outside employment. This activity is closely regulated. CPD’s Detail Coordination Unit (DCU), seeks to ensure that off duty details are in compliance with CPD procedures and policies. All off duty employment requests must be sent to DCU for approval (City of Cincinnati 2009).
TCB provided the taskforce with a rent free space in City West for them use as their substation. In return, the Sherriff made a verbal agreement that Sheriff Deputies would patrol City West as part of their runs to Over-the-Rhine.

We [TCB] had a verbal agreement with Sheriff Leis [Hamilton County Sheriff] that every time one of his deputies in the taskforce was going from the substation to OTR [Over-the-Rhine] that they wouldn’t just go around our project [City West] for the quickest route to OTR. We expected them to drive through our project and to concentrate on what they were seeing there and to be willing to step in and tell people that they needed to disperse. We didn’t want them to just past our development for the quickest route for OTR. That was part of the deal. If we were going to have them here rent free they had to provide us with their presence in our development. At one time we had around 16 to 20 deputies here and 4 or 5 sheriff cars parked outside the development. Their presence helped a lot in deterring crime in the development (Mitsch 2009).

In 2008, the Hamilton County Sherriff Department was forced to cut the funding of the Over-the-Rhine Taskforce due to budget constraints (Truong 2008). The substation in City West

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37 Over-the-Rhine is located north of downtown and east of the West End. It is one of the City’s most economically depressed neighborhoods. The Over-the-Rhine task force was created in May of 2006 by the City of Cincinnati Police Department and the Hamilton County Sheriff’s Department. The program assigned twenty sheriff deputies to aid Cincinnati Police in fighting crime in Over-the-Rhine (City of Cincinnati - Office of the Mayor 2006; Truong 2008). However, as indicated coverage extended beyond OTR to include City West.
is now vacant. However, TCB still utilizes off-duty sheriff deputies as City West’s security force (J. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009; Herald 2009; Mitsch 2009).38

5.7 Conflicts between Homeowners and the Low-Income Residents

When families moved into City West calls for an increased police presence increased.

Once the project came on board there was a lot more need for police service than we had initially anticipated. The young people [in nearby parts of the West End] were acting out. They were trying to test to see what they could get away with here. I guess they wanted to see if it [City West] was going to be any different from Lincoln and Laurel. It wasn’t anything all that serious though. It was just kids hopping over fences, cutting through peoples lawns, and hanging out on the corner in those big white shirts trying to intimidate people that came on the site (J. Davis 2009).39

Surprisingly, these behaviors did not initially result in a call for increased police services by the market rate buyers. The initial buyers were not easily intimidated because they either lived in the West End prior to City West or moved to City West from other inner-city environments, so they knew what to expect and how to live in this environment (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).

38 The CPD does not allow off-duty police officers to serve as City West’s security force (Mitsch 2009).

39 The over-sized solid white t-shirt is currently a fad among males that follow the hip-hop music culture. Originally, the t-shirts were worn by street-level drug dealers and members of gangs as a way to conceal drug paraphernalia and weapons. There is no easy way to tell who wears the t-shirts for style and who wears them to conceal illegal substances or weapons. One school district in Charlotte, N.C. - the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools - has banned solid-colored T-shirts to curtail gang problems (Edwards 2004).
You could not have staged it any better than what we got with the first thirty-five families. Most of them came from an urban environment. There were couples that had grown up in Laurel, people that lived in the West End, [and] we even had a couple from inner-city Detroit and others from elsewhere. None of those thirty-five were intimidated by the white shirts standing on the corner. They would just walk past them and say “hey, how you doing” and go about their way. They weren’t afraid of that environment. If they saw kids disrespecting their property, like jumping over fences or cutting through their yards, they would tell them to stop and deal with it themselves. The kids tried to intimidate them, but it didn’t work (J. Davis 2009).

Similarly, Lou Mitsch adds:

The majority of the initial homebuyers, and I am not saying it was all of them, grew up in the West End or they lived in the inner-city or came from a big city, like New York. They knew what it was like. They knew that seeing kids hanging on the corner is a part of the inner-city lifestyle. They are used it and living in that environment doesn’t bother them. They weren’t quick to freak out and call us [the property manager] or the police over every little thing (Mitsch 2009).
Things did not go smoothly with some who moved in later, who were more accustomed to the suburban lifestyle. Those moving into the city for the first time had difficulty adjusting to the environment (P. Davis 2009; J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).

Some of the homeowners coming from the suburbs still have the perception that they are living in Kenwood or Tri-county or someplace like that. City West is not that. It seems like they are always at odds with the residents in and around the development. They are constantly calling us [the property manager] to complain about the behaviors of [these] people [residents of City West] - how they leave their garbage can out front, [how] they litter, [how] they hang out on the sidewalk and [how] my guest don’t feel comfortable visiting; they play their music loud, and how they block my drive way from time to time. Some of them come to us and say this is not what they thought it would be (Mitsch 2009).

In addition to the presence of trash, kids hanging on the corner, and the noise, these homeowners have expressed concern about vandalism and property theft in City West. The CPD has attended City West resident association meetings to listen to such concerns and to conduct workshops on how to prevent property crimes (J. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009).

Officer Princess Davis and Mahyar Arefi, a resident of City West and a Professor of Urban Planning, suggest that the problems at the site are not major and should not be blown out of proportion. They both argue that when compared to other places in the City, the vandalism in
the actual City West development is fairly typical of other city neighborhoods, in fact the incidence of crime may be lower (Arefi 2009; P. Davis 2009). Officer Davis acknowledges that the expectation of some of the homeowners is having a positive effect in that “what was once accepted behavior, like trespassing on others’ property, graffiti, and roaming the streets after curfew, is no longer being tolerated” (P. Davis 2009).

The biggest complaint of the homeowners, the fact that kids hang out on the corner, sidewalks, and ad hoc public spaces, according to Lou Mitsch of TCB, is the result of the fact that the youngsters have nothing better to do.

There isn’t a mall or anything for them to go to. If they were in Kenwood they would do that. Those teenagers out there got places they can hang out. Out there you don’t see eight or ten kids hanging out on the street corner or on the streets talking or just doing whatever because they got something to do. In City West, on a pretty day, a lot of the teenagers and some adults gather and mingle in any of the available public spaces. Are they doing something wrong? No! Ninety-nine percent aren’t committing a crime. They’re just hanging out on the streets because there isn’t nothing to do (Mitsch 2009).

Lou Mitsch and Jackie Davis blame the failure of the City to go through with its plans for the West End as the reason why the teenagers have nothing to do. The City planned to redevelop

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40 Although crime at site is relatively minor, the key informants suggest that crime on the blocks near City West is a problem (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009; Herald 2009; Mitsch 2009). In fact, one key informant, Lou Mitsch of TCB, mentioned that since 2003 he has heard of at least three shootings in the Linn Street parking lot across from the development (Mitsch 2009). I was unable to find information to confirm is claim.
the West End into trendy art district and a mixed-use/commercial loft district. The hope of this plan was to create jobs and recreational options for residents of the West End and the entire City (City of Cincinnati 2003). To date, the 2003 plan has not been implemented.

The assertion that West End’s teenagers have nothing to do is unjustified. Within a few blocks of City West there is a public library, a community center, and two parks (one of which includes a multi-purpose recreation field). In addition, there is a YMCA which features such amenities as an aquatic center with an indoor water park, a fully equipped gym, school aged after-school programs, and a teen center (for ages 13-16) with electronic games, computers, cable, movies and board games. Membership rates for the YMCA are based on a sliding fee scale (e.g. the lower your income the lower your membership fee). There is also a program that waives the membership fee (and also the summer camp fee) for West End youngsters in exchange for volunteer work (YMCA of Greater Cincinnati 2009).

5.8 Drugs at City West

Drug related crime at the site is not as rampant as it was in the days of Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes. It is mostly a problem of the surrounding neighborhood (P. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).

City West isn’t as bad as it once was. It has dramatically improved since Lincoln and Laurel were demolished. There are

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41 In 2001, the West End Community Council invited students from the University of Cincinnati, College of Design, Architecture, Art and Planning (DAAP) – School of Planning to assist them in developing a vision for redeveloping of the West End. The City of Cincinnati Planning Department then incorporated this vision into the West End Comprehensive plan in 2003 after conducting planning forum meetings with the West End Community Council (City of Cincinnati 2003). The plan was adopted by City Council in 2003 (City of Cincinnati - City Manager 2005).
still remnants of crime and drugs, but definitely not as much.

Most of that [crime and drug activity] switched to other parts of

District 1 and into District 3 (P. Davis 2009).\(^{42}\)

Since HUD encouraged PHAs to require HOPE VI public housing residents to sign strict lease agreements which barred any involvement in criminal behavior and illegal drug activities it is not surprising that crime and drug usage/sales are down.

Furthermore, Officer Eppstein adds:

It’s no longer the hot spot that it once was. When I came on in 2003, everyone used to say how bad they [Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes] were. Don’t get me wrong it has its problem areas, like where the mixed-use stuff was supposed to go [Eppstein is suggesting that the empty retail shops create the opportunity for criminals to commit crimes]. But, it is nowhere near as bad as it used to be.\(^{43}\) Everybody acknowledges that (Eppstein 2009).

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\(^{42}\) District 3 is the district that abuts the west side of District 1. Several newspaper articles suggest that City West by displacing the residents of Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes shifted crime and the social problems into West Side neighborhoods, such as Price Hill (Osborne 2002; Hansel 2004; Monk 2004).

\(^{43}\) I was unable to gather data to substantiate Timothy Eppstein’s claim that Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes was considered a hot spot. However, all the key informants made the same claim that the two former public housing projects were high crime areas.
Although drug activity has decreased, it still remains a concern at the site. The police officers blame the design and layout of the site as part of the reason why drug activity continues at the site.

When you look at the plan it’s obvious that CPTED and Defensible Space techniques were used. My problem with the development is that they didn’t apply it consistently. CPTED is about open and through streets and looking at the development some of the streets are through streets and some not (see Figure 5). There are obstructions in the middle and at the end of some of the streets, so you really can’t get in and out quickly while on patrol. It’s not an easy area to patrol. That was one of the problems that we had with the projects in the past. It’s still like a fortress for
crime over there. It’s hard to do the patrols and proactive police work that is necessary to clean up the area. As a crime prevention specialist, I would not have designed it that way (Eppstein 2009).

**Figure 6. Prime Drug Dealing Locations behind Empty Retail Stores**

In addition, because of retail vacancies there are not enough eyes on the street to deter criminals from selling drugs in the public spaces of the site. While riding around the West End in Officer Davis’s patrol car, she pointed out several locations behind the empty retail space where people openly sell drugs (see Figure 6). The large block of empty storefronts provides the perfect opportunity for criminals to commit crime (P. Davis 2009).

Most of the time the drug dealers are not City West residents; often they are friends of City West residents or outsiders who come to the site to conduct business (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009). TCB faces pressure from both its market-rate and subsidized residents to address the drug issue (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009). While Mitsch acknowledges that TCB sometimes gets criticized by the tenants and homeowners for not doing enough to evict problem tenants, he
states that it is a high priority of TCB to control drugs on the site and to be a proactive property manager. Unfortunately, TCB is often hindered by the legal process (Mitsch 2009).

We had this one City West resident come in with a videotape of drug transaction being carried out in front of their apartment. We knew that for all extensive purposes from the videotape that it was a drug deal. But, could we go into a court of law and prove it? No! When I gave the tape to District 1 and then to the Sherriff Deputies and asked if we could prosecute them they [both Cincinnati Police and the Hamilton County Sheriffs] said that we cannot prove what was passed through the window was drugs. We know that’s what happened but we can’t prove it and we can’t evict them for it. If I can’t legally prove it, I can’t evict for it (Mitsch 2009).

One reason why TCB is experiencing difficulty with curbing crime is that City West residents are more inclined to call the property manager, TCB, to report complaints or crimes, instead of contacting CPD (J. Davis 2009; P. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009). Typically, since most of the issues with crime occur after office hours, when the resident calls they have to leave a voice message. TCB’s staff does not receive the message until the start of business the following day. When staff finally gets to the message their options are limited since they only have circumstantial evidence of what actually took place. Without concrete evidence (e.g. a police report), TCB cannot investigate the alleged crime or take meaningful action to evict or penalize problem tenants (Mitsch 2009).
To address this problem, TCB asked District 1 officers to brief the residents on the importance of (1) contacting the police and (2) completing a police report in order to develop a case to evict anti-social neighbors (P. Davis 2009). These meetings were primarily attended by the public housing residents. Lou Mitsch suggests that this is because public housing residents have had a history of participating in tenant councils. Homeowners may have felt that they didn’t have the time to deal with crime and activity at City West.

When we created the neighborhood committee association, which was an association of all renters and owners, we tried desperately to get all the residents from all the different classes [market-rate and subsidized] to participate in the association. We were not successful. The market rate renters and, surprisingly, the homeowners just weren’t interested. The market-rate component just wanted to be left alone. They didn’t want any part of organizing or coming together to talk about issues facing City West (Mitsch 2009). 44

The lack of input from the homeowners and market-rate renters makes it difficult for TCB and the Police to be proactive and address their concerns.

44 Varady et al (2003) in their study noted an identical situation in Louisville’s HOPE VI project, Park DuValle. They reported that the Park DuValle’s neighborhood association was forced to disband “because of a schism between owners and renters” (p. 114). They suggest that owners may be reluctant to be in group with renters, particularly subsidized ones (Varady et al 2003).
5.9 Identifying Barriers to CMHA-CPD Coordination

There are few barriers to CMHA-CPD coordination. CMHA and CPD have a good working relationship built on a shared goal, which is the desire to create safe communities.

We [CMHA and CPD] both want the same things. We both want to create safe environments for people to live in. That’s basically all there is to it. Our goals are one in the same. Once we both [CMHA and CPD] realize that it becomes easy for us collaborate together (Herald 2009).

In addition to having a shared goal, CMHA and CPD staff realize their interdependence in achieving that goal. Cincinnati Police officers faithfully attend the resident council meetings at CMHA’s sites and the officers realize the importance of working with CMHA and City West residents to combat crime.

This cooperative relationship between CMHA and CPD was put in place by the former manager of CMHA’s Security Operations, a retired Cincinnati Police officer; he used his influence within the Police Department to get police officers to attend resident council meetings and to share information with CMHA (P. Davis 2009; J. Davis 2009; Herald 2009). After his departure, CMHA hired an active police officer, Michael Herald, to the position of Security Operations Manager. Jackie Davis suggests that employing people with police experience in that position “helps to break down any barriers that may exist between housing types and the police” (J. Davis 2009).
Commenting on coordination during City West, Jackie Davis suggests that there has been very little turnover in staff.

It’s incredible that we’ve been working on this project for so long and had the stability in the officers we deal with. It has consistently been the same officers year after year. This is so important because often times what happens in organizations as large as this is that no sooner that we build a trust relationship people go. They get transferred, move to another department, or go somewhere else. But, whenever we need her we can always call Princess [Officer Davis], and if she’s not available she’ll send somebody who is familiar with the residents or someone they respect (J. Davis 2009).45

Having a low rate of personnel turnover is vital for creating a culture of trust needed to foster collaboration (Mattesich and Monsey 1992).

5.10 City West Inter-Agency Conflict

Although there have been no open conflicts between CMHA and CPD during City West. There have been conflicts between homeowners and CPD. The homeowners complained that whenever they contacted CPD, officers took too long to respond (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009). The police officers that I spoke to disagreed (P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009). There was also a

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45 Officer Davis is familiar with the neighborhood troublemakers. While riding around the West End in Officer Davis’s patrol car, she called out several youngsters by name and then instructed them to stop horse playing in the street.
conflict between City Council and CMHA regarding the Authority’s request to hire off-duty police. City Council also wanted CMHA to have its own police force (J. Davis 2009; Monzel 2005).

I don’t know if barriers exist between CPD and CMHA, but I think maybe three or four years ago City Council was saying that CMHA should have their own police. They [City Council] sent us an official letter requesting our response, to “Why don’t you have your own police force?” At the time, City Council was really split on the issue. We put together several reports on why we didn’t think we needed our own force (J. Davis 2009).

The above quote reflects an ongoing battle between CMHA and the City. The issue surfaced in 2003 when the federal government did away with the Public Housing Drug Elimination Grant (DEG) Program, which CMHA had used to create police substations at public housing sites and to employ off-duty police officers (J. Davis 2009). It is not clear whether the tension between City Council and CMHA affects the day-to-day relationship or the coordination between the Police Department and CMHA. None of the police officers I interviewed mentioned any conflict between CMHA and City Council.

46 City Councilmember Chris Monzel authored a motion requiring CPD to complete a report about violent crime in CMHAs public housing projects. The report was to include the number of calls for service, a statistical breakdown of criminal activity, and the approximate financial and human resources value expended by CPD on CMHA properties. The goal of the report was to show that CMHA’s projects use an inordinate amount of police resources and should beshouldering more of the burden (Monzel 2005).
5.11 City West’s Effect on Crime at the Site and in the West End

My interviews suggest that crime at the City West site has decreased dramatically.

The crime on site has significantly dropped. It’s probably a tenth of what it was. Sometimes it’s hard to decode from the available data because most of the data covers the entire district or the West End, but crime has definitely dropped. I don’t think anyone can say that crime has not dropped on site (Mitsch 2009).

Interviewees all agree that isolated pockets of crime and drug activity continue to exist at City West. As mentioned earlier, there are two reasons for this (1) the street layout is not completely integrated with the City’s street grid and (2) the stores on Linn Street provide opportunities for drug dealers (P. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009).

The development team suggests that, even with the declines in crime on the site, some of the homeowners and market-rate renters still are concerned about crime. This perception is based on the crime problem in surrounding parts of the West End not on City West itself. Lou Mitsch suggests that the West End’s high crime statistics combined with the failure of the City to do all that it promised in the West End Comprehensive Plan are the reasons why TCB cannot find tenants for the retail space.
### 5.12 The City West Project’s Impact on CMHA-CPD Coordination

City West does not appear to have had a dramatic effect on the relationship between CMHA and CPD.

No, and I am saying no because the relationship with CPD was strong already before HOPE VI. There was already a strong relationship with the Cincinnati Police in place. The guy in this position prior to me had great connections and strong relationships with the department [CPD], so the HOPE VI did not make it better because it was already a good working relationship. The infrastructure for engaging together was already firmly in place (Herald 2009).

Overall, the key informants felt that the project was just a continuation of their already established history of working together.

### 5.13 Conclusion

Four conclusions emerge from this chapter. First, changing the perception of the West End as being a high crime area was clearly a goal of the City West project. It was understood that the goal of the project was to not only contribute to the revitalization the West End, but to help rid it of crime. However, the West End’s crime statistics for the previous ten years (See Chapter 4) suggest that City West has not had any impact on crime in the West End. It still remains a high crime area.
Second, the key informants report that crime inside City West has decreased dramatically from days of Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes. This is to be expected considering that public housing residents were required to sign strict lease agreements which barred any involvement in criminal behavior and illegal drug activities. However, the crime that still occurs on site is a cause of concern for many of the residents. TCB and CPD mention that they are having difficulty addressing resident concerns about crime because of their unwillingness to report crime and the lack of participation of market-rate residents in the resident association meetings, which is the forum where TCB and CPD meet with residents to hear their concerns.

Third, the coordination during the planning phase leaves much to be desired. The Police Department did not play an important role in the design and implementation of the CPTED elements. As a result, the police consider City West, though much improved from Lincoln Court and Laurel Homes, a fortress for crime because some of its streets are not integrated with the downtown street grid, thus making it difficult to conduct routine patrols on the site (J. Davis 2009; Eppstein 2009). More should have been done to bring CPD into the discussion about how the site would be designed and laid out.

Currently, there are few barriers to CMHA-CPD coordination. The CPD and CMHA have a long history of working together. Furthermore, they both realize that they have similar goals and objectives (e.g. to create safe and livable communities for people).
CHAPTER SIX – CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A vital factor to the success of any HOPE VI development is its attractiveness to middle-income households. Research suggests that this group will avoid living in high crime areas HOPE VI developments (Taub et al. 1984; Popkin et al. 2005; Freeman 2006). Therefore, to make HOPE VI sites attractive to middle-income families, housing officials need to coordinate their efforts with local law enforcement agencies. My main objective in writing this thesis was to investigate how a PHA and its HOPE VI developer coordinated with local law enforcement to achieve community safety.

6.1 Key Findings

The literature review (Chapter 3) revealed that there are many barriers that can inhibit organizations, such as CMHA and CPD, from working together. For example, agencies may fall under the jurisdiction of different tiers of government and organizations may view collaborations as a threat to their autonomy. The key informant interviews suggest that CMHA and CPD were able to work together even before HOPE VI began. The two organizations had a long history of coordination and realized that they share a common goal, creating of safe and livable communities. This suggests that coordination during the City West project should have occurred effortlessly.

However, this was not the case. CMHA-TCB and CPD did not coordinate effectively during the planning phase of the project. This resulted in less than optimal results in regards to City West’s use of CPTED design principles. The lack of through streets in some parts of the development makes it difficult for the police to conduct routine patrols on the site. In addition, CPD’s lack of resources prevented them from partnering with TCB to provide an off duty
security detail. As a result, TCB had difficulty providing security of the site during the construction phase and once families moved in.

While HOPE VI has led to a decline in crime at the site, it has not led to a decrease in crime in the surrounding West End community. The key informants suggest that crime in development has decreased dramatically, but is still a problem. Nevertheless, Cincinnati police mention that they are having a difficult time policing the site and streets immediately surrounding the site (Linn Street and Ezzard Charles) because (1) residents are unwilling to report crime and (2) market-rate residents do not participate in crime-related discussions at the resident association meetings. Most of those who attend are the subsidized (public housing) residents.

**6.2 Recommendation**

First, TCB and CPD should come together to discuss the police officers’ concern that some of City West’s streets are not integrated into the downtown street grid, thus creating a lack of surveillance. I do not think that TCB is aware of CPD’s concerns regarding the street grid. Perhaps this problem could be remedied if TCB was made aware of the issue. It may not be too late to remove the obstructions (e.g. the rod iron fences and the sidewalks) that prevent City West’s streets from aligning with downtown’s street grid.

Second, police departments need to be brought to the table during the planning stage of the HOPE VI project. The development team for City West did not do enough to get police input in the beginning. Police should work closely with the project’s architects and designers to ensure that the design facilitates rather than interfere with street patrols. HOPE VI development teams should consider using intensive design charrettes to get meaningful input from all the parties.
with a stake in the project, including local law enforcement.\textsuperscript{47} City West’s design team met with the Community Taskforce (CTF) during the planning phase to develop a vision for the development. However, as previously noted, the CTF did not include any members from the Police Department. The police should be included on this taskforce. If the police were involved in these preliminary discussions, they may have raised concerns about the inconsistent use of CPTED design principles.

Third, PHAs need to forecast the need for police services by taking into account the high standards of incoming middle-income households. At the same time, HOPE VI developers and local housing authorities need to get a commitment from local law enforcement for additional manpower once families move in (no small matter in today’s tough economic situation). By doing this in advance, they can avoid the difficulties that City West’s developer experienced while trying to increase the police presence in the development.

Finally, PHAs, developers, and police departments need to address the lack of participation of the market-rate homeowners in dealing with crime. Their lack of input made it difficult for TCB and the police to be proactive and address their concerns. Considering they are making a long term investment in City West and arguably have the most to lose, they should be the ones shouting the loudest for more to be done to address crime at City West. Nothing gets a councilmember moving more than property taxpaying homeowners standing united on an issue.

\textsuperscript{47} A design charrette is a technique for getting the input of all stakeholders about the design of a project. Typically, it involves intense and possibly multi-day meetings, involving municipal officials, developers, and residents. When successfully done, a charrette creates a sense of shared ownership of solutions and defuses typical confrontational attitudes between residents and developers (National Charrette Institute 2009). There was a design charrette for City West, but CPD did not attend it (J. Davis 2009; Mitsch 2009).
and demanding results. In order to better involve market-rate residents, CMHA needs to better understand why these families are not involved.

6.3 Recommendations for Future Research

This study has attempted to address the lack of research on the relationship between public housing authorities and local law enforcement. In addition, I have sought to add to scholarly HOPE VI literature by demonstrating how coordination (or the lack of it) can impact a HOPE VI development and its surrounding community. Whereas, this study relied on a small number of key informant interviews, further research should conduct structured interviews on a sample of market-rate and below-market-rate residents. The interviews should focus on the perceived incidence of crime and how crime affects resident quality of life; and their levels of involvement in neighborhood affairs. The type of qualitative research reported in this thesis should be extended to other cities. This type of research would provide PHAs, their developers, and law-enforcement agencies with best practice examples to follow as a guide to public housing revitalization efforts. Lastly, further research should study to if PHAs that operate their own police force were better able to achieve community safety at HOPE VI sites.
CHAPTER SEVEN - BIBLIOGRAPHY


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APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW QUESTION GUIDE

Goals and Objectives

- To what extent was changing the perception of the West End as being a high crime area a goal of the City West HOPE VI project?

- To what extent was there an emphasis placed on collaboration with the Police department as part of the plan for City West and also during the implementation phase?

Organizational Roles and Communication during the Planning Phase

- To what extent was the Police Department involved in the planning phase of City West? How were they involved?

- Were there changes in the relationship between the Police Department and CMHA during the planning phase of the HOPE VI project?

Organizational Roles and Communication during the Construction Phase

- What was the role of the police during the City West construction began?

- Did any incident occur that increase the demand for police service during the construction phase?

Organizational Roles and Communication once Families moved in

- How (if at all) did has role as the police changed once families moved in?

- Did any incident occur that increase the demand for police service during the construction phase?

- What kinds of crime occur at City West? Are drug-related crimes a problem?

Identifying Barriers to Communication

- Prior to City West, were there any partnerships or collaborations between the Police Department and CMHA?
• How did communication between the Police Department and CMHA take place? Did communication occur between agency heads or was communication between middle-level staff?

• Did any conflicts arise between the City and the Police since City West began? What were they? Do you think a lack of coordination played a major role in creating the problem? Does the Police Department find it difficult to meet the needs of City West residents while at the same time meeting the needs of low-income West End residents?

• What if any barriers toward collaboration existed between the Police Department and CMHA? For example, were there any turf battles (City-Federal conflicts), conflicting missions and objectives, etc.. Were they overcome? How or why not?

Appraisal of how successful the communication was between the Police and CMHA

• Overall, how successful has the HOPE VI program been in changing the perception of the City West site and the West End neighborhood being plagued by crime and drugs? How do you account for any changes?

• How successful has the HOPE VI project been in bringing together leaders of Police Department with CMHA (and also with City West residents independent of CMHA)? Why has this been the case? What lessons can be drawn for other HOPE VI programs?

• How, if at all, has the relationship between the Police Department and CMHA changed since City West opened up? Did coordination get better or worse as the project progressed? Why?
APPENDIX B– INSTRUCTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL LETTER

See the following page.
TO: Patrick Duhaney  
DAAP – School of Planning
FROM: Julie Gerlach, B.S.N., M.P.H., C.I.P.  
Director, Institutional Review Board  
Chair, UC-IRB Social and Behavioral Sciences
DATE: March 2, 2009
RE: Bringing City Government and Housing Authorities Together

Please be advised that I have reviewed the study referenced above as outlined in your January 7, 2009 submission to the IRB, and have determined that the work described in this project is not research involving human subjects as described in 45CFR46.102(d, e, f).

Thank you for your continued compliance with the Board’s requirements with regard to your research activities.