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Madeleine Albright and United States Humanitarian Interventions: A Principled or Personal Agenda?

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Madeleine Albright and United States Humanitarian Interventions: A Principled or Personal Agenda?

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ABSTRACT

This study shows how Madeleine Albright’s policies and initiatives in the Rwanda and Kosovo conflicts may have been informed and shaped by her unusual personal history.

Specific events in Albright's political career are discussed, in particular, the Rwanda conflict, which occurred during her tenure as UN Ambassador during the first Clinton administration, and the Kosovo conflict during Clinton's second term when Albright was Secretary of State and US intervention was characterized as “Madeline’s War.”

The paper explores the influence Albright’s middle European heritage may have had on her policy choices in these two conflicts. Furthermore, her experiences as Ambassador to the U.N. during the Rwanda tragedy may be seen to have shaped her approach to humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Finally, the resulting “Albright Doctrine” is assessed in terms of its impact on US foreign policy.
My interest in Madeleine Albright is based on more than the fact that she is a woman and that she feels strongly about humanitarian causes. We also share an Eastern European heritage: my own ancestors immigrated to the United States from Poland, hoping for better lives for themselves and their family—streetcar and steel mill workers worked hard so their children could become doctors, architects, and other professionals.

Madeleine Albright happens to be one of three immigrants who fled Eastern Europe from Nazi aggression and who later played important roles in shaping U.S. foreign policy during the second half of the 20th century; the others are Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger. Interestingly, all three were known for their hawkish approach.

This paper will focus on Albright’s background and subsequent role in the two humanitarian crises that occurred during her tenure in public life, Rwanda and Kosovo. At the beginning of my research, I met Albright in Lexington, Kentucky where she was having a book signing for her new autobiography. I took the opportunity to ask her my first research question: Did her upbringing influence her foreign policy decisions? Her reply was in the negative; while she conceded that she learned lessons from Rwanda, she said that her upbringing had no bearing on the decisions made in Kosovo. Had this been a more formal interview, and had we gone into her upbringing in some depth, perhaps she would have answered differently. Obviously, I did not take her answer at face value. In this study, I decided to look at personal factors which may affect foreign policy decisions, using Albright to study this connection because of her heritage and the humanitarian conflicts she faced in public office.

I would like to acknowledge the help of my committee members, Dr. Howard Tolley and Dr. Richard Harknett, who guided me in my research. I would also like to thank my friends and family for their support, especially Mary Ann Weiss and Kathy and Cliff Daly. I would finally like to thank my parents, Andrew Piaskowy and Jennifer Kelley-Thierman, for their love and support throughout this writing.
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Introduction

“The present is all too often defined by the past,” Madeleine Albright writes in her memoirs.1 While she was speaking of the genocide2 of ethnic Albanians which occurred during the 1990’s in Kosovo, she could have also been speaking of her own journey, from a unique childhood in Czechoslovakia to a historic appointment as the first female Secretary of State for the United States. The statement may also apply to the evolution of US foreign policy: from the self-admitted Clinton “failure” in Rwanda to the forceful intervention under her leadership in Kosovo.

My study will show how Albright’s policies and initiatives in the Rwanda and Kosovo conflicts may have been informed and shaped by this unusual personal history. The following questions will be explored:

1. Did Albright’s middle European heritage and adolescence during World War II influence her to use public office to combat all cases of genocide or to make Kosovo a top priority?

2. Did Albright’s experiences as Ambassador to the U.N. during the Rwanda genocide shape her approach to humanitarian intervention in Kosovo?

3. Is the “Albright Doctrine” limited to her unique background, or is it an enduring policy to guide US foreign policy and US involvement in future UN interventions?

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2 For the purposes of this study, when referring to genocide, it will be in the context of the UN definition. Written in 1948, the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined the act of genocide as “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such: A. Killing members of the group; B. Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; C. Deliberately inflicting on the group the conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; D. Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; E. Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
In answering my questions, I employ case-study inquiry to explore specific events in Albright's political career. I explore in depth two particular cases involving Madeleine Albright. The Rwanda conflict occurred during her tenure as UN Ambassador during the first Clinton administration when the US opposed intervention. The Kosovo conflict occurred during Clinton's second term when Albright was Secretary of State and US intervention was characterized as “Madeline’s War.”

In detailing Albright's life, you cannot be bound by specific microanalysis. History, foreign policy and international relations are intertwined and evolving; they are not independent events. While I have researched most of her life, my focus for this study will be her roles as UN Ambassador (1993-1997) and Secretary of State (1997-2001). In order to research my questions, I chose to look at two international conflicts during this time, Rwanda and Kosovo. In addition to secondary sources, the research analysis relies on primary sources such as US Government documents, UN Security Council archived meeting notes, transcribed press conferences, as well as interviews with journalists. This research helped to find the language of Albright and other actors in the conflicts, which helped to put the events of the time into the context of her own words.

A study on the principled motives behind foreign policy decisions is important for several reasons. From a realist’s perspective, foreign policy is driven by the pursuit of national interest. However, in Albright’s case, her policy choices in Kosovo have been criticized by the press as being personally biased towards the region and not maintaining national interests.3 Scholars and pundits have studied policy makers’ choices and hypothesized about the reasons behind them.

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3 Scott, A.O., “Madeleine Albright: The diplomat who mistook her life story for statecraft.” Slate. April 25, 1999, (http://www.slate.com/id/25857/) See also Dobbs, Huffington, Isaacson. In another contemporary example, pundits suggest that President Bush sought to remove Saddam Hussein as a result of the Iraqi plot to assassinate his father.
Do upbringing and personal history have an impact on foreign policy choices? Knowing the policy maker’s motives can help clarify personal factors influencing the calculus of national interest.

While most scholars choose to ignore personal history as a factor, several writers have argued that Albright’s past colored her policy choices. Ann Blackman and Michael Dobbs both wrote biographies of Albright. Respectively, *Seasons of Her Life: A Biography of Madeleine Korbel Albright* and *Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth Century Odyssey* explain her personality by using historical events. Both authors are accomplished journalists, Blackman from the *Times* and Dobbs from the *Washington Post*. Both biographies argue that Albright's perspective on foreign policy was influenced by her upbringing. Blackman's biography is a little more personalized than Dobbs, yet neither expands much on foreign policy. They offer a great narrative on her ascent to becoming the most powerful woman in the world but little to examine what has happened since she became Secretary of State and her life in the private sector.

While Blackman and Dobbs write about her personal life, Thomas W. Lippman’s book, *Madeleine Albright and the New American Diplomacy* focuses on her professional career, namely her position as Secretary of State during the second Clinton administration. Unlike the previous biographers, who focused on her personal upbringing and years leading up to her appointments, Lippman focuses on her four years as America’s top diplomat. Lippman paints Albright as a success. Albright, he argues, is able to redefine foreign policy in a post-cold war world. He is critical of Albright’s belief that the US position is always right. Yet Lippman argues that her motivation is not personal. Rather, by security and stability abroad, Albright believes that US national interests are served.
Samantha Power provides the most even-handed and thorough assessment of the two humanitarian crises in Rwanda and Kosovo. Albright is never her primary focal point. In both her book, “A Problem from Hell” America and the Age of Genocide and her scholarly article from Atlantic Monthly titled, “Bystanders to Genocide” she represents the academic perspective. While focusing on the conflicts, she is able to analyze the situation impartially. She is not trying to write a sensational best seller. Instead, she is spreading the blame equitably between the US Government, UN, NATO, and various characters in those organizations. In Power’s estimation, Albright’s role is a minor one; Power recognized her inability to act during Rwanda and her need to correct past omissions in Kosovo.

In my research, a valuable source is Albright herself. In her memoir Madame Secretary, she provides a personal account of her actions in Rwanda and Kosovo. While providing a thorough account of her involvement in both crises, she can however manipulate the material to include as much detail, or as little, as she wishes, consciously or unconsciously. Politicians as a rule do not like to admit that personal motives influence their decision-making.

My thesis is testing conclusions by others. That is, throughout Albright’s career, either UN Ambassador or Secretary of State, she has been vilified or idolized by pundits. The commentary on Madeleine Albright was not a matter for academic discussion as much as it provided fodder for political commentary by journalists.
Personal Background

European Heritage (1937 - 1948)

Madeleine Korbel Albright’s early years were marked by the political circumstances in Europe at the time and no doubt helped to shape her subsequent views on politics and policy. In particular, her family was deeply affected by two apparent betrayals: first, the Munich Agreement, which made a mockery of Czech reliance on foreign allies, and second, the post war abdication of responsibility for Eastern Europe by the US and its allies, which allowed the Communists to gain control in these devastated countries. These betrayals led first to exile and then to permanent emigration for the Korbel family, which, in spite of the personal upheavals, meant that she spent her formative years in several European countries as well as the US, giving the child a richness of experience and a broadness of outlook that may not have occurred otherwise.

When Marie Jana Korbelová was born in Prague on May 15, 1937, her Jewish parents had converted to Catholicism to avoid persecution, without informing their daughter. The storm that had been gathering over Europe at the time was intensifying. Europe was busy trying to contain Germany. On the platform of restoring the dignity that had been lost at the Treaty of Versailles, Hitler was poised to steamroll over Europe. With the grass just returning to the battlefields of World War I, the rest of Europe was not eager to provoke the German leader. As a result, the French and British efforts to appease Hitler at Munich forced Czechoslovakia to yield power to Germany.

The French and Russian alliance, intended to protect Czechoslovakia, was discarded, along with the principles of the League of Nations. Efforts at conciliation on the part of the
British government must have been particularly galling: Neville Chamberlain’s famous declaration that the Munich Agreement would “ensure peace in our time,” was to be later characterized by Albright as “five words [that], along with the black umbrella Chamberlain carried, have stood ever since as shameful symbols of appeasement.”

Germany began to annex parts of Eastern Europe in 1939; with a puppet regime in place in their homeland, the Korbel family was forced to flee to London. This move may have ultimately saved her life: she lost her grandparents and other Jewish relatives to the Holocaust. Marie was just two years old, but the impact of these traumatic events must have echoed through the family for years afterwards. In pursuing her interests as Secretary of State, expanding NATO to include former communist bloc countries such as her homeland, she references her refugee experience as a factor in her outlook.

There was more upheaval to come during the post-war rebuilding period. With the partitioning of Europe between the western powers and Soviet Russia, the US and its allies were a nonentity in the reconstruction of Eastern Europe and the seeds of communism began to grow. It was the Soviets that had finally liberated Czechoslovakia from the Nazis, and many expatriates had dreams of returning to a democratic country, believing that the Czech communists had the same goals. Sharing this hope, the Korbels returned to Eastern Europe after World War II and settled in Belgrade, where Josef Korbel served as Czechoslovakia’s ambassador to Yugoslavia.

Within a short time and with help from Moscow, communists took key positions in government and business. The Czech democrats, with no support from the west (particularly the

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4 Albright is fluent in four languages (Czech, English, French, and Russian) and proficient in three (German, Polish, and Serbian).

5 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 8.

US), were not as organized and unified as the communist party. Meanwhile, the Cold War was beginning to shape world politics.

When the Soviets finally took control of Czechoslovakia in 1948, the Korbels fled again, this time to the United States. They settled in Denver, where Josef would become the founding dean of the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver.\footnote{7}

Many years later, on the threshold of engaging in aggressive diplomatic maneuvers, Albright was to cite America’s absence in times of crisis in her rationale for intervention in the affairs of other nations:

“After World War I, America withdrew from Europe and ignored the storm that was gathering. An entire generation of brave Europeans and Americans paid the price. After World War II...we stayed and helped Western (author’s italics) Europe build peace, prosperity, and freedom...Now that the Cold War is over we have the opportunity to extend those blessings to the rest of Europe....”\footnote{8}

Later, after she had retired from public office, Albright’s remarks on this subject are more candid:

“...my whole theory that I had operated on previously and reflected in many aspects of my life or my history was that if the United States stayed out of things, i.e. Munich, terrible things happened. When the United States got involved in World War II, better things happened. When the US allowed - or whatever word you want to use - when it happened that the Soviets liberated Czechoslovakia, terrible things happened and so I believed basically in the goodness of American power and the necessity where possible for us to apply it.”\footnote{9}

\footnote{7 Josef Korbel proved to be an important factor in the lives of two US Secretaries of State. Not only did his profession have an obvious impact on Albright’s decision to follow a career in foreign policy, but also, while at the University of Denver, Korbel also taught another future Secretary, Condoleezza Rice. (Dobbs, Madeleine Albright: A Twentieth-Century Odyssey, page 220.)}


Education and Early Public Career in the United States (1948-1992)

By the time the Korbel family came to the United States in 1948, it had already suffered the traumas of a World War, fascism, and communism. Albright attended boarding school in Switzerland and graduated from high school in Denver, Colorado in 1955. Later, she attended Wellesley College, majoring in Political Science and eventually graduating with honors. It was also during this time (1957) that Albright became a US citizen. She married Joseph Medill Patterson Albright, a Chicago newspaper journalist and scion of a prominent newspaper family. Her studies continued at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins and both the Russian Institute and the Department of Public Law and Government at Columbia University, specializing in Eastern European politics.

Albright’s doctoral dissertation, “The Role of the Press in Policy Change: Czechoslovakia 1968,” clearly shows the influence the events in her homeland still had on her. The themes of political and cultural oppression and foreign occupation, familiar from her own life, are woven throughout. The dissertation was concerned with the “Prague Spring;” so named by Western journalists, this movement began in early 1968 with an essay published in several Czech newspapers which called on people to resist oppression and appealed to them to control their own lives. This sparked an interest in Western cultures, which was seen all over Czechoslovakia, but most notably in Prague. Here culture thrived, with exciting and innovative activity in movies, theater, and even the precursor to music television.

This 20th century renaissance did not go unnoticed by the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union saw this movement as a huge threat to their uniformity, and in the summer of 1968 countries in the Warsaw Pact (excluding Romania, which refused to participate) invaded Czechoslovakia and
began a twenty-year occupation. The countermeasures to the Prague Spring resulted in a cultural ‘dark age,’ the bleakness of which can still be seen in the architecture of the time.

It is significant that her chosen dissertation advisor was Zbigniew Brzezinski. He was also of Eastern European descent and would later serve as the National Security Advisor to president Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). He became known for favoring armed intervention at a time when the Democratic Party was leaning toward a ‘dovish’ approach. Labeled a foreign policy realist, he is considered by some to be the Democrats’ response to Henry Kissinger. It is safe to assume that his pragmatic approach to foreign policy must have played a role in influencing Albright’s own position in the ‘hawkish’ minority of the Democratic Party.

The dissertation she wrote under Brzezinski’s mentorship still comes up in her speeches and interviews. In April 2000, she referred to it at a roundtable discussion with journalists in Uzbekistan: “During the discussion, Albright made several references to her Ph.D. dissertation, in which she analyzed the role of the press in political change in Czechoslovakia in the late 1960s,” and again, in September 2003, she mentioned it in a speech at the annual conference of the Special Libraries Association.

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10 Zbigniew Brzezinski served as the National Security Advisor under President Carter. Considered a hawk among the dovish democrats, he frequently went against Nixon/Kissenger détente and often clashed with people in his own party. He was the son of a Polish diplomat and like Albright, fled the Nazis during World War II. He became a US citizen in 1958. In 1988, he co-chaired the Bush National Security Advisory task force and endorsed the first President Bush. Coincidently, this hurt his star pupil; Madeleine Albright was the foreign policy advisor to democratic presidential nominee Michael Dukakis. In recent years, he has been critical of the Clinton administration’s hesitation in Serbia and advocated for NATO expansion. He has also been outspoken against President Bush’s “war on terror.”

11 Roundtable Interview with Internews Bulletin (Online), April 17, 2000. (Transcript: http://www.internews.org/prs/albright/albright_bulletin.htm)

Albright applied her craft in multiple areas: after receiving her Ph.D., she taught briefly at Columbia University and then served as Chief Legislative Assistant to US Senator Edmund Muskie. She served on the National Security Council (at Brzezinski’s instigation) during the Carter administration. She then returned to her academic roots by teaching at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Affairs. She made her mark on the political stage as a foreign policy advisor to Vice-Presidential nominee Geraldine Ferraro and to Presidential candidate Michael Dukakis. Though neither was elected, her influence remained. She rose in Washington circles socially and politically and she garnered the attention of newly-elected Democratic President Clinton.

In 1992 she was named the US Ambassador to the United Nations during the first Clinton administration. This rise in power culminated in her appointment by Clinton in 1997, during his second administration, as the 64th Secretary of State and the highest-ranking female cabinet officer in U.S. history.
Jewish Heritage

On the day of President Clinton’s first State of the Union address of his second term, the Washington Post’s front-page headline\textsuperscript{13} revealed Albright’s Jewish ancestry to the world and also to a most surprised, newly-appointed Secretary of State. She describes it as an unsettling revelation, tainting what should have been a proud moment in a distinguished career. As she led the Cabinet down the aisle shaking hands, she remembers that she was “made to feel as if I were a liar and my father, whom I adored, was portrayed as a heartless fraud.”\textsuperscript{14} In the weeks and months after the article, Albright’s background was on display for comment and criticism. There has been some controversy over this issue, with conservative pundits finding it improbable that Albright was unaware of her grandparents’ fate, and hinting at a cover-up. Michael Dobbs, the Washington Post journalist who broke the story, is not sympathetic to her. Based on his research and interviews with family members for his biography of Albright, he finds it hard to believe that she would not have suspected her ancestry.\textsuperscript{15}

It is much more probable that Albright never had any reason to question her background. It was already complete. Her earliest memories are in London after the family fled Czechoslovakia. She was two when she last saw her grandparents and remembers her mother being upset over her maternal grandmother’s death, but that is not unusual. Her parents talked openly about their past, and during Albright’s schooling the family talked about the rise of Hitler, the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the Holocaust. However, the evidence suggests that they fabricated a Catholic heritage for the benefit or protection of their children.

\textsuperscript{13} Dobbs, Michael, “Albright's Family Tragedy Comes to Light”, Washington Post, 4 February 1997, Section A.
\textsuperscript{14} Albright, Madame Secretary, page 235.
The family history written by her mother makes no mention of the grandparents’ fate. While they may have kept this knowledge a secret from their daughter, they did impart a greater moral message: her parents, she writes, “were passionate in stressing the need for tolerance and the importance of opposing evil.” She would later realize that the passion for justice would stem from her parents’ personal pain.

This personal scandal also coincided with Albright’s first days in her new office. She was serving in the highest office an immigrant can receive, and fulfilling all her promise. Now she also had to defend herself against those who felt she would be subjective towards US policy in the Middle East. Even before the Washington Post article, many Arab papers were condemning the US administration as being “completely in the hands of Jews.” When the story broke, the Israeli ambassador to the UN, Gad Yaacobi, admitted that Israel knew of the Korbel family’s Jewish heritage as far back as 1994. If you needed an example of the difference between a journalist and a diplomat, it could be found in the handling of this situation: in defending Israel’s decision not to reveal that information, Yaacobi explained that it was important not to embarrass Albright, an influential friend in the Clinton Administration, in her new position as Secretary of State. It was also seen as not in Israel’s best interest to put Albright in a position to prove herself objective in Middle East/Israeli relations at the expense of Israel.

Since the discovery, many have argued that her Jewish ancestry was never a factor in her decision-making. She remained consistent with US policy regarding Israel and worked hard to develop a working relationship with Yasser Arafat. Albright relates her parents’ decision to leave

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16 Ironically, it is Dobbs who mentions this: “In an unpublished, unfinished 11-page family narrative made available by Albright, her mother made no reference to relatives who died in the Holocaust. In the memoir, written after Josef Korbel's death, in 1977, Mandula Korbel attempted to describe his ‘turbulent life.’” (Dobbs, “Albright's Family Tragedy Comes to Light”)
17 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 242.
Czechoslovakia as refugees fleeing oppression for freedom, and not Jews fleeing for their lives. However, remembering her parents’ passion for justice conceived in that experience, Albright has vowed that with the revelation of her Jewish background “the evil of the Holocaust has an even more personal meaning for me, and I feel an even greater determination to ensure that it will never be forgotten.”

Albright had been shaken with the revelation of her Jewish ancestry and had to live it out under public scrutiny. Yet this personal pain developed into a passion for humankind, a passion to continue the lessons learned from the Holocaust “that no one’s blood is more or less precious than our own.”

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18 Dobbs, Madeleine Albright, page 388.
19 “Albright’s background known to Israel since 97,” Washington Post, 13 February 1997, Section A.
20 Lippmann, Madeleine Albright, page 92.
21 Ibid. page 94.

Given her background, it is not surprising that Albright’s two major roles in public office were to be played out on the international stage. It is a remarkable coincidence, however, that she was confronted in both positions by cases of government-sponsored genocide and “ethnic cleansing.”

The Clinton administration’s foreign policy was tested in the first two years with conflicts sparked in the Balkans (the Bosnian conflict which spread to Kosovo) and Rwanda. This was the chance for Clinton and the US to provide political and moral leadership in the international community. During Clinton’s presidency, global crisis areas were reported daily. In this list of relevant hotspots, the lowest priority, or “C” list, included areas such as Rwanda and Kosovo. Ironically it would be these “C” list issues that would dominate foreign policy because of the media attention they would receive. Albright’s intercession on behalf of the humanitarian interventions kept the conflicts on the radar when the Clinton administration would have been happy to look the other way.

In her 1993 memo to Clinton entitled “Why America Must Take the Lead,” Albright asserted that America's stewardship of foreign policy would be measured by its success in the Balkans. Even the president commented on her persistence: "She pushed, and she pushed, and she pushed," he said in 1998. "She was always out there, and that made a big difference to me." 

Asked about the memo in a 2003 interview, Albright explains:

“I really did think that there was a huge opportunity in the post Cold War period to try to follow up on actually on what the first President Bush had been talking about, which was

an undivided Europe which was free. …There were a lot of people generally who didn't see the Balkans as that important - you know as a kind of appendage to Europe rather than seeing it as part of this overall story. And I also had had a lot of background 1) my father had been the Czechoslovak ambassador to Yugoslavia and even though I was a little girl I had grown up, I had spent two years there, at that stage I had spoken Serbo-Croatian, and had also obviously heard a lot from my father in the ensuing years. I also had spent my life studying changes in communist systems and had spent a lot of time looking at what a Yugoslav model . . . so it was just an area of the world that I felt I knew a lot about and that we really had an opportunity to try to resolve a lot of the problems if there were a more active American role and that was where I was coming from.

…[H]aving an undivided and stable Europe is in US national interests and what was going on in the Balkans was making that difficult to accomplish.”

In this study, the two conflicts, in Kosovo and Rwanda, will be compared as loosely representing her principles fired by personal commitment in the first instance, and derailed by the lack of it in the second; consequently, they represent the opposite poles of success and failure of Albright’s career. Having come from Eastern Europe, she had a greater personal interest in Kosovo than in Rwanda, but it is an oversimplification to conclude that that was the reason the US didn’t get involved in Rwanda. The many complex factors that led to the Rwanda disaster are dealt with later in this work. It is nonetheless true that she worked tirelessly between Washington, D.C. and New York to ensure US involvement in the conflict in the Balkans. Her effective leadership of the NATO intervention in Kosovo was to reshape the international view of might, right, and sovereignty.

Rwanda, on the one hand, is by her own admission the greatest regret of her tenure at the United Nations. She was less aggressive in obtaining information about the genocide occurring in Rwanda; she relied on summarized reports that failed to convey the urgency of the situation. As UN Ambassador, her first ‘major-league’ position on the international affairs scene, Albright

bowed to pressure from Washington and from public opinion to not get involved in another African mission and didn’t always act decisively on her own convictions.

What Albright calls her “pragmatic idealist” approach to foreign policy was shaped by her early experiences: “I think that I am somebody who has a good moral basis, foundation -- an idealist, but also at various times pragmatic and realistic. That's why I've never liked the division between idealist and realist, as people talk about what their theory of international relations is, because the two have to combine. So I sometimes call myself an idealistic realist or a realistic idealist.” This is of course an oxymoron that may have served its purpose at the moment of the interview. However, a more precise label that does not have these implications of political theory might be “humanitarian hawk.”

Because of her background, Albright could empathize with the weak and innocent who were manipulated and destroyed by those holding power. That is, she was driven by humanitarian impulses. She also was well aware of the influence and power the United States could wield to protect those who could not fight for themselves, and she had seen first-hand what could happen when superpowers did not intervene. This meant she believed in militarily-backed diplomacy. So in effect, her basic approach to foreign policy was based on strong humanitarian principles but left room for pragmatic approaches that involved the use of force when necessary.

In an interview with Walter Isaacson of *Time*, Clinton recognized her two motivators in interventions: “She not only learned the lessons of Munich, but of Czechoslovakia under communism.”

25 Ibid.
Having seen both the positive and negative effects a US presence could make in Europe, she was decidedly dogmatic in making sure the US had a presence in the international stage. It has already been mentioned that Albright’s experiences with the Munich Agreement and then communist oppression in her youth left her with a strong sense of compassion and a respect for tolerance; it also left her with a distaste for appeasement and shirking of responsibility. Now it will be seen that her frustrations at the UN during the Rwanda crisis led to a mature approach that combined effectiveness with strong humanitarian principles during the Kosovo conflict.

The traditional theoretical models for foreign policy have revolved around two major poles: idealism and realism. In his book, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939*, Edward Hallett Carr characterized the proponents of the two theories as “those who regard politics as a function of ethics and those who regard ethics as a function of politics.”

Idealism, as the name suggests, is the idea that people will rise above the baser human traits to find a moral, “ideal” solution to foreign policy problems. Ideals, according to Robert Osgood in *Ideals and Self-interest in America’s Foreign Relations*, transcend national interest. Ideals, says Osgood, are derived from the “Christian-liberal-humanitarian tradition of Western civilization.” These ideals hold that the moral value of every human being is dignity and worth. Thus, every human being has the rights of self-protection and self-expression.

28 Hans Morgenthau is often credited with being the father of realism. Morgenthau, himself an immigrant from Germany, wrote *Politics Among Nations* during the cold war. While a Political Science professor at the University of Chicago, he taught a future Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. Kissinger and Albright have often being compared professionally as well as personally.


31 Ibid. page 6.

32 Ibid.
Albright’s “humanitarian hawk” approach represents a combination of the two political theories:

“I believe that you have to have an overall set of goals and principles. But ultimately politics and foreign policy have to have compromise in it, because you're dealing with more than just what you want. Foreign policy is trying to get some other country to do what you want. But you do have to figure out what is acceptable, what is doable.”

She has stated, “the most realistic policy for the United States is one that reflects our ideals.”

Especially in Kosovo, it can be seen that Albright demonstrates a loyalty to America’s interests above all else, but also has a strong moral sense. This hybrid attitude has drawn criticism, on the one hand, about what some saw as a mushy, sentiment-driven foreign policy. Others argued that Albright’s foreign policy put the US in untenable positions without much success, while still others considered her unduly belligerent and eager to display military force.

Equally critical to Albright’s success is her policy of compromise:

“In our era, no President or Secretary of State could manage events without combining the two. Under President Clinton, we were determined to do the right thing but in a tough-minded way. We tried to strengthen multilateral institutions, but recognized the need for America to take the lead in such areas as the Balkans…We were willing to take on hard jobs, but diligent about enlisting the aid of others and careful not to make commitments we could not keep.”

She stressed the need for this approach to foreign policy: “It is not possible to conduct foreign policy within a rigid framework where every stimulus is matched by a preordained response. A policy maker must leave room for flexibility and innovation.”

Her approach meant that she was tough-minded enough to persevere, and that she didn’t rely on slogans or emotional appeals to American sentiment to win approval for her policy.

33 Madeleine Albright, Interview with Kim Lawton, May 19, 2006.
35 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 505.
36 Ibid.
Even facing harsh criticism of inconsistency in her policies, she persevered in her determination to end injustice. While promoting democracy throughout the world, she worked diligently for security and rights of others. As she often stated, “Munich is my mindset;” she was just as appalled by international apathy toward atrocities and by efforts at appeasing their perpetrators as she was by the atrocities themselves.

In analysis of these two conflicts, an interesting role reversal appears between the orthodox idealist and realist approach to humanitarian interventions. In the case of Rwanda, the “realist approach” to intervention led to the decision not to intervene militarily in the genocide as there was no direct national interest to intervene. In Kosovo, Albright pushed for military intervention in another sovereign state. US interests in the region came from not only a desire to expand NATO but also the reputation of the organization in the region. This represented a break from the traditional roles of idealism and realism. In practice, it would be the idealists who depart from the fidelity to international law.

The outcome in Rwanda could be defined as the result of such ‘realistic’ policy-making. National interests drove the decision not to intervene. Lessons learned from US intervention in Somalia (an idealistic undertaking) seemed to prove that moralistic interventions are not in the US interests. However, Kosovo (or, more directly, a stable Europe) was a high priority in the US foreign policy, according to Albright: “[H]aving a undivided and stable Europe is in US national interests.” 37 In a press conference with the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, Albright spoke about the need to expand to the new democracies in Europe in order to build a deeper

partnership with Europe. This could only be achieved by addressing the remaining instability in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{38}

In the Kosovo conflict, Albright outlined the parameters for US participation, which included an “assertive multilateralism”. That is, Albright and the Clinton administration also relied on international institutions, like NATO. This helped to manage transnational problems and to win legitimacy for actions like the NATO bombing in Kosovo. Where the Powell Doctrine posed stricter guidelines for US intervention, the Albright Doctrine was flexible enough to allow force and diplomacy to work together. Diplomacy is strengthened when there is a credible threat of force behind it. In discussing the Kosovo conflict, she emphasized the multilateral approach to the Kosovo conflict but stated that she was “more concerned about the effectiveness of outcome than the harmony of process.”\textsuperscript{39}

This view would eventually be renamed the Albright Doctrine. While it has never been specifically defined it has been described by these characteristics. This assertive multilateralism in conjunction with her comments about the US as an “indispensable nation” departed from the traditional realist approach. This distinct approach to foreign policy redefined national interests. US national interests would also include humanitarian interests as well as use of force for humanitarian aid.

This pragmatic attitude means that the state should only take action in situations where its interests are at stake. Albright expresses it this way:

“\textit{But you do have to be able to be realistic about what you can get done often, not to have the best be the enemy of the good, which is why I have a hard time. I've said in the book that it's so hard to say that we are following an absolute good, because sometimes you}
waver from that. You have to try hard and do the best you can in order to get a solution.”

Albright knew full well the danger of ignoring the past for the sake of the future. During her tenure at the United Nations, she frequently argued that aggressive leaders would become emboldened if not countered. She compared Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, who was instigating a civil war in Bosnia, to a modern-day Hitler. His nationalistic rhetoric struck a chord with Albright who spent her early years in the region. By the end of the war, at the signing of the Peace Accords, Albright concluded that Milosevic was nothing more than an opportunist and could be persuaded with the threat of credible force. Milosevic was the problem, Albright argued, and if nothing decisive was done then America was no better than a “gerbil spinning in its wheel” getting nowhere. This contrasts sharply with her conduct at the UN during the Rwanda conflict.

The disparity in Albright’s responses to the two catastrophes can be attributed both to the difference in her family history, which affected her perspective on the conflicts, as well as to the differences in the two situations. Albright’s perspective in each of these cases was quite different. During the Rwanda crisis, she served as UN ambassador and sat on the Security Council. Her role in Rwanda was downplayed since she was following orders from Washington. As ambassador to the UN, Albright was unable to define policy directly.

Also, in the Rwanda crisis Albright’s sphere of activity was limited to the UN, where it was almost impossible to find consensus. She has since compared the bureaucracy of that

40 Madeleine Albright, Interview with Kim Lawton, May 19, 2006.
42 Ibid.
43 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 392.
institution to “trying to run a business with 184 chief executive officers – each with a different language, a distinct set of priorities, and an unemployed brother-in-law seeking a paycheck.” 44 She was later to cite the tragedies of Rwanda as showing that “[t]raditional U.N. peacekeepers lack the mandate, command structure, unity of purpose, and military might to succeed. Such weaknesses, sadly, are inherent in the voluntary and collective nature of the United Nations.” 45 At the time of her confirmation as ambassador in 1992, the UN’s credibility was already being seriously undermined by UN Secretary-General Boutros-Gali’s unwillingness to continue UN operations in Bosnia. 46

She played a more vocal and visible role in Kosovo, the region of her youth, as Secretary of State during the second Clinton administration; here, she was in a position to sculpt foreign policy and to enforce it. In this controversial intervention, she was able to bring about Milosevic’s capitulation while securing support from wavering European allies. 47

The two conflicts make an interesting contrast in and of themselves. The Kosovo dispute was part of a larger conflict, which had been underway for at least a decade when Albright came on the scene, and was well known to the European consciousness which was already tuned to the potential of the Balkans as a spark for wider destruction. Indeed, the beginnings of the conflict went back for centuries, and were rooted in a deep sense of patriotism and national pride.

The conflict in Rwanda had a much less extensive history. There had been violent episodes in the area since the Belgian withdrawal in the 1960s, when the UN was repeatedly drawn into Rwanda and neighboring Burundi. Similarly, the RPF in Uganda had been fighting

45 Ibid.
47 Lippman, Madeleine Albright, page 336.
for years against the Hutu-led Rwandan government. Nonetheless, the Rwandan genocide came to the attention of the international community relatively suddenly, and was over in 100 days.

The major institutions (the UN and NATO, respectively) involved in humanitarian intervention in each situation also differed greatly in motivation and capability. NATO saw an opportunity for expansion, as the UN had proved itself a dysfunctional organization. Historically a defensive group formed after WWII to protect Europe during the Cold War, NATO now saw an opportunity to expand its mission and gain greater power in the Balkans, where US interests were high. Weighing the actions against the consequences, it was beneficial for all to become involved. This area had already spawned two world wars, and the threat of the violence spreading to neighboring countries was escalating.

Not only did NATO have the greater and more immediate “interest,” in Morgenthau’s sense of the word, in the stability of Eastern Europe, but also its bureaucracy was more manageable and amenable to Albright’s persuasion. On the other hand, the unwieldy structure of the UN has already been commented on; it was not able to move quickly enough to be effective in Rwanda, and being a larger global organization, it did not have the specific investment in the area.

The result of Rwanda was genocide, enabled by the inability and unwillingness of the international community to intervene; in Kosovo, there were positive consequences of NATO action even though there was not complete unity in the international community.48 The Balkans and Africa should have ranked equally in terms of interest to the international community because civil unrest in a destabilized region, such as the Balkans or Africa, could spark violence.

in neighboring countries. There was a fear that the conflicts in these countries would destabilize the region and surrounding countries. In both Rwanda and Kosovo, nationalism and nationalist propaganda were used as a way of consolidating power and unity in region. Hutus used the abuse under Belgian rule to garner support for the genocide. Likewise, Milosevic was able to draw on nationalist feelings from Serbs for the Kosovo region. The two conflicts point up the very worst and the very best of the United States and the international community.

The Rwanda Conflict

Compared to the Kosovo conflict, the origins of the unrest in Rwanda conflict lie in the fairly recent past. The tense situation that erupted in genocide could be traced back to just after World War I when Rwanda became a mandated territory to Belgium by the League of Nations. Culturally, Hutus and Tutsis, shared a common language and a common religion. Intermarriage was very common between Hutus and Tutsis.

The Belgians came to regard the Tutsis, as “Black Caucasians”\(^{50}\) for their more European-looking physical features, while the Hutus resembled what was believed to be the more stereotypical African. Thus Belgians “elevated” the Tutsis to positions in the community. The Hutus were more often farmers while the Tutsis owned the land and the cattle. This was not a rigid caste system. The boundaries were permeable and some Hutus became “Tutsi.”

Throughout the colonial rule, the ethnic division grew as Belgians and other missionaries began to call Tutsis a superior race and made it mandatory for Rwandans to carry identification cards which defined them as legally Hutu or Tutsi.\(^{51}\) This reflects the dual nature of the Belgian society.\(^{52}\) While this was not an external sign like the Star of David armband, it is still unpleasantly reminiscent of the ghetto-ization of the Jews under the Nazis that was laden with meaning for Albright.

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\(^{51}\) Ibid. The ID cards called for ethnicity, place of birth, profession, place of issue, name of spouse, signature of issuing official, and names and birthdates for up to 12 children.

\(^{52}\) It should be noted that in Belgium, their complex political institutions are organized around two main communities. These communities are organized according to culture and language (Dutch-speaking and French-speaking).
Although the Hutu and Tutsi were interspersed, intermarried and co-mingling,\textsuperscript{53} a dual society existed in Rwanda, which created an especially explosive relationship when violence erupted. The polarization grew deeper after Rwanda gained independence from Belgium in the 60s, and outbreaks of violence between the two groups began which would come to a bloody denouement in 1994.

In an effort to curb the violence in the two groups, Tanzania brokered peace talks in 1993, which, set up a tentative peace agreement between the Hutu and minority Tutsi with equal power sharing. The Arusha Accords were backed by the major western powers, and UN peacekeepers would be deployed to assist and secure a safe environment for returning refugees. The UN goal was to preserve the September 1993 Arusha Accords between the Hutus and Tutsis with a mandate to monitor and setup elections.\textsuperscript{54} Albright and her colleagues at the United Nations had hoped the accords would help resolve the violence.

In October of 1993, a UN peacekeeping mission led by Brigadier General Romero Dallaire from Canada, landed in Kigali Airport in Rwanda. The UN assistance mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) began two days after US Rangers were killed in Somalia and the images of the soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu were still fresh in the minds of many. Albright compared the violence in Rwanda as a volcanic explosion: sudden, massive and unexpected to the international community.\textsuperscript{55}

Dallaire commanded 2500 men, of which the best trained and most prepared were the Belgians. The Hutus were not pleased to see the Belgians again in Rwanda. There was still a fear that the Belgians still favored the Tutsis over the Hutu in elections. Consequently, the Hutus


\textsuperscript{54} Albright, Madame Secretary, page 148.
did not trust the Belgians. While President Juvenal Habyarimana, himself a Hutu, and members of the interim Rwandan government assured Dallaire and the UN of wanting to pursue peace, it would soon become evident that was not what the Hutu government had planned. The president and the interim government were not interested in keeping with the accords and believed only in “Hutu power.”\textsuperscript{56} They saw nothing to gain by following the accords and everything to lose.

Dallaire cabled the UN multiple times about extreme Hutus arming themselves and stockpiles of machetes being collected despite a UN arms embargo. However, Kofi Annan, Ambassador Albright, and the Security Council denied his request to preempt, limiting him to “good offices” as a neutral. Annan urged Dallaire to inform the interim President of Rwanda of the activities that were in violation of the accords.\textsuperscript{57} Annan also strongly urged Dallaire to avoid any situation in which the United Nations could be in a position to use violence.\textsuperscript{58}

In a grimly prescient facsimile, General Dallaire wrote to then Under Secretary for Peacekeeping Operations Kofi Annan and Major General Maurice Baril the military advisor to Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Gali. In the fax, Dallaire warned about the potential violence against moderate Hutus and Tutsis in the Parliament and of plans to assassinate them as they entered the parliamentary building. He also warned of a plan to rid Rwanda of the Belgian soldiers: “[B]elgian troops were to be provoked and if Belgian soldiers resorted to force a number of them were to be killed and thus guarantee Belgian withdrawal from Rwanda.”\textsuperscript{59} Dallaire also hinted that the Hutu President might not have had control over his party in Rwanda.

\textsuperscript{55} Albright, Madeleine, Interview with \textit{Frontline}, February 25, 2004.  
\textsuperscript{56} Ronayne, \textit{Never Again?} page 155.  
\textsuperscript{57} Secretary-General Kofi Annan response cable to General Romeo Dallaire, 11 January 1994, UNAMIR: 100.  
\textsuperscript{58}\textsuperscript{58}Ibid.  
In the facsimile, Dallaire cited an informant who confirmed Dallaire’s fear that the identification cards for the Tutsis were to help in locating and exterminating them. The informant also told of a location for a cache of weapons the Rwandan government and the Interhamwe were storing to help in the killing. Dallaire’s cable stressed his desire to act quickly to stop what appeared to be a start of mass extermination of the Tutsis. Instead of immediate action by the UN, Dallaire was told to report his finding to Belgian, French and US missions as well as the interim government. He did, however it did little to stem the tide as the interim government planned the genocide.60 By February 1994, Dallaire warned the UN again about the impending violence. This time Tutsi refugees fleeing Rwanda for neighboring Uganda began to raise a red flag about outbreaks of violence against them. Unfortunately, these reports were largely ignored. In April 1994 at Dallaire’s urging, the UN reluctantly gave a short-term extension to the mission in Rwanda. The next day after the extension President Habyarimana’s plane was shot down as it was landing in Kigali.61

100 Days of Genocide

Within hours of the president’s death, roadblocks were set up on roads leading out of the capital city to prevent Tutsis from fleeing. This was an easy way for Hutus to gather groups of Tutsis for mass execution. The genocide proceeded quickly and targets were easily found due to election rolls, census figures and the ID cards issued by the Belgians during colonial rule.62 National radio controlled by the interim government, broadcast Tutsi addresses for violent Hutus in order to facilitate the genocide.

60 Ronyane, Never Again? page 156.
61 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 149.
When the Prime Minister and the ten Belgian soldiers protecting him were killed, it became very obvious to Dallaire that this was more than random acts of violence against Tutsis. These targets were carefully selected. The Hutus hoped that the killing of the soldiers would also force a UN withdrawal similar to the withdrawal in Somalia. The Hutus hoped that the deaths of the UN soldiers would create an outcry to abort the UN mission. The Belgian soldiers were picked because of the history between Belgium and Rwanda.

The plan was successful to an extent. Belgium, outraged at the killings, wanted an immediate withdrawal of all UN forces in Rwanda. It failed to cause a UN retreat. Dallaire knew that to leave Rwanda would be a death sentence for the Tutsis. Some on the Security Council, Albright included, knew that withdrawal was not an option, but that an initiative led by a strong power was also not possible. Tutsi intellectuals and moderate Hutus were among the first killed in the planned attacks, as a way to prevent any opposition that might try to end the attacks.

Dallaire quickly requested that the mission be elevated from peacekeeping to peacemaking status, thereby allowing him to use force to protect Rwandans. The UN Security Council, fearing another Somalia was unfolding in Rwanda, declined all the requests. In the Security Council, there was strong support from the US and Belgium to immediately withdraw from Rwanda. After the Belgian soldiers were killed, Belgium pulled the rest of their forces, thus depleting Dallaire’s forces of his best troops.

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63 Ibid, page 156.
64 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 150.
In the UN, Albright was ordered to be in “listening mode” knowing full well the US intentions were not to get involved in Rwanda. The US position, and one Albright had to follow, was a full withdrawal of all UN forces. The US did not want to place UN personnel in untenable positions.

Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent a cable to UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright which laid out the United States’ position of full and total withdrawal of UNAMIR forces from Rwanda. While conceding that the killings were tragic, he argued that in the current situation in Rwanda, there was no place for UN peacekeepers. With the threat of violence and widespread conflict in Rwanda immanent, Christopher believed that the immunity that foreigners received was coming to an end. For that purpose, he strongly urged the total withdrawal of UNAMIR forces from Rwanda.

In the confidential cable to Albright, Christopher stressed that the warring parties in Rwanda were unlikely to respect the mandate set by the UN or to keep UN personnel safe. Christopher reasoned that withdrawal from Rwanda was necessary since the UN was obligated to choose missions that would be viable, fulfill the mandates set, and the UN personnel would not be placed in untenable positions.

Christopher saw the role of the UN as a negotiator between the two warring factions in Rwanda. Although she loyally followed Washington’s wishes, Albright knew action needed to be taken. After listening to the moving testimony from the African delegate from Nigeria, Albright realized that a full withdrawal of forces from Rwanda was the wrong decision. In an

66 Albright, *Madame Secretary* page 150
uncharacteristic move, she spoke to Richard Clarke, who was in charge of peacekeeping at the National Security Council and screamed her objection to the withdrawal. Initially, the NSC stuck to the original orders, Albright undeterred, vehemently stated, “[T]hey’re unacceptable. I want them changed.” It was one of the few occasions on which Ambassador Albright would confront the Clinton administration, demanding more flexible options. Yet, even after the small victory of US support for a token force in Rwanda, Albright was unconvinced that it would be enough to stop the genocide.

**Presidential Decision Directive 25**

In an effort to explain the US position, President Clinton drafted Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). In it the President attempted to develop guidelines for future interventions. These guidelines favored multinational operations but asserted that, for the US to intervene, there must be clear US interests in the area. The Clinton administration pushed for a shift away from a US role to a UN role in humanitarian interventions. This politically realistic set of guidelines defined acceptable intervention so narrowly that it would make US interventions harder to achieve. PDD-25 helped to assert the Powell Doctrine by making strict

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68 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 The Powell Doctrine is named after General Colin Powell who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The Powell Doctrine was based on the Weinberger Doctrine, Powell’s former boss. The Powell Doctrine asks questions which must be answered in the affirmative is military action is to proceed: Is a vital national security interest threatened? Do we have a clear attainable objective? Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed? Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted? Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement? (This question is usually interpreted to mean that the US should not be involved in peace-keeping or nation-building exercises.) Have the consequences of our action been fully considered? Is the action supported by the American people? Do we have genuine broad international support?
guidelines for US interventions. In President Clinton's first National Security Strategy report, he reaffirmed PDD-25. Yet when it was released in July 1994, at the heart of the atrocities in Rwanda, Clinton's NSS merely condemned the killing and urged a peaceful resolution.

UN peacekeeping operations were primitive. Yet, the refugees made an indirect argument for US interests for international action. By fleeing the violence the refugees were causing turmoil in neighboring Burundi, Tanzania and Zaire, which would spread more violence and create more refugees.73 NATO, as justification for the bombings in Kosovo, would use this indirect impact argument, however, it would be ineffective here. The failure in Somalia became the precedent for future US interventions in UN missions. This directive could have been used to justify US involvement in Rwanda. Moral obligation and national interest should have put the US in a position to take the lead against genocide. The tragedy in Somalia shook the US so that no one in Congress challenged that the US was failing in its responsibilities under the genocide convention.74 Thus, Rwanda was excluded from any US support. PDD-25 became a catch-22 for UN missions: the US would not be involved in UN action without fulfilling all requirements under PDD-25, but requirements could not be fulfilled without a superpower to lead, i.e. the US.75 In UN meetings, PDD-25 exercised more influence than the necessity to reinforce UNAMIR.76

Powell expanded the doctrine asserting that when a nation is at war, every resource must be used against the enemy. After victory from overwhelming force, the military leaves instead of staying around as peacekeepers.

73 Otunnu, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century page 317.
75 Ronayne, Never Again? page 167.
76 PDD-25 would be expanded later during the Kosovo conflict. PDD-56 was a set of guidelines for non-combat US military deployment. It would help to further define peacekeeping missions for the US. It was an extension of PDD-25 to help explain "complex political-military operations abroad and how it would proceed once it was
The Genocide Label

Help would be stalled further by heated discussion over whether to label the killings in Rwanda genocide. The ensuing controversy over naming what was happening could serve as a good example of the problem of language and reality in any philosophy textbook. For example, in April 1994, the UN Security Council issued a resolution calling for an end to the killing. However, it failed to use the word “genocide;” instead, the UNSC condemned the killing by using the definition of genocide: “[T]he killing of members of an ethnic group with the intention of destroying such a group in whole or in part constitutes a crime punishable under International law.”77 There was a reluctance to use the word “genocide” to discuss Rwanda since doing so would require action by member states under the UN’s Convention for the Prevention of Genocide.

It was argued that the Hutus and Tutsis were not of different ethnicity, in which case the killings could be labeled “politicide,” a neologism that refers strictly to the killing of political factions. This was not the case in Rwanda. The Tutsis were hunted down, not for their political beliefs or ideologies, but for their ethnicity. Politically moderate Hutus were also targeted for being sympathetic to the Tutsis. These moderate Hutus would only impede the progress of the government and the Interhamwe. Under the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide definition, the killings that occurred in Rwanda were genocide, since the Tutsis were not only a political entity but had an ethnic identity. However, to call the atrocities in Rwanda genocide...
would legally obligate the countries that signed the convention, including the US, to act to stop the atrocities.\textsuperscript{78}

The US was especially concerned about using the term: a defense department discussion paper about Rwanda dated May 1 cautions, “Be careful. Legal at State [Department] was worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the US government] to actually ‘do something.’”\textsuperscript{79} Secretary Christopher had a legal draft analysis of the terminology issue prepared. In the May 16 analysis, Assistant Legal Advisor Joan Donoghue found ample evidence that genocide had occurred in Rwanda. She felt that the criteria for genocide had been met and fully satisfied including specific acts committed against a specific group.\textsuperscript{80}

The last criterion, intent to destroy a certain group, was harder to prove. As Donoghue argues, without specific documentation, i.e. orders, the intent falls to the individuals. The intent of the Government of Rwanda was clear in that the atrocities committed in Rwanda were aimed at Tutsis as well as sympathetic Hutus.\textsuperscript{81} The interim government following President Habyarimana’s death further confirmed intent. The government did nothing to halt the killing; inaction can also speak louder than words.

Nonetheless, Warren Christopher’s instructions to the US Representative to the UN Human Rights Commission on May 21 tried to side-step the issue by positing a difference between “genocide,” “acts of genocide,” and “some, but not all, of the killings in Rwanda are

\textsuperscript{78} Ronayne, \textit{Never Again?} page 172.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
genocide,” a triumph of obfuscation which was still being perpetuated by a State Department spokesperson in an embarrassing interview with Reuters on June 10.82

The UN soon found itself in a dilemma: the African countries wanted UNAMIR to stay, but the Belgians and US were calling for complete withdrawal of all troops. The decisions of what to do would weigh heavily on the image of the UN. Secretary-General Boutros Gali offered three options: 1) total reinforcement of Dallaire’s troops. This was not possible as no one was adequately prepared to go; 2) reduce troop size to 270. This option was seriously discussed but would also send a message to the killers: “do what you want”; and 3) total withdrawal, the option which was favored by the US and which Albright was instructed to support.83

After talking with Richard Clarke at the NSC, Albright was told that the US would support the second option. The Security Council voted to approve option number two, yet it was never fully implemented. The Belgian troops left and the rest of the peacekeeping mission, roughly 540 men, decided to stay till the fighting was over. It should be noted that foreign nationals in Rwanda were evacuated during the first few weeks of the genocide. Elite French and Belgium soldiers with the help of US marines just across the border in Burundi helped to evacuate foreign nationals including US citizens. This non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO)carried out on April 9 airlifted US personnel to Nairobi.

Finally, the French offered 1500 troops and setup a safe zone in southwest Rwanda; however, France was politically aligned with the Hutus, and protected them. In remarks to the UN Security Council, Albright commended the French for offering troops to help the cooperating forces:

“...the United States wishes to emphasize our strong support for the French initiative and the effort the cooperating force will make to guarantee the security and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and civilians in Rwanda. The grave humanitarian crisis in that country demands a swift response from the international community, and we commend the French for acting to address this need.”

She also stressed the need to recognize the peacekeeping role the UN was playing as well as members of the UN who were able to supplement UN operations. Albright defended the US stance of delaying the expansion of UNAMIR. To charge into Rwanda, she argued, would be a mistake and risk damaging the credibility of the UN. It would be better, Albright argued, “to be confident that when we do turn to the UN, the UN will be able to do the job.”

While the US refused to send troops in to Rwanda, they did commit to help the refugees who had fled into neighboring countries. This attempt, while well-meaning, was moot. It was a safer option and more acceptable since troops would not be put in harm’s way and there would be no US casualties. It was also an ineffective gesture that, to a certain extent, backfired. Ironically, those that needed the aid were still in Rwanda, not in the refugee camps. The refugees in the camps were mostly Hutus who were fleeing the Tutsis after it was obvious that the Hutu plan would not prevail. In most of the refugee camps, genocide criminals hid and took advantage of US generosity.

Most experts would place the death count in Rwanda at 800,000. However, the number would probably be closer to 1 million when criteria such as deaths in the refugee camps are factored in.

83Ibid.
84 Wheeler, Saving Strangers, page 228.
There has been much criticism about the US not being involved sooner. The US did not support intervention initially because they did not want a UN mandate that could not be enforced nor did they want to rescue a failed UN mission. Yet the truth could be more complicated than that. The fault for failing Rwanda was shared by many. The US, the UN, Europe and Africa--namely the OAU, all failed Rwanda.

“Bystanders to Genocide”

Albright has often lamented that her biggest regret regarding her tenure as US Ambassador to the UN was not be able to persuade the international community and the US involved to stop the genocide in Rwanda. However, she was in an impossible position, between the two entities where most of the responsibility lies: the UN and the US. The Rwanda genocide was not so much the result of a personal failure to act as it is the outcome of bureaucratic, rational thinking.

In her compelling analysis of the Rwanda tragedy, Samantha Power quotes from a 1971 article written by a former foreign-service officer about the war in Vietnam, to illustrate the enduring mind-set that leads to such tragedies: “Policy—good, steady policy—is made by the ‘tough-minded.’ To talk of suffering is to lose ‘effectiveness,’ almost to lose one’s grip. It is seen as a sign that one’s ‘rational’ arguments are weak.”

89 Phrase borrowed from Power article, “Bystanders to Genocide,” Atlantic Monthly.
90 Power, “Bystanders to Genocide,” page 86.
The United States

This attitude may have been subconsciously at work in the US administration, but there are other, more obvious reasons for the hesitancy to act. The first is simply ignorance. Power notes that, during a meeting with top aides, Warren Christopher had to be shown in an atlas where Rwanda was located. This ignorance is due in large part to the prevailing Eurocentrism of our time, and leads to the kind of patronizing attitude that Albright herself alluded to in a speech to the African-American Institute in March 1998, one week before Clinton was to issue his apology to the Rwandan people at Kigali Airport: “[W]e as a nation still have much to learn about Africa. For many, our impressions are dominated by images of famine and strife, exotic wildlife, and vast deserts….” She emphasized that Clinton’s forthcoming trip would be an opportunity for the American people to see Africans as “hardworking people with aspirations very similar to our own.”

This mindset leads into another obstacle, which, according to Power, was “a tendency toward blindness bred by familiarity: the few people in Washington who were paying attention to Rwanda…were those who had come to expect a certain level of ethnic violence from the region.” Ironically, US tolerance of 1993 Hutu-Tutsi violence that left 40,000 dead was seen as evidence that action was unnecessary.

Yet another cause was the insistence of the US government on negotiating with its official counterpart, the Hutu government, whose officials who were plotting the killings; repeatedly, in a perverse attempt at balance, American criticism was aimed at both the interim

91 Ibid. page 92.

92 Madeleine Albright, “US Policy Toward Africa,” Address at an event cosponsored by the African-American Institute and George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. (US Department of State Dispatch Magazine, April 1998)

Rwandan government and the rebel fighters of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), not against the perpetrators of the violence.

The tragic events in Rwanda unfolded mere months after Somalia. Unfortunately, the US was still hurting from the images of the dead soldiers, and Rwanda was going to have to pay the price. With the lesson of Mogadishu, Somalia, Americans and the Clinton administration were unable to accept casualties when the only interests were humanitarian. This is unfortunate since it diverted attention from the more serious issue in Rwanda. The Clinton administration saw no cost to avoiding Rwanda: if the American people were not pushing to intervene as they did in Somalia, then the US would not risk getting involved. Despite the mass genocide, the interests of the United States were not great enough to support a unilateral intervention.

Publicly, the US argued that the Rwanda conflict was a civil war and did not require intervention. In fact, they not only ignored the situation, they flat-out avoided it. The decision to retreat from Rwanda meant that the US abdicated its leadership role. Since the African country was ignored by the world, the Rwandan genocide was accelerated, compared to the slow burn of Bosnia under the watchful eye of the international community.

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94 The incident in Mogadishu, commonly known as Blackhawk Down, happened on October 3, 1993. The UN Security Council voted the approval of the relief mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) on October 5, two days after the tragedy.

95 Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power, page 150.

96 Power, A Problem from Hell, page 332.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Rwanda + UN</th>
<th>Albright + Clinton</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>November 1959</td>
<td>A revolt by Hutus overthrows the Tutsi government.</td>
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<td>July 1962</td>
<td>Rwanda granted independence from Belgium by UN General Assembly</td>
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<td>October 1990</td>
<td>Exiled Rwandans composed primarily of Tutsis formed the RPF led by Paul Kagame invaded Rwanda from Uganda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>War begins in the Balkans</td>
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<td>November 1992</td>
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<td>Bill Clinton elected President of the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>December 1992</td>
<td>UN Peacekeeping mission to Somalia begins</td>
<td>Clinton Appoints Albright as US Ambassador to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Albright begins serving as US Ambassador to the UN</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1993</td>
<td></td>
<td>Albright sends a memo to Clinton titled “Why America must take the lead”</td>
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<td>August 1993</td>
<td>Cease-fire agreement reached in Arusha, Tanzania between the</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1993</td>
<td>19 US soldiers are killed in Somalia, prompting withdrawal</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Relief mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR) begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1994</td>
<td>Plane crash kills Rwanda President, genocide begins</td>
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<td></td>
<td>US personnel airlifted out of country on the eve of violence.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1994-June 1994</td>
<td>100 days of genocide</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>President Clinton sign PDD-25</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1997</td>
<td>ICTR trials begin</td>
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<td>March 1998</td>
<td>Clinton apologies at the Kigali Airport for failing to act in the Rwanda genocide.</td>
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<tr>
<td>September 1998</td>
<td>The first judgments for the ICTR are past down. These help to define genocide under the Convention of Genocide.</td>
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<tr>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>Paul Kagame elected President of Rwanda.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 2003</td>
<td>Rwanda government adopts first constitution.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Kagame wins reelection in landslide victory.</td>
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</table>
The realization that the violence in Rwanda amounted to genocide was slow to occur. Since the conflict erupted so quickly, decisions were made without all the information. The urgency required to respond appropriately was beyond the capacity of the Security Council, and the data on which the Council was expected to base its response was at times confusing, misleading, and incomplete.

To put the response time into perspective, it is helpful to compare the Rwanda situation with the amount of time required for concrete action to be taken in other humanitarian crises: it took the international community until 2003 to investigate the 1995 massacre at Srebenica; in the case of Kosovo, it took three months from the massacre at Racak before the NATO bombing began (and that was without total consensus); and the UN peacekeeping mission did not arrive in Somalia until a year after the onset of serious conflict. It is important to remember that the genocide in Rwanda lasted a total of 100 days.

The information about the Rwanda conflict, which now in hindsight appears so compelling, was at the time muddled and misleading. According to Albright, messages from Africa coming to the Security Council were unclear at best. Dallaire’s cables to the UN were summarized for the Security Council and lost the urgency Dallaire was trying to convey. Albright was struck with the lack of information about the killings of innocent Rwandans: “the oral summaries [of Dallaire’s cables] provided to the Security Council lacked detail and failed to convey the full dimensions of the disaster.” Albright never saw the cables from Dallaire, only

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98 Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2005.
99 Albright had been urging the Clinton administration to intervene in the Bosnian crisis since 1993.
100 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 149.
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid.
the summaries, although access to the original cables in order to comprehend the events should not have been difficult for Albright to get. Media coverage of Rwanda was difficult, since the interim government was able to keep news cameras out of the country. The print media was even less reliable and misinformation about the killings was spread throughout the international community.103

Albright also remembers that there were many other urgent issues before the Security Council and that it was difficult in that context to isolate the conflict in Rwanda.104 The genocide was competing for attention with other critical hotspots around the world, such as the Middle East, while facing mounting domestic opposition to US forces in Africa. Just two days before the UN authorized a peacekeeping mission to Rwanda, scenes of dead US soldiers dragged through the Somali capital of Mogadishu were played on the evening news. Albright, still recalling the conversations with the family of the dead US soldiers from Somalia, remained cautious about UN peacekeeping missions.

By the time the Security Council could agree on a course of action, most of the genocide had already occurred. Although the UN decided to put together a force for intervention, no country was willing to step up and take the lead. At this time, the role of peacemaking was new to the UN. There had been a number of peacekeeping roles at the UN, but they involved cease-fires; as neutral observers, they did not have authority to get involved in any fighting.105 In the roles of peacemaker or peacekeeper, the UN found themselves in untenable situations when they picked a side. In the 1960’s, when Katanga attempted to secede from the Congo, the UN had authorized a mission. Then, two unsuccessful attacks on the Katangan forces had left the UN

103 Ronyane, Never Again? page 161.
104 Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2005.
105 Ibid.
embarrassed on the international stage. Three decades later on a peacemaking mission to Somalia, the Mogadishu disaster had left American soldiers dead and eventually the UN retreated without the rule of government restored.

The West had evacuated tourists and diplomats before the killing began in Rwanda. Then Belgium pulled soldiers and retreated after their soldiers were killed. The only countries left to help provide relief were African countries, who were usually poorly trained and unprepared for the massive intervention that was needed.

Testifying on Capital Hill, Albright conceded that sending in an intervention force without a plan and the clout to carry it out would be futile; she nonetheless defended the Security Council resolution to send a token force (5500 troops) to Rwanda: “If we do not keep commitments in line with capabilities, we will only further undermine UN credibility and support.”

Albright’s Perspective on Rwanda

For her part, Albright deeply regrets not advocating for a heavily armed US-led coalition to intimidate extremists, arrest leaders and to establish security.\(^{107}\) In spite of the lessons of her youth, Albright allowed herself to be influenced by the decisions made in Somalia and the still fresh memory of the soldiers’ deaths in that situation. The fact that, even more than most Americans, her personal bias clearly lay in the direction of the conflict in Europe also cannot be ignored: intervention in the Balkans had been the thrust of her 1993 memo to Clinton. Africa was just not on the radar.

Nonetheless, even if Albright had been in a position to determine policy on the Security Council, the solution would probably have been no different. She concedes that a large-scale humanitarian intervention, such as would have been required to be effective, would never have happened, nor would it have been possible in such a short time period.\(^{108}\) However, Dallaire believed he had enough troops to seize the Hutu weapons supply in order to halt the genocide before it occurred. He lacked only the authority to proceed. Once the genocide began, it was too late; Dallaire and his troops were overwhelmed against the Hutus. In testifying at a congressional hearing, Albright admitted that the Security Council and the UN had “missed the boat.” The situation had become greater than what anybody had suspected.\(^{109}\)

Albright is seen during this time as opposed to intervening in Rwanda. In fact, she did delay the deployment of new forces. Acting on orders from Washington, she pressed for a clearer and more complete plan of action. Albright vetoed Boutros-Gali’s initial request for an initiative in Rwanda in May of 1994. Although acting on orders from Washington, Albright also

\(^{107}\) Albright, Madame Secretary, page 154-155.
\(^{108}\) Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2005.
personally doubted that the plan would work, and argued that the force was not large enough for the task. Some interpret that as proof that the US was opposed to bearing the burden of such a UN mission. While US troops were not necessarily a part of the plan, Albright argues that she was unclear about “what the peace-enforcement mission would be or when it would end.” Regretting this later, she was to make the point that it is important to act without waiting for the perfect solution. For her part, Albright understood that politically, a US-led initiative in Rwanda was untenable. Having just suffered casualties in Somalia, the Clinton Administration and the American people were not willing to go to Central Africa. And with no US-led initiative ready, Albright knew that any UN resolution would be hollow.

In Rwanda, as in Bosnia and later Kosovo, the information coming out was that a civil war had broken out and the government was trying to put down a coup. In the eyes of the global community, the interim government was fighting a militia in self-defense. Albright and the Security Council believed that Tutsi fighters were targeted. Yet the genocide was being carried out not by Hutu military but by civilians where the motivation was ethnic cleansing. Two different stories were relayed to the UN and US. US thinking was hampered by the old thoughts of dealing with states and governments. This was flawed in dealing with Rwanda since those in power were committing the atrocities.

Albright took much of the heat for enforcing PDD-25 and not stopping the genocide in Rwanda, even from her colleagues in the UN: “The crocodiles in the Kagera River and the

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110 Dobbs, Madeleine Albright, page 357.
113 Lippman, Madeleine Albright, page 15.
114 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 149.
vultures over Rwanda have never had it so good,’ Karel Kovanda, the Czech ambassador to the
UN, reprimanded his colleagues on the Security Council (and by implication one in particular) in
an attempt to get reinforcements for the tiny UN contingent in Kigali.”116 In the aftermath of the
genocide, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), charged the US and Albright with using
stalling tactics to prevent an intervention.

In fact, Clinton assumed responsibility, and apologized publicly for the mistake. On a
visit to Rwanda on March 25, 1998, Clinton spoke to the people of Rwanda:

“It may seem strange to you here, especially the many of you who lost members of your
family, but all over the world there were people like me sitting in offices, day after day
after day, who did not fully appreciate the depth and the speed with which you were
being engulfed by this unimaginable terror. The international community, together with
nations in Africa, must bear its share of responsibility for this tragedy as well. We did not
act quickly enough after the killing began. We should not have allowed the refugee
camps to become safe haven for the killers. We did not immediately call these crimes by
their rightful name: genocide. We cannot change the past. But we can and must do
everything in our power to help you build a future without fear and full of hope.” 117

Albright’s lessons from this tragedy were hard learned. Ethnic cleansing cannot be
ignored. It develops momentum that must be stopped early. She was determined that if she was
ever in a position to make a difference, “that I would fight and argue – and I did.”118 She stressed
at a Security Council meting in June of 1994 the need for flexibility in finding solutions. In a
precursor to her Albright Doctrine, she states that judgments must be carried out on a case-by-
case basis of “what is appropriate, what is consistent with principle and what will work.”119 It

115 Power, A Problem from Hell, page 346.
116 Ambassador Karel Kovanda, Czechoslovakia Republic, United Nations Security Council Meeting, 49th Year,
118 Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2004.
was not important that all the details for peacekeeping be worked out. It was a lesson she would carry in future interventions. Unfortunately, Albright would not have to wait long.\textsuperscript{120}

\textsuperscript{120} Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2004.
Second Clinton Administration: Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State

The Kosovo Conflict

Madeleine Albright had a smooth transition in the second Clinton Administration. She was already familiar with the policies of the first Clinton Administration and, now that she was Secretary of State, she was in a position to set policy as well. She was in an ideal position for reinvigorating Bosnian policy and even stated that it was her intention to refocus attention on Bosnia and the effort to implement the Dayton accords.\(^\text{121}\)

Other issues would overshadow Bosnia for the moment, but focus would come back to the Balkans from an unlikely source. Russian President Yeltsin had been in Washington, D.C. for a summit meeting with Clinton. The result was the expansion of NATO by allowing former Soviet bloc countries, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, to join. This was a victory for NATO, since many had thought that Russia would oppose this move and would see NATO expansion as a threat. American policy on Bosnia was also reaffirmed by Albright's trip to Belgrade. While in Belgrade she showed a special understanding of the people. She was able to communicate with them in their own language, a clear advantage stemming from her childhood.\(^\text{122}\)

Bosnia would become the dominant foreign policy issue during Clinton’s first term in office. From the onset of the civil war, Western leaders struggled to broker peace negotiations between the warring parties and UN peacekeepers were reduced to little more than humanitarian relief workers. Albright in particular would feel frustration towards the US policy in Bosnia. In her 1993 memo to Clinton, Albright was insistent that using force was the only thing to bring

\(^{122}\) Ibid. page 348.
the Serbs to the negotiating table. She was vocal in her frustrations over the policy in Bosnia and would often come into conflict with General Colin Powell and the Pentagon. While some in the Clinton administration shared her frustrations, like National Security Advisor Tony Lake, her ideological views did not translate well into real policy in order to convince others. Reluctantly, the US would help to curb the violence in the Balkans and US military would bring peace to Bosnia.

War is not new to the Balkans. Albright herself points out that “the region is a crossroads where the Western and Orthodox branches of Christianity and the Islamic world meet, where World War I began, major battles of World War II were fought, and the worst fighting in Europe since Hitler’s surrender occurred in this decade.” The problems in this region have their roots in the far distant past. The dramatic conflicts that flared up in the 1990s are the outcome of centuries of conflict and deep-seated ethnic animosity that resurfaced after lying dormant during the years of Communist rule. The Kosovo region in particular, is a highly charged “sore spot” for many Serbian nationalists, dating back to the 14th century when the Turks defeated Serbian forces and set the stage for the modern day mindset which has made peace in the region so elusive. While there is great pride at the bravery of the Serbian forces, there is still the need for revenge, and to defend their territory. Perhaps the only comparable situation can be found in today’s Middle East, where Israel and Palestine (or more recently Hezbollah in Lebanon) have felt a passionate attachment to their land and an insurmountable deep-seated hatred of their ethnic and religious foes.

123 Dobbs, Madeleine Albright page 359.
125 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 379.
Ever since the Middle Ages, the Balkans have been a possible gateway for the “heathen” Turks and Muslims to invade Europe and a source of great anxiety. Since the defeat of the Muslims at the gates of Vienna in 1683, the line between Christianity and Islam was effectively drawn at the southern border of Austria-Hungary. The makeup of the Balkan region became a melting pot of religious beliefs. Europe traditionally eyes its southeastern territories with apprehension.

Nonetheless, by the mid-1950s a majority of the population in Kosovo was not made of Serbian Orthodox Christians at all, but of ethnic Muslim Albanians. In 1974, Josip Tito, President of Yugoslavia, implemented a new constitution, which gave great autonomy to the republics. Slowly, the local leaders of the republics began to chip away at the power of the central government. In Kosovo particularly, the new constitution benefited the ethnic Albanians who by then made up 90% of the population in the region.¹²⁶

Serbs in Kosovo complained bitterly about the mistreatment they received at the hands of the Albanians. This situation created an opening for Slobodan Milosevic, a businessman, who rose to power in the communist party after Tito’s death. He was elected president in 1989 and became very popular by parading nationalist propaganda and gained support from the Serbs living in Kosovo. His speeches never spewed hatred but were laced with enough manipulative rhetoric to spur Serbs to violence against their foes. In the early 1990s, Yugoslavia violently split and the republics fought to establish their sovereignty. After the collapse of Yugoslavia, Kosovo became a focus of Serb nationalism. During the Milosevic regime, many laws were passed which restricted the use of Albanian language and dissolved the Kosovo autonomy. This created greater tension between Serbian Nationalists and ethnic Albanians who wanted

¹²⁶ Harknett, Lenses of Analysis
independence from Serbia. Unlike the Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda, the Serbs and ethnic Albanians had little in common except for the land they shared. Under Serb repression in Kosovo, ethnic Albanians chose to resist by setting up “shadow” institutions. So while Bosnia burned openly, Kosovo still simmered.

Tensions were high as neighboring Bosnia erupted in a civil war in 1991. The Dayton Peace Accords of 1995, a result of US-led NATO bombings, helped to end the civil war but did nothing to help the ethnic Albanians. Though President George H.W. Bush’s “Christmas Warning” of 1992 to Milosevic indicated that he was aware that Kosovo was endangered, the Accords ignored the Kosovo region and the ethnic Albanians’ push for independence. To grant independence to the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo could have sparked other revolts in neighboring countries. Albright emphasized that there were no natural boundaries to violence in Southern Europe. The escalating violence would “re-ignite fighting in neighboring Albania and destabilize fragile Macedonia. It could effect our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.”

To support Kosovo independence would also support the use of terror since many in the international community including the US condemned the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) which was formed to protect those terrorized by Serb forces and win independence for the region. The KLA was able to raise funds through Albanian émigrés but had difficulty recruiting

127 Ibid.
128 Power, A Problem from Hell, page 452.
129 Issued on December 24, 1992 this one sentence cable was sent to the acting U.S. ambassador in Belgrade. With instructions to read it verbatim face to face to Serbian President Milosevic, the warning simply said, “In the event of conflict in Kosovo caused by Serbian action, the U.S. will be prepared to employ military force against Serbians in Kosovo and in Serbia proper.” (See “Christmas Warning” Cable from President Bush to Serbian President Milosevic, December 24, 1992)
new members. Ignored by the international community, Albanians created a parallel society, engaged in civil disobedience, and called for more active resistance.  

With Serbia’s territorial integrity intact, the Albanians became embittered by what they saw as Western neglect of their plight. While Ambassador at the UN Albright worked closely with Richard Holbrooke on key European issues. While she was not personally involved in the Dayton talks, she was heavily involved in preparations and implementations. The most important contribution at this time was the unpopular task of keeping the United Nations out of the Dayton talks. While she supported the UN, she understood that UN involvement in the talks would only complicate matters in the negotiations. After an agreement in Dayton was reached, the implementation of the accords was rocky. Albright called for continued action in Bosnia and the arrest of key architects of the atrocities. The US military quickly advised against this and warned of more casualties if they tried. 

The KLA did little to help their cause internationally. The resistance quickly turned into open conflict in 1997 as the KLA claimed responsibility for random killings of Serbs. Milosevic painted the KLA as terrorists, which would have gained him support if the Serbian attacks were not as indiscriminate against the Albanians as the KLA’s were against the Serbs. Any signs of reconciliation with the Serbs were disrupted by the KLA trying to take advantage of the moment of Serbian vulnerability. Both the United States and Russia condemned the actions of the KLA. In a joint statement Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Albright urged Kosovo Albanians

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131 Albright, Madame Secretary, page 380.
132 Holbrooke, To End a War, page 201.
133 Ibid, page 338.
to fulfill their obligations. They also denounced the KLA’s actions that “contributed significantly to the renewed deep tensions in Kosovo.”

Ironically, Milosevic could have gained international support by focusing on cutting off KLA supply lines, arresting members and protecting the Kosovo citizens. Yet he did not see Kosovo as a diplomatic problem, just as an opponent to be crushed. Fearing an outright war, the US urged Serbs and Milosevic not to open new waves of oppression in retaliation of KLA. While Albright could not excuse the conduct of Serb forces in Kosovo, “we expect governments to live up to higher standards than terrorist groups.” Support soared for the KLA each time Milosevic would retaliate against the KLA in the region. By 1998, the conflict created a major humanitarian crisis as Albanian citizens fled the region, and the brutal Serbian response was captured on television for the world to see.
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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Bosnia + Kosovo</th>
<th>Albright + Clinton</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1991-1992</td>
<td>War in Balkans begins</td>
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<td>May 1993</td>
<td>UNSC established the ICTY</td>
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<td>November 1995</td>
<td>Dayton talks end the war in Bosnia</td>
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<td>December 1996</td>
<td>President Clinton designates Albright as Secretary of State</td>
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<td>January 1997</td>
<td>Albright sworn in as 64th Secretary of State</td>
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<td>July 1997</td>
<td>NATO invites Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland to join</td>
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<td>January 1998</td>
<td>Monica Lewinsky scandal becomes public</td>
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<td>February 1998-March 1998</td>
<td>Violence breaks out in Kosovo</td>
<td>Albright warns Milosevic to withdraw forces</td>
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<td>March 1998</td>
<td>UNSC resolution 1160</td>
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<td>October 1998</td>
<td>Cease-fire agreed upon for Kosovo</td>
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<td>January 1999</td>
<td>Massacre in Racak, Kosovo</td>
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<td>Contact Group issues “Status Quo Plus”</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1999-February 1999</td>
<td>NATO threatens force against Serb forces</td>
<td>President Clinton acquitted on articles of</td>
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137 Albright, *Madame Secretary*, page 381.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>February 1999-March 1999</td>
<td>Talks in Rambouillet, France</td>
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<td>March 1999</td>
<td>Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland officially join NATO</td>
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| March 1999-June 1999 | NATO bombing of Serbs forces in Kosovo begins  
Chinese embassy bombed by NATO forces  
Milosevic indicted for war crimes by the ICTY for war in Bosnia |
| April 1999          | NATO 50th Anniversary Summit in Washington D.C.                                                                                                      |
| May 1999            | Slobodan Milosevic indicted by the ICTY for war crimes and crimes against humanity  
_Time Magazine_ article by Walter Isaacson titled “Madeleine’s War” features Albright on the cover wearing a bomber jacket |
| June 1999           | End of Kosovo conflict  
International Court of Justice rules in favor of the United States                                                                             |
| January 2001        | Albright’s last days in office                                                                                                                       |
| April 2001          | Milosevic arrested by Serb police for war crimes                                                                                                     |
| March 2006          | Milosevic dies at the Hague of a heart attack.                                                                                                       |
International Response

In most cases, the international community is reluctant to become involved in internal conflict in other regions. That was also the case in Kosovo, but Albright succeeded in persuading her NATO colleagues to cooperate both diplomatically and militarily, “[W]e are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia.” During the Bosnian conflict, Albright was UN Ambassador. When that conflict began, the US already had troops committed under a NATO plan if the UN chose to withdraw from the area. Albright shuttled between New York and Washington, D.C. during this time in order to keep the UN involved. However, UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Gali did not favor a continued effort in Bosnia. He felt it ate up too much of the UN budget and wanted to remove UN troops quickly. Boutros-Gali informed Albright that the Contact Group should create a plan for NATO implementation and begin reducing the UN’s role in the area.

At first, Albright tried to appear confident about achieving peace through diplomatic means but she also signaled that she was not afraid to use force. In a statement before the House National Security Committee as early as March 1998, she said this about the ever-worsening situation in Kosovo: “We will continue to explore all possibilities for dialogue …But there should be no doubt that we are prepared to take additional steps if Belgrade elects to continue repression in Kosovo. We will keep all options open to do what is necessary to prevent another wave of violence from overtaking the Balkans.”

139 Holbooke, To End a War, page 94.
140 Ibid. page 175.
In an interview held in Shanghai, Kosovo trumped Clinton’s June 1998 mission to China: Sam Donaldson’s opening questions to the Secretary of State focused on her reaction to Milosevic’s dangerous new offensive, and her response left all options open:

“[We] continue to believe, there’s a diplomatic solution and that violence is not the way to the end of this ... We are involved in very intensive negotiations...but I have to keep repeating that all options remain on the table. ... NATO, as you know, had exercises just a few weeks ago to demonstrate it had the ability to do something if necessary.... we have not taken any option off the table, and I think President Milosevic knows that.”

Apparently, Milosevic didn’t believe the rhetoric. By 1999, acts of ethnic cleansing against the Albanians were evident. Diplomatic initiatives were stepped up and threatened force more openly. The conflict in Kosovo posed a real threat that would also “undermine NATO’s credibility as the guarantor of peace and stability in Europe.” NATO coordinated its efforts with the Contact Group. This task force (representatives from the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy), which had been formed in the early 90s to discuss developments in the Balkans, issued a comprehensive plan. The “Kosovo Strategy” called for a peace conference to be held at Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, and a set of non-negotiable principles known as “Status Quo Plus” which represented a stern warning to Milosevic and his government to stop the fighting in Kosovo. Questions about UN authorization rose almost immediately. In a press statement in London, Albright and the Contact Group that stressed the belief that a UN resolution was desirable, but not necessary. Insisting on the legitimacy of the use of NATO force, Albright asserted that “there is existing Security Council authorization and that we have inherent authority to do what needs to be done.”

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143 Remarks by Madeleine Albright at US Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. February 4, 1999
145 Madeleine Albright remarks to reporters in London, United Kingdom June 12, 1998
At the same time, NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana issued a strong statement on behalf of NATO which seconded the Contact Group’s “Kosovo Strategy” and insisted on compliance with the UN Security Council Resolution 1160. This resolution, adopted in March 1998, had already indicated “failure to make constructive progress towards the peaceful resolution of the situation in Kosovo will lead to the consideration of additional measures.”

Solana’s statement clearly threatened military action:

“NATO stands ready to act and rules out no option to ensure full respect by both sides of the demands of the international community, and in particular observance of all relevant Security Council Resolutions. ... [T]he North Atlantic Council has decided to increase its military preparedness to ensure that the demands of the international community are met. The North Atlantic Council will follow developments closely and will decide on further measures in the light of both parties' compliance with international commitments and requirements and their response to the Contact Group's demands.”

147 Statement to the Press by NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Press Release (99) 11, 28 January 1999
Rambouillet Conference

One of the conditions imposed by the Contact Group was participation in the conference called in Rambouillet, France, in order to work out a diplomatic solution with all parties involved. While a plan similar to the Dayton Accords was offered, there were reservations. The Albanians wanted a referendum on independence while the Serb delegation was wary of foreign military forces occupying the country.\(^\text{148}\) Rambouillet was anything but successful. As talks stalled, the United States warned that if NATO were not involved, then the Serbian military would suffer air strikes. The Serb delegation sent by Milosevic had little authority and did not take the talks seriously refusing to sign the agreement. An ultimatum was put forward: sign or face a military attack.

While the Albanians agreed to sign after minor changes were made, the Serbs still refused. As time went by, it became obvious that the Serbs were not going to sign the agreement and were going to face a credible military threat.\(^\text{149}\) US actions during the talks did little to change this opinion. The terms of the agreement presented to the Serbs were outrageously harsh. None of them would agree to it, thus forcing NATO’s military hand. Albright did not view the meeting Rambouillet as a failure; on the contrary, she saw it as a victory because of her ability to get Washington and European counterparts to act on the conflict in Kosovo. Some accuse the United States of using this conference to garner legitimacy for a military strike, never intending to reach an agreement.\(^\text{150}\) Albright admits that she wanted a showdown with Milosevic. She knew Milosevic would only respond to force.\(^\text{151}\)

\(^{148}\) Albright, Madame Secretary, page 398.  
\(^{149}\) Ibid. page 404.  
Even so, there was divisiveness among NATO members about when to use force and when more diplomacy was necessary. Albright was frustrated by her European counterparts who were content to let sanctions slide and were willing to appease Milosevic.\footnote{Albright, \textit{Madame Secretary}, page 382.} Albright knew that no real progress could be made with Milosevic in power, and a major concern was stopping him. Albright wanted a concrete plan for Kosovo to bring Milosevic to the table, much like Bosnia. She conferred endlessly with NATO members to come up with a consensus.

There were also concerns back home in Washington and in public opinion. Following a meeting with the Contact Group, Albright concluded that it was not enough for the United States to follow the consensus of the Group, they would have to lead it -- not an easy task since many in Washington were reluctant to get into another confrontation with the use of force. The Pentagon and the NSC were wary of Albright’s resolve and feared she would commit troops. Others in the Clinton administration were also wary of any more interventions. By 1998, the Administration had stopped reaffirming President Bush’s “Christmas Warning,” that had warned Milosevic that the U.S. was ready to use force if Serbs took any action against Kosovo.

After Bosnia, many in Washington feared the cost of another US-led initiative in the region. Albright understood the concerns but knew that the cost of no US intervention, a scenario in which Milosevic would continue attacking Kosovo, would be far greater. She held firm in her opinion and began to sway others in Washington.

Albright saw Milosevic as a Hitler-like dictator. Milosevic would not only feel the full force of a US led NATO mission, he would also bear the brunt of Albright’s determination to see that ethnic cleansing, or any injustice, would no longer be perpetrated. Her remarks at the U.S.

Institute for Peace in Washington on February 4, 1999, provide an excellent outline of her argument for intervention. She pragmatically emphasizes America’s stake in the region, she appealed to humanitarian instincts by outlining the atrocities being committed, she warns against the spread of the conflict and the undermining of NATO, and then she pleads for immediate action.

The following enumeration of the “costs” of inaction shows her pragmatic side: “We know that the longer we delay in exercising our leadership, the dearer it will eventually be—in dollars lost, in lost credibility, and in human lives. Simply put, we learned in Bosnia that we can pay early, or we can pay much more later.”

Apparently, she knew that the threat Americans take most to heart is one to the pocketbook. Another striking aspect of the speech is the mention of NATO 17 times—an effective strategy to assuage fears of Americans who were hesitant to go it alone. Eventually she was able to win tentative support for a NATO peacekeeping force and air strikes.

The most critical holdout was Russia, an important NATO partner by virtue of the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security. Russia opposed the idea of military action in Kosovo, not only because of strong ethnic and historical ties to the area, but also because they feared such action could then be used against Russia and their dealing with Chechnya.

Russia’s opposition gave Milosevic time. As the talks stalled with the Serbs, Milosevic hoped that a Russian-led UN initiative would undermine the NATO threats of retaliation. Indeed, while there were credible policy arguments for intervention, many would argue that such a move was illegal since the UN did not approve it. Under UN Charter Article 2(4), there is to

be no use of force across national boundaries. The UN only allows for such force by authorization from the Security Council under Chapter VII or as an act of self-defense under Article 51.¹⁵⁴ Since no member of NATO was in imminent danger, Article 51 did not apply. Kosovo is also a region of Serbia, not an independent state. Albright feared UN involvement since any UN action in Kosovo would undermine NATO, thus putting NATO under the UN and giving non-NATO members, Russia included, veto power in NATO actions.¹⁵⁵

In order to be firm in bombing threats, Albright needed Russia. After intensive, skillful negotiation, she got acquiescence if not approval. Knowing that the violence had to stop, Russia tentatively went along with the NATO strategy: at an opera intermission in Moscow, Ivanov told Albright, “Russia will never agree to air strikes…We do however, share your desire for a political settlement and perhaps the threat of force is needed to achieve that. I do not see why we cannot try to work together.”¹⁵⁶ After the opera, Albright called the Contact Group in the middle of the night to tell them Russia would not prevent NATO from moving forward. Thus Albright succeeded in her goals: NATO would press Milosevic to reduce Serb military presence in Kosovo and to begin serious discussions on Kosovo autonomy. If Milosevic refused, NATO would launch strikes against the Serbs.

Milosevic answered the threat with more violence. Convinced that NATO would never make good on its threats, he hoped to delay talks further in an effort to divide NATO. However, with Russia supporting the threat, Milosevic agreed to withdraw troops and allow the refugees to return home. With Milosevic’s willingness to withdraw and international involvement to ensure

¹⁵⁵ Albright, Madame Secretary, page 384.
¹⁵⁶ Ibid. page 397.
Serb compliance, NATO threats were suspended, not withdrawn.\textsuperscript{157} Albright’s frustration grew, as it was obvious that the negotiations were going nowhere and sparks of violence still erupted in the region between the Serbs and the KLA. Emphasizing that Milosevic was the problem, she urged the reaffirmation of the NATO threats. Should both sides agree to talk, the results would be negotiations for autonomous rule and NATO peacekeeping force. Should the Albanians agree, and the Serbs still say no, then NATO bombing would begin and continue until Milosevic was brought to the bargaining table. Should both sides fail to agree, and then there would be consequences with both sides bearing the responsibility.\textsuperscript{158}

On March 23, General Wesley Clark was ordered to begin NATO bombing. This marked the first time that the US and Europe would intervene to stop genocide.\textsuperscript{159} The bombing was misdirected at first and beset by mistakes such as the presumably accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy.\textsuperscript{160} All the while, Milosevic continued his own campaign of violence. As the air strikes continued, talks of a ground campaign began. Still wary from Somalia, Clinton was adamant about not using ground troops\textsuperscript{161}, and he minimized US casualties by using only air strikes.\textsuperscript{162} During the air campaign the ICTY indicted Milosevic for war crimes. This worried NATO allies for fear that this would keep Milosevic from coming to the bargaining table. However, Albright saw the indictment as a justification for NATO intervention, “the indictment

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157}Ibid. page 390.
\item \textsuperscript{158}Ibid. page 394.
\item \textsuperscript{159}Power, A Problem from Hell, page 448.
\item \textsuperscript{160}The bombing of the Chinese Embassy sparked controversy, as very few people believe that the bombing was accidental. NATO blamed the mistake on faulty information yet still others argue that the accuracy and precision of the hit points to a government conspiracy with the CIA responsible for the attack.
\item \textsuperscript{161}Ground troops, Albright argued, would only be used if the environment were friendly and permissive. (See interview with Madeleine Albright, with Tom Brokaw, NBC Nightly News, 24 March 1999)
\item \textsuperscript{162}Ronyane, Never Again? page 199.
\end{itemize}
isolates Milosevic and the immediate group around him, and I think makes very clear why we
had to under take (sic) this air campaign.”

The legitimacy of the action immediately was challenged after NATO began military
action without Council involvement; Russia introduced a resolution condemning the NATO
action as illegal. Even though the Security Council defeated the resolution, this was in no way a
show of support for the bombings, and the issue of the legitimacy of the action became the
subject of debate. Albright's resolve was firm in her support of NATO bombing. When British
Foreign Minister Snow expressed concern that the British legal advisors warned that NATO
intervention was illegal, Albright simply retorted, "Get new lawyers."

Also during the air campaign, the Former Republic of Yugoslavia brought charges
against the United States in the International Court of Justice for violation of obligation not to
use force. Yugoslavia brought the charges under Article IX of the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. They argued that the NATO bombing did
severe damage to Yugoslavia and created conditions to bring about the destruction of an ethnic
group in whole or in part. Besides the bombing, Yugoslavia also charged the United States
with training and arming a terrorist group, the KLA. By allegedly supporting the independence
of Kosovo, the United States also violated the obligation not to be involved in internal affairs of
another state. Yugoslavia argued that the NATO bombing caused pollution to the environment,
massive destruction of buildings, roads, and bridges, death, and physical and mental harm, which

164 Byers and Chesterman, Humanitarian Intervention, page 182.
165 Ibid. page 186.
166 Article IX of the Convention states “[D]isputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation,
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for
genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”
deliberately imposed conditions to bring about the destruction of a specific group. Yugoslavia asked the Court to find the United States guilty of violating international obligations and to order the US to cease bombing and to stop any further threats of force against Yugoslavia. The United States should also pay compensation to Yugoslavia for the damage from the bombing.

The position of the United States was emphatic. The International Court of Justice had no jurisdiction in cases involving the United States because the US had withdrawn from the ICJ compulsory jurisdiction. Therefore, the charges brought by Yugoslavia were void. Consent for jurisdiction was necessary for the Court to hear the case and the United States had no intention of granting that consent. In agreeing with the United States, the International Court of Justice, in a vote of twelve to three, rejected the claim by Yugoslavia. This also in no way affirmed the NATO bombing; in its decision, the Court stressed its concern for the human loss and tragedy as well as the use of force in Yugoslavia. However, it realized that with no consent from the United States, the Court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case. It should be noted that along with the United States, nine other countries were listed in the suit: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The case against Spain was dropped for lack of jurisdiction. For the eight remaining, the Court concluded that it lacked *prima facie* jurisdiction over the states.

An Independent International Commission on Kosovo was formed to analyze the entire Kosovo situation. The commission was formed by Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson and was endorsed by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The Commission was made up of

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167 Decision by the International Court of Justice on the Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (*Yugoslavia vs. United States of America*), June 2, 1999.

168 While both Yugoslavia and the United States are parties to the Genocide Convention, the United States ratified the Convention with the following reservation: “[T]hat with reference to Article IX of the Convention, before any
politicians, academics, and political scientists, among others. The report issued by the Commission in 2000 seems to vindicate Albright’s position, especially regarding the difficulty with Russia: “Russia's contribution to the process was ambiguous. Its particular relationship with Serbia enabled crucial diplomatic steps, but its rigid commitment to veto any enforcement action was the major factor forcing NATO into an action without mandate.”

In an important, often-quoted finding, the IIC determined that:

“The NATO military intervention was illegal but legitimate. It was illegal because it did not receive prior approval from the United Nations Security Council. However, the Commission considers that the intervention was justified because all diplomatic avenues had been exhausted and because the intervention had the effect of liberating the majority population of Kosovo from a long period of oppression under Serbian rule.”

The Commission report goes on to outline the criteria for legitimacy: three “Threshold Principles” focus on the reasons for intervention (severe violations of international human rights law and the suffering of the civilian population), and the purpose of the intervention (protection of the civilian population). The legality of the intervention could thus arguably be found in evolving human rights laws.

Eight “Contextual Principles” outline the context in which intervention can legitimately be carried out: all other avenues for peaceful resolution have to be exhausted and the rule of war must be strictly followed. Two of these Principles are important with regard to the difficulties that Russia presented: “Recourse to the UN Security Council, or the lack thereof, is not conclusive. This is the case if approaching the Council fails because of the exercise of a veto by

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171 Ibid. page 4.
one or more permanent members; or if the failure to have recourse to the UN Security Council is due to the reasonable anticipation of such a veto,” a criterion which would seem to address the concern with Russia’s opposition to the bombing. Another reads, “There should not be any formal act of censure or condemnation of the intervention by a principle organ of the United Nations, especially by the International Court of Justice or the UN Security Council.”

Since Russia’s resolution to condemn the NATO bombings did not receive the approval of the Security Council, the intervention is legitimate.

Even Richard Falk, a member of the Commission who was against the NATO action and has since concluded that the action had the effect of weakening the UN, had to admit that “the NATO campaign achieved the removal of Yugoslav military forces from Kosovo and, even more significant, the departure of the dreaded Serbian paramilitary units and police.”

Russia suffered a kind of defeat with the NATO strikes against Yugoslavia:

“The use of force without the express sanction of a United Nation’s Security Council resolution dramatically devalued not only the Russian veto right but also the former superpower’s actual international weight. Moscow was shown to be impotent to prevent a major international military operation in an area, which it traditionally regards as crucial to its entire position in Europe.”

The end of the air strikes came when what Milosevic feared most came about. No longer did Belgrade have its closest ally. Russia would not come to the rescue as Milosevic believed. With Russia and NATO in agreement, Milosevic had no choice but to agree to peace talks.

Yet the question remains whether this action may have set a dangerous precedent for future interventions. The Commission report is optimistic but wary:

173 Independent International Commission on Kosovo, page 66.
“If, therefore, we stand back from the Kosovo intervention, it becomes clear that it did not so much create a precedent for intervention elsewhere as raise vital questions about the legitimacy and practicability of the use of military force to defend human rights and humanitarian values in the 21st century. … [T]he grounds for its use in international law urgently need clarification, and the tactics and rules of engagement for its use need to be improved. Finally, the legitimacy of such use of force will always be controversial, and will remain so, so long as we intervene to protect some people's lives but not others.” 176

Albright is quick to argue that she did not want Kosovo to become a precedent. Instead, she wanted each crisis to be considered individually to determine the best way to proceed. 177 Nonetheless, the controversial action in Kosovo was to have far-reaching implications for the future. It opened a Pandora’s box of issues surrounding the definition of sovereignty and protection of human rights.

“My Mindset is Munich”178

The conflict in Kosovo is often referred to as “Madeleine’s War.” It is a name she scoffs at, but it has some validity. In Kosovo, she took the brunt of the criticism yet understood that to prevail she had to persevere. Unlike Rwanda, Albright was in a position to make decisions. She would not be taking orders, she would be giving them. Opposing acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing are not new to Americans. However, to Albright, it is bred deep in her bones: “[I]t is not appropriate, possible, or permissible for one man to uncork ethnic nationalism as a weapon, and poison the atmosphere by exiling people from a place they live only because of who they are.” 179 She also pushed the issue of America’s new role in the world. No longer would the US

177 Byers and Chesterman, Humanitarian Intervention, pages 199.
178 This catch-phrase was frequently uttered by Albright in interviews; she would not settle for a compromise about Kosovo, having learned her lessons from the Munich Agreement.
just police the world, it would spread morality, ensure stability and stop atrocities committed against humanity.  

Able to flex her muscle in meetings, Albright was the one most responsible for bringing and holding the NATO coalition together and focusing on victory. While the bombs were dropping, she fought a parallel diplomatic war with three objectives: to ensure that NATO remained united; to prevent further conflicts in neighboring countries; and thirdly, to work with Russia to develop consensus with NATO in the Kosovo conflict. While all three objectives were achieved, her diplomatic efforts with Russia while the bombing was being carried out were her greatest triumph. She convinced her NATO members to present a united front to the Russians as well as the Yugoslavs, which forced both to accept NATO’s terms.

Placating the Russians was key to achieving Albright’s objectives in Kosovo, and she worked tirelessly throughout the conflict to stay in contact with them. “Russia’s opposition to the air strikes weakened the diplomatic position of NATO and threatened relations with the EU, and the joint team was one way of involving the Russians in a much needed diplomatic initiative.” In a strategic move, Albright kept diplomatic talks alive during the NATO bombing campaign. Albright convinced the Russians to attend negotiations with the Finnish president as the mediator. With this line of communication open between the two powers, Russia’s involvement in the Balkans was decidedly positive. Despite some dysfunctional collaboration, not to include Russia would have been costly. Not only did this keep Russia interested, but each day of negotiations with Russia and Finland was another day that bombing

180 Isaacson, “Madeleine’s War” Time.
could continue. The negotiations helped the public image of NATO, which was still seen as a defender of democracy in Europe.

Finnish President Ahtisaari, Strobe Talbott and Victor Chernomyrdin were skilled diplomats. Between Ahtisaari and Talbott, twenty-three countries were represented from NATO and the European Union. Allowing the two gentlemen to negotiate on their behalf helped to move the talks more effectively. The presence of the Finnish negotiator in the room with the United States and Russia helped to reassure the Europeans that this was not a re-creation of a Cold War scenario. To much surprise, the trilateral talks were successful and the conflict came to an end.

It can be argued that the intervention in Kosovo was not purely humanitarian. The United States had already invested ten billion dollars in the Bosnian war and did not want to lose the investment in Kosovo. The strife in Kosovo was certainly straining the tentative peace in the area and putting more pressure on the fragile situation in neighboring Macedonia, which could not handle the influx of refugees fleeing into the country.\textsuperscript{184}

There is also the argument that this was just an effort for NATO to demonstrate its muscle under US direction and to affirm US dominance in the world.\textsuperscript{185} The bombing of Kosovo coincided with NATO’s Fiftieth Anniversary. The party became a summit meeting with the nineteen members in Washington D.C. in which the bombing of Kosovo as well as the fate of NATO was discussed. Kosovo, and its predecessor, Bosnia, had become a test of NATO’s relevance in the twenty-first century.

\textsuperscript{184} Power, \textit{A Problem from Hell}, page 448.
\textsuperscript{185} Bacevich, \textit{American Empire}, page 104.
There was much debate about whether the killings in Kosovo could be considered genocide. As in Rwanda, the issue with genocide label meant that action was necessary and inevitable. The Kosovo situation differed from Rwanda in that there were many ethnic Albanians who were expelled from Kosovo and not murdered. However, evidence of mass graves and executions of males were found to strengthen the genocide argument,\textsuperscript{186} and had there not been a NATO intervention the executions would have certainly escalated.

Albright had developed an “aggressive moralism and idealism, pledging ‘never again’ to let the world turn a blind eye to atrocities.”\textsuperscript{187} In addressing US troops stationed in Germany, Madeleine Albright explained the reasons for US intervention in Kosovo, “What’s at stake here is the principle that aggression doesn’t pay, that ethnic cleansing cannot be permitted.”\textsuperscript{188}

While many in Washington (especially Colin Powell) and abroad hesitated, Albright was inclined to use force. She argued with Powell about the use of the military in Bosnia and Kosovo. She believed that if the United States had the ability and resources to help militarily, then the United States should use force to end the ethnic cleansing occurring in Kosovo. At a town hall meeting at Ohio State University in 1998, Albright summed up the position for US foreign policy, “[W]e are the greatest country in the world and what we are doing is serving the role of the indispensable nation to see what we can do to make the world safer for our children and grandchildren and for those people around the world who follow the rules.” This assertive multilateralism, which carried through her term in the Clinton Administration, was aptly named by the media as the Albright Doctrine.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[186] Power, \textit{A Problem from Hell}, page 467.
\item[187] Isaacson, “Madeleine’s War,” \textit{Time}
\item[188] Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
The Albright Doctrine is a tough-talking interventionism that believes in using force, even if it is limited to air strikes, to back up its objectives. This doctrine fits in line with what her critics call as a mushy foreign policy driven by morals and sentiments. Perhaps this is not entirely false. Albright has publicly stated her regrets about not getting involved sooner in Rwanda. She had seen what happens when aggressive leaders are appeased (i.e. Munich) and when there is not a US presence (i.e. communism). Albright is not a “bleeding heart” but a woman determined not to relive the past. The Albright Doctrine loosened the restrictions placed upon intervention by PDD-25 and the Powell Doctrine, which was stricter than the Albright doctrine and advocated the use of overwhelming force followed by total withdrawal.

The Albright doctrine relaxes these restrictions and broadens the range of appropriate use of military force. Albright argued, “we have to find more diplomatic words, a nuanced approach to the use of force.” Albright believed that it was not necessary for US troops to be involved in every peacekeeping operation. However, the doctrine was a tool for the use of force when necessary. In Albright’s opinion, flexibility is key when force and diplomacy need to work together. As in the case of Kosovo, “diplomacy is strengthened if you can threaten the use of force that you’re prepared to use.”

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189 Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Jim Lehrer, January 9, 2001.
190 Ibid. This is not a new concept. The abstract model of coercive diplomacy stipulates that the diplomacy will only be successful if the demands are backed by a threat of punishment and the threat of punishment is credible. The Albright doctrine uses the term in defensive use, that is, persuading an adversary to stop or reverse an action. (For more on coercive diplomacy see The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy, edited by Alexander L. George and William E. Simons).
Aftermath

International Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia

Madeleine Albright has been a staunch supporter of the war tribunals since the Second World War. She was a firm believer in the United States becoming more involved in the International Criminal Court. In a move some regarded as an affront to state sovereignty, the UN decided to invigorate the genocide convention and create a war tribunal in Bosnia. Though it had not been used since Nuremberg, the International Criminal Tribunal or the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was first formed in 1993 during Albright’s tenure at the UN. Based at The Hague, the ICTY differed from the Nuremberg trials. In Nuremberg, those who stood accused of war crimes were leaders who had surrendered their power. The ICTY were accusing those who still held authority, namely Slobodan Milosevic. This caused problems for the prosecution as important witnesses and evidence were still in control of hostile forces. Arresting criminals was also a problem as the police and military were still dependent on the Serb government.

Thanks in large part to Albright, the Clinton administration did not waiver in support for the tribunal. Not only was the US the biggest financial supporter, but it also dedicated thousands of man-hours interviewing witnesses and sharing technical support. The work proved crucial and helped to put together a case against the perpetrators and also build a base for which future prosecutions against war criminals may be built.

In May 1999, Milosevic was indicted for war crimes by the tribunal. The trial began at The Hague in 2002. Milosevic defended himself against charges of genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Convention and violations of customs of war relating to Bosnia, Croatia, and Kosovo. The trial lasted four years up to his death in March 2006 of a heart

attack at The Hague where he was being held during the trial. Fortunately, this has not stopped the tribunal from finding and convicting other perpetrators of crimes.

Albright felt that ending ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and seeing Milosevic in The Hague was one of her greatest achievements in her tenure. The Tribunals are “carving a niche in world history that I confidently believe will have profound impact on the course of human events for years to come…[T]hat is why the United States continues its significant support for both Tribunals…”\(^{192}\) She often compared the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo to the Holocaust and Milosevic to a modern day Hitler. After the Security Council affirmed the war tribunal, Albright declared that the only victor in the trials would be the truth. The message of the indictments was clear to Albright, “those who perpetrate ethnic cleansing will end up failing to gain what they seek and losing what they have.”\(^{193}\)

The International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) began trials for genocide in January 1997. The ICTR holds the trials in Arusha, the same place where peace talks negotiated an agreement prior to the genocide. Despite the troubling start, the ICTR has set a number of precedents. As of June 2006, the ICTR has handed down 22 judgments involving 28 accused. While unprepared for the task it did succeed in bringing the first conviction for genocide against Jean-Paul Akayesu. The Akayesu case helped to interpret the definition of genocide as defined by the Convention.\(^{194}\) It also helped to define the crime of rape, which was used not only in Rwanda, but in the ICTY as well.\(^{195}\) The ICTR helped to underscore the fact that rape could

\(^{192}\) Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Internews Bulletin, April 17, 2000.
\(^{193}\) Albright, Madame Secretary, page 419.
\(^{194}\) See Convention on Genocide
\(^{195}\) Patricia M. Wald was an American Judicial Representative at the ICTY (1999-2001). In a forum entitled “The Anonymous Past: Women and International Justice”, Wald credits Albright with helping to make rape and sexual violence against women war crimes in the two Tribunals. She states: “[M]adeleine Albright was the American Ambassador to the U.N. at the time the Tribunals were established, and her interest in women’s parity helped put it
constitute genocide under the Convention’s definition. The ICTY also helped to recognize rape and sexual enslavement as a crime of war.

The conviction of former Prime Minister of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda, was the first time an accused person acknowledged guilt in the crime of genocide; he was also the first head of government convicted of genocide. In a message from the United Nations, Secretary-General Kofi Annan spoke about the convictions: “[T]his judgment is a testament to our collective determination to confront the heinous crime of genocide in a way we never have before…[F]or there can be no healing without peace; there can be no peace without justice; and there can be no justice without respect for human rights and rule of law.”196

**Keeping the Peace**

What had started as “Madeleine’s War” clearly became Madeleine’s victory. However, she knew that much work remained to be done. When speaking to a group of refugees who returned to Kosovo, she warned that revenge cannot build democracy. It was not a victory over a certain group of people or government, but a victory of individual rights. Otherwise it is replacing one repression for another.197 We have learned from these conflicts that halting genocide should be a human rights issue. However, to ensure that it is done properly, political avenues must be in place to ensure that violence does not continue once the intervention ends.198

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196 “About the Tribunal: A Message from Kofi Annan, Secretary-General of the United Nations,” Internet Site of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Public Information Unit, ERSPS. (Transcript: http://69.94.11.53/default.htm)
197 Albright, *Madame Secretary*, page 425.
The situation in Africa is even trickier. Recent outbreaks of violence in Rwanda make lasting peace in the region untenable for the moment. Three key questions remain: Does intervention refer solely to using the military? How is consent to intervene determined and is it even relevant? Can “humanitarian” be applied to Africa since many objectives are hidden under the guise of humanitarian aims?199

European models do not fit the African mold. It is not possible to create new countries depending on ethnic groups; they are too spread out and interspersed to properly divide the country. Also (as in the case of Rwanda) oppressed groups often seek revenge on their oppressors and want to manipulate the intervention to suit their own agenda.

As Secretary of State, Albright unveiled the Great Lake Justice Initiative (GLJI) in December 1997, intended to help combat violence in Central Africa. It addresses several key points such as reformed judicial systems, professional assistance, universities and improved laws and institutions, as well as oversight of militaries in the region.200

For Kosovo, the healing must continue. Eruption of violence is still a threat in the area. NATO bombing of Kosovo is still debated today. Many international law scholars argue that the bombing was illegal since there was no UN authorization. Albright argues that a UN authorization was not necessary since there was already a NATO consensus, which was also a multi-lateral organization.201

The controversial NATO “victory” has not answered the Kosovo sovereignty question. Thoughts of independence in Kosovo have not diminished. Yet the current Serb government is determined to keep Kosovo in Serbia. This debate also comes at a time when Germany has

forcibly deported refugees back to Kosovo. A majority of them are Roma, or Gypsy. The Roma have been victims of Albanian violence since the end of the NATO bombing in 1999. This reverse ethnic cleansing has also been used on the Serbs living in Kosovo. Until the fate of Kosovo is decided, the people of Kosovo will not find peace.

**Impact of Rwanda and Kosovo on the Future of Humanitarian Intervention**

Remembering the failure to intervene in Rwanda and the deadlocked Security Council during the Kosovo crisis, Secretary-General Kofi Annan called upon the UN in his millennial address to debate the merits of intervention in humanitarian cases. Headed, and heavily funded, by Canada, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty presented “The Responsibility to Protect” in 2001. The Commission sought to define the new parameters for international action in response to human rights violations.

The Commission report is laced with insights learned from past failures, i.e. Rwanda and Kosovo. In the aftermath of Rwanda, the Great Lakes region became destabilized and Africans learned that some lives were less important to the rest of the world. Kosovo raised questions about state sovereignty and the use of military intervention. The lessons from these two UN failures have prompted the Commission to update the UN mission as well as keeping it relevant in international law and international politics. Like that of the Independent International Commission, the report appears to vindicate the Albright Doctrine as it pertains to Kosovo. In fact, by her success, Albright appears to have been instrumental in forcing the international community to confront challenges to its ancient concept of sovereignty and ethical responsibility.

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202 It is interesting to note that Canada took the lead in the Commission. General Romeo Dallaire, a Canadian, headed UNAMIR, arguably the biggest failure in UN history. Perhaps the commitment by Canada was prompted by the public suicide attempt by the one man who tried to stop the atrocities.
Among the most important revelations in the report is the redefinition of state sovereignty. Historically, “sovereignty” has meant autonomy and freedom from external control. The Commission expanded the definition to not only include the rights of sovereignty, but the responsibilities as well. As the title of the report suggests, the Commission found that it is a state’s responsibility to protect its own people. However, when a state is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, it is up to the international community to do so. The Commission also found the foundation for the responsibility to protect is not only in the concept of state sovereignty but also in Article 24 of the UN Charter.  

The Commission argues that military intervention by another state in humanitarian causes may only be done after all other diplomatic channels of intervention have been exhausted. As in the Kosovo Report, the principles for such military intervention are outlined. The first, the “Just Cause Principle,” calls for serious and irreparable harm to humans. This could be found in two cases: a large scale of death, i.e. genocide, or ethnic cleansing which may take the form of killing, forcibly removing/relocating people, or rape. The “Precautionary Principle” outlines the need for military intervention when all other recourses have been exhausted. The first priority must be to halt the human suffering. The Commission also notes that this type of military intervention is often best achieved through multilateral operations with the minimum military personnel to achieve the objective.

203 Article 24 of the UN Charter states, “1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Security Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and XII. 3. The Security Council shall submit annual and, when necessary, special reports to the General Assembly for its consideration. (for more information see Charter of the United Nations http://www.un.org/english/ )
The Commission also addressed the issue of who has the authority to conduct these interventions. According to the Commission, the Security Council has the authority to order military interventions, and authorization from the Security Council must be sought before any interventions. Indirectly addressing the use of NATO in Kosovo, the Commission conceded that if the UN fails to protect people in humanitarian situations, states might use other means to halt the atrocities. While the Commission agreed that this option would seriously harm the effectiveness of the UN, it did, post-Kosovo, give its blessing for the NATO intervention. The “Right Authority Principle” did also indirectly address the Rwanda issue in the Security Council.

The Commission stressed that the five permanent members of the Security Council should not use their veto power when their own states’ interests are not at stake. Perhaps this is a jab at the US during the Rwanda crisis or perhaps a jab at Russia during Kosovo. It is important to note that the situation in Iraq is not an example of the Responsibility to Protect. Thus, the efforts by the UN to remain relevant in International Politics may be too late.

The effectiveness of the UN has been damaged. Whether organizations like NATO and African Union (AU) will usurp or replace the UN remains to be seen. Albright herself may have predicted the fall of the UN. In remarks to reporters in Brussels, she stated:

“[I] believe that we are at a crossroads in the history of the Balkans as well as NATO. The decisions we take in the days ahead will be crucial for us all. NATO is our institution of choice when it comes to preserving peace and defending Western values on the continent. It must be prepared to act when a threat of this nature exists on Europe’s doorstep.”

204 The five permanent members of the Security Council are China, France, Russian Federation, The United Kingdom and The United States. There are also ten non-permanent members of the Security Council that are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms.

205 Remarks by Madeleine Albright to reporters in Brussels, Belgium October 8, 1998.
The Albright Doctrine in the Current Climate

The concern over whether the intervention in Kosovo set an unfortunate precedent arose again with the actions of the administration of President George W. Bush: the Iraq war has once again brought US foreign policy to the forefront of international politics. Not surprisingly, Madeleine Albright has been outspoken in her criticism.

The Bush administration has taken the idealist foreign policy and morphed it into neo-conservatism. This is a blend of Wilsonian idealism with an emphasis on military strength. It breaks from traditional idealism in that the Bush doctrine favors military power over diplomacy. While this differs greatly from traditional idealism, the Wilsonian idealism of spreading democracy is prominent in the Bush doctrine. Democracy is the number one goal of the Bush doctrine; it also groups states into two categories: “good” or “bad.”

Citing President Bush’s famous quote shortly after September 11, “[E]very nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists,” Albright argues that “September 11” does not mean the same to the rest of the world. Immediately after the attacks, the Muslim communities and US allies condemned the attacks. NATO called it an act of aggression against the collective. Months after 9/11, the world rallied to the support of the US financially and politically.

However, Bush failed to maintain the consensus with allies. In Albright’s words, “[S]oon, reliance on alliance had been replaced by redemption through preemption; the shock of force trumped the hard work of diplomacy, and long-time relationships were redefined.”

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Soon, allies found themselves not just opposing al Qaeda but also having to support an invasion into Afghanistan and a preemptive strike against Iraq.

In order to end al Qaeda, a multilateral initiative would have been necessary to dismantle and discredit them. Most importantly, it would be necessary to find consensus in Islamic countries, especially where moderates may govern, which would help cut off much needed supply and financial lines. The key word, as always with Albright, is “consensus.” Consensus translates into legitimacy.

The administration’s current foreign policy uses democracy as the ultimate goal in the Middle East. The name neo-conservative is somewhat a misnomer; the Bush doctrine is not a conservative foreign policy and takes a radical step away from past Republican foreign policy. With a military presence in international politics, the US would simply have to attack or threaten one adversary, thus other enemies and the rest of the world would see the US power and states would think twice before attacking. Simply put, a victory in Iraq is supposed to have the effect of pushing Palestine and the rest of the Arab world to the democratic side. The Bush doctrine calls for using small, highly trained groups instead of large armies to conduct precise attacks quickly. Large armies would be antithetical to the strategy. However, with the Iraq war nearing a four year anniversary, and a US presence still in Afghanistan, many critics argue that playing world police has stretched our military too far, making the US vulnerable to another terrorist attack.
Conclusion:

“Just because you can’t be everywhere doesn’t mean you don’t go anywhere.”

My research is not to legitimize but to recognize that personal history plays a role in decision-making. Albright stands out in politics and in foreign policy for her integrity and perseverance against injustice. However, because of the complexity of the factors involved in making foreign policy decisions, we cannot conclude that she ignored Rwanda, even though some personal bias is apparent.

What we can conclude from the evidence is that she played a very visible role in policy decision-making in Kosovo when she had the authority to direct foreign policy. Albright’s appeasement-shy attitude clashed with her predecessors who still felt the sting of a failed Vietnam. Her perspective was Munich, where she saw the full consequences of unchecked aggression in Europe. In contrast, her role in Rwanda was limited. She is neither to be condemned nor deified for her decisions. She is a remarkable person who learned and grew in the roles she occupied.

The following conclusions can be drawn from this case study:

1. Albright’s middle European heritage and adolescence during World War II influenced her to use public office to combat cases of genocide. It is a remarkably lucky coincidence that she should have the opportunity to play an important role in the affairs of the region where she was born and which had such emotional significance for her. However, it isn’t just emotional or
cultural attachment that makes a difference; it’s also the fact that Albright has the cosmopolitan upbringing—not to mention the language skills—to interact and develop trusting relationships with people from many different countries. 209

The case study of Kosovo and Rwanda loosely represented the opposite poles of success and failure of Albright’s career. Having come from Eastern Europe, she had a greater personal interest in Kosovo than in Rwanda, but it is an oversimplification to conclude that this was the reason the US didn’t get involved in Rwanda. It is nonetheless true that she worked tirelessly between Washington, D.C. and New York to ensure US involvement in the conflict in the Balkans. Her effective leadership of the NATO intervention in Kosovo was to reshape the international view of might, right, and sovereignty.

As has been shown in this case study, US inaction in Rwanda was due to many factors, and Albright’s role was not particularly significant. Therefore, we cannot impute personal motivation (or lack thereof) to this failure. It must be concluded that, while Albright’s personal attachment to Kosovo may have contributed to the success of that mission, it does not necessarily follow that she was unsuccessful in Rwanda because she did not have a personal attachment.

2. Albright’s experiences as Ambassador to the U.N. during the Rwanda genocide shaped her approach to humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. Rwanda is by her own admission the greatest regret of her tenure at the United Nations. As UN Ambassador, her first ‘major-league’ position on the international affairs scene, Albright bowed to pressure from Washington and

208 Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Jim Lehrer, PBS NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, June, 10, 1999.
209 It is interesting to note that when she left the office of Secretary of State, a festive farewell dinner arranged by Hubert Védrine, the French diplomat with whom she had so often differed, was attended by Joschka Fischer, the German foreign minister, Robin Cook, his British counterpart, and Igor Ivanov, her formidable Russian adversary, among others. It is perhaps significant that she could converse with each of these persons in his native language.
from public opinion that was opposed to involvement in another African mission, and she didn’t always act decisively on her own convictions.

The lessons from this tragedy were hard-learned. Albright was determined that if she was ever in a position to make a difference, she would fight and argue—“and I did.”\(^{210}\) She stressed at a Security Council meeting in June of 1994 the need for flexibility in finding solutions. In a precursor to her Albright Doctrine, she states that judgments must be carried out on a case-by-case basis of “what is appropriate, what is consistent with principle and what will work.”\(^{211}\) It was not important that all the details for peacekeeping be worked out.

As has been shown, Albright learned from this experience that action, even when it is not perfectly thought through, is preferable to inaction and waiting for details to fall into place. This is most dramatically shown in her handling of the NATO bombing of Kosovo, when she acted decisively, even though there were still many perplexing difficulties, and continued working to clear up the details while the bombing was being carried out. The inaction of the U.N. taught Albright that while consensus is necessary to achieve victory in multilateral humanitarian operations, it is not necessary to have details in place to stop atrocities: “[T]he point here is that if we are to respond effectively to the variety of conflicts we see in the world today we must be flexible enough to accept imperfect solutions when no perfect solutions are available to us.”\(^{212}\) The most important step in any humanitarian intervention is the need to protect the people.

3. The Albright Doctrine is a unique product of her complex background: her birthplace, parentage, multilingualism, cosmopolitan education, influence of such mentors as Brzezinski,

\(^{210}\) Albright, Madeleine, Interview with Frontline, February 25, 2004.
and lessons from Rwanda. Madeleine Albright’s success in the world of international politics has been a result of her gift for building consensus, nurturing relationships, and slogging through the diplomatic quagmires that stood between her and the objective she needed.

The repercussions of the Albright Doctrine are now a fact of international foreign policy. It was responsible for the examination and re-definition of such concepts as state sovereignty and legitimate humanitarian interventions. The doctrine itself as a guiding principle in foreign policy for the US has unfortunately, not endured. US policy has devolved from the balanced doctrine to a more one-sided interpretation of United States’ role in military interventions without the respect for widespread support that is an essential component of the Albright Doctrine.

The situation in Darfur now presents the first test of the legacy of the Albright Doctrine’s redefinition of national interests to include humanitarian interests. It is also an important test for the relevance of the UN. Having failed to act in Rwanda quickly enough or to act in Kosovo at all, the UN must prove that it is a relevant organization for international initiatives. As of this writing, it has failed to do so. The US, having already called the crisis in Darfur genocide, has also failed to act. The US has once again abdicated its role as a leader in the protection of human rights in Africa.

In a statement urging the Bush administration to pursue consensus with moderate Islamic nations, Albright states that such an initiative would entail “a maximum degree of global coordination and the integration of force, diplomacy, intelligence, and law.” Such a combination of toughness, good will, and brains might well be said to describe Albright herself.

212 Ibid.
213 Ibid.
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