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ANCIENT SPECTATOR OF TRAGEDY
FACETS OF EMOTION, PLEASURE, AND LEARNING

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Abstract

This dissertation explores responses of the ancient audiences to Greek tragedy in the fifth and fourth-century BC. The emphasis is on psychological, aesthetic, and ethical implications of emotions, pleasure, and learning associated with watching tragedies in Greek culture. A first part of my study considers less explored topics of Aristotelian theory, such as the nature and the techniques of arousing pity and fear in the audience, through looking at the Rhetoric in connection with the Poetics, De Anima, etc. A second part is dedicated to possible reactions to individual plays, through examining Aeschylean, Sophoclean, and Euripidean tragedies.

My analysis first reconsiders the nature of the pity and fear, the enigmatic tragic emotions in the Poetics, by looking at the Rhetoric. Pity (Rhetoric, 2. 1385b13-a3) is likely the most complex emotion in Aristotle's theory, because it combines temporal and personal detachment with imaginative involvement in the suffering of another. A feature distinguishes pity from all the other pathe is a very specific visual component, pro ommaton (Rh.2. 1386a28-b1). A strikingly similar formula occurs in the Poetics: playwrights should work out their plots by bringing them before the eyes (Po. 17. 1455a21-24). While Aristotle dislikes visual effects, opsis (Po. 6. 1450a), he admires the imaginative vision that conveys emotion to their audiences in oratory as well as tragedy. Furthermore, my analysis suggests possible explanations for the puzzling Aristotelian formula "proper pleasure of tragedy," by showing similarities between tragic pleasure and the joys of memory and mourning. It concludes that the oikeia hedone relies on the emotional syllogism of the spectator that involves contemplation of the universal human condition.

Ethical, political, and historic implications of the spectator’s emotional responses to tragedies such as the Persians, Prometheus Bound, Ajax and Orestes go far beyond the Aristotelian preferences and prescriptions. My analysis also considers likely differences in reactions to tragedies, between and popular audiences as well as later ancient criticism of particular plays.
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II. INTERNAL EVIDENCE OF THE PLAYS

1. Tragedy and the rhetoric of emotions.

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I. Aristotelian tradition and innovation in understanding the response to tragedy.

1. Greek Tradition and Anticipation of Aristotelian Ideas about Tragic Poetry

This first part of the thesis will deal with Aristotelian views about the spectator's response to tragedy, views that mold traditional expectations into an original theoretical approach. A second part will treat relationships between theory and tragic practice through discussing the internal evidence of several plays, to suggest possible reactions of ancient audiences to individual tragedies.

In the last decades of the fourth century, when Aristotle discussed the principles of Greek tragedy, a long tradition had already shaped expectations for the effect of the genre on the audience. In the introduction to this first part, I will briefly describe general assumptions about responses of audiences to poetry in Greek culture and, especially, assumptions about tragic poetry in the fifth-century BC, to see how these may have anticipated Aristotle's ideas on the subject. Then, I will emphasize certain aspects of Aristotelian thought that have not received full scholarly consideration and that may bring new insights into the ancient aesthetics of tragedy. Scholars have commonly recognized the importance of the emotions caused by viewing tragedy, pity and fear, in the *Poetics*.¹ My study will focus on less explored topics, such as the nature of these tragic emotions in the Aristotelian psychology and techniques of arousing emotion in the audiences,² by looking at the *Poetics* in connection with the *Rhetoric*. In addition, I will

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² I am interested in the cultural and aesthetic implications of the tragic emotions in Greek culture. Differences between the Aristotelian and modern, Christian concept of pity have been pointed out by W. Schadewaldt, "Furcht und Mitleid? Zur Deutung des Aristotelischen Tragödiensatzes", in *Hellas und Hesperien*, vol. 1 (Zurich, 1970), 194-213; M. Pohlenz, *Kleine Schriften*, vol. 2, ed. H. Dörrie, (Hildesheim,
discuss Aristotle's ideal response to the genre that combines emotion, pleasure, and learning. In the opinion of the Stagirite, good tragedies create a vision in the spectator through displaying emotion before the mind's eyes, *pro ommaton* (Po.17. 1455a21-22). Fear and pity (in particular) contain a visual, imaginative element, which might lead the spectator to the "proper pleasure" of the genre (Po. 14. 1453b11-13) and to contemplating his human condition. My analysis will emphasize an Aristotelian preference for visible and yet imaginative pathos, as present both in the tragic text itself and in the audience's response, an idea that also survives in Late Antiquity. Therefore, late sources will be also used, such as scholiasts, Plutarch, Longinus, and reports about the actual performances to the extent to which they attest continuity of fifth and fourth-century literary criticism.

A second part of the thesis will be dedicated to the internal evidence of the plays and to the reception of tragedies in Athens. The study of the plays will be concerned, on the one hand, with the relationship between Aristotelian theory and tragic practice and, on the other, with the relationship between internal and external audiences. I will first look at the manner in which several plays, ranging from Aeschylean to late Euripidean, appeal to emotional reactions of audiences. Then, my analysis will seek to find certain patterns that define arousing or experiencing pity and fear and examine whether tragic examples relate or do not relate to the theoretical account of Aristotle. Could internal audiences mirror responses to tragic action that were ingrained in Greek culture and invite the external spectators to adopt such responses? If so, what would be the

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1965), 562-73. D. Konstan's, *Pity Transformed* (London, 2001), 128-36, deals with Aristotle's views about pity, while it generally surveys the evolution of the concept of pity, from Antiquity to modern times.

3 I will use the term "internal audience" to designate both the chorus and the tragic characters, who react to the events described in the plays.
implications of a play like the *Persians*, which would involve pity for the enemy?

Moreover, in the *Poetics*, Aristotle insists that tragedians embed emotions within the plot,\(^4\) which suggests a correspondence between reactions expressed within the play and those of the spectator. By following this Aristotelian suggestion that poets represented emotions within the drama in order to elicit emotional reactions from external audiences, my analysis will explore whether there was a direct emotional link between internal and external audience or whether certain dramatic devices break such chain.

While investigating emotional responses to tragedy in Greek culture, I will further discuss possible differences in the reception of the plays. Ethical, religious, and social problems, as raised in tragedies, likely challenged the spectators, leading to various interpretations. The opinions of Aristotle sometimes conflicted not only with the taste of popular audiences, but also with certain trends of tragic practice,\(^5\) which suggests variations in the responses of the elite and popular audiences. Furthermore, changes in dramatic technique and stage production\(^6\) could have altered the expectations of the

\(^{4}\) *Po.* 14. 1453b1-4. Specific passages of the *Poetics* will be examined in detail in my analysis. The crucial role played by emotions in the structure of Greek tragedy, overall, has been shown by M. Heath, *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (Stanford, 1987) and *Unity in Greek Poetics* (Oxford, 1989). My study has a different emphasis than Heath's, as it will deal with particular appeals to emotion in various tragedies as well as the ethical and cognitive implications of the spectator's responding emotionally in each case.

\(^{5}\) A revealing passage in this sense is the passage in which Aristotle deplores the fact that dramatists spoil their plots in order to please the audience: κατ’ εὐχήν ποιοῦντες τοῖς θεαταῖς (*Po.* 13. 1453a35). The rebuke may regard both fifth and fourth-century playwrights. Aristotle assumes that tragedians intend to produce pleasure, in general, but in this case, their plot device cannot produce the "appropriate," *oikeia*, kind of pleasure. L Golden, "Aristotle and the Audience for Tragedy," *Mnemosyne* 29 (1976), 351-59, has discussed the meaning of *catharsis* in connection with ideal audiences. Halliwell 1998, 169, has sketched Aristotle's attitude toward popular audiences.

audiences and diversified their reactions to tragic innovations. In each case, I will consider the didascalic information, contemporary, and later references to the plays, to suggest possible diverse responses among spectators.

In the *Poetics*, Aristotle uses key terms, such as pity and fear, pleasure, learning, and imitation,\(^7\) in order to define the tragic genre and its effect on the spectator. Such terms were not new, but already employed by pre-Aristotelian authors. The following discussion will examine the degree to which Aristotelian ideas were anticipated in earlier descriptions and theories of audience response to poetry.

1. Early descriptions.

a) Pleasure.

From early on, the Greeks recognized that poetry produces pleasure. Descriptions of audiences who experience various types of "delight" (enjoyment, τέρψις, pleasure, ἥδονή, charm, χάρῳ) and feel the "bewitchment" (magic charm, θέληξις, rapture κηλήθημός, awesome bewilderment, ἔκπληξις) of song are common in early Greek poetry.\(^8\) The *Odyssey*, in particular, offers revealing examples in this respect. In the first

\(^7\) I will examine later in this first part of the thesis the Aristotelian views of these aesthetic notions. Pleasure, for example is constantly mentioned in the *Poetics* (6. 1450a 33-5; 13.1453a 35ff.; 26. 1462 b13 ff.), as specific to the tragic genre: "arising from pity and fear through imitation, mimesis" (Po. 14. 1453b10-14). Pity and fear appear in the definition of tragedy (Po. 6. 1449b27) and, afterwards, in the frequent expression "pitiable and fearful" (events, plots, etc, e.g. Po. 9. 1452a2-4). A certain sort of learning is associated with mimesis in general (Po. 4. 1448b7, 12). Tragedy is a type of mimesis and, therefore, there must be some learning connected with tragedy.

book, Penelope acknowledges that singer Phemius exerts enticing powers over his listeners:

"Εγ' ἄνδρὸν τε θεόν τε, τά τε κλείουσιν ἁοιδοί' (Od. 1. 337-38).

Phemius, you know many other deeds of mortals and gods which charm the hearts of the mortals and which singers celebrate.

The passage formulates expectations for the subject, the deeds of men and gods, as well as for the purpose of the bard's song - to enchant. A line ascribed to Archilochus, the seventh-century poet from Paros, also reads "everybody is charmed by songs", 

κηλεῖται δ ὀστίς ἐστίν ἁοιδαῖς (fr. 106 D-K). Indeed, when rhapsodes perform,


10 Generally on the magic implications of thelxis, see H. Parry 1992. C. Segal, Orpheus: The Myth of the Poet (Baltimore and London, 1996), 14-16, argues that the effect of poetry is perceived as a king of sorcery, thelxis, by nonliterate audiences. The idea of poetry that keeps audiences under a spell may initiate in the oral culture, but it continues to be influential in the fifth-century Greek thought, as Gorgias and Plato suggest.

11 Likewise, delectation from song is anticipated in the Odyssey 23. After the death of the suitors, Odysseus urges everybody to celebrate, so that people outside may think that Penelope has married. As soon as the singer brings his lyre, all expect to be entertained and are overwhelmed by the desire of song and dance:

. . . ὁ δ' εἶλετο θείοις ἁοιδοῖς
φοινικός γάρ γλαυκήν, ἐν δὲ σοφίαν ἱμερον ὄρσε
μολζῆς τε γλυκερείν καὶ ἁμύμονος ὀρέξθμοιο. (Od. 23. 143-45).

12 Max von Treu, Archilochus. Geschicht und deutsch herausgegeben (München, 1959), 240, discusses the connections between this passage and Homeric views about the effect of song on audiences.
Homer's audiences are often said to simply enjoy (τέρπειν) the recital. At the court of Alcinous, the Phaeacians enjoy Domodocus' singing of Troy:

Αὐτάρ ὅτ' ἄν' ἄρχοιτο καὶ ὀτρύνειαν ἀείδειν

Φαίηκων οἱ ἄριστοι, ἔπει τέρποντ' ἐπέεσιν. (Od. 8. 91-92).

As soon as (Demodocus) was about to start, the noble Phaeacians would urge him to sing, since they enjoyed his stories.

While saddened by the story of his own adventures, Odysseus himself later takes delight, together with the rest of the Phaeacians, in the song about Aphrodite and Ares:

Ταῦτ' ἄρ' ἀοίδός ἀείδε περικλυτός. Αὐτάρ' Ὑδυσσεύς

Τέρπετ' ἐνὶ φρεσίν ἥσιν ἀκούων ἧδε καὶ ἄλλοι

Φαίηκες δολιχήπτωι . . . (Od. 8. 367-69).

So the renowned singer sang his song and Odysseus enjoyed it in his heart, as did the others there, Phaeacians, people with long oar . . .

Hesiod, in the prologue of the Theogony, constantly emphasizes the pleasurable effect of poetry inspired by Muses. Thus, "honeyed words" (ἐπεα μειλίχια, 84) flow from the mouth of the one whom the daughters of Zeus favor. People are won over by such gentle words, (μαλακοῖς ἐπεσιν, 90). Pindar uses a similar expression in the sixth Isthmian, in which he offers Zeus a libation composed of "honey-voiced songs" (σπένδειν μελιφθόνγγοις ἀοίδαίς, I. 6. 9). To return to Hesiod, the poet interestingly explains the soothing quality of the bard's song in terms of listener's psychology:

Εἰ γὰρ τις καὶ πένθος ἔχων νεοκηδεί θυμῷ

ἀξιηται κραδίην ἀκαχήμενος, αὐτάρ ἀοίδός

Μουσάων θεράπων κλεία προτέρων ἀνθρώπων

ἐμνήσει μάκαράς τε θεούς οἳ "Ολυμπὸν ἔχουσιν,

αἰσ ὦ γε δυσφροσυνέων ἐπιλήθεται οὖδὲ τι κηδέων
μέμνηται· Ταχέως δὲ παρέτραπε δῶρα θεῶν (Th. 98-103).

For, even if someone is in grief and pined away with pain
Of a recent bereavement, however if a bard,
A servant of Muses sings of the famous deeds of men of old
And of blessed gods who live in Olympus,
Soon he forgets his sorrows and does not remember any
Troubles, diverted quickly by the gifts of the goddesses.

As in book one of the Odyssey, the Hesiodic bard deals here with some theme of heroic epic. He celebrates the glorious deeds of men and gods (100).\(^\text{13}\) The member of the audience, nevertheless, finds himself in a tormented state of mind. Afflicted by suffering, he is not ready to take pleasure from song. Even so, he could turn away (παρέτραπε, 104) from his own unhappiness to enjoyment, to the gifts of the Muses (104). Poetry, therefore, functions as anodyne by facilitating oblivion of personal troubles, which is twice emphasized (ἐπιλήθεται, 102, οὐδὲ...μένηται, 103). This passage can be linked to a previous account of the birth of the Muses.\(^\text{14}\) Memory (Μνήμοσύνη) bore the Muses and thus "forgetfulness" (λημοσύνη) of evils and rest from cares (Th. 53-55). As G. Walsh has well remarked, it seems paradoxical that the same divinities, though the descendants of memory, become carriers of forgetfulness. An interesting solution to the contradiction, Walsh notes, may be that while the audience forgets its own troubles, it

\(^{13}\) A. Laughlin Ford, *A Study of Early Greek Terms for Poetry: Aoide, Epos and Poiesis*, Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, University Microfilms International (Ann Arbor, 1981), 62-88, has analyzed in detail how numerous epic passages specify in a self-reflective manner, the theme as well as the effect of the bard's song, *aoide*.

\(^{14}\) In Hesiodic passage the Muses are the daughters of Zeus and Mnemosyne. The same genealogy occurs in Solon's invocation, which T. W. Allen, "Solon's Prayer to the Muses," *TAPA* 80 (1949), 50-62, discusses as a significant poetic statement:

Μνήμοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς ἀγλαὰ τέχνα
Μούσαι Πτερίδες, κλυτέ μοι εὐχομένη. (fr. 1D., 1-2). I am emphasizing this connection between inspired poetry and memory to anticipate the Aristotelian views about tragic pleasure, which I will later discuss in this chapter.
remembers the remote past of the myth. At any rate, the song from the Muses remembrance as its source and forgetfulness of the listener's personal cares as a result. Later, the idea of healing power of the songs recurs in Gorgias\textsuperscript{15}, and, a certain type of memory seems to play a crucial role in Aristotle's account of tragic emotions and pleasure, as my analysis will show. If the sweetness of song alleviates mental anguish in the \textit{Theogony}, it can also relieve physical pain, as Pindar suggests:

"Αριστος εὐφροσύνα πόνων κεκριμένων
ιατρός αι δε σοφαί
Μοισάν θυγατρες άοιδαι θέλξαν νιν ἀπτόμεναι.
Οὐδὲ θερμὸν ύδωρ τόσον γε μαλθακά τεύχει
Γυία, τόσον εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάρος (N. 4. 1-5).

The best doctor of toils judged successful
Is joyful celebration, but songs too, the wise
Daughters of the Muses, have soothed them with their touch.
Not even water relaxes limbs as much
As praise, the companion of the lyre.

Pindar's lines can well summarize the idea of pleasurable effect of poetry, as it appears in early Greek descriptions. The verb used, "charmed" (θέλξαν, 3) implies enticing the audiences, in the sense often found in the Homeric poems. On the other hand, it also refers to "soothing" the listener, in view of the ensuing comparison between water and ode as remedies. The private addressee of the fourth \textit{Nemean} is Timasarchus, a triumphant boy wrestler, whose uncle, a victorious athlete as well, has died. In this case, as in Hesiod's, although the listener is in distress, he can receive solace for exertion and

\textsuperscript{15} In Gorgias' \textit{Encomium to Helen}, (8), poetry "removes pain and brings joy", λύσην ἀφελεῖν καὶ χαράν ἐνεργάσασθαι, and so do magic incantations: διὰ λόγων ἐπιθυμής ἐπαγωγοί ἥδονῆς, ἐπαγωγοί λύσης γίνονται. (Hel. 10).
suffering through the poem. Thus, audiences most prevalently experience the poet's song as pleasure and fascination, which may effect relief from pain.

b) Instruction.

A certain instructive quality, which should not be fundamentally separated from delight, is often ascribed to poetry in early Greek thought. By drawing inspiration from Muses, poets discreetly point to the fact that their creation can enlighten the audiences. So, in the previous example, Pindar has given his charming odes the epithet "wise" (σοφάι, N. 4. 2). As Theognis makes clear, the messenger of Muses is part of a community and, therefore, people ought to be the ultimate beneficiaries of his divine wisdom:

Χρή Μουσών θεράποντα καὶ ἄγγελον, εἰ τι περισσόν
Εἰδείη, σοφίς μὴ φθορέσαι τελέσθαιν
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν μόσθαι, τὰ δὲ δεικνύαι, ἄλλα δὲ ποιεῖν
tί σφιν χρήσηται μούνος ἐπίσταμενος (769-72).

The servant and herald of Muses must not stingily
Bring forth his wisdom, if he knows something extraordinary.
However, he must seek after some things, show others, and act in some respects
What is it (wisdom) useful for, if he is the only one who knows?

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16 A fascinating example that associates pleasure with knowledge occurs as early as the Odyssey (12. 188), in which Sirens promise that their song has such an effect on the listener that he departs not only "enchanted" (τερψάμενος) but also "knowing more things than he did before" (πλείονα εἰδόξ).  
17 As W. W. Minton has summed up, "Homer's Invocation of the Muses: Traditional Patterns," TAPA (1960), 292-309, poets primarily appeal to the Muses in order to obtain "information". As daughters of Memory, Muses enable the bard to recall events "orderly", in the form of a catalogue. Invocations, nevertheless relate the poet to his audiences: they are means of concentrating the listener's attention on important subjects. For further points on this, S. Goldhill, The Poet's Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature (Cambridge, 1991), 57-59.  
18 Cf. Pindar's use of the term sophistes in reference to poets (I. 5. 28).
Theognis unmistakably emphasizes that inspired knowledge, when possessed by a poet, (εἰδεῖν, 770 ἐπιστάμενος, 772), gains value only when shared with audiences. Consequently, a poet has to play an active role in society by generously making available his "surplus", (περισσόν, 769) of insight (σοφίς, 770). This passage can be compared with a Homeric passage, in which Odysseus compliments Demodocus, after first characterizing the public appreciation of singers, in general:

Πᾶσι γὰρ ἀνθρώποισιν ἐπιθυμούσιν ἄοιδοι
τιμῆς ἐμοροί εἰσι καὶ σίδοος, οὐνέκ ἄρα σφέως
οἴμας Μοῦσ' ἐδίδαξε, φίλησε δὲ φύλον ἄοιδον. (Od. 8. 479-81).

For with all people on earth, the singers have
Their share of honor and respect, because the Muse
Has taught them her ways and loved the race of bards.

Thus, bards are held in high regard because they have received some unique teaching and inspiration from the Muse, an idea often found in Greek poetry. In this instance, they learn from a divine source the ways (οἴμας, 481), probably meaning the paths of story-telling. The passage from Theognis shows how the poet should relate to his audiences, whereas the Homeric passage indicates how the listeners regard the bard. Both texts, nevertheless, depict the singer as divinely taught and imply that hearers should partake in

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19 As R. Harriot, *Poetry and Criticism before Plato* (London, 1969), 109, has convincingly argued, the three verbs (μῶσθαι, δεικνύναι, ποιεῖν, 771) could not designate types of poetry (hortatory, didactic, and creation of myths), as previous scholars have suggested. Such division between types of poetry was unheard of by the time of Theognis. Instead, the verbs refer to the responsibility of the poet, who is the possessor of exquisite skills, to dispense his divine wisdom among hearers.

20 So Theognis in the mentioned passage (779-82), Archilochus, who also "knows the beloved song of the Muses", Μουσῆων ἔρατον δόρον ἐπιστάμενος, (fr. 1D.-K.), and Hesiod, who dedicates a tripod to the Muses, in the place where they "set him on the fine path of singing" (WD. 662).
the poet's wisdom (Theognis), or highly esteem it (Homer). Therefore, poetry contains an
instructive element, since the poet learns the means of his art from the Muse and the
audiences benefit from that, although no didactic purpose is specifically stated in these
early examples. The knowledge mainly belongs to the poet and it is only indirectly
passed to the listener through the song.

There is a significant difference between the manner in which Odysseus
acknowledges the bards as Muse-taught and, then, the assumptions made by Ion, the
rhapsode in Plato's homonymous dialogue, who believes that Homer teaches his listeners
various skills. Ion declares that Homeric poems reveal what is "appropriate" (τὰ πρέπει) for
everyone (whether woman, man, slave, or free person) to say in every circumstance
(540b3-5). He himself, for example, has become an expert in military matters, because he
has learned strategy from the Iliad:

ΣΩ. Ἡ καὶ στρατηγός, ὥ Ἰον, τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀριστος εἶ·

ΙΩΝ. Εὖ ἵσθι, ὧ Σῶκρατες· καὶ ταύτα γε ἐκ τῶν Ὀμήρου μαθῶν. (541b4-5).

So. Are you also, oh Ion, the best general?
Io. Of course, oh Socrates, I 've also learned these (military) things from Homer.

Such a claim leads to absurdity, according to Socrates, who ridicules Ion for not having
any military training and thus implies that Homeric poetry cannot provide any practical
teaching. The dialogue as a whole has been rightly classified as an early Platonic attempt

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21 G. Lanata, Poetica Pre-Platonica. Testimonianze e Frammenti (Firenze, 1963), 10-12, has well
summarized the scholarly interpretations of the word, oimas. It could mean the ways of the song, yet, at the
same time, it could signify the paths of the hero, the very subject of the Odyssey.

to dissociate rhapsody from true knowledge.\textsuperscript{23} What interests us here is the fact that Ion ascribes a didactic role to the Homeric poems and so seems to reflect a view of poetry popular in Plato's time and probably earlier.\textsuperscript{24} Poets came to be considered educators\textsuperscript{25} and Homer was especially quoted as an authority by the fifth-century.\textsuperscript{26} It is difficult to specify when and where the idea of educative poetry originated. Another question is whether the Greek public at large or only a limited audience believed that poetry could provide instruction. Heraclitus of Ephesus (about 536-470 BC) already complains that the majority regards Hesiod as an educator:

\begin{quote}
\end{quote}

The teacher of most people is Hesiod. They are sure that he knew a great number of things, he who failed to recognize (even) day and night. For they are one.

With irony, Heraclitus contrasts the wisdom, which people attribute to Hesiod (ἐπίσταναι, εἰδέναι) with the ignorance that, in fact, is proper to the poet (οὐκ ἐγίγνωσκέν). The objection is presumably directed against two particular lines from the

\begin{quote}

24 Numerous Platonic passages testify that poetry was regarded as able to provide instruction for the young. (\textit{Lg.} 858d-e, 964c; \textit{Lys.} 213-14a, \textit{Prt.} 325e; \textit{R.} 598d). Other evidence for the didactic role of poetry can be found, for instance, in Xenophon (\textit{Sym.} 2. 4-6; \textit{Mem.} 3. 1); Isocrates (2. 3. 42-44), etc.

25 F.A. G. Beck, \textit{Greek Education 450-350 BC} (London, 1964), 117-22, has shown the important role played by poetry in school.

26 The subject is well discussed in J. Dalfen's, \textit{Polis und Poiesis} (Munich, 1974), 41-54. Plato himself regularly cites Homer to build arguments in his dialogues. A very amusing example of Homeric citation occurs in Aristophanes' \textit{Birds} (910), produced around 414 BC, win which, among other pretentious parasites, a poet enters the new founded city of Pisthaetaerus and Euelpides. He admires Homer so much that he ends every line "according to Homer".\end{quote}
Theogony (123-24), saying that day came forth from night.\textsuperscript{27} A word - play was perhaps intended in the phrasing: most (\pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\nu) recognize the poet to be their teacher, since he knows most matters (\pi\lambda\epsilon\iota\sigma\tau\alpha).\textsuperscript{28} "Majority", therefore, does not have to be taken absolutely here, but it likely means that a large part of the Greek public expected to learn from the Hesiodic poems by the end of the sixth-century BC.\textsuperscript{29} Indeed, the Works and Days is designed as a didactic poem, in the strict sense of the word: two main sections of the text propose instruction on agricultural tasks and on the days of the month, which are favorable or unfavorable for different labors. Formal features strengthen the educative content of the poem. Thus, imperatives addressed to the poet's brother, Perses, also give by extension poetic guidance to larger audiences.\textsuperscript{30} Remarkably, nevertheless, the main target of Heraclitus' rebuke is not Works and Days, but the Theogony. An explanation may well be that some members of the audience were seeking elucidation about the nature of the universe in the Theogony, a possibility that can be supported by another Heraclitean fragment:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{27} Like most commentators, T. M. Robinson, \textit{Heraclitus. Fragments} (Toronto, 1987), 120-21, believes that Heraclitus refers to these lines of the Th.: 123-24. Less convincing to me sounds the hypothesis advanced by D. Sweet, \textit{Heraclitus. Translation and Analysis} (Lanham, 1995), 25, who considers that the lines of the Theogony criticized in fact are 743-54, where Day and Night personified are said to go in opposite directions. What Heraclitus seems to say here is that Hesiod does not even distinguish between day and night (they are one, as the poet believes by mistake), not that Hesiod sees the two as opposite, while they should be one).
  \item I agree with M. Conche, \textit{Heraclite. Fragments} (Paris, 1987), 102, who interprets the repetition as jocularity.
  \item The social and historical context of Hesiod's poetry is well presented by O. Murray, \textit{Early Greece} (London, 1980).
\end{itemize}
A lot of learning does not teach (someone) understanding. For, (if it could do so), it would have taught Hesiod, Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Hecataeus.

As in the former fragment, superficial knowledge (πολυμαθίη) is differentiated from true wisdom (νόος). Among those, who may appear learned, without really being so, Hesiod is listed first, in an enumeration that continues with names of philosophers. Heraclitus' critique thus suggests that many could have regarded the poet as a reliable source of information, in an era in which the borderline between poetry, philosophy, and science was not precisely defined.

Aristophanes' Frogs is frequently cited to illustrate the view that poetry had an educational role in Greek culture. When asked by Dionysus why dramatists should be admired, Euripides answers:

Δεξιότητος καὶ νουθεσίας ὥστε βελτίως τε
Ποιοῦμεν τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν. (1009-10).

For skillfulness and good counsel, and because we Make people better citizens.

The notion that poets benefit the social life of the community was probably commonplace by the end of the fifth-century, when the Frogs was produced (405 BC, Lenaia). In this passage, however, poetic knowledge receives an ethical connotation: playwrights improve the polis morally. Aeschylus, at least, interprets Euripides' words in this way,

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31 Yet another fragment of Heraclitus confirms the fact that bards and poets were - foolishly - seen as educators: τις γὰρ αὐτῶν νόος ἢ φρήν δήμων ἀοιδοίσι πείθονται καὶ διδασκάλῳ χρείονται ὁμίλῳ, οὐκ εἰδότες ὅτι οἱ πολλοὶ κακοὶ, ὀλίγοι δὲ ἄγαθοι. (104 D. -K.).
32 J. W. H. Atkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity, (Cambridge, 1934), 29-30, offers a good, overall examination of the passages of the play that propound this view.
33 As observed, the idea appeared already in Homer, in Odysseus' praise of Demodocus.
because he accuses his rival of turning his spectators into "worse" (μοιχθεροτέρους, 1012) human beings. A few moments later, Aeschylus himself gives his version of the usefulness of poetry:

... σκέψαι γὰρ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς

ὡς ὕφελίμοι τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ γενναῖοι γεγένηται.

Ορφεὺς μὲν γὰρ τελετάς θ’ ἤμιν κατέδειξε φόνων τ’ ἀπέχεσθαι

Μουσαῖος δὲ ἐξακέσεις τε νόσσων καὶ χρησιμοῦς; Ἡσιοδός δὲ

Γῆς ἐργασίας, καρπῶν ὀρας, ὄρτους· ὁ δὲ θεῖος Ὀμηρος

ἀπὸ τοῦ τιμῆν καὶ κλέος ἔσχεν πλὴν τοῦδ’ ὁτι χρήστ’ ἐδίδαξεν,

τἀξεὶς, ἀρετάς, ὀπλίσεις ἀνδρῶν. (1030-35).

... Look at how, from the beginning,
The noble poets have brought us benefits.
Orpheus disclosed mystic rites to us and taught us to refrain from killings,
Musaeus about oracles and cures for sickness, Hesiod about
Working the land, the seasons for crops, times for
Plowing, and the divine Homer, what did he get his honor
And renown from - if not from the fact that he instructed useful things
About tactics and virtues, and the equipment of soldiers.

Aeschylus' exposition strongly affirms the didactic view of poetry, to such an extent that each poet is ascribed specific teachings. Notably, he says that Homer has educated the audiences with respect to the warfare, which is exactly what the rhapsode Ion has assumed about the poet in Plato's dialogue. The opinion that poetic works could provide definite instruction perhaps circulated in the fifth-century Athens. And yet, as Socrates has quickly dismissed Ion's claim, so Dionysus ridicules the assertion that Homer would teach martial strategy. The god replies ironically: well, Homer certainly didn't instruct the clumsy Pantacles, for the guy tried to fasten the crest to his helmet after putting his helmet on the head (1036-9). As the joke implies, the didactic interpretation of
poetry leads to nonsense.\textsuperscript{34} The debate of the \textit{Frogs} reinforces the idea that poetry was associated with teaching. At the same time, it aptly speaks against two extremes, to which contemporaries might have pushed the concept. One concerns the belief that poets ought to instill moral percepts (proposed by Euripides), the other that poets offer the audiences practical lessons (advanced by Aeschylus). Both assumptions, Aristophanes suggests, are gross exaggerations. To conclude, the notion of instructive poetry has various nuances in Greek culture, and, perhaps, so did the expectations of the audience in this respect. The way in which poetic teaching is understood ranges from the opinion that it benefits the community, by preserving mythical past through the knowledge of the Muses (Homer, Theognis) to that it may provide actual information about the nature of the universe (a view against which Heraclitus protests). Then, it could give the audience particular lessons on several subjects (didactic as expressed by Ion in Plato's dialogue and Aeschylus in the \textit{Frogs}), or, finally, ethical betterment (as Euripides maintains in the \textit{Frogs}).

c) Early views about performer as intermediary between text and audience.

In the \textit{Ion}, Plato presents the rhapsode as experiencing himself the emotion that he conveys to the audience, as if present at the events described in the text. Socrates observes that Ion mostly brings his listeners to enchantment (\textit{ἐκπληξία}, 532b2) when, in the middle of the recitation, he enters a state of enthusiasm and is taken away by the

\textsuperscript{34} I agree with A. W. Gomme, \textit{The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History} (Berkeley, 1954), who argues against Victorian scholars, who see in the \textit{Frogs} a confirmation that tragedians were supposed to write their plays in order to inculcate teachings in the audience. An exclusively didactic view of poetry is, in fact, mocked in the play.
events described, whether they occur in Ithaca, Troy, or wherever else (535b3-c3). The bard admits that this is the truth:

'Ως ἔναργές μοι τούτο, ὁ Σώκρατες, τὸ τεκμήριον εἶπες· οὐ γὰρ σὲ ἀποκρυψαμένος ἔρω. Εγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἔλεεινόν τί λέγω, διακρύων ἐπίπλανται μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί. ὅταν τε φοβερὸν ἢ δεινόν, ὀρθαί αἱ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβον καὶ ἡ καρδία πηδᾶ. (535c4-8).

How vividly you've proved this, oh Socrates. I'll tell you, then, without hiding anything. Whenever I recite something pitiful, my eyes fill with tears, and whenever I say something frightening or terrible, my hair stands up and my heart throbs because of fear.

Beyond irony, Plato seems to allude here to a cultural expectation for the epic and, afterwards, tragic genre: the performer becomes a vehicle of emotion for the listeners. The same idea occurs in Plato's Menexenus, in which the performer is an orator who "transports" Socrates to the Island of the Blessed through his enthusiasm. Homeric examples can already suggest similar views about the bard. Thus, Odysseus praises Demodocus by saying that he sang the Trojan adventures as accurately, as if he had been there or an eyewitness had told him (ὡς τέ ποι ἢ αὐτός παρεὼν ἢ ἄλλου ἀκούσας, Od. 8. 491), an observation that resembles the Platonic comments about

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36 Later the bard says that he is joyful when the audiences cry, since that means good money (535e). The irony of the passage was noted by M. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge, 1986), 94-99.

37 The emotions emphasized here are "pity and fear", which Gorgias, Plato, and Aristotle consider to be the effect of either epic or tragic poetry or both. A comparison between the three authors is provided by Flashar, Der Dialog Ion als Zeugnis platonischer Philosophie (Berlin, 1958), 68-72.

38 Men. 235b-c. D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity (Berkeley and Los Angeles), 75-81, appropriately finds similarities between the ways in which bards and orators affect their audiences, through comparing the Ion, Phaedrus, and Menexenus.
When Phemius begs Odysseus for pity, he presents himself as both self-taught and inspired by some god (Od. 22. 347). More importantly, he can sing before Odysseus "as in front of a god" (ἐοίκο δὲ τοί παρείδειν, ὃς τε θεό, Od. 22. 348-49). This, perhaps, means that he can inspire his audience, because he himself is inspired.

2. Theoretical development of views about emotions aroused by tragedy before Aristotle.

2. Gorgias and the Dissoi Logoi.

Around 430 BC, Gorgias formulated certain aesthetic criteria that concerned the effect of poetry on the listener, and, more specifically, that of tragedy, which had emerged as an important genre. In the *Encomium to Helen*, a piece of rhetorical virtuosity that has been qualified as simultaneously presenting features of laudatory discourse, apology, and intellectual joke, Gorgias intends to exculpate the infamous heroine of Greek mythology. Helen can be best excused for her behavior as follows. She

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39 As M. Finkelberg, *The Birth of Literary Fiction in Ancient Greece* (Oxford, 1998), 124, has well noted on the passage that inspiration from Muses or Apollo enables the poet to "witness" past events and describe them in order (κατὰ κόσμον). It is also, I would add, the audience, Odysseus, who is transported by the bard's vision to the point that he experiences again his suffering at Troy.

40 P. Murray, "Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece," *JHS* 101 (1981), 87-100, offers a summary of the scholarly interpretations of this line. In addition, she raises the interesting question of how the bard can be inspired, and yet, simultaneously self-taught (αὐτοδιδασκομεν).

41 General consideration on the aesthetic views of Gorgias are provided by the article of C. P. Segal, "Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos," *HSCP* 66 (1962), 99-156.

42 Gorgias himself suggests that the piece be read as an apology (Hel. 2) and pastime (Hel. 21). T. Cole, *The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (London, 1991), 74-76, discusses the place of this type of rhetorical exercises for the history of Greek oratory. R. Pezzano, *Gorgias, Encomio di Elena* (Cavellermaggiore, 1993), 30, divides the discourse into: encomium (3-5), apology (6-20), which is subdivided into prothesis (exposition of the thesis) and tractatio (development of the arguments), then, finally epilogue (21).
may have been deceived and persuaded to go to Troy by speech (λόγος), (Hel. 8). As the argument goes, *logos* governs the world through its seductive power. A convincing example in this regard is poetry, defined as speech having meter, which arouses irresistible emotions in its listeners:

> Τὴν ποίησιν ἀπασαν καὶ νομίζω καὶ ὄνομάζω λόγον ἔχοντα μέτρον. Ἡς τοὺς ἀκούοντας εἰσῆλθε καὶ φρίκη περίφοβος καὶ ἔλεος πολύδακρος καὶ πόθος φιλοπενθῆς, ἐπ’ ἀλλοτρίων τε πραγμάτων καὶ σωμάτων εὐτυχίας καὶ δυσπραγίας ἰδιόν τι πάθημα διὰ τῶν λόγων ἔπαθεν ἡ ψυχή. (Hel. 9).  

I deem and declare all poetry to be speech, having meter. And shivering fear and tearful pity and painful longing has come upon those who are listening to it. The soul has experienced some peculiar emotion on account of the experiences and physical suffering of others in both the good fortunes and bad fortunes, through words.

It has been remarked that Gorgias is a "theoretician of the magic spell of word," since he shows more interest in the influence of poetry over the listener than in its production. Audiences are driven to a peculiar emotional experience (ἰδιόν τι πάθημα) by

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43 D. M. MacDowell, *Gorgias. Encomium to Helen* (Bristol, 1982), 12-13, observes that although *logos* has a variety of meanings in Greek literature, the term is used in Gorgias' *Encomium* primarily in the sense of "speech" or "speaking".

44 A. W. H. Adkins, "Form and Content in Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes," in *Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy*, vol. 2., eds. J. P. Anton and A. Preus (Albany, 1983), 109-11, analyzes the implication of the famous expression of Gorgias that proclaims the supremacy of speech (λόγος δυνάστης, Hel. 8) for early Greek rhetoric.

45 Untersteiner, *Sofisti. Testimonianze e Frammenti*, vol. 2 (Florence 1949), 99, considers that Gorgias' formula "all poetry" refers to all types of poetry, including tragedy, which seems to be a reasonable interpretation. W. Nestle, *Vom Mythos zum Logos* (Stuttgart, 1942), 320, reads "poetry is speech without meter", which most editors reject, to suggest that in Gorgias' view poetry and persuasive speech are connected. The two, poetry and rhetoric, are indeed connected in the *Encomium*, even without requiring Nestle's radical reading.

46 J. De Romilly, *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Harvard, 1975), 43. Gorgias extensively discusses the reception of poem (Hel. 9) and later the effects of songs as magic incantations (ἐποδαί, Hel. 10), while he only mentions one formal feature of poetry: meter.
participating in the fictional events: on account the experiences of others (ἄλλωτρών πραγμάτων). Perhaps, the particular (ἰδίων) emotion, which affects the soul of the audience, could be linked with the later Aristotelian formula, oikeia hedone, the "proper" pleasure of tragic genre. Both expressions appear to designate a 'peculiar', aesthetic response to poetic speech. Furthermore, Gorgias emphasizes pity and fear as reaction to poetry, the emotions that later come to be associated mostly with tragedy.\textsuperscript{47}

An intriguing comment of Gorgias deals specifically with tragedy:

"Ἡνθησε δὴ τραγῳδία καὶ διεβοήθη θαύμαστον ἀκρόαμα καὶ θέαμα τῶν τότε ἄνθρωπων γενομένη καὶ παρασχούσα τοῖς μύθοις καὶ τοῖς πάθησιν ἀπάτην, ὡς Γοργίας φησίν, ἢν ὁ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατήσαντος, καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεῖς σοφότερος τοῦ μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. Ο μὲν γὰρ ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος, ὅτι τούθ' ὑποσχόμενος πεποίηκεν. Ο δ' ἀπατηθεῖς σοφότερος εὐάλωτον γὰρ ύφ' ἤδονῆς λόγων τὸ μὴ ἀναίσθητον. (fr. 23, D.-K.).

Tragedy bloomed and was celebrated, a marvelous sound and sight for the men of that time and one which by means of myths and sufferings produced "a deception", as Gorgias says, "in which the deceiver is regarded as more just than the non - deceiver and the deceived is wiser than the undeceived." The deceiver is esteemed as more just because he has succeeded in what he intended and the deceived is wiser, for a man that is not insensitive is more easily taken away by the pleasure of words.

The text briefly places tragedy in the context of historical development, probably at the beginning of the fifth century. Then, it passes to the condition necessary for the genre to produce its effect on the audience: the mysterious "deception" (ἀπάτη). The term has been sometimes interpreted as distortion of the subject matter, which playwrights applied

\textsuperscript{47} Correlations between Gorgias' aesthetic views and Aristotle's definition of tragedy in the Poetics have been pointed out by R. Cantarella, "Appunti sulla definizione aristotelica della tragedia," RAL 8 (1975), 299-309. J. Barnes, The Presocratic Philosophers, (London, 1982), 463-66, also offers interesting suggestions on the topic.
to the myth. More likely, *apate* primarily concerns the relationship between the tragedian and his audience in Gorgias' statement. Such a relation is defined in accordance with the sophistic taste for paradox: the deceived becomes wiser, and the deceiving more righteous. Although in real life deceit was considered shameful, it is praiseworthy in respect to tragedy, because only through "deception" can the pleasure of words be effected. As R. Wardy has well noted: "we should conceive of the theatrical experience as a sort of contractual deception, relying on cooperation between the deceptive tragedian and the receptively deceived audience". The idea of poetic fiction as deception was not new in Greek culture. In Hesiod's *Theogony*, the Muses know how to tell lies like truth (Ἂδμεν ψεύδεα πολλά λέγειν ἐτύμοισιν ὀμοία, 27). Similarly, Odysseus knows how to say "many false things that were like true things" (ψεύδεα πολλά λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὀμοία, *Od.* 19. 203). Thus, for example Penelope believes the

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48 Th. Rosenmeyer, "Gorgias, Aeschylus, and Apatē," *AJP* 76 (1955) 225-60, discusses the meaning of the term in several Aeschylean fragments that refer to the *apate* of Zeus. Rosenmeyer asserts that Gorgias has used the term in the fragment on tragedy to show that myth is changed when employed by tragedians, rather than to describe the effect of tragedy on the audience. This point of view is contradicted by the language of the fragment that repeatedly underscores the idea of deception in the relationship between playwright and his audience.


hero's invented story about having entertained "Odysseus" in Crete. Pindar observes in the seventh Nemean (20-1) that the tale about Odysseus is greater than his deeds, due to the grace of Homer:

'ἐπεὶ ψεύδεσί οἱ ποτανά τε μαχανά
σεμνόν ἔπεστι τι· σοφία δὲ κλέπτει παράγοισα μύθοις (N. 7. 22-23).

In his lies and his winged contrivance
There is something majestic; wisdom persuasive in speech deceives us.

While Gorgias' *apate* relates to these early examples by equating tragic action to "deception," it also emphasizes a different, significant point. The audience of tragedy has to be aware of *apate* and "willing" to be deceived, in other words the spectator must be involved in dramatic fiction, in order to experience pleasure. Finally, in the quoted fragment (fr. 23 D.-K.), the word "deceiving", applied to both tragic stories (μύθοις) and emotions (πάθησιν) implies that tragic plots should appear believable, and, therefore, convey emotion an idea which will become crucial in Aristotle's *Poetics*.

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52 This is only one of the many "lies", which Odysseus tells his "audience" after arriving in Ithaca. The Homeric passage is analyzed in detail by E. L. Bowie, "Lies Fiction and Slander in Early Greek Poetry," in *Lies and Fiction in the Ancient World*, eds. C. Gill and T. P. Wiseman (Austin, 1993), 19-20.

53 As H. P. Foley, *Ritual Irony: Poetry and Sacrifice in Euripides* (Ithaca, 1985), 205-58, has emphasized Dionysus' connection with theater, as a god able to alter consciousness and appearance, able to cause illusion, deception. Verdenius1981, discusses other examples of literary fiction seen as *apate* in early Greek thought, such as, at 124, Parmenides' defining his cosmology as "fictional" (ἀπαρηλόν) not quite representing the reality itself (λόγος). Thus, Gorgias doctrine of *apate* could be an attack against the Eleatic concept of *logos*.

54 Audiences are not "aware" that they are told "lies" in Homer and Hesiod. Penelope takes Odysseus' fictional tale as "true" story (*Od. 19*).
The anonymous author of the sophistic treatise, *Dissoi Logoi*, written sometime after the end of the Peloponnesian War, offers a good parallel to Gorgias' aesthetic remarks. In a section that puts forward twofold arguments about the just and unjust, different cases are presented, in which deceiving or dishonest acts seems to be justified and fair at a closer examination. One of the examples concerns tragedy:

'Εν γὰρ τραγῳδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὁστίς—καὶ πλείστα ἑξαπατή ὡμοία τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὕτος ἄριστος. (D.-K. 90. 3. 10).

The best in tragedy-making or painting is the one who produces the greatest illusion (lit. "deceives mostly") by making things as close to the truth as possible.

The tragedian aims at "deceiving" (ἐξαπατή) which involves representing everything as plausible as possible. This remark agrees with Gorgias' description of tragedy as *apate*. Thus, Gorgias and the anonymous sophist, while theorizing the development of rhetoric, show interest in tragedy, an increasingly popular genre. The audiences of both tragedy and oratory have to be persuaded and moved by the delusive power of the word. A criterion of successful tragedy appears to lie in a specific relationship between poet and

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55 R. K. Sprague, "*Dissoi Logoi* or Dialexis," in *The Older Sophists*, ed. R. K. Sprague(Columbia, 1972), 279-93, emphasizes the difficulties of the text and provides a useful commentary. Written in literary Doric, the treatise includes several sections that deal with the relativity of several moral notions which are perceived as pairs of extremes, such as "good and bad", "decent and shameful", "just and unjust", "truth and falsehood", etc.

56 V. Patinella, *Poesia e tragedia nel logos gorgiano* (Palermo, 1996), 10-19, extensively discusses similarities between Gorgias' fragment on tragedy and the *Dissoi Logoi*.

57 The association is later maintained by Isocrates (15. 47), who remarks that if orators use poetic language, their speech pleases the listeners as much as real poetry does.
audience. The tragedian has to produce a dramatic illusion that is so credible that the spectator can let himself "be deceived": taken away by emotions and thus pleased.\(^5^8\)

3. Plato.

(a) Critique of poetry as a source of pleasure.

A critique of the sophistic views of tragedy as a type of rhetoric is sketched in the \textit{Gorgias}, a dialogue composed around 385 BC.\(^5^9\) In a digression (501d1-502d8), Socrates argues that all musical and dramatic performances, such as flute-playing (501e1), and cythara-singing (501e5-502a7), dithyrambic choruses, and tragedy are designed only for pleasing the audience. Callicles, the interlocutor, assents promptly, as Socrates uses conventional ideas about the audience response to tragedy.\(^6^0\) The composition of tragedy has one main purpose: to gratify the mass of spectators, without being concerned with what would be (morally) useful:

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\Sigma \Omega. \text{ Τί δὲ δὴ ἡ σεμνὴ αὐτὴ καὶ θαυμαστή, ἡ τῆς τραγῳδίας ποίησις, ἐφ᾽ ὃ ἐσπούδακεν πότερον ἐστὶν αὐτῆς τὸ ἐπιχείρημα καὶ ἡ σπουδὴ, ὡς σοὶ δοκεῖ, χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς θεαταῖς μόνον, ἢ καὶ διαμάχεσθαι, ἐὰν τι αὐτοῖς ἢδυ μὲν ἡ καὶ κεχαρισμένον, πονηρὸν δὲ, ὅπως τούτο μὲν μὴ ἔρει, εἰ δὲ τυγχάνει ἄρει δὲς καὶ ὁφέλιμον, τοῦτο καὶ λέξει καὶ ἄνεται, ἔναντε χαίρωσιν, ἔναντε μή ποτέρως σοὶ δοκεῖ παρεσκευάσθαι ἢ τῶν τραγῳδιῶν ποίησις.}
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58 Pleasure seems to be the final and most important effect of tragedy on the audience (fr. 23). Likewise, the author of the \textit{Dissoi Logoi} notes that poets do not write their poems for "truth", but for pleasure: καὶ τοῖς ποιηταῖς ὡς τὸ ποιὴ μὲν αἰλέθειαν, ἀλλὰ ποιή μὲν ἀδονᾶς τῶν ἄνθρωπων τὰ ποιήματα ποιέοντι. (D-K. 90. 3. 17).


60 The excursus on tragedy in the \textit{Gorgias} is well placed in the context of other dialogues that express the Platonic views about poetry by T. H. Irwin, \textit{Plato: Gorgias} (Oxford, 1979), 211-19.
KA. Δῆλον δὴ τοῦτο γε, ὦ Σωκράτες, ὅτι πρὸς τὴν ἡδονὴν μᾶλλον ὀρμηται καὶ τὸ χαιρεῖσθαι τοῖς θεταῖς (502b1c1).

So. Then what about this superb and marvelous pursuit, the composition of tragedy, and its concern? It is undertaking and its concern, in your opinion, just to gratify the spectators? Or does it struggle, if anything is pleasant and satisfying to them (spectators), but ignoble, to avoid saying it; and if something is unpleasant, yet advantageous, to say and sing this, whether they enjoy it or not? Which way do you think that the composition of tragedies is prepared to go?

Ca. This is quite obvious, Socrates, that it concentrates on pleasure and on gratifying the spectators.

Tragedy is a species of flattery and furthermore, a type of popular rhetoric:  

ΣΩ. Νῦν ρητορικὴ δηµιουργία ἢν εἰς ὢν ρητορεύειν δοκοῦσι οἱ ποιηταὶ ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις (502d2-3).

Now, let us define (tragedy) as popular rhetoric. Don't the poets, after all, deliver speeches in theaters?

Poetry was commonly expected to delight the listeners, but the sophists seem to have drawn attention to the association between pleasure and tragedy. Gorgias declared hedone of the audience the ultimate goal of tragic apate (fr. 23 D.-K.) and talked about the power of logos that included both poetry and oratory in the Encomium to Helen. Similarly, the anonymous sophist noted that the tragedian was primarily concerned with pleasure, hedone, not with truth (Diss. Log. 90. 3. 17). Plato launches an attack against these views, first by restating them: tragic genre aims at pleasing the spectators, not at expressing what is good; and, secondly, by dissociating the "pleasurable" from the morally good. Plato's criticism can be thus summarized: tragic performances are estimated by means of the pleasure, which they produce. Yet, pleasure has no generalized principles and, therefore, tragedies reflect no skill.  

Plato refers to the expectations for the genre as a way to rebuke poets in general. He denies here that the tragedian's art requires any kind of skill.

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Moreover, he implies that tragic pleasure, felt by the "mob of spectators", should come from vulgar instinct, which is divorced from reason.

In another dialogue, the *Philebus*, Plato uses a different argument to dismiss tragic pleasure. Among other topics, this dialogue treats the concept of pleasure, whose definition appears to have preoccupied the philosophers of the time. Generally, when the natural balance of a living organism is destroyed, the restoration of the disturbance is called pleasure:

"Όταν μὲν τοῦτο φθείρηται, τὴν μὲν φθοράν λύπην εἶναι, τὴν δ' εἰς τὴν αὐτῶν οὐσίαν ὀδόν, ταύτην δὲ αὖ πάλιν τὴν ἁναχώρησιν πάντων ἡδονήν. (32b2-4).

When this (the balance of an organism) is destroyed, (we say that) the destruction is pain, while the return towards its own nature, this general restoration is pleasure.

"Reparation" (ἀναχώρησις, 32b) and "refilling" (πλήρωσις πάλιν, 31e) characterize pleasure, but the definition is concluded with a complicated psychological addendum. Pain constitutes the condition *sine qua non* of pleasure, inasmuch as emptiness precedes fulfillment. Nevertheless, the two pairs are not exactly alike. While no living being can do without lack and replenishment, distress and pleasure are felt only at irregular

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63 The question whether pleasure could be regarded as good was of importance in the Academy, and was raised again in Aristotle's ethical works. The rigid, anti-hedonist position was adopted by Speusippus, while the opposite view was sustained by Eudoxus. Aristotle reacts against Plato and Speusippus (*EN* 7. 11-14; 10. 1-5). Overall discussions on the subject can be found in W. K. G. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 5 (Cambridge, 1978); J. B. Gosling and C. C. W. Taylor, *The Greeks on Pleasure* (Oxford, 1982); and J. M. Dillon, "Speusippus on Pleasure", in *Polyhistor: Studies in the History and Historiography of Ancient Philosophy*, eds. K.A. Algra, P. van der Horst and D. T. Runia (Leiden and New York, 1996), 99-114.

64 Cf. *Ti*. 64c7-d3, in which the nature of pleasure and pain is conceived as an affection (πάθος) that suddenly disturbs the normal state or restores it.
intervals and only if the lack and replenishment are experienced to extremes. According to this description, pleasure appears to be "mixed", because it simultaneously includes satisfaction and pain.

Mixed pleasures (46c-50e) could pertain to the body alone, to a combination of body and soul, and, finally, to the soul alone. Socrates convinces Protagoras that anger and emulation enter in the last category (47e), together with the experience of "dirges and longing in which pleasures mingle with pains" (καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς θρήνοις καὶ πόθοις ἡδονὰς ἐν λύπαις οὖσας ἀνομεμιγμένας, 48a1), and watching tragedy. Spectators of tragic performances feel joy and distress simultaneously:

ΣΩ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰς γε τραγικὰς θεωρήσεις, ὅταν ἄμα χαίροντες κλῶσι, μέμνησαι (48a3-4).

And do you remember tragic performances, when people weep at the same time as they rejoice?

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65 The difference is caused by the fact that not all sensations, pathemata, are intense enough to reach the soul and be experienced (32c-36c). Extensive commentary on the Platonic definition of pleasure as well as the Aristotelian criticism of it in the EN is provided in G. van Riel, "Aristotle's Definition of Pleasure: A Refutation of the Platonic Account," Ancient Philosophy 20 (2000), 119-38.

66 When someone refills his lack by drinking, for example, that person still feels the pain of being thirsty (35a-b). Pleasure is also "false" (42c-44a), in the sense that it exceeds the neutral, normal state, in which lack and replenishment coexist, without producing "pain" and "pleasure", the excessive states. Recently, G. van Riel, "Le plaisir est-il la répétition d'un manque? La définition du plaisir (Phil. 32a-36c) et la psychologie des plaisir faux (42c-44a)," in Le Plaisir et la pensée. Etudes sur le Philèbe ed. M. Dixaud (Paris, 1999), 299-314, has shown that the description of "false" and "mixed" pleasures is both derived from and consistent with the main definition of pleasure.

67 R. G. Bury, The Philebus of Plato (Cambridge, 1897), 107, compares the definition of anger, for example, as combination of "pleasure and pain" in the Phil., to Aristotle's definition of anger (Rh. 2. 1387a).
After the example of tragedy, a much more extended account of comedy follows (48a6-50a). Similarly, comedy induces both pleasure and pain in its spectators and the discussion ends with a strange conclusion:

ΣΩ. Μηνύει δὴ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἐν θρήνοις τε καὶ ἐν τραγῳδίαις—καὶ κωμῳδίαις, μὴ τοῖς δράμασι μόνον ἄλλα καὶ τῇ τού βίου ξυμπασῆ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία, λύπας ἡδοναῖς ἁμα κεράννυσθαι, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις δὴ μυρίοις. (50b1-4).

So the account now reveals to us that in dirges and in tragedies (and in comedies), not only in dramas, but also in the entire tragedy and comedy of life, as well as in thousands of different instances, pains are blended with pleasures.

Socrates' denouement contains the bizarre suggestion that the aesthetic delight experienced by the audience of tragedies coincides with common pleasure in real life and, therefore, it is undesirably mixed with suffering.69

By contrast, the dialogue proposes a different type of pleasure, which does not involve any deficiency or pain.70 In fact, this category stands above pleasure, as people define it, restoration of lack. It includes "pure enjoyments" (καθαρά ἡδοναί, 52c2) of learning and consists of contemplation of sheer beauty, such as the intellectual pleasure of admiring a geometrical form (51c). Thus, the dialogue lists the delight felt by the

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68 The text is corrupt and most editors accept Hermann's suggestion "and in comedies" here, but the text sounds somewhat tautological with the addition.

69 S. Bernadete, The Tragedy and Comedy of Life. Plato's Philebus (Chicago and London, 1993), 60, remarks that the passage conveys a unique imagery: "This is the first known instance of such an expression, whereby tragedy and comedy characterize life itself. Such a privilege was never extended, as far as I know, to any other poetic form." Cf. La. 183a2-b2, which propounds tragedy as model for Athenian life.

audience of tragedy among common, false, and impure pleasures, predetermined by
distress, to which Plato opposes the exceptional, true, and pure pleasures of the intellect.

Book Ten of the Republic presents several psychological arguments that give
further reasons to dismiss the enchantment of tragedy. In earlier passages (R 4. 434d-
444e), Plato claimed that human beings may be exposed to conflicts, due to the
miscellaneous composition of the soul. A reasoning part of the soul is devoted to
rationality and knowledge, a second part concerned with appetites, and a third, the
emotional part, becomes responsible for our anger or desire for honor. Book Ten
restates the theme of the contradictory aspects of the self, in a more simple, binary
manner. The better part of us resides in the "rational" (λογιστικόν) division of the soul,
(602d-603a), whose function is to correct our beliefs, in accordance with the criteria of
calculation. On the other hand, an inferior part of us is prone to accepting illusions, such
as those of the poetic works (603a10-b4). Moreover, the internal turmoil of the soul has
a deep psychological dimension, often caused by the vicissitudes of life itself. If
someone's child dies, for example, that parent wishes he could abandon himself to
endless lament (R. 10. 604b-c1). The rational part of the soul, nevertheless, pondering the
fragility of human matters, urges us to adopt a more apathetic attitude toward death. In

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71 A condensed account of the Platonic psychology of the soul is offered by T. Penner, "Thoughts and
72 There is a basic distinction between the rational soul and the others in book 4. This distinction is still
maintained in book Ten, in which the rational part should be still governing us, as pointed out by J. Annas,
73 As S. Halliwell emphasizes, Plato: Republic 10 (Warmister, 1988), 136-39, a transition is made from
intellectual to psychological problems of mimetic poetry. The analogy with painting, for instance, often
present when poetry is described as illusion is abandoned when Plato discusses the emotional dangers of
addition, one has to subdue his desire to grieve, especially in public, rather than yield to it
(R. 10. 604c). While the rational soul measures our acts, advocating control, the other
"petulant" (ἀγανακτητικός) part conducts itself childishly, wanting to yield to emotion.
Here comes, then, the "greatest charge" (μέγιστον κατηγορέκομεν, R. 10. 605c6) against
poetry:

Oi γάρ που βέλτιστοι ἡμῶν ἀκροφιμονεύσαν Ὀμήρου ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τραγῳδοποιῶν
μιμουμένοι τινά τῶν ἡρώων ἐν πένθει ὄντα καὶ μακρὰν ῥήσιν ἀποτεῖνοντα ἐν τοῖς
ὀδυρμοῖς ἢ καὶ ἄδοντάς τε καὶ κοπτομένους, οἴσθ᾽ ὅτι χαίρομέν τε καὶ ἐνδόντες ἡμᾶς
αὐτοῖς ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες καὶ σπουδάζοντες ἐπαινοῦμεν ὡς ἁγαθὸν ποιητήν, ὡς
ἀν ἡμᾶς ὁ τι μᾶλστα ὠῦτο διοικῆ. (R. 10. 605c7-d5).

Therefore, the best of us, I think, when we listen to a passage of Homer, or of one of the tragedians, in
which he represents some pitiful hero in distress and expressing (his sorrows) in a long oration, or the
chorus weeping and beating their breast - the best of us, you know, delight in giving way to sympathy and
are in rapture at the excellence of the poet who stirs our feelings most.

Plato associates the expectations for tragedy with those for epic, a connection later
maintained by Aristotle. A first description of aesthetic pleasure is thus outlined:

audiences of both genres take delight in performances, because they can express
sympathy for the suffering of fictional characters. Literally, we, spectators, "follow in
commiserating" (ἐπόμεθα συμπάσχοντες). Therefore, it is the emotional participation in
fiction that leads to enjoyment, and Plato repeats a formula, which Gorgias already
used.⁷⁴ Although Plato recognizes the process by which poets are able to enrapture their

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⁷⁴ Thus, the expression appears twice (ἄλλότριοι...πάθους, R. 604e5-c6) and in a subsequent quotation
(ἄλλοτρια πάθη, R. 606b2), cf. Gorgias, Hel. 9. For a brief comparison between Plato and Gorgias on this

epic and tragedy. Thus, the subject of mimetic arts is merely illusion, but the emotional participation of the
audience presents a real threat for the soul.
audiences, he argues, nevertheless, that painful emotions should be restrained in everyday life, since they belong to the weaker side of one's self. Spectators enjoy showing commiseration with the misfortunes of others, without realizing that, by doing so, they become more inclined to emotional outbursts in real life:

If you consider that the part (of the soul) that is barely controlled in our personal misfortunes and has been anxious to weep and to lament sufficiently, as it is, by nature, desirous of this, is the very part that receives fulfillment from poets and enjoys it. The part which is best in us, if not educated through rationality and habit, relaxes its guard of this mourning, because it watches over the sufferings of another, and it is no shame for itself if it praises and pities another man, if he, saying that he is good, grieves excessively. Furthermore, there is, one thinks, a certain gain, namely pleasure, and he would not like being deprived of it, by despising the whole drama. Only a few reflect, I think, that enjoyment will be transferred from the spectacle of another's suffering, to one's own, and the one who has nurtured and strengthened the part of him that feels pity at those (dramas) will not find it easy to refrain it at the time of his own misfortune.

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Pity is thus held as one of the crucial emotions in the audience response to tragedy (ἐλεεῖν, 606b3, τὸ ἐλεεῖνον, 606b7) and described as fundamentally connected with tragic pleasure. Remarkably, the spectator's pity not only depends on the misfortunes represented within the drama, but is especially elicited when the hero declares that he is good and suffering "untimely" (ἀκαίρως, 606b2). To some extent, this idea corresponds to later Aristotelian statements about pity being elicited at the sight of "noble" tragic characters, who suffer undeservedly. As in the Philebus, Plato associates here tragic emotion with mourning. He goes a step further to suggest that audiences of tragedies unleash their inclination to lament, "relax", the watch over the grieving part of the soul (τοῦ θηρνόδοου, 606a7), by sympathizing with the fictional characters in misfortune. As G. Ferrari has well remarked, Plato is not unaware of the idea of aesthetic distance, but he launches an attack upon such a phenomenon. He admits that people do not realize being involved in tragic fiction and that expressing sympathy for characters could affect one's emotional state in everyday life, and, therefore, they embrace tragic pleasure. Only few ponder (λόγιζεσθαί . . . ὀλίγοις, 606b5) the danger that lurks behind the - supposed - aesthetic detachment.

In conclusion, Plato starts from general expectations about tragedy, to critique the effect of the genre on the audience. In spite of his opposition to some Sophistic ideas on

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76 Both Plato and Aristotle agree that pity, or sympathy, is the essential emotion stirred by tragedy. The disagreement between the authors concerns the consequences of pity for human behavior, as noted J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato*, 2nd edition (Cambridge, 1969), 415.

77 Plato does not say that the tragic hero is good, but that he asserts that he is so. C. Janaway 1995, 150, translates ἀκαίρως as "excessively", which I have kept in my translation, but I believe that the verb still maintains its initial meaning, "untimely", which may also suggest "undeservedly".

moral grounds, his account of the spectator's response to tragedy recognizes tragic pleasure and grievous emotions, notions already present in Gorgias' aesthetic remarks. Some discrepancies can be observed in the Platonic treatment of the emotional response to tragedy. In the Gorgias, he implies that tragedy is a popular genre, enjoyed by crowds, yet disparaged by the elite. In the Republic, nevertheless, he admits that "even the best of us", the elite, takes delight at watching tragedies. The Philebus propounds the view that spectators feel base, "mixed" pleasure, and suggests as an alternative the "pure", intellectual pleasure. By contrast, the Republic does not condemn tragic pleasure per se, but the pernicious correlation between tragic pleasure and tragic emotions. Despite the differences, many common features recur in Plato's critique of tragedy. In all examples, it is assumed that tragedians want to please their audiences and that spectators experience pleasure, when attending tragic performances. Secondly, tragic pleasure is accompanied by grievous emotions. As aesthetic pleasure resembles the inferior type of pleasures, corrupted by pain in real life (Philebus),79 likewise real life emotions are influenced by the pity, which the spectators indulge while watching tragedies (Republic). Correspondingly, there is a slippery borderline between real and aesthetic experiences, which Plato considers morally dangerous for the Athenian audience.

(b) Plato's critique of poetry as a source of instruction.

Plato's equivocal treatment of poetic inspiration has been often noted. The poet may be inspired, and yet, he himself has no knowledge and, therefore, cannot transmit any knowledge to the audience. While criticizing poetry, however, Plato does not hesitate to choose examples from tragedies to sustain his arguments and to appropriate poetic imagery.

The Phaedo as well as the end of the Republic endorses myths that are essentially tragic. Plato's model citizens in the Laws make the most astonishing announcement to the tragedians, who want ask for permission to enter the city:

"Most honored citizens, we are tragedians ourselves, and our tragedy is the finest and the best we can create. However, our whole state has been established so as to be a *mimesis* of the finest and noblest life - the very thing we maintain is the truest tragedy. Then, you are poets, we ourselves are poets too, composing in the same *genre*, and your competitors as artists and actors in the finest drama, which true law alone has natural power to produce to perfection.

The passage provides the best example of how Platonic philosophy usurps the function of poetry in Greek culture. Though relegating tragedy, Plato implicitly recognizes the merits of the genre. The Platonic philosophy itself is defined here as "imitation -*mimesis* of

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81 Cf. Ap. 22b8-c6, Lg. 719c, Ion 534b.

82 T. Gould, *The Ancient Quarrel between Poetry and Philosophy* (Princeton, 1990), 15-18, analyzes several instances of Platonic quotations of tragedy. In the Republic (9. 571 b-d), for example, Plato discusses the case of Oedipus, and, perhaps, Thryestes to show what happens if the desirous part of the soul leads us.

finest and noblest life" (μιμησίς τού καλλίστου καὶ ἄριστου βίου), a phrase that almost anticipates the Aristotelian definition of tragedy as "mimesis of a noble action" (μιμησίς πράξεως σπουδαίας, Po. 6. 1449b 22). Yet, Plato transfers his philosophical tragedy to the civic life and the pursuit of justice. By implying that philosophy becomes the only true art and the highest form of art, Plato's philosopher becomes a spectator of a superior performance, but his experience resembles that of the spectator of tragedy.85

While Plato testifies that the majority believes poetry can teach listeners, he rejects this general assumption. Some Platonic arguments are not new, they reflect a long "quarrel between poetry and philosophy." Thus, the theological objection: Homer and the tragedians portray the gods as immoral (R. 2. 383; 3. 388) was already raised by Xenophanes of Colophon (fr. 9 D.-K.). Heraclitus (fr. 42 D.-K.) brought ethical objections to the way in which poets describe the behavior of heroes, or gods, which Plato reinforces (R. 3. 386).86 On the other hand, Plato originally develops the concept of imitation, mimesis, in art, especially in the Republic.87 Both poetry and painting are third-rate copies of reality. The Forms constitute the true reality, the sensible world.

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85 Thus, the audience of Socrates often experiences "philosophic" a type of rapture that resembles the poetic one, as E. Belfiore observes 1992, 220-21, how Alcibiades in Plato's Symposium feels enchantment and his eyes are filled with tears while listening to the words of Socrates.
86 Greek philosophers were not the only ones sustaining that traditional, mythological ideas about gods are impious and mistaken. Challenges of mythological conception of deity appear in Greek tragedies as well (most prominently Euripides, HF, 1341-46). On the topic, J. Mikalson, Honor Thy Gods: Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), 225-36.
87 As G. F. Else, "Imitation in the Fifth Century BC," CP 53 (1958), 73-90, has suggested, after analyzing the use of the word mimesis in Greek literature before Plato.
represents a copy. Poetry and painting imitate things belonging to the sensible world so that they are imitation of imitation. Consequently, poets know nothing of the essence, but only of the appearance. Aristotle borrows the Platonic term, *mimesis*, in the *Poetics*, but he will give the concept of artistic imitation a favorable connotation.

4. Aristotle

   a) Definition of tragedy. To preface a study of the Aristotelian description of tragic emotions, pleasure, and learning, I will next examine several interpretations of the definition of tragedy in the *Poetics*. Aristotle reshaped traditional ideas about tragedy to assess his own opinions about the structure and effect of tragic genre. Perhaps no other subject has caused as much scholarly debate as the Aristotelian definition of tragedy, which associates pity and fear, the emotions commonly reported as audience's response to tragedy in Greek culture, with the enigmatic notion of *catharsis*:

   ἐστιν οὖν τραγῳδία μίμησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας μέγεθος ἐχούσης, ἡδυσμένῳ λόγῳ χορίς ἐκάστῳ τῶν εἰδῶν τοῖς μορίοις, δρώντων καὶ οὐ ἀπαγγέλιας, διὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου περαινοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν. (*Po.* 6. 1449b22-24).

Tragedy, then, is mimesis of an action which is elevated, complete, and of magnitude: in language embellished with distinct forms in its sections, [using] enactment and not narrative, and through pity and fear producing the catharsis of such emotions.

Controversy surrounds the significance of *catharsis* and its connection with the tragic emotions, since the term is not further elucidated in the treatise. In the literature preceding Aristotle, the word and its family cover a series of medical, religious, and
philosophic connotations. Various translations have been accordingly attempted for catharsis in the Poetics, from cleansing, to purification, to intellectual clarification.

Furthermore, although the term occurs in other Aristotelian works, and most notably in the Politics (8. 1342a4-16), which deals with cathartic music, the relationship between these texts and the Poetics is not entirely clear.

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88 A first question concerning the definition is philological in nature. Should the genitive in the phrase "of such emotions" (τοιούτων παθημάτων) be considered objective or subjective? In other words, it remains uncertain whether catharsis affects the emotions, or the emotions produce catharsis.

89 The study of L. Moulinier, Le pur et l’impur dans la pensee des Grecs (Paris, 1952), 142-76, remains valuable for showing the various lexical ramifications of the word. Generally, the term refers to "removal of damaging substance" and "restoration of balance." Another useful survey for the history of the term in Greek language is D. R. White's, A Sourcebook on the Catharsis Controversy (Ph.D. diss., Florida State Univ., 1984). To the use of the term in medicine, with the strict sense of "purification", the Pythagoreans have probably added a religious meaning, which could have been known to Aristotle. Thus, F. R. Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteles, Texte und Kommentare, Heft 2 (Basel, 1945), 84. Finally, a cognitive facet of catharsis has been noted in connection with the Epicureans. For this, see M. C. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness. Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge, 1986), 389-90. Plato combines the medical and religious sense of the term, perhaps because medicine becomes often a form of ritual for the Greek, perhaps under the influence of Pythagorean and Orphic thought. He recommends the removal of the evils of the soul through purification, catharsis, of philosophic inquiry (Sph. 227d, 228d; cf. Phd., 67c-e, 69c-d).

90 In this respect, I believe that S. Halliwell 1998, 199, has noted correctly: "Translations of katharsis bring with them various connotations that only obscure further the comprehension of this enigmatic issue. For the inescapable fact is that we don't know enough, even with the help of Politics, to find even a loose equivalent for the Greek term."

91 E. Belfiore 1992, 291-320, has looked at the use of catharsis in the sense of physiological discharge in Aristotle's works GA 578a 26-30b; Ph. 194b 36; Metaph. 1013b; HA 572b) and tried to link this usage to the more philosophical occurrences of the term in the Poetics and Politics.

92 I will subsequently discuss the use of the term in the Politics, which has sometimes been held as a model for catharsis in the Poetics. Nevertheless, Aristotle treats dissimilar subjects in the two works and it is unlikely that catharsis would describe the exact same aesthetic effect. For the subject, C. Lord, Education and Culture in the Political Thought of Aristotle (Ithaca, 1982), 119-38, especially 136-38. Distinctions between Aristotle's poetic and musical katharsis were also drawn by I. Bywater, Aristotle on the Art of
Given the lexical ambiguity, scholars have tried to infer the sense of *catharsis* by addressing broader questions about the definition of tragedy. How did Aristotle characterize the tragic emotions and the way in which they affected the audience? To what degree was he replying to Plato's critique of tragedy? What was the connection between *pathemata, mimesis*, and *hedone* in the response to tragedy? Not much scholarly agreement, however, has been reached with regard to these matters. Different answers to the same question and more emphasis on one or another issue have led to diverse interpretations of *catharsis*. The following survey of scholarship is intended to outline theoretical difficulties involved in the dispute over the *catharsis* clause and not to find a new solution for it. The lack of scholarly consensus about the meaning of the definition of tragedy reflects deeper uncertainties about interpreting the arousal of spectator's emotions in the *Poetics*. My analysis will subsequently address this latter topic from different perspective and it will show that a comparative discussion of Aristotle's *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* can provide us with a better understanding of pity and fear as audience's responses to tragedy.

Homeopathic, medical view. J. Bernays has advanced a theory,93 which construes the definition of tragedy on the basis of the following remark about *catharsis* in the *Politics*. In the passage, after discussing the education of the young in general, Aristotle evaluates the role of music:

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93 J. Bernays first published his views about *katharsis* in *Abhandlung des Aristoteles über Wirkung der Tragödie* (Breslau, 1857) and, afterwards, in a reviewed version, *Zwei Abhandlungen über die aristotelische Theorie des Drama* (Berlin, 1880).
And we say that we ought not to use music on account of only one of its benefits, but because of several (for we employ it for education and catharsis and what we mean by catharsis we state in sum now, but we will speak of it more clearly in the Poetics - and third with regard to the general activity of leisure, including both relaxation and rest from activity.

Listed among the benefits of music, catharsis will be a notion described more clearly in the treatise on poetry, we are assured. This promise has not been fulfilled in the Poetics, at least in the Poetics that has been handed down to us. Nevertheless, Bernays took the allusion as a proof that Aristotle refers to an absolutely identical phenomenon, namely emotional purgation, when using catharsis in both the Poetics and the Politics. He found further support for his hypothesis in an account of types of harmonies, which follows the quoted passage of the Politics. While some melodies should contribute to education, because of their ethical component, others arouse and inspire emotions:

"O γὰρ περὶ ἕνιας συμβαίνει πάθος ψυχῆς ἵσχυρὸς, τὸῦτο ἐν πάσαις ὑπάρχει, τῷ δὲ ἢπτον διαφέρει καὶ τῷ μᾶλλον, σίδον ἔλεος καὶ φόβος, ἐπὶ δὲ ἐνθούσιασμός· καὶ γὰρ ὑπὸ ταύτης τῆς κινήσεως κατοκόψμοι τινές εἰσιν, ἐκ τῶν δ’ ἱερῶν μελῶν ὀρώμεν τούτως, ὅταν χρῆσονται τοῖς ἐξοργίαζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθιστομένους ὡσπερ ἱατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως· τοῦτο δὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκαιὸν πᾶσχειν καὶ τούς

94 Scholars have been puzzled by Aristotle's parenthesis, asserting a fuller explanation for catharsis in the Poetics. Several solutions have been suggested. (1) Indeed, Aristotle did want to clarify the term in the second book (on comedy) of the Poetics. For this, see Rostagni, Aristotele Poetica. Introduzione, Testo e Commento (Turin, 1945), 45, but Halliwell 1998, 190, argues against this view. (2) A later part of the
For an emotion that occurs strongly in some [souls], exists in all, but it differs in being less or more [fervent], for example, pity and fear, and again enthusiasm. For some people are inclined to being possessed by such motion, but we see them when they put their soul into a state of religious frenzy, restored by sacred melodies, as if they have received medical treatment and catharsis. This same experience necessarily happens to people who are inclined to pity and fear, and to those who are in general inclined to be emotional, and to others, to the extent that a share of these things falls to each person; and all receive a certain catharsis and relief with pleasure.

The link between cathartic music and emotions, such as pity and fear in this passage of the Politics,\(^95\) is certainly reminiscent of the definition of tragedy (δι’ ἐλέους καὶ φόβου περαινοῦσα τὴν τῶν τοιούτων παθημάτων κάθαρσιν, Po. 6. 1449b24). And yet, is there more than a simple verbal correspondence between the two? Bernays concentrated on the function of cathartic music as homeopathic purgation in the Politics: melodies drive audiences to sacred enthusiasm, but, at the same time, enthusiastic melodies drive them back to a normal state, like a medical treatment and catharsis. He argued that the same process operates in the Poetics, in which catharsis means purgation of pathological emotions aroused by tragedy in the audience. Bernays' interpretation, whether accepted or rejected, has greatly influenced the scholarship on the topic.\(^96\) Flashar chiefly developed a view of catharsis as medical purgation, by maintaining that the emotions themselves alter

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\(^95\) The reference to the two emotions occurs twice in this text. First, eleos and phobos parallel mystic exuberance, enthusiasm. Secondly, catharsis and relief with pleasure sooth those disposed to feel such emotions (ἐλεήμονας, φοβητικούς). Plato correlates music with enthusiasm sometimes (R. 411 a-b; Lg. 659 d-e, 790, 840e). E. Belfiore, "Wine and Catharsis of the Emotion in Plato's Laws," CQ 36 (1984), 426-29, saw in these Platonic passages a possible source for Aristotle's description of musical catharsis.

the physical condition of human beings. Tragic pity and fear, therefore, have physiological effects which catharsis would alleviate in the spectator.\textsuperscript{97}

The model of medical catharsis proposed by Bernays and Flashar, though cogent,\textsuperscript{98} has been seriously challenged in recent years. E. Belfiore has dismissed the "homeopathic" effect of music in book eight of\textit{Politics}, and, by extension, any kind of homeopathic catharsis.\textsuperscript{99} Her argument relies on the fact that Aristotle, who was preoccupied with medical issues, always prescribed allopathic not homeopathic treatments (for instance, health means balance of opposites).\textsuperscript{100} In this respect, there is no indication in the \textit{Politics} that the same melodies incited and, then, restored the listeners to the normal state. Even if Belfiore's point is not altogether embraced, and scholars still sustain the homeopathic reading of the passage in the \textit{Politics},\textsuperscript{101} there are other

\textsuperscript{97}H. Flashar, "Die medizinischen Grundlagen der Lehre von der Wirkung der Dichtung in der griechischen Poetik,"\textit{ Hermes} 84 (1956), 12-48. Flashar concludes that catharsis in the \textit{Poetics} clearly has a practical, medical meaning at 48: "Durch die medizinische Begründung dieser Auffassung erhält nun aber auch das Wort καθάρθευσις in der aristotelischen Tragödienfassung einen tieferen und prägnanteren Sinn."


\textsuperscript{99}E. Belfiore 1992, 320-6. Homeopathic treatment means restoring health through an antidote that contains ingredients that are similar in nature to those that have caused the illness initially. Allopathic treatment consists of health restoration through medicine that contains ingredients that are opposite to those causing the illness.

\textsuperscript{100}\textit{Top.} 1392b21; Belfiore 1992, 306-14.

\textsuperscript{101}The homeopathic sense is linked to a ritual of purification: "blood to clean blood pollution" (Heraclitus., fr. 5, D). With some reserves, prestigious scholars, such as R. Janko, \textit{Aristotle. Poetics I with the Tractatus Coislinianus. A Hypothetical Construction of the Poetics II. The Fragments of On the Poets} (Indianapolis, 1987), 19, and S. Halliwell 1998, 192-93, opt for a homeopathic and religious catharsis in \textit{Politics} 8.
problems with equating *catharsis* with cure, or removal of emotional outbursts.\(^{102}\) If *catharsis* means the removal of a disturbed emotional state in the *Politics* (8. 1342a4-6) and, similarly, in the definition of tragedy, as Bernays has asserted, pity and fear would be pathological in nature. There is no allusion, however, to the abnormality of tragic emotions in the *Poetics*.\(^{103}\) Furthermore, even in the *Politics*, the primary sense of *catharsis* is not medical but religious, concerning a ritual. These are major objections against Bernays' outlet theory, which, therefore, cannot account for the *catharsis* clause in the *Poetics*. At any rate, does this mean that Bernays has been completely unreasonable to connect *catharsis* in the *Politics* with the *Poetics*? The scholarly opinion is divided. Some believe that any correspondence between the two passages should be ruled out, because *catharsis* describes different phenomena in each case.\(^{104}\) Others admit that the reference to *catharsis* in the *Politics* has importance for the *Poetics*, but the relation between the two texts is not as simple as Bernays has supposed.\(^{105}\) I incline toward the latter view, for several reasons. Book eight of the *Politics* anticipates a further explanation of *catharsis* in a poetic work, which would be pointless if the term referred to completely different notions. In addition to *catharsis*, the excursus on music in the

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\(^{102}\) For a concise, persuasive criticism of the outlet theory of *catharsis*, as formulated by Bernays and his disciples, S. Halliwell, "Appendix 5. Interpretations of *Katharsis*," 1998, 354.

\(^{103}\) If Bernays had been right, there would not have been much difference in the way in which Plato and Aristotle have understood tragic pity as harmful to the spectator. This is obviously not the case. Aristotle does never suggest that tragic emotions could be pathological, but, on the contrary, he emphasizes that good tragedies ought to arouse emotions throughout the *Poetics*.

\(^{104}\) The argument is that *catharsis* is used in the context of musical education (*Pol.*) has no relevance for *catharsis* (*Po.6*), which deals with the structure of tragedy. Thus, G. F. Else, *Aristotle's Poetics: The Argument* (Harvard, 1957), 231. For an extensive discussion see L Golden's chapter on *catharsis* in his book, *Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis* (Atlanta, 1992), 5-14.

\(^{105}\) S. Halliwell 1998, 193
Politics mentions eleos, phobos, and hedone, which are all fundamental concepts in the Poetics. The difficulty lies in the fact that neither in the Poetics nor, indeed, in the Politics does Aristotle define catharsis.106

Ethical balance. According to this interpretation, Aristotle gives a subtle answer to Plato, who rebuked tragic emotion as well as its effect on the audience. Catharsis should be understood as tempering or reducing the tragic passions of the spectator to their right measure.107 The view is much indebted to the Aristotelian ethics, which defines virtue as a mean between extremes and, in particular, to a certain observation made in the Nicomachean Ethics:

λέγω δὲ τὴν ἡθικὴν. Αὐτὴ γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεως, ἐν τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἐλλεψις καὶ μέσον. Οἶνον καὶ φοβεθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπιθυμῆσαι καὶ ὁργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεησθῇ καὶ ὀλος ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπεθῆναι ἐστὶ καὶ μάλλον καὶ ἤττον, καὶ ἀμφότερα οὕκ εὖ. Τὸ δὲ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ’ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὕς καὶ οὔ ἑνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ, μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον, ὅπερ ἐστι τῆς ὀρετῆς. (EN 2. 1106b16-23).

And I am talking about moral virtue, for this is concerned with emotions and actions, and in these there is a possibility of excess, deficiency, and mean. For instance, it is possible to be afraid, to be bold, to desire, to be angry, to pity, and, in general, to feel pleasure and pain either more or less than one should and in both cases in an improper way. But to experience those feelings at those times and occasions when they are appropriate and toward those objects and on those grounds and in such manners that are appropriate, is both what is best and represents the mean that is a sign of virtue.

House considers this passage to be the key to understanding the katharsis clause in the Poetics and writes: "A tragedy rouses the emotions from potentiality to activity by

106 In the controversial passage (Pol. 8), catharsis is not, in fact, explained. It is used once as a term of comparison (Those in mystic frenzy are soothed by melodies, as by medicine or catharsis). Secondly, it is stated that all who feel emotions (to some degree or another) experience catharsis. Thus, there is a correlation between emotions and catharsis, as in the definition of tragedy in the Poetics, but it remains unclear how the cathartic process operates.

107 Early suggestions for this theory are made by G. Finsler, Platon und die aristotelische Poetik (Leipzig, 1900), 106-23; A. Rostagni 1945, 42-43, and Scritti minori I, (Turin, 1955), 89-161.
worthy and adequate stimuli; it controls them by directing them to the right objects in the right way; and it exercises them, within the limits of the play, as the emotions of the good man would be exercised. When they subside to potentiality again after the play is over, it is a more 'trained' potentiality than before. This is what Aristotle calls κάθαρσις.\textsuperscript{108}

Similarly, R. Janko argues that catharsis ought to be taken as "balance" of emotions in the definition of tragedy and finds additional evidence in post-Aristotelian sources.\textsuperscript{109}

Proclus, for example, remarks that Plato expelled tragedy and comedy illogically from the city, since it is possible through them to satisfy emotions in due measure, and that, for this reason, Aristotle and others criticize the Platonic dialogues, while defending tragic genre.\textsuperscript{110}

The view of catharsis as emotional mean has some appealing features. It places the ambiguous definition of tragedy in the context of Aristotelian ethics. Secondly, it gives a simple answer to the tantalizing question of how Aristotle responds to Plato's critique of tragic emotions. Nevertheless, this interpretation remains highly speculative at a closer examination, since there is no explicit passage in the Poetics itself to sustain it.


\textsuperscript{109} Without absolutely discounting the possibility of a medical catharsis (Pol.8), R. Janko subsumes it to the moral mean, Aristotle on Comedy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1984), 139-42, and, more extensively, R. Janko, "From Catharsis to Aristotelian Mean," in Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty (Princeton, 1992), 341-58.

\textsuperscript{110} The exact quotation is given by R. Janko 1992, 347-49, together with a commentary and other examples. Thus, Iamblichus (On Mysteries 1. 11) states that "by observing others suffering (pathe) in both tragedy and comedy, we can check our own emotions (pathe) and make them more "moderate, and the Tractatus Coislinianus (3. 9) talks about a "balance" in both tragedy and comedy. For further evidence supporting the idea of ethical catharsis see M. L. Nardelli, "La catarsi poetica nel P. Herc. 1581," Cronache Ercolanesi 8 (1978), 96-103.
Indeed, Aristotle often states in the *Poetics* that tragedy should arouse pity and fear, but never that it should teach the audience how to moderate tragic emotions. R. Janko invokes an example (*Po. 14. 1453b36-40*) to plead the ethical reading of *catharsis*. While discussing types of plots, Aristotle notes: "The worst is for someone to be about to act knowingly, and yet not to do so: this is both repugnant (or polluted, μιαρόν) and un-tragic (οὐ τραγικόν), since it lacks suffering (ἀπαθείς)." In my opinion, however, this is not a remark directed to the audience who should not feel pity and fear in such instances, as Janko suggests. Instead, it is simply an observation that no one can feel the emotions, because plots involving such instances are not emotionally conducive. It seems interesting to me, nevertheless, that the term polluted (μιαρόν) is assimilated here to un-tragic, more specifically to "lacking emotion". By analogy, the opposite word "pure" (καθαρόν), which never occurs in the *Poetics* but may be understood as antonym of "polluted" (μιαρόν), could mean "arousing emotions."

From the point of view of Aristotelian ethics, it is true that virtue represents balance between deficiency and excess. And yet, emotion is not quite defined in the same way. As the passage appreciated by House (*EN 2. 1106*) indicates, emotions are determined by circumstances and they should be felt toward the appropriate objects, in the appropriate manner. There, however, is not a "mean" of emotion, in the sense in which virtue is balance between extremes. The passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* refers to what is normal emotional response, an issue that Book Two of the *Rhetoric* discusses

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111 For example, *Po. 6. 1449b27; 9. 1452a2-3; 13. 1452b32.*
113 "Polluted" (μιαρόν) is also described as lacking emotions, precisely the "piteous and fearful" elements in another passage of the treatise (*Po.3. 1452b35-6).*
Moreover, the *Poetics* does not seem to deal with the question of whether or when it is appropriate for the audience of tragedy to feel pity and fear. Clearly, while watching tragedies, the spectators should feel these emotions, which are appropriate in such circumstance. The question that Aristotle asks is whether certain plots can arouse emotional responses and to what extent they are able to do so.

While stressing the problems related to the ethical view, I am not denying that the *Poetics* is an answer to Plato. Nonetheless, Aristotle does not always address Platonic issues directly. Sometimes, he chooses to dismiss a Platonic point by shifting the focus of the discussion. It seems to me that this happens in the case of tragic emotions, whose positive function he restores implicitly, not explicitly. Thus, instead of directly rejecting

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114 Thus, courage as a virtue is a mean between what is too much boldness and cowardice (ἡ ἄνδρεία μεσότης ἐστὶ περὶ θαρραλέα καὶ φοβερά, *EN* 1. 1116a10-11). On the other hand, fear, for example, as an emotion is not a mean between too much and too little fear. There are, indeed, circumstances in which it is appropriate or not to feel the emotion (*Rh*. 2. 1383a), but this does not imply the same conscious effort involved in reaching virtue. Also, people feel emotions to different degrees, as shown in the discussed passage(*Pol.*), but this comes rather from natural inclination than from individual effort to reach the proper level of emotion. Reason can sometimes control the emotion of fear (*de An*. 423b27-433a1).

115 A good discussion of this is provided by R. Lear, "Katharsis," in *Essays on Aristotle's Poetics*, ed. A. O. Rorty (Princeton, 1992), 315-27; this book will be subsequently quoted as *Essays on A's Po*. At 327, Lear notes: "Tragic katharsis cannot be a process that is essentially and crucially corrective: that is it cannot be purgation, in so far as purgation is something pathological or noxious; it cannot be purification of some pollution; it cannot be education of emotions."

116 E. Belfiore 1992, 285-90, reconsiders the examples of post-Aristotelian authors, offered by Janko, and concludes that these cannot explain the meaning of the *catharsis* in the *Poetics*. These later sources simply demonstrate the fact that critics have understood Aristotelian poetic theory as a reply to Plato's condemnation of tragedy.

117 In this respect, the whole Aristotelian ethical theory is an example. Aristotle dismisses the entire Platonic approach to the matter: the quest for the "supreme good", to shift to practical happiness. The idea of "Good" is not relevant to ethics, since a transcendent good cannot be attainable (*EN* 1. 1096b-1097a). As Aristotle adds with irony, it is not easy to see how a weaver or carpenter would become better by contemplating the absolute (ιδέαν αὐτήν τεθεκάμενος, *EN* 1. 1097a11).
Plato's idea that pity would weaken the Athenian audiences, the *Poetics* simply insists on tragedies awakening pity and fear (implying that they are good for the audience). Furthermore, I am not arguing against ethical implications of the emotional arousal in the *Poetics*, but only suggesting that Aristotle prefers not to emphasize them. In the definition of tragedy, *catharsis* itself is probably a retort to Plato. And yet, the term appears to be too equivocal to be read as the core of Aristotelian argument against Plato: the spectator's moral purification through emotions.

Dramatic clarification. G. F. Else formulated a theory, according to which *catharsis* refers not to the audience's reaction, but rather to the structure of tragedy itself. Tragic characters experience pity and fear, emotions that lead to recognition and, then, "clarification", *catharsis*, of tragic action. In the definition of tragedy, the emotions do not pertain to the audience, but to the internal structure of the plays. As Else puts it, at 229: "δι' ἐλέους καὶ φόβου: the preposition can perfectly well mean 'through (a sequence of), in the course of', referring not to an emotional end-effect with which we leave the theater, but to pity and fear as they are incorporated in the structure of the play by the poet." Therefore, dramatic clarification, *catharsis*, occurs when it is inferred that the agent involved in tragic events is not "polluted" (μαρτόν), because he has acted in

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118 M. C. Nussbaum, "Tragedy and Self-Sufficiency," in *Essays on A.'s Po* (1992), 281, is probably right to say that *catharsis* in the definition of tragedy would have seemed an "oxymoron" to Plato. I cannot agree with Nussbaum, though, that this is because *catharsis* has an ethical meaning in the *Po*. Regardless of the exact meaning, Aristotle places *catharsis* in a poetic context that would have been unacceptable to Plato, who uses it for pure, philosophical knowledge.

119 More arguments against taking *catharsis* as moral mean of pity and fear are given by A. Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*," in *Essays on A's Po*. (1992), 291-314.

ignorance. If Else's argument that tragic emotions have nothing to do with the spectator is extreme, is his conviction that the emotions are embedded within the plot entirely mistaken? Aristotle explicitly says that pity and fear should be built into the tragic plot \((Po. \ 14. \ 1453b13)\). Thus, Else is right to draw attention to this peculiarity of the \textit{Poetics}, which may be essential for understanding the Aristotelian aesthetic theory. Thus, several aesthetic concepts in the \textit{Poetics} appear to concern the internal structure of tragedy itself. Others adopted Else's suggestions, with the additional observation that clarification of tragic plot must be perceived not only by characters within the play, but also by external audiences. In a recent version of this interpretation, Husain considers \textit{catharsis} to mean "achievement" or "completion" in a tragedy, which makes the sequential - causal events of the plot clear. Like Else, she returns to describing

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  \item[121] Else 1963, 433-50. The ethical nuance still exists in Else's interpretation. Else extensively investigates the concept of \textit{miasma}, pollution, and \textit{katharsis} as ritual of purification of murderous acts, by looking at Plato (\textit{Lg.} 865a- 869e, 871a-874d), and Aristotle (\textit{EE} and \textit{EN}). Yet, he concludes that the moral problems of pollution and purification do not concern the spectator but the tragic characters. So he writes at 437-38: "The spectator or reader does not perform the purification any more than the judges at Delphinion or in Plato's state did so. The purification, that is the proof of the purity of the hero's motive in performing an otherwise unclean act is presented to him and his conscience accepts and certifies it to his emotions, issues a license, so to speak, which says: You may pity this man, for he is like us, a good man rather than a bad, and he is \textit{καθαρός}, free of pollution." It is interesting to compare the difference between Else and Janko in viewing the same word, polluted.
  \item[122] I will extensively discuss this topic in the next section.
  \item[123] However, Else does not seem to notice that there may be a correspondence between emotions expressed within tragedy and arousal of emotion in the audience.
  \item[125] M. Husain, \textit{Ontology and the Art of Tragedy. An Approach to Aristotle's Poetics} (Albany, 2001), 123. Husain's book interprets tragedy in the \textit{Poetics} in terms of the Aristotelian \textit{Metaphysics}. Thus, tragedy
catharsis as intrinsically referring to the structure of tragedy and excludes external audiences.

Halliwell has summarized the objections that can be raised against this view.\textsuperscript{126} The dramatic - clarification theory ignores the Politics 8 passage and, generally, does not explain the relationship between tragic emotions and catharsis. Further criticism regards the opinion that catharsis would concern exclusively the events of the plot, not the spectators. "Clarification" of tragic action cannot be understood only within tragedy, but also should be obvious to the external audiences. Despite these errors, the dramatic interpretation has, in my opinion, some important merits. Firstly, it departs from the speculative problem of how Aristotle may have responded to Plato and turns instead to the structure of tragedy, which is, indeed, the focus of the Poetics. On the other hand, the structural analysis goes so far as proclaiming tragedy a world in itself, which is certainly an exaggeration.\textsuperscript{127} Secondly, it emphasizes that pity and fear are embodied in the structure of tragedy. This crucial element of the Poetics posits an interesting connection between the emotional response within tragic action and outside it.\textsuperscript{128} Thirdly, it does not

\textsuperscript{126} 1998, 356. Detailed objections are raised against Else's theory in particular, for being limited to complex plots and not convincing as it regards the issue of pollution, etc.
\textsuperscript{127} Thus Else thought that Aristotle only dealt with the dramatic elements of tragedy, but he discussed ethical matters in this structure, such as the "guilt" of Oedipus. M. Husain saw tragedy as similar to metaphysical substance (οὐσία), not as a relative category (πρός τι). Yet, the structure of tragedy can have meaning only in relationship with something, it seems to me, i. e. in relationship with audiences.
\textsuperscript{128} Scholars who focus on the structural elements of the Po. can exaggerate as much as scholars who ignore the those elements, to prove that Aristotle's main purpose was to educate the audiences of tragedy. Thus L. Golden and O. G. Hardison, Aristotle's Poetics. A Translation and Commentary for Students of Literature
imply any negative connotations for the tragic emotions, while the other theories do (pity and fear have to be purged in the "medical" view of catharsis or moderated in the "ethical mean" theory). And this seems to be in accordance with the text of the Poetics.

Cognitive pleasure. Scholars who support this view understand catharsis as intellectual clarification, felt by the audience when watching tragedy (as mimesis) and inferring its structural and (or) moral meaning. The interpretation is based on the following reasoning. The pleasure of tragedy comes from pity and fear, through mimesis (Po. 14. 1453b11-13). A certain pleasure, which people derive from mimesis in general, comes from learning:

(Upper Saddle, 1968), write that the Poetics "deals with tragedy not the response of the audience." It seems to me that Aristotle does not separate the two in such way.

L. Golden is certainly the most fervent proponent of this view. He has developed it in numerous articles, such as "Catharsis," TAPA 93 (1962), 51-60; "Mimesis and Katharsis," CP 64 (1969), 145-53; "Epic, Tragic and Catharsis," CP 71 (1976), 77-85; "The Clarification Theory of Catharsis," Hermes 104 (1976), 437-52; "Aristotle and the Audience for Tragedy," Mnemosyne 29 (1976), 351-59; and, more recently, in his book, Aristotle on Tragic and Comic Mimesis (Atlanta, 1992), 5-39. M. Nussbaum 1986, 390-91, suggests that notion of catharsis should combine the spectator's intellectual understanding of the tragic plot with an ethical learning from tragedy. Lear 1992, 117, also links intellectual catharsis with some moral learning. Lear, whose points rejecting the medical and ethical views of catharsis are excellent, concludes with a puzzling remark at 334-35, "The world of tragic events, must, Aristotle repeatedly insists, be rational… The events in a tragedy must be necessary or plausible, and they must occur on account of one another. In so far as we do fear that the tragic events could occur in our lives, what we fear is chaos: the breakdown of primordial bounds which links person to person. For Aristotle, a good tragedy offers us this consolation: that even if the breakdown of the primordial bonds occurs, it does not occur in a world which is in itself ultimately chaotic and meaningless." Lear's conclusion is unclear to me. Would watching an "ordered" calamity give then the spectator some kind of moral satisfaction, or the illusion of control, according to Aristotle? Finally, another interpretative model comes from connecting "intellectual clarification" with the "dramatic view" of catharsis. Thus, A. Nicev, La catharsis tragique d ’Aristote: Nouvelles Contributions (Sophia, 1982), 10-15, suggests that catharsis should describe the process by which the spectator understands the truth about the tragic agent, when the hero's hamartia becomes clear.
To te γάρ μιμείσθαι σύνφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παιδῶν ἐστί καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὅτι μιμητικότατον ἐστί καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. (Po. 4. 1448b4-8).

For it is innate in human beings, from childhood, to engage in mimesis, for in this respect, humans differ from other animals: man is the most mimetic of all, and it is through mimesis that he develops his earliest understanding, and equally natural that everyone enjoys mimetic objects.

Catharsis, therefore, must refer to the cognitive pleasure felt by the audience while understanding the tragic plot. This hypothesis can be appreciated for the way in which it connects several concepts of the Poetics, such as mimesis, hedone, and pathe, in the attempt to explain catharsis. As in the case of the dramatic interpretation, the proponents of cognitive catharsis ponder the text of the Poetics, but they do so without neglecting the relation between this and other Aristotelian works.

But numerous problems remain unsolved. It is not elucidated what role the tragic emotions play in the spectator's clarification and how exactly they relate to pleasure? At times, the evidence of Politics is ignored or rejected, although the passage does not necessarily contradict the ideas of the cognitive interpretation. As suggested, catharsis (Pol. 8. 1342a4-16) was simply compared with a medical treatment and not defined in the discussion of music. The last sentence states that everybody (emotionally involved) experiences relief and catharsis with pleasure, hedone. The association of catharsis with

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130 Sometimes, even supporters of the cognitive theory realize that they do not solve the problem of tragic emotions. P. Simpson, “Aristotle on Poetry and Imitation,” Hermes 116 (1988), 279-91, for example, tries to solve the difficulty by supplementing the "intellectual clarification" with moral purification of the emotions.

131 S. Halliwell 1998, 355, criticizes L. Golden for willingly ignoring the evidence of the Pol. 8 and thus, by extension, all the proponents of the clarification theory. It is true that Golden does not discuss (1972), or rejects (1992) the passage. Others, however, who adopt the cognitive view, do not find the Pol. 8 to be in disagreement with their ideas. So, for instance, J. Lear 1992.
pleasure, in particular, seems to be close to the correlation made by the clarification theory in the Poetics. A more serious objection to this view is that learning (literally in plural, μαθησις) derived from mimesis (Po. 4. 1448b4-8) appears to refer to only an elementary level of knowledge. Then, why would scholars identify catharsis with "intellectual" clarification? Aristotle, indeed, underscores the coherence of the plot, which is an essential point in the cognitive theory, but he also emphasizes the arousal of pity and fear in the Poetics. Again, the question of how emotions and reasoning relate remains unanswered. Thus, it seems to me, the proponents of this view well argue that the definition of tragedy should be seen only as part of an Aristotelian argument and correlated with other aesthetic concepts in the Poetics. Nevertheless, I do not believe that his view "demonstrates" the meaning of catharsis. It does not explain how the process of catharsis functions exactly, as no interpretation does either, at least not with certainty. Since Aristotle does not provide us with enough clues in this respect, any theory of katharsis relies on an argument from silence.

I have only sketched notable views about the catharsis clause in the definition of tragedy. As this survey suggests, scholars not only dispute the sense of the term (as it is often stated, the "catharsis debate"), but also several essential concepts of the Aristotelian poetic theory. To take only the example of tragic emotions, some believe that Aristotle directly responds to Plato. Plato states that tragedy invites audiences to surrender to

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132 For a historical overview of the debate over catharsis, whose origin starts in the Renaissance, P. Souville, Essai sur la Poétique d’Aristote (Paris, 1975), 78-95.

133 So, for instance, S. G. Salkever, "Tragedy and the Education of the Demos: Aristotle's Response to Plato," in Greek Tragedy and Political Theory, ed. J. P. Euben (Berkeley, 1986), 274-303, sees in the Aristotelian description of catharsis as well as in the entire poetic theory of Aristotle a response to Plato. He argues that Plato's use of the term catharsis (So.) leads us to understanding Aristotle's definition of
pity and, therefore, makes the spectators less able to control emotions in real life (R. 10. 606). Aristotle, then, would oppose Plato by saying (a) that tragedy helps audiences to discharge pity and fear (medical, or outlet theory of catharsis), or (b) that tragedy helps the audiences, by education about pity and fear, so that spectators could discipline their emotions in real life (ethical - mean theory of catharsis). It is paradoxical that the supporters of such views, who seek for a strong, anti- Platonic answer in the definition of tragedy, suppose that Aristotle's understanding of tragic emotions would be very similar to Plato's. Thus, pity and fear have to be either expelled, or moderated in the spectators. On the other hand, the dramatic view of catharsis mainly takes pity and fear as attributes of the tragic action, which does not explain how these emotions would affect the spectator. The cognitive theory is less preoccupied with the problem of emotions, which would be subordinate to intellectual clarity gained from tragedy. To a great extent, all these interpretations of catharsis raise the question of what Aristotle thinks about the effect of tragedy on the audience, sometimes without purposely trying to answer it. As the meaning of catharsis itself is unattainable, perhaps, we should turn to a more practical issue - a very Aristotelian thing to do, after all -. This will be a study of what Aristotle does say about tragic emotions, cognition, and pleasure, in connection with the audience. Through particularly examining the Poetics in connection with the Rhetoric, my analysis will focus on the Aristotelian observations about arousal of pity and fear in the audiences. It will further explore the psychological and cognitive implications of the spectator's

tragedy, in which catharsis may well signify a type of political enlightenment of the collective audience (as opposed to the philosophical clarification of the individual, suggested by Plato).

134 A question already raised in connection with catharsis by S. O. Haupt, Wirkt die Tragodie auf das Gemüt oder den Verstand oder die Moralität der Zuschauer? (Znaim, 1911).
emotional as well as the relationship between tragic emotions and aesthetic pleasure of the Stagirite
(b) Pity and fear of the audience in the *Poetics*. An impasse.

As the debate over *catharsis* shows, it is difficult to determine the way in which Aristotle
thinks that pity and fear may affect the audience in the *Poetics*. Although Aristotle repeatedly
mentions the two emotions in the treatise, he does so without specifying their ethical influence on the
spectator. This aspect of the *Poetics* continues to puzzle scholars, especially after Plato's
condemnation of tragic pity as disabling the moral strength of the audience. Furthermore, the brief
references to tragic emotions do not pertain to the audience straightforwardly. Instead, they often
emphasize the conditions under which plot and characters become conducive to fearful and pitiable
emotions. When Aristotle insists that the structural elements of a play convey *eleos* and *phobos*, he
implies that they should so do for sake of the audience. On one level, pity and fear are embedded into
the internal structure of tragedy, on another, they are felt by the spectator. And yet, this latter point is
only latent in the treatise. Aristotle offers almost no elucidation to the way in which the audience

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137 E. Belfiore 1992, 181-246; 257-78, offers the best summary of the scholarly debate over the meaning of pity and fear
in the *Poetics*, as well as an outline the Aristotelian discussion of the two emotions in other works.
138 As I have shown in the previous section, all major interpretations of *catharsis* take into consideration possible
Aristotelian answers to Plato's criticism of tragedy. No doubt, this is an important scholarly issue, and yet it does not
facilitate our understanding of tragic emotions in the *Poetics*. Ironically, scholars who suggest that Aristotle most strongly
opposes Plato (by regarding *catharsis* as medical purgation, or as tempering emotions) presuppose, in fact, that Aristotle's
assumptions about tragic emotions were very similar to Plato's. They would be harmful to the spectator, or excessive, so
that *catharsis* should "purge" or "temperate" them.
139 Besides occurring in the controversial context of the definition (*Po. 6. 1449b27*), pity and fear are attributes of the
events of the play (*Po. 9. 1452a2-3*, ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον τελείας ἐστὶ πράξεως ἢ μίμησις, ἄλλα καὶ φόβερον καὶ ἔλεεινον, "[tragedy] is not only an imitation of complete action, but also of the fearful and pitiable." Later on (*Po. 13.
1452b32, 35; 1453a1, 3-4; 14. 1453b31*), Aristotle describes what sort of characters can make the tragic action fearful and
pitiable. Playwrights ought to contrive pleasure from the two emotions: ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ἀπὸ ἐλέου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως
dεὶ ἡδονῆν παρασκευάζειν τὸν ποιητήν (*Po. 14. 1453b12-13*). And this should be built into events, which are further
discussed as the sort of things that seem "terrible and pitiable": ποία οὖν δεινὰ ἢ ποία οἰκτρὰ φαίνεται τῶν
συμπινύοντων, λάβομεν. (*Po. 14. 1453b15-16*).
would experience emotions while watching tragedies.\(^{140}\) This lack of explanation raises additional questions. Is there a direct correspondence between the emotions expressed in a play and those felt by the audience? What would be the link between the spectator's emotion as an aesthetic experience during the tragic performance and his emotions in real life? Scholars have fiercely disputed these problems. To illustrate how deeply the scholarly disagreement goes, one example may suffice here.

Two of the most prominent Aristotelian scholars of our time deliberate the meaning of pity in the *Poetics* in the following way. J. Lear, in an essay that argues for connections between Aristotle's poetic and political theory, states that pity allows the audience of tragedy to disengage from the action that takes place on the stage and, thereafter, to observe the logic behind tragic events that happen in the *polis*.\(^{141}\) S. Halliwell replies to this by saying: "I do not understand Lear's claim that pity 'guarantees our ability to pull ourselves back from involvement in tragedy'. Pity is not voluntary."\(^{142}\) In addition, he notes that tragic pity transforms the conduct of the spectator in life, because it has the "potential to contribute to the tacit redefinition of an audience's moral identity."\(^{143}\) In his turn, Lear objects to Halliwell's point once more: "Pity in Halliwell's vision is emotionally susceptible to imaginative possibilities and 'might contribute to tacit redefinition of an audience's moral identity.' My response is this: that's very nice, if true. But what if it isn't? How would we ever know, especially

\(^{140}\) Aristotle rarely discusses the implications of feeling pity and fear. When he does so, he uses very general terms, in order to distinguish between *eleos* and *phobos*, emotions appropriate for the viewer of tragedy, as opposed to other feelings. Thus, tragedy should not depict a very wicked person falling from prosperity to adversity. This may elicit a fellow-feeling, but not the appropriate tragic emotions: το μὲν γάρ φιλάνθρωπον ἐξοι ὅν ἡ ταυτή σύστασις ἄλλ' οὐτε ἔλεος οὐτε φόβον, ο μὲν γάρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἐστὶν δυστυχοῦντα, ὁ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοίον (ἔλεος μὲν περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον, φόβος δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοίον), (Po. 13. 1453a4-6). Thus, the parenthesis explains toward whom one (in the audience) feels pity and fear, but even here the tone is very impersonal: "pity is felt for the undeserving, fear for one alike."

\(^{141}\) J. Lear, "Testing the limits: the place of tragedy in Aristotle's ethics", in *Aristotle and Moral Realism*, ed. R. Heinaman (London, 1995), 61-84, for pity especially 76-80; the book will be subsequently quoted as *A. and Moral*.


\(^{143}\) 1995, 94.
if we are spending our philosophical time telling ourselves self-satisfied stories about the redemptive power of pity.”

Thus, Lear believes that *eleos* in the *Poetics* leads the spectator to indifference toward the dramatic action and toward the hardships of life in the *polis*. Halliwell holds the opposite view: the emotion compels the spectator to become ethically involved in the play and, further, in real life situations. Regardless of the difference, both opinions start from the Platonic assumption that audiences experience in the theater emotions that later transform the civic behavior in real life situations. This idea, however, does never occur in the *Poetics* explicitly. I think that Lear is right when asking: - how would we ever know? - the Aristotelian ethical and political implications of feeling pity at watching tragedies. And yet, this question applies to his own argument as well as to his opponent's. The reason for this is that the remarks about pity in the *Poetics* do not support one view or another. The succinct references simply suggest that pity should be an essential component of the plot, and, consequently, of the audience's response to tragedy, but they do not clarify the manner in which it is so. Despite this ambiguity of the *Poetics*, I will show that there is a way to understand more about Aristotle's description of pity and fear with respect to the audience.

(c) "Poetic pathe" of the audience.

My reconsideration of the Aristotelian theory of poetic pathe will start with the *Rhethoric*, which discusses emotions in connection with the listener's psychology. Then I will review the

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145 The most important effort to connect the tragic emotions in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* with the *Poetics* is: A. Nehamas, "Pity and Fear in the *Rhetoric* and the *Poetics*", in *Aristotle's Rhetoric. Philosophical essays*, eds. D. J. Furley and A. Nehamas (Princeton, 1994), 257-82. Nehamas makes several pertinent observations. He rightly notes, for instance, that emotions are often induced by reason (in both *Rh.* and *EN*), which is a subtle retort to Plato. Nehamas, however, only briefly discusses the subject of tragic emotions, and shifts his analysis to *catharsis*, at 279: "Instead of claiming that the clarification involved in Aristotle's definition of tragedy primarily concerns the emotions of pity and fear themselves, I want to suggest that it instead involves the pitiful and fearful incidents of the drama itself. I propose that we consider *katharsis* the 'resolution' or denouement of the tragic plot." It is not clear to me how Nehamas comes to this conclusion.
references to pity and fear in the *Poetics* in connection with the *Rhetoric* and in the larger context of Aristotelian works. I will argue that both imaginative involvement, seeing emotion, and detachment from contemplating human condition seem essential for the Aristotelian spectator. Further, I will examine how emotions, pleasure, and cognition may interact in the response to tragedy. Fear and pity (in particular) involve a temporal distancing that links them to aesthetic pleasure. In order to experience pity, one has to either explore his past, or anticipate future suffering. Likewise, a certain type of pleasure derives from memory, or prospective satisfaction.

The treatment of emotions in the *Rhetoric* itself raises problems. A question that dominated the scholarship of the last century was whether Aristotle presented the popular beliefs of his time or his own philosophical ideas, when characterizing different kind of *pathe*. As Fortenbaugh has convincingly shown, the analysis of emotions in the second book of the *Rhetoric* cannot be dismissed as "common opinion" but corresponds to the Stagirite's philosophical system. I agree with

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146 The argument that book two of the *Rhetoric* reflects a popular treatment of emotions and lacks philosophical exactitude has been based on certain differences in definitions between *Rhetoric* and other Aristotelian works (e.g. the definition of "pleasure", to which I will return, in *Rh.* is rejected in *Top.* and *EN*). In addition, accounts of individual emotions (*Rh.*) start with the invitation: "let such and such *pathos* be", which would be a concession to the general opinion rather than a personal conviction. Proponents of this view are, for example, C. Brandis, "Uber Aristoteles Rhetorik und die griechischen Ausleger derselben," *Philologus* 4 (1849), 27; M. Dufour, *Aristote, Rhetorique*, vol. 2 (Paris, 1932), 20-21; E. Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and Rhetoricians," in *Studies in Rhetoric and Public Speaking in honor of James Albert Winans*, ed. A. M. Drummond (New York, 1962), 57-58.

147 W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's *Rhetoric* on Emotions", in *Aristotle: The Classical Heritage of Rhetoric*, ed. K. V. Erickson (Metuchen, 1974), 205-34. Fortenbaugh well argues that differences in the definitions between Aristotle's *Rh.*, *N. E.*, and *Top.* may reflect the debates in the Academy, or different stages of Aristotelian thought. The point that definitions of emotions start with "ἐστω" indicates only a stylistic preference and not a simplistic treatment of emotions. More importantly, Fortenbaugh shows that the treatment of emotions (*Rh.*) suits very well Aristotelian philosophy. Thus, it is through logical - emotional appeal that persuasion of the hearers occurs. Typically Aristotelian is the analysis of the
Fortenbaugh's observations and conclusion that the account of emotions in the *Rhetoric* should be taken seriously. And yet the issue: Aristotle versus popular opinion seems to me somewhat artificial. We know very little about common opinion concerning emotions in the fifth and fourth-century Athens. Thus, even if Aristotle starts from certain cultural beliefs in his treatment of emotions, it would be impossible for us to detect the degree to which he does so. It is certain, nevertheless, that in his presentation Aristotle is not in opposition with some general belief. If he were, he would most likely signal his own ideas by disagreeing with the "many", as he often does in his works.

More recently, several scholars have been preoccupied with the contrast between the moral attitude expressed in the introduction of the *Rhetoric*, in book one, and the account of emotions in book two. At first Aristotle states:

οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστὴν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργῆν προάγοντας ἢ φόνον ἢ ἔλεον. (*Rh.* 1. 1354a24-25).

It is not right to twist the juryman by manipulating him into anger or envy or pity.

The second book, nevertheless, contains an account of *pathe* as means of exhortation. If persuasion ought not to depend on emotional states, why is Aristotle later recommending that orators should arouse various emotions in the audience? One answer could be that the two books were composed at different times and, consequently, they mirrored different stages in the Aristotelian thought. Plato's criticism of rhetorical practices would have first influenced Aristotle, but afterwards such influence

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conditions arousing emotion, categories of people prone to certain emotions, grounds for feeling emotion, etc. As Fortenbaugh, *Aristotle on Emotion: A contribution to Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics* (New York, 1975), 9-18, notes this classification is reminiscent of the Aristotelian four causes (*Ph*).

has been gradually removed. Another explanation may be that Aristotelian psychology connects pathos with rationality and considers it as part of the logical proof (ἐνθύμημα), which makes emotion acceptable in the orator's argumentation. J. Walker, who regards the second book of the Rhetoric as very innovative, almost "neo - Aristotelian", has made an interesting suggestion. The attitude toward pathe is conflicted in the treatise. The rhetor must include emotions in his style and delivery, but Aristotle seems to wish it were not so. He appears to recognize the importance of emotions only reluctantly. Thus, according to Walker, Aristotle would anticipate, rather unwillingly, later developments of Peripatetic rhetoric that focussed primarily on style and delivery and thus fully accepted the role of emotions. Another scholarly trend, toward which I incline, is to integrate the Rhetoric, with its contradictions, into a larger, comprehensive picture of the Aristotelian theory of emotions. Even if emotions are not entirely rational, they often arise through a process of


150 T. Conley, "Path and Pisteis: Aristotle, Rhet. II 2-11," Hermes 110 (1982), 300-15. Objections to this view have been raised by J. Wisse, Ethos and Pathos from Aristotle to Cicero (Amsterdam, 1989), 20-29, and Kennedy, 1991, 123. Both scholars note that enthymeme and emotion are not necessarily connected. In fact, they are sometimes even dissociated (i.e. Rh. 3. 1418a).


152 J. Walker, 2000, 81, suggests that Aristotle feels so hesitant because he returns to the Greek sophistic tradition by recognizing the emotional power of the speech, as Gorgias does in the Helen. Thus, he departs from the Platonic critique of rhetorical practice. A possible reply to this view is that the contradiction between emotional and logical persuasion may have preceded, as a matter of fact, Plato. In Gorgias' Palamedes 33, for example, we can already see the distinction. The hero wants here to convince the jury through reason, not through emotion: παρὰ δ’ ὑμῖν τοὺς πρῶτος οὐδὲ τῶν ἐλλήνων καὶ δοκοῦσιν, οὐ φίλων βοηθείας, οὐδὲ λίτας οὐδὲ οἰκτοῖς δεῖ πείθειν ὰμας, ἀλλὰ τῷ σαφεστάτῳ δικαίῳ, διδάξαντα τάλαθες οὐκ ἀπαντήσαντα με δεὶ διαφευγεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν ταύτην.

reasoning. Thus the arousal of pathe does not contradict logical demonstration but complements it. Moreover, Aristotle may oppose the unreasonable use of emotion to influence the jury at the beginning of Book One, whereas he encourages the justified appeal to the listener's emotion in Book Two. Regardless of the interpretation we adopt in this matter, the second book of the Rhetoric carefully discusses individual pathe. The analysis includes the cause for the emotion, the category of persons toward which it is directed, and the state of mind of the individual who experiences it. This type of information that evaluates the pathos of the listener is lacking in the Poetics and could provide us with a better understanding of the nature of pity and fear, as experienced by the audience.

(c) Paradoxical nature of pity.

In the Rhetoric, pity is defined as a certain pain (λύπη τις) at an apparently destructive or painful (λυπηρό) evil\(^{154}\) happening to one who does not deserve it and which a person might expect (προσδοκήσειν) himself or one of his own to suffer and which seems close at hand:

`Εστι δὴ ἡ ἔλεος λύπη τις ἐπὶ φαινομένῳ κακῷ φθαρτικῷ ἡ λυπηρῷ τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν, ὁ κἂν αὐτὸς προσδοκήσειν ἃν παθεῖν ἢ τὸν αὐτοῦ τινα, καὶ τὸῦτο ὅταν πλεσίον φαίνηται. (Rh. 2. 1385b13-16).

A further remark explains more precisely the conditions under which someone feels pity:

καὶ ὀλως δὴ ὅταν ἐχὴ σύντος ὡστὶ ἀναγνωσθῇ τοιαῦτα συμβεβηκότα ἡ αὐτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἡ ἐλπὶς γενέσθαι ἡ ἐαυτῷ ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ. (Rh. 2. 1386a1-3).

And, in general, [someone feels pity] when his state of mind is such that he remembers such things having happened to himself or his own or expects them to happen to himself or his own.

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and further, emotional phantasia resembles opinion, doxa, which proves compatibility between emotion and logical thought. The connection between emotion and reason is not easy to establish, even in modern psychology and philosophy, as demonstrated by C. Calhoun, "Cognitive Emotions?," in What is an Emotion? Classical Readings in Philosophical Psychology (New York, 1984), 327-42.

Thus, the emotion presupposes either anticipation or recognition in the past\textsuperscript{155} of some misfortune.

Pity occupies a unique position in Aristotle's theory for two reasons. Firstly, it is a \textit{pathos} caused by the sufferings of others. Secondly, it can be reached only by contemplating the future or the past.

Different kinds of emotions can be provoked by what other people experience, such as indignation (\textit{νέμεσις}) and envy (\textit{φθόνος}), which are the opposites of pity. Although they resemble pity in this respect, neither requires, however, the temporal detachment. Being pained at undeserved good fortune, indignation and envy concern the present, not the future or past:

tò δὲ \( \nu \) ὅτι αὐτῷ τι \( \sigma\muμ\hbox{βήρεται} \) \( \dot{\epsilon} \)τερον, ἀλλὰ δὲ αὐτὸν τὸν πλησίον, ἄπασιν ὁμοίως δεῖ ὑπάρχειν. οὐ γὰρ \( \dot{\epsilon} \)τι \( \dot{\epsilon} \)σται τὸ μὲν \( \phi\hbox{θόνος} \) τὸ δὲ \( \nuμ\hbox{μεσις}, \) ἀλλὰ \( \phiβος, \) ἐάν διὰ τοῦτο ἡ \( \lambda\upsilon\hbox{τη} \) ὑπάρχη καὶ ἡ \( \tauαραχή, \) ὅτι αὐτῷ τι \( \dot{\epsilon} \)σται \( \phiα\hbox{υλον} \) ἀπὸ τῆς \( \dot{\epsilon}κείνου \) \( \epsilon\upsylh\hbox{ραξίας}. \) (Rh. 2. 1386b20-25).

Being indignant or envious is not the feeling that some unpleasant change will befall a person himself, but a [feeling of pain] because of [what good] befalls his neighbor; for it will neither be envy nor indignation, but fear if the pain and disturbance are present because something bad will come to him as a result of other person's success.

On the other hand, anger, (\textit{ὀργή}), for example, comes from a past outrage and anticipates the pleasure of retaliation\textsuperscript{156}. It regards, nevertheless, self-suffering/desire, not the \textit{pathos} of another. Thus, \textit{eleos}

\textsuperscript{155} Recollection (\textit{ἀναμνήσις}) is defined as a superior form of remembrance in \textit{De Memoria} (449b1-6): Περὶ δὲ μνήμης καὶ τῶν μνημονευέντων λεκτέων τι \( \dot{\epsilon} \)στι καὶ διὰ τὴν αίτιαν γίγνεται καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συμβαίνει τούτο τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ \( \\alpha\sigma\nu\mu\mbox{μήσ\hbox{κ\hbox{ε\hbox{σ\hbox{θ}}}}} \) \( \dot{\epsilon} \)σται: οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοὶ εἰσὶ μνημονεῖοι καὶ ἀμνηστικοί, ἀλλὰ \( \dot{\epsilon} \)πί τὸ πολὺ μνημονεῖοι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀμνηστικότεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.

A useful introduction to the Aristotelian psychology of recollection is Ch. Kahn, "Sensation and Consciousness in Aristotle Psychology," \textit{Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie} 48 (1966), 43-81, emphasizing correspondences between the account of sense - perception in Aristotelian works, such as \textit{De Anima} and \textit{De Sensu}, \textit{De Memoria} and \textit{De Insomniis}. The superiority of recollecting (\textit{ἀναμνήσ\hbox{κ\hbox{ε\hbox{σ}}\hbox{θ}}}) over remembering (\textit{μνημονευέν}) in the passage that I have quoted \textit{(Mem.)}, as well as possible connections with the Platonic doctrine of recollection are discussed by R. Sorabji, \textit{Aristotle on Memory} (Providence, 1972), 35-46 and 64-65.

\textsuperscript{156} Ἐστω δὴ \( \omega\hbox{ργή} \) \( \dot{\epsilon} \)ρεξίας μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινομένην ὀλιγορίαν τῶν εἰς αὐτοὺς ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ, τοῦ ὀλιγορεῖν μὴ προσήκοντος (Rh. 2. 1378a22-4). D. Frede, "Mixed Feelings in Aristotle's Rhetoric," in \textit{Essays on Aristotle's Rh.} (2000), 258-85, examines anger as one of the best examples of mixed emotion. Anger consists of painful desire to remedy an injury or disturbance combined with the pleasant expectation of mixed emotion. Thus, anger is a sort of pain, felt when someone is wronged, but it includes the anticipated pleasure of revenge.
stands out as the most remote, or least personal emotion in the *Rhetoric*. It is felt at the suffering of another and only if we construct a temporal perspective (we ourselves or ours may experience may have experienced something similar).\(^{157}\)

Another feature that distinguishes pity from all the other emotions consists of a very specific visual component. There is a certain tension between temporal aloofness and the necessity that pitiable events should appear near at hand:

> ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐγγὺς φαινόμενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινὰ ἐστὶ, τὰ δὲ μυριοστὸν ἔτος γενόμενα ἡ ἐσόμενα οὔτε ἐλπίζοντες οὔτε μεμνημένοι ἡ ὅλως οὐκ ἐλεοῦσιν ἡ οὐχ ὑμιῶς, ἀνάγκη τούς συναπεργαζομένους σχῆματι καὶ φωναῖς καὶ αἰσθήσει καὶ ὁλῶς ἐν ὑποκρίσει ἐλεεινοτέρους εἶναι (ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἡ ὃς μέλλον ἡ ὃς γεγονός), καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ᾧτὶ ἡ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἐλεεινότερα. (*Rh.* 2. 1386a28-1386b1).

And since sufferings are pitiable when they appear near at hand and since people do not feel pity at all, or not in the same way about things that happened or will happen ten thousand years in the past or future, neither anticipating nor remembering them, it is necessary that those producing the effect by gesture, words and display of feelings and generally in their acting should become more pitiable, for they make the misfortune seem near by making it appear before the eyes either as something about to happen or as something that has happened.

This passage, though baffling in some respects, offers fascinating insights into the Aristotelian view of pity. Clearly Aristotle refers here to the skills through which an orator should create the representation of the pitiable in the mind of the audience, through gestures, voice, his own display of feeling, in one word through "acting" (ὑποκρίσει). An interesting observation is that things happening thousands of years ago/ or in the future could not stir *eleos* (or not with the same intensity). Drama rather than rhetoric deals with events that have taken place "once upon the time, in

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\(^{157}\) The example of Amasis, which Aristotle offers (*Rh.* 2. 1386a19-21), is relevant in this sense. Amasis did not weep and feel pity when his son was led to death. The event was too personal and concerned one of his own directly. On the other hand, he wept when he saw his friend begging. Thus, he felt pity for another, by comparing the other's misfortune with his own.
the myth, so that the recommendation to present events close at hand\textsuperscript{158} may better apply to a tragedian rather than to a rhetor. Strangely, in this section of the \textit{Rhetoric} acting (\textit{ιπόθεσις}) is regarded as able to increase the effects of pity, while elsewhere in the treatise Aristotle seems to be rather annoyed by the importance that both orators and audiences grant to the art of delivery. He asserts, for instance, that delivery (\textit{ιπόθεσις}) ought to be considered only after proofs (\textit{πίστεις}) and speech composition (\textit{λέξεις}).\textsuperscript{159} Even in tragedy, he adds, acting was a late element, since, at first, the poets themselves used to present their creations to the public. Nowadays, however, Aristotle observes with regret, it is unfortunate that those who pay attention to the actor gain popularity:

\begin{quote}
tά μὲν οὖν ἄθλα σχεδόν ἕκ τῶν ἁγώνων οὕτως λαμβάνουσιν, καὶ καθάπερ ἐκεῖ μείζον δύνανται νόν τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ὕποκριταί, καὶ κατὰ τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ὁγόνας διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν. (Rh. 3. 1403b32-35).\textsuperscript{160}
\end{quote}

Those performers [who give attention to the delivery elements] are usually the ones who win poetic contests, and as actors are now more important than poets, so it is in political contests because of the corruption of the governments.\textsuperscript{161}

Why does he concede to the actor's art in the \textit{Rhetoric}, Book Two? Indeed, he not only concedes, but also argues that such an art becomes essential, particularly when one has to express pity. Perhaps this

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{158} E. Belfiore, 1992, 136, only briefly comments: "Several passages in the \textit{Rhetoric} and the \textit{Poetics} support the view that 'in the open' means 'before the eyes', 'vivid', in a primarily rhetorical rather than literal, sense." and connects this passage (\textit{Rh} 2. 1386a28ff) with another one, dealing with metaphors (\textit{Rh}. 3. 1411a22-26). I believe that the expression "bringing before the eyes" (πρὸ ὀμμάτων) deserves more scholarly attention, as it is the conceptual bridge through which Aristotle connects the emotion of the listener with that expressed by the actor/orator, who translates the \textit{pathos} of the speech.

\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Rh}. 3. 1403b20ff.

\textsuperscript{160} Cf. \textit{Rh}. 3. 1404a 7-8, in which delivery is said to be powerful because of the corruption of the audience: ἀλλ᾽ ὀμος μέγα δύναται, καθάπερ ἐξηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἁκροατοῦ μοχθηρίαν.

\textsuperscript{161} For a discussion of audience manipulation through oratorical devices, S. Goldhill, "Placing Theatre in the History of Vision," in \textit{Word and Image in Ancient Greece}, eds. N. K. Rutter and B. A. Sparkes (Edinburgh, 2000), 161-79. Goldhill defines the Athenian citizen as a democratic subject to viewing performances of oratory and drama. He draws attention to both positive and negative aspects of this characteristic of the Greek culture. As an example of a passive, unengaged audience, he cites the listeners in the speech of Cleon (Thucydides, 3. 38) – who become "spectators of speeches," no longer relying on their own judgment, but carried away by rhetorical display.
\end{footnotesize}
is so because *eleos* relates 'by nature' to a dramatic disposition. The speakers (actors) become "more pitiable", (ἐλεεινότεροι), themselves, through their acting! A similar phrasing occurs in the *Poetics*.

After describing how a play of Cracinus was rejected by the spectators, because of a blunder in visualizing a scene, Aristotle prescribes the following:

οὐσὰ δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ ἐν τοῖς σχήμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον πιθανότατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσίν, καὶ χειμαίνει ὁ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὀργιζόμενος ἀληθινότατα. (Po. 17. 1455a29-32).

One should, as much as possible, also work out the plot in gestures, since, by nature, those in the grip of emotions are the most convincing, and the one who is afflicted by misfortune [lit. "stormed"] makes others feel his affliction, and the one enraged makes others feel his anger.

Good poets, therefore, ought to think about acting, which seems to mean in this case partaking in emotion. It is noteworthy that "the ones in the grip of emotions" (οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν) could refer to the tragic poets themselves, who think of how their play should be acted, as well as to the actors, who give expression to the *pathos* through their gestures. By all means, the passage suggests unity between the way in which a tragedian envisions emotion for his plot and that expressed through acting, so that the emotional state may be transmitted to the spectators. A constant feature of the

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162 Probably a fourth century tragedian (OCD s. v. 2). The name seems to have been ascribed to both an author of comedy and tragedy by Greek literary and epigraphic evidence, as shown most recently by S. Douglas, "We Didn't Know Whether to Laugh or Cry: The Case of Karkinos," in *The Rivals of Aristophanes. Studies in Athenian Old Comedy*, eds. D. Harvey and J. Wilkins (London, 2000), 65-75.

163 The Greek reads: σημείων δὲ τούτου ὁ ἐπετημάτῳ Καρκίνω. ὁ γὰρ Ἀμφιάραος ἐξ ἵππον ἀνήκει, ὁ μὴ ὀρθῶς ἐλαίθησεν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὴς σκηνῆς ἐξέπεσεν ὄσοι περιέρροντον τὸν τοῦ τῶν θεατῶν. (Po. 17. 1455a25-8). This passage has been notoriously hard to interpret, since both the play and the dramatic incident to which it refers are unknown. J. R. Green, "Carcinus at the Temple: A Lesson in the Staging of Greek tragedy," *GRBS* 3 (1990), 281-285, offers a summary of scholarship on the reference to Carcinus’ failure in the *Poetics*. Green argues that the poet has made a mistake in staging the play. For further suggestions, L. Edmunds, "The Blame of Karkinos: Theorizing Theatrical Space," *Drama* 1 (1992), 222-25.

164 Note the emphasis on gestures (σχήμασιν) in this passage (Po. 17. 1455a29), which recalls the passage on pity (Rh. 2 1386a30): speakers should express emotions through gesture (σχήματι).
Aristotelian thought emerges here. Acting is despised when divorced from the content of both oratorical speech and tragic discourse, but considered important when it truly conveys pathos to the audience.

(d) Seeing emotion. Visual vs. Vision.

The similarities between Rhetoric and Poetics can be further explored. In both works Aristotle insists that the actors and orators should convey emotions by being emotionally involved themselves. On the other hand, he despises gratuitous performance and concrete visual effects, opsis. In the Poetics, for example, Aristotle relegates the "spectacle" to the fifth element, after plot, character, diction and thought, while listing the components of tragedy in order of their importance. Later, opsis is characterized in the following terms:

While spectacle can carry away the soul [psychagogikos], it is the least artistic element and it is least integral to poetry. The power of tragedy is quite independent of the performance of the actors, and, in addition, the costumier's art has more scope than the poet's for conveying effects of spectacle.

Many scholars have remarked with indignation that Aristotle disparages here tragic performances. J. M. Walton, for example, has maintained that staging practice and performance of actors were essential for the ancient theater, but not recognized as such in the Aristotelian theory.

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165 As I have mentioned, hypocrisis, if it is acting just for the sake of acting is criticized (Rh. 3), but praised if it is a tool for expressing emotion (Rh. 2) Likewise, in the Poetics tragedy is quite independent from the performance of the actors (Po. 6. 1450b17-20), but acting becomes essential when conveying pathos (Po. 7. 1450b15-20).

166 On the difficulty of translating opsis, Halliwell's discussion, 1998, 337, is very handy. The term, conventionally translated with "spectacle", has been understood to mean the apparatus of a play, or, more extensively, the masks, costumes and even the performance of actors and chorus on the stage. I take the extensive meaning as probable, since Poetics (6. 1450b) seems to explain opsis by alluding to both "costumier's art" and actors' appearance on the stage.

167 Po. 6. 1450a8-9.

168 J. M. Walton, The Greek Sense of Theatre. Tragedy Reviewed (Amsterdam, 1996), 17, "Aristotle notably fails here to make necessary distinction between production externals and the manner in which a playwright employs them. For all
Similarly, O. Taplin and D. Seale think that Aristotle fails to understand the importance of scenography in Greek drama.\textsuperscript{169} Others have well noted that Aristotle did not completely deny the role of the spectacle in dramatic performances, but subordinated it to the poetic art.\textsuperscript{170} A subsequent passage in the \textit{Poetics} appears to sustain this view:

\begin{quote}
"Εστιν μὲν οὖν τὸ φοβερὸν καὶ ἐλεεινὸν ἐκ τῆς ὁψεως γίγνεσθαι, ἔστιν δὲ καὶ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, ὅπερ ἐστὶ πρότερον καὶ ποιητοῦ ὁμείνονος. Δεῖ γὰρ καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὀράν οὖτω συνεστάναι τὸν μύθον ὡς τὸν ἀκούοντα τὰ πράγματα γινόμενα καὶ φρίττειν καὶ ἐλεεῖν . . . τὸ δὲ διὰ τῆς ὁψεως τούτῳ παρασκευάζειν ἀπεχνότερον καὶ χορεγίας δεόμενόν ἔστιν. Οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν δὲ τῆς ὁψεως, ἀλλὰ τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδίᾳ κοινωνοῦσιν. (Po. 14. 1453b1-5, 7-10).\end{quote}

There is something fearful and pitiable that can result from spectacle, but also from the actual structure of events, which is of higher importance and proper to a superior poet. For the plot should be so structured that, even without seeing it performed, the person who hears the events that occur should experience shudder with fear and pity . . . To create this effect through spectacle has little to do with the poet's art, and requires choregy. Those who use spectacle to create an effect not of the fearful but only of the sensational have nothing at all in common with tragedy.

Aristotle does not say that tragic performances are worthless. He simply expresses his preference for the literary text, which should arouse pity and fear in the listener even without being directly seen (καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ὀράν) but only imagined. In both cases, the external visual component of tragedy receives some credit, by being called soul - enchanting (ψυχαγωγικόν, Po. 6. 1450b15), and

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\textsuperscript{169} O. Taplin, \textit{The Stagecraft of Aeschylus} (Oxford, 1977), 477-79; D. Seale, \textit{Vision and Stagecraft in Sophocles} (Chicago, 1982), 13, notes: "There is, then, an unmistakable impression in Aristotle's \textit{Poetics} that spectacle is insignificant and liable to vulgar exploitation. The consequent interpretation of Aristotle has accepted this austerity."

\textsuperscript{170} R. Janko 1984, 229; S. Halliwell 1998, 337-43. M. G. Bonanno, "All the (Greek) World's a Stage," in \textit{Poet, Public, and Performance in Ancient Greece}, eds. L. Edmunds & R. W. Wallace (Baltimore and London, 1997), 123, makes an interesting suggestion: \textit{opsis} is the most ephemeral element of tragedy, since it is limited in time and space, and created for the occasion. Thus, \textit{opsis} pertains to the "particular" (κοθ' ἔκαστον) and becomes inferior to poetic composition, which should deal with the universal (κοθόλου).
conducive to emotions (φόβερόν, ἐλεεινόν, Po. 14. 1453b1). And yet, in both, this emotional power of the *opsis* is contrasted with the internal composition of tragedy, and regarded as inferior to it.\(^{171}\)

It is, perhaps, legitimate to wonder why Aristotle separates *opsis* so sharply from the content of tragedy. I believe that this is more than a personal predilection to some extent and it may reflect a response to a cultural phenomenon. In the *Poetics*, through the repeated statement that the poetic composition should prevail over visual apparatus and actors' show, Aristotle likely presents a point of view that may not have been universally accepted. Moreover, as stated in the *Rhetoric*, delivery occupies a marginal place in oratory. It was late in coming to be considered also in rhapsody and tragedy, since originally poets themselves acted.\(^{172}\) Because of the "corruption of the audience," however, delivery has gained tremendous power: ἄλλ' ὁμος μέγα δύναται, καθαπερ εἰρηται, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἄκροστοῦ μοχθηρίαν (Rh. 3. 1404a7-8). These comments, the content of which is reminiscent of the power of tragedy not being dependant on stage apparatus and actors (Po. 6. 1450b15), clearly mark the Aristotle's position as different from popular choice. Therefore, a first explanation for Aristotle's favoring 'plots' over 'props' could be that he has here an elitist point of view.\(^{173}\) Further, as tragedy was an increasingly popular genre in the fourth century, the play productions were most likely becoming more extravagant. When the *choregoi* thus dedicated more

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\(^{171}\) It is hard to see why this Aristotelian idea seems so outrageous to modern scholarship. D. Seale 1982, emphasizes stagecraft as essential for Greek tragedy and argues that Sophocles, whose plays were models of Aristotelian construction, made use of spectacular devices that Aristotle fails to appreciate. Seale cites several Sophoclean passages to prove his point. Among those, there is Orestes' first address in the *Electra* (lines 23-24): 'How clear to me Electra are these tokens which you make manifest', on which Seale comments, at 56: "The entry is not just an artifice to start proceedings, it embodies a vision, the return of the avenging son." I believe that Seale agrees here with Aristotle, though without realizing it, since he has a "vision" while reading the text of Sophocles, and, therefore, can imagine the stagecraft even without seeing it.

\(^{172}\) Rh. 3.1403b23-24: Καὶ γὰρ εἰς τὴν τραγικὴν καὶ ῥαψῳδιαν ὁπέ παρῆλθεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκρίνοντο γὰρ αὐτοὶ τὰς τραγῳδίας οἱ ποιηταὶ τὸ πρώτον.
attention to actors and staging details, the audiences and judges may have liked high-budget plays, sometimes to the detriment of good poetic content.\textsuperscript{174} There is, I suspect, an additional, deeper cause for the Aristotelian reaction against \textit{opsis}, which can be inferred from a passage dealing with a comparison between epic and tragedy in the \textit{Poetics}:

\begin{quote}
Τὴν μὲν οὖν πρὸς θεατὰς ἐπιεικεῖς φασίν εἶναι <οἶ> οὐδὲν δέονται τῶν σχημάτων, τὴν τραγικὴν πρὸς φαύλους· εἰ οὖν φορτική, χείρων δὴλον ὅτι ἀν εἴη, πρώτον μὲν οὐ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἢ κατηγορία ἀλλὰ τῆς ὑποκριτικῆς, ἐπεὶ ἐστὶ περιεργαζόμενοι τοῖς σημείοις καὶ ῥαψῳδοῦντα. (Po. 26. 1462a1-6).
\end{quote}

Some say that (epic genre) is directed toward decent spectators, who do not need gestures, whereas the tragic genre is directed toward the vulgar ones. If then it (tragedy) were crude, it is obvious that it would be inferior (to epic). First of all the accusation does not pertain to the poetic art, but to acting, since one can overdo visual signals\textsuperscript{175} even in recitation of epic.

Before tragedy, a relatively new genre, Greek audiences were accustomed to epic recitations.

Rhapsodic performances were certainly less elaborate than the later, tragic productions. Based on this difference, some (whether Aristotle's precursors or contemporaries remains unspecified in the \textit{Poetics}) seem to have argued that the epic genre was superior to the tragic, because the former did not need apparatus and actors to enhance the power of poetry. These unnamed critics call the spectators of tragedy "vulgar" (φαύλοι) perhaps meaning here base, uneducated, by contrast with those of epic, who would be noble (ἐπιεικεῖς).\textsuperscript{176} Aristotle rejects the accusation by saying that the power of

\textsuperscript{173} This is probably part of the truth. A modern comparison may be useful here. Large audiences nowadays like action movies with extraordinary visual effects, with or without coherent plot. It is unlikely, nevertheless, that movie critics would prefer movies with amazing "opsis", but no defined characters or plot, to those with a well-written scenario.

\textsuperscript{174} Aristotle complained that actors were more important than poets (Rh. 3. 1403b33), cf. his critique of the choregoi conveying the "sensational" through \textit{opsis} (Po. 14. 1453b10). B. Marzullo, "Die visuelle Dimension des Theaters bei Aristoteles," \textit{Philologus} 124 (1980), 189-200, thinks that Aristotle's attitude toward \textit{opsis} reflects his reaction against contemporary theatre production, as well as his admiration for the theatre production before his time, which was less sophisticated.

\textsuperscript{175} R. Dupont - Roc and J. Lallot, 1980, 407, appropriately render semeion in this passage by visible sign, gesture, in contrast with the oral expression, proper to the rhapsode.

\textsuperscript{176} This is remarkably the Aristotelian terminology for comic and, respectively tragic characters.
tragedy also lies in poetic content. Tragic poetry can be as independent from performance as the epic is, an observation which also occurs constantly in the Aristotelian critique of *opsis*:

"Ετί ἡ τραγῳδία καὶ ἂνευ κινήσεως ποιεῖ τὸ αὐτής, ὡσπερ ἡ ἐποποίια: Διὰ γὰρ ἀναγινώσκειν φανέρα ὅποια τίς ἐστιν (Po. 26. 1462a10-11).

Tragedy also achieves its effect even without actors' movement, as epic does. Its quality is clear even through reading.

We can only glimpse literary debates of fourth-century Athens and barely conceive a time when tragedy was regarded as avant-garde genre. And yet, a need to disprove the supremacy of the traditional epic over the tragic seems to have been yet another reason that *opsis* is auxiliary to the essence of tragedy in Aristotle's *Poetics*.

Some scholars maintain that Aristotle's references to *opsis* are ambiguous. They have seen contradictions between the remark that *opsis* is ancillary to tragedy (which can be appreciated even without seeing, καὶ ἂνευ τοῦ ὀράν, *Po. 14. 1453b3*), and a subsequent recommendation of the *Poetics*: Δεῖ δὲ τοὺς μύθους συνιστάναι καὶ τῇ λέξει συναπεργάζεσθαι ὅτι μᾶλλον πρὸ ὀμμάτων τιθέμενον. Οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐναργέστατα ὄραν ὡσπερ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις εὐρίσκοι τὸ πρέπον καὶ ἥκιστα λανθάνοι τὰ ὑπεναντία. (Po. 17. 1455a21-24).

One should construct plots and work them out in diction so as to place them before [the mind's] eyes as much as possible. For, thus, by seeing things most vividly, as if present at the actual events, one will discover what is appropriate, and not miss discrepancies.

The text continues with the episode relating the failure of Carcinus and the observation those in grip of emotions best convey emotions, which I have already discussed. This point that a poet should create an internal vision (*Po. 17. 1455a21-24*) does not disagree with the one in which Aristotle

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177 Thus, *opsis* was first called the "least appropriate" element of tragedy, because the power of tragedy can do even without performance and actors, καὶ ἂνευ ἁγόνως καὶ ὑποκριτῶν (*Po. 6. 1450b15*). After the second description of *opsis*, Aristotle specifies that the plot of tragedy should move the listener even if not seen, καὶ ἂνευ τοῦ ὀράν. (*Po. 14. 1453b3*).

characterizes visual effects, *opsis*, as inferior to tragic poetry (*Po.* 14. 1453b1-5, 7-10). In fact, one idea complements the other. There was a way to elicit emotion through external visual artifice (*opsis*), but also through the internal structure of tragedy, (ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς συστάσεως τῶν πραγμάτων, *Po.* 14. 1453b3). Such a device was better, since it belonged to the poet, and made conveying *pathē* possible even without directly seeing the play (*Po.* 14. 1453b3-10). As indicated in the *Poetics* (17. 1455a21-24), a poet should work out the plots and lexis to such an extent that he could "see" his creation, almost as if performed. Therefore, both passages indicate that the structure of tragedy ought to be so well composed that it can move even without actually being watched (*Po.* 14. 1453b), or it can be imagined as if watched, because the poet has made a vision out of it (*Po.* 17. 1455a21-24). The only ambivalence, if any here, may be lexical. Aristotle uses the term *opsis* as a technical term, regarding extraneous visual effects of tragedy, and then, he employs cognate words (ὁμμάτα, ὀρῶν) to refer to a different optic aspect: tragic vision of the mind's eye.

Furthermore, the parallelism between the passages discussing arousal of internal vision in both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* is striking, with respect to language as well as content. Aristotle urges rhetors to convey pity to the audience, by bringing the misfortune, to which they refer in their speech, before the eyes (ἐγγὺς γὰρ φαίνεσθαι τὸ κακὸν πρὸ ὁμμάτων ποιοῦντες, ἢ ὃς μέλλει ἢ ὃς γεγονός, *Rh.* 2. 1386a32). Likewise, he advises poets to place tragic action before the eyes (πρὸ ὁμμάτων τιθέμενον, *Po.* 17. 1455a21). As a result, the poet himself*180* may feel in the middle of the

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179 J. Vahlen, *Beiträge zu Aristoteles Poetik* (Leipzig, 1914), 142 makes pertinent observations on the visual/vision in the *Poetics*. He concludes that Aristotle pleads for compatibility between text and stage production, emphasizing the capacity of poetry to evoke *pathē* and represent *ethe* by itself. M. di Marco, "ΟΨΙΣ νella Poetica di Aristotele e nel *Tractatus Coisilianus*", in Scena e Spettacolo nell' Antichità, ed. L. S. Olschki (Trento, 1988), 121-48, well notices that Aristotle does not want to break the link between stage and play but insists on the intrinsic value of the text. Nevertheless, at 141, Di Marco still considers the treatment of *opsis* in the *Poetics* to be equivocal.

180 The "one" who sees most clearly (ὁρῶν) clearly refers to the poet here, but it may also refer to the spectator; as in the *Rhetoric*. "Bringing before the eyes" seems to concern both the orator himself and the listener. As Aristotle states a little
events, through seeing things most vividly: ὧν γὰρ ἐν ἐναργέστατα ὃρῶν, ἀσπερ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις. (Po. 17. 1455a22-24). Then, if poets succeed in envisioning their creation, they will be most convincing (to the audience), as feeling themselves the emotions (ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν, Po. 17. 1455b31). In both instances, the imaginative sight seems to cause a transfer in the mind of the orator/poet himself, and, by extension, of the audience member. One is thus transported into the world presented in the oratorical or tragic speech, as the disaster seems to appear close at hand (Rhetoric) and as if present at the tragic events (Poetics).

A tragic poet has to create a vision by dramatic structure and by working out the style (τὴν λέξει συναπαργάζεσθαι, Po. 17. 1455a22). It cannot be by chance, then, that the expression "bringing before the eyes", pro ommaton poiein, occurs again in the discussion of metaphor (Rh. 3. 1411b), which is defined as transfer, "carrying across," of an alien name: μεταφορὰ δὲ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορά. 181 More explicitly, metaphor consists of expressing (transferring to the listener) a notion that is different from the literal meaning of the words. 182 It is a figure of speech that receives special attention in Aristotle's treatment of style, in both Rhetoric and Poetics. 183

later, the one in the grasp of emotions best conveys emotion (Po. 17. 1455a 29-32), which suggest that the poet should better transmit emotions by becoming emotionally involved through "seeing" the fictional events.


183 As Aristotle himself specifies, metaphor is essential for both rhetoric and poetic speech: πόσα εἶδος μεταφορᾶς, καὶ ὅτι τούτῳ πλείστον δύναται καὶ ἐν ποιήσει καὶ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, αἱ μεταφοραί, εἰρηται, καθάπερ ἔλεγόμεν ἐν τοῖς
Metaphor is first associated with "bringing before the eyes", when Aristotle talks about word choice (Rh. 3. 1404b). This figure of speech has to find its source in beautiful terms (ἀπὸ καλλών, Rh. 3. 1405b6) and not all verbal expression can form a metaphor:

"Εστι γὰρ ἄλλο ἄλλου κυριῶτερον καὶ ὀμοιωμένον μᾶλλον καὶ οἰκειότερον τὸ ποιεῖν τὸ πρᾶγμα πρὸ ὀμμάτων. (Rh. 3. 1405b11-3).

For one expression is more powerful than another and more like (the object signified) and more appropriate to bring the thing appearing before the eyes.

Certain lexical choices are better than others in making the listener recognize, and, then, visualize the object to which the speaker refers in his metaphor. Afterwards, Aristotle discusses metaphors in detail and notes that, in some cases, they are accompanied by "bringing before the eyes." He offers two explanations for the meaning of visualization. First of all, bringing before eyes, produces a temporal actualization:

Τὸ πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν· ὅρἀν γὰρ δεῖ (τὰ) πραττόμενα μᾶλλον ἡ μέλλοντα (Rh. 3. 1410b33-34).

Scholars have recently looked at Aristotle's concept of metaphor in the Poetics and Rhetoric from the perspective of semiotics. The approach has resulted in important contributions, such as R. Moran's, "Artifice and Persuasion: The Work of Metaphor in the Rhetoric," in Essays on Aristotle's Rh. (1996), 385-98; and T. Kirby, "Aristotle on Metaphor," AJP 118 (1997), 517-54, a very sophisticated essay, which appropriately concludes that effective metaphor sets semiotic correspondences between the speaker and listener, and pleases the audience.


So, for example, "that they coming to aid against dangers call upon dangers" is both metaphor and pro ommaton poiein: Φάναι παρακαλεῖν τοὺς κινδύνους τοῖς κινδύνοις βοηθήσαντας, πρὸ ὀμματον καὶ μεταφορά (Rh. 3. 1411b5-6). I oversimplify my discussion here. A complete analysis of these examples (Rh. 3. 1411a and1411b) would be itself a challenging scholarly enterprise. The examples are often complex and the semantic distinctions subtle. For example, on a passage from (Isoc., Paneg. 151) "it was proper at the tomb (of those dying at Salamis) to cut your hair in mourning, since freedom was being buried with valor. Aristotle comments (1411a): if he had said it was proper to shed tears since their valor was being buried, that would have been a metaphor and bringing before the eyes. And yet Isocrates' phrasing "freedom with valor" provides, in fact, an antithesis.
Through bringing before the eyes, for things should be seen as happening [in present] rather than in the future.\textsuperscript{186}

Secondly, \textit{pro ommaton poiein} is defined as signifying activity, which could be translated by actualization, vivification (\textit{évérgeia}).\textsuperscript{187}

\[ \text{λεκτέον δὲ τί λέγομεν πρὸ ὀμμάτων, καὶ τί ποιοῦσι γίνεται τούτο. Λέγω δὴ πρὸ ὀμμάτων τοῦτα ποιεῖν ὅσα ἐνεργοῦντα σημαίνει. (Rh. 3. 1411b24-25).} \]

It is necessary to say what we mean by bringing before the eyes, and what makes this occur. I call those things before the eyes that signify things engaged in activity.

The definition is followed by examples. Thus, to call a nice fellow a simpleton (lit. "four cornered") is a metaphor, but does not signify activity (\textit{évérgeia}). By contrast, "having his prime of life in full bloom" is activity (\textit{évérgeia}). Finally, in the phrase "Greeks darting on their feet," "darting" is both metaphor and \textit{energeia}, because the poet means "quickly."\textsuperscript{188} To interpret each case briefly, the first instance conveys an idea to a listener by a different verbal expression, which is a metaphor. And yet there is no suggestion of movement. The second example compares young age with blooming, (a growth process) and, therefore, implies activity. And yet, being young and being "in bloom" are not entirely different notions, so that the metaphor is not powerful. Finally, "darting" clearly refers to activity (done in present), and is thus \textit{pro ommaton poiein}.\textsuperscript{189} In addition, the poet signifies an

\textsuperscript{186} Here elegance of style (\textit{asteia}) has to be achieved through \textit{pro ommaton poiein}.


\textsuperscript{188} Οἷον τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα φάναι εἶναι τετράγωνον μεταφορά: ἀμφο γὰρ τέλεια, ἀλλὰ οὐκ σημαίνει ἐνέργειαν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπων ἔχοντος τῆν ἄκμην ἐνέργειαν, καὶ...Ἐλληνες ἄξιοις ποσίν ἐνέργεια καὶ μεταφορά σας γὰρ λέγει. (Rh. 3. 1411b26-31).

\textsuperscript{189} Perhaps the analogy with several Aristotelian concepts (δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια, in the \textit{de An.}) would be useful here. The eye, for example, as an organ is potentiality (δύναμις), while the seeing of the eye is full actuality (ἐντελέχεια, \textit{de An.} 1. 412b10, 413a15). Likewise, sensation is potential, when we say that a sleeping person can see, but also actuality, when the person is in the actual process of seeing \textit{(de An.} 2. 417a1-14). A metaphor may have the potentiality to bring the object before the mind's eye, but it does so in actuality by suggesting activity (ἐνέργεια).
abstract notion (fast) through a different, concrete activity (darting), which completes the metaphor. Thus, a metaphor accompanied by "before the eyes" not only transfers (from the speaker to the listener) a notion that is different from the literal meaning of the words, but also conveys the idea of activity done in present.

From a lexical perspective, I believe, metaphor in association with pro ommaton poiein illustrates a phenomenon that Aristotle also wishes to take place on a larger semantic scale. In the Poetics, he recommends "placing before the eyes" through style and, especially, through structure of plots. Now the dramatic composition of tragedy (mainly plot) has to transfer emotions (particularly pity and fear) from the poetic creation to the audience. These emotions are different not only from what the audience may feel when coming to attend a tragic performance, but also from what the poet himself may experience emotionally while composing. The pathe, nevertheless, have to be conveyed to the spectators, which is a kind of "emotional metaphor", and "bringing before the eyes" is an important aid for the process. It is remarkable that pro ommaton poiein functions similarly on the lexical level, as well as on the level of dramatic composition. Thus, in the case of metaphor, "bringing before eyes" made the notion expressed in a phrase appear closer temporally (πραττόμενα rather than μέλλοντα, Rh. 3. 1410b33) and in action, as "being done" (ἐνέργουντα, Rh. 3. 1411b24-55).

Similarly, in the case of the structure of tragedy and rhetorical discourse, "bringing before eyes" made the events, to which the speech refers, appear closer and as if taking place. The poet could "see" as if he were in the middle of the fictional incidents (πάρ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος τοῖς πραττομένοις, Po. 17. 1455a24), and the orator brought the events close at hand (ἐγγυς, Rh.. 2. 1386a32).

In conclusion, Aristotelian theory discourages visual effects which do not fit poetic discourse, or exaggerate it, whereas it constantly underlines the fact that one, whether orator or tragic poet, should be able create a vision. "Bringing before the eyes," pro ommaton poiein, is of particular significance for intensifying the dramatic experience, because it makes the events mentioned in the
speech appear as if present to the speaker/poet and, therefore, to the audience. Aristotle does not dismiss tragic performances. He only wishes that the content of a play could be so exquisite that it may convey the impression of a performance by itself, and that actual performances would not spoil a good tragedy, or, perhaps, transform a bad one into a success.

Perhaps it could be argued that when Aristotle considered the internal vision, created by a tragedian as more important than the actual tragic performance, he expressed his own, peculiar taste, which few shared. Unfortunately we do not have testimonies of contemporary literary criticism, to draw a comparison. Later literary critics, nevertheless, constantly emphasize the internal vision that a poetic text should produce, in order to move the audience. An amusing, and yet relevant example of "seeing performances" while reading Greek tragedies comes from late Antiquity, first-second century AD. Dio Chrysostom offers an interesting piece of literary criticism in his "Oration 52." The introduction is particularly interesting for the idea of "seeing" a tragic text. Suffering from some flu, Dio decided to read three tragedies dealing with the theme of Philoctetes: besides the Sophoclean

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190 I will subsequently show how several comments of scholiasts underline the idea of "seeing" emotion in the poetic text. Moreover, in my analysis of Euripides' Orestes, I will discuss Longinus' remark (On the Subl. 15. 3) that Euripides must have seen himself the Furies, so that he made the audience see them.

191 M. Valgimigli, Contributi alla storia della critica letteraria in Grecia I: La critica letteraria di Dio Crisostomo (Bologna, 1912), discusses Dio's place in the history of literary criticism in antiquity. M. T. Luzzatto's book, Tragedia greca e cultura elenistica: L'or. LII di Dione di Prusa (Bologna, 1983), offers the most exhaustive commentary and bibliography on the "Oration Fifty Two." Luzzatto reviews the rhetorical tradition of exercises based on comparison between three ancient authors, as well as the connections between Dio and the ancient tradition of literary criticism (from Peripatetics to the Hellenistic scholars, such as Aristophanes of Byzantium). Z. Ritoók, "Some Aesthetic Views of Dio Chrysostom and Their Sources," in Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle, eds. J.G. J. Abbenes, S. R. Slings and I. Sluiter (Amsterdam, 1995), 125-34, examines those orations concerned with literary interpretations (11, 52 and 60 in particular) and decides that the Aristotelian influence is the most prominent on Dio's literary criticism. For example, Dio constantly borrows from the Aristotelian theory the criterion of the probable, eikos, and the credible, pithanon.
one, a play by Aeschylus and another one by Euripides on the subject, which are unknown to us.\textsuperscript{192}

He reflects while reading:

\begin{quote}
Οὐκοῦν ἐὕρωκούμην τῆς θέας καὶ ἔλογιζόμην πρὸς ἐμαυτόν ὅτι τότε Αθήνησιν ὅν σῦχ σοιός τ' ἂν ἦν μετασχεὶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἔκεινων ἄνταγονιζομένων (52. 3).
\end{quote}

So I was feasting my eyes on the spectacle [of these dramas] and reasoning that even if I had been in Athens in those days, I could not have witnessed those distinguished poets [lit. men] in a contest.

A little later, Dio writes in-joke, but his joke may not be too far from Aristotle's ideal of looking at a tragedy:

\begin{quote}
οὐκοῦν ἔχορήγουν ἐμαυτῷ πανύ λαμπρῶς καὶ προσέχειν ἑπειρώμην, ὃσπερ δικαστής τῶν πρῶτων τραγικῶν χορῶν (52. 4).
\end{quote}

Therefore, I played the choregus for myself in a brilliant way and tried to pay attention, as if I were a judge of the first tragic choruses.

Therefore, Dio not only imagines seeing the plays performed while reading them, but also "transports" himself to a dramatic festival, in which he participates and is ready to judge competing tragedians. Certainly, his "bringing before the eyes" of the poetic text would have pleased the Stagirite.

\textbf{(e) Conclusions on pity. Fear. Transfer of emotion through \textit{phantasia}.}

To return to the description of pity in the \textit{Rhetoric} (2. 1386a-b), the passage contains a very intriguing idea: pitiable matters are "apparent", "close at hand": \textit{ἐγγὺς φαίνομενα τὰ πάθη ἐλεεινά ἐστι} (Rh. 2. 1386a29). When they do not concern immediate events, visualizing them becomes fundamental. It seems to me that, at this point, Aristotle shifts from the analysis of the feeling aroused by real events to another facet of emotion: pity aroused by the artistic speech. As I have suggested, the phrase "(orators) make the evil to appear close at hand, by bringing it before the eyes" (Rh. 2.

\textsuperscript{192} For ancient testimonies for the lost \textit{"Philoctetai"}, see, for example, J. A. Hartung, \textit{Euripides Restitutus} (Hamburg, 1843), 354; J. M. T. Luzzatto, "Sul Filottete di Eschilo," \textit{SCO} 30 (1980), 118-24.
implies a process of transfer of emotion. I will further examine how the process of conveying emotion may take place. The speaker has to convince an audience that a past or future situation is pitiable, by making the audience members imagine, "see" it. If he succeeds, the evil appears "as (if) it is about to happen or has recently happened" (ἡ ὁς μέλλον ἡ ὁς γεγονός, Rh. 2.1386a34). Whom may this misfortune affect? Presumably the evil does not concern the audience (not directly, at any rate), but the one who is in the middle of the events. It may very well be someone unjustly accused in a trial, or an ancestor who died for the fatherland (i.e. funeral oration), or a character in tragedy. In a formula reminiscent of the Poetics, Aristotle characterizes the persons most worthy of pity as "noble" (σπουδαῖοι) and furthermore stresses the optic impression:

καὶ μάλιστα τὸ σπουδαῖος εἶναι ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις καιροῖς ὁντας ἐλεεινόν, καὶ ὁς ἀναξίου ὁντος καὶ ἐν ὑφαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ πάθους (Rh. 2.1386b6-8).

And it is especially pitiable when noble people are in such extremities, as someone who is unworthy [of suffering is suffering] and the suffering is evident before the eyes.

In the chapter dedicated to pity in the Rhetoric, Aristotle seems to deal with two different levels of the emotion. I will sketch here my reading of the two dimensions of pity: (A)eleos caused by real events and (B) eleos caused by the orator's speech (artistic representation). To draw a scheme for the first type is relatively easy:

(A) Eleos felt at real situations:

1. Someone is in misfortune undeservedly.
2. One feels pity for him by imagining that something similar could happen to himself/ or by remembering that it has happened to himself.

By contrast, the second type seems much more complicated.

(B) Eleos aroused by the orator's speech (artistic):

1. Some and especially the "noble" (σπουδαῖοι), "experience" misfortune;
2. Orators, who through their acting look themselves "more pitiable" (ἔλεεινότεροι), make that misfortune appears immediate (ἔγγυς), by bringing it before the eyes [of themselves and of the audience], (πρὸ ὃμμάτων ποιοῦντες). The misfortune thus looks:
(a) as (if) about to happen (ὡς μέλλον) or
(b) as (if) has just happened (ὡς γεγονός)
And these sorts of situations are "more pitiable" (ἔλεεινότεροι).

3. Pity is felt mostly for the "noble" (σπουδαῖος):
(a) as (since) he does "not deserve" [the suffering], (ὡς ἀναξίου) and
(b) as (since) the emotion is apparent "before the eyes" [of the audience?], (ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς τοῦ πάθους).

This pattern raises a series of questions. First, does the audience still feel pity by remembering or expecting a similar sort of misfortune? Perhaps so, but Aristotle leaves that out. The temporal inference is included, moreover, in the artistic representation itself. By acting, the speaker brings before the eyes a story in which some evil has happened or is about to happen. Is the member of the audience supposed to feel pity even without conjecturing further: the sort of evil, which has happened or might happen to me? If so, he is feeling eleos without thinking of himself, then the listener should almost identify himself with the character (i.e. subject of the speech). The character (not I, the listener) has experienced/ or will experience something terrible, but I feel pity. In this case, the specific detachment of eleos would arise in the audience from contemplating the past/future perspective within the story, not in their own lives. If not, there is a double temporal

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193 By contrast pity caused by the "real" occurs when someone is in misfortune, ἔπι φαίνομένῳ κακῷ...τοῦ ἀναξίου τυγχάνειν. (Rh. 2. 1385b13-14).

194 A similar phrasing occurs in the Poetics - pity should be in the events (of the plot) themselves. Thus, things that happen or about to occur (Po. 14. 1453b 21) should arouse pity. A spectator, for instance, should feel pity for Oedipus both when he is about to suffer misfortune, and after he has just suffered.
perspective: one of the character and one of the listener. The listener would not only recognize that someone is in a pitiable situation (within the story) but also compare it to his own experience.\textsuperscript{195} Both interpretations suggest that the mechanism of the \textit{eleos} caused by artistic speech is much more sophisticated than that of the common \textit{eleos}.

Secondly, why do the speakers themselves become "more pitiable" through acting? Probably because they imitate what is worthy of pity, through bringing before the eyes. Thus signs and actions may contribute to their representation of pity:

\textit{dia} τούτο καὶ τὰ σημεῖα (καὶ τὰς πρᾶξεις), οἰον ἐσθητάς\textsuperscript{196} τε τῶν πεπονθῶν καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, καὶ λόγους καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν ἐν τῷ πάθει ὅντων, οἰον ἡδη τελευτώντων ἁπαντα γὰρ ταύτα διὰ τὸ ἐγγὺς φαίνεσθαι μᾶλλον ποιεῖ τὸν ἔλεον. (Rh. 2. 1386b2-4).

For this reason signs and actions [induce pity], for example, the clothes of those who have suffered and any other things of this sort, such as words and any other such things of those in suffering; for example of those who are dying. For all these things, through their appearing near, make pity greater.

It is remarkable that the speakers look more pitiable [to the audience] by representing \textit{eleos}, in other words, by imitating those worthy of pity. Similarly, in the \textit{Poetics} (17. 1455a) Aristotle has recommended that poets should bring the plots before the eyes, because the one who feels emotion

\textsuperscript{195}I cannot prefer one interpretation to the other, since both seem equally plausible to me. Modern aesthetics and psychology have not solved the problem of how the audience may relate to fictional characters. An excellent discussion of the modern disputes over the subject is provided by K. R. Jauss, "Levels of Identification of Hero and Audience," \textit{Journal of New Literary History} 5 (1974), 283-315. The article raises the problem of aesthetic distance vs. aesthetic identification.

\textsuperscript{196}G. A. Kennedy 1991, 154, observes: "This is clearest in epic and drama, where suffering characters sometimes appear in rags (Euripides' portrayal of Telephus was the most notorious example) roll in the dust, etc; but defendants in Greek courts probably sometimes dressed for the part to awaken sympathy." I think that Aristotle may also say that orators should allude to the victim's cloth (or perhaps show the rags to the jury).
can best convey it to others. This resembles the idea of the chain of emotion in Plato's *Ion*, in which all poet, interpreter, and spectator are under the spell of inspired poetry.\(^{197}\)

Finally, why does not Aristotle clearly state that he is dealing with two levels of the emotion? After all, he likes dividing things in classes and sub-classes. It may be because he only wants to advise the rhetor briefly on how to stir pity. He does that while talking about other emotions as well, but never implies that the speaker should "act". The difference could be that pity is so connected with tragedy that Aristotle steps out of his usual analysis and recommends acting. There may be another explanation. Pity felt at a real situation and that felt at an artistic representation were so interchangeable in the Greek culture,\(^{198}\) that it escapes Aristotle when he passes to the second type. Thus, the little passage in the *Rhetoric* can illuminate our understanding of how Aristotelian *eleos* functions when induced by mimetic representation. And yet, its importance almost escapes us since Aristotle is so casual about it.

Fear is defined in the *Rhetoric* as:

\[ \text{éστω δή φόβος λύπη τις καὶ ταραχή ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ φθαρτικοῦ ἡ λυπεροῦ (Rh. 2. 1382a21-22).} \]

Let fear be a sort of pain or agitation, coming from imagination of a future destructive or painful evil.

While pity for another is regularly associated with fear for oneself in the *Poetics*, in the *Rhetoric* the two emotions are separated.\(^{199}\) As described, nevertheless, in the treatise, fear seems to be a

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\(^{197}\) *Ion* 533a. Moreover, when Socrates accuses Ion of being out of himself when reciting (for instance, "something pitiful" (535b6), the rhapsode replies: `Εγὼ γὰρ ὅταν ἔλεεινόν τι λέγω, δεκρών ἐμπίπτειλανται μου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· ὅταν τε φοβερόν ἢ δεινόν, ὥρθεν καὶ τρίχες ἵστανται ὑπὸ φόβου (535c6-8).

\(^{198}\) Plato often shows indignation that people can feel the emotion at listening to epic (*Ion*) or seeing tragedies (*Republic*), which represent situations that are not even "real".

\(^{199}\) Kennedy, 1990, 151 makes the observation, to suggest that the two emotions are conceptually disconnected in the *Rhetoric*. E. Belfiore 1990, 184-85, however, well notes that the two emotions are still interrelated in the *Rhetoric*. Belfiore, 186-87, also specifies differences between the two emotions. While pity appears to have action as a consequence
simplified version of pity. Both are some sort of pain, but fear overlaps only with the last part of the definition of pity (to expect a misfortune for oneself). Extreme fear excludes pity, because one is so consumed by the personal experience that he cannot think about another:

μὴν οὖν φοβοῦμενοι σφόδρα (οὐ γὰρ ἔλεοςιν οἱ ἐκπεπληγμένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ οἰκεῖον πάθει. (Rh. 2. 1385b32-34).

Nor again those who are terribly afraid [can feel pity] - for those stricken by their own suffering do not feel pity.

What happens in the rest of the cases? The two emotions seem to be still intertwined in the Rhetoric. People have to be in particular state of mind in order to feel either pity or fear. Thus those who are utterly ruined do not fear:

οὐτε οἱ ἡδή πεπονθέναι πάντα νομίζοντες τὰ δεινὰ καὶ ἀπεψυχόμενοι πρὸς τὸ μέλλον (Rh. 2. 1383a3-4).

Nor (those are afraid) who think that they have suffered all the terrible things (possible), and have become cold toward the future.

Some hope must remain for fear to continue. Likewise, those who have been utterly destroyed do not feel pity, because they think they could not suffer any more:

διὸ οὐτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἔλεοῦσιν (οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ παθεῖν οἰόνται), (Rh. 2. 1385b19-20).

Those who are completely destroyed do not pity (for they think that there is nothing left for them to suffer).

Similarly, the opposite category, those who consider themselves enormously happy can feel neither fear nor pity, since they become insolent (ὑβρισταί, Rh. 2. 1383a1, ὑβρίζοσιν, Rh. 2. 1385b22).

Indeed, in the Rhetoric Aristotle avoids saying a person pities when he "fears" a similar suffering

(i. e. it influences the mind of the judges, who, therefore, would absolve the accused) and moves to tears, fear is passive. Furthermore, there is a different physical reaction to pity. Fear, by contrast, is "cold", tearless.
himself, usually substituting a neutral word "expects." Yet, fear itself means to expect a misfortune (i.e. μετὰ προσδοκίας τινὸς τοῦ πείσεσθαι τι φθαρτικὸν πάθος, *Rh*. 2. 1382b30).

As in the case of pity, I find fascinating the way in which Aristotle gives brief indications to the speakers on how to induce fear (better):

ώστε δεῖ τοιούτους παρασκευάζειν, ὅταν ἢ βέλτιον τὸ φοβεῖσθαι αὐτούς, ὅτι τοιοῦτοι εἰσίν οἵοι παθεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ἄλλοι μείζονες ἔπαθον· καὶ τοὺς ὁμοίους δεικνύνται πάσχοντας ἢ πεπονθότας, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτων ὑψὸν οὐκ ὣτοντο, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ τότε ὅτε οὐκ ὣτοντο. (*Rh*. 2. 1383a7-12).

Thus whenever it is best [for the speaker] to make them [the audience] experience fear he should make them realize that they are of such sort that they can suffer, and that others better than them [listeners] have suffered; and to show others like them suffering or having suffered, and at the hands of those from whom they did not expect it and suffering things they did not expect and at a time when they were not thinking of the possibility.

There is no suggestion here of imitating those who feel fear, as in the case of *eleos*. The passage, however, does suggest that the audience should feel fear by realizing their human condition. The observation is particularly valuable for tragedy. Gnomic statements, which generally speak about human suffering, the importance of which we modern readers tend to ignore, would have aroused fear in the Greek audience. The orators should further show that other better people (and such should be the tragic characters, according to the *Poetics*) have suffered, so do/did/will others, like the listeners. If fear can be induced by these kinds of examples, what are the audience members supposed to feel for those "better" than themselves or like them about whom the rhetor talks? Aristotle does not tell us, but I suspect they should feel pity. In fact, this is the only type of fear that audience of tragedy seems to experience. Since the spectators watch the suffering of others, of tragic characters, the main emotion must be *eleos*. Nonetheless, by relating tragic experiences to a more general, human suffering, which could affect everyone, the audience would feel *phobos*. Fear and pity are still connected in the *Rhetoric*. Moreover, Aristotle sketches here how the two emotions interact in the

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200 There is one exception (*Rh*. 2. 1386a27).
audience response, which may clarify some of the abrupt statements on *phobos* and *eleos* in the *Poetics*.

As the definitions of tragic emotions in the *Rhetoric* have specified, pity was felt at an apparent (*φαντασία*) evil happening to someone who does not deserve it (*Rh. 2. 1285b13*), while fear came from appearance, imagination, (*φαντασία*) of an imminent evil (*Rh. 2. 1382a21*). Phantasia, conventionally translated by "imagination", in the sense of experiencing or creating an appearance, is an important concept in the Aristotelian psychological theory. In the *De Anima*, which provides the most extensive treatment of various mind - faculties, *phantasia* is characterized as a kind of movement.

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201 For the implications of Aristotle's connecting *phantasia* with emotions, J. M. Cooper, "An Aristotelian Theory of the Emotions," in Essays on A's Rh. (1996), 238-57, especially 245-49. At 247, Cooper notes that *phantasia* adds subjectivity to the way in which someone experiences emotions: "Aristotle is alert to the crucial fact about the emotions, that one can experience them simply on the basis of how, despite what one knows or believes to be the case, things strike one - how things look to one."

202 M. Schofield, "Aristotle on the Imagination", in Aristotle on Mind and the Senses, eds. G. E. R. Lloyd and G. E. L Owen (Cambridge, 1978), 105, and, more recently in the revised version of the essay, "Aristotle on the Imagination", in Essays on Aristotle. *De Anima*, eds. M. C. Nussbaum and E. O. Rorty (Oxford, 1992), 249-51, has drawn attention to the difficulties involved in rendering *phantasia* into English, which does not have a term to cover the Greek meaning. In addition, Aristotle himself uses the term ambiguously, since it can refer, for example, to the appearance itself or the faculty that allows one to experience an appearance.

203 I will only briefly examine here some aspects of *phantasia* (de An.), without considering all the Aristotelian references to *phantasia*, or the scholarly discussions on the subject. In this definition (de An. 3. 429a1-4; 430), *phantasia* is related to perception, though without being perception per se. Surprisingly, *phantasia* is defined as "weak perception" (*Rh. 1. 1370a28: φαντασία ἐστὶν αἰσθήσις τις ἄθενης*, cf. Somn. 459a17-19). By contrast, *phantasia* and thinking have the power of the actual thing (*MA* 701b18). Useful surveys of the Aristotelian use of *phantasia* can be found in J. Freudenthal, Über den Begriff des Wortes ΦΑΝΤΑΣΙΑ bei Aristoteles (Göttingen, 1863); W. D. Ross, *Aristotle* (London, 1923), 142-45; D. A. Rees, "Aristotle's Treatment of φαντασία," in Essays in Ancient Greek Philosophy, eds. Anton and G. Kustas (Albany, 1971). Inconsistencies in Aristotle's treatment of *phantasia* have been emphasized by D. W. Hamlyn, *Aristotle's De Anima* (Oxford, 1968). An opposite view is held by G. Watson, *PHANTASIA in Classical Thought* (Galway, 1988), 14-37, who argues for an unified Aristotelian concept of *phantasia*, which directly opposes the Platonic treatment of *phantasia* (*Ti. 45b, 72b; Thrt.152c; Sph. 260c*).
And imagination seems to be a kind of movement which does not take place without sensation, but only in those who have sensation with the objects of sense for its objects.\(^{204}\)

Further Aristotle connects *phantasia* with sight.\(^{205}\)

Imagination would be a motion generated by actual perception. And, since sight is the principal sense, imagination (\textit{phantasia}) has derived even its name from light (\textit{phaos}), because, without light it is not possible to see.

And yet, this does not refer to the physical sensorial process, since visions appear even to people who have their eyes closed (\textit{φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὄραματα}, \textit{de An.} 3. 428a16).

Although *phantasia* is intimately related to both sensation (\textit{αἴσθησις}), and thought (\textit{διάνοια}),\(^{206}\) it is, at the same time, separated from both faculties:

\(^{204}\)I have adopted for the last part of the definition "with the objects of sense as its objects" the translation of R. D. Hick's, \textit{De anima} (Zurich and New York, 1990), 127.

\(^{205}\) For modern lexical analysis of the word, M. Schofield 1992, 251, n. 11, who shows conceptual connections between *phantasia* and *phantasma* in Greek language before Aristotle.

\(^{206}\) The relationship between *phantasia* and reason in Aristotle has been much debated. In the first half of the twentieth-century, scholars tended to base their interpretation of *phantasia* on the link between imagination and perception (i.e. *phantasia* is feeble \textit{aisthesis}, \textit{Rh.} 21370a28). \textit{Phantasia} was considered a type of sensorial activity, which can give either accurate, or inaccurate information about reality. It would have little or no cognitive function: Freudenthal 1863, 31; J. Beare, \textit{Greek Theories of Elementary cognition} (Oxford, 1906), 290; Ross 1923, 39, and 142-43, etc. More recently, scholars have emphasized the Aristotelian link between *phantasia* and cognition (i.e. *phantasia* is a necessary premise for thought, for it is no supposition without it, \textit{de An.} 3. 427b15). Excellent discussions are provided, for example, by M. C. Nussbaum, \textit{Aristotle's De Motu Animalium} (Princeton, 1978), 221-69; D. K. W. Modrack, \textit{The Power of Perception} (Chicago, 1987), 113-39; M. Wedin, \textit{Mind and Imagination in Aristotle} (New Haven and London, 1988), 100-159; and D. Frede, "The Cognitive Role of Phantasia," in \textit{Essays on Aristotle's De Anima}, eds. M. Nussbaum & A. O. Rorty (Oxford, 1992), 279-95. T. Ward Bynum, "A New Look at Aristotle's Theory of Perception," in \textit{Aristotle's De Anima in Focus}, ed. M. Durrant (London and New York, 1993), 90-109, advances an interesting suggestion that *phantasia* is, in fact, a bridge between perception and cognition.
Fantasia γὰρ ἐτερων καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ διανοιας· αὐτὴ τε οὐ γίγνεται ἂνευ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἂνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις· Ὑπὸ δ’ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν. Τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἐστὶν, ὅταν βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τα ποιήσασθαι, ὡσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημωνικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδολοποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ’ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἂν ἡ ἰσοφανεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. Εἰτ δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινὸν τι ἡ φοβερόν, ἐὖθυς συμπάσχομεν, ὡμοίως δὲ κἀν θαρραλέον· κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα (de An. 3. 427a14-24).

For it is clear that imagination is something different from both sense and thought. And yet, it does not exist without sensorial activity and there is not perception without it (phantasia). It is obvious that thinking and perception are not the same. For this experience is in our power, whenever we want (to bring something before the eyes, as do those who range things under mnemotechnic headings and picture them for themselves. But to opine is not in our power. For it is necessary for opinion to be either false or true. Furthermore, when we have the opinion that something is terrible or alarming, we feel immediately the emotion and [it would happen] similarly even with something that is reassuring. But when we are under the influence of phantasia we are in such a state as if we saw in a picture objects that are frightening or courage-inspiring.

In this comparison between phantasia and doxa, Aristotle seems to refer to an active role of phantasia: that of creating visions (εἰδολοποιεῖν). By contrast, when defining phantasia a little later (i.e. the passage I have quoted, where phantasia comes from aisthesis, de An. 3. 429a1-4), he likely talks about the passive role of phantasia, that of receiving visions. As Frede has appropriately suggested, the transition from the former type (active) to the latter (passive) could be Aristotle's remark:

Εἰ δὴ ἐστὶν ἡ φαντασία καθ’ ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμα τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή εἰ τι κατὰ μεταφοράν λέγομεν (de An. 3. 428a1-2).207

If then phantasia, about which we are talking, is some appearance occurring to us and if we do not speak [from now on] in a metaphorical manner.

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207 D. Frede 1992, 280, n. 3: “Without wanting to be over-confident on this much debated question, my suspicion is that this active use of imagination, εἰδολοποιεῖν (de An. 3427b20), (that is up to us and neither true nor false) is the sense of phantasia that is ruled out in 428a2 as kata metaphoran, since it never recurs in De Anima and does not suit the cognitive use Aristotle wants to ascribe to phantasia.”
Aristotle may be so excluding the metaphorical use of the term (active, creative imagination) when later defining *phantasia* as dependant on sensation (passive). The active *phantasia* would thus be more related to thought, as ability to create visions before the mind's eye, whereas the passive *phantasia* would be closer to perception.

In addition to raising the problem of the double use of *phantasia* in the treatise, the passage *(de An. 3. 427b14-24)* becomes particularly interesting when compared with the recommendations given to the tragedians in the *Poetics*, as well as to the orators in the *Rhetoric*. Thus, it is in our power to create visions (*πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι, ὀσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδολοποιοῦντες*, *de An. 3. 427b18-20*). The creators of images are called creators of visions (*εἰδολοποιοῦντες*) here, while in the *Poetics* any mimetic artist, whether poet or painter, receives a very similar epithet (*εἰκονοποιός*, *Po. 25. 1460b8*). Furthermore, it is striking that the formula used here, *πρὸ ὀμματον τι ποιεσθαι*, appears almost literally in the *Poetics* and *Rhetoric*. Artists have to use their creative *phantasia*, in order to bring before the eyes fictional events (tragic poet, *πρὸ ὀμματον τιθεμενον*, *Po. 17. 1455a21-22*), or pitiable events (orators, *πρὸ ὀμματον ποιοῦντες*, *Rh.2. 1386a33-34*). I have argued that "bringing before the eyes" most likely has the role of conveying emotion from the poet/actor and orator to the audience. The process would be similar to that through which a metaphor, accompanied by actualization (*ἐνέργεια*) conveys a notion to the mind of the listener. A tragedian (or orator) actualizes the emotion of the speech, by visualizing it, and so making it plausible to the audience. Thus, those in the grip of emotions become most

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207 ἐστὶ μιμητὴς ὀσπερανεὶ ξωγράφος ἢ τις ἄλλος εἰκονοποιός, ἀνάγκη γὰρ μμείσθαι τριῶν ὄντων τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν τι ἅπα, ἢ γὰρ ὅλα ἢν ἢ ἔστιν, ἢ οἷα φασίν καὶ δοκεῖ, ἢ οἷα εἶναι δεῖ. (*Po. 25. 1460b8-11*).

208 *D.A. 3. 427a14-27* may very well be a direct reply to Plato. The language, as well as the reference to the emotional effect of image making is reminiscent of Plato's *Timaeus* Images (*εἰδόλα*) appear to the lower soul (*Ti.45b*). So the mind causes in some fear, through the application of the natural bitterness of the liver. To others, pictures of gentleness might bring forth the capacity of divination. One has understand the creation of images (*εἰδολοποιία*), occurring through projection of images, and discover the real cause of seeing. The passage ends with a hymn to the divine gift of *sight*, which has to be directed toward philosophy.
convincing (Po. 17. 1455a29-30), and, similarly, orators who envision pity become themselves more pitiable (Rh. 2. 1386b33). Aristotle himself seems to refer to the creative phantasia as metaphorical in the (de An. 3. 428a1-2), which further justifies our comparison.

Moreover the account of phantasia (in the sense of creating visions) offers a fascinating distinction between emotion aroused by imagination and that aroused by real events (de An. 427a21-24). If we form an opinion (doxa) about something as being frightening, we would experience fear immediately (ὅταν μὲν δοξάσωμεν δεινόν τι ἡ φοβερόν, εἰθῶς συμπάσχομεν, de An. 427a21-22). When we are under the influence of phantasia, nevertheless, we do not experience emotion to the same degree. Fear aroused by creative imagination is a less strong and immediate, as if watching frightening images in a painting (κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν, ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὡσπερ ἄν εἰ θεώμενοι ἐν γραφῇ τὰ δεινόν, de An. 3. 427a23-24). It may be somewhat confusing that in the Rhetoric most emotions come from phantasia, appeareance, imagination. Fear, for example, was aroused by phantasia of an imminent evil (ἐκ φαντασίας μέλλοντος κακοῦ, Rh. 2. 1382a21). In case of the real threat, nevertheless, one has to be convinced that the apparent evil is, in truth, imminent through reasoning. One would thus form an opinion, doxazein, by asking himself whether he is really threatened by the misfortune or not. And this is not in one's power, but depends on the nature of the events themselves (δοξάζειν δ’ οὔκ ἐφ’ ἤμιν ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἣ πεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν, de An. 3. 427b20-21). Likewise, one has to realize (form the opinion) that apparent evil is menacing in reality. When this produces expectation of misfortune in the Rhetoric (μετὰ προσδοκίας, Rh. 2. 1382b30), one experiences real fear.210 By contrast, emotion aroused by artistic creation does not rely on real events, but depends exclusively on the artist's imagination (πάθος ἐφ’ ἤμιν ἐστὶν, ὅταν βουλῶμεθα πρὸ ὀμμάτων γαρ ἐστὶ τι ποιήσασθαι, de An. 3. 427b19-20), and, perhaps, on the listener's ability to imagine. The audience member does not have to verify if the misfortune is truly menacing or not in
real life, and therefore form an opinion. The emotion itself, therefore, is less intense than it would be if caused by real events. Nevertheless, the emphasis on "bringing before the eyes" in both Poetics and Rhetoric is a plea for actualization of emotion aroused by artistic creation. Because emotion is diminished by not having grounds in reality, a good artist has to imitate real life situations as closely as possible. Therefore, a tragedian should see himself as if in the middle of the (fictional) events (Po. 17. 1455a24). The events narrated by the orator will look close at hand, as if happening or as if they have just happened (Rh. 2. 1386a33-34). This suggests that the misfortune (which tragic plot displays, for example) should appear as plausible as possible, so that the audience would almost believe (δοξάειν) it as real. Consequently, the audience would experience an emotion almost as powerful as the one aroused by a real event. This actualization of fictional emotion occurs when pathos becomes visible, or, to use the Aristotelian phrase referring to pity, when pathos is apparent before the eyes (ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς φαινομένου τοῦ παθοῦς, Rh. 2. 1386b8).

Several important conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the Aristotelian treatment of tragic emotions with respect to the audience. Pity is, perhaps, the most complex emotion in Aristotle's theory, since it paradoxically combines the temporal and personal detachment (referring to past or future suffering/ and of another) with imaginative involvement of the spectator. The description of eleos in the Rhetoric may theorize an aesthetic principle that was already expected by the audiences. A good example is the reaction of Odysseus when Demodocus sings of Troy. The hero is the only one who cannot feel pity and, therefore, pleasure, because the bard does not refer to the suffering of "another", but of his own, and, therefore, he is not sufficiently detached.211

The visual imaginative element, "bringing before the eyes", is fundamental for the process of transferring emotions from poet (or orator) to audience (Po. 17. 1455a21-22, Rh. 2. 1386a33-34).

210 Cf. Pity one expects (προσδοξάσειν, Rh.: 2. 1385b15) that a misfortune similar to one happening to another, will happen to himself or one of his/ or remembers that it has happened.

Thus, when the tragedian envisions his play, through creative *phantasia* (*de An.* 3. 427b), he conveys pity and fear and, further, he actualizes the two emotions for the audience, by making the events look real. Because of Aristotle's dislike of *opsis* (the external visual effects that may not be in agreement with the poetic text), most scholars have not remarked the importance of the internal vision *pro ommaton poiein* for the Aristotelian poetic theory.\(^{212}\) The same reason (critique of *opsis* in the *Poetics*) has obscured the fact that Aristotle may anticipate ideas that become very common in later literary criticism in antiquity, such as "seeing emotion" and poetic *phantasia*.\(^{213}\) Overall, Aristotle's theory provides us with important information about the psychological effects of pity and fear on the audience of tragedy. Furthermore, it suggests the mechanism through which the poet actualizes emotions for his audience as vividly as possible by imaginative vision, which remains an influential idea of literary criticism throughout antiquity.

A Homeric scholiast, for example,\(^{214}\) comments on the *Iliad* passage (22. 437), in which the news of Hector's death is brought to Hecuba but Andromache does not hear it, that this line increases

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\(^{212}\) As shown, scholars comment on "bringing before the eyes" in the *Poetics*, mostly to emphasize "contradictions" between Aristotle's treatment of *opsis*, or, at best, to show that he has favored internal visual elements as opposed to external.

\(^{213}\) Thus, *phantasia* in the creative sense is considered a post classic (third-century term) by G. Camassa, "Phantasia da Platone ai Neoplatonici," in *Phantasia - Imaginatio*, eds. M. Fattori and E. Bianchi (Roma, 1988), 26-55; S. Babut, "Sur la notion d' imitation dans les doctrines esthetiques de la Grece classique," *REG* 98 (1985), 72-73, says that Aristotle may have already recognized how poetic imagination differs from reality. And yet, Babut only offers as example the fact that characters of tragedy should appear better than real people (*Po*. 3. 1448a-b), which is far from being the most convincing example of Aristotle's suggestions about poetic vision. "A. Manieri's *L' Imagine Poetica nella Teoria degli Antichi* (Pisa & Roma, 1998), is a very well documented book on the history of poetic *phantasia*. And yet, she says that the poetic imagination is not clearly discussed anywhere in the *Rhetoric*, at 39: "Il problema, comunque, non e trattato explicitamente in nessun luogo della *Retorica*, l'idea di immaginazione nel seso di rappresentazione visiva che dipinge un oggetto sotto gli occhi del ascoltatori."

\(^{214}\) Homeric scholiasts considered the poet to be a precursor or tragedy, due to his ability to represent *pathos*: τραγῳδίας τραγικὸν ἔξεσθε προοίμιον (*Schol. Il. 1.1*). The examples I will use were suggested by the following articles: J. Griffin, "Homeric Pathos & Objectivity," *CQ* 26 (1978), 161-75 and N. J. Richardson, "Literary Criticism in the Exegetical Scholia to the *Iliad*," *CQ* 30 (1980), 265-87.
the emotion (αὐξεῖ πάθος). This is especially interesting when compared with Aristotle's remark about the arousal of pity in the Rhetoric, through pro ommaton poiein. One should present events as if about to happen or that have just happened. The explanation is that misfortunes that are about to occur, or have recently occurred are more pitiable (καὶ τὰ γεγονότα ἄρτι ἢ μέλλοντα διὰ ταχέων ἑλεινότερα, Rh. 3. 1386b1-2). The scholiast makes a strikingly similar remark. The reader's anticipation that Andromache is about to find out the horrifying news may enhance the emotion here. Later, when Andromache finally comes to the city walls and watches Hector's corpse being dragged around, the scholiast notes (Il. 22. 464-65) that "she the most pitiable vision to see" (ἐστὶ δὲ ἴδεῖν οἰκτροτάτην ὑπιν). This is reminiscent of the Aristotelian observation that pity should be visible, pathos en ophthalmois. Furthermore, Andromache's "seeing" a terrible sight, probably made the scholiast exclaim that the character herself was the most pitiable sight, which again recalls the Aristotelian observation that those in the grip of emotions best convey emotion.215 The scholiast of Sophocles' Ajax (Schol. Soph. Aj. 864) talks about a certain actor, who, like Plato's bard in the Ion or Aristotle's ideal orator or actor is able to bring pathos before the eyes of the audience. The performer should enable the viewers to imagine the hero (ἐις τὸν Αἴαντος φαντασίαν). Such an actor was Timotheus, who guided the spectators and charmed their souls though his delivery (ἐπιφανεῖ τῇ ὑπόκρισι).216

215 Many other observations of the scholiast present interest when connected with Aristotle. Thus dramatic and oratoric pity are connected in the Homeric scholia. When Helen deplores the fate of Troy, for example, (Il.24. 776), the scholiast observes that the Iliad ends with arousal of pity, as orators end their speeches with moving the audience to pity: πλείοντα ἐκίνησεν οίκτον. Ἐπὶ πλείστῳ δὲ ἐλέῳ καταστρέφει τὴν Ἰλιάδα, ὅθεν καὶ οἱ ῥήτορες ἐν τοῖς δικαιοκριτικοῖς ἐσχάτοις τιθέασιν τὸν οίκτον ὡς κινοῦντα τὸν ἀκροατήν.

216 Cf. Plutarch (Moral.17d), in which the spectators are "infected by passion" trough the voices of those who have suffered.
Later, imaginative vision, *phantasia*, becomes a fundamental principle through which both poetry and rhetoric can arouse *pathē* in the audience. Thus, Longinus defines *phantasia* as follows:\(^{217}\)

\[ \text{Καλείται μὲν γὰρ κοινὸς φαντασία πάν τὸ ὀπωσδήν ἐννομημα γέννητικὸν λόγου παριστάμενον ἡδὸν δὲ ἐπὶ τούτων κεκράτηκεν τούνομα, ὅταν ἃ λέγεις ύπε ἐνθοσιασμοῦ καὶ πάθους βλέπειν δοκής καὶ ύπε ὅψιν τοῖς ἀκούσοισιν. (Subl.15. 1-2) \]

For the term *phantasia* is used, in general, for an idea coming from any source and producing speech, but the meaning that now has prevailed regards those (discourses), in which, under the influence of enthusiasm and emotion, you seem to see what you describe and bring it vividly before the eyes of your listeners.

Longinus' general description of the term (to have a poetic vision) is reminiscent of Aristotle's view of creative *phantasia* (*De Anima*). The narrower definition of *phantasia*, which Longinus adopts, strikingly resembles the Aristotelian notion of *pro ommaton poiein* (to place the poetic vision before the eyes of the listeners), and an equivalent expression is used in the passage (ὕπε ὅψιν). Similarly, Quintilian's comments on *phantasia* echo Aristotle's theory:

\[ Quas φαντασίας Graeci vocant, nos visiones sane appellemus, per quas imagines rerum absentium ita representamur animo, ut eas cernere oculis ac praesente habere videamur, has quisquis bene ceperit, is erit affectibus potentissimus. (Inst. Or. 6. 2. 29-30). \]

We should certainly call visions what the Greeks call *phantasiae*, through which we so represent the images of absent things that we seem to discern them with our own eyes and have them present. Whoever has a hold of these (visions), he will be most powerful with respect to emotions.

The passage recovers the Aristotelian link between actualization and *pro ommaton*. Thus, the imagined things are visualized, *cernere oculis*, and seen as if present (*praesente*).\(^{218}\) Moreover, *phantasai* or *visiones* can bring before the eyes the images of absent things (*absentium rerum*), which seems to connect viewing a mimetic work of art and remembering. Remembering an absent

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\(^{218}\) As Aristotle links *pro ommaton* with *energeia*, so does Quintilian (*Inst. Or. 9. 2. 40*), who also notes that Cicero's *pro oculis subjectio* and Celsus' *evidentia* translate the Greek *energeia* or *hypotuposis*, which means: *proposita forma rerum ita expressa verbis ut cerni potius vedeantur quam audiri*. 
object as representation and watching an object of *mimesis* are similar mental processes.\(^{219}\) Finally, the idea that whoever uses *phantasia* properly is most powerful with respect to emotions (*in affectibus potentissimus*) is very similar to Aristotle's point (*Po. 17. 1455a*), in which the most convincing poets are those who visualize their plays and are in the grip of emotions.

In his *Confessions*, St. Augustine marvels at the paradoxical nature of tragic pleasure, from which he attempts to free himself in a quasi-Platonic manner:

*Rapiebant me spectacula theatrica plena imaginibus miserarum mearum et fomitibus ignis mei. Quid est quod ibi homo vult dolere cum spectat luctuosa et tragica, quae tamen pati ipse nollet. Et tamen pati vult ex eis dolorem spectator et dolor ipse est voluptas eius. Quid est nisi miserabilis insania?* (Conf. 5. 2. 13-18).

Theatrical performances were captivating me, full of visions of my misfortunes and fuel of my fire. What is it that one wants when he watches mournful and tragic [events], which, however, he himself would not want to suffer? And yet, the spectator wants to suffer and the pain derived from those [tragic sights] is the spectator's very pleasure. What is this if not unfortunate madness?

In addition to terms underlining the visual process of watching tragedies (*spectacula, spectat, spectator*), the passage clearly connects the imaginative visions conceived by tragedians to those of the viewer. Thus, the tragic performances were "full of images of misfortunes" (*plena imaginibus miserarum*), which Augustine metaphorically transfers to his own self (*mearum*). In conclusion, although the spectator can only passively sympathize with the tragic action, he nevertheless takes pleasure in the imaginative pain:

*Non tamen ad subveniendum provocatur auditor, sed tamen ad dolendum invitatur et auctori earum imaginum amplius favet cum amplius dolet.* (Conf. 5. 2. 33).

For the listener is not challenged to help [in the tragic circumstances], but only to feel pain and the more he feels the pain, the more he favors the author of these images.

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\(^{219}\) Similarities between the process of memory and that of viewing art are emphasized in Aristotle's *De Memoria*. I will next discuss this topic, while treating the Aristotle's ideas about tragic pleasure, *oikeia hedone*. 
Reminiscent of Plato’s view about tragic pleasure in the *Republic*, this statement once again draws attention to the transmission of imaginative vision, through a kind of contract (or chain) between poet and spectator. The more the spectator feels the painful emotion, the more he likes the creator of the painful visions, *auctori earum imaginum*. 
d) *Oikeia Hedone*.

Scholars have discussed tragic pleasure in the *Poetics* mainly as part of a larger Aristotelian concept of mimetic pleasure. I will focus my analysis on the concept of the *oikeia hedone* of tragedy, which has not been examined sufficiently. First, I will discuss the concept in the context of specific pleasure of an activity in Book Ten of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Then, I will discuss the "proper pleasure" of tragedy in connection with other Aristotelian views about the delights of memory and recollection. After denouncing the external visual element, Aristotle notes that there is an appropriate kind of pleasure for the genre:


For one should not seek every kind of pleasure from tragedy, but (only) the appropriate type. Since the poet has to produce the pleasure that comes from pity and fear through mimesis, obviously this should be built into the events.

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By connecting this remark with the description of mimesis in the Poetics, scholars have made some important observations regarding Aristotle's tragic pleasure. Overall, human beings have the innate tendency to imitate and take delight in mimetic works because these trigger a certain mental process:

(σύμφωνον...) καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. Σημείον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαίνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων. “Α γὰρ αὐτὰ λυπηρᾶς ὀρόμεν, τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μᾶλλον ἰκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωροῦντες, οἶνον θηρίον τε μορφὰς τῶν ἀτιμοτάτων καὶ νεκρῶν. αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἠδύστων ἄλλα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, ἄλλ' ἐπὶ βραχὺ κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτῶ. Διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο χαίρουσι τὰς εἰκόνας ὀρόμεντες, ὅτι συμβαίνει θεωροῦνται μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τὶ ἐκαστὸν, οἶνον ὅτι οὕτως ἔκεινος. (Po. 4. 1448b5, 8-17).

(it is natural) also that everyone delights in mimetic representations. A common proof of this comes from the following: we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is distressing, such as the forms of the most repulsive animals and of corpses. The explanation for this is also the fact that learning is very pleasurable not only to philosophers but likewise to all others, though the latter share in it less (than the former). This is why people enjoy looking at images, because while contemplating them it happens that they learn and infer what each element is, for example, this is that.

Aristotle uses here the verb "to learn", "to understand" (μανθάνειν) twice, in connection with pleasure. First, he states that everybody enjoys some basic type of learning, even if philosophers

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218 This account of mimesis posits some difficulties, since it deals with both imitation as a natural phenomenon (experienced by animals as well as human beings), and with artistic imitation. Thus, the birth of poetry has two natural causes (Poet. 4. 1448b3-4): the inborn tendency of human beings, in particular, (1) to imitate and (2) to enjoy imitations (4. 1448b5-8). Moreover, mimetic works are generally pleasurable, as the example of painting shows. Aristotle seems to use the concept of imitation in an extensive sense, that of mimicking (sounds and gestures perhaps), and also in more restrictive sense, that of arts as mimesis, i.e. poetry and painting. G. F. Else, "Imitation in
may experience cognitive delight on a more sophisticated level. Secondly, Aristotle describes the pleasure that people derive from mimetic works, by choosing the example of painting. In this case, "learning" consists of a reasoning process. The viewer delights in inferring the similarities between the model and its representation: \( \text{συλλογίζεσθαι τί ἔκαστον, οἷον οὗτος ἐκεῖνος.} \)

This account of pleasure produced by visual arts in the *Poetics* (4. 1448b) does not seem an adequate explanation for the pleasure of tragedy. But, as Halliwell rightly notes, tragic

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220 Cf. *Met.* 980a21: \( \text{πάντες ἀνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει.} \) S. Halliwell, "Aristotelian Mimesis and Human Understanding," in *Making Sense of Aristotle*, eds. O. Andersen and J. Haarberg (London, 2001), 87-107, interprets \( \text{μεισθέων} \) from *mimesis* as an important intellectual process, which does not quite equate a philosophical understanding of the world for Aristotle, but it is close to it. Any link between mimesis and "learning", Halliwell 1998, 78, convincingly argues, is certainly bold when we think of the Platonic dialogues and most likely a reply to Plato's critique of mimetic poetry.

221 P. T. Struck, "Allegory, Aenigma, and Anti - Mimesis: A Struggle Against Aristotelian Rhetorical Literary Theory," in *Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle*, eds. J. G. J. Abbenes, S. R. Slings & I. Sluiter (Amsterdam, 1995), 221-23, notes that Aristotle compares the poet with the picture painter no less than seven times in the *Poetics* (1. 1447a, 4. 1448a twice, 6. 1450a, 1450b, 15. 1454b, 25. 1460b). The analogy implies a criterion of clarity and plausibility for poetic mimesis, which should refer to the model represented as a painting does. This Aristotelian model of "clear" mimesis, Struck argues, has been extremely influential on later literary critics, such as Aristarchus, Cicero, and Quintilian, and opposed interpreting a poetic text as allegorical.

222 A certain recognition is involved in this cognitive process, as R. Dupont - Roc and J. Lallot 1980, 163, have remarked, "un plaisir de reconnaissance." Thus previous acquaintance with the model imitated is a condition *sine qua non* for pleasure. If the viewer does not recognize the subject of the imitation, then he does not enjoy the painting because of the imitation, but because of the execution or color of the painting: \( \text{ἐπεὶ ἓν μὴ τύχῃ προεξορκάω, οὐχ ἡ μίμημα ποιήσῃ τὴν ἡδονήν ἄλλα διὰ τὴν ἀπεργασίαν ἢ τὴν χροιὰν ἢ διὰ τοιαύτην πινὰ ἄλλην αἰτίαν.} \) (Po. 4. 1448b17-19).

223 The most interesting example is, perhaps, the one comparing a painting composed of random colors to an outline, which uses no colors (Po. 6. 1450a39-b3). The latter resembles the plot of a tragedy and produces more pleasure than the former. Though from different perspectives, both Plato and Aristotle use the analogy poetry - painting as forms of mimesis. From a modern point of view, the two arts are not so easily comparable. The most extensive study
hedone does appear to belong to the larger category, the hedone of mimesis, as genus relates to species. This view is supported by another passage in which Aristotle discusses mimetic pleasure more generally. Here he includes poetry among the arts that compel the audience to engage in a syllogistic process of learning, which ultimately produces delight:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μανθάνειν τε ἢδυ καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν, καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ἦδεα εἶναι οἶον τὸ τε μεμιμημένον, ὡσπερ γραφικὴ καὶ ἀνθριαντοποιία καὶ ποιητικὴ, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ἦ κἂν μὴ ἦδυ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον. Οὐ γὰρ ἔπι τούτῳ χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμὸς ἔστι ὅτι τούτῳ ἐκείνῳ, ὡστε μανθάνειν τι συμβαίνει. (Rh. 1. 1371b4-10).

Since to learn and to admire is pleasurable, other things are necessarily pleasurable, such as a mimetic work (lit. what has been imitated), for example painting and sculpture and poetry, and everything that is well imitated, even if the object of imitation is not in itself pleasant. For, one (the spectator) does not take delight in this (the subject of imitation), but in reasoning process: this is that, so one learns what is going on (in the artistic representation).

Moreover, the Poetics often confirms the idea that tragic pleasure presumes such a cognitive element. The dramatic composition has to be logical, but, at the same time surprising, which may combine in the spectator's reaction a process of "learning" (μανθάνειν), in the sense of reasoning, and being "amazed at" (θαυμάζειν). Events, for example, should occur on account of one another, and also contrary to expectation in the best kind of tragic plot. Best recognition comes from reasoning and is accompanied by reversal. This suggests that the audience should enjoy following the rational development of the tragic story, its plausibility, and, simultaneously,
marvel at the unexpected.\textsuperscript{226} Moreover, lexical devices lead to a similar type of pleasure,\textsuperscript{227} as the following observation shows clearly:

\begin{quote}
\textit{τὸ γάρ μανθάνειν ῥαδίως ἠδύν σύσιν ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα σημαίνει τι, ὡστε ὅσα τῶν ὀνομάτων ποιεῖ ἡμῖν μάθησιν, ἡδίστα. (Rh. 3. 1410b10-11).}
\end{quote}

To learn easily is naturally pleasant to all, and words signify something, so whatever words create knowledge in us are the most pleasurable.

It is especially remarkable that Aristotle prefers figures of speech that delight the listener through a cognitive process,\textsuperscript{228} which strikingly resembles the reasoning of the viewer in the passage on painting (\textit{Po.} 4. 1448b8-17). A good example in this respect is the characterization of a simile in contrast with metaphor:

\begin{quote}
\textit{”Εστι γάρ ἡ εἶκών, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, μεταφορά διαφέρουσα προθέσει· διὸ ἦττον ἠδύν, ὅτι μακρότερως· καὶ οὐ λέγει ὅς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο. οὐκον οὐδὲ ξητεῖ τοῦτο ἡ ψυχή. (Rh. 3. 1410b17-19).}
\end{quote}

A simile is, as it has been said earlier, a metaphor differing in the way it is put (lit. in its setting). Therefore, it is less pleasing because it is longer and because it does not signify that this is that. Thus the soul [of the listener] does not seek this [i.e. to infer that this is so].

As the viewer recognizes in the mimetic painting some elements, which remind him of the model represented, and yet, which are not identical with them, so the listener discovers in metaphorical

\textsuperscript{226} As Aristotle clearly states, \textit{peripeteiai}, reversals of fortune are pleasurable because they produce wonder: (χαίρει) καὶ αἱ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σοζέσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων· Πάντα γάρ θαυμαστὰ τάυτα. (Rh. 1. 1371b10-11). For the pleasurable effect of wonder, which promotes surprise in connection with intelligible causation of tragic events, R. Hepburn, \textit{Wonder and Other Essays} (Edinburgh, 1984), 131-54; S. Halliwell 1998, 74-76.

\textsuperscript{227} Aristotle suggests that language is a source of delight in the definition of tragedy itself, which is composed in "garnished language" (ἡδοσιένω λόγο, \textit{Po.} 6. 1449b25).

\textsuperscript{228} Metaphors, urbanities and riddles presuppose such a reasoning process in the mind of the listener. They are often accompanied by surprise. (Rh. 3. 1412a).
language elements that lead him to the object signified. In both instances, cognitive pleasure derives from the reasoning (in the viewer's or listener's mind): "this is that," and thus from the ability to discern the likeness as well as the difference between the original and its artistic representation.

Sufficient evidence indicates that, for Aristotle, tragic discourse should delight the audience through its subtle composition. Therefore, the description of the Aristotelian concept of tragic pleasure as "cognitive" qua mimesis is accurate, and yet not complete. In the definition of the oikeia hedone, a poet ought to contrive pleasure not only through mimesis but, in fact, "from pity and fear", through imitation (ἀπὸ ἔλεου καὶ φόβου διὰ μιμήσεως, Po. 14. 1453b11). Since the emotions are named as a source, they have to be crucial for the pleasure of tragedy. This emphasis on pathe, nevertheless, has not been discussed adequately. E. Belfiore has tried to prove that tragic pleasure is exclusively cognitive and somehow educational. In the conclusion of her book, she emphasizes that the spectator should perceive tragic characters not in pitiable situations, but rather in shameful ones. Thus, the audience could learn a moral lesson: to produce aidos in the soul, by avoiding "shameless emotions" (i.e. pity and fear), which would preserve

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229 Although a metaphor is different from the notion signified, the poet has to capture the similarities between the signified and signifier, through contemplating the alike (τὸ γάρ ἐν μεταφέρειν τὸ τὸ ὁμοιον θεωρεῖν ἐστιν, Po. 22. 1459a7-7; cf. Rh. .3. 1405a8-10). The listener can thus discover the notion signified. This seems to be true in the case of mimetic painting (Po. 4. 1448b), the painting does not exactly copy model but sufficiently resembles it, so that the viewer can infer "this is so and so".

230 Belfiore 1990, 316-18, tries to connect tragic pleasure with the pleasure without pain and desire, such as the pleasure of contemplation (EN 7. 1152b36ff), which would be closer to the rational, pure part of the soul. On the other hand, at 354-59, Belfiore suggests that the Aristotelian spectator should learn emotional lessons from "friendship" and "shame" (αἰδώς), not from pity and fear, which would make "tragedy better than philosophy."
the *polis*.

This interpretation departs from the text of the *Poetics* and denies the link between *eleos* and *phobos* and tragic pleasure. S. Halliwell correctly observes that the *oikeia hedone* is both cognitive and emotional. Nonetheless, he analyzes the cognitive aspects without sufficiently exploring how emotions may enter the equation of the appropriate pleasure of the genre. Heath identifies the problem: if we regard the *oikeia*, the "peculiar" pleasure of tragedy only as part of the general pleasure of *mimesis*, we do not understand its particularity. In his opinion, the solution lies in the fact that tragedy is a noble form of recreation for the audience. Such an explanation, nevertheless, does not account for the presence of pity and fear in the definition of tragic pleasure. In fact, the emotional aspect (the fearful and pitiable) seems to be specific to tragic *mimesis* and to distinguish tragic pleasure from the pleasure of *mimesis* overall, as I will show by looking at Aristotle's comments on the subject.

A synopsis of the general discussion about the *oikeia hedone* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is as follows. Pleasure perfects every activity and is, therefore, diverse:

"Ἀνευ τε γὰρ ἐνεργείας οὐ γίνεται ἡδονή, πᾶσάν τε ἐνέργειαν τελειοὶ ἢ ἡδονή.

"Οθεν δοκοῦσι καὶ τὸ εἴδει διαφέρειν (EN 10. 1175a21-22).

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231 1990, 358.-9. Belfiore's book is generally insightful and has the merit to look at the issues in the *Poetics* in connection with other Aristotelian works. However, I strongly disagree with her conclusions. Belfiore attempts to find a reply to Plato's critique of tragedy in the *Republic*, by eliminating and replacing pity and fear, as often seen with the interpreters of *catharsis*. Yet, this is misleading. Indeed tragic emotions are difficult to interpret in the *Poetics*, but there is no need to disregard them, when Aristotle insists on their importance.

232 1998, 76. Halliwell says that "cognition and emotion are integrated" in the tragic pleasure. He decides, nonetheless, to pursue analyzing *oikeia hedone* as a genus of the generic mimetic pleasure, which leads to the emphasis on the cognitive aspect and for which the text of the *Poetics* offers more, though sketchy, explanations.

For there is no pleasure without activity, and pleasure perfects every activity. Hence (pleasure) seems to be different in species.

This premise of specific *hedone* occurs in a context that raises problems with respect to terminology as well as content. Pleasure "perfects" an activity not in the sense of making it whole, but rather in the sense of "crowning" an already complete activity:


But the pleasure perfects an activity not as the fixed disposition does, by being already present, but as some supervening perfection, like the bloom in those who are vigorous.

The cryptic phrasing suggests that pleasure would follow an activity as a supervening completion (ἐπιγιγνόμενόν τι τέλος). Then, is pleasure a result of an activity (ἐνέργεια)? If so, how does it complete the activity and what exactly is the relationship between the two? Additional explanations to this point are even more baffling:

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234 For comparison between the accounts of pleasure in the Aristotelian works, see my introductory note p. 91. Gosling and Taylor 1982, 263-83, place the discussion of proper pleasure (*EN*) in its philosophical background. Eudoxus defined pleasure as the supreme good. Plato dismissed the hedonist position, most prominently in the *Philebus* (i.e. the expression "proper pleasures", 51a1). Aristotle defends Eudoxus, to some extent, but also adopts the Platonic hierarchy of intellectual pleasures as superior to the rest. For a more extensive treatment of the relationship between Aristotle's account of pleasure in the *Ethics*, Plato's *Philebus*, the anti-hedonist position of Speusippus, and hedonist Eudoxus, G. van Riel, "Aristotle's Definition of Pleasure: a Refutation of the Platonic Account," *Ancient Philosophy* 20 (2000), 119-38.

235 Ἐνέργεια is itself a problematic term here. Commonly translated with "activity" in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (Cf. LSJ sv. 1, as opposed to "disposition", ἡξίς), it also has the sense of "actualization" in the Aristotelian philosophy (Cf. LSJ sv. 2, as opposed to "potentiality", δύναμις). In this context, the term does refer to an activity being performed (i. e. music, philosophy, *EN* 10. 1175a13-16), but it also has a broader meaning. Thus, life itself is a kind of activity (*EN* 10. 1175a12, probably in the sense of process by which something attains its form), in which case "actualization" may be a better rendition of the word.

Therefore, as long as both object of thought or of perceived, and the subject discerning or judging are such as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity; for, similarly, when both the passive (pathetikou) and the active (making, poietikou) parts remain themselves and unchanged in relation to one another, the same result is naturally produced.

The abstract language used here is extremely difficult to decode. A first question regards the activity. What is the ἐνέργεια in this case? Activity, resulting in pleasure, seems to take place when the perceived (or the object of thought) is as "it should be" (οἶον δεῖ) in relation with the perceiving (or thinking). And yet this is not very helpful - how "should" they be? In the second example, activity appears to be already complete at the moment when pleasure is produced, since the making (ποιητικὸν) part and the part suffering the action (παθητικὸν) are in an unaltered relation to one another. Secondly, who feels pleasure? As far as the abstruse wording allows interpretation, one seems to experience pleasure through a twofold process. (1) The

Aristotle and the Neoplatonists (Brill, 2000), 57, well summarize the scholarly divergence in understanding the relation between pleasure and activity in this passage. Some commentators tend to diminish the significance of the idea of pleasure as "supplementary perfection." So do, for example, Gosling & Taylor 1982, 211-2, 249-50: pleasure perfects activity (frequently repeated in EN 10), and one perfection is enough. Based on this passage, others emphasize pleasure has a "different" perfection as addition to activity. For example, R. A. Gautier and J. Y. Jolif, 1970, vol. 2, 838-43. J. M. Rist, The Mind of Aristotle (Toronto and London, 1989), 109; G. van Riel 2000, 58. Both positions seem to me somewhat extreme. I like best G. J. Hughes' suggestion on the passage, Aristotle on Ethics (London and New York, 2001), 198, "Enjoying something just is part and parcel of performing a natural activity at its best. It can be thought of as something different and additional."

I do not necessarily see a contradiction between this point and the later statement that pleasure enhances activity, as some scholars do. C. Rowe and S. Broadie, Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford, 2002), 437, "Aristotle should explain how, if pleasure supervenes an activity (EN 10. 1175b31), it also strengthens it". In my opinion, Aristotle implies an interdependence activity - pleasure. When activity is well done (in this sense complete) and the doer has
activity is well performed (in this sense, complete), so, for example, the one who is thinking relates properly to the object of thought. (2) Pleasure may occur at a subsequent realization that the activity is complete (i.e. when the thinker realizes that he has thought correctly). Although the passage is too complicated to venture any definite conclusions, the definition of pleasure as supervening perfection may have consequences for aesthetic pleasure. If *hedone* derives from being aware that an activity is perfect, the audience could derive pleasure from perceiving tragedy as imitation of a *complete* action. Then, pleasure might occur, when the spectator's perception is as it "should be" in connection with the tragic action perceived and when one is properly affected (i.e. moved to pity and fear).

Apart from the preliminary discussion of *hedone* and *energeia*, the account of proper pleasure runs smoothly. As activities are different in quality, so are the pleasures perfecting them:

\[(\text{oíómeθa}) \text{ ómoeías καὶ τάς ἐνεργείας τάς διαφερούσας τῷ εἴδει ὑπὸ διαφέροντων εἴδει τελειούσθαι (\text{EN} \ 10. \ 1175a \ 22, 25-26).}\]

Similarly we think that activities different in kind are perfected by [pleasures] different in kind. Pleasures are thus different, in accordance with the activities, which they perfect, or "proper" to their activities, and the appropriate pleasure enhances the activity:

\[(\text{διαφέρουσι}) \text{ καὶ αἱ τελειοῦσαι δὴ ἥδοναί. φανείη δὲ ἃν τούτῳ καὶ ἕκ τοῦ συνορειώσθαι τῶν ἥδονῶν ἐκάστην τῇ ἐνέργειᾳ ἣν τελειοῖ. Συναύζει γὰρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἢ οἰκεῖα ἥδονή. (\text{EN} \ 10. \ 1175a\ 28-31).}\]

Therefore, pleasures that perfect (activities) also differ from each other. This may also appear so from the way in which each kind of pleasure harmonizes with the activity which it perfects. For, proper pleasure augments the activity.

the awareness that it is so, then he feels pleasure. Thereupon, when one feels the proper pleasure of an activity, he will become more involved in that activity.
Aristotle does not further explain or illustrate what is "specific" (οἰκεῖον) in the pleasures of various activities, as one may have expected, and which would have been useful for our discussion. Instead, he states that proper pleasures intensify activities, because people perform activities better if they enjoy them. By contrast, pain (λύπη), here used in the sense of "dislike", ruins an activity. For example, when someone regards counting as unpleasant, he stops doing sums, because the activity is painful to him (EN 10. 1175b17-19). An interesting observation is that "alien" (ἀλλότρια) pleasures have an effect similar to aversion (λύπη) toward an activity. Alien pleasures, it has been said, do something that is very close to dislike. For they destroy (an activity), only not to the same extent.

The alien pleasures impede an activity, because they belong to other actions than the one performed at the moment, and thus can distract somebody from the oikeia hedone. For example, persons who love flute music cannot pay attention to a philosophical discussion, when they overhear someone playing flute. Pleasure of music impairs the proper pleasure of study in this instance (EN 10. 1175b3-7).

At this point, Aristotle passes to classifying pleasures. He makes a first distinction based on quality - more exactly "purity" of pleasure. As seeing is superior in purity to all the other senses, so the pleasures of thought (διάνοια) excel those of the senses, and the pleasures of either class differ among themselves in purity. The criterion of "purity" seems to refer here to the degree to which activities, and therefore their corresponding pleasures, pertain to form.
without matter. A second division deals with pleasure as proper to species. Every animal has its own pleasure, oikeia hedone, just as its own function (érgov) namely the pleasure of exercising that function through an activity (énergeia). This observation may have some validity for the proper pleasure of tragedy, since analogy between literary genres and living creatures occurs frequently in the Poetics. Furthermore, pleasures vary within the same species and human individuals are often subjective when they regard something as pleasurable or not: tā γὰρ αὐτὰ τοὺς μὲν τρέπει τοῖς δὲ λυπεῖ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν λυπηρὰ καὶ μισητὰ ἐστὶ τοῖς δὲ ἥδεα καὶ φιλητᾶ. (EN 10. 1176a 11-12).

The same things delight some men and upset others, and things painful and displeasing to some, are pleasant and attractive to others.

Finally, ethical characteristics divide pleasures into good, when they perfect noble activities leading to happiness, and bad, when they relate to base actions (EN 10. 1176a17-35).

The account of pleasures proper to activities in the Nicomachean Ethics can provide a framework for the few, scattered references to oikeia hedone in the Poetics. I have already suggested, with much caution, some possible repercussions of Aristotle's overall views about

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238 EN 10. 1176a1-3: διαφέρει δὲ ἡ ὁπλῆς ὁφῆς καθαρεύτητι, καὶ ἀκοή καὶ ὀφθαλμῆς γεύσεως. Ὁμοίως δὴ διαφέρουσι καὶ αἱ ἡδοναὶ, καὶ τούτων αἱ περὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ ἐκάτερα ἄλλα ἠλλήλων.

239 F. H. Eterovich, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: Commentary and Analysis (Washington, 1980), 245. I do not believe that there can be only one, precise way of explaining the word catharsis in the Poetics, as I have previously argued. The use of the term "purity" in connection with pleasure (EN 10) could add yet another reading to the controversial word catharsis in the definition of tragedy. Tragic emotions may not pertain to the matter (i. e. would not be felt at real situations) but to the form (i. e. felt during a cognitive "activity", when represented by tragic mimesis).

240 δοκεῖ δ' εἶναι ἐκάστῳ ἡπὼν καὶ ἡδονή οἰκεία ὁσπερ καὶ ἔργον. Η γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἐνεργείαν. (EN 10. 1176a-4). Pleasure of a horse would differ from that of a man (EN 10. 1176a4-6), etc.

241 Thus tragedy is compared to a living being (ζῷον, Po. 7. 1450b34-51a4) and so is epic (Po. 23. 1459a20). For a good discussion of the biological analogy in the Poetics, E. Belfiore 1990, 55-57. For ethical implication of
proper pleasures on the specific tragic pleasure. In several instances in the *Poetics*, Aristotle refers to something as being or not being "particular" to tragedy. When dealing with construction of the plot, which should meet certain requirements to achieve the "function of tragedy" (τραγῳδίας ἔργον, *Po.* 13. 1452b30), he recommends

... δεί τὴν συνθέσειν εἶναι τῆς καλλίστης τραγῳδίας μὴ ἁπλῆν ἄλλα πεπληγμένην, καὶ ταύτην φοβερόν καὶ ἐλεεινόν εἶναι μιμητικὴν (τοῦτο γὰρ ἰδίον τῆς τοιαύτης μιμητικῆς ἐστίν). (Po. 13. 1452b31-33).

The structure of the finest tragedy has to be not simple, but complex and imitating fearful and pitiable events, for this is the special feature of such mimesis.

Imitation of the "fearful and pitiable" is thus called the "particular" (ἰδίον), characteristic of tragedy. On numerous other occasions, the *Poetics* emphasizes that the tragic plot represents the two emotions, and yet, here this is defined as the unique feature that differentiates tragedy as genus from other types of mimesis, be it painting, sculpture, etc. By contrast, *opsis*, the external visual element, could be conducive to the fearful and pitiable (Po. 14. 1445b1-2), but it is the "least particular" (ἡκιστα ὀἰκεῖον, *Po.* 6. 1450b17), element to tragic poetry. I have discussed extensively the reasons for which Aristotle makes such discrimination. Another detail is of interest for my analysis here. When *opsis* produces an effect matching that of good tragic composition ("of pitiable and fearful"), it can be attractive (Po. 6. 1450b16), and it can pertain to tragedy, though to the least extent. On the other hand, if *opsis* is used for a different result, it has nothing to do with tragedy:

οἱ δὲ μὴ τὸ φοβερὸν διὰ τῆς ὁψεως, ἄλλα τὸ τερατώδες μόνον παρασκευάζοντες οὐδὲν τραγῳδίας κοινωνοῦσιν (Po. 14. 1453b 8-9).

Aristotle’s "poetic" teleology, F. G. Held, "Spoudaios and Teleology in the Poetics," *TAPA* 114 (1984), 159-76; G.
Those who use spectacle to create an effect not of the fearful, but only of the sensational have nothing at all in common with tragedy.

What is so incriminating, so unforgivable about those who employ the "sensational" (τερατωδες) that they are banished from the realm of tragedy? The transgression, I believe, concerns replacing something that is "proper", intrinsic to tragedy, the fearful (φοβερόν) with a foreign component. More importantly, Aristotle sets his definition of proper pleasure of the genre as an explanation to this point. For one should not seek every pleasure from tragedy, (οù γαρ πάσαν δεί ζευγείν ἡμον ἀπὸ τραγῳδίας, Po. 14. 1453b9-10), but the proper one, oikeia, which should be derived from eleos and phobos (Po. 14. 1453b11-13). The implication is that other devices could be pleasurable, such as the sensational, but they are not proper to tragic pleasure. Pity and fear are specific to tragic mimesis, and therefore ought to be proper to the pleasure tragedy produces as "activity", to borrow the language of the Nicomachean Ethics. Then, if opsis results in the fearful and the pitiable, its effect coincides with the nature of tragic mimesis and does not impede the nature of the oikeia hedone. On the other hand, if opsis leads to some other effect, such as the "sensational", the hedone, that it may create would be "alien" and would distract from the oikeia hedone, as account of Nicomachean Ethics puts it.

The connection between pity and (or) fear and pleasure of tragedy can be found in the Greek culture preceding Aristotle. On the other hand, the concept of "proper pleasure" of the

F. Held, Aristotle's Teleological Theory of Tragedy and Epic (Heidelberg, 1995), 1-46.

242 Aristotle's emphasis on tragedy as imitation of a single action, praxis, not of a single event, as well as on concentration of tragic mimesis may suggest that he is thinking of pleasure derived from genre as pleasure of an activity. In this sense, one of his criteria for tragedy's preeminence compared to epic may be significant: έτι τῷ ἐν ἠλάττοντι μήκει τῷ τέλος τῆς μιμήσεως εἶναι (τῷ γὰρ ἄθροιστον ήδιον ἢ πολλοὶ κεκραμένον τῷ χρόνῳ. (Po. 26. 1462b3-4).

243 See my discussion, Gorgias (Hel. 8-9 Kranz); Plato talks about epic pleasure in several dialogues (Ion 535b-e, Phlb. 48a6) and about tragic pleasure (R.10. 605c-d). A B. Seidensticker, "Uber das Vergnügen an tragischen
genre is Aristotelian, as far as we can tell. Therefore, when Aristotle suggests that tragedians should contrive the *oikeia hedone* from "fearful and pitiable" exclusively, he has in mind his own criteria, which an ideal spectator would adopt. In practice, audiences seem to have had less restrictive standards and to have derived "other", alien pleasures, while watching tragedies. A relevant point in this sense is the discussion of double plot (Po. 13. 1453a33ff). Aristotle ranks this kind of plot (with opposite outcomes for good and bad characters, like the *Odyssey*) only as second and inferior to the simple one. Some, however, believe that the double is the best, but they are mistaken: δοκεῖ δὲ εἶναι πρῶτη διὰ τὴν τῶν θεάτων ἀσθένειαν ἀκολουθοῦσι γὰρ οἱ ποιηταὶ κατ’ εὐχὴν ποιοῦντες τοὺς θεατὰς Ἐστιν δὲ οὐχ αὐτὴ ὑπὸ τραγῳδίας ἡδονὴ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας. Εἰκῇ γὰρ οἱ ἐν ἔχθιστοι ὡσιν ἐν τῷ μῶθῳ, φίλοι γενόμενοι ἐπὶ τελευτής ἐξέρχονται, οἶον Ὀρέστης καὶ Αἰγισθός, καὶ ἀποθνῄσκει οὐδείς ὑπὸ οὐδενός (Poet. 13. 1453a34-38).

(The double plot structure) seems to be the best because of the weakness of the audiences, for the poets follow and fulfill the wish of the spectators. Yet, it is not the pleasure (to expect) from tragedy, but rather the pleasure proper to comedy. In such cases, those who are worst enemies, such as Orestes and Aegisthus, exit at the end as new friends, and no one dies at the hand of anyone.

Double plots were clearly popular among audiences, from what it is said. Perhaps, Aristotle is here at odds with some critics and doubtlessly he dislikes the tragic practice. I have quoted the passage in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (10. 1176a11-12), which says that the same thing can be pleasurable to some and annoying to others, to show that Aristotle is aware of personal taste. And yet, in this passage, no tolerance is granted to a different aesthetic choice. Aristotle's intolerance comes from the fact that, in his opinion, audiences do not understand a principle, the

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Gegenständen*, in Fragmenta Dramatica. (Beiträge zur Interpretation der griechischen Tragikerfragmente und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte, eds. A. Harder and H. Hofmann (Göttingen, 1991), 219-41, provides excellent survey of the ancient views about aesthetic pleasure in Greek culture.

244 Ανάγκη ἃρα τῶν καλῶν ἔχοντα μῦθον ἀπλοῦν εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ διπλοῦν. (Po. 13. 1453a12).
one of proper pleasure of tragedy. The "weakness of the spectators" (θεάτων ἀσθένειαν) is conceptual, and the poets appear to know this, but they compromise their dramatic structure, in order to satisfy their audiences. Indeed, the argument against the value of double plot is made on the basis of the specific pleasure of the genre. Such plot structure produces a hedone, which is rather "proper" to comedy. As the examples suggest, double plot does not represent the "fearful and pitiable", and consequently cannot lead to the hedone derived from eleos and phobos, which is the oikeia of tragedy.

Finally, the concept of "proper pleasure" is one of the reasons that Aristotle, unlike some of his contemporaries, regards tragedy as superior to epic. After drawing a comparison between the two genres, he concludes with the following observation:

Εἰ οὖν τούτοις διαφέρει πᾶσιν καὶ ἐπὶ τῷ τέχνης ἔργῳ (δεὶ γὰρ οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν ἕδονήν ποιεῖν αὐτάς ἄλλα τὴν εἰρημένην), φανερὸν ὅτι κρείττων ἄν εἴη μᾶλλον τοῦ τέλους τυγχάνουσα τῆς ἐποποιίας. (Po. 26. 1462b12-18).

If then [tragedy] excels in all these respects, as well as in the function (ergon) of the art - for these genres should not produce pleasure by chance, but the one which has been said - it is clear that [tragedy] should be superior, by achieving its completion more than the epic.

As the passage states, both genres should not produce a random (τυγχάνουσα) pleasure, but the one "which has been said", which can only be the "proper", the oikeia. A question is whether

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245 The examples would not even fit the scenario that is least conducive to pity. In double plot, even the deadliest enemies would become friends. However, if enemy attacks enemy, there is nothing pitiable either in the deed or in its prospect, except for the suffering (Po. 14. 1453b15-17). Thus, double plot would not meet even the minimal requirement for being conducive to pity.


247 As seen from the passages quoted, references to "proper pleasure" are usually preceded by a brief note that not "every kind" of pleasure should derived from a genre, but the proper one. Here Aristotle says that no random pleasure should be produced, but the "mentioned" - which has to be the proper (cf. PA 645a23-24), where the final
Aristotle means here a *hedone*, which would be proper to each of them separately, or the same one, specific to both (epic and tragic). The issue becomes even more complicated because the *Poetics* offers no elucidation about what the "specific" element involves, in the case of epic pleasure. The treatise only asserts that epic ought to achieve its *oikeia hedone*, by being constructed like tragedy, around a single and complete action, which resembles a whole living being. Since references to the pleasure of epic always occur in connection with tragedy, the *oikeia hedone* of the two genres is most likely the same, or a similar one. Therefore, as Else has remarked, Aristotle probably considers the pleasure derived from pity and fear *oikeia* not only to tragedy but also to epic. This would also explain why tragedy surpasses epic in this respect, since it is more able to produce the emotional *hedone* than epic poetry.

Thus, tragic pleasure has a "proper", emotional element, derived from "pity and fear", in addition to the general characteristics of mimetic pleasure. Difficulties arise, however, when interpreting this emotional element of tragic pleasure. Perhaps, a solution lies in the idea of *hedone* as supervening perfection. Pleasure may come from awareness that an activity is complete, and so it becomes a supplementary perfection in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. The *Poetics* uses the words "perfection" (τέλος) and "function"(ἔργον) ambiguously, as

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248 Περί δὲ τῆς διηγηματικῆς καὶ ἐν μέτρῳ μιμητικῆς, ὡς ὅτι δεῖ τούς μύθους καθάπερ ἐν ταῖς ἑρωιδοτίασις συνιστάναι δραματικούς καὶ περί μίαν πράξιν ὅλην καὶ τελείαν ἔχουσαν ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσα καὶ τελείαν ἰν ὅσπερ ζῆσον ἐν ὁλὸν ποιή τὴν οἰκείαν ἡδονή δὴλον. (*Po.* 23. 1459a1-4).

249 Else1957, 650-53, offers an illuminating analysis of this problem. He notes that Aristotle never connects pity and fear with epic directly, as he does with tragedy, but nevertheless often implies it. At 652, Else concludes, with caution, that "By τὴν εἰρημένην (ήδονήν) Aristotle means the pleasure based on pity and fear. Both genres aim at it, but tragedy succeeds where the epic in general fails. Even Homer's epic cannot achieve the concentration of emotion and therefore of pleasure based on emotion, which tragedy achieves."
pertaining to either plot, or to arousal of emotion and pleasure. So, for example, plot is the completion of tragedy (Po. 6. 1450a22) and a little later the function (Po. 6. 1450a30-31). In other cases, however, such as the comparison between tragedy and epic, which I have mentioned (Po.26. 1462 b12-15), completion (τελος) refers to the genre creating pleasure. In light of the discussion of the Nicomachean Ethics, the spectator's awareness that plot imitates a complete, fearful and pitiable action, may itself produce tragic pleasure. The oikeia hedone should involve pity and fear, as the activity (tragic plot) which it perfects should, so that both tragic action and its supervenient pleasure share the same characteristics.

Even if my suggestions construe the Aristotelian idiosyncrasy in defining the concept of proper pleasure, they still leave open questions. How could pity and fear, which are each a kind of pain, be linked to pleasure? A strange passage in the Nicomachean Ethics states that when the perceiving (or thinking) subject was in the right relationship with the object perceived (or thought), pleasure would ensue (as aforementioned, EN 10. 1174b34-1175a1). And yet, it does not specify what would happen if the object perceived -such as tragic action - arouses sorrowful emotions. More exactly, how would the audience experience a hedone, which has painful pathe as precondition? Furthermore, as the examples the Poetics indicate, Aristotle thinks of an ideal audience, for whom the poet should "prepare" the pleasure specific to the genre (Po. 14. 1453b10-14). He only mentions real audiences when they fail to understand the emotional prerequisite of the oikeia hedone, as in the case of double plot (Po. 13. 1453a34-38). Then, the correct question to ask is how would the ideal spectator feel the tragic pleasure based on pity and fear? Aristotle does not offer any explanations. Furthermore, he does not seem concerned with the paradox involved in the oikeia hedone, but he only asserts that it ought to come from eleos

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250 E. Belfiore 1990, 57, well notes this ambiguity, but she explains it exclusively in the view of Aristotle's biology.
and *phobos*. Does he not see a paradox here, or does he accept it as the "nature" of tragic pleasure, without further inquiry. Since the *Poetics* does not give a direct response, I will further examine several possible answers to the problem. My analysis will aim at exploring suggestions, which the Aristotelian psychology of emotions can provide to this puzzling issue.

A simplistic way of "solving" the paradox of the *oikeia hedone* would be to eliminate the tragic emotions from its equation. While dealing with the example of visual arts, Aristotle states that people enjoy looking even at the ugliest beasts in paintings, because they derive pleasure from *mimesis*, which implies reasoning. The viewer delights in even the most disgusting images represented in a painting, thanks to *mimesis*. Similarly, some scholars suggest, the spectator may enjoy tragedies exclusively through cognitive pleasure and by emotional disengagement. Such an argument is erroneous and far from the Aristotelian thought. The point in *Poetics* (4. 1448b10-18) is that a mimetic work can produce delight despite its subject,

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251 The term τέλος refers to emotional pleasure (Po. 25. 1460b24-6; Po. 26. 1462ba18-b1).

252 Perhaps this is the case and the question of how tragic pleasure and painful emotions can coexist is only a modern question. After all, Plato acknowledges this paradox in the *Republic*. He does say that by feeling pity and pleasure at watching tragedies or epic performances, the spectator relaxes the weak part of the soul, and then feels emotions more acutely in real life, see my comments, pp. 29-31. And yet, this is not an explanation of the paradox of tragic pleasure, but rather of the consequences of aesthetic pleasure on Greek audiences.

253 Besides the examples I have cited in the *Poetics*, similar remarks are to be found in other Aristotelian works (Rh. 1. 371b1-4, *PA* 1. 645a7-15).

254 According to this line of interpretation, *catharsis* purifies or eliminates tragic emotions, and then the audience experiences cognitive pleasure. Thus Belfiore 1990; R. Sorabji, *Emotion and the Peace of Mind* (Oxford, 2000), 80, seems to suggest the same: "There remain objections about reactions to the plot being enjoyable or therapeutic, when the real emotions would merely be distressing. . . To take the ancient answers, one is Aristotle's theory of catharsis of such emotions as pity and fear. Aristotle also mentions many other pleasures involved in art and drama, as well as its specific tragic pleasure. There is a further point. Even in real life the ancients repeatedly noticed, people find pleasure in grief, in jealousy, in anger and in such disgusting things as corpses." I think that Sorabji's outline does not explain much here and oversimplifies the complex Aristotelian observations about aesthetic pleasure derived from painful sights.
which may not be aesthetically pleasing, through *mimesis*. This may relate to the subject of tragic mimesis, but does not concern the tragic emotions. Tragedy should create its proper pleasure not in spite of painful emotions, but because of (from) pity and fear, through *mimesis*, as stated in the *Poetics* (14. 1453b10-14). Furthermore, to assume that Aristotle conceived an audience that delights in watching the misfortunes of others, without feeling any emotions, is preposterous. According to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, the Greeks (and therefore the Greek audience) become angry at someone who would rejoice or even would be indifferent at the undeserved misfortune of another:


[They become angry] at those rejoicing and generally taking pleasure in other's misfortunes; for it is a sign of being either an enemy or a despising person; and [they become angry] with those who do not care if they suffer.

Indeed, the definition of the *oikeia hedone* is enigmatic. Aristotle adopts in the passage containing the definition, as often in the treatise, the perspective of tragedy and not the reception of tragedy. He gives us no reason, nonetheless, to disregard the role of tragic emotions in the audience's experience of *oikeia hedone*, when he describes how a poet should contrive such pleasure from emotions. As I have argued, pity, the most detached *pathos* in the Aristotelian theory, presupposes imaginative involvement of the spectator. Tragic fear is a very specific type of emotion, which depends on pity and consists of realizing that human condition is prone to suffering. Because of these attributes and because the two emotions are felt due to *mimesis*, I will suggest, tragic *pathe* may relate to pleasure. Several Aristotelian accounts of pleasure provide
useful parallels for the paradoxical delectation of tragedy. Memories, for example, can be pleasurable even when they involve unpleasant events:

\[ \text{τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ἡδέα ἐστίν οὐ μόνον ὡσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὡτὲ παρὴν, ἄλλα ἔνια καὶ οὔχ ἡδέα, ἀν ἢ ὑστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο. . . τοῦτον ἀιτιον ὅτι ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακὸν. (Rhet. 1. 11. 1370b1-3, 6-7).} \]

Things remembered are thus pleasurable not only about things that were pleasant when they were going on, even about some unpleasant events, if what comes afterwards is good and honorable . . . the reason for this is that not having an evil is also pleasurable.

This comment becomes even more interesting when placed in the context that introduces Aristotle's discussion about the joys of memory, as it follows:

\[ \text{Εἰπὲ δ ἡν ἢ ἡμεθεὶ καὶ μεθοδος τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι τινὸς πάθους, ἢ δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν αἰσθησις τις ἄσθενης, καὶ ἐν τῷ μεμνημένῳ καὶ τῷ ἑλπίζοντι ἀκολουθοῖ ἢν φαντασία τις οὐ μέμνηται ἡ ἑλπίζει, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, δήλου ὅτι ἡμοιά ἴμαι μεμνημένοις καὶ ἑλπίζουσιν, ἐπειπερ καὶ αἰσθησίς} \]

\[ (Rhet. 1. 11. 1370a27-32).} \]

Since to be pleased means to perceive a certain emotion and since imagination is a kind of feeble perception, and since some kind of imagination of what a person remembers or hopes may linger in the what is remembered or hoped for; if this is so, it is clear that pleasures come simultaneously to those who are remembering and hoping, since there is perception there, too.

The pleasure of both memory and anticipation has a very peculiar feature here: it does not come directly from perception. Instead, it relies on imagination, \textit{phantasia}, which produces the impression of perception, or the "faint perception" (αἰσθησίς ἄσθενης). The passage implies a comparison. In present, one has the actual perception of something enjoyable and thus feels pleasure. On the other hand, when remembering or anticipating, one has the \textit{imagined} perception of something enjoyable (i.e. by constructing its mental image in past of future). It would follow
that memories of happy events are pleasurable. Indeed, this is true, but not the only possibility. Sometimes, even memories of unpleasant events could produce pleasure, as mentioned, as long as something good comes out of it. Likewise, "proper pleasure" may be based on imagination, since the spectator is involved in the painful tragic action, not through direct perception, but through phantasia. Emotions stirred by phantasia, resemble the formation of memory or anticipation, because they come from a weak sensation and are less intense than those caused by present events. As Aristotle briefly suggests in De Anima, the emotions aroused by mimetic works are of such sort. Fear, for example, is less strong when someone watches a terrifying painting than it is when somebody experiences fear through opinion, at a real event. By analogy with the pleasure derived from memory of a painful event, one could feel the oikeia hedone, an imaginative pleasure, through pity and fear at watching the tragic action, as long as "something good" will follow. A problem remains, to our chagrin: Aristotle never tells us specifically what good may come out of watching tragedy.

As I have shown previously, Aristotelian pity is an emotion felt only through memory or anticipation. On the whole, one experiences pity when his state of mind is such as to remember, or expect a misfortune like that suffered by another (to have happened/ or happen to him or one of his, Rh. 2. 1386a1-3). The remark seems to theorize an idea deeply rooted in Greek culture. I will briefly discuss here two famous examples from Greek literature preceding Aristotle to show

255 As Aristotle immediately specifies: διότι ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ηδέα ἢ ἐν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ἢ ἐν τῷ μεμνήσθαι γεγενημένα ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐλπίζειν μέλλοντα. Αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηται δὲ τὰ γεγενημένα, ἐλπίζουσι δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. (Rh. 1. 11. 1370a32-35).

256 de An 3. 427b2-5, quoted in my previous section. I have argued that in the case of pity, which is by its definition in the Rhet., the most detached emotion, Aristotle urges poets and orators to intensify the pathos, to arouse it as close as possible to the "real" emotion, by creative phantasia and pro ommaton. The audience of tragedy, nevertheless, would still feel pity through passive phantasia.
the connection between the arousal of pity and memory or anticipation, as well as the complexities involved in the process. In the *Iliad*, king Priam, guided by Hermes, reaches Achilles' tent. He supplicates for the ransom of Hector by asking Achilles to remember of his own father, Peleus:

\[\text{μνήσαι πατρός σοίο, θεοίς ἐπιείκελ' Ἀχιλλεῦ,}

\[\text{Τηλίκου ὃς περ ἔγων, ὀλοφ ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῷ (Il. 24. 486-87).}\]

Remember your father, godlike Achilles, As old as I am, on the gruesome threshold of death.

After appealing to Achilles' remembrance, by pointing out the similarities between himself and Peleus (both old, both fathers), Priam emphasizes his own misfortune (Il. 24. 488-502). Peleus may be old and defenseless but he still hopes for his Achilles' safe return from war. By comparison, he, Priam, has been so unfortunate that he lost most of his fifty sons in battle and, above all, he lost Hector, his best son, best defender of Troy. Only now, Priam begs Achilles for pity, not before inviting him again "to remember:"

\[\text{ἀλλ' αἰδεῖο θεοὺς' Ἀχιλλεῦ, αὐτὸν ἐλέησον}

\[\text{μνησύμενος σοῦ πατρός' ἐγὼ δ' ἐλεεινότερός περ}

\[\text{ἐτλην δ' οὐ πώ τις ἐπιχθόνης βροτός ἄλλος}

\[\text{ἀνδρός παιδαφόροι ποτὶ στόμα χείρ' ὀρέγεσθαι. (Il. 24. 503-06).}\]

But honor the gods, Achilles, and pity me By remembering your father, for I am even more piteous (than he is) And I endured what no other mortal on earth ever has

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To reach out my hand to the mouth of the man who's killed my son.

Priam's supplication relies, therefore, on both similarity and dissimilarity between himself and Peleus, and it is the difference that makes him "more pitiable", since he has suffered more than any other human being.\(^{258}\) Priam's speech is particularly interesting, because it stirs a reaction that is beyond the initial purpose. The scene ends in mourning as the former enemies become united in remembering and grieving:

Τώ δὲ μνησαμένω, ὁ μὲν Ἐκτόρος ἄνδροφόνοιο
Κλαῖ′ . . . (Il. 24. 509-10).

Αὐτάρ' Αχιλλεὺς κλαῖεν ἕδον πατέρ, ἄλλοτε δ' αὔτε
Πάτροκλον' (Il. 24. 511-12).

The two remembered, one wept for the manslaughtering Hector . . .
And Achilles wept now for his own father, now for Patroclus.

Thus, Achilles remembers not only his father, as Priam urged him to, but also Patroclus, and so his experience becomes more "like" Priam's, from the larger perspective of human misfortune. In Aristotelian terms, he remembers that "something similar has happened to him." As Priam has lost his beloved son, he has lost his beloved friend. Moreover, the remembrance of Peleus also moves Achilles to tears, which may involve more than the thought of aged father. Together with

\(^{258}\) There is a strange correspondence between what Priam does here to arouse Achilles' pity and what Aristotle recommends that orators should do to move the audience to pity. Priam presents himself as "more piteous" than others (ἐλεεινότερος) and dares to come, in fact "before the eyes" of his enemy. Achilles does pity his old age (515) and admits being impressed by the king's coming before his eyes (ἀνδρός ἐς ὀφθαλμούς, 520), which is an act of courage. Aristotle's orators have to become more piteous (ἐλεεινότεροι, Rh. 2. 1386a33) and imaginatively put the suffering before the eyes (ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, Rh. 2. 1386b9) of the audience. G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963), 93, discusses Priam as a first example of emotional persuasion.
the memory of his father, Achilles seems to anticipate that Peleus will also lose him in war,²⁵⁹ so that his father will be "like" Priam: old and mourning his son. According to Aristotle, this would be "expecting that one of his will suffer something similar."

The Homeric episode suggests that the association of pity with memory / anticipation is essential in Greek culture. Furthermore, there is not an absolute resemblance between the experiences of the one who feels pity and the pitied. Achilles perceives nonetheless the likeness between Priam's misfortune and his own by a complicated process of retrospection and, perhaps contemplation of the future. A second relevant in this respect occurs in Sophocles' Ajax, in which Athena invites Odysseus to be the only spectator of Ajax's madness, and thus to laugh at his enemy's misery.²⁶⁰ Surprisingly, Odysseus responds to the "scene" in a very different manner (Aj.121-26) than anticipated by the goddess. He is filled with pity (ἐποικτείρω, 121), because he sees in Ajax's plight his own situation (ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς, 125) as human being exposed to calamities. Odysseus feels here sympathy by generally contemplating, by thinking of other misfortunes (whether past or future) that all mankind might suffer. Moreover, gnomic statements in tragedy may be directed toward arousing tragic fear, as I have suggested. Then, it may well be that, besides pity for Ajax, Odysseus feels tragic fear for his own human fate, as he adds in

²⁵⁹ This is especially plausible if we think of the Il. 18. 324ff. Here, after the death of Patroclus, Achilles imagines the sorrow of Menoetius, Patroclus' father. As Achilles is aware of his own imminent death, he knows that Peleus will be also bereft of his homecoming:

. . . ἐπεὶ οὖδ’ ἐμὲ νοστήσαντα
dέξιται ἐν μεγάρουσι γέρων ἱππηλάτα Πηλεὺς
οὐδέ Θέτις μὴ πη, ἀλλ’ αὐτοῦ γαία καθέξει. (Il.18. 330-32).

²⁶⁰ I will only briefly mention the episode here and discuss it more extensively in the analysis of tragedies in the next chapter.
conclusion that "we all who live are nothing but empty shadows (121). Odysseus' reaction is again comparable with Aristotelian remarks. The kind of misfortunes that people dread for themselves, excite pity when happening to another (Rh. 2. 1386a27-29). Furthermore, when later Aristotle says that one feels pity if some similar misfortune has happened/ will happen, this may refer to common human experience. If so, the spectator would pity the tragic character, whose misfortune is out of the ordinary, not because he has suffered/ will suffer the "same", but by thinking of his own suffering from the perspective of the frailty of the human condition. I have chosen two examples that are somewhat exceptional since both Achilles and Odysseus feel pity for their enemies, the least likely category of people for whom one would feel sympathy. They exemplify, therefore, even more impressively the complex psychological process that causes the arousal of eleos. As an audience member at a trial, or rather as a judge, Achilles hears Priam pleading his desperate case: his son may have wronged the Achaians and killed Patroclus, but he has the right to burial. Remembrance and recognition of Priam's suffering as similar to his own move the heartless Achilles to pity. As a spectator of tragedy, Odysseus watches Ajax' misfortune - a tragic character, who happens to be his enemy - and even so he

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261 Cf. the famous Pindaric lines: τί δὲ τις· τί δὲ υἱὸς τις· σκλήρος ἡναρ ἴνθερτον (P. 8. 95-96); Aeschylus (Ag. 839). In Herodotus (1. 86. 6), Cyrus recognizes this own human condition in the misfortune of his enemy.


263 As Halliwell 2002, 230, has suggested: "The Poetics' notion of characters 'like us' appears to mark a condition whose status is psychologically descriptive, not normative, and therefore relative to the kinds of responsiveness that a playwright is able to tap in his audience. Moreover, such responsiveness presupposes an audience not of atomistic individuals, but those who, to borrow another revealing detail from the Rhetoric, 'have parents, children or wives (2.8, 1385b28) - a detail that exemplifies the dependence of pity on the capacity to imagine not only what one might suffer oneself, but on what those who matter most to us might suffer."

264 Belfiore 1990, 250 compares Priam to the Aristotelian orator.
feels pity through thinking of human suffering in general. Both examples present striking similarities with Aristotle's theoretical description of pity.

The psychological complexity of feeling *eleos*, in both Aristotelian theory and Greek culture, still does not explain how the tragic *pathe* relate to pleasure in the *Poetics*. Pity is some kind of pain (λύπη τις) according to Aristotle, *Rhetoric* (2. 1385b13), and, after all, for Achilles the feeling *eleos* is such a painful emotion that it drives him to mourning.

Nevertheless, the link between pity and memory or expectation is part of the answer to the enigma of the proper tragic pleasure. Another valuable parallel for the *oikeia hedone*, occurs soon after Aristotle's describing the pleasures of memory in the *Rhetoric*. He adds that there is a certain pleasure even in mourning:

Καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ὠσαύτως ἐπιγίγνεται τις ἠδονή· ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μή ὑπάρχειν, ἠδονή δὲ ἐν τῷ μεμνήσθαι καὶ ὥραν πῶς ἔκειν, καὶ ἄ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἶος ἦν. (*Rh.* 1. 1370b25-27).

And similarly, a certain pleasure is felt in lamentation and mourning; for pain applies to what is not there, but pleasure to remembering and, in a way, seeing him and what he used to do and what he was like.

The association of tragedy with grieving is extremely common in Greek culture, and, moreover, Plato has directly linked tragic pleasure to mourning. It is remarkable that this Aristotelian

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265 J. M. Cooper, *Reason and Emotion. Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical Theory* (Princeton, 1999), 414-16 correctly argues, I believe, that Aristotle does not associate emotions with "pain" or "pleasure" in the second book of the *Rhetoric* randomly. Thus, in the treatise, pain is associated with six emotions, as if it were their genus. Aristotle probably has in mind psychological and physiological effects of emotion that cause either pain or pleasure.

266 Stanford 1983, 23-25 and M. Fuhrmann, *Aristoteles Poetik* (Stuttgart, 1982), 161-64, note that pity is a much more intense emotion in Greek culture (as it often causes physical commotion and leads into lament) than it is in its modern, Christian equivalent.

267 *Phlb.* 47d, R. 10. 605c-b, 606b (in which the pleasure of tragedy may appear innocent, but it leads, in fact, toward mourning). Important studies discussing the connection between tragedy and mourning rituals are, for example, M.
account of pleasurable mourning comes from an imaginative process that is strikingly similar to watching a work of mimesis. Someone grieving feels delight when imagining the deceased, through memory (ἐν τῷ μεμνήσθαι). He can thus "somehow see him (the dead)" (ὁρῶν πως ἐκεῖνον), which means create his image before his mind's eyes. Consequently, "seeing" here is very much akin to the "seeing" of the poet, who imagines his plots so well that he is as if present at the actual events (ὁρῶν ὁσπερ παρ’ αὐτοῖς γιγνόμενος, Po.17. 1455a23-24). After creating the image, the mourner can delight in "watching" how the lost one acted (ἐπραττε, Rh. 1. 1370b27) and of what sort he was (ὀίος ἣν), which probably refers to inferring how close his mental image resembles the absent person. This is very reminiscent of what a viewer of a mimetic painting does, while inferring that "this is that", ὁίον οὕτος ἐκείνος (Po. 4. 1448b17), in other words pondering how much the imitation resembles his mental image.

Mourning,


268 Relevant in this sense is the example with which Aristotle ends his brief discussion of the pleasure of mourning: ὁθεν καὶ τούτ’ εἰκότως εἰρηται ὃς φάτο, τοίσι δὲ πᾶσιν ψιλ’ ἱμερον ὄρσε γόοιο. (Rh.. 1. 1370b12-13). The line refers to the reaction of the Achaians (Il. 23), when Achilles tells them about the vision of the dead Patroclus. Achilles "sees" in a dream the imitation of Patroclus, who looks like, talks like, and acts like his friend, and yet the image (εἴδωλον) does not have the real "heart" (φρένες) of Patroclus. The ghost spends the night with Achilles, who, in the morning recounts his vision to the Greeks:

ὦ πόσιν, ἦ δὲ τις ἐστὶ καὶ εἰν’ Ἀδαίδο δόμοισιν
ψυχὴ γὰρ εἴδωλον, ἀτὰρ φρένες ὃς ἐν πάμαν
παννυχή γὰρ μοι Πατροκλῆς δειλότο
ψυχὴ ἕφεστηκεν γούσσα τε μιρομένη τε,
καὶ μου ἐκαστι ἐπέτελλεν ἐπίκτω ἀθησκελον αὐτῷ.
"Ως φάτο, τοίσι δὲ πᾶσιν ψιλ’ ἱμερον ὄρσε γοοῖο. (Il. 23. 103-08). What Aristotle seems to imply here is that by invoking the image that was wondrous like Patroclus, eikto de theskelos autoi, Achilles stirred both pain at the fact that Patroclus was gone, but pleasure by making the Greeks think of how much the ghostly image resembled the real friend, now absent.

269 Cf. the other examples I have discussed, pleasure of mimetic arts generally comes from inference (Rh. 2. 1371b10: ὃτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, of metaphors, Rh.3. 1410a19: ὃς τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο).
therefore, seems to require both creative, or, to say so, poetic *phantasia*, in the sense of creating an image, and passive *phantasia*, watching (as a spectator would) the image created and comparing it to the real person.

The pleasure of mourning offers, perhaps, the closest parallel to the *oikeia hedone*. In the case of tragedy it is the poet, the creator of images (ἐἰχόνοποιός), like any other mimetic artist. And yet, his imitation is a *mimesis* of a very special kind, of the fearful and the pitiable. The spectators might feel *eleos* and *phobos* at seeing characters in misfortune, and remembering or anticipating their own. At the same time, they may feel pleasure at seeing how someone in distress would act - how one would display pity and fear - and "of what sort he would be." The pleasure may come from contemplating the similarities as well as the differences between personal and universal experiences of human condition. In an intriguing passage from *De Memoria*, Aristotle notes: ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένου ζῷον ἐστὶ καὶ εἰκόν, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ ἐστὶν ἀμφό, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἐστὶν ἄμφοῖν, καὶ ἐστὶ θεωρεῖν καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτό καθ’ ἐαυτῷ ἐίναι θεόρημα καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα. Ἡ μὲν οὖν καθ’ ἑαυτῷ θεώρημα ἡ φάντασμα ἐστιν, ἡ δ’ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκόν καὶ μνημόνευμα. (450b23-29).

An animal depicted on a panel is both animal-figure and representation, and while being one and the same, it is both, although being of the two is not the same. And one can contemplate them both as animal figure and representation. In the same way, one must understand the image in us to be something of its own sort and of another thing. In itself it is an object of contemplation and an image (*phantasma*). But when it is of another thing, it is a sort of representation and a reminder.

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270 *Po.* 25. 1460b 3-6.

Skifakis has drawn attention to the importance of this account for understanding the mimetic pleasure in the Poetics. He notes that "representation" (eikón) and mimesis are interchangeable in Aristotle's vocabulary. The pleasurable learning from mimesis, Skifakis argues, lies in understanding the object imitated as a generic representation, as representation ("this is such") rather than as copy of a certain model. Therefore, poetry as representation of the universals (καθόλου) is more philosophical than history, which deals with the particulars (Po. 9. 1451b5). I am not sure whether Aristotle signifies the "universal" by "eikón" in the passage from De Memoria. He certainly means not taking an image ad litteram, but symbolically, as referring to something else. In an additional example, Aristotle adds that, in case of actual perception, we need an object to form thought or image. On the other hand, a copy (eikón) would remind us of something that is not present in the perception. Thus we "see" Coriscus (i.e. think of Coriscus) while seeing his image in a painting, without actually seeing him:

ἀν δ’ ἄλλου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γράφῃ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, καὶ μὴ ἐφαρκως τὸν Κορίσκον, ὥς Κορίσκου (Mem. 450b 33-34).

When the image is of something else, one sees it as in a painting, as representation, and sees is as an image of Coriscus, without (actually) having seen Coriscus.

Furthermore, when we regard the object as an animal in chalk merely, our experience involves only thought (νόημα), whereas when we look at the object as representation, eikon, we do so through memory (μνημόνευμα, Mem. 450b35-451a3). This point closely resembles Aristotle's

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distinction between deriving pleasure through *mimesis* when watching a painting, and deriving pleasure simply by admiring the color (*Po*. 4. 1448b17-20).

To conclude, when someone remembers, he goes through a similar process as when watching a product of *mimesis*. Thus, Skifakis is right to connect the two. Secondly, universals seem to be important in the mimetic as well as mnemotic operation, and yet not because the audience learns the universal meaning of something from *mimesis*, as Skifakis proposes. The artist has to imitate, according to universals (καθόλου), so that he might catch the general characteristics of what he represents. On the other hand, the spectator must also have the precognition of such universal features of *mimesis*, so that he might understand the symbolical reference contained by *mimesis*. He should know what Corsicus may look like, to recognize him in a painting, even without seeing him directly at the moment. If not, he would simply admire the color composition of the painting, or the drawing in chalk of some man. The link between memory and *mimesis* is reminiscent again of the definition of pity in the *Rhetoric*. One would feel pity by remembering. Feeling pity, even in a real situation, seems to involve a "reasoning" process by which we relate to something else. A human being suffers undeservedly, yet this may pertain to the fact that my dear ones and I are also human, they could suffer too. Aristotle includes "the educated" among the categories of people who are most prone to feel pity, because they are good at discerning, they "reason well" (καὶ οἱ πεπαιδευμένοι ἐνλόγιστοι γὰρ, *Rh*. 2. 1385b27-28). Tragic pity (as well as its dependent fear) seems to involve an even more complex process of recognizing the universal in the personal as well as in the imitation of human experience. The audience would not watch people "actually" suffering on the stage. If this were

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274 For a tragedian, to represent the universal (καθόλου) means to show what might happen in accordance with necessity and probability (*Po* 9. 1451b8-9).
the perception, it would be similar to merely seeing the chalk drawing in a painting, and it would only arouse painful emotions without pleasure. In addition, the audience ought to see a representation of human suffering, in accordance with the universal (i.e. probability and necessity). The spectator should refer to something else the fact that the "noble" (σπουδαίοι) themselves experience pity and fear in tragedy, and take this as a "representation" (εἰκόνα). By relating the universal of tragic action to his own experience, a spectator should recognize that the tragic action shows, indeed, how one would act and feel in such given situation. The audience would thus realize: the characters' feeling eleos and phobos is "such" as it should be, "this is that", this is how it feels. But such process leads to pleasure, through imitation, as the Poetics would say. "Syllogism" is the cause of the pleasure of mimesis, in general. Emotional syllogism is likely the peculiarity of tragic pleasure.

Can the parallel between memory and emotional pleasure through mimesis work even further? In De Memoria, exercise strengthens memory and leads to recollection, which is nothing else but to view the image frequently as copy and not in itself: In the Metaphysics (980b - 981a) by exercising memories (μνήμην), one gains experience (ἐμπειρία), and, ultimately, practical ability (τέχνη). This occurs when one has one unitary perception of the similarities, μία καθόλου γένηται περί τῶν ὁμοίων ὑπόληψις. (Metaph. 981a6-7). Later on, Aristotle connects the pleasure of memories and anticipations with the activity of the prime mover (Metaph. 1072b). Could the audience, in Aristotle's view, gain some kind of emotional experience

275 This kind of reasoning occurs both when pity is produced through memory or anticipation.
276 This may be the reason for which Aristotle not only insists on the arousal of emotions in the Poetics, but also emphasizes how they should be represented within the plot.
277 Αἱ μελέτας τὴν μνήμην σάζουσι τῷ ἐπαναμιμητίκῳ. Τούτο δʼ ἐστὶν οὐδὲν ἔπερον ἢ τὸ θεωρεῖν πολλάκις ὡς εἰκόνα καὶ μὴ ὡς καθ’ αὐτό. (Mem. 451a13-15).
(ἐμπειρία) from watching tragedies? By exercising the feeling of pity and fear not in themselves, but for artistic imitations (which concern a single action, μία πράξις, and according to the universal, κοινόλογο) the spectators may be able to deal better with their own suffering. Tragic pleasure would thus offer some solace for the human suffering and the emotions, which it arouses, as the pleasure of mourning does. Perhaps so, and this would be a reply to Plato, but Aristotle is silent in this respect.

The process of remembering and anticipating that arouses pity is very complex and involves connecting personal distress with the misfortune of another, as Achilles' eleos has well shown. Therefore, any individual member of the audience may have a different way of connecting his own experience to the affliction of tragic characters. Nevertheless, tragic action pertains to a universal experience, as Odysseus remarks in the Ajax and as Aristotle has suggested in the Poetics. Thus, the ideal Aristotelian audience may feel pleasure from "inferring" the likeness as well as the dissimilarity between the emotional experiences they have and their more universal "image."

A charming description of tragic pleasure appears in a fragment of Middle Comedy, the Dionysiazousae of Timocles, a later contemporary of Aristotle:

"Ἀνθρωπός ἔστι ζῶν ἐπίπονον φύσει καὶ πολλὰ λυπήρ ὁ βιός ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρει. Παραψυχάς οὖν φροντίδων ἀνεύρετο Ταύτας ὁ γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ἰδίων λήθην λαβὼν, πρὸς ἄλλοτρίῳ τε ψυχαγωγηθείς πάθει, Μετ᾽ ἡδονής ἀπῆλθε, παιδευθεὶς ἀμα

278 Fr. 6, R. Kassel - C. Austin, Poetae Comici Graeci, vol. 7 (Berlin, 1983).
A human being is an animal prone to calamities
And his life brings him many aches
Therefore he has found solace for the worries.
For (one's) mind leaving aside the care for his personal things
And being mesmerized by the pathos of another
With pleasure has gone away, and instructed at the same time.
Look first at the tragic characters, if you want,
How they benefit everyone! For, a poor man
And learning that Telephus was poorer than him
Already bears his poverty more easily.
The one being ill with some madness, would consider Alemaeon,
Someone suffers from an eye illness? The Phinidae were blind.
Someone's child has died, Niobe has eased (his anguish).

The passage seems to be a simplified version of the Aristotelian views about the oikeia
hedone. The spectator forgets about his misery by being transported into the emotion of
another (ἀλλοτριῶ τε ψυχαγγείως πάθει, 6), a process that is accompanied by pleasure (μεθ’
ηδονής, 7). Remarkably, Timocles writes here that the spectator's mind (νοῦς, 5), makes the
transfer from the personal emotion to that of the other. This is reminiscent of the Aristotle's
"proper pleasure", which depends on both cognitive and emotional responses of the audience.
Furthermore, the spectator becomes "instructed" (πεπαυδευθείς, 7) when watching tragedies,

R. Stark, Aristotelesstudien; philologische Untersuchungen zur Entwicklung der aristotelischen Ethik (Munich, 1972), 83-90, thinks that Timocles' fragment is a direct expression of Aristotle's theory of catharsis. The passage does not seem to me a serious reinstatement of philosophical ideas, much less an explanation for the enigmatic catharsis. Nevertheless, Timocles does appear to ridicule here Aristotelian and, perhaps, other critical views about tragedy, in the old Aristophanic tradition (cf. the discussion about how tragedians "benefit" the polis in the Frogs).
because he learns how to put his petty troubles in perspective by comparing them with the misfortunes of tragic characters. Since we do not know the whole picture of the literary theory of the time, we cannot tell how extensive Timocles' parody of the Aristotelian theory might be.

There are, nevertheless, some obvious allusions to both tragic practice and Aristotle's terminology. The fragment opens with a "perfect" tragic gnome: all mankind is subject to suffering. The comic twist, man is an "unfortunate animal" (ζῶν ἐπίπον, 2), may facetiously echo Aristotle's definition of the human being as "political animal." From Gorgias on, it has been recognized that poetry has the ability to "drive the soul" of the listener (ψυχαγωγία) and a cognate is used in the fragment of Dionysiazousae (ψυχαγωγηθεῖς, 6). Plato refers in the Republic to the spectator of tragedy as ready to abandon himself to the emotion of another (ἀλλότρια πάθη, R. 606a4) an idea also mentioned in Timocles fragment (ἀλλότριο...πάθει, 6). There may be other, more subtle allusions. Thus, the spectator bears his poverty better, by realizing (καταμαθῶν, 10) how poor Telephus was, which is, perhaps, a reference to Aristotle's "learning" from mimesis (μάθησεις, μανθάνειν, Po 4. 1448b7, 12). The pain of losing a child "has been alleviated" (κεκοφίκεν, 14) by Niobe, and the same verb occurs in Aristotle's Politics to describe the effect of musical catharsis (κοφίζεσθαι μεθ' ἡδονῆς, Pol. 8. 1342a15).

An acquaintance with the whole play could, perhaps, clarify whether Timocles has used these terms here intentionally or accidentally. At any rate, Plato dismisses tragic pleasure, because spectators delight in tragedy, by foolishly thinking that they can feel pity for the suffering of tragic characters without being themselves affected, when, in fact, they become morally weak in real life. Aristotle is not directly interested in the spectator's response to tragedy in the Poetics.

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280 The fragment continues with a few other examples, which I have not listed. Interestingly, "learning" from tragic examples is used once more: if some spectator is old and unhappy he has "fully understood" (κατέμαθεν, 17)
He suggests, nevertheless, that an ideal audience should contrive the "proper pleasure" from tragic emotions, by inferring the connections as well as the differences between personal and universal human experience. Timocles, in his witty way, perhaps takes the Aristotelian side and amuses us with a description of how the theory could have worked in practice.
II. Internal Evidence of the plays.

1. Tragedy and the rhetoric of emotion. An introduction

Thus far, I have discussed cultural expectations for the tragic genre in fifth- and fourth-century Athens. Ancient authors defined the effect of tragedy on the audience in terms of emotion, pleasure, cognitive stimulation and, to a certain degree, ethical benefit, although different authors gave these characteristics varying degrees of emphasis and different nuances of meaning. My focus has been on less explored aspects of the Aristotelian theory, which proposes an integrative response to tragedy, both emotional and cognitive, and thus conducive to pleasure.

In this second part of the thesis, I will assess both likely and known responses of ancient audiences to several tragedies, ranging from early Aeschylean to late Euripidean. The main evidence used will be the internal structure of the plays, presented in connection with ancient literary criticism and, when known, historical context of the initial dramatic performance. My analyses will necessarily emphasize pity as the spectators' specific response to individual plays. Eleos is commonly recognized as the prevailing reaction to tragedy, from Plato to late Antiquity. Aristotle deems pity and fear the ideal tragic emotions (Poetics) and offers further explanations about techniques of eliciting pathe, in accordance with the psychology of the listeners (Rhetoric). The Aristotelian exegesis on the topic will serve as guideline to examine dramatic and language devices in the plays that appear to be emotionally engaging, by the standards of Greek culture. Then, through looking at the distinctive manner in which every tragedy employed such devices to stir eleos, my study will suggest certain unique implications of the spectator's feeling the emotion in each case. Other factors, which likely influenced the
arousal of pity, will also be considered, such as historical events surrounding the productions, the playwright's particular use of the literary tradition, ethical and political issues raised in the tragedies. Thus, for example, the Athenian audiences may have experienced pity at seeing both Aeschylus' *Persians* and Euripides' *Orestes*. Yet, each tragedy elicited the emotion through diverse dramatic techniques and under different historical circumstances. Therefore, in each case, the audience's pity probably depended on the particular understanding of the tragic subject and would have involved different civic or ethical considerations.

A second means of uncovering the reactions of the spectators will involve analyzing the internal structure of each play while taking account of the composition of the audiences. Internally, Greek tragedies present contemporary social and cultural controversies that may have caused ambiguous responses in the audiences. Such dramatic elements as the tragic *agon* and *stichomythiae* usually center around some kind of conflict. This divides the internal audiences and might also have led the spectators to divergent or equivocal opinions. In the dramatic debates, interestingly, one side almost always makes the argument that pity for the tragic action is unsuitable. The internal denial of the emotion may have thus challenged the external spectator, who expects to be moved by the tragic events. Furthermore, the Athenian audience was not a unitary group. Spectators had personal convictions and experiences, which certainly affected their interpretation of tragedies. Counting all the differences between individuals is impossible, even in the case of contemporary audiences. Nevertheless, to some extent, different responses of the ancient spectator can be inferred from testimonies and by examining the ideological background of the play productions. Thus, Plato and Aristotle had different
concerns and views about tragedy. Aristotle, at times, departs from the taste of the "many" in his judgment of tragedies. Aristophanes' comic critique of tragic devices in the *Frogs* contrasts with that found in Aristotle's *Poetics*. Further idiosyncratic reactions may result when ideas presented in the plays conflicted with the social, political, or theological beliefs of the spectator. Somebody believing, for example, that the state laws should be obeyed, even if they seem unfair, as Socrates asserts in Plato's *Crito*, may have been indignant rather than sympathetic toward the Sophoclean Antigone. Through considering such factors, I will discuss known and conjectured variances in the responses to each play between groups such as elite and popular audiences or elite audiences with different perspectives, and also among individuals.

My discussion of pity uses Aristotelian theory to analyze the appeals to emotion in individual plays and, then, estimate the reaction of the spectator. Audiences respond by feeling *eleos* to the *pathos* incorporated within tragedies. This idea seems to be widely accepted in the classical critique of tragic genre. Thus, in spite of their differences, both Plato and Aristotle agree on this point. Plato notes that when some hero declares his suffering, even the best spectators yield to pity (*ἐλεέσθαι*, *R. 1.10*. 606b2-3). As the remark suggests, the audience's emotion becomes most intense, notably, when a tragic character *verbally* draws attention to his misfortune, rather than when simply watching his fall. Aristotle often uses tragic emotions in the *Poetics* to refer ambiguously to both the internal structure of tragedy and the response of the audience.¹ In addition to being an

¹To give only an example, a joint recognition and reversal yield pity or fear (*Po. 12*. 1453b1). Aristotle does not clearly specify for whom the tragic device arouses the emotions. Pity and fear could concern either characters within tragedy, or the external spectators, or more likely, both. For further discussion on this point see my comments, 46-48: F. Else and his followers rightly note that pity and fear are included within the structure of tragedy, yet mistakenly assume that the two emotions do not concern the audience reaction.
imitation of a complete action, Aristotle insists, tragedy is also *mimesis* of the fearful and pitiable (φόβερόν καὶ ἐλεεινόν, *Po.* 9. 1452a 3; 13. 1452b32). In this cryptic Aristotelian formula, "fearful and pitiable" appear to describe the way in which the tragic action is perceived, as having an emotional effect, unlike "complete", which pertains to a dramatic attribute of the plot. Thus, the statement likely implies that tragic action arouses pity and fear for both the characters involved internally in the events and the spectators watching the misfortune. If this interpretation is correct, the playwrights would deal with a double emotional arousal. Perhaps, by imitating the emotional reactions of people in distress, within the plays, they would convey pity and fear to the audiences. Therefore, tragedians seem to resemble the orators who try to influence their audiences through emotional persuasion.\(^2\)

The main difference concerns the manner in which such persuasion is effected: unlike orators dramatists did not address the audiences directly, but rather via mimesis. In my analysis, one of the main focuses will be on the rhetoric of emotion in tragedies, more exactly, on specific tragic devices that may have induced pity in the audiences.

The association of tragedy with rhetoric was recognized in Greek culture. Plato already alludes to it (*Phaedrus* 268c). Aristotle openly correlates thought, or pertinent expression of thought (διάνοια), which, in his opinion, is the third tragic device in importance, with rhetorical and political speeches:

\(^2\) S. Goldhill, "The Language of Tragedy: Rhetoric and Communication," in *The Cambridge Companion to Greek Tragedy*, ed. P. E. Easterling (Cambridge, 1999), 127-50, traces the most common types of language employed in tragedy. He divides tragic speech into: (1) heroic (of Homeric grandeur), specific to both tragedy and epic, (2) religious and ritualistic, (3) law - court speech (used particularly in tragic debates), (4) sophistic (derived from law- court, used in Euripidean drama, particularly). I will anticipate my discussion
Third is thought. That is to be able to say things that are likely and consistent, which in (the art) of speeches is the task of politics and rhetoric. The early (poets) made (the characters) speak politically, while the contemporary (poets) make them speak rhetorically.

Later, Theophrastus regards both oratory and poetry as arts dealing with the orientation of the listeners, in a fragment which may have elaborated Aristotelian ideas. While analyzing the plays, I will consider how Aristotle's view, that tragic structures internally enact emotional responses able to stir the audience's pity, may have functioned in tragic practice. To do so, I will compare passages referring to pity and fear in Greek tragedies with the Aristotelian theoretical description, to see whether tragic examples follow certain cultural patterns of arousal of emotion. Then, I will explore the relation between seeing (as stated by tragic characters), emotion, and the response of internal audiences in several tragedies. Finally, I will suggest possible connections between internal and external audiences.

by saying that, although in Goldhill's classification the last two types and language are connected with rhetoric (3, 4), heroic language seems to be an essential tragic tool, used for emotional persuasion.

3 Φησιν ο Θ. τού λόγου σχέσεις ἔχοντος τὴν μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄκροστας, τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τοὺς ἄκροστας ποιηταὶ καὶ ρήτορες διάκουσι, τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὰ πράγματα φιλόσοφοι. (Wimmer, fr. 64). D. C. Innes, "Theophrastus and the Theory of Style," in Theophrastus of Ephesus. On his life and work, vol. 2, ed. W. W. Fortenbaugh (New Brunswick, 1985), 251-67, appropriately notes that Theophrastus' emphasis on the audience in this fragment seems to develop the Aristotelian theory. While Aristotle deals with the technical elements of oratory and poetry and only implicitly refers to the audience, Theophrastus may have shifted the focus. In fact, as Innes notes, Gorgias seems to have already placed oratory and poetry into the same category of speeches that charm the soul. Plato also connected the two arts, only to criticize them as demagogical and harmful to the audiences. Aristotle insists that his main discussion of "thought" (διάνοια) should be included in the Rhetoric and it is more "particular" (индивο) to oratory than poetry (Po. 19. 1456a34-35).
The Aristotelian description of tragic emotions will thus be taken as a cultural point of reference for the audience response, based on the following criteria. In the *Poetics*, Aristotle emphasizes rather than invents the aesthetic principle of emotional arousal in tragedy. He does this by reviewing the tragedies at his disposal. More importantly, the second book of the *Rhetoric* provides a theoretical basis for cultural expectations about eliciting *pathē* from audiences that long precede and outlast Aristotle. With respect to pity, for example, the Aristotelian link between *eleos* and memory can be traced as far back in time as the Homeric poems. Furthermore, as Aristotle argues in both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric*, people feel pity when someone suffers *undeservedly*. This idea was not new to the Greeks. To stir the pity of the jury in Athenian courts, defense speeches often argued that misfortune befell on the defendant, in such a way that, if convicted, he would even more unjustly suffer. Prosecutors would use the opposite technique: the accused should suffer punishment deservedly. Tragic fear is linked to pity and comes from thinking about the frailty of the human condition, according to Aristotle's psychological cues. My inquiry will examine several instances of expression of pity and fear in Greek tragedies, in contrast to Aristotle's theoretical account. If tragedians used certain cultural models of emotional arousal, the spectators would have most likely responded emotionally.

While employing the Aristotelian account as a mean of understanding emotional arousal in Greek culture, my study does not consider Aristotle the absolute measure of the audience response to specific plays. I will not argue that tragedians would have

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4 E. B. Stevens, "Some Attic Commonplaces of Pity," *AJP* 65 (1943), 1-25, provides judicial and dramatic examples for stirring pity at undeserved suffering. The article well summarizes both techniques of eliciting pity and dissuading audiences from feeling the emotion in the Athenian society.
entirely agreed with the prescriptions of the *Poetics* when composing their plays. This would be absurd and, of course, anachronistic. Nor will I maintain that Greek audiences would have unquestionably shared Aristotle's views about tragedy, when attending dramatic festivals. In fact, as I have previously shown, on occasion, Aristotle dislikes the tragic practice and openly dissents from the taste of the popular audiences.

The *Poetics* privileges pity and fear as the ideal tragic emotions and thus neglects other possible responses to tragedies, even as it may rarely intimate them. For instance, the treatise briefly alludes to the poet's ability to stir anger in the audience (*Po. 17. 1455a33*), yet never develops the topic. Most often, Aristotle disparages tragic devices, such as the double plot, that do not fully arouse his two favorite emotions. He admits, however, that popular audiences enjoy this kind of tragic structure. According to this and other suggestions in the *Poetics*, tragedians appear to be less interested in eliciting pity from the audiences by the fourth century. Another interesting example in this respect concerns the "best" tragic plot, which should preferably represent a change from prosperity to adversity and not vice-versa (*Po. 13. 1453a*). Therefore, Aristotle continues, no one should criticize Euripides for avoiding happy-endings in his plays:

Διὸ καὶ οἱ Εὐριπίδη ἔγκαλούντες τὸ αὑτὸ ἁμαρτάνουσιν ὅτι τοῦτο δρά ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις καὶ αἱ πολλαὶ αὕτου εἰς δυστυχίαν τελευτώσιν. Τοῦτο γὰρ ἔστιν ὀσπέρ εἴρηται ὀρθὸν. (*Po. 13. 1453a24-26*).

Therefore, those blaming Euripides that he does so and most of his plays end in adversity make the same mistake. For this, as it has been said, is the right way.

The Aristotelian preference is certainly not surprising: plots ending in adversity could better arouse pity and fear in the spectator than those with opposite outcome. Therefore, the first type could lead to the proper tragic pleasure of contemplating human condition.
Yet, it is rather bizarre that Euripides needs to be defended, as he appears to be too conservative for not concluding the majority of his plays happily. Enough tragedies, it seems, had happy-endings by Aristotle's time so that the audiences could have expected this as tragic norm.

Finally, scholars have often remarked that visual suggestions are present in the text of Greek tragedies, and yet, these visual suggestions have not been discussed in connection with Aristotle, because of his dislike of *opsis*. Both the *Poetics* and the *Rhetoric* emphasize nevertheless the arousal of emotion through imaginative poetic vision. Thus, verbal and dramatic techniques of anticipating or referring back to suffering in tragedies become Aristotle's favorite, as best bringing the emotions before the mind's eyes, *pro ommaton*. Later, elite audiences, such as Longinus, or the scholars whose writings are reflected in the scholiasts, will also share the Aristotelian enthusiasm for emotions aroused through imagination. Nonetheless, popular audiences may have

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5 The fact that scholarship has ignored Aristotle's emphasis on vision suggested by the tragic text as opposed to *opsis*, external visual effect, has created some confusion. An interesting example is D. Wiles, *Tragedy in Athens. Performance and Theatrical Space* (Cambridge, 1997), 5-12. At 5, Wiles accuses O. Taplin of having "staked out his ground around the phrase 'visual meaning', restoring the Aristotelian category of *opsis* to a place of more honor than Aristotle himself allowed." Wiles is thus mistaken in thinking that Aristotle has not allowed the visual to be expressed through tragic language, though he intuits that Aristotle has. In fact, Taplin disapproves of the Aristotelian criticism of external visual effects, *opsis* (see my discussion, at 64) and intends to analyze elements of staging and theatrical apparatus. He, nonetheless, considers the language of Aeschylean tragedies as expressing visual effects. Wiles protests against Taplin' method, as not analyzing the stagecraft, per se, but as looking at the text of Greek tragedies instead. Most objectionable, in Wiles' opinion, is Taplin's observation that in Greek tragedy, "there was no important action which was not signaled by words" (Taplin, *SA*, 30, quoted by Wiles, 5, f.n. 10) - a point which indeed makes Taplin Aristotelian, even if he is unaware of it (since in the *Poetics* tragedy could be visualized even without being directly seen, cf. my discussion 65-85).

6 As I have shown, 88-91.
preferred more concrete displays of human suffering in tragedies, such as Prometheus, in the *Prometheus Bound*, which could have more directly stirred pity.

Greek tragedy does not allow the voice of the poet to be heard. As E. Hall has noted, tragedy is the most polyphonic genre and "the authorial voice of the tragic poet himself is more elusive in this genre than in any other ancient literary form, including comedy." Indeed, tragedians neither state their poetic intent, nor directly address their audiences. In the absence of the poetic voice, therefore, tragedies would lead the spectators toward certain responses only indirectly, through their complex, dialogic structure. From Schlegel on, scholars have entertained the idea that the chorus would be a type of ideal spectator, as proposed by the playwright, in Greek tragedy. More recently, studies have viewed the chorus as representing Athenian collective consciousness, in the context of Athenian democracy. Segal has proposed a fascinating

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8 There may have been some exceptions, such as Euripides' *Danae*. For discussion of later sources which describe the tragic chorus speaking on behalf of the poet, as some kind of parabasis, D. Bain, "Audience Address in Greek Tragedy," *CQ* 25 (1975), 13-25.
10 Several directions of scholarship can be observed. One emphasizes that choruses were socially important, because citizens would participate in their formation and be part of the ceremonies of dramatic festivals. Thus, J. J. Winkler, "The Ephebes' Song: Tragodia and the Polis, in Nothing to do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in the Social Context*, eds. F. Zeitlin and J. Winkler (Princeton, 1990), 20-62; P. J. Wilson, "Leading the Tragic Khoros: Tragic Prestige in the Democratic City," in *Greek History and the Historian*, ed. C. Pelling (Oxford, 1997), 81-108. By contrast, another scholarly view is that choruses cannot be a social reflection of the Athenian audience. Thus, J. Gould, "Tragedy and Collective Experience," in *Tragedy and the Tragic. Greek Tragedy and Beyond*, ed. M. S. Silk (Oxford, 1996), 217-43. This book will be subsequently quoted as *Tragedy and the Tragic*. Gould notes that no social and political equivalence can be directly established between tragic choruses and the collectivity of democratic polis. Gould points out
reading of *Oedipus King*, in which the chorus gives closure to the tragedy with imitating a ritual of mourning, which should be recognizable to external audience.\(^{11}\) Calame reworks Schlegelian ideas to suggest complex relations between chorus, external audiences, and tragedian, by analyzing the choral voice (the use of "we" and "I").\(^{12}\) As scholars rightly note, therefore, spectators may have closely related to the chorus' views about the dramatic events. This does not mean, nevertheless, that audiences would have always embraced the responses proposed by the chorus. Often, external audiences know more about the tragic action than the chorus does, and may have reactions to the plays that differ from the opinions of the chorus. Sometimes choruses simply offer lyric

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\(^{11}\) C. Segal, "Catharsis, Audience, and Closure in Greek Tragedy," in *Tragedy and the Tragic*, 149-72.

\(^{12}\) C. Calame, "Performative aspects of the choral voice in Greek tragedy: civic identity in performance," in *Performance Culture and Athenian Democracy*, eds. S. Goldhill and R. Osborne (Cambridge, 1999), 125-53. Calame's point that the chorus might inculcate certain responses in the spectators, by using the "authoritative" voice "I", "we", is appealing. He goes too far, I believe, when, at 129, maintaining that the chorus would represent the voice of the tragedian himself. To prove this, Calame give examples of choruses who act with discernment (i.e. *Iphig. Aul., Hippol.*), thus expressing the poetic voice. However, in other plays, such as Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* the chorus mainly shows indecision, which could be hardly compatible with the authoritative voice of the poet. For the use of self-referential remarks of the chorus, important are also A. Henrichs's article: "Why Should I Dance? Choral Self - Reference in Greek Tragedy."
interludes, which are not directly connected with the dramatic events (e. g. Euripides' *Helen*). Furthermore, other characters offer alternative views, which do not necessarily concur with those of the chorus, and which spectators would also consider, when interpreting the plays.\(^{13}\)

While modern scholars devote so much attention to the relationship between the chorus and Athenian spectators, ancient authors say very little about the subject. Aristotle scarcely mentions the chorus in the *Poetics*,\(^ {14}\) which has often been interpreted as a sign of his disregard for tragic performance.\(^ {15}\) The omission could come, nevertheless, from Aristotle's interest in tragedy as action (πράξις) in which the chorus plays a minimal role. In a brief, but interesting remark about the tragic chorus, the Peripatetic author of the *Prolemmata* notes: ἦστι γὰρ ὁ χορὸς κηδευτῆς ἄπρακτος. Ἐὖνοιον γὰρ μόνον παρέχεται οἷς πάρεστιν. (Probl. 19. 922b48).\(^ {16}\)

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\(^{13}\) D. J. Schenker, "Dissolving Differences: Character Overlap and Audience Response," *Mnemosyne* 52 (1999), 641-57, first discusses the function of the chorus as enhancing the audience's dramatic and mythical perspective on the play, especially in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*. He notes that complex tragic characters and actions must have further proposed interpretative possibilities for audiences.

\(^{14}\) *Po.* 4.1449a 15ff., asserting that Aeschylus has reduced the role of the chorus; *Po.* 18. 1456a 25 ff., praises the chorus in Sophocles, as being integrated in the action and part of the whole. By contrast, the same passage criticizes the practice initiated by Agathon: the chorus' singing lyric interludes completely divorced from tragic action.

\(^{15}\) A clear and unbiased analysis of this subject, with a synopsis of most important scholarly opinions is offered by S. Halliwell 1998, 238-52.

\(^{16}\) This chapter of the Pseudo - Aristotelian *Problems*, in which the statement occurs, deals with music. For general discussion of the section, with bibliographical references, P. Louis, *Aristote. ProblemesII, sections XI a XXVII* (Paris, 1993), 93-99. The following question sets problem 48 (why don't choruses use the Hypodorian mode?) The answer is because this mode suits action and heroic characters, which would not be appropriate for the chorus, an inactive guardian.
For the chorus is an inactive custodian. Its only function is to offer a friendly attitude to those who are on the stage at the time.

The adjective "inactive" (ἀπρακτος) probably refers to the fact that the chorus does not contribute much to the tragic action, though being involved in it. Remarkably, the description of the chorus as outside watcher, simply expressing sympathy toward the tragic events, could apply as well to the spectators. This statement is too brief to be conclusive, but it seems to anticipate the modern idea of the chorus reflecting the reaction of the external audiences.

In the analysis of the plays, I will deal with responses of internal audiences to the tragic action, considering both the chorus and other voices. I will scrutinize the extent to which the spectators' responses may have mirrored or departed from the responses of these internal audiences. Early on, Gorgias sketched the notion of dramatic illusion in tragedy, through which the spectator should be absorbed, or willingly "taken away", by the tragic fiction. Throughout the Poetics, pity and fear seem to define internally the nature of tragic events and characters' response to them no less than tragedy's effect on the external audience.17 The passage recommending that one should work out the plot in gestures (Po. 17. 1455a30-32) and be impassioned himself to persuade others, has usually been interpreted as referring to the dramatist, but sometimes to the tragic actor.18 Such

17 See my prior discussion on catharsis for the scholarly debate whether tragic emotions in the Poetics concern tragic characters or the spectators of tragedy, 33ff. In my opinion, pity and fear refer to both internal and external audiences. Thus, the problem is not if the emotions function at one level or another (aut/aut), but rather how they function at both levels (et/et).

18 Else 1967, 490-95, is the main supporter of the view which interprets the passage as concerning the actor. Although most commentators incline toward the opposite explanation: it regards the poet, an ambiguity remains in the passage. As G. M. Skifakis, "Looking for the Actor's Art in Aristotle," in Greek and Roman Actors, eds. P. Easterling and E. Hall (Cambridge, 2002), 148-164, has noted on this, at 163, "a conflation
ambiguities, regarding who feels or transmits *pathe*, imply strong correspondences between emotional responses within the internal structure of tragedies and those of external audiences. All poets (or poetic texts), actors, and spectators thus partake in tragic *pathe*, in a manner reminiscent of the metaphorical chain of emotion in Plato's *Ion*. By consequence, through the design of the poet, internal audiences would generally show emotional reactions - mostly compassion and anxiety -, which the external spectator would adopt.

And yet, the model may not be so simple. What happens when internal audiences express conflicting or unsympathetic attitudes toward tragic characters and their actions? In cases of internal contradictory responses, the external spectator could ponder the "right" perspective. For example, Clytaemnestra brazenly claims in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon*, that her husband deserved his murder, being himself a murderer and tyrant. Creon sees in Antigone's desire to bury her brother only stubbornness and disobedience.\(^{19}\)

Other internal audiences counterbalance and dismiss these views in the plays. And yet, how would such positions affect the external spectator?\(^{20}\) They disrupt the showing of

\(^{19}\) In her defiant speech, Clytaemnestra tries to justify the killing of Agamemnon (*Ag*. 1373-98, 1401-06, 1435-47, etc). And yet, the chorus members constantly interrupt Clytaemnestra, consider her point of view wrong, and lament the terrible events. In the confrontation between Creon and Antigone (*Ant*. 441-526), the king calls Antigone an expert in insolence (480). Creon's attitude is later proved to be excessive, not only by responses of other audiences, but also by the dramatic events, such as the death of his own son, Haemon.

\(^{20}\) A difficult question is how the Athenian spectators may have taken unfriendly responses to tragic actions or characters, even when they are dismissed as wrong in the plays. For example, C. Sourvinou - Inwood, "Assumptions and the creation of meaning: reading Sophocles *Antigone*," *JHS* 109 (1989), 134-48, suggests that the audiences may have credited Creon's accusations against Antigone, for she was a woman (which from Hesiod on, had been the symbol of destruction in Greek culture). I think that this point is too
sympathy within the tragedies. Therefore, they likely posit emotional challenges for the Athenian spectator and, perhaps, ethical dilemmas.\footnote{That the tragic imitator is able to put on various postures, which forces the spectators to adjust to different perspectives, seems to be Plato's concern (\textit{R..}. 394d, 397e). In an ideal state, citizens should have only one business and not be influenced to adopt many, because of tragedy's pliability.} Often, tragic debates on whether the heroes suffer deservedly or undeservedly lead the internal audiences toward either unemotional or emotional reaction. Ideally, as Aristotle puts it (\textit{Po.} 13. 1453a9) the hero should fall into misfortune through some kind of "error" (\textit{ ámbartía}), and not because of a character "flaw" (\textit{ kakhía}). In this way, the question of the protagonist's guilt would be irrelevant, as he suffers undeservedly.\footnote{As A. N. Michelini, \textit{Euripides and the Tragic Tradition} (Wisconsin, 1987), 282, and f. n. 25, notes regarding the meaning of the term: "distinguishing between conscious responsibility and accidental agency was difficult for early Greek ethic and the term \textit{hamartia} is useful because it precisely covers both areas."} This is, however, only the \textit{ideal} tragic device, best conducive in Aristotle's opinion to arousing pity in the spectator, as exemplified by Sophocles' \textit{Oedipus King}.

Aristotle himself mentions other cases, which should not be represented in tragedy, because they do not produce the ideal response. For instance, tragedies should not show the depraved, or a very wicked person falling from adversity to prosperity (\textit{Po.} 13. 1452b35-37):
\begin{quote}
(δει)... οὖδ' αὖ τὸν σφόδρα πονηρὸν ἔξι εὐτυχίας εἰς δυστυχίαν μεταπίπτειν. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ φιλάνθρωπον ἔχοι ἃν ἡ τοιαύτη σύστασις, ἀλλ' οὔτε ἔλεον, οὔτε φόβον, ὦ μὲν γὰρ περὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον ἕστιν δυστυχοῦντα, ὦ δὲ περὶ τὸν ὁμοίον.
\end{quote}

Nor should tragedies depict an entirely evil person falling from prosperity to adversity. For this plot might arouse (lit. have) some fellow-feelings, but not pity and fear, for one (pity is felt for the undeserving, the other for one like ourselves).

\footnote{21} That the tragic imitator is able to put on various postures, which forces the spectators to adjust to different perspectives, seems to be Plato's concern (\textit{R..} 394d, 397e). In an ideal state, citizens should have only one business and not be influenced to adopt many, because of tragedy's pliability.
Sometimes, internal audiences in tragedies perceive the tragic action as fitting exactly this scenario, regarded as undesirable by Aristotle. The theoretical questions that emerge here are as follows. Why would dramatists present the tragic events through the eyes of unsympathetic internal audiences and how would this affect the external spectator? In Sophoclean tragedies, the problem of moral guilt becomes extraneous, especially after the misfortune has befallen the protagonist. The prevailing response is that of pity, which may explain the Aristotelian preference. Thus, for example, toward the end of the *Oedipus King*, the messenger invites internal (and implicitly external) spectators to imagine the terrible sight of the king, who would elicit pity even from an enemy:

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... θέαμα ὅ εἰσόψει τάχα
toiou'ton oίον καὶ στυγούντι ἐποικτίσαι. (OT 1295-96).
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You will soon behold a sight so sad
That even the one hating (the king) would pity it.

In other tragedies, the problem of whether or not the protagonist suffers undeservedly and, therefore, if pity is the appropriate response is never abandoned. Hostile attitudes of internal audiences seem to have raised questions of moral culpability and presented the tragic action in a juridical manner. This was, perhaps, pleasurable to the external audience, who would thus decide whether or not to respond emotionally. Certainly, such pleasure could not have been the "proper", Aristotelian one, which resembles mourning and comes from pity and fear. Thus, when internal controversies over the right emotional attitude toward the protagonist occurred, the external spectator could have been

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23 Problems regarding the responsibility of the protagonist are usually raised early in Sophoclean plays (e.g. Creon's accusing Oedipus or Antigone of stubbornness (*OT* and *Ant*), before the misfortune befalls the tragic hero. They easily lose importance after the calamity befalls, nevertheless, as the suffering of the heroes is undeserved, exceeding any kind of culpability.
entertained by following the argument and less involved in the tragic misfortune. On the other hand, arousal of imaginative emotion, which was the Aristotelian ideal for tragic structure, presupposes a chain of emotion between internal and external audiences and thus keeps the spectator more involved in the tragic action through syllogism. In my analysis, I will examine the degree to which Greek tragedies maintain an emotional "chain", by proposing sympathetic responses internally, which could then be taken in by external audiences. I will also discuss probable reactions of the spectators to instances in which the internal audiences display indifferent or hostile attitudes toward the tragic action.

The survey of tragedies includes Aeschylus' *Persians*, the *Prometheus Bound*, and Sophocles' *Ajax*, and, finally, Euripides' *Orestes*, an innovative play reported to have intrigued the spectators and continually reproduced, until Hellenistic times. In each case, I will consider the historical context of the play, reports about the production of the plays, and later comments of the scholiasts, to the degree to which they are available and relevant to the subject.\(^{24}\)


Any appraisal of the initial reception of Aeschylus' *Persians* raises an unusual problem. The play, produced only a few years after the event, deals with the Persian defeat at Salamis in 480 BC. Could, then, the Athenian spectators have watched a tragedy depicting the fall of their historical enemy with aesthetic detachment? My analysis

\(^{24}\) I will use the scholiasts' commentaries, especially when they give interesting details about the production of the plays and assume certain audience reactions to dramatic moments. As R. Meijering, *Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia* (Groningen, 1987), has well proven, scholiasts continue the ancient tradition of literary criticism, and revive such notions as *phantasia*, *mimesis*, etc.
examines pity and other possible reactions of the audiences, through considering the internal structure as well as the dramatic and historical milieu of the play. The dramatic background of tragedy will be compared with other descriptions of the Persian Wars in the art and literature of the time, which probably shaped certain expectations for Aeschylus' treatment of the topic. Particular emphasis is placed on the ways in which historical circumstances may have influenced the audience responses to the tragedy's techniques of emotional arousal.

Modern critics have debated whether Athenian audiences were moved to pity by the ruin of Xerxes in the Persians, after seeing the actual destruction caused by the king in Athens. According to some, no dramatic element of the play, not even the final threnody, was designed to lead the spectators toward feeling eleos. Others, on the contrary, believe that the Persians should be regarded as a 'usual' tragedy, which rises above ethnical differences and historical facts. Consequently, the play would have aroused pity for the tragic action, which the spectators saw as an abstract depiction of human fall rather than in connection with recent history. Both views seem to be

25 U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Aeschylus: Interpretationen (Berlin, 1914), 42-58, considered the kommos (Pe. 931-1078, in which the chorus and Xerxes lament the ruin of the armies), to be rather amusing than tragic. Wilamowitz, whose critique was very influential by the beginning of the twentieth century, found other structural "flaws" with the play, such as the lack of unity, absence of a "true" tragic hero, etc. S. N. Adams, "Salamis Symphony: the Persae of Aeschylus," in Studies in Honor of Gilbert Norwood, ed. M. White (Toronto, 1952), 46-54, also finds the kommos satiric and the play unemotional. G. Thompson, Aeschylus and Athens. A study in the Social Origins of Drama (London, 1973), 14, describes the Persians as "less rich in intellectual content" than the other Aeschylean plays, but valuable as poetry of an eyewitness, preserving the "spirit of the Athenian people during their struggle against Persian occupation."

26 Scholars who take interpretative side emphasize that the tragedy meets the criteria for a tragedy, in the later Aristotelian sense, since it contains a reversal, a tragic error and pertains to universality. Therefore, they conclude, the Persians must have had a powerful emotional effect on its audiences. Thus, for example, D. Conacher, "Aeschylus' Persae: A Literary Commentary," in Serta Turyniana, ed. H. Urbana (Chicago
extreme. The former discredits the *Persians* as tragedy, by assuming that audiences could not have felt pity, the tragic emotion par excellence in Antiquity. The latter emphasizes the emotional effect of the play, without considering the complex historical circumstances.

More recently, scholars have tried to harmonize the status of the *Persians* as tragedy portraying the historical foe, to which the spectator should respond with compassion, with the play's implicit glorification of Athens. Loraux has suggested that the *Persians* adopted the theme of honoring the enemy, which was common in the Athenian funeral orations. Though cogent, this point of view does not elucidate why the tragedy emphasizes the destruction and never the bravery of the Persian armies. Hall has proposed that the Greek spectators of the *Persians* could have enjoyed a sense of ethnic superiority and pride, while they also exorcised their own powerful emotions by watching them dramatically projected on the "other", the barbarian in this case. In this case, the Athenians would have mourned their own loss indirectly, by seeing the calamity and London, 1974), 141-68. Conacher suggests at 167 that the mere appearance of Xerxes on the stage would have produced *catharsis* in the audience, which the completely opposite point of view from Wilamowitz, who found Xerxes' dirge hilarious. For a reappraisal of Xerxes' entrance, W. Thalmann, "Xerxes' rags: some problems in Aeschylus' *Persians*," *AJP* 101 (1980), 260-82.

27 N. Loraux, *La voix endeuillée. Essai sur la tragédie grecque* (Paris, 1999), 71-82. At 78, Loraux points to the complexity of the audience's response to the play, which should involve a subtle mixture of patriotism and compassion, pleasure and pain.

28 Indeed, the play repeatedly mentions the impressive number of Persian soldiers and the wealth of Xerxes. In my opinion, nevertheless, rather than honoring the enemy's valor, this suggests that the Persians lack military virtues, since they lose the battle of Salamis despite their riches and multitude.

29 E. Hall 1996, 19. This explanation does not do justice to the unique historical context of the play, which, otherwise, Hall underscores adequately in her analysis. Hall notes that the formula "playing the other", coined by Zeitlin 1990, can apply to all Greek tragedy. Thus, tragedies represent "the other", the non-
that befell the Persians in war. This explanation is also not entirely satisfying. The Greek spectator typically feels pity and pleasure similar to mourning only when he senses similarities between the "other", the tragic character, and the self, through a mental process of inference rather than of projection. Therefore, in order to reach such a response, the audience could no longer have perceived the Persian as the other, the barbarian enemy in the play, but rather as self-like, human, beyond ethnicity. These interpretations generally acknowledge the difficulties involved in understanding how the historic perception of the Persians may have determined the audience's response to the play. My study will look, more specifically, at dramatic devices that appear to have been conducive to pity and other emotions. Then, it will consider how the spectators' memory of recent history may have challenged or undermined the play's appeals to emotion, perhaps leading to ambiguous responses.

The *Persians* occupies a unique place in the surviving corpus of Greek tragedy, as the only play with a historical subject, instead of a mythical theme. Other tragedies, however, dealing with historical topics predated the production of the *Persians*, in the
spring of 472 BC. Phrynichus composed the *Sack of Miletus*, after the Ionian rebellion against the Persian king, and the *Phoenician Women*, victorious in the dramatic competition in 476 BC. Aeschylus' play was thus not entirely experimental, as Athenian audiences were already used to dramas treating the Persian wars. Furthermore, the hypothesis to the *Persians* offers an interesting detail, indicating that Aeschylus modeled his tragedy after his predecessor's *Phoenissae*:

Here is the hypothesis to Aeschylus' *Persians*. In his work on Aeschylus' plots, Glaucus says that the *Persians* was fashioned after Phrynichus' *Phoenician Women*. He even quotes this beginning (line) of the drama, which is "These are things of the Persians, who have gone long ago". Except that in that play (Phrynichus') an eunuch is reporting the defeat of Xerxes at the beginning... while in this one (Aeschylus') a chorus of elders delivers the prologue.

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32 IG II, 2318: the play was produced during the archonship of Menon (473/2 BC), under the choregy of Pericles.

As the hypothesis itself suggests, the *Persians* most likely differed greatly from the dramatic structure of the *Phoenician Women*. An obvious distinction is that Aeschylus builds up Xerxes' defeat, while Phrynichus announces the king's downfall from the start. Though impossible to specify the extent to which the two plays resembled each other, in my opinion, Aeschylus appears to want his audience to be aware of the similarities. He thus imitates the first line of the *Phoenissae* in the opening of his own play, which is a very unusual position for a literary allusion in tragedy. A reason could be that Aeschylus acknowledges a literary debt, so indirectly praising his precursor. Another plausible explanation, I believe, is that Aeschylus invites the audience to compare his tragedy to Phrynichus' and to appreciate how he deals with the same theme. Whether or not the tragedian intends to enter a contest for poetic glory with Phrynichus, remains

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34 E. Hall, *Aeschylus. Persians, with Introduction, Translation and Commentary* (Warmister, 1996), 105-06, emphasizes possible structural differences between the two plays. Hall's commentary also provides basic information about the literary tradition of the hypothesis. It seems to contain observations of Hellenistic scholars, compiled at a later date. The identity of Glaucus, the author of the treatise on Aeschylus' plots, cannot be established with precision (perhaps, Glaucus of Rhegium, a fifth-century BC critic?). The hypothesis adds that the *Persians* belonged to a tetralogy, including *Phineus*, *Glaucus*, *Potineus*, and a satyr drama, *Prometheus*.

35 According to the quotation of Phrynichus' line in the hypothesis, the imitation was not literal. Aeschylus replaced βεβεκότων with οἰχομένων (Pe.1: Τάδε μὲν Περσῶν τῶν οἰχομένων) and omitted palai. J. T. Sheppard, "Notes on Aeschylus' Persae," *CR* 29 (1915), 33-35, suggests that Aeschylus borrows the line with the change to create a particular effect with a word play. Thus, while Phrynicus' verb simply means "departed", Aeschylus uses a verb tgar could be taken as both gone in the sense of "left", and gone in the sense of "perished". For a similar interpretation, R. P. Winnington - Ingram, *Studies in Aeschylus' Persae* (Cambridge, 1983), 198-99.

36 R. Garner, *From Homer to Tragedy. The Art of Allusion in Greek Tragedy* (London and New York, 1990), 206-21, lists the recognizable literary allusions in the extant tragedies and tragic fragments, which are, of course, limited by our limited access to Greek literature. The *Persians* alone uses an allusion of the first line of *Phoenissae* in the first line!

37 Thus, J. B. Bury, "Two Literary Compliments," *CR* 15 (1905, 10-11); R. Garner 1990, 22.
uncertain. Essentially, the prologue of the *Persians* seems to have reminded the spectators that they were familiar with the certainly still sensitive subject of the Persian wars in tragedy. Perhaps, it referred to the *Phoenissae* as a *captatio benevolentiae*, since Phrynichus' play had already been successful and its subject not too painful for the audience (unlike the *Sack of Miletus*). Perhaps, the imitation of the opening line of *The Phoenician Women* in the *Persians* also suggested to the audience, that Aeschylus would treat the ruin of Xerxes' armies in Greece with dramatic novelty.

In addition to the dramatic background of the play, which we can merely surmise, further difficulties in estimating the audience responses to the *Persians* arise from the fact that the play represents the fall of a historical enemy. Athenians had been involved in military campaigns against the Persians for decades, when the play was produced. In 498 BC, Athens aided Ionia in the revolt against the Persian king, which ended in 494 BC with a Greek disaster, the capture of Miletus. The expedition of Datis and Artaphrenes, under Darius' rule, aimed to conquer the Greek mainland, in 490 BC. This Persian invasion was only abated by Greek victory in the battle of Marathon, in which Aeschylus suffered a personal loss, the death of his brother. In 480 BC, after Xerxes' victory in Boeotia, Athens had to be evacuated, and it was sacked by Persian armies, which were

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38 Thomas Harrison, *The Emptiness of Asia. Aeschylus Persians and the History of the Fifth Century* (London, 2000) is the best study dealing with the historical (contrasting Aeschylus with Herodotus), political and ideological suggestions of the play, with careful discussion of the scholarship on the subject.  
40 Herodotus (6. 114).
subsequently defeated at Salamis and Plataea. Both Aeschylus and his audiences must have been deeply affected by the Persian invasion, as they witnessed the events. Under such circumstances, it is probably right to assume that the spectators felt a certain amount of pride at watching a tragedy, which, after all, depicted Greek triumphs over the Persian aggressor. The literature and visual arts of the time commemorated the bravery and sacrifice of the Greeks during the Persian wars. Simonides wrote lyric and elegiac poetry about the battles of Thermopylae and Plataea. Polygnotus painted the battle of Marathon (Paus. 1.15.3) and vase paintings portrayed Persian battles, besides showing the customary mythical scenes. Most likely, tragedies, such as Aeschylus' *Persians* and, before, Phrynichus' *Phoenissae*, belonged to this cultural trend, honoring the Athenian military glory. Indeed, scholars have noted dramatic moments in the *Persians*, which would appeal to patriotic feelings of the contemporary audiences. Perhaps the most impressive example is the extensive evocation of the naval battle at Salamis in the play

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41 T. L. Shear gives an assessment of the Persian sack of Athens, "The Persian Destruction of Athens. Evidence from the Agora Deposits," *Hesperia* 62 (1993), 383-482. The Persian threat continued to loom after 480. Furthermore, the Athenians associated the danger of the "Mede" with the return of tyranny, since Xerxes brought with him Hippias, the deposed tyrant, when invading Greece. See, for example, M. M. Austin, "Greek Tyrants and the Persians, 546-479 B. C.," *CQ* 40 (1990), 289-306.

42 As E. Hall 1996, 4, writes: "It is difficult for readers in the late twentieth century western world to imagine either the strength of emotions which thinking about Persia could stir up, or the depth of the conceptual chasm which was felt to yawn between West and East."


accompanying references to Psyttalea (447-70) and Plataea (816-20). Furthermore, when analyzed ideologically, the tragedy presents a Greek distorted vision of the "barbarians." It portrays the Persians in effeminate attitudes, confused in battle, and subdued to a hierarchical society. The Athenian spectators could have felt civic pride by contrasting this image of the "barbarian" with their image of democratic Athens, where citizens are manly and free. An ancient suggestion about the reception of the play occurs in Aristophanes' *Frogs*, in which Aeschylus describes the *Persians* as inspiring courage:

(Ai) Εἰτα διδάξας Πέρσας μετὰ τοῦτ' ἐπιθυμεῖν ἐξεδίδαξα νικάν ἄεί τούς ἀντιπάλους, κοσμήσας ἔργον ἀριστον. (1026-27).

Then, by putting on the *Persians*, I taught (the spectators) to desire Always to defeat the enemies, so crowning the best achievement.

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45 For a recent discussion and bibliography on this, S. Goldhill, "Battle Narrative and Politics in Aeschylus' *Persai*," *JHS* 108, 189-93, who discusses the implications of Aeschylus' emphasis on Salamis and the Athenian contribution in expelling the Persians for the audience of the Dionysiac Festivals.

46 S. Said, "Pourquoi Psyttalie? - ou Comme transformer un combat naval en défaite terrestre," in *Les Perses d' Eschyle*, eds P. Ghiron - Bistagne, A. Moreau and J.-C. Turpin (Montpellier 1992/1993), 53-69, argues that Aeschylus mentions the land battle on the small island of Psyttalea, to suggest that a land victory was also achieved, besides the important land victory. Said notices the dramatic irony in the Aeschylean account: the Persians, arrow masters, are killed by the arrows.


48 Hall 1989, notes that the positive image of Athens emerges implicitly in the play.

49 The phrase κοσμήσας ἔργον ἀριστον (1027), "adorning the best thing" could refer to Aeschylus' composing his best work or honoring the best Greek achievement, the defeat of the Persians. I opt for the second, with K. Dover, *Aristophanes' Frogs. Edited with introduction and commentary* (Oxford, 1993), 320.
No doubt, the comic lines should be taken *cum grano salis.* They imply, nevertheless, that the *Persians* was associated with patriotism, even generations after the initial production. This kind of response to art would have surely pleased Plato. Perhaps, he would have not banished the play from his ideal *polis,* if it educated the citizens and inculcated courage in the soldiers:

> αὐτοὶ δ' ἂν τῷ αὐστηρότερῳ καὶ ἀθέστερῳ ποιητῇ χρώμεθα καὶ μυθολόγῳ ὠφελίας ἔνεκα, ὡς ἦμιν τὴν τοῦ ἐπειεικοῦς λέξιν μιμοῖτο καὶ τὰ λεγόμενα λέγοι ἐν ἐκείνοις τοῖς τύποις οἷς καθ' ἀρχάς ἐνομοθετησάμεθα ὁτε τοὺς στρατιώτας ἐπεχειροῦμεν παιδεύειν. (R. 3. 398a8-b3)

For we mean to employ for our benefit a rather austere and severe, who would imitate the virtuous only in style, and will follow those models which we prescribed when we undertook the task to educate soldiers.

Nevertheless, in this passage and elsewhere, Plato suggests that the subject of imitation in art might directly influence the audience's behavior in life. Thus, if poetry imitates the courageous, the spectators will be inspired to display courage, and vice versa, if it imitates shameful acts, the spectators would be lead astray from virtue. The *Persians,* however, imitates not the brave Athenians, who faced the Persian army, but rather the discouraged, defeated Persians. The tragedy may have thus failed to conform to Plato's ideal poetic imitation and inculcated valor in the spectators only indirectly, a possibility ignored in the Platonic critique of art.

The dramatic and historical context of the first production of the *Persians* suggests that the tragedy was part of the artistic movement praising the Athenian victory at Salamis. Next, I will examine how the internal structure of the play could have also involved the audiences emotionally.

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50 The *Frogs* was produced in 402 BC, seventy years after the *Persians* was put on stage.
The chorus of old Persians, royal counselors recount that Xerxes has left for Greece, with his armies, which are described as:

Φοβεροί μὲν ἰδεῖν, δεῖνοι δὲ μάχην. (27)

Terrifying to look at, and dreadful in battle.

A few lines later, while giving the first catalogue of the Persian commanders, the chorus reinforces the attribute calling the army "a terrifying sight to behold" (φοβερὰν ὃσιν προσιδέσθαι, 48). As this characterization refers precisely to the visual impression that Persian troops would make on the enemy, it may have stirred painful memories in the Athenian audience, who did see or hear about the Persian invasion. Tragic fear, as later suggested by Aristotelian theory, consists of being afraid for what is happening in the play. By extension, the listener should become anxious for human destiny in general. In fact, anxiety is an essential feature of Aeschylean drama, as J. de Romilly has shown. In the Persians as well, both the chorus and later the queen exhibit anxiety for what could happen to Xerxes and his army. In the prologue itself, the chorus shows visceral fear for the fate of the absent troops. Thus, for instance, all Asia "grieves with soft yearning" (πόθῳ στένεται μᾶλερφῷ, 62); parents and wives "tremble" (τρέμεονται, 64), waiting for news from the departed soldiers. The chorus thinks about the gloomy end that might await the army:

Ταῦτα μοι μελαγχίτων φρήν ὀμύσσεται φόβῳ (115).

These (worries) tear apart my heart of black robes with fear.

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52 S. D. Sullivan, Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology. Traditional and New (Montreal and Kingston, 1997), analyzes at length the use of psychological terms in Aeschylus' tragedy and compares it with prior Homeric and Greek lyric poetry. He notes at 34-35 that often these terms occur in connection with expressions of emotions; for their use in respect to fear.
These examples show anxiety for those gone to war, to which the Athenian audiences could have related with sympathy, perhaps, since they themselves had experienced similar feelings. On the other hand, the previous descriptions of the Persian army as a "frightening sight" do not seem to belong to the same category of tragic fear. They would not involve the audiences in imaginatively "fearing for" the tragic action, but rather remind them of being afraid of the Persian armies in reality. In the *De Anima*, Aristotle distinguishes between fear felt at seeing a frightening image in art, and fear felt in front of the real danger. The former emotion comes from imagination (φαντασία) and does not materialize in a belief (δόξα) - that something terrible will truly happen to the viewer, whereas the latter emotion does materialize in opinion. When hearing the reference to the terrifying sight of the Persian army in the play, the audience may have recalled an emotion based on their expectation, at seeing the Persians.

Xerxes, portrayed as a "godlike mortal" (ἰσόθεος φῶς, 80), has a fiery, demonic look:

Κυανούν δ’ ὁμοστὶν λέσσω
Φονίου δέργῳ δράκοντος (81-82).

Casting with his eyes a dark glance
Of a deadly snake.

Once again, the inhuman glance of the king can point to his terrifying presence in battle.

Furthermore, the lines are reminiscent of the Homeric passage, in which Hector, about to confront Achilles in the fatal battle, resembles a deadly snake.⁵³ Perhaps the audiences of

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⁵³ Aeschylus' use of Homeric language is well attested by A. Sideras, *Aschylus Homericus* (Göttingen, 1971), 198-215, for the Persians. The Homeric comparison reads:

"Ως δὲ δρακόντων ἐπὶ χειλὶ ὀρέστερος ἀνδρὰ μένησι... ἢς Ἑκτωρ ἀσβεστόν ἔχων μένος οὐς ὑπερχώρει (II. 22. 93; 96)
the *Persians* would have recognized the allusion to the *Iliad*. If they did, likening Xerxes to Hector may have been intellectually satisfying and emotionally comforting. Thus, the historical enemy would appear closer to a mythical warrior, destined to be defeated, and, perhaps, worthy of pity.

Rich imagery contributes to the dramatic movement of the play, as the sight of the Persians changes from causing fear into inspiring pity. Both Atossa and Xerxes are figuratively described in terms of their sight. The queen spreads around a light that equals the eyes of gods (149-50), while Xerxes is called the "eyes of the palace" (οἷς ὀφθαλμοὺς, 169). The metaphors denote extraordinary, almost divine attributes, which prefigure the excess of power, *hybris*. Ironically, though, both the Queen and her son start seeing images which progressively shatter the images that the Persians confidently ascribe to them. After her premonitory dream (183-200), followed by a vision conveying an ill omen, Atossa exclaims:

ταύτα ἐμοί γε δεῖγματα εἰσίδειν (210).

these visions are dreadful to see.

The image recalls the description of the Persian army, lexically, but, in this case, the queen's visions are worrisome, in respect to the Persians armies. The nebulous fear of the prophetic dreams materializes for the queen, after the news of the defeat at Salamis:

Ω νυκτὸς ὀφθαλμῷ ἐμφανῆς ἐνυπνίων,

ὅς κάρτα μοι σαφῶς ἐδήλωσας κακά. (518-19).

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54 A. N. Michelini, *Tradition and Dramatic Form in the Persians of Aeschylus* (Leiden, 1982) provides an excellent analysis of imagery and dramatic techniques in the tragedy.

55 For the importance of *hybris* theme L. Lenz, "Zur Dramaturgie und Tragik in den *Persen,*" *Gymnasium* 93 (1986), 141-63.
Oh nocturnal sight, appearing in dreams
How clearly you revealed to me the misfortunes.56

When the chorus laments the destruction of the army, which Zeus has concealed in "dark grief" (πένθει δνοφερο, 536), they use for the lost Persian ships an epithet (κτανώπιδες, 559) that was once described the terrifying eyes of Xerxes. Similar lexical phrasings give, therefore, different emotional suggestions to the audience.57 As they shift the image of the Persians from brazen to humiliated, they may have also changed the response of the audience. At first the visual suggestions seem to remind the audience of an over-confident historical enemy. By contrast, as the play progresses they would invite the spectators to imagine the homecoming of a king with a shattered army. Moreover, the internal audiences anticipate the catastrophe of Salamis, or hear about it soon after it occurred. According to Aristotle's theory, evoking a misfortune (which is about to or has just happened) is the device that should best induce imaginative pity in the listeners, because it brings the events before the mind's eyes, pro ommaton. Yet, the efficacy of this tragic device becomes problematic in light of the historical events. If audiences simply imagined, following the dramatist what it was like for the Persians to experience the loss, then, the response should have been pity. If the audiences considered, however, that the Athenians were the ones inflicting misfortune on Xerxes' armies, both in tragedy and real history, then pity may not have been the response. Finally, the audiences could also have imagined what might have happened historically, had the Persians not lost the war, in which case they may have felt anger and fear.

56 Cf. the queen's exclamations at 603-04:
ἐμοὶ γάρ πάντα φόβου πλέα
ἐν δμασίν ἐ ἀνταία φαίνεται θεόν.
In the speech of Darius, Aeschylus impressively employs the motif of remembrance. As I have argued, memory and arousal of pity are closely related in Greek culture. In the *Persians*, Darius advises future generations to avoid *hybris*, by contemplating their defeat and remembering Athens:\(^{58}\)

Τοιαύθ’ ὀρόντες τῶν δε τάπιτίμια

Μέμνησθ’ Ἀθηνᾶν Ἐλλάδος τε... (823-24).

Seeing the penalties of these events
Remember Athens and Greece.

Piles of Persian corpses, left on the earth of Plataea will "silently signify to the eyes of generations of people" (ἀφωνα σημανοῦσιν ὁμμασίν βροτόν, 819), not to attempt excessive display of power. Instead of being conducive to pity, the motif of memory, as used here, must have aroused patriotic feelings in the audience. At the same time, the passage may have also humanized the "enemy", by implying the way in which the Persians envision their defeat and the importance of Athens in the Persian memory.

The end of the play clearly invites the audience to pity, at least from an Aristotelian perspective. Xerxes' threnody (908-17) is reminiscent of a very famous Homeric scene. The king (914) notices the chorus members and deplores their old age, which could recall in the mind of the spectators Priam's emphasis on his old age (*Il.* 22. 419-20) when trying to move Achilles to pity. If so, this may be significant. In a way the

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\(^{57}\) J. Assaël, "La répétition comme procédé stylistique dans les *Perses* d' Eschyle", in *Les Perses*, 15-27, discusses how Aeschylus obtains unusual stylistic effects by placing repetitions in different contexts.  

\(^{58}\) The speech questions the moral action of Xerxes and thus makes the interpretation of the final *kommos* more problematic. Interesting discussions of Darius and Xerxes as tragic characters are to be found in H. H. Bacon, *Barbarians in Greek Tragedy* (New Haven, 1961) and P. Mettis, "Xerxes' Entrance: Irony, Myth, and History in the *Persians*", in *Language and the Tragic Hero. Essays on Greek Tragedy in Honor of Gordon M. Kirkwood*, ed. P. Pucci (Atlanta, 1988), 103-19.
audience of the *Persians* is also invited to watch, with the mind's eyes, the pitiful sight of an enemy. Therefore, when envisioning Xerxes and the Persian army through the eyes of their parents and elderly, the Athenian spectators could have been compelled to the following kind of emotional syllogism. The Persians, like us, lost their youth in battle and they have anxious, mourning parents. They should be even more pitiable than we are, since they were vanquished in war, while we were victorious. This is the kind of reasoning that Priam uses to stir Achilles' pity in the *Iliad*, in the most difficult type of emotional appeal: asking pity for the foe. Perhaps some audience members would have responded in this way, through following the Aristotelian syllogism. The Persians, like us, are human, prone to suffering. We can see ourselves with our mind's eyes experiencing misfortunes and, therefore, we pity them. Nevertheless, it is not likely that everybody in the audience embraced this ideal emotional response. In Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, people cannot feel pity in certain circumstances, such as when they are in great fear, because they are too preoccupied with their own emotion.\(^59\) Likewise, those who are angry or overconfident cannot pity, because they do not think about the future.\(^60\) When the *Persians* was produced, many were probably in such states of mind toward the invader. Some may have still been utterly afraid that another Persian attack would destroy Athens. Others, perhaps those who fought against the Persians may have been confident that they could always inflict suffering on the ruthless, invading army.

Finally, the chorus laments Xerxes' loss of the "trusted eye" (πιστὸν ὀφθαλμῶν, 915) another visual metaphor for the army. Xerxes himself asks the chorus to look at his

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\(^{59}\) Μὴ τοὺς φοβοῦμενοι σφόδρα οὐ γὰρ ἔλευσιν οἱ ἐκπλεπημένοι διὰ τὸ εἶναι πρὸς τῷ ὀφθαλμῷ πάθει (*Rh.* 2. 1385b33-34).
sorry plight (1016), and the chorus responds - I see (ὁρῶ, ὄρῶ, 1017), as if about to realize the magnitude of the king's disaster. This response of the chorus can be understood as a "placing pathos before the eyes". The internal audiences verbally emphasize seeing the suffering of the king, and, therefore, indirectly appeal to the external spectator to adopt the tragic vision. A climax of the playwright's art is, perhaps, to arouse pity even for the foe, which Aeschylus seems to attempt here.

To conclude, the references to tragic emotions, particularly toward the end of the play, invite audiences to participate imaginatively in the suffering of the enemy. At the same time, the tragedy does not seem to discourage the Athenian spectators from celebrating their victory, as certain dramatic peculiarities suggest, such as the praise of Athens, the allusions to the frightening Persian armies. As the internal evidence suggests, the play may have invited the audience to imaginative pity, in a manner reminiscent of a Homeric passage (Achilles' compassion for Priam). Now that the enemy was defeated, the Athenian spectator could have seen him through the eyes of the chorus, no longer as "barbarian" and different, but rather similar to himself in suffering. Some sophisticated members of the audience may have adopted the view of the chorus, and so reached an "Aristotelian", ideal response to the tragedy. Yet, many Athenians may have been too angry, or too preoccupied with their own emotion to embrace this ideal response. Fear that real danger for Athens still lurked in Persia could have prevented the audience from seeing the Persians imaginatively in the play, as an artistic construct. If so, as the allusion in the Frogs to the tragedy suggests, some audience members would not have adopted the Aristotelian emotional syllogism. Those spectators would not have seen themselves as

60 Καὶ οἱ μῆτε ἐν ἀνδρίας πάθει ὀντες, ὦον ἐν ὤργῃ ἦ θάρρης (ἄλλοις τοῖς γάρ τοῦ ἐσομένου ταύτα)
similar to the Persians, in terms of human universals, but rather dissimilar from the
defeated enemy, in terms of historical particulars.

3. *Prometheus Bound.*

The *Prometheus* raises different problems than the *Persians* for the assessment of
the audience responses. Factors external to the dramatic structure of the *Persians* seem to
have caused variances in the reactions of the spectators. Although internal audiences
constantly show sympathy for the Persian troops, certain spectators may not have
responded to the tragedy's emotional invitations, given the historical circumstances. By
contrast, the internal structure of the *Prometheus Bound* presents the spectators various
attitudes toward the suffering Prometheus. My analysis particularly examines how these
internal attitudes may have intrigued the audiences, through challenging ethical, political
and religious ideas of the time, to suggest likely reactions to the play.

Most critics agree that the *Prometheus* must have aroused compassion for the
Titan, who redeems the human race.\(^6^1\) As G. Murray rightly notes, characters appeal to
fellow suffering in such a manner as almost to anticipate the Stoic doctrine of

\(^{61}\) To list only a few examples here, Di Benedetto, *L' ideologia del potere e la tragedia greca* (Torino,
1978), 115-16, who analyzes Prometheus' character in the play as prototype of benefactor. R. Trousson, *La
thème de Prométhée dans la littérature européenne* (Geneve, 1964), examines how Prometheus has been
seen as heroic savior of humanity in the European thought, from Goethe to Camus, thanks to this drama.
Both Winnington-Ingram 1983, 177-84, and S. Sáid 1985, 284-91, suggest that the audience should have
admired Prometheus, whose heroic character is emphasized in the play and contrasted with Zeus, the
prototype of a tyrant. Likewise, U. Albini, "I tre volti del potere nel Prometeo," *Parola del Passato* 45
(1985), 414-18, notes that the audience's sympathy has to be directed toward Prometheus, since Zeus in the
play can only arouse antipathy of the reader or spectator.
sympatheia, in which the pain of one individual affects the whole universe. Following Lessing's theory, Friedrich has argued that sympathy ("Mitleid"), sharing suffering, best explains the nature of the Aristotelian pity. He concludes that such feeling is displayed toward the protagonist in the *Prometheus Bound*. Even though Aristotle's *eleos* presupposes involvement, as Friedrich states, it is also characterized by detachment, both personal and temporal. The one who pities relates to the sufferer by imagining that he (or his dear ones) might have endured in the past or endure in the future a similar misfortune. In the play, however, Prometheus' pity for humans leads to self-sacrifice, not to imaginative reflection on the self. Pity compels the chorus to join the Titan in his final ordeal. Thus, *eleos* implies rather direct participation in one's misfortune than involvement mediated by imagination, which differs from *eleos* described in the Aristotelian account and, generally, in Greek culture. The focus of my discussion will be on ways in which the audience may have reacted to the expressions of pity, taking into account the unusual features of the emotion in this tragedy.

Some critics, on the other hand, deem pity an inappropriate reaction to the play, by maintaining that Prometheus is a villain, rightly punished for defying Zeus. This view appears to have enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century. It maintains, overall, that there is not much difference between the dramatist's handling of the myth of Prometheus and the Hesiodic tradition. The Titan, guilty of insubordination, only saved a bad human race, which Zeus, the God of justice, would have rightly destroyed. See, for example, the prefaces of the following editions of the play, G. F. Schoemann, *Des Aischylos Gefesselter Prometheus* (Greifswald, 1844); Willson, *The Prometheus Victus* (London, 1989). Some twentieth-century scholars continued to support this view, such as J. A. K.

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63 W.-H. Friedrich, *Vorbild und Neugestaltung: Sechs Kapitel zur Geschichte der Tragödie* (Göttingen, 1967), 192-95. He notes that the choruses show "Mitleid" in the *Prometheus* and most Sophoclean plays, but they do not do so in any other surviving Aeschylean tragedy.
64 As I have shown, pp. 54-67.
65 This view appears to have enjoyed some popularity in the nineteenth century. It maintains, overall, that there is not much difference between the dramatist's handling of the myth of Prometheus and the Hesiodic tradition. The Titan, guilty of insubordination, only saved a bad human race, which Zeus, the God of justice, would have rightly destroyed. See, for example, the prefaces of the following editions of the play, G. F. Schoemann, *Des Aischylos Gefesselter Prometheus* (Greifswald, 1844); Willson, *The Prometheus Victus* (London, 1989). Some twentieth-century scholars continued to support this view, such as J. A. K.
interpretation finds some support in the drama, but internal expressions sympathy for the Titan prevail over displays of antipathy. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that the spectators listened exclusively to the detractors of Prometheus and, overall, remained unmoved by the tragedy's appeals to pity. Nevertheless, spectators probably had to consider the internal voices that discredit Prometheus, even as to reject them. Moreover, the views of internal audiences opposing the Titan posit thorny issues, such as the nature of divine justice, guilt, and responsibility. These views will also be explored in my analysis, as they may have led to ambiguous responses of the audiences.

The *Prometheus Bound* has caused tremendous debates among interpreters. Scholars have disputed the Aeschylean authorship of the play, on account of language, style, dramatic content, and staging. Furthermore, in the absence of didascalic


Mainly the voices of the chorus and Prometheus himself plead for the compassion of the viewer, throughout the play. On the opposite side are Cratus and Hermes, whose appearance on the stage is sporadic.

information, the date of the initial production remains uncertain. Based on external factors, the temporal limits for the composition of the play range from the eruption of Etna in 479/8 BC, an event to which likely Prometheus refers, to 424 BC, the year of the production of Aristophanes' Knights. More recently, studies have dated the play sometime during the second half of the fifth century. Finally, though Prometheus

Pattoni, L' autenticità del Prometeo Incatenato di Eschilo (Pisa, 1987); F. Stoessl, Der Prometheus des Aischyllos als geistesgeschichtliches und theatergeschichtliches Phaënonen (Stuttgart, 1988), 11-13, incline toward accepting the authenticity of the play. Whether pro or contra genuineness, most scholars admit numerous peculiarities of the PV, if compared with other Aeschylean tragedies. The question is whether these particularities are relevant, when only a fraction of Aeschylean drama has survived as material for comparison. Metrical oddities of the Prometheus Bound include an unusual number of first-foot anapests in the trimeters and the presence of dactilo - epitrite meter (not found elsewhere in the extant Aeschylus, but later used by both Sophocles and Euripides). The vocabulary of Prometheus is less complex than that of the rest of Aeschylus' plays (Saïd 1985, 27-34). The dialogic prologue of Prometheus is unusual for Aeschylus and common for Sophoclean plays; in addition, Prometheus resembles Sophoclean characters, who keep their decision despite external pressure. For comparison, see B. Knox, The Heroic Temper (Berkeley, 1965), 45-50. The arrival of the Oceanides and Oceanus through air, and the cataclysm at the end of the play (1080-2) raise the most serious problems of staging of all Greek tragedies (Taplin 1977, 270-75; 442-48).

Prometheus has a Hypothesis, which probably derives from Aristophanes of Byzantium, but this contains no information about the date and the production of the play. M. Griffith, Aeschylus. Prometheus Bound (Cambridge, 1983), 79, notes that the absence of didascalic information from the Hypothesis could be the result of an accident in transmission (as in the case of five Sophoclean tragedies), or, perhaps, due to confusion about the date and authorship of the play. Therefore, scholars resort to external grounds for dating the play. These are the eruption of Etna (479/8 BC or 475/4 Parium Marble), alluded in Prometheus (366-72), and 424 BC, when two lines of the Prometheus seem to have been parodied in the Knights (758-59).

Although scholars still have divided opinions with respect to the authenticity of the play, they have recently agreed on a late date for the play, based on similarities between Prometheus Bound and Sophoclean tragedies. For example, Herington 1970, 127-9, who is a supporter of the genuineness of the play, dates the Prometheus after Aeschylus' second visit in Sicily, 458BC-456BC. He opts for this, because of the parallelism in language between PV and Sophocles' Antigone and Ajax. For the same reason, Griffith 1983, 33, who doubts the authenticity, proposes 440s BC or even 430s for the production of the play.
Bound may have belonged to a trilogy, together with the Pyrophorus and the Lyomenus, neither the content nor the order of these other two plays in the trilogy can be established with precision.\textsuperscript{70} Such uncertainties surrounding the first production of the play hinder speculation about the way in which the historical context might have influenced the response of the initial audiences.

Certainly many spectators were familiar with the Hesiodic version of the myth\textsuperscript{71} and, perhaps, intrigued by the manner in which the playwright reworked the story of the Titan. The tragedian omits the Mecone episode (Th. 535-64), in which Prometheus divides the sacrificial meat deceitfully, trying to dupe Zeus.\textsuperscript{72} In addition to Prometheus' stealing the fire for the benefit of human race, a common motif in both the Theogony and the Prometheus Bound, the Titan becomes a veritable benefactor and the savior of mankind in the play.\textsuperscript{73} As Prometheus tells the chorus, he has bestowed mortals with all the arts, which they now possess:\textsuperscript{74}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{70} Th. Rosenmeyer, The Masks of Tragedy (Austin, 1963), 51-102, discusses Prometheus as a self-contained play. Griffith 1983, 281-305, considers the fragments as well as the ancient testimonies about the Pyrophorus and the Lyomenus and offers a useful summary of the scholarship on the topic. He proposes the Pyrophorus as the first play of the trilogy, in which Prometheus could have stolen the fire and brought it to human beings. This would have been followed by our play, the Desmothes, and, finally, by the Lyomenus, in which Prometheus obtains his freedom, after Heracles' killing the eagle. For another possible reconstruction of the plays and the enigma surrounding the Pyrophoros, see R. P. Winnington - Ingram, Studies in Aeschylus (Cambridge, 1983), 187-97.
  \item \textsuperscript{71} Th., 535-64, and WD, 47-50.
  \item \textsuperscript{72} F. Solmsen, Hesiod and Aeschylus, 2\textsuperscript{nd} edition, with a new foreword by G. M. Kirkood (Cornell, 1995), 124-77, offers the most explicit analysis of how Hesiod's account of Prometheic myth is transformed (PV) and discusses, in particular, the absence of the sacrifice of Mecone from the play.
  \item \textsuperscript{73} Among all kinds of discoveries, (450-61) through which Prometheus benefits human kind, the Titan invents writing: combinations of letters, memory of all things, Muse: - mother and worker. Winnington-Ingram 1983, 182, has compared the lines with Th.eogony (54), in which Mnemosyne is the mother of the
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
In brief, learn all at once,
Every art, which mortals have, comes from Prometheus.

Overall, the playwright enhances the heroism of Prometheus, while deprecating the character of Zeus and deepening the conflict between the two.⁷⁵ Therefore, the dramatist's departure from the tradition in handling the topic could have provided the first means of engaging the audience emotionally in the misfortune of the Titan. Moreover, the existence of a cult and festival in honor of Prometheus, the giver of fire,⁷⁶ suggest that the audiences might have already admired Prometheus as protector of human kind. In the fifth-century vase paintings Prometheus is commonly depicted in his glorious posture of Fire-bringer, as opposed to enduring his punishment, a popular theme in the sixth-century.⁷⁷ Hence, the spectators of Prometheus Bound may have found the play's

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⁷⁴ Other gifts to humans are, for instance, metallurgy (500-04) and divination (484-99). Den Boer, "Prometheus and Progress", in Miscellanea Tragica in Honorem Kamerbeek, eds. J. M. Bremer, S. L. Radt, and J. Ruijgh (Amsterdam, 1976), 17-27, likens Prometheus to other divine inventors in Greek archaic poetry, such as Hephaestus in the Homeric Hymn.

⁷⁵ As far as genealogy is concerned, Prometheus is the son of Clymene and Iapetus, and, therefore, titan of second generation (Th. 507-11), whereas he is the son of Gaia and thus first generation of rebellious Titans (PV). For further discussion, see, Said 1985, 188. Secondly, the Hesiodic Prometheus is a clever trickster (Th. 511, WD 55), whose machinations do not endanger Zeus' power (Th. 511, 613). In the tragedy, on the other hand, Zeus achieves supremacy only with Prometheus' help (PV 199ff.) and may be overthrown without Prometheus' counsel.


⁷⁷ M. Griffith 1983, 3, and n. 10, with bibliography.
emphasis on the anguish of Prometheus somewhat disturbing, since they were used to the
dignifying representations of the Titan in fifth-century art.

The dramatic structure of the *Prometheus Bound* belongs to a peculiar type, which
does not contain any recognition or reversals, the two essential plot components
according to Aristotle. Instead, it is based exclusively on "suffering" (πάθος), regarded as
third, and probably least interesting element of the plot in the *Poetics*.\(^78\) Thus, while
extensively discussing recognition (ἀναγνώρισις, Po.16. 1454b-55a) and reversal
(περιπετεία, Po. 9. 1452a-b), Aristotle mentions suffering only in passing:

\[ \text{Tρίτων} \; \text{δὲ} \; \piάθος. \; \text{Τούτων} \; \text{δὲ} \; \text{περιπετεία} \; \muὲς \; \text{kαὶ} \; \text{ἀναγνώρισις έιρηται}, \; \piάθος \; \text{δὲ} \; \text{έστι} \; \text{πράξις} \; \text{φθαρτικὴ} \; \text{ἡ} \; \text{όδυνηρά}, \; \text{ὀἷον} \; \text{οἳ} \; \text{ἐν} \; \text{τῷ} \; \text{φανερῷ} \; \text{θάνατοι καὶ} \; \text{αἱ} \; \text{περισυναί} \; \text{kαὶ} \; \text{τρώσεις} \; \text{kαὶ} \; \text{όσα} \; \text{τοιαύτα.} \; (\text{Po.11. 1452b-14}). \]

The third element is *pathos*. Of these [elements of the plot], reversal and recognition have been explained,
and suffering is a destructive or painful action, such as deaths in public, agonizing pains, wounds, and such
other things.

Aristotle's preference for the first two plot devices over the third could be explained as
follows. Reversal and recognition cause surprise, which is conducive to pleasure.

Furthermore, they seem to transfer emotion imaginatively from text to the audiences, by

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\(^78\) The final calamity that increases the Titan's suffering at the end of the tragedy can hardly be considered a
reversal. Aristotle may have referred to the play (Po 18. 1456a2), unless he talks about a different play on
the same subject. Here, he divides tragedies into four categories: composite (πεπλεγμένη), which is based
on recognition and reversal; rich in suffering (παθητική), character-based (ἡθική), and simple (ἀπλή), in
which he includes *Prometheus, Phorcides*, and the plays set in Hades. Generally, Aristotle would probably
classify the plot of the *PV* among the simple types: Ἐσι δὲ τῶν μύθων οὐ μὲν ἀπλοὶ, οὐ δὲ πεπλεγμένοι.
Καὶ γὰρ αἱ πράξεις ἃν μιμήσεις ὁι μύθοι εἰσίν ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθὺς οὐσάς τοιαύτας. Λέγω δὲ ἀπλὴν μὲν
πράξιν ἢ γινομένης ὡσπερ ὀρίσται συνεχοῦς καὶ μιᾶς ἀνευ περιπετείας ἢ ἀναγνορισμοῦ. (Po. 10.
1452a11-14).
presenting painful events about to happen or just happening.\(^{79}\) Suffering, on the other hand, does not have potential for surprise and imaginative vision, since the pain is directly before the eyes, in a concrete manner. Thus, the *Prometheus* appears to invite audiences to a kind of pity that is less mediated by imagination, as Aristotle prefers, and more based on the direct sight of the sufferer.

The fact that suffering thoroughly defines the tragic plot of the *Prometheus* has yet further consequences. As the tortured Titan remains constantly in front of the spectators, the tragedy can hardly be described as imitation of an action (\(\pi\rho\acute{\alpha}ζ1\zeta\)) in the Aristotelian sense. It rather becomes imitation of viewing the suffering of another, because the reactions of internal audiences at seeing the Titan's anguish form the core of the play. Spectators may have generally made aesthetic judgments about tragedies by considering first the dramatic events themselves. After judging "happenings," they could have taken the response of internal audiences as additional opinions and emotional indicators. Conversely, no dramatic events occur in the *Prometheus*. Therefore, the views of internal audiences are the only criteria by which spectators can interpret the tragedy.

An internal voice that consistently appeals to the spectators' pity in the tragedy is that of the chorus. The Oceanides fear for the fate of Prometheus (\(\delta\acute{\varepsilon}1\zeta\ \delta\ \acute{\omega}φι\ \sigma\alpha\zeta\ \tau\acute{\iota}χ\alpha1\zeta,\ 182\)). They feel compassion for the hero to such an extent that they "suffer-together" with him (\(\sigma\nu\nu\alpha\lambda\gamma\omega,\ 288\))\(^{80}\) and are willing to share his fate, at the end of the

\(^{79}\) As suggested in the Aristotelian account of *pro ommaton*, see my discussion 54-68. No passage of the *Poetics* offers any specific elucidation as to why the two components of the plot are favored over the third. In the *Rhetoric* (2. 1371b24-25), nevertheless, "reversals" and "narrow escapes", in which dramatic recognitions often result, are considered pleasurable because they excite surprise, wonder.

\(^{80}\) Here the Oceanides become physically and directly involved in the pain of Prometheus, which differs from the imaginative pity of Aristotle. Friedrich 1967, has noted that Sophoclean choruses also express
play.\footnote{1} More extensively, in the first \textit{stasimon} (397-435), the Oceanides sing how they as well as the whole inhabited world lament the "pitiable pain" (ἄλγος οἶκτρόν, 435) of Prometheus.\footnote{2} Through this ode, the chorus appears not only to express its own response to the tragic action, but also to report the response of a universal audience. As a result, the spectators may have had the strange impression that the chorus can perceive their own reaction, which is assumed to be pity.

A striking feature of the play is that Prometheus himself repeatedly invites both the immediate, internal audiences and larger, external ones to watch and to sympathize with his plight. Thus, he invokes the earth and the "all - seeing" (πανόπτης, 91) sun to behold his pain, ἵδεσθε (92), δέρχθηθ (93), ὀρᾶτε (119) he then requests the chorus to watch him: δέρχθητε, εἰσίδεσθε (140), and he afterwards summons Oceanus: δέρκου θέαμα (304). He is further "vexed at heart" (δάπτομαι κέαρ, 437), "when seeing myself" (ὁρῶν ἐμαυτῶν, 438), and introduces himself to Io, in third person (ὁραῖς Προμηθέα,

\footnote{1} In the final scene, Hermes perceives the Oceanides as "partaking in the toils" (συγκάμουσαι, 1059) of Prometheus and tells them to avoid the wrath of Zeus, by running away. Yet, they decide to stand by the titan and want to experience whatever he does (μετὰ τοῦδ᾽ ὁ τι χρῆ πάσχειν ἔθελα, 1067). See Saïd 1985, 303, for the significance of the vocabulary of partaking in suffering in the play. G. Grossmann, \textit{Promethie und Orestie} (Heidelberg, 1970), 40-42, considers the Oceanides to be "ideal spectators", who participate in the suffering of the tragic hero.

\footnote{2} The Oceanides declare their own sympathy (397-405). To this, they add that every land, from Asia (411-14) to Caucasus (421-24), and, further, the sea (431-32), rivers (434-35), and the underworld (433) feel grief for the suffering of Prometheus.
In addition to the verbal emphasis on his own body as visual display, Prometheus anticipates the effect of his sight on others:

\[
\ldots \, \tau ωιαίσδε \, πιθωναίσι \, κάμπτομαι \]

\[\text{πάςχειν \, μὲν \, ἄλγεναισιν, \, οἴκτραισιν \, δ' \, ἰδεῖν.} \text{ (237-38).}\]

... I am bowed by these afflictions, painful to suffer and pitiful to see.

Similarly, a few lines later, he appraises the response of friendly audiences at seeing him, which should be pity:

\[\Pi \, Ρ. \, \text{Καὶ \, μὴν \, φίλοις \, ἐλεινὸς \, εἰσορᾶν \, ἔγω \, (246).}\]

In truth, for friends I am a piteous sight to see.

Such self-referential remarks create an interesting metatheatrical effect. Even if Prometheus does not address the external audience directly, he implies it when appealing to the universe to watch him. By presenting himself as subject to spectacle, Prometheus acknowledges his status as tragic protagonist and, furthermore, describes the reaction of his audience.

In their turn, internal audiences often react to the misfortune only after saying that they "have seen" him. Thus, the chorus responds to Prometheus' solicitation to watch him:

\[\Lambda \, ξύσσῳ \, \Pi \, ρομεθεὺς \, ὧμβερά \, δ' \, ἐμοίσιν \, ὀσ-

\[\text{σοῖς \, ὀμίχλα \, ποσῆξε \, πλήρης \, δακρύων, \, σὸν \, δέμας \, εἰσισοῦσαι.} \text{ (144-46).}\]

Likewise, Oceanus answers Prometheus' invitation to look, by confirming (ὁρῶ, 307). Benedetto Marzullo, \textit{I Sofismi di Prometeo} (Pisa, 1993), 40, has made an important observation. The compassionate connotation of the verb to "look at" (εἰσορᾶν) is pervasive in the \textit{Prometheus}, but unknown to Homer (where the implication of the verb is always "to look at" admiratively) and, generally, to the poetic tradition, including Aeschylus.

In the former example (238), Prometheus does not specify for whom his afflictions are "pitiable to see", which suggests a generic audience. In the latter example (246), he does define the attitude (friendly) of the spectators who feel "pity". In both cases, however, Prometheus does not talk about pity as reaction of the
Tragic emotions are not responses confined to the fate of Prometheus, but extend to others in the play.\(^{85}\) Io, for example, joins the internal audiences of Prometheian tragedy, as she happens to encounter the immobile titan during her wanderings and commiserates with him.\(^{86}\) On the other hand, she is herself another tragic character, whose ordeal started in the past, as reported in her narrative (631-86) and will continue in the future, according to Prometheus' prophecy (696-741). Her subsidiary drama, though only narrated in the play, elicits emotional responses from the chorus as well.\(^{87}\) To a certain degree, the chorus members become an internal audience on two levels. While watching the titan, they also see with the mind's eye the tragic "action" (in their words: πράξιν, 695) performed by horned maiden. Through foreseeing, Prometheus takes the position of internal audience and turns into a sole viewer of Io's future vicissitudes. Then,

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\(^{85}\) As noted by P. Menzio, Prometeo. Sofferenza e Partecipazione. Lettura di Eschilo, Prometeo Incatenato. (Bologna, 1992), 19, who discusses especially the chorus' attitude toward Io.

\(^{86}\) Io perceives the affliction of the titan as similar to hers even before knowing exactly who Prometheus is: . . . δυσάδαμιόνον δὲ τίνες, οἳ ἐ ἐ ἐ, / οἳ ἐγγυόμενην; (601-02) and, later, addresses him with compassion (τλήμων Προμηθεῦ, 614). Yet, her own misfortune overwhelms her and obscures her response to the suffering of Prometheus.

\(^{87}\) The Oceanides mainly express fear for what has happened to Io (πέφροικ' εἰσοδοῦσα πράξιν Ιοῦς, 695). This fear derives from consternation, on hearing something "unheard of": the affliction of the horned maiden (688-94). Next, Prometheus assures them that their anxiety will increase, when they hear what will happen to Io in the future (696-7). After the prophecy, the chorus again feel alarm (ταρβῶ, 898), at seeing Io (εἰσορώσα, 899). Though similar in wording to the initial expression of fear, the emotion has a different connotation here. It involves not shock, but rather apprehension that others, perhaps themselves, might suffer Io's fate. Thus, the third stasimon ends with the Oceanides' prayer never to attract the love of Olympian gods. While feeling tragic emotions, the chorus also expresses pleasure at listening to both Io's account and Prometheus' prophecy (629, 631, 782).
as if he were a messenger,\textsuperscript{88} he discloses to the chorus the adventures and the final destiny of Io, who is a casual spectator of his own misfortune.\textsuperscript{89} In this way, pity, seeing, and suffering create an intriguing causal chain, which often blurs the line between internal audience and tragic protagonist in the play. Prometheus, now a spectacle for everyone, was once a "spectator", who pitied Typhoeus, when seeing his punishment (ἰδὼν ὀἰκτίρα, 351). Io, who watches Prometheus, is herself subject to a tragic destiny. The play may have thus left the external audience with an unsettled feeling, as internal spectator could easily become the sufferer of tragic action and the one who pities the pitied.

In addition, pity and fear have political and moral implications in the \emph{Prometheus Bound}. Pity for the victims of Zeus may lead to rebellion, such as the Titan's against the Olympian's tyrannical rule. Prometheus suffers because, above all, he pitied mortals for their afflictions (θνητούς δὲ ἐν ὀἰκτοῖς προθέμενος, 239). Likewise, those who watch the affliction of Prometheus and express pity for him might cause their own suffering, by stirring Zeus' anger. Cratus warns Hephaestus to cease lamenting (θηνείσθαι, 42) over the fate of Prometheus, "lest you pity yourself one day" (ὅπως μὴ σαυτὸν ὀἰκτεῖς ποτε, 69). Oceanus might incur the animosity of Zeus, if he gives way to "mourning" (θηνος, 88

\textsuperscript{88} By recounting the future hardships of Io, Prometheus performs a narrative function, which usually belongs to choruses in other Greek tragedies. In the first two narratives (696-741, 782-822), interrupted by a brief \emph{stichomythia}, the Titan recounts the prospective wanderings of Io, which gives a large geographical perspective to this otherwise static drama. In his third narrative (rich in dramatic and mythological suggestions, 823-76), the Titan reveals to the chorus Io's eventual fate, as though he were a witness of the final stage of her affliction. Customarily, messengers narrate final events, which occurred in the past, whereas here Prometheus reports the future end of Io's adventures.
388) for Prometheus. Even when simply expressing their pity, characters (Hephaestus, Oceanus) can be suspected of insubordination, and liable to penalties. The audiences of *Prometheus* were likely puzzled if they noticed the unusual nature of pity in this tragedy. Generally, appeals to pity were used to obtain forgiveness or protection, in Greek culture. Plato denies pity any civic value (*Republic* 10. 606). Aristotle endows the emotion with philosophical rather than political implications, as people realize their universal human condition when feeling *eleos* (*Rhetoric*). In the *Prometheus*, however, pity leads to indignation and then to political revolt, which is unparalleled and, therefore, must have intrigued the spectators.

If pity implies courage, since it drives the titan to defy the Olympian despot, fear of Zeus is associated with cowardice. Toward the end of the play, Prometheus assures Hermes that he shall not turn "woman-hearted", for fear that Zeus might increase his punishment:

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89 As D. Konstan, “The Ocean Episode in the Prometheus Bound,” *History of Religions* 17 (1977), 61-72, emphasizes at 71, Io is the only human interlocutor of Prometheus, in a drama in which the other characters are exclusively gods or demi-gods.

90 In courthouses appeals to pity are used to obtain forgiveness of the defendant. In literature, suppliants invoke pity to obtain protection, or sometimes forgiveness and closure in a conflict (Priam in the *Iliad*).

91 For example, Prometheus pities mortals, and hence he becomes indignant at Zeus' plan to destroy the human race and replace it with another. Consequently, when no one else dares to oppose the caprice of the tyrant, he alone does so:

καὶ τοῖς ὀφείλεις ἀντέβαινε πλῆν ἐμοῦ·
ἐγὼ ἐτόλημοι. (234-35).

92 Such fear should not be confused with fear for another, or even for oneself (when this regards general apprehension about future or past misfortunes).

93 Prometheus links again fear and compromise with "effeminate" behavior in the next line, refusing to loose himself from the bonds with "womanish upliftings" (γυσκομίωις ὑπεραύμασιν, 1003). Lamentations of heroes in epic and tragedy are regarded as "womanish" in Plato (*R.* 3. 387d -388a).
Let it never cross your mind that I, fearing the Will of Zeus, will turn womanish.

When advised to abandon the scene and thus avoid the imminent storm, by which Zeus will strike Prometheus, the Oceanides respond with indignation and without fear:

Πώς με κελεύεις κακοτής άσκειν:
Μετά τοῦ δ’ ὁ τι χρῆ πάσχειν ἔθελον.

How can you order me to practice cowardice?
I want to suffer with him, whatever he has to (endure)
For I’ve learned to hate traitors.

The Oceanides have thus learned (ἐμαθον) courage, which apparently means to undertake the suffering of the one whom they have pitied, a truly Prometheian lesson.

Indirectly, the chorus could invite the spectators to mind this lesson as well. Thus, through tragic pity, the audiences would learn to become brave, an unthinkable idea for Plato. Moreover, pity would bring removal of fear. This also differs greatly from the Aristotelian theory in which pity for another is associated with fear for oneself.

Internal audiences, nevertheless, do not respond unanimously to the sight of Prometheus. Some, such as Cratus or Hermes, show no compassion for the bound titan.

Though in minority, the detractors of Prometheus resort to moral arguments and invoke

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Prometheus gives another explanation for his lack of fear, his own immortality, at 933: τί δ’ ἐν φοβοίμην, ἕθειν οὐ μόρσιμον· Strangely, at the beginning of the play, Prometheus is "afraid" of everything that comes near him, πάν μοι φοβερόν τὸ προσέρχον. (126). Thus, upon their arrival, the Oceanides have to assure him that he has nothing to fear, μηδὲν φοβηθής (127), because they approach him with a friendly attitude (127). Therefore, it seems, Prometheus himself has learned to bear hardships better throughout the play, and thus to pass from fear to fearlessness.
civic propriety in order to explain their emotional indifference. Most characters (including Prometheus) dismiss such views. Yet, the opposite responses likely posited interpretative difficulties for the external audience. Thus, the prologue of the play offers an interesting example of different reactions of the internal audience. Both Cratus and Hephaestus nail the titan on a rock. Hephaestus cannot refrain from feeling compassion at seeing the tortured Prometheus and summons Cratus:

'Οραίς θέαμα δυσθεάτον ὄμμασιν. (69).

You see the sight unbearable for the eyes to see.

While Hephaestus tries to arouse pity in his assistant, by emphatically saying that he is watching a terrible tragic scene,\(^4\) Cratus looks at the same scene from a completely different perspective:

'Όρω κυρόντα τόνδε τῶν ἔπαξιων. (70).

I see one getting what he deserves.

From this point of view, the sight cannot elicit tragic emotion, because Prometheus suffers *deserved* penalties (τῶν ἔπαξιων). Cratus implies, therefore, that the titan's ordeal does not meet a precondition required for feeling pity (for the undeserved). This idea converges with the later Aristotelian definition: *eleos* is stirred by the *undeserved*

\(^4\) The line provides an extraordinary example of verbal emphasis of the visual, since all four words belong to the optic vocabulary and are structured on a double *figura etymologica* (Θέαμα and δυσ - θέατον; ὄρας ὄμμασιν). B. Marzullo 1993, 41 n. 3 and 52 n. 20, underlines the lexical peculiarity of the line, which has no parallels in Aeschylus' plays, but several in Sophoclean tragedy. The closest match is Sophocles (*Aj* 1004). I find it interesting that the unbearable sight refers to physical decay in both plays: the Titan is being tortured (*PV*) and Teucer cannot bear to look at the decomposing face of Ajax (*Aj*).
suffering of another.\textsuperscript{95} If the conviction that Prometheus is guilty determines Cratus to remain "pitiless", \(\nu\nu\lambda\lambda\varepsilon\) (42), the same belief does not prevent Hephaestus from becoming emotionally involved. Although Hephaestus admits Prometheus' culpability,\textsuperscript{96} he is moved to sympathy, nonetheless, by his "kinship" (\(\xi\nu\gamma\gamma\varepsilon\varepsilon\zeta\), 39) and "fellowship" (\(\dot{o}m\imath\lambda\imath\alpha\), 39) with the Titan. Here, the playwright seems to adopt a traditional dramatic technique of eliciting pity from the audiences, through showing that, despite animosity, one should nevertheless respond with compassion to the suffering of another.\textsuperscript{97}

Through the stichomythia between Cratus and Hephaestus, the preamble of \textit{Prometheus} outlines certain reasons that internal audiences have divergent responses to the Prometheian drama. One is the characters' ability or inability to connect with the Titan. The other concerns the way in which internal viewers interpret the problem of Prometheus' guilt and the justice of Zeus. Both issues continue to be important throughout the play. Prometheus welcomes those who can relate to him as friends to watch his drama, because they react appropriately (246). On the other hand he worries about malicious spectators, who will be pleased to see him suffering (158-59).\textsuperscript{98} Indeed,

\textsuperscript{95} As stated in both the \textit{Poetics} and the \textit{Rhetoric}. In the former treatise, for example, pity should be felt for the undeserved: \(\pi\varepsilon\rho\iota\; t\omicron\nu\; \acute{o}n\; \acute{a}n\acute{a}xi\omicron\nu\). . . \(\delta\omicron\nu\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon\omega\eta\omicron\omicron\nu\tau\omicron\upsilon\omicron\alpha\tau\omicron\upsilon\) (Po. 13. 1453a3) \(\epsilon\lambda\lambda\omicron\varsigma\; \mu\epsilon\nu\; \pi\varepsilon\rho\iota\; t\omicron\nu\; \acute{o}n\; \acute{a}n\acute{a}xi\omicron\nu\). (Po. 13. 1453a4).

\textsuperscript{96} Notably, both Cratos and Hephaestus find Prometheus guilty of "loving humans." Thus, Cratus is convinced that the, once the titan is punished, he will learn to give up his "philanthropic way", \(\phi\lambda\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\). . . \(\tau\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) (11). Similarly Hephaestus notes that the torture is what Prometheus receives for his "philanthropic way", \(\phi\lambda\lambda\alpha\nu\theta\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\; \tau\omicron\rho\omicron\omicron\omicron\) (27). Hephaestus emphasizes again that Prometheus is not innocent, since he did not fear the wrath of gods and gave honors to mankind, beyond what is right, \(p\alpha\rho\omicron\upsilon\upsilon\delta\omicron\omicron\omicron\) (27-30).

\textsuperscript{97} Compare the response of Hephaestus to Prometheus with that of Achilles to Priam in the \textit{Iliad}.

\textsuperscript{98} Schinkel, \textit{Die Wortwiederholung beim Aischylos} (Tübingen, 1972), 136 -37, notes that part of Prometheus' punishment comes from being looked at by others, which makes it paradoxical that he invites
internal audiences often approach Prometheus with a friendly or hostile attitude,\textsuperscript{99} which predetermines the nature of their response (pity or hatred) to his suffering. Thus, the Oceanides proclaim their favorable attitude, their friendship (φιλία, 128), even before speaking with the titan. Oceanus introduces himself as most reliable friend (287), while Hermes ranks among Prometheus' enemies (973). From a metatheatrical perspective, by constantly emphasizing Prometheus' friendliness for human kind, the tragedy invites the audience to reciprocate the feeling and thus return the compassion to the protagonist.

III - disposition toward Prometheus fosters unemotional responses to his suffering. Though exceptional, these responses are not absolutely subjective in the tragedy. When inimical characters display no emotion, they justify their harshness by underscoring the culpability of the titan. Thus, Hermes regards Prometheus as a transgressor:

\begin{quote}
\textit{τὸν ἔξωμαρτον τὴν κλέπτην λέγω.} (945-46).
\end{quote}

I call you, the one who has erred against the gods, Giving honors to the ephemeral humans, thief of fire.

The problem of Prometheian error is not a mere pretext, which malevolent audiences invoke, in order to account for their hatred for Prometheus. It also preoccupies sympathetic audiences. In the prologue, Hephaestus does not dismiss guilt of the Titan, despite feeling pity. Furthermore, even the Oceanides remind Prometheus of his mistake, when they cannot see any end for his troubles:

\begin{quote}
\textit{Χόπον: δόξει δὲ πῶς τίς ἐλπίζεις οὔχ ὀρθός ὃτι}
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\textit{audiences to watch him. In my opinion, Prometheus summons only friendly spectators, who will have the appropriate emotional response (pity), whereas he loathes the presence of unfriendly audiences.}
\end{flushright}
How shall it seem [possible to end your suffering]? What hope is there? Don't you see
That you have erred? How you have erred is not pleasurable for me
To tell, but for you is pain.

To this remark of the chorus, Prometheus replies with an amazing confession. He did
make a mistake when helping humans, and yet it was a "voluntary mistake":

εκών, ἐκών ἠμαρτών, οὐκ ἄρνησομαι. (266).

Willingly, willingly, I have erred, I will not deny it.

The idea that someone can err "on his own will" (ἐκών), twice outlined in the text, is
puzzling. Error (ἁμαρτία) presupposes that a blamable action is done somewhat
involuntarily. From the unusual Platonic perspective, mistakes come from ignorance. 100

The complex Aristotelian account of "error" also implies factual unawareness, even
though it may not exclude some limited culpability of the agent. 101 The paradox
contained in the startling assertion of Prometheus could be seen as a subtle counterpoint

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99 The only character who does not have any preconceived opinion about the Promethean tragedy is Io.
Hephaestus is an interesting case, as he seems to approach the Titan with some hostility, but yields to fellow - feeling at seeing Prometheus' pain.

100 Since only the ignorant errs, "nobody makes a mistake willingly", οὐδεὶς ἐκών ἁμαρτάνει (Prt. 345d3)
and, similarly, κακός γὰρ ἐκών οὐδεὶς (Ti. 86d9). B. Marzullo 1993, 33-35, looks at the "tragic error" in
the Prometheus, in contrast with several Platonic and examples from tragedies. At 34, he finds an
interesting parallel in the play for the Platonic point (it is not the wise, but the ignorant who makes
mistakes). The Oceanides say: σοφὸ γὰρ οἷς ἔξιμοι ἐξαμαρτάνειν (1039), after advising Prometheus to give
up his stubbornness, listen to Hermes, and thus avoid the final storm.

101 Aristotle states that a tragic hero should not fall into adversity through moral depravity, but through some
kind of mistake (δι’ ἁμαρτίαν τιβό, Po 13. 1453a9), such as Oedipus. T. C. W. Stinton, "Hamartia in
Aristotle and Greek Tragedy," CQ 25 (1975), 221-54, still provides the most detailed discussion of the
variegated moral implications of "tragic error."
to the Hesiodic version of the myth. In the sacrifice of Mecone (Th. 535-60), Zeus knows that Prometheus is going to deceive him, and yet willingly allows the "deception". In the play, Prometheus knows that he will appear guilty in the eyes of Zeus, when aiding the human race, and yet he does so "willingly". Semantically, Prometheus does not appear to use the word "error" (ἀμαρτία) in the sense of moral mistake (266). He admits committing a deed, against the will of Zeus voluntarily, even though anticipating the consequences of his action. Nevertheless, helping mortals was not unethical, in his view, although it was going to be perceived as wrong by the unjust Olympians. The point becomes clearer in the last line of the play, in which Prometheus summons the audiences:

Εἰσορᾶς μ’ ὡς ἐκδίκω πάσχω (1093).

You have seen me, how I suffer unjustly.

Here, the titan precisely rejects the suggestion, which was made in the prologue by Cratus, that he would suffer deservedly. Furthermore, the final words of Prometheus may be taken as a definitive appeal to the spectators. The audiences can thus see the tragedy from the right angle and ought not to withhold their pity, by thinking that the titan is

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102 The phrase "I have erred willingly" (266) is reminiscent of the Sophistic paradoxes (cf. Gorgias' fragment on tragedy, see my discussion 20-23). Notably, Hermes addresses Prometheus first with the epithet "sophist" (944), perhaps because of the Titan's ability to find arguments to support his actions, which are crooked from the perspective of the supporters of Zeus.

103 This point is well developed by S. Said, La faute tragique (Paris, 1978), 97-104.

104 Said 1985, 221, compares the knowledge of Prometheus with that of Cassandra (Ag.) or Amphiaras (Sept.), characters who know what will happen, but cannot prevent the events. The difference, in my opinion, lies in the fact that both Cassandra and Amphiaras cannot take any action, despite their knowledge, whereas Prometheus changes the course of Zeus plan, through his action and knowledge, although he cannot avoid the consequences.
receiving a just punishment. While the debate over the guilt of Prometheus presented intellectual challenges, the spectators likely responded to the emotional appeals of the play, expressed not only through the voice of the chorus but also through the Titan's repeated pleas to be seen compassionately. Prometheus' final utterance tries to remove a last reason, that audiences may not respond with pity to his tragedy (the idea that he suffers deservedly).

Certain spectators, nevertheless, may have adhered to the image of Zeus in the *Theogony*, with his Olympian dignity, rather than accepting the novel description of the god as political despot in the play. Even in the Hesiodic tradition Zeus is prone to anger (*Th.* 554, 651) and merciless toward his adversaries, and yet his rule establishes universal order and justice.\(^{106}\) By contrast, in the *Prometheus Bound*, though never appearing on the stage, Zeus is described as the prototype of a despot. He does not give anyone an account of his deeds (324), knows only his own law (150, 187, 402), is suspicious of his friends (221-25), mistreats his former partners (304), wants to exterminate human race without a reason (231-33), abuses Io, etc.\(^{107}\) The dramatist may have mitigated this

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\(^{105}\) In this case, the invoked spectators are invisible for the external audiences, and yet all - seeing: his mother (1091) and the air that spreads light to all alike (1092).

\(^{106}\) F. Solmsen 1995, 85-100, 132.

\(^{107}\) As G. Thomson, *Aeschylus and Athens. A Study in the Social Origins of Drama* (London, 1973), 301, notes, most characters in the play admit that Zeus is a tyrant and his government a tyranny, although they may look at Zeus' position differently. So Prometheus reacts to Zeus' rule with indignation and disdain (222, 305, 357, 657, 942, 996); Cratus with pride (10), Oceanus with resignation (310). A. J. Podlecki, *The Political Background of Aeschylean Tragedy*, 2nd edition (Bristol, 1999), 101-22, shows that Zeus' characteristics (*PV*) match perfectly the behavioral patterns of a tyrant in Greek culture. Zeus' autocratic rule in this play anticipates later descriptions of tyranny (*Ath Pol.* and *Pol*).
unflattering image of Zeus in the last play of a trilogy.\textsuperscript{108} Even so, this characterization of the god could have appeared shocking to audiences. From a political perspective, Zeus becomes the embodiment of tyranny, a type of government not long abolished in Athens. Therefore, some spectators likely were surprised, if not disturbed, to see the supreme god represented in a manner reminiscent of Hippias and, ultimately, in a posture associated with the despotism of the Persian society.\textsuperscript{109}

From a religious perspective, the majority of the audience may not have been bothered by the descriptions - not always flattering - of deities in Greek poetry. Some, however, likely considered the portrait of Zeus in the drama to be irreverent. Already in the sixth century, Xenophanes of Colophon protested against humanizing deities and ascribing them moral flaws.\textsuperscript{110} Similarly, Plato reproves the poets' tendency to depict gods as immoral or cruel (\textit{R.} 3. 389a-b), arguing that the divine can only be good. Beyond the elite philosophers, others may have shared such ideas about divinity by the fifth-century. In Euripides' \textit{Heracles}, the protagonist does not believe in any phony tales of the poets, because they describe gods as having affairs, trying to be masters of one another,

\textsuperscript{108} W. Schmid 1929, 91-107, argued that Aeschylus' piety would not be compatible with such denigration of Zeus. Griffith 1997, 33, briefly, yet convincingly dismisses this hypothesis, as there is no reason that a playwright should present consistent theology in his works. D. J. Conacher, \textit{Aeschylus' Prometheus Bound. A literary Commentary.} (Toronto, 1980), 12-37, offers a model for Zeus' possible metamorphosis in a last play of a trilogy, that is the transformation of the Erinyes in the \textit{Eumenides}. Nevertheless, the existence of a trilogy, whether Aeschylean or not is not beyond controversy.

\textsuperscript{109} G. Baglio, \textit{Il Prometeo di Eschilo alla luce delle storie di Erodoto} (Roma, 1952), goes as far as to suggest that Zeus allegorically represents Xerxes. Podlecki 1999, 111-12, persuasively dismantles Baglio's theory. However, even if nothing points to the dramatist's intention to present an allegory, certain features of Xerxes (Hdt. 3. 80) resemble those of Zeus in the play and, doubtlessly, Athenians associated Persia with despotism.

\textsuperscript{110} Fr. A32, B11, B12, B14, B23-26, DK.
or throwing each other in chains (1341-46). If any spectators of the *Prometheus Bound* shared such views, they may have dismissed the myth of Prometheus altogether and, perhaps, ignored any religious implications of the play. Others could have adopted the attitude of Zeus' supporters and seen Prometheus as justly punished, in which case they did not respond with pity to the tragedy.

To conclude, the tragedy invited the audiences to inquire into the complicated dynamic of emotions when seeing suffering. Fear of suffering, revealed before an angry Zeus, is cowardly and womanish, according to Prometheus. Yet, it could be associated with wise caution (Oceanus). Pity is a foolish feeling, when felt for the "deserved" affliction of another, in Cratus' opinion. For Hephaestus, it is an emotion coming from friendship, which surpasses rational considerations of the Titan's guilt. Above all and uniquely, the Prometheian pity compels one to fight injustice courageously, to remedy the misfortune of another even if this implies his or her own suffering. This kind of pity can be considered the opposite of that discussed in Plato's *Republic*, according to which the emotion is passive, causing the citizens to become weaker and less able to bear their own suffering. By contrast, *eleos* in the *Prometheus Bound* is an active emotion, which may catalyze rebellion against tyranny.

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111 ἐγὼ δὲ τοὺς θεοῦς οὔτε λέκτροι ἢ μὴ θέμις στέργειν νομίζω, δὲςμα τ' ἐξάπτειν χεροίν, οὔτ' ἠξίωσα πᾶσιν οὔτε πείσομαι, οὔδ’ ἄλλον δεσπότιν πεφυκέναι.

The enchaining is probably an allusion to the myth of Prometheus or the fate of the Titans. This statement of Heracles becomes tragic irony, of course, since the hero himself becomes a victim of the gods.

112 Plato, for instance, argues that tragedians should portray gods as just. If deities inflict punishment, they may do so either because the wrongdoer, such as Niobe, deserves it or becomes better because of it (*R.* 2. 380a).
Unlike the Aristotelian imaginative emotion, the kind of pity aroused in the play seems to drive the spectator to indignation at the fate of the protector of human race and, by extension, at the human condition in general. Perhaps, the audiences have "learned" with the chorus (1069) some ethical, political, and theological connotations of the emotion. Through feeling pity for the Titan, the spectator may rebel against the misery of human existence, by questioning whether human suffering is, indeed, an unchangeable, universal datum or, rather, the caprice of a tyrannical divinity.

To effect emotional arousal, the *Persians* and the *Prometheus Bound* use different dramatic techniques, which appear to have posited unique cognitive and ethical challenges to the audience. The *Persians* contains a dynamic plot, with a major reversal, but not much variety of internal voices (exclusively Persian) that interpret the misfortune. Despite a static dramatic structure, conversely, the *Prometheus Bound* offers diverse internal views about tragic suffering. Arousal of *eleos* in the *Persians* requires the spectators to validate imaginatively the standpoint of the internal audiences, who represent the historically defeated enemy. On the other hand, the audiences of the *Prometheus* had to discern the internal contradictory remarks about the fall of the Titan, even as to opt for responding with *eleos*. The *Ajax* combines an eventful plot with several internal perspectives on the fall of the hero and that constitutes a more complex dramatic design than in the other two plays. My study will appraise reactions to this tragedy, by examining ways in which internal models of response could have shaped the spectators' emotions as well as understanding of the dramatic action.

Scholars most often note that the fall of Ajax, as represented in Sophocles' tragedy, must have especially driven the ancient audience to pity. According to some, nevertheless, the spectators could not have felt *eleos* for Ajax, who acts foolishly (either by committing *hybris* or by mistreating his companions and family, or by doing both)

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113 Sophocles' representation of Ajax's suicide is the only case of onstage death in the extant Greek tragedy and likely violates an established tragic convention (generally deaths were to be reported by messengers), which probably caused the ancient audience an emotional shock. Details of staging and possible reactions of the audience to Ajax's death before the eyes are discussed, for instance, by S. P. Mills, "The Death of Ajax," *CJ* 76 (1980), 129-35. D. Konstan, "The Tragic Emotions," *Comparative Drama* 33 (1995), 1-21, takes the *Ajax* to be a model tragedy for the spectator's arousal of pity.
and, therefore, deserves his fate. Indeed, Ajax's actions in the play may be interpreted as morally ambiguous and probably puzzled some members of the audience. Several dramatic elements, however, appear intended to stir compassion for Ajax, and, in my opinion, diminish the importance of the problem of hero's culpability, which is often an issue in Greek tragedies. One of these elements consists of the discrepancy between the

114 Even when admitting that certain dramatic scenes in the Ajax, such as those involving Tecmessa, may have been conducive to pity, some scholars think that Ajax does not deserve the audience's sympathy for two main reasons. One argument is that the hero committed hybris and, therefore, was punished by Athena. Thus, H. D. F. Kitto, Form and Meaning in Drama. A Study in six Greek Plays and of Hamlet (London, 1956), 179-96; N. R. E., Fisher, Hybris: A Study in the Values of Honor and Shame in Ancient Greece (Warminster, 1992), 312-29. There is, however, no clear statement in the play supporting this interpretation. Indeed, Athena notes that humans ought to avoid hybris (Aj. 127-32) in connection with Ajax's plight, but she does so in rather general terms. The other argument regards Ajax's conduct, which has been often labeled as "unethical". Thus, W. F. Zack, The Polis and the Divine Order. The Orestia, Sophocles, and the Defense of Democracy (Lewisburg, 1995), 210-13, offers a recent version of such interpretation, arguing that Ajax displays cruelty toward his former peers and insensitivity toward his family. According to Zack, 211, even though we may sympathize with Ajax's belief that he has been unjustly treated, his behavior has nothing commendable throughout the play, as the hero shows "barbarism of sentiments" both under the influence of madness and when regaining his sanity.

115 J. Hesk, Sophocles: Ajax (London, 2003), 131-36, gives a useful outline of the main modern as well as ancient views about several problematic issues raised by the character of Ajax (such as extremism and madness). Much of the scholarly debate concentrates on whether the ancient audience condemned Ajax's intention to attack the Atreidae and Odysseus. Since Ajax feels disgraced after failing to receive Achilles' weapons, he deems his former companions enemies. As M. V. Blundell, Helping Friends and Harming Enemies: a study in Sophocles and Greek ethics (Cambridge, 1989), has shown, to harm one's foe is acceptable in Greek culture and praiseworthy in the Homeric world. Based on this principle, Garvie 1998, 11-12, finds the behavior of Ajax completely understandable: Ajax's conduct is not far from Achilles (II.1), who tries to kill Agamemnon and is only stopped by Athena from doing so. C. P. Gardiner, The Sophoclean Chorus. A Study of Character and Function (Iowa City, 1987), 74-75, rejects this view. She talks about "Ajax's treachery and sadism when trying to strike the sleeping Atreidae as different from the conduct of Achilles, who openly attacks Agamemnon in the Iliad. However, Gardiner is mistaken, in my opinion, in her depreciation of Ajax: slaughtering an enemy is neither considered "sadistic" in the Homeric poems nor shameful, even if the attack is not open combat. For a more reasonable discussion of the moral implication of Ajax's attack at night, R. Scodel, Sophocles (Boston, 1984), 17.
magnitude of Ajax's fall (his suicide) and the inefficiency of his deeds (killing cattle instead of his enemies), which suggests that he suffers beyond due measure.\textsuperscript{116} Secondly, certain internal audiences (Menelaus and Agamemnon) deem Ajax unworthy of sympathy, as it also happens in the \textit{PV}, by entertaining doubts about the propriety of his behavior. Nonetheless, the internal reaction of Odysseus, who expresses pity for Ajax despite being his foe (121-6), might have largely dissipated from the mind of an external spectator questions about whether or not \textit{eleos} was the appropriate response. Odysseus specifically refuses to withhold his emotional reaction to Ajax's conduct and, furthermore, links the particulars of Ajax's misfortune to the universals of frailty of human condition, thus proposing an emotional chain between the protagonist, himself (as internal spectator), and the external audiences.\textsuperscript{117}

The focus of my analysis will be the appeals to pity and fear made in the \textit{Ajax}, which seem to correspond closely to the Aristotelian ideal of tragic emotions. Possible reactions of the audience to such appeals will be discussed particularly through exploring passages that emphasize connections between subject and viewer of tragic suffering. For

\textsuperscript{116} This idea is expressed within the play (1126-27). Menelaus denies Ajax proper burial, because he cannot let prosper an enemy (Ajax) "who's killed me" (\textit{κτείνω σοι} \textit{με}, 1126). To Menelaus' claim, Teucer replies ironically, "he's killed you?" -"so you're alive when you've died" (1127). Such verbal exchange clearly underscores the distinction between Ajax' intention (to slaughter the Atreidae) and fact (failure to do so). Most action in Greek tragedy lies in \textit{committing} a fear-inspiring deed, which brings about the fall of the protagonist and likely raises moral problems for the audience, even when it is done "out of ignorance", as Aristotle suggests that it should. For the topic, see E. Belfiore, \textit{Murder Among Friends. Violation of Philia in Greek Tragedy} (Oxford, 2000). Paradoxically, Ajax falls through failing to execute such a dreadful action against others and turns the fear-inspiring act on himself.

\textsuperscript{117} By comparison, no Athenian is represented as internal audience, responding with pity to the enemy's plight (\textit{Pe.}). Hephaestus shows pity toward Prometheus. And yet, he only is forced to display hostility toward Prometheus, without considering himself a foe and, moreover, does not dismiss the Titan's culpability (\textit{PV}).
example, Ajax's unawareness of his tragic status will be examined, as it is metatheatrically underlined in the play and may have led the audiences viewing the hero's misfortune to ponder the overall human unawareness of the vicissitudes that future might bring. This could have further compelled the audiences to respond with pity for the tragic action and anxiety about human destiny in general, a veritable Aristotelian formula.

Another point of interest of my discussion concerns ways in which the audience may have received the innovations of the Sophoclean treatment of the myth of Ajax, such as the omission of the judgment of arms.

Most commentators have dated the Ajax to the decade 450 - 440 BC, together with early Sophoclean tragedies, such as Antigone and Trachiniae. By the time Sophocles' play was produced, the myth of Ajax had already been treated in epic, lyric, and dramatic poetry. In Homer's Iliad, Ajax is one of the most distinguished heroes in the Greek army. In the Odyssey (11. 541-65), a brief episode implies the untimely death of

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118 General discussions surveying the problematic dating of the play are to be found, for example, in T.B.L. Webster, An Introduction to Sophocles, 2nd edition (London, 1969,) 2-7; H. Lloyd - Jones, Sophoclean: Studies on the Text of Sophocles (Oxford, 1990), 20-23; A. F. Garvie, Sophocles. Ajax, edited with introduction, translation and commentary (Warmister, 1998), 6-8. The chronology of the surviving Sophoclean plays cannot be established with precision, except for Philoctetes (409 BC) and Oedipus King (401 BC). Thus, scholars have attempted to date the tragedies, in accordance with literary allusions, style, or possible references to the Athenian political context. Based on elements of style (stichomythia, resolution of iambic trimeter, etc.) and dramatic motifs (debate over burial in Ajax and Antigone; madness and suicide in Trachiniae and Ajax). Most believe that Ajax, Trachiniae and Antigone belong to the same compositional period. G. M. Kirkwood, A Study of Sophoclean Drama (Ithaca, 1958), 86-89; K. Reinhardt, Sophokles (Frankfurt am Main, 1933) 42-70.

119 Helen describes Ajax to the Trojan elders as being the "outstanding bastion of the Achaeans" (πελώριος, ἔρκος Αχαίων, Il. 3. 229). Ajax is not surpassed by anyone else in physical strength, with the exception of Achilles, and appears in several memorable episodes, such as the single battle with Hector (Il. 7. 224-312) and the embassy to Achilles (Il. 9. 629-42).
Ajax, after the judgment of arms, which likely formed the theme of other epic poems, and later served as background for Sophocles' play. In the passage, Odysseus tries to appease the Ajax's angry soul in Hades, but does so in vain, because Ajax departs in silence. Sophocles' tragedy offers not only formal similarities but also conceptual parallels to the Homeric poems. Above all, Ajax's sense of honor in the play resembles Achilles' in the Iliad. Both the epic Achilles and the dramatic Ajax are concerned with their reputation and isolate themselves from the community, after being outraged. Consequently, the tragic Ajax has been described as the last traditional type of hero. He is inflexible and follows the Homeric ideal of virtue by defending his honor. By contrast, Odysseus is seen as embodying a new kind of hero, who is forgiving, adaptable, and befitting democratic Athenian society. Indeed, in the tragedy, Odysseus displays

120 Other epic poems, such as Aethiopis and the Little Iliad, referred to the death of Ajax, as a result of the judgment of arms. On this, see, for example, W. B. Stanford, Sophocles. Ajax (London, 1963), 22-24; M. Davies, The Epic Cycle (Bristol, 1989), 63-68; P. Holt, "Ajax's Burial in Early Greek Epic," AJP 113 (1992), 319-31.

121 Odysseus uses several arguments. He wishes he had never won the weapons of Achilles (548), which were awarded to him and not to Ajax, deplores the fact that Zeus brought destruction on Ajax (559), assures the hero that the Achaians have grieved for his death as much as for Achilles' (557).


unexpected sympathy toward his enemy and, eventually, secures the burial of Ajax. Yet, through a subtle contrast between the heroes, Sophocles seems to return to an established literary motif (pity for the fallen enemy) rather than to illustrate a novel model of virtue (through Odysseus).\textsuperscript{125}

From early on, Greek poetry generally professed the preeminence of Ajax, despite the victory of Odysseus in the judgment.\textsuperscript{126} In one of his epinician odes (\textit{N.} 7. 20-30, around 480 BC), Pindar declares his intention to defend the reputation of Ajax, because Homer has unfairly enhanced the glory of Odysseus. Elsewhere (\textit{N.} 8. 23-38), the poet hopes that he will resemble Ajax, rather than Odysseus.\textsuperscript{127} The question of which hero is better may have been raised in a first dramatic rendition of the Ajax - story, an Aeschylean trilogy,\textsuperscript{128} and it survived in later philosophical controversies.\textsuperscript{129} Given the
literary tradition, in which Ajax was preeminent in martial skills, whereas Odysseus in oratorical art, ancient spectators perhaps expected Sophocles' tragedy to be on one side or the other of the debate, as modern interpreters often do. The Ajax, however, does not present the two characters confronting each other openly, nor does it assess the superiority of one over the other directly, which may have left the audience frustrated with this dramatic ambiguity and, perhaps, speculating on the problem of the "better hero." Another element of surprise in the tragedy may be the lack of an agon between Ajax and the Atreidae (and/ or Odysseus), which the audiences could have also predicted in light of the tradition. While omitting any scene that treats directly the judgment of arms at the beginning of the play, Sophocles concentrates instead on the internal conflict of Ajax (caused by madness).

In addition to its literary interpretations, the myth of Ajax was likely familiar to the audiences from other sources. It often provided subjects for visual arts and enjoyed

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129 The tone of the debate was set by two speeches ascribed to philosopher Antisthenes (fifth-century BC), which, unlike Pindar's ode, praise the cleverness of Odysseus over the physical strength of Ajax. Further details in W. B. Stanford, *The Ulysses Theme* (Oxford, 1954), 93-100.

130 Scholars often declare one hero superior to the other in Sophocles' tragedy. To list only a few examples, from a moral point of view, Odysseus is regarded as better by Kitto, *Greek Tragedy* (London, 1961), 121-23; R. P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles. An Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1980), 65. On the contrary, Ajax finally achieves grandeur and our admiration, according to Kirkwood 1958, 47-49; Garvie 1998, 16-17. In more recent, political interpretations of the play, P. W. Rose, "Historicizing Sophocles' Ajax," in *History, Tragedy, Theory*, ed. B. Goff (Austin, 1995), 65-69, sees Ajax as a model leader and military commander. Conversely, C. Meier, *The Political Art of Greek Tragedy* (Cambridge, 1993), 166-87, considers Odysseus as best expressing the political ideals of the polis. For persuasive criticism against such views, which "politicize" Sophocles excessively, see J. Griffin, "Sophocles and the Democratic City," in *Sophocles Revisited*, ed. J. Griffin (Oxford, 1999), 73-94, especially 83-89. The opposite conclusions of the scholars on which hero is "better", suggest that the play itself refuses to give a precise answer. I agree with Stanford 1963, 23, who writes that instead of taking the side of one hero or another, with the poetic tradition, "Sophocles in his Ajax refused to present a partisan, black - and - white interpretation of the conflict."
increased popularity in the vase painting of the fifth-century. Furthermore, Ajax became subject to a hero-cult in the fifth-century, which may have predisposed the audiences to be sympathetic toward the Sophoclean character (cf. the *Prometheus*). As a cult-figure, he had a statue in the agora and a temple at Salamis. According to Herodotus, the Athenians prayed for Ajax's aid before the battle of Salamis in 480 BC. Although Sophocles' tragedy is not concerned with the cult directly, it does contain several passages, which the spectators could have understood as allusions to the consecration of Ajax as a hero.

The *Ajax* opens with fascinating metatheatrical suggestions about the complexities involved in watching a tragic action, emphasizing both similarities as well as differences between internal and external spectator. In the first lines of the prologue, Athena tells Odysseus that she "has always observed you" (ἀεὶ... δἐδορκα σε, 1). She continues: "now I see you" (νῦν...σε... ὀρῶ, 3), wandering by your enemy's hut so that "you might see" (ὄπως ἵδης, 6) what Ajax is doing. In the conclusion of her speech, the

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131 For art representation of Ajax's myth, see for example, O. Touchefeu, *Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae*, vol. 1 (Zurich and Munich, 1981), 325-32. The judgment of arms was a popular subject for artists from seventh-century BC on. By early-fifth century the theme of Ajax's suicide becomes increasingly popular (though the earliest depiction belongs to the sixth-century, perhaps in connection with tragedies on the subject (Garvie 1998, 3-5, with bibliography).

132 Several literary sources refer to a cult of Ajax (Hdt.5.66, Paus. 1. 5.1; 1. 35. 3), mentioning a temple and a festival at Salamis in honor of Ajax.

133 Hdt. 8. 64; 8. 121.

134 Most prominently, toward the end of the play, the chorus anticipates that the grave of Ajax will always be remembered (1166-67); cf. the praises of Salamis (chorus: 597-99; Ajax: 859-63). P. Burian, "Supplication and Hero Cult in Sophocles' *Ajax*," *GRBS* 13 (1972), 151-56; A. Henrichs, "The Tomb of Ajas and the Prospect of Hero Cult in Sophocles," *CA* 12, 1993, 165-80, explore possible suggestions to the cult in the play. I agree with Garvie 1998, 6, and J. Griffith 1999, 87-92, that the *Ajax* should not be interpreted *exclusively* as a reflection of the cult of Ajax.
goddess assures her favorite that he no longer needs to "peer" (παπταίνειν, 11) inside Ajax's gate, for he may learn from her what has happened. Odysseus responds to Athena, who is invisible to him (ἀποπτος, 15), that truly he has been trying to find Ajax. Since he heard from an eyewitness (ὁπτηρ, 29) that Ajax was running over the plains, with a sword full of blood, he wanted to follow the trail (ἰχνος, 33), and check whether the rumor was true. As T. M. Falkner has shown, the preamble of the drama mirrors the complicated relationships between internal and external audiences. Athena can symbolize the seeing power of the external audience, as she beholds the stage without being seen. Odysseus is introduced as object of the goddess' gaze (1, 3), as well as object of the audience's sight, and, at the same time, he is himself a kind of spectator (Ιδης, 6; παπταίνειν, 11). The self-referential tone of the prologue is unmistakable. As "spectator" within the play, Odysseus may resemble the external spectator, at the beginning of a dramatic performance. He knows something about the subject of the play,

135 Most scholars believe that while Athena is visible to the audience, while she is invisible to Ajax, for example, D. Seale, Vision and Stagecraft in Sophocles (London, 1982), 144; D. Mastronarde, "Actors on High: The Skene Roof, the Crane, and the Gods in Attic Drama," C.A 9 (1990), 247-94; On the other hand, Taplin 1977, 166, 366, suggests that Athena is in the orchestra, therefore visible to Odysseus.

136 J. Jouanna, "La metaphor de la chasse dans le prologue de l' 'Ajax' de Sophocle", Bulletin de l' Association G. Bude (1977), 168-86, notes the implications of the hunting metaphor in the prologue. Ajax, who hunts the cattle, is himself hunted by Odysseus, and Odysseus himself is "tracked" by Athena.


138 T. Falkner 1999, 182: "Odysseus becomes a powerful secondary image of reading", because he is puzzling over the "tracks" (30-35), therefore, metaphorically over the meaning of the story, which he witnesses. For additional comments on this, T. Falkner, "Making a Spectacle of Oneself: The Metatheatrical Design of Sophocles' Ajax," Text and Presentation 14 (1993), 35-40.
but is anxious to "see" the protagonist and understand the design of the tragic action.\textsuperscript{139}

On the other hand, Athena precisely defines Odysseus as internal audience, about to watch the tragedy from within, while being watched from outside.

Furthermore, soon afterwards, Athena seems to take the place of the poet within the drama, as she will "show Ajax's madness in full view" (δείξω... περιφανῆ, 66) to Odysseus.\textsuperscript{140} After explaining that Ajax has been in a state of madness,\textsuperscript{141} the goddess invites Odysseus to look at his foe, without being observed, as she will divert Ajax's gaze:\textsuperscript{142}

\... ἐγὼ γάρ ὄμματον ἀποστρόφους
ἀνύγας ἀπείρῳ σὴν πρόσωπιν εἰςιδεῖν. (69-70)

For I will prevent him from seeing your face
By turning away the beams of his eyes.

\textsuperscript{139} Even after Odysseus heard the "report" of an eyewitness (a kind of tragic messenger), he does not know how to interpret this data and thus finds himself in a situation in which internal audiences are sometimes put in Greek tragedies. Cf. the confusion of the chorus in Aeschylus' Agamemnon, or even the chorus in this play (i.e. the choryphaeus does not understand, what Tecmessa says about Ajax, 270).

\textsuperscript{140} The metatheatrical effect of this passage, in which Athena appears as author, director, and actor, is well emphasized by C. Segal, "Drama, Narrative, and Perspective in Sophocles' Ajax," Sacris Erudiri 31 (1989/90), 395-404; P. Easterling, "Gods on Stage in Greek Tragedy," Grazer Beitrage 5 (1993), 82; Falkner 1999, 189.

\textsuperscript{141} Athena also caused Ajax's insanity by distorting his vision, and "casting grievous opinions over his eyes" (δυσφόρους ἐπ’ ὄμμασι / γνώμας βαλοῦσα, 51-52).

\textsuperscript{142} Scholars do not notice that there is an interesting Homeric parallel for Athena's altering someone's perception. For example, after Euriclea discovers the scar, she wants to signal Penelope that her husband is there. Penelope, however, cannot look at the scene, for Athene has "turned away her mind":

\... ἡ σ’ οὔτε ἀθρήσκει δύνατ’ ἀντὶ οὔτε νοῆσαι
τῇ γάρ Ἀθηναίῃ νόσον ἔτραπεν... (Od. 19. 478-79).

R. Padel, Whom Gods May Destroy. Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness (Princeton, 1995), 70-75, offers a valuable analysis of madness "twisting" vision, comparing the case of Ajax to other examples in Greek tragedy.
Athena's proposal can blur the line between external and internal spectator. If Odysseus accepts the divine offer, then he could "see", without being seen, which is a privileged position very similar to that of the external audience.\footnote{Odysseus' position would be thus similar to that from which Athena herself watched him, at the beginning of the play. For further discussion, Segal 1989.} While goddess is ready to put the plan in practice, surprisingly, Odysseus now hesitates to behold him, though before anxious to see his foe. In a brief stichomythia (74-90), Odysseus pleads with Athena not to bring Ajax out. She tells him to face Ajax, at whom he could laugh (79), and thus to avoid the charge of cowardice (75). When Odysseus is still reluctant, she asks:

\begin{quote}
Μεμηνότ' ἀνδρα περιφανῶς ὁκνεῖς ἱδεῖν· (81).
\end{quote}

Do you shrink from seeing a crazed man in full view?

Odysseus admits that this is the reason and adds that he would not falter, had Ajax been sane. Athena reassures him of the fact that he will not be seen.\footnote{\textit{Αλλ' οὐδὲ νόν σε μὴ παρόνι ιδὴ πέλαξ} (83). The goddess interestingly emphasizes that despite local (πέλαξ) and temporal (νόν) circumstances, Ajax cannot see Odysseus.} He still remains puzzled (how could Ajax, with the same eyes, ὀφθαλμοῖς . . . αὐτοῖς, 84, see, but not see him), and the deity clarifies the issue (she'll darken his eyes, even if they can still see, 85). Only after this elucidation, Odysseus yields, he will stay to behold Ajax, although he would rather be "out of" the scene (ἡθελὼν δ ἄν ἐκτὸς ἀν τυχεῖν, 88).

From a metatheatrical point of view, Athena's alteration of Ajax's eyes could be taken as an allusion to a tragic convention. The performer of tragedy "does not see" the external audience, but only what happens within the drama. Hence the confusion of Odysseus: he cannot comprehend how he could be transformed from internal spectator (whom Ajax would be able to see) into a different kind of spectator, similar to external
one (whom Ajax would "not see"). Secondly, Odysseus' initial refusal to accept Athena's offer has puzzled many commentators. Some argue that his hesitation comes from fear of his enemy. Odysseus, however, wanted to see his foe before finding out about Ajax's sorry plight. Furthermore, he insists that he would not waver under normal circumstances, and, therefore, the scholiast rules out cowardice as explanation, calling Odysseus "wise," ἕμφορον, for his reluctance. Others believe that Odysseus needed divine reassurances, because he did not understand the implication of Athena's proposal, at first. Yet, even after realizing his advantageous watching position, Odysseus accepts the proposal almost unwillingly (88). Why is it so?

Most plausibly, Odysseus' hesitation has something to do with the madness of Ajax, as he acknowledges (81-82). If madness relates to tragedy, via Dionysus, and becomes often a tragic theme, it is mostly treated as taboo even within the tragic genre. Usually, internal audiences do not witness madness scenes directly, but hear about them

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145 For example, Garvie 1998, ad loc., following G. Perotta, "L' Aiace di Sophocle," Atene e Roma 2 (1934), 63 - 98, especially 75-76. At 131, Garvie writes that even if Odysseus is not a coward, his reluctance comes from "simple fear" and "his fear is a measure of Ajax's greatness."

146 παρατεῖναι ὁδοσσεύς ὁς κομμόδουντος τοῦ ποιητοῦ δειλίαν τοῦ ἠρως (οὕτω γὰρ ἄφαιρεθεί ἡς τραγῳδίας ἄξιωμα), ἀλλά τὸ εὐλαβές ἐνδέικνυται ἕμφορος γὰρ ἤν τῷ μεμνητὶ παραχωρεῖν. 

147 D. Mastronarde, Contact and Discontinuity: Some Conventions of Speech and Action on the Greek Tragic Stage (Berkeley, 1979), 80-81, with bibliography for earlier interpretations.

148 Stanford 1963, 65, follows the scholiast in a sense, saying that: "Nobody in his right senses would want to confront a raving madman of Ajax's formidable powers." Stanford, following the scholiast, recognizes madness as the reason for Odysseus hesitation, but he still implies that Odysseus is afraid of being attacked by Ajax, who would be more powerful because of his delusion. This can not explain, in my opinion, why Odysseus remains reluctant to see Ajax, even when he knows that he will not be seen. T. Falkner 1999, 188, intuits that madness is an essential reason for Odysseus' reluctance, but he does not try to explain why it is so. Moreover, Faulkner 1999, 179-80, notes that Odysseus is about to watch a tragedy, as madness is related to tragic genre, but dos not discuss the implication of this.

149 For general connection between tragedy and madness, R. Padel, 1995, 188-201.
indirectly, through the narrative of the messengers.\textsuperscript{150} Thus, the diffidence of Odysseus could originate in the imminent appearance of a deluded man, in full view, (\textit{περίφορος}, 81). In real life, there may have been a sacred prohibition against looking at madmen, for fear of contagion.\textsuperscript{151} Moreover, madness could metaphorically stand for a form of acting, without the awareness of playing a part, which inspires fear in the viewer. Both madness and acting involve types of illusion. Yet, the illusion of acting is known to both actor and spectator (and willingly accepted as Gorgias has put it), whereas the delusion of madness is unknown to the madman. The person who sees the madman may be in danger of being pulled into his delusion. Through Plato's chain (\textit{Ion}) actors link with spectators and pull them into the illusion, which both recognize as so. If the spectator, however, identifies with the madman, he might lose his ability to distinguish reality from illusion.\textsuperscript{152} In this respect, another tragic example can provide an interesting parallel for the reaction of Odysseus. In Euripides' \textit{Bacchae}, Pentheus condemns the madness of the Bacchants and fears that it may spread contagiously. At the end of the play, he is, however, lured by Dionysus into believing that he could watch the crazed Maenads in disguise, without being seen, as an "external" spectator, like Odysseus in the \textit{Ajax}. After yielding to the god's deceiving promise, nevertheless, Pentheus cannot remain a spectator but has to partake in the tragic spectacle as main character. By comparison, Odysseus is, perhaps,

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item See, for example, Euripides' \textit{Bacchae}, in which a messenger reports the final, famous scene of madness (1041-52).
\item A. Carr Vaughan, \textit{Madness in Greek Thought and Custom} (Baltimore, 1919), 24, "That evil will result from a fixed gaze was a well-grounded belief. For example, in the \textit{Ajax} of Sophocles, Odysseus will not venture to come within the madman's range of vision, until Athena has turned aside of the frenzied maniac, and in modern Greece the eyes of certain people may inflict madness, dumbness, or other misfortunes."
\item One of Plato's main concern about tragedy (\textit{R.3} and \textit{10}) appears to be the contagious nature of "pity" that spreads from theatrical emotion to real life emotion.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
afraid that he might become part of the tragic spectacle when seeing the unmediated, literal tragedy of Ajax's madness. Therefore he wishes he could be detached, outside the scene (ἐκτός, 88). On a larger semantic scale, the prelude of Ajax may be taken as a comment on tragedy as genre arousing fear. It signals to the external spectators that the view about to be seen reflects the instability of human existence, from which nobody can stay away - ἐκτός -. 

In conclusion, the Sophoclean opening draws attention not only to the similarities, but also to the dissimilarities between external and internal audiences. Although the internal spectator could become almost like the external one, "unseen " by other characters, he still is going to be involved in the tragic action. Odysseus is not going to look at a "tragedy", but will watch a fear-inspiring sight directly, without benefiting from the aesthetic detachment of the external viewer. Perhaps, this dramatic device also serves as a reminder for the external spectator. He is about to watch a sight, which will be disturbing, even when seen from a protected place (as Odysseus implies), so that he should feel anxiety at the entering Ajax.

In all the tragedies analyzed thus far, verbal references to "watching" the tragic action have played an important role, often leading to emotional responses. In the Persians, to a great extent we "see" the tragic protagonists (the army and Xerxes), through the eyes of the internal audiences (chorus, Atossa, reports of messengers). In addition, the visual metaphor contributes to the reversal, as the Persian army, a fear -

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153 This distinction between internal (though empowered) spectator and external audience seems to escape T. Falkner 1999, 189, who writes that Odysseus appreciates Athena's artistry of placing him in an unusual position of empowered spectator: "yet, even then he fails to comprehend its nature and wishes he were somewhere else."
inspiring sight at first, becomes worthy of pity, in the end. The *Prometheus* starts with
descriptions of the way in which internal spectators variously view the Titan, as tragic
sight (Hephaestus), or as spectacle lacking *pathos* (Cratus). The prologue of the *Ajax*
deals with the liminal nature of the internal spectator himself, who observes the tragic
action, while being observed in his turn. Moreover, by Athena's device, Odysseus
remains "invisible" to the protagonist, which alludes to the tragic convention (separation
of tragic characters from their audiences) and has further dramatic consequences. Thus,
Ajax will "perform" in a very unusual setting, as he will be unaware not only of his
external audiences, but also of an internal spectator within his drama, Odysseus. This
creates the opposite metatheatrical effect from the one suggested in the *Prometheus
Bound*. When Prometheus starts speaking, he directly addresses his internal spectators as
well as other universal audiences, to some degree implying the external audiences. He
displays tremendous awareness of his status as tragic protagonist, and expects the proper
reactions from the viewers, which is reminiscent of the metatheater of comedy: direct
audience address. On the other hand, when Ajax enters the stage (91), with his vision
distorted by madness, he is not only unaware of being watched by his internal spectator,
but also unaware of how a viewer should respond to his plight. Ajax's inability to "see"
emphasizes the position of the character in Greek tragedy: incognizance of his audiences,
by the design of the poet.

In his conversation with Athena (91-117), the deluded Ajax boasts about having
killed the two Atreidae and keeping Odysseus as prisoner inside his tent for torture.
Athena begs him not to torment "the wretched man" (Odysseus, 111). In reply, Ajax says
"farewell" (*chaire* 112) to Athena. He will let the goddess have her way in every respect,
with one exception, the punishment of Odysseus (112-13). A scholiast makes a strange comment here (at 112, Papageorgius, 11): 154

φίς δὲ ὡς κατὰ τὰ ἄλλα εἴκον τῇ θεῷ τοιοῦτο δὲ ἀντιβαίνων. ὑπεροπτικὸς δὲ τὸ ἣθος αὐτοῦ ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδείκνυται ὁ ποιητής (ἐπεὶ πάνω πρόσκειται ὁ ἀκροατὴς τῷ Αἴαντι διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν καὶ μονονοῦχοι χαλεπαίνει τῷ ποιητῇ) ἵνα δόξη ἀξιοποθεῖν Αἴας μὴ ὑποτεγμένος τῇ δαιμονὶ.

(Ajax) speaks in everything else yielding to the goddess, but in this matter opposing her. The poet hence shows his disposition of being arrogant (since the spectators are much disposed in favor of Ajax, because of his misfortune, and all angry with the poet) that Ajax may seem to suffer justly from his refusal to submit to the divinity.

As external spectator, the scholiast is clearly shocked by the passage, because it implies that Ajax's conduct would not be flawless. No sympathetic response of internal audiences to Ajax has been yet expressed within the play. Nevertheless, the scholiast assumes that the audience (lit. "listener") 155 is sympathetic toward Ajax (literally, πρόσκειται, "stands by him"), simply because of his misfortune (διὰ τὴν συμφορὰν). As this implies, suffering in itself is enough to cause the emotional response of the viewer. 156 Thus, the audience becomes "indignant at the poet" (χαλεπαίνει τῷ ποιητῇ), seemingly because the he tries to question, if not to dispel, this emotional response. As bizarre as the

154 For all quotations of the scholia of Ajax, I am using the following edition: P. N. Papageorgius, Scholia in Sophoclis tragoedias vetera: e Codice Laurentiano denuo Collata (Leipzig, 1888).

155 The word "listener" (ἀκροατής) may simply mean "reader". Yet, the term could have a special significance here. The scholiast knows and uses the term "spectator", theates, later, as my subsequent quotations will show. In this instance, however, "listener" suggests an audience that only hears the words of Ajax, which sound inappropriate and irreverent toward the goddess. Yet, the viewer does not "see" any inappropriate deed and knows that Ajax cannot realize his plan (of tormenting Odysseus). Thus, through "listening" to Ajax's words, not through "watching" his deeds, the audience may worry about the behavior of the hero.

156 This was also the point of Hephaestus as internal spectator (ΠV). He invited Cratus to look at the tragic sight of the titan, expecting that the response will be pity.
scholiast's remark about the upset listener may appear to us, it derives from the Platonic and Aristotelian idea of emotional chain between poet, character, and audience, which the dramatist breaks here. While feeling well-disposed toward the hero, the listener is suddenly faced with the possibility that Ajax suffers deservedly, (ἄξιος ἀθέετον). The scholiast's comment can further suggest the sophisticated cognitive process through which ancient audiences decided whether to respond with pity. Thus, although the scholiast realizes that Ajax is affected by madness (which he labels as misfortune) and therefore is not entirely responsible for these words to Athena, he still worries about the hero being impious and not worthy of 

To return to the play, Athena pretends to let Ajax enjoy taking revenge on his enemy (114). In his delusion, Ajax departs convinced that he is going to torture Odysseus, with the goddess' approval (116). Now alone with the privileged spectator, Athena addresses Odysseus:

′Ορᾶς, Ὀδυσσέα, τὴν θεῶν ἵσκεν ὁσί; (118)
Do you see, Odysseus, the great power of gods?

As if drawing a conclusion to the previous scene, the goddess emphasizes the limitlessness of divine power, which is able to change human destiny. In doing so, she takes Ajax's plight only as an example (119-20), by raising a rhetorical question: who would could have found a more accomplished and prudent man than this one (Ajax)

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Aristotle (Po. 13. 1453a4) says that pity is felt for the "undeserving" subject of adversity, yet the tragic hero is someone not preeminent in virtue and not depraved, but "in between" (μεταξὺ, Po. 13. 1453a7). Aristotle thus implies that there is a certain moral ambiguity existent in the status of tragic hero. He does not discuss, nevertheless, how this may raise ethical problems for the spectators willing to respond with pity. For example, internal audiences (ΠV) are constantly preoccupied with whether or not the Titan deserves the suffering).
before (119) - (implying, 'and look at him now'). The comment of the scholiast to this is again intriguing (on 118, Papageorgius, 11):

See, Odysseus: the speech (of Athena) is educational, it turns one away from errors, and therefore it is beneficial to both Odysseus and (external) spectator.

The gnomic observation of Athena is therefore considered "instructive", (παιδευτικός), for both Odysseus and the spectator (θεατή). Clearly, then, according to the scholiast internal as well as external audiences interpret Athena's words similarly, and so receive a moral lesson. A question remains - what kind of ethical benefit should both types of spectators infer from the words of the goddess? The answer appears to be provided by Odysseus, who reflects on the sad transformation of Ajax as follows:

. . . ἐποικτίρω δὲ νῦν

dύστηνον ἔμπας, καίπερ ὄντα δυσμενή

ὀθούνεκ' ἀτη συγκατέξευκται κακῆ,

οὐδὲν τὸ τούτου μάλλον ἢ τούμον σκοπῶν.

ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλήν

eἶδοι' ὀσοίπερ ζῴμεν ἦ κούψην σκίαν. (121-26)

. . . I pity him, wretched man, nevertheless, though being ill - disposed toward me, because he has been yoked to an evil doom. By looking at his situation as not much different from my own

158 J. H. Hogan, A Commentary on the Plays of Sophocles (Carbondale and Edwardsville, 1991), 186, wonders about the meaning of Athena's statement as follows: "We may ask why Athena speaks as she does and to whom? Is it possible Odysseus requires this lesson? Can this be her personal admonition to him?" Hogan, like the scholiast, concludes the words of the goddess cannot be addressed to the internal audience exclusively, but rather to a general one and compares these lines ( Ajax) to Euripides (He. 840-42, in which Iris talks about the madness about to fall on Heracles, thus showing to all the power of divinities over mortals).
For I see that we all who live are nothing more than appearances or empty shadow(s).

Despite the enmity, Odysseus pities (ἐποικτίρω, 121) Ajax and explains his emotion through a kind of syllogism, which perfectly fits the Aristotelian ideal.\(^{159}\) Like Ajax, he is a human being, all human beings are frail, and therefore, his position is not much different from that of his enemy (implying that he could also suffer a similar misfortune). Remarkably, in their comments, both Athena and Odysseus consider not only the individual case of Ajax but also its general relevance. Furthermore, both use the verb "to see" not in the sense of literally watching Ajax, but when they refer to a universal paradigm: Athena refers to the power of gods (ὁρᾶς, 118), Odysseus to the fragility of mankind (ὁρᾶ, 125). In both cases the verb "to see" could be translated by "realizing", "understanding". The internal spectator metaphorically transfers the tragic sight of Ajax to another vision, the "seeing" or understanding of human condition. In the case of Odysseus, the transfer is made through pity. While the scholiast already labeled Athena's first words as "educational", the goddess concludes with other gnomic remarks, which could well stand at the end of a tragedy,\(^{160}\) and are, in fact echoed by a gnome at the end of this tragedy. She declares that by "looking at such things" (τοιαύτα τοίνυν εἰς θεοῦν, 127), Odysseus should avoid arrogance (129) toward gods. Human destiny can change in a day (131-2), and deities like "temperate" men (132).\(^{161}\) Thus the goddess has

\(^{159}\) I have already discussed the connections between Odysseus' pity in this passage and Aristotle's theoretical description of the emotion, 89.

\(^{160}\) W. Stanford 1963, 127. Mark Ringer, *Electra and the Empty Urn. Metatheater and Role Playing in Sophocles* (Chapel Hill), 1998, 37, notes that: "the prologue and the lessons Odysseus has learned as audience member would help impart closure to the latter half of the play."

\(^{161}\) B. Knox 1964, 67, and Blundell 1989, 60-62, observe the rare occurrence of the terms deriving from the root *sophr-* in the surviving plays of Aeschylus and Sophocles. According to Knox, wisdom (σοφροσύνη),
underscored once more the metaphorical seeing (εἰσορῶν, 127), as she seems to approve Odysseus' comments about the human fate. Ultimately, pity for the enemy leads to cognitive inference and provides Odysseus with a broader view of the destiny of mortals, which corresponds exactly to the Aristotelian observations about the tragic emotion. On the other hand, Aristotle never takes a step further to assert that by feeling eleos one can be better morally. The scholiast believes that Athena teaches both Odysseus and the external spectator an ethical principle. This seems to consist of the relationship between human and divine, which is based on a man's ability to be "moderate" (σωφρον) namely to understand his limitations in relation with the divine.\(^{162}\) While a Platonic spectator may have rebuked the idea of such a lesson coming from pity,\(^{163}\) many an ancient spectator could have thought this the essence of learning from tragedy.

Upon his first entrance, Ajax was deluded and unaware of his only human (internal) spectator. On his second appearance, he is sane. His words of greeting to the

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162 L. Feder, *Madness in Ancient Literature* (Princeton 1980), 56-76, well discusses the motif of "being wise", in Greek tragedy, arguing that it generally means understanding the human condition as well as the overwhelming power of the divine. For instance, Pentheus is "mad" and "unwise" paradoxically for refusing to yield to the sacred madness of Dionysus. For several nuances of meaning of σωφρον in the *Ajax*, see Feder 1980, 90-97.

163 Athena's appeal to temperance could be contrasted with Plato's comments (*R.* 3. 388c-d), rebuking the misrepresentations of gods in poetry, and especially instances of gods lamenting the fate of mortals (i.e. Zeus deploring the fate of Hector or Sarpedon). Young people take such misrepresentations seriously, and then, instead of having any shame or self-control (σωφροσύνη), they would start lamenting on insignificant occasions. In the discussed passage of the *Ajax*, it is pity, a tearful emotion, nevertheless, through which Odysseus is led to understanding the importance of self-control for mankind. For Plato "wise" also generally seems to have a different meaning than the one used in the *Ajax*. Being wise for him means cultivating the immortal part of soul that partakes in the divine, not realizing the separation between human and divine.
chorus contain an invitation to watch his plight, "behold!" (ἰδέσοι με, 351), which is reminiscent of the Prometheian appeals to be watched. Afterwards, Ajax acknowledges seeing the chorus (δέδορκα, 359), who could help him in the future (ἐπαρκέσοντα, 360). Finally, he explains the sort of aid that he expects from them: "join in killing me", (μέ συνδαίξον, 361). This is an unusual request for the chorus to participate in a horrific tragic action, not by showing emotional support, but in a direct manner. The chorus members respond by telling Ajax to keep religious silence (εὐθημα, 362), so that he will not suffer more than he already has. Through this exchange, the protagonist demands to be watched and, at the same time, sees the chorus as potential co-doer of the tragic act.

Yet, Ajax further wants to make sure that his internal audience notes the depth of his fall:

Orᾶς τὸν θρασύν, τὸν εὐκάρδιον,
Τὸν ἐν δαῖοις ἄτρεστον μάχας,

ἐν ἄφοβοις με θηρσὶ δεινὸν χέρας (364-66).

Do you see me, the bold man, the one full of spirit
The one [once] fearless among the enemies in battles
So terrible in strength among the un-fearing beasts?

When summoning the chorus to look at him for the first time Ajax used the plural form, "look" (ἰδέσοι, 351), whereas here he employs the singular, "see" (ὄρᾶς, 364). The difference in number may suggest that the chorus should be taken as a group, in the first case ("you", sailors of Salamis). By contrast, the chorus appears as a more abstract type

164 The Peripatetic writer of the Problemmata has described the chorus in Greek tragedy as inactive. Sometimes the chorus seems nonetheless ready to join action. Thus, the Oceanides were willing to share the fate of Prometheus (PV), which perhaps means passively to endure misfortune together with him (yet it also means to confront Zeus). Usually the chorus as internal audience participates emotionally in the tragedy, while here it is invited to join in fulfilling the tragic act.
of audience, in the second instance ("you", generic watcher). Furthermore, initially Ajax alerted the chorus to his sorry plight, in general (351-53). In the latter passage, he wonders whether the audience "sees" (364), or understands, the tragic change in his identity. Thus, once he was fearless (ἀτρεστος, 365) in battle, among real foes, and therefore truly heroic. Now he is terrifying (δεινος, 366) among beasts that do not know what fear is (366), and is therefore subject to ridicule, (γελωτος, 367). Like Prometheus, Ajax is concerned that his sight may be laughable, yet unlike Prometheus, he does not directly appeal to pity. Strangely enough, Ajax reiterates Athena's previous words, without realizing it, and invites the audience to compare (literally "see") the former Ajax to his actual self. This should lead the external spectator to imaginative pity, of an Aristotelian type, as it previously triggered Odysseus' emotion.

In this context, the tragic rule metatheatrically emphasized in the preamble, the disconnection between audience and stage action, may have deeper implications for Sophoclean drama. At first, the protagonist is metaphorically "blind," as he does not visualize his own misfortune. As shown, on his reentrance he acknowledges the internal audience and realizes his tragic status. He seems to have thus undergone a painful self-

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165 C. Calame 1999, has dealt with differences in the way in which the chorus refers to itself as "I" and "we" to suggest the presence or absence of the authoritative voice of the poet in the character of the chorus. Equally interesting would be a study analyzing the way in which other internal audiences refer to the chorus (as one or many).

166 As the Greek quotation shows, Ajax uses no temporal distinction, such as "once", "now" (which I have added) to mark the change in his destiny. The audience sees the heroic Ajax, who is at the same time the ridiculed Ajax. Furthermore, Ajax's past and recent attributes are similar (ἀτρεστος and δεινος). Only the circumstances varied (he fought against real enemies, then against defenseless cattle). The two postures of Ajax (once truly fear-inspiring, now ridiculously frightening cattle) is reminiscent of the description of the Persian army, which is initially frightening the enemy, then looking deplorable in Aeschylus' Persians.
recognition, accompanied by a reversal of the self-image.\(^{167}\) In fact, Tecmessa briefly reports to the chorus a strange recognition scene (311-28), in which the hero has perceived his real plight.\(^{168}\) As she recounts, Ajax, back in his senses, forced her to reveal to him what happened, while he was mad.\(^{169}\) Though terrified (315), she told him the truth. He reacted to the story as follows:

\[O \delta\ e\u03b5\u03b9\u03b1\u03b1\'\nu\zeta\varepsilon\zeta\varphi\omicron\acute{o} -\varepsilon \acute{y}m\omega\acute{z}e\newline\textit{\acute{a}z o\acute{u}p\acute{o} \acute{i}t\acute{o} \acute{p}r\acute{o}\acute{s}t\acute{h}e\acute{n} \epsilon\iota\sigma\acute{h}k\acute{o}u\acute{s} \acute{e}g\acute{w}.}
\]

\[\Pi\acute{r}\acute{o}z \gamma\acute{a}r \kappa\acute{a}k\acute{o}u \tau\acute{e} \kappa\acute{a}i \beta\acute{a}r\acute{u}p\acute{h}\acute{\acute{h}}\acute{h} \gamma\acute{\acute{o}}\acute{u}z\acute{o}z \newline\textit{\textit{T}o\i\textit{i}o\textit{u}\textit{\acute{u}}\textit{\acute{\alpha}i \pi\textit{t} \\acute{\alpha}n\textit{d}r\acute{o}z \acute{e}x\textit{\i}\acute{h}ge\textit{\i}\acute{e}t \acute{e}x\textit{\e}i\acute{n}}\]

\[\textit{\'\textit{A}l\textit{l}l} \textit{\textit{\acute{a}n\acute{w}\acute{o}\acute{f}h\acute{t}o\acute{t}o} \acute{\acute{d}x\acute{e}w} \kappa\acute{\omega}k\textit{\acute{u}m\acute{a}t}\textit{\acute{\alpha}n}}\]

\[\acute{u}p\textit{\acute{e}st} \textit{\acute{e}n} \acute{\acute{a}t} \acute{\acute{a}r} \acute{\acute{r}} \acute{\acute{o}} \acute{\acute{z}e \acute{b}r\acute{u}x\acute{h}\acute{\acute{m}}\acute{e}n} \acute{e}n \acute{z} \acute{z} \acute{3} \textit{17-22}.\]

He broke out into sad lamentations,
Which I had never heard from him before
For he used to explain that such laments
Were specific to a weak and heart-broken man.
But he used to sigh without any sound

\(^{167}\) I use this formula "self-recognition" for the hero recognizing himself as tragic protagonist, which appears to be a characteristic of Sophoclean tragedy. This is the case not only the case of Ajax, but also of Oedipus. Furthermore, as Hyllus points out in the Tr., 1270, characters are "humanly blind", as they do not see the true actions of gods. In most tragedies recognition presupposes that characters discover the identity of other characters, or the nature of certain situations. Instead, Ajax recognizes himself as subject to tragic spectacle. For blindness in Sophocles as a metaphor for human limits, see the interesting article of R. G. A. Buxton, "Blindness and Limits. Sophocles and the Logic of Myth", JHS 100, 1980, 22-37. V. di Benedetto, Sofocle, Florence 1983, 118-19, also has useful observations about Oedipus' blindness as similar to Ajax's unawareness of his fate.

\(^{168}\) Tecmessa's narrative to the chorus could be compared with a messenger speech. It consists of a narrative in the narrative, as she tells the chorus how she told Ajax what happened, and how he reacted to the story. At 312, the scholiast describes the scene as "full of pathos", because Ajax (a symbol of masculinity) has to hear his misfortune from a woman: πάνω περιπαθὲς τὸν ἐμφόρονέστατον Ἀλαντα παρὰ τῆς γυναικὸς πυρβάνεσθαι τι νο ἔστην ἃ ἐπραξαν αὐτός.

\(^{169}\) 312-4. Ajax uttered terrible threats against her, unless she should reveal (313) to him all he has experienced (πάν... πάθος, 313).
of shrill wailing, like a bellowing bull.

Ajax's outburst has had no precedent. He yields to tragic lamentations, which he formerly despised. Usually associated with choral expression of pity in Greek tragedy, these lamentations resemble mourning. Tecmessa's narrative resembles a messenger's speech to which Ajax is audience (a function normally performed by choruses). His emotional reaction comes from imaginatively visualizing his own deluded actions. What sort of pathos does Ajax express? If he listened to a story about the suffering of another, then certainly his emotion would be pity. And yet, he hears an account of his own deeds. If so, does he feel self-pity? To some extent, he does. The 'mad Ajax' has been another self, so that, in a way, the sane Ajax hears about the misfortune of another. However, this misfortune of another directly affects the 'sane Ajax', and forever tarnishes

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170 R. Padel 1992, 150-52, discusses the imagery of the passage. Ajax used to express sadness "like a bull", and later he chases a bull. Furthermore, his prior expression of grief used to be "voiceless", a sign of his isolation. His sharp cries after finding out what happened are certainly a feminine expression of emotion, while the former were virile.

171 Ajax's previous opinion about shrill lamentation, as not befitting decent men, seems to be in agreement with the Platonic criticism of tragic laments. In the Rep. 3. 388, lamentations derived from tragic pity are appropriate only for men of the baser sort and women (especially worthless ones). Cf. Ajax's point later in the play, that a "woman is most prone to wailing" (φιλοίκιστοι γυνῆ, 580).

172 Cf. the reaction of Ajax to that of Odysseus' (Od. 8. 521-31). On hearing Demodocus' song about the Trojan Horse, Odysseus starts weeping, like… (and here comes a famous comparison, developed over eight lines), like a woman whose husband died in battle, and she was taken into slavery, and her cheeks are full of "most pitiful weeping" (ἐλεξεινοτάτῳ ἔχει, 530). As the Homeric hero listens to a song about his own deeds, so Ajax in the play listens to an account of his deeds. Both lament as if they mourn. Both appear to feel emotion at hearing their past suffering. However, Odysseus probably does so through memory, Ajax through imagination alone (as he does not recall what he has done).

173 In Aristotle, pity is emotion at the suffering of another, through imaginative relating of the suffering to the self (as similar suffering might affect the pitier, or one of his). In this case, Ajax seems to feel pity for a distorted self, whose suffering does affect him.
his self-image. Thus, through this unique recognition, as if he had been a spectator to his own tragedy, Ajax appears to bemoan the loss of his former self. The scene may have well aroused in the audience an Aristotelian type of fear, through suggesting that anybody is prone to be transformed through suffering.

An interesting subsidiary 'tragedy' is sketched in a speech of Tecmessa (485-524). Trying to prevent Ajax from committing suicide, the concubine asks him to imagine the calamities that will fall on her and his family. She asks him to imagine how she will be taken into slavery when he dies (495-500). Furthermore, Tecmessa visualizes (and tries to make Ajax see with the mind's eye) how the possible spectators of her fate will talk about the reversal of her fortune. Thus, Ajax should think about how people will say: "behold" (ἰδεῖς, 501) the woman who once belonged to Ajax, the mightiest of heroes, yet now she is falling into servitude instead of being envied (501-3). She requests that Ajax should feel shame (αἰδεσαί, 507) for abandoning his old parents, and take pity (οἴκτιρε, 510) on his child. So far Tecmessa has wanted Ajax to imagine the future calamities of his family, and thus feel emotion and change his mind about suicide. She ends with imploring him to remember even her (ἰσχε κόμῳ μνήστιν, 520). Then she continues, for a noble man should keep in his memory (μνήμην προσείναι) an experience, if it was pleasurable (522), and perhaps she has brought him grace (χάρις, 523). Overall, a noble man (εὐγηνίς, 524) does not let the recollection (μνήστις, 523) of kindness pass away.

Tecmessa's speech presents striking similarities with the Aristotelian account of the arousal of pity in the Rhetoric. The concubine imagines her own misfortune (as well

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175 This is reminiscent of Priam's prayer to Achilles in the Iliad, in which Achilles was asked to be ashamed of Zeus, and pity Priam's old age.
as that befalling on others dear to Ajax) through using anticipation and memory.

Moreover, she attempts to transmit her vision to Ajax, by bringing it "before his eyes," pro ommaton, so that he could feel pity and change his decision. Although Tecmessa addresses her plea to Ajax, she is also heard by another audience within the play, the chorus. Indeed, the chorus responds to her speech immediately, by feeling pity, and wish that Ajax had the same reaction:

Χο. Αἴας, ἔχειν σὲ ὁν οἰκτων ὡς καγώ φρενί
Θέλομι ἂν... (525-6).

Ajax., I wish you to have pity, as I do too, in my mind.

If the chorus is taken to represent the intermediary between the emotional response within the text and that of the external spectator, such a comment may have a particular significance. As internal audience the chorus displays its emotion (οἰκτον) hoping to transmit it to a different and more important spectator, Ajax. Similarly, perhaps, choruses express certain emotional responses, in order to suggest them to the external spectator.

Yet, Ajax still does not immediately acknowledge sharing the response of the chorus. Only later, before committing suicide, he does confess his pity for Tecmessa. Even I, he says, who have been incredibly strong, like iron (650-51), "have been transformed into a woman in my speech" (ἐθηλύνθην στόμα, 651), thanks to this woman. And "I pity her" (οἰκτίρω δὲ νῖν, 652), that I should leave her a widow (653).

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176 Thus, in a way, Tecmessa wants to influence Ajax's reasoning, through emotional appeal.
177 Ajax's expression of pity for Tecmessa (651-53) is part of the third monologue of the hero (646-92), which gives the internal audiences the false impression that he will not commit suicide. Whether he deliberately misleads his listeners or not is subject of debate. The different scholarly views on the monologue are summarized by Stanford 1963, Appendix D, 281-88; more recently, Garvie 1998, 185-86, with bibliography.
Expressing pity has required, in the hero’s terms, "to be changed into a woman," a remark that has puzzled commentators. This declaration is reminiscent, nevertheless, of Tecmessa’s telling the chorus how Ajax deplored his madness episode. Before that instance, Ajax appears not to have known the 'unmanly' tragic laments. Here, the hero himself refers to his verbal display of pity as "feminine", and as melting his masculine, iron heart. Moreover, Ajax surprisingly declares his compassion, and yet he will soon abandon her. In my opinion, while the speech of Tecmessa has succeeded in arousing emotion, it fails to convince Ajax to act on this emotion. Ajax has already mourned the death of his former self. The suicide appears to stand for a physical fulfillment of the metaphorical end of his heroic life, which has already happened in his view. Therefore, although Ajax still feels tragic pity for the consequences of his death on his family, as anticipated by Tecmessa, he cannot change his mind about the suicide, which likely comes from a sense of pride as well as shame before the community for losing his self-image. Ajax's decision to kill himself, despite feeling pity for his dear ones is very similar to Hector, who decides to keep fighting against the Greeks, even though this will lead to perdition and in spite of pitying his wife, Andromache (Iliad 6. 440-65).

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178 Some take the "woman transformation" in his speech to mean that Ajax signals to his spectators that his words are false, Knox 1964, 138-9; Garvie 1998, 187, who also underlines that "speech", literally "mouth" (στόμα) could mean "edge of a sword" and thus prefigure his suicide. Others believe that Ajax declares his pity only in his speech, not in his behavior, such as I. M. Linforth, "Three Scenes in Sophocles Ajax," Univ. of Calif. Public in Class. Philol. 15 (1954), 1-28, especially 15-16.

179 On this ground, it has been sometimes argued that Ajax's pity is deceptive here, as is his whole speech. He only pretends to feel compassion so that he can fulfill his wish (suicide), without being suspected of doing so (for example, Blundell 1989, 92. Garvie 1998, ad loc., "one would like to believe that at least Ajax's compassion is sincere." He does not, however explain why).

180 From early on, pity can be associated with taking action. Tecmessa has spoken as if she had been an orator, trying to dissuade Ajax from suicide, by arousing his of the emotion. See W. Burkert, "Zum
members of the ancient audience may have thus considered Ajax's final act noble and befitting the heroic code. Later on, for instance, Demosthenes lists the suicide of Ajax among other examples inspiring courage (*Funeral Speech* 60.30), because the hero takes his own life when it is no longer worth living.

In the same final monologue, Ajax raises a fascinating rhetorical question:

'Ἡμεῖς δὲ πώς οὖ γνωσόμεθα σωφρονέιν' (677)

How shall we not learn how to be temperate?

Now Ajax knows (ἐπισταματι, 678) that the enemy should be hated only to the extent to which he will become a friend one day, whereas friends may not always remain friends.181 Interestingly, in this question, the subject is the first person, plural pronoun, (ἡμεῖς), and this lexical choice could be simply ornamental, or may have a deeper meaning. When asking the question, Ajax may not simply refer to himself, "I", but also to internal audiences, and, perhaps, to external ones as well, and generally to all "we", human beings. Starting from Ajax's example, Odysseus also "had seen", that "we" (ἡμᾶς, 125) are all frail creatures, insubstantial shadows. Afterwards, he had a chance to "learn"

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181 See Blundell 1989, 85-89, for the traditional Greek views on the reversal of friendship and enmity, as well as the contradiction between this idea in Ajax's speech and his former beliefs that enemies are always enemies. Heath 1987, 195-97, talks about the manipulation of the internal audiences, who may think that
from Athena how men should be "temperate" (132), since anyone's fate could be reversed in a day. To a great extent, Ajax's final discourse parallels Odysseus' at the beginning of the play. Both Ajax and Odysseus feel "pity" (one for a deluded foe, the other for an abandoned wife and child). Both "learn" that human affairs are fickle, therefore even enmity and friendship relative. In both cases, nevertheless, neither tragic emotion nor tragic cognition can change one's destiny. In his concluding monologue, Ajax's knowledge about temperance seems to be gnomic in nature. Such learning places the tragic hero in the universal category of human beings (ἡμεῖς), to which all belong, whether audiences or tragic protagonist.

After the suicide of Ajax, the play deals with the problem of whether the hero should be granted proper burial, a theme also common in the Antigone and Trachiniae. This second part of the drama contains a quarrel between Teucer, defending the honor of the dead hero, and the Atreidae, insulting Ajax's memory. In conclusion, Odysseus intervenes to make sure that Ajax receives the burial. In addition, he proclaims Teucer, his former enemy, as now his friend (1376-77), perhaps fulfilling Ajax's intuition: friendship and enmity become irrelevant, when misfortune strikes human beings. The scholiast comments at 1123 on the quarrel between Teucer and Menelaus and, generally on the dramatic content of Ajax, following the hero's death:

Τά τοιαῦτα σοφίσματα οὐκ οἶκεία τραγῳδίας· μετὰ γὰρ τὴν ἀναίρεσιν ἐπεκτείναι τὸ δρᾶμα θελήσας ἐγυρεύσατο καὶ ἔλυσε τὸ τραγικὸν πάθος.

Ajax has forgotten his hatred for his enemy and therefore renounced the idea of suicide, whereas external audiences know that he will have to pursue his plan.
These kind of sophistic arguments are not proper to tragedy.\textsuperscript{182} For, after the suicide, [the poet] wishing to prolong the drama, has let it grow cold and loosened the tragic emotion.

Many modern scholars have considered this observation of the scholiast and, after interpreting it as an accusation against the lack of dramatic unity, some have tried to defend Sophocles and to emphasize the importance of the burial theme.\textsuperscript{183} The scholiast, however, seems to criticize not necessarily the compositional structure, but the lack of emotional expression, \textit{pathos}, within the last part of drama (thus implying the absence of emotional response from the external audiences). Furthermore, he suggests that certain formal elements of the quarrel, clever arguments (\textit{sofist\i m\i a\i ta}), are not usually proper (\textit{oixeia}) to tragedy. And, indeed, several interpreters have found lexical and dramatic elements reminiscent of the \textit{agon} of Old Comedy, in the confrontation between Teucer and the Atreidae.\textsuperscript{184} Even if we recognize these comic elements, a question still remains. Why would Sophocles opt for this dramatic design? The scholiast believes that the dramatist wanted to prolong the play, and yet why so? A reason could be that in previous literary tradition, Ajax's fall started with a quarrel between the hero and his foe,

\textsuperscript{182} A few lines later, when Menelaus (1126) complains that Ajax should not "prosper" in his death, after "killing" him (i.e. attempting to kill him), to which Teucer responds that Menelaus cannot talk about being killed if he is alive (1127). A scholiast comments on this ironic talk about death (1127): "this is rather (proper) to comedy than tragedy": \textit{t\' o d\' e toio\theta o m\' allon k\' omm\' o\theta i\' a\z o\' u \' trag\' o\delta i\' a\z}.

\textsuperscript{183} Among scholars defending the unity of the play against the scholiast are, for example, G. Perotta 1935, 130-33; Kitto 1956, 198, Garvie 1998, 9. For recognizing the formal division of the play, yet praising the importance of the second part as vindicating the reputation of Ajax, see C. Whitman 1951, 77-78; R. Scodel, 1984, 20-22.

\textsuperscript{184} E. Fraenkel, "Zur Form der \' a\i vo\i ," \textit{RhM} 73 (1920), 366-70, has identified formulae in the quarrel that seem to belong to the popular comic genre of riddles. Reinhardt 1979, 40, has noted formal similarities between the quarrel and the \textit{agon} of Old Comedy. J. Park Poe, \textit{Genre and Meaning in Sophocles' Ajax, Beiträge Zur Klassischen Philologie} 172 (1987), 22-28, provides an excellent, detailed analysis of the comic exchange of insults between Teucer, Menelaus, and Agamemnon.
Odysseus.\footnote{See the introduction for Ajax's legend in the epic cycle and Aeschylean trilogy.} Sophocles omits the direct confrontation between the two at the beginning of his play (perhaps as unworthy of tragic \textit{pathos}), but replaces it with a surrogate dispute at the end of his drama. A second explanation, which does not contradict the first, could be that after unusual display of \textit{pathos} within the first part of the tragedy (madness scene shown not through narrative, suicide), the poet wants to "loosen" the emotional response of his audience. In fact, this part of the tragedy does not seem particularly designed to stir pity, which likely is the embodiment of "tragic pathos," according to our scholiast as well as earlier Aristotelian standards. On the contrary, while certain internal audiences denigrate the memory of Ajax, some external spectators may have wondered whether to respond with pity to the death of the hero.

In a dramatic setting similar to the \textit{Prometheus}, enemies, Menelaus and Agamemnon, accuse Ajax of wickedness, whereas the friendly - disposed, Teucer, defends the unfortunate hero. Menelaus (1052-92), for example, offers clear reasons that should prevent one from feeling sympathy for the deceased Ajax and could justify denying his burial. First, Ajax betrayed the bound of friendship when attacking the Greek army, as if he had been the worst enemy, although he was considered a friend (1052-54). Secondly he always used to be insubordinate. At this point, Menelaus generally talks about insubordination that generates violations of law an order. His speech reconsiders the meaning of "moderation", a notion that earlier in the play referred to the relationship between human and divine and understanding the mutability of human fate. Menelaus applies this notion to social norms instead. Laws (νόμοι, 1073) cannot function in a city, unless people have fear (δέος, 1074) and respect. An army cannot be governed wisely
(σωφρόνως, 1075), unless people have fear (φόβος, 1076) and shame (αἰδός, 1076). Since Ajax did not feel such civic emotions and did not obey rules, he is labeled arrogant (ὑβριστής, 1088). Later on, Agamemnon accuses Teucer, the defender of Ajax, of not being moderate (οὐ σωφρονησεις, 1259) and of arrogance (ὑβρίζεις, 1258) also because he breaks social norms (daring to contradict the superiors, though born from a slave). In this way, the detractors of Ajax try to shift the semantics of "wisdom", from awareness of the limits of human beings, the sense in which Athena used the notion, to respecting the civic order. In addition, Menelaus replaces "tragic fear", explained by human anxiety in front of unknown vicissitudes that future may bring, with "fear" of civic disobedience, meaning respect for laws. Therefore, these hostile speeches of the internal audiences appear to invite the external spectator to see Ajax no longer as a tragic paradigm of human frailty, causing metaphysical anxiety, but rather as civic failure, whose example one should be afraid to follow.

While these accusations of Ajax may have persuaded some of the external spectators, they are clearly dismantled at the end of the play. Unlike the internal voices that are sympathetic to Prometheus mainly on an emotional basis and do not dismiss the critics of the Titan with logical arguments in the Prometheus, Teucer, for instance, responds to Menelaus specifically (for example, Ajax did not owe the Atreidae obedience, since he was his own master, 1093-1117). Moreover, the final intervention of Odysseus almost dictates the external audience to respond with compassion to the fall of Ajax. Remaining unsympathetic to the hero means not to be moved by suffering when even the fiercest enemy has been moved. While in the prologue Odysseus declared his pity for Ajax, he now acts on account of emotion, by ordering the burial. He reinforces
the idea that friendship and enmity are relative notions (1355-60) and wants to honor Ajax because he himself will need burial one day (1365), again relating the misfortune of his former enemy to the self (as he did when he expressed *eleos*). The chorus praises his decision as "wise" (γνώμη σοφόν, 1374). This remark of the chorus seems to reinforce the meaning of "wisdom" as found in the prologue of the play: feeling compassion for another through understanding universal human condition, so refuting Menelaus' version of wisdom in social order. Paradoxically, Odysseus' pity, which is based on the philosophical, Aristotelian syllogism (he is like his enemy) - and not the Atreidae rigid belief in social order -, restores harmony in the community, through solving the conflict between friends and enemies of Ajax. Such a conciliatory social function of tragic pity would have never been conceivable to Plato or, perhaps, to "Platonic" spectators.

Even though the last part of the play has been considered to have less "pathos", meaning, perhaps, less conducive to *eleos*, there are several instances directly appealing to this emotion. Thus, when the chorus wants to see the corpse of Ajax (912-14), Tecmessa covers the dead and responds that he is not to be seen (915) and that the sight of the lifeless hero will shock a friend, such as Teucer (920-21).

She further exclaims, "oh ill-fated Ajax, now deserving lamentations even from enemies" (καὶ παρ’ ἐξθροῖς ἄξιος θρῆνων τυχείν, 924). The scholiast remarks on this line: αὐξησις περὶ τὸ πάθος, ὡς καὶ τούς δυσμενεῖς ἑλεῖν (a climax with respect to emotion, as even the ill-disposed feel pity). As external audience, the scholiast is moved and praises the arousal

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186 She anticipates thus the reaction of Teucer, who exclaims at seeing the corpse of Ajax "sight not to be seen" (1004).

187 Cf. the chorus' comment (*OT* 1295-96), even those who hate Oedipus will be driven to pity by his sight: . . . θέαμα δ’ εἰσώξει τάχα
tοιοῦτον οἶον καὶ στυγοῦντ’ ἐποικίσαι.
of pity even in ill-disposed audiences, which seems to be an important motif within the play. Finally, the Ajax ends with a gnomic statement of the chorus (1418-20) echoing Athena's initial gnome. Mortals know many things when seeing them (ἰδοὺςίν, 1418). No one can predict what he will do in the future, "before seeing" (πρὶν ἰδεῖν, 1419). The conclusion may have induced anxiety in the external audience. As "seen" in the play, one could suddenly behold oneself as tragic spectacle and "we," all (including external) spectators, are subject to the caprices of fate.
5. Euripides. *Orestes.*

More than any other play analyzed so far, the *Ajax* evoked through plot and certain internal reactions a type of pity and fear that comes closest to the Aristotelian theoretical description. The spectators were invited to feel pity through understanding the particular misfortune of Ajax in relationship with the human universals and, in this way, to experience anxiety about their own ephemeral condition. Conversely, as literary critics suggest at times, Euripides’ *Orestes* appears to have departed from the Stagirite's ideal of tragedy. The author of a hypothesis to *Orestes,* commonly identified as Aristophanes of Byzantium (third-century BC), notes that this drama has a rather "comic denouement," (κομικὴ τραγωδία καταστροφή)¹⁸⁸ and most characters are "bad" (φαῦλοι) or, perhaps, "comic."¹⁸⁹ Tragic devices that do not stir pity and fear receive the labels of "not proper to tragedy" and "rather proper to comedy" in the *Poetics* and later in the scholia of *Ajax.*¹⁹⁰ Therefore, the writer of the hypothesis may well imply in his critique that,

¹⁸⁸ For a critical commentary on the text of the hypothesis (*Codex Parisinus* 2713B), see M. L. West, *Euripides Orestes* (Warminster, 1987), 59-60 and 178. West notes at 178 that the expression "denouement of comic type" occurs not only in the hypothesis to *Orestes* but also, almost verbatim, in that to Euripides’ *Alcestis* and can be confidently ascribed to Aristophanes of Byzantium. On the other hand, West agrees with the suggestion of R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford, 1968), 277, who says that the objections to the Euripidean drama, as found in this hypothesis, could in fact belong to the Peripatetic Didymus (first-century BC), who may have collected and preserved the hypotheses of Aristophanes.

¹⁸⁹ This is the term used by Aristotle to describe comic characters. The *Poetics* (2. 1448a), for example, distinguishes between imitation of "noble", σπουδαῖοι, and "base", φαῦλοι, people, the former being proper to tragedy, the latter to comedy. Comedy is later defined as mimesis of baser but not entirely depraved people: κωμῳδία ἐστὶν ὁσπερ εἴσομεν μίμησις φαῦλοτέρων μὲν, οὐ μέντοι κατὰ πάσαν κακίαν (*Po. 5. 1449a31*).

¹⁹⁰ In the *Poetics,* double plots bring pleasure to the audiences, but a pleasure rather proper to comedy than tragedy (ἐστιν δὲ οὐχ αὕτη ἀπὸ τραγωδίας ἡδονή, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τῆς κωμῳδίας οἰκεῖα, *Po. 13. 1453a36-7*), because the proper pleasure of tragedy comes from pity and fear (*Po. 1453b10-14*; cf. my discussion,
ultimately, the tragic action and the conduct of characters in the *Orestes* are not emotionally conducive. Modern scholars do not agree on whether Euripides' rendition of the myth of Orestes would have compelled the spectator to respond with sympathy for the plight of the heroes. Theorists who do not agree on whether Euripides' rendition of the myth of Orestes would have compelled the spectator to respond with sympathy for the plight of the heroes. My study will examine specific innovations in Euripidean techniques of emotional arousal and suggest how these could have intruged ancient audiences, leading to various reactions. Euripides' originality will be discussed by looking at internal appeals to pity and fear in the *Orestes* in contrast to those found in

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89-90. The scholiast noted at *Ajax* (1123), that the arguments of the debate (Teucer - Menelaus - Agamemnon) were not "proper to tragedy", because the poet let loose the "tragic pathos" (see my commentary, 209).

Generally, scholarly opinions arguing that pity could not be the appropriate reaction to tragedies are not concerned with the plots of the tragedies (which, in themselves, could stir the emotion). They rather emphasize factors external to tragic action that could have diverted the spectator's emotion, as I have mentioned in my analyses: historical events (*Pe*), religious beliefs about a just Zeus (*PV*), behavior of Ajax (*Aj*). By contrast, scholars often argue that the plot itself of the *Orestes* could not arouse pity, which suggests that there is something unusual about Euripides' rendition of the myth. Like Aristophanes of Byzantium, some modern scholars imply that the plot of *Orestes* is not "tragic". Thus, for example, H. D. F. Kitto, *Greek Tragedy*, 3rd edition (London, 1961), 348, calls the play a "melodrama"; D. J. Conacher, *Euripidean Drama* (Toronto and London, 1967), 213-15; H. E. Barnes, "Greek Tragicomedy," *CJ* 60 (1964), 124-31. W. Burkert, "Die Absurdität der Gewalt und das Ende der Tragödie: Euripides Orestes," *Antike und Abendland* 20 (1974), 97-109, emphasizes unorthodox elements of the Euripidean plot when compared with tradition. A major problem in interpreting the plot as being overall conducive to pity consists of the transformation of Orestes and Electra from victims of fate, who are about to die, into makers of their own destiny, about to kill Helen and harm Hermione. M. L. West 1987, 33-34, believes that ancient spectators would have felt pity for the plight of Orestes and his sister, even though they too become vengeful at the end of the play, because it was accepted in Greek culture to harm one's enemy. Against West's view, it can be argued that most Greek tragedies focus on the suffering of the heroes and not on their vengeful acts (for example *Ajax*, in which the hero's attempt to harm his foes is only a preamble to the hero's fall). Moreover, other considerations may have interfered with the arousal of *eleos*. Audiences could have been disturbed, for example, by the fact that Helen and especially Hermione did not directly harm Orestes, so that they could not be properly considered "enemies" and by the claim that killing women could
other tragedies and in contrast to Aristotelian criteria. Additional aspects of the play as well as of the spectator's responses will be discussed, such as possible differences between popular and elite audiences in reacting to elements of surprise, literary allusions, and ethical issues presented in the tragedy.

The *Orestes* was first produced in 408 BC\(^{192}\) and became one of the most popular Greek tragedies throughout antiquity. Direct evidence for the popularity of the play comes, for example, from a didascalic inscription, mentioning a performance in 340 BC at the City Dionysia.\(^ {193}\) Examination of the manuscript tradition indicates that the text of the *Orestes* has been changed by numerous interpolations of actors, which further suggests frequent performances.\(^ {194}\) Aristophanes of Byzantium confirms the success of the *Orestes* among popular audiences in the hypothesis, and yet he suggests a different reception of the play among the elite:

\begin{quote}
Τὸ δράμα τῶν ἔπι σκηνῆς εὐδοκιμοῦντων, χείριστον δὲ τοῖς ἠθεσιν πλὴν γὰρ
Πυλάδου πάντες φαύλοι ἦσαν.
\end{quote}

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\(^ {192}\) As M. L. West 1987, 45, concisely demonstrates that there is no reason to doubt this date given by the scholiast (on line 371), with the specification "when Diocles was archon."

\(^ {193}\) *IG II. 2. 2320*. 19. A. Pickard - Cambridge, *Dramatic Festivals of Athens*, 2\(^ {nd}\) edition revised by Gould and Lewis (Oxford, 1968) 109, discusses inscription and its significance. G. Xanthakis - Karamanos, *Studies in Fourth Century Tragedy* (Athens, 1980), 28-34, collects evidence for the popularity of Euripidean plays, which includes epigraphy, references to performances by later authors, parody in comedy, vase paintings. After discussing the didascalic information, he concludes, at 30, that the fourth-century audiences liked particularly late Euripidean tragedies, which were often performed, and that the *Orestes* was "one of the most popular Euripidean plays in this [the fourth] and the following century."

\(^ {194}\) As D. L. Page, *Actors Interpolations in Greek Tragedy* (Oxford, 1934), 41-45, has brilliantly demonstrated. J. Diggle, *The Textual Tradition of Euripides' Orestes* (Oxford, 1991), offers the most complete study on the manuscript tradition.
The play is one of those that are appreciated on stage, but it is inferior with respect to its characters: all are bad (funny) apart from Pylades.\(^{193}\)

Most likely, Aristophanes expresses dissatisfaction with characters by thinking of Aristotelian standards for characterization. This critique finds direct correspondence in the *Poetics*, which specifically criticizes Menelaus, one of the characters in the *Orestes*, for lacking "consistency" (τὸ ὀμαλὸν).\(^{196}\)

Παράδειγμα πονηρίας μὲν ἡθος μὴ ἀναγκαίας οἶνον ὁ Μενέλαος ἐν τῷ Ὀρέστῃ.  
(*Po. 15. 1454a28*).

An example of wickedness without necessary reason is Menelaus in the *Orestes*.

Other dramatic elements in the composition of this tragedy may have also displeased those ancient spectators who were fond of Peripatetic literary criticism, while likely these elements did not bother or even pleased popular audiences. Occasionally, characters change their mind (so, for instance, Orestes goes back and forth about killing a Phrygian slave, 1514-26), a dramatic device that is harshly criticized in the *Poetics*.\(^{197}\) An

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\(^{193}\) This comment is reminiscent of the Aristotelian remarks in the *Poetics* that complain about the poets' habit of pleasing the taste of the many and not using the "best" tragic devices.

\(^{196}\) Aristotle notes that even when the person represented by a tragic character is someone inconsistent, still he "should be consistently inconsistent", ὀμαλός ἀνώμαλον δεῖ εἶναι (*Po. 15. 1454a27*). In Euripides' play, Menelaus does not help Orestes and Electra, even though he seems well disposed toward them initially. There is no logical reason for Menelaus' change of attitude, which probably triggers Aristotle's comment. For the characterization of Menelaus, see N. A. Greenberg, "Euripides' *Orestes*. An Interpretation," *HSCP* 66 (1962), 157-92.

\(^{197}\) I will discuss the scene between Orestes and the Phrygian more extensively later in my analysis. Aristotle says that the worst is for one (tragic character) to be about to act knowingly yet not to do so, "for this is repugnant and untragic (since it lacks pathos)," τὸ τε γὰρ μισθὸν ἔχει, καὶ οὐ τραγικὸν ἀπαθὲς γὰρ (*Po. 14. 1453b37-38*), and gives as an example for this Haemon in Sophocles' *Antigone*, who is about to kill Creon, yet decides not to do so (*Po. 14. 1454a1*).
elitist spectator might have disliked the fact that Euripides gives the *Orestes* a "happy ending". In this respect, a scholiast comments (on *Or.* 691, Schwartz, 241):

> ἡ καταλήξις τῆς τραγωδίας ἢ εἰς θρήνον ἢ εἰς πάθος καταλύει, ἢ δὲ τῆς κωμῳδίας εἰς σπονδάς καὶ διαλλαγάς. Ὑθεν ὀρᾶται τόδε τὸ δράμα κωμικὴ καταλήξει χρησάμενον διαλλαγάς γὰρ πρὸς Μενέλαον καὶ Ὀρέστην.

The denouement of tragedy dissolves either into mourning or into suffering/emotion (*pathos*), whereas that of comedy leads to truces of peace and reconciliation. Hence it is seen that this drama makes use of a comic denouement, for there is reconciliation between Menelaus and Orestes.

While almost repeating the observation of the hypothesis ("rather comic end"), the scholiast explains more clearly why, in his opinion, the play does not have a tragic finale: because it does not effect *pathos*. Despite the preference of the critics, a happy ending may have been nonetheless a device that most spectators liked in tragedy by the fourth-century BC. An early indication of this is a comment of Aristotle, who prefers tragedies concluding in adversity, but feels the need to defend Euripides (for being right to end most tragedies in misfortune, contrary to what some others believe). In this respect, *Orestes* is evidently not one of those tragedies that would have needed Aristotelian

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199 Interestingly, the scholiast also mentions as proper tragic ending "mourning", θρήνος, a notion already associated with tragedy by Plato and, perhaps, with the Aristotelian "proper pleasure" of tragedy (see my discussion, 117-18). Immediately after distinguishing between tragic and comic ending, the scholiast gives other examples of tragedies, such as Euripides’ *Alcestis* and Sophocles’ *Tyro*, which similarly end happily - therefore like comedy - concluding that such things are often found in tragedy (Schwartz, 241). This point makes M. Heath, *The Poetics of Greek Tragedy* (London, 1987), 17, believe that the scholiast contradicts himself, "because he is compelled to admit that the phenomenon to which he takes exception is rather common in tragedy. A tragedy, then, may end happily (though only after troubling vicissitudes)." Yet, in my opinion, the scholiast wants to emphasize not so much the exceptionality of happy ending in tragedy, but rather its incompatibility with the emotion specific to tragedy.

defense. Moreover, the final scene of the play depends on a *deus ex machina*, the
intervention of Apollo. The *Poetics* recommends that denouements should issue from the
plot itself (λύσεις τῶν μύθων ἐξ αὐτοῦ δεῖ τοῦ μύθου συμβαίνειν, *Po.* 15. 1454a 36-37) and that *deus ex machina* should be employed only for events outside the drama (μηχανη
gρηστέον ἐπὶ τὰ ἔξω δράματος, *Po.* 15. 1454b2-3), for instance preceding the tragic action, as in Sophocles' *Oedipus*. Therefore, a spectator of Aristotelian kind may have wished to see the plot of the *Orestes* end in a logical sequence. He would have then found Apollo's appearance undesirable, especially when the god not only interferes in the dramatic action but stops it abruptly. On the other hand, many could have admired the denouement particularly for the element of surprise involved in the sudden appearance of Apollo.

Background for the Euripidean tragedy was provided by numerous literary sources dealing with the myth of Orestes, such as Homer and other poems of the epic cycle, the lyric poetry of Stesichorus (*Oresteia* and *Helen Palinode*), and Aeschylus'

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201 As B. Goward, *Telling Tragedy. Narrative Technique in Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides* (London, 1999), 126-27, observes: "it is only three tragedies, *IT* 1437f., *Hel.* 1642f., *Or.*1625f., that the god actually puts an end to the action with the cry, 'Stop'." It seems to me that the Aristotelian ideal of logical flow of plot is most extremely violated by this type of *deus ex machina*, in which Apollo orders the heroes to "cease", παύσαι (*Or.*1625) their action. Some modern critics consider Apollo's intervention completely inadequate, truly unable to solve the conflict between the city and Orestes. Thus, for instance, F. M. Dunn, *Tragedy's End* (New York and Oxford, 1996), 159-61.

202 W. G. Arnott, "Tension, Frustration and Surprise: A Study of Theatrical Techniques in some Scenes of Euripides' *Orestes*," *Antichton* 17 (1983), 13-28, especially 26-28 for the end, presents ways in which dramatic surprises of this play may have enticed the audiences. M. Quijada, *La Composicion de la Tragedia Tardia de Euripides. Iphigenia Entre Los Tauros, Helena y Orestes* (Vitoria, 1991), 228, observes that the *Orestes*, more than any other Greek tragedy, is built on a series of visual surprises.
Oresteia, to mention only a few. As F. Zeitlin has demonstrated in an excellent article, Euripides does not simply allude to previous literary tradition, he constructs entire episodes through reference to tradition and, in particular, through dismantling Aeschylus' Choephorae and Eumenides. The scene placed at the beginning of the Orestes, for example, when the hero sleeps, echoes the opening of the Eumenides as an "inverted reminiscence." Here Orestes is asleep and a prayer is made to the Night, whereas it is the Furies who sleep and Night is the mother of terrors in the Aeschylean play. Other dramatists used this kind of reference to previous dramatic tradition, although it is difficult for us to detect the extent, given the limited number of extant Greek tragedies. Nevertheless, the Orestes extensively and systematically refers to the Oresteia in key scenes, which may have particular significance, considering that the Aeschylean trilogy may have been revived around 420, and thus been fresh in the memory of the audiences. Euripides appears therefore to be inviting the spectators to compare his play with the Aeschylean dramatic treatment. This could lead the audience, in my opinion, to cognitive pleasure, which is based on reasoning "this is that." Reaching pleasure comes, according to the Aristotelian formula, from watching the tragedy as imitation, mimesis, of a fearful and pitiable action.

203 Useful discussions of Euripides' drawing upon the literary tradition in the Orestes are offered, for example, by K. Reinhardt, Tradition und Geist (Göttingen, 1960), 220-56; C. Wolf, "Orestes," in Euripides: A Collection of Twentieth Century Views, ed. E. Segal (New Jersey, 1968), 132-49.


205 As Zeitlin puts it, 1980, 55.

206 Aeschylus already seems to have done so, when alluding to the Phoenissae in the first line of the Persians, as I have shown at 145.
Instead, or perhaps in addition, the spectators of the *Orestes* would enjoy likening two types of *mimeses* through inferring how the Euripidean imitation of myth relates to the Aeschylean: *this* is how Euripides refers to *that* Aeschylean scene.\(^{208}\)

The *Orestes* opens with an explanatory prologue, delivered by Electra, which first contains a gnome:

Oúk ἔστιν οὐδὲν δεινὸν ὁδὲ εἰπὲιν ἔπος
οὐδὲ πάθος οὐδὲ ξυμφορὰ θείλατος,
תרבות αὐν ἀραίτ ἀχθος ἄνθρωπον φύσις. (1-3)

There is no story that frightening to tell
Neither suffering nor misfortune brought by a god,
That human nature may not take up as a burden.

In most Greek tragedies, a gnomic statement of this sort would be placed at the very end (as it is the case in the *Ajax*) or, sometimes, in choral odes anticipating or following a major episode. The function of such aphorisms was likely to arouse fear in the spectators by emphasizing the uncertainties of human destiny, as shown in my discussion of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. Ancient audiences were probably surprised by this unusual position

\(^{207}\) M. L. West 1987, 31, the *Oresteia* was first put on stage in 458 BC, but probably performed again around 420s.

\(^{208}\) In Aristotle's opinion, *mimesis* generally produces cognitive pleasure, derived through reasoning (this is that), but tragic *mimesis* has an additional component, which is emotional. When the spectator, then, would focus on how Euripides' *Orestes* imitates Aeschylus trilogy, he would feel delight through recognizing similarities and differences between the two. This is a cognitive type of pleasure, similar to noting the resemblance between a painting and the original model, yet it does not involve also painful emotions, which tragic imitation of an action should do, according to the Stagirite. Such a type of pleasure is involved in parody. Perhaps one of the reasons that Aristophanes makes Euripides a target of parody is because he senses that Euripides himself used techniques of parody to allude to his precursors. This may also explain why comic poets seem particularly interested in the *Orestes* (for a synopsis, see Arnott 1983, 13, with bibliography).
of the gnome in the *Orestes*, which appears to reverse the normal order of tragic display. Euripides does not start with the particulars of the hero's misfortune to suggest the universals of human condition, but rather with the universals to explain the particulars of his story (ἕπος, 1). Furthermore, the meaning of the gnomic utterance may have intrigued some spectators, as the later testimony of Cicero suggests:

*Itaque non sine causa, cum Orestem fabulam doceret Euripides, primos tris versus revocasse dicitur Socrates:*

*Necque tam terribilis ulla fando oratio est
Nec sors, nec ira caelitum invectum malum,
Quod non natura humana patiendo ecferat.*

*Est autem utilis ad persuadendum ea quae acciderint ferri et posse et opporere enumeratio eorum qui tulerunt. (Tusculan Disputations, 4. 29. 63).*

Therefore it is not without reason that, while Euripides was putting on the *Orestes*, Socrates is said to have asked to repeat the first three lines (…translation of the 3 lines)

For reckoning (*enumeratio*) that whatever things happen both can and must be endured as well as those who have endured such things is useful for argumentation.

Certainly, the fact that Socrates wanted to hear again the aphoristic opening of the *Orestes* cannot be proven historically. Yet, Cicero gives us the sense that he and probably others before him found unique meaning in these first lines of play. The significance of the gnome is no longer that mankind is prone to suffering, never knowing future vicissitudes, which would have inspired fear, as usual in Greek tragedy. It is rather that human nature *can endure* future hardships (as the Ciceronian comment stresses):

209 Although Pickard- Cambridge 1968, 274, does not deny the possibility of such incident but is rather surprised by it: "Socrates himself is said to have called for a repetition of the first three lines of the *Orestes*, which contain a not very profound observation, but Cicero who tells the story does not say what happened."
misfortunes "can be withstood", ferri, people "have endured them", tulerunt),\(^{210}\) which brings a message of hope to the opening of the \textit{Orestes}.

In the opening scene, Helen expresses sympathy for the suffering of Electra (whom she calls "unfortunate", τάλανα, 73), pain for the death of Clytaemnestra ("I sigh", "lament", στένω, 77, αἰαίζω, 80) and pity for Orestes (μέλεος, 90) who is ill, being pursued by the Erinyes. Furthermore, Helen would like Electra to reciprocate her compassion and "free her from fear" (φόβον λύσοσα δός, 104). She explains that she is afraid (δέδοικα, 103) even of going to make libations for her deceased sister, because the city of Argos still holds a grudge against her for starting the Trojan war. Electra refuses her any favor and, as if competing for the spectator's pity, shows why she alone deserves sympathy. Her suffering is before the eyes and does not need any verbal explanation:

'Ἐλένη, τί σοι λέγομι αὖν ἂ γε παροῦσ' ὀρᾶς: (81)\(^{211}\)

Helen, why should I tell you what you see in front of you? By contrast, Helen and Menelaus are, in reality, fortunate (μακαρία μακαριός, 86).\(^{212}\) Furthermore, Electra draws attention to another detail proving that Helen pretends to mourn the death of Clytaemnestra (thus faking tragic emotion), while being in fact concerned only with her image:

Εἴδετε παρέ ἄκρας ὡς ἀπέτρισεν τρίχας

Σφάζουσα δὲ καλλός ... (128-29)

\(^{210}\) Interestingly, Cicero seems both echo and reverse here the type of Aristotelian argument on how an orator could inspire fear by showing that "people are such that are prone to suffering and others have suffered" (R.2. 1383a 7-12, see my comments for the passage, 82).

\(^{211}\) Electra makes, however, an additional argument to describe verbally her suffering (253-54) saying that her eyes melt from tears for her crazed brother.

\(^{212}\) For the use of such words in Euripidean tragedies, see M. McDonald, \textit{Terms for Happiness in Euripides}, Hypomnemata 54 (Göttingen, 1978), 233-51 dealing with the \textit{Orestes}.\)
The scholiast wonders whether Electra's question "have you seen" (eἰδεῖτε, 128) addresses the internal or the external audiences and opts for the latter (128, Schwartz 110):

Τὸ εἰδεῖτε ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰδοὺ τίς ἄν, ὡς τὸ ἔνιοι δὲ φασὶ τὰῖς δημοσί ταῦτα λέγειν.
Οὐ δὲ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον, ὃ καὶ ἄμεινον.

"Have you seen' [is used] instead of one might see, as some argue she says these to the servants (chorus members). Others, though, argue that she addresses the theater, which is better.

Similar exclamations ("see", "look") that could be addressed to both internal and broader, universal audiences occur in other tragedies as well. In the Prometheus Bound, the Titan invited everyone to "see" his suffering. In Sophocles' Ajax and Oedipus King such appeals were made at the end, to reinforce the spectator's pity. The difference is that Electra invites audiences "to see" not in order to arouse pity, but rather to prevent them from feeling the emotion for another character, which is unprecedented and likely puzzled the ancient audience.

At the beginning of the play, Orestes suffers from some kind of illness, in which exhaustion follows moments of hallucination. He seems to be barely alive when sane, and struggles with the Furies when seized by madness. Electra, his only help tries

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213 D. Bain, "Audience Address in Greek Tragedy," CQ 25 (1975), 13-25, discusses this comment of the scholiast together with other similar examples.
215 When first approaching the sleeping Orestes, the chorus tells Electra to check if her brother has not already died (καρθονόν, 209). Menelaus thinks he sees a ghost when he first encounters Orestes (385).
to cure him, by explaining that his crazed visions of the Erinyes are only an invention of his mind:

''Ορῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὃς δοκεῖς σάφει εἰδέναι. (259)

For you see nothing of what it seems to you that you see clearly.

Through this comment, Electra doubts the real presence of the Furies, which reflects religious retribution of the vengeful goddesses in the Aeschylean trilogy. She suggests instead that her brother suffers only from a psychological disturbance, perhaps related to his remorse for killing Clytaemnestra. Moreover, Electra's reaction as internal audience becomes fascinating when compared to Odysseus' response to Ajax's madness in the Ajax. Odysseus did not dare to look at the deluded Ajax, not because he thought that Ajax saw real things while hallucinating, but because he felt that his enemy's misfortune could befall anyone and reflects universal human frailty. Odysseus was afraid that he himself might not be able to stay "out" of tragic distortion of reality and pity, since anybody could be subject to such suffering. His reaction metatheatrically mirrored the complicated connections between internal - external spectator when watching the tragic action and implied a similarity between madness and tragedy as forms of illusion. By contrast, Electra wants to pull Orestes out of his delusion, which she defines as such, also signaling to the external spectator that the hero's suffering is only an effect of a dramatic illusion. The sight of a madman frightens the viewer in the Ajax, whereas the same sight leads the internal spectator to skepticism in the Orestes. After not being able to rescue Orestes from his hallucinations, Electra concludes:

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216 Similarly, Orestes strangely asks Pylades whether he is not reluctant (ὀχνήσεις, 793) to stay in his company for fear that he may catch his madness. Yet Pylades does not fear contagion. The same word "reluctance" was used by Odysseus to refuse Athena's proposal to watch Ajax.
Even if one is not ill, but it seems to him that he is ill, anguish and helplessness occurs for the mortals. Pain is the effect of delusion if the madman believes in it, even though his vision is not real, she implies, and, from a metatheatrical perspective, painful emotions will be the effect of dramatic illusion, if the spectator chooses to believe in the tragic vision.

At the same time, audiences (both internal and external) do not see the Erinyes directly, but through the eyes of the Orestes, which is in accordance with Aristotelian preference for no direct visual effect. Orestes, a spectacle himself, internally watches a spectacle, and threatens to kill his visions if they do not move "out of his sight" (χωρίς ὀμμάτων ἐμῶν, 272). This likely intrigued the external spectators who would not know what to believe, as R. Padel has put it, "Is Euripides' Orestes a madman whose madness is that he sees Erinyes? Or a man punished by goddesses, visible seemingly only to him, and only when they inflict on him bursts of madness." The only way in which the external audience can "see" the Erinyes consists of fancying them through sharing the vision of Orestes, who imagines them. Thus, despite the warning of an internal spectator (Electra), the audience would be able to grasp what the poet has envisioned. Ancient commentators consider this Euripidean device to be absolutely thrilling. Longinus takes as the perfect example of poetic phantasia the scene in which Orestes prays to his

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217 In Aeschylus' Eumenides, the Erinyes are, of course, seen on the stage.
219 R. Webb, "Imagination and Arousal of Emotions in Greco-Roman Rhetoric," in The Passions in Roman Thought and Literature, eds. S. M. Braund and C. Gill (Cambridge, 1997), 112-28, provides a valuable survey of rhetorical and poetic "imagination" in the ancient world.
mother not to send the Furies, while at the same time he starts having visions (Orestes, 257 -59):  

ἐνταῦθ’ ὁ ποιητής αὐτὸς εἶδεν Ἐρινύας, ὁ δὲ ἐφαντάσθη μικροῦ δεῖν θεάσασθαι καὶ τοὺς ἀκουόντας ἡγάγκασεν. Ἐστὶ μὲν οὖν φιλοπονώτατος Ἐυριπίδης δύο ταυτί πάθη, μανίας καὶ ἔρωτας, ἐκτραγοδήσαι. (On the Sublime, 15. 2-3).  

Here the poet himself saw the Erinyes and compelled the listeners almost to see what he has imagined. For Euripides makes strenuous efforts (lit. "is hard working") to render tragically these two emotions: madness and feelings of love.

Longinus' praise of Euripides is strongly reminiscent of the Aristotelian observation (Poetics, 17. 1455a 29-32) that "the most convincing" (πιθανωτατοι) are those poets (and/or actors, tragic characters) in the grip of emotions (ἐν τοῖς πάθησιν), because they best convey feelings. Therefore, Aristotle says:

Διὸ ἐφινοὺς ἡ ποιητική ἔστιν ἡ μανικοῦ· τοῦτῳ γὰρ οἱ μὲν εὐπλαστοί οἱ δὲ ἐκστατικοί εἰσιν. (Po. 17. 1455a32-33).

Poetry is the work of a gifted person or of a madman, the former (kind of poets) are good at shaping [fiction], the latter (kind of poets) are good at becoming ecstatic (going out of his state of normality).

In this passage of the Poetics, the poet's "madness" likely concerns the artistic ability to go beyond his ordinary state of mind (to become ek-statikos) and imagine strong

220 Longinus offers a second example, that is the moment when a shepherd describes to Iphigenia (IT, 291) the behavior of a madman who is prey of the same delusion (Erinyes attacking him). This man turns out to be Orestes.

221 The use of the word "listeners" (ἀκοοῦντας) for audience perhaps implies (as in the scholia of Ajax) that the spectators do not "see" the vision of Orestes, but imagines it through listening to the hero's words.

222 Cf. my discussion, 64-67.

223 The Aristotelian use of the word here does not involve in any way diminishing the merit of the artist, which it does in Plato's writings (as the poet who becomes "ek - static" may be inspired but has no knowledge of what he is saying). See my comments on Plato's views about the "inspired" poet, 16-17, 32-34.
passions, which so become embedded in poetry. This is exactly what Longinus seems to believe that Euripides has done when he represents the Furies in the *Orestes*: the tragedian himself "saw" (had a vision of) the Erinyes and so almost "forced" (ἡνάγκασεν) the audience to share it, through showing the protagonist in the middle of his madness.

The scholiast also seems to incline toward this interpretation, as he writes (on line 257, Schwartz 124): "Orestes in a state of enthusiasm imagines that he sees the Erinyes," τὰς Ἑρινύας ἐνθουσιαστικῶς φαντάζεται ὃραν. The use of the term "enthusiastically" is rather strange in this context. One has to be first *ek-statikos* "out of his sound mind" to become then *en-thusiastikos*, "enthusiastic" (i.e. possessed by divine will, inspired), in Greek culture. It is the poet who inspires the protagonist and ultimately the audience with the hallucinations of the Erinyes, thus creating a chain of vision. Perhaps not all spectators were pleased with the absence of visible Furies on the stage. Some may have felt frustrated for not being able to look at the Erinyes directly during the performance of the *Orestes* and compare the visual effects to those of Aeschylus' *Eumenides*. Such spectators perhaps did not bother at all to imagine the Furies, together with Orestes, since they were only an illusion, as Electra has noted. For the Aristotelian type of spectator, nevertheless, Euripides' technique is the best, as it fuels Orestes and viewers alike with inspiration to discern with the eyes of the mind the "unseen" Erinyes. The presence of the vengeful goddesses on the stage pertains to the particular details of the Oresteian legend. Through imagining the Erinyes in Euripides' *Orestes*, the audience could "see"

224 This would lead to emotional participation of the audience in the suffering of Orestes, which is how the chorus responds to the scene of Orestes' madness with "pity" (ἔλεος, 332) and deplores the "fear-inspiring toils" (δεινῶν πόνων, 344) that came over the house of Agamemnon, like stormy gusts.
what it would be like to be "possessed", or rather overcome with remorse and
desperation, as the hero is and which pertains rather to the universal human experience.

In all the tragedies discussed so far, internal audiences have expressed different
views about the tragic action. These views are usually contradictory: sympathy or lack
of sympathy for the suffering of the protagonist. Thus, in the *Prometheus Bound*,
Hephaestus finds the sight of the tormented Titan pitiable, while Cratus and Hermes do
not. In the *Ajax*, the sight of the dead hero does not move Menelaus and Agamemnon,
whereas it compels Odysseus to act on pity and grant proper burial to his deceased
enemy. Therefore, the external audience is presented generally with two opposite models
of response: one is pity, the other lack of pity, and the former emotional model is more
strongly emphasized than the latter. Comparatively, in the *Orestes*, internal reactions of
the audiences belong to a more complex spectrum. The same characters may shift their
positions on the same issue, and this makes it much more difficult for the external
spectator to adopt one internal view as opposed to another.

A crucial event, Orestes' killing his mother Clytaemnestra to avenge the death of
his father Agamemnon precedes the action of the play, but it is constantly revived
through the remarks of internal audiences. The topic raises complicated ethical and
religious problems for the spectators (internal and likely external), who have to grant the
young hero absolution from crime before responding with pity for his misfortune. Unlike
in other tragedies, internal audiences do not quite know how to feel about the death of
Clytaemnestra and act as if they were searching for the appropriate emotion. Orestes

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225 The exception is to an extent Aeschylus' *Persians*, in which internal audiences (exclusively Persians)
lament the outcome of the battle of Salamis. Even in this tragedy, nonetheless, Darius accuses Xerxes of
committing *hybris* and, therefore, bringing disaster to the army.
himself initially feels "shame" (αιδώς, 460) to appear "before the eyes" (εἰς ὄμματα, 461) of his grandfather Tyndareus. Nonetheless, by trying to explain the reasons for killing his mother, Orestes passes to "excessive boldness" (θρασύνη, 607), as Tyndareus notes. The hero emphasizes first his "in-between," liminal position, which is so often the case with tragic hamartia. He stands both within and outside sacred law: "unholy" (ἀνόσιος, 546) for shedding the blood of his mother but "holy" (οσιος, 547) for being justified in doing so. After accepting in this way some responsibility for his deed, Orestes denies any guilt, arguing that he obeyed Apollo's ordinance and, therefore, the god "has made a mistake not I" (ἐκεῖνος ἡμαρτεί, οὔκ ἐγώ, 597). Tyndareus insists that the victim alone, his daughter, deserves pity. He wonders what his murderous grandson felt when Clytaemnestra was pleading for her life and adds:

...ἐγὼ μὲν οὖκ ἰδὼν τάκει κακά
δακρύως γέροντι ὀφθαλμόν ἐκτήκῳ τάλας (528-29).

Poor me, even without seeing that horrible scene [the actual killing]
My old eye melts away in tears.

As the example shows, Tyndareus is moved to tears through imagining the murder scene and even without seeing it directly, which is the best way to arouse pity, according to Aristotle. Here, the appeal to eleos is made to divert any possible sympathy for Orestes and turn the feeling exclusively toward the deceased Clytaemnestra.226 This appeal concerns directly an internal spectator, Menelaus, (535), asked not to intervene before the city of Argos on behalf of Orestes, who deserves death for his crime and is hated by gods

226 Tyndareus, nevertheless, condemns Clytaemnestra too, saying that she has died deservedly (ἐνόικα, 538), which should not be conducive to pity, but he argues that she should have not been murdered by her son (539). He further threatens Menelaus (625) and accuses Electra (615) of inciting Orestes to commit matricide. Thus, overall, Tyndareus tries to dissuade the audience from responding with sympathy.
At the same time, this plea may also influence the external spectator and it is very similar to Electra's invoking pity for herself while she proves that Helen is not worthy of such emotion at the beginning of the play. Both Tyndareus and, previously, Electra appeal to pity and, at the same time, try to dissuade the spectator from feeling the emotion.

Finally, Menelaus responds initially with compassion for Orestes, whom he calls "unhappy man", (μέλεος, 447) and whom he is ready to help in misfortune (485). Yet, he becomes confused after hearing the debate between Orestes and Tyndareus:

"Εσον έν ἐμαυτῷ τι συννούμενος

ὁπ τράπωμι τῆς τύχης ὁμηχανῶ. (634-35).

Let me be! I'm thinking about something in my mind, I'm at a loss about which alternative (lit. chance) I should turn to.

Aristotle's criticism of Menelaus in the Poetics (as being inconsistent "without necessary reason", μὴ ἀναγκαίας) appears to be somewhat unfair, as the character "thinks analytically" (συννούμενος, 635), trying to decide what course of action he should take. In Greek tragedies, nevertheless, it is highly unusual to have a character responding with sympathy toward one's misfortune and then hesitating to maintain that feeling or to act on it, and this perhaps explains the Aristotelian reaction. Eventually, Menelaus contrasts two conflicting emotions that people might feel toward Orestes: "there is pity and also angry resentment" (ἐνεστὶ δ' ὁίκτος, ἐνι δὲ καὶ θυμός, 702). He vaguely promises to defend Orestes before the assembly (704-16), implying that communities should benefit more from acting with compassion than from doing the opposite. Orestes, however, does not believe Menelaus' words (717-21). Ancient spectators were likely puzzled, as internal audiences do not simply talk about absolution or condemnation of Orestes as far as the
morally ambiguous murder of Clytemnestra is concerned. Internal feelings and thoughts on the subject range from shame and defiance (Orestes), anger (Tyndareus), pity, confusion, and hesitation (Menelaus).

A messenger brings Electra and the chorus news from the trial at Argos (866-956). The trial described in the messenger's narrative is reminiscent of the Athenian court procedure and the outcome of the judicial debate consists of a death sentence for Orestes and his sister, which has been occasionally interpreted as a reflection of Euripidean pessimistic views about the Athenian democracy. Indeed, the messenger recounts the trial in a dramatic manner, presenting each of the five speakers, their discourses, and the reaction of the assembly, to conclude that justice has not triumphed. A simple farmer (920) proposed the acquittal of Orestes and Electra and "seemed convincing to decent men" (χρηστοίς εὖ λέγειν ἐφαίνετο, 930). The same verdict was suggested by Orestes, who, nevertheless "failed to persuade the crowd" (οὐκ ἔπειθε οὐμιλον, 943). Therefore, a sharp contrast is drawn here between the elite, who understand sound reasoning, and the multitude, who do not. Furthermore, the condemnation of the young hero provides Euripides with means of returning to traditional devices of emotional arousal. In

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227 C. Pellling, *Literary Texts and the Greek Historian* (London and New York, 2002), 165-67, 184-88, offers the best analysis of this topic. At 184-85, he suggests that the *Orestes* might, indeed, reflect the poet's as well as his audience's disappointments with recent historical events, such as the Sicilian expedition, the oligarchic revolution, and the democratic counterrevolution. To an extent the play portrays a gloomy world, as participants in the trial debate are despicable, so afterwards young aristocrats, Electra and Orestes, fail to win our sympathy when they take Hermione hostage. On the other hand, Euripides' views seem to remain optimistic as his characters express trust in comradeship (*Or*: 804-06, 1072) that could overcome all hardships (cf. Th. 3.82). For a more extensive analysis on this, see also E. Rawson, "Aspects of Euripides' *Orestes*," *Arethusa* 5 (1972), 155-67.
anticipation of his trial, in a conversation with Pylades, Orestes imagines how people might pity him:

Orestes: Kai ti̠s ān gē μ' oi̠k̠t̠îseio

Pylades: Mégα γάρ η̠ύ̠γ̠έ̠νεια σου.

Orestes: Θάνατον ἀσχάλλων πατρ̠ο̠φ̠ο̠ν.

Pylades: Πάντα ταύτα ἐν ὅμμασιν. (784-85).

Or. And someone might pity me / Py. for your nobility.
Or. And being indignant at my father's death. Py. For all this is before (people's) eyes.

The invitation to pity is made in Aristotelian terms, as Orestes' plight is "before the eyes", and based on logical argument (Agamemnon's death was unfair). When announcing the death sentence and the decision of Orestes to commit suicide instead of being stoned, the messenger warns Electra that seeing her brother will be heartbreaking:

Πικρῶν θέμα καὶ πρόσοψις ἀθλία. (952)

Bitter spectacle and painful sight.

This is precisely the technique used in Sophoclean plays to arouse the audience's eleos, by anticipating the pitiable sight of the tragic protagonist.\(^\text{228}\) The chorus does respond with pity immediately after hearing about the sentencing of Orestes (ἐλεος, ἔλεος, 968) and, furthermore, invites all to contemplate the tragic fate of Agamemnon's children:

"Εθνη πολύπονα, λεύσες πορ' ἐλπίδας

Μοῖρα βαίνει. (977-78)

Much toiling nations of people, look how Moira Transgresses expectations.

\(^{228}\) Cf. the moment when the messenger announces the entrance of Oedipus blind (OT 1295-96); cf. the description of the corpse of Ajax (Aj 1004) and the description of Prometheus as "sight not to be seen" (PV 69), see my discussion 215-17.
The invocation addresses all audiences and places the misfortune of the heroes in the perspective of human suffering, in general, which is in accordance with traditional devices of emotional arousal. The play could have ended with Apollo's intervention at this point, which would have elicited from the audience Aristotelian emotions: pity through anticipation of the heroes' death (as Orestes and Electra are about to die), and fear (as tragic suffering pertains to the universals of human condition). Euripides, however, decides to add an episode, in which he manipulates again the conventional techniques of emotional arousal.

Instead of committing suicide, Orestes, Electra, and Pylades decide to die nobly or even escape by killing Helen, and, later on, by taking Hermione as hostage. They plan to trick Helen into believing that they would die, move her to tears,\(^{229}\) and then kill her. In this manner, the heroes want to stage a drama (faking their own imminent death) to bring perdition to one of their (internal) spectators, who responds emotionally to their plight. Later on, Electra is afraid ("fear comes over me", φόβος ἔχει με, 1255) that Orestes and Pylades might not succeed in murdering Helen. Yet, this is not the common tragic fear that something terrible might happen to yourself or one of yours but a different emotion: that something terrible may not happen to someone else. Hermione becomes a victim of the plot and is taken hostage when yielding to Electra's appeal to pity:

"Αγγελία μητρός ἐν χεροῖν ἐμῆς
οἰκτίρον ἣμας κάπικοφίσσον κακῶν. (1340-41)

Come, you nursed in the arms of my mother

\(^{229}\) Thus, Helen emotional response to the tragedy of Orestes and Electra would lead to her perdition. Yet, Orestes does not think that Helen's pity will be genuine, but that she will fake it:
Πυ. γόος ὑμῖν ἔντιμως θεσμότα ἅλον σωκράτην
Ορ. οὔσι εἰκονοσκόσεται, γ' ἐνδόθεν κεχαρίμενην. (Or: 1121-22).
Pity us and release us from our woes.

If hostage-scenes are not entirely without precedent in Greek tragedies,\(^{230}\) invocation of pity to entrap someone seems to be unique and likely shocked ancient audiences.

The initial murderous plan fails, as Helen vanishes into the thin air while being attacked by Orestes. Afterwards, Orestes interrogates a Phrygian slave, whom he threatens to kill but ultimately spares (1518-28). The scholiast remarks on this scene (on line 1521, Schwartz 230): ταῦτα κωμικῶτερα ἐστὶ καὶ πεζά, "these things are rather comic and low (lit. 'pedestrian'). A reason for the scholiast's comment may be that unusual for tragedies to put a slave in such a position, as afraid for his life. Moreover, Orestes mocks the Phrygian's fear of death (which is usually a profound and serious theme in Greek tragedies). He wonders, for example, why a slave should fear Hades, who will deliver him from life's miseries (δοῦλος ὃν φοβῇ τὸν Ἀιδήν, ὃς ἀπαλλάξει κακόν, 1522).\(^{231}\) At the end of the play, Menelaus reenters without understanding the plot to which he belongs. He has heard that his consort is not dead but vanished, yet he cannot trust such a 'messenger's speech': it must be an empty rumor, announced by someone deluded by terror.\(^{232}\) He finds the whole matter, as devised by Orestes "very ridiculous," comic (πολὺς γέλως, 1560), and perhaps he should feel fear, but does not know what has been done - or dramatized (τὶ χρῆμα δρᾶσαι: παρακαλεῖς γὰρ εἰς φόβον, 1587). The 'plot' designed by Orestes and his friends appears to be a distorted version of a tragic

\(^{230}\) Creon, for instance, briefly takes Antigone as hostage and threatens to seize Oedipus (OC 818-97).

\(^{231}\) The Phrygian responds that even a slave fears death (1523). This exchange seems to me an ironical allusion to Achilles' words in the Odyssey describing the underworld - it would be better to be a servant among the living than king among shadows (Od. 11. 487-91).

\(^{232}\) Κενὴν ἄκουσας βαξίν, ἢν φόβῳ σφαλεῖς ἠγεῖλε μοί τις... (Or. 1558-59).
action. Its creators have no control over the outcome (as the killing of Helen does not take place), a deluded messenger announces that someone did not die and an internal spectator does not know whether he should be afraid. Ultimately, Apollo's intervention ends the confusion and explains the dramatic events.

As the peculiar uses of emotional appeals at the end of the tragedy suggest, the Orestes proposes to the audience a type of pleasure that is different from the Aristotle's oikeia hedone, which comes from pity and fear. The audience could feel pleasure and cognitive stimulation from the dramatic surprises and from a sense that, one can escape tragic fate, despite all odds, which is perhaps opposite to the Aristotelian ideal. Euripides does not completely abandon traditional invocations to pity and fear, which are present before and immediately after Orestes' death sentence. Orestes' encounter with the Erinyes is in accordance with the Aristotelian preference, inviting to pity not through direct visual effect, but through imagination. The dramatist, nevertheless, plays with the convention, suggesting infinitely more possible reactions to tragic events: feeling pity for someone might lead to lack of pity for another (as Electra and Tyndareus imply) or even lead one into trouble (as it happens to Hermione). These possibilities do not "belong to tragedy" but "rather to comedy," as ancient literary critics declare. Perhaps, they are right in the sense that such devices were not common in tragedy before Euripides and would later be adopted in New Comedy, gaining enormous popularity among audiences.
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