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Civic Education in an Age of Ecological Crisis: A Rawlsian Political Liberal Conception

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

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An Abstract of

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The ecological crisis as defined by the scientific community raises questions that challenge contemporary ethical, political, and educational theory. Situating the problem in the tradition of democratic theory, this study lays out a Rawlsian political liberal conception of sustainability that hinges upon a liberal conception of justice that places moral duties on the state, the citizen, and the educational institutions of contemporary societies. As such the idea of ecological integrity rises to the category of a matter of justice which requires a political principle of sustainability that functions as a normative precommitment. This normative precommitment in turn places moral duties on the government of democratic peoples and concomitantly the citizenry that are the source of legitimate democratic authority. The demanding role of citizenship in this conception thus places an imperative on education which by its nature is a normative activity and thus demands a renewed civic purpose for education that entails the sustainability as well as the stability of democratic society.
To those who have gone and to those who have remained.
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List of Abbreviations

IPRR...........................Idea of Public Reason Revisited

JFR .............................Justice as Fairness Revisited

LoP .............................The Law of Peoples

PL ..............................Political Liberalism

TJ ..............................Theory of Justice
Chapter One

I. Ecological Crisis and a Rawlsian Political Liberal Response

A. Introduction

The age of ecological crisis can be characterized by the degradation of the capacity of the planet to sustain biodiversity (life in its many forms) through the destabilization of the natural processes and environmental systems that maintain life-permitting conditions on the planet. Human activity operates within these natural processes altering landscapes and impacting the conditions that sustain ecological systems. The period of human environmental impact has been given the term anthropocene as a human-dominated geological epoch and roughly corresponds historically with industrialization, increasing human dependence on fossil fuels, the emergence of urban centers, a growing human geographic footprint, and climate warming trends (Crutzen, 2002; Crutzen & Steffen, 2003; Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2007). The complexity of the problem of ecological crisis centers on the human-nature relationship, but also involves human social, cultural, economic, and political dimensions. With the problem being associated with human activity or behavior, the ecological crisis is a matter of ethical consideration as human behavior impacts the planet in ways that humans are just beginning to understand. As a matter of justice, ecological considerations are implicated by human behavior rooted in the ideas of right action and what human beings owe one another in terms of moral/ethical claims and duties. The collective actions of humanity impact not only the quality of life on the planet, but also the very possibility of life on the planet including human life and thus are of moral, ethical, and political
consideration. Education as a normative and purposeful activity related to the construction of knowledge as well as the construction of society then is a necessary site for considering the development of democratic citizens capable of reflecting and making informed and reasoned judgments considering existential ethical and political problems such as the contemporary ecological crisis.

The environmental issues that constitute the ecological crisis such as anthropogenic climate change and sustainability, or the lack of sustainability, are arguably the most pressing issues facing humanity in the contemporary world, crossing sectarian, national, and cultural divides. These issues demonstrate the complexity and interconnection of multiple issues of justice as ecological instability, environmental degradation, and anthropogenic climate change intersect with issues such as inequality, globalization, poverty, racism, sexism, and violence (Chakrabarty, 2012; 2014; Kaijser & Kronsell, 2014). Furthermore, the ecological crisis exposes the failure of political institutions across local, state, and global dimensions to deal with such crises (Bernaur, 2013). Contributing to the institutional failure is the reality that institutions by and large are constructed and operated by individuals who are both ethically autonomous and socio-culturally situated, which suggests the crisis is inherently rooted in humanity's multiple life-ways and worldviews. In other words, people hold different moral values regarding both human-human relationships and the human-environment connection, resulting in disagreements that lead to contested notions about the environment and contested understandings of issues such as anthropogenic climate change and the meaning of sustainability (Feygina, 2013; Hulme, 2009). These contested ideas factor into the inability of nations, of citizens, and humanity, in general, to effectively determine
right actions regarding human activity and the environment. As such the environment and the human relationship with the environment beg to be considered in "political terms" which speak to the human capacity for concerted and cooperative behavior, but also express the nature of power in defining and structuring human relations. As Swyngedouw (2011, p. 254) suggests: "The end of Nature and the inauguration of a socio-physical historical nature forces a profound re-consideration and re-scripting of the matter of Nature in political terms". The "socio-physical historical nature" is one that is derived from humans making meaning and value of nature, acting in the natural world based upon that understanding structured by relationships rooted in political terms.

The political nature of ecological crisis is complex. The idea that humanity is living in an age of ecological crisis is meant to convey the serious existential threat posed by anthropogenic climate change and the degradation of ecological systems. The term ecological crisis is used hereafter to convey a broad view of anthropogenic climate change, environmental degradation and global ecological system instability. The crisis is not only an environmental or natural problem per se, but involves ethical problems associated with the public political sphere as well as cultural value systems (see Gardiner, 2011). Notions regarding ecological crisis are often disputed in political and popular cultural spheres as evidenced by climate change denial as well as competing perspectives on environmental policies regarding land use, clean air, clean water, and conceptions of environmental justice (Hulme, 2009; Vogler, 2005). The meanings and values associated with the environment are also implicated in this crisis (Gardener, 2011; Hulme, 2009). Ecological crisis with its array of problems such as anthropogenic climate change, loss of biodiversity, habitat destruction, and denigration of air, soil and water quality are human
problems that result from human choices about what is valued in the world and ethical judgments about how humans should live. These judgments are rooted in cultural knowledge and ways of life and it is in the concerted or collective action of societies where the greatest ecological impacts occur. Thus, the political institutions of a society hold the most imposing ethical duty to respond (Broome, 2012).

The idea of ecological crisis as presented in this study is anthropocentric or human-centered in its focus. Indeed, there are other ways of conceiving of nature and the environment regarding who or what holds standing and what is to be valued. The fields of environmental ethics and climate change ethics clarify and expound the many dimensions associated with these concerns and provide a starting point for investigating these issues. However, the political nature of the problem begs for political solutions. There is a need for human cooperation and agreement on the constitution of societies and the policies of those societies towards the environment which includes limits to individual liberty and how human beings interact with the natural world. To this end, in democratic societies, the legitimacy of limits on human freedom requires the consent of the people. The work of John Rawls, most notably in *Political Liberalism* (1993), establishes the idea of public reason in dealing with questions of legitimate democratic response. Debates regarding environmental policy in contemporary nations both domestically and in diplomatic international contexts illustrate the kinds of disagreement associated with ecological crisis. Disagreements are generally rooted in partisan or chauvinistic interests and ideological differences (Hulme, 2009). A Rawlsian approach is positioned as such to provide insight into the means for establishing political agreement on difficult questions such as these. While economic and socio-cultural concerns are embedded in the processes
of globalization, the concerted actions driven by policy considerations and the judgments of representatives are of a political nature in determining the most just approach to adaptation, mitigation, reparations, and sustainability in general. To this end, normative theory must address the problem and provide a theoretical framework by which considered judgments can be appraised.

Environmental policy and sustainability practices have traditionally been focused on a conception that prioritizes economic growth (Beder, 2007; Hulme, 2009). Powerful economic interests fuel denial of the moral worth of ecological concern including denial of anthropogenic climate change while driving policy considerations on economic interests associated with resource allocation and utilization rather than ecological interests such as the integrity of life supporting systems (Hulme, 2009; Vogler, 2005). Yet, the scientific community is in overwhelming agreement on the reality of anthropogenic climate change, ecological instability, and the causation of human activity in accelerating these natural phenomena (Strong, 2009). It is true that disagreements exist within the fields of climate and environmental science over aspects of the research just as any field of study debates processes, data, and results that expand disciplinary knowledge (Royal Society, 2007; Heal & Milner, 2014; Freudenburg & Muselli, 2013). Still the numerous reports from governmental agencies and scientific organizations testify to the veracity of evidence regarding the existence of anthropogenic climate change, the human causes of its acceleration, the interconnection of climate change and ecological degradation and the threat to life on the planet.

The following discussion considers these scientific facts a given and will not discuss the scientific evidence per se. There are other authors and sources for such
information that are more authoritative on such matters and this study would contribute little to nothing on the empirical scientific discourse (Melillo, Richmond, & Yohe, 2014; IPCC, 2013; Royal Society, 2010). This study accepts the facts of ecological crisis such as anthropogenic climate change and ecological instability from a scientific basis, meaning that scientific authority is situated in verifiable evidence and intersubjective agreement within the scientific community. However, scientific authority does not hold political or ethical authority. Political authority in democratic societies rests on the consent of the citizens and must be taken from the view of political discussion and debate that determine the considered judgments of a people and their representatives in government (Dahl, 1998). For example, the position in this study that anthropogenic climate change is taken as a given of scientific fact is not a position of blind deference to climate scientists, but a judgment of acceptance related to understanding the validity of the practices of the scientific method and the procedures of the scientific community that verifies such evidence. Rather, global ecological crisis and the exemplar of anthropogenic climate change are indicative of other problems that are more suited to philosophical inquiry and of which science can only provide natural facts to guide our ethical understanding (Becker, 2011).

The socio-cultural and political problems associated with anthropogenic climate change expose a more general problem regarding humanity's relationship with each other and the rest of the natural world. The nature of disagreement in political spheres regarding the reality of climate change and ecological crisis is then grounded in questions that emphasize the construction and communication of knowledge, the development of ethically conscious citizens, and the capacities of citizens and their governments for
social and political cooperation (Chakrabarty, 2014; 2009; Swyngedouw, 2011). These domains of knowledge, citizenship, and social and political cooperation illicit a resound purpose in a robust civic education as the means for the development and continuation of sustainable and just societies.

**B. Statement of the Problem**

In the introduction, the context of the ecological crisis was presented as one of a complex array of interconnected problems that manifest in the unsustainable patterns of human activity on the planet. On one hand there are the environmental problems that are associated with the earth's natural or environmental processes and are mostly understood through a developing interdisciplinary scientific knowledge associated with ecology, earth science, or climate science. But there is also an array of problematic dimensions to the issue of ecological crisis that require a more expansive methodological and theoretical approach to fully understand this complex problem (Becker, 2012; Gardiner, 2011). This presents a challenge to academic fields of knowledge, the educational system that contributes to the development of those fields and to the social and political institutions that must address the pressing existential issue of ecological crisis. Furthermore, there is a need for clarity and development of the concept of sustainability and the proliferation of sustainability as a value in the culture (Becker, 2012).

These dimensions of the ecological crisis include cultural, ethical, social and political domains that must also be addressed. As a cultural problem, ecological crisis is associated with human lifeways and the systems of meaning that people employ to understand the world around them and the normative behaviors that construct patterns in people's daily lives (Hulme, 2009). Rooted in the meanings and normative behaviors are
ideas of value which implicate the crisis as an ethical problem related to the often unreflected choices and judgments that human beings make about what is valued and possible or plausible in this world (Gardiner, 2011). As an ethical problem, the field of philosophy has an important role to play in bringing clarity of understanding to the definitions and meanings associated with the ecological crisis. Normative theories provide means for making informed decisions rooted in considered convictions regarding what is valuable and what human beings owe one another. Or more simply, normative theory provides frameworks for considering the question of "what should be or what ought to be".

As suggested previously, the problem is also social and illustrates the intersection of social and economic power in ways that are matters of distributive justice. The pattern of the wealthy benefiting from unsustainable practices while the poor suffer the costs or harms associated with the ecological crisis is seen both at the global level between wealthy nations and the poorer nations as well as in more domestic contexts. People in poorer neighborhoods and poorer nations in general are exposed to many more risks associated with the ecological crisis such as higher levels of exposure to toxic air, soil, and water, as well as greater levels of risk associated with climate change, droughts and severe weather events (Broome, 2012; Gardiner, 2001; Vanderheiden, 2008).

As an ethical problem associated with norms and human choices and a social problem associated with unjust harmful outcomes, the crisis is a matter of justice. Furthermore, the crisis is a political problem that operates globally through international diplomacy and policy making, but also within domestic policy and the constitution of society. Politics in general and the field of diplomacy more explicitly are guided by
orientations that stress or promote perceived rational interests. Game theory driven diplomacy between nations tends to stifle the capacity for cooperation that is much needed to overcome broader existential problems (Baber & Bartlett, 2005; 2015; Vogler, 2005). In the political domain, inertia has predominated decision making and action, or more precisely inaction, on the ecological crisis. The dilemma of inertia is noticeable in the United Nations climate change conferences that have become overly influenced by national security and economic interests supported by private, moneyed interests while silencing many of the environmental and activist organizations that promote equally valid human and non-human interests.

Thus as a political problem, ecological crisis exposes the shortcomings of the democratic foundations of current political institutions (Baber & Bartlett, 2005; 2015; Gardiner, 2011; Vogler, 2005). As Barry and Eckersley (2005, p. ix) suggest, the environmental movement's criticism of the state rests in the ambivalent nature of political institutions to the ecological crisis which stems from "the contradictory role that states have played in facilitating both environmental degradation and environmental protection". By "facilitating degradation", the state performs a regulatory role for economic activity and the distribution and use of resources allowing private economic interests to guide the states interests and form policy. The tension described here is emblematic of critiques of liberalism in general. This critique points to liberalism's emphasis on individual rationality and freedom, the market as the sphere in which freedom is exercised, and economic growth as the primary social good. The environmental movement has been skeptical of the liberal state, critiquing the ideological foundations of liberalism rooted in atomistic individualism and the promotion of rational
interests in free market economies (Næss, 1986). The countervailing claim for a concern for environmental integrity is often characterized as limiting liberty by neo-liberal and libertarian proponents. The political nature of the problem is then associated with the need for democratic theory to elaborate an ecologically sustainable vision which Baber & Bartlett (2005) suggest is most likely through the development of a deliberative democratic approach.

With the problem being of a complex nature, there is difficulty framing the issue in a concise manner. To this end, I pull from the work of ethicists John Broome (2012), Stephen Gardiner (2011), and Ulrich Becker (2012) to develop a framework for understanding the complexity of the problem. A central theme to the approaches of these scholars is a focus on ethics and the epistemological issues related to knowledge construction including the disciplines of knowledge that address specific problems within the ecological crisis. All three point to the importance of empirical scientific research to transcend disciplinary confinements and engage in a discourse that is conscious of the ethical, philosophical, and political issues of ecological crisis.

In *Climate Matters*, Broome (2012) explores the ethical nature of climate change and the idea of moral responsibility or duty. His treatment of the issue of climate change is a valuable ethical case study of one of the principle elements of the ecological crisis. His conclusions regarding ethical and moral duty point to the role of both the citizen and the state as responsible and culpable actors. The citizen's principle moral duty is to hold his/her representatives in government responsible for taking the appropriate action to meet the demands of anthropogenic climate change. The state and those citizens functioning as agents of the state hold the highest degree of moral culpability and
responsibility for acting. This is centered on the notion that human concerted or collective activity has been the principle cause of anthropogenic climate change and that comprehensive collective action by a people and cooperative action between states is the only productive means for dealing with the matter of anthropogenic climate change. I extrapolate from Broome's discussion of anthropogenic climate change to use it as a model for the broader idea of ecological crisis. In following Broome's suggestion, the role of the citizen and the state are implicated as the foci for ethical obligations in responding to ecological crisis and the structuring of more sustainable societies.

Gardiner (2011) in *A Perfect Moral Storm: The Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change* describes three domains in which the issue of anthropogenic climate change culminates into a complex existential threat to life on the planet. In this work, the "storm" is a metaphor for the moral/ethical crisis that is climate change. These three domains are categorized as *global*, *intergenerational*, and *theoretical*. The three are distinct ethical problems that converge to create the larger more complex problem of anthropogenic climate change. The *global* domain refers to matters of distributive justice for contemporary peoples which involves the asymmetrical power relations of global elites and the power associated with wealth and control of the planet’s social, economic, political, and natural resources. As a matter of justice, Gardiner points to an ethical concern for fairness in the distribution of the costs or harms and the benefits associated with resource allocation and the economic growth attributed to carbon-based production. The *intergenerational storm* is also associated with distributive justice, but is focused upon the ethical consideration and moral standing of future generations. Gardiner addresses the temporal nature of sustainability and provides an ethical basis for
sustainability as a considered conviction. Intergenerational justice considers the duties of contemporary people to what is owed future generations while considering what former generations have provided contemporary people. The third domain, the theoretical storm involves knowledge and its construction, reproduction, and dissemination. Gardiner points to the "ineptitude" of the leading approaches in the various fields concerned with ecological issues such as the emphasis on economic theory, principally "cost-benefit analysis", driving policy and practice. Gardiner also points to the "relative silence of the most prominent political philosophies on global environmental problems" and the instrumental and anthropocentric orientation of the leading approaches to environmental research and policy construction. These concepts of instrumental value and anthropocentric orientation will be defined more fully later in this study.

Becker's (2012) treatment of an ethical analysis of the idea of sustainability also points to a similar concern of the theoretical storm. The epistemological issues surrounding the construction of knowledge about the environment and the ecological crisis are generally scientific in orientation. The ethical nature of these issues is generally under-represented or patently neglected in research focused on sustainability and the ecological crisis. Becker's analysis of sustainability ethics and research centers on three relational domains. These are relations between contemporaries, intergenerational relations, and relationship to nature. Significant to this study, however, is Becker's point that knowledge must be democratized and that sustainability research must involve transdisciplinary discourse to overcome the confinements of disciplinary knowledge. Becker suggests that scientific researchers as well as citizens and policy makers must be capable of understanding the ethical and philosophical problems associated with the
ecological crisis and recognize that objective, positivistic descriptions of the ecological crisis do not fully engage the complexity of the issue in terms of its moral/ethical and political nature. As such, Becker suggests the three relationships must be considered to fully grasp a conception of sustainability.

With these approaches in mind, the problem addressed in this study is theoretical and associated with the insufficiency of political philosophy and democratic theory to address environmental issues. The tradition of liberalism has had an ambivalent relationship to environmental concern. Critiques from the environmental movement demonstrate this ambivalence in which individualism struggles with the social and ecological contingencies of the individual. Furthermore, human freedom or liberty focused upon economic models fail to fully express the range of human life and what is of value in it. The inadequacy of disciplinary knowledge discourses to fully embrace the complexity of the ecological crisis is central to the problem.

I suggest that this is an educational problem on the following grounds. First, as Gardiner (2011, p. 41-48) suggests, contemporary political philosophy has been too silent on the environment and thus contributes to the "theoretical storm". The theoretical problem involves the relative silence of political philosophy and democratic theory on environmental issues. This includes the diminished consideration of the environment in the work of John Rawls, a seminal figure in the reinvigoration of political philosophy in the 20th Century. Rawls's form of political liberalism provides a solid foundation for a conception of justice, but must be adapted and developed to address the issue of ecological crisis. This is centered upon the idea of citizenship and the role of civic education in the development of ecologically literate democratic citizens including both
constituents and those who function as representatives in the state. The citizen in both capacities must be capable of reflecting upon existential problems such as the ecological crisis, considering their deepest convictions on matters of justice, and engaging in reasonable public discourse.

Secondly as an educational problem, civic education must address contemporary demands. The purpose of education must engage in transdisciplinary discourse and interdisciplinary problem-posing inquiry. It is vital that experts in fields of knowledge have a basic grasp of fundamental concepts in philosophy and ethics that allow for transdisciplinary discourse and interdisciplinary approaches for public necessitated inquiries of complex problems such as the ecological crisis. Also, knowledge construction is a socio-cultural, political and normative activity (Kuhn, 1970; Becker, 2012). The implications of the socio-cultural, political and normative aspects of knowledge must be addressed both pedagogically and through the transparency or publicity of educational institutions in what Becker (2012) describes as "the democratization of knowledge".

As laid out here, the problem has two dimensions. One is democratic and the other is educational. These ideas are intertwined in that democracy as a way of life hinges upon knowledge. The ideas of transparency, publicity and reason are about a people being informed and affirming the practices of the government of society through reasoned and considered judgments based upon intersubjectively verified knowledge. This I call the educational purpose of democratic institutions. Conversely, education is one of the institutions in society. The formal schools that construct this institution and the informal arenas of learning must be considered for their democratic purpose. In other
words, the role these institutions play in the transmission and construction of knowledge must be guided by democratic ideals. This I refer to as the democratic purpose of education. Thus, democracy and education are intertwined. The problem as it is laid out here is the necessity for an ecological orientation to inform the theoretical models of democracy and education. The ecological crisis facing the contemporary world suggests flaws in our current knowledge. The considered convictions of a democratic people must be brought into balance with convictions regarding the value of ecological integrity or what will be defined as sustainability hereafter.

C. Research questions

Considering the broad and complex nature of the problem, this study will address the following questions:

- *In what ways is political liberalism responsive to environmental concern and in what ways is a Rawlsian political liberal conception of sustainability ecologically-focused?*

- *What would constitute a Rawlsian political liberal conception of civic education in an age of ecological crisis?*

D. The Approach to the Problem

The term ecological crisis has been chosen to capture this multifaceted and complex problem that is a matter of existential threat and lends itself to a broad issue driven inquiry. To understand the problem then requires the capacity for a broad discourse that is interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary in nature while strengthening the democratic potential of public deliberation that involves transparency, publicity, and exchange of knowledge. Currently, modern disciplines of knowledge struggle with such a broad and interconnected discourse, disciplines often operate in a paradigm that is limited
by esoteric jargon, concepts, and internal value discourses (Becker, 2012). What is essential in terms of informing the public is that the concepts and value discourses are clearly defined and linked to democratic concepts such as publicity, transparency, and reason. The experts in the disciplines should be conscious of these issues when working outside paradigmatic domains.

The idea that knowledge is confined within scientific disciplinary structures amounts to what Amartya Sen (2009) has defined as a positional confinement which tends to produce incomplete and skewed viewpoints on the bigger picture questions such as those contributing to ecological crisis. Sen suggests that to overcome positional confinement, public reason must address the many viewpoints that construct human capacity to understand the world. The capacity to engage in public reason and to have the openness of mind to reflect on the multiple positions that shed light on problems requires development of human cognitive capacities for reason, communication, and empathy which is inherently tied to the educational problem.

Thus the problem addressed in this study will consider the ecological crisis from this multiple view of many interconnected and interrelated problems associated with the environment and how human beings relate to each other and to the rest of the natural world. This includes how human beings make meaning and value of themselves and the world around them. A fundamental focus of the study will address the problem associated with the plurality of human understanding of the ecological crisis, the nature of disagreement rooted in these different points of view, and public reason and deliberative democracy as a means for strengthening democratic institutions through the role of the
informed and reflective citizen. This attention to public reason is intended to emphasize the important educational role that is foundational to democratic institutions.

The field of environmental ethics is a relatively new field in philosophy that has developed around interests in understanding many of these dilemmas. However, as will be illustrated later in this study, environmental ethics is built upon disciplinary knowledge and the ethical traditions that influence its discourse. For example, disagreement on fundamental philosophical questions such as whom or what deserves moral consideration contributes to a lack of unified voice and diminishes the potential for broader agreement in the larger public sphere. Furthermore, the idea of sustainability is often contested and used differently by people in different fields of knowledge which further contributes to a lack of clarity and agreement on the policies and practices associated with sustainability. Thus at the heart of the problem of ecological crisis is the inability of people to agree on the very nature of the problem. Disagreement requires procedures for deliberation that limit the corrosive nature of difference and provide the template for cooperation on issues. In deliberative democracy, the justification and legitimization of policies and actions for adaptation, mitigation, and the equitable distribution of responsibility are located in consensus and agreement on fundamental principles of justice and the maintenance of the circumstances of justice from which to build a sustainable human inhabited world.

In environmental ethics, the work of the political philosopher John Rawls has often been overlooked or looked at with skepticism (Baber & Bartlett, 2005). Rawls himself has suggested that his fundamental task was to determine the fair terms of justice to which a society of free and equal persons could agree under conditions of democracy.
and pluralism. His narrow focus on the political questions surrounding justice and his statement that the human relationship to the environment is a question that is situated outside such a focus and is rooted in questions of metaphysics rather than ethics contributes to a disregard of Rawls's work by environmental ethicists. Rawls suggested that the metaphysical nature of the human-environment relationship is contested and tends toward disagreements based on ideological and philosophical positions. Yet, Rawls himself suggests that environmental matters become matters of justice when liberty, equality, and the stability of a just society are impacted by ecological concerns (Rawls, 1993, p. 244-246). Furthermore, Rawls contends that the environment becomes a matter of justice through the extension of a conception of justice to intergenerational concerns and to global relations between societies. "Of course these questions may become ones of constitutional essentials and basic justice once our duties and obligations to future generations and to other societies are involved" (PL, p. 246, n. 35). Baber and Bartlett (2005) contend that the field of environmental policy and global environmental governance could benefit from a greater understanding of the Rawlsian approach and the emphasis on the deliberative democratic nature of political liberalism.

Thus a Rawlsian political liberal vision of democratic practice can inform the discourse on this problem. Rawls defines and clarifies an understanding of human beings as socially cooperating citizens with rights and duties, of societies as nation-states constructed of constitutionally protected freedoms for all citizens equally under fair terms of agreement, the role of public reason in legitimizing political action, and the ways in which reasonable nations should interact. Of importance in Rawls's work with its focus on social cooperation and agreement is the idea of an "overlapping consensus of
reasonable comprehensive doctrines”. This idea is rooted in political terms that allows for a plurality of versions of what he calls comprehensive doctrines, these being the ideological, philosophical, and/or religious doctrines that provide people with their understanding of the world.

I will attempt to show that ecological integrity or sustainability is a fundamental conviction within human societies. That the constitution of societies and a framework of justice must recognize the ecological contingency of human life and that liberty and equality rely upon a basic level of environmental/ecological health and stability or a conviction to sustainability. Rawls premises justice on a concern for social cooperation and the social contingency of the individual. This considered conviction towards social cooperation must be adapted to also recognize ecological as well as social contingencies. Though Rawls's work is focused on establishing a normative framework situated in justice as fairness for democratic societies and was relatively silent on questions of environmental or ecological consideration, his political liberal approach to basic questions of justice has potential to inform this endeavor. Rawls suggested that questions of environmental consideration were distinct from a conception of justice and the basic constitution of societies, yet he also recognized that ecological integrity was a necessary condition for the circumstances of justice to obtain (Bell, 2002). Such conditions then require development within the political liberal framework for justice to meet these contemporary demands.

To this end, an area that is often overlooked in Rawls's political liberal approach to justice is the importance of education in the construction and intergenerational stability of societies. Education is significant for both the individual development of reasonable
citizens and the development of reasonable societies or "peoples" to use Rawls's term. A conception of education must then capture the broad flow of information that is part of the publicity, transparency, and reason required of democratic institutions. Furthermore, a conception of civic education must address the more narrow view of schooling which addresses the future oriented development of fully participatory citizens. A conception of reasonable and sustainable citizens in a deliberative democracy will be developed in this study.

The implications of a Rawlsian political liberal approach to the ecological crisis will be a focus of this study by adapting the Rawlsian approach to ecologically focused sustainability and thus orienting civic education to meet these challenges. Bell (2002), suggests that within Rawls's later works, notably Political Liberalism and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, a notion of sustainability is presented as a necessary condition for the maintenance of a stable and just democratic regime over time and between generations. Bell's development of the Rawlsian political liberal conception of sustainability will be discussed in more detail later in this study. To this end, explicating a political liberal framework for justice that is responsive to ecological consideration is a primary focus in which a conception of sustainability is developed. Sustainability will be defined as constructed from a value of ecological integrity and its life providing properties from which a principle of ecological sustainability is deduced. This requires the method of reflective equilibrium which seeks to amend and adapt considered convictions of a people with the realities of democratic practice and the contemporary world. Later in the methods section of this chapter, the idea of reflective equilibrium will be more fully defined. Furthermore, situating this focus on a considered conviction
towards sustainable democratic societies will be rooted in the Rawlsian ideas of public reason, an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and the idea of the citizen. The areas of Rawls's work that are requiring adaptation based upon new knowledge about society, ecology, and the social psychology of the person will be a central theme.

Rawls's work is seminal to the field of political philosophy in the 20th Century, but has received minimal attention in contemporary fields of educational theory (see Bell, 2004a; Callan, 1996; 2004; Costa, 2011; Hargrove, 2008; Johnston, 2005; Macedo, 1995; Popastephano, 2005; Stevens, 2014; Strike, 2004; Weber, 2008) and environmental and sustainability ethics (Baber & Bartlett, 2012; Baber & Bartlett, 2005; Bell, 2004b; Huseby, 2013; Kenehan, 2014; Kunnas, 2012; Welburn, 2014). The theory of justice as fairness that Rawls developed over his lifetime from early works such as *Theory of Justice (TJ)* to later works *Political Liberalism (PL)* and *Law of Peoples (LoP)* and the reworking of *TJ* in *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JFR)* lay out a vision of deliberative democracy rooted in citizenship and will be explored for insights to the complexity of the current problem of ecological crisis in its ethical, political, and socio-cultural domains. The emphasis on society as a form of social cooperation, justice as the ethico-political domain of the basic structure of that fair system of cooperation between free and equal persons, and the rights and duties of citizenship wrapped in the ideas of rationality and reason are central to this exploration. Rawls's work does have a precise lexicon of terms and concepts that will be defined in more detail as this work unfolds.
E. Definitions of Key Concepts and Ideas

a. Ecological crisis. The idea of ecological crisis as defined in this study is rooted in the idea of human relationship to the natural world. The term ecology has been used here to capture the relational aspect of the problem. Ecology is concerned with the interaction between species or living organisms and their environment (Sarkar, 2014). The crisis is intended to convey the collection of problems associated with human relationship to the planet. At the focus of ecological crisis is the idea that human behavior impacts the natural world in ways that are unsustainable for healthy ecosystems and life in general to subsist. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS, 1992) characterizes six areas of concern that illustrate the areas in which the ecological crisis operates. These include the atmosphere, water resources (fresh water), oceans, soil, forests, and living species. Problems such as anthropogenic climate change, severe weather events, ocean acidification and rising ocean levels, air, soil, and water quality, loss of biodiversity and mass extinctions are examples of the complex and expansive ways in which humans have impacted the environment. Following Gardiner's ethical approach to climate change, the ecological crisis is a matter of ethical inquiry and a matter of justice in three fundamental ways: 1) *globally* as a matter of justice for contemporary living beings and the moral consideration of extant living beings; 2) *intergenerationally* in terms of the moral consideration of future generations, defining the obligations of current generations to future generations, and understanding how human activity harms the choices and chances of future living beings; and 3) *theoretically* in terms of how human knowledge and systems of meaning contribute to the crisis, but also developing knowledge that can provide methods of analysis and solutions to the crisis.
b. Ecological Sustainability and other sustainabilities. A basic feature of the idea of sustainability involves temporal preservation or maintenance of something over time. Costanza & Patten (1995) emphasize that sustainability means survival or persistence over time, but that it also involves questions of who or what system should persist, how long should the entity or system persist, and when do assessments of this persistence take place. Questions of who or what, how, how long, and when should measurement/assessment occur are fundamental to the practice of sustainability.

The idea of sustainability is often traced back to *Our Common Future* (*The Bruntland Report*) prepared by the United Nation's World Commission on Environment and Development (1987). The report is rooted in the ideas of sustainable development and sustainable growth. These two economic driven concepts emphasize the capacity to improve the living conditions of contemporary human beings through economic growth while ensuring that future generations enjoy similar opportunities and benefits. Generally, the focus is on sustainable use of the world's resources in ways that do not diminish future generations' capacity to use the world in similar ways or “that do not detract from future generations' ability to derive the same benefits from similar activities” (Newton, p.2). The Bruntland Report emphasized two key components, one an emphasis on equity and human needs and the second emphasizing the limits to growth imposed by ecological systems.

Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable to ensure that it meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. The concept of sustainable development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology and social organization can be
both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth" (1987, p. 16)

However, economic models of sustainability have received fair amounts of criticism centered on their human focus (anthropocentrism) at the expense of moral consideration for non-human beings, as well as the moral status of ecosystems and landscapes. Included in these criticisms is the idea of "management" discourses that emphasize economic interests and the economic meaning of the term growth. Economic growth models entail a form of development that "has always meant the expansion of the human footprint" (Newton, 2003, p. 2).

In ethics or philosophy approaches differ on the question of moral standing and who or what should be valued or given claim, as well as disagreement on the priority of the good (teleological) versus priority of the right (deontological). These approaches will be discussed later in this work. Should the focus of sustainability be upon human centered values and outcomes such as human flourishing and/or happiness (anthropocentric approaches)? Does this entail economic development and some prescribed level or threshold for quality of life? Does sustainability respond to a moral claim to the well-being and flourishing of other species? Or does it address the flourishing of ecosystems and environmental stability (ecocentric approaches)? Conceptual disagreement is also rooted to some extent in the academy's partitions and compartmentalization of disciplinary knowledge and the unique perspective and internal logic of the paradigm associated with each field (Becker, 2012). That is not to say that within a paradigm the logic and the rationale for a particular discourse is invalid, incorrect, or misguided. But rather, experts in fields of knowledge should have some
basic ability to broaden their scope to enter larger transdisciplinary discourses on complex issue driven problems and to be aware of their own positional stances in doing so.

For instance, economic models as expressed in *Our Common Future* (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987) stress the sustainability of economic development. Sustainable development means maximizing economic development weighed against a threshold of ecological integrity. For some economists in the field of sustainable development this means that if economic growth is maximized when ecological or climate stability is on the precipice of collapse, then this ecological tipping point is the preferable condition to be sustained because this condition provides maximum economic development or growth over time. However in a much generalized contrast, environmental ethicists and ecologists more often stress some level or scale of ecological integrity, focusing on indicators such as species, habitats, landscapes, or human well-being associated with environmental conditions. Popular uses of the term in public discourse also contribute to conceptual confusion in which terms such as sustainable production, sustainable consumer, sustainable food and farmer, and sustainable growth permeate markets and consumer culture (Glavic & Lukman, 2007; for a more detailed discussion of sustainability and conceptual disagreement see Becker, 2012; Hulme, 2009). Economic driven development models fail to fully represent ethical traditions, lifeways or cultural practices that express deeper human concerns beyond prosperity indicators such as production and accumulation of wealth (Chakrabarty, 2014).

Brian Barry (1996) suggests "the core concept of sustainability is... that there is some X whose value should be maintained, in as far as it lies within our power to do so,
into the indefinite future. This leaves it open for dispute what the content of X should be" (p.101). A more ecocentric or ecological approach defines sustainability in general terms that involve what Arias-Moldanado (2000, p. 44) contends refers to "an ecologically viable social model, that is, a social model whose operation is in balance with the natural systems on which it ultimately depends". For environmental ethicists and green thinkers, this entails a reorientation from anthropocentric models of understanding the world to a more ecocentric orientation that recognizes the intrinsic value or inherent worth of the natural world. Furthermore, the perspective of ecological or environmental sustainability is attentive to the concept of intergenerational justice, or what is owed future generations, it "requires that we ask ourselves how each interaction with the natural environment will affect, and be judged by, our children in the future" (Newton, 2003, p.1). The idea of future generations does not have to be narrowly defined by generations of human beings, but can include future generations of other life forms as deserving moral consideration.

To this end, Becker (2012) defines sustainability as having three fundamental domains. The first, shared by the previous definitions, is *continuance* which refers to the maintenance of some entity over time. Becker suggests that much of the scientific literature on sustainability focuses on this domain, describing the natural processes and the persistence of a thing, but these approaches fail to completely articulate the concept. To do so, a second domain must involve the idea of *orientation*. Orientation refers to an "inherent normative and evaluative meaning". The normative orientation implies a conception of a good or a desirable outcome and implies a normative claim about what is right in terms of a sustainable action. The third domain of sustainability then involves
relationships. Becker (2012, p. 12-13) defines "sustainability relations" in three distinct dimensions, these are:

a) The relationship between humans and their contemporaries (social justice);

b) The relationship between currently living humans and future generations (intergenerational justice); and

c) The relationship between humans and nature (eco-justice).

These three dimensions are interrelated in which the factual continuance and ethical/normative dimensions interact within the sustainability relations. To summarize then, a definition of ecological sustainability, “is the ability to establish continuance as a means for orienting human actions and life toward the threefold relatedness of human existence to contemporaries, future generations, and nature" (Becker, 2012, p. 14).

Becker's discourse on the sustainability relations is vital to a reorientation of political liberalism to environmental concern. What I hope to show through a Rawlsian approach is that relationships to nature must involve a fundamental shift towards the idea of reasonableness. Just as in human social relationships, individuals hold a higher order interest in being reasonable with one another, so too, human beings have a higher order interest in concern for the ecological systems in which they live. To follow Rawlsian thinking, it is rational to be reasonable which at its core is to hold an impartial moral regard for that which has moral standing. The ideas of the rational and reasonable will be discussed in more detail later in this work.

c. Ethics and normative theory. Ethics is an area of philosophy that deals with morality seeking to define and answer questions about what is right or wrong and good or bad. Central to ethics is the philosophical justification of moral positions. The philosophical study of morality and the norms prescribed by it is distinct from other
approaches in fields such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology. These others fields tend to describe, analyze, and explain phenomena in human life and the moral codes that guide behavior in individuals and in cultures (Deigh, 1999). The approaches to morality in the social and behavioral sciences are relevant to uncovering the convictions present in the background culture of a society while ethics can then demonstrate the coherence of these convictions to a sense of justice, in others words can seek to justify or repudiate moral positions.

The idea of normative is also different in philosophy from these other disciplines, based on the distinction between scientific description versus philosophical justification. Norms are prescriptions; they construct the moral code of a people regulating behavior or what is sanctioned as good or bad, right or wrong, and what is valued. In ethics, normative theory uses specific methodologies by which prescriptions of the good or the right can be established through considered judgments. Considered judgments are those "judgments rendered under conditions favorable to the exercise of the sense of justice, and therefore in circumstances where the more common excuses and explanations for making a mistake do not obtain... those given under conditions favorable for deliberation and judgment in general" (Rawls, 1971, p. 47-48). Normative ethics seeks principles and criterion for making considered judgments, employing “general principles, rules, guidelines that we should follow, or virtues that we should inculcate, that help us distinguish right from wrong and good from bad" (LaFollette & Persson, 2013, p.2).

Korsgaard (1996, p.8) draws from Kant in suggesting that the normativity of ethical standards "do not merely describe a way in which we in fact regulate our conduct. They make claims on us; they command, oblige, recommend or guide. Or at least when we
invoke them, we make claims on one another”. Normative ethics is not merely descriptive, but is concerned with providing a justificatory foundation for morality. This means that normative ethics provides both an explanatory adequacy and a justificatory adequacy for a theoretical position. To meet these two demands, a normative theory must both adequately explain a condition, but also offer criterion or reasons why a claim is adequate and why people should be motivated and accountable to those demands (Korsgaard, 1996, p.12-13).

d. Teleological and deontological approaches in ethics. Rawls contends that the two main concepts of ethics are "those of the right and those of the good" (1971, p.24). Rawls further elaborates that an ethical theory then is structured by the way in which it "defines and connects those two basic notions... The simplest way of relating them is taken by teleological theories: the good is defined independently from the right, and the right is defined as that which maximizes the good" (p.24). Teleological approaches, often referred to as consequentialist, are concerned with the study of the good or goodness and/or what is good in and of itself. Teleology comes from the Greek telos meaning "ends" and logos referring to science (or study of). The idea of consequentialism is used to emphasize the role of outcomes in providing the justification for a moral prescription. The predominant teleological or consequentialist approach in ethics has been utilitarianism which has many variant forms depending on what good is prioritized. For example, utilitarianism in general asserts a conception of the good such as human happiness or the satisfaction of pleasure by a sentient being. The good being independent of the right, then prescribes right actions based upon the aggregate maximization of that
good. Following the examples, the right course of action is that which produces the greatest aggregate happiness or satisfaction.

Conversely, deontology from the Greek *deon* meaning duty or obligation focuses on the study of the right. The right is seen as independent of the good; a right action, one that is justifiable, is independent of the outcome of that action. Outcomes as guides for behavior are backward focused, meaning that actions are prior to outcomes, thus knowledge of outcomes can serve to aid in the development of principles that guide future behavior. The rightness of the action, however, is independent of that outcome because one can do what is right and still result in unintended consequences, likewise, good can result from bad actions. For instance, think of a person who breaks his or her leg while kicking something with the intent of damaging another person's property in a fit of rage, this would seem to be bad, it is not a right or moral action. But what if in the course of seeking medical attention, it was discovered that this person had a more serious, life-threatening health problem, such as bone cancer. The act would have led to early diagnosis which could be characterized as a good. This good and the right are independent. Deontologists search for principles of right by which to guide correct or proper action. An example of the right being independent of the good would be a rule that suggests telling the truth supersedes the repercussions of telling the truth and is thus independent of the good.

A Rawlsian approach is deontological, in that it "either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good" (Rawls, 1971, p. 30). The right provides normative constraints on what is considered right or wrong, and within this approach constrains what is conceivable as good. "The
particular requirements to refrain from doing the various things-that-can-be-known-before-the-fact-to-be-wrong are variously called rules, laws, deontological constraints, prohibitions, limitations, proscriptions, or norms" (Davis, p. 206). As Rawls elaborates, deontology does not suggest that outcomes are inconsequential, rather "all ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness" (TJ, p.30). However, a deontological approach such as Rawls's theory of justice as fairness contends that:

[P]ersons accept in advance a principle of equal liberty and they do this without knowledge of their more particular ends. They implicitly agree, therefore to conform their conceptions of their good to what the principles of justice require, or at least not to press claims which directly violate them... The principles of right, and so of justice, put limits on which satisfactions have value; they impose restrictions on what are reasonable conception's of one's good... Hence in justice as fairness one does not take men’s propensities and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then seek the best way to fulfill them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are restricted from the outset by the principles of justice which specify the boundaries that men’s system of ends must respect. We can express this by saying that in justice as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good... the priority of justice is accounted for, in part by holding that the interests requiring the violation of justice have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they cannot override its claims (TJ, p. 31).

In reading this, the idea of right is more than merely determining what is correct, that is, it is more than determining that a right action is equivalent to the correct course of action, rather it sets the limits on freedom and what is a reasonable end. As with normative ethics, deontology seeks to justify prescriptive claims that establish a moral code that guides action. As in Rawls's excerpt, the right holds people accountable, it prescribes action, but also proscribes action in ways that limit an individual's choices based on the social nature of morality. In this, rights entail duties or obligations. "The priority of right
over the good in justice as fairness turns out to be a central feature of the conception" (p. 31-32).

e. The right and rights. Sumner (2013, p. 355-359) defines rights as having four dimensions: a) subject, b) object, c) content, and d) strength. The subject of a right is an individual or group that holds a right. The object of a right is the individual or collective against whom a right is held. The content refers to either a right to do or a right to have something done. The action can be done by the subject in which the subject has the right to do or not do (a liberty-right) or the right can compel an action by the object in which the subject has a right to claim an action be done by the object (a claim-right). The strength of the right involves the weighing of that right against other moral considerations or "its resistance to rival normative considerations" (p.359). This can be seen as the defense of an individual's liberty, or capacity to make self-interested choices from being limited by a collective good. However the rights in these cases are rarely accorded absolute power. "Rights... impose duties and duties are normative constraints on the freedom of others - constraints whose justification lies in the protection they afford the rights-holder. The language of rights does therefore presuppose a social landscape in which interests often conflict and which these conflicts must be managed in a principled way (p. 363). Thus, deontological theories attempt to provide a criterion by which principles construct a system of rules to guide human association.

f. Basic Terms and Ideas in Rawls's Political Liberalism. Rawls' work involves the development of a number of ideas and concepts that work together to provide the fundamentals to his conception of justice as fairness through a political liberal approach. Justice as fairness refers to Rawls's conception of justice which is a political conception
for a liberal constitutional democratic society. Rawls begins by drawing upon basic
intuitive ideas that have been a part of the western political culture and traditions or
rather "are embedded in the institutions of a constitutional democratic regime and the
public traditions of their interpretation" (Rawls, 1999, p. 390). Rawls starts with the idea
of society as system of social cooperation. From this foundation, the importance of
equality and liberty are addressed in an attempt to determine the way in which
arrangements and agreements can achieve the institutionalization of those political values
of liberty and equality. The conception includes the development of principles of justice
and the justification for those principles for a free and equal people. "The name derives
from the idea that fair principles of justice should result from a fair initial choice situation
that incorporates all the relevant moral and practical reasons - the fairness of the initial
situation is presumed to transfer to the principles chosen therein" (Freeman, 2007, p.473).
For Rawls, this initial situation is contained in a thought experiment that operates as a
model or device of representation, called the original position, drawn from the social
contract tradition in political philosophy that models the fair conditions representing
moral convictions to equality and liberty. This will be defined in more detail later in this
work.

i. Political liberalism. Political liberalism then, is one of a number of forms of
liberalism. Liberalism as a tradition values the rights of the individual, situating equality
in a moral judgment of the inherent worth of the individual and providing the individual
with basic claims that protect the individual's equal claim to liberty. In political
liberalism, Rawls asserts that political liberalism is not individualistic in the sense that
critics have suggested, but rather is concerned with both the individual and relational

nature of the basic structure of society. A society in which a plurality of *free and equal citizens* holding reasonable moral, religious and nonreligious, positions can affirm a basic conception of justice through agreement on political grounds. "The political conception is shared by everyone while the reasonable doctrines are not, we must distinguish between a public basis of justification generally acceptable to citizens on fundamental political questions and the many nonpublic bases of justification belonging to the many comprehensive doctrines... (Rawls, 1993, p. xix). The aim of political liberalism is to maintain a stable and just society over time for a people holding a plurality of reasonable moral, religious and nonreligious, viewpoints. That is "a just society is realistically possible in which reasonable citizens all accept a liberal conception of justice on the basis of moral values implicit in democratic culture, even though they affirm different comprehensive doctrines" (Freeman, p. 478). The components that are part of the family of ideas of political liberalism are important to defining the theory and beyond the space of this section; these fundamental ideas will be laid out in greater detail in Chapter Two.

**ii. On the Role of Political Philosophy.** Rawls conceives that political philosophy is characterized by four fundamental aims or "roles". The first role is *practical*: "arising from divisive political conflict when its task is to focus on deeply disputed questions... some underlying basis of philosophical and moral agreement can be uncovered, or differences narrowed so that social cooperation on a footing of mutual respect among citizens can still be maintained" (2007, p.10). The second role is termed *orientation*: to help illuminate the social and political world and understand one's position in it and what it means to be a member of a society and a polity. "Political philosophy may contribute to how people think of their political and social institutions as a whole, of themselves as
citizens, and of their basic aims and purposes as a society with history - a nation - as opposed to their aims and purposes as individuals, or members of families or associations" (p.10). The third role Rawls defines is reconciliation: “to calm our frustration and rage against our society and its history by showing us the way in which its institutions… are rational, and developed over time as they did to attain their present, rational form” (p. 10) Yet, Rawls warns against unreflected and uncritical defense of the status quo as an ideological or indoctrinating influence. This is a vital piece that speaks to the stability of a society, the rule of law, and the confidence of the people that the mechanisms of society are mutually respected and actualized. The fourth role then is a form of political imagination rooted in possibility and plausibility, this Rawls terms probing the limits of practicable political possibility (p.10-11). Rawls calls this a form of realistic utopianism with the aim of imagining what a just social and political world can and should be, thus it is a role of political philosophy to construct normative theories that guide human understanding of moral and ethical conditions. These characteristics or roles position the political philosopher as both a social critic and as a public educator, and in essence a reasonable and critical citizen.

iii. The distinction between the moral and the political. Justice as fairness is intended to be a "freestanding" conception. This means a political conception is distinct from comprehensive philosophical, religious, and moral doctrines. A political conception is a moral conception, but not a comprehensive moral doctrine that answers metaphysical and epistemological questions, nor does it define and prescribe the good. The political is distinct in its aim towards intersubjective agreement on difficult problems or issues
through basic political ideals or values rather than seeking to define the metaphysical or epistemological "truth" of a doctrine. Rawls (1999, p. 394-395) suggests:

... it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons. This agreement when securely founded in public political and social attitudes sustains the goods of all persons and associations within a just democratic regime. To secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious questions. We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is no way to solve them politically... Philosophy as the search for truth about the independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic society.

In Rawlsian theory, the truth as it is related to philosophical and religious doctrines is a matter of liberty and one's conception of the good of which a free and equal person must have the freedom to determine for her or himself. The intention of a political conception is to protect this idea of reasonable pluralism in a democratic society. The political conception of justice is "a moral conception worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely for political, social, and economic institutions" (1999, p.389). As suggested previously, it is a framework for the basic structure of a constitutional democratic regime. This framework for a political conception of justice defines and fits together the basic structure of political, social, and economic institutions into a "unified system of social cooperation". The terms of the political agreement are fundamental ideas that have been embedded in the public political culture and traditions of a people. Rawls sees the role of the philosopher as defining these terms, providing a systematic conception of how the ideas fit together, and to provide a criterion or rationale that reconciles the often competing meanings of the terms in the larger public culture. Thus presenting a case or
rationale for how agreement can be reached and this agreement as a source for a conception of justice that is a basis for social cooperation.

**iv. The reasonable and the rational.** The reasonable and the rational are interrelated, but distinct terms defining the nature of moral powers in relationship to the ideas of social cooperation and the person. "These are basic and complementary ideas entering into the fundamental idea of society as a fair system of cooperation" (*JFR*, p.6). Reasonableness is related to the idea of a sense of justice and as a political idea expresses the capacity of human beings to be sociable. As free and equal citizens, reasonable persons are prepared to propose, or to acknowledge when proposed by others, the principles needed to specify what can be seen by all as fair terms of cooperation" (p.7). Within this idea of reasonableness is the idea of reciprocity in that the fair terms of cooperation are mutually agreed upon. This points to the complementary idea of the rational, in that being reasonable is not a matter of pure altruism, but one of mutual benefit. The rational, then, applies to the moral power for the capacity for a conception of the good. A rational person can conceive a good and pursue that good as a matter of interest. Rawls suggests that the rational allows the reasonable to have meaning. "The reasonable, without a conception of the good, does not provide any reason to care about notions of right and justice. On the other hand, the Reasonable subordinates the Rational because the principles of right limit the ends that can be pursued" (Maffettone, 2001, p.190). In this way the two ideas are complementary in which neither stands alone in relationship to social cooperation between free and equal people. Through mutual benefit, a person's rational interests are possible when constructed through the contingencies of social life (See Rawls, 1993, p. 48-51; 2001, p. 607). The idea of the reasonable and the
rational will be explicated in more detail throughout this study as these will be vital to understanding the role of justice in the development of an ecological orientation to citizenship and civic education.

v. Comprehensive Doctrines and the good. Comprehensive doctrines are the cultural, ideological, religious and ethical traditions that give complete meaning and value to human understanding of the world. Rawls (PL, p.13) defines comprehensive doctrines as:

... conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole...it covers all recognized values and virtues within one rather precisely articulated system.

Comprehensive doctrines provide a complete conception of the good life in philosophical terms and are constructive of peoples' beliefs about what is valued, good, and just. A sense of justice is strong when a person can affirm the principles of justice both in the fair terms of cooperation and within his/her own conception of the good that is from within the comprehensive doctrine to which they acquire meaning.

F. Significance and Importance of this Study

As discussed in the definition of the problem, the ecological crisis exposes the theoretical deficiencies in contemporary political and moral philosophy. The field of environmental ethics helps provide a framework for moral consideration of the human-nature relationship, but often struggles to convert the ideas to political considerations that are conducive to political agreement. Conversely, contemporary political theories tend to neglect consideration of the environment or ecological matters in developing a sustainable democratic vision of the future. Rawlsian theory itself has been relatively
silent on the topic of the environment (for treatments of environmental issues through a Rawlsian approach, see Baber & Bartlett, 2005; 2015; Bell, 2002; Huseby, 2013; Kunnas, 2012; Kenehan, 2014). To this end, this study contributes to both environmental ethics and political philosophy, by defining the ways in which political liberalism is responsive to environmental or ecological concerns situating this in the ideas of public reason and emphasizing the role of education in the development of citizens’ sense of justice. This entails development of a Rawlsian political liberal approach to sustainability with principles of ecological sustainability that cohere with the principles of justice. Furthermore, the role of deliberative democracy in forging agreement on questions of ecological sustainability requires much of the educational imperatives of democratic life. In doing this, the idea of the citizen and civic education are considered vital to this development. As such, the Rawlsian approach and its meaning for citizenship and civic education will be a central task that has had a relative paucity of treatment in the field of educational theory (for a Rawlsian approach to educational theory, see Costa, 2011). To summarize, this contributes to the synthesis of three distinct fields of philosophical and moral consideration:

1. Contribution to political philosophy, Rawlsian theory and political liberalism,
2. Contribution to educational theory in the area of civic education, and
3. Contribution to environmental and climate change ethics through the democratization of ethico-political consideration of the environment.

G. Methodology

a. Political constructivism as method in Rawls. The idea of constructivism has many variants across different fields. In philosophy, constructivism is often located within the field of metaethics which is concerned with the legitimacy of normative
theories and the source or status of morality. Constructivism in this sense proposes that morality is dependent upon a conceiver or "conceiving-dependent" facts. These facts are dependent on the function of attitudes that explain certain moral features. These moral features are properties that are a function of the rational and social nature of human beings. Rational in this sense refers to reason or the powers of reasoning. Thus, morality as perceiving-dependent and a function of human reason is thus knowable and explainable. Constructivism is distinct from the positions of error theorists or nihilists and moral realists such as rational intuitionists. Error theorists or nihilists in general contend that morality is a fiction, cannot be explained in objective terms, and thus there is no morality. Whereas, moral realists claim an objective reality for moral facts that exists independent of human consciousness (Shafer-Landau & Cuneo, 2007). For example, "Moral intuitionism says that moral first principles and judgments, when correct, are true statements about an independent order of moral values; moreover, this order does not depend on, nor is it to be explained by, the activity of any actual (human) minds, including the activity of reason" (Rawls, 1993, p.91).

In normative ethics, constructivism is rooted in the idea that moral properties or normative "truths" are the product of a conferring procedure by rational agents (a process of construction), either hypothetical (idealized) agents or non-idealized actual agents. The social contract tradition in western political philosophy generally falls within the idealized, hypothetical strain of constructivism which is often referred to as contractarian constructivism (Milo, 2007). Rawls work has been cited as reviving this tradition in contemporary moral philosophy and ethics. "According to the view... what the moral facts are - [in Rawls] which social institutions are just and unjust - is the product of a
process of construction in which rational agents, under idealized conditions, seek to reach an agreement on principles for regulating their relationships and behavior toward one another" (Milo, 2007, p. 121). The objectivity of moral principles is not grounded in an independent moral order, but in the agreement of the rational acceptability of the moral principles from a position of impartiality.

Rawls situates this agreement in the realm of the political and in the idea of reasonableness rather than in the idea of truth (PL, p.126). A political conception contends that judgments can be rooted in reasonableness as a form of correctness through forms of intersubjective verification. The idea of truth, on the other hand, is related to a metaphysical position on the validity of knowledge of which Rawls suggests is tied to comprehensive doctrines and is a source for disagreement. Political constructivism does not take a stance on the metaphysical questions related to "truth". Rather, political constructivism is concerned with discerning the principles of political justice which are represented by "the outcome of a procedure of construction". This procedure is then related to the ideas of society and the person. The intention is that free and equal persons holding different comprehensive doctrines can affirm or agree to these fair terms of social cooperation through principles of political justice. For Rawls, the procedure of construction is not a procedure that "makes, or produces, the order of moral values... rather it [political constructivism] claims only that its procedure represents an order of political values proceeding from the values expressed by the principles of practical reason, in union with conceptions of society and person, to the values expressed by certain principles of political justice" (PL, p.95).
Moral principles are laid out from an initial idealized process of construction; a thought experiment Rawls calls the *original position* that models convictions for fair conditions between free and equal persons. In the initial construction of the principles of justice, the representatives of free and equal persons are rational agents seeking the fair terms of justice for a system of social cooperation. This model of construction will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Two of this study. But for now, the correctness of the procedure is determined by critical reflection, what Rawls lays out as a method of reflective equilibrium that employs the human capacity for reason and reflection.

**b. Reflective equilibrium as methodology.** The idea of reflective equilibrium implies a kind of balancing between deeply held convictions of what are right and wrong and considered principles of right or justice. As such it is a coherentist methodology, seeking *coherence* or consistency between considered convictions and principles of justice upon due reflection. The deeply held convictions refer to the kinds of judgments people make over the course of living. Remember that the idea of the person suggests that free and equal persons possess the two moral powers rooted in the capacity for reason, a sense of justice and a conception of the good. "Under normal circumstances of human life, these powers gradually develop, and after the age of reason are exercised in many kinds of judgments of justice ranging over all kinds of subjects, from the basic structure of society to the particular actions and character of people in everyday life" (Rawls & Kelly, 2001, p.29). Rawls contends that a sense of justice is also an intellectual power that involves "reason, imagination, and judgment". Reflective equilibrium then begins by selecting the most considered convictions or judgments regarding political justice. By this, Rawls means that the judgments that have been made under the conditions
appropriate for fully exercising the moral powers without "distorting influences" or undue external corruptive influence. "Considered judgments are those given when conditions are favorable to the exercise of our powers of reason and a sense of justice... under conditions where we seem to have the ability, the opportunity, and the desire to make a sound judgment... the more familiar temptations being absent" (p. 29).

A problem arises from the lack of coherence of these different considered convictions. Differences occur both in the individual who more than likely lacks consistency in his/her own moral judgments and between individuals who hold different viewpoints on moral questions. In the first instance, the logical consistency of a person's judgment on one case may not hold on other kinds of cases. "Those who suppose their judgments are always consistent are unreflective and dogmatic; not uncommonly they are ideologues and zealots" (p.30). The incongruence of judgments requires rethinking through critical reflection the basis for revision and reconciliation of these judgments in light of the goal of reaching agreement on political justice. Maffettone (2011, p.142) summarizes this point: "The central idea is that we look for coherence between our system of moral convictions and the rest of our beliefs. We are dealing with an equilibrium because over time, principles and judgments should converge".

Rawls distinguishes between narrow reflective equilibrium and wide reflective equilibrium. Narrow reflective equilibrium is focused upon the idea of bringing an individual person; this can be a hypothesized or idealized individual, and his or her considered convictions into coherence with a conception of justice. "The equilibrium is narrow because, while general convictions, first principles, and particular judgments are in line, we looked for the conception of justice that called for the fewest revisions to
achieve consistency, and neither alternative conceptions of justice nor the force of various argument for those conceptions have been taken into account by the person in question" (TJF, p. 30-31). This does not involve an impartial consideration of what other reasonable persons may believe or affirm, nor does it meet the goal of a publicly affirmed agreement of principles of justice. To this end, the idea of wide reflective equilibrium is prioritized by Rawls. Even in the case of one person, wide reflective equilibrium is achieved through the consideration of multiple or "alternative" conceptions of political justice and the weight of the various arguments for them. Wide reflective equilibrium is concerned with exploring and weighing the implications of multiple theories to make judgments from revised and reconciled convictions.

Wide reflective equilibrium is also applied to the society as well through the idea of public reason that is the public deliberations of a people and their representatives. When an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines has affirmed the principles of justice, then the idea of a general reflective equilibrium has been achieved. The concepts of overlapping consensus and reasonable comprehensive doctrines will be developed more fully in the next chapter which should further lay out this method of reflective equilibrium.

In this study, reflective equilibrium will be of central importance as the theory of justice as fairness from the political liberal approach will be reconciled with convictions and knowledge regarding environmental concern and ecological thinking. Furthermore, a broad reflection of the multiple theoretical positions in environmental ethics, climate change ethics, and sustainability ethics will be applied to convictions associated with cultural traditions and a reasonable plurality of comprehensive doctrines. These traditions
will include philosophical (various liberalisms) and religious (i.e. Judeo-Christian, Islamic, Buddhist) traditions.

c. On the Social Foundations of Educations. A discussion of the Social Foundations of Education will give a background on the approach applied to the problem defined earlier in this work. The Foundations perspective is uniquely positioned to provide insight into this complex question with its capacity to synthesize normative, interpretive, and critical approaches in a "transdisciplinary" discourse (CSFE, 1996). The field began as an interdisciplinary dialogue regarding the educational issues of the time and has emerged into an interdisciplinary approach that synthesizes the fields of knowledge and methods of inquiry of the contributing disciplines into a broad and complex perspective on education and society. The traditional disciplines spanned the humanities including philosophy and history, and the social sciences such as sociology, anthropology, political science, and economics. The field has continued to grow in inclusion, incorporating views or theories that are issue driven from cultural studies, feminism, gender studies, critical race theory, and queer theory to name a few (Tozer et al, 2011).

Based upon the standards developed by the Council for Social Foundations of Education (CSFE, 1996) a social foundations approach incorporates normative, interpretive, and critical perspectives and methodologies. Normative perspectives largely centered in the field of philosophy provide a grounding into the nature of questions regarding "what should be". This study which focuses extensively on the concepts of democracy and social justice will draw significantly from this normative perspective. Interpretive approaches draw significantly from philosophy, history, sociology, and
anthropology seeking to illuminate an understanding of the historical and social processes associated with the interaction of schooling and society while uncovering the meanings of this intersection embedded in culture. The critical perspective transcends the disciplines and generally involves consideration of the ways in which power is implicated in human relationships to each other and to the institutions that construct and organize society while also being legitimated in the culture.

An overarching theme of the Foundations approach is an emphasis on democracy as the process and organizing ethic by which society seeks justice. As an originator of the social foundations approach, George Counts (1932) emphasized the capacity of education to serve the interests of a just democratic society that does not merely reproduce itself, but continually reconstructs itself as a means for correcting the injustices of the past while reconstituting a new social order. The idea of reflective equilibrium as a methodology serves this role critically reflecting and reconstituting the ethical or moral foundations of a society. It is in this spirit that the Social Foundations of Education provides both a critique of the existing conditions of education and society while providing a vision and a practice for a more just and democratic future.

H. Structure of the Study

Chapter Two (A Basic Outline of Rawls' Theory of Justice as Fairness: From the Principles of Justice to Political Liberalism and the Law of Peoples) will lay out a basic outline of John Rawls work. It will begin with the conception of justice as fairness, defining the principles of justice, the justification for those principles, and the natural duties associated with that regime. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (JFR) will be the focus of this section, laying out Rawls's mature theory. Political Liberalism (PL) will
then be outlined with attention to the idea of public reason and the idea of a reasonable overlapping consensus. These ideas are vital to the idea of stability of a democratic regime and will lay a foundation for chapters that follow in which I argue that environmental or ecological concern should be a matter of public reason. The last section of the chapter will look at *The Law of Peoples (LoP)* in which Rawls develops a global perspective for his conception of justice as fairness. This area of Rawls's work is also an important element to adapting a political liberal approach to the ecological crisis as it deals with the area of international diplomacy and the ways in which a political liberal society must address global injustice. As suggested previously, Rawls developed a concise lexicon to describe his concepts and how they are interrelated, this will be defined in more detail in Chapter Two.

*Chapter Three (Ethics, Ecology, and Deliberative Democracy: A Rawlsian approach)* will begin by laying out the ways in which Rawlsian theory responds to environmental concerns. Bell's (2002) explication of Rawlsian sustainability will be utilized in this section to develop a conception of ecological sustainability that can be a potential source for political agreement through the development of normative precommitments for a sustainable democratic regime. This will center on laying out a view of the potential for an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that can affirm a principle of ecological sustainability through public reason. In doing this, a survey of various comprehensive doctrines such as different philosophical positions, including utilitarianism and intuitionism, as well as religious viewpoints such as Catholicism, Islam, and Buddhism can affirm a principle of ecological sustainability.
In Chapter Four, the idea of citizenship will be explored through a survey of different notions of citizenship in the liberal tradition. This will then to turn to Rawls's idea of citizenship which squarely places an emphasis on the development of reasonable citizens as central to the proliferation of a stable and just society (Maffettone, 2011). The political conception of the person as free and equal will be shown to be consistent or compatible with contemporary understandings of identity and the self. A Rawlsian approach to citizenship will be laid out with an attention to adapting the idea of the citizen to be amenable to an ecological orientation that finds coherence between a sense of justice, concern or conviction for sustainability, and liberal ideals of freedom and equality.

Chapter Five will then address the role that civic education must play in the development of reasonable and sustainable citizens. Rawls ideas of citizenship and the obligations of the citizen have received only a small amount of attention in the field of educational theory (see Bell, 2004; Callan, 1996; 2004; Costa, 2011; Hargrove, 2008; Johnston, 2005; Macedo, 1995; Popastephano, 2005; Stevens, 2014; Strike, 2004; Weber, 2008). Costa (2011) provides the most comprehensive treatment of Rawls work and its implications for education. In this chapter, an educational goal or purpose will be established for the development of reasonable citizens through a Rawlsian lens. This will center on the idea of public reason, the development of a sense of justice, and the method of reflective equilibrium which is characterized by Rawls as a Socratic critical reflective practice (Rawls, 1971, p.49). The role of communication and intersubjective agreement that is at the heart of public reason will be developed in its similarities and distinctions to the educational philosophy of Dewey (1902; 1916) and Freire (1970; 1974).
Chapter Six will seek to provide a synthesis of these ideas into a comprehensive Rawlsian political liberal approach to civic education. The goal is to provide a vision for an educational purpose that is democratic and sustainable through the development of a sense of justice that is oriented to the three basic sustainability relations as defined by Becker (2012). That is a sense of justice that addresses the contemporary, intergenerational, and ecological contingencies of modern life. The two-fold imperative of educational purpose in democratic institutions and the democratic purpose of educational institutions will be central to this synthesis.
Chapter Two

II. An Outline of John Rawls Political Liberal Conception of Justice

A. An Introduction to Rawlsian Theory

As suggested in Chapter One, the issues surrounding the ecological crisis are complex and riddled with disagreements rooted in different philosophical, religious, and ideological positions. The nature of these disagreements has roots in the social fact of pluralism of comprehensive doctrines or worldviews and what Rawls calls the "burdens of judgment". The burdens of judgment, Rawls contends, are a source for reasonable disagreement in which reasonable and rational persons view religious, philosophical and moral issues differently. This difference in viewpoint is related to often conflicting and complex evidence; the relevance, salience, or weight given to aspects of the considerations; the various interpretations of conceptual knowledge, such as disciplinary knowledge; and the kinds of subjective experiences from which people connect to their understanding of issues (see PL, p.54-58). Comprehensive doctrines hold different positions on questions regarding the good and in terms of ecological consideration hold different views on questions regarding the ontological relationship of human beings to each other and the rest of the natural world.

Chapter One suggested that the work of the political philosopher John Rawls has the potential to demonstrate a response to meet the political challenges facing the contemporary world by focusing upon a freestanding political conception of justice that holds a neutral view on metaphysical questions while remaining impartial towards the positions of reasonable comprehensive doctrines on metaphysical and epistemological
grounds. In this chapter, Rawls' work will be surveyed with attention focused upon the mature ideas developed over the span of his entire career. This will lean heavily upon the theory of political liberalism, which is based upon a family of reasonable ideas of political justice, including the idea of public reason which is central to the task at hand. The theory of justice as fairness will be discussed as an exemplar, as one of a number of conceptions that are part of the family of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice. The general aim of Rawls' work was to provide a conception of justice that responds to the question of how "[C]an democracy and comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, be compatible" (PL, p. 485)? A full survey or outline of Rawls' work is beyond the scope of this research which is intended to illustrate a conception of justice that allows for a reasonable pluralism of comprehensive philosophical and religious doctrines while developing a political response to ecological questions. (For more complete surveys of Rawls' work with attention to the evolution of his ideas, see Freeman, 2007; Maffetone, 2012).

Rawls begins with basic convictions regarding liberal constitutional democracy. In Chapter One, the idea that liberalism is individualistic and contributes to the ecological crisis was a common critique in the environmental movement. Rawls responds to a similar critique of political liberalism in which the critique emphasizes the individualistic nature of the liberal rights regime. Here Rawls emphasizes that the aim of political liberalism is to protect liberties, both relational and individual (PL, p. 476). Political liberalism is not founded on an atomistic individualism, but at its core emphasizes an idea of society and the person rooted in the bonds of social cooperation through a fair system of institutions based upon a conception of justice and encoded in a constitution and
legitimate laws for a deliberative democracy. Political liberalism thus begins with a central organizing idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation. The idea of social cooperation is specified by the fair terms of a political conception of justice. Furthermore, the idea of social cooperation is elaborated by a family of ideas including: the idea of a well-ordered society, the idea of the basic structure, the idea of the original position, and the idea of the citizen (as free and equal person). These are ideas developed from "the historical conditions and the public culture of democracy" (JFR, p. 25). To summarize, in Rawlsian theory, there are six fundamental ideas in political liberalism with three more ideas related to the sixth (JFR, p. 24-26), these are:

1) The idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation;
2) The idea of a well-ordered society;
3) The idea of the basic structure;
4) The idea of the original position;
5) The idea of the free and equal person; and
6) The idea of public justification

The idea of public justification has three other ideas related to it (JFR, p. 26). These are:

a) The idea of reflective equilibrium;
b) The idea of an overlapping consensus; and
c) The idea of public reason

Later in this chapter, the family of ideas will be defined in more detail as well as three features of a liberal political conception of justice, or what Rawls considers as criteria for a reasonable political conception of justice, of which justice as fairness is one of a number of conceptions. To do this in a meaningful way requires defining the basic ideas of political liberalism which are necessary to understanding the criteria for a political liberal conception of justice.

As a precursor to the outline here, the terms doctrine, idea, and conception are used in Rawlsian theory in specific ways (PL, p. 441). The concept of a doctrine refers to
all kinds of comprehensive views that include an idea of the good. That is not to say that a conception of the good is not related to a political conception of justice, for the public good and individual's personal views of the good are related to a conception of justice. It is a sense of the good which gives content to a conception of justice and gives meaning to a person's sense of justice. However, in a comprehensive doctrine, the good is determined by the doctrine which does not allow for a plurality of views regarding the good. A political conception of justice attempts to be neutral to a prescription of the good beyond a statement that social cooperation and the protection of a plurality of ideas about the good are a desirable outcome of justice. The term conception on the other hand refers to a political conception and the parts that constitute its systematic meaning. The term idea then is used as a more general term that can apply to either a doctrine or a conception depending on the context. So then a political conception of justice is constructed from the coherent and systematic clarification of various component ideas. This will be laid out more completely in the following section on the idea of a freestanding political conception of justice. But first it is important to turn to the fundamental aims and questions that Rawls sought to clarify and answer.

B. The Fundamental Aims of Rawlsian Theory

Recall from Chapter One, the four roles of political philosophy that Rawls lays out: a) the practical; b) orientation; c) reconciliation; and d) probing the limits of practicable possibility. These roles guide the work in Rawlsian theory which addresses separate, but related questions (TJ and JFR; PL and IPRR; LoP). Insight into how to respond to contemporary problems can be gained by considering how Rawls frames political problems and seeks to respond to those problems. The theory of justice as
fairness (TJ and JFR) aims to "work out a liberal political conception of justice for a democratic regime" (in Reply to Habermas, PL, p. 375). For Rawls, this involves developing principles of justice that are consistent with the considered convictions of a liberal democracy and can be endorsed or affirmed by reasonable citizens. As a device of representation that models the considered convictions of a democratic society, the original position provides a method for expressing the outcomes of this thought experiment and serves as a method of justification for principles of justice. These ideas will be spelled out in more detail in forthcoming sections. The second domain of Rawlsian theory was developed in Political Liberalism and lays out the family of ideas of political justice which focuses on stability and the legitimacy of law in a constitutional democracy. This answers the question: "How is it possible for those affirming a comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, and in particular doctrines based on religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception of justice that supports a constitutional democratic society" (IPRR, in PL, p.490)? Hereafter, the term political liberalism will be used to characterize the full scale of Rawlsian theory with the idea that the theory of justice as fairness is one of a number of reasonable liberal conceptions of justice in the political culture of constitutional democracies. Rawls holds that in his judgment based upon due reflection, justice as fairness is the most reasonable conception of political justice in this tradition, but that it is reasonable to expect that other free and equal citizens may hold other perspectives. As will be discussed below, a criterion for reasonable liberal conceptions of justice is important to this idea. And finally, the question of how political liberalism extends to international diplomacy is addressed in the Law of Peoples (LoP).
To summarize, the fundamental aims that comprise Rawls' political liberal conception of justice include:

a) A conception of justice for free and equal people in a liberal democratic society;
b) Justification of basic principles of justice;
c) The question of intergenerational stability of democratic regimes; and
d) The question of global diplomacy and how liberal democratic societies should interact with other peoples.

These aims form Rawls's search for principles of justice for a democratic society of free and equal citizens who can find agreement on the basic structure of society in which a conception of justice is mutually affirmed by an overlapping consensus of citizens who hold and maintain a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The LoP addresses how a reasonable, well-ordered society of free and equal citizens should conduct relations with other nations.

C. Method of Justification in Rawls

As discussed in Chapter One, the idea of justification is vital to the work of normative theory in ethics. The work goes beyond description of cultural norms that prescribe the right and wrong or the good and the bad. Rather, normative theory lays out a systematic justification that gives reasons for normative claims. In Rawls' work, the ideas of reflective equilibrium, the original position, constructivism, and public reason are the basis of Rawlsian justification. "But reflective equilibrium is the most general idea of justification, and it provides the framework for understanding these other ideas" (Freeman, 2007, p. 29). The idea of reflective equilibrium is the beginning of Rawls' attempt to lay out a procedure or method for moral judgment.
D. Moral Theory and Reflective Equilibrium

Moral philosophy and moral theory, which is a part of moral philosophy, according to Rawls must be consistent with the accepted and general facts of natural and social science, but must remain independent of other fields of inquiry due to its own distinct set of problems and subject matter (see The Independence of Moral Theory, 1975, in CP). Reflective equilibrium as it is conceived in Rawlsian theory is a specific method of justification for a distinct domain of moral questions and judgments. It is a distinctive approach for moral philosophy and not intended as a methodology for other areas of inquiry, but rather is intended as an approach to moral justification for discerning principles of political justice. Freeman (2007, p. 36) points out that reflective equilibrium is not a metaphysical theory about the nature of truth, nor is it "a general epistemological thesis about the nature of justification in general". As will be discussed further in the idea of the person, reflective equilibrium suggests that citizens have a capacity for reason including a sense of justice. Rawls suggests that these capacities develop over the "normal" course of human lives. The capacity for a sense of justice is an "intellectual power, since its exercise in making judgments calls upon the powers of reason, imagination, and judgment" (JFR, p.29). Rawlsian theory is confident in the idea that human beings have the moral and intellectual capacity for reasoning and judgment, to discern right and wrong, good and bad, as well as develop moral principles by which to guide the structure of institutions in society including the actions of individuals and their representatives.

Reflective equilibrium begins with considered judgments on moral matters, these being judgments made under conditions "favorable to the exercise of reason and a sense
of justice". Rawls uses the example of Lincoln's position on slavery: "If slavery is not wrong, then nothing is wrong" (p.29) to illustrate the idea of a considered judgment rendered from the use of impartial reason about what ought to be and expressing a confidently held conviction. A conception of justice, however, must fit many considerations and judgments, often conflicting or contradictory judgments even within the moral thought of a single person. That is, people hold many judgments regarding different experiences and different moral cases which influence their deeply held convictions. A conception of justice then is an attempt to make a systematic reconciliation of the differences and contradictions in moral judgments and to find equilibrium between the judgments and convictions and the principles of justice.

The implications of the judgments we render on one question may be inconsistent or incongruent with those we render on other questions... Many of our most serious conflicts are conflicts within ourselves. Those who suppose their judgments are always consistent are unreflective or dogmatic; not uncommonly they are ideologues and zealots. The question arises: how can we make our own considered judgments of political justice more consistent both within ourselves and with considered judgments of others without imposing on ourselves an external political authority (JFR, p. 30)?

Recall from Chapter One, the distinction between narrow reflective equilibrium and wide reflective equilibrium. The idea of wide reflective equilibrium is emphasized in Rawlsian theory and this involves consideration of alternative conceptions of justice and the weight of reasons or arguments for those conceptions. The range of conceptions of justice includes the political conceptions of justice from the leading philosophical traditions. "[W]e suppose this person's [the person engaged in the method of reflective equilibrium] general convictions, first principles, and particular judgments are in line; but now the reflective equilibrium is wide, given the wide-ranging reflection and possibly
many changes of view that have preceded it" (JFR, p. 31). In *Political Liberalism*, the method of reflective equilibrium is extended to the intersubjective verification of moral judgments and principles of justice through the political constructivist practice of public reason. It is said that when a society has achieved a well-ordered stability for the right reasons, that is a just basic structure, through the legitimacy of public reasoning, a "full, reflective equilibrium" is achieved. These concepts will be defined in more detail as this chapter is laid out.

**E. Ideal Theory and Non-Ideal Theory**

When distinguishing between ideal theory and non-ideal theory, the purpose or aim of Rawlsian theory must be considered. Ideal theory is concerned with the justification of principles of justice for a liberal constitutional democracy; this emphasizes the "ideals" by which a just society is structured. Conversely, Rawls contends non-ideal theory deals with injustice and the aims of reparation, retribution, and restitution. "It comprises such topics as the theory of punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification for opposing unjust regimes, ranging from civil disobedience and militant resistance to revolution and rebellion. Also included here are compensatory justice and weighing one form of institutional injustice against another" (*TJ*, p. 8).

To clarify, the distinction between ideal theory and non-ideal theory for Rawls is partly explained by the four roles of political philosophy (see above, p.34-35). Rawlsian theory is not utopian or futuristic in its idealization. But rather works from the ideals and ideas already existing in democratic societies, considering the ideals inherent in the history, traditions, and culture of democratic society. Rawls aims to clarify these ideals, to systematize them into a consistent family of ideas, and finding the spaces within the
plurality of positions in a free society where people can reconcile their differences. As the fourth aim of political philosophy suggests, within this enterprise is the “probing of the limits of the practicable”. For Rawls, ideal theory must be rooted in the plausible or the possible, what has been described as realistic utopian, it cannot contradict the sociological and psychological capacities and dispositions of human beings, to do so would be merely utopian. But it also must endeavor to understand practical dilemmas in society and serve as an edifying framework. As a systematic framework of ideas, or a conception, ideal theory can be an educative guide in understanding the moral choices of the real world. In working as a guide or a frame of reference in reflective dialogue with non-ideal theory, ideal theory is one part of a philosophical life rooted in the reflective process of fitting considered convictions and judgments with principles of justice for the practice of democratic life.

Thus in moral theory, Rawls suggests that ideal theory must be developed first or independently of non-ideal theory as a means for providing a standard or a moral frame of reference. From this standard, non-ideal theory can work towards the ideal.

In the absence of such an ideal form for background institutions, there is no rational basis for continually adjusting the social process so as to preserve background justice, nor for eliminating existing injustice. Thus ideal theory, which defines a perfectly just basic structure, is a necessary complement to non-ideal theory without which the desire for change lacks an aim (PL, p.285).

Considered in light of the idea of reflective equilibrium, both domains are open to revision in the process of reflecting on and fitting together considered judgments with principles of justice.
F. Political Constructivism and a Freestanding Political Conception of Justice

In *PL* (see p. 89-129), Rawls elaborates a conception of political constructivism that gives a procedure of justificatory reason for a conception of justice while remaining neutral to metaphysical and epistemological theories. In laying out this conception, Rawls seeks a method for justifying reasons through deliberation and reflection that can allow for a reasonable plurality of metaphysical positions. Three parts are laid out for this conception of political constructivism and provide a view of objectivity in constructing a free-standing political conception of justice that remains neutral towards religious and philosophical statements regarding the metaphysical truth of moral judgments. These parts are:

1) The meaning of constructivism;
2) Constructivism and objectivity;
3) Why and how political constructivism is limited to the political.

Rawls begins:

Political constructivism is a view about the structure and content of a political conception. It says that once, if ever, reflective equilibrium is attained, the principles of political justice (content) may be represented as the outcome of a certain procedure of construction (structure). In this procedure, as modeled by the original position, rational agents, as representatives of citizens and subject to reasonable conditions, select the public principles of justice to regulate the basic structure of society. This procedure, we conjecture embodies all the relevant requirements of practical reason and shows how the principles of justice follow from the principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and person, themselves ideas of practical reason (*PL*, p. 89-90).

Practical reason here concerns a kind of reasoning that is deliberative and reflective about questions regarding what people ought to do or about what is right action, or more generally, it is reasoning for moral judgments. This is often described in terms that draw distinction or contrast to theoretical reason which is focused upon the description and analysis of facts, in the case of ethics, description and analysis of moral facts and the
objective truth of those facts. In contrast to practical reason's moral judgments, theoretical reason involves empirical judgments. Rawls defines practical reason as "concerned with the production of objects according to a conception of those objects - for example, the conception of a just constitutional regime taken as the aim of political endeavor - while theoretical reason is concerned with knowledge of given objects" (PL, p. 93). The two forms of reason are related in that theoretical reason is vital to filling out an understanding of the moral case, while practical reason aims to "produce" workable conceptions. Another way to think about this distinction is the view that practical reason is concerned with what people should do (actions and ought) and theoretical reason is concerned with what people should believe (Persson, 2013, p. 205-206).

In defining political constructivism, Rawls distinguishes the approach with two other predominant approaches in normative theory, rational intuitionism and Kantian constructivism (a form of social contract theory, of which Rawls' TJ is an example), both of which are characterized as reasonable comprehensive doctrines (p. 90-101). Rawls moves away from the Kantian tradition that characterizes the approach in TJ due to what are described as inherent flaws to the stability of such an approach. PL is focused on answering these questions of stability for a pluralistic democracy.

The full significance of a constructivist political conception lies in its connection with the fact of reasonable pluralism and the need for a democratic society to secure the possibility of an overlapping consensus on its fundamental political values. The reason such a conception may be the focus of an overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines is that it develops the principles of justice from public and shared ideas of society as a fair system of cooperation and of citizens as free and equal by using the principles of their common practical reason. In honoring those principles of justice citizens show themselves autonomous, politically speaking, and thus in a way compatible with their reasonable comprehensive doctrines (PL, P. 90).
In part, political constructivism is a method for metaphysical neutrality. In reflective equilibrium, a comprehensive doctrine, even if it seems to be accurate and true, fails to respect the pluralistic realities of democracy. To achieve this, Rawls moves to a position of neutrality on metaphysical positions by shifting from truth claims about justice to the idea of reasonableness and focusing agreement on the domain of the political and an appeal to fundamental political values. There is a generality to the fundamental political values, which are existent in the public political culture of a society. These values are recognizable and meaningful to members of the society. The specificity of the meaning of these political values is left to persons to fill out in his or her own conception of the good. What is important to the stability of such a society is that within these views, the reasonableness of a conception of justice is affirmed by citizens who affirm the compatibility of a political conception of justice and a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. This involves recognition of others' views as reasonable when they cohere to political justice. For this, Rawls contends that a constructivist approach must provide the criteria by which reasonable political conceptions of justice can be judged.

There are four fundamental features that define political constructivism (PL, p. 93-94). The first being "the principles of political justice (content) may be represented as the outcome of a procedure of construction (structure). In this procedure rational agents, as representatives of citizens and subject to reasonable conditions, select the principles to regulate the basic structure of society" (p.93). Within the social contract tradition, this procedure of construction comes in many forms, for Rawls the original position is the model of the procedure of construction which defines the convictions of the political
culture and constructs principles of justice that fit these convictions. The second feature is practical reason and not theoretical reason as the basis for the procedure of construction. The third feature then is "a complex conception of the person and society which give form and structure to its construction". In contrast, Rawls contends that in rational intuitionism, the conception of the person is "sparse" because it does not need more than a view of the person as "knower" of an objective moral truth. A moral truth that exists independent of human perception or reasoning. Whereas in a political constructivist approach, a complex view of the person and society is necessary to fill out the "form and structure" of a political conception. This complexity is laid out in the ideas of political society as a form of social cooperation and the person as having the two moral powers of a sense of justice and a conception of the good. These two aspects of the third feature will be defined in more detail in forthcoming sections of this chapter. The fourth feature includes specification of "an idea of the reasonable and applies this idea to various subjects: conceptions and principles, judgments and grounds, persons and institutions" (p. 94). For each of these cases, a criterion must provide a specification by which to judge the reasonableness of the subject. These features define the aim of political constructivism:

We adopt a constructivist view to specify the fair terms of social cooperation as given by the principles of justice agreed to by the representatives of free and equal citizens when fairly situated. The bases of this view lie in fundamental ideas of the public political culture as well as citizens’ shared principles and conceptions of practical reason. Thus, if the procedure can be correctly formulated, citizens should be able to accept its principles and conceptions along with their reasonable comprehensive doctrine. The political conception of justice can then serve as the focus of an overlapping consensus (PL, p. 97).
Through a political constructivist approach, one that is political and not metaphysical, a reasonable plurality of citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines can "construct" the terms of a political conception of justice and its principles. This does not require denying beliefs held by citizens and their comprehensive doctrines. But instead, the idea of social cooperation and the bonds of that political relation are seen as constitutive of benefits to all. "The appeal is rather to the political value of a public life conducted on terms that all reasonable citizens can accept as fair. This leads to the ideal of democratic citizens settling their fundamental differences in accordance with an idea of public reason" (p. 98). This idea of public reason will be of central focus at the end of this chapter and is at the heart of this study in general. By situating essential political and constitutional ideas in the domain of public reason, that is in a shared view, common or familiar to all citizens and neutral to reasonable metaphysical doctrines, the political conception is "freestanding".

The idea of the reasonable then is situated in the reason of the public. Reasonable involves a shared public view of the fair terms of social cooperation. "It is by the reasonable that we enter the public world of others and stand ready to propose, or accept, as the case may be, reasonable principles to specify fair terms of social cooperation (PL, p. 114). The objective point of view in justice as fairness is represented by the view of free and equal citizens. In the section of this chapter on the idea of the original position, the way in which Rawls represents objectivity in the model will illustrate these ideas. The objective view then is a kind of intersubjective verification through public reason. The idea of objectivity then, is not about uncovering an objective moral order in this sense, but of a broad view, shared by all citizens, that provides an acceptable means for thinking
and judging the terms of agreement. Reflectively, a person attempts to occupy this position from the many positions of others. Public reason is objective in the sense that it is open, transparent, and a public form of justification.

The very idea of objectivity itself can be problematic for some metaphysical or philosophical positions such as a moral skeptic. However, Rawls lays out what Freeman (2007, p. 357) has called "political objectivity" which is based on claims "regarding the objectivity of political principles without committing us to accepting their moral truth or validity within a comprehensive doctrine" (p. 358). That is, the conception of justice and the validity of its claims of objectivity are only made within the political domain, of which it may have its own internal logic or claim of "truth".

Rawls lays out five essential features or "elements" of objectivity required for a framework of public justification of which a number of competing epistemological theories can support (PL, p. 110-112). For a moral and political conception to be objective, it must address these five elements. The first element, a conception of objectivity "must establish a public framework of thought sufficient for the concept of judgment to apply and for conclusions to be reached on the basis of reasons and evidence after discussion and due reflection" (PL, p. 110). This involves criteria and mutually recognized understanding of how evidence and the reasons that evidence supports are verified or validated, or at least "able to make judgments and draw inferences on the basis of mutually recognized criteria and evidence, not through rhetoric and persuasion" (PL, p. 110)

The second element of objectivity "must specify a concept of a correct judgment [emphasis added] made from its point of view" (p.111). The correct judgment must aim
to be either reasonable or true or determined as sound in its conclusions. The third specifies an *order of reasons* "as given by its principles and criteria, and it must assign these reasons to agents, whether individual or corporate, as reasons they are to weigh and be guided by... to act from these reasons, whether moved by them or not, and so these assigned reasons may override the reasons agents have or think they have, from their own point of view". The fourth element involves a distinction between *the objective point of view* and a partial/positional point of view, of any particular individual or group. And the fifth element of objectivity is "*an account of agreement in judgment* among reasonable agents" (p. 112). For instance, political constructivism has an account of reasonable persons in which these agents are able "to learn and master the concepts and principles of practical reason as well as the principles of right and justice that issue from the procedure of construction" (p.112). Reasonable persons are capable of learning and applying concepts, principles, standards, criteria, and rules of inference, but also achieve the similar conclusions when given the same accurate information.

Rawls then adds a sixth essential that addresses the reasoning and rationale for reasonable disagreement, reasonable disagreement being rooted in the burden's of judgment and the fact of pluralism. In the political constitution of society, reasonable disagreement must be understood through the terms of the political conception in which the elements of objectivity and the procedures of public reason are upheld.

The success of the shared practice among those reasonable and rational is what warrants our saying there is an order of reasons. The idea is that if we can learn to use and apply the concepts of judgment and inference, and ground and evidence, as well as the principles and standards that single out the kind of facts to count as reasons of political justice; and if we find that by reasoning in the light of these mutually recognized criteria we can reach agreement in judgment; or if not agreement, that we can in any case narrow our differences sufficiently to secure what strikes us as just or fair,
honest or decent, relations between us; then all this supports the conviction that there are objective reasons. Those are the kind of grounds that support such a conviction.

Thus, given a background of successful practice over time, this considered agreement in judgment, or narrowing of differences, normally suffices for objectivity (*PL*, 120).

Political constructivism then is limited in its scope. These limits are laying out the political values of a democratic society. It is not concerned with uncovering or laying out all moral values, but rather those that apply to the political domain. For this purpose, political constructivism remains neutral to comprehensive views. "Political constructivism does not criticize, then, religious, philosophical, or metaphysical accounts of the truth of moral judgments and their validity. Reasonableness is its standard of correctness, and given its political aims, it need not go beyond that" (*PL*, p. 127). The political conception of justice then is intended to be acceptable to an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. When the political conception of justice is endorsed in this way, the stability of society is achieved by right reasons. By political conception of justice, Rawls is focused on a particular kind of moral conception, one that takes as its subject the political, social, and economic institutions of society (the basic structure of society). Free and equal citizens endorse a conception on grounds that other reasonable citizens can endorse the conception of justice upon due reflection. The truth of moral claims is left to the individual to determine within his/her own comprehensive view. While political claims are a category of moral claims, they are limited to the constitutional essentials of a democratic society. Constitutional essentials refer to two things: "fundamental principles that specify the general structure of government and the political process... equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that
legislative majorities are to respect" (*PL*, p. 227). In later sections on the idea of an overlapping consensus and the idea of public reason, this will hopefully be made more clear.

**G. The Complexity of the Idea of the Reasonable**

In Chapter One, a distinction was made between the ideas of the reasonable and the rational. To elaborate on this distinction, the complexity and nuanced nature of the reasonable and the ways in which Rawls employed the term will be discussed. The idea of the reasonable is used throughout Rawls' writings and Rawls has been criticized for not properly defining the term (Freeman, 2003, p.31). To provide a simple or precise definition of the idea is in many ways to cage the idea from the complex work that it does in political liberalism and its family of ideas. For Rawls, understanding the idea of the reasonable requires understanding the family of ideas that are part of *political liberalism* and construct his conception of justice.

The nuances of the idea of reasonableness are explicated by such concepts as the idea of the person or the reasonable citizen, the fact of reasonable pluralism, reasonable comprehensive doctrines, reasonable overlapping consensus and so forth. The meaning of the term reasonable refers to descriptive features of fairness and justice associated with persons, principles and conceptions of the good. Reasonable is often used in conjunction with the idea of the person describing the nature of moral capacities. The ideas of pluralism and comprehensive doctrines are also related to the idea of reasonable persons. For it is reasonable persons who affirm reasonable doctrines and based upon the burdens of judgment contributes to a reasonable plurality (*PL*, p.59). The idea of reasonable comprehensive doctrines is linked to three features: 1) "an exercise of theoretical reason...
it covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner”; 2) "singling out which values to count as especially significant and how to balance them when they conflict... an exercise of practical reason"; and 3) "is not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine... it evolves slowly in light of ... good and sufficient reasons" (p.59). This last feature implies an epistemic use which is commonly associated with the meaning to be "in conformity with reason". For instance, this is seen when Rawls suggests in PL that justice as fairness is the most reasonable conception of justice upon due reflection. These distinctions will laid out in more detail in later sections on each subject in this chapter.

As indicated in reflective equilibrium, the broad reflective practice of consideration of different and often competing and contradictory perspectives that must be surveyed to achieve wide reflective equilibrium is consistent with this idea of reasonableness. When taken to full reflective equilibrium, reasonableness moves through public justification and the idea of public reason. Here reasonableness involves the offering of reasons that other free and equal citizens can view as reasonable, if not true. It is an orientation that allows one to think of the points of view of other citizens and those holding moral standing and to think of those other points of view as plausible explanations and judgments. Later in the section on the idea of public reason, the moral duties associated with reasonableness will be discussed. The way in which these meanings apply are dependent upon the context of the use and the aspect or component idea and how it relates to other ideas in the family of reasonable ideas in political liberalism. These will unfold in the following sections.
H. Political liberalism as a Family of Reasonable Ideas

Political liberalism is developed as a systematic approach to solve the dilemma of how a democratic people who hold diverse views about the world and hold various conceptions of the good, what Rawls has called the "fact of pluralism" under conditions of freedom, can agree on the fundamental constitutional structure of society. There are a number of related ideas that must be laid out to understand this approach. These ideas are related and must be considered in how they fit together to form a complete conception of justice for a democratic society.

a. The idea of society as a system of social cooperation. The Rawlsian view of society is for a liberal constitutional democracy which is rooted in the idea of a fair system of social cooperation over time from one generation to the next (Rawls, 2001, p.5). This idea is the central organizing idea in Rawls's political liberal conception of justice as fairness and a basic organizing component in the family of ideas that is political liberalism. For Rawls, social cooperation is a considered point by which to begin a conception of justice. It draws from the political culture of the democratic tradition. "We start the exposition with this idea, which we take to be implicit in the public culture of a democratic society" (PL, p. 15). The idea is seen as a "credible" initial conviction rather than a fixed fundamental position from which reflective equilibrium works to fit into a complete systematic conception of justice for a democratic society. This idea is related to the ideas of free and equal citizens, a well ordered society, and public justification. The political order of society then is not seen as a fixed moral order, nor does it portend a religious or nonreligious source justified through religious or hierarchical doctrines. "[A] system of social cooperation is suggested by the fact that from a political point of view,
and in the context of public discussion of basic questions of political right, its citizens do not regard their social order as a fixed natural order, or as an institutional structure justified by religious doctrines or hierarchical principles expressing aristocratic values" (JFR, p. 6).

The idea of social cooperation is distinct from socially coordinated activity. Socially coordinated activity is subject to efficiency and the regulation and dictation of a central authority. Conversely, social cooperation has "three essential features" (p. 6):

1. Social cooperation is... publicly recognized rules and procedures which those cooperating accept as appropriate to regulate their conduct.
2. The idea of cooperation includes the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are fair terms each participant may reasonably accept, and sometimes should accept, provided everyone else likewise accepts them. Fair terms of cooperation specify an idea of reciprocity or mutuality, all who do their part as the recognized rules require are to benefit as specified by a public and agreed-upon standard.
3. The idea of cooperation also includes the idea of each participant's rational advantage, or good. The idea of rational advantage specifies what it is that those engaged in cooperation are seeking to advance from the standpoint of their own good.

Consent of the citizen to the publicly recognized rules and procedures suggests that authority is not situated in a religious elite or aristocracy, but rather in the citizen as free and equal. The role, then, of the principles of justice is to define the fair terms of social cooperation.

b. The idea of the person. The idea of the person is rooted in the idea of free and equal citizens and is linked to the idea of society as a fair system of social cooperation. The citizen should be capable of being "engaged in social cooperation, and hence as fully capable of doing so, and this over a complete life" (Rawls, 2001, p.18). Rawls contends that the idea is a normative and political idea, a political conception of the person, and not
a metaphysical or psychological conception, though the normative and political idea should be consistent with knowledge from scientific fields to support the idea that persons are capable of social cooperation over a lifetime. "Two moral powers" are defined as necessary for a fully capable person: a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good. A sense of justice refers to "the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify fair terms of social cooperation" (p.19). The capacity for a conception of the good invokes "the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good" (p. 19). The good means to have a conception of "ends" or what is of value in human life and the capacity to systematize these values into a coherent view of the world in a way that allows a person to follow a course in life. Rawls suggests that this coherent view is generally contained within what he calls comprehensive doctrines, or the religious, philosophical, or ideological doctrines that give structure and meaning to a person's worldview. The sense of justice and the conception of the good should move the person to engage in social cooperation from a motivation for mutual benefit, but also, from an internalized or socialized recognition of the value of the fair terms or "to be moved to honor the fair terms for their own sake" (p.19).

Rawls continues with a definition of the meaning of free and equal which are significant ideas in the conception of the citizen. The idea that persons are able to fully participate in social cooperation over a complete lifetime through an essential minimum capacity for the moral powers is central to the idea of equal persons. "The moral powers as the basis of equality" are linked to the idea of a political conception of society and does not refer to the private associations in which people engage. "All who can be fully
cooperating members of political society count as equals and can be treated differently only as the public political conception of justice allows" (p.21). Remember from the discussion of rights and duties, that rights entail duties or obligations, to be fully cooperating members of a political society, a person must be capable of both knowing his/her rights and capable of fulfilling obligations or duties. This does not mean disregard for persons or beings not capable of these moral powers, but does confer a status upon those who are functioning members of a polity. As will be described in the section on the principles of justice, moral regard or standing is protected for the "least advantaged".

The idea of freedom then is also tied to the idea of a political conception of justice distinct from definitions in other areas of philosophy. For Rawls, the idea of liberty is linked to a conception of the good. "Citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good" (p. 21). To be free is to have the capacity to determine a good life, to rationally pursue that life, and to alter and "revise" that conception over a lifetime. Freedom in terms of a political conception of justice, then, involves conceiving of the good in a rational and reasonable basis. In keeping with a Kantian view, Rawls suggests that free persons are "self-authenticating sources of valid claims" (p.23). As a matter of right, the free person regards themselves in ways that in which he/she can make claims towards the institution, as the object of those claims, to pursue his/her conception of the good. This is limited by the idea of reasonableness which requires the "conceptions of the good and the moral doctrines citizens affirm are compatible with the public conception of justice; these duties and obligations are self-authenticating from a political point of view" (p.23).
c. The idea of a well-ordered society. A society conceived as a system of social cooperation between reasonable citizens that is regulated by a widely held public conception of justice is well-ordered. "This is a highly idealized concept. Yet any conception of justice that cannot well order a constitutional democracy is inadequate as a democratic conception” (p. 35). To account for the plurality of comprehensive doctrines, it is limited to the domain of the political. The reason for this limitation is that in democratic societies, the social fact of reasonable pluralism means that people holding different comprehensive views must find agreement on the terms regulating the basic social and political institutions of society. This cannot be achieved through coercive force or oppressive means. But rather, must be in terms agreeable to at the very least a majoritarian consensus of reasonable citizens (see PL, 35-40). This idea of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines will be defined in more detail later when laying out the ideas of public justification.

For Rawls, political liberalism suggests that a well-ordered society is a stable deliberative democracy with a legitimate constitutional regime regulated by a liberal conception of justice. Three criteria define a well-ordered society.

1) A public conception of justice: "it is a society in which everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the very same political conception of justice (and so the same principles of political justice).

2) Regulation of the basic structure of society: "it's main political and social institutions and how they fit together as one system of cooperation - is publicly known, or with good reason believed, to satisfy these principles".

3) An effective sense of justice: citizens "generally comply with society's basic institutions, which they regard as just” (p. 35).
Later, as the idea of public reason is laid out, the nature of the political conception of justice being the basis for a shared view from which constitutional essentials can be derived should be more complete. As suggested by the discussion of objectivity and the freestanding political conception, this shared viewpoint is objective in that it remains neutral to reasonable comprehensive doctrines. It remains impartial to reasonable citizens' conceptions of the good and defines the terms by which political, social, and legal cooperation persists. As such, "the publicly recognized conception of justice establishes a shared point of view from which citizens' claims on society can be adjudicated" (p. 35).

d. The idea of the basic structure of society. The primary subject of a political conception of justice is the basic structure of society. The basic structure of society includes the fundamental political and social institutions (JFR, p. 39). These institutions include the political constitution and an independent judiciary, forms of legal property, the economic system, and the family (PL, p. 258; JFR, p. 10). It "is the way in which the main political and social institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation, and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of advantages that arises from social cooperation over time" (JFR, p. 10).

Basic questions that Rawls aims to answer regarding this basic structure include finding principles of justice that are most appropriate for a democratic society of free and equal citizens who have different "life-prospects" and determining what differences that arise over time for individuals and across generations can be justified and legitimated. Thus for Rawls the basic structure is the first subject of justice, it provides the "background justice" required of the most basic institutions of society that regulate the way these institutions fit together and "structure" people's daily lives. So then this
primary subject of political and social justice being the basic structure of society is categorized as "domestic justice" and holds a position of priority in justice as fairness. Rawls conceives domestic justice as the justice of a constitutional democratic regime and distinct from two other levels of justice. The second distinct level is local justice which is concerned with the principles that regulate the internal rationale of institutions and associations. An example of this would be the principles that regulate churches, unions, or schools which are "indirectly" constrained by background justice. And the third level is global justice which is concerned with international law. "Justice as fairness starts with domestic justice - the justice of the basic structure. From there it works outward to the law of peoples and inward to local justice" (JFR, p. 11).

It is important to note that these distinctions between the levels of justice and the idea of the political are based on normative theory and its methodology and not on the sociological or anthropological description of society. As feminist and critical race theorists have pointed out in critiques of liberal approaches to justice, the political as an expression of power is imbued in all domains of cultural and social life (Nussbaum, 2003). What normative theory attempts to do is to categorize and disaggregate conditions so as to frame a conception that can answer the question of what is the right thing to do and whether there are principles that can help frame thinking about these questions.

Background justice for Rawls involves clarifying the principles of justice that free and equal citizens can accept as "fair". This means that all benefit from the cooperative relations of the basic institutions in society, but also includes people believing the system is fair in its distribution of differences in life prospects and outcomes. Considering the lens of reflective equilibrium, Rawls aims to describe how differences in "life-prospect"
can be consistent with the conviction that citizens are free and equal while strengthening the bonds of social unity which must be achieved by right reasons. That is, right reasons are reasons that free and equal persons can accept as fair.

**e. The criteria for a reasonable liberal conception of justice.** Rawls lays out three general features by which to categorize liberal political conceptions of justice (see IPRR, in PL). Different forms of utilitarianism (Mill, 1861) and the capabilities approaches of Sen (2009) and Nussbaum (2006; 2011) are examples of liberal conceptions of justice that can be fitted to the political approach.

1) The principles of justice apply to the basic structure of society or "apply to the basic political and social institutions" and specify certain rights, liberties, and opportunities;

2) The conception is free-standing, that is "they can be presented independently from comprehensive doctrines of any kind"; and

3) The conception is rooted in the public political culture of democratic societies or "can be worked out from fundamental ideas seen as implicit in the public political culture of a constitutional regime" (p.453).

The first feature answers to the idea of background justice laying out the constitutional essentials of a democratic regime. The second feature then addresses the plurality of comprehensive doctrines in a democratic society fixing the matter of background justice in the political domain. And the third feature places knowledge and practice in the democratic traditions that have meaning and value to constituents. The idea of reciprocity is fundamental to these features and must be shared between free and equal citizens (PL, p. 450).

**f. Justice as Fairness as exemplar of the family of liberal political conceptions of justice.** The theory of justice as fairness as a political liberal conception of justice is laid out as one of a number of reasonable conceptions of justice in the liberal democratic
tradition. For Rawls, upon due reflection through reflective equilibrium, justice as fairness is considered the most reasonable political conception of justice. Rawls, however, acknowledges that other reasonable citizens may disagree based upon the burdens of judgment and the reasonableness of other perspectives within this tradition. "There are many liberalisms and related views, and therefore many forms of public reason specified by a family of political conceptions of justice, and not by a single one. Of these, justice as fairness is one" (IPRR, in PL, p. 450).

**g. The idea of the original position, as a model of representation.** The original position is a device of representation illustrating specific convictions existing in the political culture of the democratic tradition; these convictions are then represented in the structure of the model. The model is a heuristic device that provides justification for a conception of justice for a democratic society as laid out by the previous ideas of social cooperation, citizens as free and equal, and focused upon the basic structure. Consistent with the method of reflective equilibrium, the original position considers which conception of justice among the prevailing conceptions of justice in the democratic tradition is the most reasonable conception of justice for a liberal democratic regime. Likewise, the model demonstrates a view that the source of moral commitments to justice in the terms of social cooperation is rooted in the idea of agreement between free and equal persons (citizens). This is distinct from many other approaches to justice which espouse other sources for moral commitments. For instance, natural law is based upon knowledge of an independent moral order with an external source for that morality. Rawls rather seeks an approach to justifying a kind of agreement rooted in mutual or
reciprocal advantage that reworks the once predominant social contract tradition (See PL, p. 22-28; JFR, p. 14-18).

In essence, when considering the original position, a reader of Rawls evaluates what is the most rational conception of justice for the basic structure of society when given a limited view (the veil of ignorance) of his or her own position in that society. This is modeled by the representatives in the original position. In keeping with the original position, persons (representatives in the OP) consider what rational judgment is appropriate for a person or a person's representative to make regarding the principles of justice by which the constitution of the basic structure of society is constructed when certain conditions are represented. These conditions are intended to situate the representatives symmetrically, as free and equal persons with the basic moral powers. The veil of ignorance represents the kinds of knowledge permitted in making judgments from the original position, this includes "general facts and circumstances" such as accepted facts from social and political theory, scientific knowledge and economic theory. The veil of ignorance limits knowledge of one's social position (race and ethnic group, sex and gender, strength and intelligence) and which comprehensive doctrine the representative holds (JFR, p. 87). The limits placed upon these judgments are intended to represent conditions of impartiality between free and equal persons, that is to represent fair conditions by which an agreement on the fair terms of social cooperation can be affirmed. Furthermore, the judgment is intended to be made considering what conception of justice is rational for persons so positioned (as rational free and equal persons behind the veil of ignorance) as well as the best conception based upon the best reasons that can be mutually endorsed (PL, p. 26). This means that the acceptable reasons for agreement
are restricted by those reasons that can be mutually endorsed when representatives are ignorant of the comprehensive doctrines that are personally endorsed.

The original position as a philosophical experiment and a form of justification is part of the long social contract tradition in political philosophy. As stated previously, the original position represents the justification of principles of justice for a democratic society of free and equal people. Considering the social fact of pluralism, a democratic people cannot appeal directly to the authority of a comprehensive doctrine, that is to an external moral authority nor to any hierarchical doctrine that does not uphold a conviction to the idea of the person as free and equal. Thus Rawls uses the philosophical "imagination", to consider the people, as free and equal, as the source of moral authority in a hypothetical, thought experiment that models fundamental ideas of democratic culture. The original position and the social contract approach is not an historical event, but rather a theoretical examination. For Rawls, the hypothetical social contract is not a binding contract setting out obligations, but rather adheres to the roles of political philosophy as an edifying model or device of representation that is a "thought experiment for the purpose of public- and self-clarification" (*PL*, p. 26; *JFR*, p. 17).

**h. The two principles of justice.** The two principles of justice are constructed in the context of the fundamental ideas regarding society as a fair system of cooperation, attending to the basic structure of society in a constitutional democracy, well-ordered over time, for persons as free and equal citizens. The original position models those limits imposed by the considered convictions of a people established over time through the political culture and recognizable to members of the society. For example, the concepts of liberty and equality have developed over time in the tradition of political philosophy in
western society and have been part of the political culture in western nations such as the United States. Albeit, the political, social, and economic practices of the nation in reality both historically and contemporaneously do not always, if ever, match the ideals. However, the role of the political philosopher is to explain, define, and reconcile the dissonance between considered convictions or deeply held values and the realities of social and political life. This role of reconciliation is an edifying activity that demonstrates the spaces of agreement and gives reasons why affirmation of these principles is both rational and reasonable. Thus the ideals act as a framework for judging the considered convictions and the contradictions that arise in understanding those convictions in the context of the larger society.

The first principle establishes the priority of liberty, with an attention to the multiple liberties associated with a constitutional regime. The second principle then addresses distributive justice with two subset principles (the principle of fair equality of opportunity and the difference principle) that establish the limits of inequality in terms of social and economic differences. Below are the versions of the two principles of justice in *JFR* (p. 42):

a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and

b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions; first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).

In the liberty principle, the first principle above, the priority of liberty is established. "This means that in applying a principle (or checking it against test cases) we
assume that the prior principles are fully satisfied" (p. 43). The scheme of equal basic liberties emphasizes the notion of multiple liberties and not the abstract notion of liberty. By basic liberties, Rawls implies the liberties that are significant to the freedom of democratic citizens. This includes the liberties essential to the exercise and development of the moral powers and necessary for citizens to pursue a wide range of conceptions of the good. By this Rawls lays out a list of basic liberties, though not intended to be a complete and exhaustive list. Of priority in this basic list of liberties are those deemed as fundamental, this emphasizes freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, the political liberties (the right to vote and freedom to participate in political life), freedom of association, the rights and liberties specified by the liberty and integrity of the person (physical and psychological), and the rights and liberties covered by the rule of law.

We consider what liberties provide the political and social conditions essential for the adequate development and full exercise of the two moral powers of free and equal persons... first, that the equal political liberties and freedom of thought enable citizens to develop and to exercise these powers in judging the justice of the basic structure of society and its social policies; and second, that liberty of conscience and freedom of association enable citizens to develop and exercise their moral powers in forming and revising and in rationally pursuing (individually or, more often, in association with others) their conceptions of the good (JFR, p. 45).

The basic rights and liberties secure and protect the conditions under which citizens exercise the two moral powers while the political liberties are the protections against the monopolization of power and are vital to citizens maintaining other liberties, thus are imperative to the very idea of freedom. Rawls considers the rights and liberties that are the object of the first principle to be the constitutional essentials of a democratic society and are most urgent to a "working political agreement" for the political institutions in the basic structure (p. 46).
The second principle is concerned with distributive justice and is focused upon the social and economic institutions of the basic structure. Here, the principle of fair equality of opportunity is prior to the difference principle. Fair equality of opportunity is Rawls' response to the problems that arise from formal equality of opportunity in free market societies and which operates on assumptions of merit or the idea of "careers open to talents - in the system of natural liberty" (p. 43). Formal equality is rooted in legal equality, but does not account for the differences in social position that arise in market economies. For instance, in education, the socio-economic status (SES) of a student is the most reliable predictive factor for student achievement across various measures of achievement. Achievement correlates with SES beyond any basis in natural talent and correlates to the factors of social and cultural opportunities as well as with the higher levels of health and well-being of the child from higher SES backgrounds (Sirin, 2005). Fair equality of opportunity seeks to ensure that persons regardless of the social class to which they are born, have the same opportunity to enter into public offices or social positions, of which education serves an important role in providing these opportunities. Regulatory mechanisms must provide that talent and motivation are met with the opportunity for social mobility, that is the chance to develop those talents and to use one's talents to enter into the wide range of public and social positions.

"Supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the same level of talent and ability and the willingness to use these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin... In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achievement for those similarly motivated and endowed (p. 44).

As Maffettone (2011, p. 72) suggests, the two principles of justice must be considered together, not separately, to fully understand how the principles of justice
regulate the terms of social cooperation, "only their combination is coherent with the
theory of justice as fairness". So then, liberty is prioritized, but it is an egalitarian liberty
that is based on a constitutional scheme of equal basic liberties. The idea of equality and
an attention to principles of equity as seen in the second principle of justice work to
ensure the fair value of that scheme of basic liberties and the distribution of resources and
opportunities in a well-ordered society. Recall from a preceding discussion that it is vital
that citizens as free and equal believe the society and the terms of social cooperation are
fairly structured and that they are free to pursue their conceptions of the good within
reasonable limits. This concern for citizens affirming a fair agreement on the terms of
social cooperation and a conception of justice is rooted in an idea of stability and was the
focus of a fundamental shift in Rawls' later works. The idea of public justification by way
of public reason is central to this task.

i. Public Justification and Legitimation from Justice as Fairness to Political
Liberalism. Much of the discussion thus far has focused on the family of ideas in
political liberalism and the justification of a liberal conception of justice, justice as
fairness conceived by Rawls as the most reasonable example in a family of liberal
political conceptions of justice (PL, p. xlvi). The original position (OP) models
fundamental ideas of society and the person as well as impartiality and reciprocity; the
principles of justice are constructed to regulate the relationships of citizens within the
structure of the basic institutions of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness.
Furthermore, the OP is a method of justification for the reasonableness of a certain
political conception of justice, edifying the society to the choices in the tradition of
democratic theory and providing reasons for judgments regarding an affirmation of
principles of justice. But as Rawls concedes, based upon the burdens of judgment and the fact of pluralism in democratic societies, other citizens may endorse a different liberal conception of justice from within the democratic tradition (PL, p. xlvii). For reference to the criteria for a reasonable liberal conception of justice (see above, p. 77).

Recall, that in general, justification in moral philosophy and normative ethics is concerned with presenting the reasons for moral judgments. In Political Liberalism, Rawls lays out three kinds of justification that are essential distinctions for understanding the idea of an agreement on a political conception of justice: *pro tanto* justification, full justification, and public justification (PL, p. 386-387). *Pro tanto* justification involves the justification of a political conception of justice in public reason based on political values alone. "That is, the political values specified by it can be suitably ordered, or balanced, so that those values alone give a reasonable answer by public reason to all or nearly all questions concerning constitutional essentials and basic justice" (p. 386). This aims to determine if a political conception of justice reasonably answers various political questions. "By examining a wide range of political questions to see whether a political conception can always provide a reasonable answer we can check to see if it seems to be complete" (p. 386). This is a reflective method of determining the theoretical completeness of a conception of justice and as Rawls contends "can be overridden by citizens' comprehensive doctrines once all values are tallied up".

The idea of *full justification* then relates to the citizen "tallying up" the values of a political conception of justice. "In this case, the citizen accepts a political conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in some way into the citizen's comprehensive doctrine as either true or reasonable, depending on what that doctrine allows" (p.386).
For instance, the moral skeptic may not accept the truth of moral judgments, but may agree that the political conception of justice is a reasonable means for assuring a basic set of liberties and opportunities. Conversely, a Catholic may consider the political conception of justice as the most reasonable conception of justice for a democratic society to obtain the moral truth as interpreted and understood in the religious doctrines of the Church, a political conception that protects religious liberties through tolerance and freedom of conscience. In this form of full justification, the link between the political conception of justice and the comprehensive doctrine of the individual citizen is the focus. "Some may consider the political conception fully justified even though it is not accepted by other people. Whether our view is endorsed by them is not given sufficient weight to suspend its full justification in our eyes" (p.386). Full justification concerns the individual citizen or an association of individuals (as in a religious group) endorsing the truth or reasonableness of that conception while determining the way in which "the claims of political justice" must be reconciled with nonpolitical values, as the reasonable comprehensive doctrine provides the conception of the good endorsed. "The political conception gives no guidance in such questions, since it does not say how nonpolitical values are to be counted... a political conception of justice is not dependent upon a comprehensive doctrine... even though a political conception of justice is freestanding, that does not mean it cannot be embedded in various ways... into the different doctrines citizens affirm" (p. 387).

Public justification then is focused upon the political society. It is the space, in the abstract sense, where the shared political conception of justice is the "common ground and all reasonable citizens taken collectively are held in general and wide reflective
equilibrium in affirming the political conception on the basis of their several reasonable comprehensive doctrines" (p.388). The idea of public justification links justification and legitimacy working through the ideas of an overlapping consensus and stability for right reasons, or by public reason. These ideas will be laid out in more detail in the forthcoming sections of this chapter dealing with the overlapping consensus and public reason.

But first, there is the subject of legitimacy. Rawls develops the liberal principle of legitimacy to address the issue of stability and toleration, or the limits of toleration in terms of reasonable pluralism. The liberal principle of legitimacy responds to the question of how a society in which people holding different doctrines can agree on the very idea of liberal democracy, endorsing and valuing such a society. Legitimacy accounts for two features of the political relationship of democratic citizens. The first relationship focuses on citizens within the basic structure of society, for clarity of thinking, the structure is one into which citizens "are born and in which they normally lead a complete life" (p.216) For Rawls, the issue of emigration is one to consider in the Law of Peoples and beyond the scope of this discussion (for Rawls' reasoning, see Footnote 4, p. 136). The second feature to consider then is that of coercive power by which compliance with the constitutional and legislative sanctions of governance are enforced; "in a democracy, political power which is always coercive power, is the power of the public, that is, of free and equal citizens" (PL, p. 216). The power of the public is a power of citizens as a collective body, codified by a constitution, exercising coercive political power over each other. In political liberalism, "our exercise of political power is proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution
the essentials of which all citizens may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to them as reasonable and rational. This is the liberal principle of legitimacy" (p. 217). There are two levels in which the liberal principle of legitimacy applies: 1) to the constitutional structure; and 2) to the particular statutes and laws derived by the political process laid out in the constitution (PL, p. xliv).

Thus, for coercive power to be legitimate, it must be justifiable in terms that each citizen can endorse and can reasonably expect other citizens to endorse as well. This Rawls calls the criterion of reciprocity: "our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification for those actions" (p. xliv). This does not necessarily mean that the reasons that an individual citizen may hold as justifying reasons for endorsing the conception of justice are shared with other citizens, for full justification by individual citizens is derived through the meaning of his/her comprehensive doctrine. But when considering the viewpoints of other citizens on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, a citizen appeals to ideals and principles that are of a shared conception of justice drawn from the culture or political tradition. To reiterate, a society that is well-ordered on these grounds is said to be in general and wide reflective equilibrium. As will be described in the idea of public reason, the ideals and principles culled from the democratic tradition and political culture are construed as the political values of public reason, these are values that are general and commonly known or recognized by members of democratic societies. These will be laid out in more detail below. Objectivity in public justification is a form of intersubjective verification in terms that are reasonably agreeable and endorsable for all. As will be
discussed shortly public justification, or public reason more precisely, includes methods of verification or ground rules for inquiry.

**j. The idea of a reasonable overlapping consensus.** Recall that the primary question driving the work of *Political Liberalism* concerns reconciling the problem of stability with the social fact of pluralism (Freeman, 2007; Maffettone, 2011). A society in which the conditions of freedom obtain, will have citizens holding different religious and philosophical views based upon the burdens of judgment and the people's unique positions or perspectives. The idea of a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines is the fundamental idea responding to this question of how people who hold different comprehensive views can agree on the fair terms of cooperation through a political conception of justice. Furthermore, individuals endorse such a conception of justice from their own rational interests and conceptions of the good while affirming the regulative priority of the terms to the pursuit of that conception of the good (Freeman, p. 366). By this is meant that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is reasonable when it can endorse or affirm a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law. Thus, the citizen affirms a conception of justice on the higher order interest for social cooperation through democratic practice as it allows for the plurality of conceptions of the good, of which reasonable comprehensive doctrines elaborate.

To do this, Rawls makes the distinction between the political domain and the non-political (see above, p. 35-37). "The political is distinct from the associational, which is voluntary in ways that the political is not; it is also distinct from the personal and the familial, which are affectional, again in ways the political is not. (The associational, the
personal, and the familial are simply three examples of the nonpolitical; there are others)"
(PL, p. 137). The political domain applies to the basic structure of society and to the fundamental questions of political justice, the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. As such, the political has its own values and principles. For an overlapping consensus to obtain, the matters of constitutional essentials and basic justice must be framed in terms of these political values and principles.

Given the existence of a reasonably well-ordered constitutional regime, two points are central to political liberalism. First, questions about constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice are so far as possible to be settled by appeal to political values alone. Second, again with respect to those same fundamental questions, the political values expressed by its principles and ideals normally have sufficient weight to override all other values that may come in conflict with them (PL, p. 137-138).

Thus, persons affirm the conception of justice through their own comprehensive doctrine, but reconcile that doctrine to the liberal political conception of justice and appeal to political values on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. Political values that other citizens holding different comprehensive doctrines also recognize and affirm. This is at its core the basis of reasonableness through which a broadly affirmed conception of justice based on a kind of public reason shares a value and language discourse that is drawn from the public political culture and is familiar to the members of society. The intention of the overlapping consensus is to achieve both legitimacy in the coercive power of the democratic regime through the consent of the people and to maintain or sustain such a well-ordered society through reasons all can affirm, this is stability for the right reasons.

However, the idea that the value and language discourse is shared should not mask the individual and plural reasons by which individual persons endorse the
conception. People are reasonable when they endorse, appeal to, and are motivated to regulate their life plans based upon a conception of justice. But the reasons that people endorse the conception of justice and the constitution of the democratic regime is rooted in their own conception of the good. This is the point made in the discussion of the three forms of justification in which full justification and public justification deal with the distinct domains of the personal and the public/political (see p. 85-87 above). Maffettone (2010) points to an important distinction regarding the overlapping consensus, "the Rawlsian idea of overlapping consensus can be defended only if we accept that justifications are intrinsically plural, whereas there is convergence on legitimation" (p. 260). Endorsement and compliance in the political domain is both reasonable and rational. The overlapping consensus is not a compromise or a "modus vivendi" for people holding different comprehensive views, but rather an agreement on the most reasonable conception of justice regulating a well-ordered democratic society (For more on this point see PL, p. 144-150). For citizens, there is agreement and overlap upon the value of living in a democratic society in which basic liberties and opportunities are protected in the political constitution of society. Citizens endorse the free-standing political conception of justice as reasonable and rational persons conscious of the mutual or reciprocal benefits of living in a just well-ordered society.

k. The idea of public reason. This section surveys Lecture VI in PL (p. 212 - 254) and draws from The Idea of Public Reason Revisited (1997). To obtain the convergence of a reasonable plurality of comprehensive views through a common or shared language and also a shared way of justificatory reasoning, Rawls develops the idea
of public reason as a means to limit the reasons that are legitimately applied on fundamental constitutional questions. Rawls summarizes the idea of public reason as:

[C]haracteristic of a democratic people: it is the reason of its citizens, of those sharing the status of equal citizenship. The subject of their reason is the good of the public: what the political conception of justice requires of society's basic structure of institutions, and of the purposes and ends they are to serve. Public reason, then, is public in three ways: as the reason of citizens as such, it is the reason of the public; its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice; and its nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and principles expressed by society's conception of political justice, and conducted open to view on that basis. (p. 213)

The excerpt above lays out three fundamental ways in which human reason is made public. The first is the reason of citizens addressing one another as citizens, this is a reciprocal political relationship and informed by the idea of reasonableness and fundamentally based on the criterion of reciprocity. The second, is the subject of public reason which concerns the basic structure of society and the goal of a just well-ordered society based upon a political conception of justice affirmed publicly. And thirdly, the nature and content of public reason is legitimated through transparency and publicity conditions under terms of which all citizens are familiar. That is social cooperation is justified in terms that all reasonable citizens, as free and equal, can know, understand, and affirm.

Public reason is not a popular dialogue or mass debate, it is a purposeful and focused form of public justification concerning the constitutional essentials for the basic structure of fundamental institutions in a democratic regime. Public reason is the reason of a democratic people for resolving the terms of cooperation in the fundamental political and social institutions. As discussed in the idea of reasonable overlapping consensus, the fact of reasonable pluralism requires that in public reason "comprehensive doctrines of
truth or right be replaced by an idea of the politically reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens" (*PL*, p. 441). This form of reasonableness involves citizens addressing other citizens as free and equal persons, respecting those citizens and their viewpoints as the positions of free and equal persons based upon the moral and political standing of the citizen consistent with human rights and the burdens of judgment. This form of reasonableness is also rooted in the mutual benefits of social and political cooperation and the reciprocal duty of civility. The *duty of civility* is defined as the moral duty (not a legal duty) of the citizen to engage in public reason from the position of a reasonable citizen addressing other citizens, following the criterion of reciprocity that is the cornerstone of legitimacy in the use of political power in democratic governance. This means that the citizen and the citizen's representatives must be able to "explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason" (*PL*, p. 217).

Public reason is rooted in the intersubjective meaning and understanding of shared political values drawn from the political culture of the democratic tradition and elaborated by a political conception of justice. Yet, public reason requires also a dispositional aspect of reasonableness. Here, Rawls says "[T]his duty also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fair-mindedness in deciding when accommodations to their views should reasonably be made" (p. 217). These accommodations are made in light of the criteria for a liberal political conception of justice and the reasonableness of a position in conforming to such a conception.

The *ideal* of public reason (emphasis on the term ideal rather than idea) hinges upon this broad view of reasonableness and requires much of the citizen. Rawls has an
optimistic view of the moral powers of the person, to make judgments and behave from
the capacities of the two moral powers (a sense of justice and a conception of the good).
The ideal of public reason lays out this vision of a rigorous and vigorous deliberative
democracy.

Democracy involves, as I have said, a political relationship between
citizens within the basic structure of the society into which they are born
and within which they normally lead a complete life; it implies further an
equal share in the coercive political power that citizens exercise over one
another by voting and in other ways. As reasonable and rational, and
knowing that they affirm a diversity of reasonable religious and
philosophical doctrines, they should be ready to explain the basis of their
actions to one another in terms each could reasonably expect that others
might endorse as consistent with their freedom and equality. Trying to
meet this condition is one of the tasks that this ideal of democratic politics
asks of us. Understanding how to conduct oneself as a democratic citizen
includes understanding an ideal of public reason (p. 217-218).

To many readers, this may seem a tall task or may seem utopian. It is important to
recall the role of the political philosopher in Rawls's view; it is an educative purpose, to
clarify and systematize ideas in the political culture and to reconcile the spaces of
difference and disagreement. Unfortunately, but certainly within reason due to the focus
his work, Rawls does not adequately address the necessary nature of educating future
citizens to the rigorous demands of these ideals though he does suggest that education
plays a role. Rawls's idea of the person works on the view that persons living in such a
well-ordered society constituted through public reason will be socialized and enculturated
into such practice and the more a society practices such an ideal, the more the people will
be habituated to such practice. It is important to remember that his work was focused on
laying out an ideal that provides a framework for a conception of justice aimed at
clarifying ideas in the political culture and reconciling differences in a pluralist
democracy. The idea of the person and the moral powers offers some direction as to the
developmental concerns of future citizens. The development of reasonableness in all its complexity, empathy and sympathy, reflection and a level of civic knowledge required to engage in such practice seems vital. This developmental question of educating future citizens and what that education would look like will be addressed later in this study in *Chapter Five.*

**i. The subject of public reason.** On constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, the reasonable citizen is not driven by atomized private, rational advantage, but rather by the duty of civility to engage in reasonable exchange with other citizens as free and equal, rational and reasonable persons for the public good and mutual advantage.

[T]here is no such thing as private reason. There is social reason - the many reasons of associations in society which make up the background culture; there is also domestic reason - the reason of families as small groups in society - and this contrasts with public and social reason. As citizens we participate in all these kinds of reason and have the rights of equal citizens when we do so (*PL*, p. 220, n. 7).

Public reason does not directly apply to the background culture of society with its many non-public reasons. That means that non-political institutions and associations are free to regulate their activity based on private interests or non-political, nonpublic reasons. However, the constitutional requirements and the law hold certain priority and provide basic protections of liberties. For instance, a church can excommunicate heretics and apostates from their ranks, but they cannot deny the former members of the basic liberties, such as freedom of conscience and freedom from harm; i.e. non-believers cannot be burned at the stake for changing their beliefs nor do they run "afoul of state power" (see Rawls, *PL*, p. 221, 476; *CP*, p. 603).

So then, the subject of public reason is focused on the constitutional essentials of a democratic regime, on matters of justice in the basic structure of society consistent with
political liberal criteria for a conception of justice, and the collective good of such a society. Part of the duty of civility then involves citizens through public reason addressing "higher order interests" regarding the public good, not merely cynical, short-term self-interest. This involves making human reason a public, intersubjective reason which involves all the elements of reasoning:

Now all ways of reasoning - whether individual, associational, or political - must acknowledge certain common elements: the concept of judgment, principles of inference, and rules of evidence, and much else, otherwise they would not be ways of reasoning but perhaps rhetoric or means of persuasion. We are concerned with reason, not simply with discourse. A way of reasoning, then, must incorporate the fundamental concepts and principles of reason, and include standards of correctness and criteria for justification. A capacity to master these ideas is part of human reason (p. 220).

Recall that PL and the idea of public reason especially is Rawls's answer to the problem of stability and the necessity for a reasonable overlapping consensus of comprehensive doctrines. The stability of a just democratic society must be secured by "right reasons". That is stability must be obtained through legitimate means and justifiable to all citizens. This is an ongoing process. "Nevertheless, we may over the course of life come freely to accept, as the outcome of reflective thought and reasoned judgment, the ideals, principles, and standards that specify our basic rights and liberties, and effectively guide and moderate the political power to which we are subject. This is the outer limit of our freedom" (p. 222).

ii. Political values and the content of public reason. Previously, public reason was said to have as its subject the constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. The content of public reason then addresses the substantive meaning of the subject, that is a liberal political conception of justice, and its method of justification. Rawls begins
laying out the content of public reason by summarizing points made previously regarding
the liberal political conception of justice.

A conception of justice is liberal in three ways (*PL*, p. 223):

1) it specifies certain basic rights, liberties, and opportunities;

2) it assigns priority to these rights, liberties, and opportunities;

3) it affirms measures assuring all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make effective use of their basic liberties and opportunities.

Next, the conception of justice is political in three ways also (p.223):

1) framed solely to apply to the basic structure of society, its main political, social, and economic institutions as a unified scheme of social cooperation;

2) it is presented independently of any wider comprehensive religious or philosophical doctrine;

3) it is elaborated in terms of fundamental political ideas viewed as implicit in the public political culture of a democratic society.

Recall that *justice as fairness* is one of a number of political liberal conceptions of justice that meet these criteria. "To engage in public reason is to appeal to one of these political conceptions - to their ideals and principles, standards and values - when debating fundamental political questions" (p. 453). As such, public reason has two distinct parts (p. 224) addressing the constitution of a democratic regime and the justification of that scheme grounded in a conception of justice:

a. substantive principles of justice for the basic structure; and

b. guidelines of inquiry; principles of reasoning and rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy them.

Previously, in the ideal of public reason, the duty of civility and its criterion for reciprocity laid out a position that reasonable citizens should be able to provide reasons in
terms that other citizens can know and affirm. These terms were identified as the political values of public reason. These terms are liberal political values which Rawls separates into two kinds related to the two parts of public reason (parts a and b above). The first are values of political justice which "fall under the principles of justice for the basic structure: the values of equal political and civil liberty, equality of opportunity; the values of social equality and economic reciprocity; and let us add also values of the common good as well as the various necessary conditions for all these values" (p. 224). The second are values of public reason which "fall under the guidelines for public inquiry, which make that inquiry free and public... such political virtues as reasonableness and a readiness to honor the (moral) duty of civility, which as virtues of citizens help to make possible reasoned public discussion of political questions" (p. 224).

For example Rawls identifies a supreme court as an exemplar of public reason (p. 231-240). The judgments of the court are rooted in reasons codified in a constitution, and appeal to ideals and principles expressed in the constitution and in legal precedents. The court is conducted under conditions of impartiality and publicity, in which decisions are addressed to citizens as an explication of the reasons for considered judgments on constitutional matters.

iii. Two views of public reason and the proviso. Some critics have suggested that arguments completely rooted in public reason appealing only to the political values of public reason are an undue limitation on valid reasons for matters of justice (Rawls, p. 247-254). Rawls illustrates how the meaningful values from comprehensive doctrines can be appropriately employed in the political forum laying out both an exclusive and an inclusive view of public reason. Examples such as the abolitionist movement and the civil
rights movement both illustrate the role that a religious or philosophical doctrine can play when serious fundamental crises threaten the stability of a society.

The exclusive view of public reason contends that citizens can only reasonably appeal to fundamental political values when addressing the basic questions of justice on constitutional matters. Under conditions of a well-ordered society, this ideal is the most appropriate approach to settling such questions. However, when society is confronted with serious threats to stability rooted in profound injustice persisting in the basic structure of society, such as the case of slavery in the United States in the 19th Century or the apartheid conditions in the U.S. in the 20th Century, Rawls suggests that a more inclusive view of public reason is necessary.

The inclusive view of public reason aims at allowing for reasons initially elaborated from a comprehensive view to be appealed to in the political forum on such fundamental matters of equal liberty. In *IPRR*, Rawls broadens his openness to appeals to comprehensive doctrines in the public forum. The *proviso* "allows us to introduce into political discussion at any time our comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, provided that, in due course, we give properly public reasons to support the principles and policies our comprehensive doctrine is said to support" (p. 453). There are two aspects that favor this "wide view of the public political culture" which is distinct from the background culture of society in that the political culture applies to the fundamental political relationships of citizens in the basic structure. The *proviso* itself is intended to express tolerance of a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines by which the family of liberal conceptions of justice are given deeper meaning. This openness
according to Rawls further extends the bonds of citizenship and cooperation by broadening the awareness and understanding of the diversity of views in the society. Citizens' mutual knowledge of one another's religious and nonreligious doctrines expressed in the wide view of public political culture recognizes that the roots of democratic citizens' allegiance to their political conceptions lie in their respective comprehensive doctrines, both religious and nonreligious. In this way citizens' allegiance to the democratic ideal of public reason is strengthened for the right reasons. We may think of the reasonable political conceptions as those conceptions' vital social basis, giving them enduring strength and vigor. When these doctrines accept the proviso and only then come into political debate, the commitment to constitutional democracy is publicly manifested (p. 463).

The bonds of social cooperation are invigorated by awareness and reasonable understanding of others views and positions, this is consistent with the human capacity for empathy and sympathy. The ideal is that democratic society is strengthened by its diversity and the mutual acceptance afforded and respected by it. The proviso contends that by offering the terms of a political conception of justice in public reason, the ideals of tolerance and respect or reasonableness are practiced and the commitment to democratic life is demonstrated.

It is in this wider view of public reason, where Rawls nears completeness of vision for political constructivism and the aims of political liberalism. In the wider view, citizens demonstrate and elaborate the breadth of meaning and understanding from a comprehensive view that informs their political judgments. Through transparency of reasoning, that is by openly discussing their own convictions and how these convictions in turn fit within the political values of public reason, their reasoning becomes public. This is educative of the reasonable plurality that constructs the overlapping consensus, it also exemplifies the strength that diversity offers a society by giving voice to the many perspectives on fundamental issues. Sen (2009) has described this as an important aim of
public reason, that is, to broaden the scope of human understanding by minimizing the positional confinements that each and every individual occupies. The anthropologist Richard Schweder (2003) has described this as the "view from manywheres" in his defense of pluralism in contrast to relativism in the social sciences. In turn, the publicity of comprehensive views and their relationship to public reason puts in practice the very method of reconciliation driving Rawlsian theory, that is reflective equilibrium, in the wide and general reflective equilibrium of a just well-ordered society.

I. Political Liberalism and International Diplomacy

Before turning to Chapter Three, a brief sketch of Rawls's treatment of international relations and the moral duties of liberal democratic society in its engagement with the world as laid out in The Law of Peoples (LoP; 1999) will be described. As previously discussed, Rawls's conception of justice is centered on the idea of social cooperation within a single, closed society rooted in the social contract tradition and thus the question of international relations is a matter of "extension". Extension means that in a conception of justice, the terms of social cooperation begin with the case of the basic structure of a society from which basic principles are constructed. The case of global justice then is worked out and fitted to that conception. This is an intellectual activity that begins with the idea of society (see above p. 70-71) in which political cooperation is a vital component to the fair system of social cooperation. The limits imposed on the ideal case are meant to improve the clarity and descriptive meaning of the thought experiment, just as social researchers choose the plausible factors in descriptive empirical research to better understand a phenomena (For a discussion of this point, see Freeman, 2007, p. 416-424). As such, Rawls contends that the first concern of justice is
to determine the constitution of a society and the principles that establish the fair terms of social cooperation. From the conception of justice in the case of a fair system of social cooperation, the cases of global and local justice each have distinct moral considerations that can be developed by extension from an initial conception of justice for a society.

At the core of LoP is the goal to answer the question of how should political liberal societies engage with other societies, or "peoples", in international relations. In other words, what do just liberal constitutional democracies owe one another and how should non-democratic societies be engaged? Again this is an excursion into ideal theory. Rawls suggests that the principles of justice only apply to a society or a people, but that moral duties in general do guide the relationship of a people to other societies. In LoP, Rawls rejects the basic premise of cosmopolitanism as unable to obtain justice on grounds of instability, lack of political participation, and non-interference.

Of interest to this study, the ecological crisis involves issues that transcend national borders. For example, activities of production and consumption within one nation can have impacts upon the environment in other nations such as the effects of pollution or the effects of rising levels of CO2; in both cases, the activities and lifeways of one country impact the quality of life in other countries. The ideas of cosmopolitanism (Nussbaum, 2002) and one world government (Archibugi, 2012; Held, 2009) have been considered as possible or necessary solutions to the many issues, including ecological issues, that plague contemporary life. Rawls rejects aspects of the cosmopolitan approach and maintains an emphasis on democratic society as recognizable in the modern nation-state. However, typical of the Rawlsian approach, valid points in the cosmopolitan point of view are acknowledged and reconciled with political liberalism.
The contrast between the term "peoples" and the term "state" is an important
distinction in LoP (see p. 23-30). A "people" is based upon the idea of society and the
basic structure. A people have a fundamental political relationship and are connected by
shared social, economic, and political institutions. The moral duties associated with
civility and the criterion of reciprocity are emphasized in the political culture. However,
the idea of a people is different than the idea of a nation in that the culture that is shared
is the political culture of society, not a culture based upon a comprehensive doctrine such
as a common religion; a people is a pluralist conception consistent with the fact of
reasonable pluralism in democratic societies. This capacity for a political identity and
culture while maintaining other valuable identities and cultural expressions is consistent
with the concept of contextually contingent multiple identities as described in fields such
as anthropology and social psychology (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004;
Benet-Martínez et al, 2002; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Brook, Garcia & Fleming, 2008).

In contrast to the idea of the state, a people is seen as guided by reasonable
conceptions of justice, rationality is complemented by reasonableness, whereas, the
common view of states in the field of international relations focuses upon the rational
interests of states, of which, Rawls suggests, the roots of modern competition and warfare
are based (p. 27-29). The law of peoples is conceived as a global society of many
peoples, as a system of cooperation between the various liberal and decent societies and
guided by the criterion of reciprocity. There are essentially five typologies to which
Rawls identifies modern peoples and nations. These are 1) just societies, liberal
democracies or "reasonable liberal peoples" in which society is well-ordered for right
reasons (this is the idea of a well-ordered society laid out in PL); 2) decent societies:
these are "decent hierarchical peoples" in which a system of consultation that considers legal and political representation of a public interest and the protection of basic human rights obtain domestically and internationally such a people operates within the criterion of reciprocity with other peoples; 3) outlaw states, these are rogue states that do not observe human rights and act as belligerents in the international sphere; 4) societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, states where the basic institutions do not function and where corruption is rampant; and 5) benevolent absolutisms (LoP, p. 4-5).

Of interest to this study is to understand the moral duties that spring from citizenship in a liberal constitutional democracy in terms of global or international relations.

The Law of Peoples proceeds from the international political world as we see it, and concerns what the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people should be. To elaborate this foreign policy, the Law of peoples discusses two kinds of well-ordered societies, liberal democratic peoples and decent hierarchical peoples. The law also discusses outlaw states and states suffering from unfavorable conditions. I recognize that my account involves great simplification. Nevertheless, it allows us to examine in a reasonably realistic way what should be the aim of the foreign policy of a liberal democratic people (p.83).

To begin, an original position model for representatives of peoples is employed to determine what is described as an incomplete list of eight principles guiding foreign relations for liberal peoples. The eight principles focus on the ideas of autonomy and reciprocity in international relations (p. 37):

1) Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples.

2) Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

3) Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.

4) Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5) Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense.

6) Peoples are to honor human rights.

7) Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war.

8) Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime.

The moral duties that spring from these principles include the protection of human rights, toleration and self-determination, the duty of non-intervention, and the duty of assistance; all of which are guided by the criterion of reciprocity. Human rights and toleration are the essential features of just and decent peoples in the international society of peoples. Human rights in Rawlsian terms has a more narrow focus than many of the liberal conceptions of human rights in political philosophy. For Rawls, human rights protect the minimum necessary conditions for life and subsistence and provide the limits to toleration and cooperation, thereby inclusion, in the society of peoples. "Human rights in the Law of Peoples, by contrast, express a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups from mass murder and genocide... they restrict the justifying reasons for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime's internal autonomy" (LoP, p.79). Rights that deal with more defined claims to liberties are associated with civil rights, these being the rights constructed from an agreement of citizens with a special reciprocal political relationship and mutual interest within the domestic case of justice.
The two other moral duties of significance to this study include the duty of non-intervention associated with the idea of self-determination and the duty of assistance which is Rawls's response to defining a distributive mechanism in the society of peoples. The duty of non-intervention applies to members of the society of peoples. The duty gives priority to liberty and self-determination for just and decent peoples who abide by the demands of human rights that are required for cooperation in the society of peoples. Outlaw states are a special case in which the threat to international stability and the assault on human rights within their own domestic sphere are subject to response from the society of peoples.

If the offenses against human rights are egregious and the society does not respond to the imposition of sanctions, such intervention might be called for... if people are exposed to liberal civilization and culture's basic principles and ideas in a positive way, they may become ready to accept and act on them... in that way the circle of mutually caring peoples may expand over time (p. 94).

The intervention in other nation's affairs is extended through the duty of assistance which is applied to the case of burdened societies. "Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies" (p. 106). The duty of assistance is intended to respond to the cosmopolitan idea of global distributive justice. Rawls rejects this idea in the global case, asserting that distributive justice is a matter for the domestic case. The basis for this point is linked to the priority given to liberty and self-determination for peoples. The aim of the duty of assistance is to bring burdened societies into the well-ordered society of peoples by strengthening their social, economic, and political institutions. By having a clearly defined goal, the duty of assistance has a point where assistance terminates when a society has the capacity to maintain the basic level of human rights for its people. At this point, the principles of self-determination return to priority. For Rawls,
the duty of assistance is analogous to the just savings principle that is the basis for intergenerational justice in the domestic case, laid out in TJ (p. 284-293). The just savings principle is an important point to understand for intergenerational justice and the preservation of environmental integrity for a people and will be defined in more detail in the next chapter.

In the discussion of boundaries of nations, or the "people's territory", of which a people are the constituent political actors, a moral duty to the preservation of the environment is asserted. Here, Rawls says that:

[A]n important role of government, however arbitrary a society's boundaries appear from a historical point of view, is to be the effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as well as for maintaining the land's environmental integrity... the asset is the people's territory and its potential capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people itself as politically organized. The perpetuity condition is crucial. People must recognize that that they cannot make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people's territory without their consent (p.8).

In this excerpt, Rawls identifies a moral duty of the collective body of a people to uphold a principle of sustainability. The idea that a people have the duty to protect and preserve the natural integrity of the biosphere within its borders presents a basic moral duty of the state, as the institutional mechanism representing the people, to respond to environmental matters and to be guided by a conception of sustainability. This moral duty is consistent with Broome's (2012, p. 64-72) analysis of the moral duty of the state as the principle actor to respond to the issue of climate change. These ideas of sustainability in political liberalism and further elaborated in the background culture of society including the moral duties that spring forth from these convictions will be the focus of the next chapter.
Chapter Three

III. Ethics, Ecology, and Deliberative Democracy

A. On Public Reason and a Political Principle of Sustainability

In Chapter Two, the fundamental ideas of *Political Liberalism*, the theory of *justice as fairness*, and the *Law of Peoples* were surveyed. Going forward, the discussion in Chapter Three will center on environmental and ecological concern, first as represented by convictions and values in the background culture and briefly sketching the sustainability ethics elaborated by Christian Becker (2012). Then, the discussion will turn to the spaces in which Rawlsian theory contains environmental concern laying out a conception of sustainability and environmental justice in Rawlsian terms (see Bell, 2002). In keeping with the method of reflective equilibrium, the Rawlsian conception of sustainability will be considered in comparison with Becker's sustainability ethics. These two forms of sustainability will be clarified and reconciled to fit a sustainability ethic addressing the value of ecological integrity to public reason and thus with a liberal conception of justice. The final section of this chapter will look at the moral duties associated with ecological crisis to determine if the political liberal conception of sustainability and its moral imperatives are consistent with the moral duties developed in environmental and climate change ethics, most notably with the duties of the state/government and the duties of the citizen.

Before continuing, it is important to reemphasize that Rawlsian theory is a specific kind of moral theory developed for the political domain addressing the constitutional construction of liberal democratic society. Justice in these terms is focused upon the constitutional essentials and basic structure of such a society. Rawls makes an
important distinction between this idea of domestic justice and two other fundamental
domains of justice, the local and the global.

The environment and issues of ecological crisis are seen as outside this domain of
the political, or rather distinct from the domain of the political constitution of society, in
that the human-nature relationship is fundamentally different than the political
relationships of a people. Rawls acknowledges the ecologically situated nature of human
life, but suggests that matters of political justice be theoretically disaggregated from the
ideas of environmental or ecological justice so that an ideal of political justice can be
worked out and from which to inform extensions to other domains that are construed as
part of the background culture of a society. The matters of ecological or environmental
justice transcend the three categories of local, domestic and global justice and present a
unique case for consideration in political terms. Still, matters of the environment can be
raised in the constitutional construction of society when these matters intersect and
impact the stability of a just well-ordered society. In political justice, stability and
sustainability are focused upon the maintenance of a just well-ordered democratic
society. The environment is another domain in which this kind of society interacts and
the matters of justice must be able to respond to the concerns raised by environmental
instability or the lack of ecological sustainability as these various domains intersect.

As a point of transparency and publicity, I want to start with the disclosure that
my own personal opinions regarding the environment tend to follow ecocentric, holistic
orientations in environmental ethics. At the level of my own conception of the good and
what is right is a belief in the inherent value of the natural world, of a planet where
biodiversity, ecosystems, and landscapes have intrinsic value and the many forms of life
are given moral consideration. While the act of valuing is arguably a human construct, though some research has pointed to other species exhibiting analogous cognitive capacity (de Waal, 2008), my view is that the value of such entities is not rooted in human use, such claims seem rooted in human chauvinism or what Singer (2009, p.572-573) has termed *speciesism*. But I also have a considered conviction to the ethical foundations of deliberative democracy. In this chapter, I will attempt to lay out an example of the process of reflective equilibrium in my own thinking with an attempt to bring these convictions into balance. The goal then is to demonstrate through the idea of public reason, and the special case of the proviso, that different comprehensive doctrines can make a claim to the value of ecological integrity through their own comprehensive views while affirming a principle of sustainability that fits to the idea of a liberal conception of justice.

In Chapter Two, Rawls's political liberalism was laid out as a framework by which agreement on fundamental questions regarding the constitution of a just society can be affirmed by free and equal citizens through a political conception of justice. The necessity for deepening Rawls's ideas and conception of justice to contemporary issues surrounding ecological crisis is posited as a constructive process for understanding how agreement can be reached on such a complex and multifaceted problem. In this chapter, a brief introduction to ideas from the fields of environmental, climate change, and sustainability ethics will be reviewed to demonstrate the diversity of concepts that have informed contemporary ethical scholarship on the many facets of the ecological crisis. The diversity of comprehensive views fall into what Rawls described as the background culture. The background culture contains many nonpublic reasons and values that are
vital to the deeper meaning and purpose that people make in their lives. These nonpublic values and ideals often intersect with values of public reason when consideration of justice for the basic structure of society is associated with the ecological contingencies of modern life resulting in the need for clarification and reconciliation.

Furthermore, in Chapter One, it was posited that the various positions and traditions advanced in the field of environmental ethics fit into the idea of comprehensive doctrines. Meaning that the field has been occupied with answering the metaphysical or ontological questions related to ecology, the environment, the climate, and sustainability. This is a commendable interest in clarifying philosophical problems, what Rawls has described as the problems of "first philosophy". As such the field's influence on common knowledge has often been rooted in positions that promote a conception of the good. It is in this promotion of a conception of the good that, I have proposed, has been the basis for much of the disagreement surrounding the ecological crisis when activists, scientists, and political representatives enter into deliberative politics. While disagreement is not necessarily a negative feature of deliberative democracy, the terms of disagreement must be rooted in reasons that all parties can know, understand, and endorse as reasonable given an understanding of the burdens of judgment (PL, p. 55-56). Becker (2012) and Gardiner (2011) both have suggested the lack of fluency in philosophy and normative ethics among scientists, policy makers, and the public in general has confounded the deliberative exchanges on questions of climate change and environmental concern as descriptive scientific facts and economic interests are not elaborated in terms sufficient for normative and public justification. This is a knowledge based theoretical problem that has implications for public reason and also for education. As discussed in Chapter One,
the educational implications for a political liberal conception of sustainability will be addressed in Chapter Five of this study; for now, the implications for public reason will be explored in the ensuing discussion.

**B. Environmental Convictions and Values in the Background Culture**

In this section both religious and non-religious (secular) ethical perspectives will be explored to gain a greater view of the many views on the environment that are conducive to a moral/ethical concern for conservation and or preservation of the environment. These convictions present in the "background culture" provide a philosophical grounding of the many ways that human beings conceive of nature and give value and meaning to the natural world.

**a. Secular environmental ethics.** Environmental convictions may be best understood by first looking at the nonreligious philosophical roots in environmental ethics. This relatively new philosophical field is concerned with the questions regarding the human-nature relationship, the values associated with the nonhuman world, and the normative prescriptions for how humans should act towards the natural world. Environmental ethics encompasses contemporary convictions grounded in traditional ethical theories, as well as alternative views such as environmental pragmatism or more critical forms that often begin with a critique of western culture or intellectual traditions such as deep ecology (Næss, 1991; Næss & Drengson, 2005), eco-feminism (Warren & Erkal, 1997) and social ecology (Pepper, 1993). Many of the approaches in ethics discussed in Chapter One (see above, p.27-31) have been influential to the approaches in environmental ethics. The distinctions between teleological and deontological approaches are useful categories for understanding the field. Much of the work draws from value
theory answering who or what is valued and how that value originates. Furthermore, the terms of normative claims and duties situated in moral worth are fundamental to a comprehensive environmental ethic. (For a broad review of the field, see the anthology by Andrew Light and Holmes Rolston III, *Environmental Ethics*, 2003).

Two fundamental positions on the nature of values are the distinctions between instrumental values versus non-instrumental values. *Instrumental values* are those values attributed to the usefulness of a thing, for example, the usefulness of natural resources, such as trees, minerals, or a species. Of note, plants and animals can have instrumental values based upon human use (anthropocentric) or the usefulness of a species to the balance of a certain ecosystem (ecocentric). Anthropocentric versus ecocentric orientations concern the focus of moral standing or consideration. *Anthropocentric* orientations are rooted in human centeredness, in which the focus is on human interests and experiences, and through the cultural expressions of value attributed to the entity.

Conversely, *non-instrumental* refers to the intrinsic nature of the values, meaning the objects of value are ends in and of themselves while *ecocentric or holistic* orientations refer to "ecosystems and/or species and to the biosphere as a whole, viewed, in this context, as ethical units" (Palmer, 2003, p. 23). Examples of this approach include Aldo Leopold's (1949/2003) "The Land Ethic" with its concern for the "biotic community" or Arne Næss's (1973) ecosophy, a philosophy that emphasizes the idea of a cosmologically interconnected world in equilibrium or balance. Leopold's view of the human relationship to nature contends:

In short a land ethic changes the role of *Homo sapiens* from conqueror of the land-community to plain member and citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow members, and also respect for the community as such (Leopold, 1949/2003, p.39).
As such, the ethical conviction and normative commitment then must:

[Q]uit thinking about decent land-use as solely an economic problem. Examine each question in terms of what is ethically and aesthetically right, as well as economically expedient. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise (p. 46).

Næss (1998/2003) also points to the intrinsic value of the biosphere, "individuals, species, populations, habitat, as well as human and non-human cultures" (p. 264), and proposes values of "richness and diversity of life forms" and a principle of human non-interference in the diversity of life on the planet. To achieve such an aim, Næss develops a philosophy of life (ecosophy: ecological wisdom) rooted in the value of living simply for the purpose of quality of life requiring fundamental and radical changes to modern society.

Generally, holistic approaches expand moral consideration through non-instrumental values. For instance, plant and animal species, habitats, and the collective biosphere are seen as ends. Another example of intrinsic value is the common moral judgment in democratic societies that all human beings are equal or all human beings have equal dignity. Animal rights proponents and activists extend this claim, basing their positions on the non-instrumental value of the living being (Singer, 2003, p. 55). For Singer and other utilitarians, such as originators Jeremy Bentham (1781/2000) and J.S. Mill (1998), moral standing is attributed to all beings capable of experiencing pain or suffering. Leopold and Næss both give moral consideration to individuals, but also to the collective entities of the "biotic community" or the "ecosphere" respectively which emphasize the holistic or systemic values of integrity and stability. Later in this chapter, the values of integrity and stability will be considered in the idea of public reason and the
basis for an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Though reasonable doctrines may not agree with Leopold's or Næss's metaphysical stance on the intrinsic moral worth of ecosystems, the contingency of a nature dependent existence will be the focus for agreement. "Even if we do not think that ecosystems can count morally, it seems clear that human communities cannot grow and thrive without this life support. So we need some way of regarding those ecosystems either directly or indirectly" (Light & Rolston, 2003, p. 7).

The fact of the contingency of nature for life to persist is then a possible source for agreement among reasonable persons. As suggested previously, anthropocentric approaches to environmental ethics tend to focus upon the natural world as an instrumental value. That is, the natural world provides use value to human beings. This can incorporate conservation orientations that seek to maintain the productivity of the natural world for human use, but also focuses upon the harms to human flourishing created by ecological degradation. Sustainability in this approach generally focuses upon issues of development, or sustainable development, often with social justice implications (For example, see the Bruntland Report). Rawls's just savings principle extends the difference principle (part of the second principle of justice) to intergenerational justice. "The just savings principle can be regarded as an understanding between generations to carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and preserving a just society" (TJ, p. 289). The savings include "the gains of culture and civilization" which extends to such things as the economy and education, but also to the environment, this last point made more explicit in the LoP. The goal then is to find spaces of agreement through reasonable political terms that citizens can address to other citizens within the limits of public
reason. Callicott (1990/2003), suggests that all values are anthropogenic or human created, yet can be ecocentric or anthropocentric in focus.

Recall from the discussion of rights (see p. 31-32) moral standing is not contingent upon reciprocity. The terms moral actor and moral patient are often used in ethics to describe two kinds of moral standing, the actor has moral standing resulting in reciprocal duties. However, the moral standing of the patient is one who holds moral consideration, but is not held to reciprocal duties. Duties are contingent upon the capacity to reason and to act accordingly to prescriptive norms. Light and Rolston (p.6) summarize:

The class of moral patients is that class of beings to whom we consider that we owe ethical obligations, when those obligations can be ascertained, and are deserving of what we have been calling moral considerability. Moral agents are defined as that class of moral patients, usually only persons, to whom we owe obligations and who, in turn, are held to be morally responsible for their actions. All moral agents are moral patients but not all moral patients are moral agents. When we accord moral agents moral recognition we can expect them to live up to certain duties related to the respect of those obligations. On the other hand, if a being is moral patient and not a moral agent we do not expect it to be morally responsible for its action... examples of moral patients who are not moral agents are human infants and mentally impaired persons.

As mentioned previously, a number of ethicists, notably Peter Singer (See The Expanding Circle, 2011) and Martha Nussbaum (See Frontiers of Justice, 2006), have argued for broadening the view of moral consideration to non-human beings. Furthermore, Næss's (2003, p. 271) philosophical cosmology shares a spiritualist component with "multiple roots" drawn from "Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Baha'i, or in various philosophies" that expands moral considerability both individually and holistically. Næss, however, is critical of a "stewardship" orientation due to its tendency towards hierarchical relationships in which humanity is positioned as superior to other forms of life and thus
the "steward" over other beings. However, three examples from religious statements by scholars from Christianity, Islam, and Judaism in the next section illustrate a shift towards less hierarchical thinking and a more holistic orientation which seems to share with deep ecology a spiritually-oriented sentiment regarding the oneness of "creation".

**b. Religious doctrines and environmental stewardship.** In 2015, religious statements on the ecological crisis were released by scholars from a number of the world's predominant religious sects, including Pope Francis (2015) of the Roman Catholic Church, International Islamic Climate Change Symposium (2015), and A Rabbinic Letter on Climate (Dorff et al, 2015). A common thread in the contemporary religious statements on climate change expresses an ethic of environmental stewardship whereby the moral standing of the planet and its inhabitants are rooted in divine creation. Below are examples taken from the three statements cited in which each express an ecocentric perspective regarding the intrinsic value of the planet and a critique of anthropocentrism and spiritual disconnect from the rest of creation in modern industrial and post-industrial societies. All three claim a moral duty to protect the planet and its inhabitants.

For this reason, the ecological crisis is also a summons to profound interior conversion. It must be said that some committed and prayerful Christians, with the excuse of realism and pragmatism, tend to ridicule expressions of concern for the environment. Others are passive; they choose not to change their habits and thus become inconsistent. So what they all need is an “ecological conversion”, whereby the effects of their encounter with Jesus Christ become evident in their relationship with the world around them. Living our vocation to be protectors of God’s handiwork is essential to a life of virtue; it is not an optional or a secondary aspect of our Christian experience (Pope Francis, 2015, Section 217).

And an excerpt from the *Islamic Declaration on Global Climate Change*: 

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God – Whom we know as Allah – has created the universe in all its diversity, richness and vitality: the stars, the sun and moon, the earth and all its communities of living beings. All these reflect and manifest the boundless glory and mercy of their Creator. All created beings by nature serve and glorify their Maker, all bow to their Lord’s will. We human beings are created to serve the Lord of all beings, to work the greatest good we can for all the species, individuals, and generations of God’s creatures.

From the Rabbinical Letter:

We come as Jews and rabbis with great respect for what scientists teach us – for as we understand their teaching, it is about the unfolding mystery of God’s Presence in the unfolding universe, and especially in the history and future of our planet. Although we accept scientific accounts of earth’s history, we continue to see it as God’s creation, and we celebrate the presence of the divine hand in every earthly creature.

Yet in our generation, this wonder and this beauty have been desecrated -- not in one land alone but ‘round all the Earth. So in this crisis, even as we join all Earth in celebrating the Breath of Life that interweaves us all...

We are especially moved when the deepest, most ancient insights of Torah about healing the relationships of Earth and human earthlings, adamah and adam, are echoed in the findings of modern science.

All three also link the environmental ethic and its duties to a conception of social justice consistent with the criteria for a liberal conception of justice. Of significance to the ensuing discussion is the strong statement about the essence of human relationships to each other and to the rest of nature. Much has been left unsaid regarding the values and convictions, religious and nonreligious, associated with moral concern for the environment. What has been the aim of the discussion thus far has been to illustrate the broad and many views, religious and nonreligious, that can give comprehensive meaning to a conception of sustainability. In the next section, Becker's sustainability ethics will elaborate a conception of sustainability rooted in three fundamental domains of human relationships that must be considered to fulfill moral duties to ecological sustainability.
c. Becker's sustainability ethics. The general idea of sustainability was briefly defined in Chapter One (p. 22-27). Becker contends that economics and ecology have not sufficiently elaborated the ethical and normative nature of the concept which is rooted in the "ideal of the human being as a fundamentally dependent and related being" (p. 2). Sustainability is "at its core an issue of the self-identity of the modern individual and the related design of modern societies" (p. 1). As such, Becker bases the conception of a sustainability ethic in a relational idea of the person and of society. To use terms defined above, the moral concern for the environment is an anthropogenic matter with an ecocentric focus. Human beings are conceived as part of nature, as a being of nature in relationship to the whole of nature. Sustainability addresses the temporal relationship of human activity on the planet bridging the holistic view with moral consideration of the individual in relationship, not only to each other, but to the whole as well. As such, nature is accorded moral consideration, while human beings have a moral duty based upon their position as the moral actor in the relationship. Furthermore, this ethical dimension of sustainability, Becker contends, is either completely ignored or underdeveloped in economic conceptions focused on development and the scientific community's emphasis on the descriptive facts of ecological systems and processes.

In Chapter One (p. 26), the three fundamental domains of sustainability were defined as: continuance, orientation, and relations. According to Becker, economic and scientific approaches to sustainability generally focus on the continuance domain while inadequately addressing the ethical and normative nature of the orientation and relational domains. "The normative meaning of sustainability cannot be deduced directly from its meaning of continuance, and it cannot be dealt with within a traditional scientific
Many scientists have been skeptical about the normative aspect, and some would like to exclude this meaning entirely from an academic analysis (p. 11).

Fundamental to a sustainability ethic are the sustainability relations which include three distinct relations that have both factual and normative aspects, these are (p. 13):

a) The relationship between humans and their contemporaries (social justice);

b) The relationship between currently living humans and future generations (intergenerational justice); and

c) The relationship between humans and nature (eco-justice).

These three dimensions are interrelated in which the factual continuance and ethical/normative dimensions interact within the sustainability relations. That is human relationships do not occur in a figurative vacuum, but are structured and constrained by culture and economic and political institutions, or what Becker has termed meta-structures (p. 37-63). A meta-structure is defined as "a historically evolved structure composed of four elements - (1) basic assumptions, (2) basic evaluations, (3) driving forces, and (4) institutionalizations - that substantially affect societal and individual thoughts, actions, and relationships" (p. 41). These meta-structures pattern the ways in which human beings perceive, understand, and act in relationship to others and to the natural world. "I argue... that it is a complex interplay of theoretical and practical patterns, combined and institutionalized in several distinct structures, that we must analyze and discuss within an encompassing approach to sustainability" (p. 39). The way knowledge is constructed and proliferated is a necessary concern for sustainability research and discourse. This aspect of sustainability related to knowledge and learning is an educational issue which will be addressed more fully in Chapter Five of this study.
Becker situates moral responsibility for sustainability in the individual actor, as a matter of character, disposition, and motivation. "The interrelation of the meta-structures, and the mutual influence of their elements, causes a complex and difficult setting of patterns, values and driving forces in which the individuals are located. This affects the potential of individual morality and its actualization in regard to the sustainability relations" (p. 62-63). Becker's work is influenced by virtue ethics with its Western origins in ancient Greece, most notably in the work of Aristotle, though non-Western varieties such as Confucianism pre-date the Western tradition. Virtue ethics is concerned with the "formation of character dispositions and clarifies the main components of the virtues and the ways they might be cultivated" (Schroeder, 2013, p. 462). Virtue ethics has regained some interest in contemporary ethics with the contention that the approach provides alternative insights to the complex relational nature of human societies in contrast to teleological and deontological approaches (See Becker, p. 26-30). As such, much of Becker's sustainability ethics focuses on the character and development of the sustainable person. "At the center is the person who develops a self-identity as a relational person existing in the context of the sustainability relations, as well as specific excellent relational competencies and attitudes in regard to each of the three relations" (p. 78). The nature of the sustainable person will be explored in more detail in the discussion of citizenship in Chapter Four of this study.

Though the sustainable person is a matter of emphasis in Becker's sustainability ethics, the structural dimension also holds a role. Recall from the discussion above, the meta-structures are patterns of relationship rooted in cultural, social, economic, and political institutions that constrain and mediate the experiences and actions of individuals.
Individuals are conceived as the agents of the structure, though constrained and constructed in relationship to the institutional structures, the individuals also are the agents who construct the cultural and social system. Thus a sustainability ethic must address the structural dimension.

The relational dimension of sustainability ethics cannot just refer to the individual and her ethical role within the sustainability relations, but must be complemented by a structural dimension of sustainability ethics, which addresses the ethical role of social systems in regard to the sustainability relations. The basic challenge of this structural dimension is to analyze what are good social structures in the context of sustainability, and what are not.

The basic ethical criteria for what are good structures result from the considerations about the sustainable person and the excellence of the sustainability relations (Chap. 9). In general, social structures have to be compatible with the relational dimension of sustainability ethics, with the cultivation of sustainable relationships. That means that they would allow the full development of the sustainable person and of the sustainability relations (p.83).

To achieve a redesign of the meta-structures that fulfills the aim of fostering sustainable relationships across the three dimensions (contemporaries, intergenerational, to nature), three principles or guidelines are proposed. The guidelines include: (a) a broader conception of the person as relational, rational, emotional, creative, and communicative; (b) orientation that replaces independence, control and domination with a paradigm of interrelation and interdependence; (c) stability and simplicity - through self-governed "mutual improvement, embedded in the context of social interaction and agreement" (p. 98-102).

A final word on Becker's sustainability ethics for this section must mention his analysis that results in an appeal shared with Gardiner's theoretical storm (see Chapter One) that emphasizes the need for a reconstruction of the academy and the methods and
discourse of scholars. Sustainability research, Becker contends, reveals the necessity for interdisciplinary research and transdisciplinary dialogue rooted in the imperatives for knowledge construction that addresses the fundamental problems of society (p. 111-127). These ideas regarding the academy and the construction and proliferation of knowledge will be addressed in more detail in the discussion on education in Chapter Five of this study.

To summarize then, a definition of ecological sustainability, “is the ability to establish continuance as a means for orienting human actions and life toward the threefold relatedness of human existence to contemporaries, future generations, and nature” (Becker, 2012, p. 14). In this comprehensive ecological sustainability, the moral consideration of species and ecosystems is a direct matter to use Light and Rolston's term. To reiterate their suggestion above: "Even if we do not think that ecosystems can count morally, it seems clear that human communities cannot grow and thrive without this life support. So we need some way of regarding those ecosystems either directly or indirectly". A reading of Becker begs one fundamental political question, is a comprehensive sustainability ethic consistent with the idea of reasonable pluralism and the burdens of judgment, or does a sustainability ethic require a form of orthodoxy to a comprehensive view of the world?

C. Rawlsian Theory and Moral Consideration of the Environment

As will be laid out in this section, a Rawlsian sustainability does not directly deal with the relationship of human beings to nature in the comprehensive metaphysical sense that Becker conceives. Rather, for Rawls, matters of the environment are not a direct concern for the constitutional essentials and matters of justice intended for a just well-
ordered society over time. Recall, these fundamental constitutional matters are of a political nature, focused upon the system of governance and the political rights and liberties of citizenship (see above, p. 66; PL, p. 227). Thus, "the status of the natural world and our proper relation to it is not a constitutional essential or a basic question of justice, as these questions have been specified" (p.246). However, the questions about the environment can indirectly become matters for the constitution and basic justice when "our duties and obligations to future generations and to other societies are involved" (p. 246, n. 35). It is important to remember that Rawls's aim was to justify a conception of justice in the ideal, reconciling convictions that are common in the democratic political tradition. From this ideal framework that begins theoretically, not factually, with the idea of society and the person, questions of intergenerational justice, global justice, and the moral consideration of "animals and the rest of nature" are problems of extension (p. 20-22; p. 244-245). Thus, Rawlsian sustainability and environmental justice is concerned with sustaining the conditions by which a well-ordered democratic society obtains and persists over time.

Derek Bell's (2002) work provides a good starting place for laying out a Rawlsian conception of sustainability and environmental justice. Bell (p. 705-707) identifies two kinds of arguments or reasons in Rawlsian theory that can be used for environmental issues, public reasons (appealing to political values) and comprehensive reasons (nonpublic reason and values). In a discussion of public reasons, Rawls illustrates an extension of moral considerability to animals and the rest of nature drawing from the Christian philosophical tradition as a predominant view in the background culture to
glean common convictions and political values. These political values are identified in the excerpt below (PL, p.245, cited in Bell, 2002, p.705):

There are numerous political values here to invoke: to further the good of ourselves and future generations by preserving the natural order and its life-sustaining properties; to foster species of animals and plants for the sake of biological and medical knowledge with its potential applications to human health; to protect the beauties of nature for purposes of public recreation and the pleasures of a deeper understanding of the world. The appeal to values of this kind gives what many have found a reasonable answer to the status of animals and the rest of nature.

According to Bell (p. 707-708), the public reason argument centered on "life-sustaining properties" sufficiently establishes a Rawlsian conception of sustainability. Rawls in his later writings (See LoP, 1999; JFR, 2001) espoused a commitment to sustaining the environment as a precondition for the continuance of life in general and its basic requirement for a political liberal society. Though Rawls does not elaborate in much detail on the question of sustainability and environmental justice. Considering his task and the focus of his work being centered on a political conception of justice for a pluralist democratic society, it is reasonable to think that the aspects of the environment are open to elaboration by extension as fundamental questions of political justice are more completely established in the political philosophical tradition. Bell (p. 708) lays out three points regarding Rawlsian sustainability, these are: (1) sustainability is "connected to the notion of the circumstances of justice"; (2) "scientifically informed discussion of the environment... is an essential part of public political argument" regarding the legitimate limits of action; and (3) maintenance of the circumstances of justice take priority to economic models of sustainable development.

Next, Bell analyzes the "human health argument", the second political value in the excerpt above, to contend that Rawls establishes a view of environmental justice.
Rawlsian environmental justice asserts "the political good of human health provides grounds for protecting biodiversity because of the contribution that biological and medical knowledge of other species can make to human health" (p. 709). Bell then turns to the principles of distribution laid out in the second principle of justice, most notably, the principle of fair equality of opportunity to establish the guidelines for environmental justice. "Insofar as environmental pollution causes (triggers) illness, it can undermine full participation. Moreover, the distribution of the burdens and benefits associated with environmental planning should not be allowed to undermine the principle of fair equality of opportunity" (p. 709). Environmental conditions thus can affect the distribution of the fair value of liberty. For instance, consider a scenario in which children are exposed to lead in drinking water which is known to cause serious cognitive developmental issues. Then, consider the exposure is due to political decisions focused on economic interests and expediency. Furthermore, the likelihood of exposure is highly correlated with other social and economic factors such as racial identity and socio-economic status. The principle of fair equality of opportunity is "undermined" in such a scenario, for the life opportunities of those children are severely impacted by unequal consideration of the impacts of an environmental planning decision. Though Bell did not suggest that the difference principle is applicable to environmental justice as it was conceived in his work, the scenario presented here certainly suggests that the distribution of benefits and harms are not to the benefit of the least advantaged. As such Rawls's principles of justice do seem to provide guidance on the questions of environmental justice.

To summarize, Rawlsian sustainability and environmental justice is anthropocentric in its approach focusing on the benefits of nature to human society and
experience. Rawls acknowledges that the stance in the argument from public reason in the excerpt above (p. 124) may not be acceptable to all philosophical positions on the grounds that these are anthropocentric values directly concerned with human well-being and are insufficient in moral consideration of nonhuman entities. Still, it is not so much a position of unacceptable moral concern, for ecocentric perspectives will still purport to have a moral concern for human beings, but rather the issue for most proponents of holistic and ecocentric approaches is the incompleteness of the moral concern. That is the concern has not been sufficiently extended. Bell points to "comprehensive" arguments, or what have been described previously as nonpublic reasons as a necessary means for extension. Recall Rawls contends that environmental issues are not constitutional essentials and thus are open to legislative action justified through argumentation using reasons from comprehensive doctrines. "It is a matter in regard to which citizens can vote their nonpolitical values and try to convince other citizens accordingly. The limits to public reason do not apply" (PL, p. 246; cited in Bell, p. 706).

However, a few points missing in Bell's analysis involve ideas regarding the relationship of comprehensive doctrines to the idea of public reason. Here he focuses on the earliest version of PL published in 1993 which had a narrower, more exclusive view of public reason than the revised version and other later works:

In addition to these 'constitutional essentials', concerning the structure of government and citizens' basic rights and liberties, Rawls argues that principles covering 'social and economic inequalities', such as his principle of the 'fair equality of opportunity' and the 'difference principle', should also be discussed and debated solely in terms of public reasons. However, where an issue does not concern (or does not primarily concern) either constitutional essentials or questions of basic justice, citizens are allowed to appeal to their comprehensive doctrines in democratic debate. Moreover, a Rawlsian just state can legitimately make policy on the basis
of comprehensive reasons that have won out in the democratic debate (Bell, 2002, p. 707).

Recall the discussion from Chapter Two on the three forms of justification (see above, p. 84-89 on pro tanto, full, and public justification), the idea of the overlapping consensus (see above, p.89-91), and most notably the discussion in the section Two views of public reason and the proviso (see above, p. 98-101). Comprehensive doctrines give individual meaning to citizens and provide a broader and deeper view of intersubjective understanding through the reasonable overlapping consensus which has an educative and illuminating capacity in public discourse. That is through respectful, reasonable debate centered on public forms of justification, using agreed upon methods of inquiry and verification, the deliberations of a democratic people benefit from the diversity of views and understandings of complex problems. By expressing how a comprehensive doctrine can affirm public reasons, the democratic practice is invigorated and strengthened, and thus democratic society is affirmed. In full justification, a citizen determines if the conception of justice and a comprehensive doctrine are compatible and provide the necessary justification for a considered judgment. In public reason, this public justification is directed to an intersubjective domain of general and wide reflective equilibrium.

As Rawls's thinking evolved, he became more convinced of an increasingly inclusive view of public reason, for this development, refer to two of his later works in Reply to Habermas and especially The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, both included in the second edition of PL (2005). This more inclusive view he called the wide view of public political culture, in which the idea of the proviso is given more treatment. Here, citizens, especially under conditions of constitutional crisis and basic injustice, such as in
the examples Rawls uses of the 19th Century abolitionist movement and the 20th Century civil rights movement in the United States can appeal to comprehensive doctrines to make necessary points about moral duties or responsibilities that respond to unjust conditions that require constitutional response.

For instance, the ecological crisis also illustrates the point of the proviso, the ecological crisis as it is understood by scholars in the background culture points to the failure and complicity of what Becker has called the meta-structures of science, technology, politics, and economy. These patterns of societal structure (meta-structures) are essentially equivalent to Rawls's idea of the basic structure of society in terms of the political, economic, and social institutions that are fundamental to modern life.

Furthermore, the ecological crisis is largely due to the intensive carbon emitting lifestyles of modern life which are structured by market driven institutions of production and consumption which have caused unequal harms and benefits both in society and between societies. The pattern of unsustainable lifeways is compounded by an inadequate regulatory regime that is often influenced by economic interests which are given priority to matters of justice. Add to this the resounding agreement in the scientific community on matters of ecology, the facts and processes related to the crisis which should be given weight in the idea of public reason. "We add to this that in making these justifications we are to appeal only to presently accepted general beliefs and forms of reasoning found in common sense, and the methods and conclusions of science when these are not controversial" (p.224). The overwhelming agreement of the scientific community on the question of anthropogenic climate change and the necessary steps for mitigation must be given a level of credibility in the determinations of considered judgments. These
positions are not controversial in the scientific community, but rather, to ignore and to reject these points due to ideological confinements and political artifice is an unreasonable act.

The inclusiveness of comprehensive, nonpublic reasons in public reason should not be overstated. Rather, the limits of public reason require that such nonpublic reasons be shown as consistent with the political values. The proviso contends that claims of spiritual disconnect like those made by Næss's *Deep Ecology Movement* or the religious statements discussed above and reasoning based upon the metaphysical claims of interconnection and interrelatedness must be shown to be consistent with the aims of public reason. The proviso requires that citizens "in due time" give reason of how their comprehensive view can be explained through the political values of public reason. This is a matter of the duty of civility and the criterion of reciprocity that require citizens to offer terms that other reasonable citizens can endorse or affirm as reciprocally reasonable. That does not mean that disagreement will cease to exist.

However, as Rawls discusses the topic of reasonable disagreement in the idea of public reason, the burdens of judgment mean that citizens holding different positions and viewpoints may give weight and priority to different moral considerations. The key is that reasonableness entails offering terms of debate that other citizens can know, understand, and agree are reasonable positions. Reasonable disagreement is inevitable under the conditions of freedom, however, the reasonable aspect of the disagreement means that citizens recognize that the democratic process, the guidelines for inquiry are valid, and the procedures of the institutions are fair, in general. Thus, the disagreement is attributed to the burdens of judgment and not the fairness of the democratic system:
and if we find that by reasoning in the light of these mutually recognized
criteria we can reach agreement in judgment; or if not agreement, that we
can in any case narrow our differences sufficiently to secure what strikes
us as just or fair, honorable or decent, relations between us; then all this
supports the conviction that there are objective reasons. Those are the kind
of grounds that support such a conviction.

Thus, given a background of successful practice over time, this considered
agreement in judgment, or narrowing of differences, normally suffices for
objectivity (PL, 120).

One of the issues that the ecological crisis demonstrates for Rawlsian theory is
related to the problems of extension. This entails the challenge of moving from ideal
to non-ideal theory. Ideal theory is constructed to clarify and reconcile ideas in the
political culture. The ideal framework provides a direction or an aim to a way of thinking
about contemporary problems and gives guidance or direction in approaching the
solutions to problems. The idea of pro tanto justification is a step in which the political
conception of justice is examined for its capacity to answer completely the fundamental
constitutional questions. "By examining a wide range of political questions to see
whether a political conception can always provide a reasonable answer we can check to
see if it is complete. But since political justification is pro tanto, it may be overridden by
citizens' comprehensive doctrines once all values are tallied up" (PL, p. 386). This
requirement of citizens to be the source for full justification by confirming the
completeness of a conception of justice from within their individual comprehensive
views is the next step in justification. "In this case, the citizen accepts a political
conception and fills out its justification by embedding it in some way into the citizen's
comprehensive doctrine as either true or reasonable, depending on what that doctrine
allows" (p. 386). The idea of the overlapping consensus and the legitimacy of coercive
authority in the political regime of society depend on taking the justification to the level of the intersubjective verification and mutual affirmation of the conception of justice.

Public justification happens when all the reasonable members of political society carry out a justification of the shared political conception by embedding it in their several reasonable comprehensive views. In this case, reasonable citizens take one another into account as having reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endorse that political conception, and this mutual accounting shapes the moral quality of the public culture of the political society. A crucial point here is that while the public justification of the political conception for political society depends on reasonable comprehensive doctrines, this justification does so only in an indirect way. That is, the express contents of these doctrines have no normative role in public justification, and so remain within the bounds of the political (PL, p. 387).

This means that citizens can have different reasons for affirming a conception of justice in each of their own comprehensive views, it does not require other citizens to affirm that view as true. However, public reason provides the terms by which citizens have reasonable views consistent with the terms of political justice and the guidelines for inquiry.

As such, the ecological crisis tests the reflective equilibrium of the normative precommitments of a conception of justice and the changing conditions under which these obtain. With this in mind, environmental issues and the human relationship with nature become matters of basic justice because these issues intersect with the conditions or circumstances of justice and the stability of these conditions over time. When the stability of the necessary conditions for justice to obtain are threatened and the distribution of harms and benefits are sources for disequilibrium between the ideals of a liberal conception of justice and the lived realities of citizens, the prospects of future citizens, and the bonds of friendship in the society of peoples, then the ideal and the non-
ideal theory must be reconciled. A conception of justice is always open to reflective equilibrium and the contingencies of a changing world.

What may cause misunderstanding is the thought, using an abstract idea like the original position as a device of representation and imagining the parties to understand their selection of principles to hold in perpetuity, justice as fairness apparently supposes that citizens' conception of justice can be fixed once and for all. This overlooks a crucial point that we live in civil society and that the political conception of justice, like any other conception, is always subject to being checked by our reflective considered judgments... we cannot change them [principles of justice] to suit our rational interests and knowledge of circumstances as we please. Checking them against our considered judgments is, of course, another matter (PL, p. 399).

In the LoP, Rawls last book, the moral duty of the state to ensure sustainable environmental conditions is more succinctly stated than in previous works. Here Rawls uses the value of "maintaining the land's environmental integrity" to define one of a number of primary roles that the government must perform to uphold its moral duties to its citizens and as representatives of its citizens in the society of peoples (LoP, p.8). As discussed previously in the discussion of environmental and sustainability ethics, the idea of ecological integrity as the maintenance of life sustaining processes is an important value that in many ways deserves priority to any human constructed political conception. Without the conditions that sustain life, human occupations are fleeting and illusory. As suggested by the critique of liberalism and its emphasis on the role of property in the free-market system, the approach here emphasizes a shift in convictions to conceiving the life-sustaining properties of the environment as fulfilling basic human needs and the conditions by which just, well-ordered democratic society can persist. "The argument requires only an addition to liberal theory, namely, the requirement that the environment is taken seriously as provider of basic needs [emphasis added]" (Bell, 2005, p. 184). Bell
further contends that the idea of property is a contested political idea regarding how
democratic peoples conceive of nature or the environment. Property then, as a contested
moral notion, requires shifting to what Bell suggests is a less contested notion, the idea of
the environment as "provider of basic needs". Such a conviction thus maintains the
reasonable pluralism of a democratic society while reconciling basic convictions and
precommitments more consistent with an overlapping consensus.

The conception of the environment as provider of basic needs is consistent
with the fact of reasonable pluralism because no reasonable
comprehensive doctrine could deny either the factual or normative
elements of that conception. Any reasonable doctrine will recognize the
fact that human survival depends on the physical environment (air, water,
food, shelter). Similarly, any reasonable doctrine will regard survival as a
good - a precondition for the pursuit of any other good. Intuitively, the
bounds of reasonable pluralism are consistent with a requirement that all
citizens conceive of the environment as provider of basic needs (Bell,

Environmental concern then becomes a matter of basic justice when the
constitutional matters and basic justice are affected by environmental conditions,
especially when related to human activity. Political liberal sustainability and
environmental justice in a Rawlsian approach are matters of extension of a conception of
justice which focuses upon the fundamental political relationship of citizens to each other
and to the state. The moral consideration for the categories of species and ecosystems and
the relationship of human beings to nature are matters for comprehensive doctrines which
in turn give depth and meaning to a political conception in a more indirect approach. A
healthy natural world is seen as vital to the stability and sustainability of a democratic
people, this includes both the domains of contemporaries and future generations. It is in
this commitment to a sustainable democratic society, that people holding different
reasonable comprehensive views can find a space for agreement.
a. The relationship between sustainability and public reason. Sustainability conceptually is very similar to the Rawlsian idea of stability. Both are temporal or concerned with perpetuity and what Becker defined as continuance. The distinction between stability and sustainability has to do with orientation and relationship. Considering orientation, stability in Rawls is concerned with the continuance of a well-ordered society. In contrast ecological sustainability is centered around the value of ecological integrity. The discussion above shows that in the evolution of Rawlsian thinking, as evidenced by the excerpt from the LoP, the idea of ecological or environmental integrity has been given greater consideration in Rawls's later works. Rawls contends that ecological integrity is a concern and a duty for the government of a people in terms of the distributive justice among contemporaries and the preservation requirements for its future generations. Also, ecological integrity is related to the diplomatic role of the people's representatives in government as a matter affecting the stability of a just international order. The matter of ecological integrity then rises to the requirements for consideration as a matter of basic justice, though, it is indirectly a matter of the constitutional essentials of a society. Recall that the constitutional essentials are focused upon the political liberties and the structure and practice of democratic governance. However, the matter of ecological integrity is correlated with matters of distribution of resources and the distribution of opportunities through the anthropocentric values of human health and well-being (see the discussion on Bell's analysis above).

For Rawls, the political conception of justice is concerned with the political relationship of citizens in the institutional structure of a deliberative democratic society. This is the political relationship of a people, indirectly related theoretically to the value of
ecological integrity through the considered convictions of a people and the role or duties of the government. I have suggested that the idea of sustainability had potential to be a constructive concept in public reason on matters of justice related to the environment. The broadness and conceptual diversity of the idea of sustainability has been criticized as a weakness for researcher's and scholars seeking clarity. However, this complexity of conception also provides the potential to be a practical idea for a reasonable plurality of views as laid out in the opening section of Chapter Three. As an example, Becker's sustainability ethics provide a strong conception of the idea though it is a comprehensive doctrine. Such a conception is permissible on matters of legislation not related to the constitutional essentials of democratic society. However, when ecological integrity becomes a matter for the political conception of justice as a concern with the fundamental institutional relationships of a people, a political conception of sustainability must be presented in terms that are coherent to the principles of justice and consistent with the demands for a political, not comprehensive, view in public reason. To this end, the anthropocentric approach to sustainability by Rawls as laid out by Bell is a proper approach to such fundamental questions and most consistent with a reasonable plurality of comprehensive doctrines.

As discussed above, the comprehensive views associated with the human-nature relationship that are part of a comprehensive sustainability are unsettled philosophical questions and cause for disagreement based upon the burdens of judgment. However, considering the current contemporary context, the proviso allows for such comprehensive views to be appealed to in public reason with the caveat that these views be shown to be coherent to a liberal political conception of justice. Becker's comprehensive conception of
a sustainability ethics is consistent with a liberal conception of justice and coherent to a Rawlsian conception of sustainability. Thus, on matters addressing the limits to liberty and the role of the government as a regulator of distributive justice, sustainability must be shown as consistent with a liberal conception of justice in public reason. By expressing sustainability in the terms and values of public reason, the legitimacy of governmental action is obtained, this is sustainability for the right reasons. Recall, it is for the individual citizen to make a deeper meaning of the idea of sustainability in his/her own account, as "full justification" is a citizen's practice of reflective equilibrium, fitting a political conception of justice to a comprehensive view. Legitimacy on such fundamental matters, however, requires a public justification, that is agreement among a reasonable overlapping consensus. In the domain of public reason, the terms of sustainability are general in scope and thus open to elaboration within a comprehensive view.

b. Reconciliation between comprehensive sustainability as proviso with a political conception of justice. The proviso provides that under conditions or circumstances where the application of a constitution does not provide adequate provision or guidance on fundamental matters of justice, such as seen in the examples of the abolitionist movement and the civil rights movement in the U.S.A., a comprehensive view may be employed to show a moral duty to respond. The proviso also imposes a limitation on such use of comprehensive doctrines in coherence with the idea of public reason in that a comprehensive claim must be shown to be consistent with a political conception of justice. A comprehensive view employed in public reason must address other citizens consistent with the duty of civility and the criterion of reciprocity by explaining how the moral case fits with the political values of public reason. For instance,
Becker's comprehensive sustainability ethics and its focus upon the sustainability relations provide a compelling approach to the questions of justice in the relationships of contemporary and future generations in ways that are consistent with a Rawlsian conception of sustainability. To show how a comprehensive sustainability that addresses the human-nature relationship can be fitted to an anthropocentric political approach is a necessary step to answering the question of how sustainability can serve a role in public reason.

The human-nature relationship is best answered by a comprehensive view in terms of what Rawls calls first philosophy. That is the human-nature relationship is fundamentally a metaphysical claim. The fact that human beings are nature contingent, that is dependent upon nature for existence, is not a contested notion though the very nature of this relationship has many competing philosophical views. The statement that human beings are a part of nature, that we are contingent upon nature as fundamental to our existence is not a contested notion in the background culture. Most people, even many unreasonable people recognize that air, water, food, and the other components of nature are inextricably linked to human existence. Or rather, human lived experience is inextricably linked to nature. What becomes a matter of comprehensive metaphysical discussion or position is to define the nature of the relationship of humans and the environment. For example, that is to say something along the lines that human beings are nature itself, the cosmos is within the human being and the human being is interconnected to the all. Or conversely, human beings are the physical and transient expression of a soul that will one day transcend this natural existence. These are metaphysical statements. But rather saying human beings as living beings on this planet
are contingent upon nature is a predominantly uncontested fact. So then a political sustainability can conceivably draw from this uncontested notion of the contingency of human life to a life sustaining nature through a valuing of ecological integrity. This holds up to the Rawlsian contention that political values be general and broadly applicable, allowing for much of their definition to be elaborated by comprehensive doctrines and the citizens affirming that these general values are in coherence with their own comprehensive view. Such a process is the point of full justification and an important aspect for stability for the right reasons of an overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines.

Still, this relationship as a political question must focus upon the idea of human society as a system of social cooperation regulated by a political conception of justice. The human relationship to nature is indirectly a matter of justice in that while human beings are dependent on nature and have fundamental claims to preserving the conditions that permit life in perpetuity, to use Rawls's term, the regulation of behavior through political mechanisms of society is fundamentally a matter legitimate governance. The limits to liberty imposed by governmental authority are matters of justice directly. In the example of Becker's comprehensive sustainability ethics, the human-nature relationship is regulated via cultural mechanisms regarding individual virtue and the social-cultural sanctioning of how a "good" or virtuous person is to behave in relationship to nature. The weight of this argument is certainly reasonable in the background culture and may over time win converts while less "virtuous" views of nature as an economic resource may lose "believers". However, on fundamental constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice, a reasonable citizen will provide justification that addresses other
citizens in ways that those citizens have agreed are reasonable, these are the terms of public reason, the public political values and principles of justice that are mutually shared by all citizens.

To reconcile a comprehensive sustainability with a political approach, we recall the discussion by Bell on Rawlsian sustainability and environmental justice to begin to bring a considered conviction to ecological sustainability as represented by the religious and nonreligious viewpoints discussed above in which the value of ecological integrity is fundamental. To bring coherence between a comprehensive ecological sustainability and a liberal conception of justice, the method of reflective equilibrium is employed to develop sustainability as a political principle of justice. The stability and perpetuity of democratic society is inextricably linked to a healthy environment that allows life to persist. As such the limits of individual freedom must be responsive to the ecological limits of the perpetuity condition. Recall that for Rawls, the priority of the right places limits on what can be considered good or valued. In the case of the environment, what is right, that is the conception of justice, hinges upon the conditions of ecological integrity in perpetuity. Without such conditions, the just society is a fleeting ideal. So then, a question of justice regarding what is right or just in terms of the political limits of human freedom in relationship to the environment must turn to a conception of justice for guidance at reconciling the disequilibrium of unsustainable lifeways and democratic society. Here the principles of justice most notably, the second principle of justice provides guidance as laid out by Bell (refer to the discussion above). From this reflection on the question of justice related to the environment and the principles of justice, a basic political principle of ecological sustainability is formulated as a public reason. The limits
of individual freedom are constrained by the requirements of equality in the political, economic, and social institutions of society and must be structured so as to maintain ecological integrity in perpetuity. To this end, the political principle of ecological sustainability is characterized as: The sustainability condition, that is the circumstances by which a just well-ordered democratic society obtains and is maintained over time, requires the proper regulation of the economic and cultural practices of human society by its political institutions in a manner that addresses the ecological integrity of the planet in perpetuity consistent with the principles of justice. As a matter of justice and a requirement for the regulatory mechanisms of governance, the principle of sustainability holds both a moral and a constitutional duty for the government of a people.

D. Duties of the State and the Duties of the Citizen

As discussed above, in the LoP, Rawls identifies a moral duty to sustainability as one of the roles of government. However, in this idea of responsibility and governance is the role or duty of the citizen when recognizing the central role of citizenship in Rawlsian democratic theory. Thus in terms of sustainability and ecological integrity, the moral duties lie both in the state and in the citizen.

I argue that an important role of government, however arbitrary a society's boundaries may appear from a historical point of view, is to be an effective agent of a people as they take responsibility for their territory and the size of their population, as well as for maintaining the land's environmental integrity... the asset is the people's territory and its potential capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people itself as politically organized. The perpetuity condition is crucial. People must recognize that they cannot make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, or by migrating into another people's territory without their consent (LoP, p. 8).
In this excerpt, Rawls points to the idea of sustainability and the issue of continuance as it was defined in Becker's sustainability ethics with the idea of the *perpetuity condition*. The *LoP* is concerned with the extension of political liberal justice to the domain of international diplomacy. Here, Rawls lays out a view of the link between injustice and ecological degradation. The failure to ensure ecological integrity is seen as a source for domestic and international instability, and an indicator of the failure to uphold principles guiding the society of peoples, most notably, the duties of non-intervention and non-belligerence. These duties are related to a principle to not cause harm.

Another point made in the excerpt involves the nature of democratic governance. The government through its institutions by which legitimate use of coercive power is entrusted has a moral duty to be responsive to the issues of sustainability. But as Rawls declares, "the agent is the people itself as politically organized", thus the citizen also has a moral duty to respond to the sustainability conditions and the circumstances by which justice obtains. Citizens are the agents of the government in two ways. One way citizens are agents of the state is as the people's representatives (the legislators, judges, and bureaucrats that occupy governmental positions or offices). The other way citizens are agents involves the duty of citizens as voters and as societal members or social critics who hold their government and their representatives accountable.

When firm and widespread, the disposition of citizens to view themselves as ideal legislators, and to repudiate government officials and candidates for public office who violate public reason, is one of the political and social roots of democracy, and vital to its strength and vigor. Thus citizens fulfill their duty of civility and support the idea of public reason by doing what they can to hold government officials to it. The duty, like other political rights and duties, is an intrinsically moral duty. (*IPRR*, p. 445)
As it has been laid out here, the duties of the state and the duties of the citizen are both moral duties. This view is consistent with Broome's (2012) analysis of moral duties in the case of climate change. Broome contends that the state, as representative of a people with the coercive power of governance and the resources to act on a more significant level, has the principal moral duty to respond to climate crisis. Part of the role of the state, according to Broome (p. 97-116), is a moral duty to promote the general welfare of the public, that is the public good. "Governments have a stronger moral mandate than individuals to make things better. It is one of their principal duties to make things better for their own citizens, and they should cooperate to make things better for everyone" (p. 188). In the case of individual citizens, Broome (p. 73-96) places the moral duty on a duty to justice, that is citizens in affirming principles of justice and acting from within this conception must act in ways that mitigate causing harm. But citizens also have a moral duty that is not only an aspect of private, individual morality, but is contained in their role as citizens, as the agents collectively comprising the state. "Significant progress can be achieved only by governments, because only governments have the power to get all their people to change their behavior. Governments have a moral duty to respond to climate change, and you as a citizen have a duty to do what you can through political action to get your government to fulfill them" (p. 73-74).
E. Summary

In this chapter, I have tried to demonstrate the diversity of comprehensive views that support a conception of sustainability around a value of ecological integrity. I have further attempted to show how this considered conviction can be construed in political terms and legitimated through public reason as a matter of basic justice due to the intersection of the environment with the fundamental institutions of society. As such, the government has a moral imperative to act on matters of ecological crisis as the stability and sustainability of democratic life hinges upon the basic circumstances that allow life to persist. Furthermore, the citizen as an agent of the democratic regime has a moral responsibility to be engaged in the process of perpetuating a sustainable democratic society. The moral duties of citizenship and the imperatives of ecological sustainability will be addressed in more detail in the next chapter.
Chapter Four

IV. Citizenship and Sustainable Deliberative Democracy

A. Introduction to Citizenship

In Chapter Three, a case for sustainability as a matter of basic justice was made. As a matter of basic justice, a principle of sustainability was proposed as a normative commitment to which the state, as representative of a democratic people, has a moral duty to uphold the conditions of justice and to act within the legitimate means of governance to ensure the viability and integrity of the environment in perpetuity. This is the perpetuity condition that is vital to a principle of sustainability. The moral duty to be responsive to the perpetuity condition is thus also a moral duty of the citizen, to both hold his/her government accountable to the conception of justice and to affirm the conception of justice within his/her own comprehensive doctrine. As a reciprocal duty of civility, a reasonable citizen must also act sustainably as a matter of justice to both contemporaries and to future generations. In this next chapter, Chapter Four, the moral duties related to sustainable and reasonable citizenship will be laid out based upon a Rawlsian conception of the person.

The structure of this chapter will begin by presenting the considered convictions of citizenship in the political culture of democratic societies. While in this study a complete survey of the approaches to citizenship is not possible as the field of citizenship studies can be described as broad and lacking complete clarity on the terms and typologies defining approaches to citizenship. However, a characterization of common themes will be laid out. The liberal and classic republican, or civic republican, traditions are two distinct approaches as defined in a number of studies (see Clarke, 1994; Heater,
These two approaches provide much of the view on citizenship in democratic culture, yet can be a source of conceptual confusion in contemporary typologies. Both contemporary liberal and republican approaches to citizenship are liberal in the sense that both arise from liberal democratic theory regarding the rights of the individual in a shift away from the view of the subject as subservient to the feudal-monarchical system. Where the two approaches differ is on the emphasis to which of the array of rights is given priority and how those rights are associated with democratic practices. This includes consideration of the tension between liberty and equality in democratic citizenship. As one of the roles of political philosophy to clarify and reconcile these ideas, Rawls suggests:

To fix ideas, consider the conflict between the claims of liberty and the claims of equality in the tradition of democratic thought. Debates over the last two centuries or so make plain that there is no public agreement on how basic institutions are to be arranged so as to be most appropriate to the freedom and equality of democratic citizenship (JFR, p. 2).

Adding to this discussion is an inclusion of three other approaches that will be defined in this survey, that have been influential in the contemporary debates on citizenship. The idea of cosmopolitanism (the world citizen), the idea of multiple citizenship, and the more recent idea of green citizenship will also be discussed. The chapter will then turn to Rawls's idea of the person as citizen. The moral duties associated with Rawlsian citizenship will be laid out and fitted to the principle of sustainability as a matter of basic justice. Thus, the reasonable citizen is conceived as sustainable as an ideal to guide the limits by which freedom can be expressed in the reasonable plurality of conceptions of the good.
B. Citizenship and Democratic Political Culture

To begin this discussion of citizenship, it is meaningful to lay out some of the basic components of the idea of the citizen. Here the focus will be upon the democratic tradition and not other typologies of citizenship identified as authoritarian monarchist, fascist, or authoritarian socialist conceptions (Turner, 1990). The democratic tradition harkens back to ancient Greece and the Roman Republic for the origins of the idea of citizenship (For a survey of the historical roots, see Clarke, 1994; Heater, 1999/2005; Pocock, 1992/1995). This linear tradition as it is often presented in textbooks is not so neatly packaged when given historical analysis, often skipping the role of Arabic and Islamic scholars in the preservation of such ideas, but this is a matter for a different study (Diagne, 2011). Regardless, the Western political tradition gives meaning to the classical works on the ideas of citizenship and these ideas have been significantly influential in the political culture of modern democracies beginning with the origins of the modern state in the historical periods of the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in Europe and in America (for a discussion of these historical matters, see Pocock, 1992/1995).

The historic roots of modern citizenship are related to the economic rise of capitalism. In other words, the democratization of society from a feudal or "quasi-feudal" system had a reciprocal relationship with the rise of capitalism as the economic engine in such societies. Heater (1999/2005) contends:

We cannot say categorically that the evolution of modern liberal citizenship would have been impossible without the emergence of a capitalist market economy and an accompanying, increasingly powerful, bourgeois class. For one thing, pressure for the legal and political rights that were conceded by three revolutions in England, America, and France was spearheaded as much by a lawyer-dominated professional class as by entrepreneurial capitalists, perhaps even more so (p. 7).
Heater (see his discussion in the section *Citizenship and Capitalism*, p. 7-12) continues by laying out three ways in which capitalism and democracy were related in the process of social change. The first required an overhaul of the subservient position of subjects, alluded to previously, which includes the development of a liberal view of the individual in both economic and political spheres. This entails, the idea of the "free exercise of initiative as the very essence of capitalism" with a corresponding emphasis on the rights of the individual. The second change includes the shift in social structure from a fixed or ascribed hierarchical system to one that allowed for social mobility or "social fluidity" to use Heater's term. "Capitalism... requires social fluidity. Class divisions, it is true are inevitable... but not caste rigidity" (p. 8). This is then linked to the first kind of social change: "Initiative... required the partitions between classes to be permeable. The concept of citizenship took this alteration to the logical conclusion of equality of status. A citizen is a citizen is a citizen: no differentiation" (p.8). The third social change reflects the shift from the local economy of both the ancient and the medieval city-state to a more complex economic system based upon trade in "free and open markets" with its need for a shared system of exchange which led to the formation of the modern nation-state. "The integration and solidification of the nation-state, so essential for the capitalist, made way for citizenship as national identity" (p.8).

However, the relationship between capitalism and democracy mirrors the tension between liberty and equality in which economic power is often convertible to social and political power. Thus the tension of economic liberty and the pursuit of wealth and property pose a risk for the democratic conditions of equality and the equality of opportunity especially when wealth correlates with agency in the social and political
spheres. An example is the correlation between parental socio-economic status and student academic achievement in the United States which resembles a form of nepotism rather than the ideal of merit in the distribution of opportunity related to life prospects. This in turn undermines the basic requirement for social mobility through initiative seen as necessary to a capitalist system according to Heater (1999/2005, p. 8). This condition presents what Robert Dahl (1998) has described as the paradox of democracy and market-capitalist economy.

Historically, the development of democratic beliefs and a democratic culture has been closely associated with what might loosely be called market economy. More specifically, a highly favorable condition for democratic institutions is a market economy in which economic enterprises are mainly owned privately, and not by the state, that is, a capitalist rather than a socialist or statist economy. Yet the close association between democracy and market-capitalism conceals a paradox: a market-capitalist economy inevitably generates inequalities in the political resources to which different citizens have access. Thus a market-capitalist economy seriously impairs political equality: citizens who are economically unequal are unlikely to be politically equal. In a country with a market-capitalist economy, it appears, full political equality is impossible to achieve. Consequently, there is a permanent tension between democracy and a market-capitalist economy (p. 158).

In general, definitions of citizenship point to the relationship of the person to the state, or in ancient times, the polis (in Greece) or res publica (in Rome). Furthermore, this relationship is defined by three fundamental components: legal citizenship, political citizenship, and identity. Legal citizenship is rooted in the legal standing or status of the person. In this case, a society is viewed as ruled by law, and citizenship provides the standing or the relationship of the citizen to the legal structures and institutions, including the framework of rights and duties related to the constitution of society. Political citizenship then concerns the relationship of the person to the political institutions of society. In the democratic tradition, this involves the person as a political agent,
participating in the legitimate governance of society, and the citizens as a collective body being the source of that legitimacy. The idea of citizenship as identity involves a sense of belonging and the feelings of allegiance and group affinity based upon the polity, as well as the cultural competence that is constructive of the person as a citizen. (For a more comprehensive review and analysis on the components of citizenship, see the edited anthology *Theorizing Citizenship* by Beiner, 1995; or Heater, 1999/2005).

**a. Republicanism.** Republicanism generally emphasizes the ideas of political participation and the active inclusion in a political community. Classical conceptions were based upon the city-state model, such as ancient Athens or medieval Florence (Heater, 1999/2005; Miller, 2000). In both of these cases, the political community was relatively small and citizenship was rather exclusive in that only certain members of society, i.e. men of wealth, were granted status. The argument for this exclusivity rested on the demands of participation in governance requiring much time and devotion of which only men of means, such as the case of slaveholder's economic activities and mundane tasks being cared for by slaves, could afford such rights and duties. This view was influential in the era of revolutionary America and was represented by Jefferson's Republican vision which held stringent land ownership as a condition for the enfranchisement of White males. Added to this idea of political community was an emphasis on socially or culturally sanctioned "proper" or "virtuous" character necessary for upholding the rights and obligations pursuant to a republican citizen. This condition supported a focus on small, local communities as the center of political activity in which social sanction was a greater force.
Rawls in his work deviates from the liberal v. republican dichotomy delineated by the authors cited above. Instead, Rawls (JFR, p. 2, 143) follows a categorization based upon the kinds of liberty emphasized by the political culture. This is drawn from Benjamin Constant (1819) and referred to as the liberties of the ancients and the liberties of the moderns. The liberties of the ancients refers to the tradition from Aristotle to Rousseau and involves "the equal political liberties and the values of public life" (p.2). Conversely, the liberties of the moderns refers to the tradition of Locke which stresses "freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of law" (p. 2). Rawls suggests that classic republicanism is a form of the liberal tradition, consistent with the liberal conception of justice. Replacing the typical dichotomy of liberal v. republicanism with a distinction between civic humanism and republicanism. Civic humanism is Aristotelian and further exemplified by Rousseau; it can be identified as a comprehensive doctrine regarding human nature being deeply rooted in political life in which the good life is associated with political participation in a political community (See Rawls, JFR, p. 143-145).

Whereas classic republicanism according to Rawls, conceives participation in political society on different grounds. Here, the aim of the liberty of the moderns is concerned with the protection of "democratic liberties", both political and nonpolitical which:

requires the active participation of citizens who have the political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime. The idea is that unless there is widespread participation in democratic politics by a vigorous and informed citizen body moved in good part by a concern for political justice and public good, even the best-designed political institutions will eventually fall into the hands of those who hunger for power or military glory, or pursue narrow class and economic interests to the exclusion of
almost everything else. If we are to remain free and equal citizens, we cannot afford a general retreat into private life (JFR, p. 144).

With this in mind, contemporary republicanism maintains the participatory and community-centered ideas while extending enfranchisement on equal grounds to diverse members of society. Governance in the republican model emphasizes deliberation and the actions of legislative councils. Miller (2000, see Chapter 3) presents a contemporary case for republicanism that begins with the liberal idea of individual rights and obligations grounded in legal and political equality, but then turns to the community-based argument for a deliberative democracy. Here, the role of identity as a form of nationality situates the citizen in a community of shared deliberation on political questions, in a public forum. As this chapter unfolds, issues with republicanism raised by contemporary critics will be discussed.

b. The liberal tradition. As it is presented in many works on citizenship (Clarke, 1994; Dobson, 2003; Heater, 1999/2005; and Turner, 1990), articulation of the liberal tradition often includes the seminal work of British sociologist T.H. Marshall's (1950) *Citizenship and Social Class and other Essays*. Marshall develops a framework for understanding the historical roots and expansion of rights associated with citizenship in the case of post-World War Two era Great Britain. This is characterized by the securing of legal rights in the origins of liberalism with its roots in the development of the free market economic system, followed by the expanding enfranchisement through political rights in the 19th Century. According to Marshall, the 20th Century was characterized as expanding the rights claims of citizens to the domain of social rights. These involve the justification for a welfare state that aims to provide the social minimum for citizens while
maintaining the basic structure of a free market as a means for ameliorating the tensions between democracy and capitalism.

As can be seen in Marshall's analysis, the emphasis on equal individual rights and the role of the state in being the source of responsibility to those rights is emphasized in the liberal approach. "Civil citizenship establishes rights against the state; social citizenship establishes rights provided by the state" (Heater, 1999/2005, p. 21). Also, in coherence with liberalism in general is the maintenance of the market based economy while securing a rights regime to maintain the conditions of freedom. Miller (2000) summarizes "Citizenship should be understood as a set of rights enjoyed equally by every member of the society in question. In Marshall's analysis these are classified as civil rights, political rights, and social rights" (p. 44). Rawls has labeled this rights regime using Constant's term the liberties of the moderns, which can be traced to John Locke and have been predominantly influential in the development of the modern nation-state.

Before turning to conceptions of citizenship outside the dichotomy of liberal and republican approaches, a note regarding the term neo-liberal should be discussed. Neo-liberalism and the "New Right" in Western democracies has been by most measures a response to the welfare state and the regulatory role of government. The emphasis is on unregulated markets or a limited regulatory role for government stressing the idea that capitalism and the free markets are the basis for autonomy and freedom (Friedman, 1962/1982). Neo-liberalism is a form of liberalism that uses the language of individual rights, but rejects the development of social rights as destructive of the conditions of autonomy and freedom. The critique is situated in the idea that the welfare state produces the effect of dependence upon the state rather than the motivations and opportunities for
personal responsibility and initiative. The work of political philosopher Robert Nozick (1974) which was developed as a response to Rawls's *TJ* has been influential in this movement. Nozick emphasized the role of government as a minimalist state providing only the protections of policing and security to ensure negative liberty (such as freedom from harm and freedom from interference) and the mediation of contracts in which justice is situated in the acquisition and transfer of goods. The citizen in this case is essentially an economic consumer employing rational interest and choice as the foundation for being free. For a review of the debate within the liberal tradition between social citizenship and neo-liberalism, see Heater's (1999/2005, p. 24-28) synopsis.

c. **Cosmopolitanism.** The idea of cosmopolitanism is expressed by the claim "citizen of the world" with an orientation to global moral consideration and standing and can be split into two tracks of thought. The first track emphasizes the dispositional qualities of global moral consideration while the other track promotes one world government. As a disposition, cosmopolitans focus on the supra-identity of the citizen of the world which considers the whole of humanity as a universal community and affirms the moral claim regarding the equality of all human beings. The origins of cosmopolitanism are as ancient as the idea of citizenship, in general, and has been expressed in various traditions throughout the world. The ancient Stoics of Greece and the Roman Empire were prominent advocates of the disposition to global citizenship. "Their point [the Stoics] was even more radical: that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of government, no temporal power, but to the moral community made up by the humanity of all human beings" (Nussbaum, 2002, p. 7). Such a disposition often eschews the chauvinism or partiality of ethnic and national identification and requires a
vigorous cosmopolitan civic education to introduce the person to the world of ideas and the many manifestations of human society and culture. "But they [the student/ the citizen] must also, and centrally learn to recognize humanity wherever they encounter it, undeterred by traits that are strange to them, and be eager to understand humanity in all its strange guises" (Nussbaum, p. 9). This point will be discussed in more detail in the forthcoming chapter on education. (For a discussion of the dispositional idea of cosmopolitanism, see Nussbaum, 2002, p. 3-17; Heater, 1995/2005, p. 134-154).

Cosmopolitanism has been suggested as a solution to the flaws in both the liberal and republican approaches to citizenship. Liberalism is said to deemphasize the role of obligations and duties while focusing on the rights and claims to individual liberty. Conversely, republicanism is critiqued for its emphasis on a bounded political community centered on a distinctive way of life rather than the plurality of humanity's many cultures. Included in this critique is the analysis that liberalism and republicanism situate citizenship in national identities which tend to lead to partiality and chauvinism in international relations. As Nussbaum (2002) discussing the work of the author, poet, and educator Rabindranath Tagore and his commitment to the cosmopolitan vision contends "nationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one another, but akin - that to give support to nationalist sentiments subverts, ultimately, even the values that hold a nation together, because it substitutes a colorful idol for the substantive universal values of justice and right" (p. 5). Furthermore, the environmental and ecological ideas of interconnection and interdependence have also been influential in cosmopolitan thinking. The environment, it is said, knows no national boundary. In the next section on green citizenship, this idea will be discussed more fully.
One question that cosmopolitanism struggles to answer is how do the ideals of participatory democracy and a sense of community fit with such a superordinate identification? And how can governance involve the participation of such a large and disparate mass of people who hold such a broad array of cultural systems of meaning? The responses tend to focus on the ideas of union or confederation in which local governance deals with the local issues while representatives are chosen for the larger global issues brought to the institutions of global confederation. This then does not require the abscission of the current idea of the nation-state, but would require reworking the institutional structures of governance, legality, and enforcement at the global level (Heater, 1999/2005, p. 143-148).

d. Green citizenship. The term green citizenship has been chosen to represent a field of study that includes categories such as environmental citizenship and ecological citizenship. While these terms have distinctive meaning within the field of green politics, for the sake of this study, these approaches have been grouped under the term green citizenship (For more information on the distinctions, see Dobson, 2003; Gabrielson, 2008). "As it is commonly used, environmental citizenship makes demands on people to act differently for the sake of the environment." (Bell, 2005, p. 179-180). However as Bell points out, the focus of green citizenship is often "human behavior more generally that is put at the service of the environment" rather than citizenship which implies a political relationship with rights and duties (p.182). Recall that citizenship rather implies standing in a political community with rights and duties, a capacity for participation in collective decision-making, and an interest in the public good. Heater (1999/2005, p. 29) has suggested that though the environment and the field of "green politics" has staked a
role for an added dimension or "element" to citizenship around the idea of the relationship of human beings to the environment, such a conception raises difficulty for the traditional idea of citizenship.

Yet at the same time, the concept itself presents many difficulties; it does not sit easily in the framework of liberal citizenship. Environmental citizenship relates to the quality of life. Rather like social citizenship, it is not easy, compared with the civil and political varieties, to define exactly what the rights in this sphere should be or to legislate for their protection...

By placing the individual *qua* citizen in a relationship to these issues [environmental issues] we are expanding the very concept of citizenship beyond its traditional boundaries. In a literal geographical sense, of course, in that many of the forms taken by the forces of environmental degradation cannot be constrained by the national frontiers within which the role of citizen has usually been acted out (p. 29).

In response to Heather's claim regarding the difficulty fitting environmental concern to liberal democratic theory, one of the goals of this study has been to show that ecological integrity is a matter of justice. As such, sustainability within a liberal political conception of justice addresses the question of legitimate limits placed on human conceptions of the good and of the freedom to pursue those goods based upon the reciprocal rights and duties associated with sustaining the conditions by which a just, well-ordered democratic life obtains in perpetuity. In this conception of justice, the role of the citizen is of vital importance as the source of democratic legitimacy and in the affirmation of a system of cooperation structured by a conception of justice. As will be discussed shortly, the reciprocal duties of the citizen in relationship to this perpetuity condition defined by a principle of sustainability must find balance or coherence between the citizen's conception of the good and a sense of justice. One difficulty that I perceive to be the cause of conceptual confusion for citizenship and the environment relates to the link between comprehensive doctrines and the political conception of justice. Green
citizenship as it is defined in much of the literature in green politics has emphasized the role of virtue and a form of orthodoxy around a comprehensive conception of the environmental/ ecological good (Dobson, 2003, p. 6). In many ways this echoes the ways in which Becker's sustainability ethics must be seen as a comprehensive view of sustainability that requires fitting to a political conception through the proviso and public justification.

In general, green citizenship has mirrored the discussion of the approaches to citizenship, following the distinctions between liberal, republican, and cosmopolitan traditions. Green liberal citizenship tends to be reformist in nature, using the language of rights and developing a regime by which the rights of the individual to basic environmental goods are secured (Gabrielson, 2008, p. 431-433). Heater (1999/2005) cites Article 24 of the South African constitution as an example of this approach: "Everyone has the right (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of the present and future generations" (p. 39). Bell (2005, p. 188-188) points out three domains of environmental rights held by citizens, these are substantive rights, procedural rights, and personal rights. Substantive rights deal with claims to environmental goods such as clean air, clean water, and safe food. Procedural rights deal with the legal and political capacity for citizens to be involved in environmental decision-making processes of the polity and to take action to remedy or mitigate substantive claims to environmental goods. The personal rights then entail the idea of personal choice and the capacity of the citizen to determine those behaviors and activities that support his/her own conception of the good. The Rawlsian political liberal approach as it is laid out in Chapter Three of this study certainly fits
within this tradition, although with some caveats rooted in the synthesis of convictions regarding the environment and sustainability to the conception of justice. However, as it will hopefully be more clear going forward, the Rawlsian method is concerned with reconciliation of common considered convictions in the political culture with a conception of justice, and thus contains elements that adapt liberal theory to contemporary concerns which are responsive to republican and cosmopolitan ideas.

Conversely, green republican citizenship emphasizes the virtues, obligations and duties that are necessary in the practices of sustainable societies. In this way, republican approaches to green citizenship tend to focus on the idea of participation in the deliberative practices of society as a means for the development of ecologically conscious and conscientious citizens. Green republican views generally involve an emphasis on political agency, but also tend to promote a comprehensive conception of the environmental good which gives substance to individual virtue (Barry, 2006). In this way, this approach echoes civic humanism's emphasis on virtue and a prescribed commitment to a unitary conception of the good. Virtue in this case is attached to the idea of living sustainably and the duties and obligations of the person to behave in a way that conforms to the socially sanctioned ecologically conscious way of life. As a matter of virtue, living such an ecologically conscious life is one's ultimate good and thus develops the citizens' true nature (Connely, 2006). A robust civic and environmental education which includes the deliberative practices of the polity is seen as fundamental to ecologically conscious citizenship.

However, many in the deliberative, republican approach to green citizenship take the step towards a global or cosmopolitan view of the global civic community which
stresses the interdependence and interconnection of humanity and the rest of nature (see Naess's deep ecology movement). While sympathetic to the global scope of the deliberative cosmopolitan, Dobson (2003) has been critical of the tendency to overstate the case of interdependence at the expense of considering the unequal and often unidirectional power structures of the globalized paradigm. Rather, Dobson calls for a radical new form of citizenship labeled "post-cosmopolitanism" in which the responsibility and obligation for sustainability is squarely a duty of the people of the industrialized nations. Yet he situates this citizenship in the discourse of rights and obligations, very conventional concepts for a radical view. What Dobson does emphasize and which is important to a conception of justice, is the unequal distribution of benefits and harms related to the globalized system. The benefits of globalization and the carbon intensive economic age have flown relatively in one direction to the countries that were traditional colonial powers, recent exception may need to be made when considering the BRIC (Brazil, India, and China) nations. Still the pattern of exploitation and oppression that marred the global society of peoples, to use a Rawlsian term, has resulted in definite privileges for some while creating systemic or structural disadvantage for others. Dobson's work shows that any conception of ecological or environmental justice must consider the distributive arrangements of the society of peoples in the development of an ideal theory. This adds then the necessity to consider restorative justice in the reconciliation of the ideal theory to the non-ideal theories of application and practice. (For a more comprehensive view of green republicanism, see Gabrielson, 2008, p. 433-437).
What is difficult and somewhat conceptually confusing with the dichotomous categories of green liberalism and republicanism is that much of contemporary scholarship incorporates elements of the two approaches. As Rawls suggests in his distinction between civic humanism versus classic republicanism, the republican ideal of political participation and agency is consistent with a liberal conception of justice. Whereas civic humanism roots participation in a polity as a virtue situated in a comprehensive doctrine that calls for a form of cultural orthodoxy. So it is with green citizenship, some forms are consistent with a liberal conception of individual rights and the maintenance of a system that allows for reasonable ideological pluralism while other forms of green politics advocate a comprehensive view of a green virtuous citizen. As Hayward (2006) suggests, green citizenship in many ways is not a new form of citizenship, but rather gives "a distinctive substance" and orientation to the "conventional" conceptions of citizenship (p. 435). This orientation is a concern for ecological and environmental integrity and the cultural practices of sustainable societies of which a system of rights and duties attached to citizenship give meaning and understanding.

e. Multiple citizenships. The idea of multiple citizenship can be characterized by two different categories of thought. Heater (1999/2005) suggests multiple citizenship can be demonstrated by two metaphors, that is "to distinguish between citizenships which coexist in parallel and those which may be described as functioning in layers" (p. 115). In both there is a consideration of the legal standing of the person as well as the dimensions dealing with identification, allegiance, and cultural competence. Parallel citizenship considers dual citizenship and its standards in national and international law. Conversely
"layered citizenship" considers the multiple levels of citizenship in a complex federal system or nation-state, which will be referred to in this section as the State, emphasis on the capital "S" (For a more comprehensive discussion of multiple citizenship, see Heater, 1999/2005, Ch. 4, p. 115-154).

Heater contends there are essentially four kinds or layers of layered citizenship. These are the State, sub-State (for example, the state of Maine in the U.S.A.), sub-state (municipal citizenship), and supra-State citizenship as promoted by cosmopolitanism. Some may argue, such as in the case of cosmopolitanism, that without a clear polity, there is no citizenship (See Gutmann, 2002, p. 68). However, these categories are useful for organizing and analyzing the different dimensions of human association and give meaning to people's lives in a world of increasing complexity in which mobility and exchange are common occurrences. As Heater (1999/2005) suggests, "Multiple citizenship is, therefore, a reality" (p. 117).

Much of what is at issue in the reality of multiple citizenship is really the question of multiple identity and the capacity for multiple allegiances and cultural competencies. A republic or federal system such as the United States or the European Union provide prime examples of the challenges resulting from such layered affiliations. The Civil Rights era Southern states in the U.S. further illustrate such challenges as many states claimed both a right or duty to interposition regarding federal law and court rulings that aimed to desegregate the South while also claiming identification with their state and its history, culture, and traditions or in general, its heritage. Interposition is a state's rights claim when federal law conflicts with state's law and the state gives priority to its own position. For instance, following the Brown v. Board of Education ruling, a number of
state governors and local politicians refused to obey the federal court order to integrate schools claiming the right to *interpose* themselves between the federal law and the citizens of their state. In places like Little Rock, Arkansas and Oxford, Mississippi federal marshals and military troops were deployed to force the court order. However, built into the U.S. Constitution is the Supremacy Clause which gives priority to federal law in such conflicts, thus invalidating such state's rights claims and legitimizing force; the government being the only authority endowed with the right of force to protect the rights of citizens. But the difficulty for legalistic, or *de jure*, approaches to questions of justice and compliance, is the confrontation or conflict with *de facto* results associated with cultural values and forms of allegiance. To this day, many in the South claim an allegiance to their "heritage" and make claims to the rights to uphold social and cultural practices that diminish the equal standing of whole racial categories of people living in those states, such as witnessed by the controversy over the flying of the Confederate flag at public institutions throughout the American South. Thus a rights regime, such as the one promoted by a Rawlsian approach, has much institutional authority, but it must contend with the cultural and social meanings that are constructive of people's worldviews. This is the work of reconciliation in the Rawlsian approach between ideal theory and non-ideal theory.

The previous scenario illustrates the area of multiple citizenship which deals with the identity issues surrounding citizenship. The nature of multiple identities suggests that feelings of belonging and affiliation to various groups, associations, and political entities may at times conflict or contradict one another. The question then must consider allegiance, competency, and reconciliation within those various domains. A goal for a
conception of justice would be that the principles of justice provide a framework for resolving such conflicts through the method of reflective equilibrium.

Furthermore, considering this idea of multiple citizenship and multiple identities, a conception of justice must consider competency and the scientific understanding of human social psychology. In other words, is the very idea of multiple citizenship consistent with a person's capacity to competently hold multiple allegiances and function effectively in different social contexts? Can people hold a national identity while also maintaining the cosmopolitan disposition with a moral sense of concern and care for the category of all of humanity, or a more local identity such as an allegiance to one's state heritage? Recall from the discussion of Rawls's theory, if the ideal theory is not consistent with scientific understanding of human behavior, it is merely a form of utopian conjecture.

To answer such questions, some familiarity with social identity and social categorization theory can provide explanation of the psychological processes that operate in the categorization of social groups and the identification processes that delineate the boundaries of membership, self-enhancement, permeability of the groups, and the saliency of group identities in context (See Deaux & Burke, 2010; Hogg, 2003; Tajfel, 1981; Turner, 1999). The identity of the self is situated within group affinity and affiliation. As Tajfel (1981) suggests social identity is “that part of the individual’s self-concept which derives from his [sic] knowledge of his [sic] membership in the social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that group membership” (p. 255). The concepts of in-group and out-group are important to understanding social identity. In-group refers to accepted members of a social group.
Out-group conversely refers to “others”, to people outside the group often another
different distinct group. Hogg (2003) further contends that group membership and the
attributions of that membership are important, but also, the emotional investment in
group membership is vital to understanding social identity. This involves group
members’ perceptions of social standing or status of the group in relation to other groups.
An interest in social comparison is constructive of the self-enhancement and group
enhancement practices that become embedded in cultural beliefs and values. Social
identity theory provides a basis for understanding intergroup relations in which
categorization defines group membership while accentuation and social comparison
explain social behaviors such as conformity, stereotyping, discrimination and
ethnocentrism (Hogg, 2003; Turner et al, 1979). One outgrowth of social identity theory
is the study of “othering” in which social groups accentuate differences contributing to
the process of dehumanization associated with perceptions of threat and contributive to
violent interactions (Davies et al, 2008; Goff et al, 2008; Sen, 2006).

One consideration based upon the research on perceptions of threat involves the
capacity to re-categorize social identities and form new categories or establish more
permeable boundaries in existing social groups as a means for coping with perceptions of
shared threat. That is when two or more distinct social groups recognize a shared threat, a
process of re-categorization of the identities and the boundaries of the social groups make
it possible to form a larger more inclusive group to respond to the perceived threat. What
would be of interest to this study would be the question of whether the ecological crisis
has the potential to be seen as a shared threat by humanity and thus a potential source for
greater permeability of social groupings and re-categorization of identity. Can the
ecological crisis serve as perceived shared interest for creating more permeable views of national identity that are consistent with extending moral concern to the society of peoples, or possibly be a basis for a supra-State identity such as the cosmopolitan view of citizen of the world. This does not necessarily mean abandoning national or local identities, but developing a super-ordinate identity based upon a perceived and shared global threat. This is purely a matter of conjecture at this point, but worth noting.

Regardless, social psychology suggests that multiple identities can explain the contextual nature of identity, the capacity to seamlessly, often unconsciously, shift identity and competently practice the cultural codes that are activated by specific contexts. This involves the idea of participating in a social structure and playing one's role or part within that structure of relationships, but also involves the psychological aspects of motivation to participate, relate, and feel a sense of belonging within these different contexts (For more on these aspects, see Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; Deaux & Martin, 2003; Ethier & Deaux, 1994; Kumar, Seay, & Karabenick, 2015; Kumar, Warnke, & Karabenick, 2014). An aim for education, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter Five, is that this subconscious or unconscious shifting of cognitive frameworks will be a point of mindful reflection, consideration, and reconciliation. It is a matter of justice and the development of citizens, that the sense of justice functionally operate within a person's social interactions. That is, a citizen must not only consciously affirm a sense of justice, but also develop the reasonableness and civility that are part of pluralistic democratic life and develop a sense of belonging to such a society for the right reasons.
C. Rawls's Idea of the Person Revisited, Reconciling Citizenship

In *Chapter Two* (p. 71-73), the Rawlsian idea of the person was elaborated as one of the fundamental ideas in the family of ideas that make up political liberalism. The conception of the person as citizen must be understood in view of this systematic conception of a democratic society. In this view, Rawls is laying out a political conception of the person within a specific kind of society; that is, a democratic society conceived as a fair system of social cooperation between free and equal citizens well-ordered by a political conception of justice over time.

One can try to deal with this question by viewing political society in a certain way, namely, as a fair system of cooperation over time from one generation to the next, where those engaged in cooperation are viewed as free and equal citizens and normal cooperating members of society over a complete life. We then try to formulate principles of political justice such that if the basic structure of society - the main political and social institutions and the way they fit together as one scheme of cooperation - satisfies those principles, then we can say without pretense and fakery that citizens are indeed free and equal (*JFR*, p. 4).

Recall that these three ideas (of society as a fair system of social cooperation, of the free and equal person, and a well-ordered society) are culled from the traditions and political culture of democratic societies. As such, the ideas are common views held in different ways by diverse perspectives within this political tradition. For Rawls, one role of the political philosopher is to reconcile these ideas into a systematic conception that diminishes the spaces of disagreement within the political culture. To do this, Rawls focuses his conception of justice on the domain of the political rather than the metaphysical. In *PL*, Rawls abandons the comprehensive view of the person that was laid out in *TJ* and focuses instead upon the "free and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights and duties of citizenship, and standing in a
political relation with other citizens" (PL, p. xliii). In keeping with this approach, the
conception of the person then is a political conception and not a metaphysical statement.

This means that the conception of the person is not taken from
metaphysics or the philosophy of mind, or from psychology; it may have
little relation to conceptions of the self discussed in those disciplines. It
must be compatible with (one or more) such philosophical or
psychological conceptions (so far as they are sound), but that is another
story. The conception of the person itself is meant as both normative and
political, not metaphysical or psychological (JFR, p. 19).

The political conception of the person does not seek to answer the metaphysical
questions regarding the nature of human beings, or provide a complete view of human
nature as would a comprehensive doctrine. Rather, the political conception of the person
as a free and equal citizen provides a limited account that is commonly held in
democratic traditions and consistent across an array of comprehensive religious and
philosophical views. "The citizen is, of course, a moral agent, since a political conception
of justice is, as we have seen, a moral conception (11n). But the kinds of rights and
duties, and of the values considered, are more limited" (PL, p. xliii).

As moral agents engaged in social cooperation, Rawls contends that the political
conception of citizens as free and equal is rooted in the citizen's two moral powers. Moral
powers commonly asserted in the political culture, these are (a) a capacity for a sense of
justice and (b) a capacity for a conception of the good. The capacity for a sense of justice
entails "the capacity to understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in
accordance with) the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social
cooperation" (JFR, p. 18). This capacity suggests that the citizen as moral agent must be
responsible for affirming and upholding a conception of justice. "Moreover, they are
viewed as capable of restricting their claims in matters of justice to the kinds of things the
principles of justice allow (PL, p. 34). Whereas the capacity for a conception of the good means the person has the ability to rationally devise a plan of life based upon his/her own conception of what constitutes a good life, consistent within the limits of justice. "The other moral power... is the capacity to have, to revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good. Such a conception is ordered by a family of final ends and aims which specify what is of value in human life, or alternatively, of what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life" (JFR, p.19). The conception of the good is related to a person's own comprehensive view of the world, it is within this comprehensive view that the citizen affirms the conception of justice. Recall that within this way the conception of justice is given greater depth and meaning to each citizen. These capacities are interrelated in that each complements the other; a sense of justice is required for reasonable citizenship in a society viewed as a fair system of social cooperation, while the capacity for a conception of the good gives depth and meaning, or substance to the world occupied with fellow citizens.

a. Citizens as equal. To conceive of the citizens as equals is a moral judgment that involves the theoretical idealization of the person in the common terms of democratic culture. By situating the claim in the political, not metaphysical, Rawls limits the scope to a position that even people holding comprehensive doctrines that reject the self-authenticating position of Kantian Constructivism, can affirm the view. Equality is thus understood as a legal and political status with the source of meaning being the polity and the political culture of society. For instance, while a moral skeptic may reject the notion of human beings being free and equal in a metaphysical sense, the moral skeptic can still agree that in a democratic society, the legal and political status of citizens is free and
equal in a legal and political sense (For a review of the distinction between the political and the metaphysical refer to above, p. 60-68).

Equality associated with citizenship is then rooted in the moral powers necessary for participation as a citizen in social cooperation with other citizens:

Let's say they are regarded as equal in that they are all regarded as having to the essential minimum degree the moral powers necessary to engage in social cooperation over a complete life and to take part in society as equal citizens... that is, since we view society as a fair system of cooperation, the basis of equality is having to the requisite minimum degree the moral and other capacities that enable us to take part fully in the cooperative life of society. Thus the equality of citizens is modeled in the original position by the equality of their representatives: that is, by the fact that these representatives are symmetrically situated in that position and have equal rights in its procedure for reaching agreement. (JFR, p. 20)

The point that the basis for equal citizenship is the capacity to fully take part in the cooperative life of society has been criticized by some as not being inclusive of such people as the disabled or the infirmed (Nussbaum, 2006, p. 14-18). However, recall the discussion of rights and duties, ethics conceives of two fundamental positions regarding moral rights and duties, one the moral agent, the other the moral patient. Both positions are given moral consideration, but only the moral agent has the reciprocal duties or obligations related to rights, the moral patient does not. What Rawls is concerned with here is an abstraction from an ideal case, one in which the society is viewed as being constructed of moral agents engaged in social cooperation over a lifetime.

In using the conception of citizens as free and equal persons we abstract from various features of the social world and idealize in certain ways. This brings out one role of abstract conceptions: they are used to gain a clear and uncluttered view of a question seen as fundamental by focusing on the more significant elements we think are most relevant in determining its appropriate answer (JFR, p. 8).
From this limited view of the person, an ideal framework can be constructed. The rights say of children, the mentally disabled, and the infirmed, are matters of extension from this ideal framework. These persons are given equal moral consideration, but to determine a conception of justice for a system of social cooperation, Rawls limits his study to moral agents, those persons capable of reciprocity, which is fundamental to the conditions of impartiality as represented in the original position.

**b. Citizens as free.** To reiterate, Rawls does not seek an answer to the metaphysical questions regarding human freedom or freedom of the mind. But rather, without attempting to appear redundant, his definition is limited to general views held in common view in the political culture, reconciling these through reflective equilibrium. There are three ways in which Rawls suggests that citizens are free. The first is related to the capacity for a conception of the good. Citizens in democratic societies are seen as capable of determining and revising their conceptions of the good and can thus alter their life plans accordingly.

As free persons, citizens claim the right to view their persons as independent from and not identified with any particular conception of the good, or scheme of final ends. Given their moral power to form, revise, and rationally to pursue a conception of the good, their public or legal identity as free persons is not affected by changes over time in their determinate conception of the good. *(JFR, p. 21)*

Recall the discussion of the religious person being free to leave his/her religious community, at times under the sanctions of being an apostate or heretic. This results in excommunication from the religious sect, but does not affect the political or legal status of the person, the basic protections of life and liberty must be upheld.

A second way involves the idea "in which citizens view themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims" *(PL, p. 32)*. In a system of rights and duties, the
holder of rights must have the capacity to make claims upon the political institutions securing some good or advancing an interest (For a review of the concept of rights and claims, see above, p. 31-32). In this way, the free citizen is the source of those claims, as knowing, understanding, and acting upon his/her rights, he or she has the political and legal standing to hold the government and other citizens accountable to obligations. And the third way deals with the citizen as capable of personal responsibility for "adjusting" their claims and thus their conception of the good based upon the conception of justice (PL, p. 34). This involves the idea that citizens must accept responsibility for life choices and for the effort required to act upon a life plan under conditions of equality of opportunity. In example, a student has a right to the opportunity receive a college education, but it is the students responsibility to be motivated and work towards accomplishing that goal while doing so in way that is consistent with principles of social cooperation. All three of these aspects of citizens as free are associated with the capacity to participate in a system of social cooperation based upon reciprocal responsibility to abide by the fair terms of that arrangement. Citizens are conceived in this way in relationship to the ideas of society and justice.

**c. Public reason and the ideal of citizenship.** In the idea of public reason, Rawls discusses the ideal of citizenship being expressed by the political values of public reason. Recall that the political values of public reason are of two kinds (see p. 95-97 above), values of political justice and values of public reason. The first, the values of political justice, establish the relationship of citizens to the basic structure of society. These include the basic liberties associated with citizenship, such as "values of equal political liberty and civil liberty; fair equality of opportunity; social equality and reciprocity
(expressed by the difference principle), and so on" (JFR, p. 91). The second set are the values of public reason which "fall under the guidelines for public inquiry, which make that inquiry free and public" (PL, p. 224).

As will be discussed in the next chapter, the values of public reason are significant to the education and development of citizens, these include the "fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence, but also the virtues of reasonableness and fair-mindedness... These values reflect an ideal of citizenship: our willingness to settle the fundamental political matters in ways that others as free and equal can acknowledge as reasonable and rational" (JFR, p. 92). The political virtues, reasonableness and fair-mindedness, are essential aspects of the duty of civility (defined above, p. 92-93). The duty of civility requires that citizens address other citizens in terms that all agree establish a fair system of deliberation and governance, and to reasonably abide by the decisions achieved under these conditions of fair process. The guidelines of inquiry, focused upon methods of investigation, reasoning, the communication of reasons, and the intersubjective verification of those reasons is vital to the impartiality and fairness of this process. However, based upon the burdens of judgment, it is still possible, even likely, for reasonable disagreement to obtain. What is necessary then from a conception of political justice and the stability of democratic society, is that citizens understand the values of public reason as well as the difficulties associated with such theoretical reason as laid out in the burdens of judgment. Democratic process then hinges upon a reasonable and civil understanding of agreement and disagreement in which citizens affirm the fairness of deliberative processes or procedures (see Rawls's discussion in PL, p. 54-58).
The capacity to solve contemporary problems such as the issues of ecological crisis which in many ways are ethical/moral and theoretical or knowledge-based are really a form of human crisis (See Gardiner, 2011). As a form of human crisis, these kinds of issues demonstrate the necessity for strengthening the democratic processes of deliberation and public reason, for it is in this way open to impartial, public inquiry and scrutiny. Amartya Sen (2009) contends that such conditions strengthen both the understanding and awareness of problems and contributes to the accountability to those problems through expression of shared interest:

Consider another subject, which is beginning, at long last, to receive the attention it deserves, that is, the neglect and deterioration of the natural environment. It is, increasingly clear, a hugely serious problem and one that is closely linked with the negative effects of human behaviour, but the problem does not arise from any desire of people today to hurt those yet born, or even to be deliberately callous about future generations' interests. And yet, through lack of reasoned engagement and action, we do still fail to take adequate care of the environment around us and the sustainability of the requirements of good life. To prevent catastrophes caused by human negligence or callous obduracy, we need critical scrutiny, not just goodwill towards others (p. 48).

To this end, Bell develops the rights and duties of citizenship in a political liberal framework that are responsive to the ecological imperatives of sustainability. As suggested in Chapter Three (p.131-140), Bell (2005) addresses these issues from a view that the environment is the provider of basic needs (p.186-188). In this study this was defined by the value of ecological integrity and prioritized by a principle of sustainability. As a matter of justice then the citizen holds certain environmental rights and duties to maintain those conditions that permit the life sustaining properties to endure. Recall the description of the three kinds of environmental rights: substantive, procedural, and personal. Substantive rights include the right to clean air, clean water, and clean soil, free
from toxic harms. The procedural rights entail the capacity to take legal and political action to ensure the substantive claims are given due process. This involves the environment and ecological matters being subject to democratic decision-making processes, as identified in public reason in this study, as requiring a fair and public procedure and consistent with the duty of civility. Likewise, the personal rights claims entail the capacity of citizens to make life-plans consistent with a view of the environmental good from within his/her own comprehensive doctrine consistent with the limits imposed by justice. For instance, this means the capacity to work in green advocacy associations and to incorporate more sustainable practices in their daily lives, such as safe roads for bicycles or ordinances that allow for urban agricultural/horticultural practices.

The duties then associated with green citizenship in this political liberal account are basically of two types: the duty to obey just laws and the duty to promote just arrangements (Bell, 2005, p. 189). Recall the previous discussion (see above, p. 141-143) of Broome's (2012) analysis of climate change and the moral responsibility of citizens which is largely placed in the realm of holding their governments accountable to the moral and political imperatives of climate change. This is centered on the idea that the problem is largely one of collective responsibility, rooted in patterns of living that are culturally, socially, economically, and politically structured. The capacity to effectively intervene in such a structured and complex system is beyond the agency of any one person. However, as Broome points out, the capacity to alter this structure is held by the legitimate coercive power of governments. However, governments require the consent of the people for legitimate action to be taken. But even more so, the citizens have within
their own duties to promote just arrangements, and within their own capacity as rights-holders, the capacity to compel governments to act. "Their duty to promote just arrangements is a duty to act politically to promote just arrangements" (Bell, 2005, p. 190). Conversely as Bell points out, the liberal can endorse environmental duties within the private sphere, using the powers of argument and persuasion to endorse private daily actions of sustainability, his examples recycling and limited car use (p. 190). These can even become public law through legitimate political procedures.

**d. Reconciled democratic citizenship.** One of the critiques of liberalism in general and Rawls in particular, which in the case of Rawls is often a misunderstanding of his conception of the good, is that the emphasis on rights neglects explicating the duties of citizenship and avoids a conception of the good. Recall that for Rawls, the right and the good are complementary, though the right is independent and prior to the good, the right relies upon a conception of the good of political society. That is to live in, affirm, and maintain in perpetuity, the conditions of a just, well-ordered society for the right reasons, involves preserving the political good of free and equal citizenship and the bonds of a fair system of social cooperation.

Gutmann (2002) has described this as the idea of *democratic humanism* in contrast to civic humanism and cosmopolitanism. The cosmopolitan argues that allegiance to a nation-state, even a nation that is a democratic republic, leads to nationalism and chauvinism which can lead to global instability. Conversely, civic humanism roots the stability of the society in a kind of civic religion or comprehensive doctrine with a monolithic conception of the good shared by all virtuous citizens. Gutmann responds, "we have another alternative... to reject the idea that our primary
allegiance is to any actual community, and to recognize the moral importance of being empowered as free and equal citizens of a genuinely democratic polity" (p. 68). Recall the discussion above regarding Rawls's distinction between the *liberties of the ancients* and the *liberties of the moderns*:

To fix ideas, consider the conflict between the claims of liberty and the claims of equality in the tradition of democratic thought. Debates over the last two centuries or so make plain that there is no public agreement on how basic institutions are to be arranged so as to be most appropriate to the freedom and equality of democratic citizenship. There is a divide between the tradition derived from Locke, which stresses what Constant called 'the liberties of the moderns' - freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, certain basic rights of the person and of property, and the rule of law - and the tradition derived from Rousseau, which stresses what Constant called 'the liberties of the ancients' - the equal political liberties and the values of public life (*JFR*, p. 2).

This distinction points to a means for reconciliation between the liberal and republican approaches defined above, this involves the citizen in a participatory role in the deliberative and decision-making procedures of democratic society. Republicanism in this sense is liberal in that individual legal rights are intertwined with political and social rights. (see *JFR*, p. 142-145). There are thus two strands in the republican approach that bear mention, a distinction that Rawls has made, following Benjamin Constant and Isaiah Berlin, between classical republicanism and civic humanism. Classical republicanism according to Rawls emphasizes "the view that the safety of democratic liberties, including the liberties of nonpolitical life (the liberties of the moderns), requires the active participation of citizens who have political virtues needed to sustain a constitutional regime" (*JFR*, p. 144). Thus, stability achieved through public reason in which citizens affirm a public conception of justice by appealing to the political values of public reason serves both the liberal conception of a system of rights and duties and the
republican emphasis on participation and fundamental political virtues. Rawls's treatment of the social contract contends that deontology is not avoidant of a conception of the good or of virtue, but views these as complementary to the right. The good of political society is rooted in a shared or mutual interest of all citizens, thus it is a public good, mutually or reciprocally held both as individual citizens and as a collective body. It has been the aim of this chapter to show that this public good, and thus the good of citizens collectively, involves the preservation of the value of ecological integrity or as Bell (2005) calls it the provider of basic needs.
Chapter Five

V. The Civic, Ethical, and Ecological Imperatives in the Construction of Knowledge

A. Introduction to the Educational Imperatives

The title of this work, *Civic Education in an Age of Ecological Crisis*, explicitly states the problem of the ecological crisis while implying a role for civic education in the response to a more sustainable existence. The general term *civic* was chosen to represent a broad view of political purpose in education present in the background culture. The understanding of the relationship of the term civic to the ideas of "civic humanism" and "civic republicanism" as it has been laid out in the preceding chapters presents a notable issue with identifying education with this concept. As Rawls has suggested, the civic forms of humanism and republicanism emphasize homogeneous culture that provide a comprehensive cultural doctrine regarding the good and the virtuous. This is problematic for a conception of democratic education which is linked to a conception of justice that contends the social fact of reasonable pluralism is the right condition under which a democratic society exists. This discussion of education must then address laying out a civic vision that allows for a reasonable plurality of conceptions of the good. Furthermore, this educational vision must endorse only a partial political conception, rather than a comprehensive conception, of the good based upon the public political culture rooted in the preservation and reproduction of the good of political society across generations. As was conceived in Chapter Three, preservation of the planet's life sustaining ecology is a requisite part of the stability and sustainability of a democratic society and the larger society of peoples.
John Dewey (1937/1981) suggests that democracy itself offers a "frame of reference" by which to make judgments regarding educational purpose for society. By this he means that democracy offers a set of values and goods (fundamentally, the ideals of equality and liberty) that informs both the purpose and content of education, without which an education is "bound to be aimless, lacking a unified objective" (p. 415). For it is that education itself is a normative activity in which the values of society are implicated in the activity of educating both current and future citizens. Education as a normative activity then has an intentional aim towards reproducing the culture, either explicitly or implicitly in the way that values are transmitted or reproduced. Furthermore, education is a primary social good that functions as the provider of an equality of opportunity and is related to the life plans and prospects of citizens generally. As Dewey suggests, democracy as an ideal must inform these cultural, economic, social, and political dimensions that are being reproduced by society and its educational institutions. This entails the capacities represented by Rawls's discussion of the two moral powers, a sense of justice and a rational conception of the good. It is the contention of this study that the purpose or aim of education is the fundamental element to a philosophy of education and must be the basis for a conception of civic education in the political liberal approach. From such a purpose, other elements of education flow, such as the curriculum, pedagogy, and the relationships of the student to the teacher, to other students, and to the institution itself, all of which represent normative commitments.

So far in this study, the emphasis has been on the idea of a political solution to the problem of the ecological crisis which has focused on the justification for sustainability as a matter of justice requiring both government and citizen to respond. In
this chapter, a new problem related to this issue will be addressed. This problem is a
matter of the construction and dissemination of knowledge and a renewal to the purpose
of civic education in democratic life. Both Gardiner (2011) and Becker (2011) have laid
out cases that contend education and the structure of the disciplines of knowledge have
contributed to a lack of sustainability in contemporary societies. Both have suggested that
the lack of interdisciplinary research and the lack of a transdisciplinary discourse on
fundamental issues facing the world, such as climate change and sustainability, among
researchers and scholars in the academy have contributed to conceptual confusion and
disagreements regarding ecological and sustainability issues. Furthermore, both have
suggested that the lack of an ethical/philosophical literacy across disciplines has further
contributed to a failure to fully grasp the complexity of the ecological crisis beyond the
scientific and positivist knowledge at the expense of normative and ethical approaches to
understanding the issues at hand. The idea shared by Gardiner and Becker, and this study
as well, is that a transdisciplinary discourse rooted in free and open public discussion of
fundamental societal problems must be a function and not just a stated purpose of the
public institutions of higher learning. In this chapter, the idea of an ecologically
conscious civic education will be explored as an imperative for the continued
development of sustainable democratic citizens and the production of knowledge that is
conducive to sustaining the good of a just political society. By continued development, I
wish to convey the educational mission of the deliberative and public activities of
democratic institutions. For this to be achieved, a sound primary civic education must
prepare future citizens to be engaged in such a rigorous form of social reproduction that
is not a form of indoctrination, but maintains the priority of pluralistic liberty.
To this end, this chapter will unfold by considering various reasonable commitments and judgments regarding education in the background culture of society. Reasonable perspectives in the philosophy of education that cohere to a liberal political conception of justice will be consulted. These approaches will be categorized as human capital theory and economic approaches, liberal educational philosophy, progressivism, and social reconstructionism. The principle focus of this study will be to lay out a conception of the purpose of education that is coherent to a politically liberal conception of justice and the family of ideas in political liberalism consistent with the sustainability conditions developed in previous chapters. To do so, I first turn to Rawls's own statements regarding education which can seem to impose serious limits on the extent of schooling as a means to avoid indoctrination and maintain the social fact of pluralism.

A problem now arises about their [i.e. religious sects opposed to modern culture] children's education and the requirements the state can impose. The liberalisms of Kant and Mill may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life. But political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It will ask that children's education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society...

Observe here that we try to answer the question of children's education entirely within the political conception. Society's concern with their education lies in their role as future citizens, and so in such essential things as acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life, and in their developing the political virtues, all this from within a political point of view (PL, p. 199-200).
Rawls’s view of education in *PL* demonstrates a number of key points, the first being the aim of education and its public interest. Society has an interest in the development of future citizens, the aim of which is the reasonable, democratic citizen. Recall the citizen is defined as a free and equal person within a society conceived as a system of social cooperation regulated by publicly known and understood fair terms. This entails a citizen with certain knowledge and dispositions. The knowledge is related to an understanding of the political and civil rights of the citizen and the reciprocal duties or obligations such rights entail. For example, in the excerpt above, this involves recognizing the distinction between legal protections allowing the exercise of revising one's life plans (i.e., apostasy) and the religious rights of associations to maintain nonpublic communities. As such the two moral powers are implicated in the development of future citizens, that is to understand and affirm a conception of justice and to develop the capacity for a conception of the good. Furthermore, the statement by Rawls also establishes the necessary role of education in providing an equality of opportunity by recognizing the economic and social role served by the education of future citizens "in their being economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life". The final point made in the excerpt above also indicates the dispositional development of future citizens to the political virtues, these notably being reasonableness and fair-mindedness, but also include the breadth of the duty of civility. By this it means the development of citizens capable of offering reasons in terms that other citizens can affirm as reasonable on fundamental political questions. This last condition then must look to the discussion of reasonableness, the burdens of judgment, and the values of public reason for further explication.
The reasonable citizen is defined by the willingness to propose and accept fair terms of social cooperation on fundamental political questions with the stipulation that social cooperation requires the reciprocity of other citizens.

Persons are reasonable in one basic aspect when, among equals say, they are ready to propose principles and standards as fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them willingly, given the assurance that others will likewise do so. Those norms they view as reasonable for everyone to accept and therefore as justifiable to them; and they are ready to discuss the fair terms that others propose (PL, p. 49).

This is the basis for the reciprocal duty of civility. The second aspect of reasonableness involves "the willingness to recognize the burdens of judgment and to accept their consequences for the use of public reason in directing the legitimate exercise of political power in a constitutional regime" (PL, p. 54). This allows for reasonable disagreement and requires the citizen to uphold an affirmation of the political system, recognizing the democratic process as fair, despite not always agreeing with the legitimate conclusions of the public. The burdens of judgment are viewed as the source of reasonable disagreement in general, this idea refers to reasonable and rational persons making different kinds of judgments regarding philosophical, moral, and religious questions. The reasoning employed is open to different interpretations on the following grounds, these are paraphrased from Rawls's (PL, p. 56-57) list:

a. The evidence - both empirical and scientific - exposes the complexity of conflicting views.

b. The weight of the evidence may be considered differently, what is seen as most relevant and salient to the judgment may differ.

c. Reasonable persons may differ on the interpretation of concepts and the judgments about those interpretations due to the vagueness and abstract nature of the concepts themselves.
d. The way in which evidence is assessed and weighed is dependent upon people's experiences which give personal meaning to understanding concepts and cases.

e. The complexity and differing aspects of normative considerations often have different kinds of specific force on competing sides of an issue making overall assessment difficult.

f. The possible contradiction of a plurality of values which make a definitive answer difficult for some hard questions.

With this in mind, education must be able to develop in students an understanding of the meaning of reasoning, of judgment, inference, and evidence and how these concepts relate to disciplines of knowledge such as in ethics, social science, the liberal arts and humanities, math, and the sciences. The importance of the burdens of judgment are crucial and "of first significance for a democratic idea of toleration" (PL, p. 58). Recall the values of public reason which are defined as the guidelines for reasonable public inquiry which include the "appropriate use of the fundamental concepts of judgment, inference, and evidence" (JFR, p. 92). These insure that the procedure for deliberation and decision-making is viewed as a fair system employing fair terms of verification and agreement. Added to this are the dispositional qualities of openness to debate and fair-mindedness in both offering reasons in debate and the willingness to listen to others terms and reasons, and thus reassess one's own position. These are matters for development of the intellectual knowledge, the communicative skills, and the dispositional qualities that allow for an exchange of ideas. These qualities are the hallmark of civility rooted in tolerance and a respect for other citizens and thus form the aim of a political liberal conception of civic education aimed at supporting a view of public reason.
Extending this political liberal view of education then to an ecological understanding requires a similar approach taken in previous chapters that have sought to maintain the value pluralism of political liberalism and the green agenda, that is a sustainable life-supporting biosphere. The previous discussions of the comprehensive views of environmental ethics and green citizenship illustrate the precautions necessary for maintaining reasonableness and awareness of the burdens of judgment by which a political conception is reflectively achieved. This requires developing a political liberal account of civic education that distinguishes between the scientific and the normative aspects of environmental and ecological positions, and can express the fundamental values of ecological integrity and a principle of sustainability related to justice in reasonable political terms. "Genuine environmental education cannot be just about transmitting the 'right' attitudes. If it is to be 'education' rather than 'indoctrination' it must offer students a genuine opportunity to understand environmental issues" (Bell, 2004, p. 42-43). One approach would be for education to address this fundamental philosophical literacy in distinguishing objective scientific claims from normative, ethical claims as part of the curriculum. This means understanding the role of the terms judgment, inference, and evidence in the reasoning applied to both domains of knowledge, this then is practical learning employing Rawls's values of public reason which function as guidelines of inquiry. As Rawls contends, ethics and metaphysics each have their own methods of inquiry, but employ the general powers of reason, understanding the distinctions is an important capacity for political deliberation. For example, this study has sought to demonstrate in its methodology, how reflective equilibrium involves identifying considered convictions, which are then placed in critical reflection, fitting
those convictions to a conception of justice and thus constructing a coherent systematic set of normative commitments. Ethical reflective inquiry as pedagogy employed in education could be the basis for an issue driven, justice oriented, interdisciplinary, and value pluralistic pedagogy, a conception that is currently in development (Snauwaert, 2016). This is a promising approach for developing the skills, knowledge, and dispositions related to the development of reasonable, free and equal citizens, which is the aim of the political liberal approach to civic education. It is the contention of this study that the intersection of environmental issues with issues of justice is a fundamental aspect of an inquiry-driven interdisciplinary civic education. "The ability to critically reflect on and actively engage with environmental issues is an essential aspect of environmental education" (Bell, 2004, p. 43). And thus critical reflection is an essential component for a democratic civic education.

B. Contemporary Views on the Purpose of Education

Below are the four categories associated with different philosophies of education: human capital theory and economic approaches, liberal educational philosophy, progressivism, and social reconstructionism. These are broad categories that are by no means comprehensive in scope, but do illustrate the predominant views of education in contemporary democratic societies. The intention here is to survey the meaning and purpose of education that are promoted by these approaches and to seek a level of coherence with the political liberal conception of civic education.

a. Human capital theory and economics in education. Human capital theory (HCT) applied to education advances an idea that investments in education have benefits both at the individual level and at the aggregate public level. The individual receives
benefits by improving his/her skills and knowledge which convert to economic benefits such as good paying jobs and to other kinds of benefits such as improved health and wellness and security. The society benefits from these investments essentially in two ways, the first involves the increased productivity of an educated work-force leading to greater economic affluence and power. The second way it applies is to the notion of increasing the stability of the society from instantiation of values and through increased affluence of its people (See Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961; 1993; for a synopsis of the concepts, see Sweetland, 1996; Tan, 2014).

The philosophical or theoretical roots of HCT are situated in the perspectives associated with rational choice and the free market as the space for individuals to make rational, self-interested decisions. In other words, rational actors maximizing their interests choose education as a means to an economic end with the idea of choice being an expression of one's freedom (Friedman, 1962). "The neoclassical economic model focuses on two core paradigms by which it attempts to explain social/economic phenomena: methodological individualism and rational choice theory" (Tan, 2014, p. 413). Methodological individualism emphasizes the atomized individual and is skeptical of structural views of society, and when taken to an extension is skeptical of the idea of a public or a public good.

To this view, a collective action is a product of individual desires that aim to promote individual interests...To avoid any possible confusion, it is important to remind that political individualism has almost nothing to do with MI [methodological individualism]... political individualism starts from the general assumption that freedom, more than anything else, contributes to the development of individuals and the well-being of society, whereas the latter (MI) suggests the individual is the basic unit of a social/economic analysis (Tan, 2014, p. 414).
With methodological individualism as the foundation, rational choice theory extends the content of HCT. "The most elementary principle of rational choice theory is that individuals do their best to maximize their utility under prevailing conditions" (Tan, p. 416). HCT combines these views into a perspective that suggests rational actors maximizing their choices is the basis for understanding social and economic phenomena.

Tan (2014, p. 421-436) lays out three common forms of criticism against HCT: empirical, practical, and moral criticisms. Empirical criticism points to both individual and aggregate inconsistency between findings and the predictions in HCT models. The practical issues involve the privileging of the economy at the expense of a complex view of society. For instance, the criticism of human capital theory in education tends to emphasize the economic focus of the development of skills and knowledge that increase productivity at the expense of educating the whole person or to some other social purpose. The approach has been linked to the idea that schools are a form of sorting mechanism, leaving students in a limited career track that is increasingly correlated with income and wealth inequalities (Spence, 2011). The moral criticisms of HCT tend to focus on the HCT view of human beings as producers and consumers, and relationships as forms of exchange. Regardless, Sweetland (1996) contends "human capital theory as applied to education has paralleled a powerful paradigm created by the general public. Pursuit of education leads to individual and national economic growth" (p. 356). Tan asserts that until the field of economics provides a theory with greater explanatory power, HCT will remain a significant approach to understanding economic and social phenomena. So then, in the HCT model of educational purpose, the aim of education is
its service to economic productivity and its role in developing rational actors in a free market of competitive exchange.

Another consideration, contemporary studies in economics have suggested that investments in education are vital to the economic security of nations in an increasingly globalized economy (Reich, 1992; Spence, 2011). "Given the structural changes under way in the U.S. economy - especially the growing premium on highly educated workers at the top end of the value-added chain - education should be boosted" (Spence, 2011, p. 7). Reich (1992) has prescribed an educational model that fits within the liberal tradition in terms of academic content and pedagogy, while providing an argument or reasoning that partially draws from economic approaches. The economic case for public funding of education is linked to the necessity for a robust citizenship education in a way that fits within Rawlsian political liberalism and can be extended to the society of peoples (See the discussion of the LoP, p. 100-106).

What is being lost in this debate [between zero-sum nationalism and impassive cosmopolitanism]... a positive economic nationalism, in which each nation's citizens take primary responsibility for enhancing the capacities of their countrymen for full and productive lives, but who also work with other nations to ensure that these improvements do not come at others' expense. This position is not laissez-faire cosmopolitan, because it rests on a sense of national purpose - of principles historic and cultural connection to a common political endeavor. It seeks to encourage new learning within the nation, to smooth the transition of the labor force from older industries, to educate and train the nation's workers, to improve the nation's infrastructure, and to create international rules of fair play for accomplishing all these things. The objectives of such investments are unambiguously public (Reich, p. 311-312).

Within Reich's view, one could add the environmental rights and duties associated with the sustainability imperative developed for the political liberal approach in this study. The greening of the reinvestments in human capital and infrastructure, would be a
constructive economic and public endeavor. Reinventing the economy within the limits of sustainability of ecological integrity adds a sustainable development model to the economic approach which has shown promise in its economic results and the development of sustainable citizens (Šlaus & Jacobs, 2011).

b. The liberal tradition in education. The liberal tradition, which has been a theme in other chapters laying out the idea of the individual as a holder of rights and duties, is often a diverse and broad collection of theoretical viewpoints. However, there are a number of themes that emerge from different liberal views from the philosophy of education. First and foremost is the purpose of education which aims for unlocking the human potential of the individual and the development of an "educated", free-thinking person. "The ultimate goal of the educational process is to help human beings become educated persons" (Adler, 1982, p. 10). This includes the continual capacity to develop human potential; “all should strive to make as much of their powers as they can” (p. 16). The capacity for continual intellectual growth emphasizes preparing people for continued learning beyond the immature years, an educated person is thus able to reflect and revise his/her view of the world through increased understanding and the acquisition of knowledge. “Education is a lifelong process of which schooling is only a small but necessary part… mental, moral, and spiritual growth can go on and should go on for a lifetime (p. 10).

The idea that education involves preparation for democratic citizenship is another aspect of the liberal tradition. Adler describes a democracy in terms of its "commitment to equality" and "all its free institutions including preeminently, political and civil liberty for all" (p. 7). However, Adler suggests that the society has failed to provide an education
that provides the basis for this promise of equal liberty and thus society must reaffirm the aim that all children are "educable for full citizenship and a full human life". This includes the capacity for desirable, stable, and secure employment, but also recognizes political, social/relational, and personal fulfillment of opportunity.

Galston (2001) further substantiates the claim that the development of future citizens is a matter of concern for democratic societies. "And it is reasonably clear that good citizens are made, not born" (p. 217). However, the conception of democracy that permeates the political culture of society is a significant factor in the determination of the kind of education that the society requires to meet its civic needs. "There is an additional level of complexity: How we think about the formation of democratic citizens depends on the specific conception of democracy we embrace" (p. 217-218). Furthermore, as Callan (2004) points out, the increasing understanding of identity politics and cultural pluralism along with the growing trend of globalization have brought to the forefront of liberal theory, the necessity to be responsive to these demands for inclusion and equity, diversifying understanding of the full range of human expression, and the capacity to live in an increasingly interdependent or interconnected world.

Risking oversimplification, there are essentially three general approaches to diversity in the liberal canon of education. The first is a form of pluralism that is expressed by this study's emphasis on political liberalism which emphasizes unity around a political conception. In other words, a nation requires a shared political community and political culture in which fundamental ideals are encoded in a system of rights and duties, and a conception of justice that is known and affirmed by a predominant majority of citizens. Cultural identity persists within the background culture and within the individual
expressions of the good, but must conform to the limits that a legitimate and just constitution present (For a more complete description of this pluralistic view around a political community, see Feinberg, 1998).

The second approach is multiculturalism, an approach that is included under the liberal banner with some reservation. It has been included here as a view that it is part of the educational tradition in liberal democratic societies which emphasize such rights as self-determination, self-expression, nondiscrimination, and nonrepression (See Gutmann, 1987; 2003). However, some strands of multiculturalism have been critical of the liberal emphasis on individual rights at the expense of the collective rights of cultural groups, especially historically oppressed groups (For examples from this debate, see Kymlicka, 1995; Taylor, 1994). Teasing out the dimensions and complexity of the debate would require a digression into the concepts of identity and culture, which are beyond the scope of this current study, but require comment, nonetheless. Multicultural liberal education then adheres to basic tenets that aim for inclusion, respect for diverse perspectives, the cultural and social nature of knowledge, fostering self-knowledge, and an emphasis on social justice in some form (Crafton, 2009, p. 294). Some forms of multicultural education fit within the social reconstructionist approach that will be covered later in this chapter in which the social justice component emphasizes social change agency (See Sleeter & Grant, 1994, p. 243-251).

A third approach then is cosmopolitan in orientation, emphasizing the idea of the citizen of the world as it has been laid out in Chapter Four. To this end, Nussbaum (2010) in Not for Profit, offers a case for the revitalization of the liberal arts and humanities in a period in which education emphasizes the sciences, technology, and math (STEM) as
these disciplines are considered privileged by predominant economic models of education. Nussbaum makes a clear case for the liberal themes discussed above, in which the aim of education is the development of the individual's full humanity, represented by the capacities for critical and self-reflective thought, empathy and sympathy, and the transcendence of particularism and nationalistic chauvinism as the basis for contemporary citizenship. Her work, as a form of liberal cosmopolitanism, draws from a long tradition that begins in ancient Greece, from Socrates and Aristotle, and opens itself to the many manifestations of thinking from around the world, drawing much from the work of Rabindranath Tagore in India, as in the excerpt below:

We are pursuing the possessions that protect, please, and comfort us - what Tagore called our material 'covering'. But we seem to be forgetting about the soul, about what it is for thought to open out of the soul and connect person to world in a rich, subtle, and complicated manner; about what it is to approach another person as soul, rather than as a mere useful instrument or an obstacle to one's own plans; about what it is to talk as someone who has a soul to someone else whom one sees as similarly deep and complex.

The word 'soul' has religious connotations for many people, and I neither insist on these nor reject these. Each person may hear them or ignore them. What I do insist on, however, is what both Tagore and Alcott mean by this word: the faculties of thought and imagination that make us human and make our relationships rich human relationships, rather than relationships of mere use and manipulation. When we meet in society, if we have not learned to see both self and others in that way, imagining in one another inner faculties of thought and emotion, democracy is bound to fail, because democracy is built upon the ability to see other people as human beings, not simply as objects (Nussbaum, p. 6).

Learning to see oneself and others as full persons involves the development of human capacities for empathy and sympathy. For Nussbaum, empathy is the capacity to take other perspectives, to view the world in a way that considers the many different views that others occupy or hold. Sympathy rather expresses a sense of care or
compassion related to the empathic experience of others. This is formative of Nussbaum's view of education developing the human capacity for rich and full human relationships, rather than the view of human relations focused on the competition and rational interest models discussed previously.

Accordingly, this kind of educational aim cannot be achieved through content alone, but must be present in the pedagogical approach as well. The relationships in schools between students and peers and teachers is also instructive of this disposition and understanding of the world. Nussbaum suggests that a Socratic approach to education which poses problems, involves critical inquiry, questioning, self-reflection, and communication or dialogue is a vital component of a liberal education. The ultimate aim then is a "citizen of the world" with a developed fully human capacity for thought and relationship. The humanities and the liberal arts offer unique understanding and expression of the human condition through which self-reflective study and examination lead to the development of one's humanity, centered on the capacities of the human mind, with its emotional depth and the powers of reason, which thus free the mind.

The response that Nussbaum takes to the question of diversity in and between nations hinges upon this view of the human community and human beings in all their many forms. The goal or aim of education then is the cosmopolitan citizen with the critical mind to sustain the promise of democracy.

I shall argue that cultivated capacities for critical thinking and reflection are crucial in keeping democracies alive and wide awake. The ability to think well about a wide range of cultures, groups, and nations in the context of a grasp of the global economy and of the history of the many national and group interactions is crucial in order for democracies to deal responsibly with the problems we currently face as members of an interdependent world (p. 10).
One point that is striking in the liberal approaches is that many fall within what Rawls describes as comprehensive liberalism. Defining human nature and the nature of human relations in metaphysical terms. One difficulty with a comprehensive civic approach is that it then impoverishes the very idea of liberty and freedom of conscience, situating the idea of the person in a form of civic humanism resulting in or having the undesired effect of being a form of indoctrination. By defining a comprehensive good, education contradicts the conditions by which liberty persists. The Rawlsian approach rather emphasizes the limited conception of the good of political society. Attempting to hold back from controversial metaphysical claims and placing the ideas for a political conception within commonly shared ideals of democratic political culture and taking a more narrow view of the citizen as a member of a polity in which all members are considered free and equal in legal and political terms. This does not suggest that other nonpolitical values should be rejected and removed from an education, there are values associated with life-long learning and values associated with occupational skills that are and should be a part of a student's education. However, on the question of citizenship education, this study contends the political conception of the person must be the guiding framework by which that education aims.

**c. Progressivism in education.** Progressivism springs from the liberal, democratic tradition with its philosophical roots in pragmatism often associated with the seminal works of John Dewey. The discussion here will pull mostly from Dewey's (1916/1930) *Democracy and Education*. For Dewey, education is an end in and of itself, with the aim being growth, development, or the self-transformation of the socially nested or engaged individual, for life itself is growth. Hansen (2007) has described this idea as
Dewey's "belief that life constitutes a generative gift" (p. 22). The aim of education is for the individual to realize this "gift" of life, and that this is done through the realization of growth. By growth, Dewey means the ability for adaptation or reconstruction of knowledge, and thus oneself, from experiences, especially novel experiences with the environment, both the physical and social world one inhabits.

When it is said that education is development, everything depends upon how development is conceived. Our net conclusion is that life is development, and that developing, growing, is life. Translated into its educational equivalents, this means (i) that the educational process has no end beyond itself; it is its own end; and (ii) the educational process is one of continual reorganizing, reconstructing, transforming (Dewey, 1916, p.59).

Education is seen as the process by which the dispositions and capacities for growth are developed and secure continual growth and education beyond the schooling experience. This sentiment was especially echoed by Adler above who suggests that an aim of liberal education is to promote life-long learning. Also, reconstruction in this context means "the power to retain from one experience, something which is of avail in coping with the difficulties of a later situation" (p. 53). Within the definition of reconstruction is the idea that reorganization of experiences adds meaning to those experiences and also gives one an "increasing ability to direct the course of future experience" (p. 89-90). This reference is to the reconstruction of knowledge and the self, whereas in the next section on social reconstruction, the term will be applied in a slightly different frame.

The social world is seen as an important part of growth providing the varied experiences by which growth is enhanced. For Dewey, society is a form of "associated living" and education within any society is a form of socialization and measured by the "quality and value" of the aims of that group. That is socialization is related to the shared
and varied interests of the group. The exchanges or social interactions of the group must then be equitable and free, these are the conditions that provide "varied" and "novel" experiences.

Any education given by a group tends to socialize its members, but the quality and value of the socialization depends upon the habits and aims of the group. Hence, once more, the need of a measure for the worth of any given mode of social life…Now in any social group whatever, even a gang of thieves, we find some interest held in common, and we find a certain amount of interaction and cooperative intercourse with other groups. From these two traits we derive our standard. How numerous and varied are the interests which are consciously shared? How full and free is the interplay with other forms of association? (p. 96)

It is in this varied and diverse social intercourse that realization of life-affirming growth and experience occur. Essentially Dewey is claiming that free and equal exchange of ideas through varied and communicated experiences create the conditions by which a shared interest is realized. It is in this idea of a shared interest that Dewey suggests the idea of a public is formed (Dewey, 1984). Continual growth then requires expanding the physical and social world and one's interactions in it with a disposition open to new understanding and meaning. For Dewey, the idea that one should remain isolated from new experience, closed off by ritual or tradition, is a form of rigidity that is static and belies the very aim of life itself, which is continual growth (Dewey, 1916, p. 99-100).

Democracy then for Dewey is the most conducive system in which the conditions of growth and experience obtain.

The two elements in our criterion both point to democracy. The first signifies not only more numerous and more varied points of shared common interest, but greater reliance upon the recognition of mutual interests as a factor in social control. The second means not only freer interaction between social groups (once isolated so far as intention could keep up a separation) but change in social habit – its continuous readjustment through meeting the new situations produced by varied
intercourse. And these two traits are precisely what characterize the democratically constituted society (p. 100).

In this, democracy is an ideal, it is shared and communicated experiences and interests that hinge upon freedom and equality of opportunity. "A democracy is more than a form of government; it is primarily a mode of conjoint communicated experience" (p. 101). Education in such a society then has "social aims", this is to provide the conditions of freedom under which life in its fullest form persists. Education then is:

a freeing of individual capacity in a progressive growth directed to social aims... Since education is a social process, and there are many kinds of societies, a criterion for educational criticism and construction implies a particular social ideal. The two points selected by which to measure the worth of a form of social life are the extent in which interests of a group are shared by all its members, and the fullness and freedom with which it interacts with other groups. An undesirable society, in other words, is one which internally sets up barriers to free intercourse and communication or experience. A society which makes provision for participation in its good of all members on equal terms and which secures flexible readjustment of the different forms of associated life is in so far democratic. Such a society must have a type of education which gives individuals a personal interest in social relationships and control, and the habits of mind which secure social changes without introducing disorder (p. 115).

In this excerpt Dewey is laying out a vision of democracy in which dialogue (communicated experience) informs the members of society of shared interests in a society of mutual engagement realized in people's daily lives and interactions. It is more than a system of governance or the participation in political process, it is a way of life in which people interact on terms of equality and freedom. It is under these conditions of communicated exchange that people experience shared interests and the means for peaceful resolutions to the ever-changing world.

As a bit of speculation and digression, this view of democracy that Dewey lays out seems to have been instructive in Rawls's own work as he shifted from the
comprehensive doctrine of *TJ* to the political conception of justice as fairness laid out in later works (*PL & JFR*). Of note, the lectures that became much of the text for *PL*, were developed and given as the Dewey Lectures at Columbia University. These addressed topics that became fundamental to Rawls's conception of justice that emphasizes the public deliberative process as a fundamental form of justification and legitimacy for democratic societies.

To glean points of interest to this study, which seeks reconciliation of considered convictions such as Dewey's conception of growth and the aim of education with a political liberal conception, I turn to Dewey's discussion of method of inquiry. Recall Rawls's emphasis for citizens to understand the values of public reason (guidelines of inquiry and dispositions of civility) and the burdens of judgment, and that these values and dispositions of public reason are fundamental to the political liberal educational task. In Dewey's educational philosophy, the case for a democratic education is also shaped by methods and experiences related to inquiry, driven by issue or interest, posing problems that will create novel learning, the exploration of solutions, and the communication of ideas. Experience defined as "trying to do something and having the thing do something to one in return" is the initial stage of thinking (p. 180). From the experience, a problem is identified, solutions then are culled from collection of information and observations, followed by a systematic solution to the problem and the opportunity to test the solution and determine the validity of the idea.

The most general features of the method of knowing have been given in our chapter on thinking [described above in the preceding sentence]. They are the features of the reflective situation: Problem, collection and analysis of data, projection and elaborations of suggestions or ideas, experimental application and testing; the resulting conclusion or judgment (p. 203).
Dewey's vision of democratic education then coheres quite nicely with the idea of employing the guidelines of inquiry to answer fundamental issues of interest that require interdisciplinary approaches to understanding the physical and social world. By focusing on such a method of inquiry, students learn the basic elements necessary for further development of the capacities for public reason.

**d. Social reconstructionism and critical approaches.** Building off the issue-driven nature of progressivism, social reconstructionism (SR) offers a critique of the state of contemporary society as marred by social and economic inequalities and the cultural systems that normalize and sanction such discriminatory practices. SR makes a case for education that frees the individual from these conditions, through the development of a critical consciousness, awareness of the role that power plays in the reproduction of social inequalities, and the development of cultural and political agency to "reconstruct" or transform the social and cultural conditions to a more democratic vision of equal freedom that permits the full expression of one's humanity (Freire, 1970). A number of approaches to green citizenship education and environmental education fit within this transformative agentic approach (Andrzejewski, Pedersen, & Wicklund, 2009; Jickling & Wals, 2008). Social reconstructionism has often been defined as a liberatory approach to education, freeing the student of the mental and social circumstances of oppression. “An act is oppressive only when it prevents people from being more fully human” (Freire, 1970, p. 57). The aim or purpose of education so conceived can then be characterized as liberation through critical consciousness and political empowerment, thus the realization of full humanity.
Critical consciousness is developed through a dialogical, inquiry-based approach that situates the student at the center of the learning. Acknowledging the role that a student's own experiences and knowledge bring to the understanding of contemporary issues. Freire contends that the teacher in such a praxis must respect the reasoning ability of the student and have faith in the creative and reconstructive power of the those in dialogue. Through dialogue, human beings discover their own subjectivity and the subjectivity of others. Thus the dialogue is grounded in "love, humility, and faith, dialogue becomes a horizontal relationship of which mutual trust between the dialoguers is the logical consequence" (p. 91).

Furthermore, dialogue involves an action and reflection component as well. Students learn from one another and earn the basis of respect through engaging in a process of problem-posing dialogue - political action - reflection with their peers.

The insistence that the oppressed engage in reflection on their concrete situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection - true reflection - leads to action. On the other hand, when the situation calls for action, that action will constitute an authentic praxis only if its consequences become the object of critical reflection (p. 66).

For Freire, the stifling of dialogue is an act of violence rooted in the dehumanization of the oppressed, while education is conceived as a dialogical process that humanizes the learner.

The SR approach also draws its origins from the progressive era educator George Counts (1932), who in his speech *Dare a Progressive Education Be Progressive*, challenged the field to be responsive to the ideals of democratizing all aspects of society. SR proposes the inequalities and injustices of the economic system must be ameliorated if education truly seeks to liberate. In this approach, education must be responsive to the
social conditions in which it is situated. For instance, the conditions of capitalist economic exploitation, which manifest domination with intersections across social, political, economic, cultural, and ecological relations, require the reconstruction of society and cultural systems of meaning. Counts asserts that “educational theory will have to embrace the entire range of life. It will have to deal, not only with labor and income and property, but also with leisure and recreation, sex and family, government and public opinion, race and nationality, war and peace, art and aesthetics” (p. 5). Education then must have the purpose of raising the critical consciousness of the student and empowering all people in society to create a more just and sustainable world.

C. Reinvigorating the Democratic Purpose of Education

Considering the convictions and assertions of these prominent views in the philosophy of education, the Rawlsian political liberal conception is confronted with the challenge of reconciliation. Rawlsian citizenship, in many ways, is a robust form of citizenship in comparison to the other more "comprehensive" forms. Rawls identifies the person in a way that admits a multiplicity of dimensions with citizenship attributed to the political conception of the person, making allowance for the diverse or pluralistic views of human beings that give deep and broad meaning to human identities. These meanings are left to people's own internal justifications and their own sense of the good, within reason. This limit is in terms that citizens can reciprocally affirm as reasonable and which informs each one's own sense of justice and fairness. This is robust in that it not only concedes much of the control of society to the collectivity of the people, but also provides a common or shared view amenable to many viewpoints. This in many ways asks much of the citizen and his/her capacity for understanding the distinction between the political
good and the comprehensive good. Awareness/consciousness and competency are two distinct things (Feinberg, 1998), awareness is being conscious of the world around us, understanding our situated position and the positions of others. Whereas competence means the capacity to function, at times even subconsciously, in the cultural frameworks that structure lives. The multiple or plurality of viewpoints in the world when part of a system of social cooperation stretch the limit of awareness and competency, requiring an acknowledgement of the rightfulness of the conditions that allow an existence of many viewpoints to persist; toleration is not easy, respect even more difficult, except that the alternatives (indoctrination, authoritarian force, coercion, malice, and violence) are more difficult and destructive of liberty and equality.

Civic education then under these conditions requires a definite knowledge set around the values of public reason and the burdens of judgment. Understanding the role of evidence, inference, and judgment and the ways in which reasoning works within the various domains of knowledge is a rigorous task. Ethics, civics and the humanities, and ecological/scientific knowledge all have distinct ways of reasoning and presenting evidence and validating or verifying that evidence. The weight given to the evidence and the kinds of inference that can be made in each of these domains is also a rigorous task, but fundamental to forming legitimate political judgments through public deliberation and public decision-making procedures. In example, the climate crisis and the level of discourse surrounding the "debates" about its significance and validity exemplifies the problem of a populace not understanding the very guidelines of inquiry. The actions of climate change denial based upon economic interests, is an abasement to the very ideals of civility and public reason, and yet much of the population is swayed by these denial
advocates. This is an educational problem. Publicity and transparency of deliberation employing frameworks of inquiry and analysis are at the heart of the many educational philosophies presented above. This is a focus on a considered conviction that citizens should have the capacity to make informed judgments and decisions, which are vital to sustaining the very basis of legitimate governance through the rule of the people, for the very basic ideal of equal liberty to be realized. It is the contention of this study that the capacity for considered convictions such as these must cohere to a conception of justice that is known and affirmed by all citizens, to which compliance is reciprocally and impartially agreed and consented. The known and affirmed condition must also be an educational aim, in which all future citizens learn the fundamental basis for the conception of justice and have the critical capacities to determine its validity, and thereby incorporate that sense of justice within his/her own conception of a good life.

Developing these educational ideas will be a central task for this researcher going forward and constitute the future research agenda.

Earlier in this work there was mention of Becker's discussion regarding the need for interdisciplinary research and transdisciplinary discourse among the fields that construct the modern system of higher education. This echoes the call of peace educator Johan Galtung (2010) who urged scholars and researchers interested in the issues of peace and violence to adopt a transdisciplinary dialogue for the purposes of developing a peace pedagogy that transcends the tendencies for compartmentalization of knowledge. Galtung suggests that what is needed is research to be based upon issue-driven inquiry and transdisciplinary dialogue that addresses the political nature of the problems.
Becker (2011) contends that the complex problems of the contemporary world as laid out in sustainability research requires the many fields of knowledge with their unique views and methods of investigation to work in conjunction on interdisciplinary research teams exploring issue-driven inquiries. The findings from such research must contribute to a larger transdisciplinary discourse that explores not just the objective scientific understanding, but also the normative and political nature of these problems. One issue Becker points out is the lack of ethical literacy or fluency among many researchers in the scientific fields. This lack of fluency often manifests in an unwillingness to address the normative and political dimensions of the complex problems associated with ecological and climate research.

To resolve this lack of transdisciplinary fluency, especially the methods and guidelines for normative and political inquiry, students should begin to develop the capacities to understand the concepts from diverse disciplines that span social, political, and philosophical theory. The foundations for this kind of knowledge must be incrementally addressed in the educational endeavor through research and dialogue in problem-solving, issue-driven learning experiences. Democratizing education means the school models the ideals of democracy in its structure and practice, albeit within the limits of the developmental realities of the population being served. Educational institutions so conceived in this way represent and are more likely to reproduce the democratic institutions of the society as a whole. This is a stark contrast to the majority of educational institutions in places like the United States where schooling is hierarchical and authoritarian in nature, often having more in common with correctional institutions than with a democratic instructional model. Furthermore, this model then conceives of
the university as public incubator of knowledge and the site of deliberation of knowledge and understanding of the world upholding the civic mission that is common language in the mission statements of colleges and universities.
Chapter Six

VI. The Holistic View

A. Conclusion

The method of reflective equilibrium was an underlying emphasis to this study. The method is imbued in all of Rawls's work as he sought to live up to the four roles of the political philosopher; clarifying and reconciling the many convictions and judgments related to political justice in the democratic tradition. Chapter Two set to lay out this view of Rawls's work and to illustrate the way in which a political conception of justice is part and parcel of a reconciliation for a pluralistic democratic people. Chapter Three attempted to illustrate a common or shared view to a general conception of ecological integrity in the background culture, both in religious and non-religious doctrines, and served as the basis for the development of a political principle of sustainability. The principle of sustainability is then part of a liberal conception of justice and a part of public reason that serves as a point of reconciliation for political disagreement, or at the very least provide reason for the existence of disagreement as a circumstance of the burdens of judgment rather than an indictment of the virtue or goodness of the parties in disagreement. Chapter Four again drew heavily on Rawls's work at reconciling the convictions for citizenship in the democratic political traditions through his approach to democratic citizenship that rests on the political conception of the person. That is the person as citizen is a political relationship that connects the person to other citizens and to the institutions of governance by which persons consider and address one another as citizens with all the rights and duties pursuant to that political category. And in Chapter Five, the purpose or aim of civic education was argued as an imperative to the
contemporary issues of modern life. The democratic purpose of education means the public investment in the development of citizens with basic capacities for discernment: capable of knowing and affirming the rights and duties of citizenship and a political conception of justice; capable of discerning the distinction between their comprehensive reasons and public reasons; reconciling conflicts through reflection and communication; and understanding such reasons and reciprocating pursuant to the duty of civility and the disposition of reasonableness in its complexity.

B. Limitations of this Study

Much of the energy of this study was directed at the aim of showing ecological integrity and sustainability to be matters of basic justice. To this end, the political liberal approach to justice was presented as a seminal approach in democratic theory that had potential to bridge the disparity and plurality of views regarding the human and nature relationship. However, the political liberal approach required adaptation to be responsive to environmental claims. With this as the primary focus of this work, two important areas flowed from this reflection. These two areas included the role of citizenship and the role of education within a political liberal regime. Reflecting upon this study, these two areas need further elaboration. First, the literature on green citizenship offers potential for broadening the view of the rights, duties, and virtues entailing the role of the citizen in contemporary democratic thought. This is a relatively new field and needed to be further explored in greater detail for its contributions, the limitations of time for this study infringed upon that necessity. Also, exposition of a philosophy of education from a green political liberal approach must be further extended beyond the purpose to include greater elaboration with statement regarding the curriculum, pedagogy, and structure of
schooling. These two areas of citizenship and a green democratic education will be fundamental to the future research agenda conceived here.

Also, the critiques of reason, in general, and more specifically the political liberal approach that have come from feminist, post-colonial, critical race, and post-modernist theorists have not been given sufficient voice in this study. This was not a result of disregard or antipathy, but rather a choice based on the space and time required to complete this current task. The first priority was to develop a basic ideal framework for a political conception of sustainability and a conception of an ecologically sustainable civic education rooted in the Rawlsian political liberal tradition. The conception of the citizen and the developmental imperatives of this conception related to education have been treated as fundamental interests to the current task. Future work will certainly need to address the critiques of reason and liberalism to strengthen the case and elaborate a more democratically inclusive approach. The method of reflective equilibrium as it has been employed in this study is intended to be a continual circular process of reflection - deconstruction - reconstruction - practice. The work is never complete.

C. Reflections on this Study

After considering the idea of the ecological crisis, I've become convinced that the crisis is not so much an ecological crisis as a human crisis. The planet will continue; there will be life forms that continue; a planetary ecology will remain regardless of human existence. What is not clear is if the various species that have populated the planet for the past three million years under specific conditions with certain levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere will persist. This is a moral failing rooted in human values and choices. As a human crisis, it is imperative that humanity "do the right thing". My goal has been
to suggest that doing the right thing entails democratic rather than enlightened autocratic response. This includes democratic education rather than unreflected social transmission as a means for compliance and legitimacy, that is stability and sustainability for the right reasons. If humanity cannot respond consistent with a conception of justice then the facts of the crisis that at times bring thoughts of despair are tempered by the thought that with extinction often follows evolution.

I'd like to conclude this work by citing the concluding reflections of John Rawls in *LoP*, an excerpt from one of his last works, after a long and storied career, which strikes me as poignant and apropos of my own reflections on this study.

While realization is, of course, not unimportant, I believe that the very possibility of such a social order can itself reconcile us to the social world. The possibility is not a mere logical possibility, but one that connects with the deep tendencies and inclinations of the social world. For so long as we believe for good reasons that a self-sustaining and reasonably just political and social order both at home and abroad is possible, we can reasonably hope that we or others will someday, somewhere, achieve it; and we can then do something toward this achievement. This alone, quite apart from our success or failure, suffices to banish the dangers of resignation and cynicism. By showing how the social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia, political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today...

If a reasonably just Society of Peoples whose members subordinate their power to reasonable aims is not possible, and human beings are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask, with Kant, whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth (p. 128).

It seems to me now, not as a moment of despair, but of resignation to continue to communicate a vision with imagination and possibility, and if that isn't enough, then so be it. Some world in some form will persist and with hope, so too will the ideas of justice and democracy.
Reference List


Counts, G. (1932). Dare progressive education be progressive? In: *Dare the school build a new social order?* New York: The John Day Company.


