A Thesis

Entitled

“With this belt [we] bind your Hearts and minds with ours”: Diplomacy and Conflict in the Ohio River Valley, 1783-1793

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in History

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May 2013
An Abstract of

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In the aftermath of the American Revolution, the Old Northwest became a hotly contested borderland. The United States and Great Britain both laid claim to a series of posts in the region. Historical work done in this arena has tended to favor a nationalist narrative—that is to say, the perspective has been decidedly British or American. What has been less apparent in the discourse is the role played by the Native American peoples as they vied to retain their lands. The Ohio Indian Confederacy, the largest pan-Indian movement in the history of North America, has been viewed primarily as allies of the Great Powers. Their unlikely and unexpected emergence drastically changed the political dynamics on the ground for the competing western powers. Rather than simply reacting to the diplomacy of those powers, the Ohio Indian Confederacy was engaged in internal struggles over which course of action to take. Ultimately, it was these internal dynamics, not outside pressures, that brought about the dissolution of the alliance. The confederacy had not suffered defeat at the hands of the United States but had split along regional lines: each pursuing their own best interests.
Acknowledgments

I owe my deepest gratitude to Professor Cynthia Jo Ingham, whose remarkable patience and insight guided me through this process. I would also like to thank Al Cave and Larry Nelson for taking the time to read my work, and set me straight when I went astray. I would further like to acknowledge Terese Austin and Diana Sykes at the William L. Clements Library for their interest in my work and their excellent suggestions regarding which collections to engage. Mostly I would like to thank my wife Debbie and my children Indigo, Briar, and Aurora, for sticking with me through this process and keeping a smile on my face.
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Chapter One

Introduction

On December 5, 1785, a packet ship from Canada arrived at the garrison town of Salisbury in Great Britain. Aside from its cargo of mail, the ship carried the renowned Mohawk war chief Joseph Brant on his way to conduct business in London. Brant had taken this journey ostensibly to petition the Crown for annuities earned during years of service. In true Brant fashion, though, he embraced the opportunity to advocate for his people. But Brant would soon find that the British in England were not cut from the same cloth as the British in Canada. In his audience with Lord Sydney, he was forced to use an interpreter, the very job he was proficient at performing for the Indian department. In his own country, Brant was a widely respected chief with considerable diplomatic power, and both the United States and Canada competed for his “affections.” Yet In England, Brant was an oddity, a savage, a source of amusement.

While attending a costume ball during his visit, Brant donned his traditional garb and painted his face in the Mohawk fashion. As the evening wore on, and the libations flowed, a reveler accosted Brant by tugging on his nose in order to lift the mask he imagined to be there. Letting out a war whoop, Brant leapt onto a table and brandished his tomahawk, sending several patrons scattering, much to his delight.
Anecdotes about Joseph Brant’s trip to London are certainly entertaining, but they also reveal a persistent cultural divide. As a boy Brant had attended an English school where he had become well acculturated to British ideas of nobility, gentility, and civilization. At the same time he had never eschewed the teachings of his own people, and he gravitated always away from the bustling colonial centers to the woodlands of his home. Brant was arguably the most British Indian in North America, yet in England he could not sustain his cultural capital. These were not the British he knew. By the time he sailed home, in the spring of 1786, Brant carried some financial compensation but no further promises from English officials towards his people. He also carried a new outlook towards Britain and the king for whom he had fought and bled.

Brant was instrumental in the borderlands diplomacy that centered on the Ohio River Valley in the decade after the American Revolution. The largest pan-Indian movement ever to be seen in North America emerged to meet the threat of white encroachment. This alliance, the Ohio Indian Confederacy, exerted authority over the Old Northwest and legitimized British occupation of a series of contested posts. What became the *sine qua non* for the confederacy was the Ohio River boundary, serving as the southern line of an autonomous Indian state.

Although the diplomatic maneuverings of the Ohio Confederacy are at the center of this study, what becomes apparent is that perceptions were changing within the confederacy, so that their “response” was often plural. Brant and the eastern arm of the confederacy had a different view of the prospects for success and failure than did his western counterparts. The result was a shift in the internal dynamics of the alliance, as
well as a change in the implementation of the rituals and ceremonies that helped hold the confederacy together.

But more than the Ohio Confederacy was in transition. My work also examines the context of diplomacy for the British Empire, the Canadian “colony,” and the new United States in the period from 1783 to 1793. The contested border between Canada, the natives, and the United States was the subject of diplomatic wrangling that centered on the British retention of the posts and the idea of a buffer state. I argue that fluid dynamics of diplomacy were as much the result of internal divisions as outside pressures. Negotiations took place under unusual circumstances as all parties involved tried to find their place in the rapidly shifting political environment. Ultimately, the very human issues of organization and identity created friction from within. These changes are evident in changing policies, as well as in the practice of rituals of diplomacy. Rituals which had evolved over the course of two centuries of trade and warfare were both a means of access to friendship and a stark reminder of cultural misunderstandings.

In the past, the questions historians have asked about the buffer state have been focused on Anglo motivations. Were the British simply taunting American sovereignty? Was it the result of an altruistic attitude towards the native peoples? Ultimately, in dealing with this issue historians have drawn from the assumptions of their times: namely, that economic motives and physical security were paramount. For their part, American historians have tended to read the British position as being based on greed and fear.

British historian A.L. Burt, in *The United States, Great Britain, and British North America*, interpreted that fear as a genuine concern on the part of the British for their
Indian allies. “The retention of the posts was due primarily to a British blunder,” stated Burt, “and secondarily to an American weakness. The blunder was the utter neglect of the Indians in the negotiation of peace with the United States. The promise Britain made to the latter clashed with the guarantee she had given the former.”

Burt viewed the diplomatic breakdowns and violence that occurred in the interior as a failure of the United States to create a government capable of employing a reasonable Indian policy. In his view, the British were attempting to broker peace between the United States and the Indians throughout the contentious decade in order to reach an agreement amenable to all.

Burt’s assessment of British motivations was a response to the earlier work of Samuel Flagg Bemis. Bemis viewed the actions of the British in light of commercial enterprise. His 1923 work, *Jay’s Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy*, was the first to examine the issue. Bemis felt that the protection of the lucrative fur trade was the primary reason for retention of the posts. Rather than pressing for peaceful resolutions, Bemis envisioned the Indians as tools of the British fighting a proxy war against the United States. The natives could not have been working independently, in Bemis’s view. “They had to be assembled from out of the wilderness for hundreds of miles; they had to be entertained; they had to be fed; they had to be harangued in the manner of their native oratory; all the proprieties of savage politics must be carefully observed.”

His equally cynical view of the buffer state intimated that the idea was never serious, but simply a delaying tactic to aggravate U.S. diplomatic efforts.

While it is clear that commerce was one initial factor that influenced Britain’s decisions, Burt felt that the point was over-represented. “The oft-repeated statement that Britain continued to hold the posts for the sake of preserving her monopoly in the fur
trade is a good illustration of the operation of national suspicion and prejudice. It has long been accepted in the United States as established fact, though it has never been proven.⁴

Pointing to the documented expenses of maintaining the posts in juxtaposition to the income brought in by the southern fur trade, Burt revealed the discrepancy in Bemis’s thesis. Although Bemis’s work had been the first and last word on the subject for nearly forty years, Burt’s revision was reasonable. Where Bemis saw British collusion to protect economic interests by fomenting violence among the native peoples, Burt saw a British Empire struggling to correct the mistake of disregarding the Indians at the treaty table. These two contrasting views both offered sound, if myopic, evidentiary research. These works also constitute the greatest contribution of research to be carried out on the issues surrounding the posts and the Indian buffer state.

In 1970 Jerald A. Combs, in The Jay Treaty, added a new dimension to the economic question.⁵ His examination of the peripheral industries supported by the fur trade, particularly the carrying trade, refuted Burt’s economic premise. The carrying trade served purposes beyond the realm of finance. It ensured a ready body of able seamen as well as a naval presence plying the waters between Britain and Canada. Further, Combs pointed to the economic reality of building and maintaining posts to replace those given up. Taken as a whole, Combs paints a picture in which the retention of the posts was necessary in order to keep larger economic and military processes working.

A common thread that ties these varied arguments together is their treatment of the indigenous people. They were given no agency, left out of negotiations, relegated to the background, and viewed only as a threat. The introduction of the Indian Confederacy into the narrative requires a reevaluation of the evidence. The confederacy played an
active role in securing their own interests, which did not always line up with those of the Crown. That is not to say that economic and diplomatic policies of Britain and the United States turned on the actions of the native peoples; they were simply one factor. However, the pressure, real or perceived, posed by the confederacy was strongly felt on a local level and contributed to the internal dynamics of policymaking.

Later historians, less enthusiastic about American “expansion” as an inevitable and positive good, looked to the Ohio Valley to consider American national character. In his *Statehood and Union*, Peter Onuf examines the Northwest Ordinance as more than just a governing document of colonial expansion. In the context of fractionally divided partisan groups, the ordinance represented a coming together that registered hope for a more harmonious future. Economically, the lands of the Ohio Valley indicated the promise of a ready revenue stream for the government. That financial boon could not be tapped into until the Old Northwest succumbed to the civilizing influence of the American ideal. The national character of the United States, according to Onuf, had been predicated upon concepts of European political acumen. As the model crumbled under the pressures of the French Revolution, Americans looked inward to achieve a distinct identity. The concept of American exceptionalism was born in the process. However cogent his analysis, Onuf, like Burt and Bemis before him, failed to factor the indigenous people into his conception of the Old Northwest as a foundation of national identity.

If Onuf’s attempts to penetrate the thought world of the late eighteenth century were overly romantic, they did not rub off on his protégé, Leonard Sadosky. In *Revolutionary Negotiations* Sadosky takes a grounded look at the back-and-forth diplomacy between Britain and the United States. His work reveals the internal
organizational dynamics that colored United States diplomatic activities. Throughout the work, Sadosky traces an underlying thread of changes in Indian policy from the Articles of Confederation, through the Constitution and the “Knoxian” paradigm of national virtue. His work is unusual in that it takes a holistic view of United States diplomacy and places negotiations with Native American polities on the same footing as other international diplomatic relations.

While Sadosky finally presents a view of diplomacy that engages with Native Americans, his work in this realm is generalized. He goes into great detail about the thought worlds of American negotiators, but his treatment of the indigenous people is less specific. The Indians in Sadosky’s study are typically referred to as a group, while the Europeans and Americans are individuals representing a constituency. Even if native voices do not speak through his work, at least their role in forging the national identity is brought forward.

The interests of British historians in this period have tended to point in two directions. In one view, European diplomacy from the partitioning of Poland to the French Revolution largely drew the imperial gaze away from North America. At the same time Lewis Namier’s 1929 work, *Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III*, instigated an inward look at the functions of parliament. Through a close examination of Lords and members of Parliament, Namier revealed a political system that was more concerned with personal gain than national policy. Systems of patronage created a diplomatic corps that was ill equipped to perform their duties.

On the one hand, the partisan political lines that seem to be hardening in British politics throughout the period appear to challenge the Namerian concept. However, it is
within the fluid nature of these partisan coalitions that his insights bear out. My research reveals that alliances of convenience formed within parliament based more on the principle of defeating rivals than pursuing policy agendas.

Most recently, Jeremy Black takes a Namerian approach towards British foreign policy negotiators in *British Diplomats and Diplomacy*. His close scrutiny of the men appointed to diplomatic posts and the responsibilities implicit to their task suggests the transitional nature of diplomacy in this era. Black’s research reveals that a professional diplomatic corps did ultimately emerge as individuals rose up to meet the increasingly important challenges of their post. This was accomplished through larger structural changes which removed the management of diplomats from the Crown and placed it in the hands of the Foreign Secretary in 1782. While these structural changes began to foster a new culture of diplomacy for Britain, the results were slow to come. It is evident in British dealings with the United States that they were still suffering the effects of a long tradition of ineptitude into the 1790s.

In Native American historiography, the key issues arising from this period have centered on the evolution of Indian-white relations. The seminal work in the field is Richard White’s *The Middle Ground*. White challenged the long-held paradigm that Native Americans conformed to European conventions in order to secure trade goods. His work showed the fluid nature of all parties involved as they adopted rituals and behaviors that facilitated greater understanding. French traders and Jesuit missionaries adapted in varying degrees to the cultural constructs of the Algonquin peoples they encountered. Through language, dress, and adoption of rituals like the calumet ceremony, the French and Indians forged alliances. More important though, was the development of
kinship networks, real and fictive, through marriage and social convention. These networks had a broad and far-reaching impact on the region as hierarchical structures were created not only between native and newcomer, but between tribal peoples as well. The middle-ground interactions that White identified contributed to the emergence of lasting relationships based on ceremony and ritual. While these rituals were by no means static, they had become a central feature of negotiations and were at the heart of maintaining the integrity of intertribal relations.

White’s work is indicative of an expanded understanding emerging in Native American history. Indians had historically been relegated to the background of historical works. They were scenery at best, savages at worst. White and others like him brought the Native presence to the front of the discourse through ethnohistory, and, in so doing, reshaped the historical narrative. Acknowledging the agency of indigenous people within processes that have long been viewed as European raises questions about those processes. At the same time, the shift in focus that brings the Indians to the center of the narrative confronts issues surrounding Indian identity.¹⁰

An exploration of the Ohio Confederacy intersects with issues of pan-Indianism. Contemporary Native American scholars recognize the difficulties inherent in the formation of pan-Indian movements, given the diversity of the people involved. Differences between tribal communities extend from language to spirituality and beyond. In the Northeast Woodlands, social constructs such as clan affiliation and gender roles varied widely throughout the region. While geographic proximity coupled with long traditions of interaction muted some of these disparities, a strong bond was needed to tie
the people together. This unity often developed through spiritual and cultural revitalization movements.

Gregory Evans Dowd in his groundbreaking work, *A Spirited Resistance*, examines the factionalism that occurred within pan-Indian spiritual movements. Dowd traces the difficult identity shift that he considers necessary for a successful intertribal movement. Pan-Indianism relied on the idea that tribal, clan, and kin affiliations must be pushed aside to allow a more general Indian identity to take precedence. This was accomplished through revitalization movements led by prophets offering tangible ceremonial solutions, usually to the problem of white encroachment. The result was often strife within communities that divided over identity issues. Dowd’s important framework draws a dichotomy that he finds in common throughout these movements. “Indians who identified with ‘tribal’ leaders generally emphasized the interests of their particular people….they were advocates of accommodation. Others cast their lot with the movement’s militants, here termed nativists.”

The Ohio Indian Confederacy seems to digress from the pattern laid out by Dowd. While the fracturing emerged, it took place from within the movement. There was no specific prophet lending spiritual and ceremonial authority to the confederacy. Rather, it was the rituals of diplomacy that seem to have sustained the early confederacy. However, Pontiac’s War and the teachings of Neolin that had swept over the region two decades earlier reached into the new movement. That influence is illuminated by Al Cave In *Prophets of the Great Spirit*. Examining the rise of prophets and revitalization movements, Cave studies the deterioration of cultural complexes in the face of material goods, religious colonialism, and imperial violence, all of which contributed to the need
for syncretic spiritual ideas. This blending of traditions, often characterized by adoption of Christian elements, offered new avenues for cultural revitalization. While Neolin’s vision of eschewing European goods and returning to traditional ways did not carry over, his concept of the Great Spirit did. “The Great Spirit spoken of by the prophets,” Cave asserts, “was born in the eighteenth century.” The Great Spirit, as a concept, was not tied to any specific ideology. Neolin invoked the Great Spirit in his call for resistance with very specific, almost dogmatic teachings. But the notion of the Great Spirit transcended the teachings of any one prophet or group. While the Great Spirit represented something new, in fact it was seen as something much older, which returned to the people in their time of need. The Great Spirit, rather than a prophet, provided some cohesion among the myriad people of the Indian Confederacy.

The issues of identity and spirituality that are so clearly present in the movements of Pontiac, Tecumseh, and others are not as explicit in the Ohio Confederacy. From the outset of the alliance, the common goals were more territorial than spiritual. The recognition of the Great Spirit, coupled with the rituals of diplomacy, provided the connective tissue which held together this largely pragmatic movement. However, it was Brant who brought them together and it was Brant who would tear them apart. His role illustrates the principal that power of character and strength of personality are determinant factors in ground-level diplomacy. Brant’s motivations and movements are well documented in Isabel Thompson Kelsay’s *Joseph Brant*, a biographical work that has helped fill in the gaps left in the primary sources.

The Ohio River Valley from 1783 to 1793 was not White’s middle ground; in fact, it was almost the inverse. A century of reciprocal interactions was coming undone.
Rituals and ceremonies that had come to represent normal relations were being tested in the face of aggression and expansion. Examining some of these constructs as sacred rituals of diplomacy reveals a region in flux. Yet finding clear and resounding voices in the historical record is a difficult prospect at best when considering diplomacy in this context. It becomes all the more difficult when the voices sought are Native.

As such, few historians have generated work focused on this facet of interaction. The *History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy* is an edited volume of multidisciplinary essays that attempt to engage some of these ideas. Of particular value to my work was Michael K. Foster’s “Another Look at the Function of Wampum in Iroquois--White Councils.” Challenging the role of wampum in council, Foster looks beyond the ratifying effect of adding weight to speech, and wampum’s use as a mnemonic device. He makes a case for wampum as not only retrospective, but as a prospective organizing principle. He elevates the exchange of wampum into “the principle means for conducting a council’s business.”

Foster’s effort to attribute new roles to wampum is indicative of the difficulties surrounding this issue. Wampum appears in the primary sources with measured regularity, yet there is virtually no straightforward interpretation. Only by examining the context of its use can meaningful new frameworks emerge. My work shows that wampum represents one facet of the ritual obligations that lent cohesion to the Ohio Indian Confederacy.

The monographs discussed above played integral roles in my research. The conceptual frameworks which they represent informed my work, offering both guidance and challenges. Primary sources, though, are the wattle and daub of this paper. The *Michigan Pioneer Historical Collection* offers the papers of Fredrick Haldimand. His
correspondence with the commandants at the posts and the home government in Britain paint a vivid picture of the hopes and concerns facing Canada at the dawning of peace in 1783. Canadian authority began and ended with Haldimand in the aftermath of the Revolution, and his early decisions had far-reaching implications.

*The St. Clair Papers* were an essential resource for obtaining a palpable sense of the growing anxiety in the Old Northwest. Hostility between squatters, settlers, and the Indian Confederacy all added to the turmoil in the region. Arthur St. Clair began work there as a general in the army and a treaty negotiator. He was later named the governor of the Northwest Territory. His personality shines through his personal papers and correspondence, revealing his militaristic nature. St. Clair was a vocal proponent of war with the Indians, and he relentlessly pressed for the power to call up the militias. His star was rising until his fateful campaign against the confederated Indians in 1791 tarnished his name.

The *American State Papers, Indian Affairs*, contain the policy debates in the United States Congress over Native Americans. Secretary of War Henry Knox tempered the brash nature of St. Clair and his ilk. Realizing the cost, both financial and moral, that would be incurred in waging violent war against the Indians, Knox advised peace. His sensible letters to President George Washington, honestly examining the state of the army and prospects for success, reveal a nation in a weakened condition. Knox’s concerns are punctuated by reports filtering in of coerced treaties and Indian depredations.

Indian voices are difficult to find in the historical record of this period. The business of diplomacy is where the largest body of preservation exists. Speeches given by Native Americans in this context were translated by interpreters and recorded, nearly
always in terms the interpreter could understand. This poses real problems in trying to access Indian views. Fortunately, a cadre of British Indian agents were acculturated to certain communities, and kept written records. The translations and interpretations carried out by Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, and Joseph Brant are as reliable as possible, given the circumstances. The practice in council of reviewing the words spoken in the past lend credence to their accuracy. Unfortunately, their interests were not academic, and they largely eschewed the recording of the ceremonial procedures that took place around the council fires.

Still, a close examination of the reports of these agents provides remarkable insight as to the tenor of politics in the confederacy. These writings, along with the personal journal of Joseph Brant, can be found in the *Simcoe Papers*. This valuable source addresses not only Canadian and British political issues, but Indian issues as well. Simcoe himself was a colorful character with a zeal for conflict and a disdain for the United States. His philosophy that the best defense is a good offense had him chomping at the bit to strike a blow against the new nation. Consequently, he was very interested in the utility of the Indian warriors and the army they represented. His papers present the greatest primary source contribution to my research.

Chapter 2, “The Diplomatic Challenge,” sets the stage for native diplomatic endeavors by focusing on Great Britain and the United States. An examination of their international policies and internal struggles reveals two nations grasping for direction. Uncertainty caused governmental upheaval, and questions of legitimacy and identity were framed in diplomatic actions. The next chapter, “The Rise of the Ohio Confederacy,” traces the issues faced by the British authorities in Canada as they tried to
sustain relationships with their native allies. Persistently clinging to the long-fostered rituals of friendship and diplomacy, they tried to create stability in an ever-changing political environment. Cultures of diplomacy were tested as the United States began to push into Indian Territory. Chapter 4, “The Failure of Diplomacy,” looks more closely at the rituals of diplomacy in the context of the council fire. Changing dynamics within the confederated tribes lead to changes in intertribal relations and a shift in ritual behavior.
Chapter Two

The Diplomatic Challenge

All prisoners on both Sides shall be set at Liberty, and his Brittanic Majesty shall with all convenient speed, and without causing any Destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other Property of the American inhabitants, withdraw all his Armies, Garrisons & Fleets from the said United States, and from every Post, Place and Harbour within the same.

~From Article VII, the Treaty of Paris, September 3 1783¹⁴

The rise and fall of the Ohio Indian Confederacy occurred against a backdrop of international diplomacy, not simply domestic policy. Both internal and external pressures contributed to the fluid dynamic of the native alliance. The United States and Great Britain were facing similar pressures of their own, shaping the perception of the negotiating parties and the cultures of diplomacy. These separate but overlapping diplomatic processes are vividly demonstrated through an examination of the frustration surrounding compliance with the treaty of peace in the aftermath of the Revolution.

In British terms, diplomacy was affected by a number of factors. The war with the colonies had shaken up Parliament and polarized already contentious partisan divisions. The specter of aggression in North America loomed large from multiple directions. The Indians in Canada, the United States to the south, and the Spanish presence from the
Mississippi west all represented threats to British power. Yet a disconnect persisted between the administration in Canada and the administration at home regarding the proper course to take. As events within Europe garnered ever more of Parliament’s attention, Canada was relegated to the periphery. Diplomatic efforts became a series of reactions to exploit perceived U.S. and Native weaknesses. In this context the idea of an Indian buffer zone was first broached and became the platform of Canadian negotiations.

The emerging United States was experiencing internal pressures as well. The process of creating a new government proved to be a daunting task, and early efforts had marked flaws. Under the Articles of Confederation, states were completely sovereign. There was no mechanism to force the cooperation of the states with treaties entered into by the federal government. Economic problems plagued most states as shipping was disrupted and citizens balked at the taxes imposed on them. Open rebellion in some states cast doubt as to whether the new nation would survive. Realizing the deficiencies inherent in the current system, the Confederation Congress gave its consent to a convention in Philadelphia in 1787. The resultant alteration in political structure opened new avenues of diplomacy and a shift in national identity. With a newly organized government led by an executive power, the nation pushed once again into the theatre of international politics.

The Articles of Confederation were forged during a time of great diplomatic crisis. The Second Continental Congress in 1776 encouraged the adoption of permanent colonial governments and the drafting of constitutions. Once the establishment of these state governments took hold, some connective tissue was required to bring them together.
The significance of the Articles was that the colonies were working in concert to co-opt the powers once reserved for Crown officials. It was a signal that the trouble brewing was no mere rebellion, but a revolution.

Drafting the Articles of Confederation fell largely to the conservative Pennsylvanian John Dickinson, and his model that was eventually altered and ratified. While many of Dickinson’s articles remained intact, policies regarding Native Americans underwent crucial revisions. For instance, Article Fourteen stated: “A perpetual Alliance, offensive and defensive, is to be entered into by the United States assembled as soon as may be with the Six Nations, and other neighbouring Nations of Indians; their Limits to be ascertained, their Lands to be secured to them, and not encroached upon.” Dickinson further specified that any sale of Indian lands could only take place between the “United States assembled, or by Persons for that Purpose authorized by them and the great Councils of the Indians.”

When the Articles of Confederation were ratified on November 15, 1777, there was little mention of Indians. In fact, the points that remained from the Dickinson draft were twofold. Article Six stipulated that no state could declare war without consent of Congress, unless “such State be actively invaded by enemies, or shall have received certain advice of a resolution being formed by some nation of Indians to invade such State, and the danger is so imminent as not admit of a delay.” And according to Article Nine, the United States would “regulate the trade and manage all affairs with the Indians, not members of any of the States.” The position of the United States regarding diplomacy towards the Indians, and the rest of the world, was beginning to take shape. The central issue of federal versus states’ rights had been broached. Article Nine clearly
delineated the rights of Congress, and only Congress, to enter into treaties. Yet the implication that Indians who lived within the area of a state could be party to negotiation with that state left the situation unclear. The tribes did not constitute foreign nations, nor did they fall under the province of domestic affairs. They were somewhere in between.¹⁹

In fact, the United States adopted a very British tone in their diplomatic policies towards the indigenous peoples. British diplomacy followed two very different trajectories. In Europe, diplomats were dispatched to reside in the capitals, participate in courts, and make notice of policy changes that would affect England and the Crown. These appointments were made, not based on merit, but rather as symbolic offices of social rank and friendship with the royals. As such, the British diplomatic corps was never considered to be particularly capable. As the revolutionary age unfolded, tumultuous political affairs in Parliament further degraded the view of Britain’s foreign dignitaries.²⁰ Outside of Europe, British diplomacy was carried out by commercial enterprises like the Hudson Bay Company, or by the military occupying the region. The latter had few plenipotentiary powers and could only enter into predetermined or non-binding agreements. This rigidity was partly a function of the difficulty of moving information across great distances in a timely manner and partly due to British disinterest in treating with people on the periphery.

The United States had emulated the British model--to a degree. Negotiations with Native tribes were routinely conducted by military men, often with a company of soldiers present. The Continental Congress in 1775 established three Indian departments based on the Northern, Southern, and central regions and the tribes identified therein. The earliest negotiations did not yield written documents but were attempts to bring Indian allies into
the American fold.\textsuperscript{21} As such, trade and commerce were central elements to these meetings. By the time the Articles saw ratification in 1782, both the need for, and the prospect of, Indian fidelity had waned. Instead the tribes had largely aligned, pressured by both the British and Americans to abandon policies of neutrality. Further negotiations with the Native Peoples continued to be carried out by military men, but the ritual niceties fell to the wayside. Meanwhile, in regards to Europe, the United States was prepared to send another breed of diplomat altogether, proficient in the ways of the Old World diplomacy.

The currency of diplomacy for the western powers was the written word. If rituals of diplomacy existed within their negotiations with one another, they would have to be rooted in the concept of documentation. No diplomatic agreement was final without a tangible piece of evidence to which all parties could refer. Placing ink on paper legitimized and solemnized agreements and gave them an air of permanence. At the end of 1775, the not-yet united states formed the Committee of Secret Correspondence in order to establish relationships with sympathizers in Europe, and to pursue clandestine foreign relations.\textsuperscript{22}

However, successful diplomacy requires a certain amount of public spectacle to augment covert negotiations. To that end, committee members Benjamin Franklin and John Jay oversaw the evolution of the Committee of Secret Correspondence into the Committee of Foreign Affairs in 1777.\textsuperscript{23} By September 1782, official channels of peace between Britain and the United States were opened up in Paris. Playing an age-old game of backroom deals, the American diplomatic corps was comprised of strong willed men with quick minds and careful tongues. Drawn from the breadth of the political spectrum,
men such as Jay, Franklin, John Adams, and Henry Laurens ventured into the European theatre to firm up alliances and work towards peace. Their different approaches towards diplomacy reflected their personalities. Intrigue and suspicion permeated the atmosphere of foreign relations, and the American ministers were not immune to it.

Franklin alone among the peacemakers remained aloof from the paranoid jealousies of the moment. His solid relationship with the comte de Vergennes, the French foreign minister, cast Franklin in an unfavorable light to his contemporaries. Jay was the descendant of Huguenots who had fled to England to escape French persecution; he never lost his affinity for Great Britain nor his disdain for the French. However, Jay was also a deeply religious man with a keen sense of social justice, his training in law enabled him to wear down political opponents through excruciatingly specific details in the drawing of documents. Indefatigable in nature, he pushed through a peace with Britain on very good terms for the United States.

British Prime Minister Lord Shelburne dispatched a Scotsman, Richard Oswald, to meet the American negotiators. Oswald was a product of the weak imperial diplomatic corps. Chosen because of his advocacy of liberal trade policies, Oswald was left alone to haggle with Jay, Adams, and Franklin over the fine points of the peace treaty; he was far outmatched. Adding to his weak position was the fact that Shelburne was of a mind to sacrifice dominion for commerce. Towards the end of negotiations in October 1782, a veritable flood of diplomatic envoys from Parliament were unleashed upon Paris. Representing various partisan coalitions and seeking political advantage, they were seemingly more eager to pick over the bones of Oswald and point up blame than to make any changes to the document. The preliminaries were signed in November and despite
causing a shakeup in Parliament, they passed the following year, for the most part unchanged.

While Jay and Franklin, masters of the diplomatic dance, wrested concessions from their less astute adversaries, they mistakenly believed they would receive the support of the states back home. It is little wonder that the treaty negotiations in Paris, so painstakingly attended to, yielded a document that neither side was willing or able to honor. American diplomats had negotiated in the names of the confederated states, with no authority to force the states into compliance. Lord Shelburne’s brief tenure as prime minister had overseen the drafting of a treaty that would remain contentious for years. As for the British in Canada, and their Indian allies, they had been overlooked by commissioners who had no idea what the view was like from the ground in North America.26

A new border drawn between the United States and Canada placed a string of important posts in United States territory. During the initial treaty negotiations in Paris in 1782, Oswald had been only too eager to give up ownership of these posts: Oswegatchie, Oswego, Niagara, Presque Isle, Sandusky, Detroit, and Michilimackinac. In fact, he pushed to remove the troops as quickly as possible for redeployment off the coast of Florida in preparation for the war with Spain that seemed imminent.27 In early drafts of the treaty, evacuating the troops was to be immediate upon cessation of hostilities. However, there was a concern among British commissioners that the troops and loyalist civilians would be in some danger from American banditti if forced to pull out too rapidly. It was in this context that the language of Article Seven was changed. British soldiers were now required to evacuate American territory with “all convenient speed,” to
promote a bloodless transition. As far as the British negotiators in Paris were concerned, the posts were not a point of contention. However, British authorities in Canada had a different view; for them the posts soon became the crucial issue.

The ambiguous nature of the “all convenient speed” clause was immediately tested. George Washington dispatched Major General Friedrich von Steuben to Canada in the summer of 1783, before the treaty had even been ratified. Steuben’s orders were to make arrangements with the governor general of British North America, Fredrick Haldimand, for the transition of the posts into United States control. Haldimand kept Steuben away from the posts and avoided negotiating an exchange by stating that he had no direct orders on the subject. It was clear that the United States was eager to solidify its new boundaries and did not intend to wait for the British to choose their own time of departure. “The longer the evacuation is delayed,” wrote Haldimand, “the more time is given to our traders to remove their merchandise, or to convert it into furs, and the greater opportunity is given to the officers under my command to reconcile the Indians to a measure for which they entertain the greatest abhorrence.”

Issues of commerce and security were the central tenets of Haldimand’s concerns. The Native people represented an allied army that could be called to action in the defense of the posts in particular and British interests in general. However, Haldimand viewed their alliance as tenuous, believing the Indians to be fickle and powerful enough to overwhelm Canadian colonists. Fear of a general Indian uprising was paramount to the British administration in Canada, a fear that resonated throughout the decade. In many regards, this fear was linked to the concerns that had been expressed in Paris and were responsible for the altered language of the treaty. Canadian authorities simultaneously
tried to buttress their relationships with the myriad tribes of the region, even as they prepared to abandon them to United States rule. Networks of diplomacy between Canada and the Indians were reliant on the posts as nodes of interaction and authority.

The posts were also vital to the Canadian economy given their role in the fur trade. Britain’s primary concern about Canada was in the context of the larger trade dynamic focused on the West Indies. This touched off infighting in Parliament over whether to normalize trade relations with the United States or try to manipulate their economy. By 1784, American access to the West Indies had been restricted. However, Britain offered the states favored trading status and continued to import their raw materials while supplying them with manufactured goods. The primary response of the states to this trade inequity was to raise tariffs at their ports. However, the states did not work in concert, and British importers could always find a friendly port in which to unload their goods. This created a ready market for the enrichment of British traders while simultaneously maintaining a hold on the American economy.

By contrast, Canada had little to offer. In fact, the lack of manufacturing coupled with a short growing season placed Canada in a position to be dependent on imports. Britain had established a complete monopoly on the fur trade after the Seven Years’ War. Every aspect of the trade was controlled by British interests, from gathering raw materials to shipping, processing, and export into the global market. Thus the carrying trade was reliant to some extent on the fur trade, which in turn provided employment for other horizontal industries. Though the profits of the trade did not exceed the cost to maintain the dominion, the fur trade was the economic engine of Canadian commerce.
While the fur trade was overwhelmingly the most lucrative business venture in British North America, it was an industry that could not function without the aid of the indigenous population. Whether physically trapping and exchanging furs, or simply allowing trappers to operate unmolested, native sanction was necessary to keep the enterprise flowing. The bulk of that trade came from deep within the Canadian interior. The loss of the fur trade south of the newly established border, which was inevitable under Article Seven, did not represent a considerable economic setback for Imperial Britain. However, allowing the United States to occupy the posts would disrupt commercial relationships and reveal the weakness of the Canadian position. For Britain to retain control of Canada, it was necessary to hold the posts, at least for the time being.

If the British conflated the posts with the retention of their North American holdings, the United States viewed their abandonment as the key to expansion. The Northwest Ordinance of 1785 opened up territory to sale and settlement by Congress. The valuable farmland was to be converted into monies desperately needed by the indebted government. However, the new nation had engaged in heavy-handed treaty making tactics, attempting to coerce land cessions from the indigenous peoples. These agreements were not honored by the Indian Confederacy. The United States could not liquidate its “public lands” until they could offer security in the region. And security remained elusive as long as the British occupied the posts and continued to supply the Indians. Meanwhile, squatters exacerbated the situation by ramping up the violence and threatening to break away from American control. The situation was volatile.

The U.S. failure to carry out their treaty obligations served as the justification for British non-compliance--specifically, Articles Four, Five and Six which largely
concerned loyalists.\textsuperscript{35} Taken together, these articles ensured British loyalists the right to return to the United States and set their affairs in order. Property that had been lost over the course of the war was to be returned to the loyalists, who would also be able to collect outstanding debts. The loyalists were given a period of twelve months to conclude their business, after which time it was understood that they would depart the United States for some other territory in the British Empire. However, passions ran high in the immediate aftermath of war. For the loosely aligned United States, operating under the Articles of Confederation, forcing the states to comply proved difficult.

Loyalist issues were state issues, and they were dealt with by state legislatures. Massachusetts, for example, passed antiamnesty laws in 1778, and a banishment law followed quickly after. Returning Tories were jailed and their property sold. In the immediate postwar era, the governor of Massachusetts was given the ability to run Tories out of town without a trial.\textsuperscript{36} New York allowed their Tories to remain, but taxed them disproportionately and disenfranchised them with a voting act in 1784.\textsuperscript{37} The federal government had no authority to interfere with state legislation, and the loyalists had no recourse. The situation illuminates the problems inherent in the execution of the Treaty of Paris.

With the loyalists unable to conclude their business dealings and secure their assets in the United States, political trouble was brewing back in England. The loyalist provisions were not viewed as comprehensive enough by political enemies of British Prime Minister Lord Shelburne. Alexander Wedderburn, Lord Loughborough, was a vocal opponent of Shelburne. “To proclaim ourselves beaten Cowards,” he penned, “incapable of protecting the Adherents to our wretched fortune, is such a Loss of Credit
as no Calamity of War should have made a People submit to." In an effort to quell opposition voices in Parliament, Shelburne enacted a policy in which the Crown paid outstanding damages to its North American subjects, and then advanced these sums as debts owed by the United States.

Initial claims were blatantly outrageous. As early as 1783, some two thousand loyalists claimed losses of over seven million pounds sterling. While Shelburne’s administration did not succumb to the exaggeration, it was apparent that large amounts of capital were being disbursed into loyalist pockets. By the time congressional leaders in the United States turned their attention to the matter, the debt stood at five million pounds sterling—a sum that was impossible for the United States to advance. Shelburne’s tactics bought time for Haldimand in Canada but failed to stifle the voices of his adversaries. The embattled Shelburne resigned his office in 1783 and an interim government under William Pitt was installed.

Late eighteenth-century parliamentary politics were partisan and factional. The coalitions that formed at the top of government, in the House of Lords, were reliant on a groundswell of support from the lower house. A system of coercion and bribery had infected some areas, and “rotten boroughs” offered their political weight to the highest bidder. However, this cynical view did not permeate the whole of England. Members of the House of Commons were largely concerned with local issues and as such, would throw support behind coalitions that were willing to address those issues. This resulted in partisan vacillation over issues in order to garner support. Somewhere in the process, the political health of the nation became secondary to party and even personality.
Pitt's ministry was immediately confronted with Parliament's most pressing issue, the challenge of establishing a commercial policy with the United States. His initial proposals advocated a liberal trade agreement that would open the West Indies to American shipping. Angry conservative opposition caused Pitt to back down from his proposal and declare that it should be dealt with by the next government the king appointed. This pleased Pitt's primary rivals, Lord North and Charles Fox, who successfully advanced their coalition into the seat of power. The North/Fox coalition, somewhat ironically, pushed for very similar terms to those proposed by Pitt.\(^4\) Further irony ensued when, in 1784, the North/Fox coalition was overturned and Pitt was again appointed minister. Faced with an increasingly partisan Parliament, Pitt backtracked from his previous position and aligned himself with the Crown. The West Indies remained closed to United States trade, and the monopoly on fur remained in British control.

Objectives on the ground in Canada were not going as planned; the dual issues of commerce and security continued to be problems. While British soldiers still garrisoned the posts, it was not clear how long they could maintain their position. Haldimand had issued an open invitation to the tribes of the confederacy to relocate in Canada in an effort to shield them from United States influence, but his overtures had been largely declined. The Montreal merchants, who had petitioned the government to retain the posts in order that they might settle their affairs, had failed to conclude their business. In fact, they took advantage of the situation to expand their trade networks further west, making them ever more dependent on British diplomacy.\(^4\) Lord Dorchester, who in 1785 relieved Haldimand as governor-in-chief of British North America, summed up the problem: “The most injudicious of all is a no resolution remaining in an impotent state,
and yet holding these places in Defiance of powerful neighbors who have set their hearts upon them, and who sooner or later will certainly assault them, if left in their present situation." But the home government was not sensitive to the perceived dangers to Canadian administrators, and action was slow to come.

As British factions continued to do battle in Parliament, the United States was suffering growing pains of its own. In 1784 the secretary of Congress Charles Thomson summed up the problems developing in the emergent nation in a letter to John Jay. “There is at present no person whose business or whole duty it is to attend to matters of national Concern. The Committee of the states have in my opinion very unwarrantably separated, and though the Chairman has written to the several States to send on a Delegate to form a Committee at Philadelphia, I have little hopes in their meeting." Thomson further complained that the superintendent of finance was quitting, foreign ambassadors were acting without guidance, and the states were absorbed with their internal politics. In short, there was little left resembling a cohesive nation.

The following year, with no funds available to appease British interests, Congress attempted to mitigate the debt by tying it to the issue of slaves. States were not only unwilling to contribute to the payment of the national debt, they inflated it with their seizure of loyalist property. Article Seven of the treaty was not simply an agreement to remove troops from American soil; there were other obligations attached. The withdrawal was to take place "without causing any destruction, or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants." Official British policy during the conflict had guaranteed freedom to any slaves who abandoned their masters and made their way across British lines. Wherever the Crown soldiers advanced, they liberated what slaves
they could. Runaways sought out British garrisons, and many crossed into Canada as the outcome of the war began to take shape. In May 1785, Adams, acting as minister to France, argued that loss of property and labor was endemic to the states’ inability to shoulder the debt burden. In the view of the United States, failure to resolve the slave issue released them from the loyalist debts. British policy, however, would not be swayed.

The United States continued to suffer an economic crisis, and by the summer of 1786 the nation was insolvent. Further complicating issues, Spain had closed off access to the Mississippi River; Barbary pirates were capturing American trading vessels; and several states were on the verge of economic collapse. Britain was eager to read this as a deterioration of the nascent American government, prompting British consul Sir John Temple to write in 1787: “There is at present No Congress sitting, and it is altogether uncertain when, or whether ever, a Congress will set again under the present flimsy federal Government of this distracted Country.” The time to exert pressure on the United States had come. Dorchester seized the opportunity to increase Canada’s sphere of influence and made overtures to insurgents in Massachusetts and Vermont.

When a group of dissidents rose up in Massachusetts and took over the courts in the late summer of 1785, the government of the United States was put to the test. Relying on the policy of requisition that marked economic realities under the Articles of Confederation, the federal government could not field a national army without state cooperation. Shays’s rebellion was put down, but it highlighted yet another problem with the governing articles. James Madison suspected that British interests were at play in the uprising, and he feared that similar revolts might be fomented almost anywhere. States
with large slave populations seemed likely targets of international interference. Shays’s rebellion persuaded the Confederation Congress to heed the call for a convention that would reform the articles.

The newly drafted Constitution invested the federal government with potential resources to pursue aggressive action against the British. No one challenged the authority of the federal government to forge and carry out treaties, but the process and frequency of treaty making had been too easy under the Articles. Changes in policy were needed; as Gouvernor Morris pointed out, “[t]he more difficulty in making treaties, the more value will be set on them.” The Senate’s oversight of ratification, coupled with the stipulation that treaties be entered into between one sovereign nation to another, assuaged republican fears of giving the president unbridled power. However, the Constitution’s language created problems for diplomatic relations with Native Americans. Holding formal treaties with them was akin to recognizing them as a foreign nation. At the same time, treaties were being negotiated on the basis of the doctrine of the right of conquest in which all the lands east of the Mississippi were regarded as U.S. territory. In that line of thinking, if the Natives would not cede their lands willingly, they would be compelled to cede them. Control over the Indians, American authorities believed, would force Britain’s hand.

The Constitution’s reorganization of the United States government did not mark a significant change in either the policies or personnel of American diplomacy. Negotiations with foreign nations remained within the realm of charismatic and capable statesmen. In regards to the indigenous people, the carrying out of diplomacy fell to the secretary of war, who worked out protocols in conjunction with the president. The Indian department was reconstituted with northern and southern branches, as the government
tried to press its land claims westward. The Constitution had tied the states together and provided a mechanism to raise federal troops. However, Henry Knox, as secretary of war, derided the actively coercive policies towards the Native Americans as a stain on the national character and as impossible to enforce. The motives were equal parts humanitarian and political. For Knox, and Washington, federal control in the region was a priority, and federal treaty-making would assert that authority. Meanwhile, “expansion with honor” cut a righteous figure when posed against state aggression and frontier violence.52

Even as the democratic experiment was taking hold in the United States, France was collapsing into revolution, and a reorganization of Canada was taking place. Under the Constitutional Act of 1791, Canada was split into two provinces. Lower Canada followed the St. Lawrence River and was comprised mainly of Quebec and Newfoundland. Upper Canada encompassed southern Ontario as well as the pays d’en haut that had formed New France.53 Governor General Dorchester and Lord Grenville, Secretary of Foreign Affairs appointed men to fill out these governorships. In light of the situation unfolding in the United States, and the need to foster relationships with the Indians, it was deemed wise to fill the posts with military men.54

Dorchester was in a tough position; a different policy was required to neutralize American advances. Casting about for a new justification, an old idea once again emerged. As early as 1783 Haldimand had written to Lord North:

It would certainly be better for both nations, and the most likely means to prevent Jealousies and Quarrels that the intermediate Country between the limits assigned to Canada by the Provisional Treaty, and those established as formerly mentioned by that in the year 1768, should be considered as entirely belonging to the Indians, and that the subjects neither of Great Britain nor of the American States should be
allowed to settle within them, but that the subjects of each should have liberty to trade where they please.\textsuperscript{55}

But North had lost his post as prime minister the previous year, and Haldimand’s vision never entered the parliamentary discourse.

The idea did not surface again until December, 1790 when Sir John Johnson, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs, penned the following in a letter to a colleague.

As I know you must be interested in the result of the American expedition against the Indians in the neighborhood of Detroit I shall only inform you that the Indians have twice defeated their army and obliged them to retire with precipitation…I think the people interested in Trade of that Country ought to use their Interest with Government to put a stop to any further Encroachments in the Indian Country, by trying to establish a line of division from the Pennsylvania Northern & Western Boundary line as established in 1768 to the Southward between the Americans & Indians, as the only means of security to their Trade, and for the Peace & comfort of the parties engaged.\textsuperscript{56}

Johnson might very well have been the catalyst which set the campaign for a buffer state in motion. In less than three weeks the leading merchants in Montreal made themselves heard. Dorchester was encouraged by the aligned traders that if “it would seem fit to the wisdom of the Government to cede the Posts, that the Indian Country should be considered neutral ground, free and open for the purposes of Trade, as well to His Majesty’s Subjects, as to those of the American United States.”\textsuperscript{57}

Without a doubt, the most explicit early communication regarding the buffer state came from Henry Dundas, Secretary of Home affairs, writing to Lord Dorchester in late 1791;

Your Lordship being already apprized of the Intentions of His Majesty’s Servants to endeavor to secure what may operate as an effectual & lasting Barrier, between the Territories of the American United States and His Majesty’s Dominions in that quarter…

The Idea suggested was, that His Majesty and the American States should join in securing exclusively to the Indians a certain portion of Territory lying between and extending the whole length of the Lines of their respective Frontiers…
By placing the Indians in such a Position they will become a natural Barrier against mutual Encroachments…

This designated a shift in diplomatic policy since retention of the posts was untenable, British strategy had changed. Leaving the posts in Indian hands would alleviate the threat of American encroachment on Canada. If the Indian Confederacy was able to sustain a united front, the Nation would have to consider compliance. At last the home government had offered a point of action, to be pursued diplomatically with fervor.

To carry out their Canadian plans, the Imperial government looked to John Graves Simcoe. Simcoe was first and foremost a military man. He had gained his first commission at the age of nineteen. During the Revolution he was given command of the Queens Rangers, an elite fighting unit. Having suffered capture at the hands of a New Jersey militia, Simcoe harbored a strong disdain for American Revolutionaries. “I am one of those who know all the consequences of our late American Dominions,” he wrote, “I would die by more than Indian torture to restore my King and his Family to their just Inheritance and to give my Country that fair and natural accession of Power which an Union with their Brethren could not fail to bestow and render permanent.” Simcoe was exactly the sort of man that could hold out against both diplomatic and martial actions towards the posts. Grenville realized his utility and put his name forward for the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, he was given the appointment.

Meanwhile the United States dispatched Gouvernor Morris as an unofficial envoy to London to try to mediate the handing over of the posts, among other things. Morris had not been given any significant authority with which to make treaties, and subsequently was not regarded seriously by the Pitt administration. This diplomatic shunning was indicative of Pitt’s uncertainty about how to deal with the Americans. By recognizing
Morris as a minister, he would be elevating their national status. Pitt decided to disregard Morris and propose a ministerial exchange on his terms; undoubtedly to project a more dignified position. Upon hearing the news, Thomas Jefferson quipped to Morris, “you have placed their proposition of exchanging a minister on proper ground… we sent them one. They have taken no notice of that, and talk of agreeing to exchange one now, as if the idea were new.” Morris’ mission was ostensibly responsible for Britain agreeing to exchange foreign ministers with the United States. It is much more likely that Parliament had come to realize their need for an advocate in the halls of Congress. The British had fashioned a two pronged approach towards the United States, installing Simcoe in Canada and sending George Hammond, as minister, to Philadelphia. Both men were keenly aware of the issue of the posts, the importance of their native allies, and the expectation of a buffer state.

George Hammond had been selected as a young up and comer in the British government. Only twenty eight years old when appointed minister, Hammond appeared to have all the traits necessary for the job. “A prudent and well informed man… whose name and character had not been known in the transactions of war,” Hammond’s presence in Philadelphia seemed designed to offset Simcoe’s in Canada, in typical British fashion. While Hammond was instructed to press for a renegotiation of international boundaries through diplomatic channels, Simcoe would ensure that the 1783 boundaries were not enforced on the ground. It was not necessary for both men to succeed in their missions in order for British plans to be realized; victory on either front would create the desired results. The youth and inexperience of Hammond suggests that British hopes were vested largely in the martial prowess of Simcoe.
Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Secretary of State, was not pleased with Hammond’s arrival in October, 1791. A confirmed Anglophobe, Jefferson was embittered by the treatment of Gouvernor Morris and “uniformly encouraged the belief” that the British would never send a minister to negotiate. The very presence of the minister rankled Jefferson and he was uncooperative. It was Hammond’s great misfortune that Jefferson’s administrative post put him in a position to nullify his efforts. Further complicating issues, the United States army under General Arthur St. Clair suffered defeat at the hands of the confederated tribes on November 4, just weeks after Hammond’s arrival. It was widely believed in the United States that Lord Dorchester was arming the Indians and encouraging resistance to American encroachment.

Hammond felt it was in his best interest to tread lightly and spent much of his time sounding out various senators in an attempt to bolster some friendly support for his position. Alexander Hamilton had long espoused his desire to maintain warm relations between Great Britain and the States. British affections, among other things, added to the growing rift between Hamilton and his political adversary, Jefferson. Naturally, Hammond felt he had a powerful ally in Hamilton and hoped to use his influence to leverage a renegotiation of the treaty. However, it seems Hammond’s assessment of the situation was incorrect, as he realized when he confided the subject of the buffer state to his friend.

In his report to Lord Grenville, Hammond recalled his effort to advocate for this important point of policy. He framed the buffer zone as a plan to “conciliate all the clashing interests of the Indians, the United States, and the King’s government of Canada, and bind them in one common system of harmony and reciprocal benefit.”
reply was terse, making it clear to Hammond that the British were not invited to participate in United States Indian policy. This proved to be the beginning of the end for Hammond’s utility as a minister. The buffer zone was never brought before Congress, as Hammond was too timid to broach the subject. His clumsiness continued as he failed to achieve subsequent political endeavors. Ineffectual at carrying out his diplomatic duties, Hammond’s only real contributions were the observations his proximity to Congress allowed him.

It fell to Simcoe to try to push the buffer zone agenda through other avenues. The British Indian Agency under the Simcoe administration was placed in the capable hands of Alexander McKee. Working tirelessly, McKee and his agents went among the tribes advocating for peace talks with the United States. All parties agreed to meet in the spring of 1793 at Lower Sandusky. At the urging of Mohawk leader Joseph Brant, the Indians requested that Simcoe be in attendance as a mediator. Hammond, however, could not get the United States to concede the point, and Simcoe was forced to bow out. Insisting on access to trusted interpreters, the confederated Indians cleared the way for McKee and his subalterns to be in attendance. Simcoe knew that this council would be the last chance to negotiate a buffer state, and the diplomatic initiative was in Native American hands.

Hammond had little hope for the diplomatic abilities of the Natives and urged Simcoe to abandon the peace. He reasoned that should the Natives achieve yet another martial victory against their twice defeated adversary, the United States would be forced into a position of compliance. Should the Natives fall short, Hammond was certain that the newly appointed American general could be goaded into firing on the posts. His clear disdain for General Anthony Wayne was evidenced in a letter to he composed to Simcoe.
In it he wrote of Wayne, “His talents however, are understood to be purely Military, and abstracted from that profession, not to be either brilliant or solid. In fact during the late War, his services were rather those of an Active partizan, than of a General possessing abilities equal to the conduct of regular and extensive operations.”

Hammond had been diplomatically overmatched throughout his tenure, and he refused to believe that any diplomacy on behalf of the Crown would be met with success. At the same time, American troops had fared remarkably poorly in the field; Hammond reasoned that British goals would only be met through strength of arms.

Hammond was not alone in his assessment. Simcoe’s trusted friend and advisor, Captain Charles Stevenson, drew similar conclusions. “You cannot conceive the terror the last victory of the Savages has spread over the country.” He penned from New York, “the Indian War must not be allowed to subside; a peace must if possible be prevented. I am aware of your answer on that subject relative to the declaration of England, but opinions without council may be circulated among the Indians.”

This message seemed to resonate with Simcoe. In his official diplomatic capacity, he continued to espouse Britain’s desire for a general peace. At the same time, his agents under McKee continued to exert their influence in the councils of the Native confederacy, and while they did not overtly foment war, neither did they advocate peace.

Change was in the air. After a decade of internal struggles, both the United States and Great Britain had begun to achieve stability. The posts had served a role at the center of a diplomatic stalemate, but their utility in this arena was quickly waning. Both sides looked to the Indian Confederacy to supplant the posts. For the United States, this meant taking an aggressive stance as they tried to force Native compliance with American
diplomatic processes. For Britain, the desired change was manifested in the idea of a neutral buffer state. If the posts must fall from British control, at least they might be kept out of American hands. Lost in these international political debates was the voice of the Indian Confederacy. As it turns out, they had their own agenda.
Chapter Three

The Rise of the Ohio Confederacy

The more knowledge the Indians aquire, the clearer they will see the impositions which has been practic’d upon them by the White people, and consequently they will be the more averse to adopting the Manners of such people in place of the customs of their Forefathers who liv’d happy, and free from strife before they became acquainted with them.

~Joseph Brant in a letter to Rev. Samuel Kirkland, March 1791\textsuperscript{72}

During the decade 1783-1793, cultural and political misunderstandings hindered diplomatic efforts between the United States, Canada, and the native peoples living in the Old Northwest. Britain and the United States both were very much mistaken about their relationships with the Indians, in different ways and for different reasons. The misunderstandings of these two imperial powers created the fertile soil in which the Ohio Indian Confederacy would take root and flourish.

For native peoples, diplomatic rituals conveyed respect and understanding. These rituals included, among other things, gift giving as a tangible sign of obligations between people as well as the use of wampum to solemnize those obligations. After Pontiac’s War, the British became more sensitive to the diplomatic rituals which the natives viewed as necessary elements of a sustained relationship. Still, British understanding was marred
by their stubborn refusal to abandon their old ideas about the internal organization of native societies. Although the British had encouraged or imposed conventional ideas of leadership and political hierarchy in colonial alliances, these concepts no longer held in postwar relations. Native hierarchical relationships, where they did exist, were not dictated by British concepts of domination, but rather by kinship networks. Deployment of Indian agents who were able to establish themselves through a genuine understanding of diplomatic ritual and other cultural outlets served to lend legitimacy to the Indian/British alliance. Canadian authorities increasingly relied on these agents, distancing themselves from the situation in their frontier provinces. Once the Canadian administration was left in the unenviable position of maintaining order in the post-revolutionary world, this disconnect manifested itself as fear and distrust of the native peoples.

The United States, on the other hand, was determined to deal with the Indians as a conquered people, even if that was not the reality of the situation. In fact, the natives of the Old Northwest who had fought in the Revolution had been successful in defending their lands from the encroachment of rebel soldiers and militia. Realizing the danger and difficulty in dealing with a large pan-Indian alliance, the United States simply contented itself with pretending that the confederacy did not exist. The Indians were eager to negotiate with the emergent nation, but the musket diplomacy of U.S. policymakers was an egregious slight to the Indian nations at large. Early treaties executed by American negotiators attempted to wrest power from the hands of the Indians by laying claim to their lands, denigrating their social status and using coercive diplomatic tactics that ran counter to native tradition. Congress viewed these actions as effectively breaking up the
Indian Confederacy, when in fact they were helping to revitalize it. As U.S. efforts to quell illegal settler immigration into Indian lands proved increasingly futile, the Ohio Confederacy engaged in acts of violent retribution. Even as General Josiah Harmar led his troops on a campaign against the Miami villages, the United States continued to act as if there was no larger pan-Indian movement to contend with. This policy of denial finally ended with the defeat of Harmar. Subsequently the United States began to consider adapting to Indian diplomatic ideals.

The Haudenosaunee, or “people of the longhouse,” had come together in a great league of peace sometime prior to European contact. Their league consisted of the Mohawk, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Seneca, and later the Tuscarora. The great league of peace put an end to internecine hostilities between these groups and provided a modicum of political structure. These six “nations” shared a common root language, Iroquois, as well as other cultural practices. Through a clan system, the member tribes were able to expand their kinship networks while buttressing the league. The clans appointed sachems to represent them as peace chiefs. The fifty sachems of the Six Nations would meet at the heart of the league, Onondaga, where the council fire burned. However, this was not truly a governing body; rather the interactions were designed to ensure a continuation of the peace.73

The Six Nations were poised in this manner when European encroachment began in the Northeast Woodlands. French traders had begun supplying nearby Algonquin-speaking people with iron, and to a lesser degree, muskets. Aside from trade goods, the Europeans brought fatal diseases and an unquenchable hunger for beaver pelts. The
Iroquois soon became locked in a bitter struggle with their neighbors over furs, trade, and captives to requicken their dead. The era of the beaver wars, 1640s to 1680s, saw the Iroquois carry out total war, genocidal in nature, against their rivals. The Huron, Petun, Montagnais, Mahican, and Erihanon were among the groups that came into conflict with the Iroquois League.  

The myth of an Iroquois empire was constructed by the English to further the scope of their land claims. In the 1670s, the Iroquois pledged allegiance to Britain through an alliance known as the Covenant Chain. Britain used this alliance to assert dominion over all lands under Iroquois control. In order to make that land grab more meaningful, they created the fiction of a vast Iroquois empire that stretched traditional tribal boundaries beyond recognition. To be fair, there was a glimmer of truth in the supposition. The Iroquois had conquered people, burned towns, and forced migrations on a large scale in the seventeenth century. The effects of Iroquois military aggression were no doubt felt throughout the region that British imperial authorities envisioned, but as a people the Iroquois did not engage in European concepts of colonial dominion.  

Many of the tribes that migrated away from Iroquois oppression found their way into the sparsely populated Ohio Valley. Here villages of Shawnee, Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, and Mingo lived in close proximity to one another and in relative harmony. Fostering resentment towards both the British and the Iroquois, these diverse tribes found capable trading partners in the French who inhabited posts in the region. When the Seven Years’ War spilled into the Ohio Valley in the 1750s, there was little doubt with whom the tribes would align. Disdain for the British was so unparalleled that
even in the face of France’s defeat, a conglomeration of tribes under the leadership of Pontiac continued the struggle.\textsuperscript{77}

The withdrawal of the French left a string of posts in British hands. These posts had served not only as trading hubs but also as cultural centers where long traditions of diplomatic ritual had been defined in a reciprocal process between myriad peoples. As such they were regarded as places of power, accessible to diverse tribes as well as Europeans; they were the focal points of “middle ground” interactions.\textsuperscript{78} The British occupiers had little regard for the relationships that had been so carefully nurtured by their predecessors. Moreover, natives viewed the British military presence as dangerous and offensive. Pontiac and his allies assaulted a number of these posts to punish the British and reclaim them in hopes that the French would return. The French did not come back. However, the message of the rebellion did not fall on deaf ears; Britain began to change its stance.

Although Pontiac’s War succeeded in tempering British haughtiness, the New World imperialists still fostered the idea of Iroquois dominance within the regions under their purview and were eager to use that myth to extend British power into the Ohio Valley. In 1768, the Treaty of Fort Stanwix saw the Iroquois cede land in Pennsylvania, Kentucky, West Virginia, and New York to Crown control. Most of these lands were well outside of the Iroquois sphere of influence and were utilized primarily by Shawnee and other migrant nations. Forced to accept the terms of a treaty between the Iroquois and British based on fictive hierarchical status which negotiated away their hunting grounds, the Shawnee internalized their anger. With the ratification of this punitive treaty, the
Ohio Indians entered into a tenuous relationship of tolerance, well short of alliance, with the British and Iroquois.\textsuperscript{79}

Even as British Indian agents kept the Crown apprised of activities in the Old Northwest, there was a marked resistance on the part of the British officials to recognize the autonomous nature of the region; they still clung to the idea of using the Iroquois to legitimize their rule. During the American Revolutionary War, the Ohio tribes aligned with Britain almost out of necessity. Colonial rebels under the leadership of such men as George Rogers Clark were constantly trying to make inroads into Native lands, and fierce fighting took place along the Kentucky and Ohio border. As the war ground on, the relationship between Great Britain and the western tribes remained ill defined, even though both were fighting a common enemy.\textsuperscript{80}

In May 1783, rumors of a peace accord between Britain and the United States began circulating around the posts. Joseph Brant (\textit{Thayendanegea}) sachem of the Six Nations Mohawk, captain in the British Army, and interpreter for the British Indian Agency, was disturbed by what he had heard. He immediately set out for Quebec to ascertain the truth from Frederick Haldimand, the governor general of Canada. At issue were the boundary lines drawn into the peace treaty, which indicated British negotiators ceded Indian lands to the rebels.\textsuperscript{81} Brant spoke on behalf of the Six Nations and demanded to know “whether those Lands which the great being above has pointed out for our ancestors & their descendants from the beginning, and where the Bones of our Forefathers are Laid is secured to them.” Haldimand, who was also in the process of ascertaining the facts, had no answers.\textsuperscript{82}
Members of Haldimand’s administration were certain that their native allies would be angry and defiant if they learned the truth. Unprepared to deal with the violent backlash they feared was coming, General Allan McLean adopted a policy of deception as a stop-gap measure while they devised a way to mitigate the damage the treaty was bound to cause. Although the second article of the Treaty of Paris clearly delineated the borders between the United States and Canada, it was easy for Haldimand’s agents to claim that no Indian lands had been ceded, but rather that the British had simply agreed to withdraw.\textsuperscript{83} While this technique would assuage the concerns of the native people for the time being, it was clear to the Canadian authorities that should the posts be handed over as agreed, their lies would become transparent. Native peoples who had fought so long in the name of Britain had been wholly ignored in the peace process, and all the lands had been divided between the imperial powers.\textsuperscript{84}

Needing to once again legitimize their position among the tribes, the British predictably looked to the Iroquois for aid. However, Brant’s chastising of Haldimand created an air of uncertainty. Brant’s influence over the Eastern tribes placed him in a unique position, and the British feared him. “I should wish that Capt. Brant might be detained in Canada for some time,” wrote General Maclean; “he is much better informed and instructed than any other Indian, he is strongly attached to the interests of his Countrymen, for which I do honor him, but he would be so much more sensible of the miserable situation in which we have left this unfortunate People, that I do believe he would do a great deal of mischief here at the time.”\textsuperscript{85} Maclean was writing from experience; he had only recently met with Captain Aron Hill (\textit{Kanonraron}) and other Six
Nations sachems, and they had shamed him into promising military aid should the United States try to encroach upon Iroquois land.86

Maclean’s false promise was symptomatic of Haldimand’s handling of the situation. British forces would not be dispatched to stand with the Iroquois against any imperial incursions, but short-term peace could be assured through these clever fictions. Once the extent of the British betrayal became clear, especially in regards to the posts, Haldimand was certain that their weak and scattered colonies in Canada would be overwhelmed by angry and vindictive natives. This reasoning forced Haldimand and his aides and agents to stall for time. Smoothing things over with ritual gifts of clothes, food, powder, shot, and rum, Canadian authorities masked their concerns and deceptions.87 This maneuvering was justified to maintain normalized relations with their tribal partners. At the same time, Haldimand hoped that the treaty would change significantly before ratification or the United States would falter. Meanwhile, Haldimand offered the Six Nations their choice of Northern territory and Brant was safely kept busy in Canada, surveying lands on which he might relocate his people; he was detained on this errand until July.88 The Eastern tribes were appeased for the time being, and the Western tribes, despite settler encroachment, were restraining their warriors.89 A tenuous peace had settled over the lands all the way from the St. Lawrence to the Wabash, but Haldimand knew councils were needed to brighten the Covenant Chain, satisfy the Indians, and ensure that hatchets would stay buried.90

Haldimand need not have worried. Native allegiance was not as fragile as he believed; the tribes understood that taking up arms against Britain would have yielded nothing except blood and a cycle of revenge. The lands in Canada had proven undesirable
and were eschewed by the majority of the native people to which they were offered. Resettlement was not a viable solution for the problem at hand. Rather, the issue was how to retain traditional territories in the face of colonial aggression; at the heart of the matter was trustworthy communication. A bond had been nurtured between the Crown and the indigenous tribes through consistent and honest treatment administered through the actions of Indian agents. These agents were no mere tools of the state; they were men with real ties to native communities. Alexander McKee was a metis, the offspring of a British father and a Shawnee mother. The Girty brothers, Simon, George, and James, had been captured as children and adopted into tribal societies. Even Brant, whose sister Molly had married agent John Johnson, worked as an interpreter for the British Indian department. Concern for the wellbeing of the native peoples was deeply personal for many of these agents, and they did not all hold the Crown in a higher estimation than the tribes they served. These relationships fostered the illusion that the British “Father” would not violate the trust that had evolved, but the Crown would need to move quickly to keep up the charade, as the United States was already sending runners to the west with news of rebel victory.

If the Iroquois were the key to legitimacy for the British, then they would need to be dealt with first. On July 17, the Six Nations met in council with their Indian agent John Johnson; gifts were exchanged and assurances were given. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix, agreed to in 1768, was inviolate. The new borders being discussed did not concern the Indians and their lands would not be contested--so they were assured. Brant, though present, remained silent. There is little doubt he was aware of the lies being told; after all, he had just returned from securing new lands for his people. By July 30, a
band of Shawnee from Chi-li-ca-thi-ki village had arrived in Detroit to seek compensation for marauding Kentuckians who had crossed into Shawnee land and stolen horses. A Shawnee chief, The Snake (Petasue), had been involved. When he and his hunters had tracked the thieves to the Ohio River, blood had been spilt on both sides. The Americans clearly did not recognize the 1768 treaty, and incursions onto Indian lands continued unabated.  

In August 1783, Governor Haldimand and his agents hastily planned a council to renew tribal obligations and fidelity to the British. Detroit was the favored location of Haldimand, and runners were sent west to call in the tribes. Pulling together so many diverse people quickly was no easy task. As word spread of the coming council some of the western tribes, citing the length of the journey, would not guarantee their participation. In order to exercise a wider influence, the fires had to be kindled further away from the British seat of power at the Wyandot village of Lower Sandusky. Brant led the Six Nations delegation, accompanied by John Johnson and a large number of Iroquois chiefs and warriors. Haldimand instructed them to work to ensure peace and secure the freedom of rebel prisoners taken during the latest war, a gesture of cooperation towards the United States. Brant seemingly had his own agenda.

A delegation of Creeks and Cherokees that had come north a few months before had remained to participate in the councils. They brought with them a war belt that had been sent to them two years earlier by the Six Nations, which they had circulated among their people and into Florida. By returning the belt, they acknowledged a common cause with the Six Nations and with their traditional allies, the Shawnee. The fortuitous timing of their tidings of friendship insured that the southern Indian nations were given a
voice in council, vastly increasing the scope of the meeting. The Shawnee and Cherokee assured the Six Nations that they were prepared to defend their country as the “Americans were encroaching upon different parts of it…declaring pretensions to it by conquest.” The language at the council was not only of peace, but of watchfulness and defense. T’Sindatton of the Lake Indians declared their tomahawks were not buried, but “are now laid close to our sides.”

When Brant spoke, he implored the tribes to unite, and in doing so, he stepped out of the role assigned to him by Haldimand.

Brothers and Nephews.

You the Hurons, Delawares, Shawanese, Mingoes, Ottawas, Chippeways, Poutteawatamies, Creeks & Cherokees. We the Six Nations with this belt bind your Hearts and minds with ours, that there may be never hereafter a separation between us, let there be Peace or War, it shall never disunite us, for our interests are alike, nor should anything ever be done but by the voice of the whole as we make but one with you.

The creation of a large pan-Indian movement would have been a terrifying prospect to the British in Canada, who were simply trying to insure security in a rapidly changing region. While carrying out Haldimand’s orders to secure peace, Brant turned the opportunity to his own purpose by injecting a strong native voice into a diplomatically muddy situation.

Peace was established for the moment and the assembled tribes agreed that American prisoners would be set free. The 1768 boundary line, the Ohio River, was again confirmed as the border of Indian land. The Indians agreed they would “give no cause of offence on our parts, and if we take up the Hatchet it would be the cause of the White People and not ours.” Brant had merged the tribes, in peacetime or in war and the new confederacy would see its share of both.
Brant had thrust the Six Nations into a central role in the formation of the Ohio Confederacy. His ability to align Iroquois interests with those of the western nations was remarkable, but old animosities did not entirely evaporate in the heat of the council fires. The Half King (Deyonquat) reminded the council that the Six Nations knew where the boundary line should be, because they had, after all, been instrumental in drawing it. His simple statement at once conjured up memories of the Iroquois empire and questioned the paradigm that was taking shape. Was this simply a new iteration of that old empire? Were the Iroquois trying to impose on the Ohio Indians a renewed sense of hierarchy, in which the fictive “elder brethren” kinship of the Six Nations still held power? If so, why unite with the Iroquois in light of the long oppressive history between the assembled nations? The answer might lie in the actions of Brant. During the Revolution, Brant had actively campaigned against George Rogers Clark in Ohio and Kentucky. He had forged relationships, achieved success, and developed a reputation as a warrior. These factors, coupled with the clear expansionist policies of the United States, created a fertile environment for unification. There was little room to doubt that American settlers were primed to flood into the Ohio Valley, and in fact, that migration had already begun.

When the Treaty of Paris was finally ratified on May 12, 1784, there were no significant changes. The United States interpreted their victory over Britain as a victory over Britain’s native allies as well. The once mighty Six Nations had split ranks during the recent war, and many bands of Oneida and Tuscarora had aligned themselves with the United States. In the aftermath, the Six Nations continued to exist, though greatly diminished as animosity weakened the loose cohesion of the past. The proximity of the Iroquois to the emergent United States created a need for a meeting between the nations
to thrash out the peace and forge bonds of friendship. The emerging nation had an opportunity to foster its existing relationships with the Iroquois, and create a Covenant Chain of their own. The United States wasted no time in bringing the tribes to the negotiating table.

In October 1784, the Six Nations discovered how the victorious Americans were going to deal with the Indians. When the Indians arrived at Fort Stanwix for the negotiations, they learned that there would be no ritual diplomacy, and no talk of a Covenant Chain. United States negotiators Oliver Wolcott, Richard Butler, and Arthur Lee ordered the seizure of six Iroquois chiefs, to be held captive until all prisoners taken in the late war were delivered up. They then proceeded to set a new boundary for Iroquoia which ceded all Six Nations claims to lands west of Pennsylvania. When the chiefs balked at the terms, they were informed: “You are mistaken in supposing that having been excluded from the United States and the King of Great Britain, you are become a free and independent nation, and may make terms as you please. It is not so. You are a subdued people; you have been overcome in war which you entered into with us, not only without provocation, but in violation of most sacred obligations.”

Captain Hill had been present, subsequently held hostage, and eventually signed the coercive treaty. He later told Brant that he and the chiefs present at the negotiations had been “closely watched and surrounded by troops,” and “could scarcely speak to a soul.” Hill and his companions believed they were attending a peace treaty and were not prepared for American demands of land cessions. The British assertions that the native peoples need not worry about United States encroachment were being proven hollow. Three months later another “peace council” was held at Fort McIntosh, and
representatives of Wyandot (Huron), Delaware, Chippewa, and Ottawa communities faced similar coercion.\textsuperscript{104} That the Americans either believed they were treating the native peoples fairly or they simply did not care is evidenced by the treatment of their former allies. The Oneida and Tuscarora, as well as the Delaware bands that had fought alongside the American soldiers in the late war, were subjected to the treaties and received the same treatment as the “conquered” nations.\textsuperscript{105}

Realizing the relative ease with which they were able to absorb Indian lands, the United States sent runners to the Shawnee towns to alert them of the coming of negotiators who wished to hold a council of peace at the mouth of the Great Miami. However, word of the Americans’ draconian tactics at Stanwix and McIntosh had spread throughout the Ohio Valley. As U.S. messengers reached Wakihomekie, the people there were prepared with a message of their own.\textsuperscript{106} “You ought to know,” they stated, “this is not the way to make a good or lasting Peace to take our Chiefs Prisoners and come with Soldiers at your backs can never tend to the general good between us.” They continued, “Your Messengers have gone through several nations but \textit{we are aware of your design to divide our councils} [emphasis added], we are unanimous, and it is not right that you kindle fires among Brush or Nettles.”\textsuperscript{107} While the British had worked to reinforce hierarchical kinship networks through which they derived their base of influence, the United States was trying to force divisions within these networks. Some Shawnee, unaware of this exchange, attended the negotiations. Predictably, the meeting resulted in another coerced treaty.

A few months after the signing of the Treaty at the mouth of the Great Miami, principal Shawnee chiefs Shade, Painted Pole (\textit{Mesquakenoe}), and Maloontha sent a
message to Governor Haldimand. In it they revealed that they had been duped into signing and were not aware of the terms until the treaty was interpreted for them by Indian agent Matthew Elliot. “We have been cheated by the Americans who are striving to work our destruction and without your assistance may be able to accomplish their ends.” The confederacy had, time and again, been circumvented by American treaty negotiations designed to cause divisions. Arthur St. Clair, governor of the Northwest Territory, was the driving force behind these negotiations. “The reason why the treaties were made separately with the Six Nations and the Wyandots, and more westerly tribes,” St. Clair happily reported to George Washington, “was, a jealousy that subsisted between them, which I was not willing to lessen, by appearing to consider them as one people….I am persuaded their general confederacy is entirely broken: indeed, it would not be very difficult…to set them at deadly variance.”

What St. Clair failed to realize was that he was not dealing with the confederacy at all, but rather with individual groups that were not representative of the larger pan-Indian movement. In fact, in a speech addressed to the Congress of the United States of America from the United Indian Nations in late 1786, the issues were clearly articulated. “All treaties carried on with the United States, on our parts, should be with the general voice of the whole confederacy, and carried on in the most open manner….We hold it indispensably necessary that any cessions of land should be made in the most public manner, and by the united voice of the confederacy; holding all partial treaties as void and of no effect [emphasis added].” The confederacy had drawn the line, the coercive treaties were not recognized, the boundary remained the Ohio River, it was non-negotiable. The United Indians offered to forgive the United States for the “mischief that
has happened” and appealed to them to “prevent your surveyors and other people from coming upon our side of the Ohio river. We have told you before, we wished to pursue just steps, and we are determined they shall appear just and reasonable in the eyes of the world.”

The diplomatic policy of the United States towards the Indians was largely based on the assumption that the treaties were in fact fair and binding. At the same time, there was debate within the government as to what the posture towards the tribes should be. In many regards, the Thirteen Fires, as the United States represented themselves, were grasping for a direction to take in a diplomatic world that was outside of their ken. There was a palpable sense that conducting business with the natives in the same manner as the British had done, and continued to do, would have been desirable, if they could only figure out how. The right of conquest which formed the basis of all the United States’ claims echoed the British imposition of the Iroquois empire. This tradition of domination through strength was begrudgingly accepted in the past but was not instrumental in Britain’s success. While the British and Iroquois were able to maintain relations through ritual diplomatic acts--gifts, wampum, honorifics, and respect for sacred spaces--the United States was unfamiliar with the nature of these acts, causing them to employ them in unseemly ways. Captain John Doughty perceived the nature of the British/Indian alliance and lobbied to enact similar policies. Doughty wrote, “One great step to be pursued should be the distribution of a few presents among them, and a constant intercourse with them by emissaries well acquainted with their language and manners.” His recommendations were not heeded.
Painfully aware that these policies were offensive in nature and created a
dangerous environment, Secretary of War Henry Knox voiced his concerns. In a letter to
President Washington he wrote:

How different would be the sensation of a philosophic mind to reflect, that,
instead of exterminating a part of the human race by our modes of population, we
had persevered, through all difficulties, and at last had imparted our knowledge of
cultivation and the arts to the aboriginals of the country, by which the source of
future life and happiness had been preserved and extended. But it has been
conceived to be impracticable to civilize the Indians of North America. This
opinion is probably more convenient than just.\textsuperscript{114}

Knox certainly did not view the current state of tribal existence as being worthy of
perpetuation. However, he at least called into question a group of policies designed to
terminate the Indians’ very existence. The foundation of American identity was at stake.
Although Knox might not have recognized it in those terms, he was aware of the stain
that might well be left on national integrity.

Regardless of Knox’s insights and the diplomatic overtures of the Ohio
Confederacy, the United States government continued to try to fracture Indian solidarity
by dealing with small unauthorized groups. Congress continued to believe they had
secured land rights and had opened territory up for settlement at the same time that the
confederated tribes denied the validity of the treaties. Settlers continued to flow down the
Ohio River, and the violence increased. In 1784, reports from Fort Pitt indicated as many
as fifty bateaux plying the Ohio River at a time.\textsuperscript{115} Israel Shreve, a surveyor, traversed the
Ohio in 1789 on his way to the founding of New Madrid in current day Missouri. He
remarked daily in his journal about the number of “kentuke” boats he saw on the river
and the massive influx of families and livestock making the journey.\textsuperscript{116} Harmar provided
a count: “from October, 1786, to May, 1787, one hundred and seventy-seven boats, two
thousand six hundred and eighty-nine souls, one thousand three hundred and thirty-three horses, seven hundred and sixty-six cattle, and one hundred and two wagons, have passed Muskingum.”¹¹⁷ The population of Kentucky had jumped from 12,000 to 73,677 in the less than a decade; incursions into Indian lands were becoming ever more frequent.¹¹⁸

As the violence centered on the river increased, it was the Shawnee, Mingo, and Miami who primarily fought back. In his report to President Washington in 1789, Henry Knox pointed out that “since the conclusion of the War with Great Britain, hostilities have almost constantly existed between the people of Kentucky and the said Indians. The injuries and murders have been so reciprocal, that it would be a point of critical investigation to know on which side they have been the greatest.”¹¹⁹ Complaints came from all quarters. As County Lieutenant Robert Johnson wrote to his boss, the governor of Virginia, “The hostile acts of the savages are so frequent in our county that it becomes troublesome to write you on every occasion.”¹²⁰ Colonel Benjamin Wilson noted, “if something more than treaties made with part of the Indian tribes, is not done shortly, it will be with difficulty the frontiers of this county can be kept from evacuating their settlements.”¹²¹ Knox received word from his joint lieutenants; “We have reason to believe there is a combination of several tribes, and their numbers pretty numerous.”¹²²

In a missive to George Washington, the Indian Confederacy addressed the persistent violence. “You desire us to call in our young men, we desire you also to call in yours, as you first proposed terms of accommodation. Our young men cannot be restrained till they see you taking steps to give up your encroachments on our lands; they are obliged to watch you in their own defence: the hostilities committed are not owing to us, but to yourselves.”¹²³ If diplomacy was to take the form of bloodshed, the
confederacy was willing to accommodate. However, they never abandoned their message of a desired peace, which they reiterated in the language of the letter, as well as the four strings of white wampum that accompanied it.

A letter dated June 1, 1789, to Congressman James Madison elucidates the nature of the troubles. As George Thompson was travelling down the river, his party came under attack by Indians using boats they had commandeered in previous skirmishes. Thompson lost two boats and several horses, property he valued at over 2,000 pounds sterling. “I declare to you that almost every day while in that country I cou’d hear of some body being massacred or taken by those inhuman Savages, and the number of horses stolen by them is incredible to relate.” Thompson was incredulous that the United States did nothing while boats were being attacked with astounding regularity on the Ohio. “America ought not to exist as a nation unless she chastises when in her power her hostile enemies and avenge the blood of her countrymen. I do believe that every nation of Indians on our borders…are either Directly or indirectly concerned in killing and plundering the inhabitants of the united States.” The frontier settlers chafed at governmental efforts to keep them from claiming land in Ohio, while at the same time decrying the lack of a United States military presence.

American troops under the command of General Josiah Harmar had established a presence in the Ohio Valley in 1784. Correspondence sent from Harmar to the president of Congress in 1785 indicates his mission in the region. “In obedience to the instructions received…I detached Ensign Armstrong, with a party of twenty men, furnished with fifteen days’ provisions…to disposess sundry persons, who had presumed to settle on the lands of the United States on the western side of the Ohio River.” Charged with
keeping squatters out of the land ceded in the treaty of Fort McIntosh, Harmer’s soldiers burned settlements down and pushed illegal immigrants out of the newly acquired territory. These efforts were designed to showcase to the native peoples the strength of the army as much as they were an effort to impose order on the would-be settlers.\textsuperscript{127} Having dispatched Captain Doughty to raze more cabins, Harmer wrote it would “convince the Indians that Congress means to protect the legal settlers on the lands ceded to them by treaty.”\textsuperscript{128} The emerging government could not afford to have individual frontiersmen set the tone for land ownership and settlement patterns; there was simply too much wealth at stake, and a lesson on power needed to be made.

As Harmar began evacuating the Ohio Valley, the settlers attempted to organize against government pressure. An advertisement from March 12, 1785, called for a series of elections to be held amongst “inhabitants of the west side of the Ohio River,” to frame a constitution for their governance. “I do certify,” the advertisement stated, “that all mankind, agreeable to every constitution formed in America, have an undoubted right to pass into every vacant country…. Congress is not empowered to forbid them.”\textsuperscript{129} The United States Army was becoming ever more acquainted with the volatile and persistent settlers. By 1786 the policy of defending the territory from white encroachment was all but abandoned.\textsuperscript{130} Amidst calls for the formation of militias in Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, it was clear that Harmar’s forces needed to turn their attention to the natives if the United States was going to restrain its populace.\textsuperscript{131} Incursions by militia, once hounded by Harmar’s men, now began to receive United States troop support, and the violence was ratcheting up quickly.
George Rogers Clark, with a company of Kentucky militia, received no challenge from federal troops as he made his way to the Wabash in order to punish the tribes there. With the warriors of many of the interior villages gone off to engage Clark, Harmar sent a detachment against the undefended Shawnee towns. United States infantry under the command of Colonel Logan burned seven towns, made prisoners of thirty women and children, and murdered Chief Maloontha. As Harmar wrote, “Melanthy, the Shawanese king, would not fly, but displayed the thirteen stripes, and held out the articles of the Miami treaty, but all in vain; he was shot down by one of the party, although he was their prisoner.” This incident illustrates the inability of the United States government to regulate even their own soldiers, making the idea of restraining state-sponsored militias an utter impossibility. It also elucidates the schizophrenic nature of an American policy that was uncertain who the enemy should be in a region they were desperate to control. The United States both insisted on the validity of the coercive treaties, while simultaneously breaking them. This method of diplomacy made no sense, and tribes who had believed they were secured in a peaceful relationship began to question their safety. Many tribes that had at one time desired peace began to look at the militant wing of the confederacy as their salvation.

Meanwhile, in the early summer of 1787, Congress made it clear to Harmar that troops were immediately required to protect surveyors. Surveyed land had to be brought into the market quickly in order to remedy the flagging economy. The Ohio Company, a wealthy group of land speculators, was eager to purchase wholesale lands from the government for later parceling. The company had already engineered a million-acre purchase for allotment to soldiers who had fought in the Revolution, and they needed the
lands surveyed before they could redeem their investment. As company man John Irwin pointed out, “the Price of Land in this Country must be Regulated according to the Nature of the Demand & I find that many Wealthy people are Disposed to become Adventurers, as soon as the first Dawn of Peace offers from the Indian World.”¹³⁵ Economic considerations explained United States actions in the Old Northwest. Whether burning out squatters or “captivating” peaceful villagers, one point remained certain: the land was needed and it would be surveyed.

With the primary threat still emanating from the Wabash, and more specifically the Miami people, a halfhearted effort was made to bring the tribes to the treaty table. The Miami had resisted all previous attempts by the United States to meet in council. Numerous delays at first confounded Arthur St. Clair, who was responsible for initiating the treaty negotiations. As the weeks wore on, St. Clair began to fear Indian duplicity and instituted delays of his own.¹³⁶ All the while he continued to petition Congress for the ability to raise troops from Virginia and Pennsylvania should an ‘inevitable’ general war break out.¹³⁷ Finally he sent an emissary, Antoine Gamelin, to the Wabash tribes to carry wampum and good tidings. Gamelin’s journey yielded no results and in fact seems to have caused the confederacy to close ranks.

Upon arrival in Vermilion, the Kickapoo detained Gamelin and sent word to the Wea of his presence. From the town of Quitepicconnae came the response that they awaited his arrival. “They said they expected of me,” wrote Gamelin, “some powder and ball for the young men for hunting, and to get some good broth for their women and children; that I should know a bearer of speeches should never be with empty hands.”¹³⁸ The United States still had much to learn about frontier diplomacy. While the Wea and
Kickapoo nations were receptive to Gamelin’s overtures, he met resistance upon reaching the Miami towns. Here Shawnee Chief Blue Jacket (Weyapiersenwah) informed him that “we cannot give an answer without hearing from our father, at Detroit, and we are determined to give you back the two branches of wampum, and to send you to Detroit to see and hear the chief.” Gamelin was in no position to deal with the British at Detroit, so he politely declined and began his journey home. Word of his councils with the Miami and Shawnee raced ahead of him, and he found the Kickapoo waiting to return to him the wampum they had previously accepted. The confederacy would speak with one voice.139

Gamelin’s failure can be viewed as a direct result of the inability of the United States to adapt to diplomatic ritual. Use of wampum strings had become traditional in councils to give weight to a speakers’ words; Gamelin was offering wampum in terms of a gift. The ritual of gift giving tended towards utilitarian items for the survival of the tribe as a whole, as Gamelin was reminded. Further, rather than preparing his way and requesting councils, Gamelin simply moved from one place to the next with little regard for the internal dynamics of the Native confederacy. Had he understood and conformed to accepted diplomatic ritual behavior, he might at least have left a positive impression and room for future discourse. Instead he was escorted out of their territory, respectfully, and the confederated nations closed ranks.

Gamelin’s diplomatic failure served as the pretense to finally wage an assault on the Miami villages. The message was clear: participate in the prescribed diplomacy or face war. On September 30, 1790, Harmar and his men campaigned north to assault the unfriendly Wabash towns. In the end, the general lost around two hundred men and failed to quell the frontier violence. It is peculiar that Harmar’s march against the Miami
villages and subsequent rout has become mythologized in American history. St. Clair did not even recognize it as a defeat; in a letter to Knox, he insisted that Harmar’s forces should have remained at the Wabash and constructed a fort.\textsuperscript{140} On September 7, 1791, Harmar solicited a court of inquiry to look into the circumstances of his campaign.\textsuperscript{141} While admonished of any wrongdoing, the failure of Harmer’s operation required an explanation. The confederacy, if it ever existed, was believed to be in tatters. The enemy was perceived as weak and disorganized. Such an inauspicious beginning to United States military ambitions was difficult to fathom. According to the interpretation of most historians, Harmar’s troops were unruly militia, green, and quick to flee at the first sign of trouble; the blame was placed upon them.\textsuperscript{142} In fact, it is true that the militia had balked during one battle, in which they were surprised and fled rather than fight. It was the next encounter, however, when Harmar’s forces suffered their greatest losses. About that engagement Harmar wrote

\begin{quote}
The General is exceedingly pleased with the behavior of the militia in the action of this morning. They have laid very many of the enemy dead upon the spot. Although our loss is great, still it is inconsiderable in comparison of the slaughter made amongst the savages. Every account agrees that upwards of one hundred warriors fell in the battle; it is not more than man for man, and we can afford them two for one. The resolution, and firm determined conduct of the militia this morning, has effectually retrieved their character, in the opinion of the General. He now knows they can and will fight.\textsuperscript{143}
\end{quote}

Harmar’s war of attrition was not perceived as a victory, either by Henry Knox or by the Ohio Confederacy. The successful native resistance was viewed by both as a win for the Miami and their allies.

The effects of Harmar’s debacle had serious repercussions for the diplomatic actions of all those involved. The Crown, realizing the relative weakness of the United States, appointed John Graves Simcoe to govern the new province of Upper Canada. He
was decidedly anti-rebel and pro-Indian. This indicates a turning point in the expectations Britain fostered in regard to pushing the United States out of the Old Northwest and embracing the fighting spirit of the confederacy.

Harmar’s expedition had succeeded in burning approximately 300 houses and 20,000 bushels of corn, causing the affected Wabash tribes to consider relocation. Shawnee Chief Captain Johnny had established a town close to the main theatre of action, along the banks of the Auglaize River, and he was soon joined by the dislocated tribes. Arrayed over several miles, the seven villages that made up “the Glaize” were large, militaristic, polyglot communities. This would become the seat of the confederacy, and the launching point of further skirmishes against soldiers and settlers. Blue Jacket, The Snake, and Captain Johnny maintained Shawnee towns while Buckongahelas and Big Cat (Kelelamand) fostered the Delaware communities and Little Turtle (Michikinikwa) headed the Miami settlement. Interspersed among the towns were a variety of Mohawk, Cayuga, Seneca, Nanticokes, Chicamauga Cherokee, Conoys, metis, and Europeans.  

Within the Glaize a trader’s town had been established where approximately fifty Europeans and metis plied their trades to one another and the surrounding towns. The settlement included a French bakery, a silversmith, and the stores of prominent Indian department traders including Alexander McKee, Matthew Elliot, and James Girty. Captives taken during the course of violent raiding tended to be taken to the Glaize, and eventually to trader’s town, as they worked to secure their freedom. The Indian Confederacy, in response to the actions and policies of the United States, was growing rather than shrinking; they were well supplied and had a clear sense of purpose. The
stubborn belief on the part of the United States that the natives were disorganized was about to be shattered.

The failure of Harmar required the United States to begin mustering a new army to send against the unruly tribes. The new campaign would be led by General Arthur St. Clair himself. As Major Ebenezer Denny recorded in his journal, “General Harmar seems determined to quit the service; has positively refused going on the campaign, and takes no command.” Harmar had learned a hard lesson in the field and predicted that St. Clair would suffer similar lessons as well. Harmar was prescient; the entire campaign was terribly organized and ended in a humiliating rout.

St. Clair had the authority to draft a force of four thousand militia, levies, and regular troops. However, finding willing soldiers proved a bit more of a problem for the general than he had anticipated. Delays in mustering troops meant that it would be October before they would be on the march. St. Clair was very ill, suffering from gout, and his army made poor time, often moving as little as four miles in a day. These factors are commonly referred to in examinations of St. Clair’s defeat. However, by the end of the month things began looking more promising. St. Clair reported to Knox that he had recovered from his illness, and he expected a wagonload of provisions to catch up with the army shortly. Four days later, Indians assaulted St. Clair’s forces in the early morning darkness. It was a bloodbath, as the Indian Confederacy acting under Miami chief Little Turtle relentlessly attacked for more than three hours before St. Clair ordered a retreat. The retreat turned into a rout as soldiers dropped their heavy arms and ammunitions in order to flee more quickly.
Once again, the United States forces suffered defeat; this time it was overwhelming. Because of desertion in the ranks prior to the fighting, it is difficult to enumerate the casualties. St. Clair’s forces likely numbered around two thousand on the morning of the attack, with approximately half killed or wounded. It is estimated that the confederacy suffered twenty-one killed and around twice that wounded.\(^\text{149}\) Casting about for explanations, Knox later informed St. Clair that he might have been up against as many as twenty-five hundred Indians, so vastly outnumbered, he should thus feel no shame in his loss. General John Armstrong, renowned authority on Indian warfare, had a different opinion.\(^\text{150}\) It was poor generalship in the face of hostility—a bad battle plan—that Armstrong blamed for the defeat. Describing the native forces as invisible in comparison to the amassed army, he stated, “five hundred Indians were fully sufficient to do us all the injury we have sustained, nor can I conceive them to have been many more.”\(^\text{151}\) Unsatisfied, St. Clair pointed the finger, predictably, at the militia whom he accused of failing to carry out prompt orders, imploring them to learn obedience before they would deign to take the field again.\(^\text{152}\) It was Armstrong alone who understood the deeper implications of the encounter.

Shall we lay all the blame of this heavy misfortune to the score of natural causes, and our half surprised and mangled army? No, verily; for, if we do, the last error will be greater than the first. No, sir; the people at large, in behalf of whom the action was brought on, are more essentially to blame, and lost the battle. An infatuating security seemed to pervade the minds of all men amongst us. We pondered not sufficiently the nature and importance of the object.\(^\text{153}\)

It was time to recognize the legitimacy of the Indian Confederacy and begin to understand how to deal with them.
Chapter Four

The Failure of Diplomacy

As the Americans now seem earnestly inclined for a peace, I would recommend to my friends, to keep the Young Men within bounds, and restrain them from going to war, until the Treaty takes place, and if the Americans will not listen to reason, and conduct the business in an open and fair manner, then let the Whole Confederacy break in upon them.

~ Joseph Brant in a letter to Alexander McKee, March 1793

The United States’ military incursions into the Ohio River Valley exposed a fundamental issue which had been plaguing the Indian Confederacy. A rift was growing between the eastern and western tribes, between the factions working towards peaceful diplomacy and the factions forced to defend their lands with blood. Their success in the field propelled the warriors of the Shawnee, Miami, and Delaware into a leadership role in their communities. Elders stepped aside as the young men who answered violence with violence adopted a vocal presence around the council fires. Long-held traditions of intertribal etiquette became strained as suspicions bordering on animosity drove a wedge between the confederated allies.

These strained interactions were linked irrevocably with attitudes towards the United States. The brutal tactics carried out by soldiers and militia against sparsely defended villages and encampments diminished opportunities for cooperation. The
United States reached out in an attempt to engage the Indian Confederacy in terms that reflected an evolved understanding of diplomatic processes. However, efforts on the part of U.S. negotiators revealed that this new understanding was not only limited but had arrived too late. The confederacy itself had begun to reconfigure its policies regarding American diplomacy. This new behavior on the part of the allied Indians was designed to ensure that their best interests would be represented going forward. However, the United States was not able to understand the fluid nature of Indian politics and continued to misread the situation on the ground.

In this tumultuous new paradigm, the British in Canada were a comfortable and familiar ally to the confederacy. Indian agents were welcomed into native communities and became valuable interpreters around the council fires. The disposition of the Indian allies and their increasingly bellicose posturing filtered back to Upper Canada and informed British policy decisions. Recognizing the possibility that the Indian Confederacy might once again take the American army to task, elements within the Canadian government used their influence to foment further unrest. It was a policy that, once broached, could not easily be reined in.

In the aftermath of St. Clair’s defeat, the United States appealed to Joseph Brant to join a delegation of Iroquois chiefs on their way to Philadelphia to speak with President Washington. The initial letter from Col. Pickering was rebuffed by Brant, who claimed the invitation was too vague, the United States’ intentions unclear. In response, American officials persuaded Brant’s old friend the Reverend Samuel Kirkland to travel to Genesee to meet with chiefs of the Six Nations and accompany them to Philadelphia.
While in Genesee, he was instructed to post a letter to Brant requesting his company on the trip and assuring him of safety and good intentions; once again Brant declined. Baffled by Brant’s disposition, Knox wrote him in February 1792. In his letter, Knox explicitly stated the intentions of the United States in requesting his presence.

The United States did not want to continue the war, according to Knox; in fact, they never meant to enter into it. The current hostilities were not, Brant was assured, “for the purpose of accumulating more land than has been ceded by the treaty with the Indians, since the Peace with Great Britain.” This marked a departure from previous Indian policy, which was based on the notion of right of conquest. Whereas the United States had loudly proclaimed their right of soil all the way to the Mississippi, now they were tempering their language. This shift, Knox assured Brant, was not the result of failed military incursions; rather, it was a demonstration of humanity on the part of a government that did not wish to see the utter destruction of the Indians.

Clearly the United States viewed Brant as important and influential, and they courted him as such. Even as Knox tried to lure Brant to Philadelphia, a delegation of fifty Iroquois chiefs had already agreed to make the journey. Without Brant’s presence, the assembled chiefs offered no real conduit to the western tribes. However, Knox and Washington seem to have misjudged Brant’s position within the fluid dynamics of the confederacy. The balance of power was shifting among the allied Indians. Shortly after the defeat of St. Clair, Brant received a message from the west.

You chief Mohawk! What are you doing? Time was when you roused us to war, and told us that, if all the Indians would join with the King, they should be a happy people, and become independent. In a very short time, you changed your voice, and went to sleep, and left us in the lurch. You Mohawk chief! You have ruined us, and you shall share with us. Know it is not good for you to lie still any longer. Arise, and bestir yourself.
Brant and his warriors had been conspicuously absent in the recent battles. The old animosities harbored by the Shawnee and others had never gone away, and now they were beginning to resurface. It was not the ideal time for Brant to be entertaining thoughts of meeting with the enemy.

However, the tenor of Knox’s letter convinced Brant that a peace might be achieved. He responded to Knox that he would not endeavor to go to Philadelphia without first consulting his western brethren, thereby assuring that he was in a position to negotiate. This tactic served the dual purpose of separating him from the Six Nation chiefs who were making the journey, while simultaneously trying to mend his fraying relationship in the west. He immediately wrote to Alexander McKee explaining the situation and expressing his concern. “Disaffection seems to be gaining ground amongst our Western friends,” he wrote; “this I hope has stopped ere this & that Unanimity again prevails without which, all of our exertions will prove nought.”

It is not clear what response Brant received from the Glaize, but in early June he set off for Philadelphia. While there he did not enter into any binding negotiations but rather listened to United States proposals. Through a series of six points, Knox expressed to Brant the position the government was prepared to adopt in regards to the Indian Confederacy. The United States would bury the hatchet. They would not encroach on Indian lands. They would recognize the borders as laid out in the 1789 Treaty of Muskingum. If any Indians had just claims outside of their borders, they would be compensated. Any such compensation would recur annually and be in the form of goods that would comfort a family. Finally, the United States would teach the Indians to farm and raise cattle “as white people do.”
All of these promises were couched in the language of diplomacy. Knox recognized native interest in the soil; here again was a policy shift. The movement from U.S. right of conquest to native interest in the soil was a step in the right direction. As for the Muskingum boundary line, Brant was aware that would be a point of contention within the confederacy, since some still held fast to the Ohio River border of 1768. This rendered the points about compensation and annuities irrelevant. As to farming, Brant knew his compatriots had no desire to acculturate to the ways of the whites; they had resisted it for over a century. The United States wanted a treaty negotiation to be held and proposed that Brant should carry their terms to the confederacy and work to arrange a council. Despite the weakness of the terms, Brant agreed in the interest of forging a peace.\(^{161}\)

Brant was not the only Iroquois chief who had agreed to carry the Americans’ message to the west. Cornplanter (Kaintwakon), Red Jacket (Segoyewatha), Farmers Brother (Honayawas), and a retinue of warriors and chiefs carried speeches from the United States to a Grand Council at the Glaize in the autumn of 1792. Brant was not in attendance. Historians have widely attributed his absence to illness, for Brant suffered from an unknown malady that struck him several times in his life and rendered him incapable of travel.\(^{162}\) However, Moravian missionary David Zeisberger noted in his journal entry of September 29 that “at noon came the Mohawk, Brant, with some forty men of his people, through here on his way to the Miami.”\(^{163}\) It took Brant twelve more days to reach the Glaize, and by that time the council fire had already been extinguished.

While illness may well account for Brant’s absence, other factors must be considered as well. On his trip to Philadelphia, Brant had been the victim of an
assassination attempt—vengeance for Revolutionary War activity in the Mohawk Valley.\textsuperscript{164} His meeting with the Americans, he feared, would provoke the anger of his western allies. Upon arriving home in Canada after his U.S. mission, Brant wrote to Alexander McKee asking if his safety would be compromised by attending the council, and he refused to set out until he had been assured.\textsuperscript{165} Uncertainty about his reputation among the assembled tribes caused him to hesitate; he was losing his diplomatic stature in the very confederacy that he had been instrumental in creating. Additionally, Brant had cultivated an antagonistic relationship with Cornplanter and Red Jacket. Allowing them to broach first the unpopular subject of American peace terms might have been a deliberate act.

Red Jacket was renowned as being the greatest orator among the Seneca, and perhaps throughout all of Iroquoia.\textsuperscript{166} He was also reputed to be a coward, and at some point, he had earned the derogatory name Cow Killer. Stories differ as to how he earned the moniker: either he smeared cow blood on his face and claimed to have killed a soldier, or he stayed at home during a battle and killed another warrior’s cow to feed his family.\textsuperscript{167} Ever at odds, Brant and Red Jacket had clashed over council fires during the American Revolution, since Brant was a brash warrior and Red Jacket was more inclined to peace.\textsuperscript{168} While Brant tried to bring the whole of the Six Nations into the British sphere, Red Jacket aligned himself with the Americans. It was Red Jacket who represented the American cause at the Glaize in September and October 1792, and it must have galled Brant to share a common goal with his longtime rival.

The process of calling the diverse tribes of the confederacy to council was a daunting task. Shawnee chief Blue Jacket had circulated a pipe among the villages, and
envoys were sent in return with speeches. These speeches were recorded in a tangible way, with wampum. Ritual use of wampum in diplomacy followed two forms; embodied in strings and belts. Strings of wampum, sometimes referred to as strands or branches were used to punctuate salient points in a speech. Wampum used in this context was black and white. The use of the colors added a dimension to the words of the speaker. Black wampum was associated with warfare or negative connotations, while white wampum represented peace. The most frequent use was an intermingling of the two colors, likely representing a balanced view. There was the further aspect of enumeration, as strings were seldom presented alone. This seems most often to represent a string from each band spoken for, though more prominent bands within a coalition might offer a greater amount of wampum than their counterparts.¹⁶⁹

Wampum belts provided a more concise record. Laboriously constructed, wampum belts were designed to hold a message to be transmitted from one place to another. The message was in the wampum, not in the speaker. Thus belts could be circulated far and wide to convey a single message to all who would hear it. Further, these belts remained as readable records, promises of alliance and war, trade and negotiation. A belt carried a sense of permanence and obligation. Wampum belts of the Indians served as the analog to the written documents of the imperial powers. These were the speeches that were carried to council. This was the ritual of negotiation made tangible.¹⁷⁰

Diplomatic relations within the confederacy were in a fragile state when the council fires were kindled. Alexander McKee was present and recorded the proceedings. Before anyone spoke, Shawnee and Miami chiefs presented the calumet, a sacred pipe,
first to the Senecas, and then to the other assembled chiefs. The ceremonial ritual had many purposes; it was primarily used to promote trade relations and to cement wartime alliances. But at the Glaize in 1792, it signified renewed friendship. The Seneca might have been offered the pipe first for a number of reasons. As members of the Six Nations, they still maintained a hierarchical position among the gathered tribes. More likely, fictive kinship networks traditionally viewed eastern tribes as being elder brethren, and as such they would be treated with greater respect. Further, it might have been intended to ease their minds, as there was clearly some open tension between the developing factions. Whatever the cause, or combination of causes, McKee realized the importance of the act and made note of it.

Shawnee chief Painted Pole was the first to speak, making it clear that the western tribes were displeased with the Six Nations. Chiding them for not coming west sooner, he reminded them of their last meeting and the promises entered into: “It was unanimously agreed upon by all Nations to be strong and to defend our country,” he stated, “but we have not seen you since that time; We suppose you have been constantly trying to do us some good, and that was the reason of your not coming sooner to join us.” The elder brethren of the Six Nations were being publicly shamed, and it was being done in front of a diverse group of people. McKee recorded the presence at the council of no less than twenty disparate groups. Perhaps Brant had divined this outcome when he delayed his journey. Councils customarily encompassed several days as there was a good deal of thinking and reflecting on the words that were spoken. So it was at the Glaize, and the first day ended with the Iroquois ruminating on the thought that they had not served the confederacy well.
When Red Jacket returned to the council fire two days later, he had spent a good deal of time thinking about the words that had been spoken. He confirmed that the Seneca had come to renew the ancient friendship and expressed his pleasure that so many tribes had been assembled. Then he addressed all the nations.

Brothers:
You were very fortunate that the great Spirit above was so kind as to assist you to throw the Americans twice on their back when they came against your villages, your women and children. Now Brothers, we know that the Americans have held out their hands to offer you peace. Don’t be too proud Spirited and reject it, the great Spirit should be angry with you, but let us go in the best manner we can and make peace with them.

*A Black & White String*
Now Counsellors and Warriors—you have heared what I had to say I hope you will attend to it. Your Warriors were lately in the front, but I hope to see the Counsellors there and they together consulting which is the best means of making peace for the advantage of ourselves our women and children.

*Black & White Belt* \(^{175}\)

Invoking the Great Spirit served as a reminder that there were other factors which tied the tribes to one another. Cochenewaga, chief of the Seven Nations, replied that they had been invited to come with their counselors at their warriors’ backs, and had done so. It seemed war, not peace, was ever the driving force behind the council.

The following day, Painted Pole addressed the Seneca delegation. His tone was accusatory, and he spoke on a black and white string.

*Now Brother of the Six Nations, what you said to us yesterday, was nothing to the purpose for which you were sent to this Council fire. The Road which our forefathers made into your Country is plain and wide. I can see what you are about from this place….Brothers of the Six Nations, all the different Nations here now desire you to speak from your Heart and not from your Mouth and tell them what that bundle was which you had under your Arm when you came here. We know what you are about—we see you plainly. \(^{176}\)*

He culminated his speech by throwing the string of wampum on which he had been speaking at Red Jacket’s feet. The action of throwing wampum deviated from ritual norms. The peace chief was not pleased with this treatment. “You have talked to us a
little too roughly,’’ he protested, “you have thrown us on our backs.” The language Red
Jacket used indicates he felt betrayed, possibly ambushed; the Iroquois delegation
withdrew from the council fire to discuss the infraction. An hour later the Seneca
provided the council with the bundle from “under their arm”--the speeches of the United
States and the Muskingum boundary proposal.

Scholarly examinations of fracturing within larger pan-Indian movements have
generally revealed recurrent fault lines: nativist or traditional factions against
accommodationist attitudes. Gregory Evans Dowd, in A Spirited Resistance, offered the
first thorough exploration of this dichotomy. Though the dynamics that exist within each
pan-Indian movement are unique to that moment, and the internal divisions are the
product of complex interaction, distilled down to their essence, they tend to break
between war and peace. Red Jacket and his Seneca delegation had come to realize at the
Glaize that whatever elements of peace and accommodation remained in these western
tribes, the warriors had stepped to the front and were in control of the confederacy. The
lines had been drawn.

Several more days passed in council. Red Jacket and the other Iroquois chiefs
were chastised continually for their failure to come to the aid of the confederacy in
wartime, and for their relationship with the United States. Peace seemed ever more
unlikely as the war dance was performed around the council fire. Painted Pole revealed to
Red Jacket that they had secured the orders of Arthur St. Clair during the last
engagement, and they were aware that the Americans desired to build a fort on the
Miami.177 While they would not be lulled into a false peace, they were also not so
stubborn as to eschew U.S. offers of negotiation. However, it would need to be on terms
set by the confederacy. “You tell us Washington says he can easily remove the Forts, if they give us uneasiness. Now Brothers, if the Americans want to make peace with us, let them destroy these forts and we will meet with them next Spring at lower Sandusky, where all the parties who formerly settled the Boundary line must be present.”

The confederacy had met the Americans twice, but never at a council fire. While confident in the martial prowess of the allied Indians, Painted Pole was less certain that they were prepared to spar with them diplomatically. Just as the U.S. negotiators would not be able to read the wampum, so the Indians would have issues with the written documents. Painted Pole looked to McKee and instructed him to ask their father, the king, for a copy of the 1768 Treaty of Fort Stanwix. A large white belt was prepared to be delivered to Simcoe, as the governor of the king’s domain. Many words were spoken on the belt. The western tribes had not met Simcoe and used this belt as a greeting. Beyond that they used it to tie him to their cause. “At this Council fire which is in the center of our Country, is placed the Heart of the Indian Confederacy to which we have always considered our Father to be joined.” Invoking the sacred characteristic of the place from which they spoke added weight to the words. This was the fire that burned at the heart; there was no greater seat of power in the confederacy.

Simcoe received McKee’s report on the council proceedings and was pleased. The confederacy had requested his presence at the impending negotiations with the Americans and had asked him to provision the meeting. British interests in creating the buffer zone had heretofore been thwarted by the timidity of Hammond. Now Simcoe envisioned a council at which he could press the issue with a native army at his back. The act of provisioning the council was significant as well, since it was the fulfillment of the
paternalistic role in which the British viewed themselves. The role of provisioner reinforced the hierarchy that had long been established. If the king was the father, then the Indians and Americans were brothers. For the confederacy it was practical. Warfare and councils had distracted them from their normal subsistence patterns, the Wyandots of Lower Sandusky would not be able to provide for the large impending council.\footnote{181}

The Six Nations held a council at Buffalo Creek on November 17 to acquaint all of their chiefs with the events at the Glaize. Here they reconfirmed the desire to have Simcoe present at the council scheduled to take place in the spring. Present at the council was George Chapin, son of Israel Chapin, the superintendent of Indian affairs for the United States. Chapin was excited by the prospect of a peace council and promised, “I shall send on an Express directly to the Board of War with exact minutes of your proceedings, indeed I shall most probably go myself.”\footnote{182} For his part, Simcoe sent a dispatch to Hammond relating to him all that had passed and asking him to pave the way for Simcoe’s presence at the council.

Not one to learn from his missteps, Hammond eagerly accosted Hamilton on the subject. Though Chapin had hurried to Philadelphia ten days earlier, Hamilton claimed no knowledge of the previous councils at the Glaize and Buffalo Creek. Hammond proceeded to enlighten Hamilton as to the desire of the confederacy to hold a council which would include the United States and Great Britain, pertaining to the drawing of boundaries and the pursuit of peace. Once again, Hammond framed his conversation as unofficial, just a sharing of information between friends. Hamilton replied much as he had when confronted with the buffer state. He saw no instance in which the United States would subject itself to British mediation in Indian affairs. “Such a proceeding,” Hamilton
said, “would diminish the importance of the United States in the estimation of the Indians….He was proceeding to add other observations of a similar tendency,” penned Hammond, “but I terminated the conversation.” Hammond was more interested in preserving the loftiness of his station than he was in actually carrying out his duties. He did not broach the subject again, although he did learn “indirectly” that the Americans would not sway on this point. They were undoubtedly aware of the position Simcoe was trying to maneuver them into, and they would not let that happen.

In fact Knox attempted to exert further American control over the proceedings in his response to the western tribes. “The United States will endeavor to furnish by the way of Canada and the Lakes, a full supply of provisions during the Treaty.” The paternal nature of providing the goods during the negotiation was not lost on the Americans. While they attempted to usurp the right to furnish provisions, they were not logistically able to deliver without the cooperation of Britain. Whether Knox believed that Britain would concede the right or not, by putting forth the offer he was insinuating that the United States was establishing a new hierarchy. Simcoe predictably intervened and proved intractable in aiding the Americans in their attempts to “victual” the Indians.

Provisions, however, were not the only problems the Americans faced. Efforts to conform to diplomatic rituals were proving difficult for the United States. Tasked with securing the wampum for the negotiation, peace commissioner Benjamin Lincoln was surprised to find a lack of supply. Writing to Major Craig, commanding at Pittsburgh, Lincoln revealed, “We have been disappointed in our applications at New York and Albany for white wampum. Eighty thousand is the quantity we should choose to take with us.” Adding to the paucity of white wampum was the scarcity of interpreters.
William Wilson had consented to accompany the commissioners and was valued for his grasp of the Delaware language. While he had agreed to come, he was nowhere to be found, and further efforts to contact him had proven futile. Further, the commissioners had been wholly unable to secure a Shawnee interpreter despite their efforts. Lincoln appealed to Craig to help their cause as his knowledge of the region would enable him to point out the “most suitable persons.” On the eve of negotiations, the United States had no access to the white wampum of peace, and they were scurrying to find people they could trust to bridge the all-important language gap. It was shaping up to be an inauspicious beginning, when the Indians instituted a delay of their own.

With the spring of 1793 quickly approaching, the principal chiefs at the Glaize sent runners to Iroquoia. “We have resolved on holding a Council at our Council Fire at the foot of the Miamis Rapids,” the runners spoke on black and white strings, “before We go to meet the commissioners of the United States at Sandusky, that We may be well prepared and all of one mind.” At this section of the Maumee River, also known as the Miami of the Lake, the rapids are fast moving and shallow. As a frequent locale for important meetings, they must have been considered a sacred space. Permanent council fires represented areas of unique significance, and while no village was present there, it had long been a point of reference on the river. Pontiac had sought refuge in the area after the siege of Detroit. Alexander McKee kept his store of Indian department goods in the vicinity. In 1813, Fort Meigs was built on a hill overlooking the rapids. In 1793 it was the location selected to host the Grand Council to ensure the confederacy would be of one mind when they met the American negotiators.
This coming together in preparation for dealing with the Americans reveals another fluid aspect of native diplomacy. As far as the Americans were concerned, this was highly irregular behavior. The notion that the Indians needed to reach a consensus among themselves appears never to have occurred to the commissioners. As the scattered tribes reached the council at the rapids, Simcoe and McKee frustrated efforts by the Americans to attend the meeting, or at the very least send their interpreters. In fact, this policy of a private council prior to dealing with the Americans was not new. The same situation had presented itself to St. Clair during his halfhearted efforts to bring the Wabash tribes to the treaty table. The amassing of warriors at that time had caused St. Clair to balk and call the negotiations off. Now, similar fears emerged among the waiting Americans in 1793. “Various accounts of intelligent Persons,” according to the Moravian missionary John Heckewelder, indicated that if the commissioners did not agree to all Indian terms, “they and all with them may be knocked in the head.” The lessons learned from early treaty negotiations had prompted a shift in Indian diplomatic procedures.

Brant was the first to arrive at the rapids on May 22. He was surprised at the absence of his western allies and dispatched runners to call in the tribes. As he wrote in his journal on June 3, one of runners returned and revealed to Brant that “many evil Reports were circulated against me by the Shawanoes, Saying I was a Traitor, & that I only came there to receive Money and that they would have nothing to do with me.” The war faction, it seems, had not relinquished control in the months since the last council. Brant was facing a hostile confederacy, much as Red Jacket had before him. However, Red Jacket had a reputation as a man of peace and, as such, was given
assurances of friendship mixed with derision. Brant had been a war chief, he had initiated the alliance, and he had advocated fidelity towards Britain. Now he moved about the eastern country holding councils with the Americans and talking about peace. Assurances of friendship were not guaranteed.

“I must here remark,” wrote Brant, “that it has always been an invariable rule amongst Indians when they meet, to go through the Ceremony of Condolence and to Welcome Strangers, to their Country or Fire Place.” This was not the case as the war faction began to arrive at the rapids. In order to smooth things over, Brant took it upon himself, and “with a large Belt” he removed “impediments in the way of Public Business—this they Should have done.” Long-held traditions, rituals, and ceremonies were being tested. At the same time the diplomatic relationship with the British seems to have remained relatively static. British paternalism was still the accepted arrangement. The fluid dynamic of Indian diplomacy appears to have been restricted to areas where American influence entered into the Native sphere. With these changing policies must have come some uncertainty on all sides as to how the coming negotiations would unfold.

Brant’s adherence to the rituals produced the desired effect. The council was opened, and the way was clear for discussion. The object at hand was clear. This was going to be the most important negotiation ever held with the Americans. It was no secret that the boundary was at the center of dispute. While the American commissioners would certainly push for the Muskingum boundary, the confederacy would demand the Ohio River. Brant knew that the Americans would not give up the lands east of the Muskingum, because they had already been sold and settled. His only hope was to appeal to the counselors among them to take advantage of the opportunity for peace, “which if
you suffer now to escape may not offer again.” However, Brant’s words held little weight with the warriors, and private councils were held at night between the Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee. Public business came to a halt, and the Six Nations were excluded from these private councils for the waning half of June.

Alexander McKee had not been excluded from councils, and at the beginning of July he approached Brant. The American commissioners were at Niagara, guests of Simcoe, waiting to hear from the confederacy. The confederacy agreed to send a deputation to meet the commissioners and determine whether they had the authority to negotiate the boundaries. Brant was a part of the deputation, which met with some confusion. The initial meeting was marked by uncertainty among the Indian deputies as to who should speak, and what should be said. The confusion was overcome, and over the course of several days, the deputies met with the American commissioners, to everyone’s apparent satisfaction. Upon returning to the rapids on July 21, Brant recounted the meetings to the general council. The interaction he recorded in his journal is indicative of the tension that was still rife within the confederacy.

Brant began by explaining the initial confusion “I then made an apology and told the Confederacy that the Deputies went off in a hurry and did not act according to our Ancient Customs;” he wrote, “they ought to have been prepared in what they had to say before they left.” At this, the Delaware chief Buckongehalis interrupted Brant’s speech, claiming that it had all been settled before they left, they had known what to say. Brant had derided the brash war chiefs for neglecting ancient custom. Buckongehalis responded by further breaking with custom, interrupting Brant’s speech and accusing him of deception. This proved too much; the schism in the confederacy had been laid bare for all
to see. Chiefs of the Ottawas, Potawatomies, and Chippewas, collectively referred to by Brant as the Lake tribes, all rose to Brant’s defense. While they might not have been willing to speak out for a peaceful resolution with the Americans, the flouting of solemn traditions was enough to trigger a decisive response.

As the tumult subsided, Brant went on to explain the results of their endeavors. The deputation had met again with the commissioners on July 7. This time Brant had addressed them. The confederacy wanted an explanation for the presence of a United States army that scouts had reported moving into the Ohio Valley. They also wanted verification that the commissioners were authorized to negotiate boundaries. As to the first point, the Americans assured the assembled Indians that President Washington had forbidden any hostilities until the outcome of the Sandusky council was known. Addressing the second point, the commissioners gave assurances that they possessed the power to negotiate boundaries. “Where this line should run, will be the great subject of discussion at the treaty between you and us,” they stated, though “doubtless some concessions must be made on both sides.”198

Talk of concessions did not sit well with the confederacy, and Shawnee chief Captain Johnny proposed the drafting of a letter to the commissioners. It was agreed, and the western tribes once again held private councils, excluding Brant and the Six Nations. The letter they drafted, with the aid of McKee’s subaltern Captain Selby, was circulated for the chiefs to sign. Brant refused. In essence the letter stated that the deputies had not been clear during the previous meeting. The confederacy wanted to know if the commissioners were prepared to recognize the Ohio River boundary and remove all
Americans from north of the line. Surprised by this sudden turn of events, the commissioners delivered their response the following day.

The Ohio River could never be the boundary; it was far too late for that. “You are men of understanding,” they wrote, “and if you consider the customs of white people, the great expenses which attend their settling in a new country, the nature of their improvements, in building houses, and barns...how valuable the lands are thus rendered, and thence how dear they are to them you will see that it is now impracticable to remove our people from the northern side of the Ohio.”

The concessions the Americans had in mind were clearly spelled out. The Indians must relinquish their rights to the lands in question. In return, the commissioners were prepared to pay them the largest sum of money ever paid to any tribes. Further, the confederacy was assured an annuity to compensate for lost hunting grounds. Finally, the United States was willing to officially relinquish their claims to right of conquest and acknowledge Indian right of soil.

Having heard the answer, Brant and the Six Nations decided that the time had come to pack up their belongings and turn towards home. Certain that the confederacy would never accept the terms put forth by the commissioners, Brant saw no point in remaining among the hostile tribes. He had a letter delivered to McKee on August 4. In it he wondered why the Six Nations and Lake tribes had been left out of the business of the councils. He expressed his dismay that the renewing of the ancient friendship had been a farce.

We have been told that such a part of the Country belongs to the six nations but I am of the opinion that the Country belongs to the Confederate Indians in Common....Upwards of one hundred years ago a moon of Wampum was placed in this Country with four Roads leading to the Center for the convenience of the Indians from Different Quarters to come and settle or hunt here a Dish with one
Spoon was likewise put here with the moon of Wampum, this shews that my Sentiments respecting the Lands are not New.\textsuperscript{202}

Brant had a greater vision for the confederacy, a lasting vision, but it was rapidly slipping away. A coalition of Shawnee chiefs visited the Six Nations camp and implored them to stay a little longer. Brant agreed.\textsuperscript{203}

In a final attempt to push the confederacy towards peace, Brant gave a lengthy speech on August 7. He reminded everyone of the councils that had gone before and the agreements entered into. He declined the war pipe that had been offered by a delegation of Creek, newly arrived and boasting of their victories. “The Boundary of the Muskingum,” Brant stated, “is for the interest of us all and far preferable to an uncertain War.”\textsuperscript{204} The counselors and peace chiefs heard Brant’s message, and the following day he realized a modicum of success. Chiefs of the Shawnee, Delaware, Huron, and Seven Nations of Canada aligned themselves with Brant. They reasoned that Brant knew white people much better than they did, and therefore he must have a better judgement of affairs. “After this meeting,” Brant recorded, “I was informed that Col. McKee had a private meeting with the aforementioned Chiefs at twelve o’Clock at Night.” The next day they had reversed course. Brant’s fragile coalition dissolved as quickly as it had formed.

There was nothing left for Brant to do. The confederacy was eager to wage war, indicating that McKee had promised British aid in the coming conflict. “At this time,” Brant told them, “it is not in our power to assist you. We must first remove our people from amongst the Americans, and if any choose to stay they must abide by the consequences.”\textsuperscript{205} War with the Americans would be devastating to the Six Nations, who were living in close proximity to the expanding United States. There would be no treaty
at Sandusky. There would be no negotiated peace. The confederacy he had founded had ceased to listen to Joseph Brant, and as he left the rapids that day in early August 1793, the confederacy was fractured forever.

The assembled chiefs, and McKee, drafted their official response to the American commissioners.

Brothers;

Money, to us, is of no value, & to most of us unknown, and as no consideration whatever can induce us to sell the lands on which we get sustenance for our women and children; we hope we may be allowed to point out a mode by which your settlers may be easily removed, and peace thereby obtained.

Brothers;

We know that these settlers are poor, or they never would have ventured to live in a country which have been in continual trouble ever since they crossed the Ohio; divide therefore this large sum of money which you have offered to us, among these people, give to each also a portion of what you say you will give to us annually over and above this very large sum of money, and we are persuaded they would most readily accept it...if you add also the great sums you must expend in raising and paying Armies, with a view to force us to yield our Country, you will certainly have more than sufficient for the purposes of repaying these settlers for all their labour and improvements. 206

The commissioners had no further response; they closed negotiations and began their journey home.

The failed treaty of Sandusky was a critical turning point in the post-Revolutionary era. The decade-old confederacy that had shaped the policies of two imperial powers had been torn asunder. While the western tribes carried the idea of the confederacy forward, the fracturing that occurred at the rapids could not be mended. It was not simply a matter of the disenfranchisement of the eastern tribes. Traditions had fallen to the wayside, and elder councilors had been pushed to the periphery. The diplomacy carried out between the United States and the Six Nations had served a purpose that was not widely recognized by the hostile tribes: familiarity. The Americans
were learning how to entreat with, and in many ways to respect, the Indian Confederacy. The evolution of American identity from conquerors of the land to co-tenants was a large step. That forward progress had been enabled by the work of both peacemakers like Brant, and war makers like Buckongahelas. Together they constituted a holistic body that could address the world on any terms that should arise. Separately, they became isolated in a world of growing imperial aggression.
Chapter Five

Epilogue

Historians have recently begun to view a series of events—from the Seven Years’ War to the War of 1812—as the long war for the Great Lakes.²⁰⁷ The conflict that raged over the region had few lengthy reprieves. The rise of the Ohio Indian Confederacy stands as a pivotal moment in this epoch. The pressures brought to bear on the region were as unique as the individuals who navigated through the diplomatic channels. When the confederacy collapsed, the face of the continent changed.

The failed treaty of Sandusky left a brutal legacy. Brant made one final attempt at a peaceful resolution, but it fell on deaf ears. Simcoe embraced the impending war by beginning the construction of a British fort in United States territory. Fort Miamis, just up river from the rapids, was a symbol of resistance. On August 20, 1794, United States troops under the command of General Anthony Wayne engaged the remnant of the Indian Confederacy. The Battle of Fallen Timbers was a relatively mild skirmish. There were not scores of casualties on either side. But for the first time, the Indians were forced to fall back as the U.S. army won the field. Retreating to the safety of Fort Miamis, the warriors found the gates closed. British officials deemed it more important to present a neutral front than to ingratiate themselves to the natives. When Wayne’s forces
approached the fort, British commandant William Campbell tried to goad him into attacking, but to no avail. The Indians had anticipated British support. Alexander McKee and a unit of Canadian militia had been present at the battle but had refrained from the fight. Now the British refused to fire on Wayne, even as he stood at their gates. Hammond’s grand scheme had come up short.\textsuperscript{208}

The fighting spirit of the Indians was defeated. The duplicity of the British proved too much to bear. The confederacy disbanded for the last time as the warriors turned their attention to their homes. Wayne had marched his troops through the Old Northwest, burning crops and villages. In a gesture of dominance, he occupied the Glaize and razed most of the towns. The message was clear: failure to accommodate to American notions of peace would be tantamount to destruction.

A few months later, on November 19, 1794, U.S. and British negotiators signed the Jay Treaty. Britain had given up claims to the posts as well as the dream of a buffer state. While the British had possession of the posts for an additional eighteen months in order to conclude business, their hold on the region was quickly evaporating. All of the diplomatic intrigue had run its course, and Britain had finally abandoned their Indian allies to American rule.

Trying to make the best of the situation, the tribes met with the United States at Wayne’s headquarters, Fort Greenville. The ensuing treaty, signed August 3, 1795, facilitated the cession of Indian lands to the United States and opened up Ohio to settlement. The emergent American nation was finally able to implement top-down control over all of its territories. Tribal communities realigned themselves in support of
the United States even as they were pushed to the periphery. The Great Father was no longer the King in England, but the President in Washington.

When hostilities erupted between Britain and the United States in 1812, Indian warriors who once stood side by side in the face of encroachment now occupied opposite sides of the conflict. Shawnee brothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa launched a new movement to bring the tribal communities together once more. While they met with a modicum of success, it was short lived. There would be no more great pan-Indian movements in the Northeast Woodlands, only the prospect of reservations and removal.

The War of 1812 marked the end of Indian utility to the British as well. The Old Northwest was no longer a borderland; the boundaries had been drawn and tested. Retreating inward, Canada seemed to console itself that it, at the least, was not the United States. Still, reaction to U.S. expansion pulled Canada along in a desperate race to extend control westward. Canadians pointed to the aggressive policies of the United States towards the western tribes as the cruel acts of an imperial power, and they intentionally modeled their Indian policies in opposition to their rivals.

The United States had come through a difficult trial in trying to establish themselves as a viable nation. The opening of the west paved the way for a new American identity that would be encapsulated in Theodore Roosevelt’s *The Winning of the West*. “No treaty could be satisfactory to the whites,” he wrote, “no treaty served the needs of humanity and civilization, unless it gave the land to the American as unreservedly as any successful war.” American exceptionalism and manifest destiny were the celebrated legacies; it was a process that brought civilization to the frontier, and
tamed the land. The myth of the American founding has cleaved to this interpretation of expansion and glorified the westward advance of American ideals.

In the end, the Ohio Indian Confederacy did not falter because of military defeat. Their existence did not hinge on the actions of colonial or imperial western powers. The Indian Confederacy dissolved because powerful and charismatic leaders within the movement were never able achieve consensus. Notions of tradition and ceremony, of war and peace, notions that shaped the identity of the alliance, were in constant contention. What was considered the right course by the Shawnee and Miami was not in the best interests of the Six Nations and Brant. Remaining tied to one another through confederation turned out to be in the interests of no one. In 1793, there were no foregone conclusions, and a world of options remained open as native leaders blazed their people’s paths into the future.
Notes:

10 Many ethnohistorical works have come to light over the past two decades—of particular note are, Colin Calloway, *The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and Diversity in Native American Communities* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), was the first work to look at the effects of the Revolution on Indian communities. In a similar vein, Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York: Vintage, 2006), examines two friends who occupied different sides in the Revolution, Joseph Brant and Samuel Kirkland.
14 Treaty of Paris, United States-Great Britain, Article 7, September 3, 1783.
15 Sadosky, *Revolutionary Negotiations*, 86-88. Ben Franklin had composed a set of governing articles in which reunification with Great Britain remained an open option.
17 Ibid., 265.
18 Ibid., 268.
19 For policies towards Native Americans under the Articles of Confederation see Sadosky, *Revolutionary Negotiations*.
Britain's Peacemakers 1783-1793: ‘To an Astonishing Degree Unfit for the Task,’” *Peace and Peacemakers*, 82-83. Ritcheson argues that Oswald was not quite as unfit for the job as has been believed; rather than a pawn of the Americans, he was an avowed enemy of the rebellion. Whatever his private politics, his diplomatic skills were unquestionably weak.

In many ways, the retention of Canada itself was not a foregone conclusion. The United States wanted the northern dominion and had specifically made arrangements for acquiring it in the Articles of Confederation. Further, France was in a position to reassert power there but apparently concluded that a British presence would result in better economic terms for France in trade negotiations with the states; see Gregg L. Lint, “Preparing for Peace: The Objectives of the United States, France, and Spain in the War of the American Revolution,” *Peace and Peacemakers*, 34-37.


Treaty of Paris, Article four, dictated that “creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value” of debts owed. Article five stipulated that British loyalists should be allowed to “remain twelve months unmolested in their endeavors to obtain the restitution of such of their estates, rights, and properties as may have been confiscated.” Article six guaranteed that “there shall be no future confiscations made nor any prosecutions commenced against any person or persons for, or by reason of, the part which he or they may have taken in the present war.”


Charles R. Ritcheson, *Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States 1783-1795* (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969), 51. Alexander Wedderburne had been a member of the Carlisle Commission. Led by William Eden under the auspices of Lord North, the commission had been charged with initiating diplomacy with the rebellious colonies. In a treatise he penned on proposed negotiations with the Americans in 1778, Wedderburne stated, “The first principle of any measure that can now be pursued as a means of pacification is to gain an opening for a treaty.” The idea of pacification through diplomatic channels was naive in regards to the colonies, but prescient of American policies towards indigenous peoples in the ensuing decades. Alexander Wedderburne Papers, Clements library, notes and other writings, notes on proposed negotiations box 2 folder 7.


Duke de la Rochefoucault Liancourt, “General Simcoe appears in the most advantageous light.”

hatred against the United States, which he too loudly professes, and which carries him too far,” wrote the

Welford, 1844),

Rangers have killed or taken twice their own numbers. Col.

gallant, skillful, and successful enterprises against the enemy, without a single reverse. The Queen's

Governor Simcoe. It can be found in

to occupy their hunting grounds as well as the channels of communication between Minister Hammond and

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Kansas Press, 2003), 215. While Virginia sent troops to heed the call for a fe

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70-73. However, neither the British nor the United States had any records

pertaining to the number of slaves that had gone missing, making the situation impossible to adjudicate.

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Simcoe

Simcoe

Dorchester to Grenville, March 15, 1790, Simcoe 1: 10.

Haldimand to Lord North, November 27, 1783, quoted in Leavitt, “British Policy,” 175 n. 71

Extract from Letter of Sir John Johnson Relative to Indians in Neighborhood of Detroit, December 11, 1790,

Memorial from Montreal Merchants, Simcoe 1: 56; also in MPH C 24: 164.

Sir Henry Clinton wrote of Simcoe’s service, “The history of the corps under his command is a series of

gallant, skillful, and successful enterprises against the enemy, without a single reverse. The Queen’s

Rangers have killed or taken twice their own numbers. Col. Simcoe himself has been thrice wounded.”

Quoted in John Simcoe, A Journal of the Operations of the Queen’s Rangers (New York: Bartlett and

Welford, 1844), x.

Simcoe to Banks, January 8, 1791, Simcoe 1:17; Simcoe, Queen’s Rangers, xiv. “But for this inveterate

hatred against the United States, which he too loudly professes, and which carries him too far,” wrote the

Duke de la Rochefoucault Liancourt, “General Simcoe appears in the most advantageous light.”

Grenville to Dorchester, June 3, 1790, Simcoe 1: 13.
Jefferson to Morris, August 12, 1790, Simcoe 1: 14.
63 Colquhoun to Grenville, August 5, 1791, Simcoe 1: 42.
64 Hammond had amassed an impressive administrative career at a young age: Secretary to David Hartley, Peace Commissioner at Paris, 1783; Charge d’Affaires at Vienna, 1788-90; Charge d’Affaires at Copenhagen and Madrid, 1790-91; Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, 1791-95. However, none of his experience had prepared him for dealing with the hostility of U.S. negotiators.
65 Hammond to Grenville, November 16, 1791, Simcoe 1: 80: “It is said that he [Jefferson] has uniformly encouraged the belief that England would never send a Minister to this country, nor evince a desire to enter into a fair commercial arrangement with it. If such is or was intended to have been the foundation of his reasoning on the subject of Great Britain, there is perhaps nothing that can be more embarrassing to him in the prosecution of such a mode of reasoning…than my actual appearance.”
66 Jefferson to Washington, April 17, 1791, Simcoe 1:23: “tho’ an annual present of arms and ammunition be an innocent thing in time of peace, it is not so in time of war.” Regarding the ritual policy of gift giving between the British and Indians, see Jefferson to Morris, March 10, 1792, Simcoe 1: 119: “The British court have disavowed all aid to the Indians. Whatever may have been their orders in the direction, the Indians are fully and notoriously supplied by their agents with everything necessary to carry on the war.” In February 1793 a New York newspaper printed a speech allegedly given by Dorchester advocating war to assembled tribes. This speech sent shockwaves of denial through Parliament. Extracts of the speech and the debate surrounding it can be found in William Woodfall, An Impartial Report of the Debates that Occur in the Two Houses of Parliament, vol. 4 (London: T. Chapman, 151 Fleet-Street, 1794), 134.
68 Hammond to Grenville, June 8, 1792, Simcoe 5: 16.
69 Hammond to Simcoe, October 19, 1792, Simcoe 2: 233.
70 Hammond to Simcoe, April 21, 1792, Simcoe 1: 131-132. Hammond goes on to suggest to Simcoe that if Wayne could be induced to attack British troops, “The Members of this Government will, I doubt not, be extremely cautious in suggesting any such measure; but if it should be undertaken even without their recommendation, and be attended with success I can readily conceive that they would then join their Sanction of it to the popular approbation, which would infallibly ensue.”
71 Stevenson to Simcoe, January 7, 1792, Simcoe 1: 100-101.
72 Joseph Brant to Samuel Kirkland, March 8, 1791, Simcoe 5: 3.
74 Iroquois motivations during the Beaver Wars have been called into question by Jose Antonio Brandao, Your Fyre Shall Burn no More: Iroquois Policy toward New France and Its Native Allies to 1701 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997). In a lengthy appendix Brandao examines every recorded violent engagement between the Iroquois and their enemies. He concludes that they were not as hungry for peltries as has been previously thought.
78 White, The Middle Ground.
Lochry, with overwhelming success. A later altercation in which Brant struck Simon Girty with his sword.

This tactic was used by first by MacLean in 1783 and became the standard language of the British at council with the Indians. In a letter to Lord North, Haldimand wrote, “To prevent such a disastrous event as an Indian War, is a consideration worthy the attention of both nations and cannot be prevented so effectually as by allowing the Posts in the Upper Country to remain as they are for some time.” Quoted in Leavitt, “British Policy,” 155.

A thorough examination of the boundaries drawn during negotiations and the issues surrounding them can be found in, Burt, British North America, 15-30.

A flurry of activity regarding presents for the tribes was underway. This was partly because the thawing ice had only recently begun to allow commerce to move, but a sense of urgency was also evident in order to ease strained relationships. The following correspondence largely concerns this trade: Brig. Gen. John Johnson to Major Gen. De Riedesel, May 1, 1783, MPHC, 20: 111; Brig. Gen Allan Maclean to Gen. Frederick Haldimand, May 12, 1783, MPHC, 20: 115; Maclean to Haldimand, May 13, 1783, MPHC, 20: 116. Mixed in with the trade goods are also reassurances to the Native people that their lands will not be impinged upon as witnessed in: Major Arent S. De Peyster to Maclean, May 17, 1783, MPHC, 20: 116-117; Maclean to Haldimand, May 18, 1783, MPHC, 20: 118, 120.


Capt. Alexander McKee to De Peyster, May 24, 1783, MPHC, 20: 122-123; McKee to De Peyster, May 29, 1783, MPHC, 20: 125.

McLean to Haldimand, August 18, 1783, MPHC, 20: 171. By moving the council further from the British seat of power, there was less opportunity for the attending nations to be overawed by gifts and grandeur.

Elements of the speech given by John Johnson to the Six Nations were reiterated by McKee to the assembled nations at Sandusky. “I do in the most earnest manner recommend to you for your own advantage, to bear your losses with manly fortitude [regarding war dead], forgiving and forgetting what is past, looking forward in full hopes and expectation that on the return of the Blessings of Peace…and as proof of your Inclination to promote that desirable end, let me once more recommend to you to collect and give up without exception all Prisoners that may be yet among you.” Quoted in MPHC, 20: 177. This appears consistent with Haldimand’s promise to George Washington, ibid., 165.

The belt of wampum was sent by the Six Nations to appeal to the Southern Indians to fight the rebels during the recent revolution; De Peyster to Mclean, July 17, 1783, MPHC, 20: 146.

Transactions with the Indians at Sandusky, MPHC, 20: 175.

Brant was part of a large force sent out to engage George Rogers Clark. Brant and George Girty led a band of Huron and Lake Indians that broke away from the main body and ambushed Colonel Archibald Lochry, with overwhelming success. A later altercation in which Brant struck Simon Girty with his sword,
leaving a large scar on Girty’s forehead, was likely the result of Brant’s bragging about this engagement.


104 Articles of the Treaty concluded at Fort McIntosh, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 11. This treaty featured the renowned invader George Rogers Clark as a negotiator, further setting the militaristic tone that the United States was adopting towards the Native people. Clark would also be present at the treaty at the Big Miami. Ibid.

106 Wakitomekie is likely Wakatomika, a Shawnee village that at this time was located near the Mad River in present-day Logan County, Ohio; Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 80.

107 Speech Delivered to American Messengers at Wakitomekie, *MPHC*, 20: 25. The reference to “brush and nettles” indicates the dissatisfaction the Shawnee were feeling over not only fragmented tribal groups but also perhaps arbitrary locations.

108 In this case they had been doubly duped, as Elliot assured them that the United States was lying in their assertion that Britain had signed over the land in the treaty of Paris. It was the same old lie that Haldimand had begun telling in 1783, and it was still proving effective.


112 The United States’ policy of allowing Arthur St. Clair to oversee Indian diplomacy in the region led to several issues. St. Clair was decidedly nervous and derogatory towards most of the native peoples.

113 Captain John Doughty to the Secretary of War, October 21, 1785, *St. Clair Papers*, 2: 20. It is important to realize he is articulating a seven-month span that comprised winter months during which time it would not have been conducive to travel.

114 Knox to Washington, Date unclear, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 53.


117 Harmar to Knox, May 14, 1787, *St. Clair Papers*, 2: 20. It is important to realize he is articulating a seven-month span that comprised winter months during which time it would not have been conducive to travel.


120 Robert Johnson to the Governor of Virginia, August 22, 1789, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 84.

121 Colonel Benjamin Wilson to Governor St. Clair, October 4, 1789, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 85.

122 Extract of a letter from the Lieutenants of the counties of Fayette, Woodford, and Mercer, to the Secretary of War, April 14, 1790, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 87.


124 Harmar to the President of Congress, May 1, 1785, *The St. Clair Papers*, 2: 3.

125 An examination of attempts at top-down governmental control and their failures can be found in: Eric Hinderaker, “Liberty and Power in the Old Northwest: 1763-1800,” in *The Sixty Years’ War*, 227-139.

126 Harmar to Knox, October 1785, *St. Clair Papers*, 2: 12.

There were still orders to remove squatters, but there was no personnel to be spared once the Native populations became the target of aggression. Harmar’s last communication that he actually had ordered people out of the country was in May 1787, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 22, after which time he began to soften his stance.

The primary instigator of these calls to raise militias was Arthur St. Clair. On December 9, 1787, Harmar informed Knox that he saw no reason to execute the power recently bestowed upon him by Congress to call into service a thousand militia to counter Indian hostilities; *St Clair Papers*, 2: 37-38. In September 1788, St. Clair ordered the militias into readiness, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 88.

Clark requested federal assistance in his campaign, which he did not receive, though he did achieve cooperation; *St Clair Papers*, 2: 17-18.


Ibid., 22 n. 1.

Kenneth P. Bailey, *The Ohio Company Papers, 1753-1817: Being Primarily Papers of the “Suffering Traders” of Pennsylvania* (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers Inc., 1947), 454-455. Among the investors in the Ohio Company and its sub groups were Henry Knox and Arthur St. Clair. An examination of the rise and fall of land prices as the Indian hostilities waxed and waned might offer insights into the catalysts for changing U.S. policies in the region--for example, the order to protect surveyors with federal troops. This is touched upon in Timothy J. Shannon, “The Ohio Company and the Meaning of Opportunity in the American West, 1786-1795,” *The New England Quarterly* 64, no. 3 (Sept. 1991): 393-413.

St. Clair to Knox, September 14, 1788, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 87-89.

St. Clair to Knox, September 2, 1788, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 85.

Mr. Gamelin’s Journal, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 156.

Ibid., 158-159.

St. Clair to Knox, November 26, 1790, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 193. St. Clair’s insistence on building a fort in Miami territory had been denied by Knox before the campaign set out. Knox was acutely aware that the number of hostile natives was unknown, and the military budget would not allow for the troops needed for such a long-term commitment.


R. Douglas Hurt, *The Ohio Frontier: Crucible of the Old Northwest, 1720-1830* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1996), 109-110; Wiley Sword, *President Washington’s Indian War: The Struggle for the Old Northwest, 1790-1795* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 117-122. Perceptions about this engagement which continue to fault the militia and discount the efforts of the Native forces have not changed much over the resulting two centuries; perhaps a reassessment is in order.

After Orders, *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 1, 106.


St. Clair to Knox, November 1, 1791, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 250.

Campaign in Indian Country, *St Clair Papers*, 2: 260. As St. Clair made his way along the path of retreat, he became infuriated at the amount of weaponry that had been discarded. He would later point to the abandonment of arms as being indicative of the nature of the troops under his command.

“A summary statement of facts, relatively to the measures taken, in behalf of the United States, to induce the hostile Indians, northwest of the Ohio, to peace, previously to the exercise of coercion against them; and also a statement of the arrangements for the campaign of 1791,” *ASPIA* vol. 4, part 2, 140. This indicates St. Clair began with two thousand men; incoming Kentucky militia approximately matched the number of deserters.

Armstrong served as the Secretary of War in 1813, and was discharged a year later after failing to defend Washington, D. C., from British attack.


It seems the new hierarchy would be some time in coming. It was not something that could be rushed. The ambassador of course was advised by both Colonel Gordon, commander of the upper posts, and Joseph Chew, secretary of the Indian department, not to go. Stone, Brant, 323; Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 463, 465-466.

Knox to Brant, June 27, 1792, Simcoe 5: 18-19.

Ibid.

Stone, Brant, 334; Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 458.


Stone, Brant, 330; Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 476.

The name Segoyewatha means he keeps them awake, referring to his story-telling skills.


Wallace, Death and Rebirth, 133, 135; Kelsay, Joseph Brant, 264.

Ibid., 219 n. 1; Michael K. Foster, “Another Look at the Functions of Wampum in Iroquois-White Councils,” in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy, 99.

David Graeber, Toward an Anthropological Theory of Value: The False Coin of Our Own Dreams (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 131. Foster, “Another Look,” 103-105. Foster offers a fascinating examination of the business of councils. His argument that wampum is used as an organizing principle and not simply as a record is thought-provoking, if not entirely convincing.

“Indian Council at the Glaize, 1792,” Simcoe 1: 218.


Ibid., 220.

According to McKee, present were representatives of Delawares, Shawanoes, Miamies, Chippawas, Ottawas, Hurons, Munseys, Connoys, Nantikokes, Mohikens, Potowatamies, Cherokees, Creeks, Six Nations, Seven Nations of Canada, Mingoos of the Glaize, Sacs—Sawkies, Reynards, A few Ouitanons and a large Band of Warriors.

“Indian Council,” Simcoe 1: 222.

Ibid., 224.

“Indian Council,” Simcoe 1: 227, “If the Americans were successful they were to build a strong fort at the Miami Towns, they were then to come here and build another, and then if they succeeded, they were to proceed to the Mouth of the River and build another strong fort there. They were afterwards to set about building boats and drive all of the Indians entirely out of the Country...But if any of the Nations came and offered their hands, the Am. Chief was to put them at his back and give them Hoes in their hands to plant corn for him and his people and make them labour like their beasts, their oxen and their Packhorses.”

Ibid.

Ibid., 229.

Simcoe to McKee, November 10, 1792. Simcoe 5: 25. “I immediately forwarded the result of the meeting to his Majesty’s Embassador, & I hope, That He will be able to avail himself of it to the public advantage.” The ambassador of course was Hammond.

Foster, “Another Look,” 104.


Hammond to Simcoe, November 27, 1792, Simcoe 1: 267-268.

Knox to the Western Indians, December 12, 1792, Simcoe 1: 270.

It seems the new hierarchy would be some time in coming. The first reference to President Washington as “father” that I have been able to locate follows; “Brothers of the Fifteen United Fires, listen to the voice of the Wyandots and their confederates of Sandusky...Remember well brother the speech you sent us, dated the 1st January, 1795. We shall only give part of the contents and these are the words: ‘Your father,
General Washington, the President of the Fifteen great Fires of America, will take you under his protection, and has ordered me to defend his dutiful children.” From the Treaty of Greenville, ASPIA vol. 4, part 2, 575.

Simcoe to Hammond, January 21, 1793, Simcoe 1: 277. President Washington’s cabinet met on February 25 and at the top of the agenda was the question of whether to proceed with the negotiations in light of the provision issue. They unanimously decided to proceed. Ibid., 297.

Commissioners to Craig, May 26, 1793, ASPIA vol. 4, part 1, 344. Eventually they would have to send all the way back to Philadelphia for wampum, which was strangely unavailable over such a large stretch of country. Perhaps it was due to the flurry of diplomatic activities that had been taking place. The interpreter Wilson arrived on June 1.

“From the Western Indians to the Five Nations,” Simcoe 5: 34-35.

Dowd, War Under Heaven, 139.

“From the Western Indians to the Five Nations,” Simcoe 5: 34-35.

Commissioners to Knox, June 20, 1793, and June 26, 1793, ASPIA vol. 4, part 1, 347-348.


Ibid.

Ibid., 7.

Commissioners to Craig, ASPIA vol. 4, part 1, 349.


“The Answer of the Commissioners of the United States to the Speech Delivered by Captain Brant,” ASPIA vol. 4, part 1, 349-350. Immediately following this meeting the commissioners wrote to Knox complaining of General Wayne’s movements and the provisioning of forts for impending hostilities.

Ibid., 15.

Ibid., 17.

“The Message from the Western Indians to the Commissioners of the United States,” Simcoe 2: 19.

The best example of this is Skaggs, Sixty Years’ War.

Simcoe, 3: 97-100.

Cave, Prophets, pp.

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In Hoffman, *Peace and the Peacemakers*, 70-100.


