A Thesis

entitled

Cultural Factors and How They Shape Military Sustainment and Transition Operations in a Theater of War

by

Chris Butsky

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the

Master of Liberal Studies Degree in Military Logistics

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An Abstract of
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This thesis uses firsthand and collaborative experience in transitioning military logistics and sustainment functions to countries where cultures, values and resources differ greatly from that of America to capture concerns and provide recommendations. The research is a result of the material and insight gained by currently serving US Army members who have contributed or are contributing to the transition of sustainment to Iraq and/or Afghanistan. Because of the great difficulty American Forces have in transitioning sustainment capabilities in Iraq and Afghanistan despite being very well resourced and trained themselves, cultural values and resources directly affecting sustainment management and transition seem a viable concept for this study.

The results of the study indicate that cultural differences, as well as the disparity of funds between the US and that of undeveloped economies, make it difficult to transition US military sustainment operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. Much of this can be attributed to what is valued by each culture; there are contradictive values that build the foundations of how sustainment operations are conducted and decidedly unequal availability of funds and resources in technology and infrastructure development.
concerning sustainment operations. As a result, American Forces have to think differently and use unique approaches in transitioning sustainment functions to Arab cultures and countries with considerably less infrastructure. The final transition solution demands an understanding of the values that underpin the sustainment infrastructure desired along with an appreciation of working a sustainable solution within the confines of the fiscal capabilities of the country’s security forces receiving training.
For my wife Nichol who has ‘mobilized’ three times as the Rear Detachment Commander. Her sacrifice has allowed me to make mine.
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List of Abbreviations

AO..............................Area (of) Operation
AR2B..........................Army Resourcing and Requirements Board

BCS3.........................Battle Command Support Sustainment System
BG.............................Brigadier General

CALL.........................Center (for) Army Lessons Learned
CAISI........................Combat Automation Information System Interface
CL.............................Class (of Supply)
COL............................Colonel
CSSK.........................Combat Service Support Kandak
COP............................Common Operating Picture

DHL............................Dalsey, Hillblom (and) Lynn
DARPA.......................Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
DCAM.........................Defense (Medical Logistics Standard Support) Customer Assistance Module

FMTV..........................Family (of) Medium Tactical Vehicles
FMC............................Fully Mission Capable

GPS............................Geosynchronous Positioning System
GAO...........................Government Accounting Office

HMMWV.......................High Mobility Medium Wheeled Vehicle

IED.............................Improvised Explosive Device
IA...............................Iraqi Army
ISF.............................Iraqi Security Force

LRT.............................Logistics Reporting Tool

MAJ.............................Major
MTV.............................Medium Tactical Vehicle
MRAP..........................Mine Resistant Ambush Protected
MoD.............................Ministry of Defense
MoI.............................Ministry of Interior
MoH...........................Ministry of Health
MTT .........................Mobile Transition Team
MNSTC-I ...................Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq

OEF .........................Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF ..........................Operation Iraqi Freedom
OR% ..........................Operational Readiness Percent

PTSD .........................Post Traumatic Stress Disorders
PBUS-E ........................Property Book Unit Supply-Enhanced
PMCS ..........................Preventative Maintenance Checks (and) Services
PAO ...........................Public Affairs Officer

SFAT .........................Security Force Advisory Team
SLCR ..........................Shower, Laundry, (and) Clothing Repair
SA .............................Situational Awareness
SAAS-MOD ..................Standard Army Ammunition System-Modernized
SAMS-E .......................Standard Army Maintenance System-Enhanced
SARSS .......................Standard Army Retail Supply System
SOP ...........................Standing Operating Procedures

TTP ...........................Tactics, Techniques, (and) Procedures
TC-AIMS II ...............Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information form
Movement System II

UPS ..........................United Postal Service
US .............................United States

VSAT ..........................Very Small Aperture Terminal
Chapter 1

Culture Which Drives American Sustainment Operations

Daniel Bell, an American Sociologist, states that culture can be described as a group of people with a coherent set of values and similar approaches to answering the existential questions that confront us in the passages of our lives. (Mehen) America has a unique cultural heritage that sets it apart from other nations and it is in and through this culture that drives the practices and procedures which govern, among a myriad of other things, US military logistics. In the history of the United States, resources and innovations focused on a defense strategy has allowed technological advances that greatly contribute to today’s military operations. It is this same culture and technological advances that make it difficult to transition US Army tasks, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to other forces, especially those with considerably less financial resources with which to implement transitional ideas and practices.

The US Army has considerable resources allocated to the function of logistical sustainment operations including manning, training, equipping, automation and command focus for logistical sustainment. Iraq and Afghanistan have a completely different approach to working with these functions; they have a completely different culture distinct with their own set of values and a history that helps define that culture. They,
however, are similar to each other. Iraq has an Arabic culture with a considerable amount of Muslims helping to shape that Arab culture. Afghanistan has a predominately Muslim culture with many ethnicities in its makeup. Their leadership and governance, being very tribal in nature, are similar and allow for lessons learned in Iraq to be emplaced in Afghanistan.

These cultures were defined earlier as a group of people which have similar values focus on what’s important to them. While culture and values associated are an important aspect of what drives logistics operations, the funding and other resources are the means to the ends concerning logistics infrastructure. Since values are the basis of what is important, resources allocated towards those values will follow suit. Valuing safety over speed, innovation over tradition, commander influence over fate, and integration over segregation is what makes the US Army advanced in logistics operations while at the same time making it difficult to transition these contrasting methods to other Arab nations.

This paper demonstrates how historical necessity, paired with the American values noted above and the resources available to make the values a reality, has driven the US Army to excel in sustainment operations. Conversely, the resources which have vastly contributed to our success are not within reach of the Iraqi Army due to funding availability itself as well as the history of how the military and sustainment activities have evolved over time. This causes significant disparity in their sustainment activities thus making it difficult to transition sustainment operations during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). (Figure 1-1) The lessons learned from OIF should be heeded when working in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF)) and future countries with
similar resourcing hurdles or historical and cultural similarities.

Figure 1-1: Culture contains values which motivate what countries will fund. Funding establishes the infrastructure for sustainment operations.
Chapter 2

Literature Review

This literature review will highlight prior research that discusses the military culture and values of the US military and that of the Iraqi and Afghan militaries. It will show how these values guide the funding and allocation of resources which have built the sustainment capabilities available to these nations. The scarcity of literature available is not in the cultures or values present within America or Arab nations. Nor does it lie in the cultures and values that drive the innovations and functions these militaries use today. There is a missing link, however, in how the continued technological advancements of the US Army pose a significant barrier when used in the methods of transitioning sustainment operations to countries where values and resources are greatly different.

These two countries, Iraq and Afghanistan, share enough commonalities that they will be put together in several of the sub-sections since the causes as well as the current strategies of the US military in training them are too similar to segregate. Both Iraq and Afghanistan share traits such as being led by outside forces to rebuild their military forces, beginning their rebuilding around 2002-2003 roughly, and developing volunteer forces instead of conscript armies. They both are fighting insurgents on their own soil and are replacing their old ethnically segregated militaries into national militaries without directed segregation. While these two countries differ on many accounts, “some of these
shared traits are not essentially about Afghanistan or Iraq, but about the nature of the engagement of outside forces.” (Simonsen, 1484)

2.1 Military Culture and Values Driving Resource Allocation

It is important to note how the military culture has been and continues to be driven towards excellence. Colonel (COL) Thomas Williams, U.S. Army Reserves, wrote in the *Military Review Journal*, “When former President George W. Bush spoke to the graduating class at the United States Naval Academy in 2001, he declared a commitment to a military culture of risk-taking and forward thinking, and to recognizing and promoting visionary leaders” (Williams, 59) The US military is inherently a group of men and women dedicated to defending freedom at the extent of their lives, if it comes to that. They are typically ‘type-A’ Soldiers with a considerable competitive spirit. It can be seen in the Army Warrior Ethos “I will always place the mission first; I will never accept defeat, I will never quit”, and the Army Non-Commissioned Officer’s Creed “No one is more professional than I…Competence is my watchword…I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage”, the Army Ranger Creed “Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might.” It is in these speeches and creeds that continue to drive the military culture forward.

America’s desire for a strong military along with a value for innovation has led to the establishment of the US Congressional Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities. It was recorded of the Honorable Mac Thornberry, a Congressional Representative from Texas and Chairman for the Subcommittee, “…what are the
emerging threats to the national security of the United States? And what are the emerging capabilities in which we need to invest in order to meet those threats? The one fact of which we can all be assured in national security is that there will be change and there will be uncertainty. We can’t predict the future, but we can watch for trends and we can develop technologies”. (US Government Printing Office, 1) America stands by ready as it always has to support and build the infrastructure that will keep the US military always ahead of its enemies. America values a strong army and it can be seen in both the resources provided as well as the fact that a subcommittee performing such functions exists.

Iraq and Afghanistan have not been so lucky in their attempts to build a strong infrastructure to support their security forces. Their cultural beliefs in tradition, fate, and their continuous tribal and religious segregation have modified their values and subsequently their financial focus. “The distinguished Iraqi historian and sociologist 'Ali al-Wardi argues that Bedouin culture formed the bedrock of Iraqi [Arab] society. Characterizing Bedouin culture, he writes, are three elements: tribalism, raiding, and chivalry.” (Nimrod, 33)

The Army Arab Cultural Awareness 58 Factsheet states a couple of key ideas that show how values limit technological advancement as well as Soldier wellness programs and infrastructure. “FAITH: Arabs usually believe that many, if not all things in life are controlled by the will of God (fate) rather than by human beings. WISH VERSUS REALITY: Their desire for modernity is contradicted by a desire for tradition (especially Islamic tradition). TIME: less rigid. Approach to time is much more relaxed and slower than that in Western cultures.” (Arab Cultural Awareness: 58 Factsheets, 12-13) If Allah
wishes it, then why establish innovative techniques for bettering a situation? If technology runs counter to their traditions and these nations value tradition, then why build upon that technology? If a relaxed timeline is valued, then why would you implement systems to improve the timeliness of logistical trains?

Gareth Stansfield writes in his book, *The Reformation of Iraq’s Foreign Relations: New Elites and Enduring Legacies*, “The legacies of the past, and the wider geopolitical environment, have continued as conditioning constants, providing an underlying structure for Iraq’s [and Afghanistan’s] relations with the outside world just as they did throughout the twentieth century.” He goes on to say that the country has to concern itself with domestic political dynamics concerning national identity and socio-cultural orientation as part of the Arab world. (Stansfield, 1396-1397) Even if these nations would by and large want to ‘westernize’, the pressure amongst the Arab world is a significant countering influence. Stansfield suggests that repression is the tool used to sway and control the masses and as a technique used to stay in power. This can be seen in the essence of money spent to better the military readiness. Essentially, money, time, and energy are used to stay in power, not establish advances in the military or enhance military readiness and domestic security.

2.2 Infrastructure and Resource Allocation

Plato said that “necessity is the mother of invention.” Innovations like GPS, the internet, the US interstate highway system, the Alaskan Highway, and many other inventions and innovations have been developed and fielded to or on behalf of US troops to provide effective sustainment activities. President Eisenhower followed the dreams of President Roosevelt when he gained approval and funding for the National System of
Interstate and Defense Highways. These highways were inspired by the autobahns that Hitler built for military transport across Germany. (Blas, 128-129) President Eisenhower was motivated to increase safety, commerce between cities, and speed of supplies pushed the legislation to authorize funding of the interstate highway system. America values free trade and commerce. Interstates have allowed for interstate commerce to thrive and the added impact of a sense of nationalism where all succeed or fail together.

Another example points to communication efforts and necessities. Good communications between armies, brigades, etc. are critical to winning a war. Lack of communication is detrimental to winning. It used to be the sounds of the bugle call or the beat of the drum. The Union Forces won the Battle of Gettysburg, many would suggest, because they were able to communicate the commander’s guidance much quicker because the runners were less spread out. Synchronization among units was thereby faster than that of the Confederate Forces. Advancements in communication over time include Morse Code and wave radio. In 1969 the Arpanet was created. It “provided a communications network linking the country in the event that a military attack destroys conventional [land line] communication systems.” (Congressional Digest, 38) Since 1958, the US Government has leaned on the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) for developing enhanced projects through science and technology. Advancements in “seismic sensors, weapons testing, GPS, and shipments tracking are all a result of the $3 billion dollar a year budget provided to DARPA for research and development. (Weinberger, 390-391)

While the provincial governments if Iraq and Afghanistan have improved capital spending in the last three years, their spending compared to budgetary projections have
lagged due to security conditions and the “bureaucratic/administrative constraints which hinder various investment projects.” (Phillips, 3) The outlook does not look so good either. “Inter-communal violence could destabilize the country and derail the political initiative; thereby escalating to a civil war…government spending, the currency, and price stability would be among the casualties of such [previous mistakes] imprudent policy measures.” (ibid, 4) The government’s legitimacy, along with its focus on where to shift its capital, yields an outcome of little funding for much more than Soldiers and ammunition; certainly not for technological infrastructure advancements.

The Government Accounting Office (GAO) found that “Iraqi government data show that Iraq’s security ministries—the Ministries of Defense and Interior—increased their spending from 2005 through 2009 and set aside about $5.5 billion for purchases through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales program. However, over this 5-year period, these ministries did not use between $2.5 billion and $5.2 billion of their budgeted funds that could have been used to address security needs.” (Christoff, 1) It further goes on to report that “from January 2005 through April 2008, Iraq’s Ministries of Defense and Interior reporting spending $2.9 billion of the $12.3 billion they were budgeted for investment expenditures in support of the Iraqi security forces.” (ibid, 11) Current financial management practices, along with a lack of defense industry are debilitating the opportunity to invest in resources that enhance logistics operations. The Iraq Defense and Security Report notes a “non-existent indigenous defense industry, an economy unable to support acquisition of any military equipment leading to a reliance upon donations of both hardware and financial military aid, and a total lack of facilities to enable the manufacture of arms, and a lack of surplus equipment preventing the exporting of defense
equipment. The weak Iraqi infrastructure is unlikely to be in a position to establish a
defense industry for at least another ten years.” (Business Monitor International, 8) In
fact, the report goes on to state that the Iraqi Security Force (ISF) has a readiness rate of
8% meaning that only 8% of the force is capable of accomplishing the planning,
executing and sustaining counterinsurgency operations.

Particularly in Afghanistan, there is essentially one main road called Route 1 or
the Ring Road. This is important because, unlike Iraq, it poses additional challenges to
the flexibility available in establishing logistics operations. The Afghanistan Ministry of
Defense (MoD) does not currently possess an air-drop capable method of delivery and
therefore must rely on the road networks. “When completed it is estimated that 60% of
Afghans (approximately 17 million people) will live within the 50 km of this road.”
(Unruh, and Shalaby, 49) If Afghanis are to develop a self-sustaining logistics operation,
it is imperative to have an adequate road network that ties cities and military units
together to promote movement of supplies. Conversely, “While the benefits thought to be
connected to road infrastructure construction are numerous, some analysts have
expressed concern about the actual impact of (re)construction on local community
livelihoods, security and society in Afghanistan. Of particular note is the involvement of
the Taliban in road (re)construction in the form of demanding money from both the
villages to be serviced by roads and construction firms, in exchange for not destroying
roads as they are being rebuilt, or kidnapping workers and destroying equipment. The
Taliban also receive money in exchange for guaranteeing the security of truck
transportation on roads.” (ibid, 52) While there have been significant contributions by
outside nations to provide the funding and equipment to build the Ring Road, zero
government budgeting to date accounts for building or upkeep of the road network which proves the point that even the greatest logistical requirement in Afghanistan is not a high priority in the eyes of the Afghan leadership. In other words, it is not something they currently value.

2.3 Sustainment Operations

Major (MAJ) Douglas C. Richter, US Army Command and General Staff College, writes “Unless the approach for Army logistics operations and the larger sustaining structure is modified to account for some of the particular aspects of Afghan culture, the Afghan government will likely abandon the system after coalition forces depart Afghanistan, resulting in a failure of the security forces themselves.” (Richter, 2) The US Army continually finds itself trying to figure out the best methods by which to transition logistics functions and responsibilities to the Afghan Army. The Mobile Transition Team (MTTs) of 2006-2008 learned ways to integrate logistics into the culture in which they were operating in Iraq. Now Security Force Advisory Teams (SFATs) in Afghanistan—same mission, different name—seem to be learning the same things over again. Chief Warrant Officer James Camechis, an SFAT Logistics Advisor for the 5th Zone Afghanistan Border Police states, “we came in to teach them all our tracking mechanisms with all our tools and charts. They were using journals and very passive in their efforts. They didn’t get preventative checks and services (PMCS) maintenance where you change the oil and fill the tires up. They wait till it’s broke and then find another if they can or just do without. We are trying to teach them how to use all these tools, but we need to figure out a way to just influence what they think about maintenance.” (CW2 Camechis, USA. Personal interview, 26 MAY 2012)
Several MTT members have written about their achievements and struggles with Afghan and Iraqi sustainment transition operations but have not talked about why the disparity of infrastructure exists or what to do about it. This paper bridges that gap of several documents addressing the culture behind how these militaries work and how they function in sustainment activities. It addresses how culture/values drives infrastructure which drives sustainment and the impact on transitional activities.
Chapter 3

Research Methodology and Data

The thesis explored in this paper is a result of significant research and firsthand experience that showed how units have struggled to transition sustainment operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. I assert that some success has been achieved but the culture and infrastructure provide limitations to what and how transition can successfully occur. The goal of this research was to obtain explanations regarding lessons learned from various teams and senior Officers on their transition activity successes and struggles and to provide a way forward as the US Army seeks to do this to similar cultures with similar fiscal and other resource constraints in the future.

3.1 Sources of Data

Primary sources of data are collected from Military Transition Team (MTT) interviews, unit electronic products including standing operations procedures (SOPs), and Army Regulations. Secondary sources include journals and other published literature which discuss, in general terms: the military history and cultures of US, Iraq, and Afghani nations; the resources and infrastructure available to these nations. Agreeing with Professor James Russell’s Doctoral Thesis, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School Studying war books, “war studies make little attempt to offer up generalizable observations that can inform theory development” and “security studies
eschews drilling down to understand actual processes of organizational output in war”. (Russell, 9) Therefore, cultural and resource-based information will be primarily captured from historical journals and encyclopedia-type media while military logistics and transition operations topics will largely be captured through interviews, current identified best practices, and military journal entries mostly from units and Soldiers who have lived the topic at hand.

A great source to find analysis of military operations and the lessons learned from those who have conducted operations is the Center for Army Lesson’s Learned. “The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) rapidly collects, analyzes, disseminates, and archives tactics, techniques, procedures and operational records in order to facilitate rapid adaptation initiatives and conduct focused knowledge sharing and transfer that informs the Army and enables operationally based decision making, integration, and innovation.” (Center for Army Lessons Learned) It is peer-reviewed by senior Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) prior to publication on the website. I will gather information mainly from MTTs and other logistics advisors who have worked in Iraq or Afghanistan. Analysis will be conducted on their procedures and struggles in working with Iraq and Afghanistan security forces and develop trends to determine systemic issues amongst logistics transition.

Another very good source of logistics procedures and strategic impacts of working with other nations is from the theses written by students of the Army War College. At the Army War College, senior Lieutenant Colonels and Colonels study strategic military planning and operations and graduate with a Masters Degree in Military Strategies. Their papers are published upon approval and peer-review. All theses
produced from the Army War College center around military strategies and small facets of new details learned through 15+ years of experience. In the past ten years, a good portion of theses have been centered on strategic goals and operational realities within the framework of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Analysis will be focused on their data to understand the strategic implications of nation building and develop a bridge between this and logistics transition at the tactical and operational levels.

Because transition operations occur at the tactical level, even though influenced through budgeting, training and infrastructure at the operational and strategic levels, a significant portion of research involves receiving tools, charts and trackers directly from the units on the ground where transition operations occur. The charts and graphs show how the US Army tracks commodities, maintenance readiness and parts on order. The journal entries and Afghan forms, almost identical to the forms used in Iraq, show the process by which all supplies are tracked and ordered. While there are more than 900 forms in the US Army arsenal, there is only one form for both the Iraqis and Afghans concerning commodity management: the Iraqi Army Form (IA) 101 and Afghan Form (AF) 14 (Figure 5-1). These forms and charts are taken directly from the Soldiers who use them every day. The US Army forms will show the complexity of commodity and maintenance management in the US Army compared with the simplicity of that within the Iraqi and Afghan forces. The data will show how the US Army’s desire to push methods onto such a simplistic operation only causes confusion and cannot be sustained after US troops leave.

The research supports the discussion portion of this thesis and is divided between US Army operations and then continues with that of Iraq/Afghanistan Army operations.
First, I discuss how the US Army operates and the history of how they got there. The same line discusses Arab cultures and their security forces. The research supports how the American culture and Iraqi/Afghan (Arab) cultures drive the countries spending, infrastructure and resourcing priorities. The research shows the innovative support towards military operations that America has been able to achieve through the influence of Congressional panels and the means by which to do it. It further discusses how Arab traditions and leadership have a significantly different outcome on how their security forces can operate today.

In the next section, sustainment operations are divided into three sub-categories: commodity management; maintenance operations; and medical sustainment operations. Several charts were made available for this section. These tools have been utilized for the past several years and have been tested in garrison and wartime environments. They are the tools most used by commanders to understand the current operating picture (COP) of the battlefield for situational awareness (SA).

The tools utilized by Iraqi and Afghan forces are not so automated or robust but prove adequate for the operations they conduct, according to the relativism that exists in their culture. It works for them. The research supports that while the sustainment activities are analogous, the level of details and the focus on Soldier morale is decidedly degraded.

3.2 Methodology

Standardized, open-ended interviewing styles were used in this study (Patton). All questions were asked in the same format and in a specific order. Direct support for the SFATs generated some instantaneous feedback that sometimes led to further interview-
type questions. Interviews proved invaluable to the research conducted for this thesis. Interviews that went off course from the initial question, so long as it pertained to transition or sustainment, were allowed to continue. Unlike history you can only read about, these participants interviewed were at the point where the rubber meets the road. They lived the days of frustration and glory as transition of sustainment operations slowly moved from US forces to Iraq and Afghan forces. Some of the participants are conducting transition operations at the same time I am interviewing them which provides a real-time analysis and picture proving my thesis that we must embrace the culture and resources available to a nation in transition without trying to use our own extensive automation systems or we will fail to achieve a sustained transition of any functional logistics operation.

Interviewees were easy to find and more than willing to help. I contacted those on my MTT during my deployment in 2006-2007 for insight into maintenance and CL III specific transitional activities. I worked with more than 10 Officers and Soldiers who served in a transition team capacity in 2011-2012 who provided excellent, up-to-date information on Afghan Army transitional issues and systemic problems, as well as successes. Finally, I chose to talk with two Officers whose theses I cited. Their experience proved invaluable to rounding out some details regarding transition with logistics and operations.

There is no formal interview board that requires approval in order to seek answers from other Soldiers. All Soldiers are given orders on what they are allowed to say and what they are not. So long as it does not create an operational security risk and does not address specific mission names and events, there is usually no issue in gathering
information. If any questions arise the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) will be contacted to clarify what can be discussed and what cannot. During the interviews, no lines were crossed and PAO was not required.

The following were questions asked to interviewees:

1. What was the hardest part of transitioning with your logistics counterpart?
2. What methods proved most useful in transitioning supply management? What systems were adopted?
3. Is it possible to transition either commodity management or maintenance management with the use of the systems of record the US Army uses such as Property Book Unit Supply-Enhanced (PBUS-E) or Standard Army Maintenance-Enhanced (SAMS-E)? Is it sustainable?
4. Is there anything else you would like to add?

The goal of these three specific questions is to provide a forum of open discussion where the interviewee can elaborate on his experience. These answers provided the bridge between the strategic implications of nation building provided by the information within the CALL and Army War College and with the tactical realities at the ground level.

For the sake of the reader, all acronyms are spelled out and all military jargon is translated into a more civilianized format. Some of the answers got off topic. However, the gist of all interviewees’ feelings on the matter was captured. Some had better success than others in their efforts to transition operations with some ‘westernized’ influences. These, however, are not sustainable in the long-run and even after the interview; the
participant found themselves relooking the sustainability of the infrastructure they put in place to ensure the long-term feasibility of the operation they had established.
Chapter 4

American Military History and Innovation

Necessity drives the invention of systems the Army needs to become more efficient, effective and safer for Soldiers and leaders. Technology and the approval of the American society which supports these improvements play a huge part in our knowledge management efforts. Companies like UPS and DHL use technologically supported means to provide customers with up-to-date information on their shipments and manage their routes through enterprise solutions that creates the most efficient routes available. Orders can be placed online and can be traced from the manufacturing plant to the front door of the customer’s home. Through capitalism and fair competition, companies like these are striving to get even faster, better and more transparent in their supply chain management techniques and procedures. Companies like Facebook and MySpace emerged from American ingenuity. Through the desire for instantaneous information and a common understanding of what all our friends are doing on a daily basis emerges the desire to immediately connect with friends and family, whenever and wherever. The American culture created this need that now spreads worldwide.

In the Army, GPS and database management features are utilized to vastly improve our knowledge management of supplies on the battlefield. General Douglas MacArthur said, “The history of war proves that nine out of ten times an army has been
destroyed because its supply lines have been cut off…” (qtd. In Logistics Quotations, 2) History has taught us to be smart with our supply lines and never let them get cut off. The Army implemented the Battle Command Supply Support System (BCS3) database during OIF and OEF in order to track, monitor, forecast and maintain a daily status of all supplies, transportation assets and maintenance capabilities across the battlefield using radio frequency identification tags and GPS technology significantly increasing command awareness of all commodities and allowed for more effective management of all supplies. (TABLE 4.1) US military infrastructure focuses available funds and resources towards improving mission effectiveness, efficiency, quality, and having the best technology which shows the battlefield in as real time as possible so commanders can make the decisions necessary for mission success. The same applies with values in logistics sustainment operations.

Logistics sustainment functions provide the food, water, fuel, ammunition, medical supplies, parts and equipment necessary to operate. It also provides for maintenance and medical operations in support of the Soldiers on the ground. Culture will drive the values which drive the allocation of resources that supports these sustainment activities. (Figure 1-1)

4.1 US Army Culture and Sustainment

The US Armed Forced has its own culture built upon the foundation of the American culture. It is a sub-culture with a history as rich and deep as America herself. The military breeds this culture in each Soldier from the day you step off the bus at boot camp. Soldiers are taught the idea of continuing the exceptional reputation of being the best. Soldiers do not train to be second. It is this cultural heritage that drives the US
military harder and harder to never give up and continues ‘improving their battle positions’ which means making your position and job better daily. The US Military has invested the resources required to fulfill the obligations the American taxpayer desires: safety and quality of life for their sons and daughters; fire superiority; a common and current picture of the battlefield for mission analysis and decision making; and effective and efficient reporting mechanisms. It has proven its superiority since the Revolutionary War in combat operations, innovative technology, and sustainment operations.

An organization spun from the same needs at the US Congressional Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities is the Army’s version, the Army Resourcing and Requirements Board (AR2B). This board was born out of necessity within the wars of OIF and OEF which is a board that facilitates a rapid response in the research, development, acquisition and immediate deployment of the latest technological advances in weapons and equipment, often cutting the red-tape down from years to months (Dabolt, 10). This process highlights not only the innovation and resources America is known for but underscores the legacy of the American culture. The values of timeliness, effectiveness and Soldier quality of life can clearly be seen through this innovative process.

Some of the great modernizations in military capabilities since the beginnings of OEF and OIF include the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle which has become the replace platform for moving troops around the battlefield. It was designed out of necessity in the fight against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Another example is the Logistics Readiness Tracker (LRT). This tool allows leaders the ability to see all supplies, equipment, and military platforms such as the High Mobility Medium Wheeled
Vehicle (HMMWV) moving across the battlefield with a ‘worst-case’ five minute lag time. It is an instant Common Operating Picture (COP) of the entire friendly forces array for sustainment operations.

These advances in operational and sustainment support build on the foundation of American values are great for American Soldiers, Sailors, Airman and Marines. However, history has taught us that we must not only take the ground in a warzone, but also win the hearts and minds of the local populous. While accomplished through diplomatic, economic, information sharing, and military means, the US Armed Forces define their role in this effort through equipping and training foreign forces in operations, intelligence, communications and sustainment operations. However, the more attention to detail and technological advancements supporting real time visibility of the battlefield’s logistics COP and streamlining sustainment operations that American forces move towards, the harder it becomes to transition these capabilities to our Iraqi and Afghan counterparts stuck in the analog era. The advancements to which resources (technology, funding, training, equipping) have been allocated are based on what the US Armed Forces leadership value which coincides directly with their cultural influences and the societal biases of the American taxpayer.

4.2 US Army Sustainment Operations

Sustainment operations are developed and executed daily with the goal of ensuring accurate and reliable information is available, that supplies are pushed as far forward on the battlefield in the most expedient methods possible, and that they provide the greatest flexibility to change with the battlefield. The Army defines sustainment operations as “an integrated [function] inextricably linking sustainment to operations.
The concept focuses on building a combat ready Army force, delivering it to the Combatant Commander as part of the joint force, and sustaining its combat power across the depth of the operational area and with unrelenting endurance.” (FM 4-0, vi)

Sustainment operations include identifying what is required to support the warfighter and identifying how to sustain those operations across the battlefield regardless of the circumstances while remaining flexible to change as the war progresses. Functional sustainment areas include commodity management (supplies, distribution, infrastructure, and training), maintenance operations and medical sustainment operations.

4.2.1 Commodity Management

Commodity management includes all aspect of supply management. It incorporates the procurement, forecasting, receiving, storing, safeguarding, issuing and reporting of supplies. It includes managing the classification (Figure 4-1), condition coding (Table 4.1), and reporting (Table 4.2) of supplies. It takes account of developing the policies and procedures that establishes the management of such supplies defining how supplies are expended, categorized as excess, unserviceable or expired and provides for disposition instructions depending on the condition. However, it is much more than just managing the commodity or supplies.

Commodity management also entails establishing the infrastructure necessary to handle these commodities. The infrastructure must account for the right type and quantity of personnel and equipment necessary to administer the supplies. It includes establishing the training required to ensure those personnel are capable to use the equipment in a safe manner both effectively and efficiently.
In the spirit of the American culture, the US Army has developed advanced accountability procedures which can maintain up-to-date accountability of all classes of supply within a five minute window anywhere in the world. The LRT is an enterprise-based application on a computer system called the BCS3. Each system costs around $10,000 and can provide real time data for every supply and show the location of each shipment armed with a GPS device—and the output is a simple spreadsheet that can be manipulated to show the classes of supply desired (Table 4.2). It truly provides a Logistics COP which provides commanders the information they need to analyze the battlefield environment and make the best decisions he/she can.

The Army has more than 10 systems all designed to manage the request, receipt, issuance, storage, tracking and forecasting of all classes of supply as well as provide the tactical network connectivity required to ‘blast’ the data across the battlefield. These include the PBUS-E, Combat Service Support Automated Information Systems Interface (CAISI), Very Small Aperture Terminal (VSAT), SAMS-E, Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information form Movement System II (TC-AIMS II), Standard Army Retail Supply System (SARSS), Standard Army Ammunition System-Modernized (SAAS-MOD), BCS3, LRT, Defense Medical Logistics Standard Support Customer Assistance Module (DCAM) among others. Each system takes weeks, sometimes months, of training to become proficient enough to operate. There are additional systems and some noted above that perform more than one function. For instance, the TC-AIMS II assists in building deployment plans and also can track the movement of supplies. The SAMS-E manages Class IX (repair parts) as well as manages the deadlined equipment and issues licenses for military equipment.
These systems allow commanders and operators at all levels the sophisticated details needed to effectively make decisions and forecast availability of assets (i.e. troops, equipment, and ammunition). These systems require a lot of external support capabilities including power generation, internet connectivity, fuel for the generators, mechanics and network managers to ensure continuous connectivity.

![Classes of Supply Table](image)

Figure 4-1: Above is the Army defined ten Classes of Supply annotated by Roman numerals or with army graphics usually depicted on maps.
Table 4.1: Condition Codes for army equipment and ammunition. Below are the different codes assigned to equipment or ammunition following a technical inspection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>Serviceable (issuable without qualification)</td>
<td>New, used, or repaired materiel that is serviceable and issuable to all customers without limitation or restriction. Includes materiel with more than 6 months' shelf life remaining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Serviceable (issuable without qualification)</td>
<td>New, used, or repaired materiel that is serviceable and issuable for its intended purpose. Includes materiel with 3 through 6 months' shelf life remaining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Serviceable (priority issue)</td>
<td>Items that are serviceable and issuable to selected customers, but must be issued, when feasible, before condition A and B materiel to avoid loss as a usable asset. Includes materiel with less than 3 months' shelf life remaining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Serviceable (test/modification)</td>
<td>Serviceable items that require test, alteration, modification, conversion, or disassembly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>Unserviceable (limited restoration)</td>
<td>Items that involve only limited expense or efforts to restore to serviceable condition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>Unserviceable (reparable)</td>
<td>Economically reparable items that need repair or overhaul.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>Suspended (ammunition suitable for emergency combat use only)</td>
<td>Ammunition stocks suspended from issue except for emergency combat use.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.2: A sample shows the on-hand quantities of Class I and Class III that commodity managers use to easily identify status of supplies and who is being supported.

FOB Denver Log Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>JP8 Consumption Rate</th>
<th>3,000</th>
<th>Headcount</th>
<th>516</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commodity</td>
<td>Stockage Objective</td>
<td>O/H</td>
<td>Status</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MREs (cases)</td>
<td>258</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGR-As (each)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP8</td>
<td>9,000</td>
<td>13,101</td>
<td>146%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4.2.2 Maintenance Operations

In maintenance operations, commander’s value knowing what the status of their equipment is at all times. Systems have been procured and training conducted to ensure the commander always has an accurate picture of what’s called the Operational Readiness Rate (OR%). Commanders value this because the American culture values timeliness. If systems are down, then operations are halted or degraded. Meeting objectives on time, whether it’s an assault through a hostile village or keeping up with communications checks, vehicles and radios must remain at a high OR% or operations suffer. (AR 700-138, 39) Commanders also value maintenance because they value human life. If a vehicle breaks down during a mission, then those Soldiers are left in the open and prone to enemy fire.

Maintenance operations include fixing deadline equipment, conducting scheduled services, and executing recovery missions. The main objective in managing maintenance operations is to ensure the OR% is as close to 100% as possible. This ensures all assigned equipment is fully mission capable (FMC) which in turn tells the Commander what assets
he has available to accomplish the mission. A report called the “Slant Report” (Figure 4-3) provides this report in a clear and concise format. (FM 71-123, 46)

Reports and metrics have been created showing the exact status of every piece of equipment assigned to that unit. Specifically, the Deadline Report also called an “O26 report” named as such because of the printout report provided by the automation system that houses the maintenance data, provides the serial number of the piece of equipment deadline, the parts on order, and status of parts in the pipeline (Figure 4-2). (DA PAM 750-8, 7) The main cultural factors associated with this level of detail and fidelity concerning maintenance management includes the desire to have every bit of information you can up to date to make the best decision possible. The other has to do with value of human life. Ensuring vehicles and weapons are operational gives Soldiers the best chance of survival outside of any base camp. Some cultures put a higher value on life than others. Proactive maintenance operations ensure the greatest chance of survival for US Soldiers. While Figure 4-2 may seem daunting, with a few months of training, this information can be effectively managed. However, because this is very detailed information, it makes transitioning tools like this to Iraqis and Afghans very difficult.
Figure 4-2: The O26, or Deadline Report, provides the commander a snapshot of when all deadlined equipment will be fixed. It has details for every part on order.

The Slant report (Figure 4-3) is a simpler report that shows what equipment is on hand and the status—whether it is fully mission capable (FMC) or not. While it looks simple, data such as what kind of fault or deadline, the commander’s assessment of the safe use of the equipment, and the purpose for which the equipment is being used, all plays a role in determining whether or not equipment is FMC. The idea of such analysis is considerably more intimidating to Iraqi and Afghan troops where a functioning piece of equipment works and Allah will either let it keep working or it will quit. They believe that fate will determine the outcome of many of their situations and therefore can take this approach to maintenance management as well.
Figure 4-3: The Slant report shows all mission-critical and command directed reportable vehicles, weapons and equipment. It shows on-hand quantities and FMC status.

4.2.3 Medical Sustainment Operations

The Army takes great care to ensure Soldiers are provided for before, during and after missions are conducted. Significant time and resources have been spent upgrading facilities, increasing training, providing the capabilities and updating policies and procedures to put it all into an efficient operational program to take care of the Soldier.

The American culture values a high quality of care for its Soldiers. In addition, we are blessed as a country with the resources to even care for people well into their mature ages as can be seen with Medicare and Medicaid. This is an evolved value meaning that society appears to care more now than they did in the Vietnam War era for the health and
wellbeing of our Soldiers. Medical operations has had significant gains in treating wounded Soldiers and caring for their Post Traumatic Stress Disorders (PTSD) beginning in the 1990’s and really advancing throughout the War on Terror.

Medical sustainment operations include establishing, running and sustaining four levels of medical care. Level 1 is conducted with a Physician’s Assistant (PA) and two or three Army Medics. This type of care provides standard sick call, cuts, scrapes, and medical evaluations and checkups. Level 2 consists of all ancillary services. These services include dental, physical therapy, behavior health, X-ray, preventative medicine and medical warehouse operations. These operations, while not detrimental in saving lives, show how the US Military takes care of their Soldiers. The goal is to provide the best care as far forward on the battlefield as possible and to treat the Soldier effectively, whether physical or mental, and get that Soldier back into the fight. Soldiers who require additional attention are evacuated to America to get the additional help they need. (FM 4-0, 5-20)

Level 3 includes surgical operations. Soldiers requiring Level 3 care are usually moved to the nearest facility, treated just enough to stop the bleeding or stabilize, and then moved back to a Level 4 (hospital) facility. The Army has created what’s called the “Golden Hour”. The “Golden Hour” rule states that if you get a Soldier to a Level 3 facility within one hour of the incident the Soldier has a great chance of surviving. “Historically, wound data and casualty rates indicate that more than 90 percent of all casualties die within the first hour of severe wounding without advanced trauma life support.” (Strawder, 61)
This entire process is a testimony to the American values of caring for Soldiers and using its resources to establish the infrastructure (manning, training, equipping) necessary to sustain such operations. Each of these levels of care requires immense personnel, training and equipment in order to carry out the tasks to provide adequate care. The machines require medical equipment maintenance personnel. All facilities require Class VIII in both dry and cold storage capacities. The logistics supply chain is a key planning factor in the development of a concept of support for any pending operation. Key planning factors include ensuring all operations are conducted within the “Golden Hour” circle, ensuring an uninterrupted supply chain of Class VIII, providing trained medical providers across the battlefield and as far forward to the action as possible, and developing a medical maintenance program.
Chapter 5

Culture Which Drives Iraqi Sustainment Operations

There is no single and all-inclusive Arab culture. Different cultures exist within different Arabian geographical areas the same as there are different cultures between New England and the Mid-West. However, just as America has a set of basic cultural similarities, so does the Arab culture. These cultures drive what is important and what is valued. These values direct what resources are given to develop the infrastructure necessary to accomplish that which is valued.

For Arabs, honor and respect of family and friendship is of the utmost importance. Families, then tribes, are extremely important in the Arab culture. Anything one can do to take care of their family, then tribe, is considered honorable. This is where defining such things as stealing and cheating differ greatly from the American to Arabic cultures. For Arabic cultures, you aren’t stealing or cheating if you are doing it to simply take care of your family--and that is honorable. (Arab Cultur to both men and women?; al Awareness: 58 Factsheets, 10-13)

Arabs also “value justice and equality among Muslims, and to a lesser degree others.” (ibid, 9) This is an important fact to understand. Equality does not mean equality with other ethnicities and faiths, only with Muslims. Their interactions and motivations come with first appreciating their value for justice. This leads in to how they go about
developing their SOPs concerning interactions with other countries and cultures. This also ties in to how they interact with external military organizations discussed in Chapter 6.

As for quality of life, it isn’t so much Arabs don’t value a material aspect of life but more so has to do with their faith. The vast majority of Arabs are spiritual people. Most believe that “many, if not all, things in life are controlled by the will of God (fate) rather than by human beings.” (ibid, 9-13) If you live in luxury, it is the will of God (Allah). If you don’t, then Allah didn’t want you to. This way of appreciating your slot in life minimizes the need to resource and seek that which Allah did not intend anyway.

Finally, tradition is of considerable value to the Arab culture, especially that of undeveloped countries. (Arab) These traditions include an immense respect for elders and a submissive approach to age and sex. Younger men yield respect and submission to the elders (men); women do the same for men. This is found in the military through command channels as well as functional management positions such as influencing contracts and approval documents to filter through certain respected individuals that would otherwise not play a role in approving or managing such commodities.

In the Iraqi Army (IA) these values, which admittedly are a small set of the total values attributed to the Arab culture, are worked out in the daily operations by which they operate. Organizational hierarchy is developed to show respect to the tribes and leaders above other tribes and leaders. Paperwork processes through offices that have no reason to approve a request and yet are given the respect to offer their signature as a sign of authority and respect. Corruption isn’t black and white. If one is procuring ammunition and selling it to the Iranians on the side, he is making a living for his family. If Soldiers
desert for a while and come back without their uniform and weapon, it is because they
gave it to their family or sold it to provide for their family and therefore is provided
another set of uniforms and another AK-47 and minimal questions arise. If food and
shelter isn’t provided to a Soldier by the Commander, it is both Allah’s will and that
Commander’s prerogative and it is not to be questioned. It is interesting that what
American’s would consider deplorable conditions and rampant corruption is taken with
reverence to Allah’s will, humility toward elders and leaders, and respect for taking care
of one’s own in the Arab culture.

5.1 Iraqi History and Innovation

While the US Army has enjoyed innovation through the identification of a need
and the resources to procure, the Iraqi Army has not been as fortunate. They are stifled
from years of oppression by a militant dictator who forced military service on his people.
People are not normally empowered to develop new practices or create efficiencies under
these conditions. (Saddam Hussein) Therefore, little innovation exists from the bottom
up. The Iraqi Army, as with the US Military, is a sub-culture of the Arabic culture rich in
the same traditions and values which give the Arab culture its uniqueness. Since 2003,
the Iraqi Army has been building its forces and capabilities to align with its new
freedoms and new challenges since the end of Sadaam’s control over the country. The
Honorable Paul Bremer disbanded the Iraqi military in May of 2003 which was not
properly funded in the first place. (Fallows, 3) Beginning in early 2004, it was decided
that Iraq should again develop and enhance their security forces. One of the biggest
impacts this decision had was that it kept Soldiers and Officers from continued service if
they had served in the ranks of the Iraqi Fedayeen Army or were a part of the Baath
Party. From a logistical sustainment standpoint, those with experience in managing and running logistics in Iraq and along its roads were no longer able to provide guidance and direction on the ensuing rebuilding of the Iraqi Armed Forces. This meant that all functional logistics required reestablishment and retraining.

Iraqi culture is very tribal in nature. There are three factions that politically and socially do not get along and are constantly battling for power. These are the Shia, the Sunni and the Kurds (of Kurdistan). While all are Iraqi citizens, religious and geographical battles have displaced nationalistic pride. (Arab) Cross-provincial commerce and free trade do exist but in limited fashion and the motivation to develop the infrastructure required to further the efforts do not exist. The goal to rapidly provide connectivity and mobility for the armed forces does not exist on a state level. When units were being created in early 2004 on through 2010, they were established within tribes and regions to a great deal.

5.2 Iraqi Army Sustainment Operations

Functional sustainment areas are the same as noted above in Chapter 4.2. They include commodity management (supplies, distribution, infrastructure, and training), maintenance operations and medical sustainment operations. However, the doctrine, policies, procedures, training and equipping developed to provide sustainment operations within the Iraqi Army differs greatly from the US Army. Some things are simpler, some more complex.

5.2.1 Iraqi Army Commodity Management
Commodity management in the Iraqi Army is managed from very high levels within the Ministry’s of Defense and Interior. The Government Accounting Office (GAO) led a study in late 2006 to trace a fuel order placed by an Iraqi company. The order went through the Company Commander, through the Battalion Commander, through the Brigade Commander, and through the Division Commander. Then it gets complicated. Once it left the Division Commander’s desk, the request is moved to the MoD. Within the Defense building, the request is pushed through multiple desks, many of which do not manage fuel. However, out of respect for certain men in certain positions, the request does require their signatures. When the process map was developed it showed a staggering 47 signatures were required to approve the fuel request. Surprisingly, the entire process was hand carried by a Supply Sergeant at the company level and took about two to three weeks to complete.

This process, while seemingly recrementitious, proved quite effective time after time. The process was successful at providing fuel to the requesting party while adhering to the customs and courtesies valued in this culture. As long as planners can appreciate the timeline associated with this process, they can coordinate redistribution operations, procure adequate capacities and develop the reporting and requesting battle rhythm concerning this commodity.

Ammunition operations provide another example of commodity management operations built on the basis of fundamental values associated with the Arab culture. Concerning ammunition management, security and accountability are managed to tailor the values of family and tribe. Ammunition depots are managed by officers that belong to that region. COL Sehel, the Bayji Ammunition Depot Commander from 2006-Present is
from the general region and was picked as a strategic move to ensure ammunition would not be pilfered from that location. (Dittmar, 1) The depot was further outfitted with Kurdish tower guards to prevent any theft from within the base by Iraqi Soldiers. This concept was built on the premise of an understanding of the cultural conflicts between the Kurdish-Iraqis and non-Kurdish-Iraqis.

Accountability of supplies is all counted and tracked with ledgers. While ledgers may not provide the most up-to-date information and may be tougher to track than simply typing a formula into a spreadsheet, it appears to work for the Iraqis to such an extent, at least, that supplies are continuously provided to the end customer--the unit that needs them.

Iraq takes a very different approach from America when identifying logistics personnel and providing them training. The IA Form 101 (MOI Form 101 for the Ministry of Interior Police Forces) and the AF 14 (Figure 5-1) are the forms required to request and receive food, toiletries, fuel, ammunition, vehicles, equipment, medical supplies and spare parts. It is an extremely versatile form and needs virtually no training to complete. Because the system of record is a ledger, the requesting documents are one form deep, and any decisions concerning the disposition of supplies is provided by older men of power, therefore there is not a real need for training of logistics personnel. Establishing an infrastructure of manned and trained supply billets becomes relatively simplistic.
Figure 5-1: Above is the Afghan Forces request and receipt (AF 14) form for all classes of supply. Note the seven signatures required to procure pens and pencils.

5.2.2 Iraqi Army Maintenance Operations

Maintenance operations were relatively simplistic for maintenance operations in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to OIF and OEF. Equipment is divided in three main categories: shoot, move and communicate. Shoot-type equipment includes all weapon systems. Move-type equipment includes all vehicles, trailers and other platforms that haul either troops or other equipment. Communicate-type equipment includes all radio and network connectivity systems.

As in most countries in Eastern Europe, Asia, South America and Africa, Iraq and Afghanistan use AK-47s and RPGs for the majority of their shooting capabilities. According to the World Bank Organization, “Of the estimated 500 million firearms worldwide, approximately 100 million belong to the Kalashnikov family, three-quarters
of which are AK-47s.” (qtd in Killicoat, 3) There are several benefits in using this type of weapon system. First, they are cheap. They can be purchased from $40 to $225. (ibid, 22) Second, there are more of these weapons in country than any other type of weapon. Since OIF and OEF began, Iraq and Afghanistan have received more than 185,000 and 65,000 respectively. (Thompson) This means, as one breaks, they can either cannibalize it for spare parts or just pick up another and continue mission. Third, AK-47s and RPGs are extremely resistant to the elements in an arid desert environment.

In Iraq, M4s, M249s, and M2s, all weapons the US army uses, have been issued to all the Iraqi Army divisions. In 2008, the United States started training the Afghans on the use of the M-16 instead of their trusty AK-47. These weapon systems require extensive training to maintain and fix when necessary. These systems are also more prone to misfires and jamming in the desert since even a small amount of dirt or sand can jam the systems bolt. A significant stock of spare weapons parts were purchased and placed in regional distribution centers in anticipation of weapons malfunctions.

Prior to OIF and OEF, move-type equipment consisted of Toyota and Mercedes sedans and pickup trucks. These vehicles, like the Soviet weapon systems were standardized pieces of equipment and constituted the vast majority of motorized platforms in these Arab nations. The local village repair facilities could easily repair tires, engines, etc since these vehicles can be considered a standardized product. The ISF does not have to develop a maintenance capability within their ranks to the extent that US Forces do. They can rely on the local economy to repair their vehicles or provide newer ones and the government simply compensates the local repair shop.
Since 2004, America has been purchasing Ford F-series trucks and Suburbans to build up the capability of a better fleet of vehicles with up armor. Through Foreign Military Sales and nation-to-nation donations there are 17 different manufactured vehicles within the MoD and MoI. (US Government Printing Office, 11) They have also purchased several types of the medium tactical vehicles (MTVs) similar to the platforms the US Army uses today—15 different types. However, with the introduction of these new platforms come new infrastructure requirements. Soldiers do not have the skills or the parts to maintain this equipment. “The maintenance of the Iraqi military’s vehicles is complicated by the diversity of MoD’s fleet, the lack of trained mechanics, and the failure to budget for and maintain an authorized stockage level for equipment.” (ibid, 5)

Without a continued national maintenance contract, it is unlikely that shoot, move, and communicate type systems can be maintained past the warranty time period and will most likely revert back to Russian-style weapons and communication systems and Toyota and Mercedes type vehicle fleets where parts and systems are fairly ubiquitous throughout the region.

5.2.3 Iraqi Army Medical Sustainment Operations

Prior to OIF, Iraq was a leader in healthcare in the Middle East. “The Iraqi government developed a centralized, free healthcare system by using a hospital-based, capital-intensive model of curative care.” (Rodriguez, 42) The war destroyed about 12% of Iraqi hospitals and decimated the medical logistics supply chain. The war also led to a mass exodus of healthcare professionals out of Iraq. To reestablish the healthcare industry the Ministry of Health (MoH) needed to employ trained professionals, rebuild the supply chain infrastructure so that Class VIII could flow regularly, and rebuild several
facilities including hospitals and medical logistics warehouses. A state agency called Kimadia “is the sole source authorized by law for management, planning, selection, quantification, procurement, storage, and distribution of medicines and medical equipment.” (ibid, 41)

Where medical personnel and care of Soldiers on the battlefield is a Department of Defense function in the United States, in Iraq the MoH oversees this aspect of operations. So the legal obligation to use Kimadia has a direct impact on the flexibility and survivability of medical logistics and, in turn, medical sustainment operations. The Iraq and Afghan armies do not embed medical personnel within their ranks as the US Army does. However, they can provide self-aid and buddy-aid with small medical bags assigned to a few Soldiers per platoon. These supplies are replenished through a distribution system using the standard requisition form IA 101 as depicted in Figure 5-2. The continuous replenishment of stocks is the responsibility of Kimadia with oversight from the MoH. MTTs focused primarily on developing medical evacuation capabilities and Class VIII replenishment by developing reporting and tracking methods that interlink both the Ministries of Defense and Health.

Level 1 and Level 2 facilities do not exist within the MoD to after buddy-aid has been provided on the battlefield, the Soldier is transported to the nearest village or city hospital. Because of the lack of healthcare professionals, Army Medics, Physical Therapists, Lab Technicians, Behavioral Health Specialists and other Level 2 providers are not allocated within the ranks of these nations’ medical infrastructure. The priority of effort and subsequent funding for the Governments of Iraq and Afghanistan is to establish medical facilities and logistics infrastructure to support the entire population and not
build a separate and parallel system for Security Forces only. Security forces are authorized to use such facilities. The focus is not yet on building these same capabilities within the armed forces but could be one day.

There have been some successes for the emplacement of medical personnel within the ranks of some units in Iraq. However, these were not authorized through the MoD or MoI. Rather, these were well-intentioned initiatives of certain MTTs. However, there is no evidence of any sustained program in any of the ISF units.

Figure 5-2: The Class VIII replenishment requisition process is simplistic and effective.
Chapter 6

Transitioning Sustainment

Transitioning sustainment operations in Iraq has been a major goal since the summer of 2004 with the creation of the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I). MNSTC-I’s mission was to “generate and replenish Iraqi Security Forces; improve the quality of the ISF and institutional performance in the process in order to increase ISF capability to increasingly assume responsibility for population protection and develop Iraqi security institutions capable of sustaining security with reduced Coalition involvement.” (Harris, 21) In Afghanistan, it has been a major focus across the entire Afghan state since October 2006, although it began in 2003. The same mission focus applies for Afghanistan as it did in Iraq—to minimize the level of Coalition support needed to sustain security forces allowing the nations to effectively manage themselves. (Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force)

6.1 Commodity Management Transition

Brigadier General Jalal al Najaf, Director of Ammunition, MoD, Iraq stated that, “American units need to train ammunition operations in such a way that captures all the capabilities and limitations of the Iraqi Forces and uses them in their consumption factors.” (BG Jalal, IA. Personal interview, Aug. 2006) The US Army needs to cease emplacing automation where analog methods [journals] will work. While some Iraqi
processes are analogous and not exact as Americans would want it, they work. In Iraq, each section of the MNSTC-I Logistics Office worked with a different commodity manager within the MoD and MoI to develop policies and procedures to effectively manage all classes of supply at every level. The MTTs would work with the units to implement and action the regulations and policies. Automation was mandated at every level to the greatest extent thus subjugating western process over cultural considerations.

Simplistic automation was developed at first including simple spreadsheets and Word documents. As the transition continued, more sophisticated tracking systems were introduced that only complicated operations further. At one point in late 2006, a spreadsheet managed by MNSTC-I was compared to a ledger managed by the MoD Ammunition Officer. They compared ammunition on hand counts at all five Regional Support Units and the National Ammunition Depot in Bayji, Iraq. The ledger was within a few thousand rounds of the MNSTC-I spreadsheets. When looking at upwards of $850 million worth of ammunition that Coalition Forces were aware of throughout Iraq, a few thousand rounds is good enough for transition. It was never the intent to perfect sustainment operations, but to provide a good enough transition that would endure.

Automation is not the only sticking point in transition. Cultural awareness plays a big role influencing consumption factors and signature authorities. As discussed in Chapter 5, tribal loyalty and respect for elders plays huge roles in how a supply requisition gets approved. In 2006, there were 10 Iraqi Army divisions. 5th Division was provided transportation assets before 4th Division. When 4th Division needed resupplied from the Regional Supply Unit, they required transportation assistance from 5th Division. The Coalition MTTs pushed 4th Division to use 5th Division assets and so they did.
However, they didn’t realize that 4\textsuperscript{th} Division and 5\textsuperscript{th} Division were from two different tribes; one tribe was predominately Sunni while the other was Shia. 5\textsuperscript{th} Division agreed to assist with supply transport but charged an 80\% ‘fee’ for the assistance. While this is appalling in US Army operations, it is standard practice in Iraq. Instead of accepting this, US Forces brought a formal complaint up the chain of command to the MoD level. The 5\textsuperscript{th} Division Commander was reprimanded and relations between US MTTs and his unit were impeded. The 5\textsuperscript{th} Division did not trust the US MTTs until a new unit came in reestablishing relationships.

The MTT should have accepted the process as standard practice and added the 80\% to their consumption planning factors which would have simply resulted in higher safety stocks and an increase to 4\textsuperscript{th} Division’s reorder point. Culturally, this was acceptable practice because the unit was taking care of its own family and tribes while garnishing respect for their elder commanders within the unit. This is not considered unethical by Arab standards and therefore no repercussions are necessary. It is tough for western thought to believe this should continue but it works in their cultures.

As shown in Figure 5-1, one form simplifies the requisition process but several signatures are still required for approval to release supplies from regional warehouses. In this example, seven signatures are required for obtaining Class II. According to the GAO report, 47 signatures are required to obtain Class III. This process was not understood by the MTTs who were trying to improve the performance of the entire supply chain and speed up the time it took to receive supplies. They argued that in a wartime environment, you can’t wait for multiple signatures but were discounting the importance of elderly respect.
To streamline the process as the US Army does it, using automated systems where Supply Sergeants at the unit level can order anything authorized within the Defense system, would eliminate the requirement for IA units to seek approval from their chain of command. This would be completely disrespectful and out of character for any Iraqi to do. Seeking approval from command is a sign of respect. In addition, it also takes away the responsibility from that individual and puts it on the approving authority. Attempts to streamline the process best case hindered relations with MTTs and their unit counterparts and worst case slighted those in command positions and put the IA Soldier who complied with the MTT request at risk of being fired or taking his pay for a time.

The Iraqis, better than US Forces, know how to accurately forecast for their region. For instance, concerning fuel consumption planning, a westerner might account for each vehicle in a unit’s fleet and determine the operational hours it will run daily. Then, it will identify the fuel consumption per hour and total up an adequate forecast. An Iraqi may do the same thing but will also factor in pilferage, an additional two to three weeks to receive more, and the influence his boss has in the region; the more powerful the boss/commander, the less likely their fuel will be stolen or blown up. These are all real factors that one must use and that the MTTs decidedly failed to see when transitioning strategic and operational planning techniques. No automated system will show variables like these.

When forecasting consumption factors for 9mm ammunition, it was noted that Iraqis in the summer of 2006 were using one million rounds per month for the IA alone. When the Ammunition Program Manager for MNSTC-I dug into the details, it was noted that less than 200,000 rounds were being consumed in battle. The other 800,000 rounds
were being shot on Thursday nights during soccer matches and after weddings. Other portions were being given to family members to sell since they yielded $1 per round. Other rounds were sold or given to Iranians. The MTT working with MoD encouraged them to cease ordering that much 9mm and find ways to mitigate the problem. The MoD saw the problem but didn’t see it as stealing. It was a way for that Soldier to support his family…that is it. Instead of arguing, the MTT simply added the consumption into the planning factor and continued procurement under the assigned set of parameters. This is an example of what all commodity managers should be doing instead of getting Arabs to change their ways and turn their backs on supporting their families as their first priority in life.

Finally, tracking everything in details leaves a paper trail. CPT Steve Dawson states that “There is very little actual documentation as they avoid actual documentation at all costs. That ambiguity allows them to re-allocate as they see fit later on. Therein lies the problem with the retail Afghan logistics system.” (CPT Dawson, USA, email interview, 24 Jul. 2012) To avoid losing credibility to their family and to remain respectful towards their higher commanders, minimal paperwork proves advantageous.

6.2 Maintenance Operations Transition

There are three significant reasons maintenance transition is ineffective to a great degree. The first is automation. The second is fleet variation and the third is strategic and operational forecasting and distribution.

As discussed before, the ISF does not utilize automation to the extent western units do and as such, it makes it hard to reach a level of fidelity concerning readiness that MTTs would like to see and that they define as effective. This way of thinking falls in
line with the Arab belief that if Allah wants the mission to be successful, He will ensure the equipment works when it needs to. There is an Iraqi saying: “Ensh’ Allah”. This means ‘God willing’ and is stated in every mission planning event myself or interviewees had been involved with either in Iraq or Afghanistan. It is simply their way to accept whatever happens, happens….as a matter of God’s will.

Measurements and tracking tools like the OR%, Slant Reports and Deadline Reports help make tracking maintenance readiness effective. They show commanders and decision makers how the readiness of their equipment affects operations. They establish a COP of capabilities that, when combined with a trained Soldier, can execute any mission given. The IA does not have such tools and for very good reasons. Trying to prove that automation will increase visibility on readiness is simple and can be taught. However, it does not appear it can be sustained because it goes against the Arab way of thinking. Planning like this puts the outcome in the hands of the Commander with obvious accountability. It is best to leave it to Allah and fate.

Second, fleet variation makes it very difficult to maintain the expertise and parts to cover all equipment provided to the MoD and MoI. “The maintenance of forklifts, vehicles, and generators necessary to support day-to-day operations has suffered as well because of a lack of spare parts.” (US Government Printing Office, 5) The US Army has a standard set of vehicles called the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles (FMTVs). Fuel trucks, tow trucks, and troop transport vehicles are all FMTV and several parts like tires, wiring harnesses, fuel pumps, etc are all interchangeable which lessens the burden on the supply chain that supports these vehicles with Class III and Class IX.
The Iraqi Government has completed foreign military sales contracts to authorize the purchase or accept nation-to-nation donations of 17 different makes and models for their ISF fleets. This increases the amount of parts required to remain on hand as well as the training programs required to keep troops knowledgeable at maintaining these fleets. The ISF budget cannot maintain a sustainable plan for the fleets either. The nation simply does not have the funds or desire to sustain the complete set of fleet vehicles. Unfortunately, transition has proven impossible without the use of a national maintenance contract which provides the trained personnel and stockage levels for all equipment. (ibid, 8) In 2008, the ISF budgetary committee looked at reducing the fleet to just one or two variants of systems.

Without more advanced systems forecasting and procurement strategies can be difficult. When the Honorable Paul Bremer let the Army go, knowledgeable people that planned and forecasted supplies were also cut. There is a good chance several of these people were part of the Ba’ath Party with close ties to Sadaam Hussain and therefore would not be returning to service as the ISF stood back up. Therefore, historical requirements necessary for adequate forecasting and planning of Class IX does not exist in the short term. And if the Class IX has precious metals like platinum or copper, units must increase their consumption factors because that part is liable to be sold before it ever makes it to the vehicle or weapon it was ordered to fix. This is the reality that was not focused on in Iraq. MTTs spent countless days trying to keep the Iraqis from ‘stealing’ and ‘lying’. But they didn’t realize the Soldier was just looking out for his family and tribe. Approaches must change if sustained solutions to maintenance operations are to be realized.
6.3 Medical Sustainment Operations Transition

The reality of medical sustainment operations in Iraq is that there simply isn’t the effort or the funding priority to establish an infrastructure within the Security Forces. The MoH is devoted to building a medical program that benefits the entire population. It is quite a hurdle since a great deal of health providers left Iraq since 2003 and the logistical infrastructure was left in ruins. Great gains have been made to develop a medical infrastructure since 2003. MNSTC-I worked with the MoD and MoI health officials “on healthcare policy, preventive medicine, medical training, medical logistics, and facility planning. The health affairs medical logistics section played a crucial role in the initial distribution of Class VIII, in the design, development, and equipping of medical infrastructure and logistics systems.” (Rodriguez, 42) The lack of prioritizing medical personnel within the ranks of the ISF have less to do with their cultural values and more to do with the lack of healthcare professionals and adequate service for the rest of the country. However, prioritization does take account, at least in part, that of the populous and their perceived value of the ISF in their provinces.

The ISF is not without its challenges. Excessive bureaucracy, lack of healthcare professionals and an immature supply chain and medical maintenance program are the major deficiencies still attributing to a slow rebuilding healthcare infrastructure. The US Army has teamed up with healthcare officials within the MoD and MoI to attack these issues. With US assistance, the MoH has aggressively sought to improve safer working conditions, higher salaries, and better retirement packages to entice healthcare professionals to re-enter Iraq’s medical facilities. MNSTC-I assisted by providing recruiting campaigns and outreach programs. Additionally, the Ministries required
MNSTC-I to assist in spending funds earmarked for healthcare due to bureaucratic inefficiencies as a result of a newly formed government.

MNSTC-I provided medical logistics training opportunities for the ISF from 2004 until the US left Iraq in 2011. “The program included guidance on how medical logistics professionals can identify awareness and training needs, develop a training plan, and get organizational buy-in for the funding of awareness and training program efforts.” (ibid, 44) The challenges that face medical sustainment operations in Iraq include significant quantities of expired supplies, immature inventory automation to manage supplies throughout the regional warehouses, maintaining a COP of medical supplies throughout Iraq, and a lack of vendors. Developing long-term key relationships with different healthcare organizations and taking ownership of their processes are critical to the sustainment of medical operations in Iraq that help the citizens of Iraq and the ISF. “The success or failure of Iraq will depend chiefly on whether domestic realities and dynamics are accurately understood and can be translated into a form of government that sets priorities for healthcare provided by the Iraqi constituency.” (ibid, 44)
Chapter 7

Discussion

7.1 Commodity Management: The Way Ahead

Commodity management has been successfully transitioned to the Iraqi forces. The regional distribution centers established with MNSTC-I’s assistance have proven effective at providing supplies to their supported units. However, according to Rafaa Al-Khalidi, who worked as a translator for MNSTC-I from 2005 through 2008, states that all commodities that he is aware of are being tracked with journals and log books and that gaining approval for supplies for any unit still takes ministry-level approval. (Al-Khalidi, Civilian. telephone interview, 7 Aug. 2012) Culturally, this is acceptable and even effective. Respect is maintained, supplies are tracked and issued, and minimal infrastructure is required to maintain the supply chain.

The SFATs in Afghanistan must work with the Afghan Security Forces to develop sustainable commodity management activities and infrastructure. They must understand that culture will influence their values. Tribal traditions including border management and consternation within provinces, respect for elders including those empowered to make decisions even if it’s against efficiencies in supply chain management, traditional values and beliefs that fate and Allah influence the outcome of all things instead of trying to track up to the minute logistics status—these are the boundaries by which SFATs need
to establish the policies and procedures to manage commodities. The use of technology is fine to integrate so long as it fits within the confines of the parameters stated above. Any policy or procedure emplaced must respect the cultural values of the Afghanistan or it will be doomed to a short-lived solution. Only that which stays in the parameters that respect the Afghan culture can expect to sustain long term. If the SFATs can approach transition in this way, they will be successful.

Most challenging in developing a sustainable logistics supply chain capable of supporting the Afghan Security Forces is running that supply chain across the provinces where the terrain is difficult and more importantly the tribes are unwilling to support each other. The current structure is being built like that in Iraq where there are a couple national warehouses that feed several regional warehouses. “Unfortunately, current efforts to create a sustainable Afghan Army center solely on military logistics organizations and rely too heavily on Western methods for managing military logistics—an approach that will likely be abandoned immediately after NATO’s departure.” (Richter, 1) The Afghan culture demands segregated sustainment more tribal in nature. The government can provide national warehouses, but then the supplies will need to flow to provincial warehouses and even regional where tribal boundaries exist.

7.2 Maintenance Operations: The Way Ahead

Maintenance transition in Iraq was largely unsuccessful. The integration of too many weapons and vehicle platforms overwhelmed the supply chain. Additionally, skilled maintenance professionals were not trained to maintain this equipment nor did they have the tools necessary to diagnose and repair the equipment. A national maintenance contract was established, with US funding, in order to facilitate a sustained
maintenance program for the ISF. Instead of leaning on the established Class IX supply chain where the ISF could go to their local village mechanic and get their Toyotas and Mercedes fixed, an entirely new supply chain was created to support the M4s, western communications gear, and the 17 different manufactured vehicles 15 different types of MTVs.

The budgetary focus within the ISF has been on building operational forces and not logistics and sustainment forces. Until maintenance sustainability becomes a value of the leadership within the MoD and MoI, a downward trend in maintenance operations is expected to continue. Likewise, the cultural belief in “Ensh Allah” as a valid replacement for planning and preparation will also yield a sub-par maintenance program. This is unlikely to change as cultural tendencies will most always outweigh tactical planning since they are values based.

The maintenance infrastructure is really a strategic issue rather than a tactical. The equipment donated by neighboring countries, purchased by NATO forces, or procured with Afghan dollars all require a sustainment plan. Are there warranties to leverage? Are there trained personnel with the right equipment or is there a plan to train and equip the right personnel? How will parts flow into Afghanistan and is it possible to develop a reverse logistics process to recapture some costs? Will the security forces run a parallel maintenance program or work within their villages to share resources and trained expertise? All these questions are predicated on the equipment the Ministry’s of Defense and Interior decide to procure.

At the Ministry level, advisors must lead the Afghan leadership to procure only that which can be sustained. Advisors must find ways to influence the appropriation of
funds to support maintenance contracts and training programs. Advisors must do this while understanding the “Ensh Allah” principle which is counterintuitive to the budget appropriations concept yet still a vital part of a maintenance success plan.

At the SFAT levels who partner with the Kandaks (Battalions), maintenance operations must be simplistic and effective utilizing the supply chain that already exists within the villages. SFATs must appreciate the relationship between the civilians and Security Forces in that Area of Operation (AO). SFATs must leverage the relationships between the unit commander and the elders of the village to influence the appropriate level of support that each element can provide within maintenance operations.

7.3 Medical Sustainment Operations: The Way Ahead

Medical capabilities varied greatly throughout Iraq. Some areas were successful in implementing a short-term effective medical infrastructure fit with trained medical Soldiers and some equipment. “The 7th Iraqi Army Division Headquarters Clinic, whose compound (Camp Mejid) was located nearby the Al Asad Contingency Operating Base, was staffed by five enlisted “medics” and three Warrant Officers and was overseen by three Commissioned Officers. Training and education of the medics varied greatly: all had completed three months of basic training, which included a course akin to the US Army’s Combat Life Saver Course.” (Lynn, and De Lorenzo, 998) Other locations never saw any sustained medical support implemented within those units.

The Lynn and De Lorenzo article shows something more. The successful MTT that were able to develop a health clinic in Al Asad ‘developed’ it in 2010. The war was almost over. Chances are that others had tried to establish a medical infrastructure before their MTT deployed but it was not sustainable and quickly ceased as MTTs came and left
again. While all MTTs do amazing work at developing and partnering as commanded, this example shows that the plans are not sustainable. Why not? In Lynn and De Lorenzo’s own words: “There was, in a general sense, the temptation on the part of the Combat Support Hospital team to provide ‘quick fixes’: providing the Iraqi’s with supplies or pharmaceuticals, rearranging their stockage, or even seeing patients for them…it violated the principles of the mission.” (ibid, 1001) When accomplishing the mission, a US Army unit will not fail. It is a value inherent to the spirit of America and definitely that of the US Army. But the efforts can only be fruitful if the successes are followed with a sustained program led by the Arab nation.

“The Iraqi Army’s system and infrastructure issues, along with the cultural differences, often made for challenging opportunities.” (ibid, 1001) Americans want success but must consider the autonomy the Arab nations would like to maintain. Pushing too hard perpetuates the stigma of American arrogance and there is a risk that one could lose the confidence of the Afghan counterparts. A good example used by Lynn and De Lorenzo’s troops was how they didn’t try to teach processes doctrinally. Instead, they let their Iraqi counterparts see the US medical forces operate in actual missions and observe the systems the US forces used to validate the importance of them.

In order to successfully transition medical sustainment operations in Afghanistan, one should heed the lessons from Lynn and De Lorenzo’s experiences as well as those of several other MTTs. Culturally sensitive transition is critical to success. Everything from the training to the execution must adhere to the principles of respect for elders, free of embarrassment when calling Soldiers out for not knowing the right answer and must have a sustainment plan embedded with the MoH, MoI and MoD so that as the senior
leadership approves of new units, policies, and other practices at the unit level they can buy in to it and allocate future funding supporting the program and ensuring a sustainable long-term solution.

7.4 Conclusion

Only time will tell whether the infrastructure emplaced in Iraq by so many MTTs will endure. The US Army and other Services reorganized themselves under the MNSTC-I structure when we learned that simply toppling a country’s leadership would not help long-term national security solutions. MNSTC-I was developed with the goal of reestablishing the ISF to be operational and self sufficient. The United States also dedicated billions of dollars and years of man-hours in hopes of providing a sustained environment for sustained operations including commodity management, maintenance and medical sustainment operations. Significant resources were poured into Iraq with the hopes of an outcome of a sustained ISF.

While gains were made, it is apparent that the process used was based on western values, western processes, western lines of thought, and external funding. In the short-term, there is a hybrid process in place in sustainment activities for the ISF. Computers are under warranty at the ministry levels and some commodity management is tracked through basic Excel spreadsheets. There is no integrated intranet or enterprise system to capture the status of commodities across the MoD or MoI, however. Vehicles and weapon systems are still under warranty and the government is still purchasing parts of the national maintenance contract to keep these systems running. Concerning medical operations, the biggest problems now exist in the MoH’s ability to spend its budget. “The MoH lacks the human resources and infrastructure to spend its full budget. This spending
deficit will become less pronounced as the country’s governance, infrastructure and human resources improve.” (Iraq Business Forecast Report 2, 22)

Figure 7-1 outlines the elements which must be understood in order to develop a sustainable logistics infrastructure. The main points are: “1) reliance on information automation systems is not likely to last long after coalition departure; 2) Afghans tend to reject alien ideas; 3) culture shapes choices, and 4) account for corruption and patronage in the recommended systems” (Richter, 23) These points show that western style logistics systems will not work. Some procedures in transition that should have been learned from Iraq and translated into a more effective Afghanistan strategy have been implemented while others have not.

**Why We Need to Reframe the Problem**

- Our goal was to create a system the Afghans can operate without coalition presence or money
- Trying to change the system rather than the Afghans is much cheaper and faster
- Western models assume western-style rational choice. Choices are shaped by culture and environment
- Underlying currents, invisible to the western eye, make some Afghani choices seem irrational
- Don’t focus on corruption. It is an erroneous concept for Afghanistan. The socio-economic system has a tradition of patronage and payoffs
- What the British, Soviets, and Americans have condemned as the corrosion of corruption is actually the main glue that holds the Afghan state in one piece

Figure 7-1: Reframe the Problem. Key points advocating embracing Afghan cultures during transition operations.
References


