A Thesis

entitled

Presidential Ideology and Foreign Policy: President George W. Bush’s Ideological Justification of the Decision to go to War against Iraq.

by

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Submitted to the Graduate Faculty as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Master of Arts Degree in Political Science

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December 2012
This thesis examines the ideology of George W. Bush prior to and during the Iraq War. In the decision to invade Iraq in 2003, George Bush used ideology to justify the invasion. The method used to determine the nature of Bush’s ideology is content analysis of Bush’s speeches. The thesis finds that George W. Bush's ideology regarding Iraq was heavily influenced by neo-conservatism, and was influenced very little by realism.
For my parents, siblings, friends, and fellow students. Without your support, none of this would have been possible.
Acknowledgements

I would not be the man I am today without Matthew and Kimberly Osburn. Their undying support has been the backbone of my successes in life. Just as important are Kelsey and Catherine Osburn. It is because of them that I strive to be the best at whatever I do. Finally, I would like to thank the Political Science faculty at the University of Toledo for their insight. Professors Mark Denham, David Davis, and David Wilson have been instrumental in the making of my thesis. I aspire to follow in their academic footsteps one day.
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Preface

On December 15th, 2011, the United States formally ended the Iraq War. The eight year war came to end as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta joined the Iraqi military at Baghdad International Airport to lower the white U.S. military flag, signifying the end of military involvement in the war torn nation. More than one million coalition troops were involved in the war. These efforts have not gone unrecognized, as the Iraqi government now holds free elections and consists of a largely democratic government. Though some may cite the logic behind the invasion as being flawed or even perhaps premature, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Matt Dempsey posits that the efforts were worth the cost. “We’ve paid a great price here, but it’s a price worth paying,” Dempsey expresses. (Vaden Brook, 2011)

American foreign policy is as complex as it is fluid. Gone are the Sovietesque days when America’s enemies had clear goals, or coalesced around a single cause. Today’s American President must be mindful of the wide distribution of the country’s enemies, as well as oppressors of democracy. How to approach these elusive enemies involves many different defense mechanisms, all of which are often based on ideology.

This thesis will focus on the ideology behind George W. Bush’s 2003 invasion of Iraq and argues that George W. Bush was not only heavily dependent on modern neo-conservative ideology when he made the decision to invade Iraq, but more importantly, used this ideology to justify the invasion. This neo-conservatism additionally represented a shift from the more traditional realist approach used under past presidents, such as George H.W. Bush. I support this assertion by analyzing the content of various speeches
given by George W. Bush. Doing so will not only show that Bush used neo-conservative ideology to justify the invasion, but will additionally show that his decisions were not informed by realism.

Neo-conservatism, as it pertains to modern American foreign policy, began to take shape in the 1970s. It consisted of circles of anti-Stalinist intellectuals such as Irving Kristol, Nathan Glazer, and Norman Podhoretz. These intellectuals collectively disdained communism and started to heavily influence foreign policy decisions in the 1980s, under the Reagan administration. (“Neo-conservatism,” 2012)

At the heart of neoconservative foreign policy lies a belief very similar to democratic peace theory. Neoconservatives contend that it is in the interest of the United States to promote the development of democracies around the world. Doing so will result in cooperation with these future democratic nations. The need to wage war with them will be non-existent, because neo-conservatives believe that democracies do not wage war against each other. This promotion of democracy is made possible by America’s rich military, economic, and political power, sometimes used unilaterally if necessary. (“Neo-conservatism,” 2012)

An interventionist approach started to take the political limelight with the election of Ronald Reagan. Neoconservative idealism called for an assertive foreign policy designed to target anti—American and communist regimes. Counter efforts by the Soviet Union to match the United States’ sharp increases in military spending helped lead to their bankruptcy and dissolution. All the while, the funneling of military and economic aid to anti-communist rebels in Latin America assisted in the fight to bring communism to an end. Neo-conservatism’s influence remerged after the Clinton years with the
In contrast to neo-conservatism, realism has a more storied history. While political realisms’ roots are ambiguous, political philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes and Machiavelli helped revolutionize the way it is understood. Modern philosophers like Hans Morgenthau began researching the topic again after World War II.

While there are several different forms of realism, I focus on classic realism. Like other forms of realism, classic realism presumes that power is the primary end of political action. Nations try to attain power to satisfy their own self-interests. They act in their own self-interest because to do so is natural. However, classic realism differs from other forms of realism in that it places human nature above anything else. Neorealism, for example, while still concerned with self-interest, places emphasis on the anarchical form of the international system. Under neorealism, acting in a nation’s self-interest is not a result of human nature, but is a result of the lack of political monopoly that exists above any sovereign state.

Baylis, Smith, and Owens appropriately define classic realism as a “drive for power and the will to dominate that are held to be fundamental aspects of human nature.” (Baylis, Smith, & Owens, 2001, p. 95) This drive for power requires nations to put interests ahead of ideologies. This is perhaps the most contrasting principle of realism to neo-conservatism.

The thesis will consist of six chapters. The first chapter introduces the study of ideology. Since this thesis is related to political ideology, it is of great importance to determine everything that is involved in ideology’s formation and implementation. The second chapter focuses on how presidential ideology has been measured. This chapter
will focus on the process to finding the most accurate way to measure Bush’s ideological justification of the invasion. Chapter three focuses on determining what neo-conservatives and realists believe. After reading this chapter, readers will know how holders of both ideologies view the world, as well as the actions they prefer to take against other nations. Chapter four is the measurement section. This chapter will explain reasons why the speeches were chosen, the method of measurement used, and the results of the measurement. Chapter five concludes the thesis, and it includes explanations as to why the result of each speech turned out the way it did. Chapter six is the discussion section, which elaborates on how the invasion represented a shift from realist foreign policy approaches and further emphasize Bush’s connection to neo-conservatism
Chapter One

Defining Ideology

This section will provide a working definition of ideology. Ideology plays an integral role in this thesis. This is because both neo-conservatism and realism, the two centerpieces of this work, are ideologies. Before one can understand the role George Bush’s ideology played in his justification of the war, one must first be mindful of what political ideologies are, how they are portrayed, how they are constructed, and their consequences. Excerpts from John Jost, Christopher Federico, and Jamie Napier’s “Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities” will provide insight on all the functions of ideology. However, for the purposes of this thesis, I will put more emphasis on how Michael Hunt thinks ideologies are constructed, taken from his *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Political ideology has always been a salient social construct. Be it because of this year's presidential election, the faltering economy, or the ongoing Middle East crisis, political ideology relates to how these issues must be deal with politically. Professors Jost, Federico, and Napier provide an in depth analysis as to what political ideology is, how its dimensions come to exists, its content is constructed, and its social psychological functions and consequences.

“In Political Ideology: Its Structure, Functions, and Elective Affinities,” the scholars provide a basic definition of what ideology is before they delve into its social function. The authors provide a non-controversial definition of political ideology, one that is generally agreed upon by scholars across the spectrum. The authors agree that the definition is a fusion of Erikson and Tedin's and, Denazau and North's definition of
political ideology. Eriksin and Tedin state that ideology is a "set of beliefs about the proper order of society and how it can be achieved." (Eriksin & Tedin, 2003, p. 64). However, the authors find benefit in including Denzau and North's definition as well: “ideologies are the shared framework of mental models that groups of individuals possess that provide both an interpretation of the environment and a prescription as to how that environment should be structured." (Denzau & North, 2000, p. 24). The scholars find the combination of both definitions beneficial because in doing so, it matches political motives to ideology itself. In accepting that ideology is societally shared, that it helps interpret the social world, and that it specifies good and proper ways of addressing life's problems, it is clear to see that ideology reflects political motives as well. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009).

According to the authors, ideologies help communicate shared beliefs, opinions, and values of any given constituency. Someone who holds an ideology makes assertions about human nature and how humans should act, frequently specifying ways to change a given society so as to attain social or economic prosperity. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)

A similar definition will be examined more thoroughly later in the thesis.

The authors then turn to is how political ideologies are structured. They state that this as being a looming question for political psychologists. The generally accepted answer is that ideology is represented as a schema, a sort of learned knowledge consisting of an interrelated network of beliefs and values. Where the debate lies involves the number of dimensions needed to organize the contents of the schema of ordinary citizens. In more general terms, the authors are trying to determine how the American citizenry’s political ideologies are structured. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)
The authors offer two modes of ideological construction: The traditional notion of a single left-right dimension and the multidimensional model. In America, the former is used. In the United States a left-right ideological divide exists. The divide involves the left's desire for change and the right's desire for stability. The left-right distinction contains two opposing aspects: advocating versus resisting social change and rejecting versus accepting inequality. This division goes as far back as 1789, the year the constitution went into effect. The scholars agree that words such as "conservative" "order" and “individualism” are used in western societies to describe the right. Words like "progressive" and "system change" are used to describe the left. While it is disputed how closely the citizenry follows the left-right ideological dimensions, especially during elections, the trio agrees that most people use ideological concepts to justify and explain different states of political affairs. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)

Thus far, the authors have defined what ideology is and how it is structured. In the next section of the text the authors discuss how the content of political ideologies comes into fruition. They argue that if ideology in fact is a set of attitudes, values, and beliefs, with cognitive properties, then it should be analyzed in terms of content and function. Ideological content involves two superstructures: discursive and functional. The discursive superstructure refers to the conjunction of socially constructed values and beliefs bound with a particular ideological position at a given time. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009) While the discursive superstructure is heavily dependent on the citizenry, political judgments that guide it come in the form of a "top down" schematic fashion in which political elites make ideological decisions and project them to the public at large. I focus on the discursive superstructure and the "top down" approach because it is most
relevant to George Bush's ideological approach to the Iraq invasion.

The top down approach focuses on how political elites, such as elected officials, influence political ideology. Just as politicians are able to impose structure by simplifying a political environment, they are also able to influence the way that the citizenry understands issues and ways to address them. Political elites do this in two ways.

The first involves what is called the communications process. The authors note that an array of scholars such as Hinich and Munger, agree that specific bundling of attitudes, values, and beliefs result from interactions between partisan elites and their followers. (Hinich & Munger, 1994) In this form of ideological portrayal, a disproportionate amount of influence comes from the small political elite class. (Hinich & Munger, 1994) In other words, the people at the top may form a stance on an issue by tying their personal beliefs to it, and the partisan followers of the citizenry agree with the stance the elected official takes. The authors note that in America, people are able to choose from an ideological "menu" where politicians communicate ideological orientations and people vote for them according to them. (Sniderman & Bullock, 2004)

While American voters may have the freedom to choose which ideology they want their leaders to represent, the decision making comes from the elites. It is through the communication process that both the citizenry and the partisan elites contribute to ideological dialogue. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)

The second process involves the citizenry’s ability to cognitively understand the discursive superstructure and ideological orientations from the left or right. The authors note that decades of research point to the fact that the majority of the population does not know about the contents of liberal or conservative ideologies, show an inability to
understand political conflict in liberal/conservative terms, and hold an ideological inconsistency towards their stance on issues. As Federico and Schneider point out, this is not to say that the common man is void of ideological commitment, most men have a set of emotionally charged political beliefs. (Federico & Schneider, 2007) As mentioned previously, information involving ideological content flows from the political elites. They are responsible for making sure that followers understand their positions, with the authors noting that the more information a citizen has, the easier it will be for them to understand the issue position. The authors finally note that those that judge things as being either good or bad are more likely to follow discursive ideological content. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)

The attention now turns to the psychological functions of ideology. The central question that the authors try to answer in this section is why it is that ideology is needed. The authors recite three central motives of ideology. The first motive is that ideology offers certainty. Ball and Dagger state that ideology "serves as a guide and compass through the thicket of political life," that is, that political ideology addresses a number of needs such as explanation, evaluation, and orientation. (Ball & Dagger, 1991, pp.1-2) The second motive ideology offers is security. The authors note that according to the terror management theory, political belief systems assist people in the belief that they are persons of value in a world that transcends the finite self, which provides existential security. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009) In other words, ideologies make people feel self-secure because the mere existence of their ideology provides them with a reason to feel important. Their existence means something because they feel a certain way about an issue and are willing to act on it. An example might be American exceptionalism; a
theory that America is different from any other nation in that its world mission is to spread liberty and democracy. The final motive of ideology involves relational solidarity. That is, that the authors note that common political ideologies strengthen relationships, whether it be between a child and their parents, or amongst peers. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009)

The final point the authors make involves the social and political consequences of ideology. Politically, the authors note that the biggest ideological consequence involves political attitudes and voting. Ideology and partisanship are one of the strongest and most persistent predictors of political preferences. Those that hold left of center ideologies will most likely vote for liberal candidates, while those that hold right of center ideologies will vote for conservatives. Candidates take note of this and plan their campaigns accordingly.

The authors say that a consequence of ideology is that it can be used as a system-justifying device. They pronounce that ideologies not only are devices that allow those who hold them to make judgments about political objects, but also are used to rationalize the status quo, or even challenge it. They note that conservatives use this feature of ideology the most. I will explore how George W. Bush used this ideological consequence when justifying the Iraq invasion, how he communicated segments of his ideology to the public, and will lastly explore the psychological functions of neo-conservatism relative to the invasion.

I.A. The Cultural Approach to Ideology

Professor Michael Hunt seems to concur that ideology allows leaders to simplify world issues so that they can more easily interpret events and actions. By simplifying complex issues into being either good or bad for example, as Jost, Federico, and Napier
would say, it is easier for leaders to create solutions to problems taken from the
discursive superstructure. In his book *Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Hunt provides a
concise definition of ideology that mimics the previous authors’. However, it differs from
the former because it deals more with the interaction between different cultures. He
defines ideology as being “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces
the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and
suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.” (Hunt, 1987, p. 9) Hunt describes
several approaches to how ideology is realized within a society. The most applicable
approach for the purposes of this thesis is the cultural approach. (Hunt, 1987)

According to advocates of the cultural approach, ideologies are “integrated and
coherent systems of symbols, values, and beliefs.” They arise from “socially established
structures of meaning,” that exist in culture. (Hunt, 1987) Hunt says that ideology serves
to act as a moral guide for action and acts as a constraint for foreign policy leaders at the
same time.

Cultural ideology according to Hunt is elusive in nature and does not derive from
any one source. This is because Hunt says that societies are complex and it would be
negligent to point to one single origin of ideology as a base that determines its
superstructure. (Hunt, 1987) However, this is not to say that there are not beliefs that
contribute to America’s foreign policy ideology. Some American ideological roots that
Hunt points to are strong nationalist preoccupations, evangelical faith, racial and ethnic
identity, and regional concerns. Hunt also makes a note that social class plays a
significant role in foreign policy creation. He points to how typically wealthy white men
in the U.S. are the ones that come into power and thus make decisions based on their
interpretation of ideology. (Hunt, 1987)

It is of interest to note that the stated roots of American foreign policy meet the requirements that Hunt says cultural beliefs should have. He states that the core foreign policy ideas in the cultural approach must reflect the self-image of those who espoused them and must define a relationship with the world consonant with that self-image. (Hunt, 1987) They must derive from and be sustained by a diverse array of domestic values and arrangements. They would have to be central enough to the national experience to help account for key developments in foreign policy, while at the same time defining America’s place in the world. Essentially, Hunt views that ideas that derive from the cultural approach must supply “a world image convincing enough to support the collective and individual sense of identity.” (Hunt, 1987, p. 14)

In providing such a description, Hunt realizes the importance of both the collective interpretation of what values are involved in foreign policy, as well the individual interpretation. To this effect, Hunt lastly discusses ideological interpretive prudence. While understanding that ideologies reduce complexities to manageable terms, Hunt states the dangers of interpretive rigidity. (Hunt, 1987) By this he means that some foreign policy decisions cannot be flexibly interpreted and must be void of ideology, an action largely dependent on the president. An example would be the preservation of national security. Hunt also declares that interpretive prudence calls for the citizenry to accept ideological permeations, which occur because of changes in policy personalities. (Hunt, 1987) Different leaders interpret the ideological values of foreign policy in different ways.

Hunt’s approach to ideology is the most useful for the purposes of this experiment
due to the nature of George W. Bush’s ideological views. Ideological values were not only a key aspect of the Bush administration’s decisions, but many of these values were deemed vital to the nation’s security. Thus, it would seem that people in the administration would argue that the Iraq invasion was neither based nor justified on ideology. However, that is not my focus. My focus is that the administration’s desire for factors such as militarily preeminence and democracy promotion match the ideological values of neo-conservatism, a sub-group of American political thought. (Kagan & Kristol, 1996) Such beliefs contrast to those of realism, a principle of which focuses more on taking into consideration the relative power of countries involved before getting involved in conflict. (Morgenthau, 1978)
Chapter Two

Measuring Ideology

Since this thesis must measure ideology, it is important to review ways that scholars have determined ideology. Undoubtedly, the ideology of individual presidents is difficult to measure. There have been a multitude of studies that have measured the ideologies of participants in federal government. For example, scholars have attempted to measure the ideology of legislators. This process can be more straightforward than measuring presidential ideology because the methods can use the voting records of individual office holders. Likewise, in measuring Supreme Court justice ideology, scholars have the advantage of looking at Supreme Court case decisions. Some scholars have even measured the ideologies of voters by looking at presidential election voting patterns.

In contrast, this thesis will examine the writings of several scholars that attempt to measure presidential ideology. I will look at how presidential ideology has been attempted to be measured through presidential action on congressional bills, Supreme Court appointments, and content analysis. Presidential action on congressional bills provides an insightful way to measure ideology because it is thought that presidents’ belief and values influence his action on bills. Measuring ideology through Supreme Court appointments is believed to be credible because president’s almost always select justices that hold similar ideologies. Finally, measuring ideology through content analysis is thought to be valid because it gauges presidents’ authentic feelings towards issues based on what they say about them.
II. A. Measuring Ideology through Congressional Bills

One approach to measuring presidential ideology is by identifying a president’s action on specific congressional bills. In his article “Where does the President Stand?” Shawn Trier tries to determine presidential ideology by examining the presidential action of approving or vetoing acts of Congress. Trier feels that one can effectively measure a president’s ideology through examining whether the president signs or vetoes bills regarding issues that he does not take a public stance on. This essentially is because when presidents do this, they are taking a more moderate stance on issues and fear that publicly speaking on the bill will contradict what they say publically. It is viewed that president’s often must take a more moderate stance on issues because their constituency is larger. Thus, Trier believes that President's true feelings towards issues can be measured. (Trier, 2010)

Trier first discusses the role of “pivotal politics” in policy making. Pivotal politics summarizes policymaking by defining the hurdles each bill needs to go through to pass. These pivots involve the role that political actors play in passing or blocking a policy. The hurdles include: the median political ideology of members in the House and Senate, the Senators that have the ability to invoke cloture, the legislators that have the ability to override a veto, and the President himself. Trier states that all hurdles to a bill must be overcome for the bill to have any chance of being signed by the president. If this happens, then the bill has passed what Trier calls the “gridlock region.” (Trier, 2010) Fortunately for the Bush administration, there was little gridlock when passing the Iraq War Resolution.
To help measure the president’s ideology, Trier points to the studies conducted by McCarthy and Poole. They examine the president’s stance on congressional roll call votes. They assert that since the Nixon administration, presidents have taken a more partisan view on issues. Based on public statements taken by the president on issues, they devise a way to predict how the president would vote on an issue if he were a member of Congress. They found that 97 percent of the time, presidents will side with their own party on a bill. (McCarty & Poole, 1985) When presidents take a public stance on bills, the public can formulate an idea, albeit a small one, as to what their ideology is. However, this result does little to describe what happens when presidents do not take a public stance on an issue.

For Trier, this measurement is not sufficient. He states that presidents will take a stance on issues that provide a strong partisan division, and will not take a stance on bills where there is significant consensus. (Trier, 2010) Knowing this, Trier formulates a way to measure presidential ideology based on bills on which the president does not make a public statement. Trier starts by examining roll call votes in Congressional Quarterly. He looks at margins of vote, the presidential position, and whether the bills have been amended or not. He uses these to make determinations whether a presidential position has been assigned and if the final vote was sent to the president. He also uses Thomas.gov to see whether the president signed the bill into law and to make sure he got the final version with no amendments. With this information, Trier measures ideology through congressional bills. (Trier, 2010)

Measuring presidential ideology thorough presidential votes are erroneous and severely flawed. Many of the points that Trier tries to make in his article do not pertain to
the Bush administration. First and foremost, Trier examines bills on which the president takes no public stance. We are interested in the Iraq War Resolution; which was very public. Due to the severity of the situation, news regarding it was made public. Even things like speculation were made news. Additionally, the Bush administration made its feelings towards the war public as well. It was known that the administration supported the war, due to its consistent message advocating for it.

Trier does not seem to understand that there are multitudes of factors that comprise a president’s ideology. It simply cannot be measured by looking at the signing of a single bill. For example look at the role of compromise in Washington. In many cases, there are instances where neither the president nor the Congress gets what they want. The increasing of the debt ceiling in the summer of 2011 provides an example of this. Tea Party Republicans did not take kindly to the increase, but it was deemed necessary for the continuation of government services. Democrats did not like the thought of not being able to cut the military budget, but agreed to do it out of necessity.

Trier also does not consider the fact that the approval of a bill by a president may be conditional. That is, depending on the situation, some presidents will sign a bill only to get rid of the “do nothing Congress stigma.” Partisanship has run so rampant in Washington that sometimes the president has no choice but to sign a bill. This is especially true if Congress is controlled by members of an opposing party. An example might be towards the end of the George W. Bush presidency when he signed a bill to increase auto fuel economy and spur investment in “green energy.” Critics on the right chastised him for it, but he did little for the environment prior to the bill and with a
Democratic House, felt the need to compromise. A president’s ideology is too complex of an issue to summarize in a single vote.

II.B. Measuring Ideology through Supreme Court Appointments

Presidential ideology has also been measured through the use of Supreme Court appointments. Jeffrey Seagal, Richard Timpone, and Robert Howard, have taken on the arduous task of measuring presidential policy influence through Supreme Court appointments. In their experiment, the scholars take two steps in their approach to doing this. First, they measure preferences of presidents regarding social and economic policy from Eisenhower through Clinton by sending out surveys to Political Science scholars. The second step is then examining Supreme Court votes related to social and economic policy. The trio then uses a process called concordance to examine how well justices’ views coincide with that of the president that appoints them. The goal is to ascertain how long and to what extent the justices hold the same shared values as the presidents that appointed them. They come to the conclusion that while presidents are successful in the short run, justices tend to deviate away from their appointed president’s ideology over time. (Seagal, Timpone, & Howard, 2000)

The survey process that the trio used to gauge presidential feelings on social and economic issues was flawed and not useful for our purposes here. They decided to mail surveys to random Political Science “experts” listed in the American Political Science Association directory. They specifically sent them to people listed in the Presidency section. (Seagal, Timpone, & Howard, 2000) The assumption is that these people are “experts,” but the authors do not define what being an expert is. It would seem that maybe for this experiment mailing experts in political ideology would be a narrower, but
more prudent choice. However, with such a broad definition of the term of “expert” and failing to realize that there are different aspects of the Presidency to be concentrated on, the authors’ selection is not specific enough.

Further, the authors do not report the number of people that they interviewed, nor do they give specific criteria for how to measure presidential policy preferences. When mailed the survey, the “experts” are to use “whatever criteria appropriate” in determining the presidents views on social and economic policy. This way of measurement leaves the door open for individual interpretation. The respondents were asked to give their answer on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being extremely conservative and 100 being extremely liberal. However, this measurement is not ideal because there is no specific or consistent definition for those terms regarding both sets of policy areas.

Additionally, because the study does not report the number of respondents, readers do not know the margin of error. The larger the population size, the more likely a study is to represent feelings of the general population. Here, because we do not know how many “experts” were surveyed, we don’t know how well their onions coincide with their colleagues.

When examining the concordance of the justices to presidents, the authors come to the conclusion that justices’ views on economic policy coincide more with the presidents that appointed them than social policy. (Seagal, Timpone, & Howard, 2000) This is an interesting point of the study, but it does not take into account the fact that justices cannot be independent from the president’s own ideology or other justices. The authors do not take into consideration that justices often review cases on an individual basis. They examine cases based on different criteria than presidents do. They look at
factors such as fundamental rights, due process, and constitutional interpretation. President’s merely sign laws for justices to later interpret, and typically do not pay as much attention to these details. This being so, it is erroneous to even compare the two institutions due to their difference in responsibilities.

Finally, the authors’ results contradict a point they make in their article. The authors cite that within a justice’s first four terms on the bench, their views coincide with their appointing president’s the most. However, that number diminishes as the number of terms goes up. (Seagal, Timpone, & Howard, 2000) Ergo, the authors point out that the longer a justice serves on the bench, the more they start to deviate from their appointed president’s policy preferences and shared values. The question then becomes how good of a measurement of presidential ideology can analyzing Supreme Court decisions be if they change over time? Could it not be asserted that justice ideology changes with each president? What about public opinion? Often times, public opinion shapes what cases go to court and how they are decided. These factors combined prove that the decisions of Supreme Court Justices are not an accurate measure of presidential ideology.

II.C. Measuring Ideology through Content Analysis

In his article, “Measuring Gubernatorial Ideology: A content analysis of State of State Speeches,” David Coffey examines gubernatorial ideology using content analysis. Coffey takes state of the state speeches from governors across the country in the 2000-2001 time period and uses them as a means to measure their ideology and policy preferences.

Scholars generally use two types of content analysis: conceptual or relational analysis. For our purposes, conceptual analysis will be used. In his study, Coffey uses
conceptual analysis. Conceptual analysis involves the examination of the number of times a concept is used in a text. The examiner first chooses the concepts for which they are looking. After finding the concepts, the examiner then places these concepts into a category. Too few concept categories can lead to invalid conclusions and too many may obscure a researcher's results. What concepts to examine and the category to put them in largely involve the intention and preference of the researcher. The goal of conceptual analysis is to quantify number of times the words are used, not to examine the relationship between the words and the category. In conceptual analysis, the researcher examines the presence of words relevant to their research question. Conceptual analysis is done with the goal of determining someone’s ideological preferences. (Busha & Harter, 1980)

Coffey starts by categorizing each sentence in governor’s speeches as representing liberal or conservative ideologies. He did this when the governors expressed a clear ideological position on a policy, or if the sentence conveyed a belief that the audience would infer to be liberal or conservative. Doing so required the coding of words into a predefined dictionary, created by Coffey himself. Coffey used a computer program called TEXTPACK to code the words as being liberal or conservative based on the context in which they were used. Coffey’s dictionary contains words and parts of words that are frequently used in the context of particular issue areas and that indicate clear ideological point of view. An example he gives would be coding the word “account.” Coffey feels that the word “account,” is often associated with conservative’s views of education policy, in that teachers need to be more accountable for higher standardized testing scores. Thus, when the computer TEXTPACK found the word “account,” it was
coded in the category of conservative education. Each category was given a numeric code, which TEXTPACK was programmed to insert next to the word it was associated with. (Coffey, 2005)

Coffey created his dictionary using Laver and Garry’s dictionary used to analyze British and Irish political parties. He also used Democratic and Republican Party platforms from 1996 and 2000. Finally, he used state of the state speeches from Alabama, New York, Vermont, Washington, and New Mexico. He used these states in order to get a diverse geographical array of party orientation. (Coffey, 2005)

The categories that the words were associated with were the state budget, economic development, social welfare, health care, law and order, morality, civil rights, state regulation, education, and the environment. After the words were given a category, Coffey measured gubernatorial ideology by taking the sentences that were used and determining whether the sentences were liberal or conservative based on their content. He takes the difference between liberal and conservative sentences and divides them by the number of sentences total. The closer the number is to one, the more liberal the governor. The closer it is to negative one, the more conservative the governor. (Coffey, 2005)

The TEXTPACK program can only code words. Thus, Coffey had to put the words into their perspective categories and the program would find them. The program also did not have the ability to code sentences, so Coffey had to determine whether they were liberal or conservative, using his own knowledge of the issues. Finally, Coffey had to code sentences that did not have words form the dictionary. These sentences were coded based on the content of the preceding and following sentences. Governors would often explain an issue in a non-ideological sentence, but then give their opinion on the
issue in the sentence after, without using a code word. In these cases, if it was clear what side the governor was on, he coded them according to their political ideology. Sentences were recorded as being non-ideological if the audience could not gauge the governor’s stance on an issue. (Coffey, 2005)

Coffey believes that other researchers should consider using content analysis to gauge the ideologies of governors and other public officials. While he does mention pitfalls of the process, like the lack of including how much of what the governors say actually becomes part of their legislative packages, he considers it to be a valid way of measuring ideology. Much like Coffey’s article, conceptual content analysis will be used to gauge George W. Bush’s ideology. Unlike Coffey however, I am only concerned with one policy area: foreign policy.

I have chosen content analysis to measure ideology because I feel that it is the most direct way to ascertain political ideology. As Jost, Federico, and Napier say, leaders communicate their ideologies through public rhetoric. (Jost, Federico, Napier, 2009) By analyzing his speech, I am able to investigate the core of George W. Bush’s feelings towards the Iraq War. Content analysis is also a fairly unobtrusive way of measuring ideology, especially in my case. I am analyzing what George Bush has already publically said, which is not invasive.
Chapter Three

Defining Realism and Neo-conservatism

During his tenure in the Oval Office it was largely believed that President Bush followed a neoconservative ideology in regards to foreign policy. This ideology is particularly represented by contents of the Bush Doctrine. (Williams & Schmidt, 2008) As a presidential candidate Bush argued against neoconservative foreign policy principles, specifically nation building. However, the tragic events of 9/11 changed his views on foreign policy. (Thomas, 2003) To many, the Bush administration’s foreign policy stance represented a dramatic departure from previous foreign policy ideologies, like realism. (Williams & Schmidt, 2008) Under the tenets of neo-conservatism, the Bush administration waged war with Iraq and used public rhetoric to justify the invasion. This thesis will examine speeches given by President Bush and use their content to affirm the influence that neo-conservatism had on Bush’s ideology, both before and after the invasion of Iraq.

III.A. How to Define Realism and Neo-conservatism

My technique to define both terms will largely model Daniel Coffey’s. Whereas Coffey was satisfied with determining bilateral categories of “liberal” and “conservative” I concentrate on different categories. I have chosen to use the categories of “neo-conservatism” and “realism” in examining presidential speeches. I chose “realism” because Bush’s predecessors, like father George H.W. Bush, exemplified realist principles in their foreign policy approaches. (Williams & Schmidt, 2008). It is also one of the most globally common foreign policy approaches, unlike modern neo-conservatism, which is still a fairly new concept. Much like Coffey, I will use an array of
resources to help determine what words can be associated with these ideologies. My task will be less-complex then his however, because I am only looking for words that deal with foreign policy. These “key” words will be listed and then identified in the chosen texts. I focus on realism first.

III.A.a. Realism

In an article written in the Washington Post by E.J. Dionne Jr., the headline reads “Obama’s Realist worldview recalls George H.W. Bush.” Written shortly after the 2008 election, Dionne states that in electing Obama, the country traded the foreign policy of the second Bush for the first one. He mentions that Obama’s foreign policy fits the realist mold, specifically the intent to advance American interest by diplomacy, by working to improve the country’s image aboard, and using military force cautiously. Dionne writes, “This sounds a lot like the foreign policy of George H.W. Bush.” (Dionne, 2008, p. 1) Whether it was George Bush Sr.’s multilateral handling of the Gulf War, or his diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, scholars frequently label him as a realist. As the word “realism” is going to provide my other binary category, further consideration is merited as to what the word means.

III.A.b. Six Principles of Political Realism

Hans Morgenthau lays out six principles of political realism in Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. The book is designed to develop a cumulative theory of international politics, focusing on political realism the most. He spends a great deal of time contrasting realism to idealism, which he asserts is a form of politics that lives up to moral standards, much like neo-conservatism. To Morgenthau, realism assumes that opposing interests are inevitable in politics, as is the conflict that is
likely to come out of them. He believes that realism is not so much concerned with 
morality or material interests, but by power. (Morgenthau, 1985)

The first principle Morgenthau states involves the role of law in politics. He cites, 
“politics are driven by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.” In order to 
prove society, realists know that they must understand the laws by which society lives. 
Here, both rationality and human nature are key. While realists believe that laws are 
objective, they also realize that they must develop a rational theory to refute these laws. 
Coinciding with this, they also believe in the possibility of distinguishing between what is 
true and what is opinion in politics. Rational laws are ones that are grounded with true 
evidence and that are illuminated by reason. Irrational laws are those grounded in 
subjective judgments that are based on fictitious thinking and are separated from facts. 
(Morgenthau, 1985, p. 4)

Morgenthau notes that human nature, which laws take their roots from, hardly ever changes. It is from human nature that foreign policy takes its shape. However, 
Morgenthau notes that statesmen must be prudent in including human nature in their 
foreign policy. To base foreign policy on current crises, means that statesmen are not looking to the past enough to deal with what must be done in the future. Because human nature does not change, Morgenthau is asserting that statesmen should not disregard the way conflicts have been handled in the past, so long as it was handled in a rational manner. (Morgenthau, 1985)

Morgenthau ends the section stating that foreign policy theory consists of 
ascertaining facts and giving them meaning through reason. The character of foreign
policy action can only be assessed through the analyzing of the political acts themselves and of the predicted consequences of these acts.

The second principle involving realism regards power. Morgenthau asserts that for realists, interest is defined in terms of a power. This sets politics apart from other realms of action including economics, (interest here is determined by wealth). Because of this definition, citizens need not concern themselves with the motives, preferences, and intellectual qualities of statesmen. However, Morgenthau does later state that intellectual capability can affect a statesman’s ability to comprehend the essentials of foreign policy, the essentials being desire for power and the desire to act rationally. This lack of recognition will lead to an inability to translate these vital principles into political action. Morgenthau says that the reason foreign policies stray from rationality because of personal weaknesses of statesmen and because of what he calls “collective irrationality” or ideas that do not concern with reality that have become popularly accepted. Towards the end of the section, Morgenthau explains the benefits of rational foreign policy and why it is practiced. “Rational foreign policy is good foreign policy because it minimizes risks and benefits and complies both with the moral precept of prudence and political requirement of success.” (Morgenthau 1985, p. 5)

In the discussing the third principle of realism, Morgenthau continues on the topic of interest as power. He states, “Interest defined as power is an objective category which is universally valid, but whose meaning can change.” Here, Morgenthau discusses the malleability of national interest and power alike. He insinuates that the kind of interest that determines political action in a period of history depends upon the political and cultural context within which the foreign policy is formulated. Regarding power, which
he defines as “anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man,” the same conditions apply. The political and cultural environment determines the content and manner in which power is used as well. While realists may believe that power is driven by interest, they recognize that in the scope of history, how well the two are connected is situational. (Morgenthau, 1985, p.11) The contents of this section undoubtedly give statesmen a broader range to operate within the scope of national power.

The fourth tenet involves the application of moral principles to foreign policy action. Morgenthau states that “Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in the abstract; they must be filtered through the concrete circumstance of time and place.” Morgenthau states that while statesmen must judge political action by moral principles, like liberty, they have not right to let moral disapprobation get in the way of political action, in which national survival is the key. What Morgenthau is trying to say here is that statesmen cannot base actions solely on moral principles, especially when these actions compromise the nation’s central realist goal, its own survival. The state places survival over all moral goods. To this effect, Morgenthau says that prudence is key. “The weighing in of consequences of alternative political action is the supreme virtue in politics.” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 12)

The fifth tenet is one that neoconservatives may struggle with the most. Contrary to neoconservative exceptionality belief, Morgenthau says, “the morals that govern the universe are distinct from the morals that govern any one nation.” He says that “to know that nations are subject to moral law is one thing, while to pretend to know with certainty what is good and evil in the relations among nations is quite another.” Morgenthau asserts that for a an individual nation to pretend to know what is good for other nations
and to pursue political action based on principles that are not universally held, is not only unprecedented, but to a degree blasphemous. It is erroneous for a nation to pretend to have divinity to know that God is guiding their mission. Thus, Morgenthau retreats back to what he has already stated to in terms of what must be done to guard against a nation's alleged moral supremacy. Interest defined not by morality, but in terms of power, will guard nations against moral excess and the political folly that follows it. (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 13)

The final tenet is, in a way, a culmination of everything Morgenthau has said of realism. “The difference between political realism and other schools is real and profound.” Realism maintains the autonomy of the political sphere. While realists do recognize that there are different spheres of man, economic man, religious man, etc, they continuously judge the political man on one factor: their power. Morgenthau believes that power is the most appropriate facet for the study of politics. (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 17)

Morgenthau’s tenets of realism provide a clear contrast to neo-conservatism. For example, Morgenthau says that nations should not be concerned with other nations’ motives, or anything that is not a tangible measurement of power. However, neo-conservatives heavily consider other nations’ motives and intents when making foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Morgenthau would disagree with the neo-conservatives proclivity to try to change the structure of foreign governments, declaring that it is in the respective nation’s best interest to do so. This will be discussed further on in section four.

III.A.c. Ferraro

I have also chosen to use Professor Vincent Ferraro’s definition of realism as a guide as well. Like Morgenthau, Ferraro states that realists look to secure their nation’s
interests more than anything. The two main interests that they try to secure are their political autonomies and territorial integrity. Once these are upheld, a nation’s interest begins to take different forms, be it the expansion of resources or political systems. (Ferraro, 2010)

Ferraro says that statesmen can measure national interest in terms of a nation’s power. Power can be measured by examining absolute factors, its economy, political influence, or military. Ferraro does note that power is relative. States must consider the power of other states when interacting with them, such as the ability to defend against them. If one state’s power is smaller relative to another, then realist statesmen will act with caution towards them. (Ferraro, 2010)

For realists the international system is anarchical and is governed by a natural balance of power. It is anarchical because of nation’s lack of dependence on others. All states rely on themselves to secure their own interests and enforce agreements made with other states. There is no central authority over nation states, and for realists there should not be. (Ferraro, 2010)

The decentralized nature of the international system must be preserved by the use of force. Because nations have a tendency to expand their power, Ferraro says that their force is regulated by a balance of power amongst nations. This balance of power only exists if nations agree that state autonomy is the primary objective. If nations do agree then although war will still happen, they will be constrained by the limited objectives of each nation state. (Ferraro, 2010)

Of particular interest for the purposes of this thesis is Ferraro’s discussion of political autonomy and territorial integrity. Ferraro describes realism in a way that
contrasts with neo-conservative principles and the rationale behind the Iraq War. I will touch on this subject later on in chapter four.

III. B. Neo-conservatism

My focus now turns to the principles of neo-conservatism and the worldview that it creates.

III. B.a. Three Tenets of Neo-conservative Foreign Policy

Being an elusive political concept, I have decided to use multiple sources to define how neo-conservatives conduct foreign policy. The first article I will look at is titled “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” written by William Kristol and Robert Kagan. The article provides an insightful look as to how neoconservatives are to conduct foreign policy. The article outlines four tenets of neoconservative foreign policy, three of which will be particularly valuable for this thesis.

The first relevant tenet in the article is the moral clarity that neoconservatives use in their foreign policy. This moral clarity involves U.S. obligatory action towards other states. That is, neoconservatives believe that democratic regimes are good and tyrannical regimes are bad. (Kristol & Kagan, 1996) Both totalitarian and democratic regimes express their values when it comes to foreign policy and neoconservatives believe that the value based polices of tyrannical regimes are a threat to the security of not only the U.S., but also the world. Thus, morality and national interest form one policy for neoconservatives when dealing with other nations. It is not only right for the U.S. to act against regimes whose values and actions are morally wrong, but it is also in its national interest to do so. Neoconservatives believe, therefore, that the U.S. should promote democracy when possible and not shy away from regime change. (Kristol & Kagan,
The second tenet discussed in the article is a leverage of military power. Kristol and Kagan say that the United States should be willing to use its military force whenever possible to pursue its military goals. (Kristol & Kagan, 1996) This argument stems from two premises. The first is that if a nation’s ends are noble and good, then the nation would be morally obliged to use all the means at its disposal, including military force, in pursuit of those ends. While these ends are a bit vague, they typically include democratization and the elimination of perceived threats to the U.S. (Kristol & Kagan, 1996) Consequently, I identify the word “confront” as a means of describing neoconservative’s feelings about pursuing military interests.

A third tenet of neoconservative ideology is that of, “a benevolent U.S. hegemony.” (Kristol & Kagan, 1996, p.20) Kristol and Kagan assert that the United States’ predominance of power in the world requires it to be an arbiter of peace. They assert that neoconservatives believe that the U.S. is obliged to increase military spending and preserve its military pre-eminence. (Kristol & Kagan, 1996) U.S. hegemony represents a shift from a more traditional foreign policy stance of a balance of power amongst nations. Advocates of a more traditional foreign policy approach, like realism, believe that predominance will create coalitions against the U.S. However, this does not faze neoconservatives for two reasons. The first reason being that the most fair-minded nations will appreciate and act accordingly with the hospitable nature of U.S. hegemony. The second reason being that nations that do not agree with U.S. principles will have to live in fear of, or at least tolerate, America’s power. (Smith, Hadfield, & Dunne, 2008)
III. B.b. The Worldview of Neo-conservatives

In his article titled, “The End of Neocons,” Jonathan Clarke, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs, discusses the ideological roots of neo-conservatism and the impact they had on the Bush administration. He cites the influence that neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz had in the Bush administration. He states that the Bush administration and its neoconservative allies had devised a plan to invade Iraq well before it happened. However, the 9/11 attacks provided a pathway for the neoconservative’s plan to become a reality, calling neoconservatives the “intellectual godfathers of the law.” (Clarke, 2009, p. 1) The most relevant part of this article for the purpose of this thesis is the main characteristics of neoconservatives that he gives, specifically the tendency of neoconservatives to put nations in binary good/bad categories. (Clarke, 2009) This characteristic is closely associated with Bush’s “axis of evil” stance, as well as the administration’s disdain for nations that “harbor terrorists.”

III.B.c. Neo-conservatives and Preemptive War

Written by neoconservative author Paul Wolfowitz, the amended version of the National Security Strategy contains perhaps the most vital component of neoconservative ideology relevant to the Iraq War. (Reynolds, 2005) The strategy lays out a scenario wherein the United States can justifiably use pre-emptive war as a means of dealing with perceived threats. The strategy states: “The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security.” “The greater the threat, the greater the risk of inaction, and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries,
the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively.” (“Bush’s National,” 2002) The Defense Strategy provided advocates of the Iraq invasion with a tangible means of justification. Based on the strategy, the president and his administration could decide to wage war with other nations, based on a perceived threat sparked by inference. In the case of Iraq, the biggest inference was that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction capable of harming America and its allies.
Chapter Four

Measuring Bush’s Ideology

IV.A. Speeches Chosen

This thesis uses content analysis to determine the nature of George Bush’s ideology in an effort to assist us in determining the degree he used this ideology to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Content from five speeches will be used.

The first speech is the 2001 Joint Address to Congress. In the address, Bush addresses the nation for the first time since the 9/11 attacks and makes it clear to the world that United States is going to be involved in a global war on terror. This speech was essentially chosen because of its inclusion of one of the pillars of neo-conservatism: the tendency of neo-conservatives to see the world in binary categories of good and bad. While this speech was given before the invasion of Iraq, how Bush says America should confront its enemies in the speech largely coincides with the actions the U.S. took against Iraq.

The second speech is the 2002 State of the Union. It also includes the tendency to put nations into binary categories, but goes a bit further. In this speech, Bush attempts to determine the intentions of the nations within the “axis of evil.” This speech is of particular importance because in doing this, Bush is not only breaking one of the key rules of realism, but is also abiding by a key aspect of neo-conservatism in the process: pretending to know the motives of other nations and acting on them.

In the 2002 West Point Address, President Bush discusses preemptive war. Preemptive war is not only a staple of neo-conservative thought, but it also played a large role in the justification of the Iraq invasion. This is the first speech in which Bush
introduces preemptive war as a means of protecting the U.S. The previous two reasons, in addition to the speech’s contrast to realist principles, are why it was chosen for this thesis.

The 2003 State of the Union discusses America’s role as a democratic regime changer in the world. Again, while stated before the invasion, the actions taken in Iraq largely resemble what was said in this speech. After Sadam Hussein was found by American forces, the U.S. started work to convert the Iraqi government into a democracy, claiming everyone has the right to freedom. Realists would argue that to spread this ideal globally may not be in either nation’s best interest; however neo-conservatives think the contrary. This speech most accurately represents the benevolent U.S. hegemony that Kristol and Kagan speak of.

Finally, the 2005 Inaugural Address was chosen for largely the same reasons as the 2003 State of the Union. However, its contrast to realism are evident. Realists would argue that attempting to spread democracy around the world is erroneous because once a nation starts trying to spread an ideology, they are no less concerned about their own nation’s interest and more focused on others.

IV. B. The Role of Speech Writers

In his article “Speechwriting: An Acquired Art,” former Gerald ford speech writer stresses the important of political speeches. He states that politicians often fail to understand that they are most remembered for their speeches, what they say and how they say it. (Smith, 1989). As a consequence, speech writers are hired to help smooth the transition between what a politician is trying to convey to an audience and how they do it.

Smith says that speech writers differ from other writers because they write to
appeal to the ears; they are rhetoricians. (Smith, 1989) Speechwriters understand their audience. They know that with each speech politicians address specific, not universal, audiences. With the goal of persuading the audience in mind, speechwriters analyze the audience before the speech is even written. They must analyze the age, demographics, religious affiliations, values, and issues the audience is concerned with. Smith notes that the latter concept is difficult to prepare for. However, because many speeches consist of microcosms of the national audience, polling data provides an aide to determine which issues are of the greatest importance. (Smith, 1989)

Conveying a message is also of great importance for presidential speech writers. Smith says that most speeches try to make a point, convey a message, or change attitudes. In the case of the State of the Union, presidents try to do all three. If the goal is to convince the audience that action must be taken on an issue, speechwriters know that the issue at hand must be researched with supporting arguments and evidence. In order for the president to frame the issue, speechwriters must conduct research to find out what arguments can be made against it, responses to those arguments, and solid evidence that suggest that his the proposed solution to the issue is the best one. Speechwriters must make sure to include examples when the issue is addressed. They also need to pick credible sources of evidence and need to competently explain their data. (Smith, 1989)

Given the nature of the speeches analyzed, Smith’s description of emotional tone is of importance. He notes that if persuasion is to be sealed, emotional appeal is essential. To be credible however, Smith notes that persuasion must be backed by evidence. (Smith, 1989) To appeal to the emotions of the audience, Smith explains a three step approach to do so. Speechwriters first must determine the emotion of the audience. They then
determine what mood is most computable with their portrayed message. The president must speak in a tone that coincides with what he wants done. Finally, speechwriters use imagery to paint a picture of what the president wants done. It is much more effective for the audience to visualize the urgency of an issue, than just to hear statistics about it. (Smith, 1989)

Smith ends by saying that communicating is the most important thing a president does. He emphasizes the importance of speechwriters by saying that they must be well versed in policy issues, the dynamics of audiences, and the art of persuasion. (Smith, 1989)

IV.C. Using Content Analysis

In the previous chapter, I briefly mentioned how content analysis allowed me to seek the ideologically identifying words. As Bernard Berelson convey a message, aid, “content analysis is a research technique for the objective, systematic, and quantitative description of manifest content of communication.” (Bernard, 1952, p. 74) The results of content analysis allow researchers to make inferences about the messages of the texts and their authors’ personal principles and intentions.

As stated previously, conceptual analysis will be used here. In conceptual analysis a term is chosen for examination and the numbers of occurrences of each term are recorded. The first step is to select words that are relative to the content categories that relate to the research question. By assigning words to categories, certain characteristics of the message may be interpreted. Once they have been coded they are put into their respective categories and counted in the text. Depending on how many issues they are related to, sometimes they are counted more than once. The number of occurrences of
the chosen words can answer a research question. In this form of content analysis, presence of certain words means more than the strength of the relationship of the word to the category. The researcher’s purpose is to examine whether there is a stronger presence of negative or positive words with respect to the research question. (Busha & Harter, 1980)

As stated previously, I have chosen to use the categories of “neo-conservatism” and “realism.” The content of the sentences analyzed will be classified as being in either category, based on the words in them. I simply take the number of neo-conservative sentences and compare them to the number of realist sentences. Bush’s ideology then is identified as being representative of whichever ideology is exemplified more in the sentences. Much like Coffey, I coded the word in its respective category if it is clear what the president is trying to say, and it pertained to the issue area of foreign policy. For example, in his autobiography, Bush states that the U.S. must “confront threats before they fully materialize.” Here, while he makes no mention of being pre-emptive specifically, I would code it as if he did, thus making it a neoconservative statement. On the rare occasion that a key word was stated but did not regard foreign policy, the statement was not counted.

A central question related to the content of Bush’s speeches is which form of ideology George Bush exemplified when speaking about Iraq. Although the assumption is that he was a neo-conservative, there is reason to believe that exemplified realist principles. For example realists are concerned about national interest. Although loosely defined, maintaining a national interest typically involves maintaining the protection of the nation’s people. (Kaufman, 2006) Some could understandably argueable that in
invading Iraq, President Bush was trying to protect the nation from terrorism. This is why I have chosen both categories to help analyze the content.

For reference, I have comprised a list of words that describe neo-conservative ideology, as made possible by readings from the previous section. There are thirteen neo-conservative concepts: democracy promotion, democratic regime, tyranny, confront, preemptive, good/evil, moral, enemies, allies, harbor, obliged, and intervene. There are twelve realist concepts: actual, objective, rational, prudence, interest, relative, national dependence, balance of power, territorial integrity, protection, credible, and imminent.

IV.D. 2001 Joint Address to Congress

Shortly after the 9/11 attacks, President Bush delivered an address to a joint session of Congress that clearly defined America’s goals on the War on Terror. Bush outlined how America’s enemies should be confronted and what was to be done with those that aided them. Aside from clearly identifying Al-Qaeda and the aggressors of the 9/11 attacks President Bush took an aggressive stance on those that aided terrorists, identifying them as enemies of the U.S. as well. “We will pursue nations that provide aid or safe havens to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.”(Executive Office of President, 2001) Here, the Bush administration is putting nations into the binary categories of good and evil. Terrorist nations and their allies are nefarious, while America’s allies, or as Bush called them, the “civilized world” are good.

The vagueness of the identification of U.S. enemies aside from Al-Qaeda provides a challenge that the Bush administration considered heavily. Bush
acknowledged that this “war on terror” was going to be a war the likes of which the U.S. had never seen. He acknowledged that it was going to a lengthy, global, and costly war. Bush posits that in order to win the war, America must act diplomatically when possible, but also must use force military force when necessary. Here, Bush is exemplifying a neo-conservative principle that Kristol and Kagan state. Bush’s leverage of military power is exemplified because of his willingness to use military force to pursue the administration goal of ending terrorism.

Unlike Coffey, I did not use a computer program to code the words into categories. I found that it would not be necessary to do this, because I am dealing with foreign policy, a single issue area. To find the words; I simply used the “find” option using Microsoft Word, and typed in the respective word or phrase I was looking for. From there I counted the number of instances of the word or phrase, so long as they pertained to foreign policy.

I counted twelve instances in which neoconservative words were used and only 3 in which realist words were used. Using my measurement then, it can be considered that Bush used a neoconservative ideology when delivering this speech.

IV.E. 2002 State of the Union

In the 2002 State of the Union, President Bush centers his speech on foreign policy. Delivered on January 29th, 2002, just four months after 9/11, the speech addresses Bush’s plan of action against Al-Qaeda in response to the 9/11 attacks. (Executive Office of the President, 2002) The speech is the first to address the “axis of evil.” In the speech, Bush depicts Iran, Iraq, and North Korea as a loosely interconnected alliance of nations with the common goal of spreading terrorism. These countries were perceived to possess
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, and having terrorist training camps. Bush went on to quote, “States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” (Executive Office of the President, 2002)

The 2002 State of the Union is a primary example of how President Bush uses his ideology to put nations in the binary categories of good and evil. In the speech, Bush clearly makes a distinction between “good” nations and “bad” ones. North Korea, Iraq, and Iran were thought to be haters of peace and lovers of terrorism. These nations that comprised the “axis of evil” were deemed a threat to those democratic nations that aspired for normalcy and provided a beacon of hope for the rest of the world. At the center of the Bush administration’s accusations about the “axis of evil” is the perception that these nations foster terrorism. There was no measurable way to know of any of these nations were going to use weapons against America, or event if they possessed them, but Bush’s “us versus them” mentality set up in this speech clearly shows that he thought they did. Bush further exemplified this belief by declaring a “war on terror” against nations that foster terrorism.

In the 2002 State of the Union, neoconservative words were used a total of 12 times in the speech, while realist words were only used twice. Bush put the most emphasis on the word “allies” using it five times throughout the speech, while the word “evil” occurred the second most amount of times, with three. On the realist side, the word “power” was used four times throughout the speech, however it was not coded because it was either not used in a foreign policy context, or was not a realist statement. This means that given the context of the sentences, Bush positively expressed a neoconservative ideology twelve times, while expressing a realist ideology only twice.
IV.F. 2002 Address at West Point

The 2002 Address at West Point was what many believed to be the introduction of what is known currently as the “Bush Doctrine.” (Gonyea, 2009) At the core of the doctrine is the notion that a nation can preemptively invade or strike a nation if they believe that nation to be a threat, even if that threat is not immediate. Much of the language of the doctrine is imbedded in the 2002 National Defense Strategy. Given this, Bush spent much of the speech not only speaking on the Afghanistan War, (the then toppling of the Taliban being the central accomplishment), but set the tone for what to do in Iraq. This was the first speech that Bush used the word “preemptive.” (Gonyea, 2009)

In doing so, his administration was essentially devising a plan to invade Iraq. As noted in the 2002 State of the Union, Bush considered Iraq a part of the “axis of evil” a trio of nations with the common goals of spreading terrorism and being an end to the western way of life. Due to Iraq’s unwillingness to comply with U.N. resolutions, the Bush administration was fully convinced that military action was necessary and that it had enough evidence to strike. Speaking on the Iraq issue, “If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long.” “Our security will require all Americans to be forward looking and resolute, to be ready for preemptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our lives.” (Gonyea, 2009)

This speech marks the first in which George Bush begins to make a fundamental shift in American foreign policy. Although Bush had mentioned the in the previous two speeches that America faced a new terrorist threat, he was vague about how to confront them. In this address, by focusing on the use of preemptive strikes, Bush gives an outline of the lengths that he is willing to go to stop an attack. In the speech, he directly
repudiates the policy of containment, one that had been used for nearly half a century during the post Word War 2 era. Bush states, “Deterrence means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks without any nations or citizens to defend.” (Gonyea, 2009) He goes on to say that the war on terror requires new ways of thinking, which many critics believe to include a disregard of international laws and a unilateral militarist approach to America’s foreign enemies. (Vann & North, 2002)

Bush used neoconservative words 20 times and realist words eight times. The word “confront” was used a total of four times, a plurality of the word neo-conservative count. “Power” is the most used realist word throughout the speech; being used a total of seven times.

IV.G. 2003 State of the Union

In the 2003 State of the Union, President Bush outlined America’s role as both a democratic regime changer and as an oppressor of tyrannical regimes. Bush used fear-mongering rhetoric to label regimes that possess weapons of mass destruction as threats to the U.S. and the world. “The gravest danger facing America and the world are regimes that seek and possess nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.” (“Text of President,” 2003) Bush is clearly asserting that the U.S. must do something to stop the spread of said regimes. As Kristol and Kagan assert, neo-conservatives believe that the U.S. must act with moral clarity towards tyrannical regimes and are obliged to confront them. (“Kristol & Kagan,” 1996)

In confronting these types of regimes, it is evident from the text that the Bush administration wanted to replace them with democratic structures. Kristol and Kagan argue that a key axiom of neo-conservative foreign policy is the desire to replace
tyrannical regimes with democratic ones. “America is a strong nation and is honorable in
the use of our strength.” “We exercise power without conquest and we sacrifice for the
liberty of strangers,” Bush quotes. Bush continues by stating the benefits of freedom,
“Americans are a free people, who know that freedom is the right of every person and the

This disposing of tyrannical regimes and their replacement with democracies is
directly linked to Iraq in the speech as well as their alleged possession of weapons of
mass destruction. Several times throughout the speech, Bush asserts that Sadam Hussein
is tied to terrorist organizations, suppresses his people with tyrannical aggression, and has
had a chance to comply with U.N. regulations regarding the inspection of his alleged
weapons program, but has failed at complying. For all these factors combined, one can
assert that it was only a matter of time before the Bush administration sought war with
Iraq. In reference to Sadam, Bush quotes, “A brutal dictator with a past history of
reckless aggression, with ties to terrorism, with great potential wealth will not be
permitted to dominate a vital region and threatens the United States.” (“Text of
President,” 2003) This speech provides a litmus test as to how Americans and the rest of
the world would respond to this potential war.

My analysis shows that Bush portrayed a strong neoconservative ideology when
he delivered this speech. He used neoconservative words a total of 21 times, while only
using realist words, five times. The most used neoconservative word was “regime” used
for a total of eight times, while the most popular realist word was “power” used for a total
of five.
IV.H. 2005 Inaugural Address

After a very close battle with Senator John Kerry in the 2004 election, President Bush delivered his second Inaugural Address on January 20th, 2005. 100,000 people were on hand to see what the former President would make his biggest priority in the speech. The address was like no other in recent years. Security was the tightest it had ever been, thanks in part to the newly formed Department of Homeland Security. The address was also the first war-time address in decades. (“Bush: expand freedom,” 2005)

Americans were seeing results in the Afghanistan War directly after British and American troops led a strike that resulted in the ousting of the Taliban from Kabul and the destruction of Al-Qaeda camps. However, for as much success that occurred, obstacles challenged the allies’ success. Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden remained elusive, and was never found during the camp raids. (Mount, 2005) In 2003, the Taliban experienced a resurgence, the likes of which are still being felt by coalition forces today. (Bajoria, 2011) The war in Iraq remained mildly popular. According to a Time Magazine poll released in March 2005, 49 percent of the American public disapproved of the war. (“Iraq War,” 2005) While some success had been accomplished, such as the capturing of Sadam Hussein, shifting policy goals left many Americans questioning what the United States’ fate in Iraq was. Their doubts would be laid to rest after the inaugural speech.

The subject of Bush’s second inaugural speech involved the role the United States should have around the world. Bush formed what is referred to by former White House adviser David Gergen, as the most “ambitious” foreign policy strategy ever given in an inaugural speech. Bush essentially stated that it was the policy of the United States to seek and support democracies throughout the world, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny. To Bush, protecting the country’s borders was no longer enough to ensure that “ideologies that feed hatred and excuse murder” would not attack the U.S. again. Therefore Bush though it common sense to conclude that “the survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands.” Insinuating self-government and human freedom, the pillars of democracy, to be the core of American beliefs, Bush claimed that, “America’s vital interests and deepest beliefs are now one.”

The previous quote is perhaps the most revealing in this speech. It is in this statement that Bush combines two principles of neo-conservatism mentioned previously. In combining America’s vital interests with its deepest beliefs, Bush is essentially saying that it is in the nation’s interest to end tyranny throughout the world and replace these tyrannical regimes with democratic governments. Although Bush never directly quotes Iraq in the speech, or directly says that the U.S. will impose democracy on other nations, his conclusions on both issues can be ascertained by looking at quotes that relate to them.

In reference to democracy promotion, Bush says that the United States’ goal instead is to “help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way.” Here again though, Bush is commenting on free individualism, a fraction of democratic life, and how the United States will aide in its implementation. Bush further insinuates America’s role as a democracy promoter by saying: “We will consistently clarify the choice before every ruler and every nation, - the moral choice between oppression, which is always wrong, and freedom, which is eternally right.” (“Bush pledges to,” 2005) As Kristol and Kagan would note, Bush is using morality to justify warfare. Bush believed that it was in the nation’s interest to topple the tyrannical Iraqi
regime because their ways pose a threat to the American way of life, and freeing the Iraqi citizens from tyrannical oppression is the humane thing to do.

Further analysis of the content will exemplify Bush’s neoconservative logic. Neoconservative words were used a total of 10 times, while realist words were used a total of 5 times. The most used neoconservative word was “tyranny”, not surprising given the tone of the speech. The most used realist word was “power” for a total of two times.
Chapter Five

Conclusions

In all the speeches, neo-conservative words were used a total of 75 times, while realist words were used a total of 22 times. Table 1 summarizes the results.

Table 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech</th>
<th>Realist word count</th>
<th>Neo-conservative word Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2001 Joint Address to Congress</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 State of the Union</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002 Address at West Point</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 State of the Union</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 Inaugural Address</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the addresses, the 2003 State of the Union represents the largest contrast between neo-conservatism and realism, with a 16 word difference between the categories. The speech occurred two short months before the Iraq invasion. President Bush outlined the most specific plan of action against Hussein and the Iraqi insurgents in this speech. The consequence however, was that the lines between the two political ideologies had never been more clear.

From each speech it can be concluded that George W. Bush exemplified a neo-conservative ideology as opposed to a realist ideology when speaking of the Iraq invasion.
Given Bush's statements in the 2001 Joint Address, scholars such as Jonathan Clarke, view the speech as ideologically neoconservative. As Clarke points out, neoconservatives tend to put nations into the binary categories of “good” or “bad.” (Clarke, 2009) Neoconservatives will support nations that agree with their principles, usually through military or economic aid. However, nations that do not comply with these principles are targets of attack or sanctions. There is little tolerance for indifference in the neoconservative international world. While indifference may not merit a threat, nations that do not agree with American hegemony will have no choice but to comply. In putting nations into these categories, it is clear that Bush is engaging in neoconservative thinking.

Regarding the 2002 State of the Union, realists would disagree with President Bush’s “axis of evil” rhetoric. They would assert that Bush erroneously attempted to ascertain the motives of the nations within the “axis.” Morgenthau states that realist theories of international relations guard against the popular fallacy of trying to understand another nation's motives. He sites that claiming to know the motives of other nations is both futile and deceptive. To attempt to define the motives of a nation means that a statesman depends on psychological data. Psychological data is illusive because it is dependent on the revolving emotions of the statesmen and the state in question. Morgenthau goes further saying that even if the statesman does know the motives of the state, that does not mean that he can predict what their foreign policy will be, or even that they will act on these motives. Thus, Morgenthau asserts that there is little correlation between the quality of motives and the quality of foreign policy. (Morgenthau, 1985)

In grouping the motives of the “axis” nations into one block, the Bush
administration used non-realist rationale. In this address, Bush psychoanalyzes the intentions of the “axis of evil” without knowing what their intentions truly are. This is a fallacy that realists would avoid. (Morgenthau, 1985)

Scholars like Joyce Kaufman would agree with my conclusion regarding the 2002 Address at West Point. Kaufman, author of *A Concise History of U.S, Foreign Policy*, says that realism is tied to the national interest, the protection of its people from threat. (Kaufman, 2006) While it can be argued that Bush exemplified a realist ideology by protecting the nation from this threat, the issue lies with the credibility of the threat. Most realists define power in terms of tangibility, for example the number of tanks or missiles a state possess. However Kaufman says that it is much more difficult to measure how credible a state in its pursuance of said weapons. The attention goes from what a nation will use against another, to what they might use against another. (Kaufman, 2006) If a leader bases the credibility of a threat not based on tangibles, but on perception, then they distance themselves from the realist school of thought, as Bush did by stressing pre-emptive warfare.

According to the text of the 2003 State of the Union, it is George Bush’s belief that freedom is a universal principle that every person in every nation should one day have. (“Text of President,” 2003) As admirable as this may be, realists would disagree with Bush’s prophetic nature. Morgenthau states that realism is rooted in the notion that moral aspirations of particular nations should not be conveyed as universalistic principles. In other words, it is erroneous for nations to pretend to know what is best for other nations. Pretending to know with certainty what is good and what is evil leads to irrational policies that are rooted not in moral law, but divine law. (Morgenthau, 1985)
Morgenthau would agree that no single nation can, or should, act as an arbiter of peace
amongst nations. (Morgenthau, 1985)

Bush’s prophetic statements about the expansion of freedom may have been
thought of as being in America’s interest, but to state them as being in the interest of the
rest of the world is not politically realist.

My conclusions about the 2005 Inaugural Address are further strengthened by
Professor Vincent Ferraro. According to Ferraro, realism involves maintaining a nation’s
interest by ensuring its political autonomy and territorial integrity. He notes that once
these factor have been ensured, then a nation’s interest take different forms. These
interests include expansions of resources or political systems. (Ferraro, 2010)

While Ferraro stops short of saying that these expansions of resources and
political systems do not fall under realist principles, is implied that they do not. Not only
does a nation’s interest take a different form once political autonomy and territorial
integrity have been met, they fall under a different ideology. In searching for ways to
implement a new political system on another nation, very rarely is it the case that the
imposing nation’s territorial integrity and political autonomy are not already met. Thus,
the imposing nation is able to expand their influence because their nation’s basic needs
have been met.

Realists would argue that this was the case with the Iraq War. They would argue
that the United States’ territorial integrity and political autonomy were not in any danger
pre-invasion. No weapons of mass destruction capable of threatening the United States’
territory were found. The Iraqi threat to U.S. autonomy is more difficult to measure, but
realists would note that compared to the U.S., the Iraqi military is much smaller and
much less resourceful. This makes threats to U.S. autonomy less credible. It is clear from the speech that President Bush is committed to imposing democratic forms of government, an interest that takes a different form than realist interests.
Chapter Six

Discussion

While there a plethora of political ideologies, the two chosen represent the most salient foreign policy ideologies in America. They are also the most conflicting. It would be erroneous to say that George Bush has been a neo-conservative all his life, especially given his statements during the 2000 campaign. After 9/11 however, America’s foreign policy began to change.

The results of the analysis of each speech would lead one to believe that Bush was strongly influenced by neo-conservative ideology. However, what is less clear is the degree to which Bush was truly a neo-conservative. Many attribute Bush’s neo-conservative foreign policy stance to members of his administration such as Dick Cheney and Condoleezza Rice. However, some view that the neo-conservative influence did not come from inside the administration. In fact, there is argument about whether or not Cheney, Rice, and Donald Rumsfeld were neo-conservatives at all. (Marshall, 2003)

The question then remains, if neither Bush nor his cabinet members were true neo-conservatives, where did the influential ideology come from? To find the answer, one must look outside Bush’s Cabinet to the second tier executive level appointments and foreign policy interest groups. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, for example, may not have been in the Cabinet, but had a large role in shaping America’s Iraq policy. (Marshall, 2003) The same was the case for Pentagon adviser Richard Perle. In the wake of 9/11 these figures assisted in the changing of America’s foreign policy by influencing Cabinet members, including Vice President Dick Cheney. (Marshall, 2003)
Joshua Marshall states that while Bush may not have been the main organizer of the neo-conservative revolution that bears his name, he was the key decision maker. In fact, he notes that Bush spent little time attempting to develop formal foreign policy philosophies while in office. A lifetime of experience in politics however, created deeply entrenched instincts as to how the world works and how it doesn’t. The fact that Bush himself did not formally draft his instincts into a foreign policy doctrine mattered little to him. (Marshall, 2003) The source of his ideology made little difference to Bush.

The contrasts with realism regarding the Bush administration’s foreign policy, much like realism itself, are profound and real. Instead of emphasizing unilateralism, like Clinton did in the Kosovo War, or even deterrence, like Reagan did during the Cold War, the Bush administration emphasized preemptive war and the promotion of democracy. Realists do not believe in the sort of “bandwagon” logic like neo-conservative do. They believe in a balanced world, in which if one nation threatens another, the threatened nation will not surrender immediately, but will defend itself. Likewise, should the threatening nation find success in their mission, realists would not agree that this action would automatically mean that its allies would join them in arms. If it is not in the nation’s interest to do so, they will not. One can liken this example to the stance that many of America’s allies took against Iraq.

The future of neo-conservatism in American foreign policy is unknown, but its association with the Bush administration is clear. As Hans Morgenthau says, realism is profound and real, as are its differences with neo-conservatism.
References


