A Dissertation

Entitled

Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s *Karl Marx: Translation and Commentary*

By

Manuel Yang

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Adviser: Dr. Peter Linebaugh

Dr. Alfred Cave

Dr. Harry Cleaver

Dr. Michael Jakobson

Graduate School

The University of Toledo

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In 1966 the Japanese New Left thinker Yoshimoto Taka’aki published his seminal book on *Karl Marx*. The originality of this overview of Marx’s ideas and life lay in Yoshimoto’s stress on the young Marx’s theory of alienation as an outgrowth of a unique philosophy of nature, whose roots went back to the latter’s doctoral dissertation. It echoed Yoshimoto’s own reformulation of “alienation” (and Marx’s labor theory of value) as key concept in his theory of literary language (*What is Beauty in Language*), which he had just completed in 1965, and extended his argument -- ongoing from the mid-1950s -- with Japanese Marxism over questions of literature, politics, and culture. His extraction of the theme of “communal illusion” from the early Marx foregrounds his second major theoretical work of the decade, *Communal Illusion*, which he started to serialize in 1966 and completed in 1968, and outlines an important theoretical closure to the existential, political, and intellectual struggles he had waged since the end of the
Pacific War. Karl Marx thus offers a powerful microcosmic glimpse of Yoshimoto’s achievements at the height of his seminal influence on the Japanese New Left.

Presented here are the complete translation of Karl Marx and a selection of related materials relevant to Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx, along with a commentary that situates this text in the context of his life, with some suggestions as to its significance within the comparative context of contemporary Western Marxism. What emerges is Yoshimoto’s existentially committed, conceptually bold rereading of Karl Marx that refuses trucking with all Marxist traditions and that is firmly grounded in the actuality of popular experience that Yoshimoto learned viscerally from the three major defeats of his life: Japanese defeat in World War II in 1945, defeat of labor union struggle on the shop floor in 1953-54, and defeat of the anti-Anpo (U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty) movement in 1960.
Acknowledgments

Although I never met the man and may never do so in the flesh, I suppose it is only natural that I should first offer my thanks to Yoshimoto Taka’aki, who has supplied me with the materials for my work and whose writings will remain an essential lodestar in my intellectual peregrination.

Above all, I express my heartfelt gratitude to all the members of my dissertation committee who have given me undreamed-of freedom in pursuing my studies and were infinitely patient with my painfully slow progress and innumerable self-indulgent digressions: Profs. Alfred Cave, Harry Cleaver, William D. Hoover, Michael Jakobson, and Peter Linebaugh. Prof. Linebaugh must be marked out for particular thanks for the regular meetings he has had with me over the course of my work and his always deeply resonant words of encouragement and criticism. Also, a bow of riconoscenza to Prof. Harry Cleaver, my outsider reader without whom I would not have dared knock on the door of Marx’s work or decide to make my journey from Austin to Toledo.

Although they will never read it, I know that my father and mother -- Shih-Lin and Mitsuko Yang -- are happier than anybody else for the completion of the following work. Since my birth they have supported me emotionally, financially, and unconditionally in every sense of the word. I am truly blessed in having such parents and
no word of gratitude would be sufficient to express that. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

To them and all those who have helped me along the way: Dōmo arigatō gozaimashita!
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Translator’s Note

I have consulted two editions of Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s Karl Marx for my translation. The first is the one contained in Volume 12 of Yoshimoto’s collected works: Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenchosakushū, vol. 12 (Tokyo: Keisō-shobō, 1969). And the other one is the 2006 pocketbook paperback edition: Kāru Marukusu (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 2006). All other translations from Japanese are mine unless otherwise noted. When Japanese proper names appear in the text, the family name is placed before the given name, as it is customary in Japanese.

It is customary in a note such as this to elaborate on the most hazardous twists and turns in the translation liable to cause confusion in the reader. Allow me to mention only one because it is the most symptomatic and the most basic. It is the word shisō, which Yoshimoto uses time and again throughout the text (in fact, in virtually all his writings). The term corresponds most closely to the English word “thought”, not as in mere thinking but as in the totality of a person’s ideas. The trouble is that, without knowing the context in the original Japanese, the English reader will often not be able to distinguish this latter meaning from the former. I have therefore resorted more often than not to the term “philosophy” despite a train of misunderstanding that this might also invite. This is not “philosophy” in the disciplinary or academic sense of the word (for which the Japanese has the word tetsugaku -- which Yoshimoto uses only a few times in his book) but in the broader sense of Weltanschauung, intellectual system, method of
thinking and understanding the world. Thus, when the reader sees the word “philosophy” in the text, he or she should keep in mind that Yoshimoto is not talking about philosophy in the narrow academic sense or making a bid to establish a chair of Marxist philosophy in the universities.

The reader would find that I have tried to retain as much as possible Yoshimoto’s stylistic peculiarities, not least of all his use of angle brackets (“<>”) in lieu of quotation marks. The reason I did not turn these into quotation marks, as it would be standard practice in English writing, was because in other places Yoshimoto uses the Japanese block-quote equivalent of quotation marks (i.e., “「」”) as well as round brackets (“( )”) for parenthetical purpose and, had I done so, it would not have been possible for English readers to distinguish the two. The significance of the angle brackets lie in their coding function, that is, they indicate that they are keywords in Yoshimoto’s text.

This was my first attempt in translating a full-length book and what I have gained from the process has been incalculable. First, it taught me that there is no better, more fundamental way of reading a book than translating it. Far from it being a mechanical procedure in which the translator simply rearranges a set of words in one language to another, it is a procedure that tests your understanding word for word, every step of the way, to say nothing of your own linguistic command -- or its lack thereof -- in the act of writing. This is why mistranslations abound in the world and there is a need of multiple translations, perhaps every generation, of truly great writings. Another personally significant yield of doing this translation was that it became a vehicle for fundamentally reorganizing the structure of my daily life and clarifying the orientation of my future work. I will not dwell on this latter point, for it has no relevance to the work that follows,
but allow me to simply say that it has given me the necessary stamina and expunction of illusions to take my struggle with myself to the next level, with unceasing, focused determination.

Although I have been reading and studying the work of Yoshimoto Taka’aki on and off for over ten years -- I first encountered his writing as an undergraduate -- I do not claim to know Yoshimoto’s entire oeuvre (which easily numbers over hundred books and still ongoing) in all its painstaking detail. I am not a Yoshimotologist, just as Yoshimoto is not a Marxiologist. My only hope is that I have not prevaricated too much in conveying Yoshimoto’s ideas to an English-speaking public. Needless to say, if there are infelicities of expression and confusing passages that obscure more than clarify, no blame ought to be placed at Yoshimoto’s feet; they are entirely my own.

Since delving into Yoshimoto’s writings I have wished on many occasions that the finest Anglophone translators of Japanese language working today would take them on and discharge what Michel Foucault had told Yoshimoto at the end of their dialogue in 1978: “I strongly hope that Mr. Yoshimoto's books will be introduced into French or English…Because, for us Westerners, to be able to hear what you have to say is an extremely valuable experience and also absolutely necessary”.1 There is no small irony in the fact that it is his daughter Yoshimoto Banana’s best-selling novels -- which have induced what is known as “Banana phenomenon” in Japan during the 1990s -- have been blessed with a plethora of international translators. Indeed even in Japan Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s renown -- which was probably at its pinnacle when he was deemed a leading New Left thinker during the 1960s -- has been far outstripped by that of his daughter’s (to

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1 Yoshimoto Taka'aki, Sekai ninshiki no hōhō (Tokyo: Chōkōronsha, 1984), 48. Unless otherwise noted, all translations from Japanese sources are mine.
Yoshimoto’s great delight, incidentally; his doting on his two daughters -- the elder one is a comic book writer -- recalls something of Marx’s doting of his own daughters). But that is the inexorable logic of the cultural marketplace. It is pointless -- and indeed betrays certain delusions concerning the place of intellectuality in the social world -- to lament the fact that Stephen King is better known than Henry Miller or Jean Baudrillard (the comparison is not arbitrary: Banana is an avid reader of King while Yoshimoto wrote a major essay on Miller in 1972-73 and had an open debate with Baudrillard in 1995).

But I think it is still fair to ask why Japanese translations of Foucault, Walter Benjamin, Jean-Paul Sartre, Louis Althusser, Jurgen Habermas, Slavoj Zizek, etc., are readily available, in fact often occur virtually contemporaneously, while English translations of Yoshimoto and other seminal postwar Japanese thinkers are virtually non-existent. There have been a few hopeful signs that this incredulous disproportion is being corrected (for example, Richard F. Calichman’s recent translations of Takeuchi Yoshimi’s essays on modernity and Asia), but I doubt the situation will ever fundamentally change in the foreseeable future, for the root of this disproportion stems from the residual Eurocentrism in which almost all intellectuals works have proceeded in the past and proceed today. This is not simply a question of ideological bias, for some of these same works pose principled criticisms of Eurocentrism (such as Edward Said’s Orientalism and Andre Gunder Frank’s ReOrient), but it is a matter of the “fate of ideas”, to borrow Yoshimoto’s phrase. Just as we can do nothing about the logic of the market except to honestly acknowledge it and work in critical relation to it, the same goes for this residual Eurocentrism, which will no more disappear with a retrenchment of obsolescent Asian nationalism than with a noble but empty appeal to the egalitarian
internationalism of ideas. We must work with what we have, deal with the reality that faces us, and do our own bidding, no matter how necessarily minor and ineffectual it may be to alter the merciless conditions under which we find ourselves. This is not an admonishment for despair. It is the readiness to fight after our own fashion to the bitter end. For I believe that is finally the lesson of Yoshimoto’s Karl Marx as well. Or, for that matter, the lesson also of the great genius whom Yoshimoto tackles in his book and who said famously: “Men make their own history, but not of their own free will; not under circumstances they themselves have chosen but under the given and inherited circumstances with which they are directly confronted”.  

The reader should be forewarned that the translator is not a “Yoshimotoist” -- no more than a “Yoshimotologist” -- and that his own reading of Marx diverges necessarily from Yoshimoto’s. I say “necessarily” because, in the same sense that Yoshimoto stresses the “fate of ideas”, the reading of Marx or any other great thinker has its own “fate” as well, bound up with the trajectory of the reader’s life experiences. My reading of Marx was first prompted in college by Noam Chomsky’s passing allusions to the parallel between anarchism and the libertarian, anti-authoritarian tradition in Marxism (a terrain well captured in the works of Daniel Guerin and Maximilien Rubel, for example), sharpened by the Situationist revival of the council communist approach as applied to media-saturated consumer capitalism (Guy Debord’s laconically thesis-driven, soberly Gallic Society of the Spectacle and Raoul Vaneigem’s aphoristically sprawling, antinomian The Revolution of Everyday Life), and developed most significantly in the autonomist tradition that I learned from Harry Cleaver in seminars and classes he taught

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at the University of Texas at Austin (after over ten years of participating in various Marx study groups and reading a number of commentaries on Marx, Cleaver’s Reading Capital Politically still strikes me as the best, most succinct introduction to Capital and Marxism I have ever come across). The most discernible change that occurred in my reading since my time in college, as a graduate student in Toledo, was to rethink Marx through the prism of the commons, a change that was inspired by the works of E.P. Thompson and most especially Peter Linebaugh (reading his magisterial London Hanged in Cleaver’s seminar made me decide to come to Toledo). The most concentrated work I did for this commonist reading of Marx was done in preparation for a presentation on a panel -- which Linebaugh presided -- at the Rethinking Marxism conference in Amherst, MA in November 2003.

Very little of these influences and projects involving my reading of Marx appears in the commentary because the latter is intended to be first and foremost introductory and contextual, to provide the reader with as accurate a reading of Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx as I can manage -- that is to say, my purpose was not to enter into an argument or critical dialogue with Yoshimoto but to do my best in channeling the spirit of his interpretation and elucidate straightforwardly its historical and biographical significance. Before such arguments and dialogues can take place, I believe we must first be presented with Yoshimoto’s ideas just as they are and understand them without distortion, lest we fall into the role analogous to so many Marxists and anti-Marxists whom Yoshimoto vehemently attacks. If I have succeeded -- if not fully, at least essentially -- in doing this, I would consider my aim fulfilled.
Preface for the Paperback Edition: Marx in the Twenty-First Century

Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s *Karl Marx*

In my heretofore understanding (as of February 2006), *Capital* has two important frameworks. One is the understanding that, although the use-value of natural water and air is limitlessly expandable, their exchange-value (so-called economic value) is zero. To put this into ordinary speech, this is a view that postulates water and air remaining free even if the possibility of their diverse use is ever expandable. The other framework is that, if we socially posit (hypothesize) a standard for an epoch (for example, today), human beings’ manner of labor in relation to the external world will have a temporary fixed standard. To also put this into common speech, all we have to do is posit an equivalent standard when we consider the social labor of an epoch even if each and every laborer’s manner of labor is multifarious, including the physically fit, physically weak, or diligent, lazy, male and female differences. The reader may have many questions about this because my way of explanation is poor. As I would prefer to use better words myself, I would like the reader to excuse me for the time being.

A question immediately arises. Even if we just think of Japan, hasn’t natural water (for instance, the spring water of Mount Rokkō) been bottled and sold as a commodity from about 1972? Hasn’t the content of carbon dioxide increased in the
upper layer of atmosphere and in the sky above where people live, worsening the earth’s
temperature and air pollution and prompting professional conferences and international
treaties to impose industrial restriction on it? In view of this, the possibility of use-value
of natural water and air only increases, but the framework of classical economics that
deems their exchange value (value) as zero is found to be questionable, spreading crisis
from the developed regions of the world. The less and moderately developed regions
oppose this on the ground that the progress of their regional industries will be restricted.
This is my view as an individual and I won’t assert that it has necessarily any
universality. The value theory of *Capital* is the most coherent one in economics. If this
is so, we can say that the framework of all value theories in economics, including modern
economics, is in crisis.

As it is well known, Marx states two important things in the preface to *Capital*. One is his statement that, although there are passages where he treats the “capitalist” in negative terms, he is not talking about denying the character of the individual “capitalist” but speaking from the perspective of the <capitalist as a institution> in mind. I speculate that such an annotation was necessary because the image of the capitalist of his day that many people had was one of an evil man with an enormously bloated stomach who abused working people only for their profit, disregarding human beings as being human. He states one more thing. It is where he notes his purpose, quoting Dante’s words -- “Go on your way, and let the people talk”. I think he did because there were, in fact, capitalists with enormously bloated belly who did not think of human beings as human and thought only of their profit, and they and their followers spread the word that Marx and his associates were the incarnation of the devil. Fate is always likely to visit human
beings this way. But I think, as his best friend Engels says, there is no doubt that Marx is a figure whom “anybody will have to recognize as the world’s greatest thinker through the centuries”. If I may add my comment to this, he is not a mediocre political activist or thinker who can be torn apart by parsimonious parties and sectarianism.

Maybe this should be said because Marx was too great, but even today (February 2006) problems caused by petty sectarianism that are proposed in the preface of Capital infest the less and moderately developed regions of the world. I think the symptoms of the collapse of the framework -- whose sign of tranquility Marx viewed as the pastoral nature of natural water and air -- should be considered a new issue in thinking about how the developed regions of the world are being destroyed graphically.

I am not one to aim for Marx’s greatness nor do I have the talent for that. But, at the beginning of my poor treatise on Marx, I wanted at the very least to make a note of this. What must be said are inexhaustible, coming one after another, but, after the great medieval Japanese monk, I would like to just state “non-delinquency, non-righteousness” as a solace to one’s subjectivity and assert the directness of philosophy.3

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3 “Hikō hizen” (rendered here as “non-delinquency, non-righteousness”) is a term from the thirteenth-century Japanese Buddhist monk Shinran, on whom Yoshimoto wrote a major study.
Part I: Travel in Marx

I

A book asks us something new every time we read it. Or it would be the same to say that a book is what unceasingly asks us new questions. This is because, even though a book is fixed on the other side, a reader matures and circulates in relation to it. When this questioning from the side of the book can endure this circulation and still has the power to drag the reader into its world, binding him with a certain ineluctable strength, we can call such a book a classic.

In spite of the fact the same words are placed next to each other, works that are generally called classics indicate something that, depending on the movement and depth on the side of the reader, still appears as changes of movement and depth. Such movement and depth on the side of the classic works seem to strike at the hard core of certain universality and individuality, in other words the core of historicity and contemporaneity. I have not had many occasions to feel that I have encountered such books. Although I am not sure if this is fortunate or not, our epoch is one in which reality itself is that restless.

I first encountered Marx’s major writings several years after the defeat of the war when I returned to the university as a special research student. Reality was as desolate as it is now but there was a saving grace in the fact that the color of the desolation was still
thick. I wrote “A Few Notes on the Methods of Rimbaud and Karl Marx” around the time for the Osaka poetry journal Poetic Culture edited by Mr. Fujimura Sei’ichi and others, and it retains the impression of that encounter. Not only because the translation was poorly written but because Marx’s style was of a distinctively German dialectic, I remember its strange influence over me and how difficult it was for me to escape from the power of its style. But I joyously basked under its influence because it was a period in which I could not write poetry well. Then, when I started being able to write poetry, I stopped reading Marx. Poetry cannot be created without believing in the existence of consciousness in the same sense as you believe in the existence of trees and stones. Marx’s philosophy, which deems consciousness as nothing more than existence that has become conscious of itself, stands inversely as the non-poetic to the poetic. My early writing should say something to the effect that rather than this being an opposition, it may very well be none other than roughly two forms of what are at polar ends of the spectrum.

I most likely understand Marx’s ideas now better than I did few years after the defeat of the war. Additionally, Marx whom I once considered unreachable appears now as a consciousness of what is still unreachable within a certain manageable image. Although someone might say that it is illegitimate to read a book, especially Marx’s writings, in the chance moment of one individual’s relationship to another, he is the one who is wrong. Unlike paintings and movies, there is nothing that demands the chance moment of an individual’s relationship to another more than a book (what is written in letters). Even if it were scientific writing, it cannot be truly read without the demands of an individual’s relationship to another.
I don’t think even now that my juvenile understanding of Marx, articulated once as the inversion between the poetic and the non-poetic, was so misguided. Now, as I have come to deal with Marx by coincidence, I can do nothing except to clarify where this inversion between the poetic and the non-poetic in Marx resonates and where it sets off sparks with the equation of the inversion between the poetic and non-poetic in the understanding of my twenties. There is nothing more to this than just the fact that I have now acquired an understanding at the level of being able to replace the words of inversion between the poetic and the non-poetic with the concept of inversion between what is illusory (law, state) and non-illusory (civil society, nature).

According to my current understanding, Marx’s intellectual system assumed a completed form after his mid-twenties, from 1843 to 1844. This can be symbolized by “On the Jewish Question”, “A Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, and “Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts”. If an individual’s lifetime of thought matures toward the first work and all of its buds are essentially laid out there, these are Marx’s first work in the real sense and we can say that he never went beyond it throughout his life.

In these theoretical propositions Marx exhaustively thought about the illusoriness and illusory communality that are religion, law, and state, established the skeletal form of economic category as a structure of civil society -- which is opposed to this communality despite being in a sense its origin -- and completed a single system by fusing and enmeshing in a trinitarian link his own philosophy of nature that lay at the root of these investigations. People should not say that this is no time for Marx. This applies especially to those <Marx>ists who have mistaken the Russian development of Marx’s
ideas for his ideas and those anti-<Marx>ists who have made this into a straw man to shoot at. If I had anything to spare, I could bibliographically critique each and every one of them, but, if I could find no new meaning in Marx’s ideas, I think they should laugh me off. Just as I have continuously laughed them off in derision.

Any intellectual person in a period of youth may be seized by the impulse to exhaustively investigate the existing reality and the human relationships residing there through his philosophy. But for several centuries no one has achieved the aspirations of youth with such thoroughness and logical passion as he did. Anyone who tries to trace his entire system can find three itineraries from his ideas.

One is the road that flows down from religion to law and state,

another is economics as a key to unveiling the structure of civil society of his day,

and the third is the path of philosophy of nature he formed himself.

As an individual, no person can move far and deep on many paths. This is not because one’s lifetime is limited but because the reality that comes upon one’s life forces one invariably onto a particular path. The very fact that he thinks and acts makes this reality prepare a path that only he could walk. At the very least this cannot be avoided as long as we view a human being as an individual. Even if by common sense we call it experience of reality or philosophy of experience, there is far deeper, important significance than commonly thought in how human being experiences events in his lifetime and how he extracts ideas from it are tangled up with each other.
The three paths Marx made during his youth soon thicken one of them and transform the remaining others into byways. As long as we see this as something that his own experience forced upon him, nobody can complain about it. For it is self-evident that the frequently trampled path thickens and the rarely stepped path becomes thinner as grasses grow on it and shrubbery lines alongside of it. According to documents that can be consulted today, after “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, Marx ceased the study of religion, law, and state, or, in other words, communality as a totality.

Furthermore, it is only in the economic category that his philosophy of <nature> is preserved on the path en route to Capital.

Why did the study of the non-poetic remain the only royal path of his life?

I have persistently distrusted what the believers of the Russian form of Marx’s ideas say. I only believe in something that can be called the actuality of historical reality that necessarily forced Marx to take that path. Because that is the only something that can make an individual’s philosophy transcend the times and live. It is only there that the philosophy of a human being as an individual connects with philosophy as a species. What makes a person live philosophically is always through the chance of the crossing point between contemporaneity and historicity, not by <faith> or by <science>. If the science of nature and society could only become <science>, this is due to the inevitability about which nothing at all could be done. What this means is that, once an object is examined, it accumulates on the back of many human beings and various epochs, eventually develops veins and cells that are somehow completely different from what they were at the beginning of its origination, and finally departs from human beings as if it were a completely self-sufficient creature, whose grotesqueness is a process that human
thought and its products cannot avoid. Science is no more than merely a different name
given to human objectification that has become distant from human objectification.

In Marx’s ideas, there are at first three paths and soon one of them becomes a city
road and the other two become byways. I must trace this, at times humming a song,
sometimes mocking, and occasionally feeling the kind of comfort found in walking a
perfectly paved, completely faultless road.

II

For instance, we have the following remarks:

The universality of man manifests itself in practice [note: in the
sense of laboring in relation to <nature> and “society”] in that universality
which makes the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means
of life and (2) as the matter, the object and the tool of his life activity.

Death appears as the harsh victory of the species over the
particular individual, and seemingly contradicts their unity; but the
particular individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal.

Both are words found in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. 4 What are
articulated here incisively -- though in the obsessed form of <nature> and <death> -- and
thoroughly are how the universal character of human beings can be conceived in terms of
its relationship with nature and why the concept of species of human beings (human
species) can be formed despite individual human beings are merely repetition in the form
of birth and death. The roots of Marx’s philosophy of <nature> are symbolized
effectively here. I think he learned his obsession over “nature and <death> from the

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4 The English translation I am using here is from Karl Marx, Early Writings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and
Gregory Benton (New York: Vintage Books, 1975), 328, 351. In the Benton translation, the words
<death> and “particular species-being” are italicized but I have regularized the scripts to correspond with
Yoshimoto’s lack of emphasis in his quotation. Although I have not made note of it, I have done the same
for later quotations cited by Yoshimoto, only indicating when there may be substantive discrepancy of
meaning between the English and Japanese translations.
Greek philosophy of nature, especially Epicurus to whom he was attached in the early period of his youth. The first itinerary I want to trace is the path from the Greek philosophy of \textit{nature}, which he tried to resolve with terminological borrowings from Hegel’s philosophy in his doctoral dissertation at Jena University, to the formation of his own philosophy of \textit{nature} in the \textit{Manuscripts}. More that they are conscionable (that is, more that they think such concepts of Marx’s as \textit{alienation} and \textit{self-alienation} ought to be reconsidered), many Marxist philosophers and political scientists are ever more liable to misunderstand Marx’s concepts of \textit{alienation} and \textit{self-alienation}, but they should recognize that these concepts emerged from the category of his philosophy of \textit{nature} and were not directly produced from economic category as the structure of civil society.

The ability to make the whole of nature into one’s \textit{inorganic body} (the humanization of nature), a characteristic that only human beings have come to possess, is impossible without, inversely, the contrary effect of being able to make the whole of humanity into nature’s \textit{organic nature}; and it is this reciprocal intermeshing between the whole of nature and the whole of humanity that Marx conceived as \textit{alienation} or \textit{self-alienation} through the category of philosophy of \textit{nature}. Even if this is represented as an economic category of civil society, expanded or differentiated to what lies between one who labors and his product, between the act of production and labor (laboring), between a human being and his self-existence, there is no doubt that his philosophy of \textit{nature} is hidden at its roots and the concept of \textit{alienation} in contemporary society emerges from this philosophy of \textit{nature}.
Moreover, when one <dies>, at least for each and every individual human being, the whole of nature becomes his <inorganic body> and, because of this, the relationship of <alienation> in which he becomes nature’s <organic nature> seems to disappear. And certainly he does disappear as an “individual”. However, among other living human beings, this relationship between the whole of nature and the whole of humanity does not disappear. Various real problems arise when this is represented in economic category of civil society as the relationship between one human being and another, between human beings and nature, and, although these problem will change with social changes and they will disappear socially when they are made to do so, no change would take place between nature and human existence. By positing it as the relationship between the species and the individual, Marx goes beyond the contradiction found in the relationship of <alienation> between nature and human beings, which seems to disappear in <death> in the category of philosophy of <nature>.

So-called <Marx>ists commonly confuse the relationship of <alienation> between human beings and nature, which is the essence of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, with <alienation> as an economic category that is conceptualized when it is represented in civil society, trying to treat them at the same level. Thus, just as when you think there is a man who says that <alienation> and <self-alienation> in Marx’s early manuscripts are premature concepts that are still burdened with idealist residues, we find another man who promotes the argument that the early Marx’s <alienation> should be reassessed from the economic category of society. But, in my view, these are both trivial topics of discussion. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of Marx’s theory of <alienation> cannot be debated without making an issue of the thoroughgoing appearance of his philosophy of
that seeks to rescue the permanence of human existence through the concept of the species even as all of “human beings” and nature is made to enter and dissolve into nature.

The concepts of alienation and self-alienation that emerge in Marx’s philosophy of nature as representation of the reciprocal relationship between human beings and nature are essential and therefore immutable concepts and they are not conceptualized in such a way that they change with social change. But alienation (labor that is alienated) represented as an economic category of real society can disappear with social change and emerges as a concept that can be made the self-objective of human society.

Recently I read a young literary man by the name of Kasa Kei’ichi in New Japanese Literature writing something along the line of “those of you intellectuals who are at this time still going on about Marx’s ‘alienation’ theory…” and almost burst out laughing. As far as I know, intellectuals who can genuinely throw around the theory of alienation can be counted only on a few fingers. There are innumerable figures who talk about alienation or class as if they know what they are talking about, such as Kasa Kei’ichi and those of his ilk, and we must first of all smash such vacuous arrogance that is neither here nor there. Neither Lenin, Stalin, nor Mao Zedong knew the concepts of alienation and self-alienation, which are the essence of Marx’s philosophy of nature. But that is due to the clear reason of their not having read about them.

New Japanese Literature (Shin Nihon bungaku) was a leading literary journal of writers affiliated with the Japanese Communist Party. They advocated a variant of socialist realism, arguing the priority of political commitment, documentary, and realism over avant-guard modernism. In the 1950s they also issued a list of writers’ names to be indicted for their collaboration with the state during World War II -- which Yoshimoto criticized vehemently as the height of Stalinist hypocrisy (many of the writers promoting the list hid their own “collaboration” behind the vanguardist respectability of the JCP and as an untenable confusion between political and literary categories, setting the ground for the emergent Japanese New Left’s skirmishes with the JCP and postwar democratic establishment.
However, with such people as Kasa Ke‘ichi, they do not know because, first, they do not try to know and, second, the hubris of contemporary Russian philosophy and aesthetic theory has already soaked through their entire being for them to know.

I believe the essence of individuality to be the fact that every individual commits errors. But I only feel loathing whenever I see someone who tries to speak of errors under universal and organizational halo. For that is an attempt to propose human weakness as universality, and weakness is only beautiful when it exists as individuality within an individual.

<Alienation>, the essence of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, appears as an individuated <class> concept as soon as it is represented and enters into the economic category of real society. The complex relationship concerning individual human existence exists here just as it is, such as a worker who is at the same a capitalist. In this real society that is as it is, in which a capitalist’s kin or friend is a worker or a worker’s uncle or colleague a capitalist, <class> also only exists individually. Moreover, as soon as this as-it-is real society is made to recognize the political law/state in the communal illusory part of its head, the individuated <class> concept of real society starts to emerge as a <public> class concept. This is Marx’s concept of <class> in the political sense.

The concept of the relationship of <alienation> between human beings and nature, which is the essence of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, is an immutable concept for Marx because he considers any other relationship as unable to exist to reciprocally determine human beings and nature.

Why and where did Marx extract his own philosophy of <nature>?
In 1841 he submitted to Jena University a doctoral dissertation entitled “The Difference Between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature”. Among <Marx>ists who cannot bear a person if he is not a materialist from infancy or who suffer from the delusion that merely being a materialist endows one with superiority, some make note of how this dissertation is still written within the ambit of idealism or how it indicates incisiveness that goes well beyond Hegel’s philosophy despite being under its influence, forcefully stressing its immaturity or, inversely, putting on airs about it, but all such matters are of no consequence. It is intolerable that the work of an individual’s life or the entire development of human history is accounted in this manner. They may be adherents of the bureaucratic Soviet scholars but they have no relationship to Marx’s thought; we should engrave the fact that they can never have their way as universality in our country.

In this country, which in reality is nothing more than a valley in the world, theory has a fertile soil, and we are already transcending the latitude given to Soviet and Chinese adherents to have currency.

The important thing in this doctoral dissertation is that Marx paid attention to the Greek philosophy of <nature> and that he assessed and extracted the uniqueness of Epicurus’s philosophy from many assessments of Epicurus as a mere imitator of Democritus. His deep entry into Epicurus’s philosophy of <nature> struck back in the form of an enormous influence that Epicurus exerted on him and led to the formation of his own philosophy of <nature> in the Manuscripts. Tracing this is the itinerary toward his philosophy of <nature>. 
In the atmosphere in which the critique of Christianity was a kind of fevered air for the Young Hegelians, with D. Strauss’s publication of *The Life of Jesus*, and the great Feuerbach publishing *The Essence of Christianity*, the fact that Marx committed himself to the Greek philosophy of <nature> speaks to his unusual interest in <nature>. Of course, there was no way he did not know the German intellectual fashion and fevered air of his day, and, although several years later he would also leap into their current by using as his catalyst Feuerbach’s critique of Christianity -- which originated from an incisive study of consciousness in terms of human essence and natural essence --, his commitment to Greek philosophy of <nature> has greater significance at least in giving shape to his own interest. As he seemingly turned his back on the cutting edge of the German intellectual world, he patiently dug a hole through his foundation and went deeply underground. His heart may have *gotten excited*, but this going underground into the ancient Greek philosophy of <nature> was not meaningless at all.

Currently, due to the fact that our country’s Greek scholars have not transplanted Greek philosophy in a perfect form, I -- who cannot read the original -- can neither situate Marx’s doctoral dissertation within the history of scholarship nor indicate its degree of accomplishment.

But the only important thing here is how Epicurus’s philosophy of <nature> influenced the philosophy of <nature> that Marx asserts in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. This is pregnant with unexpectedly deep significance. Within my limited knowledge, Democritus’s philosophy of <nature> is conceivable on the basis of the following four propositions:
1) All substance consists of fullness and void and, among them, what is full and hard is called “what is” and what is void “what is not”.

2) All worlds consist of many matters cut off and brought to the great emptiness to form a vortex, differentiated as they mutually clash into one another and rotate, the lighter ones going to the external emptiness and the remaining ones coming together to form the first sphere, and these start to separate into a membrane-like thing that covers over matter.

3) All things necessarily form from such vortex.

4) In perception there is what comes from the senses and what comes from thinking; perception according to the senses is dark matter and this includes vision, hearing, smell, taste, and touch; perception according to thinking is true matter and is isolated from dark matter.

Collected Fragments of Early Greek Philosophy, trans. and ed. Yamamoto Mitsuo

As Marx also thinks in his doctoral dissertation, what Epicurus inherited from Democritus was the conception of substance in the two terms of what is and what is not and where he distinguished himself from Democritus was the point that, as long as sensation was made the subject, all the world was what is and what is not did not exist.

Unlike Democritus, Epicurus put more emphasis on sensation than thinking and thought, “in order to obtain the basis for interpreting what expects verification or what is unclear, all must be seen through sensation”.

Therefore, according to Epicurus, the world was matter and place and the existence of matter is indisputable because it is validated by sensation and, as long as matter appears to the senses as motion, place does not mean what is not but the existence of what is which is indicated by sensory perception.

The point Marx appropriately appreciated, with the use of Hegelian terminology, was Epicurus’s positing of the world as the object of the senses. Because of this, the
concept of eidola (exfoliated image), which Democritus and Epicurus viewed as a conductor between sense perception and thinking, takes on a different nuance between matter and sense perception or thinking. For Democritus, eidola exfoliates from matter and reaches the human senses by flowing into them while, for Epicurus, matter and senses appear as a reciprocally determined concept. Marx appreciated what seemed at first glance to be Epicurus’s subjectivist and sensorially idealist correction with Democritus’s materialist objectivity was, in fact, something premised on the concept of reciprocal determination.

However, when the philosophy of <nature> in Marx’s *Manuscripts* takes a thorough shape between human existence and objectified nature, what emerges always as an enormous influence is Epicurus’s sermon on <soul> and <death>.

According to Epicurus, the most frequent cause of the senses is the <soul>.

<soul> is made up of infinitesimal parts and is distributed all over the entire organizational system; it is a matter that most resembles the wind that is mixed with a certain amount of heat. Because the <soul> can become the cause of the senses in order to avoid enclosure and diffusion by the remaining organizational system (body), the <body> is also in that sense viewed as involved in the accidentality that is the senses.

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6 “Eidola” is a Greek term used in Democritus’s theory of perception: “Democritus first devised the ingenious theory (although one would never know it from reading Epicurus” that out beyond the periphery of our bodies there are innumerable aggregations of moving atoms which emit thin films, or replicas of themselves (know as *eidola* in Greek). These atomic films are constantly impinging in a steady stream on our various sense organs, which are likewise collections of moving atoms, and there they excite complicated patterns of vibration which we experience as whole ‘things’ with all their natural colors, odors, shapes, and so on. In other words, there are no ‘things’ in the external world, only collections of atoms; furthermore, there are no colors, odors, etc., in outer nature, only atoms having velocities, quantitative dimensions, and organizations. ‘Things’ with natural qualities exist only in our sensory experience as the ‘appearances’ or ‘phenomena’ of outer realities”. George K. Strodach, *The Philosophy of Epicurus* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1963), 27-28.
This simple atomism of Epicurus’s greatly influenced <alienation> in Marx’s philosophy of <nature>. The universality that more sharply distinguishes human beings from animals is the ability to make nature into human being’s <inorganic body> and, because of this, human beings have no choice but to transform themselves into nature’s <organic nature> -- this view of <alienation> is, already from the very terminology, the early Greek philosophy of <nature>, especially Epicurus’s.

First, the concept that the <soul> is an infinitesimal matter and, second, the concept that this matter is distributed and enclosed all over the body reflect as they are Marx’s concept of <alienation>, which says that human essence lies in nature becoming human being’s <inorganic body>. If what Feuerbach fully developed into the insight concerning the naturalness and humanity of consciousness -- “Although the animal experiences itself as an individual -- this is what is meant by saying that it has a feeling of itself -- it does not do so as a species” (Essence of Christianity)⁷ -- is grafted here, we can understand that <alienation> as Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, or, in other words, the relationship between <inorganic body> and <organic nature> is formed on itself in the concatenation of <soul>, <matter>, <body>, and universality of human <consciousness>. Using Feuerbach’s contemporaneity as a stepping ladder, he resuscitated Epicurus’s philosophy in a thoroughgoing fashion.

This influence also appears in the view on language:

Therefore, names were not assigned in the beginning by arbitrary decree, but rather than natures of humankind, as they felt their own peculiar feelings according to their nationalities and received their own peculiar sense perceptions, each in their own way emitted air (i.e., uttered a sound)

given form by their particular feelings and impressions, according to the difference in nations owing to their various locations. (*Epicurus*)

Of course, from its very terminology, the view on language that is utilized in the discussion on Feuerbach transmits a semblance of Epicurus’s atomism, as in: “The ‘mind’ is from the outset afflicted with the curse of being ‘burdened’ with matter, which here makes its appearance in the form of agitated layers of air, sounds, in short, of language”. (*German Ideology*)

Although phrase such as “agitated layers of air” may not impress us today, it is a phrase that would have pleased Democritus and Epicurus, and we can see it as Marx’s retention of a shade of strong influence from the atomism of Greek philosophy of nature. However, by drawing correspondence between the critique of Hegel’s philosophy and the critique of Christian theology, Feuerbach rigorously developed the steps necessary for a word such as <soul> to be replaced by <spirit> and <consciousness>. Marx brings closer Epicurus’s philosophy, using Feuerbach as a mirror of contemporaneity. Or another way to say this is that Marx used Feuerbach as mediation to resuscitate Epicurus’s philosophy of <nature>.

For Epicurus, the distinct quality of the <soul> lay in thinking that objective existence, natural objects, that were like the motion of the heavenly bodies “are blessed and immortal but have at the same time wills, actions and motives that are opposed to these divine attributes”. Vacillation is born here. When this intensifies, the <soul>
starts to entertain irrational and selfish fantasies and becomes terrified or worried as if the very loss of the senses through <death> has something to do with us human beings.

When Marx emerges in the form of a thoroughgoing philosopher in the Manuscripts, his preoccupation with <death> and his dealing with species and being owe to Epicurus’s influence, and he had no choice but to bring them up in his philosophy of <nature>.

Distributed infinitesimally in other human atoms, that is, in the body, Epicurus’s <soul> is conceived as an objective sensation that acts in relation to objectively natural matters. In contrast, Marx’s philosophy of <nature> is posited as a relationship of <alienation> in which human beings could make the objectified nature of nature’s <organic nature> into human beings’ <organic body>. Nature reflected in sensation becomes in the same way human being’s sensuous nature. Just as when “consciousness” captures nature in consciousness through the distinctive quality of its own consciousness, consciousness exists as the consciousness of nature.

In Epicurus, <death> is nothing more than the lack of sensation due to the loss of enclosing power from the <soul>-enclosing remainder (body). It is the departure of the heat- and wind-like infinitesimal matter of the <soul> from the matter-enclosing frame called the body.

Death, therefore -- the most dreadful of evils -- is nothing to us, since while we exist, death is not present, and whenever death is present, we do not exist. It is nothing either to the living or the dead, since it does not exist for the living, and the dead no longer are.\(^\text{11}\)

This atomism that derives from Epicurus’s philosophy of <nature> considers human beings to as if they were individually scattered human forms.

\(^\text{11}\) Ibid., 63.
But death is terrifying because, whether it is fantasy or sorrow, consciousness of *relationship* exists in human beings. Regardless of whether one considers human beings to be part of nature, human being entertains the fantasy or feels the sorrow of his survival and death as a *relationship* because that appears as a *relationship* between his survival and the death of others or he thinks of it as a *relationship* between his death and the survival of others. This has nothing to do with witnessing others’ death or fantasizing others’ mourning over one’s death. For the *relationship* between a human being’s own survival and death can only appear as a *relationship* between oneself and another.

IV

For Marx <death> could not be as it was for Epicurus. That is to say, because <death> does not exist for those actually living and those who are dead cannot think of <death>, <death> as a result cannot be feared except through fantasy.

Even if <he> thought inside his individuality of <death> and “life” as dislocation in an Epicurean fashion, <his> death could only be expressed through a relationship between <himself> and others. For Marx, <his> <death> *fundamentally* appears as the death of the inescapable relationship of <alienation> between <himself> and <nature>. And, as a representation of that fundamental relationship, it emerges for the first time in reality as a relationship between <himself> and others. If we are to go over this carefully, it is as follows.

When <his> individuality <dies>, a blank hole is left in the relationship of <alienation> that existed between <himself> and <nature>, in other words, the relationship in which <he> makes nature his <inorganic body> and he himself is made into nature’s <organic body>.
This blank hole could have its empty seat filled with a relationship of <alienation> between some other human being and <nature>. If one does not want to put it this way, another way of saying it is how <his> individual death could always exert some influence on others. Even if <his> <death> is conceived as something that does not need to be feared in this manner, <his> <death> necessarily emerges in the form of others’ grief or fear and it recoils into a fantasy of fear or grief even for <his> individuality. In Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, <he> and other human beings are represented as an inescapable relationship, in short, a relationship of <alienation>.

Even an individual’s <death> is inconceivable with only the Epicurean absence of individual senses and dispersion of matter that is the <soul>. For Epicurus’s philosophy of <nature> cannot resolve whether the resignation toward <his> <death> turns into grief or fear through relationship with others. This also means that nothing can be resolved as far as whether <his> own death turns into a fantasy of grief or fear for <himself>.

Of course, neither can this be resolved through <alienation>, which is the essence of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>. But it was merely self-evident to position <his> <death> as a relationship between “individual” and <species> in the category of philosophy of <nature>. In short:

Death appears as the harsh victory of the species over the particular individual, and seemingly contradicts their unity; but the particular individual is only a particular species-being, and as such mortal.\footnote{Marx, \textit{Early Writings}, 351.}

Needless to say, the concept of <death> emerging here as a category of Marx’s philosophy of <nature> cannot be confused with the sensuousness of the living, real human Marx toward <death>. That is tantamount to not confusing <alienation> as a
category of philosophy of <nature> with <alienation> that emerges as an economic category. Otherwise we arrive at the sentimental anti-<Marx> that thinks what a cruel man Marx was for saying such a thing. Just those in his days who pretended at being revolutionaries called Marx “Citizen Marx”, those who made him into a demigod were nothing more than the Holy Russian Empire’s progressive and their followers.

In the same way that this type of confusion had brought <philosophical>, <political>, and <literary> <death> to so-called <Marx>ist philosophers, politicians, and writers of the world, it had brought <death> to anti-<Marx>ism that targeted the <dead> of this kind. I do not have any spare time to preach the elementary rule that a person must first understand what he agrees with or opposes. All I need to do is to proclaim that I have no relationship with such people.

At this point we must question the last itinerary of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>. Of course, that must take the form of the question, how far did Feuerbach reach in terms of the philosophy of <nature>?

Feuerbach’s two excellent propositions towered in front of the young Marx’s eyes. One was “Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy” of 1842 and the other was the Essence of Christianity of the previous year. The latter in particular pointed out, with surprising precision, that the essence of Hegel’s philosophy was necessarily an apologia for Christianity, a philosophy that was transformed from theology, rationality that was transformed from faith. But these stand even more at the origin of the study of religion, law, and state. What I would want to explore here is the contribution to the philosophy of <nature> contained in it.
In the category of humanist or human-deity theory, Feuerbach clearly brought down <alienation> and <self-alienation> in Hegel’s philosophy to an earthly, humanist essence. But, in the category of philosophy of <nature>, he did not go that far. He thought in the following way:

Nature is essence that is not distinguished from existence; 
man is essence that distinguishes itself from existence. The
essence that does not distinguish is the ground of the essence that
distinguishes; nature is, therefore, the ground of man. 
*Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy*\(^{13}\)

Although in nature existence itself is essence, human being knows how to distinguish himself from his own natural existence. In other words, human being can objectify himself through self-consciousness, but nature, that is, natural existence lies at the basis. To use an analogy, this is like human beings and nature existing in common as muddy lava at the bottom of the earth’s crust while one assumes the form of a towering sharp rock and the other that of a flat ground on the surface of the earth.

But are not animals and human beings indistinguishable from each other in the sense of objectifying the self through self-consciousness? Even dogs and cats are not in the least different from human beings on the matter of having self-emotions. There is a difference of degree at most. Here Feuerbach draws in the concept of <species> consciousness. Animals cannot have consciousness of the <species> (in other words, abstract commonality) because the self-emotions of animals are at best individuated. They cannot objectify themselves through the common name of the <species> for this reason. Cats and dogs cannot objectify themselves as a <species> of cats.

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\(^{13}\) This is a modified version of Zawar Hanfi’s translation found in *The Fiery Brook*, 169. I took out the italics and changed “being” into “essence” in keeping with the Japanese translation Yoshimoto uses.
To state this in the analogy Feuerbach uses in the *Essence of Christianity*, the consciousness of caterpillars that parasitically live off of a certain type of plants cannot expand beyond the realm of this type of plant. Caterpillars have consciousness that distinguishes plants that are suited to their life and behavior from other types of plants, and, although it is not a consciousness that is either universal or infinite, it cannot be lost and is accurate because this consciousness is restricted. Such consciousness is called instinct and is distinguished from human consciousness.

If the plants had eyes, taste, and judgment, each plant would declare its own flower the most beautiful; for its comprehension, its taste, would reach no farther than its natural power of production. *Essence of Christianity*¹⁴

Any person can tell that the difference between this insight of Feuerbach’s and that of Marx’s is almost paper-thin. In that sense, the life of a thinker is to go beyond this paper-thinness and from the beginning there cannot be any originality in this world in which something comes out of nothing.

For Marx <nature> was not, as it was for Feuerbach, the common basis between human beings and nature. It was a relationship of <alienation> that, as <inorganic body> and <organic nature>, saturated each other reciprocally as well as opposed each other reciprocally. In my thinking, if Feuerbach conceived light as waves, Marx conceived it from the aspect of particles. This means that Marx made a through use of the atom theory found in Greek philosophy of <nature>. The great force that developed Feuerbach’s <common basis> to the point of <alienation> was this paper-thin chance.

In any age there are nothing worse than progressives who pretend to be progressives. Strauss and Bauer in this sense were disciples of Feuerbach and could not

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escape from Feuerbach. Marx had gone beyond Feuerbach at a paper-thin place. It was not the progressives but the Prussian state philosophy’s reactionary master Hegel that truly worried Marx like a ghost, stood before him as a gigantic wall, and appeared as a transcendentally great being from whom he could truly learn. This sort of intellectual outline also does not change in any age. The reason we currently have nothing to learn from the progressive ignoramuses while we have a great deal to learn from bourgeois thinkers and writers is because, while even the best progressives are no more than beings who are always late by paper-thin duration from us, the first-class bourgeois thinkers and writers stand without unconscious scruples on the basis of past intellectual and literary achievements to contemporaneity.

V

Just as the study of the political process is the study of illusoriness (to be more precise, the externalization of illusoriness), the discipline concerning politics is one of the disciplines of illusoriness. The externalization of illusoriness first emerged for human beings as religious consciousness. Religious consciousness began with a vague awe of nature and crystallized into the theology of theism after going through nature worship, faith in idols, or pantheism. The process of the formation of Marx’s political philosophy had nothing else to stand on except this general principle. The path of political philosophy that Marx took was the path from religion to law and from law to the actuality of the state.
In Germany, as far as religion was concerned, Feuerbach’s study was in front of his eyes as a crane so to speak among a group of chickens. In terms of the philosophy of law and state, Hegel’s philosophy of law towered above him.

First, we must clarify where Marx needed to depart on religion. This is because we cannot know how exhausting Marx’s itinerary was without asking how much ground had been completed.

In the *Essence of Christianity* Feuerbach clarified from the perspective of human cognition the difference between understanding related to <nature> and sensuousness related to <religion>. The path of philosophy of <nature> and that of the philosophy of <politics> is not yet another different or transferring railway. According to Feuerbach, human understanding works indiscriminately toward all things and essences, experiencing interest in them as objects. In exactly the same way <religion> fascinated <him>, <he> was fascinated by botany, mineralogy, zoology, physics, or astronomy. In short, understanding was universal, pantheistic essence, and <love for the cosmos>.

However, <religion>, especially Christianity, is a human being’s <exclusionary love> for himself, a self-affirmation.

For example, this difference lies in the difference between Greek philosophy of <nature> and the Hebrew religion.

Consciousness concerning <nature> is different from self-consciousness, but consciousness concerning <religious object> coincides with self-consciousness. In other words, although the object of <nature> exists outside human beings, religious object is an interior object within human beings. If we were to think from Feuerbach’s <foundational commonality> between human beings and nature, God is a nature god when human
beings are a natural being and God lives in the temple when human beings live in a building. Because the temple is in fact made from the desire to make a house beautiful and is nothing other than a house that is recognized as the most beautiful house, it is not especially a house where God resides. For God is an objectification of consciousness when human beings consider self-consciousness as infinite and supreme and from the beginning does not live anywhere except in human self-consciousness.

What human being does within the consciousness of <religion> is the process of objectifying one’s essence and yet again turning this objectified essence into one’s object. To put it differently, in <religion> human beings throw out their own essence outside of themselves and incorporate that thrown essence into themselves.

If we were to digress here somewhat, is not the consciousness of <art> also human beings objectifying their essence outside of themselves and making it once again their object? Feuerbach explains this as the difference between the consciousness of <religion> and that of <art>.

Religion, especially theism such as Christianity, conceives human essence as infinite and at once externalizes self-consciousness, which is said to be something supreme, as God (Christ) who is an infinite person and this returns again into self-consciousness. Hence God emerges in the dual meaning of being an infinite person while at the same time being a human being. But, in consciousness of <art>, self-consciousness that makes human being’s real essence as supreme and infinite is externalized as <work> and this returns again into self-consciousness. In this sense, the dual meaning does not exist for human consciousness in <work>.
In other words, because <religion> externalizes God as the supreme thing, God seemingly becomes primary and the human beings who externalized it become secondary for self-consciousness. But, because in <art> the consciousness that conceives human beings’ real essence as the supreme thing is externalized and this comes back into self-consciousness, the illusoriness of consciousness that persistently makes itself the supreme thing is what is primary.

According to Feuerbach, the reason why Christianity cannot give birth to great religious art is because, although its theistic character is qualitatively the same as art itself, contradiction is produced by such a consciousness that makes God supreme and consciousness that makes human beings supreme. Only the consciousness of polytheism, idol worship, or pan-nature could be the fountain of <art> or <scholarship>, and theism in itself contradicts art.

For example, Feuerbach’s point here already contains the reason why no work or theory of any significance can be produced when contemporary views of “politics and literature” are proposed by debaters who have faith in “politics” as if it were theism and do not grasp it in the least as a science.

Feuerbach’s insight is far superior to those who, without understanding the true meaning of <alienation>, write trivial books full of errors such as “art and alienation”. When objectified nature emerging in the consciousness of <nature> was at the stage of nature worship, human beings received for the first time the chance to tie the crossing point between consciousness of religion and consciousness of art. Trying to debate art and alienation stage is utterly impossible without the logical structure that is not even found in Feuerbach’s stage, and we can only click our tongue at seeing something
pointless being reproduced. There is no use except to say, stop being so damn complacent.

Feuerbach grasped Judaism, or, in other words, the principle of Hebraic religion before Christianity as “making nature an object of self-interest to be used for contingent purpose”. This is because in Judaism, when Jehovah ordered, the sea split in two, the flowing water turned into blood, and the mountain moved, and these were miracles that the tribal god Jehovah executed largely for the profit of the Israeli tribes.

The so-called <Jewish Question>, which was reflected in Marx’s eyes, first emerged inside various European states, on the one hand, as an exclusionary religious principle that Feuerbach talks about and, on the other hand, as the problem of exclusionary commandment inside religious principle. To this extent, we can say that Feuerbach’s insight have thoroughly clarified the essence of religion in general and the religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity.

Thus, in the eyes of such radical Hegelians as Bauer and others who were deeply under Feuerbach’s influence and whose understanding they never tried to transcend, Christianity should not be protected as a national religion no more than Judaism, and they thought all could be resolved by declaring it as the question of an individual’s contingent faith. In short, they thought of it as the liberation of religion from the state, or, to put it another way, as a question of political liberation.

This understanding in a sense shares a commonality with not only religion but with such externalization of illusoriness as art and law/state. Even today progressive art movements suffer from the misperception that it actually means something to side with progressive sectarianism within the arts and to oppose its conservative sectarian
counterpart, smashing or bringing the latter into one’s fold. However, they do not know that there could be political liberation even if human beings are not liberated and art could be free even if human beings are not free in reality. Leninist sectarianism does not exist in the arts. The semblance of its existence could be established because it is nothing more than a single representation of a <semblance> of freedom in a free society (capitalist society) in which artistic prejudices can assume many shapes. This sort of retreat that at first glance seems progressive or radical originated in Russia under the name of <Marxist> aesthetics and has survived for half a century in various countries as if it were a ghost.

Marx was facing the progressive Hegelians’ stupid ideas, which at first glance seemed radical. Feuerbach had already foreshadowed in the *Essence of Christianity* that, when religious illusoriness is inside a political community, it is realized in the self-consciousness that considers <law> supreme and human beings secondary, or, to put it differently, realized in the law of the state and the way this recoils back to human beings. Those who could not sufficiently discern this were, like the artistic fools of today, the political fools of the day. Just as today’s artistic progressives who say that the first step in being politically progressive is to be artistically progressive is and, inversely, the first step in being artistically progressive is to be politically progressive are foolish, it is a foolish view that holds the beginning of political liberation to consist in throwing away the exclusionary principle and commandments of Judaism within the Christian state. To this sort of progressive-pretending progressive, Marx writes as follows:

Therefore we do not tell the Jews that they cannot be emancipated politically without radically emancipating themselves from Judaism, which is what Bauer tells them. We say instead: the fact that you can be politically emancipated without completely and absolutely renouncing
Judaism shows that political emancipation by itself is not human emancipation. If you Jews want to be politically emancipated without emancipating yourselves as humans, the incompleteness and the contradiction lies not only in you but in the nature and the category of political emancipation. *(On the Jewish Question)*\(^{15}\)

VI

Just as the consciousness positing the self as supreme and the real self-consciousness exist doubly within self-consciousness when human being *<alienates>* the essence of his self as religion, human beings live doubly in the social and the political when they *<alienate>* the essence of society as political communality (i.e., the state) inside really existing society (civil society). In social life we live concretely and privately, eating and being eaten by others, living the life of eating or being eaten by the communality of others, and in political life we live as if we were public, communal members. And we are in real life when we are private and concrete, and we are in illusory life when we are communal.

This view of Marx’s replaces Feuerbach’s insight on *<religion>* with an insight on *<law>* and replaced the logic of *<religion>* with the logic of political community (here it is the modern state). Real development of philosophy is like this and cannot formulate the formula within vertically closed walls such as *<Marx>*ism had done to Marx. The difference between Bauer and Marx in their respective relationship to Feuerbach emerges here. Advancing a step forward from Feuerbach’s study of human self-consciousness’s relationship to *<religious>* alienation, he expands the study of the relationship of *<self>*

\(^{15}\) Marx, *Early Writings*, 226.
consciousness> (communal consciousness) of civil society to that of <legal> alienation inside the political community. As he says here:

Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a profane being. Here, where he regards himself and is regarded by others as a real individual, he is an illusory phenomenon. In the state, on the other hand, where he is considered to be a species-being, he is the imaginary member of a fictitious sovereignty, he is divested of his real individual life and filled with an unreal universality. *(On the Jewish Question)*

It goes without saying that Marx’s such study in relation to <law> and <state> is premised on the perfect political state, that is, the formation of the institution of political community, just as Feuerbach’s study in relation to religion is premised on the perfect religious consciousness or, put it another way, the formation of theology.

Thus, he thought that in a <holy> state such as Prussia the Jewish question emerged realistically as a religious opposition between Christianity and Judaism, emerged as a question of halfway religious opposition and halfway political opposition in a constitutional state such as France, and emerged for the first time as a secular question in North America where freedom of religion was recognized.

<Religion> is the representation of human self-consciousness that considers itself supreme at a stage where the political community is not yet in order, but it emerges as the representation of human self-consciousness that views the <law> as the supreme thing in a modern state where the political community is set in order -- this way of thinking was what Marx grasped as a development by accurately reading Feuerbach. And, when he tried to capture <law> and <state> substantively, Hegel’s philosophy of the state and philosophy of law blocked his way with its gigantic dimension. It is here that he directly confronts Hegel’s philosophy in an essential sense. Following the intellectual fashion of

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16 Marx, *Early Writings*, 220.
the day, he had occasions to use Hegel’s terminology during his student days, but this was only in a superficial sense. Such a thing could not do away the gigantic reaction that was Hegel. He tried to acquire the intellect of the real movement of entire Western Europe by critically following Hegel’s philosophy of state and law.

By critically taking up the central theses of Hegel’s philosophy of law and theory of state law, Marx tried to elucidate the substantial structure of the political state and the political elements of civil society corresponding with it.

Marx’s fundamental critique was that, even though the political state alienated itself to the point of a <state> on the human, natural basis of the <family> and on the artificial basis of <civil society>, Hegel inversely thought the state was made up of real ideas.

For instance, the political state in the ancient state constituted everything, and the whole length and breadth of human beings’ real society existed as the political state’s hands and feet. But the political and non-political states in the modern capitalist state are adjusted by law and lead a double existence. The political state makes civil society -- the concreteness of the non-political state -- its content while existing as alienated, formal communality. Thus state and family or civil society cannot be an existence without contradiction as Hegel says. The state is not the representation of the life-process of family and civil society themselves but the idealist life-process in which family and civil society distinguish and separate (enact <alienation>) from themselves. Hence <law> (constitution = political state system), which politically concentrates this idealist life-
process, is the religious heaven of universality in opposition to the earthliness of the real life of the people of the nation.

What supports the political state substantively (in other words, as the illusory unification of form and content) is bureaucracy and, within this bureaucratic system, the imaginary state is formed alongside of the actual state.

With what does civil society approach the illusory state when the illusory state approaches civil state with executive right in this fashion?

Human beings appear as *somebody* inside civil society. One can only be an occupational human being, just as if one were not a shoemaker, he would be a fishmonger, salaried worker, proletariat. From the essence of human labor, the fact that one can only be an occupational human being is a distortion, alienation that is partially here and partially there, it is what makes his essence different from who he is. Occupational groups, community of occupational individuality, are a small state, a bureaucratic system, partial communal consciousness, and communal will inside civil society. This element tries to become the state and it is a germ that could very well be the substance of the state. What civil society extends to the political state is none other than this element. When the state was state as such, status, ranking, and education were nothing more than what distinguished real human beings. When the political state proceed *<legally>* by organizing another state that is in substance a bureaucratic system or by organizing the occupational groups of the state, civil society confronts the occupational groups as the *bureaucracy of civil society*. Expressed in Marx’s connective philosophy of religion/law/state, this is summarized as follows:
The bureaucratic mind is a Jesuitic, theological mind through and through. The bureaucrats are the Jesuits and theologians of the state. The bureaucracy is the republic of priests. *(Critique of Hegel’s Theory of State Law)*\(^{17}\)

What does civil society deliver as its priesthood against this?

As the monarch mediates himself with civil society through the executive power as its Christ, so society mediates itself with the monarch through the estates as its priests. *(Ibid.)*\(^{18}\)

I must make a qualification here about the term <representation>, which I have used from the beginning of this manuscript. In my aesthetics (for instance, in *What Is Beauty for Language*) I use the word <expression> to refer to the same thing.

Since those who state erroneous views on art and alienation and those of the same ilk would misunderstand, let me make a qualification that in my use of <representation> or <expression> the terms mean the desire for <alienation>, therefore, superseding of <alienation>. However, they do not at all mean the erroneous <alienation> that is the real category of <alienation> (alienated labor).

First there is <alienation> as a mutual regulation between human beings and nature at the root of Marx’s philosophy of nature and, when that is “represented” in real

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\(^{17}\) I have consulted four translations for this quote: the Tom Nairn one in Marx, *Early Writings*, 107; the one *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, trans. and ed. Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967); one by Clemens Dutt in Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, Volume 3, Marx and Engels: 1843-44* (New York: International Publishers, 1975); and the one in *Early Political Writings*, ed. and trans. Joseph O’Malley with Richard Davis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 12. Nairn renders the last line -- “Die Bürokratie ist la république prêtre [die Pfaffenrepublik]” -- “The bureaucracy is the religious republic”, Easton and Guddat translate it as “Bureaucracy is the priest’s republic”, and the Dutt and O’Malley/Davis versions both retain the original phrase: “The bureaucracy is la république prêtre”. In light of both Yoshimoto’s purpose, I have translated the French phrase into English, following Easton and Guddat’s example. The title of Marx’s text however I have translated it according to the Japanese translation Yoshimoto is using, instead of Easton/Guddat (“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State”), Dutt (“Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”), Nairn (“Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State”), or O’Malley/Davis version (“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right”). An intriguing political history of ideological reconceptualization of Marx’s ideas could be pieced together by philologically comparing various translations of his work.

\(^{18}\) Marx and Engels, *Collected Works, Volume 3*, 86.
civil society, the various dimensions of real <alienation> that issue from <alienated labor> come into being.

The <self-consciousness> (in other words, communal consciousness) of civil society “alienates” the real state as if it were the <representation> of the consciousness of communality. And the <self-consciousness> of civil society <alienates> the political state system, political state, and law as the supreme <self-consciousness> of civil society as if it were a religion <alienating> the supreme thing that is God.

The problem of political (philosophy) discipline emerges when we think of this as a move toward the historical contemporaneity of religion, law, and state. <Representation>, <expression>, or <alienation> are therefore the contrary effect of erasing <representation>, <expression>, or <alienation>. The pulses slacken when you mistake a high-speed film for the speed of the process of reality or of ideas, treating the <alienation> of “heart contraction” (Feuerbach) differently from the “heart expansion” of incorporating this into the self again. Therefore, you <die>. This is why people’s <alienation> <dies>. Because error exists only inside you brain, you should not be proud even if you write a trivial book that is praised by those of the same ilk who are absolutely of no consequence. In this world it is possible not to criticize because it is not worth criticizing.

Why does <alienation> between human beings and nature -- as a category of Marx’s philosophy of nature -- appear as the oppositional concept of <capitalist> and <worker> when it is <represented> (alienated) in the economic category of civil society? What do <capitalist> and <worker> mean? Over this question the Manuscripts appears for the first time as the problem of economic category in real society.
VII

The *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* posits economic category as the key to elucidate the structure of civil society. Here it does not mean the foundation of a civil society as a historical stage in industrial society, as it was first proposed as a clear concept in the *Critique of Political Economy*. Marx thought of economic category only for the purpose of making an incision into the raw reality of existing Western society. Economic category was still a *field of means* for his system. And, because of this, we can also say that it was inserted into a lively chain of totality. Therefore, we can enter into the economic category of the *Manuscripts* from anywhere.

We are going to think about this from two directions. One, as the representation of *<alienation>* , which reciprocally stipulates human beings and nature in an essential sense through the fundamental category in the philosophy of *<nature>* ; and the other is religion, law, state, in other words, as the realm of non-illusoriness that opposes externalized illusoriness and that is also the foundation of this illusoriness. This implies my view that the economic category of civil society is formed within Marx as a real realm in which philosophy of *<nature>* and political philosophy contradict each other.

If, like the so-called *<Marx>* ists, we do not think of *<alienation>* (alienated labor) qua category of civil society -- which is stated in the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* -- in terms of a reality existing as the contradiction between illusoriness and essentiality, in other words, as the real existence of society, and start directly from labor and end there, we would have to become dependent on an understanding of the world which is as laughable as theirs. That means permitting (vulgar) materialists and
economists to exist even as we speak in the realm of illusoriness, such as art, literature, and politics. \(^\text{19}\) For all the debate on the relationship between art and alienation, nothing can be saved as long as the self is <alienated> by positing realism, documentary, themes and materials as the supreme thing. And, because what cannot be saved are generally the progressives, we can say that each and every individual is merely one of their symbols.

I will try to enter into this problem by way of economic category as a representation of the philosophy of <nature>, but I do not know if this will go well.

When the relationship between human beings and nature, the relationship of <alienation> in which human beings become nature’s <organic nature> and nature becomes human beings’ <inorganic body>, is represented necessarily as the economic category of civil society, this demands us to think on the basis of human beings who enter into a relationship with <nature> (industry) through direct simple labor. And complex labor is accumulation of simple labors and complex relationship inside civil society is accumulation of simple relationships. In this way the concept of the proletariat enters the scene as the basis of human beings as an economic category of civil society. The fact that Marx’s concept of proletariat is not the real proletariat is the same fact as, and to the same degree that, human beings as an economic category are not the whole of human existence.

Simple, concrete labor places the produced natural object (product) outside the worker, places the objectifying act of labor outside labor itself, places outside of nature

\(^{19}\) In the original Japanese, the Chinese character for yuibutsu (materialist) can also be read as “tada-mono”, a pun for “ordinary or common thing/person”. I have rendered it “vulgar” to stress Yoshimoto’s implied denunciatory bite.
those who work in totality, and, by this, brings about the contrary effect of placing the worker outside himself, placing the universality of human existence outside itself.

When <he> who does simple, concrete labor enters totally into the relationship of <alienation> with the objectified world through labor, he has no choice but to represent that necessarily in his relationship with <another human being>. This <another human being> is represented in the end as a capitalist.

In a civil society that is as it is, everybody, except for human beings who perform simple, concrete labor, can only appear to <him> more or less as <another human being> (capitalist) and <he> himself could also possibly appear to <him> as <another human being> (capitalist). That is, the proletariat could also possibly appear in another context as a capitalist. This is the upper-level concept that signifies all alienation in civil society. But, with the disappearance of the capitalist (capitalist as a system) who could act as if <law> and <state> are his universal essentiality, such double-layered relationship is ultimately a concept that will necessarily disappear as a hierarchy.

If <alienated labor> as an economic category of civil society possesses a totality and could be brought up in relation to the total, this must be something that could of course be analogized as a representation from the philosophy of <nature> as the roots but also from illusoriness, that is, general illusoriness as the <alienation> of <self-consciousness> (communal consciousness) in real society. This means that the concept of <alienated labor> must be a relationship that could be made analogous to the category of the philosophy of religion, law, and state, that is, the political (philosophy) discipline. Here lies the basis of our trying again to bring up <alienation> (alienated labor) as an
economic category of civil society in the *Manuscripts*, this time from his study of illusoriness. Again, I do not know if this will go well.

In religion God is the externalization of self-consciousness that posits human essence as infinite and, just as God recoils in human self-consciousness as something primary in the externalized symbol, in civil society, where <alienated labor> exists in reality, the product of labor appears to the worker as <God>-like self-consciousness and, becoming a primarily powerful force like God, recoils by turning the producer into a less-than-secondary self-consciousness. In the same way, inside the worker labor itself recoils dominantly like God against the act of labor. Also, in the same way, capital recoils in relation to labor like <theology>, capitalist becomes primary like a <singular God> to the worker, and workers are pushed down into being something less than secondary by what they themselves had supported and produced.

And, in order to change capital, capitalist as a system, from <God> to <theology>, it is necessary for such illusoriness as <law> and <state> to engage <alienated labor> as universality.

Since this is not written openly in the *Manuscripts*, people may think I am uselessly revising and expanding the economic category in the *Manuscripts*, but this is not at all the case. It is simply that I do not join in with the so-called creative <Marx>ists of the world who are establishing formula of a formula.

In the most basic sense, we can say that <alienation> (alienated labor) as an economic category appears in three senses. In the first, as representation of a category in the philosophy of <nature>; second, as a concrete relationship that can only make itself
into organic nature when human beings process natural raw materials or make nature into their means of production by working most simply and concretely in civil society (a society that is historical because it is concrete); third, in the sense that when such concrete relationship places its essence outside of itself and, because of this, distinguishes and opposes its existence and its existence as nature within self-consciousness, this separates necessarily in the form of general illusoriness from general non-illusoriness or separates in the form of political communality from non-political real society, and this is recoiled back to economic category in the double sense of self-consciousness and its political communality.

Just as the category of illusory individuality and communality is smaller than all real humans, just as economic category is smaller than all existing categories, and just as the relationship between human beings and nature is smaller than the objectification of all human existence, it is clear that within its direct, concrete meaning economic category has to be pregnant with triple-layered accumulation of meanings.

The concept of <alienation> for Marx in a particular case means the non-illusory receiving the contrary effect of extracting illusoriness from the non-illusory; in another case it means an inescapable, immutable concept that is a natural stipulation of human beings, which therefore has been used as an immutable concept in relation to the very self of human beings or to other human beings; yet in another case, it is a private class concept that occurs concretely between the <worker> and his objectified material through <labor>, therefore between the <worker> and those who privatize that objectified material. But, no matter how it is used, of course what is important in his thought is the
fact that it is covered up with other concepts through cumulative layers and connections. It is there that the totality of Marx’s philosophy exists.

When his philosophy was completed as a totality that connects religion, law, state, civil society, and nature, he was still a young man who did not know in a real sense the terror of the historical contemporaneity of society. Why does a stupid society exist now as a state and why does such a society controlled by figures that anyone could see as stupid not perish? Why is this irrational society, which at first glance seems vulnerable, so powerfully solid? Marx was forced in a real sense into this self-interrogation when the uprising of the Western democrats failed and the <Communist League> that dissolved from the residual blow purged him during an inner dispute, when he was publicly isolated in the midst of poverty. Here Marx’s real experiences engaged his ideas as a <conversion>. Its significance was probably more important than Marx himself realized.

Marx’s intellectual coffin carried around by so-called <Marx>ists of the world is limited to the philosophy that makes economic category primary, into which Marx plunged subsequently in order to investigate the existing society as historical accumulations. I have to part with this manuscript by merely saying that I just will not carry his coffin in the way they do. It is already time for the readers go on their own way. I have always denigrated enlighteners, but, if I had to be a little bit of an enlightener here, this stems from the reason of having to be one to myself above all. If there were a little adventure here, it stems from my having relied only on Marx and his predecessors. If there were someone who would say, I have already thoroughly said what you say here, he may be my philosophical lover whom I have not yet encountered.
Part II: Marx Biography

Prologue

Whether chasing after a person’s life remaining in documents and writings or dealing with a person whose place or era, means of subsistence or the age when he died we know nothing about, we are faced with the same difficulty. But this difficulty is the consequence of a simple reason. Because from the very beginning living cannot be cut off from reality, even if he had tried to live by self-propulsion, reality must close in on him like a solid wall the more he tried to put forth his strength. That is to say, what is aimed for accomplishment and what is actually accomplished always visit the flesh-and-blood human being with a different face. No matter what document or intellectual affinity one has, it does not at all seem possible to pick this up exhaustively. In short, the parts where reality offers help are always hidden.

The person we are dealing with here is most likely a master who would appear in the world only once every one thousand years, but the difficulty of reproducing his life is no different from reproducing the life of a common person who lived and died in the corner of the streets. The value of the innumerable persons who repeated the life of being born, growing up, giving birth to children, living, aging and dying in the street corner is completely the same as that of a person who only appears once every thousand years. As human beings acquire knowledge -- which is the only act of human consciousness, to
borrow the expression of the person we are dealing with here -- their knowledge are accumulated and realized in history, then return to historical writing, such is the necessity of historical passage. And if we acknowledge this, we can say the following fantasy is necessary for human beings: that those who participated in knowledge and emerged in historical writing have value and those who participated extraordinarily have extraordinary value, as compared to the innumerable common people who have lived and died without participating in knowledge. But in the end this kind of understanding belongs to the realm of illusion. When we sharply descend from the realm of illusion to the realm of reality, we realize that such a judgment is unjustified. The person who has lived and died in the street corner is in no way simple or inferior when it comes to the accumulation of judgments and accumulation of things he had encountered in his life. This is in fact a far more terrifying matter than we think.

History extracts this <equality> between the master who appears once every thousand years and the innumerable common people who live and die in the street corner as a quality of the <age>.

In order for a particular quality of the <age> to make a person stand out in that age and succeeding ones, he must always participate in the value of the illusory realm. If he is not a master within the illusory realm, history does not preserve him from the quality of the <age>. Whether he creates enormous wealth, a wealthy individual in that age, or he lives and dies just for the day in the street corner, history will suppress him along with the disappearance of <historicity>. This is enormously important. The desire for many people to leave even the slightest imprint onto the world of record, that is, the world that externalizes illusion and ideas, to even make even the slightest appearance in
that world is similar to the impulse of wanting to go beyond the quality of the <age>
within a particular historical age. For this reason he would even place his life in the real
society as an offering on the altar and quarrel with people who are encumbrances.
Although this in no way makes life enjoyable, it is impossible to restrain this impulse.
Knowledge’s state of being in history is concealed in the ontological character of such
human beings. But, like the impulse of desire, in the end such action of knowledge does
not amount to much. To awaken to the terror of the impulse that wants to express illusion
and ideas is the only thing that matters philosophically. Just as awakening to the terror of
the repetition of being born, marrying, giving birth, aging, and dying is the only thing that
matters for life.

When a human being is born, he is already placed under certain fixed conditions.
These conditions follow the individual until the end of his life. This is why it is
meaningless to say, in the end he turned out to be such and such. The universality that
lies at the root of being such and such or becoming such and such, the degree to which he
has consciously extracted this universality, is what is meaningful. It is not whether
something was recorded or not that is at issue. Many have viewed the person with whom
we are dealing here as the greatest master in the realm of expressing illusion and ideas.
But this should not be misunderstood. In the real world he was quite a commonplace
person of subsistence. What is at issue hen is the extent to which he consciously gave a
basis to the totality of this illusion and reality, to the totality of the individual and the
universal. The myth-lovers and intellectual gangsters who repeatedly float and sink with
the use of his ideas as a floating device will take care of the rest.
Democritean Philosophy and Epicurean Philosophy

Karl Marx was born in Trier on the German Rhine on May 5, 1818. There is no particular significance to this besides the fact that he was born as a younger child of the Jewish middle class. No human being bears responsibility for his birth. In 1829 he entered school at the Gymnasium (humanities-oriented high school) and was a student there until 1835. In the autumn of that year he entered Bonn University seeking to study law and transferred to Berlin University a year later, in 1836. Although the great Hegel had already died a few years earlier, his philosophy enveloped the entire German intellectual world like a huge cumulonimbus cloud. Unless we are biographers who have made a detailed study, we ought to sum up Marx of this period as an ordinary student who breathed the air of the liberal, progressive mood and a young man who wrote poetry.

If we were to raise matters of significance for Marx of this period, one is the 1836 publication of David Strauss’s Life of Jesus and the other is his engagement with Jenny von Westphalen. The former symbolizes the Hegelian philosophy of history turning toward the human criticism of religious faith and the latter signifies the discovery of a person who would carry a lifetime’s subsistent suffering, that is, the suffering of the kitchen (making ends meet), for Marx. The themes of religion, law and state were the greatest themes that the early Marx engaged and are most responsible for making his ideas difficult and hard to resolve correctly. If we ably follow Marx’s intricate thought and logic directed toward these themes, we will not misunderstand what comes after for the most part. The criticism of religion was fashionable at the time, given its initial
prompting by David Strauss’s *Life of Jesus*. In the Prussian <holy> state, Strauss’s biography of Jesus had epochal significance.

Jenny von Westphalen was his sister’s school friend and a woman older than he was; we will not misunderstand Marx’s life and ideas if we can burn into the depth of our vision how she paid for her life as Frau Marx in later years. There are so many absurd <Marx>ists and anti-<Marx>ists in this world that it is almost better to give up in despair. Neither god nor devil lives in the shape of a human being in this world. The desire to take a particular philosophy and life to its bitter end must dog anybody’s steps, but the place where that desire can live completely is only in the world of ideas. At the most minimal level he cannot be anything but a common person of subsistence in reality. But even in the world of ideas it is rare to live completely. Especially as much as Marx did. That is not a matter of talent; as long as ideas also disguise themselves as a world to the outside, they clash with the person of subsistence within oneself. That is all and that is a more troublesome thing than anything else.

In 1837, around the time he entered Berlin University, Marx wrote two kinds of deeply meaningful letters.

Poetry, however, could be and had to be only an accompaniment; I had to study law and above all felt the urge to wrestle with philosophy. (To Marx’s father, November 10, 1837)

When I left you a new world had just begun to exist for me, the world of love that was at first drunk with its own desire and hopeless. Even the journey to Berlin which would otherwise have charmed me completely, exciting in me an admiration for nature and inflaming me with a zest for life, left me cold and, surprisingly, even depressed me; for the rocks that I saw were not rougher, not harsher than the emotions of my soul, the broad cities not more full of life than my blood, the tables of the inns not more overladen and their fare not more indigestible than the stocks of fantasies
that I carried with me, nor, finally, was any work of art as beautiful as Jenny… (To Jenny, September 1837)\textsuperscript{20}

There is premonition of a particular awakening, along with excess feelings, that hesitate in going beyond the foothold of the reality on which they are firmly planted -- such scene, in short youthfulness, is expressed here. German artisans living in Paris had already founded the <League of the Just> 1836, and a situation existed as <society> in which the Blanqui-led <Society of the Seasons> was formed. And there was Jenny, who, in contrast to Marx, was a daughter of the upper class not within his reach.

We can only make our imagination bolder and conjecture that, beyond the shore of his agitation in having to learn more, <society> appeared at times like an apparition, visiting him with a premonition of excessive destruction, and then at other times there were endlessly continuous daydreams of a quiet world of studies with Jenny at his side. His habit of dividing his thoughts into extremes barely maintained a delicate balance. He still did not know which direction his life was going to go. No, rather, he did not know that life was not made for the individual so that one could tell where and how to go about it from the beginning.

In April 1841, Marx submitted *Differences between Democritean (Democritus’s) and Epicurean (Epicurus’s) Philosophy of Nature* as his doctoral dissertation to Jena University. The aspect of this dissertation worthy of our attention is still the summary he gave in the aforementioned letters to his father and fiancée.

The fact that he paid attention to ancient Greek philosophy of nature was perhaps due to his keeping in the forefront of his mind how Strauss’s *Life of Jesus* was written with an eye to the Hebraic religion. <Nature> emerged as his first theme, and perhaps

this shows how this dissertation had deeply appropriated Hegel’s method and constituted at the same time a kind of fate. For his thought never departed from the surface of the philosophy of <nature> throughout his life. Marx first thought about the philosophy of <nature> as a pastime, and then law later appeared in fusion with his own philosophy of <nature>. This sequence is not planned but rather providential.

The fundamental principle of Democritean philosophy lies in its point that the truly real consists of <atom> and <void> and that everything else is no more than a matter of subjectivity. The sensuously visible world is not real in itself and, when subjectivity is removed from it, it becomes an independent existence. Hence the world of sensuous phenomenon is an objective world with subjective and objective dimensions. In Epicurean philosophy the sensuously reflected world is what exists and the senses transmit this world to human beings. For Epicurus, <atom> is not apprehended through ideas but first apprehended when it becomes an objectified image of the senses (as Democritus says). That is to say, it assumes its true nature by an essentially <natural> attribute, form, or objectified image. To borrow Marx’s expression, “Epicurus was the first to grasp phenomenon as phenomenon, that is, as alienation of the essence”, and this objectified image could always be viewed from the two aspects of subjectivity and objectivity and either <atom> or <void> lies as its essence because, according to Democritus, a phenomenon first becomes an objectified image through the interlacing of atoms.21

According to Enlightened, that is, eighteenth-century materialism, Democritus’s theory of <atom> shows a particularly materialist understanding with its emphasis on

21 Marx and Engels, Collected Works: Volume 1, 64. I have rendered the term “appearance” in the translation as “phenomenon” in order to more closely follow the Japanese word Yoshimoto’s text (genshō).
reason. Contrarily, Epicurean philosophy is an idealist understanding of the world emphasizing the sensuous world. But Marx who had mastered Hegel thought that although Democritean materialism had no more than enlightening significance, Epicurean philosophy of the senses had room for the concept of the world as alienation of ideas to encroach. By first paying attention to the objectified relationship between nature and human beings, Marx’s doctoral dissertation is meticulous but not at all penetrating. Nonetheless, despite its overall impression as an ordinary dissertation, it was not in the least a bad one. From the perspective of posterity, in a sense it can even be called fateful.

After climbing over one mountain range of study on religion, law, and state, the meaning of Marx’s initial attachment to <nature> in this dissertation will bear fruit for the first time as his own philosophy of <nature> in the 1844 Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (“Draft” of Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts). As he wrote in a letter to his father, Marx’s doctoral dissertation speaks well about the significance and theme of his attraction to religion in the midst of studying law. But, at the same time, we can tell how much his experience of love with Jenny brought this scholarly interest back to reality itself and rescued its scholasticism of thought. He writes something like the following in the “Critique of Plutarch’s Polemic Against the Theology of Epicurus”, which was attached to his doctoral dissertation.

Let us say there is someone here who has lost his wife and child. Instead of his wife and child dying completely, he wishes that they <existed> somewhere even if they were unhappy. In this case, if his concern lies in love itself, it must exist most purely within his mind and it should be the same to him whether his wife and child <exist> or
are <dead>. In this way, if love exists within the human mind, it should be considered a superior <existence> to an experiential <existence>.

But the facts are different.

Wife and child as such are only in empirical existence insofar as the individual to whom they belong exists empirically himself. That the individual therefore prefers to know that they are somewhere in sensuous space, even under bad conditions, rather than nowhere, only means that he wants to preserve the consciousness of his own empirical existence. The mantle of love was only a shadow. The naked empirical Ego, the love of self, the oldest love, is the core and has not rejuvenated itself into a more concrete, more ideal shape.  

Here we can imagine a young man who does not know what to do with the excess of his sensitive feelings as he harbors an intense intellectual concern for scholarship. He cannot effectively sort out among pride, love, and self-love. In the sense that even as logic pushes the shape of human love to the point of self-love, the heart is pulled aside by worldly, experiential love, wrestles itself, and goes mad. Marx appears here in the commonplace image of a student who is full of talent, a young man with an excess of self-consciousness and feelings.

Love toward others is an objectified alienation of self-love as long as human beings exist in experiential survival, and this was so even in the oldest ancient age (or even in the age of animal life) -- a thought that fuses such α (alpha) and ω (omega) into a thread is particularly interesting. For we can later receive this pattern from Marx’s philosophy time and time again.

Immediately after taking his degree, Marx made a short visit to his birthplace Trier to meet his parents and fiancée and then departed to throw himself into the group under the radical Hegelian disciple Bruno Bauer, at the time a lecturer at Bonn.

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22 Ibid., 76.
University. He was hoping to pave the road of committed study with this group, choose university teaching as his profession, and have a family with Jenny. Bruno Bauer was at a period in his life when, under the strong influence of Strauss’s *Life of Jesus*, he published *Historical Critique of the Synoptic Gospels*. According to E.H. Carr’s *Karl Marx*, in this atmosphere of the radical Hegelian group, after his arrival Marx published a pamphlet that he co-authored with Bauer, *Last Trump of Judgment against Hegel*. Bauer’s critique of Christianity and Hegelian radicalism earned the displeasure of the government, and Bauer’s occupation as a professor was terminated. Of course, this was because the authorities knew that the critique of Christianity was synonymous with the critique of the <holy> Prussian state, not because they were afraid of a professor who was not particularly intelligent and even somewhat superficial in his taste for novelties. At the same time this also meant that Marx had closed off with his own hands the possibility of finding work in the university. Most likely in the back of Marx’s mind, he had no further hope than acting as a radical Hegelian within the general current of the young intellectuals of the period and, from that position, deepening his scholarly studies as he worked as a university teacher. But even if we presuppose a powerful will on the individual’s part, nothing can be done about the meaning of a particular individual’s hope in a particular age not finding fulfillment as he had hoped. Reality externally exerts its force from its side, as realistic chance. He ends up realizing his hope in some other form without having a choice in the matter. This meaning has a far deeper basis than people commonly assume. He has no choice but to go through his hope in another form,

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23 The actual title is “The Last Trumpet of Judgment against Hegel”. This erratum is not due to either Yoshimoto or the Japanese translator of Carr but found in Carr’s original book.
consciously knowing that this is the case. The power of intellect to cut open the world of ideas is then something that can finally break through life.

The radical Hegelians were planning the *Rhine Newspaper* from the summer of 1841 and it was published for the first time in 1842. Here Marx assigned himself the task of writing political commentary on Prussian censorship codes and freedom of the press. As he worried about censorship against an anti-governmental newspaper, Marx continued to compose the most unscholarly writings and, through this experience, he came into contact with real politics for the first time, mastering the method of how to conduct himself in such a place. He also may have fully realized the extent to which such an insignificant young student as himself was overestimated in a political world that was a gathering of mostly many good-for-nothings. That must have given Marx confidence outside the world of scholarship. In late November of this year, his lifelong sworn friend Engels made a short visit at the office of the *Rhine Newspaper* and met Marx for the first time. By October Marx had become the paper’s lead writer. Marx himself would not have been able to explain this rapid transformation and the change in the course of his life. The only explicable thing is on the side of reality. And what he is as a real human being. But it is certain that both in the means to go around the censors and in his journalistic writing, he amply demonstrated his correspondent skill.

Although the state censors terminated the publication of the *Rhine Newspaper* a year later (1843), Marx traveled to Baron von Westphalen’s family house, which had already moved to Kreuznach, and married his daughter Jenny in the summer of this year. After staying there for a while, they left in autumn for Paris, where many exiles,
including Germans, gathered. <League of the Just> was resurrected under Ewerbeck, and Karl Grün and other German students had formed the group <True Socialists>.

Later Marx was destined to make a real break with Ewerbeck and pick an intellectual fight with Grün in *The German Ideology*, but for now this does not matter. From the <holy> Prussian state he had come as a new exile to cosmopolitan Paris. Even putting aside Marx’s pugnacious personality and thoroughness, Marx never tried to avoid the ideological peculiarity of the undeveloped country, in which opposition to reality begins with an opposition in ideology. The most detestable things are falsehood, ambiguity, and inconsistent philosophy under the banner of righteousness. For they invariably deceive people’s minds through invisible forms. Visible falsehoods are, as cognition, far easier and unraveled. They deceive only those who are truly stupid.

Around the time he entered into exile, Marx emerged with an almost miraculously completed skeletal form of his philosophy.

2 Formation of Marx’s Philosophy

1843 to 1844 was the most important year for Marx’s philosophy. The planning and the immediate failure of the *German-French Yearbook* with Ruge and others were no more than an episode indicating how powerless these young German radicals were as actors on the international stage and how German overconfidence had no currency in cosmopolitan Paris. But “On the Jewish Question”, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, and *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* -- which Marx wrote with *The German-French Yearbook* centrally in mind -- at the very least were a crowing of the cock that signaled the establishment of a system that fused Marx’s philosophy of
<nature> with the most innovative themes of the day, such as religion, law and state. Here Marx’s philosophy gave out its first cry of birth, a philosophy which subsequently would become inescapable for centuries as long as one were engaged in philosophy, regardless of one’s position.

In 1841 Ludwig Feuerbach was writing the *Essence of Christianity*. There he already discerned that religion was human beings’ consciousness about their essence and, because this was not consciousness of a limited essence but of an infinite one, religious faith, i.e. human consciousness toward infinite God, was therefore in fact none other than self-consciousness that conceived consciousness as infinite. Human consciousness toward the world of sensuousness can be distinguished from self-consciousness because it is directed toward what is objectified. But in the case of religion, consciousness of the objectified coincides with self-consciousness. God as a religious object is the expression of human interiority, but religious faith is characterized by the fact that human beings themselves do not know that God coincides with the infinity of their self-consciousness. From this general essence of religion, Feuerbach explicated Christian “passion”, “trinity”, “miracles”, and “heaven”.

According to Feuerbach’s understanding, Jewish creationism is a subjective or self-interested principle by which human beings practically subordinated <nature> under the dictate of their will and desire, trying to lower it into a product within their power of representation, or, to put it another way, into the product of their will. Here nature and God are concepts that are not intuitively distinguishable. “Water divides or rolls itself together like a firm mass, dust is changed into lice, a staff into a serpent, rivers into blood, a rock into a fountain; in the same place it is both light and dark at once, the sun
now stands still, now goes backward. And all these contradictions of Nature happen for the welfare of Israel, purely at the command of Jehovah, who troubles himself about nothing but Israel, who is nothing but the personified selfishness of the Israelitish people, to the exclusion of all other nations, -- absolute intolerance, the secret essence of monotheism”.

This is somewhat malicious to Judaism, but Feuerbach said them in order to philosophically distinguish Judaism and Christianity.

Under Feuerbach’s profound influence Marx saw that this difference between Judaism and Christianity had captured the various West European countries of the day, but Feuerbach’s following manner of thinking attracted Marx’s interest even more:

The highest idea, the God of a political community, of a people whose political system expresses itself in the form of religion, is Law, the consciousness of the law as an absolute divine power; the highest idea, the God of unpolitical, unworldly feeling is Love; the love which brings all the treasures and glories in heaven and upon earth as an offering to the beloved, the love whose law is the wish of the beloved one, and whose power is the unlimited power of the imagination…

It is not difficult to speculate that Feuerbach’s target, translated into reality, was the Prussian <holy> state and its laws while his philosophical target was Hegel. Most likely Marx gravitated to this as well. That is how Marx’s “On the Jewish Question” began. In “On the Jewish Question”, Marx put on the table Bruno Bauer’s book *The Jewish Question* and “The Capacity of Present-day Jews and Christians to Become Free”. He started with the critique of Bauer’s critique of the Jewish question. Feuerbach also deeply influenced Bauer, but Marx discerned that this was nothing more than the mirroring of Feuerbach.

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24 *Essence of Christianity*, 113-114.
25 Ibid., 121.
Bauer thought about the Jewish question in the following manner.

The opposition between Jews and Christians existing today in Europe is a religious opposition. This religious opposition is not going to be resolved until religious opposition is rendered impossible, that is, unless religion is abandoned. When both Judaism and Christianity recognize that religion is nothing more than a cloak that human beings wear become a critical, scientific, and human relationship, science will unify Judaism and Christianity. In Germany, this Jewish question is confronted with the lack of a political solution and the Christian character of the state itself. It is at this point that the question is no longer merely a German one and can be universalized into the general character found in the question of the relationship between religion and state, contradiction between religious prejudice and political liberation. If the state can extend to all areas of life the recognition that keeping Jewish laws or not is purely a private affair for the Jews and that Christianity is also not a privileged religion at all but a private affair, this would mean the abolition of Judaism and of Christianity and therefore human ecdysis from religion. On the other hand, this liberation from religion would also be proposed as the question of political liberation in relation to the state and soon enough for human beings as well…

But Marx criticizes Bauer as follows. Merely starting from the religious question of the Jewish question, Bauer only undertakes a critique of the state that exists in fact as a Christian state against Judaism. But he does not seek to criticize the very essence of the state. Bauer also speaks about political liberation and so on but he fails to grasp the relationship between political liberation and human liberation. Does the liberation of
Jews from Judaism, liberation of Christians from Christianity, human liberation from religion really come from political liberation?

Marx thought that the Jewish question assumed different forms according to the existing conditions of the state in which the Jews actually lived, citing three examples.

The first, under a state like Prussian Germany where the state has not become a modern political state, the Jewish question is nothing more than purely a theological question and Jews exist in religious opposition against the state that has made Christianity into a religion.

The second, in the constitutional state like France, it is the question of the constitution (state law), that is, the question of incomplete political liberation. To put it another way, it is the question of criticizing the state religion that appears externally as a religious opposition.

The third, in the various North American free states, here it is no longer a theological critique but turns into the question of criticizing the political state because the constitution does not give political privilege to any particular religion. In other words, it becomes a secular question in the true sense of the word.

What is Marx trying to say here? He is stating the process in which, with state law as mediation, religion gradually transforms into the question of the state. To the degree that state law is attached to religion, religion turns into the question of the state and, as soon as law abandons religion, the question of religion changes from a heavenly to a secular question. The limitation of <political liberation> appears in the point that the state could find itself liberated even without the liberation of human beings. Even if
human beings are not free human beings, the state could be a free state. Here Marx’s view of the state appears for the first time in its complete form.

The perfected political state is essentially the species life of man in opposition to his material life. All presuppositions of this egoistic life are retained outside the sphere of the state in civil society, but as attributes of civil society. Where the political state has attained its full development man leads -- and not only in thought, in consciousness, but also in reality, in life -- a double life, a heavenly one and an earthly one, a life in the political community [Politisches Gemeinwesen], in which he counts as a communal being [Gemeinwesen], and a life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, views other people as means, debases himself to the status of a means and becomes a plaything of alien forces.  

He also says:

Man in his immediate reality, in civil society, is a secular being. Here, where he counts for himself and others as a real individual, he is a false semblance. In the state, on the other hand, where man counts as a species-being, he is an imaginary member of an illusory sovereignty, is robbed of his actual individual life, and is filled with an unreal universality.

As Bauer says, when religion is not attached to state law and human beings are politically liberated from religion so that the latter becomes a matter of individual preference, religion is not the spirit of the state and becomes the spirit of civil society, thus transforming not into communality but into discrimination. It becomes the representation of a human being separated from not only the community and himself but also from other human beings. Marx considers this to be originally the real nature of religion.

When religion has already come down this far, “critique of religion turns into the critique of law and critique of theology into the critique of politics” (“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”).

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27 Ibid.
Marx shot an arrow of direct critique at his erstwhile teacher and friend Bruno Bauer. But the problem was no longer Bauer but Feuerbach. When Feuerbach’s religion turns into law, civil society as human beings’ individuated, self-interested principle must of course emerge against the state that makes law into a universal principle. If religion is the infinity of human self-consciousness that comes in the form of consciousness of infinity that does not know itself, civil society, which has the appearance of infinity of relations between human beings, must emerge in relation to law and state, which do not come to human beings in the form of mere Christianity, Judaism, or other religions but with the appearance of a universal generality within the state. Such ideas of Marx’s of course came directly from Feuerbach. But in Europe the state did not necessarily exist as a perfect political state. Thus civil society did not necessarily appear as civil society. For Marx, it was sufficient to learn just this much from Feuerbach. Although Feuerbach was an intimate presence that gave suggestive insights to Marx, the great Hegel’s legacy was a strong, gigantic ghost that forced opposition upon him.

Marx conducts the critique of law as a critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law. Why?

As stated earlier, Germany for Marx was a holy state that did not assume the shape of the modern political state. And this Germany that had not become the modern state wore German legal and state philosophy like sandals and, on the face of it, stood shoulder to shoulder with the contemporaneity of modern Europe for the first time. Hence German philosophy was an ideological extension of German history and Hegel’s philosophy of law was considered to be the apex of this extension. He thought taking up
Hegel’s philosophy of law was tantamount to taking up the real problems of other contemporary modern states, critiquing Hegel’s philosophy of law equivalent to critiquing the very reality of the state, and breaking with Hegel’s philosophy of law meant the same as breaking with the real conditions of other modern states. Marx thought the contemporary conditions of German legal and state philosophy were none other than the theoretical expression that exposed the defects of other modern states beyond the Rhine River.

In the Introduction to the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, Marx is scrupulously committed and pays attention to the near hopelessness of Germany’s statist backwardness and the thoroughness of the consequently bloated German legal and state philosophy. The two German characteristics of ideological bloating and thoroughness, which are grafted onto this backwardness in reality, gave Marx the following two understandings. One was that human liberation in Germany could not be accomplished by merely political liberation but only through a fundamental liberation that considered human beings supreme for human beings. Another was how such liberation was impossible without using the bloated and thoroughgoing German legal/state philosophy against itself. And this inverted German legal/state philosophy would on that occasion go across the Rhine River and envelope the other matured modern states, and, inversely, the real movement of the proletariat lying beyond the shores of the Rhine River would cross the Rhine and envelope human liberation in Germany.

We can severely interpret these preliminary remarks of Marx’s as his excuse for universalizing the significance of his attachment to Hegel’s philosophy of law. Marx must not have been able to forget the reactionary nature of the Prussian state that put
Hegel’s legal/state philosophy under government license and expelled Bruno Bauer’s group that rapidly radicalized itself after emerging from Hegel. While what was nominally a real movement of workers proliferated on the other side of the Rhine River, its guiding intellect was impoverished. In a country this side of the Rhine, all reality slept within the mystical <holy> state but its legal, state philosophy had developed under a gigantic intellect, bearing an undoubtedly fertile fruit that needed only to be plucked and tasted. We cannot laugh at this understanding that came upon the young Marx -- even if reality tested whether or not this understanding was true and forced Marx to incorporate a somewhat different pivot into his thought. A young man’s formed ideas have no choice but to be tested by reality.

“Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” undertakes a detailed investigation of the way “On the Jewish Question” situates <law> and <state>. As he grew up in a backward state like Prussia and was not able to find a place of rest until he left it, Marx committed to his heart the lesson that all critiques start with the speculative critique of reality. And this touches upon the general theme that comes upon intellectuals in a backward society. When he says <bureaucratic politics>, the reality of Prussia was no doubt hanging vividly in the background.

According to Marx, bureaucratic politics makes civil society into its content and is the formal<ism> of the state that is outside of civil society; when we perceive this as a single grouping, it is <state consciousness>, <state will>, and <state right>, an <illusory> state that stands next to the <existing> state. The state gets in touch with civil society through a representative because it is outside of civil society, but this representative only
mediates the solidified opposition between the two through <law> rather than calming the opposition.

But, once he takes a state examination, any citizen is qualified to become a bureaucrat. Rather than ameliorating the opposition between state and civil society, this only symbolizes that citizens originally do not have civil rights.

Legislative right is the power in which the state tries to organize civil society through universality; it is included in the constitution because, although it is a power that covers up the constitution in the sense of possessing universality, its must accommodate itself to the constitution in the opposite sense.

Constitution is outside the <law> just as it is outside legislative right because it gives law to legislative right. This character of the constitution functions as the safety valve between the state as politics and the real, non-political state. Contrary to Hegel’s understanding, in the modern state in the sense he developed in his philosophy of law, what has universality is only realized formally, that is, as illusion and only specificity or individuality exists in concrete reality like civil society. For example, constitutional state is an illusory state that, as a fixed form, stands next to the real state and in which state interest exists only formally as the real interests of citizens.

Class is such a legal contradiction between state and civil society and, as long as it is a contradiction, a demand that seeks its resolution. Class is private within civil society because, considered merely within civil society, class is the representation of the state that is not the state. If the legislative right of the state acts as if it were universal, class also cannot help but abandon its private self and possess “political significance and effect” because civil society originally exists outside of the state.
At first glance seemingly complex and in fact complex, Marx’s study of the relationship between <law>, <state>, and <civil society> is actually made up of subtle analogy and magical power of correspondence.

Let us transpose our eyes inside civil society. Because the characteristic of civil society is the arbitrariness of its private class, it circulates with money and education as its standard and the only formal universal distinction is the distinction between city and region. Also, in here the class of non-possession, direct labor, and concrete labor constitutes the bottommost foundation.

Just as civil society is separated from political society, it is divided between class and social status within civil society. Possession and the ability to possess connect the two.

Thus the life and activity of a citizen in civil society do not make him function as a member of society but strain him into a social exception. Defending this through the fusion of communality does not dissolve his exceptionality but is merely the expression of exceptionality. That is to say, class is not only based on division in society but, as it tears him apart from his universal human essence, makes him into an animal that corresponds with his occupation.

Through legislative right, civil society as a class element and right of rule as an executive element enter into a real, direct relationship of hostility.

On the other hand, legislative right is also a totality and is characterized by 1) principle of rule that is the executive right, 2) class element that is the symbol of civil society, and 3) despite it not including civil society within itself, inclusion of the principle of rule that is its polar opposite.
But because for the state as politics *legislative right* is the state itself, civil society is subordinated to it as politics. Thus civil society has no choice but to appear as a class element against the principle of rule, etc.

Marx’s “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” extends across the structure of each and every pillar of law, state, and civil society, and to reproduce this necessitates far greater labor. But it is not at all impossible to make a summary.

A human being is a real person in life and yet cannot exist as human essence when he is in civil society, while, as member of the political state, he can only exist as a universal illusion, because in reality state and civil society are in contradictory opposition. And how does the <law> appear and what does it express?

Marx’s answer to this question is the entirety of what he had elucidated.

What is it about Marx here that should surprise us? If we are only surprised by the brilliant revision of Hegel’s philosophy of law, he will have to enter the gate of illusion’s universality. His private class will be abandoned at that moment. A surprise must always be twofold: the surprise of understanding and the surprise at what great distance this surprise of understanding lies from our reality, concreteness, historicity. If Marx’s understanding is to be grafted onto our reality, we will have to find the self disappear twofold, by reality and self-consciousness. There ideas have no choice but to appear as reality <religion>. In fact, the first step is to graft our concrete, real, and historical society on top of Marx’s understanding. Even if this does not at all constitute the ω (omega).

Although Hegel’s philosophy of law draws out the fact that the state is outside civil society and is in opposition to civil society, it changes immediately afterwards into a
rational, dialectical interpretation of state/law. That stems from Hegel viewing the existing state as a permanent essence.

Just as the doctrines of Hegel’s philosophy of law are difficult, Marx’s interpretation is also difficult, as it cuts open at precisely the point where Hegel changes into an interpretation of law and state, forcibly opening the floodgate that logic must invariably follow.

But what is important are only the following two points.

The state appears twofold through <law>: in the (political) state as politics and in the real state. And the <constitution> adjusts this twofold state. Moreover, the power that tries to organize the state as universality is <legislative right> and it signifies the totality of the political state. Although <constitution> is included in <legislative right> insofar as it is viewed politically, <constitution> as the adjustor between the twofold nature of the state is what gives the law to <legislative right> and thus it is outside <legislative right>, it is <law> outside the <law>.

What sort of relationship does the twofold nature of the state, which is produced from the intervention of <law>, bring about to civil society, which is outside the state and which opposes it. As long as human beings are concretely in civil society, its class is a private class existing respectively through such things as education and wealth. What can conceivably be distinguished here universally are the distinction between city and region. But where state as politics is formed through <legislative right> civil society changes from a private class into what has “political effect and significance”. Class and social status are divided inside civil society. There the citizen’s life and activities mean, just as they are, the occupational specialization within society. As he adapts himself into an
occupational specialist, he departs from his human essence. Rather than the arbitrary citizen, human beings who concretely repeat direct labor (proletariat) are the ones who constitute the foundation of civil society.

As universal power, <legislative right> covers up the rulers’ essence, executive right, and civil society, and because in the same way it is the <law> of the state as politics, which is outside civil society, generality is given only to the right of rule. Consequently civil society has no choice but to position the class element as a political effect against this.

Just as the descent from <religion> to <law> corresponds to the making of the state outside civil society, Marx’s study clarifies the meaning of the direct opposition between civil society and what is inside the state when the state doubles the meaning of the political state through <law>. In this way Marx grasps the linked hierarchy of <religion>/<law>/<state>/<civil society> in a thoroughgoing form through a unified principle. What this understanding teaches us as understanding is how our concretely lived human existence has the twofold nature of being alienated by class within civil society and by <law> outside civil society.

Where did Marx’s own philosophy go? Did it lie in dissolving these various links that make up the pillars of the Western modern state, simply through the critical inversion of Hegel, into the theme of political reality that connects the two shores of the Rhine River?

From 1843 to 1844 Marx’s intellectual groping advanced and assumed an almost completed form. After immanently advancing in “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” the study of the state and <law>, which paints the former as if it had universal
authority, into constitution/legislative right/executive right and their representative in the form of the bureaucrat, their concentration in the form of the monarchy, etc., Marx had to shift his study to the substance inside civil society.

But, in order to grapple with the structure inside civil society, relative importance (as an object) from the outside must be given between state/law/political community and community inside civil society. Are state/law even more of a problem? Is civil society, which lies outside and is concrete as well as individuated, more of a problem? As objects, what relationship do they have with each other? For example, “Critical Marginal Notes on ‘The King of Prussia and Social Reform. By a Prussian’”, which Marx wrote in 1844, is one of the writings that touches on this. Marx thinks the life community inside civil society is the very life that is separated by labor, that is, the life of body and mind, the whole of human morality/activity/pleasure, in short, human essence, and to be isolated from this essence is more comprehensively terrifying than to be isolated from the political community. Just as being human (existence of human being) is infinitely larger than being a public person (political human being), human life is far larger than political life. He assessed that, no matter how partial the <uprising> to supersede human isolation from the life community seems to be, it is larger than the political <uprising> that assumes a universal mask. This was not because politics was communal illusion and society individuated concreteness but because society was unquestionably larger than politics, just as a <human being> is larger than a <political> human being.

The study of the inner aspects of civil society must have a great relative importance. French socialist political economy and, in the German style, Engels’s
“Outline of a Critique of Political Economy”, which appeared in the *German-French Yearbook*, lay in front of his eyes.

The 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* (*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*) begins suddenly with <wages> and also begins suddenly with <capitalist> and <worker> not only because the history of classical economics had worn out such concepts until they arrived in front of Marx’s eyes but, according to the necessity of Marx’s own inner formation, when starting the study of inner aspects of civil society, the most important, most self-evident, most elementary thing was to put at polar opposites the human being doing direct, concrete labor (worker) who is its basis and the human being doing the abstract labor of circulation that indirectly accumulates profit (capitalist).

We should not forget that for Marx the concepts of <capitalist> and <worker> in the *Manuscripts* have the twofold meaning of historical presence as well as necessity of inner groping. The problem is not the hyper-epochal <capitalist> and <worker> but <capitalist> and <worker> as an epoch and as a structure inside civil society. The meaning of economic category in the *Manuscripts* lay here. Just as Hegel’s philosophy of law was the object of critique in the study of <law>/<state>, here <political economist> becomes the object. The real importance of the *Manuscripts* is in the point that his philosophy on <nature> appears at the base of his study of civil society. As he asks what <nature> is for <human beings>, Marx’s philosophy appears in the foundation of the counter-positioning of <capitalist> and <worker> into polar opposites inside civil society. Just as <law>/<state> appeared outside of civil society in “Critique of Hegel’s
Philosophy of Law”, this time civil society appears outside of <nature>, as the objectification of human labor in relation to <nature>.

Workers cannot make anything unless <nature>, that is, the external sensuous world exists. In that sense <nature> gives labor the means of production and, in the narrow sense, provides workers with their means of living physically (natural crops, etc.). But more that the worker makes sensuous nature into a thing through labor, nature narrows as an object of labor and ceases to become the means of physical survival in the narrow sense. In short, it loses its natural character.

This relationship between <nature> and <worker>, to use different words, means that the direct relationship between what labor produces, i.e., processed <nature>, and labor is also a relationship of the worker and the object of production. The relationship of the <capitalist> in relation to the object of this production is no more than a conclusion that stems from this.

If we call this relationship between the worker and the product (that appears as a result of labor in relation to nature) <alienation>, this <alienation> does not only appear in the result but also inside the act of labor. The relationship with intensified result is also <alienation> because production is an activity of self-externalization (alienation) for the worker.

Because labor is <alienation> for the worker, it is outside his essence, he feels unhappiness instead of happiness, feels waste, and, therefore, when he is outside labor (pleasure, rest, subsistence, etc.), he feels within himself while, inside labor, he feels outside himself.
Two things actually become a problem here. One is the problem in relation to Marx’s philosophy of nature itself. The other is whether there is not a worker who finds labor exceedingly pleasurable, feels like himself when he is inside labor, and only feels repulsion in the life of food, clothing, and shelter.

Indeed there are workers who feel like themselves when they are inside labor and, outside, feel other than themselves. That such individuality can concretely exist is a private matter, and what is at issue is the universality extracted from the individuality of human beings and nature. Also what is at issue is how this universality is not a simple abstraction but is produced from individuality. Regardless of how an individual worker thinks about labor, if he pushes it to the limit, it will always turn out this way -- that is the universality under discussion. If labor for the worker is outside himself, it must belong to someone other than himself. Just as a human being always belongs to someone else when he feels like he is not himself.

Human being can act inside himself as if relating to a universal, free being. To put it another way, he can act with the content of consciousness. If we rephrase this as a relationship between human being and nature, it means that human being can make nature into his inorganic body. In order not to die, the human being must make nature stay within a process and be a human body that is not organic. “That man’s physical and mental life is connected to nature means simply that nature is connected to itself, for man is a part of nature”.

But, in the case of labor, in short in relation to nature, human being manages to exist only to make his essence simply a means of survival. This is nature’s alienation from nature and simultaneously alienation of man from man.

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28 Early Political Writings, 75.
Do we not see here a dynamic resuscitation of Greek philosophy of <nature>, which Marx was into during a period of his youth? All the economic categories in the *Manuscripts* are drawn from the <atom> theory that says the relationship between human beings and the relationship between human being and nature are a relationship between nature and nature because human being is part of nature and this is also an inevitability.

But I think Marx’s philosophy of <nature> requires revision in places where human being’s relationship to nature has all become human being and humanized nature (processed nature).

For example, United States today approximates this most closely and Soviet Union, Japan, Germany, and France are belatedly following suit. In China the separation between city and country has finally become an issue, facing the stage in which agrarianism is to be modified. Even if no ideal type is conceivable from the contemporary situation, as soon as human being’s relationship to nature appears perfectly as a relationship with processed nature, natural consciousness (consciousness of the external world) inside the content of human consciousness enters into a reciprocal relationship with self-propagation and, inside that self-propagation, with the separation and objectification of natural consciousness and illusory natural consciousness. This appears inside society as if the relationship between nature and human beings was a relationship between natural processing and illusion of natural processing. But I will not go far here. Let Marx be Marx. For in the contemporary situation what we are witnessing is <Marx>ism and anti-<Marx>ism or the tragedy within <Marx>ism, none of which has anything to do with Marx.
According to Marx, liberation from <alienation> cannot appear except in the political form of workers’ liberation, but the reason this includes the liberation of human beings in general is because it includes the universal relationship between <nature> and <human beings> in the social sense. “To say that man is a corporeal, living, real, sensuous, objective being with natural powers means that he has real, sensuous objects as the object of his being and of his vital expression, or that he can only express his life in real, sensuous objects. To be objective, natural, and sensuous, and to have object, nature, and sense outside oneself, or to be oneself object, nature, and sense for a third person is one and the same thing”.

In Hegel, <alienation> is the opposition between the self as such and the objectified self, opposition between consciousness and self-consciousness, opposition between objectivity and subjectivity. In other words, it is the opposition between abstract thinking and real feeling within philosophy itself. This does not mean human essence is objectified in its opposition with itself inside <nature> as its inhuman, inorganic body.

Do I need to make here a footnote on the Manuscripts?

There is most likely no need for a footnote on the content of the Manuscripts. For although its expressions may seem difficult because one is not used to them, anybody who picks it up and reads it can understand it. A trivial Marxist such as Lefebvre, many of the even more trivial <Marx>ists of the Stalinist world, a trivial scholar such as Marcuse have appended many poor interpretations on this matter.

So all that is left for me to do is to clarify the position of various concepts in the Manuscripts, the position of the Manuscripts itself.

29 Early Writings, 390.
For Marx’s philosophy the Manuscripts attends to the investigation of the structure inside civil society. This is on the same order as the “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law” being an investigation of <law>/<state>, that is, the structure inside the political state. And just as for this political state civil society, which lies outside this state, is positioned against it, in the Manuscripts <capitalist> and <worker> are positioned against each other inside civil society. And, if we were to think only of this, such a counter-positioning is an <economic> category, but what lies as its basis is the mutual determination between naturalized human being and humanized nature and this is generalized as <alienation>. This is ultimately dissolved in a history that is part of natural history or in Marx’s philosophy of <nature>.

There is no need for us to be bothered by all sorts of pointless talk about how <class> and <alienation> are different from each other or are the same, how the early Marx and the late Marx are different from each other or are related to each other. For <alienation> emerges as the foundation of civil society in Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, in the humanization of nature and naturalization of human beings whose process is labor, and <class> emerges as a private class within civil society and as a concept of the political class in its relationship to the political state.

Such economic categories as <capital>, <wages>, <money>, <commodity>, and so on in the Manuscript conceptually appear in the same that <law> does in a study on the political state. What is of importance is that we understand such analogy in the double sense: that it existed in the development of Marx’s ideas and that simultaneously in the development of classical economics until the mid-nineteenth-century, it signified the lucid and logical summation of intuitively existing economic categories.
Between 1843 and 1844, Marx’s ideas assumed an almost complete system. It was a period some time past his mid-twenties. What was completed was a single link that connected <religion>/<law>/<state>/<civil society>/<nature>. “On the Jewish Question”, “Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law”, and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts make up the chain that connects the link. We cannot understand Marx without grasping this link in its totality. Whether he is intellectually anti-<Marx> or pro-<Marx>, he can only be <anti> or <pro> in relation to the totality of this link. <Marx>ists only correspond with anti-<Marx>ists. That has no relation to Marx’s ideas. Only fools are opposing each other and this opposition produces intellectual meaninglessness and practical harm.

I think this chain of Marx’s ideas then at least requires a footnote.

In an epochal situation when Strauss wrote Life of Jesus, the Essence of Christianity appeared, and his friend and teacher Bruno Bauer wrote a critique of the synoptic gospels, it was a matter of course that Marx thought the critique of religion was the presupposition of all critiques. And this religious question in the most real sense appeared as the Jewish question. The Jewish question was the question of religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity in a <holy> state like Germany that was not yet a modern state, the question of religion as the human question in such a place as France where the Christian state was on the verge of becoming a political state, and the question of the state itself, of state and civil society in a modern political state where there was freedom of religion (North America).

The real state (as such) corresponds to the civil society as such and, although it is outside of this, as soon as <law> emerges as the universal organizational power of the
state, the state undergoes the double resolution of the state as such and the political state, whose adjustment is done by the <constitution>. Inside civil society, which lies outside of the state as such and in opposition to the state, human beings are merely a private class but, within the political state, they have no choice but to oppose with political class element the <legislative right> that is the state’s universally organizing power.

The internal structure of the state and the political state is studied through the study of the structure of <law>. Similarly, the study of class inside civil society is studied through economic categories. And what forms the basis of these economic categories is the study of relationship between the human beings who do direct labor and the human beings who enjoy its results. At its roots lies the existence of <nature> that extends the mirror of human beings and of <human beings> that extend the image of nature, with labor (working) as a processing activity.

In the process of investigating this link of <religion>/<law>/<state>/<civil society>/<nature>, Marx, who once undertook the study of ancient Greek philosophy of nature, becomes completed as his own philosophy of <nature>.

For Marx personally this meant the unification of his scholarly interest in law and philosophy and the ideas from his life experience concerning his passion and self-consciousness. Similarly, it was the completion of a system concerning all of reality and all the political illusions drawn from it, which stand above his naturalism = humanist philosophy.
In the spring of 1845, with the prompting of the Guizot cabinet, the Prussian state succeeded in expelling Marx from France. Marx stayed in Brussels and at this time Engels also came to Brussels and the two went on a trip to England. For Marx the study of all reality was already done with and criticizing the German ideological forms, with all their diverse nuances, was easy. We can say “Feuerbach” is the only thing worth looking at in *The German Ideology* (1845). The very criticism against ideologues, who are fashionable in an epoch and soon disappear, also disappears. What he newly added in “Feuerbach” were only the conditions of the real movement, that *communism* was not experientially possible unless it was the act of variously dominant nations *at once* or at the same time, that *communism* was not an ideal for this to happen but the real movement for superseding contemporary conditions, that it could only be a *world-historical* movement because it presupposes the formation of the world market.

This view of Marx’s has circulated as the theory of *world revolution* and, on the other hand, is today transmitted to reality by way of Stalin-Khruschev’s idiotic ethnic *communist* theory that posits the entrance of the Soviet Union into a *communist* society in twenty, thirty years. It is also circulated as a *religion* that says the future is *communism* or the latter half of the twentieth century is an age in which the whole world is moving toward socialism. But these vulgar opinions in circulation are nothing more than simple theory of political revolution or determinism solely for an industrial society and, essentially, they have no association with Marx’s philosophy. At least Marx is here taking into consideration all of reality across both the political community and the social community and speaks with the presupposition of the world market as an economic
category. Thus Marx’s view needs to be understood with the presupposition that there is a real issue in the contradiction between the question of the real political movement that is in fact under state communality and the world communality of economic society. From the very beginning, religious ideas and corrective or oppositional opinions stating how the real world has not gone according to Marx do not mean anything at all. For opposition and correction first presuppose understanding.

Marx’s completed system was not well understood at the time (and even now) but was formed in such a way that theory necessarily led him to practice.

In 1846 German exiles and socialists living in Brussels gathered together and organized the <Brussels Committee>. At any time there are disciples of <awakened workers> who say seemingly sensible things like how workers do not need to trust or depend on theorists and intellectuals, that the most important thing is only the activity of calling on the workers to act. Weitling played this role at the meeting of March 30. Putting aside Engel’s cool-headed remark, Marx severely took Weitling to task by remarking how the agitation of workers without a clear foundation only made for a stupid disciple and stupid asses intently listening to him. Weitling struck back by stating how this world doesn’t change with abstract analysis. At the end Marx beat on the table with such a force that made people jump and shouted, “There is no case in which ignorance was useful”.

This not only meant the break between Marx and Weitling but also the break between Marx who believed that, by making Hegel’s philosophy his own, his theory could be an intellect on the scale of all Europe and the real worker-like movement that was more actual feeling than theory, more class hatred than class opposition. In such an
oppositional scene Marx was not a victor. In almost all cases, he was consistently in the minority or isolated. Marx’s ideas were neither simple nor easy to understand. Even in all Europe there must have been only a handful of people who could understand them.

Marx founded the <Communist Correspondence Committee> and, a year later, in June 1847 at the second congress of the reconstructed <Communist League>, he became in charge of the Brussels branch and Engels of the Paris branch. It is not particularly interesting to speak of the gathering and parting of the exile group who came in the form of sometimes involving Marx and at other times coldly dismissing him. In any period there are retrograde and practical fools who carried or didn’t carry Marx on their shoulders, and there was also on Marx’s part nothing more than the repetition of sometimes staking hope into them and losing hope in them on other occasions. But, between such gathering and parting, his theoretical and intellectual influence spread to some extent in the field of the workers’ movement. There is nothing more exhausting, nothing that makes you feel more pitiful than being in the company of ex-workers who are ignorant and yet think they had awakened. Marx himself must have also wondered, is there nothing else for my theory to do but stake hope in a game of repetition with such people? Exile, being in a stagnant pool of people removed from order, most likely cannot help but be always miserable. The shade and stench of death among the putrefying parts surrounded him.

Addressing his friends, Bakunin wrote around this time:

Marx is still carrying on the same old vain activities, spoiling the workers by making logie-choppers out of them. It’s the same old insane theorizing and dissatisfied self-satisfaction.

In a word, lies and stupidity, stupidity and lies. It is impossible to breathe freely in their company. I keep away from them and I have told them very
definitely that I will not join their communist artisans group and that I refuse to have anything to do with it.\textsuperscript{30}

No doubt this was accurate -- apart from the fact that Bakunin did not understand how Marx himself knew quite well what fruitless labor it was to show the required patience in directing his effort to give counsel among fools who believed that heaven was near like the characters in the New Testament, among down-and-out worker-like exiles for whom his theory was completely outside of their understanding.

There is also data indicating that the Brussels study group revolving around Marx was, to all appearances, something enjoyable. Frau Marx sometimes read aloud poetry and people sang and danced together. He also delivered lectures on economics, which he had by then mastered, to those who had gathered.

Already a year earlier, writing \textit{Poverty of Philosophy} in order to criticize Proudhon’s \textit{Philosophy of Poverty}, Marx had clarified his thinking against Proudhon’s \textit{<constituted value>}, showing that the relative value of commodities is constituted by the labor-time spent on it because labor is the source of value and time is its measure. We can roughly guess at the content of the economics in his lecture and whether or not people understood it. Incidentally, we can even imagine the people’s faces.

Why could the quantity of labor be the measure of value, regardless of its quality? Here is the scene in which Marx looks across people’s faces as if to say this is the important thing. Because simple labor is the primary axis of production and human beings are subordinated to the machine, diverse kinds of labor are considered equivalent through the division of labor. Human influence withdraws into the shadow. To put this

accurately, worker A’s single unit of labor-time is of equal value to worker B’s single unit of labor-time.

Time is everything, man is nothing; he is, at the most, time’s carcass. Quality no longer matters. Quantity alone decides everything; hour for hour, day for day; but this equalizing of labor is not by any means the work of M. Proudhon’s eternal justice; it is purely and simply a fact of modern industry. (*Poverty of Philosophy*)

If we think this in plain language, it is as follows. Quantitative difference could be a qualitative difference but, even if this is so, it is only conceivable as the smallest quality because the aforesaid <time> operates partially from biological causes, such as body type, age, and gender and from mental causes such as endurance, immunity to pain, and diligence. Proudhon tries to measure the relative value of commodity through the value of labor, but that is determined by the quantity of labor and thus by labor-time. The value of labor is determined by the labor-time necessary for producing things that such labor cannot do without, such as maintaining life and giving birth; and there is no way that the relative value of commodity can be determined by it. Marx’s lecture in the Brussels circle seems to have consisted of such clear distinction from the preexisting conceptualization of economic concepts.

1848 coincides with the period of Europe’s radical change in reality. In January the democrats rose up in Italy, and revolution started in Paris. The liberals lied by declaring that they would implement a republican system with their own power, concentrating the army around Brussels and surrounding the democrats. The democrats planned a demonstration but were suppressed by the army. The government of liberals made a list of exiled democrats and expelled them. Marx was arrested in March, Frau

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Marx was also arrested under the pretext of vagrancy, and they were both expelled. Marx went to Paris from Brussels.

Here the German exiles were forming an armed group, but, judging that this was not what the situation called for, Marx did not join in the armed group and tried to persuade them to stay in Paris and wait for the next occasion. Because of this he was denounced as a <traitor> and <coward> and was forced to make a break with the organization of German democrats.

As an aftereffect of this, the <Communist League> disbanded, the <Cologne Democratic Association> was established, and Marx and others published its newsletter the *New Rhine News*. Marx’s participation in this European-wide uprising was virtually nil and, in reality, he made very little contribution to the <Communist League>. The armed group denounced Marx, made a break with him, and was destroyed on its own. Drawing from these lessons, Marx engraved on his mind that democracy contained the ambivalence of being able to be used by either a liberal or a true democrat. By then the concept of <democracy> was the seed of distrust. In short, just as it tends to happen in any age, the popular democrats were effectively done in by the liberal democrats. As soon as the latter connected themselves with political power, they unleashed the military in the name of practicing democracy.

The German uprising occurred a year later in 1849. Workers in Dresden, Pfarz, Baden, and Erbfert rose up in succession, but the Prussian government concentrated the army in Cologne and repressed them. Marx received an expulsion order, and the *New Rhine News* disappeared after releasing its last issue in May.
In the summer Marx went to London and fixed his permanent residence there. His wife and three children came later to join him and set up a place to live in a rented house in the London suburb. Soon another child was born.

Tasting disappointment in the liberals’ democracy, Marx stated “what <counterrevolution> is” in Wage-Labor and Capital, written and delivered in 1849 with the aim of enlightening the workers: “every revolutionary upheaval, however remote its aims may appear to be from the class struggle, is bound to miscarry until the revolutionary working class shall have triumphed, that every social reform remains a utopia until the proletarian revolution and the feudalistic counter-revolution measure swords in a world war”.\textsuperscript{32} Undoubtedly he could barely stomach it. Marx’s tongue-clicking resonates here. And clearly he wrote it with the presupposition of the pan-European defeat in front of his eyes. The problem of situation rather than that of logic, the problem of inner sense of disappointment rather than that of meaning of words, is given greater relative importance in this remark.

But it is not that there is no important theoretical development in Wage-Labor and Capital. He peels off one thin paper of economic category after another as if it were his fate to arrive at Capital.

**Labor and labor-power and worker.** For example, the capitalist appears to buy labor with money and worker to sell labor in exchange for money but that is only the external appearance. What the worker sells in exchange for money is labor-power. On the other hand, labor-power is not a commodity because the worker is.

**Capital.** Accumulated labor that is useful as the means for new production is capital. Even if capital increases and the material life of the worker improves, the

opposition between the capitalist’s interest and the worker’s interest does not disappear and, even in this case, profit and wages are inversely proportional to each other.

The ordering of these economic categories corresponds to an effort in bringing the preexisting conceptions of classical economics closer to the site of his philosophy of <nature>. Here is a worker and he lives by receiving money from a capitalist for whom he works. In this moment, is his labor or is his ability to labor lying within him being sold? Also, from the capitalist’s perspective, is it labor, labor-power, or the worker that can be called the commodity, the special commodity that increases value? All he had to do was to sort out these confusions within the seemingly plausible common idea of political economy that said profit decreases with rise in wages.

Marx was rather enjoying himself in isolation. On the other hand, he was exhausting his nerves in the eddy of the vanquished. In short, he was living. If either aspect is removed from Marx of this period, it will be a lie. Living is nothing other than such a thing.

The gathering and parting among the group of exiles were still repeating themselves like foam around Marx who was forced to live permanently in London. In March 1850 the Central Committee of the Communist League drafted its address, and Heinrich Bauer brought this to Germany. In April the <International Association of Revolutionary Communists> was established. In September a split occurred between Marx and Willich and, withdrawing from the <Communist League>, Marx disbanded the <Association>.

This year (1850) was a turning point in Marx’s life. Marx and his comrade Engels isolated themselves from the group of exiled revolutionaries. They felt disdainful
about the group of exiles, a stagnant pool of exiled revolutionaries, and denounced them as political scum. All they had were their righteously brandished vanity, trivial life of decadence, days consumed in petty conspiracies. The utterly defeated politicos are the same in any era and just as useless. They turn into entities that already drag their feet on everything and only find interest in acting like a chameleon.

One can see more and more that exile [of the revolutionary group -- author’s note] is an institution in which everyone must necessarily become a fool, a donkey and a scurvy knave unless he withdraws from it completely and contents himself with being an independent writer who doesn’t bother his head in the least even about the so-called revolutionary party. (Engels)

I very much like the public isolation in which we two now find ourselves. It is quite in accordance with our attitude and our principles. The system of mutual concessions, of half-measures tolerated for the sake of appearances, and the necessity of taking one’s share of the responsibility in the eyes of the general public together with all those donkeys, is now at an end. (Marx)

We have now once more an opportunity, for the first time for a very long time, of showing that we need no popularity and no support from any party in any country, that our position is completely independent of such trivialities. From now on we are responsible to ourselves alone…By the way, we can hardly complain about the fact that the petits grands hommes avoid us. For years, although we acted as though Krethi and Plethi were our party, although we had no party and the people whom we considered as belonging to our party, at least officially, did not understand even the elementary principles of our cause. (Engels) 33

In any era there are differences of such degree between ideas and their practice. The more real the ideas are, this is what happens. Even if nothing elementary is understood, one can still act. Did not Marx think that one thing he didn’t want anybody to do was

33 Quoted in Mehring, Karl Marx, 208-209. There is a note at the bottom of the page: “Krethi and Plethi = university-student expression for Tom, Dick, and Harry”. In the Japanese quotation Yoshimoto uses, this is rendered as renchū (“those fellows”).
carry a sign? For philosophy isolation is neither painful nor wanting. “I eagerly grasped the opportunity to withdraw from the public stage to my study”.

The accumulation of documents related to the history of economics at the British Museum, the advantageous position of London, the new stage of development in bourgeois society that seemingly began with the discovery of gold in California and Australia -- with such conditions before him, Marx’s study started anew. Although the contribution of topical articles to the *New York Tribune* (these are said to be ghostwritten by Engels) was the only source of income for subsistence, the acquisition of its manuscript fee did not go as desired and even Engels’s occasional help was like throwing water on a conflagration.

Political isolation, economic difficulty, and scholarly study came to Marx in succession. The rent dried up and his property was invariably seized. Addressing Weydemeyer, Frau Marx wrote a letter to the effect that what broke her heart to its very core and made her want to throw up blood was the fact that her husband had to do so much trivial stuff, that she could not help him, and that someone who had helped so many people like he did was so helpless and isolated.

Her husband (Marx) similarly wrote to Weydemeyer. The letter said, if this bleak condition of life continued long, his wife would die. In addition, his enemies took out their powerlessness by trying to make people think he was persona non grata as a citizen, denouncing him, circulating insults and defamations that cannot be said in public. They were spreading into his nervously exhausted wife’s ears polluted materials from the

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underground sewer that was full of the democratic epidemic, worsening her moods even more.

The noises of political isolation, subsistent poverty, political defamation, and frame-ups (conspiracy) colored this period of Marx’s life. The worst among them was journalism concocted by political scums, denouncing Marx for selling himself to the Prussian reaction by alluding to Frau Jenny Marx’s brother, who was a Prussian Minister of Interior. Marx challenged to a duel the journalist who proffered this libel and made him retract it. Under such circumstances, days went on, days of Marx visiting the Great British Museum from morning to night and making his way into the various categories of economics. His contribution to the New York Tribune continued from 1851 to 1852 and, though it earned him a small income, his poverty was not ameliorated. Because of unpaid rent, the seven members of the Marx family lived in a small two-bedroom hovel in London’s underclass area of Soho. The spread of communicable diseases were the worst in this unsanitary district and his three children died one after another. There was good reason for Frau Jenny Marx to lament to acquaintances, if only her husband made capital rather than study about it. For all the strains of poverty shifted onto her. As an employee at his father’s firm, Engels did not spare monetary aid to them.

Although public political activity started to be linked to a strong bureaucracy when Lenin revised Marx’s ideas in the Russian manner, a sense of the pastoral still remained for Marx. But the reason politics is politics never changes. How much significance was there originally in the revolutionaries’ group in which Marx intervened organizationally? Was there in the result of Marx’s investigation in economics something to equal his poverty and the death of his three children? Even such questions
can be anticipated. Regarding the former, Marx and Engels had made their closure in their correspondence. But the latter’s significance is unknown, that is, if the answer to it is no more than “did not Marx’s *Capital* give birth to contemporary Russia and China?”

Central Committeemen who are the red salesman, big lying leaders who proclaim Russia will be a communist society in thirty years’ time, are not Marx’s ideas already long dead where you are? Wherever one picks up Marx’s work, his words and deeds, none of their parts tells a great lie. Marx died surrounded by only a few disciples and friends, but what were his ideas to humanity? What is certain is the fact that the great liars and their society are of no consequence.

Whether by accident or necessity, the period Marx retreated from politically public activity and the period he made his way into a vein of economics coincided.

The entire system of his ideas had already assumed a completed form from 1843 to 1844. What he drew from this study was the summation that civil society being infinitely larger than state/civil society was synonymous with the existence of human beings being infinitely larger than their nature as res publicas. Then he considered various economic categories capable of grasping the inner structure of civil society. In other words, the various concepts of classical economics were only needed for studying the structure of civil society in relation to the statist society.

*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* of 1843-44 clearly meant that economics was a *means* of studying civil society. It was the predicate to the subject.

But now the meaning of economics was taking on a somewhat different nuance in Marx. He was starting to think of economic categories as the basis for studying all reality. After his political isolation, the meaning of the economic categories had come to carry
the sense of a core that demarcated the stages of historical development in society -- as in the actually existing foundation of the entire historical process that led to the capitalist system.

As I see it, it was Marx who for the first time expanded the position of conceiving economic foundation from actual existence and came to consider actual existence as one of the historical stages.

The rebellion that was diffused but European-wide in scope, its defeat, and political isolation after 1848 perhaps forced Marx to search for the historical base of the actually existing society. Even if in reality he had hesitations about many of the democrats’ rebellion, he also staked considerable hopes in it. Why does the actually existing society ruled by political reaction and bigotry have such a strong base and seems to fall but does not?

Marx’s view of the intellect based on the critical superseding of German philosophy and the heart based on the proletariat of all Europe had to be forced into self-examination at least on this point. Instead of constructing an entire system above the philosophy of <nature>, what was now needed was an axis to rethink the actually existing society as a historical concentrate. In the preface to the *Critique of Political Economy* he stresses “the new stage of development which this society seemed to have entered with the discovery of gold in California and Australia” as one of the reasons he got into economics, but to a large extent I cannot believe this. Rather, I think the European rebellion and its defeat after 1848, along with Marx’s own isolation in public life, were the motif that “induced [him] to start again from the very beginning and to work carefully...
through new material”. Here the motif of economics as an elucidation of the inner structure of civil society is transformed into the primary historical factor that made society develop to the point of capitalist civil society. This subtle shift in Marx’s manner of punctuation was an intensive expression of the entire situation of the post-1848 rebellion and its defeat, accompanied by Marx’s alienation from the politically public life, and the piling up of his family poverty.

Nobody can assess whether the gravitational shift in Marx’s ideas was justified.

Even if, subsequently, innumerable (vulgar) materialists and economists called themselves Marxists, lined up like ghosts, and walked around carrying his intellectual coffin, what relationship does that have to Marx? What responsibility does he have? In this sense the ineluctable chance encounter between the epoch and the individual determines what ideas a single human being has as a public person, as human existence, and how they are spread.

The changes in Marx’s ideas were crystallized as Pre-Capitalist Economic Formation of 1857-58 and Critique of Political Economy of 1859. The axis of historicity is incorporated in the study of concrete human society for the first time. This axis of historicity can be summed up in the following few lines:

> In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. (Critique of Political Economy)

> No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for

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35 Marx, Critique of Political Economy, 22, 23.
their existence have matured within the framework of the old society. Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve. (Ibid. -- emphasis in the original Japanese)³⁶

Marx’s experience of defeat pulsates here. The once <legal> and <political> universality has come out of civil society and its expression has changed to one of communality of interests alienated outside of civil society; and the <legal> and <political> generality is expressed here as a superstructure standing on top of it! Also, the concept in which the relationship between nature and human beings -- the basis of his philosophy of <nature> - - is not a relationship between object and subject but a relationship in which <nature> is humanized and <human being> is naturalized through the medium of labor (working) seems to have completely vanished without a trace…

What had happened?

Anybody would recognize that the gravitational point in Marx’s ideas has shifted here. What oversaw this shift was the incorporation of society as history. Despite this, however, his study of the relationship between <law>/<state> and civil society, along with his own philosophy of <nature>, have vanished here without a trace, and, if we think of this vanishing as an evolution of his ideas, we have no choice but to say that this brings about misunderstanding to many economic categories and the division of the <early Marx> in the opposite sense.

In the sense that everybody completes his expression in his youth, his ideas are already all finished from 1843 to 1844. What comes after this? What comes after is what reality and the epoch had exerted on him in the form of intellectual development. In this sense the historical study of industrial society and the inquiry into the inner structure of this very industrial society came now as a task to Marx.

³⁶ Ibid., 20, 21.
To investigate the historical development of all industrial society until modern civil society would necessarily draw out the macroscopic, that is to say, an axis of transformation within a span of time that goes across quite a number of centuries, in contrast to the study that so far made as its object a span of time that was at most no more than one hundred years.

Numerous misunderstandings arise if this macroscopic quality is ignored in Marx’s study of economic categories after 1848. The concept of superstructure is the product of drawing out this macroscopic quality. In an 1852 correspondence addressed to Weydemeyer, Marx wrote that what he had proved for the first time was that various classes are connected to a particular stage of historical development, that class struggle produces the dictatorship of the proletariat, and how this dictatorship constitutes a process from the superseding of class to the arrival of the classless society. However if this proof is not understood as being articulated on the basis of incorporating this macroscopic time (that is, historicity), one will end up making idle remarks along the line of how communism in one country would emerge in Soviet Union in about thirty years, in the manner of Khruschev, Togliatti, and their factions. History is not a matter of immediacy that people can measure with their life as a single unit of time. Additionally, political revolution that occurred once is not of itself a social revolution and there also exist political revolutions that have reversed themselves.

I find it strange that Marx rather casually focused all his powers into the investigation of industrial society, or, to put it colloquially, how much he was into economics as a critique of economics. The preparation of delving into economic categories is not done especially meticulously by consistently keeping in mind their
relationship to the philosophy of <law>/<state>. He seems to literally delve into economics. On this point, we might well expect the discovery of new documents. If that happens, the Russian revision of Marx’s ideas that have circulated as <Marx>ism might finally disappear from everybody’s sight. There does not seem to be any great significance in only extracting or solidifying what Marx believed he drew from his study of economic categories. At least we cannot even fathom as to why, how, and what human beings must do to live and die in such a macroscopic time. Many <Marx>ists can only function as a kind of a believer, a fortune-teller, or a masochist because they attempt to counterpoise their life to this macroscopic time.

Needless to say, here one cannot participate in this macroscopic quality except by alienating one’s own life, except by becoming an organic illusion in an illusory life called political life or turning into a kind of non-functionality. Or, as an individual, he has no choice but to cover up the contradiction between private and public life.

In Capital of 1867, rather than in A Critique of Political Economy of 1859, we can find in a more perfected form Marx’s views on society as relations of production, which he considered to be the most crucial core of all social stages leading up to the formation of modern civil society, and his views on economic categories as a critique of political economy, which were derived from deeming the development of industrial society as a process of natural history.

4 On the Late Years

On the surface, seclusion, study of economics, and poverty thereafter continued for more than a decade. We can think of this period as running from approximately the
late 1850 until the foundation of the <International Working Men’s Association> (so-called First International) in 1864. During this time, apart from a few acquaintances and political activists who occasionally came for <advice>, his only companions were his family and intense poverty.

One memorable event was the Karl Vogt case of 1860. Vogt had published a book by the title of My Action against the “Allgemeine Zeitung”. We should consider it the same sort of <memoir> that the decrepit, former-such-and-such enjoys writing even now. It “contained a rehash in still greater detail of all the old nonsense Vogt had previously published in the Bieler Handelskurier”. (Mehring, Karl Marx)\(^\text{37}\)

Marx was placed as a head of a blackmailing group, and “not one letter, but hundreds of other letters have been sent to people in Germany threatening to denounce their participation in this or that revolutionary action unless a sum of money specified was sent to a given address by a certain date”. (Ibid.)

Such problem always occurs among down-and-out exiles who include political scums and self-proclaimed revolutionaries who make it their common practice to knock someone down by surprise in order to be a drag on him. It is also always the case that those who enjoy playing the accompaniment, keeping the self-proclaimed revolutionaries in company with a seemingly fair-minded face, are the progressives. This material was made into a news item for all Europe, which wanted to push Marx’s isolation to the point of his burial.

Marx was enraged, and his wife exhausted her nerves even more and became irritated in illness and poverty. His biographer states how for about a year Marx sued,

\(^{37}\) Mehring, Karl Marx, 288. I have modified this passage in this English translation to correspond with the Japanese quotation, removing a phrase -- “about the ‘Vagabonds’” -- that appears after the word “nonsense”.

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gathered materials and testimonies, and was forced to waste his time in order to fight this frame-up (conspiracy). Politics always seems to turn out this way. Threats and blackmalls do not become materials for making a fuss for politicians because they constitute the very component of politics, but for the politics of counter-power there is an illusion that a frame-up could somehow become the means of striking a fatal wound. From the small-scale student activist punks and down-and-out leftists infesting journalism to the large-scale organization calling itself the <party> of workers, such things make up a part of their occupation day or night. Even progressive cultural magazines and newspapers under the command of degenerate leftists imitate this. Only when we truly feel that those who revolt against public power are threatened by inner decay do we feel, so to speak, inner fear. The remaining fear is nothing more than merely a biological one such as the kind of fear we feel when we are right on the verge of falling off a cliff.

Marx’s persistence is worthy of astonishment. This time a challenge to a duel did not settle the matter and he retorted by fully mobilizing his power of writing. It was a sort of work that could not result in victory, only exhaustion. What is clear is that, just as his philosophy could not be buried, it was impossible for a self-proclaimed revolutionary group to bury him. This is because his enemies did not understand that philosophy is not matter but externalized ideas. The movement of ideas is only buried by ideas; idea A only dies when idea B includes and supercedes it, in other words, only by putting idea A into the bag alive.

On September 28, 1864, the founding meeting of the <International Working Men’s Association> (the International) took place at St. Martin’s Hall.
Already grasping society in terms of various relations of production and incorporating the axis of historicity into this productive society’s stage of development, Marx pointed out <two great facts> in the <Inaugural Address>, the English workers’ formation of the Ten Hour Bill and of a few cooperative factories. Of course, these were not great facts but small ones, but in Marx’s eyes they reflected as victory of principle or theory. The <Address> added the following provisional rules to these <great facts>. If these <great facts> were confined within the individual workers’ accidental efforts and narrow framework, they were clearly limited in nature and hence must be expanded on a national scale, nurtured by means of the state, which obviously has to involve the seizure of political power. It concluded that, in order to realize this, it was necessary to be well versed in international policies and to watch over governmental actions as well as to acknowledge the rule of morality and justice supporting each individual’s relationship as the highest principle of relations among various nations.

It is the same with *The Communist Manifesto* but, when it comes to such <Address>, Marx’s philosophy gives the impression of being a deformed child with the brain and heart attached to each other. There is something else at work here besides the intent to produce an agitational effect. Just as he meant <Western states> when he said <all countries>, did not the problem of <law>/<state> take a revenge on his idea of <all countries> when he reduced the problem of <law>/<state> to the problem of stages of development in a productive society by incorporating the axis of historicity? His <Address> seems to at least overlook this contradiction.

Another noteworthy event was Marx’s lecture *Value, Price, and Profit*, which was delivered at the General Council as a retort to an <old Owenite> Weston’s economic
lecture. His conception in the Volume One of Capital was already ripe, and it must have been easy for him to retort to Weston’s understanding, which was tantamount to saying that commodity prices were determined by wages. The only problem that accompanied this was: “However it is not easy to explain all the economic problems debated here to those without theoretical preparation”. (Correspondence to Engels)

The International’s second congress was held at Lausanne in September 1867 and the third congress a year later in September 1868 at Brussels. According to the <Report to the General Council of the Brussels congress>, “the Association has assumed dimensions powerful enough to provoke the bitter denunciations of the ruling classes and the hostile demonstrations of governments”.

Just as only the Western world is in Marx’s mind when he says the International, there is nothing more trivially boring than the history of the International.

The fourth Basle Congress of 1869 was something of a wakeup call. Apart from the International Working Men’s Association, Bakunin organized the International League of Social Democracy and designated it to undertake the <special task of studying various political and philosophical problems on the basis of the great principle of <equality>. From primarily an organizational viewpoint, Marx considered that <the existence of a second international organization that is active outside as well as inside the International Workingmen’s Association is the surest means of organizational dissolution>, and, as a delegate of the General Council, with joint signature of the chair, correspondents in charge of the various countries, and the General Council secretary, he decided Bakunin and others’ alliance agreement between the International League of Social Democracy and the International Workingmen’s Association to be null and void,
that it should be withdrawn, that the League was not going to be enlisted as a section of
the Association.

Engels addressed the following letter to Marx about this, in the first half calming
him down and in the latter half expressing agreement with Marx’s attitude.

I think it would be best calmly but firmly to rebuff these people with their
pretensions to sneaking into the International. Apart from this, we should
say that they had selected a special field and one would have to wait to see
what they make of it and, we should also say that, for the present, there
was nothing to stop members of one association from being members of
the other. Since the fellows, to put it bluntly, have no other field of
activity than chatter, they will soon enough bore one another to death, and
since it may be expected that they will have no new adherents from
outside (given such conditions), the whole concern will certainly soon
collapse. But if you violently oppose this Russian intrigue, you will
unnecessarily arouse the very numerous -- particularly in Switzerland --
political philistines among the journeymen, and harm the International.
With a Russian (and in this case there are 4, not counting the females),
with a Russian one must never lose one’s temper.

I have never read anything more wretched than the theoretical
program. Siberia, his stomach, and the young Polish woman have made
Bakunin a perfect blockhead. (December 18, 1868)

There is nothing else to say except how trivial all of this is. Marx and Engels’s
correspondence <concerning the International> are filled with such kinds of things as
whether someone is relatively reliable or not. As soon as they start thinking someone is
unreliable or untrustworthy, the other person also would come to the conclusion that
Marx and Engels are unreliable and untrustworthy; one should not make such remarks
unless one is willing to completely break relations because such human relationships are
mutually determined -- there was no way that Marx, so full of political sense, did not
understand such an anthropological point. The world’s common politician also inhabited
this gigantic brain.

Bakunin assessed Marx of this period in the following manner:

As a thinker Marx is on the right path. He has set up the principle that all religious, political and legal developments in history are not the cause but the effects of economic developments. That is a great and fruitful idea, but not all the credit for it is due to him. Many others before him had an inkling of it and even expressed it in parts, but in the last resort credit is due to him for having developed the idea scientifically and having made it the basis of his whole economic teachings. On the other hand, Proudhon understood and appreciated the idea of freedom better than Marx. When not engaged in inventing doctrines and fantasies Proudhon possessed the authentic instinct of the revolutionary; he respected Satan and proclaimed anarchy. It is quite possible that Marx will develop an even more reasonable system of freedom than did Proudhon, but he lacks Proudhon’s instinct. As a German and a Jew he is authoritarian from head to heels.39

If 1869 was a year of internal turmoil for the International Workingmen’s Association, 1870 was the year of outer ferment. In July France and Prussia entered into war.

The Paris Commune revolted when the Prussian army approached the gates of Paris. Marx admonished the French workers to rise up by fulfilling their duties as citizens and at the same time organize themselves as a class by making use of all the legal freedoms afforded by a republican government -- a dual demand that, in reality, was almost completely contradictory to each other. The revolt of Paris Commune was a spontaneous one that also involved Blanquists and Proudhonists, and, knowing quite well that it was hopeless, Marx could not help praising their courage and creativity. The situation, of course, did not take an ideal passage, as Marx depicted in his intellect.

As if to exactly coincide with Bakunin’s mockery of him, Marx ascribes the defeat of the Commune to the crime of their <good nature> in his letter to Kugelmann. According to Marx’s intellectual strategy, “They should have marched at once on Versailles, after first Viony and then the reactionary section of the Paris National Guard

39 Cited in Mehring, 404-405.
itself had cleared the field. The right moment was missed because of conscientious scruples. They did not want to start the civil war, as if the mischievous dwarf Thiers had not already started the civil war with his attempt to disarm Paris. Second mistake: The Central Committee surrendered its power too soon, to make way for the Commune. Again from a too ‘honorable’ scrupulousness”.40

A gigantic intellect and an ignorance regarding real battles coexist in Marx. Only those who have fought or are endowed with an enormous imagination can understand the real scene of battle and the necessity of what happens there. This is the source for producing in the subsequent age those ignorant, bigmouth fellows who call themselves the <vanguard> and political activists who have no idea what reality is. Had it been me, I would have said to Marx here: you do it yourself; battles don’t turn out that way.

The Paris branch of the International Workingmen’s Association in no way led the Paris Commune, but the aftermath of the Commune’s defeat was borne largely by the Association. The same thing he had done with the German exiles, he had to do again with the French exiles. Offering help and giving advice, wearing out his time and spirit in a small dirty world strewn with petty conspiracies, defamations, and feuds. The defeat from power always assumes the same form, and, since primitive Christianity, the exiles and the vanquished always have the same mindset. Those who deserve sympathy and praise, those who are incorrigible, and those whose nature is unknown and who are detestable coexist among each other. As in the case of those so damaged that they are useless, weaving strange dreams and not able to forget the glory of the past. Having nowhere to release his frustration, Marx bitched occasionally. But the life of philosophy is

40 Padover, 280. I have removed the italics, transposed the original French term for the English (“dwarf” for avorton) as Padover notes in a bracket, and eliminated the exclamation mark at the end.
like that. It cannot pass over what it has engaged. One must completely deal with the aftermath. What is important for victory is action. But the only important support for defeat is philosophy. Action dies at this moment but it could also conceal its trails. Philosophy cannot conceal its trails. Even at any time of defeat.

For Marx’s life the defeat of the Paris Commune was a practical end, a running aground. His health deteriorated in a few years and he started to periodically suffer from nervous disorder and brain fever. Following a doctor’s advice, he sometimes moved from place to place for some years. His kidney disease consequently cleared up, but his nervous and stomach disorders did not get well and his insomnia persisted.

He appears to not have known despair. But that is only because nobody would know this. Despair that can be spoken and written about is predictable from the outset. Instead of complaining at the intellectual level, he put in even more effort and lost himself in study. He did not have much time left in his life and most likely he did not even imagine that there was going to be rapid recovery from what the defeat of Paris Commune had brought to all of Europe. Now was the time for him to leave a penetrating philosophy.

The greatest intellectual event that took place in Marx’s late years was the completion of the Volume One of Capital.

If the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts treated categories of economics as internal structure of civil society, Capital treated the capitalist system, a historical stage of development of humanity’s productive society, as a total process between capital and labor. In addition, if the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts was constituted on the basis of Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, Capital is constituted on the basis of a
philosophy that views the development stage of productive society as a process of <natural> history. Hence if the Manuscripts were the historicity of society concentrated within actual existence, Capital is a study of the actual existence of a society that is developed within historicity. Again, this is why when a person voluntarily approaches the Manuscripts, he is made to concentrate within a single point of actual existence, but a person who approaches Capital is dispersed into the entire historical process of human history. This is the reason why Manuscripts feels as if it engages human subjectivity while Capital feels as if it excludes human subjectivity. Marx offers a warning in the preface to Capital in this way:

To prevent possible misunderstandings, let me say this. I do not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colors. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers of particular class relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for relations whose creature he remains, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.41

Capital resolved what Marx presented piecemeal since Critique of Political Economy, partially in Wage-Labor and Capital, in Value, Price and Profit, and in Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations. On the basis of synthesizing them, including all the manuscripts on economics, he attempted a systematic narrative.

By now he believed that he was able to bring together the preceding categories of classical economics since Smith and Ricardo to the foundation of his philosophy of <nature>. In Capital his philosophy of <nature> is seamlessly fused with economic categories. Wherever one takes as a point of departure, his philosophy of <nature> intersects with the critical consciousness of the structure of the capitalist productive

society as a current stage of historical development of productive society. Although in *Capital* he begins with the analysis of the *commodity*, an immovable meticulousness captures economic categories in the capitalist system from the intersection of historicity and actual existence regardless of one’s point of departure.

Let us sketch a somewhat basic problem from the concept of value, which we can consider *Capital* to have clarified for the first time.

The fact that a particular thing is useful makes that thing into a **use-value**. To be precise, a useful thing is not a use-value, neither is being useful a use-value, but the effectivity of being useful gives the expression of use-value to a thing.

Things (commodities) that are expressed as use-value have diversely different qualities. This is something anybody can understand. However, **exchange-value**, which is produced when a particular thing is exchanged for another thing, can only be in diversely different quantities and does not in the least contain how use-value is.

For example, where there is a high-quality notebook and an average-quality notebook, the high-quality notebook has a greater use-value than the average-quality one. In order to make this simple, if we think of pencils of completely equal quality and if we posit that a high-quality notebook is worth being exchanged with ten pencils and an average-quality notebook with five pencils, the expression of the notebook as exchange value is only represented with the quantity of ten or five pencils and the expression of that notebook’s usefulness doesn’t enter into it. But has not the fact that the notebook is of high quality or of average quality become the quantitative difference of ten or five pencils? If that is so, does not the concept of exchange-value contain use-value? Certainly that is how it appears, but this is either something within human cognition or
determined by the position of the notebook and the pencil in terms of entire social production; the fact that the exchange value of the notebook itself, of the pencil itself, still only finds expression through quantitative difference does not change.

Next, the reason a thing has value is because abstract, human labor is objectified in it. The magnitude of its value is measured by the quantity of labor contained in it and the quantity of labor is determined according to labor time as a measurement.

In fact, he has repeatedly explained this concept since Wage-Labor and Capital and, in that sense, it is a familiar one and there is almost no need to mention it anew.

Because greater the productive force of labor, lesser the labor time of making a particular thing, the value of this thing is small. In short, the greatness of a commodity’s value is in proportion to the quantity of labor and changes in inverse proportion to its force of production.

But certain kinds of things can be use-value without being value or can be value without being a commodity. For example, air, virgin land, natural grassland, and wild trees do not include any objectification of labor but can be use-value. Also, if one consumes on one’s own what is made from labor, that is value but not social use-value.

It is at this point in our sketch that Marx’s concept of value comes into contact with his philosophy of nature.

In order for something to have value, a qualitative transformation between human being and nature must take place. Adding labor to a natural material makes it into a processed material, but, as soon as this processed material starts functioning as usefulness, value is produced as an expression. In this sense labor is a condition of survival regardless of social form and it is a permanent natural necessity for mediating human life.
For example, commodities such as coat and linen cloth are fusion of two substances, natural material and labor, but, if all useful labor is removed from them, what remains are only the raw materials actually existing in nature. In the case of labor (working), human being acts in the same way that <nature> does, changing the form of its raw materials, and this change of form is the <humanization> of nature, or, to put it another way, it is being humanly aided by nature. “As William Petty says, labor is the father of material wealth, the earth is its mother”. (Capital) 42

Marx’s philosophy of <nature> that supports the Manuscripts is here resuscitated as it is. He knew here that the concept of <value> was unstable by itself without dropping it on top of this philosophy or until it reached the site of this philosophy.

In order for no misunderstanding to occur, let me add a modest footnote. Value is a representation that attaches itself to commodity and is not concomitant with labor, labor-power, or the worker. This should not be confused with the fact that, without labor, commodity in which labor is objectified does not produce any value and value thus makes the existence of the worker a necessary presupposition. Although the laboring human being is on one side, value is always on the other, in other words, it is attached to the produced commodity and what reciprocally bridges the two (that is, between nature and human being) is nothing other than labor itself.

Incidentally, the concept of commodity <value> produced by the objectified relationship between nature and human being has no choice in the arena of circulation but to circulate as its equivalence as <orientation to the other>. In other words, commodity cannot itself be <value> without relating itself to other commodities. Here Capital poses this <equivalent> form as a problem.

42 Capital, 134.
This means labor that is at the same an objectification to nature cannot itself be labor without making concrete labor into a phenomenon.

This is also synonymous with the fact that individual labor cannot itself be individual labor without becoming social labor.

Borrowing a few concepts, I am merely commenting after my own fashion on the philosophy of nature which lies at the foundation of Capital. I think those who want to read ought to read the original text, which is written more skillfully in Marx’s own hands. But, as I see it, Marx spends a really considerable amount of time in reaching the site of his philosophy of nature by way of extensively thinking through the categories of classical economics. And Capital is located at the place where economic categories as the central core of historical stage of production cross this philosophy of nature.

What happens when the axis of historicity is incorporated into the essence of self-oriented/other-oriented relationship of such value? To put it differently, what happens when this essential relationship is realized after undergoing all the stages of productive society in history?

Value increasingly pushes equivalence, as the relationship between commodities, from specificity to universal equivalence and realizes itself in the form of money/currency/stocks and bonds, etc.

Similarly, labor starts to be done on the basis of a particular market objective, and, as this continues, use-value increasingly separates from use-value for exchange, that is, exchange value.
When this axis of historicity is made to cross the contemporaneity of actually existing capitalist system, the circulation of commodity as value emerges as <capital>. <Capital> can be considered in the following manner.

As in W (commodity) $\rightarrow$ G (money) $\rightarrow$ W (commodity), the direct form in which commodity circulates is one that changes commodity into money and changes money again into commodity.

In contradistinction to this form, we can conceive the form G (money) $\rightarrow$ W (commodity) $\rightarrow$ G (money). In short, this is changing money into commodity and, selling this commodity, changing it back into money. In this latter case, money transforms into <capital>. Hence use-value does not become an objective for the capitalist, and, moreover, what is at issue is not individual gain and profit but the continuation of <G $\rightarrow$ W $\rightarrow$ G> to the infinite power. The value of commodity appears here as a substance that is on the verge of starting to move on its own.

What does this mean?

That means value is distinguishing itself from itself as surplus value and, moreover, interminably repeating the process of self-movement in which value plus surplus value again appears as value. This can be considered the real nature of capital.

But when value, as surplus value, performs the magic of distinguishing itself from and opposing self-value, there must be on one side, that is, outside this process, a unique commodity in which use-value itself is the source of value. For, if there is no value that is itself use-value, there can never be, on the other hand, an internality in which value is value in a self-accumulative sense. The unique commodity in which use-value itself is
the source of value is labor-power. And labor-power exists inside the worker and reproduces itself in the same way.

A human being/worker who possesses the unique commodity of labor-power goes to the market and enters into a relationship with human being who has money. And, in order to perpetually continue this relationship, the human being who has labor-power must sell that only for a certain amount of time and make sure that he does not lose his property right over labor-power in return.

What determines the value of labor-power?

As with other commodities, the necessary quantity of labor time in producing labor-power, namely time, determines it. However, the labor-time necessary for producing labor-power, that is to say, the value of labor-power varies, depending on its country’s climate and cultural stage, the condition of social formation of human beings who possesses that labor-power. In short, unlike other commodities, historical and mental factors come into play, but an average range can be conceived for a particular country during a particular epoch.

Incidentally, the form that the self-accumulation of value assumes at the stage of circulation is money capital and merchant capital, the form it assumes at the stage of production is productive capital, and the capital that responds accordingly and transforms into these in the process of totality is industrial capital. But such distinctions over details do not concern us here. The historicity of productive society is basically considered distinguishable according to the mode of connection between the worker and the means of production.

Do I need to make a few more footnotes on the fundamental structure of *Capital*?
There does not seem to be any reason this is needed. Along the horizontal axis, the reciprocally objectified relationship between nature and human beings, determined by Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, exists as <labor>, and the fundamental structure of Capital is the study of how <value>, as the resulting expression of the produced object, turns into phenomenologically formed value and what forms this takes in the capitalist system as a historical stage of development. Whether or not people spare the labor of examining in detail the economic categories explicated in Capital, it is sufficient if they understand that in case the categories described there are historical, they are conceptualized at a place where they cross with actual existence, and, in case they are actually existing, they cross with historicity.

Understanding Capital is not that difficult. The philosophy of <nature> that he places as its basis is not at all different from that of the Manuscripts. But what he incorporated anew as an axis of study was a philosophy of <history> that posited history as a process of natural history. And he faced his greatest difficulty in finding the means to connect the philosophy of history, as a study of <natural> history, with the philosophy of <nature> that constituted his own subjective position. If people were to stumble, it lies in the following secret: although human being as <nature> is on this side, as soon as he makes his approach as <labor> (working) to the objective world of <nature>, does <value> appear on the other side, in other words, as a representation of processed <nature> (commodity). It is at this point that the concept of <alienation> in the Manuscripts crosses with the concept of <value> in Capital and they connect with each other. If nothing is understood other than this, no one should lack anything in understating Capital when he puts it into his own hands.
Marx’s philosophy of <nature> as a relationship between human beings and <nature> and his philosophy of <history> that posits history as a process of natural history were subsequently formulated in such forms as dialectical materialism and historical materialism by bad interpreters. In other words, they transformed them into Russian <Marx>ism. But they appear to have completely failed to understand the frightfulness of Marx’s <philosophy>, which utterly dissolves into <nature> <human beings> and <society> that they formed irrespective of their desire. Even when they gather together en masse, <Marx>ists who do not know that the center of all philosophy contains such frightfulness only build layer after layer of hermeneutics, in other words, scholarly scraps.

Where does Marx’s philosophy of pan-<nature> terminate? We can enumerate the conditions for it but now is surely not the time to make prediction and digression. A not so faithful sketch of his theory should end here.

Frau Marx died on December 2, 1881. The cause of her death was cancer. This woman lived a life amidst poverty and deaths of her young children, dealing with those who were mostly political scums, a life of defamation, disaffection, unceasing repression from all European authorities, and exile, all whose strains had shifted onto her.

Not that such wounds ever heal completely, and certainly not in a mother’s heart, but gradually one recovers one’s receptivity and even one’s sensitiveness for new sufferings and new pleasures, and one lives on and on with a broken, but still hopeful heart until finally it is stilled for ever and eternal peace is there.43

Just as she wrote to Sorge, eternal peace visited her.

43 Quoted in Mehring, Karl Marx, 527.
Marx was “doubly crippled, morally because of the loss of [his] wife, and physically because of a thickening of the pleura and a greater irritation of the trachea windpipe” and lived for another year and some months but, on March 14, 1883, “had been left alone for scarcely two minutes, and when we came back we found him in his armchair, peacefully gone to sleep -- but for ever”. (Engels)\(^\text{44}\)

A master died, a master whom anyone has to recognize as the world’s greatest thinker over several centuries.

Near the end of his twenties, he had created a systematic philosophy on top of a unique philosophy of \textit{<nature>}, with a law that penetrated the structure of civil society, the structure of the state as the alienated communality of that society and of its \textit{<law>} that made the state function politically, and \textit{<religion>} that is the source from whence \textit{<law>} derives, in other words, linking in their totality the concretely real society and the society produced by ideas. At its foundation was a philosophy of the relationship between human beings and their surrounding \textit{<nature>}, in which \textit{<labor>} (working) that human beings add to natural material is human objectification from the perspective of \textit{<nature>}, at which point human being is alienated from himself and is opposed to the object on which he himself had started to labor while \textit{<nature>} is also alienated from \textit{<nature>} by being humanized. Prior to him there was never a time when people possessed such a philosophy.

This philosophy taught us to study society on the basis of the structure of various relations of production. There he found forms that dominated many relations between the movement of capital and the nature of \textit{<labor>} through economic categories. His most

\(^{44}\) Padover, \textit{Letters of Karl Marx}, 348.
brilliant study derived from his insight of how <law> and <state> were abstracted as illusory communality from society and stood outside of society, how the state went into opposition with society through the universal power of <law>. And how at such moment inside society human beings’ private discrimination (class), concretely existing as status/ranking/occupation, enters directly in oppositional relationship with the political state that is his illusion, as a political class.

Later he remade this study into something macroscopic by incorporating a few axes positing that this study came as a result of several historical stages. He reached the conclusion that the remaining illusions are produced by human history that is formed as part of so-called natural history after going through stages in which society develops as productive society. This conclusion made him commit to economics until his late years and crystallize an immortal work that stands as the complete summation of classical economics and a guide to the subsequent world.

There is no need to lament the fact that he did not deal much with the general theory of illusoriness and ideas after *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law*. He spent his remaining time as a segregated intellect of the <Communist League> and <International Workingmen’s Association> (the International). He experienced the breakdown of the exiles’ group and the defeat of the workers’ movement that was symbolized by the defeat of the Paris Commune. On each of these occasions, he took care of the defeated warriors, advising them, becoming their intellect, and, for this, the very vanquished showered his entire person with anathema and defamation. The authorities of all Europe viewed him as an enemy. But, even in his isolation, he did not despair and immersed himself in study. He knew well the place to live and the place to die and also knew how to enjoy life in
poverty. In terms of his synthesizing power, humanity will find it hard to discover a comparable thinker now or in the future.

To study the history of humanity as a species by linking the $\alpha$ (alpha) and the $\omega$ (omega) suited his <taste>. If coincidence gave me an opportunity to summarily view his life as an individual, I may be permitted to link the $\alpha$ (alpha) and the $\omega$ (omega) of his life.

Once, when he was still a young poet, he wrote:

How so! I plunge, plunge without fail  
My blood-black saber into your soul.  
    That art God neither wants nor wists,  
    It leaps to the brain from Hell’s black mists.

Till heart’s bewitched, till senses reel:  
With Satan I have struck my deal.  
    He chalks the signs, beats time for me,  
    I play the death march fast and free.

I must play dark, I must play light,  
Till bowstrings break my heart outright.  
(Marx, “The Fiddler”)

(For the biographical facts in this text, I have consulted H. Lefebvre’s *Karl Marx*, E.H. Carr’s *Karl Marx*, Karl Kautsky’s *Karl Marx*, Franz Mehring’s *Karl Marx*, Engels’s *Karl Marx*, and other materials. I owe a great deal especially to Carr and Mehring. Let me make it clear that I myself take responsibility for the philosophical understanding of Marx presented here.)

Chronological Notes on Marx

Sources
I H. Lefebvre, Karl Marx
II E.H. Carr, Karl Marx
III Karl Kautsky, Karl Marx
IV Franz Mehring, Karl Marx
V Engels, Karl Marx

1818 (one year old)
I Karl Marx was born on May 5, 1818, as the third child among nine children.

II On May 5, 1818, at 2 a.m., Henriette gave birth to her second child and eldest son Karl.

IV Born in Trier on May 5, 1818.

1829 (twelve years old)
II Entered the “Gymnasium” in Trier.

1831 (fourteen years old)
II Hegel’s death.

1835 (eighteen years old)
I Was a student in a Trier high school until 1835.
   Entered Bonn University to study law at the end of this year.

II In October 1835 Marx entered Bonn University to study law and, a year later, transferred to Berlin University.

IV He graduated at a quite young age from the Gymnasium [humanities-oriented middle school] in the city of his birth. The graduation diploma is dated August 25, 1835. In 1835, David Strauss’s Life of Jesus.

1836 (nineteen years old)
I The <<Poets’ Club>> that Marx joined (he wrote poetry and seemed to want to dedicate his entire life to literature) was a gathering of the children of the liberal bourgeoisie. In the spring of 1836, an intense fight took place between these autonomous clubs and <<Borussia-Korps>>, an aristocratic, reactionary organization.
Karl Marx dueled one of the members of the <<Korps>> and received a wound above his left eye.

Engaged with Jenny von Westphalen (who was four years older). (According to Lefebvre, Marx was eighteen years old in 1836).

II A few German artisans living in Paris founded the “League of Just”. Blanqui was leading “The Society of the Seasons”, a French organization.

IV On October 22, 1836, Karl Marx was permitted to enter Berlin University.

1837 (twenty years old)
I Entered the Department of Law at Berlin University. (Described as nineteen years old).

II In September 1837, a long letter addressed to Jenny.

1838 (twenty-one years old)
II Death of his father, Heinrich Marx. (According to Carr, Marx was twenty years old).

1839 (twenty-two years old)
II In 1839 he made a collection of eighty folk songs from all nations and dedicated it to <sweet Jenny of my heart>. And in the beginning of 1841 two lyric poems under his name appeared in Berlin’s *Athenäum*.

1841 (twenty-four years old)
I On March 30, 1841, Marx received his diploma from Berlin University. And on April 15 he submitted his doctoral dissertation *Differences between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature* to Jena University.

II After receiving his degree from Jena, Marx returned to the Rhineland in the spring of 1841. In Trier he visited and paid his respects to his prospective mother-in-law and bride-to-be and departed in order to become a colleague of Bruno Bauer, who was then a lecturer at Bonn University.

In the summer of 1841, a group of “Young Hegelians” in Rhineland initiated an ambitious preparation to found a new daily paper. (<<Rhenish Newspaper>> will appear in 1842).

IV On April 15, 1841, on the basis of a dissertation that argued the *Differences between Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature*, he received in absentia a doctoral degree from Jena University.

1842 (twenty-five years old)
I Wrote an article on <<Prussian censorship>>. (Its publication was a year later in Switzerland).
On May 5, wrote an article on freedom of the press.

Around this time, he rejected even Edgar and Bruno Bauer brothers’ simple <<radicalism>>. He was trying to be one of the <<moderate liberals who took on the modest role of fighting for freedom within the constitutional framework>>.

II <<Rhenish Newspaper>> appeared for the first time on January 1, 1842. (In October, editor).

In autumn of 1842, when the period of military service was over, Engels departed on his father’s order to work at the firm of “Ermen and Engels”. En route, he visited the office of <<Rhenish Newspaper>>. And there he met Karl Marx for the first time -- this was in the latter part of November in 1842.

V In Cologne, Rhenish Newspaper was founded.

1843 (twenty-six years old)
I On January 4, due to the intervention of the tsar and the Russian ambassador, the newspaper was banned and its last issue was released on March 31.

The marriage of Karl Marx and Jenny von Westphalen took place at Kreuznach on June 23, 1843.

October, resided in Paris.

II And on June 12, “Karl Marx, Doctor of Philosophy, resident in Cologne” married “Johanna Bertha Julia Jenny von Westphalen, no occupation, resident in Kreuznach”.

The three years from 1843 to 1846 were an extremely important period for his philosophical development.

Resuscitation of “League of the Just”, Ewerbeck.

Karl Grün, leader of the “True Socialists”.

In November, migrated to Paris.

V Marx married Jenny von Westphalen that summer and then moved to Paris.

1844 (twenty-seven years old)
I Marx published the first issue of the German-French Yearbook in February 1844. <<On the Jewish Question>> appeared here.

Weitling founded the <<League of Just>>.
II Marx’s only primary contribution in the *German-French Yearbook* was an article on Hegel’s *Philosophy of Law*.

The joint January-February issue was published in the beginning of March 1844.

After being successively expelled by the police from Germany and Switzerland, Bakunin arrived in Paris in July 1844, full of unmeasured passion and missionary zeal, waving the flag of “Hegel and revolution”.

1845 (twenty-eight years old)
I March 1845, <<Theses on Feuerbach>>.

September 1845 -- August 1846, *The German Ideology*.

IV Spring 1845, Engels also came to Brussels and the two friends went on a trip of collaborative research to England for six weeks.

V In the spring of 1845, the Prussian authority vented its spite by convincing the Guizot inner cabinet to give this criminal an order of expulsion.

1846 (twenty-nine years old)
I On March 30, 1846, an important meeting of the Brussels Committee took place. Both Marx and Engels were in attendance.

In Brussels, Paris, and Germany, Marx organized the <<Communist Correspondence Committee>> that maintained communication with the <<German Workers Committee>> in London.

1847 (thirty years old)
I “Communist League”, June 1, 1847.

The second congress, Paris branch representative Engels, Brussels representative Marx

Marx came to London to also attend the congress of <<Friends of Democracy>> that was held on November 19, 1847, as a representative of the <<Brussels Democratic Association>>. The next day the communist congress was held.

V In 1847, as soon as he and his colleagues joined the “Communist League”, which has already existed for several years as a secret society, he became even more actively involved in the revolutionary movement.

1848 (thirty-one years old)
I The influence of Brussels’s “study circle”, which Marx energized, increased rapidly in these years.
(According to Lefebvre, he turned thirty-one-years old).

In January 1848 the democrats rose up in southern Italy.

Publication of The Communist Manifesto.

Marx arrived in Paris that was in the midst of revolutionary romanticism and intoxication (March 1848).

Marx founded the “Cologne Democratic Association”. The first issue of its newsletter New Rhenish Newspaper came out on June 1, 1848. Marx proclaimed the dissolution of the “Communist League”.

II The revolutionary wave spread across Western Europe, making 1848 the most memorable year in European history since 1815.

V June 1848 -- May 19, 1849, New Rhenish Newspaper published.

1849 (thirty-two years old)

I In May the German revolution undertook its last attempt.

Dresden revolted (it is a well-known fact that Richard Wagner was one of its fighters), alongside the workers in Pfarz, principality of Baden, and Erbfert. The Prussian government organized its most trustworthy army in Cologne. On May 16, 1849, Marx received notice of an expulsion order. On May 18, the last issue of the New Rhenish Newspaper was published in red ink.

August 29, 1849, arrived in London from Paris.

II In August or September 1849, he made London his permanent residence. Two, three weeks later, his family also came.

In the autumn of 1849, the newly arrived Marx family settled in a furnished rented house in a suburb where people of first rank in Camberwell were living. By now there were three children -- five-year-old Jenny named after her mother, four-year-old Laura, and two-year-old Edgar. And, one month after their arrival, another son, Guido, was born. Housemaid Helene Demuth, nicknamed Lenchen, was the only employee.

1850 (thirty-three years old)

I In March an important address was drafted under the signature of the League’s Central Committee (Marx, Engels, Bauer, Eccarius, Pfänder, Schapper).

In April, the <<International Revolutionary Communist Association>> was founded.

In September 15, 1850, a break occurred between Marx and Willich. After the break, Marx withdrew from the activity of the <<Communist League>>.
Dissolved the <<International Association>>.

II In April or May of 1850, when Jenny Marx was still doing her best to suckle her sick child despite becoming haggard from poverty and mental anguish, there was a distraint because of unpaid rent. A bailiff came and seized their property. The merchants’ bills were presented with impunity. Marx’s few belongings, everything from bedclothes to furniture to the baby’s crib, were all seized and sold, and the family was ruthlessly thrown out on the streets.

IV Dated March 1850, the Central Committee address, which Marx and Engels drafted and which Heinrich Bauer as an emissary brought to Germany, stipulated the reconstruction of the Communist League.

1851 (thirty-four years old)
I From the beginning of 1851 Marx and Engels were almost completely in a state of isolation.

II He wrote in the summer of 1851 that he was “sitting generally from nine till seven in the British Museum” and immersed himself in the “confounded ramifications” of economics.

1852 (thirty-five years old)
I A few years after 1852 were the most difficult ones in Karl Marx’s life. Contributions to the New York Tribune (August 1851 -- November 1852). Although under Marx’s byline, they were really written by Engels.

Although he obtained an income of one or two pounds from these articles, this did not ameliorate his poverty. After being driven away from their residence, Marx’s family -- of seven people -- were forced to live in two small rooms in London’s poorest district Soho. There the spread of transmittable diseases was worse than anywhere else. Three children died… If Engels did not come to their aid, Marx and his family would have most likely starved to death. Engels entered a textile mill as an employee under his father’s management and, thereafter, decided to send the larger portion of his income to his friend [Marx]. Marx sometimes could not go out because he borrowed money by pawning his clothes.

1853 (thirty-six years old)
I A war between Prussia and Russia [sic].

1857 (forty-years old)
IV Bakunin was sent to Siberia from Peter Paul Fort in 1857, but in 1861 he successfully escaped there and went to London via Japan and the United States.

46 It is not clear what this "war" is referring to, for -- as Prof. Michael Jakobson kindly reminded me -- there was no war between the two nations in 1853. It could very well be an erroneous reference to the beginning of the Crimean War, but, without Henri Lefebvre's biography on Marx at hand (Yoshimoto's source), it is impossible to say for sure.
1858 (forty-one years old)
II 1858 -- 1859 winter marked a period by Marx getting out from his status of quiet withdrawal that he kept for the last three, four years.

IV Around the Christmas of 1858 his family took on an unprecedentedly bleak, despairing aspect.

1859 (forty-two years old)
I A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy published.

1864 (forty-seven years old)
I On September 28, the founding meeting of the “First International” (International Workingmen’s Association) was held in London’s <<St. Martin’s Hall>>.

1865 (forty-eight years old)
IV September 25-29, 1865. The International’s emergency meeting in London.

1866 (forty-nine years old)
IV From January 1866 to March 1867 Marx produced from this stupendous mass of material the first volume of Capital as an “artistic whole”.

1867 (fifty years old)
IV A little before the release of Capital Volume One, the International’s second meeting was held in Lausanne from September second to eighth in 1867.

Marx was the German Corresponding Secretary on the General Council.

V Capital published in Hamburg.

1868 (fifty-one years old)
IV The International’s third meeting was held in Brussels from September sixth to thirteenth in 1868.

1869 (fifty-two years old)
II 1869, the International’s Basel Congress.

As a result of a long and fierce debate, two opposing proposals were submitted to the Congress, one from Bakunin and his friends and the other from Eccarius representing the General Council. The former proposed the abolition of property inheritance while the latter argued that the abolition of property inheritance was a part of the general abolition of private property and therefore could not be treated as a separate objective.

IV In the annual meeting held on September fifth and sixth in 1869, the International undertook the review of its troops for the fifth year after its founding.
1870 (fifty-three years old)
II War between France and Prussia.

IV The International assumed the responsibility of the Paris Commune’s defeat and took care of the exiles.

1871 (fifty-four years old)
I Marx supported the declaration (March 18) of the Paris Commune National Army’s Central Committee.

On May 30 Marx wrote an “appeal” addressed to the Paris Commune.

1872 (fifty-five years old)
I September 2, “International Workingmen’s Association”, Hague Congress.

1873 (fifty-six years old)
IV Although his last decade has been dubbed a “slow death”, this is a great exaggeration. It is true that the struggles after the Commune did strike a challenging blow to his health. Namely, he developed a severe brain fever in the autumn of 1873 and faced the extreme danger of apoplexy.

1874 (fifty-seven years old)
IV Following Gumpert’s advice, Marx decided to go to Carlsbad in 1874 and he also went there the year after.

1875 (fifty-eight years old)
I The Gotha Congress was held on May 22, 1875.

1876 (fifty-nine years old)
IV On July 1 Bakunin died in Berlin.

1877 (sixty years old)
IV In order to change his mood, he chose Neuenahr in 1877. And, because of the two cases of assassination attempt at the German emperor and the associated persecution of socialists, he could not go to the continent in 1878. Anyway, the fact that he recuperated for three times in Carlsbad had an especially “miraculous” effect on his body, making the kidney disease that afflicted him for a long time disappear almost completely. His congenital liver problems and nervous breakdown manifested in the form of headaches and, on many occasions, insomnia.

1881 (sixty-four years old)
IV Frau Marx died on December 2, 1881.

1883 (sixty-six years old)
I Marx’s late years were bleak because of mourning and illness. His wife passed away on December 2, 1881, and his daughter Jenny Longuet passed away in the
beginning of 1883. In the same year he also passed away and was buried in Highgate Cemetery.

IV At midday on March 14, Karl Marx peacefully and painlessly entered into eternal sleep while lying deeply in an armchair.

March 17 was a Saturday, and Karl Marx was buried next to his wife. The family members skillfully declined “all rituals” that, had he lived, this man would have flatly refused. Only a handful of people who were loyal to him gathered at the burial site. That is, besides Engels, Lessner and Lochner, the old comrades since the days of the Communist League. Lafargue and Longuet came from France and Liebknecht from Germany. Two first-class scholars, the chemist Schorlemmer and the biologist Ray Lankester, represented the scientists.
One Afterthought

The two periods in which I rather fervently devoted myself to Marx’s work were three, four years after the defeat of the war and a few years ago. They are separated by the duration of a little over ten years. In each period after reading Marx, I publicized some afterthoughts and criticisms.

What does Marx do for me now? When I ask that question to myself, various replies are revived. During the period some time after the defeat of the war, amazement in encountering for the first time an unknown world was stronger. A few years ago the necessity of rescuing Marx was stronger. Rescuing Marx means rescuing him from the embraced suicide of the classical left that is on the verge of collapse twenty years after the war. My feeling was that, although they will die, they will die holding only the false image of Marx, and Marx’s real image was too uncultivated for Marx to die with them.

In the past I became tense in relation to Marx because his was a world that had been completely unknown to me. This time I was tense because I thought that, if I could not rescue it, this world would collapse completely in philosophical terms for me. I was surprised that even now I could not find basically any flaw in Marx’s work. In short, I was surprised by Marx’s potency. But, unlike in the past, I had become able to see considerably what Marx did and could not do. The thought of what I philosophically should do remains and the thought of “that’s not it” to anybody’s past or still-existing
understanding of Marx flows at the bottom of this book. It has been my secret wish to
publish this from our publisher.

A note on the content of this book: “Travel in Marx” was serialized in *Library News [Tosho Shinbun]* and “Marx Biography” was published as “Karl Marx” in *Intellectuals of the World [Sekai no chishikijin] (People who Moved the Twentieth Century 1 [20-seiki o ugokashita hitobioto 1])* (Kodan Publisher), both revised with additional writing. Although “Chronological Notes on Marx” originally came about as *Chronological Notes for Biographical Writing* as a personal aid for work, I have excerpted the purely chronological portions from these *Notes* as an original text and tacked it up at the end as a reference.

Yoshimoto Taka’aki
September 1966
In 1964 when the poet and critic Yoshimoto Taka’aki -- at the time known more by the phonetic reading of his first name, as Yoshimoto Ryûmei -- wrote his two texts on Marx ("Travel in Marx" and "Marx Biography"), his influence was spreading widely as the leading intellectual voice of the Japanese New Left. By then Shikō, the journal he had co-founded and edited in the aftermath of the collapse of the 1960 anti-Anpo (U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty) movement, was becoming a formidable presence as a fortress of radical intellectual, political, and literary autonomy (jiritsu) from the orthodoxy of all leftwing ideologies, including those reviving in the form of sectarian currents within the New Left. As the decade progressed and his major theoretical treatises and fierce polemics were printed on the pages of Shikō with breathlessly concentrated energy, it became virtually de jure for student radicals to carry and read Yoshimoto’s books, alongside those of Jean-Paul Sartre and Herbert Marcuse. The novelist Mishima Yukio went so far as to write in a blurb for Yoshimoto’s Reflection and Mirror, a collection of essays and poems which also appeared in 1964: “I clearly became a fan of Mr.
Yoshimoto since the *End of the Fictional System*, and I have rarely encountered a criticism that made me feel a kind of sexual excitement as I read it…”

“Travel in Marx” was serialized on the pages of *Tosho shinbun* (*Library News*) from July 18 to August 29 and “Marx Biography” was published in the first volume in a book series on the world’s great intellectuals edited by two leading progressive thinkers, Hisano Osamu and Tsurumi Shunsuke. In the previous three years Yoshimoto had collaborated in organizing and lecturing at the “Autonomy School” (*jiritsu gakkō*), a project initiated by the militant coalmine organizer and poet Tanigawa Gan (a fellow cofounder of *Shikō*). His seminal critique of the leading progressive liberal political scientist Maruyama Masao -- who played a major role in defining the discourse of postwar Japanese democracy -- appeared the year before, along with polemical exchanges over the question of “politics and literature” with Takei Teruo, who had been the first chief committeeman of the Zengakuren (the national Japanese student union that organized the most militant actions during the Anpo struggle) and with whom Yoshimoto coauthored a book on Japanese writers’ war responsibility (*sensō sekinin*) in 1956. He was on the last leg of completing his first major theoretical work -- *Gengo ni totte bi to*...
wa nanika (What Is Beauty for Language) -- which was serialized in Shikō and which developed a distinctive theory of Japanese linguistic expression. 1964 was also the year in which Yoshimoto put his name among thirteen signatories alongside of Tanigawa Gan, novelist Haniya Yutaka, Trotskyist theoretician Kuroda Kan’ichi, and editor Iwabuchi Gorō on a proclamation entitled “Warning and Protest to Not Reverse the Freedom of Speech” in response to the way in which Japanese Library News (Nihon dokusho shinbun) handled the Associations of the Great Japanese Patriot Organizations’ demand for apology and cessation of publication when the periodical printed an anonymous column on the media treatment of marriage in the imperial household. Not least importantly, his second daughter (Mahoko, who later become an internationally renowned, award-winning novelist under the pen name of Yoshimoto Banana) was born.⁵⁰

As Yoshimoto was immersing himself in the flurry of such activities and events, the Zengakuren, the central organization of the Japanese New Left students (the first Japanese New Left, to be more precise), was in fragmentary shambles. Founded in 1948 and closely allied with the Japanese Communist Party (JCP), it repeatedly found its political militancy and activities constrained by JCP policies in the following ten years. The relationship between the Zengakuren and JCP finally fractured irreparably in the wake of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, as the student militants actively participated in the three major domestic struggles of the period: against militarization (expansion of U.S. military bases in Sunagawa City, Tokyo and in Okinawa more generally), against atomic and hydrogen bomb testing (British testing of the bomb in the Christmas Islands), and against the

⁵⁰Yoshimoto Taka’aki zen-shishū, 1694-1697.
government’s attempt to impose productivity measures and ideological control among teachers (kinpyō). The Zengakuren and the JCP came to a decisive blow in 1958, when the main current of the Zengakuren students sought to intensify their activism under the rubric of their newly developing anti-imperialist, anti-Stalinist position and the JCP purged seventy-two dissident student leaders from party membership in order to bring the Zengakuren back into its fold. The students struck back by forming the Bund (Bunto)\(^1\), which became the ecumenical main current of the Zengakuren and whose first and last major political breakthrough was to radicalize the 1959-1960 Anpo movement into a virtual confrontation with the Japanese state and to unreservedly reject the JCP as the revolutionary vanguard of the working class.\(^2\) Yoshimoto belonged to an extreme minority of intellectuals who actively supported the Bund (the majority, including the Communist and liberal postwar democrats, denounced and dismissed the Zengakuren while trying to restrain the opposition against Anpo within narrowly nationalist and constitutionalist framework). In later years Yoshimoto noted that he was dubbed the “secondary wife” fellow-traveling intellectual to the Bund (the first was Shimizu Ikutarō, sociologist and translator of Georg Simmel, E.H. Carr, and John Dewey).\(^3\) Soon after the Anpo demonstration, as it often happens to organically constituted self-organizations in the wake of a movement’s defeat, the Bund broke up into pieces: at the sixteenth Zengakuren Congress held on July 4, 1960, the organization had a three-way split into Senki-ha (Battle Flag Faction), Puroretariā tô-tsūshin-ha (Proletarian Correspondence

\(^{1}\) The full organizational name for Bunto was Kyosanshugisha dōmei (League of Communists). Its rival, though equally anti-Stalinist (that is, anti-JCP) current, was the Kakumeiteki kyosanshugisha dōmei (League of Revolutionary Communists), which was more ideologically rigid along Trotskyist line.

\(^{2}\) Takagi Masayuki, Zengakuren to zenkyōō: sengo-gakusei-undō no kīseki (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1985), 37-44.

\(^{3}\) Yoshimoto Taka’aki, Isho (Tokyo: Kadokawa Haruki jimusho, 1997), 192-193. Shimizu was a leading peace activist and postwar democrat prior to Anpo; subsequently, in the 1970s, however he made a rightward turn and proceeded to defend the emperor system and nuclear armament.
Faction), *Kakumei-no-tsūtatsu-ha* (Revolutionary Communication Faction), which also quickly disintegrated and got absorbed into the *Kakukyodō zenkokui* (National Committee of Revolutionary Community, the most dominant Trotskyist current at the time). The ensuing fractious internal struggle for power among other sectarian tendencies soon brokered a period of three-faction Zengakuren by the mid-1950s. The last valiant effort among students to resuscitate the Bund’s non-sectarian radical energy of autonomy outside the non-Marxist-Leninist framework was *Shagakudō* (League of Socialist Students)’s Kyoto-based magazine *Sect No. 6*, which dissolved after a couple of years.54

The organizationally fragmented night of the first New Left had reached a point of no return.

Hence “Travel in Marx” and “Marx Biography” -- which were published in 1966 as *Karl Marx* in a single volume -- form a significant theoretical stocktaking for Yoshimoto amidst the first Japanese New Left’s fragmentation in the aftermath of defeat. It is not hard to imagine that the defeat of the 1848 Revolution that led Marx to retreat into his all-consuming theoretical studies of political economy was uppermost in Yoshimoto’s mind as he was critically reconsidering the intellectual and contemporary significance of Marx’s work (in fact, Yoshimoto emphasizes this decisive moment of transition in Marx’s life in his biographical essay). As he was running through the arduous gauntlet of his own ambitious theoretical project (after he completed the serialization of *What Is Beauty for Language* in 1965, he would simultaneously write his *Phenomenological Theory of the Mind* and *Communal Illusion* in the latter half of the 1960s) and trying to further develop a political space for an autonomous, non-sectarian radicalism which had emerged in the 1960 mass anti-Anpo movement, Yoshimoto

54 Takagi, 60, 69-70.
returned to his philosophical and political origin (Marx’s writings) in postwar Japan.

These two essays on Marx thus afforded Yoshimoto an opportunity to clarify what he had learned from Marx, whom he judged to be “the greatest thinker to have appeared in several centuries”, and take note of his own development since he had first read him in his early twenties.

**Reading Marx through the *Taishū***

Just as there are traces of biographical and historical determinations left on the genetic code, so to speak, of writing, so there are such traces found in the act of reading. Nowhere has this been truer than in the act of reading Marx. In the context of postwar Japanese leftwing politics, especially across the new political horizon of radical thought and action made possible by the New Left’s emergence as a movement in 1960, the content of such a reading demonstrated the place where one stood politically and intellectually. Even the minority of rightwing students who were busily fighting the majority of the New Left militants felt keenly the necessity of reading Marx. Suzuki Kunio, one of the contemporary New Right’s opinion leaders, offers a telling reminiscence:

> Around that time, I debated and fought every day with those in the Zenkyōtō [major organization of the second New Left students, known for their confrontational direct action and university occupation] on the Waseda University campus. It was thirty-five years ago. I was sorrowfully determined to protect the university, to protect Japan from the crisis of revolution…

> But they also occasionally said good things in their agitational speeches. Such as “We are alienated. We are not treated as human beings. Industry does not require as ‘humans’ but as ‘parts’”; “That’s why we oppose the policy of cooperation between university and industry. Defend the freedom of the university!” This moved me. Did Marx also say this? If so, I thought to myself, I needed to read him. As one of our seniors, Mr. Tamazawa Tokuichirō (currently, a diet member) also came
to support us rightwing students. He spoke at length about how erroneous Marxism was. So let’s read it in the original, I thought. I wanted to know the <ringleader> who made them mobilize to that degree. Among the rightwing students there was also a guy who had acquired the complete works of Marx and Lenin and was reading them. He told me, ‘You can’t fight the enemy without understanding him. Isn’t that so?’ And Marx, Lenin, Trotsky, Yoshimoto Taka’aki came up in daily conversations among the students. I thought, goddamn it, I have to read them so I can follow this. Students today would become agitated by not watching trendy TV dramas because they wouldn’t be able to follow conversation among their friends. It was the same feeling. So, out of stubbornness, vanity, and obligation, I read Marx.55

Marx study groups sprouted everywhere in universities and communities, in coffee shops and behind university barricades. Alongside of reading Marx’s original writings, many avidly absorbed the contemporary interpretations of Marx, which effectively influenced the politically charged, theoretically unstable climate of New Left thought. Among these interpretations, some of the most signal ones included Uno Kozô’s scientific approach to Marxist economics, Kakeashi Akihde’s reading of Capital as a philosophy of logic, Hiromatsu Wataru’s philologically meticulous view of Engels as the formative theorist of historical materialism and communism, Kuroda Kan’ichi’s Trotskyist interpretation, Iwata Hiroshi’s “world capitalism theory” that critically combined Unoist economics with neo-Leninist theory of imperialism, and Yoshimoto’s reading. What distinguished Yoshimoto’s approach from these domestic -- as well as internationally inspired -- views of Marx was his utter refusal of sectarianism (tōha-sei). Perhaps “refusal” is a mild term, for the political battle line he had publicly drawn since the mid-1950s against the Communist Party and the postwar democratic establishment derived from a relentlessly uncompromising spirit of combat.

But why combat sectarianism and to what end? In a sentence, because it had

55 Suzuki Kunio, “Marukusu was stātasu datta” [“Marx was Status”] in Imamura Hitoshi, ed., Marx (Tokyo: Sakuhinsha, 2001), 154-156.
nothing to do with the actual movement and consciousness of the taishū, because it mistook its ideological and intellectual purity for a privileged vanguardist vantage point to judge and organize the taishū whereas this illusion of vanguardism had its roots in the necessary alienation of intellectuals from the experience of the taishū.

Usually a major thinker’s ideas are reducible to a handful of keywords, a particular set of recurrent leitmotifs resonating throughout their work like dominant chords in a musical composition. In Yoshimoto’s case, one of the keywords is taishū no genzō, “original image of the taishū”. The term taishū can be translated variously as “people”, “masses”, “popular class”. Just as, according to Yoshimoto, the reading of the term “alienation” makes or breaks one’s understanding of Marx, the same can be said for taishū no genzō in the totality of Yoshimoto’s work. For example, American sociologist Lawrence Olson has produced one blatant example of a “broken” interpretation, that is, how not to understand the phrase:

His ideas about “the people”, which he said lay at the core of his thought, had no sustained political consequence. He built no system, proposed no special theory, but persistently exalted the notion of emotional solidarity between intellectuals and “ordinary” Japanese. Like the American poet Carl Sandburg, he proclaimed “the people, Yes!” He was a symptom of the pluralistic intellectual search for cultural identity that accompanied economic recovery and political confrontation in the postwar period, and especially in the decade 1955-65.56

...one felt that, by design, his “people” remained metaphysical to a degree, more idea than reality, or, rather, seen by him to be more real as idea than as fact. This tendency to idealize them, which Yoshimoto readily admitted, was attributed by Maruyama to Yoshimoto's literary vocation as well as to his despair over the masses in defeat in 1945. With no personal experience of the evolution of prewar thought, Yoshimoto's own intellectual pilgrimage had taken him from conventional chauvinism to a

shocked desire to identify, not with a class-conscious proletariat but with a
romantic image of the masses.\textsuperscript{57}

We find in these two representative passages from Olson’s essay on Yoshimoto all the
diagnostic reflexes of a professional sociologist who rapidly ensnares whatever ideas he
finds flying across his path with an overused net of ideological presuppositions and
mechanically shove them into a bottle full of classificatory cyanide. Sandburgian
exaltation of emotional solidarity with the people, metaphysical idealization,
identification with a “romantic image of the masses”, all attributed to “a symptom of the
pluralistic intellectual search for cultural identity that accompanied economic recovery
and political confrontation in the postwar period”: had Olson had not long served as an
academic attaché for the United States State Department, we might have mistaken these
egregiously distorted and erroneous representations of Yoshimoto’s \textit{taishū no genzō} as a
piece of vulgar Marxist economic reductionism (all metaphysical idealization of the
masses in the superstructure resulting from the economic base of “economic recovery”).
Indeed Olson’s interview with Yoshimoto -- which is the basis of the chapter from which
the above excerpts are taken -- is an exemplary case of an essentially third-rate Orientalist
scholar trying to force-feed what he does not understand (or rather does not make the
minimal effort to understand) about Japanese intellectual life through the meat-grinder of
his intellectual condescension (the irony is that Yoshimoto warns against such a reading
in the interview).\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 110.
\textsuperscript{58} The interview is collected in \textit{Yoshimoto Taka'aki zentaidanshū}, vol. 12 (Tokyo: Seidosha, 1989), 448-
477. The other reigning misconception among the still-scant references to Yoshimoto made in Anglophone
scholarship is the characterization of Yoshimoto as a “folk” communalist. See, for example, Tetsuo Najita
and H.D. Harootunian’s “Japan’s Revolt against the West” in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, ed., \textit{Modern
Japanese Thought} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 271:
Yoshimoto’s taishū is not exactly the proletariat or the working class, for it is not an occupational category and is not premised on the material relationship to the means of production. Nor is it the “people” in the vague, populist sense of the word. We should remind ourselves that there are several distinct words in the Japanese language that are all translatable as “people” but carry very precise and different connotations: e.g., kokumin (literally, “national people” or “people of the nation”), jinmin (people in the legal, constitutional sense), shimin (citizens), shomin (plebs), gunshū (crowds), etc. Taishū carries with it a sense of the unorganized, unformed, almost inchoate “people” who are not reified, intellectualized, or grouped into a particular category, sociological, ideological, or otherwise. It is the “people” in their subsistent, everyday context, immersed in the immediacy of day-to-day living. In a lecture on “Marx and Contemporary Times” he delivered in 1967, Yoshimoto explained the original image of the taishū that could lay the basis of an “antiestablishment communality” against the

Yoshimoto Ryūmei or Takaaki (1924- ) and Irokawa Daikichi (1925- ) appropriated Yanagida to anticipate the state and became leaders of local protest movements demanding bureaucratic accountability in such vital issues as ecological pollution and the apparent elimination of regional self-governance. Yoshimoto, perhaps the most powerful theorist of this resuscitated ideal of community, hoped to transmute the state into a structureless entity occupied by a folk held together by mutual respect and affection. Yes this concentration on the community opened the way for a renewed emphasis on particularism and cultural exceptionalism.

This is utter nonsense spouted with a subtler tone of scholarly precision and particularly shameful as they come from two of the leading historians of Japan. The description regarding local protest movements demanding bureaucratic accountability, etc., certainly fit the social historian Irokawa’s activism with the victims of the Minamata pollution and his effort to organize a regionalist “people’s history”, but Yoshimoto has been critical of both ecological and regionalist politics that do not engage respectively the nature of science and the communal illusion of the state (indeed Yoshimoto views Irokawa as part of the genealogy of progressive postwar democrats and citizen movement activists, who have in the main constituted his political opponents). Moreover, one would have thought that even the most cursory glance at Yoshimoto’s major work on Communal Illusion and the profuse commentaries and writings on the subject he has left elsewhere would demonstrate that it is not the “folk community” as a restructured state Yoshimoto is advocating but the critical analysis of the state to create this illusion, namely the communal illusion of the state. Such a characterization is tantamount to labeling Marx a “bourgeois” or “capitalist” thinker because he spent most of his life writing about bourgeois political economy and Victorian capitalism. Even J. Victor Koschmann, who generally has an accurate understanding of the subject, has designated Yoshimoto as an exponent of “left-wing nationalism”: “Intellectuals and Politics”, 411-412.
communal illusion of the existing state: “when we think of the taishū not as the taishū who have some kind of philosophy or ideology but, abstracting them considerably, the taishū who have none of this, that is, taishū who are abstracted to the degree that they have no particular sense of being dominated by the state even if they are, if we unceasingly channel as philosophy or ideology the problem consciousness, the problematic of such a taishū, then perhaps we can form an antiestablishment communality”. Perhaps the most approximate literary analogy to Yoshimoto’s concept of the taishū is Bertolt Brecht’s characterization of Mother Courage, who is bent on survival at any cost through the Seven Years’ War and, while showing no interest in opposing the war that takes the lives of her children, still possesses profound demotic wisdom wrested from her experience of complete immersion in the struggle for subsistence.

Yoshimoto considered any revolutionary philosophy or ideology that did not draw the fund of its energy from such an original image of the taishū as bound at best for baseless utopian aspirations divorced from the actuality of the taishū’s lives or at worst for the reproduction of repressive bureaucratic power. This is the meaning of Yoshimoto’s intellectual self-designation in an oft-quoted passage in “Self-Annotation on the Past”, published a month before “Travel in Marx” started to be serialized:

No matter how trivial, the trajectory of all intellectual experience is not to be thrown away or concealed. It exists to be synthesized and superseded. If I have an intellectual method, in contrast to the ideologues of the world who believe that they have acquired their realistic “position” by throwing away and concealing the philosophy of their experience, it lies in the fact that I have not thrown mine away but synthesized it. Inevitably this sometimes keeps apart the intellectual speculations of the world’s ideologues from my intellectual contribution to the point of infinite distance and at other times close to each other within a point-blank range. They sway according to “position” and I sway only according to reality. When I sense within myself a foundation for an unequaled philosophy of the age, they become a name for an annihilated “position”. When they
emphasize this “position”, I appear as a solitary figure. But, of course, I am the one who is more of the shapeless organizer, the shapeless majority, and resolute “reality” itself.\(^5^9\)

To my knowledge, Yoshimoto is the only intellectual -- in Japan or anywhere else -- who has taken this concept of the *taishū* as the grounding of his entire intellectual and theoretical project, pushing it as far as it would go. There are unquestionably many types of populist or radical intellectuals who express solidarity with the working class or, to use a sociologically rarefied term, the underprivileged sector of the population. But what Yoshimoto calls the “ideologues of the world” are precisely intellectuals who exercise this type of one-way solidarity, positing themselves as a distinct group capable of enlightening the masses or of raising correct class consciousness among workers. The social historian E.P. Thompson, in many ways the British New Left’s counterpart to Yoshimoto, summed up the problem this way:

“*It*, the working class, is assumed to have a real existence, which can be defined almost mathematically -- so many men who stand in a certain relation to the means of production. Once this is assumed it becomes possible to deduce the class-consciousness which “*it*” ought to have (but seldom does have) if “*it*” was properly aware of its own position and real interests. There is a cultural superstructure, through which this recognition dawns in inefficient ways. These cultural “lags” and distortions are a nuisance, so that it is easy to pass from this to some of theory of substitution: the party, sect, or theorist, who disclose class-consciousness, not as it is, but as it ought to be.\(^6^0\)

Thompson went around this vanguardist fallacy of establishing a preconceived image of the working class by entering into the empirical reality of the self-formation of the English working class. Yoshimoto took a more existential route, making the experience of the *taishū* within himself the basis of his “intellectual trajectory”.

Hence in Yoshimoto’s case, there is a further -- for him essential -- addenda,

\(^{5^9}\) *Shoki nōto* (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 2006), 541.

which is that there is nothing inherently special or privileged about the intellectual process of acquiring knowledge and formulating analysis -- the intellectual’s very domain of activity -- because it is simply an ineluctable aspect of “nature”, that is, human nature considered in the context of natural history. In other words, scientific curiosities about the world and the cognitive act of abstraction are natural human endowments and when intellectuals (the vanguard) develop them to increasingly higher levels of sophistication, they are merely living out the inevitable process of natural history; where intellectuals (the vanguard) delude themselves is in confusing this natural process of alienation (between the actuality of subsistent life -- what Marx described in The German Ideology as the production and reproduction of the “means of subsistence” -- and their necessarily ever-abstracted intellectual activity) as the source of their higher class consciousness or intellectual awareness that enables them to enlighten and organize the masses. The alienation between intellectuals and the taishū is thus a necessary outcome in human history, and the former’s conviction in their capacity to enlighten or revolutionize the latter is the height of such inevitably self-alienated, illusory thinking. For Yoshimoto, the necessary step then is to practice intellectual activity on the basis of the experience of those who are excluded from it, namely the taishū, while entertaining no illusion that intellectual activity could be subordinated to the experience of the taishū or the taishū subordinated to intellectual activity (in short, they both possessed, in Yoshimoto’s term, jiritsu, i.e. “autonomy”).

The concept of “natural history” that frames Yoshimoto’s philosophy of intellectuality and experience is derived in part from Karl Marx’s seminal passage in the preface to the first edition of the first volume of Capital:
I do not by any means depict the capitalist and the landowner in rosy colours. But individuals are dealt with here only in so far as they are the personifications of economic categories, the bearers [Träger] of particular class-relations and interests. My standpoint, from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for the relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them.\textsuperscript{61}

As he notes in the 2006 paperback edition of \textit{Karl} Marx, Yoshimoto clearly reads this passage as a cautionary remark against the “petty sectarian” reading of Marx, to which Marxism has more often than not fallen prey. Hence the severe indictment he persistently places upon the feet of leftwing sectarians, be they the Old Left of postwar democrats and the Communist Party or the various New Left Marxist sects coming then to the foreground of the post-Anpo movement. Hence his sweeping dismissal of all Marxist traditions and their contemporary bearers. Hence his unbridled criticism of Marx when the latter had played the part of a sectarian politician in the International, despite Yoshimoto’s unswerving designation of Marx as the greatest thinker to have appeared in several centuries.

Yoshimoto views Marx’s trans-millenarian greatness to lie in the latter’s successful formation of an unprecedented philosophy of nature in 1843-44, a philosophy that radically reconceptualized “alienation” as a process of nature that necessarily enters into the making of human society and that is expressed most forcefully in the formation of religion, law, and state. Yoshimoto adduces this philosophy of nature to be the theoretical grounding of Marx’s application of “alienation” within the labor-process, that is, as an economic category of civil society in the \textit{Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts}. He also maintains that this theoretical grounding never left the building of

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Capital}, 92.
Marx’s later ideas, whose immense flowering appears in *Capital* twenty-three years later.

A few words of qualification and amplification may be in order to underscore the uniqueness of such a reading of Marx.

Here the continuity or discontinuity thesis that wracked Marxist debates at the time -- namely, the debate over the extent to which Marx’s early writings of 1843-44 are consistent or inconsistent with his later economic writings, the “humanist Marx” vs. the “scientific Marx” -- is dismissed completely. He views these debates as trivially beside the point because those involved in this debate fail to recognize -- due to their sectarian ideological preconceptions -- the historically unprecedented system Marx had created in 1843-44 and to grasp the shift of emphasis occurring in Marx’s ideas as simply biographical exigency through which all ideas are fated to pass. Yoshimoto shows nothing but impatience with this sort of Marxiological wrangling:

There is no need for us to be bothered by all sorts of pointless talk about how <class> and <alienation> are different from each other or are the same, how the early Marx and the late Marx are different from each other or are related to each other. For <alienation> emerges as the foundation of civil society in Marx’s philosophy of <nature>, in the humanization of nature and naturalization of human beings whose process is labor, and <class> emerges as a private class within civil society and as a concept of the political class in its relationship to the political state.

In other words, the Marxist ideologues have completely lost sight of the fact that Marx’s subsequent analysis of class struggle and economic categories is premised on “alienation” as a process of nature and that the latter’s manifestation in the workers’ alienation of their labor-power in civil society only assumes the basis of a politically constituted class when directly confronting the state, the secular bearer of religious “communal illusion” that divorced (alienated) human beings from themselves and mediated this rupture with the notion of God (law in the case of the secular state). All political activities, including
class struggle, take place within the realm of communal illusion, and failing to acknowledge this in social struggle results in political delusions regarding the imminence of revolution, belief in the inherent superiority of intellect over experience of subsistence, “disease of vanguardism”.

The biographical motif in Yoshimoto’s focus on the communal illusion of the state derives undoubtedly from his first and most devastating experience of defeat, the Japanese defeat in World War II. For he could only resolve his youthful struggle to find an existentially convincing reason to shore up his determination to die in the war, as many of his friends and classmates had no choice but to accept, in the communal illusion of the emperor (Yoshimoto comments that this was a decidedly working-class mind-set to assume, for those in the more affluent classes generally defined their motives in terms of their family or intellectual convictions or concealed their doubts in private letters and diaries). This defeat and those that followed laid the existential basis for Yoshimoto’s unremittingly anti-sectarian reading of Marx.

Structure and Experience of Defeat

If taishū is the positive experiential keyword for Yoshimoto’s philosophy, then its negative counterpart is haiboku (“defeat”). On June 10, 1970, at a political gathering sponsored by the Anti-Imperialist Front/League of Socialist Students at Meiji Gakuin University in Tokyo, Yoshimoto spoke on the “Structure of Defeat” and acknowledged three moments of defeat that defined his life. The first was the 1945 Japanese defeat in

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63 “Haiboku no kōzō” in Katari no umi Yoshimoto Taka’aki 1: Gensō to shite no kokka (Tokyo: Chuōkōronsha, 1995), 181.
World War II, the second was the defeat of his struggle to build a labor union, and the third was the defeat of the 1960 anti-Anpo movement.

The reason the two terms -- taishū and haiboku -- are inextricably bound up with each other in Yoshimoto’s thought is because the above three moments all signify in a different register the defeat of the taishū. In the first and personally most decisive defeat in the Pacific War, the taishū was defeated both militarily and politically, in fact virtually in every sense of the word. To Yoshimoto’s astonishment, the immediate aftermath of a popularly supported war for which the Japanese taishū had sacrificed their lives, including the near annihilation of the country’s urban centers (apart from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. B-52 had, for instance, virtually flattened the two major cities of Osaka and Tokyo into a Dresden-like apocalyptic firestorm -- in which incidentally the lives of Yoshimoto’s own boyhood tutor and his family were claimed as well) yielded no resistance, not even the slightest gesture of protest, against their former enemies. Instead they meekly accepted the unconditional surrender and went about scrounging for the day-to-day means for subsistence when starvation was a familiar sight in the streets. He also observed what he considered to be a slavish inversion in the factory where he had been working when the defeat was announced: the cluster of a few Korean co-workers who had whispered and kept to themselves in the corner during the war now started to act brashly in the open, speaking loudly in their native language; while the majority of the Japanese workers were now the ones whispering and keeping to themselves in the corner. Yoshimoto found this sight “unpleasant” for the slavishness of both the Japanese and Korean working class, whether
in their liberated or defeated condition. 64

Here Yoshimoto realized his fundamental mistake in having entertained the illusion of identifying the popular consciousness of the *taishū* with the state and neglecting the realm of everyday subsistence within which the *taishū* reside permanently. There was a brief period -- between the announcement of defeat and the commencement of the U.S. Occupation -- in which the Japanese state had effectively disintegrated, but no chaos or disorder ensued: the *taishū*, including Yoshimoto and his fellow workers, immersed themselves in the search for the daily bread and proved by deed that society was far larger and more enduring than the state. This latter fact constituted a vivid revelation for Yoshimoto. The final blow came at the beginning of the Occupation when he, as with many other Japanese, fled the city to avoid possible rape and pillage which they suspected would occur at the hands of the occupying U.S. soldiers and, when they returned, all they found was the relaxed and carefree behavior of the American GI’s, which utterly contradicted the image of *kichiku-beiei* (“American and English demonic beasts”) that the Japanese wartime propaganda disseminated. 65 Indeed he realized acutely that what Japan had undergone was not only a military defeat but also a political and moral one. For he found the very manner in which SCAP (Supreme Commander of Allied Powers) conducted themselves politically, publicizing and explaining at length the policies and reforms they were about to implement (the most impressive of which was, for Yoshimoto, land reform, which he thought even the Japanese Communist Party would never have dared on their own to go as far as SCAP did), was democratically far superior to the conduct of the Japanese wartime state.

64 Ibid., 181-183.
Never would Yoshimoto permit himself to be deluded by the “communal illusion” of the state, to subsume the experience of the *taishū* (or, in Marx’s roughly analogous term, civil society) under its religious aura. As a young working poet (in the literal sense, for Yoshimoto was a factory worker and his family came from a solidly working-class background -- his father built boats in the plebian area of downtown Tokyo), he thought he had a good grasp of human sensibility and interiority at the level of individual psychology. But when it came to politics, the nature of the state, the very realm where he found himself delusionally enthralled during the war like the rest of the Japanese *taishū*, he realized that he had met the greatest of his intellectual and existential defeats. And the only way he could overcome this defeat was to get at the fundamental reason for the delusion, to take on and thoroughly demystify the religious aura of the state. This theoretical project was thus not an intellectual curiosity in the abstract, an academic investigation, but a matter that concerned, as he saw it, the life or death of his whole intellectual life.

It might be understandable then why the Japanese postwar democrats and Communist Party -- quickly revived during the postwar period into a major ideological center of Japanese intellectual and political life -- could never appeal to Yoshimoto. These political forces were the ideological custodians of the new postwar democratic state and he could hardly accept their seamless transformation overnight from emperor-centered military statists to ardent democrats and Communists as anything other than an egregious failure on their part to confront their own “war responsibility”. He was especially not going to give any credence to the Japanese Communist Party, for he took issue with their dismissive characterization of the wartime Japanese *taishū* as
ideologically deluded puppets of military propaganda -- he considered the designation not only an abnegation of their own responsibility for the war (for many of the members, particularly the intellectuals and writers, actively wrote and engaged in pro-war propaganda) but also an abject betrayal of the *taishū*’s irreducible experiences. He also clearly saw the JCP as a purveyor of new myth of the state, singing praises to Stalin and the Russian Red Army as new forces of liberation, when he and many Japanese knew that the Red Army was committing atrocities against Japanese refugees returning from Manchuria and other areas of China formerly colonized by the Japanese. Later, at the height of the anti-Anpo struggle, Yoshimoto would welcome the emergence of the New Left students who fundamentally broke with the JCP and sought a direct confrontation with the Japanese state as a death-knell that sounded the “end of the myth of the vanguard” -- the ideological myth that the Communist Party represented the revolutionary vanguard of the working class.

**Toward the End of the Fictional System: Yoshimoto and Marx against the Communist Party**

Yoshimoto initiated his polemical battle with the JCP in 1955, two years after he became a labor union leader of *Rengō-kai* (literally, the “Associationists”) at the Toyō Ink Manufacturing Company and two years before he would quit the job on account of this union activism. The battle of ideas with the purported political organization of the working class was thus underwritten by the actuality of working-class struggle at the point of production.

Despite the postwar passage of laws protecting labor rights, Toyō Ink -- the second largest producer of printing ink at the time -- and many other smaller companies,

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66 Ibid., 59.
particularly the city factories (machikōba), violated them with impunity and their working conditions remained dangerous and wages below average. Despite his resolve to get not involved again in the labor movement after his bitter experiences in trying to organize at the machikōba where he had worked previously, he found himself again becoming out of necessity a union organizer at Toyō Ink. Yoshimoto was successful in forcing the company to agree to most of the labor standard laws, including the establishment of recreation facility with a bathing area and the general improvement of working conditions, but, when it came to the struggle over the wage, management put up an unbreakable resistance that led to Yoshimoto’s transfer and eventual resignation.67

His Verses of “Notes and Bills”, written in 1953-54, captures the energy and exhaustion of this period of class struggle.68 Even the titles of these poems alone encapsulate the soberly merciless mood of an impossible struggle undertaken under conditions of necessity: “Spring without Salvation”, “Song that Dies and Lives in Crisis”, “Song of Spring that Came When I Was Alone”, “Song of Subservience at Every Sundown”, “Despair Is Still Near”, “The Sun Moves Away”, “Harsh Judgment”, “Song of Death inside an Age”, “Season of Green and Time of Rust”, “Song of the Raining Season”, “Destruction Comes after the Night”, “Exile”, “Beyond Death”, and “To a Class Standing on Dangerous Ground”. The words “finance” and “finance capitalism” recur throughout these poems as if they were broken syllables wrested from the souls of the damned who are forced to labor in the bowels of a proletarian inferno: “The dark, one and only road/Road paved under finance and caterpillar tread of the fire of war/by the act of receiving them/I want to leave my will with all my words”; “In apocalypse two things

68 These poems were not published until 1975, as the second part of the Yoshimoto Taka’aki shin-shishū (New Poems of Yoshimoto Taka’aki).
are revealed/The unlimited march of finance’s caterpillar tread/that crushes the hopes of
human beings/and the human will to stop that/This is all/I meet on the streets”; “Going
through the raining season/the sharp conflict with finance runs at full speed/In the hidden
surrender/sky is reflected like purgatory/and a canal that that the landslide washed
away/passes over our shoulders”; “The dead who lay their corpses/inside the system
whose pathology is fully exposed/I cannot dedicate a poem of mourning to you/without
being hatefully enraged with/what sent you to your death,/the living hands and feet of
gigantic finance”; “Ah, one day in that season/We wander like dogs in front of the door
of the bank/In the mechanical noise of financial capitalism/Our forebodings are dark/
Waning and profuse growth promised by notes and bills are dark”. 69 This rage against
capital clearly echoes Marx’s reasoning on the mechanization of the labor-process and its
abstraction in the endless accumulation of finance capital.70

In the broken light my premonition sees
My life and my death forced into a can
The agony of buried human beings
Those who remain alive and their lonely symbol
If we can think of ourselves as one of the machines,
Our civilization is quite peaceful
The doors of the banks open and the faces of stocks and bonds disperse in
all directions
The reproduction and expansion of finance capitalism
The two eyes given to me
See with certitude what must be seen
You ax that tries to cut the metal chain
You season of soot-covered flowers.71

The coming struggle against the JCP was allegorically intimated in 1952 in

69 Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenshishū, 1574-1623.
70 Consider, for example, the following passage in the chapter on the machine in Capital, 548: “Factory
work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost; at the same time, it does away with the many-sided play
of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily and in intellectual activity. Even the
lightening of the labour becomes the instrument of torture, since the machine does not free the worker from
work, but rather deprives the work itself of all content”.
71 Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenshishū, 1580.
Yoshimoto’s *An Essay on the Book of Mathieu*, a critical adumbration of the struggle between Judaism and primitive Christianity through the prism of the New Testament author (he Gallicized the Biblical names to mark out the fact that he was not writing a religious commentary but offering a secular political and philosophical reading). This major essay was a product of Yoshimoto’s intense soul-searching in the immediate aftermath of the war, when all his erstwhile political beliefs and commitments had collapsed, plunging him into a state of nihilistic uncertainty. He read widely to take stock of his intellectual situation, including the Bible and Marx’s work (many years later in a reply to a survey, he would list the New Testament and Marx’s *Capital* as two of the three most influential books in his life -- the third one was the French peasant entomologist Jean Henri Fabre’s *Souvenirs Entomologiques*). He went so far as to briefly attend Christian churches, which struck him as being embarrassingly simple-minded as compared to the mercilessly rigorous ethics of the New Testament. *An Essay on the Book of Mathieu* was then Yoshimoto’s way of summing up what he had extracted from this period in his life, and the text’s place in Yoshimoto’s work is roughly analogous to the place of the 1843-44 writings in Marx’s oeuvre.

*An Essay on the Book of Mathieu* posits two notions that are essential in our understanding of Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx. One is the “absoluteness of relations” (*kankei no zettaisei*) and the other involves the three types of “fate” that ideas inevitably assume after their originator’s demise. The “absoluteness of relations” refers to the primacy of actually existing human relationships in determining ideas, as opposed to ideological formulations that put ideas first and determine human beings accordingly or, to put it Biblically, confuse that the Sabbath was made for man and not the other way
around. Here all sectarian conceptions of politics, class struggle, and revolution are pulverized to dust, for such conceptions function blindly as did the Pharisees’ fetishism of the Sabbath law:

Contemporary Christianity has the freedom to say to the poor and the alienated, we sympathize with you, aim to save you, and are in fact practicing this, we are on your side. For, if needs be, they can choose to do that with their free will. But regardless of their will, they can do nothing about the fact that within the absoluteness of relations they are in reality the defenders of order and assist the enemies of the poor and the alienated. In the absoluteness of relations the meaning of assistance freely leaves human sentiments and is made to transfer into the mechanism of totality.

In the form of an attack on the scholars of law and Pharisees, the author of Mathieu speaks about what sort of contradiction between relativity and absoluteness human beings, who must live within the order of reality, continue to live out. He is saying that philosophy never guarantees giving meaning to human life.

Human beings can believe in revolutionary philosophy as they cunningly pass through order and can loathe revolutionary philosophy as they are forced to defend poverty and irrational laws. This is because free will makes choices. But only absoluteness of relations determines human situations. Only when we try to cut off this contradiction, we gouge out the bottom of our conceptions. Our loneliness exists at that moment. Loneliness asks itself. What is revolution? If we cannot cut off the contradiction in human survival.

The author of Mathieu must have grasped this conception from the heavy pressure exerted by order and the blood-related conflict with Judaism. All primitive Christianity had to do was to defeat the Jewish sects with whatever conception at hand. Chapter fifty-nine, verse five, in the Book of Esaie says “They hatch cockatrice’ eggs, and weave the spider’s web: he that eateth of their eggs dieth, and that which is crushed breaketh out into a viper” — which is where the author of Mathieu acquired the idea for its expression of hatred in “Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers” against the Pharisees -- and if there is anything that justifies primitive Christianity’s violently aggressive pathos and dismal psychological hatred, there is no other means except with the assistance of the perspective of the absoluteness of relations.72

It is no accident then that in his book on Marx Yoshimoto underscores the aforementioned passage in the preface to the first edition of Capital where Marx notes

that his analysis concerns not the individual capitalist but “capital personified” and that his standpoint, “from which the development of the economic formation of society is viewed as a process of natural history, can less than any other make the individual responsible for the relations whose creature he remains, socially speaking, however much he may subjectively raise himself above them”. For the same concept of “absoluteness of relations” is being expressed there, namely that no class or ideology or person is inherently revolutionary or reactionary, that such determinations only arise from the actually existing relations in society and it is the “absoluteness” of these relations in reality which must inform our commitments. There is also an understanding in Yoshimoto’s *An Essay on the Book of Mathieu* that the struggle between ideas -- i.e., primitive Christianity and Judaism -- is above all an unrelenting struggle that directly reflects this “absoluteness of relations”. Yoshimoto seized this vantage point as a way of coming to terms with the slavish defeat of the *taishū* at the end of the war, whether in the liberated manner of the Korean workers or the defeated one of the Japanese -- that is, neither to denigrate them from a presumably superior ideological perspective (that is, to believe erroneously in the absoluteness of ideas, as do the Communists and other “ideologues of the world”) nor to complacently accept them.

In the immediate aftermath of his third defeat -- the anti-Anpo struggle -- Yoshimoto would chide those currents in the New Left who were entertaining revolutionary illusions and believed in an inherently revolutionary nature of the Japanese labor movement (one major current -- the Trotskyist *Kakukyodō*, League of Revolutionary Communists -- was for example calling for the construction of a new anti-Stalinist, anti-imperialist revolutionary political party). In a humorous imaginary
dialogue, he told his New Left student interlocutor:

“...There is no way that the Japanese worker, who is an adult in every sense, is ever going to eat up your “revolutionary Marxism”, is there? Those who are going to eat it up are only those of the same species. The Japanese labor movement is not as great as you fetishize it. First it is alienated by the progressive labor activist and then it is doubly alienated by the fact that this labor activist used to be a fascist leader of the Patriotic Industrial Movement [the official wartime labor organization]. And the Japanese workers have doubly undergone the experience of being slaves in the sense of having silently obeyed the absolute order of the emperor during the war and, after the war, having silently obeyed the policies of the existing party. Both have been convicted twice, so to speak. Why and how can you draw up a phantasm of these Japanese workers standing up autonomously? Those who have never despaired about this talk about “revolutionary Marxism” -- don’t make me laugh.

“In the Anpo struggle, which was called the greatest postwar struggle, I wanted to see even once the autonomous figure of the labor movement, a phantasm that could give us a glimpse of the future, even if it were merely a glint, but it was useless. I only saw the figure of pilgrims going to the Zenkōji Temple led by an ox.

“Don’t say that I’m doing nothing and just spreading despair. Ignorance has never prospered. In terms of experience, at least I know more about workers and the labor movement. The root of my despair has been there for over ten years”.

Yoshimoto goes on to admonish the “revolutionary Marxist” student that he is suffering from the “disease of vanguardism”, merely inheriting the ossified skeletal form of Leninist political organization, and quotes Jesus’s curse from the Gospel of Matthew on which he had commented seven years earlier:

“Lenin’s followers only receive the mere skeleton of the theory of organization that was desperate and necessary for Lenin. And they have produced degenerates who take the name of the vanguard. These are the figures of ‘Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye compass sea and land to make one proselyte, and when he is made, ye make him twofold the child of hell than yourselves’. The taishū who have died in battle are superior to the goddamned vanguard. The taishū who died in the Russian Revolution are greater than Lenin. You can’t save leaders and the vanguard without hating and hating them as they come inevitably into shape because there’s nothing else to be done. Those with power in capitalism are formed inevitably within self-interest and selfish

desire, and the revolutionary vanguard is formed in hating and hating it 
[the vanguard] because there’s nothing else to be done. This is the 
relationship between the vanguard’s affective foundation and the *taishū*.74

We have come full circle from Yoshimoto’s second defeat to his third and now back to 
the second again. His warning to the New Left student is surely underwritten by the 
defeat he had suffered at the Toyō ink factory as a labor organizer (which he became only 
out of necessity), just as it underwrote his combative criticism of the JCP, which had 
complacently carried the “disease of the vanguard” by merely reconstituting the Stalinist 
statist philosophy of “slavery” from the wartime emperor-statist philosophy of “slavery”. 
The “absoluteness of relations”: such ideological makeover did nothing more than 
conceal the same relationship of domination that state power imposes upon the *taishū*.

Yoshimoto certainly recognizes Lenin’s political genius for practical political 
organization (he has elsewhere referred to Lenin’s *Imperialism* as a “book of political 
philosophy by a genius practitioner”).75 However, the Achilles’s heel in Lenin’s 
organizational theory was its definition of class in strictly economic terms -- which 
Yoshimoto considered an inheritance from Engels’s *Origins of Family, Private Property, 
and State* -- whereas the fundamental basis of class relations lay in the alienation exacted 
by the communal illusion of the state, which primordially grounded the economic 
relations of the labor-process. The consequence of this conceptual flaw was the political 
theory and practice of the vanguard party:

So, if it is Lenin, the party or the vanguard party that Lenin conceived, the 
essence of this idea meant undoubtedly an existence that could 
unceasingly scoop up as its philosophical problem the *taishū* as an original 
image, which exists as the meaningfulness of silence.

However, what Lenin actualized was nothing like this; the party he 
actualized was only a gathering of the talkative *taishū*, the enlightened

74 Ibid., 84-85.
75 *Dokusho no hohō*, 19.
halfway taishū among a minority of ideological intellectuals. Because this party actualized by Lenin necessarily took this form, it had an element that could invert its relation to the taishū. In sum that is the fundamental problem of bureaucracy in Russia. This problem also appears in Lenin or Trotsky’s study on culture. The warning Lenin and Trotsky kept giving to so-called halfway ideologues, in other words, such haphazard progressive jobbers who release proclamations, was that they could never produce proletarian culture by cultivating it as pure culture within the political sect. They kept giving this warning. That is to say, the problem of why sectarian cultural theory made by seemingly very radical, so-called progressive men of culture or revolutionary men of culture is no good, and this is because proletarian culture flowers for the first time when the proletariat go culturally beyond humanity’s all cultural stages and cultural legacies which had developed until the capitalist system, something that will need an extremely long time requiring considerable patience. But nothing can be done about those who have gone crazy, and they have made self-rotations in utter disregard of such warnings, appearing in the form of such things as Proletkult, sectarian literature, and socialist realism.\footnote{Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenchosakushū, vol. 14, 211-212.}

The second key notion in An Essay on the Book of Mathieu has to do with the fate of ideas. In light of the “fate” that primitive Christianity underwent in the historical genealogy of ideas, Yoshimoto poses three distinct possibilities:

Christianity subsequently assumed three types in relation to the theme [as to “what kind of relativity human existence is to be exposed in the order or reality”] indicated by the Book of Mathieu. The first was the Luther type that showed the place of conscience by saying that the self was also nothing more than an irresolute existence swayed by reciprocal emotions; the second was the Thomas Aquinas type that, exactly like the legal scholars of the Pharisees whom the Book of Mathieu attacked, constituted order and resided there, not caring whether it was the first seat in the church or fusion with power; and the third was the Franciscan type that rejected becoming the Pharisees of the heart and actively became aliens from order. Human history changes the structure of its order according to its laws, but the type we can take to give meaning to human existence is one of these three types.\footnote{Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenchosakushū, vol. 4, 101-102.}

Although Yoshimoto never commented on how these three types of ideological development of ideas are applicable to the historical fate of Marxism and how he situated

\footnote{Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenchosakushū, vol. 14, 211-212.}
\footnote{Yoshimoto Taka’aki zenchosakushū, vol. 4, 101-102.}
himself in relation to them, we can advance some speculations. The orthodox Marxist-Leninist vanguardism of the JCP and a certain tendency among the New Left students most closely fit the Thomas Aquinas type, thirsting after domination over the working class and the seizure of state power at whatever cost. The ideological engineers of social democracy, such as the highly influential social scientist and economists’ group in the Japanese Socialist Party who formulated policies that advanced postwar economic growth often at the expense of workers’ rights, fit this category as well. Franciscan Marxists may apply to groups of anti-authoritarian, libertarian Marxists who have voluntarily “alienated” themselves from the main currents of Marxism and maintained a position of recalcitrant autonomy, from the council communists and anarcho-communists to Marxist humanists and autonomist Marxists. And finally the Marxists of the Lutheran type could conceivably apply to those who have determined their own agency and that of the working class as essentially irresolute and unreliable, easily swayed by the order of capitalist structure, which would include the Frankfurt School and other currents in Western Marxism.

As to where Yoshimoto can be placed within the continuum of this tripartite typology, would it be fair to place him somewhere between the Franciscan and Lutheran types? Without Yoshimoto’s own statement on the matter, this is nothing more than a speculative game, but I think it might be more accurate to say that he fits nowhere on the spectrum, for the running assumption here is that one is an adherent to a particular philosophy or idea (to Marxism in this case) and Yoshimoto has publicly declared that he is not a “Marxist” but a “Marx-person” (Marukusu-sha). By “Marx-person”, Yoshimoto

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meant that his aim was in attempting to do for his times what Marx did for his and that this was the only meaningful way for us to read Marx: “In the past I have not joined with progressive common sense and I have never thought of becoming a Marxist. There are times when I thought of becoming a Marx and, although even today I have not lost the issue of becoming in short a new Marx despite my inadequacy, I have rarely thought of becoming a Marxist. You may think, aren’t Marx and Marxism, that is, Marx’s thought and Marxism the same thing, but that is quite wrong, they are completely different”.

The onus of Yoshimoto’s critique of contemporary Marxism, in whatever typological form, has been a relentless attack on its abnegation of this essential intellectual responsibility by reducing Marx’s historically unprecedented insights to the function of sterile intellectual exercise or petty ideological intrigues for power. Yoshimoto does not spare Marx’s own political failings in engaging himself with the internal squabbles of the International, calling it “trivial” and a futile act of a mediocre politician: “The world’s common politician also inhabited this gigantic brain”. Indeed Marx in political practice often does not fare well in Yoshimoto’s assessment. Quoting Marx’s letter to Ludwig Kugelmann in which Marx enumerates the errors of the Paris Communards and suggests the course of action they should have taken, Yoshimoto cites this as a pointless exercise of armchair revolutionary strategy and gives his curt riposte: “you do it yourself; battles don’t turn out that way”.

This is a criticism backed up by Yoshimoto’s experiences of defeat in his direct confrontation with power on the factory floor and in the streets. It is precisely what had prompted his unceasing, ferocious assault on revolutionary illusions, whether their purveyors were the Communist Party or the New Left students. Yoshimoto’s greatest

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sympathy for Marx’s political life thus lies in the latter’s relationship to the community of exiled revolutionaries, first the refugees from the 1848 Revolution and then later from the Paris Commune, in Marx’s willingness to deal with the aftermath of these defeats by offering help and advice and by expending considerable amount of his time and energy. This is why in the biographical portion of *Karl Marx* Yoshimoto highlights Frau Jenny Marx’s suffering and the enormous strains placed upon her by exile, poverty, death of her children, streams of defamation her husband had to suffer from his political enemies, and the repressive pressures of the European ruling class. For Yoshimoto also made sure that he did his part in dealing with the aftermath of the defeat of the Anpo struggle, going to gatherings and giving talks when asked by the students, attending funerals of students who had committed suicide and giving all the counsel and help he could provide in the wake of such a traumatic political fallout.

And no doubt in these necessary endeavors of commitment Yoshimoto viewed his wife Kazuko, who helped him on the accounting and business side of publishing *Shikō*, as an absolutely essential pillar of his life. Some of the most memorable lines in *Karl Marx* indicate Yoshimoto’s grasp of Jenny Marx’s great sacrifices as a crucial contribution to her husband’s work:

Jenny von Westphalen was his sister’s school friend and a woman older than he was; we will not misunderstand Marx’s life and ideas if we can burn into the depth of our vision how she paid for her life as Frau Marx in later years.

If we were to raise matters of significance for Marx of this period, one is the 1836 publication of David Strauss’s *Life of Jesus* and the other is his engagement with Jenny von Westphalen. The former symbolizes the Hegelian philosophy of history turning toward the human criticism of <religious> faith and the latter signifies the discovery of a person who would carry a lifetime’s subsistent suffering, that is, the suffering of the kitchen (making ends meet), for Marx.
Frau Marx died on December 2, 1881. The cause of her death was cancer. This woman lived a life amidst poverty and deaths of her young children, dealing with those who were mostly political scum, a life of defamation, disaffection, unceasing repression from all European authorities, and exile, all whose strains had shifted onto her.

Yoshimoto could readily understand the weight of “a lifetime’s subsistent suffering, the suffering of the kitchen (making ends meet)” because when he and Kurosawa Kazuko started living together, they had no money and virtually no food (a typical dish was putting thinly sliced green onions and shaved bonito on top of rice flavored with soy sauce) and, for a number of years after their marriage, when the physically frail Kazuko had taken ill, Yoshimoto did all the cooking and shopping. Yoshimoto could appreciate the centrality of Marx’s relationship to Jenny von Westphalen because his own relation with Kazuko was initiated under emotionally arduous circumstances (she was married to his friend and fellow poet), demanding from him the impossible task of sensitively negotiating the pain of betraying a friendship and bringing a resolution satisfactory to all parties (the aggrieved husband at first refused adamantly to agree to a divorce). Indeed, to one of the questions asked in a three-part questionnaire taken in 1965 -- “What was the incident that shocked you the most in the postwar?” -- he replied: “Circumstances of my marriage. Never have I faced a more difficult incident of this nature”. When Yoshimoto makes note of Marx’s ability to enjoy himself with his family and friends even in the midst of poverty and political firestorm, we can also sense the discernible outline of the private and quotidian happiness he found in his family life. Yoshimoto has

80 “Shoku” o kataru, 118, 120.
81 The other two questions were “What were the authors/works that influenced you most deeply?” and “What is your favorite saying?” and Yoshimoto’s answers were, respectively: “Fabre, Souvenirs Entomologiques; Editor unknown, New Testament; Marx, Capital” and “O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killest the prophets, and stonest them which are sent unto thee… (Matthew 23:37)”. Dokusho no hōhō (Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 2001), 289.
written elsewhere that he was determined to establish and maintain a “magnetic barrier” to keep away the political turmoil of his public life from intruding into the privacy of his family and that he considered raising his two daughters as one of the most important works of his life.

The political calumny and vehement denunciations that showered upon Yoshimoto -- largely from the circle of the establishment Left, that is, intellectual figures associated with the Japanese Communist Party -- were quite real and stemmed from his own singularly relentless criticisms, which he pursued with combative élan and scathing polemical ferocity. Here too Yoshimoto no doubt felt a great affinity for Marx’s denunciatory temperament and the endless streams of personal and political defamations had to endure.

The battle line was first drawn in the mid-1950s when a major JCP-affiliated literary journal *New Japanese Literature* published a list of politically suspect writers who had allegedly collaborated with Japanese militarism. This was a period immediately following Yoshimoto’s virtually forced resignation from Tōyō Ink for his union activity. Unemployed and making ends meet by playing pachinko (a variation of the pinball machine in which the player can win various prizes, from cigarettes to subsistent materials), Yoshimoto went onto an offensive, penning a series of essays on the “war responsibility of writers” (also a title of the 1956 book he coauthored with Takei Teruo) which exposed the degree to which the very pro-JCP writers making this indictment were themselves collaborators.

For Yoshimoto there was no qualitative difference between the advocates of Japanese militarist state for which he had been once willing to stake his youthful life and
the postwar ideologues of the Communist Party, most of them formerly direct or indirect collaborators with the war effort who had seamlessly changed the ideological colors on their chameleon-like political skin (from prewar leftwing activism to wartime militarism to postwar democracy and Communist activism). One of the major flashpoints of this debate took place between Yoshimoto and Hanada Kiyoteru, a well-respected avant-guard critic and essayist who was a JCP fellow traveler (Hanada was also a mentor to the novelist and playwright Abe Kōbō). Hanada denounced Yoshimoto as an anticommunist reactionary who never outgrew his militarist youth. Yoshimoto pointed to Hanada’s hypocrisy in concealing his own compromised political past, as an active wartime member of a rightwing fascist organization, and in pretending that he was a silent dissenter to the war.

The moral logic of Yoshimoto’s political rage is quite palpable. As mentioned earlier, it is rooted in the JCP’s dismissal of the wartime experience of the Japanese taishū and its failure to come to terms with the responsibility of its own formerly apostate members in actively supporting the militarist emperor state. One of the reigning points of political discussion in the 1950s involved the phenomenon of the almost unanimous tenkō (conversion, apostasy) among Japanese Communists of the 1930s. Yoshimoto undertook a detailed study of tenkō and unveiled the way in which prewar Communist social science, philosophy, and proletarian literary dogmas came to smoothly transmute themselves in the service of the wartime emperor state under the hands of the apostates. The political ramifications for postwar politics were clear, with the resuscitation of prewar Communist dogmatisms under JCP’s increasingly hegemonic status in the discourse of postwar democracy. This was not only political bad faith but entailed the
grotesque reification of ideas in which the *taishū* was reduced to nothing more than an abstract pawn in the ideological fetishism of the state: in the 1930s almost all the Japanese Communists made their apostate turn, retooling their ideological and intellectual apparatus for the Japanese empire’s “Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”, and the extreme handful who did not merely accept the Cominform catechism by labeling the Japanese *taishū* as passive victims of reactionary imperialism -- another version of *tenkō* as far as Yoshimoto was concerned (Yoshimoto’s definition of *tenkō* was not premised on a particular ideological position but on the “absoluteness of relations” vis-à-vis the actuality of the *taishū*); after the war, these same apostates refashioned their intellectual apertures back into the Communist mold and pretended as if they had always been silent and passive opponents to the war, replacing the communal illusion of the emperor with the communal illusion of the Stalinist state and the Communist Party.

Along with Yoshimoto, one of the early postwar critics of JCP from a position of independent radicalism was Takeuchi Yoshimi, scholar of modern Chinese literature and active supporter of the Chinese Revolution as a genuine fulfillment of Asian modernity (as opposed to the imperialist and inauthentic modernity of the Japanese). Despite Yoshimoto’s rejection of Takeuchi’s idealized image of Maoism, Yoshimoto was greatly impressed by Takeuchi’s principled criticism of the JCP in 1950:

In 1950 when there was so-called criticism of the Japanese Communist Party by the Cominform, I recall how Takeuchi Yoshimi’s “I Give to the Japanese Communist Party” overjoyed me. This was an incorruptible model for me in undertaking any thought and action relating to communality and it still is now. It also cleared the clouds from my inability to deal with my innermost issue as to whether the legacy of my war experience and wartime philosophical experience were *<nothing>* or *<negative>*.

If you were going to apologize with your hands on the
ground, it should not have been to the Cominform but in front of the Japanese people. There can be no loyalty to Communism without an apology to the people. However, the Japanese Communists’ attitude was exactly the opposite. Every step along the way they turned their asses to the people and kept studying the pleasure of the Cominform. Without self-examining the fact that you did not represent the Japanese people (this is the essence of the criticism) and still thinking that you are their representatives, you have put in a signed deed of apology to the Cominform and even dragged along the people who were the victims (according to the criticism). I think the critics of the Cominform would consider this a hopeless slave mentality. (Collected Criticism Volume Two Japanese Ideology, New Edition)

Where are the Japanese people that the Cominform’s criticism calls on? They are in fact nowhere. The Cominform is merely calling on the imaginary people who are asleep. The Japanese people whom the Japanese Communists think they are representing in their apology to the Cominform are not the real people. They are the minions of the Japanese Communists, underlings of slaves, and are therefore slaves themselves. Slaves can never be the people. People are free human beings who possess their own morality and who are capable of being in charge of executing a revolution. They are not slaves who are obsequious to authority (including Communism). Although some day such human beings should perhaps be formed from slaves, the formative operation has not occurred. The reason is, had it occurred, it would also be reflected in the cultural aspects and then revolution in Japan ought to be the issue in all the debates on cultural questions, but, because none of its symptoms has appeared, voices enraged by the corruption of the Japanese Communist Party do not at all resonate loudly around me. . (Collected Criticism Volume Two Japanese Ideology, New Edition)

[…] The background and its experiences out of which Takeuchi drew out these words were not that distant from ours. Elsewhere he also argues that the modernists, including the Marxists, treated themselves as victims after the defeat of the war and “avoided passing through blood-smeared nationalism”. I took this to mean that anybody who tries to linger in the postwar by dissolving the taishū’s war experience into nothing should live fully aware that he is a priori crippled. I took this to include the
proposition of self-ethics: if at the same time the former emperor system and the former rulers could nonchalantly multiply their progenies and go uncontested in the postwar, we were of course not permitted to linger in the postwar without being fully aware that these were permanent liabilities. This attitude was Takeuchi Yoshimi’s philosophical body that did not change or atrophy until his laborious work “Overcoming Modernity”. I loved this philosophical body of his. 82

Yoshimoto’s philosophical body was unquestionably of a similar make, a fact that the Bund students clearly recognized at the onset of the 1960 Anpo struggle when they invited both Yoshimoto and Takeuchi to their meeting and asked them to watch over, as opposed to supervise or help, their struggle (a political attitude of autonomy that distinctively impressed Yoshimoto). Indeed what Yoshimoto saw in the direct action of the Bund students, where they put their bodies on the line against the communal illusion of the state, was the actualization of the intellectual body he had been training during the 1950s through his fight with the “fictitious system” (gisei) of the JCP and other “citizen-democracy intellectuals” who constituted the postwar establishment Left:

When the autonomous consciousness that grants “private” interests priority over the interests of society emerged in combination with revolutionary political theory, it relativized the myth of the established vanguard [political party]. It gave rise to the independent actions of Zengakuren, which simply ignored organizational bureaucratisation. It demonstrated a dynamism unimaginable in the case of prewar faction that was terror stricken by a self-imposed illusion of suppression. When the prewar faction called the Zengakuren faction reckless youth, it felt the pain of the wounds inflicted on it by the authority of the prewar emperor system. The Zengakuren faction was as free as it could be, at least from an imagined fear of suppression. Here the cleavage between the understanding held by the prewar faction and the postwar generation of the level of development of postwar society, the transformation in the structure of power, and the transformation in the consciousness of the masses, had become apparent. 83

What Marx then provided Yoshimoto was a theoretical framework to understand “the transformation in the structure of power, and the transformation in the consciousness of the masses” in postwar Japan. Yoshimoto saw the *axis mundi* of this framework in Marx’s philosophy of nature, which primordially grasped “alienation” through the concept of “communal illusion”.

**Communal Illusion and Literary Theory of Value: Yoshimoto’s Rethinking of Marx**

Where do we place Yoshimoto’s reading on Marx on the spectrum of Marxist theory? Is he right to claim his reading as having no relationship whatsoever to all Marxist traditions, that in a sense it is a reading of Marx against Marxism? And how do we assess the content of Yoshimoto’s reading, that the theory of alienation runs beneath the whole of Marx’s work and, moreover, this theory -- conceived as a theoretical system in 1843-1844 -- is not in the primary sense an economic category of alienated labor-process in capitalist society but, primarily, a category in Marx’s unique philosophy of nature, which helps us to fundamentally unlock the structure of religion, law, and state? In order to understand these questions, a more in-depth look at how Yoshimoto develops his argument is necessary.

Yoshimoto saw in the early Marx three possible roads to the Damascus of his final system: one concerned the philosophy of nature; the second the study of religion and state (or “communal illusion”, to use the term Yoshimoto takes from Marx’s *Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Law*); and the third the study of political economy. The poststructuralist religious scholar and anthropologist Nakazawa Shin’ichi calls this tripartite designation the trinitarian “rings of Borromeo”, supplying the following visual illustration:
According to Nakazawa:

In these “Borromean rings” the three composite parts are mutually fused with each other and they never separate. Although sometimes only one part seems to become expansive, this ‘trinitarian’ structure does not change. It is impossible for thinkers who carry such a unifying core in their depth to display it simultaneously on the surface no matter how brilliant they are. We do not know the reason for this but anyway one part appears on the surface in the beginning. But soon enough another part makes an appearance to the point of covering this up.

Although when subsequent people look at this, they think as if a philosophical evolution is taking place there, denying or cutting off what was realized earlier, in fact an unchanging structural core is merely sprouting and maturing according to the situation with which the thinker is confronted from time to time, following the chronological axis toward the surface of reality. A biography of a thinker expresses this, and what is actually interesting about the book *Karl Marx* is that, following “Travel in Marx”, an operational report on extracting the structural core of the philosophy of “Marx the person”, it places “Marx Biography”, a description of the way in which this structural core evolves along the chronological axis. In a sense the very composition of this book represents Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s own thinking that revolves around the essence of philosophy.84

Nakazawa’s illustration and comment are useful in highlighting two important aspects of Yoshimoto’s approach to Marx: Yoshimoto posits a unifying “structural core” in Marx’s thought, grasping Marx’s intellectual development or “evolution” within the totality of this core; this approach in many way mirrors Yoshimoto’s own development as a thinker.

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bringing to Yoshimoto’s reading a necessary grounding in his own biographical experience (“chronological axis”).

Thus, for Yoshimoto, the fact that Marx ended up pursuing the critique of political economy as a key to unlocking the “structure of civil society” was a “fate” exerted upon him by the historical and biographical circumstances under which he had found himself. Yoshimoto does not take much stock in Marx’s admission in 1859 that it was the “the new stage of development” in capitalism “with the discovery of gold in California and Australia” which prompted him to study issues of material economic interest. Instead he situated the source of this intellectual shift in the defeat of the 1848 pan-European revolutionary tidal wave. By the same token, we can say that Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx expresses a kind of biographical fate crystallized in his postwar defeats. His experience of defeat gave him a “way of seeing” that underscored the natural logic of “communal illusion” found in Marx’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law and prompted him to work out Marx’s theoretical insight into a full-fledged theoretical endeavor of his own. Thus we can adapt Nakzawa’s Borromean rings to Yoshimoto’s own tripartite distinctions developed in Communal Illusion (1968).

These three rings also constitute the three main fields (or paths) of Yoshimoto’s entire
work. His writings and theoretical ruminations on literary language and the human mind belong to the sphere of individual illusion (What Is Beauty for Language, Introduction to the Phenomenology of Mind), his various discussions of the family and relations between the sexes found throughout his literary criticism and other writings intersect with the domain of relational illusion, and his major body of work on the origin of the Japanese state, religious subjects, cultural changes within contemporary consumer capitalism, and historical stages (Communal Illusion, Shinran, Theory of Hyper-Image, On the African Stage) deal with the realm of communal illusion. The linkages in the image suggest how these three spheres of studies are not discrete in Yoshimoto’s work but interact intimately with each other even when Yoshimoto is primarily focused on a particular domain in his writing.

There is a more important analogy we can draw from this illustration, and that is the fundamental role of “communal illusion” in Yoshimoto’s work, just as Yoshimoto posits the “philosophy of nature” as the fundamental undercurrent in the totality of Marx’s work. Indeed what Yoshimoto’s Karl Marx reminds us is the fact that the theoretical source for “communal illusion” is precisely Marx’s “philosophy of nature” -- a sphere that Marx had unveiled in a historically unprecedented fashion but, due to biographical exigencies, left in the background as he later burrowed his way into the categories of political economy. Yoshimoto’s self-imposed task was to further develop and clarify concretely the significance of Marx’s theoretical breakthrough. This was the meaning of Yoshimoto’s quip about not being a Marxist but a “Marx-person”, to do what Marx did for his time for our own, to not reproduce a system but create a new one in accordance with our experiences and demands imposed by the historically specific
situations facing us.

The extent to which Yoshimoto’s project of doing Marx for his own times converges or diverges with the works of contemporary Western Marxists is an interesting question but which we can only touch upon briefly here (any serious study in this regard would easily require a volume). In 1964, when “Travel in Marx” and “Marx Biography” first saw the light of day, Herbert Marcuse’s seminal *One-Dimensional Man* was published (and quickly translated into Japanese). In 1965 Louis Althusser’s two defining works, *For Marx* and *Reading Capital*, were published in France. These two Western Marxist thinkers, Marcuse and Althusser, share with Yoshimoto an interest in Marx as a philosopher, although their conception of philosophy is decidedly narrower than his, approaching Marx more as *tetsugaku* (philosophical discipline) than as *shisō* (thought). How does Yoshimoto’s *Karl Marx* relate to these two major constellations of Western Marxism in the mid-1960s?

In order to obtain the answer, fortunately we can minimize our speculations and rely on Yoshimoto’s own words. He commented on both Marcuse and Althusser in a series of essays serialized, under the broader title of *Jokyō* (*Situation*), in the literary magazine *Bungei* (*Literary Arts*) in 1969. These essays all carried the clause “logic of…” in their respective titles, implying that they were intended as critical commentary on the various intellectual and philosophical logics of the contemporary situation.

“The Logic of the Standard” begins with a quote from Marcuse’s “On Repressive Tolerance” (1966). In the quote Marcuse notes that the “repressive tolerance” in advanced industrial capitalism can only be overcome by postulating the “natural right” of illegal and armed resistance among the repressed and dominated minority when they
realize the legal, majoritarian means for social change have been exhausted and that the educators and intellectuals have no right to preach restraint to their use of violence because this violence is aimed to abolish the larger institutionalized violence and their users are well aware of their legal repercussions and personal risks. Yoshimoto gives assent to Marcuse’s warning against intellectuals (in the preceding installment Yoshimoto attacked Prof. Maruyama Masao’s celebrated “preaching” to the Zenkyōtō students when they stormed the archival library of his department, Department of Law, at Tokyo University for occupation and destroyed some of its collection), but rejects Marcuse’s postulation of “natural right” of illegal resistance:

The relationship between “natural right” and its execution does not follow such a simple logic in any part of the world. The reason I have not the slightest intention of recommending “self-restraint” is because, if we can find anything <new> that goes beyond the frame of the mode of the traditional antiestablishment movement in the currently ongoing struggles in our country’s universities, I think there is nothing except the militant students’ action-based radicalism. Leaving aside the <newness> of this mode of action, the greater part of the philosophy dominating them are

85 Maruyama’s celebrated denunciation to the Zenkyōtō students was: “Even the Nazis and Japanese militarists did not commit such an outrage. I do not hate you, only hold you in contempt”. Yoshimoto’s response to Maruyama and his colleagues, who publicly lamented the loss of “more than three hundred million yen” worth of microfilm documents and called it “cultural destruction”, was in many ways Yoshimoto at his polemical best, attacking the residual elitism of the progressive postwar democrat intellectuals ensconced in prestigious academic institutions (ibid., 26-27):

…these professors and researchers share in common the absence of self-introspection concerning their own responsibility (just the fact that they could not bring the students under control can form a charge against their responsibility and the basis of their disqualification as university intellectuals) and their act of assuming the pose of scholarly researchers with exaggerated manners and consideration. I will not say which of your published research achievements is worthy of such consideration. How ridiculous to say “cultural destruction” just because one’s private research room had been made a mess in what is, of itself, a near-disaster of nonfeasance. They also lament the loss of precious (reaching three hundred million! And from whom did you collect that three hundred million!) research materials, but they have never proclaimed from their own lips how such precious research materials are common property to be liberated without discrimination to free citizens and non-academic researchers. It is true that there can be no bourgeois or proletarian in scholarly research materials. At the same time there must exist a principal rule of the toleration of openness to the public, which goes beyond private ownership and possession.
what we can only call directly imported, mediocre old tools.\footnote{Ibid., 30.}

As Yoshimoto saw it, the problem with Marcuse’s notion of “natural right” is that it did not establish a valid “standard” on which those struggling against the order of repressive tolerance had the “guarantee of truth”, that it was finally indistinguishable from the Maoist logic of class contradiction, which easily translated into Stalinism. It posited a dichotomous logic of the excluded middle (“repressive tolerance” as opposed to “natural right of resistance”, “contradiction” between the people and the rulers in Mao’s case), which was premised on a “religious <tendency>” to consider one’s particular position as infallibly supreme. In fact, according to Yoshimoto, “certitude” (and “certitude of certitude”) was the only support that all sectarian philosophies had, whether they were of ostensibly radical or conservative nature. And he knew from his wartime experience that “certitude” was no guarantee for the truth of one’s position. In order establish the necessary “standard” of “guarantee of truth”, Yoshimoto again went back to his critical engagement with the New Testament and its intersection with the realm of illusoriness (Marx):

When I wrote about the New Testament in the past, I faced the same question that Marcuse does here.

In the fierce philosophical struggles that primitive Christianity had with the old Jewish sects and the Roman imperial order, which side had truth within its grasp? And what is the standard that guarantees that either of the two voluntarily fighting philosophies is on the side of truth?

Of course, the New Testament only writes about the sectarian ethics and philosophy of primitive Christianity. It is studded with the logia that expose the hypocrisy of the old Jewish sects with fierce and strong persuasive power. But, as history tells it, Christianity also easily became a prisoner of the same degree of hypocrisy in a brief space of time. At that time I could not think, as Prof. Marcuse does today, the minority repressed by the social order were guaranteed the truth with their “natural right” to break through <repressive tolerance>…

[…]
In the New Testament, the trajectory of primitive Christianity’s rebellious ethics also ceases in the realm where the independent logic of all <sectarian> philosophies breaks down. And at the time I also had to halt in this realm and think hard. It was already clear to me as experience that <certitude> was no guarantee for the truth of philosophy. Then what guarantees the truth of philosophy? Even if we do not know what it is, it is certain that it is not the subjective <certitude> or <justice> appearing arbitrarily in equal number as there are philosophies. I could not grasp this firmly but I thought I could call it the <absoluteness of relations>. If the problem were not of ideas, I should have called the word appearing here as <absoluteness>, as <objectivity>. Here emerged, though faintly, the problem of what was for me the totality of relations with this world, which appeared within the style of human social being, and what basic axis could structurally grasp it. If this could be resolved completely, it should be able to become the concrete content of <absoluteness of relations> and, as the absoluteness of relations between human beings and the world beyond the shore of philosophical sectarianism, it should be able to become the standard of philosophical truthfulness at least insofar as the connective realm where all philosophies come into contact with various scenes of reality was concerned. I have already spent more than ten years in order to establish this problem as the realm of the theory of illusion.87

In Yoshimoto’s opinion, this lack of “standard of philosophical truthfulness” on Marcuse’s part has effectuated “a far more miserable philosophical passage”, prompting to advance as a politically realized example of his concept of “aesthetic-erotic quality” the scene of “necking”, “petting”, and singing he had witnessed at a Berkeley anti-Vietnam-War protest. Yoshimoto finds this preposterous: “But we cannot permit the logic that directly connects petting and necking with political action as if they have any relationship to each other. We should not forget that petting and necking are real sexual act between men and women whether done among demonstrators or done in a private room and that the essence of political action is a communally illusory act whether it is enacted physically in the streets or enacted ideally in a room”.88 Such blurring of distinctions between relational and communal illusions neglected to understand that “the

87 Ibid., 31, 33-34.
88 Ibid., 37.
rewriting of ‘aesthetic-erotic’ quality of such degree can easily occur in a ‘currently existing society’…could occur to the same precise degree as the ‘aesthetic-erotic’ sensibility and consciousness of individual men and women could behave without any relationship to the foundation of the social totality”. In other words, Marcuse’s valorization of the ‘aesthetic-erotic’ dimension as a necessary part of political struggle fails to see that the dominant structure of power could very well accommodate radical changes and variations in relational illusion in the form of sexual and aesthetic liberations. Yoshimoto assessed Marcuse’s view as essentially a resuscitation of the French utopian socialists Charles Fourier and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s philosophy. Although he certainly did not consider this philosophy “trivial” as compared to the “globally transformed Stalinism” in Russia and China and judged Marcuse’s “hesitant dissent to dead-end Russian Marxism” to be “not without meaning”, he found Marcuse ultimately lacking in understanding the “essential difference and qualitatively structural distinctions between the <social> and <political>” as Marcuse staked his political hopes on the radical student movement: “Even with the greatest estimate, what remains is only the foolish <logic of expectation> that says the sum of <socially> partial rewriting must transform into a <political> rewriting”.89

If Yoshimoto saw in Marcuse a contemporary resuscitation of Proudhonism and Fourierism, he saw in Althusser a seeming resuscitation of “Marxism” -- which of course would constitute no virtue to Yoshimoto, even were it true -- but not of Marx:

Marx is not even in the least <resuscitated> in Althusser. Even if Marx<ism> seems to be <resuscitated>. Here <structure> appears as nothing more than fiction at the abstract level of semiotic logic. It is not fiction only because a concrete human being with a <body> does not

89 Ibid., 39-40.
actually appear in this theory but because the degree of abstraction and phase of the concept of <structure> have the exact level of fiction.\textsuperscript{90}

Then Yoshimoto cites Levi-Strauss’s essay on “culinary triangle” and remarks on its accurate grasp of the duality of “technology”, which recognizes how it belongs simultaneously to the realm of “culture” and “nature”. He contrasts this to Althusser’s logic of “overdetermination”:

Incidentally, “overdetermination” as a <structure> proposed by Althusser does not seem to possess this ontological condition. The <structure> of “overdetermination” always belongs to either <matter> or <idea> and its ontological rationale is the excluded middle. The conceptual thread following such an excluded middle belongs to the system of semiotic logic. We can say that it is something that cannot be singularly extracted unless a foundational axiomatic system is posited.\textsuperscript{91}

As it is self-evident in these two passages, Yoshimoto’s critique of Althusser pivots on the fallacy of the excluded middle exhibited by the structuralist logic of Althusser’s concept of “overdetermination”, which lacks moreover the analytical acuity and empirical richness found in Levi-Strauss’s writing. His take on structuralism (this essay is entitled “Limitation of Functional Logic”, i.e. the conceptual logic of structuralism) is then finally of effective reservation:

Although all various concepts established by functional logic originate generally with the meaning of <effective> establishment, the space behind this <effectivity> is a space that is always a transparent, colorless, and homogenous space. In other words, although we cannot necessarily say it is a meaningless space, we can say it is a space <without value>. Because the concept of <value> does not necessarily have to engage the dimension of <effectivity> or <ineffectivity>, it is a concept that cannot be established without the non-homogeneity of space forming its background. It seems that the concept of <structure> ends where functional logic ends. Is not the only thing worth remaining the superior anthropologist’s -- like Levi-Strauss’s -- investigative result organized by empirical evidence and fieldwork?\textsuperscript{92}

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 63-64.  
\textsuperscript{91} Ibid., 65.  
\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., 65.
Yoshimoto’s use of “value” in this context clearly calls to mind Marx’s theory of value, reconstituted as a concept in the field (or space) of ideas, as opposed to the field of economic exploitation of labor for the extraction of surplus value. It also connects the conceptual framework Yoshimoto employs here for the assessment of structuralism in terms of its intellectual “value” to his reconceptualization of “value” in terms of literary language in *What Is Beauty for Language*.

Yoshimoto took his cues for developing a theory of “literary value” from the Marxist dialectician Miura Tsutomu, an autodidactic print-engraver who theorized the nature of Japanese language and popularized dialectical philosophy for the working class. Before the rise of the New Left, during the long night of Stalinist hegemony wielded by the JCP, Miura was one of the rare voices who preserved the fierce light of radically democratic reason within the shell of his Marxist dialectic. Indeed any global history of mid-twentieth-century dissident Marxism would be amiss without assessing Miura's contributions, next to those of Isaac Deutscher, *Socialisme ou Barbarie*, Johnson-Forest Tendency, and the British Marxist historians. Later a regular contributor to *Shikō*, Miura's theory of Japanese language (synthesized for the general public in his 1956 *Nihongo wa dō iu gengo ka [What Kind of Language Is Japanese]*) affected Yoshimoto's own approach in at least two ways. It confirmed the intellectual vacuity of the Stalinist or generally orthodox Marxist view in which language was treated merely as an instrument that reflected human consciousness and stressed the necessity of any literary theory worthy of its name to be able to explain the subtle nuances, in many cases non-semantic, turns of linguistic expression.

The questions of wartime responsibility and political commitment in literature,
which were of immediate political relevance during the 1950s, also carried within them the seed of this theoretical discussion of linguistic expression in literature. In order to properly combat the orthodox Left's one-dimensional reduction of literary value to an ideological position, valorizing politics as the defining category to evaluate the value of a literary work, Yoshimoto traced the prehistory of their arguments to the prewar debate over “proletarian literature”. One of the most important moments of this earlier debate was one conducted between the literary critic Kobayashi Hideo and the Marxist defenders of “proletarian literature” who advocated a variation of socialist realism as the only literature worth producing. Kobayashi single-handedly founded the practice of modern Japanese literary criticism as an “impressionistic criticism” that took the critic's consciousness as its central vortex, taking to heart the modernist ethos of viewing literature as an expression of individual personality (he famously defined the objective of literary criticism to be one of “speaking doubtfully of one's own dream”). Accordingly he blasted the Marxist writers for utilizing theory as a commodity, a reified mechanism incapable of capturing the psychological depth and irreducible individuality of a literary work and, in an intriguingly dialectical move, took them to task for their failure in radically reconceptualizing Marx's labor theory of value for literature.

Had Marx written *Aesthetics* instead of *Capital*, he would not have started from the analysis of Tolstoy's “What is Art?”, as Plekhanov did. He would have directly started from *Anna Karenina* or, better yet, from the analysis of language. Of course such a speculation is foolish. What I'm saying is that the problem is simply one of whether to deeply understand the difficulty of discovering art's socially equivalent value or to perceive it superficially. Difficulty is synonymous with reality, and reality is synonymous with effort. But to deny this possibility is even more foolish. And yet even more foolish to dream and preach this theoretical heaven. I only say after Engels: “The science of art is as possible as it is impossible. And this is the necessity of all”.  

As a critic of acutely poetic sensibility and enormously wide-ranging breadth who practiced criticism as a form of creative, literary expression by other means, it was not for Kobayashi to bring down to earth and make real the said “theoretical heaven”. That was a task that unwittingly fell upon Yoshimoto, who out of necessity had to work out this problem of value to his satisfaction. He took the shifting and overlapping senses of “value”, as in Marx's sense of the congealed notation of socially necessarily labor that goes into the making of a commodity and in the more ill-defined sense of literary and aesthetic worth, and wove Kobayashi's notion of language as the essence of literary value into the theoretical fabric of *What Is Beauty for Language*.

By 1959, on the cusp of the anti-Anpo struggle, Yoshimoto's sense of his own work was that the polemical charges that obtained in his criticisms against the JCP and its literary minions were all but exhausted. His publication that year of *Artistic Resistance and Breakdown* (*Geijutsuteki zasetsu to teikō*), in effect a record of the last ferocious stage of this polemical battle, showed that the arguments had been pushed to as far as they could go. The only way left for him was to put into deed what he had attacked his opponents for failing to produce, namely a literary theory of linguistic expression that could comprehensively and rationally explicate the determination of “literary value”. In the next five years, through the rise and fall of the anti-Anpo movement, Yoshimoto expended much of his effort in composing that very work of theory in *What Is Beauty for Language*.

There was no question that *What Is Beauty* was a tour de force that demanded of Yoshimoto all his creative and intellectual energies. It occasioned for him perhaps for the first time in the postwar years a taste of “victory”, albeit a solitary one with no
discernible sense of its significance, as he noted in the afterword of the one-volume edition of the book:

Because this journal [Shikō] bases itself on a direct subscription system that makes it a semi-non-purchasable commodity, only a small number of people read it during its serialization. I continued to write this manuscript with these small readers in mind. During that time, I think my mind kept whispering in silent words, “It’s a victory, it’s a victory”.

I cannot say in clear words what the “victory” was and against what and why it was a “victory”. Those may have been words uttered against myself or may have been words uttered against all the conditions under which the manuscript was written. It was just that I could not cover up the impression that I had been overcoming someone.94

What was the nature of this “victory”, be it real or imaginary?

One was obviously a theoretical one. Two crisscrossing categories, like two interweaving fabrics, shape the entire theoretical scope of *What Is Beauty: jiko-hyōshutsu* (self-expression) and *shiji-hyōshutsu* (indicative expression). *Jiko-hyōshutsu* refers to expressions that arise directly and viscerally for oneself, such as the groans of pain or ecstasy, not for the purpose of communicating to those outside the self. *Shiji-hyōshutsu*, on other hand, denotes those expressions that *are* communicative, intended to *indicate* something out in the world. “Self-expression” and “indicative expression” are obviously not mutually exclusive categories but heuristic devices intended to underscore the defining characteristics of language. They work in tandem with each other, for in the actually existing world of linguistic expressions what we find are a wide swath of expressions that contain lesser or greater degrees of both.

The textile analogy of crisscrossing fabrics, which is Yoshimoto's own, is not accidental. For that is what Marx employs too in his exposition of “use value” and “exchange value” in Part I of Volume One of *Capital*. Indeed an observant reader would

94 *Yoshimoto Taka’aki zen-chosakushū*, vol. 6 (Tokyo: Keisō-shobō, 1972), 623.
immediately recognize that Marx's two intertwining central economic categories in his labor theory of value are radically reconfigured under Yoshimoto's hands into two intertwining categories for linguistic expression. The determinants of “use-value” derive from the act of labor itself, the uses to which that product of labor is put; similarly self-expression is expression that is singularly self-referential, deriving its value from the immediate impulses and urges of the user. “Exchange-value” of course is premised on the existence of a network of historically determined social relations, a capitalist world of commerce and accumulation, and, therefore, is a singularly social category; the same can be said of “indicative expression”, for that entire realm of signification and communication making up linguistic expressions only make sense within a historically determined community of shared expressions and signs.

Of course this analogy can only be pushed so far. As we can see with the class privileging of certain accents or linguistic expressions over others and the commodification of phrases and terms under the privatization of trademark laws, language is certainly not free from incorporation into the commodity-form. However, given the plethora of independently structured forms of linguistic expressions that we use from day to day, the defining axis of “self-expression” and “indicative expression” is not ideological or economic (just as Marx's economic categories, though linguistically expressed, are not reducible to mere linguistically determined reflections). In fact, the bulk of *What Is Beauty* is allotted to empirically proving this very point by surveying the history of Japanese literary expressions.

These shifting meaning of “value” in Yoshimoto’s work from the field of economic relations proper to the field of intellectual discourse to the field of literary
language would no doubt exasperate many, if not all, adherents of classical Marxist theory, including perhaps Marcuse and Althusser. However, as we recall the interdependent Borromean rings of Yoshimoto’s work and their theoretical background assumptions, we should recognize that this is not a loosely metaphorical usage of the term “value” -- it is a usage that is presupposed explicitly on the natural alienation of language and ideas in human beings (individual illusion), which in turn grounds the alienation of religion, law, state (communal illusion).

And this is where Yoshimoto understanding of Marx most significantly diverges from Marcuse and Althusser’s respective understandings. For Marcuse, Marx’s theory of alienation was premised on the political recovery of the humanist Marx against technological alienation of advanced industrial society, as we can see in his defense of illegal resistance on the basis of “natural right” and advocacy for the liberation of human beings’ aesthetic-erotic dimension. It would have been equally appropriate to rename his One-Dimensional Man as Alienated Man under Advanced Industrial Capitalism. In this respect, alongside of Raya Dunayevskaya (for whose Marxism and Freedom Marcuse wrote a preface), Marcuse is one of the most representative Marxist humanists of his day. Althusser, on the other hand, dismisses Marx’s alienation thesis as an outgrowth of his early bourgeois period, a conceptual error still mucking about in the swamp of Hegelian and Feuerbachian assumptions, in contrast to the later scientific Marx of Capital -- upon whose foundation Althusser sought to construct a philosophical equivalent to the “science” of historical materialism. In short, Althusser is the most representative figure in the anti-humanist “scientific” camp of Western Marxism.

Yoshimoto, on the other hand, is not really representative of any current in
Marxism. This is not only because of his persistent declaration that he is not a Marxist and has no interest in being one, along with his unswervingly fundamental rejection of the Japanese Communist Party from the outset of postwar Japanese history. To put in a highly schematic fashion, Yoshimoto’s placement of Marx’s philosophy of nature as the “structural core” in the totality of Marx’s work, a philosophy of nature whose conception of alienation is critically extracted from the young Marx’s study of Democritus and Epicurus, Feuerbach, and Hegel; his argument that this primordial alienation between human beings and nature, which Marx expands into the domain of “communal illusion” of the state, informs Marx’s shifting conception of alienation in terms of the labor-process in economic relations; and thus his conclusion that Marx’s conceptual revolution (of the 1843-44 writings) demonstrates how class struggle only assumes an effectively political meaning when it directly confronts the state have no real point of contact with either the humanist or anti-humanist approaches to the early Marx. Of course, there are superficial analogies that we can draw. For example, Yoshimoto shares with Marcuse a preoccupation with Hegel and with Althusser a critical motif against the economically determinist reading of Marx. But in the end such analogies are virtually meaningless. Marcuse’s concern with the Hegelian dialectic reflects his interest in reviving the critical function of negation, particularly under the repressively tolerant condition of advanced industrial society, while Yoshimoto’s interest has to do with Hegel’s theory of the state and the will, the ways in which those distinct domains operate and interact with each other. As for Althusser’s theoretical problematic of finding ways to go beyond the economically reductionist interpretation of Marx, this is almost a universal theme in the annals of Western Marxism, shared by even Althusser’s most vehement critics, including
E.P. Thompson.

Perhaps the most useful way of distinguishing Yoshimoto from Althusser and Marcuse is by way of Yoshimoto’s concept of the *taishū*. With Althusser, we have a virtually complete elision of the proletarian subject -- or really any social agency for that matter -- from his theory, whose self-enclosure as “theoretical science” tended at times toward a species of Marxist scholasticism. Marcuse, on the other hand, detected a new force of liberation, if not revolution, in the actions of radical students, racial minority in the ghetto, and anti-imperialist movements in the Third World. However, given the consumerist and technological logic of the Keynesian “one-dimensional society” that indoctrinated the general population, he also averred that the “working class no longer represents the negation of existing needs”. In contrast, Yoshimoto does not posit the “original image of the *taishū*” -- which would include the “working class” whom Marcuse judges to be too deeply institutionalized into advanced capitalism -- as a social or revolutionary subject but as the necessary *experiential* grounding for all his thinking. In other words, Yoshimoto reads Marx not from the perspective of the politically conscious self-organized working class but from that of the *unorganized, unformed, and anonymous* taishū, those people who would never read his books, those who live and die in the street corner, leaving no trace of themselves in history, but the weight of whose life is equal to that of the genius who only appears once every millennium, as he says in *Karl Marx*:

A person we are dealing here is most likely a master who would appear in the world only once every one thousand years, but the difficulty of reproducing his life is no different from reproducing the life of a common person who lived and died in the corner of the streets. The value of the

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innumerable persons who repeated the life of being born, growing up, giving birth to children, living, aging and dying in the street corner is completely the same as that of a person who only appears once every thousand years... The person who has lived and died in the street corner is in no way simple or inferior when it comes to the accumulation of judgments and cumulation of things he had encountered in his life. This is in fact a far more terrifying matter than we think.

It is this inexorable dialectic between the taishū and the genius that distinguishes Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx. Yoshimoto’s reading of Marx is unique precisely because he is not reading Marx for this or that particular ideological purpose, as the fount of dogma within a historical tradition, for the making of yet another political sect. He is reading it at the very limits of his actual experience, that is to say, at that rare point of contact between the actuality of one’s life and one’s ideas.

By making the “terrifying” reality of the taishū’s judgments and encounters (i.e., experience) the foundation of his thinking, Yoshimoto had rescued for good the reading of Marx from all vanguardist, sectarian, and academic interpretations of Marx. Of course it is possible for Marxists and anti-Marxists alike to continue reading Marx this way, just as economists can and do continue to practice the art of their reified “dismal science” the same way they did before Marx published Capital in 1867 (in fact, their twenty-first-century epigones have arguably taken the process of conceptual and ideological reification to an econometrically ever-more-sophisticated degree at the expense of empirical reality). But the bar has been set. After Yoshimoto’s Karl Marx, anybody who would read Marx with anything less than the full exertion of their intellectual and political experiences, failing to eschew the offer of all ideological temptations, is bound to deserve Jesus’s curse against the Pharisees in the Gospel of Matthew (23:29-33),
quoted at length near the end of *An Essay on the Book of Mathieu*: 96

Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, And say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we would not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of them which killed the prophets. Fill ye up then the measure of your fathers. Ye serpents, ye generation of vipers, how can ye escape the damnation of hell?

With the three irreducible defeats in his life, Yoshimoto had undergone his forty days, so to speak, in the wilderness, purifying his intellectual body to fight the Marxist Pharisees who partook in the blood the prophets, including Marx and the innumerable *taishū* of the world. Over forty years later Yoshimoto Taka’aki’s *Karl Marx* asks us anew: what is the wilderness out of which we shall read Marx from below, from our own original image of the *taishū*?

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96 *Yoshimoto Taka'aki zenchosakushū*, vol. 4, 104.
Appendix

“A Little Shade of Marx”

(March- April 1950)

Karl Marx’s *Capital* is endowed with all the qualities that most superior books possess -- rigor, flow of heartfelt feelings, theoretical perfection, logic trained to the point of capturing reality. Moreover, it is supported by the tension of the spirit which did not slacken even for a moment. The understating of many commentators and scholars on this oft-discussed book could not satisfy me on any single point. Even if this book had contained many errors, I wouldn’t have thought much of them, and, even if this book had fulfilled perfectly the function of mystical prophecy, I wouldn’t have been able to believe in it. This extremely abstract and simultaneously fundamental principle of logical development seemed to coincide with the principal rule of my thought.

People note the credulity of logic because logic is sometimes not able to explain a phenomenon, but, according to my view, logic is not something that bears the original responsibility for explaining a phenomenon. If logic has some function to fulfill, it lies in reducing all drives to the basic response of fundamental principles and to capture with the combination of that basic response a particular law in relation to a phenomenon that is universal and simultaneously approximate. If one desires to logically explicate a phenomenon, I think it is something that each person should do by adding a certain
amount of accidental element to this basic response. We can say *Capital* is endowed correctly with such importance that abstraction must possess.

Researchers tried to denounce *Capital* because they said its various theories reached erroneous conclusions and, on the other hand, believers seemed to have a certain hallucination about abstraction and phenomenon, reality and practice…and I could only think of these generally as an astonishing ignorance concerning the formation of philosophy. I thought anyone who has undergone even the slightest struggle of some sort with one’s spirit probably knows how philosophy is formed and developed and, if this were so, one would not with foolish indifference render the necessary relations and subtle layers between philosophy and human beings, reality and theory, as an equivalent.

Above all what never ceased to amaze me about this book was that it demanded a higher order of sensibility. On this point I know well the bad circulation of many believers and I also knew even Marx’s impeccable philosophy demanded bad circulation from them. The only reason I did not experience that bad circulation was because I had been trained a little in a diametrically opposite department.
“A Few Notes concerning the Methods of Rimbaud and Karl Marx”

(August 1949)

Note I

Marx’s *Capital* as a critique of economic does not begin with the analysis of commodities. This unprecedented masterpiece conceals behind its science of economic analysis a certainty and a passion of incomparable form. Only an undecorated mind would weave by itself the most appropriate method of understanding. My understanding of *Capital* begins with the analysis of myself in relation to the place of interdependence between Marx’s passion and method. And it ends where the form of general inversion with all poetic philosophy is formulated from this analysis. Such a manner of my understanding leads me immediately to Dante’s famous saying, “Go on your way, and let the people talk”, which Marx quotes in the preface to *Capital*. The methodological departure for a critique of economics which *Capital* constitutes lies here. Of course, this famous saying and Marx’s mind that quotes it do not in the least assume a theoretical character. Had he spared the endurance to follow to the end his historical materialist methodology, shot through with his immoveable certainty, it would have been nothing more than a vacuous irresponsible utterance. But we can find a representation of such a theoretically unformed high spirits at the basis of all authentic philosophies.
The historical materialist manner of understanding history is, as Marx says, a principal truth for understanding reality, a truth that is as old as the origin of humanity. But, as long as it remains a truth, a principal truth may convince people but could never move them. Only when truth is penetrated with a form of passion does it begin to move people. Such condition is an axiom that generally exists between philosophy and human beings without exception, and the interdependence between method and passion in Marx does not ever stand outside of this axiom. *Capital*, which begins with Dante’s famous saying, then most likely moves to a passage near the end of chapter fifty, part seven in volume three. In short, it moves to the final part of *Capital*, excluding the history of the theory of surplus value. That is, it reduces the wage to the produced part of the worker’s labor which becomes his own individual consumption and, liberating this part from capitalist limitation, expands it to the consumption level that is permitted by the social production of his own labor and that is moreover necessary for the sufficient development of his individuality. And furthermore squeeze surplus labor and surplus commodities in order to produce preparatory money on the scale of an insurance fund and to the point necessary for expanding reproduction at a sufficient level in fulfilling social desires. And finally make it contain labor that is need for the young and old from the difference between necessary and surplus labor. Put differently, eliminate from both wages and surplus value their specifically capitalist character. In such a case, these various forms no longer exist and what remains is only the foundation common to all the methods of social production. In short, Marx’s passion for socially changing the capitalist system and methodological point of arrival existed as self-evident premise when he undertook the enormous writing of *Capital*. Thus it was sufficient for him to
analyze the economic phenomenon on the surface layer of society with only this method and passion. He advances his analysis from a form that is as similar as possible to the real circulation form on top of the historical materialist methodology that he already grasped firmly.

Note II

According to Marx, when one views the commodity separately from use-value, what remains is only its character as a product of labor. This operation abstracts the useful character and concrete form of labor effectuated in the commodity and the commodity is replaced by abstract human labor that is uniformly equivalent. In short, the abstract labor that appears in the exchange relations of commodities is measured by the quantity of socially necessary labor contained within use-value. This hypothesis is quite lucidly definite and can be considered the terminus of his penetrating historical gaze that viewed human history as a history of traffic between means of production. As soon as commodities enter as they are into the process of exchange, they divide into commodity and money, resulting in external opposition at a point where the inner opposition between use-value and exchange-value in a commodity is expressed. Commodity as use-value and money as exchange-value are counterpoised to each other in this opposition. Although under simple circulation the value of commodity is opposed to use-value in the aforementioned fashion and merely receives at most the independent form of money, once the capitalization of money occurs commodity is suddenly expressed as the substance of ongoing self-activity that makes money into a mere form at the level of the
commodity. Marx is led to discover the law of inner division within capitalist society and conclude its inevitable collapse.

On the other hand, the possessor of labor-power is unable to sell the commodity that objectifies his labor, and indeed this results in him having to sell as a commodity the labor-power that exists only in his living body. Hence labor-power must be reproduced unceasingly. In short, human beings must survive. The labor-time necessary in producing labor-power is the labor-time necessary in producing materials for subsistence. To put it another way, the value of labor-power is the value of subsistence materials necessary for maintaining the survival of the possessor of labor-power.

How could the capitalist still accumulate surplus value even with the premise of equivalent exchange, in other words, how is surplus value produced? This is produced through the labor over and above the quantity of labor necessary for the worker to produce his own labor-power, that is, the quantity of labor necessary for his own survival. Marx defines the rate of exploitation of labor through the rate of such surplus value. And behind the back of this study lies his deep insight into the specific commodity character of labor-power, in other words, the structure of human beings as productive bodies. The specific contribution that the capitalist expects from the worker is the unique use-value of labor-power that possesses within its structure the ability to produce more value than value possesses by itself.

From my analysis the methodological unit that composes Capital is summarized above. There is no space for a useless idea to make a leap in Marx’s such thought-process. In short, a chance of necessity links the space between a presupposition that is
the methodological terminus of his historical materialist view of history and the conclusion drawn from it.

Note III

Philosophy is only mediated by language, which is the representation of the effect of consciousness. Practical action is expressed by the simple self-activity at the site of existence. Thus philosophy never mediates this as the motor of practical action. Whatever practical philosophy it is, it is this way eternally. What mediate between philosophy and practice are none other than will and passion.

The unclear conceptuality of will and passion links, on one hand, with the effect of consciousness and, on the other, with self-activity as the motor of the nervous system. The original character of Marx’s method and philosophy is their character as practical philosophy. Practical philosophy is not philosophy that can be practiced but philosophy that expresses practice. Hence it requires an equivalent pain needed in fighting oneself in order to also practice this philosophy. In short, such pain must be produced in the execution of will and passion.

I do not intend to seek the principle of evaluating philosophy outside of how it exists in necessary relation to humanity. Various philosophies are nothing more than ideas as long as they are separated from human beings and overrun like commodities. Although Marx’s method in analyzing the mechanism of capitalist society is none other than dialectical physics, what stipulates his perception is the principle of fresh and lively love and hate (for example, the general law of capitalist accumulation, the secret of
primary accumulation). When such primary relational principle between human being and philosophy is lost, his method ends up overrunning as a costume that is a commodity. Human beings forget the (spiritually) endured suffering of labor and purchase preexisting commodities. What an irresolutely comical story this is.

Note IV

As long as doubt remains doubt, it does not ever become a principle of active survival. But if this is understood as an expression of disbelief in history and reality, it is none other than the fate of a theoretical form that is fought in loneliness. The pain and difficulty such a form possesses are superseded by acquiring a place called nihilism. Thus nihilism never means defeat because it indicates the difficult persistence of certainty. Perhaps all philosophies begin at the place of escaping nihilism. But the theory of fate ceases at the place where the resistance from the site of nihilism ends. Philosophy of art also ends at the place the theory of fate ceases. Such original meaning of art clashes with the essential principle of Marx’s so-called historical materialism. I want to clarify the form of general inversion between all poetic and non-poetic philosophies in analyzing the meaning of this clash.

Generally true philosophy, the fact that one philosophy expels another philosophy on philosophical foundation due to the difference in level contained in the basis on which it stands is no more than a comical affair. Philosophy’s expulsion of philosophy is none other than the general rule of human reciprocity of passion’s expulsion of passion and therefore does not take the form of truth expelling untruth. Let alone the idea of fiction of progress expelling the fiction of anti-progress is nothing more than a laughably stupid
affair. (For example, although the poet Arthur Rimbaud and the thinker Karl Marx
coexist within me now without any particular sense of strangeness, the poet Rimbaud
would most likely not stop denouncing Marx with that lonely, violent invective simply
because Marx is a human being. Simply because Rimbaud was a stupid daydreamer of a
poet, Marx would most likely not stop making sweeping judgments with various concepts
such as industry and transportation that Rimbaud did not even imagine. To ask whose
philosophy is truth is nonsense

But aren’t you political poets of Japan today trying to maintain such nonsense?
As long as you keep imposing such nonsense, you will also not avoid being denounced
by a genuine philosophy.

Note V

In his disquisition on Feuerbach, Marx says that ghost, kinship, higher existence,
concept, anxiety, and so on are an ideologically priestly expression of an isolated
individual, clearly nothing more than a representation of this, and he also states without
wasting his words that they are nothing more than the representation of the extremely
experiential fetters and limitations that move the form of transportation related to it at the
level of the subsistent mode of production. What a true, great man’s unapologetic
certainty and philosophy this is.

This is no narrow-minded opinion. This is also no such thing as truth. It is a form
of a mind’s bold leap that exists at the foundation of all genuine philosophies. Such
certainty must have had to forbear within many misunderstandings and suspicions and
will not be able to avoid that even from now on. Genuine philosophy always suffers a
little too much to receive the crown of universal legitimacy. If the basis of Marx’s so-called dialectical materialism is to be said in his words, it is that the primary presupposition of human history is the survival of various individuals as living human beings. Therefore the primary situation that must be confirmed is these individuals’ physical organization and the human relationship to the remaining nature given from this. Such presupposition on his part leads to the definite determination that the way human beings express their life is the way they exist. He establishes with erudite knowledge and penetrating historical view the method toward human history by seeking the mode of development between growth of population, reciprocal transportation between individuals, and mode of production. It is inevitable that his process of grasping historical reality this way would be expressed in his revolutionary determination of the following sort. Hence he reaches the conclusion that all the forms and products of consciousness can be resolved not by spiritual criticism but by practically subverting the various existing social relations that are the source from whence these stupid idealist theories are produced. It is a certain conclusion. In Marx no admixture is contained between existence and consciousness. Existence, that is, human being’s method of expressing life is consciousness itself and there is nothing else besides this. Here the philosophical method of dialectical materialism must be fixed. There is a world of difference between this and the Japanese adherents who shamelessly say such a pointless thing as how human beings must have an active will in relation to historical reality because they are the expressive body of historical reality. Why do you Japanese Marxists today abandon the pain of seeking social consciousness, that is, the survival mechanism of society in your own consciousness? I don’t understand why you become simple
optimists. Marx drew the practical principle of social change as a philosophy from the agony of his own consciousness. And throughout his life he did not abandon the difficulty of studying the various existing conditions within his own consciousness. What a sad fact it is that his adherents have become philosophical idiots. It is fortunate if Marx’s method and practical philosophy do not exist in your brain as the kind of ideas that Marx despised the most. Genuine philosophy is always too subtle to be standardized with a measurement. It is self-evident that when you gauge Marx’s philosophical system with such a measurement only dead forms would fall inside your brain. Passion and method in Marx, in other words, the subtle coloration between human being and philosophy will spill out of measurement. To suppress such coloration in the name of science is never permitted.

Note VI

Marx’s philosophy is inverted in poetic philosophy. If we think of the process of poetic composition as a relational site between consciousness and the language that represents it, the poetic act begins in the state of the mind in which consciousness limits language and, inversely, ends in the state of mind in which language limits consciousness. The operation of turning language as representation into existing language must be completed in such a process. All art has always been fought with an individual’s individual philosophy, individual pain, with the mediation of simple individual means. This is quite a strange fact. Is not the essential question of art probably subsumed in this fact?
As long as we understand language as a product of social intercourse, as Marx says, the practical act of poetic composition as art loses its motivation. (Not the result but the motivation) Here the various questions of realism arise in an essential sense. And here is the basis of the political poets’ longing to use poetry (or art) as a means of human social intercourse.

In poetry, language as representation of consciousness must exist in becoming a single existence. The poetic is really none other than the act to change by some means language as representation into existing language. The reason a superior poetic work can convince us derives from no other fact than because this operation is completed in all its phases. I am not saying anything new in the least. By what means does this operation--silently fulfilled by the finest poets--turn language as representation into existing language through the mediation of the simple operation of writing? Probably the secret of creation lies here. Not even the most precise scholar of consciousness has probably completed this analysis. Of course there is no way I understand it either. We have no other way of resolving it except by layering it cumulatively in the practice that is work. The only principal fact we can point out is that this process of changing the character of language is the process of turning consciousness into existence. In order to complete the turning of consciousness into existence, the poet must believe the existential condition of consciousness within himself.

The reason Marx expelled all art from his philosophy is because for him consciousness as existence was nothing more than a laughable, absurd matter. Consciousness could never be nothing but conscious existence, and human existence is
their real life process ("Feuerbach"). In the fundamental diagram of such a philosophy of Marx’s, there is no space for art or poetry to establish itself.

Poetic philosophy is only established where it is truly convinced of the existence of consciousness in the same sense that trees and architectures exist. Such conviction is without exception the true assumption that the finest poets did not lose throughout their lives. Marx’s assumption that consciousness is nothing other than conscious existence contains the counter-assumption that existence could not be conscious existence without consciousness. The legitimacy of such inverted assumption must be determined only by the depth of the conviction and by practice. Reaching this point, poetic philosophy reaches the point of being counterpoised to Marx’s so-called non-poetic philosophy. But fact does not contract but merely inverts. If we so desire, we may be able to feel the resonant reverberation that exists at the foundation of all genuine philosophy in the two philosophies abstracted as such polar opposites.

The only last remaining question for us is drawing the principal truth of how to establish the existentialization of consciousness and, therefore, the existentialization of language. I cannot speak of such certain experiential truth with conviction. But, were I to continue writing poetry, I must believe in the following truth that is foolish but about which nothing can be done. Due to the limitlessly continuous promotion of the effect of consciousness, the field of consciousness becomes field of existence and language as representation transforms into existing poetic work. As long as such principal truth is acknowledged as a presupposition, does not the question of true realism in poetry exist for example within Arthur Rimbaud’s poems that expropriated the image of nature through the limitless derangement of the senses, within Mr. Miyazawa Kenji’s poems that
burst into natural history by using momentary flashes of the senses, or, to put it a little more exaggeratedly, within the <dream> of Gerard de Nerval? I do not detail with what inevitability and history and at what scale the debate concerning poetic realism is today conducted in the Japanese poetic establishment, but I want to point out as a principal rule that if these debates are conducted in terms of the application of the scientific method, the application of historical materialism related to the consciousness of historical change, the Marxist methodology that understands language as a product of human social intercourse, this involves the error of attempting to replace inner objects with external objects.

Does not the poet today mean someone who protects the glory of being a determined annihilator who studies the various aspects of historical reality within his own consciousness?

<Afterword to the Notes>

In 1873 Karl Marx noted in the postface to the second edition of Capital that the world of ideas is in the final analysis nothing other than the material world revised and translated inside the intellect of humanity.

In the same year (1873) my beloved Jean Arthur Rimbaud completed the following painful parting from the poetic muse under the glimmering constellation of the Great Bear:

*Cependant c’est la veille. Recevons tous les influx de vigueur et de tendresse réelle. Et à l’aurore, armés d’une ardente patience, nous entrerons aux splendides villes.*
It is still, it is still night, night, the influx of vigor and real tenderness, let’s accept them all, when the dawn comes we will wear the armor of ardent patience and enter into the splendid cities. (I borrow Mr. Kobyashi’s translation)\textsuperscript{97}

This is probably no accidental coincidence, it is a form in which genuine philosophy is inverted inside a disciple of poetry.

\textsuperscript{97}Kobayashi Hideo, the major twentieth-century literary critic who laid the ground for modern literary criticism in Japan.
"Contemporary Times and Marx"

(October 12, 1967 at Chuō University)

I am Yoshimoto, who have just been introduced. This year is said to coincide with the hundredth year since the publication of Capital, but it would be my twentieth anniversary because I first read and got to know Capital twenty years ago. I remember that this was about two, three years after the end of the war.

I will speak first about how Marx was thinking in undertaking his intellectual views. Germany at the time was a holy state so to speak, fused between Christian divine rights and state power and in a condition of being virtually fast asleep. In European countries besides Germany, what we today would call anti-establishment and labor movements had been underway, though sporadically. But in Germany there were very little realistic developments of such nature. Nevertheless, in what seemed like slumbering Germany the system of German philosophy, that is, German idealism had at the time reached almost completely its ultimate limit as the idealist dialectic with Hegel as its peak. Here the study of everything from the general problem of consciousness to that of family, state, law, and such was done in a thoroughgoing form. Incidentally, in other European countries where the real movement had been developing, the thought or philosophy as a principle propelling it was impoverished.
And thought, that is, philosophy by reconstituting German idealism in its unique form and the real movement by emulating the ongoing real movement in relatively modernized countries besides Germany, the intellect by reconstituting German idealism and the practical movement by learning from the ongoing workers’ movement and other movements of the intelligentsia, the idea was by combining the two a movement connecting internationally all Europe must develop in the real sense. And this is how Marx’s intellectual work commenced.

By the way, twenty years ago, that is, around the time just right after the end of the war, if we were to think what Japan was like at the time, or what Japanese philosophy under the so-called emperor-state was like, completely unlike Marx, only reactionary philosophy, conservative philosophy existed. If the Japanese conservative philosophers, reactionary philosophers had made great achievements during the war, we may have been able to reconstitute that and to some extent develop postwar intellectuals problems within the real workers’ movement. I don’t know what the reason is, but no great reactionary philosophy or great conservative philosophy existed in the Japanese emperor state that was reactionary or theocratic, that is, thick with ancient residual institution and lasted until wartime.

For example, during the war those ideologues of the citizens’ movement today had passed through the war only in the double sense of disliking the war in their mind but still going to war by carrying the guns on their own. There liberal or conservative philosophy was not completed at a high degree. For example the philosophers who rationalized the war itself during the war were the Kyoto philosophers, and we can say that there was nothing superior about them. And there was the situation where the more
reactionary, rightwing ideology developed only in prehistorical form, such as the theory of social organic body in which a state socialist or agrarian-centered revolution was to be fulfilled under the charismatic existence of the emperor. And we greeted the postwar in a situation where of course Marxists had attached themselves to either or both of these, or did not undertake any intellectual work.

Therefore, according to my experience, something philosophical, that is, a philosophical point of origin that needed to be developed after the war did not exist at all. The problem of philosophy existed as something I had no choice but to explore on my own. Thus I thought in various ways, for example I thought about the problems of Christianity, also thought about such matters as Japanese classics, literature, philosophy, and proceeded also to concern myself with Marx, and, as I was doing this, I had no consciousness of trying to learn from Japanese Marxists, that is, Marxists who were either silent or undertook the rationalization of reactionary philosophy during the war. Thus I came to have the experience of going directly for Marx.

And, as I think from such experience, the greatest shock I received from Marx was the philosophy of the state. What this is means is that I received a great shock from Marx’s idea that the state was a communal illusion. The reason was, according to our experience of the war, the point of departure we had was that there ought to be more weight placed on the state rather than really the individual, that is, the individual in civil society or the family, and I remember being shocked by Marx’s idea that this state needing to be weighed more was nothing more than an illusion masked with communality.
And, as we keep looking over Marx’s writings, from the early period to the later years, that is, until *Capital*, we understand that his study of the state more or less takes a completed shape and also ends with the treatise critiquing Hegel’s philosophy of law. After that Marx stuck his neck into the problem of economics or economic categories. In this way the completion of *Capital* was proposed as the final concluding point, but, speaking from my consciousness of the problem, what comes as a huge problem is how to develop Marx’s philosophy of state that reaches its peak as a critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law.

This problem may seem at first glance inappropriate for the one hundredth anniversary of *Capital*, but in our thinking, as to how Marx conceives the economic categories in *Capital*, in the case of the study or theoretical, scientific elucidation of economic categories developing the latter’s inner structure inside economic categories, it is conceived within a phase in which the problems of communality (that is, the problems of state, religion, law, art) can be abstracted. Our understanding is that Marx never considers economic categories as what completely determines the tendency of the history of humanity. Hence in case one views economic categories as important and as the primary factor moving the history of humanity and explicating them, the economic categories are conceived in the phase of abstraction where communal categories can be put at a distance and abstracted.

So-called materialist dialectics and historical materialism developed in Russia after the 1920s, but I think they are invalid because they were developed more or less with the presupposition that economic categories make up all the categories. At least I
wanted to state at the beginning that this point is what distinguishes me completely from so-called Marxists (that is, to use my term, Russian Marxists).

About twenty years ago, when I started concerning myself with Marx, the *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* that has become generally known among you had not been translated in Japan. So that means I read it about six, seven years ago. I think this is an important writing in considering Marx’s complete system. The reason is, without the self-alienation theory or alienation theory as the foundation, the study of problems such as the problem of communality, that is, the problem of the state, the problem of law, the problem of religion, and the problem of art become quite difficult. In short, without them, the problem of communality is only proposed at the level of producing at most a counter-effect of relative autonomy as the superstructure is moved and changed by the base. Today I would like to enter a little bit from such a place.

Alienation, or self-alienation, is of course not a concept that Marx used first, it was a concept already used by Hegel, but, when we think what significance the concept of self-alienation has in Marx, the first is basically as follows. A human being cannot exist without an objectified act in relation to another human being (or it could be in relation to nature as well). Incidentally, when human being undertakes the objectified act of survival, that is, necessary conditions for existence, his very self becomes correspondingly alienated from the original self. That is, the self too receives a counter-effect and influence. Or the objectified act is not possible without receiving a counter-effect -- this is the philosophy of nature that is at the foundation of Marx’s theory of alienation.
When such a philosophy of nature is represented in a civil society that makes economic categories its basic structure, if we were to make an easily understandable diagram of it, when it is transplanted to civil society, the relationship of self-alienation as economic categories is established. That means the relationship of self-alienation and alienation is established between the worker and the product that emerges as its result, as well as in relation to the capitalist who possesses and develops profit from that product following a fixed law and in relation to the organized worker.

In this case, we similarly call alienation or self-alienation transplantation, that is, representation from the category of this philosophy of nature to the economic category that is the basis of civil society. The concept of self-alienation is called alienation or self-alienation not only inside the category of philosophy of nature but also the transplantation of category of philosophy of nature to the economic category of civil society. Of course such relations are established within the inner structure of civil society.

Incidentally, human relations that make such economic categories as their basis produce the world of ideas, that is, the world of communality, and, in that case, we also call alienation the transplantation of the various relations of life in this civil society or various economic categories into the category of communal illusion. This is so to speak idealist alienation or idealist self-alienation. The concept of alienation is simultaneously a spatial concept and a chronological concept. If we were to say this differently, the transformation to the phase that all human categories possess, such a concept is also called alienation. This is the basic structure of Marx’s theory of alienation.

There are many forms in the current trend to examine Marx. For example, it is possible to take the stance of finding defects somewhere in the materialist dialectic and
historical materialism that is the basis of Russian Marxism developed in Russia since the 1920s and repairing or compensating them with some kind of philosophy. That is, for instance, Sartre’s stance and that of the Japanese adherents of Sartre. And the position of the so-called Marxists in Japan is, as I just stated, to compensate or repair the development of Russian Marxist philosophy. Yet another are the Marxists who take the stance that materialist dialectics in the real sense cannot be developed without thinking about the alienation theory or the self-alienation theory of ideas, that is, such problems as the problem of communality, in other words, the problem of the state, as well as the problem of law, and the problem of art. Such stances of examination symbolize their respective stance. This is the reason why the various stances of examining Marx undertaken today can only appear in the form of finally forcing their stance on the very thing they are examining.

By the way, such system of alienation theory is important because, as I said earlier, without this, we cannot approach in short the world of illusoriness, that is, such problems as those of state, law, and art. That is to say, we can’t do the theory of power. Hence alienation theory -- and it doesn’t matter what we call it -- is carried all the way to Capital as an important problem and dominates the philosophy of nature in Capital. The logic is established as a crossing point between the philosophy of nature as alienation theory and historiography of nature that sees the history of the humanity as the process of natural history.

My own concern is obviously related to the field of literature where I’ve worked hard, and the problem of communality, which Marx ended for the moment with his
critique of Hegel’s philosophy of law, currently occupies my problem consciousness. My thinking has largely developed from this place.

Today when Marxists examine the theory of the state, the base on which they rely is Engels’s *Origins of Family, Private Property, and State*. That is, there is an ongoing examination where they think they could perhaps develop a philosophy of state by examining this meticulously.

There are at least two important elements in thinking about the state. One is, what is communal illusion, that is, communal illusion that is the state. And another thing is the fact the form of the state does not come from the individual but always mediates the family form. In short, the problem is the fact that the origin of the state always mediates the family form. Engels of course captures this problem and has done a basic study of it.

In Engels’s study, his problem consciousness is how much is the family expanded until it reaches the first form of the state, that is, the embryonic form of the state.

Engels posited the stage of primitive group marriage in the beginning. At this stage, for example, all the women within the tribe could have sexual intercourse with all the men. Engels thought that there was no other method to expand the family form to the size of the tribe. That is, by positing stage in which all the women within the tribe could have sexual intercourse with all the men, it becomes a family group, therefore, a tribe.

As to what Engels says is basis on which he posited the stage of group marriage -- and if you read *Origins* you’ll understand this immediately -- the primary element that made it possible to establish group marriage was the liberation from human, particularly male, emotion of jealousy, that is, human beings’ mutual sexual tolerance. Without positing this, we cannot say why the family form, in other words, the form shaped by
sexual relations between men and women could be expanded to the size of the tribe. Thus we can say that there was no other way but to posit such relations as a stage. Engels explains that this is the first factor that differentiated animals and what made human beings form a relatively durable group.

By the way, I think you’ll understand this if you think about it experientially but I think what Engels considered the primary factor cannot possibly be the basis of group marriage. The reason is, we can say jealous emotion among men who have had sexual relations with many women is probably less than those who had not, that is, we can say jealous emotion would soften if group marriage lay at the foundation, but to say that group marriage was established because jealous emotion was softened is an inversion. We cannot say that. That is how human beings are made. That is, it is not ideas that come first, it is the real basis that comes first and then ideas are born. So what we can say at most is that human beings who have slept around a lot with women or slept around a lot with men would probably have less jealous emotion than those who have not. Thus this means that Engels’s idea, which sought the primary element or factor of group marriage in the liberation of jealous emotion or men’s mutual sexual tolerance, is quite dubious.

This problem becomes an important one. When Engels says the sexual act, he is thinking above all in terms of economic categories. He says that the human sexual division of labor between men and women is the first form of division of labor among human beings. The sexual act is thought along the line of a concept that it is the production of human beings themselves.
Incidentally, just as all economic categories always alienate illusory categories, human beings’ natural sexual act or sexual relations always alienate illusoriness. In my words, I give this the name of relational illusion. If this is the case, we have no need to posit group marriage and imagine the family form expanding to the size of the tribe, as Engels did.

The aforementioned problem consciousness that considers alienation theory important appears here again, for the human sexual act always alienates illusoriness. That is, it accompanies the illusion that has become relational. And that exists as the essence of the family. If this is so, as to how we search logically for the point at which relational illusion (what is said here as the family form) converges with the primitive for the state form, the problem of illusoriness is proposed as the problem of how relational illusion converges with communal illusion.

In thinking simply about the family now, we will think of the relational illusion based on the natural, sexual relations between father and mother as the essence. If so, the relations of relations illusion is formed of course also between the father and her sisters who are in the same generation as his children, as well as between the mother and her brothers, of course between the mother and her sisters, and also between the father and his brothers. In those cases the problem is only whether or not it is accompanied by the natural sexual act, but what is relational illusion can exist.

And, as we think about what relations within relation illusion can have the possibility of converging with communal illusion, it is the relationship between brothers and sisters. That is, the relationship between brothers and sisters are the only relationship that can endure, to use words used previously, spatial expansion to a certain extent. This
relationship is in a sense a light relational illusion because sexual relation does not accompany it, but we can consider inversely that this lightness endures regional expansion and endures permanence to a certain extent. The relational illusion between mother and father disappears when they die. And if we can posit a relational illusion between older and younger brothers, it more or less disintegrates when the father and mother’s generation dies out. But the relationship between brothers and sisters has permanency to some extent. For example, even in the position when the sisters have a husband and the brothers have a wife, there is permanency. Thus, although we don’t know what form it takes, if relational illusion has the possibility of approaching communal illusion to the very limits, we can only think of the relationship between brothers and sisters.

In so-called matrilineal society, the line of sisters who came from the same mother is considered the basic family line. Leaving aside actual intimacy towards the mother or religious sense of worship, the brothers in relation to this have the same consciousness as the sisters in terms of having the same mother. But, spatially, they could be far apart and far away. Brothers and sisters are connected just by the fact that they are from the same mother, that is, siblings. Engels calls this Stammutter and, in relation to this, brothers and sisters can endure spatial expansion to the very limits. That is, they can approach communal illusion to the very limits. Nonetheless, the sisters have a husband in matrilineal society and this becomes the major line of the branch. And the brothers marry a woman from another tribe or the same one, it doesn’t matter, and, marrying such a woman, they go out as another family line. In this way, the family form uses as its lever the fact that the relationship of relational illusion between brothers and
sisters who have the same mother has permanency to some extent and obtains the first opportunity to transform itself into tribal communality (in other words, the original form of the state).

When we think along this line, many explanations have been given in the case of Japan. That is, if it’s in Kyushū, in Kyushū there is an unceasing argument with Miyazaki Prefecture and somewhere about how <our place is the land of the Sun-Goddess’s descendants descending to earth> and so on, but, if you go to Ryukyū, Kudaka Island is said to be the land of the Sun-Goddess’s descendants descending to earth. And there is a festival called <Izaihō> on this Kudaka Island. It is a religious event, that is, a festival of communal religion in the tribe, in which all women who are within a certain age range in the tribe participate. As to what kind of festival this is, it is one in which these women seclude themselves for about four days in a shrine in the forest. And they sing shall we say god-song or norito, they sing that and dance, then again sing and dance for about four days. And because if you don’t do this, it means abandoning your rights in the tribe or on the island, that is, nobody speaking to you, even women who are away and working in the region return at that time (it takes place once every thirteen years) and participate in this divine service.

Such things still remain, and what happens on the last fourth day is that there is a practice in which the highest-ranking shrine maiden puts a red mark on the forehead and cheek of the woman who did not go home for four days and completed the divine service. And another thing is -- and this is what’s important -- the brothers of this woman (of course she could be married or unmarried) make dumplings with rice and bring them to the divine service site where the fourth day was completed. They are not husbands, not
husbands but brothers. The brothers make them and bring them. Even in the case of married women, the brothers bring them. And, after doing a fixed ritual in which these dumplings are touched on the cheeks, foreheads, and so on, the women of that island can place themselves in the very beginning rank of the shrine maiden. That is, they acquire their qualification as the shrine maiden.

This sort of divine service symbolizes the fact that, in places where the sisters acquire divine right or religious right, the brothers acquire political power. Hence the meaning of this ritual is that, in short, the women’s family line acquire the right given by god by participating in a communal religious divine service and the divine service is completed when -- I don’t know whether it’s a contract or something but when the representative act of such a relationship is performed with the brothers. So, when the sisters acquire divine right, usually the brothers acquire secular power.

As a relatively new form of this, there is the debate over the <Yamatai Nation>. What that is about is, it is a variation of this, a problem of the form of power in which the brothers hold political power by making the shrine maiden who is at the highest place, that is, the shrine maiden who holds divine right, the subject. As a variation of this, there could be a case in which the highest shrine maiden combines in herself divine right and political power. In short, the <Yamatai Nation> debate is a very new form of tracing such a divine service as far as it would go back. That is, we can say that that the Yamatai Nation is something quite new.

And as to how far back this divine service can be traced, generally Japan is more or less this way, but, because it is an island, the men go out into the coast to fish. And women generally cultivate the grains. That is, up until the period of paddy rice
production before transitioning to agricultural society, we can trace back with the form that remains now. Thus, in that sense, we can at least trace back to a form before the Japanese emperor state because the latter begins with agricultural power. Hence, if we think this way, relational illusion can endure spatial expansion, that is the only relationship that has the possibility of transitioning to the state form, is the relationship between brothers and sisters.

Most contemporary scholars of ancient law reject completely Morgan-Engels’s ideas and consider them dubious. The reason for this is because, for example, the stage of group marriage is not posited except to the extent that some tribes exist with the form of group marriage while old uncivilized races also possessed a form that looks like monogamy. That is, it only has meaning to that degree. There are certainly tribes that have such form of group marriage but there are also their opposites, you can only believe it to that extent. Hence Engels’s stage theory becomes rejected with subsequently discovered evidence. As to why it was rejected, does this mean it is correct to say that only monogamy existed, well, that’s not the case either. Of course we can say tribes and races that take the form such as group marriage still remain and have existed. But all we can say is that they existed and it has absolutely no meaning in the sense that it particularly demarcates this or that stage.

The reason why it has an element that would be rejected is because in Engels’s attempt to make the family form converge with the state form there is a presupposition of having to posit group marriage no matter what and, if group marriage is posited, something like the liberation from jealous emotion has to be posited, this has to be rejected as a theory because the problem is developed in this kind of form. That is, it has
to be rejected if evidence is discovered subsequently. Basically, only this kind of meaning exists here. And as to why it turned out this way, it is because Engels captured human sexual relationship between men and women as an economic category. And the fact that he could not clearly bring out the fact that economic category always alienates illusoriness became a problem. This is the reason for Engels’s study taking a form that is rejected completely today.

If so, how far would the family form expand when it is spatially expanded in the form like that of brothers and sisters? That is, there is the problem of whether it would be expanded to the level of the state. However, there is always there a limit. A consanguineous group (relationship between brothers and sisters) can expand to the point of the communal system of the clan, but the outer limit to which a consanguineous group spatially expands stops at the clan system because a unified state or a unified society does not emerge as long as the clan system remains a consanguineous group, unless another consanguineous group is posited. This does not change the fact that the clan system is communal illusion because it is an institution as well but it cannot single-handedly form a unified society. In that case another factor that is different from the consanguineous group must be incorporated in order to posit a unified communal illusion, a unified state. Morgan-Engels’s idea of the transition from the clan system to the tribe, from the tribal system being unified to the nation, also becomes dubious. This means that there is a particular layer, that is, a difference of phase, in the place where the boundary of the consanguineous group transforms into the tribal system. If this is not studied, the problem of communal illusion has no chance to transform into the problem of the state.
Depending on the race, there are places where the consciousness of the consanguineous group remains powerfully. I think that is the case with Japan. There are such races and there are places where the state was formed in the form in which such elements have entirely disappeared. Speaking in that sense, the states are as different regionally as, to put it exaggeratedly, they are in their essential structure. Thus to think that you can grasp in a unified, theoretical fashion is no good, a big mistake, and, if you want to have a unified, theoretical grasp, we know that state theory in a universal sense will not be formed unless the fact that economic categories always alienate communal categories is studied and the philosophy of the state, state theory, is considered at that level of abstraction.

This is the place where my stance is completely different from that of the self-avowed Marxists. What the Russian Marxists do in their most conscionable part is with the influence that the state as communal illusion receives from various economic categories. This is the concept of *macht* (power). *Macht* is an illusory function that for the time being became independent from the regional *taishū*, and this *macht* is manifested in so-called law. Law is a right, a duty. That is, where *macht* is there is law and where is law there are those who impart it as right and the people, the *taishū* who use it as a duty. That is the concept of *macht*. And when we go from *macht* to the concept of *gewalt*, this is the state of power that imparts duty as duty even if right is not extracted independently. In short, in this case, it is fine with such things as force and violence.

Thus, if legal duty is always executed in a particular sense in the law, he demand for rights from the side of the *taishū* will offset it properly. That is, for instance, law’s neutral concept, that is, concept of power. When this turns into *gewalt*, it is the form in
which only duty is imposed and rights are completely ignored, that is, a condition in which *macht* alienates itself absolutely, it is such a form.

Such form is also in Engels, and the problem consciousness of Russian Marxists in Japan is generally the need to distinguish such a concept well. But, as we stated just now, we are fundamentally critiquing Engel’s *Origins of State*. Without that, the problem can’t be resolved at all.

In its totality illusoriness is restricted by various economic relations of civil society, by economic categories, but, once we want to treat the problem of illusoriness as an inner structure, we can think about it by putting aside economic categories to a fixed position. Also, to put this inversely, we must think about it by putting them aside. Speaking in terms of the problem of the origin of the state, in primitive society there are places where it has a communist system and there are races that have a despotic system, there is nothing unified about them. Engels studied this as if there were a logically unified, theoretical stage, or a real stage. But in actuality there is no such thing. So, when we are explicating the problem of illusoriness in its inner structure, the problem consciousness of course emerges, which says we can put aside economic categories to a particular place, that is, where economic categories relate as a structural element. If this is the case, this means the problem of illusoriness, the problem of communal illusion, can be treated in terms of its inner structure. That is, this doesn’t mean that we necessarily have to make rationalizations by always combining economic categories. This becomes a problem.

The reason the Japanese state was called the family state until wartime was because the residual institution of the clan system remained considerably. As to why it
remained, it is probably because it is a separate island. And when we consider the separate island that is Japan, it is better to think of Honshū [Main Island], Hondo [mainland, or Japan proper] as relatively new. This means South and North are old. So we can trace this problem back until the time preceding agricultural society. For example, in Okinawa today such problems as the return to Hondo are proposed in diverse forms, and, when we think about such problems, I think we should not forget that in Okinawa, Amami, such people in the South think they themselves are the older Japanese. That is, they must think, old Japan is actually here, we are the ones who are older while you are of mixed blood with all kinds of people like the Koreans and Southern race and have become a race of which we can’t make heads or tails. That is the same as the Northern problem.

Let’s think whether the antiestablishment can be formed as communality against state power as communal illusion today. In reality it cannot be formed. In reality what can invert in relation to communal illusion is only individual illusion. So antiestablishment communality cannot be formed intrinsically. But it can be formed with an added condition. As to what this condition is, the taishū who support the state as communal illusion at the most idealist basis (or this could be a realistic basis), as the basis of illusoriness -- when we think of the taishū not as the taishū who have some kind of philosophy or ideology but, abstracting them considerably, the taishū who have none of this, that is, taishū who are abstracted to the degree that they have no particular sense of being dominated by the state even if they are, if we unceasingly channel as philosophy or ideology the problem consciousness, the problematic of such a taishū, then perhaps we can form an antiestablishment communality. If you do not channel this and start thinking
about political organization or political communality, that is, antiestablishment
communality with only the ideologically educated taishū as the object, this will always be
enclosed from within. If it is enclosed, it will always invert itself in relation to the taishū.
That is the meaning of bureaucracy.

For example, the reason the Leninist establishment in Russia degenerated is
because of this problem. That is, although Lenin wanted to think about the party as a
primary principle by positing a communality in which the problems of the taishū who are
neither here nor there are channeled, the actual problem was that it was only enclosed
from within. If that becomes distorted, it changes of course into bureaucracy and, if that
itself acquires power, that itself will again exert force or violence as state power, that is
try to do more than macht. In short, it ends up in the form that also self-alienates macht.
Such problems can also exist.

As I stated earlier, the communality of relational illusion has a layer that at the
stage of the clan system never goes to the origin of the state. In the words of legal
scholars, unless the form based on territorial communality is not established in relation to
consanguinity, there is no transition to the communality of the state itself. That is, we
can say that the wall directly facing consanguineous groups stop generally in the clan
system. Thus, the extent to which the residual institution of this clan system is powerful
or not powerful could constitute a factor determining the mechanism of power in the
respective tribal states. If I were to say this, it is that we can conceive how the absolute
structure of each respective state power would be different for each currently existing
state. There is no way this problem could be resolved with no matter how detailed we do
it in the form where everything comes out of economic categories. Economic categories
cannot extract laws except at a particular level of abstraction. We can say that this degree of abstraction will lead to absurdly wrong conclusions unless we study within the totality of reality and the totality of illusoriness the phase of the degree of abstraction that economic categories possess.

That is what distinguishes Marx from Engels. Marx does not say anything in the least dubious because he is a person has understanding. He has not said anything more than the fact that, to put it essentially, state is a communal illusion. If you were to say more than that as Engels does and try to fuse it with economic categories, you end up doing something that seems rational but is quite absurd. The states are so different that we can virtually say they are different with each so-called race. In short, that is where Marx is truly superior. That is, he understands. In case one is dealing with economic categories, he understands that what position these categories assume in the totality of categories. So he never presume to do anything dubious, such as trying to make up a law on matters where, beyond here, there is no questions that empirical proof or counterproof could conceivably be raised. If a stadial law is to be produced, he posits a particular degree of abstraction from the beginning and considers the law there. That is, for example, the structure of Capital. In my view, there is basically no mistake in Capital. The reason is, if you remove, for example, the abstraction or the phase of economic categories, it would in fact be considerably wrong. For instance, he says one labor hour of person A and one labor hour of person B are the same and here the problem is one of time. But actually that’s not the case. For instance, if A is someone is hardworking and likes to work and B is indolent and lazy, the quantity as well as the quality of the product made in the same one labor hour are of course going to be different. That is, in real
categories this is wrong. But the reason we can consider it the same is because a particular degree of abstraction is posited there. It is because the phase of economic categories in the totality of categories is grasped well. So in the case of person A’s one labor hour, it is one labor hour of entirely natural time. There is no other nuance besides this. But if we think realistically, that is, if we take individual illusion into consideration, for a particular person under particular conditions, there are cases when it feels like the work lasted only for thirty minutes even after working for one hour or there are times, for example, just an hour of work feels like I’ve worked for about ten hours. That is, if the time of consciousness is taken into consideration, it becomes entirely wrong. But this can be abstracted. It can be abstracted when thinking in economic categories, when dealing with it in terms of a particular law, in terms of inner structure. He does not make a mistake because he grasps well the degree of abstraction and the phase of such economic categories. That is why he can also draw out a particular law. If these categories are taken away, then it would be the case where such stupid things cannot be said. In that case, A and B are completely different, their abilities are also different, everything is different. In that sense Engels is not great. Engels himself said and thought that, after Marx’s death, he assumed Marx’s mantle, he developed what Marx could not do. But that is not the case. You have to understand the fact that it would be dubious if you say more than this, that is, understand the categories that cannot be stated in terms of laws. And when we are thinking about philosophy or fundamental principles, we could occasionally make mistakes unless we clearly grasp the phase in the world produced by such abstraction and the ideas of all human beings. Marx committed mistakes in this
sense. Marx made sure he did not speak on such dubious matters. In short, that becomes one crossroad for philosophy or thinkers.

Today studies of Marx are undertaken and Marxism is developing in diverse forms, but they are completely different from our phase. We do not consider Russian Marxism or Chinese Marxism as that much of a problem; our phase exists at the place where the problem is brought in and where the problem can be developed. I think the future is going to properly determine which of the either ways of thinking is going to be victorious. That is one of the lessons Marx taught us wordlessly. When we are thinking about the problem of what is going to philosophically and principally smash the existing state, the first thing that must be smashed is mythology. Without smashing mythology, nothing can be smashed. I think one of the biggest lessons that Marx’s greatness teaches us is, in Marx’s words, <there was never a case in which ignorance prospered>. 
For some time I had a vague feeling in me that *What is Beauty for Language*, *Introduction to the Theory of the Phenomenology of Mind*, and *Communal Illusion* were not separate from each other. Today I came to make some clear order out of this feeling. I think it would be good if I can clarify even a little of the motif in which the three realms are related well to each other and find a place where they can be bound with a single chain.

First I will go into it from language (words). Language has the characteristic of appearing in such a way that it can be understood immediately by anybody who thinks or sees it. Language is expressed though vocal sound or letters, and, when we look at vocal sounds or letters by themselves (as matter), they are vibration in the air or strangely formed signs that have become printed letters, nothing more than that whether we look at them from the back or the front, no matter how we flip them over. But when we view them as an expression of inner human consciousness, or as signs fixed by letters, words can become the object in which certain value can be added. That is, what was merely an object or a sound wave becomes something in which value can be given.
I just said words can be become the object of value, and we can understand quickly that this value is based on language’s natural function to indicate certain matters and communicate them. But when we start thinking about this natural function of language in relation to the will of the speaker or the writer who indicates certain matters and tries to communicate them to someone else, something else besides natural function is added. The intention to indicate certain matters vaguely or more clearly, to communicate this part emphatically or vaguely transforms the human voice or the rhythm in the manner of speaking. If this is so, this should be already taken this into account when words become the object of value.

What this means is that, when we think in relation to the consciousness or will of the speaker or the writer, there is an unconscious or conscious motif to indicate certain matters and communicate them, and words are something that tries to realize a certain universal expression that has no particular relation to this motif or objective. Put another way, in realizing their <indicative> and <communicative> function, words always activate a different <non-indicative> and <non-communicative> function. We sometimes find speaking or writing bothersome or painful despite our need to indicate and communicate something because we have to use this <non-indicative>, <non-communicative> function.

Let us think if there is anything else like this. We find then that there is something of very similar character in a certain sense. This is commodity within the circulation process. Commodity (pointing to a canned juice) is merely a can made from metal and liquid is inside it in terms of its raw materials, and we cannot give any other meaning to it. If we start thinking of this as something produced by human social labor,
then certain value can be added to a commodity. Of course the value-adding is already contained in the fact that this canned juice is a commodity, in other words, in it being used <for…>. At that moment the liquid inside the can is no longer some chemical ingredients of a certain liquid but value-adding produced from the fact that it is a drink. To put it differently, this is giving value as usefulness or useful qualities such as being delicious, nutritious, etc., as a drink. But this canned juice can be value added as original value from the fact that it was manufactured under someone’s hands. This is because, when considered this way, the canned juice is added for the first time with a character that is exposed even after the material stipulations of chemically liquid ingredients inside a metal container is <put into brackets>, a universal character produced when human beings are at least involved, such as a delicious taste when you drink it, having nutrition, etc. This is different from manufacturing or using canned juice <for> it being delicious, having nutrition, etc. Rather I think it’s closer to saying the canned juice <as> tasting delicious when you drink it, having nutrition, etc. There seems to be the primacy of value-adding n the certain way human beings relate to each other and are related from the fact of matter appearing at the base of the character that takes the <as….> form.

Here I think we can picture the following image: in the same way commodities circulate within society through the reticular state of its economic mechanism, words also exist diversely intertwined on the upper layers of invisible ideas through forms that are invisible but could be analogized as if they were the same as commodities, the image of words flying to and fro and overrunning across invisible space in intertwined ideas as if it were the negative of commodities in terms of social composition.
But this image is nothing more than a diagram of the concept of the <commodity> and the concept of <words> made to correspond with each other. When we imagine the condition of commodities and words making the meshes of a net on the basis of our value-adding world, these two both become an image like the world of the negative that has the relief of mountains, valleys, rivers, and trees that make the very giving of value its sea level.

Words circulate at diverse dimensions of value-adding. They could take the form of simple correspondence or note of communication, from advertising lines to complete abbreviations, signs, or hidden codes. Also, if we think of literature in particular, literature produces among them a beautiful thing, or indicates what is flying to and fro as a produced beautiful thing. If we fix our eyes here, I think we can analogously think the study of literature to be the study of words that we could consider as category of beauty interweave diversely with each other within the diversely related forms of words overrunning inside society, study of how such words are made. If we think this way, the study of literature begins with the analysis of words and what obviously emerges as an issue is the investigation of how words are produced and circulate within diverse relationality.

Even if they were in the beginning words used for <indicating> and <communicating> objects, it is obvious that they would soon acquire the self-character of words as <indication> and <communication>. Perhaps it’s more accurate to say that we can start viewing them from such an aspect, rather than saying they acquire such a character. For at least in the beginning of intention, even if <for> words are used, the used words possess at the same time the <as> character.
At the end of this an intentional desire to use words only in their <as> character sometimes emerges. I think we can say that this is nothing special because this is also nothing other than emphasizing or exaggerating an aspect that words possess from the beginning. We don’t know at present why such desire emerges. Perhaps it stems from a desire for play such as wanting to slice a piece of paper with a sawing blade, or perhaps it stems from having discovered a universal character common to all the other produced things outside of the words’ function of <non-indication> and <non-communication> as we use words for <indication> and <communication>.

The reason certain value is added to the commodity is because at first commodity possesses a natural form of use-value that are obviously on par with desires in relation to its diverse uses. Another reason is that it is able to be a measurable and exchangeable substance of value that could stand as a common standard. We can view these two as the great characteristics that makes commodity a commodity and not a simple matter.

Let’s say there is the fact “twenty yards of linen is worth one coat”. In this case, “one coat” is the equivalent of “twenty yards of linen”. If “twenty yards of linen” is also wroth “ten pounds of tea”, relationship of equality as an equivalent is opened up between “one coat” and “ten pounds of tea” with “twenty years of linen” as the subject. Of course, there is the inverse relation of “twenty yards of linen” being the equivalent of “one coat”. It is also the common characteristic of all commodities to be able to assume this equivalent form. If this is so, the aspect of the equivalent function that all commodities can commonly carry on should be able to be replaced by a certain commodity with a universal equivalent form, a universal commodity whose only use-value is its usefulness as the equivalent, namely money.
Can we not say the same thing about words?

At a place most removed from the uses of <indication> and <communication>, words are executed only in the aspect of them being persistently the equivalent of a certain inner condition. Such words are use-value losing its use-value and also turn into words in search of value expression that is like the universal equivalent. And perhaps we can say that today literature has such words as the outer limit within its field of vision.

In Capital’s first chapter “The Commodity”, Marx makes the example of linen and coat the standard of his study by, for example, such wording as “20 yards of linen are worth one coat”. In the form of an equation, this expression becomes as follows:

\[20 \text{ yards of linen} = 1 \text{ coat}\]

I we look at this grammatically, “twenty yards of linen” becomes the equivalent expression of the subject word (subject part), “one coat” that of the object word (object part), and “is worth” that of a verb that connects the subject and object parts. Grammatically speaking, this sentence is composed in the way that first there is a subject part, this draws out a certain object part, and they are connected equivalently by the very of “is worth”.

But let’s say we don’t look at this as a grammatical expression and try to find a way to consider it as a literary expression. At such a moment the meaning of the equivalent must change completely. In order to register them now as literary words with the same grammatical structure of words, let us change for the sake convenience “twenty yards of linen” into “that beautiful linen” and “one coat” into “an angel’s coat”. Then the expression turns into “that beautiful linen is like (is worth) an angel’s coat” or “that
beautiful linen *is* (is worth) an angel’s worth”. In the form of equation, this expression becomes, just like before, as follows:

\[
\text{beautiful linen } = \text{angel’s coat}
\]

In this case we understand that the expression of metaphor and simile in “like the angel’s coat” or “is the angel’s coat” is an equivalent expression that anybody can understand, in other words, expression for using words in the aspect of their original value.

By the way, speaking in terms of the value theory of commodity, the subject part corresponds to the relative form of value and the object part corresponds with the equivalent form of value. But such manners of speaking as the relative form of value or equivalent form of value are terminologies necessary in thinking about the circulation of commodities and they do not matter for the moment. The point is, there are twenty yards of linen and in case you’re trying to compare it to something else its value form is qualification can be formed for the first time because a coat is there as an equivalent substitute and something that was made completely differently can be related as well because it takes such a value form, this is why this kind of terminological expression was produced.? The only question is where do words leap from the grammatical dimension to the literary dimension and how does the concept of equivalence transform at that moment.

The sentence “twenty yards of linen are worth one coat” can be expressed mathematically or can be related with the theory of the value form but it can also be made to leap to the dimension of beauty. That is, if there is a logic that can make the world of words and the world of circulating commodities correspond commonly with each other, it means that the key lies in the fact that the basic question is contained in this kind of
simple composition of a sentence. And similarly the study of beauty of words must be separated from the study of words.

Such usefulness of words as <indication> and <communication> for our present purpose points to what ends up being realized regardless of whether it is intended or not. But, as soon as they are intended as such, don’t words placed as the equivalent form of something else, shall I say, become oblivious to something like the natural form of words such as <indication> and <communication> or try to secede from it. It might be good to say that in this a certain universal language is aimed at. But why do words aim at such a non-essential thing at the point where it becomes related to the state of consciousness or intention of the human being who articulates them, its original impulse may seem uncertain. We can say that the basis of aiming for universality lurks in the essential quality of what we consider the <concept> of words for the present moment. I think it is not that the <concept> itself has universality but such an element lurks in the structure of the <concept>.

When we think now of such a manner of speaking as “twenty yards of linen are worth ten pounds”, the thing (commodity) that comes in the object part had disappeared and, seeing in terms of the commodity, it has become a universal, abstract money. There commoning and abstracting are enacted simultaneously to the equivalent.

If this state of the equivalent can be thought in terms of language, it is unmistakable that the root lies at the place where the <concept> of language is conceived. But we understand that deciphering the state of language as concrete beauty, as literary language is difficult.
Earlier we thought of the state of equivalent words at the place of metaphor and simile in “the beautiful linen is (like) the angel’s coat”. This “is (like) the angel’s coat” can be replaced with innumerable metaphors that would suggest the same <concept>. “Is (like) the rainbow’s end”, “is (like) the feather of a peacock”, etc., we should be able to at least use any words equal to the <concept> of <beauty>. Is there a word that can represent all these innumerably conceivable words? What is that? It seems certain that it is not “beautiful linen is beautiful”. And it must be what represents the <concept> of the <concept> of <beauty> (of <concept>). I cannot say what fits this description but if Marx’s example of “twenty yards of linen is worth ten pounds”, or rather if his concept of money as the universal equivalent form demands correspondence in language, it should already exist and also should be possible, but it seems that this cannot be stated concretely.

The basic diagram for the circulation of commodities which Marx gives in *Capital* is the process in which, if there is a commodity, this is bought with money, which in turn transforms again into commodity. This diagram is as follows:

\[
\text{W} \quad -- \quad \text{G} \quad -- \quad \text{W} \\
\text{(commodity)} \quad -- \quad \text{(money)} \quad -- \quad \text{(commodity)}
\]

No matter how this process continues, the basic form is determined within the circulation of commodity -- money -- commodity.

If this diagram is explained in words, it means, for instance, someone who acquires ten pounds by selling linen for ten pounds now goes on to buy a Bible for ten pounds. If so, “the linen is ten pounds” and “ten pounds is the Bible” corresponds to this diagram. So we can say that the basic form in which commodities circulate is the same
as -- that is, can correspond with -- two sentences made to have a certain relation with each other.

In the circulation process, the fact that “the linen is ten pounds” and the fact that “ten pounds is the Bible” are processes that originally have no relation to each other unless the bearer of G (money) is the same person. Similarly these two sentences should have no relation to each other at all. But if the bearer of G (money) is the same person (character), the commodity can take the minimalist basic process and, in the same way, the two sentences can be related to each other if the bearer of ten pounds is the same person (expresser). Then we can say that it is even now still possible here to make the circulation (exchange) form of commodities and the circulation (exchange) form of words correspond with each other.

Incidentally, there is a point of divergence here for various ways of thinking. That is the place that belongs to the most secret part in the verbal expression of beauty and also the place where it becomes the first magic-filled process as the circulation process of commodities. Marx often uses such an expression and, if we think of the manner of circulation in which commodity transforms into capital, its basic diagram would be as follows:

\[ G \quad -- \quad W \quad -- \quad G' \quad (G' = G + \alpha) \]

The diagram for the time when commodity starts circulating as the process of capita is becomes the end the limitless continuation of this process. In short, the commodity entering into the capitalist circulation process means that at first there is money, then commodity (thing) is purchased, and that commodity (thing) changes again into money. Two problems arise between this first money and the subsequent money. One is the fact
that the subsequent money is larger than the first money, that the plus $\alpha$ is attached at least when it is exchanged the subsequent money. Another is an important matter, that once commodity enters into the process of capital its fundamental impulse is that, with the commodity as mediation in the middle, its essential process is simply $G'$ from $G$. That is, $G'$ is produced from $G$, $G''$ from $G'$, and it is always attached with plus $\alpha$.

Why does $G$ change into $G'$? For example, here is ten yen and, no matter how much it tries hard, it doesn’t become fifteen yen. If this becomes fifteen yen, it means that magic has been performed. However, when commodity interposes in the middle and when it enters into the capitalist process on top of that, the ten yen ends up becoming fifteen yen. If ten yen changes into fifteen yen by magic or hypnotic power, it should be the end of capitalism. Thus, leaving aside whether or not magic can be established, we can say that capitalism is established on magic as its intentional consciousness. In short, the essence of this process is the magic of $G'$ from $G$ and this is all. That is the basics of the section on “Commodity” in Capital and I think it’s probably the basics of the whole.

Here is where it becomes a problem, there is always money as the real form, stepping through the first basic process in which commodities are bought and sold and also exchanged for money. But the essential process is only the simple $G'$ from $G$ (that is, from money to money). We can say that here a division, a separation, occurs between the essential process (form) and the real process (form).

This division, separation, between the essential process and the real process are conceived as <alienation>. And we can think of <alienation> by itself as <expression>. Just now we stated that in order to realize its function the usefulness of words such as <indication> and <communication> end up executing words at a particular universal
level and containing the functional aspect of "non-indication" and "non-communication". And we had also commented the we are forced to execute words only for the sake of emphasizing or exaggerating this non-indicative and non-communicative aspect when words leap into the dimension of beauty. We also touched on the fact that such divisions are invited because there is an element that is not usefulness within the structure of the "concept" of language.

If this is the case, it should be all right to say that any word corresponding to a "concept" at the moment of its execution lies already in the division and separation between the essential process and the real process, in the process of alienation. And certainly that is precisely the case and there should be no need for us to further make an enclosure to think about language of beauty, in other words, literary language. But just as the commodity’s circulation processes W—G—W and G—W—G’ are conceived as having a different motive, impulse, and motif at least for the protagonists of this process, I think it will be permitted to think of the difference in motif. We can consider the protagonist of W—G—W as having the motif of exchanging a particular commodity for money and wanting to purchase a different, necessary commodity with that money. We can consider the protagonist of G—W—G’ has the motif of exchanging a commodity for money and wanting to accumulate that money by selling again that commodity.

Similarly, words that make up the common meshes of the net are words used for "indication" and "communication" and, even if contrivance for beauty is made in that process, they are words whose motif is to make better "indication" and "communication". As opposed to this, we can think of words of beauty as words that are executed from the beginning for just the value of words and with the motif of value
accumulation. This process is not use-value but value itself. Its self-objective is the self-accumulation of value. That’s why I think I started to think that the only world of language corresponding with this process was the world of literature.

But, as we have come to this point, I think we are now able to analogize the basic form of how verbal expression becomes literature. That is, self-accumulation is strictly the essential process and, when we analogize this to literature (I use the term “self-expression”), in the case of why literature was produced, use-value is never primary but the self-accumulation of value is precisely the essential impulse of literature (beauty of language). I think the basic form of literary artistry is probably the fulfillment of process of self-accumulation through the mediation of words.

If this is so, because the process of contemporary literature is of extreme high level, the rest involves tracing meticulously its concrete manner of being according to the question of verbal expression. Then we can construct what is happening today with the art of verbal expression (literature) on a great relational basis.

As I said at the beginning, what forms the appearance of literature is the fact that we think of the form in which words emerge as beauty within the worlds of words, which are drawn in the image of them reciprocally relating to and intermeshing with each other, flying to and fro as they undulate like mountains and valleys, as one mode of something like an invisible negative of the commodity’s circulation and production process in society. If this is so, apart from this, words intermesh in various forms, such as appearing as simple signs or expression for communicative purpose.

When we start viewing these worlds once they enter into the world of universal value-addition like the world of beautiful words, from the world of so-called purposeless
purpose, creation without usefulness, and creation itself, everything ends up transforming on the basis of a particular horizon of verbal <concept> into the negative image in which the relief of high and low is drawn, or the surface of invisible undulation. At the place where value itself is sought after, even the world of commodity is transformed into the undulation of universal value floating on top of such level of verbal <concept>. The mysterious blueprint in which everything from the world that aims at universal words or essential words seems to float on top of words becomes closer to the map of the world. We do not know very well the meaning of such contemporary world of words and things but we live there.

2

For the great modern philosophies of Marx, Engels, or Nietzsche, there was contemporaneously the gigantic existence of Hegel. The reason he was a giant was because he was able to preserve the ancient concept of the <world> just as it was in its modern reconstitution. Whether Asian, classical ancient, or primitive, the philosophy preceding ancient times was the theory of the <world>, the theory of <cosmos> as the concept of ontological creation. Transforming this into a modern idea while preserving it, Hegel was able to only make the concept of the <world> survive. Everybody was influenced by Hegel’s concept of the <world> and indicated his rebellion in his respective way.

Hegel made a comprehensive system from the idea that the macroscopic world such as law, state, and religion and the individual’s inner consciousness such as morality, ethics, and character, the realm that covers all these fields is manifested in human will
(“will” for Hegel is “practical consciousness”). This had meticulously no escape route and, if we were to say it, it was systematization with tremendous degree of thoroughness and sharpness. To the extent that contemporaneously it was considered impossible to escape from it. Nietzsche, Marx, and Engels gave a representative response to this.

For example, Marx shows a tremendous respect to the entire system of Hegel’s “theory of the will” that developed everything from the individual to the totality. He left everything as the object of study. But for Marx Hegel’s basic viewpoint was inverted, a viewpoint that said this <world> was a manifestation of self-consciousness and the whole of human history was the process in which this <world> approaches the absolute concretization that it will reach ultimately. That is to say, he thought what was basic for human history was nothing like the process of the <world>’s spiritual realization but the development of relations between things and things or between nature and human beings, that from this there is a process of development of society that human beings made and, in relation to this, the process of ideas was secondary. Here was the principal rule that Marx embraced in relation to historical development.

But, according to my thinking, Hegel had attempted to modernize most fundamentally the concept of the <world> in ancient philosophy, seeing the development of the <world> as a process in which the idea, the universality of self-consciousness, was concretized. And Marx, who was a specialist of ancient Greek philosophy in his youth, must have understood well the meaning of Hegel’s difficult achievement. And in a sense he tried to repair that classically.

But Marx did not completely do away with the system of Hegel’s “theory of will”. I think it’s a mistake to think that this has been done away with. I think what Marx
thought as a contemporary was that one could make Hegel live on the basis of just inverting the basic viewpoint.

However, let’s look at how Engels thought about it. Engels fixed his eyes on the fact that, if there were a hundred people at a cross section in history’s particular moment, acting with a hundred different wills in order to realize them, their sum should make human history but that doesn’t happen. That is something one which anyone would fix his eyes. That is, Engels was stuck on how to think about the way in which the sum of a hundred individual wills would come out differently when it appeared as a social totality.

If this were natural history, it would be predictable to a certain extent with something like natural law, but unfortunately in a society made by human beings, according to Engel’s manner of speaking, human beings are organisms with self-consciousness and what doesn’t follow natural historical or biological historical law comes out at the point they possess self-consciousness. That is, the reason why the sum of individual wills isn’t concretized in history is because human beings are organisms in possession of self-consciousness.

Let’s try sorting out what Engels says is an unmistakable truth, namely that the sum of actions practiced by a hundred people with their respective will constitute history. I think in this he considered the greatest element that seemed segregated and different both qualitatively and quantitatively as that which appears with communal will, communal will that constitutes political power, and that this would have effective power to the point of determining the general direction of history. He thought that if this part could be replaced completely with purposive consciousness and controlled, then what
remains is a metabolic relationship between human consciousness and nature and this could even be in terms of rational law.

When Engels thought that history is not concretized according to human will, its meaning can be thought in two ways. One means that there is an inevitable gap between intention and reality even if a hundred people took action for realization with a single common will. Another is the fact that even if power that is communal will seems to determine almost completely the direction of history, that is nothing more than something done originally on the basis of predicting what is missed in similitude and accident. When we contemplate on either of these cases, prediction of historical direction seems impossible. But, along with Marx, he lucidly grasped where the historical present possessed for the moment the center of clear defect in the metabolism between human beings and nature, which was similar to natural law. I said Marx was in a sense a classical repairing of the ancient concept of the <world> and, using a similar manner of speaking, there is an aspect of primitive philosophy of nature, philosophy of ontological creation, in short, resuscitation of the theory of <cosmos> in Engels’s concept of the <world>.

If that’s the case, one could also think that only accidents, irregularity, suddenness, unexpectedness, and stagnation could be history. This is exactly what Nietzsche thought. Nietzsche thought that historical progress and historical development are all lies, that history was only a series of accidents. For example, Nietzsche thought that, if there are relations of causality and inevitability in history, this is because historical concepts are placed in the verbal or semiotic dimension, that concrete history is full of events and phenomena that appear completely accidentally out of the blue.
One way Nietzsche rebelled against Hegel was by rebelling against the systematicity of the \(<\text{world}>\). Nietzsche’s one way of rebelling was to say \(<\text{there is no stupider system of conceptual stipulation like this, stop talking nonsense from an imaginary stipulation of concepts}>\). So he thought Hegel’s ideal systematicity of the \(<\text{world}>\) and rigorous conceptual self-stipulation of words were completely scholastic and meaningless. The other thing was, speaking strictly in terms of historical concepts, Nietzsche thought that human (social) history only evolves by accident but, if there were a basic impulse in the human beings who are in pursuit of that accident, it was will to power. Human beings move blindly by following will to power and this appears as history that only emerges as accidents.

Nietzsche’s philosophy that is the basis of the idea of will to power derived from the manner of capturing \(<\text{nature}>\). Nietzsche thought of the concept of \(<\text{nature}>\) from animal nature. That is, despite the fact that the arbitrariness and freeness of life in animal condition were real freedom, human beings were weighed down with gravitation when they started walking bipedally and this weight emerged as the weight of consciousness and at that moment human beings received a kind of self-restriction and thus animal nature was real \(<\text{nature}>\) and real \(<\text{freedom}>\). Hence Nietzsche’s idea is that it is already repression itself to possess consciousness stipulated by self-consciousness and the state in which you don’t possess that is what it is to be free of repression and that is where the will to power will not manifest itself. Nietzsche rebelled against Hegel in this way.

In denying the coherence of Hegel’s concept of the \(<\text{world}>\), Nietzsche was a classicist in the opposite sense of Marx’s. He smelled distinctly the idea and various conceptual habits of Christianity behind Hegel’s theory of the will. When he says anti-
Christ, I think he was reproducing the concept of the <world> as the Greek concept of nature. Instead of losing the interiority of the concept of the <world>, Nietzsche’s style was to resuscitate the diverse concepts that represented the biological nature of self-consciousness. I think the only noteworthy part of Nietzsche is that he recognized that the very concept of history cannot be conceived by ignoring the description of the verbal <concept> or the concept of the <statement>. When his contemporaries were shouting history, he thought it became ambiguous as to whether they were pointing to the reality of history or to the formation of the concept of history. When we take into consideration the phase wherein words interpose, he thought, the concept of historical development should be ascribed to a verbal <concept>. I think this is a presentation of a fruitful question on Nietzsche’s part.

In these studies revolving around the concept of the <world>, what seems latent is a motif of how to position various modern concepts in relation to the way philosophy is, such as the comprehensive theory of the <world> that was completed in ancient times, theory of <cosmos> that includes the origin of ontological creation, and theory of <logic> that stipulates how to live a life. In that we can see the problem connecting to the survival of philosophy today.

As I just now mentioned briefly, Engels wondered whether there was no law in social evolution if the sum of individual wills did not necessarily appear as social history. And he judged that there must be a law to human social history even if our understanding was imperfect at present. I think he considered the law of social history could be grasped
by analyzing the wills of the opposing classes because the place where this law was
determined on a global scale was where the totality of a particular people’s will
determined history and, within a national state, where the sum of class wills determined
social history.

We can summarize Engels by saying that, in thinking about the concept of law of
social history, he abstracted at the level of individuals all that belongs to the individual,
such as personality, ethics, and manifestation of self-will. If so, Engel’s basic concept of
nature is barely different from Nietzsche’s and thus we can say that Engels viewed the
society preceding the state an ideal condition, namely the natural condition in which
human beings communally lived and ate together at most in places like the tribe, clan, kin,
and family. He does not locate this in such places as animal nature, animal freedom, and
animal psyche, as Nietzsche does, but in a concept that is at a little higher position. In
short, we can say that he depicted as a kind of ideal natural condition the age when
human beings formed groups in the form of the community preceding the state, such as
tribes and kin, an age when people worked and divided their yield equally.

I think this way of thinking is a little different in nuance from Marx’s. I think in
relation to Hegel Marx did not individually organize and do away with the system of
Hegel’s theory of the will and thought that only his basic principle needed to be inverted.
And I think this is the place where the representative and symbolic thinkers of nineteenth-
century Europe were uniformly engaged.

Engels organizes effectively, shall I say, its background, the contemporary and
previous generation’s intellectual atmosphere. Darwin’s theory of evolution appeared,
cells were discovered, molecular theory and what became its basis, atom theory, emerged,
and new ways of thinking were occurring successively. Also, for example, in investigating ancient society, Morgan spent his life in a tribe that preserved well the communality preceding the state, communality preceding the clan, and did quite a detailed study of how such an institution worked. These things made the concept of the will found in the theory of the will something that had to be problematized no matter what. In economics as well, classical economics had reached a peak and was in state of saturation, and Marx began *Capital* with a feeling of let’s completely redo the analysis of modern economic society, and so many concepts were quickening anew.

Darwin thought of something incredible. He was the first to systematize by stages the fact that all organisms, including human beings, emerged as a single cell and developed into a current form and started saying that human beings too originated and humanized somewhere warm, dividing into various regions and races. And, analogizing from that, Darwin said that all the languages of all the races had been singular in the beginning and differentiated from there, branching off and separating regionally.

The fact that Darwin’s discovery of stages in the evolution from single cell to human being brought about an incalculable transformation in the concept of human beings exceeds our speculation. But Darwin’s discovery is at the same time the very place of its greatest weakness. This is because Darwin’s evolutionary concept at first has a single cell occur on earth or in a space around earth and make all organisms continuous with human beings. This also means that, as Darwin says in *Origin of Species*, humanity possessed a singular language in the beginning and that branched into various national, racial, ethnic languages. There is no doubt that a suggestion is contained in the structure of the <concept> of language that language has an origin even if it is not a singular
language and that it could possess a chance of occurrence. The unicellular biological structure also contains the fact that not only one cell must occur inevitably. But we can imagine how astonishing it was when Darwin was able to discover a particular continuous aspect of evolution between organisms that appeared completely different from each other or between human beings and other organisms.

Darwin’s way of thinking exerted an enormously decisive influence on Engels. That is, Engels was astonished by three texts: Morgan’s *Ancient Society*, Marx’s *Capital*, and Darwin’s *Origin of Species*. In his case Darwin’s *Origin of Species* described the history of biological evolution preceding human beings, Morgan’s *Ancient Society* narrated the way human society was created preceding the state, and Marx’s *Capital* contained in it the historical description of social development after the state. And Engels thought it was possible to establish such an parallel arrangement because the history of organisms and human beings were grasped and described in parts where these two could be treated as concepts of natural history.

What Engels wanted to do away was Hegel. He wondered whether there weren’t any escape route in Hegel. Engle’s thought is excessively arranged in terms of stadial development. But its motif is clear.

The viewpoint of treating the history of biological evolution and social history made by human beings as natural history means the modernized version of ancient <cosmology> viewed from modern thought (scientific thought). Engels has, in a word, a bird’s-eye view of the Earth. But what human beings can make the object of bird’s-eye view is probably at most the history of the behavior of inorganic matter and organisms up to the animals. Even if there were parts in human social history that could be treated as
natural history, but they would not be with the bird’s-eye view but would have to human beings in the position of human beings as what metabolizes that natural history.

Following through Engels’s idea as it takes on various transformations, it arrives at <Marxism> of contemporary world. I think this could be positioned in Engels’s genealogy, that is, as the process of its development. And there is the problem of what happened to this process of development, or what is the current situation of the state that made this as its principle, that is to say, the philosophical state, and why it did not become as Engels wrote down. Considering what ought to be the problem, I think two things are worth examining: in the case of the sum of individual wills not concretizing in history, the idea of viewing a particular part of Hegel’s theory of the will, that is, a part to which individual will belongs, as abstractable and abstracting it; and the stadialist idea under Darwin’s influence.

What is unique in the system of Hegel’s theory of the will is the idea that the universality of freedom is in the manifestation of communal will. That is why Marx saw inversely the repression of freedom in the communal will. We always try to look into this world of communal will from an individual’s ethics, good or evil, or religion and become exposed to the contradictions and divisions in-between. But ethics does not interpose even slightly in the concept of the communally manifest form of <will> and <freedom>. But we only end up interposing not a little ethically.

Is there any way to release this, is there any place to release the way contradiction turns into ethics -- this was a huge issue.

I thought that if the entire realm of theory of the will that Hegel conceived could be ably divided into layers and their relationality forged, we could perhaps avoid having
to engage only ethically with ideas in strange forms and, inversely, forcefully abstract the problem of ethics, morality, and character, thus breathing life into Hegel’s theory of the will. In short, I proceeded to think that we could probably avoid doing something stupid like agonizing over being divided between communal purpose, will, and individual will, ethical matters in such a sense could be released if we could separate into layers and forge into relationality individual consciousness (I used the term “illusion”), the layer that belongs to individual consciousness; opposing illusion, that is, the realm of consciousness that emerges when an individual is made to relate to another individual, which if I were to say it is the world of family and of sex between men and women, such a layer of ideas; and then state, law, and society that belong to the world of communal ideas, the world of communal will.

In short, we still have as an issue the problem of the realm which Hegel brought out in the form of the theory of the will and phenomenology of the spirit, that is, the problem of how to give closure to what appears only as a gap or lack of realization, as absence of causality, or as accidentality between an individual’s practical consciousness in this realm and what comes out as the totality of society, or what comes out as the determinant of historical tendency, that is, communal will, communal directivity.
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