Mobilization and Transformation of the Teacher Pay-For-Performance Policy in South Korea

DISSERTATION

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By

Jeong-a Kim

Graduate Program in Educational Studies

The Ohio State University

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Dissertation Committee:

Jan Nespor, Advisor

Ann Allen

Antoinette Errante
Teacher pay-for-performance policies have been introduced in many countries in order to improve the quality of the teacher workforces, which has been considered as one of the most essential determinants affecting student achievement. Based on free-market economic principles, teacher pay-for-performance aims to improve the competitiveness among teachers through competition. South Korea adopted a teacher pay-for-performance policy in 2001. Since then, the government has tried to change the rank- and seniority-centered single salary system into a performance-based payment system. Korean policymakers have tried to emulate teacher pay-for-performance in the US and UK. However, such policies cannot be exactly replicated across countries. A policy transferred across borders is transformed within the new variegated and dynamic situations. Teacher pay-for-performance policies are implemented in different ways in different contexts.

In order to explain this phenomenon, this study employs policy mobility and transformation frameworks (McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, & Theodore, 2010, 2015). Policy mobility and transformation frameworks provide explanations of how a policy developed in a certain context moves into other contexts and is transformed into a new form of policy. Policy mobility and transformation frameworks present the theoretical and conceptual basis for a dialectical relationship between a policy and society;
nevertheless, it provides very little information about how the policy actually interacts with its contexts. To investigate the process of how teacher pay-for-performance has been adopted and implemented in South Korea, therefore, there is a need to develop a more analytical and practical framework. Focusing on both policy texts and their contexts, this study investigates the processes and effects of policy mobilization and policy transformation by analyzing various types of documents related to teacher pay-for-performance, published by both proponents and opponents.

The relationship of teachers’ unions and the South Korean government, conditions of teaching, and economic changes since the Asian financial crisis are examined as contextual factors for explaining why Korean policymakers have adopted teacher pay-for-performance and how the policy has been transformed and adjusted to the unique setting of Korean society. In particular, teacher union resistance has functioned not only as an obstacle to such policies in education, but also as a driving force behind their transformation and adaptation to the South Korean context. For exposition, the transformation of teacher pay-for-performance policy can be roughly divided into five phases: introduction, institutionalization, intensification, inflation/expansion, and indigenization. In each phase, the policy has been carried out with different approaches and strategies to reach the intended goal. And also, forms and degrees of resistance have also been changed along with the change of the policy.

First, in the introduction phase, teacher pay-for-performance is introduced by the government and encounters strong opposition from opponents, especially teachers’ unions. Government officials try to negotiate with the unions to build a consensus on the
need for neoliberal approach to education. Second, in the institutionalization phase, the
government does not enforce the policy aggressively, but instead accommodates the
demands of teachers’ unions. The open tensions between the proponents and opponents
are reduced, and the government focuses on preserving the policy. Third, in an
intensification phase, the neoliberal character of the teacher pay-for-performance policy
is strengthened by increasing competition and government control over teachers. The
government develops strategies to prevent arbitrary decisions about teachers’
performance, and to cope with challenges, such as union resistance. Opponents look for
ways to fight against the strengthened policy while reducing public criticism of teachers
and their collective actions. Fourth, in the inflation/expansion phase school performance
payments are introduced. This contributes to diluting of resistance to the individual
performance payment by expanding the focus of resistance from individual to school
levels. The scope of resistance also expanded in the sense that the unions shifted the
target of resistance from the MOE to the government, fighting for fixed-term teachers
who are not members of teachers’ unions and building solidarity among opponents. Fifth,
in the indigenization phase, the government reconfigures the pay-for-performance policy
back into something resembling its original form (which had been discarded in the face of
the teachers’ initial strong resistance). Indeed, the government made the policy harsher by
making it possible to exclude low-performing teachers from teaching jobs, and to punish
teachers who oppose performance-based bonuses with dismissal. Union opponents,
however, continue to resist.
Acknowledgments

I give thanks to God who is my Shepherd all my life.

“I love you, O Lord, my strength. The Lord is my rock and my fortress and my deliverer, my God, my rock, in whom I take refuge, my shield, and the horn of my salvation, my stronghold.” Psalm 18:1-2 (English Standard Version)

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr. Jan Nespor, my advisor. He has inspired me to think about education policy deeply and differently, and has taught me how to read and write as a researcher. He has guided me through this journey of learning with great patience and encouragement. It has always been a great deal of pleasure and privilege to get his thoughtful and insightful comments on my dissertation. I am deeply grateful for being able to learn from him and with him. I would also like to thank Dr. Ann Allen and Dr. Antoinette Errante. Their constant encouragement and constructive guidance have been extremely helpful and valuable throughout my doctoral studies as well as my dissertation.

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Vita

2002..............................................................B.A. Education, Yonsei University

2004..............................................................M.A. Education, Yonsei University

2004-2006 ......................................................Research Assistant, Korean Educational
Development Institute (KEDI)

2007-2011 ......................................................Admissions Officer, Kyunghee University

2012-2013 ......................................................Researcher, Jeollabukdo Education Research
& Information Institute

Fields of Study

Major Field: Educational Studies
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Teacher pay-for-performance. Pay-for-performance, or merit pay, offers financial incentives to individual teachers, groups of teachers, or whole schools, based on measurable outcomes of their effectiveness (e.g., student academic performance, student attendance rates, graduation rates, dropout rates, classroom observations and portfolio completion) (Springer & Gardner, 2010).

Performance-based bonuses. A kind of monetary incentive that is paid differentially to individuals or organizations, according to their performance.

Differential payment ratio. The portion of differential payment that is differentially distributed, according to teachers’ performance.

Equal payment ratio. The portion of equal payment that is equally distributed, regardless of teachers’ performances.

Equal distribution. The equal division of performance-based bonuses among all teachers; teachers who receive more than the average give the difference to teachers who receive less than the average amount.

Grades circulation. To allocate the grades to teachers according to their years of teaching or other criteria, regardless of the results of performance evaluations.

Fixed-term teacher. A teacher who works as a substitute teacher—a non-regular worker—when a tenured teacher leaves the job due to parental leave, study abroad, sick leave or other reasons.
Korean names
In Korea a last name usually comes before a first name, as in Kim Jeong-a. I have written all Korean names using this practice.

KRW-USD exchange rates
US Dollars are calculated by applying the average KRW-USD exchange rate for each year.

Name changes
The names of the ministries in South Korean have been changed several times, mostly along with the changes of presidential administrations:

Ministry of Education.
Ministry of Education (MOE) (12/27/1990~1/28/2001, under the Kim Dae-jung Administration and before);
Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (MOEHRD) (1/29/2001~2/28/2008, under the Kim Dae-jung Administration and Roh Moo-hyun Administration);
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST) (2/29/2008~2/22/2013, under the Lee Myung-bak Administration); and
Ministry of Education (MOE) (2/23/2013~present, under the Park Geun-hye Administration). This is the name used throughout this document.
Ministry of Personnel Management.

Civil Service Commission (CSC) (5/24/1999~2/28/2008, under the Kim Dae-jung Administration and Roh Moo-hyun Administration);

Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MPAS) (2/29/2008~3/22/2013, under the Lee Myung-bak Administration);

Ministry of Security and Public Administration (MOSPA) (3/23/2013~11/18/2014, under the Park Geun-hye Administration); and

Ministry of Personnel Management (MPM) (11/19/2014~present, under the Park Geun-hye Administration).
List of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CIPB</td>
<td>Committee on the Improvement of Performance-based Bonuses for public educational officials</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Civil Service Commission</td>
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<td>KATU</td>
<td>Korean Association of Teachers’ Unions</td>
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<td>KCTU</td>
<td>Korean Confederation of Trade Unions</td>
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<td>KFTA</td>
<td>Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations</td>
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<td>KGEU</td>
<td>Korean Government Employees’ Union</td>
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<td>KLTU</td>
<td>Korean Liberal Teachers’ Union</td>
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<td>KOTU</td>
<td>Korean Teachers’ Union</td>
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<td>KTU</td>
<td>Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union</td>
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<td>KUTE</td>
<td>Korean Union of Teaching and Education Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEHRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Education &amp; Human Resources Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEL</td>
<td>Ministry of Employment &amp; Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOEST</td>
<td>Ministry of Education, Science and Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOSPA</td>
<td>Ministry of Security and Public Administration</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAS</td>
<td>Ministry of Public Administration and Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPM</td>
<td>Ministry of Personnel Management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPOE</td>
<td>Metropolitan and Provincial Offices of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAFT</td>
<td>National Association of Fixed-term Teachers</td>
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<td>NCGE</td>
<td>Korea National Council of Governors of Education</td>
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In the US and the UK, the political conservatives and neoliberals\(^1\) who took power in the late 1970s and early 1980s attacked unions and embraced market-based approaches to social policy (Eisenberg & Ingraham, 1993; Miller, 1988). Conservative and neoliberal policymakers believed that market-oriented competition would increase productivity and performance in education. They insisted that free market-oriented policies improve the quality of education and strengthen equal opportunity for low-income and minority students (Stedman, 1987). Reflecting the shift to neoliberal approaches, the influential report, \textit{A Nation at Risk} (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983), called for linking teacher pay to their performances (Miller, 1988).

Teacher pay-for-performance policies have since been introduced in many countries in order to improve the quality of the teacher workforces, which has been considered as one of the most essential determinants affecting student achievement (Darling-Hammond, 2000; Aaronson, Barrow & Sander, 2003; Hanushek, 2011). Pay-for-performance is designed to compensate teachers for their effectiveness based on measurable outcomes, such as standardized test scores, and to provide monetary rewards.

\(^1\) I use the term “neoliberal” in its broadest sense to refer to market-oriented political practices (Peck, 2010). Neoliberalism, in common with classical liberalism, is based on the free-market principles, such as choice, deregulation and competition. However, for enforcing those market principles, neoliberals argue that the role of the government should be small, but strong. The government puts its efforts not only on state downsizing and austerity financing, but also on the privatization and marketization of public sector through government interventions and regulations (Peck. & Tickell, 2002).
accordingly (Springer & Gardner, 2010). Based on free-market economic principles, teacher pay-for-performance aims to improve the competitiveness among teachers through competition (Davies, 2014; Peck & Tickell, 2002). It is part of a broader effort to expand the teaching workforce labor market and to encourage the free flow of the workforce by promoting labor flexibility and lowering job stability (Maguire, 2014; Kalleberg, 2009; Goldhaber et al., 2005).

Advocates for pay-for-performance say that performance-based payment is more likely to attract competent people to teaching jobs, strengthen teachers’ motivations and retain qualified teachers than the single salary schedule, which focuses on inputs, such as the teacher’s training or years of experience (Springer & Gardner, 2010). They insist that teachers should be treated like workers in other businesses (Goldhaber et al., 2008; Hanushek, 2003, 2007). These ideas have been exported globally since the 1980s, and have been adopted as elements of education reform by governments around the world.

However, such policies cannot be exactly replicated across countries. A policy transferred across borders is transformed within the new variegated and dynamic situations. Teacher pay-for-performance policies are implemented in different ways in different contexts. In order to explain how a policy moves, scholars in geography have developed a theoretical framework—policy mobility and transformation (McCann, 2011; McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, 2011; Peck, & Theodore, 2015). Based on a social-constructivist approach, the framework focuses on socio-spatial contexts where policies are implemented, and focuses on the dynamic process of how policy is socially and
institutionally constructed and contextualized (McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, 2011; Peck, & Theodore, 2015).

Drawing on this policy mobility and transformation framework (Peck, & Theodore, 2015), the purpose of this study is to investigate how the teacher pay-for-performance policy has been adopted and implemented in South Korea, focusing on the influence of contextual factors (economy, politics, culture, education, etc.) on the policy formation process, and how the policy has adapted to its specific circumstances. Teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea is not merely a matter of compensating teachers, but it involves a wide range of issues in society—e.g., the nature of teaching and schooling, teachers’ labor rights, the legitimacy of teachers’ unions, and the political confrontation over neoliberalism. This means that teacher pay-for-performance is prominently located in the center of educational, social and political debates and has far-reaching implications for Korean society.

South Korea adopted a teacher pay-for-performance policy in 2001. Since then, the government has tried to change the rank- and seniority-centered single salary system into a performance-based payment system. Korean policymakers have tried to emulate teacher pay-for-performance in the UK and US, countries that play a leading role in education reform. Indeed, in the 1990s and 2000s, many Korean educational policies were borrowed from other developed countries. In 1995, the South Korean government introduced the ‘May 31 Educational Reform’ to establish a new education system. In order to prepare education reform strategies, the Education Reform Committee\(^2\)

\(^2\) The Education Reform Committee, a presidential task force on educational reform, visited eight
benchmarked the educational reforms of developed countries and, based on the report of the committee, the South Korean government introduced various education policies focused on free-market principles and deregulation (The Education Reform Committee, 1996a, 1996b). Moreover, the Korean Education Development Institute (KEDI), a government-funded national think-tank, investigated trends and implications of education reforms in the US, UK, France, Germany and Japan (Kwak, 1998). It emphasized the necessity of devising broad and long term government-led plans for education reform and developing the reform strategies, focusing on financial support such as the performance pay system in the US. After that, Korean policymakers made a quick decision to adopt a teacher pay-for-performance policy and rolled it out rapidly (Kim & Lee, 2003). Yet teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea has not been implemented as the government officials planned. It has encountered strong resistance from teachers’ unions, and has been repeatedly revised and modified over the past 17 years.

In order to explain this phenomenon, this study employs policy mobility and transformation frameworks (McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, & Theodore, 2010, 2015). Policy mobility and transformation frameworks provide explanations of how a policy developed in a certain context moves into other contexts and is transformed into a new form of policy. They also widen and deepen the understanding of social contexts, which

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countries—e.g., the US, UK, France, Germany, Japan, Canada and Australia—and investigated their recent research and education reform trends (The Education Reform Committee, 1996b; National Archive of Korea, 2006a). The committee reported that developed countries were pushing to promote education reform for the enhancement of national competitiveness through education. The committee particularly mentioned that the US put more emphasis on excellence through competition than educational opportunity.

3 After reviewing the issues and contents of the education reforms of other developed countries, in particular, the researcher highlighted the US education reform that was triggered by the report “A Nation at Risk (1983).”
have not been sufficiently considered in the policy process. Policy mobility and transformation frameworks present the theoretical and conceptual basis for a dialectical relationship between a policy and society; nevertheless, it provides very little information about how the policy actually interacts with its contexts. To investigate the process of how teacher pay-for-performance has been adopted and implemented in South Korea, therefore, there is a need to develop a more analytical and practical framework. Focusing on both policy texts and their contexts, this study addresses the following research questions:

1) How has a teacher pay-for-performance policy been adopted and implemented in South Korea?
   A. How have contextual factors in South Korea influenced the adoption and implementation of pay-for-performance?
   B. How has the policy been adapted to the specific circumstances of South Korea?

2) How have proponents’ arguments and opponents’ arguments been fed into the policy process and been embodied in policy documents?
   A. How do different advocacy networks respond to those documents?
   B. How do policy texts deal with the arguments of opponents?

This study does not aim to provide solutions to problems that are emerging in implementing teacher pay-for-performance, nor to provide policy suggestions for developing effective policy. It provides critical perspectives and questions about the relationship between the policy and society (Ball, 1993). In addition, although this study
analyzes one policy—teacher pay-for-performance—in the single context of South Korea, it can further extend our understanding of policy mobility and transformation and provide policymakers with critical perspectives on the broad implementation of neoliberal education policies.
Chapter 2: Literature

Teacher pay-for-performance schemes are widely accepted to address the problems caused by a single salary schedule that treats teachers equally, regardless of their performance. By rewarding higher-performing teachers, the teacher pay-for-performance policy aims to improve the quality of teaching. However, there have been ongoing debates about implementing pay-for-performance in the field of education. In the first section of this study, conflicting arguments by proponents and opponents are discussed in detail after reviewing the historical background of teacher pay-for-performance. The underlying assumptions on which supporting arguments are based and the limitations of teacher pay-for-performance pointed out by opponents are examined thoroughly.

In the next section, the policy mobilization and transformation frameworks are presented as a conceptual framework for explaining how teacher pay-for-performance, developed in the US and UK, moves into South Korea, interacts with Korean social, economic, political and cultural contexts, and transforms itself into a reinforced neoliberal policy. However, policy mobilization and transformation frameworks are not useful for explaining how the policy is adjusted to specific circumstances and how the policy transforms itself according to its contexts.
Teacher Pay-for-Performance Schemes

**Background.** Teacher compensation systems have changed over time in response to social and educational needs (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Protsik, 1995). To increase equity and fairness in the teacher compensation system, a single salary schedule—i.e., the level of teacher pay is determined by the years of teaching experience and level of academic preparation—was introduced and widely used starting in the mid-20th century (Protsik, 1995). Proponents argue that the single salary schedule provides objectivity, predictability and equity by treating teachers based on an established salary schedule regardless of teacher’s gender, race and the grade level that they teach. Critics complain that fails to recognize the unequal performance of teachers. The single salary schedule does not offer sufficient rewards for a higher performance and, as a result, teachers tend to put less effort into improving their performances in the classroom. It seems to fail to hold teachers accountable for the academic achievement of their students (Protsik, 1995; Storey, 2000).

To address problems attributed to the single salary schedule, performance-based pay was proposed in the 1980s (Protsik, 1995). There had been earlier, local attempts to implement performance pay plans, but the 1980s brought the first nation-wide effort to reform the single salary schedule (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Protsik, 1995). The influential report, *A Nation at Risk* (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) claimed that teachers’ salaries should be directly linked with their performance, and called for performance-based pay to improve teachers’ performance and increase teacher accountability through monetary incentives (Protsik, 1995).
However, pay-for-performance, which was invoked by *A Nation at Risk*, was not successful in increasing teacher motivation and student achievement, and did not last long, due to reasons such as inadequate funding, invalid measurements and unfair evaluations (Protsik, 1995). However, the federal No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 required states to be equipped with a more rigorous and data-driven accountability system, and allocated hundreds of millions of dollars to states and districts that link teacher compensation with performance (e.g., student test scores) (Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Shaul & Ganson, 2005). Since then, the federal government has maintained its support for pay-for-performance by, for example, endorsing the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF), which is a federal discretionary grant program. It was started in 2006, awarding $99 million to states and school districts to develop a performance pay system in high poverty schools, and has continued to award from tens of millions to hundreds of millions of dollars since (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; U.S. Department of Education, 2016a). From 2009 to 2016, the Obama administration’s Race To The Top provided more than 4 billion dollars to states to encourage fundamental education reform, including the teacher compensation system based on performance (U.S. Department of Education, 2016b). Along with the federal effort to strengthen the performance pay system, several states have enthusiastically implemented teacher compensation systems based on performance (e.g., Denver’s ProComp and the District of Columbia’s IMPACTplus) (U.S. Department of Education, n.d.). In recent years, however, many states and districts encountering budgetary constraints have considered discontinuing these programs (Blazer, 2011).
Arguments for teacher pay-for-performance. According to proponents of pay-for-performance, under this compensation system, effective teachers will get rewarded and remain in school, while ineffective and unrewarded teachers will leave (Goldhaber et al., 2008; Hanushek, 2003, 2007; National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983). Thus, the teacher pay-for-performance policy will strengthen teachers’ motivation, attract competent people to teaching jobs and retain qualified teachers (Milkovich & Wigdor, 1991; Springer & Gardner, 2010). There are three main underlying assumptions of pay-for-performance; first, teachers, like as other workers, need fair and equitable treatment (Caillier, 2010); second, the differentiated compensation system, which links a monetary compensation with performance, contributes to educational excellence (Leigh, 2013; Hanushek, 2007); third, the nature of teaching and schooling does not differ essentially from other kinds of work (Goldhaber et al., 2005). In addition, based on empirical research, proponents claim that teacher pay-for-performance has a positive impact on increasing student achievement (Eberts et al., 2002; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Sojourner et al., 2014; Woessmann, 2011).

Fair and equitable treatment. The pay-for-performance scheme is basically derived from expectancy theory and equity theory (Johnson, 1986; Storey, 2000). From the perspective of expectancy theory, promised rewards (e.g., bonus or a promotion) are more likely to encourage employees to work harder than no rewards. Rewards work effectively when workers know what to do to get the reward and when their efforts are linked to achievable results. Equity theory also suggests that a sufficient and proper
reward is essential for improving performance, because inadequate compensation dissatisfies employees (Johnson, 1986).

From the perspectives of these two theories, advocates for pay-for-performance claim that teachers will be motivated to perform better by adequate rewards for their performances and the public will support the fair and equitable salary system in schools (OECD, 2012). At the same time, they acknowledge that for pay-for-performance to work properly, a certain set of conditions must be met: Performance must be validly measured; workers must value the reward and be motivated by that; and workers must know exactly what they are supposed to do for the reward (Bohnet & Eaton, 2003, as cited in Caillier, 2010). In addition, all workers must have an equal access to the information related to the reward and the performance, and they need to agree on the performance pay system (Lawler, 1983, as cited in Johnson, 1986).

**Educational excellence.** Proponents of pay-for-performance claim that performance pay systems contribute to improving the quality of education (Storey, 2000). They argue that a single salary schedule, which is based on the principle of equal pay for equal work, merely encourages mediocrity (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983; Protsik, 1995). Under the system, which offers rewards to both low-performing teachers and high-performing teachers, it is hard for the best teachers to find any reason to work harder or remain in teaching jobs. Moreover, there is no way to dismiss low-performing teachers under the single salary schedule (Figlio & Kenny, 2007). Thus, teacher pay-for-performance does much to improve the effectiveness of
teachers and induce qualified people into the teaching profession (Hanushek, 2007; Leigh, 2013).

**No exception for education.** Granted that teaching is a complex and multidimensional job and it is hard to measure teachers’ performance, supporters of pay-for-performance nevertheless insist that performance payment can be applied to schools. If pay-for-performance is a poor fit for education, it is not because of the nature of teaching, but because of resistance from teachers’ unions (Goldhaber et al., 2005). As Ballou (2001) has argued, there is nothing inherent in teaching and schooling that makes it hard to carry out performance assessment. The fact that private schools are more likely to operate performance-based pay systems than public schools indicates that any problems with implementing pay-for-performance are not attributable to the nature of teaching or school work per se (Goldhaber et al., 2008).

Moreover, instituting pay-for-performance, which is designed to motivate teachers by offering monetary incentives, does not require that teachers should be motivated only by extrinsic rewards instead of intrinsic rewards (Caillier, 2010). By the same token, the fact that teachers—especially, public school teachers as social service providers—are more likely to be motivated by non-monetary rewards than monetary rewards does not mean that it is unnecessary to provide monetary rewards to high-performing teachers.

**Positive effects on student performance.** Some research results show that teacher pay-for-performance has had a positive impact on student performance (Eberts et al., 2002; Figlio & Kenny, 2007; Sojourner et al., 2014; Woessmann, 2011). Because of the
lack of information about teacher incentive practices within schools (Lazear, 2000), many studies attempt to compare schools’ performance, depending on whether schools adopt the pay-for-performance system or not, rather than to analyze individual teacher’s performance and the influence on student performance. In this manner, Eberts, Hollenbeck and Stone (2002), Figlio and Kenny (2007) and Sojourner and his colleagues (2014) conducted research on the effect of pay-for-performance.

Eberts, Hollenbeck and Stone (2002) compared two high schools—one was under the pay-for-performance system and the other was under the traditional system—and they examined the influence of the individual performance-based bonuses on both student academic and non-academic performance. Since the performance-based bonuses were given as a reward for teachers’ efforts to lower student dropout rates in their study, it was effective in reducing dropout rates. However, it did not have any impact in raising student grade-point averages and attendance rates, and it even caused decreases in course passing rates. In effect, because most students who are willing to drop out are relatively low-performing students, dropout rates and student grade-point averages are positively correlated. Thus, the decrease of student dropout rates causes the decrease of student grade-point averages. If the pay-for-performance system compensated for teachers’ effort to raise student academic performance, the result would have been the opposite.

Figlio and Kenny (2007) also compared two groups of schools; one group offered individual monetary incentives and the other group did not. The results suggested that schools rewarding teachers individually based on performance produced higher test scores than schools with no rewards. Thus, the researchers conclude that there is a
positive relationship between teacher pay-for-performance and student academic achievement. However, the research has several weaknesses. First, it can be interpreted in two different ways; the effective schools are more receptive to pay-for-performance than non-effective schools, and the monetary reward contributes to improving teacher performance by raising student test scores. Moreover, in regard to the research design, there exists a considerable time interval between the two combined data—survey and test scores data were collected eight years after the teacher compensation practice date. Even though researchers assert that is not a major flaw in the research design, it is hard to ignore the fact that many related variables have been changed in eight years. As researchers acknowledged, to increase the validity of this type research and to prove the causality between teacher pay-for-performance and student performance, a controlled experimental study design is needed.

In 2005, the Minnesota state government introduced pay-for-performance, as a part of its Quality Compensation program (Q-Comp). Sojourner and his colleagues (2014) investigated the effect of this pay-for-performance program on student academic achievement in a nonexperimental context. The study shows that pay-for-performance produces an average 3 percent of a standard deviation increase in student achievement in reading and math. However, caution is required when interpreting how much teacher pay-for-performance contributes to student performance, as the influence of pay-for-performance on student performance is mixed with other components of the Q-Comp program (Sojourner et al., 2014). Besides changing the compensation system, Q-Comp

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4 Q-comp in Minnesota includes Career ladder/advancement options, job-embedded professional...
involves other factors, such as changes in professional development, and improved evaluation procedures (Minnesota Department of Education, n. d.; Sojourner et al., 2014).

In addition to studies conducted in the US, Woessmann (2011) explores a relationship between pay-for-performance and student achievement in math, science and reading across countries. Based on an analysis of the relationship of country-level pay-for-performance systems and PISA-2003 international test scores, Woessmann finds that the students in countries where pay-for-performance is implemented perform about 25 percent of a standard deviation on the math and reading tests and about 15 percent of a standard deviation on the science test higher than students in countries where pay-for-performance is not implemented.

**Arguments against teacher pay-for-performance.** Murnane & Cohen (1986) categorize the limitations of pay-for-performance into three problem areas: the measurement problem, the poor trade-off between the benefits and costs, and the distortion of the nature of teachers’ work. First, the measurement problem comes from the fact that it is not easy to develop valid and reliable measurements for teacher performance (Caillier, 2010; Eberts et al., 2002; Johnson, 1984; Storey, 2000). Second, the problem of the poor trade-off between the benefits and costs is based on the fact that the costs of evaluating teachers’ performance outweigh the benefits of providing incentives for teachers to work hard (Eberts et al., 2002; Segerholm, 2010; Thayer, 1987). Third, the distortion of the nature of teachers’ work arises from the fact that pay-for-performance systems cannot work well in school systems because teaching, contrary to
piece-rate work, is not only complex and multidimensional, but also cooperative and cumulative (Caillier, 2010; Johnson, 1986; Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Storey, 2000). In addition to the limitations mentioned above, some recent research results indicate that teacher pay-for-performance has a negative or no influence on student performance (Jones, 2013; Fryer, 2011; OECD, 2012; Springer et al., 2010, 2012).

**Measurement problem.** Opponents of teacher pay-for-performance argue that teaching cannot be properly measured by standardized measurements or by subjective assessments (Eberts et al., 2002; Johnson, 1984). First, standardized measurements, such as student academic achievement, might not be valid and appropriate. That is not only because teachers’ performance cannot be represented by test scores on certain subjects, but also because it may distort students’ learning by adopting a narrowed curriculum (Segerholm, 2010). Measuring teacher performance based on their students’ standardized test scores also tends to encourage undesirable practices such as excluding underperforming students from the test and manipulating the reported data (Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

Furthermore, it is difficult to accurately determine individual teachers’ contributions to individual students’ achievement because student academic achievement is affected by diverse participants in school—for example, other teachers and other students—and it is also affected by diverse factors that cannot be controlled by teachers (Storey, 2000). Although value-added models consider several variables other than teachers’ influence, there are still problems with statistical reliability and validity (Caillier, 2010; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).
Even if student achievement can be accurately measured, there still remain some areas—e.g., psychological development and social development—that cannot be measured by standardized tests (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Since a teacher’s job encompasses many areas, such as caring about students’ emotional and psychological well-being, fostering interpersonal skills among students, enhancing their motivation to participate in school activities, nurturing responsible citizenship, providing a good role model in daily lives, and so on, a teacher’s job should not be limited to promoting students’ cognitive development (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Storey, 2000; Vick & Martinez, 2011).

Second, in cases where teacher pay-for-performance is determined not by standardized measurement but by subjective evaluations, measuring performance also has defective aspects (Eberts et al., 2002). Evaluators may not be objective in appraising teachers’ performance because the evaluation of their subordinates is linked to the evaluation of themselves. Also, evaluators are more likely to assign a narrow range of ratings than fairly high or low ratings, because they try to avoid conflict with their teachers. As a result, it does not provide considerable differentiation among teachers (Eberts et al., 2002).

**Trade-offs between the benefits and costs.** Compared to the benefits of pay-for-performance, the costs are considerable (Eberts et al., 2002; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). The costs arise when administrators and teachers are diverted away from their normal activities. Pay-for-performance based on principals’ evaluations requires extensive time and expenditures for training the evaluators. To evaluate teachers’ performance regarding the many and diverse aspects of students’ development, the process of evaluating
teachers’ performance must be time-consuming and intensive. Performance-based payment relying on standardized test scores is even worse. When decisions on teacher’s dismissal, retention, tenure and incentives are made based on test scores, teachers tend to narrow down their curriculum and instruction plans to focus on the test. In the worst case, teachers are put under the pressure to teach their students testing skills, to manipulate data or to encourage cheating (Segerholm, 2010).

Both types of pay-for-performance—i.e., based on principals’ evaluations or based on test scores—cause teachers’ morale to fall significantly (Protsik, 1995). Although teacher pay-for-performance aims to raise teachers’ motivation and morale, it can hinder teachers from working hard. Teachers who get higher ratings and rewards are more likely to function as disrupters rather than as promoters, since their rewards may cause damage to other teachers’ self-esteem and self-efficacy (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Thayer, 1987). Except for those who continuously get the highest ratings, teachers who receive a grade lower than the one they received previously will question the fairness of the assessment. These teachers may respond to their unsatisfactory rating for their performances by working less hard. Unfair evaluation causes not only the collapse of teachers’ morale but also conflicts between teachers. Since pay-for-performance promotes competition instead of collaboration, it destroys teamwork among teachers and weakens relationships between teachers and administrators (Johnson, 1984; Podgursky & Springer, 2007).

In this regard, Murnane & Cohen (1986) insist that teacher compensation must go beyond evaluating teachers’ performance and giving rewards accordingly. It should
contribute to promoting a favorable environment for teachers and improving the quality of education. Thus, they urge that teachers’ understanding and consensus should be solicited beforehand for pay-for-performance to work as a motivational factor for the best outcomes (Caillier, 2010).

**The nature of teaching and schooling.** Opponents argue that the nature of teaching makes it difficult for pay-for-performance to be implemented in schools (Caillier, 2010; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Teaching is a complex job involving multiple tasks, rather than independent and an individualized work. Unlike factories and offices where the qualities of a worker can be agreed upon and measured (Lazear, 2000), the qualities of a good teacher are difficult to agree on and impossible to measure. Much of the work in schools is done by teachers working together, so each teacher’s performance is related to other teachers’ performance (Podgursky & Springer, 2007). Furthermore, teachers’ performance is based on the accumulation of effort of various participants (Murnane & Cohen, 1986; Johnson, 1986; Storey, 2000). This nature of teaching—complex, cooperative and cumulative—makes it impossible to link clearly the inputs and outputs (Eberts et al., 2002). In accordance with Caillier’s (2010) analysis on pay-for-performance, it is difficult to implement pay-for-performance in schools for the following reasons: teachers’ performance cannot be specified and quantified; monetary rewards do not always motivate teachers; and in most cases, it is hard for teachers to recognize expected outputs. Caillier also points out that teachers, as social service providers, are more likely motivated by nonmonetary rewards than monetary incentives.
The changes in compensation practices—from the single salary schedule to pay-for-performance—have been accompanied by the fundamental changes in the nature of teaching (Mohrman et al., 1996; Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Teacher pay-for-performance makes teachers focus on recognized and evaluated performance, rather than teaching and learning itself. Also, pay-for-performance tends to make teachers participate less in unpaid cooperative work (Jones, 2013). It indicates that teachers can behave opportunistically and try to be seen as effective instead of being the one caring about the teamwork and student substantial development (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). Since teachers are evaluated by what they cannot control and rewarded by what they do not necessarily seek, teachers perceive that pay-for-performance tends marginalize and de-professionalize them (Ball, 2003; Protsik, 1995). In addition to changes in the nature of teaching, the working relationship between teachers and their supervisors is also changed. Under the performance-based pay system, teachers are less likely to have autonomy in their work, while principals’ control is more likely to be strengthened (Protsik, 1995).

**Negative or no impact on students’ performance.** While some nonexperimental studies show that teacher pay-for-performance has positive effects on student performance, others point out that it is difficult to confirm the validity of a causal link between teacher pay-for-performance and student performance unless research is conducted under controlled experimental conditions. Thus, there have been several attempts to investigate the effect of pay-for-performance on student academic achievement in a controlled experimental setting. Most of these types of research results
show that pay-for-performance has no effect on student performance or the evidence is inconclusive (Fryer, 2011; Jones, 2013; OECD, 2012; Springer et al., 2010, 2012).

Springer et al. (2010, 2012) conducted a three-year study, Project on Incentives in Teaching (POINT), in the Metropolitan Nashville School System from the 2006-2007 through the 2008-2009 school years. They examined the effect of monetary rewards for middle school mathematics teachers whose students achieved improvement in student standardized tests. The results show that incentives for teachers in fifth grade bring in a temporary improvement in standardized test scores, but the outcome does not persist. This study concludes that incentives for teachers are not directly related to students’ academic achievement (Springer et al., 2010, 2012).

In the case of the pay-for-performance system in the New York City Public Schools, there is also no evidence that pay-for-performance improves student performance or attendance, or affects student behavior (Fryer, 2011; Marsh et al., 2011). From an analysis of student- and teacher-level data from the 2007-2008 to 2009-2010 school years, Fryer (2011) and Marsh and colleagues (2011) demonstrate that providing monetary rewards to teachers according to their school’s performance has no significant influence on student academic achievement in math and English Language Arts, and has negative influence on students attendance and behavior.

Moreover, a study conducted by the OECD (2012) concludes that there is no clear connection between pay-for-performance and student academic performance. However, this study reveals that pay-for-performance produces differentiated outcomes depending on the context of each country. More specifically, pay-for-performance is linked to better
student performance in countries where teacher salaries are relatively low, while in relatively high teacher salary contexts, the pay-for-performance systems do not seem to work well at improving student performance. The result of this study implies that policymakers need to consider teachers’ salaries and working conditions when adopting pay-for-performance in their country.

**Policy Mobilization and Transformation of Teacher Pay-for-Performance**

Teacher pay-for-performance, a controversial and powerful neoliberal policy, is transferred across the borders and has influenced education systems in many countries. South Korean policymakers are especially enthusiastic to emulate neoliberal education reform in the UK and US; they introduced a teacher pay-for-performance policy to motivate teachers and improve the quality of education. However, the policy is not transferred intact from one site to another. It is more likely to be constructed and contextualized through the interaction with various contextual factors of the new site. The unique circumstances of South Korea have pushed policymakers to adopt a teacher pay-for-performance policy there, but at the same time, due to those circumstances, the policy could not be implemented as the policymakers had planned. Thus, the introduction and adjustment of a policy requires explanations in connection with its contexts. In the following section, policy mobility and transformation frameworks, which allow examination of how policies are transferred to a different context, are discussed, as are the way policies are conditioned by socio-spatial contexts.

**Policy borrowing.** Policymakers in many countries seem to believe that there exists a single optimal model of education that can be applied everywhere and can
produce the desired results (Beech, 2006). Based on the rational-choice model, in which decisions are made in a logical and scientific way, a policy in one context is consciously adopted in another. This phenomenon is commonly referred to policy borrowing (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Phillips, 2005; Phillips & Ochs, 2003). Policy borrowing indicates that a policy—policy goals, structures/contents, instruments/techniques, institutions, ideologies, ideas/attitudes/concepts, or negative lessons—is partially or fully transferred both vertically (e.g., between hierarchical organizations) or horizontally (e.g., between nations) (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996, 2000; Peck, 2011).

Policy borrowing is a major theme of comparative education in that one of the main purposes of comparative education is to learn from elsewhere and contribute to the improvement of education (Phillips, 2005). In the early 19th century, comparative education started with the notion that education was detached from its contexts and could be transplanted from one country to another (Beech, 2006). Thus, policy borrowing was counted as an effective means to reduce the cost of reaching the goal—universally ideal education system (Beech, 2006). Most comparatists in education agree that policy borrowing follows a sequence: 1) identifying a problem in the homeland, 2) seeking solutions in other systems and 3) introducing them into the new contexts (Beech, 2006; Phillips, 2004).

Phillips and Ochs (2003, 2004) specifically explain the process of how a policy is transferred from one context to another. The process can be divided into four stages; 1) cross-national attraction, 2) decision, 3) implementation and 4) internalization. Specifically, they illuminate cross-national attraction with the impulses and the aspects of
attraction. In terms of the impulses, as preconditions of policy borrowing, researchers present the major arguments for politicians and policymakers to adopt foreign policies, which encompass internal dissatisfaction, systemic collapse, negative external evaluation, economic change, political change, new configurations and innovation in knowledge and skills.

However, some scholars attend to the differences in recipient countries and the negative aspects of policy borrowing that arise in the process of adapting a policy to new contexts (Beech, 2006). They deny the existence of the best policy that can be effective wherever it is applied (Beech, 2006). Since a transplanted policy tends to cause tension and resistance from the recipient country, an adjustment is necessary. It is important to understand the history and traditions of the education system in each country and consider the social, political, economic and cultural contexts when a policy is transferred (Arnove, 2003; Beech, 2006; McCann & Ward, 2010; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Steiner-Khamsi, 2000).

**Policy mobility and transformation.** Policy mobilization and transformation frameworks are useful in explaining how policy develops in a certain context, moves into other contexts, and transforms into a new form of policy. In other words, policy mobility and transformation frameworks focus on socio-spatial contexts, where policies are implemented, and on complex dynamics between policy actors and policy fields (Peck & Theodore, 2015; McCann, 2011). They consider the movement of policy as a mutually interdependent activity rather than as a linear and unidirectional flow from one site to another (Peck & Theodore, 2015). This means that the policy is constructed and
contextualized in a certain situation (McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, 2011; Peck, & Theodore, 201).

**The reasons for policy mobility.** The literature suggests that policy mobility can be explained by reasons of efficiency, international coalition-building and political legitimacy. First, policies that are widely adopted across countries are considered effective in solving social problems and reducing costs in the policy process (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Second, countries that recognize their common concerns and their mutual dependency are more likely to benchmark each other and to build a coalition (Dolowitz & Marsh, 1996; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Third, policies that are approved by professional consultants and experts around the world provide public confidence to support politicians and policymakers (Temenos & McCann, 2012).

**Efficiency.** When politicians and policymakers encounter policy failures accompanied with internal dissatisfaction, negative external evaluation or other social economic changes, they explore foreign policy models that address the problems elsewhere, and import a model into their homeland based on their evaluation of its potential value (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009; Phillips & Ochs, 2003, 2004). Policies that are frequently chosen and widely circulated are considered to be most effective (Evans, 2009; Peck & Theodore, 2015; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Those adopting these kinds of policies—best policies—tend to draw information from previous implementation and impact. This can presumably reduce the costs of trial and error.
Globalization and international standardization accelerate policy mobility by removing the barriers (Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000; Evans, 2009). This allows the free flow of capital and information, and these provide sufficient conditions for policies to move across the national boundaries (Stone, 2001). Furthermore, the policies that are guaranteed their success by international organizations or market experts and processed into an accessible and consumable form tend to shorten policy cycles, expedite the decision making and facilitate the implementation by allowing the ongoing revision of rules and guidelines (Peck & Theodore, 2015; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Thus, globally standardized policies can increase both speed and predictability in the policy process (Temenos & McCann, 2012).

*International coalition-building.* Policy mobility is triggered by the perception that a problem commonly observed in many countries can be solved by a similar intervention (Halpin & Troyna, 1995). Policy actors—both governmental and non-governmental—in those countries recognize their common concerns and interests and their mutual dependency (Temenos & McCann, 2012). Through international collaborations, the rationalities, strategies and technologies for effective policy implementation can be developed.

Successful policies effectively spread out through linkages, relationships and connections between policy actors such as national or international politicians, bureaucrats, consultants, researchers and journalists (Clarke, 2012; McCann, 2011; Peck, 2011, 2015). In those circumstances, the role of international institutes (e.g., the United Nations, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the World Bank...
or the International Monetary Fund) have become increasingly more important in that those organizations not only make policies and rules, but also enforce them (Clarke, 2012). The increasing dominance of transnational agencies promotes homogeneity in education. By imposing rules and policies that are not attentive to the specific traditions and contexts of each country, those agencies prompt the emergence of big policies in the global education policy field (Arnott & Ozga, 2010; Ball, 1993).

*Political legitimacy.* Policies that are widely adopted provide not only practical information and tools for policy implementation, but also political resources to support politicians and policymakers (Temenos & McCann, 2012). In order to address specific problems facing the country, politicians and policymakers scan globally for policy models, bring them to their country and adjust them locally (McCann & Ward, 2010; Temenos & McCann, 2012). Policies that have been approved by professional consultants and experts provide confidence to political leaders because they have already survived in the world market (MaCann, 2004; Temenos & McCann, 2012). On the other hand, these policies are focused on specific problems in the recipient country and intentionally processed for the benefits of policymakers (Temenos & McCann, 2012). This means that policies that are adopted from another country tend to be used for legitimizing a certain action by a government and for justifying previous policy failures (Halpin & Troyna, 1995; Johnson, 2006). Politicians and policymakers are more likely to care about political rhetoric and symbolism than the details and techniques for effective policy implementation (Halpin & Troyna, 1995).
The reason for policy transformation. Policymakers adopt policies from other countries to improve efficiency, build international coalition and obtain political legitimacy. However, those policies are not necessarily efficient nor politically secure, because the additional costs incurred in the process of adjusting policies according to different contexts, and internal resistance, can impede the successful policy implementation. According to Peck and Theodore (2010, 2015), a policy is not merely being transplanted, but it continuously remakes its relationship to the field of policy and interacts with the socio-institutional landscape.

Contextuality. Many policies that are adopted from other countries encounter difficulties in pursuing the intended goal, when historical, social, political, economic, cultural and other differences between countries are not carefully taken into consideration, nor properly fed into the policy process (Halpin & Troyna, 1995). Since policies seem to be influenced by unconsidered factors, a policy transferred from other contexts could face more challenges than an indigenous one. As Sadler (1979, as cited in Beech, 2006) points out, the factors outside the education system are more important than the education system itself, which is conditioned and influenced by outside factors—i.e., its contextual factors. This means that, due to a wide range of contextual factors, a policy is transformed into a new form and adjusted to a new context (McCann & Ward, 2012; Peck, & Theodore, 2010, 2015).

The limitations of policy mobility. Policy mobility frameworks provide a conceptual understanding of the phenomenon whereby a policy in a certain context moves to other contexts. However, this conceptual theoretical framework contains little
information about how the policy interacts with diverse contextual factors, and transforms itself into a new form of policy. Except for a few studies (McCann & Ward, 2010; Wodak & Fairclough, 2010), it is hard to find research conducted on the procedures and effects of policy transformation. Thus, the details of policy transformation—e.g., what kinds of contextual factors substantially affect the policy process and what kinds of changes the policy has undergone—need to be studied more thoroughly.

**Policy-as-Discourse and Policy Transformation**

To frame the discursive details of policy transformation, I also draw questions and concepts from critical discourse analysis (CDA), which focuses on power relations and politics through language use (Fairclough, 1989), and allows us to see policy, as discourse, as the outcome of struggles between various policy actors contending for power (Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1993; Dijk, 1990; Fairclough et al., 2011; Gasper & Apthorpe, 1996; Hyatt, 2013; Taylor, 1997).

**Policy-as-discourse.** Policy-as-discourse, which is discursively constructed and presented in written and spoken texts, has a dialectical relationship with its contexts, in that the policy shapes the social relations and structures and also it is shaped by them (Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1993; Fairclough et al., 2011; Taylor, 1997). From the perspective of policy-as-discourse, a policy is not simply to respond to problems that exist (Bacchi, 2000). Rather, the policy is carried out in order to address problems that are presented and defined by those who have the power (Bacchi, 2000; Ball, 1993, 1990; Thompson, 1994). Thus, the policy can be seen as the outcome of struggles between various policy
actors contending for power (Hyatt, 2013). As Ball explains (1993, p.14), discourse is about “what can be said, and thought, but also about who can speak, when, where and with what authority.” In this regard, the policy-as-discourse is deeply implicated in power relations. By revealing the hidden power relations and increasing consciousness about the uses and effects of discourse, it enables those who are hitherto marginalized to emancipate themselves from oppressive domination and to participate in the policy process (Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

**Power and resistance.** Policy-as-discourse is heavily involved in power relations and struggles; policies are not only the manifestation of hegemony but also the consequence of the exercise of power and resistance (Barbalet, 1985; Fairclough, 1993; Howarth, 2010). In other words, power is inherent in social relations and policies are the product of power relations (Howarth, 2010). Thus, CDA addresses how social realities are produced, reproduced, resisted and transformed (Mumby, 2004). The analysis of power and resistance suggests that multiple and contradictory discourses exist in social reality and those are reflected in the policy texts (Mumby, 2004). Furthermore, policy texts construct and regulate social and political relations (Luke, 1995). For example, the policy (text) constitutes teachers’ identity and their social relations. A series of neoliberal education policies have strengthened educational accountability and weakened teachers’ professional autonomy. Neoliberal ideology becomes internalized and naturalized and, as a result, teachers are marginalized and ignored in the educational process.

However, teachers try to constitute the reality by themselves (Luke, 1995; Wodak, 2001). There is the possibility of modifying power relations through social struggle. The
existing social relations and orders of discourse, which are established by the dominating 
groups, can be transformed by those who fight for a new social order. Since policy texts 
are often sites of struggles, the ability to produce and interpret texts is the most important 
skill in the power struggle (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). In other words, when the dominated 
groups cannot make their own voices heard, they have no choice but to comply with the 
present education system. This means that policies are stabilized and maintained for the 
benefits of people in power, since the dominant force effectively suppresses opposing 
forces (Wodak, 2001).
Chapter 3: Methods

The methods used to investigate the processes and effects of policy mobilization and policy transformation are described in this chapter. Focusing on the interaction with the contexts of South Korea, policy documents produced by both proponents and opponents of teacher pay-for-performance are examined. The analytical approach, data sources, data selection criteria and data processing procedures are presented in turn. Finally, the limitations of this study are also discussed.

Analytical Approach

To investigate the relationship between teacher pay-for-performance and the policy context of South Korea, I first describe the important contextual factors; I provide a concise historical background of South Korea to explain the confrontational relationship between the Korean government—a major proponent—and teachers’ unions—a major opponent of teacher pay-for-performance; and then, teaching conditions and the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990’s are presented to explain the reasons of policy mobilization and transformation.

On top of that, to look into the dialectical relationship between the policy and its contexts more thoroughly, I examine how proponents’ and opponents’ arguments on teacher pay-for-performance have been fed into policy process and have been embodied in policy documents. To this end, I identify major proponents and opponents, and analyze
their respective intentions to produce the documents, interpretations of the policy, strategies to achieve their goals, and interactions with other policy actors, focusing on reactions to opponents. Furthermore, I pay attention to the fact that government strategies have been developed for effective policy implementation over time, and forms and degrees of resistance have been changed along with the change of the policy. In other words, teacher pay-for-performance has been transformed and adjusted to specific circumstances of South Korea for the last two decades.

The process of policy transformation can be divided into five phases based on the change of key elements of teacher pay-for-performance: the change of differential payment ratio, and the implementation of school performance payment. As differential payment ratio increases, it intensifies competition among teachers, so differential payment ratio reveals the neoliberal characteristic of teacher pay-for-performance. And also school performance payment expands the scope of competition by forcing teachers compete with teachers not only within their own schools but also in other schools. After the introduction phase of teacher pay-for-performance, the first two phases—institutionalization and intensification phases—are classified according to the decrease and re-increase of differential performance ratio, and the latter two phases—inflation/expansion and indigenization—are classified according to the introduction and abolition of school performance payment. To determine where one phase ends and another begins, various factors, such as government strategies to cope with resistance from teachers and opponents’ resistance strategies, are also considered in addition to differential payment ratio and school performance payment.
Data Collection

Various types of documents related to teacher pay-for-performance, published by both proponents and opponents, were collected and carefully selected according to these criteria: relevance, representativeness, authenticity/credibility and time appropriateness.

Data sources. The data consist mainly of written texts that have been produced in the policy implementation process of teacher pay-for-performance. Some spoken texts, transcribed into written forms, are also included. Data consists of government documents (e.g., guidelines), laws and regulations, documents of advocacy organizations (e.g., teachers’ unions), newspapers, magazines, scholarly articles, internet-based resources and other types of texts—e.g., photographs.

Government documents. The primary text used for this study is the Guidelines for Paying Performance-Based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials published by MOE from 2001 to 2017. These guidelines stem from the Guidelines for Work Process of Performance-based Bonuses published each year by the Ministry of Personnel Management (2001-2017). The basics of performance-based bonuses are informed in the Guidelines for Work Process of Performance-based Bonuses. Specific details and information about performance-based bonuses for teachers are presented in the Guidelines for Paying Performance-Based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials. In addition, a pamphlet, a Q&A brochure, and press releases used to promote performance-based bonuses by MOE are included (see Table 1).
### Table 1

*Government Documents List*

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**Laws and regulations.** As the legal basis, the Regulations on Allowances, etc., for Public Officials and the Remuneration Regulations for Public Officials, which are directly related to performance-based bonuses, is included. In addition to these
administrative legislations, several laws and regulations documents directly and indirectly involved in the implementation of performance bonuses are considered. Those include the State Public Officials Act, the Educational Officials Act, the Disciplinary Rules for Educational Officials and the Act on the Establishment and Operation of Teachers’ Unions.

**Documents of advocacy organizations.** Press releases, statements, press conference statements, comments, newsletters, newspaper advertisements, official letters and other materials published by governmental and nongovernmental organizations—mainly teachers’ unions—to put forward their positions and demands on performance-based bonuses form another set of data documents (see Table 2). In addition, to understand the context of their positions and demands, I collected founding statements, history, organizational structure, bulletin board posts and any other relevant information for those organizations from their websites.

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**Newspapers and magazines.** A large amount of data related to the implementation of and resistance to performance-based bonuses were collected from the major daily newspapers, which represent both conservative and liberal journalism in South Korea: Chosun Ilbo, Dong-a Ilbo, Jung-ang Ilbo, Yonhap News, Hankyoreh, Kyunghyang, and so on (Choi & Han, 2012). In particular, the news articles provide detailed inside information through interviews with a government officials or the president of teachers’ unions, such as KLTU and KOTU, which rarely issue any documents publicly.

**Scholarly articles.** A number of studies on the performance-based bonus system conducted by governmental commission or individual researchers are also included. Most of them focus on surveying teachers’ and administrators’ perceptions and satisfactions
with the policy and offer development strategies based on the results of a survey (Ban et al., 2012; Ha et al., 2003; Joo & Jeon, 2010; Kim & Lee, 2004; Shin et al., 2002). Additionally, conferences and debates were held to diagnose problems and develop improvement plans for the teacher performance-based bonus system (Korean Society for the Study of Teacher Education, 2009). Scholarly articles on teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea were obtained through academic database systems such as Research Information Sharing Service (RISS), Korean studies Information Service System (KISS), and DBPIA.

**Photographs.** Photographs are collected to show the mood and emotion that are less clearly expressed in letters. Photos taken during the events such as press conferences and rallies were collected. Those pictures are released by those who hold the copyright from the websites or newspapers.

**Data Selection Criteria**

To gain a more comprehensive understanding and conduct more meaningful analyses of teacher pay-for-performance, documents are carefully selected based on the following criteria: relevance, representativeness, authenticity/credibility and time appropriateness.

**Relevance.** I searched through policy documents on teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea from the websites of the relevant organizations (see Appendix). Among the available documents, I selected those that are directly related to teacher pay-for-performance. In addition, I also reviewed and selected policy documents closely related
to pay-for-performance, such as teacher evaluations, if they provide meaningful
information about teacher pay-for-performance.

**Representativeness.** MOE has published the Guidelines for Paying Performance-
Based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials each year and then allowed MPOEs to
customize the guidelines to fit their needs and circumstances. MPOE also gives schools a
certain level of discretion in determining the details. To clarify the original intent of
policy makers pursuing this policy, the guidelines made by the MPOEs and schools are
excluded. Therefore, documents produced by the central government are analyzed in this
study. In the same vein, documents issued by the headquarters of advocacy organizations
are analyzed. When the documents from the headquarters are not available, however,
documents from the local branches are analyzed instead (e.g., KLTU, KOTU).

**Authenticity & credibility.** Documents were obtained through the official
website of the government agencies and advocacy organizations in order to prevent
documents from being changed from their original. In cases where the website of the
agency concerned no longer provides documents, documents are collected from other
for the Guidelines for Paying Performance-Based Bonuses for Public Educational
Officials through its website. 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016 documents were obtained from
an officer who is charge of performance-based bonuses in MOE by email in October
2016. The other remaining Guidelines were retrieved from the websites of KFTA and
MPOEs. As 2001 and 2005 Guidelines are unavailable, contents of those guidelines were
gathered through news articles, documents of relevant organizations and related scholarly articles.

**Time appropriateness.** Time appropriateness is factored into the selection and use of documents. To understand accurately the content of the policy, news articles written to predict the guidelines before the guidelines were officially published are excluded from the analysis.

**Data Processing**

First of all, collected documents are classified according to publishers and publication time. Then, through the process of reading the documents several times, I determined the key aspects of each document:

I partially translated some documents written in Korean into English and, when necessary, translated documents were reviewed by a person who is fluent in both English and Korean. The translation was conducted so as to be true to the original.

**Limitations**

There are limitations to my analytic approach. First, it does not necessarily include the full range of diverse and different voices, and as a result, the analysis may be biased towards policy elites. In other words, there are very few who can make their voice heard by producing texts. Thus, the perspectives of disadvantaged populations tend to be easily underrepresented and excluded (Harrison, 2015). Additionally, since it is impossible to collect and analyze all written, spoken and visual texts related to teacher pay-for-performance, texts used in this type of study are limited by practical constraints.
Because of those constraints, I might have left out significant texts in the data-selection process.
Chapter 4: Policy Context of South Korea

Policy contexts, including social-historic, economic, political and educational contexts, have shaped teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea (Arnove, 20003; Beech, 2006; McCann & Ward, 2010; McShane, 2016; Peck, 2011; Phillips & Ochs, 2003, 2004; Steiner-Khamisi, 2000). Among them, the relationship of teachers’ unions and the South Korean government, conditions of teaching, and economic changes since the Asian financial crisis are examined as contextual factors for explaining why Korean policymakers have adopted teacher pay-for-performance and how the policy has been transformed and adjusted to the unique setting of Korean society.

Historical Background

To understand the conflicting relationship between teachers’ unions and the government, I outline the Korean history focusing on major political events since the establishment of the South Korean government (see Figure 1 and Table 3). The first South Korean president, Rhee Syng-man, was elected on August 15, 1948 and he was in power for 12 years. During his reign, Rhee illegally amended the Constitution, severely repressed the opposition parties and repeatedly stuffed the ballot box in order to maintain his power⁵. At the end of January 1960, about a month before the fourth presidential

⁵ To secure Rhee Syng-man’s reelection, for example, in November 1951 the ruling party initiated a
election and fifth vice presidential election⁶, the presidential candidate of the opposing party died and Rhee became the sole presidential candidate. However, it was highly likely that the vice presidential candidate of the opposing party would be elected. To get the ruling party vice presidential candidate elected, Rhee mobilized mobsters, police and even teachers to intervene in election campaigns and to manipulate voting results.

Electoral Fraud on March 15 triggered the April 19 Revolution of 1960, which was to resist the Rhee regime's corruption and illegality and to overthrow his autocratic regime. The bloodshed revolution, which resulted in more than 180 deaths⁷ and more than 6,200 injuries, ended with Rhee Syng-man’s resignation from the presidency on April 26, 1960. (Y. Kim, 2010; Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs, 2008; Seo, 2011).

After the April 19 Revolution, which was mainly led by students and labors, the first teachers’ union, the Korean Association of Teachers’ Unions (KATU)—also known as the April 19th Teachers’ Union, organized on May 22, 1960 (Sohn, 2014). KATU emphasized the social responsibility of the teachers and the significance of paying

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⁶ Since the presidential election and vice presidential elections were separately held, the president and the vice president could come from different parties at that time.

⁷ According to the Korea Democracy Foundation (Han, 2013), the death toll at that time was 186, of which 77 were students: 36 high school students, 22 college students, and 19 elementary and middle school students.
homage to the blood of the students who died in the April 19 Revolution (Kim, 1999). However, the interim government after the Rhee Syng-man regime outlawed teacher unions, stating that teachers are not workers. So, they protested and struggled nationwide for the legalization of KATU.

On May 16, 1961, Park Chung-hee, the father of President Park Geun-hye who has been impeached in March 2017, staged a military coup and ruled for 18 years. Immediately after the coup d’état, KATU was dissolved. Over 1,500 teachers who joined KATU were dismissed and many activists were arrested on grounds of accusations of being pro-communist. In the name of national security, labor movements and collective actions of teachers as public officials were absolutely forbidden (Kim, 1999). On October 17, 1972, Park Chung-hee announced a special presidential declaration, which dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the Constitution and imposed martial law (Lim, 2012). Moreover, he enacted the new Constitution—Yushin Constitution—on December 27, 1972, under which the President was able to take power for his lifetime with all three of executive, legislative and judicial powers. The Yushin Constitution removed the provision prohibiting censorship of freedom of assembly and association and precluded public officials’ rights of labor—the right to organize, the right to bargain collectively and the right to strike (Shin, 2008). Under Park Chung-hee’s military regime, teachers were not permitted to organize unions and social movements were brutally suppressed.

After Park Chung-hee was assassinated on October 26, 1979, Chun Doo-hwan led a military coup on December 12, 1979 and took over the power of the nation. This led

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8 After the death of Park Chung-hee in October 26, 1979, Choi Kyu-hah, who was the prime minister at that
to fierce clashes between the new military forces trying to restore the dictatorial regime and citizens aspiring to democracy (Kim, 2015). In particular, the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement in 1980, which lasted for 10 days until May 27, was a desperate struggle to protest against Chun Doo-hwan’s military junta. College student and citizen protestors deployed a full-scale political struggle and staged street demonstrations, demanding the end of the military law, the release of Kim Dae-jung, who had been sentenced to death for the conspiracy of rebellion, the withdrawal of Chun Doo-hwan, and so on. To break up the protest by unarmed citizens, Chun dispatched well-trained, elite soldiers, and suppressed them by force (Ahn, 2002). According to official statistics (The May 18 Memorial Foundation, n.d.), the May 18 Gwangju Democratization Movement resulted in 154 deaths, 70 missing and 3,208 wounded. After bloody suppression of the uprising, Chun became President of South Korea through the indirect election in September 1980; nevertheless, the May 18th Gwangju Democratization Movement was the starting point for opening up the democratic movement in the 1980s.

In the 1980s, by participating in the struggle for democracy and against dictatorships, teachers gradually gained political power and public popularity (National Archive of Korea, 2006b). On May 10, 1986, 546 secondary school teachers who belonged to YMCA Secondary Educators’ Association, and 20 elementary school teachers together issued the Declaration of Educational Democratization, calling for

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9 Since these figures are the number of people who have applied for compensation and have been compensated in relation to the Gwangju Democratization Movement, the actual number of victims must be likely to be larger than these figures.
political neutrality of education, the right to education and civil rights of teachers, freedom of the establishment of independent teachers’ unions, and the elimination of supplementary classes and compulsory late-night learning for students. As this kind of movement spread across the nation, the authorities punished about 150 teachers—11 were arrested, 6 were transferred, 26 were dismissed, 9 were suspended, and so on (National Archives of Korea, 2006c). Furthermore, the June Struggle in June 1987, also known as the June Democracy Movement, became a watershed which amended the constitution to elect the president through direct elections, ended the long-standing military dictatorship and opened the space for the workers’ struggle from July to September in 1987 (Park, 2016).

In the aftermath of the Declaration of Educational Democratization in 1986 and the June Struggle in 1987, the National Association of Teachers, the predecessor of the Korean Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union (KTU), was established and two years later in 1989, the KTU was officially founded. However, the government declared the KTU illegal and dismissed 1,465 teachers who joined the union (Lee, 2012). Many dismissed teachers were reinstated in 1993; nevertheless, the KTU remained banned until 1999. In the meantime, OECD demanded that the Korean government guarantee the establishment of legitimate unions by public officials and teachers as one of the preconditions for joining OECD in 1996. In addition, the Board of International Labor Organization (ILO) urged the Korean government several times to allow teachers to unionize, approve the KTU, and guarantee freedom of association (Lee, 1999). As a result of internal and international pressures, the Act on the Establishment and Operation
of Teachers’ Unions passed through the National Assembly and KTU became legalized in 1999. Through this law, teachers were able to organize unions legally\(^{10}\) and secure the right to bargain collectively with the government in order to improve their labor conditions (Lee, 1999).

\(^{10}\) In South Korea, there are four national teachers’ unions: Korea Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union (KTU), Korean Union of Teaching and Education Workers (KUTE), the Korean Teachers Union (KOTU) and Korean Liberal Teachers’ Union (KLTU). As of 2015, officially, KTU has 53,470 (12.9%) members, KUTE has 5,857 (1.4%) members, KLTU has 568 (0.1%) members and KOTU has 389 (0.1%) members (Ministry of Employment and Labor, 2016a). On the other hand, the Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations (KFTA), which is categorized as a teachers’ professional organization, not a teachers’ union, was originally established in 1947. KFTA, the largest and most traditional teachers’ association, represents 40% of the educators from kindergarten to university as members (Korean Federation of Teachers' Association, n.d.).
Table 3

Contemporary History of South Korea

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<th>Event</th>
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<th>Regime</th>
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<th>Event</th>
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<td>Assassination of President Park Chung-hee</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(Military regime,</td>
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Conditions of Teaching

Since 1966, elementary and secondary school teachers have been paid according to the single salary schedule in South Korea. This was firmly established when differential payment by school level was stopped in 1987. Based on the Remuneration Regulations for Public Officials\textsuperscript{11}, teachers receive their salary and other allowances (Lee, 2008; National Archive of Korea, 2009). Teachers’ salary has been determined by teacher’s training and years of experience, and their salary schedule has been divided by 40 classes, which annually increased by one class. There are more than 20 allowances given to teachers (e.g., fitness training, family allowance, overtime allowance and tuition subsidy) and the portion of allowances in the total wage has been relatively high\textsuperscript{12}. To hold down salary increases in the private sector, the government has kept public officials’ salaries at the minimum level, but instead made a variety of allowances and increased the portion of allowances (Kim 2000). Consequently, the teacher compensation system has a somewhat complicated structure with various regulations and guidelines on allowances.

When the pay of teachers and private sector workers was compared, the wage (salary and allowance) of teachers was relatively lower than that of private sector workers (Jung, 1999). As of 1996, the average monthly wage of teachers (1,704,079 KRW/about 2,000 USD) was 81% of the wage of private sector workers (2,103,649 KRW/about 2,500 USD). In 1998, during the financial crisis, teachers’ annual average wages

\textsuperscript{11} From 1949 to 1954, teachers were paid on the basis of the Provisional Remuneration Regulations for Public Officials. As established under the Remuneration Regulations for Educational Officials in 1954, school teachers had a separate compensation system from other public officials, which was then integrated into the Remuneration Regulations for Public Officials from 1982 (National Archive of Korea, 2009).

\textsuperscript{12} Kim (2000) analyzed that the portion of allowance in the total remuneration was, on average, about 40% in the 1970s, about 51% in the 1980s and about 54% in the 1990s.
(1,870,824 KRW/about 1,550 USD) were 84% of private workers’ wages (2,229,286 KRW/about 1,850 USD). According to analysis by Kim Yu-seon (2000), as of 1998, the average annual wage of teachers at the 24~33 years of age were higher than the annual average pay of male college graduates in the same age. However, the annual average wage of male teachers above 34 years of age was lower than that of male college graduates of the same age, and the wage gap had been increasing.

However, the economic depression and overall restructuring of companies in the late 1990s attracted college students to the teaching profession, which provides the security of tenure. Particularly, many excellent students entered national universities of education, which train elementary school teachers, rather than the training institutions for secondary school teachers, because national universities of education almost guarantee employment (Kim & Han, 2002). However, due to the relatively low level of teachers’ wages and high levels of unemployment among graduates of the training institutions for secondary school teachers, teaching jobs have become less attractive.

In terms of teacher evaluation, performance ratings have been implemented in accordance with the provision of promotion in the Regulation for Education Officials Act (Article 18) since 1969 (Lee, 2004). Under the system of performance ratings, teachers are evaluated for their qualifications, attitudes and work performance (e.g., instruction, student guidance, educational research and assigned tasks) by a principal and an assistant principal, and divided into four grades (A: 20%, B:30%, C: 40%, D:10%). However, performance ratings have been criticized for lack of objectivity and for providing limited information for teachers’ professional development. Also, since the results of
performance ratings have been used only for personnel management purposes, a small number of teachers who want to be a principal or an educational official care about the results of the evaluation (Lee, 2004; Jeon, 2009).

In this context, to improve the quality of education, to cultivate competent teachers and to motivate teachers, the South Korean government introduced the ‘May 31 Educational Reform’ in 1995. The Presidential Commission on Educational Reform, a special presidential advisory organization, suggested an education reform similar to education reforms in the U.S. and U.K., and a number of neoliberal education policies, which focused on market principles of choice, competition and deregulation, have been implemented (The Education Reform Committee, 1996a, 1996b). In particular, the reform strategies focusing on financial support, such as the performance pay system in the US, were highlighted and the South Korean government attempted to introduce the teacher pay-for-performance policy (Kim & Yoo, 2007).

1997 Financial Crisis

In November 1997, South Korea was hit by a financial crisis, which was mainly caused by Korean conglomerate companies’ bad debt and the Korean government’s inability to deal with the potential crisis appropriately (Cho, 1999; K. Kim, 2006). South Korea had to borrow $58.4 billion from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other multilateral institutions (K. Kim, 2006). In line with its agreement with the IMF, the South Korean government has implemented a number of fiscal and structural reforms including the labor market reform to improve labor flexibility (International Monetary Fund, 1997).
Before the economic crisis, seniority-based pay systems prevailed in South Korea. However, in the aftermath of the crisis, the job insecurity of workers has increased. Under the pressure of the crisis, firms cut labor costs by laying off long-tenured workers. Korean companies were attracted by the different wage systems in the US, which provided greater labor flexibility (Cho & Keum, 2004). The South Korean government has similarly attempted to enhance competitiveness among public officials and encourage them to work hard by changing the rank- and seniority-centered salary system into a performance-based payment system.

The Kim Dae-jung Administration (1998~2003), which took office soon after the outbreak of the financial crisis, adopted the New Public Management (NPM) system in the late 1990s, as a means to cope with the crisis and as a part of public sector reform (Kwon, 2004; So & Hong, 2004). NPM, as an alternative to the traditional public administration, had been adopted in many OECD countries in the late 1970s and early 1980s (Hood, 1995), when failure of the Keynesian welfare state was seized on by neoliberals, who emphasized efficiency and competition, as well as shifts from process to output; from fixed structure to flexible structure; and from a supply-driven approach to a demand-driven approach (Hood, 1995; Larbi, 1999). From the perspective of NPM, the distinction between public sector and private sector became blurred (Hood, 1995). In the same vein, Korean policymakers pushed a series of NPM reforms, such as deregulation, privatization of public services, a performance-based budget system and a performance-based payment system, with the expectation that these private sector principles would work in the same way in the public sector (Kapucu, 2006; Kim & Moon, 2002).
Performance-based payment systems based on market-oriented competition and linked to the marketization of education were thought of as the epitome of NPM reform (Mulderrig, 2003).

On top of that, in 1999, the South Korean government announced that teachers’ retirement age would be reduced from 65 to 62. To overcome the economic challenges and to make the teaching profession more efficient, teachers had to leave their jobs three years earlier. The educational authorities claimed that if one aged teacher retires early, they could hire 2.5 new young teachers in exchange. And also, the Korean government encouraged teachers to leave their jobs earlier through the honorary retirement system, which was a kind of voluntary retirement. With monetary incentives—an honorary retirement allowance—a considerable number of teachers in their late fifties chose to leave their jobs through the honorary retirement system (Kim & Han, 2002). A sudden reduction of the teacher retirement age severely hurt teachers’ morale. And, even worse, teachers’ pride and passion were critically damaged because of the discriminatory treatment toward teachers without a similar cutback of retirement age for university professors and only one year reduction for other public servants (Kim & Han, 2002). For this reason, the South Korean government had to find ways to boost teacher morale and make a teaching job more attractive (Kim & Han, 2002; MOEHRD, 2001).
Chapter 5: The transformation of Teacher Pay-For-Performance, 1995-2017

After the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s, neoliberal approaches, such as performance-based compensation systems, were widely adopted by the South Korean government. However, policy makers have been unable to impose them without opposition. In particular, teacher union resistance has functioned not only as an obstacle to such policies in education, but also as a driving force behind their transformation and adaptation to the South Korean context. For exposition, the transformation of teacher pay-for-performance policy can be roughly divided into five phases: introduction, institutionalization, intensification, inflation/expansion, and indigenization.

The introductory or pre-implementation phase involves a series of false starts and revisions before the policy is officially introduced, and the initial opposition of teachers to the proposed plans. In the second, institutionalization phase, teachers’ union opposition continues, but the government responds not by suppressing resistance, but instead through negotiations to make the policy more acceptable to opponents. The process is one of institutionalization or normalization, as pay for performance in one form or another becomes an established element of the system.

Once institutionalized, in the third, intensification phase, proponents advance harsher or purer versions of teacher pay-for-performance, reflecting its neoliberal
emphasis on increasing competition and state control of teachers. Resistance from teachers’ unions increases in response. Fourth, in an inflationary and expansive phase, proponents expand the scope of the policy from individual teacher performance payment to school performance payments. At the same time, teacher resistance expands in scope by changing the target of resistance from Ministry of Education to the government, and by taking up new issues, in particular discrimination against fixed-term teachers, who are not members of teachers’ unions, and by building solidarity among opposition organizations. Finally, in the indigenization phase, teacher pay-for-performance achieves the intended goals—to pay all bonuses differentially according to individual teachers’ performance, equips itself with a powerful defense system against resistance forces, and finishes establishing a firm root in Korean society.


In South Korea, the teacher pay-for-performance system was first advanced, along with other neoliberal education policies, as a part of the ‘May 31 Educational Reform’ of 1995. The purported aim was to improve the quality of education and cultivate competent teachers (The Education Reform Committee, 1996a, 1996b). This early introduction was short-lived, however. Special bonus allowances were given in February of 1996 and 1997 to teachers and education officials with the top 10% of performance records (Kim & Yoo, 2007), but the program was stopped in late 1997 when the Asian financial crisis erupted and created state budgetary shortfalls in South Korea. The idea of performance-based compensation did not disappear, however. In fact, it gained new force. To cope with the crisis, South Korea had to borrow large sums of money from international organizations.
such as the IMF, and the terms of the loan required the state to restructure labor market and increase labor flexibility. In this context, performance-based payment systems were promoted as means of increasing efficiency of human resources in both private and public sectors.

Thus, in the aftermath of the crisis, the Civil Service Committee (CSC) began to prepare for the introduction of a performance-based bonus system from 1998, and officially introduced such a system in 2001. Following a Presidential Decree, the Regulations on Allowances, etc. for Public Officials (Article 7, Clause 2), directed that performance-based bonuses be paid to public officials with excellent performance records. To implement the decree, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), the government agency responsible for the personnel management of public officials, established the Guidelines for Work Process of Performance-based Bonuses in 2001. These dealt with the basics of performance-based bonuses, such as eligibility and payment methods. Since these Guidelines pertained to all public officials (Kim, 2002), the Ministry of Education (MOE) developed separate guidelines addressing specifics for public educational officials, the Guidelines for Paying Performance-Based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials (hereinafter “the Guidelines”).

The fact that pay-for-performance policies were introduced under the liberal Administration of Kim Dae-jung suggests that there was a certain degree of political consensus on the necessity of introducing such compensation systems. But this is misleading. In education, there was strong resistance from teachers’ unions, in particular the Korea Teachers’ and Education Workers’ Union (KTU), and to a lesser degree the
Korean Federation of Teachers’ Association (KFTA). The KTU, which now exerts a considerable amount of political influence in opposition to neoliberal education policies, including teacher pay-for-performance, gradually gained political power and public popularity by participating in the struggle for democracy and against dictatorships (National Archive of Korea, 2006b). Its origins in the aftermath of the Declaration of Educational Democratization in 1986 and the June Struggle in 1987 were described earlier.

The Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations (KFTA) was originally established in 1947 as a teachers’ professional organization, not a teachers’ union. From 1948 it was called the Korean Education Association and it changed its name to the current Korean Federation of Teachers’ Associations in 1989. KFTA commits itself to the improvement of teachers’ economic status, including measures such as the establishment of a single salary schedule, and professional development (Kim, Yoon, Kim & Kim, 2012). It is the largest and most traditional teachers’ organization, representing 40% of educators, from kindergarten to university faculty (Korean Federation of Teachers’ Association, n.d.). It has, however, been criticized for its decision-making structure, which is mostly centered on administrators such as principals, rather than teachers (D. Kim, 2006). In addition, the KFTA has been criticized for being too conciliatory and defending governmental education policies rather than defending the rights and interests of teachers (Kim, Yoon, Kim & Kim, 2012).

Among other things, the unions initially insisted that the specificity of education should be considered, arguing that teachers should not be treated the same as other public
officials. In response, one CSC official said in February of 2001, “regarding teachers’ resistance, we will persistently persuade them with patience.” Part of this persuasion was to be accomplished by creating committees that invited teacher participation:

We will organize the Committee on the Improvement of Performance-based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials (CIPB), in which related ministries, private experts, and teacher organizations will participate under the supervision of the Ministry of Education & Human Resources Development (MOEHRD) to develop improvement plans for performance-based bonuses. (D. Kim, 2001a, my translation)

In addition, however, the official suggested that more coercive pressures could be brought to bear, explaining that if a ministry allocated performance-based bonuses according to seniority instead of performance evaluations, its budget for bonuses would be cut (D. Kim, 2001a).

A month later, a CSC official reiterated the basic claim that “performance-based bonuses are essential for enhancing the competitiveness of the public sector, and teachers are no exception (Ko, 2001). The CSC then commissioned a study to investigate overseas examples of pay-for-performance and to develop improvement plans in 2003, focusing especially on teacher pay-for-performance (Ha et al, 2003). The fact that the study was conducted after the policy was introduced, however, suggests that the CSC was seeking a way to defend the policy from the criticism and the study was conducted to serve that purpose. The report resulting from the study emphasized the purpose of performance-based bonuses, and underlined the necessity of persuading teachers to accept the bonus system.
It is the trend of the times to introduce teacher pay-for-performance to improve the productivity and the quality of education by strengthening the rewards for teachers who have excellent performance and, by doing so, creating an atmosphere that teachers work hard. (…) Therefore, it is necessary to persuade teachers that educational performance can be evaluated and to establish evaluation criteria that most teachers can accept. (Ha et al, 2003, p.299, my translation)

Not surprisingly, then, the conclusion of the study was in alignment with the direction of the government’s policy. Thus, on the surface, the CSC showed a willingness to persuade teachers, but in addition was threatening to use coercive pressures, such as budget cuts.

**Major features of performance-based bonuses.** There were four key areas of the initial government plan, all of which were to become objects of contention: eligibility criteria, exclusion criteria, criteria for performance evaluation, and payment methods. I first outline the initial government plans, then examine the forms of union opposition and the transformations they produced in the plan.

**Eligibility.** According to the initial Guidelines, performance-based bonuses were to be given to teachers, principals and assistant principals in K-12 schools, and educational expert officials\(^{13}\) working at MOE and the MPOEs. To be eligible for the bonuses, workers had to belong to the relevant institutions as of payment date\(^{14}\). Also

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\(^{13}\) Educational expert officials refer to supervisory officials, school inspectors, educational research officials and educational researchers (Public Educational Officials Act, Article 2, Clause 2).

\(^{14}\) From 2001 to 2013, the evaluation period started on the 1\(^{st}\) January and ended on the 31\(^{st}\) December each year and the payment date was the last day of the evaluation period. But from 2013, the evaluation period has been changed to align with the school year. Now the evaluation period is from 1\(^{st}\) March to 28\(^{th}\) (or 29\(^{th}\)) February each year, and the payment date is the last day of the evaluation period.
eligible were those retired\textsuperscript{15} at the payment date, as well as those who were on temporary
leaves of absence from work (including army leaves). In addition, public educational
officials who had been dispatched, promoted, demoted, or transferred during the
evaluation period were also able to get performance-based bonuses, according to the
established criteria.

\textit{Exclusion criteria.} The 2001 Guidelines excluded teachers who had received
disciplinary actions or been released from their positions, and teachers who had worked
less than 3 months during the evaluation period.\textsuperscript{16} Setting a minimum working period
excluded short-term workers, such as part-time instructors working in schools and
governmental agencies, from performance-based bonuses. Considering the fact that
performance-based payments are supposedly intended to pay for performance regardless
of length of working time or experience, the requirement for a minimum working period
can be seen as a measure to increase job vulnerability and administrative expediency.

\textit{Criteria for evaluating performance.} The Guidelines governing the teacher pay-
for-performance policy did not initially include specific criteria for performance
evaluation. The establishment of criteria was left to the discretion of the heads of
organizations (the head of the State agency, superintendents, the heads of district offices
of education, and school principals). The heads of these organizations were to decide on
criteria for evaluating performance, including teachers’ positions, instructional hours,
assigned tasks, and any other factors unique to their own organization. A Performance-

\textsuperscript{15} If public educational officials retired at the payment date, they are considered to have worked by the
payment date and thus they are eligible for performance-based bonuses.

\textsuperscript{16} The required work period increased to 4 months in 2004 and decreased to 2 months in 2005.
based Bonuses Examination Committee (hereinafter “the examination committee”) established by each organization was to survey the opinions of its members; along with this, the head of the organization defined the criteria for performance evaluation; and the examination committee would then evaluate teachers’ performance according to the criteria.

**Payment method.** According to the initial plan of 2001, performance-based bonuses were to be paid to the top 70% of performers, and to exclude the low-performing 30%. Teachers were to be sorted into four grades (S, A, B, C) and the total amount of performance-based bonuses were paid differentially according to the assigned grade; Teachers in S-grade (top decile) were to receive 150% of their monthly salary; A-grade teachers (teachers in the 10th-30th percentiles) would get 100% of the monthly salary; B-grade teachers (in the 30th-70th percentiles) would receive 50% of their monthly salary; and C-grade teachers (in the bottom 3 deciles) would be paid nothing additional (Cho, 2001).

Through negotiation, however, performance-based bonuses were eventually paid to all teachers, including low-performing teachers, and 10% of the bonus-pay budget was equally distributed among teachers. Many teachers, however, still opposed this revised policy and attempted to return their bonuses to the government. In this introduction phase of teacher pay-for-performance, the government was seeking a way to mitigate resistance from teachers and to make the policy acceptable to teachers at the same time. Conciliation and negotiation contributed to decreasing resistance and also made
opponents hope that their demands would be accepted. In the sections that follow I track the forms of this resistance and conciliation.

**Negotiating with opponents of performance-based bonuses.** Faced with the serious opposition of teachers, the government organized a committee to discuss the improvement plans for the teacher pay-for-performance policy with various educational stakeholders. While ignoring the demand to abolish the policy, the government partially accepted the teachers’ request and agreed to pay performance-based bonuses to all teachers, including low-performing teachers, and to provide a certain portion of the bonus equally, regardless of their performances.

**Conciliation with teachers.** In the early stages of performance-based bonuses, the policy was not forcibly imposed on teachers at once. Here it is useful to note that the Ministry of Education (MOE) was not the force behind the introduction of performance-based bonuses in education. For example, when the Vice-Minister of Education stated at the 4th Meeting of CIPB in 2001 that “I understand that the performance-based bonus system was introduced to give more incentives to the public officials with excellent performance” (KFTA, 2001), the phrase “I understand” implies that he is merely conveying second-hand information, and is taking a passive stance on the introduction of this system. Again in 2001, the MOE showed a receptive attitude toward resistance from teachers, and seemed more interested in conciliation than extreme confrontation:

The Ministry of Education announced in a press release that “the tasks that teachers perform are difficult to assess accurately due to the nature of the teaching profession.” This shows that the MOE recognizes the specificity of teaching that has been claimed by KTU and schoolteachers. In addition, we consider the
MOE’s decision to consider changing performance-based bonuses to an allowance as the acceptance of the opinions of 400,000 teachers. (KTU, 2001h, my translation)

During the introductory phase, 1995-2001, the MOE seemed to agree, to some extent, with the KTU’s argument, and acknowledged problems with performance-based bonuses. This orientation extended into the next phase as well. In 2003, for example, regarding maternity leave, the MOE accepted teachers’ request that female teachers who take maternity leave should be paid, and delivered their request to CSC (Yeo, 2003). In other words, in the early phases of the performance-based bonus system, the MOE appeared to be serving as a mediator, or buffer, between the CSC and the teachers’ unions.

_The Committee on the Improvement of Performance-based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials (CIPB)._ When the 2001 Guidelines were first published, most teachers—and teachers’ unions—opposed the policy, insisting that teaching could not be standardized, and that educational outcomes could not be measured over a short period of time. To express their opposition, many teachers resolved to reject or return their performance-based bonuses (KTU, 2001a, 2001h). In this context, the government organized a committee to discuss ways to implement the performance-based bonus system better.

The CIPB was launched in March 2001. Its mission was to develop plans for a teacher pay-for-performance policy that would take into consideration the special characteristics of the teaching profession. There were eighteen appointed members: the Vice-Minister of Education, who served as chairperson, the Director of School Policy and
the Director of Teacher Policy in MOE, three representatives from teachers’ organizations (the KFTA, KTU and KOTE), two school principals, two school teachers, the Director General for the Human Resources of CSC, a university professor as an expert, three supervisory officials/school inspectors in MPOEs, a representative of parent organizations, and two press officials.

The first CIPB meeting was held on March 16, 2001 and 8 more meetings were held until the next guidelines were released in September of the following year. Representatives from parents, academia and the press argued that teachers should not be excluded from performance evaluations, and also opposed the idea of paying bonuses equally (KFTA, 2002). As suggested by the minutes of the 4th meeting on July 10, 2001 (KFTA, 2001), the MOE was also persistent in its position that performance-based bonuses could not be paid equally. The KTU, by contrast, opposed differential performance payment, while the KFTA wanted to receive performance-based bonuses while exploring ways to improve the plan. Because the government and the unions could not reach agreement on the basic direction of the policy, details regarding performance criteria and payment methods could not be discussed in the committee meeting.

Choi Hee-sun (Vice-Minister of Education, chairperson): (…) It is hard to accept the claim that all teachers are paid equally because performance-based bonuses are specified in the Regulations on Allowance, etc. for Public Officials and equal payment of them is incompatible with government policies. (…)

Woo Jae-gu (Representative of KFTA): (…) KFTA has been demanding payment for all teachers, the minimization of the differential payment ratio, and payment before the summer vacation. And KFTA has decided that it is effective to receive
them first and then convert them into benefits or welfare funds for teachers—so called “receiving and struggling.” (…)

Lee Soon-chul (Representative of KTU): Many teachers, including principals and vice-principals, are participating in the signature campaign for equal payment of performance-based bonuses. (…) Given this, if the government wants to establish a compensation system for all teachers, pay all teachers equally. (KFTA, 2001, my translation)

During the CIPB meetings there was, however, a consensus on the need to pay all teachers without exclusions. But, as mentioned above, the details of the policy could not be determined in the CIPB meetings. Decisions on details—e.g., criteria of evaluation and payment method—were delegated to the MOE and the CSC, although the KTU resisted the delegation decision and insisted that the differential payment ratio of performance-based bonuses should not be decided by the MOE and CSC (KTU, 2001g).

**Equal payment for all teachers.** After changing the original plan several times, performance-based bonuses were finally disbursed in September of 2001. The total number of grades decreased from 4 (S, A, B, C) to 3 (S, A, B) and performance-based bonuses were paid to all teachers, including the bottom 30%. Most of the total budget (90%) was differentially allocated according to the evaluation grade, and the remaining 10% was equally distributed to all teachers in the name of an ability-development subsidy.

**Union responses: returning performance-based bonuses.** Despite the Government’s revision, the teachers’ unions rejected performance-based bonuses and fiercely resisted through collective action, including the return of bonuses to the government. Under the leadership of KTU, 81,602 teachers (approximately 25% of
teachers receiving performance payment) gathered 29.8 billion KRW (about 23 million USD). To return performance-based bonuses, some branches of the KTU piled up a bunch of cash in front of the MPOEs, while and other branches returned them through bank accounts (Kim, 2001; Kim & Lee, 2003; Park, 2002; KTU, 2001m). Although the government did not accept the returned bonuses, KTU evaluated this returning struggle as the triumph over the government because it led to the change of the policy.

In 2001, the MOE planned to pay performance-based bonuses to the top 70% of the teachers and exclude the remaining 30%. And also they wanted to pay the top group more than three times the bottom groups. However, over 100,000 teachers returned the 37 billion KRW (more than $28,000,000) of differential performance payments and we defeated the differential performance payment with the united struggle of our union members. Over the following four years since 2001, while other officials’ difference performance payment has increased, teachers’ differential performance payment has been fixed at 10%, which is also a result of our equal distribution struggle. It is the history of our proud and worthwhile struggle. (KTU, 2011c, my translation)

**Institutionalization Phase (2002-2005)**

After the KTU’s attempt to return the bonuses, the government made several adjustments to accommodate the demands of opponents. The portion of equal payment to be equally distributed among teachers, regardless of their performances, was sharply increased from 10% to 90%. Although there were government attempts to decrease the equal payment ratio, claiming the high ratio was unfair to other public officials, the

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17 Figures are larger than those published in 2001. But, I quote the figures exactly as in the document.  
18 In 2001, 30% of other public officials were excluded from performance-based bonuses and from the following year 10% of them were excluded. And there is no budget for public officials to be equally paid regardless of performance.
equal payment ratio remained at 90% until 2005. During this period, the government was not pushing the pay-for-performance policy aggressively, and the resistance of teachers’ unions was not as strident as in 2001. Although the KTU continued to demand the elimination of the policy, the government ignored the demand and focused on preserving the policy. Conflicts between the government and teachers’ unions were reduced. Thus the period from 2002 to 2005 can be seen as an institutionalization phase for the teacher pay-for-performance policy, as it becomes a given, without serious confrontations between proponents and opponents.

**Accommodating the opposition.** *Maintaining a minimum level of differential performance ratio.* As noted above, the differential payment ratio, which was 90% in 2001, was reduced to 10% in 2002 and remained at that level until 2005. During this period, the difference in performance-based bonuses between the top-grade teachers and the bottom-grade teachers was relatively small (less than 120,000 KRW, about 119 USD). The focus of the policy was on paying monetary incentives to teachers under the name of performance-based bonuses, even though the payment was made to the teachers equally rather than differentially, according to teachers’ performances.

**Encouraging MPOEs to promote the performance-based bonus system.** In the 2003 and 2004 Guidelines, the MOE requested that the Metropolitan and Provincial Offices of Education (MPOEs) make efforts to introduce the performance-based payment system in schools. The MOE did not require MPOEs to record misconduct related to the bonuses or to punish teachers who were involved in such resistance actions. Instead, the government requested MPOEs’ cooperation: “It is required for MPOEs to make
multilateral efforts for the purpose of the performance-based bonus system to be widely spread among teachers” (MOEHR, 2003, 2004, my translation).

**Discriminating against young female teachers.** Despite the MOE’s conciliatory attitude, the teacher pay-for-performance policy remains a neoliberal policy. It puts more weight on efficiency than equity, and thus, for example, permitted discrimination against young female teachers, who are not expected, in Korean society, to produce work at higher levels of performance. The Guidelines exclude those who work less than 2-4 months\textsuperscript{19} during the evaluation period from performance-based bonuses. The Guidelines also exclude female teachers who take maternity leave and do not work more than the pre-determined number of months—the guidelines do not count maternity and parental leaves as working time. The government regards pregnancy as a personal matter making it hard for women to balance work and family. Since most female teachers who take maternity or parental leaves are in their twenties and thirties, they are doubly discriminated against by age as well as gender. Considering the fact that about 70% of teachers working in elementary, middle and high schools are female (Korean Educational Statistics Service, n.d.), imposing disadvantages on individual women due to childbirth and childcare can be seen as an intentional discrimination against young women.

The 2004 version of the Guidelines inserted a clause prohibiting discrimination against female public officials who take a maternity leave (not including a parental leave). Although such a clause remained part of the Guidelines for Work Process of

\textsuperscript{19} In 2001, the Guidelines exclude those who work less than 3 months during the evaluation period from performance-based bonuses. After then, the required work period increased to 4 months in 2004 and decreased to 2 months in 2005.
Performance-based Bonuses, which supposedly applied to all public officials, from 2004 until 2017, the MOE removed it from the Guidelines for public educational officials in 2005 (KFTA, 2005).

Each institution may autonomously set up separate criteria for exclusion from performance-based bonuses through the process of gathering staff members’ opinions and with consideration of the actual circumstances of each institution. But, with the consideration of the regulations reinforcing maternity protection (Framework Act on Women’s Development Article 18), female public officials who take maternity leave should not be unreasonably discriminated against, as long as the fundamental purpose of the performance-based bonuses is not undermined. (MOEHR, 2004, my translation)

Female teachers on maternity leave. Although the Guidelines excluded both female teachers on maternity leave and fixed-term teachers from performance-based bonuses, the teachers’ unions first focused on the issue as it related to tenured female teachers. It was not until 10 years after the introduction of the performance-based bonus system that teachers’ unions raised an issue of discrimination against fixed-term teachers, who were not union members.

KTU urges the following, and announces that a one-man protest begins in front of the government building from today to this end.  
<Our demand>
- Amend the guidelines that discriminate against women on maternity leave!  
- Eliminate the provisions of differential performance payment that lower fertility rates!  
- Be sure to include the period of maternity leave in the work period!
Childbirth is a result of performance, be sure to include women who are pregnant in the eligibility for performance-based bonuses! (KTU, 2003b, my translation)

KFTA stresses that it is urgent and necessary to pay performance-based bonuses to female teachers who take maternity leave for the protection of women’s rights and interests and mother and child health, although it is somewhat late to ask the CSC to pay performance-based bonuses to those on maternity leave. (…) Unless the guidelines are changed, it is clearly unfair that thousands of female teachers and female civil servants are discriminated against in employment and treatment each year only because they are women. (KFTA, 2003, my translation)

Later, in 2006, the KTU, other trade unions, and women's organizations jointly moved to file a lawsuit against the discriminatory practice against female teachers.

During the institutionalization phase, however, union resistance did not lead to substantive actions or significant results.

**Intensification Phase (2006-2010)**

Once the teacher pay-for-performance policy became relatively institutionalized, the state began to re-emphasize its neoliberal character by increasing the differential payment ratio of performance-based bonuses and by providing examples of criteria for evaluating teachers’ performance through the Guidelines. The increase in the differential payment ratio implies a purpose of intensifying competition, which free-market advocates believed would improve the quality of education. The introduction of exemplary criteria indicates the purpose of strengthening performativity, the regulation of teaching by prescribed standards, rewards and sanctions. The differential performance
ratio started to increase in 2006\textsuperscript{20} and continued to increase until 2011, when school performance payment was introduced. I will label this period the intensification phase. In this phase, the government attempted to strengthen its control over teachers, and to reinforce the pay-for-performance system to protect it against internal and external challenges, that is, arbitrary decisions on teachers’ performance, and teachers’ resistance, respectively. Teacher resistance, from the KTU in particular, became correspondingly prominent during this phase.

**Increasing differential payment and defining performance criteria.** One element of this effort was an effort to increase competition among teachers. During the intensification phase, the government tried to do this mainly by increasing the differential payment ratio. Between 2006 and 2010, the proportion of performance-based bonuses differently distributed according to teachers’ performance—the differential payment ratio—rose from 20% to 50-70% (See Table 4)\textsuperscript{21}.

\textsuperscript{20} The Roh Moo-hyun Administration (2003-2008) continued to carry out administrative reform based on NPM, which was introduced by the Kim Dae-jung Administration to cope with the financial crisis in the late 1990s. The Roh Administration focused on the efficiency of the government and on personnel management based on performance management by enacting the Framework Act on Public Service Evaluation of 2006 for promoting performance management and by implementing the Senior Executive Service System, based on the performance contract since 2006 (Kong et al., 2013; Park, 2007). Along with this, in January 2006, the CSC announced that the standard payment of performance-based bonuses increased from 57% of monthly salary to 80% in 2006, and the portion of performance-based bonuses in total annual wages would be expanded to 6% by 2010, which was 2% in 2006 (Sohn, 2006). In the situation that 10% of public officials who get the lowest grade were excluded from performance-based bonuses, the increase of the amount of performance-based bonuses led to greater differentiation between the high- and low-performing public officials. Thus, the pressure on equity with other public officials pushed MOE to increase the differential payment ratio of performance-based bonuses.

\textsuperscript{21} The Ministry of Education sets the range of the differential payment ratio of individual performance payments, and then the local governments determine the exact ratio of individual performance.
Table 4

*The 2011 Guidelines allow the differential payment ratio to be up to 100%.

The impetus behind the rise in differential pay is complex. For example, the Association for Parents Who Love School (APLS), a parents’ organization founded in 2001 and registered with the MOE, played a role. The APLS argues that it is necessary to push teachers and evaluate their practices in order to improve school education. They have supported teacher pay-for-performance, and in 2007, when the MOE announced that the differential ratio of performance-based bonuses for teachers would remain at 20%, APLS filed a request for the payment suspension of performance-based bonuses to the Seoul Central District Court. APLS asserted that performance-based bonuses should be a 100% differential payment to raise the quality of public education, and if not, that the bonuses should not be paid at all. Choi Sang-Gi, the president of APLS in 2008, condemned the KTU’s equal distribution and grades circulation. He said, “The
differential performance bonuses are paid by our tax money in order to encourage excellent teachers. (…) Therefore, if performance incentives are distributed without competition, which is what teachers desire, it is better to remove performance-based bonuses” (Kim & Hwang, 2008).

The court dismissed the APLS request the following year, ruling that the decision on the differential payment ratio fell within the discretion of the MOE (Seoul Central District Court, 2008). Nonetheless, the APLS has continued to urge that performance payments should be carried out according to the original plan (100% differential performance payment) through various methods, such as lawsuits, interviews with the press, press conferences, and participation in the related committee, to name a few.

The conciliatory position of the largest teachers’ association, the KFTA, may have also encouraged government intensification. Unlike the KTU, the KFTA accepted the pay-for-performance policy with some conditions—for example, minimization of differential payment ratio and early payment of bonuses. The organization advanced several reasons for accepting performance-based bonuses, in particular avoiding conflict with the government and public hostility toward teachers.

KFTA is willing to accept performance-based bonuses, a controversial policy, under the conditions that the differential payment ratio is minimized within 20%, the bonuses are paid early in July and the government-teachers association council is set up to discuss the overall system of performance-based bonuses. (…) KFTA concludes that the government and teachers’ organizations are responsible for minimizing conflicts and finding realistic and reasonable alternatives in order to avoid annual confrontation between the government and teachers’ organizations and the blame from the public. (…) The reason why KFTA decided
to accept performance-based bonus this year is because the annual controversy over performance-based bonuses causes widespread condemnation from the public and it damages the credibility of teachers. (KFTA, 2006, my translation)

Contrary to the KTU, which demanded the abolishment of the policy, the KFTA basically agreed with the policy and its aims—to revitalize education and motivate teachers—but requested refinements of the way the policy would be implemented, and greater government communication with teachers and staff in schools in order to achieve the policy’s goals:

KFTA hopes that the Ministry of Education will not continue to push and haul performance-based bonuses like the past ten years. We urge the MOE to come up with improvement plans for performance-based payment in order to revitalize education and motivate teachers. We do not want the policy without communication and sufficient discussion with schools. (KFTA, 2010, my translation)

Along with raising the ratio of differential pay, however, the Government also attempted to exert greater control over the criteria used to award such pay. From the beginning, the Guidelines have stated that criteria for evaluating teachers’ performance can be determined by superintendents (the head of an organization or a school principal), after deliberation by the Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee established within each organization. Starting in 2007, however, examples of criteria for performance evaluation have been provided in the Guidelines, and these criteria have become the standard for defining the role of teachers and assessing the quality of performance. Because teachers are judged, compared with other teachers, and regulated by rewards and sanctions, teachers may be more likely to orient their behavior performatively to be in
line with the criteria. Such implicit forms of government regulation and control on teaching may thus have weakened teacher autonomy and professionalism.

The exemplary criteria presented in the Guidelines are categorized into four general areas: instruction (e.g., instructional hours and the number of open classes), student guidance (e.g., student counselling and parent counselling), assigned tasks (e.g., extracurricular activity guidance and the difficulty of the position) and professional development (e.g., training hours and the award in the teaching ability contest) (see Table 5). Because the exemplary criteria heavily rely on numbers, that is, quantitative indicators, evaluating teaching by these criteria poses the risk of simplifying teaching activities, which are complex and multidimensional by nature.

Table 5

*Examples of Criteria for Evaluating Teacher’s Performance (in the 2008 Guidelines)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field of Task</th>
<th>Detailed Criteria</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>- Instructional hours</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The number of open classes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Development activity guidance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Autonomous adaptation activities guidance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Teaching various grades</td>
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<td>- Teaching various subjects</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Night self-study guidance</td>
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<td>Student Guidance</td>
<td>- Parent counseling results</td>
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<td>- Student counseling results</td>
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<td>- School gate guidance</td>
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<td>- Lunch guidance</td>
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<tr>
<th>Field of Task</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assigned Tasks</td>
<td>- Homeroom teacher or not</td>
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<td>- Difficulty of the position</td>
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<td>- Difficulty of the task (avoided task or not)</td>
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<td>- Students’ award results</td>
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<td>- Working days</td>
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<td>- Responsible for managing research/model school</td>
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<td>- Difficulty of the grade of which the teacher is in charge</td>
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<td>- Extracurricular activities guidance</td>
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<td>- Responsible for the integrated class student (special child)</td>
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<td>- Academic competition guidance</td>
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<td>- Curriculum director or not</td>
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<td>- Academic career and employment guidance</td>
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<td>- Responsible for the task of school specialization and autonomous school</td>
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<td>Professional Development</td>
<td>- Training hours</td>
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<td>- Certification related to educational activities</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Award results of research competition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Class-related scholarship personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Performance of research and development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Reward results</td>
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<td>- Participation in the research group on curriculum</td>
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**Online information of performance-based bonuses.** The MOE has required schools and teachers to observe the Guidelines and imposed requirements to release each school’s performance-based bonuses information, such as criteria for performance evaluation and differential performance ratio. The requirement to release each school’s information publicly makes it easier for the government to monitor teachers’ decisions and, as a result, more difficult for teachers to make decisions freely, opposing the teacher pay-for-performance policy. Under the name of accountability, the government has strengthened its control over teachers and schools.
To Strengthen Accountability of the Organization:

A. Each school has to publish ‘the differential payment ratio and criteria for performance evaluation’ on its website.

B. A school information disclosure data system will be introduced to disclose the ‘differential payment ratio’ and ‘criteria for performance evaluation,’ which have been decided by the Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee for the past three years. (MOEST, 2010a, my translation)

**Operating inspection teams.** Since 2010, the Guidelines have required MPOEs to operate ‘inspection teams’ and impose strict sanctions on individuals who illegally receive performance-based bonuses or who let others illegally receive them. The Guidelines state that inspection teams should be organized by the MPOEs, but can be operated in cooperation with the MOE. At least 100 schools nationwide are selected randomly and audited on whether years of teaching experience are included in the evaluation criteria, whether performance-based bonuses are distributed regardless of performance (e.g., equal distribution or grades circulation) or through collusion or the funneling of money, are redistributed after consultation, and whether there are other acts that damage the purpose of performance-based bonuses.

However, since most superintendents have a close relationship with KTU, the instruction to require superintendents to surveil teachers’ resistance actions has caused tension between superintendents and teachers. At the same time, if superintendents were to turn a blind-eye to teachers’ collective actions against performance-based bonuses, the
MOE could accuse them of disobedience. This has been another tactic of the MOE to control superintendents, most of whom oppose the teacher pay-for-performance policy\textsuperscript{22}.

The MOE has also threatened that teachers who are involved in resistance actions, such as circulating grades and distributing bonuses equally, can be subject to criminal prosecution, because the MOE considers resistance actions to be obstruction of the performance of official duties.

Performance-based bonuses are not paid out of the salaries of education officials, but an allowance based on additional resources. In this regard, it is necessary to evaluate fairly the performance of educational activities during the evaluation period and reasonably distribute performance-based bonuses. Therefore, the resolution to circulate grades and to distribute the bonuses equally at the Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee assumes that the criteria for performance evaluation were intentionally determined by an arbitrary decision, not a rational standard. This is the abuse or misuse of discretion, so those who resolve these actions may have to take a corresponding responsibility for that (Article 56 of the State Public Officials Act). (…) Also, they may have to take criminal liability if it is recognized that they interfere with the work of the person in charge of the performance-based bonuses (Article 137 of the Criminal Code). (MOEST, 2010a, my translation)

\textbf{Preventing arbitrary decisions by the examination committee.} From the beginning, the Guidelines required each organization to establish the Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee. The examination committee sets up the criteria for

\textsuperscript{22} This can be seen in the example of the deprivation of legal status of KTU. After the court ruling that it is legitimate for MOEL to deprive KTU of its legal status, the MOE ordered the 83 full-time union officials to return to school. The MOE instructed the superintendents, the head of the MPOE, to remove the 35 full-time union officials from their positions and then accused 8 superintendents who have not carried out their duties. The superintendents immediately published a statement and demanded to withdraw the accusations against the superintendents. However, they cannot help but fulfill their duties according to the instruction of MOE (Chang, 2016).
performance evaluation and evaluates the performance according to the established criteria. The Guidelines suggest that the examination committee should make efforts to collect opinions of the members of the organization and those should be democratically reflected in decisions about criteria for performance evaluation. The Guidelines state that there shall be 3-7 examination committee members, including at least one extra-curricular teacher (health teacher, nutrition teachers, librarian, professional counselor, etc.). However, since the Guidelines have not specified the composition and procedures of the examination committee, it is possible that the examination committee is made up of people who are biased toward the head of an organization or a principal. To put it differently, it has been difficult to guarantee the objectivity and reliability of the committee’s decision.

Meanwhile, the Guidelines have provided some devices to prevent arbitrary decisions by the examination committee since 2007. For example, if someone has an objection about the decision of a payment grade, they can appeal the decision by a written appeal to the head of an organization. The head of the organization or the personnel manager may request a reexamination of the examination committee only when the objection is judged to be reasonable.

A. Notification of Payment Results and Objection

(1) The Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee shall notify the head of the organization or the head of the office about the results of the examination on the payment grade.

(2) Public educational officials who have objections about the payment grade can appeal the decision by a written appeal (using the attached form) to the head of the organization. If the head of an organization or a personnel
manager determines that the objection is valid, they can request the review of the Performance-based Bonuses Examination Committee.

(3) Appeal period: more than 7 days before the performance-based bonuses are paid. (MOEHRD, 2007, my translation)

**Increasing resistance to performance-based bonuses.** The KTU again organized massive struggles to return performance-based bonuses to the government in 2006 and 2007. It also encouraged teachers to redistribute performance-based bonuses equally within a school and to circulate the grade assignments independent of their performance evaluations. Along with this, the KTU, perhaps in response to criticisms by the public that it was acting selfishly, made efforts to convert the performance-based bonuses to social funds to support the socially and economically under-privileged. Throughout the phase, the arguments of the KTU become more explicit and developed.

Most importantly, the KTU insisted that market principles should not be applied in education. They argued that market-driven educational policies have been proven to fail in other countries and, thus, teacher pay-for-performance based on market principles should be abolished (KTU, 2001g). They claim that performance-based compensation systems cause conflict and discomfort among teachers and lower their morale, rather than improve service quality and work efficiency (KTU, 2007a). More specifically, opponents claim that the performance-based compensation system ignores the teachers’ role as a public service provider and weakens the publicity of education. They also argue that teaching is complex, multidimensional and collaborative work, such that teachers’ performance cannot be measured by numbers or standardized criteria. Moreover, competition that governs the private sector should not be applied in education, because
the quality of teaching and education can be improved through collaboration among teachers, not through competition. Finally, opponents assert that teacher pay-for-performance is just a means to transfer the responsibility of education to teachers. In other words, paying performance-based bonuses cannot be a way to improve the quality of education, because current educational problems are, in fact, attributable to the lack of education funding and investments to improve the educational environment.

The reality of our education is that the educational environment is worse than that of many African countries; the number of students per class is excessive; the number of teachers is much below the legal requirement; there are a lot of instructional hours and chores; and the education budget is not enough to establish basic infrastructure. If the government really wants to improve the educational power, it should start supporting the best educational activities to be carried out by securing education finances and improving the education environment. The government must stop the mean behavior of shifting all responsibility for education to teachers who have no right to make decisions. (KTU, 2006g, my translation)

The KTU also develops the argument that monetary incentives cannot be a reward for teachers’ hard work. They consider the idea that money will make teachers work harder as anti-educational (KTU, 2006i). Since they consider teachers as public-service providers, they insist that teachers’ reward should be social respect, instead of monetary bonuses.

We emphasize that a slightly higher grade or a slightly larger bonus than other colleagues’ cannot be a reward for teachers; reward must be the fruitful experience that only a teacher can feel, and social respect for teachers. (KTU, 2006h, my translation)
The union insists that pay, personnel and promotion systems should be improved in ways that enhance teachers’ pride and self-esteem. In other words, teachers desire a more stable working environment, not monetary bonuses that make them compete with each other. And also they demand that the government should expand its support for improving the educational environment and guarantee the democratic rights of teachers—including three primary rights of labor and the right to the freedom of political activity (KTU, 2015c).

Then the alternative is clear. If the government wants to promote teacher morale, the performance-based bonus system should be removed and the plan for improving the treatment of teachers fundamentally, such as the wage system reflecting the life cycle that KTU has demanded, should be developed. (KTU, 2001e, my translation)

Opponents of teacher pay-for-performance basically disagree with the idea that teaching can be quantified because teaching is to cultivate people and is related to teachers’ and students’ personalities, which are rarely visible and measurable. They argue that teaching is a complex and diverse set of creative activities. Teaching is also long-term endeavor and, for this reason, educational outcomes cannot be produced or evaluated in a year. In addition, opponents stress that teaching is a mutually collaborative process, so it cannot be individualized to address each teacher’s performance.

We resent the frivolous idea to force short-term achievements in education—even though education is an holistic activity to nurture people and a “one-hundred-year-long plan” to cultivate the next generation—and to quantify the complex,
diverse and creative educational activities for the purpose of grading teachers. (KTU, 2006g, my translation)

KTU points out that job motivation is sufficiently induced by the HR system such as promotion and it is utterly impossible to individualize teachers’ performance because educational activities are mutually collaborative. (KTU, 2010a, my translation)

The union also claims that differential performance payment in essence grades teachers’ and students’ personalities (KTU, 2006i), and that quantifying teaching by uniform standards and evaluating only short-term outcomes will destroy the essential characteristics of education and cause side effects. Evaluating teaching in a superficial way, they argue, focuses attention on the non-essential parts of education. For example, schools can force elementary school students to attend night classes to prepare for standardized tests, and low-performing students to transfer to other schools or not to come to school on the test day (KTU, 2011e).

Schools are not factories and students are not parts to be completed. When one values short-term outcomes and quantification in ‘raising a human being,’ the essence of education disappears. It is obvious that differential performance payment, which compels outward performance by uniform standards, will not only make teachers drive students into anti-educational competition in order to improve performance, but also degrade the quality of school education by promoting non-educational competition, preventing mutual cooperation and interfering with information sharing among teachers. (…) Therefore, abolishing differential performance payment is to fight against superficial evaluation and competition, which ranks teachers and students, and also it is to preserve the essential characteristics of education. (KTU, 2006d, my translation)
Along with the leadership changes and the increase of the differential performance ratio in 2006, KTU more aggressively resisted performance-based bonuses. In 2006 and 2007, KTU organized massive struggles to return performance-based bonuses and encouraged equal distribution and grades circulation, which were organized by the branches of KTU before, at the headquarters level. Moreover, KTU started to convert the part of performance-based bonuses to social funds in order to respond to the criticism that KTU selfishly pursues their own interest without consideration of students.

**Struggling to return performance-based bonuses.** While the MOE has been striving to give performance-based bonuses to teachers through performance evaluation, teachers were making every effort not to receive that money. KTU was arguing that receiving performance-based bonuses means complying with a neoliberal approach to education—marketization and privatization in education—and accepting government’s control over teachers. Thus, KTU again decided to return performance-based bonuses to the government. Unlike the first return campaign in 2001, when KTU attempted to return the whole amount of performance-based bonuses, KTU organized to return only the differential performance payment in 2006 and 2007 (Park, 2002; B. Kim, 2010; KTU, 2001m, 2006j, 2007g). As the total amount of performance-based bonuses had been

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23 The leadership of KTU is deeply related to the resistance of KTU against performance-based bonuses. KTU is politically divided into two major fractions: ‘The Solidarity for Practicing True Education’ and ‘People Looking for the Vision of the Educational Labor Movement.’ The president of KTU is usually elected through competition between those two factions. The Solidarity for Practicing True Education aims to achieve democracy, self-reliance and unification, leads the unification education in schools, and emphasizes the practice in the field rather than the fight against the government (Namgung, 2007). On the other hand, People Looking for the Vision of the Educational Labor Movement, sees itself as faithfully representing the interests of the working class, and tends to employ aggressive strategies, such as taking leave early and taking annual leave rather than consultation or discussion with the government (Namgung, 2007). Thus, when People Looking for the Vision of the Educational Labor Movement has taken the leadership (in 2003–2004, 2006, 2013–2017), KTU has been more likely to resist the government aggressively.
getting larger, KTU excluded the equal payment, which was equally allotted among teachers regardless of their performance evaluations, from the returned performance-based bonuses. Again, KTU tried to return the bonuses by leaving piles of cash with the MPOEs and by sending money through bank accounts (Lee, 2006). In 2006, 80,189 teachers (slightly down from the 81,602 in 2001) gathered 75.8 billion KRW (about 82 million USD). And in 2007 about 40,000 teachers gathered 40 billion KRW (about 43 million USD). Despite excluding equal payments, the average amount of money per capita to be returned was about 1,000,000 KRW (about 1,000 USD) in 2006 and 2007, which was much higher than in 2001 (365,000 KRW, about 280 USD). But again, the MOE ordered MPOEs not to receive the money that KTU tried to return, and again the attempt of KTU to return the bonuses was rejected.

This is a declaration that teachers will not compete with each other in an anti-educational way, a promise not to make children a means for promotions and salary increases, and a strong resistance to vulgar competition and evaluation that rank even the personality of teachers and students. (…) We warn the Ministry of Education. Again, differential performance payment is teachers’ salaries. It was just wrongly paid, so receive it back and return it to us as a proper salary. Now we are fighting against a wrong policy and to get back the price for the sacred educational labor. Do not despise or insult it. No one can undermine the divine right of educational labor. No one can trample teachers’ self-esteem any longer. If MOE continues to ignore the teachers’ demands and show no willingness to resolve them, we clearly state that the second struggle to return differential performance payment will be deployed in a more vigorous way. Of course, the responsibility for all the terrible things in the second struggle rests entirely upon the MOE, who has no will to solve the problem. (KTU, 2006j, my translation)
As KTU clearly stated here, returning performance-based bonuses does not mean simply rejecting the money. Rather, it urges MOE to distribute the money in the way they want—as a salary, not in the way MOE wants—as performance-based bonuses. In this regard, it resembles a ping pong game with money, in which each player tries to toss a ball—money—in a way that the opponent does not want. In addition, the players send back the ball as soon as they receive it because the one who keeps the ball longer loses in that game.

**Distributing the bonuses equally.** As KTU’s struggle to return performance-based bonuses to the government has not been able to achieve its goal and it has been subject to criticism from the public, KTU has explored an alternative. KTU has encouraged teachers to divide money equally among them and to circulate their grades along with the salary schedule (KTU, 2007e). To achieve an equal distribution, S-grade teachers, who receive the most differential performance payment, give A-grade and B-grade teachers the difference between the average amount of performance-based bonuses and what they received. Grades circulation is to assign grades to teachers according to their years of teaching, regardless of the results of performance evaluation. The equal distribution and grades circulation appeared to be effective in achieving the purpose of frustrating the teacher pay-for-performance policy without any financial loss.

At the school council meeting, let’s discuss the unfairness of differential performance payment and let’s decide to divide money equally and to give grades along with the salary schedule or circulation. (...) If the government refuses to accept the returned performance bonuses, as in 2006, it will be turned into funds to support the socially underprivileged, solving the problem of depolarization of
education and irregular workers and raising scholarship and struggle funds to abolish performance-based payment. (KTU, 2007e, my translation)

**Refusing to participate in CIPB.** Since the establishment of CIPB in 2001, CIPB has been playing a role in responding to the needs of the MOE. Especially in 2006, when the performance-based bonus system encountered strong resistance from teachers’ unions again, CIPB was reorganized and it functioned to discuss the improvement plans for the performance-based bonus system. However, KTU insisted that the wage of teachers should be discussed through collective bargaining rather than through CIPB, and that the parents’ organizations should not be represented on the committee. As a sign of objection to the decision of the committee, the representative of KTU left in the middle of the meeting in October of 2007 (KFTA, 2007). KTU essentially opposed the composition of the committee and considered the decisions of the committee as non-binding.

8 CIPB members out of 12 members, excluding 4 members who represent teachers’ organizations, favored the performance-based bonus system. In addition, although 4 teachers’ organizations demand that the representative of parents’ organization should be excluded, they continued to serve as committee members without any explanation in advance. Why should we discuss the wages of teachers with parents and professors? (KTU, 2007e, my translation)

**Appealing to society.** As KTU failed to return performance-based bonuses to the government in 2001 and 2006, KTU gave teachers back as much money as much as they had given (Park, 2002; Sun, 2007). Then, the criticism was raised from inside and outside of KTU of the union’s decision to give the performance payment back to teachers. Some people pointed out that most teachers pretended to return performance-based bonuses and
expected to get them back, because they knew that there was no legal basis for the government to retrieve the bonuses. So the critics considered KTU’s returning struggle as a kind of a gimmick (Lee, 2006).

Various advocacy groups blamed KTU for the inadequacy of its struggle. For example, KLTU described KTU’s resistance as an action insulting teachers and a political show disrupting teacher evaluation, and urged it to use performance-based bonuses for disadvantaged students, rather than to return them. And, Citizens Action for the Promotion of Education Rights stated that “KTU can return performance payment in the form of donations to the school as school development funds or social welfare facilities within the boundary of the current law” (S. Shin, 2006). Furthermore, Association for Parents Who Love School criticized KTU’s equal distribution and insisted that “the MOE should retrieve performance payment and reinvest it in education, even if it revises the law” (S. Shin, 2006).

Choi Jae-kyu, the president of Seoul Liberal Teachers’ Union, asserts, “Do not insult schoolteachers who silently take care of school with a return show that thwarts teacher evaluation.” and “If KTU really wants to return performance-based bonuses, they should pay it as scholarship for disadvantaged students, such as low-income students and disabled students. (Lee, 2006, my translation)

In response to the public criticism that the teachers’ union selfishly pursues their own interests, KTU determined to raise funds for social services in order to gain social approval, and planned to use some of the performance-based bonuses as funds for social needs as well as for their struggle.
If the government refuses to accept the returned performance payment, as in 2006, it will be turned into scholarship funds to support the socially underprivileged, to solve the problem of depolarization of education and irregular workers, and into struggle funds to abolish performance-based bonuses. (KTU, 2007c, my translation)

According to the KTU Newsletter, KTU spent about 2.84 billion KRW (about 3 million USD) on scholarship projects, out of 4 billion KRW (about 4.3 million USD) that was collected for return in 2007. More specifically, scholarships were offered to underprivileged youth and students affected by the oil spillage in Taean County in 2007, and to the organizations that support students with disabilities, and regional study groups (KTU, 2008b, 2009a).

Although the KTU comes to the forefront of opposition during this intensification phase, it is also significant that in this context, two new teachers’ unions appear: the Korean Liberal Teachers’ Union (KLTU) and the Korean Teachers’ Union (KOTU), both supporting pay-for-performance policies. The KLTU was officially launched on April 22, 2006 with the slogan “anti-KTU.” Lee Pyung-gi, the first president of KLTU, clearly stated that their purpose was to reform the education system for increasing school autonomy in the age of liberalism (Cho, 2006). The KLTU supports teacher evaluation and the performance-based compensation system. The union also participated in CIPB as a representative of the teachers’ organizations and agreed, in principle, on the performance-based bonus system. Thus a KLTU representative said, “Teacher evaluation should be carried out and the performance-based bonus system for enabling a six-figure salary should be gradually implemented” at the CIPB meeting (Hwang, 2006). However,
KLTU demanded that a differential payment should be extended after setting up reasonable criteria (KFTA, 2007).

The KOTU stemmed from the New Light National Union—one of South Korea’s extreme right wing groups—and was established on November 26, 2008. The KOTU has promoted a liberal teacher movement based on autonomy, responsibility and diversity, emphasizing what it refers to as liberal democratic values in education, and thus supporting the teacher pay-for-performance policy (Park, 2008). The KOTU has also criticized left-leaning teachers—i.e., KTU—and has characterized their political tendencies as a form of ideological greed (KOTU, 2008).

**Inflation and Expansion Phase (2011-2015)**

After South Korean policy makers returned to the more extreme versions of pay-for-performance policies, they tried to expand the scope of performance evaluation from the individual to the school. I will label the years 2011-2015, during which school performance payment was introduced and implemented the “inflation/expansion phase.”

School performance payments were first introduced by the Ministry of Education in 2011, as a strategy to increase the quality of education through competition among schools. Teachers’ performance was thus to be evaluated both at the individual level and at the organizational level: teachers were to be put in competition with teachers in other schools as well as teachers within their own schools. As in the preceding phases, all this did not go completely according to plan. When school performance payment is equally allocated to teachers in one school, it functions as an equal payment and tends to offset the impact of individual performance pay. To put it differently, school performance
payment did not seem to promote competition among schools in the South Korean\textsuperscript{24} context.

It did, however, help make individual pay-for-performance become more taken-for-granted. The KTU and other organizations opposed the idea that competition between schools would increase the quality of public education, and the KTU organized struggles to return the school performance payment. In addition, the scope of teacher resistance was expanding from internal issues, such as discrimination against tenured female teachers who take maternity leave, to what had formerly been external issues such as the discrimination against fixed-term teachers who are not members of teachers’ unions.

But while teacher unions once again mounted significant resistance, the MOE’s focus on school-level performance payments also led to a blurring of the target of resistance, diverting teachers’ attention from individual performance payment to school performance pay. As opponents of performance-based bonuses focused on the elimination of school performance pay, the existence of individual performance payment was more easily taken for granted. By the time school performance payments were suspended, after five years, individual performance payments had become relatively stabilized.

In addition, the withdrawal of school performance payment provided the MOE with the argument that they had satisfied the teachers’ demand to end school performance payment, and that for this reason, teachers should compromise as well and accept individual performance payment. In the inflation phase, policymakers pose higher level

\textsuperscript{24} School performance tends to be determined by the location of the school and socio-economic status of the school (Namgung et al., 2014)
of goals than the level they actually intend. Even if the inflated goal (school performance payment) cannot be achieved, teacher pay-for-performance policy can accomplish at least its original goal (individual performance payment).

**Introducing school performance payment.** One of the KTU’s arguments against teacher pay-for-performance was that the resulting competition among teachers hindered the collaborative climate of the schools (KTU, 2006d). Seeking to blunt this objection, in 2010, the MOE announced that because it is important to promote collaboration among teachers in order to improve the quality of school education, they had decided to introduce school-level performance as the criteria for performance evaluation, in addition to individual teachers’ performance, starting in 2011 (MOEST, 2010a). The MOE claimed that the school performance payments would enhance the teaching expertise of individual teachers and the quality of school education by rewarding schools achieving excellent performance through collaborative teamwork.

It is difficult to make a difference in schools with only one or two teachers making an effort, so the agreement and collaboration of teachers within a school is urgent. It has been pointed out that paying performance-based bonuses to individual teachers causes competition among individuals and interferes with collaboration between teachers, so school performance payment is introduced to solve these problems. Because teachers’ instructional expertise and their performances are closely related to school-level performance, we put more emphasis on school-level performance as a common goal of school education. (MOEST, 2010c, my translation)

In 2011, when school performance payment was introduced, it comprised 10% of performance-based bonus. The following year it increased to 20%. Although the MOE
planned to increase the portion of school performance payment to 30%, it remained at 20% until 2015 (MOEST, 2011a). All school performance payments were then stopped in 2016.

School performance payments were allocated to schools in accordance with the evaluation results of school-level performance. Criteria for evaluating school performance are comprised of common indicators given by the MOE, and self-determined indicators decided by each MPOE. Common indicators are made up of 5 areas: progress of academic achievement, specialized programs, the participation rate for after-school activities, the dropout rate and the employment rate (Table 6).

Table 6

Common Indicators for Evaluating School Performance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>5 Areas of Common Indicators</th>
<th>Elementary</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>General High</th>
<th>Vocational High</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Progress of academic achievement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Specialized programs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Participation rate for after-school activities</td>
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<td>Physical development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dropout rate</td>
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<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
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Table 6: Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common Indicator</th>
<th>Detailed Indicator</th>
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<tr>
<td>Progress of academic achievement</td>
<td>- Decrease of deficient subjects</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Performance index reflecting school conditions</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Ratio of basic livelihood recipients and multicultural families)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>※ Excluding progress of academic achievement in elementary school, to ease the evaluation burden</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialized programs</td>
<td>- Operation of a subject classroom system, autonomous school, ability grouping-based education and English education program (extra curriculum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation rate for after-school activities</td>
<td>- Participation rate of subject, special ability and care program (in elementary school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical development</td>
<td>- Average percentage of students who get grade 1 ~ 3 through the Physical Activity Promotion System (PAPS) (for 5th and 6th grade-students)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dropout rate</td>
<td>- Percentage of students who are suspended (for reasons of conduct, maladjustment, or illness), or who withdraw or are expelled.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment rate</td>
<td>- The number of graduates who are employed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Criteria for evaluating school-level performance.**

Self-determined indicators are determined by MPOE, and take into consideration special circumstances, such as condition indicators—the number of class hours, the number of students and school location. To ease the burden evaluation places on schools, the number of autonomous indicators (3 or 4) is similar to the number of common
indicators (3 or 4), and the total number of (common and self-determined) indicators may not exceed 8.

**Suspension of school performance pay.** In September of 2015, the MOE announced that school performance payments would be suspended in 2016, in order to reduce the overall evaluation burden felt by teachers (MOE, 2015b). Kim Dong-won, the executive director of the Office of School Policy, said, “There are many teachers who complain that school performance grades are determined by the geographical and social conditions of the school, regardless of individual teachers’ efforts.” This suggests that the MOE had accepted the demands of teachers’ unions to abolish school performance payment (Roh, 2015). However, considering that the plan to abolish school performance payment had been included in the improvement plan for the teacher evaluation system, it could also be interpreted as a tactic used by the MOE in an attempt to pacify opposition to the new teacher evaluation system.

A more plausible explanation for ending school performance payments was that they conflicted with individual performance payments. Because teachers’ grades for individual performance payment are given according to a fixed portion (A-grade: 30%, B-grade: 40%, C-grade: 30%), teachers must compete with each other to get better grades. School performance payments, however, were equally disbursed to all teachers in a school, and reduced the portion of differential payment. In addition, it did not seem that school performance payments actually made teachers work collaboratively to produce better school-level performance.
Realignment of the performance-based bonuses system. Presenting the purposes of performance-based bonuses. For the first ten years of the performance-based bonus system, the MOE did not clearly state the purpose of the system in their policy documents. After school performance payments were introduced in 2011, however, the MOE claimed, without providing empirical evidence, that the school bonuses would improve the quality of education and promote teacher morale by inducing collaboration and competition (MOEST, 2012b), improve teachers’ instructional expertise, and strengthen school-life guidance:

- Performance-based bonuses aim to improve the quality of education and also promote teacher morale by inducing collaboration and competition among teachers.
- School performance pay aims to improve instructional expertise and strengthen school-life guidance by inducing friendly competition among schools as well as teachers. (MOEST, 2012b, my translation)

Although teacher pay-for-performance is based on market-oriented competition, the MOE inserted the term “collaboration” into the Guidelines and argued that teachers would make concerted efforts to earn school performance payments. Interestingly, in 2016, “collaboration” remains in the purpose statement of the Guidelines, even though school performance payments are no longer being used:

- Performance-based bonuses aim to improve the quality of education and also promote teacher morale by inducing collaboration and competition among teachers.
Performance-based bonuses aim to create conditions for teachers to devote themselves to education by giving preferential treatment to teachers who are good at instruction and school-life guidance. (MOE, 2016a, my translation)

**Payment of performance-based bonuses in proportion to the work period.** From 2014, performance-based bonuses started to be paid in proportion to the work period. After fixed-term teachers were paid *pro rata* in accordance with the separate guidelines in 2013, this practice has been applied to the overall payment of performance-based bonuses for teachers. It shows that the Guidelines consider teaching to be daily based work, like piece-rate work in factories.

- Payment method: Payments to individuals who have worked for at least two months in proportion to their working days.
- Calculation of the amount of payment: \[\text{[the amount of payment for the applicable grade } \times (\text{number of months normally working} \div 12 \text{ months})] + \text{[the amount of payment for a month (the month of leave) for the applicable grade } \times (\text{number of working days} \div \text{number of days of the month of leave})}\] (MOE, 2014, my translation)

**Publicizing procedural justifications.** The MOE used the Committee on the Improvement of Performance-based Bonuses for Public Educational Officials (CIPB) to publicize that fact that they were taking into account a range of opinions, including teachers’ opinion, in the policy making process. Thus, when the MOE announced that the percentage of school performance payments increased from 10% in 2011 to 20% in 2012, they emphasized that the decision reflected various voices articulated through the CIPB:

This is determined based on the various opinions collected by the CIPB in the MOE and the Delegation of Elementary and Secondary School Principals, as well
as on a comprehensive consideration of equality with other public officials, police and fire-fighters. (MOE, 2012a, my translation)

The MOE allowed teachers to participate in the decision-making process through CIPB, allowing teachers to raise their voices in opposition to the pay-for-performance scheme. However, most committee members were proponents of performance-based bonuses. Moreover, even majority opinions were easily ignored by the MOE. In this regard, voice and participation on the committee seemed to be in name only.

**Excluding teachers who illegally receive performance-based bonuses.** The Guidelines state that teachers who let others receive performance-based bonuses ‘illegally,’ or who receive them illegally, are not eligible for performance-based bonuses. This was an effort to blunt union strategies of redistributing bonus money.

From 2011, to cope with teachers’ resistance, which impedes the implementation of performance-based bonuses, the Guidelines define some behaviors as illegal and exclude those who practice them from receiving performance-based bonuses. The aim was clearly to deter the KTU’s collective actions, such as equal distribution and grades circulation.

If the past actions of receiving performance-based bonuses by false and unlawful means are identified this year, they will be excluded from performance-based bonuses. If the performance-based bonuses have already been paid, they shall not be paid next year. Illegal actions include:

- Distributing performance-based bonuses irrespective of performance record, work performance, etc.
- Receiving performance-based bonuses through collusion or the funneling of money, etc.
Redistributing performance-based bonuses through consultation and conspiracy after normally receiving them.
(MOEST, 2011b, my translation)

**Returning school performance payment and distributing equally.** After school performance payments were introduced, the KTU organized teachers to return only the school performance payments, not the individual performance payment, in 2011 and 2013 (Ko, 2013; KTU, 2011g; KTU, NAFT & KCTU, 2012b). In 2011, 1 billion KRW (about 870,000 USD) of school performance payment was collected to be returned and in 2013, 6.9 billion KRW (6.6 million USD) was collected from 15,113 teachers. However, all attempts of KTU to return performance-based bonuses were rejected by the MOE. In addition, KTU organized the equal distribution of school performance payment as a means to incapacitate performance-based bonuses, insisting that school performance payment only promotes anti-educational competition and demoralizes teachers (KTU, 2014).

**Expanding resistance. Changing the target of resistance: from MOE to the government.** Teachers’ unions have changed the targets of blame and the objects of the struggle. At the early stage of the teacher pay-for-performance policy, teachers’ unions struggled against the MOE, tried to negotiate with MOE, and called for the resignation of the Minister of Education at times. MOE still remains the main target of blame; nevertheless, KTU has expanded their target of blame to the entire government, not just the MOE. While the progressive presidents—Kim Dae-jung (1998-2001) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008)—were in power, the KTU never demanded the resignation of the president. In contrast, during the regimes of the conservative presidents—Lee Myung-bak
(2008-2013) and Park Geun-hye (2013-2017, the KTU shifted its focus to the government and the president. Meanwhile, ironically, the MOE has positioned itself as a substantial player by organizing inspection teams and excluding teachers who resist the policy from performance-based bonuses (KTU, 2016e; MOEST, 2010a, 2011b).

It is already 40 days since KTU has staged an all-day sit-in in front of the Ministry of Education in urging a resolution of educational issues. The number of teachers who oppose differential performance payment has exceeded 110,000. (…) Even now, KTU urges Kim Byung-Joon, the Deputy Prime Minister for Education, to show that he is responsible for cooperation and communication with the teachers by suspending performance-based bonuses and teacher evaluation, and reconsidering them from the starting point. Finally, KTU clarifies once again that we will fight to the end against policies that undermine educational publicity and result in control of teachers and restructuring. (KTU, 2006e, my translation)

The Park Geun-hye Administration must abolish performance-based bonuses that destroy the public sector. (…) Therefore, KGEU and KTU call for the immediate abolition of performance-based bonuses in the public sector beyond the opposition to the amendment of “Regulations on Allowances, etc. for Local Public Officials” submitted by the Ministry of the Interior. (KTU & KGEU, 2015, my translation)

*Expanding resistance: separate guidelines for fixed-term teachers.* Like pay-for-performance policies themselves, teachers’ resistance to the policies also expanded during the inflation/expansion phase. From the beginning (2001), fixed-term teachers had been excluded from performance-based bonuses because the government did not consider them public educational officials. Ten years later, the matter of non-regular teachers was raised as an issue, as the attention of teachers’ unions had expanded from internal to
external. Since fixed-term teachers do not have a membership in teachers’ unions, the
unions were hardly interested in fighting on their behalf in the early 2000s.

However, in the inflation/expansion phase of the teacher pay-for-performance
policy, KTU started to fight for the rights of fixed-term teachers, campaigning for them to
receive performance-based bonuses as public officials. KTU and KCTU have made joint
efforts to support the process of filing a lawsuit and a joint press conference on behalf of

However, fixed-term teachers are excluded from the object of performance-based
bonuses simply because they are non-regular workers. Therefore, four teachers
who work as fixed-term teachers file a claim for damages caused by the
Guidelines in which MOEST excluded fixed-term teachers from performance-
based bonuses. (KTCU, 2011, my translation)

On May 3, 2011, with the supports of KTU and KCTU, four fixed-term teachers
filed a lawsuit against the government, which had excluded fixed-term teachers from
performance-based bonuses. In 2012, they won the lawsuit in recognition of their right to
receive performance-based bonuses. On October 2012, the National Association of
Fixed-term Teachers (NAFT), KCTU and KTU launched a class action law suit, in which
more than 2,700 fixed-term teachers participated as plaintiffs.

Fixed-term teachers decided to voice their opinions and established the National
Association of Fixed-term Teachers, because they no longer trusted the MOE.
The first action of NAFT is to file a class action suit. Over 2,700 teachers,
surpassing the one thousand initially targeted, have joined the class action lawsuit
as of today. (KTU, NAFT & KCTU, 2012b, my translation)
In 2012, the Seoul Central District Court ruled that fixed-term teachers are, in fact, public education officials and they have the right to demand performance-based bonuses. Despite the time limit, it is clear that fixed-term teachers are education officials, appointed according to the Educational Officials Act. It is also clear that fixed-term teachers have the legal right to demand compensation and the right to receive performance-based bonuses as stipulated by the provisions of the Regulations on Allowance, etc. for Public Officials, unless there are special circumstances.

The performance-based bonuses stipulated by the provisions of the Regulations on Allowance, etc. are given to those who produce excellent performance within the budget. Criteria for paying performance-based bonuses should be determined by performance evaluations, and it should not be paid according to career or status. It is a discriminatory act to determine whether or not fixed-term teachers are paid in accordance with their status, which is not relevant to their performance or duties. (Seoul Central District Court, 2012, my translation)

The MOE rejected this ruling:

In our department, we decided that fixed-term teachers are not public educational officials and thus we cannot accept the court’s decision. Therefore, we filed an appeal and are going to respond actively to the appeal. (MOEST, 2012c, my translation)

Thus, despite the court’s ruling that fixed-term teachers are public education officials with the right to demand performance-based bonuses (Seoul Central District Court, 2012), the MOE did not recognized fixed-term teachers as public officials. However, in 2013, the MOE did set up separate guidelines for fixed-term teachers and has since paid performance-based bonuses to fixed-term teachers. These separate
guidelines function as a filter to discriminate non-regular workers (fixed-term teachers) from regular workers (tenured teachers). KTU criticizes these guidelines, refuting that it is the path to better education, and demands the elimination of discrimination against fixed-term teachers.

If the MOE really wants to boost teachers’ morale and increase the educational power of the schools, there is no need to provide the separate guidelines of paying performance-based bonuses for fixed-term teachers. (KTU, 2012d, my translation)

Fixed-term teachers, as plaintiffs, will participate in the press conference wearing the traditional Korean face masks ‘Gagsital.’ Because of the regrettable reality, incumbent fixed-term teachers should be concerned about disadvantages when they disclose their names and make speeches publicly. And the same disadvantages are concerned when they leave early for the press conference. Thus, it is unavoidable that the press conference time is delayed. (KTU, NAFT & KCTU, 2012a, my translation)
Due to the temporary status of the job, fixed-term teachers not only are discriminated against, but also are threatened with employment termination when they resist the governmental policy. To avoid the difficulties of revealing their identities in public, fixed-term teachers who attended the press conference wore traditional Korean masks (Figure 2). They needed to replace their identity as a teacher with anonymity to survive as a teacher.

The MOE position is that fixed-term teachers are not public educational officials. Instead, the MOE set up separate guidelines for fixed-term teachers and paid them bonuses based on these guidelines since 2013. The amount of performance-based bonuses
for fixed-term teachers is significantly less than that of tenured teachers. In 2013, while S-grade tenured teachers received 3,995,670 KRW\(^{25}\) (approximately 3,800 USD) as performance-based bonuses, S-grade fixed-term teachers received 2,378,760 KRW\(^{26}\) (approximately 2,300 USD), which was only 60% of tenured teachers’ performance-based bonuses.

Later, the Supreme Court over-turned the District Court and ruled that the MOE’s decision to exclude fixed-term teachers from performance-based bonuses was lawful, thus rejecting the eligibility of fixed-term teachers for performance-based bonuses.

In principle, performance-based bonuses are paid to public officials according to the evaluation results of the previous year’s work, to encourage them to keep improving their performance in the next year. Fixed-term teachers are employed for a short period of time—less than a year—and they are expected to retire when the term of employment expires. Therefore, it is difficult to say that paying performance bonuses to fixed-term teachers is compatible with the intention of the performance-based bonus system. (Supreme Court, 2017, my translation)

**Indigenization Phase (2016-present)**

After the stages of internal enhancement—the intensification phase—and external enlargement—the inflation/expansion phase, teacher pay-for-performance has seemingly become firmly settled in South Korea’s governmental infrastructure. In the process, the government has also reintroduced more extreme versions of the policy. In 2016, when school performance payment was suspended, the differential payment ratio for

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\(^{25}\) Tenured teachers received 80% of the individual performance payment and 20% of the school performance payment. S-grade tenured teachers received 3,031,840 KRW as the individual performance payment and 963,830 KRW as the school performance payment when 50% of the differential payment ratio—the minimum level—was applied in 2013.

\(^{26}\) S-grade fixed-term teachers received 2,378,760 KRW as 100% of the individual performance payment when 70% of the differential payment ratio—the minimum level—was applied in 2013.
individuals increased to 70%-100%. Similar to the initial plan of 2001, 100% of performance-based bonuses can now be differentially paid according to individual teachers’ performance. This means that the teacher pay-for-performance policy seems to have been shaped back into the form in which it was initially proposed. Indeed, the government now also attempts not only to exclude low-performing teachers from bonuses, but from teaching jobs, through a revision of the State Public Officials Act (MPM, 2016c). The 2016 Guidelines also contain provisions for the punishment of teachers who redistribute performance-based bonuses through consultation and conspiracy—equal distribution—with the maximum punishment being dismissal. I label this current period, beginning in 2016, the indigenization phase of the teacher pay-for-performance policy. In this phase, the teacher pay-for-performance policy has consolidated its neoliberal characteristics and seemingly successfully defended itself against resistance forces.

However, as the history detailed in previous sections makes clear, such success is contingent. In response to the government’s strategies to remove resistance by the roots, opponents declared all-out war, using all available resources. The KTU continues to organize the equal distribution of performance-based bonuses. Moreover, the KTU has issued a newspaper advertisement in conjunction with the Korean Government Employees’ Union (KGEU) to appeal for public support (KTU & KGEU, 2016b). Through these newspaper advertisements, KTU discloses the names of teachers who oppose performance-based bonuses. In addition, the KFTA launched a petition to abolish

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27 MOE sets the range of the differential ratio of individual performance payment and leaves determining the rate of it to MPOEs and schools.
28 The initial plan of 2001 planned to pay performance-based bonuses to 70% of teachers and exclude bottom 30% teachers.
the teacher pay-for-performance policy, and about 50% of school teachers signed it in October 2016. In the following month, the Korea National Council of Governors of Education (NCGE) demanded the abolition of performance-based bonuses, as well as the resignation of the South Korean president.

**Recovering the original shape of performance-based bonuses.** According to the initial plan of 2001, performance-based bonuses were supposed to be paid based on the evaluation of individual teachers’ performance. The total amount of performance-based bonuses (100%) were to be paid differentially, according to the evaluation results. The equal payment ratio, which accounted for 90% of the performance-based bonus in 2002, gradually decreased and fell to 0-30% in 2016, with the differential performance payment rising from 10% to 70-100%, accordingly. Although there has been a tendency for the MPOEs and schools to choose the minimum differential payment ratio, the 2016 Guidelines allow teachers to receive 100% of differential performance payment. Thus it seems that the payment formulas have approached those of the initial plan, which was abandoned in the first year of policy implementation.

**Suppression of union opposition.** Beginning in the inflation and expansion phase, the government also moved to suppress the main voice of opposition to pay for performance policies, threatening the legal status of the KTU, due to its anti-government activities. In October 2013, the Ministry of Employment and Labor (MOEL) had declared the KTU illegal because labor law prohibited the union from including dismissed teachers as members. The KTU refused to change its membership regulations and filed a petition with the court. The Seoul Administrative Court ruled in June, 2014 that the MOEL’s
decision was lawful (Seoul Administrative Court, 2014), and the Constitutional Court rejected KTU’s appeal and upheld the Government’s decision on May 28, 2015\(^{29}\) (Constitutional Court of Korea, 2015). In the meantime, the Seoul High Court had blocked the effect of the MOEL’s decision to strip KTU’s legal status in November 2015 (Shin, 2015); but soon, in January 2016 the Seoul High Court ruled that the MOEL's decision was legal (Seoul High Court, 2016). A forthcoming judgment in the Supreme Court will determine whether or not the KTU continues to have collective bargaining rights and can receive governmental subsidies.

**Excluding low-performing teachers from teaching Job.** The initial policy of 2001 planned to pay performance-based bonuses to 70% of teachers and exclude the bottom 30% teachers. Due to the resistance from teachers, performance-based bonuses have been paid to all teachers, including low-performing teachers. In 2016, the government has tried to go beyond excluding low-performing teachers from performance-based bonuses and has tried to exclude them even from teaching jobs.

The government proposed the legislative amendment of the State Public Officials Act and passed it at the Cabinet Council in January and June of 2016\(^{30}\). This amendment proposal of the State Public Officials Act aims to enhance personnel management, based on job performance, and emphasize the duty of retaining the value of public service (MPM, 2016b). According to this proposal, the basis of pay, appointment and promotion of public officials would be changed from an examination and professional experience to

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29 May 28, 1989 is the establishment date of KTU. It may be considered as the government’s intention to deny the existence of KTU.

30 The amendment proposal was passed at the Cabinet Council on January 26, 2016 but it was automatically discarded after the expiration of the term of the National Assembly. The Cabinet Council passed it again on June 14, 2016.
job performance. The Ministry of Personnel Management (MPM) presents this reason for the revision of the State Public Officials Act:

- We will introduce a job- and competency-centered personnel management system to cope effectively with the changes in the future administrative environment; strengthen the performance-based personnel management system, such as giving preferential treatment to high-performers, linking pay with performance, and providing poor performers with the opportunity to strengthen their capacity. These actions will aim to enhance the competitiveness of the public sector, prescribe the obligation to keep the value of public service, and ensure public trust by establishing such value. (MPM, 2016c, my translation)

- The KTU contends that the government intends to introduce general dismissal policies—dismissing workers with poor performance—through the revision of the State Public Officials Act in the public sector. They also argue that the government is attempting to evaluate teachers’ loyalty to the state by adding patriotism to the provision of the value of public service (KTU, 2016).

*Punishing teachers who resist performance-based bonuses with dismissal.* The MOE claims that, even after disbursing the bonuses, the money still belongs to the state and, thus, the government can punish illegal activities that counter the intent of performance-based bonuses, such as equal distribution of bonuses. In response to teachers’ collective actions hindering the performance-based bonuses system, the MOE tried to strengthen punishment by changing the disciplinary rules for educational officials. The MOE declared teachers’ collective actions—equal distribution and grades circulation—unlawful, and developed a plan to punish teachers involved in these actions with dismissal to the maximum. According to the Pre-announcement of the Partial
Amendment of the Disciplinary Rules for Educational Officials (MOE, 2016b), those who receive performance-based bonuses in illegal ways can be punished from reprimand (at a minimum) to dismissal (at a maximum), depending on the degree of offense (see Table 7). For the successful policy implementation, the government has focused on removing obstacles and suppressing opposition to performance-based bonuses. The MOE has been putting more efforts into punishing teachers who do not conform to this policy, rather than achieving the intended policy goals—to improve the quality of education and to promote teacher morale.

Table 7

*Newly Added Items in the Disciplinary Rules for Educational Officials (MOE, 2016c, my translation)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Degree of offense and Negligence</th>
<th>Type of Offense</th>
<th>Offense related to Regulations on Allowances, etc. for Public Officials, 10th paragraph of the 2nd clause of article 7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Severe and intentional</td>
<td>Dismissal</td>
<td>Dismissal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe, gross negligence/ Weak and intentional</td>
<td>Demotion/Suspension</td>
<td>Demotion/Suspension</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Severe, simple negligence/ Weak, gross negligence</td>
<td>Suspension/ Salary Reduction</td>
<td>Suspension/ Salary Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak, simple negligence</td>
<td>Salary Reduction</td>
<td>Salary Reduction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reprimand</td>
<td>Reprimand</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Resisting with no concession.** As the performance-based bonus system has spread to the public sector at large, opponents of teacher pay-for-performance have revealed their strong opposition to performance-based bonuses. KTU has continued to struggle against performance-based bonuses through equal distribution and grades circulation. KTU reported that at least 75,627 teachers of 3,520 schools participated in the equal distribution of individual performance payment in 2016\(^{31}\) (KTU, 2016f). In response to the MOE’s claim that performance-based bonuses should be returned to the national treasury if teachers refuse to receive them, KTU argues that performance-based bonuses are teachers’ private property and so the MOE should not invade their property rights. KTU claims that the MOE cannot punish teachers who dispose of their property. It submitted an opinion statement, signed by 2,867 teachers who oppose the amendment of the Disciplinary Rules for Educational Officials, which allows teachers who are involved in equal distribution to be punished with dismissal (KTU, 2016e).

MOE is sharpening the sword of punishment again to forcibly suppress the voluntary equal distribution, which stems from criticism and anger among teachers against the performance-based bonus system. It is a surprisingly irrational idea that the MOE counts equal distribution as a case of receiving performance-based bonuses by false and unlawful means, which is prohibited in the regulations and that can be punished by dismissal, at a maximum. However, since equal distribution is a practice of disposing performance-based bonuses after lawfully receiving it, to punish this is an unconstitutional provocation that intervenes in the disposition of private property beyond the call of duty. (KTU, 2016e, my translation)

\(^{31}\) In the previous year, KTU reported that at least 71,965 teachers of 2,877 schools participated in the equal distribution of individual performance payment (KTU, 2016e).
In May 2016, the KTU issued a joint statement with the Korean Government Employees’ Union (KGEU) and advertised in a newspaper based on this joint statement. In the advertisement, the KTU has presented the names of teachers who oppose performance-based bonuses. An enlarged view of the middle black part in the center of the advertisement should show the names of 34,089 teachers and public officials. In response to the MOE’s use of severe sanctions, that is, punishing teachers with dismissal, the KTU has refused to make concessions.

Civil Servants’ and Teachers’ Joint Declaration for the Abolition of Performance-based Payment System

If the performance-based payment system is expanded to public officials and teachers, democracy—the main virtue of democratic society—would disappear and blind loyalty would be enforced under the pretext of performance evaluation. This is nothing more than the taming of civil servants and teachers by the government to destroy the reputation of the government, to rank public officials and teachers, and to enchain us with the chain of subservience. (…) There is no reason to implement the performance-based payment system, which only produces these kinds of side-effects. To make schools and public society emphasize communication, collaboration and confidence between public officials and teachers, rather than competition, and to improve the quality of public and educational services, all competition- and performance-centered policies, such as performance-based payment, implemented in schools and in the public sector under the name of competitiveness must be abolished. (KTU & KGEU, 2016a, my translation)
Recently, the KTFA, which had earlier shown a more moderate attitude toward performance-based bonuses, has begun to oppose them strongly. The KFTA launched a petition campaign to solve 10 educational problems, with the abolishment of differential performance payments as the first item, in October of 2016. The petition paper, signed by 201,072 teachers (about half of the nation’s teachers) was delivered to the MOE. At the same time, the KFTA announced plans to submit the petition to the National Assembly as a petition for legislation (KFTA, 2016c).

In November of 2016, all superintendents reached a consensus, deciding to demand the abolition of performance-based bonuses and the resignation of the president.
at the general meeting of NCGE. Prior to the decision, their stances had been somewhat mixed, in that some of them refused to express their opinion on performance-based bonuses, and others recognized individual performance payments. However, in late 2016, when the president faced impeachment, superintendents started to raise their voices more loudly to the central government.

We agree to the abolition of the performance-based personnel system and the change of the performance-based bonuses to an allowance without differential payment, and we suggest these to the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of the Interior. Superintendents are concerned that adopting the performance-based system in the public sector will result in competition and disbelief and, thus, will diminish the quality of public services. (NCGE, 2016, my translation)
Chapter 6: Conclusions

Policy mobility and transformation frameworks provide a crucial theoretical grounding for explaining the ongoing reshaping of teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea. Teacher pay-for-performance has not been simply transferred to South Korea, but instead is continuously constituted and contextualized through interactions with contextual factors unique to Korean society.

Policy Mobilization

Phillips and Ochs (2003, 2004) explain the process of how a policy is transferred across the borders with the four stage model—cross-national attraction, decision, implementation and internalization. They especially focus on cross-national attraction in which diverse contextual factors, such as internal dissatisfaction, negative external evaluation and economic/political change, cause the mobilization of the policy. However, they do not pay much attention to the role of multi-national and non-governmental institutions which recently exert power in imposing certain types of policies on countries. Thus, in the example of South Korea, the financial crisis allowed the IMF to require the state, as a debtor government, to implement policies, such as labor market reform, as a condition of lending money.
Phillips and Ochs also suggest that contextual factors work at each stage as the impetuses, determinants and conditions, and they also explicate the adjustment of the transplanted policy as inevitable within a new context. However, they underestimate the importance of the interaction between policy and contexts, inasmuch as they consider the policy transfer process as a linear and unidirectional flow. In other words, they do not provide an explanation of how contextual factors have shaped the policy and have been shaped by it.

This limited perception on contexts leads to misinterpretations. Phillips and Ochs oversimplify decisions by considering them as the outcomes of cross-national attraction and as a starting-point of implementation. Their linear understanding of policy mobilization allows them to ignore the fact that the opposition and resistance that occur in the policy ‘implementation’ process may often move backward to ‘decision making.’ As the case examined here shows, however, decisions can be repeatedly revised as a result of contention between proponents and opponents of policies.

As an alternative to these limitations, I have focused on the dialectical relationship between a policy—teacher pay-for-performance—and its South Korean contexts. The Education Reform of 1995 for improving the quality of public education, economic changes after the financial crisis in the late 1990s, and new public management reforms by the Kim Dae-jung Administration, set a stage for teacher pay-for-performance to be adopted in South Korea. The financial crisis allowed the IMF to push the Korean government to restructure labor flexibility. To cope with the crisis, the Korean government adopted New Public Management, which emphasizes efficiency and
competition in the public sector. Those contextual factors not only have formed the policy context for the introduction of teacher pay-for-performance, but also, since then, have provided conditions for strengthening neoliberal policies.

In addition, the transformation process of teacher pay-for-performance reveals that there is an ongoing series of decisions shaped by struggle between the government and the unions. The ‘decision’ is not a one-time event, or a simple step leading to implementation. Teacher pay-for-performance policy has not been carried out as policymakers planned, but has been continuously revised due to the resistance from opponents—especially teachers’ unions.

**Policy Transformation**

I have divided the process of policy transformation generated through the conflicts and dialectical interactions between proponents and opponents into five phases: introduction, institutionalization, intensification, inflation/expansion, and indigenization. In each phase, the policy has been carried out with different approaches and strategies to reach the intended goal. And also, forms and degrees of resistance have also been changed along with the change of the policy.

First, in the introduction phase, teacher pay-for-performance is introduced by the government and encounters strong opposition from opponents, especially teachers’ unions. Government officials try to negotiate with the unions to build a consensus on the need for neoliberal approach to education. Second, in the institutionalization phase, the government does not enforce the policy aggressively, but instead accommodates the demands of teachers’ unions. The open tensions between the proponents and opponents
are reduced, and the government focuses on preserving the policy. Third, in an intensification phase, the neoliberal character of the teacher pay-for-performance policy is strengthened by increasing competition and government control over teachers. The government develops strategies to prevent arbitrary decisions about teachers’ performance, and to cope with challenges, such as union resistance. The latter increase in this phase, as opponents look for ways to fight against the strengthened policy while reducing public criticism of teachers and their collective actions. Fourth, in the inflation/expansion phase school performance payments are introduced. This contributes to diluting of resistance to the individual performance payment elements of the policy by expanding the focus of resistance from individual to school levels. The scope of resistance also expanded in the sense that the unions shifted the target of resistance from the MOE to the government, fighting for fixed-term teachers who are not members of teachers’ unions and building solidarity among opponents. Fifth, in the indigenization phase, the government reconfigures the pay-for-performance policy back into something resembling its original form (which had been discarded in the face of the teachers’ initial strong resistance). Indeed, the government made the policy harsher by making it possible to exclude low-performing teachers from teaching jobs, and to punish teachers who oppose performance-based bonuses with dismissal. Union opponents, however, continue to resist.

**Teacher Pay-for-Performance and State Control of Teachers**

The transformation process of teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea suggests that the nature of the neoliberal education policy is not only to increasing
competition and performativity, but also to strengthen government control over teachers. Standards for comparison are needed to make competition possible. Thus the increase of the differential payment ratio went hand in hand with the provision of examples of criteria for evaluating teachers’ performance (in the intensification phase). The introduction of exemplary criteria also strengthens performativity, that is, reinforces the self-regulation of teachers by providing rewards and sanctions based on the prescribed standards.

The case described here further suggests that control of teachers is an essential element of the pay-for-performance policy, pursued through the reinforcement of punishment for teachers who do not conform to government policies, even to the point of excluding them from teaching jobs (in the inflation/expansion and indigenization phase). In the early stages, the government chose to protect the policy from teacher resistance, and thus conceded on the key issue of paying money differentially according to teachers’ performances. In the later stages, the focus moves to distinguishing teachers who are compliant with the policy from those who do not.

**Reasons for Policy Mobilization**

The transformation process of teacher pay-for-performance points to some of the reasons the South Korean government has adopted and implemented neoliberal education policy, and provides insight into how neoliberalism works in conjunction with state power.

In the research literature, policy mobility is explained by reasons of efficiency, international coalition-building, and political legitimization. Efficiency means that
policies which are widely adopted across countries are adopted as a strategy to reduce the costs in solving educational problems (Temenos & McCann, 2012; Phillips & Ochs, 2003; Dolowitz & Marsh, 2000). Coalition-building refers to the idea that countries which recognize common concerns and mutual dependencies are more likely to benchmark each other and adopt similar policies to strengthen ties (Temenos & McCann, 2012). Legitimization refers to the idea that policies which have been approved by professional consultants and experts from around the world help policy makers gain public support (Temenos & McCann, 2012).

First, in the 1990s, South Korean policymakers tried to benchmark education reforms in the US and UK and emulate their performance pay systems. But this study shows that if the idea was that copying foreign systems ‘off the rack’ would make policy creation and implementation more efficient, this study shows that it was not so: policy makers were forced to introduce new policy elements specific to the Korean context, and quickly encountered historically distinct counter-forces that have resulted in far-from-efficient, ongoing transformations of the policy.

Second, coalition-building between South Korea and the US does not seem to explain policy mobilization. Due to the political and military alliance and psychological proximity with the US, Korean policymakers tend to be receptive to American policies and consider them as an effective means to reduce the costs and risks in the policy formation and implementation process. However, the adoption of teacher pay-for-

32 Passing through the period of the US army military government in Korea from 1945 to 1948, the US had a great deal of influences on the politics, economy, culture and education in South Korea and, up to now, a lot of public policies in diverse domains has been imported from the US to South Korea.
performance from the US to South Korea was not based on common concerns and mutual interdependency between two countries. Rather, Korean policymakers seemed to follow models, or respond to pressures from international forces such as the IMF. The mobilization of teacher pay-for-performance seems bettered explained as a case of emulation or coercion instead of mutually referential and interdependent links (Peck & Theodore, 2015).

Third, the fact that neoliberal education policies are widely adopted across countries, especially, that the US as an economic superpower had carried out teacher pay-for-performance policies (in some settings) may have helped generate public support for policymakers (Temenos & McCann, 2012). That is, the South Korean government could obtain some political legitimacy to pursue teacher pay-for-performance more aggressively, and to suppress the opposing forces of teacher pay-for-performance.

As a political adversary of the government, the KTU has struggled against neoliberal education policies, including teacher pay-for-performance, from their introduction. Historically, the KTU had fought against dictatorship and built political power in the course of the Democratic Movement since the 1980s. Even after the dictatorship ended, the KTU kept fighting against neoliberal education policies and the suppression of teachers’ unions. In resisting teacher pay-for-performance, KTU has confronted the government, and has organized teachers’ collective actions to block teacher pay-for-performance. KTU claims that teacher pay-for-performance destroys public education, diminishes teachers’ morale, pride and self-esteem, induces conflicts
among teachers and impedes teachers’ collaboration which is considered as the essence of teaching and schooling.

By contrast, the South Korean government defines current educational problems as problems caused by teachers. Teacher pay-for-performance systems are seen as solutions. For the government, therefore, strengthening pay-for-performance policies increases the quality of education. To abolish this policy would be to abandon public education. Thus, the government justifies its suppression teachers’ unions. The deprivation of KTU’s legal status by the government in 2013 can be interpreted in relation with the expansion of neoliberal discourse in education.

It seems, however, that the South Korean government is preoccupied with developing the rhetoric and political discourse to justify their actions, rather than with techniques and skills that might facilitate successful policy implementation. The tendency of the government to consider teacher pay-for-performance as a political tool explains the why there are few transnational links and multilinear connections, which are created and activated when countries voluntarily share practical information using policy implementation. By contrast, in the case of unions, transnational interdependencies and multilinear connections across countries seem to be active and strong, perhaps because coalitions and interactions of teachers’ unions among countries are based on voluntary participation by their real needs.

In conclusion, across a 17 year time span, teacher pay-for-performance in South Korea has been transformed into a reinforced neoliberal education policy and has strengthened government control of teachers—especially over the last 10 years, under the
conservative regimes of the Lee Myung-bak Administration and the Park Geun-hye Administration. Along with this, through the process of struggling against teacher pay-for-performance, teachers’ unions have actively participated in the process of reshaping teacher pay-for-performance. They seem to be acutely aware that teacher pay-for-performance has been as a means to transfer the responsibility of education to teachers and that the purpose of teacher pay-for-performance is to tighten the control over teachers and limit the teachers’ autonomy.

**The Challenges of Resistance**

First, resistance is ultimately aimed at abolishing the policy; nevertheless, teachers’ unions and other opponents have put their efforts to make the teacher pay-for-performance policy is fair and reasonable. Their efforts to fix the problems of the teacher pay-for-performance policy seem to be somewhat conflicted with their ultimate purpose to abolish the policy. For example, the KTU, NAFT and KCTU raised an issue regarding the exclusion of fixed-term teachers from performance-based bonuses and, in response to this, the MOE set up separate guidelines for fixed-term teachers. As a result, the opposition has contributed to correcting the defects of the policy and improving the policy.

Second, after the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in March 2017, the teacher pay-for-performance policy may move into another phase if a liberal government

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33 On March 10, 2017, President Park Geun-hye was impeached by a unanimous decision of the Constitutional Court and she was immediately stripped of her office. The grounds of impeachment of President Park were that, for the benefit of a certain person, she violated the Constitution, the State Public Officials Act and the Ethics Law of the Public Officials, by abusing the status and authority of the President, and that she infringed on the property rights of the enterprise and the freedom of enterprise management, and breached the obligation of secrecy of the State Public Officials Act by leaking
comes to power. However, considering the fact that the performance-based bonus system was introduced by one of the most liberal governments—the Kim Dae-jung Administration, it can be predicted that this policy will not be abolished nor drastically reduced in the future. Instead, a liberal government might employ strategies to conciliate and persuade teachers to comply with the reinforced performance-based bonus system.

Third, opposition to the teacher pay-for-performance policy is deeply related to their denial of the legitimacy of the government’s policy actions. Because KTU and other opponents feel that the teacher pay-for-performance policy violates the fundamental rights of teachers guaranteed by law, they raised a lawsuit against it. The government appealed the court decision was against the policy. Furthermore, the government attempted to remove the legal status of the KTU in addition to punishing their resistance actions. Since the validity and effect of the policy are likely to be determined by the interpretation of the judiciary, the government has put increased effort into revising relevant laws and regulations in order to give legal legitimacy to their policy actions. Meanwhile, the teachers’ unions have also attempted to persuade lawmakers to enact legislation to protect the rights of teachers and improve their status by submitting the petition to the National Assembly (KFTA, 2016c) and by submitting the opinion statement of teachers to stop the government from revising the law (KTU, 2016e). For this reason, it is important for the judiciary to have expertise in education policy, and it should be ensured that a fair judgment can be made without a question of collusion between the judiciary and the administration.

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corresponding documents (Constitutional Court of Korea, 2017).
Future Research

This study focused on examining the flows and changes of the teacher pay-for-performance policy in South Korea at the national level. It contributes to a comprehensive understanding of how the policy has been interacting with the specific context of South Korea and how the policy has been transformed over time from the macro level perspective. However, it is necessary to analyze the relationship between the policy and its contexts at the micro level as well, in order to understand how teacher pay-for-performance has actually affected the everyday life of teachers and how it has changed the characteristics of teaching and schooling. By focusing on undocumented practices beyond policy texts, future research needs to investigate what kinds of substantial efforts have been made among teachers, more than declarative demonstrations such as street rallies and struggle to return performance-based bonuses, and to explore what kinds of resistance strategies can be developed and constructed at the classroom and schools in order to protect teachers from neoliberal attacks.


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Appendix: List of Websites of Relevant Organizations

**Government Agencies**

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**Advocacy Organizations**

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