The Globalization of the Acceptance of Homosexuality: Mass Opinion and National Policy

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This dissertation examines how and why worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality and national policies that affect the lives of gay men and women have changed over time. I use three main theories to frame my analysis of attitudes and laws. The first – world society theory – describes the globalizing influence of an elite “global culture.” Support for gay rights has, in recent years, become institutionalized within this global culture. Second, multiple modernities theory points to the effect of region-specific cultural programs. Third, the postmaterialist thesis casts the experience of existential security or insecurity as a main influence on societal norms.

Results indicate that both global and region-specific cultures have driven change over time in worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality. I use data from the integrated World Values Survey/European Values Survey (1981-2012) and a longitudinal multilevel design to investigate how societal attitudes toward homosexuality have changed over time – and to test the relative power of world society theory, multiple modernities theory, and the postmaterialist thesis to explain worldwide attitudinal change. In line with world society theory, the results show that there has been a broad global upswing in the acceptance of homosexuality, driven in large part by the diffusion of favorable global cultural messages. The results provide perhaps the strongest evidence yet that global culture has shaped collective attitudes globally. High levels of religiosity may, however, act to moderate the positive influence of exposure to global culture. And, even as
attitudes toward homosexuality in most societies have become more accepting, the pace of change has been uneven. My analysis finds a widening attitudinal gap between countries, and, consistent with multiple modernities theory, suggests this is due in part to the role of anti-gay region-specific cultural programs in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. Contrary to the postmaterialist thesis, existential security is not found to have influenced attitudes.

Next, I examine the global spread of national policies for: (1) the prohibition of employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, (2) the legalization of same-sex unions, and (3) the decriminalization of same-sex sexual relations. The world society literature has found that exposure to global culture, via national ties to international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), promotes the global diffusion of national policies. But here I investigate whether the domestic societal “uptake” of global culture can also promote global policy diffusion from the “bottom up.” If, moreover, national policy adoption is shaped by prevailing norms and notions of legitimacy, as world society theory would indicate, then whose notions of legitimacy are more influential: those of an international cultural elite or those of the domestic society? Results from event history models indicate that national ties to INGOs strongly promote the adoption of both anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies while accepting domestic attitudes toward homosexuality promote the adoption of same-sex unions but not anti-discrimination polices. I argue that this difference in the effect of attitudes can be explained by the greater salience of same-sex union policies with national publics, which would lead us to expect that public opinion would be more influential in this case. The strength of
domestic lesbian and gay civil societies, meanwhile, had no effect. And results for the decriminalization of homosexuality present something of an anomaly: INGO ties had little or no effect on the likelihood of decriminalization even while domestic factors and region effects were more consequential. I suggest that, since the decriminalization of homosexuality has been by far the most widely adopted of the three gay-rights policies, many of those countries that had still not decriminalized by the 1991-2014 period were highly resistant to the global gay rights norm, and thus not receptive to pro-gay cultural messages conveyed through INGO ties. The results indicate that favorable domestic public opinion can help drive global policy diffusion from the bottom up – and that global norms can become inconsequential in the face of strong domestic resistance.

This dissertation extends our understanding of global culture’s impact at the level of the domestic society. This study also shows how sub-global resistance to global culture can be highly impactful, even to the point of blunting the effect of exposure to global culture.
Acknowledgments

This dissertation has been long in the making. I first put down on paper some of the ideas for what would become this dissertation project way back in the fall of 2007, when I was pursuing my M.A. degree at the University of Chicago. I was already fascinated by the globalization of beliefs and values, and I wrote a research paper comparing and contrasting world society theory with Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis for Karin Knorr Cetina’s class on social and cultural globalization. There were many starts and stops (including many scrapped dissertation ideas) along the journey from there to here. I am grateful to many people for encouragement and advice along the way, including Arland Thornton, Tasleem Padamsee, Mike Vuolo, and my dissertation writing group.

This dissertation owes the most to my advisor, Ryan King. It is a testament both to Ryan’s generosity and his breadth of knowledge as a scholar that, when I came to him with a near-fully-formed dissertation idea that was outside his main area of specialization, Ryan was not only willing to take me on as a student but offered me a wealth of useful feedback and insightful questions. Ryan has really been there for me when I needed him throughout this process. Thanks Ryan for taking this dissertation so seriously and encouraging me to do so as well! I am also grateful to my committee. Hollie Nyseth Brehm has been a source of very valuable encouragement and knowledge about cross-national research. Chris Browning has provided important expert knowledge...
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Here in the United States, prevailing attitudes toward same-sex attraction have undergone a major revolution, just in this author’s lifetime. What was once a powerful taboo, or at best looked upon as weird, is today widely if not exactly universally accepted. This change culminated with the nationwide conferral of legal status to gay marriage in 2015 (e.g., Lax and Phillips 2009). The status of homosexuality in American society thus changed with remarkable speed. But is this trend symptomatic of a global shift, and if so, why? And how influential has been resistance to the acceptance of homosexuality? This dissertation investigates the impact of the globalization of tolerant cultural norms surrounding homosexuality. Specifically, I examine how worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality, and national policies affecting the status of gay men and women have evolved over time, and how the global diffusion of ideas favorable to same-sex attraction have shaped that evolution.

It is my hope that this study will shed light on the extent to which the world today has become interconnected, as well as on the nature of the cultural rifts that remain. I am particularly concerned with how the beliefs of average people living around the world have been influenced by cultural globalization; that is, to what extent are people today on the same “cultural wavelength?” And, what cultural particularism remains? There has
been almost no work examining what factors drive change over time in worldwide attitudes. I do so here by modeling change in global attitudes toward homosexuality.

I am also concerned with whether national policy-making responds to domestic support for globalizing cultural norms that favor gay rights. In this dissertation, I model the dynamics driving global liberalizing trends surrounding national policies on (1) employment discrimination based on sexual orientation, (2) same-sex unions, and (3) the legality of same-sex sexual relations. I seek to understand whether globalizing legal change can be driven from the bottom up, that is by domestic societal support for global norms. And I ask whether, in the case of gay rights law, liberalizing global trends have encountered significant domestic roadblocks or cultural resistance.

I draw on multiple theories to help explain how attitudes and laws have changed over time, but the theoretical framework that I engage with most heavily in this dissertation is world society theory. World society theory has become an influential sociological interpretation of the process of cultural globalization. Founded by John Meyer at Stanford University, world society theory (also known as world polity theory) explains how norms and principles diffuse, and are widely influential, within the modern global context. World society theory is a variant or application of the broader sociological institutionalist tradition (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1977). Sociological institutionalism, at least in the form developed by Meyer and his collaborators, describes the influence of shared cultural norms and standards of legitimacy on behavior. Once established as legitimate and appropriate, it is argued,
norms and cultural models are often adopted in an unreflective manner (Jepperson 2002). Meyer and colleagues (1997) cite, for example how in the 1950’s statisticians at UNESCO chose to report educational enrollments for a six-year primary school level and three-year junior and senior secondary school levels. They narrate how, in the years that followed, many countries designed their mass educational systems around this exact six-year/three-year/three-year model, generally, without investigating whether it was the best and most efficient educational model to meet their needs. World society theory, and the broader sociological tradition of which it is a part, fills an important gap in contemporary American sociology in that they conceive of social action as profoundly culturally situated and produced, in contrast to typical more “actor centric” perspectives, such as rational choice theory and conflict theory (Meyer et al. 1997). Even actors themselves (whether individual people or modern nation states) are viewed as substantially social constructed, in that their identities or “roles” are derived from the shared cultural context (Meyer et al. 1997; Frank and Meyer 2002).

Meyer’s world society theory is an incredibly ambitious theory about the influence today of a specific body of cultural norms and principles on nearly all aspects of social life around the world. It posits the existence of a more-or-less unitary global culture and argues that this culture is today sweeping around the globe, reshaping all aspects of social life. In a famous thought experiment, Meyer and colleagues (1997) asked what would happen if a new society were “discovered” on a previously-unknown island. They answered that social and political life on the island would be entirely transformed through the influence of global cultural principles and norms and the
international organizations and international expert communities that “speak for” them. So, for example: a government would soon form on the island, “looking something like a modern nation state;” the society would be “analyzed as an economy, with standard types of data,” and, “Its people would be formally reorganized as citizens with many familiar rights…” (Meyer et al. 1997: 145). The island society would also see the development of modern “educational, medical, scientific, and family law institutions” (Meyer et al. 1997: 146). The island, in other words, would be profoundly transformed in a relatively short space of time, just as, the theory suggests, the rest of the world has been.

Theorists working in this paradigm have done the legwork of specifying the content of global culture. Drawing, for example, on an analysis of the world’s international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), Boli and Thomas (1997) list some of the key principles of global culture. These principles include a universalistic individualism and respect for the authority of scientific rationality. And various scholars have traced the recent (generally post-World-War-II) evolution of global cultural norms and scripts around, for example, the promotion of education, women’s rights, and environmentalism (e.g. Schofer and Meyer 2005; Berkovitch 1999; Boyle 2002; Hironaka 2014). Of particular relevance to the current study, Frank and colleagues have argued that acceptance of homosexuality has recently been incorporated as a global cultural norm (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank, Camp, and Boutcher 2010). Meyer and others acknowledge the historical Western origin of much of the content of global culture but nevertheless argue that today the culture is truly global, and divorced from a purely Western cultural context (e.g., Meyer 1989, 2004). World society theory’s claims
have also been tested in a sizable and growing body of empirical literature, notable for
the demonstration of how exposure to global culture, through national ties to international
organizations, has promoted the global diffusion of a wide range of national laws and
policies (e.g. Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000;
Schofer and Meyer 2005).

Despite the size of the empirical literature inspired by world society theory, some
of the theory’s important propositions have as yet been little-tested. One of these claims,
articulated in Meyer et al.’s (1997) seminal statement of world society theory, is that
global culture is diffusing to average people around the world. Meyer (2009)
acknowledges that of course people around the world are not yet all the same, but he
nevertheless argues that global culture is increasingly “penetrating” down to even
relatively isolated communities of people (see also Meyer 2010). Meyer does not discuss
effects on popular attitudes in any detail, but the clear implication is that the attitudes of
people everywhere should be changing to more closely reflect the norms and principles
of global culture. If so, then this indeed a wide-ranging and impactful outcome.

Meyer and colleagues (1997) adumbrate a second as-yet little-tested claim as
well: that, influenced by globalizing cultural currents themselves, domestic actors will
pressure their governments to adopt globally-approved national laws, in cases where their
governments have failed to do so. Empirical research within the world society tradition
has usually measured national exposure to global culture by country memberships in
international organizations (e.g. Ramirez et al. 1997; Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000;
Schofer and Meyer 2005). This has produced a very top-down picture of how the global
diffusion of law takes place. But the suggestion by Meyer and colleagues (1997) is, in
essence, that national policy is in some cases globalized from the bottom up, not, or not
just, from the top down.

This raises a persistent ambiguity within world society theory. Social actors are
argued to act on the basis of prevailing notions of what is legitimate and appropriate –
generally responding, as Jepperson (2002) articulates it, to their perception of what others
view as legitimate (although it is acknowledged that social actors sometimes also act on
the basis of internalized beliefs). In line with this way of thinking, countries are
described as responding to the influence of global culture by bringing national policies
into line with its norms and cultural models. But in this case whose culture, whose
notions of legitimacy, matter? Specifically, is national policy entirely shaped by the
notions of legitimacy current within the international community (in particular, those
current among INGOs, representatives at international conferences and
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and members of scientific and professional
communities), or also by those of the domestic society? I would argue that the question
of whether the globalization of law takes place in an entirely top-down manner, without
regard to domestic notions of legitimacy, is of moral significance. The answer would tell
us much about the democratic legitimacy of the process by which national laws and
policies have diffused globally.¹

I respond to these gaps in our understanding by refocusing world society theory’s
analytical lens on the level of the domestic society. I investigate global culture’s effects

¹ It is worth noting here that democratic legitimacy is itself a global cultural norm.
on the attitudes of national populations around world, specifically their attitudes towards homosexuality, and examine whether the influence of cultural globalization on domestic societies has helped drive the global spread of gay-rights policies from the bottom up.

No theory can explain everything. The gains to be had from any given theory involve pushing it so far as it can usefully explain reality, but no further. In addition to elaborating upon and testing some of world society theory’s more under-tested (but important) claims, I am also interested in where the limits of world society theory lie. By examining attitudes and laws on homosexuality, this dissertation confronts one possible source of limitation on world society theory’s ability to explain reality: the presence of cultural contestation and resistance. In my first and (unfortunately up this point) only conversation with John Meyer, he told about how he had developed world society theory in the 1970’s to explain the rapid expansion of education that he and others were observing around the world. (The expansion could not be explained by the then-current modernization theory.) Meyer said that at the time, he and others expected that in future years, they would see some people around the world resisting the worldwide expansion of modern education systems (which indeed represents a great revolution in the human experience). But Meyer said the expected resistance never materialized; national educational systems continued to expand around the world, with very little push-back. Since then, this has been the story with most of the national policies that scholars working within world society theory have examined. Most of the policies have diffused around the world with only limited resistance, for example the expansion of national bureaus for the study of geology (Schofer 2003). Homosexuality is different, although
not entirely unique, in that the emergence of arguments for gay rights have met and continue to meet with considerable cultural resistance. World society theory, with its emphasis on the global expansion of a single, integrated cultural system, cannot fully explain such resistance. An additional focus of this dissertation will be on understanding how this resistance can best be understood and modeled.

In the chapters that follow, I begin by giving a brief sketch of the history of homosexuality, its current status in global culture, and worldwide efforts to combat gay rights (Chapter 2). Then, in Chapter 3, I spell out some new terms and concepts, with the purpose of further specifying some of world society theory’s propositions, and I point to some new directions in which I would like to take the theory. Chapter 4, my first empirical chapter, models global change over time in societal attitudes towards homosexuality. This chapter pits world society theory and its ability to explain global attitudinal change against other available theories for understanding such change. Next, in Chapter 5, I model global change over time in the adoption of national policies for gay rights. This chapter explores the effect of domestic societal support for gay rights on the likelihood of the adoption of pro-gay policies that are diffusing globally. I conclude in chapter 6.
Chapter 2: Global Homosexuality

The purpose of this chapter is to provide some background about the world history of homosexuality and about how we can understand its contemporary status in today’s world. I discuss the contemporary status of homosexuality within the global culture described by world society theory. I also draw attention to the existence of resistance and contestation surrounding the issue, and I engage with some arguments about how contemporary resistance to the acceptance of homosexuality can best be understood.

HOMOSEXUALITY IN WORLD HISTORY

Both our understanding of what homosexuality means, and its social legitimacy, are socially constructed (e.g. Ghaziani 2017). This point is illustrated by the wide variety of meanings and understandings that were attached to homosexuality in the pre-modern world. Drawing on anthropological and historical sources, Greenberg (1988) details some of the wide variety of cultural understanding of homosexuality that existed in tribal, kinship-based societies and in ancient civilizations. A number of tribal societies around the world, for example, practiced ritualized sodomy as part of male initiation rites. When, for instance, in some Pacific Island tribes, young boys were placed under the charge of an older man for manhood training, this included a sexual relationship. Ancient
civilizations featured other expressions of same-sex sexuality that are foreign to us today, including male cult prostitution, sex between warriors, and class-structured homosexuality. Later on, however, there grew up in the ancient world a sexual asceticism that frowned on the practice of sexual activity for purposes other than procreation. And the Abrahamic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam tended to take an antagonistic or at best ambivalent stance towards same-sex sexual activity.

The Middle Ages in Western Europe were characterized by an actual loathing and persecution of homosexuality (Greenberg 1988). This hostile attitude persisted through to the colonial period, in which European powers colonized much of the world. During this time, negative European ideas about homosexuality spread around the world, via, for example, the influence of Christian missionaries and the imposition of European legal codes that made same-sex sexuality, especially between men, illegal (see Cabezon 1993: 90-91 on China; Wawrytko 1993: 215 on Japan; Epprecht 2005: 257-59 on southern Africa; El Menyawi 2014 on the Muslim World; Sharma 1993: 70 on India; and Frank et al. 2010 on the colonial-era globalization of sodomy law). This period of European colonization can be understood as an early wave of globalization (Robertson 2003), and one that encouraged the stigmatization of all forms of homosexuality. Ironically, much current resistance in, for example, the Muslim World and sub-Saharan Africa to homosexuality as foreign, and as a decadent Western import, is thought to borrow from ideas that were originally introduced by European colonizers (Epprecht 2005; El Menyawi 2015).
Greenberg (1988) emphasizes that at no time in this history did same-sex sexual relations take on the meaning that we attach to them today, in which we understand same-sex sexual relations to be part of a broader homosexual identity. Our contemporary understanding of homosexuality as encompassing not just sexual behavior but an individual’s identity (as lesbian, gay, bisexual, queer, etc.) is thought to have begun to grow up in Western countries in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in large part as a product of a new medical understanding of homosexuality as a disorder (Greenberg 1988).

Modern movements for gay rights, meanwhile, emerged in the late 1960’s and 1970’s in the countries of Western Europe and North America. For example, New York’s 1969 Stonewall Riots, which involved spontaneous, violent demonstrations by members of the gay community against a police raid, are looked upon cross-nationally as an important symbolic moment in the development of a new gay rights consciousness (Altman 2002). This new gay rights movement grew up in tandem with the broader civil rights movement and the liberalization of the culture. And the movement is thought to have been heavily influenced by the earlier, negative understanding of homosexuality that had begun to grow up in the nineteenth century, since it too understood same-sex sexual activity as just one element of a broader gay identity (Foucault 1979 [1976]). The gay rights movement simply put a more positive valence on the idea of a homosexual identity. The emergence of the Western gay rights movement also coincided with a period of growing globalization. The new gay rights movement came to see itself in increasingly global terms. The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) was
founded in 1978, and by the early 1990’s national and international discourses about homosexuality increasingly framed gay rights not just in terms of equality or liberation but of universal human rights (Altman 2002; Kollman and Waites 2009: 2). The idea of the acceptance of homosexuality, and the related concept of homosexuality as an identity, not just a behavior, meanwhile began to globalize through the international media and other channels (Altman 2001).

THE ACCEPTANCE OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL CULTURE: CONSENSUS AND CONTESTATION

Understood through the lens of world society theory, this history culminated, in recent decades, in the incorporation of the acceptance of homosexuality into global culture. Frank and colleagues argue that the acceptance of homosexuality is a logical outgrowth of the global cultural value for individualism (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank et al. 2010). Over the course of the 20th and early 21st century, they argue, an individualistic ethic and way of viewing the world has been extended beyond its historical masculine, Western origins to encompass traditionally-marginalized groups, including sexual minorities. Individualism casts human sexuality in terms of individual freedom and choice, rather than considering it in the light of the interests of religion, the family, and procreation. The onset of the gay rights movement, indeed, came at a time when many Western countries had both embraced the idea of married heterosexual couples’ engaging in sex as recreation, not just procreation, and were becoming increasingly accepting of heterosexual sex outside of marriage (Cherlin 2003). And if
heterosexual sex was no longer just for procreation, then there was less reason to stigmatize homosexual sex. Individualism, in addition, can be understood as reconstituting individual persons as the proper recipients of human rights, including gay rights (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank et al. 2010).

Although the issue remains a contested one, a new global cultural acceptance of homosexuality has emerged remarkably rapidly and can be seen in: (1) the recent evolution of national and international law, (2) the emergence and proliferation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movement organizations around the world, and (3) the evolving stance of international expert communities. At the national level, there has been a broad move to decriminalize homosexuality. The decriminalizations began with a trickle of mostly European countries in the 1960s and 1970s and became a veritable gush in the 1990s (Hildebrant 2014) – although 76 nations, or slightly more than a third of the world’s countries, still criminalized same-sex sexual activity in 2012 (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). By 2012, meanwhile, employment discrimination had been prohibited in 59 countries, and same-sex civil unions or marriages had been legalized in 24 countries (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). At the level of international law, the European Court of Human Right’s 1981 ruling in Dudgeon v. United Kingdom formally prohibited the criminalization of homosexuality in the European Union (EU). Thirteen years later, the international human rights system followed suit: in Toonen v. Australia (1994), the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Committee ruled that criminal prohibitions on homosexuality violated the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Subsequent developments
have further promoted recognition of sexuality rights as human rights within international law (Pillay 2011; Symons and Altman 2015). LGBT social movement organizations have meanwhile proliferated, first in Western countries and then internationally (Altman 2002). The founding of ILGA in 1978 was followed by the establishment of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission in 1990. And the prominent international advocacy organization Amnesty International began to represent imprisoned gay-rights advocates in 1979 and added fighting anti-gay persecution to its formal mandate in 1991 (Gallagher 1994). Meanwhile, the discourse has shifted within international scientific and professional communities. The American Psychiatric Association chose in 1973 to remove homosexuality from its official Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, and the World Health Organization followed suit in 1990, when it dropped homosexuality from its International Classification of Diseases. Public health professionals have similarly shifted to promote the acceptance of LGBT individuals, especially through the international fight against HIV/AIDS (Altman 2004; Symons and Altman 2015).

Despite its global cultural institutionalization, there has nevertheless been widespread opposition to gay rights. At the level of elite cultural discourse, some of the strongest resistance to the new gay-rights norm has been concentrated in three world regions: the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern bloc. El Menyawi (2015) argues, for example, that, while the Muslim World was historically comparatively tolerant of homosexuality, an impulse toward “differentiation” has led contemporary Muslim governments and societies to forcefully reject homosexuality as
un-Islamic and decadent Western import. The leaders of many African nations have meanwhile decried homosexuality as contrary to “African values” and traditions (Long 2005; Epprecht 2005). At the international level, the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the African Group, and the Arab Group have all been actively involved in opposing the recognition of sexuality rights (Symons and Altman 2015). And approximately two-thirds of the 76 countries that still criminalized homosexuality in 2012 were in fact sub-Saharan African or Muslim-majority nations (Itaborahy and Zhu 2013: 22). Within the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc region, nations have faced pressure from the EU and the Council of Europe to decriminalize homosexuality and to outlaw sexuality-based employment discrimination (Helfer and Voeten 2014; Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi 2006). But homosexuality has also frequently been opposed in the name of national identity and traditional values (Ayoub 2014; Bodnar and Śledzińska-Simon 2014). Conservative and right-wing political parties that oppose sexuality rights have, for example, gained in popularity in many former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries in recent years.2 And Russia has been a particularly prominent opponent of sexuality rights, for example leading a campaign beginning in 2008 for the international recognition of universal “traditional values” – in opposition to “extreme feminist and homosexual attitudes” (Symons and Altman 2015).

Arguably, the force of the global gay-rights norm has been made manifest by international condemnations of deviations from it. The issue of gay rights has generated various highly-visible international controversies. For example, Russia’s passage of a law against so-called homosexual propaganda in 2013 gave rise to a loud international outcry, especially in the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia, which the leaders of the United States, France, Germany, Canada, and the EU pointedly refused to attend (Domi 2014).

MAKING SENSE OF CONTEMPORARY OPPOSITION TO GAY RIGHTS

If the acceptance of homosexuality has today been incorporated as an element of global culture, then how should we understand determined resistance to the new global norm? I engage here with three studies that each offer different interpretations or theoretical contributions to our understanding of this question. The first study is Symons and Altman’s (2015) work on international “norm polarization” surrounding the desirability of gay rights. Symons and Altman argue that opposition to LGBT rights can today be understood as constituting its own global norm, one that exists side-by-side with the pro-LGBT rights norm. To support this claim, Symons and Altman (2015) cite Russia’s advocacy for a universal “traditional values.” They also detail various controversies that have played out in international fora, for example in the UN General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Council. These have pitted those who seek to

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3 Jepperson (1991) argues that in order for something to be considered as institutionalized, deviations from it must be “counteracted in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially constructed, controls – that is by some set of rewards and sanctions”.

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further recognize gay rights against those arrayed against such recognition, typically: the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, the African Group, the Arab Group, and states like Russia and the Vatican.

Symons and Altman (2015) argue convincingly that the acceptance of homosexuality has been more contested on the world stage than have most other global norms. However, I believe that it is overstating the case to characterize the rejection of gay rights as a truly global cultural norm. In order for the rejection of gay rights to constitute its own global norm (one that exists in parallel with the global norm in support of gay rights), it seems to me that two conditions would need to be satisfied. First, the rejection of gay rights would need to receive substantial international institutional support. Borrowing from world society theory (e.g. Meyer et al. 1997), I would especially expect to see substantial support for an anti-gay norm among international scientific and professional communities, INGOs, IGOs, and international treaties. Second, discourse around the rejection of homosexuality would need to be framed in universalistic, global terms (e.g. Ramirez et al. 1997). I would argue that neither of these conditions is fully met in this case. It is true that there has been some attempt to organize a global campaign against gay, or LGBT, rights. There were Russia’s recent efforts in this vein (Symons and Altman 2015). And in 2015, 25 nations led by Belarus, Egypt, and Qatar launched the new group, Friends of the Family, with the objective of upholding the interests of “the traditional family” (Belarus Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2015). But despite such efforts, the evidence suggests that the global anti-gay-rights campaign remains only weakly organized. While many IGOs and INGOs lend their support to gay
rights, there is little in the way of a parallel constellation of IGOs and INGOs that support the rejection of gay rights. The same is true of the stance taken by international scientific and professional communities. Within psychology, for example, professionals willing to administer “conversion therapy” are very much marginalized, and becoming increasingly so. And significantly, discourse surrounding the rejection of homosexuality is seldom framed in global or universalistic terms. Talk of the defense of traditional values as in some sense universal has gained very little momentum – and indeed there seems to be some incompatibility between the idea that the rejection of homosexuality represents authentic local tradition and the framing of the rejection of homosexuality as a universal value. The rejection of gay rights is, instead, almost always framed in terms of particularistic religious, world-regional, or national considerations. I therefore understand resistance to the global gay-rights norm as primarily a particularistic, sub-global phenomenon.4

The second and third studies I wish to discuss and respond to here are recent works by El Menyawi (2015) and Frank and Moss (2017). El Menyawi describes a contemporary, elite-led “backlash” against the acceptance of homosexuality throughout the Muslim World. El Menyawi makes the point that world society theory would predict the unimpeded global diffusion of lesbian, gay, and bisexual rights. And so he argues that the reality of contemporary Muslim-led resistance to these is inconsistent with world society theory. Frank and Moss, on the other hand, come at the subject of opposition to gay rights from the perspective of world society theory. They describe the discourses

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4 See John Meyer’s (2007: 262) similar argument on how conservative opposition to economic opposition has not reached the level of global institutionalization.
employed by the handful of countries around the world that have, over the past half century and more, acted contrary to the emergent global norm of the acceptance of homosexuality, by expanding their criminal prohibitions on same-sex sexual activity. For example, some countries have expanded existing criminal prohibitions to apply to sex between women as well as between men. Frank and Moss observe that, although these countries chose to defy the global gay-rights norm, they nevertheless legitimated their resistance by reference to the global cultural principles of national autonomy and religious freedom. When, for example, in 1998 Botswana expanded its existing anti-homosexuality law, proponents of the change claimed that “homosexuality represents both the antithesis of Botswana culture and a reflection of Western influence…” Supporters, furthermore, argued that homosexuality violated the Christian principles that Botswanans value (Frank and Moss 2017: 958-59). In Frank and Moss’s words, global cultural principles became the “raw materials for the construction of counterpoint reforms,” that is reforms that run contrary to more specific global norms – in this case the norm of the acceptance of homosexuality (2017: 960).

I believe that Frank and Moss’s observation is an instructive one. Their findings would seem to speak to the deep influence of global culture: even when countries choose to resist the global gay rights norm, they nevertheless tend to use other elements of global culture to justify that resistance. But I would also argue that their observation takes world society theory about as far as it can go in explaining the sub-global rejection of gay rights. Ultimately, I agree with El Menyawi that world society theory cannot explain why countries in the Muslim World would choose to defy the gay rights norm in the first
place. Nor can world society theory explain the substantial resistance to gay rights elsewhere in the world, for example in sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. There is therefore a need for some alternate interpretive framework or frameworks to understand sub-global resistance to the global cultural norm.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Considerations

Before moving on to the empirical analyses, several theoretical issues merit discussion. I begin this chapter with a discussion of where the global culture described by world society theory spreads from. Here, I attempt to elaborate on and further specify this aspect of world society theory, especially as it relates to global culture’s influence on domestic societies. Next, I discuss how global culture “diffuses.” I argue that the simple fact that global cultural diffusion can sometimes meet with resistance suggests the need to view diffusion as a two-step process. Here, I introduce the concept of receptivity. Finally, I propose bringing regional cultural diversity “back in” to our consideration of global culture’s impact. And I introduce an alternate theoretical approach – Eisenstadt’s multiple modernities theory – that can help us do so.

WHERE DOES GLOBAL CULTURE SPREAD FROM?

One of my main aims in this dissertation is to better understand global culture’s impact at the level of the domestic society. Chapter 4 will investigate whether global culture is spreading to average people around the world while Chapter 5 will investigate whether global culture’s impact on domestic societies helps drive global policy diffusion. But here is a potential point of confusion. Namely, where is this global culture spreading
from – especially if global culture is conceived as having, in some substantial degree, already spread everywhere (see for example Krücken and Drori 2009; Meyer 2010; Boli and Eliot 2008)? The world society literature has tended to focus on the influence of global cultural diffusion on national policy making around the world. Scholars working in this theoretical tradition have only begun to consider what global culture’s influence on domestic societies might look like. So here I find the need for some further specification of the theory. Meyer and colleagues (1997) introduce the term “rationalized others” to describe “social elements …that give advice to nation-state and other actors about their true and responsible natures, purposes, technologies, and so on.” A close reading indicates that these rationalized others include international scientific and professional communities, INGOs, some of which have a “social movement” character, and IGOs. These entities act to develop and disseminate global cultural models and norms. They are not supposed to be interested actors but rather acquire their influence and prestige by speaking in the figurative “voice” of global culture (e.g. Jepperson and Meyer 2000). One answer, then, to the question of where global culture spreads from, is from these rationalized others. When discussing global culture’s influence on domestic society, Meyer and colleagues typically describe global cultural norms as “penetrating down” to domestic societies, suggesting movement from an elite international level to a non-elite domestic level (e.g. Meyer 2009: 53; Meyer 2010: 10).

Here, I describe the expert communities, INGOs, and IGOs from which global culture is thought to emanate as making up an elite global stratum, or strata. I seek to indicate by this term that they are both “global,” in their geographic location and
ambition, and elite, in that they function as a fairly removed cadre of global opinion leaders. This term serves to differentiate these developers and disseminators of global cultural content from the national populations and domestic civil societies that I study in Chapters 4 and 5, as well as from the domestic political elites that in some places promote anti-global or reactionary cultural discourses. Note that these elite global strata, while international, tend be based or led out of the West and to have the strongest cultural links to the U.S. and other Western countries. This is almost always the case for scientific and professional communities, and see Jason Beckfield’s (2003) work on cross-regional inequality in linkages to IGOs and especially INGOs. Meyer and colleagues describe education as an important pathway of global cultural diffusion (Jepperson 2002; Meyer 2007, 2010; Meyer, Bromley, and Ramirez 2010). And education would seem to be a prime mechanism by which the ideas and cultural models current among elite global strata (especially scientific and professional communities) might be disseminated to people in domestic societies around the world.

Another answer to the question of where the global cultural content that reaches domestic societies comes from is that it likely also spreads from society to society. One would expect the content of global culture to spread from more globalized to less globalized societies through society-to-society contact. The possibility of society-to-society diffusion has not for the most part been explicitly articulated in the world society literature. However, it is suggested by the argument that exposure to international migration, international telecommunications (Clark and Hall 2011), and also the
international media (Boyle, McMorris, and Gómez 2002) play a role in the dissemination of global culture.

HOW DOES GLOBAL CULTURE SPREAD?

World society theory, and the broader sociological institutionalist tradition, uses the metaphor of diffusion (originally a molecular biological or chemical process) to describe how global culture originates in one social location but quickly spreads to other social locations (e.g. Meyer et al. 1997; Strang and Meyer 1993). Note that in the original scientific understanding, diffusion refers to how a solute diffuses from an area of high concentration to areas of low concentration, with the end result that the solute becomes evenly distributed throughout. Work in the world society literature has tended to assume that, when sufficiently institutionalized at the global level, exposure to new global cultural content is by itself enough to lead to the expected change: typically in the literature, the adoption of some new law or policy. I would expect this to be the case where new cultural norms are adopted in an unreflective manner, as they are thought to be. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) famously coined the term “mimetic isomorphism” to refer, in Meyer’s (2009) phrasing, to the “taken-for-granted copying of established models.” The phrase “taken-for-granted” is key here; new cultural content is thought to be often adopted unthinkingly, and simply by virtue of its being perceived as legitimate and appropriate (Jepperson 2002). But I would like to distinguish between exposure to global cultural content, on the one hand, and uptake of that content, on the other. I understand cultural uptake as occurring when new cultural content becomes recognized
as legitimate and appropriate, as made manifest in the actions and expressed beliefs of “receiving units” (which in this study include domestic societies and national governments).

It is worth making this distinction because in some cases receiving units (which in this study would include domestic societies and national governments) may receive new cultural content in a reflective, rather than an unreflective, manner. In this case, receptivity towards the new cultural content may be uneven, and exposure may be met with resistance. The existence today of widespread resistance to the global gay rights norm would certainly appear to be a case in which receptivity towards that norm varies.

To extend the aforementioned diffusion metaphor, we can imagine how in a multicellular organism, intercellular diffusion results in cells being “exposed” to new substances. These substances can enter the cells by crossing the cell membranes, through a process of “uptake.” But the uptake process can be a variable one: in some cases the new substance has qualities such that it is able to pass through the cell membrane unhindered and more or less automatically, but in others a special transporter protein, located in the cell membrane, must be activated in order to convey the new substance from one side of the cell membrane to the other. Similarly, I argue that exposure to new cultural content is distinct from its uptake and that we should not assume that this uptake will occur automatically, or in an unmediated fashion.

I introduce the term receptivity here to refer to receiving units’ openness to adopting new cultural content. The uptake of new content requires not just cultural exposure but also cultural receptivity on the part of the receiving unit. In the two
empirical chapters that follow, I explore the relevance of the concept of receptivity for understanding cultural globalization’s influence on attitudes and national policies around gay rights. I, moreover, make use of my distinction between exposure and uptake in Chapter 5, when I distinguish between two possible sources of influence on national policy-making: exposure to global cultural ideas emanating from elite international organizations, and the domestic uptake of global cultural ideas, manifest in popular acceptance of homosexuality and the presence of a domestic LGBT civil society.

BRINGING REGIONAL CULTURAL DIVERSITY BACK IN

When it was first developed, world society theory introduced something very new: the idea that a single global-scale culture might be shaping social outcomes around the world. Of course, world society theory was not the first theory of culture’s influence, but culture has traditionally been understood as a particularistic rather than a global entity (Weber 2002 [1905]; Geertz 1972). World society theory implies that such cultural particularism is being progressively edged out by the expanding influence of global culture. And the potential influence of cultural particularism has generally been little-considered in the world society literature. However, as I argued in Chapter 2, world society theory cannot by itself explain the existence of considerable resistance to the global gay rights norm. So here I bring in another theoretical approach that might help us understand this resistance, that of multiple modernities theory (Eisenstadt 2000, 2002). And I attempt to put world society theory into dialogue with this alternate theoretical approach.
Akin to world society theory, multiple modernities theory takes as its main subject matter cultural discourses and institutions. But multiple modernities theory studies regional or civilizational cultures rather than a single global one. The theory’s founder, Shmuel Eisenstadt (2000), argues that different regions, and in some cases nations, have distinct “cultural programs” that have developed over time. These cultural programs are composed of distinct sets of typically elite-driven cultural discourses or ideologies and institutional patterns. Each cultural program, moreover, offers a particular interpretation of “modernity” – a term which, as Eisenstadt uses it, might almost be used interchangeably with “global culture.”

The great strength of the multiple modernities approach is that, while it emphasizes regional cultural particularity, it does not reduce regional cultures to primordial cultural essences. Rather, it depicts regional cultural programs as being in constant dialog with the modern. Regions’ distinct cultural and institutional characteristics result from a combination of what might be described as historical path dependence (Eisenstadt 2000: 22) and a continuous and ongoing dialog with the modern. Eisenstadt (2000: 15, 22) writes that non-Western societies in particular are engaged in the constant selection, reinterpretation, and reformulation of “imported ideas;” societies can also engage in “denial,” “confrontation,” and “rejection” of the modern, in some cases “rejecting the Western cultural program as the epitome of the modernity.” Multiple modernities theory thus provides a way to think about regionally-based resistance to the global gay rights norm, for example that described by El Menyawi (2015) in the Muslim World. I argued in Chapter 2 that much of the contemporary resistance to gay rights is

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concentrated in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. Specifically, I described how elite cultural discourses and institutions in these three regions have grown particularly hostile to the acceptance of homosexuality. Going forward, in Chapter 4 I will test whether anti-gay cultural programs in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc have had a negative effect on popular attitudes towards homosexuality. And in Chapter 5 I will evaluate the influence of region-specific cultural programs on the likelihood of the adoption of national policies favorable towards gay rights.

More broadly, the potential offered by bringing world society theory into dialog with multiple modernities theory is that it might allow us to begin to explore how today’s global culture is interpreted within regional and sub-regional cultural traditions. Multiple modernities theory has not been as fully developed, as a theoretical program, as has world society theory. But it is also interesting that the two theories would also seem to present us with two alternate types of cultural elites. As I discussed above, world society theory describes the influence of the INGOs, IGOs, and scientific and professional communities that make up an elite global stratum. But multiple modernities theory would imply the operation of a parallel if sometimes overlapping constellation of cultural elites operating at the sub-global level, including political leaders and various other opinion leaders, including religious figures. When the global gay rights norm encounters sub-global resistance, these two types of cultural elites can be thought of as coming into competition with one another.
Chapter 4: Changing Global Attitudes toward Homosexuality: The Influence of Global and Region-Specific Cultures, 1981-2012

INTRODUCTION

Public attitudes toward homosexuality have become substantially more favorable in many Western countries, including the United States, over recent decades (Hicks and Lee 2006; Loftus 2001; Scott 1998). This has been a marked and widely-observed trend, and one with far-reaching implications for lesbians, gays, and bisexuals living in Western nations (e.g., Seidman 2002). We know much less, however, about what has occurred in the rest of the world. The existing literature does not speak to whether the shift observed in Western countries reflects a broader global trend – in which most countries have participated – or whether many societies today remain untouched by the tide of increasing acceptance.

More broadly, our understanding of what forces drive change in global attitudes, including attitudes toward homosexuality, remains extremely limited. Three prominent social scientific theories – Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis, world society theory, and multiple modernities theory – can each be used to generate different predictions about what drives global attitudes. Inglehart’s (1997) postmaterialist thesis has heavily
influenced the scholarship on global attitudes, and has been found in prior studies to help explain cross-national variation in attitudes toward homosexuality in particular (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben and Verbakel 2014; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009). This contemporary variant on classical modernization theory conceives of existential security (i.e., the personal security that results from having one’s basic needs met) as the key driver of attitudes on a wide range of social and political issues, including homosexuality.

World society theory, in contrast, would offer a global cultural explanation. As I have already discussed, world society theory points to the influence of an expansive and more-or-less unitary “global culture,” embodied, for example, in the elite-level discourses that circulate within international professional and activist communities (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997). Evidence indicates that pro-gay discourses have achieved a certain international ascendancy in recent decades: in international fora, in professional and activist communities, and at the level of national policy-making (e.g., Altman 2001, 2002; Frank, Camp, and Boucher 2010; Kollman 2007; Symons and Altman 2015). It follows that if global cultural messages have increasingly reached to the level of the average person living around the world – as has sometimes been proposed (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer 2010) – then exposure to these messages should be driving a worldwide upswing in the societal acceptance of homosexuality, as well as cross-national convergence around the new norm.

Finally, multiple modernities theory points to the importance of regional discourses and institutions. Scholarly perspectives that can be grouped under the heading
of multiple modernities theory emphasize the contemporary influence of region- or civilization-specific “cultural programs,” even in the face of modernizing and globalizing trends (Eisenstadt 2000). The multiple modernities approach would suggest that in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, cultural and institutional influences may promote negative societal attitudes toward homosexuality – in spite of the more positive discourse to be found at the global level.

Here I draw upon each of these theoretical approaches to investigate global change and variation in societal levels of acceptance of homosexuality. I use a longitudinal multilevel modeling approach to analyze an unusually long sequence of global data on attitudes toward homosexuality: the same question about the acceptance of homosexuality has been asked in every wave of the integrated World Values Survey/European Values Survey (WVS/EVS), from 1981 through 2012.

This chapter yields new knowledge about how global attitudes toward homosexuality have changed over time. The chapter also advances our understanding of global attitudinal change more broadly, and of the relative explanatory power of the theories employed here, in three ways. First, prior studies of global attitudinal data have relied almost solely on cross-sectional analyses. This study builds on prior work by modeling change over time as well as cross-national variation. Modeling change gives me additional leverage in testing the causal claims of the three theoretical approaches employed here. Second, I improve upon prior tests of the postmaterialist thesis by introducing a new, more precise operationalization of existential security. Third, scholars working within the world society tradition have just begun to consider the possible
implications of new globalizing cultural dynamics for the attitudes and beliefs of people around the world. I further draw these out so as to test the implications of world society theory for changing global attitudes, alongside those of the postmaterialist thesis and multiple modernities theory. Multiple modernities theory is, moreover, brought into dialogue with world society theory.

The results show a broad global upswing in societal acceptance of homosexuality over the period 1981 to 2012, both within and outside Western countries. World society theory is supported, in that this widespread increase appears to have been driven in large part by the diffusion of a new global cultural discourse favorable toward homosexuality. The results provide strong evidence that global culture has shaped attitudes globally. I find, at the same time, that the attitudinal gap between countries has widened. This widening gap appears to be due in part to the influence of region-specific cultural programs: a finding consistent with the multiple modernities approach. But, contrary to the postmaterialist thesis, I find no evidence for the influence of existential security on attitudes toward homosexuality.

EXPLANATIONS OF VARIATION IN THE SOCIETAL ACCEPTANCE OF HOMOSEXUALITY

The Postmaterialist Thesis

Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis represents an important scholarly perspective on what drives culture and belief. First proposed over 40 years ago, it remains a dominant theoretical perspective within the study of cross-national attitudes (Inglehart 1971). The
influence of the postmaterialist thesis is such that each of six previous studies that have modelled cross-national variation in attitudes toward homosexuality have drawn upon its explanatory logic (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben and Verbakel 2014; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009).

The influential postmaterialist thesis is fundamentally a materially-based and psychological theory of culture; it can be understood as involving a two-part argument (Inglehart 1997). The first part borrows explicitly from Abraham Maslow’s theory of the hierarchy of needs (Maslow 1943). According to Maslow, humans’ most basic needs are for such things as food and shelter, and for safety, security, and health. It is only once these are met that people will focus on higher-order needs, such as for love and respect, and at the highest level, for self-actualization. Following from Maslow, the postmaterialist thesis assumes that every person has a psychological predisposition to focus on one category of needs or another, depending on which needs have already been met (or, on what Inglehart and colleagues describe as experienced levels of “existential security”). The second part of the postmaterialist-thesis argument (as articulated for example in Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; and Inglehart and Welzel 2005) is that this psychological predisposition will directly determine individual attitudes on social and political topics. Collective culture is thought to be the more-or-less aggregate product of individual-level psychological predispositions (Inglehart 1997).

Inglehart and colleagues argue that individuals whose basic needs for safety and security have been met will hold modern or post-modern secular-rational and egalitarian values, including – of especial relevance here – tolerating homosexuality. Those who
have experienced more insecurity will by contrast hold traditional values as well as prizing various forms of social hierarchy and exclusion (Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). It follows that:

*Hypothesis 1*: High average levels of existential security promote the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

The six prior studies that have modelled cross-national variation in attitudes toward homosexuality do indeed find that GDP per capita and other related indicators of existential security predict variation in attitudes toward homosexuality (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben and Verbakel 2014; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009). However, despite such findings and despite its continued influence, criticisms of the postmaterialist thesis have surfaced over the years (e.g., Flanagan 1982; Haller 2002; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). A particular concern here regards what has been the standard operationalization of existential security, and whether the standard measure of existential security (GDP per capita) might also act as a proxy indicator for the influence of global cultural messages. This concern, and how it can best be addressed, will be discussed more fully in the data section below.

**World Society Theory**

World society theory has become an influential sociological interpretation of the process of cultural globalization. In contrast to the postmaterialist thesis, world society theory suggests that global attitudes can be understood as the product of cultural globalization rather than of material conditions that are endogenous to the domestic
society. Culture, moreover, is understood, not as the aggregate product of individual psychological predispositions, but as much more shared and collective, and as the product of long historical development.

World society theory can be used to generate multiple hypotheses regarding how global attitudes have changed over time, and what factors have driven those changes.

_A Global Change Trajectory._—Scholars working within the world society tradition have long suggested that global cultural messages should directly influence national populations (e.g., Meyer et al. 1997). But the impact on average people has seldom been studied or examined. The bulk of empirical work on the influence of global culture has instead focused on how national governments have been affected, with many studies having demonstrated the influence of global cultural diffusion on national policy-making (Schofer et al. 2012). Very recently, however, there has been an emergent interest in examining whether global culture matters to average people, and specifically to collective attitudes (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Hadler 2012; Pierotti 2013; Thornton et al. 2012; Zhou 2015). While the work in this area is still very new, and has tended to rely on descriptive, cross-sectional, or single-country analyses, it has nevertheless supported the proposition that collective attitudes can be affected by global cultural influences. Pierotti (2013) describes, for example, how a recent global campaign against intimate partner violence was followed by a shift toward increased rejection of intimate partner violence, across 20 of 22 developing countries. In light of the presence of a supportive global discourse around homosexuality and sexuality rights, I would expect that, if global culture is indeed reaching the level of the average, non-elite person, then:
Hypothesis 2: Average global attitudes toward homosexuality have become more favorable over recent decades.\(^5\)

*Convergence.*—World society theory predicts global convergence around the norms and principles of global culture. Countries around the world have been found to have converged around the adoption of a range of national policies, for example on environmental protection and women’s rights (Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Ramirez, Soysal, and Shanahan 1997). Cross-national convergence has been found to have occurred on some other fronts as well, for instance the percentage of young people enrolled in higher education (Schofer and Meyer 2005). If the new global cultural norm of acceptance of homosexuality has increasingly diffused to people around the world then world society theory would tend to suggest that:

Hypothesis 3: Societal attitudes toward homosexuality have converged over time.

A necessary correlate of this convergence prediction is that countries that began the recent period with comparatively unfavorable average attitudes toward homosexuality must also be those in which average levels of acceptance increased the most rapidly over time. Divergence rather than convergence would result if the countries that began with the highest average acceptance levels were also those that changed most rapidly to become more accepting.

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\(^5\) Note, however, that evidence of a global rise in the acceptance of homosexuality cannot by itself adjudicate between world society theory and the postmaterialist thesis, since the same trend might also be produced by rising global levels of existential security.
Exposure to Global Culture.—According to world society theory, global cultural messages spread through a variety of channels or carriers, including for example the media, globalized educational systems, and ties to international organizations (Meyer et al. 1997; Schofer and Hironaka 2005). And, when persons or collectivities are exposed to these models and ideas they are thought to be directly influenced by them. It follows that:

Hypothesis 4: Exposure to global culture, via global cultural carriers, promotes the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

Moderating the Effect of Exposure to Global Culture.—While world society theory generates the expectation that exposure to global messages should influence attitudes, it may in fact be that exposure is not enough to explain variation in attitudes toward homosexuality. A number of literatures, including perspectives from within the broader sociological institutionalist literature, suggest that prevailing cultural frameworks and ideas might influence individuals’ or local societies’ receptivity toward outside messages. Strang and Meyer (1993) suggest that an outside concept or practice will diffuse more readily when the local cultural context is already congruent with it, and less readily in cultural contexts in which there is a poor cultural “match” between the outside concept and standard, authoritative local schema. Similarly, Snow and colleagues (1986) argue that new arguments or ideas are most influential when they are seen as aligned with already-influential ideological frameworks. And work in the fields of anthropology and media studies suggests that people often bring pre-existing ideas and frameworks to their interpretation of media messages (e.g., Askew and Wilk 2002).
The implication of these lines of thought is that attitudes should be influenced not just by the reception of global messages but also by local receptivity toward these messages. And this receptivity should depend on the nature of already-accepted cultural frameworks and ideas. As I argued in chapter 3, standard descriptions of cultural diffusion from the world society theory and broader sociological institutionalist literatures have not taken account of the potential moderating effect of differential levels of receptivity on the influence of exposure to new cultural content (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997). But to assume that already-accepted cultural frameworks and ideas never affect how new cultural content is received would be to make the dubious assumption that people are blank slates, equally ready to adopt any new norm or idea to which they are exposed, regardless of content.

In the case of societal attitudes toward homosexuality, religiosity may be an important determinant of receptivity toward pro-gay global cultural messages. Around the world and across various religious traditions, religion has often been cast as opposed to the acceptance of homosexuality (Ayoub 2014; Carmody and Carmody 1993; Duran 1993; Ellison 1993; Eron 1993; Hildebrant 2015; Kollman 2007; Long 2005; Symons and Altman 2015). I therefore expect that people living in more religious societies tend to be less receptive to favorable messages about homosexuality even when they are exposed to these messages, such that:

*Hypothesis 5:* High average levels of religiosity moderate the effect of exposure to global culture on societal attitudes toward homosexuality.
Multiple Modernities Theory

The multiple modernities tradition acknowledges the presence of global, modernizing influences but nevertheless emphasizes the particular cultural and institutional characteristics of specific world regions (rather than the globally-shared cultural and institutional characteristics that are made the subject of study in world society theory). In his seminal statement of multiple modernities theory, Eisenstadt (2000) argues that there is not one single modernity but rather multiple modernities, or “multiple interpretations of modernity.”

On the subject of homosexuality, I argued in Chapters 2 and 3 that there is considerable evidence of cross-regional variation, at the level of political and religious discourse and national policy. Support for gay rights is thought to have its origin in Western countries: Western countries were the home of the first gay-rights activist organizations, and they were prominent among the first countries to adopt same-sex marriage and anti-discrimination laws (Altman 2002; Itaborahy and Zhu 2013). Meanwhile, while political reaction and rejection of the acceptance norm can be found worldwide, for example in the form of religion-based objections, reaction and rejection have been particularly pronounced in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc.

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6 For example, the Vatican and mostly U.S.-based NGOs identifying as evangelical Protestant have been involved in international lobbying efforts aimed at limiting the international acceptance of sexuality rights (Long 2005).
The broad multiple modernities perspective suggests that region-specific cultural programs should affect societal levels of acceptance of homosexuality. Moreover, the evidence specifically on homosexuality and sexuality rights would imply that:

Hypothesis 6: Compared to the influence of a relatively accepting Western cultural program, the influence of cultural programs in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc reduces the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

DATA

I turn now to the quantitative analysis of change and cross-national variation in societal levels of acceptance of homosexuality for the period 1981 to 2012. While this study brings together data from multiple sources, the analytical sample is largely dictated by the availability of attitudinal survey data from the integrated WVS/EVS. The sample is composed of data from 87 countries. The former Soviet and Eastern Bloc and the West are the best-represented world regions, with 21 countries each. Slightly more than half of the sampled countries, meanwhile, are from other world regions, with: 13 countries from the Muslim world, 12 from Latin America and the Caribbean, 10 from sub-Saharan Africa, six from South and Southeast Asia, and three from East Asia. Together, these countries represent 85 percent of the world’s population. The analytic sample is thus broadly, although not perfectly, representative of the entire globe. Each country in the sample was surveyed between one and eight times between 1981 and 2012, for an average of 3.1 observations per country, and a total of 286 country-years in the sample.

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7 This percentage was computed from World Bank population estimates from 2010.
Dependent Variable

Data on *mean national levels of acceptance of homosexuality* were sourced from the integrated WVS/EVS. Survey samples were nationally representative, with an average sample size of 1,633 per national survey. Survey respondents were given the following statement: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justifiable, never be justifiable, or something in between, using this card … Homosexuality.” Their responses were measured on a 10-point scale ranging from “never justifiable” (coded 1) to “always justifiable” (coded 10). As would be expected, responses on this survey item were highly correlated with attitudes on other sexuality- and gender-related issues (e.g., Welzel 2013; Wernet, Elman and Pendleton 2005).

Independent Variables

*Existential security.*—GDP per capita has been the standard measure of existential security at the national level (e.g., Inglehart 1997; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Inglehart and Welzel 2005). However, a fundamental problem with using GDP per capita—especially in a study such as this one that seeks to distinguish between the effect on attitudes of existential security and the effect of cultural globalization—is that GDP per capita is not only a plausible measure of existential security but also of cultural globalization. In a recent book with Norris, Inglehart himself employs GDP per capita not as a measure of existential security but as a measure of exposure to international
media messages (2009). Norris and Inglehart argue that GDP per capita is appropriate for inclusion in their three-item cosmopolitan index because it measures “the extent to which countries have widespread access to communication networks,” for example to television and newspapers (2009: 151). They similarly use income as a proxy measure of exposure to international communications at the individual level, although income has also been a standard individual-level measure of the experience of existential security (e.g., Inglehart 1997).

Since GDP per capita is so problematic, I chose not to use it here as a measure of existential security. It is nevertheless a standard variable used in many cross-national analyses. Therefore, in this study, I included GDP per capita (in international dollars, corrected for purchasing power parity) as a control variable. Data for this variable were sourced from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), which provides the most complete cross-national time series data on GDP per capita in international dollars, and attempts to correct for source-specific biases, by combining GDP data from seven different sources (James et al. 2012). Here I interpret GDP per capita not as an indicator of either existential security or global cultural exposure but rather as a composite indicator of both these and additional factors.8 See footnote 9 for why I likewise avoided use of the postmaterialist values index.9

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8 Anderson and Fetner (2008) found, for example, that the effect of GDP per capita on attitudes toward homosexuality became nonsignificant when variables for the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc region and national religion were included in their models, suggesting that GDP per capita may also serve as a proxy for regional and religious influences.

9 The postmaterialist values index, which was developed by Inglehart (1997) to measure the extent to which people value physical and economic security over other higher-order needs, can in theory be used as a measure of existential security’s most direct impact on attitudes (e.g., Hadler 2012). However, I consider there to be some problems with using this values index as a proxy measure of the experience of existential
I have instead employed a standardized *existential security scale* that combines three measures: average life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and a measure of intrastate conflict.\(^\text{10}\) The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for this existential security scale is .78.\(^\text{11}\) The items that compose the scale make for a fairly direct measure of the security of human existence, within any given society. Unlike GDP per capita, moreover, there is little reason to suspect that these measures should also act as proxies for exposure to global culture.\(^\text{12}\)

*Exposure to global culture.*—Exposure to global culture was operationalized using: (1) transnational flows of media, people, and interpersonal communications and (2) average education levels. The international media is thought to carry global cultural security. One is that Inglehart theorizes existential security as acting both upon postmaterialist values, narrowly defined, and upon people’s social and political attitudes more broadly, including on their attitudes toward homosexuality (Inglehart 1997). To use the postmaterialist values index (or Inglehart’s survival-self expression values index (Adamczyk and Pitt 2012)) as a predictor of homosexuality therefore risks simply modeling the internal consistency of attitudes that have already been hypothesized to closely covary. (It is certainly possible that holding one attitude or set of attitudes can increase the likelihood of adopting similar attitudes on other, related subjects. However, this is not what the postmaterialist thesis would predict.) Second, I agree with Flanagan that there are some serious problems with the validity of the postmaterialist values index that bring into question its suitability as a measure. A careful examination suggests that the index is a composite measure not just of materialist-postmaterialist values but also of left-right or authoritarian-libertarian values (e.g., Flanagan 1982; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987).\(^\text{10}\)

Data on life expectancy and infant mortality rates were sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database. The intrastate conflict measure (coded 0-10) is sourced from the Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) database (Marshall and Cole 2014). Results varied little when I substituted the MEPV’s interstate conflict measure in place of the MEPV’s intrastate conflict measure. I also tried the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset’s dichotomous measure for intrastate conflict in my models. The substantive results were again the same. However, I chose to use the MEPV’s intrastate conflict measure because of its wider country-year coverage and because its 0-10 scaling allows for greater precision.

\(^\text{11}\) In addition to the three measures included in this existential security scale, I also tried including unemployment rates, which have been argued to reflect one aspect of existential security (Inglehart 1997). Including this measure did not affect my substantive results, however. I ultimately chose not to include it because the variable did not correlate highly with the other items included in the existential security scale, and because of limited country-year coverage on this variable.

\(^\text{12}\) A possible exception is the intrastate conflict measure, since high levels of intrastate conflict might plausibly disrupt communication with the outside world. In sensitivity tests, I excluded intrastate conflict from my existential security scale. The substantive results were unchanged.
messages (e.g., Boyle et al. 2002). The role of international flows of people and person-to-person communications in spreading global cultural messages has also been proposed (Clark and Hall 2011; Tsutsui and Wotpika 2004). And education is theorized to act as a global cultural carrier because, worldwide, educational content has been found to incorporate global cultural ideas, for example support for human rights (Meyer et al. 1997; Meyer, Bromley, and Ramirez 2010). Both variables, moreover, represent global cultural carriers that should be of especial consequence to the attitudes of average people.\footnote{Prior studies conducted within the world society tradition have indeed found that media exposure and education affect attitudes toward female genital cutting and intimate partner violence (Boyle, McMorris, and Gómez 2002; Pierotti 2013).}

Transnational flows of media, people, and interpersonal communications were measured using the KOF index of social globalization (Dreher 2006; Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). This three-faceted index combines: (1) information about international telephone traffic, non-commercial transfers of money, goods, and services, international tourism, the presence of a foreign migrant population, and international letters; (2) a quantification of the percentage of television and internet users and the import and export of newspapers; and (3) data on the import and export of books and pamphlets and on the number of McDonald’s restaurants and IKEA stores within each country.\footnote{Scholarship in the world society theory tradition has seldom made use of the KOF social globalization index, but Cole (2013) suggests its use as a measure of the influence of global culture on people and societies, as opposed to on national governments.}

Education, meanwhile, was measured using IHME’s data on average, population-level years of schooling (Gakidou et al. 2010).\footnote{I also tried using Barro and Lee’s data (2013) on average years of schooling (interpolated so as fill in regular five-year gaps) and the IHME measure of average levels of tertiary education. The substantive results were unchanged.} The KOF index and the IHME education measure
correlate in the analytical sample at a high $r=.70$ level, and were combined into a single standardized *scale of exposure to global culture*.

Although they are widely used as a measure of exposure to global culture, national ties to INGOs have not been employed as an indicator here (Schofer et al. 2012). Two prior studies of global attitudes have used INGOs ties to measure exposure to global culture (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Hadler 2012). However, the authors of these studies acknowledge the potential for a reciprocal causal relationship between INGO ties and attitudes, which, if present, would bias the model results. Just as INGO ties might spread global cultural ideas and thus affect average attitudes, average attitudes (here, toward homosexuality and related issue areas) might also affect the number of national citizens and domestic organizations that elect to become members of INGOs. Appendix A describes the results of a supplementary analysis in which I used an instrumental variable for logged INGO ties, to avoid any endogeneity bias resulting from a reciprocal causal relationship between INGO ties and attitudes toward homosexuality. The results show that, when this instrumental variable was used, logged INGO ties no longer had a statistically significant predictive effect on societal attitudes toward homosexuality.

To test whether societal religiosity moderated the effect of exposure to global culture, I employed an interaction between the scale of exposure to global culture and a scale of religiosity (*global culture X religiosity*). My standardized religiosity scale was constructed from mean responses to two WVS/EVS survey items that each measure different aspects of religiosity and that have been asked across all survey waves. One

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16 There is little reason to suspect, however, that average attitudes affect either transnational flows of media, people, and interpersonal communications or average education levels.
item gauges religious commitment and belief, asking respondents, “How important is God in your life?” (coded 1 to 10). The other measures religious behavior, with respondents asked: “Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious services these days?” (coded 1 to 8). Since religiosity is believed to affect attitudes toward homosexuality, I have also included the resulting religiosity scale across models, as a control.

Region-specific cultural programs.—Country membership in seven world regions or civilizational groupings – the West (including Western Europe and European settler colonies in North America and the Pacific), Latin America and the Caribbean, the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and East Asia – was employed as a proxy measure of the influence of region-specific cultural programs. The West, where accepting discourses and institutions are thought to be relatively prevalent, has been made the reference category. My regional classification system is largely borrowed from the classification system developed by Teorell and Hadenius (2004; Hadenius and Teorell 2007), which is itself based on area experts’ assessments of institutional similarities and differences across countries, together with considerations of geographical proximity. Their system generally reflects the regional classifications that have been used or implied in the multiple modernities literature (Eisenstadt 2002). I have, however, chosen to make two changes to the original Teorell and Hadenius classification system. First, to avoid including regions with only a small number of cases, I combined Latin America and the Caribbean into a single region and South Asia and Southeast Asia into a single region. Second, I replaced
the Middle East and North Africa category used in the original Teorell and Hadenius schema with a broader Muslim World grouping, which includes all countries that had a Muslim majority in 1980.\textsuperscript{17} This was done to reflect the emphasis within the broad multiple modernities tradition on the Muslim World as a distinct cultural grouping, particularly when it comes to questions of gender and sexuality (Eisenstadt 2000; El Menyawi 2015; Göle 2000). In sensitivity analyses, however, the same substantive results were produced by using either the Muslim World or the Middle East and North Africa region.

Controls

In addition to using GDP per capita and religiosity as controls, I also tried a number of other variables to test whether their inclusion affected my substantive results, including: the average age of WVS/EVS respondents in each national sample, religious composition (La Porta et al. 1999), democracy (both Polity IV and Freedom House measures), KOF indexes of economic globalization and political globalization, and finally, the size of agriculture, industry and service sectors, population size, and percent urban (all sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicator database). Most of these variables did not have statistically significant effects when entered into the full

\textsuperscript{17} The Muslim-majority countries included in my sample are: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Mali, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. Muslim religion data was compiled by La Porta and colleagues (1999). Both these data and Teorell and Hadenius’s (2004) region classification data were obtained from the Quality of Governance Dataset (Teorell et al. 2015).
model and none changed the substantive results. They have thus not been included in the main models.  

METHODOLOGY

I employed longitudinal multilevel, or mixed effects, models to predict societal attitudes toward homosexuality. These models nest country-year (the basic unit of analysis) within country. Global attitudes, and cross-national data more generally, have rarely been modelled using a longitudinal multilevel approach. However, this analytic approach is well suited to the data and research questions under investigation here. One important advantage is that the approach allows variables to have both between- and within-country effects. In addition, as discussed further below, longitudinal multi-level models allow for an accommodation of the unbalanced nature of my analytical sample, i.e., how the number and timing of measurement occasions varies between countries (Singer and Willett 2003). This modeling approach also has the advantage of allowing flexibility in the specification of the random effects terms. Here I specified the models to enable the intercept and the coefficient for year to vary randomly between countries, and

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All data are aggregated to the societal level. The choice to use societal- rather than individual-level data was informed by considerations of theory and data availability. In the case of the postmaterialist thesis, there are, as I have indicated, fundamental theoretical problems with the only available individual-level variables that might be used to measure existential security, including income, social class, which has sometimes been used as a proxy for income (Anderson and Fetner 2008), and materialist-postmaterialist values. The multiple modernities approach, meanwhile, theorizes the importance of societal-level variables (region-specific cultural programs), not individual-level variables. Moreover, it is in alignment with the theoretical premises of world society theory to evaluate attitudes at the level of the society rather than at the level of the individual. In world society theory, culture is conceptualized as existing at the collective level, with the main theorized influences on individual behavior (and, by extension, individuals’ responses to survey questions) being socially-shared, culturally-supplied notions of what is legitimate and appropriate (Jepperson 2002; Meyer et al. 1997; Pierotti 2013). Additionally, global longitudinal data on attitudes exist only at the societal level, not at the level of the individual.
to allow the two terms to covary. I was then able to use the resulting covariance term to test Hypothesis 3, which anticipates that societal attitudes toward homosexuality have converged over time. A negative correlation between the intercept and the effect of year would point to a cross-national pattern of attitudinal convergence, while a positive correlation would indicate the reverse.

In the models that follow, the key time-varying variables of interest (existential security and exposure to global culture) have each been decomposed into their between-country and within-country effects. This allows for the estimation of each variable’s separate effects on: (1) between-country differences in the acceptance of homosexuality (the between-country effect); and (2) within-country fluctuation in levels of acceptance over time (the within-country effect). I meanwhile included the world region variables, which are time-invariant, as main effects, and also interacted them with year, to allow their effects to vary over time as a function of year. All time-varying variables were lagged by one year, except in the case of religiosity where lagging was not possible. Appendix B provides descriptive statistics for all variables included in the models.

Handling Imbalance

Multilevel models tend to be accommodating of unbalanced data, such as the data here. In longitudinal multilevel models, data are considered to be missing completely at

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19 The between-country components are the country-mean values of the predictor variables. The within-country components, meanwhile, are the values of the predictor variables, centered at their country-mean (i.e., each value was subtracted from the corresponding country-mean). See Hoffman (2015: chapter 8).

20 This is thanks in part to the models’ power-borrowing feature, which allows countries with few data points to “borrow” information from countries that have more data but similar values on the covariates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002; Singer and Willett 2003: 136).
random (MCAR) when the uneven pattern of representation of the cases is uncorrelated with the unobserved values of the dependent variable. Even when not MCAR, however, data can still be considered as missing at random (MAR) when the uneven pattern of representation varies depending on observed data: on the dependent variable or on observed values of the predictor variables. An uneven pattern of representation is considered “ignorable” when either the MCAR or the more forgiving MAR assumption is fulfilled (Little and Rubin 1987; Singer and Willett 2003: 156-159). The data in this study cannot be assumed to be entirely MCAR. The data show, for example, that the Western countries in the sample have comparatively high levels of acceptance of homosexuality, and they are also among those countries that have been surveyed most frequently. The WVS/EVS, in addition, has typically relied on country collaborators to conduct and field surveys,\textsuperscript{21} which suggests that the frequency of being surveyed may be correlated with national wealth or the strength of the local social science infrastructure. However, the data in this study do appear to satisfy the MAR assumption, since any nonrandom variation in the frequency and pattern of inclusion in the sample is likely to depend on the observed values of the dependent variable, and also on observed values of predictor variables such as region and GDP per capita.

Although theory suggests that the data in this study should satisfy the MAR condition, I nevertheless took the additional step of conducting a sensitivity analysis to test whether the study results were affected by the pattern of representation of the countries in my analytical sample. For this analysis, I estimated a separate model for the

probability of any of the 87 countries in the study sample being included in any given year. This model was then used to generate a set of inverse probability weights for each observation in the sample (Scharfstein, Rotnitzky, and Robins 1999; see also Vuolo et al. 2014). Variables that were used to predict the probability of inclusion include: year, average years of schooling (employed as a proxy measure of the strength of national social science infrastructures), population size, whether the country was then in existence (data compiled from the CIA World Factbook), region variables, interactions between the region variables and year, variables for each survey wave, a variable for whether the country was located in Europe (and therefore a candidate for inclusion in the EVS), and interactions between the Europe variable and specific survey waves. The resulting inverse probability weights were then included in each of my main models. While statistically significant, their inclusion had only negligible effects on the other coefficients. This outcome further increases confidence in the study results.

RESULTS

Figure 1 shows changing average levels of acceptance of homosexuality, broken out by world region. This figure provides a largely descriptive look at how, cross-nationally, attitudes have changed over time. Moving country-specific averages are shown in grey. The bold black lines, which are superimposed over these descriptive data, meanwhile provide separate Empirical Bayes estimates of the mean growth trajectory for

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22 In line with previous research (Slomczynski and Tomescu-Dubrow 2006), variables for GDP per capita and democracy were also tried. However, these variables did not improve model fit and were ultimately excluded from the model.

23 All results are available from the author upon request.
each region. Focusing on these mean growth trajectories, a key takeaway is that there has been an average upward trend in the acceptance of homosexuality across most or all world regions. The upward trend is statistically significant for all regions except the Muslim World. The figure provides preliminary support for the expectation, derived from world society theory, that average global attitudes toward homosexuality have become more accepting over time (Hypothesis 2). The worldwide nature of this trend is also consistent with an explanation of the trend as driven by a common, global influence.

At the same time, Figure 1 points to considerable variation between countries and to substantial cross-regional variation. Comparing across regions, the data do not appear to indicate that countries have converged over time, as world society theory would tend to suggest. In fact, the region with the highest starting levels of acceptance in 1981 (the West) also had the highest estimated rate of positive change. Starting levels, meanwhile, appear to have been comparatively low in the two regions with the lowest rates of change over time (the Muslim World and sub-Saharan Africa).

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24 Each trajectory was estimated separately, using only data from the individual region. The models used to estimate them are identical to Model 1 in Table 1, except that the random intercepts and slopes for year have not been allowed to covary, due to data limitations associated with the smaller sample sizes.
N (country-years) = 320; N (countries) = 98.

FIGURE 4.1: Changing Attitudes toward Homosexuality, 1981-2012
Next, Table 1 presents results from a series of longitudinal multilevel models predicting change and cross-national variation in attitudes toward homosexuality. Model 1 is a conditional baseline model that includes only year as a predictor variable. Model 2 adds controls for GDP per capita and religiosity. The next four models estimate the effects of specific variables of theoretical interest: existential security (Model 3), exposure to global culture (Models 4 and 5), and world region (Model 6). Finally, Model 7 combines all variables of interest in a single full model.
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Covariance</td>
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<td>-.006</td>
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<td>-.009</td>
<td>-.007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wn-Country Variance</td>
<td>.257</td>
<td>.290</td>
<td>.282</td>
<td>.266</td>
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Deviance | 728.428 | 667.134 | 665.322 | 653.575 | 639.425 | 590.57 | 562.303 |

NOTE.—N (country-years) = 273; N (countries) = 87.

* P < .10.
* * P < .05.
* * * P < .01.
* ** P < .001.

Model 1, the conditional baseline model, describes the global, overall pattern of change over time in attitudes toward homosexuality. The intercept and coefficient for year in this model give the mean growth trajectory for all countries included in the sample. The year coefficient (.050) is statistically significant, and indicates that the sample mean level of acceptance of homosexuality increased by half a unit per decade between 1981 and 2012. This result is consistent with world society theory as it provides further evidence that a global upswing in the acceptance of homosexuality has taken place over time. Hypothesis 2 is supported. As noted above, however, evidence of this upswing cannot by itself adjudicate between world society theory and the postmaterialist thesis, since a global rise in acceptance could be generated, equally, by increased
exposure to favorable global cultural discourses (world society theory) or by widespread increases in existential security (the postmaterialist thesis).

Turning next to the random effects terms in Model 1, these indicate that societal attitudes toward homosexuality varied greatly between countries, and that there has also been variation in attitudes over time within countries, and in countries’ rates of change over time as a function of year. The covariance of the random effects (.019) is of particular interest here. Contrary to the expectation, derived from world society theory, that societal attitudes toward homosexuality have converged over time (Hypothesis 3), the positive value of the covariance term indicates that countries’ estimated starting levels of acceptance in 1981 (represented by the intercept) are positively correlated with their rate of change over the following decades (represented by the coefficient for year). The correlation between the starting level of acceptance and the rate of change over time is a fairly high \( r = 0.41 \) (not shown). Instead of converging, then, the data indicate that countries have tended to diverge over time, producing a widening attitudinal gap between countries. Hypothesis 3 is thus not supported.

Model 2 adds the two control variables GDP per capita and religiosity. The positive effects for GDP per capita (.070) are consistent with what has been found in prior, mostly cross-sectional analyses (Anderson and Fetner 2008; Adamczyk and Pitt

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25 The Inter-Class Correlation, calculated from the fully unconditional model, indicates that 72 percent of variation in the dependent variable is explained by between-country variation and 28 percent by within-country variation.

26 Year has been centered at 1981 so as to set the intercept at 1981. Supplementary analyses in which I experimented with centering year at 1990, 2000, and 2010 show that the covariance between the sample mean and the effect of year increases over time, providing further evidence that societal attitudes have tended to diverge. Except for year, all other continuous variables not country-mean-centered have been centered at their grand mean (i.e., each value was subtracted from the mean value of the entire sample), in line with common practice in multilevel modeling.
2009; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben and Verbakel 2014). The negative effect for religiosity, meanwhile, is in line with what theory would predict.

Model 3 adds two terms for existential security, testing separately for the effect of existential security on between-country differences in attitudes toward homosexuality, and on within-country change in attitudes. Contrary to the expectation generated by the postmaterialist thesis (Hypothesis 1), neither effect is statistically significant. The coefficient for the within-country effect is negative, and so not in the predicted direction. Furthermore, the inclusion in Model 3 of existential security actually slightly increases the coefficient for year (from .027 in Model 2 to .030 in Model 3), which suggests that rising global levels of existential security cannot help explain the overall rise in acceptance of homosexuality that has taken place over recent decades. These results call into question the role of existential security as a driver of attitudes toward homosexuality.

Model 4 examines the impact on attitudes of exposure to global culture. Both the between- and within-country effects of exposure to global culture are positive and statistically significant in this model. This result supports the expectation, stated in Hypothesis 4, that exposure to global culture acts as an important driver of attitudes toward homosexuality. Additionally, the inclusion of the two terms for global culture reduces the effect of year from .027 in Model 2 to a non-significant near-zero (-.004) in Model 4. This outcome suggests that the influence of global culture helps explain the overall rise in acceptance that has occurred over recent decades.
Next, I used Model 5 to examine whether the influence of exposure to global culture is lower in more religious societies, where people might be less receptive to positive global cultural messages about homosexuality (Hypothesis 5). The model contains two interaction terms, one between religiosity and the between-country effect of exposure to global culture, and the other between religiosity and the within-country effect of global culture. The between-country interaction (-.345) is negative and statistically significant. It indicates that a one standard deviation increase in national religiosity reduces the between-country effect of global culture by more than half.\(^\text{27}\) The within-country interaction (-.134) is also negative, but not statistically significant as expected.\(^\text{28}\) Hypothesis 5 therefore receives only partial support. The lack of significance of the within-country interaction term may be due to the relatively limited amount of over-time data, and associated low within-country variability, on the two interacted variables.\(^\text{29}\)

Model 6 suggests the influence of region-specific cultural programs. The main effects for most of the world regions included in the model are negative and statistically significant, indicating that in 1981, membership in these regions was associated with having less accepting attitudes toward homosexuality, as compared to the Western

\(^{27}\) For example, when religiosity is at its mean, the value for the between-country effect of exposure to global culture is: \(0.583 + (-0.345 \times 0) = 0.583\). But when religiosity is one standard deviation above its mean, the value of the between-country global culture effect is less than half that, or \(0.583 + (-0.345 \times 1) = 0.238\).

\(^{28}\) While the effect of religiosity is represented here by a single term, religiosity could also be decomposed into between- and within-county effects, which, when interacted with the between- and within-country effects of global culture, would produce four interaction terms. I tried this specification in a supplementary analysis (available upon request). Again, only one interaction term (the between-country effect for religiosity \(X\) the between-country effect for global culture) was statistically significant. This term retained its statistical significance when included in the full model. In the interests of parsimony, however, I have limited Model 5 to two interaction terms.

\(^{29}\) In addition to interacting global culture with religiosity, I also tried interacting global culture with the various world regions. All of these interactions became non-significant when included in the same model as the interaction with religiosity.
reference group. The rate of change for the West, represented by the coefficient for year, is positive and statistically significant. Rates of change are meanwhile negative and significantly different from the West in three regions: the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the Muslim World, and sub-Saharan Africa. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 6, which anticipates the negative influence of cultural programs in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the Muslim World, and sub-Saharan Africa, in comparison to the West.

Interestingly, while the coefficient for GDP per capita was reduced somewhat in the models for existential security and global culture, its coefficient becomes entirely non-significant in the model for region (Model 6). This suggests that much of the predictive effect of GDP per capita on attitudes toward homosexuality may reflect the effect of cross-regional variation. It is also worth noting that, across models, the effect of GDP per capita was least affected by the addition of the existential security terms, suggesting that very little of the predictive effect of GDP per capita on attitudes is a reflection of the influence of existential security.

Finally, Model 7 includes the full set of predictor variables. A likelihood ratio test indicates this is the best-fitting model. The results confirm the positive, statistically significant effect of exposure to global culture on the acceptance of homosexuality. The coefficient for the within-country effect of global cultural exposure indicates that the acceptance of homosexuality increases by 2.074 units over the range of this variable.

30 Cross-model comparison of the random effects terms is here complicated by the inclusion of random effects for year and the covariance. In a supplementary analysis, I therefore re-ran all the models with only the between-country and within-country random effects. These models demonstrate that the variables in the full model explain 68.2% of the between-country variation in the outcome (a decrease in the random effect from 0.85 to 0.27) and 85.7% of the within-country variation (a decrease in the random effect from 2.87 to 0.41).
And, holding religiosity constant at its mean, societal acceptance is predicted to increase by 1.860 units over the range of the between-country effect of exposure to global culture.\textsuperscript{31} Hypothesis 4 thus receives strong support.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, the negative interaction between religiosity and the between-country effect of religiosity is virtually unchanged in this model.

Once again, there is no indication in Model 7 that the experience of existential security promotes the acceptance of homosexuality. Although in the predicted (positive) direction, the between-country effect of existential security remains statistically insignificant while the negative coefficient for the within-country effect of existential security actually becomes statistically significant in this model.\textsuperscript{33} We may be seeing this negative effect of within-country change because two of the three indicators that make up the existential security scale – life expectancy and child mortality rates – have tended to improve more rapidly in the poorer, more marginalized countries that had low starting values of existential security in 1981.\textsuperscript{34} The effect of GDP per capita, which has been a common measure of existential security, and which I view here as a composite indicator

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{31}To obtain these estimates, the coefficient for the within-country effect of exposure to global culture was multiplied by the number of units by which it varies over its range: .942 x 2.202 = 2.074. And the coefficient for the between-country effect was multiplied by the number of units by which it varies over its range: .470 x 3.957 = 1.860.
  \item \textsuperscript{32}This finding is robust to alternate specifications. The substantive results from the full model were unchanged when I replaced the global culture scale with either of its two component elements, the KOF social globalization index or average education, with the sole exception that when I replaced the global culture scale with average education, the between-country effect for education was only marginally significant. I also tried including interactions between year and the between- and within-country effects of global culture, to test whether the effect of exposure to global culture increased over time, as global cultural discourse about homosexuality grew more positive. But these interactions were not statistically significant.\textsuperscript{33} Additionally, I tried entering into the model the between- and within-country components of each of the three elements that make up the existential security scale, individually. None had positive and statistically significant effects.
  \item \textsuperscript{34}Supplementary analyses point to strong patterns of cross-national convergence in both life expectancy and infant mortality rates over the 1981-2012 time period.
\end{itemize}
of multiple factors, also remains statistically insignificant in Model 7. Hypothesis 1, which anticipates a positive role for existential security, is thus not supported.

Model 7 continues to suggest that region-specific cultural programs influence attitudes, even net of other factors. Membership in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the Muslim World, and sub-Saharan Africa once again depresses rates of positive attitudinal change, as compared to membership in the West. Hypothesis 6 is thus supported. Many of the other region coefficients in Model 7 are no longer statistically significant, but they remain in the same direction as in Model 6. And, interestingly, membership in Latin America and the Caribbean is estimated to have a more positive effect on the rate of change over time than membership in the West, although the difference between the two is not statistically significant.

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35 I also tried decomposing GDP per capita into between- and within-country effects. Neither effect was statistically significant when included in the full model.
FIGURE 4.2: Expected Levels of Acceptance of Homosexuality, by Year and Region

The results from Model 7 additionally suggest that region-specific cultural programs have had an overall polarizing effect on attitudes, and, thus, that they contributed to the widening gap in attitudes identified in Model 1. Figure 2 shows how region-specific influences were more polarizing in 2012 than in 1981. The figure displays Model-7-generated estimates of how the acceptance of homosexuality changed over time, depending on world region. The standard deviation of the region-specific effects around their mean was twice as high in 2012 as in 1981. And, while the region-

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36 In supplementary analyses, I explored whether the widening gap might also have been driven by differential levels of exposure to global culture. Models of over-time change in exposure to global culture did not, however, point to a strong pattern of either convergence or divergence, which suggests a limited role for the effects of exposure to global culture.

37 The standard deviation of the regional effects rose from .51 around a mean of 2.88 in 1981 to 1.12 around a mean of 3.39 in 2012.
specific effects were fairly evenly distributed in 1981, the figure shows how by 2012 they were much more polarized. By 2012, the region-specific effects for the Muslim World and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc were quite low and clustered together at one extreme while the effects of membership in the West and Latin America and the Caribbean were high and clustered together at the opposite extreme.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

This chapter began by asking both how global attitudes toward homosexuality have changed over time, and what theoretical perspectives can help explain that change. Regarding the over-time trends, I found evidence of a broad global upswing in the acceptance of homosexuality during the period 1981 to 2012. Societal attitudes toward homosexuality became more favorable across most world regions. However, attitudes varied considerably between countries, and societies that began the period with the least favorable attitudes also changed most slowly. The attitudinal gap between countries thus widened over time.

What forces have driven change in global attitudes toward homosexuality? This chapter sheds light on the relative explanatory power of three social scientific traditions: world society theory, multiple modernities theory, and the postmaterialist thesis. In line with world society theory, I found that exposure to global culture exerted an important influence on attitudes. Given how, in recent decades, a norm of acceptance of homosexuality has been incorporated within global cultural discourse and institutions, I anticipated that exposure to this culture had promoted favorable attitudes toward
homosexuality. Both the longitudinal, within-country effects of global cultural exposure and its between-country effects supported this expectation. The influence of global culture, moreover, explained much of the overall upswing in acceptance of homosexuality in the sample as a whole. These findings suggest that the global culture described by world society theory is not just global, in the sense that it flourishes among an elite global stratum or influences national governments, but also in that it penetrates down to national populations around the world. This chapter builds on prior investigations of the effect of global culture on attitudes (Givens and Jorgenson 2013; Hadler 2012; Pierotti 2013; Thornton et al. 2012; Zhou 2015) by modeling attitudinal variation over time as well as globally. The results support world society theory and provide the strongest evidence yet that global culture has shaped collective attitudes.

Although it appears that the attitudes of people the world over are indeed being affected by a common global cultural message, I found that global culture’s influence has not given rise to the kind of cross-national convergence that world society theory would lead us to anticipate. At least in the short term, the results suggest that cultural globalization has not led to the homogenization of attitudes toward homosexuality.

I suggested here that societal receptivity toward global cultural messages may sometimes vary, depending on the congruence between diffusing global cultural messages and local cultural schema. I anticipated, specifically, that high levels of societal religiosity have moderated the effect of exposure to favorable global cultural messages about homosexuality. The results provide partial support for this expectation, as societal religiosity significantly moderated the influence on average attitudes of
between-country variation in global cultural exposure, but not the effect of within-country change in exposure to global culture. If some societies are indeed less receptive to specific global cultural messages than others, then this would call for the incorporation of a new, complicating dynamic into standard accounts of how global cultural diffusion takes place. Further research is needed to more fully understand whether and under what circumstances low levels of societal receptivity might moderate the influence of exposure to global cultural messages.

This chapter’s findings also support the relevance of multiple modernities theory. It was anticipated, on the basis of this theoretical approach, that regional membership should affect societal attitudes toward homosexuality, and specifically that membership in three regions – the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc – should have a comparatively negative effect on attitudes, given the reactive political discourses and policies on homosexuality in these three regions. The results confirm this expectation: net of other factors and relative to membership in the West, membership in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc slowed over-time increases in the societal acceptance of homosexuality. As a whole, moreover, regional effects promoted a trend toward increased divergence in societal attitudes, and thus help explain why the attitudinal gap between countries has widened over time.

These results suggest the utility of increased dialogue between world society theory and the multiple modernities approach. Both approaches involve the study of collective culture and institutions, but work within the world society tradition has tended
to focus on the study of homogenizing global cultural tendencies, not on the
particularities of specific regions or localities. Alongside its existing emphasis on
homogenizing global cultural tendencies, there may also be room within the world
society tradition for the further theorization and examination of cultural difference, or the
study of what Eisenstadt (2000) calls the “ongoing dialogue” between the regional and
the modern or global.

Perhaps surprisingly, this study did not find support for Inglehart’s influential
postmaterialist thesis, which predicts that existential security should promote the societal
acceptance of homosexuality. Unlike previous work on this subject (Adamczyk and Pitt
2009; Anderson and Fetner 2008; Gerhards 2010; Hadler 2012; Slenders, Sieben and
Verbakel 2014; Štulhofer and Rimac 2009), here I introduced a new, more precise
measure of existential security that allows the effect of existential security to be
distinguished from that of global cultural influence. I moreover modeled change in
global attitudes as well as cross-sectional variation. The existential security scale
employed here (a composite scale of average life expectancy, infant mortality rates, and
intrastate conflict) failed to have a positive predictive effect on either between-country
differences in the acceptance of homosexuality or on within-country change. Net of other
factors, moreover, GDP per capita, the standard measure of existential security, also
failed to predict attitudes toward homosexuality.

Attitudes toward homosexuality are, of course, just one attitude among many.
Additional research will be needed to determine the extent to which the factors that affect
attitudes toward homosexuality also shape attitudes on other subjects. There is the
potential for the global culture described by world society theory to affect attitudes on a range of subjects, given its broad emphasis on rationalism and universalistic individualism. However, the influence of global culture on attitudes may well be less strong or less readily detectable in cases where the implications of global cultural norms are more ambiguous (for example, attitudes toward prostitution: see Frank et al. 2010), or where global culture is relatively silent: for instance, global culture does not support any one religious faith over another. It is possible, moreover, that region-specific cultural programs play a greater role in shaping collective attitudes on subjects like homosexuality, around which there is an unusual level of global controversy (Symons and Altman 2015), than attitudes on subjects around which there is greater elite-level consensus. And future investigations may uncover a greater tendency toward attitudinal convergence on subjects that are less controversial at the global level, for example the desirability of universal education (e.g., Schofer and Meyer 2005). Furthermore, while this study calls the explanatory power of the postmaterialist thesis into some question, more work will be needed to understand whether the theory is able to explain global variation in attitudes on social and political issues other than homosexuality. The postmaterialist thesis would predict, for example, that the experience of existential security should decrease belief in the importance of religion (Norris and Inglehart 2004) and increase support for democracy and civic empowerment (Inglehart and Welzel 2005). As in this chapter, future tests of the postmaterialist thesis should use measures of existential security that allow its effects to be distinguished from those of exposure to global culture. Additionally, it is worth noting that this study modeled global attitudes
but not global behavioral patterns. Scholars have only just begun to consider the potential influence of global cultural influences on behavior (Allendorf and Thornton 2015; Hadler and Haller 2011), and this is another promising area for future research.

In summary, I found in this chapter that there has been a broad global upswing in the societal acceptance of homosexuality, and an accompanying widening attitudinal gap between countries. The results support the utility of multiple modernities theory for explaining global attitudes while calling into some question the explanatory power of the postmaterialist thesis. The analysis, furthermore, provides the strongest evidence yet that an expansive global culture has influenced collective attitudes around the world.
Chapter 5: Globalizing Dynamics surrounding Gay Rights Policy

INTRODUCTION

This chapter explores what factors can help explain the (still limited) worldwide diffusion of national policies for gay rights. I investigate the adoption between 1973 and 2014 of national policies for: 1) the prohibition of sexual-orientation-based employment discrimination; 2) same-sex civil unions and marriages; and 3) the decriminalization of same-sex sexual acts. Each of these policies has been adopted by many countries around the world. Policies for the decriminalization of homosexuality have been adopted most widely. According to the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA), same-sex sexual relations had been made legal in 118 countries by 2014 while they were still criminalized in 75 nations (Carroll and Itaborahy 2015). Policies for same-sex unions were, meanwhile, the least widely-adopted. Still, same-sex unions had by 2014 received official sanction in 33 countries on five continents. And that number would grow to 39 or more by just the following year.\(^{38}\) Thus, while not universally embraced, policies for gay rights have been adopted in a growing number of countries around the world.

The global nature of the expansion of the three gay-rights policies of interest here suggests the influence of some global-scale driving force. And prior studies of the cross-
national adoption of gay-rights policies – while varying greatly in terms of whether they were cross-sectional or longitudinal and in how globalization was modeled – have nevertheless tended to suggest that the worldwide diffusion of global culture has promoted the adoption of national policies for gay rights (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank et al. 2010; Asal et al. 2012; Sommer and Asal 2012; Fernández and Lutter 2013; Ayoub 2014; Hildebrant 2014). There is thus precedent for drawing on world society theory (and related theories of globalization) to understand the adoption of gay-rights policies. I engage with world society theory in this chapter, with the dual aims of better understanding the adoption of gay rights policies and of contributing, more broadly, to our understanding of the dynamics that drive global policy diffusion.

A main focus of the chapter is on better understanding the mechanisms or pathways through which the norms, principles, and cultural models of global culture promote policy adoption. Prior work within the world society tradition has tended to give a fairly “top down” depiction of how national policies diffuse, one that emphasizes the importance of national ties to elite international organizations (Schofer et al 2012). Scholars have thus far only begun to explore whether, and when, what I here term the “domestic uptake” of global cultural messages may promote policy diffusion (e.g. Longhofer et al. 2016). As I noted in the Introduction, the question of whether national policies spread around the world via an entirely top-down diffusion process, or whether more “bottom-up” globalizing dynamics also play a role is interesting in part because the former possibility would suggest a significant democratic deficit in the way “globally-approved” policies have spread. In this chapter, I test for the effect of both top-down and
bottom-up globalizing pathways, and I attempt to measure the domestic uptake of global culture as broadly as possible, through the use of multiple measures.

One innovation here is my testing of whether public attitudes – which, as I showed in the last chapter, are shaped by favorable global cultural messages about homosexuality – have helped drive global policy diffusion. World society scholars contend that global culture is influential primarily because of the impactful nature of prevailing notions of legitimacy in social life (e.g. Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer et al. 1997; Jepperson 2002). That is, culture shapes action. But a question that has gone largely unaddressed in the world society literature is the question of whose notions of legitimacy matter to global policy diffusion: those of average people living in societies around the world, or only those current within an elite global stratum of INGOs, IGOs, and international expert communities. I seek to help answer this question by evaluating the effect of public opinion on the diffusion of gay rights policies. The question of whose notions of legitimacy (or whose culture) matters is perhaps most interestingly explored on a subject like gay rights, on which average people can be expected to have real opinions, as opposed to on some more technocratic subjects, for example global accounting norms, on which one would not expect most non-experts to have a meaningful opinion (see Burstein 2006).

I have argued here that the norm of acceptance of homosexuality has increasingly been incorporated within global culture but that this acceptance still faces significant sub-global resistance. This chapter’s second main contribution is to our understanding of the influence (if any) of this sub-global resistance on the global diffusion of my three gay
rights policies. World society theory has tended to focus on the effects of global consensus, not on dissensus. But there has been some recent interest in the impact of global contestation on policy. Boyle and colleagues (2015) investigated the effect of global-level controversy surrounding abortion, and they concluded that this controversy had prevented the global institutionalization of abortion as a women’s rights issue. In contrast to the failed global-level institutionalization of abortion as a women’s rights issue, I have argued that gay rights has, to a significant degree at least, been successfully institutionalized within global culture. So here I am not so much interested in the impact of global-level contestation surrounding the issue as I am on the consequences of sub-global resistance. This chapter will shed light on whether global policy diffusion takes place in the same way in a context in which substantial global consensus, within an elite global stratum, is met with determined resistance at the sub-global level. I not only engage here with world society theory, but I also again call upon multiple modernities theory to help understand the influence of cross-regional cultural variation on gay-rights policy adoption.

This chapter begins with a brief consideration of the global history of policies for the prohibition of discrimination in employment, same-sex unions, and the decriminalization of homosexuality. I then draw upon theory and prior literature to consider what factors might have influenced the adoption of these policies. Finally, I use event history analysis to model cross-national and over-time variation in the likelihood of adoption of the three policies.

39 They found, however, that a right to abortion had been successfully institutionalized within global culture as a public health issue.
BACKGROUND ON THE THREE GAY-RIGHTS POLICIES

The three gay rights policies that will be examined here can each be seen as representing the same gay-rights norm that has today become an accepted element within global culture. But these policies have different histories and vary in some other meaningful ways. The first policies prohibiting discrimination and allowing same-sex unions came into being at a time when the issue of gay rights was coming to greater prominence globally and especially in Western countries. Although the United States was an early site of lesbian and gay activism, with for example the Stonewall Riots of 1969, it was the more secular countries of Western Europe that led the way in adopting new policies for gay rights. The first anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies were adopted just three years apart. Same-sex unions received their first official sanction in 1989, when Denmark instituted a policy allowing same-sex couples to enter into civil unions. Belgium later became the first country to adopt a same-sex marriage policy, in 2003 (Carroll 2016). (Following Fernández and Lutter (2013), I categorize both same-sex civil unions and marriages as “same-sex unions.”) The Netherlands, meanwhile, adopted the first policy prohibiting sexual-orientation-based discrimination in employment in 1992. And just a few years later, in 2000, the Western-Europe-dominated EU made the adoption of anti-discrimination provisions mandatory for its existing members states as well as for countries that would join the EU in the future (Waaldijk
Same-sex unions have, meanwhile, lacked this level of formal support from pan-European organizations. These two gay-rights policies arguably differ in another way as well, and that is in their level of public salience. The term salience is used in political science to describe the importance national publics attach to different issues (Wlezien 2005). Any gay rights policy might be expected to garner some public interest, since homosexuality challenges sexual taboos and because the subject of gay rights is by nature personal and easily comprehensible. But there is reason to think that same-sex unions should in general be more salient than anti-discrimination policies. Same-sex union policies, after all, involve a change (or at least an addendum) to the bedrock societal institution of marriage. These policies tend to be more than mere window dressing, in that actual same-sex couples are allowed to marry or form civil unions. Formally-recognized same-sex weddings and same-sex couples are, moreover, likely to be highly visible. In contrast, policies prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation pertain to a less visible domain of social life (the treatment of workers by their employers or potential employers), and sexual orientation is often tacked on at the end of a long list of other categories, for example gender, religion, and ethnicity. Once adopted, meanwhile, active enforcement may be spotty.

Turning to the decriminalization of homosexuality, the history of this policy stretches back much further, to 1791, when homosexuality was decriminalized by France’s revolutionary government. In decriminalizing homosexuality, the French

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40 I am referring to the November 27, 2000 adoption of Directive 2000/78/EC, which established a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation.
government was not responding to any concept of gay rights (which had not yet been “invented”) but rather, as Frank and colleagues (2010) have pointed out, to the civil libertarian idea articulated in Article 4 of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man, that “liberty consists in the freedom to do everything which injures no one else.” The decriminalization of homosexuality was subsequently incorporated into the Napoleonic Code, which spread to the neighboring European countries of Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, and Spain via Napoleon’s conquests, and later to these countries’ colonies (Frank et al. 2010; Frank and Moss 2017). Thus, due primarily to the influence of the Napoleonic Code, homosexuality had already been decriminalized in a substantial minority of countries prior to the current, post-World-War-II wave of globalization. But in the post-war period, an increasing number of countries have moved to decriminalize homosexuality.

Of these three policies for gay rights, the decriminalization of homosexuality arguably involves the most fundamental right. I noted above that the decriminalization of homosexuality is the most widely adopted of the three gay-rights policies. It is also today the most institutionalized at the global level. Drawing on Jepperson’s definition of institutions and institutionalization (1991:145), we can understand the global institutionalization of a particular national policy to depend on 1) the degree to which the policy is viewed as legitimate and appropriate internationally, especially among the elite

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41 Note that the period of European colonization can be understood as an earlier (and even more Western-dominated) wave of globalization (see for example Robertson 2003).
42 Participation in same-sex sexual relations can be understood as fundamental to lesbian and gay identity and thus a logical precursor to the other two rights. Certainly, it is a logical precursor to same-sex marriage as sexual relations are widely considered to be a basic element of marriage, whether between partners of the opposite sex or of the same sex.
global strata where can be found so many of the opinion-makers and opinion-leaders of
global culture, and 2) the degree to which failure to adopt such a policy is “counteracted
in a regulated fashion, by repetitively activated, socially constructed, controls – that is by
some set of rewards and sanctions”. The relative global legitimacy of decriminalization
appears to be reflected in the fact that it is today the most widely-adopted of the three
policies. We can also find evidence of international sanctions on those who violate this
norm. As I have already noted, laws prohibiting same-sex sexual relations have been
struck down by both European and international human rights courts (in 1981 and 1994,
respectively). And criminal prohibitions have sometimes been met by shaming and
threats of financial sanctions. In 2014, for example, a number of Western donors and the
World Bank pulled foreign aid from Uganda when the country adopted a harsh anti-gay
law that made same-sex acts punishable by life in prison (Plaut 2014).

THEORY

World Society Theory and Policy Diffusion Dynamics

The world society literature has identified a common pattern by which national
policies tend to diffuse globally (e.g. Ramirez et al 1997; Frank et al. 2000). First comes
the initial adoption of the policy, usually by a prominent or influential country heavily
embedded in world society (typically, a Western nation). Then, especially if the policy is
heavily resonant with global cultural principles and norms (Strang and Meyer 1993),
other countries with strong links to global culture begin to adopt the policy as well, and
they are later followed by countries with weaker links to world society. Generally this
process is thought to proceed with little reflection on the part of the adopters. Policies are adopted because they are seen as legitimate and appropriate. This is the standard narrative. The standard measures of global cultural influence have been measures of connectivity to elite international organizational forms. These elite international organizations are theorized to play a key role in both developing and disseminating the norms and discourses of global culture. And of the available measures of connectivity to elite international organizations, INGO ties have been the most standard (see for example Schofer et al. 2012). INGOs are thought to be influential both because some of them directly advise or lobby national governments to adopt new policies and, less directly, because INGO ties help disseminate global cultural norms and ideas (Meyer et al. 1997:162; Schofer and Hironaka 2005: 30; Schofer et al. 2012: 63). In the case of the gay rights policies of interest here, INGO ties have generally been found to predict law adoption (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank et al. 2010; Fernández and Lutter 2013).

Despite the great emphasis placed on the role of ties to INGOs and other elite international organizations, some scholars have argued that these ties are unlikely to tell the full story. Schofer and Hironaka (2005: 30) argue, for example, that policy diffusion is probably driven by “an array of specific and diffuse mechanisms.” And some scholars have begun to explore the effect of some aspects of what I have termed here the domestic uptake of global culture. The domestic uptake of global culture, which might alternatively be termed “societal globalization,” occurs when the norms and principles of global culture are adopted by domestic societies, such that they come to be seen as legitimate and appropriate, and such that they begin to organize various aspects of
domestic social life. Domestic conditions that result from the uptake of global culture are analytically distinct from domestic conditions that are more readily understood as particular to the specific national context (for example religion), and they do not fit neatly within the oft-referenced dichotomy in cross-national research, between domestic factors and international ones. What I label as “bottom-up” globalization occurs when the domestic uptake of global cultural norms prompts national governments to adopt laws and policies that are in accordance with global cultural norms. This bottom-up form of globalization is in contrast to the more top-down diffusion that occurs via the influence of elite international organizations.

Conceivably, various forms of domestic uptake might matter to policy adoption. The world society scholarship that has considered domestic uptake’s potential role has tended to focus on domestic civil society, and in particular on domestic NGOs. This emphasis is partially in line with social movements theory; empirical research within this tradition has sometimes pointed to the influence of social movement organizations on policy-making (e.g. Kane 2003). (Although note that the social movements literature on this subject has not generally been internationally-oriented and has tended to focus on the United States and other Western countries (Longhofer et al. 2016).) Recent work in the world society tradition has, however, challenged the common depiction of social movement organizations as products of their local environment (e.g. Frank et al. 2007; Longhofer et al. 2016). For Longhofer and colleagues (2016: 1749), domestic NGOs are often “derivative features of world society.” Schofer and Longhofer (2011) find, for example, that ties to elite international organizations and foreign aid have been important
drivers of the creation of domestic NGOs. And Longhofer and colleagues (2016: 1749) suggest that domestic NGOs can be viewed as especially derivative of the international environment in sectors where “international efforts and activities play a critical role” in the social construction of problems, as for example I have argued to be the case with the gay rights sector.

Research within the world society tradition on the worldwide influence of domestic NGOs and related civil society indicators on policy adoption has thus far produced mixed results. Most recently, Longhofer and colleagues (2016) found that ties to environmental INGOs but not the presence of environmental domestic NGOs promoted pro-environmental policy outcomes, except in a sub-sample of democratic nations, in which environmental domestic NGOs generally had a significant effect. Some years back, Frank and McEneaney (1999) evaluated the effect of lesbian and gay domestic NGOs on the presence of criminal prohibitions on same-sex sexuality, and, although they were then working with a comparatively limited dataset, they found that domestic NGOs did predict policy outcomes. Yet, Frank and colleagues (2010) later found no effect for domestic lesbian and gay visibility (used as a proxy for domestic civil society activity) on a composite policy-outcome variable. Some other cross-national studies, drawing on various theoretical traditions, have considered the effect of different measures of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) civil society on the existence of criminal prohibitions on homosexuality and same-sex unions, and have again found
mixed results (Fernández and Lutter 2013; Ayoub 2014; Hildebrandt 2014). This mixed record presents something of a puzzle, and suggests there may be a need to further examine sources of variation in the influence of domestic NGOs.

By contrast to domestic NGOs and related civil society measures, I am not aware of any work in the world society tradition investigating the impact of domestic public opinion on policy adoption. This is a common omission in social scientific studies of policy outcomes, especially those conducted by sociologists (Burstein 1998). There has been a particular dearth of work on the effect of public opinion on policy outside of the United States and other Western countries. But some prominent political sociologists have argued that scholars omit public opinion at their peril, and that lack of attention to its impact likely biases results (Burstein 1998; Manza and Brooks 2012). Burstein (2006) has argued for the particular influence of public opinion on policies on which the public has a strong opinion, that is on those policies that are highly salient.

Given the multiple forms of domestic uptake that might influence policy, I try to measure domestic uptake as broadly as possible, capturing both the influence of domestic lesbian and gay civil society and public attitudes. Civil society, as I use it here, is a term that emphasizes the collective activity of individual citizens. I meanwhile conceptualize public opinion or public attitudes as capturing shared cultural notions of legitimacy (as

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43 Note that the variation of the effect on lesbian and gay dNGOs in this literature did not clearly correspond to the democracy/non-democracy dichotomy that Longhofer and colleagues (2016) identified in the case of environmental dNGOs.

44 Note, however, Fernández and Lutter’s (2013) work on the adoption of same-sex union policies in Europe. In that study, they evaluate the effect of Inglehart’s secular-rational values index on policy adoption, and they find that secular-rational values do encourage policy adoption. Fernández and Lutter, however, conceptualize the values index as a measure of the operation of Inglehart’s postmaterialist thesis, not as a world-society measure.
opposed to, for example, the aggregate product of individual dispositions). This understanding is in line with world society theory’s understanding of norms and principles as products of shared cultural notions of legitimacy (Jepperson 2002).45

As has been argued about domestic NGOs, I consider favorable public attitudes about homosexuality to in large part be a derivative feature of world society. I found in the last chapter, for example, that exposure to global culture has driven worldwide increases in the acceptance of homosexuality. It is the case, moreover, that the social construction of homosexuality and the positive valence often assigned to it today are embedded within and produced by global culture. I described in Chapter 2 how, prior to the modern gay rights movement, homosexuality was widely viewed in a negative light. This was a product not only of generally unfavorable messages about homosexuality emanating, for example, from Jewish, Christian, and Islamic religious traditions, but also of an earlier wave of globalization in which European colonizers and missionaries promoted a highly negative view of homosexuality around the world. Generally speaking then, the positive or tolerant views of homosexuality encouraged over recent decades by global culture replaced negative or intolerant ones.

The following hypotheses flow from this discussion of the global diffusion of cultural norms. In light of prior literature and theory, I anticipate that:

Hypothesis 1: INGO ties increase the likelihood that gay-rights policies will be adopted.

45 See also Jepperson’s (1992) work on public opinion, which shows how globally, attitudes on a wide range of subjects vary from society to society and seem to depend on societal context.
But note that the impact of INGO ties could be influenced by variation in national receptivity toward global legal norms. The world society literature suggests, furthermore, that ties to international organizations should have the greatest influence when a national policy is highly institutionalized within global culture. Thus, for, example, Ramirez and colleagues (1997) in the their study of the global spread of female suffrage find that international organizational ties only became influential after 1930, when the norm of female suffrage had become institutionalized at the global level. Similarly, Boyle and colleagues (2015) find that ties to women’s INGOs do not promote abortion policy liberalization because abortion has never been institutionalized globally as a women’s rights issue. I argued above that the decriminalization of homosexuality had by the 1990’s become globally institutionalized, and that it is today the most globally institutionalized of my three gay-rights policies. It follows that:

*Hypothesis 1(a):* INGO ties have a greater positive effect on the likelihood of the decriminalization of homosexuality than on the likelihood of anti-discrimination or same-sex union policy adoption.

Despite mixed results in the empirical literature, social movement theory nevertheless suggests that:

*Hypothesis 2: The presence of a domestic lesbian and gay civil society increases the likelihood that gay-rights policies will be adopted.*

Theory on the influence of public opinion on policy would meanwhile suggest that:
**Hypothesis 3**: Tolerant domestic attitudes toward homosexuality increase the likelihood of gay-rights policy adoption.

And, given that same-sex union policies should tend to be of greater public salience than anti-discrimination policies, I also expect that:

**Hypothesis 3(a)**: Public opinion has a greater effect on the likelihood of same-sex policy adoption than on the likelihood anti-discrimination policies being adopted.

Region Effects

While world society theory focuses on the influence of a single global culture, multiple modernities theory allows us to think about how regional variation in cultural norms and discourses about homosexuality might affect patterns of policy adoption. I have argued that elite cultural discourses in three world regions, the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, are particularly opposed to homosexuality. But it is also possible to argue that elite cultural norms and discourses are particularly accepting in some world regions. I have discussed how it was in the West where the modern gay rights movement originated (Altman 2002). And the West, as the original birthplace of the global cultural norm and ideal of individualism, might be expected to be particularly culturally receptive to the idea of gay rights, given that the concept of gay rights takes individualism as its logical premise (Frank and McEneaney 1999; Frank et al. 2010). It has meanwhile been argued that in Latin America today demands for human rights carry a particularly “powerful resonance,” especially given the region’s history with authoritarian repression (Friedman 2014). And in the last three
decades, most Latin American countries have adopted new or substantially revised constitutions that place special emphasis on human rights (Encarnación 2014).\footnote{While Latin America can be thought of as having a regional cultural program that is particularly accepting of gay rights, the opposite would appear to be the case for the Caribbean (Mintz 2013; Marshall 2014).} Accordingly, and drawing on Eisenstadt’s (2000) concept of the regional cultural program, I expect that:

\textit{Hypothesis 4:} The influence of cultural programs in the West and Latin America increases the likelihood of the adoption of gay-rights policies.

In the previous chapter, I demonstrated the influence of anti-gay elite cultural discourses on public attitudes in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. But even as this is the case, most of the countries of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc are also members of one or both of two Western-European-dominated European organizations that have pushed for gay rights: the Council of Europe (now with 47 member countries) and the European Union (with 28). The Council of Europe’s European Court of Human Rights ruling in 1981, against criminal prohibitions on homosexuality among Council of Europe member countries, pressure on members to decriminalize homosexuality (Moroney 2000). And the European Union’s 2000 requirement that member states adopt anti-discrimination policies is also binding (Waaldijk and Bonini-Baraldi 2006). These pan-European organizations thus exercise a coercive influence in favor of gay rights, rather than a cultural one; this influence falls outside the strict confines of either world society theory or multiple modernities theory. It follows that:
Hypothesis 5: Membership in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc increases the likelihood of the adoption of gay rights policies, in particular for the adoption of anti-discrimination and decriminalization policies.

DATA

Data for this project come from multiple sources, including established cross-national data sources, international surveys, and my own analysis of publicly-available reports, periodicals, reference works, and online databases. I merged these data into a single cross-national time-series data file, organized by country-year. In what follows, I describe the various dependent, independent, and control variables used here.

Dependent Variables

Data on: 1) the prohibition of discrimination in employment based on sexual orientation; 2) adoption of same-sex union policies; and 3) the decriminalization of same-sex sexual acts among consenting adults were sourced from the ILGA’s annual report on State-Sponsored Homophobia (Carroll and Itaborahy 2015; Carroll 2016). For each, policy adoption has been coded on a 0 to 1 scale, with 0 representing the absence of a particular policy and 1 its presence. For same-sex union policies, I coded whichever was received legal sanction first, same-sex civil unions or same-sex marriages. In nations where the policy of interest was adopted in some states or provinces but not in others (a circumstance which occurred most frequently in countries with a federal system of government), I coded adoption as having occurred in the first year in which the policy
was adopted in more than half of a nation’s states or provinces. For example, in the United States homosexuality was gradually decriminalized on a state-by-state basis, before criminal prohibitions on same-sex sex were ultimately ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 2003. I coded the United States as having decriminalized homosexuality in 1992 because that was the first year in which a majority of U.S. states (more than 25) had removed criminal prohibitions. The policy data provided by ILGA was in some cases supplemented with additional country-specific research.

Independent Variables of Interest

My first independent variable of interest is INGO ties, logged. This standard measure of world-society connectedness (Schofer et al. 2012) was collected from the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations 1981-2013). A country is considered to have a tie to a given INGO if a domestic organization or citizen of that country is a member of the INGO. The greater the number of INGOs to which domestic organizations or citizens are members, the higher the number of that country’s INGO ties. The INGO data used here include ties to all INGOs listed in the Yearbook of International Organizations. I also collected data on ties to lesbian and gay INGOs specifically, but the results were comparatively weak and did not correlate strongly with the results for all INGOs.47 The more specific INGO measure is arguably a

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47 I would like to thank Wade Cole for sharing his data on general INGO ties, which I updated through 2013, and, especially, David Frank for sharing his data on national ties to lesbian and gay INGOs, which I also updated. I worked with my hard-working and conscientious research assistant, Danielle Lyons, to update both data series.
poor one since the Yearbook provides membership data on only a limited number of these organizations, and so I ultimately selected the broader INGO ties measure.

While INGO ties are the most standard measure of national ties to the elite global stratum of organizations and experts that develop and disseminate global cultural content, scholars have sometimes also used IGO ties or treaty ratifications to measure world-society connectedness. I tried IGO ties, again collected from the Yearbook of International Organizations, and found they generally had a similar predictive effect as did INGO ties. Following from Sommer and Asal’s (2012) study on anti-discrimination policy, I also tried data on country ratifications of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 1958 Discrimination (in employment and occupation) Convention (C111) of the International Labor Organization (ILO). But neither of these two measures had a predictive effect on policy adoption.

I used linear year to capture the influence on policy adoption of time, net of other factors. Year is of interest here because it can reveal the effect of the increasing global institutionalization of my three policies.

I, meanwhile, assessed the strength of domestic lesbian and gay civil societies using two separate measures. The first is an index of the presence of domestic gay and lesbian social life and media, collected from the Spartacus International Travel Guide. The purpose of the Spartacus guide, which has been published annually for decades, is to provide lesbian and gay travelers with information about lesbian-and-gay-specific amenities and social life in countries around the world. Data from the guide have been collected at five year intervals and interpolated on year. Lesbian and gay social life has
been measured on a 0 to 5 scale, with 0 indicating the absence of any lesbian and gay 
social life within a country and 5 its widespread presence, in the form, for example, of 
gay bars, restaurants, and hotels. The presence of lesbian and gay media has meanwhile 
been measured on a 0 to 3 scale, where 0 indicates the absence of lesbian and gay media 
outlets, for example magazines, newspapers, and internet sites, and 3 indicates their 
widespread presence. These two indexes were averaged together. Frank and colleagues 
(2010) label the resulting measure “lesbian and gay social visibility,” and describe it as 
the best available measure of lesbian and gay civil society in countries around the world. 
Results for this measure should be interpreted with some caution because, besides 
gauging the strength of domestic lesbian and gay civil society, this measure might also 
represent the general societal acceptability of a lesbian and gay “lifestyle.” The most 
repressive countries forcibly limit lesbian and gay visibility (e.g. Egypt), both through 
informal social pressure and government repression. Lesbian and gay visibility may thus 
capture these dynamics as well as the effect of lesbian and gay civil society. David Frank 
has generously shared lesbian and gay visibility data with me, through 2005, and I have 
updated the measure through to 2015. Note that the number of countries covered by this 
measure is limited by the range of countries featured in the Spartacus guide.

The second measure of lesbian and gay civil society, which I introduce for the 
first time here, is a measure of the presence of *domestic NGOs*, collected from ILGA’s 
international database of domestic LGBTQ organizations. Founded in 1978, ILGA has 
emerged as the lesbian and gay INGO with the broadest international membership, 
according to the *Yearbook of International Organizations*’ most recent records on the
organization from 2007. My measure of domestic LGBTQ organizations includes only those domestic organizations that have registered as members of ILGA; it therefore skews in the direction of capturing politically-involved, internationally-embedded LGBTQ organizations. This suits my purposes since this type of organization is more likely than many other types of organizations (for example gay choir associations) to be in a position to exert direct influence on the policy making process. Data on this measure were collected in fall 2015 and capture only those domestic organizations that were members of ILGA in 2015. (The ILGA database lists start dates of membership for all current members.) This measure is therefore likely missing some domestic LGBTQ organizations that became members of ILGA some decades ago but which are now defunct, meaning that the measure should be especially likely to capture those domestic organizations that have been more permanent and long-standing.

Data on average national attitudes toward homosexuality were sourced from the integrated WVS/EVS. Survey samples were nationally representative, with an average sample size of 1,633 per national survey. Survey respondents were given the following statement: “Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justifiable, never be justifiable, or something in between, using this card … Homosexuality.” Their responses were measured on a 10-point scale ranging from “never justifiable” (coded 1) to “always justifiable” (coded 10). As would be expected, responses on this survey item were highly correlated with attitudes on other sexuality- and gender-related issues (e.g., Welzel 2013; Wernet, Elman and Pendleton 2005).
The limited availability of cross-national survey data has represented a constraint, for those who might wish to evaluate the effect of public opinion on policy adoption (e.g. Schofer and Hironaka 2005:33). In the case of attitudes toward homosexuality, the available cross-national time-series data, although unusually plentiful by comparison to most other attitudinal data, are nevertheless available for only a limited range of countries (87 countries, representing a total of 85 percent of the world’s population) and years (countries were surveyed between one and eight times between 1981 and 2012, for an average of 3.1 observations per country). There has therefore been a need to make the most of the available attitudinal data. Country-level attitudes are generally highly correlated from year to year, and so I have chosen to fill in data between the available country-years, using interpolation, and to extrapolate out 10 years from each country’s available trend line. For countries with just one attitudinal data point, I have used that data point for all country-years within 10 years of that observation. While imperfect, I would argue that these strategies are much preferable to the alternative, of not including public opinion in our models at all. Given its theorized influence, the exclusion of public opinion would mean that we could not only not test for its influence but also that other coefficients might well be biased by its exclusion (Burstein 1998).

As with lesbian and gay visibility, one might suspect there is some risk of public opinion capturing more than is intended here. Might national policy affect public opinion rather than the other way around? Although the models employed here will be longitudinal, and the independent variables will be lagged by one year, one can still envision the possibility that early discussion of future plans for pro-gay policy changes
might positively influence public opinion (although, I would argue that one can also imagine the reverse: that such public discussions might trigger a public backlash). To evaluate this possibility, I separately added variables for each of the gay-rights policies being discussed here to my full model for attitudes toward homosexuality (Model 7 in Table 4.1) in Chapter 4. None of the policy variables had a statistically significant effect on attitudes, net of other factors.

I used country membership in three world regions -- the West (including Western Europe and European settler colonies in North America and the Pacific), Latin America, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc -- to capture the influence of region-specific factors, especially the influence of region-specific cultural programs. My choice of what countries fall into these regions is taken from the regional classification system developed by Teorell and Hadenius (2004; Hadenius and Teorell 2007), which is itself based on area experts’ assessments of institutional similarities and differences across countries, together with considerations of geographical proximity. My choice to include just three regions in my models means that all other regions in Teorell and Hadenius’ classification system (the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific) have been relegated to a single reference category. This choice was informed by practical exigency: countries in world regions outside of the West, Latin America, and the former Soviet and Eastern bloc were less likely to adopt gay-rights policies and thus lacked sufficient variation across my three dependent variables. One consequence is that my models are not able to measure for and capture a full range of region effects.
Controls

My first control variable is *population size, logged*. As is fairly standard in the world society literature, I have not weighted INGO ties by population size. Yet, one can conceive of a situation in which the predictive effect of a certain number of INGO ties would depend on the population size. So the variable is included here in order to obtain the effect of INGO ties, net of population size. Population data were sourced from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database (The World Bank 2016).

I include *democracy* as a control because the effect of the domestic public opinion and domestic civil society might vary by the level of democracy within a society. It is possible, moreover, that democracies, which enshrine various civil rights, may be more receptive to new claims for gay rights (see Strang and Meyer 1993’s theoretical argument on the importance of cultural congruence to diffusion). Note that democracy itself involves a set of globally legitimated institutions and norms (e.g. Meyer et al. 1997), and so its presence can also be viewed as reflecting the domestic uptake of global cultural norms.

Democracy is measured using combined Freedom House and imputed Polity indexes of democracy. The constituent Freedom House democracy index averages together Freedom House’s measures of both political rights (for example the right to vote) and civil rights. The constituent Polity index of democracy, meanwhile, combines the extent of repression of competitive political participation within a country (the Polity institutionalized autocracy index), with more positive indicators of democracy, for
example the presence of democratic institutions and civil liberties (the Polity institutionalized democracy index). To fill in missing data, the Polity index was regressed on the Freedom House measure of democracy. The resulting Freedom House/imputed Polity measure was sourced from the Quality of Governance indicators database (Teorell et al. 2016). The combined index has been found to perform better, in terms of reliability and validity, than either constituent index used singly (Hadenius & Teorell 2005).

Lastly, I use GDP per capita (PPP), logged because it is a standard control variable in cross-national research, and one that might capture the effect of a range of different factors (see, for example, my discussion of per capita GDP in Chapter 4). Data for this variable were sourced from the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), which provides the most complete cross-national time series data on GDP per capita in international dollars, and attempts to correct for source-specific biases, by combining GDP data from seven different sources (James et al. 2012).

METHODS

In line with prior studies of global policy diffusion (e.g. Frank, Hironaka, and Schofer 2000; Schofer 2003; Longhofer et al. 2016), I employed discrete-time event-history analysis to model how the likelihood, or “hazard,” of policy adoption has varied over time and between countries. These models are “constant rate” models, meaning that a given country’s likelihood of policy adoption is assumed to be constant over time, after controlling for the effect of the time-varying independent variables. Standard errors have
been adjusted for possible country-level clustering. All time-varying independent variables are lagged by one year to ensure proper temporal order.

Event history analysis involves the analysis of only those countries that have not yet adopted a given policy. Countries are dropped from the sample, or “right censored,” following policy adoption. Analyses of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policy adoption begin in 1992 and 1989, respectively. In line with prior literature (e.g. Ramirez et al. 1997), these start dates are set to correspond to the first adoption of each policy. The Netherlands became the first country to prohibit employment discrimination based on sexual orientation in 1992, and Denmark was the first country to allow same-sex civil unions, in 1989. It was arguably at these dates when the idea of adopting such policies became widely available for adoption and mimicry. All country-year data from before these two start dates were dropped from the analysis, or “left censored.” The analysis of the decriminalization of homosexuality begins earlier, in 1973. Theoretically, this analysis could have begun earlier, for example in 1933 when Denmark became the first of a dozen or so European countries to decriminalize homosexuality over the course of the mid-century, or much further back in 1791 when the French revolutionary government decriminalized homosexuality. But data on a full complement of my independent variables is missing prior to 1973. One might add that the globalizing cultural forces highlighted by world society theory are not thought to have come into full operation until the period after the Second World War (Meyer et al. 1997). Countries that had already decriminalized before 1973 were therefore not included in my analyses.
RESULTS

Descriptive Analysis

Turning first to the descriptive data, Figure 1 shows how the cumulative percentage of countries that have adopted each of the three gay-rights policies – for the prohibition of employment discrimination, the legal recognition of same-sex unions, and the decriminalization of homosexuality – has increased over time. Anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies follow fairly similar patterns of adoption. In each case, an initial adoption event was followed by rapid adoption elsewhere. It is worth noting though that neither of these policies had been adopted by anything close to a majority of the world’s countries by 2014. Also, adoption of same-sex union policies has lagged behind adoption of anti-discrimination policies. Indeed, a closer look at patterns of cross-regional variation shows that same-sex unions had for the most part only been adopted in three world regions as of 2014: the West, Latin America, and the Former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. (See Appendix C for policy adoption patterns by region.) And of these three regions, policies allowing for same-sex unions were by far the most common across Western countries. For the case of same-sex union policies, then, Figure 1 would seem to provide some preliminary support for hypotheses 4 and 5, which expect regional particularities to be influential. By contrast, anti-discrimination policies have been much more widely adopted across different world regions. Still, by 2014, no country in either the Middle East and North Africa or the Caribbean had adopted an anti-discrimination policy.
Looking to the decriminalization of homosexuality, we see a different pattern. Figure 1 shows that homosexuality had already been decriminalized in close of 40 percent of countries in the sample by 1973. This can be attributed both to the early incorporation of decriminalization within France’s Napoleonic Code and the subsequent adoption of the Napoleonic Code by other European countries, and their colonies, as well as to mid-twentieth century moves to decriminalize among various West and Central European countries. Moreover, between 1973 and 2014, the percentage of new decriminalizations increased slowly. The period of most rapid increase occurred between 1990 and approximately 2002. A closer examination of the data shows that the
The heightened pace of change between 1990 and 2002 was due to decriminalizations among the countries of the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc. Between 1990 and the early 2000s, the percentage of former Soviet and Eastern Bloc countries that had decriminalized homosexuality rose sharply, from just under 30 percent of countries in the region to close to 90 percent. This shift is likely attributable to multiple factors. These include the sudden exposure of countries in this region to outside ideas, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. The years immediately following 1991 were a period of pro-liberal, pro-Western sentiment, and of the adoption of new legal codes, especially in the former republics of the Soviet Union. Most countries in the region also joined the Council of Europe, which strongly encouraged decriminalization. The old Soviet Union had outlawed same-sex sexual activity, but even Russia moved to decriminalize in 1993.

Following 2002, the worldwide pace of new decriminalizations slowed somewhat and even showed some sign of levelling off after approximately 2008.

By the end of the time series in 2014, homosexuality had been decriminalized in over 60 percent of the world’s countries, making it by far the most widely-adopted of the three gay rights policies. Cross-regional variation in adoption patterns nevertheless remained stark. By 2014, all countries in the West, Latin America, and East Asia had decriminalized, together with the great majority of the countries in the former Soviet and Eastern bloc. Meanwhile, less than half of countries in the remaining five world regions (the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific) had done so. Percentages of countries that had decriminalized in these regions ranged from 43 percent among countries in the Pacific to
just 12.5 percent of countries in the Middle East and North Africa. This result is generally in line with hypotheses 4 and 5.

Explanatory Analyses

I turn now to the results from the explanatory models. Models 1 through 3 in Table 5.1 show the effect of INGO ties and region on the likelihood of the adoption of policies prohibiting discrimination in employment, allowing same-sex unions, and decriminalizing homosexuality. These are my main models, but they are restricted in that they exclude variables for the domestic uptake of gay-friendly global cultural messages: domestic lesbian and gay visibility, the presence of domestic gay and lesbian NGOs, and domestic attitudes toward homosexuality. Inclusion of each of these domestic uptake variables entails a reduction in sample size. They are therefore included individually in separate models, results of which are shown in Tables 5.2 through 5.4. The effect of domestic public opinion on decriminalization is not shown at all because in this case the sample size was too small to reliably measure its influence.

Turning first to Table 5.1, the results for anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies (Models 1 and 2) are in line with the standard world-society-theory narrative of what drives global policy diffusion. The analysis yields a very large positive and statistically significant coefficient for INGO ties. The coefficient of 2.57 for the effect of logged INGO ties on same-sex unions can be interpreted to mean that a one standard deviation increase in INGO ties increases the odds of same-sex unions being legalized by
a factor of 16.86. Hypothesis 1 is thus supported in the case of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. The effect for year in Models 1 and 2 is also positive and statistically significant. This coefficient may reflect the effect of over-time increases in the global institutionalization of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. In contrast, region effects for the West, Latin America, and the former Soviet and Eastern bloc are all non-significant, in spite of the presence of substantial cross-regional variation in the descriptive outcomes for both policies, especially for same-sex unions. Supplementary analyses show that the region effects are positive and statistically significant when INGO ties is excluded from Models 1 and 2, suggesting that regional differences in levels of global connectivity can explain much of the cross-regional variation in anti-discrimination and same-sex union policy adoption found in the descriptive data. Hypotheses 4 and 5, which anticipated significant region effects, are thus supported in the case of these two policies. I find no evidence for the effect of the control variable GDP per capita on either the likelihood of adoption of anti-discrimination of same-sex union policies. Democracy has a near-significant positive effect on anti-discrimination policy adoption while population size has a positive and statistically significant impact on both policies.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{48} This number was calculated by taking the antilog of 2.57 (13.07) and multiplying it by the standard deviation of logged INGO ties in the sample (1.29).

\textsuperscript{49} Note, however, that population becomes insignificant when INGO ties is excluded from the models.
### TABLE 5.1: Event History Analysis of the Adoption of Policies against Employment Discrimination, for Same-Sex Unions, and for the Decriminalization of Homosexuality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1 Employment Discrimination</th>
<th>Model 2 Same-Sex Unions</th>
<th>Model 3 Decriminalization of Homosexuality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-9.79*** (2.13)</td>
<td>-26.16*** (6.90)</td>
<td>-9.46** (3.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.14*** (.04)</td>
<td>0.11** (.04)</td>
<td>.03 (.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>-.18 (.19)</td>
<td>.88 (.68)</td>
<td>.23 (.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.22* (.12)</td>
<td>.16 (.19)</td>
<td>.25** (.09)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-.70*** (.17)</td>
<td>-.69*** (.19)</td>
<td>-.08 (.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Culture: Int’l Ties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs (logged)</td>
<td>2.06*** (.46)</td>
<td>2.57*** (.73)</td>
<td>.26 (.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.39 (.80)</td>
<td>1.62 (1.25)</td>
<td>1.90* (.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>.23 (.68)</td>
<td>3.02 (1.66)</td>
<td>2.05*** (.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet and</td>
<td>1.06 (.64)</td>
<td>1.54 (1.45)</td>
<td>4.08*** (.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Bloc</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
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<td>2907</td>
</tr>
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<td>175</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of Events</strong></td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Wald Chi-Square</strong></td>
<td>132.49***</td>
<td>95.29***</td>
<td>67.10***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE.**—Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.

* p<.10.

* * p<.05.

* * * p<.01.

* * * * p<.001.

Perhaps the most striking finding in Table 5.1 is how much the results for the decriminalization of homosexuality, in Model 3, contrast with those for anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. The coefficient for INGO ties in this model, while positive, is not statistically significant, and its magnitude is quite low. Hypothesis 1 is thus not supported in this case. And, while I had expected INGO ties to have the greatest impact on decriminalization (Hypothesis 1a), these results in fact show the
opposite. The effect of year on decriminalization is also non-significant. Model 3 thus yields no evidence for the effect of world society connectedness on decriminalization. Region, meanwhile, appears to exert a strong influence. The effect of membership in the former Soviet and Eastern bloc is particularly strong. By comparison to membership in the reference category (that is, membership in the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, or the Pacific), membership in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc increased the odds of decriminalization by a huge factor of 59.15. Some effect for membership in the former Soviet and Eastern bloc was expected, given the influence there of the Council of Europe’s opposition to the criminalization of homosexuality; hypothesis 5 thus receives support in this case. Membership in the West and Latin America also increases the likelihood of decriminalization. This result is in line with the descriptive finding that all countries in these regions had decriminalized by 2014, and in this case supports the expectation articulated in hypothesis 4, that rights-related norms and discourses in the West and Latin America should have a positive effect on gay-rights policy adoption. Among the control variables, democracy has a positive and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of decriminalization while GDP per capita and population size do not.

Let us turn now to the effect of the domestic uptake of pro-gay global cultural messages on policy adoption. Recall that my question here is whether global culture drives policy not just through national ties to elite international organizations but also through its influence on domestic societies. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 display the effects of domestic uptake on anti-discrimination and same-union policy adoption, respectively.
Because the inclusion of each of the three domestic uptake variables entails a reduction in sample size, I first run models with the reduced sample size but without the domestic uptake variable. I then add each domestic uptake variable, individually. Starting with the models in Table 5.2, I find no evidence for the influence of gay and lesbian visibility or domestic LGBT NGOs on the adoption of anti-discrimination policies. The effect of domestic attitudes toward homosexuality, meanwhile, is small and marginally significant. Inclusion of these terms has no substantial effect on the INGO ties coefficient, which remains robust across all models in Table 5.2. It would appear on the basis of these findings that the global diffusion of anti-discrimination policy is very much a top-down process, driven in large part by the influence of elite international networks.

Similarly, in Table 5.3, I find no evidence for the influence of the two domestic civil society variables, lesbian and gay visibility and domestic LGBT NGOs, on the likelihood of same-sex union policies being adopted. For these policies, ties to international civil society again matter more than the presence of a lesbian and gay domestic civil society. Hypothesis 2 is thus not supported for the cases of both anti-discrimination and same-sex union policy. For same-sex unions, however, domestic uptake in the form of public attitudes does matter to policy adoption. The effect of public attitudes on the likelihood of same-sex union policy adoption is both positive and statistically significant. And the magnitude of its predictive effect is about 3.5 times greater for same-sex union policies than for anti-discrimination policy. A one unit increase in public acceptance of homosexuality (scaled one to ten) doubles the odds of
same-sex union policy adoption.⁵⁰ I thus conclude that tolerant public attitudes are an important predictor of same-sex union policy adoption. Hypothesis 3 is supported, as is Hypothesis 3a, which anticipated that public opinion would have a greater effect of the adoption of same-sex unions than on adoption of anti-discrimination policies. Note that the inclusion in this model of attitudes toward homosexuality actually increases the size of the coefficient for INGO ties. This is interesting because some theorists have questioned whether INGO ties might in part represent the influence of global culture on individual people or on domestic societies, which would presumably include public opinion (Schofer and Hironaka 2005: 34; Cole 2013: 12). But the result in Table 5.3 suggests a lack of overlap between the influence exerted by INGO ties and that of domestic attitudes.

⁵⁰ The antilog of the coefficient for attitudes toward homosexuality (.71) is 2.03.
TABLE 5.2: The Effect of Domestic Uptake of Global Culture on Adoption of Policies that Prohibit Employment Discrimination

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 4</th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
<th>Model 9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>-8.16***</td>
<td>-1.43</td>
<td>-9.79***</td>
<td>-8.63***</td>
<td>-7.62**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(4.99)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td>(2.38)</td>
<td>(2.26)</td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>.15**</td>
<td>.16***</td>
<td>.14***</td>
<td>.13***</td>
<td>.13**</td>
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<td>(.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
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<td>-.61*</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.18</td>
<td>-.25</td>
<td>-.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged international dollars)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.26)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
<td>(.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.22*</td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.15)</td>
<td>(.19)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.12)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
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<td>-.96***</td>
<td>-.70***</td>
<td>-.71***</td>
<td>-.74***</td>
<td>-.72***</td>
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<tr>
<td>(logged)</td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
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<td>Global Culture:</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int'l Ties</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2.04***</td>
<td>2.06***</td>
<td>1.97***</td>
<td>1.96***</td>
<td>1.88***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.50)</td>
<td>(.46)</td>
<td>(.45)</td>
<td>(.47)</td>
<td>(.39)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Global Culture:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Uptake</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay and Lesbian</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.62)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT NGOs</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.08)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
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<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Region</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.56</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.32</td>
<td>-.14</td>
<td>-.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(.82)</td>
<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>.23</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>-.17</td>
<td>-.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.71)</td>
<td>(.91)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
<td>(.72)</td>
<td>(.76)</td>
<td>(.78)</td>
</tr>
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<td>.22</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>.46</td>
<td>.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern Bloc</td>
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<td>(.80)</td>
<td>(.64)</td>
<td>(.65)</td>
<td>(.71)</td>
<td>(.70)</td>
</tr>
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<td>173</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>98</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald Chi-Square</td>
<td>69.26***</td>
<td>79.09***</td>
<td>132.38***</td>
<td>135.10***</td>
<td>53.99***</td>
<td>60.82***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE.—Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.
* p<.10.
* * p<.05.
* * * p<.01.
* * * * p<.001.
Let us turn now to Table 5.4 and the influence of the domestic uptake variables on the likelihood of decriminalization. In contrast to the previous two policies,
domestic lesbian and gay civil society does matter here, even while INGO ties continue to be of little consequence to the outcome. The effect of domestic LGBT NGOs is positive but not significant. And of particular interest, lesbian and gay visibility has a substantial positive and statistically significant effect. A one standard deviation increase in lesbian and gay visibility increases the odds of decriminalization by a factor of 2.40.\textsuperscript{51} But recall that, in addition to capturing the direct influence of domestic lesbian and gay civil societies on policy adoption, this variable may also capture the level of domestic toleration of such visibility. Unlike in the main restricted model for decriminalization (Model 3), the coefficients for INGO ties in Table 5.4 are statistically significant in most models. Magnitudes are fairly low, however, and the direction of the effect varies between positive and negative. Also in these models, region continues to exert an important predictive effect on the likelihood of decriminalization, although the effect of the West becomes non-significant with the inclusion of lesbian and gay visibility. This result suggests that the positive impact of membership in the West on the likelihood of homosexuality being decriminalized may stem from the presence in most Western countries of an active lesbian and gay civil society.

\textsuperscript{51} This was calculated by multiplying the antilog of 1.40 (4.06) by the standard deviation of lesbian and gay visibility in the sample (.59).
TABLE 5.4: The Effect of Domestic Uptake of Global Culture on the Decriminalization of Homosexuality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 16</th>
<th>Model 17</th>
<th>Model 18</th>
<th>Model 19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>-10.96**</td>
<td>-8.23*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.10)</td>
<td>(7.04)</td>
<td>(3.38)</td>
<td>(3.85)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Year</td>
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<td>.08*</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
<td>(.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Controls</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>1.04*</td>
<td>.74*</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(logged international dollars)</td>
<td>(.41)</td>
<td>(.42)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
<td>(.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy</td>
<td>.28*</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.32**</td>
<td>.29**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
<td>(.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
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<td>-.04</td>
<td>-.03</td>
<td>-.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.28)</td>
<td>(.14)</td>
<td>(.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Global Culture: Int'l Ties</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGOs (logged)</td>
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<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.21)</td>
<td>(.20)</td>
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<td><strong>Global Culture: Domestic Uptake</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gay and Lesbian</td>
<td>1.40**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
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<td>(.49)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBT NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>.21*</td>
<td>(.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Region</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>1.75*</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>1.78*</td>
<td>1.80*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.89)</td>
<td>(.86)</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
<td>(.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1.48*</td>
<td>1.79***</td>
<td>1.49**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>(.89)</td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td>(.61)</td>
<td>(.68)</td>
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<td>Wald Chi-Square</td>
<td>43.76***</td>
<td>45.52***</td>
<td>63.59***</td>
<td>61.70***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE.—Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses.

* p<.10.
* p<.05.
** p<.01.
*** p<.001.

These results can be summarized thusly. INGO ties had a strong positive predictive effect on the likelihood of the adoption of both anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies, but they had little or no effect on the decriminalization of homosexuality. As regards domestic attitudes, these had a substantial influence on same-
sex union policy adoption (although their influence on same-sex unions was still smaller than that of INGO ties). Attitudes had a smaller and only marginally significant influence on anti-discrimination policy. And data constraints unfortunately prevented me from evaluating the effect of public attitudes on decriminalization. Turning to my two measures of domestic civil society, LGBT NGOs had no statistically significant predictive effects, while domestic lesbian and gay visibility only had a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of decriminalization. Likewise, membership in the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, the West, and Latin America had statistically significant predictive effects but only on decriminalization.

DISCUSSION

It is worth lingering for a moment on the least expected result to come out of these models: the finding that INGO ties mattered much less (if at all) to the decriminalization of homosexuality than to either of the other two policies, even as domestic civil society and world region apparently mattered more. The decriminalization of homosexuality reflects the same gay-rights norms as do anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. And recall that I had expected INGO ties to have a larger influence on decriminalization (Hypothesis 1a), since decriminalization is today the most globally institutionalized of the three policies. The aberrant analytical results for decriminalization were, moreover, accompanied by a marked difference in the descriptive data: unlike the rapid rise of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies, the

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52 But note that the two are fairly highly correlated in the available sample.
cumulative percentage of countries that had decriminalized homosexuality rose only gradually between 1973 and 2014. The pace of new decriminalizations in fact showed some sign of leveling off after 2008.

How can these results be explained? One factor seems to be that although today the decriminalization of homosexuality is the most globally institutionalized of the three policies, this policy was not so well institutionalized in the early years of my analysis (approximately 1973 to 1990). Recall, for example, that it was only in 1981 that the European Court of Human Rights ruled against criminal prohibitions on homosexuality and only in 1994 that the International Court for Human Rights did so. In a supplementary analysis, I partitioned the data into 1973-1990 and 1991-2014 components and re-ran Model 3 (the restricted main model for decriminalization) separately for each time period. I found no effect for INGO ties on the likelihood of decriminalization in the first time period but a small but statistically significant effect in the second period. The effect size was .42, which is about one fifth the size of the effect of INGO ties on anti-discrimination policy and one sixth the size of its effect on same-sex unions. This finding is in line with the idea that gay rights were not yet well institutionalized in the 1973-1990 period. But it still does not explain why the influence of INGO ties was still so weak in the 1991-2014 period.

I propose that the weak effect of INGO ties in the later period can be explained by the operation of a “mismatch effect,” whereby, today, even upon receipt (via INGO ties) of global cultural norms favorable towards gay rights, some countries are not receptive to those norms. I would speculate that this lack of receptivity towards the global gay rights
norm is due in part to the influence of elite conservative, reactionary, and anti-gay discourses in some world regions. The operation of such a mismatch effect seems to be suggested by the chart in Appendix C, which shows how the cumulative percentage of decriminalizations varied by world region. The chart indicates that while the cumulative percentage of decriminalizations grew over time in the West, Latin America, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc, very little change took place in the rest of the world’s regions. The over-time trend lines for the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, sub-Saharan Africa, South and Southeast Asia, and the Pacific show very little movement. After 1976, for example, no country in the Middle East and North Africa moved to decriminalize homosexuality, such that by 2014 just two out of 16 countries in the region (Turkey and Bahrain) had decriminalized.

Societal religiosity may also be a driver of the mismatch between the global norms spread via INGO ties and domestic norms and standards of legitimacy. I find, for example, that while in the general sample, average national religiosity and INGO ties are negatively correlated ($\rho=-.21$), meaning that countries with many INGO ties tended on average to be less religious, in the sample of those countries that had still not decriminalized by 2014, the correlation was actually positive ($\rho=.09$), indicating that the countries with high INGO ties that had still not decriminalized homosexuality by 2014 also tended to be more religious than the other remaining countries. This would tend to suggest that high religiosity can make societies less receptive toward the gay-favorable global cultural messages conveyed through INGO ties. We can dig a little bit deeper by

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53 East Asia also changed little, but that region began the period without any criminal prohibitions on homosexuality.
examining the countries that had the highest numbers of INGO ties, from among the
group of countries that had not yet decriminalized by 2014. In further support of a
mismatch effect, all of these most globally-connected countries show signs of having
“received” positive global cultural messages about homosexuality but of having rejected
them. India, for example, had the highest number of INGO ties from among the countries
that still criminalized homosexuality in 2014. In 2009, a sub-national court struck down
India’s national criminal prohibition on same-sex sexual relations, arguing that the
prohibition constituted a violation of basic rights. But the Indian Ministry of Home
Affairs subsequently opposed the sub-national court’s ruling, contending that
homosexuality was still considered to be immoral by Indian society (Mahapatra 2012).
India’s Supreme Court then reinstated the country’s criminal prohibition on
homosexuality in 2013. Most members of parliament evidently supported this ruling: in
2015, India’s lower house of parliament, the Lok Sabha, rejected a bill to criminalize
homosexuality by a vote of 71 to 24.

An examination of the three criminalizing countries with the next-highest INGO
counts – Singapore, Egypt, and Malaysia – reveals a similar record of domestic resistance
to the global gay rights norm. As in India, Singapore’s criminal prohibition on sex
between consenting adult males was challenged in court in 2010. While the plaintiffs in
the case argued that Singapore’s prohibition on same-sex sexual relations violated basic
rights to privacy and personal autonomy, the Supreme Court upheld the prohibition’s
constitutionality (Fasman 2014). Meanwhile, in Egypt, Al-Azhar University, the
country’s leading authority on Sunni Islam, issued a statement in 2015 calling “gayness .
. . a distortion of the freedom of human rights” and accusing “international organisations” of orchestrating a global campaign in support of gay marriage (El-Fekki 2015). And in Malaysia, the national government has in recent years pursued various efforts to prevent the “development” of homosexuality in its population. The Malaysian Ministry of Education has published a list of “symptoms” of homosexuality that parents can look out for in their children (DeFraia 2012). And the country’s Film Censorship Board refuses to allow the appearance of LGBT characters in films shown in the country, except in cases where those characters “die or repent” (Mosbergen 2015). The above-described countries have clearly been exposed to the relevant global cultural messages but have chosen to reject them. In the absence of such resistance, it seems probable that, given their fairly dense ties to world society, most or all of these countries would already have decriminalized by 2014. A mismatch between local norms and the global norm of acceptance of homosexuality has evidently blunted the influence of INGO ties.

In total, according to ILGA (Carroll and Itaborahy 2015), 75 countries had still not decriminalized by 2014. Of these, all were in five world regions: the Caribbean, the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, South Southeast and Asia, and the Pacific. This pattern would again seem to support the role of regional cultural programs, this time in fostering resistance to the global gay rights norm. Some of these regions may, however, be less resistant to gay rights than others. For example, the island nation of Fiji in the Pacific was the last country in the sample to decriminalize homosexuality (in 2010), and the island nations of the Pacific may generally have been less exposed to global
influences than many other regions of the world, suggesting that resistance may be less of a factor impeding decriminalization in this world region.

How lasting current resistance to decriminalizing homosexuality will prove to be remains unclear. While some less resistant counties may decriminalize in the near term, there looks to be no prospect of some of the more fundamentalist of the world’s countries, for example Malaysia, liberalizing their policies any time soon. But it is also the case that national policies, and societal norms, have sometimes changed with surprising rapidity, as in the United States.

The operation of this apparent mismatch effect in the case of decriminalizations likely has important implications for the future spread of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. Resistance to gay rights among a certain sub-group of countries has apparently done little as yet to blunt the predictive effect of INGO ties on the likelihood of the adoption of either policy. (Recall that my formal analyses in this chapter were confined to a case set of countries that had not yet adopted each policy. Thus, by comparison to the decriminalization of homosexuality, my analyses of the adoption of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies involved more countries because there remains a larger number of countries that have not yet adopted either policy. And so the sub-group of countries that appear to be totally resistant to gay rights messages (as conveyed through INGO ties) made up a smaller proportion of the observations in these analyses.) But one would expect that if current levels of resistance hold, then it will ultimately also restrict the spread of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies.
CONCLUSION

This chapter on the global diffusion of gay rights policies contributed to our understanding of global policy diffusion by investigating: 1) the effect of different forms of bottom-up globalization (via domestic civil society and public opinion) on the adoption of gay rights policies; 2) how and whether global diffusion dynamics are altered when globally-approved policies face significant sub-global resistance.

This is the first study of which I am aware to evaluate the potential role of public opinion in driving global policy diffusion. The results indicate that public attitudes help drive, or retard, policy diffusion when the policy is highly salient within the domestic political context. In this case, I found that attitudes had a strong, statistically significant effect on same-sex union policy adoption and weaker and marginally significant effect on anti-discrimination policies, which I argue are a less salient policy. Where salience is high, domestic standards of legitimacy become influential, alongside global ones.

The likelihood of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies being adopted was most strongly affected by INGO ties. Surprisingly, neither world regional membership nor either of my two indicators of the strength of domestic LGBT civil societies (lesbian and gay visibility and domestic NGOs) appeared to affect the likelihood of the adoption of either of these two policies. Other variables, especially INGO ties, apparently account for observed cross-regional differences in the rate of adoption of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies. Meanwhile, and in the relative absence of the effect of INGO ties, both world regional membership and domestic lesbian and gay
visibility had significant predictive effects on the likelihood of homosexuality being decriminalized.

While I have suggested that gay rights may have been only weakly institutionalized within global culture between 1973 and 1990 – producing a weak INGO tie effect, I explain the low impact of INGO ties on the decriminalization of homosexuality in the 1991-2014 period by proposing that some countries have consciously resisted acquiescence to the global cultural norm of decriminalizing homosexuality. This is the first study of which I am aware to suggest that sub-global resistance can act to block the effect of INGO ties. Work in the world society tradition has typically depicted exposure to global cultural norms as leading directly to policy adoption, without the action of any moderating factors. And this depiction may be accurate in the majority of cases where significant sub-global resistance is lacking. Here, however, the data would seem to suggest that some countries are less receptive to the global gay rights norm than others.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

SUMMATION

This dissertation has asked how the globalization of tolerant cultural norms surrounding homosexuality has shaped worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality and national policies that affect the lives of gay men and women. Throughout this dissertation, I have employed world society theory to understand liberalizing global trends. One of my key objectives has been to extend world society theory by investigating cultural globalization’s impact at the level of domestic societies around the world. I have also sought to understand contemporary opposition to gay rights, and its impact on public attitudes and national policies.

I have argued here that gay rights are, to a substantial degree, institutionalized and supported at the global level today. I described in Chapter 2 how gay rights have in recent years achieved the status of a global cultural norm, in the sense of being accepted among an elite global stratum of international scientific and professional communities, INGOs, and IGOs. Gay rights, have, additionally, been enshrined in national law in a still-growing number of countries around the world. At the same time, however, I detail the presence of substantial opposition to the gay rights norm, and I argue that this opposition can best be conceived of as located at the sub-global level. In Chapter 3, I introduce multiple modernities theory, a theory of world regional and sub-regional
cultural and institutional “interpretations of modernity.” I have here used multiple modernities theory to understand the institutionalization of opposition to the global gay rights norm within particular world regions. I argue, in particular, that a rejectionist stance has been incorporated within the elite cultural discourses of much of the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc.

Having established this context, I asked in Chapter 4 how worldwide attitudes toward homosexuality have changed over time, and what factors have driven that change. This is one of the first studies to model global attitudinal change over time. To do so, I took an innovative modeling approach that combined longitudinal multilevel modeling with a supplementary propensity score analysis, to check for bias arising from the unbalanced data structure. My analysis focused on the years 1981 to 2012, a time period for which appropriate international survey data were available, and included 87 countries that together made up 85 percent of the world’s population.

My results show that there was a broad global upswing in the societal acceptance of homosexuality over this time period. I found that this trend has been driven in large part by the influence of cultural globalization, as measured by societal exposure to international flows of ideas and people, as well as by average years of schooling, since education itself is thought to be a mechanism of globalization. In much of the world, then, it appears that globalization has increased acceptance of same-sex attraction. Chapter 4 thus extends world society theory by showing that the theory can help explain change over time in the beliefs of national populations worldwide. This chapter provides perhaps the strongest evidence yet that cultural globalization is shaping the attitudes of
people around the world. World society theory’s wide-ranging ambition would appear to be justified in this case; here is evidence that global culture is influencing individual people around the world. But the results in Chapter 4 also indicate that the attitudinal gap between countries has actually widened over time, such that countries that began the period with the lowest levels of acceptance of homosexuality also changed at the slowest rate. I found that the influence of anti-gay regional cultures in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet and Eastern Bloc was responsible for much of this slower pace of growth. This result is in line with what we would expect on the basis of multiple modernities theory. I found as well that societal religiosity had a negative effect on the societal acceptance of homosexuality, even net of the effect of world-regional membership. Religion, presumably, provides an alternate belief system, and one that has tended to be unfavorable towards homosexuality. Interestingly, I found some evidence that societal religiosity “immunized” societies against the influence of cultural globalization. That is, exposure to international ideas, people, and education may have less of a favorable impact when a society is highly religious. Surprisingly, given the prominence of the postmaterialist thesis in the literature on cross-national attitudinal variation, I found no evidence that existential security or wealth promoted the societal acceptance of homosexuality.

Turning to law adoption, we know that many countries have adopted national policies prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, allowing same-sex unions, and decriminalizing homosexuality. I ask why so many countries around the world have adopted these pro-gay policies – and why many others
have thus far abstained from doing so. Prior empirical studies have emphasized the direct cultural influence of an elite global stratum of INGOs, IGOs, and international expert communities in driving the global diffusion of a wide range of national policies, including those surrounding gay rights. But here I investigate whether a “bottom up” globalization via the domestic-level uptake of global cultural norms also contributes to global policy diffusion. Accordingly, I measured the domestic uptake of pro-gay norms as broadly as possible, using two measures of domestic LGBT civil society and a measure of domestic public attitudes towards homosexuality. This is the first study of which I am aware to test the effect of supportive public opinion on global policy diffusion. The use of this public opinion data allows me to get an additional but related research question as well: the question of whose notions of legitimacy shape national policy adoption. The world society literature emphasizes how state action is if influenced by elite global notions of what is legitimate and appropriate. But if policy-making is deeply influenced by ambient notions of legitimacy, what about the influence of domestic societal standards of legitimacy?

Chapter 5 uses standard event history analyses to examine what factors have tended to promote the adoption of the three gay-rights policies. I found when I examined the spread of anti-discrimination and same-sex union policies that INGO ties are highly consequential in both cases. The greater the exposure to elite global cultural ideas, via INGO ties, the greater the likelihood that these policies will be adopted. Favorable public attitudes toward homosexuality also increased the likelihood of the adoption of same-sex unions, but not the adoption of anti-discrimination policies. In line with prior theory on
the impact of public opinion on policy (Burstein 2006), I attribute this difference to what we would expect to be the greater salience of same-sex union policies with national publics around the world. This result suggests that domestic standards of legitimacy do matter alongside elite global ones, but only when the national policy is one on which the public has a strong and meaningful opinion. Perhaps surprisingly, I found no evidence for the effect of domestic LGBT civil society or world regional membership on the likelihood of the adoption of either policy.

The decriminalization of homosexuality was, by contrast to the other two policies, a bit of an anomaly. While arguably the most globally institutionalized of the three gay-rights policies, the number of countries that have decriminalized homosexuality has grown more slowly over time. And INGO ties have had little or no effect on the likelihood of decriminalization. I was not able to examine the effect of public opinion on the likelihood of decriminalization, due to data constraints. But regional membership, domestic LGBT civil society, and other domestic factors were influential here. I cannot provide a definitive answer to why new decriminalizations have followed such a different pattern. But it would appear to be due to a combination of two factors. First, my analysis of decriminalization begins in 1973, almost two decades before the analyses for the other two policies. In the 1970’s and 1980’s, gay rights were only beginning to become institutionalized within global culture. And since gay rights were still weakly institutionalized globally, we would not expect INGO ties to play a strong role in promoting them (see for example Ramirez et al. 1997). Later, by the 1990’s, when gay rights had become strongly institutionalized globally, many countries had already
decriminalized homosexuality. If today the world is divided into countries that are more and less receptive to the global gay rights norm, then the countries that had not yet decriminalized by the 1991-2014 period were composed of a comparatively high proportion of unreceptive countries. The great majority of the countries that had not yet decriminalized by 2014 were indeed in the Muslim World, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean, where cultural opposition to gay rights has been substantial. Anecdotal evidence suggests, moreover, that in those still-criminalizing countries that had the highest INGO counts in 2014, the influence of exposure to gay-friendly global cultural messages was counteracted by determined domestic resistance. This suggests that, with sufficient domestic resistance, domestic cultural standards can trump global ones.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

One implication here is that, if public attitudes toward homosexuality are being shaped by exposure to global culture, then likely attitudes on a range of other subjects are as well. I have taken advantage in this dissertation of an unusually protracted global dataset on attitudes toward homosexuality. As, hopefully, more and more longitudinal global survey data become available in the future, research will be able to examine change over time for a range of other attitudes as well. This development will also allow for the incorporation of public opinion into more cross-national studies as an independent variable, as I have done here when modeling policy adoption.

I have introduced the concept of receptivity, to describe the openness on the part of “receiving units” (here, domestic societies and national governments) to adopting...
global culture. While the world society literature has tended to assume that exposure to global culture automatically leads to cultural uptake, that is not what I have found for the case of the globalization of pro-gay attitudes and laws. Future scholarship should take account of the possibility of uneven receptivity toward global cultural messages that deal with subjects on which sub-global resistance is present. I would especially expect to see uneven receptivity on other subjects that relate to gender and sexuality.

This dissertation brings multiple modernities theory into the realm of quantitative data analysis and shows how region-specific cultural programs have influenced the course of change over time in both public attitudes and law adoption. Future work on global trends should explore the possible influence of region-specific cultural programs, especially where there are wide cross-regional cultural differences in the interpretation of the issue at hand.

As I argued in Chapter 3, there is a need to bring world society theory into greater dialog with multiple modernities theory, in order that we might begin to explore how today’s global culture is understood and interpreted within particular regional and sub-regional cultural traditions. The concept of receptivity suggests one possible theoretical synthesis: global cultural norms, once they are received, can be assigned a negative valence within local, national, and regional cultural discourses and be resisted on that basis. The results from Chapter 5 would, for example, suggest that regional and sub-regional discourses may reduce the effect of INGO ties on countries’ likelihood of decriminalizing homosexuality. I would argue that this dissertation has only begun to explore possible opportunities for synthesis between world society theory and multiple
modernities theory. Eisenstadt’s (2000) arguments suggest that while regional and sub-regional interpretations of global culture can lead to contestation and rejection, they more often produce selection, reinterpretation, or reformulation. We can interpret Frank and Moss’s (2017) observation of how the global cultural principles of national sovereignty and religious freedom had often been used to justify and legitimate anti-gay policies through this lens. This is a case where global cultural principles have been repurposed for local ends. Merry’s (2006) work on the local interpretation of human rights norms represents another notable contribution here. She argues, on the basis of ethnographic work in the Asia-Pacific region, that in order to be effective, global human rights norms must first be reinterpreted in a way that makes them meaningful at the local level. This is thus another example of the sub-global reinterpretation of global culture.

LIMITATIONS OF THIS STUDY

This dissertation examined global change over time in societal, rather than individual, attitudes toward homosexuality. This choice was in line with my interest in changing shared notions of legitimacy. But future work might go further, to examine global cultural impacts on individual-level attitudes. Such research would especially benefit from finding and working with survey data that are longitudinal at the individual level rather than simply the country level (that is, where the same individuals have been surveyed repeatedly). One question that might be asked with individual-level data is whether global culture’s influence on societal attitudes is the aggregate result of individual-level exposure to global culture (via, for example, individual exposure to
education and the media) or a contextual-level effect mediated by the effect of exposure to global culture on the shared national culture.

Another limitation to this study regards the challenge involved in obtaining measures of domestic uptake of global culture. For my analyses of policy adoption, I would have preferred to have had more data on public attitudes towards homosexuality and domestic LGBT civil societies. Even after interpolating and extrapolating the available attitudinal data, their availability was still insufficient to model effects on one of my three national policies (decriminalization). Civil society data were also limited. And here there is some concern of possible reciprocal causality. I found that domestic lesbian and gay visibility increased the likelihood that countries would decriminalize homosexuality. But there is room for the precise mechanisms involved to be further explored. In countries with substantial lesbian and gay visibility, it may be that lesbian and gay civil society organizations were able to effectively lobby for decriminalization. But is also possible that countries that were willing to tolerate a visible lesbian and gay community were already comparatively tolerant, in terms of what domestic norms held sway, and that it was these tolerant domestic norms increased the likelihood of decriminalization. There is thus some reason for caution in the interpretation of the effect of lesbian and gay visibility.

FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

This dissertation has, I hope, moved us forward in our understanding of global culture’s impact on domestic societies. Future research can take us further in
understanding global culture’s domestic impact. While this dissertation examined
globalizing effects on attitudinal change over time, I hope to investigate whether
globalization is also driving mass behavioral changes. There is great scope for future
research in this area. I have noted already the potential value of further study of sub-
global interpretations of global culture. Another intriguing question that I intend to
pursue in future research involves possible global cultural effects on the inter-
relationship, or ideological structure and organization, of people’s attitudes. World
society theory suggests that global culture has an ideological structure, with, for example,
individualism serving as one of global culture’s organizing principles (e.g. Boli and
Thomas 1997). Cultural globalization might therefore be acting to shape not just what
people around the world think about specific subjects, but how their views on a range of
different subjects are organized and inter-relate. There has as yet been very limited
investigation of international variation in the ideological structure of belief.

This dissertation demonstrates, in addition, how sub-global resistance to global
culture can be highly impactful, even to the point of blunting the effect of exposure to
global culture. Future research might explore whether the sub-global resistance dynamics
that surround gay rights have also grown up around other important issues.
References


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Mosbergen, Dominique. 2015. “Malaysia Staunchly Opposes LGBT Rights: The country’s prime minister recently compared the LGBT community to terror group ISIS.” Huffington Post, October 16.


Appendix A: Instrumental Variable Analysis

This appendix describes the use of logged population size as an instrumental variable for the effect of logged INGO ties on average attitudes towards homosexuality. As typically calculated, INGO ties represent the number of INGOs that are registered in the Yearbook of International Organizations as having one or more individual or organizational members within each country. Logged population size was selected to instrument for logged INGO ties because countries with large populations have more potential INGO members than those with smaller populations. Population size thus affects the number of INGO ties, but there is no reason to suspect that population size should affect average attitudes towards homosexuality, except through the effect of population size on INGO ties. The first-stage $F$ statistic on the exclusion of this instrumental variable is greater than 10, suggesting that logged population size is not a weak instrument (Staiger and Stock 1997).

Table A1 shows the effect of logged INGO ties on societal levels of acceptance of homosexuality, with and without the use of the instrument variable. Without the use of the instrumental variable, logged INGO ties (which are grand-mean centered, with a standard deviation of .74) have a statistically significant positive effect on attitudes toward homosexuality. With the use of the instrument, however, their effect becomes statistically insignificant. The same substantive results were obtained in supplementary
analyses in which both logged INGO ties and the instrumental variable were decomposed into their between- and within-country effects, and in simpler models that limited the number of covariates.
### TABLE A1: Predicting Societal Acceptance of Homosexuality, 1981-2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fixed Effects</th>
<th>Without Instrument</th>
<th>With Instrument</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.991*** (0.232)</td>
<td>2.992*** (0.224)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>0.072*** (0.010)</td>
<td>0.076*** (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INGO Ties, logged</td>
<td>0.562*** (0.148)</td>
<td>0.312 (0.259)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita ($1000s)</td>
<td>0.011 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.509*** (0.111)</td>
<td>-0.538*** (0.109)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Security (between-country)</td>
<td>0.073 (0.162)</td>
<td>0.046 (0.157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Security (within-country)</td>
<td>-0.266* (0.140)</td>
<td>-0.204 (0.153)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>-0.873* (0.451)</td>
<td>-0.911* (0.452)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet &amp; Eastern Bloc</td>
<td>-0.128 (0.452)</td>
<td>-0.445 (0.530)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim World</td>
<td>-0.547 (0.716)</td>
<td>-0.817 (0.757)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>0.045 (0.768)</td>
<td>-0.150 (0.788)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Southeast Asia</td>
<td>-1.226 (0.857)</td>
<td>-1.142 (0.862)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>-2.412*** (0.655)</td>
<td>-2.474*** (0.643)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America X Year</td>
<td>0.019 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.017 (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet &amp; Eastern Bloc X Year</td>
<td>-0.075*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim World X Year</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.024)</td>
<td>-0.067*** (0.025)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa X Year</td>
<td>-0.061*** (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.061*** (0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Southeast Asia X Year</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.029)</td>
<td>-0.013 (0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia X Year</td>
<td>0.000 (0.020)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.975)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Random Effects
- Between-Country Variance: 0.503, 0.574
- Within-Country Variance: 0.285, 0.421

**NOTE.**—N (country-years) = 273; N (countries) = 87. * P < .10; * P < .05; ** P < .01; *** P < .001.

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Stata 13’s instrumental variable testing routines have required the use here of generalized least squares random effects estimation, rather than the maximum likelihood random effect estimation used in the main analyses. Random effects terms for year and for the covariance also had to be excluded. Supplementary analyses indicate, however, that these adjustments had only negligible effects on the model coefficients.
It is not entirely clear why there is this null outcome for the effect of logged INGO ties on attitudes toward homosexuality. One possibility is that INGO ties affect national policies but not attitudes. (INGO ties have most typically been used in studies of the global diffusion of national policies (Schofer et al. 2012).) Another possibility is that the available measure of INGO ties is not sufficiently precise. Whereas the current measure enumerates the number of INGOs that have any members (whether 1 or 10,000) within each country, a more precise measure might give the number of individuals and organizations within each country that are members of an INGO.55

In additional supplementary analyses, I also assessed the effect on attitudes toward homosexuality of ties, specifically, to lesbian and gay INGOs, and of IGO ties, which have sometimes been used as a measure of exposure to global culture. As with the more general INGO measure, the predictive effect of logged lesbian and gay INGOs became non-significant when logged population size was used as an instrumental variable. The same concerns about reciprocal causality do not arise with IGO ties. IGO ties did not, however, have a statistically significant effect on the acceptance of homosexuality, net of other factors. All INGO and IGO data were ultimately sourced from the Yearbook of International Organizations (Union of International Associations 1981-2013). But in the case of the lesbian and gay INGO data, I drew upon and updated a dataset compiled and generously shared by Frank and colleagues (Frank et al. 2010).

Appendix B: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>MEAN</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>RANGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptance Homosexuality</td>
<td>3.460</td>
<td>1.804</td>
<td>1.005 – 8.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>19.974</td>
<td>8.259</td>
<td>1981 - 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita</td>
<td>15,969.94</td>
<td>12,545.23</td>
<td>363.69 – 79,122.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-2.836 – 2.193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Security (combined effect)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.962</td>
<td>-1.153 - .202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Security (between-country)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>-3.755 - .920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Existential Security (within-country)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>-3.755 - .920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Culture (combined effect)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>-2.631 – 1.803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Culture (between-country)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.914</td>
<td>-.223 - .597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Culture (within-country)</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.405</td>
<td>-2.59 – 1.359</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West</td>
<td>.333</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>.128</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former Soviet &amp; Eastern Bloc</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim World</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-Saharan Africa</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South &amp; Southeast Asia</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>0 - 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE.—N (country-years) = 273; N (countries) = 87.

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Religiosity, existential security, and global culture represent standardized multi-item scales.

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Appendix C: Law Adoption Rates by World Region

FIGURE C1: Percentage of Countries with Anti-Discrimination Policy, by Region
The percentage of policy-adopters in the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific remained at zero throughout this whole period.

FIGURE C2: Percentage of Countries Allowing Same-Sex Unions, by Region

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57 The percentage of policy-adopters in the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific remained at zero throughout this whole period.
FIGURE C3: Percentage of Countries Decriminalizing Homosexuality, by Region