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PARTY BEHAVIOR:
THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES
TO RACIAL, RELIGIOUS AND ETHNIC GROUPS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By
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ABSTRACT

This study examines the behavior of the major parties towards three groups in American society: African Americans, Protestant evangelicals (the Christian Right), and Hispanics. Although at different times, each of these groups has orchestrated a contemporary political mobilization and brought a unique set of demands into the political arena. The parties have responded in strikingly different ways to their demands for incorporation. This study seeks to explain this variation in party behavior.

I used several approaches to explore the puzzle of party behavior. The primary source of original research came from 27 in-depth interviews with party elites conducted in 1998 and 1999. I also performed content analysis of platforms and State of the Union Addresses and examined the legislative behavior of the parties. At the heart of my project are three case study chapters that explore the responses of the parties to blacks, evangelicals and Hispanics and offer critical tests of competing theories of party behavior.

This study reviews several mainstream theories of party behavior, pluralism, the median voter theorem and the ideological or responsible party model and argues that they have difficulty explaining the responses of the parties towards these groups. This study argues that a fourth model, the elite power struggle framework, best explains party behavior. This theory suggests that conflict between elite factions within a party determines the extent that a
party will support a group's causes. Groups can best achieve representation by mobilizing into and organizing within the party.

This project provides insight into the evolution of party policies on a range of issues, including affirmative action, language and immigration policies, and morality-based social issues. These types of issues will become increasingly important to the viability of the party system as the size and political activism of racial, religious and ethnic groups continue to increase. Moreover, the ability of a political system to address the needs of its citizens is a critical test of representative democracy. Assessing the responsiveness of the parties to the interests of these groups demonstrates the extent that our two-party system helps and hinders our political system from achieving these democratic ideals.
Dedicated To
My Mother, Father and Sister
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CHAPTER 1
THE PUZZLE OF PARTY BEHAVIOR

American democracy is premised on the ideal that government should represent the interests of its citizens and respond to their unmet and changing needs. Political parties play a pivotal role in reaching this ideal by connecting elected officials to the interests and concerns of individuals and groups in society. Despite the critical function parties carry out in our political system, our understanding of party behavior is far from complete. Many of the existing theories of party behavior are unable to explain fully the responses of American political parties towards emerging and established groups in society. A defining characteristic of the American political system has been its ability to incorporate the distinctive demands brought forward by a steady stream of racial, religious and ethnic groups. Yet our understanding of how political parties have responded to these groups and, more importantly, why political parties have behaved this way remains incomplete.

This study systematically examines the behavior of the Democratic and Republican parties towards three demographic groups\(^1\) in American society: African Americans, Protestant evangelicals (the Christian Right), and Hispanics, as they have pushed for incorporation and achieved an established place in the political process. Although at different times, each of these three groups has orchestrated a contemporary

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\(^1\) Although evangelicals are not as easy to identify as a group visibly as Hispanics and African Americans, I consider all three demographic groups in this study for the sake of simplicity.
political mobilization and brought a unique set of demands into the political arena. The Democratic and Republican parties have responded in strikingly different ways to their demands for incorporation. The parties have at times broadened their platforms to accommodate a group's demands, at times adopted policy positions antithetical to the interests of a group, and at times tried to straddle or ignore a group's demands.

What factors and conditions explain the varied responses of America's parties to racial, religious and ethnic groups and their policy demands? Under what conditions do parties accommodate, co-opt or ignore the demands of emerging and established groups? To answer these questions I first turn to the existing literature on party behavior. Existing theories offer several hypotheses concerning the main determinants of party behavior. Each of the dominant theories points to a specific factor or set of factors as the primary structuring force behind the responses of political parties, including the victory-oriented calculations of political elites, the distribution of public opinion, the parties' ideologies, and the pressure to build majority electoral coalitions. While these theories draw attention to important factors, each on their own falls short of adequately explaining the behavior of the Republican and Democratic parties towards the three groups examined in this study. The goal of this project is to build a more complete understanding of the conditions and factors that shape the responses of political parties. Based on interviews with party elites and other sources I argue that the behavior of American political parties is best conceptualized as the product of power struggles inside each of the parties. The overall configuration of factions amongst the party elites, as well as the resources exerted by each faction, are key determinants in how internal party disputes are resolved, and hence of the behavior of political parties. Thus, the most effective way for groups to achieve responsiveness is by mobilizing into a party's structure and becoming an aggressive competitor in these intra-party struggles.
Political Parties and Party Behavior

Studies on political parties must deal with a seemingly basic but controversial question concerning the definition of a political party. Scholars disagree over what should and should not be included in our conceptualization of political parties. The most established definition views political parties as having three components: the party in government, party organization, and the party in the electorate or party coalition (V.O. Key 1964; Beck and Sorauf 1992). Other political scientists have argued for a conceptualization of political parties that excludes voters (Aldrich 1995; Schlesinger 1991; Downs 1964; Schattschneider 1942). Although these authors acknowledge that the mass electorate is important, they view voters as the targets rather than the initiators of party behavior. Schlesinger argues that the voters choose between political parties and thus need to be conceptualized as separate from, or outside of, the party (1991, 7). I adopt the latter interpretation. The central puzzle of this research project concerns what factors and conditions shape the response of parties towards groups in society. The nature of this question demands a conceptualization of political parties that, to some degree, separates the actions of party elites from groups and individuals in society. Therefore, when
referring to the behavior of political parties I mean the behavior of party activists, organizational elites, and elected office holders and seekers.

There are many ways a party can respond to a group. Parties can provide a group with material benefits and/or ensure that the group receives descriptive representation within the party's internal decision making processes. These are important indicators of party responsiveness. While I consider these factors in the following chapters, this study focuses primarily on the policy behavior of the parties because I view this as the most important and meaningful form of party responsiveness. Representative democracy is based on the simple idea that the government should respond to and address the interests of those it is serving. The central issue this study sets out to explore is whether or not the parties have fulfilled this role; have the parties addressed and incorporated the policy concerns of different racial, religious and ethnic groups in society? More broadly, I seek to uncover the factors and conditions that influence the decision of political parties to embrace, propose and enact certain policies in their platforms, legislative agendas and other statements of party goals. Thus, the dependent variable is whether party organization elites and party office-holders have accommodated, ignored or been hostile towards the key issue concerns of African Americans, Protestant evangelicals and Hispanics. The challenge is to explain the variation in these responses.

The Puzzle

The puzzle this study seeks to understand are the complex responses of the Republican and Democratic parties towards African Americans, white Protestant evangelicals and Hispanics as they have mobilized and articulated distinct policy concerns. Each of these three case studies provides a rich opportunity to explore the causal complexities shaping party behavior. The three cases have several similarities. Each group represents a numerical minority in American society composing between 10-
20% of the population. Despite this minority status each group represents a bloc of voters large enough to impact the outcome of national elections. Further, each of these demographic groups has assembled numerous national organizations that explicitly represent, lobby and defend their interests in the political realm. Finally, each of these groups has brought a distinct set of policy concerns into the political realm that have not "fit" easily into either party. African Americans mobilized over civil rights and racial issues. Evangelicals mobilized politically in the 1970s largely because their entire moral, social agenda was not being addressed by either party. More recently, Hispanics have mobilized over immigration and language issues. The three groups are similar because each one has mobilized around a set of issues that veers either towards the right or left within a two-party political system. Despite their similar predicaments the two major parties have responded in a different manner in each case.

The first case my study examines is the policy response of the parties towards African Americans. I examine party behavior towards this group from the end of World War II to the present day. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, African Americans mounted an increasingly aggressive and vocal political mobilization. At this time the issues of integration and civil rights dominated the substantive focus of their demands. Both parties struggled over how to respond to this mobilization and, in the end, the parties adopted markedly different strategies. The Republican party continued its historically progressive position on civil rights through 1960. Over the next four years, however, the party radically changed course and moved in a conservative direction on racial issues. Even after the passage of the Voting Rights Act, which resulted in a rapid and dramatic increase in the number of African American voters, the Republican party continued to embrace a conservative position on racial issues. In fact, the Republican party has
embraced legislation that is antithetical to the interests of African Americans such as reducing the budget for civil rights enforcement and social welfare programs and dismantling affirmative action programs. Although African Americans compose a sizable and growing group of voters, since 1964 the Republican party has made little effort to reach out to them as a group.

The Democratic party moved in the opposite direction on racial and civil rights issues. Historically, the Democratic party had been the party of slavery, segregation and white supremacy. After decades of embracing conservative or moderate civil rights platforms, however, the Democratic party edged towards a more liberal position in its 1960 platform. By 1964, the Democratic party had broadened its platform and legislative agenda to fully accommodate the demands of African Americans (Carmines and Stimson 1989). This decision was unusual for several reasons. It represented a significant change in direction for the Democratic party on civil rights and racial issues. Moreover, the Democratic party embraced the agenda of African Americans despite an understanding that the party would lose the votes of white southerners, a significant component of their electoral coalition. Until the 1990s, the Democratic party continued to defend faithfully issues that were both subjectively and objectively important to most African Americans including civil rights, affirmative action and government supported social welfare programs despite the fact that many of these policies were opposed by a majority of the public and a majority of Democratic partisans. Across the 1990s, however, the Democratic party has pursued more centrist policies on racial and social welfare issues, at the cost of being less supportive of the interests of African Americans.

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2 I define African American interests based on the perceptions of a majority of this group, the groups' socioeconomic status, and the issues that this group has mobilized over politically. I fully recognize, however, that defining African American interests, similar to defining the interests of any group, is a very difficult and controversial process. I address the problems and controversies surrounding the concept of an African American political agenda in Chapter 3.
The fact that the Republican and Democratic parties embraced different positions on racial issues in the 1960s has been well documented and discussed. Sundquist (1983), Carmines and Stimson (1989), and Edsall and Edsall (1991) have argued that the parties polarized over issues of race and cite 1964 as the crystallizing year of that polarization. These authors have focused their attention, however, on the impact of this polarization on the partisan loyalties of voters and the political system more broadly. Less attention has been given to understanding why the Republican and Democratic embraced opposite ideological positions in the first place, particularly when operating under the influence of a moderating two-party system. What were the factors and conditions that led the Democratic party to fully accommodate the issue concerns of African Americans? Why did the Republican party decide not to compete actively for the votes of this group? Answering these questions will give us a better understanding of the factors that shape party behavior.

The second case in this study is the response of the parties to the political mobilization of a religious group, white Protestant evangelicals. Evangelicals have mobilized into the national political realm at several different times throughout American history to defend their Biblically grounded worldview and values. In this study I focus on this group’s most recent political resurgence and the subsequent response of the parties. In the 1970s, evangelical elites formed a number of national organizations and aggressively encouraged their followers to participate in elections. This mobilization of evangelicals, referred to as the New Christian Right or simply the Christian Right, brought a new set of moral policy demands into the political realm. Evangelicals wanted to outlaw abortion, preserve the traditional family, return prayer to the schools, and restrict pornography and other immoral cultural influences. As they had done in the 1960s in response to the demands of African Americans, the political parties had to choose how to respond to this newly mobilized group. The socially conservative
demands of evangelicals did not fit easily into the ideologies or issue structures of either party. Yet both parties were in a reasonable position to vie for the votes and allegiance of this group (Shafer 1998, 123-124). Once again, the policy responses of the two parties were strikingly different.

Although not without considerable (and continuing) internal turmoil, the Republican party incorporated a substantial number of the political demands within the evangelical agenda into its platforms and legislative agenda. Prior to the mobilization of evangelicals, the Republican party was solidly conservative on fiscal, economic and role of government issues. Yet on social issues it tolerated great diversity (Sundquist 1983). The party ignored issues such as abortion, gay rights, pornography, and the proper definition of the family. In 1976, however, the Republican party took decisive stands in its platform against abortion and for school prayer. Under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, the Republican party further broadened its platform to accommodate more elements of the evangelical agenda. The party reversed its support for the Equal Rights Amendment, replacing this section in their platform with support for women's traditional roles and the importance of traditional family values. The party further compromised its traditional belief in less government by supporting the regulation of pornography and the implementation of abstinence education programs in the schools. In the 1990s, the party went one step further to condemn gay rights legislation and to uphold discrimination against gays as a "courageous stand for family values". Particularly after gaining control of Congress, Republicans have sponsored and supported policies embracing many of the key concerns of evangelicals, such as legislation to return prayer to the schools and multiple measures to chip away at the Roe v. Wade decision.

The Democratic party took the opposite approach. Despite having an evangelical President in office from 1976-1980, the Democratic party made no efforts to

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3 This is a quote from the 1992 Republican platform.
accommodate the key policy concerns of this group. "There were no governmental initiatives to restore the place of prayer; abortion rights were safeguarded and extended" (Shafer 1998, 124). Throughout the 1980s the Democratic party's platform and legislative agenda remained firmly pro-choice, committed to a pluralistic conception of the family, and supportive of gay rights and a strict church-state separation. Moreover, while the Democratic National Committee has established formal outreach efforts towards a great number of demographic groups, including recently reviving their outreach office towards white ethnic groups, the party did not initiate any outreach towards evangelicals. In the 1990s, however, the behavior of the Democratic party changed. Democratic platforms and the legislative agenda outlined by President Bill Clinton increasingly integrated the "family values" rhetoric originally introduced onto the national agenda by evangelicals. The Democratic party has embraced several ideas that are widely popular within the evangelical community, such as increased parental control, stricter regulation of television and the media, encouraging families to stay together, and applauding "the President's work to ensure that children are not denied private religious expression in school".  

The puzzle, once again, is to determine why the parties adopted the strategies they did towards evangelicals. Similar to the case of African Americans, only one party made concerted efforts to accommodate the policy demands of evangelicals when they re-emerged politically in the 1970s. What explains the lack of competition for this sizable and growing group of voters? Why was the Democratic party, typically sensitive to demands for incorporation from ethnic and religious minorities, reluctant to accommodate any of the concerns of evangelicals? After all, the Democratic party had been willing to accommodate the key policy concerns of African Americans at the cost of losing part of its electoral coalition. Meanwhile, we must ask why the Republican party

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4 This is a quote from the 1996 Democratic platform.
continued to incorporate the demands of evangelicals even though many of these policies lacked majority support within the public and among Republican partisans. Why was the Republican party willing to compromise some of its long-held principles to incorporate the demands of this group? Finally, why has the Democratic party, after years of apparent disinterest in the evangelical voting bloc, begun embracing policies more congenial to evangelical interests? More broadly, what factors and conditions explain the different responses of the two parties? Answering these questions will give us a better understanding of the factors and conditions that shape party behavior in this and all cases.

The third case this study examines is the response of the parties to the political mobilization of Hispanics. Hispanics possess a lengthy history in the United States, yet it is only since the late 1980s that they have begun to escalate their presence in the political realm. A high birth rate, continuing immigration, increased turnout, plus their strategic location in states with large numbers of electoral votes have heightened the stature of Hispanics in the electoral arena. Moreover, Hispanics have mobilized recently around a distinct set of political concerns centering on language, cultural and immigration issues. Once again, the Democratic and Republican parties have had to decide how to respond to this growing group of voters.

The response of the parties to Hispanics has been markedly different than their responses to the other two groups. One difference is that both parties, to some degree, have been competing for the Hispanic vote. Both the Republican National Committee and Democratic National Committee have established Latino outreach programs. In 1992 and 1996 both the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates devoted an entire group of campaign staff to work solely on Latino outreach. The Republican party has been trying to catch up to the Democratic party in terms of Hispanic staff; in the Spring of 1998, former Speaker Newt Gingrich hired a Spanish-speaking aide. The two parties also have increased their attempts to contact Latinos in Spanish. In 1992, the
Democratic party aired its party convention in Spanish. The Republican party quickly followed suit. In the Spring of 1997 the Republican party began airing its responses to the President's weekly radio address in Spanish. Further, ambitious elected officials from both parties, including George W. Bush, John McCain, and Al Gore, have secured speaking positions at the yearly conferences of prominent national Hispanic organizations.

Both parties are in a reasonable position to accommodate at least some of the issues that concern this group. Hispanics have a mixed set of policy beliefs that find a home in both political parties. Surveys reveal that Hispanics support the core elements of a liberal social welfare agenda. Yet Hispanics also hold conservative views on abortion, express concern over the weakening of traditional families, and desire greater economic opportunities. However, a particularly powerful source of recent Hispanic mobilization has been the treatment of legal and illegal immigrants and language issues. A majority of Hispanics supports bilingual education and the continued preservation and protection of the Spanish language, while they oppose proposals to make English our official language. These issues do not fit easily into the ideological structures of either party.

The parties have responded to Hispanics in an almost schizophrenic manner. Both parties have embraced some positions that are congruent with Hispanics interests and some legislation antithetical to Hispanic concerns. Congressional Republicans have made explicit attempts to appeal to Hispanic voters by doing things such as highlighting their support of the Puerto Rican self-determination Bill, a measure receiving around 90% approval among Hispanics. Further, in 1998 Republicans voted to return social welfare benefits to some legal immigrants, a decision also supported by the Hispanic community. Yet the Republican party has simultaneously sponsored legislation viewed by the majority of Hispanics as harmful to the economic, political, and social interests of their group including measures designed to dismantle bilingual education, force non-
Anglo citizens to produce valid identification in order to register and vote, make English the official language, and cut legal immigrants from numerous federal benefit programs. Moreover, some Republican candidates for national office have incorporated anti-immigration themes in their campaigns.

The behavior of the Democratic party has been contradictory as well. Democratic President Bill Clinton signed legislation that took social welfare benefits away from many legal Hispanic residents. Then, the Democratic party vowed to restore those benefits. The Democratic party has been fairly cohesive in fighting Republican attempts to dismantle programs geared to help Hispanics, but has not gone beyond these defensive measures. Moreover, many Hispanics feel that there is a Latino glass ceiling with the Democratic party. The contradictory behavior of the two parties towards Latinos may be an indication that the parties are still in the process of forming their response to this community and its demands for incorporation.

The Hispanic case provokes several interesting questions. Why have both parties engaged in competition, at least to some degree, for the votes of Hispanics, but not other growing ethnic, religious, and racial groups? What explains the seemingly schizophrenic behavior of the parties towards Hispanics and their agenda? Will the parties continue to straddle the Hispanic agenda or will they eventually stake out ideologically distinct positions? Moreover, what will be the deciding factor or factors in this process? Once again, the answers to these questions will help us form a better theoretical understanding of party behavior.

How Can We Explain Party Behavior?

What these brief accounts reveal is that the parties have reacted to racial, religious and ethnic groups in a complex and puzzling manner. As groups emerge on the political scene with a set of policy demands the parties appear to struggle for a response. In some
cases the parties have enlarged or altered their ideological stances to accommodate the agenda of new groups even when this decision has held the potential of weakening the party's future success at the polls. In other cases, the parties have decided not to compete for the loyalty of a particular group, despite the potential votes the group possesses. Another pattern suggested by the African American and evangelical cases is that established patterns of competition, or more accurately, lack of competition, persist for considerable periods of time. Thus, the central task of this study is to determine what accounts for the diverse, complex responses of the parties towards these three groups. More broadly, what factors and conditions shape party behavior?

Existing theories of political parties represent the natural place to begin answering this question. Accounts of party behavior fall into several distinct classes of explanation. The pluralist or accommodationist model of party behavior has been one of the dominant theories of party behavior in American politics. It posits that the pressure of electoral competition forces political parties to continually attempt to expand their coalition. Thus, pluralists argue that the two-party system offers opportunities to all group interests, if they can mobilize their followers, and that no party will totally write off any group. A second class of explanation is spatial theories of party competition. These theories assert that political parties are teams of winning-oriented politicians that adopt whatever policies maximize their chances of winning. As a result, the parties will converge to the center and be reluctant to accommodate the demands of ideologically extreme groups. Still another school of thought, the ideological or responsible party model, argues that the behavior of political parties is guided by their distinct ideologies. Thus, the parties offer the electorate a clear choice and only accommodate the demands of a group if they fit within their pre-established ideological framework. The following chapter discusses these theories in more depth by fleshing out their basic claims and behavioral expectations.
How do these explanations fare when we extend them to the behavior of political parties towards the three groups in this study? The short answer is not very well. These theories of party behavior do reveal important insights about the political incorporation of African Americans, Hispanics and evangelicals. However, as later empirical chapters detail, none of these theories on its own can account for the varied behavior of the political parties towards these groups. I offer a fourth explanation of party behavior, which I label the elite power struggle model. This model views the behavior of political parties as driven primarily by elites, rather than public opinion or the partisan masses. The elite power struggle model conceptualizes political parties as compositions of distinct factions, identifiable groups of activists and elected officials, who have conflicting goals and visions of how they want the party to behave. This model posits that party behavior is shaped through intra-party turmoil, as competing factions mobilize into and within the party structure and struggle to define the policies and direction of the party. The key to understanding party behavior rests in identifying the goals of each faction and uncovering patterns in how these intra-party struggles are resolved. The elite power struggle model builds on the strengths of previous theories, such as recognizing the importance of elite preferences and the costs associated with accommodating groups, but overcomes their problems, and by doing so provides a fuller and more sophisticated explanation for party behavior.

TESTING THE ARGUMENT: DATA AND METHODS

What explains party behavior? How can we explain the responses of the parties to demands for incorporation from racial, religious and ethnic groups? I used several different approaches to answer these questions, both quantitative and qualitative. One of the primary sources of original research for my project came from in-depth interviews with party elites. Interviewing individuals active in the parties at the national level and
observing the day-to-day operations of the parties provided keen insights into party behavior. In addition, I used a series of objective and more quantitative indicators to assess party behavior, including content analysis of party platforms and State of the Union Addresses, and analyses of congressional voting behavior. The other sources of data I used are party documents, secondary sources of party history, and contemporary accounts of party affairs in newspapers, magazines and journals. Finally, the central method, which structures this project, is a focused comparison of the behavior of the parties towards three similarly sized demographic groups. In this section I discuss each of these methods in more depth and demonstrate why using multiple methods provides a powerful way to explore the empirical and theoretical puzzle of party behavior.

**Elite Interviews**

What do party elites, those involved in the day-to-day activities of the Republican and Democratic parties, think has shaped the behavior of their party? One of the most important and interesting components of my research was conducting interviews with party elites. During 1998 and 1999 I conducted a total of 27 interviews with individuals holding mid-level positions within the parties, active in a range of party affairs. I interviewed National Committee members, directors and coordinators within the congressional campaign committees, directors of outreach programs at the national level, aides to members of Congress and national convention delegates. In addition, I spoke with individuals who held policy-making positions within the parties, such as Caucus and Policy Committee staff members, as well as individuals working at technically independent policy councils, such as the Democratic Leadership Council and the Progressive Policy Institute. Although I tailored my questions to the specialties of each person, in general I sought to unearth the central determinants of the party's behavior. Party elites offered their assessments concerning what role factors such as public opinion,
ideology, the desire to build majority coalitions, and intra-party factional struggles played in shaping the response of the parties.

These interviews allowed me to "get inside" the internal decision making process of the parties and yielded powerful insights into the central question of my project, why parties behave like they do. Interviewing party elites in their respective organizational settings provided a sense of what impact, if any, the distinctive cultures and ideologies of the political parties had on their behavior. Moreover, party elites, particularly those overseeing national outreach efforts, were able to provide detailed accounts of how the party had responded to particular groups and more importantly, what factors shaped the party's decisions. One potential problem inherent in interviewing party elites is that they have a vested interest in presenting their party and its actions in the best possible light. Thus, I suspect that many of those I interviewed may not have provided all relevant information in the most objective light. However, I should also point out that a surprising number of party elites in both parties seemed to be very frank in their responses to my questions and were often quite critical of their own party and its efforts, or lack of efforts, to respond to racial, religious and ethnic groups.

On a more abstract level, the information produced by my interviews provided some of the most compelling evidence that several of the mainstream theories of party behavior were incomplete. The interviews helped me to realize that the parties were not internally in agreement about how to behave or respond to the political concerns of different groups as some of the mainstream theories of party behavior assumed. It was largely from my preliminary round of interviews that I began to see that the responses of the parties should be conceptualized as a product of struggle among factions more than agreement among like-minded actors. My second round of interviews helped illuminate the configuration of elite factions within their party, the nature and content of intra-party struggles and the resources that were critical within intra-party struggles. All the elites I
interviewed were in agreement that mobilizing into and within the party was the single best way for a group to have influence over the behavior of the party. Finally, the interviews provided a much needed, real-world compliment to the numerous scholarly accounts of political parties provided in journal articles and books.

Comparative Case Studies

At the heart of my project are three case study chapters focusing on the response of political parties to African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics. Each case provides a rich ground for exploring the casual complexes shaping party behavior and offers a critical test of competing theories of party behavior. Moreover, comparison of party response in three different contexts provides more analytical leverage than a single case. As discussed at the start of this chapter, the three groups who are the focus of this study posses several similarities. Although at different times, each group has mobilized politically in the contemporary era, marked by a substantial increase in voter turnout and the creation of many national organizations advocating their political agenda. The policy concerns of the groups cover a broad range of the ideological spectrum. However, each group has faced a common dilemma in our political system. Each represents a numerical minority in society. More importantly, each group has mobilized over a set of policy concerns that did not "fit" easily into either party. Yet the groups have achieved different policy responses.

Evangelicals and African Americans have both embraced non-moderate agendas that veer either to the right or the left in comparison to the median voter. Moreover, both form roughly similar proportions of the parties' coalitions. Yet they have achieved very different outcomes. Evangelicals have been much more successful in voicing their claims through the Republican party than African Americans have been in the Democratic party. The Republican party has incorporated most aspects of the evangelical
agenda, while the Democratic party has retained the loyalty of blacks while providing much less substantive representation (Tate 1994). The focused comparison, which I conduct in this study, provides the opportunity to isolate the cause of this disparity. Meanwhile, Hispanics are being courted by both parties, but have yet to achieve secure representation from or an established voice in either. Comparing the experience of this more recently mobilized group to that of evangelicals and African Americans allows us to isolate the factors that spark inter-party competition for a group's vote and make predictions about the fate of Hispanics in America's two-party system.

Group Agendas

In each of the following case study chapters I provide an empirically supported picture of the agendas of each group, which I define as the set of policy interests that the group has been, and continues to be, most inclined to pursue politically. Defining the agenda of any group is a difficult and controversial task because of the degree of generalization involved. Aware of these difficulties I draw on several different types of information in my efforts to identify the groups' agendas. National survey results are useful for identifying the political issues that are of particular concern for each group and for identifying policies on which a majority of each group agrees. In addition, I use national survey data to illuminate the placement of the group's core policy demands in relation to majority public opinion. To attain a high degree of consistency I rely as much as possible on one data set, the National Election Surveys. Economic, social and educational statistics about each group compose another set of information helpful in

5 The National Election Survey includes only a small number of Hispanic respondents and excludes non-citizens, which is a problem because an estimated 40% of Hispanics living in the United States are non-citizens. To more accurately identify the Hispanic agenda, I rely on the Latino National Political Survey and surveys conducted by Univision. Moreover, when the National Election Survey did not contain questions that were pertinent to my study, such as public opinion on the regulation of pornography, I rely on other surveys, such as those conducted by the Gallup Organization.
identifying these agendas. Another indicator is the policy priorities of national organizations representing these groups such as the NAACP, the Congressional Black Caucus, the Christian Coalition, the Family Research Council, League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and the National Council of La Raza. Although the stands of these organizations are not perfectly reflective of the opinion of the black, evangelical and Hispanic communities, their agendas provide practical indicators of each group's interests and reflect the issues that leaders within these communities have emphasized to mobilize their followers.

Analyzing Party Response to Group Agendas

How have the two major parties differed in their response to these groups? After I establish a clear conceptualization of their agendas, the three case study chapters describe and categorize the responses of the parties towards each group. For each case, I assess whether the parties have embraced, ignored or been hostile towards these groups and their demands. In the following chapters I use multiple sources of information, discussed in more detail in the next paragraph, to place the responses of the Republican and Democratic parties into one of four categories: (1) A strong positive response: the party proposes or enacts all, or almost all, of the group's key policy concerns into its platform and legislative agenda, (2) A weak positive response: the party mentions issues of importance to the group but in an extremely vague way or the party proposes to enact a few of the groups' key demands while ignoring others, (3) Avoidance: the party makes no mention of the group or its key concerns, or (4) A negative response: the party endorses policies that are contradictory to the agenda of the group (see Table 1.1).

The following chapters use several sources of data to assess the degree that the parties have proposed and enacted the key policies of each group: party platforms, State of the Union Addresses, congressional voting records and the legislative agendas of the
two parties. In categorizing the responses of the parties, I consider both effort and accomplishment as important. What a political party actually accomplishes is a product of many factors, several of which are beyond the control of the party. Therefore, I examine the words of the parties as well as their actions.

Borrowing Philip Klinker's definition, I consider the national party organizations to include the Democratic and Republican National Committees, any committees and organizations set up by the national committees, and any national party organizations set up by party elites that influence the national committees, as well as the congressional and senatorial campaign committees (1994, 4). Recent examinations of the national party committees have revealed their increasingly important role in party affairs; they develop procedural rules, fundraise, and provide campaign services. More central to this study, however, is the role of the national organizations in shaping the behavior and policies of the party. Although not on a regular basis, the RNC and DNC have established policy committees to rethink or recast the party's position on various issues. Examples are the Democratic Advisory Council between 1956 and 1960, the Republican Coordinating Committee between 1964 and 1968, and more recently, the Democratic Leadership Committee. The following chapters examine whether policy committees have been created to address a group's key issue concerns, who within the party was responsible for creating these committees, and what impact the committees have had on the policy behavior of the parties.

The national party organizations are also responsible for writing the platforms every four years, which are the most consistent, and often the most public, statements of what the party stands for. Although platforms are not legally binding, several scholars have found that parties carry out a large majority of their platform promises (Pomper 1967 and 1980; Monroe 1983). Platforms, therefore, are meaningful indicators of party intentions, and they serve as valuable measures of party responsiveness to the groups'
agendas. Although party platforms are heavily influenced by the party's presidential candidate, they are nevertheless good indicators of which direction the party's candidate is trying to push the party in, which factions are winning intra-party struggles, and what groups the candidate feels are important to accommodate (Maisel 1993). Based on content analysis of all the Republican and Democratic platforms from 1950 to 1996, I describe the parties' positions (or lack of positions) on the key issues of the groups over time. Analyzing the content of the platforms provides a fairly objective indicator of how the parties have responded to each group's demands and how the behavior of the parties has changed over time. Following the example set by Carmines and Stimson (1989), I also assess the space devoted to the agenda of each group in the platforms and where in the platform the key concerns of each group get mentioned because these are indicators of the priority and importance the parties attach to issues.

The second broad component of party behavior concerns the actions of elected officials. I examine the policy initiatives of both the president and the two parties in Congress. The president is the titular head of the party and for millions of Americans the president symbolizes the party. Although there may be some intra-party disagreement, State of the Union Addresses are a concise and fairly accurate indicator of the priorities and positions of the president's party. I assessed the content of all the Addresses since 1950, examining if they incorporated the concerns of the three groups and if they did, how they dealt with these concerns.

I also assessed the voting behavior and legislative agendas of the two parties in Congress. One measure of the congressional parties' responsiveness to the groups' agendas is their aggregate scores on voting indexes. Carol Swain (1995) has demonstrated that both LCCR and COPE scales provide a valid measure of

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6 All of the official party platforms of every major political party for each presidential election since 1840 are now available on one CD-ROM, The American Reference Library.
Representatives' support for public policies preferred by blacks. The Christian Coalition and other evangelical organizations have published their own scorecards on legislators, ranking Representatives on how well they voted on issues of importance to evangelicals. The National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA) has released Congressional Scorecards designed to provide the Latino community with clear information on the positions of Representatives and Senators on the issues of greatest concern to Hispanics. These indexes provide a good indicator of group interests and how responsive each party has been to these interests. Moreover, the index scores indicate whether the parties have taken the same or polarized positions on issues, which is important information for assessing some of the existing theories of party behavior. I also examine the legislation sponsored by each party. Making room for a group's key agenda items on the limited space of its legislative agenda is another solid indicator of party support. With a clear conceptualization of how the parties have responded to each of the groups, we have the information necessary to test the predictions of four theories of party behavior.

**Significance of the Project**

This study promises to make a worthy contribution to the discipline of political science in several ways. First and foremost, this project provides an opportunity to expand our understanding of political parties in the United States. At present we know little about the internal operations of party elites in setting their party’s agendas. The following chapters will provide insight into the evolution of party policies on a range of issues, such as affirmative action, language and immigration policies and morality-based social issues. These types of issues will become increasingly important to the future viability of the party system as the size and political activism of racial, religious and ethnic groups increases over the coming decades.
The project also promises to advance our understanding in the field of minority politics. Recent years have seen a large increase in the number of studies using race, ethnicity and religion as significant analytical categories. Most studies in this area, however, have focused on one group. While these case studies have provided qualitatively rich and empirically grounded descriptions of the political attitudes and behavior of African Americans, Hispanics and evangelicals, the literature is virtually devoid of the type of comparative analysis I propose. The structured case method that I use provides the opportunity to develop new theoretical and empirical distinctions. Only through comparison can one accurately separate the aspects of a group's experience in America's political system that are unique from those that are general consequences of the two-party system. This study argues for the development of a single framework for understanding party behavior. In the future, this theoretical framework could be applied to better understand the pattern and degree of responsiveness of the two parties towards other minority groups within society, such as Asian Americans, Jewish Americans, feminists and conservative women.

Finally, the policy responses of the political parties towards groups in American society have broad implications concerning the quality of representation and the nature of democracy in the United States. The ability of a political system to address the needs of its citizens is a critical test of representative democracy. Further, one of the major tasks faced by democracies is the incorporation of groups, particularly previously excluded groups, into full social, political and economic citizenship. Assessing the responsiveness of the major parties to the needs and interests of African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics will reveal whether the two-party system helps or hinders our political system from achieving these democratic ideals.
STRONG POSITIVE RESPONSE: party proposes or enacts all, or almost, all, of the group's key policy concerns into its platform and legislative agenda.

WEAK POSITIVE RESPONSE: party mentions issues of importance to the group but in a vague way or supports some but not all of the group's interests.

NO RESPONSE: party does not mention the issues the group is concerned with.

Negative Response: party endorses or enacts policies that are contradictory to the interests of the group.

Table 1.1
CATEGORIES OF PARTY RESPONSIVENESS
CHAPTER 2
THEORIES OF PARTY BEHAVIOR

E. E. Schattschneider begins *Party Government* by stating that "political parties created democracy and ... modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of parties" (1942, 1). More than two decades later Robert Dahl echoed this sentiment, stating that "In light of long experience, not only in the United States but in all other democracies, there is no longer any substantial ground for doubting that political parties make substantial contributions to the operation of a democracy" (1967, 243). Political parties are critical to democracy because they provide an institutionalized means of communication between leaders and the electorate. They are the main mechanisms through which the views of voters are translated into legislative proposals and government policies.

Recognizing their critical role, scholars have produced many studies exploring how America's parties and the two-party system have impacted voters, public policy and the achievement of democratic ideals. Less attention, however, has been given to explaining the behavior of political parties in the first place. Why do parties behave like they do? What explains their behavior in certain contexts? Specifically for this study, how can we explain the responses of parties towards demands for incorporation from minority groups in society? To answer these questions I turn first to existing theories of party behavior. In this chapter, I review three well-established theories of party behavior:
pluralism, the median voter theorem, and the ideological party model. For each of these theories I draw out its predictions for how the parties should respond to demands for incorporation from racial, religious and ethnic groups in society. I then lay out a fourth theory of party behavior, the elite power struggle model. I demonstrate how this framework builds on the strengths of previous theories yet offers a different and fuller understanding of party behavior.

**Pluralism: Accommodation Model**

The pluralist model has been one of, if not the dominant view of parties in the United States. Implicit in the work of pluralists is the assumption that the party system fosters the accommodation of new groups. Moreover, pluralism conceptualizes parties as open and flexible entities that are eager and able to accommodate the demands of many different groups in society. Everett Ladd and Charles Hadley provide a clear and concise description of the pluralist or accommodationist view of parties, as they refer to it, in *Transformations of the American Party System*. They state, "The model which emerged from observation of the American parties nationally, then, has seen them as coalition-minded, seeking a majority from the extraordinary heterogeneity of the country, searching for a majority on the bases of loose appeals" (1975, 274). In *Parties and Politics in America*, Clinton Rossiter argues that American parties "are vast, gaudy, friendly umbrellas under which all Americans, whoever and wherever and however-minded they may be, are invited to stand for the sake of being counted in the next election" (1960, 11). No pluralist would go as far as to say that the major parties are

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1 The pluralist model of party behavior discussed in this study should not be confused with the broader pluralist theory of politics. Pluralism as a broad theory of how government works and who governs has long been a dominant perspective in political science research on the United States. Although scholars have defined pluralism differently and the concept has been refined over time (e.g. Dahl 1982; Lindblom 1980) some of the basic tenets of this model are that there are multiple centers of power in society and politics, power is widely dispersed among a variety of groups and institutions in society and that resources are noncumulative. Although the pluralist perspective used in this study draws from some of these ideas, it is a much narrower framework focused solely on explaining the behavior of parties.
continually open to all groups. Clearly there are natural tendencies for one of the parties to appeal to some groups more than others and for some groups to be more naturally attracted to one party than to others. However, the idea inherent in the pluralist approach is that the two-party system offers opportunities to all group interests, if the can mobilize their followers, and that no party will totally write off any group.

To break this down a bit, the pluralist model argues that the task uppermost in the mind of political parties is to build and maintain a majority coalition so they can win elections. "Coalition building is the central task of American political parties" (Polsby 1981, 156). Making a similar point, Samuel Eldersveld described American parties as "a power-aspiring group, "greedy" for new followers" (1964, 5). The competition between the parties enables a new group's claims to be heard because they will be attractive to the parties as they strive to assemble a majority following. As Robert Dahl, one of the founders of the pluralist perspective, explained "elections and competitive parties give politicians a powerful motivation for expanding their coalitions and increasing their electoral following" (1961, 91). Competitive elections assure that political parties will make some efforts to woo groups who have mobilized, either to broaden their base of support or to try to lessen the allegiance of such groups to their competitor.

In *Who Governs*, Dahl (1961) described how both political parties offered at least some policy concessions to all ethnic, religious and racial groups in New Haven so they could get their votes. According to the pluralist perspective the political parties view all groups, even minority groups, as desirable coalition partners. Moreover, the pluralist perspective views accommodating new groups as an essentially costless activity that can only benefit, and not harm, a party's chances for electoral victory. Based on his assessment of party behavior on the national level, Rossiter argued that, "There are few places in the United States in which the Democrats and Republicans do not appeal
forcefully and sincerely to every identifiable interest and group, whether economic, social, racial, religious or even ideological" (1960, 11). Making a similar point E.E. Schattschneider argued that the "hospitality of the parties to all interests is one of their most pronounced characteristics" (1942, 88). Nor will parties concede or opt to not compete at all for the votes of any group. As Dahl states, "In a competitive political system within a changing society, a party that neglects any important sources of support decreases its chances of survival" (1961, 114). Likewise, Rossiter comments that, "there are no interests and groups, certainly of a nationwide range, which either party is prepared to write off in advance of a national election" (1960, 11). Thus, all groups in American society, even minority groups, will find some degree of representation in the major political parties and their incorporation will be facilitated by the parties themselves who find it useful to do so for their own purposes.

In order to accomplish their goal of winning "parties seek to appeal to as many different groups as possible" (Wildavsky 1965, 390). American parties seek to win elections by giving some concessions to many different groups within the American electorate. "Measured on a scale of radicalism and conservatism from Left to Right, both parties try more or less successfully to spread over the whole political rainbow from one extreme to the other" (Schattschneider 1942, 88). In other words, the major political parties in the United States have essentially been "catch-all" parties trying to pick up support wherever they can get it in the political market. As a result of this pragmatic outlook American parties have been criticized. Rossiter described American parties as "moderate and tolerant and self-contradictory to a fault" (1960, 11). Moreover, people have criticized the parties as trying to be "all things to all people" (Ladd and Hadley 1975). Pluralism views political parties as virtually boundless in their ideological flexibility, or more accurately, as non-ideological entities.
How does the pluralist approach predict parties will respond to groups? The basic empirical prediction of pluralism is that the two-party system offers opportunities to all groups to achieve representation from the parties, if they can mobilize their followers. Faced with the realities of competition in America's electoral system both political parties will make at least some effort to accommodate the interests of new groups, particularly if they are mobilized and sizable. In other words, there will be party competition for the votes of mobilized groups. Second, parties will resist the urge to prioritize the interests of one group over all others. Rather than completely accommodating the agenda of any one group, they will try to construct their platforms and agendas so that everyone will get something. The party's platform and legislative agenda will reflect the "loose confederation" of interests composing its coalition (Truman 1951, 532). Third, parties will sacrifice ideological coherence in their platforms and agendas for the most important goal of pleasing as many groups as possible.

**The Median Voter Theorem of Party Behavior**

Another dominant theory of party behavior comes from the rational choice literature. One of the goals of this literature is to identify the conditions that yield a behavioral equilibrium, a situation where actors choose in the most advantageous way, given the choice of others, and reach an outcome they would not wish to depart from (Aldrich 1995, 39; Green and Shapiro 1994, 25). One of the most famous results in this line of research has been Duncan Black's "median voter" theorem (1958) which argues that there is a behavioral equilibrium in committees and that the equilibrium is found at

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2 Duncan Black's *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (1958) is cited most often as the source of the median voter theorem. However, the ideas in this book were actually developed through a series of previous journal articles published in 1948 and 1949.

3 Black defines a committee as "any group of people who arrive at a decision by means of voting". He goes on to clarify that "the voters or members of the committee may be situated in one room, as in the case of the committee meeting of a sports club, or they may be scattered over an area, as in the election of a member of parliament" (1958, 1).
the point most preferred by the median voter. Anthony Downs (1957) applied this same concept to large electorates to develop a spatial theory of party competition. In *An Economic Theory of Democracy* Downs makes a number of simplifying assumptions, the most important of which is the assumption of political competition along a single dimension (e.g. a left/right ideological continuum). Like other rational choice theories, Downs' spatial theory of party competition seeks to predict the behavior of parties in terms of their purposes. Downs views political parties as teams of rational individuals whose primary goal is to win elections. When two parties compete along a unidimensional continuum and seek only to win elections, Downs argued, their platforms tend to converge to the ideal point of the median voter.

Similar to the pluralist perspective, Downs viewed the parties as governed by pragmatic, not ideological, concerns. However, according to pluralism, the parties are dependent on securing the allegiance of groups to win elections and hence are willing to accommodate some of their interests. The spatial model advanced by Downs suggests that groups, not the parties, are dependent. In the American political system groups are restricted in their options for representation and interest articulation, for all practical purposes, to two political parties. Downs argues that "In spite of the universal, equal franchise, government cannot rationally regard every voter as being of the same importance as every other ... Each party designs its ideologies to appeal to that combination of social groups which it feels will produce the most support" (1957, 93 and 101). In other words, the major parties cannot or will not respond to the concerns of all mobilized groups the way pluralism predicts. On the contrary, parties are going to be

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4 The unidimensional assumption is critical because the more general spatial theory result is that there is no equilibrium solution in a multidimensional setting (e.g. McKelvey's chaos theorem), except as Plott (1967) has shown, where there is the very unlikely situation of "radial symmetry", where preferences are distributed symmetrically around the origin of a space.

5 Almost every theory of party behavior incorporates the assumption that parties want to win elections. However, the median voter theorem is distinguished from other models of party behavior by viewing "competition as the singular defining characteristic of the major political party" (Aldrich 1995, 12).
strategic in deciding which groups they respond to and what policies they accommodate. Rather than trying to accommodate some of the demands of every group, parties will support whatever package of policies maximizes the chances of their candidates being re-elected (Downs 1957, 28).

The pluralist model does not allocate a role for public opinion as a factor in shaping party behavior. In contrast, the spatial model of party competition advanced by Downs views public opinion as the central influence. The policies that win elections are those corresponding with the preferences of the median voter. Therefore, driven by their single-minded desire to win elections both parties will embrace fairly centrist platforms. As discussed previously, the location of the median voter is an equilibrium in the sense that neither party can make itself better off by embracing a different position (Green and Shapiro 1994, 152). Although most advocates of this model would concede that in reality the parties will probably not come to occupy identical places in the ideological space, both parties will be drawn to compete for the median voter, or groups whose preferences rest in the center of the public opinion distribution, from different sides of the ideological continuum. In other words, even though the coalitions of the parties are not identical they will both actively seek to appeal to "median voter groups" by embracing platforms and issue positions coinciding with their interests.

What are the empirical predictions of this model? The median voter theorem posits that parties are not going to try to accommodate the demands of all groups, but rather they are going to pick and choose policies they endorse based on which positions will be winners. Moreover, parties will be more inclined to avoid rather than accommodate group demands that are more extreme than the preferences of the median voter. Finally, in their efforts to attract as many voters as possible parties will put forth "vague and ambiguous" policies rather than embracing controversial positions on contentious issues (Downs 1957, 115).
The Ideological or Responsible Party Model

Another theory of party behavior is the ideological or responsible party model. The premise of this model is that each party possesses a systematic set of beliefs, or an ideology that guides its behavior (Reichley 1995, 74). Many scholars have argued that the ideological or responsible party model is not a plausible theory of party behavior in the United States. One of the clearest articulations of this position comes from Louis Hartz (1955) who argued that the politics of the United States has been essentially free of ideological divisions. Dominant theories of party behavior, such as the median voter theorem and pluralism, also treat parties as distinctly non-ideological entities. They assume American politics and parties are driven by pragmatic, organizational and electoral imperatives, not guiding ideologies.

To many observers of American politics, however, the idea of non-ideological parties does not seem an accurate reflection of reality. Increasingly scholars appear to be dissatisfied with models of party behavior that do not have a place for ideology and have carved out a greater role for ideology in their theories. Realignment theorists have directly contradicted Downs by arguing that, at least during several specific periods of American history, one or both of the major parties have eschewed moderate stances and embraced highly ideological positions (Sundquist 1983). Rational choice theorists, such as Page (1978) and Aldrich (1995) have offered spatial models of party competition that attempt to account for the increased ideological orientation of American parties since the 1960s.

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6 Sundquist cites the Republican party in the 1860s, the Democratic party in 1936 and the Republican party in the 1980s, as examples of when the parties took clear ideological positions and still won. Sundquist noted that if parties needed to be moderate to win "Ronald Reagan either would have moved conspicuously toward the center in his 1980 campaign or would have lost - neither of which, of course, he did" (1983, 324).
Other scholars have gone further and argued that ideology has always played a central role in guiding the behavior and programmatic agendas of America's major parties. John Gerring's central argument in *Party Ideologies in America, 1928-1996* is that "the major American parties have articulated views that were (and are) coherent, differentiated, and stable. American party history and, by extension, American political history at large have been irreducibly ideological" (1998, 6). Similarly A. James Reichley argues that "the political struggle between two major national parties, under changing labels, has represented what appears to be a natural division between competing ideological traditions in American politics" (1992, 4). Although not immune to electoral considerations and the desire to win office, the ideological party theory suggests that political parties are reluctant to shift policy positions for the sake of pure electoral gain or simply to add a new group to their coalition. On the contrary, parties strive to engage in policy responses aimed toward electoral success without entailing ideological compromise. In brief, the behavior of the parties is driven by their different ideologies. Moreover, most scholars who view ideology as an important force in shaping party behavior argue that it is reinforced by the make-up of a party's electoral composition.

Reichley, like most observers of American politics, labels the ideology of the Democratic party as "liberalism", although he points out that it is far removed from classical liberalism (1992, 4). A belief in fairness, change and equality, and the use of government to achieve those principles has structured the ideology of the Democratic party. Pomper stated that the "basic Democratic philosophy, from Thomas Jefferson to William Jefferson Clinton, has stressed the value of equality more than liberty, particularly on matters of economic policy" (1995, 101). Since the New Deal realignment the Democratic party has been characterized as "a coalition of diverse overlapping minorities" and has been composed disproportionately of people from lower incomes and social status (Axelrod 1972, 13). Jo Freeman points out that many of the
groups within the Democratic coalition "think of themselves as outsiders pounding on the
door seeking programs that will facilitate entry into the mainstream" (1986, 338). As a
result, the Democratic party is inclined to be responsive to demands for inclusion from all
groups, particularly those that claim to be left out. Moreover, the composition of the
Democratic coalition predisposes the party to embrace policies favorable to minorities
and lower income groups. Particularly since the New Deal realignment the party's
ideology has been grounded in the idea that the government should help the needy and
give power to the dispossessed (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 186). Guided by its liberal
ideology, the Democratic party has initiated and supported policies entailing direct
involvement by the federal government to solve economic problems and more spending
to improve the social welfare of Americans. Moreover, the liberal tradition in America
has been inclined to champion freedoms that are most likely to be compatible with
equality, notably freedoms of personal behavior and expression (Reichley 1992).

The ideology of the Republican party most commonly has been labeled as
conservatism, although scholars have also referred to it as republican or neoliberal
(Reichley 1992; Gerring 1998). Despite the different labels scholars have used most
agree on the central themes of the Republican party's ideology. According to Gerring,
the major dichotomy structuring the Republican party's behavior in the 20th century has
been the state versus the individual. The core belief of the Republican party is that the
government needs to be contained. Big government threatens the health of the country
and the liberty of the citizens. Moreover, individuals will be best able to achieve their
full potential when they are free from the unnecessary intrusion of the state. The party's
1980 platform succinctly captures this belief: "It has long been a fundamental conviction
of the Republican Party that government should foster in our society a climate of
maximum individual liberty and freedom of choice". Moreover, the ideology that guides
the Republican party prioritizes order over equality (Reichley 1992). The party is
predisposed to advocate freedoms that are least likely to conflict with order, specifically economic freedoms. Dahl offers this comparison of the two parties, "where Democratic rhetoric emphasizes the equality of Americans in dignity, respect and rights, Republican rhetoric emphasizes their liberties and differences in capacities" (1967, 262).

The composition of the Republican party's coalition is shaped by, and in turn reinforces, its ideology. In comparison to the Democratic coalition the Republican's electoral following is fairly homogenous (Freeman 1988). Axelrod described the Republican party as "a coalition of the nonpoor" and described its core groups as whites, nonunion families, Protestants, and those residing outside the central cities (1972, 13). Since Republicans as individuals control most of the major private institutions, particularly economic ones, the party is under pressure to oppose the idea of a strong central government (Freeman 1988). Its electoral coalition predisposes the Republican party to favor economic and social policies more consistent with business and the economic interests of more affluent segments of the population. While Democratic platforms often expressed the needs and aspirations of the less well off, "Republican rhetoric declaims the needs and aspirations of the solid successful strata" (Dahl 1967, 262). Moreover, the social homogeneity of the Republican party's electoral base makes the party less open to new groups. "Since social homogeneity is the basis for cohesion, it is extremely difficult for the party to absorb a large group of newcomers sufficiently different from the traditional party activists" (Freeman 1986, 356). According to Pomper, the "Republicans' ideological preferences require that they promote libertarian and individualistic solutions" (1995, 102). Guided by its conservative ideology the Republican has long favored policies and solutions that entail less federal government, less regulation of business, less spending, lowering taxes, and devolving power to state and local governments.
The predictions of the ideological model differ from the other theories reviewed in several important ways. Pluralism and the median voter theorem envision both parties as being guided by identical factors (the pressures of electoral competition or the preferences of the median voter, respectively). Thus, they predict parties will behave similarly towards a group demanding incorporation. The ideological perspective, however, predicts that the parties would respond to the same group in different ways, guided by their distinct ideologies. Parties should embrace the key demands of new groups if they fit into their pre-existing ideology and be reluctant to if they do not. Further, the ideological theory of party behavior predicts that the parties may not always react to groups in a rational, victory-oriented manner. Guided by long held principles, further reinforced by their electoral bases, parties may include items in their platforms and legislative agendas that do not have majority support within society. In other words, the ideological party model predicts that parties may not always seek the moderate center on policy issues or accommodate the agendas of all mobilized groups. Finally, the ideological approach predicts that, on the whole, the Democratic party should be more responsive and receptive to claims for inclusion from groups perceiving themselves to be outsiders than the Republican party (Freeman 1988, 356).

THE ELITE POWER STRUGGLE MODEL

Based on my research and building on the work of a wide array of scholars, I offer a fourth theory of party behavior, a theory that emphasizes the importance of internal party dynamics. Through my interviews I became increasingly aware that elites within the same party were offering strikingly different views about how their party should be responding to the political concerns of blacks, Hispanics or evangelicals, or if the party should be responding at all. The parties did not speak with one voice. Nor was there agreement on some very basic issues, such as "should the party attempt to reach out
to a particular group?" What I heard within each of the parties were several distinct and competing voices. I came to realize that the parties simply were not behaving in the manner envisioned by the dominant theories of party behavior and that a more conflict-oriented and elite-focused conceptualization of party behavior was needed.

In comparison to the theories just reviewed, this model carves out a more autonomous role for elites and a less central role for the mass public in shaping party behavior. At the same time, however, it recognizes that party elites are not a closed circle of people; there is mobility into and out of elite circles, as the cost is simply activism and involvement. The elite power struggle model conceptualizes political parties as compositions of distinct factions, identifiable groups of activists and elected officials. The model posits that party behavior is shaped through intra-party turmoil, as competing factions struggle to define the policies and direction of the party. Therefore the key to understanding party behavior rests in identifying the goals of each faction and uncovering any patterns in how these intra-party struggles are resolved. I argue that the central source of power within these struggles comes from mobilization and organization within the party behind a clear policy vision. In this section I demonstrate how the elite power struggle model builds on the strengths of previous theories, but overcomes their problems, and by doing so provides a fuller and more sophisticated explanation for party behavior.

**An Elite-Level Theory of Party Behavior**

One of the central differences between the power struggle framework that I offer and the previous theories of party behavior is that it concedes a more autonomous and central role to the actions of elites within the party. By party elites I am referring to individuals active within the party organization and party-in-government at all levels, from precinct captains to the president. My main contention is that most of the dominant
theories overestimate the importance of the masses and party-in-the-electorate in shaping party behavior and underestimate the importance of elites. The power struggle model builds on a fairly recent, but growing set of studies offering elite-led and elite-focused accounts of party change and behavior.  

John Gerring argued that, with a few exceptions, "those who study the American parties have adopted a society-centered view of politics" (1998, 267). One of the central goals of the revised realignment model offered by Clubb, Flanigan and Zingale (1990) was to combat the tendency with the party literature "to treat the electorate as the primary driving force in American politics" (14). The dominant theories of party behavior, reviewed previously, rest on different assumptions. However, they do share one very important characteristic; they view party behavior as driven by the preferences of the electorate.  

Although through different mechanisms, these three theories of party behavior envision power flowing from groups through the political parties into policy. Thus, the major theoretical weakness of these society-centered accounts of party behavior is that they are deterministic. They leave very little room for the independent actions of office-holders, organizational elites and activists in shaping party behavior. Even Downs' rational choice perspective, typically conceived of as the most agency-oriented theory, implies that the distribution of public opinion will have a determining influence on the behavior of party elites. Nor do the these society-centered theories hold up under empirical scrutiny. As the following case-study chapters demonstrate the parties repeatedly have embraced policies opposed by the majority of their electoral coalitions.

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8 Baer and Bositis make a similar argument. They suggest that the emphasis within the party literature on the masses may be a result of, what Sorauf has labeled, "The Law of Available Data". The wealth of survey data produced by the biennial National Election Studies "have given birth to a line of analysis in which the party organization is only inferred from mass-voting behavior, the party in the electorate" (1989, 38).
and the mass public, nor have they competed to attract the votes of sizable groups within society.

The elite power struggle model builds on the work of many scholars that have argued that the "electoral connection" (Mayhew 1974) between public opinion and the behavior of party elites is not as strong as others have portrayed it. In his massive historical account of party realignments, Sundquist (1983) argues that even when the mass public reacts strongly to new political issues, party elites have room to respond in several different ways. He stated that "the leaders of a political party do more than just reflect the will of the party members; they also lead" (1983, 329). Making a similar point, Gerring (1998) stressed that although the distribution of preferences in society may constrain the behavior of parties, within these constraints party elites have considerable room to act autonomously. He cites several examples of "presidents and party leaders who refused, despite considerable electoral inducements, to truckle to public opinion" (1998, 270). Carmines and Stimson (1989) and Adams (1995) make an even stronger case that party elites act independently of party masses; based on their statistical analyses these scholars find that rather than the preferences of their electoral coalitions guiding the behavior of party elites, the decisions of party elites guide the partisan behavior of the mass public.

Building on these ideas the elite power struggle model argues that the preferences and goals of party elites are central in shaping party behavior. In order to have any chance of accommodation a group needs to have elites in the party who are part of the group or committed to the group's agenda. If there is no faction within a party that wants to accommodate a group it is unlikely that the party will be responsive to the group’s demands, even if that group forms a considerable electoral bloc. Thus, in order to

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9 Sundquist's main point is that how party elites respond to crises or new issues plays a significant role in whether or not a realignment occurs. But the important insight that I am drawing from his work is that party elites are not compelled to act in any one manner.
understand the behavior of parties we need to examine the goals and preferences of party elites.

**Party Elites: A Porous Group**

Although the power struggle model of party behavior emphasizes the importance of elites in shaping party behavior, it is important not to make too strict an elite-mass distinction because this would obscure an essential shaping force behind party behavior. As I discuss in more depth later on in this chapter, the way that groups can best achieve representation and responsiveness from the parties is by making the transition from mass to elite: by becoming active within the party organization and even winning party offices at the grassroots level. American parties are particularly open to such activism. Even in today's media centered political world, parties need a plethora of organizational workers, or activists, in order to carry out their most basic jobs: to provide services to candidates, to raise money, and to turnout their electoral coalitions in local, state and national elections. Although national and state level office holders receive the most attention from the press and by party scholars the vast majority of people within the parties work behind the scenes and contribute their time and money on a voluntary basis (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 114). Needing activists, but unable to provide any particularly strong and attractive material incentives, parties are forced to accept whoever volunteers their efforts. In fact, in many parts of the country local party organizational offices, such as precinct captain, go unfilled from year to year (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 75). Furthermore, because of state statues, parties do not have much control over who comes in. As Beck and Sorauf point out "open party caucuses and the election of party officials in primaries tend to encourage self-recruitment at the expense of party initiatives and control" (1992, 126). Thus, American parties are particularly open to infiltration by virtually any highly motivated and mobilized group.
Once inside the party, groups have meaningful opportunities to influence behavior because power within American parties is widely diffused and to some degree flows from the grassroots upwards. Several scholars of American parties have suggested the term stratarchy best captures the diffuse and non-hierarchical distribution of power among the different layers of party organization (Beck and Sorauf 1992; Eldersveld 1964; Kessel 1968). Eldersveld explains this by arguing that "the desperate need in all parties for voters, which are scarcely mobilized at the apex of the hierarchy, results in at least some, if not pronounced deference to local structural strata where voters are won or lost" (Eldersveld 1964, 9). Moreover, those in lower levels of party organization typically have influence over the selection of those in higher positions (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 139). Thus, by saying that the power struggle model is an elite theory of party behavior I am not arguing that party behavior is run from the top by a closed group of elites. On the contrary, groups in society have considerable opportunities to penetrate the parties and, once inside, have meaningful opportunities to truly influence the party's policies and behavior.

Party Factions

The power struggle model both draws from and contradicts the reasoning behind Downs' spatial model of party competition. A vital contribution of rational choice theory has been its emphasis on the micro-foundations of institutions. Rational choice theorists have raised awareness that when we discuss party behavior, or the behavior of any other institution, we are actually discussing the aggregated decisions of many individual party elites, not the behavior of some actual entity called a party. Thus, understanding the motivations and goals of these individuals is critical to understanding the behavior of parties. For the most part, however, rational choice theorists have attributed the same goal to every party elite, the goal of winning elections (Downs 1957; Schlesinger 1991).
Many rational choice theorists concede that this is an abstraction from the real world, but justify making the assumption on the basis of the analytical leverage it produces (Downs 1957, 26). I argue that assuming all party elites share the same goal deters, rather than furthers, our understanding of party behavior. Assuming uniformity among party elites obscures the central mechanism shaping party behavior, intra-party struggles between factions.

Rather than viewing parties as unified teams I view parties as being composed of various factions, identifiable groups with distinct visions of how the party should behave. Such a conceptualization is not new. Many scholars, largely as a result of conducting their own interviews with party elites, have argued that there are distinct types of party activists. Two of the defining works in this area have come from James Q. Wilson (1962) and Aaron Wildavsky (1965) who developed fairly similar typologies of party elites. On the one hand, there are the "professionals" or "traditional politicians" who are primarily concerned with winning elections and successfully maintaining the party organization. They view compromise and bargaining as important tools to achieve these ends. Moreover, they are willing to bend a little to capture public support or broaden the appeal of the party. The second type is the "amateur" and "purist" who are distinguished by their greater concern with substantive policy and lesser orientation towards winning. They want the party to embrace the ideologically "right" policies and therefore disdain compromise and accommodation. Although Wilson's argument was based on observations of local Democratic activists and Wildavsky's article was based on interviews with delegates only from the Republican party, the typologies they identified transcend these specific contexts and provide a powerful tool for understanding the structure and behavior of contemporary American parties.

10 It is conventional within the party literature to contrast the party professionals or politicians with the ideological purists. But the "politicians" are not always innocent of ideology; to some degree they simply look more pragmatic because their ideology already defines the mainstream of the party.
The elite power struggle model draws on these typologies and extends them beyond their creators' intentions. James Q. Wilson and Aaron Wildavsky did not apply their typologies to elected officials. Nor have the many articles that have incorporated these typologies applied them to anyone beyond organizational elites. A widespread assumption is that among those pursuing elective office, policy and purposive goals are always secondary to winning. I argue that the typology should be extended to elected officials as well. Even those harboring office ambitions are sometimes motivated by policy (Aldrich 1995; Page 1978; Green and Shapiro 1994). One of the unique benefits about holding elective office is that it offers the opportunity to affect policy. Aldrich points out that "the comparative advantage of politics over many private careers is not financial. Many who hold high office could earn far more income in private careers ... One of the major comparative advantages of a political career is the opportunity to shape public policy" (1995, 188). It is precisely those with intense political views and strong desires to affect policy who would be more inclined to self-select into political careers.

Moreover, many people seek elective office to further the agenda and well being of "their group", rather than simply out of a desire to hold office per se. Social movements, in particular, have catapulted many ideological elites into the office-holding cadres of the parties. Baer and Bositis argue that "both political parties and social movements are vehicles of group representation" (1989, 93). Participants in social movements often undergo a transition from protesting outside institutionalized government structures to participation in the more conventional realm of party politics (Tate 1994). They come to pursue political office as a means of furthering their movements' goals and thus officeholders replace protest leaders as spokespeople for the

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12 It is important to point out that policy goals remain strong motivations for party activists as well. Based on existing studies of party activists in all parts of the country, Beck and Sorauf have found that "the desire to use the party as a means to achieve policy goals appears to be the major incentive attracting individuals to party work these days" (1992, 124).
group's interests. Moreover, once an active spokesperson for a group penetrates a party and runs for a high visibility position under the party's label this can and often has spurred an influx of like-minded followers into the party structure. The process of party recruitment, particularly drawing a specific group into a party's organization and elected positions, is largely dependent upon the presence of a magnetic leader who champions issues meaningful to them. As Beck and Sorauf point out "the mobilization of issue and ideologically motivated workers into the party often depends upon the drawing power of an attractive leader who champions their cause" (1992, 123). Rational choice theories, assuming that elected officials will only act in self-interest, fail to account for the role of group-based interests that may motivate actors into elective politics (Baer and Bositis 1989). Thus, assuming that all candidates and office holders share the goal of winning does not provide analytical leverage and insight into the functioning of parties. It obscures the fact that many elites have policy-oriented and group-based goals, which they pressure their party to embrace and thereby does damage to our full understanding of party behavior.

The Struggle Over Party Behavior
And the Sources of Power

In the preceding section I argued that parties are composed of factions of elites with contrasting views of how the party should be responding to demands for incorporation from groups. Recognizing that party elites have different goals is critical because it has behavioral implications for the parties. Both Wildavsky and Wilson argued that the influx of "amateurs" or "purists" made the parties behave less like the pluralist model predicts and more ideologically, which they both viewed in a negative light. Wilson argued that when the amateurs gained control of the party organization, they weakened the capacity of their party to engage in broad-based, diffuse,
accommodationist, coalition building activities. Wildavsky began his article by stating that "party leaders are expected to conciliate groups of voters in order to get at least part of their vote" and then questions why that did not occur in 1964. He argued that the infusion of purists into the Republican party was responsible for the party's ideological behavior and its subsequent landslide loss. He warned that the increasing number of purists in both parties may represent "the beginnings of ideology in the United States" (1965, 413). Both suggest that the purists achieved substantive representation within the party by displacing the agenda of traditional coalition members. Using a spatial model, Aldrich (1995) also demonstrated that the different goals held by elites had consequences for party behavior. He argued that the entrance of more policy-oriented activists into the parties yields an equilibrium, which accounts for the durable and consistent ideological differences characterizing the contemporary Democratic and Republican parties.

The elite power struggle theory builds on the idea that the goals and preferences of party elites are critical factors shaping party behavior. Rather than viewing parties as having a natural inclination to be ideologically consistent, to broaden their appeal as wide as possible, or to run to the center, I argue that parties should be conceptualized as entities open to being shaped by mobilized and determined factions. A distinctive feature of American parties is that they are very permeable, both structurally and ideologically. James Sundquist best captured this conceptualization by stating that "an American party should be thought of not as a rational organism with some kind of collective brain making coherent strategic judgments, but as a terrain to be fought over, conquered, and controlled by one element, then by another" (1983, 328). Within each party factions of activists and office holders vie to influence the direction and content of party behavior. For a group to receive a positive response from a party, themselves or their allies need to enter the elite cadre. They at least need to be contenders in the struggle. Depending on who wins intra-party struggles, parties can be the instruments of pluralists, centrists or
ideological extremists. "American parties are ... extraordinarily open to participation by any group that seeks to use a party for its purposes." (Sundquist 1983, 328).

How does one faction succeed in defining party policy? Power in intra-party struggles comes from three sources: mobilization within the party organization, becoming part of the party-in-government, and being united around a honed vision of how the party should be behaving in a specific policy realm. One of the most surprising things I encountered when conducting my interviews was that very few party elites claimed any responsibility for creating party policy. "Oh, we don't get involved in that" was the response of many party elites. What this reveals is that in part because of their heterogeneity, American parties are characterized by policy vacuums; there is a lack of people within the parties who think broadly about policy and think systematically about how the party should be responding to a group on a set of issues. Thus, organized factions with strong and clear views often shape party behavior, even if these views are only held by a minority within the party elite. In other words, simply having a well-defined vision of how the party should be behaving is a valuable resource in intra-party struggle (Hale 1994). By relentlessly pushing its view, a faction can have disproportionately high influence on party policies and behavior, even though this may have negative consequences for the electoral success of party (Wildavsky 1965; Wilson 1962).

A common refrain I heard from virtually every party elite I spoke with was that entering and mobilizing within the organization was the most effective way for a group with a particular agenda to influence party policy. As discussed previously, one of the most noted features of American party organizations is their decentralization and porosity (Eldersveld 1964; Schattschneider 1942). As a result of these characteristics, organized newcomers can potentially take over precincts, come to dominate state parties and gain substantial footing in the national party organizations, which in turn provides

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factions with a number of resources through which they can affect party policy and behavior. By infiltrating the party organization at the state level a faction gains leverage over the content of state platforms, the distribution of resources, and the selection of national delegates and alternates (Beck and Sorauf 1992). Gaining a place within the national organization provides even more bargaining power over party behavior. Obviously if a faction is able to get one of its own nominated for president and win, it is going to gain a huge advantage in the struggle to define the party's policies. More likely, however, a minority faction will not be able to nominate one of their own. Nevertheless, a faction can translate the participation of its members in national party conventions into veto power over the party's choice of presidential and vice-presidential nominees and into significant influence over the selection of the convention speakers. Moreover, through bargaining, threats of disruption, and cohesive action on platform committees, a faction can gain significant leeway in shaping the platform to incorporate their concerns.

Beyond directly shaping the platform, an organized, mobilized faction can indirectly influence party policy by influencing the policy positions of presidential and congressional nominees. Several scholars have pointed out that even in today's candidate-centered world, ambitious office-seekers need the help of the party's organizational components (Page 1978; Aldrich 1995). Party activists are critical in helping a candidate gain the nomination and provide the grassroots, day-to-day efforts needed to win the general election. Summarizing this idea, Page argued "if a candidate wants to get nominated, increase his turnout, and win voters, he must adjust his issue stands to please the policy-oriented activists, delegates, and money givers of his party" (1978, 27). By participating in grassroots campaign activities, a faction can gain significant leverage over the stands of candidates. It can force candidates to adopt positions more in-line with its agenda than the candidate might otherwise desire to do. Moreover, candidates seeking long careers in elective office possess incentives to be
consistent and "act in office as they advocated on the campaign trail" (Aldrich 1995, 192). Thus, once they are pressured into adopting a policy stand more amenable to a mobilized, ideological faction, the candidates will most likely keep or at least not stray too far from that position.

Therefore, an organized faction with a clearly defined policy vision has the potential to shape the party's policy both directly and indirectly by mobilizing within the parties' organizations. However, navigating the complexities of each state's organizational structure and delegate selection process is a time consuming and labor-intensive process. Yet if a faction is able to surmount the collective action problem and successfully mobilize within the party, it seizes a key to winning intra-party battles. Wildavsky (1965) recognized the importance of intra-party mobilization, at least implicitly. After describing how Goldwater "purists" had infiltrated the Republican party, he declared that counter-mobilization and struggle would have to take place within the party to move the party back in a moderate direction. "If these conservatives are to be defeated they will have to be challenged by a rival, moderate elite, willing to engage in the daily tasks of political organization over the next four years" (Wildavsky 1965, 411). In other words, one of the few ways to counter the influence of a mobilized faction is through aggressive counter-mobilization. If none materializes, an organized, mobilized faction representing a minority view can control party policy.

Another means through which factions can influence party policy is by self-recruiting into public office and becoming part of the party-in-government. Although focusing on local politics, the central argument of Protest is Not Enough (1984) emphasizes the importance of incorporation as a prerequisite for policy representation. Browning, Marshall and Tabb's study of ten cities in California revealed that protest and electoral mobilization by Hispanics and blacks put some pressure on local governments to respond to their demands, but that this society-level mobilization was not enough.
They found that local governments were most responsive to the substantive demands of these groups when blacks and Hispanics became part of the local political elite. They argued that "A group that is intensely concerned about government policies but has not gained access to the policy-making process has not achieved significant political equality" (Browning et al. 1984, 243. On the other hand, "A group that achieves substantial incorporation ... is in a strong position to change government policy in areas of special concern to them" (Browning et al. 1984, 243).

Applying the arguments of Browning, Marshall and Tabb to parties at the national level suggests that a group needs to aggressively mobilize its own members within the party-in-government in order to influence the party's response. Once in office, groups have the opportunity to influence the legislative agenda and the outcome of legislative struggles. Groups themselves have long recognized that one of the most reliable ways to shape the behavior of political parties is to get "their own kind" into elective positions. In the 1960s feminist organizations prioritized electing feminists to Congress recognizing that they would be the most reliable and loyal defenders of feminist interests. Yet becoming part of the elite is not enough. Factions must use the presence of their members within the governing structure in an effective manner. This means acting cohesively and mobilizing behind a clearly defined agenda. Making a similar point, Ronald Walters (1988) argued that in order to influence party policy, blacks not only needed to gain a place within the party elite, but needed to engage in "leverage strategies" in order to translate their numbers into actual influence.

The Costs of Group Accommodation

Although the elite power struggle model argues that parties are open to the mobilization of groups in society, it also recognizes that not all groups have the same opportunities to influence the behavior of one or both of the parties. The power struggle
model builds on another insight from the ideological party model and Downs' spatial model, that parties are not equally open to the interests of all groups. In other words, some groups are easier to accommodate than others. The configuration of interests within a particular party can make it more difficult for some groups to obtain a positive response from the party than for others. If the interests of a emerging group are completely in tension with the interests of another faction, which is already embedded within the party structure, the group cannot succeed in achieving representation from the party unless the group has the power to force the party to jettison a part of their coalition. The latter happens sometimes, but forcing a party to jettison a part of its coalition is certainly a very difficult task. Meanwhile, an emerging group whose interests fit more comfortably with those embraced by the factions already established in the party elite is going to have an easier time achieving a positive response from the party. In other words, accommodating some groups creates more intra-party conflict than accommodating others. While this does not preclude a group's chances for representation it suggests that the opportunities for some groups to achieve meaningful representation from one or both of the parties are more limited than for others.

Moreover, the elite power struggle model is premised on the idea that mobilization into a party's organization and elected positions is an effective way for groups to achieve representation. Mobilizing into and organizing within a party, however, is an intense, time consuming, knowledge intensive activity. In other words, it is very costly. Although I have argued that African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics are similar and therefore warrant comparison, there are some significant differences across the groups as well, which is something this study will explore in more detail in the following chapters. The most significant difference across the groups is that some possess more resources than others in terms of money, education, political connections and knowledge, a history of political inclusion, mastery of the English
language and pre-existing organizational bases. To the extent that the groups have different levels of resources, they have different opportunities to overcome the costs of mobilization and achieve responsiveness from the parties. Thus, the power struggle model argues that contrary to the assumptions underlying the pluralist model there are costs to accommodating a group's demands. The less conflict a group and its political concerns provoke and the more resources a group has the better its ability to enter into a party's elite and be an effective competitor in the factional struggles that define party behavior.

The Predictions of the Elite Power Struggle Model

What does the elite power struggle model predict? How will the parties respond to demands for incorporation from racial, religious and ethnic groups? The model does not predict any set outcome. As I have argued, one of the strengths of this framework is that it is less deterministic than the other approaches. However, the elite struggle model does predict that parties will react differently to demands for incorporation because the behavior of each party is shaped by distinct internal struggles. Although factions have different goals, no faction will willingly concede power to a new group. Thus, the incorporation of a new group will be preceded by intra-party turmoil. Moreover, this model predicts that parties will not accommodate a group's demands for incorporation unless there is a faction within the party elite that is dedicated to this task. Although the costs of success may be higher for some groups than others, no group is structurally prevented from achieving representation. This model argues that vocal minorities, or factions, can achieve responsiveness from either party by aggressively mobilizing with the party structure. Mobilized factions have multiple openings through which to influence party policy and behavior. Finally, the power struggle model predicts that the behavior of parties will not be an accurate reflection of all the interests within a party.
coalition, but a distorted reflection magnifying the views of the faction that is winning the intra-party struggle.

**Theories of Party Behavior: A Summary**

Examining the responses of the Democratic and Republican parties towards three different demographic groups, African Americans, white evangelicals and Hispanics provides a fertile testing ground for these theories of party behavior. Before turning to the individual case studies, I offer a quick review of the four theories of party behavior and their hypotheses.

**Hypothesis 1: Pluralism:** The pluralist perspective argues that both parties will compete for the allegiance of all three groups, if the groups are mobilized. The platforms and legislative agendas sponsored by both parties should embrace some elements of each group's agendas.

**Hypothesis 2: The median voter theorem:** This perspective predicts that the parties should adopt fairly similar positions. Moreover, the parties should ignore ideologically extreme demands made by groups and jointly occupy the moderate center on issues.

**Hypothesis 3: Ideological Party Model:** This model predicts that the parties should accommodate a group's demands only if these issues fit with their pre-established ideology or set of policy views. Moreover, it suggests that the Democratic party should be more inclined to accommodate the demands of disadvantaged "out" groups.
Hypothesis 4: *Elite Power Struggle Model*: The factional theory does not predict any one outcome, but suggests that the configuration of factional disagreements within each party plus the resources each group is willing and able to exert shapes party response.
CHAPTER 3

THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO AFRICAN AMERICANS

African Americans\(^1\) possess a distinct history in the United States as members of a subordinated minority group. Although present in the United States almost from its creation as an independent nation, unlike many other ethnic, religious and racial minorities, African Americans did not come here willingly and spent their first two centuries as slaves.\(^2\) Incorporation into the political system has been a slow process. It was not until the 1960s that African Americans were given a claim to political equality. And many would argue that the process of political incorporation is still incomplete (Walters 1988). The historical struggle between the African American community, aiming to secure political rights and improve their socio-economic conditions, and those seeking to block the advancements of this group has been a pivotal influence on American political development. Many scholars argue that race and racial issues have been one of the most powerful cleavages shaping American politics and society (Black and Black 1987; Carmichael and Hamilton 1967; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall; Hacker 1992; V.O. Key 1949; West 1993).

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1 My usage of the terms African American, black, and black American is interchangeable throughout the chapter.

2 African Americans can be considered to be present in American history "almost from its beginning" if we conceive of American history as starting around 1600 (Lipset 1996, 115).
Of the three groups I examine in this study, African Americans have received the most attention by political scientists. One of the principal concerns in the field of minority politics has been the identification of those factors that contribute to or inhibit the political empowerment of African Americans (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986; Nelson 1990). In particular, scholars have examined the development and impact of black insurgency (Lawson 1997; McAdam 1982) as well as the voting behavior and electoral strategies of African Americans (Tate 1994; Walters 1988). Coming from a different angle, several studies have provided in-depth assessments of public opinion on racial issues and the strikingly different experiences and perspectives of blacks and whites in American society (Jelen 1997; Hacker 1992; Schuman, Steeh and Bobo 1985; Sigelman and Welch 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). Although these are all important areas of research few studies have sought to explain the response of the political system to the mobilization and demands of African Americans. In particular, what explains the diverse responses of the parties towards this minority group?

In this chapter I briefly describe the historical experiences of African Americans within the political system and the mobilization of blacks within the civil rights movement across the first half of the twentieth century. Next, I present an empirically supported picture of the policy demands of African Americans based on objective statistics about the group, national survey results, the goals of national organizations representing African Americans, the issues used by African American leaders to mobilize the group, and the work of other scholars. Third, I draw from party platforms, State of the Union Addresses, and congressional records to describe and categorize the changing responses of the parties towards the concerns of African Americans. The fourth and central task of this chapter is to explain the behavior of the parties.

The Republican and Democratic parties responded in very different ways to African Americans' demands for civil rights and racial equality. After a century of
championing the cause of racial equality and issuing progressive civil rights platforms, the Republican party abruptly changed courses in 1964 and began embracing policies considerably less supportive, if not antithetical, to the interests of African Americans. From that time forward, the positions taken by the Republican party on civil rights, affirmative action and social welfare issues have been opposed by a majority of African Americans. Meanwhile, the Democratic party, once the party of slavery, white supremacy and a long-time supporter of segregation embraced the full agenda of the African American community by 1964. Despite the marked unpopularity of many components of the black agenda among whites in society, the Democratic party continued to champion the cause of racial equality and support policies designed to address the socioeconomic inequalities faced by African Americans. Across the 1990s the Democratic party has lessened its support. In this chapter I use interview data, platforms and the legislative activity of Democratic office-holders to demonstrate that although the party has not abandoned the African American agenda, it has moved towards the preferences of the median voter and away from the ideal preferences of African Americans.

How can we explain the variation and change in party response? Why did the parties reverse their historical stances on racial issues? Why did the parties embrace and maintain opposing ideological positions on racial issues, particularly when operating under the supposedly moderating influence of the two-party system. Edsall and Edsall point out that despite forming a substantial electoral bloc, "partisan competition for the votes of black America has been absent for over a generation" (1992, 30). What accounts for this absence of competition? Which theory of party behavior best explains the

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3 Defining the interests or agenda of African Americans is a difficult and controversial task. As I discuss later on in this chapter, I identify the agenda of African Americans as a set of issues that blacks are fairly cohesive on, feel intensely about, and that black leaders have used to mobilize this group politically. I also recognize that conservative black leaders would disagree with my definition of black interests and attempt to contend with such arguments.
responses of the parties to the mobilization of African Americans? In this chapter I argue that pluralism, the median voter theorem and the ideological model of party behavior are unable to fully explain the behavior of the parties towards African Americans. The elite power struggle model provides a fuller explanation, which can account for the polarization of the parties and the Democratic party's more recent move towards the center.

**Historical Overview**

**African Americans and the Political System**

History is critical to understanding the political experience of any previously excluded group. Thus, in this section I briefly review the African American experience within America's political system giving particular attention to their precarious relationship with political parties.

Racial equality was a particularly salient issue during the Reconstruction era and the Republican party was its champion. Support for abolition was the central factor sparking the creation of the Republican party in 1854 and the party continued to support the cause of racial equality. In their overview of the African American political experience, Barker and McCorry point out that "Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation and the policies of the Republican Reconstruction Congress stand out as historic benchmarks in black America's struggle for freedom" (1976, 242). In its platforms, the Republican party enthusiastically praised the nation's moves towards racial equality and applauded the active role of the national government in achieving this process. In 1866 the Republican majority in Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, which protected blacks from discriminatory legislation by state governments (Reichley 1992, 135). The Republican party also played the pivotal role in introducing and passing the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which ended slavery and gave newly freed slaves
full rights of citizenship and the promise of equality under the law.\textsuperscript{4} Moreover, the Republican party ensured that these promises of political equality were translated into reality by stationing federal troops in the South.

As a result of its progressive stances on racial issues, the Republican party became the almost exclusive beneficiary of African American political participation. Existing statistics suggest that African Americans voted overwhelmingly for Republican candidates from the end of the Civil War through the first several decades of the 20th century (Walters 1988, 8). Additionally, all African American legislators who served in Congress during this time were Republicans (Singh 1998, 33). Perhaps one of the most visible signs of the acceptance of African Americans in the Republican party was the appointment of John R. Lynch, an African American, as temporary Chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1884 (Cotter and Hennessy 1964).

After the Compromise of 1877, when Democrats in Congress used their votes to put Republican presidential candidate Rutherford Hayes into office in return for the removal of the last federal troops from the South, the Republican party’s commitment to enforcing racial equality weakened (Walters 1988, 7). Although the party continued to express support for racial equality in its platforms, it no longer prioritized racial issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 31). Meanwhile, left to the control of white southerners, who consolidated their control over state government through the Democratic party, African Americans saw their civil and political rights almost completely erode. The Democratic party instituted a variety of devices that disenfranchised African Americans ranging from cumbersome and unreasonable registration procedures, to poll taxes, to violence and intimidation. Moreover, southern Democrats implemented a wide range of Jim Crow laws that institutionalized racial segregation in all realms of public life and

\textsuperscript{4} It is important to remember that the rights of citizenship provided in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were given only to African American males at this time. In fact, the Fourteenth Amendment inserted the word male into the United States Constitution for the first time.
relegated African Americans to a distinctively subordinate status. Despite the Republican party's failure to faithfully uphold its promises of racial equality, considering its racially oppressive actions, the Democratic party was not a viable option for African Americans. The limited pool of African Americans who were still able to participate in politics had little choice but to remain loyal Republicans.

The election of Democrat Franklin Delano Roosevelt loosened the Republican monopoly on the African American vote. During the Depression of the 1930s African Americans began a slow move towards the Democratic party. Because of their distinctively low socioeconomic status, northern African Americans were attracted to the party's New Deal welfare policies. Moreover, as more African Americans migrated from the South to northern cities they found that not only were they allowed to vote, but they were encouraged to register as Democrats by Democratic ward politicians attempting to keep the machines in power (Cotter and Hennessy 1964, 160). Although their class policies were attractive to African Americans "few could forget that the Democratic party was largely controlled by the South, which depended on lynching, supremacist violence and legal devices to disenfranchise Blacks" (Tate 1994, 51). Despite his emphasis on economic justice, President Franklin Roosevelt had a dismal civil rights record. Between 1937 and 1946 more than 150 civil rights bills were introduced in Congress, but not a single one passed, largely because of Roosevelt's unwillingness to take public positions in favor of the legislation or to do anything to encourage their passage (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 31). Moreover, in many southern states the Democratic party continued systematically to exclude blacks (Reichley 1992, 298). Thus, unlike other groups who were part of the New Deal coalition, the Democratic realignment among African Americans occurred slowly and tentatively over more than three decades.
The 1964 presidential election marks an important turning point in the partisan identification and voting behavior of African Americans. African Americans "voted 94 percent for Johnson - a pattern of monolithic backing for the Democratic national ticket that has continued ever since" (Reichley 1992, 331). In that year, 80 percent of African Americans identified as Democrats, a figure which has remained remarkably consistent over the following decades.\(^5\) According to data from the National Election Study, in 1994, 80.7 percent of African Americans identified as Democrats. An even higher percentage of African Americans have voted for Democratic candidates in presidential and congressional races (Ladd 1995; Tate 1995). Thus, for the past three decades African Americans have made up "the single most solid voting bloc in American politics" (Radcliff and Saiz 1995, 779). Not only have African Americans become the most loyal Democrats, but also their attachment to the party has been, and remains, unusually strong. Survey data from the National Election Survey demonstrate that across the 1990s less than 30 percent of white Americans identify themselves as strong partisans, either Democratic or Republicans. Meanwhile 40 percent of African Americans have identified themselves as strong Democrats.\(^6\)

The Political Mobilization of African Americans

African Americans began emerging as an independent political force in local and national politics in the 1950s. Sociologists and political scientists have offered competing explanations for the emergence and timing of the civil rights movement. Although I draw from numerous sources this summary of the political mobilization of African Americans draws heavily on the account offered by Doug McAdam (1982) in *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency*. His historical account

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\(^5\) This figure includes Independents leaning towards the Democratic party.

\(^6\) Across the 1990s, 3% or less of African Americans have identified as strong Republicans.
stresses the importance of changes in the broader environment and the acquisition of group-based resources as critical prerequisites for the political mobilization of African Americans.

The broader political and economic environment, which McAdam refers to as the political opportunity structure, played a significant role in the timing and eventual emergence of the civil rights movement. One of the main changes that advanced the opportunity for black mobilization was the gradual collapse of cotton as the backbone of the southern economy across the first several decades of the Twentieth century. Prior to the 1930s, the everyday life of most African Americans was dominated by the institution of cotton farming. As white southerners became less reliant on African Americans to pick cotton, their need for the elaborate set of oppressive controls used to ensure an abundant supply of cheap black labor also declined. "The practical effect of this relaxation of social control was to make black insurgency more feasible by reducing the risks associated with protest activity" (McAdam 1982, 77).

In addition to the decline of the cotton industry, the involvement of the United States in World War II opened opportunities for African American mobilization by bringing international scrutiny to the behavior of the American government. As Gunnar Myrdal made clear in *An American Dilemma* (1944), the commitment of the United States to universal justice and equality were contradicted by the way it treated its principal minority race. At the close of World War II, racial discrimination and segregation remained widespread in the United States and lynching remained an accepted custom in the South. In the following decades "white Americans found themselves embarrassed by blatant cases of discrimination" (Hacker 1992, 200). Moreover, the rising status of the United States as a world leader and the ideological battle with the USSR put tremendous pressure on the American government to treat
its own citizens more fairly and close the gap between democratic rhetoric and reality. This in turn fostered a climate more favorable to demands by African Americans for basic political rights and inclusion.

Beyond changes in the broader political climate, African Americans developed several indigenous or group-based resources that made it possible for them to mount a sustained campaign for political incorporation. Across the first half of the 20th century millions of African Americans migrated from rural southern towns to both southern and northern cities. City living provided many with the new experience of living close to many other African Americans without the watchful eye of whites censoring their every move. Concentrated black living in urban areas was a critical resource for the development of political consciousness and strategies for action. McAdam points out that "between opportunity and action are people and the subjective meanings they attach to their situations" (1982, 48). Urban living allowed African Americans the space to "collectively define their situation as unjust and subject to change through group action" (McAdam 1982, 51). Moreover, their mass migration made African Americans a strategically important political block in several northern cities (Walters 1988). Finally, cities provided the opportunity for blacks to develop an independent economic base, a critical prerequisite for political activity of any kind. Northern cities, in particular, provided opportunities for the economic advancement of African Americans that would never have been possible in the South (Tate 1994). Black churches were also critical in this respect as they were one of the few economically independent organizations within the African American community.

The development of formal and informal black organizations was also a critical prerequisite for African American political mobilization. Informal groups provided critical resources and guided early protest activity. Black churches offered a pre-mobilized group of people for whom the costs of collective political action had already
been partially overcome and a pre-existing network of communication across which information and strategies could be transferred. Black colleges, which increased in number and quality over the first half of the twentieth century, provided many of the skills necessary for effective leadership and organization. Finally more formal national organizations, the most powerful of which were the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), the Southern Christian Leadership Council (SCLC), and the Congress for Racial Equality (CORE) came to dominate the mobilization of African Americans and provided the commitment and resources necessary for sustained mobilization.

With these resources African Americans demanded an end to the widespread discrimination occurring in the South and the exclusion of African Americans from the political process and achieved momentous reforms in both these areas. Katherine Tate (1994) argues that although there is no longer an identifiable black social movement, there are many compelling continuities characterizing the political participation of African Americans that extend from the civil rights period of protest to the present. African Americans, although channeling their participation through electoral channels, still have a distinctly high level of race consciousness and recognize that they are part of a distinctive group that has been and remains disadvantaged within America's political, economic and social structure. Moreover, African Americans share similar political concerns and support progressive, liberal-oriented change within government.

**Part II: THE CONTEMPORARY AGENDA OF AFRICAN AMERICANS**

In order to say anything definitive about the responsiveness of the parties to African Americans, we must first identify the set of issues that African Americans have been, and continue to be, most likely to mobilize around. Most minority politics scholars
agree that although African Americans are by no means monolithic, there is an identifiable black political agenda (Dawson 1994; Nelson 1990; Singh 1998; Swain 1995; Tate 1994; Walters 1988). There is a remarkably high level of agreement among African Americans concerning the primary problems facing the black community and what role the government should play in society. Based on public opinion surveys, socio-economic indicators, the priorities of organizations representing African Americans, and the issues emphasized by black leaders to mobilize this group politically, I conceptualize the contemporary African American agenda as having three main components or issue clusters. These issue clusters are civil rights, racial preference or race-conscious programs, and social welfare policy (Singh 1998; Sniderman and Piazza 1993). African Americans share distinctively liberal views on these issues, which sets them apart from most Americans.\footnote{To broadly label African Americans as a liberal group is inaccurate because African Americans hold conservative views on many social issues, such as abortion, homosexuality and women's rights (Tate 1994, 38).} As Robert Singh wrote in his analysis of African American political interests, "Blacks constitute not only a racial minority but also, more importantly, an ideological one in terms of their abiding values and beliefs" (1998, 11).

The primary factor underlying the cohesive African American agenda is their experience as a subordinate group in American society. "Slavery, state-sanctioned segregation and the protracted and costly struggle to secure their civil and political rights have powerfully distinguished Blacks from their compatriots" (Singh 1998, 4). Moreover, as a result of slavery and its legacy, African Americans began their fight for political inclusion severely disadvantaged in terms of wealth, experience and education. Their unique history, reinforced by current group-based discrimination and socioeconomic disadvantage, has fostered a particularly high sense of group or race consciousness among African Americans. The National Black Election Survey found that in 1984, 75 percent of African Americans felt that what happened to black people...
would shape their own lives. This figure increased to 83 percent in the 1996 study by Katherine Tate. In other words, the vast majority of African Americans see their fate as dependent on the fate of the group (Tate 1994). Michael Dawson (1994) argues that African Americans' strong sense of group identity provides a lens through which they view the world, including the political world. The "black" experience is equally distributed across the group making it rational for individuals to use group interests to evaluate politics. Making a similar point, Seymour Martin Lipset argues that, "[b]eing defined either de jure or de facto as a caste for most of their history, blacks, like European workers, are much more likely to respond to group related, rather than individually oriented values" (1996, 113).

Civil Rights

One of the central components of the African American agenda is civil rights. Until the middle of the 1960s, African American mobilization focused almost exclusively on the attainment of integration, political inclusion and racial equality (McAdam 1982; Tate 1994). Tremendous progress has occurred in these areas over the past decades. The federal government has struck down almost all discriminatory laws and practices dismantling the legal structure of segregation. The passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, with its strong enforcement provisions, provided African Americans with secured access to voting. Despite substantial progress, civil rights continues to be an important item on the contemporary agenda of blacks. The African American public and national organizations representing African Americans continue to view racial discrimination as a serious problem, remain highly supportive of active government involvement in combating racial discrimination and prioritize the passage and
enforcement of civil right legislation as one of their central goals, if not their foremost priority (Wickham 1998, 13A).\footnote{After years of internal problems, the NAACP recently redefined its mission and placed civil rights as its main and central goal.}

One reason why civil rights remains a central concern is that prejudice and discrimination remain a reality for many African Americans and have decreased opportunities for their socio-economic advancement. Multiple studies reveal that discrimination continues to decrease the hiring prospects for African Americans. Moreover, there is evidence that African Americans who are hired face racial harassment on the job and are passed up for promotions (Welch et al, 1997: 483). The high-profile case concerning Texaco in the Fall of 1996, where top executives were caught on tape trying to cover up evidence of discrimination and racial harassment, vividly demonstrates the continuing lack of equality in the workplace. Discrimination remains a problem in housing as well. Recent studies released by the Clinton administration revealed that despite legislation mandating against these practices, the majority of times that African Americans tried to buy or rent a house they encountered discrimination in the form of redlining and steering (Dedman 1998; Janofsky 1998). Moreover, surveys reveal that negative stereotypes about African Americans remain pervasive in American society. A majority of whites view African Americans as more violent, less intelligent, and lazier than whites (Sigelman and Welch 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1993, 12; Tate 1994, 22). Sometimes these attitudes are translated into actual discrimination, illustrated by the incident at Denny's restaurant where servers refused to wait on African American customers (Welch et. al., 1997, 482). Since discrimination negatively affects African Americans as a group, one can argue that the implementation and vigorous enforcement of civil rights laws are in their objective interest.
Even more compelling are survey results demonstrating that a vast majority of African Americans perceive discrimination as a persistent and debilitating factor in their lives. According to the National Black Election Survey (NBES), 85% of African Americans disagreed with the statement that "Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the U.S." and 65% of that total strongly disagreed (Tate 1994, 24). Moreover, a majority of African Americans are not satisfied with the amount of progress made in race relations since the Civil Rights era (Tate 1994, 22). A majority claim to have experienced discrimination in education, housing, employment opportunities, and wages and continue to "see racial discrimination as an everyday occurrence, not an historical curiosity" (Sigelman and Welch 1991, 59). Finally, African Americans share a high level of agreement that it is the responsibility of government to enforce civil rights. NES data demonstrate that over the past several decades over 90 percent of African Americans have deemed it the federal government's responsibility to see that blacks get fair treatment in jobs (see Figure 3.1). A vast majority of African Americans also feel that it is the responsibility of the federal government to see that schools are integrated (see Figure 3.2). Based on both objective evidence and subjective factors, Katherine Tate argues that "racial inequality and racial discrimination remain central concerns of many Blacks today" (1994, 46).

The perceptions of black Americans are strikingly different than those held by white Americans. Prior to the 1960s, most whites rejected the civil rights agenda. Less than half of white Americans supported the principle of equal employment opportunity and only about half of white adults nationwide were willing to concede that black and white students should attend the same school (Sigelman and Welch 1991, 121). Over time, however, the public became highly opposed to racial discrimination. Americans are now so cohesive in their belief that blacks deserve to have equal opportunities that these questions have been dropped from most surveys. Despite these changes whites still differ
significantly from blacks in terms of their views on the pervasiveness of racial
discrimination. In direct contradiction to the perceptions of African Americans, a
majority of whites feel that substantial progress has been made in the area of civil rights
(Tate 1994, 22). A 1997 Gallup poll revealed that whites are much more likely than
blacks to say that blacks are treated equally in local communities (76% compared to
49%) and that blacks have as good a chance as whites to get any kind of job (79% to
46%), education (93% to 71%) and housing (86% to 58%). Moreover, while support for
the abstract principle of racial equality is extremely high, there is not majority support for
government involvement to enforce civil rights and ensure racial equality. NES data
reveal that half or slightly more than half of white Americans feel that it is NOT the
government's responsibility to see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs (see
Figure 3.1). Since 1972, a clear majority of whites have felt that government should stay
out and not ensure school integration (see Figure 3.2). One recent survey revealed that
rather than seeing a large role for government in continuing to enforce civil rights, a
majority of whites claim that "We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this
country" (Lacayo 1995).

Race-Conscious Programs

Another issue cluster within the contemporary agenda of African Americans is the
preservation and extension of race-conscious or affirmative action programs. The U. S.
Commission of Civil Rights has defined affirmative action to encompass "any measure,
beyond simple determination of a discriminatory process, adopted to correct or
compensate for past or present discrimination or to prevent discrimination from
reoccurring in the future"; thus, it covers everything from outreach and recruitment

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9 This survey was conducted by the Gallup Poll Social Audit program and was based on interviews with
3036 Americans including over 1680 whites and 1269 blacks.
Affirmative action was first implemented by the Johnson administration in 1965 through the issuance of Executive Order 11246, which required that federal government contractors take affirmative steps in areas such as recruitment, employment and promotion to increase minority employment. Johnson issues this executive order based on the belief that equality of opportunity and formal integration were not enough to level the playing field for African Americans. This order, vastly expanded under President Richard Nixon, required every company with 50 employees and doing more than $50,000 in business directly with the federal government to prepare "goals and timetables" for a more diverse workforce (Harris and Merida 1995). Over the next decade the national government implemented a variety of race conscious programs such as busing, reserving spots in universities for racial minorities, and procurement policies that set-aside a particular amount of government contracts for minority owned businesses in an effort to reduce race-based social, economic and political inequality and counter any remaining discrimination. According to the Congressional Research Service about 160 federal programs, statutes, regulations and executive orders now grant some measure of preference to minorities in the areas of hiring, federal contracts, education opportunities and grants (Harris and Merida 1995).10

Whether or not affirmative action programs are in the objective interest of African Americans is a hotly debated issue and one that is difficult to resolve empirically.11 On the one side of this debate is the argument advanced by several prominent black politicians and scholars, that affirmative action and racial preference programs hurt

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10 As Harris and Merida (1995) point out, many of these "affirmative action" programs are vaguely worded and not very stringent. The Agriculture Department, for example, requires that winners of rural housing grants be "encouraged to use minority banks" (A.1).

11 Assessing affirmative action programs empirically is very difficult, because African Americans may have made progress in education and employment realms even in the absence of affirmative action programs.
African Americans in the long term. Rueter (1995) has argued that although black conservatives are few in number their arguments have received widespread attention in society and the impact of their presence has been great. The consensus of the viewpoint advanced by "the new black conservatives" is that by fueling racism and casting doubt on the credentials and accomplishments of African Americans who do succeed, racial preference programs have had a negative impact (Rueter 1995). Justice Clarence Thomas has been steadfast in his opposition arguing that affirmative action is a continuation of discrimination, albeit in a different form (Fletcher 1998). In explaining his opposition to race-conscious programs he stated, "I have always found it offensive for the government to treat black people different because of the color of their skin" (Lawson 1997, 266). In *The Content of Our Character* (1990), Shelby Steele argues that affirmative action quotas have undermined the morale of African Americans and made them second-guess their achievements.12

Most scholars of minority politics and national organizations representing the interests of African Americans, however, view affirmative action from a much different perspective. Harold Cruse put forward one of the first and most influential defenses of affirmative action (1967, 3-10). He argued that since white Americans profited greatly from two centuries of slavery and continue to retain firm control over political and economic power in American society, African Americans remain handicapped in open competition with whites. Thus, the elimination of discrimination and segregation is not enough to bring about equality in American society. Because of their uniquely oppressive history of slavery and based on the fact that African Americans only recently regained their legal rights to equality, they are due compensation from the government or private sector in the form of group-based rights (Lawson 1997, 195). Cornell West

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12 For review of the best-known black conservatives and a discussion of the gap between their ideas and the views of the majority of black Americans in terms of public opinion, electoral behavior and ideology see Rueter 1995.
(1993) has argued that although affirmative action may be flawed, race-conscious programs represent one of the only proposals our government has come up with to combat black poverty and discrimination.

More recently, scholars have argued in defense of affirmative action based on statistical evidence suggesting that racial preference programs have improved the socioeconomic status of African Americans (Johnson 1993; Urofsky 1997, 21-22). Ezorsky argues that affirmative action has helped middle class and some lower-class blacks get jobs in government and business and that race conscious programs have noticeably increased the number of blacks in government agencies, police departments, fire departments, construction trades, and textile companies (1991, 48-49, 63-65). Moreover, there is preliminary evidence that the elimination of race-conscious programs might result in backsliding for African Americans. The recent elimination of racial preferences in admissions decisions at California and Texas universities were followed by a marked drop in the percentage of minority enrollments (Pressley 1997; Sanchez 1998). The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), which Robert Singh (1998) describes as the single most faithful defender of black political interests, has consistently included the extension of affirmative action in its biannual agenda. In 1999, Representative James Clyburn, the new CBC chair, said that saving affirmative action from its recent attack represents the Caucus' number one priority. Similarly, NAACP President Kweisi Mfume stated that protecting the nation's embattled affirmative action programs must remain at the top of the group's agenda (Fletcher 1998). Over the last few years the NAACP has worked with like-minded organizations to defeat legislative attempts to end affirmative action in 23 states (Fletcher 1998). Finally, Cornell West (1993) argues that "Even if affirmative action fails significantly to reduce black poverty or contributes to the persistence of racist perceptions in the workplace, without affirmative action black access
to America's prosperity would be even more difficult to obtain and racism in the workplace would persist anyway" (1993, 64).

Although the objective impact of racial preference programs on African Americans continues to be debated, according to NES data, as well as other national surveys, African Americans themselves are supportive of race-conscious policies of all kinds. According to 1992 NES data, 78 percent of African Americans responded that colleges and universities should reserve openings for black students and 66 percent said they strongly favored the use of quotas in education. In the employment realm, 62 percent of African Americans support preferences to be given to African Americans in hiring and promotion. Moreover, 69 percent of African Americans responded that federal spending on programs that assist African Americans should be increased rather than decreased or held at the current level. According to the Gallup organization's 1997 comprehensive survey of black and white Americans, a majority of African Americans say that the government should increase affirmative action programs (see Figure 3.3). Moreover, a majority of African Americans, 59 percent, responded that "Government should make every effort to improve conditions of blacks and minorities" (see Figure 3.4).

Once again, there are fairly dramatic and statistically significant differences between the views of black and white Americans on these issues (see Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4). Although scholars disagree about the root of this opposition, the fact is that Americans have continuously opposed programs that single out African Americans for preferential treatment. According to 1996 NES data, a mere 12 percent of whites say they support affirmative action. Meanwhile, 70 percent of whites responded that they oppose affirmative action strongly. According to the General Social Survey only 19 percent of whites think that federal spending on programs to assist blacks should be
increased rather than decreased. Finally, a vast majority of Americans have consistently opposed busing to achieve integrated schools.

Social Welfare Policy

The third cluster of issues within the African American political agenda is social welfare policies. I use the term social welfare policies to refer to a broad set of programs designed to provide a safety net for all Americans who need it, irrespective of race. African Americans are supportive of and have a clear objective interest in an activist national government that uses its power to rectify social issues because of the persistent socioeconomic disparities between blacks and whites.

On virtually every objective indicator of social and economic well being, African Americans fall below whites. The unemployment rate of African Americans is twice that of whites (Swain 1995, 9). Despite a growing black middle class, African Americans as a group suffer disproportionately from poverty.\(^\text{13}\) Over one-third of black families live below the poverty line, which is three times the rate among the white population (Welch et. al., 1997, 506; Swain 1995, 9). A study conducted by the Clinton administration, released in 1998, revealed that the income gap between black and white families remains as large as it was three decades ago and that the median wealth of white families is ten times that of black families (Stevenson 1998). Moreover, data on health care demonstrates that African Americans are far less likely than white Americans to be receiving good quality healthcare and are more likely to be uninsured (Swain 1995, 9). A series of recent studies reveal a continuing disparity between the health of black and white Americans that remains significant even when economics and education are

\(^{13}\) Many statistics indicate a growing Black middle class. The percentage of Black families earning over $50,000 a year has increased (Swain 1995, 10). The percentage of Black professionals has nearly tripled from 1.7% of all professionals in 1996 to about 5% in 1993. The number of black families able to leave the inner-cities for the suburbs has sharply increased; one third of all blacks live in the suburbs now (Welch et. al, 1997, 505).
controlled for. Blacks have two times the infant mortality rate of whites, nine less years of healthy life, a higher level of tuberculosis, a higher occurrence of maternal mortality, a higher occurrence of diabetes related death, and a higher occurrence of all forms of cancer, heart disease and stroke (Kilbourn 1998).

As a result of their disproportionately high poverty and unemployment rate, a higher percentage of African Americans are recipients of government programs that serve the poor than whites and thus are disproportionately hurt when these programs are scaled back (Singh 1997, 4). Moreover, African Americans would benefit disproportionately from a national health care system and more aggressive efforts to eradicate poverty and unemployment. More broadly, these statistics reveal that African Americans have an objective interest in liberal social welfare policies. Such a conclusion is not new. In 1989 a committee on the status of Black Americans, commissioned by the National Association of Sciences, assessed the objective conditions of African Americans and gave policy advice on how to best improve these conditions. They concluded that policies calling for more government involvement, an expanded welfare state and more spending on social programs were in the best objective interest of Black Americans (Swain 1995, 9).

National surveys reveal that African Americans hold fairly cohesive and distinctively liberal views on the role of government in providing for the social welfare or its citizens. Radcliff and Saiz argue that on "economic and fiscal issues, the collective preferences of the black community can be reasonably characterized as both (a) strongly liberal and (b) much more liberal than that of whites, regardless of socioeconomic status" (1995, 780). NES data reveal that significantly more African Americans believe that it is the federal government's responsibility to guarantee a job and a decent standard of living for its citizens than believe that the government should let each person get ahead on his/
her own (see Figure 3.5). NES data also reveal that African Americans are considerably more supportive of the idea that the government should provide more services even if it means an increase in spending, than the idea of government providing fewer services in order to reduce spending (see Figure 3.6). Other surveys reveal similar results. According to the General Social Survey over 90 percent of African Americans feel that government has the responsibility to provide decent housing for those that cannot afford it and the elderly, provide health care for the sick and give financial assistance to college students from low-income families. Surveys focusing solely on the African American community demonstrate that even though affluent African Americans are slightly more conservative on some social welfare policy issues, they are still much more liberal in comparison to their white counterparts (Tate 1994; Tuch and Sigelman 1997). Moreover, there are no significant class identification differences on attitudes towards federal spending on Medicare, food stamps, and jobs programs (Tate 1994, 42).

Tate has argued that even though increased government involvement may be viewed by many as less radical than the goals of African Americans in the civil rights era, considering the views of most Americans on social welfare policies, even this element of the African American agenda is fairly radical (1994, 17). According to NES data, only a minority of whites believe that it is the federal government's responsibility to guarantee a job and a good standard of living for its citizens (see Figure 3.7). NES data also demonstrate a statistically significant difference between the views of white and black Americans on a range of social welfare policies (see Figure 3.8). Only about 15 percent of whites feel that too little is being spent on welfare and more than half of white respondents feel that too much is being spent. Thus, to a large degree the opinions of

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14 Other national surveys reveal similar results. According to General Social Survey data, 80 percent of African Americans said that guaranteeing a job is probably or definitely the responsibility of government. More than 80 percent of African Americans also viewed the provision of "a decent standard of living" for the unemployed as government's responsibility. A large majority of African Americans, 69 percent, responded that the government should be responsible to reduce income differences between the rich and poor.
white and black Americans are diametrically opposed. African Americans are much more likely to favor increased social welfare spending, while whites are much more likely to advocate social welfare cuts (Sigelman and Welch 1991, 139).

Increased spending on social welfare programs has remained a consistent priority on the agendas of national organizations attempting to represent the interests of African Americans. Barker and Jones (1994) point out that although black interest groups remain concerned with civil rights, they also emphasize economic justice and improving the socioeconomic standing of blacks. "It has become increasingly and painfully clear to all that without corresponding economic rights and economic justice, legal rights are somewhat hollow and on their own, do little to improve the quality of everyday life for African Americans" (Barker and Jones 1994, 177). National organizations representing African Americans remain strong advocates of liberal social welfare policies (Singh 1998, 96). Leaders of the National Urban League have been calling for a domestic Marshall Plan for blacks, an aggressive government sponsored economic program to boost employment and counteract poverty since at least 1962 (Tate 1994, 178). Moreover the CBC's biannual "Black agenda" consistently has called for a federally administered health insurance system, urban aid and extension of the welfare system (Singh 1998, 86).

PART II: THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES TOWARDS AFRICAN AMERICANS

How responsive have the parties been to the political concerns of African Americans? As discussed in the first chapter, I rely on several sources to gauge whether the parties have responded in a positive or negative manner to demands for incorporation. For the majority of the 20th century the Republican party more faithfully defended the civil rights of African Americans than the Democratic party. In the 1960s, however, the parties reversed their historic positions on racial issues as revealed by their platforms,
legislative agendas and voting. Moreover, the changing position of the parties on issues of importance to African Americans is reflected in the views of the public. Prior to 1964, voters largely failed to see any difference between the two parties on racial grounds. From then on the public has consistently and overwhelmingly viewed the Democratic party as more supportive of black interests than the Republican party. A *New York Times/CBS News* poll conducted in mid-1991 found that 56 percent of Americans said the Democratic party "cares more about the needs and problems of blacks", while only 15 percent replied that the Republicans do (Lipset 1996, 139).

**THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND THE REPRESENTATION OF BLACKS**

How responsive has the Republican party been to the concerns of African Americans? In this section I argue that the Republican party has moved from a weak positive response, when it accommodated some of the issues important to African Americans, to behavior categorized as a negative response as it has embraced positions that are antithetical to the interests of African Americans on each of the three issue clusters discussed previously. Although offering verbal support for the concept of equality before the law, the Republican party has weakened the enforcement of civil rights laws. Second, the Republican party has moved from expanding the scope of affirmative action programs to adamantly opposing and working to dismantle them. Although the Republican party has been on the side of minimal government involvement since across the twentieth century, across the past two decades the party has increasingly offered a social welfare agenda that disproportionately hurts African Americans and contradicts their preferences.
Civil Rights

During the immediate post World War II era the Republican party embraced progressive civil rights policies as they had throughout the first half of the 20th century. The 1956 Republican platform highlighted the party's lengthy commitment to racial equality and offered strong support for the Supreme Court's controversial decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, which mandated the racial integration of all public schools. The Republican party backed these pledges with legislative and executive action. During his second term as President, Dwight Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960, the first civil rights laws passed since Reconstruction. He took forceful action to eliminate discrimination within the government, including the armed forces. Moreover, in 1957 President Eisenhower sent federal troops to Little Rock Arkansas to enforce a school desegregation order (Sundquist 1983, 357).

The 1960 Republican platform recognizes that discrimination is a widespread problem in American society, posing obstacles to the advancement of blacks in both the South and the North, and commits the party to a strong course of action to counter it. The party not only praised the Eisenhower administration's record on civil rights as being highly progressive, but expressed support for more government involvement in civil rights, including equal voting rights legislation, the establishment of a Commission on Equal Job Opportunity, and legislation prohibiting discrimination in federal housing and facilities. The Republican party claimed that it would have passed even more stringent civil rights legislation had it not been for the obstacle posed by Congressional Democrats. Finally, the party criticized Democratic efforts to slow down school desegregation. "We oppose the pretense of fixing a target date 3 years from now for the mere submission of plans for school desegregation. Slow-moving school districts would construe it as a three-year moratorium during which progress would cease, postponing until 1963 the legal process of compliance. We believe that each of the pending court actions should
proceed as the Supreme Court has directed and that in no district should there be any such delay". In 1960 the campaign statements of Republican presidential candidate Richard Nixon followed the progressive tone of the platform.

Over the next four years, however, the Republican party radically changed courses and moved in a conservative direction on racial issues. Unlike its predecessors, the 1964 Republican platform did not contain a section devoted to civil rights. Rather, under a section titled "Faith in the Individual" the party devoted one line to the issue, stating that the party was committed to the faithful execution of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and opposed discrimination based on race. This statement was followed by a section applauding state's rights and individual freedoms. The substantive change in the Republican party's position on civil rights was reflected most visibly in the party's presidential nominee, Barry Goldwater, who was one of the six Republican Senators who had voted against the 1964 Civil Rights Act (Tate 1994, 54). During his campaign, Barry Goldwater offered no conciliatory statement to African Americans about his opposition to the legislation (Wildavsky 1965).

From 1964 onward, the Republican party has remained cool towards civil rights legislation. The party has embraced the concept of equal opportunity and rejected discrimination based on race: "no individual should be victimized by unfair discrimination because of race, sex, advanced age, physical handicap, difference in national origins or religion or economic circumstance." This quote is from the 1980 Republican platform, but very similar statements are found in every Republican platform from 1968 to 1996. However, since 1960, the Republican party has only given short-thrift to the issue of civil rights, usually one sentence. Moreover, after 1960, the party no longer acknowledged the persistence of group based discrimination in American society, which contradicts the experiences and reality of most African Americans. In 1996, the party's only mention of civil rights was
that "we call on all Republicans and all Americans to reject the forces of hatred and bigotry ... we denounce all who practice or promote racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic prejudice, and religious intolerance". What is perhaps most telling is what the party does not say. The party has not made any mention of historic civil rights legislation that had been passed, such as the Voting Rights Act of 1965.

The Republican party has increasingly taken the position that although discrimination and segregation are bad the active involvement of the federal government to rectify these situations is inappropriate. Instead of support for civil rights legislation, the Republican party suggests that the operation of unfettered capitalism and minimal government involvement are the best solutions to any remaining racial disparities. The 1988 Republican platform states that "With its message of economic growth and opportunity, the GOP is the natural champion of blacks, minorities, women and ethnic Americans ... A free economy helps defeat discrimination by fostering opportunity for all." In 1992 the Republican party states that "our agenda for equality of opportunity runs throughout this Platform and applies to all Americans. There is no such thing as segregated success."

Turning from rhetoric to action, the Republican party has made several decisions that sought to undermine the enforcement and effectiveness of civil rights legislation. In direct contrast to the party's criticism of such attempts in 1960, President Richard Nixon attempted to slow the pace of Southern desegregation by directing the departments of Justice and Health, Education and Welfare to request a federal court to postpone the desegregation of Mississippi's public schools (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 53). Further attempting to undermine the cause of civil rights for African Americans, Richard Nixon nominated three southern racial conservatives to the Supreme Court, forced the liberal chairman of the Civil Rights Commission to resign and opposed the extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 in its original form (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 85-86).
The Republican party under the leadership of two-term President Ronald Reagan also fought the expansion and enforcement of civil rights laws. The Reagan administration reduced the budgets and staffs of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs, the central organizations in charge of enforcing civil rights legislation (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 187). Through his appointments, Ronald Reagan altered the Civil Rights Commission from a strong advocate for bold racial policies into an open opponent of racial liberalism (Lawson 1997, 203). The Reagan administration also undermined civil rights progress in the public schools. His administration put hundreds of school desegregation cases on hold and, although ultimately unsuccessful, pushed for tax breaks for segregated schools (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 54; Lawson 1997, 204).

**Racial Preference Programs: Affirmative Action**

Although a Democratic president introduced affirmative action programs, the initial response of the Republican party was to accept them. The Nixon administration not only continued to implement Lyndon Johnson's executive order, but greatly expanded its scope and broke new ground by implementing the first affirmative action quotas (Harris and Merida 1995; Lipset 1996). Several prominent members of the Nixon administration felt that the court system and administrative agencies would not be able to resolve anti-discrimination cases quick enough to have noticeable impact, and that their actions alone would do not do much to open the discriminatory parts of the labor markets to African Americans. Thus, the administration issued an order setting hiring quotas for African American workers in the Philadelphia construction industry, a field of work where employers and unions had colluded to keep out African Americans (Johnson 1993). The Republican administration then extended this system of affirmative action quotas to other cities and other fields, such as higher education (Lipset 1995).
The Republican party's acceptance of affirmative action, however, was short-lived. Before he left office, President Nixon had begun publicly denouncing affirmative action programs, even though his administration continued to implement them. Moreover, the Republican party came out strongly in opposition of other race-conscious programs such as school busing. In 1972, President Richard Nixon requested that Congress issue an order to stop the policy of school busing. Moreover, the 1972 Republican platform stated that "we are irrevocably opposed to busing ... we regard it as unnecessary, counter-productive and wrong", a statement repeated in similar form in following years.

Beginning in the 1980s, the Republicans party's opposition to racial preference programs began to escalate, condemning quotas as one of the most insidious forms of discrimination. In 1980 the party stated that "equal opportunity should not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions which rely on quotas, ratios and numerical requirements". In 1988, in a section titled "Equal Rights", the Republican platform pledged to "resist efforts to replace equal rights with discriminatory quota systems and preferential treatment. Quotas are the most insidious form of reverse discrimination against the innocent". In 1996 the Republicans endorsed Propositions 209, a statewide initiative in California to dismantle affirmative action programs in order "to restore to law the original meaning of civil rights".

Although President Nixon was the first president to openly criticize affirmative action, Ronald Reagan was the first Republican president to translate the party's rhetoric and platform pledges into reality. Ronald Reagan selected an outspoken opponent of affirmative action to head the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department. The Justice department then began to challenge existing programs that attempted to compensate for past employment discrimination by calling for racial preferences in hiring and promotion (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 188). The Reagan administration filed a series of
lawsuits (ultimately unsuccessful) asking the Supreme Court and lower courts to declare affirmative action agreements in many cities unconstitutional (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 190). The administration was more successful in narrowing the coverage of affirmative action programs. It managed to change the rules governing the distribution of federal funds for public works projects in such a way that 75 percent of federal contractors were exempted from affirmative action compliance (Lawson 1997, 203). Thus, while the Republican party was not able to have affirmative action programs thrown out as unconstitutional, they were able to greatly undermine their scope in practice.

In the 1990s, Republicans escalated their attempts to dismantle affirmative action programs. On the state level, Republicans worked to remove affirmative action programs from the books in over a dozen states. Following the November 1994 elections, in which Republicans gained control of both the House and the Senate, they immediately launched an aggressive campaign to overhaul affirmative action. In February 1995, Republicans introduced and passed legislation repealing a Federal Communications Commission Program intended to encourage minority ownership of broadcast companies. In the summer of 1995, then Senator Bob Dole and Representative Charles T. Canady, both Republicans, sponsored sweeping legislation to eliminate all race-based affirmative action programs in federal contracting, federal employment and federally conducted programs. After being approved in subcommittee on a party-line vote, the bill died at the end of the 104th Congress only to be reintroduced in the 105th as the "Civil Rights Act of 1997". Republicans have introduced more focused legislation seeking to eliminate set-asides for minorities in federal contracting and to prohibit colleges and universities from using affirmative action (Harris 1995; Fletcher 1996). Finally, in a highly partisan vote, the Senate Judiciary Committee refused in 1997 to approve Bill Lann Lee to head the Civil Rights Office because he did not disavow use of racial preferences (Dewar 1997). The Republican party appears to have begun using
opposition to affirmative action as a litmus test for presidential nominations, much like
they have for nominees' views on abortion.

Social Welfare Issues

Across the twentieth century, the Republican party has consistently favored
policies calling for a reduced or limited role for the federal government in helping
disadvantaged Americans. Since African Americans benefit disproportionately from
national social welfare programs and are fairly cohesive in their support for these
policies, the Republicans position is antithetical to the black agenda. In their 1972
platform, for example, the Republicans flatly opposed "programs or policies which
embrace the principle of a government-guaranteed income ... nationalized compulsory
health insurance" and rejected as "inconscionable the idea that all citizens have the right
to be supported by the government, regardless of their ability or desires to support
themselves or their families".

Although never supportive of a liberal social welfare state, the antithetical nature
of the Republican party's social welfare policies towards the interests of African
Americans increased in the 1980s. Ronald Reagan ran on a pledge to reduce the size and
scope of the federal government, a pledge he faithfully pursued once elected. The
Reagan administration cut spending on Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC), food stamps, supplemental security income and other means tested programs
(Edsall and Edsall 1991, 141). Moreover, it attempted to eliminate job programs, reduce
health services, and limit welfare eligibility (Lawson 1997, 207). Although Ronald
Reagan repeatedly asserted that his economic and social welfare policies were race-
neutral, the president's efforts to implement drastic cuts or outright eliminate domestic
spending on social and welfare programs went against the subjective and objective
interests of African Americans. In 1995, such efforts continued as congressional
Republicans sought to fulfill the promises of their "Contract With America" by rolling back social welfare programs and overhauling Medicaid (Lawson 1997, 282). Moreover, Reagan's proposals to cut the size of federal government, in terms of government personnel, also contradicted the substantive interests of African Americans. Government is a more important basic source of employment for blacks than whites. Moreover, black professionals and managers are two times more likely to work for city, state or federal government agencies than their white counterparts (Singh 1997, 4). Thus, Reagan's efforts to reduce government translated into the loss of good jobs for many African Americans.

BLACKS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

The response of the Democratic party to the African Americans agenda differs in several significant respects from the response of the Republican party. Historically the Democratic party was the party of white supremacy, slavery and segregation. Over time, however, the party began to embrace more and more policies coinciding with the interests of African Americans. Beginning in the 1930s the Democratic party advocated an increased role for the national government in providing for the social welfare of Americans and implemented a series of policies that were in the economic interest of African Americans. In the 1960s, the party implemented and vigorously enforced civil rights and equal protection laws. The Democratic party soon went on to support the creation and expansion of affirmative action and other government involvement to reduce the socioeconomic disparity between blacks and whites. I classify the Democratic party as giving a highly positive response to African Americans based on the fact that the party had endorsed and enacted some legislation supportive of all the issues on the black agenda. Unlike the Republican party, however, whose response to the interests of
African Americans has remained fairly consistent over the past several decades, the Democratic party's response has undergone a noticeable change. Although the Democratic party remains moderately supportive of the African American agenda, across the 1990s the party has given less attention to the core concerns of African Americans and qualified its support for some programs beneficial to blacks. To illuminate the ways the behavior of the Democratic party towards African Americans and their political concerns has changed, I have broken the description of the party's response into two sections: one that focuses on the Democratic party's civil rights, affirmative action and social welfare policies prior to the 1990s and one that focuses on the Democratic party's policies from 1992 to the present.

The Pre-1990 Democratic Party

Civil Rights

For the majority of its history, the Democratic party opposed all legislative efforts to achieve racial equality from antilynching laws to voting rights. In 1960 this began to change. The Democratic party's 1960 platform was almost as progressive as the Republicans'. For the first time it expressed strong and specific support for equal rights by calling for the establishment of a permanent Civil Rights Commission, granting the attorney general the power to file civil injunction suits to speed the process of desegregation, and setting 1963 as the deadline for the initiation of school desegregation plans. During the 1960 campaign John Kennedy embraced a progressive civil rights position almost identical to that of Richard Nixon. Kennedy became more closely identified with the cause of racial equality than Richard Nixon because he called the wife of Martin Luther King Jr. when King was imprisoned (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 39).
The Democratic party's first substantive action in this area came in 1963 when President Kennedy sent a comprehensive civil rights bill to Congress. In 1964, Democratic President Lyndon Johnson along with a Democratic-majority Congress enacted this legislation, which prohibited discrimination in employment and public accommodations, forbade job discrimination by employers or unions, and provided that federal funds would be withheld from any program or activity that practiced discrimination.\textsuperscript{17}

The party's 1964 platform heralded the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and from this time forward the party heartily praised this and all following civil rights legislation. In the 1968 platform the Democrats wrote, "The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, all adopted under the vigorous leadership of President Johnson, are basic to America's long march toward full equality under the law. We will not permit these great gains to be chipped away by opponents or eroded by administrative neglect". In direct contrast to the Republicans, the Democrats argued that government should take every action in its power to tackle the continued problem of racial discrimination. The Democratic party declared in 1984 that "Government has a special responsibility to those whom society has historically prevented from enjoying the benefits of full citizenship for reasons of race, religion, sex, age, national origin and ethnic heritage, sexual orientation, or disability." Moreover, the Democratic party portrayed itself as the only party willing to enforce equality: "If Mr. Reagan is reelected, who would protect women and minorities against discrimination?"\textsuperscript{18} The party goes on to state that "Although strides have been made in combating discrimination and defamation against Americans of various ethnic groups, much remains to be done."

\textsuperscript{17} The credit for passing this legislation cannot be conceded entirely to the Democratic party. The majority of Congressional Republicans supported this legislation as well. Of the 177 Republicans in the House, 138 voted for the bill and 34 voted against it.

\textsuperscript{18} Italics in original platform.
Just as important as supporting government involvement to combat discrimination, the Democratic party began conferring great legitimacy to the worldview and experiences of African Americans. Democratic platforms acknowledge the continued pervasiveness of racial discrimination in American society and recognize how it poses significant obstacles for the success of African Americans. In 1984, the party promised that a "new Democratic Administration will understand that the age-old scourge of discrimination and prejudice against many groups in American society is still rampant and very much a part of the reason for the debilitating circumstances in which disadvantaged peoples are forced to live." Concerns about discrimination and the needs of African Americans are not limited to one section of Democratic platforms throughout the 1970s and 1980s, but are woven into almost every section. The party recognized the existence of persistent racial discrimination in the housing market, in education programs, in alcohol and drug abuse programs, in the health care profession, at the hands of law officers, and against minority veterans. Concern for civil rights and racial discrimination even guided the foreign policy positions of the Democratic party. In the 1984 platform the Democratic party supported a ban on all new loans by U.S. business interests to the South African government "until there is substantial progress towards the full participation of all the people of South Africa in the social, political and economic life in that country and toward an end to discrimination based on race or ethnic origin."

**Affirmative Action**

The Democratic party, under the leadership of President Lyndon Johnson, was responsible for the initiation of affirmative action. Thereafter the party continually asserted in its platforms and legislative proposals that the removal of legal barriers to integration was not enough to remedy the legacy left by three centuries of slavery and
formal segregation and that an "effective affirmative action program is an essential component of our commitment to expanding civil rights protections."19 Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Democratic platforms were littered with statements extolling the need for affirmative action programs. More specifically, the party enthusiastically supported the expansion of affirmation action programs in higher education, declared the need for every branch of the government to seek out more minorities for training and promotion, and suggested that employers across the country needed to recruit more minority teachers, health-care professionals and law enforcement officers. Moreover, the Democrats repeatedly spoke of the need to increase federal set asides and loans for minority businesses. Under the leadership of Democratic President Jimmy Carter, the government increased the number of contracts channeled to minority firms and boosted the amount of federal deposits in minority-owned banks (Lawson 1997). In the 1988 platform, the Democrats continued to assert that "the lingering effects of past discrimination [should be] eliminated by affirmative action, including goals, timetables and procurement set-asides". Finally, from 1976 on the party supported busing, another race-conscious program, "as an important tool" in the effort to give all children equal educational opportunity.

Social Welfare Policy

Since the New Deal the Democratic party has advocated an active role for the national government in providing for the social welfare of its citizens. In the 1960s, Democratic President Lyndon Johnson and a Democratically controlled Congress prioritized and passed many Great Society measures, which extended national government into a host of new fields and provided assistance to depressed areas

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19 This is a quote from the 1980 Democratic platform, but similar statements can be found in platforms from 1968 to 1988.
(Sundquist 1983, 352). Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the Democratic party continued to recognize government involvement and spending as necessary and appropriate means to help disadvantaged citizens and more specifically, stressed a steady commitment to providing fairness and economic justice.

In the 1972 Democratic platform the party agreed with Republicans that the welfare system needed to be replaced. But the Democratic party offered very different solutions, such as replacing welfare with "an income security program" that includes a guaranteed annual income "substantially more than the poverty level". The Democrats also supported federally financed and federally administrated national health insurance. Democratic President Jimmy Carter along with congressional Democrats passed the Humphrey-Hawkins bill, which increased the federal government's responsibility to ensure full employment, a measure actively lobbied for by the CBC and national black organizations (Singh 1998, 88).

Through the 1980s, the platforms echoed similar themes. The Democratic party declared in 1980 that "We reaffirm our commitment to improve the conditions of the least fortunate in our society." Specifically, they declared that "we will not support reductions in the funding of any program whose purpose is to serve the basic human needs of the most needy in our society" and stated that the goal of the Democratic party was "to improve benefits and services for those dependent on welfare." In 1984, the Democratic party stated that the "goal for the coming decades is not only full justice under the law, but economic justice as well". The 1988 platform made a similar declaration: "We believe that all Americans have a fundamental right to economic justice."
Post 1990 Democratic Party

Across the 1990s the Democratic party has remained supportive of the interests of African Americans, but in several important ways that support has weakened. This section highlights those areas where the Democratic party has become less responsive to the African American agenda.

Support for civil rights is still recognizable in the 1992 and 1996 Democratic platforms, but these issues are given much less space and emphasis than in the past. Democratic platforms throughout the 1980s contained an average of well over 50 references to minorities or blacks. In the 1992 and 1996 platforms this figure declined to 2. Absent from Democratic platforms in the 1990s are any acknowledgements that minorities face obstacles as a result of racial discrimination, an idea expressed abundantly in previous platforms. Rather than weaving discussions of race-based discrimination and racial inequality into multiple sections of the platform, the 1992 and 1996 platforms concentrate discussions of all minority concerns into one paragraph. In 1992 the Democrats pledge "to lead the fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age disability, sexual orientation or other characteristics irrelevant to ability. We support the ratification of the Equal rights Amendment, affirmative action, stronger protection of voting rights for racial and ethnic minorities." Although these statements offer strong support for the interests of African Americans, their concentration and brevity are a marked contrast to the pre-1990 party. In 1996 the "token" paragraph on discrimination and civil rights is found on the last page of the platform.

Despite the marginalization of racial issues in current platforms, the Democratic administration has made some efforts to highlight these issues. In 1997, President Clinton began a "race initiative", whose goal was to foster conversations about race and move towards "racial reconciliation" (Holmes and Bennet 1998). Although the initiative
heightened national attention on issues important to the African American community, the goals of the yearlong "conversation on race" were never particularly well defined. The initiative ended in September 1998 without making concrete accomplishments (Fletcher 1998). Rather than offering government involvement to address racial inequalities or discrimination, the party has suggested, much like the Republican party, that a healthy economy is an effective anti-discrimination policy: "The Revolution of 1992 is about restoring America's economic progress ... An expanding, entrepreneurial economy of high-skill, high-wage jobs is the most important family policy, urban policy, minority policy and foreign policy America can have."

The 1990s have also seen a lessening, although not reversal, of Democratic support for racial preference programs. Although the party made a passing reference to support for affirmative action in the 1992 platform, this is a marked change from the broad support given previously. In his 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton rejected and even criticized the special preference and quota policies identified with his predecessors (Lipset 1996). Once elected, however, he stressed racial "diversity" in his political appointments and pledged to create an administration that looked like America, a concept very similar to affirmative action. At the start of 1995, President Clinton began speaking publicly about the problems of affirmative action and publicly mulled the possibility of withdrawing support for it. After further study, President Clinton and the Democratic party more broadly stressed the need to re-evaluate and change racial preference programs, rather than to completely abolish them (Singh 1998, 195). In a speech given in 1995, President Clinton offered the Democratic party's new slogan on affirmative action

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20 The final report of the advisory board on race called on the president to establish a standing race council to continue its work and called for a public education program to highlight "common values" of a racially diverse nation (Fletcher 1996).

21 The 1992 platform states: "We support the ratification of the Equal rights Amendment, affirmative action, stronger protection voting rights for racial and ethnic minorities, including language access to voting" (emphasis mine).

22 When the Clinton administration began a government-wide review of affirmative action in February 1995, Clinton had stated "We shouldn't be defending things we can't defend" (Harris 1995, A1).
"Mend it, but don't end it" (Harris 1995, A1). Echoing this speech, the 1996 Democratic platform stated that "President Clinton is leading the way to reform affirmative action so that it works, it is improved, and promotes opportunity, but does not accidentally hold others back in the process ... When it comes to affirmative action, we should mend it, not end it".

Turning from rhetoric to action, the current Democratic administration has limited the scope of affirmative action programs. At the start of 1995, the administration launched a five-month study of affirmative action. On the basis of this study's findings President Clinton signed an executive order directing Cabinet secretaries and agency officials to review all affirmative action programs and ordered them to eliminate or reform all programs that created a quota, created preferences for unqualified individuals, created reverse discrimination, and were in effect even after their equal opportunity purpose had been achieved (Harris 1995). In the Spring of 1995, President Clinton signed legislation repealing a Federal Communications Commission Program intended to encourage minority ownership of broadcast companies. Moreover, the Clinton administration also suspended a huge Defense Department set-aside program for minorities and proposed revamping a wide range of other affirmative action efforts in federal purchasing (Fletcher 1996).

Turning to social welfare issues, the Democratic party makes a fairly clear change in the 1990s. Although their opinions on these changes differed substantially, all the Democratic party activists and leaders I interviewed indicated that the party had shifted its message to the center (or right) on social welfare issues starting in 1992, followed by a more dramatic shift in 1995. Moreover, the themes of economic fairness and economic justice disappear from the party's platform and much more frequent are references to "equal opportunity". The party also begins to champion efforts to reduce the size and scope of the government. At a 1996 speech President Bill Clinton proudly pointed out
that "Our administration, reduced the size of the federal government by 250,000 ... As a percentage of our work force it's the smallest it's been since Franklin Roosevelt first took the oath of office in 1933" (Gerring 1998, 282). Moreover, the 1992 platform offered a harsher line on welfare: "Welfare should be a second chance, not a way of life". In 1996, President Clinton signed into law a welfare bill that ended the federal guarantee of cash assistance to the poor, turned welfare programs over to the states, and restricted welfare benefits. Many civil rights leaders and representatives of the black community criticized this decision because it would have a disproportionately negative impact on African Americans (Holmes and Bennet, 1998).

Support for African American Interests in Congress

The voting records of the two parties in Congress reveal similar patterns to the one described above. Prior to 1964 the Republican party was more responsive to the concerns of African Americans than the Democratic party, but after that the pattern was reversed and the Democratic party became far more responsive while the Republican party took positions increasingly antithetical to the interests of African Americans. Edward Carmines and James Stimson (1989) analyzed roll call votes of both branches of Congress from 1945 to 1980 and found that Republicans in the Senate were overwhelmingly more liberal on race issues than Democrats until 1958. For the next six years until 1964, the voting patterns of Democratic and Republican senators remained similar on race issues. After 1964, Democratic senators became steadily more liberal on matters on race while Republican senators moved to the right on race issues. Meanwhile, from the end of World War II to 1964, House Republicans were decisively to the left of House Democrats on issues of race. From 1964 to 1967, the two parties were roughly equal, but after 1967, the Republicans became decisively conservative and the Democrats decisively liberal.
Examining the more recent voting behavior of the two parties in Congress further confirms the picture of responsiveness already established. Although the Democratic party has lessened its support for the African American agenda, it remains far more supportive of the agenda than Republicans. In *Black Faces, Black Interests* (1995) Carol Swain sets out to answer the question "Which party gives the best substantive representation to blacks?" (1995, 13). To answer this question she examines the congruence between the policy preferences of the majority of blacks and the voting behavior of congressional representatives. As indicators of the policy interests of African Americans Swain uses the LCCR (Leadership Council on Civil Rights) and COPE (AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education) rating scales, as well as two others indexes of her own creation which exclude items on the LCCR and COPE scales not relevant to the black community. All four scales produced highly consistent scores for legislators.\(^3\) She demonstrates that in the 100th Congress (1987-1989), "that Democrats and Republicans differ considerably in their support of black interests. Democrats are always more supportive of civil rights and redistributive welfare policies than are Republicans" and that "on every indicator, Republicans are less responsive to black interests than are Democrats" (Swain 1995, 15, 19).

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\(^3\) Swain argues that "No rating scale is without problems ... There is, however, considerable evidence to suggest that the LCCR and COPE scales work quite well for measuring a representative's support for public policies preferred by Blacks (1995, 15)."
SUMMARY OF PARTY RESPONSIVENESS TO AFRICAN AMERICAN AGENDA

1. CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES

REPUBLICAN PARTY RESPONSE

Prior to 1964:
- recognizes racial discrimination as a widespread problem
- embraces moderate to progressive platforms on civil rights

1964-present:
- does not recognize racial discrimination as problem
- civil rights issues are not discussed in platforms or legislative agenda
- reduces budget for civil rights enforcement

DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPONSE

1964-1990:
- recognizes racial discrimination as serious, continuing problem
- supports strong government action to ensure racial equality
- concern for racial equality pervades all aspects of party agenda

1990-present:
- discussion of racial discrimination as problem disappears
- attention to civil rights and racial discrimination minimal
- discussions of equality replaced with discussions of equal opportunity

2. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

REPUBLICAN PARTY RESPONSE:

1968-1970:
- Nixon Administration accepts and even expands affirmative action programs

1972-present:
- publicly opposes busing to integrate schools
- condemns affirmative action as reverse discrimination.
- reduces budget for affirmative action programs
- attempts to get affirmative action declared unconstitutional
- supports elimination of all race-based affirmative action programs in federal contracting, federal employment and federally conducted programs.

Table 3.1: Summary of Party Response to African American Agenda

(continued)

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Table 3.1 - continued

DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPONSE

1965-1990:
- Johnson administration initiates affirmative action
- party supports the continuation and expansion of affirmative action programs in business, education and government

1990-present:
- pledges to mend, but not end affirmative action programs
- reviews and limits scope of affirmative action programs

3. SOCIAL WELFARE ISSUES

REPUBLICAN PARTY RESPONSE

Prior to 1980: favors policies calling for reduced or limited role for federal government in helping disadvantaged Americans.

1980-present: increases efforts to cut social welfare programs.

DEMOCRATIC PARTY RESPONSE

Prior to 1990:
- strong commitment to using government resources and programs to achieve economic equality and justice

1990-Present:
- themes of economic fairness and justice replaced with emphasis on equal opportunity
- Clinton signs 1996 welfare Reform Act
PART IV: EXPLAINING PARTY BEHAVIOR

The preceding sections demonstrated that the parties have responded differently to the mobilization of African Americans and their evolving political agenda. Overall, the Democratic party has been more responsive to African Americans than the Republican party, although the Democrats level of support seems to have softened across the 1990s. How can we explain the different responses of the parties? Why has the Republican party chosen to neglect a sizable and growing group of voters? Why did the Democratic party continue to endorse particular elements of the African American agenda long after they had lost public support? We turn now to existing theories of party behavior and use them as lenses for understanding the responses of the parties.

Pluralism: Accommodation Model

To review briefly, pluralism argues that the electoral pressure inherent within the political system forces the parties, for the sake of survival, to be accommodating towards the interests of new groups. According to the pluralist theory of party behavior, there are strong reasons to predict that both the Democrats and Republicans would put forth effort to woo African American voters. Across the first half the 20th century, African Americans gained several resources that made them an increasingly vital electoral bloc. The African American electorate increased dramatically in size, acquired a strategic electoral position, and became a more volatile political commodity. Writing prior to the 1960 election, Glantz succinctly captures the pluralist expectations for party response: "neither party can afford to ignore the numerical weight of the Negro vote. In the next campaign the Democratic party will have the responsibility of reversing the changing
image of the Democratic party, while the Republican candidate will have the responsibility of enlarging ... the appeal of the Republican party" (1960, 1010).

Prior to World War I, the number of African Americans in Northern and Western states were too small to warrant attention from the parties. Foremost concerned with assembling victorious coalitions, the parties had little incentive to compete for the votes of African Americans as long as they remained concentrated in the one-party South. Across the first half of the 20th century, however, African Americans migrated out of the South at a high rate and became a significant presence in the northern electorate for the first time. This migration greatly increased the electoral strength of African Americans because those who migrated were disproportionately from states with the lowest percentage of blacks registered to vote (McAdam 1982, 79). Even while African Americans were migrating to the North in masses, the African American electorate in the South was increasing as well. The absolute numbers of southern blacks registered to vote rose sharply from approximately 900,000 in 1950 to more than 2,250,000 over the next fifteen years (McAdam 1982, 157). By 1965, as the result of its sheer size, plus the return of competition between the parties in the South, the black vote had become a significant factor in national politics.

Not only did its increasing size enhance the political value of the African American electorate, but it was also enhanced by its concentrated presence in northern cities. African Americans migrated to the most populous states, which possessed large numbers of electoral votes. Between 1910 and 1960, 87 percent of African Americans migrating from the South settled in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, California, Illinois, and Michigan. Together these states controlled 79 percent of the electoral college votes required to win the presidency (McAdam 1982, 157). Moreover, the African American vote was pivotal in determining the outcomes of several presidential contests between 1936 and 1964 (McAdam 1982; Walters 1988). As
Carmines and Stimson point out, the concentration of African Americans in major cities resulted in a growing recognition that "for a Democratic presidential nominee to win Illinois [it] meant that he had to win big in Chicago, which meant he had to do very well among black voters in the city" (1989, 33). Moreover, Barker and McCorry argue that "the sheer size and distribution of the potential black vote makes it almost necessary for the Republican party to make some effort to attract black votes" (1976, 258). Because of its size and strategic location, there were reasons to predict that both parties needed African Americans votes to win national and local elections.

Moreover, both parties were in a reasonable position to woo and successfully attract African Americans voters because the partisan loyalties of this group were open. Although a growing number of African American voters had begun moving towards the Democratic party since the New Deal era, this move was not seen by either African Americans or the two major parties as a permanent shift (Walters 1988, 22). In both presidential contests of the 1950s, the Republican candidate, Eisenhower, re-gained a significant portion of the African American vote that had gone to Democratic president Franklin Roosevelt. In 1956, Eisenhower captured an estimated 40 percent of the African American vote (McAdam 1982, 158). In the 1960 presidential election African Americans remained slightly independent of the Democratic party, dividing their votes between the two parties, giving almost one-third to Republican candidate Richard Nixon (Tate 1994, 51). McAdam argues that the unpredictable nature of the African American electorate rendered the black vote more valuable, and prompted "both parties to intensify their efforts to appeal to black voters" (1982, 158). The African American vote was pivotal to the electoral fortunes of both political parties. Overall, African Americans formed a bloc of voters susceptible to appeals from either party and critical to the fulfillment of both parties' desires to gain or maintain a majority following in society.
To a large degree the Democratic party acted as the pluralist model predicts. Throughout the majority of the 1950s the Democratic party did not have the presidency thus the party was particularly eager to broaden its coalition in a manner that would allow them to regain the highest office of the land. The growing presence of African Americans in northern cities made their vote especially critical. After analyzing the election returns of 1956 and 1960 Aaron Wildavsky argued that the main lesson to be learned is "[i]f a candidate wants to get elected President on the Democratic ticket he had better get many more votes from Catholics, Jews, Negroes ... than was the case in 1956" (1970, 47). Thus, the party reached out to a growing and strategically important group of voters, African Americans, in hopes of assembling a winning coalition. The party embraced a progressive position on civil rights in its 1960 platform and after he was elected, Democratic President John F. Kennedy made several gestures of accommodation towards African Americans, the most significant of which was sending civil rights legislation to Congress. As Jo Freeman points out, "the Democratic party is a coalition party and ... maintaining and broadening the coalition has been its primary political strategy" (1986, 334).

One problem, however, is the Democratic party's inclusion of African Americans into their coalition led directly to a loss of other voters, primarily southern whites, out of their coalition. Many scholars argue that there is a direct relationship between the Democratic party's embrace of liberal racial policies and the decline of the party's fortune among white voters (Black and Black 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Huckfeldt and Kohfeld 1989). Significant sections of the white South and the white working class in the North defected on racial issues. Giles and Hertz's (1994) study of the Democratic party in the South reveals that the increase of African Americans in the Democratic party was associated with a decline in the percentage of whites registered as Democrats and an increase in the percentage of white registered as
Republicans. This presents a different picture of party behavior than the one depicted by the pluralist model. The pluralist perspective sees party coalitions as very open and expansive. Such qualities are necessary to succeed. This case suggests that parties may be more limited in their ability to be inclusive. Depending on the nature of a group's agenda, accommodation may be a zero-sum game. Those pushing the Democratic party towards a more progressive position on racial issues seemed fully aware of the consequences of the decision. After signing the Civil Rights Act of 1964 President Johnson said he believed he had "delivered the South to the Republican Party [sic] for a long time to come", which is very different from the pluralist concept of accommodating to increase the coalition (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 37).

Another related problem with the pluralist account is that the Democratic party went beyond accommodating a few demands of African Americans in order to woo them and ended up endorsing all of the concerns of African Americans. The Democratic party, in other words, actually became more responsive than the pluralist perspective would predict. The party began prioritizing racial issues and the attainment of racial equality to the exclusion of other differing interests in the party. As Carmines and Stimson point out, "one possible course of action for Johnson after his overwhelming victory in 1964 was to be conciliatory toward the white South - to moderate the strong stand he had taken on civil rights" (1989, 48). After all, according to the pluralist model of party behavior all groups should get something and no group should lose so much of the time that they stop playing the game. However, racial conservatives in the Democratic party consistently lost after 1964 to the extent that many stopped playing the game.

The main problem with the pluralist model, however, is that it cannot account for the behavior of the Republican party. Implicitly or explicitly, many accounts use a pluralist framework to explain the Democratic party's dramatic shift on racial policies in the 1960s. Doug McAdam credits the growing electoral strength of African Americans
and their political mobilization as critical determinants in the Democratic party's change in racial policy (1982, 81). Katherine Tate likewise argues that the mounting mobilization of African Americans led to a change in the Democratic party's behavior. The problem with these explanations are that even though the Republican party also faced the same growing black constituency and the same mounting pressures of the civil rights movement, it did not respond by accommodating the agenda of African Americans. In fact, the Republican party responded to demands for incorporation from the growing African American electorate by abandoning its historically progressive position on civil rights and adopting a conservative view on racial issues, the set of issues that were at the heart of African American mobilization.

The failure of the Republican party to try to woo African American voters confounded scholars working from pluralist assumptions. Writing in 1965, Aaron Wildavsky expressed his puzzlement at the behavior of the Republican party. He stated, "Party leaders are expected to conciliate groups of voters in order to get at least part of their vote. Abandoning a large number of citizens to the enemy is not usually done ... And the major parties often accommodate themselves to the most popular part of the opposition's policies in order to enhance their prospects of victory. Yet none of these things happened - at least on the Republican side - in 1964. Why?" (1965, 387). Not only did the Republican party seemingly fail to woo African American voters, but also they appeared to adopt a course of action in which they consciously wrote off the votes of African Americans. At a meeting of southern Republican state party chairman in Atlanta, Barry Goldwater stated that "We're not going to get the Negro vote as a bloc in 1964 and 1968, so we ought to go hunting where the ducks are" (Klinker 1994, 58). Within some parts of the Republican party, racism appears to have overridden political logic and pragmatism.
Even after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which was followed by a dramatic increase in the number of African American voters, Republicans failed to reverse their course of action and make sincere gestures of accommodation towards this group. The Republican party has simply not been willing to stretch its platforms and policy umbrella to substantively address the policy interests of African Americans on their own terms. Thus, the pluralist approach is unable to explain why the mobilization of African Americans did not have the same impact on the Republican party as it did on the Democratic party. Moreover, it is unable to provide analytical leverage into the question of why the Republican party would write-off this significant component of the electorate, particularly when they were benefiting from a considerable portion of African American votes.

Examining the behavior of the parties through the pluralist lens reveals several things. Both parties recognize that broadening their coalition is critical to winning elections. The halting and limited steps of the Republican party to reach out to minorities (discussed in more detail in the final section) suggests that the party certainly is under some pressure to reach out to and try to win the votes of African Americans. However, these pluralist tendencies have not come to be the main voice of the party. This case therefore suggests that the electoral system simply does not create enough pressure to force competition for the votes of mobilized and sizable groups. Moreover, the parties responded very differently to the mobilization of African Americans. This outcome suggests that a different dynamic has guided the behavior of each party. Finally, the pluralist theory fails to take into account the costs associated with accommodation. As the Democratic party accommodated the interests of African Americans it lost white southerners. Moreover, the Republican party appeared to adopt a strategy, at least in 1964, that sought to gain white voters by completely conceding the black vote to the Democrats. Contrary to the assumptions underlying the pluralist approach there are costs
associated with accommodating some groups and these costs vary according to the nature of their agenda.

The Median Voter Theorem

The median voter theorem articulated by Duncan Black and refined by Anthony Downs views parties as teams of rational actors, unified by their desire to win elections. Parties adopt whatever policies will win them the election, which in a two-party system are typically the policy positions embraced by the median voter. A couple of concepts embedded within the African American agenda have fairly widespread support in society. As discussed previously, an overwhelming percentage of Americans support the idea of racial equality, equality of opportunity, and racial integration in the abstract. Along these lines, Americans are highly supportive of civil rights policies outlawing discrimination. Yet, the other components of the black agenda, such as government efforts to achieve racial equality, affirmative action programs, and an expansion of social welfare programs are fairly unpopular.

In 1964 civil rights was one of the most prominent issues on the national agenda. In six of eleven national polls conducted between 1961 and 1965, "civil rights" was identified as the most important problem facing the nation (McAdam 1982, 159). Moreover, the public had undergone a fairly big evolution in terms of its beliefs and was now strongly supportive of government involvement to insure equality. Describing the dramatic change throughout the public, James Sundquist wrote that "[t]he nation was appalled as they saw police use clubs, firehoses and dogs to attack defenseless children who were marching and singing hymns ... Public opinion polls showed overwhelming support for action" (1968, 269). By the 1960s there was widespread public support for
federal action to outlaw de jure segregation, including school segregation (Sigelman and
Welch 1991, 125). 24

The initial response of the Republican party to demands for political inclusion
and equality from the civil rights movement appears to defy the logic of the median voter
theorem. Despite seemingly clear indications of what the public wanted, the Republican
party adopted a conservative plank on civil rights issues and nominated Barry Goldwater
as their presidential nominee, who was one of six Republican Senators who had voted
against the Civil Rights Act. Rather than responding to the progressive mood of the
public the Republican party reversed their historically progressive position on civil rights.
As Edsall and Edsall point out, "in the immediate aftermath of the 1964 Johnson
landslide, every indication was that the Republican party had fatally misjudged the
Americans mood in choosing a racial conservative as it presidential nominee" (1991, 36).
Meanwhile, the Democratic party's push for the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965 as well as President Lyndon Johnson's speeches stressing the civil
rights movements' theme of "We Shall Overcome" captured the spirit of the country
(Sundquist 1968). A majority of Americans were demanding that government end the
unfair practices of discrimination and segregation, and the Democratic party followed the
tide of popular demand.

After their landslide loss in 1964, however, the Republican party began behaving
much more like the median voter model would predict. Although the party did not
dramatically change their positions on racial issues, it repackaged these positions in a
more palatable form (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 75; Klinker 1994, 199). By doing so the
party successfully positioned itself just where the overwhelming majority of white
Americans stood and continue to stand on racial policy issues. Reflecting the views of
most white Americans, the Republican party favors the principle of equality but opposes

24 According to NES data, however, this support began to decrease very quickly. See figures 3:1 and 3:2.
government efforts to enforce equality, such as court ordered busing and government intervention to make sure minorities are being treated equally. The party has stressed opposition to discrimination of any kind. Based on the popular and ostensibly egalitarian principle that merit, not special favor, should determine job advancement and access to college, the Republican party opposes affirmative action. Thus, although coming at it from the conservative side, the Republican party has carved out a centrist position on racial issues coinciding nicely with the median voter. Several scholars have argued that the Republican party has benefited from the debate on racial issues and affirmative action by holding a position more sensitive to the desires of white Americans (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Lipset 1996).

In contrast, the Democratic party soon moved out of step with public opinion. As race riots broke out in northern cities and public opinion cooled, the Democratic party continued to pursue the attainment of racial equality with vigor and ever-expansive efforts. The party fought for more policies to attack racial equality despite fairly clear signals that these positions were hurting the party at the polls. Philip Klinker argued that the loss of millions of white southern voters in the 1968 presidential election "should have disturbed those Democrats concerned with winning elections; for good or for ill, these Wallace voters held the balance of power in presidential elections and it behooved the party to find a way to keep them in the fold. Certainly any party acting according to Downsian rationality would have done so." (1994, 100).

But the Democratic party did not heed the call of the median voter. Rather, it has consistently supported platforms and issues considerably more liberal than the views of the white public. In 1976 the party endorsed busing as an effective tool in desegregating the schools. According to NES data this policy has never received as much as 10 percent support from the general public. Moreover, the party continued to talk at length about the debilitating impact of racial discrimination on the lives of America's minorities and the
need to continue expanding affirmative action efforts, while a growing number of white Americans felt that they were losing out to minorities. From their inception in 1965, a clear majority of Americans have opposed racial preference programs. Seymour Martin Lipset argues that the debate over racial issues has hurt the Democrats (1996, 140). Writing in 1991, Thomas Edsall and Mary Edsall similarly argued that the Democratic party's position on racial issues had placed it at a competitive disadvantage and cost it the previous five presidential elections. They claimed the party would continue to lose out as long as it supported policies that the electorate disliked (1991, 6).

Across the 1990s the Democratic party, once again, began behaving in a manner more consistent with the predictions of the median voter theorem. Although approaching the center from the liberal side, the Democratic party has adopted solidly centrist positions on social welfare spending, civil rights and affirmative action. Perhaps a testament to the party's new centrist orientation are accusations by the Republican party that the Democrats are trying to take credit for Republican issues. As discussed earlier, the Democratic party, as viewed through its platforms and statements of the president, now stresses the importance of equal opportunity, without any discussion of government involvement to ensure equality of outcome. Moreover, the Democratic party has reviewed and eliminated some affirmative action programs and stressed the need to mend the rest.

Examining the behavior of the parties through the lens of the median voter theorem reveals several things. Public opinion and the preferences of the median voter do seem to exert some pull on the behavior of parties; however, they do not provide the kind of strict constraint and direction that the median voter theorem posits. The parties currently hold positions on social welfare, affirmative action and civil rights policies that have fairly broad support in society, however, they have not always done so. The Democratic party appeared to ignore public opinion for a long time on racial issues.
Thus, it appears that public opinion may influence and at times reinforce the parties’ strategies towards groups, but it does not define them.

The Ideological Party Model

The ideological or responsible party model predicts that the parties would accommodate the parts of the African American agenda that fit with their ideological traditions and be more reluctant to accommodate those that are in conflict with their principles. Unlike the pluralist and median voter theories, which assume the parties operate under largely the same set of influences, this model depicts the parties as being pushed by distinct ideologies. It therefore expects the parties to embrace divergent and not necessarily the most popular positions. Examining the response of the parties to the political agenda of African Americans through the ideological party lens, however, is complicated. The mobilization of African Americans brought racial issues to the center of national attention. Although the parties had addressed racial issues in the nineteenth century, the new set of demands thrust onto the national agenda by the contemporary civil rights movement did not fit neatly into the scope of conflict structuring competition between the parties since the New Deal. As Carmines and Stimson point out "race existed outside the New Deal's ideological framework" (1989, 117). Nevertheless, the parties ended up taking distinct and opposing ideological stands.

On the one hand, the Republican party had a deep historical commitment to upholding the interests of African Americans. Support for abolition was the pre-eminent factor sparking the creation of the Republican party. The exclusion of slavery from the territories was the central plank of the Republican party's first platform in 1856 (Reichley 1992, 122). Moreover, slavery was the moral cause underlying the Civil War. The North's ultimate victory, Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation and the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments powerfully connected the Republican
party with the cause of racial equality in the hearts and minds of most Americans. Their historical commitment to abolition and securing rights for African Americans predisposed Republicans to be receptive to further demands made by this group. Across the first half of the twentieth century, the Republican party led attempts to pass anti-lynching and civil rights legislation, the two issues prioritized by black organizations at that time.

While firmly committed to equality before the law and acting as social liberators against slavery, the Republican party was also, from the beginning, the party more identified with emerging industrial capitalism (Reichley 1992, 126). As business interests became a solid component of the Republican coalition, their own fear of an intrusive and strong federal government pushed the Republican party to embrace the "neoliberal" idea that there are distinct limitations on the role and responsibility of the national government (Freeman 1986, 336; Gerring 1998). The opposition of the Republican party to emerging social welfare programs was based on the idea that these were inappropriate areas for national government involvement. Across the twentieth century, the party increasingly defended states' rights against the intrusion of federal authority. Racial conservatism flowed naturally from this position. Opposition to an activist federal government laid the ideological groundwork for arguing that although the party was supportive of equality, a national government active in forcing integration and ameliorating the negative affects of racism was inappropriate (Gerring 1998, 191; Carmines and Stimson 1989, 117). Thus, in 1964 the party conceded its position as the defender of African American rights and pursued a course more ideologically consistent with its belief in limited government and the importance of states' rights.25

25 The 1996 Republican platform discusses the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution at length as the basis for their agenda. Moreover, Bob Dole carried a copy of the Tenth Amendment in his pocket and often pulled it out and read it, as he was campaigning for the presidency in 1996.
The Democratic party also was faced with conflicting ideological tendencies. On the one hand, the Democratic party was intimately tied with defending slavery and later on, segregation. In *Southern Politics*, V. O. Key wrote that the "predominant consideration in the architecture of southern political institutions is to assure locally a subordination of the Negro population and, externally to block threatened interferences from the outside with these local arrangements" (1949, 665). The Democratic party in the South did everything in its power to oppress and maintain the subordinate status of African Americans. In several southern states the Democratic line on the general election ballot was headed by the symbol of a rooster and the slogan "Defend White Supremacy" (Reichley 1992, 217).

While the Democratic party had a lengthy history of defending slavery and oppressing blacks, it also had a long history of egalitarianism and defending the interests of the less powerful (Reichley 1992, 125). If one does not consider the Democratic party's treatments of blacks, the party has been consistently committed to the principles of fairness, change and equality, and the use of government to achieve those principles. Particularly since the New Deal, many groups identifying with the Democratic party have perceived themselves as being locked out of America's important social and political decision-making processes. The party's electoral composition, therefore, has reinforced the party's inclination to be responsive to demands from groups claiming to be left out. As Carmines and Stimson point out, "If the New Deal was premised on help for the needy, on power for the dispossessed, and on respect for all, how long could it avoid the plight of black Americans?" (1989, 186). Progressive civil rights policies were a natural extension of the party's commitment to equality and view of the national government as responsible for the social welfare of its citizens (Gerring 1998). In the 1960s, the party's commitment to equality triumphed over its historical commitment to segregation and white supremacy. In 1965, in a private White House discussion about civil rights laws,
President Johnson said, "We have to press for them as a matter of right, but we also have to recognize that by doing so we will destroy the Democratic party" (Lipset 1996, 139). This statement reveals that ideological commitment, rather than Downsian or pluralist considerations, shaped the behavior of the Democratic party.

Ideology was important in shaping the behavior of the parties. The ideological model, however, provides little insight into the timing of party behavior and how it is that one ideological tradition eventually won out over another within each of the parties. Why did the Republican party finally extend its belief in limited national government to racial issues in 1964 and not before? Why did the Democratic party extend its belief in equality and government intervention on behalf of the less fortunate to African Americans from the 1960s on and not before? Most proponents of the ideological model of party behavior suggest that the behavior of parties is shaped largely by the preferences of their electoral coalitions. What is most damaging to the ideological model, therefore, is that the polarizing behavior of the parties was not driven by the views of their mass electorates. By 1964 the electoral coalitions of both parties were generally supportive of civil rights. NES data show that in 1962, about half of both parties' coalitions (49 percent of Republicans and 47 percent of Democrats) thought the national government should be involved in achieving racial integration in the schools. Meanwhile, a similarly sized minority in both parties (33 percent of Democrats and only 30 percent of Republicans) felt the government should stay out of school integration. If anything, it was the Democratic party that was more strongly predisposed to oppose civil rights. In 1964, 25 percent of Democrats and only 19 percent of Republicans said they supported "segregation" over the other two options of "desegregation" or "something in between". For the next decade more Democrats than Republicans continued to support the segregation option. In 1964, majorities in both parties responded that "Negroes have the

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26 This figure includes Republican and Democratic leaners.
right to live wherever they can afford, just like any body else", but a larger contingent of the Democratic party felt that "White people have a right to keep Negroes out of their neighborhoods if they want to". Finally a majority of both parties' identifiers felt that "civil rights people have been trying to push too fast" across the 1960s.

What these figures suggest is that neither party's electoral coalition was pushing them towards a clearly liberal or a clearly conservative position on racial issues. Based on the preferences of their electoral coalitions, one might have expected the parties to respond similarly to African Americans. Although the gap between the Republican party's policies and the preferences of its mass electorate soon closed, the Democratic party continued to embrace positions that did not have support among the majority of its electoral base. According to NES data affirmative action has never been a popular policy among Democrats, yet the party continued to not only support, but praise these policies. Support for busing among Democrats has never reached higher than 13 percent. Despite the fact that more than three-fourths of the party's identifiers said they opposed busing the party continued to promote busing as an effective tool in racial integration.

In sum, the behavior of the parties does appear to be ideological, but the preferences of their electoral coalitions have not been the driving factor behind their evolutions in ideology. The electoral coalitions of both parties looked remarkable similar to one another on racial issues prior to 1964, yet the parties took divergent courses. As Carmines and Stimson (1989) have argued, in the case of racial issues, it appears that elite behavior led the masses. Similarly, John Gerring has stated that "the connection between ideology and constituency seems a good deal more attenuated than scholars have traditionally assumed" (1998, 267). Examining the parties through the ideological model pushes us towards a framework in which party elites rather than party masses are the engines of party behavior and the agents of change.
ELITE POWER STRUGGLE MODEL

How can we explain the behavior of the parties? Pluralism, the median voter theorem and the ideological party model draw our attention to important factors influencing party behavior. However, each of these theories on its own can explain only part of the empirical puzzle. Although public opinion and the preferences of a party's electoral base certainly impose constraints on the responses of the parties, they do not do so consistently. The elite power struggle framework suggests that the parties polarized over racial issues across the 1960s because ideological factions within both parties aggressively mobilized and gained control over the direction of the party. These intra-party struggles were heated and ultimately could have resulted in several different outcomes. In this section I describe the nature and configuration of faction struggles within each party and how they shaped party behavior.

ELITE POWER STRUGGLE IN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

The Progressives versus The Hard Right

In the decades immediately following World War II, "progressives", as A. James Reichley has labeled them, formed a visible and fairly cohesive faction within the Republican party elite. This faction was composed disproportionately of northern elected officials and although not numerous, those African Americans involved in Republican party operations (Klinker 1994, 64; Reichley 1992, 319). Although holding views quite different from liberals on many issues, progressives shared with them a deep concern with civil rights. Republican progressives were strong advocates of federal and state legislation to outlaw and eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination.

Labeling this faction as either "purist" or "politician" is difficult because the rationale behind the progressives' efforts to push the Republican party in a liberal
direction on racial issues was based on a combination of pragmatic, winning-oriented and ideological goals. Many northern Republicans embraced liberal positions on civil rights because this was the overwhelmingly sentiment of their constituents. Moreover, like their Democratic counterparts, many Republicans felt the mounting pressure of the civil rights movement (Sundquist 1983, 356). A progressive position on civil rights was viewed by Republicans as a prerequisite for competing effectively in urban areas and maintaining or expanding their share of the black vote, which in turn was critical to the party's hopes of constructing a viable majority coalition (Klinker 1994, 52). Some progressives, however, were moved to defend civil rights for ideological reasons. After all, the Republican party was founded largely out of abolitionist sentiment and had a long tradition of promoting racial equality (Reichley 1992, 319). Moreover, many progressives saw inherent justice in the cause African Americans were fighting for (Cotter and Hennessy 1964, 158; Sundquist 1983, 356). Although based on a mix of ideological and pragmatic concerns the progressives had a clear view of how they wanted the party to stand on civil rights policy.

Another faction within the Republican party was the "hard right" and was composed of those who wanted the party to pursue racially conservative policies. In several ways, this faction fits the description of a "purist" faction. Indeed, it was in describing this faction that Aaron Wildavsky (1965) coined this term. The Goldwater faction was ideological in that it strictly adhered to the principles of states' rights and a smaller, less intrusive national government. Although limiting the power of national government rather than civil rights per se formed the core concerns of many individuals

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27 A perfect example of a progressive Republican, ideologically committed to civil rights was Grant Reynolds, an African American assistant to the RNC chair during this time. He continually worked to highlight the party's historic support for civil rights and publicize the positions and efforts of contemporary Republicans who supported civil rights (Klinker 1994, 64).

28 Sundquist (1983) referred to this faction as the "programmatic republican conservatives", Reichley (1992) labeled them as "the hard right" and Wildavsky (1965) called them the Goldwater faction. I use these terms interchangeably.
within the faction, they were in agreement that the party should embrace conservative positions on racial issues. Wildavsky's interviews with hundreds of Goldwater delegates at the 1964 Republican convention revealed that this faction was distinctive in its ideological commitment and reluctance to compromise their principles, even if this lessened their chances of winning (1965, 395). The speeches of Barry Goldwater also revealed the purist sentiments of this faction. At his acceptance speech in 1964 he stated, "Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice! Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue!" (Reichley 1992, 330). In this same speech Goldwater also said "anyone who cares to join us in all sincerity, we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause, we don't expect to enter our ranks in any case." (Kessel 1968, 115). These statements were clear and highly visible indicators of the unwillingness of this faction to bend or compromise its positions for the sake of party unity and coalitional vitality.

On the other hand, it is important to recognize that there was a "politician" component to the hard right faction as well. Emphasis on states' rights and racial conservatism was viewed by many as a strategic way to build a Republican majority and win elections (Reichley 1992, 330). To become a majority in Congress the Republicans had to break the Democratic lock on the 100 House Seats in the South and the "southern strategy" offered a practical means of doing this (Sundquist 1983). What differentiated the Goldwater faction from "politician" or "professional" factions, however, was its willingness to completely concede a group of voters to the other party. Wildavsky (1965) argues that for "politicians" the desire to win is intimately connected with the belief that a political party should try to get as much support from as many diverse groups as possible. The response offered by the hard right faction, however, demanded the party completely write off the votes of African Americans. Once again, the comments of Goldwater delegates confirm this. They said things such as, "They [African Americans] can vote for the other party for all I care" and "We won't change our principles just to get a few votes
from Negroes" (Wildavsky 1965, 398). Tom Stagg, Jr., a RNC member from Louisiana, also revealed the willingness of the programmatic conservative faction to opt out of competition for the black vote. In 1961 he stated, "I just hope to God that for once my party has the guts to say to hell with carrying New York. I hope for once we have the guts to say to hell with those Eastern liberals" (Klinker 1994, 69).

**The Struggle: Mobilization into the Party**

The racial progressive faction within the Republican party had significant leverage over party policy through 1960, which was revealed at the party's convention that year. The initial platform adopted by the Republican party embraced a moderate civil rights plank. However, this plank was rejected for an even more progressive one called for by a group of progressives (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 38; Klinker 1994, 52). Despite the loss of Richard Nixon, A. James Reichley (1992) argues that in the early 1960s progressive Republicans retained their strength. In the 1962 mid-term elections Republicans who identified themselves as progressives were re-elected to Congress and won important governships in Pennsylvania and Michigan. The strong showing of progressives suggested to many that the loss of ten pro-civil rights Republican Senators in 1958 had been a passing fluke. Moreover, many assumed that Nelson Rockefeller, a staunch advocate for civil rights, was going to be the next Republican presidential nominee and would make sure the party continued on a progressive path (Kessel 1968, 44; Reichley 1992, 317). After the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, progressive Republican Senator Jacob Javits stated, "It is now clear that the mainstream of my party is in support of civil rights legislation, and, particularly, support of this bill" (Sundquist 1968, 271). Although soon to be proven wrong, progressives saw their influence over the direction of the party on racial issues as secure.
The progressives, however, were out-mobilized by the hard-right faction within the Republican party organization. Having been the minority party for several decades and having very few elective offices in the South, the Republican party's organization was extraordinarily porous and even non-existent in certain regions of the country. Some efforts to rebuild and strengthen local and state Republican party organizations began prior to 1960. In 1957, RNC Chair Meade Alcorn initiated "Operation Dixie", an effort to build up the Republican party in the South, based on his sense that "many people in the region would be receptive to moderate, nonracist Republicanism" (Klinker 1994, 50). These efforts, however, were more successful in attracting southern racial conservatives than southern moderates into the Republican party's fold. Conservatives were convinced that the party had lost the presidential race in 1960 partly because its message was too moderate for the South. With this conviction and their increased numbers, racial conservatives took over, redirected, and heightened Republican mobilization efforts in the South. Thus, despite Meade Alcorn's intentions, efforts to build and strengthen the Republican party in the South were quickly taken over by conservatives and drew more racial conservatives, if not racists, into the party's local and state organization (Cotter and Hennessy 1964, 158-60). Moreover, as John H. Kessel has pointed out "groups do not come together at random to form coalitions" (1968, 42). Rather, they are attracted to and mobilized into party involvement by specific candidates. Barry Goldwater's candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination was a powerful force behind the influx of devoted conservatives into the Republican party structure (Kessel 1968). Conservative elites mobilized and guided conservatives into the party and successfully penetrated many Republican state party organizations in both Western states,

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29 In 1957, for example, only 22 of Louisiana's 101 parishes had Republican committees, and only one city, Shreveport, had a truly active Republican organization (Sundquist 1983, 288).
where regular party organizations had been weak since the Progressive Era, and the South (Kessel 1968; Sundquist 1983).

Where the Republican party was nonexistent the hard right built it from the ground up. In other places where there was some organization, this faction engaged in all-out battles to wrest its control from progressives (Kessel 1968, 87). In Memphis, Tennessee there was a weak, although existing Republican party organization run by an African American and composed of virtually all black Republicans. Rather than working with these Republicans, however, the hard right faction essentially started a parallel Republican party organization. They mobilized conservatives to run in every white precinct. When the Memphis Republican Party caucused, the pre-existing black organization was outnumbered and the white conservatives got seated as delegates at the San Francisco convention (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 43). Similarly, the leader of the southern drive to nominate Goldwater, Wirt A. Yerger, Jr., wrote a memorandum to key Republican leaders stating that "the Mississippi Republican party is planning a white conservative registration campaign ... If we want responsible conservative government in Mississippi, unregistered white conservatives must register and vote" (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 44). By 1964, more than 87 percent of the counties in the South had a Republican party chair and co-chair, and the "programmatic conservatives" were clearly in control (Sundquist 1983, 291).

The infusion of Goldwater activists into the Republican party gave this faction considerable leverage over the selection of the presidential candidate (Gerring 1998, 191). Most states in these newly conquered regions picked their national convention delegates through caucuses and conventions, which tend to magnify the preferences of the most determined and mobilized intra-party factions. Hard-right politicians outmobilized progressives and moderates and elected Goldwater delegates (Reichley 1992, 326). In 1964, 97% of the southern delegates gave their convention votes to Barry
Goldwater (Klinker 1994, 53). The rise of conservatives within the Republican party also was assisted by the malapportionment of seats on the Republican National Committee. Southern Republican organizations were vastly over-represented at the national convention in relation to the electoral strength they had previously provided Republican candidates in the general election. Meanwhile the northeastern states controlled only 20% of the seats (Klinker 1994, 53). For decades the Southern seats had been used as proxies for other interests and were the source of various manipulations by those seeking the Republican nomination (V. O. Key 1949). Once the hard right rebuilt the southern organizations, they used their disproportionately high representation to push their own cause and successfully nominated Barry Goldwater.

The change in the balance of power within the Republican party was clear at the 1964 convention. When progressives attempted to include strong civil rights planks in the platform as they had successfully done in 1960, their efforts were soundly rejected by a vote of 807 to 409 (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 44; Reichley 1992, 329). In an attempt to stop the Republican party from completely reversing its position on civil rights, George Romney from Michigan offered an even milder civil rights amendment that pledged "action at the state, local and private levels to eliminate discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color", but this too was declared unnecessary by the platform committee spokesman and defeated by voice vote (Kessel 1968, 114). The refusal of the 1964 Republican convention to accept this amendment, despite its reasonable popularity in society and its vague wording, illustrated both the capture of the Republican party organization by the hard right faction and "foreshadowed a determination on the part of the Goldwater coalition to run the party its way" (Kessel 1968, 115).

After Goldwater's overwhelming loss there were some efforts by progressives within the Republican party to undermine the growing influence of the Goldwater faction and redirect the party's behavior. Progressives struggled and eventually succeeded in
replacing the conservative RNC Chair Dean Burch, who Goldwater had hand-selected, with a highly pragmatic and non-ideological chair, Ray Bliss (Reichley 1992, 333). The progressives also went through the RNC to commission a policy committee, whose job was to moderate the party's policy positions. Although it pushed for a more inclusive party, it failed to articulate a cohesive alternative policy agenda to the one offered by the now dominant hard-right faction. In the end, its existence was short-lived and had little impact on altering the behavior of the party (Klinker 1994, 85). Senators Jacob Javits (NY) and Sherman Cooper (KY) publicly criticized their party's move towards racial conservatism. Former RNC chair Meade Alcorn admonished the party for abandoning its commitment to civil rights and using subtle racism in order to attract the votes of segregationist whites (Klinker 1994, 65).

Despite these scattered criticisms, progressive Republicans did little to retain their influence in the Republican party. In her description of progressives within the Republican party Jo Freeman commented that "they know how to talk but don't know how to organize" (1986 340). Although the progressives made some top-down efforts through the RNC, they did not try to mobilize more racial progressives into the party's base, the party's organizational structure and its elected positions. Writing in 1965, Aaron Wildavsky commented that "a majority of party activists now support the political tendency Goldwater represented" (411).

Similarly, Sundquist argued that although Goldwater lost, the programmatic conservatives his candidacy mobilized into the party structure "were prepared to contest elections from top to bottom. They had learned how to do precinct work, to proselyte recruits, to outorganize and outmaneuver" (1983, 291). After Goldwater's defeat they continued to influence the party's available pool and selection of candidates, thereby changing the balance of progressive and conservative Republicans in Congress in their favor (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Sundquist 1983). Meanwhile the influence of
progressives continued to weaken. In 1964, many swing-district Republicans were defeated in the landslide, thereby shrinking the progressive wing of the Republican party and giving Republican conservatives more influence over party policy. Although the Republican party recovered tremendous ground in the congressional elections of 1966 and 1968, the moderates never recovered their role in the party because in many cases southern Republican conservatives replaced Republican moderates. Moreover, the Republican party's "southern strategy" was reinforced with Richard Nixon's 1968 election. Writing in the mid 1980s, Jo Freeman argued that "Liberals within the Republican party (former supporters of Nelson Rockefeller and William Scranton)30 ... have been virtually read out of the party ... Liberal Republicans have largely failed to demonstrate a following and thus have lost power" (1986, 339-40).

The Losing Struggle of Republican Pluralists

In the current decade, the Republican party has continued to follow a similar path, holding positions antithetical to the agenda of African Americans and as a result securing only a very small fraction of the black vote in elections. The fairly consistent, unresponsive behavior of the Republican party is the product of a lopsided struggle among the party's elite. Today, there is a pluralist faction within the Republican party that is genuinely interested in framing or altering the party's message in a way that would appeal to African Americans. This faction is an outgrowth or a continuation of the progressive faction. A much larger number of Republican office-holders and organizational elites, however, have no interest in making a concerted effort to appeal to African Americans. Either because they feel group-based appeals are inappropriate or because they feel the party actually benefits from its absence of association with black

30 parentheses in original article

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voters and can benefit from racially polarizing campaigns and issues, they oppose pluralist efforts to reach out to African Americans.

One high profile Republican figure that spoke of the need to attract more African American voters was Lee Atwater, a former RNC chair. Although recognizing that the Republican party could not capture the majority of the black vote, Atwater repeatedly discussed the need for the Republican party to attract a larger portion of the African American vote than it was currently doing (20 percent was his goal). He frequently used pluralist-sounding phrases, such as the Republican party's "big tent" and the "G.O.P. Rainbow" to describe his view of how the party should be behaving (Bolce et al., 1993, 255). Similar proclamations about the need for the party to compete more effectively among minority voters were made by several Republican elites after the 1998 congressional elections, as the African American vote was perceived to be the deciding factor in several close races that ultimately went to the Democratic party.

The clearest visible embodiment of this pluralist faction has been the creation of the New Majority Council (NMC). In 1997, the co-chair of the RNC, Pat Harrison, established the NMC within the national organization, whose stated goal is to broaden the base of the Republican party by directly communicating with America's minorities. The NMC has pursued group-based outreach and encouraged state parties to be more sensitive to issues of race. NMC literature highlights a number of Republican issues that have strong support within the African American community, such as school choice, "hope" scholarships that allow inner-city youths to go to private schools, enterprise zones, tenant purchase plans in public housing, and tougher crime laws.\(^\text{31}\) Recognizing that the Republican party has a serious image problem among black Americans the directors of the New Majority Council have encouraged Republican office-holders to make special

\(^{31}\) According to the Joint Center for Political Studies, the three-strikes and you are out crime proposal has 75 percent support among African Americans.
efforts to convey these positions directly to black audiences and be more sensitive to how they frame all their issues. The NMC has arranged for Republican elites to attend and participate at meetings of national black organizations, from the NAACP and the National Conference of Black Mayors to the National Minority Grocer's Association. Many of these associations are places where no Republicans have ever spoken before. Once at these functions the goal is to more effectively relate Republican positions and ask African Americans for their vote. As one NMC director said, "You can't get the vote unless you at least ask". Thus some Republicans are now seeking out black audiences, attempting to frame issues in ways more sensitive to the interests of blacks and effectively forcing the Democrats to share audiences with them that used to be the exclusive terrain of the Democratic party.

In conducting my interviews, however, I found that beyond those actively involved in the creation and day-to-day operations of the New Majority Council there was not much support for the group-based outreach efforts and some clear opposition. Jo Freeman has argued that "Republican activists are expected to be good soldiers who respect leadership and whose only important political commitment is to the Republican party" (1986, 339). In my interviews, I found support for that idea. In general, Republican elites rejected the basic concept of "groups" and viewed group loyalties other than party loyalty as unnecessary if not problematic. Most individuals I interviewed felt that the Republican party should not make special efforts to appeal to African Americans as a group. The consensus was that the Republican party should reach out to new people on an individual basis, through the force of ideas, rather than trying to attract groups through supporting or framing their programs and policies with group-based benefits.

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32 Interviews conducted at the National Republic Headquarters in Washington DC on June 15, 1998.
33 Interview conducted at the Democratic National Committee on June 17, 1998.
34 While many of the Republicans I spoke with claimed to dislike the idea of appealing to blacks as a group, it is important to point out that the party certainly does engage in group-based accommodation towards others groups, such as wealthy Americans, business interests, and white evangelicals.
Reflecting this sentiment, former RNC chair Frank Fahrenkopf said "Whether we talk to white collar workers, Blacks, Hispanics, bank presidents, spot welders, astronauts ... we concentrate on points in common rather than why they, as a distinct group should feel different and in need of different treatment" (Freeman 1986, 355). The problem is that this view of how the party should behave is fundamentally at odds with the nature of the African American agenda. As discussed earlier the black agenda is structured by a high level of race-consciousness and is focused primarily on policies beneficial to African Americans as a group (Dawson 1994). By discouraging group loyalties and rejecting the legitimacy of group-based demands this faction within the Republican party fails to speak to the central political reality of most African Americans. If this remains the dominant behavior of the party it will not have a realistic chance of gaining many more black followers regardless of the party's support for school choice programs.

In addition to a general distaste for group-based appeals and policies, Republican candidates sometimes attempt to profit electorally from subtly racist campaigns. Many have pointed to the Willie Horton ads run in the 1988 presidential election as a clear example of a campaign strategy explicitly attempting to gain white voters at the cost of playing on negative racial stereotypes. Similarly, in his 1990 campaign for another Senate term, Jesse Helms of North Carolina clearly attempted to use race to gain white voters. He ran ads that said. "You needed that job, and you were the best qualified, but it had to go to a minority because of a racial quota" (Hacker 1993, 202). The directors of the New Majority Council said they were discouraged by media coverage suggesting their efforts were tokenism rather than genuine attempts to change the behavior of the party. However, until racially polarizing campaigns are truly a thing of the past, pluralist efforts by the Republican party are not going to be the defining view of the party in the minds of most black and white voters.
Thus far, the pluralist faction has not been able to define Republican party behavior. All the Republicans I interviewed were very open about the inconsistency of the Republican party's efforts to attract more minority voters and bring more minorities into the party. For example, after Ford's presidential defeat in 1976, the party put money into an effort to recruit more black support for Republican candidates and to establish the Black Republican Council, whose goal was to help build stronger organizations for black Republican candidates. This effort was short-lived and left little evidence of its existence in its wake (Klinker 1994, 147). The creation of the New Majority Council as a formal part of the party's national organization was actually an effort to overcome this problem and institutionalize the party's outreach efforts. Despite their institutionalization the outreach efforts are clearly not the priority of the party. In a speech at the 1998 GOP convention, J.C. Watts summed up the party's flailing efforts to integrate more African Americans into the party: "Look at the RNC, we probably only have one black Republican at the RNC, one. How do we defend that, that you have one African American in charge of outreach [who] probably doesn't have the authority to do outreach?" (Eilperin 1998, A17).

Moreover, the pluralist faction remains small. Unlike the Democratic party, the Republicans did not engage in any internal reforms across the 1960s and 1970s to increase African American representation within the party. On the contrary, the Republican party categorically dismissed any mandatory or enforceable representation requirements of various groups on the RNC or at their national conventions. Higher minority participation at conventions and within the Republican party structure would most likely have resulted in more internal pressure within the party to behave in a more pluralist manner. Without such reforms the faction committed to such a vision of party behavior has remained small. Moreover, considering the distaste for "groups" and other group loyalties among many Republican elites, it is not surprising that those African
Americans who do find a home in the Republican party elite are those least likely to push for intra-party reforms or policies that would benefit blacks as a group. At present, Oklahoma Representative J.C. Watts is the only black Republican in Congress and he has repeatedly stressed the fact that he did not come to Congress to be a black leader and very much dislikes being labeled "the black Republican". There is simply not enough internal pressure within the party elite to change its behavior towards African Americans. Pluralist-minded Republicans have not been able to demonstrate a viable following in society or mobilize like-minded individuals into the party's structure. Thus, although the Republican party is home to many who feel the party needs to change its image and begin making more sincere efforts to attract the vote of minorities, at present the Republican party appears set on a course much like it has followed in the past.

FACTIONAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Conservatives vs. Liberals

After the close of World War II, the dominant faction among congressional Democrats was Southern conservatives, an all-white faction systematically opposed to civil rights and integration. The anti-civil rights posture of many southern Democrats was undoubtedly the result of conservative pressure by their predominantly white constituents, but their behavior was also shaped by a deep ideological commitment to defending what they perceived to be the southern way of life. This faction of "southern white resistance" was clearly willing to put its ideological opposition to civil rights and racial equality above its concern for the strength and viability of the party. Many within the faction fled the Democratic party in 1948 in reaction to what they claimed were Harry Truman's "attacks on white supremacy" and nominated Strom Thurmond on the

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35 In the South blacks were largely disenfranchised at this time. As recently as 1940, only 5% of blacks were registered to vote in the South. In 1965 less than 31 percent of blacks in the South were registered to vote (Tate 1994, 1).
Dixiecrat, segregationist ticket. This faction made it clear that it would bolt if the party followed a racially liberal course (Reichley 1992, 298; Sundquist 1983, 274).

Another faction within the Democratic party elite was composed of racial liberals. The composition of this racially liberal faction within the Democratic party changed over time, but it was primarily formed of a growing number of black activists and white liberals who sought to move the party into a more progressive policy towards race. This racially liberal faction had strong, clear policy goals, to use the power of the federal government to end discrimination, facilitate integration and address the dramatic socioeconomic inequalities between blacks and whites. The racial liberalism of many Democrats was the result of many factors including the northern migration of blacks, increasingly liberal sentiments of northern white voters, and mounting pressure of the civil rights movement. Yet there was a real ideological commitment to racial liberalism among this faction as well. Like their segregationist counterparts, the liberal Democrats demanded "an unqualified commitment to civil rights regardless of the consequences to the party" (Sundquist 1983, 355). They were committed to creating an inclusive party and pursuing policies of racial equality for ideological reasons regardless of their negative impact on party viability and cohesiveness.

Besides the racially conservative and racially liberal factions within the Democratic party, it is important to point out that at least prior to the 1960s there was also a faction within the party who wanted to avoid racial issues. As far back as the 1940s the majority coalition of the Democratic party was built upon the solid white South and the liberal North. Many in the Democratic party realized that if civil rights issues moved to the top, or near the top, of the political agenda, this majority coalition would be badly fractured. Recognizing this political reality, a faction within the Democratic party

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36 Although once a moderate who fought against racial liberals in the Senate, President Lyndon Johnson came to head the civil rights activists within the Democratic party. Unlike his predecessors, he chose to align his party directly and openly with its northern polar forces (Sundquist 1983, 356).
probably best exemplified by Adlai Stevenson, worked very hard to keep civil rights and racial issues off the agenda. The continuing migration of African Americans to the North, the changing racial climate after World War II, and most importantly, the increasing force of the civil rights movement raised the salience of these issues, making it impossible for civil rights and racial issues to be finessed or kept off the agenda. At this point the struggle within the Democratic party over how to respond to the growing demands for political incorporation from African Americans became a struggle predominantly between the racial conservatives and the racial liberals.

**The Struggle To Define The Party's Response**

As an earlier section demonstrated the majority of Democratic partisans were not pushing for the party to champion the cause of racial equality. Yet, the liberal faction among the Democratic party elite won the struggle to shape the party's behavior on issues of importance to African Americans for several reasons. One factor, as Carmines and Stimson have pointed out, is the changing balance of Democrats in Congress in favor of racial liberals. In 1958, ten racially liberal Democrats were elected to Congress (Carmines and Stimson 1989). The force of their increased numbers gave them power over civil rights legislation. For example, in 1963 when President Kennedy presented a relatively cautious civil rights program to Congress, the Democratic controlled House Judiciary Committee strengthened his bill (Sundquist 1983, 356). Moreover, the 1964 elections carried a number of new liberal Democrats into office, shifting the congressional balance even more in favor of racial liberals. However, numbers alone were not enough to fully explain the changing behavior of the Democratic party.

At this time, Democratic southerners controlled most of the key committee chairmanships in Congress. Faced with a congressional leadership that was reluctant to consider civil rights legislation, the liberal faction sought to change the behavior of the
party through the part of the party where they had much better representation, the Democratic National Committee. The racially liberal faction within the Democratic party maneuvered to maximize its power within the party and leverage over policy through the creation of the Democratic Advisory Committee, a comprehensive policy commission (Cotter and Hennessy 1964, 213). The membership of the Democratic Advisory Committee was composed almost solely of northern and western liberals (Sundquist 1968, 407). More specifically, the DAC's committee on civil rights was chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt and consisted entirely of strong advocates of civil rights (Sundquist 1968, 409). The lack of conservatives on the Council allowed it to craft policy positions with a more forceful and unified voice than earlier councils had been unable to achieve (Klinker 1994, 25). Sundquist argues that the DAC provided "a clear voice for their 'party' that could state positions different from and, if necessary in defiance of, those of congressional leaders" (Sundquist 1968, 407). It provided a place for the liberal faction to hone its message in preparation for the coming intra-party warfare and provided a pivotal role in paving the way for the party's dramatic move towards racial liberalism (Hale 1994).

The liberal faction also guided African Americans and those active within the civil rights movement into the Democratic party, which provided it with increased legitimacy and leverage in the intra-party struggle. Schattschneider argued that "the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion" and "Every change in the scope of conflict has a bias" (1964, 3–4). Although the racially progressive positions of the Democratic party lost the party votes in the South, the liberal faction secured the passage of the Voting Rights Act. This act widened the scope of participation to include more blacks and drew the participation of these newly mobilized segments of the population almost solely towards the Democratic party.
The Democratic party's decision to embrace the cause of racial equality may have been short-lived had African Americans not followed these initial steps by concerted mobilization into and within the Democratic party structure. Although the party's policies were growing more supportive of African American interests, in terms of the composition of its organizational and electoral elite, it was still a white party. Throughout the decade of the 1960s there were only four black Democrats in Congress. Moreover, in 1964, two-thirds of state party delegations to the national convention had no black members. Only one-half of one percent of the delegates from southern states were black, while only two percent of all delegates overall were black (Baer and Bositis 1989, 62). African Americans and other white liberal activists pressured the Democratic party to reform its rules in a way that would open the party up and increase minority representation. In 1964, African Americans formed the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) and brought the racial discrimination in the delegate selection procedures to the forefront by challenging the seating of the all white Mississippi delegation at the convention. Though their effort failed (the MFDP was offered two seats which they declined), it made visible the goal to get blacks integrated into the party structure and it set the stage for a series of challenges over the unrepresentative nature of convention delegates (Walters 1988, 53).

Over the next decade, the Democratic party passed a series of reforms to increase the proportion of African Americans at Democratic conventions. Following the 1964 convention, the Democratic party passed resolutions outlawing racial discrimination in the delegate selection process and at all public meetings of the party (Baer and Bositis 1989, 63). These changes were followed four years later by more reforms mandating that African Americans, as well as women and youth (those under 30), be represented in delegations in reasonable relationship to the groups' presence in the population of the state and were altered once again in 1972 (Baer and Bositis 1989, 64). At the 1968
Democratic convention, African American representation increased to 5.5 percent and in 1972 it rose to 15 percent. As a result of the replacement of racial quotas with looser affirmative action goals, the number of blacks at the Democratic convention dropped to 10% in 1976 and but then rose again to 14 percent in 1980 (Baer and Bositis 1989, 63; Walters 1998, 56). Constant pressure by African Americans was critical in passing and perhaps equally important in enforcing these reforms. Groups who failed to remain vigilant and active within the party such as "Young Democrats" soon saw their representation plummet steadily from a high of 22 percent in 1972 to a mere 4 percent in 1988 (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 286; Shafer 1983).

As African Americans (and other groups) sought increasing representation within the Democratic party structure, this provoked some, but surprisingly not fierce opposition. Considering that the increasing presence and influence of African Americans within the party's delegate structure and overall organization meant a reduction in the influence and presence of other interests within the party, several scholars have expressed amazement at the limited nature of intra-party conflict this provoked. Phillip Klinker commented that the Democratic "regulars and professionals, who one would think would be concerned only with winning elections, were in fact quite open to appeals to procedural fairness, even in the face of massive electoral defeat and sharp reduction of their influence within the party" (1994, 113). Similarly, Byron Shafer pointed out in disbelief that "party officials treated critical choices about party reform - about the institutions of delegate selection ... as one more, separate and coequal area for decision, in which the most intense participants were permitted to wield the greater influence" (1983, 524). Rather than fighting over whether the party should or should not reform itself to be more inclusive, the intra-party debate focused on how much representation African Americans should get. African Americans wanted black representation within the party to be equivalent to their presence in the Democratic party's electoral base, which
was 25% or more in many states. Meanwhile, Democratic party regulars were attempting to limit black representation within the party to a level proportional to their overall presence in the national and state populations (Walters 1988, 65). Even though African Americans did not achieve their ideal proportion of representation through these reforms they did gain enough of a secured presence to have veto power over the selection of presidential candidates and significant leverage over the content of national platforms.

Scholars have debated whether or not these reforms were good or bad for the party. On the one hand, several scholars have argued that they were bad for the party because they reduced the influence of the white working class over presidential nominations. Moreover, the reforms allowed platforms and party decisions to be made in an artificially liberal and unrepresentative group (Shafer 1983). Edsall and Edsall lament that "The presidential selection process was changed, in other words, in a way that cut off feedback and information vital, in terms of successful general election competition, to the party's candidates and to their managers" (1991, 14). Meanwhile Baer and Bositis (1989) argue that these reforms made the Democratic party more democratic by allowing new groups within the party's elite cadres. The point the two sides agree on, however, is that the reforms were effective in allowing African Americans and other liberals within the party to have a considerable say in party decisions. By pushing for and achieving some internal reforms African Americans obtained a secure, although clearly not a majority influence over party decisions. Their presence was critical in maintaining the party's support for race-conscious programs such as busing, affirmative action and minority set-asides, as well as national health care and full employment legislation, despite the declining support for such positions in society more broadly. The mobilization of blacks within the Democratic party and the change of rules that magnified their views forced the party to take ideological stands that were not congruent with the views of the majority of Americans and many Democrats (Edsall and Edsall 1991, 80).
In addition to intra-party reforms, Jesse Jackson's two runs for the Democratic presidential nomination were critical for increasing the leverage of African Americans within the Democratic party. Katherine Tate has pointed out that "there is both a historical and an empirical link between Black officeseeking and Black political mobilization" (1994, 111). Beyond providing a symbolic figure for African Americans to mobilize around, Jesse Jackson espoused liberal, pro-minority policies and values, which were in direct accordance with the black agenda outlined previously. In 1984, and even more so in 1988, Jesse Jackson received the vast majority of black votes in the Democratic primaries. Even more significantly, those who favored Jackson were more likely to participate in their state's primaries and caucuses (Tate 1994, 111). Lucius Barker argues that Jesse Jackson's candidacy drew attention to the problems and concerns of the locked out, enhanced black political consciousness and voter education, and increased black voter registration and turnout (1988, 183). In 1984, Jackson won the District of Columbia and the state of Louisiana. In 1988, with four more years of mobilization under his belt and unified support from the black political elite, his success was more widespread. Jackson performed particularly well in states with caucuses; he won Michigan, South Carolina, Texas, Alaska, Delaware, Kansas, Nevada and Vermont (Hertzke 1993, 188). Moreover in 1988, he won primary contests in Alabama, Kentucky, Louisiana, Virginia and the District of Columbia (Tate 1994, 111). The higher participation rates of blacks in 1984 and 1988 acted as a constraint on individuals within the party to take the black vote for granted.

Although there was already a sizable minority of African Americans active in the party, another critical effect of Jackson's campaigns was a dramatic rise in black participation at upper levels of Democratic party politics. Based on interviews with state

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17 In 1984 this figure was 77 percent, while in 1988 Jesse Jackson received an overwhelming 92 percent of the black primary vote. Jackson won 13 percent of the white Democratic vote in 1988 (Tate 1994, 12)
and national party officials, Allen D. Hertzke found that Jackson's two campaigns brought a significant amount of newcomers into the Democratic party politics at the national, state and local level who were black and/or highly favorable towards the African American agenda.\(^{38}\) Supporters of Jackson filled many state and national party positions and in some southern states, such as South Carolina, Jackson forces became the clear majority (Hertzke 1993, 172). The most high-profile position filled by an African American was the election of Ron Brown, an advisor to Jackson, to DNC chair (Klinker 1994, 184). Having more African Americans within the Democratic party elite was critical for two reasons. First of all, in the aggregate, African Americans are the most consistent supporters of black interests. Therefore, more blacks in the party simply translates into a stronger intra-party faction defending black interests. Moreover, activists act as constraints on candidates who might otherwise move towards the center (Aldrich 1995, 185). Thus, as more and more African Americans entered the Democratic party and overwhelmed the party structure in some states they were able to act as a countervailing weight on candidates interested in dropping support for controversial items of the black agenda.

Another significant way Jackson’s candidacy increased the leverage of African Americans over the behavior of the Democratic party was through his acquisition of convention delegates. Jackson’s bid for the Democratic nomination was highly correlated with an increase of black delegates at the national convention. The percentage of black convention delegates rose from 14 percent in 1980 to 18 percent in 1984 to 21 percent in 1988 (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 286). Jackson used the increase in delegates as a powerful bargaining tool to extract concessions from the party. In the 1988 primary after losing badly to Michael Dukakis in Wisconsin and New York, it became clear that Jackson

\(^{38}\) Although Paul Wellstone is white, this former campaign manager for Jesse Jackson is a strong advocate for African American interests in Congress.
could not win the nomination and most observers expected Jackson to step out of the race and let Dukakis begin preparing his attack against his Republican competition. Jackson, however, stayed in the race in an apparent attempt to amass as many delegates and bargaining power as possible (Tate 1994, 147-8). The Democratic party's rules make it extremely difficult for the winner of a state's primary or caucus to win all of the state's delegates and so Jackson could increase his delegates even in contests where he consistently lost to Dukakis.

The greater presence of Jackson and black delegates at the conventions was used to wrest several significant concessions from the Democratic party as well as maintain party support on other critical issues for blacks (Hertzke 1993, 191). One clear example concerned the Democratic party's delegate selection system. At the 1984 convention Jackson argued that the Democratic party's 20 percent threshold requirement for delegates unfairly penalized minority and urban voters, who were more likely to be concentrated in a few congressional districts.\footnote{In 1984, Jackson won 18.3 percent of the total primary vote but ended up with only ten percent of the convention delegates (Tate 1994, 11).} Although his resolution was defeated at the 1984 convention, the party reduced it to 15 percent before the 1988 campaign as the result of sustained pressure by blacks within the party. Moreover, in 1988, Jackson bargained with Democratic nominee Dukakis in advance of the convention and managed to get several policies important to blacks added to the party's platform, such as the party's endorsement for the designation of South Africa as a terrorist state, same day voter registration, D.C. statehood, and increased set-asides for minority contractors in federal contracts (Tate 1994, 13). Beyond gaining new provisions the leverage gained by black mobilization was critical in maintaining the Democratic party's commitment to policies with waning support in the public. Admittedly, many of the people who worked for Jesse Jackson in his bids for the Democratic presidential nomination were
disappointed with these concessions and felt that Jackson gave up too much when he negotiated with the centrist faction. Even those who felt Jackson could have extracted more, however, agree that his presence in the Democratic nomination process and the mobilization his presence created was pivotal in shaping the nature and outcome of intra-party struggles.

Jo Freeman has argued that "In the Democratic party, keeping quiet is the cause of atrophy and speaking out is a means of access" (1986, 340). Jackson's back-to-back runs for the Democratic nomination maintained and increased the voice of African Americans within the party. Moreover, they suggest that the mounting pressure of running twice was considerably more effective in extracting concessions from other factions in the party than simply running once. Jesse Jackson's runs were clearly uncomfortable for many in the party. Jackson and his delegates were struggling to push the party to further accommodate the interests of blacks and minorities. Because the agenda of this liberal faction contradicted the interests and power of the growing centrist faction within the party, Jackson and his delegates were treated poorly at the conventions by party leaders (Barker 1988, 204).

As Hertzke stated, "When Jackson announced that he would not seek the Democratic nomination in 1992, many Democratic party figures breathed a sigh of relief" (1993, 178). A good deal of the poor treatment of Jackson delegates in the 1980s and relief by many Democratic in 1992 was undoubtedly because Jackson's candidacy forced more centrist-oriented factions within the party to pay more attention to the demands of African Americans than they wanted to.

The Declining Influence of African Americans And The Rise of a Centrist Faction

Across the 1990s a struggle over the direction of the party within the Democratic party has become more visible and has resulted in the declining influence of African Americans and the rising power of a centrist faction. There remains a recognizable and
sizable faction within the Democratic party that is committed to keeping the Democratic party highly supportive of liberal social welfare policies and African American interests. In interviews, Democrats that I would classify in the liberal faction made comments to the effect that policies aimed to help the disadvantaged and minorities formed the ideological heart of the party. One commented that "if the Democratic party forgets its base voters and the issues important to its base voters, then what is the Democratic party?" Making a similar point Donald Payne, the former chair of the Congressional Black Caucus, stated that the goals of African Americans in Congress is "to keep the Democratic party focused and ... trying to keep the President's program embodying the principles of the Democratic Party. We don't want to get lost by trying to out-Republican the Republicans" (Singh 1998, 194).

Moreover, the liberal faction within the party has worked hard to demonstrate that an increased emphasis on policies important to African Americans is a viable electoral strategy. One Democratic elite argued that in 1994, the Democratic party lost the House by 10,000 votes, which is about the same number of African Americans who stayed home because the Democratic party was not speaking about issues of importance to them or trying to mobilize them. From 1997-1998, the National Committee For an Effective Congress, part of the DNC, established a plan to mobilize the black vote in a targeted selection of Governor’s races and congressional districts where there were a high number of minorities or where minority candidates were running. Their goal was to "demonstrate the importance of the ethnic vote in Democratic victories". In other words, they sought to gather statistical evidence demonstrating that campaigns directed at blacks, using issues that resonated with the black community, was a viable strategy for the Democratic party. The DNC encouraged candidates to stress issues of importance to blacks, such as

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* Interview conducted on June 18, 1998 in Washington DC.
discrimination. In addition they campaigned through black media outlets, encouraged high profile black figures to endorse Democratic candidates, and highlighted the presence of any black candidates on the ticket, even if they were running for lower office, by putting their picture on campaign literature along with the top candidates. According to precinct level analysis, their efforts paid off. In high minority precincts turnout and the Democratic vote increased over previous years.

While the liberal faction remains dedicated to African American voters, other elites have become increasingly disgruntled with the Democratic party's liberalism, particularly the party's embrace of policies geared to benefit minorities. This faction, which I label the centrist faction, is composed of elites committed to two ideas: winning is the pre-eminent goal and that in order to win the Democratic party has to perform better among swing voters. The centrist faction has pushed the party to develop policies and an image that resonates with the middle class (Reagan Democrats and white suburbanites in particular) rather than the poor and lower classes, where blacks are found in disproportionate numbers (Barker 1994, 6). This faction was institutionalized through the creation of the Democratic Leadership Council in 1985, a technically independent policy council. Similar to how the liberal faction within the Democratic party created and used the Democratic Advisory Committee to move the party in their preferred direction on civil rights, the DLC has provided a place for the centrist faction "to hone their message in preparation for intraparty warfare" (Hale 1994, 262). Moreover, the election of Bill Clinton, one of the founders of the DLC, as the President in 1992 and again in 1996, gave this faction a privileged position in the intra-party struggle to define party behavior.

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41 In the 1997 race for Governor of New Jersey, the Democratic Committee encouraged Democratic candidate Jim McGreevey to emphasize the issue of discrimination in car insurance.
Although this faction claims to be seeking a "third way" that transcends the "tired" liberal-conservative debate, thus far the DLC has largely worked to move the party away from liberal positions and toward more conservative ones. After identifying affirmative action as an area where the Democratic party was clearly losing out to the Republican party, the Democratic Leadership Council has forcefully pushed the party to change its position. The published recommendations of the DLC are "that the numerical preferences, including set asides and preferential hiring practices in public contracting and employment should be phased out." Moreover, they recommend that the Democratic party pursue policies that "shift the basis of affirmative action in college admissions from racial group to economic need." In terms of welfare policy, this faction advocated reforms that limited benefits long before President Clinton signed the 1996 Welfare Reform Act. Clearly the goal of this faction is to move the party even further to the center (or right) on welfare and affirmative action issues.

From my interviews, there was clear consensus that the centrist faction had become the defining voice of the party in the 1990s. Although people disagreed over whether the growing prominence of the centrist faction was good, bad or necessary, all the Democrats I spoke with said that since 1992 the party had marginalized the interests of African Americans in its pursuit of centrist voters. Moreover, the party's congressional campaign committees, which raise and spend vast amounts of the party's resources, are clearly under the influence of the centrist faction. The DCCC seeks out candidates who will appeal to swing voters. Particularly in the South they try to recruit and support only white moderates. They are increasingly reluctant to support African Americans in House races (except in majority-black districts), let alone statewide contest. Moreover, although America's black and white communities have completely different media

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42 Several Democrats pointed out to me that when Cynthia McKinney, an African American, ran for a House seat in 1996, in a majority white district the DCCC did not support her and discouraged her from running.
outlets, the DCCC solely targets the mainstream white media suggesting that it is unconcerned with contacting or mobilizing African American voters.

The growing power of the centrist faction over the direction and behavior of the Democratic party was clearly aided by the decision of Jesse Jackson to not seek the Democratic nomination in 1992. Lucius Barker argued that "Very directly, Jackson's decision helped to subordinate, if not suppress, race as an issue, making it easier for Clinton to hold on to the black vote without jeopardizing the moderate-centrist image believed necessary to recapture Reagan Democrats and appeal to whites generally" (Barker 1994, 6). Many political analysts have pointed out that because Jackson was not running, the eventual Democratic nominee Bill Clinton was able to distance himself from Jesse Jackson, rather than having to bargain with him (Hertzke 1993, 186). In what many interpreted as a highly symbolic move, signaling that he was not beholden to minority interests, Clinton criticized the rap artist Sister Souljah while at Jesse Jackson's side moments after a reconciliatory meeting between the two men (Tate 1994, 181). Without the mobilization and organization Jackson's candidacy had sparked in the past, the concerns of blacks were dramatically marginalized in the 1992 and even more so in the 1996 Democratic platforms and legislative agendas laid out by Clinton.

The different views held by the two factions within the Democratic party are clearly causing tension. Jesse Jackson has publicly labeled the DLC "the Democratic party for the white leisure class". Over the course of my interviews, a high level of hostility between DLCers and those concerned with minority interests was easy to discern. Despite scattered criticisms and the effort to prove statistically that the "base vote" is important, the liberal faction within the Democratic party has not waged an aggressive counter-mobilization against the growing power of the centrist faction. One

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reason is that even among African Americans within the party elite there is much concern that the party needs to be unified in order to win (Barker 1994). Others commented that even a centrist Democrat is better than a Republican in the White House. And finally, some Democrats told me that even though they found the party's new direction ideologically problematic, they were refraining from doing something about it because the centrist strategy appeared to be working.

There was also a considerable amount of consensus from Democrats in both factions that Bill Clinton was largely responsible for holding back the intra-party tension from developing into all out warfare. Many Democrats spoke at length about how Clinton was one of the most gifted politicians they had seen because of his ability to make all communities feel like he was on their side. Despite the fact that he pursued moderate policies, many of which negatively impacted African Americans, black voters and elites have supported him largely because he understands the need to touch everybody and he is comfortable in minority communities; when Clinton is gone, more intense battles may erupt.

The more dramatic factional struggles over the direction of the party have occurred at the state level and may very well be a preview of what will happen at the national level. In Florida, a rising centrist faction within the Democratic party (composed of all white Democrats) removed Willie F. Logan, an African American, from his leadership position. Had the Democratic party regained control of the Florida House, he would have become the Speaker. Although there is some controversy around the reasons behind this action, most agree that it was racially motivated. The centrist faction simply feared the negative consequences that might result if the Democratic party became too strongly and visibly associated with African Americans and their liberal agenda (Neal 1998, A6). The ouster of Logan sparked an outcry among black Democratic elites as well as prominent black organizations such as the NAACP. A group of African
American leaders from across the state announced an end to their unqualified allegiance to the Democratic party. Logan responded to his ouster by traveling around Florida campaigning with Republican gubernatorial candidate Jeb Bush. Similar ruptures brewed under the surface in Illinois and Nevada in 1998. Centrist factions within those states sought to de-emphasize racial issues. Moreover, they sought withdraw party resources when they realized that the majority of the top candidates on the Democratic party's ticket in their state were black. These actions, in turn, invoked a barrage of criticisms from black Democratic leaders. The Democratic National Committee was called in, in both cases, to try to work out tensions between the two factions. Although these fairly blatant efforts by the centrist faction to reduce the visibility of African Americans and issues connected with African Americans within the Democratic party have sparked some anger, so far they have not provoked the type of sustained and directed mobilization needed to change the response and behavior of the party.

Considering the current configuration of the factional struggle within the Democratic party and the resources each faction possesses, the party appears to be set on a course where the centrist faction will continue to dominate. The centrist faction has accumulated important resources within the intra-party struggle. The current president, Bill Clinton, was a former chair of the Democratic Leadership Council, which has acted as the engine behind the centrist policy vision of the party, and both of the leading contenders for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2000 fit more comfortably within the centrist than liberal faction. As a result the campaigns of Al Gore and Bill Bradley will undoubtedly inspire and mobilize centrists, rather than liberals, into the Democratic party structure. Although African Americans remain a significant minority within the party structure, across the 1990s they have not shown signs of organizing an effective countermobilization to the growing influence and dominance of the centrist faction. An inspiring leader or powerful new issue could provide the spark needed to
restart such a mobilization. At present, however, neither of these appear on the horizon. Jesse Jackson has already announced his intentions not to compete for the Democratic nomination in 2000 and no other representative from the liberal faction seems likely to take on such a task. Although this decision may help the Democratic party present a unified face and message to the nation as it moves into the next decade, it will also lead to the further marginalization of the interests of African Americans and the liberal faction more broadly.

Conclusion

The fourth model, the elite power struggle framework of party behavior, offers a fuller explanation for the responses of the parties than the three mainstream theories of party behavior: pluralism, Downs’ spatial model of party competition, and the ideological or responsible party model. The elite power struggle framework emphasizes that within parties there are factions with competing ideas of how the party should be behaving and, more specifically, how the party should be responding to the concerns of African Americans. The Republican party has been home to both the progressives and the hard right faction, each of whom have strikingly different views on how the party should behave towards African Americans and their political concerns. Meanwhile, the Democratic party has been home to liberals, pushing the party to more thoroughly address the demands of the poor and the needs of minorities, and a centrist faction pushing the party to minimize the attention it gives to policies geared specifically to benefit minority groups.

Moreover, this fourth framework argues that struggle among factions within the parties rather than the preferences of their electoral coalitions or the constraints imposed by public opinion has been the foremost influence on the behavior and responsiveness of the parties. Although parties are very concerned with winning as the pluralist and
median voter theorems posit, they are also very decentralized and therefore open to being influenced by mobilized groups. When the progressive faction was in a dominant position within the Republican party, prior to 1960, the party acted much like the pluralist perspective predicts. Although it certainly did not fully accommodate all the demands made by African Americans the Republican party embraced moderate to progressive positions on civil rights and racial issues. Moreover, although it had been losing shares of the African American vote since the New Deal era, the Republican party was determined to not concede the votes of blacks to the Democratic party. As the hard right faction mobilized into the Republican party's organization, however, it was able to force the party to change its historically progressive position on civil rights despite the lack of widespread support within the public and from Republican partisans for such a change.

Similar intra-party struggles have shaped the response of the Democratic party. As the liberal faction within the Democratic party honed its policy vision through the Democratic Advisory Committee and increased its presence within the party's organization and elected positions it was able to gain disproportionate influence over the direction of Democratic party behavior. The Democratic party strongly supported a variety of programs to achieve true racial equality, spoke of the need to expand affirmative action programs and embraced compassionate social welfare programs despite the lack of support many of these policies had within the public and among Democratic partisans. Jesse Jackson's back-to-back runs for the Democratic presidential nomination continued to mobilize and sustain the organization of blacks into the Democratic party organization. As a result, the liberal faction was able to compete effectively within the intra-party struggles and at least maintain, if not extend, the Democratic party's support for liberal policies.

Finally the elite power struggle model sees party behavior as open to change as factions mobilize and demobilize, gain and lose resources. Across the 1990s the liberal
faction within the Democratic party has decreased in size and mobilization, while the centrist faction has gained resources and strategic positioning and sharpened its own policy views. As a result, the centrist faction has been able to increasingly influence the platforms and legislative agenda of the Democratic party. Across the 1990s, therefore, the median voter theorem offers a useful explanation for the behavior of the Democratic party. However, the centrist or "median voter" oriented faction has never been the only faction within the Democratic party, nor has its goals always won out within intra-party struggles. Because the median voter theorem fails to recognize the existence of competing factions within parties, some of whom may place the furthering of their group's interest above, or equally important to winning, the utility of the median voter theorem is limited.

Looking to the future, the possibility that the parties will turn around and become more responsive to the needs of African Americans does not appear particularly promising. The progressive or pluralist faction within the Republican party, embodied most visibly in the New Majority Council, is simply too small to have any chance of changing the party's current course of pursuing racially and economically conservative policies. Meanwhile, the liberal faction within the Democratic party has not countered the party's move to the center (or right) on racial, civil rights and social welfare issues. The reasons behind this lack of sustained countermobilization from the liberal faction are complex. One reasons is the perception among many blacks and liberals within the Democratic party that party unity is critical for victory, particularly for retaining the presidency. Another reason for the lack of more aggressive intra-party fighting is because of Bill Clinton's unique ability to connect with the liberal faction while pursuing the policies of the centrist faction. Change and increased substantive representation for African Americans from the parties is possible if African Americans are able to mobilize into one or both of the parties, sustain that mobilization and remain committed to a clear
vision of how the party should be responding. The costs of such mobilization, however, particularly for African Americans, a group historically excluded from the political realm and still facing societal resistance to their concerns, will be very high.
Figure 3.1
Percentage of blacks and whites who feel the government in Washington should see to it that black people get fair treatment in jobs
Figure 3.2
Percentage of people who think the government should see to it that white and black children go to the same schools

Source: National Election Survey Data
Figure 3.3
The Views of Blacks and Whites on Affirmative Action

Source: 1997 Gallup Poll based on interviews with 3036 Americans including 1680 whites and 1269 blacks
Government should make every effort to improve conditions of blacks and minorities

Government should not make every effort, they should help themselves

Source: 1997 Gallup Organization Poll

Figure 3.4
Government's Role in Improving the Conditions for Blacks and Minorities
Blacks views (on 7 point scale) of whether the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living or whether the government should just let each person get ahead on his/their own.

Source: National Election Study

Figure 3.5
blacks who think it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending.

- blacks who think the government should provide fewer services, in order to reduce spending.

Source: National Election Study

Figure 3.6
Views of blacks on the provision of government services
Figure 3.7
Percentage of blacks and whites who feel government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living.

Source: National Election Study
Source: National Election Study

Figure 3.8
Percentage of Americans who think that it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending
CHAPTER 4

THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO EVANGELICALS

During the 1970s evangelicals awakened from decades of political withdrawal and began demanding action from the government on a host of moral and social demands. Since then, white Protestant evangelicals, the demographic group forming the base of the Christian Right, have remained active in American politics. Religion has profoundly molded American culture and politics in the past. The recent political mobilization of evangelicals has acted as a highly visible reminder of the continuing relevance of religion in American politics.

Existing studies have assessed the political behavior of evangelicals from many different angles. Scholars have offered explanations for the renewed political activism of evangelicals (Menendez 1996, Liebman and Wuthnow 1983) and for the changing patterns in evangelical voting behavior and partisan identification (Jelen 1997). A particularly large number of political studies have examined the political power of evangelicals. Scholars have assessed the organizational strengths and weaknesses of evangelical organizations (Rozell and Wilcox 1995), the impact of evangelical voters in particular elections (Guth and Green 1991, Hertzke 1993), and the impact of evangelical activists on the political system (Moen 1989, Soper 1994, Oldfield 1996). Few studies,

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1 I use the terms evangelicals, white Protestant evangelicals and the Christian Right interchangeably throughout this study. A full discussion of the who these terms do and do not include and the distinctions between these terms is found in the following two pages.
however, have explored the other side of the relationship, how the political system has behaved towards evangelicals. How have American political parties, in particular, responded to the mobilization of this group? More importantly, how can we explain the behavior of the Republican and Democratic parties towards evangelicals?

In this chapter I briefly describe the history of evangelical political involvement in the United States and review the factors and conditions that led evangelicals to re-enter politics in the 1970s. Second, I identify the evangelical political agenda, based on the goals and activities of national evangelical organizations, survey data, and the work of other scholars. Third, I assess the behavior of the two parties towards evangelicals based on content analysis of party platforms and State of the Union Addresses, and analysis of congressional behavior. The results are puzzling. The two major parties have responded in very different ways to demands for incorporation from evangelicals. After a century of avoiding most social and moral issues, the Republican party has incorporated almost all of the policy demands of evangelicals into their platforms and legislative agenda. Meanwhile, the Democratic party, often described as the defender of religious and ethnic minorities, made no effort to accommodate any of the substantive demands of this group. Until the 1990s, rather than obscuring their stands on these contentious issues, the parties have taken increasingly polarized positions on issues of concern to the evangelical constituency. Since then, the Democratic party has moved back towards the center on several social issues and attempted to obscure their positions on others.

How can we explain this variation in party response? Why did the Republican party compromise its long-held principles and ideology to incorporate the policy demands of evangelicals, many of which lacked strong public support? Why did the Democratic party make very little attempt to woo this sizable and growing group of voters? What explains the recent shift in Democratic party behavior? In the fourth section of this chapter, I turn to the theories of party behavior discussed in earlier
chapters. I argue that many of the existing and dominant theories of party behavior are unable to fully explain the behavior of the parties towards evangelicals and that the elite power struggle model provides the most complete and sophisticated explanation.

PART I: THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF EVANGELICALS

Who are Evangelicals?

Because the label "evangelical" has no fixed legal meaning, there is considerable debate over who exactly fits in this category. Researchers mainly use one of two survey strategies to identify evangelicals. One approach classifies people as evangelical based on their answers to doctrinal questions and is referred to as the doctrinal approach. People are categorized as "evangelical" if they believe they have had a born again experience (this refers to a personal decision or experience involving the acceptance of Jesus Christ as a personal savior), believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible, and have encouraged other people to believe in Jesus Christ (Jelen 1997, Oldfield 1996, Wald 1987). One problem with the doctrinal approach is that some people claim to embrace evangelical doctrine yet exhibit only a marginal attachment to religion (Wilcox 1996). For example, over one-third of the population claims to have had a born-again experience. An even bigger problem with this approach is that until recently surveys have not asked the detailed doctrinal questions needed to classify individuals as evangelical.

Another way of identifying evangelicals is the denominational approach. Evangelicals are identified as all the individuals who identify as members of certain denominations including Baptists, Assemblies of God, Churches of Christ, the Nazarenes and other smaller churches commonly regarded as fundamentalist or Pentecostal (Wald
1987). Most of these denominations are members of an umbrella organization called the National Association of Evangelicals. Jelen (1997) argues that this approach is more meaningful to respondents because the denomination is the basic social unit of American religion. However, the denominational approach does have some problems. This method classifies as evangelical members of evangelical denominations who are not religiously active or who do not hold to evangelical religious beliefs. Also, this approach fails to include people who hold evangelical beliefs, but attend non-denominational churches, such as charismatics (Oldfield 1996, 27).

Both approaches draw similar conclusions about the percentage of white evangelicals in society (about 20%), but they do not necessarily identify the same people as evangelicals. The fit between denominational and doctrinal evangelicalism is not perfect and the use of these different measurement tools is undoubtedly responsible for the some of the conflicting claims made about evangelicals. In this study I use the denominational approach because denominational questions have been asked more frequently in surveys. Moreover, the denominational approach does not gainsay ideology. Thus, I identify evangelicals as all whites who indicate an affiliation with a church in an evangelical denomination.3

Another important distinction to make is the difference between the Christian Right and white evangelical Protestants. The Christian Right is the set of evangelical organizations that pursue the same broad set of goals, to promote traditional family values in society, and the highly active group of individuals involved in those organizations. The difference between the Christian Right and evangelicals is analogous

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2 For a complete detailed list of all denominations classified as evangelical see Kellstedt, et al. 1996 pp. 188-189.
3 It is important to point out that many African Americans are classified as evangelical under both the doctrinal and denominational classification systems, but are excluded in this study because the historical experience and political beliefs of Black evangelicals are very different from those of white evangelicals (Calhoun-Brown 1997).
to the difference between the civil rights movement and African Americans. Although not all blacks or evangelicals share the goals of these movements, they are the demographic groups that form their core members and are most responsive to their appeals. In this study I mainly refer to evangelicals, rather than to the Christian Right, to make this case study consistent with the other two case studies, which focus on demographic groups, Hispanics and African Americans. Moreover, many evangelical activists object to the term "Christian Right" because they feel it depicts a narrow movement outside of the political mainstream (Wilcox 1996, 5; Wald 1995, 43).

**History of Evangelical Involvement in Politics**

For much of the 20th century, evangelicals were reluctant to get involved in what many perceived to be the "immoral" world of politics. Hence, the mobilization of evangelicals in the 1970s surprised many observers of politics. However, this was not the first time that this religious group mobilized into the secular world of politics. Across American history, evangelicals were very active at several different periods (Shafer 1998). The specific policy focus of evangelical political activity has changed over time, from religious freedom, to abolition, to prohibition, to their present day concerns of abortion and family values (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983; Shafer 1998). However, from "The Great Awakening" to their most current mobilization, their activity has been spurred by the same broad concern, their desire to preserve morality and to fight off perceived assaults against their deeply held social values.

In the twenty years before World War I evangelical Protestants joined forces with the Populists and embraced William Jennings Bryan as their symbolic leader. After World War I, evangelicals worked to outlaw alcohol and fought against the teaching of evolution in schools. Although they achieved some success in both areas, the victories
were short-lived (Shafer 1998). Discouraged by defeats and a growing sense that politics was corrupt, evangelicals began to withdraw from politics and mainstream society. In addition, political evangelicalism was submerged as other political cleavages came to the fore, especially class issues with the occurrence of the Great Depression and the new working class Democratic party. As class issues ascended as the dominant political cleavage in society, religious differences within the working and middle class sectors of society were submerged and fell into the background. As a result of these changes, from the 1920s to the 1970s most evangelicals and their leaders distanced themselves from politics and political parties (Wald 1987, 184; Edsall and Edsall 1991, 133). Moreover, there was recognition among the evangelical community that their beliefs were becoming increasingly distant from those of other Americans. Thus, they withdrew socially and developed their own subculture where they could foster and pass on their deeply held religious values and beliefs (Oldfield 1996, chapter 2).

Several things occurred during these five decades of political withdrawal that have had significant consequences for evangelical political involvement today. First, Protestantism in the United States split. Many predominantly northern denominations attempted to adapt the Bible to the modern world and to continuing scientific advances. These mainline denominations, which generally include Methodists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians, view scriptural authority less stringently than their counterparts. The members of mainline churches, on the whole, are more likely to come from urban and suburban areas and possess middle and upper socioeconomic status (Jelen 1997 and Shafer 1998). Meanwhile, the evangelical strand of contemporary Protestantism continued to emphasize the infallibility and authority of the Bible, the role of Christ in direct personal salvation, and the necessity of applying Christian principles to one's everyday life. The members of evangelical churches are more likely to be rural, lower-middle and working class people and are, on the whole, less educated than
their mainline counterparts (Shafer 1998, 116). This split was significant because as a result the stronghold of evangelicalism shifted to the South, a pattern that still holds today.

Also during this time, the status of evangelicals in American society began to decline. Throughout the 19th century, evangelicalism was in the mainstream of American intellectual and political life; evangelical values were widely accepted among the American public (Oldfield 1996, 13; Wald 1987, 183). Over time, however, evangelical Protestantism was displaced from its position as a major cultural force. Evangelicals' refusal to accept scientific advances, such as Darwinian evolution, or any criticisms of the Bible, caused people to view evangelicalism as anti-intellectual and anti-modern. Moreover the association between some sub-groups of evangelicalism and regressive political movements fixed it in the public mind as narrow-minded and backward looking (Wald 1987, 184). Evangelicalism lost credibility among the intellectual elite and was increasingly written off by the public as religious fanaticism (Simpson 1983). Since the 1920s, evangelicals have been located largely outside the mainstream of American society, while mainline churches have been at the center of American culture, influence and power (Kellstedt et al. 1991, 141). This change in status has had important implications for evangelicals' contemporary role in politics (Oldfield 1996, 15).

The third change that occurred during this time of political withdrawal was a shift in church membership favoring evangelical Protestant denominations. Although evangelicalism may have lost mainstream acceptance, since the 1960s, evangelical denominations have continued to experience increasing membership. This feat is particularly impressive considering that the overall number of Americans professing religious association has declined. Since the 1960s, mainline Protestant denominations have suffered large declines in membership (Shafer 1998, 117-118). Today, evangelicals
form about 26% of the white population and about 20% of the overall population (Oldfield 1996, 26; Reichley 1992, 357). The growth in the number of evangelicals increased the potential political capacity of an evangelical movement by providing potential supporters and resources.

Re-Emergence of Evangelicals As a Political Force

Evangelicals began re-emerging as a political force in local and national politics in the 1970s. One broad factor behind the timing of this re-emergence is the changing nature of American politics. As class politics and southern white solidarity started to decline in the late 1960s, religion once again had the space to become an important and relevant political cleavage. Most refer to this latest mobilization as the New Christian Right, the religious right, or simply the Christian right (Wilcox 1996, Wald 1995). Scholars have offered different explanations for renewed political activism of evangelicals at this time. A full review of all the competing theories is outside of the scope of this study. Most accounts, however, focus on the importance of two interrelated factors, government decisions and broader changes within society, which threatened the morals and beliefs of evangelicals.

The political mobilization of evangelicals was fostered by a series of government actions. The Supreme Court, in particular, made several decisions perceived by many evangelicals as contributing to a moral decline in American society. One of the largest affronts to evangelical beliefs was the series of Supreme Court decisions to remove prayer from the public schools in the early 1960s. Although these decisions did not spark immediate mobilization, they "laid the groundwork" for future evangelical mobilization (Shafer 1998, 121). The Supreme Court's 1973 decision to legalize abortion played an even larger role in mobilizing evangelicals. First, this decision legalized what

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4 See Wald (1997), chapter 7, for a thorough review of the competing theories of evangelical mobilization.
evangelicals viewed as murder. Second, the nature of the law put evangelicals in a position where they were powerless to outlaw abortion even in states or localities where they were the majority (Oldfield 1996, 61). A further political agitation for evangelicals was the series of Supreme Court decisions, based on the First Amendment, making pornography more difficult to outlaw.

Equally important were the large-scale social, cultural and economic changes in society that many evangelicals perceived as clear signs of moral decline. When asked to explain their mobilization into politics, evangelical activists often point to social and economic changes which, in their minds, have disrupted the natural God-given order of things (Lunch 1995, 247). The biggest concern of the evangelical community has been the breakdown of the American family. Evangelicals saw signs of family decay in the increasing divorce rate, rising number of children born out of wedlock and the rising crime rates (Shafer 1998). Many evangelicals mention the changing status of women as a reason they became politically active (Lunch 1995, 247). Homosexuality was another symbol of immoral behavior encouraged by modern society. In addition, there was more and more explicit programming on television. Once again government was seen as playing a role in this decline by implementing no-fault divorce laws, irrational welfare policies and anti-family tax laws.

As evangelicals came into contact with lifestyles and worldviews they found abhorrent and the trend toward secularization of American culture continued, they were prompted to political action. A movement in West Virginia to keep "obscene" and pornographic books out of the schools and a referendum on a gay rights ordinance in Dade County Florida awakened evangelicals from decades of political acquiescence. Another political issue that launched evangelicals back into local and state level politics was opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment. Each of these campaigns attracted many different supporters but appealed most strongly to evangelical Protestants who saw
each campaign as a crusade in defense of traditional Christian values and tradition (Wald 1987, 188-189). These movements laid the groundwork for the eventual national mobilization of evangelicals.

The late 1970s saw the rise of a host of evangelical political organizations seeking to uphold traditional family values and conservative cultural principles. The Moral Majority, founded by televangelist Jerry Falwell, was the first evangelical organization to reach national prominence and media attention. Also founded in 1979 was the Christian Voice, an organization that grew out of an unsuccessful attempt by California evangelicals to pass a state law prohibiting the employment of homosexuals or advocates of homosexuality in publicly supported teaching positions. Evangelicals also founded the Religious Roundtable and the National Christian Action Coalition at this time. Today the dominant evangelical organizations are the Christian Coalition, which hosts the largest membership, the Family Research Council, which has been one of the most politically vocal evangelical organizations, and Concerned Women of America, an evangelical women’s group that was founded in 1978 and still maintains a 500,000 membership (Wilcox 1996). Although these organizations disagree on some things, such as how to frame their positions, they have focused on the same broad set of issues to rally evangelicals to political action.\(^5\)

**PART II: THE EVANGELICAL AGENDA**

In order to assess the responsiveness of the parties to evangelicals, it is first important to lay out the set of issues that represent the heart of their concerns. In this section I identify the political agenda of evangelicals based on several sources -- national surveys results, the stated goals of evangelical or Christian Right organizations and the

\(^5\) Gary Bauer, head of the Family Research Council, has been very critical of efforts made by the Christian Coalition, under the leadership of Ralph Reed, to soften their rhetoric in attempts to appeal to a broader audience. Nevertheless, the organizations focus on a similar set of social issues.
issues that have mobilized the evangelical community. Together these sources provide an empirically grounded picture of evangelical political beliefs and opinions, and more importantly, they provide a sense of which issues are particularly salient and meaningful to the evangelical community. I begin by discussing how evangelicalism provides a basis for group identification and for a cohesive political agenda. Then I discuss the central components of the evangelical agenda. Because their contemporary agenda contains multiple issues I break it down into four parts. The evangelical agenda includes: (1) support for religious institutions and a wider role of religion in the public sphere, (2) support for the traditional family (which includes support for women's traditional roles and opposition to gay rights), (3) opposition to abortion, and (4) opposition to pornography and other immoral cultural influences.

The Evangelical Basis for Group Identity

The driving force behind the political agenda of white evangelical Christians is their religion. Religion plays a significant role in the lives of most evangelicals. National Election Survey data, from which I draw my statistics unless otherwise indicated, reveals that most evangelicals feel that religion provides a good deal of guidance in their lives. Evangelicals are more active in their churches than mainline Protestants or Catholics. According to a poll conducted by Christianity Today in 1979, 62.5 percent of evangelicals contributed ten or more percent of their income to their church, compared to 29.9 percent of nonevangelicals (Soper 1994, 44). A 1980 Gallup poll indicated that 80 percent of evangelicals did voluntary work for their church, whereas only 48 percent of mainline Protestants and 36 percent of Catholics reported doing so (Soper 1994, 44). Along the same lines, evangelicals attend church, pray, and read their Bible significantly more often than other Christians. According to 1992 NES data, 41% of evangelicals claim to pray several times a day and over half attend church
Evangelicals are united by a powerful set of doctrinal beliefs. As discussed previously, an essential characteristic of evangelicalism is biblical literalism, a belief that all truths are contained in the Bible and that the Bible is infallible. "The Bible is held to be the rock that holds the faithful steady against the temptations of modernism" (Oldfield 1996, 56). Evangelicals have used the Bible as the grounds for their disputes with mainline protestants and scientists. Moreover, Biblical literalism has led evangelicals to oppose the theory of evolution, believe in millennial prophecies, and argue that God is active in historical development (Oldfield 1996). Thus, even the political views of evangelicals flow from their interpretation the Bible. Evangelicalism does not explicitly call for the use of political means to bring about social reform. Throughout American history, however, evangelicals have gotten involved in politics when social practices or government decisions have conflicted with their religious values. For evangelicals, the Bible provides the most significant source of moral legitimization for political involvement and positions (Soper 1994).

Many political scholars have recognized that evangelicals hold a distinct set of political interests that are structured by their religious beliefs (Oldfield 1996; Menendez 1996; Moen 1989; Soper 1994; Wilcox 1996). The unique and powerful religious understanding of evangelicals has fostered a high degree of concern with social and moral issues. Again and again, social issues spark the mobilization of evangelicals into politics. Moreover, virtually every empirical survey demonstrates close connections between evangelical beliefs and conservative views on social and moral issues (Wuthnow 1983, Jelen 1997). The importance of religion also can be seen by examining the views of "core evangelicals", those who attend church at least once a week (Wilcox 1996, 51). Surveys reveal that this smaller but more religiously committed group is even more
conservative on social and moral issues than other evangelicals. Thus, the importance of religion in the lives of evangelicals and the distinct beliefs inherent in evangelicalism has provided the basis for a fairly cohesive political agenda.

Before moving on to a fuller discussion of the evangelical agenda it is important to issue a note of caution. Although a majority of evangelicals hold similar views on many issues, support for conservative social policies has been far from unanimous. Although evangelicals are more conservative than the rest of the population on issues such as abortion, women's place, and gay rights, these are divisive issues even within the evangelical community. Therefore, we need to be cautious about attributing a single, unified political perspective to what is a diverse community. Nevertheless, the following sections attempt to illuminate that there is an identifiable set of issues that have mobilized evangelicals to political action and on which most evangelicals agree.

Role of Religion

One of the central reasons evangelicals have mobilized politically has been to defend and enlarge the role of religion in the public realm. As mentioned, religion plays a critical role in the lives of evangelicals. Moreover, evangelicals overwhelmingly agree that belief in God is a very important prerequisite for true Americans (see Figure 4.1). Evangelicals are significantly more committed to this position than mainline Protestants and Catholics (see Figure 4.1). Thus, evangelicals have been committed to integrating religion into American public life. Evangelical organizations have pushed the government to recognize that the United States is founded on Christian or Judeo-Christian principles (Moen 1996; Wilcox 1996). They have also pushed for legislation that helps sustain religious institutions in society, such as the tax-exempt status of churches and allowing prayers and religious symbols at public events.
Because of their concern with religion in public life, educational policy has been a particularly powerful issue for evangelicals. Many evangelicals believe that the public school system has created an environment in which religion is not tolerated. They lament the absence of school prayer and the teaching of evolution instead of creationism in biology classes. Since the question was first asked in NES surveys an overwhelmingly majority of evangelicals have supported allowing prayer in public schools. Since 1964, over 85% of evangelicals have supported prayer in public schools (see Figure 4.2). Evangelical activists also have denounced safe-sex educational programs and condom distribution in the public schools claiming that these programs undermine moral codes and religious values and increase sexual activity among students. Moreover, by providing information on homosexuality, AIDs, and basic information about human reproduction, many evangelicals argue that the curriculum in public schools encourages immoral behavior (Bruce 1995, 70 and Wilcox 1996, 116). Frustrated with the lack of religion and morality in the public school system, many evangelicals have sent their children to private religious institutions. Evangelical organizations have pushed for legislation supporting these schools, such as tax credits and school voucher programs and policies mandating the non-interference of the federal government in private school curriculum or policies.

The Traditional Family

Another core concern of evangelicals is the preservation of the traditional family, which they see as under siege by an immoral culture. For evangelicals the traditional family rests at the core of their worldview (Klatch 1987; Soper 1994). According to 1992 NES data, 87 percent of evangelicals responded that family values are important.⑥

⑥ However, evangelicals are not unique in this respect. Mainline protestants and Catholics are almost equally likely to hold this same view.
The ideal family for evangelicals is one where the mother and father have clearly defined and differentiated roles, the father working for wages outside the home and the mother working as a homemaker, at least while her children are young (Oldfield 1996; Soper 1994; Wilcox 1996). Evangelical organizations clearly state that the promotion of the traditional family is their central goal.\(^7\) Moreover, evangelical activists have argued explicitly that the government has a unique responsibility to promote and encourage the traditional family unit.

Evangelical concern with the traditional family naturally entails support for women's traditional roles in society. Thus it is not surprising that the Equal Rights Amendment, which many believed would undermine women's traditional roles and force homemakers into the workforce, mobilized many evangelicals into politics (Mansbridge 1986). Opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment was one of the first positions to be included in the "moral" report cards published by evangelical organizations (Wald 1986, 197). More recently evangelical organizations have sought to protect the traditional role of women by pushing for tax-breaks for families with children, which would allow women to stay home and pushing for a "Homemakers' Rights Act", which would allow homemakers to contribute up to $2,000 a year toward an Individual Retirement Account. National surveys reveal that there is a large difference between evangelicals, especially core evangelicals (those who attend church at least once a week) and other Americans concerning the role of women in society (see Figure 4.3). Evangelicals are significantly more likely than other whites to oppose equality for women and to believe that men should have more power in families. However, a majority of evangelicals do favor equality for women. This should not be seen as contradictory to belief in the traditional

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\(^7\) The web page of the Family Research Council states that the organization "Exists to reaffirm and promote nationally, and particularly in Washington DC, the traditional family unit and the Judeo-Christian value system upon which it is built."
family. Although evangelicals view women and men as having different duties, women's roles have long been perceived as equally, if not more, important (Kraditor 1965).

Supporting the traditional family also entails opposition to homosexuality. Evangelicals are highly unified in their belief that homosexuality is immoral and should be actively discouraged. Wald argues that perhaps "no other policy debate, not even abortion, can match gay rights as a hot-button issue for religious conservatives" (1995, 36). Although eliminating homosexuality is not typically highlighted in its literature,° opposition to it is a key agenda item for all evangelical groups (Wilcox 1996, 118). Evangelical organizations have been very active at the local, state and national level in attempting to defeat gay rights proposals arguing that any protection of gay rights simply legitimizes this immoral lifestyle (Wald 1995). According to NES data a majority of evangelicals strongly oppose allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military and oppose the passage of anti-discrimination laws for gays, whereas a majority of Americans and a majority of other religious groups, such as Catholics and mainline Protestants, support both of these proposals (see Figure 4.4). All these groups, however, are opposed to the idea of gay adoptions.

**Abortion**

Beyond protecting the traditional family, evangelical organizations are strongly unified in their opposition to abortion. According to some scholars of the Christian right, the need to protect innocent life through the banning abortion is the movement's first priority (Oldfield 1996, 68). Based on particular Bible passages evangelicals believe that abortion is murder and this inspires passionate commitment to protect innocent life. Every "moral" report card put out by evangelical organizations includes several

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° For example, the "Contract with the American Family" published by the Christian Coalition in 1995, makes no explicit mention of eliminating pornography as one of its central goals.

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congressional votes concerning abortion. The moral position is always the one that, in any way, makes abortion more difficult to obtain. This is consistent with the views of evangelicals, of whom a vast majority support making abortions more difficult to obtain. NES data reveal that 85% of evangelicals support parental notification for abortion. Moreover, the vast majority of core evangelicals either oppose abortion under all circumstances or would only allow them in rare circumstances while the general public thinks that abortions should usually or always be allowed (see Figure 4.5).

**Pornography and Negative Cultural Influences**

Evangelicals view pornography and other cultural influences, such as the increased sex and nudity on television, as threats to their morals and values. Much like gay rights and abortion, the issue of pornography has mobilized many evangelicals. Evangelicals have formed numerous anti-pornography organizations such as Citizens Against Pornography (1982) and the National Coalition against Pornography (1983) (Soper 1994). Moreover, the top three evangelical organizations today, the Christian Coalition, Focus on the Family, and Concerned Women of America, identify protecting people from pornography as one of their central goals.

Thus evangelicals have been active in endorsing legislation that restricts the distribution and possession of pornography such as banning pornography from the internet. Countless local evangelical groups have sought to remove books and newspapers they find offensive from their libraries and to stop the sale of adult magazines in their community (Wilcox 1996, 122). Such concerns have also translated into strong opposition for funding for federal cultural agencies such as the National Endowment of the Arts, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the Legal Services Corporation. Finally, evangelical organizations have promoted stricter regulation of television and promoted Christian stations, which present family friendly programming.
It is important to point out that by supporting such legislation, evangelical groups do not see themselves as imposing their morality on everyone else. Rather they believe that allowing the sale and possession of pornography will distort the realization of Christian values within their communities (Soper 1994, 118).

Race and the Evangelical Agenda?

What degree does race enter into the agenda of evangelical organizations? This is a very difficult question. In the past there has been a clear connection between white evangelicals and racism. Because evangelicals are disproportionately southern, they have been closely tied to that region's troubled racial history (Oldfield 1996, 57). Leaders of the Christian Right have acknowledged the role of the evangelical church in fostering racial discrimination and have made great strides to overcome this legacy. Ralph Reed confessed that "the white evangelical church was, sadly and painfully, the picket fence that once sustained Jim Crow and segregation" (Shepard 1997, 14A). Evangelical leaders now preach racial equality and have even reached out to black evangelicals to join their pursuit for pro-family policies (Calhoun-Brown, 1997). Although the views of evangelicals and evangelical leaders on race-related issue remain quite conservative, their views are not much different from other whites. In fact, NES data reveal that evangelicals are more likely than other whites to favor ending all forms of active discrimination, although they are less likely to favor government aid to blacks or efforts to ameliorate the prior effects of racism. The extent that these views reflect outright prejudice is hard to determine. Based on the goals and actions of evangelical organizations, however, it appears that racism is no longer an explicit component of the evangelical agenda.
Economic Issues

Evangelical organizations have taken stands on issues beyond the social and moral realm. Several Christian Right organizations have supported conservative economic policies, such as tax cuts and privatizing the welfare system. Economic issues, however, do not seem to be the priority of evangelical organizations. This can be seen in the way these issues are framed. As Wald pointed out, "Jerry Falwell has asserted a scriptural basis for low inflation, flat-rate taxation, and a balanced federal budget" (1987, 191). More recently the Christian Coalition has framed its support for tax cuts as a means to strengthen the family and allow women to stay home with their children. An even more telling indicator of evangelical priorities is that evangelical organizations have predominantly committed their resources to social issues, not economic ones (Moen 1989). In his interviews with Christian Right activists, Duane Oldfield found little doubt that it was social issue concerns that fired their enthusiasm (1996, 68).

Attempts by evangelical leaders to discuss economic issues have been highly ineffective at mobilizing their followers (Rozell and Wilcox, 1995). Jelen (1997) argues that despite the attempts of evangelical leaders to promote an economically conservative agenda, the relationship between evangelicalism and economic conservatism at the mass level is quite weak. National Election Survey data suggest that on economic issues white evangelicals are indistinguishable from mainline Protestants but more conservative than Catholics or those with no religious ties. A few studies, however, demonstrate that white evangelicals are slightly more liberal on economic issues than other Americans (Jelen 1997). Moreover, a study of Protestant clergy found that in some evangelical denominations, such as the Assemblies and Southern Baptists, the clergy take faintly liberal stances on social welfare issues (Guth et. al, 1991).
PART III: THE BEHAVIOR OF THE PARTIES TOWARDS EVANGELICALS

How responsive have the parties been to the political concerns of evangelicals? To gauge this I rely on several sources, content analysis of party platforms and State of the Union Addresses and examining the legislative agenda of each party. For the majority of the 20th century, both parties ignored the issues that later became the basis for evangelical mobilization. In the 1960s, the platforms, campaigns and legislative agendas of both parties dealt with issues such as national defense, economic policy, crime, and racial issues. However, they contained no discussion of abortion, gender roles, gay rights, the family, pornography, traditional values, or the proper role of religion in public life. Religious and cultural issues such as these were simply not within the scope of partisan competition. Over the next several decades, the parties began devoting more and more space to these issues in their platform. Moreover, the parties assumed bolder and more ideologically distinct stances. Divisions on moral issues were not limited to the platforms. They were reflected in the legislative agendas and congressional voting behavior of the two parties. Moreover, they were reflected in the public's perception of what the parties represented.

EVANGELICALS AND THE REPUBLICAN PARTY

How responsive has the Republican party been to the concerns of evangelicals? This has been the topic of significant debate. Several scholars suggest the influence of the Christian Right on the Republican party has been exaggerated in many accounts, particularly accounts in the popular media (Rozell and Wilcox 1995). They point out that after almost two decades of heightened political involvement by evangelicals, abortion is still legal, public schools still cannot begin their days with a prayer, and gays and lesbians continue to gain equality and acceptance in society. In contrast, I argue that the
Republican party has gone from ignoring the issues of concern to the evangelical community to engaging in what I label a highly positive response. I base this on the fact that over time the Republican party has supported each and every issue in the evangelical agenda in its platform and legislative agenda. Moreover, the Republican party has helped give legitimacy to evangelical concerns and provided them a secure space on the highly limited national agenda. The Republican party may not always include these issues as their top priorities, and it may not always get these issues passed into legislation, but the party has embraced the entire evangelical agenda.

Religion

A central motivation for evangelical political involvement has been their belief that the government needs to protect and extend the influence of religion, particularly Christian institutions. Prior to 1980, the platforms of the Republican party are noteworthy for their lack of discussion about religion. The Republican party first endorsed school prayer in 1964, but this was the only plank relating to religion. Over time references to religion, God and Christianity have increased fairly dramatically. Republican platforms have come to support legislation guaranteeing equal access to school facilities by student religious groups and the tax-free status of churches, religious schools and all other religious institutions. Starting in 1988 the party began expressing opposition to public school programs that provide birth control or abortion referrals and began supporting the Family Life program, which teaches students about the traditional values of restraint and sanctity of marriage. In 1992, the Republican platform added language to support home schooling.

In 1988 the party stated that "The family's most importance function is to raise the next generation of Americans, handing on to them the Judeo-Christian values of western
This is significant because it is the first time the Republican party uses the more exclusive "Judeo-Christian" term in its platform and because this statement mirrors the rhetoric of evangelical organizations who stress the critical role of family in passing religious values to children. A similar change can be seen in the wording used to support school prayer. Originally the party spoke of a non-denominational prayer but over time the term "non-denominational" was dropped. In addition, from 1964 to 1988, the plank supporting school prayer began with the cautionary phrase, "Mindful of our countries' rich religious pluralism". In 1992 this was changed to "Mindful of our country's Judeo-Christian heritage, we support the right of students to engage in voluntary prayer in schools and the right of the community to do so at commencements or other occasions". Starting in 1992, Republican platforms also contain quotes from the Bible.

The importance of these religious issues within the Republican party is demonstrated by their integration into the state of the union addresses of Republican presidents. Year after year, Ronald Reagan discussed the passage of tuition tax credits for parents who want to send their children to religiously affiliated schools. He promoted 1983 as "the year of the Bible" (Oldfield 1996, 119). Moreover, Ronald Reagan repeatedly invoked strong language to support a constitutional amendment returning prayer to public schools. In 1983, he stated that "God should never have been expelled from America's classrooms in the first place" (1983 CQ Almanac 5-E). Four years later he implored the American people and Congress to "stop suppressing the spiritual core of our national being. Our nation could not have been conceived without divine help. Why is it that we can build a nation with our prayers but we can't use a schoolroom for voluntary prayer?" (1987 CQ Almanac, 8-D). Republican president George Bush

9 All quotes from party platforms are from the CD, The American Reference Library, The Western Standard Publishing Company, which includes the full text of all the party platforms from 1840-1996.
10 emphasis mine
reinforced the importance of religion in the public sphere by beginning his 1989 inaugural address with a prayer.\textsuperscript{11}

Republicans have not just endorsed the ideas of the Christian Right but have worked to turn them into legislation. In the early 1980s Congressional Republicans secured the passage of a rider restricting the Justice Department from enforcing school prayer laws and the White House pushed a school prayer amendment that received the votes of a majority of the Senate (Moen 1989). After gaining control of Congress in 1994, Republicans have introduced legislation to establish school vouchers for use at religious and other private schools and to ban the federal government from discriminating against religious organizations in the receipt of public money. They have, once again, sponsored a constitutional amendment allowing organized prayer in public schools, which would also have allowed religious symbols on public property and tax money to be used for religious activities. Although the measure did not secure the two-thirds majority needed to pass, it was supported by a majority of House members, including 197 Republicans. Meanwhile the amendment garnered support from only 27 Democrats (Seelye 1988). Republicans also initiated debate on a proposal for mandatory sanctions on countries that engage in religious persecution (Martinez 1998).

\textbf{The Traditional Family}

As discussed previously, the preservation and protection of the traditional family against its erosion in society represents the core of the evangelical political agenda. Prior to 1976 Republican platforms do not discuss the family, except to talk about the "family farm" or "low-income families". The term "traditional family" is never used until

\textsuperscript{11} George Bush stated "And my first act as President is a prayer and I ask you to bow your heads" (1989 CQ Alamanac7-C).
1980. In this year, however, Republicans "reaffirm our belief in the traditional role and values of the family in our society" and caution that "For the first time in our history, there is a real concern the family may not survive". Each year the platform contains more pledges to use government to restore morality in American society. Also starting in 1980, the Republicans have consistently called for the appointment of judges who would uphold "traditional family values" and for the elimination of the marriage tax.

**Women's Rights**

One of the clearest indicators of change within the Republican party has been its position on the role of women and feminist issues. Starting in 1940 and continuing for the next forty years the Republican party encouraged the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment in every platform. In 1980, however, support for the ERA was dropped and replaced with highly ambiguous language: "We acknowledge the legitimate efforts of those who support or oppose ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment". Ronald Reagan was vocal in his opposition to the Equal Rights Amendment, while congressional Republicans played a significant role in defeating attempts to resurrect the Amendment after its failure to achieve ratification in the states by 1982 (Mansbridge 1986). After that, all mentions of the Equal Rights Amendment disappear from Republican platforms.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Republican party continued to affirm vague support for women's economic rights, while much greater emphasis has been placed on women's role within the family. The Republicans "applaud our society's increasing awareness of the role of homemakers in the economy." Moreover, starting in 1980 the Republicans began praising and promising to protect the traditional role of women. "The damage being done to the family takes its greatest toll on the woman ... The importance of support for the mother and homemaker in maintaining the values of this country"
cannot be overemphasized". Even in the 1996 presidential campaign, Republican candidate Bob Dole framed his massive tax-cut proposal as a means to allow women to stay home.

**Gay and Lesbian Rights**

Although the emphasis within Republican platforms and rhetoric on traditional families implied that the party was opposed to gay and lesbian rights, it was not until the 1990s that the party directly tackled this issue. The 1992 platform proclaimed that Republicans were opposed to same sex marriages, adoptions by same sex couples, and the extension of anti-discrimination legislation to homosexuals. The party also denounced all corporations that cut off contributions to the Boy Scouts in response to their exclusion of gays. "We reject the irresponsible position of those corporations that have cut off contributions to such organizations because of their courageous stand for family values". The section of the 1992 platform addressing AIDS was amended to call for education stressing abstinence, to denounce the distribution of condoms or clean needles, and to call for legislation making it a criminal act to knowingly transmit the AIDS virus. The 1996 platform included these same planks on gay rights and AIDS.

Republicans have been active in sponsoring legislation to curtail the rights of gays and lesbians. Under Ronald Reagan, the Legal Services Administration was prevented from taking legal action to "promote, defend or protect homosexuality" (Oldfield 1996, 119). In the summer of 1998, Republicans in Congress tried to pass several anti-gay measures (Ghent 1998b). One of these was a rider prohibiting the enforcement of a directive given by the White House granting employment nondiscrimination rights to federal workers who are gay and lesbian (Ghent 1998a). Senate Majority leader Trent Lott held up the nomination of a gay philanthropist as ambassador based on some lawmakers' assertions that he would promote homosexuality overseas.
Abortion

In its 1976 platform, the Republican party spoke about abortion for the first time, taking a cautious position opposing the 1973 *Roe v. Wade* decision. The party declared its approval of a constitutional amendment to overturn the *Roe* decision, but also embraced a position of tolerance, by acknowledging that the party respected the views of everyone on this controversial and difficult issue. Over time, the party's discussion of tolerance was dropped and replaced with clear, strong opposition to abortion in all cases. The 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 platforms use the same language to oppose abortion, "The unborn child has a fundamental individual right to life which cannot be infringed. We support a human life amendment to the Constitution and we endorse legislation to make it clear that the Fourteenth Amendment's protections apply to unborn children."

Starting in 1980, the party demonstrated a stronger commitment to the pro-life cause by advocating the appointment of only pro-life judges. Moreover, the party began opposing public funding of abortions and giving government money to any organizations, domestic or international, that performed or even discussed abortion. In 1992 language was added to protect Operation Rescue against prosecution under RICO laws.

Ronald Reagan brought the issue of abortion to the center of the Republican agenda when he repeatedly applauded efforts to protect unborn children in his State of the Union Addresses. In 1984 he questioned "unless it can be proven that an unborn child is not a living human being, can we justify assuming without proof that it is not?" (1984 CQ Almanac, 7-E). In 1986 he argued that "America will never be whole as long as the right to life granted by our Creator is denied to the unborn. For the rest of my time, I shall do what I can to see that this wound is one day healed" (1986 CQ Almanac, 4-D). Presidents Ronald Reagan and George Bush issued a "gag rule", an executive order that barred the bureaucracy from distributing public funds to any family planning
organization that mentioned abortion, a decision that restricted abortion access considerably (Wilcox 1996, 85). Moreover, Republican presidents have been very faithful in carrying out the party's pledge to nominate only pro-life judges (Reichley 1995, 71).

Republicans in Congress have introduced and in some cases, succeeded in passing laws that reduce access to abortion. Although the Republican administration under Reagan lacked the votes in Congress to reverse Roe v. Wade, the administration was able to pass some riders that further restricted federal funding of abortion (Oldfield 1996, 119). Since becoming the majority in Congress, Republican leaders have introduced many bills making abortion more difficult to obtain, such as making it a crime to take a minor across state lines for an abortion and outlawing certain late-term abortion procedures. Although eventually vetoed by President Clinton, Congressional Republicans sponsored and successfully passed a bill banning one late term abortion procedure.

**Pornography and Negative Cultural Influences**

The Republican party has increasingly become more supportive of efforts to reduce and regulate "hostile" or "immoral" cultural influences. The Reagan administration took some of the first steps in this regard by creating a commission on pornography to study the problem.\(^{12}\) Moreover, Ronald Reagan highlighted the party's commitment to tackling the issues of pornography when he spoke of the need for families and communities to "band together to fight pornography" in his 1986 State of the Union Address (1986 CQ Almanac 4-D). The first Republican platform to express opposition to pornography was the 1984 platform, which condemned its negative influence and supported strict enforcement of laws regulating cable porn. The 1988 platform contains

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\(^{12}\)Reagan's creation of a commission on pornography is mentioned in the 1984 Republican platform.
an entire section titled "pornography" that deplores its evils in more depth. The 1992 platform contains the strongest condemnation of pornography along with Christian undertones: "We must recognize that the time has come for a national crusade against pornography ... We call on federal agencies to halt the sale, under government auspices, of pornographic materials." Republicans explain their involvement in regulating pornography by stating that the government has the responsibility "to ensure that it promotes the common moral values that bind us together as a nation".13

Related to the party's strengthening opposition to pornography is a condemnation of other cultural mediums seen as promoting immoral values. The 1992 platform contains a biting criticism of the National Endowment of the Arts. "We therefore condemn the use of public funds to subsidize obscenity and blasphemy masquerading as art ... no artist has an inherent right to claim taxpayer support for his or her private vision of art if that vision mocks the moral and spiritual basis on which our society is founded". Republicans highlighted the importance of this issue by including a call to end funding to the National Endowment for the Arts in the party's 1994 Contract with America, an overview of the party's legislative priorities. Although ultimately unsuccessful, congressional Republicans did hold roll-call votes on this and were highly unified in voting to end funding to the National Endowment for the Arts. Another particularly poignant section of the 1992 platform was titled "Promoting cultural values". In this section Republicans declared that the entertainment industry, media, academics, and the Democratic party were "waging a guerilla war against American values. They deny personal responsibility, disparage religion and promote hostility towards the family's way

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13 Interestingly, the Republican party's escalating condemnation of pornography stops in 1992. There is no mention of pornography in the 1996 platform.
of life". In an attempt to stem the flow of this war on values, Congressional Republicans incorporated a ban on Internet pornography into the 1996 Telecommunications Bill (Wilcox 1996, 87).

**High Grades on Moral Report Cards**

Starting in the late 1970s, various evangelical or Christian Right organizations began issuing "moral report cards". Like other interest groups that rate elected officials by their support for favored causes, evangelical organizations identify a key set of roll call votes each election year and have ranked candidates by their fidelity to the position endorsed by the group. The Christian Voice was the first evangelical organization to publish these cards, but across the 1990s the Christian Coalition has taken over this task. Examining these scorecards provides further affirmation that the Republican party is highly supportive of the evangelical agenda. In 1998, Republicans sponsored all the legislation that was supported in these report cards. Senate Republicans received an aggregate rating of 78.5 and 14 Republican Senators received a score of 100 on the Christian Coalition's scorecard. Only five Republican Senators received a score under 50.

**Priority and Space devoted to Evangelical Issues**

Two crude indicators of the importance of issues to a party are the space devoted to them in the platforms and where they are mentioned in the platform (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Discussions of evangelical themes creep closer and closer to the start of Republican platforms and come to take up more and more space over time. In 1992, the first topic the platform discusses is the family, including sub-sections on cultural values, and opposition to abortion. Before the party even talks about the economy or taxes, which up through the 1980s had been their lead issues, they spend one-fifth of their
platform discussing evangelical issues. The placement of the family agenda at the start of
the platform and the significant amount of space devoted to pro-family issues are
unmistakable signs of the importance of these issues. In the 1996 platform, the section on
family values no longer is the first topic, but discussion of evangelical issues still
composes about 20% of the platform. Despite many analysts’ claims that Republicans
were trying to soften their platform in 1996, it still contained strong support for every
issue on the evangelical agenda - prayer in schools, protecting traditional families,
opposition to gay rights, opposition to abortion - except pornography.

EVANGELICALS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

At the start of the 1970s, the Democratic party, much like its Republican
counterpart, ignored the social issues that came to represent the heart of evangelical
concerns. Since then, however, the behavior of the Democratic party has followed a
much different pattern than the Republican party. Across the 1970s and 1980s the
Democratic party increasingly embraced positions antithetical to the evangelical agenda.
Also unlike the Republican party, whose behavior represents a steady pattern of
becoming more responsive, the Democratic party’s pattern appears to reverse directions
starting in the 1990s. In the past decade, the Democratic party has softened its opposition
to evangelical positions and embraced several policies that are fairly congruent with
evangelical interests. To capture this change I discuss the party’s response to
evangelicals in two separate sections, one covering their behavior up to the 1990s and the
second covering the 1990s.

Pre-1990 Democratic Party

Prior to the 1990s, Democratic platforms consistently espouse strong support for a
strict separation between church and state. The 1984 platform contains a section titled
"Religious Liberty and Church/ State Separation" in which the Democratic party "affirms its support of the principles of religious liberty, religious tolerance and church/ state separation and of the Supreme Court decisions forbidding violation of those principles. We pledge to resist all efforts to weaken those decisions". Equally important is what the Democratic party does not say. They offer no support or encouragement of any kind to religious institutions, churches or private religious schools.

Prior to the 1970s the Democratic party did not discuss the family in its platform. In 1980 the Democratic party takes its first tentative steps into the family values debate by including a very short section in the platform titled "The Family". All that is included under this heading is the following statement: "The Democratic Party supports efforts to make federal programs more sensitive to the needs of the family, in all its diverse forms". Although the party did not elaborate on what this phrase meant, it appears to contradict the more narrow vision of the traditional family inherent in evangelical ideology. In 1980, also for the first time, the Democratic party explicitly recognizes sexual orientation as a category deserving of civil rights protection and continues to do so through its most current platform. The 1988 platform advocates "compassionate patient care" and "protection of the civil rights of those suffering from AIDS or AIDS-Related Complex".

In response to the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision the Democratic party adopted a pro-choice platform in their 1976 platform. Much like the initial wording used by the Republican party, its statement was cautious and stresses recognition for diverse positions: "We fully recognize the religious and ethical nature of the concerns which many Americans have on the subject of abortion. We feel, however, that it is undesirable to attempt to amend the U.S. Constitution to overturn the Supreme Court decision in this area". The party's stance became considerably stronger over time, dropping language

14 emphasis mine
recognizing different views on the topic and calling for federal funding for abortions. In 1988, the Democratic party asserts that "the fundamental right of reproductive choice should be guaranteed regardless of ability to pay".

The Democratic party trailed the Republican party in their decision to support the Equal Rights Amendment. However, the Democratic party proved to be a more faithful supporter; from the 1960s to the present, the Democratic party has continued to endorse the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment in their platforms. More significant than this consistency is the weight the party has given to the ERA. In 1980, when the Equal Rights Amendment was facing a daunting battle for ratification in the states, the Democratic party visibly strengthened their commitment to its passage. The party pledged to "withhold financial support and technical campaign assistance from candidates who do not support the ERA". In addition, the party refused to hold any meetings in states that had not ratified the ERA and encouraged all national organizations to uphold this boycott. Thus, the party made support for the Equal Rights Amendment a virtually required position of all Democratic candidates. Compared to their Republican counterparts, Democratic platforms spend considerably more time emphasizing the needs and rights of working women and considerably less time discussing homemakers. In the 1980 platform, the Democratic party offered sections on "women in business" and "women and the economy". Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the party consistently promised government action to aid women-owned businesses, assist women's entrance into fields traditionally reserved for men, and enforce equal pay for jobs of comparable worth.

Although the Democratic party certainly does not support pornography, its platforms do not discuss opposition to pornography either. Democratic platforms express unqualified support for the arts and the need for art to be unregulated. The 1984 platform has a section titled "Investing in the Arts" in which the party argues that a
Democratic administration will strengthen federal agencies that support the arts and free them from political intimidation.

Democratic Party and Evangelical Issues: the 1990s

The Democratic party's platforms and to a lesser extent its legislative agenda underwent a change starting in 1992. As mentioned previously, the Democratic party began altering its positions on several issues, in a way more congenial with the interests of evangelicals. One change is that the Democratic party makes explicit references to God in its 1992 and 1996 platforms, which it had never done before. Contrary to previous platforms supporting a strict separation of Church and State, the 1996 Democratic platform states: "Americans have a right to express their love of God in public, and we applaud the President's work to ensure that children are not denied private religious expression in school".

Overall, the Democratic platforms in the 1990s spend considerably more time stressing the importance of families and values than in the past. The 1992 platform contains an entire subsection titled "Strengthening the family" under which it states that "People who bring children into this world have a responsibility to care for them and give them values, motivation and discipline". Meanwhile, the 1996 platform was called "Meeting America's Challenges, Protecting America's Values" and began with the wish that all Americans could reach their "God-given potential". In his 1996 State of the Union Address President Clinton stated that "Families are the foundation of American life". Moreover, the Democratic party included proposals to increase parental authority. In 1996, the Democratic platform states "We want parents to bring order to their children's lives and teach them right from wrong", which echoes the deeply embedded desire among evangelicals to pass the values of the evangelical subculture on to the next
The platform expresses support for several concrete ways to increase parental authority such as implementation of curfews and uniforms in the public school. In his 1996 State of the Union Address Clinton stated that "I challenge America's families to work harder to stay together" (1996 CQ Almanac, D-6).

Starting in 1992, the party's discussion of women's rights and feminist issues receives a much smaller proportion of the platform compared to previous ones. There is no section solely devoted to women, women's rights, or women in the workplace and there is not even a full sentence devoted to support for the Equal Rights Amendment. When women's issues are mentioned they are framed in family friendly terms. In the 1992 platform feminist issues, such as support for affordable child-care, pay equity, and reducing spousal abuse, are listed under the section titled "Strengthening the Family". Jo Freeman argues that in the Democratic party's 1996 platform and throughout the 1996 campaign "Almost every press release, statement or speech aimed at women used the phrase 'women and their families' or 'women and children'" (1997, 365).

Although Democratic platforms and Democratic office-holders, in the aggregate, remain strongly supportive of the pro-choice position on abortion, this support has been expressed with more reservations across the 1990s. In 1992 the party added that "The goal of our nation must be to make abortion less necessary" to their abortion plank. Although the media focused intently on efforts by the Republican party to secure tolerance language in their abortion plank, it is the Democratic plank on abortion that did so in 1996. The language of the Democratic platform on abortion was changed to recognize respect for all views, language that had been dropped from earlier platforms. The 1996 platform was modified to say: "The Democratic party is a party of inclusion. We respect the individual conscience of each American on this difficult issue, and we

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15 For a fuller discussion of the commitment among evangelical organizations and the evangelical community more broadly to pass their values to their children see Oldfield 1996, Chapter 2.

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welcome all our members to participate at every level of our party". Moreover the 1996 platform has a section titled "Teen Pregnancy" under which the party states that "We must send the strongest possible signal to young people that it is wrong to get pregnant or father a child until they are married".

The 1996 platform also contained a section on "Responsible Entertainment" in which the party expressed support for the V-Chip and a rating system for television programs. They are careful to point out that "When parents control the remote, it is not censorship, it is personal responsibility for their children's upbringing". In his 1996 state of the union address, Bill Clinton pointedly told the media to "create movies, CDs and television shows you would want your own children and grandchildren to enjoy" (1996 CQ Almanac D-6). The 1996 platform supported "high-quality, family-friendly programming" and echoed President Clinton's call to the entertainment industry to "work harder to develop and promote movies, music and TV shows that are suitable - and educational - for children".
REVIEWS OF PARTY RESPONSIVENESS TO EVANGELICALS

THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: has gone from not discussing the issues of concern to the evangelical community (no response) to engaging in a highly positive response.

Religion:

1980 to present:
- supports Judeo-Christian values as foundation of American society
- supports return of prayer to public schools
- supports tax-exemptions for religious institutions
- supports vouchers for use at religious schools

The Traditional Family and Traditional Family Values

Prior to 1980:
- no mention of traditional family or values
- supports Equal Rights Amendment

1980 to present:
- drops support for Equal Rights Amendment
- applauds women's traditional roles as homemaker and mother
- supports tax cuts as means to allow women to stay home
- opposes same-sex marriages, adoptions by gay couples, and antidiscrimination legislation to protect gays.
- begins using sexual orientation as criteria in approving presidential appointments.

Abortion

1976: tentatively opposes Roe v. Wade decision, but acknowledges the existence of diverse views on the subject
1980: begins using pro-life support as criteria for appointments
1984: supports a constitutional ban on all abortions, with no exceptions
1995: begins passing legislation to restrict abortion

Pornography and Negative Cultural Influences

Pre-1980: no mentions of pornography or need to censor art

1980 - present:
- creates commission to study problem of pornography
- hails need to regulate pornography and enforce regulations
- declares "national crusade against pornography"
- attempts to strip funding from National Endowment for the Arts

4.1: Party Responsiveness Towards Evangelicals (continued)
THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY: Across the 1970s and 1980s the Democratic party responded negatively to evangelicals by embracing positions antithetical to their concerns. In 1990 the Democratic party has adopted a "mixed" response, adopting some positions supportive of evangelical concerns and some opposed.

**Pre 1990:**
- supports strict separation between church and state
- supports the family "in all its diverse forms"
- recognizes sexual orientation as a category deserving of civil rights protections
- supports unqualified pro-choice position on abortion
- calls for federal funding for abortions
- ties support for ERA with funding, making support a virtually mandatory position for all candidates
- strongly supports unregulated, well-financed arts

**1990-present:**
- declares Americans have the right to express their love of God in public
- proclaims that children should not be denied private religious expression in school
- qualifies pro-choice position by recognizing the views of pro-lifers in the party and discouraging abortion
- recognizes importance of families, parental authority, and values
- feminist issues are framed in family-friendly terms
- supports a series of legislation to promote responsible entertainment
PART IV: THEORIES OF PARTY BEHAVIOR: HOW WELL DO THEY EXPLAIN?

The preceding section demonstrated that the parties have responded differently to demands for inclusion from evangelicals. How can we explain the variation in their responses? Why did the Republican party continue to endorse more and more of the evangelical agenda? Why did the Democratic party change its behavior in the 1990s? I turn now to existing theories of party behavior reviewed earlier and assess how well they explain the response patterns of the two parties.

Pluralism: Accommodation Model

According to the pluralist theory of party behavior, there are strong reasons to predict that both parties would make some effort to woo evangelicals. In the five decades preceding the 1970s, white evangelical Christians largely withdrew from American politics creating little incentive for either party to actively court their vote. In the 1970s, however, evangelicals emerged from their political slumber and re-entered the political arena armed with several relatively new and important resources. The first resource was sheer numbers. The number of white evangelicals in American society has been increasing steadily since the 1960s and by most estimates this demographic group now forms about 20% of the population and 26% of the white population. Evangelicals form a majority of all citizens in several southern states as well as Idaho, Alaska and Utah (Shafer 1998, 119). Moreover, the number of evangelicals is continuing to increase at a faster rate than most other religious and demographic groups in American society.

When evangelicals re-emerged politically in the 1970s, not only did they form a sizable group, but also their partisan loyalties were largely up for grabs (Shafer 1998, 193).
Historically, evangelicals had identified as Democrats, but their loyalty to the Democratic party had been weakening since the early 1960s, creating a large pool of Independent and weak partisans open to wooing by whichever party attempted to address their moral and social concerns. The voting patterns of evangelicals across the 1960s and 1970s were highly volatile, reinforcing the idea that this group of voters could potentially be won by either party. In the 1960, 1968, and 1972 presidential contests, a majority of white evangelicals supported the Republican candidate whereas in 1964, and 1976 a majority of white evangelicals supported the Democratic candidate (Oldfield 1996 103-8; Reichley 1992, 357; Shafer 1998; Wald 1987, 185). Moreover, there is evidence that the evangelical vote was critical to the success of both parties. Many political analysts credited the victory of Democrat Jimmy Carter in 1976 to his ability to win back the support of evangelicals who had strayed from the Democratic fold in previous elections (Oldfield 1996; Wald 1997). Meanwhile pollster Louis Harris argued that Ronald Reagan's margin among evangelicals put him in the White House in 1980 (Guth 1983, 38). Overall, evangelical Christians formed a bloc of voters susceptible to appeals from either party and critical to the fulfillment of both parties' desires to gain or maintain a majority following in society.

To some degree the Republican party acted as the pluralist model predicts. Having been the minority party for decades, Republican elites had a particularly intense desire to put together a majority coalition. The party was eager to reach out to almost any group to achieve this goal. At the start of the 1980s, one Republican party official observed that "When you are as distinct a minority as we are, you welcome anything short of the National Order of Child Molesters" (Guth 1983, 36). Many within the Republican party viewed evangelicals as the key to Republican victories. Therefore, the party reached out to this demographic group by creating and funding outreach efforts, such as the American Coalition for Traditional Values (ACTV), whose sole purpose was
to mobilize evangelicals to vote Republican (Oldfield 1996, 124). In typical pluralist fashion, the Republican party stretched open its platform and legislative agenda to make room for some of the religious and moral demands of the group. The party took a strong pro-life position, dropped their support of the Equal Rights Amendment, strengthened their support for prayer in the schools, and began stressing the importance of traditional families. Also, as predicted by the pluralist model, the party's desire to appeal to evangelicals was greater than its desire for ideological coherence. The party embraced a platform and legislative agenda that contained some internal contradictions in order to accommodate evangelicals. Finally, despite accommodating some elements of the evangelical agenda, the party was reluctant to prioritize the concerns of evangelicals over others in the coalition.

I argue that the behavior of the Republican party began to exceed these initial pluralistic efforts in the mid-to-late 1980s. The initial accommodation of evangelical concerns by the Republican party turned into full-scale endorsement of all the concerns of evangelicals. In other words, the Republican party has become *more responsive* than the pluralist perspective would predict. Pluralism suggests the parties will throw out concessions to each group, but not devote one-fifth of their platform to including every demand the group has. There were also signs by the mid-1980s that many within the Republican party were trying to contain evangelical influence, rather than accommodate their concerns. The Republican party refused to support outreach efforts towards evangelicals in 1986. Tim LaHaye, who had headed earlier outreach projects towards this group, wanted to launch a similar effort in 1986 but the party refused to fund it (Oldfield 1996, 124). His view was that the party was frightened by the growing power of evangelicals in the party. Yet the Republican party continued to embrace more and more of the evangelical agenda, not so much because they wanted to lure more evangelicals into their fold, but because evangelicals continued to force their way into the
party structure. Rather than the pluralist vision of a unified decision to accommodate a new group, the behavior of the Republican coalition appears to be the product of intense intra-party struggles.

Meanwhile, despite the growing electoral importance of white evangelicals, the Democratic party made little effort to accommodate their substantive demands throughout the 1970s and 1980s. One Democratic party elite I interviewed, who had been active in Democratic policy-making for more than 15 years, claimed that no one involved in the Democratic party's policy process was even suggesting that the party listen to this group let alone accommodate some of their concerns. Some analysts have suggested that considering the Democratic party was home to liberal groups such as feminists, the party may have been prohibited from embracing the evangelical agenda. However, even if there was a sizable group within the Democratic party opposed to all elements of the evangelical agenda, previous examples have demonstrated that this alone does not necessarily stop accommodation. The Democratic party fully supported the civil rights agenda in the 1960s despite the active opposition by a sizable group within the party. Rather than accommodating parts of the evangelical agenda, the Democratic party highlighted their opposition to issues and ideas of importance to evangelicals.

The Democratic party could at least have offered some conciliatory language on family values or the importance of religion, but it did not do this until 1992. Moreover, the Democratic party could have established an outreach office for evangelicals since they have an outreach office towards a plethora of other demographic groups, but once again, it did not. In 1988 the political director of the National Association of Evangelicals, one the more moderate evangelical organizations, claimed that the Democratic National Committee had not approached the organization at all. He said he was frustrated because the Democratic party was making no effort to reach out to

17 Interview conducted on January 19, 1999.
evangelicals (Oldfield 1996, 116). The Democratic party's lack of attempt to woo this large constituency flies in the face of pluralist logic. According to the pluralist approach, for either party to concede the votes of a sizable group to the other could mean doom in a competitive party system (Dahl 1961).

Beginning in 1992, however, the Democratic party began to change. Specifically, the Democratic party began co-opting the family values rhetoric of Christian Right organizations and endorsed several policies that were fairly congenial to the evangelical community. Several Democratic party elites suggested that this change was the product of a growing recognition among some Democrats that the party needed to try to listen to and appeal to evangelicals in order to remain a majority coalition. This message was driven home particularly hard after the Democrats lost their majority in the House and Senate in 1994.

Examining the behavior of the parties through the pluralist lens reveals several things. The desire to build a majority coalition and win elections is definitely an important factor shaping the behavior of parties. Both parties, although at different times, have acknowledged the importance of evangelicals for their electoral success and adjusted their policies to some extent. However, examining the response of the parties towards evangelicals reveals that this desire does not always translate into efforts at accommodation. Across the 1970s and 1980s, the Democratic party made little effort to woo this sizable electoral bloc. Thus the competition produced by the electoral system does not create enough pressure to force the parties to compete for the votes of every mobilized group. Other intervening factors must play a role in shaping party behavior as well. Finally, the fact that the parties responded in contradictory ways to evangelical mobilization strongly suggests that a different dynamic or process guides the behavior of each party.
The Median Voter Theorem

The median voter theorem predicts that the parties will accommodate only the demands made by evangelicals that have widespread support in society and will avoid taking clear stands on the controversial elements of their agenda. Assessing the degree of public support for the evangelical agenda is challenging because it is composed of several different issues and because support varies dramatically depending on how the issues are framed (Wilcox 1996, 157). Nevertheless, several of the general ideas advocated by evangelical organizations have broad support within the American public. National Election Study results reveal that most Americans are generally supportive of having religion play a larger role in public life. In addition, a clear majority of Americans favor a moment of silence at school during which children can pray if they wish. An overwhelming majority of Americans also agree that America would be better off if more attention was given to family values.

Since 1992 the Democratic party has been behaving largely as the median voter theorem would predict. To a much greater extent than the Republican party, the Democrats have been able to embrace the ideas from the Christian Right agenda that have widespread popularity without using any exclusionary terms. The Democratic party has supported a greater role for religion and prayer in American life, without singling out "Judeo-Christian" religion, as the Republican party has. The Democratic party also has endorsed a larger role for families and values in American society, without restricting their endorsement to the more narrowly defined and exclusionary realm of "traditional families" and "Christian values". The Democratic party has qualified their support for abortion by emphasizing that abortion needs to be discouraged, a view much more in line with popular opinion. Moreover, the party has returned tolerance language to their abortion plank, which provides a more welcoming message for those holding different views on the issue. Finally, the party has effectively hid their support for feminist issues
in rhetoric about the family. Viewed through the median voter lens, the recent change in behavior by the Democratic party appears to be an effort, not so much to respond to evangelicals, but rather to respond to the "center" of public opinion.

Despite the recent centrist behavior of the Democratic party, the median voter theorem cannot explain the behavior of the parties at all times. Prior to the 1990s the Democratic party repeatedly endorsed platforms that were considerably more liberal on social issues than the median voter. Moreover, the Republican party appears to be moving in the wrong direction, away from rather than towards the median voter on many issues. Christopher Soper's cross-national study revealed that when faced with pressure from evangelicals in the 1980s, "Mrs. Thatcher and the Conservatives avoided taking a position on abortion and related social issues, claiming that they were non-party matters" (1994, 153). In fact, he argues that in contrast to their American counterparts, British parties have continued to ignore social issues such as abortion, family values and homosexuality (Soper 1997, 183). This contrasts sharply with the behavior of American parties, particularly the Republican party, which, according to Soper "shaped the national debate on abortion, homosexuality, and women's rights, and gave much needed credibility to evangelical positions on those issues" (1994, 153).

One example of how the parties failed to act as the median voter theorem predicts is their behavior concerning the Equal Rights Amendment. In *Why We Lost the ERA* (1986), Jane Mansbridge documents that a majority of Americans supported the Equal Rights Amendment across the decade long struggle to secure ratification in the states. Despite the Amendment's majority support, the Republican party dropped its historic commitment to the passage of the Equal Rights Amendment in its 1980 platform. In the section of the platform titled "Women's Rights", the Republicans replaced their call for the ERA's ratification with praise for women's traditional roles. Mansbridge also points out that even though a majority of Americans did support its passage, the Equal Rights
Amendment became a highly controversial issue. Rather than trying to obscure their position on this controversial issue, as the median voter model would predict, the Democratic party highlighted their support. As discussed previously, the party tied financial support for candidates to their support of the Equal Rights Amendment, making support an almost mandatory position for Democratic candidates. The decision of the Democratic party to strong-arm their candidates into supporting the Equal Right Amendment appears to be an ideologically driven decision and rather than one driven by the rational calculations of a winning-oriented party.

Gay and lesbian rights represents another issue area where the behavior of the parties, particularly the Republican party, has defied the predictions of the median voter model. Surveys reveal that Americans find homosexuality an uncomfortable and controversial topic. On the one hand, support for gay and lesbian rights has increased over time (see Figure 4.6). NES data reveals that a majority of Americans favor the passage of laws to prohibit discrimination against individuals based on their sexual orientation and favor allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military. A 1998 survey of likely voters revealed that 53% of Americans support increased tolerance for gay men and lesbians, while 19% identified themselves as against tolerance and 26% claimed to be neutral on the subject\(^\text{18}\) (Ghent 1998b). The percentage of Americans who think homosexuals should have equal rights in terms of job opportunities has been increasing steadily over time and in 1999 was at 83 percent (see Figure 4.6). On the other hand, a majority of the public opposes allowing gays and lesbians to adopt children. Moreover, another national survey in 1993 found that a majority of Americans were uncomfortable with the thought of homosexuality (Wilcox 1996, 120).\(^\text{19}\) Had the parties

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\(^{18}\) These figures come from a bipartisan poll of 800 people who said they planned to vote in the 1998 elections conducted by Republican pollster Linda Divall and Democratic pollster Celinda Lake. The results were released by the Human Rights Campaign, the nation’s largest gay rights group.

\(^{19}\) Even though a majority of Americans are uncomfortable with the idea of homosexuality I argue that homosexuality is a "position-issue" and not a "valence issue" (Stokes 1963, 373). Donald E. Stokes defines valence issues as issues on which there is an overwhelming consensus within the public, whereas
been acting in the manner envisioned by the median voter theorem they would have most likely avoided this terrain. One Democratic party activist suggested that while people are not homophobic, they also do not want the parties to be talking about gay rights. The Republican party appears to be moving in the wrong direction on this issue. While public opinion has been liberalizing on gay rights, the party has been more vocal and active in opposing gay rights legislation. In its most recent platforms the party applauds organizations that discriminate against gays for taking a strong stand in support of traditional family values.

The clearest example of the failure of the median voter theorem is the behavior of the parties on the issue of abortion. According to NES data a majority of Americans favor some restrictions on abortion, but strongly oppose outlawing abortions all together. In other words, the "median voter" or "winning" position on abortion would be a limited pro-choice position. American parties, however, have taken ideologically opposing stands on this issue. Throughout the 1980s, Democratic platforms embraced an unqualified pro-choice position, a view that only a minority of Americans hold. Meanwhile, since 1980, Republican platforms have contained adamant pro-life language, opposing abortions even under extreme circumstances such as cases of rape or incest. Opposition to abortion under all circumstances is a position that only about 13% of the population holds. According to NES data the percentage of Americans who think abortion should never be permitted has remained highly consistent over time, ranging from a low of 10 percent in 1978, to a high of 13 percent in 1996. Moreover, scholars have found evidence that the Republican party's position on abortion, in particular, has

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position issues are those issues over which a distribution of voter preferences is defined. Although most Americans may not be in favor of homosexuality at least a minority of voters view homosexuality positively and are strong advocates for increased acceptance and increased rights for gays.

20 Interview conducted on January 22, 1999.

21 See Greg Adams (1995) for a fuller account of the polarization of the parties over abortion.

22 According to NES data, the percentage of Americans who feel that "By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice" has increased from 24% in 1972 to 40% in 1996.
hurt them in elections. In 1989, shortly after the Supreme Court's *Webster* decision, which allowed states to implement more restrictions on abortion, pro-choice gubernatorial candidates actually gained votes by the virtue of their position on abortion (Cook, Jelen, and Wilcox 1994). Studies also suggest that George Bush lost net electoral support because of his party's stated commitment to the pro-life cause (Abramowitz 1995, Rozell and Wilcox 1995). The median voter model of party behavior cannot explain why a winning-oriented party would continue to embrace positions that repel voters and decrease the party's chance of victory.

Examining the behavior of the parties through the lens of the median voter theorem reveals several things. Although the parties can, and sometimes do, act in the winning-oriented manner predicted by the median voter model, they do not always do so. Both parties have embraced ideological positions on controversial issues, rather than tailoring their policies towards the median voter. Even across the 1990s the Republican party appears to be moving further and further away from the median voter on issues such as abortion and gay rights. Thus this examination leads to more questions than it provides answers. What mechanisms have prevented American political parties from acting in the winning oriented manner envisioned by Downs? The Democratic party has only recently started to tailor their policies on religion, the family, values and abortion in Downs' victory oriented manner. Why do we see this change in 1992 and not before? Moreover why is it that we do not see the same moderating tendency from the Republican party?

**The Ideological Party Model**

America's evangelical community played a pivotal role in bringing a new set of issues to national attention. Prior to the 1970s, the major parties and the national political system more broadly, did not debate issues such as gay rights, abortion, pornography, the
definition of the family, and women's roles. The ideological model predicts that the parties would be guided by their ideologies in determining whether or not they should seek to incorporate these demands. The conservative social agenda of evangelicals, however, did not fit easily into the ideological structures of either party. Neither the Republican party's emphasis on less government nor the Democratic party's concern with promoting equality could be easily extended to incorporate the moral demands of the evangelical community. Yet the Republican party responded in a highly positive manner to evangelical demands for incorporation, while the Democratic party adopted many positions that were antithetical to the interests of this group.

I turn first to the Republican party. Several Republican elites I interviewed insisted that the behavior of their party towards evangelicals has been completely consistent with the party's ideological history and that the same principles had guided the agenda of the Republican party since its founding. When I asked why the Republican party began incorporating many of the demands of evangelicals into its platforms and legislative agenda, I was reminded that the Republican party was founded on a social issue, abolition. Moreover, the Republican party was heavily involved in other social, moral and religious issues such as temperance. In brief, several of those I interviewed argued that the Republican party's concern with abortion, religion, homosexuality and the traditional family was not an inconsistency in Republican ideology, but a continuation of a historical concern with moral issues.

In contrast, I argue that the Republican party's wholesale adoption of the evangelical agenda entailed a betrayal, rather than an extension, of its long-held ideology in several ways. Although concern for social and moral causes does have precedent, such issues have remained outside the scope of the 20th century Republican party. Paul Kleppner documents how the Republican party under President McKinley ceased being the "agency of rapid evangelical Protestantism that it had been for the temperance,
sabbatarian, and abolitionist crusades of the 1850s” (1987, 258). Allen Hertzke reaffirms that, close to a century ago, the Republican party abandoned its concern with social and moral issues and “Instead it became the carrier of an emergent entrepreneurial, market liberalism” (1993, 48). The guiding principles of the modern Republican party have been a desire for less government and more freedom for every American (Gerring 1998). Moreover, this ideology has been based on the idea that individuals are the primary elements of society. As rational beings, individuals are best able to achieve their full potential when left free of the interference of government.

The ideological model predicts the Republican party should only accommodate those demands that fit within its ideology, i.e. proposals that call for less government and more freedom for the individual, particularly in the economic realm. Several sources suggest that the initial goal of many within the Republican party in the late 1970s was to build an alliance with evangelicals around their shared desire for less government (Baer and Bositis 1989; Liebman and Wuthnow 1983). As discussed previously, evangelicals viewed the intrusion of the national government and its application of liberal policies, particularly in areas historically associated with the family, as one of the central forces behind the moral decline in American society. According to evangelicals, the government had undermined the traditional family, religion, and morality in a number of ways. The national government had directed the Internal Revenue Services to pursue cases against Christian schools, supported the Equal Rights Amendment, which would undermine women’s traditional role in society, implemented welfare policies that rewarded illegitimacy, and generally encouraged a secular humanist outlook (Himmelstein 1983, 16). Given the Republican party's strong belief in smaller government, it was fairly easy ideologically for the party to accommodate evangelical demands such as opposition to the ERA and publicly funded day-care, and less national government involvement in the schools.

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The Republican party, however, went beyond incorporating evangelical demands that call for reduced government and has come to support all of their demands, even those that call for more government. Although supportive of a less intrusive state in some policy areas, evangelicals have argued that in other areas it is necessary and even desirable to bring the coercive power of the state down upon individual citizens in order to regulate their behavior (Moen 1989, 88). Evangelical organizations have pushed for policies to control the reproductive behavior of women, to regulate the religious practices of students, and to set federal standards on sex education (Wald 1997). They have pushed for boycotts of stores that sell pornography and bans on advertisers that promote sex and violence on TV, legislation that clearly contradicts the idea of unfettered capitalism. In addition, evangelicals have pushed for proposals to regulate the entertainment media and to control the flow of information across computer networks (Hertzke 1993, 93). The Republican party has embraced these evangelical positions in their platforms and legislative agenda even though they all require the party to compromise its belief in less government.

Examining the behavior of the Republican party on the issue of abortion provides a good lens into the ideological compromises made by the party. In 1972, delegates debated the issue of abortion at the Republican national convention, but ultimately decided to leave abortion out of their platform based on an agreement that this was an area where the government should not be involved (Melich 1996, 31). Since then the Republican party has become heavily involved in abortion policy; Republican presidents have issued orders restricting the behavior of health-related organizations that receive any federal funds and Congressional Republicans have introduced legislation that involves increased government regulation of abortion. The change in Republican ideology is also revealed through the party's platforms. In 1980, the party warned that big government threatens the freedoms of the individual. In 1992, the Republican platform encourages a
larger role for the government in promoting morality. "Government has a responsibility, as well, to ensure that it promotes the common moral values that bind us together as a nation".

Not only has the Republican party begun supporting policies that require more government, but also in incorporating evangelicals the party has altered its underlying worldview. The evangelical worldview sees religion and the family as the central elements of society. Church and the family are critically important institutions because they instill and enforce traditional values and restrain the otherwise selfish and destructive desires of individuals. Based on her interviews with different types of conservative women, Rebecca Klatch described the worldview of evangelicals as one where "society brings the individual under the moral authority of God, the church, and the family, thereby restraining man's instincts and curbing individual self interest" (1988, 31). This directly contrasts with the ideology of the modern Republican party, discussed previously, which viewed the individual pursuit of self-interest, not as a threat to the social bond, but its very basis (Himmelstein 1983). Over the past several decades the Republican party has compromised, if not abandoned, its focus on the individual as the fundamental unit in society in favor of the evangelical worldview. The 1980 Republican platform states that "it is the individual, not the government, who reigns at the center of our philosophy". Over time the party drops references to the centrality and freedom of the individual and replaces them with acknowledgments of the centrality and the rights of the family. In 1988, the platform states that the "God-given rights of the family come before those of the government". In 1996, the platform states "Because institutions like the family are the backbone of a healthy society, we believe government must support the rights of the family".

The fact that the Republican party has compromised some of its long-held principles does not, in itself, completely discredit the ideological model of party
behavior. Indeed, American parties have a lengthy history of adjusting, if not outright reversing their positions on some issues to suit the interests of their electoral coalition (Reichley 1992). Many scholars conceptualize political parties as reflections of the cleavages and conflicts within society. Thus the ideologies of political parties are driven largely by their electoral coalitions and altered in accordance with the changing interests of their partisans. What is most damaging to the ideological model, therefore, is that a majority of the Republican party's electoral coalition did not support the changes made by the party. In fact, Republican partisans were highly divided on most social issues, and even leaning in a slightly liberal direction on issues such as women's rights, abortion, and pornography. Thus, by moving in a conservative direction on these issues the party was clearly not responding to its base as a whole.

The Republican party's behavior on abortion policy represents the clearest example of its failure to respond to its electoral base. From the early 1970s, when these questions were first asked on national surveys, to the early 1990s more Republicans identified as pro-choice than pro-life. A slim majority of all those who identified as strong Republicans were still pro-choice until 1992. According to Abramowitz, among the more limited group of Republicans who reported voting in the 1992 presidential election, a majority were still pro-choice. Barely one in ten Republican voters supported the position of the Republican platform on abortion and only 36% agreed with the slightly less restrictive position taken by President Bush (Abramowitz 1995, 179). Until recently, based on the opinions of its base in society, the Republican party was more prone to embrace a strong pro-choice position than a strong pro-life position. Even in 1996, 57 percent of Republican voters continue to think abortion should not be part of the party's platform (Freeman 1997, 358). Moreover, a majority of Republican primary voters, often a more conservative group than Republicans in the aggregate, are not supportive of a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion (Menendez 1996, 296).
Nor is abortion the only example of this. A majority of Republican partisans supported the passage of the ERA, yet the party reversed its position and began to oppose it (Mansbridge 1986). Moreover, a majority of Republicans opposed the inclusion of anti-gay sentiments in their party's platforms (Oldfield 1996).

Meanwhile, based on its ideological history and the composition of its electoral coalition one might have expected the Democratic party to at least consider the demands of evangelicals. The Democratic party had been more receptive to moral and religious causes in the 20th century than the Republican party (Hertzke 1993). Moreover, Jo Freeman (1986, 1997) has argued that the composition of the Democratic party's electoral coalition has made the party particularly responsive to demands for inclusion from all groups, particularly those who claim to be "left out" or disadvantaged. Evangelicals have long perceived themselves to be outsiders in America's cultural and political life (Hertzke 1993, 158). Evangelical leaders often portray their group as a persecuted minority, whose rights need protection from the actions of the majority (Oldfield 1996). Although evangelicals have not faced the same degree of discrimination as Hispanics and African Americans, there are some grounds for such claims. Evangelicals have been ridiculed by mainstream culture for most of the 20th century, a fact most evangelical activists are well aware of (Menendez 1996; Oldfield 1996; Wald 1987). Moreover, evangelicals have long experienced difficulty gaining a hearing within society or the political system because the language they have used to express their interests undercuts acceptance of their position among non-evangelicals (Oldfield 1996, 30).

Yet despite the group's outsider status, the Democratic party has reacted negatively to the demands of evangelicals. As discussed, the party did not even try to listen to, let alone reach out to, more moderate evangelical organizations. Moreover, the Democratic party adopted positions antithetical to the concerns of evangelicals. The
party strongly supported women's choice to have an abortion, women's rights, gay rights and a broad understanding of family. The behavior of the Democratic party is surprising, not because it breaks with ideological tradition, but because the party's strong positions on social issues did not flow from its electoral coalition as a whole. Based on the composition of its partisans the Democratic party should have been under greater pressure than the Republicans to accommodate evangelical demands. In the 1970s there were more evangelicals within the Democratic coalition than the Republican coalition. Democratic partisans were divided on issues of abortion, school prayer, women's rights and pornography. It was not until 1984 that the majority of strong Democrats identified as pro-choice. Greg Adams (1995) points out that if Democratic members of Congress were truly following the lead of the Democratic masses on abortion, they would have become less pro-choice, not more pro-choice. Nor can the more recent shift of the Democratic party towards the center be explained by a shift in the party's coalition. The public opinion of Democratic identifiers has remained fairly stable on these issues, yet the party's behavior has changed.

In sum, the behavior of the parties does appear to be ideological, at least at times. Therefore, the pertinent issue is not determining whether parties are ideological or not. The challenge is to determine what factors and conditions influence political parties to maintain, broaden or change their ideological positions in response to demands for incorporation. The evidence suggests that the behavior of the parties has not been guided by their electoral masses, at least in the aggregate. In fact, both parties have embraced positions on issues that were more ideologically extreme than those held by their partisans in society. Examining the parties through the ideological model pushes us towards a conceptualization that views elites within the party rather than the masses or the parties' electoral coalitions as the engines of party behavior and the agents of change.
ELITE POWER STRUGGLE MODEL

How can we explain the behavior of the parties towards demands for incorporation from evangelicals? The theories just reviewed explain only part of the empirical puzzle. Public opinion, the pressure to build majority coalitions and ideology are important factors shaping the behavior of American parties. However, they have not determined the responses of the parties towards evangelicals. The power struggle model suggests that it is the elites within the parties, working with considerable autonomy from the pressures of the mass electorate, that are the primary forces crafting the policy behavior of the parties. Within the Republican and Democratic parties there are factions with competing visions of how the parties should respond to evangelical demands for incorporation. Although different tactics are being used, a very similar type of struggle has been playing out among elites in each party. In this section I describe the nature and configuration of factional struggles within each party and how they have shaped party behavior.

Elite Power Struggle in the Republican Party
"The Politicians Versus The Purists"

The Republican party elite is split over whether, and to what extent, it should embrace the agenda of evangelicals. There are two distinct factions in the party on this issue. On the one hand, there are many activists and elected officials who fit fairly well Wildavsky's (1965) description of "politicians". The Republican congressional campaign committees have adamantly pressured candidates to avoid or obscure their language on social issues so that they do not scare away potential voters (Rozell and Wilcox 1995, 256). The "politicians" also think the party should focus on economic issues, because the party has "winning" positions on these issues, positions that have widespread popularity among voters. High profile Republicans have warned that including social issues in the
Republican agenda is dangerous. Former Republican President Gerald Ford stated that the party should avoid the abortion issue because it causes "significant turmoil in the party" (Berk 1998, A14). His words reflect the views of many other party regulars who view the preservation of the Republican party as a worthy end in itself, rather than a vehicle for the implementation of a particular vision (Sundquist 1983). My own interviews confirmed that there are many elites who want the party to avoid social issues; some simply argued that social issues were not part of the Republican agenda. Although these statements are not accurate assessments of the party's behavior, they do reveal the existence of a faction, or group of party elites, who want the Republican party to act in a manner predicted by the median voter theorem, to accommodate popular policies and avoid contentious issues.

The other faction within the Republican party elite is composed predominantly, although not exclusively, of evangelicals, and often refers to itself as "the Christians" (Hertzke 1993). This faction fits Wildavsky's (1965) description of "purists" because they have strong policy views; they want the party to fully embrace the agenda of evangelicals. Moreover, they feel that getting the party to take the "correct" or "moral" stands on social issues is more important than embracing popular positions. Gary Bauer, former Republican party administrator and former president of the Family Research Council, stated "I think they're [the Republican party] constantly reading polls saying the party has to be more tolerant, it shouldn't look judgmental. But a great party ought to stop looking at polls and find its voice for the people that have given it the power it has got" (Goodstein 1998, A16). Surveys of evangelical activists within the Republican party reveal that, in the aggregate, they "disdain political compromise, believe parties must clearly stand for issues, and see little virtue in harboring diverse viewpoints" (Oldfield 1996, 187). This disdain for compromise may stem from evangelicals' fairly recent entrance into party politics. Moreover, evangelicals have spent the majority of the
20th century fighting the encroachment of religious modernists, those willing to compromise the literal authority and meaning of scripture to fit with contemporary technology and social currents. Whatever the reason, the fact remains that the "Christian" faction is "less interested in belonging to [the] party than using it" (Sundquist 1983, 306).

The politicians and purists have fought, and continue to fight, a heated battle over how the party should respond to evangelicals and their conservative social demands. It is important to point out that the "politician" faction in the Republican party is not necessarily devoid of ideology, but can also be conceptualized as composed of entrenched ideologues. In other words, the moderate or politician faction is seen as less ideological because it has occupied the mainstream of the party in the past and wants to retain that position. It is resisting the "new" ideological tradition that the "purists" are trying to impose on the Republican party. Thus, it is not necessary to view this as a struggle between an ideological and non-ideological faction. Rather, it can also be viewed as a faction of entrenched ideologues fighting challengers from a competing ideological tradition. In either case, the important idea to recognize is that there are distinct factions within the party with conflicting views of how they want the party to behave. The struggle between these two factions ultimately shapes party behavior.

The "purist" or "Christian" faction has been winning the intra-party struggle. By winning I mean it has been able to shape Republican party behavior in the policy areas it is most deeply concerned with. Evangelicals have successfully forced the party to take clear stands on controversial social issues, such as gay rights and abortion, despite the fact that most Republicans would prefer the party behave differently. What explains the success of
evangelicals? Evangelicals have been able to define Republican party terrain because they have penetrated the party structure at all levels and once inside have aggressively pushed their agenda.

At first, the entrance of evangelicals into the Republican party was nurtured by a related, but nonetheless distinct, faction — "the New Right", which emphasized conservative causes such as militant communism, antiunionism, and opposition to big government. The New Right was different from more established conservatives in the Republican party because its "tone was populist, strident, and anti-status quo. The New Right portrayed itself as 'blue-collar' rather than 'blue blood'" (Oldfield 1996, 96). The New Right criticized big business as well as big government and big labor (Oldfield 1996). As the South became less solidly Democratic in the 1960s, this faction saw that the Republican party had a bigger opening in the South than they had in the 1940s, but in order to take advantage of this change this meant appealing to Southern evangelicals. Desiring to enlarge the party's electoral coalition, the New Right pushed the Republican party to emphasize social conservatism in an effort to win over this large, untapped audience. Although the New Right was the initial force pushing the Republican party to grant some evangelical demands, evangelical influence has gone well beyond these initial gestures of accommodation. Paul Weyrich, one of the leaders of the New Right commented that "In 1980, the religious right's leadership was to some extent subservient; they were so new to politics" (Oldfield 1996, 102). In the years after 1980, however, he admits that the dominant position of the New Right eroded and the evangelical faction took on a life of its own. Once in the door of the Republican party, the "Christian" faction relentlessly pursued the incorporation of its entire agenda. Most of the successes of evangelicals, therefore, have been the result of their own sustained mobilization into the party, not a strategic decision by the party per se to incorporate them. Based on interviews with hundreds of Republican elites in all 50 states, Persinos commented that
"The weapon of today's intra-party Republican warfare is organization" (1994, 23). As I will demonstrate in more detail, the policy-oriented evangelical faction is winning because it has out-mobilized its competitors.

**Mobilization and Influence in Local and State Republican Parties**

In many local and state Republican parties, evangelicals simply have out-mobilized the moderates, thereby gaining important resources with which to shape party behavior. Evangelical leaders have set an explicit goal of getting more individuals supportive of their agenda into the Republican party structure (Persinos 1994, 23). At the 1995 Christian Coalition convention, Pat Robertson announced that his organization would not be content until "pro-family" Christians became a majority in all fifty Republican state committees (Wilcox 1996, 75). Because American political parties are porous and decentralized power goes to those who organize. Already semi-mobilized through their church membership, evangelicals have been particularly successful in overcoming the collective action barriers to organization. By going to evangelical churches and informing congregations about the importance of party involvement and how to run for precinct delegate or a state committee member, organizations such as Concerned Women for America and the Family Research Council, have lowered the typically prohibitive costs of involvement (Wilcox 1996). Moreover, Pat Roberston's run for the Republican presidential nomination in 1988 accelerated the already heightened flow of evangelical activists into the Republican party structure. After his campaign ended (unsuccessfully), many of his supporters remained in the Republican party structure and used their presence to further push forward his campaign issues concerning religion, morality and the traditional family (Hertzke 1993; Oldfield 1996).
One of my interviews provided particularly keen insights into the evangelical incorporation process into the Republican party. In the early 1990s, evangelical churches launched a major effort to win seats on the central committee in a Midwest city. Typically these elections receive very little attention, even by party members. In most years, only a small percentage of the central committee seats are even challenged. In an organized effort to change the ideological direction of the party and make it more responsive to their concerns, evangelicals challenged over half of those seats. Party regulars were resentful; they viewed this as a hostile takeover attempt by outsiders. Moreover, they fought hard to keep the newcomers out of the party organization. In this case, the success of the evangelical effort was limited to about a dozen seats. But scholars have described similar attempts in localities and counties all across the country where evangelicals have been successful. For example, in the 1980s thousands of evangelicals ran as precinct delegates in Michigan and won a considerable portion of the more than 9,000 seats (Oldfield 1996, 151). Rozell and Wilcox’s God at the Grassroots provides detailed accounts of this scenario in eleven other states. For example, in Minnesota, where less than 1% of the state’s citizens participate in precinct caucuses, evangelicals came to dominate the entire process (Gilbert and Peterson 1995). In California, Christian Right factions had gained control of a majority of Republican central committees by 1992 (Soper 1995).

There have been parallel battles for control of the Republican party machinery at the state level. As early as 1980, Moral Majority activists had gained control of the state committee in Alaska (Guth 1983, 36). By the middle of the 1980s evangelicals had made major headway into the Republican party structure in Arizona, Georgia, Hawaii, Iowa,

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23 Interview conducted on April 9, 1998.
24 The central committee acts as a board of directors for the party at the county level.
25 In 1998, for example, only 21 of the 133 seats on the central committee, about 16%, were challenged in the Republican primary.
Michigan, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Virginia, and Washington (Hertzke 1993, 158). A survey done by Campaigns and Elections magazine published in 1994 found that Religious conservatives were had a working majority in 18 state Republican parties and formed a substantial force in 13 others (Persinos 1994).26 Many of the states where Christian Right activists have come to dominate are in the South where the evangelical population is concentrated and provides "the infantry for the intraparty battle" (Wilcox 1996, 74). Christian activists have also gained some control in the mid-west and North, particularly in states that have been transitioning from Democratic to Republican majorities. This may be because in states where the Republicans were the minority the party contains "fewer entrenched Republican elites who resist its incursion into the party" (Wilcox 1996, 75).

Gaining control of county and state level party machinery has provided evangelicals with several powerful resources through which to define Republican party policy. Control over state parties has allowed evangelicals to include their central concerns in state platforms, which then form the core of the party’s agenda (Hertzke 1993; Rozell and Wilcox 1995; Wilcox 1996). Controlling the party also allows the evangelical faction to influence the priorities of the party. For example, in 1999, the California Republican party elected a new chair, who ran on a pledge stating that outlawing abortion will be the number one mission of the party. The defeated candidates said he would focus the party on other issues (NY Times, March 1 1999, A18). Perhaps most importantly, control of the state party has been valuable to evangelicals because it allows them to write the rules concerning how candidates are selected and how national convention delegates, alternates and national committee members are chosen and to

26 The 13 states classified as dominant were Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and North Carolina. Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington.
choose the members of the national committee. Whoever controls the state party organization has the ability to change the rules to their advantage, which evangelicals have done in several states (Oldfield 1996, 149; Wilcox 1996, 77).

An inevitable byproduct of this struggle for power has been resistance from the "politician" faction, those foremost concerned with the strength and viability of the party in elections. Pat Robertson aptly described the situation when he stated, "We have been telling the Republican party, let us in or we will kick the door down" (Hertzke 1993, 138). The hostility of party regulars and moderates towards the entrance of evangelical newcomers has been clear from their words and actions. The Chair of Michigan's Republican party described the newly mobilized evangelical party activists as resembling "the bar scene out of Star Wars" (Hertzke 1993, 159). In North Carolina the entrance of evangelicals into the Republican party organization resulted in the eruption of actual fist fights (Hertzke 1993). Surveys of party activists have revealed that in some states, such as Minnesota and Virginia, there is such intense hostility between the moderates and the Christians that each faction prefers Democratic candidates to Republicans from the other faction of the party (Wilcox 1996, 76). An accurate picture of Republican party's behavior is not one in where the party willingly opened their arms to growing group of voters, but one where evangelicals fought their way into the party.

Mobilization and Influence in National Party Organization

Beyond setting the rules in their favor, evangelical organizations have lowered the costs of navigating the complex delegate selection process by publishing strategy guides, detailing how the process works in each state and how to have influence at caucuses (Oldfield 1996). Determining the strength of the "Christian" faction at Republican

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27 The selection of convention delegates and national committee members is guided by a complex set of rules that differs across parties and across states. See Beck and Sorauf, chapter 4 and chapter 11 for a fuller discussion.
national conventions is difficult, because questions regarding religious affiliation and beliefs were not asked until recently. However, existing information suggests that evangelicals have been successful and the size of the "purist" faction has been steadily increasing. As early as 1980, evangelical activists from the Moral Majority dominated the state delegation from Alaska (Guth 1983, 36). Various accounts detail how the Robertson campaign used its strength at the state level to send a number of their supporters to the convention as pledged Bush or Dole delegates in 1988 (Green and Guth 1991; Hertzke 1993; Oldfield 1996). In 1992 many estimated that 300 Republican delegates were part of the Christian Coalition and one-fourth were part of the more broadly defined conservative Christian bloc (Oldfield 1996, 198). In 1996, CBS reported that 11 percent of Republican delegates were members of the Christian Coalition, 21 percent considered themselves part of the "religious right" and 31 percent were evangelical Christians (Freeman, 1997, 359). Although only a minority, the "Christian" faction has acted cohesively to shape the party's policy on social issues.

By mobilizing within the national organization evangelicals have gained influence over the party's presidential and vice-presidential candidates. A party's presidential nominee holds tremendous potential for shaping the behavior of the party and the party's image in the minds of Americans. Although the Christian Right faction has not secured the nomination of its first choice candidate, it has been able to veto candidates whose policy views conflict with their agenda. Wald argued that the early exit of all pro-choice candidates from the field of Republican nominees in 1996 is clear evidence "that Christian Right activists have gained a virtual veto power" (1997, 257). This faction was also successful in forcing Bob Dole to choose a vice-presidential nominee who supported the pro-life position without reservations (Wald 1997). Thus the purist faction has been able to successfully restrict the pool of Republican nominees to pro-life candidates and those at least moderately supportive of their agenda.
The mobilization of evangelicals at the national level has not only allowed them leverage over the candidates, but also over the content of party platforms. Through effective mobilization, evangelical activists have secured a significant minority of seats on Republican platform committees, particularly across the 1990s. In 1992, for example, 20 of the platform committee's 107 members were members of the Christian Coalition (Oldfield 1996, 198). Even when they were not able to get their own onto the committee, in states where evangelicals dominated the party machinery they were able to keep pro-choice supporters or even less ardent pro-lifers off the state delegations to the national convention (Wald 1997, 260). Although evangelicals only form a minority, their concerted effort behind clear goals has amplified their power in the platform writing process. Presidential nominees have considerable influence over the content of their party's platform (Maisel 1993). Therefore it is a testament to the strength of the evangelical faction that all of their policy concerns have been strongly supported in Republican platforms despite opposition by the nominee. Two clear examples of this concern the platforms' language on abortion and gay rights. In 1992 a national evangelical group wanted to add antigay and anti-lesbian language to the Republican platform. When they discussed the idea with Bush's campaign staff, however, they were told it was not a good idea for the party and that Bush did not support it. Regardless of this warning, the evangelical organization got a platform delegate to introduce their amendments at the convention. Planks opposing civil rights for gays, homosexual marriage, and the boycott of organizations that discriminated against gays were passed with no resistance from the Bush campaign (Oldfield 1996, 201). A similar situation occurred in 1996. Although Republican nominee Bob Dole publicly expressed his intention to add tolerance language to the party's abortion plank, the platform committee soundly refuted this idea.
Mobilization and Influence in Elected Office

Parties are largely defined by their candidates and aspirants for party nomination. Moreover, elected officials have direct control over party policy. Therefore another way the "Christian" faction has influenced the behavior of the Republican party is by constraining the views of candidates and by becoming candidates themselves. Candidates are dependent on party activists, those willing to do the non-glamorous and tedious campaign work, in order to win their party's nomination and win election (Aldrich 1995; Page 1978). As Aldrich explains "activists in a party provide a countervailing weight to the electoral pull toward the center for ambitious office seekers" (1995, 185). Evangelicals have not been big financial contributors, but they have generated significant "person power" in primaries and elections. A disproportionately high number have served as campaign officials, organizers, fundraisers, or been active in more menial campaign work (Green 1995, 15). As U.S. Senator Nancy Kassebaum said "moderates aren't willing to work in the trenches, while Christian conservatives have gone door to door and worked hard" (Persinos 1994, 23). Thus even "politicians" are pulled towards the views of evangelicals.

Across the past two decades, evangelical organizations have canvassed church congregations in attempts to identify potential candidates and offered an array of services to help encourage evangelicals to run for office at all levels. The Christian Coalition has provided training for candidates, their campaign managers, and even for their finance directors (Wilcox 1996, 74). As mentioned previously, one of the unique benefits of elected office is the opportunity to shape policy (Aldrich 1995). It makes sense, therefore, that evangelicals with particularly strong policy views have been attracted to this path. In several cases, evangelical ministers have run for office under the Republican label (Wald 1995, 49). As the Republican party increasingly comes to embrace
conservative platforms at the state and national level, this may very well reinforce the self-recruitment of evangelicals. The growing social conservatism of the party may encourage those who hold similar views to run under the Republican party label and simultaneously repel potential candidates who no longer find their more moderate views reflected.

Several scholars have pointed out that self-recruitment from the evangelical community has not produced the most viable candidates (Green 1995; Persinos 1994). "Indeed close identification with the movement has more often proven itself a liability than electoral asset to candidates for statewide office" (Wald 1995, 20). However, even evangelical candidates who lose have managed to set the policy agenda of the race, bring their issues to state or national level attention, and shape the image of the Republican party. Moreover, many have won. Evangelical organizations have produced several highly viable candidates such as Steve Largent and J.C. Watts in Oklahoma (Green 1995). According to the Christian Coalition, forty Republicans elected in 1994 alone were "pro-life conservative Christians" (Rozell and Wilcox 1995, 256). A greater number of evangelicals in office has translated into a greater ability to get elements of their agenda introduced. Studies at the local, state and national level demonstrate that once in office evangelicals have faithfully attempted to implement their agenda. For example, a small group of evangelicals in the Florida state legislature launched an ambitious effort to pass a number of bills including a ban on public nudity, returning prayer to the public schools, and changing the educational curricula (Wald 1995, 22). Similar efforts have occurred in most other states where evangelicals have secured a considerable minority of seats (Rozell and Wilcox 1995). Across the 1990s evangelicals in Congress and those associated with the Christian Right movement have sponsored legislation dealing with prayer in school, pornography, gay rights and abortion (Wilcox 1996).
Lack of Organized Counter-mobilization

The moderate or "politician" faction with the Republican party has not been happy with the considerable influence that the Christian Right faction has gained in defining Republican policy. Arlen Specter, a moderate Senator, has been one of the most vocal Republicans in this regard. He has complained that the view of Ralph Reed, the former leader of the Christian Coalition, "has captured the major voice of the party" and that "the people who have different political views in the Republican party have got to get off the sidelines ... We've got to stop criticizing them and start competing with them" (Thomma 1997, A10). Moderates have made some efforts in this regard; they have created organizations to counter the influence of Christian activists (Wald 1997, 257). However, these efforts have been uniformly unsuccessful because the moderate faction has not shown a steadfast commitment to its vision of how the party should be behaving, it has not mobilized aggressively, and leaders within the party have refused to rally behind these efforts.

Moderates failed to offer cohesive support behind efforts to soften the party's abortion plank. Two groups within the moderate faction that sought to counter the influence of the Christian faction were the National Republican Coalition for Choice and Republicans for Choice. These groups have come to the Republican conventions prepared for battle. Like the "Christian" faction, these groups attempted to educate pro-choice individuals about the intricacies of the Republican delegate selection process and encouraged them to get involved (Oldfield 1996, 198-199). According to surveys, a majority of Republican convention delegates supported the idea of dropping the abortion plank from the platform or adding tolerance language. Yet when pro-choice delegates attempted to make these changes, they received very little support from other Republicans. In 1992 and 1996, even an attempt to add language to the platform
expressing sympathy for victims of rape and incest failed to pass (Oldfield 1996; Freeman 1997). The evangelical forces were cohesive, the moderate forces were not.

Some scholars have argued that the single-minded policy orientation of the evangelical faction has limited its potential impact within the party and that a greater willingness to compromise would help it make more "friends" among party regulars (Rozell and Wilcox 1995, 259). I, however, argue that the deep commitment of the evangelical faction to its social policy agenda and its reluctance to compromise has worked to its advantage. Particularly at national conventions, refusing to compromise has proven to be an advantage in the intra-party struggle. Republican leaders want to avoid disruptions at national conventions because they reflect poorly on the party in the eyes of the nation, and because they distract from the carefully scripted message the leaders have tried to put forward. Since the Christian faction has been so steadfast in its commitment to its policy goals, its threats of disruption are highly credible. Thus, party leaders have given the evangelical faction tremendous leeway in shaping the party's positions on issues of importance to it. Meanwhile, since the moderate faction is more willing to compromise, particularly for the sake of winning, it is not accorded special consideration. Ann Stone, the leader of Republicans For Choice, argued that in 1992 Republican nominee George Bush and his campaign staff "knew our people wouldn't throw fits. Our people aren't willing to do anything. They are too civilized." (Oldfield 1996, 205). When the Christian faction introduced anti-gay planks into the party's platform, not only did moderates fail to block this, but George Bush failed to mobilize any opposition to it.

The inability of social moderates within the Republican party to react effectively is strikingly parallel to the lack of resistance from progressive Republicans on civil rights issues, that occurred, or more accurately did not occur, after the party moved in a conservative direction in 1964. As long as the strategy of the "moderate" faction in the
Republican party is to simply try to avoid social issues or pretend that the party does not get involved in social issues, it is not going to have control over defining the party's image and policies on social issues. Meanwhile, the Christian faction, which wants the party to continue adopting conservative positions on gay rights, traditional family issues, abortion and pornography is firmly embedded in the Republican party structure and is well positioned to continue influencing policy. Wildavsky's comment about the Goldwater purists could easily be applied to the rise of evangelicals within the contemporary Republican party. "Once it is understood, that the [Christian Right movement] is not a temporary aberration, but represents a profound current within the Republican party, it becomes impossible for me to join the wishful thinkers who believe that the moderates and liberals in the party will automatically regain control" (1965, 411).

Elite Power Struggle in the Democratic Party

The Lack of An Ally Faction

The struggle to define the terrain of the Democratic party has unfolded differently. In one sense, the story is shorter because there has been less struggle. One of the central ideas proposed within the elite struggle model is that in order to have any chance of accommodation, a group needs to have elites in the party who are committed to its agenda. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there simply was no internal pressure from anywhere within the Democratic party elite to respond in a positive manner to the agenda of evangelicals. On the contrary, the elite faction that was gaining numbers was hostile to the agenda of evangelicals. By most accounts, the reforms enacted by the McGovern-Fraiser Commission and numerous subsequent commissions increased the influence of liberal activists within the Democratic party (Polsby 1983; Shafer 1983). As a result, liberals gained considerable influence over the presidential nomination process, the
platform writing process and the party’s legislative agenda. They pushed the party to embrace social policies and legislative proposals that were antithetical to the interests of evangelicals. One Democratic elite I interviewed, who had worked on policy at the Democratic Caucus since the 1970s, said that no one within the party elite was even suggesting that the party try to listen to, let alone respond to, the concerns of evangelicals.\footnote{Interview conducted on January 19, 1999 in Washington DC.} Despite the fact that evangelicals composed a sizable portion of the electorate and the Democratic coalition, because they had no voice within the Democratic party elite, their demands for incorporation went unanswered.

In the previous section I described the concerted and successful efforts made by evangelical organizations to penetrate the Republican party structure. In contrast, they made very little effort to infiltrate the Democratic party organization (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983). Although evangelical organizations put together packets on how to successfully navigate the Republican delegate selection process, run for Republican precinct delegate, and have influence at Republican caucuses and conventions, there was no parallel information provided about the Democratic party (Oldfield 1996). The resources of evangelical organizations have been almost exclusively directed at the infiltration of the Republican party. What explains this concentration of resources? The Republican party, or at least the New Right faction within the party, did invite evangelicals into their party, whereas no one in the Democratic party was doing that. More importantly, evangelicals focused their energy on infiltrating the Republican party because it was easier to infiltrate. Being the minority party for the majority of the 20th century, especially in the South, left the Republican party’s organizational structure more open. James Guth pointed out that "in some strong Democratic areas, the Christian Right did not so much infiltrate the Republican organization as create it from scratch" (1983, 36). Particularly in states where the Republican party had been in the minority for
decades, evangelical efforts to mobilize within the Republican party quickly proved more rewarding than parallel efforts directed at the Democratic party (Liebman and Wuthnow 1983).

The point that the elite struggle model stresses, however, is that although evangelicals did not infiltrate the Democratic party structure, they could have. Had Pat Robertson, or another evangelical leader, run for the Democratic rather than the Republican presidential nomination, a large number of evangelical activists committed to implementing his agenda would have moved into the Democratic party. The “Christian” faction may have met more resistance in the Democratic party, since social liberals had become entrenched in the party structure, and the struggle may have been more intense, but evangelicals could have been contenders in the struggle to shape party behavior. Had evangelicals organized within the Democratic party structure with the same intensity and perseverance as they did within the Republican party they could have altered the party's policy. Thus, the behavior of the parties’ was not determined by the public mood or the distinct compositions of their electoral compositions or strategic calculations by political elites. Through pure power struggle evangelicals could have forced either party to be more responsive to their demands.

The Rise of A Centrist Faction

Across the 1990s, the Democratic party began using rhetoric and embracing policies more amenable to the interest of evangelicals. This is not the result of the infiltration of evangelicals within the Democratic party elite, but the growing influence of a centrist-oriented faction within the party. Largely in response to the perception of growing liberal influence within the party, a purely winning-oriented faction emerged, organized, and launched a struggle to redefine the party's behavior. This faction felt the party's positions on social issues, as well as many others, were too liberal for most
Americans and the party's continued association with liberalism was hurting the electoral viability of its presidential and congressional candidates.

The centrist faction has gained the upper-hand in the struggle over party behavior for two main reasons. First, a group of moderate Democratic elites, mostly elected officials, created a national organization, the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) and within that the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI). The creation of this organization gave the centrist faction more power than it otherwise would have had. The DLC provided the resources to develop clear policy proposals and a honed vision of how the party should be behaving, which is a significant advantage in intraparty warfare (Hale 1994, 254). Second, this centrist faction effectively convinced a growing number of national Democratic candidates to join the DLC and adopt its ideas. Obviously the DLC and the centrist faction it represents received its biggest chance to influence the behavior of the Democratic party because the DLC's former chairman, Bill Clinton, won the presidency. However, the DLC has also successfully enticed a significant number of other national-level candidates to adopt its message, providing the centrist faction with powerful policy leverage in the congressional arena as well as in the executive branch.

Rather than using the party as a vehicle to achieve particular policy goals, as the purist-evangelical faction has attempted to do within the Republican party, the self-proclaimed goal of this faction is to "seize the center" and adopt "strong, defensible, centrist positions" (Marshall 1997, 1). The Democratic Leadership Council strives to identify and adopt whatever policies will win elections. A director at the Progressive Policy Institute described to me how his organization develops policy. He said that they look at the positions of liberals, look at the position of the Republicans, and then carve out a position in the middle. By doing this, the centrist faction feels they can "outflank the GOP on issue after issue" (Marshall 1997). One of the foremost goals of this faction

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39 Interview conducted on January 22, 1999 in Washington DC.
was to "outflank" the Republican party on the family values debate. Based largely on public opinion results this faction decided the party needed to develop policies that would appeal to "Americans concerned about strains on the family and the breakdown of social order" (Marshall 1997, 3). Thus the DLC encouraged the Democratic party to develop "a cultural agenda – focused on government, schools, and the media – that reinforces the values of parental responsibility and child development" (Marshall and Schram 1993, 154). It wanted the party to talk more about strengthening and preserving the two-parent family and family values and to minimize attention given to liberal interests such as gay rights groups and feminists.

And the centrist faction has achieved considerable success. As one long-time director of the Democratic Leadership Council pointed out to me, the 1992 and 1996 Democratic platforms were basically DLC platforms. Based on his systematic comparison of the DLC's 1991 statement of goals with the 1992 Democratic platform Hale agreed with this assessment. A comparison of the documents revealed "striking similarities ... Nothing in the platform was in disagreement" (1994, 259). Specifically, the DLC proposed and the Democratic party later embraced in its platform and legislative agenda many different proposals to increase parental control, such as school uniforms, the television V-chip and curfews. Other DLC themes incorporated in Democratic platforms were planks explicitly discouraging and condemning teen pregnancy and out-of-wedlock births, whereas the Democratic party had been silent on those issues previously. Moreover, in the 1992 and 1996 Democratic platforms, feminist issues were given dramatically reduced space at the end of the platform and were buried in family-friendly rhetoric (Freeman 1997).

Once again, it is important to recognize that the DLC pushed these policies, not because it believed in them per se, but because it believed they would be attractive to

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30 Interview conducted on January 22, 1999 in Washington DC

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white, suburbanites - pivotal swing voters in national elections. The success of the centrist faction in defining party policy in these areas has not come without considerable, and continuing, intraparty conflict. Simply the founding of the DLC sparked controversy within the Democratic party (Hale 1994, 253). Since then it has increased its power and influence over party behavior, gains which have come only through an accompanying decrease in power and influence for liberal factions. Contrary to the image portrayed by pluralism, there is not room in the party for these competing views. Thus, centrist planks have replaced liberal planks on many social issues. During my interviews many Democratic elites expressed strong hostility towards the Democratic Leadership Council and the faction of the party it represented. The criticisms varied in content, but some elites accused the Democratic Leadership faction of attempting to gut the party of its ideology and principles. Despite their criticisms, liberals within the party have not organized an effective counter-mobilization. The Democratic elites I spoke with were generally in agreement about why this had not occurred. They suggested that although many liberal elites disapproved of the methods and means of the centrist faction, they felt they could not argue with a strategy that appeared to be working.

Examining the Democratic response through the elite struggle lens confirms that change in party policy does not occur without struggle. For decades the Democratic party had been more liberal on social issues than the mass public and its electoral coalition. Without a mechanism to translate this gap between public opinion and party behavior into action, the party would have continued to follow this path, regardless of electoral consequences. The centrist faction provided this mechanism. Indeed, the success of the DLC makes it a model for intraparty groups that want to change a party’s policy direction (Hale 1994).

Based on the literature of the DLC and talking with several people working there, it is clear that their ultimate aim is to move the party to the center on even more social
issues, including gay rights and abortion. Whether this faction will continue to influence the party policy beyond the tenure of Bill Clinton is less clear. The influence of this faction has come from the top down, through the creation of a national policy committee and the power of the president. Unlike evangelicals, the DLC has just begun to build a grassroots presence in the state Democratic party organizations. As a result the influence of this centrist faction on the party may be more tenuous, dependent on convincing other elected Democratic that they have good ideas. If they falter in this regards, liberals in the party will have a big opportunity to reclaim their voice in the formation of party policy. Based on his extensive analysis of platforms and presidential addresses, John Gerring made a similar point. He argued that in 1996 the Democratic party definitely moved to the center, but there is no reason to expect that the party will maintain this centrist direction (1998, 285).

**Conclusion**

The central argument of this chapter is that the elite power struggle model provides the best explanation for the responses of the parties to the political mobilization of evangelicals. The elite struggle framework emphasizes the fact that within each of the parties there are factions with different views about how the party should respond to evangelicals and their issue concerns. The Republican party is home to moderates, who want to avoid social issues, and the "Christian faction" who wants the party to embrace the entirety of the evangelical agenda. Meanwhile, within the Democratic party there is a social liberal faction, determined to keep the party endorsing positions antithetical to those outlined by Christian Right organizations, and a centrist faction, who wants the party to move to the center (or right) on family values and religious issues, so that the party is more in line within the center of public opinion.
The parties responded differently to demands for incorporation from evangelicals because the behavior of each party was shaped by distinct internal struggles. Much like the pluralist perspective predicts, many in the Republican party were eager to broaden the party's coalition and were willing to make some concessions to evangelicals in order to attract them to their party's fold. Moreover, the "politician" faction in the Republican party has pushed the party to avoid or to obscure its positions on social issues, afraid that they repel voters, and focus instead on "winning" economic issues that are consistent with the party's ideological tradition. Not every faction in the Republican party, however, has possessed these same goals and priorities. Many evangelicals entered the Republican party structure because they were inspired by Pat Robertson's candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination and because they wanted to advance their group's political concerns: increase the role of religion in public life, eliminate abortion, reinforce traditional family values, and use government to censor pornography and other negative cultural influences. The "Christian" faction placed the enactment of these policy goals above the more "professional" concerns of party cohesion and electoral viability.

Across the past two decades, the Republican party has ended up incorporating almost all of the evangelical agenda because evangelicals mobilized into the Republican party structure, organized behind a clear vision of what positions the party should endorse on social issues, and effectively employed their numbers and resources to advance the interests of their group. Thus the Republican party per se did not try to reach out to evangelicals, rather evangelicals flooded the party and used their numbers and activism to move the party's social policies in their desired direction. Thus, if the "Christian" faction within the Republican party were to lessen its steadfast, uncompromising commitment to its agenda or presence in the party's structure, the responsiveness of the Republican party to their agenda would undoubtedly weaken.
Given the considerable feminist and social liberal contingent within the Democratic coalition in the late 1970s when evangelicals re-emerged on the political scene, the Democratic party was more constrained in its ability to incorporate evangelicals than the Republican party. In other words, the costs of achieving responsiveness from the Democratic party would have been higher for evangelicals than the costs of achieving responsiveness from the Republican party. However, this does not mean that evangelicals were structurally prevented from, or had no chance of achieving representation from the Democratic party. Had evangelicals attempted to penetrate the Democratic party with the same perseverance as they did the Republican party, they could have become contenders in the struggle to shape party behavior and altered the party's policy. However, evangelicals focused their efforts on the Republican party and throughout the past several decades the Democratic party has made little effort to reach out to evangelicals as a group. Across the 1990s the Democratic party has endorsed positions on religious and family value issues that are closer to those advocated by evangelicals. This was not the result of evangelical mobilization within the Democratic party nor a group-based appeal towards evangelicals. Rather it was an explicit effort by the centrist or "median voter" oriented faction within the Democratic party to make the Democratic party take more mainstream, middle of the road positions on these issues, thereby negating any benefit the Republican party was gaining from them. Much like the "Christian" faction within the Republican party, the centrists in the Democratic party have gained leverage in the intra-party warfare because they have gained resources and numbers and have developed a clear vision of how they want the party to behave.

Looking to the future, it appears that evangelicals are well-positioned to continue achieving representation from the parties. Through massive grassroots mobilization, evangelicals have achieved a secure position within the Republican party to influence
outcomes. Only if the moderate faction in the party launches a sustained and forceful countermobilization, as the centrist faction in the Democratic party has done, can they begin to counter the influence that evangelicals have had on the party's positions on social issues. Moreover, the issues of concern to evangelicals are now firmly embedded in the national agenda, the limited set of issues that make it into public and governmental debate. Several studies have argued that groups tend to participate politically when the parties are discussing issues of importance to them (Piven and Cloward 1988; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The fact that both of the parties are talking about issues that are meaningful to and resonate with many evangelicals will act to sustain the current political mobilization of evangelicals.
Figure 4.1
Percentage Who Respond that "Belief in God is Very Important for True Americans"

Source: National Election Study, 1992
Support for Prayer in School

Source: 1992 National Election Survey Data

Figure 4.2
Support For Prayer in School
Figure 4.3
Views on Women's Role

Source: National Election Survey, 1992
Source: National Election Study, 1992

Figure 4.4
Views on Gay Rights
Figure 4.5
Issue Positions on Abortion

Source: National Election Survey Data 1992
Figure 4.6
Percentage of Americans who think homosexuals should and should not have equal rights in terms of job opportunities

Source: Gallup Organization Polls
CHAPTER 5
THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES TO HISPANICS

Hispanics1 are residents of the United States who can trace their ancestry or origins to the Spanish-speaking regions of Latin America and the Caribbean. At present they are the nation's second largest minority group after African Americans, compromising a little over 10 percent of the population. Although the specifics of the predictions vary, most sources suggest that Hispanics will become the largest minority group in the United States by the year 2020. Hispanics actually trace their origins to many different nations; the most common of which are Mexico, Puerto Rico2 and Cuba. In recent years an increasing number of Hispanics have come to the United States from other Caribbean and Central American countries, such as Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic.

Because of their diverse national origins, scholars have debated whether it is appropriate to speak about Hispanics as a cohesive group or if "Hispanic" is actually an artificial construct imposed by others on a diverse range of people. Building on the work of many other scholars, I argue that even though there are some important differences among the different nationalities, Hispanics form a meaningful group in American

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1 I use the terms Latino and Hispanic interchangeably throughout this project. Scholars continue to debate the more appropriate label to use when identifying this group. The term "Hispanic" is widely used and popularly accepted. Some, however, have criticized it as a label largely imposed by government agencies for the sake of convenience and simplicity and for overemphasizing "the Spanish European aspects of the Latino political experience, while it de-emphasizes experiences in the Americas, particularly the experience of conquest in the United States" (Hero 1992, 3).
2 Puerto Rico is not an independent country, as are Cuba and Mexico, but a commonwealth of the United States. However, political scholars and Puerto Ricans view Puerto Rico as a "nation within a country" (Hero 1992; Jennings 1988).
Hispanics are bound together by the similarity of their cultures, especially their attachment to the Spanish language, and their desire to protect and retain their culture. Moreover, Hispanics are united by their past and present experiences with discrimination in American society. Thus, Hispanic identity is "a home-grown response to problems of discrimination ... and is shaped by U.S. institutions" (Fox 1996, 239). Several scholars have argued that group identity and consciousness among Hispanics has been growing stronger across the 1980s and 1990s largely in response to perceived attacks on the group as a whole. More than ever before, Hispanics of different national origins are identifying common political problems and seeking out group-based solutions to address those problems (Garcia 1997; Hero 1992; Moreno and Warren 1999; Moore and Pachon 1985; Torres 1988). Across the 1990s, Hispanics have mobilized into the political realm with unprecedented force, unity and numbers.

Despite the length and the unique nature of their position within the United States, Hispanics have received scant attention from the political science discipline. Particularly across the 1990s, however, scholars have begun to fill this problematic void. Rodney Hero's *Latinos and the Political System* (1992), laid the foundation for this subfield by providing a broad overview of Latino voting behavior, political ideology and their connection with mainstream political institutions. Another vital contribution to our understanding of Hispanic political behavior has been the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS), the first truly representative national sample of Hispanics, which reports the partisan leanings, political values and policy preferences of Mexican American, Puerto Rican and Cuban citizens and noncitizens (de la Garza et al. 1992). The LNPS shows that over 90 percent of all the major Hispanic groups feel that retaining Spanish is a very important goal. According to a 1997 bi-partisan poll conducted by Univision, over 90% of Hispanics place importance on sustaining the Spanish language and preserving Hispanic heritage and traditions.

In this study Rodney Hero draws from a variety of local, state and regional level surveys and the work of other scholars to substantiate his arguments about the political behavior, views and ideology of Hispanics.
has spawned a series of articles that analyze various aspects of Latino electoral participation and policy orientation. Many studies have also assessed the impact of Hispanics in state and national elections (de la Garza et al. 1987; de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1996, 1999; de la Garza, Menchaca, and DeSipio 1994; Cain et al. 1991). Rather than focusing further on the political behavior of Hispanics, this chapter seeks to explain the strategies that America's major political parties have used to attract this growing ethnic group. How can we explain the behavior of the Republican and Democratic party towards Hispanics as they mobilize into the political realm in unprecedented numbers?

In this chapter I briefly describe the political history of the different national-origin groups composing the Hispanic population in the United States. I also review the factors and conditions that led Hispanics to heighten their political mobilization and organization across the 1980s and 1990s. Second, I identify the Hispanic political agenda based on the agendas of national Hispanic interest groups, the results of the LNPS and other surveys of Hispanic views, the issues that have mobilized Hispanics and the work of other scholars. Third, I assess the behavior of the Republican and Democratic parties towards Hispanics over time, focusing in particular on their behavior across the last two decades. I argue that the collective behavior of the parties towards Hispanics has been different than their responses to evangelicals and African Americans. To a greater extent than in the other two cases, both parties have been competing for the Hispanic vote. They have assembled Hispanic outreach teams and scrambled to find staff able to communicate with the rapidly expanding Spanish media. Despite these symbolic gestures, neither party has responded positively to some of the core demands of Hispanics and both parties have embraced legislation antithetical to the interests of most Hispanics. How can we explain the behavior of the parties towards Hispanics? What explains their seemingly schizophrenic behavior towards the political agenda of this
group? Will the parties continue to straddle the Hispanic agenda or will they eventually stake out ideologically distinct positions as they did in the previous two cases reviewed? What will be the deciding factors in this process? Answering these questions should provide insight into the distinct experience of Hispanics in our two-party system and more generally, into the factors that shape the behavior of American parties.

The History of Hispanics Within America’s Political System

In this section I briefly discuss each major Hispanic national-origin group, outlining the defining events in each group’s political experience in the United States. The different reasons that Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans, Cubans and newer immigrant groups came to the United States and the different experiences they have encountered as residents and citizens of this country have had a lasting impact on each group's political ideologies and behavior. As a result, Hispanics are not a monolithic group. At the same time, these different groups have gone through many similar experiences. Thus, their histories also have provided considerable basis for a common agenda and a fairly strong pan-ethnic group consciousness.

The largest national origin group among Hispanics is Mexican Americans, currently forming about 61 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population. About 85 percent of the Mexican American population resides in five southwestern states: California, New Mexico, Texas, Arizona, and Colorado. Their history in the United States is both long and complicated. About a 100,000 Mexicans were settled in the Southwest when the United States took this land from Mexico in 1848. However, many more Mexicans have immigrated to the United States, primarily in the twentieth century, driven by economic need. Many Mexican Americans originally came to the United States through the Bracero Program, a guest worker program geared to provide labor to U.S. agricultural
interests suffering from labor shortages. The program lasted for over 20 years and admitted 4.6 million Mexican nationals. Moreover, the Bracero Program initiated a pattern of seasonal agricultural migration and undocumented immigration from Mexico that continues today (DeSipio 1997, 317).

Mexican Americans have a long and rich history of political activism in the United States (Hero 1992). One of the most visible examples of Mexican American mobilization was the Chicano movement in the 1960s and early 1970s. This movement was composed of activist, and sometimes radical, Mexican American organizations, such as Raza Unida (Estrada et al. 1988). The Chicano movement fought for political and civil rights, recognition for Mexican culture, as well as a fundamental transformation in the distribution of power in the United States (DeSipio 1996b, 34). As the 1970s progressed much of the steam ran out of the Chicano movement. However, many of the Mexican American organizations involved in the movement continued to exist and accumulate resources and eventually they reoriented themselves to a panethnic focus, lobbying on behalf of problems affecting the larger Hispanic community.

Puerto Ricans form the second largest group of Hispanics within the United States forming about 15% of the Hispanic population. Puerto Rico became an U.S. territory following the Spanish American War in 1898. As a result of the Jones Act of 1917 Puerto Ricans became U.S. citizens. However, Puerto Rico remained a colony of the United States until 1952, when the island was granted commonwealth status. Puerto Rico has often been described as a nation within a state (Jennings 1988; Hero 1992). Puerto Ricans are all United States citizens by birth, a fact which differentiates them from their counterparts from other Latin American and Caribbean countries. However, their legal status and rights differ from other U.S. citizens and vary depending on whether or not they reside in the United States mainland or in Puerto Rico. Those who live in Puerto
Rico are subject to the draft,⁵ but do not pay national income taxes and cannot participate in national elections. Puerto Ricans are free to move to the United States mainland at any time, which many have done across the twentieth century, primarily for economic reasons. Once they establish residency on the mainland they are entitled to the same rights and responsibilities as all other U.S. citizens. Another characteristic that distinguishes Puerto Ricans from other Hispanics is their lower socioeconomic status. According to income, education and occupational statistics, Puerto Ricans are the worst off of the three major Hispanic groups. The lower socioeconomic status of Puerto Ricans living on the mainland, plus the fact that Puerto Ricans can return to their homeland more easily than other Hispanic immigrant groups has strongly impacted contemporary Puerto Rican politics (Jennings 1988). These factors have stunted voting rates and electoral activism on the American mainland.⁶

Cuban Americas form about 6 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States. About 60 percent of Cuban Americans reside in Florida. Many scholars have pointed out that Cuban Americans are quite different in many respects from other Hispanics (Hero 1992; Garcia 1988). Although some migrated to the United in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the vast majority of Cuban Americans trace their origins to the period after the 1959 Cuban revolution. These Cubans immigrated to the United States to escape the communist rule of Fidel Castro rather than to improve their economic situation. Compared to other Hispanics they were relatively well off when they entered the United States. Moreover, the U.S. government, driven to discredit Cuba's communist regime, set up special resettlement programs for Cuban immigrants, including food, clothing, medical care and cash benefits (Hero 1992, 42). Because of their unique

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⁵ This only applies to Puerto Rican males when there is a draft as women remain exempt from draft registration laws in the United States.
⁶ Interestingly Puerto Ricans, in Puerto Rico, have a much higher turnout rate for elections than is the case for all voters in the United States. Between 80 and 90 percent of Puerto Ricans vote in Puerto Rican elections (Jennings 1988, 72).

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history, Cuban Americans have been heavily consumed by the politics of their homeland. Anticommunism and the desire to overthrow Fidel Castro has been the primary factor shaping their political orientation and behavior (DeSipio 1996b, 38). Several scholars, however, have argued that the distinctiveness of Cuban Americans is beginning to fade (Moreno and Warren 1999; Torres 1988). More recent Cuban immigrants have been of lower socioeconomic status and have had darker skin and as a result have encountered more obstacles and discrimination than their wealthier, lighter-skinned predecessors (Hero 1992, 42). Moreover, as Cubans slowly have become more concerned with domestic issues, they have found more in common with other Hispanics and have begun to view themselves as a minority rather than an exile community (Torres 1988).

A sizable population of Hispanics lives in the United States who do not come from one of the three dominant groups discussed above. The four largest of these populations are Colombians, Dominicans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans (Hero 1992, 43). These populations are much less studied than the three dominant populations. The studies that have been done, however, indicate that these groups are developing political agendas similar to the dominant Latino population (DeSipio 1996b, 39). According to my interviews, the dominant and unifying concerns of these newer immigrant groups is getting to the Unites States and staying here. Colombians, Dominicans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans have been joining forces with one another and more established Hispanic groups to lobby the government on immigration policy.

The diverse experiences of the national origin groups is clearly reflected in their voting patterns. About two-thirds of Mexican Americans and 70 percent of Puerto Ricans report that they are Democrats. Meanwhile, about two-thirds of Cuban Americans identify as Republicans, largely because of their strong opposition to communism and Fidel Castro. Since Cubans compose a small portion of the Hispanic community in the United States, however, Hispanics in the aggregate have been
significantly more Democratic than the rest of the population. In terms of voting behavior, however, up until 1996 there were signs that Hispanic electoral unity behind the Democratic party was eroding (DeSipio et al. 1999; Pachon, Sanchez and Falcon 1999, 170). In the 1976 elections, Hispanic support for national Democratic candidates was close to 80 percent. Over the next two decades Hispanic support for national Democratic candidates declined to a range of 60 to 70 percent (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 7-8). In 1984, Republican presidential candidate Ronald Reagan received 40 percent of the Latino vote. In 1992, Democratic candidate Bill Clinton received only 62 percent of the Hispanic vote with George Bush and Ross Perot amassing almost 40 percent between them (DeSipio et al. 1999, 8). The year 1996 marked a sharp reversal in this pattern. In 1996 support for Republican candidates among all Hispanic national origin groups plummeted to new lows (Kirschten 1998). Although Cuban Americans cast a slight plurality of their votes for Republican candidate Bob Dole, far more Cuban Americans voted Democratic in the 1996 race than in any previous presidential election (Moreno and Warren 1999, 211). 7 No one knows for sure whether the significant shift among Hispanics towards the Democratic party is a temporary aberration or the start of a new trend, as it will largely depend on the behavior of the parties themselves.

The Political Mobilization of Hispanics

Several scholars of Hispanic politics have marked the 1980s as the beginnings of a truly "Hispanic" politics in the United States (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999; Garcia 1988). In response to the 1980 census, which revealed that the Hispanic portion of the population had grown tremendously and promised to become the largest ethnic group in

7 DeSipio et al. (1999) suggest that although Cuban Americans living in Florida maintained a slight Republican leaning, a slight plurality of Cuban Americans nation-wide may have voted for Democratic candidate Bill Clinton in 1996. Although the evidence is inconclusive, studies suggest that Cuban Americans living in New York and New Jersey overwhelmingly voted Democratic.
the United States, the 1980s were labeled "the Decade of the Hispanics" (Garcia 1988, 1). Although each national origin group has retained their own more narrow agendas to some degree, it was in the 1980s that Mexican Americans, Puerto Ricans and Cuban Americans truly began to work together on behalf of a commonly identified set of issues. Hispanics have formed several national organizations that take an explicit pan-ethnic focus such as the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, the National Association of Latino Elected Leaders (NALEO) and the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA). Moreover, several organizations that previously identified with the Mexican American community, including the National Council of La Raza (NCLR) and the Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF) consciously began working on behalf of the welfare of the Hispanic community as a whole. They have ensured that their boards include non-Mexican American Hispanics and they work on issues beyond the narrower needs of Mexican Americans (DeSipio 1996, 35). In the 1980s, American parties began to develop targeted outreach towards Hispanics as a cohesive group (DeSipio et al 1999, 5).

Another indication of the political mobilization of Hispanics is their increased visibility in elections. Historically, Hispanics have had a very low turnout in elections as a result of several factors, the very high level of noncitizenship among Hispanics and the fact that Hispanics are more likely to have characteristics that predict nonvoting: they are younger, have less formal education and have lower income than Americans on average. Although Hispanics still lag behind other sectors of the electorate in terms of turnout, this situation is beginning to change. Across the 1980s and 1990s Hispanics have been the fastest growing segment of the electorate. Part of this is because Hispanics are gaining

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8 Prior to the 1980s the parties had occasionally targeted Mexican Americans, as Kennedy did in 1960. or Cubans, they did not make appeals to Hispanics as a group (DeSipio et al. 1999).
9 The most recent figures suggest that nationally about 40% of Hispanics are not citizens. In Florida and California, about 50% of Hispanic adults are not citizens (DeSipio et al. 1999, 11).
more education, more income and growing older (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997). However, the increasing turnout among Hispanics is also a response to the growing anti-immigrant mood of the country and what has been perceived by many Hispanics as anti-Hispanic legislation. Proposals to cut-off benefits for legal and illegal immigrants, crack down on immigration, and ban Spanish from schools and workplaces gave many Hispanics an increased incentive to have a say in the political system (Garcia 1997). Moreover, national and community level organizations have dramatically expanded their efforts to naturalize and register Hispanics (DeSipio 1997, 335). Naturalization rates among Hispanics have shot up dramatically since 1994 and according to the most recent statistics the naturalization rates are still increasing. Moreover, these new citizens are voting in disproportionately high numbers (DeSipio 1997, 336). A million more Hispanics voted in 1996 than in 1992. Moreover, Hispanics were the only demographic group among whom turnout increased from 1992 to 1996 (Garcia 1997, 434).

Another visible sign of Hispanic political mobilization was the Hispanic march on Washington. In October of 1996 somewhere between 25,000 to 50,000 Hispanics marched on the capital. This march was important for substantive and symbolic reasons. It was the largest Hispanic rally in the history of the United States and the first Hispanic rally on the nation's capital. Moreover, the march revealed the growing unity of the Hispanic community. Over 1,000 different Latino groups were present at the October march and marchers from all different national origins were present. The marchers collectively articulated a seven-point list of policy demands including a more streamlined citizenship procedure, an extended amnesty program for illegal immigrants, a return of benefits to legal immigrants, citizen review boards of police departments, better healthcare and an increase in the minimum wage. Moreover, the broader goal of the march was to gain respect, political inclusion and a say in the decision making process of the country. Juan Jose Gutierrez, the coordinator of the march stated: "We are
Hispanic community. Over 1,000 different Latino groups were present at the October march and marchers from all different national origins were present. The marchers collectively articulated a seven-point list of policy demands including a more streamlined citizenship procedure, an extended amnesty program for illegal immigrants, a return of benefits to legal immigrants, citizen review boards of police departments, better healthcare and an increase in the minimum wage. Moreover, the broader goal of the march was to gain respect, political inclusion and a say in the decision making process of the country. Juan Jose Gutierrez, the coordinator of the march stated: "We are Americans. We aren't going anywhere. We want to be part of the political and social dialogue of this country" (Ramos 1996, A1). This march, along with the increased electoral participation among Hispanics and the increased number and activity of organizations pursuing pan-ethnic Hispanic goals, demonstrates that Hispanics have become a politically significant force within American politics.

THE HISPANIC AGENDA

In order to assess and then explain the responsiveness of the parties to the mobilization of Hispanics, it is first important to lay out the set of issues that represent the heart of their concerns. In particular, I seek to identify the issues on that are of particular concern to Hispanics, that disproportionately impact Hispanics, and on which Hispanics have fairly cohesive views. I use several sources to identify these issues. One of the primary sources is public opinion surveys. The best source of data on Hispanics comes from the Latino National Political Survey (LNPS) conducted in 1989-1990. The LNPS was the first and remains one of the only national probability surveys of persons of Spanish origin living in the United States. The American National Election Survey is

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10 This survey was restricted to Hispanics of Mexican, Puerto Rican and Cuban origin, whom together compose four-fifths of the Latino population in the United States. A total of 2,816 Hispanics were
not as helpful in assessing Hispanic public opinion because it only includes U.S. citizens and 40% of Hispanics are not citizens.

Another source I use to identify Hispanic priorities are the goals and activities of organizations representing Hispanic Americans. Particularly useful has been the congressional scorecards and Hispanic agenda composed by the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA), a non-partisan coalition of 24 national Latino organizations, including all the major ones. Thus, Hispanic organizations have worked together to identify a set of issues important to all the national origin Hispanic groups. It should be noted that some analysts, most prominently Linda Chavez, have argued that Latino national interest groups are out of touch with the true feelings of the Hispanic population. She and others argue that Hispanic organizations pursue a civil rights based agenda and encourage a separate identity whereas most Hispanics simply want to assimilate. However, as the following sections demonstrate empirical evidence from surveys suggests a large degree of cohesion between the priorities of Hispanic organizations and the preferences of the Hispanic mass public. Individuals and groups typically mobilize politically over issues that are of intense concern to them. Thus, a final source of information concerning the Hispanic agenda are the issues that have actually mobilized the Hispanic community.

interviewed. Of that total 1,546 were Mexican origin, 589 Puerto Rican and 679 Cuban. In addition the research design included a sample of non-Latinos were interviewed. Approximately 60 percent of the Hispanic respondents completed the interview in Spanish. The survey oversampled Cuban Americans; Cubans form 6% of the Hispanic population in the United States and they formed 24% of the overall sample. de la Garza et al. did this so they could make statistically sound statements about the interests of Cubans as an ethnic subgroup and see how Cubans differed in their views from Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans. de la Garza et al. report their findings by ethnic subgroup so the oversampling of Cubans does not lead to any overall skewing in the sample.

11 The Hispanic organizations involved in NHLA and in developing the Hispanic agenda are League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC), Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF), National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials (NALEO), National Council of La Raza, National Puerto Rican Coalition and U.S. Hispanic Chamber of Commerce.
Based on these sources, I argue that although not as cohesive as the agenda of African Americans, there is an identifiable set of political issues that have united and mobilized the Hispanic community and distinguished them from other forces in American politics. I conceptualize the contemporary Hispanic agenda as having several overlapping issue clusters including: (1) the achievement of civil rights and the elimination of discrimination (2) the preservation of Spanish language and Hispanic culture (3) more compassionate immigration policies and better treatment of legal and illegal immigrants and (4) support for social welfare policies.  

There are several forces holding together the political agenda of Hispanics. One of the deepest unifying forces is the Spanish language, which for most Hispanics is part of their identity (DeSipio 1996; Fox 1996; Schmidt 1997). Geoffrey Fox argues that "respect for themselves, their language, and their culture" is the fundamental goal of Hispanics, regardless of their national origin, socioeconomic status or political identification (1996, 183). In addition, the agenda of Hispanics is partially a response to their experiences within the United States. Hispanics have been lumped together, for better and for worse, by government institutions (Espiritu 1992). Moreover, they have experienced and continue to experience group-based discrimination as the result of their status as a language-minority and for being part of a group that continues to immigrate to the United States at high rates (Welch et al. 1997). As a result of cultural links and common experiences as a minority group in American society, Hispanics possess a fairly high level of group consciousness. The LNPS reveals that a majority of Hispanics believe they have an obligation to help their co-ethnics (ranging from a low of 55 percent for  

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12 Hispanics take conservative positions on some social issues. According to the LNPS the majority of Hispanics support the death penalty, and a fairly sizable minority oppose abortion. On these issues, however, the views of Hispanics generally fall in line with the majority of Americans. Moreover, these issues have not been included on the agenda of national Hispanic organizations, nor have they mobilized Hispanics politically.
Cubans to a high of 73 percent for Puerto Ricans). Even more important, Hispanics see their fate as connected. The majority of all national origin groups, (59 percent of Cubans, 65 percent of Mexican Americans and 74 percent of Puerto Ricans) believed that they benefited when other Hispanics improved their status.

The Civil Rights Agenda

One of the central components of the Hispanic agenda is the attainment of civil rights and the protection of voting rights in particular. Hispanics never endured slavery, but they have experienced a good deal of discrimination in the United States. Similar to African Americans, Hispanics have faced discrimination in education, employment, housing and voting. Although many Hispanics are Caucasian, many Puerto Ricans and Cubans are of African ancestry and many Mexicans have some Indian ancestry, so they have darker skin than non-Hispanic whites. As a result they have been subjected to considerable race-based discrimination. Moreover, many Hispanics encounter hostility and discrimination as a result of anti-immigrant sentiments. U. S. Border Patrol and local law enforcement officers, who cannot tell the difference between Hispanics who are legal residents or citizens and those who are not, often stop Hispanics for questioning well inside the borders of the United States. Moreover, the 1986 law that penalizes employers for hiring illegal immigrants has increased discrimination against Hispanics who are citizens and legal immigrants (Vigil 1996; Welch et al 1997, 486). Finally, studies conducted in the 1990s have found that Americans still hold negative stereotypes about Hispanics. Hispanics are perceived as significantly more likely to be lazier, more violence prone, more likely to live off welfare, less intelligent, and less patriotic than the average non-Hispanic white American (Garcia 1997, 12). DeSipio (1996) argues that Hispanics'
Americans, support strong civil rights efforts. Hispanic organizations have made the continued fight for civil rights one of their central priorities. For example, LULAC's central goal has remained "Equal access to and equal treatment from public institutions" since 1920 when it was founded. Meanwhile, MALDEF has fought against discrimination in schools, public accommodations and the electoral arena.

One area where Hispanics have faced particularly severe discrimination historically is voting. For more than 100 years Spanish speakers were consciously excluded from political participation in American electoral politics (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997, 114). Many states imposed English literacy requirements and sent out English-language re-registration notices. Others states simply refused to place registered Hispanics on voting lists and used intimidation to keep Hispanics from voting despite their citizenship status (DeSipio 1996b, 36). When the Voting Rights Act came up for renewal in 1975, Mexican American and Puerto Rican leaders testified about the formal and informal procedures used to reduce Hispanic registration and voting. Congress decided that state efforts to exclude Hispanics were comparable to those that kept blacks from polling places in the South. Thus, they extended the key provisions of the Act to the Spanish-origin population. Moreover, they created several new protections for Hispanics to compensate for past discrimination. Most importantly, Congress mandated that election materials had to be bilingual in areas with concentrations of 5 percent or more Spanish speakers (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997, 114; DeSipio 1996, 183).

Bilingual ballots and laws upholding non-discriminatory registration and voting procedures remain important issues for Hispanics for both substantive and symbolic reasons. Bilingual ballot provisions serve as a signal that Latinos are welcome in the American political system. Moreover many Hispanics, particularly Puerto Ricans who migrated to the United States as adults, are not able to function in English. Their rights to participate are abridged unless they have access to election materials in the language of
their state-provided education (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997, 115). According to the LNPS, over 90 percent of each Hispanic national origin group favors the provision of public services in Spanish (see Figure 5.1). This is an issue on which the Hispanic public is highly cohesive. Moreover, the National Council of La Raza and the Southwest Voter Research Project have fought to maintain bilingual ballots and have struggled against laws that impose special burdens on Hispanic voters, such as demonstrating proof of their citizenship at the polls.

**Cultural Agenda: Language and Bilingual Education**

One of the most important ties among Hispanics is language (DeSipio 1996; Padilla 1985). The Spanish language serves as a cultural and symbolic link that connects Hispanics of various ancestries and various periods of immigration, and distinguishes Hispanics from other U.S. populations. Over 40 percent of the Hispanic population in the United States is foreign born and among them Spanish is overwhelmingly the dominant language (Schmidt 1997). Even among Hispanics who use English as their dominant language, Spanish offers an important cultural link that most want to preserve. In fact Padilla argues that Hispanic identity is related more to the symbolism of Spanish as a separate language than to its actual use by all members of the group (1985, 151). Louis DeSipio has argued that "Sensitivity ... to the needs of non-English speakers is a critical linkage across Latino populations" (1996, 179).

Similar to most Americans, Hispanics overwhelmingly feel that learning English is very important and critical for prospering in the United States (Schmidt 1997). According to the Latino National Political Survey, over 90 percent of each national-origin group agrees that citizens and residents of the U.S. should learn English. A survey of Hispanics in South Florida found that 98 percent thought it was important for their children to read and write "perfect English" (Welch et al. 1997, 42). Moreover, evidence
from the Census Bureau suggests that current immigrants are mastering English. According to the 1990 Census, of the 17.3 million Spanish speakers in the United States, fewer than 10 percent do not speak any English. Multiple studies show that virtually all Hispanic immigrants want to learn English and do so despite the limited supply of English instruction for adults (Citron 1990, 539).

Across the 1980s and 1990s, more than 20 states have passed laws making English their official language, mostly through statewide referendums. Surveys conducted in states considering English Only referendums revealed that such measures have widespread support among the public in every major demographic group except Hispanics (Citron 1990, 548). According to the LNPS, 79 percent of the non-Hispanic white respondents support establishing English as the official language (see Figure 5.2). Despite the importance Hispanics themselves place on learning English, they are generally opposed to efforts making English the official language. The LNPS revealed that a majority of Hispanics opposed making English only laws (see Figure 5.2). Moreover, fewer than 30 percent of each national-origin group favored a policy of allowing employers to impose English-only rules in the workplace, while a majority of Anglos supported such policies (see Figure 5.3).

The majority of Hispanics and Hispanic interest groups embrace "English-plus" programs which foster the learning and use of English without forcing anyone to let go of Spanish. According to a poll conducted by Univision, over 90% of Hispanics place importance on sustaining the Spanish language and preserving Hispanic heritage and traditions.14 Moreover, many Hispanics view English only laws as unnecessary at best,

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14 One Democratic and one Republican pollster conducted this bipartisan poll. They conducted the poll for Univision Communications Inc. on April 22, 1998. There were 750 respondents of Hispanic origin in 7 major US media markets. Penn, Schoen, and Berland Associates and Edelman Public Relations Worldwide conducted the interviews from April 5, 1998 to April 18, 1998. The margin of error is ± or - 3.6% at a 95% confidence level (www.lulac.issues).
since Hispanics are already strongly committed to learning English, and discriminatory at worst, suggesting that linguistic minorities are inferior and unwanted in the United States. Many Hispanic organizations have argued that English only laws lay the groundwork for future discrimination against language minorities and endanger the continuation of bilingual services that ease the process of assimilation (Citron 1990, 539).

Hispanics are also fairly cohesive in their support for bilingual education. Bilingual education, which means teaching students their core subjects such as math and history in their native language while providing them gradual training in how to read and speak English, was created to allow foreign students the opportunity for an equal education. In 1968, Congress encouraged bilingual education by passing the Bilingual Education Act, which provided funding for such programs, and in 1974 the Supreme Court held that schools must teach students in a language they can understand. While there are a great number of immigrant groups in the United States about three-fourths of children with English learning needs are Hispanic, making bilingual education a particularly important issue for this group (Bronner 1998).

Most Americans oppose the continuation of bilingual education. According to a Gallup poll conducted in May of 1998, 63% of the American public supports "immersion", which means teaching non-English speaking students all of their subjects in English while giving them intensive short term training on how to read and speak English. Only 33 percent supported bilingual education (Newport 1998).¹⁵ Similar patterns of support can be seen in the state of California. Proposition 227, the "Save the Children" initiative, which proposed to remove bilingual programs from the schools, was supported by a majority of non-Hispanic Californians. The measure passed with 61% of

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¹⁵ These results are based on telephone interviews with a randomly selected national sample of 1,005 adults, conducted May 8-10, 1998. Error could be as much as plus or minus 3 percentage points.

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the vote (Donner 1998). Since California is home to one-half of all the students who qualify for bilingual education the referendum results clearly have national significance.

Meanwhile, although many Hispanics have expressed concern over the state and quality of bilingual education, the vast majority supports it and seeks to maintain it. Fewer than 40 percent of California Hispanics supported Proposition 227 (Terry 1998c). According to the LNPS, over 90 percent of each national-origin group favors the provision of public services in Spanish and at least 79 percent of each group explicitly supported bilingual education (see Figure 5.1 and Figure 5.4). Equally striking is the finding that a majority of each respondent group was willing to be taxed more in order to ensure the continuance of bilingual education programs. More recent polls have produced similar findings (see Figure 5.5). According to the Univision poll discussed earlier, 83% of Hispanics support bilingual education programs. As Ronald Schmidt (1997) has pointed out, Hispanics support bilingual education for different reasons. Some Hispanics see bilingual education as a way to preserve their native language and culture. This is supported by LNPS results, which revealed that fewer than 15 percent of each Latino respondent group chose "to learn English" as the primary objective or bilingual education programs. Meanwhile strong majorities of at least 70 percent of each group favored a maintenance approach to bilingual education by supporting "to learn two languages" as the primary objective of this form of schooling. Other Hispanics fear that the elimination of bilingual education will result in a return to past ways, when children were sometimes punished for speaking Spanish at school. One participant in the 1996 Hispanic march on Washington captured this fear: "I remembered my first grade teacher in Houston scolding me and my class about speaking Spanish to each other and how ashamed we were made to feel about talking in our parents' tongue. Now we are no longer ashamed to speak two languages" (Zuniga 1996, 2).
The protection of bilingual education has acted as a major mobilizing and unifying force among Hispanics. All major Latino organizations, including the Congressional Hispanic Caucus and even more conservative ones such as the Cuban American National Council and US Hispanic Chamber of Commerce, actively opposed the passage of Proposition 227. Moreover, bilingual education has strengthened the ties between Cuban Americans and other Hispanics groups. As one Republican leader pointed out during an interview, bilingual education is working quite well in Florida. He feared that the elimination of bilingual education in California might have angered Cuban Americans in Florida who are themselves products of a successful bilingual education system.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{Immigration}

Immigration is an explosive issue within the Latino community that possesses the power to divide as well as unite and mobilize the community. On the one hand, surveys reveal that Hispanics share some of the general concerns that most Americans have about immigration (Garcia and Sapien 1999). According to the Univision poll 58% of Hispanics said illegal immigration is a problem and 48% said that the United States lets too many immigrants into this country. The LNPS revealed that majorities of all national-origin groups felt that "there are too many immigrants".\textsuperscript{17} For many Hispanics, their desire to present a positive public image of Hispanics as a group is complicated by the continuing influx of immigrants. What differentiates Hispanics from the rest of the

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{16} Interview at the Republican National Headquarters on June 16, 1998.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} One of the problems with the LNPS is that the one question included in the poll that directly probes public opinion regarding levels of immigration to the United States fails to distinguish between illegal and legal immigration, an important distinction in immigration research (Hood et al. 1997). The exact wording of the LNPS immigration question is "There are too many immigrants coming to this country: strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree" (de la Garza et al. 1992).
\end{itemize}
American public, however, is that they are more intensely concerned with immigration policies and they are more liberal on these issues than the American public as a whole.

Hispanics are more intensely concerned with immigration than most Americans for the simple reason that a disproportionately high percentage of Hispanics have had direct or indirect experience with immigration laws. Having immigrant ancestors certainly does not set Hispanics apart from most other Americans. What differentiates Hispanics is that immigration from Spanish speaking countries in the Caribbean and Latin America has been an ongoing element in the immigrant stream. Moreover, immigration issues disproportionately impact Hispanics because over the past 30 years Latin Americans have made up the largest share of immigrants to the United States (DeSipio 1997, 315). At present, approximately 200,000 Latinos immigrate each year for permanent residence and an unknown number enter in an undocumented status (DeSipio 1996, 181). About 40% of Hispanics in the United States are not citizens, as opposed to 3.1% of the non-Latino population (DeSipio et al. 1999). Thus laws aimed at legal or illegal immigrants directly affect a significant minority of Hispanics. Even among the majority of Hispanics who are citizens, they are more likely than non-Hispanics to have recent immigrant ancestors. Crackdowns on immigration often result in ripping Hispanic families apart. Moreover, the high levels of contemporary immigration and the ill treatment that many first generation immigrants receive reinforces the distinctiveness felt by many Hispanics who are citizens and long term residents (DeSipio 1996, 181).

Multiple studies also show that Hispanics tend to favor more liberal immigration policies than white or black Americans (Cain and Kiewet 1986; de la Garza and DeSipio 1998; DeSipio 1996b; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Harwood 1983). According to the LNPS a majority of Hispanics advocate protections for the civil rights of immigrants. Moreover, a majority of all national-origin groups support expanded government resettlement programs to assist immigrants and refugees (DeSipio 1996b, 80).
According to a survey of Hispanics conducted in California, 61 percent supported increased amnesty of immigrants (Cain and Kiewet 1987, 59).

Moreover, there is particularly clear evidence that Hispanics, in contrast to the non-Hispanic public, are opposed to efforts to take benefits away from legal and illegal immigrants. Looking at public support for California's Proposition 187 shows the vast differences between Hispanic and non-Hispanic views (see Figure 5.6). This proposition sought to curb undocumented immigration into California by denying undocumented immigrants and their offspring access to public services such as health care, schools and welfare. While this Proposition was favored overwhelmingly among non-Hispanic whites by a margin of 64 percent, the measure was overwhelmingly rejected by Latino voters by a margin of 72 percent (Pachon et al. 1999, 170; Tolbert and Hero 1996). Moreover, surveys revealed that nearly three out of four registered Hispanic voters believed that Proposition 187 would lead to anti-immigrant hatred and raise discrimination against Latinos in the state. In contrast, fewer than half of all voters agreed with this perspective (Pachon et al. 1999, 171). This issue has increased the bond between Cuban Americans and other Hispanics. A recent attempt to get a "shadow" Proposition 187 initiative on the state ballot in Florida sparked fierce opposition from Cuban Americans (Moreno and Warren 1999, 211). The Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) announced that for the first time in its history it will take on issues not directly linked to Cuba and lobby on behalf of immigrants facing cuts in social programs (Moreno and Warren 1999, 212).

Immigration, perhaps more than any other issue has demonstrated the potential to mobilize the Hispanic community to political action. Proposition 187 in California and the passage of the Welfare Reform Act in 1996, which took benefits away from close to one million legal immigrants a large portion of whom were Hispanic, have been responsible for mobilization among widespread sections of the Hispanic community.
The greatest increase in local and national groups representing Hispanics has been immigrant advocacy groups (Ramos 1996). Moreover, immigration issues were one of the major forces behind the 1996 Hispanic march on Washington. The march was referred to by many as "The Immigrant Rights March". One of the participants in the march said that "It had to take something like Proposition 187 for us to become offended enough to rebel" (Moscoso 1996, 1). Some scholars of Hispanic politics have surmised "that the impact of immigration issues is so great that it is changing the essence of Latino politics from one of citizen civil rights to that of immigration policy and the status of immigrants" (Garcia 1997, 433).

**Liberal Social Welfare Policies**

Socioeconomic data indicate that Hispanics are one of the most disadvantaged groups in American society. On almost every measure of economic well being Hispanics fall far behind non-Hispanic whites. Latinos earn significantly less than non-Hispanic whites. Hispanic family income throughout the 1980s was two-thirds that of the non-Hispanic population (Hero 1992, 52). A recent report released by the Clinton administration revealed that not much progress towards income equalization has been made over the last decade. In 1998, the median wealth of white families was more than twice that of black and Hispanic families; however, these figures vary across the national origin groups to some degree (Stevenson 1998). Cubans are the closest to the non-Hispanic pattern while Puerto Ricans are the worst off with median family incomes that are less than half of non-Hispanics (DeSipio 1996, 182). Moreover, Hispanics have poverty rates dramatically higher than the non-Hispanic population, even among the Cuban population (Hero 1992, 52). Recent reports by federal agencies demonstrate that for the first time a higher proportion of Hispanics than African Americans are "officially" poor.
Surveys have demonstrated that Latinos are more inclined to label themselves conservative than liberal (Hero 1992, 64). However, in terms of social welfare policies, Hispanics support what would be considered a liberal social welfare agenda (de la Garza et al. 1992). The majority of all Hispanic national origin groups support an increase in federal spending on a broad range of domestic issues, including education, health-care, child services, the environment, crime and drugs. Moreover, a majority of Hispanics responded that they support more government spending in all these areas even if this necessitated an increase in their taxes (de la Garza et al. 1992, 89). Moreover, an increase in the minimum wage, the improvement of public education and expanded health care are top priorities for most Hispanic organizations and are regularly included on the "congressional scorecards" created by the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda.

THE RESPONSE OF THE PARTIES TO HISPANICS

A couple of similarities characterize the behavior of the Republican and Democratic parties towards Hispanics. Despite increased outreach efforts towards Hispanics (discussed later in the pluralism section), both parties, on the whole, have become less supportive of the Hispanic political agenda over time. The second similarity is that the response of both parties has been somewhat schizophrenic. The Republican party has endorsed a plethora of legislation antithetical to Hispanic interests, but has also attempted to pass some legislation favored by a majority of Hispanics. The Democratic party has behaved similarly. The Democratic party has portrayed itself as the only true champion of ethnic and racial minorities while simultaneously passing legislation perceived by many Hispanics to be harmful to the social and economic well being of their group.

To some degree the response of the parties has been covered in previous chapters. As just described, Hispanics support the core elements of a liberal social welfare agenda
and the rigorous enforcement of civil rights policies. The chapter on African Americans
detailed how the Democratic party has been more responsive on these type of issues than
the Republican party although, as many Democrats pointed out to me during interviews,
some happily and some with great frustration, the Democratic party now emphasizes
economic opportunity rather than economic justice and equality. Since the behavior of
the parties on civil rights and social welfare issues has already been described, this
section focuses more on the parties' responses to the other issues within the Hispanic
agenda: voting rights legislation, bilingual education and programs, language policy and
immigration.

The Republican Party and the Hispanic Agenda

How responsive has the Republican party been to the concerns of Hispanics? In
this section I argue that the Republican party has moved from a low positive response,
when it accommodated some of the issues important to Hispanics, to a negative response.
When Hispanics first began demanding incorporation from the political system, the
Republican party accommodated many of their concerns such as bilingual education and
the recognition of minority language rights. Gradually, however, the Republican party
has come to embrace positions that are antithetical to the interests of Hispanics as defined
in the previous section. In comparison to the party's response to African Americans, its
response to Hispanics is less solidified, as demonstrated by occasional gestures towards
accommodation. Nevertheless, the prevailing trend has been in the opposite direction.
The Republican party weakened the enforcement of civil rights laws throughout the
1980s. In the 1990s the party has pursued legislation chipping away at the voting rights
of Hispanics. The Republicans have devoted more and more space within their platforms
to issues on the Hispanics agenda, but have taken positions most Hispanics oppose, even
Hispanics within the Republican party. After the 1994 election, the Republican

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leadership, almost daily, initiated legislation attacking taxpaying, legal immigrants. The party also has become incrementally more conservative on issues such as bilingual education, English only laws and immigration.

**Voting Rights**

As discussed in the previous chapter on African Americans, since 1964 the Republican party has not been a strong advocate of voting rights legislation. Republican party platforms never mention, let alone praise the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act, which extended its original protections to language minorities and provided for bilingual ballots.

Since taking over Congress in 1994, however, the Republican party has begun a genuine attack on voting rights legislation. They have introduced many different pieces of voter fraud legislation that would make it more difficult for Hispanics and new citizens to participate in elections.\(^2\) One bill, the Voter Eligibility Verification Act, proposed to give states the power to remove people from the voter rolls if they were unable to prove their United States citizenship. The bill did not pass because it was rushed to the floor and required a two-thirds majority. However it was supported by a traditional majority of 210 of whom only 7 were Democrats (Alvarez 1998a). A similar bill sought to give registrars the power to check a person's citizenship when they go to vote if there was reason to suspect that person was not a citizen (Alvarez 1998b). Moreover, Republicans have proposed legislation to repeal provisions of the Voting Rights Act that would prohibit the use of bilingual ballots and bilingual assistance during elections. Most

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\(^2\) Much of the voter fraud legislation introduced by Congressional Republicans has been a reaction to the loss of Representative Bob Doman to a Hispanic Democrat, Loretta Sanchez, in Orange County, California. Many Republicans argued that the election was marred by voter fraud, in particular, non-citizens voting. A congressional committee examined these claims and dismissed them.
Hispanics feel that these voter fraud laws would increase the number of voting rights violations against Hispanics and would have a chilling affect on minority participation.

Cultural Issues: Bilingual Education and Language Policy

Through 1980 the Republican party acknowledged the value of Spanish culture and language in their rhetoric and legislation. The 1980 Republican platform devoted an entire section to "Hispanic-Americans", under which it recognized that "Hispanics ... are one of the major pillars in our cultural, social and economic life ... Diverse in character, proud in heritage, they are greatly enriching the American melting pot". When bilingual education began to emerge across the country, the Republican party was at worst ambivalent to these policies and at best, moderately supportive. In 1967, as Governor of California, Ronald Reagan signed a bill eliminating the state's English-only instructional mandate and began the implementation of bilingual education (Terry 1998b). In their 1976 platform, the Republicans listed among their education reforms "an education bill of rights for Spanish-speaking people". In 1980 the Republicans stated that "We also believe there should be local educational programs which enable those who grew up learning another language such as Spanish to become proficient in English while also maintaining their own language and cultural heritage ... neither Hispanics nor any other American citizen should be barred from education or employment opportunity because English is not their first language".

Throughout the 1980s, Republicans in the House and Senate initiated legislation to make English the official language of the United States. However, such efforts had the support of only a minority of Republicans. When English Only laws were on the ballot in state referendums in California, Arizona and Colorado during the 1980s, they were
opposed by top elected officials in both parties (Citron et al. 1990, 548). Moreover, the party refrained from mentioning anything about language policy in its platforms. By 1996, the balance of power in the party had clearly changed. That year the Republican platform officially endorsed the idea of making English the official language. Soon after, Republican congressional leaders heightened efforts to pass the English Language Empowerment Act, which would have made English the official language and would have prohibited government employees from communicating in any language other than English. Although this was not enacted into law, it received support from the vast majority of Republicans in both the House and Senate.

Republicans have also changed from passive acquiescence of bilingual education into a full-fledged attack on such programs. California's Proposition 227 was sponsored by Ron Unz a Republican nominee for Governor in 1998. At the Republican party's semi-annual convention that year, the California party chairman frantically tried to keep the delegates from endorsing proposition 227 but was overruled by the rank and file. Thus, the Republican party gave their official endorsement to the proposal to end bilingual education. In 1998, Frank Riggs (R. CA) sponsored the "English Language Fluency Act", which would end federal aid to bilingual education programs and set a two-year limit for public school limited-English proficient children to learn English. Although federal money for bilingual education only amounts to $400 million annually, only a fraction of the program's costs, such a bill would be an important symbolic victory for those seeking to limit or end bilingual education (Bronner 1998).

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19 One of the few Republican elected officials to support such efforts was then junior legislator Pete Wilson, who later became the Governor of California (Citron et al. 1990).
Immigration

The schizophrenic behavior of the Republican party is nowhere more obvious than on the issue of immigration. The Republican party has never been overly warm to the idea of immigration, but it was not until the 1990s that the party began to forcefully attack legal and illegal immigrants in their platforms and legislative agenda. Throughout the 1980s the Republican party stressed the contribution of immigrants to the United States, yet simultaneously defended the right of the United States to control its borders and limit immigration. Overall the issue of immigration did not warrant much attention from Republicans nationally. All the party had to say on the subject in 1988 was that "We welcome those from other lands who bring to America their ideals and industry. At the same time, we insist upon our country's absolute right to control its borders."

By the 1990s things had clearly changed. The Republican party launched a clear and aggressive attack on immigration. The 1992 Republican party platform called for the use of the "tools, technologies and structures necessary to secure the border", despite the vocal opposition of Hispanic Republican delegates. The platform also warned that illegal immigration "threatens the social compact on which our country is based." At the 1992 convention, many prominent Republicans spoke to national audiences about how immigrants were abusing the generosity of the United States and its programs. Most notable was Pat Buchanan who claimed that immigrants threatened the moral and cultural fiber of the United States and called for a fence to be constructed between Mexico and the United States (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 13).

Although the Republicans made conscious efforts to tone down the anti-immigrant rhetoric in the speeches at the 1996 convention, the platform that year was even harsher on the issue than four years before. The party laid out "A Sensible Immigration Policy". Among other provisions, the platform called for an end to automatic citizenship for U.S. born children of undocumented immigrants, a prohibition
on public education for the children of undocumented immigrants regardless of the
citizenship status of the children, a prohibition on all public benefits (except emergency
aid) for all undocumented immigrants, and a reduction in legal immigration levels.
Moreover, it condemned President Clinton for opposing California's Proposition 187. All
of these provisions, with the possible exception of reducing immigration levels, are
opposed by a majority of Hispanics.

In 1994, congressional Republicans signed and ran on the "Contract With
America", which among many other pledges, proposed a reduction in government
program benefit eligibility for permanent residents. The only three Republicans who
refused to sign the Contract were the three Hispanic Republicans in Congress. After
becoming the majority in Congress, Republicans almost lived up to their promises by
sponsoring legislation to restrict immigration and cut off benefits to legal and illegal
immigrants. Congressional Republicans wrote and passed the 1996 Welfare Reform Act,
which ended food stamp benefits for close to one million greencard carrying, tax-paying,
legal immigrants, a large percentage of whom were Hispanic (Dao 1998). The
Republican party also sponsored and passed legislation that took away Medicaid and
Supplemental Security Income to legal immigrants. Bob Goodlatte (R-VA), chairman of
the subcommittee overseeing the foodstamp program argued that "noncitizens should
look to themselves, their families and their sponsors, not the American taxpayers, for
financial support" (Dao 1998, A16). Republicans also passed the 1996 Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act, which increased the number of
border patrols between the United States and Mexico, implemented new employer
sanctions on businesses hiring illegal immigrants, and toughened deportation laws for
immigrants who had failed to file the proper paperwork. House Republicans included a
provision allowing states to keep children of illegal immigrants from public schools,
similar to Proposition 187 in California, but this provision was ultimately dropped in an attempt to iron out differences with the Senate version of the bill.

One year later, in 1997, Republicans backtracked on almost every one of these hard-line stances on immigration. Under the guidance of Speaker Newt Gingrich, Congressional Republicans passed legislation exempting thousands of Central American immigrants from the deportation rules included in the 1996 Immigration Reform legislation. Moreover Newt Gingrich shepherded through legislation that allowed hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants who hoped to gain permanent visas to stay in the United States instead of having to go home to file their applications (Schmitt 1997). In terms of benefits, Republicans voted to re-instate Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income to a considerable portion of legal immigrants as part of the balanced budget agreement. Shortly after they decided to restore food stamp benefits to many legal immigrants as well. Thus, the very same Republicans who supported cutting off legal immigrants from welfare programs began emphasizing the need to protect innocent, aged people from destitution (Dugger 1997). Although the return of benefits to legal immigrants passed overwhelmingly in the House and Senate, there was some vocal opposition by prominent Congressional Republicans. Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) led the opposition arguing that such legislation would tempt freeloaders to come to the United States. He argued that the restoration bill puts up "A neon sign that says 'Come to America and get welfare'" (Alvarez 1998d, A18).

**The Democratic Party and the Hispanic Agenda**

How responsive has the Democratic party been to the concerns of Hispanics? Prior to the 1990s the Democratic party strongly defended and advocated the expansion of bilingual education and other bilingual services. The party recognized the additional obstacles faced by Hispanics as an ethnic and language minority in American society and
pushed for more government intervention and programs to overcome those obstacles and achieve true equality and fairness. Moreover, the party defended and sought to uphold the rights of immigrants. In the 1990s the behavior of the Democratic party has changed. According to the Democrats I interviewed, the party's central strategy across this decade has been to exploit the Republican party's alienation of Hispanic voters, without offering any specific policies to further the interests of Hispanics themselves. In the 1996 and 1998 elections, the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee set up a special Hispanic outreach program, whose main strategy was to encourage candidates with 5 percent or more Hispanics in their districts to highlight the "anti-Hispanic" legislation that the Republican party had proposed and passed. In 1998, House minority leader Richard Gephardt (D- MO) wrote and circulated a document titled "The GOP-Anti-Latino Congress" arguing that the Republicans "are advocating an agenda that is openly hostile to minorities in this country - particularly Hispanic Americans" (Gugliotta 1998, A8). In 1996, the Democratic party's tactic to gain Hispanic votes was to argue that a Democratic president was needed to halt Republican party efforts to roll back previous gains made the Hispanic community. While pointing out the faults of the Republican party, however, the Democratic party itself has withdrawn support on many policies favored by the Hispanic community.20 Interestingly it was the Democratic president himself who signed the 1996 Welfare Reform Act and the 1996 Immigration Act, which initiated many of these rollbacks.

**Voting Rights**

As discussed in the chapter on African Americans, from 1964 on the Democratic party has been a strong advocate of legislation to protect the voting rights of minorities.

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20 This is based on a series of interviews conducted at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 19, 1998 and at the DCCC on both June 16 1998 and January 20, 1999.
The Democratic party played a pivotal role in passing the 1975 Voting Rights Act extension and vowed to vigorously enforce its provisions. In 1980 the Democratic party argued that "To end discrimination against language minorities, we must enforce vigorously the amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1975 to assist Hispanic citizens". Moreover the Democratic party set a goal to "Encourage voter participation in elections through use of simplified procedures for registration ... and by resisting efforts to reduce access to bilingual ballots."

Across the 1990s, the Democratic party has remained a more faithful defender of the voting rights of minorities than the Republican party. Congressional Democrats have been fairly unified in voting against all variations of voter fraud legislation. Expressing the sentiment of many Democrats, John Lewis (D-GA) argued that such legislation was "intended to keep people from participating in our political process" (Alvarez 1998a, A19). The Democratic party labeled Republican voter fraud legislation as blatant voter intimidation efforts aimed at minority communities. However, the Democratic party's own enthusiasm for protecting the voting rights of Hispanics and other minorities appears to have waned considerably. Beyond blocking Republican legislation the party has not taken any proactive steps to further protect the rights of Hispanic voters or increase the mobilization and turnout of Hispanic voters on election day. A senior staffer characterized the Democratic party's Hispanic outreach efforts as an "air war" using targeted advertising and anti-Republican slogans and not a "ground war" geared at actually getting more Hispanics registered and using their right to vote (DeSipio et al. 1999, 25). In 1992 and 1996 the Democratic party briefly mentioned its support for "language access to voting", but no longer discussed, let alone supported bilingual ballots or the importance of the Voting Rights Act. Many of the Democrats I spoke with said the party was trying to move away from strong endorsement of policies geared to help specific minority groups in an effort to craft a message that appealed to all Americans.
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Cultural Issues: Language Policy and Bilingual Education

Over the past several decades the Democratic party has been very supportive of the special needs of language minorities as well as the desire among Hispanics and other minority groups to preserve their culture and language. Throughout the 1970s and most of the 1980s the Democratic party showed firm commitment to bilingual education
programs. The 1980 Democratic platform pledged to expand support for bilingual education and to historically Hispanic institutions. In 1984 the Democrats claim to "reject the Reagan double-talk on bilingual education and commit ourselves to expanding and increasing its effectiveness." The Democratic party stressed the need for more bilingual interpreters in all realms of life, including the healthcare profession and schools.

Once again, we see a change in the behavior Democratic party that starts in the late 1980s and continues across the 1990s. Although Democrats in Congress have voted against Republican efforts to dismantle bilingual education programs, from 1988 on there is no mention of bilingual education programs in Democratic platforms. Although Hispanics have increasingly questioned the effectiveness of these programs and want to see them improved, surveys and referenda show that a majority still support their continuation as an effective means to learn English and retain Spanish and are opposed to efforts to dismantle these programs. In terms of language policy the party has gone from clearly embracing a multilingual conception to a position emphasizing the importance and superiority of English. In 1996, the Democratic platform stated that "We believe everyone in America should learn English so they can fully share in our daily life, but we strongly oppose divisive efforts like English-only legislation".

Immigration

The most distinctive aspects of the Democratic party's discussion of immigration have been that the party has recognized the rights of immigrants. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Democratic platforms emphasized the idea that "immigrants have rights too". In 1980 the Democrats stated that "the Immigration and Naturalization service, in
them ineligible for government work in addition. This executive order will undoubtedly lead to more discrimination against Hispanics, an outcome the Democratic administration is definitely aware of. A study conducted by the General Accounting Office of the impact of fining employers for hiring illegals revealed that as many as 1.3 million of 4.6 million companies surveyed admitted that they discriminated against job applicants who appeared "foreign born" out of fear of incurring huge INS fines (Vigil 1996, 89). Hiking the severity of the punishment will increase these occurrences. Finally, in 1996 President Clinton signed the Welfare Reform Act which denied welfare, nutritional and cash assistance to an estimated one million legal immigrants. Since high proportions of these legal immigrants are Hispanics, this action has had direct negative consequences on the economic well being of many Hispanics and their families.

Almost immediately after President Clinton signed the Welfare Reform Act into law, he positioned himself as the champion of the cause to restore government aid to legal immigrations. In the next budget Bill Clinton presented to Congress, he called for 2.5 billion in spending over the next five years to provide food stamps to a portion of legal immigrants whose benefits were cut off (Dao 1998). In his 1997 State of the Union Address, Clinton made an oblique reference to Congress' moves in this direction: "I also want to thank Congress for restoring some of the benefits to immigrants who are here legally and working hard, and I hope you will finish that job this year" (Dao 1998, A16). In Clinton's 1999 State of the Union Address, he addressed another immigration-related issue, providing more money for naturalization programs that allow immigrants to become citizens. Although President Clinton was not willing to expend any of his own political capital by taking a clear stand and refusing to sign legislation harming many Hispanics in the first place, he has been willing to capitalize on their unhappiness.
Support for Hispanic Interests in Congress

The voting records of the two parties in Congress reveal that the parties are clearly polarized on the issues considered important by Hispanics. As mentioned earlier, the National Hispanic Leadership Agenda (NHLA) is a conglomeration of many Hispanic interest groups that "Seeks a consensus among Hispanic leaders to help frame policy and promote awareness of the major issues that affect Latinos at a national level." The organization has put together Congressional Scorecards to provide an objective tool for assessing the performance of members of Congress on issues that matter to Hispanics. In the 105th Congress the votes included on the scorecard reflected the array of concerns identified previously: civil rights, voting rights, education, immigration, and income security and family support.

NHLA scorecards show that in the 105th Congress, Democratic Senators and Representatives were considerably more supportive of the Hispanic positions than Republicans. All but one Democratic Senator received a score higher than 70 percent. Meanwhile, all but four Republican Senators received a score lower than 40 percent. Similar patterns existed in the House. Thus, although the Democratic party has been willing to drop support for some Hispanic positions, it has remained considerably more supportive of Hispanic interests than the Republican party. However, a close examination of the scorecards also reveals that the higher scores of the Democrats reflect the fairly cohesive Democratic opposition to Republican proposals to end bilingual education, make English the official language, implement voter fraud legislation, and take away benefits from legal and illegal immigrants rather than support for proactive legislation addressing the substantive interests of Hispanics.
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY: has gone from a low positive response to a negative response.

Voting Rights
- since 1964 does not discuss need for or enforcement of voting rights legislation
- introduces and supports several types of voter-fraud legislation
- supports the elimination of bilingual ballots and voting materials

Cultural Issues: Bilingual Education and Language Policy

pre-1990:
- acknowledges the value of Spanish culture and language
- endorses the provision of bilingual education
- supports education bill of rights for Spanish speakers

1990-present:
- endorses legislation making English the official language
- opposes bilingual education
- supports legislation to dismantle bilingual education

Immigration

pre 1990:
- stresses contributions that immigrants have made to the United States
- insists on country's right to control border

1990-present:
- support harsher measures to crackdown on illegal immigration
- supports end to automatic citizenship for U.S. born citizens of undocumented immigrants
- supports the prohibition of public services to children of illegal immigrants
- eliminates social welfare benefits to legal immigrants
* returns social welfare benefits to some legal immigrants

Table 5.1: Review of Party Response to Hispanic Agenda (continued)
Table 5.1: continued

THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY: Prior to the 1990s the Democratic party responded positively to the demands of Hispanics. Across the 1990s the Democratic party has embraced a mixed response, endorsing some legislation supportive of Hispanic interests and some policies antithetical to Hispanic interests.

Voting Rights

pre 1990:
- applauds the 1975 extension of voting rights act
- emphasizes the need for bilingual ballots

1990 - present:
- congressional Democrats vote against voter fraud legislation
- voting rights receives less attention in platforms and legislative agenda

Cultural Issues: Bilingual Education and Language Policy

pre 1990:
- supports expansion of bilingual education
- endorses need for more bilingual programs

1990-present:
- fairly cohesive in opposing Republican attempts to eliminate bilingual programs and services
- reduces support of bilingual programs
- emphasizes need to learn English

Immigration

pre 1990:
- recognizes the rights of immigrants
- recognizes discrimination faced by Hispanics

1988 - present:
- no more mentions of immigrant rights
- increases funding and guards for patrolling Mexico border
- toughens deportation criteria
- toughens penalties on businesses for hiring illegal immigrants
- enacts legislation that strips social welfare benefits from legal immigrants.
EXPLAINING PARTY BEHAVIOR

The parties have decreased their support for the Hispanic agenda over time and moreover, they have responded in a fairly schizophrenic way to the mobilization and growing electoral strength of Hispanics. How can we explain the behavior of the parties? In the following sections I argue that several of the existing theories of party behavior provide important insights into our understanding of party behavior, but fall short of fully explaining the actual responses of the parties. I argue that the fourth model, the elite power struggle model, best captures the complexity of party behavior. Within each party, factions of activists and office holders vie to influence the direction and content of party behavior. As James Sundquist states "American parties are ... extraordinarily open to participation by any group that seeks to use a party for its purposes" (1983, 328). Thus, factions that are able to mobilize more supporters into the party and organize within the party structure around a honed vision of how the party should be responding are able to exert disproportionate influence on the party's behavior.

Pluralism

Pluralism posits that the pressures inherent within the electoral system force the parties to be accommodating towards the interests of new groups. Across the 20th century, Hispanics have been growing in size. Yet the Hispanics vote was often referred to as "The Sleeping Giant" because their electoral turnout was very low. Across the 1980s, and even more so during the 1990s, the Hispanic electorate has begun to awaken. Hispanics are becoming citizens and turning out to vote in unprecedented numbers and placing specific demands on the political system.
The most current figures estimate Hispanics as forming slightly over 10 percent of the population of United States. Because of continued immigration and higher than average birth rates, Hispanics are growing at a faster rate than other groups. The Hispanic population in the United States grew 61 percent between 1970 and 1980, and grew 53 percent from 1980 to 1990 (Fox 1996, 143). The Census Bureau predicts that Hispanics will become the largest minority in the United States by 2020, but other predictions suggest this could happen as early as 2005 (Garcia 1997). Not only is the Hispanic population growing, but the proportion of Hispanic *citizens* is growing as well. From 1994 to 1996, the annual number of applicants for naturalization surged from approximately 350,000 per year to between 800,000-1,000,000 annually, probably 30-40 percent of whom are Hispanics (DeSipio 1997, 336). California alone gained more than 375,000 citizens in 1996 which is twice the number of immigrants who became citizens in 1995 and seven times as many as in 1992 (Schneider 1998). Since these large increases are a fairly recent phenomena it is hard to tell whether or not they will continue, but the most current information suggests that these high numbers are being sustained. Thus, the sheer size of the Hispanic population and the promise of its increasing size should make Hispanics a valuable commodity to both parties. Capturing this idea, F. Chris Garcia stated "because of the demographics of the Latino populace, particularly its rapid increase in size, it is inevitable that Latinos will become a major consideration for the nation's policy-makers ... political parties should be making concerted efforts to bring these new forces into their ranks" (1988, 8).

Moreover, there is evidence that the newly naturalized Hispanic citizens are turning out to vote at unusually high rates (Garcia 1997). A recent study conducted by Political Data Incorporated, a nonpartisan research group, found that two-thirds of newly registered Hispanic voters turned out to vote in the 1996 presidential election, a higher rate than among other voters (Schneider 1998). Moreover, in the aggregate the Latino
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rate than among other voters (Schneider 1998). Moreover, in the aggregate the Latino population in the United States is aging, increasing numbers are obtaining higher levels of education and earning higher incomes, all of which should steadily increase turnout among Latinos (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997, 115). Finally, registration drives conducted by NALEO and the Southwest Voter Research Project, along with numerous local organizations, have added hundreds of thousands of Hispanic voters to the American electorate. Multiple studies have revealed a surge in Hispanic turnout across the country in 1996. Hispanics were the only demographic group for whom turnout went up in 1996 and they remain the fastest growing segment of the electorate.

Not only has their increasing size enhanced their political clout, but the concentrated residential patterns of Hispanics within a few large states makes them even more important to the parties than their numbers alone suggest. The Hispanic electorate is concentrated in nine states: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York and Texas. Hispanics are in a strong position to influence the outcome of statewide elections in these states. In 1998 California Democrat Barbara Boxer lost the white vote, but was re-elected because Hispanic and black voters overwhelmingly supported her. Meanwhile, New York Republican Senator Alfonse D'Amato captured over half the white vote in his re-election bid, but overwhelmingly lost among Hispanic and black voters and was defeated (Meckler 1998). Moreover, the states that Hispanics are concentrated in possess 75 percent of the electoral college votes needed to carry the presidency (DeSipio 1996b, 69). The Hispanic vote has played a pivotal role in several presidential elections. As early as 1960, Latino voters, especially in Texas, were crucial to the victory of Democratic candidate John F. Kennedy (Hero 1992, 82). Hispanic voters were also important in determining the 1976, 1988 and 1992 presidential primaries and general elections (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1996, 1999; Hero 1992).
In 1996, the Hispanic vote was critical in helping Democratic incumbent Bill Clinton win Arizona and Florida, states that had gone Republican four years earlier (Moreno and Warren 1999). Thus, because of its growing size and strategic location there are compelling reasons to predict that both parties need Hispanics to win national and local elections. Overall, Hispanics form a growing bloc of voters susceptible to the appeals from either party and critical to the fulfillment of both parties' desires to assemble a majority following in society.

To a large degree the Republican and Democratic parties have acted as the pluralist model predicts. Seeing their electoral potential, both parties have reached out and tried too woo Hispanic voters (de la Garza and DeSipio 1992, 1996, and 1999). During my interviews with party elites, the size and growing power of the Hispanic community was cited again and again by Republicans and Democrats as an important reason why their party needed to be concerned with this group. The Republican elites in particular repeatedly emphasized the idea that any future-oriented party would be foolish to ignore Hispanics.

One of the most visible efforts the parties have made to attract Hispanics has been their increased use of Spanish language media and their efforts to hire more Spanish speaking staff and aides. According to a recent poll conducted by the Spanish television station Univision, a very high proportion of Hispanics, 61 percent, responded that it is "very important that a political candidate communicate to Hispanic voters in Spanish." The consensus from Hispanics I interviewed in both the Republican and Democratic parties was that in order to be successful among Hispanic voters, parties and candidates need to use Spanish. Overall, Spanish media tends to give more attention to issues such as bilingual education, immigration and language policy. Meanwhile, these issues get very little if any attention from the mainstream media.
In 1992 the Democratic party, for the first time, aired its national convention in Spanish. Also, in 1992 and again in 1996, the party launched "Adelante con Clinton-Gore!" a campaign that made considerable use of Spanish media and was clearly directed at people of Spanish-speaking origin. The Republican party has not been far behind the Democrats in such efforts. In 1992 the Republican party made arrangements with C-Span Spanish to broadcast parts of their convention and party activities (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 16). Moreover, in 1992, the Republican National Committee launched "Viva Bush" and put out bilingual fliers criticizing Bill Clinton. In 1996 the Republican party launched "Hispanics for Dole", which used some Spanish fliers, although not as many as in 1992 (DeSipio et al. 1999). In 1998, both Democratic and Republican candidates for Governor of California ran ads in Spanish for the first time. That same year, House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA.) hired a Spanish-speaking spokeswoman to communicate his press releases and positions to the Spanish language media. In 1998, even Republican Bob Dornan, who had accused Hispanic voters of outright fraud in the 1996 election, sent out fliers in Spanish, including one featuring Our Lady of Guadalupe, the patron saint of the Americas, in his attempt to regain his former House seat (Meckler 1998). According to Armando Guzman, the Univision national correspondent, top officials from both parties have been calling the station to offer interviews, whereas "Ten years ago, no one in Washington would return our calls" (Moscoso 1996, A1).

Both parties have also been very active in securing speaking engagements at the national conferences of the most prominent Hispanic organizations. In 1997, the Republican National Committee created the New Majority Council to expand the Republican's coalition by directly communicating with America's minorities. The NMC has been particularly active in encouraging high profile Republican leaders to enter the Hispanic community and talk to Hispanic groups. One Republican elite involved with the
NMC told me that "We are not going to concede the Hispanic vote to the Democratic party anymore." As the result of the NMC's encouragement and for some, their own resolve and commitment to the cause of outreach, many Republicans have met with Hispanic groups that no Republican has spoken with for a long time, if ever. In 1998, former Speaker Newt Gingrich spoke at LULAC's national convention and the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce. In 1999 LULAC's featured guests were Democratic presidential contender Al Gore and Republican presidential candidate John McCain. During his presentation, John McCain said he was going to fight not just to get a portion, but to get all of the Hispanic vote (Srivansan 1999). As one Democratic elite commented, "the Republican party is showing up places where they have not been before and this is putting pressure on us to not take the Hispanic vote for granted."^2

Although both parties have made outreach efforts, the Democratic party's efforts have been better executed. As DeSipio et al. point out, "More often than their Democratic counterparts, Republican outreach efforts to Latinos highlighted the greater distance of the party to the mass of the Latino electorate" (1999, 10).^3 Hispanic aides hired by Republicans have used Spanish words incorrectly in their translations given to the Spanish media, errors that received heavy criticism from the press and may have been offensive to the Hispanic community (Myerson 1998). Several people I interviewed said that the Republican party simply did not have enough fluent Spanish speakers to draw from and that although the Republican party has been able to find individuals with Hispanic surnames, finding individuals who can communicate fluently in written Spanish is more difficult. The lack of qualified staff hampered Hispanic outreach efforts by the Republican party in California as well. In recognition of the ever-growing Hispanic

^2 Interview at the Republican National Committee on June 19, 1998.
^3 Interview at the Democratic National Committee on June 22, 1998.
^4 The example DeSipio et al. use to illustrate this is that at a *Viva Gerald!* rally in 1976, President Ford tried to eat a tamale, but gagged on the cornhusk instead (1999, 10).
community in California, the state Republican party scheduled nine "Hispanic summits" to be held in different parts of the state in 1998, but could not get Hispanic politicians to speak at all these outreach meetings because there is only one Latino Republican in the California state legislature and only a handful in the party's organizational structure. On the national level, "Hispanics for Dole" was marginalized within the Dole campaign, had little money and no influence (DeSipio et al 1999).

Within the Democratic party structure there are many more individuals who speak Spanish. As a result, the party has been able to communicate much more easily with the Spanish media. One source estimated that between 30 and 40 of the four hundred campaign staff on Clinton's 1996 re-election committee were Hispanic, including seven state directors and the political director in one state (DeSipio 1999, 25). Many staff members at the DNC are fluent in Spanish and consistently work on lining up coverage for Democratic events with Spanish media stations. The DCCC has recently hired a Hispanic outreach director to work with any Democratic candidate with 5 percent or more Hispanics in their district. The budget for "Adelante con Clinton-Gore!" in 1996 was approximately $2.5 million just for advertising, which far exceeds any previous presidential campaign spending on Latinos (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 25).

The biggest problem with the pluralist perspective is that it cannot fully explain the behavior of the Republican party. Despite pluralist gestures made by some within the Republican party towards Hispanics, most Republicans in Congress have been voting against issues that Hispanics care about and have initiated legislation seen by most Hispanics as "anti-Hispanic". Representative Henry Bonilla (R-TX) has complained that the Republican party's legislative behavior contradicts their outreach efforts and reinforces the notion that the party is hostile to Hispanics (Doherty 1998). Rather than competing for the vote among Hispanics, the continuous stream of voter fraud legislation initiated by
the Republican party suggests that Republicans are intentionally trying to reduce turnout among Hispanics. Moreover, while the Republican party has produced bilingual fliers and hired aides to translate press releases to the Spanish language media, the party has strengthened its endorsement of English-only laws. Rather than competing for the votes of Hispanics, the Republican party seems to be trying to gain white voters by "taking back" America from immigrants who threaten "the social compact on which our country is based". In terms of the substantive policies it is pursuing, the Republican party is largely conceeding the Hispanic vote to the Democrats or simply assuming that Hispanics will not vote. As one Republican elite commented, critiquing his own party's past efforts towards Hispanics, "Viva this and viva that is nice, but the Hispanic community needs more." Making a similar point, Cecilia Munoz, the director of the National Council of La Raza said "Outreach is important and outreach is great, but outreach by itself isn't going to attract voters if your policies aren't consistent with what people want" (Meckler 1998, www.allpolitics.com).

Despite their increasing size, Hispanics remain a smaller portion of the population and a much smaller portion of the electorate than African Americans and evangelicals. Yet, even more so than in the other two cases, the parties appear to be engaging in actual outreach activities in an attempt to woo Hispanics. What this suggests is that the size of groups alone is not the driving factor behind the behavior of the parties. The nature of a group's agenda, more than the size of the group, appears to be a more important factor in predicting the outreach efforts of the parties. On the other hand, despite their outreach attempts, neither party has been particularly eager to embrace the substantive concerns of this group nor to raise and defend Latino interests within the national debate. Across the 1990s, the Republican party has been pursuing an agenda that is clearly not in the interests

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24 This is a quote from the 1992 Republican platform.
of most Hispanics and by most accounts has been repelling this group of voters. Thus, increasing size and electoral power is not enough, on its own, to force the parties to respond positively to a group's agenda.

The Median Voter Theorem

The median voter theory views parties as teams of rational actors, unified by their desire to win elections. Parties adopt whatever policies will win elections, which within the American two-party system are typically policy positions embraced by the median voter. How well does this theory capture and explain the behavior of the parties towards Hispanics? In order to determine that it is first important to review the views of the American public on the issues within the Hispanic agenda. The Hispanic agenda holds an interesting place within the minds of most Americans. More so than the social agenda of evangelicals and the civil rights agenda of African Americans, the public’s views on issues of importance to Hispanics appears volatile: public opinion has ranged from opposition, to indifference, to mild support over time.

On the whole, the non-Hispanic public is opposed to most aspects of the Latino political agenda. Although there was once lukewarm support for bilingual education among Americans, a solid majority of the public is now opposed to the continuation of such programs (Garcia 1997, 433). Moreover, the vast majority of Americans support making English the official language of the United States. Many Americans express fear that bilingual education and other public uses of Spanish will contribute to ethnic separatism and "balkanize" the country (Fox 1996, 236). Many also feel that the rapid growth of Hispanic and other non-European immigrant groups will undermine American culture.
According to a series of Gallup polls, for the past two decades most Americans have supported stopping legal immigration all together (Gillespie 1999). In 1996, 50% of Americans supported a three-year moratorium on immigration (while 46% opposed such a halt). Large number of U.S. citizens born in America blame immigrants for taking "their" jobs and feel that legal and illegal immigrants are disproportionately freeloading on government programs. Peter Brimelow captures the sentiments of many Americans in Alien Nation (1996) in which he argues that the United States is letting too many people into the country and that immigrants cost more than they contribute. Illegal immigrants also are blamed for high crime rates, drug smuggling and falling educational standards. Writing in response to the recent surge in naturalization, some have argued that the requirements for naturalization are too few (Chavez 1996). Moreover, the continuing influx of immigrants, a great portion of whom are from Latin America, "has engendered xenophobia as well as economic opposition to Latinos, whether immigrants or not" (Garcia 1997, 433).

Despite the public's opposition to many aspects of the Hispanics agenda, an important qualification needs to be made. The public's views on immigration, and towards the entire Hispanic agenda, appear strongly tied to the performance of the economy. Throughout American history anti-immigrant sentiment has flared during times of economic hardship. Movements defending "American culture" are typically a knee-jerk reaction to economics and heightened influxes of immigrants, and often pass over time. A recent Gallup poll conducted in February of 1999, reveals a liberalization in the views of Americans on immigration, undoubtedly a result of the strong performance of the economy. 26 This poll found that 58 percent opposed a moratorium on legal immigration.

26 This poll was conducted during the weekend of February 26-28 1999. The Gallup poll is some of the most recent polling data on immigration. Moreover, it asks more extensive questions about immigration than NES or LNPS.
compared to 39% in favor of it (Gillespie 1999). Moreover, 51% of those polled supported keeping immigration at the current level or increasing it, compared to 44% who favored lowering immigration levels. This is the first time a Gallup poll on this issue has shown at least plurality support for immigration since 1977. Thus, public opinion on issues of importance to Hispanics appears more open and capable of change than public opinion on issues important to evangelicals and blacks.

To some degree the expectations of the median voter theorem appear to be borne out in this case. Both parties seem to be interested in securing the vote of this growing group of voters, however, they are weighing this desire carefully against the views of broader public opinion. To the extent that appealing to the Hispanic population means turning off the majority of white voters neither party seems willing to take that step (de la Garza and DeSapio 1999). During the first half of the 1990s, when the economy was not performing well and anti-immigrant feelings were running high, politicians perceived courting the Latino vote with substantive policies a political liability.

However, one of the problems of the median voter theorem is that it cannot fully explain the behavior of the parties at all times. The Republican party appears bent on advancing a conservative "America First" agenda, advancing English-only laws and harsh immigration policies despite the fact that this is no longer a "winning" strategy in terms of public opinion. In addition to a growing liberalization of views on immigration discussed previously, surveys suggest that particularly in good economic times, Americans do not care that much about the issues that compose the Hispanic agenda. When asked generally what is the most important issue facing the nation today, less than one percent of Americans named immigration (Dugger 1997; Garcia and Sapien 1999, 91). Despite the broad indifference of most Americans, the Republican party appears unable to adjust its course to one more palatable to the current mood. Meanwhile, although the Democratic
Hispanic identifiers into the Republican party is more effective communication with the Hispanic community.

One of the major problems with the argument made by Senator McCain and others is that even though there is some common ideological ground between the Republican party and Hispanics, the issues that are mobilizing Hispanics at present are not family values or social issues, but are largely issues of ethnic insensitivity (Schneider 1998). And on the issues that have mobilized the Hispanic community to the polls and to march on Washington, such as immigration, language policy and bilingual education, the Republican party has embraced positions that harm immigrants and Hispanics. The second problem is that according to my interviews, one of the most important political concerns for Hispanics is to feel accepted and wanted in the political system without having to give up their group identity and group agenda. While the Republican party has accepted certain Hispanics as individuals, it does not accept or welcome Hispanics as a group. On the contrary, it often makes broad, negative generalizations about the group.29 Moreover, despite making group-based outreach efforts towards Hispanics (as well as evangelicals and "angry white males") many Republicans argue that the party is ideologically opposed to reaching out to groups per se (Freeman 1986). Most Republicans I interviewed argued that the Republican party offers everyone the same and the best message. Republican economic policies will benefit Hispanics, as they will benefit everyone else. The problem is that this stance gives no recognition to Hispanics and their unique and disadvantaged position in America's political, economic and social systems. As one Hispanic Republican elite commented to me. "The Republican party looks at people as people and that is good. But Hispanics have special interests and

29 A particularly good example of this is that at the 1996 Republican convention. Pat Buchanan identified all Mexicans (on either side of the border) as "Jose" and talked about the negative impact of immigration on American social, cultural and economic well-being (DeSipio 1999, 17).
circumstances and the party needs to recognize that as well." All the Hispanics I interviewed in both parties agreed that better issue framing would not be enough for the Republican party to attract more Hispanic voters.

Democrats I spoke with claimed that their party met the needs of Hispanics by supporting a greater government role in seeking to overcome discrimination and in achieving a more equitable distribution of societal resources. While the Republican party may share some political concerns with Hispanics, the Democratic party speaks more to their concerns about social welfare issues. Despite the self-professed conservatism of the plurality of Hispanics, one of the top priorities of the Hispanic community is social welfare issues. According to the LNPS a majority of all national origin Hispanic groups support an increased role for the government in domestic policy. Moreover, the majority of Hispanics expressed willingness to pay more in taxes for many social welfare programs. Regardless of national origin, Latinos overwhelmingly saw government as the proper vehicle to solve the national and local problems they identified (de la Garza et al. 1992). "Despite George Bush's rhetoric in 1988 of a kinder, gentler America, issues such as these are more frequently addressed both by national Democratic campaigns than they are by Republicans" (DeSipio 1996b, 80). When Gore spoke before LULAC in 1999 he highlighted a $480 million program to help Hispanic students prepare for and stay in school and an initiative directing the Small Business Administration to provide 2.5 billion in loans to Hispanic businesses by the year 2000.

Beyond a more attractive social welfare agenda, the Democratic party has offered Hispanics something that is as important as the "correct" issue positions. In interviews, Hispanic elites told me that the single best thing about the Democratic party is that it has opened its doors to Hispanics and offered acceptance to a group that has often felt unwanted in the United States. Hispanic activists said that the willingness of the

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Democratic party to let Hispanics remain a group and to let Hispanics speak Spanish at work is very important to them. Moreover, the Democratic party has been more active in recruiting Hispanics to run campaigns and be staffers. Although Hispanics are sometimes used as "window dressing", they are nevertheless still being recruited. Thus the Democratic party's tradition of openness and acceptance of groups as groups has proved an important factor in the party's positive perception among Hispanics.

What the ideological model reveals is that the current alliances between the Hispanic community and the political parties are potentially more open to change than those of the other two groups examined. Both parties have some credible ideological ground on which to reach out to Hispanics. If the Republican party could tame its anti-immigrant rhetoric and work on making Hispanics feel welcome, it could make vast inroads into the Hispanic vote. The Democratic party has been effective at making Hispanics feel welcome, but has not addressed all of their substantive policy needs and thus does not have a secure lock on the Hispanic vote.

The ideological model, however, cannot explain the change in party behavior over time. The proportion of Hispanics has been rising in both the Republican and the Democratic coalitions (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 1999). The proportion is still no more than 12 percent, even within the Democratic party, but it promises to continue increasing. If anything the parties should be predisposed to becoming more responsive to the concerns of Hispanics. Yet the Republican party is moving in the opposite direction. Across the 1990s it has launched an attack on most aspects of the Hispanic agenda, devoting large sections of its platforms and agenda to cracking down on immigration and stripping benefits from legal immigrants and pushing highly symbolic policies such as English only laws. While the larger number of Hispanics within the Democratic coalition has helped keep the Democratic party on the more moderate side of these issues, the party has nevertheless been backing away from its commitment to the defense of
Hispanic interests and is taking much more centrist positions. Thus, the changes in party behavior appear the product of the decisions of party elites, rather than the preferences of their electoral coalitions.

**ELITE POWER STRUGGLE MODEL**

From my interviews I came to the conclusion that both of the parties were in the midst of power struggles concerning their responses to Hispanics. Activists within the same party were making very different statements about how the party should try to attract Hispanic voters, or even whether this was an important goal. The parties were not behaving in the manner envisioned by the dominant theories of party behavior just reviewed. Different factions within the party elite were pushing the party in different directions, a concept that neither pluralism, the median voter theorem, nor the ideological party model can account for. Rather than the distribution of public opinion or the party's ideology, the most important factor shaping the behavior of parties is how factional struggles within the party are played out and which faction ultimately becomes a player within the dominant governing coalition. Thus, in comparison to the other theories reviewed, this model carves out a more autonomous role for elites and a less central role for the mass public in shaping party behavior. Moreover, it emphasizes that a group's ability to mobilize into the party and within the party structure is the most powerful asset within the struggle. In this section I describe the nature and configuration of factional struggles within each party, assess their level of mobilization and effectiveness and discuss how factional struggle shaped party behavior.

**POWER STRUGGLE WITHIN THE REPUBLICAN PARTY**

Pluralists Versus the "Americans First" Purists
The Republican party elite is split over whether, and to what extent the party should reach out to Hispanics. There is a faction within the Republican party that is pressing the party to promote what I will refer to as an "Americans First" agenda. The overwhelming sentiment of this faction is that the Republican party does not have to engage in traditional pluralist coalition building. This faction is composed disproportionately of Republicans from states with high immigrant populations and interestingly, from Southern states. These "purists" as I have labeled them overlap, to some degree, with the hard-right faction discussed in an earlier chapter who have pushed the party to write off the votes of African Americans. This faction pressures the Republican party to take a hard-line stand on issues impacting the Hispanic community and constantly introduces legislation in Congress to crack down on illegal immigration, tighten voter registration procedures, increase the requirements for the naturalization process, ban bilingual services and make English the official language of the United States and the only language used by government agencies.

Despite labeling this faction as "purist" it is important to note that the rationale behind their efforts to push the Republican party in a conservative direction on cultural, language and immigration policies has been based on a combination of pragmatic and ideological goals. Many Republicans see promoting English as the official language and kicking legal and illegal immigrants off tax-payer supported programs as effective ways to gain the votes of Americans who feel economically and culturally threatened by America's growing non-European immigrant population. Former California Governor Pete Wilson clearly sought to solidify and expand his base among white voters by adopting hard-line positions on immigration and language policy (Purdum 1997). His

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31 I am taking this from Pat Buchanan, who labeled his agenda the "America First" (DeSipio 1999). I feel this term captures the ideological commitment of this faction of the party to put the needs and culture of English speaking, non-immigrant Americans before any other group, and refusal to accommodate the needs of non-English speaking groups.
re-election advertisements in 1994 showed grainy black and white footage purporting to
depict illegal immigrants streaming over the border from Mexico as a narrator said "They
keep coming" (Purdum 1997, A1). Pete Wilson is simply one of many Republicans at
the state and national level that view playing on Americans fears of immigration as a way
to win.

Many within this faction, however, are led by ideology and are committed to
pursuing such policies regardless of the consequences for party unity and the party's
electoral viability. One of the most visible examples is Pat Buchanan, a Republican
presidential candidate in 1992 and 1996. In both of his presidential campaigns he called
for a three-year halt to all immigration to stem the "invasion" of the United States, tighter
controls of the southern border (he actually proposed erecting a wall between the two
countries) and the passage of English-only legislation (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999,
17). Similarly, Alabama Senator Richard C. Shelby, who switched to the Republican
party immediately after his reelection in 1994, complained during his campaign that
immigration laws were a "horror story" that threatened to turn people of "Anglo-Saxon
heritage" into a minority (Kirschten 1998, 55). Other Republicans pursue legislation
such as denying babies of illegal immigrants born in the United States citizenship and
denying access to schools for children of illegal immigrants, based on their belief that
this is in the best interest of the country (Gugliotta 1998, A8). Henry Bonilla, one of
three Republican Hispanics in Congress criticized his colleagues for trying to "ram these
bills through" with little regard for the destruction they impose on the Republican party's
image and the party's internal cohesion (Doherty 1998, allpolitics.com).

Another faction within the Republican party is the pluralist faction. This faction
is largely the evolution, or the remnants of, the progressive faction discussed in an earlier
chapter. This faction pushes the party to do more to appeal to Hispanics not because they
are committed to any particular ideological goals, but because they see the future of the
party as inextricably bound to its ability to expand its following among America's
growing minority communities. Moreover, this faction balks at the idea of writing off or
dismissing whole groups of voters. The most vocal members of this faction are Hispanic
elected and organizational elites who see no ideological contradiction between the
protection and promotion of Hispanic interests and the fundamental principles of the
Republican party. This faction has pushed the party to, at minimum, stop pushing
legislation perceived as "anti-Hispanic or anti-immigrant" such as English only laws and
proposals to strip benefits from legal immigrants. At most this faction has pushed the
party to pass legislation more attentive to the particular needs of Hispanics and
immigrants. They argue that there is no ideological or pragmatic reason why the
Republican party cannot tolerate programs geared to help immigrants, refugees and
language minority citizens (DeSipio 1996b, 81).

One of the most visible manifestations of the pluralist faction, mentioned earlier,
is the New Majority Council (NMC). The Republican National Committee created the
NMC in 1997, partially in reaction to the party's declining performance among Hispanic
voters across the 1990s. During interviews, the directors of the NMC stressed that the
fate of the Republican party rests on its ability to change its image among Hispanic
voters and more effectively reach out to them. Several prominent Republicans, clearly
within the pluralist faction of the party, have made this same argument. Representative
Henry Bonilla (R-TX) argued that "There is not a corporation worth its salt right now that
is not looking to market to Hispanic voters. Anyone with a half a brain needs to realize
that we must be cognizant of that" (Alvarez 1997, A30). Similarly, Stuart Spencer a
respected Republican strategist and former advisor to two Republican presidents wrote a
much circulated "Wake-up Call for the GOP" warning his fellow Republicans that the
party risked "political suicide and dooms itself to permanent minority status" if it does
not begin reaching out to Hispanic voters (Purdum 1997, A20). Moreover, he argued that
"Our party has a sad and politically self-defeating history of alienating immigrant groups and new voters ... We cannot allow the home of Ronald Reagan and the largest state of the union to befall the same fate and become a permanent Democratic bastion" (Schneider 1998. 138). In 1997, Senator John McCain of Arizona told a Western states Republican conference that the electoral future of the Republican party is in jeopardy because "Republicans have come to be perceived as opponents of immigrants" (Schmitt 1997. A12).

The Struggle To Define Party Response

The Republican party is in the midst of a power struggle over how to behave towards Hispanics. In this section I argue that across the 1990s, the "purists" have possessed the advantage in defining the behavior of the Republican party because they have been more numerous, more organized and more single-minded in pursuit of their vision of how the party should be behaving. However, their victory is not complete nor is it solidified. The pluralists have made some headway largely because of the focused pressure from the three Republican Hispanics within Congress, Henry Bonilla, Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. These three have aggressively lobbied the rest of their party to pursue a more moderate and sensitive course on issues important to the Hispanic community in the United States and have, at times, achieved some limited successes. These three were pivotal in pushing their party to restore benefits to legal immigrants and in negotiating the deportation exemptions for immigrants passed by Congress in 1997 (Dugger 1997; Schmitt 1997). Moreover, the votes of pluralists within the Republican party have been critical in blocking the passage of legislation even more detrimental to the Hispanic community in the United States.

In most cases, however, the pluralist faction has not been able to influence the party's course of action. One of the most obvious examples of their weakness is the fact
that they were not able to prevent harsh immigration legislation from being passed in the first place. Perhaps an even clearer sign of their lack of influence concerns the Republican's 1994 "Contract With America". Henry Bonilla, Lincoln Diaz-Balart and Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ultimately opposed the Contract because it pledged to cut off government aid to legal immigrants. Despite their lobbying they were not able to change this section of the Contract or convince any other Republicans not to sign it (Alvarez 1997, A10). Similarly, in 1998, the Republican party took up a measure to allow Puerto Ricans to choose the island's destiny, either statehood, independence or continued commonwealth status. Since this measure has over 90 percent support among Hispanics, it was highlighted by several Republicans as a useful, and not very painful way to demonstrate Republican support for Hispanic interests. Although the measure ultimately passed, it revealed the greater strength of the purist faction. First of all the legislation was bogged down early, when an amendment was brought to the floor that would have required Puerto Rico, if it became a state, to abide by English only rules (Alvarez 1998c). Gerald B.H. Solomon (R-NY) representing those Republicans who feel outreach to Hispanics is not important called the bill "A pointless attempt to pander to the Hispanic vote" (Doherty 1998, www.allpolitics.com). In the end, only 43 of 220 Republicans voted for the legislation.

Although the pluralists are a broader group than simply Hispanics. Hispanic elites often have been the only ones willing to expend political capital to more aggressively defend Hispanic interests. Some Republicans have warned of the problems associated with the party's growing image as "anti-immigrant" and "anti-Hispanic" but have not prioritized doing anything to counteract this. Thus, one of the main weaknesses of the pluralists is that they are few and far between. There are only three Hispanics in Congress, and from my observations very few in the party organization at the national level. Although reliable figures are hard to come by, existing statistics reveal that the
proportion of Hispanics at Republican national conventions has been very small and may have declined across the 1990s. According to the Republican party's own statistics about 5% of their delegates and alternates at the 1992 convention were Hispanics (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 16). Six Latinos served on the Republican platform committee and 13 spoke before the convention. Interestingly the speakers were not just Cubans, but were equally distributed from each of the major Latino national-origin groups. Hispanic delegates were much fewer at the 1996 Republican convention. According to the Associated Press, in 1996. Hispanics formed only 2.3 percent of the delegates and many fewer spoke at the convention (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 21). If the percentage of Hispanics within the Republican party structure is on the decline, this will only weaken their already precarious leverage over party behavior.

From the number of different Senators and Representatives who have sponsored variations of legislation to end bilingual education, pass English-only laws and cut-off benefits to legal and illegal immigrants, it is clear that the "purists" have many more vocal leaders in Congress. Equally, if not more important, they are better organized at the grassroots level of the Republican party. One of the clearest examples of this can be seen in California, the state predicted to have the first majority-minority population. The chair of California's Republican party, Mr. Schroeder, made several moves to improve the party's appeal towards Hispanics and get back the Hispanic vote. For the job of state political director, he hired a 26-year-old Mexican American operative named Mike Madrid, who wrote his college thesis on how the GOP could win Latino votes. He also hired a full time Hispanic outreach coordinator and made increasing diversity in the party his top goal (Purdum 1997). Finally, he lobbied strenuously to prevent the Republican party from endorsing Proposition 227. Each of these efforts came unraveled and was undermined, however, by the mobilization of the purist faction. The party's state delegates voted to endorse Proposition 227 over the chair's clear protest and adamant
lobbying that they do otherwise. Moreover, in 1999, Republican party activists voted Mr. Schroeder out as chair and replaced him with someone who summarily dismissed as unfounded fears that the current behavior of the Republican party could spawn a dangerous backlash from the Hispanic community. It is likely that he will not pursue the same outreach efforts as Schroeder.

The better organization and mobilization of the purists have allowed them to dominate the platform writing process and constrain the views of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Issues on the Hispanic agenda were discussed at length in the speeches and platform debates at the Republican conventions in 1992 and 1996. However, the positions expressed and eventually endorsed were antithetical to the Hispanic agenda as described previously and offensive to the Hispanic Republican delegates and observers (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 1999). In 1992 and 1996 Republican platforms included lengthy sections stressing the cultural threat and economic problems of immigration and immigrants, harsh measures to crackdown on immigration and make English the official language. The inclusion of these planks provoked strong opposition from some with the Republican party, particularly Hispanic delegates, who argued that these planks were exclusionary. Edward Juarez, vice-chair of the Michigan Republican party, called these planks "isolationism ... and purely racist". He argues that "Our numbers are increasing and that scares nonLatinos" (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 21). Despite their protests, these planks passed with large majorities.

The strength of the purist faction also comes from its clear vision of how the party should behave. They have aggressively pursued an "Americans First" vision of how the party should behave, that puts the rights and needs of English-speaking, non-immigrant Americans above those of non-European immigrants. With the exception of very few individuals, the pluralists have not aggressively tried to build a pro-Hispanic image for the party. They have tried to move the party away from this "Americans First" agenda.
and focus instead on issues that Hispanics and non-Hispanics can both agree on such as reducing regulations on small businesses and cutting taxes. As long as the pluralists fail to articulate a clear message that Hispanics are welcome within the Republican party coalition, the purists are going to have control over defining the party's image and policies on issues of importance to Hispanics.

The discrepancy in the commitment of the two factions to their positions was revealed clearly through the changing positions of Jack Kemp. Prior to becoming the Republican vice-presidential nominee in 1996, Jack Kemp was perceived favorably by the Hispanic community. He was a supporter of empowerment zones. Moreover he had opposed Proposition 187 in California and had spoken out against national attempts to deny public school and other services to the children of illegal immigrants (Monosco 1996). However, after accepting the nomination Kemp retracted these positions. Although this change received little notice within the mainstream media, it was covered intensely by the growing Spanish media. Kemp's reversal and willingness to concede his previous positions demonstrated which faction was stronger and which faction was in control. By mobilizing within the party the purist faction has gained clear influence over the party's candidates, who in turn have tremendous power for shaping the behavior and image of the party in the minds of Americans.

There are two future paths that the Republican party can take. One scenario is that the pluralist faction of the party could gain power. The most powerful reasons to suspect this could happen is that some of the top contenders for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000 find their home within the pluralist wing of the party. Their candidacies hold the potential for altering the balance of power between the two factions within the party. Both Texas Governor George W. Bush and Arizona Senator John McCain have very high approval ratings and have performed well among Hispanics in their respective states. According to a 1997 poll conducted by Univision, George W.
Bush has 81 percent approval ratings among Hispanics in Texas. In his re-election bid in 1998, he got slightly shy of 50 percent of the Hispanic vote. In my interviews some Democrats tried to minimize the accomplishments of Bush among Hispanic voters, but considering the long tradition of heavy Democratic support among Mexican-American Texans, his performance was impressive. John McCain performed even better among the Hispanic voters of Arizona, capturing more than 50 percent of their votes in his last two elections (Srinivasan 1999). Moreover, both recognize the importance of Hispanics. John McCain has vowed to secure more Latino support for the Republican party. Meanwhile, George W. Bush, who speaks fluent Spanish, has used every opportunity available to speak it for Hispanics. When speaking at national Hispanic meetings he switches back and forth between English and Spanish and often fields questions in Spanish. Mr. Vargas, the executive director of NALEO said of George W. Bush, "he gets it". suggesting that he understands the particular importance and needs of the Hispanic community in a way many Republicans do not (Purdum 1997, A1).

Even more importantly, both candidates embrace positions that have widespread support within the Hispanic community and have distanced themselves from the anti-immigrant positions of others within their party. Both support the "English plus" position on bilingual education and language policy, which states that while English is important to succeeding in the United States, native Spanish speakers should not have to relinquish their native tongue. Speaking at the LULAC convention, Senator McCain stated that "No one should have to abandon the language of their birth to learn the language of their future ... We don't need laws that cause any American to believe we

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32 Interestingly, someone at the Democratic party framed the 46-48% of the Hispanic vote that Bush received as a failure. She commented that Bush "flew in everyone he knew who spoke Spanish and he went around to every neighborhood and spoke Spanish. He spent as much money as he could to communicate with Hispanics and yet he only got 46%. He must have been extremely disappointed". Interview on January 22, 1999 in Washington D.C.
33 George W. Bush Jr. has also used his brother, Jeb Bush (current Governor of Florida) who also speaks fluent Spanish and his wife, who is Mexican-American to help him campaign among Hispanics in Texas (Meckler 1998)
scorn their contributions to our culture" (Srinivasan 1999. allpolitics.com). Both have suggested that bilingual programs need to be re-evaluated but not dismissed or thrown out (Schneider 1998). Speaking about the topic recently, George W. Bush said "If the bilingual program serves to teach our children English, then we ought to say, 'Thank you very much, and leave them in place" (All politics July 2 1998). Bush also came out against the use of U.S. military troops to patrol the border with Mexico, warning against "policy and rhetoric that will wall Mexico off from America ... The U.S. military is trained to fight the enemy, and Mexico is not the enemy" (All politics July 2 1998).

If either or both of these candidates continue to compete for the Republican nomination this could shift the behavior of the Republican party on issues of importance to Hispanics. If a Republican candidate won the presidency with the help of a significant minority, if not majority, of the Hispanic vote, the party would certainly be under more pressure to respond more favorably to the Hispanic community. More importantly, however, a Bush or McCain candidacy would mobilize more Hispanics and pluralists into the Republican party structure at all levels. Although neither of these candidates are Hispanic, they are favorably perceived by the Hispanic community and their nomination would most likely produce an impact similar to what Robertson had for evangelicals and Jackson had for African Americans. Thus even if neither candidate won the nomination, nor won the presidential election, their presence could mobilize more Hispanics into the Republican party at the state level and change the balance of power. Moreover, if elected, both these men would undoubtedly bring more pluralists into the national party organization and into appointed positions. At best, Hispanics might have greater access to the governing coalition, the core group of insiders who come together repeatedly in making important decisions about party policy and strategy (Stone 1989. 5). At minimum, the nomination and/or election of a Republican pluralist could restrain the party from becoming even more anti-Hispanic in its agenda. There is also the possibility,
However, that any pluralist candidate would be pressured to sacrifice their pluralist leanings to obtain the nomination, much as Kemp was.

Without some type of countermobilization by pluralists, the Republican party is going to continue to pursue what I have labeled the "Americans First" agenda. At present this faction has clearly captured the main voice of the party. A poll of Hispanic political attitudes recently conducted by the Tarrance Group, a GOP polling firm, concluded: "A majority of Hispanics have come to believe that Republicans would rather have an America that did not include them." (Doherty 1998, allpolitics.com). As the party ostracizes more and more Hispanics with harsh rhetoric and policies, the grassroots base of the pluralist faction is going to get even weaker. Specifically, if Cuban Americans continue to leave the Republican party as they began to do in 1996, the factional struggle will only become more lopsided. The few Hispanic elites in the Republican party will find it increasingly difficult to mobilize a base and use that as leverage within party debates.

Some high profile Republicans, such as Stuart Spencer, have argued that the Republican party will self-destruct if it continues in the path encouraged by the purists. However, whether or not this prediction comes true probably depends on the performance of the economy more than anything else. If the economy remains good, an "Americans First" agenda could be, as Spencer and others have warned, a potentially disastrous course for the Republican party to follow. It would continue to alienate Hispanics while having minimal impact on others. However, if the United States experiences an economic downturn and rising unemployment rates, anti-immigrant and anti-Hispanic sentiment will undoubtedly flare and this strategy could yield some victories for the party.

FACTIONAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

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The behavior of the Democratic party has been schizophrenic. This is the product of a continuous struggle between two factions within the Democratic party who possess very distinct visions of how the party should be behaving. In several ways, this factional struggle mirrors the struggle between liberals and centrists over how to respond to the political concerns of African Americans. Within the Democratic party there is a sizable faction committed to the Hispanic agenda, composed primarily of Hispanics and other liberals. They are pushing the party to embrace policies supported by Hispanics and directly address the concerns of the Hispanic community. They argue that only by championing policies meaningful to the Hispanic community can the party actually mobilize more Hispanic voters into the political realm. Moreover, the Hispanics within the Democratic party that I spoke with said they felt there was a glass ceiling of how high Hispanics could go in the party and they wanted that to change. They also wanted the contribution of Hispanics to the Democratic party to be more visibly rewarded with more Hispanic appointments, particularly to key positions within the Clinton administration.

The other faction with the Democratic party, which is clearly growing in numbers and strength is the centrist faction. Some of the centrists are former liberals who have adjusted their ideological orientation and electoral strategy out of frustration with the party's inability to win the presidency for many years prior to 1992. Also within this faction, however, are younger Democrats who are truly passionate centrist ideologues. Although we often think of centrists as non-ideological individuals, from my interviews it was clear that some Democrats are as ideologically committed to a centrist course as liberals are to liberal policies. The central message repeatedly put forth by Democrats working for the Democratic Leadership Council was that the party has to adjust to political reality. They argued that Americans today are tired of minority groups getting special benefits. Thus, this faction is pushing the Democratic party to reach beyond the
concerns of their base voters and embrace positions that will attract suburban and middle class voters. In other words, the centrist faction is pushing the Democratic party to give as little as possible to Hispanics in the way of specific proposals, which in turn means marginalizing most of the issues of importance to Hispanics. Moreover, from reading their publications and talking with people at the DLC it was clear that they disapproved of Bill Clinton's pledge to create a diverse administration. Although Bill Clinton was the former chair of the DLC, the main sentiment in this faction was that during the first years after his initial election, President Clinton was being lured away from the universally appealing message developed by the DLC. He was being pressured into making specific, visible concessions to minority groups as all Democratic presidents before him had done to the detriment of the party electorally. They viewed Clinton's high profile commitments to racial and ethnic diversity in his administration as another form of quotas and therefore another reason Americans remain frustrated with the Democratic party.

The centrist faction has been advantaged in defining the behavior of the party across the 1990s. As discussed previously this is largely the result of the election of one of their own, former DLC chair Bill Clinton, to the presidency. However, this faction has also effectively mobilized within the party, not so much through grassroots mobilization, but by attracting many national elected officials to their cause. Thus, the views of the DLC have been strongly represented within the governing coalition of the party. In 1992 the rhetoric of the Democratic presidential campaign visibly demonstrated the preeminence of the centrist faction. Bill Clinton's 1992 campaign was labeled "a campaign for all America" and traditional Democratic party efforts to seek minority votes with specialized messages were almost completely left out (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 12). Although many of the issues Bill Clinton stressed in 1992 and 1996 such as education, Medicare, Medicaid and the environment are widely supported by Hispanics.
these were policies selected more because they resonated with the middle class and suburban voters. In 1992 and then again in 1996, the Democratic party orchestrated conventions and wrote platforms that did not specifically reach out to Latinos or address Latino issues. Instead the party stressed that a strong economy would benefit everyone, including minorities, an argument sounding very much like that made by the Republican party.

At best, pluralists within the Democratic party have been able to make the party keep some of their promises to undo the more punitive measures in the welfare and immigration bills. At worst, some of the positions taken by the Democratic administration have conflicted with positions held by the majority of Latinos. As discussed previously, Democratic President Bill Clinton signed the Welfare Reform Bill and the Immigration Reform Bill into law, both of which were widely condemned by Hispanic leaders. An aide of President Clinton defended these actions by exploiting the divisions within the Hispanic community on immigration. He said, "Hispanics are anxious to stop uncontrolled immigration ... There is no country that can have open borders" (Zielinski 1996, 1). Thus the Democratic party has managed to hold on to the support of most Hispanics, despite, rather than because of its political actions and policies. "Although it would be hard to imagine a situation in which a candidate and any electorate would be in complete agreement. Clinton's ability to advocate positions so opposed by the majority of Latinos and still receive so many of their votes indicates how marginal Latinos were to the plan of the Clinton campaign" (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 26).

Similar battles are being fought on the state level and won by the centrists as well. The newly elected Democratic Governor of California has chosen a strictly centrist course on issues of importance to Hispanics. Gray Davis could have let Proposition 187, the measure that blocked services to illegal immigrants, die in the courts. the outcome
most Hispanics favor. Instead he asked a federal court to broker a settlement between the two sides. His behavior has provoked a rebuke from the state’s highest-ranking Hispanic official, Lt. Governor Cruz Bustamante (Sanchez 1999). As one columnist commented, Gray Davis “is proving to be so committed to the middle ground in the state’s influential politics that he manages to find it even on issues where friend and foe alike think there isn’t any” (Sanchez 1999, A18). Thus, the centrist faction in the Democratic party is triumphing at the national level as well as in some of the largest and electorally most important states.

Hispanics have suffered disappointments in terms of symbolic responsiveness as well as substantive responsiveness from the Democratic party. In 1992, newly elected President Clinton made a promise to establish a more diverse administration that "looked like America" and Hispanic elites have pressured the President to keep this promise (Alvarez 1997, A10). When Vice-President Al Gore and Hillary Clinton have spoken in front of Hispanic audiences, they always emphasize the large numbers of Hispanics nominated by President Clinton for Cabinet positions and judgeships as one of the ways the administration has been responsive to Hispanics. However, even on this measure the commitment of the Democratic party appears to be weakening.

During Bill Clinton's first term, Hispanics served as Secretaries of Housing and Urban Development (Henry Cisneros) and Transportation (Federico Pena), and Henry Cisneros was part of Clinton's inner circle. In Clinton's second term, Cisneros resigned to return to the private sector and is now president of Univision Television in Los Angeles (Meckler 1998). Pena was nominated as Secretary of Energy, but his nomination came late in the process and "had the appearance of responding to pressure

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14 Henry Cisneros was indicted in December 1997 on charges that he made false statements to FBI background investigators about his relationship with an ex-mistress, Linda Jones, before his confirmation as HUD secretary in 1993. Cisneros has pleaded not guilty to 18 felony charges. He will stand trial in September 1999 (Miller 1999). It is not clear whether this investigation played a role in Cisneros's decision, made in 1996, to return to the private sector or Clinton's decision not to nominate again him as HUD secretary during his second term.
from Latino leaders to appoint a Latino - any Latino" (DeSipio et al. 1999, 38). Moreover, Pena was asked to return to the cabinet in a position that he had no obvious training for. In 1998, Pena resigned and Bill Richardson was appointed as Secretary of the Energy Department. Thus the number of Hispanics remains at one, which is one fewer than in Clinton's first administration (Alvarez 1997, A.10).

Clearly Hispanics are better represented within the Democratic party than within the Republican party, in both elected and organizational positions. However, their representation is still low in comparison to their contribution to the Democratic party's base, which was estimated at 10 percent in 1992 and 12 percent in 1996 (Stanley and Niemi 1995, 1999). There are 17 Hispanic Democrats in Congress who form the solid core of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus. In 1992, the Hispanic National Reporter estimated that Hispanic delegates and alternates numbered approximately 373 out of the 4,928 delegates and alternates, which is about 8 percent (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 14). Moreover, Hispanics held some significant positions at the convention including the chair of the platform's drafting committee, the co-chair of the rules committee and co-chair of the entire convention (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 15). Although the accuracy of such surveys is questionable, existing data suggests that the percentage of Hispanic delegates has declined across the 1990s. In 1996, a survey found that only 6 percent were Latino (de la Garza and DeSipio 1999, 22). Moreover, relative to the total number of Hispanics in the Republican and Democratic parties, Hispanic Republicans were better represented at the Republican convention than Democratic Hispanics at theirs (de la Garza and DeSipio 1996, 16).

The low number of Hispanics within the party's structure is significant for reasons beyond symbolic ones. The impressive media outreach campaign towards Hispanics in the 1996 presidential election was the direct result of efforts made by Hispanics within

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15 This number includes the non-voting delegates from the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.
the administration and the two Hispanic cabinet members in particular (DeSipio et al 1999). As we have seen time and again, without a mobilized and aggressive presence within the party structure groups have little chance of achieving substantive benefits. If the number of Hispanics within the Democratic party's structure continues to decline, it is unlikely that the party will commit as many resources to Hispanic outreach or programs in the future.

So far, there has not been any Democratic candidate who has been particularly effective at mobilizing Hispanics into the Democratic party structure. Although the studies at this point are preliminary, they suggest that if more Hispanics ran for high profile national races, this would mobilize more Hispanics into politics. Studies conducted at the state level have shown that Hispanics are more interested in politics and more likely to get involved when another Hispanic runs. Victor Morales ran for a Senate seat in Texas in 1996. A Tomas Rivera Policy Institute survey revealed that 42 percent of Texas Latinos reported that they were more interested in politics because of Morales' candidacy. This impact was particularly strong among those who felt that they had some or a lot of influence in politics (DeSipio et al. 1999. 35). In both the primary and the runoff elections, turnout in predominantly Hispanic counties was at least 25 percent higher than turnout in predominantly white counties. Moreover, 88 percent of the votes in the predominantly Hispanic counties were for Morales (Montoya 1999. 155). Morales lost to incumbent Phil Gramm 54 to 44 percent, a strong showing considering Morales' relatively limited resources and organization (Montoya 1999. 156). If no Hispanic candidate, or candidate championing the issues important to Hispanics, steps forward to mobilize Hispanics into the Democratic party structure, and at present there does not

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56 To help put the performance of Victor Morales in perspective it helps to compare his performances to former challengers to Phil Gramm. In 1984, Democratic insider Representative Lloyd Dogget received less than 44 percent of the vote in his challenge. Further, in 1996, Morales spent only 37 cents per vote, while Gram spent $2.90 per vote (Montoya 1999. 156).
appear to be any on the horizon, the Democratic party appears poised to continue
marginalizing the interests of Hispanics in pursuit of the center.

Conclusion

The central argument of this chapter is that the fourth model of party behavior, the elite power struggle framework, offers the best explanation for the behavior of the Republican and Democratic parties towards Hispanics. Despite the emphasis put on society as the driving force in many party behavior theories, the elites within both of the parties have played the most important role in defining their parties' strategies. Although public opinion and the views of their electoral coalitions provide constraints, elites have a significant degree of autonomy in shaping party strategy and behavior. However, it is also critical to keep in mind that American parties are very decentralized and open to participation by active groups. Who composes the party elite over time can change. Moreover, which factions secure a place within the governing coalition can change over time as well.

The elite power struggle model, more so than the other three mainstream theories of party behavior, recognizes that parties are composed of factions with different and often competing views of how the party should be behaving. The Republican party is home to two factions with highly contradictory views about the strategy the party should embrace on issues such as immigration, bilingual education and language policy. One faction, which I have labeled the "Americans First" faction, is pushing the party to toughen voting and registration requirements, strip welfare benefits from legal and illegal immigrants, mandate English as the official language, and end bilingual education as well as other bilingual services. This "Americans First" agenda is viewed by many Hispanics and others in society as anti-Hispanic. There is also a pluralist faction within the Republican party, most visibly embodied in the New Majority Council and the three
Hispanic Republicans in Congress, which wants the party to pursue policies on immigration, welfare, and language policy that are more sensitive to the needs and interests of the Hispanic community. At present, those Republicans pushing the "Americans First" agenda are predominately defining the response of the party. However, they do not prevail in every situation, which explains the occasional schizophrenic behavior of the party. The ongoing struggle between these factions is the reason why the Republican controlled Congress voted to cut off benefits to legal immigrants in 1996 and voted to restore the vast majority of those benefits in 1997.

Meanwhile, the Democratic party is also home to factions with contrasting views concerning the strategy the party should pursue towards Hispanics. Within the Democratic party there is a sizable faction that pushes the party to embrace policies supported by and meaningful to Hispanics and to directly address the concerns of the Hispanic community. Meanwhile, the centrist faction wants to party to move to the right on immigration and language issues in an attempt to "outflank" the Republican party and move closer to the positions held by white voters (Penn 1997. 11). Because of its increased viability, size and honed vision of how it wants the party to behave, the centrist faction has had the edge in shaping Democratic strategies across the 1990s.

The future of representation for Hispanics from the Republican party does not appear as bleak as the scenario this study sketched out for African Americans. Although the party is now pursuing an agenda perceived by many to be antithetical to the interests of Hispanics, the Republican party's behavior and policies on issues of importance to many Hispanics could change if more pluralists and Hispanics moved into the party's structure and positions of power. The candidacies of George W. Bush and John McCain for the Republican presidential nomination could hold some potential for doing just that. If the Republican party continues to pass measures seen as anti-Hispanic, however, this could lead to two fairly different possible outcomes. On the one hand, the continued
ostracizing of Hispanics by the Republican party would allow the Democratic party the room to continue pursuing a centrist strategy that neglects the interests of Hispanics without suffering electoral reprisal. It could also, however, anger and mobilize even more Hispanics into politics and into the Democratic party structure in particular. If this grassroots mobilization could be sustained and resulted in more Hispanics penetrating the Democratic party at all levels, the Democratic party might also start becoming more responsive to the concerns of Hispanics.
Figure 5.1
Attitude Toward Public Service Provision in Spanish, by National Origin

Source: de la Garza et al. 1992, 97
Figure 5.2
Support for Whether English Should be the Official Language, By National Origin

Source: de la Garza et al. 1992, 97
Figure 5.3
Attitudes Towards English in the Workplace, by National Origin

Source: de la Garza et al. 1992, 98
Figure 5.4
Attitude Toward Bilingual Education, by National Origin

Source: de la Garza et a. 1992, 99
Figure 5.5
Willingness to Be Taxed for Bilingual Education, by National Origin

Source: de la Garza et al. 1992, 99
Figure 5.6
Support for California's Proposition 187 by Ethnic Group

Source: Pachon et al. 1999, 170
CHAPTER 6
EXPLAINING THE PUZZLE OF PARTY BEHAVIOR:
THE ELITE POWER STRUGGLE MODEL

This study has examined the responsiveness of the Democratic and Republican parties to demands for incorporation from Protestant evangelicals, Hispanics and African Americans and has assessed how well several theories of party behavior explain the variation in party responsiveness. In each case, this study has argued that the elite power struggle model provides a fuller explanation for the behavior of the parties than the pluralist, median voter and ideological party models. In brief, this study argues that conflict between elite factions within the party determines the extent to which a party will support a particular group's causes. This chapter seeks to bring together the insights revealed in the previous case studies. Comparing the responses of the Republican and Democratic parties to these three groups provides the analytical leverage needed to more fully understand the determinants of party behavior and to explain why some groups have been more successful in achieving party responsiveness than others.

This chapter first engages in a brief review of the three case studies focusing on what they revealed about the behavior and responsiveness of the Republican and Democratic parties. Second, I discuss both the significant contributions that my interviews made to the development of the elite power struggle model of party behavior and the weaknesses of interview data. Third, I review, once again, several mainstream theories of party behavior and discuss their problems. I argue that the pluralist
perspective fails to account for the costs of accommodation, and that all three theories of party behavior fail to recognize the autonomy that party activists and elected officials have in shaping party behavior because of the structure of the American political system. Moreover, these perspectives fail to explicitly recognize the existence of factions with diverse goals within each of the parties and the importance of intra-party struggles in shaping the ultimate party response. Finally, I more explicitly lay out the elite faction theory of party behavior and then discuss why some groups are more capable of forming factions, mobilizing through the parties, and competing successfully in intra-party struggles than others. Although I have argued that the three groups in this study, African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics, possess several compelling similarities and thus warrant comparison, in this chapter I also give some attention to the way the three groups differ. There are several important distinctions between the groups and the nature of their agendas, which have caused some groups to face more or less barriers to representation and incorporation than others.

Review of the Cases: Variation in Party Behavior and Responsiveness

Although at different times, African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics have mobilized politically in the contemporary era. Moreover, each group has brought a unique set of interests to the political realm. Although defining group agendas is a difficult and controversial task. I have argued that for each of these groups there is an identifiable set of issues that a majority of the group feels intensely about and agrees on. that group leaders have used as a basis for mobilizing the group politically, and that set the group apart from the rest of the public. For African Americans these issues have been civil rights, racial equality, and economic justice. Evangelicals mobilized politically because most of their moral, religious and social concerns were not being
addressed by either of the political parties. And for Hispanics these issues have been the
treatment of legal and illegal immigrants, the provision of bilingual education and
services, and language policy. The groups are similar, therefore, in that each of them are
numerical minorities that have mobilized politically over a set of issues that have not "fit"
easily into either party and are opposed, at least in part, by a majority of the public.

By examining party platforms, State of the Union Addresses and the legislative
agenda and activities of the two parties, the preceding case studies have shown that the
Republican and Democratic parties have responded in different ways to the demands of
these groups and that the strategies of the parties towards groups have changed over time.
When African Americans intensified their political mobilization in the 1960s the
Republican party responded by dropping their historically progressive position on civil
rights and pursuing a conservative path on racial and civil rights issues from 1964
forward. Meanwhile, the Democratic party strongly embraced the agenda of African
Americans. The parties responded in an almost reverse fashion to evangelicals. The
Republican party came to embrace almost all of the concerns articulated by Christian
Right organizations, while the Democratic party made little effort to reach out to
evangelicals, let alone substantively accommodate any of their demands. Over the
1990s, the Republican party has repeatedly introduced and attempted to pass legislation
perceived as antithetical to Hispanics, while the Democratic party has fairly cohesively
voted against and criticized such efforts. Not only have the Republican and Democratic
parties responded in different ways to these groups, but the preceding chapters also have
demonstrated that the behavior of the parties towards groups has changed over time. The
Republican party has gone from ignoring issues of concern to the evangelical community
to engaging in a highly positive response. Over the past two decades the Republican
party has devoted more and more space and stronger language to support evangelical
concerns in their platforms and has provided these concerns a secure place on the national
agenda. Meanwhile, the Democratic party has become visibly less responsive to demands of Hispanics and African Americans across the 1990s. In the 1980s, Democratic platforms contained an average of well-over 50 references to minorities, blacks and Hispanics. In the 1992 and 1996 platforms this figure declined to two. President Bill Clinton, the symbolic leader of the Democratic party, signed into law two major pieces of legislation in 1996 that were disproportionately harmful to the economic and social well being of African Americans and Hispanics.

One of the most important insights these cases have revealed is that racial, religious and ethnic minorities are not doomed to marginalized status or minimal representation in our political system. Although at different times, both evangelicals and African Americans have achieved significant levels of substantive representation from at least one of the major parties. Thus, their experiences suggest that American political parties are flexible enough to accommodate the ideologically extreme demands of racial, religious and ethnic groups. However, these cases also reveal considerable variation in the responsiveness of parties across time. Evangelicals, Hispanics and African Americans have experienced extended periods when neither of the parties responded to their group and their group's political concerns in a positive manner. These cases underscore the need for a theory of party behavior that can explain both the responsiveness and the unresponsiveness demonstrated by the parties and account for change in party strategy and behavior over time.

**Developing a Theory of Party Behavior**

I did not begin this study with a clear theoretical conceptualization of the determinants of party behavior. I simply began by asking, "why do parties behave the way they do?" I recognized that there were several competing explanations of party behavior within the political science literature. The most prominent of these were the
rational choice-based median voter theorem articulated by Duncan Black and refined by Anthony Downs, the pluralist view of parties articulated by Robert Dahl and Samuel Eldersveld, and the ideological party model articulated by A. James Reichley. But I also recognized that most of these theories of party behavior had not explicitly been applied to the experiences of racial, religious and ethnic groups. My expectation was that they, similar to other mainstream political science theories, would run into difficulties in trying to explain the parties’ responses to these groups. The interviews I conducted with party elites illuminated many of the specific shortcomings with each of these theories.

Moreover, I did not begin this study with the elite power struggle framework of party behavior fully conceptualized and ready to be tested. On the contrary, I developed this theory of party behavior over time as part of an ongoing interaction between elite interviews, empirical research on the three case studies, and drawing on the insights of other party scholars. Many aspects of the elite power struggle framework are drawn from the work of James Sundquist (1983) and a group of scholars who have attempted to carve out a more autonomous role for party elites and "the state" in American politics theories (Adams 1997; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Clubb. Flanigan and Zingale 1990; Harvey 1998; Piven and Cloward 1988; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Schattschneider 1960; Shefter 1994). However, the most revealing source of information for this project came from interviews with party elites. The insights and information I gathered from the several rounds of interviews I conducted steered me towards an elite power struggle model and provided the information needed to flesh out the specifics of the model.

As discussed earlier, during 1998 and 1999 I conducted a total of 27 interviews with mid-level elites from both the Republican and Democratic parties. Although I tailored my questions to the specialties of each person’s specific role, in general, I used the interviews to unearth the central determinants of the party’s behavior. I fully recognize that there are some serious pitfalls to using interviews as a source of data.
Although I made attempts to interview elites involved in a diverse array of party activities, there is no way to be sure that I have spoken with a representative sample of activists. One of the ways this project could be improved in the future would be to conduct even more interviews with a wider range of party elites. A somewhat unexpected problem I encountered was the lack of historical perspective many party leaders and activists possessed. Although a few individuals I interviewed had a very long history of party activity and involvement, the majority of people could not say much about what their party had done prior to the 1980s, or in some cases, prior to the 1990s. Thus, the interviews were much more helpful for providing contemporary rather than background information about party behavior and strategy. Yet another problem with interviewing is that party activists have a vested interest in presenting their party and its actions in the best possible light. Thus, I suspect that many of those I interviewed may not have provided all relevant information in the most objective manner. However, I should also point out that a surprisingly number of elites in both parties seemed to be very frank in their responses to my questions and were often quite critical of their own party and its efforts, or lack of efforts, to respond to racial, ethnic and religious groups.

Despite the potential pitfalls involved in interviewing, I came away from the experience convinced that there is simply no better way to gain insight into party behavior and the factors that shape party responses than to actually watch and talk to the people who are involved in the day-to-day party activities. As I conducted my interviews, several general themes emerged, which were pivotal in putting together the elite power struggle model. One theme was that the parties were not internally in agreement on how to behave. Through my interviews I became increasingly aware that there were factions of elites within the same party who held very different visions about how their party should be responding to the political concerns of African Americans, Hispanics and Protestant evangelicals. Nor was there agreement on some very basic
issues, such as "should the party attempt to reach out to a particular group?" What I heard were several distinct and competing voices. Some factions within each of the parties were concerned with mobilizing their base voters. Some wanted their party to take clear ideological positions and really stand for something, and some thought their party should face up to political realities and embrace policies and positions that were popular with the public. By listening to these party workers, I began to see that the response of the parties should be conceptualized as a product of struggle among factions more than agreement among like-minded actors. Factions of activists and office holders vied for influence over the direction and content of party behavior. Depending on which faction was winning the intra-party struggle, the parties could be instruments of pluralists, centrists or ideological extremists.

One of the most important themes that emerged from the interviews was that mobilizing within the party was the single best way for a group to have influence over the behavior of the party. Party activists and leaders involved in all types of work were in agreement that, whether they liked it or not, any aggressive and committed group could gain a substantial foothold in the party. More than voting in high numbers, contributing money to the party, and/or having a moderate agenda, virtually all the elites I interviewed said that mobilization and organization within the party structure, both in elected and organizational positions, was the best way to steer the party's response towards a particular group. Through sustained grassroots mobilization into the party, a group gains the resources to influence platforms and constrain the view of elected officials. Thus, mobilization and organization within the party is the most effective weapon for intra-party warfare.
The Problems With Pluralism:
Lack of Competition and the Costs of Accommodation

The three preceding case studies have demonstrated that across the contemporary era, America's major parties have not acted in the manner envisioned by the pluralist approach. Once again, the pluralist theory of party behavior views parties as "power aspiring" groups who are "greedy" for new followers (Eldersveld 1964, 5). The very nature of elections motivates political leaders to mobilize public involvement and address some of the needs of groups. Parties do this in order to broaden their base of support or, at minimum, to lessen the allegiance of groups to their competitor. In other words, the central logic underlying the pluralist approach is that parties are always under pressure to enlarge their electoral bases, and this pressure forces them to be good representative bodies.

Examining the responses of the Republican and Democratic parties to evangelicals, African Americans and Hispanics reveals that the pluralist framework represents more of an ideal than a reality in American party politics. According Robert Dahl, Clinton Rossiter and other pluralists at one time the parties did respond to the needs (at least the material needs) of ethnic and religious groups seeking political incorporation and helped them assimilate into American society. In contrast to this image, I found that one of the most distinctive features of America's contemporary parties is their lack of desire and effort to mobilize new voters.¹ More than half of the voting age public does not participate in presidential elections and even greater proportions do not vote in congressional, state and local elections, yet neither party appears to be concerned about this. A theme that clearly came through during my interviews was that neither party was particularly interested in mobilizing new groups of voters.² Although both parties are

¹ Not all scholars, however, agree with the pluralist contention that parties were/are interested in mobilizing new groups into their coalition. Sundquist (1983) is replete with tales of party leaders throughout the history of American party politics that were reluctant to enlarge their coalitions.

² As I have argued in the preceding chapters, there are some exceptions. A few individuals at the Democratic National Headquarters in Washington D.C. were sincerely interested in mobilizing new voters.
engaging in "outreach". these efforts are geared at attracting individuals and groups that are already voting and already integrated into the political system rather than mobilizing new participants into the electoral realm. The Republicans are trying to reach out to Hispanic voters (the minority of Hispanics who are citizens and already participating in elections) that are business-oriented or highly religious, not bring new groups into the process. The frequent attempts of congressional Republicans to pass voter fraud legislation and eliminate bilingual ballots and election materials suggest that the Republican party is more interested in depressing rather than mobilizing Hispanic turnout. Although the Democratic party spent an unprecedented amount of money on Hispanic outreach in 1996, these efforts were "air wars" geared at attracting Hispanic voters to the Democratic party, not "foot wars" geared at mobilizing new Hispanics into the political realm (DeSipio et al. 1999).

Contrary to the predictions of the pluralist theory of party behavior the pressures of the electoral system have not forced the parties to accommodate the concerns of all sizable and mobilized groups. Even after the passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, which was followed by a dramatic increase in the number of African American voters, Republicans made few sincere, substantive gestures of accommodation towards this group. In fact, the Republican party appeared to consciously concede the votes of African Americans and exploit racial issues for electoral gain.¹ As a result, there has been no competition for the votes of African Americans for over thirty years (Edsall and Edsall 1991). Nor has there been much competition for the partisan allegiance of evangelicals. Despite the Democratic party's reputation as the champion of religious, as well as ethnic minorities, the party has not tried to listen to, let alone reach out to even more moderate evangelical organizations. Nor did the Republican party per se willingly

¹ To some degree, this strategy appears to have worked.
and eagerly reach out to evangelicals. On the contrary, the party withdrew financial support from evangelical outreach efforts in 1986 fearing the growing influence of the "Christian" faction (Oldfield 1996, 124). The Republican party continued to embrace more and more of the evangelical agenda, not so much because it wanted to lure more evangelicals into its fold, but because evangelicals forced their way into the party structure and single-mindedly used the party to pursue their policy goals. Rather than the pluralist vision of a unified decision to accommodate a new group, the behavior of the Republican party appears to be the product of intra-party struggles.

When Dahl (1961), Rossiter (1960) and Eldersveld (1964) discussed the incorporation and accommodation of ethnic, racial and religious groups they portrayed it as an essentially costless, if not a purely beneficial activity for political parties. This is a major flaw of the pluralist framework. As the case studies have demonstrated accommodating groups does have costs for political parties. Indeed, this is one of the insights the elite struggle model has borrowed from Down's spatial theory of party competition. Downs' theory suggests that accommodating the demands of the median voter or median voter groups is much more beneficial to parties, in terms of winning elections, than accommodating the demands of ideologically extreme groups. Beyond the strategic considerations emphasized by Downs, adherence to a group-representation strategy holds various dangers for a party: if parties are only in the business of representing groups, they encourage voters to think only in in-group, out-group benefits terms and they may run out of benefits before they have assembled a majority. Since all three of the groups in this study have mobilized around political issues that a majority of Americans oppose the costs of accommodating each of them are significant. What this means is that without the groups themselves, or very strong advocates for the groups, getting inside the parties and forcing the party to embrace their concerns, the parties will be reluctant to incur these costs.
Moreover, the pluralist theory of party representation does not differentiate between groups: all groups are viewed as desirable coalition partners. Yet because of the different levels of opposition and intensity of opposition to some groups and their political concerns within the public and within the pre-existing party coalitions the cost of accommodation varies. Although the three groups in this study have each mobilized around a set of issues that are opposed by a majority in society the degree that their agendas are perceived to be threatening by the public varies. As a result, accommodating the demands made by some groups is more costly than accommodating the demands of others. Although costs alone do not drive the behavior of parties, they do form constraints. Contrary to the predictions of the pluralist perspective the opportunities for some groups to achieve meaningful representation from one or both of the parties are more limited than for others.

In comparative perspective we can see that the cost of incorporating African Americans and accommodating their political demands appears to be the highest of the three groups. This is because there are still significant sections of the American public that are opposed to government programs designed to achieve racial equality or simply opposed to being in the same political party as African Americans. Jesse Jackson has aptly captured this idea when, on multiple occasions, he has said, "It's not the bus. It's us" to explain the resistance of white America to a range of programs geared to achieve racial equality and improve the lives of black Americans (Winant 1995, 62). As discussed previously, the Democratic party's inclusion of African Americans into their coalition in the 1960s directly led to a loss of other voters, primarily southern whites, from the coalition. Scholars have found strong evidence that significant sections of the white South and the white working class in the North defected from the Democratic party because of its position on civil rights and racial issues (Black and Black 1987; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Edsall and Edsall 1991; Huckfeld and Kohfeld 1989). In *Chain
Reaction (1991). Edsall and Edsall argued that the price the Democratic party paid for accommodating the civil rights and racial agenda was the loss of five presidential elections.

Further, this study has suggested that in terms of pure strategic calculation there is arguably more to be gained from not accommodating the agenda of African Americans than from accommodating it. In *Chain Reaction*, Edsall and Edsall argue that the Republican party and many individual Republican candidates have profited from the use of racial issues. Specifically, they argued that the Republican party had gained a seeming lock on the presidency through the manipulation of racial issues. Starting in the mid-1960s the hard right faction in the Republican party pursued a southern strategy, stressing issues that played on peoples' racial fears (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Klinker 1994). By embracing such a strategy the Republican party knowingly gave up the votes of African Americans in an attempt to gain more white voters. Although not a strategy endorsed and used by all Republicans, some Republican candidates continue to run ads and stress issues that subtly, or not so subtly, play on racial fears. The Willie Horton ads run in the 1988 presidential election are one example of an explicit attempt to gain white voters at the cost of playing on negative racial stereotypes. Winant (1995) has argued that the use and benefits of this type of strategy are still far from being exhausted. Making a similar point, Theodore Rueter argues that "a skeptic might conclude that Republicans do not want too many blacks in the GOP, given that this would make it difficult for them to exploit the racial issues in American politics" (1995, 101). Thus, in this way as well as several others that will be discussed shortly, race cannot be dismissed as an important

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4 Following the work of many other political scientists I have argued that Barry Goldwater and the Goldwater faction pursued a Southern strategy and sought to appeal to the segregationist sentiment in America. John Kessel, however, has argued that although many of Goldwater's supporters endorsed a southern strategy and advocated a racial appeal, Goldwater himself did not (1968, 209).

5 These ads were run by a technically independent group, rather than the Republican party or the Bush campaign. Nevertheless, this group was clearly trying to design an ad to benefit the Republican party and used a strategy endorsed by one faction within the Republican party elite.
factor in explaining the responsiveness of the parties, or more accurately, the lack of responsiveness.

There are also costs to accommodating the Hispanic agenda; however, they are harder to estimate precisely because they are closely tied to the performance of the economy and thus subject to change. One of the critical factors in the ability of Hispanics to gain a positive response from the parties is their ability to minimize white backlash. Bruce Cain, however, has pointed out that "this is critically true, but at the same time, it is also an almost impossible demand to make of Latino leadership" as it "asks Latinos to try to control something they cannot control - the positions white voters will take" (1996. xiii). At the start of the 1990s when the economy was performing poorly, supporting bilingual services, a more compassionate immigration policy, and the rights of immigrants to social welfare services had high costs. Recent polls, however, show that anti-immigrant sentiment has dropped to a twenty year low, and that the political choices of most Americans are not affected either way by such issues. Considering the strong performance of the economy, low unemployment rates, and predicted budget surpluses, the costs for accommodating the Hispanic agenda at present are probably the lowest they will ever be. This widens the opportunity for meaningful representation for Hispanics but does not guarantee that either party will become more responsive to their concerns. In this present environment, however, the Republican party's decision to accommodate the "Americans First" agenda that puts the needs and culture of English speaking, non-immigrant Americans before any other group, has costs. The cost is that it has alienated Hispanic voters. In 1996, even Cuban Americans, typically the most Republican of Hispanic national origin groups, moved in unprecedented numbers away from the Republican party.

Whether or not there are costs associated with accommodating the evangelical agenda is less clear. On the one hand there is evidence that the Republican party has
incurred at least minimal costs for embracing aspects of the evangelical agenda. For example, scholars have found evidence that the Republican party's strong pro-life position on abortion has reduced electoral support for Republican candidates. In 1989, a study showed that gubernatorial candidates actually gained votes by the virtue or their pro-choice position on abortion (Cook, Jelen and Wilcox 1994). Studies also suggest that President George Bush lost net electoral support in 1988 and 1992 because of his party's stated commitment to the pro-life cause (Abramowitz 1995; Rozell and Wilcox 1995). Although women are no more pro-choice than men, studies have revealed that women are more inclined to defect from the Republican party when the party's candidate appears poised to take actual steps to restrict women's right to abortion (Anderson 1997, 26). Moreover, the Republican party's decision to embrace "Judeo-Christian" values and traditions sends out an exclusive and unwelcoming message to individuals of non-Christian faith.

On the other hand, the agenda of evangelicals appears to be less frightening to voters, on the whole, than the agendas of either African Americans or Hispanics. After all, a majority of Americans are Christians and believers. While many Americans may think that evangelicals have gone too far in proselytizing for their faith, they are not inclined to see the activities of evangelicals in zero-sum terms or, if they do, to see themselves in conflict with evangelicals in a zero-sum struggle. That may not be the case with African Americans and Hispanics, particularly when those groups' demands are phrased in group-specific terms - e.g. more programs for African Americans or Hispanics. Although there is considerable fear among moderate Republicans that their party's association with "Christian" causes may destroy their party's viability, scholars and political analysts alike continue to debate how much this association, if any, has cost the party. Because the evangelical agenda poses less of a threat to most Americans than
the agendas of Hispanics and African Americans, it is less costly, and thus easier for the
Republican party to accommodate their demands.

Overall, the pluralist approach is inadequate for explaining party behavior for
several reasons. The perspective is unable to provide analytical leverage into the
question of why parties would choose not to compete for the votes of significant electoral
blocs. Secondly, accommodation does have costs. For many groups, substantive
representation can be achieved only by displacing the agenda of traditional coalition
members and by threatening the positions of current party elites. Therefore, the entrance
of groups into a party's elite coalition will be more conflict-ridden than smooth. Finally,
some groups are more desirable coalition partners than others are. This coalitional bias
contradicts the assumptions underlying the pluralist model. Overall, the pluralist account
tends to overestimate a party's need to appeal to all groups in order to survive and
underestimate the costs and conflict involved in accommodating group demands.

The Structure of the American Party System
And the Autonomy of Party Elites

The structure of the party system plays an important role in shaping the way the
parties have responded to racial, ethnic and religious groups. As new institutionalists
have argued structural arrangements are not neutral in their effects. Institutions shape
outcomes independent of the specific people within them, and they benefit some groups
and disadvantage others. Despite their impact on political outcomes much of standard
political science ignores institutions. Pluralism presumes enough openness in the
political system that one need not be concerned about the structural biases favoring some
groups of people over others (Pohlmann 1999, 33). Even though rational choice scholars
have focused on institutions more than have others, they have looked primarily at how
institutions are created and serve the purpose of solving collective action dilemmas and not as much at the way that institutions structure outcomes."

American parties are often characterized as weak particularly in comparison to their European counterparts for several reasons. One of the central weaknesses of American parties is that they do not have control over their own nominations. In other words, the Republican and Democratic parties per se have little power over who can and cannot be a Republican or Democratic candidate or office-holder. Nor do American party organizations have much power or discipline over the voting behavior of elected officials from their party. Moreover, studies have shown that a larger portion of the electorate is dealigned, or lacking any standing partisan loyalties, than ever before (Beck 1996). Close to one in three Americans consider themselves independent of both parties. Despite these signs of weakness, American parties have a source of potential strength that most of their counterparts do not possess.

In the United States there have been only two major parties at a time, largely because of our institutional structure, something which sets our political system apart from others. As Robert Dahl pointed out, "In no other large democracy, do third parties have so slight a representation in national politics as in the United States" (1967. 214). America's two-party system allows party elites the room to act autonomously and pursue strategies that would be fatal for parties in other political systems. Parties can neglect and marginalize their more ideologically extreme supporters with little to fear in terms of retribution because groups are constrained in their ability to fight back. If an ideologically extreme group tried to sanction a party, either by not voting or voting for the other party, this could actually undermine their cause by leading to the installation of challengers who are less sympathetic to their preferences and less effective in promoting

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\( ^a \) Some examples of rational choice works that view institutions as solutions to collective action dilemmas are Aldrich (1995) and Cox and McCubbins (1993). Both these works view political parties as being created and restructured by office holders and seekers to fit their needs and goals.
their interests. In other words, more so than in our countries American parties have room to act independently of public opinion and their own electoral bases without facing retribution.

Evangelical leaders have frequently threatened to make their followers "stay home" or abandon Republican candidates if the Republican party does not accommodate and prioritize their political agenda. Oldfield (1996) has argued that threats of defection to the Democratic party or withdrawing from politics all together were once fairly credible sources of leverage for evangelicals. However, as the parties polarized over the social and moral issues so important to the evangelical community across the 1980s, defection from the Republican party has become a less realistic and viable option. On the one hand, a mass decision made by evangelicals to stay home or vote Democratic would increase the number of Republican defeats. However, the victory of Democrats, who in general tend to be more supportive of the pro-choice position on abortion and more liberal on social issues, would threaten to undermine the evangelicals' agenda.

The recent conflict in Florida vividly illuminates that a similar dilemma surrounds African Americans within the Democratic party. As discussed previously, black elected officials and leaders in Florida vowed to end their blind loyalty to the Democratic party and made gestures towards a new alliance with the Republican party. They have done this in response to the decision made by white Democrats in the Florida House to remove African American representative Willie Logan as the incoming Democratic leader. After Logan's ouster, more than 300 African American leaders from all over the state gathered and announced that "black voters should consider themselves 'free agents' no longer beholden to the Democratic Party" (Neal 1998, A6). The state NAACP president, Leon W. Russell, said that "We have to do something that hurts the Democratic Party sufficiently that it pays attention" (Neal 1998, A6). Several African American legislators have begun discussions with state Republican leaders and Willie
Logan started campaigning side by side with Republican candidates. However, it simply is not clear that supporting Republicans marks any substantive improvement for African American interests. Commenting on these recent events Earl Black has said "In the short term, personal grudges can go a long way. But I'm not sure that there's a basis for anything permanent. Black Democrats don't have enough in common with white conservatives" (Bridges 1998 www.herald.com).

The whole topic that this study examines, party behavior, would be very different if there were more parties within the American political system or if our electoral system presented fewer obstacles to the creation of third parties. In a proportional representation, multiparty system, racial, religious and ethnic groups would have more ways to sanction party elites for neglecting their interests. Unified groups could throw their support behind one of several parties or create a new party, which could realistically gain some seats in the legislature. While it is legal to create and vote for third parties in the United States, building a successful third party is very difficult and almost unprecedented (Rosenstone, Behr and Lazarus 1984). Plurality based, winner-take-all electoral systems provide little reward to minor party efforts that fall short of victory. As a result, citizens are often not willing to "waste" their votes on third party candidates and strong candidates typically run under the major party labels. In addition, the existing parties have erected formidable obstacles for third parties to even get onto ballots in the first place.

Across the past decade, there have been some signs that the two-party monopoly in American politics might be weakening. In 1992, Independent candidate Ross Perot received 19 percent of the popular vote. However, his campaign did not offer a meaningful alternative for African Americans, Protestant evangelicals, or Hispanics. de la Garza and DeSipio found that in 1992, Ross Perot made no effort to integrate Hispanics into his campaign staff or appeal to them as a constituency. "He spoke to no
Latino groups and there is no record that he named any Latinos to his National Advising Panel of 100" (1996, 18). Although Ross Perot made more of an effort to reach out to African Americans in 1992, his efforts were widely viewed as patronizing because of his "you people" comment before the NAACP (Tate 1994, 196). Finally, Perot's central message of deficit reduction had little to offer Protestant evangelicals, particularly those evangelicals primarily concerned with social and moral issues. Moreover, Perot declared that he was pro-choice, a position that further limited his attractiveness among evangelicals. The most telling sign of Perot's failure to provide a serious alternative for any of these three groups is his poor performance among them in the election. In 1992, Ross Perot received a lower percentage of votes from Blacks, evangelicals, and Hispanics than from the population overall. In fact, Perot did worse among African American voters than all other social groups, except perhaps Jews (Tate 1994, 195). Among all white evangelicals Perot only received 15 percent of their vote and among evangelicals who were regular church attendees he received only 12 percent or their vote (Oldfield 1996, 209). Finally, de la Garza and DeSipio estimate that Perot received between 4 and 9 percent of the Latino vote (1996, 29). Although Ross Perot and his Reform Party have not offered a meaningful alternative for these groups his limited successes have demonstrated that although difficult, third party challenges are in the realm of possibility. Thus the creation of a third party represents a strategy, albeit a risky and expensive one, that evangelicals, African Americans or Hispanics could pursue.

At present, however, there remains no viable alternative to the two major parties nor do any new options appear on the horizon. Long ago, E.E. Schattschneider pointed out that in the United States, "because they have only two alternatives, the groups, segments, classes, and occupations have less bargaining power than might be supposed"

7 In 1996, however, an estimated 11 percent of evangelical Protestants voted for Perot, whereas only 7.6 percent of the overall population did (Weisberg and Mockabee 1999, 57)
In the American political system societal actors are "constrained" to a greater degree than party elites. In 1996, Democratic president Bill Clinton signed into law the Welfare Reform Act and the Immigration Reform bill, which harmed the social and economic well being of Hispanics and African Americans. Later that same year, the same Democratic president amassed an overwhelmingly high share of the African American and Hispanic vote. It is only because of the unique structure of America's political institutions that such an outcome is possible.

One of the central differences between the elite power struggle framework that I have offered in this study and other theories of party behavior reviewed is that it concedes a more autonomous role to the actions of elites within the party. Institutions and the way they are structured carve out the range of viable strategies that party elites can take. In the case of the United States, the structure of the party system explains why it is that party elites are able to act with great autonomy from their bases in society. On the other hand, institutional constraints only tell part of the story. In this chapter I also discuss why it is that within these constraints some groups have fared better than others have in terms of party responsiveness.

A Move Away From Society-Centered Theories

A central argument of this study is that the dominant theories of party behavior overestimate the importance of public opinion and the partisan masses in shaping the behavior of each party. Although pluralism, the median voter theorem, and the ideological party model differ in their predictions, they all share the assumption that the parties act in response to societal demands. To a greater degree than the elite power struggle model, these three theories of party behavior envision power flowing from groups in society through the political parties into policy. Although it is important not to overstate the differences between these approaches, the mainstream theories of party
behavior tend to conceptualize parties as neutral reactors. whereas the elite power struggle model conceptualizes parties more as autonomous actors.

As discussed in previous chapters, the ideological model of party behavior concedes a considerable role to societal actors in shaping party behavior. Scholars within this tradition have conceptualized political parties as reflections of the dominant cleavages and conflicts within society. They view the ideologies of parties as driven by their electoral coalitions. What is most damaging to the ideological model is that the Republican and Democratic parties have, at times, embraced policies contradicting elements of their long-held ideologies despite the fact that these changes were not supported by a majority of their electoral coalitions.

National Election Survey data reveal that neither party's partisan identifiers were pushing their respective parties towards a clearly liberal or conservative position on racial and civil rights issues in the 1960s, yet the parties polarized over these issues. If anything, the Republican party's electoral base seemed more disposed and the Democratic coalition more reluctant to take liberal positions on civil rights issues, yet the parties polarized in the opposite direction. Meanwhile, for decades the Democratic party continued to support busing and a wide range of affirmative action and minority set-aside policies despite the strong opposition of the majority of Democratic partisans. Therefore, it was not the Democratic party's electoral coalition, nor its more liberal primary voters, who provided the direction and motivation behind the Democratic party's decision to embrace and maintain an accommodating posture on civil rights and racial issues. The behavior of the Democratic party on these issues was a product of the intra-party struggle among party elites. Through successful intra-party organization, the liberal faction in the Democratic party was able to triumph over the racially conservative and more moderate factions within the party. Carmines and Stimson (1989) have argued that party elites have led the masses on racial and civil rights issues, not the other way around.
Similarly, the preferences of the parties' electoral followers cannot account for their polarization over social and moral issues. Republican partisans were leaning in a liberal direction on most social issues, yet the party moved and continues to move in a decidedly conservative direction on these issues. A majority of Republican partisans supported the Equal Rights Amendment, yet the party reversed its position and opposed its passage in 1980. A slim majority of all those who identified as strong Republicans were pro-choice until 1992, yet the Republican party embraced a strong pro-life position from 1980 on. Even the majority of Republican primary voters, typically a more conservative group than Republicans in the aggregate, are not supportive of a constitutional amendment outlawing abortion, the position officially endorsed by the Republican party (Menendez 1996, 296). Meanwhile, the Democratic party embraced strong pro-choice planks, sexual orientation as a protected class, and a strict separation between church and state despite the ambivalence or opposition of the majority of its coalition on these issues. The behavior of the parties on these issues demonstrates that the connection between party ideology and constituency views is not as direct and strong as many scholars have assumed.

Although rational choice theories are often perceived as agency-oriented, the median voter theorem, much like the ideological party model, leaves little room for autonomous actions and decisions by party activists and leaders in guiding party behavior. As discussed previously, the median voter theorem views the behavior of the parties as strongly influenced by the distribution of public opinion. Since the collective goal of parties is to win, parties tend to endorse positions that have widespread support within society. The "winning" positions are those resting near the middle. Moreover, the median voter theory predicts that rational parties will be inclined to avoid rather than accommodate ideologically extreme demands made by any group, even those groups highly loyal to the party. In their efforts to maximize the number of votes they receive.
the parties will put forth "vague and ambiguous" policies rather than embracing controversial positions on contentious issues (Downs 1957, 115).

Taken collectively, the cases examined in this study have revealed several problems with the median voter theorem. The distribution of public opinion and the preferences of the median voter do not provide the kind of strict constraints and focused direction that the median voter theorem posits. The parties have frequently embraced policies that are not very popular with the majority of the public and continued to do so despite evidence that these positions have hurt the party in elections. The Democratic party continued to support government involvement and spending to achieve racial equality, despite the clear and increasingly strong opposition of most Americans to such programs. Moreover, the party continued to embrace and support the expansion of affirmative action programs, government set asides for minority businesses and busing despite clear signs that these positions hurt Democratic candidates in elections, particularly in presidential elections (Edsall and Edsall 1991; Klinker 1994; Lipset 1996). Meanwhile the Republican party has embraced uncompromising pro-life positions on abortion despite evidence that this position repels the majority of Americans and has hurt Republican candidates in national elections (Abramowitz 1995; Cook, Jelen and Wilcox 1994).

Along similar lines the Republican and Democratic parties have polarized on contentious issues, endorsing positions considerably more ideological than the preferences of the median voter. Rather than negotiating a moderate path on civil rights and racial issues, which would have reflected the views of most Americans, the parties have polarized on these issues since the 1960s. Similarly, the parties have polarized over abortion, gay rights, women's rights, the definition of the family, pornography, and the
proper role for religion in public life. Despite the clearly middle-of-the-road position on abortion embraced by most Americans the Democratic party has embraced an unqualified pro-choice position, a view that only a minority of Americans hold. While the Republican party has opposed abortion under all circumstances a position only 13 percent of the population holds. The Republican party, in particular, appears to be moving away from, rather than towards, the median voter on several social issues such as abortion, women's rights and gay rights. Finally, the stances of the parties on immigration, bilingual education and language policy have often been clear, ideological and distinctly to the right or left of the median voter.

Public opinion does put some serious constraints on the behavior of parties. It is unlikely, for example, that at present either of the parties could survive by advocating an overtly racist platform or a strongly pro-homosexual rights platform because such positions are simply too far from the views of the median voter. However, as this study has demonstrated, empirically the evidence does not support these more society-centered accounts. Moreover, on a theoretical level, neither pluralism, the median voter theorem, nor the ideological party models explicitly take into account the structure of the party system. Specifically, they do not recognize the full extent to which party elites have room to behave independently of public opinion, their partisan masses, and sizable, mobilized groups. Party elites have their own independent preferences and the structure of the party system provides the space and capacity to translate these preferences into strategies and policies.

The polarization over social and moral issues has been reduced across the 1990s, however, as the Democratic party has moved decidedly rightward on prayer in the school and the importance of parental authority, and the need to regulate and restrict harmful and immoral cultural influences.
Internal Disunity: Party Factions

The structure of the American party system creates a situation where elites have more room to be autonomous than in other political systems. The significance of this is that the goals and preferences of party activists and elected officials are critical to understanding party behavior. One of the premises of the median voter theorem is that all party members share the same goal, winning elections, and that parties will behave strategically to achieve that goal. I have argued throughout this study that attributing the same preferences to all party activists or assuming all party elites have the same goals obscures our understanding of party behavior by covering up the central mechanism of party behavior: struggle amongst factions within the party. A political party is not "a rational organism with some kind of collective brain making coherent strategic judgments" (Sundquist 1983, 328). There is internal disunity concerning how the party should respond to demands for incorporation from groups. Throughout each case study chapter I have argued that parties are better conceptualized as compositions of elite factions possessing different and competing visions of how the party should be behaving.

Within each of the parties there are factions pushing them to behave in the highly strategic way the median voter theorem posits. Centrist or "median voter" oriented factions are almost always strong, partly because of strong societal support (the large number of voters with preferences in the ideological center) but mostly because many individuals become active in party politics to win, and they place that goal firmly above policy considerations. In other words, considering the power-seeking orientation of many party leaders and activists, it would be very unlikely for one of the major parties to lack a median voter faction. For these factions the pull of the center is a driving influence on the strategy and behavior they push the party to adopt. However, strategic "Downsian" factions are not the only voice in the parties. Although "winning" factors into the considerations of most party activists and leaders, it is not the only reason
individuals and groups become involved in party politics. Some do it to advance strong policy interests and some to advance the interests and well-being of their group (Aldrich 1995: 188; Baer and Bositis 1989, 93). Thus, there are also factions in the parties with ideological goals who want the party to pursue a clear and strong policy course, and factions with pluralist-type goals who want the party to expand its coalition by making efforts to appeal to and obtain at least part of the vote of all mobilized, sizable groups. Nor are strategic, center-oriented factions always successful in directing their party's ultimate course. By aggressively mobilizing within the party and relentlessly pushing their view, ideological factions can have disproportionately high influence on party policies and behavior, even though this may have negative consequences for the electoral success of the party.

In the Republican party, the "moderate" or "politician" faction as I have labeled it has behaved much like the median voter theorem predicts. It is acutely aware of the costs of accommodating the moral and social concerns of evangelicals. In other words, this faction recognizes that taking strong stands against abortion, condemning homosexuality, and opposing the Equal Rights Amendment will repel voters. The Republican Congressional Campaign Committee has regularly pressured its candidates to avoid or obscure their language on social issues and focus instead on "winning" issues such as reducing economic regulations and lowering taxes. However, the moderates are not the only faction within the party. The self-labeled "Christian" faction, composed primarily of evangelical activists and office holders, fits Wildavsky's (1965) description of "purists" because it has put ideological principles over strategic concerns (Hertzke 1993). A survey of evangelical activists within the Republican party revealed that compared to others they "disdain political compromise. believe parties must clearly stand for issues, and see little virtue in harboring diverse viewpoints" (Oldfield 1996, 187). Leaders of the evangelical faction have complained that the party needs to "stop looking at polls to find
its positions" and should instead fully embrace the agenda of evangelicals (Goodstein 1998, A16).

There is also a faction within the Democratic party that fits the description of median-voter mentality to a tee. This centrist faction, as I have labeled it, is composed of elites committed to two ideas: winning is the pre-eminent goal and in order to win the Democratic party has to perform better among swing voters. The self-proclaimed goal of this centrist faction is to "seize the center" and adopt "defensible, centrist positions" (Penn 1997, 1). Those I interviewed at the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) repeatedly stressed that the party's adherence to a group-representation strategy has been costly and undermined the party's ability to appeal to a wider array of Americans. Their goal, therefore, is "to construct a 'center-out' coalition" by taking issue stands between the positions of Republicans and liberals (From and Marshall 1997, 5). Although the centrist faction is now dominating in intra-party struggles it is not the only faction within the Democratic party, nor have its priorities always prevailed. There remains a faction within the Democratic party committed to using government resources to tackle the inequalities and discrimination that continues to plague racial and ethnic minorities in American society.

Thus, within both parties, there are strategic, power-seeking, winning-oriented factions pushing their parties to heed the pull of the center. But this is not the only force shaping party behavior. There are different intra-party factions and the response of the parties to a group's demands is ultimately shaped by the struggle between those factions. Therefore, pluralism, the median voter theorem, and the ideological party model are not all wrong or all right. American parties are fairly open and thus can be the tools of any faction that is mobilized and determined enough. Depending on which faction is winning the intra-party struggle, the parties can be instruments of pluralists, centrists or ideological extremists. When a pluralist, median voter or ideological faction has
captured the dominant voice of the party these theories can explain party behavior. As other factions come to dominate in these struggles (e.g. an ideological oriented faction loses out to a centrist faction), however, these explanations lose their explanatory power. Therefore, understanding how intra-party struggles are fought and won is a vital key to understanding party behavior and that is an issue on which these theories cannot offer adequate analytical leverage.

**Factional Struggle**

Contrary to the assumptions of other models of party behavior, parties are home to multiple factions that possess different views of how the party should behave. The struggle amongst these party factions ultimately shapes party behavior. The keys to success in intra-party struggle are mobilization within the party organization, becoming part of the party-in-government, and being united around a honed vision of how the party should be behaving in a specific policy realm. Penetrating the party elite is critical if a group is to achieve responsiveness and the circle of elites within each of the parties is not an impenetrable fortress. On the contrary, a distinctive feature of American political parties is that they are very open and porous. After years of studying political parties, E.E. Schattschneider concluded that "decentralization of power is by all odds the most important single characteristics of the American major party" (1942, 129).

The decentralization and openness of American parties is critical for several reasons. First of all, because American political parties are decentralized, power goes to those who mobilize within the party. Thus, the most important determinant shaping the response of the parties is the degree that groups are able to get inside the actual party structure and how effectively they organize once inside. Rather than being welcomed or incorporated, new groups need to force themselves into the party’s structure and use their united presence as leverage to force their concerns into party platforms and legislative
agendas. The decentralization of American parties is also significant because it leads to a policy vacuum, or lack of people within the parties who think systematically about how the party should be responding to a whole set of demands. Having a well-defined vision of how the party should be behaving is a valuable resource in intra-party struggle. Therefore, organized factions with strong and clear views often have the opportunity to shape party positions on a range of issues, even if these views are only held by a minority within the party elite. Moreover, according to the elite power struggle model the relationship between the number of voters and elite influence is important, but not in the direct way that the pluralist perspective suggests. If a faction within the party elite is able to demonstrate that it has mobilized a significant amount of voters it gains increased bargaining power in the intra-party struggles. As Schattschneider has argued, "the outcome of all conflict is determined by the scope of its contagion" (1964, 3). If group leaders can embed themselves within a party and mobilize their followers in society they can alter the scope of conflict in a manner favoring their own causes and agenda.

Of the three groups I have examined in this study, evangelicals have been the most successful in terms of getting the parties, or at least one of the parties, to respond to their concerns. This success is a product of mobilization within the party organization, becoming part of the party-in-government, being united around a honed vision of how the party should be behaving on social and moral issues, and demonstrating a viable following in society. As discussed previously, American parties are particularly open to infiltration by virtually any highly motivated and mobilized group. At the grassroots level parties typically struggle to find enough organizational workers or activists to carry out their most basic jobs. In fact, in many parts of the country, local party organizational offices, such as precinct captain, go unfilled from year to year (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 75). Parties therefore are open and typically eager to accept whoever volunteers their time. Furthermore, because of state statutes mandating open party caucuses and the
election of party officials in primaries, parties do not have much control over who comes in. Once inside a party groups have meaningful opportunities to influence the strategy and behavior of the party because of the diffuse distribution of power. Within American parties, power is decentralized and to some degree flows from the grassroots upwards. Those in the lower levels of party organization typically have influence over the selection of those in higher positions (Beck and Sorauf 1992, 139). Thus, they have the opportunity to depose party leaders who are not seen as friendly to the interests of their group.

Evangelical elites have made penetrating the Republican party organization in all fifty states an explicit goal (Persinos 1994, 23; Wilcox 1996, 75). Already semimobilized through their active participation in the church and church-related activities, evangelicals have been particularly successful in overcoming the collective action barriers to labor intensive political activity. In many local and state Republican parties, evangelicals have simply out-mobilized more moderate Republicans and have become a dominant or substantial influence in about half of the 50 states. In these states, evangelicals have used their numbers and their strategic positioning to depose leaders reluctant to accommodate and prioritize their concerns. One of the most recent examples of this occurred in California. In 1999, the "Christian" faction within California's Republican party mobilized and successfully voted out the party chair and replaced him with an individual who pledged that outlawing abortion would be the number one mission of the party (NY Times 1999).

Through grassroots mobilization into the Republican party organization at all levels and an unwillingness to compromise, the evangelical faction has gained tremendous leverage over the party's positions on social and moral issues. Desirous of avoiding conflict, particularly at highly visible events such as the national conventions, the moderate and "professional" factions in the Republican party have allowed the
evangelical activists to write the party's platform on issues of importance to them. Moreover, through their mobilization the Christian faction has gained virtual veto power over the selection of presidential and vice-presidential candidates. According to Downsian logic, because of the distribution of the Republican electorate in primaries, Republican candidates need to move to the right in order to succeed. Through daily hard work "in the trenches" evangelicals have pulled the issue positions of candidates towards their own views and, more importantly, kept them there through the general election and even after the election. Even in today's candidate-centered world ambitious office-seekers need the grassroots services provided by the party's organizational components, and evangelicals have provided this help in disproportionately high numbers.

Finally, Christian Right organizations and evangelical churches have successfully recruited and run many of their own for office. Although many evangelical candidates have been defeated, all together this group has been fairly successful in penetrating elected offices at all levels. About 40 individuals associated with the Christian Right were elected to Congress under the Republican party label in 1994. More importantly, those evangelicals who have won at the local, state and national level have aggressively pursued the enactment of the evangelical agenda described earlier. Once in office they have introduced legislation to restrict abortion, increase regulation on pornography and other negative immoral influences, and fought the legitimization and legalization of homosexual relationships. Finally, as the elite struggle model predicts, the success of evangelicals has come only at the expense of other coalition members. The growing influence of evangelicals within the Republican party has angered and displeased many and has come only after considerable intra-party fighting.

African Americans and Hispanics have been less successful than evangelicals in gaining responsiveness from the political parties. Turning first to the Republican party, we see that the major reason for this failure has been the lack of penetration by these
groups within the Republican party. In the 1960s there was a progressive faction within the Republican party committed to competing for the votes of African Americans and maintaining the party's progressive course on civil rights and racial issues. The progressives, however, were out-mobilized by the hard right faction. Efforts to build and strengthen the Republican party in the South attracted racial conservatives, if not racists, into the party's organizational structure, who then went on to engage in an all out battles to wrest control of the party's strategy and direction from the progressives. Although Barry Goldwater lost the presidential race in 1964, largely as a result of the mobilization his candidacy sparked, programmatic conservatives were firmly embedded within the party structure from the local to national level and were prepared to contest elections from top to bottom (Sundquist 1983, 291). The progressive faction continued to decrease in size and more importantly, it mounted little organized, countermobilization against the changing behavior of the party.

Today the Republican party possesses a small faction of pluralists, an outgrowth or evolution of the progressive faction that had significant leverage over party policy through the 1950s. This faction is uncomfortable with the willingness of the racially conservative and "Americans First" factions to write off entire groups of voters and wants to make the party more appealing to African Americans and Hispanics. However, Republican pluralists are few in numbers, not very well organized, and have failed to develop a cohesive alternative message for the party. The number of Republican officeholders at the national (as well as the state and local level) that are Hispanic or African American are very few. The three Republican Hispanics in Congress have fought hard to prevent their party from trampling on the interests of the Hispanic community, but they have received little support in this quest. On many occasions their efforts have not been enough to stop the legislative initiatives of the better funded, more numerous "Americans First" faction. The creation of the New Majority Council (NMC) in 1997, whose goal is
to increase the Republican party's support among minority voters, represents a significant
first step towards increasing the organization and thus influence of the pluralist faction.
At present, however, it lacks real power and influence. Most Republicans I spoke with
thought the NMC was either misguided or inconsequential. Moreover, neither the NMC
nor the pluralist faction more broadly has developed and pushed a proactive vision of
how the party should be behaving. Without more African Americans and Hispanics
moving into the party structure and mobilizing behind a focused vision of how they want
the party to behave, it is unlikely that the Republican party will become more responsive
to these groups.

Turning to the Democratic party, we see similar factional struggles at the root of
party responsiveness (or the lack thereof). In the 1960s, the liberal faction within the
Democratic party was able to dictate the party's response to demands made by African
Americans and the civil rights movement more broadly because it had strong clear goals,
gained more seats in Congress, and organized effectively within the national party
organization. The goals of the liberal faction were to use the federal government to end
discrimination, facilitate integration and address the dramatic socioeconomic inequalities
between blacks and whites. The liberal faction created the Democratic Advisory
Committee, which provided the space for this racially liberal faction to hone its message
and create a cohesive policy message for the party different from the one offered by
southern conservatives. Through the election of President Johnson and Vice President
Humphrey, who supported the goals of the liberal faction, and the liberal faction's clear
domination of the national organization, this faction forced the Democratic party to
embrace a liberal position on racial issues over the opposition of the segregationist,
southern faction.

The liberal faction within the Democratic party was able to maintain the party on
a liberal track through intra-party mobilization. The mobilization of liberals and African
Americans in particular was aided by a change in the Democratic party's rules beginning in 1972, which encouraged the proportional representation of minorities as convention delegates. It was further aided by the back-to-back attempts by Jesse Jackson for the Democratic presidential nomination in the 1980s. Some African American leaders and activists felt Jesse Jackson did not push hard enough in 1984 and 1988, and that he capitulated to the more centered oriented faction within the party. However, even they would agree that his presence played a critical role in maintaining if not furthering Democratic support for liberal, pro-minority policies and values, which were in direct accordance with the black agenda outlined previously. Jackson's candidacies increased the interest and participation of African Americans in Democratic primaries and more importantly brought more African Americans and liberals into the Democratic party structure at all levels. They were able to act as a countervailing weight on candidates interested in dropping support for controversial policies on the African American agenda, much to the dismay of the centrist faction within the party. As Hertzke has pointed out, "When Jackson announced that he would not seek the Democratic nomination in 1992, many Democratic party figures breathed a sigh a relief" (1993, 178). This is because the mobilization and organization his candidacy sparked made the party pay more attention to the concerns of African Americans and undermined the party's ability to construct a message directed at suburbanites, Reagan Democrats and swing voters.

Hispanics are not as numerous as African Americans within the Democratic party, neither in the party organization nor in elected positions. Unlike African Americans, Hispanics were never included in party reforms, nor have they had a leader as visible as Jesse Jackson to mobilize and sustain Hispanic participation into the Democratic party structure at the grassroots and state level. Many of the gains obtained by Hispanics from

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"Several individuals I spoke with at the Democratic National Committee, both Hispanic and African American, said that Henry Cisneros was a unifying leader for Hispanics. As a Cabinet Secretary, however,
the Democratic party came on the tail of victories made by African Americans, much as they have in the political system more broadly (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986). As African Americans fought for and gained planks in Democratic platforms for commitments to anti-discrimination policies, support for black colleges, and government set-asides, they were extended to Hispanics as well. When there were two Hispanics within the Cabinet (1992-1996), probably the height of Hispanic incorporation into the Democratic party elite, they were able to obtain the resources and support to organize an unprecedented Hispanic outreach in the 1996 presidential campaign (DeSipio et al. 1999).

An alliance between Hispanics, African Americans and other liberals within the Democratic party clearly holds the most potential as a means to counteract the growing influence of the centrist faction at present and in the future. To some degree, this is now occurring in that both Hispanics and African Americans are trying to keep the party focused on issues that resonate with minority voters and prevent the party from trying to "out-Republican the Republicans" (Singh 1998, 194). This liberal faction feels that by running more minority candidates and stressing issues important to minority voters, the Democratic party can win elections and remain committed to equality and the concerns of poor and working class Americans.

For several reasons, however, the liberal faction within the Democratic party has declined in effectiveness, particularly across the 1990s. Both Hispanics and African Americans appear to be demobilizing, rather then mobilizing into the Democratic party structure, thereby losing hold of one of the key resources for intra-party warfare. Although the percentage of the Democratic coalition composed by Hispanics has been growing (about 12 percent in 1996) their presence in the Democratic party's elite

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Cisneros was less visible than Jackson was and obtaining his position did not require the direct mobilization and participation of Hispanics.
coalition has remained small and may even be declining (Stanley and Niemi 1999, 173). The number of Hispanic delegates at the Democratic convention in 1996 was estimated to be lower than in 1992. There are also fewer Hispanics in President Bill Clinton's Cabinet in his second term than in his first term.\footnote{There were 2 Hispanics in his first Cabinet and there is 1 in his second Cabinet.} The proportion of African Americans within the Democratic party also shows signs of decline. There were almost 200 fewer African American delegates at the 1992 Democratic National Convention than at the convention in 1988 (Piliawsky 1995, 385). In 1992, Jesse Jackson, the most prominent black Democratic figure, was relegated to a non prime time appearance at the convention, signaling a significant drop in intra-party importance and stature (Piliawsky 1995, 385). Beyond the demobilization of African Americans and Hispanics, there are several ways that the interests of these two groups diverge. Existing studies suggest that on several of the issues important to the Hispanic community such as immigration, bilingual education, and the provision of social welfare benefits to legal and illegal immigrants, the views of African Americans and Hispanics divide almost as greatly as Hispanics and white Americans (DeSipio et al. 1999). The failure of Hispanics and African Americans and the liberal faction within the Democratic party more broadly to identify a clear vision of how they want the party to behave has impinged their ability to be effective.\footnote{It is worth pointing out that the prevailing perception among the electorate has been that the Democratic party represents black interests, and the interests of minorities, very well. Even if this perception is not accurate or shared by minorities themselves, its existence is important for Democratic leaders. President Clinton's attempts to distance himself from blacks, both rhetorically and substantively, was no doubt in response to the perceptions of the white electorate.}

Although the Democratic party has always had a centrist faction, over the past two decades this faction has gained increased leverage in the intra-party warfare because it has gained resources and numbers, become institutionalized and developed a clear vision of how it wants to party to behave. When I was at the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) I asked people why this organization was formed. One person said it was created to counterbalance the overrepresentation of extremists and ideologues among the
party's activists. "Normal people do not work at their local party office on nights and the weekends. The DLC is trying to represent the interests of those people". The DLC was created in 1985 and may have remained relatively powerless and inconsequential, similar to the NMC, had it not been for the nomination and election of its former chairman Bill Clinton as president. His election in 1992 brought in resources and gave the DLC a privileged position in the intra-party struggle.

Convinced by the need of a centrist policy message, more and more elected officials have signed on as members of the DLC. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind the reality that faced Democratic party elites in the early 1990s. They were looking at an unbroken twelve years of Republican control of the presidency, including eight years of the Reagan presidency that had redefined the agenda of American politics. There was a sense among many Democrats as well as many political scientists that a realignment was occurring that would bring the Republican party into hegemony and that the Republican party enjoyed a "lock" on the presidency (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1991. 290-293). In this environment it very easy to see why the centrist strategy offered by the DLC looked increasingly attractive to many Democrats. In 1992, the DLC estimated its membership at 750 office-holders across the country (Marshall and Schram 1993). Across the 1990s, about half of the Democratic members of Congress have belonged to the DLC, although this membership is admittedly more meaningful for some than others (Hale 1994). Therefore, although the centrist faction does not have a particularly active grassroots component, its strength among elected officials is very strong.

Besides increased visibility and size, the centrist faction has benefited from having a clear vision of how it wants the party to behave and what policies it wants the

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13 I am not making a judgment on whether or not such an assessment was accurate or not. This study attempts to understand why parties adopt the strategies they do towards particular groups and not judge the electoral effectiveness of these strategies.
Democratic party to pursue. In 1992, the DLC and its associated policy institute, the Progressive Policy Institute (PPI), put forth *Mandate for Change*, which outlined a new philosophy and agenda for the Democratic party. In 1996, the DLC and PPI offered *Building the Bridge: 10 Big Ideas to Transform America*. The 1992 and 1996 Democratic platforms were drawn heavily from these and other policy declarations published by the DLC and PPI. Some activists at the DLC claimed that the 1992 and 1996 Democratic platforms were in fact DLC platforms. Moreover, many of these centrist ideas formed the cornerstone of Bill Clinton and Al Gore's campaigns, particularly in 1996 (Weko and Aldrich 1998, 285).

More specifically, the centrist faction has been very clear about how they want the Democratic party to respond, or not respond, to the demands of African Americans, Hispanics and evangelicals. The centrist faction clearly wants the party to reduce its commitment to affirmative action, diversity, and programs benefiting disadvantaged minority groups. In 1996, the Democratic Leadership Council wrote that "In the first Clinton administration, too many key posts went to liberal activists ... This time around, the administration should make innovation and reform, rather than the single-minded quest for diversity, the touchstone of his staffing decisions" (From and Marshall 1997, 6). Moreover, the centrist faction stated that its goal was also to "outflank the GOP" on immigration by encouraging Bill Clinton to adopt and then highlight his tough record in this policy area. One DLC leader pointed out that Clinton "had hired more border guards, increased deportations, and insisted on strict enforcement of immigration rules and procedures. With these moves, the President moved close to even on immigration among white voters" (Penn 1997, 11). The centrist faction also was a strong force behind Bill Clinton's decision to sign the 1996 Welfare Reform Bill, which disproportionately hurt Hispanics and African Americans. Finally, the recent moves by the Democratic party towards evangelical positions on religious and family values issues was not the
result of evangelical mobilization within the Democratic party nor a group-based appeal towards evangelicals. Rather it was an explicit effort engineered by the centrist faction to make the Democratic party take more mainstream, middle of the road positions on these issues, thereby negating any benefit the Republican party was gaining from them. As the DLC's policy declaration points out, Bill Clinton "appropriated this traditional Republican issue" and put forth an agenda focusing on values, parental authority, school uniforms and the V-chip which "resonated powerfully with Americans concerned about strains on the family and the breakdown of the social order" (Penn 1997. 12; From and Marshall 1997. 3).

Without Jesse Jackson, or a similar mobilizing figure from the liberal faction of the Democratic party in the 1992 and 1996 presidential race, it was easier for the centrist faction to implement its mainstream agenda. The party was able to appeal to "critical voting blocs" which it identified as "women, suburbanites, Catholics, independents, the middle class and married people" without having to accommodate many of the demands of minorities (Penn 1997. 9). Moreover, the centrist faction benefited from and continues to benefit from the reluctant, but growing consensus among some African Americans, Hispanics and liberals in the Democratic party that a centrist course is needed to keep the party electorally viable. Although there remains a core group preparing for battle, several liberals I spoke with in the Democratic party felt that they could not launch an aggressive countermobilization against a strategy that appeared to be working. This greater consensus has made the Democratic party less fractious than the party was in the 1980s. However, this consensus works to the disadvantage of African Americans and Hispanics. Without struggling to counter the influence of the centrist faction their interests will continue to be marginalized.
Costs and Opportunities for Mobilization

Struggle between factions within the party elite plays the key role in shaping party responsiveness towards a group's demands. However, this explanation for party behavior still leaves several important questions unanswered. Why do some interests get organized into intra-party factions while others remain disorganized? Why are some factions able to mount an aggressive take-over of the party while others become demobilized? Why do some factions fare better in intra-party struggle than others? In this section I argue that there are several reasons why it is easier for some groups to organize and mobilize than others. Moreover, I argue that these factors help explain why it has been easier for evangelicals to mobilize effectively than Hispanics and African Americans. The "opportunity costs" associated with mobilizing are higher for some groups than for others (Stone 1986). In other words, there is variation across groups in terms of the resources and opportunities they have. Whether or not the American political system historically has excluded or included a particular group, the degree that contemporary citizens are reluctant to vote for elected officials from a particular group, discrepancies in resources, and the presence or lack of strong leaders all contribute to whether or not a group mobilizes into a party.

For groups who have been excluded from the political realm historically, the cost of mobilization is higher than for groups who have always been included. African Americans, and to a lesser extent Hispanics, were systematically excluded from electoral politics in the United States. Until the passage of the 15th amendment in 1865, blacks were considered property and thus denied all rights of citizenship including the right to vote. After the passage of the 15th amendment, states passed laws and used economic and physical intimidation to keep blacks from registering and voting. Although not to the same extent, discrimination and voter intimidation prevented many Mexican Americans and other Latinos from participating in American politics with the same freedoms and
protections as other Americans. "Overt intimidation, capricious changes in voting rules. English language registration and voting requirements, lengthy residential requirements" were all tools used to exclude Hispanics from participating in elections (de la Garza and DeSipio 1997. 82). Thus, for over 80 percent of our nation's history African Americans and Hispanics have been disenfranchised. Although evangelicals have been outside the cultural mainstream throughout much of the 20th century, evangelical men were never excluded from the political realm (Oldfield 1996. 30). Only for the last two or three decades have Hispanics and African Americans even begun to have a real opportunity to get integrated into political parties at the local, state and national level. Meanwhile, evangelicals (and other Anglo/white groups) have had this opportunity for centuries.

Although the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the 1975 extension of the Voting Rights Act eliminated much of the institutionalized discrimination and intimidation against African Americans and Hispanics such lengthy experiences with exclusion cannot be quickly overcome. For a long time scholars mistakenly assumed that once the franchise was extended to all groups, that all groups possessed equal opportunities to influence political outcomes. As Anna Harvey argues, however, "recent theoretical developments in the fields of political science and economics have focused scholarly attention on the lasting consequences of institutional arrangements, even after those arrangements have been altered" (1998, 1). Structural arrangements alter the political cultures of both elites and excluded groups and act as a restraint on their full participation. In other words, ending discriminatory procedures does not level the playing field. Even though the Voting Rights Act and its extensions eliminated discrimination against minorities in the electoral arena it did nothing to mobilize newly enfranchised electorates or help them to catch up in terms of political participation and mobilization.
Historical exclusion and discrimination is clearly only part of the story behind why some groups have been able to mobilize into effective intra-party factions while others have not. History alone cannot explain change over time in terms of groups' abilities to achieve influence. Moreover, even excluded groups have, at times, been able to overcome the costs of mobilization and effectively advance their political concerns and interests in the political realm, as is most clearly illustrated by the civil rights movement. Nevertheless, the degree of historical exclusion faced by a group is an important variable to consider as it has acted as an added constraint on the ability of Hispanics and African Americans to effectively mobilize into the parties.

I have argued throughout this study that the most important determinant shaping the response of the parties is the degree that groups are able to get inside the actual party structure, in terms of party organization and elected positions. Hispanics and African Americans are disadvantaged in this aspect, more so than other groups, because of the persistence of racially and ethnically polarized voting. In their study of minority representation, Grofman, Handley and Niemi find strong evidence that "Unpalatable as it might be, the simple truth is that at the congressional and state legislative level, at least in the South, blacks are very unlikely to be elected from any districts that are not majority minority" (1992, 134). These authors go on to point out that although polarized voting may not be as stark for Hispanics as for African Americans, their situations "are uncomfortably similar" (Grofman, Handley and Niemi 1992, 135).

In the 1980s, based on empirical evidence of racial and ethnic polarized voting and the underrepresentation of minorities that this was causing, the Supreme Court and

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1 The case of North Carolina illustrates the problem well. The state's population is 24 percent black but had been represented by an all-white congressional delegation since Reconstruction. No blacks were elected to many statewide or local offices, even where blacks were a sizable minority of the voters. In 1984 the Supreme Court found voting in the state to be so racially polarized that 82 percent of white voters would not vote for a black candidate. Political campaigns, the court noted, had been dominated by explicit racial appeals, in which black candidates were targeted because of, not in spite of, their race (Guinier 1995, 227).
the Justice Department directed states to create, where possible, districts in which African Americans and Hispanics would constitute a majority. After the 1990 census, 11 majority-Black and 6 majority-Hispanic districts were drawn. The 1992 election resulted in the election of an unprecedented number of African Americans and Hispanics to Congress. However, the opportunity for Hispanics or African Americans to continue increasing their presence in Congress appears limited. The capacity to create "contiguous" minority-majority districts has been almost maximized. Thus, the only possibility for more minority office-holders comes from success in majority white districts. While this occasionally occurs, the continued reluctance of white citizens to vote for minority candidates will act as an increased obstacle in the path of Hispanics and African Americans seeking elective offices and the degree they can become integrated into the parties (Guinier 1995). Even more problematic for the integration of Hispanics and African Americans in the parties is that the constitutionality of existing minority-majority districts has been thrown into question by a series of recent Supreme Court decisions. In one recent ruling, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said that race-conscious gerrymandering, however well-intentioned, smacked of "political apartheid" and was thus constitutionally suspect (Guinier 1995, 227). The Court has decided that when race is the prevailing factor behind the shape of a district this violates the constitutional right of white voters to participate in a color-blind electoral process. While this does not threaten the existence of all minority-majority districts, it does make many susceptible to constitutional challenges. The end result could be even fewer Hispanics and African Americans in the party-in-government than there are at present.

*much of the reasoning for drawing these districts can be found in the case of Thornburg v. Gingles (1986). In their decision on this case, the Court devised a three-part test for discrimination that focuses on an analysis of the local political situation, its openness to minorities, and the ability of minority groups to elect the representatives of their choice (Swain 1995b, 215).*
Protestant evangelicals also have faced some societal resistance when trying to run for office. In many races, candidates who were portrayed as card-carrying members of the Christian Right lost elections because of this association (Green 1995, 11; Wald 1997, 256). However, evangelicals have more ways to overcome or maneuver around these societal prejudices. Race and ethnicity are ascriptive characteristics while religion is not. In other words, their race or ethnicity marks Hispanics and African Americans in immutable ways. Even if black and Hispanic candidates embrace "deracialized" campaigns, their race and/or ethnicity remains visible and permanent. Moreover, voters tend to automatically associate Hispanic and African American candidates with minority concerns and agendas, even if minority candidates do not focus on such issues in their campaigns. In contrast, evangelicals can and have overcome societal prejudices by changing their image and rhetoric. In the early 1990s, evangelicals ran "stealth" campaigns, hiding their morality based political agenda all together until after they won the election. More recently, evangelicals are increasingly trying to avoid using rhetoric that the public finds inflammatory and use more secular language to convince people of the correctness of their views (Rozell and Wilcox 1995, 257). Moreover, as discussed earlier in this chapter, the agenda advocated by evangelicals, particularly when framed in more moderate language is less threatening to many voters than the agendas of Hispanics and African Americans. For these reasons evangelicals have a greater opportunity to become a sizable faction in one of the parties than African Americans and Hispanics.

Another factor that may increase opportunities for evangelicals to achieve responsiveness from the parties concerns their geographical concentration. Geographical concentration is often perceived as a resource for minority groups (Browning, Marshall and Tabb 1986, 1997; de la Garza and DeSipio 1999). On the whole African Americans and Hispanics are more concentrated than evangelicals. The creation of minority-majority districts has acted to intensify this concentration. As many scholars and
political analysts have pointed out, however, the geographical concentration of blacks and Hispanics makes other districts less representative of minorities (Swain 1995). At a more general level, American politics has a distinctively local bias. Except for the President and perhaps the national committee chairs, every other American political leader represents a particular geographical constituency, which may not be very reflective of the entire nation. Evangelicals are to be found, often in impressive numbers in virtually every district. Blacks and Hispanics are not. Therefore, politicians may be more inclined toward evangelicals than the other two groups. In other words, Hispanics and African Americans, once again face more constraints on achieving party responsiveness than evangelicals.

Before Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action*, the dominant perception pervading political science theories was that participation was a costless and natural activity. If people had interests they would organize, join a group and lobby on behalf of their interests. A vital contribution of rational choice theorists, therefore, has been the recognition that political participation of any kind has costs associated with it. The more intensive the activity, the higher the costs. Mobilizing into a political party, which this study has argued is critical for a group to obtain a positive response from the political system, is an extremely time consuming, labor-intensive and thus costly activity. Studies have also explored the ways that resources such as money, time and education make participation easier (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995). Recently, scholars have also found evidence that group identity - in particular, language and patterns of religious affiliation - also confer resources that facilitate political action (Verba et al. 1993). However, these resources are unequally distributed across groups, thereby making it easier for some groups to participate than others. Although reviewing an exhaustive list of the resources each group has and does not have is outside of the scope of this study, I
briefly review a few of the ways resources have constricted or widened opportunities for group mobilization into the parties.

Hispanics have the least of the resources critical for political participation and thus face the biggest obstacles in terms of intra-party mobilization. First of all, close to 40 percent of Hispanics living in the United States are not citizens, which prevents them from several of the most common and meaningful forms of participation: voting and running for elective office. Secondly, as Verba et al. point out "Proficiency in English is quite obviously useful for political action" (1993. 470). Many sources of political information are in English. Moreover, for the forms of political activity that this study argues are critical for group representation, such as running for elective office or securing a position in the party organization. mastery of English is almost essential. Because a considerable minority of the Hispanic population does not speak English fluently, these forms of political participation have higher costs for them. Third, a considerable minority of Hispanic citizens are immigrants who are unfamiliar with the way our political system functions (Espiritu 1992. 58). As discussed previously, because of evangelicals extensive knowledge of the intricacies of the Republican delegate selection process (largely because Christian Right organizations have published guidebooks detailing how the process works in each state) they have been successful in entering the Republican party and gaining leverage over platforms and the selection of national candidates. For immigrants who are new to our political system, the sheer complexity of entering local races for precinct captain, let alone navigating the national delegate selection process, would be prohibitively confusing. Finally, Hispanics are also disadvantaged economically, with an average yearly income substantially below that of Anglo-whites and according to some studies, even slightly lower than African

10 The fairly recent expansion of Spanish language new stations, however, helps Spanish speaking immigrants and citizens overcome the language barriers to gaining political information and thus, political participation.
Americans. This lessens the ability of Hispanics, as a group to influence the political process through contributions (Verba et al. 1993, 469). Based on their citizenship participation survey, Verba et al. found that while 23.8 percent of the public overall claims to have given a campaign contribution only 12.9 percent of all Hispanics and 12.4 percent of Hispanic citizens claim to have done so (Verba et al. 1993, 463). In contrast, groups such as "English First", who are pushing to dismantle bilingual education and pass English only laws, have been very aggressive fundraisers and contributors and thus have a better opportunity to constrain the views of the Republican party.

Strong church networks have been an important resource for the political activity of both African Americans and evangelicals in the political parties. Church provides its members with opportunities to develop organizational and communications skills that are pertinent to political participation. Moreover, church settings provide exposure to political stimuli, such as informal political discussions and explicit political mobilization (Knoke 1990; Leighley 1996; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). African-Americans and evangelicals predominantly belong to churches whose internal structures foster opportunities to exercise politically relevant skills, and they are exposed to requests for political participation and messages from the pulpit about political matters (Verba et al. 1993, 487). Studies have shown that the black and evangelical church networks played pivotal roles in Jesse Jackson and Pat Robertson's bids for major party presidential nominations (Hertzke 1993). Although Hispanics also have fairly strong church attendance, scholars have noted the church has not played a similar mobilizing role for them (Hero 1992, 51). The Latino disadvantage seems to derive from the fact that they are disproportionately Catholic, and Catholic churches provide less opportunities for their members to get involved and learn politically relevant skills than Protestant churches (Verba et al. 480). The broader point is that resources influence participation and some
groups possess more resources than others and thus have a greater opportunity to form effective intra-party factions.

Another factor that explains the mobilization of some groups into viable factions in the parties more than others is the presence or absence of group leaders within the parties. The process of party recruitment, particularly drawing a particular group into a party's organization and elected positions, is largely dependent upon the presence of a magnetic leader who discusses issues meaningful to the group. As Beck and Sorauf have argued, "the mobilization of issue and ideologically motivated workers into the party often depends upon the drawing power of an attractive leader who champions their cause" (1992, 123). Leaders can make a difference by sparking increased interests in politics, directing their followers into a particular party, and helping to overcome the costs and collective action barriers to party activity. As the case studies have demonstrated when an attractive spokesperson for a group penetrates a party and runs for a high visibility position under the party's label this has spurred an influx of like-minded followers into the party structure. Jesse Jackson's back-to-back runs for the Democratic nomination and Pat Robertson's run for the Republican nomination in 1988 increased the mobilization of African Americans and evangelicals into the respective party structures. Although a Hispanic has never competed for one of the major party presidential nominations, existing surveys suggest that if a credible, likable Hispanic leader made such a decision it would also increase the presence and mobilization of Hispanics within that party (DeSipio 1999, 35).

Looking to the future an important question is whether or not leaders from these groups will emerge and be able to motivate their followers to become active in one or both of the parties. To some degree this is difficult to predict. However, looking at the current state of affairs, the situation does not bode well for African Americans and Hispanics. At present, no African American or Hispanic leader appears poised to take on
such a role in either of the parties in the near future. Several people I interviewed suggested that Henry Cisneros could have played such a role for the Hispanics community but because of allegations of wrongdoing at his Cabinet confirmation hearings and his decision to return to the private sector, he will not be in a position to do this. Jesse Jackson has already announced his intentions not to run for the Democratic nomination in 2000 and no other figure appears poised to fill his shoes. Meanwhile several evangelical leaders remain visible and active in party politics. Gary Bauer may not prove to be as popular a candidate as Pat Robertson was in 1988, but his candidacy for the Republican presidential nomination in 2000 will undoubtedly provide energy for sustaining the mobilization of evangelicals within the Republican party structure. Thus, in terms of leadership capable of bringing its group into the political parties and organizing an effective intra-party faction, evangelicals once again appear to have an advantage over African Americans and Hispanics.

Conclusion

Comparing the responsiveness of the Democratic and Republican parties to demands for incorporation from Protestant evangelicals, Hispanics and African Americans has revealed that racial, religious and ethnic groups do have the potential to achieve representation from one or both of the parties. According to the elite power struggle model, which I argue provides the best and fullest explanation for the behavior of the parties, conflict between elite factions within the party determines the extent to which a party will support a particular group's causes. By mobilizing into a party and cohesively pushing the party to adopt a certain strategy, all three of the groups can become contenders in the struggle to influence party behavior. However, this chapter has also demonstrated that not all groups have the same opportunities to organize effective factions. There are several important distinctions between the groups and the nature of
their agendas, which have caused some groups to face more or less barriers to representation and incorporation than others.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

The previous chapters described, analyzed and compared the responsiveness of the Republican and Democratic parties towards evangelicals, African Americans and Hispanics across the contemporary era. I have argued throughout this study that the elite power struggle model offers the fullest explanation for the variation in party responsiveness across cases and across time. This chapter discusses the importance of this argument for theories in American politics and the fate of racial, religious and ethnic minorities in our political system.

This chapter first discusses the basic view of parties that underlies this research, a view of parties as builders and managers of coalitions among groups. Next, I discuss the significance of this study from several different angles. Understanding the determinants of party behavior towards African Americans, Hispanics and evangelicals is important both because of the pivotal role parties play in our democratic political system and because of the fact that racial, religious and ethnic groups are an enduring and growing component of the American political landscape. I also discuss the theoretic contributions of this study, focusing primarily on the value of applying mainstream theories of political science to the experiences of racial, religious and ethnic groups. Next I discuss some of the implications of the elite power struggle model of party behavior for the fate of evangelicals, Hispanics, African Americans, and other minority groups in our political
system. I conclude by discussing the limitations of this study, paths for improvement, and suggestions for future research.

Groups and Political Parties

This study has examined the response of America's major parties to racial, religious and ethnic groups and argued that conflict between elite factions within the party determines the extent that a party supports a particular group's causes. The underlying argument made throughout this work is that groups are central to politics. In placing groups at the forefront of my analysis of political parties I am drawing upon a long tradition within the political science literature of viewing party coalitions in social group terms (Axelrod 1973; Beck 1997; Key 1955; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Petrocik 1981; Stanley and Niemi 1995. 1999; Sundquist 1983). One of the most influential scholars of party politics, V.O Key (1955, 1959) argued that one party or the other usually dominates American politics for decades by putting together a stable winning coalition of different groups. Similarly, Nelson Polsby has argued that "coalition building is the central task of American political parties" (1981. 156). Scholars such as Robert Axelrod (1973) and Stanley and Niemi (1995. 1999) have used empirical data to document the social group bases of the parties and track changes in the racial, religious, ethnic and class compositions of the party coalitions over time. Like these works, this study is premised on the idea that it is both meaningful and useful to examine the parties' strategies and responses towards different demographic groups in society.

There is clearly more to party behavior than responding to or not responding to the interests of a group or seeking to build coalitions on a group by group basis. Successful parties are able to bind together voters into a winning coalition by reaching beyond narrow group interest. Nevertheless, a group approach to studying party behavior can be highly useful. As Beck argues, adopting a group approach to the study
of political parties "often provides the lens through which more complicated changes can be seen, as long as one does not conclude that this is the full picture" (1997. 3). To a large degree conceptualizing the political world in terms of groups is a way to make sense of an overwhelmingly complex reality, and it is something that both political parties and voters do.

From my interviews, I came to see that party leaders and activists are very comfortable viewing the American electorate in terms of groups. Since the New Deal, the Democratic party has been more closely associated with this group view of parties than the Republican party. Nevertheless, both parties see their role as builders and managers of group coalitions. The parties allocate a good deal of their resources to analyzing group preferences, developing strategies to appeal to different groups, and engaging in group-based outreach efforts. The behavior of Richard Wirthlin, President Ronald Reagan's main pollster, provides a clear, if perhaps extreme, example of parties' tendencies to break the political world down into simplified groups. In the 1980s, he broke women down into 8 distinct groups, ranked them on a scale of how receptive they would be to Republican party appeals and then targeted ads, direct mail and campaign appearances at the demographic groups considered most winnable (Mueller 1988. 32).

Not only do the parties themselves see groups as meaningful political entities, but Americans tend to view the political world in terms of groups and group interest as well. People often think of themselves as belonging to specific groups and these group-based identifications act as lenses in how they view the political world and structure their political views (Conover 1984; Converse 1964). In The American Voter, Campbell et al. demonstrated that when other social characteristics, such as urban-rural residence, region, and occupational status are held constant, secondary group membership, such as race, ethnicity and religion, has an independent impact on an individual's political behavior. Moreover, they found that the stronger one's group identification, the greater the impact.
of group standards on vote choice (Campbell et al. 1960, 295-332). More recent studies have demonstrated that people use group membership as a cue or conceptual short cut in evaluating policies, candidates and the parties (Conover 1984; Conover and Feldman 1984 and 1989; Miller et al. 1981; Paolino 1995). By viewing party coalitions in social group terms, therefore, this study builds on a long tradition in the literature and provides a useful lens for analyzing party behavior.

The Importance of Party Behavior
Towards Evangelicals, Hispanics and African Americans

Understanding the determinants of party behavior is important because parties play a critical role in our political system as well as in all other democracies. Although not envisioned by the Founders, political parties arose soon after the ratification of the Constitution and have become a seemingly permanent feature of American politics. As Robert Dahl has argued "whatever the intentions of the Founding Fathers may have been, their Constitution, if it were kept to, made political parties not only possible but inevitable" (1967, 247). Indeed, many political scientists have argued that parties form the heart of American politics and American democracy for several compelling reasons (Aldrich 1995; Dahl 1967; Epstein 1986; Reichley 1992; Schattschneider 1942; Schlesinger 1966).¹

A. James Reichley argues that political parties are the most valuable institutional means for combining governmental effectiveness with accountability to the public and the protection of individual rights and liberties (1992, 1). Dahl points out that modern democratic theory assigns a central role to conflict and competition, and that parties remain the only institution capable of organizing the opposition and thus providing

¹ These scholars have made an array of broad claims about the importance of political parties. Dahl argues that "The fact that rival parties now exist in every polyarchy and not in a single dictatorship hints at the possibility that parties may be inevitable in any organization that accepts democratic principles" (1967, 246). More recently, John Aldrich has argued that "democracy is unworkable save in terms of parties" (1995, 3).
effective competition in elections on a regular basis (1967. 250). Although some have criticized America's two major parties as possessing more similarities than differences, the major parties consistently have provided American voters with alternative policy directions for the country throughout the history of our nation (Aldrich 1995; Gerring 1998; Page 1978). Moreover, political parties are important because citizens can hold them collectively accountable for perceived failures in governmental performance and programs. Most importantly, political parties serve as a link between elected officials and the public. American democracy is premised on the ideal that the government should represent the interests of its citizens and respond to their changing needs. Parties play a pivotal role in achieving this ideal by aggregating the interests of different groups into their platforms and, if elected, into policy (Pomper 1967; Monroe 1983).

Understanding the behavior of the major parties towards the Christian Right (Protestant evangelicals), African Americans and Hispanics, in particular, is important because these groups are becoming larger and more visible players in the political arena. Each of these three groups has been growing in size and continues to grow at a faster rate than the rest of the population. As I have discussed in this study, each of these groups has become more politically active over time. Across the twentieth century African Americans have undergone a dramatic transformation from having little presence in the political realm, largely because they were excluded, to becoming important political players who have influenced policy outcomes through unconventional and conventional political participation. During the late 1970s, evangelicals awakened from decades of political withdrawal and began demanding action from the government on a host of moral and social demands. Since this political reawakening, evangelicals have remained an

\[\text{\footnotesize E. E. Schattschneider has also put forth a very strong argument about the important role parties play in providing competition. He argued that "Above everything, the people are powerless if the political enterprise is not competitive. It is the competition of political organizations that provides the people with the opposition to make a choice. Without this popular sovereignty amounts to nothing" (1960. 140).}\]
active and visible force in American politics. Although more recently than the other two groups, Hispanics have also begun to increase their presence in the political realm. Across the 1990s, in particular, Hispanics have been naturalizing, registering and voting at unprecedented rates. Thus, because of their size and political mobilization, the political demands and behavior of these three groups is going to become increasingly important to the functioning of our political system and the viability of our party system.

Not only are these groups increasing in size and political mobilization, but also they have maintained a fairly strong sense of group consciousness. In fact, in each of the cases, the group's identification has acted as one of the primary bases for their heightened political mobilization. Many sociologists and political scientists, based on the general assumptions of assimilation theory, have long predicted that the importance of race, ethnicity and religion in American politics would decrease over time. They have argued that group-based identifications and group-based political concerns would become less important as each group proceeded through the stages of assimilation (contact, competition, conflict, and accommodation) and became fully incorporated into American society. This study, however, has revealed that group identification remains very meaningful to many ethnic, racial and religious groups and may be growing even stronger. According the National Black Election Survey, an even higher percentage of African Americans expressed a strong sense of group consciousness in the 1990s than in the 1980s. Rather than fading, evangelical identification has been on the rise in recent years. While overall church membership among Americans has declined dramatically since the 1950s, the percentage of Americans belonging to evangelical churches has increased slightly. Many of the political concerns of evangelicals are based on their shared set of religious and doctrinal beliefs, which in turn are reinforced by frequent

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1 The National Black Election Survey found that in 1984, 75 percent of African Americans felt that what happened to black people would shape their own lives. This figure increased to 83 percent in 1996.
church attendance, involvement in many church related activities and having a social network that revolves around the church (Wilcox 1996. 49). Pan-ethnic identification among Hispanics also appears to be growing stronger, rather than weaker. The onslaught of "anti-Hispanic" legislation that has been introduced in the United States across the 1990s has sparked what Yen Espiritu refers to as a "protective pan-ethnicity" among Hispanics (1992. 7). Under the force of necessity, Cubans, Puerto Ricans and Mexican Americans as well as Dominicans, Salvadorans and Guatemalans have come together to force the political system to be more responsive to their grievances and agendas. Despite predictions to the contrary, racial, religious and ethnic groups remain meaningful actors in Americans politics as we move into the twenty-first century.

Mainstream Theories in Political Science and The Politics of Race, Ethnicity and Religion

Despite their persistence, many of the dominant theories in political science do not deal with the experiences of racial, religious and ethnic groups. In an attempt to empirically document this neglect, DeSipio et al. (1999) systematically examined the dominant works in political science on national elections and found that only in rare instances did they discuss Hispanics. When they did mention Hispanics it was only very briefly and often these brief discussions demonstrated confusion and an underdeveloped understanding of the behavior and impact of Hispanics in elections (1999. 13-14). An even broader problem within the American politics literature is that many of the dominant theories and paradigms implicitly ignore the experiences of racial, religious and ethnic groups because they adopt the individual and/or individual acts as the main unit of analysis. Voting behavior and public opinion studies, two dominant fields within American politics, focus predominantly on individuals and rarely ask questions broader than what shapes the preferences and decisions of the individual. By focusing on individuals, behavioralists, rational choice theorists and other political scientists have not
given sufficient attention to the unique role of groups, group consciousness, and group resources in American politics. More importantly, such a narrow focus obscures the features of the American political system that have constricted or opened opportunities for various groups. Finally, individual level theories cannot explain the group-based inequalities in economic, social and political outcomes that characterize American society.

Much of the work that has been done in areas of minority politics (under which I consider the politics of race, ethnicity and religion) has applied "mainstream" concepts and theories to the experiences of these groups. In doing so scholars have found that much of standard political science is inadequate (Browning Marshall and Tabb 1986; Hero 1992; Pohlmann 1999; Stone 1991; Wald 1997). Indeed, many scholars focusing on the politics of minority groups have been so frustrated with the inadequacies of mainstream theories that they have advocated throwing them out completely and using radically different frameworks instead. Some political scientists exploring the political experiences African Americans and Hispanics, as well as women, Native Americans, and Asian-Americans have found that paradigms such as Marxism, internal colonialism, or black and women's liberation theory are more useful lenses for understanding American politics than the dominant rational choice, pluralist or behavioralist approaches (Hamilton and Carmichael 1967; Mackinnon 1989; Pohlmann 1999).

On the other hand, even if mainstream theories are incomplete, applying them to the experiences of racial, religious and ethnic groups is a very valuable exercise for several reasons. Mainstream theories typically have important insights to offer, even if they have limitations. Moreover, by applying mainstream theories to the experiences of minority groups, we can see if and where they are flawed and also gain insight into how to correct and revise them. Finally, in order to contribute to the ongoing discussion and
debate within the political science discipline, it is important to relate to mainstream concepts and theories.

There are many examples of work that have established new insights and stronger theories by combining mainstream theories and the experiences of minority groups. of which I will just mention a few. In *Latinos and the U.S. Political System* (1992), Rodney Hero draws from the weaknesses and strengths of several sociological and political science theories to build a new framework, two-tiered pluralism, which more accurately captures the overall experience of Hispanics in the American political system. Katherine Tate (1994, 1995) has argued that the dominant theories of partisanship are inadequate for explaining the party identification and voting behavior of African Americans. She offers a revised and arguably fuller model of political behavior that takes institutions, such as the structure of the two-party system, and group resources, such as race-consciousness and church membership, as well as the standard, individual, socioeconomic resources, into account. In *Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency* (1982) Doug McAdam found that the social-psychological, individual level approach to understanding social movements could not provide an adequate explanation for the emergence, achievements and decline of the civil rights movement. By drawing on past models and the unique experiences of blacks, he put forward the political process model, which explicitly takes group resources, political structure and history into account. Most agree that McAdam's political process model remains the leading theory of social movement emergence and decline.

This study has explicitly sought to emulate these works by applying mainstream theories of party behavior to the responses of the Democratic and Republican parties to racial, religious and ethnic groups. One of the reasons I began this study was because I had a sense that African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics possessed compelling similarities: each group is a numerical minority and each group has mobilized around a
set of political issues that has only minority support in society. Yet, these groups were achieving very different levels of success within the party system. In particular, the Christian Right, composed primarily of Protestant evangelicals, had been successful in gaining responsiveness from the Republican party. By examining the platforms and legislative agenda of the Republican party, this study demonstrated that the party has gone from ignoring most social and moral issues, to supporting every issue on the Christian Right's agenda. Meanwhile African Americans and Hispanics have fared much worse in terms of party responsiveness. The Republican party has made little effort to reach out to African Americans and address their substantive concerns. Meanwhile, after several decades of support, the Democratic party has lessened its support for social welfare programs, the civil rights agenda and the broader idea of using government to help minorities in recent years. Although issues impacting Hispanics have been making it onto the national agenda with more frequency, they have been framed by the parties in ways perceived to be harmful, rather than beneficial, to the Hispanic community.

I found that most theories of party behavior could not adequately explain the variation across these cases. Beyond the work of realignment theorists, much of the work done on American parties gives very little attention to their relationship with racial, religious and ethnic groups. Even among the works on realignment, many focus primarily on the shifting partisan identification of different groups rather than on explaining the actual behavior of the parties towards groups (Stanley and Niemi 1999). By forcing general theories of party behavior to come to terms with the persistence and divergent experiences of religious, ethnic and racial minority groups, this study has accomplished several things. It has contributed to a better understanding of party behavior and better illuminated the specific experiences of each of these three groups.

\[\text{Sources:}\] Some of the dominant works in the area of political parties that do not discuss or make mention of racial, religious or ethnic groups include Downs (1957); Eldersveld (1964); Epstein (1986); Ladd and Hadley (1975); Page (1978); Rossiter (1960); Schattschneider 1942; Schlesinger (1991).
within the party system and at the broadest level forged a critical assessment of American democracy.

**Implications of the Elite Power Struggle Model**

*For Racial, Religious and Ethnic Minorities*

The ability of a political system to address the needs of its citizens is a critical test of representative democracy. Further, one of the major tasks faced by democracies is the incorporation of groups, particularly previously excluded groups, into full social, political and economic citizenship. What has this study revealed about the ability of America's two-party system to achieve these democratic ideals? The implications of the elite power struggle model of party behavior for the ability of racial, religious and ethnic minorities to achieve representation in our political system is mixed. On the one hand, the elite power struggle model provides a view of political parties that is not particularly democratic in the respect that it does not see a very tight connection between the preferences of voters and the behavior of the parties. The elite power struggle model recognizes that party elites can pursue policies and act in ways contrary to the preferences of their partisans, particularly their more extreme coalition members, and not face electoral retribution.

Yet the elite power struggle model is also premised on a view of American parties as flexible and open. According to the spatial model of party competition advanced by Anthony Downs, minorities have little chance of receiving substantive representation in a two party system. In contrast, the elite faction model views the parties as capable of accommodating the demands of diverse and ideologically extreme groups. Since parties are open, even a minority group with an ideologically extreme agenda can achieve responsiveness by entering a party's structure and cohesively mobilizing behind a clear vision of how the party should behave. Moreover, the elite power struggle model views party responsiveness as a dynamic process that can be altered as new groups enter
the party and push for incorporation. No interest or group is permanently locked out or structurally prevented from achieving representation.

Thus, the most positive element of the elite struggle model for the fate of minorities is the underlying argument that the parties are capable of accommodating their demands. The negative aspect of this model in terms of group representation is that party responsiveness is highly dependent on the effort the group itself is able to put forth. As discussed previously, there are costs associated with accommodating the political demands of minority groups. The costs are higher if a group or a group's demands are strongly opposed by a majority of the public or a majority of the party's pre-existing coalition. Thus, parties are not going to willingly reach out to and accommodate the demands of ideologically extreme groups on their own. If a group is to achieve responsiveness, the effort is going to have to come from groups themselves not the parties. The biggest obstacle to representation of group interests by American parties, therefore, lies in the fact that entering a party and forming a faction is a costly activity and not all groups have the same level of resources. In other words, it is not impossible for racial, religious and ethnic groups to achieve positive representation from America's parties; however, groups do not have an equal opportunity to achieve representation.

The stakes involved in party responsiveness have significant implications for the fate of the groups as well. The outcomes of factional struggles within the parties play a large role in determining the issues and conflicts that will define American politics. E.E. Schattschneider has argued that the "definition of alternatives is the supreme instrument of power" (1960, 68). Factional struggles within the parties are largely about what issues or ideology the party will emphasize, what problems the party will tackle, and what solutions the party will consider seriously. Perhaps even more importantly, the outcome of intra-party struggles determines what issues will not make it onto the party's agenda and what interests will be relegated to the terrain of "nondecisions" (Bachrach and Baratz
1970. 16). "Some issues are organized into politics while others are organized out" (Schattschneider 1960, 71). Whether or not a group's interests are mobilized into or out of the parties' agendas, in turn, has a reinforcing impact on the group's political participation and on the nature of American democracy.

Although the dominant theories of political participation attempt to explain varying levels of political activity by focusing on the participants themselves and their resources, other scholars have suggested that such a focus captures only part of the picture. Piven and Cloward (1988) and Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) have argued that the orientations, resources and endowments of individual citizens or groups alone cannot explain political participation. "People participate in politics not so much because of who they are but because of the political choices and incentives they are offered" (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, 5). In other words, groups (or individuals) are more likely to be drawn to politics and become active in party organizations when the parties are discussing issues meaningful to them. Meanwhile, groups who feel the parties are not responding to their concerns and not discussing issues that are relevant to the realities of their everyday lives, are more likely to "exit" or "disengage" from the political realm (Azarya 1988; Hirschman 1970). Although groups need to get inside the elite structure of parties in order to influence the strategies they choose, groups are more likely to do so when the party is discussing issues meaningful to them.

Over the past two decades and continuing through the present, the political concerns of the evangelical community have been mobilized into politics. The result of factional struggle within the Republican party elite has been that the party has gone from barely addressing the social and moral issues to devoting one-fifth of its platforms and a significant component of its legislative agenda to the concerns that form the heart of the evangelical agenda. The Republican party has brought the political concerns of Protestant evangelicals into the national debate and given evangelical positions, such as
restricting abortion, encouraging a larger role for religion in public life, and the regulation of pornography and other immoral cultural influences, considerable credibility within the national political debate. Across the past several years the Democratic party has even jumped into the family values debate arguing that children do have a right to recite a prayer in school, that the content of television and movies does need to be more strictly controlled, and that parental authority does need to be recognized and expanded. Because the parties are debating issues that are meaningful to evangelicals, this group is more likely to continue being drawn into politics and party activity.

Meanwhile, across the 1990s, issues of importance to African Americans and Hispanics have been increasingly mobilized out of politics. The Democratic party used to devote immense space in their platforms and legislative agenda to issues such as the fair treatment of immigrants, the persistence of ethnic and racial discrimination, and the need to employ government resources to ensure civil rights and equality for all. The growing power of the centrist faction and its dominance in intra-party struggle, however, is blocking the party from discussing issues that resonate with racial and ethnic minorities and other lower-strata groups. Issues that are of particular concern to and have disproportionate impact on Hispanics and African Americans such as civil rights, affirmative action and bilingual programs are being pushed off the Democratic party's agenda and replaced with issues that resonate more with white swing voters. As the Democratic party drops its commitment to these kinds of issues they are likely to fall completely off the national political agenda. Given the current factional configuration within the Republican party elite, there is not much chance that the Republican party is going to pick up the slack and begin championing the interests of ethnic and racial minorities. Nor do any third parties stressing these types of issues appear on the horizon. If the Democratic party continues to move away from issues important to Hispanics and
African Americans, not only might the voting levels of these groups drop, but they could also become further disconnected and alienated from the political system.

**Avenues For Improvement and Further Research**

The elite power struggle model argues that conflict between factions within the party elite determines the extent that a party accommodates a group's demands. This suggests that the key to further discoveries about party behavior lies less with understanding and tracking public opinion than many theories have assumed. Much of the work done in the area of party behavior has focused on public opinion and the views of partisan masses. While such research is important and interesting in its own right, public opinion research on partisan masses alone does not hold the key for understanding party behavior. As E. E. Schattschneider pointed out several decades ago "public opinion about specific issues does not necessarily govern the course of public policy" (1960, 133). Referring to the misguided pursuit of many political scientists in trying to understand the behavior of parties and government by focusing on public opinion, he stated that the "result is that sometimes we seem to be interviewing the fish in the sea to find out what the birds in the heavens are doing" (Schattschneider 1960, 133). Thus, in order to further our understanding of party behavior we need to focus on elites. Specifically, we need to analyze the entrance of new groups into and out of elite coalitions within the parties, more clearly understand the goals of different party factions, and most importantly explore how the different views held by elite factions are aggregated into party strategy and behavior.

One of the ways this study could be improved in the future would be to conduct more interviews. Questioning more people from each faction within the parties would provide a stronger, more reliable basis for the findings I have made. More interviews with party elites could also provide increased insight into the processes of intra-party
struggle and resolution. In addition, this study could benefit from additional interviews with group leaders, or individuals from national interest groups representing the different demographic groups. I would like to ask group leaders why they have or have not tried to mobilize their groups into the parties. Are organizations such as LULAC and the NAACP aggressively encouraging their followers to enter into the parties at the grassroots level to the same extent as Christian Right organizations? Why or why not? Moreover, I would like to explore more deeply why group leaders encourage mobilization into one party rather than another. Finally, interviews with group leaders could help illuminate the specific obstacles that each group has had to face in its attempts to mobilize into and organize within the political parties.

One avenue of future research growing out of this project could be a series of state level studies that examine the extent that Hispanics, evangelicals and African Americans have or have not penetrated the parties at the state level. State-level studies that examine attempts, successful and unsuccessful, to enter the party organizations and structure could provide more insight into what I have argued is the most important prerequisite for party responsiveness, mobilizing into the party structure. Some work in this vein has already been done and proven very informative. Rozell and Wilcox's edited volume, *God at the Grassroots* provides an analysis of the presence, effectiveness and obstacles faced by the Christian Right in eleven different states in the 1994 election. Examining the relationships between the parties and African Americans in states such as Florida, Nevada and Illinois, where tensions between blacks and the Democratic party have erupted or are very tense, could prove to be an informative compliment to this national level study. Moreover, state level studies may be able to help us understand the lack of a more organized black response to efforts by centrists within the Democratic party to minimize attention given to policies associated with blacks and minimize the visibility of blacks within the party. Studies in states with sizable Hispanic populations
could help illuminate how deeply the recent surge in Hispanic participation has impacted the Republican and Democratic parties at the state level and how this has or has not impacted their ability to influence party strategies and behavior.

Another way this study could be expanded and improved is to more fully examine the resource bases of African Americans, Hispanics and evangelicals and assess more thoroughly how various resources have helped groups in their struggles to mobilize into the parties and achieve representation. In particular, more attention needs to be given to the role of money. A major limitation of this study is that it has not given explicit attention to the campaign contributions made by different groups and the differing levels and sources of financial support various intra-party factions have received. Clearly, factions that are well funded are going to have more power in intra-party struggles. A thorough analysis of the role of campaign contributions would add considerable insight into our understanding of intra-party struggles and party behavior.

Perhaps the most important facet of this study is that it offers a new framework for understanding party behavior, and more specifically, for understanding the strategies that parties adopt towards groups in society. This study has focused on explaining the responses of American political parties to African Americans, evangelicals and Hispanics. Another interesting avenue of research stemming from this project, and a critical way to continue testing the strength of the elite power struggle model of party behavior, would be to apply it to the experiences of others groups, such as feminists, conservative women and Asian Americans, and assess the extent that the framework captures and explains party responsiveness in these cases. Such an exercise could provide insight into the political experiences of other important groups in American society, help us understand more clearly the factors that allow some groups to achieve better representation than others, and help refine and revise the elite power struggle model.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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Overall I conducted 27 national level interviews with party elites in Washington D.C. and 5 state-level interviews for this study. I conducted the national level interviews on several trips to Washington D.C. across 1998 and 1999. All of the interviews were in-depth. On average each interview lasted about an hour, although a few were as short as forty-five minutes and some lasted as long as two hours. All those I spoke with answered my questions on the condition that they remain anonymous.

Questions: I used the same set of prepared questions as the basis of each interview; however, I tailored the questions and added supplementary questions to fit the particular role and specialties of the individual I was interviewing. On the broadest level the questions I asked attempted to unearth what party elites felt has shaped the behavior of their party. Party elites were asked to offer their assessments concerning what role factors such as public opinion, ideology, the desire to build majority coalitions, and intra-party factional struggles played in shaping the response and strategy of their party. In addition, interviewing party elites in their respective organizational setting provided a sense of what impact, if any, the distinctive cultures and ideologies of the political parties had on their behavior.
elite, particularly those overseeing national outreach efforts were able to provide detailed accounts of what efforts their party had made and how their party had responded to particular groups.

**General Description of People Interviewed:**

Three interviews with mid-level officials at the Republican National Committee at the Republican National Headquarters with individuals involved in outreach towards minority groups and finance.

Five interviews with mid to upper level officials at the Democratic National Committee at the Democratic Party Headquarters dealing with outreach towards minority groups.

Two members of the Democratic Policy Committee who and two members of the Republican Policy Committee.

Two mid/upper level members of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee.

One mid-level party individual working at the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee.

Three mid-level to senior-level individuals at the Democratic Leadership Council and/ or the Progressive Policy Institute.

Eight interviews with aides to members of Congress, 5 Representatives (three Democratic and two Republican) and 3 Senators (2 Democratic and 1 Republican).

One mid-level staffer working in the White House.

**Overall racial, ethnic and gender breakdown of the interviewees:**

8 Hispanics
6 African Americans
13 White Americans
9 women
18 men

**State-level interviews**

I also conducted five interviews with party individuals in one Midwestern state: two with Democrats and three with Republicans. These interviews helped me to hone my list of questions for the national level interviews and
also provided some contacts for people I could interview on the national level.