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THE PSYCHOLOGICAL STRUCTURE OF PARTISANSHIP: AFFECT, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN PARTY IDENTIFICATION

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for

the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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*****

The Ohio State University
1999

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ABSTRACT

I examine the foundations of U.S. citizens' attitudes towards major political parties. Political scientists traditionally define political partisanship as an emotional (affective) attachment to a party. I view this as an incomplete and misleading picture of party loyalty. Based upon this traditional definition, our explanations of partisanship exclude both citizens' beliefs about the parties as well as attachment to a party as a social group. This dissertation examines three separate sources of party attitudes: emotional attachment to the party (partisan affect), beliefs about the parties (partisan cognitions), and a sense of belonging to the party (partisan social identification) in order to better explain and predict political behavior.

I used a precisely-designed survey questionnaire to assess the affective, cognitive, and social identity components of partisanship in a manner not previously attempted. Three-hundred-two randomly selected registered voters in Franklin County, Ohio completed the survey. I first categorized individuals based on the affective or cognitive basis of their partisanship. I found that affectively-oriented partisans tended to be more consistent in their partisan behavior whereas cognitively-oriented partisans exhibited ideology and party assessments more preferable to their preferred party. I concluded that emotional attachments to political parties represent a more stable source of partisan
orientations providing for more consistent behavior over time, yet cognitive orientation to politics strengthens partisanship through increased information.

I subsequently examined partisan and independent social identification, that is, attachment to a political party as a meaningful social group of which one considers oneself to be a member. Basing my predictions on social identity theory, I found that as partisan social identity increased, respondents were more likely to perceive greater differences between parties and candidates and to behave in a more partisan manner. Furthermore, I found that for some persons a social identity with political independents also exists. The final analyses examine the relationship between affect, cognition, and social identity and find that the social identity is more closely tied to partisan affect. The dissertation's conclusion discussed what these varying psychological bases of partisanship imply for how citizens relate to parties and how political parties can strengthen partisanship among the electorate.
To Kim
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my adviser, Paul Beck, for his advice, encouragement, and support throughout this project. He was especially helpful in helping me to shape and refine my ideas. Throughout this dissertation and my graduate career, I could always count on him for solid advice, academic and otherwise.

Tom Nelson has also been very helpful on this project and a great source of expertise through the years. In dealing with many different psychological theories and issues, he was a tremendous resource.

I am also thankful to Herb Weisberg, a great source of wisdom on all things related to party identification. Dean Lacy also provided great advice over the years, both theoretical and practical.

I would also like to thank the members of the political psychology research team over my years here, Tom Nelson, Jon Krosnick, Dean Lacy, Penny Visser, Joann Miller, David Kimball, Zoe Oxley, George Bizer, Allyson Holbrook, and Elaine Willey, who saw parts of this project in various incarnations over the years and never failed to provide helpful insights and ideas.

I could have never carried out the survey upon which this whole dissertation is based without some very generous help from a number of sources. I am grateful to the Ohio State University Graduate School for awarding me the Graduate School Alumni Research Award which provided the funding for the survey. Karen Snyder and Kathleen
Carr provided me the voter registration database from which I drew my sample as well as invaluable advice on conducting surveys. The people over at Ohio State University Mail Services, especially Kenny Milhiser, proved to be an enormous help in getting everything done correctly and inexpensively. Special thanks to Laurel, Joe, and Jason who helped me stuff envelopes, and especially to my wife Kim who probably stuffed more than me.

My aforementioned friends, Joe McGarvey, Laurel Elder, and Jason Pigg certainly helped a lot more than just stuffing envelopes. Their encouragement and support throughout has been tremendous. They have been especially helpful in taking care of things in Columbus while I reside in Blacksburg. I am grateful to each of them. Doug Perkins also deserves special mention for both his friendly and intellectual support.

I, of course, have to thank my parents for their unwavering support and confidence in me, both in graduate school and for all my years. In many ways, this dissertation topic was inspired by my efforts to figure out how my mom could call herself an Independent despite being among the most Democratically partisan people I know.

And finally, I cannot resist the cliché to say that I couldn’t have done it without my wife Kim. Many people thought we were crazy to try and get our Ph.D.’s at the same time, but it has enabled us to have a deeper level of appreciation and understanding for the other’s struggles. Her support, both emotional and intellectual, has simply been invaluable.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During the 1830's expert political organizer and future president Martin Van Buren transformed the Democratic party into the first mass-based political party on the American scene. By appealing directly to the common man and developing grass-roots organization, Van Buren created a party closely linked to the electorate as never before. He began a system of mass-based political parties in American that has persisted to this day. In contrast to elite or cadre parties, American mass parties throughout history have depended upon broad-based support across groups within the electorate. Though few Americans have official membership in a political party, the vast majority of American voters have traditionally provided fairly consistent support to one party or the other. At the base of Americans' support for political parties lies a psychological sense of identification with and attachment to one's political party. Though only in recent decades has survey evidence demonstrated the psychological ties between individuals and the parties they support, the psychological tie between individual and party has proven to be a fundamental aspect of politics in all mass party democracies (Dalton, Flanigan, and Beck 1984).

Beginning with The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) the psychological ties between Americans and their political parties (termed partisanship or party identification)
have been at the center of our understanding of political attitudes and behavior. In this, the most-accepted model of political behavior, partisanship stands at the center as a key determinant of other political attitudes and behaviors. Individuals acquire their partisanship through family socialization before they are even truly aware of what the parties stand for (Campbell et al. 1960; Greenstein 1965). Party identification then serves as a fundamental guide for subsequent political attitudes. Working as a perceptual screen, incoming political information is filtered through the lens of partisanship, such that issues and candidates are seen in an inherently biased, partisan light. Partisanship then exerts a direct pull on political behavior, as well as an indirect pull through its perceptual impact on the political world.

Many have challenged this first cause view of partisanship as unrealistic. Scholars have uncovered evidence that partisanship is responsive to short-term evaluations of the parties (Fiorina 1981), changes in the parties’ issue positions over time (Carmines and Stimson 1991), events in a political campaign (Allsop and Weisberg 1988), and assessments of political candidates (Rapaport 1997). Despite these challenges to party identification, it remains a central feature of virtually all explanations of American political attitudes and behavior. Furthermore, though it is not perfectly stable nor immune from outside influences, individual partisanship has proven to be fairly stable on the whole and far and away the most stable of individuals’ political attitudes (Green and Palmquist 1993; Miller 1991)

Despite the challenges to the primacy and stability of partisanship, few have challenged or expanded upon the original American Voter conception of party identification as “an affective attachment to an important group-object in one’s
environment” (Campbell et al. 1960, p. 143). There have been great advances in social-psychological theory since party identification--essentially a social-psychological concept--was first defined, yet scholars have only begun to scratch the surface in applying these theoretical advances to understanding individual-level partisanship. Without directly challenging the Campbell et al. definition, some scholars have attempted to further elucidate the psychological structure of partisanship. These scholars categorize partisanship as a cognitive structure, a schema (Hamill, Lodge, and Blake 1985; Rahn 1993), but even in these cases the authors assert the schema as mental organization for one's partisanship without directly refuting its fundamental affective basis. Given the centrality of partisanship in our models of political attitudes and behavior, there has been surprisingly little effort to apply advances in social-psychological theory to broaden our understanding of citizens' psychological ties to political parties.

In this study, I intend to make a full and systematic examination of the psychological foundations and structure of individual level partisanship. I believe that by considering only affect as the basis of partisanship, we are shortchanging our conception of partisanship and that we should rightly also consider cognitive and social identity components of political partisanship. Importantly, I think that by having what is essentially a single universal model of partisanship, we are greatly limiting the variety of psychological ties which individuals bring to their preferred political party. While partisanship may indeed represent an emotional attachment for many individuals, for others it may denote a careful cognitive weighing of the issues or a long-standing sense of social identification. I thus propose that the basic psychological structure uniting an individual to a political party may vary considerably across the population and fail to be
captured in any single homogenous psychological model. Most importantly, I predict that the different psychological bases of partisanship will have important consequences for the character, stability, and consistency of citizens’ partisan-influenced attitudes and behavior.

In current psychological theory, attitudes are generally thought to consist of affective, cognitive, and behavioral components (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).¹ For any given attitude, some, or all of these components can be present to varying degrees. The exact affective or cognitive composition of an attitude can vary tremendously across individuals and across attitude objects (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993).² According to modern attitude theory then, it is quite reasonable to expect that partisanship has variable bases— and that for some individuals partisanship is primarily an affective-based attitude whereas for others it is a cognitive-based attitude.

Though partisanship is defined as an affective attachment to party, copious evidence indicates that there is also an essential cognitive component that further explains individuals’ responses to parties. While affect is assuredly a key component of partisanship, this may not be the case for all individuals, some of whom may experience a primarily cognitive attachment to their preferred party. One can readily think of individuals for whom a life-long, close emotional tie to their preferred party exists, in contrast to others who have little or no emotional investment in a party, but consistently

¹ Please note that throughout, the term affect is used in the more narrowly psychological sense and refers solely to individual emotional response to an object. It should not be confused with a the more general evaluative meaning with which it is often used within the field of Political Science.
favor it due to ideological factors. Certainly, in many individuals these affective and
cognitive bases of partisanship will be overlapping and mutually reinforcing.
Nonetheless, citizens may have both affective and cognitive attachments, yet emphasize
one or the other in determining behavior and other attitudes. The interplay between the
affective and cognitive components of partisanship and its potential consequences has
been largely unexplored.

I believe that the exploration of the affective and cognitive components of
partisanship can give us greater insight into how partisanship affects political behavior.
More specifically, I expect that citizens whose partisanship is primarily affective will be
more stable and consistent in their partisan political behavior than citizens whose
partisanship consists of primarily cognitive attachment. In keeping with traditional
theory, affective partisans’ attachments should generally form at an early age,
independent of cognitive-based candidate and issue considerations. As long as there is
reasonable stability in the political world, an affectively-oriented partisanship should
result in fairly consistent support for the favored party. A cognitively-oriented
partisanship, in contrast, is likely based on cognitive responses to issues and candidates.
As issues and candidates vary across time and elections, a cognitive partisan’s political
behavior should thus demonstrate somewhat greater volatility than an affective partisan,
whose partisanship is grounded in emotional attachment to the party. This
conceptualization of partisanship can also be used to explain the considerable attitudinal
and behavioral differences in each of the four basic partisan categories (pure independent,

\(^2\) Obviously, behavioral manifestations of attitudes vary quite considerably as well. Since we already been
studying partisanship based on behavioral measures for decades, there is little need to discuss the matter
further here.

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independent leaner, weak partisan, strong partisan), I expect to find systematically different combinations of affect and cognition at each level of partisanship.

In addressing the affective and cognitive aspects of partisanship, the focus is on emotions and cognitions as components of attitudes towards the political parties as broad entities. Political parties may represent vastly different mental representations of attitude objects for different people. When persons are asked to simply assess "The Democratic Party" or "The Republican Party" they could be considering factors as diverse as major national political figures, an abstract collection of related issues positions, or the ordinary people they know who belong to a political party.

In this research, I also propose that individuals' partisanship may also be strongly influenced by their identification towards the party as a group. More than just an attitude towards a preferred party, social identification represents identity with a political party. Social identity is defined as, "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel 1978). Social identity is more than knowledge that one is a member of a particular group; it represents a psychological sense of belonging to the group (Hogg and Abrams 1988). A social identification thus contains cognitive elements of perceived group membership as well as an affective component of emotional value for that group membership. Affect and cognition towards the political party as a group thus combine to form a social identity with that party. Given that social identifications are based on perceived, rather than any formal group membership, it would seem quite likely that social identification with a political party would be a basic element of partisanship for many individuals. For some
individuals partisan social identification may be their party identification. For others, it may play a subsidiary or complementary role with their affective or cognitive partisan attachments.

Social identity theory offers a complementary approach to partisanship as an affective or cognitive attachment to a political party. Social identity offers a meaningful conception of both strength of partisanship and direction of partisanship as based upon the degree of an individual's social identification with their preferred political party. In other words, for at least some persons, the strength and direction of their partisanship may be a direct consequence of the degree to which they socially identify with a party. Like an affective partisan orientation, a strong social identity with a party, as a group to which one belongs, seems to favor consistent partisan behavior more so than do cognitive attachments to a party. Obviously, a partisan social identification will be influenced by and related to one’s affective and cognitive attitudes towards the political party, but it also remains somewhat distinct, in that it by definition requires affective and cognitive attitude components and that it is focused narrowly on the party as a group. Though I believe that these three components remain somewhat conceptually distinct, I believe that the greater the overlap between these three psychological components, the stronger one’s partisanship will be.

Social identity also offers the potential to explain both partisanship and Independence within a single coherent framework. In particular, social identity may offer a new manner for understanding what appears to be two quasi-distinct dimensions of partisanship and independence (Weisberg 1980). A social identity approach has the potential to explain why individuals with similar political characteristics and attitudes
may choose to identify as true partisans or alternatively as political independents with partisan leanings. For some individuals, political attitudes and behaviors may be determined by attitudes towards the political parties while their response to standard measures of partisanship may alternatively be driven by identity with political independents or lack of partisan social identity. The social identity approach allows us not only to examine the partisan identity of citizens, but also any identity persons may have with other political independents.

In short, I am proposing that partisanship consists of three main elements: affective attitude components towards the political parties, cognitive attitude components towards the political parties, and social identification with a party as a group. I believe that these three elements combine in a variety of different ways within individuals, leading to not one monolithic model of the psychological bases of partisanship, but rather a variety of potential patterns of psychological ties which persons may have with the political parties. Most importantly, the psychological structure of one’s partisanship should affect how that partisanship is realized through other political attitudes and behaviors.

It seems short-sighted to continue to focus on just one aspect, affect, out of three possible components of partisanship. Considerable debate about the nature of partisanship still continues. It may be that no clear answers are found because we are looking in the wrong place. We are attempting to explain everything by affect when there are important cognitive and social identity bases of partisanship to alternatively consider. These bases may vary over time and circumstance in response to changes in the political system. Variations in citizens’ psychological foundations of partisanship offer
the potential to better explain the varied impact of partisanship on political attitudes and behaviors.

Using survey data collected especially for this research project, I undertake a comprehensive analysis of the affective, cognitive, and social identity bases of partisanship. The goal of this study is to come to fuller understanding of the psychological components of partisanship and their consequences for political attitudes and behaviors. Fundamental questions which this project is designed to answer include: Is partisanship generally a similar matter of either affect, cognition, or social identity for most voters or is there instead considerable variation across individuals on the source of their partisanship? How are these different bases of partisanship dispersed throughout the population and how are they related to each other? How are these different bases of partisanship acquired—how are they related to parental partisanship? How do the bases of partisanship relate to issue attitudes and political sophistication? How well do these alternative conceptions of partisanship fit with our traditional seven-point measure? And perhaps most importantly, how can this broader conception of partisanship explain the quantity and consistency of political behavior. Finally, from the normative perspective, I will address what the findings suggest for the appropriate behaviors of individual citizens and the political parties in the American democracy.

The most important hypothesis advocated here is that we need to consider cognition and social identity as well as affect to truly understand the forces of partisanship in the American political context. What can these potential findings pragmatically contribute to our collective knowledge of politics? Many scholars have recently argued that emotion, rather than cognition, is a superior normative guide to
behavior (Kinder 1994; Marcus and MacKuen 1993). If this is indeed the case, the relative balance of affective and cognitive partisanship within the electorate should give some indication of the health of our democracy. If affect proves to create more stable and consistent partisan attitudes than does cognition, many would argue that affective partisanship should be encouraged to strengthen the party system. An additional possibility is that affect and cognition may vary systematically with ideology or ideological extremity. If this is the case, political candidates could use this knowledge to better reach and motivate a particular target group.

A further examination of the role of social identity in partisanship offers a compelling explanation for the pervasive negative attitudes and lack of civility characterizing politics today. A strong social identity basis for partisanship would suggest that this is an inescapable feature of our party system. As long as individuals have a social identity with one party, they will perceive members of the opposition party in a negative light. Insofar as social identity governs partisanship, strong partisan conflict on a personal level should be the norm. Regardless of its affective or cognitive basis, the social identity component of partisanship should heighten conflict through the mechanism of out-group derogation, by which individuals increase their sense of self-worth through belittling individuals in groups perceived in opposition to those which the individual belongs. If this study finds that partisan social identity is indeed a major aspect of most individual’s partisanship, then we will at least have the knowledge that fractious partisan strife is here to stay so long as individuals identify with political parties. The hostility between political parties may be universal not just as part of politics, but as a basic aspect of human psychology.
The further exploration of the affective, cognitive, and social identity bases of partisanship also has the potential to provide additional theoretical basis for partisan realignments and dealignments. Since affective partisanship should be primarily a strong emotional tie to a political party, it should be less susceptible to change based on changes in candidates and parties’ issue positions. The more affective the basis of partisanship is in the aggregate, the less should be the possibility of realignment. Similarly, to the degree which partisanship is based on social identifications, persons should see strong, clear distinctions between the members of the parties and be resistant to joining with a previous out-group. At the individual level, both affective and social identity attachments to political parties should lessen the possibility of realignment. The weakening of these aspects of partisanship at the individual level may be a critical factor in determining whether a realignment occurs.

As partisanship is more cognitively-based, in contrast, individuals should be more sensitive to external political circumstance in the form of issue cleavages and candidate characteristics. Consequently, a more cognitive basis of partisanship should heighten the possibility for realignment and dealignment. Unfortunately, the lack of appropriate measures in the past prevent a direct test of this hypothesis. Nonetheless, a consideration of the affective and cognitive components of partisanship and their potential variability over time provides additional psychological insight on the causes of realignment and dealignment at the individual level.

In the remainder of this study, I will review relevant literature, develop testable predictions, analyze the findings and draw conclusions about the psychological state of partisanship in America. A brief chapter outline follows.
Chapter Outline

Chapter 2 consists of a review of relevant literature. I begin by examining the traditional understanding of party identification, and how it has developed in recent decades. I discuss challenges to the traditional view, the dimensional structure of partisanship, the measurement of partisanship, and the acquisition of partisanship. I also discuss the developments in psychological theory regarding affect, cognition, and social identity and how these have been and can be applied to a theory of political partisanship.

Chapter 3 sets forth the research design of the project. I describe the specific psychological measures employed to best assess the concepts of partisan affect, cognition, and social identity, central to this project. Additional measures contained on the survey are also discussed. I also describe the research methodology and design of the random mail survey of Franklin County, Ohio adults which serves as the main data source for this project.

In chapter 4, I examine the affective and cognitive bases of partisanship. Using the Ohio survey data, I group individuals into categories as either cognitive or affective partisans and demonstrate how the political attitudes and behaviors of these groups differ in theoretically meaningful ways. The political attitudes I examine include ideology, issue positions, candidate assessments, and political knowledge. I also examine political behaviors such as split-ticket voting, presidential voting, partisan activity, and over-time partisan support. Throughout, I expect affective partisans to be more stable in their partisanship. I also examine these attitudes and behaviors across all individuals with respect to affect and cognition, with the expectation that while some political behaviors
may be primarily driven by partisan cognitions, others will be driven by partisan affect. I likewise expect that certain demographic groups may be more inclined to a particular mode of partisanship, affective or cognitive, so I explore how these factors vary, if at all, across gender, racial, socio-economic, and ideological lines. Finally, I examine what these insights about affect and cognition can tell us about the traditional seven-point party identification scale.

In chapter 5, I examine the social identity aspects of partisanship using Ohio survey data. Similarly to the analyses in chapter 4, I examine how partisan social identity impacts various partisan attitudes and behavior. I expect that this explicitly-group based aspect of partisanship should have a significant impact in political attitudes and behaviors most conducive to a group-based perspective. I predict that for most measures, a greater partisan social identity will lead to greater partisanship in attitudes and behaviors. Due to the perceptual distortions caused by social identity, I expect that social identity is considerably responsible for perceived differences between the parties. Since I believe that social identity is a primary component of our traditional measure of partisanship, I explore how closely partisan social identity accords with the traditional seven-point scale.

In addition to measures of partisan social identity, the Ohio survey also contains measures of social identification with political independents. I use this measure to examine the dimensionality of partisan social identifications. More specifically, I expect to find that intransitivities within the party identification scale (Keith et al. 1992; Petrocik 1974) can be significantly explained by a multidimensional partisan social identification which includes in-group sentiment towards both fellow partisan supporters and political
independents. I also examine the degree to which an independent social identity may influence other partisan attitudes and behaviors.

Chapter 6 attempts to unify the preceding findings on affect and cognition with those on partisan social identity. I will also create a typology of partisan categories based on respondents' scores on affect, cognition, and social identity. Using this typology, I hope to demonstrate how affect, cognition, and social identity can be used in conjunction to better explain partisanship. I will also examine the degree to which partisan social identity correlates most closely with affect or cognition (a question still unanswered in social psychology). Finally, I will examine the degree to which the traditional party identification scale is differentially composed of these three attitude components by estimating a multinomial logit model of seven-point party identification in which affect, cognition, and social identity serve as the independent variables.

Chapter 7 presents the conclusions of the study. Here I summarize the basic findings of the preceding chapters and discuss their practical and normative implications. I discuss the theoretical advances as well as practical problems arising from the application of refined psychological measurement scales to the study of partisanship. I argue for the widespread use of similar measurement scales in future surveys. I explore what the implications should mean for voters, parties, and candidates in a complex political world. I consider the limitations of the survey and the potential generalizability of the conclusions. Finally, I will discuss the ways in which the major findings can be developed upon and generate new avenues of research upon which to further enhance our understanding of partisanship in America.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of partisanship, an individual’s attachment to or preference for a particular party has been at the center of the study of American political behavior for decades. First described in its modern form as a social-psychological concept nearly four decades ago in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), the concept of party identification has shaped how scholars study voting and public opinion ever since. Far from being an unchallenged, static concept, however, party identification has remained one of the most controversial issues within the discipline of political science. To a greater or lesser degree, scholars have challenged the fundamental meaning, the impact, the dimensionality, and the stability of party identification, among other things. In this research project, I hope to reexamine and reinterpret the fundamental psychological basis of partisanship. A new psychological understanding may also bring original perspectives to bear on many of the other debates focused on this partisanship. In order to accomplish these goals, I will first review the current understanding of partisanship and its development. I will then examine some of the many controversies surrounding partisanship: causal ordering, stability, and dimensionality. I will then review the psychological concepts of affect and cognition, and social identity as they relate to
partisanship in order to find a revised psychological basis for partisanship within these concepts.

**Party Identification Through the Years**

Though the major role which political parties play in our democracy has always been recognized, it was not until *The American Voter*, that we understood partisanship to consist of a psychological attachment between an individual and a political party. The previous, sociological, paradigm presented partisanship as little more than an inherited function of birth and social class (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1948). A person born to a Catholic family living in a working class neighborhood would vote Democratic, and that was that. Lazarsfeld and colleagues did not conceptualize partisanship, per se, as anything beyond an individual's vote choice arising predominantly from social background. First in *The Voter Decides* (Campbell, Gurin, and Miller 1954) and then in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960) University of Michigan researchers presented party identification as a political attitude at the heart of the voting process. Though clearly recognizing the roots of partisanship within the family and social group, Campbell et al. went beyond earlier research to conceptualize partisanship as essentially a psychological tie contained within the voter's mind.

Campbell et al. (1960) described party identification as a person’s “affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment” (Campbell et al., p. 143). In contrast to the earlier social group approach, it rests fundamentally on self classification in response to a two-part question. The first question, subdividing citizens into three
classifications, asks, "generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, or Independent." In the follow-up question, Democrats and Republicans are asked to describe themselves as either "strong" or "not so strong" (traditionally referred to as weak) in their partisanship. Those who identify as independents are asked whether they consider themselves close to either party, or neither. The result of the first question is a three-part categorization: Democrat, Republican, or independent. Using both parts, there is a seven-part categorization: strong Democrat, weak Democrat, independent Democrat (Democratic leaner), pure independent, independent Republican (Republican leaner), weak Republican, and strong Republican. The scale is seen as a bipolar continuum of partisan intensity, anchored by Democratic and Republican affiliations.

Campbell et al. (1960) identify party identification as a stable, fundamental political attitude which drives other attitudes and behaviors. Partisanship is believed to be acquired fairly early in life from the immediate social environment, especially one's family. It is for the most part quite resistant to change, except when subjected to dramatic changes in either the political environment or personal circumstances. It raises a "perceptual screen" which filters political information to the favor of the preferred party, such that identification is self-reinforcing. Consequently, the longer one is a partisan, the stronger one's partisanship becomes. In addition, Campbell et al. contend that the impact of party identification on other attitudes is far greater that any impact these may have on party identification. Party identification thus influences vote choice both directly, and indirectly, through its antecedent impact on evaluations of issues and candidates.
Revisionist Challenge

Despite the impressive theory Campbell et al. presented, it was of course only a matter of time before their view of partisanship was strongly challenged. The first series of challenges questioned partisanship as the primary motivating force behind vote choice. Page and Jones (1975) and Jackson (1975) and others coming from a more rational choice perspective asserted that issue positions, irrespective of one’s partisanship, were the driving force behind political behavior. Building upon this challenge, Fiorina (1981) presented a bold new model of partisanship which essentially turned the *American Voter* on its head. Fiorina contends that rather than partisanship shaping other political attitudes, that partisanship is in fact endogenous, a summary response of evaluations of recent behavior by the political parties. He argues from a rational choice perspective that reliance on past information is essentially a low cost, rational method through which to evaluate the political world and make voting decisions. Fiorina finds that partisanship is substantially explained by recent retrospective evaluations of the major political parties and the economy. Despite the existence of inertial partisanship in the model, Fiorina is essentially claiming that evaluations of the parties, political figures, and the economy drive partisanship—in direct contrast to the claims of *The American Voter*.

Using more-sophisticated non-recursive causal models, many scholars attempted to settle the debate as to the causal order of partisanship and other political evaluations (e.g., Jackson 1975; Markus and Converse 1979; Page and Jones 1979) Unfortunately, the methods used in these models are highly susceptible to changes in initial specifications. Consequently, we are left with conflicting conclusions and perhaps the impossibility of ever truly determining the causal patterns of partisanship, issues, and
retrospective evaluations. For the most part, efforts to find the precise reciprocal effects of partisanship and other political attitudes have been dropped, as scholars following the Michigan school have been willing to admit that partisanship is perhaps not quite so impervious to other factors as initially proposed, while the revisionists have admitted that partisanship is to some degree exogenous.

Further developing upon Fiorina’s model of endogenous partisanship, Franklin and Jackson (1983) model partisanship as a function of past partisanship and positions on current issues. Borrowing from the spatial theory of voting (Downs 1957), they estimate the effect of proximity to the parties on issue positions as a key component of partisanship. In keeping with Markus and Converse’s (1979) voting model, they expect that party identification should also be responsive to past votes which are not in accord with previous identification. They also examine the hypothesis that partisanship becomes less responsive to exogenous forces with age. In order to account for the non-recursive pattern of effects, they estimate the model using two-stage probit. The major finding is that proximity to the parties’ current issue positions is the best predictor of current partisanship. The impact of recent votes, in contrast, are statistically significant, but have a considerably smaller substantive impact. Surprisingly, the weight of past identification is an important, but not dominant, factor in current identification. With regards to age, they find that past identification has a greater impact for older voters, but that the effects of issue proximity and past voting are invariant with age. Franklin and Jackson conclude that although past partisanship does retard change, it does not prevent it entirely. Rather, party identifications are the result of accumulated evaluations of issues and candidates.
Rather than a sophisticated model of partisanship to demonstrate its susceptibility to outside influence, many have attempted to demonstrate that partisanship is quite unstable and thus necessarily influenced by political circumstance. Brody and Rothenberg (1988) used individual-level panel data on the 1980 election to assert that issues caused changes in partisanship over the course of the panel. Coming from a similar theoretical perspective, but relying instead upon aggregate data, MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson (1989) argued that when measured at the aggregate level, partisanship is a function of retrospective economic evaluations. They find that at the macro level, partisanship is not particularly stable and identify retrospective economic evaluations as the primary cause of change. Similarly, Weisberg and Smith (1991) demonstrate the responsiveness of aggregate partisanship to economic events and presidential approval. Allsop and Weisberg (1988) show that party identification is responsive to events during a presidential campaign. All these studies, by demonstrating the instability of partisanship, implicitly and explicitly challenge the traditional view that party identification is a relatively stable exogenous cause of other political attitudes.

Response to the Revisionists

Green and Palmquist (1990) issue a strong challenge to Franklin and Jackson on methodological grounds. They contend that Franklin and Jackson's findings are severely biased by non-random measurement error. The retrospective models of Fiorina (1981) and Franklin and Jackson (1983) rely on past partisanship as a significant explanatory variable. Because of measurement error in partisanship at t-1, the short term forces which Franklin and Jackson include in the model account for more than their fair share of
the variance. Green and Palmquist find that when measurement error is accounted for, the effects of candidate evaluation, performance evaluation, past vote, and issue proximities on current party identification are negligible.

Miller (1991) responds to the revisionists by calling for the conceptual separation of party identification from partisanship, where party identification represents the presence or lack of a partisan affiliation, while partisanship represents the strength of the affiliation. He argues that only the strength component is susceptible to short-term influences. The underlying partisan direction measured in the first party identification question, in contrast, is quite stable and relatively unaffected by short-term forces.

Continuing Controversy

Franklin (1992) responds to the counter-revisionists primarily by challenging Miller's contention that "partisanship" and "party identification" are separate constructs, one measuring direction, the other intensity, of partisan attitudes. He posits instead a "measurement model," in which the three party identification questions create an "ordinal scale that subdivides a single, underlying, continuous dimension of partisanship" (Franklin 1992, p. 299). As with Franklin and Jackson (1983), Franklin again models party identification as a function of past party identification and evaluations of current issues (as well as age times past party identification). He estimates the model using 7-point, 5-point (leaners grouped with weak partisans), and 3-point party identification scales. If Miller's (1991) hypothesis that only strength, and not direction of partisanship,

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3 Franklin also responds to Green and Palmquist (1990). He accepts their assertions as somewhat valid, but adds that further exploration of these claims "requires the development of more fully specified measurement models (Franklin 1992, p. 298)."
is responsive to issues, is correct, the coefficient for issues should be significant when party identification is measured on the 7-point scale, but not on the 3-point scale.

Franklin, however, finds support for his own hypothesis, that strength and direction of partisanship are part of the same construct and that they are both influenced by evaluations of contemporary political issues. Based on an ordered-probit analysis, Franklin also finds that the reason that pure independents and partisans tend to be less stable in their partisanship is that the thresholds between categories are considerable closer together than they are for weak and strong partisans.

Though Franklin makes a strong case, his analysis fundamentally rests upon the assumption that party identification is a unidimensional bipolar construct. By performing an ordered probit analysis, which assumes that each category of party identification represents greater strength of partisanship than the preceding category, Franklin forces his dependent variable to be unidimensional. Yet previous research strongly suggests that this may be a tenuous assumption (Dennis 1988b; Weisberg 1980).

At this point, it appears that the debate on the stability and exogeneity vs. endogeneity of partisanship will never be satisfactorily settled. Though Franklin’s (1992) results are compelling, they fail to adequately the important measurement issues raised by Green and Palmquist (1990). Until we have perfect measures and perfect models, this debate is likely to oscillate back and forth.

The Dimensionality of Partisanship

The traditional view of partisanship conceives the seven-point scale as a bipolar unidimensional construct. That is, as one moves from strong Democrat to weak
Democrat to Democratic leaner and so on to strong Republican, individuals are moving on a single dimension from the most Democratic to the most Republican. The neutral point, pure independent, thus represents complete lack of attachment to either party.

From the very beginning, however, even the authors of *The American Voter* recognized some potential problems with this conceptualization, referring to “undercover partisans,” who were classified as independents. By choosing to make distinctions based on the regularity of partisan voting behavior, however, Campbell et al. consigned leaners to reside with pure independents, despite other factors which indicated their partisanship.

Petrocik (1974) was the first to fully emphasize the problems in the traditional unidimensional view. In what he termed “intransitivities” in the party identification index, he found that leaners were essentially more partisan than weak partisans on measures of partisan political participation and interest. Keith et al. (1992) have comprehensively followed up on this direction of research and found that on virtually every measure of partisanship tested, leaners are at least as strong in their partisanship as weak partisans. They conclude that leaners are just as partisan as weak partisans and should be counted as partisans in models of political behavior.

In order to account for the measurement problems seemingly apparent in party identification, Weisberg (1980) conceptualizes party identification as a multidimensional attitude consisting of separate attitudes towards the Democratic party, the Republican party, and political independence. In support of his contention that attitudes towards Democrats and Republicans are separate dimensions he finds very low to non-existent correlations between feeling thermometers towards the two parties. He also finds that independence is neither a simple dislike of the two parties nor a true midpoint of the party
identification scale. The dimensional perspective provides an explanation for the anomalous intransitivities found by Petrocik (1974). That is, identification as a leaner may indicate placement on the separate partisan dimension and does not preclude simultaneous strong partisan attachments which would explain Petrocik’s finding.

In a far-reaching finding, Weisberg (1980) concludes that the independent category contains not a single, monolithic category of voters, but rather contains a variety of different political types lumped together. The problems in the measurement of party identification arise from the fact that the separate dimensions of partisanship and independence are placed onto a single, unidimensional scale. Despite these compelling findings, however, Weisberg nonetheless concludes that the traditional seven-point scale transforms this into a single dimension with “minimal violence.”

In a series of articles, Dennis (1988a, 1988b, 1992) follows up upon Weisberg’s finding that partisanship and independence are multidimensional and that there are many different types of independents placed into this single category. Dennis (1988a) also finds that in some areas partisanship and independence are separate dimensions; yet, he also concludes that in may areas they are inversely related. Among many individuals, Independent Partisan Supporters, support for political independence and political parties are both high. They are fairly partisan, highly involved, and supportive of the party system in general. Even those Dennis terms Ordinary Independents, have moderate levels of party support. Only the unattached, accord with the traditional American Voter conception of non-partisan, uninterested voters. Nonetheless, all these different categories have been grouped together into the single Independent category using the traditional measure of party identification.
Dennis (1988b) attempts to examine more explicitly the structure of independence. He finds that there are four separate dimensions of political independence: political autonomy, anti-partyism, partisan neutrality, and partisan variability. Political autonomy is evidenced in attitudes such as traditional American conceptions of individualism, and a negative attitude towards party-line voting. Partisan variability is simply the self perception that one's partisan support tends to vary over time. Party neutrality and anti-partyism are lack of sentiment and negative sentiment towards the parties, respectively. With regard to the traditional party identification scale, each of these forms of independence features a monotonically increasing pattern as persons become less partisan. Not just one of these dimensions, but all four combine to create political independence in America—though anti-partyism seems to be the most pervasive (at least as of 1980). The greatest differences between true partisans and leaners lie on the dimensions of autonomy and political variability.

Dennis (1992) focuses this analysis more specifically on “closet partisans” and finds that independent leaners who are most like strong partisans in the areas of partisan activity and commitment are nonetheless least like strong partisans in their attitudes towards independence and affective response to elections. This subgroup of leaners is most unlike strong partisans in their high degree of political autonomy and sense of partisan variability. Interestingly, the original *American Voter* analyses concluded that leaners are independents largely based on findings that leaners are less likely to support a party’s candidates over time—partisan variability. Dennis concludes that the reason leaners choose to be independent—an emphasis on autonomy and variability—is more about “being one’s own person” than an explicitly politically-focused rationale. Their
partisan preferences also appear to arise more from cognitive-based reasons of substance than affective political symbols. Dennis (1992) concludes that both the American Voter's argument that leaners are independents and Keith et al.'s contention that they are partisans are oversimplifications.

Green (1988), though he has little argument with Weisberg's finding that partisanship and independence are separate dimensions, argues strongly against the contention that attitudes towards Democrats and Republicans are separate dimensions. Green details the random and systematic measurement error associated with feeling thermometer measures and explains how these can attenuate otherwise robust correlations. Green then examines the relationship between Democratic and Republican attitudes while accounting for measurement error and finds strong negative correlations between these attitudes. Stanga and Sheffield (1987) come to a similar conclusion through a very different approach. By reconfiguring the party scales to control for a positivity bias and examining open-ended like/dislike questions, they find that a substantial majority of the public still has a bipolar attitude structure with one party rated positively and the other negatively. Though neither of these findings denies the multidimensionality of independence, they do support the traditional bipolar interpretation of partisanship.

Alvarez (1990), however, reaffirms Weisberg's findings that Republican, Democratic, and Independent attitudes form three separate dimensions. Alvarez develops a set of four implications that a unidimensional structure of partisanship should have and finds that none of these implications are supported. He responds to Green's (1988)
measurement error findings by arguing that the assumptions of Green’s LISREL model are biased so as to lead to unidimensional findings.

**Partisanship: Where do we stand?**

The debate on the true nature of partisanship is far from settled. The evidence on both sides of the debate on the stability of partisanship can seem quite compelling. For every revisionist finding that partisanship is unstable and exogenously influenced, there seems to be a response contradicting the finding. For each new counter-revisionist hypothesis, the revisionists also seem to have a worthy response. In sum, it seems wise to admit that partisanship is both the cause and consequence of other political attitudes and that due to the extremely inter-related nature it will never be possible, pragmatically or theoretically, to sort out the true causal pattern. It is best to move forward accepting that partisanship does play an important causal role, yet that it is tied into other political attitudes in a complicated network of reinforcing beliefs.

Similarly, there is strong evidence indicating both the multidimensional structure of partisanship and independence, yet also compelling findings that partisanship can be successfully operationalized in one dimension. The degree to which Democratic and Republican attitudes are opposite points on a bipolar continuum or thoroughly separate attitudes seems far from settled. At this point, however, few would argue that independence is nothing more than the opposite of partisanship. Even the scholars attempting to refute the multidimensional view have failed to demonstrate persuasively that independence and partisanship are on a single dimension. Nonetheless, the degree to which a quasi-distinct dimension of independence actually impacts political attitudes and
behaviors remains up to debate. The best course of action should accept that partisanship and independence are very likely somewhat separate dimensions while nonetheless remaining mindful of Weisberg's admonition that the traditional seven-point scale places this on a single dimension with "minimal violence." This research project cannot settle the debate on whether partisanship is endogenous or exogenous, nor can it definitely settle the importance of a multidimensional structure, yet by better understanding the underlying psychological bases of partisanship, it may shed important light on these issues.

Affect and Cognition

Though politics has generally been analyzed in terms of cognitive attitude components such as issue positions and candidate performance, affect has been shown to play an important role in politics on its own. Attitudes are generally thought to consist of cognitive, affective, and behavioral components which together form a global attitude. (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Petty and Cacioppo 1981). The cognitive component consists of an individual's beliefs about the attitude object; they can be either concrete or abstract. The affective component consists of feelings, moods, and emotions experienced in relation to an attitude object. Finally, the behavioral component reflects a person's actions towards the attitude object (Eagly and Chaiken 1995). An attitude is an overall, abstract evaluation of an object, which can be primarily based on either affective, cognitive, or behavioral components (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zanna and Rempel 1988). Though behavioral tendencies are considered a key attitude component, these are generally examined separately from research on affect and cognition.
Abelson et al. (1982) and Breckler (1984) were among the first to demonstrate that affective and cognitive attitude components can be empirically separated. More recently, social psychologists have refined their measures and understanding of the affective and cognitive components of attitudes. Any attitude can be based upon either affective or cognitive considerations. That is, for any given attitude object, some individuals will respond to it based primarily on beliefs about the object while others may respond based upon the moods or emotions it invokes (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995). Furthermore, within any individual, some of her attitudes may be based on affect while others are based more on cognition. In order to assess the affective and cognitive characteristics of attitudes, social psychologists examine the discrepancy between evaluation and cognition and the discrepancy between evaluation and affect. As the evaluative-cognitive consistency and the evaluative-affective consistency become greater, i.e., the smaller the discrepancies, so does the strength of the attitude become greater (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995). Whether an attitude is primarily affective or cognitive may depend upon which of these discrepancies is smaller (Eagly and Chaiken 1993). Attitudes are strong to the degree to which they have a consistent internal structure, be it mainly cognitive, mainly affective, or mainly both (Eagly and Chaiken 1995). Though not yet directly tested, the different potential affective and cognitive bases of attitudes also have divergent implications for the psychological mechanism by which individuals resist attitude change. A cognitive-oriented attitude will likely resist change through counter-arguing whereas selective attention and selective processing may serve to bolster affective attitudes (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995).
In the most comprehensive test of the separability of affect and cognition in attitude measurement, Crites, Petty, and Fabrigar (1994) measured the affective and cognitive components of attitudes using a variety of techniques, including: semantic differential scales, multi-response checklist, and dichotomous checklist. Each of these techniques reliably produced separate affective and cognitive dimensions across a variety of attitude objects. Using the semantic differential scales, the most reliable of the group, they found that the scales could indeed differentiate between experimentally-induced affective and cognitive-based attitudes.

The original understanding of the role of affect has been that it is post-cognitive (Edwards 1990). That is, emotional response to an object is derived from beliefs about its attributes (Ajzen and Fishbein 1975). Zajonc (1980, 1984) challenged this contention by arguing that in some cases affect could completely precede cognition. In these cases where affect is primary, subsequent cognitions may be in service to the affect, but do not constitute the primary basis of the attitude. Similarly, cognitive attitudes may be bolstered by affect, but remain fundamentally cognitive in orientation (Edwards 1990). Zajonc (1984) argues that affective attitudes may be especially resistant to change since affect is phenomenologically valid and that we often doubt almost everything but our own feelings. Coming from this theoretical perspective, Edwards (1990) found that affective attitudes are more responsive to affective forms of persuasion. Interestingly, cognitive attitudes are equally susceptible to affective and cognitive appeals. Edwards also found evidence that affective-based attitudes were held with greater conviction. Edwards argues that attitudes can likely be ordered upon a continuum according to the
sequence and relative contributions of affect and cognition in attitude formation.

Attitudes towards which individuals have little knowledge will reside near the affective extreme and attitudes based primarily on objective attributes and factual information will reside near the cognitive extreme. As individuals mature and have more cognitive knowledge available, presumably an increasing number of attitudes will be cognitive-based (Edwards 1990).

Millar and colleagues (Millar and Tesser 1986; Millar and Tesser 1989; Millar and Millar 1990) have also examined the different implications of affective and cognitive based attitudes. Millar and Tesser (1986) examined the link between attitude and behavior and how the affective or cognitive basis of an attitude leads to different behavioral implications. They found that attitudes would be most predictive of behavior when there was congruence between the component influencing the attitude and the component influencing the behavior. More specifically, affective-based attitudes best predicted consumatory (i.e., non-instrumental) behaviors whereas cognitive attitudes best predicted instrumental behaviors. Following up on these findings, Millar and Tesser (1989) found that this congruence effect occurs when there is low consistency between affective and cognitive attitude components, but that when there is high consistency between affect and cognition, both predict behavior equally well.

Driven by a similar theoretical interest to Edwards (1990), Millar and Millar (1990) also examined the susceptibility of affective and cognitive-based attitudes to different forms of persuasion. In complete contrast to Edwards (1990), Millar and Millar (1990) found that affect-based attitudes were most susceptible to change from rational

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4 Rather than take preexisting attitudes and measure their affective and cognitive content, Edwards (1990)
arguments whereas cognition-based attitudes were most susceptible to change from emotional arguments. Millar and Millar (1990) hypothesize that when an argument and an attitude are based on the same type of information (i.e., affective or cognitive) the argument threatens the way in which a person has thought about an object. A counter-attitudinal argument based on the same type of information will challenge the adequacy of the person’s attitude by a direct contradiction of her beliefs or feelings. Consequently, the way in which the person thinks (feels) about the object is threatened and the individual has motivation for counterarguing. It follows that a person with a cognitive attitude confronted with affective information will be under less threat, have less reason to counterargue, and thus be more susceptible to attitude change. Millar and Millar account for the divergent findings from Edwards (1990) by the fact that in Edwards’ study the attitudes were newly formed and based on indirect experience, and therefore not as amenable to support through counterarguing.

Several of the more recent studies have made it clear that far from being an esoteric debate on theoretical constructs, the affective and cognitive bases of attitudes have important consequences for attitude change and the attitude behavior relation. If we know that certain classes of attitudes tend to be based more upon affect or cognition, persuasion messages can be tailored for the most potential influence (Edwards 1990; Millar and Millar 1990). The hypothesis that affective-based attitudes should be harder to influence than cognitive-based attitudes (Edwards 1990; Zajonc 1984; Zanna and Rempel 1988) also has important consequences for attempts at persuasion and attitude change. Finally, the link between different attitude bases and their potentially differential
effects on behavior (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Millar and Tesser 1986; Millar and Tesser 1989) has important implications for how we understand the links between attitudes and behaviors.

Affect, Cognition, and Politics

The present study builds on the assumption that affect and cognition can both play independent roles in attitude formation (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Crites, Petty, and Fabrigar 1994; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Eagly and Chaiken 1995; Zanna and Rempel 1988) and applies it to political partisanship. Several studies have already evidenced a clear affect/cognition distinction within political attitudes. Abelson et al. (1982) showed that emotional responses to presidential candidates greatly augment simple trait assessments in predicting candidate feeling thermometer scores. Kinder (1994) found similar results on presidential candidate evaluation. Additional studies have shown that not only does affect play a role in overall attitudes, it often plays the primary role. Marcus (1988) demonstrated that affective responses along the dimensions of "threat" and "mastery" are largely responsible for attitudes towards presidential candidates. Tolerance for groups' activities has been shown to depend more on affective, "gut-level" reactions than considered thoughts (Kuklinski et al. 1991). Marcus and colleagues have also demonstrated that affect effects not only what individuals think about politics, but the way in which they process political information (Marcus and MacKuen 1993; Marcus et al. 1995)

Several researchers have commented upon the roles of affect and cognition specifically within the realm of partisanship. Though their primary focus was not on
partisanship, Abelson et al. (1982) did find that affect towards political candidates does vary with party identification. Gant and Luttbeg (1987) examine issue voting by levels of partisanship to look for effects of partisan cognitions. They define the cognitive component of partisanship as partisan knowledge and operationalize it by a person’s ability to correctly identify differences between the Democratic and Republican parties. In an attempt to find differences across partisan groups, however, they find that the level of issue voting (cognitive partisanship) is invariant across strong partisans, weak partisans, and leaners\textsuperscript{5}. They conclude that there is an important cognitive component to partisanship, but that a categorical difference exists between partisans (including leaners) and non-partisans while there is minimal variation within levels of partisanship. They contend that in the traditional party identification scale, the cognitive component is essentially “washed out” by the more powerful affective component. Gant and Luttbeg therefore suggest that partisanship does include both affective and cognitive components, but that the traditional seven-point measure essentially measures only the affective component.

Although Gant and Luttbeg’s (1987) results make a fairly strong argument for the importance of partisan cognitions, there are shortcomings. Knowledge of partisan differences on issues is a limited set of beliefs about the parties. There are many possible cognitions about parties (competence, candidate quality, etc.) that extend beyond issues. Furthermore, even if issue voting has a cognitive component, certain issues, i.e., “easy” issues (Carmines and Stimson 1980), likely have affective components. Finally, there is no corresponding measure of partisan affect. Gant and Luttbeg’s findings do seem to

\textsuperscript{5} The term “leaners” refers to individuals who identify as “independent” in the first part of the party identification scale.
indicate that there is a cognitive component of partisanship, but clearly more rigorous
tests and measures are required.

In a cross-national study, Dalton (1984) argues that cognitive mobilization—the
dramatic spread of education and information resources—in advanced democracies has
created a new category of citizen who does not need to rely on partisan cues to make
political decisions. In his four part typology, cognitively-mobilized citizens who are
close to a party are “cognitive partisans.” Those with partisan leanings, but lacking
cognitive mobilization, he terms “ritual partisans.” Cognitive partisans are
operationalized as those persons who consider themselves close to a party and who are
politically knowledgeable and engaged. Dalton argues that cognitive mobilization leads
to greater numbers of cognitively-mobilized “apartisans” and “cognitive partisans.”

Dalton demonstrates that expanding information and educational resources leads
to partisans who are more aware of and interested in politics, i.e., cognitive partisans.
However, this does not indicate that their partisanship is fundamentally different from the
less cognitively mobilized “ritual partisans.” Just because one knows much and is
interested in politics does not entail that a deep affective attachment is not at the heart of
partisan behavior. “Cognitive partisans,” oriented towards parties based on thoughts
rather than feelings, may certainly exist. Dalton’s argument, however, fails to effectively
demonstrate that this is the case.

Although partisanship has been conceived of primarily as an affective attachment
since its inception in *The American Voter* (Campbell et al. 1960), several studies have
approached partisanship as an essentially cognitive attitude structure, a schema. A
schema can be formally defined as a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among these attributes (Fiske and Taylor 1991). In addition, schemas can also have an affective tag, an implicit emotional reaction evoked by application of the schema. Schemas play a fundamental role in how we think about the social world (Fiske and Taylor 1991). Rahn (1993) found that partisan stereotypes (a stereotype is a particular type of schema), when accessible, tended to dominate other types of information, e.g., policy stands, in thinking about political candidates. Individuals fill in missing knowledge about candidates based on schemas consisting of knowledge about political parties. This result was also found by Lodge, McGraw, and Stroh (1989) in an examination of information processing about political candidates. Rahn proposes that availability of a stereotype label, e.g., Republican, enables a rapid affective judgment of a member of that category, e.g., Bob Dole. Despite the conception of schemas as essentially cognitive structures, Rahn concludes that partisanship may indeed be influenced by cognitive judgments, but that it is best characterized as an affective heuristic for aiding political decision-making.

Richardson (1991) similarly proposes that partisanship should be thought of as a schema including both affective and cognitive components. He proposes a cross-national schema-based framework of partisanship as consisting of positive affective feelings towards favored parties, negative feelings towards non-favored parties, evaluative images favoring the supported party, and political values and preferences congenial to preference for a particular party. In an examination of several European countries, Richardson (1991) demonstrates that both affective and cognitive components of partisanship play independent and significant roles in voting behavior. He also concludes that for many
voters cognitive aspects of partisanship are more influential than affective components. Although Richardson's conclusions apply primarily to the European party systems, they can nonetheless lead to further understanding of American instantisities. Richardson's findings serve as a basis for the proposition that Independent leaners in America are the more cognitively oriented voters. His findings also support a schematic approach in which leaners' partisan schemas lack an affective tag found in the schemas of true partisans.

These findings on affect and cognitive components of partisanship suggest that the relative balance of affective and cognitive relations to party may determine which category of partisanship in which an individual is placed. In the specific case of partisan leaners, the findings imply that partisan leaners may share similar cognitive attitude components towards the parties as genuine partisans, yet their lack of affective attachment reveals itself in their failure to openly identify with a party. Rahn's and Richardson's conclusions suggest that Independent leaners may share similar cognitive schemas with true partisans, but that leaners' party schemas will be lacking or have a deficient affective tag. Given these findings, I propose that the relative balance of partisan affect to partisan cognition should increase as one moves from leaner to strong partisan. This relative balance, in combination with either partisan or Independent social identity should be able to account for considerable variation within the party identification scale.

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6 Recall that Dennis (1992) found that a key difference between "closet partisans," a major sub-category of leaners, and avowed partisans was less affective response to the campaign.
Social Identity

Despite the obvious implications of the social identity approach for understanding partisan identification, no such studies have been undertaken in the American political context. The original conception of party identification as social identification in *The American Voter* actually shows itself to be decades ahead of its time. Campbell et al. (1960) essentially state that just as people identify with various, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, so do they identify with political parties (Niemi and Weisberg 1993). Campbell et al. clearly recognized the importance of group attachment in partisanship. What they were lacking was the understanding this could yield from a social identity theory which was two-decades away from development. Perhaps amazingly, scholars have failed to apply the insights of social identity theory to the concept of partisanship in America despite Campbell et al.'s comparison of party identification to identification with other social groups. Though Campbell et al. certainly recognized the importance of group identification, it has taken modern social identity theory to tell us what this group identification element of partisanship should entail for political attitudes and behavior.

Social Identity Theory

Social identity is defined as, "that part of an individual's self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership" (Tajfel 1978). Social identity is more than knowledge that one is a member of a particular group; it represents a psychological sense of belonging to the group (Hogg and Abrams 1988). At the heart of this theory lies self categorization. Humans instinctively categorize the world into
myriad dichotomous groupings consisting of *us* and *them*. Persons define themselves by the groups to which they belong. We have multiple social identifications; circumstances determine which social identifications will be salient at any given time. Identification results from a need for some positive distinctiveness, which is believed to be satisfied through social comparisons to heighten differences between groups. Social comparison of the groups is filtered by perceptual exaggeration of differences between in-group and out-group. Consequently, individuals come to see their own group as superior and receive psychic benefit from the distinction (Hogg and Abrams 1988). The stronger a persons' attachment to the group, the greater differentiation they perceive between their in-group and the relevant out-group (Kelly 1990a). Stronger group identifications also increase behaviors which favor the in-group (Kelly 1990b). Social identity theory hypothesizes that the inter-group differentiation encouraged by social identification has a motivational basis in increasing self esteem. In the very closely related social categorization theory, categorization alone leads to these perceptual contrasts (Turner et al. 1987). Both theories, however, predict that social categorization of groups and social identification with a group will lead to biased perceptions of in-group and out-group members.

**Social Identity and Partisanship**

Many of the standard findings on partisanship within recent decades can be convincingly reinterpreted through the lens of social identity. A fairly persistent feature
of partisanship is its bipolar nature among the majority of the electorate. For most people, a clear preference for one party goes hand-in-hand with a negative attitude towards the opposition party. Though strong negative attitudes towards the opposition party have traditionally been interpreted as a result of selective perception and party identification as a perceptual screen (Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992), the social comparison aspect of social identity theory offers a more theoretically rich explanation. Campbell et al. provide us the "perceptual screen" in which information favoring one's preferred party is given selective attention whereas information favoring the opposition party is not. Stronger partisanship leads to a more exaggerated process of selection and perceptual distortion. Campbell et al. emphasize that it is the party as a symbol, not a group, that leads to these effects. Though a plausible explanation, the perceptual distortions described lack either the affective or cognitive bases found in the group differentiation aspect of social identity/social comparison theory. In social identity theory, in contrast, bipolar partisan attitudes are a natural psychological outgrowth of self-perceived membership in a political party. The much-discussed weakening of partisanship in recent decades assuredly represents weakening of social identification with the parties and we consequently see a less differentiated, more neutral partisanship, as demonstrated in recent scholarship (e.g., Wattenberg 1996).

The social identity approach allows us not only to examine the partisan social identity of citizens, but also any identity they may have with other political independents. Under a multidimensional approach to partisanship (Dennis 1988b; Weisberg 1980),

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7 Weisberg (1980) and Alvarez (1990) aside, there is still strong evidence that for many citizens a positive attitude towards one party is correlated with a negative attitude towards the other (Green 1988; Stanga and Sheffield 1987).
partisan and independent social identifications need not be mutually exclusive. Given the strong civic virtue and social norms placed upon political independence, it may be that either in addition to, or in place of, a social identification with a political party, some citizens may also socially identify with other political independents. Though “political independents” do not represent a clear social group in the way that Democrats or Republicans do, this fact does not preclude citizens having some rough mental conception of independents as a group. Given the pervasive media treatment of independents as homogenous entity, it may not be too far-fetched for some citizens to conceive of independents as just another political group to which they do or do not belong.

If political independents indeed have a social identity as such, regardless of any partisan leanings, this fact can go a long way towards explaining the multidimensional structure and intransitivities of our current party identification scale. Social identity in combination with a multidimensional view of partisanship offers a potential explanation for the seemingly incongruous behavior and self identification of partisan leaners (Keith et al. 1992, Petrocik 1974). An independent social identification may exist somewhat independently of a partisan social identification and cause an individual to identify as an independent, yet not prevent the person from behaving in a partisan fashion.

Despite the lack of American applications, social identity theorists have recognized the utility of social identity in understanding an individual’s affiliation with a political party (Hogg and Abrams 1988). Though the present effort marks a rare application of social identity theory to the American context, several studies by psychologists have applied social identity to the study of European political parties.
Perhaps most prominently, Caroline Kelly (1988, 1989, 1990a, 1990b) has found considerable evidence for a social identity basis of partisanship in a series of studies of British political parties. In her first study, Kelly (1988) found that in-group identification and inter-group differentiation (the perceived difference between in and out group) were significantly positively correlated. That is, as individuals feel more strongly about their own party, they see a greater difference between it and the opposition party. Further bolstering the social identity theory perspective, Kelly found that for many partisans, level of partisan social identity was positively correlated with self esteem.

In an experimental study, Kelly (1989) found that members of a political party were significantly more likely to perceive their own group as relatively diverse and the opposition party as relatively homogenous and extreme, as social categorization theory predicts. Kelly also found that not only does social identification affect inter-party perceptions, it also affects intra-party perceptions where factions exist (Kelly 1990a, 1990b). In studies of Scottish political parties, Abrams (1994) and Abrams and Emler (1994) also found strong evidence for a social identity interpretation of party loyalties. Duck, Hogg, and Terry (1995) found apparent effects of political social identity on in-group and out-group perceptions of Australian partisans.

The aforementioned studies, by examining social identity and partisanship in a variety of countries and contexts clearly demonstrate the utility of social identity theory for understanding partisanship. Since social identity is based on perceived relations to groups, rather than any formal membership, the findings should be informative to any party system. Importantly, the minimal groups paradigm studies of Tajfel (1978) indicate that it requires only a weak conception of group identification to elicit the predictions of
social identity theory. Consequently, even in a political system with relatively weak party attachments social identity theory and its consequences should be relevant.

Social identity theory clearly has the potential to offer important insights into American partisanship. It has proven its value in the study of European parties. Importantly, social identity theory offers additional theoretical explanation for many consistent findings about the structure of partisanship. It can explain both the perceptual distortions involved in partisan and group perceptions as well as anomalies caused by a multidimensional partisan structure. In short, social identity has much to offer both theoretically and empirically in our study of partisanship.

Conclusion

The relevant literature discussed here leads us toward a revised psychological conception of partisanship. Though the traditional conception of partisanship has been that of an affective orientation, revisionist challenges have attacked the traditional approach, yet failed to follow through to the intra-psychological level. The strong evidence for the influence of issues, economic assessments, etc., on partisanship would seem to be persuasive evidence for the implication that partisanship is just as much a cognitive as an affective-based attitude. The findings from social psychologists indicate that, with the right measures, we should be able to accurately assess the affective and cognitive components of partisanship. A finding that partisanship was predominantly cognitive or predominantly affective would not settle the debate on its stability and relationship to other political attitudes, but it would certainly prove informative. The social-psychological perspective also offers potential consideration of the heterogeneity
of partisanship across the population. It may be that results are so mixed because some individuals are affective-based partisans, characterized by relatively exogenous stable attitudes, while others may be cognitive-based partisans, more influenced by the changing political world. There may also be important differences in socialization and demographic patterns, which may account for the different psychological bases of partisanship (see Beck 1974; Edwards 1990).

The successful categorization of partisanship into its affective and cognitive components, both within and across persons, also offers important potential insights for our study of political communication and political behavior. The dominant psychological basis of an attitude very likely affects the overall susceptibility of the attitude to persuasion as well as the best route to persuasion (Edwards 1990; Millar and Millar 1990). Greater understanding by politicians of the distribution of psychological partisanship within the electorate could therefore greatly aid attempts at persuasive political communication. Similarly, an understanding of these psychological bases can lead us to an improved understanding of the link between partisans attitudes and partisan behaviors.

The application of social identity theory to political parties also has considerable potential for increasing our understanding of the relationship between partisanship and other political attitudes and behaviors. Social identity offers a compelling theory through which to interpret partisanship and its influence on political perceptions. It provides a motivational and cognitive basis for the persistent bipolar perceptual and attitudinal patterns of partisanship. Within a multidimensional framework, social identity theory
also offers important insight into partisan intransitivities and the separate attitudes towards parties and political independents.

In sum, we have much to gain in our understanding of partisanship through a thorough examination of its bases in affect, cognition, and social identity. These areas of social-psychological research have seen extensive theoretical development in recent years which should bear directly on partisan political attitudes. In this study, I hope to demonstrate that applying psychological theory on affect, cognition, and social identity to partisanship, can lead to important new insights as well as offer compelling new ways to reinterpret old debates.
CHAPTER 3

SURVEY DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

Building upon the preceding literature, I have a number of hypotheses about the affective, cognitive, and social identity aspects of partisanship which I intend to test. Most importantly, I believe that affect, cognition, and social identity will prove to be separable psychological components of partisanship that may vary considerably across the population.

Ideally, pre-existing survey instruments could be adopted to test these hypotheses. Unfortunately, no suitable surveys exist; general political surveys lack the precise psychological measures necessary to answer the research questions posed here. National Election Studies (NES) surveys have made some basic attempts to measure affective and cognitive elements of attitudes towards political candidates, but have no such questions with regards to parties. Even if one were to rely on the candidate measures as proxies, there are serious drawbacks. The affect measures are simple dichotomous responses to questions such as, “has president X ever made you feel angry (proud, happy, etc.)?” This surely measures an underlying dimension of emotional response. The so-called cognitive measures are based on trait assessments—“how well does the term moral (caring, provides strong leadership, intelligent, honest, etc.) describe president X?” Besides the inherent shortcomings in these questions as measures of affect and cognition, of which
there are many, they apply only to candidates, not political parties. The open-ended questions also present a possible basis for assessing affective and cognitive-based attitudes towards the parties. Unfortunately, increasingly few persons tend to answer these questions and those who do are not a representative sample (Smith 1979). Even then, the coding schemes leave much room for interpretation as to whether a particular response is affective or cognitive in nature. Clearly, alternative measures of affect and cognition towards political parties are required.

**Measuring Affect and Cognition**

Fortunately, social psychologists have developed a measurement system uniquely designed to separate the affective and cognitive components of attitudes. Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) have been able to empirically separate affective and cognitive attitude components with measures proven to be equally reliable and valid in assessing both affect and cognition. The measurement strategy was also designed to be universally applicable across attitude objects. Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) found that separate semantic differential scales consistently provided reliable and valid measures across a variety of attitude objects. With this measurement system, subjects indicated their reactions to a stimulus object on several bipolar continua. To measure affect, respondents indicated the position between two bipolar words (e.g., love/hate, joy/sorrow, delighted/sad) that best described their feelings towards the object. For cognition, respondents indicated the position between words (e.g., useful/useless, valuable/worthless) that described traits of the object. To assess overall evaluation, or attitude, respondents placed themselves using pairs of general evaluative terms (e.g.,
positive/negative, desirable/undesirable) that did not describe either affective states or
traits of an object. For example, respondents were asked to rate the attitude object, snake,
on a variety of semantic differential scales—affective, e.g., love/hate; cognitive, e.g.,
wise/unwise, and evaluative, e.g., good/bad. Importantly, since the affective and
cognitive measures are based on similar scales, the measures of relative affect and
cognition are unbiased. Affect and cognition are usually measured with different types of
scales that attenuate their reliability in forming full attitude scales and in comparing the
relative impact on overall attitude (Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994). Separate summary
measures of affect, cognition, and evaluation could then be computed for each target
item. Importantly, these scales worked equally well for a disparate collection of attitude
objects: literature, math, capital punishment, birth control, church, and snakes. Crites,
Fabrigar, and Petty regressed evaluation on affect and cognition for each different
attitude object and found that depending upon the attitude, the relative impact of affect
and cognition varied considerably, in keeping with recent theoretical conceptions of
attitudes (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zanna
and Rempel 1988).

Importantly for present purposes, Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) assessed the
validity of categorizing persons as to whether their attitude towards an object was
primarily affective or primarily cognitive. They computed affective discrepancy scores
by taking the absolute value of the difference from the mean scores on the affective scale
and the evaluation scale and cognitive discrepancy scores in a similar manner using the
cognition and evaluation scales. Using experimentally-induced new attitudes, both
cognitive and affective, Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty successfully demonstrated that
discrepancy scores can reliably predict the affective or cognitive basis of an attitude. Eagly and Chaiken (1998) likewise suggest that the attitude dimension (affective or cognitive) with the lower discrepancy score provides the primary basis for the attitude.

In order to have an even more complete understanding of the bases of partisan attitudes, I use a slightly modified version of this measurement strategy taken from Fabrigar and Petty (1998). Cacioppo and Berntson (1994) argue that the positive and negative properties of attitudes are somewhat independent. For example, positive sentiment towards the Democratic party does not necessarily entail a lack of negative sentiment. Thus an attitude towards a given object can, to some degree, consist of conflicting positive and negative response. Consequently, the most accurate measure of an attitude should assess positive and negative dimensions separately. The Fabrigar and Petty design, rather than have two opposite words, e.g., love/hate, serve as opposite ends of a continuum, places each word in its own scale. Respondents are then asked to rate the amount of agreement they have that the word describes the political party. For example, subjects are asked to rate on a scale from 1, strongly disagree, to 7, strongly agree, the degree to which “hate” describes their feeling towards the Democratic party. By placing each word in its own bipolar scale, rather than using true semantic differential word pairings, no reliability is lost, yet the scales can more accurately measure the positive and negative attitude substrates. The exact content of these measures and the instructions for their use can be found in the appendices at the end of the dissertation.

Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) used over 40 different words in their original semantic differential scales. In order to restrict the number of measures for inclusion in a space-limited mail survey, I pre-tested the full set of items used by Crites, Fabrigar, and
Petty on a student sample. The student respondents, enrolled in introductory political science classes, received extra credit for their voluntary participation. A total of 151 respondents completed the full complement of Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty affect and cognition measures with both “Democratic Party” and “Republican Party” as issue objects. In addition, 35 of these respondents completed surveys which included alternative measures of partisan cognition. These alternative measures were placed in the same format as the Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty measures, but the response items were adapted from NES candidate trait measures, e.g., “gets things done,” “honest,” “trustworthy,” “cares about people like me.”

I conducted both factor analyses and reliability analyses to choose the best subset of measures to use on the mail survey. Firstly, although the adapted NES measures would seem to apply more directly to political attitude objects than the Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty measures, they proved to be no more reliable. Since Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty intend for their attitude measures to be universally applicable across attitude objects and their measures were already well-tested, I chose to use only a subset of the Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty measures in the mail survey. Using both reliability and factor analysis, I selected the items which proved most reliable and which loaded most highly on the relevant attitude dimension.

**Social Identity Measures**

As with precise measures of partisan affect and cognition, existing surveys also fall short at providing useful measures of social identification with the political parties. While they have a variety of question that may provide somewhat indirect measures,
other than the party identification question, none of these questions address any potential aspects of partisan social identification. As with affect and cognition, we must look elsewhere for appropriate measures of partisan social identity. Within the study of group behavior, there are a variety of scales to measure social identity. One which seems particularly well-suited to use with political parties is Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) Identification with a Psychological Group (IDPG) scale. This scale has proven a reliable and robust measure of social identity under many circumstances in industrial/organizational studies (Mael and Ashworth 1992; Mael and Tetrick 1992). More recently, Brewer and Silver (1998) demonstrated its utility for social psychology. The IDPG scale measures social identity with a designated group through a series of ten questions which assess the respondents perceptions of shared identity and shared experiences with the group (Mael and Tetrick 1992). The complete text of these 10 questions as well as the instructions for their use are included in the Appendix A.

Since social identity is identity with an in-group (Brewer and Brown 1998), respondents were only asked to respond to the IDPG scale with regard to the political party with which they identified. Although theoretically, one could be asked to complete this scale for both political parties, the concept of social identity rests upon identification with a group—clearly individuals will not identify with a political party in opposition to the one they identify with. Those individuals expressing no partisan preference at all, were exempt from this scale, as it would have been essentially meaningless in their case.

In addition to social identity with one’s preferred party, all respondents were asked to complete the IDPG scale with “political independents” as the referent. If indeed party identification is multidimensional (Weisberg 1980; Dennis 1988), partisan and
independent social identification need not be mutually exclusive. Therefore, including an independent social identity scale as well as the partisan social identity scale offers the potential to shed light on the dimensionality of partisanship and the degree to which separate social identities may be responsible for a multidimensional partisanship.

Although the affect, cognition, and social identity measures alone should provide important insight into the psychological structure of partisanship, it is important to understand how these aspects of party identification are related to other factors such as political attitudes, political behaviors, and demographic characteristics. Certainly, affect, cognition, and social identity bases of partisanship may result in different patterns of political behavior. For example, strong partisan social identity may lead to increased partisan political activity regardless of one's overall evaluation of the party. The behavioral measures in my survey included: presidential vote in 1996, straight-ticket vote in 1996, support for a party's presidential candidates over time, and a series of items measuring partisan activity: contributing money to a party, attending a rally, displaying campaign paraphernalia, voting in a primary, working for campaign, or trying to persuade others.

Measures of political attitudes included issue positions, ideology, party identification, political knowledge, and candidate and political party feeling thermometers. Issue positions were measured using self-placement on government services, government job guarantees, and government support for Blacks. Ideology was measured using the standard seven-point measure ranging from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Party identification was measured using the standard two-part question. Political knowledge was assessed following the five-item factual knowledge
scale advocated by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). Feeling thermometers measured
atitudes towards the 1996 presidential candidates, Bill Clinton and Bob Dole, as well as
attitudes towards the two parties. For a complete explanation of measures see the
appendix.

Of course, it also quite possible that the psychological bases of partisanship are
somehow related to individuals’ demographic background. Measures of demographic
data included gender, age, education, income, race, and religious denomination.
Education was measured according to highest degree achieved. Income was broken
down into 5 categories by $20,000 increments. Race followed the same response options
as provided in the NES. For religion, respondents provided the name of the church they
attended, which was matched against a database of Franklin County churches and their
religious denominations. Again, the complete text of the questions appears in the
appendix.

The Survey

Franklin county Ohio registered voters were chosen as the universe for the survey.
As the survey was to be a mail survey about political issues, many respondents would
lack motivation to respond. It was therefore necessary to take all possible measures to
increase the response rate. By restricting the survey to Franklin county Ohio, it was
possible to trade on the name recognition afforded Ohio State University, which would
not exist elsewhere. The universe was also restricted to registered voters in an effort to
increase the response rate. The individuals who did not register to vote would certainly
have been among the least likely to respond to a political survey. The final strategy to
increase response rate was the offering of a $150 reward for one of the respondents chosen in a random lottery.

In order to select the respondents for the sample, I obtained a complete electronic database of all the registered voters in Franklin County as of 1996. Using a random number generator, I selected 1000 respondents. A first wave of 1000 surveys was mailed out the second week of February, 1998. Upon the realization that the voter registration database contained an unacceptably high number of wrong addresses, an additional 500 respondents were randomly selected and mailed surveys in early March. For both waves, respondents were send reminder postcards one week and three weeks after the initial survey to further encourage participation. All respondents had until April 17 to return their survey and be eligible to receive the $150 reward. By April 30, the final survey was returned. A total of 302 surveys were properly filled out and returned. Of the 1500 surveys sent out, 250 were returned to sender with an invalid address. Consequently, the response rate was 302 out of 1250, for 24%. Admittedly, this is a low response rate, but not entirely out of line for a mail survey with low respondent motivation.

Fortunately, Franklin county is surprisingly representative of the United States. Median household income was $30,375, as opposed to $30,056 for the U.S. Franklin county is 82% white, as opposed to 80% for the U.S. Median age of eligible voters for both the county and the U.S. falls between 30 and 34. The county is slightly better educated, 52% some college, versus 45% U.S. As for the sample of county respondents who returned the PCP survey, they are more white, 90%; older, median age 45; slightly

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8 A total of 250 surveys were actually received marked return to sender. This is most likely a conservative estimate, as many surveys probably went to households where the new resident simply discarded the survey.
better educated, 55% some college, and wealthier, median income between $40,000 and $60,000, than the county population as a whole.

Although not ideally representative, the respondents do have a significant amount of demographic and political diversity. The median age was 45, with a quarter of the sample below the age of 37 and a quarter of the sample above the age of 58. Median education level was a college degree, 28%, with considerable minorities having high school, 16%, some college, 26%, or post-college education, 28%. Household income was divided fairly evenly between categories based on $20,000 increments, with $40,000 to $60,000 being the median category. 53% of the respondents were female and 89% were white. As for political features, 29% were Democrats, 43% Republicans, and 27% independents. In the case of ideology, 26% of the sample described themselves as at least leaning liberal, 48% were conservative or leaning conservative, and 21% were middle of the road. Although the sample would ideally be fully representative of the U.S., it almost certainly has enough diversity to examine many possible patterns of psychological response to political parties.

The 302 respondents to the survey provide the primary data source for all subsequent analyses. All the items used in the survey have been mentioned here. Further detailed codings of measures into useful variables are described in the chapters where these variables are used.

^ All population characteristics are taken from the 1990 U.S. Census.
CHAPTER 4

AFFECT, COGNITION, AND PARTISANSHIP

Introduction

Party identification is "the individual's affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment" (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). With these words in *The American Voter*, Campbell and colleagues set forth a theoretical orientation to party identification that has largely held sway for nearly 40 years. Party identification was seen as an *attitude* towards a particular group-object, the political party. Grounded in the social psychology of the times, Campbell et al. saw party identification a primarily affective, or emotional, attachment to a political party. Beliefs about the object were seen as influencing the attitude, but were not actually part of the attitude. For example, if one believes that the Republican party is against the working person, this belief may result in a negative attitude towards the Republican party, in which the attitude is characterized by negative affect towards Republicans. The belief about the Republican party is not part of the attitude. Based on the existing attitude research of the time (e.g., Allport 1935; Hovland, Janis, and Kelly 1953), the concept of party identification as an attitude was placed in this psychological framework.

Since the publication of *The American Voter*, attitude research has undergone tremendous development and change. Social psychologists now believe that attitudes are not just affect influenced by beliefs, but rather attitudes are a combination of affect,
cognition (beliefs), and behavior. The cognitive component consists of an individual’s beliefs about the attitude object; they can be either concrete or abstract. The affective component consists of feelings, moods, and emotions experienced in relation to an attitude object. Finally, the behavioral component reflects a person’s actions towards the attitude object (Eagly and Chaiken 1995). An attitude is an overall, abstract evaluation of an object, which can be primarily based on either affective, cognitive, or behavioral components (Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Zanna and Rempel 1988). For any given attitude object, some individuals will respond to it based primarily on beliefs about the object while others may respond based upon the moods or emotions it invokes (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995).

Despite these important theoretical developments on the nature of attitudes, our conceptualization of partisanship still largely rests on the understanding put forth by Campbell et al. nearly 40 years ago. Contemporary attitude theory, however, has much to offer for a richer conceptualization of partisanship. Partisanship, as originally envisioned in The American Voter, is seen as an affective, or an emotional attachment. Just like a child’s unfailing love for a puppy, partisanship exists as an emotional bond between a citizen and a political party. Though certainly influenced by informational considerations, e.g., a bite from the puppy, or a weak Democratic president, the attitude remains primarily emotional in nature. Contemporary attitude theory, however, suggests that we consider an opposite extreme of cognitive-based attitudes. Here one might think of a careful stockbroker, buying and selling companies based on hard financial information, e.g., price/earnings ratios, company management policy, etc. The broker’s attitude towards a company is entirely based on cold, cognitive considerations about
attributes affecting the company’s stock price. Similarly, we might consider a cognitive partisan who lacks any emotional ties to the political parties, but rather evaluates them based upon their proposed policies and the quality of their politicians in office.

Obviously, the examples presented here are pure types and there likely are not many partisans with a purely child-like love for the political parties nor do many pure stock-broker type partisans likely exist. Nonetheless, given the advances in the conceptualization of attitudes, there is a reasonable expectation, that within partisanship, as with other attitudes, there is a broad range of psychological response, such that while some individuals may be primarily affective partisans, others may be primarily cognitive in their partisan orientation.

Knowing the psychological bases for individuals’ partisan attitudes has several potentially important political consequences. Edwards (1990) contends that affectively-based attitudes will be held with stronger conviction. In addition, she argues that affective attitudes will be more susceptible to persuasion from emotional appeals whereas cognitive attitudes will be more influenced from informational messages. Her findings suggest that some partisans can best be reached and persuaded through emotional and symbolic appeals, whereas others will be more responsive to factual political information. The latest and most thorough research, Fabrigar and Petty (1998) likewise finds for symmetry—that is affective attitudes are most persuaded by emotion-laden information and cognitive attitudes influenced by cognitive information (cf. Millar and Millar 1990). These findings imply that if there are indeed both affective and cognitive partisans they should respond in quite different ways to different forms of political messages.
Along related lines, Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla (1995) suggest that a cognitive-oriented attitude will likely resist change through counter-arguing whereas selective attention and selective processing may serve to bolster affective attitudes. For example, in the case of partisanship, a cognitive partisan might resist new information about a favorite political candidate by supplying counter information, while an affective partisan might essentially ignore the information. In order to persuade these two types of partisans, politicians may need to rely on different strategies. In the case of affective partisans, the optimal strategy for politicians would be gain the attention of these partisans. At this point, affective partisans should be most influenced by emotional appeals. To influence cognitive partisans, in contrast, politicians would need to focus on effective arguments. Furthermore, attitude theory implies that weak counter-arguments will only serve to strengthen the partisan attitudes of cognitive partisans—only strong counter arguments should weaken a partisan attitude (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).

Given these findings, how might we expect affective and cognitive partisans to be different? Following the conclusions of Edwards (1990), Fabrigar and Petty (1998), and Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla (1995) affective partisans should have stronger partisan attitudes and be more resistant to partisan change. They will be less knowledgeable about politics and inclined to bolster their attitudes through selective perception, rather than fact-based counter-arguing. Affective partisans may behave in a more consistent partisan manner because their attitude likely depends more on an early socialized partisan bond (Beck 1974; Edwards 1990) than a responsiveness to changing political information about party issue positions and candidate actions.¹⁰ Affective partisans may be more resistant to change because their attitudes are more firmly rooted in early socialization experiences. In contrast, cognitive partisans are more likely to be influenced by new information and arguments, as they are less bound by established beliefs and values.

¹⁰ The fact that childhood partisanship is largely devoid of issue or informational content strongly suggests that it is affectively based (Jennings and Niemi 1968).
partisans may be the staunch, durable partisans who most always support their party and its candidates, whereas cognitive partisans may at times have a partisan attitude just as strong or more so, but this attitude should be more susceptible to changing political information. The “yellow-dog Democrats” of political lore may be classic affective partisans in contrast to swing voters, or “Reagan Democrats,” for example, as classic cognitive partisans.

Given the implications described above, the question follows: are there indeed affective and cognitive partisans and do systematic differences exist in how these different groups respond to politics? With regard to this question, I intend to assess, 1) the degree to which persons can successfully and meaningfully be categorized as affective or cognitive partisans, 2) observable attitudinal and behavioral differences between these two groups, and 3) the degree to which affective and cognitive based attitudes function on a linear continuum.

Although the first part of this chapter attempts to group persons based on their affective and cognitive responses towards parties, the conceptualization of attitudes advocated by Eagly and Chaiken (1998) implies that not only will some persons have a more cognitive response to a particular attitude object while others have a more affective response, but some attitude objects may be more inclined to have an affective or cognitive basis across the population. In other words, whether or not one is an affective or cognitive partisan, some attitudes and behaviors may be relatively more driven by cognition whereas others may be more dependent upon affect. I will therefore also explore partisan affect and cognition as independent predictors of key political attitudes and behaviors.
In addition to these issues, I will also address how affective and cognitive bases of partisanship may vary across the population based on demographic factors such as gender, education, and income. Gilligan (1983) argued that for women, the social world is composed of an interwoven web or relationships, more so than for men. The result being that women are more concerned with others and have a greater group basis for social life than do men. Recent findings indicate that not only are women more likely to be Democrats than men, they are more likely to affiliate with a party, in general (Burden and Greene 1998; Norrander 1997). An increased tendency for women to identify as partisans may result from the heightened group orientation as theorized by Gilligan (1993). On the psychological level, this gender difference could potentially be attributed to greater social identification with parties on the part of women, or alternatively, increased affective or cognitive response.

Finally, a thorough exploration of the affective and cognitive bases of partisanship leads towards an affective/cognitive typology to explain the intransitivities in the seven-point party identification scale (Keith et al. 1992). At present, the primary area that separates leaners from true partisans is their behavioral volatility both within and across elections; they are more likely to split their tickets and to shift their votes between parties over time (Dennis 1992). It is the lack of stability in partisan behaviors, both within and across elections, in which partisanship indeed follows the monotonic pattern (Dennis 1988; Petrocik 1974). When leaners are motivated by the cognitive component of partisanship, which they more often than not will be, their political behavior should be just as “partisan” as that of true partisans. Since leaners are more likely to be wealthy and well-educated—two key elements of increased participation—it is not surprising that
given significant cognitive motivation, leaners' political behavior can be even more partisan than that of weak partisans. Since the cognitive component should, however, be more malleable than the affective component, *ceteris paribus*, the leaners should experience more partisan behavioral variability as the evidence indicates they do. It is important to note here that the cognitive considerations of leaners are not substantially different from true partisans. Rather, I propose that it is the relative balance of cognition and affect in driving political behavior that sets leaners apart.

Testing all of these hypotheses depends upon meaningfully separating partisanship into affective and cognitive components. It may seem a hopeless task to distinguish affective from cognitive partisanship, but fortunately, Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) have been able to empirically separate affective and cognitive attitude components with measures proven to be equally reliable and valid in assessing both affect and cognition. The heart of the analysis in this chapter relies on the Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) and Fabrigar and Petty (1998) measurement strategy detailed in the previous chapter. The measurement system results in separate affective, cognitive, and evaluative scores for each party. In addition, the discrepancy scores provide a measure of which aspect, affect or cognition, is more central in determining one's overall partisan attitude.

Not only have Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) come up with a valid and reliable method for grouping individuals based on the affective and cognitive bases of their attitudes, they have in fact already demonstrated the effectiveness using a political attitude, capital punishment. The present analysis builds upon these findings by applying them to political parties as attitude objects. Using the Crites, Fabrigar, Petty procedure it
should be possible to group individuals into categories based on their affective and
cognitive responses to political parties and then examine the differences which emerge
between these groups. Furthermore, using the raw affect and cognition scores, it will be
possible to examine 1) to what degree affect and cognition influence other political
attitudes and behaviors, 2) the degree to which affect and cognition vary based upon
gender and race, and 3) the ability of affect and cognition to explain intransitivities in the
standard party identification scale.

**Affect and Cognition in Partisanship: A New Strategy**

Abelson et al. (1982), Kinder (1994), Marcus and colleagues (Marcus 1988,
Marcus 1993, Marcus et al. 1995), and Haddock and Zanna (1998) have demonstrated the
utility of examining the affective and cognitive components of political attitudes. Crites,
Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) have provided a valid, reliable, and general measurement
strategy for separating the affective and cognitive components of attitudes and
categorizing persons based on their primary response pattern. They have demonstrated
this strategy using a variety of attitudes, including a salient political issue, capital
punishment. The Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty measurement strategy readily lends itself to
the study of political partisanship and can thus be used to extend a research tradition on
the roles of affect and cognition in political attitudes.

The present study uses the Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty measurement system with
the Democratic party and Republican party as the key attitude objects. Based upon an
individuals' preferred political party and responses to the affect, cognition, and
evaluation scales, it should be possible to categorize persons as affective partisans,
cognitive partisans, or balanced partisans—those exhibiting equal parts affect and cognition. Given these categorizations, psychological findings lead to several expectations about how these groups should differ. Though attitudes towards the parties may certainly shift over time for all citizens, they should likely be more stable for affective partisans to the degree that their partisan attitudes are based on basic emotional responses and prior socialization (Beck 1974; Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1993; Edwards 1990). Cognitive partisanship, in contrast, most likely has its basis in cognitive response to candidates, issues, and parties. Due to changing political circumstances in these areas, cognitive partisans should experience greater change in their partisanship, and thus less partisan stability. Though there is certainly considerable emotional content and potential emotional response to political information, the basis of affective partisanship is, in all likelihood, not as closely tied to political information, emotional or not, but more so in experiences and prior socialization. Thus, for citizens with equal levels of overall liking for a party, the affectively-oriented individual should behave in a more traditional partisan manner. Cognitive partisans, may, nonetheless have stronger partisan-related attitudes about issues and candidates. Since attitudes with low cognitive-evaluative discrepancy are generally accompanied by a highly organized set of organized cognitions (Eagly and Chaiken 1998) and are strengthened by counter-arguing messages (Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla 1995; Millar and Millar 1990), the counter-arguing of incoming political messages may result in more ideological and extreme views of issues, candidates, and parties.

The research findings discussed above lead to several hypotheses regarding a more fully conceived partisanship, which incorporates both affective and cognitive
components. I expect that different balances of affective and cognitive partisan orientations within individuals should have systematic impacts on their behavior. Since affective response has been shown to be a more reliable guide to predicting behavior (Damasio 1994; Marcus 1988; Kinder 1994), it should lead to more behavioral stability with regard to partisanship. I predict that partisans with a stronger affective than cognitive response to their preferred party should exhibit more stability and consistency in their partisan behavior. Citizens expressing a primarily cognitive attachment to party, in contrast, should show less partisan consistency than affect-driven partisans. Though attitudes towards the parties may certainly shift over time, the fundamental emotional reaction should be relatively stable to the degree it is not sensitive to changing cognitive elements such as issues and candidates. Partisan cognitions, on the other hand, can vary greatly within and across elections because they depend on specific policies, issues, and candidates. I therefore expect that given citizens with equal levels of overall attachment for a party, the affectively-oriented individual will behave in a more traditional partisan manner. Similarly, I predict that in behaviors that exemplify partisan stability—straight ticket voting, party support over time, voting for the presidential candidate of one's party—affective partisans attitudes will be more important than partisan cognitions. In contrast, partisan attitudes that should be more sensitive to the particular political context—candidate assessments and issue positions—should be primarily guided by cognitive attachments. For example, if a cognitive partisan is a pro-life, conservative Republican facing a voting decision where the Republican candidate is pro-choice, she will be more likely to defect than a similar affective partisan, who relies more on emotional party attachment in making vote decisions.
Measures

The data to test the preceding hypotheses comes from the survey described in chapter 3. The principal measures used here are the affect, cognition, evaluation scales as well as measures of ideology and political behavior. For the affect and cognition measures, respondents rated the two parties according to a series of bipolar semantic scales. Using "Democratic Party" and "Republican Party" as objects, respondents assessed how well they thought particular words described the Democratic and Republican parties on a scale of 1 to 7, strongly disagree to strongly agree. In the case of the affective scale, respondents were instructed to think about how the target word made them feel. The affective measures consisted of eight (four positive and four negative) affective words: delighted, happy, joy, relaxed, hateful, disgusted, annoyed, and angry. For the cognitive scale, respondents indicated their agreement to the degree with which the cognitive words described their beliefs about the party. The cognitive measure consisted of eight cognitive words: useful, valuable, beneficial, wise, unsafe, unhealthy, worthless, and harmful. The evaluation item measure instructed respondents to assess how well the words described their overall evaluation. The evaluative word pairs included: good, positive, like, desirable, bad, dislike, undesirable, and negative.11

The individual items were transformed into three separate summary measures of affect, cognition, and evaluation for each party. For each summary measure, the mean value of response to negative items was created and then subtracted from the mean.

11 Though the evaluative target words superficially resemble the cognitive target words in that they can be beliefs an individual has about a political party, they do not describe potential traits about the parties as the cognitive items do. Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994) found that the evaluative items consistently had a different factor structure than the cognitive items.
response value for positive items. In this way, separate measures of affect, cognition, and evaluation, ranging from 6, most positive, to -6, most negative, were created for both the Democratic and Republican parties. The reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha) of the scales as used in this study ranged from a low of .90 to a high of .96 (positive and negative scales analyzed separately), indicating highly reliable instruments (Carmines and Zeller 1979).

Borrowing again from Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty (1994), a discrepancy measure was used in order to assess the relative affective and cognitive bases of partisan attitudes. The discrepancy between the affect and evaluation scales as well as between the cognition and evaluation scales, should indicate to what degree one’s overall attitude is based on either affect or cognition (Chaiken, Shelly, Eva Pomerantz, and Roger Giner-Sorolla. 1995; Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994). Affective discrepancy scores were created by taking the absolute value of the difference between the affective score and the evaluation score for each party. Cognitive discrepancy scores were likewise created in similar fashion. The values of these scales could range from 0, indicating complete affective or cognitive agreement with evaluation, to 6, indicating maximum discrepancy. The smaller the discrepancy, the more the attitude can be considered to be based on the particular component (Crites, Fabrigar, and Petty 1994). Finally, an overall discrepancy score was created to represent the relative balance of affective and cognitive attitude components the affective discrepancy score minus the cognitive discrepancy score. The values of this scale theoretically range from 6, representing an attitude based entirely on cognition, to -6, indicating an attitude based entirely on affect. 0 reflects an attitude based equally on affect and cognition.
This overall discrepancy score was then used to categorize respondents based on the dominant response to their preferred party.\textsuperscript{12} Individuals on the negative side of this scale were categorized as affective partisans while individuals on the positive side were categorized as cognitive partisans. Individuals at 0 were categorized as balanced partisans, since their partisan attitudes were equally based on affect and cognition.

**Affective and Cognitive Partisans**

First, a rudimentary examination of the overall discrepancy score reveals that there is a wide range of affective and cognitive basis to partisanship. The scores ranged from a high of 6, indicating partisanship based solely on cognition, to a low of -2.75, indicating partisanship based predominantly on affective response. Interestingly, within this sample, cognitive partisanship predominates—over two-thirds of respondents, 68%, had a discrepancy score greater than 0 (table 4.1). In contrast, affective partisans, those with smaller affective than cognitive discrepancy, represented 21% of the sample. Balanced partisans with equal affective and cognitive partisan account for the remaining 11% of the sample. Since there were no clear theoretical expectations for balanced partisans and this small group seemed to be particularly susceptible to non-random response bias (answering each item in identical fashion), these respondents were excluded from further analysis. Two simple regression models validated the appropriateness of these categorizations. When overall evaluation was regressed on affect and cognition, affect was the primary determinant for affective partisans and cognition.

\textsuperscript{12}Preferred party was determined by which party received a higher score on the overall evaluation scale.
was the primary determinant for cognitive partisans (table 4.2). These results indicate that there are at least two types of partisans based on psychological response to the political parties. Whereas some persons rely primarily on cognitions in determining their overall attitude towards their preferred party, others rely more on affective response to the political parties.

A simple comparison of means and t-tests demonstrates the difference between affective and cognitive partisans on important measures of political attitudes and behavior (table 4.3). As might be expected due to a tendency to counterargue political information, cognitive partisans are more extreme in terms of ideological and issue extremity, though only significantly so in the case of issue extremity. Cognitive partisans also have a greater differentiation between the two parties than do affective partisans.

In both matters of ideology and party ratings, it thus appears that cognitive partisans more fully adopt the “party-line” than do affective partisans. These differences may arise because cognitive partisans are more reliant on political information as the basis of their partisanship. Whereas an affective partisanship can represent an emotional bond to a political party which need not have significant informational content, cognitive partisanship quite likely depends upon evaluations on information in the political arena. Attention to political information in conjunction with counterarguing to bolster partisan views may thus result in greater extremity in ideology and views of the parties.

It is not only political attitudes where cognitive and affective partisans prove to be significantly different, but they likewise prove to have differences in two specific forms

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13 While this regression may seem tautological, it is not. A consistently smaller discrepancy does not necessarily mean that the affect-evaluation scales or cognitive-evaluation scales will have greater covariation. The pattern of results therefore validates the categorizations as representing the primary basis of overall evaluation.
of political behavior—supporting their party over time and in a single election. Affective partisans are both significantly more likely to vote a straight ticket and to vote for a party’s presidential candidates over time (table 4.3). Thus, even though the cognitive partisans are clearly more ideological, this does not result in more consistent support for the party with whom they ideologically agree. Rather, it is the emotion-based, affective partisans who provide a more consistent partisan voting block within single elections and across time. This same reliance on political information for partisan political identity that results in greater ideological extremity may simultaneously make cognitive partisans more volatile in their political behavior. Whereas an affective partisan certainly uses and applies cognitive political information, it only forms a secondary role in how they view their preferred political party. For a cognitive partisan, in contrast, ever-changing political information is more likely to result in changing partisan attitudes and subsequently, less consistent partisan political behavior.

Despite the clear differences on issues and ideology, these differences do not carry over to how these partisan types assess political candidates. The feeling thermometer differential between Dole and Clinton was virtually identical for both partisan groups (t=.017, p=.985). This may suggest that, more so than for issues, candidate assessments are very much a matter of both affect and cognition (Abelson et al. 1982; Kinder 1994; Marcus 1988)

Not only might affective partisans and cognitive partisans differ on their precise attitudes and behaviors, but also the way in which their attitudes influence behaviors. If cognitive partisans are more focused on issues and ideology than are affective partisans, it follows that issue positions may have more of an impact on their vote choice than for
affective partisans. The results in table 4.4 indeed show this to be the case. In a simple logistic regression model of Democratic vote, issues are a significant explanatory factor in the vote choice of cognitive partisans, but play no role for affective partisans. Even if the issues coefficient were significant for affective partisans, the first difference in the impact of issues (one standard deviation below mean to one standard deviation above) is considerably greater for cognitive partisans. Consequently, cognitive partisans differ from affective partisans not only in their issue positions, but in their reliance upon those positions.

Dividing persons into affective and cognitive partisan categories provides telling significant results, but fails to fully take advantage of the continuous nature of the overall discrepancy scores. In the dichotomous categorizations, persons with marginally more affective than cognitive agreement with evaluation are grouped in the same category as those for whom an attitude appears to be based almost wholly on affect. Conversely, a wide range of cognitive partisans fall into a single category. If, affective based partisanship indeed does lead to greater partisan consistency and cognitive partisanship leads to greater ideological extremity, those individuals towards the extremes of each category should exhibit these traits more so than individuals towards the middle, resulting in a linear relationship. That is, as partisanship becomes increasingly based on cognition, relative to affect, ideological extremity should increase, and as partisanship becomes increasingly based on affect, partisan consistency should increase.

In order to test the preceding propositions, overall discrepancy served as an independent variable in five separate regression using self-placement ideology, issue positions, party differential, straight-ticket voting, and over-time party support as
dependent variables. All the equations except straight-ticket vote were estimated using OLS. Due to the dichotomous dependent variable, the straight-ticket voting equation employed a logit model.

To control for additional factors which could potentially be confounded with psychological partisanship, the models also included age, education, income, political knowledge, gender, and non-white/minority as control variables. Though not all these control variables have clear expectations for each dependent variable, it is important to include them to ensure that any relationships these variables may have with partisan affect and cognition do not obscure the true results. We might expect more educated respondents and more knowledgeable respondents to have more political information and thus be more ideologically extreme. Increasing education and income are correlated with political independence, which may make respondents less likely to provide consistent party support. Increasing age, in contrast, usually leads to stronger partisanship. Women and Blacks are both less likely to be independent than men and whites respectively (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998; Norrander 1997) and thus might be expected to have more partisan attitudes and behaviors.

In four of these five models, the hypotheses were confirmed, and overall discrepancy proved to be a statistically significant predictor of these dependent variables (table 4.5). Only, in the case of over-time party support did the discrepancy measure fail to achieve statistical significance (though the relationship was in the appropriate direction). These results demonstrate the continuous linear effects of type of

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14 As age becomes very high, there may be a curvilinear effect on political behaviors as persons are less able to perform life activities. Consequently, I also attempted alternative models including a term for age squared. As neither age nor age squared had significant effects, I used the model with only the age term to allow for easier interpretation.
psychological partisanship. As cognition increasingly predominates over affect in determining one's partisanship, the individual is increasingly likely to be ideological, as measured with both ideological self-placement and issue positions. In contrast, as individuals becomes increasingly affectively-oriented in their partisanship, they become significantly more likely to vote a straight ticket.

Although the strength of the relationships in the regressions is not great, many other factors beyond the psychological nature of one's partisanship determine complex political behavior and attitudes. These models nonetheless illustrate the potential importance of the psychological form of individual partisanship. Not only is affective partisanship different from cognitive partisanship, but as each type moves towards the extreme, the two become more different.

Demographic Sources of Affective and Cognitive Differences

The preceding analysis clearly show that partisanship exists in both affective and cognitive forms. Given the many political differences which are related to demographics, we might expect to find demographic relationships with the psychological bases of partisanship. In order to see if there is a different psychology of partisanship based upon gender, I examined the affective and cognitive components of partisanship separately for men and women. There were several interesting differences between how men and women perceived the parties. First, across the psychological dimensions of affect, cognition, and overall evaluation, men were uniformly more supportive of their preferred political party, than were women (table 4.6). On one level this finding was contrary to expectations, as recent evidence indicates that men are more likely to be independent than
are women (Norrander 1997). It thus appears, that despite men’s higher incidence of independence, when it comes to all forms of psychological evaluations of the parties, men actually have more positive attitudes towards parties than do women. The greatest difference between the two groups was in partisan affect—the higher partisan ratings of men appear to be especially based on emotional response to parties.

In addition to gender, respondents also provided demographic information on their age, income, and education. Though not true demographic variables, political knowledge and political interest provide similar basic information about respondents. Unlike gender, which is a categorical variable, the continuous nature of these variables allows for an examination of linear relationships. To examine these relationships, I correlated the aforementioned variables with partisan affect, cognition, and the relative affect/cognition discrepancy measure. The results of the correlations include several statistically significant relationships (table 4.7). The strongest relationship is for education. Level of education is negatively correlated both partisan cognitions and partisan affect. The relationship is considerably stronger for affect, $r = -0.228$, than for cognition, $r = -0.124$. Consequently, as individuals become more educated the balance of their partisan orientations becomes significantly more cognitive relative to affective, $r = 0.134$. Income, obviously fairly well-correlated with education, shows a somewhat similar pattern, but only the relationship between affect and income is statistically significant. Interestingly, as political interest increases, respondents are more cognitive in their partisan orientation, $r = 0.194$. Neither political knowledge nor age, however, appear to have any relation to the affective and cognitive bases of partisan attitudes. The failure for
A relationship to appear with knowledge likely results from the fact that the sample proved to be extremely knowledgeable, leading to very little variation on this variable.

Affect, Cognition, and Party Identification

Previous findings clearly indicate that partisanship can be motivated by both affect and cognition with clear differences in attitudes and behavior. Given these consequential differences, it is important to address how this conception of affective and cognitive partisans fits with our traditional party identification scale. The use of affective and cognitive measures allows us to examine the effects of both affect and cognition in determining the strength of one’s partisanship and additionally offers a potential solution to the anomalous case of partisan-leaning independents. We know that as partisan strength increases, support for one’s party on a variety of behavioral and attitudinal measures increases (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1998; Keith et al. 1992). An important exception is that of independent leaners, who on many measures, including feeling thermometer scores and partisan activity, are often just as partisan or more so than weak partisans (Keith et al. 1992; Petrocik 1974). There has been little explanation offered for this phenomenon, but that it represents some unseen psychological factor (Keith et al. 1992). The data in the present study enable us to assess the degree to which differences in the partisan groups may arise from different psychological patterns of partisan preference.

In a simple cross-tabulation of strength of party identification with psychological partisan category, it appears as if there is no relationship between partisan strength and the type of psychological partisanship (table 4.8). The relationship is suggestive, with the
percentage of cognitive partisans decreasing linearly, 73% to 63%, and affective partisans increasing linearly, 20% to 24%, as one moves from leaner to strong partisan, yet due to the cell sizes, these differences are far from significant (F(4,1) = 2.598, p = .627). The lack of a significant relationship is seemingly supported when examining overall levels of affect and cognition towards one's preferred party (table 4.9). Leaners and weak partisans appear to be virtually identical, and significantly less partisan than strong partisans, in keeping with much of Keith et al.'s (1992) findings. The results appear to support Keith et al.'s contention that leaners should be grouped with weak partisans.

It thus initially appears that the difference between leaners and partisans cannot be accounted for by differing levels of affect and cognition. The answer, however, is not that simple. As it turns out, it is not the amount of partisan affect or cognition that separates leaners from true partisans, it is the weight of affect and cognition in determining their overall partisan evaluation. When regressing overall partisan evaluation on partisan affect and cognition separately for each category of partisanship, two distinct patterns emerge (table 4.10). For all three categories, cognition actually appears to play the primary role in determining one's overall partisan attitude. This is very much in keeping with the earlier finding that the majority of the voting public are cognitive partisans. However, for leaners, the cognition coefficient is larger than it is for true partisans and the affective coefficient is much smaller and statistically insignificant. The coefficients for weak and strong partisans are quite similar—perhaps indicating one pattern of affective and cognitive attachment to party for true partisans and a separate one for partisan leaners. It thus appears that leaners represent a group where cognition is a very dominant component of partisanship, with affect playing no role, in contrast to true
partisans (both weak and strong) where cognition is the primary component of partisan evaluation, but significantly supplemented by partisan affect. The difference between weak and strong partisans lies not in how they use affect and cognition to determine their overall partisan attitudes, but rather the absolute levels of these attitude components (table 4.10).

**Discussion**

The preceding analyses demonstrate that the psychological form of partisanship can vary significantly across individuals with meaningful political consequences. Across persons there is a continuum of partisanship ranging from a partisanship based almost entirely on affect towards political parties to partisanship based almost entirely on cognitions about the political parties. Rival claims that partisanship is either socialized as an early affective attachment, or rather comes from weighing cognitive items to determine partisan attitudes fail to capture the whole picture. Modern American partisanship represents a balance of competing affective and cognitive considerations which varies considerably across individuals. For some persons, partisanship appears to be more a matter of emotional attachment to their preferred party, whereas for others partisanship is based more upon a cognitive weighing of political information. Though simple dichotomous categorizations are clearly informative, the results here clearly demonstrate that partisanship is a complex psychological attitude across the public. There is a wide range of both affective and cognitive orientation towards parties ranging from the strongly cognitive, to the strongly affective, with a variety of balances in between. Most persons fall on one side or other of this psychological continuum with important consequences for their other political attitudes and behaviors.
The significant differences between affective and cognitive partisans offer a potentially meaningful impact on how they think and behave in the modern political arena. Cognitive partisans are characterized by heightened levels of issue and ideological extremity as well as greater partisan differentiation. Despite the seemingly stronger partisanship of cognitive partisans when assessing political attitudes, when it comes to political behavior, affective partisans set themselves apart as the stronger partisans. Affective partisans prove to be more consistent in their partisans behavior, both within and across elections, by being significantly more likely to vote a straight ticket in the 1996 election as well as being more likely to support the same party in successive presidential elections. Furthermore, except for over-time party support, all these relationships appear to behave in a linear fashion. That is, the more cognition predominates in one’s attitude, the greater their ideological extremity will be, and the more affect predominates, the greater the likelihood of voting a straight party ballot.

Though cognitive partisans may in a sense be “stronger” partisans due to their greater issue extremity and partisan differentiation, it is affective partisans who may form a stable core of party supporters that the political parties can rely on to provide consistent support, both within and across elections. Cognitive partisans may behave more partisan in a particular election in response to greater attitudinal reliance on issues and party comparisons, but issues are transitory whereas an emotional attachment to a party provides a stable base for party support. Thus at any given time cognitive partisans may be stronger partisans, but they will also experience greater volatility in their partisanship due to their attitudes’ greater basis in the ever-changing political environment.
Though not to a great degree, affective and cognitive bases of partisan response are systematically related to some features of demographic background. Surprisingly, in the case of gender, men were uniformly more supportive of their preferred party, in terms of overall evaluation, affect, and cognition. The largest discrepancy between men and women occurred on partisan affect, with men's partisan attitudes appearing significantly more affectively based. Additionally, increased education appears to be related to a more cognitive-oriented partisan attitude; perhaps because education provides the cognitive resources to better evaluate politics in this manner.

Following, Chaiken, Pomerantz, and Giner-Sorolla (1995) and Edwards (1990), one might expect affective partisans to be less educated and politically knowledgeable, as increasing education and knowledge about politics likely increases a basis for cognitive partisanship. The expected relationship did indeed appear in the correlation between education and affective/cognitive balance. This relationship is in keeping with the expectation that part of the difference between affective and cognitive partisans arises from cognitive partisans' greater dependence on information as a basis of their partisanship.

So, what do all these findings mean for contemporary politics? The results have important implications for the relationships between citizens, parties, and candidates. For one, this research suggests that despite the greater ideological agreement of cognitive partisan, it is likely to be affective partisans whom the parties can count on most as a core of support. To a slight degree, women and Blacks appear to be more affectively inclined towards their preferred party. Psychological research suggests that affective partisans would best be mobilized with emotional appeals (Edwards 1990; Fabrigar and
Furthermore, to the degree that likely groups of affective and cognitive partisans can be identified, parties and candidates could selectively direct emotional appeals to affective partisans and cognitive appeals to cognitive partisans for maximum effect. Though it may prove quite difficult for parties to increase the emotional content of their supporters' partisanship, to the degree that they can, they should have a more stable and consistent base of support.

Additionally, in terms of our understanding of the role of partisanship in American politics, we can improve the explanatory power of our models by considering not only the direction and strength of partisanship, as traditionally measured, but also including the psychological basis of one's partisanship. Important matters such as split-ticket voting and ideological strength can be better understood when the psychology of individual partisanship is included.

Although it is not possible go back in time to apply these measures, it is certainly worth speculating on how changes in the psychological bases of partisanship may be related to observed changes in politics, most prominently the well-documented decline in partisanship. The evidence presented here suggests that much of the decline in partisanship and its strength may be represented by a shift from more affective to more cognitive partisanship in the electorate. Though in some sense cognitive partisans appear to be stronger in their partisanship, they are nonetheless more volatile—more likely to split their tickets and to switch parties across elections. As the increasing volatility in partisan behavior is one of the hallmarks of the decline of partisanship (Wattenberg 1996), it may very well be that fewer people have the primarily affective orientation to a political party which appears to provide greater insulation against changing political
circumstances. Perhaps the theorized weaker parent to child partisan socialization in the modern era (Beck 1974) provides the basis for affective partisanship and as this form of socialization declines as the current party system drags on, fewer and fewer citizens have the emotional content to their partisanship to provide the partisan stability in an ever-changing political world.

The results in this paper have provided significant evidence that there are at least two distinct ways in which individuals psychologically relate to political parties. The analyses have also demonstrated that affect and cognition contribute differentially depending upon the political attitude or behavior under study. The results have also shown that some of these differences have some small basis in demographics. Among the shortcomings in these analyses, the small numbers in this study prevented an examination of balanced partisans—those whose partisanship is equally based on affect and cognition. A larger, more thorough dataset is required to give these individuals their due. Finally, for some individuals, partisanship may be primarily a matter of social identification, regardless of affect and cognition. This possibility will be explored in the following chapters. The analyses here nonetheless suggest the utility of considering the affective and cognitive bases of partisan attitudes.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological Type</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective Partisans</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>20.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Partisans</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>68.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced Partisans</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>269</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1: Types of Psychological Partisans**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affective Partisans</th>
<th>Cognitive Partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.803*</td>
<td>.938*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.316)</td>
<td>(.131)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>.725*</td>
<td>.120*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.157)</td>
<td>(.044)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>-.178</td>
<td>.697*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.143)</td>
<td>(.048)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.769</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, one-tailed test, standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients.

**Table 4.2: Overall Partisan Evaluation as a function of Affect and Cognition for Partisan Types**
### Table 4.3: Affective and Cognitive Partisan Issue and Behavior Comparisons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Affective Partisans</th>
<th>First Difference*</th>
<th>Cognitive Partisans</th>
<th>First Difference*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.629</td>
<td>3.923*</td>
<td>(6.327)</td>
<td>(1.553)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Assessment</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>.081*</td>
<td>(.308)</td>
<td>(.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issues</td>
<td>-.851</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>-.781*</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.657)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(.331)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2 Log Likelihood</td>
<td>73.454</td>
<td>240.705</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Correctly Predicted</td>
<td>94.34</td>
<td>92.61</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R²</td>
<td>.718</td>
<td>.605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, one-tailed test, standard errors are in parentheses
Note: First Difference is the difference in probability of voting for Clinton when issues varies from 1 standard deviation below to 1 standard deviation above the mean.

### Table 4.4: Logistic Regression of Issues on Vote for Affective and Cognitive Partisans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological Extremity</th>
<th>Issue Extremity</th>
<th>Straight Ticket Vote</th>
<th>Party Support</th>
<th>Party Difference</th>
<th>Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective Partisans</td>
<td>4.81</td>
<td>4.51</td>
<td>.57</td>
<td>3.87</td>
<td>4.04</td>
<td>2.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Partisans</td>
<td>5.07</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>.43</td>
<td>3.57</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td>2.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference</td>
<td>-.26</td>
<td>-.36*</td>
<td>.14*</td>
<td>.30*</td>
<td>-.93*</td>
<td>-.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates difference in rows is significant at p<.05, one-tailed test
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideological Extremity</th>
<th>Issue Extremity</th>
<th>Straight Ticket Vote</th>
<th>Party Support</th>
<th>Party Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy</td>
<td>.113*</td>
<td>-.197*</td>
<td>-.062</td>
<td>.322*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.057)</td>
<td>(.111)</td>
<td>(.056)</td>
<td>(.162)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.143*</td>
<td>-.163</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>-.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.078)</td>
<td>(.147)</td>
<td>(.076)</td>
<td>(.221)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-.021</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>-.058</td>
<td>-.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.064)</td>
<td>(.123)</td>
<td>(.062)</td>
<td>(.181)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-.176</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>-.177</td>
<td>-.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.151)</td>
<td>(.286)</td>
<td>(.148)</td>
<td>(.426)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.009)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonwhite</td>
<td>-.702*</td>
<td>1.034*</td>
<td>.227</td>
<td>.584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.236)</td>
<td>(.473)</td>
<td>(.228)</td>
<td>(.668)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.741*</td>
<td>.228</td>
<td>3.736</td>
<td>6.771</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.468)</td>
<td>(.884)</td>
<td>(.455)</td>
<td>(1.305)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, one-tailed test, standard errors are in parentheses.
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients

Table 4.5: Regressions of Overall Discrepancy on Key Attitudes and Behaviors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Attitude</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>3.15</td>
<td>3.58</td>
<td>-.43*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>-.69*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>3.11</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>-.48*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, two-tailed test

Table 4.6: Components of Overall Partisan Evaluation by Gender
### Table 4.7: Correlations of Demographic Factors with Affect and Cognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aff/Cog</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Interest</th>
<th>Income</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aff/Cog</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>-.433*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>-.008</td>
<td>.785*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.134*</td>
<td>-.228*</td>
<td>-.124*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.194*</td>
<td>-.010</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>-.163*</td>
<td>-.069</td>
<td>.408*</td>
<td>-.131*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, two-tailed test

### Table 4.8: Types of Psychological Partisans and Partisan Strength

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychological Type</th>
<th>All Partisans (%)</th>
<th>Leaners (%)</th>
<th>Weak Partisans (%)</th>
<th>Strong Partisans (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective</td>
<td>22 (55)</td>
<td>20 (12)</td>
<td>22 (22)</td>
<td>24 (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive</td>
<td>67 (168)</td>
<td>73 (44)</td>
<td>68 (67)</td>
<td>63 (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balanced</td>
<td>11 (28)</td>
<td>7 (4)</td>
<td>10 (10)</td>
<td>13 (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>100 (251)</td>
<td>100 (60)</td>
<td>100 (99)</td>
<td>100 (92)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries indicate percentage of row heading which is each type of psychological partisan. Numbers in parentheses are numbers of respondents. Cell totals are less than in table 4.1 because this table excludes pure independents and apartisans who were earlier classified as partisans on the basis of their responses to party evaluation measures.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Strength</th>
<th>Evaluation</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Leaner</td>
<td>2.83*</td>
<td>1.30*</td>
<td>3.00*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Partisan</td>
<td>2.96*</td>
<td>1.30*</td>
<td>3.02*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Partisan</td>
<td>4.10+</td>
<td>2.87+</td>
<td>4.28+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Within same column, values with * are statistically distinct from values with + at \( p \leq 0.05 \)

**Table 4.9: Evaluation, Affect, and Cognition for Preferred Political Party by Party Identification Strength**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Independent Leaner</th>
<th>Weak Partisans</th>
<th>Strong Partisans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.357 (.243)</td>
<td>.714* (.198)</td>
<td>.840* (.295)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>.072 (.076)</td>
<td>.279* (.065)</td>
<td>.176* (.069)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>.783* (.089)</td>
<td>.602* (.075)</td>
<td>.647* (.092)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( R^2 )</td>
<td>.741</td>
<td>.740</td>
<td>.663</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * \( p \leq 0.05 \), one-tailed test, standard errors are in parentheses
Note: Cell entries are unstandardized OLS coefficients

**Table 4.10: Regressions of Affect and Cognition on Preferred Party Evaluation by Partisan Strength**
CHAPTER 5

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND PARTISANSHIP

Introduction

The findings in the previous chapter provide an enhanced understanding of the attitudinal bases of partisanship. Attitudes towards political parties consist of both affective and cognitive components which vary across persons in their intensity and their impact on political behavior. Partisan attitudes can not be strictly characterized as purely affective or purely cognitive across the population. Though these findings further define and clarify what it means to be a partisan, they do not answer as to just what entirely this partisan attitude is toward. Is partisanship a favorable attitude towards policies, candidates, and abstract concepts? I argue here, that to a considerable degree, partisanship is characterized by social identification with a political party as a meaningful psychological group to which one belongs. In other words, a fundamental aspect of partisanship is one’s sense of belonging to a political party. By considering the social identity aspects of partisanship in addition to the affective and cognitive bases of partisan attitudes, greater understanding of the psychological meaning and role of partisanship is possible.

Since The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960) first described party identification as a central component of political behavior, the concept has been
continually challenged, redefined, and modified. Yet very few efforts have been made to further examine the group aspect of party identification as explicitly discussed by Campbell et al. The original conception of party identification in *The American Voter* is a precursor of social identity theory years ahead of its time. The authors essentially state that just as people identify with various, racial, ethnic, and religious groups, so too do they identify with political parties. Campbell et al. clearly recognized the importance of group attachment in partisanship, what they were lacking was the implications this could yield from a fully developed theory of social identification.

In this chapter, I contend that social identification with a political party is an important additional element of partisanship. Social identity theory attempts to explain how self-perceived membership in a social group affects social perceptions and attitudes. The theory holds that individuals attempt to maximize differences between in-group and out-group and thus perceive greater differences between one’s in-group and the relevant out-group than actually exist and show favoritism toward in-group members (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Importantly, these social identifications are not based on any formal group membership, but rather self-perceived membership in a particular group. Given the largely informal membership in American political parties and the already apparent perceptual biases discovered in political partisanship, social identity presents a powerful paradigm through which to examine party identification in the American context.
Explaining Partisan Attitudes and Behavior with Social Identity

A fairly persistent feature of partisanship is its bipolar nature among the majority of the electorate.\(^{15}\) For most people, a clear preference for one party goes hand-in-hand with a negative attitude towards the opposition party. Though strong negative attitudes towards the opposition party have traditionally been interpreted as a result of selective perception and party identification as a perceptual screen (Campbell et al. 1960, Zaller 1992), the social comparison aspect of social identity theory offers a more theoretically rich explanation. Campbell et al. provide us the “perceptual screen” but fail to offer a compelling explanation for why it should exist. A social identity perspective posits that the perceptual screen exists in service to a self esteem/social comparison motive.

Following from the group differentiation aspect of social identity theory, the group nature of partisanship should naturally create a bipolar partisanship where individuals characterize the political parties into \textit{us} and \textit{them} and perceive them accordingly. Thus bipolar partisan perceptions, that is the amount of differentiation between perceptions of the parties, should increase with strength of partisan social identity. In social identity theory, bipolar partisan attitudes are a natural psychological outgrowth of self-perceived membership in a political party. Though a perceptual screen and selective perception may be in operation, social identity theory provides a motivational basis; selective perception operates to maximize intergroup differentiation. The traditional approach simply offers us a perceptual screen, but does not tell us why it should exist. Social

\(^{15}\) Weisberg (1980) argues that attitudes towards the Democratic and Republican parties actually represent separate dimension, rather than a bipolar continuum, but Green and Citrin (1988) argue persuasively that Weisberg’s findings are the result of non-random measurement error and that a single bipolar dimension in fact exists. Wattenberg (1996) has argued that the citizens increasingly feel neutral, rather than negative towards the opposition party, yet this still represents a minority of the population. Furthermore, Stanga and
identity theory explains that the perceptual screen, by increasing intergroup distinctiveness, heightens self esteem through belonging to the in-group. Social identity theory provides a motivational basis for the perceptual patterns of partisanship.

In social identity theory, intergroup differentiation occurs in two primary ways: in-group favoritism and out-group derogation (Brewer and Brown 1998). In-group favoritism simply refers to the tendency for group members to mentally exaggerate and enhance the favorable qualities of the relevant in-group to which they see themselves belonging. Out-group derogation, in contrast, is exaggeration of the negative characteristics of relevant out-groups, thereby also making one's in-group seem superior. The net result of either process is enhanced group differentiation. Interestingly, in-group favoritism and out-group derogation need not co-occur. Across many studies the expected link between the two is tenuous at best (Brewer and Brown). Rather, intergroup differentiation can be predominantly driven by either process, depending upon circumstances. Consequently, in the case of partisanship, we may expect either or both processes to be a prime causal factor behind bipolar partisan attitudes.

In recent years, scholars have argued that there has been a decline in the bipolar pattern of partisan attitudes. Wattenberg (1996) contends that persons are becoming increasingly neutral towards both the parties. From a social identity perspective, this is likewise understandable. More and more, Americans are declining to join groups and engaging in less civic participation (e.g., Putnam 1995). Consequently, the group aspect of partisanship should have likely also suffered a decline. Thus, a decrease in bipolar partisan attitudes may represent, to some degree, a weakening in partisan social identity.

Sheffield (1987) using a more refined measurement technique, found that Wattenberg’s earlier analyses
Unfortunately, since the data here were collected in early 1997 and no similar measures of partisan social identity extend back in time, this can only be speculation.

Partisan social identity has the potential to affect not only partisan attitudes, but partisan behaviors as well. Certainly group-oriented political activities, e.g., attending rallies, party meetings, may be favored as partisan social identity increases. Beyond positive sentiment towards a party, a meaningful sense of group membership should encourage one to act on that party's behalf. The relationship may also be reciprocal to some degree; persons who engage in partisan political activities should be more likely to consider themselves a member of the group. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and others have clearly demonstrated the myriad factors behind political participation, but partisan social identity adds a heretofore unexamined factor which may also account for levels of political participation.

Like affective-oriented partisans, it may also be reasonable to expect individuals with stronger partisan social identity to more consistently support their preferred party at the ballot box. Increasing partisan social identity should lead to greater differentiation between the parties, thus making defection from one's preferred party less likely. The greater one's social identity with a political party, the more the opposition party should be seen as a disliked other, and consequently not worthy of one's vote. Additionally, the greater the level of group identification, the more a defection from one's party at the ballot box becomes a betrayal of one's own in-group. Thus, we might expect that as one's partisan social identity increases they should be more likely to vote a straight ticket, significantly understate bipolarity.
vote for their party’s presidential candidate, and vote for their party more consistently across elections.

Higher partisan social identity may also influence levels of partisan political activity. Many partisan activities are group activities, e.g., attending meetings, rallies, other forms of volunteering. Certainly the commitment to the party as a group should foster participation in such activities. Furthermore, on other activities, whether group-oriented or not, e.g., contributing money, trying to persuade others how to vote, the increased differentiation between the two parties provides more incentive to work for one’s own party. Along with behavior at the ballot box, we might expect higher levels of partisan civic participation as social identity increases.

Social Identity and Gender

As with affect and cognition in chapter 4, we should also expect to find significant relationships between one’s gender and partisan social identity. In a landmark work, Carol Gilligan (1983) proposed that women and men relate to the social world in very different ways. She argued that for women, the social world is composed of an interwoven web of relationships, more so than for men. Women are thus more concerned with others and have a greater group basis for social life than do men. In the political world, recent findings indicate that not only are women more likely to be Democrats than men, they are more likely to affiliate with a party in general (Burden and Greene 1998; Norrander 1997). An increased tendency for women to identify as partisans may result from the heightened group orientation as theorized by Gilligan (1993). On the
psychological level, this gender difference could potentially be attributed to greater social identification with parties on the part of women.

**The Dimensionality of Partisanship and the Party Identification Scale**

Social identity also offers the potential to explain both partisanship and political independence within a single coherent framework. Weisberg (1980) and others (e.g., Alvarez 1990; Dennis 1988) have argued that the traditional seven-point categorization of partisanship forces two separate attitudinal dimensions—partisanship and independence—onto a single bipolar scale. They argue that, to a considerable degree, attitudes towards parties and attitudes towards political independence are separate and distinct. Social identity offers a new perspective on what appears to be two quasi-distinct dimensions of partisanship and independence. Certainly we should expect that many persons will have a clear partisan social identity. However, given the strong civic virtue and social norms placed upon political independence, it may be that either in addition to, or in place of, a social identification with a political party, some citizens may also socially identify with other political independents. Though “political independents” do not represent a clear social group in the way that Democrats or Republicans do, this fact does not preclude citizens having some rough mental conception of independents as a group. Given the pervasive media treatment of independents as homogenous entity and the fact that in many states persons can register as “independent,” just as they would as a Republican or Democrat, it may not be too far-fetched for some citizens to conceive of independents as just another political group to which they do or do not belong.
The social identity approach allows us not only to examine the partisan social identity of citizens, but also any identity they may have with other political independents. Under a multidimensional approach to partisanship, partisan and independent social identifications need not be mutually exclusive. Social identity in combination with a multidimensional view of partisanship thus offers a potential explanation for the seemingly incongruous behavior and self identification of partisan leaners (Keith et al. 1992, Petrocik 1974). As discussed in chapter 2, many persons identify themselves as “independent” in the first part of the party identification question but then admit to preferring one party over the other. These “leaners” are often just as partisan, if not more so, than weak partisans despite identifying themselves as independents. The coexistence of partisan and independent social identifications offers possible insight into the unique combination of identification and behavior in these individuals. An independent social identification may exist somewhat independently of a partisan social identification and cause an individual to identify as an independent, yet not prevent the person from behaving in a partisan fashion. In the multidimensional perspective, this does not entail that the person has no partisan social identification, but rather that independent social identification may prove more personally relevant in the realm of politics. Consequently, we might expect that leaners are marked by a greater independent social identification than true partisans and most likely less partisan social identification.

Measures

The key measure throughout subsequent analyses is partisan social identification. Social identity is measured using Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) Identification with a
Psychological Group (IDPG) scale as described in chapter 3. The partisan social identification scale consists of responses to ten questions assessing the cognitive and emotional attachment to a particular group. Respondents completed this scale only for their preferred political party. Additionally, all respondents completed the IDPG scale with "people who call themselves political independents" as the reference group, in order to measure any independent social identification. Respondents indicated how much they agreed with the statements, e.g., "this group's successes are my successes," on a scale from 0, strongly disagree, to 3, strongly agree. Two straightforward summary social identification measures were created. For both partisan and independent social identity, respondents received the mean score, from 0 to 3, of their ten responses to the IDPG scale. Higher scores indicate greater social identity.

Throughout the analyses, both partisan and independent social identities use continuous scales. This follows both conceptually and empirically from previous studies on social identity. Social identity with a group is conceived of as a sense of group membership which one has to a greater or lesser degree. Rarely, if at all, is social identification categorized in a dichotomous sense, by the presence or absence of a social identity with a particular group. Whenever dichotomized, persons are grouped as having high or low social identity with a particular group—not the presence or absence. Though it would be interesting to compare persons with a partisan social identity to those without such an identity, existing psychological literature provides no guidance as to where such a conceptual cut-point should be.

Additional measures used in the analyses include the standard two-party party identification question, feeling thermometers for the two parties, candidate feeling
thermometers, ideological extremity, issue-based ideological extremity, partisan activity index, party vote over time, and demographic measures. For a complete explanation of any measures see chapter 3 and Appendix B.

Analyses

Partisan and Independent Social Identity

The first step in the analysis is to examine how successfully the IDPG scale was able to measure partisan social identity. Although Mael and Tetrick (1992) and Brewer and Silver (1999) have tested the reliability and validity of the IDPG measure under other circumstances, it is important to do so here with political parties and political independents as the reference groups. I computed Cronbach’s alpha scores in order to determine the reliability of the measure. The IDPG scale actually measures social identity on two dimensions: shared characteristics and shared experiences. Consequently, in a factor analysis we should expect to see the ten items load on two dimensions.

The IDPG scale functions as intended in measuring both partisan and independent social identity. The Cronbach’s alpha for the ten questions of the IDPG as applied to one’s preferred political party is .85. For the scale applied to independents, the alpha is .86. These figures obviously indicate that the IDPG measure is equally reliable for both partisan and independent social identity, but more importantly, that these are very reliable scales well above the desired .80 threshold (Carmines and Zeller 1979). Furthermore, in a principal components factor analysis both scales load on two dimensions, as expected.

Now that we know the scale reliably measures social identity in the political context, this leads us then to the question of what exactly are the levels of partisan and
independent social identity and how are they distributed across the population. These results are presented in table 5.1. Across the sample of respondents, partisan social identity presents a nearly classic normal distribution. Mean social identity falls just above the midpoint (1.5) of the scale at 1.55. The median is right at the midpoint, 1.50.

Breaking the scale into thirds, presents the vast majority of respondents, 72%, in the middle third and nearly equal numbers falling on both the high and low sides. Respondents’ levels of partisan social identification spanned the whole range of the scale from 0 to 3. It certainly appears then that there is a wide distribution of and meaningful variation in partisan social identity across the public.

The descriptive statistics also indicate that an independent social identification is likely not very meaningful to much of the public. The mean and median responses were both near 1, thus fully half the sample falls in the bottom possible third of independent social identification. Only 1% falls in the top possible third and the highest score any respondent received was only 2.3. It should not be too surprising that independent social identification scores were so much lower than partisan social identity. Political parties represent real and meaningful groups that any person could potentially readily identify with in a way not true for political independents. Furthermore, except for pure independents, the vast majority of the public still has clear partisan preferences. Nonetheless, half the sample fell in the range of at least moderate independent social identity.
Social Identity and Political Perceptions

A key test for the role of social identity in partisanship is that as partisan social identity increases respondents should be more likely to evidence perceptual exaggerations towards both parties. As partisan social identity increases, persons should exhibit in-group favoritism and have a better opinion of their party. Similarly, we might expect to see out-group derogation, and more negative opinions towards the opposition party as social identity increases. In order to test these predictions of social identity theory, I ran a series of regressions using partisan social identity as a key independent variable. To examine the effects of social identity on in-group favoritism, I used preferred party feeling thermometer as the dependent variable. Conversely, to assess out-group derogation the non-preferred party feeling thermometer served as the dependent variable. Finally, I included a dependent variables to measure the total effects of social identity on differentiation between the parties: preferred party minus non-preferred party feeling thermometer.

Not surprisingly, strength of partisan social identity is considerably correlated with partisan strength traditionally measured (r=.3, p<.001), but to convincingly demonstrate that social identity represents an independent aspect of partisan perceptions, partisan strength, measured using the folded Michigan index, and ideological extremity were included as additional independent variables. Under a realistic group conflict perspective (e.g., Sherif 1966), those with a greater ideological investment in the party might be inclined to favor them more. We should expect conservatives to favor Republicans more and liberals to like Democrats more, regardless of their social identity.
Similarly, the traditional measure of partisan strength presents an additional rival explanation for increased differentiation between the two parties. A significant coefficient for social identity in the presence of these controls would indicate that the perceptual phenomena evoked by a partisan social identification account for bipolar partisan attitudes above and beyond simple partisan strength and ideology. Although the multidimensional perspective would hold independent and partisan social identification to be largely independent of each other, I included independent social identification to assess whether this orientation might decrease differentiation between the two parties. As with the models in chapter 4, political interest, political knowledge, education, income, gender, race, and age were included as additional control variables.

The results of the first regression model clearly bear out the expectations from social identity theory with regard to in-group favoritism (table 5.2). Partisan social identity has considerable statistical and substantive significance. The coefficient, 8.87, is significant at the p=.001 level and indicates that for each one point move on the 0-3 social identity scale, the feeling thermometer towards one’s preferred party increases by nearly 10 points. Importantly, this is controlling for partisan strength and ideological strength, which both proved to be statistically significant as well. In fact, both measured on 0 to 3 scales, the impact of social identity is twice that of partisan strength. The social identity tenet of in-group favoritism is clearly borne out within this model. Interestingly, independent social identification had a significant downward impact on in-party favoritism. Although partisan and independent social identity do not appear to be at all correlated (r=.031, p=.632), independent social identity appears to detract from partisanship by reducing the amount of favoritism for one’s preferred party.
The second model examined the impact of social identity on out-group derogation. Although one might initially think the relationship should be reciprocal, levels of in-group favoritism and out-group derogation are largely independent (Brewer and Brown 1998). Thus it is worthwhile to examine separately the contribution of out-group derogation to overall intergroup differentiation. The model is identical to the previous, except that the dependent variable is the feeling thermometer for the opposition party, rather than one's preferred party.

The results from this model most clearly demonstrate that in-group favoritism and out-group derogation need not be reciprocally related. While partisan social identity proves to be a dominant factor in how one perceives their preferred political party, it does not have a statistically significant impact on how they perceive the opposition party. The coefficient is in the negative direction, but much smaller than its standard error. Interestingly, partisan strength did not significantly impact the dependent variable, either. Ideological strength, then, was left as the sole political variable driving down ratings of the opposition party.

The final model in the series assesses the impact of social identity on overall differentiation between the parties, that is preferred party feeling thermometer minus opposition party feeling thermometer. The independent variables remain the same as in the previous two models. Due to its significant impact on own-party ratings, it is not at all surprising that partisan social identity is again a significant explanatory factor. As before, ideological strength is again an additional significant variable. Partisan strength falls just short of statistical significance (p=.051, one-tailed), but even more importantly, its substantive impact on the feeling thermometer differential (b=4.42) is dwarfed by the
influence of partisan social identity (b=11.39). The series of three models in table 5.2 thus fairly clearly demonstrates that partisan social identity in the form of intergroup differentiation is indeed a dominant cause of bipolar partisan attitudes and that this is accomplished predominantly through in-group favoritism more than out-group derogation.

Although social identity and attendant perceptual biases are directed towards the political party as a group, we might also expect partisan social identity to impact presidential candidates. In an election year, the presidential candidates serve as very visible symbols of their respective parties. Consequently, some of the same perceptual influences which affect views of the two parties may influence how the candidates are viewed as well. In order to test this proposition, I ran three regression models analogous to the party differential models, but using candidate feeling thermometers instead. In this case, the three dependent variables were preferred party candidate feeling thermometer, opposition party candidate thermometer, and the differential between the two. The same set of independent variables was used to estimate these models.

The results from these models follow largely the same pattern as the models with party feeling thermometers as the dependent variables (table 5.3). Partisan social identity was in fact statistically significant in all 3 models. It appeared to significantly impact not only own party candidate rating and inter-candidate differentiation, but opposition candidate derogation as well. The coefficients were again quite sizable, indicating a substantive political impact. As before, ideological extremity likewise played an important role in candidate evaluations. Independent social identity did not significantly impact candidate favoritism or derogation, but did significantly affect overall candidate
differential. The series of models in table 5.3 indicates that partisan social identity plays an important role in not only what one thinks about the two parties, but their symbolic leaders as well.

If partisan social identity has this impact on political attitudes, beyond the specific boundaries of in-group and out-group and on to political candidates, we might expect it to influence issue positions and ideology as well. According to optimal distinctiveness theory persons try and perceive the in-group as clearly distinct from (and presumably better than) the out-group on key characteristics (Brewer and Brown 1998). A primary way for partisans to differentiate themselves from members of the other party is to become more ideological. Thus we might expect increased social identity to lead to increased ideological extremity in the direction of one's preferred party. To examine this proposition, I ran regression models with ideological extremity (based on liberal-conservative self placement) and issue extremity (based on self placement on actual issues) as dependent variables. The independent variables were the same as in the previous models, except that here, of course, ideological extremity did not serve as an independent variable.

The results from these two models indeed confirm the importance of partisan social identity in shaping political attitudes (table 5.4). In both models, partisan social identity is a statistically and substantively significant predictor of ideological extremity. Partisan strength, in contrast, does not quite achieve statistical significance in the first model and falls far short in the second. More importantly, the size of the coefficients for

\footnote{Perhaps an even superior test would be to examine the relationship between partisan social identity and the relative placement of the two parties (e.g., Kelly 1988). Unfortunately, the data for such an analysis are not present in the dataset used here.}

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partisan social identity are substantially greater than that of the coefficients for partisan strength. As in the candidate evaluation models, independent social identity does not play a significant explanatory role.

Social Identity and Partisan Political Activity

Given the considerable impact of partisan social identity on political perceptions, it may affect certain forms of political behavior as well. We might expect that as partisan social identity increases, political participation in support of one's chosen party would also increase. Although social identity theory deals primarily with perceptions, the in-group favoritism clearly evidenced in the previous analyses presents a likely influence on one's behavior.

To assess the impact of partisan social identification on political behavior, regression models were run on two measures of partisan political behavior. The first measures overall partisan activity in terms of attending rallies, attempting to persuade others, placing yard signs, etc; in other words, activities which represent active support for the party, rather than just voting. The second measure is voting support for that party across elections. Partisan social identity again serves as the key independent variable. As with previous models partisan intensity and demographics provide controls. Unlike the previous models, independent social identity and ideological extremity are not included. Although independent social identity may affect partisan perceptions, it seems

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17 Ideally, straight ticket vote and vote for the presidential candidate of one's party should be included as dependent variables as well. Unfortunately, neither of these variables were significantly correlated with partisan social identity. In the case of voting for the presidential candidate of the respondent's preferred party, nearly 90% of the valid responses did so. This reduced the possible variation making it difficult to achieve significant results.
unlikely that it should diminish partisan activities where a coincident partisan identity exists. As for ideological extremity, neither it or similar measures appear to influence political participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

The results from these two models demonstrate that not only does social identity affect political perceptions, but important partisan behaviors as well (table 5.5). Partisan social identity is statistically and substantively significant in each model. In the case of partisan political activities, a person at the top of the social identity scale would participate in fully three more activities than someone at the bottom. The results from over-time voting are not as strong, but nonetheless statistically significant. As before, these findings persist controlling for partisan strength, thus implicating the group identity aspect of partisanship as a key element in behavior.

Social Identity and Gender

Gender and race present the two most readily identifiable demographic groupings to be related to social identity. The simplest test to determine if indeed women have a greater partisan social identity than men and Blacks a greater identity than whites is a comparison of the mean social identity scores for these groups. The comparisons of means and attendant t-tests present surprising findings (table 5.6). Men and women score virtually identically on partisan social identity ($\bar{x} = 1.58$ for men, $\bar{x} = 1.54$ for women). Despite the contention that women are more group-oriented (Gilligan 1983) there initially appears to be no difference with regards to partisan social identification.

Although women initially appear to be no different from men in their partisan social identity, that is not the end of the story. Even if the relative levels of partisan
social identity are indistinguishable based on gender, it remains possible that partisan social identity, at whatever level it may be, has a greater impact on the partisanship of women than of men. To test this possibility, I regressed overall partisan evaluation (as measured with semantic scales) on partisan social identity, partisan affect, and partisan cognition, separately for men and women. The results of this regression indeed indicated that social identity plays a significantly greater role for women than men in forming one’s overall partisan evaluation (table 5.7). Whereas social identity was statistically and substantively insignificant for men (b=.01, p=.45), social identity played a considerable and statistically significant explanatory role in women’s partisanship (b=.42, p=.03).

Social Identity and the Party Identification Scale

As hypothesized earlier, a social identity perspective including partisan and independent social identifications can potentially bring further understanding to our traditional seven-point party identification scale. It especially offers the potential explanation for the pattern of intransitivities seen in the scale. In order to examine the relationship between social identity and the traditional party identification scale, I conducted simple comparisons of means and t-tests, first for all seven partisan categories and then separately for the folded four-category scale. Additionally, I computed the correlations between partisan strength and partisan and independent social identity.

The basic comparisons of social identity across different categories of partisanship present several interesting findings (tables 5.8 and 5.9). In table 5.8, mean social identity by the seven categories of party identification, a clear u-shaped pattern of partisan social identity emerges with strong Democrats and Republicans having the most
social identity, followed by weak partisans, followed by the leaners. Pure independents
do not have a partisan social identity since their failure to indicate a preference for either
party precluded them from completing the partisan social identity scale. There are no
significant differences of partisan social identity within a particular strength of
partisanship. It does appear, then, that social identity is a meaningful part of the standard
party identification index which indeed has the transitive properties for which we should
expect. The pattern is the mirror image for independent social identification. Here, pure
independents and leaners score the highest whereas independent identity tails off as we
move to strong Democrats and Republicans. Again, as with partisan social identity, there
are no significant differences of independent social identity within a particular strength of
partisanship. Furthermore, Democratic and Republican leaners are statistically
indistinguishable from each other and pure independents. Thus, as far as an independent
social identity goes, leaners are independents and not partisans.

Since there were no significant differences between Democrats and Republicans
at any level of partisanship, table 5.9 collapses respondents across party based on strength
of party identification. The findings here reconfirm those in the previous table. There
are two clear transitive patterns: as partisan strength increases, partisan social identity
increases; and as partisan strength increases, independent social identity decreases. The
sole apparent exception is the independent social identification of pure independents and
leaners, but this is not a statistically distinct difference, unlike all the other differences
between categories. This dual pattern presents evidence that although leaners behave in a
consistently partisan manner, their failure to identify as partisans may very well result
from a relative deficit of partisan social identity and surplus of independent social identity as compared to avowed partisans.

Finally, the correlations in table 5.10 clearly support the transitive pattern seen in table 5.9. Partisan social identity is correlated with partisan strength at a healthy $r = .48$. Independent social identity, in contrast, has a negative correlation with partisan strength at $r = -.25$. Interestingly, though, partisan and independent social identity are not significantly correlated, $(r = .03)$. Green's (1988) findings raise the possibility, however, that the correlation is attenuated due to measurement error and therefore suggest that this null finding not be considered definitive.

Discussion

On the whole, the findings here clearly indicate that we can learn much by applying social identity theory to American partisanship. Perhaps, most importantly, when we think about what partisanship truly is, we need to consider the group component. Campbell et al. (1960) clearly recognized this four decades ago when they spoke about the sense of belonging in partisanship. Yet subsequent scholars have been remiss to consider the implications of this group aspect of partisan belonging. Social identity theory, initially developed well after *The American Voter* 's psychological grounding of party identification, provides a compelling theoretical perspective from which to reinterpret the meaning and implications of party identification. In this chapter, I have attempted to demonstrate that by considering partisan social identification in addition to our standard measure of partisanship, we can better explain and predict certain political perceptions and behaviors which arise from partisanship.
When it comes to social identification with a political party, a substantial majority of respondents fall in the range of moderate social identity. Very few fall in the upper and lower ranges. As individuals with no partisan preference did not indicate a partisan social identity, this would imply that on the whole, substantially more persons have a weak partisan social identification than have a strong one. Partisan social identification appears to be an important and meaningful, but not dominant, element of one's party identification. Although no measures of partisan social identity exist over time, the overall moderate degree of social identification and relatively low numbers of respondents near the top of the scale may suggest that partisan social identity has fallen in recent decades and is a contributing factor to weaker partisan attitudes.

The comparison between partisan and independent social identifications clearly indicates that despite widespread independence among the electorate, political independence lacks the same basis in social identification as does partisanship. Although some individuals appear to have a moderate level of independent identification, virtually nobody feels a strong group loyalty towards other political independents. Despite nearly a third of the electorate identifying themselves as independents, an independent social identification does not provide the basis for influencing independent political attitudes to nearly the degree that partisan social identification has the potential to shape partisan attitudes and behaviors.

The first series of regression models in this chapter demonstrated that partisan social identification can indeed explain why most citizens tend to view their own party positively and the other negatively. The strength of one's partisanship and ideological intensity are certainly contributing factors, but as social identity theory predicts, greater
Social identification leads to a perception of greater differences (here measured with feeling thermometers) between the relevant in-group and out-group. Social identity theory holds that intergroup differentiation can be caused by either increased in-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both. Interestingly, in the case of political parties, it appears that intergroup differentiation is caused essentially by in-group favoritism, the heightened preference for one's own party. The negative aspect, out-group derogation, was driven primarily by ideological intensity.

Not only partisan social identity, but independent social identity as well had a significant effect in these models. As with partisan identity, independent identity played a significant role in in-group favoritism and intergroup differentiation, but not out-group derogation. Although there is much evidence elsewhere and even here that partisanship and independence are separate dimensions, this finding adds to the argument that this is not necessarily the case. An independent social identification attenuated the differences that persons perceived between groups, as one would expect if independence was simply the opposite of partisanship. It did this primarily through reducing the favoritism towards one's own party—again, something we should expect in a unidimensional framework.

Not only does partisan social identity influence political perceptions, it appeared to influence partisan behavior as well. As partisan social identity increased, respondents were more likely to engage in partisan-oriented activities, such as attending rallies and wearing buttons, as well as to vote for that party across elections. Thus the group identity aspect of partisanship seems to contribute to partisan activity above and beyond partisan strength. Social identity theory does not offer clear predictions of why this should be the case. Possible explanations for this relationship are that the perceptual biases cause
individuals to behave in a more partisan manner. Additionally, as partisan social identification increases, defection from the party may become more psychologically difficult, as one hypothesized effect of group belonging is increased self esteem.

The findings that partisan social identification affects political perceptions and behavior has real consequences for political parties. Tajfel (1978) has shown in the minimal groups paradigm that it takes only the slightest categorization to invoke a group social identity. Consequently, it would seem that political parties need not go to great lengths to induce social identification in their supporters. However, the results here clearly show the benefits a party stands to accrue by fostering a strong social identification among its members. Any actions that political parties can take to heighten social identification with the party and to stimulate the use of partisan categories among their rank and file can create a more partisan, more active group of supporters. Existing research suggests that emphasizing group distinctiveness and emphasizing similarity and interdependence of group members should lead to increased group categorization (Brewer and Brown 1998).

Interestingly, political parties perhaps have the most to gain by focusing on their own distinctiveness. Since in America both parties represent broad cross-sections of the public, the only area for which the parties to truly set themselves apart is ideology. Consequently, to maximize the social identification of party members and presumably increase their partisan attitudes and behavior, the parties should take distinct and divergent political stands. Of course this places them in a classic tension with Downs’ (1957) median voter theorem which suggests the parties should converge at the median voter. Perhaps one of the reasons parties do not converge at the center is because of the
benefits they receive from increased social identification of their members when they take distinct ideological stands. The increased partisan attitudes, partisan consistency, and activities in support of the party among those with meaningful levels of partisan social identity may outweigh the costs to the parties in taking more ideological stances. Those with greater partisan social identity are more likely to both participate in the primaries and to have more extreme ideologies, thereby contributing towards moving the parties away from the median voter.

The examination of partisan social identity also had interesting implications for the relationships between gender and partisanship. An important finding on gender, in keeping with previous theoretical speculations, was that partisan social identity formed a key component of overall partisan evaluation for women, but not for men. Although the absolute levels of social identity were nearly identical for men and women, social identity was a statistically significant contributor to partisanship for women, but not men. This is in keeping with Gilligan's (1983) proposition that women are more group oriented than men and would seem to suggest that, relative to men, women respond to political parties in a group-oriented fashion based on their partisan social identification. Thus, we might actually expect women to be more likely to perceive greater difference between the parties and act accordingly. Future research could indeed explore whether women are more likely to show the perceptual characteristics of higher partisan social identity.

Beyond the realm of politics, it may also be worth exploring whether women have greater social identifications with other social groups.

Social identity theory can also provide additional evidence as to the dimensionality of partisanship. As the multidimensional perspective would argue, there
is an independent social identity distinct from partisan social identity. Although this identity generally received much lower ratings throughout the sample, at least for some persons there does appear to be a somewhat meaningful independent political identity shared with other political independents. Furthermore, independent and partisan social identity were virtually completely uncorrelated (r=.03) thereby indicating that at least as far as the group aspect of partisanship, partisan and independent identifications are on separate attitudinal dimensions. Green's (1988) findings raise the possibility, however, that the correlation is attenuated due to measurement error and therefore suggest that this null finding not be considered definitive.

Despite the lack of a significant relationship between partisan and social identification, there is also some evidence which fits with the traditional unidimensional interpretation of partisanship. Independent social identity had a negative relationship with several variables as would be expected in a unidimensional system. Independent identification had a negative impact on in-group favoritism, intergroup differentiation, and candidate differentiation. It was also significantly correlated with partisan strength. These results provides moderate evidence that partisanship and independence are not entirely distinct. Regardless of the degree to which partisanship and independence represent separate dimensions, however, the statistical analysis in this study finds that partisan attitudes, much more so than independent attitudes, impact political perceptions and behaviors.

Finally, the examination of separate partisan and independent social identities across the traditional partisan scale yields important insight into the problem of intransitivities in the traditional measure of partisanship. The patterns for both partisan
and independent social identity help to explain why leaners choose to identify as independents. The answer is that in terms of independent social identity, they are independents, no different from pure independents. Additionally, they have significantly less social identification with their chosen party than do true partisans. Mean values in both the partisan social identification measure and independent social identification measure are transitive across the traditional partisan categories. In the matter of social identity, we see a scale as we would expect with no intransitivities. Furthermore, although the average partisan identity was higher than the average independent identity for leaners, over 60% of leaners had an independent identity greater than or equal to their partisan social identity. For weak and strong partisans, in contrast, the figures are 20% are 4%, respectively. For the most part, leaners seem to identify with both their preferred party and other independents. Whereas the opposition party clearly represents a relevant political out-group to a partisan social identity, “partisans” do not appear to represent an out-group to the “independent” social identity of leaners, avoiding internal conflict. One possible explanation is that leaners are aware of their partisan preferences yet value their perceived political autonomy and variability (see Dennis 1988). They may thus define themselves against a relatively narrow and specific out-group they see as unthinking party-line voters, rather than defining themselves against all partisan identifiers, many of whom share traits with the independents. Although this is only part of the picture, certainly some explanation for intransitivities thus lies in the fact that despite leaners’ other clearly-partisan political attitudes, their pattern of partisan and independent social identifications fits a clearly transitive pattern and yields an avowed partisanship as a political independent.
This finding about a possible source of intransitivities has important practical implications. First of all, despite Keith et al.'s (1992) contention that leaners should simply be grouped with weak partisans, there are systematic psychological differences between the groups which imply that this may not always be a wise course of action. It is clear, that in a variety of ways (e.g., affect and cognition as well), leaners are simply not as well socialized into the party system. The diminished partisan social identity and enhanced independent identity marks leaners as a group who, despite clear partisan preferences, lack the psychological bases of partisanship which should lead them to consistently act on these preferences. This is very much in keeping with the finding that leaners are less consistently partisan in their behavior (Dennis 1992; Keith et al. 1992).

In practice, then, the way in which we treat leaners should depend upon the objective of the research. As Keith et al. (1992) have clearly demonstrated, leaners are best categorized with other partisans when studying specific political behaviors or attitudes, e.g., vote choice, ideology. None of the findings here discount this argument. On the other hand, when addressing more general issues of partisanship and independence, leaners should most appropriately be considered as independents. Leaners, in both their level of independent social identity as well as their attitudes towards parties in general, are indistinguishable from pure independents. Social identity theory, then, provides meaningful guidance on how to treat leaners in political research.

Taken as a whole, the many findings discussed here clearly demonstrate that including the social identity element of partisanship, both conceptually and analytically, in research designs has much to offer for our understanding of partisanship and its role in the American political system. In terms of understanding the sources of partisan
attitudes, partisan activities, and the party identification index, social identity theory has much to augment traditional conceptualizations and measures of partisanship. Even an abbreviated social identity scale included in future surveys offers the potential to significantly enhance our understanding of and predictions of American political behavior.

In this chapter I have presented social identity theory as offering considerable potential to improve our theoretical understanding of political partisanship. Social identity theory represents an important addition to our current knowledge base by expanding our view of partisanship. Social identity offers a compelling theoretical basis for the bipolar patterns of partisan attitudes which statistical analyses bear out. Partisan social identity also influences candidate and ideological perceptions. Furthermore, partisan social identity can have a substantive impact not only on perceptions, but partisan political behavior as well. It appears that some Americans derive positive psychic benefit from identifying themselves with political parties, and perceiving and acting in accord with those identifications.
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<th>Partisan Social Identity</th>
<th>Independent Social Identity</th>
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<td>Mean</td>
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<td>Standard Deviation</td>
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<td>Percent in 1.1-2.0 Range</td>
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<tr>
<td>Percent in 2.1-3.0 Range</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics and Frequency Distribution of Social Identity
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<th>Out-Party FT</th>
<th>Inter-Party Differential</th>
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<td><strong>Social Identity</strong></td>
<td>8.870**</td>
<td>-2.698</td>
<td>11.398**</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.944)</td>
<td>(10.897)</td>
<td>(4.402)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Strength</strong></td>
<td>3.298**</td>
<td>-7.500**</td>
<td>10.761**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.106)</td>
<td>(1.185)</td>
<td>(1.654)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Identity</strong></td>
<td>-6.938**</td>
<td>.548</td>
<td>-7.657*</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.528)</td>
<td>(2.707)</td>
<td>(3.780)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisan Strength</strong></td>
<td>4.154*</td>
<td>-1.594</td>
<td>5.492*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.887)</td>
<td>(2.016)</td>
<td>(2.822)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Interest</strong></td>
<td>1.629</td>
<td>-5.287</td>
<td>7.936</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(5.565)</td>
<td>(5.930)</td>
<td>(8.321)</td>
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<td>3.690**</td>
<td>-4.077*</td>
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<td>(1.288)</td>
<td>(1.802)</td>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-5.723**</td>
<td>.983</td>
<td>-6.877**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(2.384)</td>
<td>(2.545)</td>
<td>(3.565)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority</strong></td>
<td>3.804</td>
<td>-9.175*</td>
<td>12.540*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.256)</td>
<td>(4.533)</td>
<td>(6.364)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.080)</td>
<td>(.084)</td>
<td>(.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>69.354**</td>
<td>57.469</td>
<td>13.377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.205)</td>
<td>(10.897)</td>
<td>(15.258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number</strong></td>
<td>191</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R^2</strong></td>
<td>.346</td>
<td>.252</td>
<td>.397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adjusted R^2</strong></td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.360</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 5.2: Social Identity and Political Party Perceptions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Identity</th>
<th>In-Party Candidate FT</th>
<th>Out-Party Candidate FT</th>
<th>Inter-Party Candidate Differential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.790**</td>
<td>-7.921*</td>
<td>17.235**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.447)</td>
<td>(4.361)</td>
<td>(5.405)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Strength</td>
<td>3.251**</td>
<td>-9.824**</td>
<td>13.124**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.295)</td>
<td>(1.626)</td>
<td>(2.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Identity</td>
<td>-4.159</td>
<td>3.630</td>
<td>-7.830*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.959)</td>
<td>(3.713)</td>
<td>(4.601)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>5.998*</td>
<td>-6.418*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.203)</td>
<td>(2.788)</td>
<td>(3.456)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.441</td>
<td>1.830</td>
<td>-2.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.481)</td>
<td>(8.817)</td>
<td>(10.146)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>-.948</td>
<td>1.902</td>
<td>-2.596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.407)</td>
<td>(1.787)</td>
<td>(2.215)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-4.364**</td>
<td>2.278</td>
<td>-6.641**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.487)</td>
<td>(1.866)</td>
<td>(2.313)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.921</td>
<td>-1.839</td>
<td>-.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.256)</td>
<td>(1.577)</td>
<td>(1.954)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-2.197</td>
<td>-2.821</td>
<td>.525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.782)</td>
<td>(3.492)</td>
<td>(4.328)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>9.950*</td>
<td>-8.106</td>
<td>18.506**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.976)</td>
<td>(6.263)</td>
<td>(7.762)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>-.036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td>(.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>69.229**</td>
<td>69.925</td>
<td>-1.646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.909)</td>
<td>(14.979)</td>
<td>(18.564)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 5.3: Social Identity and Political Candidate Perceptions
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological Self-Placement</th>
<th>Mean Issue Placement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Social Identity</strong></td>
<td>0.396**</td>
<td>0.514**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.168)</td>
<td>(0.200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Identity</strong></td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>-0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.158)</td>
<td>(0.188)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisan Strength</strong></td>
<td>0.193</td>
<td>-0.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.117)</td>
<td>(0.140)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest</strong></td>
<td>0.315</td>
<td>-0.317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.332)</td>
<td>(0.396)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>0.216**</td>
<td>0.208**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.070)</td>
<td>(0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>0.089</td>
<td>0.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.078)</td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>-0.017</td>
<td>-0.028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.148)</td>
<td>(0.177)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority</strong></td>
<td>-0.159</td>
<td>0.304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.264)</td>
<td>(0.315)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.005)</td>
<td>(0.006)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>2.890**</td>
<td>3.093**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.617)</td>
<td>(0.736)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 5.4: Social Identity and Ideological Intensity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Identity</th>
<th>Partisan Activity Index</th>
<th>Over-time Party Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.751**</td>
<td>.281*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.189)</td>
<td>(.169)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>-.119</td>
<td>.232*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.126)</td>
<td>(.113)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>1.746**</td>
<td>.314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.382)</td>
<td>(.343)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.080)</td>
<td>(.071)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.088)</td>
<td>(.079)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.075)</td>
<td>(.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>-.133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.169)</td>
<td>(.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>.312</td>
<td>.267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.299)</td>
<td>(.265)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.005)</td>
<td>(.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.771</td>
<td>2.315**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.676)</td>
<td>(.602)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number 220 215
R² .218 .093
Adjusted R² .185 .053

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 5.5: Social Identity and Partisan Political Behavior

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.58</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p≤.05, two-tailed test

Table 5.6: Mean Social Identity by Gender
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Women</th>
<th>Men</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.081)</td>
<td>(.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.165*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>.515*</td>
<td>.580*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
<td>.418*</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>.669*</td>
<td>1.163*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>.539</td>
<td>.678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * indicates p<.05, one-tailed test

### Table 5.7: Regressions of Overall Partisan Evaluation by Gender

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Identity with preferred party</th>
<th>Social Identity with Independents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strong Democrat</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Democrat</td>
<td>1.31*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaning Democrat</td>
<td>1.21♦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pure Independent</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaning Republican</td>
<td>1.26♦</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Republican</td>
<td>1.46*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Republican</td>
<td>1.90*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Items within same column followed by identical symbols (*, †, ♦) are statistically indistinguishable from each other at p<.05.

Note: Items in parentheses are number of respondents.

### Table 5.8: Social Identity by Category of Party Identification
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Strength</th>
<th>Independent Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pure Independent (14)</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Leaner (45)</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Partisan (104)</td>
<td>1.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Partisan (96)</td>
<td>1.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Items followed by * are statistically distinct from items followed by + at p<.05. Items in parentheses are number of respondents.

Table 5.9: Social Identity by Strength of Party Identification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partisan Strength</th>
<th>Partisan Identity</th>
<th>Independent Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Identity</td>
<td>.482*</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Identity</td>
<td>-.252*</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .01

Table 5.10: Correlation Matrix of Partisan Strength and Social Identifications
CHAPTER 6

AFFECT, COGNITION, AND SOCIAL IDENTITY IN PARTISANSHIP

Affect and cognition are components of an overall attitude. Social identity, in contrast, is a broader concept, encompassing attitudes towards a group—including both affective and cognitive components. Consequently, affective and cognitive attitude components, and social identity, do not represent entirely analogous ways in which to approach partisanship. Nonetheless, they have been united in this research design because they represent two fundamental areas where advances in social psychology can further inform our understanding of partisanship. In this chapter, I will examine how affect and cognition in unison with social identity can bring about a better understanding of partisanship. I first develop a partisan typology classifying respondents based on affect, cognition, and social identity and examine how these different categories vary and what these variations may reveal about partisanship. I also examine the relationship through correlations and discrepancy scores. Secondly, I examine the affective and cognitive components of social identity—exploring how affect and cognition differentially contribute to the effects of partisan social identification. Lastly, I investigate how affect, cognition, and social identity can together contribute to explaining variations in the traditional party identification scale.
A Partisan Typology of Affect, Cognition, and Social Identity

Similar to the analysis in chapter 4, I will create a partisan typology. Here, however, I will use social identity, as well as affect and cognition to classify respondents. This typological approach can help us better understand the importance and unique contribution of each of these psychological aspects to partisanship. For example, do persons need to be high on all three aspects to be a truly strong and consistent partisan? Does lacking only one of these bases lead to weaker partisanship? If so, is a lack of one of these bases more influential than a lack in others? Is a strong social identity alone sufficient to outweigh weaker affect and cognition in terms of partisan perceptions? By comparing different categories of partisans, as grouped by affect, cognition, and social identity, we should be able to answer questions such as these and come a more complete understanding of how each of these psychological components contributes to one’s partisanship.

Unfortunately, there is little theoretical guidance on how affect, cognition, and social identity should come together to influence partisanship. When social identity has been discussed along with affect and cognition in social psychology, the focus has been on the affective and cognitive components of that social identity, i.e., the emotional bond to a group as well as the cognitive awareness of group membership. The focus has not been on how social identification with a group as well as affect and cognition towards the group-object can explain characteristics and consequences of group membership. Consequently, any attempts to understand how these social-psychological concepts may together explain partisanship depends largely on existing independent research into each and common-sense intuitions on how they may most sensibly combine.
Several expectations of the partisan typology follow directly from social identity theory and theories of attitudes, as well as the findings from previous chapters. Perhaps the most obvious prediction is that respondents who are high on all three components will be the most strongly partisan in all the measures of partisanship used here. Due to the strong partisan orientation across the board, we might also expect these persons to be the most interested in and knowledgeable about politics. Certainly when comparing all high to all low persons, these contrasts should likely be apparent. Additional informative comparisons exist where respondents are categorized as high for all but one of the three aspects. For example, we might expect a person scoring below average on social identity but high on affect and cognition to show less inter-party and inter-candidate differentiation than a person scoring high on all three. A person scoring low on cognition only might show less ideological extremity. A person scoring low on affect only might be less likely to vote a straight ticket or support one’s party over time.

A second series of interesting comparisons is that between individuals who score low across all three aspects compared to those who score high on only one of the three. We might expect that even in conjunction with low affect and low cognition, an above average social identity will lead to greater party differentiation, party activities, and stronger partisanship on the seven-point scale. Being above average on only cognition could be expected to lead to greater ideological strength, partisan activities, and perhaps knowledge and education. Above average placement in affect only may lead to more consistent partisan behavior, but less ideological intensity. Though it is unlikely that all these expectations will hold true, many of them may do so. To the degree that these
comparisons form clear patterns, we can begin to see how affect, cognition, and social identity jointly influence one's partisanship.

In addition to the typology, simple correlations between affect, cognition, social identity, and partisan strength can further elucidate the how these three elements relate to partisanship. Here, I will examine how partisan social identification relates to the overall affective and cognitive aspects of one's partisan attitude. Additionally, I will compute discrepancy scores, similar to those in chapter 4, between social identity and affect and between social identity and cognition. The correlations as well as the discrepancy scores should help to answer whether partisan social identity is equally based on affect and cognition. These analyses, then, in conjunction with the typology can further aid our understanding of how affect, cognition, and social identity independently and in combination influence individual partisanship.

Affective and Cognitive Bases of Social Identity

There is also potentially much to be learned about partisanship by examining the affective and cognitive bases of a partisan social identity. That is, an exploration not of how social identity relates to affective and cognitive partisan attitude components as described above, but rather how emotion and cognition unite to form a partisan social identity. Both cognitive and affective components are indicated in Tajfel's (1978) classic definition—the cognitive, "self concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership" and affective, "together with the value and emotional significance attached to the membership."
If social identification truly consists of distinct affective and cognitive components, we might expect that these bases might vary across a partisan social identity and vary in their effects on perceptual biases as well. Some persons' partisan social identity may be predominantly based upon the emotional significance they attach to their relationship with the group. In contrast, others' partisan social identification may be principally driven by knowledge of group membership. Furthermore, some of the effects apparently caused by partisan social identity as a unified process, e.g., group differentiation, ideological extremity, could be caused differentially by either the affective or cognitive component of social identity. If there are indeed differences based on a more affective or cognitive social identity, this would suggest that different partisan goals can be accomplished either through focusing on emotional attachment to a party or cognitive awareness of group membership. Although it is not entirely clear how these two elements of a partisan social identity may be fostered and encouraged, the simple awareness of differences would suggest a need for alternative political strategies.

The most direct exploration of the affective and cognitive bases of social identification comes from Hinkle et al. (1989). They examined the affective and cognitive components of social identification in order to assess whether the identification-group differentiation relationship varies depending upon the components of identification. They used a 10 item scale to measure social identity with other university students and selected items from the full scale to developed three separate subscales: emotion, cognition, and individual needs versus group dynamics. Both the emotion and cognition subscales had nearly identical correlations with the overall social identity scale. When they regressed ingroup and outgroup ratings as well as overall differentiation on
the separate subscales, emotional social identity proved to be the most robust predictor of
each. In predicting both ingroup and outgroup ratings, the emotion subscale was
statistically significant with a much larger coefficient that the statistically insignificant
cognition scale. They also found that the subscales predicted ingroup ratings much better
than they do outgroup ratings. Hinkle et al. concluded that while cognitive aspects of
identification are likely requisite for group formation, it is the affective component which
seems to be the primary determinant of differentiation.

Although not always examining affective and cognitive components specifically,
many scholars have taken a similar approach in attempting to determine a multi-
component basis for social identification. In the most recent, and perhaps most
comprehensive, examination of the structure of social identification, Jackson and Smith
(1999) note that many of the key hypotheses of social identity have received only mixed
empirical support. They argue that this is likely a result of incomplete conceptualization
and measurement of social identification. Jackson and Smith argue that social identity
fully consists of perception of intergroup context, attraction to in-group, interdependency
beliefs, and depersonalization; yet most previous efforts have included scales which did
not assess all these relevant dimensions. Jackson and Smith therefore claim that the
inconsistent findings are a result of using scales which did not properly assess the
relevant dimension driving the group process under study. Many scales only properly
assess attraction to the in-group and therefore fail to find a relationship with group
differentiation which additionally depends upon perception of intergroup context as well
as interdependency beliefs.
Though not explicit, elements of affect and cognition can clearly be seen within Jackson and Smith’s (1999) components of social identity. Perception of the intergroup context refers to the idea that identification with an ingroup is necessarily defined, in part, by recognition of an intergroup situation. This is very similar to the cognitive basis of self categorization theory which defines social identities as “cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same... in contrast to some other class of stimuli” (Turner et al. 1987, p. 44). Thus we can think of this dimension as a primarily cognitive recognition of the contrast and interrelationship of two groups. Attraction to the ingroup, in contrast, represents a primarily affective element of social identity. This can be thought of the positive sense of emotional belonging to the group. Interdependency beliefs are essentially a belief in a shared common fate—self identity and self interests as based on membership in an ingroup. Here the major component is likely cognitive, as it depends on a recognition of the shared common fate. Nonetheless, affect may also play a role in interdependency beliefs in the emotional tie between self and group. Finally, depersonalization is considerably based upon the self categorization theory idea of a “shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of the self as unique person” (Turner et al. 1987, p. 50). Depersonalization appears to be predominantly cognitive in orientation, as it is focused on perception.

Jackson and Smith (1999) did not examine Mael and Tetrick’s (1992) IDPG scale, but it does seem to meet their qualifications fairly well. As with virtually all social identity measures, the IDPG scale would appear to assess ingroup attraction fairly well. Questions assessing the respondent as a typical group member likely measure this
dimension. The IDPG scale also appears to measure depersonalization quite well. Several items on the scale assess respondents' tendency to internalize the group, e.g., "when someone criticizes this group it feels like a personal insult," "if a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed." The items on the IDPG scale are also well equipped to assess perceptions of a common fate: "this group's successes are my successes," "the limitations associated with this group apply to me also." Where the IDPG scale would seem to fall short in this analysis is the perception of intergroup context; the scale has no questions making reference to any other social groups. Jackson and Smith, in fact, remark that most social identity scales are inadequate in this regard. It seems likely that in many applications of social identity theory, e.g., ethnic groups, the relevant intergroup context seems so obvious as to negate a specific need for measurement. Although the IDPG instrument is indeed lacking in this regard, in the application here to political parties, in the middle of a survey about politics, it would seem that the intergroup context would be relevant and accessible to the vast majority of respondents as they complete the scale.

**Affect, Cognition, Social Identity and the Party Identification Scale**

The final analyses examine the contributions of affect, cognition, and social identity to understanding the traditional seven-point party identification scale. In chapter 4, we saw that the relative emphasis on affect and cognition in one's overall partisan attitude appears to be related to category of partisanship. The results in chapter 5 demonstrated that partisan and independent social identity likewise play a role in an individual's partisan categorization. Here I attempt to examine the contribution of each
to the party identification scale and predict respondents' party identification by their affect, cognition and social identity. To explore the contributions of all three, they will be used as independent variables in multinomial logit models estimating category of party identification. Based upon the preceding findings, I expect to find that as partisan social identity increases strength of partisanship increases and as independent social identity increases, partisan strength decreases. I also expect that either increasing reliance on affect or decreasing cognition will be related to increases in category of partisan strength.

Methods

The methodology behind the affect, cognition, and social identity typology of partisanship is fairly straightforward. For each aspect—affect, cognition, and social identity, respondents were categorized as either high or low, depending upon which side of the mean they fell on. None of the respondents had exactly the mean value on either of the three key variables. These three dichotomous categorizations were then combined to place respondents in a total of 8 ($2^3$) possible categories. Respondents could be high on all three aspects, low on all three aspects, or any combination in between. Members of these categories were compared on the following variables; political: party differences, candidate differences, affective/cognitive discrepancy, partisan strength (Traditional index), political interest, independent attitudes, political knowledge, over-time party support, party activity index, self-placement ideology, issue placement ideology, straight-ticket vote, vote for president of one's party; and demographic: education, income, gender, and age. To compare theoretically interesting differences, respondents high on all three aspects were separately compared to those high on only two of the three aspects.
Likewise, respondents low on all were compared to those low on two of the three. In all cases t-tests were used to determine significant differences.

I also examined how partisan social identification, the group aspect of partisanship, relates to the overall affective and cognitive aspects of one's partisan attitude. I first accomplished this through simple correlation analyses. In addition, I computed discrepancy scores, much like those used in chapter 4. First, affect, cognition, and social identity were all standardized from 0-1 since they are on different scales. I then computed affect-social identity discrepancy by taking the absolute value of the difference of affect and social identity. A cognition-social identity score was computed in the same manner. Finally, the cognition-social identity score was subtracted from the affect-social identity score, with values theoretically ranging from -1 to 1. Following the same reasoning as in chapter 4, values above 0 indicated a social identity based primarily on cognition, values below 0, a social identity based primarily on affect.

In order to examine the affective and cognitive bases of a partisan social identity I created affective and cognitive subscales of the social identity measure. To determine which items of the IDPG scale were most cognitive and most affective in orientation, I correlated each item with the respondents' overall affective and cognitive partisan attitudes. Once appropriate subscales were identified, I conducted an analysis similar to that of Hinkle et al. (1989) in which affective and cognitive components of partisan social identity were used as independent variables to predict group ratings and group differentiation. I repeated many of the analyses of chapter 5 using not a unified social identity, but the two social identity subscales as independent variables. The results from Hinkle et al. lead to the expectation that affective social identity should have a greater
impact on party ratings and party differentiation than cognitive social identity, yet a different sample and a different group object certainly provides room for dissimilar findings. Furthermore, as partisan cognition proved to be a more prominent predictor of ideological extremity in chapter 4, it is possible that cognitive social identity may be more prominent here than affective social identity.

The use of multinomial logit enables the estimation of a dependent variable with several discrete variables, such as party identification. A multinomial logit model estimates the likelihood of each outcome/category, relative to a designated base category, e.g., the impact of social identity on being a weak Democrat relative to being a strong Democrat. Pure independents would obviously provide an ideal base category for this estimation, unfortunately, since pure independents did not have a party to have a social identity towards they are excluded from any regression model using social identity as an independent variable. Consequently, I estimated separate models for each half of the party identification scale: one for Republican partisanship and one for Democratic partisanship. Weak partisans served as the baseline category so that differences between leaners and weak partisans would be clear. Leaners could also serve as the baseline category to accomplish this goal. However, since weak partisans fall in the middle of these three categories, using them as the baseline should make contrasts more clear. Since all prior analyses have focused only on affect or cognition towards one's preferred party, Democratic affect and cognition are included in the Democratic model and Republican affect and cognition for the Republican model.
Analyses

Partisan Typology

The results of the partisan typology can be seen in table 6.1. Given the non-representative nature of the sample, it is probably best not to read too much into the relative frequencies of the categories. Nonetheless, it is interesting that a plurality of respondents are high across all three dimensions, suggesting that such covariation may be common. Interestingly as well, the second most populous category was individuals who were uniformly low across all three dimensions. Thus, it seems that there may be a tendency for persons to be fairly equivalent, whether high or low, across these three dimensions.

The first set of analyses explores the differences between persons in these different partisan categories. Before continuing, it is important to raise several issues. First of all, as can be seen in table 6.1, in many cases we will be dealing with rather small cell sizes. It is therefore necessary to be very cautious in generalizing where significant results are found. On the other hand, we also need to be aware of type II error. Due to the low cell sizes, the t-tests in many of these comparisons will have very low power and not be able to discriminate relationships which may actually exist. The failure of a relationship to prove statistically significant should definitely not be taken to conclusively indicate that such a relationship does not exist. Consequently, though I do not present all the comparisons, I will present those where the significance level is $p<.10$ and below, instead of $p<.05$. In exploring these comparisons, then, it is useful to view them as instructive, but not definitive, in helping us to understand partisanship. Finally,
so as to avoid overwhelming amounts of comparisons, only those relationships which are statistically significant, or at least close, are presented in the tables.

The first series of comparisons contrasts those who are high on all three aspects to those who are high on two of the three and low on the other. In addition, a complete contrast is provided by comparing those high on all three to those low on all three. The comparison between those high on affect, cognition, and social identity with those low on all three does not offer many surprises (table 6.2). In every political variable used, the persons high across the board were substantially more partisan than those who scored low on the three partisan dimensions. Most all these political differences could be predicted almost solely from the clear differences in strength of partisanship. Among the more enlightening and less predictable findings is that although both comparison groups fall on the cognitive side of the affective/cognitive balance, the stronger partisans do significantly more so. Additionally, in an indication of unidimensionality of partisanship, the independent attitudes of the low scorers are substantially higher. Demographic differences, which could not so easily be predicted, did not arise, however. Only the matter of income comes close, with the low scorers almost having significantly higher income (p<.10).

For individuals who are low on only social identity, but high on both affect and cognition, there are still substantial differences with those who are high on all three (table 6.3). Following most directly from social identity theory, the level of inter-party differentiation is significantly lower for those individuals relatively lacking in social identity. The importance of social identity in political activity is also evident as those individuals below average in social identity participate in dramatically fewer partisan
activities and have significantly less political interest as well. Finally, the importance of
social identity in the traditional measure of party identification is quite evident, as the
average person high on affect and cognition, but lacking strong social identity averages a
weak partisan party identification, whereas individuals high on all three are closer to
strong partisan.

The comparisons between those high on all three aspects with those lacking in
affect only also reveal several interesting differences (table 6.4). Interestingly, despite a
strong social identity and high cognitive partisan support, considerable partisan affect still
appears to be necessary to heighten the perceived differences between the parties. Affect
also appears to play a meaningful role in political interest, with those lacking affect
having lower interest. Perhaps not surprisingly, the discrepancy variable indicates that
those low on affect have a partisanship considerably more based on cognition. Though
there is no clear theoretical rationale, those lacking affect appear to be more ideologically
extreme as measured by issue placements. Though not quite achieving statistical
significance, it also appears that those lacking emotional party ties may engage in less
partisan activities, despite high cognition and social identity, which chapters 4 and 5
clearly demonstrated to be related to party activity. Again, though not reaching the p<.05
level, it may suggest that a partisanship fully consisting of high levels of affect,
cognition, and social identity is necessary to fully engage in party-related activities. On
the demographic side, those lacking in affect were considerably more likely to be female,
which fits with the findings in chapter 4. Finally, though not quite significant, those
lacking in affect may be more educated.
The final group to be contrasted with those persons high on all three elements are those individuals high on affect and social identity, but low on cognition. Unfortunately, the comparisons are the most tenuous as there are only nine respondents who fall into this category. Despite this very low cell size, three comparisons in fact proved to have statistically significant results (table 6.5). Oddly enough, the issue extremity of this group was almost identical to that of the low affect group and significantly more extreme than that of the all high group. Again, caveats duly noted, it seems as if possessing strong cognitive and affective attitudes together may limit ideological extremity. It also appears that those lacking a strong cognitive basis to their partisanship may be more inclined to anti-partisan attitudes, as they score significantly higher here. Finally, it appears that the members of this group were significantly less likely to cast a straight-ticket vote for president and Congress.

In a similar series of analyses, I contrasted the category of respondents who scored low on all three dimensions with those who scored high on a single dimension. In this way, as with the previous series of contrasts, the effects of changing one aspect of partisanship while the others remain stable could be examined. The first comparison here was between those who scored low on all three with those who scored low on affect and cognition, but high on social identity (table 6.6). To a considerable degree, the findings here support the contrasts in table 6.3 on the impact of social identity. Though not quite significant due to the small cell sizes, $p=0.056$, the party differential is much higher for those who have a high social identity than those who do not. As before, moving from low to high social identity has a significant impact on the strength of one’s partisan strength with the traditional measure. The relationship between interest and social
identity again appears as here those with high social identity have significantly more interest in politics. Those who fall into the high social identity category also evidence this in their behavior, supporting their party more over time and engaging in more partisan activities, though this is not quite significant at $p=.062$. In an interesting demographic result, those with high partisan social identity were significantly older than those lacking a strong social identity. One explanation may be that with age comes time in a community and a greater opportunity to build the group ties to parties and other groups that characterize social identity.

Comparisons with those high in affect only did not prove very fruitful, as there were only 11 individuals to fall into this category. Only a single, very predictable comparison proved significant. Persons high in affect only had an affective/cognitive balance much more on the affective side than those who were low on all three dimensions, $\bar{x} = .25$ versus $\bar{x} = 1.15$, respectively, $p=.001$. No other comparisons approached significance.

The final group contrast was between those low on all three and the respondents scoring above average on the cognitive dimension only (table 6.7). The results here show that the presence of significantly positive partisan cognitions can substantially enhance several key aspects of partisanship. Perhaps most prominently, even more than social identity, high cognition significantly enhanced contrasts between the parties and the candidates. It also made respondents significantly more likely to vote for the presidential candidate of their party. Not surprisingly, these individuals were also strongly on the cognitive side of the affective/cognitive balance. Finally, the political knowledge of
these respondents was significantly higher—perhaps not too surprising given an enhanced cognitive orientation.

In order to further examine the relationship between affect, cognition, and social identity, I examined the correlations between these dimensions as well as discrepancy scores. Conceptually, social identity depends upon both affective and cognitive elements and there is little guiding theory to suggest that it would be more closely related with either one. As the correlation matrix in table 6.8 shows, social identity is, in fact, correlated with both affect and cognition to a very similar degree. The correlation between affect and social identity is $r = .319$, whereas it is $r = .299$ between cognition and social identity ($p < .001$ in both cases). Partisan social identity thus appears to have a moderately low and proportionately similar correlation with both partisan affect and partisan cognition. Interestingly, however, the correlation between social identity and affective/cognitive relative discrepancy is significantly correlated in the negative direction ($r = -.135$, $p < .05$), indicating that as one's partisan attitude becomes more affective relative to cognitive, their partisan social identity increases.

Although the correlations appear to show little difference between the relationships of affect and social identity, and cognition and social identity, the discrepancy measure shows a clear pattern favoring the linkage between affect and social identity (table 6.9). The mean value of the measure is $-.09$ (on a theoretical range of $-1$ to $1$). This negative value indicates that on average the discrepancy between respondents' cognition and social identity scores is greater than their discrepancy between their affect and social identity scores. Even more tellingly, fully 79% of the sample fall on the negative side. Accounting for the 7% of the sample falling right at 0,
that leaves only 14% of the sample for whom their social identity is more closely related
to the cognitive component of their partisan attitude. This analysis seems to make it
fairly clear that, for most persons, their partisan social identity is more closely tied to
their emotional response to the parties than to their cognitive evaluations. Attempted
comparisons between the groups on either side of 0 found no significant differences on
either political or demographic variables.

Affect and Cognition in Partisan Social Identity

Though the preceding analyses examine how affect and cognition towards parties
are related to social identity, it can also be useful to examine the emotional and cognitive
components of partisan social identity to better understand how the nature of one's
partisan social identity influences political perceptions and behaviors. In order to create
affective and cognitive subscales of partisan social identity, I correlated each item of the
10 item IDPG scale with both partisan affect and partisan cognition. For the affective
items, I selected those most highly correlated with partisan affect: "I don't act like the
typical person of this group," and "I act like a person of this group to a great extent."
The cognitive items were those most highly correlated with partisan cognition: "The
limitations associated with this group apply to me also," and "when I talk about this
group, I usually say 'we' rather than 'they.'" Several other items also correlated fairly
well with affect, yet the two items here were the only ones to correlate well with
cognition. I therefore chose to use only the two best items for each subscale. If the affect
subscale were to be based on more items, it would be more reliable and have a bias
towards producing significant results relative to cognition. The correlations involving

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these subscales are shown in table 6.10. The affect-social identity scale correlates with
the overall social identity scale at $r = .732$ and with partisan affect at $r = .306$. The
cognition-social identity scale correlated with the overall social identity scale at $r = .835$
and with partisan cognition at $r = .394$. Both scales are relatively equivalent measures of
their relative concepts and should therefore not produce biased results in subsequent
regression models.

With these two subscales in place, the next step was to repeat the regressions of
chapter 5, this time using the two separate affective and cognitive social identity
subscales rather than the unified scale. The party feeling thermometer models (in-party,
out-party, and party differential) most clearly allow us to see the separate effects of affect
and cognition in social identity on group perceptions. As with the findings in chapter 6,
social identity affects only in-group ratings and intergroup differentiation, but not out-
group ratings (table 6.11). However, the impact appears to depend entirely on the
affective component and not the cognitive component—a strong confirmation of the
results found by Hinkle et al. (1989). In both the in-group and intergroup differentiation
models, affective social identity is statistically significant whereas cognitive social
identity is not. Furthermore, the coefficient for the affective component is more than
twice that of the cognitive component in both cases. These models strongly suggest that
it is the emotional attachment to a group—not the cognitive awareness of group
membership—that invoke the intergroup differentiation that is the hallmark of social
identity theory.

The preeminence of the affective over the cognitive component of social
identification is further confirmed in the analyses of candidate perceptions, ideological
extremity, and party activity. As with chapter 5, the models of candidate evaluations closely mirror those of party ratings (table 6.12). Again, a pattern occurs where affective social identity significantly drives in-group ratings and intergroup differentiation at statistically significant levels whereas cognitive social identity does not. As before, the size of the affective coefficients is again much larger. Interestingly, affective social identity is even the preeminent factor in driving ideological extremity (table 6.13). Due to the greater influence of cognition on ideological strength seen in chapter 4, we might have expected cognitive social identity to have a greater impact on this variable, but it was not the case. Neither component significantly predicted ideological strength based on issue placement. Interestingly, though, here cognitive social identity was much closer to achieving statistical significance and also had a much larger coefficient. To make it a clean sweep, affective social identity also proved statistically significant in predicting number of partisan activities, where the cognitive component did not. Neither factor was a significant predictor of over-time party voting. This and the issue-based ideological extremity had been the two weakest of the social identity results and the decreased reliability from these measures likely contributed to the null findings in these models. Finally, it is important to note that the preeminence of affect in these models is not a methodological artifact. The affective social identity measure is not significantly more reliable and is in fact is less correlated with overall social identity than is the cognitive component.
The Party Identification Scale

The final analyses examine how social identity, affect, and cognition can be jointly used to explain partisan categorization according to the traditional party identification index. Two separate multinomial logit models were run on Democrats and Republicans (table 6.14 and 6.15). The primary result of these models is to validate the importance of social identity in determining one’s partisan classification, as determined through other methods in chapter 5. Increasing partisan social identity makes one significantly less likely to be a leaner than a weak partisan and significantly more likely to be a strong partisan, relative to a weak partisan. The effects for independent partisan identity were also clear. Increasing independent social identity increased the likelihood that Republicans would be leaners relative to weak partisans and that one would be a weak partisan relative to a strong partisan. For Democrats, independent social identity likewise worked as expected—increasing the likelihood one would be a leaner rather than a weak Democrat and decreasing the likelihood of being a strong Democrat relative to a weak Democrat.

The effects of affect and cognition were not nearly as strong or consistent as the case for social identity. For Democrats, increased partisan cognition made one significantly more likely to be a leaner relative to a weak Democrat, in support of the findings in chapter 4. None of the other affect or cognition coefficients were significant, however. The affect coefficient was negative signed for leaners and positively signed for strong Democrats, as might be expected, but fell far short of statistical significance in

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18 These analyses were also attempted using the overall affect-cognition discrepancy measure from chapter 4 instead of the separate affect and cognition measures, yet this never approached statistical significance as an independent variable.
both cases. The results in the Republican model are somewhat surprising. Both affect coefficients were positive and significant. This would indicate that increased affect makes an individual to be more likely to be either a strong or leaning Republican, relative to a weak Republican. Though the result is as expected for strong Republicans, the findings in chapter 4 would lead us to expect that the coefficient should be negative, if anything, for leaners. The results from the multinomial logit models are unequivocal on the importance of social identity in determining one's party identification. However, they leave the impact of partisan affect and cognition to rest upon the findings in chapter 4, and certainly less substantial than that of social identity.

Discussion

The results in this chapter demonstrate that by examining affect, cognition, and social identity, in unison, as well as independently as in chapters 4 and 5, these psychological principles can further inform our understanding of partisanship. The partisan typology, though suffering from small cell sizes, nonetheless presented many interesting insights into how these factors combine to create individual partisanship. Comparisons were difficult with the nine respondents comprising the group who were low on only cognition, but the comparisons between those high on all three and low on either affect or social identity proved informative. Even when an individual was on the high side of two of the three components, a lack of either affect or social identity dramatically reduced the differences they perceived between the parties. Perhaps even more importantly, a relative lack in either of these components was related to lower interest and lower levels of partisan activity. Both cognition and social identity appeared
to be important in creating favorable attitudes towards the parties, as scoring below
average in either of these aspects led to more anti-party attitudes.

The converse series of comparisons, that is, respondents scoring low on all three
aspects compared to those scoring high on only one, further bolstered the findings
mentioned above. Individuals high on only social identity showed significantly greater
inter-party differentiation, interest in politics, and levels of partisan support. Individuals
high in only cognition likewise demonstrated significantly greater inter-party
differentiation as well as enhanced political knowledge and more partisan support for the
party's presidential candidate. Unfortunately, there were no meaningful comparisons for
those high in affect only.

Taken as a whole, these many comparisons indicate the importance of all three
aspects of partisanship discussed here and how to some degree a combination of all three
is necessary to achieve a partisanship complete in both attitude and behavior. Perhaps
most prominently, each of these aspects of partisanship appears to explain a considerable
role in perceptions of the parties. Lacking only one component, inter-party
differentiation drops considerably; adding only one component to an otherwise deficient
partisanship likewise leads to greater partisan differentiation. Furthermore, in one way or
another, each of these appears to be related to at least some aspect of partisan behavior.
Political interest, knowledge, and perhaps level of support for parties in general, all
appear to some degree to depend upon having above average partisan attitudes across the
board. It is also worth noting here that both the presence or lack of partisan social
identity appear to be a key element of partisan strength as traditionally measured.
The results in this chapter also offer interesting insight into how affective and cognitive components within one's partisan social identity contribute differentially to the perceptual effects of social identity. Although, emotional attachment to a group and cognitive awareness of membership in that group are both requisite elements of a social identification (Hinkle et al. 1989; Tajfel 1978), it was the affective component of social identification that was primarily responsible for intergroup differentiation as well as ideological extremity and party activity. Thus, although both affect and cognition are required to have a partisan social identification, it is the emotional attachment to the group which appears to drive how that social identification plays out. Furthermore, the fact that these results largely replicate those found by Hinkle et al. (1989) when examining collegiate social identification suggests that this may indeed be a universal trait of social identification not limited to political parties.

The affect-social identity, cognitive-social identity discrepancy analysis provided further evidence for the preeminent role of emotion in partisan social identity. For a substantial majority of the respondents, their partisan social identity was more closely related to their partisan affect than their partisan cognition. Through two very disparate methods of analyses, then, affect appears to be more closely related to one's partisan social identity. This again suggests that although knowledge of group membership may be a necessary component of a social identification, the emotional component is at the heart of one's partisan social identity.

The separate analyses in chapters 4 and 5 indicated that affect and cognition as well as social identity contribute towards an explanation for the observed intransitivities in the traditional party identification scale. When affect and cognition and social identity
are looked at in conjunction here in multinomial logit analyses, it appears that it is social
identity theory which offers more insight into the party identification scale. Both partisan
and independent social identity are meaningful predictors of one's partisan category for
both Democrats and Republicans. Affective and cognitive partisan attitude components,
in contrast, add little to explaining one's level of party identification. As might be
expected, increased cognition made one more likely to be a Democratic leaner relative to
a weak Democrat. Although the affect coefficients were not significant, they were at
least signed as might be expected, negative for leaners, positive for strong Democrats. In
contrast, in the Republican model, increased affect appeared to make individuals to be
both more likely to be leaners and strong Republicans relative to the weak Republican
baseline. A model using the overall affect-cognition discrepancy variable instead of
affect and cognition separately had even less success. Consequently, these models are
ultimately inconclusive with regards to how affect and cognition can explain one's party
identification. They do not, however, contradict the findings in chapter 4. Rather, they
indicate that we are on more solid ground when attempting to explain variations in the
traditional party identification index using social identity theory.

The strong role of social identity in the multinomial logit models as well as the
clear relationship between social identity and partisan strength in the analyses in chapter
5 as well as the typological comparisons in the present chapter, clearly demonstrate the
prominence of social identity in our traditional measurement of party identification.
Campbell et al. (1960) correctly identified the group element of party identification in
their original conceptualization of partisanship, yet it has undergone little theoretical or
empirical elaboration in intervening years. The analyses in both chapters 5 and 6 plainly
show the role that social identification with the party as a group has in one's party identification and partisan perceptions. Even individuals who are high on both affect and cognition, but lack this group aspect of partisan identification prove to be much weaker partisans on key measures. Thus, the full key to understanding partisanship must include not only attitudes towards the parties, but group identification with the parties as well.

The findings here also offer potential insight into interactions between voters and the political parties. First, to a considerable degree, strong partisanship is based on attachment to the political party as a meaningful social group. Perceptions of the parties, candidates, ideology, and partisan activities are all related to the strength of one's partisan social identification. This social identification appears to be most closely tied to one's emotional bond with the party, rather than cognitive evaluations. Additionally, the regression models in the present chapter have demonstrated that the consequences of this social identification rest largely on the emotional value that one attaches to their membership in a political party. In other words, it is not enough that persons define themselves as belonging to a particular party, but rather that they place emotional significance on that belonging.

In order to successfully increase partisanship, a winning strategy for parties is to focus on creating an emotional, group-based attachment among supporters. How can this best be accomplished? Brewer and Silver (1999) write, "in order to engage member identification and loyalty, groups must have explicit, agreed-upon rules of inclusion and exclusion that define clear boundaries between ingroup and outgroups." Certainly, one way to achieve this is through ideological distinctiveness. As political parties take more distinct and divergent stands, they produce clear ingroup/outgroup contrasts. Although
the two-party system in the United States necessitates fairly broad, non-ideological parties, this apparently works to the detriment of the parties in building commitment among supporters. The parties therefore need to walk a fairly fine line between an inclusive ideological breadth sufficient enough to maintain popular majorities, yet narrow enough to create a sense of distinctiveness and engender partisan social identity among its supporters. The difficult balancing act between these conflicting goals may contribute to the relative weakness of American political parties. In multi-party systems where parties can strongly adhere to an ideological niche, they should have greater social identification among their members. In America, as the social group basis of partisanship (e.g., Catholic = Democrat, Upper class = Republican) continues to decline (e.g., Niemi and Stanley 1996), the parties face the troubling task of depending more on the strength of their ideological appeals to provide distinct ingroup/outgroup contrasts for supporters.

Engendering partisan social identification needs to be more than an ideological distinctiveness, however. As the analyses here make clear, perception of self as belonging to a party is not enough, emotional significance attached to that belonging is required as well. To be truly successful in this area, parties need to find a way to stimulate emotional group attachment. In all likelihood, the best way to accomplish this is not through mass media campaigns exhorting support for one candidate or the other. To increase group awareness and value, citizens likely need to have more direct experience with other party members. Old-fashioned politicking such as rallies and door-to-door campaigning may have the most potential to bring about the valuable emotional, group-based partisanship. The rise of candidate-centered politics and pervasive media campaigns have rightly been tagged as major factors contributing to the decline of
partisanship (Wattenberg 1996). What the results here suggest is that these factors may have hastened the decline by weakening the group basis of partisanship within the electorate. As politics has become more and more about television commercials and less about interpersonal interactions, the social basis of partisanship has surely eroded. The result is partisans who are less strong, less supportive, and see fewer differences between the parties. Recent studies have demonstrated that grass-roots politics can indeed provide a meaningful advantage at the polls (Beck et al. 1997). The results here suggest, that a return to more grass-roots politics may lead to even greater benefit for political parties by enhancing citizen's partisan social identifications.

A strong sense of social identity among a party's rank and file can serve as an important political resource. When a social identity is engaged, shared understandings of group attributes and goals can be sufficient to produce uniformity of behavior among those who share that social identity (Brewer and Silver 1999). In this sense, partisan social identity can be a resource central to mobilizing collective action on behalf of partisan purposes. Actions such as increasing turnout, mobilizing political action, and stimulating public opinion, can all be done with greater success to the degree that citizens have social identifications with political parties.

Taken as a whole, the results in this chapter ultimately demonstrate the significance of affect, cognition, and social identity—each independently, and in conjunction—for enhancing our understanding of modern American partisanship. Though social identity clearly had more impact than the affective and cognitive partisan attitude components in predicting political phenomena, the relationship between affect and cognition, and social identity enhances our understanding of social identity theory.
and what it has to offer for our understanding of parties and politics. Principally, emotional attachment to a political party as a group to which one belongs is a central factor in political perceptions. Nonetheless, the cognitive component remains essential as emotional attachment to a group is critically dependent upon a cognitive awareness that one is a member of that group. For an emotional group bond to develop, one must first cognitively consider oneself to be a group member. Furthermore, partisan social identity in the electorate would seem to depend upon both affective aspects of group attachment and cognitive response to the ideological distinctiveness of the two parties. In short, social-psychological perspectives on affect, cognition, and social identity offer important insights into contemporary American politics.
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<th>Percent</th>
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**Table 6.1: Partisan Typology by Affect, Cognition, and Social Identity**

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<td>28.38*</td>
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<td>-0.74*</td>
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<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>-1.05*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-time voting</td>
<td>3.97</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>0.79*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Activities</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>1.11*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Extremity</td>
<td>5.48</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>0.8*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>0.21*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>-0.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>4.41</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>0.6*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p< .01

**Table 6.2: Contrast of Partisan Types**
Table 6.3: Contrast of Partisan Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High affect, high cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>High affect, high cognition, low social identity</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Differential</td>
<td>62.46</td>
<td>51.32</td>
<td>11.14*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan strength</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>0.57**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Traditional index)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.15**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.55</td>
<td>-0.84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attitudes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Activities</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1.41**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 6.4 Contrast of Partisan Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High affect, high cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>Low affect, high cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Differential</td>
<td>62.46</td>
<td>49.71</td>
<td>12.75*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy</td>
<td>0.42</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>-1.56**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.09*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Activities</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.72+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Extremity</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.54</td>
<td>-0.67*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>2.72</td>
<td>3.12</td>
<td>-0.4+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>1.47</td>
<td>1.63</td>
<td>-0.16*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, **p<.01
### Table 6.5 Contrast of Partisan Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>High affect, high cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>High affect, low cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>3.71</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>-0.89*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue Extremity</td>
<td>4.87</td>
<td>5.53</td>
<td>-0.66*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straight-ticket</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.43*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p<.05

### Table 6.6 Contrast of Partisan Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low affect, low cognition, low social identity</th>
<th>Low affect, low cognition, high social identity</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Differential</td>
<td>20.68</td>
<td>35.00</td>
<td>-14.32+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan strength</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>2.444</td>
<td>-0.564*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Traditional index)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>-0.13*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over-time voting</td>
<td>3.18</td>
<td>4.00</td>
<td>-0.82**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party Activities</td>
<td>1.61</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>-0.55+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>49.55</td>
<td>-3.35+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: + p<.10, * p<.05, **p<.01
Table 6.7: Contrast of Partisan Types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Low affect, low cognition, low social identity</th>
<th>Low affect, high cognition, low social identity</th>
<th>Difference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Differential</td>
<td>20.68</td>
<td>47.00</td>
<td>-26.32**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate Evaluation</td>
<td>24.85</td>
<td>44.75</td>
<td>-19.90*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy</td>
<td>1.16</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>-0.84*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote</td>
<td>0.76</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>-0.24**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Knowledge</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>4.50</td>
<td>-0.69*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01

Table 6.8: Correlation Matrix of Social Identity, Affect, and Cognition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Identity</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>.319**</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>.299**</td>
<td>.772**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Discrepancy</td>
<td>-.135*</td>
<td>-.456**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p < .05, ** p < .01, two-tailed test
### Table 6.9: Social Identity Discrepancy Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Percent in -1 to -.01 Range</th>
<th>Percent at 0</th>
<th>Percent in .01 to 1 Range</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affect/Cognition Social Identity Discrepancy Scores</td>
<td>-.09</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>-.08</td>
<td>-.48</td>
<td>.31</td>
<td>78.6</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 6.10: Correlation Matrix of Affective and Cognitive Social Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social Identity</th>
<th>Affect</th>
<th>Cognition</th>
<th>Affective-Social Identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affect</td>
<td>.319</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognition</td>
<td>.299</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Affective-Social Identity</td>
<td>.732</td>
<td>.306</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Social Identity</td>
<td>.835</td>
<td>.278</td>
<td>.294</td>
<td>.601</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All correlations significant at p<.01
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In-Party FT</th>
<th>Out-Party FT</th>
<th>Inter-Party Differential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective Social</td>
<td>5.255*</td>
<td>-1.326</td>
<td>6.655*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>(2.448)</td>
<td>(2.624)</td>
<td>(3.657)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Social</td>
<td>2.630</td>
<td>-1.306</td>
<td>3.786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>(2.353)</td>
<td>(2.520)</td>
<td>(3.515)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideological Strength</td>
<td>3.207**</td>
<td>-7.464</td>
<td>10.627**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.113)</td>
<td>(1.193)</td>
<td>(1.663)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Identity</td>
<td>-6.860**</td>
<td>.536**</td>
<td>-7.583*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.530)</td>
<td>(2.709)</td>
<td>(3.779)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>4.125*</td>
<td>-1.518</td>
<td>5.360*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.896)</td>
<td>(2.024)</td>
<td>(2.832)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>2.277</td>
<td>-5.275</td>
<td>8.542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.538)</td>
<td>(5.904)</td>
<td>(8.274)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-.180</td>
<td>3.706**</td>
<td>-4.048*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.217)</td>
<td>(1.300)</td>
<td>(1.818)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-5.636**</td>
<td>.951</td>
<td>-6.760**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.277)</td>
<td>(1.365)</td>
<td>(1.908)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>-1.550</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>-1.647*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.082)</td>
<td>(1.160)</td>
<td>(1.617)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-5.933**</td>
<td>.421</td>
<td>-6.708*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.402)</td>
<td>(2.565)</td>
<td>(3.588)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority</td>
<td>3.268</td>
<td>-9.113*</td>
<td>11.948*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.252)</td>
<td>(4.551)</td>
<td>(6.353)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.080)</td>
<td>(.085)</td>
<td>(.119)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>70.419**</td>
<td>56.996**</td>
<td>14.845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.245)</td>
<td>(10.947)</td>
<td>(15.307)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Number                   | 191         | 192          | 191                        |
| R^2                      | .346        | .253         | .399                       |
| Adjusted R^2             | .303        | .203         | .358                       |

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 6.11: Affective and Cognitive Social Identity Effects on Party Ratings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>In-Party Candidate FT</th>
<th>Out-Party Candidate FT</th>
<th>Inter-Party Differential</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Affective Social Identity</strong></td>
<td>5.296*</td>
<td>-3.768</td>
<td>9.135*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.870)</td>
<td>(3.611)</td>
<td>(4.484)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cognitive Social Identity</strong></td>
<td>2.299</td>
<td>-2.036</td>
<td>4.592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.757)</td>
<td>(3.481)</td>
<td>(4.323)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological Strength</strong></td>
<td>3.175*</td>
<td>-9.837**</td>
<td>13.062**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.305)</td>
<td>(1.642)</td>
<td>(2.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Identity</strong></td>
<td>-4.056</td>
<td>3.410</td>
<td>-7.483*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.963)</td>
<td>(3.728)</td>
<td>(4.629)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Partisan Strength</strong></td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>5.608*</td>
<td>-5.917*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.214)</td>
<td>(2.805)</td>
<td>(3.483)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interest</strong></td>
<td>1.207</td>
<td>.518</td>
<td>-.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(6.458)</td>
<td>(8.169)</td>
<td>(10.145)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Knowledge</strong></td>
<td>-.887</td>
<td>1.899</td>
<td>-2.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.422)</td>
<td>(1.808)</td>
<td>(2.246)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td>-4.274**</td>
<td>2.219</td>
<td>-6.489**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.493)</td>
<td>(1.878)</td>
<td>(2.332)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td>-2.143*</td>
<td>-1.675</td>
<td>-.412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.268)</td>
<td>(1.597)</td>
<td>(1.983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td>-1.809</td>
<td>-3.073</td>
<td>1.173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.806)</td>
<td>(3.531)</td>
<td>(4.385)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Minority</strong></td>
<td>9.365*</td>
<td>-7.378</td>
<td>17.121*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4.977)</td>
<td>(6.277)</td>
<td>(7.795)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td>-.038</td>
<td>.022</td>
<td>-.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.092)</td>
<td>(.116)</td>
<td>(.144)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Constant</strong></td>
<td>70.143**</td>
<td>68.764</td>
<td>.650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.972)</td>
<td>(15.085)**</td>
<td>(18.734)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number 192 191 191

R²  .181  .203  .283

Adjusted R²  .127  .150  .235

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 6.12: Affective and Cognitive Social Identity effects on Candidate Ratings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ideological Self-Placement</th>
<th>Mean Issue Placement</th>
<th>Partisan Activity Index</th>
<th>Over-time Party Voting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affective Social Identity</td>
<td>.303* (.162)</td>
<td>.060 (.193)</td>
<td>.380* (.176)</td>
<td>-.059 (.156)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Social Identity</td>
<td>.122 (.157)</td>
<td>.237 (.186)</td>
<td>.238 (.172)</td>
<td>.155 (.152)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Identity</td>
<td>.038 (.169)</td>
<td>-.037 (.200)</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partisan Strength</td>
<td>.193 (.125)</td>
<td>-.015 (.438)</td>
<td>-.084 (.386)</td>
<td>.271* (.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest Knowledge</td>
<td>-.004 (.368)</td>
<td>-.409 (.438)</td>
<td>1.831 (.386)</td>
<td>.407 (.344)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Education</td>
<td>.259** (.079)</td>
<td>.160* (.093)</td>
<td>.003 (.083)</td>
<td>.025 (.073)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge Income</td>
<td>(.085) (.085)</td>
<td>(.100) (.085)</td>
<td>(.090) (.077)</td>
<td>(.080) (.068)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Gender</td>
<td>-.017 (.160)</td>
<td>-.020 (.190)</td>
<td>.080 (.173)</td>
<td>-.150 (.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender Minority</td>
<td>-.067 (.283)</td>
<td>.247 (.338)</td>
<td>.234 (.302)</td>
<td>.245 (.266)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority Age</td>
<td>(.001) (.005)</td>
<td>(.007) (.006)</td>
<td>(.002) (.006)</td>
<td>.003 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age Constant</td>
<td>2.577** (.655)</td>
<td>3.311** (.780)</td>
<td>-0.671 (.688)</td>
<td>2.483 (.609)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number 192</td>
<td>R² .195</td>
<td>Adjusted R² .146</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R² 218</td>
<td>.070</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adjusted R² 213</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, one-tailed test

Table 6.13: Affective and Cognitive Social Identity Effects on Ideology and Activity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratic Leaner/ Weak Democrat</th>
<th>Strong Democrat/ Weak Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
<td>-1.59* (0.93)</td>
<td>3.72* (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent Identity</td>
<td>1.25* (0.81)</td>
<td>-1.89* (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Affect</td>
<td>-0.17 (0.26)</td>
<td>0.14 (0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic Cognition</td>
<td>0.57* (0.35)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.78 (1.32)</td>
<td>-4.53* (1.47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number: 86
-2 Log Likelihood: 61.37
Pseudo R²: 0.309

Note: * p ≤ .05, one-tailed test

Table 6.14: Multinomial Logit of Democratic Party Identification
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican Leaner/Weak Republican</th>
<th>Strong Republican/Weak Republican</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity</td>
<td>-3.54*</td>
<td>1.64*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.94)</td>
<td>(.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(.47)</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(.18)</td>
<td>(.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Cognition</td>
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<td>0.08</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>(.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(.96)</td>
<td>(1.09)</td>
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</table>

Number: 139
-2 Log Likelihood: 110.92
Pseudo $R^2$: .245

Note: * p ≤ .10 ** p ≤ .05, two-tailed test

Table 6.15: Multinomial Logit of Republican Party Identification
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Summary of Findings

The findings in this research project have clearly demonstrated that there is much more to partisanship than merely affective attachment to a political party. A reconceptualization of partisanship as an attitude dependent upon both affective and cognitive elements as well as a social identification with a political party leads to important new insights into the nature of partisanship and how it affects other aspects of citizen’s political attitudes and behaviors. A brief summary of the major findings plainly indicates the value of this approach.

Although partisanship has traditionally been examined as a primarily affective orientation (e.g., Campbell et al. 1960), or alternatively as an essentially cognitive construct (Fiorina 1981; Franklin and Jackson 1983) the evidence here indicates that partisanship is based on both affect and cognition to considerable degrees. While some persons’ partisan attitudes are primarily dependent upon their emotional response to parties, others’ partisan attitudes depend more on cognitive partisan response. Furthermore, there are meaningful political differences between citizens depending upon the psychological basis of their partisan attitudes. Most prominently, affective partisans appear to be more loyal partisans—both in terms of straight ticket vote and supporting
their party over time. Despite being less consistent partisans, cognitive partisans were distinguished by being more ideological than affective partisans as well as perceiving greater differences between the two parties. Thus, in attitudes, cognitive partisans appear to be more partisan, but where it really counts, at the polls, the affective partisans were the better partisans. Importantly, these effects were not just limited to comparisons between the two groups. Rather, they functioned on a linear continuum. As one became more affective or more cognitive, the described effects became stronger. The affective and cognitive components of partisan attitudes thus proved to be meaningful elements to consider in how partisanship affects both political perceptions and behaviors.

Social identity theory proved to be perhaps even more robust in adding new understanding to party identification. Social identity theory, which describes the relationship between persons and the groups to which they consider themselves to belong, has obvious value in an application to partisanship. Social-psychology studies in other countries had clearly identified the role of social identifications in political party membership (e.g., Abrams and Emler 1994; Duck, Hogg, and Terry 1995; Kelly 1988). My research found a clear, though not overwhelmingly strong, social identity basis to partisanship in America. The majority of the respondents appeared to have at least moderate levels of social identification with their preferred party. Social identity with political independents, in contrast, was marked by much lower levels of identification.

Although the fact that Americans have these partisan social identifications is interesting, the value of understanding a partisan social identity is how it impacts on political perceptions above and beyond one's attitude towards the political party. A key tenet of social identity is that of inter-group differentiation: as social identity increases
persons perceive greater differences between the groups to which they belong and the relevant groups to which they do not. Here, the results found that as one’s partisan social identity increased, ratings of both the political parties and the major presidential candidates saw increased inter-group distance. Interestingly, this appeared to be accomplished primarily through enhanced positive perceptions of one’s own party rather than exaggerated negative ratings of the opposition party. Despite the large differences in persons’ ratings of the parties, the lack of out-party derogation perhaps points to the general level of civility and tolerance within our political culture. This finding may also suggest that partisan social identifications may not be as strong as other social identifications which lead to both in-group favoritism and out-group derogation.

Partisan social identity impacted not only party and candidate perceptions, but one’s ideology as well. A social identification with a group is strengthened by its distinctiveness from other groups. Consequently, it appears that one way in which social identity may affect partisanship is to drive partisans away from the ideological middleground. Social identity also impacts partisan behavior, most significantly partisan political activities. As one’s social identity increased there was also a substantial increase in activities such as primary voting and attending political rallies. Finally, greater social identity also increased the likelihood that one would support one’s preferred party over time.

Although social identification as a sense of group belonging and affect and cognition as elements of overall partisan attitudes are conceptually distinct, there was also much to be gained from examining these concepts in unison. First, when examining separate affective and cognitive components of partisan social identification, the affective
component proved dominant in driving all the predictions of social identity theory. Thus, although social identity depends upon both cognitive awareness of group membership and emotional value attached to that membership, the emotional value proves decisive in driving perceptual contrasts. Furthermore, social identity appears to be more closely related to the affective attitude component of most persons' partisanship. Although the correlation coefficients indicated little difference between the strength of the affective-social identity and cognitive-social identity relationships, discrepancy scores indicated a stronger relationship between affect and social identity for a substantial majority of the sample. Finally, the analyses in chapter 6 demonstrate that partisan social identity has more explanatory power in modeling politics than do affect and cognition. When social identity, affect, and cognition were all included as independent variables, social identity was consistently a significant predictor whereas affect and cognition were not. Consequently, it would seem that while both approaches are indeed valuable, the conceptualization and measurement of social identity offers more to the study of partisanship than does an examination of its affective and cognitive bases.

The examination of affect, cognition, and social identity also produced interesting findings on gender and racial differences in partisanship. Men were more positive towards their preferred party in affect, cognition, and evaluation. This gap was substantially larger for affect, however. Although men and women had nearly identical levels of partisan social identification, social identity was a significant aspect of overall partisanship for women, but not men. Despite very few non-whites in the sample, significant results were achieved with regards to race as well. Blacks had levels of partisan affect significantly higher than those of whites while there were no statistically
significant differences for partisan cognition. Though conclusions from the small sample are tenuous, it would appear that Black Americans have a greater emotional attachment to their preferred party than do whites. Interestingly, Blacks had lower partisan social identity than whites, perhaps because Blacks’ racial identifications need not translate into social identification with the Democratic party.

Finally, this conceptual approach proved to be very useful for understanding the traditional seven-point party identification scale. An ongoing controversy within political science has been the problem of “intransitivities” in this scale—the fact that independents leaning towards a political party are often more partisan than those who are weak identifiers with a party. The analyses here indicate that the relative balance of affect and cognition in one’s partisanship as well as both partisan and independent social identity can go a long way towards explaining this unique pattern. Although independent leaners are more partisan than weak partisan on many measures (e.g., Keith et al. 1992), they are clearly distinct from weak partisan in relying more on cognition relative to affect, having more independent social identity, and less partisan social identity. These features follow the transitive properties we would expect and thus offer considerable explanation for the unique psychological constellation of partisanship that results in an individual choosing to identify as an independent instead of a partisan, despite obvious partisan preferences.

**Practical Implications**

The findings discussed above have several practical implications for the study of partisanship and political behavior in America. Perceptions of political parties and political candidates and patterns of political behavior can be much more fully understood
by taking into account affective, cognitive, and social identity components of partisanship. Future research would do well to take these factors into account in both conceptual and analytic strategies.

The findings here go along ways towards explaining the intransitivities in the party identification index and how they should be dealt with. First of all, despite Keith et al.'s (1992) contention that leaners should simply be grouped with weak partisans, there are systematic psychological differences between the groups which imply that this may not always be a wise course of action. It is clear, that in a variety of ways, leaners are simply not as well socialized into the party system. The preponderance of partisan cognition relative to partisan affect and the weaker group identity with partisans clearly identifies leaners as a group who, despite clear partisan preferences, lack the psychological bases, both affect and social identity, of partisanship which should lead them to consistently act on these preferences. This is very much in keeping with the finding that leaners are less consistently partisan in their behavior (Dennis 1992; Keith et al. 1992).

In practice, then, the way in which we treat leaners should depend upon the objective of the research. As Keith et al. (1992) have clearly demonstrated, leaners are best categorized with other partisans when studying specific political behaviors or attitudes, e.g., vote choice, ideology. The findings in this study do not discount this argument. On the other hand, when addressing more general issues of partisanship and independence, leaners should most appropriately be considered as independents. Leaners, in both their level of independent social identity as well as their attitudes towards parties in general, are indistinguishable from pure independents. They are also
significantly less like true partisans in their impoverished partisan social identity. These explorations of affect, cognition, and social identity indicate that in conceptualizing partisanship and examining partisan psychology, leaners are clearly a unique group sharing characteristics of both avowed partisans and pure independents.

To explore the nature of partisanship and its impact on Americans' political beliefs and behaviors, most current research relies on the National Election Studies data. Although these studies are immensely valuable and contain an enormous amount of data, partisanship—a central variable in just about every model of political attitudes and behavior—is essentially measured with only the standard two-part question. Simply adding up party likes and dislikes does not add any relevant psychological information. Using the open-ended codes is tedious and arbitrary. Furthermore, increasingly few individuals have anything to say here. It would seem then, that major surveys of political opinion could benefit from including fuller measures of partisanship in their surveys. Though it might seem that adding all the measures used here would not be practical, the full scales are not needed for valid results. For starters, the affect and cognition measures can be abbreviated by using true semantic differentials, e.g., “like” and “dislike” as the two anchors. Just a few questions each on affect, cognition, and social identity are sufficient for reliable measures of these concepts. Three questions each on these concepts could provide very valuable information while only marginally lengthening the survey. As for the National Election Studies, there is admittedly something to be said to continuity over the years, but the measures used here would provide substantially more insight into politics than the increasingly little-used open-ended measures. Until such measures are widely available it does little good to recommend when and where they

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should be used. However, it is clear that where possible, measures of affect, cognition, and especially social identity should be included in models of political perceptions.

**Political Implications**

The findings in this study have implications not only for how we study politics, but for how political parties, candidates, and voters interact as well. Perhaps the most significant finding in this regard is the importance of an emotional bond to a political party among voters. The persons who are most likely to actively support their party in a consistent fashion are those whose partisan attitudes are based more on emotion than cognition. Furthermore, social identification with a political party, which has proven to be very influential in both partisan perceptions and activities, depends primarily upon its affective component for its effects. Although cognitive aspects of partisanship are very important as well—leading to more partisan ideology and candidate perceptions—it appears that an emotional bond may make a critical difference. Thus, cognitive-based attitudes towards parties are responsible for more ideological extremity and more favorable candidate and party attitudes, but consistent voting patterns as well as in-group favoritism of social identity appear to rest predominantly on an affective bond.

Consequently, insofar as political parties hope to gain consistent and meaningful support, they need to work to create emotional and social group ties with voters. Whether there is all that much that the political parties can do to strength emotional ties among the electorate is not all that clear. It would seem that a more emotional, less issue-based partisanship, fits the classic ideal of partisanship passed down from one generation to the next. As increasingly fewer Americans are strong partisans, though, there is less of
a reservoir of emotionally-based partisanship to be passed on to the next generation. Perhaps this is an important contributing factor behind the cycle of partisan decline following realignments (Beck 1974). Partisan realignments are marked by major issue cleavages that transform the political system. Such dramatic political changes and prominent new issues may evoke an emotional political response that is less salient in times of "normal" politics. Barring a realignment, political parties may have more to gain by focusing on so-called "easy" issues (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Issues which are closely associated with a political party and lead to more basic emotional response, rather than complex problems, e.g., health care reform, probably lend themselves to strengthening the affective basis of partisanship. As levels of formal education continue to rise, however, increasing numbers of citizens have the cognitive resources to base their partisanship on cognitive evaluations of issues and candidates. It may be that the emotional basis of partisanship faces inevitable decline as citizens are more able to base their partisan evaluations on cognitive factors.

Perhaps the area where political parties can best hope to improve partisanship is through engendering stronger social identity in their supporters. Parties have increasingly focused the resources on the media to the detriment of grass-roots activities. Media messages represent just an individual passively attuned to a television. Media messages are also more likely to focus on the candidate and not the party. Grass-roots activities, in contrast, involve persons in political parties in an interpersonal fashion. By engaging in such activities, citizens are provided an opportunity to cognitively acknowledge their membership in a group as well as establish an emotional bond. In this age of media-
driven, candidate-centered campaigns, partisan social identity may be deprived of its full potential to influence parties and campaigns.

Social identity theory also would seem to suggest that, to some degree, partisan conflict is inevitable. Certainly, a considerable amount of partisan conflict can be explained by realistic group conflict theory (Sherif 1966), as parties contend over political offices and public policies. Nonetheless, even where we might expect bipartisanship, widespread social identification with political parties should reduce cooperation through in-group favoritism and out-group derogation. Relatively speaking, a partisan should perceive the opposition party as consisting of inferior, homogeneously like-minded others. Obviously, such biases can be and often are overcome in the realm of politics, but social identity certainly presents cause for political conflict rather than cooperation.

**Caveats**

Despite many significant and interesting results, the findings from this study should be considered in context. The affect and cognitive attitude measures as well as the social identity scale have already been validated both empirically and conceptually within social psychology. As all these scales were designed to be fairly universal in application, it would seem that we can accept their results with regards to political parties. Where problems arise, however, is the nature of the sample used here.

Whereas social-psychologists examine basic human psychological processes which are assumed to be universal across the human population, the issues become more difficult when we examine the psychology of politics. Insofar as we are interested in the
psychological findings here, the results should be considered fairly generalizeable. In fact, several of the results here, e.g., separability of affect and cognition, social identity influence on inter-group differentiation and group distinctiveness, replicate findings in the psychological literature. In generalizing the results to the political world, however, the representativeness of the sample becomes a serious issue. This is where the weakness of the present study lies. Although every effort, within financial constraints, was made to obtain a sample representative of the voting-age public, the present sample almost assuredly suffers from more bias than the average political survey.

The survey here was a mail survey and resultantly relied on respondent motivation more than most. Although two follow-up postcards were sent and a chance at $150 was offered, the response rate was only 24%. Two key features indicate that the sample was more interested in politics and political parties than average citizens. First, there many fewer pure independents and less Democratic and Republican leaners, then would be expected from comparisons with NES data. Secondly, the respondents were much more knowledgeable about politics than average Americans. Using a series of items measuring factual knowledge about politics advocated by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), the vast majority of the respondents answered four or more of the five questions correctly—a figure much higher than would be expected from Delli and Carpini and Keeter's analysis. In short then, the respondents represent a group particularly interested in and knowledgeable about politics, perhaps not surprisingly given the nature of the survey. Furthermore, though likely not as serious a problem, the respondents were limited to the geographic area. Fortunately, as market researchers can attest, this region is quite representative of the United States as whole. Nonetheless, given potential
regional differences in the nature of partisanship, e.g., South vs. non-South, any national conclusions on these matters require a national sample.

Given the somewhat biased nature of the sample, then, the generalizeability of the conclusions here must be approached with moderate skepticism. Any attempts to generalize about the levels of affect, cognition, and social identity or the ratio of affective to cognitive partisans within the general population would be unwise given the politically attentive, geographically limited sample. Despite these problems, though, general conclusions about the psychological nature of partisanship are tenable. The sample did represent a fairly wide cross-section of adults in terms of age, education, and income—all factors which relate to partisanship. Although the results do not allow one to make conclusions about the true ratio of affective to cognitive partisans, they do allow for the definitive conclusions that both affective and cognitive-based partisanship exist and have clear consequences for political attitudes and behavior. Similarly, though we may not be able to discuss overall levels of partisan social identity in America, it is clear that it does exist among many citizens and clearly affects the ways in which they perceive politics. Although the sample is not as representative as desired, there is not theoretical basis to expect that social identity, a universal psychological phenomenon, affects politically knowledgeable central Ohioans any differently than it affects other Americans.

Further Research

The first prescription for further research is clearly the need to include measures of partisan affect, cognition, and social identity in large-scale, representative, national political surveys. First, this deals with the sample problems discussed above and allows
for true generalizeability about the nature of these partisan psychological phenomena. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, this would allow for the exploration of many issues beyond the limitations of the small-scale mail survey used here. How affect, cognition, and social identity relate to candidate evaluations, issue placement of self, parties, and candidates, attitude importance, evaluations of parties on specific issues Congressional voting, and many other issues could be explored with potentially enlightening results. Marcus (1988), Marcus and MacKuen (1993), Kinder (1994), and others have shown the considerable potential to exploring affective and cognitive bases of political attitudes. Might affectively and cognitively oriented partisans respond differently to candidates? To media campaigns? To major political issues? Though not previously demonstrated in America, social identity theory has likewise shown considerable potential for further explaining politics (e.g., Duck, Hogg, and Terry 1998; Kelly 1989). How does social identity affect perceptions of media bias? Of candidates during campaigns? Of Congress and the President? Since the nature of partisan social identity changes with changes in the relative power and status of political parties (Duck, Hogg, and Terry 1998), social identity may help explain the dynamics of presidential support and the presidential honeymoon. All these questions can help us to better understand and predict how Americans relate to the political world.

In addition to examining these issues through the use of surveys, the psychological nature of the phenomena under investigation also lends itself to a variety of experimental analyses. Social psychological evidence suggests that affective and cognitive partisans should be susceptible to persuasion from political messages alternatively more affective or cognitive in nature (Fabrigar and Petty 1999). It should
therefore be possible to test different styles of campaign advertisements and messages to
determine if they can indeed differentially influence citizens based upon the type of their
partisanship. Furthermore, it may be possible to experimentally manipulate the salience
of one’s partisan affect or cognition. For example, if engaging in certain activities or
watching certain types of political messages make one’s emotional bond to a party more
salient, that should lead to more consistent partisan support.

Partisan social identity should also be amenable to experimental examination.
Social identity theory was first developed following a series of experiments termed the
“minimal groups paradigm.” Here, the most arbitrary group distinctions evoked the
perceptual biases of social identity. In environments where partisan salience is
manipulated, through exposure to campaign propaganda, presidential speeches, etc., it
would be possible to examine whether partisan social identity increases, and with it either
in-group favoritism or out-group derogation. An additional aspect of social identity
theory not discussed here due to lack of appropriate data is the group homogeneity effect.
This is a perceptual bias where the outgroup is seen as homogenous others, whereas the
ingroup is a differentiated, but united, collection of heterogeneous individuals (Brewer
and Brown 1998). The nature of perceptions of out-party members as well as perceptions
of individuals who are members of groups closely-related groups, e.g., the Christian
right, labor unions, could also yield interesting findings based on social identity theory.

Ultimately then, the findings here, rather than settling any existing arguments
about partisanship and politics, present a clear call for further research into the
psychological structure of partisanship and how it explains our political attitudes and
behaviors. The results here really are just a very step towards demonstrating how a richer
conceptualization of partisanship offers us improved understanding and predictive power. The application of affective and cognitive attitude components and social identity theory to political parties and politics in general holds great potential for further solving the puzzles of American democracy.
APPENDIX A

PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPONENTS OF PARTISANSHIP SURVEY

Political Parties and the American Citizen: A Survey on Attitudes About American Political Parties

We want to know about the roles of political parties in the lives of Americans. Do political parties provide real choices for Americans? Do political parties do more to confuse than to clarify politics? Are political parties a vital part of the American form of government, or are they no longer important? We want to know what you think and feel about political parties in America today and how this relates to your thoughts on politics.

Please answer all of the questions. If you wish to comment on any question or further explain your answers, please use the “comments” section on the back cover of this booklet. When you have completed the questionnaire return it in the included postage-paid envelope.

Thank you for your help.

The Ohio State University
Department of Political Science
2140 Derby Hall
Columbus, OH 43210
Below is a list of words that could be used to describe your overall evaluation of an object. Please use the list below to describe your evaluation of The Democratic Party. If the word definitely describes your evaluation of The Democratic Party, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe your evaluation of The Democratic Party, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

### Overall Evaluation

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Below is a list of feelings or moods that could be caused by an object. Please use the list below to describe how The Democratic Party makes you feel. If the word definitely describes how The Democratic Party makes you feel, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe how The Democratic Party makes you feel, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

### Feelings or Moods

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Below is a list of traits or characteristics that could be used to describe an object. Please use the list below to describe The Democratic Party. If the word definitely describes The Democratic Party, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe The Democratic Party, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

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Below is a list of words that could be used to describe your overall evaluation of an object. Please use the list below to describe your evaluation of The Republican Party. If the word definitely describes your evaluation of The Republican Party, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe your evaluation of The Republican Party, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Good</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dislike</td>
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<td>Positive</td>
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<td>Undesirable</td>
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<td>Desirable</td>
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<td>Negative</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

179
Below is a list of feelings or moods that could be caused by an object. Please use the list below to describe how The Republican Party makes you feel. If the word definitely describes how The Republican Party makes you feel, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe how The Republican Party makes you feel, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Feeling</th>
<th>NOT AT ALL</th>
<th></th>
<th>DEFINITELY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delighted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Annoyed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hateful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relaxed</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disgusted</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Below is a list of traits or characteristics that could be used to describe an object. Please use the list below to describe The Republican Party. If the word definitely describes The Republican Party, then circle the number "7". If you decide that the word does not at all describe The Republican Party, then circle the number "1". Use the intermediate numbers between 1 and 7 to indicate responses between these two extremes.

Work rapidly. Your first reaction is best. Please circle a number for all words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Trait</th>
<th>NOT AT ALL</th>
<th></th>
<th>DEFINITELY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Useful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unsafe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unhealthy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worthless</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wise</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmful</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following section is intended to learn a little bit more about you and your views on politics. Please answer as honestly and accurately as possible. Please circle the most appropriate response for each question.

1. Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, Republican, Independent, or other?
   1  DEMOCRAT
   2  REPUBLICAN
   3  INDEPENDENT
   4  OTHER

2. If you consider yourself a Democrat or Republican, do you consider yourself a strong Democrat/Republican or a not so strong Democrat/Republican?
   1  STRONG
   2  NOT SO STRONG

3. If you consider yourself an Independent, do you consider yourself to be closer to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party, or neither?
   1  DEMOCRATIC PARTY
   2  REPUBLICAN PARTY
   3  NEITHER

The following is a list of some of our political leaders and other groups who are in the news these days. Please rate that person using the ‘feeling thermometer.’ Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person or group. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person or group and that you don't care too much for that person or group. You would rate the person or group at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person or group.

4. Bill Clinton ________
5. Bob Dole ________
6. Ross Perot ________
7. Democratic Party ________
8. Republican Party ________
9. Political Independents ________
10. Labor Unions ________
11. Poor People ________
12. Big Business ________
13. Christian Fundamentalists ________
14. Environmentalist ________
15. Liberals ________
16. Conservatives ________
17. People on welfare ________
Think about people who call themselves political independents. Please use the scale below to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement regarding this group. When you have decided on an answer to an item, please circle the number in the space next to that item.

0 STRONGLY DISAGREE
1 DISAGREE
2 AGREE
3 STRONGLY AGREE

18. When someone criticizes this group, it feels like a personal insult. 0 1 2 3
19. I don't act like the typical person of this group. 0 1 2 3
20. I'm very interested in what others think about this group. 0 1 2 3
21. The limitations associated with this group apply to me also. 0 1 2 3
22. When I talk about this group, I usually say "we" rather than "they." 0 1 2 3
23. I have a number of qualities typical of members of this group. 0 1 2 3
24. This group's successes are my successes. 0 1 2 3
25. If a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed. 0 1 2 3
26. When someone praises this group, it feels like a personal compliment. 0 1 2 3
27. I act like a person of this group to a great extent. 0 1 2 3

Please write in the political party, Democrat or Republican, that you consider yourself closest to in the following space ________________________ (if you did not select either the Democratic or Republican party skip to question 24)

Please answer the following questions with THIS political party in mind. Please use the scale below to indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement. When you have decided on an answer to an item, please write the number in the space next to that item.

0 STRONGLY DISAGREE
1 DISAGREE
2 AGREE
3 STRONGLY AGREE

28. When someone criticizes this group, it feels like a personal insult. 0 1 2 3
29. I don't act like the typical person of this group. 0 1 2 3
30. I'm very interested in what others think about this group. 0 1 2 3
31. The limitations associated with this group apply to me also. 0 1 2 3
32. When I talk about this group, I usually say "we" rather than "they." 0 1 2 3
33. I have a number of qualities typical of members of this group. 0 1 2 3
34. This group's successes are my successes. 0 1 2 3
35. If a story in the media criticized this group, I would feel embarrassed. 0 1 2 3
36. When someone praises this group, it feels like a personal compliment. 0 1 2 3
37. I act like a person of this group to a great extent. 0 1 2 3
38. Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you? Would you say that you were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in following the political campaigns in 1996?

1  VERY MUCH INTERESTED
2  SOMEWHAT INTERESTED
3  NOT MUCH INTERESTED

39. Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?

1  MOST OF THE TIME
2  SOME OF THE TIME
3  ONLY NOW AND THEN

Please indicate your agreement with the following statements from 1, strongly agree, to 7 strongly disagree.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STRONGLY AGREE</th>
<th>STRONGLY DISAGREE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>40. The best rule in voting is to pick a candidate regardless of party label.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41. It is better to be a firm party supporter than to be a political Independent.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42. The parties do more to confuse the issues than to provide clear choices.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43. It would be better if, in all elections, we put no party labels on the ballot.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44. The truth is we probably don't need political parties in America.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

45. Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point 1. Other people feel it is important for the government to provide many more services even if it means an increase in spending. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale at point 7. And of course other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6. Where would you place yourself?

1  PROVIDE FEWER SERVICES
2
3
4
5
6
7  PROVIDE MORE SERVICES

46. Some people feel that the government should provide a job for anyone who wants to work. Others think that the government should just let each person find a job on his or her own. And, of
course, other people have opinions somewhere in between. What about you? Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1. GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE JOBS
2
3
4
5
6
7 EACH SHOULD GET AHEAD ON HIS OR HER OWN

47. Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve the social and economic position of blacks. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks because they should help themselves. And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1. GOVERNMENT SHOULD HELP BLACKS
2
3
4
5
6
7 BLACKS SHOULD HELP THEMSELVES

48. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

1. EXTREMELY LIBERAL
2. LIBERAL
3. SLIGHTLY LIBERAL
4. MODERATE; MIDDLE OF THE ROAD
5. SLIGHTLY CONSERVATIVE
6. CONSERVATIVE
7. EXTREMELY CONSERVATIVE

49. Did you vote in the 1996 Election?

1. YES
2. NO
50. For whom did you vote for president in 1996? (If you did not vote, circle your preferred candidate)

1  BILL CLINTON
2  BOB DOLE
3  ROSS PEROT

51. Did you vote for (or prefer) a Democrat or Republican for U.S. Congress?

1  DEMOCRAT
2  REPUBLICAN
3  DON'T KNOW

52. Have you always voted for the same party for President?

1  ALWAYS
2  OFTEN
3  SOMETIMES
4  RARELY
5  NEVER

53. Did your father (or father substitute) think of himself mostly as a Democrat, as a Republican, as an Independent, or what?

1  DEMOCRAT
2  REPUBLICAN
3  INDEPENDENT
4  OTHER________________

54. Did your mother (or mother substitute) think of herself mostly as a Democrat, as a Republican, as an Independent, or what?

1  DEMOCRAT
2  REPUBLICAN
3  INDEPENDENT
4  OTHER________________

The following questions refer to the 1996 presidential election campaign.

55. During the campaign, did you talk to any people and try to show them why they should vote for or against one of the parties or candidates?

1  YES
2  NO
56. Did you wear a campaign button, put a campaign sticker on your car, or place a sign in your window or in front of your house?

1  YES
2  NO

57. Did you go to any political meetings, rallies, speeches, dinners, or things like that in support of a particular candidate?

1  YES
2  NO

58. Did you do any (other) work for one of the parties or candidates?

1  YES
2  NO

59. Did you vote in a 1996 Presidential Primary election?

1  YES
2  NO

60. During an election year people are often asked to make a contribution to support campaigns. Did you give money to an individual candidate running for public office or to a political party?

1  YES
2  NO

Here are a few questions about the government in Washington. Many people don't know the answers to these questions, so if there are some you don't know, just move on

61. Do you happen to know what job or political office is now held by Al Gore? ______________

62. Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not? Is it the president, the Congress, or the Supreme Court? ______________

63. How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto? ______________

64. Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington? ______________

65. Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative that the other at the national level? Which party is more conservative? ______________

66. What is your highest level of education?

1  HIGH SCHOOL
2  SOME COLLEGE
3  COLLEGE DEGREE
4  POST-COLLEGE
67. What is your approximate Household Income?

1  LESS THAN $20,000
2  $20,000 TO $40,000
3  $41,000 TO $60,000
4  $61,000 TO $80,000
8  MORE THAN $80,000

68. Are you Male or Female?

1  MALE
2  FEMALE

69. What race or ethnicity do you consider yourself?

1  WHITE
2  BLACK/AFRICAN-AMERICAN
3  AMERICAN INDIAN OR ALASKAN NATIVE
4  ASIAN OR PACIFIC ISLANDER
5  MULTI-RACIAL
6  OTHER____________________

70. Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?

1  EVERY WEEK
2  ALMOST EVERY WEEK
3  ONCE OR TWICE A MONTH
4  A FEW TIMES A YEAR
5  NEVER

71. If you do attend religious services, what church do you attend?

____________________

73. What is your age in years?

____________________
Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your thoughts on political parties or politics in general? If so, please use this space for that purpose.

Also any comments that you wish to make that you think may help us in future effort to understand what Franklin County residents think about their political parties will be appreciated, either here or in a separate letter.

Your contribution to this effort is very greatly appreciated. If you would like to be entered in the lottery to receive an opportunity to win $150, please print your name and either a phone number or address on the enclosed index card, so that we may inform you if you have been selected as the winner.
APPENDIX B

Additional Measures

**Party Evaluation:** Mean response of positive evaluation minus mean response of negative evaluation for respondent's preferred party. Derived from semantic scales.

**Partisan Affect:** Mean response of positive affect minus mean response of negative affect for respondent's preferred party. Derived from semantic scales.

**Partisan Cognition:** Mean response of positive cognition minus mean response of negative cognition for respondent's preferred party. Derived from semantic scales.

**Preferred Party:** Democratic party if mean Democratic evaluation is greater than mean Republican evaluation. Republican party if mean Republican evaluation is greater than mean Democratic evaluation.

**Preferred Party Rating:** Democratic feeling thermometer if preferred party is Democratic, Republican feeling thermometer if preferred party is Republican.

**Non-preferred Party Rating:** Republican feeling thermometer if preferred party is Democratic, Democratic feeling thermometer if preferred party is Republican.

**Comparative Candidate Ratings:** Feeling thermometer rating (0 to 100) of Clinton - Dole, if Democrat; Dole - Clinton, if Republican.

**Preferred Party Candidate Rating:** Clinton feeling thermometer if preferred party is Democratic, Dole if preferred party is Republican.

**Non-preferred Party Candidate Rating:** Dole feeling thermometer if preferred party is Democratic, Clinton if preferred party is Republican.

**Candidate Assessment:** Clinton Feeling Thermometer - Dole Feeling Thermometer.

**Ideological Extremity:** Scaled from 1, liberal, to 7, conservative, if Republican; 1, conservative, to 7 liberal, if Democrat.

**Issue Position:** Scaled from 1, most liberal, to 7 most conservative and averaged across the three issues of government services, government provided jobs, and government assistance to Blacks

**Issue Average Extremity:** Scaled from 1, most liberal, to 7, most conservative, if Republican; 1, most conservative, to 7, most liberal, if Democrat. Based on the issues of
government services, government provided jobs, and government assistance to Blacks.

**Over-time Party Support:** Based on question asking how frequently one has voted for presidential candidate of preferred party, ranging from 1, never, to 5, always.

**Party Activity Index:** Additive scale based on yes/no responses to 5 activity questions: trying to convince another to vote a particular way, wearing a campaign button, etc., attending a rally or speech, other work for a candidate, voting in the presidential primary, and contributing money to a candidate or party.

**Party System Attitudes:** Mean response, from 1 to 7, indicating support for the party system in general, based on questions 40 through 44 in the survey. Scores of 1 indicate most support for party system and 7 indicates least support.

**Democratic Vote:** Scored 1 if respondent voted for Bill Clinton, 0 if voted for Dole or Perot.

**Presidential Vote:** Scored 1 if Republican voted for Dole or Democrat voted for Clinton, 0 otherwise.

**Straight Ticket Vote:** Scored 1 if respondent voted for president and congressional representative of preferred party, 0 otherwise.

**Education:** Four point scale ranging from 1, HS diploma, to 4, post-college work.

**Income:** Five point scale ranging from 1, less than $20,000/year, to 4, more than $80,000/year.

**Non-white/Minority:** Scored 0 for whites, 1 otherwise.

**Age:** Age in years.

**Gender:** Scored 1 for male, 2 for female.
REFERENCES


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