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INSULAR SELF-DETERMINATION: THE KYKLADES UNDER THE SECOND ATHENIAN LEAGUE

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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****

The Ohio State University
1998

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1998
ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the possibility that the islands of the Kyklades enjoyed a high degree of economic prosperity during the period of the Second Athenian League (378-338 B.C.E.). This prosperity was directly linked to the membership of the islands in this League, as well as other political and commercial connections between Athens and individual island communities. Loans to these islands from the Temple of Apollo on Delos, that are usually interpreted as the result of a need to pay high levels of tribute to Athens in the fifth century B.C.E., may instead have been the result of Spartan financial exactions from the island states at various times between the end of the Peloponnesian War and the beginning of the Second Athenian League. Sparta may also have contributed to economic hardship in the Kyklades due to her inability to mount regular naval escorts for merchant shipping or to provide an economic marketplace comparable to the Peiraeus at Athens.

In contrast, the Athenians appear to have taken steps to increase the economic potential of their Kykladic allies. Athenian control of the Delian loan accounts appears to have resulted in a system of collection that allowed certain islands to remain in arrears of
payment of interest. Inscriptional evidence shows that commanders of Athenian garrisons in the Kyklades were often honored by island communities for economic assistance. The existence of decrees such as symbolai and proxenia, both between Athens and certain islands, as well as between the Kyklades themselves, indicate political ties that may have had economic components as well.

Additionally, several islands of the Kyklades minted coins during the Second Athenian League whose weight standards could have allowed easy exchange between Greek cities of the mainland and of cities in Asia Minor. Several islands had local mineral products that may have been exploited at this time, and these islands were situated along well-attested ancient trading routes. Recent archaeological surveys on several of the islands appear to also show a high level of agricultural exploitation during this period. Overall the evidence strongly suggests that the Second Athenian League provided a strong economic stimulus to this region.
Dedicated to my parents, J. Kurt and Eleanor Rutishauser, without whose love and support this project would never have been completed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank my adviser, Jack Martin Balcer, for his support and encouragement both for this project as well as throughout my graduate career, and also for his patience in reviewing various drafts of this manuscript.

I am grateful to the other members of my dissertation committee, Stephen Tracy and Timothy Gregory, for their expertise and invaluable advice. I thank the faculty and staff of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, in particular Ronald Stroud and William Coulson, for their assistance and stimulating discussions during my time of research and study in Greece. I am also indebted to Ken Sheedy, H. Papageorgiadou-Banis, Lina Mendoni, Patrice Brun, M.B. Wallace, and Gary Reger for many helpful suggestions. Any errors, of course, are the responsibility of the author.
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Accame Lega = Accame, S. La lega ateniense del sec.IV, a.c.. Rome 1941.
Beloch Geschichte = Beloch, J. Griechische Geschichte. 3 vol. Strasbourg 1893-1904.
IG = Inscriptiones Graecae, various editors. Berlin 1873-.
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<td>SV</td>
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INTRODUCTION

The cluster of Aegean islands that surrounds Delos, known as the Kyklades, is an area of the Greek world for which the evidence available to us is tantalizing in its potential but maddening in its scarcity. The region has seen many individual studies of specific islands, ranging from collections of inscriptions and historical surveys that proliferated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to recent archaeological surveys and scattered excavations that form a patchwork of "snapshots" of various islands.\(^1\) These studies have only begun to be recently synthesized.\(^2\)

Although many of the islands have received diachronic treatments, the Hellenistic period has been the era most thoroughly discussed, as epigraphic and other evidence is quite numerous for these centuries.\(^3\) The islands of Delos and Tenos have received particularly


detailed treatment in regards to the economic and legal records of sanctuaries. In the case of Delos, the time of independence (314-167 B.C.) has the most completely preserved records of the administration of the Temple of Apollo, but these records do exist in a more fragmentary form for the fourth and fifth centuries B.C. The political situations of Delos and the Kyklades in these two latter centuries involved periods of heavy influence by Athens, especially under the Delian Confederacy of 479-403. The Second Athenian League of 378-338, however, is a time of greater controversy in terms of the level of imperialism and domination exerted by Athens over her "allies."  

Imperialism, however, may be too all-inclusive a word for the relations between states that are at variance in their levels of political, military, and economic strength and influence. Whatever its varying strengths and weaknesses, Cargill’s study has shown that the alliances made between Athens and other states in the period before Chaironeia were not of uniform character. The privileges, benefits, sanctions, and penalties that applied to certain states did not apply to all, and some states obviously were in a better political and economic position, whether due to the power they brought into the initial alliance or to the degree in which they succumbed to the wishes of the Athenian state. Cargill exhaustively points out how the states that were inscribed on the stele of Aristoteles (IG II² 43) were the only ones guaranteed under all the provisions of the League- his arguments that members of the League were only

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4 The literature on this question is extensive. J. Cargill, The Second Athenian League (Berkeley 1981) is the latest treatment of the subject and provides a strong challenge to previous analyses of the period. S. Accame, La lega ateniense (Rome 1941) is still the most definitive overall study, although it largely echoes the imperialistic evaluation of Athens by earlier scholars such as F.H. Marshall, The Second Athenian Confederacy (Cambridge 1905).
enrolled in its early stages are fairly decisive, although points of controversy remain. These states, and these states alone, received protection from the abuses of the fifth-century Delian Confederacy.\(^5\)

Most of the Kykladic islands can be confidently stated to have been included in the initial group of poleis who joined the Second Athenian League.\(^6\) The dates of admission of a handful of the islands are still controversial, and this issue will be dealt with in the first chapter. The proximity of these islands to Athens and their strategic importance in the Aegean is amply attested by many ancient sources from various periods.\(^7\) The economic corollaries to strategy come to the fore when discussing Kykladic contributions of provisions and crews for fleets, their importance as bases for convoying the grain supply of Athens and for combatting piracy and privateering, and their geographic position as “stepping-stones” for merchantmen coping with the various navigational problems associated with the eastern Mediterranean.\(^8\) It was in the interest of Athens to keep the Kykladic islands allied to herself, or failing that, to keep them in a subservient position, which is especially relevant to the fifth century and the discussion of kleruchies.\(^9\)

\(^5\) Cargill League 195-6.

\(^6\) Ibid., 1-3.

\(^7\) See for example Thucydides on the fifth century, and Hellenistic power struggles between the various monarchies- Reger, 105.

\(^8\) Reger, 106ff.

Despite these important issues, the Kyklades have long suffered from a tendency among ancient historians to dismiss them as economic and cultural backwaters. The reasons for this prejudice are varied, ranging from the occasional joke in a play of Aristophanes to the relative barrenness of many of the islands in modern times.

Another reason for this view is that the levels of tribute paid by the Kykladic islands in the Delian Confederacy are often of lower amounts than seen in the poleis of other tributary districts. Some islands, however, such as Paros and Siphnos, had high tribute assessments that may have been due to income from certain local products such as marble or precious metals.

All told, the Kyklades until very recently have been given short shrift for the Classical period. This is certainly understandable in light of the relative amounts of evidence for these periods, but it would seem prudent to reexamine what is available for a time period of great change and importance to the Greek world in general, with the Kyklades a part of this

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10 R. Meiggs’ voluminous work, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) provides a perfect example of this view.


14 There have been numerous Bronze Age studies on the Kyklades: a good recent example is W. Ekschmitt, *Die Kyklades: Bronzezeit, Geometrische und Arkaische Zeit* (Mainz 1993).
world. Old prejudices must be discarded in favor of honest appraisals of the newest archaeological and epigraphic evidence, as well as new analytical approaches that have permeated the field of ancient Greek history, such as the application of sociological and anthropological models.¹⁵

The study of the ancient economy as a subfield of ancient history is another area that has experienced sweeping changes in its methodology and ideology. Moses Finley created a new orthodoxy with the publication of The Ancient Economy in 1973, which effectively demolished the older views of Rostovtzeff and others that economics in the ancient world had a character similar to modern capitalism, with long-range profit planning, an integrated monetary and trading network, and widespread entrepreneurialism on the part of the nobility of the Greek and Roman worlds.¹⁶ Finley showed that this assumption was false by demonstrating the primary role of agriculture in antiquity and the lack of highly developed economic theory in the classical world.

Within the past twenty or so years, however, there has been a revisionist movement contra Finley that has a growing number of adherents, all citing the recent use of survey, statistics, and pottery sampling, that would appear to indicate a greater level of economic activity than Finley would have admitted.¹⁷ These scholars have published new treatments of topics such

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¹⁵ See Island Polity, 1-8 for an excellent introduction to the use of sociological models in approaching historical questions.


as banking, land tenure and exploitation of resources, the flow of currency, trade in fine and coarse pottery, and so on, and have accumulated a growing body of evidence to refute some of Finley's claims. While the nature of the evidence for the Roman world (particularly Late Roman and into Late Antiquity) has allowed for more sophisticated statistical analyses, these paradigm shifts have also affected the study of Classical Greece to no mean degree.

Some of the aforementioned studies have applied these new methodologies to specific Kykladic islands, but never has the entire region been systematically examined for the period of the Second Athenian League, in order to create a holistic economic and political analysis. The political angle becomes important for the economy when discussing the question of imperialism and domination of one state by another, and how much economic benefit could be accrued by the stronger party.

The present study intends to provide just such an analysis. Individual islands and their relative differences are emphasized, but an effort is made to come to conclusions about the region in general. The relations between Athens and the Kyklades were unique compared to those that Athens had with other areas of the Greek world. The lists of the aparche to Athena in *The Athenian Tribute Lists* are an important resource; however, for the Classical period the fourth century B.C. and particularly the years of the Second Athenian League offer the most detailed and useful records.

These records take the form of decrees of the Athenians, their allies (in one extant instance), and of the assemblies and officials of various Kykladic islands. These will be discussed extensively herein. Less important, but still relevant, are records of land leases for

Keos and Tenos that help illuminate the demography of property ownership on those islands.\textsuperscript{18} Most important perhaps for this study is the so-called “Sandwich Marble”, the accounts of the Temple of Apollo on Delos that enumerate monies lent out to many of the Kykladic islands as well as arrears of interest.\textsuperscript{19} A few scholars have mentioned a possible connection between loans from Delos (an island under strong Athenian influence in this period) and the financial and military contributions called \textit{syntaxeis} to which many of the same islands were liable under the terms of the League.\textsuperscript{20}

I propose that the control of the Delian loan accounts represented one facet (but only one) of a real and systematic agenda on the part of the Athenian government to keep the Kykladic allies strong, as well as promote her own interests. This agenda failed in certain ways, one of the most important being that each island appears to have used the League and the Delian loan policy to her own advantage.

This study is mainly concerned with the period from the foundation of the Second Athenian League in 378/77 to its collapse in 338 after the formation of the League of Korinth. In terms of historical background, however, events from 405 will be used to construct the scenario in which we find the Kyklades at the time of the inauguration of the League. Before examining the evidence for the period, it is necessary to give a general description of the region in order to provide a setting for the historical events in question.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} See Landscape, 322; Etienne Tenos II (Paris 1990), 51, 63.
\item \textsuperscript{19} The Sandwich Marble: Coupry ID 98 (=IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1635).
\item \textsuperscript{20} L. Migeotte, \textit{L’Emprunt Public dans les Cites Grecques} (Paris 1984).
\end{itemize}
Geography and Sources For the Region

The term “Kyklades” as used by modern geographers is not strictly compatible with the use of the term by ancient writers. There are three authors from antiquity who give lists of Kykladic islands, namely Artemidoros (quoted in Strabo 10.5.3), Strabo, and Pliny. There is no strict correspondence between even these accounts.\(^\text{21}\) Artemidoros included Gyaros but the other two did not; only Pliny includes Rheneia while omitting Helena (modern Makronisos), Melos, and Kimolos. Strabo left out Prepesinthos (modern Despotiko) and Oliaros (modern Antiparos). All three include: Keos, Kythnos, Seriphos, Siphnos, Paros, Naxos, Syros, Mykonos, Tenos, and Andros.\(^\text{22}\)

Other writers divided the islands along ethnic lines. Skylax of Karyanda, writing in the sixth century B.C., listed Melos, Kimolos, Oliaros, Sikinos, Thera, Anaphe, and Astypalaia as grouped within the Dorian sphere. Keos, Helena, Kythnos, Seriphos, Paros, Naxos, Delos, Rheneia, Syros, Mykonos, Tenos, and Andros are all listed as Ionian islands. Ios, Amorgos, and Ikaros are not included by Skylax in his Kykladic list.\(^\text{23}\)

\(^{21}\) Strabo 10.15.3; Pliny 4.12.65-67.

\(^{22}\) I thank Ken Sheedy for kindly bringing these sources to my attention.

\(^{23}\) See Skylax 2.
The position of the islands on important trade routes is also well-attested. One route ran from the Peiraeus across Paros, Naxos, and Knidos to Rhodes and thence past Phaselis and Cyprus and down the Levant to Egypt. The cities of Ionia in Asia Minor were also well-placed to make use of these islands as stepping stones. The most important route, however, for Athens’ purposes was the grain route from the Hellespont, which passed the northern Aegean islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Halonnesos, and Skyros before rounding Andros and the tip of Euboia into the Saronic Gulf.24 The vital need of Athens to protect her food supply is amply shown by her establishment of klerouchies on Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros in the fifth century B.C. (as well as the fourth), the suppression of pirates based on Skyros at various times, and the use of convoys and naval expeditions throughout the Classical period to ensure that this lifeline remained open.25

How did these routes relate to those sea powers who held a hegemony over the Kykladic region? An examination of Spartan naval practices during this period is in order. Several routes taken by Spartan ships from the mainland of Greece to Asia Minor are implied by the sources, although none of the contemporary accounts give a complete itinerary of naval voyages through the islands. It has been theorized that most Spartan naval vessels, at least until the end of the fifth century, used the harbor of Kenchreai as a point of departure for the

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24 For the Egypt route: Thuc. 2.69, 8.35; Dem. 56.9; Lykurg. 1.18; Pseudo-Skylax 15.34; IG II/III1 283. For the Bosporus: Xen. Hell. 4.8.15; Dem. 7.2,12.13. On the latter route ships could expect to make two trips a summer- the Egypt route however could be traversed in wintertime.

25 Meiggs AE, 51,95,148.
The termini of the cross-Aegean voyages varied according to the needs of individual expeditions. The most detailed description of a Spartan naval itinerary is given in Thucydides, who states that in 427 a Spartan fleet departed for Mytilene. The voyage continued “around the Peloponnese” and Delos, Mykonos, and Ikaria are all attested as stopover points. A quick glance at a map of the Aegean really does not resolve the issue as to which point of departure, Gytheion or Kenchreai, is implied here. The use of the phrase “around the Peloponnese” is evidence for Gytheion, but Thucydides’ words are simply too vague to make hard and fast judgments from them. Later evidence for the cruise does not provide much additional information. The Athenian admiral Paches pursued the fleet from Ephesos to Patmos, but this destination might have been chosen by the Spartans in extremis, and may not have been on the normal itinerary for a return voyage to either Kenchreai or Gytheion.

If the departure was from Gytheion in 427, then the fleet would have passed Seriphos, Siphnos, and perhaps Syros before reaching Delos. Paros is also possible; there is a bit of reverse evidence in the statement of Xenophon that Alkibiades sailed from Samos to Paros...
and thence to Gytheion. Ikaria, although definitely mentioned, would appear strange since its harbor, subject to the ravages of the Etesian Winds, was not an exemplary one. Yet Ikaria does form a sort of central “hub” for shipping that could then proceed either north to Chios and Lesbos, straight on east to Samos and Ephesos, or south towards Rhodes.

If Kenchreai was the point of departure, Keos, Kythnos and Syros are likely stopping points, and Tenos is close to the route also, but would seem an unnecessary detour.

In 396 Agesilaos took a combined fleet of Spartans and their allies from Geraistos in Euboia to Ephesos. His sacrifice at Aulis is the main item of interest in the sources for this expedition, but the beginning and ending points of the journey are more significant for this study. If the usual island-hopping practice is maintained, Andros, Tenos, Mykonos, Ikaria, and Samos are all potential nodes on the itinerary to Ephesos. Ephesos is well-attested for this period as the site of a major Spartan base of operations. There are other destinations for the Spartan navy throughout the years. In 413/12 a Spartan armada landed at Chios, and

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28 Xen. Hell. 1.4.11.

29 Homer Iliad 2.145; Paus. 9.11; Pliny Ep. 7.51; Papalas Ikaria, 10 and 33 n.1, in which it is pointed out by Papalas that a good port does not necessarily guarantee prosperity- witness the case of Syros until the modern period.

30 Xen. Hell. 3.4.4; Plut. Ages. 6.4-6; Paus. 3.9.2-3.

31 All of the above sources discuss Agesilaos’ preoccupation with being seen as a “second” Agamemnon, and Aulis is where Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter Iphigenia in Homer.

32 Cook, J.M., “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” JHS 81 (1961), 70. The controversy over whether or not Ephesos was actually hostile to Sparta, with the Spartan base centered instead on nearby Mt. Kornisos, seems to have been effectively solved by Cook in 70 n.82 of this article, in favor of the idea that Ephesos remained firmly on the Spartan side.
this terminus is attested again in 411/10. This would imply roughly the same itinerary as the journey to Mytilene in 427. Rhodes is also attested, but is more problematic and the sources must be read carefully. In 391 Thibron departed for the east, and although Diodoros mentions the fleet putting in at Samos first and securing this island, Xenophon does not. Later that same year Teleutias sailed from the Korinthian Gulf to Samos, picked up ships there to augment his fleet, and then proceeded on to Rhodes. Spartan ships in these cases may have used Patmos, Leros, Kalymnos, Kos, Nisyros, and Telos as potential stopovers before reaching Rhodes, although the Spartan naval base at Knidos is another strong possibility. Thibron, however, would have had a long stretch with few stopovers on his way to Rhodes in 391, since there is evidence that at least Kos and Nisyros had broken away

33 In 413/12: Thuc. 8.6.2-5, where Phrynis “made ready five ships at Lakonia”, and Thuc. 8.7-10 when Alkamenes is stated to have hauled his ships over the Isthmos from Korinth. In 411/10: Thuc. 8.23.1-2, with a departure from Kenchreai under Astyochos. Another possible example is in 409 when Kratesippidas became involved in operations near Chios, although that island is not definitely stated as the place where his forces first landed in Asia Minor. See Diod. 13.65.5; Oxyrhynchus P.S. 1304; R. Sealey, “Die spartanische Nauarchie,” Klio 58 (1976), 335-358.

34 In 407 Lysander sailed to Rhodes, but it is uncertain whether this was his mainland terminus in Asia Minor; Xen. Hell. 1.5.1; Plut. Lys. 3.2.

35 Xen. Hell. 4.8.22-3; Diod. 14.97.3-9. The account of Xenophon seems confused here, since in 4.8.17 Thibron was attested as having sailed to Ephesos first. In reality it would appear that Xenophon has simply neglected to mention the Samian incident, strange as this fact may be. All he says is that Teleutias later “picked up” ships at Samos before leaving for Rhodes.

36 Xen. Hell. 4.8.23 says that Ekdikos first sailed to Knidos, followed by Teleutias; Diod. 14.97.4 also mentions Knidos as a stopover on the way to Rhodes.

37 In Thuc. 8.26, Spartan ships put in at Leros.
from Sparta in 394 at the instigation of Konon.\textsuperscript{38} Again, Knidos is the most likely place of stopover for Thibron's fleet, despite the controversy that such a view has aroused.\textsuperscript{39} In addition to Kenchreai, Aigina was also used as a Spartan base of operations.\textsuperscript{40} Antalkidas and Gorgopas sailed from Aigina to Ephesos in 388.\textsuperscript{41} It may be that in these later years Aigina had supplanted Kenchreai as the point of departure for Spartan naval journeys to the East.

The question of the use of Gytheion by the fleets is important for tracing the most commonly-used routes. There is definitely a fleet attested there by Xenophon in 408.\textsuperscript{42} Whether Falkner's ideas on Gytheion are correct or not, we must consider the most likely routes of these sea expeditions and which islands would have been important to have remained either sympathetic to Sparta or even hosts for Spartan garrisons and installations.

\textsuperscript{38} Diod. 14.84.3.

\textsuperscript{39} Cook, "Peraea," \textit{JHS} 81 (1961), 67 states that Knidos must have remained a Spartan stronghold even after their defeat in 394 nearby, citing evidence for its continued use in 391/90 in such passages as Xen. \textit{Hell}, 4.8.22-24. Cawkwell, G.L., "The SYN coins again," \textit{JHS} 83 (1963), 153 thinks this to be unlikely, but to my mind does not produce enough evidence to refute Cook's claim. Coupled with the fact that the Spartan ships would almost certainly have required places to stop along the way from Samos, I feel that Cook's position is the more likely one, whether or not he is correct about the actual base being on the nearby hill of Maltepe instead of the polis of Knidos itself; "Peraea," 67-8. According to Xen. \textit{Hell}, 4.8.24, Teleutias sold booty at Knidos as well in 391.

\textsuperscript{40} Xen. \textit{Hell}, 5.1.13.

\textsuperscript{41} Xen. \textit{Hell}, 5.1.6.

\textsuperscript{42} Xen. \textit{Hell}, 1.4.11. However, some ships were kept there in 429, according to Thuc. 2.80. Falkner "Gytheum," \textit{Historia} 43 (1994), 498 argues that is only after the Battle of Kyzikos that Spartan naval shipbuilding begins in earnest. Prior to this, allied ships may have been preferred, such as the Chian vessels mentioned in Thuc. 8.6. Certainly the Spartans made use of the bases of their allies, see Thuc. 2.9, 2.84, 3.86.
For this purpose, a work of later date may prove to be helpful. The *Stadiasmus Maris Magni* is an anonymous geographical work of uncertain date, although most editors would place its composition in the third century A.D. One section of the work outlines a series of routes recommended for shipping through the eastern Aegean, with island nodes on the journey listed from east to west. The Peiraeus is the destination of at least one of these routes, and it is possible to surmise that Spartan ships sailing to or from Kenchreai would follow a similar itinerary, as the supply needs of military vessels would have been no less pressing than those of merchantmen. One is the route that ran Kos-Kalymnos-Leros-Patmos-Mykonos-Tenos. A second, similar sea lane runs Kos-Leros-Kinaros-Amorgos-Naxos-Delos. A third consists of Amorgos-Naxos-Kythnos, and this one points out the strategic positioning of Kythnos at the entrance to the Saronic Gulf. While the passages of the work dealing with the Kyklades give fewer details compared to other areas of the Mediterranean described in the work, some details on bearings are given, and it would be unwise to discount the importance of the document. Although one would expect Ikaria to be included, the first of these itineraries is a potential fit for most Spartan expeditions to the east, and includes the possible route to Rhodes taken on several occasions. The second route, however, points out the possibility that Spartan ships returning from Rhodes and Knidos could also have crossed

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Bunbury, *Geography*, 667 decries the value of this work for the Kyklades but then, in n. 8 on the same page, admits that some important details are included.
to Amorgos and Naxos, and then to Delos, instead of retracing their steps north. In Chapter 3 on Paros, evidence for the removal of a garrison there after the Battle of Knidos is discussed. Naxos is another strong possibility as a location for a Spartan base, since such forces are attested there in 376. Looking at the routes previously mentioned, the following other Kykladic islands fall on the surmised routes: Keos, Kythnos, Syros, Siphnos, Seriphos, Ios, and Amorgos. It is interesting that Athenian garrisons are definitely attested during the Second Athenian League for one of these, Amorgos, and possibly for Syros and Ios.

There is no direct evidence for Spartan garrisons in 394. Judging from references in the sources, however, it would not be outside the realm of possibility to suggest Mykonos and perhaps Ikaria as Spartan strongholds, with Naxos as another likely location. Presumably it would not have been necessary for Sparta to invest islands that were so closely placed together with more than a handful of bases.

Most of the Kyklades are no more than 20 km apart; the greatest distance is 37 km. Several of the islands such as Keos had safe, well-sheltered harbors, while others such as Amorgos are not known for this quality. The agricultural productivity and resources of the islands varied considerably, although Gary Reger, among others, feels that the islands in modern times “are grossly under-exploited compared to antiquity.” Their current relative barrenness may have influenced the evaluations of modern scholars on this aspect of their character.

45 Diod. 15.34.5.
46 See below.
47 Reger, 102.
Fishing appears never to have been a great source of revenue, but the cultivation of olives and vines is a different story. Keian wine, for example, was renowned by several writers in antiquity. Other examples of agricultural, minerological, and metallurgical products will be discussed in chapters on individual islands; for now a few general remarks can be made. Siphnos was known for its gold and silver mines, mentioned particularly by Herodotus. As for other islands, small silver deposits are known from Antiparos, Syros, Naxos, Keos, Anaphi, Melos, Seriphos, and Thera, but these are of inferior quality and there is as yet no evidence that they were worked in antiquity. It is possible, however, that more modern workings might obscure mining traces from the Classical era. One recent study has been made of the metallurgy of the Kyklades and their relation to local coinage.

The modern view of the Kykladic islands as depressed backwaters can be traced to certain ancient references. One example is the inhabitants of Andros pleading poverty against Themistokles' exactions in 479. In The Acharnians lines 541-544, Aristophanes makes a jab at the inhabitants of Seriphos. It is true that the islands appear to have been more heavily populated in the Archaic and Hellenistic periods than in either the Classical or modern

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48 Ibid., 102; although we have evidence of a grant of fishing rights on Rheneia, see Tod 54.

49 Bacchyl. Epinician 6.5; Pind. Pae. 4.25-6.

50 Hdt. 3.57-8.


52 Hdt. 8.111.
times.\textsuperscript{53} Any attempts at population estimates, however, must be used with caution. H.J.G. Pounds has made conjectures on the size of fifth-century \textit{poleis}, based on the Athenian tribute lists.\textsuperscript{54} Others have hazarded guesses based on modern population figures and recent levels of rainfall, agricultural production, and other factors. These have been rightly criticized, however, in light of the sometimes too-strong parallels they draw between ancient and modern evidence.\textsuperscript{55} These publications will be discussed more fully in a following chapter.

Although evidence for the Kyklades in the period between 405 and 395 is very sporadic, events after 395 become more clear when examined with the political and military situation throughout the Mediterranean during the Corinthian War. The first chapter will suggest that a new political and economic analysis is needed of the relations between Athens and the Kyklades throughout most of the fourth century up to Chaironeia. Subsequent chapters will focus on particular islands to discuss all relevant information for each as well as areas ripe for further enquiry. The islands dealt with will not strictly conform to any of the ancient or modern island lists; rather, they will correspond to the list of islands on the Sandwich Marble (ID 98=IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1635), the islands who owed money to the Temple of Apollo on Delos. A case will be made that the Athenian reorganization of the Delian accounts in 377 was in direct

\textsuperscript{53} Twenty-six islands are now inhabited as compared to thirty-five in 1940. See L. Yiangakis, \textit{National Year Book of Greece} (Athens 1995), 45-46.


\textsuperscript{55} See the review article by I. Morris, “The Athenian Economy Twenty Years After \textit{The Ancient Economy},” \textit{CP} 89 (1994), 351-66 for a detailed listing.
relation to the formation of the Second League, and that arrears from the islands and their repayment had a connection to their status as allies. Athenian strategic planning on this issue attempted to minimize the financial problems of the islands and keep the League strong, partially by allowing some of the islands to remain in arrears for many years. This policy ultimately failed, however, since there were at least two times in League history when the polis of Athens was driven to near financial ruin, in 375 and at the end of the Social War in 355.\textsuperscript{56} The latter instance was more severe, and there is evidence that Athens was forced to make certain reforms, especially those dealing with foreign merchants, to bring herself out of an economic collapse.

In later chapters, it will be shown that certain islands, or at least certain groups on these islands, managed to gain advantages from this arrangement and prosper financially. On just a few occasions during the history of the League, these groups were ousted by opposing elements within their home poleis. The proximity of Athens and the strategic importance of these islands, however, usually led to swift Athenian (and perhaps allied) intervention to restore their sympathizers to power. The role of the allied synedrion, the details of which still remain obscure to scholars, will be examined in light of this new interpretation, and some suppositions will be made regarding its powers and degree of possible independence.

\textsuperscript{56} In 375: Xen. Hell. 6.2.1; Philoch. FGrH 328 F151. In 355: Dem. 10.37; 20.1,24,42,44,48,115; 22.63; 23.209; 24.8,11,160-75.
The significance of the collapse of the Athenian Empire after Aigospotami in 405 for the Kyklades has still not been addressed in detail by historians. The removal of garrisons and governors installed by the Athenians in earlier years was followed in some cases by the establishment of Spartan detachments and harmosts (military governors), and the impact of these on local affairs has yet to be determined. Athenian control over the island of Delos and its important Panhellenic sanctuary of Apollo lapsed at this time, which can be seen from an inscription that leaves tantalizing hints of Spartan involvement on this island as well.\(^1\) It must be stressed that these islands would now have been placed in a vulnerable position; the fear of Persian domination may have spurred many of them on to accept Spartan “protection,” although their obligations to their new guardians may have been onerous, and may have more bearing on which islands later joined the Second Athenian League and the particular times at which they may have made this move.

It would be prudent to emphasize at this point that the traditional view of these islands as simple pawns or tiny insect poleis, powerless against the machinations of leviathans like Athens, Sparta, or Susa, is to misunderstand the many facets and chaotic vagaries of the balance of power in the Aegean throughout the fifth and fourth centuries. No one would

\(^1\) Coupry ID 87; Tod II 99; H. de Santerre and J. Treheux, “Chronique des fouilles en 1946,” BCH 71 (1947) 403-417; Syll.\(^3\) 119a.
argue that any of the islands could long withstand a determined attack from any of the major powers, and the examples of sieges such as that of Melos in 416 bear this out. Nevertheless, there are always ways in which diplomacy can enable smaller states and communities to survive or even gain advantages when dealing with more powerful ones, and an avoidance of direct military conflict may simply reflect a community’s talent in this regard and warrant a closer examination of the evidence. Most historians appear to have assumed that the Kyklades simply bounced back and forth like beachballs from one side to the other, depending on who had a stronger fleet in the area at the time. This is an oversimplification of the actions of these island poleis, for from epigraphic and other evidence we can see that they were fairly sophisticated communities, both in terms of political and economic organization as well as the possession of important cult centers and mercantile connections. Very few scholars seem to consider the possibility that some islands or at least some groups on these islands could have used their strategic position in the Aegean to play off various combatants against each other and actually benefit from their struggles for supremacy. Of course, different islands may have been more successful at this game than others, and some may have simply bowed to pressure after all, but this study will attempt to show that at least a few of the Kyklades succeeded in achieving economic prosperity and relative freedom from molestation even under the Second Athenian League.

The policy of Lysander when “freeing” a polis from Athenian control was to recruit

\[ \text{Thuc. 5.116.} \]

\[ \text{See for example the Ionic festival of Delos, in W.A. Laidlaw, A History of Delos (Oxford 1939), 67.} \]
groups of local oligarchs and encourage them to form hetairai, or political clubs, to take over the administration of these states once he had wrested them from Athens. This is first attested at Ephesos and apparently became his habitual method when installing new governments in the Aegean and along the Ionian coast. His fleet around the time of Aigospotami included many exiles and islanders acting in both an official and in a private capacity—witness the “pirate” Theopompos of Miletos. In effect, Lysander went a long way in simply transforming the Aegean into a Spartan maritime empire by means of the installation of garrisons, harmosts, and sympathetic oligarchies. There is strong, though by no means certain, evidence that tribute was exacted from the islands by the Spartans during this period, although when this practice began is impossible to determine. The argument of Parke, that the collection of tribute by Sparta was unlikely because she lacked naval resources, seems to disregard the possibility that the garrisons could have done the collecting. Spartan interest in Delos at this time is attested both by the aforementioned decree and by an inscription dating to 402 that possibly refers to a harmost there. Spartan intervention at Delos is important to consider when discussing the possibility that tribute was

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5 See Xen. Hell. 2.1.30.

6 For the evidence see Isok. 4.131-32, 12.67-8; Polyb. 6.49.10; Diod. 14.10.2, 15.28.30; H.W. Parke, “The Development of the Second Spartan Empire,” JHS 50 (1930), 56-77.

7 Parke “Development,” JHS 50 (1930), 56.

8 IG V.1, 1564 (=Syll. 3 119a).
levied from the islands, for if the Sandwich Marble shows arrears that had been accumulating for some time before 377, they may reflect loans taken out to meet these financial obligations and not those of the fifth century Athenian phoros, which is what has usually been suggested. It is significant that the Spartan decree regarding Delos appears to give the native Delians control over the temple finances, and I will return to this point later in this chapter.

Along with the “liberation” of Delos and the sacrifices he is attested to have made there, Lysander is also credited with the establishment of harmosts, garrisons, and dekarchies throughout the Aegean. A few of these had been established before Aigospotami. Andros had a garrison in 407, although after the defeat of the Andrians by Alkibiades the garrison may have been temporarily removed. It is noteworthy that the Athenian commander at the Hellespont, Philokles, had ordered the captured crew of an Andrian trireme thrown overboard. There is mention in Demosthenes of a harmost at Keos in 405, and we know of a later revolt of this island from Sparta in 394. There is also a reference to a governor on Melos expelled by Pharnabazos and Konon in 393. Other than these there are no other direct attestations of governors and garrisons on any Kykladic islands, however many sources simply use phrases such as “...and other islands” when discussing the locations of military

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10 On the harmostai at Andros see Xen. Hell. 1.4.21, Plut. Alk. 35, Diod. 13.69.4. Diodoros says that Alkibiades left a garrison of his own before leaving the island. On the atrocity of Philokles see Xen. Hell. 2.1.31.

11 Dem. 18.96; M. Burchner, “Keos,” RE 11.1 (1921), 189; Diod. 14.84.3.

12 Xen. Hell. 4.8.7.
actions, especially during the expedition of Konon. It would not be out of order to assume that other islands in the area came under direct Lakedaimonian control at this time. The establishment of dekarchies, or boards of ten leading oligarchs in each city, is also likely, although again there is no direct mention of this except in Asia Minor.\(^{13}\) If dekarchies were established in the Kyklades, it is probable that they outlasted many of the others, since the so-called "Ephor's Decree", which mandated their removal, only mentions garrisons in Ionia. In addition, a Boiotian speech to the Athenians of 395 speaks of continued Spartan control in the Aegean.\(^{14}\)

The question of Spartan financial gain from her newly-won empire is also an important subject. In spite of the long-avowed Spartan disdain of lucre and personal wealth, it is clear that the polis was experiencing new social pressures and changes that were playing havoc with the old morality. The affairs of Gylippus and Thorax, for example, show that financial scandal was becoming a problem in the city, if not exactly an endemic one.\(^{15}\) In addition, we do have indication that Sparta began to levy tribute from her new territories, in blatant disregard of her anti-imperialistic stance and in emulation of her defeated enemy. There is a reference that no Spartan ally shared in the booty taken on Lysander's campaigns.\(^{16}\) The


\(^{14}\) The date of the ephor's decree, though controversial, may have been around 395. See R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire", *CP* 43 (1948), 155; for the Boiotian speech and its circumstances, see Xen. *Hell.*, 3.5.13.


\(^{16}\) Xen. *Lac.pol.*, 14.2-4, *Hell.*, 3.5.5,12; Justin 6.10; Diod. 13.106.8; Plut.*Lys.*, 27.2.
references to the collection of this tribute are scattered. The only total given is that of a
thousand talents, in Diodoros. Since he is the only source for this figure, many have
discounted the veracity of it, although Parke has used the available evidence for Spartan
military expenditures in the year 399/8 to conclude that this is not an impossible
assessment. Spartan views of economics were not as developed as that of the Athenians,
who had switched the phoros to a tax on trade after the Sicilian disaster. Parke points out
that Sparta did not provide a center for trade as the Peiraeus did, and as her fleet was not
strong in numbers, it is probable that she did not provide the kind of protection from piracy
that Athens did. Piracy had been endemic in the Aegean for some time and was capable of
causing great economic chaos for the islands as well as for Athens. Sparta, however, was
neither dependent on grain convoys from the Hellespont nor involved in interstate commerce
to any great degree, and as such was under no compulsion to concern herself too much with
this question. Athenian influence in the Aegean area had always followed a different pattern
from that of Sparta, and would continue to do so in the years of the fourth century as well.
The control of piracy was one aspect of this; another was the treatment of Delos. Her

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17 Isok. 12.67-8,4.131-32; Polyb. 6.49.10; Diod. 14.10.2,15.28; Thuc. 8.44.4 states that
in 412, the Spartans levied 32 talents from Rhodes while she was allied to her.

18 Parke, “Development,” JHS 50 (1930), 56. Also note Xen. Hell.3.4.3, in which island
allies are ordered to build triremes for Agesilaos’ expedition.

19 Thuc. 7.28.4; IG II2 249.

20 The references to Aegean piracy are numerous. For the fifth century: Plut Kim. 8.3, Per.19.2, Thes.19.4; Thuc. 1.98.2. Sparta and other states engaged in semi-official
piracy in both the fifth and fourth centuries. See Isok. Paneg.115, Trapez.35-36; Xen.
Hell. 5.1.2.
connections to Delos and the sanctuary of Apollo located there had always involved a measure of coercion. Peisistratos had purified the island in 540 and decreed that no births or deaths should take place there. A new purification by the Athenians was performed in 426, and a new quadrennial festival of Apollo was inaugurated by Nikias, including the institution of horse races. Athens was banned from both the Olympian and Pythian games at this time and this may have led to the establishment of the new festival.

In 422 a more serious intervention occurred when the Delians were expelled by Athens, on the grounds that they were “too impure to do priestly functions”. The subsequent adventures of the Delian exiles were none too uplifting; they were allowed by the Phrygian satrap Pharnakes to settle in his territory at Adramyttion, but many were killed treacherously by Arsakes of Lydia after having been invited to a banquet. The survivors were finally allowed to return in 421 after the Peace of Nikias. Given the unfortunate fate of most of the exiles, the later resistance to Athenian control on the part of the Delians is easier to understand. Diodorus refers to some pro-Spartan sentiment on the island at this time (while anti-Athenian feeling, though not explicit at this moment, will be noted in later years), and some historians have theorized that the island was a commercial threat to the Peiraeus. It is true that the festivals of Apollo would have provided great economic stimulus both to

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21 Hdt. 1.64.
22 Laidlaw Delos 67; Hdt. 1.64 on Peisistratos.
23 Thuc. 5.1.
24 Thuc. 5.32.1; Diod. 12.77.
25 Laidlaw Delos 73; Diod. 12.73.
Delos and to the surrounding area, and the new festival inaugurated by Nikias would have had a similar effect.\textsuperscript{26}

The assets, properties, and finances of the temple of Apollo, it will be seen, were of more direct interest to the Athenian state. The temple leased many estates on both the home island and on nearby Rhencia and Mykonos. It also possessed an extensive treasury, the inventories of which we have for certain years in the fifth and fourth centuries, and records have survived more completely for the Hellenistic period.\textsuperscript{27} Finally, the temple acted as a bank from which many parties, both public and private, drew loans. The accounts of these loans are also recorded in the archives of the amphiktyons, and these loans are of major importance to this study. They are extremely problematic documents, however. Only the accounts from a few years from the span of time covered by this study, 410-338, have survived, and those in a very fragmentary form.\textsuperscript{28} The accounts tabulate both interest paid and interest remaining in arrears. There is no evidence in the loan accounts for when loans were extended to borrowers or in what amounts (except for the year 341/0, when the Athenian amphiktyons granted new credit to several League allies). There are no records from any of the islands borrowing money from the temple that give clues as to when and why the loans were taken out, or for what purposes the funds were used. All of these factors must be kept in mind when discussing the economic implications of these loans from Delian Apollo, for any such


\textsuperscript{27} Coupry \textit{Atti}, 56.

\textsuperscript{28} Coupry \textit{ID} 97-104 are the relevant inscriptions.
discussion will involve a large degree of supposition. There is enough evidence in the loan accounts, however, to allow for some conclusions about their nature to be drawn.

The first mention of Athenian amphiktyons in any Delian temple record is from the year 434, an inscription that, although published, is now lost. The next reference is in an account of 410, which was copied and displayed in Athens. The only literary reference to the Athenian amphiktyons is in Athenaios, who describes them as watchdogs over Delian "table-dodgers" and shysters who reap great profits from the festivals of Apollo. A total treasure of 20 talents and 2,850 drachmas is listed but no inventory is given. It will be remembered that Athens was in some financial straits by 410, although she had not yet had to resort to the iron reserve, bronze coinage, and the other measures that she took in the final years of the war. From the Spartan decree it can be assumed that Athenian control persisted on the island until the coming of Lysander. If this is the case, why did Athens not plunder the temple treasury outright? Several possibilities exist to explain her reluctance, the most convincing being the stigma of impiety that would have fallen on the city for this action. It would be fair to assume that any of her allies who had not yet revolted from the Delian Confederacy would have needed no further provocation than this. It might have been possible for individual Athenians to have enriched themselves from the office of amphiktyon;

29 IG I3 402.

30 For the inscription of 410 see Coupry ID 93; T. Homolle, "Documents nouveaux sur l'amphictyonie attico-delienne," BCH 8 (1884),282-89; Michel, 570; Schoeffer, 42-4. In the corpus from Athens: IG I3 402, II2 1633-1653.

31 Laidlaw Delos, 75.

32 Meiggs AE, 601.
certainly the rapacity of kleruchs and Athenian governors abroad in the fifth century was one of the major issues in the guarantees included in the stele of Aristoteles (IG II² 43) that marked the foundation of the Second Athenian League. The question of how much fourth-century Athenian officials in the Aegean may have fleeced the locals will be examined in the individual chapters for each island. For the year 410 and immediately afterward, however, the exact character of Athenian control is a matter of supposition.

The collapse of Athenian naval power after Aigospotami was complete. Even after the expulsion of the Thirty, the fiscal distress of the Athenian state was deeply felt. The silver mines at Laureion were not to be extensively worked again until the middle of the fourth century. The devastation of Attica and the large-scale desertions of slaves, both instigated by the Spartan base at Dekeleia, had greatly weakened the city as well. The loss of the kleruchies in the islands had deprived many Athenians of property. The Long Walls of the Peiraeus had been pulled down under the terms of the treaty with Sparta and a limit of twelve ships had been ordained. Low quality bronze coinage was in use at the city until 394 and may have played great havoc with commerce.

For several years, even though the democracy had been restored, the Athenians were members of the Peloponnesian League and by the terms of the peace, "were to have the same

33 Cargill League, 131-2.

34 D. Kagan, "Economic Origins of the Corinthian War," La parola del passato 16 (1961), 321-41. It is debatable, however, whether the thetes sent out to settle as kleruchs were owners or tenants from wealthier Athenians.

friends and enemies as the Lakedaimonians." Athenian forces participated on the Spartan side in the campaign against Elis, as well as sending cavalry to the Spartan commander Thibron in Asia Minor. It was not long, however, before the campaign of Agesilaos in Ionia had induced the Persians to court assistance against Sparta on the Greek mainland, and the Athenian admiral Konon took the first steps in restoring Athenian naval hegemony.

Konon was responsible for commanding a Persian fleet in the Aegean, as well as for bringing Persian gold back to Athens and putting it towards the rebuilding of the Long Walls and city walls, the refurbishment of the Peiraeus, and the building of warships for his home city. The Battle of Knidos in 394, in which he decisively defeated a Spartan flotilla commanded by Peisander, marked a turning point in the balance of power in the eastern Mediterranean. Aided by the Persian satrap Pharnabazos, Konon sailed throughout the Aegean in the months after the battle, expelling the harmosts and garrisons and often installing democracies in the various poleis that had been tributary to Sparta.

Their activity in the Kyklades is well-attested by the evidence. Both Xenophon and Diodorus say that the expedition detached many of the islands from Sparta. Melos was made Konon’s base in the area, and Keos revolted from Sparta soon afterward. There is other

36 Xen. Hell.2.2.20,2.4.38. See also Arist. Ath.pol. 39.2.
37 Xen. Hell.3.1.4.
38 Xen. Hell.4.8.9. It should be remembered, however, that originally he was commanding a purely Persian, not an Athenian, fleet.
39 Xen. Hell.4.8.6-7; Diod. 14.84.4.
evidence for an upheaval in the region in the following years. A speech of Isokrates preserves the account of the seizure of Paros by an officer named Pasinos, who is otherwise unknown, in spring of 393. Among Pasinos’ forces were democratic exiles from Siphnos, and the same speech reports that soon afterward there was an exodus, presumably oligarchic and pro-Spartan, from Siphnos as well.\footnote{Isok. 19.18-21, in which island aristocrats flee to Aigina. See also Lys. 2.59. Plato has a reference to this event in \textit{Menexenus} 245b, but the reference is generally thought to be corrupt.}

This brings us to one item of debate in the history of this period, which is the extent to which Konon was acting in the interests of Athens or simply aiding in the growth of Persian power. Some scholars such as Seager consider any gains made by Konon and Pharnabazos at this time to be purely Persian ones.\footnote{R. Seager, “Thrasybulus, Konon, and Athenian Imperialism,” \textit{JHS} 87 (1967), 101.} He is also of the opinion that Paros was garrisoned. There is ample evidence, however, that Konon secured guarantees of autonomy and freedom from garrisons for these cities from the Persian King.\footnote{Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.8.1. It is also probable that some of the islands had sent troops with Agesilaos and so were weakened- see Xen. \textit{Hell.} 4.3.17. Diod. 14.84.4 states that some were autonomous and others \(\omega \epsilon \rho\iota \varepsilon \Pi \kappa \omicron \nu \omega \nu \alpha\), i.e. to Konon.} Some scholars have even hinted at the idea that some of the Kyklades may have been members of the \(\SigmaYN\) league that may or may not have been formed as an anti-Spartan coalition after the battle of Knidos in 394.\footnote{Seager, “Thrasybulus,” \textit{JHS} 87 (1967), 92.}

This last suggestion, however, would seem to be a remote possibility. None of the extant \(\SigmaYN\) coins are attested from Kykladic mints, only Ionic or Pontic ones: Rhodes, Knidos.
Iasos, Samos, Ephesos, Byzantion, Kyzikos, and Lampsakos. While it is possible that the Kykladic islands could have used the coins minted by other members of the alliance rather than minting their own, there are additional arguments that would make the coinage representative of a pro-Spartan rather than an anti-Spartan mindset. Stefan Karwiese argued persuasively in 1980 that the evidence for the coinage would best fit a date of 405-400, and that it was actually a pro-Spartan organization for which the coins were struck. This seems to be the only way to reconcile the discrepancies of membership in this ΣYN league that any date after 394 would cause.

If Karwiese’s argument is accepted, however, the absence of numismatic evidence for an anti-Spartan league still does not imply that such an atmosphere of hostility to Sparta did not exist. Whether or not a league was formed would not fundamentally change the political situation after 394, either for these Ionic states or for the Kyklades. None of these islands would have had to strike coins to prove the sincerity of their new inclination towards Athens. It now becomes a very vexing question as to just which of the Kyklades were brought over to the Athenian side by Konon and Pharnabazus. Where would the Spartan ships have had the opportunity to stop for supplies after 394? Xenophon states that Antalkidas needed a convoy on his diplomatic journey to Ephesos in 388. Konon and Pharnabazos had made

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47 Diod. 14.84.3.
48 Xen. Hell. 5.1.6, in which he “took with him the ships of Gorgopas” and then sent them back to Aigina.
Melos one of their bases in 394, so their efforts were definitely being pressed close to Lakonia. Delos had been brought back under Athenian control, so it is safe to assume that Mykonos was also free of a Spartan presence. Paros and Siphnos, judging from the testimony of Isokrates, seem to have been taken over by pro-Athenian elements. Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros were recovered by Athens sometime after Knidos and before spring 392.

If any Spartan garrisons or harmosts remained in the Kyklades after 394, they would have been operating under great duress. Xenophon reports that Konon tried to support his fleet from contributions from the islands, and this is important since it raises the question of just how benevolent his actions were regarding these newly-liberated territories. It should be noted that Athenian amphiktyons are again seen in the Delian accounts, starting in 393. Their presence appears to have been felt until the conclusion of the King’s Peace, or Peace of Antalkidas, in 387. After the abortive peace negotiations at Sparta in 392/1, the Athenians also attempted to raise money by reinstating the five-percent tax on trade on their old allies, which had temporarily replaced the phoros from 413-410. Xenophon reports that Athenian

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49 Xen. Hell. 4.87.
50 Coupry ID 97.
51 Isok. 19.18-21.
52 Xen. Hell 4.8.15; Andok. 3.12,14; Seager, “Thrasybulus,” JHS 87 (1967),102 n.66.
54 On reinstatement: Diod .14.94.2. For the fifth century: Thuc. 7.28.4.
squadrons began interfering in the internal affairs of the islands at this time, although these stories may have been exaggerated by oligarchic exiles, and Athens appears to have been ready to offer guarantees of autonomy.\textsuperscript{55} In any event no Kykladic cities are mentioned by him, only places such as Lesbos. Thrasybulos was known for his money-raising activities at this time, particularly in Karpathos, Thasos, and Klazomenai, and one particularly unkindly collection at Aspendos resulted in his death at the hands of the locals in 389.\textsuperscript{56} There is some indication that the Athenian treasury was in trouble at this time as subsidies of Persian gold had long evaporated after Konon's arrest.\textsuperscript{57} We know that the imposition of the εἰκοστὴ or five-percent tax continued after the death of Thrasybulos, since it was collected by Iphikrates in 389.\textsuperscript{58} Other considerations are important for discussing the possibility of a return to fifth-century practice. We have one inscription regarding the island of Karpathos, a former Delian League member who was guaranteed freedom from a garrison, unless it asked for one.\textsuperscript{59} This point will be returned to later in discussions of garrisons during the Social War, but it is clear from the sources that garrisons were not always onerous to a polis and often could provide security and protection. Unfortunately, we have no similar inscriptions for the Kykladic

\textsuperscript{55} Xen. Hell. 4.8.25; Ryder Koine, 34.

\textsuperscript{56} Xen. Hell. 4.8.28-30; Diod. 14.94.3,99.4.

\textsuperscript{57} On Konon: Diod. 14.85.4. For the treasury: Arist. Eccl. 823-9,1006f,197f; Seager, "Thrasybulus," JHS 87 (1967), 111. Lysias reports that after his death some of his friends were prosecuted for these exactions: 28.5, 29.2; also Hyp. 28.2,11. It may be that Athens was wary of offending her allies at this time.


\textsuperscript{59} IG XII.1, 977 (=Tod II 110).
islands as we do for Karpathos. It is a fair assumption, however, that the five-percent tax was assessed on them as well.

The islands could be a definite source of money at this time, as witnessed by the affair of Teleutias. In 389 the Spartan commander at Aigina, Eteonikos, attempted to close the Peiraeus although Aigina had been trading with Athens for several years (Chabrias had briefly made the seas safe again for Athenian shipping by defeating the previous navarch Gorgopas). An Athenian force under Pamphilos attempted to wrest Aigina from Spartan hands in retaliation, but Teleutias, who had been on a nearby (though unnamed) island trying to raise funds, drove the Athenians off. Teleutias was appointed navarch later that year and made a raid on the Peiraeus. It is again maddening that the island is not specifically named, but Keos, Kythnos, and Seriphos were closest in proximity. It is unsure whether these exactions were done with the consent of the islanders- Xenophon speaks of Teleutias “taking away provisions.” The raid on the Peiraeus was particularly successful- merchants’ wares were stolen, passengers of fishing boats and ferryboats from nearby islands were captured, and piracy was carried on around Sounion as well. The booty was sold on Aigina, showing the effects of government-sponsored privateering. The combination of Teleutias in the west and Nikolochos and Antalkidas in the Hellespontine area did not bade well for Athenian

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60 Xen. Hell. 5.1.12.
62 Xen. Hell. 5.1.2.
63 Xen. Hell. 5.1.8-9,10-13.
trade at this time.\textsuperscript{64}

Studies of the question of Athenian imperialism point to the five percent tax and the other activities of Konon, Thrasybulos, and Iphikrates as clear indicators of Athenian attempts to restore her old fifth-century empire and naval hegemony.\textsuperscript{65} It is highly probable that Athens took steps to make sure that her war-chest would not run dry when Persian assistance was no longer forthcoming. It is also probable that her brief takeover of the Delian Amphiktyony is related to these financial questions. However, the Spartan military resurgence in the early 380's may have forestalled these policies before they had a chance of fruition. The activities of the Spartan fleet would have wreaked havoc with Aegean trade and consequently the tax may have had slight returns. The oration of Lysias, \textit{Against the Corn Dealers}, is ample testimony of the situation at Athens at this time.\textsuperscript{66} Athens was soon to face even greater difficulties. The Great King, Artaxerxes II, alarmed at the growth of Athenian power and particularly her support for the rebel Evagoras of Cyprus, had agreed to make peace with Sparta on condition that the Ionian states remain under his control and others remain autonomous.\textsuperscript{67} Consequently the Spartan squadron in the Hellespontine area was augmented with Persian ships as well as those of the tyrant Dionysius of Syracuse. With the closure of the Hellespont by the Spartan commander Antalkidas, Athens' grain lifeline was once again cut, and the promulgation of the King's Peace put an end to whatever hegemony she had

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\textsuperscript{64} Hamilton \textit{Bitter}, 303.
\textsuperscript{65} Seager "Thrasybulus," \textit{JHS} 87 (1967), 101.
\textsuperscript{66} See also Xen. \textit{Hell.} 5.1.24-29; Plato \textit{Menexenus} 245E.
\textsuperscript{67} Hamilton \textit{Bitter}, 312.
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35
recovered in the first decade of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{68}

How does this relate to the Kyklades? In particular, it appears that Athenian control at Delos lapsed once again in 386. There are several reasons for this assumption. The Sandwich Marble of 377/374 makes no mention of Athenian magistrates handing over the balance from previous years.\textsuperscript{69} There is also a break in the rhythm of the Delian quinquennial festival from the third to the second year of an Olympiad, in which the period shifts to 372-367, instead of 373-368. The dedication of crowns, instituted by the Athenians in 425, also shows a break in administration. One would have expected them in 393, 389, 381, and 377; yet they are in only in 393 (probably from Konon), 389, and 385. There are none in 378/7, but one in 375/4. All these signs point strongly to an Athenian absence in the years following the Peace of Antalkidas.\textsuperscript{70}

This peace stated that all Greek cities would henceforth be autonomous, except for those of Ionia which would be subject to Persia; the Athenians could retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros.\textsuperscript{71} Athens was also allowed to keep her rebuilt walls and navy, and this should be noted in that she could still (theoretically at least) offer protection from piracy, through the

\textsuperscript{68} Xen. Hell. 5.1.31.
\textsuperscript{69} Coupry ID 98. See also W.S. Ferguson, “The Delian Amphictyony,” CR 15 (1901), 38-40.
\textsuperscript{71} Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3. Cyprus and Klazomenai would also be added to the Persian domain.
convoys of grain transports and the like.\textsuperscript{72} Whether she actually did provide this protection, however, is a vexing question. Isokrates, in his \textit{Panegyricus} of 380, decries the recent deprivations of pirates in Aegean waters, and states emphatically that Sparta was levying tribute from the Kyklades.\textsuperscript{73} Nothing is said as to whether this is being forcibly exacted, and Isokrates’ testimony must be critically examined rather simply accepted as truth. Sparta may have had naval stations in the area at this time.\textsuperscript{74} If privateers were operating in the area this would seem to imply that there was prey worth stalking, and that a lively commerce was flourishing. Most scholars agree also that the Athenian banking industry began to prosper in this decade.\textsuperscript{75}

It is unfortunate that so little evidence for the Kyklades has survived for the decade of the 380’s. The only island alliance into which Athens entered at this time was with Chios in 384,

\textsuperscript{72} Ryder Koine, 36.

\textsuperscript{73} Isok. 4.115 or pirates, 132-136 on Spartan tribute. Parke, “Development,” \textit{JHS} 50 (1930), 73 is of the opinion that the allegation of tribute was simply inflammatory rhetoric, although R.E. Smith, “The Opposition to Agesilaus’ Foreign Policy 394-371 B.C.,” \textit{Historia} 2 (1953-4) 274-288 claims that this would have to be at least somewhat accurate. Isokrates speaks of a “wrangle over the Kyklades”, whose inhabitants “deserve pity” and are forced to “till mountains” because of scarcity of land. On the flip side, Isokrates is attempting to get the Greek states to put aside their petty squabbles and unite against Persia, so there is an ulterior motive here in describing the islands. Beloch 3.1, 144 speaks of a possible dispute over Delos, but Sinclair “King’s Peace,” \textit{Chiron} 8 (1974), 43 notes the use of the verb \textit{αμφισβατοῦμεν}, “arguing”, which he feels implies diplomacy and not armed conflict.

\textsuperscript{74} Diod. 15.30.5. These stations, however, might have been established when the Spartan fleet resumed hostilities against the grain fleet that year.

and this was simply a renewal of the ties that had carried over between the two states after
the King’s Peace. Indeed, the treaty expressly stipulates that the terms of the King’s Peace
would not be violated.\textsuperscript{76} Many states in the Aegean may have had quite a free hand in
international dealings at this time, the best example being that of Paros. In 385, following the
advice of an oracle, the Parians established a colony on the island of Pharos in the Adriatic.
Assistance to this foundation was given by Dionysius I of Syracuse, who had been courted
by various Greek powers but also highly disliked. Lysias’ \textit{Olympic Oration}, dated by some
to 388 and others to 384, provoked such antipathy towards the tyrant when it was delivered
at Olympia that his tent was attacked.\textsuperscript{77} Dionysius was no great friend of Athens in this era,
as was seen by his naval contingent supplied to Antalkidas as well as his later assistance to
the Spartans at Korkyra against Athens.\textsuperscript{78} This foundation implies some political
independence from Athens on the part of Paros, and it will be discussed in greater detail in
the chapter on Paros.

The decade of the 370’s marks one of the most crucial turning points of the history of the

\textsuperscript{76} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 34 (=Tod II 118); C.L. Lawton, \textit{Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in

\textsuperscript{77} On Pharos: Diod. 15.13-14 (probably derived from Ephoros and sporting a tantalizing
lacuna); Skylax 23; Strabo 7.315; Pseudo-Skymnos of Chios 426-7,413-4; Stephen
of Byzantium s.v.; Pliny \textit{NH} 3.140. See also L.Robert, “Inscriptions Hellenistique de
44.

\textsuperscript{78} On Korkyra see Xen. \textit{Hell.} 6.2.4,33; Diod. 15.46.2,47.7. Athens did not make a treaty
with Dionysius until 367- see IG II\textsuperscript{2} 105+523 (=Tod II 136); J. Kirchner \textit{Imagines
Inscriptionum Atticarum} (Berlin 1948), no.53.
fourth century, the foundation of the Second Athenian League. Although it has long been debated as to how imperialistic the aims of Athens were in inaugurating this union, it has been reasonably demonstrated that its charter, the stele of Aristoteles, is explicit in its guarantees against the kinds of abuses that Athens indulged in at the expense of its allies in the fifth century. These abuses included the imposition of governors and garrisons, the establishment of kleruchies or, indeed, any ownership of property by Athenians in allied territory, and the exaction of phoros or tribute. It is true that the rule concerning garrisons and governors was broken later in the history of the League, although as we will see this may have only been done on request and with the approval of the synedrion, or council of allies.

The synedrion met at Athens and each participating polis had a single vote, and decisions were made jointly between this body and the Athenian Boule. This legislative arrangement, as far as the islands and other states went, was far better than that under which the Peloponnesian League had operated. That body could only ratify the decisions of the Spartan assembly, and we know from Xenophon that contributions to the Lakedaimonian army were proposed by allies anxious “to please the Spartans” and only when the allied delegates were permitted to speak. The syntaxeis of the new Athenian League could be debated upon by the allies themselves, and theoretically they could propose matters such as these to the Athenians

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79 See the introduction, note 4, for a list of relevant studies.

80 The charter: IG II² 43 (=Tod II 123). Xenophon omits the foundation in his Hellenika although there is mention in Diod. 15.28.2-5.

81 IG II² 97 (=Tod II 127=Lawton Reliefs no.96 (the treaty between Athens and Kerkyra)); Aisch. 2.60.3.69-75; Accame Lega, 112-3; Cargill League, 115-128 for a full discussion of all available evidence on this organization.
first. It is true that the nature of the *syntaxis* appears to have changed in later years, especially after the Social War, so the rosy picture here painted is of course not applicable to all times and circumstances. Nevertheless, at the time of its foundation and through a large percentage of its history the original tenets of the Second Athenian League appear to have been more or less adhered to.

With this in mind, it is important to determine how the various Kykladic islands became enrolled in the League, which ones are known positively to have been members and which ones are merely objects of speculation. The stele of Aristoteles lists, on the main front face of the stele, Paros (line 89), Peparethos (line 85), Skiathos (line 86), and Poiesa on Keos (center of line 83). The left lateral face of the stele lists the other three Kean cities of Ioulis, Karthaia, and Koressos (lines 119-122), Amorgos (line 124), Siphnos (line 126), Andros (line 112), Sikinos (line 127 and not on the Sandwich Marble), Tenos (line 113), and Mykonos (line 115). There are other possibilities for the lost names of the lower right hand column of the front face; Cargill theorizes that Syros, Ios, and Seriphos as well as the cities of Oinoe and Thermai on Ikaria are likely candidates, due to their presence on the Sandwich Marble. I would support these restorations, as I feel that enrollment in the League was closely tied to the fiscal policies of the Athenian amphiktyons at Delos after 378.

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82 For the Spartan tribute, *Xen. Hell.* 5.2.21.

83 Cargill is the most ardent defender of the League as a non-imperialistic entity.

84 Cargill *League,* 37-8. Accame *Lega,* 82,124 and Beloch *Geschichte* 3.2,161 argue from [Dem.] 58.56 that Melos was a member because she was fined ten talents for harboring pirates in later years; Cargill rejects this. Ormerod *Piracy,* 116 feels that this oration is to be dated after the Social War, when piracy again became rampant and new measures were needed. This subject will be dealt with later in this chapter.
Naxos, which is also on the Marble but not on the stele, relates to a thornier question, whether or not most of the Kyklades joined before or after the Battle of Naxos in 376. The background of this battle is as follows. The Spartan admiral Pollis, in an attempt to cut off the grain convoys to Athens as well as harass Athenian shipping in general, cruised in the neighborhood of Aigina, Keos, and Andros, and bottled the Athenian grain fleet around Cape Geraistos on Euboia. Marshall states that Keos and the other Kyklades were not members of the League yet or they would have been attacked, but this disregards the possibility that Pollis’ main interest was in the grain transports and only attacked shipping around the islands in an incidental fashion.

To counter this, the Athenians sent Chabrias with a force of 83 triremes, according to Diodoros, who enabled the grain fleet to reach the Peiraeus. Chabrias’ flotilla then proceeded to sail to Naxos and lay siege to the polis, drawing the Spartan ships over to relieve the beleaguered island. In the ensuing battle Chabrias was victorious, destroying 24 of the Spartan triremes and capturing eight with their crews, losing 18 of his own in the process (Dem.20.78 says that he captured 49 triremes). According to Plutarch, Chabrias sent Phokion off to gather funds from nearby allied islands, and Demosthenes goes on to say that Chabrias made other islands “friends who had once been enemies.” Of course, this statement is quite

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85 Xen. Hell. 5.4.60.
87 Diod. 15.34.5ff. Xenophon omits any reference to the siege. See also Dem. 20.77,80; Plut. Cam.19.3.
88 Dem. 20.77; Plut. Phok. 6.
ambiguous and there is no strong evidence to suggest that Chabrias used coercion to bring them to the Athenian side, Plutarch notwithstanding.

Neither Xenophon or Diodoros state whether Naxos was conquered at this time. If the island did not voluntarily join the Spartan side in 377, then it was perhaps being used as a base through coercion. Although Xenophon does not mention a siege it is probable that the island was under Spartan control, whether voluntary or not. Most scholars take the stand that the island joined the League without a full-blown conquest, either through overwhelming Athenian pressure or by a recognition by the Naxians that such an action would be advantageous to them. I would take the latter proposition as being closer to the truth, in view of later developments and the fact that Naxos had heavily defaulted on loans recorded on the Sandwich Marble.

Many scholars feel that the lion’s share of the Kykladic and Sporadic islands joined after the battle, either under compulsion or because they saw the writing on the wall, and not in the initial foundation in 377. Judging from their position on the left face (lines 110-125),

89 A.P. Burnett, and C. Edmondson, “The Chabrias Monument in the Athenian Agora,” Hesperia 30 (1961), 81.n.15. Busolt Bund, 758 thinks that Ampelius Lib.mem. 15 is unacceptable as evidence for the conquest of the island. Marshall Confederacy, 60 states that the island joined voluntarily after the battle, while Accame Lega, 81-82 states that the island had revolted from the League earlier. Beloch Geschichte 2, 242 would add Paros to the list of secessionists, but Marshall states with some justification that Xenophon would have mentioned a Spartan success such as this.

90 Burnett and Edmondson “Chabrias Monument,” Hesperia 30 (1961), 81 n.15; Marshall Confederacy, 60. Cargill League, 38 is one of the few doubters.

91 Another bit of evidence pointing to the recruitment of the islands to the Athenian camp around this time is the testimony of Diod. 15.31.2, who names the ten new districts in the reorganization of the Peloponnesian League in 376, including that of the Olynthians and Thracians, but makes no mention of the Aegean islands at all.
the islands of Andros, Amorgos, Siphnos, Sikinos, Tenos, Mykonos, and the triad of Keian
cities would fit this interpretation well. Whether Andros was being actually used as a base
by Pollis is difficult to determine, but it may have been in a similar position as Naxos. There
are no Andrian amphiktyons attested for 377-74 on the Sandwich Marble, but they are
mentioned beginning in 374.

Just how valuable were these islands as recruits to the League? It is true that the eastern
states of Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Byzantium, and Rhodes, who appear from epigraphical
evidence on the stele itself to have been the first members of the alliance\textsuperscript{92}, were far wealthier
by comparison than most of the Kyklades. There are several references in the orators stating
that the bulk of the syntaxeis, or at least the money that a strategos could collect in the field,
came from these places. Demosthenes VIII.24-26 names Asia Minor as the main source of
military resources and collections for the fleet, and it would seem that since the smaller
Aegean islands were the only ones paying after the Social War, and only contributed 45
talents in 355/4 B.C., then we have economics operating on a puny scale indeed.\textsuperscript{93}

We should be wary, however, of making snap judgments based on the statements in
forensic orators without judiciously examining all the evidence. The entire question of
syntaxeis, ranging from their gross amounts to their methods, frequency, and circumstances
of collection, has never been satisfactorily resolved.\textsuperscript{94} The origin of the term itself is

\textsuperscript{92} Cargill \textit{League}, 38.

\textsuperscript{93} Dem. 18.2.34, when only the “weakest islands” remained in the Athenian sphere. See
also the “wretched islanders” comment of Aisch. 2.71.

\textsuperscript{94} Cawkwell “Peace,” 84-95 is in opposition to most scholars when he states that the
contributions most likely did not start before the campaign of Timotheos in 373,
attributed to Kallistratos, and was cited as an example of deception, of the covering up the renewal of the old fifth-century phoros system with a new, less controversial term. It has been recently theorized that the syntaxeis might have been comparable to the system of eisphora in operation in Athens. It would appear from the sources that contributions from each state may have been assessed by the allied synedrion, then collected by commanders in the field. This raises the question of whether or not these were made only in wartime but also for the maintenance of naval patrols in the absence of a “shooting” war. The apparently ad hoc nature of meetings of the synedrion in Athens, the frequent shortages of cash experienced by Athenian strategoi while on campaigns, and the descriptions of “benevolences” in Demosthenes 8.24 would all seem to indicate the following concerning contributions before 346:

A) Contributions to strategoi were collected in the field, an operation conducted with all the attendant chaos of any wartime situation. It is important to note that these contributions,

at least 375, and he has a point in that these years our first definite uses of the word appear in the sources. Nevertheless, the consensus has remained that the League could not have carried on extensive military operations without finances. See F. Mitchell, “The Assessment of the Allies in the Second Athenian League,” EMC 28 (1984), 23-37; M.G. Clark, The Economy of the Athenian Navy in the Fourth Century B.C. (diss. Oxford 1993), 364 n.172.

Theopomp. FGrH 115 F98; Harpokration s.v.; Cargill League, 124.


Plut. Phok. 11, Dem.49.14, IG II² 213 (=Tod II 168) for the Mytilene garrison in 346, IG II² 123 (=Tod II 156) for the same on Andros. IG II  207 (=M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens [Brussels 1981-83], D12) shows money from Lesbos assigned to Chares, Charidemos, and Phokion.
judging from inscriptionsal evidence, were often in arrears and this may have made collections by the strategoi involved somewhat unpleasant.99

B) In peacetime the syntaxeis appear to have been largely earmarked for the maintenance of police squadrons in the Aegean, and were often paid for in exchange for the protection or convoying of merchant vessels from contributing states (the "benevolences" of Dem.8.24-26). Small patrols are also attested in the area in wartime.100

This situation appears to have altered around 346, when along with changes in the system of collecting eisphorai in Athens, it seems that syntaxeis contributions had become fixed at an annual rate as well.101 Moreover, the Athenian demos appears to have set these amounts.102 There is evidence that the money was first brought to Athens at this time rather than collected in the field.103

We have very few actual numbers that survive for syntaxeis amounts, and all are from later

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99 The statement of Plut. Phok.11 that allies often closed their doors to strategoi other than Phokion, while aggrandizing of his subject, probably preserves a kernel of truth about times like these.

100 Under Iphikrates in 372 and Chares in 366. See Xen. Hell.6.2.14 and 7.4.5, respectively. There is also evidence that commanders would escort merchant ships in Antiphanes ap. Athen. 8.342E.

101 Aisch. 2.71 for 60 talents in 346; Dem. 18.234 for 45 talents.

102 Dem. 8.21; [Dem.] 58.37-8. Clark Navy, 366 n.177 surmises that the synedrion still ratified these amounts, and could perhaps even initiate new levies, presumably in their own interest.

103 Aisch. 3.94-105 states that in 340 Demosthenes wanted the Euboians not to send their contributions to Athens but instead keep them for use at home; Clark Navy, 366 n.180.
years when it is true that they appear to have become regular annual payments.\textsuperscript{104} These contributions, however, would not begin to tell the full story even if more complete records had survived. It has been suggested that early in the League the allies operated a common chest of their own, into which were placed, among other things, the proceeds from fines and confiscations levied by the allies in their respective poleis.\textsuperscript{105} The existence of such a treasury is not certain, however, nor do we know where such monies was kept, or even if they were kept in one location.\textsuperscript{106} It is noteworthy that two sources state that the Peace of 375 was partially concluded because of Athenian financial exhaustion and the feeling at Athens that the allies had reaped all the benefits of the alliance.\textsuperscript{107} Wilson notes that although Chabrias had supposedly captured 110 talents of booty and 3000 slaves after the battle of Naxos (at

\textsuperscript{104} The aforementioned 45 talents in Dem. 18.234; 60 talents in 346 in Aisch. 2.71; 5 talents annually each from Histaia and Eretria between 357-349 in Aisch. 3.94,100 (this speech probably dates around 330). Many scholars have made attempts at syntaxeis estimates: Schaefer Zeit I\textsuperscript{2}, 36 says 200 talents annually, Busolt Bund, 723 gives a figure of 350. But these are guesses and nothing more, often based on analogy with the fifth-century aparche lists. Marshall Confederacy, 41 claims that the Histaia/Eretria assessments are not exorbitant when compared with the fact that each paid 15 talents in 425. Meiggs AE 260, Beloch Geschichte, 3.2,167-8, and Accame Lega, 135-6 all are of the opinion that they were lower than fifth-century tribute. See also Cargill League, 127. Clark Navy, 364 theorizes that the combination of Athenian eisphora and allied syntaxeis would have paid for less than half the misthos due to rowers in the Athenian navy in this period. He estimates 450-900 talents a year for 347-338; Navy, 369.

\textsuperscript{105} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 43 lines 45-46; IG II\textsuperscript{2} 123; II\textsuperscript{2} 125 lines 15ff. See also Marshall Confederacy, 39.

\textsuperscript{106} Plut. Phok, 7 mentions that the allies gave ships and money, although this is a late source and perhaps should not be given too much credence. There may have been confusion with the fifth-century procedure here.

\textsuperscript{107} Xen. Hell.6.2.1; Philoch. FGrH 328 F151; C.H. Wilson, “Athenian Military Finances, 378/7 to the Peace of 375,” Athenaeum 48 (1970), 302-326.
2 minas each they would have fetched around 100 additional talents), Timotheos in 373 only
received 13 talents from the state for his expedition and had to raise more money by other
means.\(^{108}\) The Kyklades no doubt profited for the next few years as remaining Spartan ships
would have been withdrawn to the west to counter Timotheos.\(^{109}\) Wilson also attempts to
make some financial estimates for **syntaxeis** and other costs to the islands, i.e. the cost of the
garrison that Chabrias left on Syros and the contributions from Paros and Mykonos.\(^{110}\) F.E.
Robbins was of the opinion that other garrisons in allied states were established in these early
years as well, due to Xenophon's statement that in the Peace of 371 Athens "withdrew
garrisons from the cities."\(^{111}\) We have so little information that it is hard to make
generalizations, but it would not be too radical to postulate that conditions in the islands may
have been improved by their adherence to the League in these early years.

One island, however, does appear to have taken issue with Athenian purposes. Part of the
Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98, lines134-140) prescribes fines and perpetual exile to eight
inhabitants of Delos for provoking a riot in which the Athenian amphiktyons were physically

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\(^{108}\) On Chabrias: Dem. 20.76f, schol.Aristides 3.282; on Timotheos see Isok. 15.109f;
IG II² 96; Wilson "Finances," *Athenaeum* 48 (1970), 317 n.75. It is significant that
Thebes was apparently not contributing at this time; see Marshall *Confederacy*, 65.

are attested to have lost 49 of 60 ships at Naxos and to have sent 55 to Alyzeia.

\(^{110}\) Wilson, "Finances," *Athenaeum* 48 (1970), 315. 1 1/3 talents a year for Syros (he
assumes that the locals paid half), and he uses the assessments of Paros and Mykonos
in 432 as the same for 375, which is highly problematic and should not be taken too
seriously.

\(^{111}\) Xen. *Hell*.6.4.1; F.E. Robbins, "The Cost to Athens of Her Second Empire," *CP* 13
(1918), 361-88. If Syros can be assumed to be one of them, then other nearby islands
are not out of the question.
assaulted. This is dated from its position on the stone to 376/5. It would also appear that lines 141-44 show properties confiscated from some of these same individuals.\(^{112}\) It is interesting as well that the exiles were not banished from Delos but only from Athens and allied states; one of the “exiles” was even elected Delian archon just a few years later, in 374/3.\(^{113}\) This would seem to show that anti-Athenian feeling on Delos was not confined to a few rabble-rousers.

A brief word applies here concerning Andros and its relation to these events. While there are no Andrian amphiktyons attested for the period 377-375 on the inscription, they are mentioned beginning in 374 (lines 62-76). They appear to have been in a subordinate role to their Athenian colleagues, nevertheless they are equal in numerical strength, five to five Athenians.\(^{114}\) The question of how long Andrians shared this office is a vexing one. They are also listed in the accounts from 372/1, and on a small undated fragment that is generally thought to hail from roughly the same time period.\(^{115}\) There are no Andrians mentioned in the accounts of 364/3, in which the Delian assembly assists the Amphiktyons in their inventory of the temple property and may indicate a cooling off of the tensions from the ...
previous decade.\textsuperscript{116}

It could be that the participation of the Andrians was only temporary, perhaps as some sort of response to the crisis of the riot in 376/5, and was no longer seen as necessary after better relations with the Delians had been achieved.\textsuperscript{117} Laidlaw considers the possibility that the “odium of the office” was shared with the Athenians but this seems ridiculous— the very fact that Athenians coveted the office both on an individual level as well as a matter of state policy would rule this out rather soundly.\textsuperscript{118} Homolle theorizes that they were brought in by the Athenians as “favored helpers,” without explaining his phrase.\textsuperscript{119} They are possibly attested in the accounts of 390/89, and if this is true, this older practice may have been put off a few years by the Athenians just as it was in this earlier time after 393.\textsuperscript{120} If it is true that they did not join the League until after the battle of Naxos, then their participation may have been strongly encouraged by Athens as a safeguard to their loyalty. These issues are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4 on Andros.

While there may have been some attempt to show the allies that Athens was willing to share its hegemony of Delos, I think that their participation has an even greater significance, certainly more than other scholars would admit. It has always been noted that the creation

\textsuperscript{116} Laidlaw \textit{Delos}, 81; T. Homolle, “Inventaires des temples deliens en l’année 364,” \textit{BCH} 10 (1886), 461-475.

\textsuperscript{117} This is the view of Laidlaw \textit{Delos}, 81.

\textsuperscript{118} Laidlaw \textit{Delos}, 80. Witness the career of Hypereides in Aisch.3.

\textsuperscript{119} Homolle, “Documents,” \textit{BCH} 8 (1884), 317.

\textsuperscript{120} Coupry \textit{ID} 97.
of the Second Athenian League and the Athenian takeover of the Amphiktyony occurred within a year of each other, and it cannot be simply a coincidence. It is impossible to tell exactly when the debts listed on the Sandwich Marble were incurred, and although some would argue that they might go as far back as the fifth century, it is more likely that they date more closely to the Athenian takeover. It is certainly possible that some of these debts could perhaps be traced to the decade of the 380's and piratical deprivations during this period, especially the raids from Aigina 389-388. I would venture to speculate, however, that some of the islands also went into debt during the time of Spartan control prior to the expedition of Konon and Pharnabazos, since they paid tribute to the Peloponnesian League and also because Sparta did not offer the islands the same level of naval protection or the benefits of an entrepôt. The accounts of 393/88 mention debts of Mykonos, Syros, Paros, and Thermai on Ikaria, and other names may not have survived. If some of the islands joined the League in 378/7, as perhaps Paros did for example, there may have been the knowledge that the Athenian takeover of the temple and the protection of the Athenian fleet could have a beneficial effect on their financial situations. If one takes the opposite example of Naxos, which probably did not join until after Athenian supremacy was firmly established, one can still see a similar pattern. This island not only had one of the comparatively higher debts but also had severely defaulted on its interest payments. This key point will be further explored in the next chapter on finances and trade in the islands, but for now it should be kept in mind

121 Migeotte L' emprunt, 155; Coupry Atti 65-66.
122 Migeotte L' emprunt, 142.
123 Ibid., 153.
as the later years of the League unfold.

The Peace of 375 was rather short-lived. The support of the democratic exiles at Zakynthos by Timotheos opened hostilities with Sparta anew.124 Timotheos was forced to enroll new members in the League to bring his force up to strength in the summer of 373-it is probable that most of these new recruits were from Thrace and the Chersonese, but some may have been islanders.125 It should be noted, however, that Timotheos appears to have mishandled his funds, for he was replaced by Iphikrates and was narrowly acquitted on a charge of embezzlement, and it is probable that his acquittal was due to the intercession of Jason of Pherai on his behalf.126 The financial problems did not end with his dismissal as Iphikrates apparently raised money for a fleet not only by means of eisphora but also may have used some additional cajolery against Athenian property owners.127 The question of why the syntaxeis was unable to fill his coffers can be approached in different ways. It is possible

124 Xen. Hell.6.2.2; Diod. 15.45.2.

125 On Timotheos' voyage: Xen. Hell.6.2.13; Diod. 15.47.3. There are several scholars-Marshall Confederacy, 60 and Accame Lega, 78-81, for example-who feel that many of the Kyklades were added during this voyage. However, from the evidence so far amassed I feel that this should be rejected. The battle of Naxos would have been a more decisive event than a simple fund-raising expedition, at least as far as the islands in the immediate area of Naxos would be concerned. I follow Cargill League, 38 in the assumption that at least most of the Kyklades, and certainly the ones listed on the Sandwich Marble (Coupy ID 98), were already members when Timotheos sailed.

126 Xen. Hell.6.2.13; Diod. 15.47.3; Nep. Tim. 4; [Dem.] 49. 9.

127 Polyain. 3.9.30, if it is to be believed, states that he proposed to have all buildings that projected over public roads torn down, and collected bribes so he would drop this idea. See Marshall Confederacy, 70 n.7. He did manage to outfit seventy triremes from this.
that there was simply not enough money available from allied resources. This could very well apply to the Kyklades since many of them, as has been stated, were in arrears with Delian Apollo. But this does not hold water when it is remembered that richer states like Chios and Mytilene were members. Judging from the aforementioned evidence concerning the syntaxeis and its assessment, it seems more likely that individual allies were unwilling to commit much more than they needed to for their own immediate protection. The synedrion, perhaps having more clout at this early date than it had in later years, may have upheld this viewpoint and discouraged too much Athenian expansion at this time, especially if they saw no real advantage for themselves in these adventures.128

A financial exhaustion similar to the one experienced by Athens in 375 had now struck again.129 Problems with Thebes were yet another reason for Athens to end the conflict with Sparta. The Peace of 371 entailed that all garrisons would be withdrawn and all Greek cities made autonomous. This would seem to have ended Athenian presence in the islands, except for Delos which appears to have stood outside even the tenets of the King’s Peace. Athenian amphiktyons appear again in 364/3, on the same new cycle of years as that set up on the Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98), and this would seem to indicate their influence there had not wavered.130 Garrisons such as the one on Syros, however, can safely be assumed to have been dismantled. Thebes, recognizing her claim to Boiotia would be annulled if she swore

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128 A similar view is held by Meyer Altertums 5, 399, although it is challenged by Marshall Confederacy, 68 n.2. Marshall’s view, however, does not appear to take into account the idea that the synedrion had any power to check Athenian ambition.

129 Xen. Hell.6.3.3.

130 Laidlaw Delos, 81.
to the Peace, instead withdrew from the League at this time.\textsuperscript{131} This was not a decisive blow at the foundations of the organization, as Thebes had always been somewhat ambivalent about its membership and in any case was more of a land than a sea power until a few years later.\textsuperscript{132}

The Athenian navy, in spite of its cash flow problems, was still quite strong. Isokrates mentions that the Spartans did not dare intervene in the Aegean at this time.\textsuperscript{133} But it should be stressed Athens bore the brunt of the cost of keeping mastery of the sea. We have evidence that the year 378/7 saw not only the formation of the League and the takeover of the amphiktyonic accounts, but also the creation of the symmories to more effectively raise money for the fleet.\textsuperscript{134} Yet even this did not have the desired effect.\textsuperscript{135}

There was another disturbance in the Kykladic area around this period. An inscription (SV 268), part of which contains the only extant portion of a decree of the synedrion, appears to set the terms for the readmission of Paros into the League after a revolt. This inscription and its ramifications will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3 on Paros. For now it suffices to say that not only are its tenets generally considered to have been very moderate, but it is not firmly established that the island even actually rose in revolt. It is possible it was experiencing internal disturbances of the kind that had recently occurred on Delos.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[131] Xen. Hell.6.3.19.
\item[132] Marshall Confederacy, 75.
\item[133] Isok. 15.110.
\item[134] Philoch. FGrH F126 (Harpokration s.v.); Polyb. 2.62.6,7.
\item[135] Dem. 22. 44.
\end{footnotes}
There is little direct mention of the islands in the sources for the next decade. The Delian accounts survive for 372-368 (in a very fragmentary form) and mention continued interest payments by Paros, Oinoe of Ikaria, and Tenos. There are two fragments from unknown years of the mid fourth century which are similar and mention Tenos, Thermai and Oinoe of Ikaria, and Siphnos. Thereafter no amphiktyonic accounts survive until 341/0, when the League was nearly at an end. The decade of the 360's, however, is marked by increased hostility between Athens and Thebes in the wake of the Spartan defeat at Leuktra. The Euboian cities had defected from the League after this battle and taken up the Theban side, but it does not appear that any of the Kyklades attempted to follow their example. It is likely, however, that Euboia's proximity to the grain route made the presence of the Athenian navy in the area even more crucial. This fact was not lost on Epaminondas of Thebes, who in 366 openly declared his intention to make his home polis master of the sea. In 364 he sent a fleet of a hundred triremes to the Hellespontine area. After defeating an Athenian squadron under Laches, he succeeded in detaching Byzantion from the League and apparently his exploits caused Ioulis on the island of Keos to rise in revolt.

136 Coupry ID 100; Migeotte L'emprunt, 145.
137 Coupry ID 104-8, 104-9.
139 Xen. Hell.6.5.23,7.5.4.
140 Diod. 15.78.4; Aristides Leuktr. 1.18. Apparently in 367 the Theban Pelopidas had succeeded in getting a rescript from the Persian King demanding that Athens withdraw her navy from the Aegean, but this was apparently not enforced.
141 Laches: Diod. 15.79; Byzantion: Isok. Phil., 53; IG VII, 2418 line 10.
This revolt (actually a double one) and the various judicial and commercial consequences of it will be fully discussed in Chapter 2 on Keos. For now we can surmise that certain elements in the city (perhaps oligarchic), perhaps disturbed both by the creation of an Athenian kleruchy on Samos in 365 and encouraged by the new naval power of Epaminondas, decided to shift their allegiance. There are two isopolity decrees, one between Keos and Eretria, the other between Keos and Histiaia, which some scholars date to this year. In any event there were definitely pro-Athenian elements in the city who were restored by Athenian strategoi after the revolts. The kleruchy established on Samos in 366/5, breaking the spirit of one of the most important clauses of the charter of the Second Athenian League, was however a major shift in Athenian policy. It is true, as stressed by Cargill, that Samos was not a member of the League. But this development could not have failed to alarm certain elements in various other poleis of the area, and S. Hornblower, in his review of Cargill’s book, lists epigraphic evidence for a favorable reception of Samian exiles throughout the Greek world. Epaminondas would obviously have played upon these fears,

142 See Chapter 2.

Sources for the kleruchy: Heraklides Pontikos FGrH 2, 216; Diod. 18.18.9; Strabo 638; C. Habicht, MDAIA 72 (1957), 154ff; also C. Habicht, “Athens, Samos, and Alexander the Great,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 140 no.3 (1996), 397-405; G.L. Cawkwell, “Epaminondas and Thebes,” CQ 22 (1972), 272-3; S.M. Sherwin-White, Ancient Cos (1978), 68; E. Schweigert, “The Athenian Cleruchy of Samos,” AJPh 61 (1940), 194-98; Cargill League 148-50 and n.8 for additional bibliography. For allied fears: Isok. 15.111; Dein. 1.14. Athenian operations at Pydna, Methone, Amphipolis, and Sestos may also have contributed to this unease; Buckler, Theban Hegemony, 169.

144 Cargill League, 148-50.

145 S. Hornblower, review of Cargill’s Second Athenian League, CR (1982), 238.

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and the effects of this will be examined presently. Other scholars, however, have noticed the strategic value of the island on Aegean trading routes, especially for travel during the more inclement months, and Athens had not been the first Mediterranean power to realize this. It should be remembered, moreover, that the Athenian kleruchs on Samos would have been keenly interested in maintaining commercial connections with Athens, and the kleruchy may have increased the level of east-west trade after its installation. Samos was an olive oil-producing island, and there is amphora evidence that some of this oil was even exported to Attika. A large number of these Samian amphorae fragments have also been identified in Egypt. Despite unrest among the allies after the establishment of the kleruchy, it was reinforced on two more occasions in League history, once in 361/0 and also in 351/0. There is no evidence to support the conclusion that either of these reinforcements caused additional revolts in the Kyklades. The original installation in 366/5, it must be admitted, may have contributed to disaffection on Keos that eventually led to revolt on that island a few years later. We shall see, however, that this revolt was probably due more to the proximity of the island to the bases for the Theban fleet, and the supposition that

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146 J.M. Cook, “Cnidian Peraea and Spartan Coins,” IHS 81 (1961), 70 n.81. Cook goes so far as to imply that it was suspicion of Epaminondas that actually prompted the foundation of the kleruchy.

147 V. Grace, “Samian Amphoras,” Hesperia 40 (1971), 81, on mushroom-rim amphorae fragments found in the Athenian Agora of the mid-to-late fourth century. On 78 she states that these rim types first appear on Samos itself in the earlier part of the century. On Samian oil: Anakreon F 98 Page; Aeschylus Persae 882; Antiphanes or Alexis, ap. Athenaios 66.


149 Schol. Aisch. 1.53; Philochoros FGrH 3, B328 F154.
Epaminondas could replace Athens as a seapower. The struggle between Epaminondas and Athens (personified by Timotheos) in these years extended southward as well, and commercial considerations may also have influenced the decision of the Keian cities to attempt secession.

Connections between Athens and the southern areas of Egypt and Libya are well-attested, and they may have grown stronger in the 360's, around the same time as the establishment of the Samian kleruchy, and perhaps part of a similar policy. There are signs of strong Athenian interest in the south a decade before, with Chabrias apparently enrolling Thera in the League after the battle of Naxos in 376. Chabrias was also a member of the theoria sent to the sanctuary of Ammon in the Siwa oasis ca. 360, and had a hand in bringing Cyrene over to a pro-Athenian stance around 362 as well. Around the same time Chabrias appears to have assisted the Egyptian Tachos in various military operations.

Epaminondas appears to have taken a strong interest in these regions as well. It has been

150 IG II² 179c lines 9,11; the ekklesia on Thera IG XII.3, suppl. 1289a, line 5.


152 IG II² 176, which has been variously dated to 363, 362, or early 361. Dusanic, “Cyrene,” Chiron 8 (1978), 76.

153 Diod. 15.92.3; Plut. Ages. 37; [Arist.] Oec. 2.2.25 for collaboration at Naukratis. For an even earlier example: Diog. Laert. 8.8.87 on the visit of the Athenian Eudoxos in 380. For Egyptian grain: [Dem.] 56.3, 10; Lyk. e. Leokr. 18; P. Cloche, “La Grece et l’Egypte de 405 a 342/1 avant J.C.,” Revue egyptologique 1 (1919), 210-258; J.G. Milne, “Trade Between Greece and Egypt Before Alexander the Great,” Journal of Egyptian Archaeology 25 (1939), 177-183.
theorized that his cruise of 364 included a stop at Crete, although the possible results are not documented.\textsuperscript{154} It has also been suggested that this expedition may have temporarily brought Cyrene over to the Theban side.\textsuperscript{155} It should be noticed that most of these accomplishments of Epaminondas were quite short-lived, and that Athens quickly reestablished diplomatic (and presumably commercial) connections in Crete, Cyrene and Egypt soon afterward, from the evidence already cited. To this may be added the symbolai treaties with Knossos and another, unknown Cretan state mentioned in Chapter 5, that underscore the possibility of economic ties.\textsuperscript{156}

The troubles on Keos in the 360's may now be put into a larger perspective, since this is the only island of our study that is firmly-attested to have attempted to leave the Second Athenian League. Epaminondas, at this time, was a short-lived but significant threat to the naval hegemony of Athens, a hegemony that would have been a major motivation behind the initial decision of the Kykladic islands to enroll in the League.\textsuperscript{157} Epaminondas courted not only the Kyklades, but also Rhodes, Chios and other states of the East.\textsuperscript{158} If successful, the Theban leader could have controlled the termini of major trade routes that traversed the

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\textsuperscript{155} Dusanic, “Crete,” \textit{Talanta} 12/13 (1980-81), 19 n.81, who mentions the Samian exiles welcomed there in 366/5 and detailed in Sherwin-White, \textit{Ancient Cos}, 67 and n.194.

\textsuperscript{156} For continued Athenian interest in Crete in the 340's, see IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1443 line 121.

\textsuperscript{157} The routing of Laches' squadron in 364 by Epaminondas' fleet would have strengthened this impression at Keos; Diod. 15.79.1.

\textsuperscript{158} These cities did not formally ally themselves with Epaminondas, however; Buckler, \textit{Hegemony}, 173.
Combined with possible fears engendered by the Samian kleruchy, strong motivations for the ascendancy of an anti-Athenian faction on Keos can be reconstructed. Although it cannot be proven, there is more than enough evidence to suggest that the Keian revolt was prompted by pro-Thebans on the island who were apparently left in the lurch by Epaminondas, for there is no evidence that Theban aid to the revolt ever materialized. As other islands (including Naxos) are not firmly attested as following the Keian example, this is a testament to the confidence of the Kyklades in Athenian seapower and influence.

There was another crisis in the Aegean area in 362. Alexander of Pherai launched a surprise expedition, not against the Hellespont and the strategic lifeline of Athens, but a mainly piratical raid against the Kyklades. Diodoros says that he stormed some islands and took many captives, and besieged the island of Peparethos (modern Skopelos), north of Skyros. After Alexander defeated a relief contingent sent by the Athenians under Leosthenes, Chares was elected strategos but he promptly took his ships to Korkyra and apparently committed many atrocities there. Xenophon simply calls Alexander a “robber by land and sea.” He is also attested to have seized Tenos and reduced the population to slavery, and to have made a raid on the Peiraeus in which money was taken from the merchants right off

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159 A bit of later evidence which may illustrate trade routes with Cyrene, as well as the traditional routes given in the Stadiasmus Maris Magni, has its context in the grain crises of 330-26; P. Brun, “La stele des cereales de Cyrene et le commerce du grain en Egee au IVe s. av. J.C.,” ZPE 76 (1989), 185-196.

160 The treaty with Histiaia (IG XII.5, 594) may have been an attempt to solicit such aid; Buckler, Hegemony, 173.

161 Diod. 15.95.1-3.

162 Xen. Hell.6.4.35.
the tables in the *Deigma.* After 361, however, nothing is heard of Alexander’s privateers.

These events might be seen as proof that Athens was unable to keep control of the seas at this time, and that the Kyklades were so unimportant to her that Chares would not come to their aid. This is misleading, however. Cawkwell very eloquently points out that Athens was experiencing a four-fold naval crisis in the year 362. Not only did she have Alexander’s deprivations to contend with, but Miltokythes rebelled against King Kotys of Thrace at this time and promised the Chersonese to the Athenians if they would aid him. Also, the island of Prokonnesos was under attack by the Kyzikenes, and the grain ships from the Bosporos were being forced into harbor by the inhabitants of Kyzikos, Chalkedon, and Byzantion because of a shortage in their own territory. In addition to this, it is widely attested that Chares was a less than reputable individual who abused his commands on many occasions. In such circumstances the inability of Athens to stop Alexander, while not easily excusable to the allies themselves, can be properly understood.

The grain shortage that led to ships being forced into harbor was apparently not confined to the Hellespont. There is also evidence that Attika experienced a drought along with rising grain prices in 361, and later Dem.20.33. speaks of a “grain shortage throughout the human race the year before last,” which on the accepted dating would have been 357/6. It is difficult

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163 On Tenos: [Dem.] 50.4-6; On the Peiraeus: Polyain. 6.2.1-2. See also Dem. 51.8.
164 Cawkwell “Naval,” 10.
165 [Dem.] 50.4-6; Cawkwell “Naval”, 10.
166 See Diod. 15.95, Ain. Takt. 11.13f for reaction to his activities at Korkyra, and Dein. C.Dem.14, c.Philok. 17 for his accusations against Iphikrates, Timotheos, and Menestheos after the defeat at Embata in 356.
to tell if the Kykladic islands experienced the same agricultural problems at this time. The islands are widely varied in their fertility and some may have been dependent on grain brought to the Peiraeus. This will be discussed in the chapter on agriculture, but it can be said at this point that economic turmoil at the Peiraeus most likely had repercussions in the Kyklades, and rising costs both of grain and of all services (especially trierarchies as seen from [Dem.] 50.8ff) would have had an adverse effect on the islands as well. It is also problematic to ascertain how long Tenos was in the hands of Alexander and just how much the island suffered from his presence. Judging from the nature of the expedition his sojourn on the island was brief, but according to Demosthenes it was devastating. It is impossible to tell what percentage of the island’s population was enslaved, but archaeological evidence points to a refoundation of the city around this time period, and in the fragmentary account of the Athenian Amphiktyons mentioned above (see note 120), the Tenians are listed as possibly in default and still owing back interest. As will be seen Tenos had strong connections to Athens in this period.

The reverses Athens experienced against Epaminondas and Alexander, as well as the misconduct of her generals abroad, led Chios, Byzantion, Mytilene, and Rhodes to rebel in 357, igniting the Social War. It is probable that Mausolos, satrap of Karia, had a hand in their defection. The Athenians responded swiftly but not very decisively. Chabrias was killed in an attack on the harbor of Chios in 357 and probably his siege of that island died with

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167 Diod. 16.7; Dem. 15.3. Xenophon’s account, unfortunately, ceases after 362. These revolutions appear to have been oligarchic in character-see Dem. 15.19; Arist. Pol. 8. 1304b.
him. The next year the rebels raised a fleet of a hundred ships and attacked Lemnos, Imbros, and Samos, as well as many of the Kyklades. Diodoros says that enough money came from the "islands" (he is not more specific) for the rebels to finance their operations. The Athenian general Chares was defeated by them at Embata off Chios in 356, and because of lack of funds he decided to take service with Artabazos, the satrap of Phrygia, who was in revolt from Persia. This step led to King Artaxerxes Ochos threatening an invasion of Greece with three hundred ships, and this brought the Social War to an end. Chios, Kos, Rhodes, Byzantion, Selymbria, and Perinthos left the League at this time; Korkyra, Methymna, and Mytilene soon afterward.

The Kykladic area, however, for whatever reason remained firmly Athenian. It is noteworthy that the Euboian cities of Karystos, Eretria, Chalkis, and Histiaia rejoined the League in 357 before the outbreak of hostilities, and remained loyal throughout the Social War. The next chapter will examine some of the economic implications of their readmittance, particularly in the area of numismatics. But it may help show why none of the Kykladic states are attested to have rebelled during this period, even though the Athenians

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168 Diod. 16.7.
169 Diod. 16.21.
170 Diod. 16.21, 22.2; Nep. Tim. 3.3; Polyain. 3.9.29. For Chares' lack of funds see Isok. 7.8, 10, 81; Dem. 4.23-24 and schol. 19; Marshall Confederacy, 112.
171 Plut. Dem. 17; Dem. 18.234; 15.19, 26; Marshall Confederacy, 113-114.
172 IG II² 124 (=SV 304) gives the conditions of readmission.
are known to have placed garrisons and governors on some of them.\(^1\) Both these garrisons, however, appear to have had approval from the synedrion, and the Andros garrison is to be paid for out of syntaxeis contributions from all the allies. The Arkesine garrison is paid for by the governor Androtion himself, who also gives the city an interest-free loan and ransoms prisoners presumably taken as captives in the conflict.\(^2\) The only other island for which any evidence is extant for a garrison at this time is Ios, but this inscription remains undated.\(^3\)

The Kyklades were in some financial distress from the attacks of the rebels. To this may be connected the attendant economic woes of Athens in effect when the Social War drew to a close. The sources that attest to this fiscal exhaustion are many and varied. Demosthenes gives ample testimony to the lowering of revenues, the arrears of eisphora, and the fact that the festivals were in jeopardy.\(^4\) Two other documents show the problems facing Athens at this time. Isokrates' On the Peace and Xenophon's On the Revenues are both dated by most authorities to around 355. Isokrates bewails the loss of trade, the poor condition of the docks

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\(^{1}\) IG I\(^{\text{P}}\) 123 (=Tod II 156) for Andros, IG XII.7,5 (=Tod II 152) for Arkesine on Amorgos.

\(^{2}\) Cargill League, 155-6. These two inscriptions will be examined in greater detail in the respective chapters on Andros and Amorgos. Cargill states that these garrisons do not exhibit signs of imperialism but are rather emergency measures during the Social War that were approved by the islands in question. I accept his evaluation on the evidence marshalled by him.

\(^{3}\) IG XII.5, 1000. See P. Graindor, “Fouilles d’Ios,” BCH 28 (1904), 308-333. The unnamed governor is awarded a crown of 1000 drachmas. It is possible as well that line 7 of IG II\(^{\text{P}}\) 404 could point to a garrison on Keos, and this will be discussed in the relevant chapter along with the other problems that this inscription presents.

\(^{4}\) Dem. 10.37 on revenue (130 talents for 355); 20.24,115; 23.209; for eisphora 20.1,42,44,48f.; 24.8,11f., 160-75,197; 22.63; for festivals 24.11.
in the Peiraeus, and the desertion of Athens by traders and metics.\textsuperscript{177} Xenophon gives a series of proposals for rebuilding the Athenian economy, many of which appear to have been adopted, probably under the program of Eubulus.\textsuperscript{178} Metics were granted \textit{enktesis} (the right to own property, which had other benefits as well), the facilities of the Peiraeus were improved, and new judicial arrangements for commercial cases were established. In addition, the building of warships rose steadily during this period. The \textit{diagrammata}, or lists of naval equipment, cite 283 ships in 357/6 at the outbreak of war. The inventory for 353/2 lists 349 ships, however, and the numbers continue to rise even after Chaironeia.\textsuperscript{179}

There is also evidence that Eubulus took measures to combat piracy. As in the 380's, the period after the Social War appears to have been a time of heavy piratical activity. Paradoxically, it would seem that a large amount of it was semi-official, i.e. done either at the instigation of Athens or of Philip II.\textsuperscript{180} On some occasions Philip is seen providing convoys or attacking pirates like Sostratos on Halonnesos, at other times he encourages them. The motion of Moerokles to organize more anti-piracy patrols with the allies is probably to

\textsuperscript{177} Isok. 8.19,21,69.

\textsuperscript{178} Cawkwell “Eubulus,” 47-67.

\textsuperscript{179} For 357/6: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1611 1.9; for 353/2 IG II 1613 1.302; for 330/29 there were 392 ships, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1627 1.269. Eubulus apparently bought ship timber in large amounts. See Cawkwell “Eubulus,” 65.

\textsuperscript{180} On Philip’s piracy see Dem. 4.34; Androtion \textit{FGrH} F24; Justin 8.3.13; H. Hauben, “Philippe II, fondateur de la marine macedonienne,” \textit{AncSoc} 6 (1975), 51-59; Ormerod \textit{Piracy}, 116. For Athenian responses see Dem. 18.73,77,145;23.166; [Dem.] 7.2, 12.2-5,13; Aisch. 2.12,72. Demosthenes realizes that for Philip to publicly proclaim anti-piracy patrols is to take over an Athenian prerogative and detach her allies from her—Dem. 8.14-15; Cawkwell “Failure,” 50.
be dated to the 340's.\(^{181}\)

What can be said about these remaining allies, and especially the Kyklades, in the last years of the League? We have evidence that some of the islands continued to court Athenian protection. In 348/7 crowns were voted to Athens by Paros and Andros, and possibly Naxos as well.\(^{182}\) Keos continued to send delegates to the synedrion and pay contributions after 350.\(^{183}\) There are undated symbola decrees between Athens and Siphnos (Agora XVI no.50), and Athens and Naxos (IG II\(^2\) 179) that may also date to these years. Even after Chaironeia, two Andrians are honored by the Athenians in 338/7 for unspecified services.\(^{184}\)

One island that definitely seems to have never stopped resenting her connections to Athens was Delos. In 345 the Delians sent an embassy to the Delphic Amphiktyony in an attempt to expel the Athenians from the temple of Apollo. One of the Delian delegates was Euthykrates, who had helped Philip to gain Olynthos and obviously was counting on his support. However, the Athenian Hypereides made a persuasive speech, and it is probable that Philip was still courting Athenian friendship at this time, for the appeal was rejected.\(^{185}\)

\(^{181}\) See Cawkwell "Failure," 51. Melos had apparently been fined ten talents for harboring pirates at this time.

\(^{182}\) IG II\(^2\) 1441; Cargill League, 158. The fragmentary decree IG XII.5, 714 may also refer to Andros in this period honoring an Athenian general; Accame, 184.

\(^{183}\) IG IV\(^2\) 135f.

\(^{184}\) C.J. Schwenk, Athens in the Age of Alexander (Chicago 1985), no.2 feels that the services may have involved the safeguarding of the grain supply. Lykourgos in c.Leoc. 42 states that immediately after Chaironeia Athens sought the aid of Andros, Keos, Troizen, and Epidauros.

\(^{185}\) Dem. 18.134; Laidlaw Delos, 86.
is an inscription, dated only to the mid-fourth century, in which a certain Peisitheides, named as an Athenian partisan, is exiled.\(^\text{186}\) It is not known if there is any connection between these two events. As will be seen in the following chapter, the continued arrears of the Kyklades to the temple, which the Athenians appear to have tolerated, would have greatly angered the Delians. In the last Amphiktyonic account attested for the period, that of 341/0, it appears that some of the islands actually took out new loans at 10% interest, including such heavy debtors as Paros.\(^\text{187}\)

As for the financial situation at Athens in the final years before Chaironeia, there is at least some evidence that improvements were seen. By 346, according to a speech in the Demosthenic corpus, the revenues of the Athenian state had increased to 400 talents a year.\(^\text{188}\) The contributions from the allies were apparently voted by the ekklesia by this time, but this does not necessarily imply the allies had no veto power.\(^\text{189}\) Demosthenes appears to have raised money from additional sources for his anti-Macedonian alliance in 339/8, although much of this may have come from new allies such as Korinth, Byzantion, Messenia, Lokris,

\(^{186}\) IG II² 222; M.J. Osborne, Naturalization in Athens 1 (Brussels 1981), D22, who dates it to 334. Delos was not totally without rights at this time, however. She was allowed to grant proxenia, of which six are extant from this period, including two Athenians and one individual from Ios. See Laidlaw Delos, 81; Th. Homolle, “Decrets Atheniens des annees 369 et 363,” BCH 3 (1879), 473-8.

\(^{187}\) Migeotte L’emprunt, 146-7,155. There is an inscription from Paros from this year, IG XII.5, 113, that thanks the Athenian people for unspecified assistance, and Migeotte suggests it is a loan. See O. Rubensohn, “Ein Parisch-Thasischer Vertrag,” MDAI 27 (1902), 273-288.

\(^{188}\) [Dem.] 10.37; Clark Navy, 366 n.179 attributes this increase to a combination of eisphora and syntaxeis, both of which had been regularized by this point.

\(^{189}\) Dem. 58.7; Cargill League, 126.
and Thebes.¹⁹⁰

The battle of Chaironeia in 338 and the subsequent formation of the League of Korinth brought the Second Athenian League to an end. It did not end Athenian control of the temple on Delos, which persisted until 315.¹⁹¹ Nevertheless, the Athenian leadership of the seas and of the Kykladic islands had ceased.

In the following chapters, the issue of trade and commerce, as well as evidence of numismatics, mining, and agriculture on the various islands, will be explored and brought into connection with the temple of Apollo to which nearly all Kykladic islands were indebted.

¹⁹⁰ Dem. 18.237; [Plut.] Mor. 851B lists the new allies and some financial totals; Clark Navy, 369 n.187 states that these figures could have been confused with the regular annual syntaxeis.

¹⁹¹ Laidlaw Delos, 88.
CHAPTER 2- KEOS

The island of Keos (modern Kea) lies only 12 km from the coast of Attika and is 103 square kilometers in area. The island measures 10 by 20 km at its greatest extent and is mountainous but rich in water and mineral resources. There are several harbors on Kea, the most inviting being the inlet of Ayios Nikolaos on the northwest corner which is shielded from northern winds. The harbor of Karthaia, on the southeastern tip of the island, was also well protected.

The island is especially important to this study for several reasons. The first is its proximity to Athens, which could work either in its favor or against its interests depending upon particular historical circumstances. The second is its important strategic position. The island acts effectively as a sentry point for the entrance to the Saronic Gulf and also straddles the Black Sea grain route on the stretch between Cape Geraistos in

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1. Landscape, 57.
2. Ibid., 57, 5.
3. Ibid., 57; see also ancient references to this harbor in: Aisch. Epist. a 1; Cicero Epist. ad Atticum 5.12; Valerius Maximus Memorabilia 2.6.7-8. During the Ptolemaic period of control this harbor was used as a naval base; see J.L. Davis and J.F. Cherry, “The Ptolemaic Naval Base at Koressos on Keos,” BSA 86 (1991), 9-28.
Euboia and the Gulf. Its harbors have given it additional weight in terms of its naval and mercantile significance. Thirdly, in comparison to the other Kyklades, Keos has been especially rich in fresh water supplies and various mineral products such as iron, lead, copper, and red ocher (miltos), many of which were exploited in antiquity as well as in more modern times.

Lastly, the intensive archaeological investigations carried out on the island since the nineteenth century have yielded a rich harvest of epigraphical evidence for the history of Keos, especially during the period covered by this study. Keos is also one of the few Kyklades to have had part of its territory subjected to intensive archaeological surveys during the decade of the 1980's, surveys that are of immeasurable importance in

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5 The Ptolemaic naval base referred to in n.3 above is a prime example of Aegean powers recognizing the position of the island. Koressos was renamed Arsinoe during the Khremonidean War and became part of a network of such installations around the Saronic Gulf area, such as Hydria, Patrokles, and the islands of Pelops. See K.A. Sheedy, “The Origins of the Second Nesiotic League and the Defence of Kythnos,” Historia 45/4 (1996), 436-7; C. Habicht, “Athens and the Ptolemies,” CA 11 (1992), 89; Reger Regionalism, 48. Recent survey work on Kythnos has discussed the large fortification walls of the polis at Vriokastro and the nearby independent strongpoint of Phourio, which is later than the town wall and may date from the time of the Nesiotic League. See A. Mazarakis-Ainian, “Ricognizioni archeologiche nell’isola di Kithnos,” in E. Lanzilotta and D. Schilardi (eds.), Le Cicladi ed il Mondo Egeo (Rome 1997), 105-132.

6 The results of the Koressos survey have been published in Landscape, 265-84. The Karthaia survey has received only preliminary publication in L.G. Mendoni, “Archaiologikes ereunes stin Kea,” Archaiognosia 4 (1989), 149-184, but will be detailed in a forthcoming volume of Meletemata, the journal of the National Hellenic Research Foundation. The survey of the territory of Poiessa is described by L.G. Mendoni and H. Papageorgiadou, “Roman Keos: A Surface Survey,” S. Walker and A. Cameron, eds., The Greek Renaissance in the Roman Empire, BICS suppl. 55 (1989), 169-173. The Ioulis survey by Y. Galani and H. Papageorgiadou has as yet not received any publication but some tentative conclusions are given in L.G. Mendoni, “The Organization of the Countryside in Kea,” in P.N. Doukellis and L.G.
determining economic conditions prevalent in this region in antiquity.\textsuperscript{7} In Classical and Roman times there were four poleis on the island: Koressos (modern Koressia), Ioulis, Poiessa (modern Poisses), and Karthaia (modern Poles).\textsuperscript{8} Although Koressos and Poiessa were relatively small and Ioulis was the largest and most important politically, Karthaia may have rivalled Ioulis in the size of its population.\textsuperscript{9}

The population in the island during the fourth century has been a major point of contention among scholars for some time. Ruschenbusch has used two inscriptions pertaining to cities on the island to make estimates. The first is a census list (IG XII.5 609) from Koressos and Ioulis that he considers to be a roster of male heads-of-household compiled after a temporary union of the two poleis.\textsuperscript{10} He has also interpreted the stele

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\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{7} Other important publications that have dealt with the history and character of Keos include: A. Pridik, \textit{De Cei insulae rebus} (Berlin 1892), which discussed many of the inscriptions discovered in the course of the nineteenth century and collected in IG XII.5 526-650; L.G. Mendoni, \textit{Kea I} (diss. Univ. of Athens 1988); F.G. Maier, “Stadtmauern auf Keos,” \textit{AA} 73 (1958), 6-16 which is concerned with the chronology of the fortifications of the four poleis; R. Kloutsinioti and N. Faraklas, \textit{Tzia (Keos): Greek Traditional Architecture} (Athens 1984) on settlement patterns; H. Papageorgiadou-Banis, \textit{The Coinage of Kea} (forthcoming); and \textit{Proceedings of the Kea-Kythnos Symposium June 1994}, forthcoming.

\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Landscape} 62. See also L. Burchner, “Keos,” \textit{RE} 11 (1921), 181-89; E. Kirsten, “Poiessa,” \textit{RE} 21 (1951), 1270-1276.

\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Landscape} 63.

\textsuperscript{10} E. Ruschenbusch, “Eine Burgerliste von Iulis und Koresia auf Keos,” \textit{ZPE} 48 (1982), 175-188. Brun, “L’Ile de Keos et ses cites au IV\textsuperscript{e} siecle av. J.C.,” \textit{ZPE} 99 (1993), 126-27, on the basis of the political union of Ioulis and Koressos, would prefer to date this list during the 360's and the possible tightening of a Keian Federation, which will be discussed below. Brun also notes the name of Simalos, which is also
from Cyrene listing grain shipments to various cities, including Ioulis, Karthaia, and Koressos, in an effort to determine the relative sizes of these communities.\textsuperscript{11} Ruschenbusch arrives at an estimate of 3,840-4,090 inhabitants of Keos for the fourth century.

Cherry, Davis, and Mantzourani have pointed out, however, problems with his interpretations that are telling.\textsuperscript{12} The heading of the supposed citizen list has not survived so it is impossible to tell for certain why it was compiled in the first place. A mustering-list of available manpower is offered as an alternative by these authors, which has more parallel examples from the Greek world, and would lead to a vastly different population figure. Instead of Ruschenbusch's figure of 770 for Koressos (assuming four individuals to a family plus one slave per household), the military interpretation of the document yields a population of 1,300. Concerning the grain shipments, they point out that there is no reason to assume that there was only one shipment sent to these towns from Cyrene that year nor that the shipments were done on a proportional basis, and moreover Poiessa was not included. The fact that residents on the island were scattered among four poleis may have made less of a strain on resources, and the authors surmise that 4,000-6,700

\textsuperscript{11} For discussion and recent bibliography on the grain stele, see S.V. Tracy, \textit{Athenian Democracy in Transition: Attic Letter Cutters of 340 to 290 B.C.} (Berkeley 1995), 31 and n.5. The date of the inscription has been generally accepted to be around the years 330-326, when serious food shortages throughout the Aegean are attested. See [Dem.] 34.39; 42.20,31.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Landscape}, 236-7.
individuals may be postulated as their combined population for the fourth century. This is quite a massive figure for one of the Kyklades during this period and deserves careful consideration. In the interest of caution it would perhaps be best to assume a figure on the lower end of the scale, but even if this is done the population level is quite high for a time period described by many modern writers (and a few ancient ones) as one of relative poverty in this region. It may be that Keos' water resources made it very fertile and supporting such a population level was not as difficult as on other Kykladic islands. The proximity of the island to Athens may have allowed its inhabitants to reap the benefits of transit trade moving to and from the Peiraeus. The mining of miltos and possibly other mineral resources, which will be discussed later in this chapter, may have brought additional income to the island. The supposed high population of Keos in antiquity may be reflected in the custom described by several ancient authors of mandatory suicide of those citizens over sixty. The aforementioned surveys of the territories of the four poleis have illuminated many aspects of their approaches to land tenure and exploitation. All show the greatest number of rural sites in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., with the

The authors make the observation that the highest population recorded on Kea in modern times was 4,900 individuals in 1896, at a time of intensive agricultural exploitation of the island’s territory. See the information in the National Statistical Service of Greece, Athina: Ethniki Statistiki Ypiresia tis Hellados (Athens 1912), 5-10.

Strabo 10.5.6; Valerius Maximus 2.8; Heraklides Pontikos FGrH II, 215.9.3; Aelian Varia Historia 3.37. It may be, however, that this simply reflected ideas of the aged voluntarily avoiding becoming a burden on their communities—see Landscape, 242 n.3. For other similar examples of this practice noted in Gaul and Sardinia, see Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 1.38.2 and schol. Plato Leges 1.337a, respectively. I thank Brian Garand of the American Academy in Rome for these references.
later Roman period as a close second and the Hellenistic period with markedly fewer sites.\textsuperscript{15} These are not sites of permanent habitation, however, but structures meant for temporary or seasonal use. As is the case on many other Kykladic islands, Keos possessed rural towers, and indeed sports the greatest number of recorded towers in the Kyklades other than Siphnos.\textsuperscript{16} Although the dating of these towers is still very controversial, it appears that most of them were in use during the Classical period although they often cannot be directly related to other buildings or settlements.\textsuperscript{17} Their exact function, be it defense, signalling, storage, or a combination of many uses, has also remained an open question.\textsuperscript{18} It has been suggested, however, that the towers represent investment by

\begin{itemize}
  \item\textsuperscript{15} Mendoni, “Organization,” \textit{Structures}, 157.
  \item\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Landscape}, 285. The most complete discussion of towers on Keos can be found in \textit{Landscape} 285-298, although the authors make clear that the number of possible towers is problematic and their own data is limited to the northwest area of the island. For earlier writings on Keian towers see G. Welter, “Von griechischen Inseln: Keos I,” \textit{AA} 94 (1954), 48-93. L. Mendoni, “Organization,” \textit{Structures}, 148 n.7 mentions towers discovered during the summer of 1992 which may help determine the boundary between the territories of Poiessa and Karthaia.
  \item\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Landscape}, 291. Date ranges for island towers have ranged from the sixth through the third centuries B.C. A.W. Lawrence, \textit{Greek Aims in Fortification} (Oxford 1979), 188 would date the towers to the Hellenistic period of Cilician piracy ca. second-first centuries B.C., but the authors of \textit{Landscape} point out that no Hellenistic pottery or other finds have been located at around 50\% of the towers. It would seem, however, that defense from pirates or other seaborne hazards might have factored into their construction no matter what their date.
  \item\textsuperscript{18} There appears to have been a greater ratio of towers situated farther inland on Keos than on other islands, although this may not preclude their defensive use since it would have been advantageous during pirate attacks to retreat further from the coast—see \textit{Landscape} 295; H.A. Ormerod, \textit{Piracy in the Ancient World} (Liverpool 1924), 41-49 for coastal towers.
\end{itemize}
wealthier families engaging in displays of personal resources and competition. The fact that four poleis existed on the island may have exacerbated political and territorial tensions, and as we will see later in this chapter in the discussion of the miltos decree, there may have been political infighting between the cities reflected in their relationships towards Athens and vice versa.

This interpretation fits well when compared with the survey evidence for rural activity. It appears that in all Keian cities the population lived within the astu of the town, the polis center. The chora of each town was intensively cultivated, judging from the extensive remains of terracing that have been noted over much of the island. The construction of these terraces implies the availability of a substantial work force, though we do not know if these laborers were slaves or freemen. It would also correspond with the higher population estimates for Keos at this time. As we will see in later chapters, this system of land ownership is relatively similar to those in operation in other Kykladic islands during the Classical and Hellenistic periods such as Amorgos, Naxos, Paros, and Tenos. Agriculture on Keos formed the greatest sphere of activity, with a lesser emphasis on apiculture and animal husbandry (though in stables as pasturage was scarce), and it appears from later epigraphic evidence that many of the landowners were from rich

19 Landscape, 297 and 298 n.7. These displays of wealth may even have gone beyond the ideological boundaries of the four poleis.

20 Ibid., 157.

21 Ibid., 156; P.M. Nigdelis, Politeuma kai koinonia ton Kukladon kata ten Ellenistiki kai Autokratorike epoche (Thessaloniki 1990).
families, especially in Karthaia. Holdings appear to have scattered, with the same owner leasing land in different areas of the territory of his home polis. An unusually large number of archons, or local officials, are implied by the epigraphic evidence and from this has been posited a large number of wealthier families that were leasing land and cultivating it intensively, and perhaps the rural towers indicate the locations of their estates. At the end of the fourth and beginning of the third centuries B.C., the property of these richer families was used as security on a loan from that city’s sanctuary of Apollo, which eerily resembles the Delian loans although it is difficult to relate the two in a chain of causation.

Given this hypothesis concerning the structure of Keian society, we can then proceed to its place within the Kykladic region and the Second Athenian League. We are fortunate in that several important inscriptions regarding the relations between Athens and Keos, as


23 Mendoni, “Organization,” Structures, 152. The geomorphology of the island appears to have determined the extent of individual holdings.


25 IG XII suppl.236. See L.G. Mendoni, KEA I, chapter 2; R. Bogaert, Banques et banquiers dans les cites grecques (Paris 1968), 197. Bogaert has commented upon the tiny loan amounts (100 drachmas maximum) as being a remarkable state of affairs, but we simply do not know what the city needed these for and they really cannot be taken to show the possible wealth of the temple nor the possible financial problems of the public treasury of Koressos. Depending on point of view, the temple may have simply been providing relief for mild cash flow problems, or just as easily be contributing minor drops in a larger bucket of debt. Considering the large number of these families, however, it does not seem likely that the polis and, by extension, the entire island, was in dire financial straits.
well as Keian relations with other Mediterranean islands and territories, have been found and allow us to paint a more complete picture of events during this period than is possible on many of the other islands in this study. These inscriptions, however, are very problematic and seem to raise as many questions as they answer.

One of the most maddening topics of Keian history is the question of exactly when the poleis of Ioulis, Koressos, and Karthaia may have been joined in a federation or koinon. Except for the list of 450/49 (the first appearance of any Keians), the tribute lists of the fifth-century Delian Confederacy all record payments made collectively under the rubric Κειοι; the first list records Koressos as a separate payment from that of the Κειοι.26 Poiessa, as we will see in later examples, is conspicuously absent. Many scholars, particularly Lewis, have postulated that there was some sort of synteleia for purposes of making tribute payments but with no further political ramifications.27

If this system actually was a political union, it does not seem to have included Poiessa. Two controversial pieces of evidence are boundary stones detailing public land leases from this polis.28 Not all scholars agree on the significance of these leases for the

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26 IG I2 263 col.II, line 21. Meritt, et al., have argued that the high figure for Koressos may have been a punishment of some sort: the authors of Landscape, 242 n.4 state that in any event it cannot show exceptional prosperity for this polis. There is really not enough evidence to support a firm conclusion.


28 IG XII.5, 568,1100.
federation, but they are intriguing nonetheless. Much more direct evidence is given by other sources. The Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98, line 113) records a loan from Delian Apollo, again under the heading Κεσιτοι. In the charter of the Second Athenian League (IG Π² 43), Poissa is recorded as having entered the organization before the rest of the cities, which are listed as Κεσιν Ιουλιτai, Καρθαι, Κορησιοι (ll. 82, 119-22). Poissa is instead on the front face of the stele (in the middle column between the Rhodians and Arethousians) while the other names are on the left side with many other Kykladic entries that may date from the time immediately after the Battle of Naxos.

Even more important are the inscriptions which appear to show the federation in a hostile position towards Athens. A stele found at Ioulis notes a treaty of isopoliteia between the Keians and Histiaia on Euboia. A second isopoliteia treaty with Eretria, utilizing many of the same formulae, has also been discovered. Both have been found in Ioulis, but the dating is still controversial. These two inscriptions clearly point to the

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29 P. Brun, “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 133 thinks that it is evidence for Poissa’s independence, while Landscape, 320 claims that it has no bearing on this question.


31 Cargill League, 34.

32 IG XII.5, 594 (=Tod II 141). Brun “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 124 notes that line 15 mentions a “Boule of the Keians.”


34 Lewis, citing possible Eretrian influence on the constitution of the federation, dated the Eretria treaty to the end of the fifth century. Dunant and Roux favored a date of 393-377 based on the treaty’s stoichedon style and a supposed level of independence among the Kyklades in these years. I would not debate this evaluation of conditions in the region during this period, but Moggi Sinecismi, 337 and Brun “L’Ile,” ZPE 99
existence of some kind of federation, if not a synoecism then at the least a sympolity, between the Keian cities. Ioulis was located in the center of the island and would have been easiest of all the cities to use as a meeting place; the polis also revolted a second time from Athens and was reconquered in 362.\textsuperscript{35} Federal silver coins may have been struck during this period, and this possibility will be discussed later in this chapter. One other possible bit of evidence for a strong federation at this time is an inscription listing Keian athletic victors at the Isthmian and Nemean Games.\textsuperscript{36}

Poiessa, however, may not figure in the equation. The later Athenian decrees concerning the regulation of Ioulis after revolt and the subsequent dissolution of the federation make no mention of Poiessa, it can be confidently asserted that this polis did not join in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{37} Poiessa also is not definitely attested on the Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98) although she may have required loans of which we have no record. Lewis has shown that the tripartite system of citizenship detailed in the two isopolity decrees, (1993), 125 offer convincing arguments as to the attribution of the isopolities to the years of Epaminondas’ cruise in the Aegean and the revolt of Keos from Athens.

\textsuperscript{35} Moggi Sinecismi, 336. This geographical position may also have lessened the influence of Athens as compared to the coastal cities.

\textsuperscript{36} IG XII.5, 608. The names are known from a fifth-century chant of Bacchylides but the inscription has been dated on the basis of letter forms to the fourth. Brun “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 135 would like to see this as a reinscribing of the list for propaganda purposes by a newly-turgid koinon of the Keians in 364. This is certainly possible, but it is also possible that it was inscribed earlier in the century simply out of civic pride, if the looser kind of confederation I posit below was in effect.

\textsuperscript{37} Regulations for Ioulis: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 111(=SY 289); For the dissolution of the federation: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 404. In addition, the Athenian decree regulating the export of milites, IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1128 (=SY 320), does not include Poissa. All three of these inscriptions will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
that of phulai, trityxes, and choroi, would have worked far more easily if Poiessa was not included and only Ioulis, Koressos, and Karthaia were members. All evidence seems to point to Poiessa’s absence from any internal federation on Keos.

This leads us, however, to a point of contention. Moggi argues that if the isopolities date to the 360's, then the federation must have been a temporary union conceived and born of the revolt of Keos from Athens in those years, a revolt led by Ioulis but provoked by Theban and Euboian influence. He characterizes the federation as short-lived and contentious, with pro-Athenian and pro-Theban factions in constant struggle during the years 364-362. In Moggi’s view, the decree of 357 dissolving the federation for good was designed to prevent a repeat occurrence of this kind of trouble during a dangerous period, the beginning of the Social War.

Many of his points are well made. It is obvious from the regulations for Ioulis that the whole island was not in agreement when the revolts occurred. The Athenian proxenos had been murdered by a certain Antipater during the first revolt. Chabrias put down the insurrection, executed Antipater and made a new treaty with the Keians. The anti-Athenian faction, however, took power again in Ioulis, killed some of the Athenian

39 Moggi Sinecismi 336-7.
40 It has been speculated by Buckler, Theban, 169, that Ioulis’ decision may have been influenced by events on Samos; Isok. 15.111; Dein. 1.14; [Arist.] Oec. 2.2.73. It should also be remembered that the Athenian squadron under Laches had been chased from the area in 364; Diod. 15.79.1.
41 IG II² 111, 8.
sympathizers and confiscated their property, as well as casting down the stelae on which Chabrias' settlement had been inscribed. The strategos Aristophon led another Athenian expedition to the island, brought Ioulis to heel, and banished the perpetrators from the territory of Keos and Athens, with their property passing to the city of Ioulis itself. Karthaia is expressly thanked in the inscription for having remained loyal, while Koressos is unmentioned. It may be that Koressos stayed completely neutral while Karthaia may have actually lent a hand to Athens in this second expedition. The regulations end (lines 57-69) with oaths to protect the Keians from unjust retribution by Athens or any of her allies, and that those Keians who wished to emigrate could live on private property in allied states. The decree seems to show that the hostility towards Athens was perpetrated by a single faction, albeit a fairly numerous and influential one.

Moggi’s interpretation, however, is problematic in the sense that if the Keian federation dates only to the short-lived rebellion of 364-62, this union was then allowed by Athens to stand, after two rebellions, for another five years until the Social War commenced and it was then abolished by decree. This seems highly unlikely, and a different explanation of events must be offered. The evidence of both the charter of the Second Athenian League as well as the Sandwich Marble cannot be ignored- the cities of Keos (minus Poissa) certainly had some sort of loose organization for many years before the rebellion, although it is impossible to tell when in the years 411-376 this system

42 IG II² 111, 27-41.

43 Tod is of the opinion that this was done in order to prevent “malcontents” from moving to Thebes.
coalesced. Lewis’ argument is that Spartan and Eretrian influence on the island after Aigospotami may have led to its creation, but the years after the Battle of Knidos are also possible, and a loose confederation such as this may not have fallen under the prohibitions of the Peace of Antalkidas.\textsuperscript{44} It is only during the rebellion of 364-62 that the umbrella of the federation may have been made more rigid with the isopolity and citizenship systems, and Lewis may still be right that Eretria provided the model on which it was based. When the second revolt of Ioulis was put down, it should be remembered that the Euboian cities were still hostile to Athens and did not rejoin the Second Athenian League until 357. This would mean that if the Keian federation was allowed to stand (in some form), then the isopolity decrees were not seen as a threat by Athens. This is difficult to accept.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{44} Moggi Sinecismi, 339 wonders if entering the cities as a unit on the League charter was meant as a kind of concession to the Keians. It is probable that a loose organization, not having the kind of totally-interlocking citizenship implied by the isopolity decrees, would have been tolerated by Athens; but if these cities entered after the Battle of Naxos, when Athenian power was riding high, it seems unlikely that the Keians would have had enough clout to bargain for something new that the Athenians could have considered to be a potential threat. In all likelihood the organization predates the 370's.

\textsuperscript{45} Cargill League, 136 claims that there is no reason to assume that Athens did not allow isopolities between League members- but isopolities between League members and League enemies would appear to be an impossible state of affairs. W. Gawantka, Isopolitie (Munich 1975), the most comprehensive discussion of this institution, stresses that isopolity treaties often had no effect on foreign policy and alliances (87-91), but this, the suppression of a second revolt on an island near to Athens and near to the hostile Euboian states, could have been an exception. In many cases weaker states used these treaties to gain the protection of stronger ones, as the Samians did from Athens in 405 (Meiggs and Lewis 94). It is not inconceivable that the Keians attempted to secure this protection and did not receive it when the Athenians came to retake the island, since any such Theban assistance would have probably left some record. It is likely, however, that Athens considered the situation in the Aegean too
The inscription ordering the breakup of the Keian federation, which is generally dated to ca. 357 B.C., mentions the requests of certain prominent Keians for assistance and allows for the repair of fortifications of the "Keian" cities, but it is difficult to tell what this phrase means. It may refer to the same cities as listed in the League charter (IG II² 43), or it may exclude Ioulis. The privilege of rebuilding fortifications would seem a strange provision for such a supposedly "repressive" decree, but this is not the only issue. Cargill pointed out in 1981 the various problems of previous reconstructions in this decree and took the novel stance that the Social War date is far from certain. His arguments are rather convincing. Both 362 and 357 were periods of danger in the Aegean, so the provision for the rebuilding of the walls of the Keian cities could apply to either period.

Recently Martin Dreher has offered a new reading and interpretation of IG II² 404. He points out that Ioulis and the other cities in IG II² 111 could only have been referred to singly if the federation had already been splintered. He also argues that Chabrias would not have had the power to negotiate such a settlement with Ioulis if ambassadors had not volatile to allow the isopolities to stand, along with the federation that had ratified them.

46 IG II² 404 line 15. Poiessa, which remains invisible in the evidence, may very well have stayed out of the rebellion and, by extension, the anti-Athenian federation.
47 Cargill League, 135 n.13.
already been sent from Keos to Athens, but they are attested in IG II² 404.⁴⁹ He states that the rebuilding of the walls of the cities would have precluded the installation of an Athenian garrison, and that the Thebans would have been a primary threat to the newly restored allies.⁵⁰

The regulations for Ioulis (IG II² 111) are firmly dated to the archon year of Chariklides 363/2, proposed on the motion of Aristophon (lines 1-2). We will return to Aristophon later. Apollodoros, in his speech against Polykles preserved in the Demosthenic corpus, mentions the naval crisis facing Athens in the month of Metageitnion, or August, 362.⁵¹ This is very early in 362 by the terms of the Athenian calendar and is definitely after the Ioulis regulations were passed. There is no mention of an attack on Keos in Apollodoros’ catalog of crises, nor any mention of any internal trouble on that island whatsoever. While this is not proof that the federation was already dissolved at this time it is still a strong argument for it. Dreher speculates that the Thebans were in mind when the fortifications were ordered to be rebuilt, but it was Alexander of Pherai who next threatened the area. The fortifications should perhaps be seen as general protection against piracy as well as more organized assaults, and it is noteworthy that the Keian cities would be seen as important enough to allow them to rebuild their walls almost immediately after a

⁴⁹ Dreher, “Volksbeschluss,” Symposium, 269. His parallels with other inscriptions citing the diplomatic powers of a strategos are intriguing; e.g. the treaty between Athens and Selymbria (IG I³ 118) in 407, and Athens and Klazomenai (IG I³ 119).


⁵¹ [Dem.] 3-6. The year 362 is attested by the mention of the archonship of Molon. See Schaefer, Demosthenes 3, 147; Cawkwell “Naval Power,” 10.
rebellion, two rebellions in the case of Ioulis. This points out the danger of the federation to continued stability on Keos. The Euboian cities (with the possible exception of Karystos) were still opposed to Athens and would continue to be until 357. The isopolity agreements with these hostile cities would have still been in effect during the period 362-357, a long stretch of time during a dangerous period in the Aegean, when Athenian military resources were sorely taxed and anti-Athenian factions on Keos had risen twice. The federation would have allowed partisans opposed to Athens a potential voice on Keos- hence it was dissolved as a prophylactic measure. The redating of IG II² 404 to 362 removes the problem of Athens allowing to continue a system of shared citizenship of Keians with enemy states, a system conceived in a time of revolt. It would have made no sense to dissolve the federation in 357, just when the Euboian cities had returned to the Athenian camp. It may also be significant that the isopolity agreement with Histiaia specifically mentions the exchange of citizen rights of import and export. As yet I have read no speculation as to whether the fortifications enumerated in the inscription would have included the harbor of Ioulis, now generally considered to have been at Otzias; I.L. Merker, “The Harbor of Iulis,” AJA 72 (1968), 383-4. It would seem likely that they did, so that commercial interests would be protected but the city of Ioulis itself would not require a third siege.

52 As yet I have read no speculation as to whether the fortifications enumerated in the inscription would have included the harbor of Ioulis, now generally considered to have been at Otzias; I.L. Merker, “The Harbor of Iulis,” AJA 72 (1968), 383-4. It would seem likely that they did, so that commercial interests would be protected but the city of Ioulis itself would not require a third siege.


54 Brun “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 125 supports a date in the 360's for the isopolities also, but only on the basis of a wide range of possible dates for the letter forms.

55 IG XII.5, 594, lines 11-14. Gawantka, Isopolitie, 46-91, does not consider economics to be the prime motivation in such cases, that rights of import and export were meant for private needs, for those who decided to activate their full shared citizenship, and as such were similar to other grants of this kind to foreigners. Yet the factional disputes apparently involved in the revolts on Keos could have been based in the ties
The isopolities may thus be seen as attempts by the Keian federation to create new economic as well as political contacts, having sundered such ties with Athens. Given that Athens had a vested interest in at least one Keian product (miltos), the commercial importance of Keos may have also induced Athens to dissuade Keian trade contacts with enemy states after Keos was brought back into the League.

One last puzzle to be explained, however, is why the “Keians” are still listed collectively on the later Delian loan accounts for 341/0 if the federation was no longer in existence. It may be that this was simply ossified administrative procedure on the part of the amphiktyons, or that the debt was handled in some common way by the Keian cities that we simply cannot reconstruct. The most likely explanation, however, is that IG II² 404 only eradicated laws and political procedures concocted during the revolt of 364-62, and that any fiscal or other administrative methods in use before the revolt remained in place. This would place the Keian cities sans Poissa in more of a syntely than a synoecism, and it may have been a holdover from fifth-century practice. This would result in a sequence of a) syntely after 405 (perhaps based on one organized for the collection of the tribute to Athens), b) synoecism from 364-362 (including isopolities of prominent individuals, and as will be discussed later in this chapter, these ties persisted even after the island returned to the League, in the form of proxenies and other honors.

56 Migeotte, 156-7; Dreher Hegemon, 244 states that this is evidence that the supposed federation does not date to before 364 and has no relation to the rubric on the League charter. This does not explain, however, how the payments were determined and collected if the cities were simply being grouped together for convenience, either in 378 or in 341.

with Eretria and Histiaia), then c) syntely again, to continue the payment of interest on the Delian loans. Just how violent was the “repression” of Keos? Damage to the walls of various Keian cities is likely around the time of Chabrias’ expedition, but this is hardly unusual after a revolt and as mentioned above repairs were soon allowed again by Athens. We do not know, moreover, just how much damage may have been done to the various city walls nor in what locations. A deposit of Classical pottery found at Ayia Irini has been suggested as dating to the year of Chabrias’ assault, but this is purely speculative and the destruction could also stem from earthquakes or other strictly local causes.\footnote{K. Butt, “A Deposit of Archaic and Classical Greek Pottery at Ayia Irini, Keos,” Hesperia 46 (1977), 314. Landscape 242 n.8 is skeptical of the possibility that widespread damage occurred.}

Many modern historians, operating on the assumption that Athens was in the process of turning the League into a second Empire, have noted passages such as that in Plato Leges 638b:

...Επει δὴ γὰρ αἱ μείζονες τὰς ἐλάττων πόλεις νικῶσι μαχόμεναι καὶ καταδουλοῦνται. Συπακόστην μὲν Λοκροὺς, οἱ δὲ δοκοῦσιν εὔνομοτατοὶ τῶν περὶ ἅκινον τῶν τόπων γεγονέναι, Κεῖους δὲ Ἀθηναίοι, μουρία δὲ ἀλλα τοιαῦτα ἄν εὑροιμεν.

...Larger states, for example, are victorious in battle over smaller states, and we find the Syracusans subjugating the Locrians, who are reputed to have been the best-governed of the peoples in that part of the world, and the Athenians the Keians, and we could find countless other instances of the same kind. (Loeb translation)
While this is a powerful statement, it is dangerous to take at face value. What independent, strong evidence do we have that the Keians were oppressed by Athens after the two-part revolt was crushed? Jack Cargill has pointed out that many of the inscriptions cited as evidence for this oppressive model do not support such an analysis.\(^{59}\)

The stipulations of IG II\(^2\) 111 are actually moderate, considering that they pertain to a second revolt. Fair legal procedure is to be guaranteed to those brought to trial for leading the insurrection, and execution is expressly ruled out.\(^{60}\)

The question becomes more complicated, however, when one moves into the area of judicial procedure and trade agreements. The Athenian decree regulating the export of ruddle or miltos is a very problematic case.\(^{61}\) The decree, generally dated to before 350 B.C., mentions three of the Keian cities, Ioulis, Karthaia, and Koressos. The portion of the inscription concerning Karthaia (lines 1-8) is very badly mutilated, but the other two sections can be fairly well restored. It is not known whether a separate decree for Poisessa once existed but the exclusion of this polis from other Keian affairs may have applied here as well.

\(^{59}\) Cargill League, 136-40.

\(^{60}\) Even Marshall, Confederacy, 46 admits that the appeal to Athens granted to accused rebels might have helped them secure a fair venue. It is apparent, however, that an acquittal on Keos had to be retried at Athens- see H.T. Wade-Gery, Essays in Greek History (Oxford 1963), 190.

The main problem in the text is that the Koressos decree and the Ioulis decree simply do not match even though their provisions are similar. The Koressos decree is a reaffirmation of a previous agreement between this city and Athens (cf. line 11: καθαρτερον προτερον). The producers of ruddle are to pay a transport fee of 1 obol per talent to the merchants on ships “to be appointed”, presumably by the Athenians (lines 12-14). They must also pay the 5% export duty (πεντεκοστή). Speedy adjudication is specified in cases of infringement of this decree, with hearings stipulated to occur within thirty days (lines 16-18). Informers have the right of appeal to an Athenian court, and if successful they receive a portion of the confiscated property (lines 18-20).

The Ioulis decree is somewhat different. In this case the destination of Athens has been deduced from lines 27-28; the ruddle is to be exported to no other locale, “from this day”- ἀλλασσε δε μηδαμη απο τησ της ημερας (line 28), but the explicit mentioning of Athens is completely restored in line 27. Line 32 repeats the clause regarding ships designated by the Athenians (and indeed the two decrees have helped in each other’s restoration), and like the Koressos decree states that any future Athenian decrees on this

Only some scholars have noted that it is not, strictly speaking, Athenian ships which are at issue but ships to be designated by them- ἄποδειξοσιν. This could mean any merchants whom the Athenians decide to bestow this favor upon, and it should be remembered that many of the merchants who utilized the Peiraeus were foreigners or metics (For that matter “Athenians”, though probable, is completely restored; Wallinga “Nautika,” Mnemosyne 17 (1964), 8). Secondly, it is noteworthy that Athens has fixed a transport charge for this product. Velissaropoulos Naucieres, 189 makes an analogy with requisitioned private vessels in Ptolemaic Egypt, and surmises that other strategic materials must have been included on these ships but offers no possible candidates. It is also interesting to note that Bosporus grain shipped to Athens was exempted from the 1/30 export tax there; Dem. 20.31-3, 34.36; Isok. 17.57.
subject will be valid (lines 31-3). There is no mention, however, of a transport charge on the miltos paid to shipowners, and it appears that Ioulietan producers of the mineral are to be exempt from taxation (unfortunately there is a lacuna here- Ἀτέλεκτων δὲ εἰναι-----) starting from a certain month. The gap does not allow us to discern which tax the exemption applies to but it has usually been assumed that this refers to the export tax mentioned in the Koressos decree.

This gives rise to a real difficulty, that Ioulis which had rebelled twice from the League is apparently being put in a more favorable economic position regarding the export of one of its key commodities, while another polis on the same island, which had remained loyal after its first secession, is being doubly fleeced by the terms of this decree. Moreover, one would expect that a new regulation, imposed after 362, would be more harsh and oppressive than the renewal of an earlier agreement, but this is not the case. Clearly we are lacking some important information about events in the island and the exploitation of this product.

Although there are several literary and epigraphical references to miltos in antiquity, scholars have been singularly unable to agree on why Athens was so interested in this material and to what purposes it served. Theophrastos states that Keian ruddle is worked both on its own and out of iron mines, and that this brand is the best, although other

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63 Landscape, 299-303 is the most recent and most comprehensive review of the evidence. See also M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction (Berkeley 1977), 295-297; R.J. Hopper, Trade and Industry in Classical Greece (London 1979), 60, 164; Wallinga “Nautika,” Mnemosyne 17 (1964), 8-10; J. Hasebroek, Trade and Politics in the Ancient World (New York 1965), 140-141; P. Gardner, “Coinage of the Athenian Empire,” JHS 33 (1913), 152-153.
authors mention that of Lemnos and Sinope. Many uses of the mineral are attested, from pharmaceutical applications to the painting of vases and trireme hulls. It is this last, military usage of millos that has given rise to the most speculation regarding Athenian interest in its export. Most scholars have assumed that this was the primary motivation for Athens to secure its supply, although this supposition has been recently challenged.

Given that this was a product that Athens had a keen interest in, it would be advantageous to determine just how much profit could be derived from its exploitation. We do not know if the charge of 1 obol per talent in the Koressos decree refers to measurement by weight or by value, although the first possibility is far more likely. Wallinga has assumed this and calculated a rate of 17.5 drachmas on the talent based on the price listed in IG II² 1672 for Sinopic ruddle, which records 3.5 obols on the stater. He also estimates that no more than 5000 talents a year would have been required by

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65 Landscape 300. The yellow ocher from the Laurion mines, which were reactivated around the time of this decree, has been posited as a lower-quality but cheaper and effective substitute. It is interesting that we have little record of Athenian interest in ruddle in the fifth century when shipbuilding materials were a matter of great concern to the state- see Meiggs, AE, 195 for discussion. It may be that the earlier Koressos decree which was being reconfirmed actually dated back to the time of the earlier Empire. Lemnos is another possibility, since it was dominated by Athenian cleruchs during both the Delian Confederacy and the Second League, the cheap exploitation of Lemnian millos would have been assured. The proximity of Keos, however, would no doubt have given it an edge in speedy transportation of this commodity to Athens. The question of possible Athenian coercion here is viable. [Xen.] Ath.pol. 2.2 considers the possibility of forcing allies to bring shipbuilding materials to the Peiraeus. But as we will see, there is no real justification for applying this to the present decree.

Athens, by comparison with known imports of Roman mineral products. If the material had at least one military application, however, then it is possible that it was needed in larger amounts, especially during times of increased shipbuilding. In any event, 5000 talents’ weight of the product per annum at 17.5 drachmas a talent yields 87,500 drachmas a year, a little less than 15 Attic talents in value. We do not know if shipping charges applied to Karthaia or even Poiessa, but the total of these charges from Koressos would amount to 833 drachmas a year, quite small in comparison. The πεντακοστή would yield 4,375 drachmas a year using the same figures. Even if ships sailing from Ioulis were exempt from this harbor tax, if the product was in high enough demand then we can assume that this figure would probably still stand, assuming that Wallinga’s estimate is taken as a minimum. It should be noted that this amount is quite close to both the interest recovered from the Keian cities by the Delian temple in 377-6-374/3 (5,472 drachmas, 4.5 obols) and the interest which was left in arrears during that same period (4,127 drachmas, 1.5 obols). No further numbers are extant in the Delian accounts for Keos, although the island is mentioned in the list for 341/0, under the rubric of “sums recovered”, but no numerical information survives. What significance is to be found in this calculation? Figures such as these must of course be used with caution and are often


68 It should be kept in mind, however, that port taxes were often farmed out to wealthy individuals in the Kyklades, especially in the Hellenistic and Roman periods- see P.M. Nigdelis, Politeuma, 415. It is difficult to determine how much this calculation applies to real net revenue seen by the state.

69 Migeotte L’emprunt, 143-4, 147.
dismissed outright. Nevertheless the "good fit" of these figures seems to show that they may be useful as a yardstick for determining levels of revenue accruing to the Keian cities during this time. This is, of course, assuming that the export duty from Keos is meant and not the import duty at the Peiraeus, but this has not been a matter of controversy for some time. If it is assumed that at least one major use of the ruddle was for triremes (and it would appear probable that Athens would not have taken so much interest in a monopoly on the product unless it had some strategic use), then it is interesting to note that a major shipbuilding program was instituted by the Athenians in the 350's. This would coincide well with a time in which Athens would have taken steps to ensure that she had some control over the export of this material. The idea of Athens attempting a commercial monopoly simply for increased profits is probably an anachronistic one. Nevertheless a situation in which some producers on the island had more favorable conditions for export might indicate that some political maneuvering was occurring which we cannot reconstruct, and that certain poleis or individual families would have reaped more of the benefits from this arrangement with Athens than others. Other trading contacts between the Keian cities and the rest of the Greek world are more nebulous. Karystos is an

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70 As we will see, however, they are still fertile ground. Brun Eisphora uses similar methods to discuss levels of syntaxis during this same period. His conclusions will be discussed in a later chapter.

71 IG II² 1611 and 1613 are evidence for the increase in fleet strength.

72 This is the view of Gardner, "Coinage," JHS 33 (1913), 152-3. It is true that Aristotle Pol. 1.4.6 mentions the institution of μονοπόλιον to increase revenues, but this is not one on production and hence would not remove all profit from the hands of Keian producers of ruddle.
interesting possibility and has its own relationship to the “Kykladic question”. This polis of Euboia, although hostile to Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War, joined the Second Athenian League in 378, and appears to have remained either loyal to Athens or at least neutral during the time that the Euboian League joined the Theban camp after the Battle of Leuktra.73 Karystos is also the only Euboian city to be listed on the Delian loan accounts, for 377/6-374/3 and also in 341/0. The first account lists her as being in arrears for 1 talent and 2,400 drachmas of interest, while in the second she is part of the rubric that lists new loans given out that year, of which the number is somewhat effaced but is approximately three talents.74 This is not the only loan that Karystos contracts for during this period, for an inscription dated to 371 notes monies borrowed from several Thebans and Histiaians, a total sum of over ten talents.75 This would appear to show that the Theban bloc was courting favor with the city at this time and perhaps inducing her away

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73 M.B. Wallace, History of Karystos from the Sixth to the Fourth Centuries B.C. (Diss. Univ. of Toronto, 1972), 222. The polis had been subjected to a kleruchy around 450-446 and there is some evidence that at least a few Athenians or their progeny remained there even after the Peloponnesian War. Wallace 239 n.4 points out that Alkiphron 1.14, which refers to Athenian recruitment at the port of Geraistos, though dated to the third century A.D., may have drawn on fourth-century comedy as its source and thus may contain a kernel of truth. Lysias 34.3 refers to the right of intermarriage being extended to Euboians. For ancient references to the kleruchy see Diod. 11.88.3; Paus. 1.27.5; Andok. 3.1; Aisch. 2.186.

74 Migeotte, L’emprunt, 144, 147. There is also a Karystian individual listed on line 121 of Coupry ID 98 as owing 200 drachmas for four years’ interest.

75 IG XII.9.7; Migeotte, L’emprunt, 248-252; W.P. Wallace, “Loans to Karystos about 370 B.C.,” Phoenix 16 (1962), 15-28; M.B. Wallace, “Reply to Migeotte,” Phoenix 30 (1976), 42-45. Migeotte prefers a date closer to around 350 for these loans, but M.B. Wallace has made a convincing connection with the numismatic evidence for the 370's and the period of Theban expansionism would seem to warrant placing these events late in that decade as well.
from Athens. Once again we do not know what the loans were for, either the ones from Delos or the ones from elsewhere, although it is conceivable that the latter were used to help pay off the Delian loans.

In any case, whatever financial negotiations were being carried out at this time, Karystos takes no anti-Athenian stance during these years that is evident in the sources. Indeed, there is some evidence from coinage that she may have remained in the Athenian trading sphere. A series of didrachms, with the legend KAPYE, has been tentatively dated to around 370 and was struck on a weight standard of 8 grams, a standard formerly known as “reduced” Euboio-Attic. If, as Wallace suggests, they are to be understood more as coins on the “Chian” weight standard (prevalent in the islands, as we shall see, and in other states connected to trade with eastern poleis such as Chios and Rhodes), this may indicate closer commercial dealings with the Aegean world than the rest of the cities.

Although Xen. Hell. 6.5.23 and Ages. 2.24 discuss the break of Euboia with Athens, the phrase used by the author is simply “the Euboian cities”, and it has been usually assumed that he meant all of them. See also Diod. 15.85.2,6 and 87.3. Wallace History, 224 points out, however, that no trouble is noted with Karystos ca. 362, and the city was the promptest to declare for Athens in 357. There was also a temporary break in her interest payments to Thebes and Histiaia, but this could easily have had other causes. It would seem to remain an open question, but combined with other evidence discussed below it seems likely that Karystos was at least neutral regarding Athens during the years 370-357.

Wallace, History, 362, and “The ‘Reduced Euboio-Attic’ Coin Weight Standard,” in W. Heckel and R. Sullivan, eds., Ancient Coins of the Greco-Roman World (Nickle Numismatic Papers, Ontario 1984), 19-37. Wallace states in the later article that this name is a misnomer, that the standard can be used to refer to “Macedonian”, or in the case of Karystos, “Chian” weight coins that appear slightly heavier. His History 242 n.10 offers the opinion that this issue of coins was also designed to standardize payments from a heterogeneous treasury that resulted from loans taken out from so many places. We do not know, however, if weight standards had any relation to loan payments to Delos, and the syntaxeis are another possibility.
of Euboia. As an aside Diodoros states that in 368 the Euripos was closed to Athens so her ships had to sail around the Karystia, and it is possible that he meant allied shipping as well. The cities of Euboia returned to the Athenian camp in 357, on the eve of the Social War, but again broke away from 348-341. This last year saw a reconstituted Euboian League once again allying with Athens, although the cities of this League did not rejoin the League of the Athenians but concluded a separate alliance with her. What makes this especially interesting is that Histiaia appears to have struck an issue of octobols and tetrobols of “full” Euboio-Attic weight, which would have easily exchanged

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78 The Euboian League coinage of the time, which probably excluded Karystos, is still controversial. O. Picard, Chalcis et la confédération eubeenne (Paris 1979), 236 states that the Aiginetic didrachms dated to around 411 by W.P. Wallace in The Euboian League and its Coinage: Numismatic Notes and Monographs 134 (New York 1956), 5 actually began after 370, and that the Euboio-Attic tetrobol fractions dated by W.P. Wallace to the 390's actually are more likely after 357. This problem brings to the fore the question of just how much the weight standard of a particular city reflects its political allegiances. Many scholars have rejected this concept; T.R. Martin, Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece (Princeton 1985), Ken Sheedy has cautioned that weight standards often reflect local traditions rather than short-term political situations (personal communication). However it does seem that the adoption of certain standards was determined by a state’s relation to certain political spheres, and if coins can be dated on stylistic grounds to years that also coincide with political events, and the weights that they are struck on fit these events, then this interpretation has merit. I thank M.B. Wallace for his many helpful suggestions on these points (personal communication).

79 Diod. 15.71.4; Wallace, History, 223. For the economic importance of Euboia to Athens see Thuc. 8.95.2, 7.28.1; Arist. Ath. pol. 33.1.

80 IG II² 124 for the renewal of alliance; Dem. 8.74; Aisch. 3.85; Diod. 16.7.2; IG II² 125 for Athenian aid to Eretria.

81 Dem. 4.34, 19.326; Wallace History, 226.

82 Cargill League. This was a period of renewed strength for Athens- Mytilene had rejoined the League in 346 after the tyrant Kammyes was overthrown; [Dem.] 40.37.
with the “Chian” standard then prevalent in Karystos and the Aegean. How does this relate to Keos? There are a few tantalizing hints but nothing that can be firmly established. Most of the coins of the Keian Federation that have been found have been placed at the end of the third to the mid-second century B.C. Nevertheless, there is still some controversy, and it is conceded by most scholars that at least one series of bronze coins from one Keian polis can be dated to before 320 B.C., of which specimens from Koressos have been found in levels from this period at Olynthos.

A recent study has posited a date of ca. 368 for a few of the silver and bronze coins of Karthaia and Ioulis. The silvers are of the textbook Euboic-Attic standard (7.64 on the didrachm) and the bronze from Ioulis is of the same type. The Karthaian coins (only 3 specimens in existence) appear carefully struck, with an obverse of Zeus/Aristaios and a reverse of Sirius with the legend KAPΘAI. The obverse is similar to the series from Ioulis, of which Zeus is not a traditional Keian insignia but Aristaios is, and the reverse is

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83 Wallace, “Reduced,” Nickel, 25 and 31 n.27. C.M. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (London 1976), 93-94 notes the legend ΑΘΑΝΑ on these specimens. Picard Chalcis, 176-77, however, puts the Attic weight coins after 338 B.C.

84 Landscape, 308, which points out that the major find spots of these coins, i.e. Tenos, Delos, and the Athenian agora, all point to a terminus ante quem of 200-150 B.C. for most of the bronzes.

85 Ibid., 308 for the relevant excavation reports and discussion.

86 I thank H. Papageorgiadou-Banis for kindly allowing me to see her unpublished manuscript, which will soon be published as The Coinage of Kea, Meletemata 24.

of a bee and Sirius.\textsuperscript{88} The bronze of Ioulis cited by Papageorgiadou-Banis, of which only one specimen in Berlin is extant, is so damaged as to render the inscription illegible.\textsuperscript{89} Papageorgiadou-Banis theorizes that the coins were struck to commemorate the defection of the Keian cities from the Second Athenian League after the affirmation of autonomy for all Greek states in 368, and that the silver may have been provided by Athenian coins that were subsequently overstruck.\textsuperscript{90} She sees an economic decline on Keos after the suppression of the revolts, exacerbated by such decrees as the one concerning \textit{miltos}, and that Athenian coinage was used on the island in the decades afterward in reflection of these economic hardships.

This analysis has some problems, although the date advanced for these coins is certainly a plausible one. The idea that the adoption of Athenian coinage indicates a depressed economy appears to have no parallel and may simply reflect the greater desirability of these coins on the part of merchants.\textsuperscript{91} Having access to currency, even if not natively issued, would of course allow wealth to be accumulated without overstriking of these coins being required. If the coins are truly of the fourth century (and this is possible although the small number of specimens makes this highly speculative), and if they date from 368 as proposed, then there is nothing about the issue that is inherently

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 27

\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 27.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 6.

\textsuperscript{91} See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the Athenian law on silver coinage from 374/3, just a few years before these issues may have been struck.
anti-Athenian in any way. If they are coins struck by the autonomous poleis of Keos, then this is neither an affirmation of the existence of a federation nor evidence against it.\(^{92}\) The Attic weight standard of these coins is somewhat telling, since if they do date from this period then their trading connections might still be firmly grounded in the Athenian sphere. They may or may not have ceased minting at the time of the rebellion and the isopolity decrees with Euboian cities, as Karystos may have done at the same period with her Attic weight didrachms, but in any case they do not appear to have minted on the Aiginetic weight standard as the Euboian League did, a standard prevalent in Boiotia and Central Greece at the time; in short, the Theban sphere.\(^{93}\) Even the trading agreements in the isopolities, giving citizens' rights to foreign merchants from the respective cities, do not seem to have led to the adoption of identical weight standards.\(^{94}\)

As we have seen, the decree regulating the export of miltos, in and of itself, cannot be used as a basis to hypothesize a state of poverty in Keos after the dual revolt. If it shows us anything at all, given its very problematic nature, it is that some poleis or even factions within poleis on Keos benefited more from the decree than others. If the calculations given for revenue from the export of this mineral are at all close to the real historical figures, then the island could not likely have been in a depressed economic situation.

What this all amounts to regarding the coinage is that whether or not these coins date

\(^{92}\) Note that even when joined in the Euboian League of the third quarter of the fourth century, some cities of that island continued to mint their own issues—see Wallace "Reduced," Nickel, 19.

\(^{93}\) Wallace "Reduced," Nickel, 23.

\(^{94}\) See IG XII.5, 594, lines 11-14.
from the 360's, there is nothing about them to indicate an anti-Athenian stance, or a
decision to forego economic ties with Athens and her other Aegean allies. They may
simply reflect the desire of the cities to proclaim their autonomy while still participating
in the same commercial dealings with the same poleis as before, and while the cessation
of these issues may have been related to the dissolution of the Keian federation around
363/2, this offers no evidence for a suppression of these cities nor a decline in their
economic potency.

To discuss further evidence on the Keian cities and their economic situation at this
time, it is necessary to return to the testimony of epigraphy. There is a decree of Karthaia
honoring an embassy sent to Karystos that is undated, although most scholars would place
it in the second half of the fourth century. Of greater interest to our purposes is a list of
the proxenies of Karthaia that has been dated to the middle of the fourth century. This
document lists individuals in various foreign cities who have received proxenies from the
Karthaians, in many diverse locales. There are several from the Kyklades, notably Tenos
(line 45), Syros (line 46), Seriphos (line 48), Delos (line 49), and Andros (line 4, right
side). Eretria (line 8) is the only extant Euboian polis, but the text is very fragmentary and

95 IG XII.5, 537; Brun, "L'Ile," ZPE 99 (1993), 127-28 would simply place it sometime
after the dissolution of the Federation and perhaps as an after-effect of Athenian
problems with Euboia, but as we have seen Karystos may never have really broken
with Athens. Previously, a set of Karystian proxenies with Athens, Naxos(?), Syros
and Andros were placed around the third century, see C. Marek, Die Proxenie (Berlin
1984), 90 ; IG XII.9, 1245-48. These inscriptions, however, first published by F.
Lenormant in Rheinisches Museum (1866), 386-93, are now known to be forgeries.
I thank M.B. Wallace for bringing this to my attention.

others such as Karystos are certainly possible. States from the coast of Asia Minor are represented, namely Kyzikos (line 54), Tenedos (lines 50 and 52), and Knidos (line 26). Many Athenians are also represented, including Aristophon (line 43), whom we last saw as the strategos who put down the second revolt on Keos and was the proposer of the regulations for Ioulis (IG II2 111). There are also mainland poleis represented, some of whom were not necessarily close allies of Athens, i.e. Aigina (line 24), Sparta (line 18), and Korinth (line 14). Two other Lakonian states are also on the list, Pellana (line 20) and Kyphanta (line 21). There are Thracian states, Ainos (line 23) and Maroneia (line 60). Most striking of all is a Theban proxeny (line 27), and one from Levadia in Boiotia (line 25).

Aristophon had a bit of a colorful career before his time as proxenos of Karthaia and we would do well to examine it briefly. He was the son of Aristophanes of Azenia and was a major player on the Athenian political scene, beginning in 403. Although the proposer of many decrees (a list is given by Tod in II 142), he was often indicted under the γραφή παρανόμων and narrowly escaped conviction regarding his role on Keos.97 The most complete information regarding his deeds comes from the scholiast; but we do not know how truthful the charges of abuse may have been, or even which Keians are

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97 Hyp. 4.28; Aisch. 3.194 and schol. 1.64; J. Kirchner, Procopographica Attica II (Berlin 1902), 447-48; J.K. Davies, Athenian Propertied Families 600-300 B.C. (Oxford 1971), 64-66. The scholiast to Aischines claims that the charge in 362 stemmed from Aristophon’s evil deeds towards the inhabitants of Keos that were motivated by a desire for gain- cf. διὰ φιλοχρήματι'ν πολλά κακά ἐργασάμενος τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας. Hypereides claims that Aristophon bragged of being acquitted no less than seventy-five times under this same procedure.
being referred to as the victims of his caprices. Presumably it is the inhabitants of Ioulis
that are meant, and it seems likely that a second revolt must have resulted in some rather
unpleasant consequences for those Ioulietans who had led the insurrection, as mentioned
above. It is also important to remember, however, that some Ioulietans obviously
supported the Athenian reconquest, as can be seen from the regulations for Ioulis, which
target a specific faction for retribution. The rather mild conditions of this retribution,
including guarantees for those accused of complicity in the revolt, would seem to clash
with the picture of Aristophon painted by the orators. Nevertheless it is certainly possible
that Aristophon managed to skim some of the property confiscated from these hostile
Ioulietans away from the people of Ioulis for whom it was supposedly earmarked. It is
also possible that he plundered property during the campaign and then ceased before he
made the motion for the decree, which would have allowed him to claim that due process
was followed in confiscations after hostilities had ended. There are several intriguing
possibilities here and we simply do not have enough evidence to make conclusions
regarding Aristophon’s ethics. What we can do, however, is look at later developments on
the island beyond the suppression of the revolt, and this is where the polis of Karthaia
becomes important. Karthaians are praised in these regulations as having aided in the
suppression of the second revolt (line 54), and this cooperation with the Athenian
strategos apparently was the beginning of a longer professional relationship between the
two parties.98

98 It is tempting to restore Chabrias in line 40 of the proxeny list- Χαβριας- but this
has been rightly cautioned against by Brun, “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 126 n.36.
We do not know what benefits, financial or otherwise, would have accrued to the Karthaians from this arrangement. Here is a situation in which the fragmentary nature of the milto decree takes on an even more frustrating character, for if the details regarding the export of the material from Karthaia were better preserved, and compared to those for Koressos and Ioulis, we might be able to establish a firm connection between proxenies and financial concessions for the cities that they represented at Athens. If we possessed a Ioulietan or Koressian list, this might also help to establish parallels. It might be of some value if we knew who replaced the deceased Antipater as proxenos at Ioulis, but this information is also lacking. As such we are left only with tantalizing possibilities.

A proxenos, by definition, was recognized as a friend and representative of a foreign polis. It was usually bestowed as a prize for services rendered to the state, with the benefactor honored as a euergetes in many cases. When delegations were sent to foreign states the proxenies of that state were often the preferred choices for

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99 Plato Leg. 642b, which emphasizes that a proxenos would protect the interests of the foreign state if not sacrifice his home state in the process. There are examples, however, of a proxenos assisting his honorary state in their intervention in affairs in his homeland. Thrasybulos managed to wrest Byzantium from Spartan hands in 390 with the help of the Athenian proxenos there—see Dem. 20.59-60; Xen. Hell. 4.8.27. Later proxenoi at Byzantium also helped direct the course of home policy down a pro-Athenian path, such as Philinos in 378/7 (IG II² 76). For more discussion on the institution in this period see E.M. Burke, “The Economy of Athens in the Classical Era: Some Adjustments to the Primitivist Model,” TAPA 122 (1992), 205; P. Gauthier, Symbola (Nancy 1972), 18-27.

100 Dem. 20.57, 64, 105-6, 121; Liban. Hypoth. Dem. 23; S. Perlman, “A Note on the Political Implications of Proxenia in the Fourth Century B.C.,” CQ 8 (1958), 186.
ambassadors. To cause physical harm to a proxenos was considered a grave offense by the state whom he represented, as was seen in the regulations for Ioulis which contained provisions for bringing the killers of the Athenian representative in that polis to justice.

Although the primary motivations behind creating proxenies were political, it has been recently shown that by the fourth century economic considerations had also become a factor. The grant of enktesis, or the privilege of owning land in the city from which an individual receives a proxeny, also increases in the fourth century, although admittedly most of the extant decrees date to the second half of this century. After the Social War, merchants began to receive these honors more and more as Athens attempted to lure them back to the city. It is apparent that the grant of enktesis had a connection to the promotion of commercial activity, and the program of Eubulus detailed in chapter 1 had just this sort of aim in mind.

101 Aisch. 2.172, 3.138-9; Dein. Ag.Dem. 38; Thuc. 2.29.1 on the use of proxenies to safeguard the northern grain route to Athens; Xen. Hell. 4.5.6, 6.3.4; Lys. 19.19; [Dem.] 40.36.

102 This was a more mild justice than in the past, as well, since in the fifth century the death penalty was often prescribed for this act. See IG II² 71+38, 32; Perlman “Note,” CQ 8 (1958), 190 n.7.

103 Burke, “Economy,” 206. Marek Proxenie, 285-332 is more traditional in his treatment. The increase in grants of proxenies to coastal and island states in this period is noted by Burke, although there no extant grants to a Kykladic state before 332/1 (Andros, IG II² 347). Dem. 7.38 however, delivered in 342, mentions a Karystian proxenos of Athens killed by Philip.


105 Most notably Bion of Tenos, IG II² 279, whom we will meet again in the chapter on that island.
Given that the grant of enktesis seems to have had as at least part of its motivation the promotion of commercial interests, it is noteworthy that the proxeny list from Karthaia has been restored with this phrase in line 5. With the obligatory grain of salt swallowed to accompany the fact that this is a restoration and not definitive, the implications of this must be considered since the wide range of states represented on the list presents problems.

Sparta and the Lakonian poleis are examples. Although Sparta had not participated in the “Common Peace” of 362/1, her military strength was vastly reduced by this time and many of her Peloponnesian subordinates were now practically autonomous. Still, Sparta did render some assistance to Phokis against Thebes in 355, and defeated Argos in 353. She was technically not hostile to Athens at this time since the alliance concluded in 369 had never been repealed. In 355 Athens allied with the Messenians, who were still the professed enemies of the Lakedaimonians. The relationship between Athens and Sparta at this time could best be described as nebulous and any connections between

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106 The restored section at the beginning of the line reads: [πολεμοὶ καὶ γῆς ἐγκτησίν καὶ προσῳδο]ν.

107 Ryder Koine, 85, 140. On the peace of 362/1 see Diod. 15.89.1; Xen. Hell. 7.5.27; Plut. Ages. 35.3-4; Polyb. 4.33.8-9. Tod II 145 may also refer to this agreement. Autonomy, however, did not guarantee stability in these states- see Isok. 6.64-8; Diod. 15.40.

108 Diod. 16.24 on Thebes, 16.34 on Argos.

109 Xen. Hell. 6.5.36-7, 39; Dem. 16.6; Ryder Koine, 94-95. Both cities had fought together against Thebes at Mantinea.

110 Dem. 16.8-9; Paus. 4.28.1.
Athenian allies and the latter would be even more so, but in any case there is no evidence of any outright hostility. Aigina is probably a similar case, although there is some evidence of piracy troubles there continuing into the 360's. Korinth had been unsuccessfully attacked by Athens in 366, and had concluded a separate peace with Thebes that same year, thereby staying clear of the conflict at Mantinea. Athens could neither be said to be her ally nor actively her enemy at this time. Thebes, Lebadea, and Eretria are more complicated, since Theban influence was still felt on Euboia until 357 and she was to be the prime mover in the declaration of the Sacred War against Phokis in 355. Eretria, moreover, had been connected in isopolity with the Keian federation. The presence on the proxeny list (IG XII.5, 542) of these states in the ‘Theban sphere’ poses the most serious problem to dating it, for this has not yet been pinned down beyond a rough figure of the mid-fourth century. The seemingly all-embracing spirit of the proxeny list would make a strong case for dating it soon after the promulgation of the “Common Peace” of 362/1, but this was not necessarily a time of total cooperation and cooperation and

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111 S. Hornblower, The Greek World 479-323 B.C. (London and New York 1983), 244-46 gives a good summary of conditions at this time.

112 [Dem.] 53.6.

113 Hornblower World, 234. For the Athenian attack: Xen. Hell, 7.4.2. For the peace with Thebes: Xen. Hell, 7.4.9. For general conditions at Korinth during this period see Diod. 16.65.

114 Ibid., 246.

115 Brun, “L’Ile,” ZPE 99 (1993), 125, who gives no other opinion than the fact that it must date after the dissolution of the Federation.
goodwill between the adherents to this Peace.\textsuperscript{116} Another possible date would be at the start of the Social War, as a way for Keos to protect its interests abroad during a new time of crisis; this would also remove the problem of Eretria since after 357 Euboia was again allied to Athens, but this still leaves Thebes. Conditions near 355 and the outbreak of the Sacred War would seem to weigh against stronger ties with Thebes by any state in the Athenian sphere. The late 360's would thus seem to be the most likely date for the Karthaian proxeny list.

Given this assumption, we must still consider the possible Athenian reaction to this wide-ranging list of political connections. It is difficult to tell if Athens would have considered it dangerous for an allied state, which had recently revolted, to bestow proxenies on enemy states or allow old ones with enemies to remain in force.\textsuperscript{117} It would seem that Athens would have looked with disfavor upon either proxenies or isopolities with enemy states, even though neither are specifically mentioned in the inscriptions concerning the settlement of affairs on the island. We do not know how much contact may have continued between Keian cities and Eretria after the federation was dissolved, and the naming of a proxenos there may have been one way to keep contact alive without incurring the enmity of Athens. The situation with Thebes and Levadia could be similar cases. Even though the former connections established under the auspices of the Keian

116 Ryder \textit{Koine}, 85; Diod 15.89.1; Xen. \textit{Hell}, 7.5.27.

117 Both are primarily expressions of goodwill between states, see Gawantka, \textit{Isopolitie}, 143-50, and Perlman, “Note,” \textit{CQ} 8 (1958), 190. Isopolities would most likely have constituted more of a threat, since even those citizens who did not fully activate their second citizenship were still recognized as xenoi; cf. Gawantka \textit{Isopolitie}, 11-39.
federation may have been sundered, the proxenies may have allowed certain individuals or factions on Keos to keep contact with associates in these other locales. It would be very useful in this case if we had attestations of proxenies from any of these problematic cities residing in Karthaia or elsewhere on Keos, but no such decrees are listed in Marek's comprehensive study.\(^\text{118}\) It is possible that Athens could have looked with tolerance on proxenies of Karthaia in these ambivalent states, but not on the reverse situation, since they could be possible wellsprings of further revolts. Such proxenies may very well have been bestowed on Karthaian, but if so, they are not extant.

Given the admittedly fragmentary state of our information in this matter, one of two conclusions can be reached: a) Athens did not care about these proxenies or at least did not consider them a real threat, or b) Athens disapproved of the decrees but did not interfere publicly due to guarantees of autonomy to League members. Whichever conclusion is correct, Athenians and Athenian factions exercised their own influence on Keos, through their own proxeny connections. The second interpretation seems to fit the evidence more precisely. The situation is thus more complex than most scholars would admit when discussing the state of Keos after her readmittance to the League.

The nature of such factional relations between Keos and Athens is hinted at in an inscription that honors two Athenians, Kleomelos and Chaireas, with proxenies for having assisted two Karthaian citizens, Zenis and Lysimachos, in a case at Athens.\(^\text{119}\)

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\(^\text{118}\) Marek, *Proxenie*, 30 (Thebes), 11 (Korinth), 15 (Sparta), 32 (Livadia), 89 (Eretria).

\(^\text{119}\) IG XII.5, 528(=Michel 403), and 538; P. Graindor, "Inscriptions des Cyclades," *Musee Belge* 11 (1907), 103; Brun, "L'Ile." *ZPE* 99 (1993), 126 for most recent discussion. It is now widely considered to date to the same general period of the mid-
Brun speculates that the case involved prosecution under the terms of the *miltos* decree. If true, this would open up other possibilities for infighting and politicking in Athens and certainly does not imply a unified front towards the oppression of Keos. Although the case was eventually tried at Athens it appears that judges, *syndikoi*, were sent to Keos at some point. This has been taken as more evidence for Athenian oppression of the island. However, since this is a decree honoring certain Athenians, it would rule out a concerted effort on the part of all factions and individuals in Athens to wreak havoc with Keian affairs. That Athenians looked after Keian interests, and very likely doing this at loggerheads to the purposes of other Athenians, can perhaps be connected to Aristophon’s aforementioned prosecution at home after serving as *strategos* on the island. Whatever his possible abuses to Ioulietans (and probably just the rebel Ioulietans), he was definitely on good terms with the Karthaians to be included on their proxeny list.

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120 IG XII.5, 528 line 7; 538 line 5.

121 For example, S. Hornblower, *World*, 233, who compares the appeal provisions of this and IG II.2 111 to the fifth-century “Chalkis Decree” (IG I² 40). Brun, curiously, does not discuss the *syndikoi* question in his examination of this inscription.

122 It was not unheard of for a state to have more than one *proxenos* in a foreign city, so this multiplicity of Athenians is not necessarily a special case; Perlman, “Note,” 186. This may indicate ties with more than one faction in these cities, and the various accusations of bribery leveled against *proxenoi* of foreigners at Athens would appear to bear this out. See Dem. 20.132-3; Dein. *Ag.Dem.*, 42-5; Hyp. *Ag.Dem.*, 25; Lys. 13.72 on those who pay money to receive the title of *euergetes* and its consequent prestige. The experience of Aristophon fits this scenario as well.

123 Brun, “L’Ile,” *ZPE* 99 (1993), 126 points out that even though Kleomelos and Chaireas do not appear on the list in IG XII.5 542, they may have received these
The other states on the list present no real problems of political alignment but bespeak of connections firmly in the Athenian sphere. Knidos, although not a member of the League, apparently engaged in a decent volume of trade with Athens in the fourth century, as has been determined by the finds of Knidian (as well as Rhodian) amphorae from this period.\textsuperscript{124} Tenedos, a small island not far from the Hellespont, was one of the most exemplary members of the Second League.\textsuperscript{125} It had an important geographical position on the grain route from the Bosporos to Athens and possessed two harbors.\textsuperscript{126}

It is important to consider what else this proxeny list tells us, beyond the simple fact that it is of invaluable importance in determining the position of Karthaia, and by extension, Keos, in the Aegean world in the middle of the fourth century. It definitely shows that Keos appears to have held a special place in the Kyklades in regard to connections with mainland Greece.\textsuperscript{127} Athens theoretically may have exerted some

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\item honors a few years afterward and thus missed being inscribed on the main stele, but were recorded on IG XII.5, 528 and 538. In any case the Karthaian list is very fragmentary.
\item S. Isager and M.H. Hansen, \textit{Aspects of Athenian Society in the Fourth Century} (Odense 1975), 35. The greater share of the amphorae finds from these locales, however, are Hellenistic in date.
\item IG II\textsuperscript{2} 233, dated to 339 B.C., shows the Tenedians being granted an exemption from syntaxeis payments. The island had remained loyal even through the Social War. IG II\textsuperscript{2} 232 mentions other Athenian honors to Tenedians that probably date around the same time. It is presumed in Tod that Tenedos, along with Chios, Kos, and Rhodes, aided in the Athenian expedition to help Byzantion when it was attacked by Philip.
\item W. Leaf, \textit{Strabo on the Troad} (Cambridge 1923), 214.
\item This is in contrast to other islands in the area, who mainly had ties to Crete, Rhodes, Chios, and Kos. As we have seen, Karthaia also had connections in the east. Tenos, especially in the Hellenistic age, had proxenies with several poleis in Magna Graecia,
\end{itemize}
influence over Karthaia's choice of proxenies at this time, but the states that these individuals pressed Karthaian interests in, as we have seen, were by no means all Athenian allies. Some commercial connections with these poleis can be inferred from the inclusion of enktesis in these grants. This implies that the Keians, even though split into respective cities after an unsuccessful rebellion, could continue to make some independent decisions regarding their livelihood and contact with other states of the Greek world besides Athens. Although Athens was a powerful neighbor and exerted great influence on Keos both through the League and through other channels, the epigraphical evidence seems to show that the island was not simply a lapdog of the Athenian demos. We can not tell any more from the list and it is difficult to carry speculation any further on what Karthaia may have imported or exported to and from these states, or if she simply carried on transit trade and acted as an intermediary. It is unlikely that miltos would have been a possible export, since even if Athens had the right to designate other destinations for the product none of the listed allied states would probably have been major shipbuilders. Nevertheless, the position of Keos on both the east-west route to Asia Minor and her proximity to the grain route would have allowed her to become involved in trade contacts that used these shipping lanes.

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Tenedos is a possible exception considering that she may have aided in the Byzantion expedition of 339; Diod. 16.77.2 says that the various states συμμορχίαν ἐξεπεμψαν, “sent reinforcements”.

It is noteworthy, however, that there is little evidence of connections with Thasos, either on this proxeny list (admittedly fragmentary) or in terms of later imports of
Possible trading relationships between Keos and the various Peloponnesian and central Greek states are harder to determine. It is just possible that the presence of a Korinthian proxenos may indicate some involvement in western trade, but there is no other evidence to support this assertion.\textsuperscript{130} They do give reason to suspect, however, that certain political and economic connections between Karthaia and other Greek poleis may have been forged without the intervention of Athens, and perhaps even without its approval at times. As Athenians still comprised the greatest number of honorands, there is no possibility of viewing this document as anti-Athenian. Yet by the same token it is certainly not an affirmation of submission to Athens or decisive evidence for a limitation of Keian trade ties to Athens only, as might be inferred from the miltos decree. Once again, the lacunose nature of that inscription precludes us from knowing more fully what provisions of the miltos trade applied to Karthaia, and in what position it stood relative to Ioulis (apparently favored) and Koressos (apparently sanctioned).

It may appear that this overview of the fourth-century evidence for the island raises more questions than it answers, and in a sense this is intended. Past scholarship on the history of Keos, as well as many other of the Kyklades, has tended to look for neat and tidy solutions to historical problems which the evidence does not permit. The epigraphic and textual evidence needs to be considered in light of recent archaeological data that wine amphorae in the third century. Thasos was a colony of Paros and such links would prove interesting in developing a regional analysis. This is part of the rationale for the idea that the Kykladic islands, although sharing regional characteristics, often followed independent paths.

\textsuperscript{130} There may have been commercial activity with the various Greek colonies on the islands off the Illyrian coast, however. See Chapter 3 on Paros for discussion.
seems to contradict the standard view of conditions on Keos during its membership in the League. Keos is more fortunate than other Kykladic islands, in that not only have extensive surveys been conducted of its territory, but also in that it has been blessed with a greater number of extant inscriptions than other islands in the region, with which the archaeological evidence can be correlated.

We have seen that the island was by no means poverty-stricken during this period. On the contrary, a large percentage of the population appears to have been wealthy enough to own property, lease it, and exploit it agriculturally. Mineral resources of the island were also utilized, and militos, at least, may have had some profit potential. The island was indebted to Delian Apollo, but from the extant accounts there did not have as high arrears of interest as others in the Kyklades.

What is most important to keep in mind, however, is that when we speak of Keos during this period, we are not speaking of a unified whole. Even during the period of revolt in the 360's, the polis of Poiessa does not seem to have followed the path of its sister cities on the island. Poiessa is the most maddening political entity on Keos, lurking like a phantom in the archaeological record but managing to stay out of virtually every important epigraphical source connected with the island in general. It may never have been part of the revolt or carried out any anti-Athenian policy. It is even possible that Athens and even other Keians did not pay it much heed; one can imagine a city that tried for relative self-sufficiency, exported no special minerals or other products, and stayed out of the politics current on the rest of the island. Such a situation would not have been unprecedented in classical Greek history: witness the continued, lone loyalty of
Methymna to Athens during the Lesbian revolt of 428/7.\textsuperscript{131} The small size of Poiessa (and also Koressos) in relation to Ioulis and Karthaia, as determined from survey and other data, may also be an indication of a city that managed to steer clear of the affairs of its neighbors.\textsuperscript{132}

\textsuperscript{131} Thuc. 3.2.5.

\textsuperscript{132} There were several synoikismoi later in the island’s history, with Karthaia absorbing Poiessa and Ioulis incorporating Koressos in the Hellenistic period; Strabo 10.5.6. It is possible that Poiessa was swallowed up at an earlier date, even the late fourth or early third centuries; Landscape 243 n.10.
CHAPTER 3- PAROS

One of the largest of the Kyklades, Paros has figured more importantly in the history of the Aegean than other islands in this study, due to its marble quarries and the artistic tradition which stemmed from them.\(^1\) The renowned “Parian marble” which was used to grace many famous structures and to construct many well-known masterpieces of statuary, has been posited as the primary reason that Paros was perceived as a wealthy locale in antiquity.\(^2\) This perception is reinforced by financial documents such as the Athenian tribute lists of the fifth century, which show Paros as paying one of the highest amounts of tribute of any polis throughout the history of the Delian Confederacy.\(^3\)

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2. For the quarries: N. Herz and M. Waelkens (eds.), *Classical Marble: Geochemistry, Technology, and Trade* (Dordrecht 1988). As summarized in Brun *Archipels* 122, recent research has identified two actual types of marble from the island (Paros 1 and 2), and the sites of over twenty possible quarries have been located. Nevertheless, it is difficult to tell Parian marble from Naxian, even under laboratory conditions, and Brun theorizes that ancient writers may have grouped the two together under the rubric “Parian.”

3. The accounts for the year 450/49 shows annual payments of 16 talents and 1200 drachmas (IG I\(^3\) 263, col.II line 24). This was elevated to 18 talents in 446/5 (IG I\(^3\) 266, line 25); Lanzillotta *Paro* 116.
The relationship of Paros to Athens, however, was not an amiable one at several key points in the fifth century. Paros medized during the first Persian invasion under Datis in 490, sending an indeterminate number of ships to Marathon with the Persian fleet.\(^4\) As a consequence of this, and perhaps also due to the island’s wealth, Miltiades led a punitive expedition against the Parians in 489 which was utterly unsuccessful.\(^5\)

There are actually two accounts of this siege, that of Herodotos and that of Ephoros.\(^6\) In addition, Herodotus himself states that he is reporting both the Parian version, in which Miltiades injures himself while attempting sacrilege, and that of the “other Greeks”; both end in failure of the siege, but the Parian story places Miltiades in an even worse light. Modern commentators have pointed to Herodotos’ pro-Alkmaionid leanings and that clan’s hatred of the Philaids, of whom Miltiades was a member.\(^7\) Whatever his motivations, Herodotos reports that the Parians held firm against the attack, rebuilding their damaged walls by night and holding out for twenty-six days, even though the rest of

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\(^4\) Hdt. 6.133; Aeschylus Per. 880; Paus. 1.33.2. Herodotos had stated earlier in 6.99, however, that male hostages had been exacted from island families along with these levies, so this cannot be seen as simple collaboration or a necessarily anti-Athenian stance.

\(^5\) Hdt. 6.132-36. Lanzilotta Paro, 108 and n.15 postulates that it was not really wealth on Paros, but rather the gold available to the Parian colonists on Thasos, that Miltiades had in mind. See also B. Holtzmaan, “Des mines d’or a Thasos?” in BCH suppl. 5 (1979), 345 and 346 n.4; H.T. Wallinga, Ships and Sea Power Before the Great Persian War (Leiden 1993), 145-48.

\(^6\) The account of Ephoros: Jacoby FGrH 2.70 fr.63. A similar tale is also told by Cornelius Nepos, Milt. 7.

\(^7\) Lanzilotta Paro, 108, 112; H. Bengtson, Einzelpersonlichkeit und athenisches Staat zur Zeit des Peisistratos und des Miltiades (Bayer. Akad. der Wissenschaft, 1939), 50.
the island had been devastated. The Ephoran account, however, is far more anti-Parian. In this version the inhabitants of Paros, with their walls being increasingly damaged, come to terms with Miltiades for a surrender of their city. Then a signal fire, believed to come from the forces of Datis at Mykonos, induces them to change their minds and refuse Miltiades entry into the city. This is explained as the origin of the verb ἀναπάριξεῖν. While this verb may certainly have had its basis in some Parian deed, it seems preferable to follow Herodotos' account due to its greater chronological precision and richness of detail. Lanzilotta points out that several of the other Kyklades resisted assault in the following years, such as Andros during the later exactions of Themistokles and Naxos during Darios' invasion.

In 480 during the invasion of Xerxes, the Parians adopted a neutral stance, their ships waiting at Kythnos for the outcome of the engagement at Salamis. Herodotos postulates two warring factions on the island at this time, one pro-Persian and the other pro-Greek, but Lanzilotta feels that there is no real justification for making this assumption, that

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8 Hdt. 6.133 and 135. We have no information on the extent of this devastation. Presumably it involved whatever arable land was available to the Parian polis, as per the Spartan devastations in Attica during the Archidamian War. Whether or not the lucrative marble quarries were looted or damaged is also unknown, but any possible molestation by the Athenian forces does not seem to have prevented the flowering of Parian sculpture that followed the Persian wars. Raw, unworked marble, although possessing some intrinsic value, may not have made attractive booty either due to its great weight.

9 Lanzilotta Paro. 112-13.


11 Hdt. 8.67.
Paros’ neutral stance at this time would indicate a large degree of internal unity.\textsuperscript{12} This would be the only explanation for the great strength of Paros during this dangerous time, exemplified also by the subsequent demand by Themistokles for money from the island to use in his campaign.\textsuperscript{13} Lanzilotta is correct to point out that the focus is not so much on which side the Parians were on during Xerxes’ invasion, but on what the Parians considered to be best for themselves. Having suffered at the hands of the Athenians for having taken the wrong side in the previous war, but also reluctant to take sides against her again and be on the losing end a second time, the Parians decided to wait and see. The passage in Herodotos leaves some unanswered questions, such as how many ships from Paros were at station near Kythnos and how decisive their entry into action might have been. Other islands in the area that did participate in the battle sent only small contingents of a few ships, but again these islands would most likely not have had the same financial resources as Paros.\textsuperscript{14} What is significant about this passage is that it gives more weight to the notion that Xerxes’ invasion may have drawn more support from the islands than that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12} Hdt. 8.46; Lanzilotta \textit{Paro}, 114.
\item \textsuperscript{13} Hdt. 8.112.
\item \textsuperscript{14} Hdt. 8.46-48 states that on the Greek side, 2 triremes had come from Keos (literally he says that they sent the same number as at Artemision, which the passage 8.1 reveals as 2), 1 trireme and 1 penteconter from Kythnos, 2 penteconters from Melos, 1 penteconter from Siphnos, 1 penteconter from Seriphos, and 4 Naxian ships which deserted to the Greek side. Other historians give the strength of the Naxian squadron as 5 (Ephoros \textit{FGrH} 2 A70 F 187), or as 6 (Hellanikos \textit{FGrH} 1, 4 F 183). One Tenian ship also went over to the Greeks, 8.82. The rest of the islands had medized, according to Herodotos, and had sent a total of 17 ships to the Persian fleet, 7.95. Most are not mentioned by name, however.
\end{itemize}
of Darios, for if the Parians were permitted to remain neutral and hold station in the
waters off Kythnos, then Andros and Tenos and other islands may have participated out
of choice rather than compulsion.\textsuperscript{15} The cruise of Themistokles to raise funds from the
islands after Salamis raises other questions. According to Herodotos, Andros refused and
was besieged, and the Parians and Karystians then contributed out of fear.\textsuperscript{16} This
investiture, like the attempt of Miltiades on Paros, is also unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{17} Scholars overall
have neglected to mention the fact that even though Athens is recorded as having reduced
several island \textit{poleis} to submission in the fifth century, such as Naxos, Thasos, and
Melos, the examples of Paros and Andros show that Athenian success was not always a
foregone conclusion.\textsuperscript{18} Islands were not necessarily easy nuts to crack, and the level of

\textsuperscript{15} Nevertheless, since some island ships changed sides at the battle, this may
indicate internal disputes and factionalism among the islanders, and may also lend
credence to Lanzilotta’s aforementioned theory regarding the unity of the Parians
during these events.

\textsuperscript{16} Hdt. 8.111-12. The obedience of the Karystians brings them no guarantee of
safety, however, as their territory is soon ravaged by the Athenians anyway,
8.121.. It should be remembered, though, that unlike the Parians the people of
Karystos had actively participated in the Persian fleet during the hostilities.
Herodotos believes that other islands gave money to Themistokles, although he
claims not to know specifically which ones did and does not speculate. Naxos had
been devastated ten years before by Darios, but Paros too had suffered heavy
damage under Miltiades and had been solicited by Themistokles anyway, so
Naxos is possible. Kythnos, Keos, and Tenos are also strong possibilities.

\textsuperscript{17} Hdt. 8.121. The significance of these passages for economic prosperity on Andros
at this time will be discussed in the chapter for that island.

\textsuperscript{18} Naxos in 466: Thuc. 1.98.4, Meiggs \textit{AE} 70. Thasos in 465: Thuc. 1.101.3,
Steinbrecher, M., \textit{Der delisch-attische Seebund und die athenisch-spartanischen
Beziehungen in der kimonischen Ara, ca. 478/7-462/1} (Stuttgart 1985), 111.
Melos in 416: Thuc. 5.7.
defensive work found in archaeological excavations and survey on various Aegean islands would seem to support this idea as well.

Notwithstanding the payment which the Parians made to Themistokles, or her high tribute assessments which have already been mentioned, the years after 480 show a marked development in the “Parian school” of sculpture. Besides objects on home ground such as the Nike of Paros, we also have artists from the island appearing in Ikaria and Athens. Parian marble comes into vogue later in the century as a favored material for sarcophagi found in the Levant, Egypt and Sicily, with stylistic similarities that have been seen as belonging to the “Parian school.”

What is difficult to determine is how much profit would have accrued to Parians from the popularity of their native style. It is unclear whether those artists who set up shop in other locales would have kept property and influence back on Paros, and there are no records for statue and sculpture production on the island, that might enable some estimates to be made concerning a possible increase in demand for exports of this type from the island. There is some evidence of Parian trade connections in the Aegean found in the Zagazig Hoard, which contains Parian and Thasian coins, Thasos being a Parian

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19 The Nike has been dated to ca. 470 on stylistic grounds, see Lanzilotta 114-5 and 115 n.37. For Palion, the sculptor of a funeral stele on Ikaria in 460, see A. Ioannidou-Koretsou, ADeltion 27 B2 (1972), 325. At Athens, several sculptors are attested by name, such as Euphron, Agorakritos, and Lokros, and an unnamed Parian artist is credited by Pausanias 1.8.4 with a statue in the sanctuary of Ares; Lanzilotta Paro, 115 n.39.

20 Lanzilotta Paro, 115 and n.41.
colony.  Paros drops out of the historical record for some time after this, and does not resurface until the oligarchic revolution of 412/11 which results in its temporary succession from the Delian Confederacy.  This oligarchic regime was very short-lived, however, being ousted in 411/0 by Theramenes. In 407 Alkibiades used Paros as a base for his attacks on Andros and Samos. The reinstated Parian democracy collapses, however, after the Spartan victory at Aigospotami in 404; this is clear from the statements in the Aiginitikos of Isokrates. It is unclear as to whether a harmost and garrison were placed on the island at this point.

The cruise of Konon and Pharnabazus after their victory at Knidos in 394, according to Diodoros, passed through the Kyklades. There is a passage in the Menexenos of Plato which mentions an Athenian attack on the Spartans on behalf of the Parians, which implies that a garrison was present there. While most scholars have dismissed this passage of Plato as a corruption, when coupled with the account of Diodoros, such an event seems more probable. The island’s strategic position and wealth may have been all the justification needed to make an attempt to bring the island back into the Athenian

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21 Lanzilotta Paro, 118 and n.58.
22 Thuc. 8.65.1; Meyer GdA 4, 2, 289. It is unknown at what time prior to this a democracy had come to power in Paros.
23 Diod. 13.47.8.
24 Xen. Hell. 1.4.11.
25 Diod. 14.84.
26 Plato Men. 245b; Accame Lega 243; Lanzilotta Paro, 128-29.
27 This opinion is shared by Lanzilotta Paro, 129.
sphere of influence. How exactly this was done, however, remains nebulous when one adds the testimony of Isokrates to this mix. The *Aiginitikos* is a speech given by Isokrates that has been dated to 391 or 390. It discusses events on Paros and Siphnos resulting from the Athenian/Persian cruise in the island area in 393. In this account, an otherwise-unknown individual named Pasinos, most likely a subaltern or lieutenant in Konon’s fleet, seizes Paros with the help of exiles from Siphnos who are presumably democrats.

The property of the man Isokrates is speaking on behalf of had been left on Paros with guest-friends of the family, because “we thought that this island was by far the safest” (Loeb translation). This could either be interpreted that the island was rabidly pro-Lakonian and pro-oligarchic, or that it was simply a well-defended city due to its wealth and would be more secure from danger than anywhere else in the Kyklades. It is likely that it was actually a combination of the two, in that the oligarchic faction there appears to have been firmly entrenched, but we do not know what “fifth-column” elements may have been at work in the Parian polis.

The participation of the Siphnians is a very interesting phenomenon that raises more questions than it answers. We do not know the size of Pasinos’ forces or whether or not he required assistance, and if he did, was it just for attacking a stronghold like Paros or at every stage in his expedition, which presumably involved the reduction of other islands in the area? If he did not require assistance, did the Siphnian democrats have inside

28 Lanzilotta Paro, 128.
29 Isok. 19.18-21.
30 ΜΑΛΙΣΤΑ ΤΑΥΤΗΝ ΤΗΝ ΝΗΣΟΥ ΕΣΦΑΛΔΩΣ ΕΧΕΙΝ; Isok. 19.18.4-5.
information, or was he making plans for the future by enlisting their help, which would most likely have given them booty and put them in a stronger position to return to their native island and drive out their own oligarchs? This is precisely what happened a short time later, according to Isokrates. The “hero” of the speech managed to retrieve the family’s property from Paros, despite the fact that a garrison had been installed there. This may have been no more than Pasinos’ expeditionary force which had not yet left the island, or it may have been more permanent, but there is no hard evidence. As mentioned in chapter 1, the evidence on the contrary shows that Konon made it policy to give guarantees against such practices. In all likelihood the city was still in a state of transition after the usurpation of the oligarchs and this is when Isokrates’ client made his admittedly bold move. Apparently this same client also participated in an unsuccessful aristocratic counter-assault on Siphnos against the democrats after they had retaken that island also. Again, this is an event for which there is no other reference, although it is evidence for the idea that the supporters of Sparta had not lost all confidence in her power to protect them. Evidence for Parian affairs during these turbulent years is scanty. The Parians are seen, however, in the Delian loan accounts for 393/2-389/8, which record an interest payment of at least 3,000 drachmas, possibly 5,000. Paros, which had

31 Isok. 19.20.

32 R. Seager, “Thrasybulus, Konon, and Athenian Imperialism,” JHS 87 (1967), 101 believes that a garrison was left on Paros.


34 Coup. ID 97, line 13. The other debtors extant on the stone are Mykonos, Syros, and Thermai on Ikaria. One name, connected to an amount of 1000 drachmas, is
experienced great civil strife at the beginning of the loan period, is handing over a sum to the temple treasury that, while not astronomical, is still a decent amount considering the circumstances. If most of the island’s wealth was generated through marble quarrying, then this is easier to understand, for these workings are unlikely to have been damaged during a conflict, being located at a distance from the polis itself and in numerous places around the island. Moreover, these would have been coveted by any group seeking power and prosperity on Paros and would have made counterproductive targets anyway. Consequently, even after localized turmoil, the island may have still been able to amass enough public income to make a fairly substantial interest payment.

It is also important to remember that Athenian amphiktyons were in control during these years. This may have led to certain arrangements between the temple and the Parians, perhaps even a lowering of their interest payment to help the city recover after the supposed Spartan garrison was driven out. This is mere speculation, however, as previous interest payments by the Parians are not recorded. It is also hard to make a comparison with the other islands on the Delian accounts for the years in question, since we do not know whether Syros, Thermai, or Mykonos had suffered at the hands of harmosts.

With the promulgation of the King’s Peace in 386, Athens’ newfound hegemony of the Aegean vanishes. The period between the King’s Peace and the enrollment of Paros in the Second Athenian League in 378/7 is one of the cloudiest in the entire history of the

missing, and Thermai’s payment amount is also missing. Syros pays the most, a little over 1 talent.
island. We do not know what repayment schedule that Paros followed, if she followed one at all, for her loans from Delian Apollo. There is also some debate as to whether or not Paros returned to a pro-Spartan stance in these years. This view is held by Lanzilotta, who cites Xenophon’s statement that the Lakedaimonians had been entrusted with protectorship of the Peace.  

He also points out that in 385 Paros is recorded as having established a colony on the island of Pharos in the Adriatic, a colony which soon found a guardian in Dionysius I of Syracuse. Lanzilotta refers to the relatively friendly relations between the Sicilian tyrant and Sparta during this period as giving justification to the hypothesis that factions sympathetic to Sparta had regained their hold on Paros.  

Although this seems likely, a close examination of the evidence would seem to indicate that the matter is more complicated than this.

Due to a relative dearth of evidence, Pharos was not a subject of detailed inquiry until the past decade. New archaeological surveys have begun to paint a clearer picture of settlement on the island. There are several ancient sources which also mention Pharos. It

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35 Xen. Hell. 5.1.36; Lanzilotta Paro, 130.
36 Lanzilotta Paro, 131.
38 Diod. 15.13-14; Ephor. FGrH 70 F.89; Eratosth. ap. Schol. Apoll. Rhod. 4.1215; [Skymnos] 426; Strabo 7.315; [Skylax] 23; Stephen of Byzantium ϕαρός, s.v.
is Diodorus who gives the account of the foundation of the colony (sparse as it is), and the one from whom we can hope to draw some tentative conclusions. Diodorus states that the Parians, on the advice of an oracle, sent colonists to the island of Pharos near the Dalmatian coast. The reason for this action is not given, and remains unsatisfactorily explained by scholars. The colonists are attacked in 384 by a force of 10,000 Illyrians, drawn from the Ardiaei and Pleraei tribes, and brought from the mainland by appeals from the native population of the island. This raiding party causes great damage and loss of life to the new colony. A retaliatory strike is launched from the neighboring island of Lissos, composed of men in the service of Dionysius I who were stationed there, which falls upon the Illyrians as they are transporting their plunder to the mainland. Diodoros states that 5,000 Illyrians are killed and 2,000 captured by Dionysius’ troops.

There is some controversy over which island in the area Diodoros is referring to as “Lissos”. Most scholars have accepted the idea that it is actually the island of Issa (modern Vis) which is meant, but this is not unanimous. Diodoros is not our only source

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39 Diod. 15.13.4. Patrice Brun has expressed to me the theory that the colony was a deduction of oligarchic or aristocratic citizens due to internal strife (personal communication). While this would appear to be a likely explanation, as we will see, it raises more questions than it answers. We have one reference to an earlier Parian colony on the same site, known as Anchiale; Stephen of Byzantium s.v.


41 G. Woodhead, “The ‘Adriatic empire’ of Dionysius I of Syracuse,” Klio 52 (1971), 503-512, is a dissenting voice. Woodhead observes that both Issa and Pharos are much further north than the Straits of Otranto, which Diodorus states is the main area which Dionysius seeks to gain control of, τὸν Ἰονίον καλούμενον, lit. “the Ionian passage”. See p.508, n.1-2 for his discussion of the history of this question.
for a link between Pharos and Issa. Skylax’s account speaks of the two islands as being closely related, but calls Issa the key to the Adriatic and claims that it was settled by the Greeks first, predating Pharos only by a few years.\textsuperscript{42} Pseudo-Skymnos refers to Issa as a Syracusan colony.\textsuperscript{43} At one time the extant coinage from Issa and Pharos seemed to offer other clues of Sicilian involvement, but these interpretations have recently been called into question. On the old view of early coinage in this area, both Issa and Pharos may have shared a federal coinage with an obverse of a laureate Zeus Eleutherios and a reverse of a goat. The goat is a badge of Paros, while this epithet of Zeus is a Syracusan motif and features prominently on contemporary bronzes from that Sicilian polis.\textsuperscript{44}

New discoveries, however, such as the Skuldljivac Hoard found on Pharos, have led to several rival views. P. Visona states that the first Pharian coins are Corinthian-weight silver drachms which are replaced by the bronzes in the early fourth century. The head of Zeus on these bronzes may actually have been that of Zeus Meilichios, an Aegean

\textsuperscript{42} [Skylax] 23; E.A. Freeman, \textit{A History of Sicily} (Oxford 1894), 225; B. Caven, \textit{Dionysius I: War-Lord of Sicily} (Yale 1990), 151-2. Admittedly it is difficult to find evidence to corroborate the navigator’s account; other than Issan wine, mentioned in Athenaios 1.52, Issa does not figure prominently in the sources, and this may be reason to doubt its importance. Nevertheless, the nearby island settlement of Brattia (Brac) has a fifth-fourth century cemetery with a high number of imported Western Greek pottery and glass objects- see \textit{Vjesnik} 70-71 (1968-69), 5-55.

\textsuperscript{43} [Skymnos] 426. Woodhead, “Adriatic,” 508 says that while this may well be true, the colony long predates the fourth century. For other discussion of the ancient geographical references, see M. Nikolanci, \textit{Hvarski zbornik} 1 (1973), 105-23.

\textsuperscript{44} E.A. Freeman, \textit{Sicily}, 225-26.
manifestation of the god. The coins were on the 17 gram Syracusan standard, however.\textsuperscript{45} What complicates the matter even more is that some overstriking on these coins occurred. Visona says that the Pharians overstruck Issan coins bearing ΤΟΝΤΕΣ, but that by the end of the fourth century Issa began to overstrike Pharian coins due to a lack of bullion and an end to Syracusan patronage.\textsuperscript{46} B. Kirigin feels that the bronzes are actually from the Knidian colony of Kerkyra Melaina.\textsuperscript{47} Clearly much more evidence is needed.

Even if Dionysius I provided some protection for the new Parian colony, this does not necessarily imply a Parian-Spartan-Syracusan power axis, as some scholars have implied.\textsuperscript{48} Dionysius I proves to be a slippery character when his alliances are examined at close range. Diodorus states that he made an alliance with the Illyrians and sent them armor and weapons in order to restore the exiled Alketas to the throne of the Molossians.\textsuperscript{49} Sparta considers this a threat and sends a force to aid the Molossians, and the Illyrians are defeated.\textsuperscript{50} The colony at Lissos is heard of no more, and Alketas does not reappear until he joins the Second Athenian League.\textsuperscript{51} Woodhead would like to see


\textsuperscript{46} Visona, “Bronze,” 149.


\textsuperscript{48} Lanzilotta \textit{Paro}, 131.

\textsuperscript{49} Diod. 15.13.2.

\textsuperscript{50} Diod. 15.13.3.

\textsuperscript{51} Woodhead, “Adriatic,” \textit{Klio} 52 (1971), 505.
this event as evidence that Alketas and Dionysius I had parted ways, considering that Diod. 15.47.7 states that Syracuse was aiding Sparta in 373. While this is a likely hypothesis, it is perhaps best to see Dionysius as a simple opportunist, and his alliance with Sparta to be no more than expedience. After the crushing of Spartan power at Leuktra in 371, Dionysius and Athens finally made an alliance, so it may be that the Sicilian was doing no more than playing with the various Greek powers to further his own ends.52

The same may possibly be said for Paros. If the colony on Pharos was a Parian "outpost" in the Adriatic, what particular benefits would be gained by the mother city? The fact that the area could be seen as prosperous even though it was plagued by pirates is shown by the Athenian colony established on Adria in 325/4.53 Given that some trading benefits may have accrued from the colony on Pharos, we must try to reconstruct the possibilities. The newest evidence from survey and excavation on Hvar illustrates a city which was founded early in the fourth century and continued to be inhabited through the

52 L. Braccesi, Grecita Adriatica: un capitolo della colonizzazione greca in Occidente (Bologna 1971), 135-6 thinks it not surprising or problematic that Dionysius' soldiers attacked the Illyrian raiders of Pharos even though he was allied to them, but perhaps this underscores the idea that an alliance with Dionysius I could be a dicey proposition. Athens had tried honoring him in 393 with little effect - see IG II² 18 (=Tod II 108); Lys. 19.19-20.

53 IG II² 1629, lines 170-271. This could perhaps be better described as a garrison or military colony under the leadership of Miltiades. Tyrrenian pirates had been dealt with by Athens a few years earlier in 335, when Diotimos led a punitive expedition against them. See IG³ 1623, lines 276-285; [Plut.] Mor. 844a.

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Hellenistic and Roman periods. The fourth century, however, appears to have been the most prosperous time for the colony. There is a wide urban scatter of Greek material, imported pottery of fourth century date, stretching over a 10 hectare area. There seems to have also been an “industrial zone” for the production of tiles, amphorae, and coarse wares, and some of the black-glaze remnants appear to be either Attic or Attic imitation. There are also fragments, however, that bear motifs common to pottery from Southern Italy and Sicily, which may be evidence of stronger ties with places such as Syracuse. There are remains of a town wall and also a field system on the Stari Grad plain. Nearby sites such as the islands of Issa and Palagruza show similar patterns if not identical finds, with various import wares and evidence of the cult of Diomedes, which Strabo mentions as being popular with merchants and seen along trade routes. It would appear from the archaeological evidence that the inhabitants of Pharos and Issa practiced differing burial customs, with the Issaeans favoring family vaults and the Pharians individual graves; the pottery are also of differing types. Beyond this it is difficult to say what the connections

55 Forenbaher, et al., 19.
56 Ibid., 25.
58 Forenbaher, et al., 42.
59 Diod. 5.22 on Palagruza (Vela); Forenbaher, et al., 43.

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of these colonists may have been, but with both ceramic and numismatic evidence to show ties to Sicily, it would seem that the greatest influence may have been exerted by Syracuse, perhaps more so than other Greek areas.\textsuperscript{61} The aforementioned fact that all the cities in the area appear to decline late in the fourth century, when Syracusan patronage was withdrawn, is another strong argument for this idea.

If we grant that Pharos was a fairly prosperous city in the fourth century, what does this mean for Paros in the same period? We must speculate on the motivation behind sending out colonists in the first place, even though the lack of direct evidence is a real hindrance to arriving at any definite conclusions. There seem to be two possibilities which must be considered, a) that the colony was sent out by a unified Paros in order to strengthen the position of the home island in the Greek world, implying some strong connections with the home polis; or b) that there was a deduction of citizens who were forced to emigrate to the new locale, which could imply some hostility between the two.

If the colony represents hostilities, then it must have been the democratic or pro-Athenian faction that seceded or was forced out. The King’s Peace and its designation of the Spartans as “protectors” of its provisions would seem to rule out an oligarchic exodus from Paros or any other island in the Kyklades at this time. If the colony represented the flight of anti-Spartan elements of the population, this may help explain why we hear absolutely nothing more of Parian interest in these colonists. The presence of democratic,

\textsuperscript{61} Although the Parian goat is present on many coins found in the region, this could be nothing more than the preservation of a familiar symbol by the colonists from Paros. Even if they left under duress, they may have hoped to return at some point to their homeland.
pro-Athenian exiles may also have some relation to the finds of Attic pottery there, and the later Athenian colony in this area. If it is true that pro-Spartan elements regained control of Paros after 386, this is not meant to imply that Paros was simply following a Spartan leash. We have seen that Dionysius I, though often on friendly terms with Sparta in this period, was not above backstabbing her to further his own ends from time to time. Whatever the reasons for establishing the colony, Dionysius’ support of it can be better understood as part of his expansionist ideas in controlling the Adriatic. This strategy should be seen as separate from Spartan aims, or even contrary to them in the case of his assistance to Alketas, who was no friend of Sparta. In spite of their occasional cooperation it is misleading to equate Dionysian policy with Spartan policy during the 380's or any other period. What is much more important is to see Paros as essentially following a policy of self-aggrandizement, using connections with Dionysius I as well as Sparta to further her own ends.

There is another bit of evidence that seems to show good relations between Paros and Dionysius I. Two Parians, Euephenos and Eukritos, are attested as intervening in the cause of two Pythagoreans of Syracuse who had fallen afoul of the tyrant’s good graces. Their successful intervention in saving the lives of men whom Dionysius had condemned to be executed has been taken to mean that there was a strong “Pythagorean party” on Paros, and that the predominantly aristocratic nature of the followers of this philosophical

62 Although Woodhead “Adriatic,” *Klio* 52 (1971) points out with some justification that his efforts were unsuccessful, the fact that Dionysius had a pre-existing naval base on Lissos would seem to make such a strategy more tangible.

63 Polyainos 5.2.22; Iamblichos *Vita Pyth.* 267; Lanzilotta *Paro,* 134.
school is another indicator of where Paros’ loyalties lay at this time. Lamblichus’
reference is to these Pythagoreans holding their property in common, and to a donation of
a large sum from their community on Paros to help one of their own in financial trouble.
Although Lanzilotta has perhaps made too much of an isolated incident, the evidence is
not without value. The entire anecdote, whether accurate or not, has the ring of
informality, a sense of action performed between individuals that almost has overtones of
archaic guest-friendship. It may very well reveal a special link between Dionysius and
certain Parian citizens.

There is other evidence, indirect but nonetheless telling, which would appear to show
that Paros was, if not oppressed by Sparta, still under her influence in the 380's and
certainly not hostile to her. This can be discerned from the circumstances under which
Paros joined the Second Athenian League. Although still quite muddled, much recent
work has been done on the League charter (IG II² 43), and attempts made to reconstruct
when certain allies were enrolled, and in what order. Nevertheless, many questions
remain unanswered, and it is possible to make new suggestions regarding the date of the
enrollment of Paros.

The date of Paros’ accession to the Second Athenian League, even more than other
Kykladic islands, is fraught with unknowns. The sequence of events for the formation of
the League given in Diodoros, formerly disregarded by many scholars, was given new

64 Lanzilotta Paro, 135.

65 Most recently J. Cargill, “The Decree of Aristoteles: Some Epigraphical Details,”
Ancient World 27 (1996), 39-51, which answers many criticisms of his readings
and provides a good summary of recent work on this inscription.
credibility by Cawkwell. Xenophon gives no information on the charter for the League, but Diodoros gives many details which appear to be plausible given the state of our knowledge. After certain Athenians had lent assistance to the Thebans in the liberation of the Kadmeia from Sparta in 379 (an event on which all the sources agree, though none agree on the details), Spartan retaliation was soon expected, both by the Boiotians and by Athens. At this time the Athenians sent out ambassadors to various Aegean states to entice them over to their camp. Diodoros reports that Chios, Byzantion, Rhodes, Mytilene, and “other islanders”(των ἀλλων τίνες νησιωτῶν) were brought over in this fashion. A synedrion was then established, and the terms under which it would meet and decide policy were discussed. Diodoros says that the Spartans then sent out ambassadors of their own to forestall her allies from joining this new organization. The raid of Sphodrias in 378 is placed after these events by Diodoros and this is what brings on a renewal of hostilities between Athens and Sparta. Most scholars have correctly pointed out that Diodoros’ “other islanders” comment is misleading, since Methymna is the only other state that, while not named in his account, is listed in the first group of names on the

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67 Diodoros is notoriously unreliable for archon dating, and often confluates events, but in many cases the sequence of events that he gives on a certain topic appears to be sound. For an excellent discussion of these problems, see R.M. Kallet-Marx, “Athens, Thebes, and the Foundation of the Second Athenian League,” *CA* 4 (1985), 139.

68 Xen. Hell. 5.4.9, 19; Diod. 15.25.4-26.2; Plut. Pelop. 14.1; Cargill *League* 56.

69 Diod. 15.28.
Accame wanted to date the second group of names to before the battle of Naxos in 376, while Cargill states that there simply is not enough evidence to date these names properly. All concerned, however, seem to have overlooked the possibility that while Diodoros may indeed be looking ahead a year or two, he also gives another reference that may complement the stele perfectly, vague though the reference is.

This statement has to do with both Athenian and Spartan naval operations. Diodoros 15.30.5, speaking of events right after the raid of Sphodrias, states that Chabrias sailed in 377 and took Peparethos, Skiathos, and “other islands” and detached them from Spartan control. The so-called second group of names on the front face of the stele include Peparethos, Skiathos, Maroneia, Dion, Paros, and the inhabitants of Athenai Diades on Euboea, while eight names are either completely effaced or have just the first few letters remaining. Although “Parians” is rendered in a different hand with larger lettering, its placement before “Athenitai” would seem to rule out that the Parians were added much later.

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70 Cargill League 58; K. Horsley, “The Second Athenian Confederacy,” Hellenika: Essays on Greek Politics and History (London 1982), 141; Kallet-Marx “Foundation,” CA 4 (1985), 132 agrees although in n.24 points out a minor glitch, in that IG II² 42 shows that Methymna entered after the establishment of the synedrion, not before. This is perhaps just another aspect of Diodoros’ looking forward to later events, however, and in any event he never mentions Methymna by name.

71 Accame Lega 78,81; Cargill League 38 and 61, the latter page giving the enigmatic statement: “What little literary and epigraphic evidence there is for the adherence of the other allies listed on the front face of the Stele of Aristoteles would allow, but not require, the conclusion that the states listed here joined the League prior (my italics) to the victory of Chabrias at Naxos in the autumn of 376.”

72 Cargill League 25.
later than the earlier names. While Cargill states that there is no way to date the accession of Athenai Diades to the League, its location on Euboia would seem to indicate that Chabrias enrolled it while conducting operations there, prior to making his cruise to the islands.  

Thus we have a plausible reconstruction in which Chabrias enrolls the second group of allies in 377, before the expedition of Pollis in 376, the expedition that results in the battle of Naxos. As we will see in later chapters, most of the other Kyklades can safely be assumed to have joined the League after this battle. But it is reasonable to propose that Paros entered the League before them, along with the other allies in the second group, and it is also reasonable to propose that they were inscribed on the stele before the Spartans under Pollis took action against them in 376. Following this argument, Diodoros has used a formula to indicate this second group (albeit a slightly nebulous one), that of “Peparethos, Skiathos, and other islands”, which includes Paros. Since he uses almost identical phrasing to describe which locales were affected by the cruises of both Chabrias and Pollis, this gives additional weight to this theory.

In this light, Diodorus’ earlier statement of “other islands”, in connection with Chios, Byzantion, and the other allies who were first to join the League, can be explained either as telescoping future events (as most scholars have thought) or perhaps even a reluctance on the part of places like Paros to commit to Athens until she could demonstrate the

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73 Diod. 15.30.3. This passage states that Chabrias gave aid to Euboian cities already enrolled, and it would make sense that Athenai Diades was brought under Athens’ wing at this time. Lanzilotta Paro, 135, however, thinks that Paros only joined because Chabrias had devastated Histiaia.
ability to intervene militarily in the Aegean.74 This supposed reluctance need not be seen simply as the result of philo-Lakonian tendencies. There is some evidence that Sparta had continued her use of harmosts and garrisons, as well as the collection of tribute, into the 380's.75 Isokrates’ Panegyrikos, delivered in 380 on the eve of hostilities, speaks of these phenomena as if they were occurring in the present. It has even been suggested that the guarantees against garrisons, tribute, etc. in the Charter of the Second Athenian League referred not so much to fifth-century Athenian abuses but more to contemporary Spartan policies in the Aegean.76

It is unclear from the Aiginitikos whether or not there was a garrison on Paros when Pasinos arrived in 393, although the wording would seem to indicate it in an indirect fashion.77 There is reason to suspect, however, that if Sparta did in fact reinstall garrisons in the Aegean after the King’s Peace in 386, that Paros was not one of the islands so

74 Although Athens had been building ships since the 380's, the cruise of Chabrias was the first Athenian naval expedition in nearly a decade. Athens had gone from 70 triremes in 386 to 100 in 378; Polybius 2.62.6; Diod. 15.29.6 (for a slightly different figure). Perhaps Poissa, placed between the columns in the first group of allies, was also added at the time of Chabrias’ cruise.

75 References to a Spartan phoros abound: Isok. 12.67-69, 4.132; Arist. Ath.Pol. 39.2; Diod. 14.10.2; Polyainos 6.49.8.

76 C.D. Hamilton, “Isocrates, IG II² 43, Greek Propaganda, and Imperialism,” Traditio 36 (1980), 102-5. Sparta, of course, violated the tenets of the King’s Peace many times, with Mantinea and the Kadmeia of Thebes being the two most famous cases; Cargill League, 9.

77 Pasinos’ takeover is described as a forceful one, and his troops remain on the island for some time after the conquest; Isok. 19.18-21. Patrice Brun has used the same oration to support in an unpublished paper the opinion that neither Siphnos nor Paros was garrisoned; “Siphnos au IVe siecle av. J.C.,” 5 (forthcoming- I thank B. for kindly allowing me to read his unpublished paper).
chosen. When Diodoros speaks of Athenian ambassadors being sent out after the liberation of the Kadmeia, it would be almost certain that only non-garrisoned poleis could have been approached in this manner. Athens would have first attempted to drum up support for her new organization by coaxing to her side cities who were not only powerful, but could have joined without removing Spartan forces first, and forcing Athens to provoke hostilities before the new League had fully coalesced.

In this situation, one can perhaps see the majority of the Kyklades, other than Paros, as being either held under the thumb of Spartan garrisons or in the immediate neighborhood of them. If Paros was added to the League during the cruise of Chabrias in 377, but none of the other Kyklades were (almost all are listed later on the left side of the stele), then we may suppose not only that Paros was free of a garrison, but that its sympathies were beginning to lean towards Athens. The lack of a garrison may have precluded the Spartans from collecting from the Parians the kinds of heavy exactions cited by Isokrates, perhaps explaining why the Parians did not join the League along with the first group of allies such as Chios and Byzantion. But at the first sign of Athenian seapower, this may have been all that was needed to entice the Parians to throw in with the new League. This would certainly go some way in explaining why Paros was added to the League at more or less the same time as other islands and states that were at some distance from her. There may have been overtures made to the ambassadors, a “wait-and-see” kind of policy which Chabrias had finally resolved during his expedition. It is also possible, given some of the connections with Chios mentioned below, that the gravitation of Chios towards the Athenian camp enticed the Parians along with it, even if it took several months for the
Parians to formally switch sides.

Paros would have been one of Athens' more formidable allies in the Kyklades, for whether or not she possessed warships, she had withstood assault on several occasions (the attack of Pasinos in 393 may have been more successful when combined with a democratic fifth-column inside the city). Those who might balk at the idea of an oligarchic Paros joining the League would do well to notice that Thebes and King Alketas of the Molossians were also early League members. 78

If this reconstruction is accepted, we must then proceed to the vexing question of whether or not Paros seceded and was forcibly restored to the League in 373. Scholars have debated this question for many years. 79 The orthodox view, held by most including Cargill, is that Paros did in fact rebel from the League and was readmitted under certain conditions, the most noteworthy of which were the requirement that the Parians bring an ox and panoply to the Panathenaia and an ox and phallos to the Dionysia. This has been taken as hearkening back to Athenian treatment of rebellious allies in the fifth century, such as the Kleinias Decree. 80 Cargill has pointed out, however, that the other provisions of the treaty (which also preserve the only extant decree of the allied synedrion) by no

78 Cargill League, 27.

79 J.H. Oliver, "Inscriptions from Athens," AJA 40 (1936), 462-64 (=SY 268); Accame Lega, 229-244; Cargill League, 121, 163-64; most recently Dreher Hegemon, 110-141, who offers the newest reading and, as will be seen, the most controversial interpretation.

80 IG I 34, line 41.

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means hint at harsh treatment of the Parians.\textsuperscript{81} The aforementioned obligations are those which were formerly placed upon Athenian colonists, but there is some evidence that Paros in fact was such a colony, or at least that it was believed to have been by some of those living in the fourth century.\textsuperscript{82}

Dreher has offered a new reading and interpretation of this inscription, in which he claims that it is not a rebellion but an internal dispute on Paros which is being settled by Athens and the \textit{synedrion}. He makes several convincing arguments in favor of this view. Unlike most other decrees promulgated by Athens for a city which had rebelled in the fifth (or in the case of Keos, fourth) century, which involved the setting up of a copy of the decree in that city as well as Athens, this was not the case with the Paros decree.\textsuperscript{83} There was no provision for Paros as there was in lines 61-62 of the Kean decree, and on the other hand, there were no pseudo-colonial obligations decreed for Keos such as bringing a phallos.\textsuperscript{84} Similar legal provisions are made for the inhabitants of Arkesine on Amorgos during the League, but there is no evidence that Arkesine ever rebelled.\textsuperscript{85}

\textsuperscript{81} Cargill \textit{League}, 164.

\textsuperscript{82} Thuc. 1.12.4; Isok. 12.43; Diony. Per. 525 and Schol.; Vell. 1.4.3; and Herakl. \textit{FGrH} 2, 214 for an Athenian foundation; Arist. frag. 611 and Stephanus of Byzantium \textit{s.v.} for an Arkadian foundation of Paros. Sometimes the colonial objects were brought voluntarily by a \textit{polis}; witness Kolophon in 307/6 (\textit{IG II}² 456) and Priene in 326/5 (F. Hiller von Gaertringen, \textit{Die Inschriften von Priene} (Berlin 1906), 5.

\textsuperscript{83} Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 123. Lines 7-11 discuss the setting up of the decree in Athens.

\textsuperscript{84} Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 129.

\textsuperscript{85} IG XII.7, 3. Not all agree, however. Gauthier \textit{Symbola}, 337 would place this inscription in the time of the Social War.
The idea of the inscription as evidence for civil strife on Paros, rather than an outright revolt, did not begin with Dreher, but it receives its fullest justification under him. There is some external evidence which may help illuminate the situation. The year 373 saw the Athenian action taken against Kerkyra, in which Spartan ships augmented by a squadron from Syracuse faced the Athenian admiral Timotheos. Accame believes that the attack of the Spartans under Mnasippos against Kerkyra was the spark that set off the revolt of Paros. Yet Dreher rightly states that this did not become a phenomenon throughout the Aegean world, although Paros was one of the leading states in the region. There is even evidence that Timotheos may have stopped on Paros and/or other islands for recruits before his expedition left for Kerkyra.

It may be that certain elements on Paros had become disenchanted with Athenian behavior at this time, that the Spartan military was experiencing (or seen to be experiencing) a resurgence, and the possibility of further help from Dionysius’ quarter may have given an added impetus to stasis, especially considering the possible aforementioned connections between oligarchic elements on Paros and the Sicilian tyrant.

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86 It is actually G. Cawkwell, “Notes on Failure,” 50 who seems to have been the first to make this suggestion.

87 Diod. 15.46.2, 47.7.

88 Accame Lega. 238.

89 Dreher Hegemon. 125 calls the Spartan resurgence at this time a “kurzfristige Episode”. However, it may have had some psychological effect on the Parians and others. Apollodoros states that when Timotheos was on trial in 373, the allies around the Peloponnesos were under Spartan attack; [Dem.] 49.13.

90 Xen. Hell. 6.2.12; Diod. 15.47.2.
Whatever the circumstances, the settlement passed by Athens and her allies had an effect. We hear of no more disturbances on Paros for the remainder of the history of the League. How did membership in the League affect the Parian economy after 373? Lanzilotta has painted a picture of this island in the grip of economic depression during these years, surrounded by Athenian garrisons on Andros, Syros and Amorgos. In his view, Paros was resentful of Athenian “domination” during the League years, and suffered from chronic shortages of cash. In order to evaluate the validity of this viewpoint, the evidence for the years between 373 and 338, though scant, must now be examined.

Unfortunately, there as yet have been no systematic surveys of the countryside of Paros to determine settlement or agricultural patterns, as has been done on several other Kykladic islands in this study. A fragment of the fourth century comic poet Alexis, quoted in Athenaios, calls Paros the “happy island.” We do not know, however, to what extent the island may have been autarkous in its food supply (Paros purchases 10,000 medimnoi of grain from Cyrene in 330/29, but the drought at this time was Aegean-wide and this may simply show that she could afford a large stockpile). For this reason it cannot be said for certain whether Paros shared the same fourth-century profile that may have obtained on other Kykladic islands: high population and heavy exploitation of available land. There are many fewer towers extant on Paros than other islands in the

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91 Lanzilotta Paro, 136-39.
93 Tod II 196; Tracy Transition, 34.
Kyklades. Only two are listed in Maria Nowicka's study. One is near the seaboard and is not far from an ancient quarry, while the tower southeast of Naoussa may have been located near an oil-press. Haselberger would date the Naoussa tower to the fourth century, based on certain building features which date to this time and are essentially military.

If, as has been suggested, the island towers are part of a defensive program connected to the League, then the military aspect of the towers makes sense. Paros was important for guarding the route to Samos and the Athenian kleruchy placed there in 365; this route would have also made Paros a good stopover for merchant shipping. It is more likely that the smaller number of towers on Paros reflected a concentration of land in a smaller number of landowners, which is discussed in Chapter 6 below in relation to other Kykladic islands, like Keos and Tenos, that seem to show the opposite situation.

Lanzilotta's theory is primarily based on the evidence of various loans taken out by the polis in the fourth century, both from Delian Apollo and from certain private individuals on Chios.

The Chian loans are referred to in an inscription listing the accounts of the public treasury on Paros. They are undated although it is generally accepted from letter forms that they should be placed 400-340 B.C. The Chian creditors are not known by name.

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96 Migeotte L’emprunt 213-15.
although it has been suggested that the Chians mentioned in two proxeny decrees of approximately the same period, may in fact be those creditors. Migeotte feels that this is not certain, but even if they are not the exact same individuals, it would seem to indicate Parian-Chian ties.

The interest payments made by Paros on this loan tended to be kept on a regular footing, although the fact that compound interest was assessed may indicate a penalty inflicted by the creditors for at least one late payment, a delinquency that may have been an exception rather than a rule.98

This instance, however, is not proof that Paros was experiencing financial difficulties on a wide scale. As Brun has described, there may have been chronic shortages of liquid currency in the Kyklades at this time, even though they were prosperous in agricultural and other products.99 This will be discussed in more detail in a later chapter, but at this time it can be said that lack of ready cash is not necessarily a sign of economic deterioration, for it is unlikely that loans would be extended to poleis or individuals whom the creditors had no confidence in. Paros was certainly able to pay interest on her loans to Apollo in 341/0, interest payments that are among the highest recorded for the Kyklades.100 There is even evidence that she was granted new credit in that year, and that

97 IG XII.5, 110, 111 (=Michel 407, 408).
98 Migeotte L’emprunt 215. The analogy is here made to 1st century B.C. Roman creditors, who only charged compound interest when payments were not made on time.
99 Brun Archipels, 156.
100 Migeotte L’emprunt 151-55.
perhaps other of the Kyklades were as well. An impoverished island presumably would not receive such a grant from the temple unless it was ordered by a higher authority such as Athens. I will argue later in this study, however, that Athens may have had the defense of the League (against Philip II) in mind when the Amphiktyons allowed these new loans, rather than any dire financial difficulties on the part of the Kyklades.

Lanzilotta's theory is undermined further by the fact that Paros did not secede during or after the Social War. On the contrary, the Parians vote a crown to Athens in 348/7. There is also a reference to Kephisophon, an Athenian strategos, being named as proxenos and benefactor to the Parians in a decree dated to 340. Clearly the ties between the two cities grew stronger rather than weaker after the Social War.

The picture of Paros that has emerged from this study should perhaps be seen in terms of a polis looking out for its own best interests. The fifth century history of Paros showed that the island often followed its own path, remaining neutral when it could in the face of international conflicts and siding with one group or the other at times when it appeared more prudent. The evidence from the 380's seems to show that the island, while probably sympathetic towards Sparta and certainly not seen as a threat by her (or perhaps a garrison and harmost would have been installed), still acted independently. There is no evidence that Sparta was involved in any way with the foundation of Pharos; scholars have assumed too much from the usually friendly relations between the Lakedaimonians and Dionysius I. Whatever the motivation behind the colony, it must be seen as a Parian

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101 IG II² 144 lines 5-17.
102 IG XII.5, 114.
decision and a Parian action. As hypothesized above, Paros was probably the first of the
Kyklades to join the Second Athenian League. Although the disturbances that followed in
373 show some lack of unity at this time, the trouble was soon quelled and Paros did not
attempt to secede for the remainder of the League’s history. The evidence also does not
indicate any great economic distress for Paros in the later years of the League. While we
do not have hard evidence for Parian income in these years, the school of Parian sculpture
continued to produce new geniuses, the best example being Skopas.¹⁰³ It may be safely
assumed that the quarries were still being worked in these years. The fourth century may
not have been the apex of Parian prosperity that the fifth century was, but Paros was still a
valuable member of the League.

¹⁰³ P. Orlandini, Enc. dell’arte antica I (Rome 1958), 639; Lanzilotta Paro, 127.
CHAPTER 4- ANDROS AND AMORGOS

i-Andros

The island of Andros is the northernmost of the Kyklades and is strategically placed along the route from the Hellespont that passes Euboea’s eastern coast, and continues westward to the Saronic Gulf and the Peiraeus.¹ During several historical periods, this strategic positioning of Andros was recognized by powers attempting to impose their hegemony over the Aegean.² The presence of an Athenian garrison on Andros during the period of the Second Athenian League is one example, and it raises yet again the difficult question of Athenian treatment of the islands. The latter years of the fifth-century Athenian Empire showed increasing tension between Andros and Athens. A kleruchy had

¹ General overviews of the history of Andros can be found in T. Sauciuc, Andros (Vienna 1914); D. Paschali, Istoria tes Nesou Androu (Athens 1925, reprinted 1995); D. Kyriakou, Andros- Istoria kai Politismos (Athens 1966).

² Persian garrisons were placed on Andros and Siphnos by Pharnabazos in 333; Q. Curtius 4.1.37, 5.14. Antigonus Monophthalmos and Demetrios had imposed forces there which were ousted by Ptolemaios I in 308; Diod. 20.37.1. Aratos of Sikyon was compelled to deal with troops stationed on the island by Antigonus Gonatas ca. 250; Plut. Aratos 12.2-3. Andros received a Macedonian garrison in 201 along with Paros and Kythnos; Polyb. 16.26.19; Livy 31.15.8. Attalos I turned the island into a base for his Aegean operations, Livy 31.45.8. For most of these references see G. Reger, “The Date and Historical Significance of IG XII v 714 of Andros,” Hesperia 63 (1994), 315-16.
been established on the island around 450 and most likely contributed to the ill-feeling.\(^3\) Andros revolted from the Delian Confederacy in 410, and both Diodorus and Xenophon attest to the presence of Spartan forces on the island encountered by Alkibiades in 407.\(^4\) Xenophon states that the Athenian general did not conquer the island but merely sailed into the harbor at Gaurion, routed a force of Andrians and Lakedaimonians, and then sailed on for Samos. Diodorus' account, however, states that he left a garrison behind at the newly-fortified harbor, and the use of Andros as a base by Konon and Phanosthenes for Athenian operations later in the year is also recorded.\(^5\) Andros had provided soldiers in 425 for the army led by Nikias, as well as for the Sicilian expedition, and resentment over the fate of these troops may have given an additional impetus to their break from Athens.\(^6\)

We have no further direct information on this Athenian garrison, or whether or not a new Spartan garrison and harmost were placed in its stead after the end of the war. The location of Andros on Aegean routes and the many attestations of garrisons on the island at different times, however, give the hypothesis some credence that Sparta may have installed forces there after 404. Where would the Spartan ships have had the opportunity to stop for supplies after 394? Apparently anti-Spartan feeling in the islands was high; it

\(^3\) Plut. Per. 11.5-6; Meiggs AE 121.

\(^4\) Xen. Hell. 1.4.21; Diod. 13.69.4. Plutarch says in Alk. 35 that Alkibiades "conquered...but did not capture" the polis. This would appear to agree with the account of Xenophon.

\(^5\) Diod. 13.69.4; for Konon and Phanosthenes see Xen. Hell. 1.5.10-16.

\(^6\) In 425: Thuc. 4.42.1, 4.53-54. For Sicily: Thuc. 6.43..
is hinted in Diodoros that Antalkidas needed a convoy on his diplomatic journey to Ephesos in 388. It may be that supplies were requisitioned by force during his journey. Konon and Pharnabazus had made Melos one of their bases in 394, so their efforts were definitely being pressed close to Lakonia. Delos had been brought back under Athenian control, so we may guess that Mykonos was also free of a Spartan presence. Paros and Siphnos, judging from the testimony of Isokrates, seem to have been taken over by pro-Athenian elements. If any Spartan garrisons or harmosts remained in the Kyklades in the years before 388, they would have been operating under great duress.

More important for our purposes is a different question: which islands might have been garrisoned after the Peace of Antalkidas? Again, Naxos is the only one for which we have direct evidence of a Spartan garrison being stationed there, due to the siege which Chabrias pressed there in 376. But what of Andros? We have already mentioned the strategic position of this island, especially vis-a-vis the grain route to Athens. The cruise of Pollis in 376 mentions Andros and Keos, and the use of Andros’ harbor Gaurion by the Spartan fleet is attested. An actual garrison and harmost on Andros through the 380's may seem problematic, in that the King’s Peace does make provisions for the protection of the

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7 Xen. Hell. 5.1.6, in which he “took with him the ships of Gorgopas” and then sent them back to Aigina for other missions; A. J. Papalas, Ancient Ikaria (1992), 92. The fact that Teleutias had raised a “contribution” from an unnamed island in 389 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.2) would seem to be a euphemism in this case; privateering from bases on Aigina was a specialty of Teleutias at this time.

8 Xen. Hell. 4.87.

9 Coupry ID 97.

10 Isok. 19.18-21; Lys. 2.59.
Athenian grain supply by guaranteeing Lemnos, Imbros, and Skyros as Athenian possessions. A threat to Athens’ lifeline, based on Andros, may have seemed unacceptable to the Athenians. But the King’s Peace was definitely favorable to Sparta; she even showed her willingness to flaunt its provisions on more than one occasion in the 380's, especially in regards to garrisons. In any event, the sources are ambiguous in regards to whether or not Andros and Keos were being coerced into accepting the Spartan fleet or whether factions sympathetic to Sparta were in control on these islands. They are also ambiguous as to the possible presence of Spartan forces on Andros and Keos, whether welcome or no.

The evidence would seem to favor the idea that the islands were being coerced by Sparta. While Sparta did suffer a severe naval defeat at the Battle of Naxos, it by no means signalled a total end to Spartan power. With a Spartan garrison directly attacked, however, and her power in the immediate area crippled, it is easier to understand why so many of the Kyklades would have joined the League en masse after the defeat of Pollis. It is certainly possible that there were pro-Spartan factions on several of these islands, especially Andros and Keos. Although Lysander’s system of dekarchies had been

11 Xen. Hel. 5.1.31; Diod. 14.110.3; Cargill League, 8.
12 In particular, the occupation of the Kadmeia.
13 While the assistance of Dionysius I of Syracuse may have helped considerably (Xen. Hel. 6.2.33 and chapter 3 above), the Spartans could still mount expeditions after 376, such as at Kerkyra in 375/4; Xen. Hel. 6.2.2-38; Diod. 15. 45-47.
abolished long before, certain individuals and families might still have profited from the benefits of (even unofficial) allegiance to Sparta. This fact may relate to why Andros, of all the Kyklades, was given a special honor upon joining the Second League, an honor that was not even accorded to those islands or island poleis who may have joined before the Battle of Naxos (such as Paros or the inhabitants of Poiessa).

This was the honor of Andrians participating in the Athenian administration of the temple of Delian Apollo by serving as amphiktyons. This rather obscure phenomenon has been fertile ground for much speculation on the part of historians of this period, ranging from the idea that the Andrians had a real voice in the supervision of the temple, to that of a kind of diplomatic pacifier, designed to “throw a bone” to the Andrians without giving them more than purely symbolic or ceremonial duties in the administration. It has also been seen as a burden, an involuntary requirement that the Andrians needed to fulfill. All available evidence must be examined to come to a satisfactory conclusion regarding this institution on Delos.

The Andrian amphiktyons are first attested in the Delian temple records for 374/3, in what would seem to be an equal position with the Athenian ones, due their positioning under the same rubric in the inscription. It seems that they were particularly responsible


16 Coupry ID 98A, lines 57-64. For scholarly opinion on the Andrian amphiktyons: Sauciuc Andros, 72; Schoefffer, 55 n.19; IG XII.5, 2, p.ix; Dreher Hegemon, 223. Apparently there were other non-Athenian officials present in 393 (Coupry ID 97, lines 1-5) but their origin is not preserved. Coupry does not discount the possibility that they were Andrians as well. Dreher Hegemon, 217 considers this unlikely, however, for reasons that include the murder of a whole Andrian ship’s
for musical and gymnastic contests.\textsuperscript{17} They are also listed in the accounts of the Delian temple for 372/1-368/7.\textsuperscript{18} Beyond these years the evidence becomes more hazy. An undated fragment first published in 1884 mentions an Andrian official as well, but this is generally considered to be not that far separated in time from the years listed on the Sandwich Marble.\textsuperscript{19} The account for 364/3 does not mention Andrians, yet the amphiktyons are specified as “Athenian” in the inscription, and it has been pointed out that this may be a qualifier, that the inventory carried out with the help of the Delian Senate and the \textit{hieropoioi} may simply have not included the Andrian officials, for whatever reason.\textsuperscript{20} They are definitely absent in 341/0, for the accounts of this year mention only five Athenians and a secretary.\textsuperscript{21} As will be seen, this latter period is not one attested for ill relations between Andros and Athens, so an absence at this time cannot be seen as a pejorative one. Due to the touchy nature of Aegean politics in the 360's,

\begin{itemize}
  \item crew by Philokles- \textit{Xen. Hell}, 1.4.21; 1.5.18; 2.1.3. While not definitive, Dreher’s opinion is valid and the identity of the mysterious amphiktyons of 393 remains an open question.
  \item Coupry \textbf{ID} 98A, 67-76; Laidlaw \textbf{Delos}, 80.
  \item Coupry \textbf{ID} 100, lines 7-10; Coupry \textbf{Atti} 60, who points out that after 364 the secretaries follow the cycle of Athenian tribes.
  \item For the fragment: T. Homolle, “Inscriptions grecques,” \textit{BCH} 8 (1884), 317-19; Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 215 n.95. The similar style of the letters and the similarity of names with the Sandwich Marble (Coupry \textbf{ID} 98), including a secretary with the same demotic, are Homolle’s arguments for a date “postérieur, mais de peu de temps” the Sandwich Marble; Dreher agrees and I consider it likely as well.
  \item Laidlaw \textbf{Delos}, 81; Coupry \textbf{ID} 104.
  \item Coupry \textbf{ID} 104-28.
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{17} Coupry \textbf{ID} 98A, 67-76; Laidlaw \textbf{Delos}, 80.
\textsuperscript{18} Coupry \textbf{ID} 100, lines 7-10; Coupry \textbf{Atti} 60, who points out that after 364 the secretaries follow the cycle of Athenian tribes.
\textsuperscript{19} For the fragment: T. Homolle, “Inscriptions grecques,” \textit{BCH} 8 (1884), 317-19; Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 215 n.95. The similar style of the letters and the similarity of names with the Sandwich Marble (Coupry \textbf{ID} 98), including a secretary with the same demotic, are Homolle’s arguments for a date “postérieur, mais de peu de temps” the Sandwich Marble; Dreher agrees and I consider it likely as well.
\textsuperscript{20} Laidlaw \textbf{Delos}, 81; Coupry \textbf{ID} 104.
\textsuperscript{21} Coupry \textbf{ID} 104-28.
however, the earlier years are more complicated. Interpretations of the Andrian participation in the amphiktyonate, as has been mentioned, have ranged widely. Homolle, one of the earliest commentators, theorized that they were brought in by the Athenians as favored helpers, and cites the fact that they are listed before other Kykladic islands on the left face of the stele of Aristoteles. Laidlaw considered the office either an odium shared with the Andrians or a move to push home further the idea of Delian isolation from temple affairs; an uprising had occurred on Delos in 376/5. He wonders if perhaps Andrian participation was only scattered and temporary, a halfhearted effort either on their part or on the part of the Athenians for including them.

Much more recently, Dreher has discussed the matter further and to this date has given the most complete discussion of the evidence. He states reasons why other nearby islands may not have been given the same privilege as Andros. Athens may have wanted to keep Keos fragmented, and participation in the amphiktyony may have been feared as too much of a unifying force for the Keians. Karystos was a polis of Dryopian rather than Ionian ancestry, and it may have been problematic to include one Euboian city to the exclusion of all others. Paros had no oikos on Delos, and its internal difficulties in 373/2 may have been crucial in keeping this island out of the running for the privilege of

22 Homolle, “Inscriptions,” BCH 8 (1884), 290.
23 Laidlaw Delos, 80.
24 Ibid., 81.
26 Dreher Hegemon, 219.
serving on the board of amphiktyons. The Andrians, by all accounts, seem to have been model allies from their enrollment in the League, and this is partly shown by their bestowal of a crown to the Athenian Boule in 368/7.\textsuperscript{27} Dreher sees the entry of the Andrians as a clever attempt by Athens to appease the allies, and assure the spirit of the King’s Peace.\textsuperscript{28} In particular, in the wake of the anti-Athenian violence in 376, it may have been intended to mollify the Delians by showing them that Athens would not lord it over the amphiktyony exclusively.\textsuperscript{29} He does not see the Andrian officials as being in a subordinate position to the Athenian ones, due to their position on the inscription and to the fact that all amphiktyons received a drachma a day as a wage.\textsuperscript{30}

Dreher also gives the best discussion of possible reasons why the Andrians were removed from the board. He does not see it as a symptom of Athenian oppression over the League in the early 360's, but perhaps as a mutual decision on the part of the Andrians and Athenians to allow the Delians to return to some position of authority in the temple.\textsuperscript{31}

It had, after all, been nearly a decade since the assault on the Athenians, and there may have been some amelioration of old wounds in the intervening time. While he concludes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1425, lines 221-223; Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 220. It should also be noted that the amphiktyons as a body also agree to pay for the erection of a copy of an Athenian proxeny decree for Pythodoros of Delos in 369/8 (Coupry \textit{ID} 88), which would seem to show cooperation between the Andrians and Athenians on the board.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 221.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 222.
\item \textsuperscript{30} Coupry \textit{ID} 98, lines 74-76 for the pay rate; Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 223.
\item \textsuperscript{31} Dreher \textit{Hegemon}, 226.
\end{itemize}
his discussion by stating that there is no real way to tell at this time what the true reason for their departure was, Dreher seems to imply strongly that the Andrians may have made a voluntary abdication from their privileged post.\textsuperscript{32}

This is certainly within the realm of possibility. It is important to remember, however, that whatever the reasoning behind the inclusion of Andrians in the amphiktyonic council or their eventual departure, Andros had been one of three Kykladic poleis to default on their interest payments to Delian Apollo in the years 377/6-374/3, to the tune of two talents, the highest amount of the three.\textsuperscript{33}

This fact alone is open to varying interpretations, none of them completely satisfactory. Some scholars, thinking Naxos was not a member of the League, have seen this failure to make interest payments as an act of open defiance to the new Athenian-controlled Delian treasury.\textsuperscript{34} It will be seen in a later chapter, however, that while evidence for the membership of Naxos in the Second Athenian League is not definitive, it is much stronger than any evidence to the contrary. Karystos had been enrolled in the League even before Andros, and it seems highly unlikely that the Athenian amphiktyons would include the debts of a somewhat hostile, non-League member under the same rubric as two

\begin{flushleft}
\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{32} Ibid., 226-27.

\textsuperscript{33} Coupry \textit{ID} 98 lines 9-10; Migeotte \textit{L' emprunt}, 144. The other two islands that defaulted were Naxos, with 1 talent and 3,600 drachmas, and Karystos, with 1 talent 2,400 drachmas.

\textsuperscript{34} Boeckh \textit{Staatshaltung} II, 88 thinks that Naxos, Andros, and Karystos all defaulted 377-73 because they remained pro-Spartan at this time, but this is unlikely.
\end{flushleft}
allies. These three cities could have defaulted due to financial difficulties, especially in the case of Naxos, which had suffered under the Athenian siege in 376. But what is more important is that this fiscal delinquency does not seem to have prevented the Andrians from receiving the opportunity to serve as administrators in the very temple to which they owed these sums. It is unfortunate that we do not have the amounts of interest paid for Andros in the later years of the League, for this might give us more insight as to when Andrians may have stopped serving as amphiktyons, or when they might have begun to make interest payments anew. Out of the three cities just mentioned, we only have later evidence for Karystos, which in 341/0 is recorded as having made an interest payment (the amount itself has been lost on the stone), but is also attested as one of the new borrowers for that year. The situation over time of the Andrian debt remains shrouded in darkness. Nevertheless, by the middle of the century Andros appears to have

35 Diod. 15.30.1; SV 259 for an Athens-Chalkis treaty for the years 377; Cargill League, 34.
36 The Spartan garrison on Naxos may have hurt the island financially, due to the heavy exactions attested by several ancient authors. If Andros had possessed a similar garrison, then similar ill effects may have resulted.
37 Dreher Hegemon, 222 mentions the Andrian debt but gives no real evaluation of its significance for their participation in the amphiktyony. As for Naxos, if the island did suffer from the Athenian siege (probably directed more against a Spartan garrison than against the polis itself) then the allowance of unpaid interest may have been a concession by Athens to the newly-allied island, a means of ensuring loyalty.
38 Coupry ID 104-28, line 12; Migeotte L'emprunt, 146. The new loan amount is a matter of debate, but is at least three talents and at most five; Migeotte 147 n.8. Perhaps it was done to bolster the city against further incursions by Philip into Euboia.
been one of Athens’ strongest allies in the Aegean (for reasons which will be examined shortly), so the absence of her representatives in the amphiktyonic council after a certain date earlier in the League’s history cannot be seen as a punishment of some sort.

It also seems unlikely that the office of the amphiktyonate would have been seen as an ignominious burden by the Andrians. The one literary reference we have to the office, while somewhat irreverent, does not cast it in an unfavorable light. While there most likely was some cash outlay on the part of individuals who held this position, the Delian temple appears to have done quite well financially during the time of Athenian supervision, with lots of building activity. It is improbable that the office would have put undue monetary strain on those who held it. In addition, it would be quite beneficial to the Andrians to have seats on a council if they were in arrears of payment to the temple, to press their interests there and make sure policy decisions included their concerns. The opening of the amphikytonate to the Andrians may have been a “clever move” on the part of Athens, but its acceptance seems to have been an equally astute maneuver on the part of Andros.

Some scholars would cite the later presence of an Athenian garrison on Andros, however, as reason to doubt that an atmosphere of benevolence and cooperation existed between the two powers. Along with Amorgos, Andros appears to have been the only

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39 Athenaios 4.173a.
40 Coupry ID 104-6; Dreher Hegemon, 266.
41 Marshall Confederacy, 111 and n.3; Cargill League, gives a dissenting view on pages 155-56.

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Aegean island graced (or cursed, depending on the view) with an Athenian military presence during the course of the history of the League, although as we will see there may have been a garrison or some sort of fleet installation on Syros, at least in the 370's, and Ios is another possibility.  

The inscription that records the garrison, IG II² 123, purports to be a prophylactic measure designed to protect both the demos of Athens and that of Andros. A dogma or resolution of the allied synedrion is mentioned in the inscription, so the imposition of the garrison does not seem to have been a unilateral decision on the part of Athens. What is strange is that no scholars have considered the possibility that the garrison’s personnel may have not been solely composed of Athenians. The presence of an Athenian commander does not automatically imply that the rank and file could not partially have been composed of allied units, even if the fiscal burden for the outpost was being shared from the pool of allied money.

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Cargill League, 38, 153 on Syros. For Cargill, the only other securely attested garrison in League territory is Abdera in 375 (Diod. 15.36.4); on p.156 he expresses his doubts concerning the chance that Ios was host to one (IG XII.5, 1000; Accame Lega, 185 n.3), and on p. 152 his doubts that SV 267 line 17 (Kephallenia) can be really be restored with a reference to “the islands”. His opinion of the Kephallenia inscription is justified; but judging from the similar honors accorded to the beneficiary of the Ios inscription, it would seem likely that we do have another case of a garrison located there (see next chapter).

IG II² 123, lines 8-9.

Line 11, as per the most accepted reading. Paschali 360-61 offers a different restoration for this line, κα[κα]τ[α]ν[ν]δ[δ]ρ[δ]. See also Michel 502-3; Syll. 3 111.

The final chapter of this study will address the military potential of the islands, in regards to probable levels of population, the likelihood of standing naval squadrons hailing from the Kylades, and other factors.

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The inscription is securely dated to 356, the year of the archonship of Agathokles. Pay for the garrison is to be drawn from the syntaxeis contributions of the allies, and a certain Archedemos, presumably the garrison commander, is named as the collector of the funds, although the text breaks off before more detailed information on this procedure is given, if at all, in the decree's original form. 46

There is reason to believe that a garrison on Andros had already been established in the 360's, and was being renewed by this decree, perhaps after a short hiatus. An Athenian general, Timarchos, is accused by Aischines of having paid thirty mnai for the archonship of Andros, the office mentioned in line 20 of the decree of 356. 47 Recently, many scholars have surmised that the order of Timarchos' offices given in lines 106-112 of Aischines is in the correct chronological order; if so, then a date around 363/2 is probable. 48 This could perhaps be related to the troubles on Keos in that year, if only to stop a revolt from spreading in the Kyklades; but there is no good evidence that revolt became the norm in the region at this time, and there were many threats to Athenian sea power in the latter part of this decade. 49 In particular, the grain supply of Athens was menaced, and Andros was closely proximate to the sea-lanes used by the convoys plying to and from the Hellespont. Therefore, without additional evidence it would be rash to see the garrison

46 Lines 16-21. Pay for the garrison of Amorgos was handled differently; see below.
47 Aisch. 1.107.
49 See Chapter 2 on Keos for the situation in these years.
strictly as a reaction to the revolt on Keos. The view that the garrison was a repressive measure is also somewhat in doubt, considering that the garrison is supported by funds appropriated “according to the dogmata of the allies.”\textsuperscript{50} Whether or not the language that mentions protecting the demos of the Andrians is merely for propagandistic purposes, it seems unlikely that the remaining allies would agree to an oppressive measure taken against one of their own.\textsuperscript{51}

Another inscription, IG XII.5, 714, has usually been taken to refer to this same garrison of the mid-fourth century.\textsuperscript{52} A certain Antidotos, commander of the garrison, allows the inhabitants of Andros to buy grain intended for his troops at the same reduced price, and in return is awarded a gold crown.\textsuperscript{53} Gary Reger has recently assembled strong arguments, however, that would place this inscription and garrison it refers to in the third quarter of the third century.\textsuperscript{54} The new dating, while tentative even by Reger’s own admission, has stronger evidence to support it than what could connect it to the fourth century garrison as

\textsuperscript{50} IG II\textsuperscript{2} 123 lines 11-12; Cargill \textit{League}, 155-56. There is nothing in either the Andros or Amorgos decrees to rule out the presence of non-Athenian allied contingents in these garrisons either. This question will be explored in the final chapter of this work. Dreher Hegemon, 43 speculates that the safety of Andros may have concerned all the allies; this sounds probable in view of its strategic location and its potential to host hostile forces in its anchorage.

\textsuperscript{51} See Cargill \textit{League}, 151-52 on the meaning of αρχας in the fourth century.

\textsuperscript{52} Reger, “Significance,” \textit{Hesperia} 63 (1994), 309-310 and 310 n.6 for the references to scholars who support the fourth century date, most notably T. Sauciuć, \textit{Andros}, 10-19.

\textsuperscript{53} IG XII suppl. 245, lines 1-21.

\textsuperscript{54} Reger, “Significance,” \textit{Hesperia} 63 (1994), 309-321 for the new interpretation, on the grounds of letter forms and comparisons made to grain prices on Delos.
previous scholarship had done. This does not, however, make a major impact on our
discussion of the fourth century garrison in IG II² 123. Androton, the governor of the
garrison at Arkesine on Amorgos during the Social War, is also honored by the city for
various beneficial actions, so the precedent was definitely already set in the fourth century
for individual Athenian generals to forge connections with the people and governments of
the islands.⁵⁵ Even if Antidotos belongs to a later era, this does not change the fact that
the Andrian garrison had continued into the time of the Social War, and that the
governors of these garrisons could and did make strong connections with the islands that
they were situated on.

We do have one name, of course, attributed to the fourth century garrison on Andros
that deserves consideration, the aforementioned Timarchos. Here care must again be
exercised when examining forensic speeches that abound in invective and allegation, and
statements of rhetoric not taken at face value, as cautioned by Cargill.⁵⁶ While it is
uncertain how “wild and unspecific” the allegations of Aischines are in this case, as stated
by Cargill, it is clear that they should not be used as the sole testimonia for the actions of
Athenian officials in the islands, or as an indication of the norm, as hinted at by
Marshall.⁵⁷ With so many activities of the Athenians in the Kykladic region recorded as
being carried out also with the resolution of the allies, there appears to have been far more
of a “watchdog” mentality in operation in the League than there was in similar situations

⁵５ IG XII.7,5 lines 2-16.
⁵⁶ Cargill League, 157-58.
⁵⁷ Marshall Confederacy, 111 n.3.
in the fifth-century Delian Confederacy, insofar as the rights of the allies were concerned. This is not to say, however, that there would not be political and especially financial benefits in holding such an office in an allied state, benefits that would not necessarily result from unscrupulous behavior. The award of crowns is one example, but the kind of involvement in local economies hinted at by awards of proxenia is another. While Timarchos is not cited on a proxeny list from Andros (and indeed few of these survive from any period of Andrian history\(^{58}\)), the beneficiary of the Ios inscription does receive this honor, although it is unclear whether this anonymous individual was the governor of a garrison as well.\(^{59}\) Androtion, commander of the garrison at Arkesine on Amorgos, is also named as a proxenos. Considering the possible economic character of proxenia that was discussed in the Keos chapter, it would not be out of place to suggest that the governors of Athenian garrisons in the League (and, as Cargill has pointed out, there are very few that can be taken as secure possibilities) could draw financial benefits from holding these offices and perhaps even be involved in commerce in these states.\(^{60}\)

Our knowledge of the impact of the League on Andros is limited, however, as there is little evidence for the internal structure of the island’s polis, the exploitation of its land, and how much of the population may have been involved in land ownership. One of the

\(^{58}\) Marek Proxenie, 82, in which only three examples are known, all from the third century or later.

\(^{59}\) IG XII.5, 1000, lines 5-15.

\(^{60}\) Notice that Kephisophon, a strategos stationed on Paros, was honored with proxenia in IG XII.5, 114; also the supposed governor on Ios in IG XII.5, 1000 had received this honor.
few Andrian individuals that we know by name in this period is Epainetos, who appears
to have made frequent journeys to Athens, where he became embroiled in a legal conflict
with one Stephanos. The description given by Demosthenes (composed ca. 340) has led
one commentator to speculate on a *symbola* or other convention between Athens and
Andros. Given the evidence for other such legal agreements with Kykladic islands, such
an assertion is a reasonable one. The aforementioned lack of proxeny decrees relative to
the other islands is notable, although this state of affairs may be due to epigraphical
accidents of non-survival. But here is at least one example of an Andrian who, according
to the account of Demosthenes, was frequently in Athens though not a metic, and was
wealthy enough to bestow largesse upon mistresses. He was also influential enough to
bring his case before an Athenian court and win in a suit against an Athenian.

As for the countryside of Andros itself, there is not an overwhelming amount of
evidence for this period. There are several examples of towers, of the type seen on other
nearby islands. Nowicka only records one in her 1975 study, the tower of Aghios Petros,
3 km from the port of Gaurion. She considers it unlikely that the tower served as a refuge,

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61 Dem. 59.64-72. This rather amusing anecdote had Epainetos traveling to Athens
to debauch both Neaira and her daughter Phano. Stephanos had baited Epainetos
by inviting him to Athens to take part in a sacrifice, then caught Epainetos with
Phano *in flagrante delicto* and blackmailed him. Two Athenians, Aristomachos
and Nausiphoi, provided sureties for the Andrian. Epainetos, however, was able
to bring the case before the Athenian board of *thesmothetai* and successfully plead
that Neaira’s house counted as a legal brothel. The suit was settled when
Epainetos agreed to pay 1000 drachmas into Phano’s dowry.

as earlier scholarship had suggested, due to its being located in an arid region of Andros. Instead she theorizes that it served to defend the iron mines located nearby, which have yielded finds of kidney ore and slag that also may point to copper extraction and glassmaking. The remains of the mines have four extant levels with shafts and crosscuts for drainage purposes, and several Greek and Roman coins were found at this site, including an Athenian silver coin. These finds, along with the high proportion of Hellenistic sherds found around the tower of Aghios Petros, have led Davies to date the workings to late Greek/early Roman times.

There are other towers on Andros that were not included in Nowicka’s study, however. The towers of Tsouka at Gaurion, Ayia Marina at Mermigies, Hellenikon-Choreza at Kalamos, and Tokeli are all located in the northwestern region of the island. The Tsouka tower is characterized by fourth-century pottery finds, and while small has a good visual field and is located on prime agricultural land, and may have been built on private initiative as a storage facility. The tower at Kalamos has a good view of the strait of Kaphireos that runs between Andros and Euboia, a sector of the Athenian grain route, and

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63 Nowicka Maisons, 43 n.107. Older references to the tower of Aghios Petros can be found in Sauciuc Andros, 29.
64 Davies Mines, 264.
65 Ibid., 264.
67 Ibid., 159.
this tower is also located near a possible ancient lead mine. It is possible that this tower was more of a public project, since its style of construction has better parallels with mainland structures. A similar theory has been advanced for a tower at Drakanon on Ikaria, which shows fourth-century techniques in its fabrication. The Tokeli tower on Andros also would have provided a strategic view of the strait of Kaphireos and also of the southeastern coast of Euboia, where two other towers were found that also seem to have been intended for reconnaissances of the sea lanes. Control of the grain route from the Hellespont to Athens was a constant concern, both for Athens as well as her enemies, and could apply to many different periods in the history of the Aegean, including that of the Second League. Considering the roughly fourth century dates of many other Kykladic towers, the Andrian examples may be contemporary with them. Unfortunately, other evidence for landholding and land use on Andros is not yet extant. No large-scale surveys have been attempted on the island, as on other Kykladic islands such as Keos, Naxos, and

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68 Ibid., 169; Davies Mines, 263 n.2.

69 Techniques such as isodomic trapezoidal blocks and bosses on the external faces have led Koutsoukou-Kanellopoulos, ABSA 85 (1990), 159 to this conclusion. Similarities can be found to Ayia Marina on Keos and Naoussa on Paros. Haselberger “Naoussa,” AA (1978), 374 likens these Kykladic structures to similar ones found at Pergamon and favors Hellenistic dates for them. Koutsoukou-Kanellopoulos, 171 have suggested a date around 315 and the time of the First Nesiotic League, and would place the Aghios Petros tower in this same period.

70 Papalas Icaria, 98.

Amorgos, and no inscriptional evidence such as the catalog of land leases that exists for Karthaia on Keos has been found pertaining to Andros. Until such surveys are performed or such an inscription is found, any hypotheses on the character of the island’s economy must of necessity be in the realm of supposition.

What can be said, given the present state of knowledge about the island? Andros is attested as having made interest payments to Delian Apollo during the time of the League, although for most of the early years of the League she had defaulted on these payments. This did not prevent her, however, from participating on the board of amphiktyons for this same temple in these same years of delinquency. She possessed towers in her territory like the other Kyklades, although fewer in number than other islands such as Siphnos. Andros was not renowned for certain agricultural or mineral products, as is seen elsewhere in the region, but there is some evidence for ancient lead and/or iron mining on the island. Other than the defaulted payments to Delos, there is no strong evidence for economic hardship. While some may consider the “emergency” measures regarding the pay for garrison troops during the Social War to be an additional argument for this, there is no reason to believe that the soldiers were near mutiny or that the island was becoming disloyal to Athens. True, the conditions of the Social War would have brought urgency to the proceedings, but there may simply have been delays in the collection of the syntaxeis from various source allies as a result of these conditions. The Andrians may not have had sufficient liquid assets to pay the troops on the spot, but

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72 G. Radet, “Inscriptions d’Amorgos,” BCH 12 (1888), 226 makes this assertion while comparing it to the Amorgos garrison in the same period.
by this time *syntaxis* payments would seem to have been more regularized and it may not have been expected that an Andrian contribution would have been the only one. The loyalty of the Andrians to Athens both before and after the Social War is manifest. In addition to the crown voted to the Boule in 368/7 (see note 32 above), they also voted a crown to the Athenian demos in 348/7. Another bit of epigraphic evidence, dating to just after the Battle of Chaironeia and the end of the League itself, shows that at least some individuals on Andros demonstrated this loyalty to the very end. Two individuals, Drakontides and Hegesias, were honored by the Athenians in 338/37 for services rendered when Philip V threatened Athens. Although the portion of the inscriptions that details the actual deeds of the two Andrians has been effaced, a passage of Lykourgos states that Athens requested assistance from the inhabitants of Andros, Keos, Troizen, and Epidauros after the defeat at Chaironeia. Schwenk theorizes that the assistance given by the two Andrians may have involved securing of the grain supply, and this seems quite likely in regards to the strategic location of Andros, although there is no direct evidence. As with Paros, most monographs on the history of Andros posit a general anti-Athenian attitude on the part of the Andrians at this time, and also a general decline in economic prosperity on Andros during the League. Paschali believes that

73 IG II² 1441 line 12.
74 Schwenk *Age of Alexander*, #2, 13-17.
75 Lyk. c. Leokrates 42.
76 Schwenk *Age of Alexander*, 17.
77 Paschali *Istoria*, 359-367.
Andros stayed loyal more out of necessity than out of any truly pro-Athenian stance, and that League membership had negative results for the economy of the island, going as far back as 477. Paskhali would also like to see an anti-Athenian faction on the island in the time of the Social War, possibly a pro-Chian one, but does not marshal much evidence to support this assertion. It is hinted that this faction became powerful enough that the garrison had to be renewed in the Social War period (although Paskhali supports a date of the late 360's for the original installation).

There is no reason to doubt that certain elements on Andros may have favored the rebel side in the Social War, but we have little evidence that this political stance took hold with a significant part of the population. If anything, it would seem more likely that of all the rebel states, Byzantion would have been the most likely candidate for connections to Andros, considering the latter's position on the grain route. But again, proxeny and symbolaii decrees, some of the best indicators of potential for such connections, are lacking for Andros not only in this period but throughout antiquity, and none are attested at Byzantion for this period either. Given that Andros as well as the other Kyklades

78 Ibid., 365.
79 Ibid., 362.
80 Marek Proxenie, 84 (Chios), 65 (Byzantion). There are Chian treaties with Andros (D.W.S. Hunt, "An Archaeological Survey of the Island of Chios," BSA 41 (1940/45), 45-46=SEG XII, 390), and with Naxos (G. Dunst, Bemerkungen zu Griechischen Inschriften (Berlin 1960), 38-9=SEG XVIII,334) from ca. 300, and with Tenos at some point in the late fourth century (J. Vanseveren, "Inscriptions d'Amorgos et de Chios," RPh 11 (1937), 327-330), but nothing securely from the time of the League. There is some indirect evidence that Chios may have been a node on the grain route also, but it is controversial. See [Dem.] 35.52-4.
were governed by democracies in the Second League, we see many instances (such as the aforementioned crowns) that point to a position of continued loyalty on the part of the Andrians, and certainly no evidence that the island ever attempted to break away from the League. It is possible that there were some economic ties with the Social War rebels, and the final chapter of this study will examine the possible economic links between the Kyklades and Asia Minor, in particular Chios, Byzantion, and Rhodes. But it will also be shown that Athens was an integral component of this trade as well, that islands such as Andros may have benefitted from "transit trade" between Athens and the east.

It is also important to consider the possibility that the Athenian garrison established on the island may have actually helped stimulate the local economy. Since the pay for the garrison troops was deducted from the common syntaxeis contributions of all the allies, then the majority of these funds may have come to Andros from the outside, and could then be spent by the garrison locally on food, supplies, and other pursuits.\textsuperscript{81}

The exploitation of local resources on Andros during this period is obscure. We do not know whether the mining of iron was exploited to the degree that miltos was on Keos or marble was on Paros. We know of an issue of Andrian coinage late in the period of the League, from a single attestation at Livadia from ca. 350, when a Tenian paid the oracle

\textsuperscript{81} Clark \textit{Navy}, 370 n.191. It appears that, like the eisphora, the syntaxeis was put directly into the hands of generals after its collection; [Dem.] 49.49.
of Trophonios in Andrian coins. Other information is scanty; but there is every reason to believe that the Andrians were fully aware of the benefits that resulted from League membership, and took advantage of them. The de facto, if not de iure, forbearance they received on their Delian loans is just one aspect of this. Their location on the grain route might have brought additional benefits if convoys used the excellent port of Gaurion as a stopover. And finally, the awarding of fiscal honors such as crowns, along with the ability of two Andrian individuals to render assistance after Chaironeia, do not give much credence to the view that the island was truly in decline in this period.

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82 IG VII, 3055 line 20; Brun Archipels, 156. Other examples of Kykladic coinage at this time, and their possible implications, will be discussed in the final chapter.
Amorgos, the other island to see an Athenian garrison during the League, is very problematic for this study, due to its apparent lack of connections to the temple of Delian Apollo. Although the Amorgians are attested as League members on the League charter, there are no loans recorded from Delos for any of the three poleis on the island, Arkesine, Minoa, and Aigiale. Nevertheless, there is epigraphic evidence of a garrison at Arkesine during the Social War, and the inscription seems to record an inability of the city of Arkesine to pay for these soldiers without borrowing from their Athenian commander. If the Athenians had control of the temple treasury on Delos, why were temple funds not advanced to the Arkesinians at this time of crisis? Conversely, why were outside syntaxeis not collected for the Arkesinian garrison, as they were for the garrison on Andros? What must first be examined is the nature of the three Amorgian cities, according to the current state of knowledge. They are part of the same group that encompasses Andros, Tenos, Mykonos, Siphnos, and the poleis of Keos. They are listed

83 IG II² 43, line 124; Cargill League, 27.

collectively, however, contra the practice for Keos, which lists Ioulis, Karthaia, and Koressos individually after the rubric “Keians”. This seems to be a continuance of the practice of the fifth-century Athenian tribute lists, which also list the inhabitants of the island under the single term of “Amorgians.”

There is other evidence, however, that the cities of Amorgos could be dealt with individually by the Athenians or by the citizens of other states. The most important example of this is the garrison established at Arkesine, apparently during the time of the Social War, which appears to have not involved the use of syntaxeis in its payment. In this inscription, Androtion is honored by the Arkesinians for his benevolence as a governor (lines 2-4), his good conduct towards both citizens and foreign visitors (lines 4-6), the advancement of an interest-free loan to the city (lines 7-8), his payment of the garrison from his own resources (lines 9-10), and his ransoming of Arkesinians who had been captured, presumably during the Social War (lines 15-16). He is awarded with a gold crown, proxenia and euergetes, and is made exempt from all taxes (lines 16-24). At the end of the decree, the last few lines are damaged but appear to refer to a decree of the allied synedrion. A shortage of syntaxeis during the Social War is possible, and may have led to the need of cash that Androtion himself remedied. G. Radet stated that it was Arkesine’s contributions that may have been in default, but again, it is not clear whether

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85 IG I² 233-291. Other sources are ambiguous; cf. [Skylax] 58, Ἀμοργός ἀντὶ Τριπόλις.
86 IG XII.7, 5 (=Syll³ 193+); Accame Lega, 185-87; Cargill League 155, 158-59.
87 Line 25: συνμονέχοις ἐδόξε. Cargill League, 155 considers this as proof that the garrison was approved of by the allies.
syntaxeis were always collected locally for local needs by this later date.\textsuperscript{88} It may also be true, as Cargill states, that Amorgos was not seen as being of the same priority as Andros, despite Radet’s insistence on its strategic location near Kos and Rhodes.\textsuperscript{89} Rhodes had rebelled at this time, however, and perhaps threatened the inhabitants of Amorgos; Rhodians may have even been the privateers who had abducted the Arkesinian citizens mentioned in the inscription. This might have carried more immediate weight with questions of allied morale than a threat to the grain route of Athens. Perhaps it was simply that there was not sufficient time to collect funds either from the allies, or from the temple of Delos in the form of a loan. Cargill thinks that the difference is not significant and may simply be based on relative sizes of the garrisons, or possibly that the Arkesinian garrison was requested for by its citizens, and Brun seems to accept this argument.\textsuperscript{90} The most likely explanation is perhaps a combined one, that because of the Social War there was a smaller amount of syntaxeis funds able to be distributed and slowed their collection, and that wartime conditions made disgruntled garrison troops a real liability and extraordinary measures had to be taken. Certainly the award of a crown to Androton implies that his actions were beneficial. Androton is attested as a member of the boule in Athens during the year 356/5; so most scholars have surmised that this Arkesinian decree cannot be later than 357/6.\textsuperscript{91} This would be a prime time for the kinds of fiscal

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{88} G. Radet, “Inscriptions d’Amorgos,”\textit{BCH} 12 (1888), 227.
\item \textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 228. Cargill \textit{League}, 158 n.29.
\item \textsuperscript{90} Cargill \textit{League}, 158 n.29; Brun \textit{Eisphora}, 125.
\item \textsuperscript{91} Dem. 22.38.
\end{itemize}
emergencies described above to have hit the collective world of the League. The lack of attested loans from Delos may, as in the case of Kythnos, be interpreted as a sign of greater prosperity on Amorgos as compared to the other islands for most of the first half of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{92} There is some indication that the Amorgians had a local product that could potentially have been a good source of revenue, namely the so-called \textit{amorgina} or Amorgian cloaks. There are multiple references to these textiles mostly from Classical and Hellenistic times but some from later periods as well.\textsuperscript{93} What would seem to offset this evidence is the fact that there are several fourth-century inscriptions, other than the garrison inscription, which would seem to point to financial insolvency not just in Arkesine but throughout Amorgos. One is the record of a loan taken out in Attic silver by all three cities, from an unknown creditor or creditors.\textsuperscript{94} The amounts of the loans are not preserved. While the coinage used was Attic, this does not automatically mean that the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[92] Kythnos appears to have had stronger economic potential due to its iron and copper mines as well as agricultural production. While she did not take out Delian loans in the fourth century, she did make a large grain purchase from Cyrene during the Aegean-wide grain shortage in the 330's, in the amount of 10,000 medimnoi or over six talents worth; Brun \textit{Archipels}, 130.

\item[93] The list is quite extensive: Empedokles fr. 84 Diels; Kratinos fr.96 Koch; Ar. \textit{Lysistrata} 5.150,737+schol.; Pollux 7.74; Antiphanes fr.153 Koch(=Pollux 7.57); Aisch. \textit{C.Tim}. 97+schol.; Klearchos of Soloi in Athenaios 6.255 d-e; [Plato] \textit{Letters} 13.363a; Clement of Alexandria \textit{Ped}. 2.10.115.2; Souda s.v. \textit{Amorgeia, amorginon, amorgis}; Harpokration s.v. \textit{amorgos}; Hesychius s.v. \textit{amorgina}; consecrations of gifts of these cloaks at Brauron- IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1514-17; Eustathios \textit{Com. Denys.Per.} 525; Nigdelis \textit{Politeuma}, 53; Brun \textit{Archipels} 136 n.92; G. Rougemont “Amorgos colonie de Samos?”; \textit{Les Cyclades} 237 n.18. J.M.A. Richter, “Silk in Greece,” \textit{AJA} 33 (1929) 27-33 thinks that the cloaks may actually have been Persian, but this has not been followed by many other scholars.

\item[94] IG XII.7, 68; T. Homolle, “Contrats le pret et de la location,” \textit{BCH} 16 (1892) 270-72; Bogaert \textit{Banques}, 201 and n.382.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
creditors had to be Athenian. There are strong possibilities that Attic coins were used throughout the Kyklades for major transactions at this time.\(^5\) This inscription might perhaps be related to the loan agreement contracted between the Parians and certain Chian individuals, an incident more isolated from the grander scheme of the loans from Delos.\(^6\)

There are also other loan agreements from Amorgos, but most seem to cluster around the end of the fourth century, and most seem to apply only to Arkesine. One involves a loan from the inhabitants of Astypalaia of five talents at 8 \(\frac{1}{2}\)% interest.\(^7\) Arkesine also borrows three talents at 10% interest from a certain Praxikles of Naxos, in which an agreement of symbolon is mentioned.\(^8\) But certain power centers at Arkesine were better equipped with resources, as witnessed by the leasing of sacred land by the temple of Zeus Temenites.\(^9\) Commercial connections may be implied by the proxeny decree for Kallignotos of Thera, in which prosodos was also awarded.\(^10\) And finally, there is evidence of coinage and transport amphorae, perhaps from a commercial union between

\[^{5}\] Brun Archipels, 157, who points out that Attic and Aiginetan coins were quite common in the temple accounts both at Delos and Delphi. He also cites IG XII.7, 67, where Arkesine pays back a loan at the end of the fourth century with coins of both the Attic and Macedonian standards.

\[^{6}\] See Chapter 3 on Paros.

\[^{7}\] IG XII.7, 67A.

\[^{8}\] IG XII.7, 67B.

\[^{9}\] IG XII.7, 62; Homolle “Contrats,” BCH 16 (1892), 276-294.

\[^{10}\] IG XII.7, 6; Marek Proxenie, 85-86.
all three cities, for the end of the fourth century as well.\textsuperscript{101} So even the loans mentioned for Arkesine at this time do not necessarily mean that the island was not prosperous.

One inscription that does seem to apply to the time of the League, however, and relates Arkesine to other Kykladic \textit{poleis} at this time, is a judicial decree that is concerned with a reduction in the number of lawsuits at Arkesine, dated to the first half of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{102} One aspect of the decree, however, involves a provision that is contained in other similar decrees for Keos, Siphnos, and Naxos at around the same period; namely the referral of certain cases to a third party city, or an \textit{ekkletos polis}.\textsuperscript{103} There have been many attempts to relate these inscriptions to each other as being part of some sort of programme of judicial oppression of the islands, or at least as punitive measures introduced after revolts at places such as Keos.\textsuperscript{104} P. Gauthier has shown, however, that the various decrees, although possessing some overlap in their phraseology, cannot be said to be identical or to describe identical procedures or situations.\textsuperscript{105} Gauthier has shown that the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{101} Both bear the legend AMOP. For the coins: B.V. Head \textit{H.N.} \textsuperscript{2} 481. For the amphorae: T. Homolle, "Nouvelles et correspondance," 17 (1893), 203 n.9; W. Ruppel, "Zur Verfassung und Verwaltung der amorginischen Stadte," \textit{Klio} 21 (1926), 314 n.8.
\item \textsuperscript{102} IG XII.7,3; G. Radet, "Inscriptions d'Amorgos," \textit{BCH} 13 (1888), 229-234; J.M. Rainer, "Uber die Atimie in den Griechischen Inschriften," \textit{ZPE} 64 (1986), 170.
\item \textsuperscript{103} For Keos: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 111. For Naxos: IG II\textsuperscript{2} 179. For Siphnos: \textit{SV} 294.
\item \textsuperscript{104} The earliest attempt was in M. Szanto, "Zum Gerichtswesen der attischen Bundesgenossen," \textit{Ath.Mitt.} (1891), 30-45. See also A.G. Woodhead, \textit{The Athenian Agora 16: Inscriptions: The Decrees} (Princeton 1997), 79-80, who considers these decrees to be oppressive measures, and implies that Naxos and Siphnos had also revolted in the manner of Keos.
\item \textsuperscript{105} Gauthier \textit{Symbola}, 168 (for Naxos).
\end{itemize}
decree for Arkesine has only superficial resemblance to the Keos decree, that it seems to have applied only to suits where both parties were Arkesinian, and that a situation is outlined where some sort of judicial chaos had resulted from an inordinate number of suits.\textsuperscript{106} He compares the conditions to those at Ephesos early in the third century, when warfare had made creditors call in their debts on a massive scale and foreign arbitrators were brought into the polis to alleviate the crisis.\textsuperscript{107} Gauthier would like to see the decree dated to the end of the Social War, when the ravages of armed conflict, along with the need for a loan from Androtion for the garrison, might have given rise to the same problems.\textsuperscript{108} He also compares the situation to that of Tegea in 324 and Phlious in 385, when internal strife led to the same reliance on foreign judges as civil conflicts had rendered the local tribunals incompetent.\textsuperscript{109} The cases that are to be referred to third-party arbitration are those that are greater than 100 drachmas.\textsuperscript{110} This is similar to the decree for Keos, but there is no evidence of a revolt on Amorgos at any time during the years of the League, and unlike at Keos there is nothing in the Arkesinian decree that definitely states that Athens must be the ekkletos polis. It is also hasty to assume that the decree refers to a lack of financial prosperity on Amorgos, as one might interpret the statements of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{Ibid., 334.}{\textsuperscript{106}}
\footnote{IG I, 5 (=Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 364A).}{\textsuperscript{107}}
\footnote{Gauthier Symbola, 173.}{\textsuperscript{108}}
\footnote{For Tegea: IG V, 2 (=Tod II 202= Syll.\textsuperscript{3} 306). For Phlious: Xen. Hell. 5.2.10, 5.3.10; Gauthier Symbola, 174.}{\textsuperscript{109}}
\footnote{Radet, “Inscriptions,” BCH 13 (1888), 234.}{\textsuperscript{110}}
\end{footnotes}
Gauthier. The decree states that fines of 3000 drachmas will be assessed and consecrated to Hera for breaches of procedure. It seems obvious that the decree would not have been passed if such problems were not occurring, and such fines could be expected to be paid by offenders. Moreover, a condition of wartime financial chaos does not imply economic difficulties for an entire half of a century. The dating of this decree to the same approximate time as the decree for Androtion is an attractive one, and the chaotic years of the Social War and its aftermath would have been a prime opportunity for certain unscrupulous individuals to raise judicial havoc. Certainly the inscription does carry a tone of protection for the community of Arkesine at large. The role played by temple treasuries on Amorgos itself bears mention. There are several examples, including one from the fourth century, of Amorgian temples paying for the erection of stelai of public decrees. What is noteworthy is that Arkesine, unlike Minoa and Aigiale, does not appear to have had a temple to Apollo. Apollo’s presence in Kythnos is not attested either, and it must be remembered that Kythnos, like Arkesine, did not borrow funds from Delian Apollo. Given this situation, the inability of Arkesine to pay for a garrison becomes more interesting, for it may be that this city’s lack of Apollonian connections

111 Lines 41-42.

112 Rainer “Atimie,” ZPE 84 (1986), 170. It is important to note, however, that the decree for Androtion implies that not all commerce with foreign states had ceased during the Social War, since his kindness to visitors is specifically stated; cf. Brun Archipels, 147.

113 IG XII.7,2 lines 13-15 at Arkesine.

made it difficult to get loans from the temple on Delos. While it would probably be going too far to suggest that syntaxeis for paying garrisons were only available to Ionian cities, cities that participated in the cult of Apollo, some link does seem to be hinted at in that almost all of the Kyklades that borrowed funds from Delos were Ionian, and worshipped Delian Apollo.115

Other aspects of the Amorgian communities have been discovered through archaeological survey, although the most extensive and thorough survey has yet to be published. Minoa’s fine harbor appears to have made it the best known of the three cities on the island in antiquity.116 Some tracing of the movement of the coinage of Histiaia implies a route coming from Leros, Lebinthos, and Kinaros in the east, through Minoa, and on to Keros and Naxos.117 The landscape itself contains many towers, whose dating straddles the fourth to third centuries.118 The towers seem to be connected with the road system on the island, and tend to be spread out at a distance of half an hour walks; this has led many scholars to surmise that they were intended for rural protection.119 Other than the inscription for leases from the temple of Zeus, however, the pattern of

115 Brun Archipels, 165. Syros is the sole exception as no temple to Apollo has been found there.


118 Bent Cyclades, 489 stated that he observed more towers on Amorgos than anywhere else in the Kyklades.

119 Boussac and Rougemont, “Observations,” Les Cyclades, 117. Some references to the roads near Arkesine are contained in IG XII.7,62 line 19; Brun Archipels, 118.
landholding on Amorgos remains obscure. From the late fourth/early third century comes an inscription of land sales at Arkesine, describing homes with gardens and boundaries, and the properties sold with option of resale.\textsuperscript{120}

There has been speculation, however, on population levels on Amorgos that are at odds with the picture that has been drawn for the Kykladic region in the fourth century. E. Ruschenbusch has attempted to calculate the population of the three cities of Amorgos in antiquity, based upon more modern figures from the years 1879-1971.\textsuperscript{121} These figures have never risen above four thousand or so inhabitants, so he makes the assumption (rather illogical) that the island could never have supported more people than this in its history.\textsuperscript{122} Ruschenbusch goes on to state that this level of population would have precluded the existence of an aristocratic or hoplite class, and that civic expenses consequently must have been distributed among all the inhabitants of the island.\textsuperscript{123} Infantry or naval squadrons would also have been out of the question, according to Ruschenbusch's model. In addition, the few number of law cases brought before the \textit{eisagogeis} in Arkesine, "1-4 Prozessen im Jahr" (he gives no evidence) would have resulted in most of them being referred off the island to other arbitrators.\textsuperscript{124} This

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{120} IG XII.7, 55, 58; Brun \textit{Archipels}, 117.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 266.
\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 268.
\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., 269.
\end{flushleft}
statement is not only illogical, but completely disregards the epigraphic evidence for an overabundance of lawsuits in at least one period of the history of Arkesine.

Until more extensive survey evidence is published, possible population levels on Amorgos are largely a matter of speculation. Nevertheless, Patrice Brun has shown that the population and economic prosperity of the Kyklades, recorded by voyagers in more modern times can and has changed considerably over the course of relatively few years at a time. Ruschenbusch’s assertions are made with almost no ancient evidence to support them, and the presence of large numbers of rural towers on Amorgos at this time would seem to negate both the idea that the population was abnormally low, as well as the contention that there was virtually no group of citizens of any particular wealth or stature. One might protest that if Ruschenbusch is correct about the sharing of public expenses, then the towers were part of a public program. However, many of them were inscribed with the names of donors. This would seem to indicate that the pattern of tower construction on Amorgos followed the pattern seen elsewhere in the Kyklades, in which a high number of landowning families may have built the towers for storage and protection on their estates, and as a form of aristocratic competition.

Overall, Amorgos does not seem to have deviated greatly from the character of the other Kyklades during the time of the Second Athenian League, even though she is an anomaly in that no loans to her from Delian Apollo are recorded. In other ways, however, we see the same phenomena occurring on Amorgos as elsewhere, in which a fairly high

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125 Brun Archipels, 141-45.

level of economic prosperity can be seen during the period under study. The presence of a garrison at Arkesine, as at Andros, does not seem to have been an indicator of Athenian oppression, but rather a safeguard against the attacks on the Kyklades that ancient authors record for the time of the Social War. Close ties to Athens can be seen at Amorgos in the crown given to Androtion, although it is true that no other crowns to Athenians are recorded, as they are for Andros. Amorgos' distance from Athens (Strabo 10.5.2 actually considers it to be one of the Sporades) and its later connections with Krete and Astypalaia, may point to a greater connection with the southern Aegean than the Kykladic islands. This is not to say, however, that Amorgos was not a part of the Kykladic region during the time of the League, and the installation of a garrison shows that Athens' influence was never too far away. The garrisons on Andros and Amorgos should be seen as part of the benefits that could accrue from League membership. There is no evidence that the kinds of levies exacted by Sparta in the early fourth century were mimicked by Athens towards League allies, even if Athens did to poleis who were not League members. Allies such as Andros and Amorgos do appear to have enjoyed protection from Athens, whether manifested by the city as a whole or by individuals such as

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127 While as stated above, the Andrian garrison may date from the late 360's, this was also a period of danger for the region.

128 [Skylax] Per. 58 mentions its proximity, though not incorporation in, the Roman province of Asia. For a treaty with Knossos in the 2nd century: IG XII.7, 32, 63. For a loan from Astypalaia from the late fourth/early third centuries: IG XII.7, 67A. Bent Cyclades, 475 noted that he could see Astypalaia and Asia Minor from the island.

129 Witness the case of Kephallenia in 372 upon the arrival of Iphikrates: Xen. Hell. 6.2.33, 38; Cargill League, 64 and n.40.
Androtion. And this protection seems to have resulted in material prosperity that lasted, with the possible exception of the Social War years, throughout the entire history of the League.
CHAPTER 5- ADDITIONAL ISLANDS OF THE REGION

Siphnos

The island of Siphnos has been the center of a great deal of recent archaeological and scientific research, due to its ancient reputation as a source of precious metals and as a paragon of wealth, at least until the end of the fifth century B.C.¹ Later periods, however, such as the fourth century through late Roman times, have been traditionally seen as eras of decline in the prosperity of Siphnos.

The Delian accounts for the years 377/6-374/3 show that Siphnos had reimbursed a very large amount of interest to the temple of Apollo, 3,190 drachmas and 4 obols.² Out of the ten islands extant on this list, Siphnos is the fourth highest in terms of interest paid, following Tenos, Oinoe on Ikaria, and the Keian cities, respectively. Conversely, the island has the third smallest remaining amount of unpaid interest, that of 2,089 drachmas and 2 obols. Siphnos is not preserved on the accounts of 393/2-389/8, although this inscription is very fragmentary and it is difficult to say which islands were originally

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² Migeotte L'emprunt, 143.
cataloged on the stone. There is other evidence to assist in reconstructing aspects of Siphnian public finance at the beginning of the fourth century. There is an attestation in a speech of Isokrates, concerning an eisphora levied from the wealthier citizens on the island.³ Stasis later broke out on Siphnos, led by democratic exiles who had utilized Paros as a base after the Battle of Knidos.⁴ While there is no firm evidence in Isokrates or anywhere else that Siphnos had been garrisoned by the Spartans, the sources do contain references to the high amounts of tribute collected by the Spartans from their allies.⁵

Siphnos appears again in accounts from an unknown year, along with Thermai of Ikaros. The amount of interest paid by the latter polis is not preserved, but Siphnos pays some 1,320 drachmas, over half the amount given in the accounts of the 370's as debt remaining unpaid.⁶ It is difficult to ascertain the year of this entry without more evidence, but we do know of a crown voted to the Athenians by the Siphnians in 370/69.⁷ It has been theorized that the account belongs to either 360/59 or 355/4, on the basis of formulas restored for the early lines, but this is supposition.⁸ A date in the late 360's, however, is attractive if the symbolon attested between Athens and Siphnos discussed below also dates to that time, and both may be reflections of a more widespread

³ Isok. 19.36; Brun Eisphora, 116.
⁴ Isok. 19. 18-21.
⁵ Diod. 14.10.2, 15.28; Isok. 12.67-8, 4.131-2; Polyb. 6.49.10.
⁶ Migeotte L'emprunt, 144.
⁷ IG II² 1425 line 125.
⁸ Migeotte L'emprunt, 145 n.5.

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phenomenon. In any event, this record of paid interest would seem to defuse any ideas about Siphnos heading down a path to decline in the first half of the fourth century, even if the island was relatively poorer than it had been in earlier centuries. The island appears to have remained politically stable during the time of the League. We have no record of revolts or internal strife, such as may have happened on Paros in 373/2. Such conditions would have been favorable for the continued exploitation of all Siphnian resources, from mineral products to agricultural ones. The high number of rural towers on Siphnos, about a fifth of which have been tentatively dated to the fourth century, would seem to be another possible indication of a high level of agricultural activity.

A recent item of speculation has been whether or not the Siphnian mines were still being exploited in the fourth century. In 350, an unnamed Siphnian is listed among the lessees of silver mines at Laurion. It has been posited that this individual is Kallaiashkros, who is attested as a metic trierarch in Athens in 366, and may also be the lessee from 338/7.

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9 Dreher Hegemon, 274-75.


11 IG II² 1609, line 27. His son Stesileides was also trierarch for several years after the end of the League, for example in 335/4; IG II² 1627 lines 194-96; M. Crosby, “The Leases of the Laureion Mines,” Hesperia 19 (1950), 212.

12 Lalonde, et al., Agora 19, #3. Another, unnamed Siphnian is mentioned, but a date range of 350-325 is the most precise that can be given for this list; G. Byrne and M.J. Osborne, The Foreign Residents of Athens: An Annex to the Lexicon of Greek Personal Names (Leiden 1996), 294.
Opinions on the significance of Siphnians working veins at Laurion differ widely. Ashton and Pantazoglou would have it that Kallaiskhros and his family left the flooded and/or tapped-out workings of their home island for more profitable territory. These authors date the cessation of mining on Siphnos between the death of Herodotos ca.420 and the death of Aristophanes ca.385. There is ambiguity in the ancient sources, however, as Herodotos mentions both gold and silver mining on the island but does not refer to flooding, whereas Pausanias only mentions the exploitation of silver, and blames flooding on the anger of Delphian Apollo at Siphnian deception.

Patrice Brun has suggested that since the only foreigners attested in the Laurion leases were Siphnians, that they still had the necessary expertise for extracting the metal from the earth. Such technical knowledge would not have been still available to Siphnians of the fourth century if they had been unable to practice their craft. New geological information, moreover, shows that the vast majority of Siphnian mines were actually located inland, and therefore, were unlikely to have been flooded. These inland sites include Ayios Sostis, Ayios Silvestros, Vorini, Kapsalos, and Xeroxylon, and lead deposits tend to be found alongside those of silver at these sites. Gold has been found in the southeast of the island, at Ayios Ioannis, Apokofto, and Aspros Pyrgos. Another

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13 Ashton and Pantazoglou, Siphnos, 20, followed by Sheppard Mining, 119.
14 Hdt. 3.57-58; Paus. 10.11.2.
15 P. Brun, personal communication.
16 Wagner and Weisgerber, Silber, 230.
17 Ibid., 231.
mineral product of Siphnos is mentioned by Theophrastus, probably a kind of steatite or soapstone used to make tableware. In terms of agriculture, there is archaeological evidence to support a model of heavy exploitation of arable land on Siphnos in Classical times, as well as a proliferation of towers that is extensive even by Kykladic standards. Approximately one-fifth (9 out of 55) of the extant towers on Siphnos have been tentatively dated to the fourth century, and while this is not an overwhelming number (and some undoubtedly date to the later fourth century, after the end of the League), they may provide clues to the situation on Siphnos during the League. One may posit a fairly high amount of wealth being earmarked for tower construction, whether from public monies in a spirit of civic cooperation, or (more likely) from individual aristocratic landowners who marked boundaries and competed for prestige.

It is more problematic to assess just how many of these Siphnian citizens may have been involved in commerce. If the mines were still being exploited then the number may have been great, and the involvement of Kallaiskhros and his clan at Laurion could have been a sign of lack of opportunity at home due to oversaturation, not due to a cessation of mining activity. This remains an open question, however. Participation in trade may or may not have entailed the ownership of merchant vessels by Siphnians. It is true that Siphnos does not seem to have had a contingent of warships in the fourth century, but as

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18 Theophr. De Lap. 6.12; Pliny Hist. Nat. 36.159; Isidore, Orig. 16.4; Stephen of Byzantion, s.v. Σιφνιον ποτηριον; Sheppard Mining, 118-19.

one scholar has pointed out, the evidence of Herodotos suggests that this was the case even at the height of the island’s prosperity in the sixth century B.C.\textsuperscript{20} Indeed, it would seem that Athens, especially in the later years of the League, had developed its shipbuilding program to such a degree that ample triremes would have been available for convoying duty in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{21}

Other clues to economic activity on Siphnos may come from numismatic studies, as coinage was minted on the island around the middle of the fourth century.\textsuperscript{22} Only a few specimens have survived, one stater and three tetrobols, as part of a hoard that also contained Athenian coins. The stater is on the Aiginetan standard and is somewhat crudely manufactured, with the head of Apollo on the obverse. The tetrobols were adaptable to both the Aiginetan and Rhodian standards in terms of fractioning, and this may provide the key to understanding their use. Newell hypothesized that these coins, although probably only used locally, may have been a good intermediary for exchange between the two weight standards.\textsuperscript{23} The issue was most likely a small one, but this would have been commensurate with a sphere of usage limited to the island itself, unlike the coins of states like Athens or Aigina. The existence of this Siphnian coinage is of interest in isolation, but is of even greater importance when compared to other local Kykladic

\textsuperscript{20} Hdt. 3.57-58; H. Matthaus, “Sifnos im Altertum,” in Wagner and Weisgerber, \textit{Silber}, 45.
\textsuperscript{21} Dem. 24.201 (353/2); Brun \textit{Eisphora}, 170.
\textsuperscript{22} E.T. Newell, \textit{A Hoard from Siphnos: NNM 64} (New York 1934).
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 19.
coinages from this same period. There are extant coins of Naxos, in obol, trihemiobol, diobol, and tetrobol denominations on the Aiginetan standard.\(^\text{24}\) There is also the mention of Naxian tetradrachms in the Delian temple accounts for 364/3,\(^\text{25}\) and these same accounts record drachms from Syros.\(^\text{26}\) An Andrian coin was used to pay the oracle of Trophonios at Livadia around 350.\(^\text{27}\) All of these Kykladic issues were most likely smaller ones, as in the case of the coins from Siphnos, and most likely they fulfilled similar commercial roles.

Siphnos, like many of the other Kyklades at this time, may be seen as a stopover for merchant shipping as well as a potential seafaring polis herself, although it is unclear how many Siphnians may have owned such vessels. The type of trade engaged in by Siphnians, however, may have been more of the transit variety. Shipping would have stopped on the island while making the east-west crossing of the Aegean (or vice versa), and exchanged goods and/or currency while in port for local agricultural or mineral products.\(^\text{28}\) Local coinage of the type attested for Siphnos at this time would have made financial transactions, especially those of the two weight standards that dominated


\(^\text{25}\) Coupri ID 104 line 67; Brun Eisphora, 157.

\(^\text{26}\) Coupri ID 104 line 105.

\(^\text{27}\) IG VII, 3055 line 20.

\(^\text{28}\) Sheppard Mining, 127 also discusses the possibility of gold and lead mining in Classical times.
Aegean trade (Aiginetan and Rhodian), far more convenient. As some of the Naxian coins could also have been utilized in this manner (with the Aiginetan-weight tetrobols being roughly equivalent to Rhodian drachms), we have at least two examples from the Kyklades of currency systems that could have served as a bridge between the Greek mainland and more eastern Greek poleis such as Rhodes, Chios, and the cities of Asia Minor.  

Considering that Siphnos was at this time allied with Athens, it would be fitting to look for evidence of direct economic connections with that city. Such a link may be deduced from the judicial agreement between Athens and Siphnos that shares some common features with other treaties made between Athens and other states in the years of the League. This very fragmentary inscription forbids the demos from prosecuting or putting an Athenian to death on its own authority. The treaty appears to refer to an earlier symbolon made between the two cities.

Woodhead prefers to group this inscription together with similar resolutions for Naxos and Keos, the latter being rather securely dated to the late 360's and passed as a consequence of revolt. Thus he dates all three inscriptions to more or less the same time period (although he admits the possibility that the Siphnos decree dates from the end of the Social War), and he interprets all as being of an oppressive character. Woodhead believes that the Naxos resolution was also the aftermath of a revolt by the people of that

30 Woodhead, Agora XVI, 79-80.  
31 For Keos: IG II² 111. For Naxos: IG II² 179.
island, and he seems to infer similar troubles for Siphnos as well. There are problems with this reconstruction. To begin with, despite its frequent assertion by scholars such as Woodhead, there is no strong evidence to support the idea that Naxos revolted from the League. Indeed, it is often this very same judicial agreement that is the sole piece of evidence used to support the idea of a Naxian revolt. Woodhead himself mentions other examples of symbolai made between Athens and non-League states such as Stymphalos (IG II² 144), Troizen (IG II² 46), and an unknown Kretan polis, the last of which refers to an earlier pact made with Knossos. Woodhead tends to contrast these agreements, cast in a more beneficial and pleasant light, with the Kykladic examples, which he finds far more sinister. He tends to date the non-League examples to the 370's, connecting them to a supposed policy of commercial contracting with states that did not wish to join the League, but still wished to create links with Athens. It seems unlikely, though, that League members would not have been eligible for the same benefits, and the League charter says nothing of these matters, increasing the possibility that individual symbolai of this very sort had to be made with League members on a piecemeal basis. Since the Siphnos decree refers to an earlier symbolon, it may be that this former agreement also dates to the 370's like the ones for Stymphalos and Troizen. The Naxos decree, also a

32 Although the membership of Naxos in the League is also uncertain, the presence of the Naxians on the Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98) makes it likely. Cargill League, 137 dismisses the Siphnian judicial inscription, as well as the similar treaty with Naxos, as being so fragmentary that they “should probably be left out of the argument” concerning Athenian imperialism during the League. It is negligent to discount them in such a manner, however, especially when they have other ramifications.

33 Woodhead, Agora XVI, 48-49 (Troizen), 80-81 (Kretan polis).
decree of symbolon, has no internal means of dating although various propositions have been made, from 376 to 360 to 350. It is tempting to also place it in the 370's and connect it to the similar provisions made with Siphnos. Athens could have made these symbolai with a wide variety of states in the 370's to cement further its economic connections, both League and non-League, throughout the Aegean. The notion that Athens, at the inauguration of a new sea league after the Battle of Naxos, would have excluded their new allies from profitable commercial agreements that they extended to other non-League states (especially when the new allies were to make financial contributions to the League) does not seem practical.

It is also dangerous to equate all of the allied judicial agreements to the Keian example, as if the revolt of a single island would have resulted in punitive (or at least prophylactic) measures for all poleis in the region. In spite of a recent attempt to explain all examples of appeal procedures in these agreements to an ekkletos polis, or “third city”, as referring to Athens, each separate decree seems rather to reflect locally varying conditions. The Keian example mentions all suits over 100 drachmas, but this restriction is not attested for any of the other decrees, and may represent a punitive measure taken because of that island’s revolt, perhaps even with the approval of the allied synedrion. As seen in Chapter 1, the late 360’s was a time of definite hardship for Athens and the structural

34 Gauthier Symbola, 168.


36 IG XII.7, 3, the decree of the Arkesinians, does refer to all cases over 100 drachmas to outside arbitration (lines 47-51), but there is nothing in this decree to indicate that these arbitrators must be Athenian; Gauthier Symbola, 225.
integrity of the League. The decree concerning Athenians on Siphnos may have been passed as a preventative measure to forestall the kinds of abuses wreaked by the Keian rebels (who murdered an Athenian proxenos at Ioulis). It is also possible that it could have been passed soon after the main symbolon in the 370's. But there is nothing in the Siphnos decree to suggest that economic connections forged under the symbolon had been abrogated in any way, and indeed such changes would have been counterproductive both for Athens as well as for Siphnos.
Naxos

Naxos is one of the more problematic islands in this study, for two reasons. Firstly, there is much less evidence for the situation on this island during the time of the League than for other islands. Secondly, there are many scholars who subscribe to the concept that Naxos was never a League member at all; a good many others are ambivalent on the subject. This study follows the assumption that Naxos was in fact a League member, due to the presence of the island on the Sandwich Marble (which may have been part of an Athenian-led reorganization of island debt), the siege pressed there by Chabrias in 376, and also the symbolon between Athens and the island, although symbolai were sometimes made with non-League members. None of these points constitute positive proof of membership, but together they build a case for the probability of this idea. Above all other considerations, it is highly improbable that Chabrias, after expending so much effort on reducing the island’s defenses, would have neglected to bring it into the League along with so many other neighboring islands after the Battle of Naxos.

In tandem with discussion of her political leanings has come speculation on Naxos’ financial footing in the fourth century. Naxos is listed on the Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98) as having paid no interest in this period of 377/6-374/3, on a total outstanding debt of 1 talent 3600 drachmas. The island, along with Karystos and Andros, failed to make interest payments in those years, and like Andros does not show up on any later extant...
portions of the Delian accounts. This non-payment has been interpreted in many ways, ranging from the defiance of a non-aligned state towards Athens,\textsuperscript{39} to a level of poverty resulting from an inability to repair the damage wreaked by the Persians in 490.\textsuperscript{40} One scholar has considered that "la situation financiere etait deplorable" on Naxos at this time.\textsuperscript{41} In addition to the Persian destruction of over a century before, Bogaert also blames a largely agrarian economy and a weak involvement in commerce, due to a lack of suitable port facilities.

These comments must be addressed in turn. To begin with, while the Persian attack on the island may have been quite severe, the records of fifth-century tribute for Naxos do not represent an island stricken with poverty in the years following the Persian expedition.\textsuperscript{42} Naxos does appear to have been saddled with a Spartan garrison in 376 since the island had to be reduced by Chabrias' forces; it is unclear when this garrison may have been installed, although it is probable that if one was in place before 394 it was quickly expelled during the Kykladic cruise of Konon and Pharnabazos. A date after 386 is most likely. As was discussed in the previous chapter concerning Andros, the presence of a Spartan garrison may have placed a drain on the local economy, not only to support

\textsuperscript{39} Migeotte \textit{L'emprunt}, 144.
\textsuperscript{40} Bogaert \textit{Banques}, 203.
\textsuperscript{41} Bogaert \textit{Banques}, 203.
\textsuperscript{42} It is true that the tribute payments for Naxos are relatively low compared to other poleis of the Insular District, but the presence of an Athenian kleruchy may have drastically influenced these figures; Plut. \textit{Per}, 11.5-6; Meiggs \textit{AE} 112. Naxos had been previously attacked by the Persians in 500 but had repulsed the assault after six months; Hdt. 5.30-36.
these troops directly but also because it would have been easier for the Spartans to collect tribute from places where they kept standing forces. It is probable that Sparta could not and did not bring to bear the kind of tribute-collecting infrastructure wielded by the Athenians the century before. If Spartan commanders were in the area, then collection could be carried out.

As also seen in the case of Andros, the failure to pay interest to Delos did not necessarily carry a stigma in regards to treatment by Athens. While Naxians do not appear to have served as amphiktyons, one cannot automatically assume ill will directed against them by Athenians simply on account of delinquency at Delos. Considering its strategic position, it would have been foolhardy for the Athenians to have taken any steps to bring Naxos to a low economic plane, or antagonize it politically while attempting to forge a new alliance in the Aegean. Sparta had been momentarily chased from the Kyklades in 376, but she was far from beaten.

The strategic location of Naxos deserves further discussion. Despite Bogaert’s insistence that the island lacked good ports, there is evidence to the contrary. The Stadismus Maris Magni mentions the harbor of Panormos, on the southern coast of the island. In addition, Naxos is listed as a node on two of the three east-west routes across the Aegean outlined in this work, forming links between Amorgos and Delos (or Kythnos), and ultimately to Kos farther to the east. That these routes could be illustrated by other evidence of commerce is shown by Robert’s work on monetary circulation in the

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44 Ibid., 280-82.
The involvement of Naxians in commerce is further seen in a reference to a large type of merchant vessel known as a Naxiourgeis, and is similar to other location-specific ship names such as Knidiourgeis, Kerkyros, and Paron. The collected fragments of Attic comedy refer to certain Naxian exports such as almonds and wine. Iron may have been either mined or simply smelted on Naxos, as indicated by finds of slag in the environs of the Classical town.

The symbolon between Athens and Naxos may be yet another indication of commercial links, although such agreements are usually discussed more for their political than their economic implications. The dating of this inscription is quite problematic, and it seems that this question is the key to understanding the tone and significance of the decree. Dates proposed in the 370's or 350's have led to more egalitarian interpretations, while the late 360's, if applicable, might place the decree in a context of stricter judicial controls of


46 Ar. Pax 143 and schol.; Velissaropoulos Naucleres, 61; Brun Archipels, 138.

47 Eupolis fr.253 (=J.M. Edmonds, Fragments of Attic Comedy 1 [Leiden 1957], 403); Phrynichos fr.68 and schol.Ath.Deip. (=Edmonds 1, 471).

48 Davies Roman Mines, 264.

49 Cataldi “Atene,” ASNP 9 (1979), 6-12.
the island allies. Gauthier favors a date around 350 due to letter forms, and also because the phraseology appears to refer to a restitution of normal judicial relations that could be part of the aftermath of the Social War. He states that it is unclear whether the appellate “third city” would always of necessity be Athens, while Cataldi points out that the fragments of the decree that refer to the Athenian demos resemble fifth-century agreements that were of a more interventionist character. Cataldi finds the late 360's date the most probable, and that Naxos had its judicial autonomy limited after revolting from the League. The presence of the thesmothetai at lines 10 and 17, he claims, definitely show that the tribunal at Naxos had been suppressed.

This inscription, however, currently exists in three fragments, and fragment c contains a reference to Thera. Cataldi downplays these lines by theorizing that Athenian ambassadors on Thera may have organized a college of diallaktai for disputes at Naxos and elsewhere. Thera, it should be remembered, is generally considered to have been a League member. This island is not present in the Delian loan accounts, but it is an island

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50 For a summary of the various dates proposed for this inscription, see Cataldi “Atene,” ASNP 9 (1979), 6 n.34 and 7-12; Gauthier Symbola, 168.

51 Cataldi “Atene,” ASNP 9 (1979), 9 n.50.

52 Ibid., 13.

53 IG II² 179, fragment c, lines 9 and 11.


55 Cargill League 40-41 discusses the idea that a democratic faction on Thera may have joined the League and its existence is partially preserved on lines 97-98 of IG II² 43.
of Dorian foundation and may not have had the same connections with the temple of Delian Apollo that other islands in the region had. Judging from Athenian activity in the region in the 370's, it would have been tempting for the Therans to enroll their polis into the League.

The significance of Theran membership for the present discussion is that, although Cataldi has assembled strong arguments for Athenian control of all the proceedings outlined in the decree, this fragment still leaves open the strong possibility that other League members could be involved in the judicial process also. This implies that the decree may not have been unilaterally ordained by the Athenian demos; a good parallel example is the decree for Paros from 373/2. As far as a revolt is concerned, the wording of the Naxos decree certainly does imply a restoration of good legal relations after some unknown period when they were in abeyance; but the decree is sufficiently different from the one prescribed for Keos that they may very well belong to different years, and different situations.

As there is no strong evidence to suggest that Naxos rebelled along with the Keian cities in the 360's, a more likely period would be the mid-370's. Naxos had been reduced by siege in 376 and it is quite possible that a Spartan garrison was expelled at this time. Such a state of affairs might warrant taking steps to ensure smooth relations with Athens after the siege was over, and if the island had been invested by Spartan troops sometime after the King’s Peace, then normal connections with Athens may have been interrupted in those years. This situation is slightly different from that of Siphnos, although the rider

\[SV 268.\]
to the Siphnian symbolon could date to this same period and would also have been concerned with the smoothing of relations.

Little else is known of internal events on Naxos at the time of the League. The fourth century coinage of the island, and its similarities to contemporary Siphnian coinage, were outlined earlier in this chapter. Nicolet-Pierre surmises that there was but a single emission of tetrobols, while several issues of obols may have been struck. The Naxos hoard was buried at approximately the same time as the hoard on Siphnos, around 320, and this may point to troubles after the Battle of Amorgos in 322. The similarities between the Siphnian and Naxian issues lend credence to the idea that they were minted for similar purposes. It has been suggested that island issues were smaller in number at this time, due to the large number of Athenian and Aiginetan coins in circulation, shown in both the Delian and Delphian temple accounts for this period.

Towers on the island of Naxos are yet another aspect of the island's history that raise many questions. The most famous of the Naxian towers is the “Pyrgos Chimarru.” It has been tentatively dated to the fourth century B.C., due to the construction technique of isodomic ashlar blocks used. Its purpose is not so clear-cut, with various theories having been proposed, ranging from a marker for estate boundaries, to an enclosure for livestock.

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58 Brun Archipels, 157.

or a watchtower. There is another tower on the island, of a more rectangular construction, that is located in a fertile valley near granite quarries. This may have served as a watchtower for the quarries, but this is uncertain.

This study has assumed that in this period towers were often the indicators of estate boundaries, and that many towers may mean a high number of landowners. If this is true, then the small number of extant towers is puzzling, as Naxos was considered one of the most fertile islands of the Kyklades in antiquity, much more so than Paros, which also sports fewer towers than other islands in the Kyklades. In addition, no proxenies have been found for Naxos that can be dated to this period. Does Naxos invalidate the thesis of this study?

Some recent survey work has been done on Naxos, however, that may help explain the situation. Some fifteen Classical sites were identified in this survey, which covered only the northwest section of the island, implying that many more could be found in a larger survey. Most of the Classical sites were closer to the hills than the shore, the common pattern for Archaic sites as well. Since the Archaic period was known to be a period of great prosperity for Naxos, the phenomenon of inland settlement seems unrelated to the

60 Nowicka Maisons, 53.
61 Nowicka Maisons, 54; Bent Cyclades, 370.
63 Ibid., 92.
involvement of its citizens in commerce. There is another anomaly concerning Naxos that this survey appears to have uncovered, however. The rule of thumb for Classical settlement types on Naxos seems to be somewhat irregular compared to the pattern seen on the other Kyklades at this time, in that there appears to be more dense settlement in the Hellenistic and early Roman periods than the Classical. The pattern in the Classical period is one of a smaller number of larger sites, along the lines of more substantial rural villages, rather than a multiplicity of smaller sites. The surveyors caution that this is only one region of the island, and also that there may have been changes in the uses and forms of settlement over time, as from permanent to seasonal and vice versa.

However, the pattern of fewer, more densely populated sites may be mirrored in the smaller number of towers, if indeed these towers marked land boundaries. In such a case, the Naxian towers may have been more the collective efforts of small villages than of the aristocracy, but it is difficult to be certain. It would be interesting to see the results of a similar survey on Paros, where there is also a smaller number of towers, to see if the same pattern of settlement can be discerned.

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64 The Naxians were considered thalassocrats in the sixth century: Diodoros ap. Eusebius Chronica 1, 255 (Schone); Hdt. 5.30 states that the Naxians could field 8,000 hoplites and possessed many warships at this time; R. Ross Holloway, “The Crown of Naxos,” ANS Museum Notes 10 (1962), 1.

65 Dalongeville and Rougemont, Recherches, 95.
Tenos

Overall, this island constitutes a rather remarkable success story. Tenos suffered considerably in the late 360's from the depredations of Alexander of Pherai, who, according to Apollodoros, seized the island and reduced its inhabitants to slavery during the archonship of Molon in 362. This devastation did not bring any lasting ruin to the island, however, for the Tenians appear to have regrouped after the disaster and moved their polis to a new locale on the island. This new settlement developed into a fairly prosperous town by the middle of the century.

Tenos has been extensively studied in recent years by a French team under the supervision of Roland Etienne. Working with fieldwalking notes compiled by P. Graindor in 1910, Etienne has reconstructed the extent of the walls of both the older and newer poleis of ancient Tenos and has connected the latter with the establishment of a temple to Poseidon and Amphitrite, dated by finds of fourth century pottery. The center of the post-destruction city is more aligned along the southern coast of the island, while

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66 [Dem.] 50.4; although Diod. 15.95 placed the event during the archonship of Nikophemos in 361/0.


68 Etienne Tenos II, 16-22.
the older settlement was located at Xombourgo farther inland. Etienne speculates on the possibility that this relocation may have had a commercial motivation, as has been surmised for similar movements on Crete in a slightly later period. Etienne also makes a comparison to the port of Gaurion on Andros' southern coast. However, we have seen that in the case of Naxos, proximity to the coast was unrelated to involvement in commerce, so while this supposition is attractive, it should not be taken as the only possible motivation.

Two terms are used to describe ports on Tenos at this time, "Panormos" and "Limeneia." The old and new towns themselves are clearly differentiated in this same inscription, with astu indicating the latter and polis for the former. This inscription is a veritable goldmine for information on land use on Tenos, roughly comparable to the list from Karthaia on Keos that dates to a similar period. Extant on this list are forty-seven

69 Ibid., 21.
70 H. Van Effenterre, La Crete et le monde greque de Platon a Polybe (Paris 1948), 97 and n.10-11. The poleis of Lato, Lyttos, Oleros, and Hierapytna all appear to follow this pattern.
71 Etienne, Tenos II, 21.
72 Euphron (fr.1 Edmonds) does mention a merchant ship manned by Tenians and, as one scholar has pointed out, the reference does not appear to have been made in jest; Brun Archipels 154 n.173.
73 IG XII.5, 872 line 90. The harbor was used at least once in Roman times, by Augustus on his way to the East in 21-19 B.C.; IG XII.5, 940 lists dedications from this expedition.
74 See Chapter 2. While the dating of both is generally given as the "second half of the fourth century," both these inscriptions may show conditions that resulted from increases in prosperity made under the League. See Chapter 6 for full
transactions involving forty-five individuals, quite a high ratio and also comparable to Karthaia. There also appears to have been a high amount of liquid assets available to these families, as some 70,000 drachmas change hands in these transactions. Patrice Brun has suggested that marketing agriculture may have led to such an abundance of ready cash, but this must remain speculative. The same inscription also contains information on the presence of rural villages and the road infrastructure near the polis.

It is also noteworthy that there were properties on the island owned by Delian Apollo. Tenos is attested on the Sandwich Marble (Coupry ID 98) as having been in fairly good financial standing in 377/6-374/3. The Tenians are listed as having paid interest in the amount of 1 talent, with 2,400 drachmas of interest remaining unpaid. They are again listed in the accounts for 372/1-368/7, although the amount remitted is not preserved, and again in an account of an unknown year from mid-century, also with the amount missing. It is unfortunate that more securely-dated examples of Tenian payments after the movement of the polis are not forthcoming. However, since Tenos is preserved in the

discussion of this issue.


76 Moreover, it appears to contradict other statements by Brun that the various loans contracted by island poleis were due to a lack of liquid assets.

77 IG XII.5, 872 line 19.

78 Coupry ID 104-8 B, line 46.

79 Coupry ID 98, line 4; Migeotte L'emprunt, 143-44.

80 Coupry ID 100, line 17.
last account mentioned above, that quite possibly dates after the Thessalian raid, this
might indicate that the island was able to continue its payments. Several private debts to
Delian Apollo were incurred by individuals in the years before and during the League,
and we know of at least one Tenian who leased an estate on Delos in 354/3. There is
also a Tenian proxenos attested at Karthaia on Keos in the middle of the century.
Although it is quite brief and fragmentary, there is a portion of an Athenian decree that
has survived concerning Athens and Tenos. The inscription, though of uncertain date,
has been posited ca.350 on the basis of letter forms; the use of the term symmachoi would
date it to before 338. The purpose behind the decree is unknown, although an individual
named Bion is mentioned who may have been a Tenian ambassador or delegate to
Athens. The inscription is quite tantalizing and it is hoped that joins may later be made
with other fragments; for now it is sufficient to note that Tenos had several connections

81 On the debtors: Agathonides in 393/2-389/8 (Coupry ID 97, line 16); Agakleas
Psokleas in 377/6-374/3 (ID 98B, line 15); Pasikles Deikratos in accounts of
393/2 up to 367/6 (ID 97, line 15, ID 98A, line 53, ID 100, line 20). There are
other examples of interest payments on Tenian debts being covered by other
individuals who may or may not be Tenian; the list is given in Etienne Tenos II,
180. The estate on Delos was leased by Phoinix (ID 104-11A, line 20 and ID 104-
18, line 3.

82 IG XII.5, 542, line 45.

83 IG II² 279; J. Pecirka, The Formula for the Grant of Enktesis in Attic Inscriptions
(Prague 1966), 53-4.

84 Pecirka Formula, 53.

85 Pecirka states that the inscription appears to be more than a simple honorary
decree for Bion, and that D.M. Lewis, in a personal communication, suggested
that Bion was a Tenian who had come to Athens with a legal complaint.
both with Athens and with other Kykladic islands during the League. The remains of some eight towers are known from Tenos. The most famous of these, at Smovolon, has been dated to the Hellenistic period (late third/early second centuries) and contains the inscribed name of the proprietor. The other towers have not been securely dated, but, as on other nearby islands, some may very well date to the fourth century, and may reflect a similar pattern of the marking of estate boundaries by landowners.

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86 Nowicka Maisons 43-4.
87 Ibid., 44 n.117.
The two cities of Ikaria, Thermai and Oinoe, appear in many of the different accounts from the temple of Delos. Thermai is first attested in the years 393/2-389/8, although the amount of interest paid by the city is not preserved. The years recorded on the Sandwich Marble, 377/6-374/3, are quite puzzling, in that there is a major discrepancy between the amounts of interest, both remitted and unremitting, of the two cities. Thermai had paid a modest sum of 400 drachmas in these years, and only another 400 drachmas were left in arrears. Oinoe had reimbursed the temple treasury in the amount of 4,000 drachmas, and still owed 1 talent and 80 drachmas of unpaid interest at the end of this period. Oinoe pays 1 talent and 1,520 drachmas soon afterward, in 372/1-368/7. Oinoe is also listed in the accounts of an unknown later year (with no sum preserved), and Thermai is listed as paying 200 drachmas. Yet another account of unidentified date lists Thermai (again with

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88 Coupry ID 97, line 13; Migeotte L'emprunt, 142.
89 Coupry ID 98, lines 4-5.
90 Coupry ID 98, lines 5-6.
91 Coupry ID 104-8, line 6.
92 Coupry ID 104-8, line 6.
While neither of the Ikarian poleis is definitely attested on the League charter, most scholars have tentatively accepted their status as League members. The most recent monograph on Ikaria takes the stand that while its inhabitants were not oppressed by Athens during the League, they did not precisely prosper economically at this time either. Papalas speculates that pro-Spartan governments had been installed in both Oinoe and Thermai some time after 405, since they were situated on a frequently-used navarch’s route to Samos. There are also pirates attested on Ikaria in the early part of the century, although it is unclear if they are native to the island, and may perhaps be Spartan privateers. Papalas does feel that anti-Spartan feeling did develop on Ikaria, and even implies that this island and others nearby may have joined the anti-Spartan ΣYN league; however, as seen in Chapter 3, the existence of such a league is still very controversial.

Papalas focuses on one particular structure in order to propose a rather sweeping theory regarding the islands of the Second Athenian League. The tower found at Drakanon, with an excellent view of the nearby sea lanes, has been dated on the basis of construction techniques to the middle of the fourth century, roughly 378-355. The fourth century

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93 Coupry ID 104-9, line 9.
94 Cargill League, 37 n.32.
96 Xen. Hell. 2.3.6-7; Diod. 36.1.2; Papalas Icaria, 91.
97 Xen. Hell. 2.1.28-30; Isok. 17.35; Paus. 10.9.10; Papalas Icaria, 89 n.82.
98 Papalas Icaria, 98; Brun Archipels, 155.
walls at Kataphydion are mentioned by Papalas as being possibly related to the tower. He speculates that a lookout was placed here near the end of the Peloponnesian War, and that the revolt of Chios in 412 made conditions in the Aegean more dangerous. He suggests that this tower, as well as others on certain islands, was built under Athenian supervision and with Athenian funding. The islands of Leros, Astypalaia, Andros, Keos, Kythnos, Seriphos, Samos, and Amorgos all possess towers with views of the sea, nearby arable plains. Papalas maintains that these towers were meant as a series of outposts to monitor maritime traffic, built under Athenian patronage, because the Athenian fleet was unable to guard the seas effectively at this time. Patrice Brun, who finds this theory attractive, goes so far as to suggest that the loans from Delos may have helped provide liquid capital for the building of these towers.

Such a hypothesis would seem to accord quite well with the present study; however, there are many problems with this reconstruction. Aspects of tower construction seen at Drakonon, such as the use of Lesbian masonry and an arched entryway, arrow slits, probable catapult platforms, and postern gates, can also refer to the late fourth/early third centuries. It is quite possible that some of them were part of an early Hellenistic building program of the same purpose as the one proposed. It is also possible that they were antipiracy outposts commissioned and paid for by the local inhabitants. The date of these

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99 Thuc. 8.80.53; Xen. Hell. 1.6.2.
100 Papalas Icaria, 100, in which he also notes the similarity in construction to contemporary Attic forts.
101 Brun Archipels, 159.
coastal towers must remain an open question until more evidence is gathered. In addition, there are many towers in the Kyklades that do not have views of the sea and are not explained by the theories of Papalas and Brun; if there was indeed an Athenian-sponsored program of tower construction in the islands, only a small percentage of the extant structures would seem to have been of any benefit to the surveillance of shipping lanes. Several of the islands with coastal towers (Leros, Astypalaia, and Kythnos) are neither mentioned on the League charter nor in the Delian loan accounts, which makes Brun's proposition more problematic.

Similarities in tower construction, moreover, could simply reflect styles that were in vogue during a particular period, rather than a common sponsor. If the loans from Delos had any relation to this phenomenon, then the new credit given in 341/0 would be the only possible time that a major tower-building program could have been funded from this source. But given the Macedonian threat at this time, it would have perhaps made more sense to use such monies for syntaxeis to support local fleet operations than for towers, if the protection of shipping was the major issue.

Papalas views the Delian loans more as an indicator of financial hardship in Ikaria during the League, and that the tower at Drakonon could not have been built by the Ikarians acting on their own initiative. He does not equate the building of the tower with Athenian oppression, since it would have been more effective to place the fort closer

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102 Coupry ID 104-28; Migeotte L'emprunt 146-7.
103 Papalas Icaria, 101.
to Oinoe, the largest population center on the island.\textsuperscript{104}

There is some evidence, however, that Ikaria was not without sources of income. Ikaria had a long tradition as a center of timber production and, even more so, of viticulture.\textsuperscript{105} The two cities of Oinoe and Thermai had paid relatively high tributes during the fifth-century Athenian Confederacy; Oinoe paid around 1 talent for most of the lifetime of that organization.\textsuperscript{106} Ikarian wine was still famous in the fourth century and was celebrated on the local island coinage.\textsuperscript{107} Ikaria does seem to have suffered disaster around the beginning of the Hellenistic era,\textsuperscript{108} but given the fairly regular payments of Oinoe to Delos, one cannot say the same about prosperity on Ikaria earlier in the century.

The discrepancy in the sizes of interest payments to Delian Apollo by the two cities may be related more to earlier Spartan policies. If Oinoe was the more important and wealthier polis of the island, then it would have been more of a prime target for Spartan exactions, perhaps even a garrison. The strategic position of Ikaria along the most commonly-used routes of Spartan naval expeditions, and in particular its proximity to Samos, lends further support to this supposition. It may represent the strongest evidence for linking the Delian loans to financial damage wrought by the Spartans after they

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., 102.


\textsuperscript{106} Meiggs \textit{AE} 540.

\textsuperscript{107} B.V. Head, \textit{Historia Numorum}\textsuperscript{2} (London 1911), 602.

\textsuperscript{108} Arrian \textit{Anab.} 7.20.5, in which displaced inhabitants of Thermai were lured to the east by Alexander.
wrested control of the Aegean from Athens. Oinoe had a substantial debt when the Athenian amphiktyons resumed control of the temple accounts on Delos, but the interest on this debt was paid in full within a few years afterward.
Ios

The remaining islands in this chapter are all scarce in evidence for the period of the League. Ios does not appear on the League charter, but it does in the Delian loan accounts. Because of the inscription (discussed below) that may refer to an Athenian garrison, most scholars have accepted its membership in the League. Ios appears on only two accounts from Delos, having paid a modest sum of 800 drachmas in 377/6-374/3, with no interest remaining unpaid. The island does not show up again until the accounts for 341/0, in which she pays an unspecified sum of interest (on line 14), and takes out a new loan in this year, though the amount of this loan is not preserved.

Some scholars have speculated that an Athenian garrison existed on Ios at this time, as there is an inscription from Ios that votes to an unnamed Athenian similar honors to those bestowed on Androtion, the governor at Amorgos. Cargill is skeptical about the presence of a garrison, due to the fragmentary and undated character of this text. But the possibility must remain open until more evidence is found. There may have been a force placed on Ios later in the history of the League, perhaps even reflected in the new loan

109 Cargill League, 37; Strabo 10.5.1 on the geography of the island.
110 Coupry ID 98, line 13.
111 Coupry ID 104-28, line 14.
112 IG XII.5, 1000; P. Graindor, “Fouilles de’Ios: Inscriptions,” BCH 28 (1904), 313; Accame Lega, 185 and n.3; Cargill League, 156.
given to the island in 341/0, that could have contributed to the payment of these troops.

There are remains of towers on Ios, but they have not been extensively studied and little can be said about their date or probable function.\textsuperscript{113}
Seriphos

This island is another polis considered as a candidate for one of the lost names on the League charter. She also appears on the temple accounts from Delos in 377/6-374/3, where she has remitted an amount of interest totalling 1,600 drachmas, not an incredible sum but higher than a few other islands for these years. She does not appear again until 341/0, where she is given new credit in the amount of 4,000 drachmas.

One area of profit potential for Seriphos appears to have been its iron mines. In the fifth century Seriphos paid 2 (later 1) talents regularly to the Delian Confederacy, and mining profits may have contributed to this higher assessment. Ancient iron workings have been found at Port Megalo Livadi, but no slag remains were found nearby.

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114 Cargill League, 37-8.
115 Coupy ID 98, line 12.
116 Coupy ID 104-28, line 20.
117 Brun Archipels, 129, who notes that the island’s name may have originated from the Phoenician word sareph, meaning “foundry.”
118 IG I² 233-91.
119 Shepard Mining, 112. It has been suggested that iron was transported from islands where it was mined to others where slag and furnaces have been found but no workings, such as Peparethos (Skopelos); A. Landerer, “Uber die in Griechenland
are also remains of copper slag heaps and crucible fragments at Konduro.\textsuperscript{120} The tower at Aspropyrgos was situated near iron workings, and perhaps also marble quarries, that provided some of the material for the tower.\textsuperscript{121} Seriphos, along with Siphnos and Melos, had refused to submit to the Persians and had sent one pentekonter to the Battle of Salamis.\textsuperscript{122} It seems that by the fourth century, however, Athenians had become fond of mocking Seriphians.\textsuperscript{123} This should not be taken to refer to poverty, though, but rather to Athenian attitudes of the time concerning their own preeminence at sea and a real disdain of both the small size of the polis of the Seriphians and their lack of political influence.\textsuperscript{124}

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\textit{sich finderen Bergwerke aus den Zeiten der alten Hellenin},” \textit{Berg-und-Huttenmannische Zeitung} 9 (1850), 625-50.
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\textsuperscript{120} Davies \textit{Roman Mines}, 259-61.

\textsuperscript{121} S. Blaicher, “A survey of the island of Seriphos,” 11; Nowicka \textit{Maisons}, 49.

\textsuperscript{122} Hdt. 8.46-8.

\textsuperscript{123} Brun \textit{Archipels}, 122 for a list of references.

Mykonos

This island had a reputation for poverty in antiquity. This may not have been totally warranted, however, for the island paid a respectable 1 to 1.5 talent tribute in the fifth century. Mykonos is securely attested as a League member, presumably joining at roughly the same time as other Kyklades after the Battle of Naxos. Mykonos appears on the Delian accounts for 393/2-389/8, having paid 1000 drachmas in those years. A total of 1,260 drachmas of interest had been paid during the years of the Sandwich Marble, 377/6-374/3, and only 420 drachmas of interest remained unpaid. The island does not appear again in extant Delian accounts, but it seems that Mykonos had little trouble making its interest payments during the League years.

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125 Athenaios Deip. 1.7-8; Ovid Metam. 7.463; Strabo 10.5.9 on baldness (!); Brun Archipels. 155 n.179 notes however that a third-century inscription from Mykonos (Syll. 3 1215) lists dowries comparable to contemporary ones at Athens. Skylax 58 mentions two towns on the island.

126 IG I3 233-291.

127 IG II2 43, line 115; Cargill League. 27. It is possible, however, that Mykonos joined in 377 when the island of Delos was again brought under Athenian control, and was not inscribed on the League charter until later.

128 Coupri ID 97, line 11; Migeotte L’emprunt, 142.

129 Coupri ID 98, line 11.
It seems fair to state that most economic activity of Mykonos was probably connected to its neighboring sacred island of Delos. The most visible manifestation of this relationship was the estates owned by Apollo on Mykonos.\(^{130}\) It is difficult to say if the Spartans had ever maintained forces on Mykonos, but as has been stated earlier, the island was often a stopover for Spartan forces, and certain monies may have been fleeced from its inhabitants, especially after 405. Other aspects of the Mykonian landscape are also difficult to reconstruct. Only three towers are known from the southwest of the island, near Lino and close to the sea.\(^{131}\)


\(^{131}\) Nowicka *Maisons*, 44-8. At least one has been identified as probably Hellenistic.
Syros

This is another island that has remained quite enigmatic in discussions of the Classical period in the Aegean. Although it possesses one of the best harbors in the Kyklades, it does not appear to have been unduly prosperous in Archaic times. It is one of the few Kykladic poleis, however, that appears to have discharged most or all of its debt to Delian Apollo. Syros had paid a considerable amount in the accounts for 393/2-389/8, totalling 1 talent, 103 drachmas and 1 obol. By 377/6-374/3, the island had paid 2,300 drachmas, and had 4,900 drachmas of interest left in arrears. The accounts for 372/1-368/7 are problematic, for an amount of remitted interest is listed in that exact amount of 4,900 drachmas, but the city making the payment has not survived. Most commentators have restored Syros here as the most likely candidate, but the reason for Syros’ ability to make these payments remains obscure.

Syros is not definitely attested on the League charter but another, rather dramatic piece of evidence gives good reason to believe that the island was a member of the League. A statue base has been found in the Athenian agora that lists dedications to the Athenian

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132 Coupry ID 97, line 11.

133 Coupry ID 100 line 16; Migeotte L' emprunt 145; Brun Archipels, 165 speculates that revenue from lands on Syros helped them discharge the debt.
A general Chabrias made after the Battle of Naxos in 376. Among the donors, on fragment L of the base, Diotimos and the soldiers of Syros appear. Burnett and Edmondson believe that the troops were mercenaries established at Syros by Chabrias after the battle, under Diotimos’ command since they are identified by the name of this commander. It is unknown how long these forces remained on the island, or what their possible connection to the payments to Delian Apollo might have been, or even if the people of Syros were responsible for their wages. Their status as mercenaries makes them more ambiguous regarding the syntaxeis and other financial considerations.

With the islands of this study now cataloged, an overall analysis of the region can be attempted. The final chapter of this study will bring together evidence for commercial links between these islands and Athens, as well as the Pontic area, Ionia, and Egypt, to speculate on possible sources of revenue for the islands and their place on strategic sea lanes. The ultimate relationship between these connections, the League, the Delian loans, and economic conditions on the islands themselves gives a highly plausible reconstruction of how these islands fared under the Second Athenian League, and why this organization was of a beneficial character.

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135 Polyainos 3.11.3 mentions a tactic of Diotimos at the battle of Naxos, and the same man as a leader of grain convoys, 5.22.1. He was accused of withholding 40 talents from the Athenian state that had been paid to him by merchants in exchange for protection, but was eventually acquitted; Lys. 19.50.

136 Burnett and Edmondson, “Monument,” 81 and n.16.
CHAPTER 6- CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS

The preceding chapters have attempted to portray the nature of local conditions on each of the islands in this study immediately before and during the Second Athenian League. It is now possible to come to some general conclusions about the economic history of the region, and to examine the possibility that there was a strong economic as well as political element to the Second Athenian League.

This study hinges upon several controversial topics concerning Kykladic history and archaeology in the fourth century. The proper method for interpreting survey data, the political and economic implications of island towers and proxenia decrees, the background behind the Delian loans, and basic assumptions about the ancient economy in general, are all covered under the aegis of the present work, and all remain very controversial at this time.

This study proposes that it was Athenian policy to encourage the economic strength and vitality of League members through the convoying of allied shipping as well as various honorary decrees for individuals from allied poleis, such as proxenia and symbolai, that contained economic benefits among their clauses. Many “primitivist” discussions of proxeny decrees would not accept such an evaluation, stressing the
primarily political and military aspects of this institution. However, there is evidence to suggest that the character of proxenia shifted to more of an economic focus by the fourth century. As pointed out by Edmund Burke, in Athens at least, proxenia was awarded publicly, by a vote of the ekklesia. Moreover, many of the individuals honored also received the title of euergetes. In addition to such honors as exemption from harbor taxes, a major new addition to proxenies of the fourth century was the grant of enktesis, the right of foreigners to own land in the polis. While only a few of the recorded proxenies can be traced specifically to individuals involved in commerce, there are enough examples to indicate that they were increasing in number in the fourth century. The Kyklades shared these same benefits of membership along with states such as the eastern cities of Chios and Asia Minor. Since most of the Kyklades already had connections to the temple of Apollo on Delos, however, an additional impetus was given to the financial growth of the islands through Athenian control of the Delian temple treasury.

Contrary to the view of most scholars, it is proposed in this study that Spartan exactions before the formation of the Second Athenian League, which are discussed in several ancient sources, were the major cause of Kykladic debt to Delian Apollo. G. Bockisch theorizes that Spartan support of oligarchs in allied states disenfranchised the

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1 G. Herman, *Ritualized Friendship in the Greek City* (Cambridge 1987), 130-42; Marek Pro xenie, 332-85.


4 Burke, “Economy,” 207 n.34.
common people and suppressed their economic development. This theory may be partially correct in that oligarchies may have limited prosperity to fewer families, while democracies could have led to a greater number of landowning families engaging in the economy, as seen on Keos and Tenos. Democracies in ancient Greece never led to the elimination of elites, however. Some of these debts to Delos were no doubt incurred before 393/2, as shown by the Delian accounts for that year, but it is likely that the majority of the debts came about in the 380's, during a time of both rampant piracy in the Aegean and increased Spartan domination after the King’s Peace.

Martin Dreher’s interpretation of Athenian policy concerning the Delian loans is that Athens would not have forced the payments because of provoking old fears among the allies of the fifth-century phoros, but that the display of the arrears would have kept them in line morally and to keep a good credit rating. Athenian piety for the sanctity of the Delian temple is also mentioned by Dreher, and he explains away the Andrian sharing of the amphiktyonate as simple goodwill on the part of Athens. Athens thus always had the option to collect, a way of exerting gentle persuasion.

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6 Bockisch, “Krise,” Poleis, 221 n. 23 points out that, although the figure of 1000 talents of tribute to Sparta given in Diod. 14.10.2 seems quite high, especially in comparison to the 600 talents of fifth-century tribute to Athens in Thuc. 2.13.3, the figure of 1000 may also have encompassed Sparta’s mainland allies in the Peloponnese.

7 Ibid., 256-57.

8 Ibid., 259.
Dreher is correct, insofar as the Delian loans cannot be seen as having a direct, one-for-one correspondance with any known syntaxis figures, or having any real potential for actual recruitment of new members to the League. In particular, he points out that the Sandwich Marble does not appear to grant new credit (except in 341/0), and states that if the treasury of Delos were directly connected to support of the islands in the League, that new loans would have been issued in this year.

But we have seen that it is not necessary to posit a one-to-one correlation between the Delian loans and syntaxeis, in order to see a relationship between Athenian supervision of these debts and their desire to keep the allies financially strong and solvent. Even Dreher is forced to admit that the new loans of 341/0 might have had some relation to the threat of Macedon. It may be that Athenian control over the Delian temple was not without some limits, that 341/0 and the new threats to the Greek world, as well as a longer period of time under the management of Athenian amphiktyons, was required before Athens could grant new credit to the islands. It is not necessary, moreover, to consider that the extension of new credit meant that the islands had become poor, for Athens may have been trying at that late date to mobilize all possible resources against Philip II. Patrice Brun has interpreted the loans as having been originally issued in the greatest amounts to

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9 Dreher Hegemon, 245, 258, 268.
10 Ibid., 251.
11 Ibid., 252, 258. Athens even loaned ships to Chalkis at this time; IG II2 1629 line 517.
islands who were most potentially able to pay them back.\textsuperscript{12} He discusses the possibility that the islanders, though agriculturally prosperous, were in need of liquid capital for payment of \textit{syntaxeis}, towers, and fortifications. I consider his theory, however, as being more applicable to explaining the original, pre-378 loans from Delos. Spartan exactions may have led to the borrowing of Delian Apollo’s funds by the islands rather than any of the demands of the \textit{syntaxeis} of the Athenian League. The towers may have been more indicative of estate boundaries, and built in greater numbers because of a higher number of landowners, indicated at two \textit{poleis} (that of the Tenians and that of the Karthaian on Keos) by epigraphic evidence, and in the case of Tenos a high number of land transactions. While the inscriptions that detail these aspects of land use admittedly date from the later fourth century, after the time of the League, they may actually represent the aftermath, the results of the kind of fiscal policy exercised by Athens in their control of the treasury.

Although such a comparison must be used with caution, there is a possible parallel to the situation of the Second Athenian League, that of the domination of the First Nesiotic League under Ptolemy II, starting in 288.\textsuperscript{13} J. Delamarre has noted epigraphical evidence that the Egyptian monarch intervened to ensure the disbursement of loans from the temple of Delian Apollo to the various constituents of the \textit{koinon} of the islands.\textsuperscript{14} This is

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\textsuperscript{12} Brun \textit{Archipels}, 159.
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compared to evidence for amounts of tribute paid to Egypt by various islands.\textsuperscript{15} Delamarre theorizes that control of the Delian treasury by Ptolemy II, and the subsequent credit extended to the members of the Nesiotic League, ensured the regular payment of tribute to his kingdom by the islands.\textsuperscript{16} He then goes on to speculate that the Second Athenian League operated on the same principle; in this he remains the only other scholar to take a firm stand on the relation of control of Delian Apollo to the finances of the allies in the League. His thesis, however, differs from the one presented herein, as he states that the majority of the loans originated from the harbor taxes imposed by the Athenians after the battle of Knidos in 394/3 (and were recorded in the accounts for 393/2-389/8), but this ingenious explanation has difficulties. Judging from the testimony of Diodoros, these harbor taxes appear to have been concentrated on the states of the eastern Mediterranean, probably more out of considerations of where the Athenian forces were than out of disregard for the economic potential of the Kyklades.\textsuperscript{17} It seems unlikely, moreover, that a richer island such as Paros would have required the kind of massive loans recorded on the Sandwich Marble to pay five percent of its harbor taxes, while a smaller island like Syros pays off a much greater amount of interest in the period 393/2-389/8 than Paros does. In other words, massive loans would seem to be unnecessary for the payment of five percent of a sum that normally accrued to the civic income of a polis. The amounts do not appear to fit Delamarre’s hypothesis, and conform more to the concept of ad hoc exactions by

\begin{itemize}
\item[15] Keos, for example, in IG XII.5, 533; Delamarre, “Contrats,” \textit{RPh.} 28 (1904), 100.
\end{itemize}

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Sparta, exactions that had much more of a negative effect on the financial situation of the islands than harbor taxes. Just how much did the Kykladic islands depend upon commerce? This is a complex question and the present study does not claim to have solved all facets of the problem. If Athens took steps to stimulate trade in the Aegean, as this study suggests, then the prosperity of the islands may have depended upon it a great deal. The question then becomes one of status and social classes. If economic conditions in the Kyklades did in fact improve during the Second Athenian League, did all inhabitants of these islands benefit, or just the elites, who would have owned the majority of the land, built most of the island towers (if they were indeed estate boundaries), and been the recipients of the proxenies and other honorary decrees?

M.G. Clark has attempted to calculate some basic figures for revenue from harbor taxes in the Aegean.\textsuperscript{18} One of Lysias' speeches describes an Athenian general in 388/7 who failed to report 40 talents that he received from harbors and ships' captains.\textsuperscript{19} There is also a reference to Philip II selling the grain cargoes of some 200 ships at the Pontos for 700 talents.\textsuperscript{20} Clark reasons that if this were a tenth of the total annual grain traffic through the Hellespont, then a 5\% harbor tax of the kind instituted by the Athenians in

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{18}] Clark \textit{Navy}, 375 n.203.
\item[\textsuperscript{19}] Lysias 19.50.
\item[\textsuperscript{20}] Philochoros \textit{FGrH} 328 F.162; Theopomp. \textit{FGrH} 115 F.292.
\end{itemize}
412\textsuperscript{21} and in 387\textsuperscript{22} would have yielded around 350 talents a year.\textsuperscript{23} One major area of evidence that must be examined when discussing Aegean trade in this period is that of numismatics. In 375/4, Athens passed a new law governing the use of foreign as well as Athenian silver coins in the markets of the Peiraeus.\textsuperscript{24} The original editor of the inscription, R. Stroud, interpreted the inscription as one referring to a fear of counterfeit coins by the merchants in the harbor, and that the law establishes an official to test all silver coins and confiscate all plated specimens. Stroud understands the law to state that imitations of Attic coins are acceptable in the Peiraeus, while others have theorized that only Attic coins bearing the official device were considered legal tender.\textsuperscript{25} Most scholars have sided with Stroud, and his interpretation appears more probable.\textsuperscript{26} If many imitations of Attic coins were being produced at this time, to counter a scarcity of the genuine article, then it would have behooved the harbor officials to allow their use to continue so

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\item Thuc. 7.28.4.
\item See Chapter 1 for details.
\item Clark \textit{Navy}, 375 n.203.
\item Cargill, \textit{League}, 140-41 and n.24 for other bibliography. Cargill focuses on the contrasts between this coinage law and the Standards Decree of the fifth century, but he also mentions the fourth-century law in the context of stimuli to trade.
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that commerce would still thrive. As a preventative measure, however, all coins would be tested to ensure their quality and to keep out plated coins that would further damage the reputation of Athenian-style coinage. The main purpose of the law seems to have been to promote the smooth operation of the Peiraeus and to keep trade ties with Aegean states, many of whom had been recently enrolled in the Second Athenian League (and most of the Kyklades appear to have joined only a year or so before the promulgation of this law).

The local coinages of Naxos and Siphnos were discussed in the last chapter, and their weight standards were characterized as providing a monetary “bridge” of easy conversion between the Aiginetan and Chian/Rhodian standards. This makes the connection of Paros and Chios interesting, as Parian coinage is lacking for the period in question, and thus the loans from Chian merchants to the polis of Paros may be significant. It does not appear that trade with the Chian/Rhodian sphere ceased after the Social War of 357-55, although it probably experienced a temporary lull during the conflict itself. One bit of evidence for the continued importance of the route to the East at the end of the history of the League, is the coinage issued by Histiaia on Euboia ca. 341-338. These issues included octobols of Euboio-Attic weight standard, which equate almost exactly to nine

It should also be remembered that mining leases at Laurion were not issued again until 367/6; see Isager and Hansen, Aspects, 42.

L. Robert, “La circulation des monnaies d’Histiee,” Etudes de numismatique grecque (1951), 179-216, shows how the movement of coinage appears to have roughly followed the trade routes given in the Stadiasmus Maris Magni.

See Chapter 3.

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obols of the Chian standard.\textsuperscript{30} The flow of coinage from Athens to other parts of the Mediterranean in the fourth century has been well-documented.\textsuperscript{31} Coin hoards containing Athenian moneys have been found in Asia Minor, the Levant, and Egypt, and some Athenian silver traveled east of the Euphrates.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, the Kabul hoard as well as one from Malayer in Iran contain staters from Aigina and Melos.\textsuperscript{33} We can also append to this the finds of other indications of trade connections, such as the Athenian red-figure pottery and the grave steles of metics in Attika from some of these same locales.\textsuperscript{34}

In Chapter 1 of this study, it was noted that after the Social War Athens took several steps to strengthen her economy and to stimulate trade by offering more privileges and enticements to metics.\textsuperscript{35} All of the benefits could have potentially applied to the

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\item M. Thompson, O. Markholm, and C.M. Kraay, \textit{An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards} (New York 1973), 1227f; Isager and Hansen, \textit{Aspects}, 215-17.
\item A few examples are Lesbos (4th c.): Kraay 1227; Al-Mina (ca.375): Kraay 1487-88; Naukratis (ca.360): Kraay 1652; Kabul (ca.380): Kraay 1830.
\item Malayer (ca.375): Kraay 1790. For evidence of metics on Aigina involved in trade in the fourth century, see Dem. 23.211; Xen. \textit{Hell.}, 5.1.12; H. Winterscheidt, \textit{Aigina: Eine Untersuchung über seine Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft} (diss. Koln 1938), 41-42.
\item Red-figure vases: J.D. Beazley, \textit{Attic Red-figure Vase Painters} (Oxford 1963) and \textit{Paralipomena} (Oxford 1971). Grave steles: Isager and Hansen, \textit{Aspects}, 217-19, among these steles are 11 from Keos, 7 from Krete, 6 from Rhodes, 13 from Samos, and 15 from Egypt and Libya. As for Egypt, it is noteworthy that there is a reference to Plato taking Attic olive oil to Egypt to exchange in Plut. \textit{Solon} 2; V. Grace, “Samian Amphoras,” \textit{Hesperia} 40 (1971), 81.
\item Chapter 1, 44-45.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
inhabitants of the Kyklades, ones who traveled to Athens as well as those who profited from the increased sea traffic that may have made use of their ports on their way to and from Athens. One aspect of these economic reforms, the establishment of new maritime courts, the dikai emporikai, remains controversial. These courts were open to xenoi from states that had no formal symbolai treaties with Athens, and were established some time after 355 and before 347. These courts gave quick verdicts and had special powers of arrest to ensure that defendants did not flee Athens, but this should be seen as simple prudence on the part of the Athenians and not as an overly repressive measure. What is controversial about the courts is whether or not they had large-scale trade in grain as their sole sphere of jurisdiction, and held session in these cases only in the winter months. Others have surmised that the courts were available to a wider range of merchants, not just those who dealt in grain. Considering that the only route that could be traversed in

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Dem. 7.12; Isager and Hansen, Aspects, 84, who are careful to stress that this was not a “new type of process but rather a new procedure that can be employed in connection with already existing types of process in cases of conflict over Athenian maritime trade.”

Xen. Vect. 3.3 for 355, Dem. 21.176 for 347.

This is the theory of M.B. Walbank, “Athens and Stymphalos: IG II² 144+,” Hesperia 55 (1986), 351 n.50, shared by Gauthier, Symbola, 202-03, but is criticized below.

Velissaropoulos, Naucleres, 245-47; both this author and M.H. Hansen, “Two Notes on the Athenian Dikai Emporikai,” The Scientific Year-book of the Graduate School of Political Sciences ‘Panteios’ (Athens 1981), 167-75, and Isager and Hansen, Aspects 84-5, state that the courts met in summer; the controversy revolves around the proper interpretation of months given in Dem. 33.23, which states that the courts met from “Boedromion to Mounichion,” i.e. winter. The first to propose that the text should be emended was U.E. Paoli, “Zur Gerichtszeit der dikai emporikai im attischen Recht,” RA 49 (1929), 473-77.

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the winter months was Rhodes-Egypt, and that the whole point of the courts was to
provide merchants with speedy trials, the postponement of cases until the winter seems
absurd.\textsuperscript{40} There is evidence from Demosthenes that these cases were brought as monthly
suits.\textsuperscript{41} It is far more likely that these privileges, as well as the others brought in by the
 programme of Eubulos, would extend to other merchants and other products, since grain
was by no means the only kind of cargo brought to the Peiraeus.

The participation of the Kyklades in trade connected to the grain route to the Bosporos
is more difficult to determine, although Andros appears to have been strategic in guarding
part of the route, as was seen in Chapter 4. There is also the evidence of Parian amphorae
in the Euxine region.\textsuperscript{42} The islands that may have most benefitted from the Bosporan
grain trade, however, were more northern ones that straddled the route, such as
Peparethos, Skiathos, and Tenedos, and as such are the proper subject of a different
study.\textsuperscript{43}

There is evidence that remaining an enemy of Athens could economically backfire on
the inhabitants of such a polis. There is a case of prosecution of a Bosporan nobleman
that is dated to 395/4, in which this individual is prosecuted for extending a maritime loan

\textsuperscript{40} It is true that some grain came to Athens from Egypt along this route, as mention
in n.22 above. To this may be added Cyprus (Andok. 2.20-1; IG II\textsuperscript{2} 407) and Tyre
(IG II\textsuperscript{2} 342; M.B. Walbank, "Athens, Carthage, and Tyre," ZPE 59 107-111). But
these were secondary sources of grain compared to the Bosporos, which could
definitely not be sailed to in winter.

\textsuperscript{41} Dem. 7.12; 33.23; Arist. Ath.pol. 52.2; Isager and Hansen Aspects, 85.

\textsuperscript{42} E.H. Minns, Scythians and Greeks (Cambridge 1911), 246.

\textsuperscript{43} I plan to enumerate these connections in a future article.
to a Delian vessel. The Bosporan has been prosecuted under the procedure of phasis, which was customarily used by the Athenians against those engaging in commercial dealings with hostile states. The case is dated during the Korinthian War, when Delos was under Spartan control, and the Spartans are mentioned in the speech as dominating the sea lanes, so the suit must be dated before the battle of Knidos. Although this is perhaps an isolated incident (and the Bosporan appears to have been acquitted), this case may illustrate that in order to take advantage of the emporion of the Peiraeus, it was to an island state’s advantage to remain in the Athenian camp.

Trade between the various Kyklades themselves is a different possibility, and one for which unfortunately little information is available. With the existence of proxenia between Karthaia and several other of the island poleis, however, there is at least some evidence that trade existed on a more intrainsular level, involving transactions that were not so concerned with the major movement of shipping across the trans-Aegean routes. Such traffic would have been quick and relatively safe, although piracy could still pose a threat to even short island-hopping voyages. There has been little work done in this area, although a nineteenth-century traveler postulated that metals mined on certain islands (such as Seriphos) could have been shipped as raw ore to other nearby islands for

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45 Hansen, *Apagoge*, 133.

46 Ibid., 133.
smelting. Presumably, the smelting islands had more readily available timber supplies or expertise in the techniques used. Landerer proposed Skopelos (Peparethos) as a smelting island, and this island was close to the Bosporan route and may have had easier access to timber from Macedon or from Thrace. Isager and Hansen also mention that iron appears to have been a major Athenian import, although the sources are unknown, so it is not impossible that the city may have been a market for island iron. All these measures on the part of Athens may have given the islands a fairly high level of prosperity, even in the later years of the League when the main syntaxeis-contributing states of the Eastern Mediterranean had seceded from the League. With Athens contributing more and more to the production of warships from her own funds, it may be suggested that the Kyklades were the main beneficiaries of Athenian financial practice rather than the Athenians themselves.

Moreover, as was detailed in Chapter 4, Athenian garrisons on islands such as Andros and Amorgos need not be seen as oppressive, either politically or economically. Garrison commanders could be named as euergetes in the islands, and support for the garrison forces could be brought in from outside syntaxeis rather than exacted entirely from the

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47 A. Landerer, see last chapter.

48 Strabo 9.1.23 on smelting; Isager and Hansen, Aspects, 102, on its centralization.

49 IG I3 117, line 30; Andok. 2.11; Dem. 17.28; 19.114,145,265; 49.26; Xen. Hell. 6.1.11.

50 Thuc. 4.108.1; Xen. Hell. 5.2.16; Diod. 12.58.4.

51 Isager and Hansen Aspects, 30.
local population. A cautionary statement must be made about the survey evidence cited for several of these islands as support for the hypothesis that the Kyklades as a region was one of high agricultural exploitation and population during the period of the League. Survey evidence is by its very nature controversial and problematic. Susan Alcock, in particular, has enumerated many of the caveats that must be acknowledged whenever conclusions are drawn from the evidence of surveys.\textsuperscript{52} These include: 1) the lack of standard chronological parameters used to define historical periods such as Classical and Hellenistic; 2) widely varying analyses of ceramics and their dating, as well as their supply to rural areas; 3) the identification of settlements as permanent, as opposed to seasonal; and 4) the dangers of equating population levels with the absolute number of identified settlements, since many inhabitants could, over time, congregate in larger centers that are fewer in number but greater in population density.\textsuperscript{53}

Phoebe Acheson has recently amassed survey evidence to show that at Halieis in the Southern Argolid, Classical sites tended to reflect the needs of individual, small-scale farmers rather than large landowners.\textsuperscript{54} Rather than being ‘market-driven’, or inclined towards the production of crops for export or profit, agriculture in this area appears to have been based more on subsistence and minute variations in topography and other

\textsuperscript{52} S. Alcock, Graecia Capta (Cambridge 1994).

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., 48-55.

environmental factors. It is also problematic to assert that the pattern presented in this study, if correct, would not have occurred if the islands had not joined the League. Similar survey data has been compiled for the fourth century for a great number of regions on the Greek mainland as well. The records of symbolai cited in the previous chapter, however, show that economic connections were also being cemented with mainland states such as Troizen and Stymphalos in the years of the League. Considering the depredations of pirates in periods when no strong hegemon patrolled the Aegean seaways, the probability that membership of these islands in the League helped stimulate their local economies cannot be overlooked. Although the survey evidence must be used cautiously, the repetition of similar phenomena on more than one island, noted by different survey teams using different methods, allows some confidence to be placed in the reconstruction here presented.

Moreover, topographical conditions on the Kykladic islands could be quite different from Halieis or other mainland areas. Although terracing was never important in the Argolid, places like the northern sector of Keos were much steeper and would have required them for increased agricultural production. Moreover, the high number of towers in the islands could indicate a greater number of elite landowners than in some of the mainland areas. The question of island towers and their purpose has yet to be resolved to the satisfaction of scholars. Towers have been noted on virtually every island of the

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55 Ibid., 185.
56 Ibid., 35-48.
57 Ibid., 183.
Kyklades, and their locations were listed in earlier chapters, but their date and function remain matters of debate. However, given that a good percentage of the towers may date to the fourth century, they can be considered as bearing upon the conclusions of this study. Although some of the towers (such as on Andros and Ikaria) may have had military purposes, as watchtowers or signalling posts for surveillance over important sailing routes, most of the island towers do not have good views of the sea, or even of each other, negating some of the possibilities of a signalling network. It is possible that the purpose of the towers changed over time; if this is true, given that there were fewer towers in the fourth century (especially those that seem to have incorporated military elements in their design), the towers present during the Second Athenian League may have represented markers for the boundaries of estates, constructed by elite landowners in a spirit of aristocratic competition. Y. Bequignon has noted examples of towers at Teos in Asia Minor with the names of individuals inscribed on the blocks, apparently reflecting the division of the local population into military units called pyrgoi. While some similar arrangement might be seen at work in the Kyklades (most notably, the tower of Smovolon on Tenos, inscribed with the name of a proprietor), these examples seem to date more from the Hellenistic era. Other scholars have argued that ethnic divisions in the landscape may have contributed to the construction of towers. R.G. Osborne has theorized that non-Greek slaves in Thasos and Attika lived in the rural districts near the

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59 See Chapter 5 for the Tenian tower. Bequignon “Teos,” RA 28 (1928), 200 n.2 does mention an inscribed tower block from Teos that may date to the fourth century, but it is supposition.

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mines where they worked, while Greeks who lived closer to the polis centers built towers to mark their farmland in the chora. Similar situations have been posited for Sicily and Lesbos. The theory concerning Lesbos is that separate myths of descent helped define various ethnic groups and communities on the island, partially shown by the various Lesbian cities. There are possible parallels in the Kyklades, not only because of multiple poleis on some of the islands such as Keos and Amorgos, but also in the various foundation myths that applied on Amorgos, and the possibility of colonies on Amorgos from different sources such as Samos. In any event, the towers on Lesbos have been interpreted as constructions that represented investment by elites in arable land that was distant from the polis centers where these landowners lived. They are also apparently situated along major roads and lines of communication between important resources on Lesbos, a phenomenon that can be seen to some degree in towers on Naxos. Overall, Spencer’s arguments seem applicable to a discussion of Kykladic towers on at least some of the relevant islands. Consistently, throughout the history of the League, the Kyklades show signs of continued loyalty to Athens. It should be stressed that such loyalty need not

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62 See Chapter 5 on Amorgos.

63 Spencer “Definition,” Tradition, 41.

64 See Chapter 5 on Naxos.
have been of sentimental nature, or some particular idealization of Athens as a rightful *hegemon* over the Aegean. All too often, scholars seem to favor the concept of drawing very defined lines of "black/white" and "good/evil" when discussing the exercise of political power in the ancient world, especially in regards to the actions of Athens. The very debate on oppression under the Second League is concerned with such issues. These tendencies are difficult to explain, although the nature of the available sources like the speeches of the fourth century orators may have helped create the initial bias. It is perhaps more accurate to remember one of the cardinal features of the politics in the Greek cities before the triumph of Macedon, which was an overriding concern with local powers and issues, and an unwillingness to cooperate with other *poleis* except when necessary or advantageous. If the premise is adopted that Athens, as well as the Kykladic islands, would first and foremost have entered into this organization to suit their own purposes, and not to fulfill lofty social or political ideals, then the reality of the situation becomes easier to explain.

Even with the evidence of various honors, crowns, epigraphic expressions of gratitude, and so forth that have been detailed in the various chapters of this study, it is erroneous to attribute these phenomena to some form of political *agape* vis-a-vis Athens and any particular island ally. Even if most of the islands were ruled by democracies during this period (as they appear to have been from the inscriptive evidence), this does not automatically rule out the potential for cross-purposes with Athens, at least sporadically.\(^\text{65}\)

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\(^{65}\) Dusanic, "Crete," *Talanta* 12/13 (1980-81), 19 n.81 points out that Epaminondas may have actually established an anti-Athenian radical democracy at Cyrene, to replace a pro-Athenian oligarchy.
What is important is that most of these differences do not seem to have led to secession by the Kyklades. It would seem easy to explain this away by stating that the islands were too cowed by Athens, too frightened to have taken action, and powerless to defend themselves in any case. But the islands met in a synedrion; and presumably they could have detached themselves en masse if Athenian rule proved to be oppressive or financially ruinous to them. Even a single island like Keos required a fairly extensive operation to reconquer, and a more extensive movement of this kind could have been disastrous for Athens. During the Social War, when major shipowning states such as Chios and Byzantion were taking on the Athenian fleet and ravaging some of the Kyklades, the islands did not play the turncoat.\(^6\) Trade with these eastern states appears to have outlived the hostilities, so another explanation for Kykladic loyalty must be sought than their location on trade routes.

Easy access to a friendly emporion, as embodied in the Peiraeus, is one possibility, but the loans from Delos lurk in the shadows as the potential prime mover. The Social War rebels were not indebted to Delian Apollo, but most of the Kyklades were. Under Athenian control, the major loans to islands such as Naxos, Andros, and Paros do not appear to have been aggressively collected, and new credit was issued to some near the end of the history of the League. While this could be interpreted as a form of coercion on the part of Athens, it is equally viable to see the islands weighing their options, and seeing a continuation of League membership as the best course of action, the most

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\(^6\) Diod. 16.21.2; IG XII.7,5 lines 15-16 on Amorgians apparently held for ransom by the rebels. On the ships of Chios: Aineias Pol. 11.3; Byzantion and Kyzikos: [Dem.] 50.6.
profitable and conducive to their interests. It is this perspicacity of their own best interests by the Kykladic allies that is neglected in most treatments of the period; an inability for scholars to conceive of the islands being anything other than lapdogs of whichever superpower could station the most triremes off their shores.

If this assumption is correct, the islands can be seen as falling into a more favorable position after the Social War. Athens took steps to stimulate commerce and attract metics and traders to the city. The syntaxeis, often levied locally and for local needs, were still being paid, but were a small part of total Athenian revenue. It is likely that much of the money contributed in this way by the islands helped themselves more than Athens, by paying for naval patrols and the like. Patrice Brun believes that even the smaller Kyklades were indispensable to Athens in this later period, although he favors the traditional view of the synedrion becoming the equivalent of a “Rump Parliament” by the 340's. But with continued shipbuilding going on at Athens, and the syntaxeis of the Kyklades potentially contributing no more than a small percentage of its total cost, a greater level of fiscal responsibility is taken on by Athens itself. The so-called “failure” of the Second Athenian League may have been just that for Athens, but the same cannot be said with certainty for the Kyklades.

This study accepts the overall thesis of Cargill that the Second Athenian League was generally a non-oppressive organization. It goes a step farther, however, in speculating that for the Kyklades, the League was also positive in an economic as well as political

67 Brun Eisphora, 118.
68 Ibid., 137.
sense, that membership in the League allowed these islands to flourish. This study makes no such assertion for other members of the League, although similar conditions of prosperity may have applied for them as well. There is one island of the region for which the model of prosperity in connection with Athens does not fit, one island that appears to have been the loser in the time of the League and did everything possible to shake off the influence of Athens. This was Delos. In Chapter 1 it was shown that several incidents occurred in which Delians attempted either to attack the Athenian amphiktyons, or to engage the assistance of foreign powers such as Macedon in removing them from the temple. Although certain Delians were honored by Athens (such as Pythodoros), these honorands appear to have been in fairly constant danger of reprisals from their fellow Delians who did not benefit from connections with Athens. Delos was not a member of the League, and although she was allowed to grant honors and proxenia, and engage in negotiations with other states, she appears to have had little say in the administration of the temple of Apollo during the League years. Loans from the temple were extended to cities who did not pay arrears; the temple estates of Delos, Rheneia, and Mykonos prospered, but were under Athenian control; and the temple itself fared well financially under Athens, with lots of building activity attested. It is almost certain that few inhabitants of Delos, the traditional administrators of the temple, shared in this prosperity. Delos is a special case, the island that seems to have “taken a fall” so that the more strategic islands that encircled it could remain financially strong. In such circumstances, the other islands in the allied synedrion would most likely have neglected to protest such

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69 Coupry ID 104-4,-5,-6,-23,-24; Dreher Hegemon, 266.
treatment of the Delians, seeing their own civic advantage in better credit relations with
the Temple of Apollo as outweighing any ethical considerations that may have been at
hand. Greek unity had always been a dicey proposition, and the Kyklades were no
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