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DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Volume I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School
of The Ohio State University

By
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*****

The Ohio State University
1998

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ABSTRACT

The Army National Guard played a sizable role in the American mobilization during the Korean War: 138,600 Guardsmen, about one-third of the force. But in both works on the Guard and on the war, the Army Guard's role passed, for the most part, into historical obscurity after the 1953 armistice.

A variety of units are examined, based on a mix of variables, including type, size, race, post-mobilization assignment, and regional origins. This work looks at two main areas. The first is military effectiveness; how quickly did Guard units become combat ready and how well did they perform after completing post-mobilization training. Units faced many obstacles during post-mobilization training, some self-inflicted but most the result of outside forces. Generally, most units sent to Korea and Germany performed as well as their Regular and Reserve peers: a very few failed, most accomplished the mission assigned to them, and a few excelled. The desperate personnel dilemmas the Army had trapped itself into during the war buffeted units kept in the United States, stripping
them of their Guard character and combat effectiveness.

This study also provides some new ways to examine early Cold War American society. The National Guard's dual state-Federal status, its strong local ties and its powerful lobbying organization gave the Guard a role at all levels of American society during this period. Through the mobilization of these units, the costs of the Truman Administration's decisions came into the communities and homes of many Americans.

For the most part, communities saw the mobilization of their units as an undesirable but necessary sacrifice in the struggle against communism. Criticism focused on whether the Army properly prepared Guardsmen for service in Korea; on equity of sacrifice, particularly for World War II veterans; and on maintenance of Guard unit integrity. When they believed that the Army had wronged them, Guardsmen and their supporters vigorously appealed to their political representatives to intervene with the Army. However, these efforts yielded meager results; on no issue considered crucial by the Army did this lobbying cause the Army to reverse its decision.
For Krista
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people helped make this project possible. Staff at all the archives I visited responded patiently and efficiently to my requests for sometimes very dusty file boxes. I want to note especially the assistance of Richard Sommers and David Keough at the U.S. Army Military History Institute; their knowledge of Army history is breathtaking and their desire to aid researchers is inspiring. The staff at Ohio State’s Interlibrary Loan Office quickly obtained newspaper microfilms and obscure publications from across the nation. The National Guard Association allowed me to spend a day browsing in their well-stocked library. A Dissertation Year Fellowship from the Harry S. Truman Library Institute was crucial to the completion of this project.

Major General Bruce Jacobs, AUS, Retired, Professor Edward Coffman, Professor Jerry Cooper, and Professor William Childs all graciously gave of their time to review various drafts and offered many useful comments. William Berebitsky generously sent me a
draft copy of his book on Guard units in Korea. Professor Allen Millett, my adviser, provided a critique that did much to improve both the history and writing in this work.

The members of 3d Battalion, 92d Field Artillery, Akron, Ohio, never suspected that in the four years we served together that they were providing a historian numerous insights into the reserve components. The lessons continue with the soldiers of the 660th Transportation Company, Cadiz, Ohio, particularly on those marathon motor marches to North Dakota. I also want to thank Major David Brooks, Royal Logistics Corps, Territorial Army, for his friendship and insights during his stay with my unit under some very trying conditions.

Krista Donnelly’s love and encouragement helped me see this project through to its end, and gave me a deeper understanding for the sorrows of separation and the joys of reunion felt by citizen-soldiers called away from home "under Army orders."
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INTRODUCTION

A FORGOTTEN PART OF THE "FORGOTTEN WAR"

The Army National Guard played a sizable role in the American mobilization during the Korean War. It provided 138,600 Guardsmen in eight divisions, three regimental combat teams, and numerous separate battalions, companies, and detachments for Federal service throughout the world.¹ Yet the Army Guard’s participation in the war passed, for the most part, into historical obscurity soon after the 1953 armistice. Both in works on the war and in works on the National Guard, there is little detailed discussion of the Army Guard during the war. And what discussion there is on the Army Guard during the war usually focuses on one of four areas: Army Guard units deployed to Korea; military effectiveness; manpower problems during the war; or effects of the war on reserve component policy.²

This historical shadow under which the Army National Guard’s role during the Korean War resides is,
in part, the result of the general shadow which fell over the entire Korean War for Americans. Many Americans, conditioned to destruction of the opposing regime by World War II, saw the Korean War as an aberration; since it would not be repeated, it need not be examined in any great detail. With the trauma of the Vietnam War following fifteen years later, the Korean War became trapped between two giants that soaked up most attention in America for 20th Century wars. Further complicating the Army Guard's role in the war is the fact that only about one-third of its units were mobilized, and not even a majority of mobilized units saw service in Korea. However, many individual Guardsmen were levied out of units not deployed to Korea and sent to Korea for a tour there as an individual replacement.

Fewer units of the Army National Guard deployed to Korea than deployed to Europe or remained in the Zone of the Interior (ZI), the Army's term for the continental United States. However, Guard units sent to Korea have garnered most of what slim attention has been paid to the Army Guard in discussions of the war. This is not surprising. Official histories of the American war effort focus on learning from the past to aid performance in the future; unit performance in a
combat zone is a rich source of examples, good and bad, and is the ultimate test of unit and institutional effectiveness. Unofficial histories sometimes share the same concerns as official histories, and also are attracted to the dramatic over the mundane. Most space in most histories of the Guard is dedicated to examining institutional or policy questions, not individual units' experiences. Histories of the National Guard, and of individual state Guards, are drawn to units that served in Korea for much the same reason as histories of the war effort, so what space which is provided for discussions of the Guard units during the Korean War is given over to units that served in Korea.

The Historiography

The most detailed discussions of the Guard in the Army's official history of the war cover the decision in 1950 to mobilize parts of the Guard and the decision in 1951 to deploy two Guard infantry divisions to Korea. There is no discussion of what happened during mobilization or of training after entering Federal service, and very little on combat experience of Guard units deployed to Korea. At most, Guard units are briefly mentioned in passing in the narrative of
combat operations, usually without being identified as Guard units. The only exceptions to this coverage by the Army are a bibliographical survey of mobilization during the war and a case study, focusing on military effectiveness, of a Guard non-divisional field artillery battalion mobilized in 1950 and deployed to Korea in 1951.

The Army and the Department of Defense after 1953 produced or commissioned several studies, which were for internal use, examining the mobilization of Guard and Reserve units. The focus in these works is the question of military effectiveness: what can be learned from past mobilizations to improve future reserve component mobilizations. The best of these is the Historical Research and Evaluation Organization’s study on the mobilization of all the services’ reserve components during the Korean War. However, while it discusses most of the major problems faced by mobilized Guard units and looks at units sent to Korea, sent to Europe, and kept in the United States, the study’s sample base of Guard units is small and consists mainly of divisions.

Unofficial histories of the American effort during the war generally follow the same pattern of the Army official history: a brief discussion of the 1950
decision to mobilize the Guard and a brief discussion of the decision to deploy two Guard divisions to Korea.9 The major exception to this pattern is William Berebitsky’s A Very Long Weekend, which is devoted exclusively to Army Guard units deployed to Korea. Using mainly interviews with veterans, supplemented with unit command reports, Berebitsky looks at mobilization, post mobilization training, and operations in Korea. The book touches on the major problems mobilized Guard units faced, such as equipment, personnel, and training shortfalls; racial integration; Guard-Regular relations; adjusting to combat; and the phase-out of Guard personnel from units which remained in Federal service. Still, because it focuses only on units deployed to Korea, the book does not cover the entire Army Guard experience during the war.10

Published works on the Army during the period of the Korean War follow the trend in works on the war, with little discussion of the Army Guard and almost no examination of the Guard’s experiences during this period. Russell F. Weigley, in his standard history of the Army, sketches the size of the Army Guard’s contribution, but does not discuss any details of that contribution; the Guard is considered only in the
context of the Army's personnel problems during the war.\textsuperscript{11}

A recent article by David T. Fautua looking at the creation of the Cold War U.S. Army does briefly discuss the National Guard, both in the 1945-1950 period and during the Korean War. Fautua sees the Army's use of the four Guard divisions mobilized in 1950 as supporting his thesis that the Army's primary strategic attention was on Seventh Army in Europe rather than on Eighth Army in Korea, as the Army saw the Cold War as the long-term conflict and Korea as just a short-term conflict. However, Fautua does not consider the use of non-divisional Guard units and his discussion of the four Guard divisions' training before they deployed to Korea and Germany is flawed.\textsuperscript{12}

John Kendall's unpublished history of Army manpower mobilization policy between 1945-1957 is the standard work on the subject and contains an excellent discussion of how Army planners during this period dealt with the tricky question of what should be the Guard's role in mobilization. Kendall is very useful for looking at manpower policy decisions during the Korea War, especially the reasons that led the Army to levy mobilized Guard units not deployed to Korea for individual replacements for service in Korea, but his
focus does not allow the study to examine in detail the effects of these decisions on units and their supporters in the states. 13

There are no published studies of the Army Guard’s role in another major manpower question of the Korean War period, racial integration. Morris MacGregor’s study on the racial integration of the armed forces does look in some detail at efforts to advance and to prevent racial integration of the National Guard in the period 1945-1950. However, in his discussion of the Army’s racial integration programs during the war, MacGregor does not examine what happened to Guard units in Federal service. The standard history of African Americans in the National Guard, by Charles Johnson, Jr., does not discuss the Korean War at all, as its coverage ends with 1949. 14

The two major published histories of the National Guard by John K. Mahon and Jim Dan Hill devote little attention to examining the Army Guard during the war. Mahon has just three pages on the topic, which provide a brief outline of the Army Guard’s role during the war, but do not look in detail at units’ experiences. Hill has twelve pages on the subject, but almost all this space is taken up by an extended critique of American strategy and personnel policies during the
war. Hill, a Guard major general, argued that the war should never have been allowed to degenerate into a war of posts that aimed to restore the status quo ante, with Eighth Army manned by a revolving door of draftees and Reservists. Instead, Hill says, the correct American strategy in Korea should have been a total mobilization of the Guard, followed by a campaign to destroy Kim Il Sung’s regime using all or most of the Guard, and the creation of a unified Korea, allied to the U.S., with its northern border on the Yalu River.¹⁵

Coverage of the Army Guard during the Korean War varies considerably in works tracing the history of a state’s National Guard. Some histories outline the service of the state’s units which were inducted into Federal service during the war.¹⁶ Others provide a more detailed narrative of their state’s Army Guard experience during the war. Kenny Franks’ Citizen Soldiers: Oklahoma’s National Guard focuses on the state’s 45th Infantry Division, which arrived in Korea in late 1951, but does not go into much detail about the problems the division faced and how it handled them. The same description applies to Richard Seiverling’s essay on Pennsylvania’s 28th Infantry Division. A more sophisticated treatment of a state’s
units is provided in Jerry Cooper with Glen Smith, *Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard*; the authors stress the effects on Federalized units, none of which were deployed overseas, of levies of individuals for overseas service.\textsuperscript{17}

The best discussion of a state's Army Guard units during the war is in Richard C. Roberts' unpublished history of the Utah National Guard. Roberts provides a narrative of what happened to Utah units inducted into Federal service using an extensive amount of primary sources, and his history is more representative of the Army Guard's experience as Utah had units that deployed to Korea and units that remained in the United States. Roberts also discusses reactions back home in Utah to what happened to its units, particularly when these experiences angered Utahans.\textsuperscript{18}

**Methods**

This study seeks to sample the entire range of what the Army National Guard experienced during the Korean War: mobilization; deployment to Korea and Europe; remaining in the ZI; levies for individual replacements; racial integration; the return to state service; and reactions to these experiences from
Guardsmen, their families and friends, their political leaders and state adjutants general, and their lobby, the National Guard Association.

A variety of units were selected for study, based on a mix of three variables. First is type of unit: combat or combat support; size, ranging from division to independent company; and race, since the great majority of African American Guardsmen at this time served in all-black units. Second is post-mobilization assignment: Far East, Europe, or the United States, as units assigned to each of these areas faced a number of different challenges. Third is regional origin: urban and rural, north, south, midwest and west, reflecting the significant regional variations that existed within the United States at this time.

By examining the experiences of a variety of mobilized units, this study will address two questions. First, how effective was the Army Guard in meeting the demands placed upon it by the Korean War? Important considerations here are how quickly could Guard units be used after mobilization and how well they performed their assigned tasks. This question will be considered not only in the light of unit performance but also in light of the expectations about the Guard held by Guardsmen, the Regular Army, Federal and state
officials, and by citizens of the units' communities.

Second, this study provides another window on early Cold War American society. The National Guard's dual state-Federal status, its strong local ties and its powerful lobbying organization gave the Guard a role in many parts of American society during this period. Through the mobilization of these units, the costs of the Truman Administration's decisions during this period came into the communities and homes of a large number of Americans.

Results

During the Korean War, Army Guard units generally performed well when they possessed the traditional ingredients of military success: good leadership, good training, good equipment, and a belief in the cause or at least an acceptance of service. Non-divisional units deployed to Korea in late 1950 and early 1951 equalled or surpassed the performance of like-type Regular units. The two infantry divisions deployed to Korea in late 1951 also did as well or better than their Regular counterparts, though the war of limited movement and advantage that had developed by their arrival did not fully test their skills.¹⁹

Units deployed to Europe or which remained in the
United States were never tested in combat, so they cannot be judged by this most exacting of methods. Additionally, they were buffeted by extensive personnel turbulence, for reasons so well explained by Kendall. Generally, however, units sent to Germany performed well in the role given them by the Army, building up NATO's military strength as part of the Army's "long-pull" approach to the Cold War as outlined by Fautua. Units that remained in the ZI are another matter. Both units assigned to the General Reserve and AAA units assigned to air defense of the ZI were ripped apart by personnel turbulence that greatly weakened or even destroyed their Guard character by the end of their first year in Federal service. Often these units spent their second year in Federal service as little more than way stations on the manpower pipelines to and from overseas units, as the Army scrambled under limited national mobilization to supply personnel for the hot war in Korea and the cold war in Europe. It is best that these units were never tested in combat.

For the most part, communities in 1950 and 1951 saw the mobilization of their Guard units as an undesirable but necessary measure in the struggle against communism. In areas where much emotion had been invested in a Guard unit, there was some pride
that their unit had been selected. What protest of the mobilization there was centered on two issues: perceived unfairness and fears of Regular Army mistreatment of Guard units. The first mainly concerned the issue of World War II veterans in the Guard having to serve on active duty again. While bitterness over this issue among Guardsmen never approached the intensity found among involuntarily recalled Inactive Reservists, it did increase after the war stalemated and college draft deferments were introduced, especially among Guardsmen deployed overseas.

The second issue was a hardy perennial. There were a number of concerns: purging of senior Guard officers; ignoring the tactical integrity of larger units; and stripping Guardsmen from their units to provide individual replacements for other units. All three, but especially the last one, once again flared up during this war.

Also once again, Guardsmen, their communities, and their lobbyists were not shy about seeking political assistance in redressing their grievances. Families and friends often contacted state political figures on issues concerning mobilized Guardsmen. Guardsmen in Federal
service often maintained backchannel communications with their adjutants general and state political figures, and adjutants general and state political figures kept watch over their mobilized units. In Washington, the National Guard Association maintained its vigil against what it saw as Uptonian attempts to use this war as a tool to weaken the Guard as a key institution in American community life.

However, what is clear from this study is that the Army Guard’s experiences are a part of what both Jerry Cooper and Martha Derthick have pointed out: the increasing weakness during the twentieth century of the Guard vis a vis the Regular Army. During the Korean War, Guardsmen and their advocates could only successfully work the margins of influence in a reactive manner, hoping to block actions by the Regular Army. On the major issues, such as total mobilization of the Army Guard and preventing the stripping of units not sent to Korea, Guardsmen and their advocates lost. As Major General James C. Styron pointed out in 1951, when orders arrived sending his 45th Infantry Division to Japan, a Guard unit inducted into Federal service was "under army orders, and will go wherever it is assigned."

14
NOTES


   And, of course, the Korean War must compete with these other wars against the still very large shadow cast by the American Civil War. For example, the Cowles Media Group has magazines devoted to World War II, the Vietnam War, and the American Civil War, but none to the Korean War.


Several students at the Army War College have written theses that looked at the mobilization of Guard units or at the state of the Guard during or just after the Korean War: Colonel Raymond E. Gandy, Jr., "Are The 'Minute Men' Fast Enough? A Historical Look At Pre And Post Mobilization Training," 1991; Colonel Cyrus A. Dolph, III, "The National Guard," 1951; Colonel Charles L. Southward, "Training the National Guard," 1954; Lieutenant Colonel William B. Rose, "Training the National Guard," 1954; Lieutenant Colonel Thomas W. O'Donnell, "Training the National Guard," 1955.

9. Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: Times Books, 1987), with its focus on tactical operations during the first year of the war, does mention some of the Guard field artillery battalions in passing during its discussion of the Chinese 1951 spring offensives. However, it does not talk about the many Guard support units in Korea nor does it look in detail at the experiences of the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions, since their arrival in Korea falls outside the book's focus.

Published memoirs by senior officers, as Gough points out, are practically useless for this topic, as at most they only briefly discuss the use of Guard units during the war. Gough, *U.S. Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War*, p.98.
10. An area that Berebitsky does not discuss except in passing, because of the sources he uses, is the reactions to mobilization and Federal service in units' communities and states and the interplay between state and Federal officials over the use and treatment of mobilized Guardsmen by the Regular Army.

This area is discussed in some detail in Kerry L. Diminyatz, "The 40th Infantry Division in the Korean Conflict: The Employment of the California National Guard in an Undeclared War" (M.A. Thesis, Sonoma State University, 1990), which is the only unit case study besides Grodecki's.


12. David T. Fautua, "The 'Long Pull' Army: NSC 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army" Journal of Military History (January 1997), pp.93-120. Fautua argues that the Army's greater concern for Cold War Europe is shown, in part, by the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions receiving less than two months of training before deploying to Korea, while the 28th and 43d Infantry Divisions received six months of training before deploying to Germany. This is not what happened; see chapters four and five. Fautua's reaches this conclusion based on a poor choice of sources; he did not consult any unit primary sources or any published histories of the four divisions.

The Guard is briefly mentioned in another article that covers, in part, the Army during the Korean War, but again the author does not discuss in any detail the Guard units' experiences. Stephen P. Moeller, "Vigilant and Invincible: United States Army Air Defense Command" Air Defense Artillery (May-June 1995), pp.2-42.


15. Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard, pp.208-210; Jim Dan Hill, The Minute Man In Peace And War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1964), pp.503-514. Because Hill’s book does not examine in detail the mobilization experience of Guard units during the war, his argument about proper American strategy does not consider the actual status of Guard units in June 1950, the Army and industry’s ability to support a total Guard mobilization during the summer of 1950, and the nation’s capacity to transport significant Guard forces to Korea before the Inchon landing and Chinese intervention. Hill argues that the Chinese forces in Korea could have been dealt with by stationing several American divisions on Formosa, which would have posed such a threat to Chinese seaports that Mao would have withdrawn his forces from Korea.

As would be expected, Martha Derthick’s discussion of the Korean War is brief and concerned with the effects of the war on the National Guard Association’s political strength. Martha Derthick, The National Guard in Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p.111-113.


19. And of course, "Regular" is a relative term here. Most units of the Regular Army in Korea after the early days of the war were filled with a great mix of personnel sources; most enlisted were draftees and many of the NCOs and junior officers were Reservists. Only the field grade and general officer ranks remained dominated by Regulars, a situation that often developed in mobilized Guard units as well. However, these had always been the positions in the Guard about which Regulars had the greatest doubts during earlier wars.

The National Guard played an important part in the success of the Army of the United States during World War II. From the mobilization that began in the fall of 1940 to victory in 1945, the Guard provided eighteen infantry divisions, hundreds of separate units and almost 300,000 officers and men. In 1945 prewar Guardsmen looked back at this performance with great pride, believing it justified the sacrifices and slights they had endured during the 1920s and 1930s. Ohio's Major General Robert S. Beightler, commander of the 37th "Buckeye" Infantry Division, wrote the Chief, National Guard Bureau in April 1945 that the "Guard has made an incalculably valuable contribution to the building of our great armed forces of today. The preservation and strengthening of the National Guard in years to come must be assured."

However, Guardsmen looked forward to the postwar world with trepidation. The Army of the United States'
success had not stilled traditional National Guard-Regular Army tensions. Many Guardsmen complained of what they perceived as the condescension and contempt of most Regulars. Beightler wrote the president of the National Guard Association in 1945 that Regular Army officers during the war had "succeeded in alienating and embittering the civilian component officers and particularly the National Guard." On the other hand, many Regulars believed that the war had demonstrated what they perceived as critical flaws in the Guard and the need for one Federal reserve force. Shortly before his death in 1944 Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, Chief of Army Ground Forces, submitted a plan to the Army Chief of Staff calling for the abolition of the National Guard after the war.²

Complicating this volatile emotional situation was the fact that on VJ Day there were no units in the National Guard. Every Guard unit either had been ordered to active duty in 1940-41 or been disbanded. All the mobilization had left behind in the states were the staff of each state adjutant general and some "home guard" units of overage and unfit men raised by states for internal security duties and without Federal recognition. While on active service, many Guard units had been reorganized to meet new tactical demands and
filled with non-guardsmen to bring them up to strength and to replace casualties. After VJ Day the Army deactivated all Guard units and discharged all surviving Guardsmen as individuals. The only equipment returned to the states were their units' colors. The Guard would require a massive rebuilding effort in the postwar period.

**Campaigning With Walsh**

Even as Guard units campaigned around the globe, back in Washington, D.C. other Guardsmen waged what they saw as their own crucial and hard fought, if bureaucratic and political, campaign for the Guard's postwar future. Their objective: prevent the enemies of the National Guard from using the war as a means either to abolish the Guard or to bring it under the total control of the Regular Army. For these Guardsmen, their enemies were the traditional ones, Regular Army officers like General McNair and their Reservist allies. The friendly forces were the National Guard Association (NGA) and its supporters in Congress.

Guardsmen found much to worry about when considering the postwar future of their institution.
There was the precedent of World War I. After that war, the War Department had attempted to do away with the Guard and replace it with the Uptonian dream of a single Federal reserve force based on universal military training. Many Guardsmen believed that the relief of many Guard senior officers and the reorganizations of Guard units during 1940-41 had been part of a conspiracy by Regulars to weaken the Guard and to deny Guardsmen the power and prestige of senior positions. The continuing hostility and condescension from Regulars that many Guardsmen such as Beightler encountered was another major source of irritation for Guardsmen. Finally, the Guard’s advocate on the Army’s General Staff, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), suffered a dramatic decline in its influence when the Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, reorganized the General Staff in early 1942.

Into this situation quickly stepped the National Guard Association (NGA), a private organization representing Guard officers. In January 1942, George E. Lynch, mayor of Minneapolis and vice president of the NGA, wrote the Army Chief of Staff. Lynch requested a committee of Guard, Regular and Reserve officers be appointed to study the question of how to organize the postwar Army. However, the NGA made
little progress in shaping the postwar Army until 1944, when several developments came together.

First, Major General Ellard A. Walsh, the Adjutant General of Minnesota, became president of the NGA in 1943. Born in 1887, Walsh joined the Minnesota National Guard in 1905. Commissioned during World War I, Walsh served thirteen months overseas and returned home to accept an offer to oversee administration of the Minnesota veterans' bonus. His work on this led to his appointment as assistant adjutant general of Minnesota in 1921 and in 1927 Walsh became Adjutant General of Minnesota. In 1940 Walsh took command of the 34th Division and in 1941 went on active duty with it, but health problems forced him to give up command before Pearl Harbor. He returned to Minnesota and again became the Adjutant General.

From Minnesota, Walsh watched the use of the Guard in the war effort and became increasingly concerned about its treatment by the Regular Army. He invigorated the NGA with his energy and determination to protect the Guard from what, in Walsh's opinion, were the efforts of the Army General Staff destroy it. Walsh set out to rally the NGA's members and its influence to what he saw as a struggle to save the Guard.
A skilled political and bureaucratic operator, Walsh exploited the NGA's considerable support in Congress. This support rested on certain characteristics of the Guard. Many communities had strong emotional links with their local Guard units; often the units had become, particularly in small towns, a major local institution. This made issues affecting the Guard issues that concerned state politicians. The involvement of Guard officers in state politics reinforced this concern at the state level. This provided the foundation upon which rested the NGA's influence with Congress. That a number of members in both houses had been Guard officers also helped the NGA when it came to Capitol Hill. This influence allowed Walsh in 1944 to inform the War Department that Congress would not look favorably upon any effort to shape the postwar Army without consulting the Guard, in the form of the NGB and the NGA.

Finally the Guard found important, if unexpected, support from Brigadier General John McAuley Palmer. Marshall had called Palmer, a close friend, out of retirement to advise on the postwar Army. While a Regular, Palmer had long been an advocate of a small standing force. He wanted to back up that force with a very large reserve of citizen soldiers produced by a
system of universal military training. His ideas had greatly influenced how the Army reorganized after World War I, though Congress never provided the funds to implement those ideas. In 1944, Palmer wrote and Marshall signed War Department Circular 347. This document argued that a small regular force, backed up by a large reserve produced by universal military training, should form the basis for planning the postwar Army. However, in a reversal of Palmer’s earlier views, the circular stated that the reserve force should be organized as units ready for use rather than as individual fillers.

War Department Circular 347 did not mention specifically the National Guard. However, it gave the National Guard Association a much firmer footing upon which to base its claims for continuing the Guard’s role as the Army’s first-line reserve combat component. The bureaucratic struggle by early 1945 resulted in a victory for the NGA. The joint Regular-Guard committee established the year before reported that the Guard should be an "integral" part of the postwar military. Furthermore, it reported that the Guard’s postwar strength should be based on the Army’s M [Mobilization] Day requirements and that the Guard should be ready for deployment on M-Day anywhere in the world. Finally,
the committee concluded that the National Guard Bureau should be returned to its prewar position as a special staff agency.

In mid-1945 Marshall merged the joint Guard-Regular committee with a similar committee working on the postwar Reserve. To reassure Walsh and the NGA, Marshall appointed as committee chairman Major General Milton A. Reckord, a Maryland National Guardsman then serving as provost marshal of the European Theater of Operations. Born in rural Maryland in 1879, Reckord enlisted in the local Guard unit in 1901. A Guard major by 1917, Reckord returned home in 1919 as a decorated colonel after commanding his regiment in combat. The same year he became Maryland’s Adjutant General. Reckord, because of his proximity to Washington and connections made during World War I, became the NGA’s primary lobbyist. Indeed, he had helped John McAuley Palmer, Reckord’s brigade commander in France, during the struggle over the shape of the Army after World War I. Reckord soon was the man to see in Washington about Guard matters and wrote most of the interwar legislation dealing with the Guard. In 1940 Reckord went on active duty as commander of the 29th Division, which he had led since 1934. However, General McNair, Chief of Army Field Forces, evaluated
Reckord as a "good administrator, but should go." And go Reckord did, relieved of command in January 1942 and assigned to a series of administrative posts before Marshall selected him in 1945 to head the new committee.®

Thus, it was not a surprise that in an October 1945 report the Reckord committee reaffirmed the earlier findings of the joint Guard-Regular committee. It based its findings on two assumptions: that large numbers of World War II veterans would join the Guard and that all postwar Guard recruits would be graduates of a Universal Military Training (UMT) system. The Army General Staff agreed to these findings because it concluded that the NGA's support in Congress was too strong for it to overcome. Also, General Staff officers believed that any Guard based on these findings would be dependent on UMT and thus would buy the Guard's support in trying to get Congressional approval of UMT.®

How Big a National Guard?

As Army Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall stressed a small (330,000) postwar Regular Army training large numbers of UMT draftees who would then fill Guard units and the Reserve. Marshall based this
plan on the assumption that the nation would have up to a year's warning to fully mobilize. When Dwight Eisenhower succeeded Marshall as Chief of Staff in November 1945, plans for the postwar Army changed. The new Chief of Staff believed that the next war would be another total war lasting up to five years, and he rejected the assumption that the nation would have up to a year's warning in which to mobilize.

These assumptions meant that the Army would face two difficult tasks: be prepared to field quickly a significant force and be prepared for a long duration conflict requiring a mobilization on the same scale as World War II. These tasks would require a much larger Army than the one Marshall planned. Eisenhower wanted an Army that could put into the field 27 2/3 divisions, with supporting units, by thirty days after M-Day, a mission that would depend heavily on Guard and Reserve units being able to deploy quickly after M-Day. Furthermore, while fielding this force, the Army had to retain the capability of significant further expansion as the war continued.

To meet these objectives, the final plan for the postwar Army, approved in September 1946, called for a Regular Army of 1.121 million men in ten divisions and seventy air groups. (This plan assumed that universal
military training would begin in 1948 and that
can occupation duties overseas would end by 1951.) The
plan envisioned a National Guard of 680,000 men that
would provide the Army's first line combat reserve
force. This National Guard, more than twice as large
as the one mobilized in 1940-1941, would be composed of
twenty-five infantry divisions, two armored divisions,
twenty-one regimental combat teams, hundreds of non-
divisional combat and support units, and twenty-seven
air groups. For Guardsmen, this very ambitious plan,
with its increased size and responsibility, reaffirmed
the Guard's importance to national defense as the first
line combat reserve.7

Over the next few years the Guard reinforced its
success in shaping the postwar reorganization plan with
other bureaucratic and political victories. Again, its
success rested in large part on its influence with
Congress as expressed through the National Guard
Association. In 1947, Congress funded a major three
year public relations effort by the Guard at a cost of
one million dollars a year. Also in that year, the NGA
made sure that the National Security Act, which created
a separate Air Force, contained language insuring that
the Air Force would have to administer the new Air
National Guard through the National Guard Bureau.
The following year saw continued triumphs. Congress established retirement benefits for Guard officers. A special Department of Defense committee on reserve policy, the Gray Board, recommended the merging of the Guard and the Reserve into a single Federal reserve force. Walsh, Reckord, and the NGA mobilized for what they called "the Battle of Washington." The threat of their influence with Congress prevented the Defense Department from implementing the Gray Board's recommendations. Also in 1948, when Congress approved resumption of the draft (though not in the form of UMT), the Guard benefited. The NGA made sure that inserted into the Selective Service Act was a provision providing an exemption from the draft for men age seventeen to eighteen-and-a-half who enlisted in the Guard. The National Guard Association, particularly its two key leaders and lobbyists, Ellard Walsh and Milton Reckord, were justifiably proud of these achievements.®

Chief of the "New Minutemen"

The postwar blueprint for the Guard was impressive and ambitious, and would require an impressive and ambitious level of funding and skill to implement. General Walsh and General Reckord, as officials of the
NGA, could lobby for and promote the Guard’s interests. However, their public, official power was limited to their roles as adjutants general of Minnesota and Maryland, respectively. Official direction at the national level for the building of the postwar Guard was the responsibility of the National Guard Bureau, a special staff agency of the Army’s General Staff. The NGB acted as the Army’s supervisor of the various states’ National Guards and as the Guard’s official advocate on the Army General Staff. The NGB’s staff was a mix of Guardsmen on extended active duty tours and Regulars. However, reserved for a senior Guardsman was the position of Chief, National Guard Bureau. In 1946 Major General Butler B. Miltonberger was Chief, National Guard Bureau, but poor health forced his retirement in 1947.

Connecticut’s Major General Kenneth F. Cramer, commander of the 43d Infantry Division (Connecticut/Rhode Island/Vermont), replaced Miltonberger in September 1947. Cramer’s National Guard experience differed significantly from that of generals like Walsh and Reckord. Born in 1894, Cramer held BA and MA degrees from Princeton. He enlisted in the Army in 1917, earned a commission, and served with a draftee division in France. After leaving active
duty in 1919, he founded a coal company in Hartford, joined the Reserves and served twice in the state House of Representatives and twice in the state Senate. In 1931 Cramer left the Reserves and joined the Connecticut National Guard, where by 1941 he commanded an infantry regiment. Cramer had a much more professionally satisfying Second World War than Reckord or Walsh. Promoted to brigadier general in 1942, he spent most of the war in the Pacific as assistant division commander of the 24th Infantry Division, a Regular Army division, emerging with a reputation as a tough disciplinarian and a "front-line" general. Cramer left active duty and returned to Connecticut in 1946, where he was promoted to major general and took command of the 43d Infantry Division.

Cramer's scrappy character, reflected in his wartime reputation and three Silver Stars, did not make him a subtle or patient Chief, NGB. His final efficiency report as Chief, NGB praised his "high integrity and moral courage" and his "high professional competence," but noted that his "inflexible adherence to his own views" detracted from "that maturity of judgment" expected of an officer of his rank and experience. These qualities were most noticeable in Cramer's determination to safeguard what he saw as the
proper sphere of the NGB’s interests. In 1949 he embarrassed Walsh and the NGA by engaging in a public feud with the Air Force over control of the Air National Guard. On other occasions Cramer and the NGA would butt heads, disagreements often based on the different backgrounds of Cramer and Walsh. Cramer, as Chief, NGB and not a soldier who came of age in the Guard, focused on preparing the Guard for M-Day. (This included the 43d Infantry Division, which Cramer remained commander of while serving as Chief, NGB.) If that meant sacrificing some power or control to the Regular Army to achieve that goal, Cramer would not reflexively oppose doing so. This was not so for Walsh, who saw himself and the NGA as standing between the Guard and the efforts of Uptonian Regulars to destroy the Guard. As with the rest of the Army Staff, the NGA’s political clout usually made it the winner in any disputes with the Bureau and its Chief.9

Army Chief of Staff Dwight Eisenhower had supported Cramer for the position as Chief, NGB. Cramer brought a drive and determination to the post that Eisenhower believed vital to the success of the very ambitious postwar Guard. While Cramer was difficult to get along with and had been a Guardsman for only sixteen years, he enthusiastically supported
the postwar Guard’s role. Soon after taking over as Chief, NGB, Cramer (the descendant of a Minuteman) published a series of articles outlining the Guard’s expanded role in national defense, all stressing the idea of the Guard as "Our Modern Minutemen." Cramer linked the colonial militiaman with his 1940s descendant, writing that "the United States is indeed fortunate that succeeding generations have followed the traditional concept of national defense." He then claimed that with the "volunteer spirit, local leadership, and the Guardsman’s sure knowledge that he fights for his own home and family," it was "obvious that America has the essentials of an indomitable defense."

Bring Back Our Old Company K

The first task in building the postwar National Guard was assigning units to the states. This was a cooperative process, involving the NGB and the states, largely completed by 1947. The NGB staff analyzed the force structure established for the Guard in Army Mobilization Plan I (AMP I) and how many and what types of units each state could support. It then would offer units to the states, which could either accept them or reject them, based on what the states needed and
thought they could support. This process continued until all the units called for by AMP I had been assigned to states.\textsuperscript{12}

Assigning units to the states often involved the NGB in negotiations with state adjutants general. The strong ties that linked company-sized units with their communities, and sometimes an entire division with a state, meant that state officials often found themselves under pressure to return units to their prewar location. Complicating this process were other factors. The much larger postwar Guard required many more units than the Guard of 1940. Population distribution had shifted during the war, often changing an area's ability to support a Guard unit. Changes in Army doctrine and tactical organization also affected the process. The changes eliminated the need for some units, such as horse cavalry and coast defense guns, and increased the need for others, such as tanks and antiaircraft artillery. Other prewar units, which in 1940 had been part of larger units, now found themselves independent units.

The NGB and the states dealt with these considerations in a number of ways. Infantry divisions traditionally associated with one large and politically influential state, such as Texas' 36th, Ohio's 37th,
and Pennsylvania's 28th, retained their prewar connections. Some divisions which before the war had connections to several states now had different state connections. Some prewar units smaller than a division were simply converted to another type of unit needed under AMP I. Also a problem was the need to activate units that had not existed in the prewar Guard. Often the solution to this was redesignating prewar units and parts of large new units, like divisions and regimental combat teams, were drawn from prewar units. However, smaller new postwar units, particularly support units, often had no formal links to the prewar Guard.

Once a state accepted units from the National Guard Bureau, the state adjutant general had to assign subunits to communities within the state. This often resulted in another round of negotiations, this time between the adjutant general and communities. Many communities felt a strong attachment to "their" long time company, battery or troop and resented any changes. This process often required much time and discussion until both the communities' demands and the demands of the state's assigned troop list were satisfied or at least reconciled.

A major problem for both the National Guard Bureau
and some states in developing the new troop lists was the question of what to do with African American Guardsmen. Three all-black regiments had been mobilized during World War II. African American Guardsmen and the communities their units came from also felt deep attachments to "their" unit. In the postwar atmosphere of heightened civil rights activism, the National Guard Bureau and the states came under increasing pressure to desegregate the Guard. This pressure only intensified with President Truman's executive order of 1948 ordering an end to segregation in the armed forces.

The NGB's policy in this period was that of the Regular Army, which moved with anything but all deliberate speed between 1948 and 1950 to comply with Truman's executive order. Given the NGB's attitude and without pressure for integration from higher echelons, the issue defaulted to the state level. Some all-black units served within larger Guard formations, such as the 137th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion of Ohio's 37th Infantry Division. A few northern states began the process of desegregating their forces, but by 1950 there were few integrated units. Most African American Guardsmen, about two percent of the Guard in 1950, served in separate all-black battalions and companies,
limited to fourteen states and the District of Columbia.\textsuperscript{18}

"...Not Ordinary Men"

Once a state adjutant general and the NGB had agreed on the assignment of units, their next task was recruiting men for these units. Particularly important was the selection of commanding officers, since they would bear the main burden of building the unit. The Regular Army before and during the war had often complained about the uneven quality of the Guard officer corps. Guard officers, proven in battle, also warned of this problem in 1945. General Beightler, the most successful Guard division commander of the war, wrote the Chief, NGB that "I have seen too many officers given advancement in rank simply because they were friends or favorites of the regimental commander or the Adjutant General of the state."\textsuperscript{19}

Sometimes the senior Guard officers still with a unit began the selection of officers between the end of the war and the demobilization of the unit. However, given the high levels of Guard personnel turbulence most units experienced, this process usually did not begin until the unit colors returned to the state. Then the adjutant general and other senior Guard
officers in the state would ask officers to take command of units. Political considerations within each state also contributed to this process, particularly in regards to command of the largest units (divisions, regiments, brigades) in a state. In some cases, officers would lobby for positions, particularly if they had served with the unit before or during the war. Often the new commanders, particularly of larger units, would personally recruit officers for key command and staff positions in the unit. Routine assignment procedures would usually fill other officer billets in units, especially company grade ones.\textsuperscript{20}

Selection of company commanders was especially important, as they were the key men in recruiting soldiers. Selecting a man whose community held him in respect and who had regular contact with young men was crucial to bringing in recruits: Guard senior officers especially liked having teachers and coaches as junior officers. Robert Stockton enlisted in the 45th Infantry Division’s band in 1949 at age 17; his high school band director was also the warrant officer who commanded the band. Marine Corps lieutenant LaVern Weber returned home to become a high school teacher and Marine Reservist. An Oklahoma Guard general officer visited Weber twice during 1948, trying to get him to
take command of a company which had failed its second annual inspection. Despite Weber's protests of "I'm a Marine," he finally capitulated and took command of the company.²¹

By 1950 the Guard contained a mix of three different generations of officers. The first came of age shortly before or during World War I. This generation dominated the general officer ranks and many colonel slots in the Guard. Many had served with Guard units during the Mexican Border Crisis and World War I. Almost all had served with the Guard during the long twilight of the interwar years. They had witnessed what they saw as the shabby treatment of their seniors by Regulars in 1917-1918 and the efforts by Uptonian Regulars to destroy the Guard after that war. Their dislike of the Regulars was further inflamed by what they saw as continued discrimination by Regulars during World War II. Given other characteristics these men shared they tended to be predisposed to distrust the Federal government in any case: small town or rural background, politically conservative and significant involvement in state politics. They tended to be middle class professionals or businessmen, for only with these civilian careers could they afford to concentrate on their "exclusive hobby." These officers
usually had a significant emotional investment in the Guard. The only major split within this group tended to be between those officers who had spent most of their careers with troop units (like General Cramer) and those who had spent much of their careers within state adjutant general offices (like Generals Walsh and Reckord). The latter group tended to be the most vociferous in their defense of the Guard against any perceived encroachment by Regulars.  

The second generation came of age during World War II. This group of officers consisted of some colonels, the majority of other field grades, and most of the company grades. Because of the much longer duration of World War II, many of these officers had received much more on-the-job training and active duty experience than the World War I generation. Guard senior officers vigorously recruited them, believing that this experience would be crucial to the greatly expanded postwar Guard’s success. Unlike their seniors, this group was more diverse in its experiences and had three subdivisions: prewar members of the Guard (either as officers or enlisted), wartime commissionees, and wartime enlisted men who received a postwar commission in the Guard.

Those who had served in the prewar Guard, while
not a majority of this generation, provided a strong bridge of continuity for Guard traditions. Many of the higher ranking members of this subgroup had begun their Guard careers in the late 1920s or early 1930s and the resulting socializing process gave them much the same outlook about the Guard as the World War I generation. These officers filled many of the key command and staff positions at regimental, group and battalion levels.

Officers commissioned during World War II usually had graduated from one of the many wartime officer candidate schools. However, often these officers found themselves commissioned as Guard officers in an arm or service different from the one they had served in during the war. (The most dramatic examples of this were former air and naval officers who became ground combat officers.) This posed problems since few of these officers in new branches were able to attend active duty branch schools; most of their training in their new specialties came from drill nights, summer training camps, and correspondence courses.

Many of these officers did not immediately join the Guard after demobilization. Some remained in the inactive reserve, into which many wartime officers had been demobilized, or the active reserve for two or three years before joining the Guard. These officers
joined the Guard for a number of reasons: an interest in things military sparked by the war; Cold War tensions; pay and benefits; and social status, a motivation most powerful in small towns. Because of this and their lack of prior Guard experience, the World War I generation often suspected these officers' commitment to the Guard as a historic and crucial American institution.23

Enlisted veterans who received commissions in the postwar Guard were the last subgroup of the World War II generation. These men usually enlisted in the postwar Guard and, after completing a course of study and appearing before an examination board, received commissions. They shared many of the same characteristics of the World War II commissionees, including often finding themselves in a branch different from the one they had served in during wartime. However, in addition they often had to learn how to be effective leaders and trainers, roles their wartime experience usually had not included.

Likewise lacking in much experience as troop leaders and trainers was the third generation of Guard officers, men who had been too young for World War II service. These men, the smallest of the three groups, usually became Guard officers either by enlisting in
the Guard and following the same procedure as enlisted veterans, or by graduating from college with a ROTC commission. This group, with the exceptions of chaplains and doctors, filled lieutenants' billets, and few of them had attended branch officer basic course before mobilization.

Before mobilization, most units were unable to fill all their company grade officer billets. To fill some of these vacancies, a number of enlisted Guardsmen, most but not all World War II enlisted veterans, were given commissions after their unit its received mobilization alert notice. Other vacancies were filled by Guard officers who were recalled from inactive status, and by Reserve officers who resigned their Federal commission and took a commission in a Guard unit, usually to escape involuntarily recall and shipment to Korea as an individual replacement.24

Once the state adjutant general found officers for his units, the next step was obtaining enlisted men. Enlisted personnel remained a source of concern for the Guard all through 1945-1950, first because of problems in recruitment, then because of problems in retention. As with officers, enlisted men fell into one of three generations: prewar Guardsmen, World War II veterans, and those too young for service in the war. Overall,
by 1950 youth dominated the enlisted ranks of the Guard: 25.8% were age 17-19 and 50.4% were age 20-25.\textsuperscript{25}

Not many prewar enlisted Guardsmen returned to the Guard after World War II as enlisted men. Many had been killed or disabled in the war. Some had failed to perform during the war and were not welcomed back. Others either had tired of military life or found a new calling and enlisted in the Regular Army. Many received commissions during the war. Enlisted men that did return to the Guard were welcomed for their experience and commitment to the Guard, but they remained a small part of the force, though they often recruited family members to join their units.

For the backbone of the enlisted force, non-commissioned officers, Guard leaders sought out veterans of World War II. These men possessed the maturity and experience needed by good NCOs and also could quickly form the cadres needed to train the large number of young non-veterans the Guard recruited. In many units, up to 25% of the enlisted strength were veterans and they dominated the NCO ranks.

The majority of enlisted Guardsmen by 1950 came from the postwar generation, men too young for service during World War II. They joined from a mix of
motives: adolescent fascination with things military; to learn a skill; pay; fellowship; and patriotism. In 1948 the draft became another motive; the Selective Service Act of that year exempted men age seventeen to eighteen-and-a-half from any active duty service if they enlisted in a Guard unit. (It was only in the 1950s that the Army required that men without prior service who enlisted in the Guard attend active duty training.)

While this generation often brought great enthusiasm to their units, they were also a source of many difficulties. Without prior service, they required extensive training. Many left their units before their enlistment expired, as college, jobs, families or enlistment in the Regular Army pulled them away. This created significant personnel turbulence in many units. Some young enlistees actually were underage and thus non-deployable if mobilized. Finally, many from the World War I generation suspected that these youngsters did not share their dedication to the cause of the National Guard.²⁶

The National Guard Bureau under General Cramer made recruitment one of its top priorities between 1947-1950. The Guard’s success at this forced the states in early 1950 to limit recruiting to replacing
losses when the Guard reached its budgetary strength ceiling of 350,000. The NGB used the million dollars a year authorized by Congress in 1947 to mount a sophisticated effort to convince Americans that the "The New National Guard" was "giving the nation 'the thing that counts!'"

The NGB combined a national campaign with efforts by state officials and unit leaders that took advantage of the Guard's strong local ties. At the national level, the NGB hired an advertising firm and orchestrated publicity campaigns that used mass market magazines and sponsorship of radio programs. The NGB sought to build bridges to other groups in American society in the hopes that they could help spread the word about the Guard. This effort included educators, businessmen, labor unions and clergy, yielding valuable endorsements, publicity and collateral advertising.

The most significant single recruiting period for the Guard was between August 1947 and August 1948. This raised its strength from 96,815 to 309,322. "Operation 88,888" conducted from September to November 1947 became the high point of this period. Designed to add 88,888 men to the Guard and raise the public's awareness of the Guard, it began on 16 September with a proclamation by former Guardsman President Harry S
Truman of "National Guard Day." The campaign, integrating a national print and radio advertising effort with the activities of local units, brought in 81,648 new men.¹⁰

The Guard stressed several themes in its recruiting campaigns. Trying to downplay bad publicity generated during the 1940-1941 mobilization, the Guard stressed that it was now a "new" organization, with plenty of up-to-date equipment and methods. In the atmosphere of a deepening Cold War, the Guard noted that in "this era of world uncertainties, peace cannot be governed by wishful thinking." "The basic insurance against future war is national preparedness," Guard ads proclaimed and the "new" National Guard had a vital role in that preparedness.

With a modern Guard playing such a vital role, the ads told potential recruits that they could learn new skills both useful for the nation and for their own improvement. "Members of the National Guard are not ordinary men," said a message from Dwight Eisenhower, and ads stressed the fellowship one could find in such company. Not neglecting its dual nature, the Guard also stressed its status as a "Federally supervised" state institution that played an important role in communities. Drawing on its militia roots now over
three hundred years old and the strong Guard traditions existing in many communities, ads pointed out the strong continuity across generations and a glorious heritage created by past members. Finally, the Guard stressed the practical benefits of pay and retirement benefits. Ads did not openly state that Guard service was a way out of the draft. However, the Guard appealed to men to serve with buddies or neighbors, the implication clearly being don’t serve with strange draftees in far away places for two years.  

"Giving the nation ‘the thing that counts!’"

With units assigned to the states and soldiers recruited, the next priority was training. Originally the National Guard Bureau had planned a six year train-up program to get units ready for M-Day. However, in 1948 the NGB replaced this with a three year train up plan, keyed to the three year enlistment of soldiers and focused on the essential items required to make units as ready as possible for M-Day, a day many thought closer than ever with growing Cold War tensions. In their first year, recruits would learn basic soldier skills, in the second begin specialist training and in the third master advanced specialist skills. This change placed a great deal of stress on
units, by forcing them to run a number of different classes during each drill for the different skill levels within the unit. The personnel turbulence, particularly from young enlistees, within many units caused further problems in training management. This was particularly troubling since the plan rested on the assumption that there would be little turnover. An Army Field Forces report in early 1950 noted that with this turnover, "it is doubtful if the training and overall efficiency of the Guard will ever reach its desired standards." The new three year plan also meant that for many units the only time they could do collective training was during their two week summer camp.\textsuperscript{32}

Guard units faced additional training distractions. Guard units depended on the Regular Army to assign officers and sergeants as instructors to Guard units. These instructors helped plan and present training, advised Guardsmen, and inspected to insure that units met the standards required for Federal recognition and thus Federal funding. However, in these years constant Truman Administration budget cuts left the Regular Army far under the strength planned for it in 1946 and badly overcommitted. As a result, many Guard instructor slots remained unfilled and
Reserve officers on extended active duty tours filled others. In addition, Guard instructor duty had never been seen as an assignment that would enhance careers. Thus many instructors were those whom an already shorthanded Army felt it could spare from other duties. And even good instructors often had difficulty making the cultural transition from serving with Regulars to serving with Guardsmen.\textsuperscript{33}

The Guard also suffered from inadequate armories. Construction and maintenance of armories was a state responsibility before 1941. When units returned from World War II, they often found their armories taken over for other purposes. With the great expansion of the Guard after the war and major changes in weapons and equipment from prewar organization, even units that reclaimed their armories often found them inadequate for the "new" Guard. An extreme example of this problem occurred in Hastings, Nebraska. The rifle company commander there received his unit’s full load of equipment shortly after Federal recognition. However, the company’s armory at the time was a barn leased from the county. Until more satisfactory storage could be arranged, the commander kept the equipment on two-and-a-half ton trucks in his home’s driveway, at the cost of wrecking his driveway.\textsuperscript{34}
The Guard could not find an answer to its greatest training problem, the lack of sufficient time. This had always been a major criticism of the Guard, most recently by the 1948 Gray Board. Units trained for only ninety-six hours a year at home station and then spent two weeks each summer in field training. This schedule could not make units, particularly higher echelon staffs, ready on M-Day for the stressful demands of modern combat operations, no matter how often the Guard was extolled as the "new Minutemen." 35

Shortages of equipment further aggravated shortages of time. The stockpiles of World War II equipment and the small procurement budgets of the Truman years did not allow the Army to purchase much new equipment. What equipment it did have was, like its manpower, stretched thin. While Guardsmen did not usually suffer a shortage of individual equipment, their units often lacked a complete allotment of major items like heavy weapons, electronics and vehicles. In 1950, Pennsylvania’s 628th Tank Battalion had only fifteen of twenty-two tanks authorized for each of its three companies. Most firing batteries of the 28th Division Artillery fielded only four of six authorized howitzers. The 121st Transportation Truck Company had only two of fifty-six authorized trucks. Shortages
affected training and meant that units were not fully prepared for operations on M-Day.  

The Limits of Influence

Despite the National Guard Association's influence, neither President Truman nor the Congress ever proposed or authorized enough money to fully fund the ambitious plan of a 680,000 man Guard. While the Guard was cheaper to maintain than an equivalent force of Regulars, a 680,000 man Guard was still beyond the pale for a President and a Congress determined to keep the military on a very lean diet. By June 1950, the Congress had appropriated only enough funds for an Army National Guard of 324,761 officers and men.

This ceiling did not allow units to be manned at their full wartime strength. To become combat ready, they would have to spend time after mobilization absorbing draftees and reservists and would have to receive large shipments of equipment to reach their full, wartime strength. The Guard and the Regular Army both understood this situation and made plans for post-mobilization expansion of Guard units to full strength, followed by a training program to prepare units for deployment. However, this situation did not provide the Regular Army with a combat-ready force it could tap
on M-Day; nor did it fit with the image the Guard had projected since 1945 as the "new Minutemen."

M-Day finally arrived in August 1950. However, when the nation called on the Army National Guard, it was for a type of war neither it nor the Guard had expected to fight and for which neither was prepared. Learning how to deal effectively with the problems posed by the Korean War would prove to be a long and painful process for both.
NOTES


2. Letter 11 October 1945, Beightler to Major General Ellard A. Walsh, Box 1 Folder 4, Beightler Papers, OHS. On Guard-Regular relations, see Major General Bruce Jacobs, "Tensions Between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army," Military Review (October 1993), pp.5-17. A bitter early postwar assessment of Regular-Guard relations during the war is Major General James E. Edmonds, "It's Up to Congress," The National Guardsman (January 1949), pp.8-10, 29. In what some Guardsmen saw as a fitting irony, McNair died in France, killed by a U.S Army Air Force bomb, while observing the Normandy breakout in the sector of a National Guard division.

3. The writings of Emory Upton, a brilliant young officer during the Civil War, had heavily influenced since the 1880s much of the Regular Army’s thinking on reserve forces policy. Disgusted by the waste and stupidity he saw during the Civil War, Upton blamed this on the amateurishness of militia officers, a too-small prewar professional army, and the interference of politicians in military matters. Upton greatly admired the German system of a large professional army backed by a large centrally controlled reserve force maintained by universal male conscription. See Russell Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp.100-128.


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6. This section is based on Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, pp.58-69 and Mahon, *History of the Militia and National Guard*, pp.195-197. The quote is from Memo for Chief of Staff from General Staff Committee on National Guard Policy, September 14, 1944, as quoted in Derthick, p.67. Universal Military Training differed from the wartime draft in two ways. All able-bodied men would serve and they would serve on active duty only long enough to become trained; they would then join the Guard or Reserves for a mandatory length of time. Some senior Guardsmen had doubts about basing the postwar Guard on UMT, which they believed an American people weary of military burdens would not allow Congress to pass. See Robert S. Beightler to Major General John F. Williams, 20 August 1945, Box 1 Folder 3, Beightler Papers, OHS.


12. This process can be followed at the national level with the State Decimal Files of the National Guard Bureau, Record Group 168, National Archives, College Park, Maryland (hereafter RG 168, NA). The state perspective on this process is harder to reconstruct, given the wide difference in available archival material among the states I have sampled. Some of this can be seen using the NGB’s records. Pennsylvania’s experience is well documented in the Archives of the Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania (hereafter PHMC): see MG 156, the Edward Martin Papers; MG 190, the James H. Duff Papers; and Record Group 19, Department of Military Affairs. The manuscript and oral history collections at USAMHI also are useful. Two good secondary works are Jerry Cooper with Glenn Smith, Citizens as Soldiers: A History of the North Dakota National Guard (Fargo, ND: The North Dakota Institute for Regional Studies, 1986), pp.375-386, and Richard C. Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard, 1894-1954" (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Utah, 1973), pp.426-446.

13. The most dramatic shift occurred with the 45th Infantry Division. In 1940 it had drawn on Oklahoma, Colorado, Arizona and New Mexico. In 1946, Oklahoman Guardsmen successfully lobbied to make the 45th an all-Oklahoma division. This was quite a coup, given the Thunderbirds’ outstanding record from the war, and Oklahomans took a very possessive interest in "their" division. Kenny Franks, Citizen Soldiers: Oklahoma's National Guard (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984), pp.140-141.

14. Such as: the Second Battalion, 117th Infantry became the 168th Military Police Battalion (Tennessee); the 197th Coast Artillery Regiment became the 197th Antiaircraft Artillery Group (New Hampshire); a battalion of the 115th Cavalry became the 300th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (Wyoming); a battalion of the 372d Infantry became the 272d Field Artillery Battalion (Massachusetts).

15. Such as: the 44th Infantry Division (Illinois) included the 129th and 130th Infantry Regiments; the 196th Regimental Combat Team (South Dakota) drew on the 147th Field Artillery.

16. The Duff Papers and the Department of Military Affairs records in the PHMC provide a good view of this for Pennsylvania. See also the manuscript collections and oral histories at USAMHI; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," ibid, and Cooper, Citizens as Soldiers, ibid; and Colonel Sherwood Dixon, "The Impossible Takes Longer," Infantry Journal, (April 1948), pp.27-30.
17. This did not stop charges that the Ohio National Guard was still a "Jim Crow Guard." Cleveland Call and Post, "Ohio Still Planning To Set Up Jim Crow Guard," October 18, 1947, p.1; "Ohio Guard to End Jim Crow? ‘Brass in Dark’," December 8, 1951, p.3B.

18. Charles Johnson, African American Soldiers in the National Guard: Recruitment and Deployment During Peacetime and War (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1992), pp.165-179. None of the three prewar regiments were reconstituted in the postwar Guard, though battalions of each were used to form new units. In keeping with the Regular Army's conventional wisdom about African Americans' abilities, no all-black units larger than a battalion were created in the postwar Guard. General Cramer's Connecticut was one of the few states to integrate its Guard by 1950; this caused some concern in Connecticut in 1950 when the 43d mobilized and went to Camp Pickett, Virginia. "Guardsmen Will Not Be Jim Crowed in Virginia, Connecticut Promises," Pittsburgh Courier, August 19, 1950, p.17.

19. Letter 20 August 1945, Robert S. Beightler to Major General John F. Williams, Box 1 File 3, Beightler Papers, OHS.


21. LaVern Weber Oral History, USAMHI. Born in 1923, Weber had graduated from Marine Corps Officer Candidate School in 1945, but had not seen combat before the war ended. Robert L Stockton, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI.

22. This section is based upon: Derthick, The National Guard in Politics, pp.78-82; editorials in The National Guardsman, 1948-1950; manuscript and oral history collections, USAMHI; an analysis of the careers of the general officers of Guard divisions mobilized for the Korean War. A good expression of this generation's belief in the importance of the Guard as a state institution is Colonel Elbridge Colby, "What of the National Guard," Infantry Journal (February 1947), pp.9-15. The quote is from Letter, 31 May 1939, Governor John W. Bricker to the Secretary of War, Box 1 Folder Adjutant General W-Z, John W. Bricker Papers, Ohio Historical Society.
23. This discussion is based on: manuscript and oral history collections, USAMHI; an analysis of officer backgrounds in selected units mobilized during the Korean War (see Appendix A); Dixon, "The Impossible Takes Longer"; Cooper, *Citizens as Soldiers*, ibid; Derthick, *The National Guard in Politics*, pp. 92-93; "The President's Page--Operation Circulation," *The National Guardsman* (February 1949); "New Pay Table," *The National Guardsman* (November 1949), p. 7; "Report of Staff Training Visit, 5-13 September 1950" in Second Army Command Report 1950, volume 5, Box 943, RG 407, NA.

24. This discussion is based on the same sources as listed in Note 16. A particularly dramatic example of premobilization commissioning occurred with Pennsylvania's 28th Reconnaissance Company: out of seventy enlisted men, twelve received commissions. "12 in City Troop Pass Officer Test," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, September 1, 1950, p. 5.


26. Information on enlisted Guardsmen is sparse compared to that on officers. This section is based on: manuscript and oral history collections, USAMHI; Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI; Dixon, "The Impossible Takes Longer"; Cooper, *Citizens as Soldiers*, ibid; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," ibid; Colonel Charles L. Southward, "Training the National Guard," (U.S. Army War College student thesis, 15 March 1954), pp. 15-17, copy in USAMHI Army War College Student Theses Collection; "As We See It: Things the Recruit Must Know," *The National Guardsman* (January 1949); and the monthly column "Posting the Guard" in *The National Guardsman*, 1948-1950. The large numbers of underage enlistees, particularly in small town areas, became quite noticeable when units mobilized in 1950. The 28th Infantry Division (Pennsylvania) lost 3.8% of its strength to underage enlistees, the 45th Infantry division (Oklahoma) lost 16%, and the 278th Regimental Combat Team (Tennessee) lost 10.5%. Memorandum, "Report on Divisions and RCT's inducted into Federal Service," 27 November 1950, National Guard Bureau, Army National Guard Decimal File 1949-50, Box 1083, RG 168, NA.


28. As the headline to a two page ad proclaimed in *Collier's*, March 22, 1947.


31. Examples of all of these themes can be found in the run of ads placed by the National Guard Bureau in Collier’s during 1947; see the issues of March 22, March 29, April 12, April 26, May 3, May 24, August 23, September 20, October 18, November 15, and December 13. The quotes are drawn from these ads. Blatant examples of the serving with your buddies and neighbors instead of strange draftees theme can be seen in recruiting ads placed in The Daily Oklahoman, August 15, 1950, p.20 and The Providence Journal, August 15, 1950, p.5, when the 45th and 43d Infantry Divisions, respectively, were mobilized.

32. National Guard Bureau, Draft of "Notes and Comments for Unit Commanders---The Three Year Training Plan," Army Decimal File, Box 1102, RG 168, NA; Colonel Thomas L. Martin, "New National Guard Training Plan," Infantry Journal (September 1948), 32-36; Army Field Forces, "Report of Staff Visit to National Guard Units of Texas and Oklahoma," 11 January 1950, Box 26 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; manuscript and oral history collections, USAMHI.


35. See Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, "Comments on Certain Aspects of the National Guard," 8 August 1951, copy in the U.S. Army Military History Institute. McLain had been one of the best Guard officers during World War II and accepted a Regular commission after the war. He served on the Gray Board.

36. Shortages of equipment is mentioned constantly in the command reports of Guard units mobilized for the Korean War found in the Records of the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 407, National Archives. The statistics for Pennsylvania units are taken from the units' 1950 Training Inspection Reports (National Guard Bureau Form 115), Box 1, RG 19, PHMC. Many Guard units also lacked sufficient numbers of field manuals and technical manuals; officers of the Ohio National Guard purchased their own copies instead of waiting for The Adjutant General's Office to finally deliver them. Colonel W.R. Smith, "Staff Visit to Camp Atterbury, 18-20 August 1948," Box 1 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

CHAPTER 2
LIMITED MOBILIZATION DURING A LIMITED WAR

When M-Day arrived in July 1950 for the Army National Guard, there were significant differences between what planners had expected to happen and what actually happened. The Army called on the Guard not for World War III with the Soviet Union, but for a limited war in defense of a nation most Guardsmen probably could not point to on a map. The Army did not call out the entire Guard, but only a portion of it. And, with few exceptions, most units mobilized did not quickly proceed to the theater of operations. At M-Day plus thirty, no Guard units were in Korea; the first Guard units (transportation truck companies) would arrive in Korea five months after M-Day. Instead, the Army ordered Guard units to posts across the nation for a lengthy training period, accompanied by rumors and uncertainty over their eventual use.
Unexpected War, Unexpected Demands

These developments flowed naturally from a set of interrelated factors: stopping a North Korean invasion of the South was not the type of war the Army had been planning to fight, and stopping this invasion during July 1950 proved embarrassingly more difficult and costly than the Army had expected. The Regular Army’s flaws and weaknesses in 1950 are well-described elsewhere. These flaws and weaknesses left the Army ill-prepared for war, even a limited war in Korea that fell short of the final showdown with the Soviet Union that had driven Army planning in the postwar period.¹

In order to prevent Pusan from joining Dunkirk on the list of ignominious withdrawals from a continent, senior Army leadership had to strip the General Reserve in the Zone of the Interior to send reinforcements and replacements to Eighth Army. Reinforcements, such as infantry divisions, field artillery and tank battalions, and separate service support companies were hastily prepared and shipped to Korea. At posts and stations across the nation, individuals received orders to ship out as replacements for Eighth Army’s growing number of casualties. By early August, the cupboard in the ZI, not very full to begin with, was nearly bare.²

The stripping of the General Reserve affected the
Guard’s mobilization in several ways. First, it meant that the Army ordered many more Guard units to active duty than could be prepared for combat and transported to Korea in time to influence the course of events during the remainder of 1950. These units were needed instead to reconstitute the General Reserve, which had to be rebuilt in case the Soviets, as many feared, used Kim Il Sung’s reunification drive as a cover for mischief elsewhere in the world. This fear also led the Army to mobilize large numbers of Guard antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units to build up the nearly nonexistent air defense of the ZI.¹

Second, tight budgets had left Eighth Army before the war without many of the non-divisional combat and support units called for by Army doctrine and sorely missed during the early fighting in Korea. The small prewar General Reserve, also limited by the same tight budgets, had run short of these types of units before filling Eighth Army’s needs. As a result, Guard units of these types would have to take up the slack and be deployed to Korea as fast as possible.

Third, the use of so much of the General Reserve’s trained manpower in Korea meant the Army would find it exceedingly difficult to expand its relatively small training base to meet the demands of mobilization;
almost all of its product was quickly taken up for service in Korea. Thus, those Guard units not designated during the autumn of 1950 for deployment to Korea received mostly untrained draftees for enlisted fillers, creating a very heavy load on these units' already overstretched available trained, experienced personnel.

Struggling to keep Eighth Army supplied with men and material, the Army Staff made another decision that had a significant effect on the Guard's mobilization during 1950. Casualties in Korea soon outpaced the Regular Army's ability to provide trained replacements. The Army turned to two components of the Reserves, the Volunteer and the Inactive, to provide quickly the thousands of trained and experienced officers and enlisted men needed by Eighth Army. Unfortunately, Army mobilization planning had designated many of these Reservists to fill key vacancies in Guard units ordered to active duty. As a result, most mobilized Guard units would experience shortages of junior officers and qualified technical specialists during their first year of active duty because they did not receive the expected number of Reservists. Compounding this shortage was the decision by Army Field Forces that units would send many of their Guardsmen to Army
schools during the early months of their active duty service.

As the situation in Korea worsened during July, the senior Army leadership in Washington debated what would be the Guard’s role in this unexpected conflict. The Selective Service Extension Act, passed at the end of June, had given the President the authority to order to active duty for a period not to exceed twenty-one months whatever portions of the various civilian components he believed were needed to deal with the emergency.

However, there was an initial hesitation among senior Army leaders, especially the Chief of Staff, General J. Lawton Collins, to mobilize Guard units. The hesitation arose from worry over the economic and political repercussions of ordering large numbers of Guardsmen to active duty; concerns that the already overstretched Army could not supply the equipment, fillers, and training sites needed by Guard units to make them combat ready; uncertainty over whether Guard units could be ready in time to influence the course of events in Korea; and fears that Guard units sent to Korea would not be available for use elsewhere in case this conflict expanded into World War III.

But Army leaders by mid-July came to the
conclusion that at least a portion of the Guard would have to be ordered into Federal service, a decision based on the continuing bad news from Korea, together with the realization that stripping the General Reserve had left the Army with little ability to respond to some other crisis, and that there was no effective AAA defense of the United States if the crisis expanded into World War III.⁶

To address this last concern, AAA units dominated the first two increments of Guard units alerted for mobilization on 22 and 23 July. Army Field Forces recommended Guard units for active duty based on estimates of units' training and leadership and units' equipment status. Thus the Army (over the National Guard Bureau's objections) did not maintain the command relationships between Guard AAA groups, brigades, battalions, and detachments. Instead, the Army pulled out the higher ranked battalions and detachments and sent them to various training sites. Group and brigade headquarters batteries ordered to active duty arrived at training sites to take command of gun battalions, operations detachments, and radar maintenance units they had never worked with before.⁷

Two other groups of Guard non-divisional units were alerted for mobilization during July. One was of
types needed in Korea which the General Reserve had run out of before filling Eighth Army's requests. The other was of types needed to help in rebuilding the depleted General Reserve. These units included field artillery battalions, maintenance companies, truck companies, engineer battalions, signal battalions, and several different types of battalion and group headquarters detachments and companies. By the end of July, a total of 16 battalions, 25 separate companies, and 11 battalion and group headquarters detachments had been alerted for active duty service. These were joined, in three more increments during early August, by a further 29 battalions, 33 separate companies, and 18 headquarters detachments, companies, and batteries. The Army also increased the number of mobilized Guard AAA units, adding a further two gun battalions, three headquarters batteries, and six operations detachments.®

Whether or not to deploy Guard non-divisional units to Korea remained uncertain for several months. Initially, the Army G-3 earmarked a number of units that entered active duty during August and September 1950 for service in Korea. These units were filled to full strength with Reservists and a few Regulars, and many of these units went to training sites west of the
Mississippi for easier outloading for shipment to Korea.

But with the success of the Inchon landing, the liberation of all of South Korea, and the invasion of North Korea, the Army put on hold any decision to deploy Guard units to Korea. Then in early November, in order to improve Eighth Army’s increasingly creaky logistical system as it advanced deeper into North Korea, six truck companies and two truck battalion headquarters detachments received orders to sail. Chinese interventions in October and November highlighted, among other problems, Eighth Army’s shortage of crucial types of non-divisional units. As a result, the Army G-3 in December and early January issued movement orders for Korea to nine field artillery battalions, six combat engineer battalions, three bridge companies, one engineer group headquarters, three maintenance companies, one ordnance battalion headquarters, and one quartermaster group headquarters.9

The use of Guard divisions was the thorniest Guard mobilization decision. There were serious concerns among senior Army leaders both over the usefulness of Guard divisions in the war and over the political and economic ramifications of mobilizing Guard divisions.
Mobilization of Guard divisions would present the Army, already straining to support the war in Korea, with some difficult problems in finding fillers and equipment to bring the divisions to full Table of Organization and Equipment strengths. In addition, mobilized Guard divisions would not be ready for deployment in time to influence Eighth Army's immediate fate, and many Regular officers still doubted the skills of senior Guard commanders and staffs to competently operate a formation as large as a division in combat.

These divisions formed the core of the Guard's 20th century heritage; much emotion and symbolism for Guardsmen were tied up in these formations, particularly the sensitive issue of how the Regular Army treated Guard general and senior field grade officers. As the biggest Guard units, their mobilization would create the greatest fallout, particularly with divisions that drew all their members from just one state (like Oklahoma's 45th) and with divisions that were located in the industrial heartland of America (like Pennsylvania's 28th, Illinois' 33d and Ohio's 37th). These political ramifications would escalate greatly if a Guard division suffered casualties on the same scale as suffered by some
Regular divisions in Korea during July and August 1950.10

In spite of these concerns, the empty General Reserve and fears of a possible wider war with the Soviets led the Army General Staff to conclude that it would have to order some Guard divisions to active duty. The question then became how many and which ones. After examining several proposals generated by the G-3, the Army Chief of Staff on 31 July decided, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed, that four divisions and two separate regimental combat teams should be ordered into Federal service on 1 September. At this time, the Army did not designate any of these units for use in Korea.11

The second question became much more complicated. Earlier in July, General Collins had ordered Army Field Forces to prepare recommendations on which Guard divisions should be ordered into Federal service. AFF ranked the Guard divisions based on their equipment status and AFF’s evaluations of their training status and the quality of their leadership. Using these criteria, AFF recommended, in order: 28th Infantry (Pennsylvania); 29th Infantry (Virginia and Maryland); 31st Infantry (Mississippi and Alabama); 37th Infantry (Ohio); 45th Infantry (Oklahoma); and 50th Armored (New
However, the Army Chief of Staff, General Collins, believed that other criteria also had to be considered: nearness to ports of embarkation for deployment overseas and geographical spread across the United States, so that one or several sections of the country did not bear a heavier burden than others. But the Chief, Army Field Forces, General Mark W. Clark, felt very strongly that the two key considerations in selecting divisions had to be their personnel strength and the quality of senior leaders, so the only modification made on 31 July to AFF's list was the substitution of the 40th Infantry Division (California) for the 50th Armored Division.

General Collins continued to insist on using more than just military effectiveness as the selection criteria. On 31 July, the Chief of Staff selected the 28th, the 40th, the 45th, and the 43d (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont) Infantry Divisions; for the two RCTs, Collins picked the 196th (South Dakota) and the 278th (Tennessee). Alert orders went out to the state adjutants general, and the Secretary of the Army telephoned each of the governors in the affected states on 1 August. (Probably an additional consideration in selecting the 43d over Massachusetts' 26th for First
Army's contribution was that mobilizing the 43d would get its commander, the prickly Chief, National Guard Bureau, Major General Kenneth F. Cramer, out of Washington.\textsuperscript{14}

**M-Day...The Reality**

As senior Army leaders during July pondered what role the Guard would play in this unexpected war, and bad news continued to dominate reports from Korea, Guardsmen across the country braced themselves for the call, some mocking recruiting slogans with a new version: "There's a Korea in the Army for You." Some units, especially during early July, believed that they would only be called if the crisis in Korea expanded into World War III. Other Guardsmen were not so sure. Those at summer training watched for the unusual, like conspicuous visits by senior Regular officers and extra attention from the AFF training inspection teams that visited summer training, clues that perhaps their unit was being considered for mobilization.

For many Guardsmen, the distinct possibility of mobilization for a war that was not going well for the United States gave summer training an urgency lacking in past summers; a reporter at Indiantown Gap in early July found non-divisional units from Pennsylvania...
"grimly serious." When the 28th Infantry Division arrived at Indiantown Gap later that month for summer training, the division commander warned his soldiers "that we must lose no time in getting ourselves in the best possible state of readiness." In late July, on the eve of departure for summer training, the commander of Rhode Island's Battery C, 243d AAA Battalion said that since the war began, there had been a "spirit of determination and seriousness in their weekly drills."\(^{15}\)

Some Guardsmen, mainly those boys and young men who had not served during World War II, looked forward to the adventure and excitement of active duty service. A first sergeant in the 163d Military Police Battalion told a reporter that his young soldiers "were full of ginger." A reporter visiting Battery D, 705th AAA Gun Battalion noticed that "there's no hiding the eagerness" among the young soldiers in the battery. However, their families did not usually share this eagerness, fearful of sending their boys and young men off to war. The 43d Infantry Division, at summer camp when it received its alert notice, reported "many anxious calls" from the mothers of the division's large contingent of 17 and 18 year old soldiers.\(^{16}\)

The 45th Infantry Division had recruited heavily
among high school boys and most of the division's enlisted soldiers were either in high school or recent high school graduates; The Daily Oklahoman estimated that only 20-21% of the enlisted were veterans of some type of military service during World War II. Oklahomans, particularly parents of these junior enlisted soldiers, could only grow more and more concerned during August as newspapers carried more and more reports of Sooners in the Regular Army and the Marine Corps killed, wounded or missing in action during the retreat to and fighting around the Pusan perimeter. The Daily Oklahoman did point out that about 60% of the enlisted were veterans of at least one summer training camp and a year of armory drills, which could not offer much reassurance to those familiar with Guard training.\textsuperscript{17}

The Daily Oklahoman offered reassurance from another source: "many parents may be glad to know" that the 45th's staffs and commanders had "lots of service experience."\textsuperscript{18} Army Field Forces commander General Clark offered his own reassurance about the mobilized National Guard divisions: "We can shorten the length of training to five months instead of nine. It doesn't take long to make killers of them." From his position as a company commander, LaVern Weber was less
sanguine. Mobilization "was a traumatic time for me because of the fact I had worked with the parents of the local community to recruit all of these youngsters into my unit and now I was taking them from their community, and from their homes and families, off to something."\(^{19}\)

Also not looking forward to mobilization were the many World War II veterans in the Guard, most of whom were only now getting into their stride as civilians, graduating from college, setting up businesses, and starting families. They watched the news reports from Korea and Washington with a mix of apprehension and resignation, wondering if their civilian lives, only recently restablished after World War II, would again be disrupted by active duty. A *Daily Oklahoman* reporter and long-time Guardsman told readers "You knew all the the time world conditions might one day result in another spell of active army duty yet it's still somewhat a shock when it actually happens." A *Providence Journal* reporter found Battery C, 169th AAA’s veterans "in no hurry to see action again" and quoted a lieutenant in the 43d Infantry Division: "We all had a stomachfull of war last time. None of us want to go back in very much, but we know the country is in a bad spot and we are willing."
Some, like Major James Christie, the 51st AAA Brigade's radar officer, expected orders for active duty when he heard of the North Korean invasion and, while "[N]ot overly happy" when the orders did arrive, looked forward to the challenges of active duty service. Also reassuring for some veterans was the comfort of going with those that they knew; a sergeant first class in Oklahoma’s 279th Infantry said "[I]t’s a job that has to be done. I’m not eager but I’m not going to twist anyone’s arm to get out. I like the old outfit. There’s still some of the old guys in it and I’d like to see a lot more of them."  

Guardsmen who had come to distrust the Regular Army’s use of Guard units in Federal service carefully watched the Regular Army’s decisions concerning the Guard’s role in this war, determined to prevent any efforts by the Regulars to use the 1950 mobilization to mistreat the Guard, as these Guard veterans believed the Army had done during the world wars. The major fears were that Guard divisions would be broken up, their components scattered across the Army; that senior Guard officers would be usurped by Regular Army officers; and that the Regular Army would violate the Guard’s major selling point, "Go With Those You Know," by stripping Guard units for individual replacements.
for Regular units. The friends and families of some Guardsmen, particularly in New Mexico, also feared that their hometown unit would be destroyed in this new war as its predecessor had been during World War II.²¹

Oklahoma, which had invested substantial amounts of state pride in its 45th Infantry Division, saw a significant level of concern over these fears about active duty service. Local political leaders quickly intervened; Congressman Mike Moroney reported that "top Defense officials" had reassured him that "under no circumstances" would the 45th be broken up in this way. Despite the official reassurances gained by Oklahoma politicians, news in August of the 45th's selection for active duty rekindled fears. A Daily Oklahoman editorial reviewed the proud history of the Oklahoma Guard, with an emphasis on mistreatment by the Regular Army of Guard units on active duty. The editorial warned that "[M]any of the officers who recruit the guard and train it are not privileged to command its units in active service."²²

Many state officials and many Guardsmen, whatever their age, experience, and enthusiasm about mobilization, during July and August expressed a great deal of pride in their unit, that they were "ready to go," as the activated 715th Transportation Truck
Company's commander told a reporter in July. Governor James H. Duff said that the Army's selection of the 28th Infantry Division was "the highest tribute that could be given the splendid leadership and caliber of the officers and men of our Keystone Division." A lieutenant in the 987th Armored Field Artillery, who had served in the British Army during World War II, said of his battalion, after it received orders for active duty, that "[T]here just aren't enough good adjectives to describe them." A corporal in the 705th AAA Gun Battalion boasted that "I've been in four different outfits, including 22 months in the ETO during the war, and this is the best yet."23

Failure to select a unit that believed it should have been selected could create hard feelings and generate a political squall. When the Army Chief of Staff passed over the 31st Infantry Division, one Mississippian wrote his senator, complaining that "[I]n the minds of the public, the thought will lie forevermore that the four divisions called were the best four divisions---this being untrue and unfair to the name of the 31st."24

Generally, newspaper editorial opinion presented the partial mobilization of the Guard as a necessary, if unwelcome, development in this odd war. The Logan
Herald-Journal portrayed the departure of Utah's 204th Field Artillery Battalion for Fort Lewis as part of "a great conflict today between the people who believe in Democracy and those who spread Communism all over the globe." One questioning voice came in a 30 July Washington Post analysis piece which charged that the Guard was not ready on M-Day for combat operations, and that its units were "far under strength, ill-trained, partly equipped and, most important of all, unprepared morally for the task which confronts it now."²⁵

However, much more common was a celebration of the Guard's citizen-soldier tradition. Discussing the 378th Combat Engineer Battalion's imminent departure from North Carolina, the Charlotte News said that the battalion was "imbued with the high tradition of the National Guard established in four previous wars. They realize--as we all do--that the National Guard is an invaluable reservoir of strength to this nation in time of need." The Raleigh News and Observer pointed out that the mobilizing 449th Field Artillery Battalion's North Carolina Guardsmen "once again join the ranks of civilians who have taken up arms in times of stress when freedom was threatened." The caretaker of Westerly, Rhode Island's armory told a reporter that "[T]his'll be the third outfit I've seen leave the
armory. First the old 5th Company, then Battery E in '41 and now Battery D. The other two were corking outfits and this one can hold its own with either of them."

In areas where local or state pride had been deeply invested in a Guard unit, there also was an element of chauvinism in coverage of the mobilization, nowhere more evident than in Oklahomans' attitude towards "their" 45th Infantry Division. The division commander on 1 August told Oklahomans that "[T]here's a rich heritage in the Thunderbird history and, although it may be a dubious honor, it still is an honor to be considered one of the nation's best outfits." The Oklahoma Press Association launched a drive for contributions to a division welfare fund, reminding Oklahomans that "this outfit belongs to the whole state and we should show our appreciation for it...No matter who comes in the division later it always will be the 45th from Oklahoma." To help maintain those ties between the division and the state, The Daily Oklahoman arranged for its daily and Sunday editions to be delivered to Camp Polk and nearby towns."
From Alert to Farewells

As the shock from receiving alert notices passed, Guardsmen began the hard work of preparing their units for entry onto active duty. Army Field Forces in mid-August brought commanders and key staff officers of alerted divisions and RCTs to AFF headquarters for a conference outlining AFF's plan for training these units to reach combat readiness. For all alerted units, there were many tasks to accomplish in the thirty days allotted by AFF between alert and entry into Federal service.

With all Guard units understrength, one of the first and most pressing tasks was recruiting. With the alert notice came authorization for Guard units to recruit to their full wartime Table of Organization (T/O) strength. The states launched aggressive recruiting drives, reminiscent of the Operation 88,888 campaign of 1947. The theme also was reminiscent of the 1947 recruiting campaign; in the words of a Providence Journal editorial cartoon: "If You've Got To Go, Go With Friends!" Battery C, 705th AAA's commander stressed that enlisting in his battery permitted "area men to train with their friends and other local enlistees. Members of the batteries will not be separated." Major General James Styron, commander of

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the 45th Infantry Division, told reporters:

Men who are subject to draft probably would rather be with other men they know, particularly those from their home town. We would rather have Oklahomans in the 45th because we know what they can do. There's a rich heritage in the Thunderbird history and, although it may be a dubious honor, it still is an honor to be considered one of the nation's best outfits. 

The success of these campaigns varied, with divisions benefitting the most, as they could offer the widest variety of positions to potential recruits and because their greater visibility tended to monopolize the public's attention. Other units faced different problems; despite the "handicap" of the Kansas State Fair, the 130th Field Artillery Group headquarters added 30 new recruits before induction.

As in many other aspects of the postwar Guard, Oklahoma's pride in its Thunderbirds led the state to outdo others. Across Oklahoma, newspapers, radio stations, and prominent citizens accepted the division's request to spread the word. Oklahoma Gas and Electric, with 43 of its employees Thunderbirds, saluted the 45th and wished for them "a soldier's 'Best
O’ Luck’ and an American hand shake on their new adventure." The new medium of television joined in, with WKY-TV airing a program combining a history of the 45th and interviews with current Thunderbirds.11

Across the state, the emphasis was on recruiting junior officers and enlisted men to go with those they knew. A major asset for this campaign was Lieutenant Colonel Roy P. Stewart, the division’s Military Government Officer and a senior reporter for The Daily Oklahoman. Stewart’s newspaper ran 67 stories concerning the 45th between August 2 and August 31; a large ad in The Daily Oklahoman warned young men that this was "the best military opportunity you’ll ever have---a chance to serve with your hometown outfit, a combat organization that performed heroically on the battleground of World War II...a chance to serve with your hometown friends and neighbors, to train with the people you’ve lived with all your life!"32

The "Go With The Men You Know" theme proved very appealing, including to those who had already received their draft notices; in early August, the Oklahoma Selective Service found 41 men enlisted in the 45th who had not answered their draft calls. Some draft boards gave their local Guard unit lists of those men most likely to be called up next. William Craig passed his
physical in mid-July and returned home to await his notice to report for induction. In early August, after being "propositioned many times" by Thunderbird recruiters, Craig enlisted in the 179th Infantry after a friend had joined the regiment. "I knew in my heart that I was violating the draft laws by enlisting, but the 45th Division recruiter, a silver-tongued devil, convinced me that it was completely legal." 33

Along with recruiting new enlisted Guardsmen, alerted units moved to fill key vacancies. One of the most important vacancies was the unit administrator, a warrant officer position in each company or battery which was not always filled in state service. However, the great administrative demands of mobilization led many units to promote senior noncommissioned officers, often battery or company first sergeants, into this position. 34

Another major set of vacancies existed in battery and company grade officer positions. To fill many of these vacancies, units received some officers out of the Inactive Guard and commissioned promising Guard enlisted men (usually World War II veterans), 1950 ROTC graduates, and officers in the Inactive Reserve who wished to avoid going to Korea as an individual replacement. The 28th Infantry Division’s Reconnaissance
Company, descendant of Philadelphia’s elite City Troop, provided twelve new officers to various units of the division. The 45th Infantry Division’s 180th Infantry Regiment received twenty officers commissioned after the alert notice arrived, while the division’s 158th Field Artillery received six. New York’s 715th AAA Gun Battalion commissioned two officers after the alert and received five officers from the Inactive Guard.\(^{35}\)

Some recruiting campaigns were quite successful; the 45th Infantry Division enlisted 2,321 men. The other divisions and the two RCTs did not match Oklahoma’s turn-out, but did bring in significant numbers to each unit: 43d Infantry Division, 1,267; 28th Infantry Division, 968; 40th Infantry Division, 847; 196th RCT, 551; 278th RCT, 504. Non-divisional units usually measured their success at recruiting in the tens, though some added significant numbers. However, with the exception of Alabama’s 107th Transportation Truck Company, no Guard unit examined was able to reach full T/O strength through the recruiting campaign before departing for training sites; all would need officer and enlisted fillers to become combat ready.\(^{36}\)

One reason that the post alert recruiting campaigns did not significantly increase units’
strength before induction was that the mobilization process subtracted, as well as added Guardsmen to units. As a result, the gains in new personnel achieved by the four divisions and two RCTs was cancelled out by losses of pre-alert personnel; the six units added a total of 6,458 new personnel after the alert notice, but lost 6,210 Guardsmen during the same period. Non-divisional units suffered from the same phenomenon on a smaller scale.37

A major source of personnel losses during mobilization was the Guard’s success after 1945 in recruiting among boys, especially in rural and small town America where the local Guard unit often was one of the main social centers of a community. Army regulations prohibited the induction into Federal service of anyone younger than seventeen. Once again, the 45th Infantry Division led the way; it discharged 1,218 boys (16% of its enlisted strength) for being underage. California’s 40th Infantry Division was a close second with 1,114 (12.7% of enlisted strength). The 45th suffered an additional loss when Governor Roy Turner announced that he would offer discharges to boys under 18 who wanted to finish high school; 565 boys took up the offer. Together, these two sources cost the Thunderbirds 23% of their 1 August enlisted
strength.\textsuperscript{38}

The other leading source of Guardsmen’s failure to join their units on active duty was the induction physical. Army regulations required a physical examination by an Army doctor to certify a Guardsman fit for active duty. Among the divisions and RCTs, the 28th Infantry Division suffered the greatest losses from induction physicals, with 673 Guardsmen failing the exam (6.7% of total strength); the next highest was the 43d Infantry Division, with 505 (6%) failing the exam.\textsuperscript{39}

Trying to arrange these exams consumed a great deal of time and effort after the alert notice, as most military districts did not have enough doctors on hand to smoothly process units through this phase of mobilization. Military districts and continental armies responded by using doctors at military installations and by placing Reserve doctors on short active duty tours, but arranging for physical exams threw a good deal of sand into the mobilization machinery.\textsuperscript{40}

Other sources of manpower losses during mobilization were Guardsmen granted deferments based on either hardship or on irreplaceable positions in key sectors of the economy needed for industrial
mobilization, such as the 705th AAA’s chaplain, a forty year old World War II veteran with five children and the commander of the 145th Field Artillery, who took his battalion into active duty, but quickly returned to Utah because of his civilian position as a senior executive at a steel corporation.11

Unfortunately, there was extensive confusion concerning deferments; units often lacked copies of the appropriate Army regulations and received conflicting guidance from military districts, continental armies, and the NGB. Governors and state adjutants general usually tried to insulate the process of granting deferments from politics by appointing a board of officers to hear requests. Governor Turner appointed the state adjutant general, the state Selective Service director, and the governor’s executive secretary to Oklahoma’s deferment screening committee.

These measures did not prevent Guardsmen and their families, encouraged or angered by the conflicting policies they heard about, from appealing, both before and after induction into Federal service, to state governors and Congressmen for assistance. However, governors usually referred these requests back to the state adjutant general’s office, while Congressmen’s requests for assistance from the National Guard Bureau
were referred by the NGB back to the appropriate state adjutant general's office.\textsuperscript{42}

Physical exams and applications for deferment only added to the daunting administrative workload created by mobilization. A major problem for Guardsmen preparing for active duty was that the Guard and the Regular Army operated two different and incompatible administrative systems. Clerks and personnel officers struggled to transfer personnel records from the Guard system to the Regular Army system, one with which Guardsmen had little experience and for which most units lacked the appropriate forms and references. To handle the workload, some units rented typewriters or hired civilian typists. Another source of friction in this process was some personnel officers' "initial failure to grasp the necessity for night work in their sections."\textsuperscript{43}

To prepare for induction into Federal service, many units brought key administrative and logistical personnel on to active duty early. Units' Regular Army instructors worked closely with these personnel; more familiar with Regular Army systems, these instructors proved especially useful in dealing with staff officers at military districts and at the continental armies. Military districts created administrative support teams
for alerted units, but the districts lacked the manpower to provide every unit with all the support they needed. Rivalling the transfer of personnel records in administrative complexity and consumption of time for mobilizing units was the transfer of equipment provided by the Federal government, thru the United States Property and Disbursing Office in each state, to units' property books.44

Most state adjutants general authorized alerted units to hold three drills a week instead of the normal one. While some units hoped to use this time for extensive training, these hopes were crushed under the combined weight of administrative processing and preparing equipment for movement to the training site. As a result, most training during the alert period was on less-complex skills, such as close order drill and first aid; also covered during this period were Army regulations and military law.45

On the day appointed for entry into Federal service, units mustered at their armories early in the morning. There an officer would read the orders bringing the unit on to active duty, formally inducting the unit into Federal service. Some units performed the requirement with ceremony; others, like some in the 28th Infantry Division, did so with "a note of
informality, which found many of the former civilian soldiers in the Pennsylvania National Guard wearing street clothes."

The days between entry into Federal service and departure for the training site were filled with more of the same: the seemingly endless administrative work; the completion of preparations for shipping unit equipment and loading onto cars those items to be shipped by rail; continuation of training on less-complex tasks, and lectures on military law and Army regulations. Those who lived near enough to the armories could return home at night, while those who did not would bunk out at the armory. Some Guardsmen in every battalion or larger sized unit left their communities for the training site before the rest to act as an advance party, coordinating billets and support at the training site."

As units prepared for departure, so did their communities. Most Guard units, especially in rural and small town America, had strong ties in their communities, with local citizens feeling very possessive about "their" unit. Local governments and private groups arranged farewell dinners, picnics and dances, often coupled with fundraising events to build up company and battery units funds. Speakers at these
events stressed the sad necessity of mobilization to fight the new foe, communism, and pride in their Guardsmen’s continuation of the citizen-soldier tradition. At the farewell barbecue for Statesboro, Georgia’s 101st AAA Gun Battalion, each soldier received a silver cigarette lighter as a token of the community’s affection.48

While other areas of the nation often had enthusiastic farewells for their units, as would be expected, Oklahoma’s pride in its 45th led to a massive show of support as citizens rallied to support their Thunderbirds. Shortly after the alert notice, Governor Turner declared that Saturday, 26 August would be "45th Division Day" in Oklahoma. Between the alert notice and induction, cities and towns across the state set aside their own days to honor their local units. Ardmore, home of Company H, 179th Infantry and the 179th’s medical company, held a special service and dinner for its guardsmen on 19 August at the Missionary Baptist Church. A few days later, the town had a stag party, at a dollar a ticket, to help raise money for the two companies unit funds. During the weekend of "45th Division Day," there were farewell parties across the state.49

Soon, too soon for many, the day to depart from
home station arrived. Units generally marched from their armory to the nearest train station, usually behind a Guard or Reserve band not yet mobilized or a local high school band. Often local or state political leaders addressed the unit; before leaving its armory to march to North Station, Massachusetts’ 272d Field Artillery heard Governor Paul Dever convey the Commonwealth’s pride in the state’s first Guard battalion to leave. For many of the young men in departing units who had no prior active-duty service, it was the beginning of the great adventure of their short lives, and they acted more like boys off to summer camp than soldiers who might soon find themselves on the battlefield.

However, at the railroad station, often under the brightness of TV lights in larger cities, families and friends said their final farewells in an atmosphere usually described as tearful, grim, and apprehensive. In East Greenwhich, Rhode Island, for Battery B, 705th AAA Gun Battalion came "[A]ll too soon the train’s warning whistle---the hurried goodbyes---the crowd of youngsters cheering as the train disappears in a blur which hankerchiefs cannot seem to clear. The 705th was on its way!" In Charlotte, North Carolina, home of the departed 378th Combat Engineer Battalion, "[L]ong after
the station was deserted, a pretty, teen-aged girl in a brown sunback dress stood beside the track, her face buried in her hands.\textsuperscript{50}

The Army National Guard, at least a sizable part of it, was again going off to war; a war however, unlike the one it, the Army, and the nation had been expecting since 1945. As the troop trains moved out of the stations, for Guardsmen and their families, the next twenty-one months stretched out ahead of them covered by a mist of uncertainty and concern.

Newspapers carried more and more articles reporting the death, wounding, and disappearance of hometown boys and men in Korea. In Oklahoma, a Regular Army corporal, back home from Korea to mend from his wounds warned that this was a very different war, that the "Gooks" were a crueler and more dangerous foe than the Nazis defeated just five years earlier. What would happen in Korea? Was World War III just down the tracks? And most importantly for them, what would the Army do with these modern minutemen?\textsuperscript{51}
NOTES


3. Both the Army, with its resources overtaxed, and the Air Force, which focused its resources on Strategic Air Command's atomic strike force, had done little before June 1950 to build up an effective air defense system for the continental United States. During the late 1940s, the Army had assigned the mission of continental air defense mainly to the National Guard. Studies by an interservice committee in 1950 had recommended a list of sites critical enough to warrant AAA defense, but only at the Hanford nuclear weapons production facility had a Regular AAA gun battalion been deployed by the start of the Korean War. The Army did not establish Army Antiaircraft Command until July 1950; it filled the first two increments of Guard units called to active duty with AAA units to implement the AAA defense plan and give Army Antiaircraft Command operational units. Stephen P. Moeller, "Vigilant and Invincible: United States Army Air Defense Command," Air Defense Artillery, May-June 1995, pp.7-13.

4. The Army tapped the Inactive and Volunteer Reservists instead of those Reservists in organized units because, fearing that war in Korea might lead to an even larger conflict, it wanted to maintain these units for future mobilization. As
almost all Reservists in Inactive or Volunteer status had not expected to be called for anything short of World War III and had not been attending drills or receiving pay, this decision was extremely unpopular and later led Congress to mandate their early release from active duty during 1951, generating in the process significant personnel turbulence for Guard units deployed to Korea which had received large numbers of enlisted Reservists as fillers during 1950. The Inactive and Volunteer Reserves also proved inadequate to the demands for junior combat arms officers, forcing the Army later to tap unmobilized Reserve units for individual officers. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.120-122; Kendall, "An Inflexible Response," pp.180-183, 206-210; Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, "Mobilization in the Korean Conflict," (Dunn Loring, Virginia: 1982), pp.5-25; Richard B. Crossland and James T. Currie, Twice the Citizen: A History of the United States Army Reserve, 1908-1983 (Washington: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 1984), pp.94-100.

The major exception to this generalization were Guard units selected during 1950 for deployment to Korea; they receieved large numbers of enlisted Reservists as fillers and some officer Reservists. See chapter three.

5. Some Guardsmen hoped that the draft extension law would help recruiting for Guard units. "45th Hears Draft News, Opens Armory Doors to Enlistments," The Daily Oklahoman, July 8, 1950, p.5.


7. The tactical integrity of Guard AAA groups and brigades developed after arriving at training sites was not maintained during active duty; once units finished their Army Training Program in 1951, battalions and groups and brigades brought together in 1950 were split up and sent to different sites across the country. The first two increments mobilized in 1950
contained:

19 AAA gun battalions
7 AAA group and brigade headquarters
24 AAA operations detachments and radar maintenance units
3 combat engineer battalions
1 field artillery battalion
1 separate engineer company
1 ordnance company
1 ordnance battalion headquarters
1 engineer group headquarters


8. Also mobilized later during 1950 were the following non-divisional units: Puerto Rico’s 296th Infantry (to replace the Regular Army’s 65th Infantry, normally stationed on the island, but deployed to Korea); one tank battalion; one engineer group headquarters; and sixteen bands. "Induction and Release of National Guard Units, 1950-1956."


Some Reserve officers and NCOs arrived at mobilized Guard units "disgruntled at being recalled" and "skeptical at being assigned to a National Guard unit, fearing favoritism" toward Guard officers and NCOs. Kenneth R. Scurr, Reflections of Service: 147th Field Artillery Group, 1917-1977 (privately printed, n.d.), pp.71-72.

10. Many of the Guard divisions that had served during one or both of the two world wars had created an intense foci of affection and pride among Guardsmen who had served in the divisions. The divisions also tended to monopolize national attention concerning the Guard after 1917. See John Mahon, History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983), chapter 13; Bruce Jacobs, "Tensions Between the Army National Guard and the Regular Army," Military Review (October 1993), pp.5-17; William Donnelly, "Keeping the Buckeye in the Buckeye Division: Major General Robert S. Beightler and 37th Infantry Division, 1940-1945," Ohio History, Winter/Spring
1997. pp.42-58; and the discussion of the 45th Infantry Division in chapter four, the 28th Infantry Division in chapter five, and the 37th Infantry Division in chapter six.

11. The regimental combat teams (RCTs) were needed to cover missions in peripheral areas providing locations for bases, such as Iceland and Alaska, that did not require an entire division. General Collins did want to violate the integrity of divisions (and risk the wrath of the NGA) to provide units for this type of mission when the separate RCTs were available. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.122-125; "Mobilization in the Korean Conflict," pp.27-30.

12. Interestingly, only three of the six divisions designated by the NGB in 1948 as priority divisions of the mobile strike force were on AFF's recommendation list in 1950: the 28th, the 31st and 45th. Missing from AFF's list were the 26th (Massachusetts) and 43d (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Vermont) Infantry and the 49th (Texas) Armored Divisions.

13. These selections meant that each numbered army in the continental United States provided either a division or a RCT. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.124-125; Kendall, "An Inflexible Response," pp.105, 173-175; "Mobilization in the Korean Conflict," pp.28-29. LIFE argued in an editorial that concern over the political implications of mobilizing Guard divisions "was a sure sign of Washington's failure to face the implications of the Korean war." The magazine agreed with General Clark that Guard divisions "ought to be called up in the order of their fitness." "Questions For Washington," LIFE, August 7, 1950, p.30.

14. While he was gotten out of Washington, Cramer could not stay out of controversy. Complaints from Guardsmen, draftees, and their families over Cramer's policies and command style led to press criticisms and calls from politicians in the 43d's home states for an investigation. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet's Second Army headquarters (in whose area the 43d was stationed on active duty) did investigate, clearing Cramer of any wrongdoing. However, Army Field Forces remained dubious of both Cramer's abilities as a division commander and of the abilities of the 43d's senior leaders up until the division deployed to Germany in 1951. See Diary entry for 2 October 1950, File Historical Record August-October 1950, Box 16, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, USAMHI; "Officers and Men at Camp Pickett Are Restless Under Restrictions," The Providence Journal, October 1, 1950, p.16; "Green, Fogarty, Forand Ask 43rd Div. Complaints Probe," The Providence Journal, October 7, 1950, p.1; "Probers Report on Pickett," Army Times, December 2, 1950, p.1.; "The Troubled
Colonel Kenneth Scurr, commander of the 196th RCT, claimed in his memoirs that an AFF inspector visiting the RCT at its summer training in June 1950 told him that the 196th would be among the first units ordered to active duty for the Korean crisis. Scurr, Reflections of Service, p.68

Passed over in favor of the 43d Infantry Division, a "majority" of Guardsmen in the 26th Infantry Division believed it was only a matter of time before they too would enter active duty. (They never did.) "Y-D Just Misses Being Called Up; Is Getting Ready," Boston Globe, August 1, 1950, p.1.

16. "MP Battalion From District Is Federalized," Washington Post, September 4, 1950, p.18; "Battery D Recruits, Put Through Paces, Say Life in Army Is Great," Providence Journal, August 20, 1950, p.18; "Report of Staff Visit to the 43d Infantry Division, Pine Camp New York." Robert Stockton, a 1950 high school graduate, recalled his initial reaction on hearing that his 45th Infantry Division had been alerted was "this changed college plans." Robert Stockton, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI. The mother of a 17 year old Guardsman wrote the Governor of Pennsylvania asking him to intervene to support her application for the discharge of her son, illegally enlisted, she claimed, in
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21. Some higher Regular headquarters were concerned over the caliber of senior Guard officers entering Federal service. For example, on 1 August, Second Army ordered Senior Army Instructors in the army area to "furnish confidential biographical information" on commanders and key staff officers of major Guard units, including separate battalions. G3 Section, Command Report, 1950, Second Army, Box 943, RG 407, NA. New Mexicans lived with the memory of the 200th Coast Artillery Regiment, lost on Bataan; the AAA gun battalions in the postwar New Mexico Guard all traced their ancestry to that regiment, and a few survivors of the regiment had joined the postwar Guard. See "Silver City Goes To War Again," LIFE, August 7, 1950, pp.25-29.


Major General Cramer said that he and his 43d Infantry Division "are very happy the Forty-Third Division was among the first National Guard divisions selected for active duty." "43rd Division of New England Among 4 Guard Units Called," New York Times, August 2, 1950, p.1.

As National Guard units received alert notices, concerns arose among state officials, particularly in industrial states, that this war would result in the complete mobilization of the National Guard, as had occurred during World War II, leaving states vulnerable to sabotage and civil disturbances. As Pennsylvania Governor James H. Duff put it: "the day-to-day news makes it clear that anything can happen. It also should be an additional incentive for communities throughout the Commonwealth.


25. The same Washington Post article also charged that the Regular Army had not been properly prepared in training, equipment, and morale for combat operations. It blamed as the root cause "a people who congenitally seek the easy way out until they find themselves in a corner from which escape is only the toughest way of all." "'M-Day Force' Still Mainly on Paper," Washington Post, July 30, 1950, p.3B; "Farewells...Tears...Wonder," Logan Herald-Journal, August 25, 1950, p.1; "A Call to Arms," Providence Journal, August 2, 1950, p.11; "Pennsylvania's 28th Division to Serve U.S. Again," Philadelphia Inquirer, August 3, 1950, p.22.


Non-divisional Guard units that shared their state with a division sometimes lost out in press coverage. In Rhode Island, mobilization orders arrived for the 705th AAA Gun Battalion and for the state's portion of the 43d Infantry Division (three battalions, four separate companies and Division Artillery headquarters). Between 21 July and 30 September, there were thirteen articles about the 705th in the Providence Journal and fifty-two articles about the 43d; the newspaper even sent one of its reporters to Camp Pickett, Virginia to see how the division was settling in at its training site. Wives of two 705th AAA soldiers wrote to the newspaper accusing it of bias in favor of the 43d. The second pleaded for "more news about the 705th. They're R.I. boys too." "Partial to the 43rd?" Providence Journal, October 8, 1950, p.1-III; "Remember the 705th," Providence Journal, October 22, 1950, p.1-III.


New York City's 715th AAA Gun Battalion and 955th Field Artillery Battalion also suffered in press coverage compared to New York's 27th and 42d Infantry Divisions' summer camps. Coverage of the former by The New York Times consisted of one short notice; the newspaper provided the latter five much longer articles during August.


Pennsylvania was not far behind Oklahoma when it came to the 28th Infantry Division; while the state had many other Guard units in addition to the "Bloody Bucket" division, it is clear that the 28th was first in the Keystone State's affections. "28th Lauuded by Pershing," Philadelphia Inquirer August 2, 1950, p.2; "Pennslyvania's 28th Division to Serve U.S. Again," Philadelphia Inquirer, August 3, 1950, p.22; "28th Division Proves It's Ready for Duty," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, August 7, 1950, p.1
28. A copy of the information handed out to commanders and their staffs by AFF at the conference can be found in Headquarters, Army Field Forces, Secret Decimal Correspondence File, 1949-1950, Box 190, RG 337, NA.


30. Command Report, 1950, 130th Field Artillery Group, Box 4685, RG 407, NA. Most units' 1950 command reports in Record Group 407, National Archives, mention a recruiting campaign conducted between alert and induction, but few reveal the results of the campaign.


32. The Daily Oklahoman, August 15, 1950, p.20; 1950 Command Report, 45th Infantry Division, G-1 Section, Box 4257, RG 407, NA. The 45th also tried to use its wartime esprit as a recruiting tool, getting a special dispensation from the Department of the Army that would allow World War II Thunderbird veterans living anywhere in the country to enlist in the Army after the division entered active duty and be guaranteed assignment to the 45th. There is no evidence that many veterans outside of Oklahoma took up this offer. "Veterans of 45th May Go Back to Old Outfits," The Daily Oklahoman, August 5, 1950, p.2. Three officer veterans of the 45th did travel to Oklahoma before 1 September to rejoin their old outfit: a Boston University professor, a Cincinnati lawyer, and Salt Lake city lawyer. All Field Artillery captains, they were convinced that they would have to serve in this new war, so they wanted to do it in the 45th. The Daily Oklahoman, August 29, 1950, p.7.

warrant for failure to report for induction on September 15. The sheriff returned to Oklahoma without a prisoner when Craig produced his Army identification card (which showed his date of entry on active duty) and pointed out to the sheriff that he would "look like an idiot" for arresting a soldier on active duty who had ignored an induction notice dated fourteen days after he went on active duty. Craig, Lifer!, pp.21-22.

34. The very shorthanded 235th Field Artillery Observation Battalion promoted six enlisted to warrant officer after the alert; two to be unit administrators, one to be an assistant radar officer, one to be the assistant supply officer, and one to be the assistant survey officer, and one to be the battalion motor officer. For a description of this unfortunate battalion's travails, see chapter three.

35. The conclusions concerning warrants and company grade officers is based on checking unit officer rosters against the 1951 National Guard Register. On the Philadelphia City Troop, see "12 in City Troop Pass Officer Test," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 1, 1950, p.5; the 1950 annual Federal inspection of the 28th Reconnaissance Company noted that "mostly high type men" filled the company's ranks, with many college graduates, and recommended that most of the unit's enlisted should be sent to Officer Candidate School upon mobilization of the company. Training Inspection Report, 1950, 28th Reconnaissance Company, Department of Military Affairs, General File, Adjutant General, 1934-1989, Box 1, RG 19, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Oklahoman Charles Rice had served in Europe with the 69th Infantry Division's reconnaissance troop. After the war he attended college and was commissioned in the Army Reserve. Going to Korea as an individual replacement, Rice decided, "wasn't for me...I did not want to go as a replacement, I wanted to go with a unit." So he called the 45th Reconnaissance Company's commander, asking if the unit could use another lieutenant. The company could and Rice quickly obtained a Guard commission. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.115.

In addition to commissioning new officers, some Guard units after receiving the alert notice promoted some officers and enlisted to the next higher grade. as it was easier to do so while still in state service than after entering Federal service, when units would be governed by Regular Army promotion policies. Comparison of unit officer rosters with 1951 National Guard Register. Not all Regulars thought this action helped units, believing it moved some Guardsmen beyond their level of competence. Memorandum, 14 September 1950, Subject: "Report of Staff Training Visit," copy in Volume V, Command Report, 1950, Second Army, Box 943, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 746th AAA Gun Battalion.
36. Memorandum from National Guard Bureau Information Office for General Fleming, 27 November 1950, "Report on Divisions and RCT's Inducted into Federal Service," File 325.452 General, National Guard Bureau Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 1083, Record Group 168, NA; Gordecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," op. cit. Command Reports for 1950 for mobilized non-divisional units show the shortfall between full T/O strength and the personnel strength units actually brought on to active duty. See chapters three, five, and six for examples.


38. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division; "17-Year-Olds Find Door Out Of Guard Open," The Daily Oklahoman, August 12, 1950, p.1; The Daily Oklahoman, August 24, 1950, p.7; "Report on Divisions and RCT’s inducted into Federal Service." Other losses to underage: 28th, 345; 43d, 235; 196th RCT, 0; 278th RCT, 256. Non-divisional units undoubtedly contained some underage boys, but not all of these units' 1950 command reports broke out the causes of why Guardsmen did not enter active duty. The 710th AAA Gun Battalion did note that it lost five Guardsmen to minority. Command Report, 1950, 710th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4576, RG 407, NA.

39. Other losses to physicals: 40th, 484; 45th, 457; 196th RCT, 340; the 278th RCT, 106. "Report on Divisions and RCT’s inducted into Federal Service." Some examples of losses reported by non-divisional units from Guardsmen failing the physicals:

- 703d AAA Gun Battalion about 4%
- 710th AAA Gun Battalion 14
- 746th AAA Gun Battalion 10
- 235th Field Artillery Battalion 25
- 171st Military Police Battalion 4
- 112th Truck Battalion Headquarters Company 7
- 107th Truck Company (minority and physical) 13

Source: 1950 Command Reports, RG 407, NA for 703d AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4576; 710th AAA Gun Battalion; 746th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4576; 235th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 4681; 171st Military Police Battalion, Box 4718; 107th Truck Company, Box 4755; 112th Truck Battalion Headquarters Company, Box 4753.

40. Letter, 6 November 1950, Commanding General Sixth Army to The Adjutant General, National Guard Bureau Decimal File 1949-1950, File 325.452, Box 1083, RG 168, NA; Command Report, 1950, 179th Infantry, Box 4258, RG 407, NA; 1950 Command Report, G-1 Section, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report, 1950, 28th
Infantry Division, Box 3983, RG 407, NA; M-Day...The Reality, "The National Guardsmen" (February 1951), pp.2-3, 16-21.


42. This and the preceding paragraph are based on: Remarks by Major General Raymond H. Fleming, Chief, National Guard Bureau, Official Proceedings of the National Guard Association of the United States General Conference 1950, pp.50-51; Governor 1947-1951 Subject File, Box 13, Duff Papers, PHMC; Box 45, W. Kerr Scott Papers; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," pp.459-460; "M-Day...The Reality;" "Deferments From 28th Facing Close Scrutiny," Philadelphia Inquirer, August 5, 1950, p.5; The Daily Oklahoman, August 9, 1950, p.8; Command Report, 1950, 28th Infantry Division.

43. Command Reports, 1950, 28th and 45th Infantry Divisions; "M-Day...The Reality;" Command Reports, 1950, 171st MP Battalion, 710th AAA Gun Battalion, and 107th Truck Company; Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.18-20. The quote is from the 45th Infantry Division's Command Report.

44. Command Report, 1950, 158th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 4258, RG 168, NA; Command Report, 1950, 179th Infantry; Command Report, 1950, 28th Infantry Division; Command Report, 1950, 746th AAA Gun Battalion; "M-Day...The Reality."

The 45th Infantry Division faced an especially difficult problem in transferring Federal property to units; the division chief of staff was also the head of the U.S. Property and Disbursing Office for Oklahoma. But the Oklahoma USP&DO managed to transfer all Federal property to units by 1 September, assisted greatly by hiring additional clerks, extensive use of long-distance telephone calls, and the fortuitous fact that the USP&DO had inventoried most units between May and June 1950. "Interview 1st Lieutenant Warren R. Cook," Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. Cook, the division's assistant finance officer, worked as a civilian in the USP&DO.

Divisions also sent small parties to scout out the posts to which the divisions would move after entering active duty. What they found there was usually depressing, as these posts had been placed in standby status after World War II, with only small caretaker staffs and insufficient funds for adequate upkeep. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. The Daily Oklahoman dispatched a reporter to Camp Polk, who told Oklahomans, rather optimistically, that the camp, used only for Guard and Reserve training since 1945, was "in Fair Shape."

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46. See note 47. The quote is from "Penna.'s Own 28th Inducted With Simple Roll Call," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1950, p.2.

47. Reflecting the elite social status of its members and its history, "the long famous First Troop Philadelphia Cavalry" ("officially now the 28th Reconnaissance Company") received a breezy, chatty story in the "Features For Women" section of the Philadelphia Inquirer. "First City Troop Trains For New Call to Colors," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 6, 1950, p.40.


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The Army deployed two infantry divisions (40th and 45th) and forty-one non-divisional units of the Guard to Korea.¹ Most non-divisional units arrived between January and March 1951, deployed to make up the shortfall created when the General Reserve could not fulfill all of Eighth Army’s requests. These units proved very useful in Eighth Army’s defeat of the Chinese spring offensive that year. Other non-divisional units arrived later in 1951 or during 1952 to enhance Eighth Army’s capabilities in certain areas, such as fire support and air defense. This chapter will examine the experiences of non-divisional units; the next chapter will look at the 45th Infantry Division.

It is not surprising, though it was disappointing to many senior Guardsmen, that the Army Guard’s participation on the battlefield during the Korean War did not match its contributions during World War II. Early in the war, the Army lacked the resources to
prepare and deploy mobilized Guard units in time to affect the course of events before the Chinese intervened. President Truman's decision not to mobilize the United States during the Korean War on the same scale as during World War II, and the decision after Chinese intervention to limit the war to restoring the prewar status quo, meant that a mobilization of the Guard on the same scale as during 1940-1941, and its deployment to Korea, could not have been supported and would not have made a significant difference in achieving American war aims after the spring of 1951.

Overall, despite their handicaps at mobilization and the many training distractions they faced after mobilization, the Guard non-divisional units sent to Korea fulfilled their role as the Army's first line reserve force and greatly enhanced Eighth Army's firepower, engineer capabilities, and logistical system.

Transportation Companies

The first Guard units to arrive in Korea were transportation truck companies and transportation truck battalion headquarters detachments, deployed in late 1950 to reinforce Eighth Army's increasingly creaky
logistical support system. Two of these were Alabama's 107th Transportation Truck Company and the District of Columbia's 715th Transportation Truck Company. Both entered Federal service in August 1950 and arrived in Korea in January 1951.²

Both companies at induction into Federal service were better off in personnel than in equipment. The 107th, thanks to recruiting after the alert notice, entered active duty at its full Table of Organization (T/O) strength of 4 officers, 1 warrant, and 127 enlisted; the 715th had 3 officers, 1 warrant, and 95 enlisted upon induction. Neither company commander had been transportation officers during World War II. Both companies were very short of their key equipment, two-and-a-half ton trucks: of the required 56 trucks, the 107th had 17 trucks and the 715th had 20 trucks.³

Both companies, through no fault of their own, had little constructive training between induction and shipping overseas. The 107th went to Fort Bliss, Texas, where it was assigned to the 167th Transportation Truck Battalion, a mobilized Guard unit from Pennsylvania. While at Bliss, the 107th conducted little unit or advanced individual training. Upon arrival, the company had to renovate its quarters. Men were detailed to support the Recruit Training Center
(RTC) on post, while 56 of the company’s enlisted took basic training at the RTC. During October, 60% of the 107th’s personnel spent 24 days practicing for and performing in parades honoring the outgoing and incoming post commanding generals. Training was cut short on 15 November, when the company received its alert for overseas service and had to focus its attention of Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) required tasks.\textsuperscript{4}

The 715th’s experience was similar. Sent to Fort Eustis, Virginia, the company spent most of its time in post support duties, including performing in several parades. A number of its personnel were placed on detached service with the 1st Transportation Replacement Training Group (RTG) and 44 enlisted took basic training with this RTG. Arriving understrength, the 715th received 33 fillers who were recalled Inactive Reservists and 21 fillers from a Regular unit at Eustis. Also alerted for overseas service in November, the company ended what little training it was doing and focused its attention on POM.\textsuperscript{5}

The 107th moved to San Francisco, the 715th to Seattle, boarded transports, and arrived at Pusan on 7 January and 5 January, respectively. After recovering their vehicles on the docks, both companies were
quickly put to work and their inexperienced drivers now received intensive on-the-job training. The 107th drove 250 miles over "very poor Korean roads" in hard winter weather to Chungju. There the company began hauling cargo from the railhead to supply dumps of the 2d Infantry Division, demonstrating "their quality by fulfilling every commitment in a commendable manner" despite operating around the clock over poor roads in "extremely cold weather" without adequate cold weather equipment. In late February, the 107th left the 2d Infantry Division's sector and until the end of March spent most of its time supporting the 1st Marine Division. The 715th initially hauled ammunition among different depots of 2d Logistical Command. In February, it moved forward to support the 1st Marine Division, then in March it was placed in general support of IX Corps. The demands placed on the 715th, the conditions under which it operated, and its performance were similar to those of the 107th.

Their intensive on-the-job training from January to March provided the companies' drivers with invaluable, if unintended experience for the greatest trial the two companies would face while still Guard in character: the Chinese spring offensives of April and May 1951. During April, the 107th remained attached to
the Marines, putting 89,202 miles on their vehicles. The 715th hauled supplies forward from railheads to various units of X Corps. In May, the 107th spent most of its time moving troops: Koreans, the 7th Infantry Division, and, in its most important operation, helping to shift the 3d Infantry Division from its reserve position in western Korea across the peninsula to help reinforce X Corps, the main target of the Chinese May offensive. In the X Corps sector, the 715th recorded "a big increase in the tonnage and passengers hauled" as it supported the corps' operations. A platoon, supporting one of X Corps' typical ad hoc combat task forces, was ambushed, but suffered no casualties."

From this high point, operations for both companies settled into more routine rear echelon trucking missions, usually bringing supplies forward from railheads and Eighth Army supply dumps, though the pace of missions naturally ebbed and flowed with the pace of combat. However, both companies often had to commit most or all of their available trucks to missions because they were caught in a vicious circle: they had come to Korea with rebuilt World War II veteran trucks that with the poor roads of Korea, the heavy loads, and hard use soon began to break down, but the pace of operations during the first five months,
combined with a shortage of spare parts meant that broken trucks often spent a long time on deadline, forcing the companies to use what trucks were available to meet commitments every day, and thus wearing them out faster. The 107th, for example, had to suspend operations for much of July to bring most of its fleet off deadline; in June, the 715th noted that to "keep a representative number of vehicles on the road the unit Maintenance Officer and his Section had to work feverishly day and night." The companies began to experience personnel turn over, as Reservists were sent home for discharge from active duty and some Guardsmen were transferred to other units in Korea. Most of the enlisted replacements received from the ZI had not been given driver's training, forcing the companies to send the new men to a driver's school run by Eighth Army. This turn over was used by Eighth Army to begin desegregating both companies, as part of Far East Command's (FEC) racial integration program, starting in November with the white 107th and in March 1952 with the black 715th. Both companies reported no problems with integration.

While the two companies would remain in Korea until the end of the war, early in 1952, Guardsmen...
began returning to the ZI under FEC's rotation plan; by the spring of 1952, the 107th and the 715th had lost their Guard character. The two companies, despite short-circuited post-mobilization training and weary trucks, had performed successfully under very demanding conditions.\textsuperscript{10}

King of Battle: Non-divisional Field Artillery Battalions

When the Korean War began, Eighth Army did not have the corps artillery headquarters, field artillery group headquarters, and the separate battalions that doctrine called for in a field army. The lack of this capability in Eighth Army affected its combat effectiveness in a number of ways. Indirect fire support was crucial to American tactical doctrine, and became even more important in Korea to compensate for the uneven quality of American infantry early in the war, and for the numerical superiority enemy infantry often enjoyed in engagements. The large losses the enemy inflicted on field artillery units in the first six months of the war made corps artillery reinforcing fires even more important. Corps artillery also was needed to support Republic of Korea (ROK) divisions, units that had very little organic artillery. These
considerations made obtaining sufficient battalions and headquarters elements to create corps artilleries one of Far East Command's (FEC) high priority requests for help from the Department of the Army (DA). FEC in July 1950 requested fifteen, then twenty-five non-divisional field artillery battalions for Eighth Army.11

Unfortunately for Eighth Army, the same budgetary limits that had helped strip it of non-divisional field artillery had also greatly curtailed the amount of field artillery available to use in creating corps artillery. The General Reserve contained only seven battalions of the usual corps artillery weapons, 8" howitzers, 155mm howitzers, and 155mm guns, plus four 105mm howitzer battalions. DA ordered three 155mm howitzer battalions, the 8" howitzer battalion, a self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalion, an observation battalion, and a field artillery group headquarters to Korea. Getting these units up to strength for deployment, along with supplying personnel for additional 105mm howitzer batteries and replacing casualties, drained the level of trained field artillerymen in the Zone of the Interior to very low levels.12

As a result of this situation, the Army turned to the National Guard, both to build up the corps
artillery for Eighth Army and to rebuild the General Reserve stripped to support Eighth Army. During August and September 1950, the Army ordered to active duty eight self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions, five towed 155mm howitzer battalions, two self-propelled 155mm gun battalions, two towed 155mm gun battalions, five field artillery group headquarters, and four observation battalions. These orders mobilized 57% of Guard non-divisional field artillery battalions and 42% of Guard field artillery group headquarters. In 1951, after the Chinese intervention led commanders in Korea to call for more artillery, the Army would order several more Guard field artillery units to active duty: five towed 155mm howitzer battalions, two self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions; and one self-propelled 155mm gun battalion.

Of the Guard artillery units mobilized, eleven would serve in Korea: five self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions, two self-propelled 155mm gun battalions, three towed 155mm howitzer battalions, and one observation battalion. These field artillery units varied in proficiency and degree of readiness upon mobilization, but all shared the characteristics of the Army Guard in 1950: shortages of equipment;
personnel turbulence among junior enlisted men; and a small core of technically qualified personnel supporting a larger number of personnel with little experience or Army service school training in their specialties.\textsuperscript{16}

The Army concentrated most non-divisional field artillery units mobilized in August and September 1950 at four training sites: Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Hood, Texas; Camp Carson, Colorado; and Fort Lewis, Washington. The Army General Staff and Army Field Forces selected nine Guard battalions from those at Hood, Carson, and Lewis, for deployment to Far East Command. However, with the confusion between Inchon and the Chinese intervention over what reinforcements Eighth Army needed, these battalions did not receive warning orders for service in Korea until late December or early January.\textsuperscript{17}

After arriving at their training sites and setting up housekeeping, usually in run-down World War II era "temporary" buildings, units began working on becoming combat ready, as defined by passing Army Training Tests (ATT). However, some battalions were more equal than others in this effort. The nine battalions selected for early 1951 deployment benefitted from this status by receiving fillers almost according to the Army
Mobilization Plan; most of the personnel they needed to reach full strength came from the Officer and the Enlisted Reserve Corps (ORC & ERC). Lieutenant Colonel Joe E. Whitesides of the 204th Field Artillery (FA) recalled that the ERC fillers his battalion received "were badly needed and were very welcome replacements. In most cases they had served during World War II and were excellent soldiers."

The remaining personnel needed before deployment came from a variety of sources: Regular field artillery units, other Regular units, and several other Guard units, including the mobilized 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania. The 936th FA received a group of "real good artillerymen" when the Army disbanded a mule pack 75mm howitzer unit at Carson. The arrival of Regulars in Guard units could create a bit of a culture shock for both sides. Regular Army Corporal Richard Stinson found that most of the officers and enlisted were related to each other in the battery of the 936th that he joined; only the Regular enlisted in the battery addressed officers as "sir."18

However, a unit's place in the deployment queue and the actions of training site staffs could destroy the benefits of Guard cohesion and post-mobilization training with experienced fillers. The 300th Armored
Field Artillery (AFA) arrived at Lewis in September, received its share of ORC and ERC fillers, and began training. Even though the battalion had been alerted for deployment, the Lewis post personnel section began stripping men from the 300th AFA, transferring them to both field artillery and non-field artillery units leaving for Korea before the 300th AFA. The post staff justified such a drastic action by citing Army regulations that required units deploying be filled to 100% strength before departure. This action gutted the 300th AFA, taking almost 40% of the battalion's enlisted strength, and replaced them with whatever the post staff could scrape up, including musicians, firefighters, and fresh graduates of basic training, as the post staff transferred personnel based on the rank required, not the Military Occupational Speciality (MOS) required. Though the battalion commander believed that his unit had now been rendered combat ineffective, the 300th AFA deployed to Korea at the end of January as scheduled. 19

The two Guard field artillery units mobilized in 1950 which deployed to Korea after the first increment of their peers did in early 1951 had a mobilization experience more like those of Guard units sent to Europe or which remained in the ZI. The 145th FA and

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the 235th Observation Battalion received fewer ERC fillers and many more untrained recruits; they were placed on reduced strength tables at the end of 1950; and in early 1951 the battalions lost large numbers of personnel, both Guard and Reserve, to levies providing replacements for units overseas. After much of the Guard character of the 145th FA had been lost, the Army deployed it to Korea in November 1951. The 235th had lost all of its Guard character by the time the Army deployed it to Korea in November 1952.\(^{20}\)

In late 1950 and early 1951, equipment and supplies were harder to come by than personnel in the ZI, as the demands of combat in Korea drew heavily on existing Army stocks. Units training at Carson did not receive cold weather clothing as the Colorado winter swept over the post. While firing batteries received a good deal of artillery ammunition to train with, small arms ammunition sometimes ran short.\(^{21}\)

Most units reported to their training sites with significant shortages of equipment, such as artillery tubes, prime movers and other vehicles, and radios and other communication gear. Many of these shortages remained unfilled during the battalions' training period, primarily because the Army had ordered that units in the ZI receive only enough of many of these

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items to reach 30% or 50% of authorized amounts. While for some items of equipment, especially radios and vehicles, units did receive either older models or similar types of equipment in lieu of what was called for by TO&E, most units would only receive equipment to bring them up to full TO&E strength at the port of embarkation.

Two key factors influenced the training of units before deployment. Equipment shortages were, an AFF inspector noted, a "definite handicap" to training. Shortages of howitzers and prime movers forced gun crews in some battalions to take turns training on the equipment. Shortages of vehicles made supporting training in general, and training on displacing elements of the battalion (a key skill during the first year of the war in Korea), very difficult. Shortages of radios made it more difficult to conduct service practices and to train on coordinating fire support.

Equipment shortages exacerbated the difficulties of overcoming the uneven skill levels within Guard units. This was most noticeable in the 300th AFA, the only one of the first nine battalions sent to Korea which did not have connections to a pre-World War II Guard field artillery unit. The other eight battalions could draw on World War II field artillery veterans,
varying in numbers between units, to fill key positions in the unit after 1945.\textsuperscript{25}

While the other eight battalions did have Guard field artillery lineages that could give them an advantage over other units like the 300th AFA, that did not exempt them from problems facing all mobilized Guard units. In the five battalions at Hood and Carson, five of the fifteen firing batteries failed their initial Battery Army Training Test and only in the 936th FA did the passing score exceed 80%\textsuperscript{26}. While some of the battalions were able did conduct battalion level collective training, none had taken the Battalion ATT before they received the alert order for deployment\textsuperscript{27}.

The initial condition of Guard field artillery units and the problems they faced after mobilization were reflected in their estimated readiness just before mobilization. In the five battalions visited by an AFF inspector in January 1951, operational readiness ratings were rather low for units preparing to deploy into a combat zone. The ratings ranged from 50\% for the howitzer poor 176th AFA to 72\% for the 196th FA, rich in World War II field artillery veterans. The 300th AFA, gutted by levies at Lewis, also left for Korea with a rating of 50\%\textsuperscript{28}.
Despite their low readiness ratings, in January 1951 these nine battalions were even more urgently needed in Korea. The Chinese in November had defeated the UN invasion of North Korea. By the time the nine Guard field artillery battalions arrived in Pusan harbor, between 2 and 17 February, Eighth Army had retreated back into South Korea and the Chinese had taken Seoul.  

The King of Battle in Korea

Disembarking, the battalions encountered the usual problems of units deploying by ship into a combat zone’s rear echelon: waiting for their equipment to be unloaded (or arrive on a different ship), familiarizing themselves with an unfamiliar country, and dealing with all the red tape and administrative confusion then enshrouding Pusan. As they waited for their equipment to arrive, be unloaded, and prepared for use, battalions conducted individual training in the cold, muddy tent cities around Pusan.  

While these nine Guard battalions that arrived in February were in many ways better prepared than the divisional field artillery battalions deployed from Japan and the ZI in 1950, they still were not fully ready for combat, as the firing battery ATT results and
battalion readiness ratings showed. Already under
criticism back home for the performance of poorly
prepared units and concerned about squandering this new
valuable asset, Eighth Army ordered that all the newly
arrived Guard and Reserve field artillery battalions
undergo training and testing supervised by corps
artillery headquarters. As Eighth Army was slowly
moving north again and the Chinese were gathering
strength for a spring offensive, there was time
available for this training. 31

The corps artillery headquarters took a close
interest in their new battalions. Each battalion sent
groups forward to observe corps artillery battalions in
operation. Once all equipment had arrived, most
battalions began a training program of three to four
weeks. These programs used a building block approach
to collective training, starting with sections, then
batteries, and finally battalion level. Training was
conducted by the battalions, supervised by staff
officers from corps artillery headquarters. The
program culminated with a Battalion ATT, as modified by
corps for conditions of combat in Korea, such as the
need for more emphasis on high angle fire and on
perimeter defense. It was, the 204th FA's commander
recalled, "a very strenuous training program." The
training after arriving in Korea, the 955th FA's commander believed, had made the unit "a good battalion, indeed ready to add its weight to the UN Forces."^32

Imminent entry into combat not only motivated good training that made good battalions; it also led some commanders to make significant personnel changes, seeking to fit the best person in each key position. The 955th FA underwent a major change between arriving in Korea and entering combat. On 13 February, all three firing battery commanders were sacked, replaced by the battalion liaison officer, intelligence officer, and adjutant. Four days later, the battalion executive officer and operations officer were replaced by two Regular Army majors, veterans of combat service in Korea, from the 11th FA (the 24th Infantry Division's 155mm howitzer battalion). On 8 March, the battalion commander was transferred to 2d Logistical Command, replaced by a lieutenant colonel from Eighth Army Artillery. Eight days later, the three sacked battery commanders were transferred to three different division artillery and later in March, the two redundant majors were transferred out of the battalion.^33

Less drastic, but still troubling personnel problems afflicted some battalions that had trained at 130
Lewis; they spent part of their time between arriving in Korea and entering combat dealing with the unpleasant residue generated by the Lewis personnel staff's actions. The 213th AFA had an "informal" visit from the IX Corps Inspector General, checking on complaints from non-Guard enlisted soldiers placed in the battalion shortly before it sailed, even though they did not have MOSs needed by the 213th AFA. A number of fillers with infantry MOSs, assigned to the 300th AFA just before it sailed, deserted the battalion once it arrived in Korea, heading north to the frontline after hearing stories that men with their MOSs would be taken in without questions by infantry units.¹⁴

Not surprisingly, given the difficulties it had faced at Lewis and its lack of a pre-1946 field artillery heritage to draw on, the 300th AFA had a very difficult training period after arriving in Korea. While its firing batteries passed their ATTs, the 300th AFA failed its Battalion ATT in the presence of the I Corps Artillery commander. I Corps Artillery dispatched a team of officers to provide remedial training for the battalion's officers in all phases of field artillery operations, and for the enlisted in the two most technical artillery specialties, fire 131
direction and survey. At the same time, a team from the Eighth Army Inspector General descended upon the unit's administration, maintenance and supply personnel. On 9 May, two weeks after failing, the 300th AFA retook the Battalion ATT and passed with a score of 84%.35

Beginning in late March, all the Guard field artillery battalions, save the 300th AFA, moved forward to the battlefield, some remaining with the corps that had supervised their training, others moved by Eighth Army to a different corps. Some battalions moved by motor march, others by ship from Pusan to Inchon, now again in UN hands. The first Guard battalion to fire in combat was the 936th FA on 30 March, providing 155mm howitzer reinforcing fires for the 3d Infantry Division.36

The arrival on the battlefield of the 937th FA attracted special attention because it was the first self-propelled 155mm gun battalion in Korea. Wishing to exploit the surprise effect of this weapon's range and power, which the Chinese had not yet faced, Eighth Army ordered the battalion to conduct an artillery raid against Chinese staging areas near Chorwon, nearly fifteen miles from the American frontline. The 937th FA, now assigned to I Corps, created a composite
battery that drew sections from each firing battery and practiced the mission. On the night of 7-8 April, escorted by elements of the 25th Infantry Division, the composite battery moved forward to its firing point and in thirty minutes sent 120 rounds screaming north 25,715 yards to impact among some very surprised Chinese. The surprise of the 937th FA's 155mm guns, however, did not deflect the Chinese from their offensive planned for later in April. Meanwhile, Eighth Army mounted Operation Dauntless, beginning on 11 April, a slow, careful advance north to secure good defensible terrain just above the 38th parallel.37

Operation Dauntless provided eight of the battalions, after they finished their ATTs, an opportunity for a gradual introduction to combat service. The 955th FA, between 9 and 22 April, fired a total of 6,811 rounds; the daily high was 1,068 on 12-13 April, the daily low was 143 on 16-17 April. During this period, the battalion moved twice and one of its firing batteries moved a third time. Before 22 April, the 204th FA, assigned by I Corps to a general support reinforcing mission with the 3d Infantry Division, established a good working relationship with the 3d Division Artillery and fired missions for a British brigade. The 213th AFA, assigned to IX Corps, between 133
7 and 22 April supported the 6th ROK Division and the 1st Marine Division, but did not fire its first rounds in combat until 22 April. Also assigned to IX Corps, the 987th AFA supported the 1st Marine Division from 15 to 21 April, firing mainly harassment and interdiction missions.38

As the eight Guard battalions acquired some experience, Eighth Army prepared for the Chinese offensive it expected to begin later in April. Lieutenant General James A. Van Fleet, Eighth Army’s commander, believed that the Chinese would make the capture of Seoul a key objective during their offensive. Determined that Seoul would not fall for a third time, Van Fleet concentrated combat power in I Corps, defending the approaches to the city with three American divisions, a ROK division, a British brigade, a Turkish brigade, and a corps artillery that included five Guard battalions: the 955th FA, the 176th AFA, the 936th FA, the 937th FA, and the 204th FA.39

The Chinese attacked on 22 April, a large-scale offensive weighted against I Corps as Eighth Army had expected, launched with the hope of inflicting such a severe defeat on UN forces that it would end the war. Eighth Army’s plan to defeat this offensive combined gradual withdrawals to prevent the enemy from
overrunning and destroying UN units with a hurricane of firepower to shatter the advancing Chinese units. Once the Chinese had been sufficiently weakened, Eighth Army would counterattack to destroy what remained.

In both preventing the Chinese from overrunning UN infantry and in shattering enemy units, the newly arrived Guard battalions would play an important role, and receive an examination in combat operations more demanding than any ATT. For most of the battalions, the period 22-29 April was one of numerous fire missions and frequent moves, sometimes just ahead of the advancing Chinese.

In the hard pressed I Corps, the tactical situation forced a decentralized approach on the corps artillery; the five Guard battalions usually received missions to reinforce the fires of division artilleries or even direct support battalions in regimental combat teams. The 204th FA, with its long-range 155mm guns, supported the 3d Infantry division from 22-27 April, then returned to I Corps control; during April, the battalion fired 10,215 rounds. The 955th FA’s 155mm howitzers, reinforcing the 24th Division Artillery, fired 2,774 rounds in three days; from 22 to 30 April, the battalion displaced five times. The 176th AFA, the 936th FA and the 937th FA were in the 25th Infantry
Division’s sector, the 176th AFA supporting the 27th RCT, the 936th FA supporting the Turks, and the 937th FA in general support to the division. These three battalions provided a significant part of the wave of firepower the 25th used to break up Chinese infantry attacks against American regiments and helped plug the hole created when the Chinese broke through the Turkish brigade. Despite the tremendous amount of steel expended against them, the great numbers of Chinese pressed I Corps backwards toward Seoul as expected. However, the advance came at a terrible cost to the Chinese, as American firepower killed and wounded thousands of enemy infantrymen. By late April, these losses, together with the difficulties Chinese logistics had sustaining large-scale offensives for an extended period, left the Chinese units opposite I Corps too weak to press forward any further and take Seoul.40

While the Chinese attack against IX Corps was their offensive’s secondary effort, it caused more difficulties for the two Guard battalions assigned to IX Corps than for the five battalions assigned to I Corps.41 Both battalions, the 213th AFA and the 987th AFA, were self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions. Their 105mm howitzers had a shorter range than the
155mm and 8" weapons normally used by corps artillery units, forcing the two battalions to move farther forward than normal for corps units and encouraging supported commanders to use these battalions for direct support of infantry units instead of in the general support role. During the April offensive, IX Corps, like I Corps, fought a generally decentralized artillery battle. The 987th AFA’s initial mission was reinforcing the direct support battalion of the 6th ROK Division. After the collapse of that division, the battalion was assigned to general support of the 1st Marine Division, whose artillery commander often gave the 987th AFA a mission reinforcing one of the 11th Marine’s direct support battalions. Then on 30 April, the 987th AFA returned to reinforcing the 6th ROK Division. The 213th AFA on 22 April was in general support of the 1st Marine Division. On 23 April, IX Corps moved it to fire in direct support of the 6th ROK Division’s crumbling regiments. On 24 April, IX Corps moved the 213th AFA to reinforce the direct support battalion of the 27th Commonwealth Brigade, its mission until 28 April, though on 25 April most of the battalion’s fire missions were again in support of the 6th ROK Division. On 28 April, the battalion shifted to general support of the 24th Infantry Division.
The 213th and 987th AFAs not only found themselves usually firing reinforcing missions, their M7 lightly armored, open-topped howitzer carriages led some supported commanders to use the M7s in rear guard operations. The 987th AFA covered one withdrawal of Marine units on 24 April while the 213th AFA conducted this operation twice for the 27th Commonwealth Brigade and once for the 24th Infantry Division. The 213th AFA's commander remarked that he found this "excessive in-as-much as in all cases the unit to which Battalion was attached had organic light artillery."42

The need for fire support to shore up the 6th ROK Division led IX Corps to place the 987th AFA in an untenable position. Sent down a ragged mountain road that kept crumbling under the weight of the battalion's tracked vehicles on 22 April, only half the howitzers had managed to occupy firing positions when the Chinese attack began. Warned by its liaison officer that the ROK division was disintegrating under the attack, the 987th AFA attempted to withdraw, but the road collapsed when the first M7 tried to make its way out. With the routed Koreans running through their positions and the Chinese moving onto the surrounding high ground, troops disabled the nine howitzers, abandoned the wheeled vehicles, and moved on foot back down the road to link
up with the remaining nine howitzers of the battalion. An attempt the next morning to recover the abandoned vehicles was ambushed by Chinese infantry and led to the battalion's only killed in action during the offensive. The Chinese also turned back Marine efforts later in the day to reach the vehicles. 43

Their use as direct support battalions, mainly with non-Army units, also created problems for the 213th and 987th AFAs. The battalions' TO&E did not provide enough men and equipment to field the proper number of liaison and forward observer parties required in direct support missions. This forced both battalions to strip men and equipment from the batteries to provide the necessary parties. 44 Both battalions during many critical moments in April had to work extra hard at fire support coordination because IX Corps had them supporting units with different doctrine, procedures, and skill levels: U.S. Marines, the British, and the South Koreans. Supporting the Koreans in general proved especially difficult. The language difference was a major source of friction; at this stage of the war, infantry-artillery coordination was not a well-developed skill in most ROK units; and American units supporting ROK divisions feared that the ROKs would not hold against the enemy, leaving the
American gunners vulnerable to envelopment by the Chinese.  

While Eighth Army was unable to mount the crushing counterattack it had planned for once the Chinese offensive had been smothered by American firepower, UN forces had won a major victory against their enemy. For the seven Guard battalions in I and IX Corps, it had been a memorable introduction to high intensity combat. Despite a number of close calls for battalions in both corps, only the 987th AFA, stuck at the end of a mountain road as a ROK division collapsed around it, had suffered significant equipment losses. None of the battalions had suffered significant personnel losses. Thus, by the end of April, eight of the nine Guard field artillery battalions in Korea had been blooded in battle in such a way as they gained extensive experience without having to pay an exorbitant price for it.

During the first two weeks of May, the eight Guard battalions absorbed the lessons of April and trained on problem areas as needed. They fired many fewer missions than during the last week of April and were joined on the battlefield by the 300th AFA. Now certified as combat ready, the battalion was assigned to X Corps, which promptly split the battalion,
attaching one battery to the 1st Marine Division and the remainder of the battalion to the 2d Infantry Division in a general support mission. Meanwhile, Eighth Army picked up indications that the Chinese were massing for another major offensive sometime in May, which General Van Fleet came to believe would once again target Seoul as the main objective. Therefore, the preponderance of Eighth Army’s combat power, including the corps artillery units, remained concentrated in I and IX Corps.\textsuperscript{48}

The most dramatic response to the experiences of April’s last week was in the 987th AFA. During the first week of May, the battalion was issued vehicles to replace those lost while supporting the 6th ROK Division. Because there were no M7s immediately available for issue, all of A Battery and half of B Battery were issued towed 105mm howitzers to replace the nine 7s abandoned the previous month. Also during this period, the battalion commander made major changes in officer assignments; the three firing battery commanders were relieved, replaced by the headquarters battery commander, the battalion liaison officer, and the assistant operations officer, and five lieutenants swapped positions.\textsuperscript{49}

The battalions assigned to I and IX Corps

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artilleries prepared themselves for the expected Chinese offensive, digging in positions, putting up wire barriers, reconning alternate positions, and coordinating fire support plans with the units they were reinforcing. However, the enemy had other plans; on 16 May, an estimated fifteen Chinese and five North Korean divisions assaulted X Corps and the two ROK corps on its right flank.\textsuperscript{50}

This development did not come as a surprise to X Corps, which had predicted the Chinese course of action. The 1st Marine Division and the 2d Infantry Division had stockpiled large amounts of ammunition and developed extensive fire support plans, and X Corps had placed the 196th FA in general support of the 2d Infantry Division. But X Corps' plans for defense were unhinged by the collapse of its two ROK divisions and the ROK corps to its right, creating a hole through which the Chinese advanced, threatening to envelop the 2d Infantry Division and destroy it.

In response, 2d Division Artillery and X Corps Artillery provided another demonstration of why field artillery was the greatest killer on the battlefield. The 300th AFA's Batteries A and C fired 6,100 105mm rounds during the first forty-eight hours of the attack, while the 196th FA expended 2,650 155mm rounds
during the first twenty-four hours. Battalions fired these amounts as they displaced up to five times a day in response to the changing tactical situation. The still sometimes shallow level of field artillery skill in the 300th AFA revealed itself during this period. To speed up its rate of fire, the 300th AFA fired its missions without computing the optimum charge. Instead, to simplify procedures for howitzer crews and fire direction personnel which had only recently passed their remedial ATT, missions were fired with the maximum charge, despite the tremendous wear this placed on howitzer tubes that significantly shortened tube life. When one battery had to relay the battery at night for a new direction of fire, the battery leadership suddenly realized that they had never before performed such a procedure. Luckily, one soldier with World War II field artillery experience was able to relay the battery and the battery uneasily continued to fire missions until dawn, when the battery’s new lay could be verified by battery officers.51

The 300th AFA found that units in X Corps were as prone as those in I and IX Corps to regard the M7 as more than just an indirect fire weapon. On 18 May, 2d Infantry Division used one battery of M7s to support, with indirect and direct fire, an attempt to break a
roadblock preventing the withdrawal of the 23d Infantry. However, the most flagrant use of the M7 as an assault gun took place during X Corps' counterattack once the Chinese offensive stalled out. On 25 May, X Corps assigned the 300th AFA the mission of reinforcing the fires of the task force it had created, composed of the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 72d Tank Battalion. The task force was to counterattack north across the Soyang River to seize a key road junction at Kansong in the hopes of cutting off the retreat of those Chinese and North Korean units that had survived the hurricane of steel X Corps had used to help defeat their attacks.

Under intense pressure from the X Corps commander, Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, on 26 May the task force's advance guard moved forward with the 300th AFA's A Battery in the lead, acting more as assault guns than field artillery. On the 27th, the advance guard, supported by A Battery's lightly armored, open-topped M7s using direct fire, took most of the intermediate objective of Inje; A Battery was preceded into the town by only three tanks and a small group of infantry. Meanwhile the main body of the task force struggled along poor roads to catch up; the 300th AFA's tracked vehicles and overloaded ammunition trucks had
an especially hard time with the poor road conditions.

Luck ran out on 28 May. Pushing north from Inje, A Battery encountered heavy enemy resistance as it advanced along a narrow mountain road. Three thousand yards north of the town, the battery and its accompanying infantry were stopped by a roadblock, then pinned down by small arms and mortar fire for four hours, until the task force ordered them to withdraw, a tricky operation on such a road. With the 300th AFA’s other two batteries firing suppression missions, A Battery was able to turn around and disengage. The day’s action had cost A Battery two killed and twenty-three wounded.\(^5\)

Meanwhile, the Guard battalions in I and IX Corps had been supporting their corps’ attacks towards the 38th parallel, designed to take pressure off X Corps and block the withdrawal of surviving enemy forces. During much of this action, the corps artilleries assigned the Guard units general support reinforcing missions, often tasking battalions to support an American division artillery and a ROK division at the same time. Also, IX Corps Artillery created several ad hoc artillery task forces during this action, most notably from 27 to 29 May, when it created a task force to provide general support to the 24th Division.
Artillery and a ROK division. Corps ordered the 987th AFA to attach its remaining M7s to the 955th FA; in return, IX Corps added to the 987th AFA's nine towed 105mm howitzers one battery of towed 155mm howitzers from the 955th FA and one battery of 155mm guns from the 937th FA.53

Also supporting the 24th Division Artillery for much of this time was the 213th FA. Again, the mobility of self-propelled 105mm howitzers led supported commanders to use this unit in a direct support role. Ordered on 22 May by the 24th Division Artillery to reinforce the 52d FA, in direct support of the 21st Infantry, the 213th AFA was then ordered by the 52d FA to move forward of the 52d FA and join the 21st Infantry. On occasion, the 21st Infantry used the M7s more as assault guns than as field artillery and on 27 May, the 213th AFA's Headquarters and A Batteries did the same, counterattacking against a Chinese attack on the perimeters of the 213th AFA and the 21st Infantry's command post.54

The Chinese offensives of April and May 1951 would mark the end of the large-scale maneuver phase of the Korean War. As the war changed from a war of large-scale movement to a war of posts, the Guard battalions entered a period of transition. The first major change
for all the battalions was the release from active duty of the enlisted Reservists who had joined the battalions shortly after mobilization; in June, the first groups of these men began leaving Korea. The process continued through the rest of 1951; by the end of the year, there were few of these men left in the battalions.\textsuperscript{55}

This created a major problem, as many of the ERC personnel filled key technical specialities and NCO leadership positions.\textsuperscript{56} The loss of the ERC personnel also foreshadowed even further personnel turbulence. Eighth Army in late spring began its Rotation of Combat Personnel (RCP) program and by December, those Guardsmen, Reserve officers, and Regulars who had come over to Korea in February with the battalions would become eligible for rotation back to the ZI. In addition, Guardsmen would have to begin returning home in the spring of 1952 in any case as the expiration of their active duty period neared.\textsuperscript{57}

The problems of outgoing personnel were exacerbated by the inadequate number of qualified personnel the Army could find to ship to Korea as replacements, leaving the battalions facing the prospect of a serious deficit in skilled manpower by summer 1952. Replacements came from a mixed pool.
Some were men already serving in Korea or Japan, mainly Regulars, but with a seasoning of Reservists and Guardsmen. More common were Guardsmen levied from units mobilized, but either sent to Europe or kept in the ZI. However, this source often provided officers and enlisted with little or no experience in field artillery or experience on a weapon different from the one used by the unit they joined in Korea. Draftee replacements were often either basic training graduates shipped to Korea without any training in a specific MOS or soldiers awarded an MOS after incomplete training for service in Korea. The battalions did receive a large number of Reserve officers during 1952, both freshly commissioned lieutenants and battery and field grade officers on extended active duty status. This group’s training and experience varied greatly, from trained but inexperienced lieutenants to officers with significant World War II field artillery experience.

A side effect of the shortage of qualified replacements was that many who were eligible under the ERC phaseout, Guard phaseout or RCP programs for return home had to spend extra time in Korea until either a qualified replacement arrived or one could be trained within the unit. While the start of rotation in the 987th AFA generated a "noticeable improvement" in the
battalion's morale, the 955th FA noted a significant negative effect on the morale of those eligible for return home, but held because their replacement had not yet arrived. By January 1952, the battalion noted, the RCP program had become part of the bedrock of the unit's morale.63

Another element added to the battalions' personnel turbulence as the war of movement came to an end in Korea: racial integration. In the summer of 1951, Far East Command had no political inhibitions in using the corps artilleries' Guard battalions, as it did with the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions then training in Japan, to help in the racial integration of Eighth Army. In July and August, the 300th AFA received over 80 black enlisted, approximately 14% of the battalion's total strength. In August, the 213th and 987th AFAs received their first black enlisted soldiers, 26 and 27 respectively, while the 204th FA received 26 black enlisted. (These soldiers had originally been assigned by a replacement battalion to the 24th Infantry Division, but were diverted to the field artillery battalions to begin the integration process.) By December 1951, the 987th AFA had 99 black enlisted, 17% of the battalion's enlisted strength,64

Racial integration proceeded more or less
smoothly. The 204th FA’s commander recalled that integration did not create any problems in his battalion. In some units, such as the 300th and 987th AFAs, commanders assigned the black troops they received fairly evenly among their batteries, and saw these soldiers, most of whom were fresh graduates of basic training, as a welcome source of manpower. However, integration created more concerns in the 955th Field Artillery from New York City, where by early December 1951, the battalion was complaining to corps that it was getting "too many" black soldiers as replacements.\(^6^5\)

As the battalions attempted to deal with this personnel turbulence, Eighth Army called on them to provide even greater amounts of firepower, to offset the enemy’s numerical superiority and to keep casualties down among the friendly infantrymen now digging in atop hills and ridge lines. As the enemy was also digging in, and building up his indirect fire capability, the battalions now faced the additional problem of dealing with increasing counterbattery fire targeting them.\(^6^6\)

At the same time, Eighth Army also tasked the battalions to act as division artillery headquarters for ROK divisions and to assist in training ROK field
artillery units, part of the American effort to expand and improve the ROK Army. Often a corps artillery headquarters would assign a battalion headquarters the additional mission of controlling a provisional field artillery group of one to three other battalions, sometimes American, sometimes ROK, sometimes a mix from both nations. Usually these provisional groups acted as a ROK division artillery until the ROK field artillerymen were judged capable of operating on their own. Controlling these provisional groups, supplying ROK units with forward observer and liaison parties, and training ROK field artillerymen placed a heavy burden on the available skilled manpower in the battalions, as none of these tasks had been planned for in the design of the battalions' TO&Es.  

While the changing nature of the war meant fewer moves for the battalions, these demands on the battalions' resources intersected with the personnel turbulence between early autumn 1951 to late spring 1952 to generate pressures on the units, that while not as dramatic as the battles of April and May, placed a great strain on the battalions. Both battalions and corps artilleries grew concerned during the autumn of 1951 over the erosion of skill within units.

Each corps artillery and its battalions, let down
by the replacement system, developed their own programs to maintain combat effectiveness. Corps artillery staffs gave short courses in the duties of key positions, such as battery executive officer, and mandated that battalions train on certain tasks. Battalions rotated junior officers among different duties, both to broaden their skills and to distribute equitably the hazards of forward observer duty. While battalions developed formal training programs that covered both collective and individual tasks, the problems with replacements meant that the emphasis was on the latter. Because the battalions were never placed in reserve during this period, the major form of training in individual skills was on-the-job training for the new soldiers.69

Conclusions

By the end of spring 1952, the personnel crisis in Guard units that had arrived in early 1951 had passed with the departure of the last original Guard and Reserve officers. While the units still carried their Guard colors, they were no longer Guard units in character. While none of these units were tested as severely as Regular units in the summer of 1950 or during the Chinese November 1950 offensive, these units
had arrived in Korea just in time to receive a thorough examination in various aspects of combat: defense, withdrawal, attack, and pursuit. Some performed better than others, but none failed. While not the key to victory during the spring 1951 battles, these Guard units did provide Eighth Army with important engineer, transportation, and fire support resources that it had lacked during its previous battles in Korea.

While none of these units were ready for deployment on M-Day, they all proved to possess a strong base upon which could be created combat effective units. Use of Reservists to help fill these units did much to speed the building of combat effective units and to partly counteract the many distractions units faced at their training sites.

The field artillery battalions had the greatest challenge. Crucial to their success, given that the orders for overseas movement cut short the ATPs, was that each battalion after arriving in Korea did not immediately move forward to the battlefield. Instead, they had the opportunity to train under the supervision of officers experienced in the problems facing field artillery units in Korea, allowing the Guard battalions to profit from the lessons learned at a significant cost by units deployed during 1950. Then the
battalions had from several weeks to at least a few days to make the transition from training to actual combat during a period of relatively light battlefield activity. This combination of intensive training in theater and a gradual introduction to the battlefield did much to prepare the battalions for the shock of intense combat during the Chinese spring offensives.
NOTES

1. These units consisted of: eleven field artillery battalions; one field artillery observation battalion; two antiaircraft artillery battalions; one antiaircraft artillery group headquarters; six combat engineer battalions; three engineer bridge companies; one engineer group headquarters; six truck companies; two truck battalion headquarters; three ordnance maintenance companies; two ordnance battalion headquarters; one signal battalion; one medical collecting company; and one quartermaster group headquarters. William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953* (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: White Mane Publishing, 1996), pp.268-269.


3. Command Report, August 1950 to March 1951, 107th Transportation Truck Company, Box 4755, RG 407, NA; "Narrative Summary of Unit Activities from Federal Activation Date to First Submission of Monthly Command Report," 1 October 1951, 715th Transportation Truck Company, Box 5452, RG 407, NA. The two lieutenants in the 715th were both enlisted veterans of World War II; one was commissioned in the Guard as a quartermaster second lieutenant in 1949, the other was commissioned in the Guard as an infantry second lieutenant in 1948. Of the three lieutenants in the 107th, two had been enlisted during World War II and the third, an Alabama Guardsman in 1940, ended the war a warrant officer. One had been commissioned in the Guard in 1948, one in early July 1950, and the third in August 1950 after the alert notice. National Guard Register 1951.

4. Command Report, August 1950-March 1951, 107th Transportation Company. Two decisions by higher echelons generated a good deal of anger in the 107th before it left Bliss. The trucks the company brought to Bliss, all in good condition and with low mileage, were taken from the 107th and replaced by old trucks scraped together from other units at Bliss. A request for leave before deployment was denied, but a "considerable number of relatives" traveled from Alabama to spend Thanksgiving at Bliss.
with their soldiers.

5. "Narrative Summary of Unit Activities."


8. Command Reports, June-December 1951, 107th Transportation Truck Company, Box 5446, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, June-December 1951, 715th Transportation Truck Company, Box 5452, RG 407, NA.

9. Command Reports, June-December 1951, 107th Transportation Truck Company; Command Reports, June-December 1951, 715th Transportation Truck Company; Command Reports, January-March 1952, 107th Transportation Truck Company, Box 6458, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, January-March 1952, 715th Transportation Truck Company, Box 4753, RG 407, NA. The 107th lost two Guard lieutenants in the autumn of 1951, one transferred to a field artillery battalion and one transferred to another truck company. The 715th’s Guard commander was transferred in August 1951 to the staff of a drivers training school at Taegu. A first hand account of racial integration in the 715th, by a black Guard officer from Maryland who took command a month beforehand, is in Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend*, pp.253-254.


On Eighth Army's need for corps artillery units, see James F. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington:

12. Schnabel, *Policy and Direction*, pp.89-92, 96-97. The General Reserve contained four 105mm howitzer battalions, five 155mm howitzer battalions, one 155mm gun battalion, and one 8" howitzer battalion. Much of the General Reserve's 105mm howitzer strength (a weapon normally used by division artilleries in the direct support role) had to be used in bringing up to full strength the direct support field artillery battalions in Korea and in divisions and regimental combat teams deploying to Korea, as before the war these units had only been permitted to field two of the three firing batteries and only four of the six howitzers per battery called for in the Table of Equipment.

13. In 1950, the National Guard troop list contained the following organized field artillery units: nine self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalions; sixteen towed 155mm howitzer battalions; one self-propelled 155mm howitzer battalion; four self-propelled 155mm gun battalions; two towed 155mm gun battalions; five observation battalions; twelve group headquarters; and four corps artillery headquarters. In addition to these units, the troop list included the following units not yet organized: one self-propelled 105mm howitzer battalion; two towed 155mm howitzer battalions; three self-propelled 155mm gun battalions; one observation battalion; three group headquarters; and two corps artillery headquarters. *Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1950* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp.54-74.


16. These characteristics were especially troubling for field artillery units given the highly technical nature of fire direction tasks and gun crew drill, and the complexities of planning and coordinating fire support. As a result, many Guard artillery commanders focused much of their training time during drills and summer camp on the first two tasks; non-divisional...
battalions usually had little opportunity to train on the third task. A sergeant in the 936th FA recalled of his battery that "we could shoot. The rest of it, the perimeter defense stuff, the Army stuff, we didn't know nothing, no one did, but we could shoot." Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.21. See also Thomas S. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang: The 300th Armored Field Artillery in Korea: A Case Study of the Integration of the Reserve Component into the Active Force" (manuscript, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania), pp.1-23.

An Army Field Forces inspector visiting five Guard battalions alerted for Korea found eighty-one of the field artillery officers in the battalions had not attended the Artillery School’s basic course or an equivalent course. Memorandum, 17 January 1951, Colonel James J. Winn to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Report of Visit to Artillery Units, Fort Hood, Texas, Camp Carson, Colorado, and Camp McCoy, Wisconsin," Box 41 (Inspection Records), RG 337, NA.

17. Far East Command constantly pressed DA to ship the mobilized field artillery battalions as soon as possible, even if they had not finished their training program, arguing they could complete the program in Japan. DA preferred that the battalions remain in the ZI until they had completed the Army Training Tests, signifying that they had reached a minimum level of operational readiness. Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp.136, 230; Blair, The Forgotten War, op.cit. Those battalions mobilized in 1950 and selected for deployment in early 1951 were: Pennsylvania’s 176th Armored Field Artillery (self-propelled 105mm howitzer); Tennessee’s 196th Field Artillery (towed 155mm howitzer); Utah’s 204th Field Artillery (self-propelled 155mm gun) and 213th Armored Field Artillery (self-propelled 105mm howitzer); Wyoming’s 300th Armored Field Artillery (105mm self-propelled howitzer); Arkansas’ 936th Field Artillery (towed 155mm howitzer) and 937th Field Artillery (self-propelled 155mm gun); New York’s 955th Field Artillery (towed 155mm howitzer); and Ohio’s 987th Armored Field Artillery (self-propelled 105mm howitzer). Berebitsky, op. cit.

18. This and the preceding paragraph are based on "Report of Visit to Artillery Units;" Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.15, 21, 23-24, 46; Joe E. Whitesides, 204th Field Artillery Battalion in Korea (privately printed, n.d.), p.12. In January 1951, just before shipping to Korea, the following battalions’ enlisted strength was composed of the following mix:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>176th</th>
<th>196th</th>
<th>936th</th>
<th>937th</th>
<th>987th</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>636</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>597</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Enlisted</td>
<td>296</td>
<td>308</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

158
Strength (50%) (48%) (61%) (62%) (61%)

Number of ERC Assigned (26%) (42%) (17%) (31%) (20%)

158 267 106 157 120

Source: "Report of Visit to Artillery Units."

19. The battalion commander exercised the Guard's traditional option of appealing to state authorities for assistance. Wyoming's Adjutant General traveled to the Pentagon, where he threatened the Army Chief of Staff with a massive publicity campaign if the 300th suffered losses in combat because of the personnel turbulence inflicted upon it before deployment. As a result, the Army promised that the battalion would receive six weeks of additional training after arriving in Korea before being committed to combat. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.24-25, 27-30.

20. Utah's 145th FA arrived at Fort Hood in early September 1950 short 324 enlisted; near the end of the month it received 200 enlisted fillers gathered from across the Fifth Army area and by early November, the battalion was shooting service practice missions. However, later in the month the Army placed it on a new TO&E that reduced its authorized strength by 19% and the battalion lost its commander, released from active duty because he was a steel company executive needed at home for industrial mobilization. In December, the Army shipped to the battalion 113 recruits fresh from reception centers, forcing it to form a provisional training battery. In April 1951, the battalion moved to Fort Sill for duty as school troops, where it lost 15% of its enlisted strength to levies; many of those lost to the levies were Guard and ERC NCOs because the levies called for MOS qualified personnel. After receiving more fillers, the battalion learned in August that is was going to Korea, as the 145th's 155mm guns were needed to boost Eighth Army's firepower. By December, the 145th was in Korea and firing missions, including sniping at bunkers from the MLR. Its Korea service paralleled the 45th Infantry Division's; in April 1952, 145th Guardsmen began returning home and by August there were none left in the battalion. Richard C. Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard: 1894-1954" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Utah, 1973), pp.494-497.

Philadelphia's 235th Field Artillery Observation Battalion was a truly troubled unit. Ordered to active duty in September 1950, the battalion was so short of personnel and equipment that it had only one of its three line batteries organized. Assigned to Camp McCoy, a post poorly suited to training in target acquisition, the battalion was swamped by untrained draftees. During 1951, the battalion commander and executive officer were

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relieved and tried by general court martial; the overall level of
commissioned and noncommissioned officer leadership was poor;
levies for overseas service gutted the battalion; the battalion
received an inadequate number of Army service school quotas for
the key MOSs; technical training in target acquisition skills was
abandoned because of the continuing shortage of equipment; and
what trained manpower the battalion did hang on to was often
detailed by VI Corps to test other field artillery units in the
corps area. In 1952, new leadership began to make a difference,
but the battalion only truly began to turn around when Army Field
Forces transferred the 235th FA to Fort Sill in January.
Borrowing equipment from the Artillery School, the battalion
managed to train to the point where it could pass the ATT in
April. The battalion then lost many of its trained enlisted as
Guardsmen were released from active duty. In November, now no
longer a Guard battalion, the 235th FA left Sill for Korea, after
a massive personnel shuffle to get enough school trained
personnel into the battalion to replace those men not eligible
for overseas service. Command Reports, 1950, 1951, 1952, 235th
Field Artillery Observation Battalion, Boxes 4681, 5192, and
6089, RG 407, NA.

Long Weekend, pp.20-21. The AFF inspector found that the
following amounts of artillery ammunition had been fired during
training before deployment: 176th AFA, 2,042 rounds; 196th FA,
1,903 rounds; 936th FA, 1,754 rounds; 987th AFA, 2,788 rounds.

22. The Army imposed these limits for three reasons: small
existing stocks at the start of the war; a very high loss rate
for many of these items in Eighth Army; and little existing
industrial capacity to manufacture new items. See James A.
Huston, Guns and Butter. Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in
the Korean War (Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1989),
equipment shortages created for units training in the ZI caused a
great deal of concern in Army Field Forces; see letter, January
22, 1951, from Lieutenant General T.R. Larkin (Assistant Chief of
Staff, G-4) to General Mark W. Clark (Chief, Army Field Forces),
enclosure 7 to "Report of Visit to Artillery Units."

23. An AFF inspection shortly before deployment found the
following shortages:

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>176th</th>
<th>196th</th>
<th>936th</th>
<th>937th</th>
<th>987th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cargo Trucks</td>
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<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jeeps</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Radios 8 1 0 2 4 0

Source: "Report of Visit to Artillery Units."

24. "Report of Visit to Artillery Units."

25. The 300th's part of Wyoming had supported a cavalry unit before 1941. Grodecki believes that this factor was exacerbated in the 300th's case because a mobilized Guard, not a Regular Army field artillery group supervised the battalion's training at Lewis. "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.21-22. The battalion at Hood had its training supervised by the 2d Armored Division and those at Carson by a Regular field artillery group. "Report of Visit to Artillery Units." At least some of the units had the opportunity to speak with veterans of combat in Korea before deploying. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.20. Of the nine battalions, the 196th FA benefitted the most from its prewar Guard field artillery connections. The battalion had twenty-one officers with World War II field artillery experience, and its commander had been the battalion executive officer during World War II. "Report of Visit to Artillery Units."

26. "Report of Visit to Artillery Units." Two of the failing batteries were in the 176th, whose shortage of howitzers, the battalion commander noted, "definitely hampered training."

27. Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," pp.472-474, 484-485; "Report of Visit to Artillery Units;" 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, "Activities Report," 4 March 1951, Box 388 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA. Once units received the alert order for deployment, training ceased as they prepared equipment for movement, conducted preparation for overseas movement required by Army regulations, and did a thorough review of soldiers' medical and administrative records.

28. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," p.28; "Report of Visit to Artillery Unit."

29. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.40-41. Training aboard ship was hampered by lack of space and because most equipment was stored in the cargo holds, inaccessible to the troops. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," p.31.

30. The 204th FA had an especially quick course on life in the rear echelon and how the war had ravaged Korea. One of the battalion's trucks was stolen and soon after the units set up its bivouac site a few miles from Pusan, a group of prostitutes and other camp followers set up nearby. The battalion sent a detail to run off the camp followers and burn down their camp. Roberts,
"History of the Utah National Guard," pp.474-475, 485-486. The 213th AFA had to maintain a "constant and thorough vigil" on the Pusan docks for its equipment, which had been loaded on several ships. Command Report, March 1951, 213th AFA Battalion, Box 5192, RG 407, NA. See also Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.33-39; Command Report, February 1951, 955th FA, Box 5217, RG 407; Executive and SI Journal, March 1951, 987th AFA, Box 5222, RG 407; "Activities Report," 987th AFA. Much of what these battalions went through at Pusan is very familiar; many of these experiences repeated themselves for my field artillery battery on the docks in Saudi Arabia during August 1990.

31. The newly arrived battalions were assigned as follows. I Corps: 176th AFA; 204th FA; 300th AFA; 936th FA; 955th FA. IX Corps: 213th AFA; 937th FA; 987th AFA. X Corps: 196th FA. These were not permanent assignments; Eighth Army would shift these battalions from corps to corps as the tactical situation changed. The Reserve battalion was the 780th FA, an 8" howitzer unit. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.40-41.


33. Command Reports, February and March 1951, 955th FA.

34. Command Report, March 1951, 213th AFA; Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," p.39. The 213th AFA's commander noted that the answer to the MOS mismatch in his battalion was to retrain the fillers in artillery MOSs. The 300th AFA's unhappy infantrymen were quickly rounded up and returned to the battalion, in part because they had made their way north in vehicles stolen from the battalion.


36. After the 936th FA, the Guard field artillery battalions entered combat in the following order between 3 April and 22 April: 937th FA; 204th FA; 176th AFA; 196th FA; 955th FA; 987th AFA; and 213th AFA. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.46-52.

37. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.46-48. The other 155mm gun battalion, the 204th FA, fired its first round in combat on 6 April, also in the I Corps sector. On Operation Dauntless, see


39. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.54; Blair, The Forgotten War, pp.822-823.


41. The following account of the 213th and 987th AFAs’ experiences during the April Chinese offensive is based on Command Reports, April 1951, 213th and 987th AFA; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.61-68.

42. The 213th AFA battery assigned this mission on 24 April withdrew under small arms and mortar fire while the battery performing the mission on 27 April had its perimeter probed by Chinese patrols. While covering the 24th Infantry Division’s withdrawal on 28 April, the battalion twice had to ford the Pukham River. The quote is from Command Report, April 1951, 213th AFA.

43. Meanwhile, the 987th AFA’s liaison team and forward observers struggled to reach safety amidst the rout of the 6th ROK Division. Two forward observers, originally listed as missing in action, were discovered later in the month to have been wounded and evacuated through Marine channels. The action on 22-23 April cost the battalion a total of one killed in action and four wounded in action. The folks back in Stark County learned of the 987th’s actions a month later. See "Stark’s 987th Routs Reds in Initial Korean Battle," Canton Repository, May 23, 1951, p.2; "987th Loses Equipment in Rugged Korean Pass," Canton Repository, May 24, 1951, p.1.

44. The TO&E gave these AFA battalions one liaison officer and three forward observer officers, but no supporting enlisted or equipment. The 213th AFA found that direct support of infantry regiments or brigades required four liaison officers and nine forward observers.

45. Both the 6th ROK Division commander and the IX Corps Artillery commander called the 213th AFA on 27 April to express their appreciation for the battalion’s support of the division,
calling that support the "largest single factor" in breaking the Chinese attack on the division. Meanwhile, the 987th AFA found it difficult to get "up to date intelligence" from U.S. Marine artilleryman the battalion reinforced, as Marine forward observers "are more interested in shooting than in reporting the location nature and activities of either enemy or friendly units." Command Reports, April 1951, 213th and 987th AFAs.

46. X Corps' front during April had seen an attack by not very determined North Korean units. Part of this lack of determination no doubt came from the 196th FA, which fired 9,114 155mm rounds from 22 to 29 April in support of the 7th Infantry Division and the 5th ROK Division. Blair, The Forgotten War, pp.832-833, 851; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.68.

47. Despite the loss of one-third of its vehicles and half of its howitzers, the 987th AFA's operations officer believed that by the end of April, the battalion's combat efficiency had "improved noticeably." Command Report, April 1951, 987th AFA. The 555th Field Artillery, supporting the 5th Infantry, was not so lucky. While withdrawing on the night of 25-26 April, it was ambushed by the Chinese, losing 13 howitzers and about 100 men. Blair, The Forgotten War, p.850.


49. Command Report, May 1951, 987th AFA. Two of the relieved battery commanders were ORC officers; the third was a Guard captain who had been an Army Air Forces navigator during World War II. Two of the new battery commanders had been enlisted field artillerymen during World War II, both commissioned in 1945; the third had been an infantry officer during the war. National Guard Register 1951.

The 955th FA's commander also did some weeding in his battalion. He relieved one howitzer chief and busted him to private for using an 8" howitzer powder charge; when fired, the more powerful charge badly damaged the 155mm howitzer and slightly wounded three men in the section. The commander also engaged in some officer swapping; seven officers changed positions, but only one firing battery command changed hands. Command Report, May 1951, 955th FA.

51. In the 300th AFA, ammunition trucks backed up directly behind M7s and remained there until the howitzer fired off the truck’s load. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.62-67; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.72-74. On 17 May, the divisional and corps field artillery battalions in X Corps fired a total of 38,000 rounds; on 19 May, the total climbed to 50,000 rounds. Eighth Army also reinforced X Corps Artillery with a composite artillery task force built on the 937th FA: the 937th FA, less one of its firing batteries, plus a battery of 8" howitzers from the 17th FA. Blair, The Forgotten War, pp.876, 883.

52. One of A Battery’s killed in action was its executive officer, shot as he directed the turning around of the howitzers on the road. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.75-84; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.75-78.

53. Command Report, May 1951, 987th AFA; Command Report, May 1951, 955th FA; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," pp.478-479; Whitesides, 204th Field Artillery Battalion in Korea, pp.53-58. The 987th AFA’s operations officer, after the spring offensives, made it clear that a key lesson of this fighting was that 105mm howitzers lacked the range and power required by battalions serving as corps artillery; he recommended that 155mm be the minimum size weapon for this role. Command Report, August 1951, 987th AFA, Box 5222, RG 407, NA. Eighth Army agreed with this analysis and as the weapons became available, it converted the AFAs to more conventional corps artillery weapons, such as the 155mm and 8" howitzers. The 213th AFA did the switch in October 1951 with only a month’s notice and only a few borrowed 155mm howitzers to train on. The battalion remained in position and continued to fire missions as the M7s were driven out and towed 155mm howitzers were moved into position. The 987th AFA converted to self-propelled 8" howitzers in October 1952, after it had lost its Guard character. Command Report, October 1952, 213th FA, Box 5192, RG 407, NA; Command Report, October 1952, 987th FA, Box 6130, RG 407, NA.


55. The phaseout of ERC fillers during 1951 in three battalions:  

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By autumn, the ERC fillers, along with other members of the battalion who had arrived in Korea in February, had become eligible for return home under the RCP program. Therefore, units stopped keeping separate figures for those ERC fillers who left Korea under the ERC phaseout and those who left because they had accumulated enough points under the RCP program. Command Reports, June-December 1951, 213th AFA, 955th FA, and 987th AFA.

The question of what order ERC fillers within a battalion would leave under the phaseout program was a potential source of great friction. To forestall such friction, the 955th FA established its own internal point system to determine the order in which its ERC personnel would leave for home. Command Report, July 1951, 955th FA, Box 5219, RG 407, NA.

56. In the first group of ERC fillers (nineteen NCOs and six other enlisted) who left the 300th AFA in June 1951 were the battalion operations and personnel sergeants, the Service battery First Sergeant, a chief of firing battery, a battery motor sergeant, a communications specialist, and some mechanics and cooks. Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," p.102.

57. The problems these different phaseout programs combined to present to units can be seen, for example, in the 987th AFA, which in its first group of RCP rotatees in November 1951 lost 112 NCOs. Command Report, November 1951, 987th AFA, Box 5223, RG 407, NA. By December 1951, the 955th FA's personnel officer believed that his key problem was the lack of qualified field artillery NCOs being sent as replacements and a lack among the replacements the battalion did receive of those with the potential of filling crucial NCO positions. Command Report, December 1951, 955th FA, Box 5221, RG 407, NA.

58. Most of the Regular Army officers arriving as replacements were field grade officers, usually to replace Guard battalion commanders as the latter rotated home or departed on emergency leave, as in the 204th FA, the 213th AFA, the 300th AFA, and the 987th AFA. The reverse took place in the 955th FA, where its Regular battalion commander was replaced by a Guard lieutenant colonel stripped from a mobilized unit in the ZI. Command Report, December 1951, 213th AFA, Box 5192, RG 407, NA; Command Report, September 1951, 955th FA, Box 5220, RG 407, NA; Command Report, March 1952, 987th AFA, Box 6129, RG 407, NA; Whitesides, 204th Field Artillery in Korea, p.94; Grodecki, "From Powder
River to Soyang," p.110; Army Register 1951; National Guard Register 1951.

59. As in the 45th Infantry Division, a number of these Guard replacements were levied from AAA units for service in Korea, as Army personnel managers seemed to believe that the 1947 merger of Coast and Field Artillery branches into one Artillery branch meant that an Artillerymen could function equally well in both FA and AAA units. The 987th AFA, receiving one such officer in September 1951 from a Virginia AAA unit in the ZI, made him the billeting officer. The command report noted that the "assignment of such an officer to a combat unit is an injustice to the officer and the unit." Command Report, September 1951, 987th AFA.

The 987th AFA noted that a "great number" of the replacements it received during 1951 either had field artillery experience on some other type of weapon or did not have a field artillery MOS. Command Report, December 1951, 987th FA, Box 5223, RG 407, NA. In September, the "bulk" of the 987th AFA's enlisted replacements were cannoneers, but all their experience had been on the towed 155mm howitzer, which was still better than no FA experience, as they showed when they "quickly absorbed their new assignments." Command Report, September 1951, 987th AFA, Box 5222, RG 407, NA. Of the enlisted replacements the 955th FA received in September, 18 were Regular Army (15 of which were privates), 24 were draftees, and 31 were Guardsmen, 11 of which were NCOs. Command Report, September 1951, 955th FA, Box 5220, RG 407, NA.

60. On the poor skill levels of many of the replacements received by corps artilleries' battalions, see Command Report, July 1951, I Corps Artillery, Box 1588, RG 407, NA; Command Report, March 1952, 213th FA, Box 6088, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, January and February 1952, 987th AFA, Box 6129, RG 407, NA.

61. The Army's heavy reliance on Reserve officers can be seen in the 987th AFA. By May 1952, only one officer, a Guardsmen who had agreed to an extended active duty tour, remained in the battalion among those who had arrived with the 987th in February 1951. The battalion's officer roster in May 1952 included two Regular Army officers, the battalion commander and a second lieutenant. There were five Guard captains and two Guard lieutenants levied for service in Korea from units in the ZI. The battalion's remaining twenty-eight officers were Reservists: both majors, eleven captains, eight first lieutenants, and seven second lieutenants. Roster of Officers, May 1952, 987th FA, Box 394 (Field Artillery Battalions), RG 338, NA. The replacement officers received by the 955th FA by the end of February 1952,
two months before the battalion completely lost its Guard character, consisted of one Guard first lieutenant, one Regular second lieutenant, and twenty-one Reservists (three majors, six captains, nine first lieutenants, and three second lieutenants). Command Report, February 1952, 955th FA, Box 6124, RG 407, NA.

62. Officers were especially likely to be held until a qualified replacement arrived. The arrival of four new officers at the 955th FA in February 1952 led that month's command report to remark that this "brightens the Officer rotation picture." Command Report, February 1952, 955th FA, Box 6124, RG 407, NA.

63. The 955th FA noted in November that "the men awaited eagerly for news of replacements so that they could be rotated." That month the battalion had 247 enlisted eligible for rotation, but who could not leave for lack of a replacement. Command Reports, September-November 1951, 955th FA, Box 5220, RG 407, NA; Command Report, January 1952, 955th FA, Box 6124, RG 407, NA. The 213th AFA in November sent 120 men home under the RCP out of a total of 270 enlisted in the battalion eligible for rotation; in December, it sent home 2 officers and 136 enlisted of the 26 officers and 242 enlisted eligible. Command Reports, November and December 1951, 213th AFA, Box 5192, RG 407, NA. The 987th AFA in November was able to rotate home 177 of its 280 enlisted eligible under the RCP program, thanks in large part to the trained, if on a different type of weapon, artillerymen it had received. Command Report, November 1951, 987th AFA, Box 5223, RG 407, NA.

64. The 987th AFA's 17% black enlisted strength exceeded FEC's guidance that blacks make up no more than 12% of a unit's enlisted strength. Command Reports, August 1951, 213th and 987th AFA; Command Report, December 1951, 987th AFA; Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.105-106. By October 1951, black enlisted strength in the four Guard battalions assigned to I Corps Artillery was as follows: 176th AFA, 13%; 204th FA, 14%; 936th FA, 11%; 955th FA, 8%. Command Report, October 1951, I Corps Artillery, Box 1589, RG 407, NA.

65. Colonel Joe E. Whitesides, Korean War Veterans Survey, United States Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.105-107; Command Report, December 1951, 955th FA; Thomas Cacciola, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI. (Cacciola was a Guardsman in the 955th FA.)

66. As the opposing Main Lines of Resistance (MLR) congealed into place, the Chinese turned out to be better bunker builders than Americans; often their positions could withstand normal
indirect fire from division artillery. As a result, division artillery called upon the self-propelled 155mm gun and towed 8" howitzer battalions to send one or two sections forward to the MLR to snipe at enemy fortifications with direct fire. Command Reports, October-December 1951, 955th FA; Command Reports, January-February 1952, 955th FA, Box 6124, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, October-December 1951, 987th AFA; Command Reports, January-February 1952, 987th AFA, Box 6129, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, October-December 1951, 213th AFA; Command Reports, January-February 1952, 213th AFA, Box 6088, RG 407, NA; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," pp.481-482, 492-493, 496-497; Grodecki, "From Powder River to Soyang," pp.104-105; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.81-83.

67. Op. cit. The 955th FA from January to mid-February 1952 commanded a provisional group supporting the 9th ROK Division in I Corps. From mid-February to late March it continued to support the 9th ROK, but now the 987th AFA controlled the provisional group. X Corps Artillery noted in May 1951 that the "lack of Field Artillery Group Headquarters had a detrimental effect on the operations of Corps Artillery." Command Report, December 1950-September 1951, X Corps Artillery.

Because the corps artillery were dominated by Guard units (nine of thirteen battalions in September 1951), this meant that these Guardsmen had the opportunity to work with men from different parts of the United States. Men from Wyoming's 300th AFA, working in a provisional group with New York City's 955th FA, remembered the latter as good soldiers, but harder to understand than Koreans. Those Guardsmen sent to help train Korean artillerymen remembered the units they worked with as enthusiastic and hard working, but inclined to dispense with sophisticated techniques of targeting and adjusting fire; "[T]hey liked to shoot and just keep firing until they hit the target; even if it took a hundred rounds." Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.83.

68. For example, I Corps Artillery in November 1951 ordered the 204th FA to fire a series of missions designed to test the battalion's gunnery skills. The results showed that the battalion's ability to quickly mass fires on a target had badly degraded because of the loss to rotation and phaseout of experienced soldiers and their replacement by soldiers poorly trained or untrained in gunnery skills. Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," p.483.

69. Command Report, July 1951, I Corps Artillery; Command Reports, October 1951-February 1952, 213th AFA; Command Reports, October 1951-February 1952, 955th FA; Command Reports, October 1951-February 1952, 987th AFA; Grodecki, "From Powder River to
Soyang," pp.95-97, 104-105, 111-112; Roberts, "History of the Utah National Guard," p.483. The battalions were not placed in reserve to conduct an intensive training program like the one they had gone through after arriving in Korea because American doctrine held (and still holds) that artillery is never to be placed in reserve.
CHAPTER 4
THUNDERBIRDS IN KOREA

Only two of the eight Guard infantry divisions ordered into Federal service for the war deployed to Korea: California’s 40th and Oklahoma’s 45th, the Thunderbird Division. The 40th and 45th both suffered many distractions during their post-mobilization training, including moving to Japan before completion of their ATP. Both divisions arrived in Korea from Japan after the war’s large-scale movement phase ended. While neither division was tested in combat to anywhere near the same degree as divisions deployed in 1950, both divisions performed their duties as well as Regular divisions during the roughly six months of their existence as Guard divisions in Korea.

A study of the 45th Infantry Division in this war provides a good look at several issues. First, a rich source base allows an thorough examination of the 45th from pre-mobilization through the return of the unit to state control. A collateral effect of this is that a
study of the 45th allows an in-depth examination of the effects on units of the war’s second phase, and of how the Army’s attempts to deal with the many difficulties of this phase affected units on the Main Line of Resistance in Korea. Second, an examination of the 45th’s performance can provide some insight on one of the major sources of Guard-Regular tensions: the ability of Guard officers to train a formation as large and complex as a division and lead it in combat.

Finally, the 45th’s unique character provides an opportunity to study several aspects of the Guard in perhaps their ultimate expression during this period: the strong links between community and unit, the effects on that community of a wartime mobilization of their unit, and the political repercussions of Guard mobilization and commitment to combat.¹

The Pride of Oklahoma

In 1950, the Thunderbird of the 45th Infantry Division flew high and wide over Oklahoma. The division possessed one of the strongest links in the nation between a Guard unit and its community, a link forged from several different sources. There existed in Oklahoma after 1945 what one junior officer of the 45th described as "a very strong military mindset."
This aspect of state culture combined with a strong sense of pride in the 45th Infantry Division as one of the great achievements of the state. The division had earned a reputation as one of the best divisions of the World War II Army, spearheading the invasions of Sicily, Italy, and Southern France, and ending the war by capturing Munich. The 45th had produced, in Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, the most successful Guard officer of the war and, in Sergeant Bill Mauldin, the greatest voice of the war for the enlisted soldier.

The power of this reputation within the division and the state was maintained by veterans of the wartime 45th, who made up approximately 10% of the officers and 5% of the enlisted in the postwar 45th. In the postwar reorganization of the Guard, the National Guard Bureau (NGB), after intense lobbying from Oklahoma, assigned the entire 45th to Oklahoma; the only non-divisional part of the Army Guard in the state after 1946 was an engineer bridge company. In 1948 the NGB reinforced the 45th’s sense of itself as an elite by selecting the division as one of six Guard divisions in a mobile strike force earmarked for early deployment after mobilization. Inspection visits by Army Field Forces to the division’s summer camp praised the 45th’s
training. The 45th enjoyed good relations with the Oklahoma legislature and close ties with the Oklahoma press, especially Oklahoma City's The Daily Oklahoman newspaper, ensured regular and favorable publicity for the division.²

The 45th Infantry Division in 1950 had a large pool of combat experienced commanders at battalion level and above. These men understood the demands of combat and what it took to prepare for those demands. The division commander was Major General James C. Styron. Born in Texas in 1898, Styron attended high school in Oklahoma. He graduated from West Point in 1918 in one of the war-shortened classes, but too late to see service in France. Commissioned into the Coast Artillery, Styron resigned his commission in 1920, returning to Oklahoma to become a cotton broker. In 1922, Styron joined the 45th Division as a field artillery first lieutenant. By 1940, he was a lieutenant colonel, executive officer of the division's field artillery brigade, and a graduate of the National Guard officer courses at the Field Artillery School (1937) and the Command and General Staff School (1939).

During the 45th's World War II service, Styron was promoted to colonel, served as division chief of staff, became executive officer of the division artillery in
1942, then went back to division chief of staff in 1943. In March 1944, after serving through mobilization, training, the Sicily and Salerno campaigns, and several months at Anzio, Styron was evacuated from the beachhead because of illness; after recovering he spent the rest of the war at the Field Artillery Replacement Training Center and on the War Department General Staff. After a brief stint in the Pacific as a corps G-3 officer, Styron left active duty in February 1946 with a Silver Star and a Legion of Merit, and returned home. Back in Oklahoma, he accepted a commission as a brigadier general in the Oklahoma Guard. That same year, Governor Robert S. Kerr, on the recommendation of Raymond McLain, gave Styron command of the division, which led to his promotion to major general later in the year.³

Styron, with McLain’s advice, selected men to fill the senior positions in the 45th with an emphasis first on service with the division in the war and second on service overseas during the war. Assistant division commander was Brigadier General Ray W. Kenny, born in 1895 and commissioned into the field artillery from Officer Training Camp in 1917. He joined the Guard in 1925 and commanded a field artillery battalion in the 45th during World War II. Upon demobilization, he
returned to Oklahoma, where Governor Kerr made him state Adjutant General. Division artillery commander was Brigadier General Hal Muldrow, Jr. Born in 1905, Muldrow joined the 45th as a field artillery officer in 1929. During World War II, Muldrow also commanded a field artillery battalion in the 45th. Returning to Oklahoma in 1946, he became a brigadier and division artillery commander.4

The division chief of staff was Colonel Ross H. Routh. Born in Texas in 1907, Routh enlisted in the Guard in 1930. Commissioned as an infantry officer in 1932, Routh changed branches in 1940 to become a finance officer. He spent the war with the 45th as its division finance officer. Demobilized in 1946, by 1950 he was the United States Property and Disbursing Officer (USP&DO) for Oklahoma, the NGB’s supervisor of Federal money and supplies sent to the state. Three of the four division assistant chiefs of staff were pre-1940 veterans of the 45th; all were infantry lieutenant colonels with an average age of forty.5

The three infantry regimental commanders, with an average age of 41, were all Oklahoma natives who had enlisted and then been commissioned in the Guard. Colonel James O. Smith (180th Infantry), commissioned in 1940 after eleven years enlisted service, described
as a "very experienced combat officer" by one of his junior officers, served with the 45th from mobilization in 1940 to VE Day in 1945. Colonel Herbert G. Sitler (279th Infantry), commissioned in 1935 after four years enlisted service, left the 45th after mobilization to serve as a battalion commander and executive officer of the 325th Glider Infantry Regiment. Both Smith and Sitler ended the war as lieutenant colonels. Colonel Frederick A. Daugherty (179th Infantry), commissioned in 1936 after two years enlisted service, also left the 45th after mobilization in 1940, spending much of the war on the staff of Sixth Army, and ended the war as a colonel. Daugherty and Smith both returned to Oklahoma in 1946, taking command of their regiments and organizing them. Sitler returned to the Guard in 1949, taking command of the 279th after several other officers had organized it.6

The nine infantry battalion commanders at mobilization in 1950 were all World War II veterans, though not all with the 45th. With an average age of 37, all but one of the commanders were native Oklahomans. Four had received their initial commissions in the Oklahoma Guard, three in the Reserve and two during the war. All but one had served as enlisted men in the Oklahoma Guard for periods ranging
from two to eight years. During the war, one had reached the rank of colonel, two lieutenant colonel, and the rest major. All had joined the postwar 45th in 1946 or 1947. 

The four field artillery battalion commanders at mobilization in 1950 had all been battery commanders or artillery staff officers at mobilization in 1940. With an average age of 41, three of the four had been born in Oklahoma and all had served as enlisted Guardsmen, for periods ranging from one to eight years. All had attended battery officer level training courses at the Field Artillery School during the war; three of the four ended the war as captains and one as a major. All rejoined the 45th in 1946.

Only one of the four separate battalion commanders, the 145th Antiaircraft Artillery’s Lieutenant Colonel I.V. LeMaster, had been born in Oklahoma. LeMaster, the 245th Tank’s Major J.W. Parrish, and the 120th Medical’s Lieutenant Colonel J.O. Hood had been in the division at the 1940 mobilization. After the war, Parrish and Hood joined the division in 1946; the other two did so in 1947, though LeMaster, a field artilleryman up to 1945, was commissioned as a coast artilleryman in 1949. Hood (a 1931 graduate of the University of Oklahoma’s medical
school) ended the war as a lieutenant colonel; LeMaster and the 120th Engineer's Lieutenant Colonel V.E. Thieson (commissioned in the Reserve in 1939) ended the war as majors; Parrish had been a captain. Of the four, with an average age of 38, only the 245th Tank's Parrish had graduated from an Army service school in the branch in which he now commanded a battalion, and he had attended the associate basic course.  

Between reorganization in 1946 and mobilization in 1950, the 45th lived the life of a typical Guard division, though with a greater sense of esprit and community backing than many. It suffered the same problems of inadequate armories, lack of equipment, and the time constraints of weekly two hour drills and two week summer camps, usually held at Fort Hood, Texas or Fort Sill, Oklahoma. While Army Field Forces selected the 45th in July 1950 as one of the most ready Guard divisions, "ready" was a relative term. The division was short major pieces of equipment, such as tanks, howitzers, and antiaircraft guns and also of many of the smaller items required to run a division.  

However, the major problem for combat readiness was the number and training of the soldiers. While most senior officers were well qualified for their
posts, the 45th in the summer of 1950, like most Guard units, had to cover a significant gap between the number and training of the men it had and the number it needed for combat operations. In 1950, a full-strength infantry division called for 910 officers, 132 warrant officers, an 17,460 enlisted men. The reduced National Guard authorization called for 851 officers, 130 warrant officers, and 12,777 enlisted men. The 45th on 1 August reported 698 officers, 64 warrant officers, and 7,651 enlisted men. This total of 8,413 was 61% of the division's National Guard reduced authorization and 45% of its full-strength authorization. The 45th's commissioned officer strength was at 82% of its reduced National Guard authorization and at 77% of its full strength authorization. For enlisted soldiers, the respective figures were 60% and 44%.

Within the infantry regiments, officer strength averaged 74% of reduced Guard authorization and 72% of full strength; enlisted strength averaged 54% of reduced Guard authorization and 40% of full strength. Within the field artillery battalions, officer strength averaged 82% of reduced Guard authorization and 73% of full strength; enlisted strength averaged 79% of reduced Guard authorization and 57% of full strength.
While many of the officers and senior noncommissioned officers could draw on extensive World War II experience, the same could not be said for non-veterans, particularly the junior enlisted. Even World War II veterans often found themselves in positions very different from those they held during World War II. The commander of the 158th Field Artillery had few battery officers who had been artillerymen during the war; he described the majority of his battery officers as "former Air Force and naval personnel; a few combat infantrymen, with tankers and ordnance thrown in for good measure."14 A master sergeant in the 180th Infantry described his infantry company before mobilization as "we just had the nucleus; we were a long way from full strength. It was mostly the cadre NCOs and a few recruit type soldiers who had just joined."15

Camp Polk, 1950-1951

After a month of hectic recruiting, paperwork shuffling, packing, and farewell ceremonies, the Thunderbirds left Oklahoma. At midnight on 8 September, the 45th Infantry Division Command Post opened at Camp Polk, Louisiana. By 11 September, the division had completed the move from Oklahoma. General
Styron welcomed each trainload of Thunderbirds to their new home and then units marched off to their company or battery areas. Despite a Daily Oklahoman optimistic report in August, Camp Polk needed a good deal of work to make it fully fit for an infantry division training for combat. The junior enlisted found themselves spending afternoons for several weeks working on home improvement, as "the housekeeping and rehabilitation of troop areas was one of major undertaking."\textsuperscript{16}

But the main objectives of the 45th at Polk were reaching full strength and training to reach combat readiness. Army Field Forces had developed a 28 week training plan for this purpose; a briefing on this plan had been one of the main purposes of the Guard commanders' conference Styron had attended at AFF headquarters in August. The "Master Training Plan" (MTP) had three phases: eleven weeks of individual training, thirteen weeks of unit training, and four weeks of combined arms field training at the regiment and division level. The MTP also called for a period of "Cadre and Pre-cycle Filler Training" of variable length before the start of the individual training phase. This phase was scheduled to last just less than a month for the 45th, as AFF planned to deliver the first enlisted fillers (draftees and volunteer
enlistees) to Polk between 15 September and 1 October.17

The wide variations in training and experience among the Guardsmen presented an immediate problem for the division. This situation had inspired AFF to place the "Cadre and Pre-Cycle Filler Training" period in the MTP. As part of this period, Fourth Army dispatched to Polk on temporary duty teams of officers and enlisted men to provide refresher training in a number of areas that Guard units usually found difficult to maintain a high proficiency.18 The 45th conducted a number of its own schools, both at the division level and at regimental and battalion levels. These schools were both to brush up experienced Guardsmen on key skills and to train them on methods of training, in preparation for training the thousands of enlisted fillers soon to arrive. Some of the experienced Guardsmen also conducted basic training for junior enlisted Guardsmen.19

The 45th received "almost unlimited quotas" for Regular Army service schools, a situation unknown before the war. General Styron aggressively exploited this opportunity. The emphasis was on acquiring the skills required by an individual's position. Enlisted soldiers attended Military Occupational Skill (MOS)
courses while officers attended the basic or advanced courses in their branches. Officers and enlisted also attended courses, such as NCO leadership and Command and General Staff College, not tied to their specific duty position. At the end of 1950, 142 officers and 524 enlisted had graduated from schools at Polk and elsewhere, 197 officers and 700 enlisted were attending schools, and 117 officers and 927 enlisted were scheduled to attend schools.\textsuperscript{20}

Most Guardsmen welcomed the opportunity for extensive schooling. Colonel Frederick Daugherty, commanding the 179th Infantry, sent many of his junior officers to the Infantry School, particularly those World War II veterans who had not been infantrymen during the war. While school attendance disrupted units by removing officers and NCOs during the MTP, commanders believed it to be worthwhile in the long run because their soldiers returned to the unit with the latest Army doctrine and techniques.\textsuperscript{21}

School attendance was not the only source of personnel turbulence within the division between September and December 1950. Enlisted Thunderbirds might go with those they knew, but not always under the leaders they knew. Some commanders shuffled officers between positions within the unit. Lieutenant Colonel
Cleverdon, commander of 158th Field Artillery, explained his decision to do so:

I devised this procedure to break up the circles of personal friendship that naturally exist in small communities among officers and enlisted men, especially non-commissioned officers; these warm friendships--natural and, to a great extent, beneficial among Guardsmen--are prejudicial to good order during periods of active service. Such a decision also tends to inure both officers and men to accept the personnel changes that are bound to occur in service.

There was significant change at higher levels of the 45th as well, beginning with Brigadier General Kenny. Kenny stepped down as Assistant Division Commander to remain in Oklahoma as the Adjutant General. To replace Kenny, Styron asked the Department of the Army to assign Colonel Robert L. Dulaney to the 45th. Commanding an infantry regiment in Austria at the time, Dulaney was a 1923 West Point graduate and Regular Army infantry officer who had served with the 45th during World War II. He arrived at Polk in late September and the next month regained the brigadier general's star he had briefly worn during the last few
months of the war in Europe.23

In October, Colonel Ross Routh, the division chief of staff, left the 45th, transferred to First Army at Fort Dix, New Jersey where his extensive finance experience could be put to use. In early December his replacement, Colonel Preston J.C. Murphy, joined the division. Unlike Dulaney, Murphy was a long-time Thunderbird, though not an Oklahoman, having been commissioned into Colorado's 157th Infantry (then part of the 45th) in 1925. He served with the 45th throughout the war, including command of the 179th Infantry in 1944-1945. Integrated into the Regular Army after the war, Murphy left the plans and training section of AFF to rejoin the Thunderbirds.24

As officers shifted around and in and out of the division, the 45th also had to handle the arrival of thousands of enlisted fillers. The plan devised by AFF for this influx had two parts. First, from 1 to 15 September, the division was to receive trained fillers for vacant key positions, drawn mainly from the Enlisted Reserve; these would bring the 45th up to the cadre strength necessary for training the untrained fillers. Second, from 15 September to 1 October, enough untrained fillers to bring the 45th to 10% over its full strength would arrive at Polk from training.
divisions and reception centers.

With understatement born of long acquaintance with Murphy's Law, the division's 1950 command report noted that "[T]he exigencies attendant to the National Military situation made the realization of the above plan impossible." The 45th received no trained enlisted fillers; units in combat in Korea and units preparing to move to Korea had a greater need for this precious source of manpower. As for the untrained fillers, the first shipment did not arrive until 6 October, when 47 soldiers arrived from two reception centers. Between 6 October and 21 November, 11,044 untrained fillers arrived at Polk from five training divisions and four reception centers in 95 different shipments ranging in size from one to five hundred soldiers.\footnote{25}

To administer this flood of to be Thunderbirds, the division activated its replacement company on 20 September. The replacement company was part of the division's organization, but it was not even organized at cadre strength while the division was in state service. With its four officers and eighteen enlisted men starting from scratch, the 45th Replacement Company first had to scramble to obtain necessary supplies and set up operations. It then established a standard
operating procedure to unload troop trains, assign troops to barracks, feed them and move them on to their permanent units. Veterans of the 1940 mobilization marveled at this care compared with the reception given draftees in 1940.26

The company's internal operations quickly fell into routine; its greatest source of friction was external, in the form of the Kansas City Southern Railroad, which side-tracked between Camp Polk and Shreveport, Louisiana almost every train for one to six hours without notifying either the company or the camp transportation officer. The company did avoid another possible source of friction for the Jim Crow 45th when reception centers sent it African-American soldiers. The sixteen received during 1950 were quickly transferred to another unit at Camp Polk.27

The delays in receiving untrained enlisted fillers forced the 45th to set back the date for the start of the individual training phase of the Master Training Program. By 6 November the division had received the bulk of its fillers and started basic training. Oklahoma Guardsmen, used to the greatly reduced size of peacetime units, sometimes took a while to get used to their units at full strength. Commanding an infantry battalion headquarters company, LaVern Weber at first
"really didn’t appreciate what a full 283-man company can be."28

While units were short of qualified cadre, especially officers, the instructor training of September and October now paid off in the quality of training by those cadre remaining. Some units used committee training systems, where recruits moved from one site to another to receive training on different skills instead of being trained on all skills by one instructor. The committee system eased the problem faced by many units of equipment shortages and, as many mechanics were away at schools, of equipment maintenance. The quality of the fillers, who "were found to be of even higher type than anticipated, physically capable, mentally alert, and eager to learn" also contributed to the success of training.29

As the basic training of the fillers got off to a good start, the Department of the Army threw sand into the machine. An additional 1,578 fillers arrived at the 45th Replacement Company between 7 and 21 November. The division assigned these soldiers to 179th Infantry and the 279th Infantry. To prevent disruption of the training program begun on 6 November, both regiments established provisional training battalions for these late arrivals. These training battalions drained 19
officers and 90 NCOs away from other units of the regiments, already short of cadre, to form the cadre to train the new fillers. The provisional training battalions embarked on a special training program designed to bring the late arrivals up to the same training level as the infantry companies by the end of 1950, and then integrate them back into their companies.\textsuperscript{30}

Another question of integration was that of integrating these new Thunderbirds from the rest of the nation into the pride of Oklahoma. Some of the draftees were from Oklahoma, prompting enthusiastic headlines in \textit{The Daily Oklahoman}.\textsuperscript{31} But most of the fillers did not have the luck to be born in the Sooner State, prompting concerns over possible culture clashes. General Styron addressed this concern in his welcoming talk to the fillers, telling them they shared in "international communism" a common foe with the Guardsmen. He added that everyone in the 45th was "giving up much and we here in the 45th want you to share with us on equal terms every thing that lies ahead. We like you want to see our country secure then return to enjoy the fruits of that security in peace."\textsuperscript{32}

Successful integration of Guardsmen and fillers in 190
LaVern Weber's company was in large part the work of his first sergeant, a World War II veteran of the 45th and "super troop leader" with extensive experience dealing with fillers during the war. Lieutenant Colonel Cleverdon of the 158th Field Artillery sought "to imbue our old men with a spirit of hospitality toward the new men and a feeling of tolerance for their ways (our fillers were from the North Atlantic and Northwestern States). It worked. A fortnight after their arrival, the new had blended with the old so that one could not discern a stranger in the organization."³³

While thousands of men from the rest of the nation joined the 45th at Polk, the Thunderbirds remained the pride of Oklahoma. During the Christmas season, Kerr's department store in Oklahoma City advertised a $1 plastic helmet, painted the same color as used by the U.S. Army, only Kerr's sported "the famous red 'n white 45th Division insignia!" The ad boasted: "kids! here's a real THUNDERBIRD helmet like a GI's."³⁴

From September to December 1950, the Oklahoma press maintained an extensive coverage of the 45th, fed by a steady stream of stories from the division's public information office. Articles about training, school assignments, new senior officers, the enlisted
fillers, accidents, and a variety of human interest stories filled Oklahoma newspapers. In December, WKY radio began broadcasting "Following the 45th," a program transcribed at Polk and flown back to Oklahoma City for transmission. The new medium of television joined in; in early September WKY-TV sent a crew to Polk to film reports broadcast later in the month.\textsuperscript{35}

Communities kept in touch with their Thunderbirds at Polk, though not without some unexpected difficulties. Many World War II Thunderbirds and their families out of old habit used the 45th's wartime Army Post Office address. Unfortunately, after 1945 the Army had reassigned that address to the Far East Command, so for several months after mobilization many letters from Oklahoma traveled across the Pacific before finally arriving at Polk.\textsuperscript{36}

Friends and family members traveled to Polk to visit their Thunderbirds; not all were impressed with the camp's facilities. Battery C, 160th FA received a semi-trailer load of furniture from its hometown of Haskell after some soldiers' mothers visited and found a bare battery day room. A delegation from Chickasha came to Polk in December bearing gifts for their hometown battery.\textsuperscript{37} The seeming closeness between Camp Polk and Oklahoma tempted traffic in the other
direction, as Thunderbirds attempted to drive home and then back to Louisiana on 36 hour weekend passes.\(^{38}\)

The Christmas season brought a large flow of traffic between Louisiana and Oklahoma. Because of the state of national emergency declared after the Chinese defeated United Nations forces in North Korea, the Department of the Army canceled the service’s traditional Christmas leave policy and ordered units to continue training during all of December. General Styron authorized 72 hour passes, with half the division getting one for Christmas and the other half getting one for New Year’s. The Oklahoma Air National Guard dispatched several transport aircraft to ferry Thunderbirds home and back to Camp Polk, as well as to carry Christmas mail to the division. The holiday airlift expanded when private planes and the planes of several oil companies joined the ferry operations.\(^{39}\)

The desire of soldiers away from home to return there during the holidays was sharpened by the news from Korea. The 45th had left for Polk under the cloud of summer disasters and desperate battles along the Pusan perimeter, with mounting Sooner casualty lists. The clouds lifted with the shattering of North Korean forces following the Inchon landing and the pursuit of the remnants deep into North Korea. Statements by
senior defense officials in late October painted a bright future for Thunderbirds. Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall announced that involuntarily recalled Guardsmen and Reservists would be released as soon as they had finished their training and there were sufficient draftees and volunteers trained to take their places on active duty. Three days later, Secretary of the Army Pace said that he hoped to begin releasing Guardsmen next summer and that the Army now planned to send no Guard units overseas. The Chinese offensive in late November upset plans concerning the use of mobilized Guard units, among other American assumptions about the war.40

Early 1951 saw these overturned assumptions affect the 45th in three significant ways. First, the Department of the Army sent the division thousands of new untrained soldiers as the Army's overstretched training base struggled to meet the demands of Korean casualty lists. Then the Department of the Army levied the 45th for hundreds of the 1950 fillers to send to Korea as replacements for the terrible losses suffered there by Eighth Army. Finally, the Department of the Army ordered the 45th, before it had finished the 28 week MTP, to deploy to Japan, now stripped of ground combat units by the demands of fighting in Korea.41

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However, as Thunderbirds returned to Camp Polk from their New Year’s 72 hour passes home, their focus was on completing the final weeks of the MTP’s individual training phase and preparing for the unit training phase. In January, the division tested units on the individual training phase tasks, with results described as "satisfactory." On 22 January the 45th began unit training.42

Two of the division’s units would not be training with the rest of the 45th at Camp Polk. On 6 January, six officers and 190 enlisted men left for the Ranger Training Center at Fort Benning. The Army had decided to assign a Ranger company to each infantry division and after arriving at Polk, the division posted a call for volunteers to form such a company in the 45th. Over 500 answered the call, whether from a sense of adventure or from a belief that this type of unit and its training offered them the best chance to survive combat. After a rigorous screening program, those selected departed for the even more rigorous training at Fort Benning that would turn them into the 10th Ranger Company.43

Camp Polk did not have firing ranges that could accommodate the 145th AAA Battalion, so the battalion traveled in mid-January to Fort Bliss, home of the
Army’s antiaircraft artillery school. There the battalion found the school to be "extremely cooperative" in assisting the 145th, including assigning to the battalion an instructor team, drawn from the school’s cadre, that was "invaluable in the conduct of training." Also helping to improve training at Bliss was the return to the battalion in early February of sixteen officers after their graduation from the Officer Basic Antiaircraft Course at Bliss. The opportunity to fire their antiaircraft weapons and extensive field training kept morale "high" during the battalion’s stay at Bliss. However, the battalion’s inexperience with its weapons kept its scores below the passing grade of 70% while it was at Bliss.\(^4\)

The other units of the 45th began the unit training phase back at Polk facing a number of training distractors. Winter weather hampered training. Attendance at Army schools continued to take officers and NCOs away from their units throughout early 1951. The 245th Tank Battalion, for example, sent 11 officers and 49 enlisted men to the Armor School.\(^4\)

The infantry regiments and the field artillery battalions suffered another drain on their qualified personnel with the removal of officers and NCOs to staff new provisional training battalions. The 45th
received 4,006 fillers between 4 January and 7 February. Division parceled out 1,000 filler to each infantry regiment. Each regiment created their own training battalion, separate from the rest of the regiment, to handle the fourteen weeks of basic and advanced individual training for the new fillers. Division Artillery received the final thousand and established its own training battalion of four batteries, each battery linked to and cadred by one of the four field artillery battalions. The division boasted that the new fillers were "receiving excellent training," but it came at a significant cost. Division Artillery levied the 158th Field Artillery for one officer and 42 NCOs; the 179th Infantry staffed its provisional training battalion with 14 officers and 32 NCOs taken from other units in the regiment. The 179th's commander noted that this requirement, together with attendance at service schools, left the 179th's officers and NCOs "spread very thinly, placing a severe burden on those remaining." 46

Another serious problem facing unit training was a shortage of equipment and supplies and the uncertainty surrounding the arrival of items requisitioned to make up these shortages. Most affected by these shortages were the 245th Tank Battalion and the infantry
regiment's tank companies. The 245th, which at full authorization was supposed to have three companies with 22 M46 tanks per company, found that in January and February it could usually field only one platoon of tanks for the entire battalion. Company B of the battalion developed a field expedient by using the company commander's private automobile during training on tank formations, but "even with that some people had to walk, waving the flags to change from one formation into another." Regimental tank companies also were supposed to have 22 M46 tanks, but they never did during this period; the 179th Infantry, for example, had only one M26 and five M4A3 tanks.47

Other significant shortages included motor vehicles, especially in Division Artillery, counterfire equipment, and radios. While these shortages made life difficult, LaVern Weber found this period "quite enjoyable because of the challenges. Every day was kind of a new world in that we didn't know what kind of equipment we'd be getting tomorrow."

Temporary equipment shortages developed because of the additional fillers sent to the 45th in January and February. As these fillers were over the division's authorized strength, the provisional training battalions had to borrow rifles and other equipment from their parent
units in order to train the new fillers.\textsuperscript{49}

The 45th also faced shortages in ammunition for weapons. Division Artillery faced the most serious ammunition shortages, a result of the Army's problems in producing artillery ammunition and the prodigious consumption of it by units in Korea. Artillery ammunition for training often arrived at units only a day before the scheduled shoot and on several occasions service practice firing had to be postponed because the ammunition did not arrive in time. Other ammunition shortages also reflected production problems and heavy consumption in Korea: 4.2" mortar shells, 57mm and 75mm recoilless rifle rounds, and 3.5" rockets. Colonel Daugherty of the 179th Infantry noted that the lack of 3.5" rockets "was detrimental to the training of those individuals who will have to use it in event of combat."\textsuperscript{50}

Despite these obstacles to effective training, the 45th impressed visiting Army Field Forces inspectors. A mid-January visit commended the division for its "excellent progress" and "particularly well-organized training." A visit in early March praised the 45th's "excellent" discipline and morale, and described the "command structures" also as excellent. While the division in four months of training under the MTP had
reached an operational readiness rating of only 42%, the inspection team took into account the problems facing the division and, based on what it had seen and the caliber of the 45th’s Guard cadre, predicted that with further training the 45th "will perform well in combat."51

The 45th stopped unit training on 25 February to concentrate on preparing for its move to Japan. The division would not be combat ready when it arrived in Japan; the movement order came as the infantry regiments were finishing the platoon level of unit training and the field artillery had not finished the service practice firings prescribed by the ATPs. Some Oklahomans protested the decision to send the 45th overseas on the grounds that the division had not had "sufficient combat training." However, this effort faded when Thunderbirds home on leave protested the protest.52

But not all the Thunderbirds who began the new year with the 45th would travel with it to Japan or even spend much of 1951 with the division. Scouring the service to find trained men who could replace those lost during the terrible defeats in North Korea, the Army General Staff turned to the four mobilized Guard divisions. To avoid violating the "Go With the Men You
Know" promise and thus incurring the wrath of the National Guard Association and its friends in Congress, the levy on the Guard divisions specifically prohibited the use of Guardsmen to meet this requirement. These conditions left only the enlisted fillers received in 1950, now just finishing their advanced individual training. The 45th lost 650 men to this levy.\textsuperscript{53}

Also lost to the division were two senior officers of the 279th Infantry: a battalion commander transferred in January, and on 27 February, three days after receiving the notice for the move to Japan, the 279th's commander gave up command because of ill-health. The 279th received a new colonel on 22 March, Colonel Frank R. Maerdian, a Regular Army officer and commander of an infantry regiment in the closing days of World War II. He joined the 279th from the University of Oregon, where he had commanded the Army ROTC program.\textsuperscript{54}

The infusion of men from the rest of the nation made Sooners a minority of Thunderbirds by the end of 1950; in January the division allowed soldiers from other states to display their state flags in unit day rooms. However, the links between the 45th and Oklahoma remained strong. Stories about the 45th continued to appear regularly in Oklahoma papers,
keeping the state informed about the activities of their division. Ham radio operators in Oklahoma passed messages between family members and Thunderbirds in Louisiana. General Styron returned to the state for a brief visit in early February, telling fellow Oklahomans that the division would finish its training program in June, but that plans for the 45th after that were "indefinite."  

Interlude in Japan

The indefinite became the definite on February 24, when Fourth Army called the 45th with a warning order for movement to Japan. At 3 P.M. Central Standard Time that day, the Department of the Army made public the decision which, the 45th's Command Report described dramatically, "was to electrify the citizens of Oklahoma and the Nation."  

The news electrified The Daily Oklahoman's front page the next day: "45TH GOING TO JAPAN IN MARCH." Reactions in Oklahoma fell into several categories. One was a feeling of resignation. Congressman Tom Steed said that given the current situation in the Far East, "I don't know how it can be avoided." Another was anger, especially among the families of World War II veterans, who believed it unjust to call on these
soldiers to serve overseas for a second time. Closely related to anger was fear that the 45th would be committed to combat in Korea before it could finish the Master Training Program. Governor Johnston Murray offered reassurance, based on a phone call from Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, that the 45th would be kept in Japan unless there was an "emergency" requiring its use in Korea.57

Given the belief of many Oklahomans that theirs was an elite division with a proud past, it was no surprise that another reaction to the news was pride, that the Thunderbirds once again led the way. The Daily Oklahoman quickly pointed this out with an article on "Division Adds Another to Long List of Firsts." The paper's editorial, "Oklahoma's Own," added

[All Oklahomans have reason for pride in the fact that Oklahoma is one of the handful of states whose organized militia was ready for activation when the first call to the colors came...[T]his is a great tribute indeed to the patriotism and fighting spirit of the lads of Oklahoma...they will not be unmindful of the name they bear. There is illustrious blood in their military ancestry...[I]t is a
proud record, and they who bear the flag of the 45th in 1951 will add to the luster of that record, if they are given the opportunity.  

General Styron unsurprisingly endorsed this view: "We have a natural feeling of pride that the department of the army has chosen us as one of the first civilian component divisions to be sent overseas in this emergency." Roy Stewart, in a March Daily Oklahoman article, favorably compared the division of 1951 with the division of 1941, marveling at how the division of 1951 was "better led due to experience, better trained due to new methods and new training aids, better informed as to national purposes and international conditions, better equipped, better supplied and better able to add its bit to the bitterly earned tradition of Oklahoma's own divisional unit."  

However, not all of his subordinates shared General Styron's pride at the honor accorded the 45th. Some had pinned their hopes on rumors that the division would be sent to Germany as part of NATO's military buildup. Others were concerned that Japan was only a way station on the road to combat duty in Korea, particularly after remarks in mid-March by Senator Kerr that this was possible. Some World War II veterans
were uneasy about becoming "rear echelon" troopers in Japan while American troops were hard pressed nearby in Korea. But the dominant emotion came to be resignation, for as General Styron stated in announcing the news, the division was "under army orders, and will go wherever it is assigned."^60

The 45th faced many problems in preparing the division for embarkation in little more than a month. Problems began with the effort to get clear and helpful guidance from higher echelons. "The receipt of the complete movement order answered many pertinent questions but gave rise to many additional ones," forcing the division’s staff to remain "constantly in telephone communication with their counterparts at 4th Army or the Department of the Army."^61

The 145th AAA Battalion had to be recalled from Fort Bliss. Showdown inspections had to be held and requisitions to fill shortages had to be submitted. Arrangements had to be made for clearing Camp Polk. Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) tasks required by Army regulations for troops moving overseas had to be accomplished. Schools on skills required to move the division, such as railloading, packing and crating, and preparing all the shipping paperwork, had to be organized and run. Then the Thunderbirds had to put
all this new knowledge to use in packing up the division. Information on Japan and its people had to be disseminated throughout the division, so that all could be "indoctrinated with the necessity of a friendly treatment and consideration toward the Japanese people."  

Some Thunderbirds would not meet the Japanese people. The POM review unmasked further under-age enlistees. Some soldiers applied for and received discharges on grounds of hardship or dependency. Others failed the POM physical or could not get their medical profiles upgraded to meet POM standards. The most noticeable loss for medical reasons, after the 279th Infantry's commander, was The Daily Oklahoman's Lieutenant Colonel Roy P. Stewart.  

The division's major headache in trying to prepare for the move in a month was the question of what to do with the 4,000 untrained fillers received during January and February. No where near completing basic training, under Army regulations they could not go overseas until they had completed that training. They could not be sent to another training center; the lack of slack in the Army's training system was the reason they had been sent to the 45th. The answer to this question was the creation of the 45th Division Training
Regiment. This headquarters, augmented with a personnel section and a medical detachment, took control of the four provisional training battalions established by the infantry regiments and Division Artillery. It would complete the fillers’ training, then the cadre and those fillers required by the 45th would join the division in Japan. Those fillers excess to the 45th’s needs would be sent to other units. At its peak strength, the regiment had 137 officers, 8 warrant officers and 1,242 enlisted cadre to take care of the 4,006 fillers.  

Units of the division faced a further manpower drain that impeded their POM efforts. Four days after receiving the telephone call from Fourth Army about the move, General Styron allowed 65% of the division to begin departing Polk on ten days leave, with the remaining 35% getting leave on the first group’s return. This decision introduced considerable friction into the POM process, but was well-received by most of the troops even though they had to arrange their own transportation. The 1950 fillers dispersed around the nation and Sooners returned to Oklahoma for another, more somber farewell.  

"In spite of vexing problems all men in the division met the POM requirements" and the division was
ready to leave for Japan when it held its farewell parade at Polk on 26 March. Governor Murray, Adjutant General Kenny, Major General W.S. Key, and "Congressional and local dignitaries" traveled from Oklahoma to watch the 45th pass in review. Governor Murray expressed his pride in the division, but many families of Thunderbirds watching the parade under an overcast sky shared the sentiments of a young woman newly married to a departing soldier: "They look so handsome and strong. God knows when we'll see them again." Following the parade, "a stream of cars, many of them bearing Oklahoma tags, started pouring onto the gray highway and the grayer afternoon."66

The last unit of the 45th left Polk on 30 March and sailed from New Orleans the next day. Units arriving at the New Orleans Port of Embarkation found considerable confusion at the port, creating a good deal of friction and misunderstandings. The greatest casualty of this confusion was equipment to be used for training during the voyage; it was loaded into ships' cargo holds instead of being kept accessible and could not be used, destroying the elaborate training schedules that had been created for the trip.67

The Daily Oklahoman kept Oklahomans informed of the 45th's move to the Far East Command by sending one
of its reporters along with the division. During the voyage a new wave of concern arose in Oklahoma over the use of the 45th in Far East Command. Once again, Oklahoma politicians produced pledges from the Department of the Army that the 45th would not be broken up and that Thunderbirds would not be stripped from the division and used as individual replacements for units in Korea.\textsuperscript{68}

The ships carrying the 45th Infantry Division arrived at Hokkaido, Japan’s northernmost island, between 25 and 30 April. Sent to Hokkaido to guard against the possibility of a Soviet invasion, the 45th found only enough permanent quarters to house a third of the division. The rest of the Thunderbirds moved into several tent cities hurriedly organized by the division’s advance party using Japanese labor, and completed with the assistance of the division’s engineer battalion.\textsuperscript{69}

Once established in Hokkaido, the 45th had two missions. The first was to prepare to defend the island against a Soviet invasion, a threat that appeared unlikely to materialize. However, the division drew up plans for defense, scouted positions, and kept watch on the near-by Soviet controlled Sakhalin Island.\textsuperscript{70}
The more important mission was completing the Master Training Program. The division's infantry regiments restarted their unit training phase with platoon problems in mid-May and company level training in the final week of May. Division Artillery began shooting service practice missions in the latter part of May, missions which showed that "the loss of skill through dis-use was evident." The 145th AAA Battalion, bolstered by the issue of 22 self-propelled multiple machine gun weapons from depots in Japan, picked up where it had left off at Fort Bliss in February. Support units of the division worked on their special technical skills. Only the 245th Tank Battalion, still very short of its authorized strength in tanks, lagged behind, forced by the shortage of tanks to conduct infantry instead of armor training.71

Between mid-May and 1 September the division completed the Master Training Program, thanks in large part to its finally being able to settle down and concentrate on training without having to worry about thousands of overstrength fillers, levies to provide replacements for other units, filling school quotas, or moving halfway across the world. While the 45th continued to face training distractors, none during this period matched in disruptiveness those of early
1951.

The division's greatest training problem between May and September was personnel turbulence. However, unlike earlier in the year, the problem during this period arose from a number of sources separately small in numbers, but cumulatively they had a sizable effect on the division's training and operation. Early in this period, cadre and fillers of the 45th Division Training Regiment began arriving in Japan from Polk, and the division disbanded the Training Regiment in July. Along with the Training Regiment, those soldiers in service schools when the 45th left Polk began returning to their units. Both these groups had to be brought up to the level of collective training their units had achieved during their absence.72

In July the 10th Ranger Company rejoined the 45th, but its life in Japan was cut short when the Army decided to disband divisional Ranger companies. Its short time in Japan had seen considerable friction between the airborne company and the rest of the "leg" division, which General Styron found "silly" given that all involved were "wearing the Thunderbird." When the company disbanded in September, its members had the choice of transferring to the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team or returning to their original 45th unit.
Those Guardsmen returning to the 45th found the "Go
With Those You Know" slogan a reality; back in the
120th Medical Battalion, ex-Ranger Allan Turner "was
glad to see old buddies from my home town of Norman,
Oklahoma ...it was like a homecoming under difficult
circumstances." 73

The division's greatest personnel problem was a
small but constant loss of manpower through a variety
of sources. A steady trickle of officers and men
returned to the Zone of the Interior (ZI) for
discharges of various sorts, mostly on grounds of
hardship, dependency, and expiration of Guard
enlistment. While not lost to the Army, the 45th lost
a small number of enlisted men every month who were
accepted for Officer Candidate School in the ZI.
Another, though temporary source, was men returning to
the ZI on emergency leave. These sources of manpower
drain steadily increased the longer the division stayed
in Japan. In October, as the division moved into its
post-MTP training cycle, the manpower drain continued
and increased with a new source, providing replacements
for other units in Japan and to Eighth Army in Korea.
The 45th lost five officers and 172 enlisted to Eighth
Army and 76 enlisted to units in Japan. As the 45th
ranked behind Eighth Army in priority for replacements
from the ZI, it could not make up the balance of its losses, even after it began to receive soldiers rotated to the division from units in Korea. The 45th’s strength declined especially during the period August to October. At the end of August it had 872 officers, 109 warrant officers, and 17,199 enlisted; at the end of October, it had 827 officers, 111 warrant officers, and 16,535 enlisted. The shortages especially affected the division artillery and the 700th Ordnance Company, which found themselves so understrength in officers as to significantly impair their effectiveness. 

Another training distractor for the 45th during its time in Japan was a shortage of several important types of equipment and supplies. The most critical was in the long suffering 245th Tank Battalion, which only in July received enough tanks to switch from infantry to armor training. With understatement, the 245th’s commander described August, the battalion’s first full month with enough tanks, as "most certainly a progressive period for this Battalion." The 45th also suffered from a shortage of some types of artillery ammunition, of some types of communications equipment, and of a wide variety of spare parts.

Despite these problems, the 45th made steady progress in completing the Master Training Program. In
June, the division completed the company and battalion level portions of the MTP. In July, regimental combat team level training began and the 45th's higher headquarters, XVI Corps, tested the infantry battalions and the AAA and medical battalions. August saw division level field training exercises and XVI Corps tests of the regimental combat teams, the battalions of Division Artillery, and the engineer battalion. The training and Army Training Tests (ATT) were bringing units together, both in competency and esprit. Battalion and regimental commanders all commented on how the challenges and hard work of unit training kept morale in their units at "high" to "very high" levels. Units scored well on their ATTs given by XVI Corps. On 1 September 1951, General Styron looked back on the previous year and wrote that "the organization has come a long way in its training and development into a combat ready division. It has accomplished much and has been a source of pride to its commander."  

The 45th also continued to remain a source of pride for the state of Oklahoma. The division worked hard to maintain its ties with Oklahoma; the 45th's Public Information Office (PIO) sent home a steady stream of stories, photographs, and recorded radio and television programs that were used by the Oklahoma
press. In Washington, Roy Stewart, now *The Daily Oklahoman's* Washington bureau chief, kept watch over the 45th's fortunes in the Pentagon. Raymond McLain, now a lieutenant general and Comptroller of the Army, visited the 45th while in Japan and reported back to Oklahoma that the division was "in fine shape" and that the XVI Corps' commander had told McLain that the 45th was "the best trained division he has ever seen."

Congressman John Jarman also dropped in on the 45th, finding morale "high" and the division "ready for anything" in mid-November.

The 45th may have been ready for anything, but its units saw several significant command changes while in Japan. The AAA and the engineer battalions both received new commanders in September. However, it was the ever turbulent 279th Infantry that again saw the greatest changes. First Battalion in July received its third commander since mobilization. Then in November the regiment lost its second commander and second executive officer since mobilization. Colonel Maerdian, at his request, was transferred to Eighth Army headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel Satterfield was transferred to 45th Division headquarters. Colonel Murphy moved from division chief of staff to command of the 279th; his new executive officer was Lieutenant
Colonel William Van Stuck, previously the division G2.79

While Thunderbirds and Oklahomans felt a great deal of pride in the division's achievements since mobilization, the burning question after completing the MTP in August was what the Army would do with the 45th. The division had only one more year left on its Federal service. The war in Korea had apparently reached a stalemate, with peace talks underway. Neither the Chinese nor the Americans now appeared willing to mount and bear the costs of the offensive campaign required to sweep its opponent off the Korean peninsula. The result by the end of November 1951 for United Nations forces was "active defense." This policy focused on digging in to hold the current trace of UN positions, small attacks either to take better outpost positions or to deny such to the enemy, constant patrolling in front of UN lines, and the liberal use of American firepower, especially field artillery. Meanwhile, talks with the enemy on concluding an armistice would continue.80

The summer and autumn of 1951 saw increasing speculation over what the Guardsmen and 1950 draftees of the 45th would do in their second and final year of Federal service. Thunderbirds and their families

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exhaled with relief in July when the Army announced that President Truman’s recent executive order extending enlistments for one year would not apply to Guardsmen. The 45th established good relations with Japanese civilians on Hokkaido and some wives of 45th soldiers, hoping that the division would finish its Federal service as benevolent occupiers, wondered if they would be allowed to join their husbands after Far East Command removed its ban on military dependents in Japan.  

In August, Thunderbirds and their families began receiving mixed signals concerning the division’s fate. From his new post in Washington, Roy Stewart warned readers that the 45th was most likely going to Korea and that "friends and families of the division might as well get ready for it." But in early November, Raymond McLain reported to Oklahomans that Lieutenant General Matthew B. Ridgway, commander of Far East Command, had told him recently that the 45th would go to Korea only if it could be replaced in Japan by another division. Meanwhile, the 45th’s PIO continued to send home stories about the division’s current training and its plans for winter training in Japan.  

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War in the Land of the Morning Calm

In late November came word that General Ridgway had found a division to replace the 45th in Japan---the 1st Cavalry Division, which despite its name was an infantry division which had been fighting in Korea since July 1950. Unknown to Thunderbirds and their families, this decision had been forced on General Ridgway by General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff. Ridgway did not want the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions in Korea. He preferred to leave the two Guard divisions in Japan and strip them of their trained manpower to use as individual replacements in support of the troop rotation program in Korea. General Collins rejected Ridgway's plan. The Army Chief of Staff believed that not to use the 40th and 45th in Korea would poison the Army's relations with the Guard's many supporters in Congress, inflame traditional Regular Army-Guard tensions, and imply that Army Field Force's Master Training Program was a failure. Collins added that leaving the divisions in Japan on occupation duties would disappoint soldiers in the two divisions who expected and deserved to serve in Korea. On 18 November, Far East Command alerted Eighth Army that the Thunderbirds would not be disappointed; the 45th would move to Korea in December and take over
the 1st Cavalry's positions. General Styron took the news of the alert "with justifiable pride...[T]he division has trained hard and the results appear to be excellent. Morale is high and it is believed that the officers and men will acquit themselves well in their new assignment. The men feel the compliment of being the first National Guard Division to receive a combat mission in the present world crisis." Not all soldiers of the 45th viewed their deployment to Korea as quite the compliment seen by General Styron. The Daily Oklahoman ran a story stating that the alert for movement in November "got a reception as cold as the weather in this snow-blanketed headquarters," a reception made chillier by the fact that many Thunderbirds had just moved out of tents into new brick barracks. A reporter's tour of division units found "only glum comments from men who had felt sure they were ticketed to remain in Japan until they were transferred back home." Back in Oklahoma, Congressman Jarman reported that the 45th took the news "in good stride." Roy Stewart told his readers that the 45th would be replacing combat weary troops to give them a chance to rest in Japan and that the 45th would be committed to Korea as
a division, not broken up and its components spread across the peninsula. He also reassured Oklahomans that the 45th's "command channels are filled by men experienced and tried in battle, to whom the division means more than just an army unit." The Daily Oklahoman published an editorial cartoon showing a fresh Thunderbird moving forward into smoke, passing a tired, scruffy infantryman moving to the rear. The Thunderbird is patting the veteran on the shoulder and telling him "You need a rest—I'll take over!" As a proud Thunderbird and veteran of the 1940 mobilization, Stewart could not pass up the opportunity to remind readers that the 45th had defeated the 1st Cavalry during the 1941 Louisiana Maneuvers.

Far East Command's plan for the exchange between the 45th and the 1st Cav called for the 45th to leave all its equipment, save each soldier's individual equipment, in Japan. The 45th would move to Korea and take over the 1st Cav's equipment there while the 1st Cav would take over the 45th's equipment left in Japan. Advance parties and liaison teams of the 45th left Japan in late November for Korea to coordinate the move with the 1st Cav and its higher headquarters, I Corps. In Japan, the division once again went through an administrative review, weeding out those soldiers.
medically unfit for combat duty and those whose enlistments would expire by March 1952. The 179th and the 279th Regimental Combat Teams ran battalion combat team exercises. The 180th Regimental Combat Team stood down from training, preparing to be the first RCT to move to Korea.  

The first Thunderbird unit to arrive in Korea was the 189th Field Artillery Battalion, which sailed into Inchon harbor on 1 December. By 5 December, the battalion had moved into the 1st Cavalry Division's sector and, under control of I Corps, was firing missions in support of the 8th Cavalry Regiment. The remainder of the 45th crossed over to Korea in increments throughout the month, with the last element, the 145th AAA Battalion, arriving at Inchon on 29 December.

The 180th Infantry relieved the 8th Cavalry on 16 December and the 179th Infantry relieved the 65th Infantry of the 3rd Infantry Division on 27 December. (I Corps took opportunity of the relief to adjust divisional boundaries.) The 45th Infantry Division headquarters took over responsibility for its sector of Line JAMESTOWN (I Corps' section of the Eighth Army front) from 1st Cavalry Division headquarters on 23 December. 
While the troops of the 1st Cavalry Division may not have been as battle-weary as reported, the division’s equipment was. Every unit in the 45th commented on how their counterpart’s equipment was, as the 245th Tank’s commander put it, "in the main, badly in need of general rehabilitation and repair." Also in need of extensive work were the positions turned over by the 1st Cav to the 45th. Bunkers on the Main Line of Resistance (MLR) often were weakly built and poorly sited. Roads, bridges, airstrips, and rear area positions all varied greatly in the quality of their construction; once it arrived in the 45th’s sector, the 120th Engineer Battalion immediately began a program of constructing and upgrading facilities behind the MLR. Another relic of the 1st Cav’s messy housekeeping was the presence within the division’s sector of a number of unmarked American minefields, a "menace" to the 45th that caused some of the division’s first casualties in December.89

Another legacy from the 1st Cav was thousands of its troopers transformed into Thunderbirds by transfer into the 45th. This was done to bring the 45th up to full strength as the divisions swapped positions. Despite receiving 126 officers, 18 warrant officers and 946 enlisted men as replacements in November (its
largest amount since arriving in Japan), the division was short 59 officers, 40 warrant officer, and 1,239 enlisted on 1 December. The 36 officers and 2,411 enlisted men transferred from the 1st Cav had less than twenty points of Constructive Military Service (CMS) in Korea and thus were not yet close to eligibility for rotation out of the country. Many of these soldiers had valuable experience gained during the Chinese spring offensives and the 1st Cav’s October attacks to establish Line Jamestown, but the 45th’s official records do not discuss this aspect of the transfer. Some Cav troopers initially did resent being assigned to a "rinky-dink National Guard unit," and others were upset that they had been kept in Korea, but there is no available evidence that these frictions had a major effect on the 45th’s operations.90

The Thunderbird Returns to Combat

The 45th’s experience of combat, from the time it took over from the 1st Cavalry Division in December 1951 to the end of its existence as a National Guard division in June 1952, did not differ significantly from the experience of other American divisions in Korea during this period. The war had settled into a pattern of patrols between the opposing lines, raiding
Chinese positions, defending against Chinese raids, and both sides trading mortar and artillery fire. The 45th’s sector of the UN line was in the Chorwon corridor, a relatively open area for Korea and a major avenue for attacks aimed at Seoul. The Thunderbirds put two regiments on line with the third held in reserve, the regiments rotating on and off the line. Division Artillery supported the regiments on the line and fired interdiction missions beyond the Chinese MLR.

While the war lacked the sweep and movement of its earlier phase, it still held a considerable degree of discomfort and danger, as the 45th quickly discovered. During December, the Thunderbirds were introduced to the rugged Korean terrain and the intensely cold Korean winter. While the 45th conducted no raids during this month, patrols and indirect fire killed six, wounded twenty-six, and left one man missing in action. One of the wounded was Colonel J.O. Smith’s son, a 20 year old sergeant first class serving in his father’s 180th Infantry.91

General Styron and the 45th’s senior staff and commanders believed the division "in excellent condition" and "well prepared" for combat when it entered the line in December. As General Styron correctly pointed out at a 6 January 1952 commanders’
conference, the 45th arrived "in better shape than any other American Division" that preceded it to Korea. 92

However, the combat envisaged in Army Training Tests was not exactly the combat the 45th found in Korea. With a potential air threat that never materialized, the 145th AAA Battalion found its impressive firepower directed against ground targets. With static battle lines, the 45th Reconnaissance Company found itself detailed to act as an early warning system on the division's right flank, in case the 9th Republic of Korea (ROK) Division beyond it collapsed during a Chinese offensive, as had other ROK divisions earlier in the war. Men of the 45th Recon also found themselves running patrols in conjunction with the infantry regiments. The 245th Tank Battalion initially found itself placed in reserve in the 9th ROK Division's sector to help bolster the ROK position, as ROK divisions did not have their own tanks. With the 45th, the battalion's tanks were used as glorified mobile pillboxes, supporting infantry raids and sniping at Chinese fortifications. 93

Field artillery battalions found they needed more training on firing high-angle missions, made necessary by the many steep hills of Korea. The battalions also found it very difficult to acquire targets; the Chinese
were much better than Americans at building field fortifications and camouflage. Chinese mortars and artillery also were hard to locate, both because of Chinese skill at deception and because of weaknesses in American counterfire efforts. And when the artillery did find targets, the strength of Chinese positions often defeated the division's 105mm and 155mm howitzers. Occasionally, I Corps sent an 8 inch howitzer section to the 45th for temporary duty; Division Artillery would move this much more accurate and powerful weapon into forward positions to snipe at Chinese positions with direct fire. While not the scenario used to develop ATTs, the demands of covering patrols, supporting MLR outposts attacked by the Chinese and firing harassment missions beyond the Chinese MLR kept Division Artillery busy firing many missions and expending thousands of rounds a month. An old artilleryman, General Styron instructed his regimental commanders: "We can't fight these Commies hand to hand and we don't want that. We want to keep them away from us and tear them apart with our fire power."

The 45th's infantry regiments also had to make a number of adjustments to conditions they found in Korea. A major problem for the infantry was improving
the defensive positions inherited from the 1st Cav. Building extensive field fortifications had not been a large part of the Thunderbirds’ training and this showed in the division’s early efforts. At a February commanders’ conference, Styron chastised the regimental commanders, warning them that "we don’t know what our people are going to do if they are fired upon. If they are in good strong positions, they will fight and we will save a lot of lives. These bunkers are still not good." Two weeks later, Styron told his senior commanders that "[S]ome of these bunkers we are building are not worth a damn" and noted that "[W]e know how hard it is to get these Chinese out of their positions and that is because they are so well dug in." 

Styron believed that much of the responsibility for this weakness was "a question of supervision. We would all do a lot better if we would put the heat down on these junior officers." In February, Styron created a Division Defense Board to examine the current condition of the MLR positions and develop suggestions for improvements. The Defense Board published its findings and suggestions in March, but the Thunderbirds showed a disinclination to emulate their enemy’s diligence in this matter. Up until he rotated home to
the ZI in May, Styron had to continually stress the need for improving positions and the need to hold noncommissioned officers and company grade officers responsible for this work.96

Patrolling was another infantry task that the regiments needed to work on. Patrolling was the main form of infantry combat for the 45th, whether it was to locate Chinese positions, destroy Chinese positions, take prisoners, or ambush Chinese patrols. Concerned over the possibility of a Chinese offensive in the spring and the deleterious effects on his infantry of static battle lines, Styron on 22 January told his senior commanders

We will not know where the enemy is if we don’t get out on these patrols. This patrolling is the finest training I have yet seen. You have to get these patrols out. This patrolling can be considered or compared to life insurance; some day, it is going to pay off. I want this explained to the men; I want it carried down to them; let them know that we are doing it for their own protection. The only way we can play safe is to prepare for the enemy if they do hit. It just doesn’t make sense unless we do this
with that in view. We must be ready for
them. Patrols and raids are ways of keeping
our people ready. I want that explained to
them.\textsuperscript{97}

Styron told his regimental commanders in early
January that "I want a contact every day to see where
the enemy is. Don’t let these people edge in on us.
These patrols should go out until they draw small arms
fire."\textsuperscript{98}

The experience of the 179th Infantry during
January suggests that the division’s infantrymen only
partially met their commanding general’s guidance. The
179th spent the entire month of January on the MLR in
the division’s left sector, with all three battalions
on line. During the month it ran numerous patrols,
both day and night, between the opposing lines and into
Chinese positions. Chinese skill at camouflaging their
positions and their excellent fire discipline, together
with American combat inexperience, gave the initiative
to the Chinese most times. During January, 21 patrols
from the 179th made contact with the enemy; of these,
the Chinese initiated contact 18 times, though the
Americans usually were the ones to break contact, often
with the assistance of mortar or artillery covering
fire. These patrols cost the regiment 5 dead and 23
wounded.

The 179th's MLR positions detected and fired upon one Chinese patrol. The regiment called fire missions on groups of Chinese soldiers observed during the day from American positions. In return, the Chinese harassed the 179th's sector with intermittent artillery and mortar fire.

The regiment mounted two raids during January. The objective of both was to destroy Chinese bunkers. The first found empty bunkers; the second, by a reinforced company, encountered significant Chinese resistance that killed three Thunderbirds and wounded twenty-seven. Patrolling and raiding accounted for 54% of the regiment's total battle casualties of 9 dead and 98 wounded during the month.99

The 180th and 279th Infantry regiments reported similar experiences patrolling. After eight days of planning, reconnaissance, and coordination, a reinforced rifle company of the 279th Infantry, shortly after dawn on 24 January, hit Chinese fortifications on "Old Baldy." This was a steep knob of Hill 290, a large T-shaped hill that dominated the Chinese MLR opposite the 45th. Crossing the line of departure fifteen minutes late, one assault platoon crept to within 100 yards of the bunker line before the Chinese
opened fire. The platoon attempted to continue onto the objective, but "intense fire" forced it to withdraw under cover of supporting American fire after an almost forty minute fire fight with the Chinese. Seeing this, the company commander ordered another platoon to attack. This platoon made it onto the objective, supported by heavy American covering fire, and destroyed two bunkers before withdrawing with "heavy" casualties. Total losses for the 279th in this operation were 4 dead, 23 wounded, and 3 missing. These raids, along with one staged by the 180th Infantry, cost the 45th a total of 12 dead, 77 wounded and 3 missing, 59% of the division's total battle casualties for January.¹⁰⁰

Adapting to Combat in the Land of the Morning Calm

Throughout the period January to May, the 45th rated itself as having "excellent" combat efficiency and morale. The division command reports credited this condition "to the increased confidence and skill of the individual soldier and his leaders." The division did not define "excellent." Perhaps the best measure of the 45th's skill is the question of how it adapted to the conditions it faced in Korea in early 1952. Certainly the 45th was better prepared, both in
training and in personnel stability, than Army divisions sent to Korea in 1950. However, the tactical situation the 45th faced, while not much resembling the one used to develop Army Training Tests, was much less demanding than the situations other divisions had to cope with during the first year of the war.  

Reviewing his 179th Infantry’s experiences at the end of January, Colonel Daugherty commented on the strength of the Chinese positions, particularly their imperviousness to most weapons available to the 179th. As for his troops, Daugherty noted that their combat inexperience showed when they went to ground when caught in the open by Chinese indirect fire during raids, instead of pressing forward into Chinese positions which would provide cover from the fire. Soldiers needed more training on patrolling, especially at night. Daugherty believed that raids needed at least five days planning to ensure full coordination between the raiders and all the supporting elements, especially artillery.

While pleased with the performance of his infantrymen during the raid on Old Baldy, the 279th Infantry’s Colonel Murphy did find fault with the measures taken to coordinate supporting fires for the raid. Overall, however, Murphy believed his troops
were "too dependent" on fire support and that there was a need for "more forceful leadership," particularly at the platoon level.\textsuperscript{103}

General Styron agreed with these evaluations, particularly the lack of detailed planning and preparation for patrols and the quality of junior leadership in the infantry. In early February, he told senior commanders that "we know where the enemy is, and if these patrols are organized, we will get contact. These patrols go out and don't get contact."\textsuperscript{104}

As a result of these evaluations of its performance in January, the 45th took several steps to improve its ability to "get contact" and improve the effectiveness of its raids. Division Headquarters became much more involved in the planning and preparation of patrols and raids. Regiments' plans for each day's patrols had to be forwarded to division no later than noon of the preceding day for review and approval. All plans for raids had to be reviewed and approved by the assistant division commander.\textsuperscript{105}

Infantry regiments, when off the line in division reserve, conducted extensive training. "Because patrolling has assumed the role of a major activity in the present situation, much stress was devoted to patrols during the training period." In early
February, the 179th Infantry went into reserve for two weeks. During that time, each rifle company conducted sixteen hours of training on patrolling, sixteen hours on weapons training, and eight hours on small unit tactics. Realizing that one way to lower casualties was to use the cloak of night, the regiment spent one-third of its training time in darkness.

Also given attention during regiments' training while in reserve was the problem of attacking fortified positions. The 179th spent sixteen hours on this subject while in reserve during February, with an emphasis on actions once assault groups were within fifty yards of their objective. In addition to training on this task, battalions in reserve selected possible targets to raid during their next period on the line, planning and rehearsing the raid while in reserve. (The 179th spent only six hours in February training on field fortifications.)

Artillery battalions taught infantry officers and sergeants how to call for and adjust indirect fire. Two soldiers from each rifle platoon were trained as snipers. The 179th, in response to concerns over the quality of junior leadership, conducted weekly schools for officers and NCOs. In all training, "[P]ractical work by the individual was stressed and lecture type
classes were kept to a minimum."

These were all orthodox responses to the problems the 45th encountered during its early operations in Korea. The division also developed an unorthodox response to these problems: each infantry regiment created "Raider" groups to undertake operations "requiring training or ability beyond that of a normal rifle squad." Volunteers accepted for this group would be relieved of all duties with their parent unit, training and operating as a group directly controlled by the battalion or regimental commander. Each Raider group was built around a nucleus of men from the disbanded 10th Ranger Company, who ran the group through a training program based on their Ranger training.

The Raider program paid off during the later part of February and during March. The 179th Infantry spent ten days during February and all of March on the MLR. During that time, most of the regiment's patrols still did not make contact with the enemy. However, of the regiment's twenty-two patrol contacts, ten were by Raider patrols, some of which aggressively engaged much larger Chinese patrols. The 279th Infantry's largest patrol contact during March also was initiated by a Raider patrol. Colonel Murphy of the 279th believed
the problem in his regiment was that regular infantry patrols still were not aggressive enough, which he blamed on a lack of aggressiveness among the regiment's junior leaders.

The 45th mounted three major raids on Chinese positions during February. The first, by the 279th Infantry, was a night raid by a reinforced platoon on Chinese positions on Hill 290, preceded by a two hour artillery preparation designed to isolate the objective and fifty rounds of direct fire into the Chinese positions from an 8" howitzer. After tripping a Chinese mine, the platoon reached the objective, where it spent fifty-five minutes before withdrawing. The platoon killed five Chinese and destroyed one bunker, at a cost of four dead and twelve wounded.

The second raid, also a night operation by the 279th, did not reach its objective as the reinforced platoon had to engage two separate Chinese patrols in heavy fire fights that cost it one dead and three wounded. While the second raid did not reach its objective, "planning for this raid and execution of plans were considered to be an improvement over the previous raid." The third raid used two platoons from the 180th Infantry's tank company to shoot up Chinese bunkers and trenches at a cost of one tank destroyed by
mortar fire, two disabled by mines and nine soldiers wounded.\textsuperscript{109}

These raids accounted for five of the six dead and twenty-four of thirty-six wounded suffered by the division during February. Orders from higher headquarters prohibited the 45th from conducting further major raids, with their potential for high casualties, from March to May, by which time most Guardsmen had left the division.

While the 45th could not mount raids after February, the Chinese found other ways to inflict casualties on the Thunderbirds until the phase-out of almost all Guardsmen in early June. As Chinese activity grew, so did the 45th's casualty lists. There were 72 battle casualties in March, 104 in April, and 146 in May. Increasing numbers of artillery and mortar rounds hit 45th positions each month. The 279th Infantry's Colonel Murphy noted that this indirect fire led to an "increasing number of unnecessary casualties" because "in many instances, the basic principles of cover, concealment and dispersion were not being followed." The Chinese also began paying the 45th more visits. Patrols probed American positions and the Chinese attempted to win control of the space between the opposing MLRs by attacking American outposts.\textsuperscript{110}
On 1 March, the Chinese raided a 179th Infantry outpost, killing three Thunderbirds and wounding one; one man was listed as missing. On 22 March, the Chinese mounted a major raid on a key 45th outpost. Outpost Eeire sat on the southern end of Hill 290, the northern section of which had been the target of many patrols and several raids by the Thunderbirds. Two reinforced squads from the 179th Infantry manned the outpost. The Chinese attacked with a force estimated to be company sized, which breached the outpost’s defensive wire and overran the position despite a hard fight by the twenty-six defenders. Before they could consolidate on the position, artillery airbursts, fired on Colonel Daugherty’s order, drove the Chinese off the outpost. The relief force sent to Eeire found eight dead, five wounded and two missing. The Americans collected their casualties, stripped the outpost of its equipment and returned to the MLR. Eerie would not be occupied again by the 45th until June.111

The next major Chinese attack was on the night of 25-26 May, when a force estimated to be of battalion size hit an outpost on Hill 200 manned by a reinforced platoon of Company F, 179th Infantry. The Chinese fired a brief, intense artillery preparation on the outpost. Then, under heavy covering fire directed at
the outpost and American MLR positions, the Chinese assault force moved forward. A platoon breached the wire barriers on the outpost’s western side, but American fire prevented them from penetrating further into the outpost. On the eastern side of the outpost, a company breached the wire barriers and moved onto the eastern edge of the outpost, forcing the Americans to abandon several bunkers. Forming a skirmish line using trenches and shell holes, the Americans stopped every subsequent Chinese attempt to overrun the outpost.

Almost an hour after the attack began, the outpost commander fired the signal flare requesting reinforcements. The alert platoon from G Company left the MLR, but the Chinese directed heavy machine gun fire against it. After calling for mortar fire to silence the Chinese weapons, the platoon moved forward again, but part of the Chinese company attacking the eastern end of Hill 200 turned away from the hill and attempted to encircle the relief platoon. The ensuing firefight prevented the platoon from reaching the outpost, but it diverted significant power from the Chinese effort to exploit their penetration on Hill 200.

The 179th Infantry’s heavy weapons and the 160th and 189th Field Artillery Battalions provided
supporting fire for the outpost and attempted to suppress the Chinese weapons firing in support of the attack. The artillery and mortars fired illuminating rounds over the area, but the tide turned decisively with the arrival, approximately three and a half hours after the battle began and two and a half hours after Colonel Daugherty requested it, of an Air Force flare ship. The Chinese quickly broke off their attack once the aerial flares began lighting up the hill and large portions of the surrounding area, exposing the Chinese to large amounts of accurate American indirect fire. A two platoon relief force from Company I reached the outpost without opposition. After more than four hours of combat, the Chinese had been defeated, at the cost of seven dead Thunderbirds and fifty-four wounded.  

Combat Effectiveness in a Limited War

The 45th's efforts to improve its battlefield performance produced mixed results. The division accurately diagnosed its problems and prescribed good remedies, as seen in its training programs, the Defense Board, and creation of the Raider groups. Patrolling did improve thanks to training and command supervision. Robert A. Howes, a 1951 West Point graduate, joined the 45th in March 1952 and his first assignment was as a
forward observer in the 160th Artillery. The two enlisted men in his team, both Guardsmen, impressed him with their skill. On his first patrol, supporting the 279th Infantry, Howes found himself taking Chinese fire from three sides. Favorably impressed by the reactions and skill of the infantry he was accompanying, Howes called in large amounts of indirect fire, forcing the Chinese to break contact. The Chinese left behind 22 bodies and the patrol suffered one dead and six wounded.\textsuperscript{113}

However, the fact that Raider units had a large percentage of the successful patrols suggests a significant difference in skill and motivation between them and non-Raider patrols. The 279th’s Colonel Murphy found patrols like Lieutenant Howe’s disquieting. Such patrol actions demonstrated, to Murphy, an excessive reliance on fire support, substituting it for aggressive leadership and infantry skills. Attempts in March to impose aggressiveness on patrols, by ordering patrols to remain out until they did make contact with the Chinese, were soon rescinded.\textsuperscript{114}

The 179th Infantry’s defense of Hill 200 in May did show a well-designed and built fortification combined with a good defensive plan properly rehearsed.
and well executed. However, the continual complaints of General Styron and his successor and the rising casualties from increasing Chinese indirect fire show that the Thunderbirds never came close to matching their opponent's skills in field fortifications.\textsuperscript{115}

The major problem for the 45th was that the war had stalemated by the time it arrived in Korea. This situation denied the division an opportunity to demonstrate its ability to meet all the varied challenges combat can pose, and thus live up to its World War II predecessor's standard. The stalemated war also eroded the sense of purpose among Thunderbirds and Oklahomans. For a division and a state that just seven years earlier had gloried in the 45th's linear progression from mobilization to V-E Day, the seemingly endless attrition in Korea was thin soup indeed upon which to feed support for this war.\textsuperscript{116}

Another factor affecting the 45th's ability to demonstrate its full potential was that, unlike the World War II Thunderbirds, soldiers arriving in Korea in 1952 knew that the calendar, not victory, would bring them home. Guardsmen looked forward to their return to the ZI for release from active duty; others in the 45th counted the days until they had accumulated sufficient CMS points for rotation.
Styron was well aware of this factor, believing that it was "a very serious mistake that we let these men know when it is planned that they will be leaving." How much this knowledge affected the division's performance, particularly in patrolling, is impossible to quantify, but it surely colored some decisions made on cold nights out between the opposing MLRs. Waiting out Chinese artillery fire in a bunker with a friend late in May, William Craig recalled that it "was not lost on me or Kubala that we had only two weeks to go in-country." Watching the calendar also affected morale. In April and May, the division artillery noted there was "anxiety among draftees about discrimination" against them, as the Guard phase-out program allowed some men to leave Korea several months before they would have earned sufficient CMS points for rotation. In May, the 279th Infantry noted that morale was "high" in part because sufficient replacements had arrived to allow those eligible for phase-out and rotation to leave for the ZI.117.

The quality of leadership within a military organization always is a crucial factor in unit performance. Again, while the 45th's situation was not like that units during 1951-1952 faced, the stalemated war did test the division's leadership in other ways.
General Styron and his senior leaders never had an opportunity to demonstrate their full potential in combat as tacticians, but the extent of that potential did worry General James A. Van Fleet, commander of Eighth Army. Van Fleet did not trust the abilities of General Styron or Major General David H. Hudelson, the commander of California’s 40th Infantry Division. However, Styron and his senior subordinates did understand that combat in Korea in 1952 was significantly different from combat in Europe in 1944.118

Because of that understanding, General Styron spent much of his time in Korea concerned about the quality of the 45th’s junior leadership. However, Styron was never able to impose his will fully on the division’s heterogeneous collection of junior leaders. In late January, he warned senior leaders against an "apparent laxity throughout the Division," encouraged in large part by the attitude of junior leaders, because the Chinese had not yet launched a major attack on the Thunderbirds.

Styron on an almost monthly basis chastised his senior commanders for not holding junior leaders to higher standards of performance in building fortifications and running patrols. The Commanding
General often complained of a distressing lack of military courtesy throughout his division. In April, he reminded senior leaders that in "relations between officers and enlisted men, it is not that an officer thinks he is any better than an enlisted man, but we all realize that close association, drinking together, playing cards together, and calling them by the first name, causes the officer to lose his discipline over the men." 119

The sources of Styron's discontent were several. Many of the junior officers in the 45th had little experience in their duties or even as officers before the division entered combat. Many of the Guard junior officers had been commissioned from the ranks during August 1950 or they had had no experience in their duties prior to mobilization beyond weekly drills and a few two-week summer camps. In December 1951, the month it became the first regiment of the 45th to arrive in Korea, the 180th Infantry had 20 officers who had been commissioned in the Oklahoma Guard during August 1950. Only 11 of the 34 Guard officers in the regiment who had received their first commissions during World War II had received it in the infantry. In January 1952, the 189th Field Artillery had only two Guard officers with commissions from August 1950, but of the thirteen
who had received commissions during or shortly after World War II, only five had been in the field artillery. Particularly in units that had not shuffled officers among subordinate elements, the long, boring watching and waiting could allow hometown associations to wear down the type of military discipline Styron believed his officers should enforce.\textsuperscript{120}

Many of the junior officers sent to the 45th as fillers or replacements were 1950 and 1951 ROTC graduates, ordered to active duty after commissioning, and Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates. Even before arriving in Korea, the 45th found a number of its junior officer slots filled with men from these sources because of its initial shortage of officers and the trickle of Guard officers released from active duty before December 1951. One of the most affected units was the 189th Field Artillery. By January 1952, officers from these sources filled 11 of its 32 battery officer slots and two slots were vacant. In the 180th Infantry, by December 1951, 27% of its company grade officers were not from the Oklahoma Guard.\textsuperscript{121}

These lieutenants usually had little experience before joining the 45th beyond their training and sometimes a short period spent training draftees in the ZI. The 45th, like other units in Korea, also received
a number of Reserve officers ordered to active duty and Guardsmen stripped from other mobilized units and sent to the Far East as individual replacements. These officers often had much more experience than ROTC and OCS lieutenants, but their abilities and motivation, particularly Reservists recalled involuntarily, varied considerably.122

After arriving in Korea, the 45th began receiving replacement officers that reflected the blend of experienced Reserve and inexperienced ROTC and OCS officers that the Army was drawing on to keep units overseas up to strength. (There was a light sprinkling of Regular officers and the Army also continued to strip officers from mobilized Guard units; this source provided a mix of experienced and inexperienced officers.) From March to June 1952, the 189th Field Artillery received 30 officer replacements. Two were Thunderbirds transferred into the 189th from elsewhere in the 45th. Five were Guardsmen stripped from other mobilized units and sent to Korea as individual replacements. Two were 1951 college graduates given Regular lieutenant commissions and one was the new battalion commander, a Regular lieutenant colonel. The remaining twenty officers were Reserve, ROTC or OCS. The 179th Infantry, from January to May 1952 received
50 new officers. Three were Guardsmen stripped from the 31st and 47th Infantry Divisions, mobilized in early 1951. Two were Regular lieutenants commissioned in 1951, one was a Regular captain, and one was a Regular major. The remaining 43, mostly lieutenants and captains, were Reserve, ROTC or OCS officers.¹²³

The uneven levels of maturity, skill, experience, and motivation among junior officers were also characterized the 45th’s non-commissioned officer leadership. Few NCOs were Regulars or Reservists and Guardsmen with World War II experience relevant to their current position. William Craig, an August 1950 enlistee, complained that during the MTP, many of the Guard NCOs "had been learning their trade on the shoulders of the ‘go with the men you know’ men and the draftees." Some of the 45th’s Guard NCOs inducted with the division in 1950 left the 45th during 1951 when their Guard enlistments (and the President’s one year enlistment extension) expired. By the time the division arrived in Korea, many of its NCOs were Guardsmen and 1950 draftees promoted after little active service and sometimes graduation from one of the Army’s leadership schools in the ZI. An ROTC graduate who joined the 45th in 1951 as a rifle platoon leader remembered that these NCOs "were very young and barely
trained. The shortage of career NCOs was a serious consideration."

These concerns over junior leadership (which foreshadowed problems the Army would have during the Vietnam War) were part of a larger concern over the quality of manpower the Army could tap for this stage of the war in Korea. Also of concern to Army leaders was the question of how to motivate that manpower to fight in what was already being called by many Americans "the forgotten war" and to do that fighting in units whose composition was shifting constantly because of casualties and rotation."

After integrating the 1st Cavalry troopers transferred during the December swap out, the 45th depended on normal Army channels to provide replacements for casualties, for Guardsmen and 1950 draftees scheduled for phase-out and for former 1st Cavalry soldiers reaching their CMS points total required for rotation. However, the Army's personnel replacement system by early 1952 was under a great deal of stress from trying to meet the demands of NATO's military buildup and rotation in Korea while under the manpower and budget ceilings of partial national mobilization."

The replacements produced by this system created
by the Army's "inflexible response" did not please senior Thunderbird leaders. The division's January command report complained that the "quality of replacements is considerably lower than that previously experienced by the division." In one artillery battery, the average Army General Classification Test score fell from 104 to 77. In addition to problems with human raw material, the division was dissatisfied with the training its replacements had received in the ZI and with the number and type of Military Occupational Skill qualified soldiers it received.¹²⁷

The senior division leadership's concerns over the quality of replacements extended not only to current combat operations, but also to the future. By the end of June, almost all the 45th's Guardsmen were scheduled to be rotated out of the division; by early autumn, all the 150 fillers also would be leaving active duty. If this massive personnel turbulence was not to gut the 45th's combat effectiveness, then the Thunderbirds would have to devise their own solutions to this problem. Therefore, in February the 45th established a School of Standards to train replacements in certain skills the division found they lacked. The school's staff came from personnel drawn from division units and placed on temporary duty at the school. Unit
commanders complained that this was a "serious problem," diverting qualified manpower away from the units. General Styron agreed that this levy was a burden on units, but that units were "more than compensated for" it by the benefits of receiving replacements trained by the school.  

A group of cooks and bakers was the first class graduated from the School of Standards. An "informal investigation showed that Battalion and Company Commanders were highly pleased with the improvement in mess operations" when these soldiers rejoined their units. By the end of April, 388 soldiers had graduated from the school and 346 were enrolled. By the end of June, with increasing rotation and the completion of enlisted Guardsmen phase-out, 1,491 replacement soldiers had graduated from courses at the School of Standards.  

The success of the School of Standards inspired other efforts within the 45th to raise the skill level of replacements. To improve the skills of replacement riflemen and refresh those of hospital returnees, the division established an Infantry Replacement Training Center, which ran a one-week course designed around the problems of combat in Korea. The division artillery in late April established its own replacement school which
gave forty hours of instruction. Instruction at the school was followed by "closely supervised" on-the-job training in the soldiers' units. During May, 296 soldiers went through this school. Also in May, the division established a twenty-four hour orientation course for all replacement officers to provide them with "information peculiar to the local situation for an intelligent approach to their assigned duties."130

The division's efforts paid off in early June, when Styron's successor ordered an attack to seize a new outpost line that would provide more depth to the American position and deny the Chinese some key terrain, especially Old Baldy, Pork Chop Hill, and Outpost Eeire. By this time, the last enlisted Guardsmen were preparing for rotation home and only a handful of the Guard officers remained in the division. The attack achieved its objectives and then the 45th hung on to them against heavy Chinese counterattacks and shelling until the 2d Infantry Division relieved the 45th in mid-July.131

In the end, the 45th accomplished the mission assigned it in Korea, though that mission lacked the sweep and drama of the Thunderbirds' role in the destruction of Nazi Germany. The division adapted to the conditions of a static battlefield, though not to
the degree desired by its senior leaders. However, it is not a surprise that these leaders would be disappointed, given the conditions of combat in Korea in 1952, the human resources available to the division, and the lack of an objective besides reaching their rotation dates to motivate soldiers. One Guard master sergeant, a veteran of the 45th's European campaigns, told reporters on his return from Korea: "We've never seen a war quite like this one. It certainly is not like the last one."^^^ 

The End of the Oklahoma 45th in Korea

Oklahomans continued to keep a close eye on their division once it entered combat. The 45th's PIO section made that easier by producing and sending home to Oklahoma a steady stream of copy, photographs, and recordings for radio and television broadcast. Oklahomans did not receive a sugar-coated picture of Thunderbird life on the MLR. Newspaper stories portrayed the difficulties and dangers of life in a combat zone, most noticeably in a Sunday magazine article entitled "BY THE WAY, HIS LEGS ARE GONE." As Department of the Army telegrams arrived at homes with news of Thunderbird casualties, the reports were noted in newspaper articles.\textsuperscript{133}
However, the low number of casualties among Oklahoma Guardsmen and the limited time they were exposed to combat made the Korean War a much less disruptive intrusion into the life of the state than World War II. Also, the war in Korea by early 1952 lacked the dramatic large-scale sweep of events during 1950-1951 and the sense of national survival being at stake that colored the Thunderbirds previous war. The major combat events of the 45th’s time as a Guard unit in Korea, the battles for Eerie and Hill 200, did not receive special coverage in Oklahoma. Instead, much of the coverage of the 45th once it entered combat centered on the question of when the division’s Guardsmen would return to Oklahoma and whether the Army would return the division to state control at the end of the Guardsmen’s two year service.\textsuperscript{134}

The life of the Oklahoma 45th in Korea was short. As the Chinese picked up the tempo of combat during April and May, the 45th’s Oklahoma National Guard character dwindled at both the bottom and the top of the division. The 45th had begun planning for the phase-out of Guardsmen while in Japan, but had shelved that effort when the division received the order for movement to Korea. Once the 45th settled into position
in Korea, the G1 resumed planning the phaseout and the first group of Guardsmen, 55 officers and 144 enlisted, left the 45th in late March. Several hindered more Guardsmen departed in April. May saw the greatest outflow of Guardsmen, about 2,600, with the final burst in June of about 1,300 and a coda in July of about 140 officers.\textsuperscript{135}

In April, Brigadier General Muldrow left the division for release from active duty and Brigadier General Dulaney left the 45th to become commander of the neighboring 3rd Infantry Division. Then in May, as part of the single largest group of Guardsmen leaving for home, General Styron turned over command of the 45th to Major General David L. Ruffner.\textsuperscript{136}

The Guard phase-out program was the major, but not the only source of personnel change in the 45th that diluted and then ended its Oklahoma character. While in Korea, the racially segregated 45th became racially integrated. The Department of the Army, fearing the political fallout in California and Oklahoma, had exempted the 40th and 45th from the initial round of racial integration instituted by General Ridgway after he became head of Far East Command in April 1951. By the end of October 1951, the 45th had only one black enlisted soldier assigned to the division.\textsuperscript{137}
However, preparing the division for Korean service gave FEC the opportunity to begin integrating the 45th. During November, 126 of the 946 enlisted replacements assigned to the 45th were black soldiers. However, the 45th did not allow any black 1st Cavalry soldiers to transfer into the division during December and the black replacements received during November left the division very far from FEC's goal of 12% "Class II" enlisted personnel in each division. Once in Korea, though, the 45th, now integrated into the normal Eighth Army replacement system, received more and more black soldiers. By March 1952, the 45th had 10 officer, 2 warrant officer, and 444 enlisted black personnel. By June 1952, when the last enlisted Guardsmen left for the ZI, the 45th had 30 officer, 4 warrant officer, and 2,215 enlisted black personnel assigned.138

The pressure from higher headquarters to have 12% of combat units manned by black soldiers and the large number of vacancies in combat units led to some misuse of black soldiers' skills. The 279th Infantry complained that it received as infantry replacements many black soldiers with non-infantry MOSs, particularly military policemen. This was the result of the Division G-1 and General Styron's policy to spread the black soldiers throughout the division to
avoid charges of segregation and to "equalize" the burden of integration throughout the division. Another motive for distributing black soldiers as much as possible one to a squad was, as Styron put it, "we don't want to let them gang up." Integration provoked no immediate press attention back home in Oklahoma, and by all available accounts, generated no wide-spread friction degrading the 45th's effectiveness.\(^{139}\)

**Back in the Sooner State**

Oklahoma press reports eagerly tracked the progress of the first group of Guardsmen to be sent home from Korea in April. After their troopship docked in Seattle, officers took airliners direct to cities across the state, while enlisted Thunderbirds boarded troop trains for Ft. Sill. Will Rogers Field in Oklahoma City on 14 April "was the scene of the happy homecoming of the first of Oklahoma's famed 45th division to reach their native soil." Three days later, the troop train pulled into Ft. Sill. "Men were on the ground and running to greet relatives before the train ever rolled to a stop." Similar scenes followed the return of each succeeding group of Guardsmen.\(^{140}\)

Most of the enlisted, their Guard enlistments expired, separated completely from the military during
outprocessing at Ft. Sill. Those with time remaining in their enlistments and officers were placed in the Inactive National Guard until the 45th Infantry Division (National Guard of the United States) (NGUS) could be established later in 1952 under its commander, Brigadier General Muldrow. The Army, desiring to keep the lineage and esprit of Guard divisions in Federal service, did not return the units' colors when their Guardsmen left active duty. Instead, there would be two Thunderbird divisions, one in Korea and the NGUS one in Oklahoma. The 45th Infantry Division (NGUS) would operate with a reduced personnel authorization, collecting sufficient cadre, especially Korea veterans, until the Army returned the 45th's colors to Oklahoma. General Muldrow was promoted from commander of the 45th Division Artillery to commanding general of the 45th Infantry Division (NGUS).  

The formal end of the 45th's Korean War service came on 25 September 1954 in Oklahoma City. There, at the opening night of the Oklahoma State Fair, Governor Johnston Murray returned to now Major General Muldrow and 5,000 Thunderbirds the "original battle flags and colors of Oklahoma's world-famed and storied 45th Infantry Division."
Conclusions

Guard units missed the two most trying periods of the war for the United States, the retreat to and fighting around Pusan and the Chinese defeat of UN forces in North Korea. If Guard units had been deployed to Korea in time for these two periods, and been brought to full strength in the same manner as understrength Regular Army units deployed during this period, most likely the performance of Guard units would have equaled the Regular Army units of the day: a few very good ones, a larger group of poor to very poor ones, and the majority of units muddling through until combat experience and the weeding out of poor leaders improved their performance.  

The two Guard infantry divisions sent to Korea arrived there after extensive training and after the battle lines became static, so their abilities and the quality of their training could not be fully tested. While they had to adapt to conditions not foreseen by Army Field Forces' training plans, and suffered from the same problems of manpower and motivation that affected other American divisions on the MLR during the same period, the Guard divisions, like the other Guard units sent to Korea, successfully accomplished the mission assigned to them.
NOTES

1. A final reason is that there already exists a study of the 40th Infantry Division during the Korean War; no comparable study exists for the Thunderbirds.


   When the 45th sailed for Japan in early 1951, three of its officers were members of the Oklahoma House of Representatives. "Time to Go to Japan!" *The Daily Oklahoman*, March 2, 1951, p.1.

   Raymond S. McLain entered active duty in 1940 with the 45th as commander of its field artillery brigade. By 1945, he was commanding a corps in Europe. McLain was one of only two pre-war Guard general officers offered Regular Army general officer commissions after the war. Accepting the offer, he went on to earn a third star before retirement. Bill Mauldin entered active duty with the 45th in 1940, left the infantry to join the division newspaper, and later moved to *Stars and Stripes*. His cartoons, featuring the infantrymen Willie and Joe, won the Pulitzer Prize in 1945. In 1951, a movie based on *Up Front*, a collection of Mauldin’s wartime cartoons, was released. The ads for this movie were modified in Oklahoma with additional copy: "'Willie and Joe' Of The Fighting 45th Thunderbirds Come To Life And Step Out Of Bill Mauldin’s World Famous Book," *The Daily Oklahoman*, April 5, 1951, p.10.

3. Background on General Styron is based on National Guard Register 1951; Franks, *Citizen Soldiers*, pp.140-141; Thunderbird Review (Atlanta: Albert Love, 1952)

5. The division’s G2, William Van Stuck, was born in Maryland and served in the Army Air Forces during the war, ending the war as a major. He joined the Guard in 1946 as an infantry lieutenant colonel.


7. *National Guard Register 1951*.


10. On equipment shortages, see "Report of Staff Visit to 45th Infantry Division and the Artillery School."

11. For full-strength authorizations of an infantry division, see Department of the Army Table of Organization and Equipment 7N: Infantry Division (7 July 1948), copy in U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. For the 1950 National Guard strength authorizations for each type of unit, see 1950 NGB 115 Reports, Box 1, General File, Adjutant General, 1934-1989, Record Group 19, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.

12. Report 7 August 1950, Adjutant General of Oklahoma to Chief, National Guard Bureau, Strength of 45th Infantry Division units as of 2400 1 August 1950, File 325.44 Oklahoma, State Decimal File, 1949-1950, Box 1199, Record Group 168, National Archives, College Park, Maryland. Within the major units of the 45th, strength when alerted in August was:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Guard TO</th>
<th>% Full TO</th>
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<tr>
<td>179th Infantry</td>
<td>1,471</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>180th Infantry</td>
<td>1,726</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>279th Infantry</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>38%</td>
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261
13. Ibid.

14. Colonel Frederick Daugherty found many World War II vets to fill the 179th Infantry as he rebuilt the regiment; the problem was finding veterans with the skills he needed. In the 1946 reorganization of the division, the 179th had many of its companies moved to towns that before 1941 had traditionally been the home of artillery units. Unable to find enough infantry officers with combat experience to build his companies, Daugherty turned to a traditional Guard approach: making company commanders out of men with "the ability to put a unit together." This approach led Daugherty to make infantry company commanders out of two former Navy officers, an aviator and a captain of a landing ship. William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.165-166. On the 158th FA, see 1950 Command Report, 158th FA.


18. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. The subjects covered by the Regular Army instructor teams were field artillery topics, the 4.2" mortar, recoilless rifles, tanks, signal, ordnance, engineer, antiaircraft artillery, food service, and the information and education program.
19. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. A major problem for the 45th was that at mobilization it did not have copies of the Army Training Program (ATP) for each type of unit in the division. The Master Training Program only outlined the general subjects a unit was to train on in each phase; the ATPs provided specific guidance to regiments, battalions, and separate companies on what to train on, in what sequence, and the standard to train to. ATPs began arriving in Oklahoma as the G-3 was packing for Polk; only after setting up shop at Polk could the G-3 and units begin to examine the ATPs and plan to implement them.

As the division G-3 staff needed time to set up, prepare for the arrival of fillers and to conduct its own training, much of the planning and coordinating of this training in September and early October fell on a team of three officers and two NCOs, drawn from the Regular Army instructor group assigned to Oklahoma, who accompanied the Thunderbirds to Polk on TDY. While his comrades aided the G-3 section, LTC C.P. Howe moved from Regular Army instructor for the 180th Infantry to duty as the executive officer of the 279th Infantry. Command Report, 1950, 279th Infantry.

20. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. The Daily Oklahoman kept the folks back home updated on this by publishing the rosters for groups sent to various schools.

21. Master Sergeant Vernon Ribera, of the 180th Infantry, left for the Infantry Leaders course at Ft. Riley, Corporal George Bewley, 189th Field Artillery, left for the survey course at Ft. Sill, and Private William Craig left for message center course at Ft. Gordon. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.118-119; Craig, Lifer!, p.20; Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. These school quotas often left units with few trained, experienced Guardsmen. The 158th FA had absent at school 22 out of 39 officers assigned in early December. The battalion commander noted that this "had imposed a burden upon those remaining that mitigated only the knowledge that when those away return, the load upon all will be immeasurably lightened." Command Report, 1950, 158th FA.


23. Born in Illinois in 1902, Dulaney graduated from the Infantry Company Officer's Course in 1931 and Command and General Staff School in 1941. He had first joined the 45th in 1942, then left it to command the 645th Tank Destroyer Battalion, created out of artillery units made excess when the 45th went from square to triangular that year. He returned to the division a year later.
later on Sicily, as executive officer of the 180th Infantry. In October 1943 he took command of the regiment in Italy, leading it until January 1945, when he was transferred to the 44th Infantry Division as assistant division commander. Dulaney picked up his brigadier general’s star in March 1945, but in 1946, along with many other officers, he lost his star in the Army’s demobilization. Notable assignments between wars included command of the 25th Infantry at Ft. Benning, graduation form the National War College, and command of the 350th Infantry in Austria. Army Register 1951; Register of Graduates of the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York: Association of Graduates United States Military Academy, 1974); "Wartime Comrade Gets Post As Assistant 45th Commander," The Daily Oklahoman, September 10, 1950, p.1. There were several changes among the separate battalion commanders. In August, General Styron made Lieutenant Colonel Hood the Division Surgeon and replaced him as commander of the 120th Medical Battalion with the commander of the 179th Infantry’s medical company. Shortly after arriving at Polk, Lieutenant Colonel McMaster moved from command of the 145th AAA Battalion to command of the 160th Field Artillery, in which he had served during the World War II and which his experience better suited him to command than the 145th. Lieutenant Colonel J.S. Wilkes arrived in early October from Fort Meade, where he had commanded the 70th AAA Gun Battalion, to take command of the 145th. Wilkes had been a Guard cavalry officer in New York before World War II. His regiment had converted to antiaircraft artillery before mobilization in early 1941 and Wilkes integrated into the Regular Army as an antiaircraft artillery officer after the war. Shortly after this change another Guardsmen turned Regular Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel J.M. Throckmorton, joined the division. A Guard cavalry first sergeant from Pennsylvania commissioned during the mobilization of 1940, Throckmorton took command of the 245th Tank Battalion. Born in New York in 1909, Wilkes served as an enlisted cavalryman in the Guard from 1928 to 1935. Commissioned in 1935, he graduated from the Cavalry School National Guard Officer’s Course in 1937. He graduated from the Command and General Staff School in 1941. Born in Virginia in 1910, Throckmorton served as an enlisted cavalryman in the Guard from 1931 to 1940. Commissioned in 1940, he graduated from the Cavalry School Squadron Commander and Staff Officer Course in 1942, the Command and General Staff School in 1943, and the Armor Officer Advance Course in 1950. Command Report, 1950, 145th AAA Bn; Command Report, 1950, 245th Tank Battalion; Army Register 1951; National Guard Register 1939; National Guard Register 1943; "Two Regular Army Officers Get 45th Jobs," The Daily Oklahoman, October 18, 1950, p.8.
24. Born in Canada in 1901, Murphy served four years in the Regular Army, ending his enlistment in 1925 as a First Sergeant. Commissioned the same year into the 157th Infantry, Murphy became a businessman in Fort Collins and graduated from the Infantry School’s National Guard Officer Machine Gun and Howitzer Course in 1930. Mobilized in 1940 with the 157th Infantry, in 1941 Murphy graduated from the Infantry School’s Battalion Commander and Staff Course. He commanded a battalion of the 157th on Sicily and in the early stages of the Italian campaign. Just before landing at Anzio, he moved to the 179th Infantry as executive officer, taking command of the regiment during the campaign in Southern France. After V-E Day, Murphy remained on active duty until 1947, mostly as part of the investigation of war crimes in Italy. He left active duty in August 1947 and received a commission in the Regular Army in November of the same year. Between August and December 1950, Murphy had spent considerable time at AFF working on issues related to Guard mobilization. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division; Thunderbird Review; Army Register 1951; National Guard Register 1939; "Wartime 45th Leader Named Chief of Staff," The Daily Oklahoman, November 30, 1950, p.20.

25. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. The sources of untrained fillers were: 3d Armored Division, Ft. Knox, Kentucky, 1,000; 5th Armored Division, Camp Chaffee, Arkansas, 504; 6th Infantry Division, Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri, 991; 8th Infantry Division, Ft. Jackson, South Carolina, 1,959; 9th Infantry Division, Ft. Dix, New Jersey, 950; Ft. Sill, Oklahoma, 500; Fort Deven, Massachusetts, 1,395; Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 587; Ft. Sheridan, Illinois, 1,001. These divisions were not tactical organizations; during this period, the Army organized training centers using the divisional structure and titles.


27. Command Report, 1950, 45th Replacement Company. The Kansas City Southern was not the only source of friction. Several times, reception centers shipped small groups of soldiers to the 45th without notifying the 45th. These "recruits fresh from civilian life," given no instructions by the reception center, found themselves unloaded at Leesville, the nearest railroad stop to Camp Polk, and many had to pay for rides to Polk. The 45th Replacement Company commented in its command report that this "was not only an injustice to the soldier, but it left him with a bad impression of his receiving unit." The company corrected this "discrepancy" by posting notices in the Leesville station instructing recruits to call the company for transportation.

29. Command Report, 1950, 45th Infantry Division. See also 1950 command reports of 45th Division Artillery, 179th and 279th Infantry Regiments, 145th AAA Battalion, 158th FA Battalion, and 245th Tank Battalion. The fillers sent to LaVern Weber’s company “turned out to be great soldiers.” Weber Oral History, USAMHI.

30. 1950 Command Reports for 179th Infantry, 279th Infantry and 45th Infantry Division.

31. "State Draftees Sent to ‘Men They Know’!" The Daily Oklahoman, October 6, 1950, p.10 and "Oklahoma’s First 14 Selectee Fillers Are Welcomed to Polk," The Daily Oklahoman, October 7, 1950, p.2. The 14 draftees consisted of five farmers, a truck driver, a cabinet maker, a cabinet maker’s apprentice, an oil pipeline supply company employee, an oil field roustabout, a yardmaster, a crane operator, and a tractor operator.


33. LaVern Weber Oral History, USAMHI; Command Report, 1950, 158th Field Artillery. A private in Service Company, 180th Infantry from Okemah told The Daily Oklahoman that the only problem he had with draftees from east of the Mississippi was explaining to them where Okemah was and how to pronounce it. The Daily Oklahoman, November 12, 1950, p.17.

34. The Daily Oklahoman, December 17, 1950, p.14C.

35. See the extensive coverage of the 45th in The Daily Oklahoman, October to December 1950.


38. The Daily Oklahoman, November 7, 1950, p.1. Concerned about the safety issues of driving over a thousand miles in that amount of time, General Styron had the 45th MP Company establish a checkpoint in Marshall, Texas to stop homeward bound Thunderbirds and direct them back to Louisiana. There were sanctioned Thunderbird trips home to Oklahoma, most notably the division boxing team, which traveled to Oklahoma City and dominated the Golden Gloves tournament, a feat broadcast on WKY-


42. Command Report Number 2, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4259, RG 407, NA. Lawton’s 700th Ordnance Maintenance Company had the best company average in the testing with a 91%. "Lawton Is Tops as 45th Tests Training Plans," The Daily Oklahoman, February, 1951, p.7.

43. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Allan P. Turner, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.121-122. All the company officers but the commander were Guard officers and all the NCOs were Guardsmen, but most of the privates were draftee or enlistee fillers. Robert W. Black Collection on Rangers, File: 10th Ranger Company Roster List, USAMHI. William Craig, away at a service school when the company formed, was disappointed at missing his chance to join several other Oklahoma friends in the company. Craig, Lifer!, p.21.

44. Command Report Number 1, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 145th AAA Battalion, Box 4275, RG 407, NA. The battalion was equipped with the M15 and M16 halftrack mounted weapons. The M15 carried a 37mm gun and two 0.50 caliber machine guns; the M16 carried four 0.50 caliber machine guns. Using weapons drawn from the school and other units at Bliss (on which the 145th had to do much maintenance work), the battalion fired the service practice tables three times before returning prematurely to Polk in March. Out of a possible 100 and with passing being 70, the battalion shot as follows on the service practices:

<table>
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<th>First</th>
<th>Second</th>
<th>Third</th>
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<tr>
<td>M15</td>
<td>36.18</td>
<td>48.43</td>
<td>55.95</td>
</tr>
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</table>
45. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report Number 1, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 245th Tank Battalion, Box 4288, RG 407, NA; "Power Fails, 45th Has a Chilly Time," The Daily Oklahoman, February 1, 1951, p.6.

46. Command Report Number 1, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 158th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 4278, RG 407, NA; Command Report Number 1, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 179th Infantry, Box 4281, NA; Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division. A little help in dealing with these problems came in early January with the arrival of six first lieutenants and forty-four second lieutenants transferred from the 5th Armored Division. However, the 45th's resources remained thinly spread. An AFF inspection team visiting in March noted that while the training in the provisional battalions was well-prepared, it suffered from a shortage of qualified instructors and supervision by the infantry regiments and Division Artillery. Memorandum, Major General Wayne C. Zimmerman to Chief, Army Field Forces, "Report of Inspection of 45th Infantry Division and Non-Divisional Units at Camp Polk, Louisiana, 5-7 March 1951," Box 42 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

47. Command Report, January-April 1951, 245th Tank Battalion; Command Report Number 2, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 179th Infantry Regiment, Box 4281, RG 407, NA. The quote is from Sergeant First Class Tommy Hawkins, in Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, p.122. The M4A3 and M26 both were older designs than the M46.


49. Command Report Number 1, 1 January 1951 to 30 April 1951, 279th Infantry Regiment, Box 4285, RG 407, NA.

Memorandum, 2 February 1951, Major General George D. Shea to Chief, Army Field Forces, "Report of Training Inspection, 18-27 January 1951," Box 42 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; "Report of Inspection of 45th Infantry Division and Non-Divisional Units at Camp Polk, Louisiana, 5-7 March 1951."

"Protests Over 45th Assignment Cease," The Daily Oklahoman, March 4, 1951, p.1. Army Field Forces' Master Training Plan called for infantry company training to begin in the fifth week of the unit training phase. Oklahomans with a sense of the nation's military history had reason to be concerned, given the American military tradition of sending into combat units and individuals not fully prepared for combat. See Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft, America's First Battles, 1776-1965 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1986).


Born in Montana in 1902, Maerdian enlisted in the Regular Army in 1924 and received an appointment to West Point the same year. Maerdian graduated from the Infantry School in 1935 and from the Command and General Staff School in 1941. During World War II, he served as a tactical officer at West Point and commanded the 353d Infantry Regiment in Europe. The 353d, part of the 89th Infantry Division, saw far less combat than the 45th; it arrived in France in late January 1945. Maerdian had been Professor of Military Science and Tactics at Oregon since 1947. Command Report, January-April 1951, 279th Infantry Regiment; Register of Graduates of the United States Military Academy; Army Register 1951; Shelby L. Stanton, Order of Battle U.S. Army World War II (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1984), p.250.

The Daily Oklahoman, February 10, 1951, p.1. During January and February The Daily Oklahoman had 56 items concerning the 45th. The paper's senior writer and the 45th's Military Government Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Roy P. Stewart, returned to the state in late January to address the Oklahoma Press Association convention. The 45th's Public Information Section aggressively distributed press releases to newspapers, recorded weekly radio programs for distribution in Oklahoma and sent spot news announcements to many state radio stations. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division.

Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division. California's 40th Infantry Division also received notice that it would be going to Japan.
57. "45TH GOING TO JAPAN IN MARCH," and "Governor Told It's Not Korea," both in The Daily Oklahoman, February 25, 1951, p.1. Murray had been elected governor in November 1950; in the same election Kerr had moved from the governorship to a seat in the U.S. Senate.


60. "45th Will Keep Training, Grant Short Furlough," The Daily Oklahoman, February 25, 1951, p.18; "Men at Polk Resigned to Fate; Many Questions Unanswered," The Daily Oklahoman, February 26, 1951, p.1; "Korea Duty Called Possible for 45th," The Daily Oklahoman, March 18, 1951, p.1; "45th Veterans Eye Japan Duty And Their Role in 'Rear Echelon,'" The Daily Oklahoman, March 22, 1951, p.10.


62. Ibid. The 10th Ranger Company had to remain at Fort Benning to complete its training and would rejoin the 45th in Japan. Soldiers in Army schools who would not graduate before the 45th sailed also would rejoin the division in Japan. The required POM tasks involved two major areas, administration and training. Unit personnel sections had to review every soldier's records to ensure that the soldier met the Army's standards for overseas service, including having all necessary immunizations. Every soldier had to complete a set of training events before he was eligible to go overseas, including qualification on his weapon, various combat courses, and overhead artillery fire. The last event imposed an especially heavy burden on Division Artillery as it prepared for the move. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Division Artillery.

63. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division. During the period of this report, the division lost to discharges from the service 245 men for minority, 186 for hardship, 205 for dependency, and 28 for other reasons. Stewart would soon leave active duty and become The Daily Oklahoman's Washington bureau chief. "Colonel's Transfer Shakes Top Levels," The Daily Oklahoman, March 27, 1951, p.5.
64. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division; James H. Weaver, *45th Division Training Regiment* (Oklahoma City: 45th Infantry Division Museum, 1989). Weaver commanded the Training Regiment.

65. For examples of this friction, see the Command Reports of the 279th Infantry, 158th Field Artillery, 145th AAA Battalion, the 120th Engineer Battalion and the 45th Infantry Division for January-April 1951. For Oklahoma soldiers on leave, see the following articles from *The Daily Oklahoman*: "Excuses Start, 45th Soldiers Heading Home," February 28, p.1; "First Thunderbirds Arrive In City for 'Sailing' Leaves," March 1, p.11; "Ada Becomes Center for 45th Men on Leave," March 5, p.22; and "Indians in 45th Honored," March 12, p.7. The leave allowed some soldiers to bring their new Louisiana sweethearts back home to meet the family. The leave also produced a tragedy when a nineteen year old Guardsman brought home a 3.5" rocket that exploded, killing his two younger brothers. "Army Orders Tragic Norman Blast Probed," March 17, p.1.

66. Command Report, January-April 1951, 45th Infantry Division. For coverage of the final parade, see "45th, Relatives Crowd Chapels; Parade Is Today," *The Daily Oklahoman*, March 26, 1951, p.20; "Marching Boots Crunch 45th Farewell," *The Daily Oklahoman*, March 27, 1951, p.1. General Key had commanded the 45th when it mobilized in 1940, but was relieved of command in 1942 as part of the Army's purge of senior officers following the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941.


68. *The Daily Oklahoman* reporter was Wayne Mackey, a World War II veteran of the Pacific, who received six hours notice that he would be going to Japan. "GI Life Seems Different Now," *The Daily Oklahoman*, March 25, 1951, p.1. In addition, the editor of the division newspaper was a *Daily Oklahoman* reporter "on Military Leave," as the newspaper described him in the byline for stories he filed with *The Daily Oklahoman*. On renewed concern over possible misuse of the 45th by the Regular Army, see "45th Expected to Stay Intact," *The Daily Oklahoman*, April 6, 1951, p.11 and "Army Renews Promise to 45th," *The Daily Oklahoman*, April 9, 1951, p.23.


71. Command Report, May 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4261, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1951, 45th Division Artillery, Box 4276, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1951, 179th Infantry, Box 4281, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1951, 279th Infantry, Box 4285, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1951, 145th AAA Battalion, Box 4275, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1951, 120th Engineer Battalion, Box 4277, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 245th Tank Battalion, Box 4288, RG 407, NA. The 145th AAA converted to an all-M16 equipped battalion, turning in its M15s and towed 40mm guns.

72. See Command Reports, 45th Infantry Division, for May to September 1951 in Boxes 4261-4269, RG 407, NA. Soldiers returning to the 45th from Army schools sometimes had to run the gauntlet of an Army replacement system that treated soldiers as interchangeable parts. One night while waiting at Camp Drake, outside of Tokyo, for transportation to Hokkaido after graduating from medical training at Fort Sam Houston, Master Sergeant Charles Brown and twenty-four other members of the 180th Infantry’s Medical Company were given orders to ship to Korea the next morning. Brown called 45th Division Headquarters to alert the division of this attempted theft. The next day, the group found these orders revoked and they continued on to Hokkaido. Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend*, pp.130-131.

73. Command Reports, May-September 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Allan P. Turner, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI; Black Ranger Collection, USAMHI. One Ranger broke his neck on a training jump in July; on the company’s next jump, nine men refused to jump and were transferred back to their original 45th units.

74. Command Reports, May to September, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report, October 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4270, RG 407, NA. The men discharged for expiration of enlistment were Guardsmen whose Guard term of enlistment had ended and who had served one year of active duty. This policy mainly affected junior enlisted who had joined the Guard in 1948, the year it switched from six to three year enlistments. The policy did not sit well with some World War II veterans who believed that their prior wartime service should be factored into deciding which soldiers were released from active duty first. "National Guard Discharge Plan Irks 45th Men," The Daily Oklahoman, August 13, 1951, p. 8.

Enlisted men sent to Officer Candidate School (OCS) were lost to the 45th because Army policy was not to return graduates
of OCS to their units. The drain of enlisted manpower to OCS became somewhat scandalous in early 1952 with revelations that a significant number of men accepted as candidates from units in Far East Command, including the 45th, had applied with no intention of becoming officers. They would report to OCS and then resign from the school within a week or two of their class starting. Nineteen of the fifty-three Thunderbirds sent to Field Artillery OCS at Fort Sill between February 1951 and December 1951 had resigned from the school. Soldiers did this in order to get out of Far East Command and finish their active duty in the ZI, since Army regulations prohibited their return overseas for a period that exceeded the time remaining for them on active duty. The Army put an end to this scam in March 1952 with a new policy that those soldiers suspected of this motive for leaving OCS would be shipped back to their unit. "Officer School Discovers GIs Pull Fast One," *The Daily Oklahoman*, January 24, 1952, p.1; "OCS No Longer Ticket Home," *The Daily Oklahoman*, March 11, 1952, p.4.

*The Daily Oklahoman*, in a January 25, 1952 editorial that reflected the growing war-weariness in America, found the OCS scam raised "questions truly disturbing." However, if "some soldiers are in a mood to trifle with their responsibilities it may be because they feel they were trifled with first. Invariably in the past this country's soldiers have conducted themselves honestly and bravely, but always before they knew they were fighting for keeps."

75. Command Reports, July and August 1951, 245th Tank Battalion, Box 4228, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, May to September 1951, 45th Infantry Division. The 158th FA Battalion faced an interesting problem for field artillerymen: its battalion Fire Direction Center (FDC) did not have a fire direction set, having turned in its previous one as unserviceable before leaving Polk. The battalion did receive a replacement in July, but it contained coordinate squares (used to plot fire missions) graduated in scales that the Army had stopped using years ago. Not surprisingly, the battalion's FDC "failed miserably" its practice Army Field Forces Training Test on 30 July. Command Reports, June and July 1951, 158th FA, Box 4278, RG 407, NA.

76. Regimental combat teams were a standard Army task organization for combat, comprising an infantry regiment, a field artillery battalion, and a company of engineers. Command Reports, May to September 1951, 45th Infantry Division. The quote from Styron is in the September report. See also: Command Reports, May to September 1951, 179th Infantry, Boxes 4281-4282, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, May to September 1951, 279th Infantry, Boxes 4285-4286, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, May to
September 1951, 45th Division Artillery, Box 4276, RG 407, NA.
See also these stories from The Daily Oklahoman written by Wayne Mackey during his stay with the division: "45th Is Fit, but Men Have Their Gripes," August 12, 1951, p.1; "Despite Gripes, 45th Training Has A Reason," August 14, p.20; "Thunderbirds Are Ready if Korea Duty Comes," August 19, 1951, p.20.

77. Command Reports, May to September 1951, 45th Infantry Division. The hard-working PIO section made sure the folks back home knew of their efforts. "Staff of 10 Publicizes Life With The Thunderbirds," The Daily Oklahoman, August 16, 1951, p.15. In July, WKY-TV began a weekly program, "The Forty-Fifth," using film sent by the 45th’s PIO. The Daily Oklahoman, Sunday Magazine, July 22, 1951, p.20. McLain brought his news to Oklahoma during a speech at the 90th Infantry Division reunion in Oklahoma City. (The 90th in World War I had been recruited mainly from Texas and Oklahoma.) "McLain Is Told Ridgway Plans No 45th Move," The Daily Oklahoman, November 4, 1951, p.1.

Jarman on his visit was escorted by two colleagues from the Oklahoma legislature, now on active duty with the 45th, with whom Jarman had served before his election to the U.S. House of Representatives. "45th Welcomes Jarman to Island," The Daily Oklahoman, November 17, 1951, p.18; "45th Takes Korea Duty News 'In Good Stride,' Says Jarman," The Daily Oklahoman, December 16, 1951, p.1.

78. The 145th AAA's commander was transferred to Division Artillery's staff. His replacement was Lieutenant Colonel Carl Santilli, a Guardsman. Born in Washington, D.C. in 1909, Santilli had served six years as an enlisted man in the D.C. Guard before being commissioned in the 260th Coast Artillery in 1933. He graduated from the Coast Artillery National Guard Officer's Course in 1940 and was mobilized in 1941 as a captain. He left active duty in 1946 as a lieutenant colonel and graduate of the Command and General Staff School. Appointed a lieutenant colonel in the D.C. Guard in 1946, Santilli had been mobilized in September 1950 with the 260th AAA Group's headquarters. Command Report, September 1951, 145th AAA Battalion; National Guard Register 1951.

The 120th Engineer's new commander was Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Murphy. Born in New York in 1915, Murphy graduated from City College of New York in 1938 and accepted a Reserve infantry lieutenant commission in 1939. He integrated into the Regular Army in 1947 as an Engineer, graduating from the Engineer Officer Advanced Course in 1949. Command Report, September 1951, 120th Engineer Battalion; Army Register 1951.
79. Watkins, born in Oklahoma in 1908, had graduated from Central State Teachers College in 1930, and served seven years as an enlisted man in the 45th before being commissioned an Infantry officer in 1939. Mobilized with the 45th in 1940, he ended the war as a major. He rejoined the 45th in 1946, graduated from Command and General Staff School’s Associate Course in 1948, and entered active duty in 1950 as a lieutenant colonel and the division G4. Van Stuck, born in Maryland in 1905, was commissioned in the Army Air Corps in 1942 and ended the war as a major. Commissioned an Infantry major in the Oklahoma Guard in 1946, Van Stuck entered active duty in 1950 as a lieutenant colonel and division G2. 


81. See the following Daily Oklahoman stories: "Two-Year Hitch For 45th is All," July 22, 1951, p.1; August 8, 1951, p.7; On relations between the 45th and the Japanese, see "Japanese Friendly to 45th," The Daily Oklahoman, August 15, 1951, p.19; Command Reports, May to September 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, 131-132; Craig, Lifer!, p.26. One indicator of extensive contact between soldiers and local civilians was a sharp rise in the number of venereal disease cases reported in the division.


84. Command Report, November 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4272, RG 407, NA.


86. "45th Takes Korea Duty News 'In Good Stride,' Jarman Says," The Daily Oklahoman, December 16, 1951, p.1; "45th Units Going to Korea As Rotation Replacements; Division to Give Weary Troops
"Chance to Rest," The Daily Oklahoman, November 30, 1951, p.1; "Left in Good Hands," The Daily Oklahoman, December 3, 1951, p.24; "45th in Combat Again; Entire Division Moves to Front Line Positions," The Daily Oklahoman, December 31, 1951, p.1; "Cavalry on Foot Has Unpleasant Memory of 45th," The Daily Oklahoman, December 3, 1951, p.8. The 1st Cavalry was not as weary as press reports painted it; many of the soldiers who had landed in Korea with the division in July 1950 were no longer with it, lost from death, wounds, transfers and rotation.

87. Command Report, November 1951, 45th Infantry Division. During November, the 45th lost 166 enlisted returned to the ZI for various types of discharges, 209 enlisted transferred out of the division, and 11 officers transferred to other units in Japan because they were sole survivors and could not serve in combat. In return, 126 officers, 18 warrant officers and 946 enlisted were transferred into the division. By the end of the month, the 45th had 911 officers, 124 warrant officers, and 16,715 enlisted.

88. Command Report, December 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4274, RG 407, NA. The 189th Field Artillery arrived first because, as the division's general support artillery battalion, it was not paired with an infantry regiment in a RCT. Also, the battalion's 155mm howitzers would provide welcomed additional firepower for I Corps, especially if the Chinese attempted to disrupt the switch.

89. Command Report, December 1951, 245th Tank Battalion, Box 4288, RG 407, NA; Command Report, December 1951, 120th Engineer Battalion, Box 4277, RG 407, NA; Command Report, December 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.137-138. On the state of bunkers left behind by the 1st Cav, see Headquarters, 45th Infantry Division, Minutes of Commanders' Conference, 22 January 1952, Box 4289, RG 407, NA. The 1st Cav was not unique in its approach to fortifying its position; there were many complaints, from the time the war stalemate in 1951 to its conclusion in 1953, that Americans were not willing to dig in properly. See S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in Action. Korea. Spring, 1953 (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1956). However, in defense of the 1st Cav, it must be noted that the division had occupied its portion of Line JAMESTOWN for only a little more than a month when it handed the position over to the 45th. The 1st Cav had seized the position from the Chinese during heavy fighting in October, as part of I Corps' establishment of Line JAMESTOWN, at a cost of about 2,900 casualties. See Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp.98-102.

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90. Command Report, November 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report, December 1951, 45th Infantry Division; Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend*, pp.142-144. On 31 December, the 45th had 946 officers, 125 warrant officers, and 18,657 enlisted. On CMS and the rotation system, see Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp.186-187, 349-341. In December 1951, an officer needed 40 CMS points for rotation and an enlisted man 36 points.


93. This paragraph is based on Command Reports, 45th Infantry Division, for January-June 1952, Boxes 4289-4304, RG 407, NA. Also see Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend*, pp. 160-161.

94. This paragraph is based on Command Reports, 45th Division Artillery, January-June 1952, Boxes 4324-4325, RG 407, NA and Command Reports, December 1951-June 1952, 158th Field Artillery, Boxes 4278, 4331-4332, RG 407, NA. The quote is from Commanders' Conference, 6 January 1952, 45th Infantry Division. During the period January-May 1952, the Division Artillery each month on average fired 3,403 missions, expending 57,610 rounds. June 1952, when the division mounted a major effort to seize new outpost positions in front of its MLR, saw a significant rise in artillery action: 5,138 fire missions expending 154,135 rounds. The 45th’s counterbattery efforts were hampered by the failure of infantry units to forward timely shell reports; the age and wear of TPQ-3 countermortar radars inherited from the 1st Cav; and a shortage of trained counterfire specialists. Chinese indirect fire became an increasing problem for the 45th. In March, the Chinese fired 2,096 rounds into the 45th's sector; in May, 14,264 rounds. During June, the Chinese fired 41,383 rounds.

95. Commanders' Conferences, 6 and 21 February 1952, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4292, RG 407, NA. A major problem was bunkers built on the forward slope of hills without a connecting trench built to the hill’s reverse slope, thus forcing troops to expose themselves to enemy fire when crossing the hill’s skyline to reach the bunker.
96. Commanders’ Conferences, February to May 1952, 45th Infantry Division. The quote is from the Commanders’ Conference of 21 February 1952. Colonel Murphy of the 279th Infantry echoed Styron’s concerns about the field fortification skills of battalion and company officers and the need for "more forceful leadership," particularly at the platoon level. See Command Report, January 1952, 279th Infantry, Box 4346, RG 407, NA. There was still much work left to be done on field fortifications in the division’s sector when Major General David L. Ruffner succeeded Styron. At a 25 May commanders’ conference, four days after taking command, Ruffner noted that "I haven’t seen one position that doesn’t need a lot of work done on it. The Chinese are building up their artillery fire and a direct hit by a 155mm is not like a hand grenade. Let’s get these positions built up and get some wire out there."

97. Commanders’ Conference, 22 January 1952, 45th Infantry Division.

98. Commanders’ Conference, 6 January 1952, 45th Infantry Division; The division’s command report for January described its patrol action as "numerous, aggressive, and the intelligence gained has been of a high order." Command Report, January 1952, 45th Infantry Division.

99. This and the two preceding paragraphs are based on Command Report, January 1952, 179th Infantry, Box 4340, RG 407, NA. One fire mission called by the 179th was on a Chinese company unwise enough to assemble during the day in the open in view of their enemy. The 179th’s casualties were 69% of the division’s total battle casualties for January of 27 dead, 126 wounded and 3 missing. Command Report, January 1952, 45th Infantry Division.

101. The quote first appears in the division's March command report and was repeated in the next two months' command reports. While it is counterfactual to place the 45th of 1952 into the war of 1950-1951, it is obvious that the Thunderbirds as a unit never were placed under stress anywhere near as intense as that placed on the 2nd Infantry Division during the Battle of Kunu-ri in late 1950 and the Chinese 1951 Spring Offensives or on the 1st Marine Division at the Chosin Reservoir.

102. Commanders' Conference, 6 February 1952, 45th Infantry Division.


104. Command Report, January 1952, 179th Infantry. An account of the sometimes haphazard patrolling methods used by the 45th early in its service in Korea is provided by the 279th Infantry's Lieutenant Carl Stevens in Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.150-152.


106. This and the preceding two paragraphs are based on: Command Report, February 1952, 179th Infantry, Box 4340, RG 407, NA; Command Report, February 1952, 279th Infantry, Box 4347, RG 407, NA; 179th Infantry, "Training Memorandum Number 1," 2 February 1952, with Annex 3, 8 February 1952 and Annex 4, 10 February 1952, Box 393, Record Group 338, NA. The quotes are from the 179th's command report.

107. Command Reports, February 1952, 179th and 279th Infantry. The 279th's Raiders were organized and trained by Lieutenant Carl Stevens; his account of the platoon's training and operations is in Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.166-167.

108. Command Reports, February and March 1952, 179th Infantry; Command Report, March 1952, 279th Infantry, Box 4347, RG 407, NA. For an account which shows why good patrolling was vital in the type of combat the 45th found in Korea and what proper preparation and good leadership could accomplish, as well as the difficulties patrols faced, see 179th Infantry, "After Action Report of Patrol #5 and Company 'L' Outpost on the Night of 8-9 March 52," 10 March 1952, copy in Command Report, March 1952, 179th Infantry.
109. Command Report, February 1952, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report, March 1952, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4295, RG 407, NA.

110. Command Report, April 1952, 279th Infantry, Box 4349, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, April and May 1952, 179th Infantry, Box 4341, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, April and May 1952, 45th Infantry Division; Craig, Lifer!, pp.51-53.

111. Command Report, March 1952, 45th Infantry Division; Command Report, March 1952, 179th Infantry. The fight for Outpost Eeire, caused 21% of the 45th’s casualties for March. Accounts of the battle are in Russell A. Gugeler, Combat Actions In Korea (Washington: Center of Military History reprint, 1987), pp.222-235 and Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.162-166. I Corps had ordered the 45th to occupy Eeire, over the protests of both Colonel Daugherty and General Styron that the position was too vulnerable.


113. The next day, Howes received a phone call from Styron congratulating the new lieutenant on his performance; the same day, all three general officers of the 45th attended a critique of the patrol. Howes Diary, USAMHI.

114. Command Reports, March and April 1952, 279th Infantry. The Chinese also had difficulties with the skill of their infantry and motivating infantrymen to conduct aggressive patrols. One platoon leader in the attack on Hill 200 in May botched the reconnaissance of and approach march to the objective. One company in the same attack was assigned this mission as punishment for the "poor showing" of its patrols. 6th Historical Detachment, "Night Defense of Hill 200."

115. While the fortifications on Hill 200 did play an important role in the defense of the outpost, they still were not on the same level as those built by the Chinese. Several Thunderbirds were killed or wounded when 155mm shells hit their bunkers. Most of the bunkers, when subjected to the stress of hits and near-misses, showered their occupants with dirt, fouling weapons. This was a major reason the Chinese were able to exploit their breach of the wire on the outpost’s eastern edge; for several minutes the only machine gun covering this area was out of action.
as its crew disassembled, cleaned and reassembled it.


117. Commander's Conference, 21 February 1952, 45th Infantry Division; Command Reports, April and May 1952, 45th Division Artillery; Command Report, May 1952, 279th Infantry; Craig, Lifer!, p.52. In August 1952, shortly after the end of the 45th as a Guard division, the shortage of qualified replacements meant that some soldiers in the 158th Field Artillery had to be retained beyond their rotation dates for the "minimum requirements of combat effectiveness" of the battalion. The battalion noted that this was a "great detriment to good morale and defeats the purpose for which the personnel were held." Command Report, August 1952, 158th Field Artillery, Box 4332, RG 407, NA. A good account of infantry combat during this period and how the stalemate in Korea and the use of individual rotation could affect unit performance is Rudolph W. Stephens, Old Ugly Hill: A G.I.’s Fourteen Months in the Korean Trenches, 1952-1953 (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, 1995). A draftee, Stephens served in the 2d Infantry Division and would fight twice on Old Baldy. Though set in 1953, a good dramatization of the stalemated war is Pork Chop Hill (United Artists, 1959). The practice of fixed tours of duty in a combat zone would become a major factor in unit performance during the Vietnam War. See Russell Spector, After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (New York: The Free Press, 1993), chapter two.

118. In early March 1952, concerned about a possible Chinese spring offensive, Van Fleet advised Ridgway to replace both Guard commanders with Regular officers to provide the 40th and 45th with stronger leadership and raise their combat effectiveness. Van Fleet, after reconsidering the matter, reversed his recommendation on the grounds that to send the Guard commanders home before most of their men would damage morale in the divisions and that the 40th and 45th, while they had a significant percentage of Guard personnel, would fight better under Hudelson and Styron than under an unfamiliar Regular officer. See Memorandum for the Diary, 11 March 1952, Special File Korean War January-April 1952, Box 20, Ridgway Papers, USAMHI. Most likely a factor inhibiting removal of the two Guard division commanders was the political storm such a move would generate, the same consideration that had led General Collins to overrule Ridgway on deploying the divisions to Korea. Van Fleet earlier in the war had had a taste of the political waters mobilized Guard units could roil. While commanding Second Army

119. Commanders' Conference, January-May 1952, 45th Infantry Division. The quotes are from the 22 January and 1 April conferences. Responses to the USAMHI Korean War Veterans Survey from former Thunderbirds vary in their evaluation of the division's leadership. Veterans' comments range from "excellent" to "fair" to "spotty" to "not adequate." John B. Blount, a 1950 ROTC Distinguished Military Graduate who joined the 45th as a replacement platoon leader in February 1952, pointed out that "because we were a National Guard division, I had some learning to do about who was in charge. It wasn't always the officer. Their interpersonal relationships were tricky."

120. The figures on the 180th Infantry are based on a review of officers listed in Thunderbird Review (Atlanta: Albert Love Publishing, 1952) against the 1951 editions of the National Guard Register and the Army Register. Fifteen Guard officers of the 180th had been Army Air Forces officers during World War II; five of the Guard officers were not World War II veterans. An officers roster from Command Report, January 1952, 189th Field Artillery, was checked against the 1951 editions of the National Guard Register and the Army Register.

121. Command Report, January 1952, 189th Field Artillery, Box 4339, RG 407, NA. One of the 189th's battery grade officers was a Pennsylvania Guardsmen stripped from his mobilized antiaircraft battalion and sent to FEC as an individual replacement. For the 180th Infantry, see note 146. In the 180th, there were one Regular Army officer; two Guard officers, one from Florida and one from Arkansas; and twenty-nine Reserve, ROTC or OCS officers.

122. Respondents to the USAMHI Korean War Veterans Survey differed often in their evaluation of the leadership provided from each of these commissioning sources, but many commented on the youth and inexperience of ROTC and OCS lieutenants. The problems that Army personnel planners faced in providing enough junior officers are described in Kendall, "An Inflexible

One problem faced by all field artillery units in Korea was the practice of assigning to them as replacements officers stripped from mobilized Guard antiaircraft artillery battalions and Reserve officers whose only experience was in AAA. While the field artillery and the coast artillery had been merged in 1948, few Regular artillery officers, let alone Guard and Reserve officers, had become proficient in both types of artillery. Wilfrid Boettiger, a World War II Guard AAA officer who joined the Reserve after the war, volunteered for active duty in 1950. After time on the Camp McCoy staff and attending the AAA Officer Advanced Course, he was assigned in August 1951 to the 64th Field Artillery, whose commander greeted Boettiger with "Another Goddamn antiaircraft officer." Wilfrid O. Boettiger, An Antiaircraft Artilleryman From 1939 to 1970 (privately printed, 1990), p.125.

123. Command Reports, March-June 1952, 189th Field Artillery; Command Reports, January-May 1952, 179th Infantry. Lieutenant Robert A. Howes (West Point '51), noted in his diary that while in-processing at the 45th Replacement Company in March 1952, "there was quite a discussion about me, the one Regular Army man against all the other reservists national Guardsmen and draftees. The Catholic Chaplain got quite a kick out of the discussion in fact he egged it on." Howes Diary, USAMHI.

124. Craig, Lifer!, pp.33-34; John Blount, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI. Also see Command Report, June 1952, 158th Field Artillery, Box 4325, RG 407, NA. Craig was one of the new NCOs in the 45th, leaving Korea in June 1952 as a platoon sergeant in the 179th Infantry. Also in the 179th was a 1950 draftee, the future actor Dan Blocker, who left Korea as a first sergeant.

125. Kendall, op. cit. For the personnel dilemmas facing the Vietnam-era Army, see Spector, chapter two.

126. Kendall, "An Inflexible Response," op. cit. Another drain on the Army's manpower quality was deferment of college students from the draft; by the end of 1952, about 200,000 students had received deferments. George Q. Flynn, "The Draft and College Deferments During the Korean War," The Historian (May 1988), p.383. The war and the draft to support it grew increasingly unpopular during 1952. For a contemporary report, see "Why the Draft Makes Our Young Men Angry," Collier's (September 13, 1952), pp.15-18. The Army's manpower situation was so bad that it had ordered the 37th (Ohio) and 44th (Illinois) Infantry Divisions to active duty in early 1952 to build up the General Reserve stationed in the ZI. However, the demands of NATO and Korea quickly led the Army to begin stripping the two divisions of
their trained manpower and many Ohio and Illinois Guardsmen found themselves spending a year in Korea. See chapter five for details on the 37th’s unhappy fate.

127. Command Report, January 1952, 45th Infantry Division. MOS imbalances could seriously affect a unit’s efficiency and morale. In April, the 279th Infantry received 41 school-trained cooks as replacements. It had needed only sixteen. The excess 25 were assigned to other positions in the regiment, no doubt at a significant cost to their morale and to their unit’s efficiency as they had to learn their new position on-the-job. Command Report, April 1952, 279th Infantry.

128. Command Reports, February and March 1952, 45th Infantry Division. The first quotation is from Command Report, February 1952, 158th Field Artillery, Box 4331, RG 407, NA. The second is from Styron’s indorsement on Command Report, April 1952, 158th Field Artillery, Box 4331, RG 407, NA. The school ran courses on specialist skills in intelligence; signal; artillery and mortar fire direction; medical; chemical; and food service. The school also ran a leadership course to provide junior NCOs.

129. Command Reports, March-June 1952, 45th Infantry Division. The quote is from the March report. Of the total graduated by 31 May, 310 were from the leadership course. Division Artillery complained that not only was it getting few qualified NCOs, but that there were few potential NCOs among the enlisted replacements received. Command Report, June 1952, 45th Division Artillery, Box 4325, RG 407, NA.

130. Command Report, April 1952, 45th Division Artillery, Box 4324, RG 407, NA; Command Report, May 1952, 45th Division Artillery, Box 4325, RG 407, NA; Command Reports, April-June 1952, 45th Infantry Division. In July, the division consolidated all its schools at Camp Casey, site of the Infantry Training Replacement Center.

131. On Plan Counter, see Command Report, June 1952, 45th Infantry Division, and Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front*, pp. 285-294. Division battle casualties in June were 55 officers and 949 enlisted, of whom 8 officers and 176 enlisted were killed in action. The success of the operation, the June Command Report held, was the result of "adequate training and preparation for the defense of newly-won objectives" and that "[P]latoon and company commanders were directed to take immediate and forceful measures in the defense of newly won objectives." American firepower played a key role in stopping the Chinese counterattacks; in June, the 45th Division Artillery fired 154,135 rounds. For an example of how personnel turbulence could
gut a unit’s combat effectiveness, see the account of the 65th Infantry Regiment’s battle for Outpost Kelly in Hermes, pp.299-303.


By the time the 45th entered combat, less than half the division was composed of Guardsmen and many of them, because of rank and position, had little exposure to combat in Korea. For example, the 179th Infantry between January and April lost no Guardsmen killed in action and only two missing in action. The bulk of the regiment’s casualties were among draftees and those who had enlisted in the Regular Army.

135. Command Reports, January-June 1952, 45th Infantry Division. The criteria for priority in return favored those who were World War II veterans, had dependency or hardship situations, those who served in combat while in Korea, and
whether a trained replacement for the Guardsman had arrived.

136. Command Reports, April and May 1952, 45th Infantry Division and 45th Division Artillery. Major General Ruffner, a field artilleryman, was born in 1896 and graduated from the Virginia Military Institute in 1917. He took over the 45th after commanding the 5th Armored Division, a training unit, from January to May 1952. Ruffner's brother, Major General Nick Ruffner, commanded the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, January to September 1951. Colonel Francis M. Day (West Point '24), the new division artillery commander, had commanded a field artillery group during World War II and joined the 45th from the faculty of the Armed Forces Staff College. Brigadier General Wayne C. Smith (West Point '25), the new assistant division commander, had spent most of World War II as chief of staff of the Central Pacific Base Command. Before his assignment to the 45th, Smith had been deputy commanding general of IX Corps in Korea. Register of Graduates United States Military Academy; Army Register 1951.

137. Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. Integration of the Armed Forces 1940-1965 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1981), pp.442-446. While General Ridgway followed the Army staff's decision to temporarily exempt the 40th and 45th, it caused significant problems for other divisions trying to absorb the large number of black replacements being shipped to Eighth Army from the ZI.

138. Adjutant General’s Report, October 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4271, RG 407, NA; G1 Report, November 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4272, RG 407, NA; Adjutant General’s Report, December 1951, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4274, RG 407, NA; Command Report, March 1952, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4295, RG 407, NA; Command Report, June 1952, 45th Infantry Division, Box 4304, RG 407, NA. "Class II" was the euphemism used to refer to black soldiers.

139. Command Report, July 1952, 279th Infantry, Box 4351, RG 407, NA; Commanders’ Conference, 17 May 1952, 45th Infantry Division. On the reactions within the division to racial integration, see Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI; Craig, Lifer!, pp.40-41; Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.254-255.


General Styron reached San Francisco in early June; by 22 June, he had separated from active duty at Ft. Sill and was back.

141. "First of Thunderbirds Say 'Call Us Mister'," The Daily Oklahoman, April 23, 1952, p.1. The reasons for and the mechanics of the NGUS arrangement are explained by the Army’s Chief of Staff in J. Lawton Collins, "1 In 1," The National Guardsman, June 1952, pp.2-4. Roy P. Stewart told readers that the NGUS solution to the question of possession of the 45th’s lineage was "Solomon-like" and that "both sides win the argument." Roy P. Stewart, "Report From Washington," The Daily Oklahoman, April 6, 1952, p.1B.

142. "Praised 45th Gets Battle Flags Back," The Daily Oklahoman, September 26, 1954, p.1. On the reviewing stand beside the governor were the Secretary of the Army, now retired Lieutenant General McLain, two former Guard commanders of the 45th, Major Generals Key and Styron, and a number of Thunderbirds who had remained on active duty.

143. The core of World War II veterans that many Guard units possessed, along with the cohesion of long service together, would have given Guard units an edge over most Regular units. On the other hand, Guard units suffered from many of the defects of Regular units: obsolescent equipment; high turnover among junior enlisted; uneven levels of training and experience among junior officers; and an unreadiness for the physical, mental, and emotional demands of combat at all echelons. And of course, these Guard units would have suffered similar casualties as the Regular units that were sent to Korea during these periods, with the attendant political repercussions in the ZI.
"UNDER ARMY ORDERS:"
THE U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
DURING THE KOREAN WAR

Volume II

DISSERTATION

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By
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*****

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The crisis atmosphere created by events in Korea, especially after the Chinese defeated UN forces in late 1950, became crucial in creating support for the military buildup called for by NSC 68. According to David Fautua, NSC 68 "helped the Army serve its own institutional agenda for the Cold War, thereby revitalizing more than just its overall force structure, but providing much of the intellectual rationale for more men, more weapons, and more money." A major part of that rationale rested on creation of a conventional defense for Western Europe against the Soviets; the Korean War provided the political leverage needed to station a large ground combat force in Europe on a long term basis.¹

By the end of 1951, as part of this military build up in Europe, the Army had deployed to Germany two infantry divisions, seven battalion or group headquarters, eight non-divisional battalions, and nine
separate companies from among those Army National Guard units in Federal service. Only in separate battalions did the number of Guard units sent to Korea significantly exceed the number sent to Germany (19 to 8), a result of Eighth Army's prewar weakness in non-divisional field artillery and combat engineers and the heavy demands for these types of units created by the conditions of combat in Korea.\textsuperscript{2}

Guard units sent to Germany suffered from the same problems during training in the Zone of the Interior that afflicted units sent to Korea. However, many of the Guard units sent to Germany suffered much larger levies for Far East Command before moving overseas, and they had a much lower priority for receiving Reservists as fillers. Arriving in Germany, most units found that the infrastructure to support Seventh Army's buildup inadequate: cramped barracks, often former German military kasernes, with buildings in poor shape and lacking in the troop welfare facilities Americans expected.

Once in Germany, Guard units, like other units in Seventh Army, particularly combat units, had a steady diet of field training, exercises, and Army Training Tests. However, Guard units sent to Seventh Army, like those sent to Eighth Army, faced extensive personnel
turbulence during 1952, as Guardsmen, Reservists, and 1950 draftees all left active duty during the year. And as in Korea, units in Germany were less than pleased with the quantity and quality of replacements they received from the ZI.

Thankfully, those Guard units sent to Germany never faced the ultimate test of their effectiveness, defending against a Soviet attack across the Inner German Border. Without such a test, one must rely on ATT scores and anecdotal evidence. Based on these, Guard units sent to Seventh Army performed much like their Regular and Reserve counterparts.

**37th Ordnance Battalion Headquarters Detachment**

Organized at Cleveland in 1947, the 37th Ordnance Battalion Headquarters Detachment, as part of the 50th Ordnance Group, supervised several ordnance maintenance companies in Ohio. Between organization and mobilization in 1950, the 37th had a significant personnel turnover, including three battalion commanders and several first sergeants. At mobilization, Lieutenant Colonel Rudolph Maxa commanded the 37th. Born in Ohio in 1917, Maxa had served three years enlisted in the Guard before World War II, though he was not in the Guard at the 1940 mobilization.
Drafted in 1941, Maxa was commissioned in the Ordnance Corps in 1942 and ended the war a major. He returned to the Guard as an infantry major in 1947; in 1949 he returned to the Ordnance Corps and was promoted to lieutenant colonel in early August 1950, after the 37th received its alert notice.³

An ordnance battalion headquarters detachment’s Table of Organization (T/O) called for ten officers, two warrant officers, and thirty-five enlisted men; the 37th entered Federal service on 19 August 1950 with six officers, one warrant officer, and eleven enlisted men. On 30 August, the battalion arrived at Fort Knox, Kentucky and on 7 September opened its headquarters on post. Later that month, the 37th lost its executive officer and adjutant, transferred to another ordnance battalion at Knox, and received two Reserve officers as replacements. The battalion had "very little difficulty" in filling its enlisted ranks to full strength since it only required thirty-five men, though it lost five Guard enlisted men between induction and the end of 1950. The enlisted fillers received were of high quality; only five had AGTC scores below 100. The result was "excellent" progress in both individual and collective training in the battalion headquarters.⁴

The 37th soon went to work as a battalion
headquarters. In September, the battalion’s fellow Ohio Guard unit, the 50th Ordnance Group, also in Federal service at Fort Knox, became its higher headquarters. The 37th initially had seven ordnance companies assigned to it, but in October the 50th Group took direct control of three companies which were not maintenance companies. The four companies that remained under the 37th were a very mixed bag. The 881st Ordnance Heavy Automotive Maintenance Company was a "fully trained," full strength Regular unit already stationed at Knox. The 517th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company was a Regular unit transferred to Knox from Fort Benning; it was organized at cadre strength and during 1950 did not receive many fillers—as a result, its personnel were used to train other units and to conduct inspections. The 460th Ordnance Recovery Company was a North Carolina Reserve unit that reported to Knox with three officers and twenty-nine enlisted, none of whom had any experience at recovery operations; they "learned the hard way on-the-job" from recovery missions given them by the post’s ordnance section. In November, the 37th had another company assigned to it—the 514th Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company, a Regular unit organized on a reduced T/O, but with "completely trained" personnel.5
The only Guard unit under the 37th was Tennessee’s 568th Ordnance Heavy Maintenance Company. Of the 5 officers and 116 enlisted men who reported to Knox in August, only 2 officers and 12 enlisted men had service school training in their specialities. Soon after arriving on post, the company lost twenty-two enlisted men minority or hardship discharges. Those Guardsmen without prior active service and fillers assigned to the company were placed on temporary duty with the 3d Armored Division for basic training.

Unable to obtain seats at Ordnance Corps schools for unqualified Guardsmen, Reservists, and fillers, the 50th Group in November established a technical school at Knox, drawing on its subordinate units for instructors and equipment. While better than nothing, this solution was, the 37th noted "not adequate because of the lack of trained personnel and training equipment as well as training facilities." 6

In early December, the 37th lost its second executive officer, and received another Reservist as his replacement. Also arriving in December were a maintenance officer, a chaplain, a doctor, and a dentist, all Reservists. On 15 December, the battalion received an alert notice for shipment to Far East Command. The 50th Group took control of all the
companies assigned to the 37th; in early January, the battalion shipped its equipment to the San Francisco Port of Embarkation and a two officer advance party left Knox in mid-month for the port. But on 31 January, two days before their scheduled departure from Knox, the 37th’s movement orders were canceled.⁷

For twenty days, the 37th hung in limbo, remaining on alert for movement. Then on 19 February, the battalion received orders to resume its operational mission at Knox under the 50th Group. After recovering its equipment and advance party from San Francisco, the 37th had fully resumed operations by 12 March. Battalion personnel once again worked as instructors at the 50th Group’s technical school. The companies now assigned to the 37th were all in different stages of training and all suffered from the unavailability of slots for their unqualified personnel at Ordnance service schools. Adding to these training problems now were levies on the companies to provide replacements for units in Korea.⁸

Then on 31 March, the 37th received an alert notice for movement to European Command. Once again, the battalion turned its companies over to another battalion, packed and shipped its equipment, and conducted the required Preparation for Overseas
Movement training and administrative reviews. Leaving Knox at full T/O strength---seven officers, two warrant officers, and twenty-seven enlisted men---the battalion arrived in Germany on 23 May, where it joined Seventh Army and was attached to the 47th Ordnance Group.9

Accompanying the group commander to a conference with the Seventh Army Ordnance Officer on 24 May, Colonel Maxa received some rather unexpected and unpleasant news: Seventh Army had decided to use the 37th as an Ordnance Ammunition Battalion. This was a mission for which the 37th had neither training nor experience; many of battalion headquarters' officers and NCOs requested transfers to ordnance maintenance units when they learned of this mission.10

Seventh Army planned to move the battalion to Munster Ammunition Depot, a former Luftwaffe ammunition depot, with the mission of stocking and issuing all training ammunition for Seventh Army. The depot had been closed since December 1949 and required "considerable renovation and adaptation," a project contracted out to German companies and which proceeded at such a "slow" pace during 1951 that it remained unfinished at the end of the year.11

Nevertheless, the 37th moved to Munster in mid-July, where it took control of three ordnance
ammunition companies. Two of these companies created considerable headaches for Colonel Maxa and his staff. The 443d and 450th Ordnance Ammunition Companies (OAC) were both Reserve units in which "the majority of officers and other key personnel were previously trained for other than ammunition work." Inactive Reservists recalled to active duty and sent to the companies as individual fillers compromised a large percentage of the units' personnel. Many of these Reservists did not understand why they had been recalled because of a war in Korea and then sent to Germany. Both companies suffered from chronic poor leadership; most of the officers in the companies "were openly discontent with being in the service" and Maxa had to fire two company commanders in the 443d OAC and one in the 450th OAC. When the Department of the Army announced its Inactive Reservist phase-out program, "the problems of maintaining proper discipline, training, and efficiency became most difficult."12

The third company under the 37th was the 60th Ordnance Ammunition Company, activated on 1 July with a cadre of two white officers and twenty-two black enlisted men. The cadre was "excellent," and the company commander had extensive experience in ammunition work. However, while the black enlisted
fillers shipped to the 60th were of generally good quality, all of them had received only basic training in the ZI. This required the company cadre to train most of the fillers in their MOSs, as it received only 18 slots at the EUCOM Ordnance School's ammunition courses. Slow issue of unit equipment to the 60th OAC after its activation added to the company's troubles.\textsuperscript{13}

Poor living conditions and lack of recreational facilities compounded the problems facing the 37th and its companies. The 60th OAC, stationed at the Rhine Ammunition Depot, began its life with "high morale," but this "deteriorated to an appreciable extent due to poor living conditions." The disgruntled Reservists in the 450th OAC spent over a month living in tents in the middle of the Rhine Ordnance Depot, where they could observe that even a Polish labor unit had better facilities. The 443d OAC and the 37th headquarters detachment endured the slow pace of renovation at the Munster Depot. Colonel Maxa wrote that he "spent a large part of his time and efforts on the matter of getting suitable buildings renovated or constructed for use of the units."\textsuperscript{14}

The final blow to battalion readiness came as Inactive Reservists returned to the ZI for release from
active duty. The 443d OAC had an 82% turn over in personnel, the 450th OAC 51%. Replacements from the ZI had no training in ammunition MOSs and in evaluating the replacements, Maxa wrote that "from the attitude, appearance, and conduct of these men it was all too obvious that considerable refresher basic training was necessary." Further, 167 of the replacements sent to the two companies had scored below 70% on the AGCT or had not completed the fifth grade. The battalion noted that for the 443d OAC and 450th OAC by the end of 1951, "[O]perational readiness if it ever really had been obtained before, was now gone."15

The few Guardsmen left in the 37th Ordnance Battalion headquarters as 1952 began continued to struggle with these problems. But their remaining time in Germany was short, and in June, Colonel Maxa turned over command of the battalion, ending its last link with the Ohio National Guard. The 37th's experience in Federal service had been a trying one, providing many examples of Murphy's Law in action both in the ZI and in Germany. However, the battalion headquarters itself had performed well, a tribute to the high quality of the fillers it received after mobilization and to the Guardsmen who brought the unit into Federal service.16
272d Field Artillery Battalion

As Boston’s 272d Field Artillery Battalion marched from its armory to North Station on 27 September 1950, there was no outward indication that this battalion’s Federal service would become one of the most controversial episodes of the Guard mobilization during the Korean War. After a speech from Governor Paul Dever at the armory, expressing the Commonwealth’s pride in its first battalion to leave for active duty in this new war, the 272d went through the same scenes of farewell occurring at train stations across the nation. Then the 272d’s officers and men boarded the troop train for the trip to their new home, Camp McCoy, Wisconsin.¹⁷

However, the 272d Field Artillery Battalion would face a number of problems that would render it combat ineffective during its time as a Guard battalion in Federal service. While at Camp McCoy, the battalion would suffer severe training distractions. These would exacerbate what was the key flaw in the 272d, poor preparation for active service. While this was not a unique situation for Guard units in 1950, the 272d was especially noteworthy in this regard. The battalion was not well-trained, and it lacked a cadre of qualified and experienced personnel who could be used
once on active duty to fix what was wrong with battalion.

As the battalion struggled with these problems, it became enmeshed in the racial politics of the day. Some white officers, both Regular and Guard, came to believe that this battalion, with an officer corps composed entirely of African-Americans, could never perform successfully. Some African-Americans, particularly in the press, would believe that nothing that went wrong for the battalion was the fault of the battalion’s black Guardsmen. The 272d went through a purge of officers in 1951, and just barely achieved the criteria for overseas service, but throughout its time in Germany as a Guard unit it remained a troubled battalion of questionable combat readiness.

The 272d’s problems began with its creation after World War II. The battalion was not based on a prewar Guard field artillery unit. Instead, the 272d traced its lineage to the Third Battalion, 372d Infantry Regiment, a multi-state, all-black regiment organized after World War I. Mobilized in 1941, the regiment during World War II was used as a security force in the ZI and on Hawaii and did not see combat service.18

After the war, the National Guard Bureau chose not to reorganize multi-state regiments in the new troop
list. Unwilling to integrate the 26th Infantry Division or the 182d Regimental Combat Team, Massachusetts' Adjutant General decided to place returning 372d Guardsmen in a tank battalion allocated to the state. However, the 372d's armory in Boston proved too small for such a unit; the only remaining unit available in the state's allotment was a non-divisional field artillery battalion, and so was born the 272d Field Artillery Battalion. Initially organized as a towed 105mm howitzer battalion, the 272d converted in 1948 to towed 155mm howitzers when the National Guard deleted non-divisional towed 105mm howitzer battalions from the troop list. Thus, unlike many other Guard field artillery battalions after 1945, the 272d had no cadre of trained, experienced Guard field artillerymen upon which it could draw in building the unit.\(^{19}\)

In August 1950, Lieutenant Colonel Karl B. Russell commanded the battalion. Born in 1900, Russell had served three years enlisted in the Regular Army and seven years enlisted in the Guard before becoming in 1931 an infantry lieutenant in the 372d. A captain in 1941, Russell entered Federal service with the 372d, leaving in 1946 a major. He rejoined the Guard in 1947 and took command of the 272d in March 1950.\(^{20}\)
Of the thirty-one other officers identified as members of the 272d in August 1950, all were World War II veterans, either as officers or enlisted. Nineteen of these officers were veterans, either as officers or enlisted, of the 372d Infantry. Like the battalion commander, all lacked active duty service as a field artillery officer. Only three, the battalion operations officer, a captain, and a lieutenant, had graduated before mobilization from the Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course at Fort Sill. The others had to learn field artillery skills from week night drills, correspondence courses, and the two week summer training sessions of 1948, 1949, and 1950.\textsuperscript{31}

The alert notice for mobilization reached the 272d on 11 August 1950 as it was preparing for summer training. As the battalion would not be inducted into Federal service until mid-September, the 272d went to Camp Edwards, Massachusetts as planned for its two weeks training. Upon its return, the battalion began a recruiting campaign to fill vacancies, but available sources do not mention the results. However, when the battalion reported to its armory on 27 September for induction it had a strength of 36 officers, 7 warrants, and 423 enlisted. This was 102\% of its officer and 96\% of its enlisted National Guard reduced Table of

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Organization (T/O) authorization, and 97% of its officer and 68% of its enlisted full T/O authorization. About 25% of the enlisted strength were World War II veterans, but it is unlikely that many were veterans of the "colored" World War II field artillery battalions. However the 272d was in good shape for a Guard battalion when it came to required equipment. It had 12 of 18 howitzers; 13 of 22 tractors; 11 of 26 ammunition trailers; 13 of 29 jeeps; 14 of 33 cargo trucks; 505 of 550 required carbines; 1 of 2 liaison airplanes; and 90% of radios.

Camp McCoy, 1950-1951

However, the 272d was not in good shape when it came to its training site. With few options and pressed for time in the autumn of 1950, Army Field Forces had to make do with what was available in the way of training sites for mobilized Guard and Reserve units. Yet, as several AFF inspections clearly pointed out, Camp McCoy was a very poor choice as the training site for mobilized field artillery units. McCoy is renowned for its bitter winters, which made the post "unfit" for the training of mobilized units, according to the AFF's Inspector of Artillery. Compounding this problem, sufficient cold weather clothing to outfit all
soldiers stationed there did not arrive before winter did, and the post lacked sufficient classrooms to conduct training indoors. McCoy's artillery ranges were small and encumbered with many restrictions. The post had little in the way of recreational equipment or furnishings for day rooms. The area surrounding McCoy had few accommodations for married soldiers' families.24

Despite these handicaps, Army Field Forces assigned an entire corps artillery of Guard and Reserve units to McCoy. Initially, IX Corps Artillery controlled the field artillery groups and battalions at McCoy. However, Fifth Army, upset that this headquarters could not handle the administrative workload, in November removed the units from IX Corps Artillery's control and placed them directly under the post commander, an infantryman with neither the time nor the knowledge to supervise their training. This left the groups and the battalions on their own in conducting the appropriate Army Training Program for their unit.25

The 272d at McCoy faced additional handicaps. In addition to making the transition from part-time to full-time soldiering, they had to make the transitions from living in an urban area to a very rural one and
from living in a city with a significant black population to an area with few black inhabitants. The assistant commander of IX Corps Artillery noted at the end of 1950 that "[T]hough there is little local hostility to them, they are not understood and there are no provisions for them. I sense a building up of pressure, and look for trouble eventually."\textsuperscript{26}

From its arrival at McCoy in September to the end of 1950, the 272d’s experiences were similar to other mobilized Guard units not selected in 1950 for deployment to Korea. The battalion settled into its new quarters, conducted precycle and cadre training until 28 October, and began sending personnel to Army schools. A total of 315 untrained enlisted fillers arrived between October and December, but in an irregular stream instead of one shipment, forcing the battalion to form a separate basic training battery for those who arrived after the start of basic individual training. The quality of the fillers varied considerably. The initial shipments, drawn from urban black areas in the Midwest, were "desirable." In a later shipment of 195 fillers from Fort Jackson, South Carolina, 95\% of the men had less than a fourth grade education.\textsuperscript{27}

Because of the Army’s segregation policies and the
shortage of training facilities, the 272d received more enlisted fillers than it needed, ballooning to a high of 127% of authorized enlisted strength by 15 December; transfers dropped enlisted strength to 111% the following week. Despite this and other difficulties, by the end of 1950, the battalion had moved into the third week of advanced individual training under the ATP and the battalion commander described morale as "very high."28

This bright start to active duty would not be carried through during 1951. Indeed, 1951 would be a traumatic year for the battalion, as excess personnel swamped the battalion, it failed Army Training Tests, went through a dramatic change of command and leadership purge, became the focus of national press attention, and moved to Germany.

The tremendous enlisted over strength inflicted upon the 272d, a result of the Army's overstretched training base and racial policies, started the unraveling of the battalion. During early 1951, the battalion received an a stream of untrained fillers at irregular intervals. By May 1951, the battalion had 1,038 enlisted men assigned, 171% of its authorized strength, forcing the battalion to run a series of basic training detachments while trying to conduct unit
collective training according to the ATP. And when these men graduated from basic training, they then had to be integrated into unit training. Colonel Russell, with understatement, told an AFF inspector that the "excessive numbers of untrained fillers" was "hampering unit training." 29

With a number of officers and NCOs away at service schools during the same period, this tremendous overstrength placed a great strain on the battalion’s shallow pool of leadership and field artillery talent. The low educational level of many of the enlisted fillers assigned to the battalion only added to these difficulties. As measured by the Army General Classification Test, a field artillery battalion was supposed to have 33% of its enlisted from Category I, 34% from Category II, 33% from Category III, and 0% from Category IV. The 272d’s enlisted strength was 32% from Category I, 14% from Category II, 17% from Category III, and 37% from Category IV. (The average for all black field artillery battalions in the ZI was 20% from Category I, 18% from Category II, 25% from Category III, and 37% from Category IV.) 30

Carrying this heavy burden never anticipated by prewar planners, without guidance from an experienced field artillery higher headquarters, and still short
30% of its prime movers and vehicles, the 272d attempted to follow ATP 6-300 and create a combat ready battalion. They failed. Completing the ATP in April, the battalion in May took its graduation exam, the Army Training Tests (ATT), administered by the 130th Field Artillery Group. Between 4 and 10 May, two of three firing batteries failed ATT 6-1; on 16 May, the battalion took ATT 6-2-1 and scored zero points.  

Five days later, Colonel Russell left for Fort Sill to attend the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course. The battalion operations officer, Major George Bingham (a 1948 graduate of Sill's Associate Officer Basic Course) took temporary command of the 272d. The battalion began a program of remedial training, which worked to some degree at the battery level. Retested by the 130th FA Group on 12 June, the two batteries that failed ATT 6-1 in May now just passed it with scores of 71.0% and 71.6%. However, the 272d still could not function effectively as a battalion. A retest on 9 June of ATT 6-2-1 given by the 130th FA Group resulted in a score of 29%. The same headquarters gave the 272d ATT 6-5 on 11 June; the battalion scored 59%. In addition to its weaknesses in tactical skills, the 272d's maintenance and administration were in poor shape.  

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During the remainder of June and through July, Fifth Army and Army Field Forces considered what to do about the 272d, scheduled for shipment to Germany in late August and now preparing for overseas service, packing and shipping equipment for the move and transferring excess personnel to other units. An AFF inspector visited the battalion and concluded that the 272d needed a minimum of four to six months training under a new commander before it "may conceivably pass the tests." Colonel Russell's failure to graduate from the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course reinforced this conclusion; he returned to McCoy and resumed command of the battalion on 2 August.\textsuperscript{33}

Fifth Army and Army Field Forces in late July came to two decisions concerning the 272d. First, the battalion's ship date would be pushed back thirty days to allow for further remedial training and retesting. Second, Colonel Russell and Major Bingham would be relieved, transferred out of the 272d, and replaced by two white officers. Russell's successor would be Lieutenant Colonel Cornelius Murphy, currently commanding the 97th Field Artillery Battalion at Camp Carson. Born in 1917 and a native of South Dakota, Murphy was a 1940 West Point graduate. During World War II, he had graduated from the Field Artillery
Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, served in 1944-1945 as operations officer of XIII Corps Artillery, and ended the war a lieutenant colonel. Murphy probably did not welcome the opportunity to give up command of the 97th in exchange for command of the 272d; he wrote that the "lack of discipline, the training ineptitude and the administrative derelictions of the 272nd FA Bn were notorious in the Fifth Army Area, being common knowledge at Camp Carson." Murphy and Major Nyenhuis, the new operations officer, arrived at Camp McCoy on 6 August; the next day Murphy took command of the 272d and Colonel Russell and Major Bingham left the battalion. The 272d began unpacking equipment and drawing from post stocks for those items which had already been shipped, a process completed on 11 August. Then from 13 to 29 August, Murphy put the battalion through what he described as "intensive" training under his "immediate and close supervision and planning." In addition to unit training, Murphy established twice weekly officer and NCO schools conducted after duty hours. The training was not designed to make the 272d a combat ready unit; its purpose was to enable the battalion to pass the ATTs, thus certifying it as ready for overseas service, so that the battalion could meet its new port call date
of 15 September. Between 24 and 28 August, the 272d took the three ATTs required of field artillery battalions, scoring 75.25%, 75.2%, and 63.4%. Army Field Forces then released the battalion for overseas service.36

From September to the end of November, the 272d repacked its equipment, moved to Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, and sailed to Germany, where it joined the 35th Field Artillery Group, part of VII Corps Artillery. During this period, the battalion became embroiled in the racial politics of 1951 America, the result of Colonel Murphy’s attempts to fix what he saw as the root cause of the 272d’s problems: "unqualified officers and non-commissioned officers."37

Examining his new battalion, Murphy concluded that for the 272d to become combat ready, he would have to remove a number of officers who were "mediocre" or "patently unsuitable." Unable to arrange their transfers out of the unit, Murphy initiated board of inquiry proceedings to determine the competency of five captains and six lieutenants in the battalion. At the same time, Murphy submitted a requisition for replacement officers; the Department of the Army ordered four captains and six lieutenants, all white, to join the battalion at its port of embarkation.38
For the most part, the officers referred to boards of inquiry were men with strong ties to the 372d Infantry, the 272d, and Colonel Russell. Two of the officers had been officers in the 372d Infantry in 1941 and four had been enlisted men in that regiment. Seven had served as officers during World War II, six in the infantry and one in the Army Air Forces. Six had been commissioned into the Guard, and the 272d, in 1947; another had enlisted in 1947 and been commissioned in July 1950. Three had been commissioned in 1949; the eleventh had enlisted in 1949 and been commissioned after the 272d was alerted in August 1950. One had graduated from the Artillery School before mobilization in 1950.  

Two officers, both second lieutenants, requested relief from active duty in lieu of facing a board of inquiry. The other nine officers went before boards of inquiry, composed of officers stationed at McCoy. The boards recommended that the commissions of two captains and one first lieutenant be terminated; that one first lieutenant and one second lieutenant be released from active duty; and that three captains and one second lieutenant be retained on active duty, but transferred out of the 272d. The post commanding general endorsed the boards' recommendations and the Department of the
Army transferred all but one second lieutenant out of the battalion. Murphy had a twelfth officer, Lieutenant William Bingham (brother of the sacked operations officer), tried by Special Court Martial for "conduct detrimental to the battalion during ATT 6-5" and speeding and uniform violations. While the court found Bingham guilty only on the uniform charge, the post commanding general transferred him without a board of inquiry to another unit at McCoy "because of his apparent dislike of the new battalion commander and a belief that he was agitating or would agitate against the new order."  

These actions quickly came to the attention of Collins George, the Pittsburgh Courier military affairs correspondent. The Courier, the nation's leading African-American newspaper, saw the Korean War, as it had World War II, as a way to advance the cause of civil rights in America. Since the start of the Korean War, George and the Courier had argued that it was long past time to fully implement President Truman's 1948 executive order calling for racial integration of the military. George had already toured a number of military installations in the ZI earlier in 1951, checking on the treatment of black servicemen and the status of racial integration in all the services.
Visiting McCoy in May, he reported that "there is the most wanton, flagrant and shocking disregard of the President's executive order calling for full integration. Bald, open, old-fashioned racial segregation is the rule at McCoy." George held the post commander, Colonel Peter C. Bullard, responsible as the major reason for this situation. (However, Bullard had given up command of McCoy by the time Murphy took over the 272d, and Brigadier General Frederick Brown had approved the results of the boards of inquiry.)

In a 6 October page one story, George described Murphy's actions and the boards of inquiry recommendations as "one of the most vicious bits of racial maneuvering this correspondent has ever seen." The article portrayed Murphy as a racist out to purge qualified, proven, dedicated black officers from the 272d and replace them with white officers of unknown quality. George quoted Murphy as saying his only objective was to build an excellent battalion, that he had not specifically requested white officer replacements, and that he would have been glad to have "'competent colored artillery officers'" as replacements. However, George reported, it "would be difficult to find any of the men or officers in the
outfit who believe his denial of racial bias."

The Courier sent a telegram to Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, demanding "full and immediate inquiry by an impartial and interracial board into the conditions surrounding the removal of colored officers of the 272nd Field Artillery Battalion." The Courier recommended that, in the absence of racial integration, that a full set of qualified black field artillery officers, including a battalion commander, be assigned to the 272d and that the battalion be reassigned to another post.

The publicity generated by this story brought the 272d to the attention of Governor Dever and Representative John F. Kennedy; both called for a delay in shipping the battalion and an investigation of the officer transfers. Instead, the Secretary of the Army ordered Fifth Army to review the McCoy boards' findings; Fifth Army reversed them in the cases of three captains and one second lieutenant, ordering them to rejoin the 272d at the port of embarkation. Collins George was not satisfied, charging "Army Whitewashes Brass Charges At Camp McCoy." George wrote that Fifth Army had not investigated the "'racial maneuvering'" behind the boards, nor had it looked at the case of the Bingham brothers. Colonel Murphy, according to George,
had staged a racist purge designed to recreate "the old world war type of outfit in which the enlisted men and junior officers are Negro, but the top command consists of whites using the outfit as a stepping stone to further their military careers."45

Nor was Murphy satisfied with the results of Fifth Army's review. Having been "vilified by the negro press with no opportunity to defend himself," he charged that George was getting "information, much of it false or half-truths" from officers sent before the boards. Murphy argued that he had "acted on the assumption that units and individuals, not professionally qualified, should either be removed from the services or retained in the US until qualified" and that the removal of the boarded officers and the arrival of the ten white officers, who were "far superior to their predecessors," had done much to improve efficiency and morale in the 272d. Finally Murphy claimed that "the enlisted men as well as the non-affected officers of the battalion, were well aware of the previous officers inadequacies and welcomed the action taken."46
Collapse and Rebirth

Believing that the "return of officers to my unit despite my efforts to remove them from the service places me in a tenuous command position," Murphy and the 272d sailed to Germany in late October. Stationed with another black field artillery battalion at a kaserne that was too small and lacked recreational facilities, the 272d unpacked and then moved to the Grafenwohr training area for three weeks of training focused on the battery level. The training was "invaluable," but the battalion's very poor maintenance discipline meant that "[N]ew vehicles were becoming junk rapidly. Reconditioned howitzers and prime movers were becoming unfit for service." 47

The 272d did not impress its new higher headquarters, the 35th Field Artillery Group. The group commander evaluated the battalion in late 1951 as "[T]his unit is unsatisfactory tactically and technically. With few exceptions, the officers and enlisted men lack initiative and a willingness to learn" and his prediction was that "[T]his battalion is not now or will be satisfactory within foreseeable future." The group in its annual command report noted that in the 272d "loyalty to the commander is lacking, esprit de corps is non existent, and field activity and

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firing have shown them to be disorganized, lacking an understanding of tactically sound procedures, and erratic in firing their primary weapon."48

Under these unpromising conditions, in January 1952 the 272d began its final months as a Guard battalion in Federal service. The battalion did begin a "program of basic education" for its large number of poorly educated enlisted men and 35th FA Group administered proficiency tests to all officers in the battalion. Probably on the basis of the test results, Murphy again attempted to remove from the service officers he considered unfit, but these efforts failed. However, he did get the battalion's original black Guard executive officer replaced in early January by a white Reservist, and a number of other black officers requested and received transfers to other units in Germany. The battalion in January returned to Grafenwohr for two weeks of training and the firing batteries again took ATT 6-1. Two barely passed with scores of 70.0% and 70.25%; the third failed, but passed its retest with a 73.9% score.49

Discipline and morale in the battalion by January 1952 had collapsed, in part because of "the lack of adequate supervision and competent leadership on the part of both officers and noncommissioned officers" and
"the examples set by some of the officers." Among the serious incidents during this period were refusal to obey orders, loss of classified signal material, allegations of rape by a German woman, and allegations of homosexual activity. Compounding these incidents was the fact that "[S]ome officers in the battalion could not be trusted to conduct an investigation." Twenty-eight summary courts martial, eleven special courts-martial, and six general courts martial were held prior to racial integration of the battalion in April.50

By early 1952, with the successful example of Far East Command, European Command moved to racially integrate its units. Murphy would not be present to see the 272d integrated; on 6 March he left the battalion for duty with the 36th Field Artillery Group. Collins George, in Europe checking on the status of European Command's racial integration program, wrote that the officer "who endangered the careers of a dozen or more Negro officers" had himself been relieved of command "after scarcely six months with the unit."

Murphy's replacement was Lieutenant Colonel John Blocker from the 18th Field Artillery Group. Blocker, born in Alabama in 1913, had been commissioned a Reserve field artillery officer in 1936. During World
War II, he rose to colonel; after the war he integrated into the Regular Army as a lieutenant colonel. The 272d stood down from training in early April to prepare for racial integration, which actually began on 27 March when a group of white officers transferred into the battalion from three divisions in Germany. Then between 15 and 18 April, four groups of black enlisted men, totaling 262 men, were transferred to four different field artillery battalions. Another 215 black enlisted men left the 272d on 19 April, all of them Guardsmen heading back to the ZI for release from Federal service. Finally, between 23 and 26 April, six groups of white enlisted men, totaling 410 men, transferred into the 272d from six different field artillery battalions, ending the racial integration process and the 272d's Guard character.

The battalion's performance after racial integration and the Guard phase-out demonstrated that this was indeed a new 272d Field Artillery Battalion. After two weeks of reorganizing batteries and doing "much needed maintenance of vehicles and other material," the battalion on 12 May began a special training program. Because most of the new soldiers were already trained in their individual skills, the program focused on refreshing those skills and building
teamwork. In July, the firing batteries took ATT 6-1. Two passed with scores of 91.7% and 89.7%; the third failed, but when retested, scored 81.1%. In August, the battalion took ATT 6-2 and scored 87.85%, the highest score during 1952 of any towed 155mm howitzer battalion in Europe. The 272d’s 1952 command report noted that this turn around was the result of the integration program, "which allowed us to remove many of the undesirable persons from our unit and sent us new personnel in their places. With these new replacements and the best of our old personnel which we held over, we were able to build a new combat effective battalion." But the "new combat effective" 272d was not the Guard 272d.

The 272d Field Artillery Battalion in Federal service failed to become combat ready while it remained a black and mostly black Guard unit. There were many factors involved in that failure: poor Guard officer and NCO leadership, the poorly managed transition from infantry to field artillery, the decision to station the 272d at McCoy, the quality and quantity of enlisted fillers sent to the battalion, racism within the Army, the manner of Colonel Russell’s and Major Bingham’s reliefs, Colonel Murphy’s command methods, the power of the press, state politicians’ interest in their
mobilized Guard constituents, and the poor conditions of its kaserne in Germany.

Whatever problems created by a white West Pointer taking command of a troubled black Guard battalion, it is clear that Colonel Murphy's assumption of command did not trigger the 272d's slide into combat ineffectiveness. Without a doubt, the battalion was broken by the summer of 1951 and some changes had to be made in order to salvage its second year of Federal service. While it is counterfactual to suppose that Colonel Blocker could have done better than Colonel Murphy from August 1951 to March 1952, it does appear that Murphy's motivation to command the 272d was low, as he gave up a good battalion for command of what he considered a disaster area. In addition, Murphy's approach to the 272d's problems appears to have lacked any sensitivity for the battalion's entwined heritage as a black Guard unit.⁵⁴

In the end, the story of the 272d Field Artillery Battalion's Federal service during the Korean War demonstrates above all an eternal military truth: good units are based on good troops, good training, and good leadership.
28th Infantry Division

Pennsylvania’s 28th Infantry Division, while it did not exert a hold on its state to the same extent that the 45th did on Oklahoma, was the gem of the Pennsylvania National Guard. The 28th also saw some of the hardest service of any Guard division during the two world wars. During the Great War, the 28th earned the nickname "Iron Division," spending 102 days on the line at a cost of 2,874 dead and 11,265 wounded. In the postwar Guard, Pennsylvania kept the Iron Division to itself.

Mobilized in early 1941, the 28th suffered a number of growing pains in its second war; the Guard division commander, Major General Edward Martin, left Federal service in early 1942 to make a successful run for the governor’s office in Pennsylvania. His Regular Army replacement was fired and replaced by Omar Bradley, who like Colonel Murphy of the 272d Field Artillery, had to give up command of a successful unit to fix a broken one. Bradley did so and was rewarded with promotion after eight months in command. Bradley fired his Regular Army replacement as division commander during the Normandy campaign, the division’s first combat operation; the division’s new commander was killed in action the same day he took command. The
28th’s next commander, Major General Norman D. Cota, would last for the rest of the war, but he would command during the division’s two great disasters of World War II. In November 1944, the division’s infantry was devastated in the "dark and bloody ground" of the Hurtgen Forest. In December, as it tried to rebuild from that ordeal, the 28th found itself struck by the full force of the German counter-offensive in the Ardennes, and after fighting a hard and extremely confused delaying action against a full German panzer corps, the division was rendered combat ineffective in a week. After reconstituting itself, the 28th went back into the line for the final push into Germany; casualties for its nine months of combat were 2,483 dead and 9,609 wounded. After the division returned to state control, Governor Martin gave the job of rebuilding the 28th to Major General Edward Stackpole, a long-time Pennsylvania Guardsman. Martin selected Brigadier General Daniel B. Strickler to be Stackpole’s assistant.  

In June 1947, Stackpole retired. Strickler, promoted to major general, took command of the 28th and would command it until 1952. Born in Pennsylvania in 1897, Strickler knew well the bloody business of combat and had a long association with the Bloody Bucket. He
enlisted in the local Guard company in 1916, served on the Mexican border, and in April 1917 was elected a second lieutenant by the enlisted of his company. In France, he was with the 28th throughout all its battles, commanded a machine gun company, and was wounded. Between the wars, he became a lawyer and was actively involved in state Republican Party activities. However, he did not return to the 28th; instead, he joined the Reserves and by 1935 was a colonel.

In 1941, convinced that the Regular Army would not allow senior Reserve officers to serve with troops, Strickler visited his fellow Pennsylvanian Republican, Major General Edward Martin, and convinced Martin to take him on as a lieutenant colonel and infantry battalion commander in the 28th. After arranging for his reduction in rank at the War Department, Strickler rejoined the 28th. He commanded a battalion of the 109th Infantry in combat from July to September 1944, then briefly commanded the 109th Infantry when General Cota fired its commander, until displaced by a Regular officer. Sent to the 110th Infantry as executive officer, he took charge of the regiment in the Bulge when its commander became a prisoner of war, rallying the fragmented regiment to fight a tough delaying action against the Germans. For his outstanding
performance in the Bulge, Strickler received a Silver Star, a Legion of Merit, permanent command of the 110th Infantry, and his colonel's eagles in late December. He commanded the regiment until the end of the war. With his impressive war record and long involvement in state politics, it was unsurprising that in 1946 he would both be appointed the 28th's Assistant Division Commander and that he would run for and be elected Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania.  

Strickler's assistant division commander in 1950 was Brigadier General T.L. Hoban, a state judge. Born in Pennsylvania in 1893, Hoban was commissioned a National Army infantry lieutenant in 1917. After the war, he became a Guard infantry lieutenant in 1921. By 1939, he was executive officer of the 109th Infantry and a lieutenant colonel, the rank he held throughout World War II. Returning to Pennsylvania, Hoban was promoted to colonel and given the task of organizing the 109th Infantry. When Strickler moved up to division commander, Hoban replaced him. The acting Division Artillery Commander at mobilization was Colonel W.W. Gilmore. Born in Pennsylvania in 1905, Gilmore was commissioned a Guard field artillery lieutenant in 1931. At mobilization in 1941, Gilmore was a captain in the 108th Field Artillery; he ended
the war a lieutenant colonel. Returning to the 28th in 1947, Gilmore was promoted to colonel and became Division Artillery executive officer.\textsuperscript{57}

The Division Chief of Staff was Colonel J.G Mackey. Born in Pennsylvania in 1899, he was commissioned a Guard infantry lieutenant in 1930 after a year in the ranks. A captain at mobilization in 1940, he ended the war a lieutenant colonel. Mackey returned to 28th in 1947 as an adjutant general lieutenant colonel; the next year he moved back to infantry and then was promoted to colonel and made chief of staff. His four assistant chiefs of staff, with an average age of 38, were all native Pennsylvanians. Three had been Guard lieutenants at mobilization in 1941 and ended the war lieutenant colonels; the fourth had been a Reserve lieutenant and ended the war a captain. Two of the Guardsmen rejoined the 28th in 1947, the third in May 1950; the Reservist joined the Guard in February 1950.\textsuperscript{58}

The division's three regimental commanders, with an average age of 46, were Colonel F.R. Evans (109th Infantry); Colonel H.K. Fluck (110th Infantry); and Lieutenant Colonel A.J. Dreibelbies (112th Infantry). The first two had been born in Pennsylvania, the third in Ohio. All three had served as both enlisted men and
officers in their regiments before mobilization in 1941. Evans ended the war as a major, helped organize the postwar 109th as a lieutenant colonel, and succeeded Hoban as regimental commander. Dreibelbies ended the war a lieutenant colonel and remained on extended active duty as a Reserve officer until May 1950; returning to the state, in early June 1950 he received a commission as a Guard lieutenant colonel and command of the 112th Infantry. Fluck, transferred out of the 28th, ended the war a lieutenant colonel and infantry battalion commander in another division; returning to the 110th Infantry in 1946, he helped organize it as executive officer and took command of the regiment in 1948.59

The nine infantry battalion commanders, with an average age of 39, reflected the typical backgrounds at this level: four had been officers in the 28th in 1941; one had been an officer in the Connecticut Guard; one had been a Reserve officer; and three had been drafted and commissioned during the war. Five ended the war as captains; one each ended the war as a lieutenant, a major, a lieutenant colonel, and a colonel. Three joined the 28th in 1946; two each in 1947, 1948, and 1949.

Of the four field artillery battalion commanders,
with an average age of 35, two had been Guard officers in 1941, one a Reserve officer, and one was commissioned during the war as a Marine officer. Two ended the war as majors and two as captains. One joined the 28th in 1946; the other three in 1947. None of the four separate battalion commanders, with an average age of 40, had been Guardsmen in 1941; three had been Reserve officers and one was commissioned during the war. The three Reserve officers ended the war lieutenant colonels; the other ended the war a major. Two joined the 28th in 1947, the other two in 1949.  

The 28th spent the years 1946-1950 as most Guard divisions did, trying to recruit up to its National Guard reduced T/O strength authorization, cope with armory problems, and train as best it could given the constraints of time, personnel and equipment. The National Guard Bureau selected the 28th, like the 45th in Oklahoma, as one of the priority Guard divisions of the mobile strike force; like the Thunderbirds, the Keystone division thought highly of itself, as did its state. And also like the 45th, the 28th made General Clark's July 1950 short list of divisions most ready for mobilization.  

When the Army released the alert for mobilization
in August 1950, the 28th had just begun its summer training. Summer training was cut short by a week to allow the division the full thirty days for induction; after the traditional Governor’s Day division review on 6 August, the 28th’s units broke camp and headed back to their home stations.62

Camp Atterbury, 1950

The division’s experiences between alert and departure for its training site, Camp Atterbury, Indiana, were similar to those of the 45th Infantry Division. On 5 September, the 28th Infantry Division entered Federal service for its third war with a strength of 726 officers, 134 warrant officers, and 8,856 enlisted men. Overall, this was 52% of its full-strength T/O; the 28th had 78% of its officer strength, but only 50% of its enlisted strength. While most of the 28th’s experiences during August and September resembled those of the other three mobilized divisions, the 28th suffered one incident unique among mobilized Guard units. On 11 September, a troop train carrying Guardsmen from northeastern Pennsylvania stopped near Coshocton, Ohio to check on a broken air hose. Around dawn, a passenger train crashed into the rear of the troop train, killing thirty-three soldiers from the
109th Field Artillery Battalion. The dead were returned to Wilkes-Barre for funerals with full military honors and the division held a memorial service at Atterbury on 16 September. Strickler wrote that the shock of this "very distressing affair" took weeks to pass from the division.63

With the division assembled at Atterbury and their dead buried, the 28th, like the 45th at Camp Polk, began preparing for the same AFF Master Training Program. Also like the 45th at Polk, the 28th found that Camp Atterbury badly in need of rehabilitation, forcing many of the junior enlisted men to spend much of the first few weeks on post fixing up facilities. Units held classes on training methods for officers and NCOs, and ten Regular Army instructor teams arrived for temporary duty during the pre-cycle phase. Guardsmen also began leaving to attend Army service schools; in September, 399 left, followed by 816 in October.64

On 3 October, 550 untrained soldiers arrived at Atterbury, the first of nearly 9,000 fillers the 28th would receive to bring the division up to its full T/O strength. By 6 November, enough fillers had arrived to begin the 28 week MTP, although not every unit had reached its full T/O strength. The division's training proceeded for the rest of 1950 with the usual training
distractions facing mobilized Guard units in 1950: lack of equipment and supplies, absence at service schools of many Guard officers and NCOs, and the continued arrival of fillers at Atterbury after the start of the MTP. The 28th also faced two additional problems. The winter of 1950-1951 in central Indiana became one of the coldest and wettest in recent years, beginning with a Thanksgiving Day snow storm. Then in early December, the 28th received a levy for 193 enlisted men qualified in engineer, field artillery, survey, and general duty Military Occupational Skills (MOSs). Because the levy required qualified personnel for units deploying to Korea, it had to be filled with Guardsmen.65

By the end of December, the 28th had nearly finished the basic individual training phase of the MTP. While the Department of the Army ordered the 28th, like the 45th, to train through the Christmas and New Year’s holidays, General Strickler authorized the Keystoners to take five day leaves, half of the division during each holiday, instead of the three day passes issued to Thunderbirds. The end of 1950 saw Strickler and the 28th optimistic about their prospects during 1951. Fillers had been integrated into the division, the MTP was successfully underway, and the coming year would see the division beginning to reap
the benefits of personnel sent to service schools.

Army Field Forces' inspectors also were optimistic about 28th's prospects. Major General John O'Daniel commented on the fillers sent to the division: "I have never seen a better appearing group of recruits." He added that the quality of the fillers, the Guard cadres, and the division's training methods "should make this Division an efficient combat outfit." The only major handicap the AFF team found was a significant shortage of major pieces of equipment, and that what items the 28th did have were so worn that their use in combat was "questionable." This problem would dog the 28th throughout the coming year, as it did other units in the ZI, because of the Army's decision in late 1950 to limit these units to just 50% of their authorized equipment levels.\textsuperscript{66}

\textbf{Indiana to Germany, 1951}

The optimism of the holiday season would not last for long in 1951. The 28th would encounter numerous obstacles in its efforts to follow the MTP, which while not on the same scale as those faced by the 45th Infantry Division, did result in the 28th not reaching combat readiness status as scheduled by AFF in 1950.

The weather remained miserable during the first
three months of the year, with temperatures so low at times that the tracks on the 628th Tank Battalion's M4 Shermans would freeze to the ground in the battalion's dirt motorpool. A shortage of classroom space forced units to conduct much training outdoors, where a lack of adequate cold weather clothing left troops, in the words of the 628th Tank's commander, "too concerned with keeping warm to concentrate on the instruction." A thaw in February, coupled with heavy rain, made many of the dirt roads in training areas impassable to wheeled vehicles, until freezing weather returned in March.  

Camp Atterbury's size made it too small for the task of training an entire infantry division. Limitations on firing hampered field artillery training. The 628th Tank Battalion and the infantry regiments' tank companies had to travel to the Armor School at Fort Knox, Kentucky to fire on tank ranges unavailable at Atterbury. The 112th Infantry complained that Atterbury lacked "adequate training areas of sufficient size to conduct battalion problems properly."  

During January 1951, the 28th finished the basic individual training phase of the MTP, administered proficiency tests, and then completed the advanced
individual training phase. Fillers continued to arrive, bringing all the division's units to full T/O strength, most notably in the 109th Infantry, which received 1,085 during the month. The division opened a set of ranges to run Battle Indoctrination Courses, designed to help prepare soldiers physically and mentally for combat conditions: Close Combat, Combat in Cities, Infiltration, and Overhead Artillery Fire. Also opening in January at Atterbury was VI Corps headquarters, activated to take control of the 28th and all non-divisional units stationed at the post. The corps commander from activation to May was Major General Withers Burress, with whom Strickler established a close and effective relationship.\textsuperscript{69}

Heavy casualties in Korea threatened the 28th's ability to follow the MTP effectively. Army planners turned to the 28th, as they did to the 45th and other mobilized Guard units. In early February, Fifth Army ordered the 28th to provide 3,000 enlisted, from among the fillers it had received, for duty in Far East Command. The division in turn levied its subordinate units, though not on an equal basis. Instead, those units which had first reached full strength lost more fillers, since they would have more fillers who had completed the minimum 14 weeks of training now
mandatory for overseas service. For example, the 112th Infantry, the first regiment to reach full strength, lost 1,649 enlisted; the 109th Infantry, which only reached full strength the previous month, lost just 120 enlisted. The 109th Field Artillery lost 32 enlisted while the 229th Field Artillery lost 92 enlisted. Strickler disapproved of this action, writing that it "was a sad day to see the draftees leave us for the Korean War, only after inadequate fourteen weeks of military training with us."

To replace those lost to levies, the Department of the Army during February shipped 3,000 untrained fillers fresh from reception centers to the 28th. Depending on the number of fillers received, units established provisional training battalions or companies and batteries. Then in March, the Army again tapped the 28th for 3,000 individual replacements, since the Keystoners were not protected from a second levy as were the Thunderbirds by orders for overseas movement. A third group of fillers arrived piecemeal during March and April to make up the strength lost to this second major levy in two months.

The disruptive effects of these levies and backfilling rippled throughout the rest of the MTP. Before leaving Atterbury, levied soldiers required
administrative outprocessing and had to complete various training events mandated by Army regulations for overseas service. Incoming fillers needed provisional training units to give them basic training; then they had to be integrated into their companies and batteries, which were still moving along through the unit training phase of the MTP. By April, infantry regiments operated several provisional training battalions at different stages of progress, Division Artillery had two provisional training battalions, and the tank, medical, and engineer battalions each had one provisional training unit. The 28th received no additional support to staff these provisional units; division units supplied the cadres. With many officers and NCOs at service schools, this extra requirement left some companies with few qualified officers and NCOs to conduct collective training.\textsuperscript{72}

The effects of all this personnel turbulence, and the absence of many officers and enlisted men at service schools, appeared most noticeably when units began higher echelon collective training. Without a solid foundation of individual and small unit training, and without many key personnel, higher echelon training and performance suffered in a number of units during the spring of 1951. In both the 109th Field Artillery

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and the 229th Field Artillery Battalions, one firing battery failed the Army Training Test conducted during March, and in the other batteries, the test revealed many deficiencies. When the four field artillery battalions took ATT 6-2 in April, two battalions failed and one just barely passed. The 103d Medical Battalion failed its ATT in early June. Most infantry battalions passed their ATTs in late spring and early summer, but only with "satisfactory" ratings, probably in part because the division skipped the company level ATTs in an effort to keep to the timetable for completing the MTP.73

Visits by Army Field Forces' inspectors also revealed the problems created by personnel turbulence and the absence of officers and NCOs away at schools. Watching an infantry battalion ATT in late June, the AAF inspector saw many tactical and staff errors, complained of a lack of aggressive spirit in the troops, and noted that the unit had trained at the battalion level for only two weeks before taking the ATT. Watching infantry units during field training in early July, another AFF inspector remarked upon the "poor" discipline of soldiers, the low morale of infantrymen, and the lack of realism in the training conducted. The inspector found major fault with most
of the NCOs he encountered, calling them "timid and lacking in initiative." 74

As a result of these and other observations from AFF and VI Corps inspectors, a number of commanders and staff officers in the 28th were relieved during the summer. The most noticeable casualty was Colonel Evans, the 109th Infantry's commander and the oldest of the three Guard regimental commanders. He was replaced on 6 August by Colonel H.D. McHugh, a Regular who had commanded two infantry regiments in Europe during World War II. Strickler found relieving officers a painful, but necessary duty: "[T]his we had to do, and we dropped a number in spite of our friendship because we knew we had have top notch officers in every instance."

Also lost was Brigadier General Hoban. Sent on temporary duty status to sit on a promotion board in Washington, the Department of the Army transferred him permanently to staff duties in Washington. His replacement arrived in August: Brigadier General J.G. Van Houten. a Regular who had commanded the Ranger Training Center at Fort Benning. Strickler recalled that, while disappointed to lose Hoban, he and Van Houten "got along well together, for he was a fine soldier." 75

On 21 July, with the end of the division field
training exercise, the 28th completed the MTP, approximately one month behind schedule because of the disruptions created by levies. The same month, the 28th received word that it, along with the 43d Infantry Division, had been selected for deployment to Germany as part of the NATO military buildup. But before leaving for Germany, the two Guard infantry divisions would participate in post-graduate training at Exercise Southern Pine, a two-week maneuver held in North Carolina during August. While officially Southern Pine’s purpose was to provide training for the two divisions, numerous non-divisional units, and elements of the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command, the exercise was also an excellent opportunity to examine the ability of the 28th and 43d to function as divisions for an extended period under simulated combat conditions. For that purpose, Army Field Forces deployed a set of observers to the exercise. 76

The 28th came out of Exercise Southern Pine with mixed reviews. The 110th Infantry’s operations officer thought the exercise "rigorous and very useful." Strickler believed that Southern Pine "proved to be very valuable to us and gave me personally a grand opportunity to operate and observe the units of my organization in the field." Colonel H.D McHugh, who
took command of the 109th Infantry just before Southern Pine, wrote that the exercise had "brought to light many minor, but few major deficiencies in training and procedure" and that "much progress" was made over the course of the two weeks in correcting these problems. The 112th Infantry thought the exercise provided much "valuable experience" and disclosed that the regiment's "most glaring need was for more small unit training."

Army Field Forces' staff officers watching the 28th at Southern Pine agreed that the division's greatest deficiency was at the battalion level and lower. While individual soldiers were generally proficient at their skills, units had difficulty in small unit tactics, in coordinating infantry and artillery, and demonstrated a "general lack of emphasis on security measures." On the positive side, the 28th had "an excellent level of discipline and showed good control during the exercise." The 28th also demonstrated that it could learn quickly: "Command and staff functioning improved as the maneuver progressed. Aggressiveness increased and most of the major units were well handled during the latter phases." AFF believed that many of the problems revealed by the maneuver were the result of the levies imposed on the
Also observing operations was Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, commander of Third Army and Southern Pine's director. He reported that the 28th soldiers "proved to be better than they looked on initial contact." The division "learned a lot from the maneuver." Hodge evaluated Strickler as "an intent, sincere commander," but "[I]f anything, he may over-command in the sense that he does quite a lot himself." Like the AFF observers, Hodge also believed that the 28th's major problem was the need for more training at the small unit level; he added that junior officers and NCOs needed "more training in leadership." Overall, Hodge believed that the 28th and the 43d were "basically in far better shape than were the divisions I saw in any of the 1941 maneuvers, either National Guard or Regular" and that both divisions were "reasonably ready to go to Europe."\

General Clark urged Fifth Army's commander to make "every effort to further improve the combat effectiveness of the 28th Division in the short time remaining" before it sailed for Germany, with an emphasis on small unit training from battalion downward. Strickler in early September wrote Fifth Army's commander that "refresher work and training is
being instituted to correct deficiencies." This is what the 28th did for the first two weeks of September, building on the progress made during Southern Pine. The 103d Medical Battalion passed its ATT retest on 20 September and two days later its new Regular Army commander replaced most of his staff officers and company commanders and first sergeants. Army Field Forces' final inspection in mid-September found morale in the division "good" and rated the 28th's operational readiness at 75%; AFF estimated that the division needed eight more weeks of unit tactical training.⁸⁰

For most of the 28th's units, all but the most perfunctory training ceased after the second week of September as the division began preparations for movement to Germany. Every Keystoner received two weeks preembarkation leave. The many administrative requirements for POM taxed unit personnel sections, while other soldiers prepared vehicles and equipment for shipment. On 26 October, the 28th staged its final review at Camp Atterbury, with Governor John S. Fine travelling from Pennsylvania to take the salute. In early November, the 28th took trains to east coast ports. Most of the division left the ZI via the Hampton Roads, Virginia Port of Embarkation, but about 3,000 Keystoners paraded through Philadelphia on 12
November before a "silent and solemn throng" estimated at 200,000, then boarded their troop transport at the Navy Yard.\textsuperscript{81}

The division's subordinate units arrived in Germany during late November and early December; the 28th's headquarters opened in Goeppingen on 26 November. Once again under General Burress, who now commanded VII Corps, the division spent the rest of the year settling into its new quarters, mainly renovated German kasernes, spread out in six groupings in the Stuttgart area.\textsuperscript{82}

The Pennsylvania 28th in Germany, January-July 1952

Making up equipment shortages, running a modified form of the MTP, and personnel turbulence arising from the phase-out of Guardsmen dominated the first seven months of 1952 for the division. The 28th, like the 45th and other mobilized Guard divisions, had its colors retained in Federal service after its Guardsmen completed their active duty, though the 28th retained its Guard character for slightly longer than the 45th.

The Keystoners arrived in Germany still feeling the effects of the reduced equipment authorizations placed on units in the ZI in late 1950; this was "a major obstacle" to combat readiness during the first
half of 1952. In January, for example, a shortage of mounts and telescopes left none of the 155mm howitzers and only 61% of the 105mm howitzers operational in 28th Division Artillery. The division had none of its tanks and only 70% of its engineer equipment. European Command planned for the 28th to make up these shortfalls from stocks held in theater. The division’s inventory improved each month, but it only after the Guard phase-out were most shortages filled in full.\textsuperscript{83}

In order to address the problems revealed during Southern Pine, the 28th ran a modified version of the MTP from January to October 1952 which involved extensive time spent in field training. The program began with advanced individual and squad training, moved in March to the platoon and company level, then in May to the battalion and regiment level, and culminated with regimental combat team and division level training from July to October. Interspersed within this cycle were command post exercises, NCO leadership schools, a division field training exercise in March, Army Training Tests, numerous inspections from VII Corps, and monthly practice alerts designed to prepare the division to move from garrison to tactical field positions in case of suprise Soviet attack on NATO.\textsuperscript{84}
This training plan faced a number of obstacles in its execution. One was the shortage of equipment and spare parts. Another for regimental and Division Artillery headquarters was the "heavy drain" on their time and personnel created by the administrative and housekeeping requirements created by running six separate garrison groupings.\(^5\)

A third obstacle was the growth of garrison and short-timer's attitudes within the division. For example, many soldiers "came to expect three-day passes regularly regardless of merit and morale, as a result, suffered during field problems when no passes were given." Venereal disease rates increased to five times the division's rate while at Atterbury. The 229th Field Artillery noted an "attitude of indifference" among Guardsmen during the early months of the year.\(^6\)

These attitudes came to a head during the 28th's Exercise Keystone, a five day maneuver in March that pitted the bulk of the division against the 109th Regimental Combat Team acting as an aggressor force. This was the first time the entire division had taken the field since Southern Pine, "and results indicated that the interval had been too great to maintain efficiency in the field." At a special meeting halfway through the exercise, General Strickler told the 28th's
senior leaders that the exercise "has thus far been deplorable and shockingly unsatisfactory from the conduct and performance of the troops and their leaders." Strickler was particularly upset given that most of the 28th’s personnel had performed well during Southern Pine. Now "[G]enerally, men displayed sloppiness, lack of interest, little enthusiasm, no realism, and discipline is far below normal." The fault, according to the division commander, was poor leadership. "Squad and platoon leadership had been the worst I have ever seen" and higher echelon commanders "seemed to be CP bound. All commanders must get out in the field." 87

One answer to this problem was the opening of NCO academies in March, with one each in the division artillery, the infantry regiments, and the separate battalions. Company and battery commanders selected which soldiers would attend the academy, which were originally four, then six weeks long. The syllabus was focused on key general NCO skills: leadership, map reading, squad and platoon tactics, weapons, and drill and ceremony. The schools received extensive publicity within the division and a general officer always attended graduation ceremonies. The division’s 1952 command report noted that the "success of the schools
was evident in the continual improvement of the units in field operations."\(^{88}\)

The NCO academies were also valuable in dealing with the 28th's greatest personnel problem of 1952: the phase-out of Guardsmen and 1950 draftees. Planning began in February and the phase-out began in April with 1,188 enlisted men leaving for the ZI. In May, 103 officers, 15 warrant officers, and 1,148 enlisted men left, followed in June by 112 officers, 37 warrant officers, and 1,351 enlisted men. The last large group of Guardsmen left in July: 59 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 1,066 enlisted men. These losses represented 27% of authorized enlisted and 29% of authorized officer strength. The Guardsmen's departure had effects out of proportion to their numbers, for most of them, especially the enlisted men, held "specialist MOS's or positions requiring leadership abilities." (The phase-out of 1950 draftees beginning in September only aggravated this problem, for among them were many "who had accompanied the Division overseas and who were familiar with its problems."\(^{89}\)

Replacements for these losses came from three sources. The first was very short term: in order to cushion the loss of Guardsmen in the spring and summer, Seventh Army during February and March transferred into
the 28th from other divisions about 1,500 enlisted men who had autumn 1952 discharge dates. The division easily integrated these already trained and experienced men.90

Also integrated into the 28th were African-Americans, as part of EUCOM’s racial integration program. Integration began in March, when a battalion’s worth of black infantrymen arrived from Seventh Army’s all-black infantry battalions. The division distributed them across the three infantry regiments so that no company contained more than 10% black enlisted men, the limit established by EUCOM. Further shipments arrived to integrate other units of the division, followed during the rest of the year by blacks arriving in the replacements from the ZI. To balance these arrivals, units of the 28th made up shipments of white enlisted men with the same distribution of MOSs and rank that they had received and sent them to all-black units in Seventh Army. The division’s 1952 command report stated that racial integration within its units was "highly successful."91

Command reports from subordinate units within the 28th vary in their evaluation racial integration’s effects. The division artillery commented that
"[S]mall isolated incidents did occur immediately after the integration, but generally the program was successful and caused the minimum amount of friction."

The 899th AAA Battalion found its black soldiers very valuable as the Guard phase-out accelerated, for many of the new Keystoners were trained, qualified personnel. However, the battalion also believed that integration was partly responsible for a rise in misconduct after June, with the "graver incidents" committed by blacks. The 229th Field Artillery reported "only minor problems," but noted that because many black enlisted men had not attained a fifth grade education level before entering the service, they were often at "basic education" classes and thus unavailable for duty.92

The 628th Tank Battalion and the 109th Infantry reported the greatest problems with integration. The 628th lost "too many" good white NCOs transferred to integrate all-black units; the black NCOs it received in return "were not the answer." The battalion also complained that there were few serious disciplinary incidents before integration, but afterwards it experienced an increase, particularly in incidents involving knives. The 109th Infantry found "little evidence of interracial problems within the Regiment."
Its difficulty with integration was that higher headquarters selected which white enlisted men to transfer out of the 109th, and took good soldiers, but that all-black units were allowed to select which soldiers to transfer out, and sent the 109th many soldiers whose disciplinary records "indicated that they should long since have been kicked out."93

However, the 28th's greatest problem with manpower quality was the replacements received from the ZI. These soldiers began to arrive in April and most did not impress the Keystoners. Most of the enlisted replacements sent to the 109th Infantry had received only basic training in the ZI; many were of a lower caliber than the troops who accompanied the regiment to Germany. The division artillery reported that "practically all" its enlisted replacements had not attended advanced individual training in field artillery MOSs; about 25% of its officer replacements were AAA officers who had no field artillery experience or training. This situation forced units to conduct training on field artillery skills while in the field doing collective training or even taking ATTs. Ninety percent of the enlisted replacements sent to the 103d Engineer Battalion had not attended advanced individual training; some officer replacements also
lacked training in engineer skills.

The 899th AAA Battalion found many of its replacements had records showing them as qualified but that the soldiers actually knew nothing about that MOS; their former unit in the ZI had awarded the MOS just before shipping them to Europe in order that the unit could meet its levy quotas. In addition, some replacements arrived at the 899th AAA with six months or less remaining on their active duty service.

A partial exception to these trends was the 628th Tank Battalion, which reported that until November its enlisted replacements generally had training in armor MOSs. However, after November, its replacement stream was like those of other division units.94

Unlike the 45th in Korea, the 28th in Germany did not establish a division level school to train replacements from the ZI in the skills they lacked. Instead, the 28th used on-the-job training for officers and enlisted men assigned to positions for which they had neither training nor experience. Seventh Army and European Command did have a network of schools for technical specialities such as ordnance and signal, but these schools were not as useful as they could have been. On 12 January, EUCOM changed its school policy; effective immediately, "quotas for schools would be
assigned on a mandatory basis even though spaces for a particular school had not been requested by a unit."
These quotas "became increasingly hard to fill" as more and more men in the division fell below the minimum requirement of six months remaining in EUCOM after graduation and many of the replacements fell below the minimum AGCT scores required to attend the schools. 95

With all this personnel turbulence, the "required state of combat readiness was maintained, but only with great difficulty" according to the division artillery.
In early 1953, Colonel McHugh wrote that if his 109th Infantry should "be tried by combat, it would be found ready." The 112th Infantry's commander rated his regiment's operational readiness as "good." The results of battalion ATTs appeared to support these comments. All nine infantry battalions passed their ATTs, administered by VII Corps between July and September. Field artillery battalions passed their ATTs in the early autumn, as did the four separate battalions.

However, these ATTs did not always accurately reflect trends within the division. Most units took their ATTs just before or as 1950 draftees, and the enlisted men transferred into the 28th from other Seventh Army units in early 1952, began to return to
the ZI. When these men departed, to be followed shortly thereafter by the enlisted who joined the 28th at Atterbury in early 1951, units would once again have to rebuild teamwork and unit cohesion, and would face an increasing erosion of individual skill levels as their officers and enlisted men consisted more and more of replacements from the ZI often ill-suited for the positions they took in the units.

While battalions passed the ATTs, most did not achieve the very high scores one would expect of units standing guard on the frontier of what some historians argue was the Army's highest strategic priority of this period, the defense of western Europe. Five of the nine infantry battalions and the 899th AAA Battalion only scored "Satisfactory," while the 628th Tank and 103d Engineers earned ratings of "Very Satisfactory." The 899th AAA's commander wrote that while "this score may be considered low, it was gratifying to pass the test considering the tremendous personnel turnover experienced the previous five months." The 229th Field Artillery Battalion clearly displayed the effects of this personnel turbulence. It earned an "Excellent" on the first part of its ATT in September, but this score depended on the "relatively few well trained" personnel in the battalion. Their departure showed in the second
part of the ATT held the next month, when the battalion scored only "Satisfactory." 96

Back home, the Pennsylvania National Guard organized a NGUS division in 1953 to form the cadre needed to rebuild the 28th once the Army returned its colors to the state. Governor Fine appointed as division commander Major General Charles Curtis, back in the state after his 51st AAA Brigade left Federal service in mid-1952. As Curtis was an AAA officer and 60 years old, Pennsylvania’s Adjutant General moved to get a younger infantry officer as Curtis’ assistant and most likely replacement. In October 1952, the Adjutant General offered the position to Colonel Fluck, who had gone on extended active duty so that he could remain in command of the 110th Infantry. Fluck wanted the position, but was concerned that the Army would not release him from extended active. The Adjutant General wrote Fluck not to worry: "I am having some influential friends check with the officials in the Pentagon, concerning your release and I have been informed there should be no trouble in securing it for you." 97

Colonel Fluck returned to Pennsylvania, was promoted to brigadier general, and soon succeeded
Curtis as division commander. On 22 August 1954, at the Governor's Day Review during the division's first postwar summer training, the Department of the Army returned the 28th's colors to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Major General Fluck accepted the colors from Governor Fine, officially ending the Keystone Division's Korean War service.

Conclusion

For the 28th Infantry Division, its third war was an unconsummated war; after training hard, the Keystoners found themselves back in Germany, where their greatest opponent turned out to be personnel turbulence generated by the Army's desperate manpower dilemmas. Other Guard units deployed to Germany faced the same problem, though for the 272d Field Artillery, personnel turnover was the means to finally becoming an operationally ready battalion.

Sent to Europe as part of the NATO military buildup for the "long pull" of the Cold War, Guard units performed their symbolic role well, representing America's commitment to the new alliance. However, while these units were much better prepared for combat than most Guard units in 1942 or Regular units in 1950, their combat effectiveness during 1952 and early 1953
remains questionable, given the equipment shortages, morale problems, and especially the waves of personnel turbulence that washed across these units.
NOTES


3. "Unit History, HQ & HQ DET 37TH Ordnance Bn," undated manuscript, copy in 37th Ordnance Battalion Historical Files, Box 13 (Ordnance), RG 338, NA; National Guard Register 1951.

4. Command Report, 1950, 37th Ordnance Battalion, Box 4725, RG 407, NA. The command report does not mention what happened to the five Guardsmen lost to the battalion. By the end of 1950, the battalion’s enlisted composition was: five Guardsmen; ten Reservists; ten draftees; and ten Regulars. Most of Ohio’s Guard ordnance troop list went into Federal service along with the 37th: the 50th Ordnance Group headquarters, the 38th Ordnance Battalion headquarters, and three of five maintenance companies. National Guard Bureau, "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units, 1950-1956," copy in U.S. Army Center of Military History.


6. Ibid. The 3d Armored Division was a training formation, not a tactical unit at this time. Three of the twelve qualified enlisted in the 568th were civilian employees of the Tennessee Guard, working in the state maintenance section. Colonel Maxa blamed the poor state of the Guard and Reserve units assigned to his battalion in large part on the units’ Regular Army instructors: "officers serving with the reserve units did not guide the unit officer properly."

7. Command Report, 1951, 37th Ordnance Battalion, Box 5328, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 37th Ordnance Battalion. The 568th, also on alert for Korea, did make it to the Land of the Morning Calm. William Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend: The Army
8. Command Report, 1951, 37th Ordnance Battalion. The companies assigned to the battalion were once again the 460th, 517th, and 881st from 1950; joining the battalion in 1951 was the 832d Ordnance Medium Automotive Maintenance Company.


11. The Munster depot had only twelve usable ammunition bunkers; the rest had been destroyed by the Germans in 1945, scattering so many rounds of ammunition in one area of the depot that it was still unsafe to use. The Americans had used the depot for ammunition storage from 1945 to 1949, after which the facility had been used for a time as a displaced persons camp and then a field problem site for Seventh Army. Command Report, 1951, 37th Ordnance Battalion.

12. Ibid. In the 443d, 193 of the enlisted were Inactive Reserve fillers and the 450th had 112; when these were released from active duty in late 1951, morale among the Reservists who had come on to active duty with companies plunged even further downward. A major problem for the 450th was that it remained at Ludwigsburg without a mission or adequate training facilities for several months.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid. The battalion developed a basic training refresher program for the replacements. The first commander of the 60th, who later moved up to battalion staff, developed a five week training program to qualify men as Ammunition Supply Specialists that the battalion adopted for all three companies. Because many replacements had such low AGCT scores, few could get into EUCOM Ordnance schools.

16. Command Report, 1952, 37th Ordnance Battalion, Box 6259, RG 407, NA. The Army would return the 37th’s colors to state control in December 1954. "Induction and Release." It could be argued that the 37th’s Federal service provided a better example of O’Toole’s Commentary on Murphy’s Law: "Murphy was an optimist."


19. Ohio, which before World War II had had the 372d’s Second Battalion and a part of regimental headquarters, obtained both the 372d designation and a separate all-black infantry battalion in the postwar troop list. Johnson, *African American Soldiers In The National Guard*, pp.169-170, 172-173.


21. This paragraph is based on *National Guard Register 1951*. These thirty-one officers received Guard commissions as follows: 14 in 1947; 3 in 1948; 8 in 1949; 1 in February 1950; 3 in July 1950; and 1 after the alert notice. One officer was commissioned as an infantry lieutenant in the Illinois Guard in 1947; in 1949, he was commissioned a field artillery second lieutenant in the 272d. The battalion’s dentist was a graduate of the Harvard Dental School. There were two sets of brothers among the battalion’s officers: Major George Bingham and Lieutenant William Bingham, and Captains Clevia and Lawrence Johnson. "Officers Railroaded: Army ‘Busts’ Top Negro Personnel On Nat’l Guard Unit From Boston," *Pittsburgh Courier*, October 6, 1951, p.1.

22. Command Report, 1950, 272d Field Artillery Battalion, Box 4681, RG 407, NA; Memorandum, 27 December 1950, Artillery Inspector, Army Field Forces to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Obstacles to Training, Camp McCoy, Wisconsin" Box 15 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; "National Guard Battalion Alerted For Duty."

23. Ibid.

24. Memorandum, 13 November 1950, Colonel Malin Craig, Jr. to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Report of Staff Visit to Artillery at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin" Box 15 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; "Obstacles to Training, Camp McCoy."

25. Ibid. Assigned to Camp McCoy were: IX Corps Artillery Headquarters (a Regular unit activated in August 1950 and filled to a great extent with Reservists); two National Guard Field Artillery Group Headquarters (Kansas’ 130th and New York’s 187th); two Guard Field Artillery Battalions (the 272d and Iowa’s
194th); one Guard Observation Battalion (Pennsylvania's 235th); and five Reserve Field Artillery Battalions (the 330th, 465th, 793d, 847th, and 887th).

26. Letter, 22 December 1950, Colonel George D. Crosby to Major General George D. Shea, enclosure to "Obstacles to Training, Camp McCoy." The commander of the all-black 171st Military Police Battalion, sent to McCoy from the District of Columbia, agreed with Colonel Crosby. See Memorandum, 5 April 1951, Provost Marshal Section, AFF for Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Report of Inspection of Military Police and Military Government Units and Staff Sections, Office of the Provost Marshal General; Fifth Army Area; and Second Army Area, 23 March-3 April 1951," Box 33 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

According to Collins George, a Pittsburgh Courier reporter, another problem for black units at McCoy was the racism of the post commander, Colonel Peter C. Bullard. See "Camp McCoy Race Policy Vilest in U.S.," Pittsburgh Courier, June 9, 1951, p.1. Bullard, born in Kansas in 1892, was a 1914 West Point graduate. Commissioned an engineer, he served in France in World War I. Between wars, he graduated from the Command and General Staff College, Army War College, and the Ecole Superieure de Guerre in France. Bullard transferred to the infantry in 1937 and was a colonel in 1941; however, he was out of the mainstream during World War II, never reaching flag rank; his most prominent assignment during the war was working in SHAEF's G1 section, 19441946. Register of Graduates of the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York: Association of Graduates United States Military Academy, 1974).

27. By mid-December, six officers had been sent to the Artillery Officer Basic Course at Ft. Sill and thirty enlisted were in various Army service schools. Memorandum, 21 December 1950, Commander, 272d Field Artillery Battalion, Subject: "Status of Training and Equipment," enclosure to "Obstacles to Training, Camp McCoy;" Command Report, 1950, 272d Field Artillery.

28. Ibid. The 272d was ahead of the other Guard howitzer battalion at McCoy, the 194th. Also a towed 155mm howitzer battalion, the 194th arrived at McCoy with only 47% of the enlisted strength required by the full T/0, 9 of 18 howitzers, and 9 of 22 prime movers. It did not receive any enlisted fillers until 1 December and did not start the basic individual training phase of the ATP until 15 December. However, the 194th did have five officers with World War II field artillery experience and another three with antiaircraft artillery experience. Command Report, 1950, 194th Field Artillery, Box 4681, RG 407, NA.
29. "Commander's Questionnaire," 12 May 1951, copy in 272d Field Artillery Historical Files, Box 305 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA; Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery, Box 5192, RG 407, NA.


31. The firing battery scores were: A-63.5%; B-47.8%; C-74.6%. The passing score for ATT 6-1 was 70%. Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion.

The 194th Field Artillery Battalion faced problems similar to those faced by the 272d, but not to the same extent as the 272d. It too received excess fillers, but its enlisted strength only rose to 125% of authorization. The 194th also suffered from the cold weather, from the loss to training of officers and NCOs sent to service schools, and from a shortage of vehicles. The 194th did pass its ATTs, though not spectacularly, with scores ranging from 75.9% to 80.8%; its greatest weakness was in massing the battalion's fires. Command Report, 1951, 194th Field Artillery Journal, Box 293 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA; Unit Journal, 1951, 194th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 293 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA.

32. Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion. When forced to swap prime movers with the 272d in August, the 194th FA complained that McCoy's maintenance facility "found it necessary to conduct major overhauls on tractors we receive." Unit Journal, 1951, 194th Field Artillery Battalion.

33. Colonel Malin Craig, Jr., "Report of Staff Visit to Units of the Fifth Army at: Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; Camp Ripley, Minnesota," 8 August 1951, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion. Two hundred seventy-five of the 272d's excess personnel were dumped on the 171st MP Battalion, itself preparing to move to Fort Custer, Michigan. Command Report, 1951, 171st MP Battalion, Box 5307, RG 407, NA.

34. The 97th Field Artillery Battalion also was a towed 155mm howitzer battalion. The new operations officer was Major E.J. Nyenhuis, a Reserve officer on active duty currently serving as an ORC instructor in Minnesota. Memorandum, 14 November 1951, Lieutenant Colonel C.A. Murphy to Seventh Army Artillery Officer, Subject: "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion," 272d Field Artillery Battalion Historical Files, Box 305 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA; Register of Graduates of the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York: Association of
Graduates United States Military Academy, 1974); Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery.

35. "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion."

36. The quotes are from "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion;" Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion. VI Corps Artillery administered the ATTs in August, which focused only on technical field artillery skills; VI Corps Artillery did not test the tactical portion of the ATTs.


38. The boards of inquiry were convened in accordance with Army Regulation 605-200. "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion;" Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion.


40. The quotes are from "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion." Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery Battalion. The boards of inquiry had pushed the battalion's port call back fifteen days; crowded conditions at the New York port of embarkation pushed it back a further fifteen days.

41. "Camp McCoy Race Policy Vilest in U.S."

42. "Officers Railroaded."

43. Ibid.

44. "Officer 'Purge' Probe Launched," Pittsburgh Courier, October 13, 1951, p.1. At this time, the Department of the Army had placed on hold racial integration in the ZI, waiting to see how the process worked first in overseas commands. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp.453-454.

45. All three captains had been infantry officers during World War II and had been commissioned into the 272d in 1947; two had been in the 372d Infantry when it mobilized in 1941. The lieutenant had been enlisted during the war, enlisted in the 272d in 1949 and been commissioned after the alert notice in August 1950. None had completed the Field Artillery Officer Basic Course before mobilization. "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion;" National Guard Register 1951. The former commander of the 372d Infantry and the 272d Field Artillery, Colonel Edward Gourdin, according to George, had brought some of the transferred officers to meet with Governor Dever. "Army Whitewashes Brass Charges At Camp McCoy," Pittsburgh Courier, October 27, 1951,
46. Murphy wrote that he had lodged a "vehement protest" with a Department of the Army staff officer over the return of the four transferred officers to the 272d, but had been told by that officer that this action had been directed by the Secretary of the Army. Murphy also wrote that he believed the only answer to preventing such controversies was the disbanding all-black units and racial integration of units. "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion."

47. The first quote is from "Chronology of 272nd Field Artillery Battalion;" the latter quotes are from Command Report, 1951, 272d Field Artillery.

48. Colonel W.A. Enemark, 35th Field Artillery Group, "Combat Effectiveness Report for Assigned Forces," 25 December 1951, Historical Files, 272d Field Artillery, Box 305 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA; Command Report, 1951, 35th Field Artillery Group, Historical Files, 35th Field Artillery Group, Box 9 (Field Artillery), RG 338, NA. Colonel Enemark's indorsement to Murphy's "Chronology" noted that the "retention within a unit of officers against whom Board of Inquiry action has been taken is extremely undesirable. Normally the individuals are dissatisfied with and resentful of the commander who initiated the action. Through their disaffection they tend to poison the minds of their contemporaries and their subordinates. In addition, the confidence of their subordinates in them is destroyed as a result of the inquiry and they can seldom, if ever, regain their stature in the unit."


50. Ibid. The German woman could not identify her attacker among the soldiers of the 272d or the 599th Field Artillery Battalions at the kaserne. Intense criticism of the Army over the incident by the German press subsided after the 35th FA Group commander convinced reporters that the guilty soldiers had come from another kaserne. The homosexual activity investigation concluded with "the discharge or release of eighteen men as undesirable and unfit to be in the service." The battalion's problems came to the attention of the VII Corps commander, who instructed the VII Corps Artillery commander to keep an eye on this battalion. Memorandum, 18 January 1952, Major General
European Command had begun small scale integration of its units in 1951 due to the large numbers of black soldiers it had received who were surplus to the needs of its all black units. Many senior officers in Europe were against integration, but not the commander of Seventh Army, who undoubtedly had units like the 272d in mind when he noted that, as most of his black units were unsatisfactory, integration was vital to improving Seventh Army's combat effectiveness. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, pp.450-453.


53. Ibid.

The 194th FA arrived in Germany in early September 1951, but its equipment did not catch up with the battalion until mid-December, a gap the 1951 command report noted could not be "utilized with any great degree of efficiency in training as a field artillery battalion." In January 1952, the 194th moved to Grafenwohr for field training and to practice ATT 6-1; in early April, the firing batteries took ATT 6-1, scoring 93.5%, 87%, and 86.26%. Also in April, Guardsmen began to return to the ZI under the phase-out program and the 194th transferred 69 enlisted to the 272d under the racial integration program. The black enlisted transferred into the battalion, including 62 from the 272d, did not impress the 194th; obviously some of the 272d's "undesirable persons" were unloaded on other units. The 194th noted: "[T]he first effects of the racial integration program were felt as our court martial rate started to increase." By the end of June, the 194th's Guard commander and most of his fellow Iowa Guardsmen had returned to the ZI. This was about 35% of the 194th's January 1952 strength, which was not completely replaced until the end of August. Despite this personnel turbulence, the 194th took its battalion ATT at the end of June, scoring 74.6%. However, in late 1952, the 194th lost the 1950 draftees who had joined the battalion at McCoy as their term of service expired; by the end of the year the battalion had suffered a 90% personnel turnover. This forced the 194th to begin a modified version of the ATP in October, designed to rebuild the battalion's collective skill level. Command Report, 1951, 194th Field
Artillery Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 194th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 6083, RG 407, NA.

54. What few comments by Murphy that are available cannot answer the question of what were his opinions about African-Americans. There are hints in the two main documents written by Murphy, especially the battalion's 1951 command report, that he subscribed to the belief of many white officers that blacks could make good enlisted soldiers only if they were assigned to the less-complex MOSs and that black officers could not command and staff at the battalion level. For example: "The military command of negroes by negroes has failed in this battalion. Integration is recommended." "As was the case during World War II, the bulk of the technical work in negro battalions must be accomplished by commissioned personnel. They must be superior officers in order that the unit may be satisfactory." It is unknown whether Murphy, while assigned to XIII Corps Artillery operations section in the European Theater of Operations during 1944-1945, observed or heard about the nine black non-divisional field artillery battalions that saw service during the campaigns in Europe. It is also not known if Murphy had read War Department Pamphlet 20-6, "Command of Negro Troops," published in February 1944.

55. As a unit from the "Keystone State," the 28th wore a red keystone symbol as its division patch; after the Hurtgen and Bulge battles, the division had a new nickname: the "Bloody Bucket."


After giving up command of the 28th in 1942, Edward Martin remained keenly interested in Guard matters and in the 28th. He kept up a regular correspondence with key Guard leaders, like Ellard Walsh and Milton Reckord of the National Guard Association. Martin and Strickler also corresponded regularly.
during this period; in a 9 February 1945 letter to Martin, Strickler wrote that "[I]t has been a long time since I came into the Division through your efforts. You always said someday I would get a regiment. So I did but by the hard way." See Boxes 29, 33, 37, and 39, Official Papers, General Correspondence 1943-1946, Edward Martin Papers, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The correspondence between Strickler and Martin is in Box 37. In the 1946 election, Martin won a seat in the United States Senate; the new governor and Strickler's running mate was James Duff.


58. Strickler, op. cit.; National Guard Register 1951.


60. Of the infantry battalion commanders, three had attended the officer basic course during the war; one, the battalion commander course during the war; and two, the associate officer advance course in 1948. Of the field artillery battalion commanders, the three Army veterans had attended officer basic courses during the war. None of the separate battalion commanders had attended a service school in their branch. Indeed, the commander of the 899th AAA Battalion had begun the war a quartermaster officer, ended it an ordnance officer, and only became a coast artillery officer in 1947 when he joined the Guard. National Guard Register 1951.


65. Like the 45th, the 28th activated its replacement company to process the flood of fillers arriving at the Camp Atterbury railhead. Also like the 45th, the 28th received a new general officer, in the case of the Keystoneers, a new Division Artillery Commander. Brigadier General G.O. Kurtz, born in 1894, enlisted in the Regular Army in 1915. Commissioned in 1917 in the cavalry, in 1920 he transferred into the field artillery. A colonel by 1947, Kurtz spent 1948-1950 as a staff officer working on a multi-national committee in Canada. He was promoted to brigadier general in October 1950 a month before he reported to the 28th. Army Register 1951; Roll On 28th: Twenty-Eighth Infantry Division, United States Army, Camp Atterbury, Indiana, 1950-1951 (Atlanta: Albert Love, 1951), n.p.; Command Report, 1950, 28th Infantry Division; Strickler, Memoirs, pp.163-165; Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI; 28th Infantry Division, Training Memorandum #9, 14 October 1950, copy in Strickler Papers, USAMHI. The 28th filled only 144 of the 193 enlisted required by the levy placed on it in early December. All the enlisted levied were sent to units at Camp Carson, including the Guard 196th Field Artillery Battalion, and 176th and 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalions, all preparing for deployment to Korea. G1, 28th Infantry Division, "Levy and Fulfillment," 7 December 1950, copy in Strickler Papers, USAMHI.
66. For the evaluations by AFF inspectors, see the collection of staff reports from Major General John O'Daniel's visit of 25-26 October 1950, Box 1 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

Strickler and his staff did not get along well with Fifth Army headquarters, which supervised the 28th at Atterbury during 1950. Strickler recalled that they "were a tough crowd of officers at Fifth Army, and their top commanders were not any too friendly to the National Guard." Strickler, Memoirs, pp.163-164. On holiday leaves, see "Half 28th Division Starts Yuletide Dash Home Today," Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, December 22, 1950, p.1.

67. On the effects of the winter weather on training, see:
Command Report, 1951, 628th Tank Battalion, Box 3995, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 103d Engineer Battalion, Box 3995, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 103d Medical Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 109th Infantry, Box 3994, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 112th Infantry, Box 3995, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 28th Division Artillery, Box 3994, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 109th Field Artillery, Box 3994, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1951, 229th Field Artillery, Box 3994, RG 407, NA. AFF's Major General G.D. Shea, visiting the 28th in mid-January, commended the division for its performance under such harsh conditions. "Report of Training Inspection," 2 February 1951, Box 42 (Inspections), RG 337, NA. The division G3 section, thinking of "reports of the setbacks in Korea during weather worse than that in Indiana" saw the weather "as an advantage, for they knew that the harder the conditions in training, the better the men would be able to stand up under combat conditions." Roll On 28th. Having trained at Atterbury and served in Korea in wintertime, I doubt many of the Keystoners shared their G3 section's evaluation.

68. Command Reports, 1951, 28th Division Artillery, 628th Tank Battalion, and 112th Infantry. Camp Atterbury, like Camp Polk, could not accommodate an automatic weapons AAA battalion. Therefore, the 899th AAA Battalion left Atterbury on 30 January for eight weeks training at the AAA School at Fort Bliss, Texas. However, Bliss was too crowded to accept the 899th; instead, the battalion was sent to Bliss' Oro Grande AAA Range in New Mexico. While in New Mexico, the 899th was protected from the levies tearing apart other units in the 28th back at Atterbury. Also during this time, the battalion commander and the operations officer, both of whom had no experience or training in AAA, were absent for training at the AAA School. Under the temporary command of the battalion executive officer (who also had no training or experience in AAA) the battalion went through its Army Training Program. The 899th had none of the M19 self-propelled twin 40mm guns and few of the M16 self-propelled quad-50 caliber machine guns required by its T/O. The AAA School
issued the battalion a number of M16s and M15s (a self-propelled system with one 37mm gun and two 50 calibre machine guns) to use in training. After completing its ATT, the 899th returned to Atterbury in early April to participate in regimental combat team training. Command Report, 1951, 899th AAA Battalion, Box 3994, RG 407, NA.

69. Ibid. The 109th Infantry organized provisional recruit training companies of 200 fillers each to give the new enlisted basic training. Division Artillery rotated the duty of firing missions on the Overhead Artillery range among the direct support battalions on two week cycles. On Burress, see Strickler, Memoirs, pp.165-166; on the end of Strickler’s term as lieutenant governor of Pennsylvania, see p.165.


71. Ibid.

72. Command Reports, 1951, 28th Division Artillery, 109th Field Artillery, 229th Field Artillery, 112th Infantry, 109th Infantry, 103d Engineer Battalion, 103d Medical Battalion and 628th Tank Battalion; Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI; "Plan of Training for 28th Infantry Division, April-June 51," copy in Strickler Papers, USAMHI. Another distractor for the 28th occurred when Major General Burress left Atterbury to take command of VII Corps in Germany. His replacement, Major General Paul Kendall, according to Strickler, "was a tough, unreasonable commander, who did not like the Guard. He rode us hard and his demands were harsh. The result was that he got everyone mad at him and a spirit of we’ll show you, gripped the soldiers." Strickler, Memoirs, p.169.

73. Command Reports, 1951, 28th Division Artillery, 109th Field Artillery, 229th Field Artillery, 109th Infantry, 112th Infantry, 628th Tank Battalion, 103d Engineer Battalion, 103d Medical Battalion; Memorandum, 28 May 1951, Commanding General Fifth Army to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: Results of Army Field Forces Training Tests, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.
74. Memorandum, 5 July 1951, "Staff Visit to 28th Infantry Division, 24-29 June 1951," Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; Memorandum, Major P.O. Walker, "OCAFF Observer's Report of VI Corps Inspection of 28th Infantry Division, 1-6 July 1951," Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA. Major Walker did praise the 28th Reconnaissance Company, drawn from the elite of Philadelphia society, for its "superior" standard of discipline.

75. This and the preceding paragraph are based on: Command Report, 1951, 109th Infantry; Command Report, 1951, 103d Medical Battalion; Register of Graduates of the United States Military Academy (West Point, New York: Association of Graduates United States Military Academy, 1974); Army Register 1951; Strickler, Memoirs, p.168. McHugh, 49, graduated from West Point in 1924 and joined the 28th from Indiana University, where he had been the Professor of Military Science and Tactics. Another casualty was the commander of the 103d Medical Battalion, also relieved in August; his replacement was Lieutenant Colonel J.D. Goldstein, 43, who received a Reserve commission in 1934 and integrated into the Regular Army after World War II.

Van Houten, a 1926 graduate of the University of Georgia, obtained a Regular Army commission as an infantry lieutenant the same year, and was promoted to colonel in 1943. While not explicitly stated, the negative reports of observers may have led Department of the Army to keep Hoban in Washington. Van Houten was seven years younger than Hoban; during World War II, he commanded an infantry regiment, and served as chief of staff and assistant division commander of the 9th Infantry Division. His wartime duties and his experience running the Ranger Training Center may have been thought the background needed to get the Keystone infantry in shape. Army Register 1951; David R. Gray, "Black and Gold Warriors: U.S. Army Rangers During the Korean War (Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1992), pp.54-55.

76. Another major objective of the exercise was to test the newly formed VII Corps staff, also slated for deployment to Germany, and its commander, Major General Withers Burress. Southern Pine's scenario began with the 82d Airborne conducting a delaying action, followed by an attack by the 28th and 43d, then a defense by the corps, and concluded with the 28th and 43d resuming the attack to link up with the 82d, which had been dropped behind "Aggressor" lines. See Maneuver Director's Report, Exercise Southern Pine, copy in Box 3990, RG 407, NA.

77. Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI; Letter, 4 September 1951, Strickler to Lieutenant General Stephen Chamberlain (Commanding General, Fifth Army), Strickler Papers, USAMHI; Command Report, 1951, 109th Infantry. A Pittsburgh Post-Gazette reporter joined the division for Southern Pine, filing stories much like a war

78. Letters, 23 August 1951 and 5 September 1951, General Mark W. Clark to Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlain, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA. The quotes are from the 5 September letter.

79. Letter, 27 August 1951, Lieutenant General John R. Hodge to General Mark W. Clark, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA. Hodge also believed that "[M]any of the minor deficiencies exhibited will be corrected after their first contact in battle and I know of no way of correcting these faults without battle experience." During World War II, Hodge had served in combat as an assistant division commander, division commander, and corps commander. On the 1941 maneuvers, see Christopher R. Gabel, The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941 (Washington: Center of Military History, 1991).

Hanson W. Baldwin, New York Times military affairs correspondent, also was an observer at Southern Pine. His comments on the 28th and the 43d echoed those of Hodge and the AFF observers. See "110,000 U.S. Troops 'War' In Sand Hills," August 22, 1951, p.3, and "Army Games Show Many Deficiencies," August 29, 1951, p.12.

80. Also taking and passing an ATT retest after Southern Pine was the 112th Infantry's Third Battalion. The 628th Tank Battalion, with the infantry regiment tank companies attached, spent October in the desert at Camp Irwin, California, where the post's unrestricted opportunities for armor offered Keystone tankers their "best training" since mobilization. Command Reports, 1951, 109th Infantry, 112th Infantry, 109th Field Artillery, 229th Field Artillery, 899th AAA Battalion, 103d Medical Battalion, 103d Engineer Battalion; Letter, 5 September 1951, Clark to Chamberlain; Letter, 4 September 1951, Major General Daniel Strickler to Lieutenant General Stephen Chamberlain, Strickler Papers, USAMHI; Colonel W.F. Rehm, "Report of Final Inspection of 28th Infantry Division," 20 September 1951, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.


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82. Command Reports, 1951, 109th Infantry, 112th Infantry, 109th Field Artillery, 229th Field Artillery, 628th Tank Battalion, 103d Engineer Battalion, 103d Medical Battalion; Strickler, Memoirs, pp.170-172.

83. Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division, Box 3996, RG 407, NA. As a result of these problems with equipment, the 28th instituted a program of special inspections of units' maintenance efforts. The program worked well, except that members of the 28th's inspection teams often disagreed with the conclusions of teams from VII Corps working in a similar program. "This, of course, made it extremely difficult for the lower units to know exactly what sort of action to take in regard to the inspected equipment." Like the 45th's tankers, the 628th Tank Battalion had to wait the longest for its key piece of equipment. Only in April did the battalion reach full strength in tanks. However, the M26s sent by EUCOM were old and in poor condition, creating a high deadline rate and requiring extensive maintenance handicapped by a shortage of parts. Only after the Guard phase-out did the 628th convert to the new M47 tank. Command Report, 1952, 628th Tank Battalion, Box 4022, RG 407, NA. The 899th AAA Battalion was not so lucky; it ended 1952 still armed with M15s in lieu of M19s. The battalion commander noted that the M15 "obsolete for several years, receives little confidence of the ones dependent upon its service." Command Report, 1952, 899th AAA Battalion, Box 4014, RG 407, NA.


86. Command Report, 1952, 229th Field Artillery, Box 4019, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division. Another source of poor morale was a virtual freeze on promotions for both officers and enlisted. For example, many Guard officers, who entered Federal service in a duty position calling for a rank higher than the one they held, were not promoted while in Federal service. This was a major reason why efforts to get Guard officers to sign up for extended active duty tours failed miserably in the 28th. This problem only became worse once the Guard phase-out began; by late summer, many NCO positions in the 109th Infantry were being held by privates first class. Command Report, 1952, 109th Infantry.
87. The first quote is from Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division; the others are from Commanders' Conference, 19 March 1952, 28th Infantry Division, Box 3996, RG 407, NA. One possible source of poor leadership at platoon level was a shortage of second lieutenants in the 28th at this time; the division had lost "quite a few" of them when it moved to Germany because these officers had not yet attended their branch officer basic course, a requirement for overseas service. Memorandum, 19 August 1952, G1 to Division Chief of Staff, Box 3997, RG 407, NA.

Also during March, the Division Artillery administered firing battery ATTs to the direct support battalions; two in the 109th Field Artillery and one in the 107th Field Artillery failed. The 229th Field Artillery's batteries passed their ATTs in January, but the battalion failed its ATT in March. Command Report, 1952, 109th Field Artillery, Box 4019, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1952, 229th Field Artillery; Command Report, 1952, 28th Division Artillery.


89. Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division. General Strickler decided to remain on extended active duty and commanded the 28th until November 1952, when he was transferred to head the military assistance group in Italy. Strickler would remain on active duty until September 1957, serving on the Army Review Board Council and as Far East Command's assistant chief of staff for civil and governmental affairs. In 1953 and 1957, a faction within the Pennsylvania Republican Party tried to make Strickler the party's candidate for governor, but both efforts failed because of bitter factionalism within the party. Strickler, Memoirs, pp.190-250.


91. Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division. One tool used to manage racial integration was a policy that "no Race 2 NCO could be reduced in grade for inefficiency for a period of six months" after joining the 28th. The command report noted that the greatest problem with racial integration was that "immoral relationships between soldiers and German women (many of whom accompanied transferees from Berlin, Manheim, and Nurnberg)
increased with the beginning of the program." Attempts to crack down on these relationships generated complaints of discrimination. Strickler did not address this subject in his memoirs. However, at a division commanders' conference on 2 May, Strickler told his senior subordinates to "[T]reat integrated personnel fairly and make on distinctions." Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division. Nicholas Kafkalas, commanding a battalion in the 110th Infantry by spring 1952, only said of integration that "[I]t worked out." Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI.

92. Command Reports, 1952, 28th Division Artillery, 899th AAA Battalion, 229th Field Artillery. The education standard in Seventh Army was the fifth grade level; it was mandatory that soldiers not at that level take classes during the duty day to reach it.


94. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Command Reports, 1952, 109th Infantry, 28th Division Artillery, 103d Engineer Battalion, and 899th AAA Battalion. The 229th Field Artillery in October received 183 replacements from the ZI without MOSs required by the battalion: 100 infantrymen, 60 cooks, and 23 fresh graduates of basic training. Command Report, 1952, 229th Field Artillery.

95. Command Report, 1952, 28th Infantry Division. The command report noted that unit commanders, "anxious to send the most qualified students to school, had to compromise in order to meet the operational demands placed on their unit by the training program." At the end of 1952, the 28th was attempting to implement a program aimed at shoring up critically short MOSs in the division: enlisted qualified in the MOS would teach their skills, using the resources of post education centers, but during off-duty hours.

96. Command Reports, 1952, 28th Infantry Division, 28th Division Artillery, 103d Engineer Battalion, 628th Tank Battalion, 899th AAA Battalion, 229th Field Artillery Battalion. Only the 103d Medical Battalion earned the highest rating of "Superior." Strickler was well aware of the problems facing his battalions. He wrote Colonel Fluck to congratulate him on all the 110th Infantry's battalions passing their ATTs: "I know the difficulties which have made it quite a job to get your battalions through but they have made the grade." Letter, 2 October 1952, General Strickler to Colonel Fluck, Fluck Papers, USAMHI. One of Fluck's battalion commanders, Nicholas Kafkalas,
recalled that the night before his battalion began its ATT, it received a "couple hundred replacements." His battalion earned a "Satisfactory" rating. Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI.

97. Seiverling, "Post World War II--Korean War;" Fluck Oral History, USAMHI; Letters, 24 October 1952 and 2 December 1952, Lieutenant General F.A. Weber to Colonel H.K. Fluck, Fluck Papers, USAMHI. A major selling point for Fluck was that the position was full-time; in 1953, Pennsylvania was one of the few states to do this. The commander of U.S. Army Europe wrote Weber in early 1953 about Fluck's release from active duty: "While I was reluctant to approve his request because he is such a good man, I felt that in the best interests of everyone concerned it was the thing to do. He was an outstanding commander while he had the 110th Infantry." Letter, 16 February 1953, Lieutenant General Manton Eddy to Lieutenant General Weber, copy in Fluck Papers, USAMHI.

98. Seiverling, "Post World War II--Korean War."
CHAPTER 6
LOST IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR

Most Army National Guard units mobilized during the Korean War did not deploy overseas. Instead, they remained in the Zone of the Interior. These units spent their Federal service in a limbo, as they lost their Guard character and most drifted without a realistic operational mission after completing their Army Training Program.¹

Units that remained in the ZI for two reasons. Many of these units were antiaircraft artillery (AAA) units, mobilized as part of the rush to create an effective air defense of the ZI. The North Korean attack on South Korea generated fears among Americans that the Soviets might use it as a prelude for attacks against the United States with nuclear armed bombers. Other units remained in the ZI as part of the Army’s efforts to rebuild its General Reserve, stripped during the summer of 1950 to reinforce Eighth Army, in case the communists challenged the United States elsewhere in the world.

However, both AAA units and units assigned to the
General Reserve fell victim to the Army's desperate need for expedient sources of trained manpower. Because of President Truman's decision to forego a total national mobilization for this war and the Army's inadequate training capacity in June 1950, the Army played catchup during the entire war as it tried to meet the needs of combat in Korea and NATO's military buildup. The need for manpower overseas led the Army first to strip most units in the ZI of trained officers and enlisted men, then use these units as supplements to the inadequate training facilities. With the introduction of rotation in Korea in 1951, these units also became holding areas for soldiers rotated back to the ZI who had a few months of active service remaining before discharge.

This process was especially painful for Guard units. Levies for overseas service mocked the Guard's "Go With Those You Know" slogan, stirred up the old Guard suspicions about the Regulars' attitude toward the Guard, and were the source of the greatest anger and bitterness among Guardsmen, their families, and Guard supporters during the Korean War.

Not surprisingly, the stripping of trained manpower destroyed unit combat readiness and the ensuing personnel turbulence created by using the units as adjuncts to the training system prevented the reestablishment of combat readiness in most units. The Army carried this policy to its extreme with the two Guard divisions mobilized during
1952: after they completed their MTP, these units were stripped of almost all of their trained manpower, refilled with an odd assortment of replacements to create a new cadre, placed on a reduced Table of Organization, and officially assigned training individual replacements as their primary mission.

**Policing the Zone of the Interior**

During 1950, the Army ordered the 163d, 168th and 171st Military Police Battalions (MPB) to active duty. Each was a different type of MP battalion: the 171st was designed for use in the Zone of the Interior, the 168th for use by a field army, and the 163d was a general purpose battalion. All three battalions remained in the Zone of the Interior until their return to state control; however, the Army through levies did give many of the Guardsmen in these battalions the opportunity to travel overseas before their active duty service ended.²

While none of these battalions had existed in the 1940 National Guard troop list, all had links to the 1940 Guard. The 163d MPB (District of Columbia) traced its roots to 121st Engineer Regiment, and the 168th MPB (Tennessee) traced its heritage to the 117th Infantry Regiment. The all-black 171st MPB (District of Columbia) included a number of former members of the African-American 372d Infantry
The 171st's commander, Lieutenant Colonel S.F. Blackwell, a forty-eight year old native of the District, was the longest serving Guardsmen of the three battalion commanders, commissioned in 1927 into the 372d Infantry after six years enlisted service in the Guard. The 163d's Lieutenant Colonel G.O. Weber, thirty-eight, served eleven years as an enlisted Guardsman and was commissioned an infantry first lieutenant upon mobilization in 1941. Both Weber and Blackwell ended the war as lieutenant colonels. The 168th's Lieutenant Colonel J.L. O'Connell, thirty-six, served less than a year as an enlisted Guardsman before mobilization in 1941; commissioned a military police second lieutenant in 1943, he ended the war a captain. Weber rejoined the Guard in 1946, the other two in 1947.

The officers Blackwell, Weber and O'Connell commanded reflected the typical profile of Guard units. Some officers, like their battalion commanders, had served in the Guard before World War II. The 168th and the 171st both had seven such officers, the 163d six. Most of these officers had served only a few years as enlisted men before the 1940-1941 mobilization; of these twenty, only six ended the war without a commission. (The 171st had one officer who had received a Reserve commission in 1940.) Also in each battalion were World War II officer veterans who had not
been prewar Guardsmen: ten in the 163d, six in the 168th and five in the 171st. Infantry was the most common wartime branch of these officers, eleven out of the twenty-one.

Each battalion had a number of World War II enlisted veterans who received postwar commissions in the Guard: six in the 163d, seven in the 168th and thirteen in the 171st. Only the 163d had an officer who was not a veteran of some type of military service during World War II. The 163d also had the most officers with the shortest experience in the postwar Guard: nine of its officers were commissioned in the D.C. Guard in 1950 and three more after receipt of the mobilization alert in August 1950. All three battalions had few officers in 1950 with service school training related to military police work. Three officers in the 171st and one in the 168th were graduates of the MP Associate Officer Basic Course; one each from the 163d and the 168th were graduates of the MP Officer Investigator Course.\(^5\)

The battalions' enlisted strength resembled the typical profile Guard units in 1950 in regards to age and experience. The three battalions, also like most Guard units, were significantly under their full Table of Organization (T/O) strength when they entered active duty in September 1950: the 163d was at 50%, the 168th was at 43%, and the 171st was at 41% of full strength.\(^6\)

Upon receiving the alert notification in August, the
three battalions began "the formidable amount of work," as
the 163d described it, of mobilization. The 171st faced two
additional burdens in mobilization. First, it had to
organize its Company D, which had not yet received Federal
recognition. Second, it had to finish the mobilization of
the 715th Transportation Company, a separate unit attached
to the battalion for administrative purposes, which had been
alerted in late July. Advance parties left for each
battalion's training site: the 163d, Fort Custer, Michigan;
the 168th, Fort Meade, Maryland; the 171st, Camp McCoy,
Wisconsin. On 3 September, the 163d and 168th entered
active duty, with the 171st following on 11 September. By
20 September, the three battalions were at their training
sites. 7

Once at their training sites, the battalions prepared
to receive and train the fillers required to bring them up
to full strength, followed by the collective training
necessary to make the battalions ready for combat.
Conditions at each training site varied. The 163d found
"excellent co-operation of all staff and installation
officers" at Custer. Upon arriving at Meade, the 168th
briefly found itself policing the post, as the Regular Army
MP unit assigned to Meade had just received orders to move
overseas. This distraction ended with the arrival at Meade
of a mobilized Reserve MP company. 8

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The 171st had the greatest challenge; at Camp McCoy it shared the same problems of duty there that the 272d Field Artillery Battalion faced. Like the 272d, the 171st MBP did not receive a warm welcome in the towns around the post; an Army Field Forces inspection team visiting McCoy in early 1951 noted that "inter-racial social contacts are not accepted by the indigenous population." In addition to this social chill, the 171st, like all other units sent to McCoy, was not prepared for a northern Wisconsin winter. 9

After settling into their new quarters, the battalions began preparing to receive hundreds of fillers. The first step was to make sure there were sufficient trained personnel to conduct the training required by ATP 19-300. Unlike infantry divisions, the MP battalions did not receive assistance from Regular Army training teams. But like the divisions, the battalions began using the Army school system soon after entering active duty. The 163d, from September to December, had approximately 10% of its enlisted men and 20% of its officer strength absent attending courses, mainly at the Provost Marshal General (PMG) School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The 168th, by the end of 1950, had sent 141 enlisted men, 2 warrant officers and 9 officers to courses at the PMG School. Colonel O'Connell believed that the courses "helped considerably in refreshing" the skills of the battalion's NCOs. The 171st sent 10 officers and 28
enlisted men to courses at the PMG School. In addition, all three battalions detailed soldiers to the Provost Marshal of their training site for on-the-job training in garrison MP tasks.\textsuperscript{10}  

The battalions conducted their own cadre training in preparation to receive their fillers. Because "many of the officers knew enlisted men under them too well as all were from the same locality, and in many instances were relatives," soon after the 168th arrived at Meade Colonel O'Connell reassigned all his platoon leaders to different companies within the battalion.\textsuperscript{11}  

Fillers arrived at each battalion at different times. The 168th was the first to receive fillers, in late September. On 8 October, the first group of 230 fillers arrived at the 163d, but the battalion complained these men "had not been carefully screened as concerns their qualification for performing military police duties." The 171st's first fillers also arrived in October, and the 171st also complained that not all these soldiers had the necessary AGCT scores, the "high sense of individual moral responsibility, and a desire to be a part of the Military Police Corps."  

The overtaxed Army training base's struggle to provide replacements for units in Korea soon affected the MP battalions. Fillers sent to these battalions came straight
from reception centers and required basic and advanced individual training before collective training could begin. Since in a racially segregated Army there were few units to which black enlistees and draftees could be sent for basic training, the 171st MPB, like the 272d Field Artillery Battalion, received more soldiers than it needed, placing additional burdens upon the unit. By January 1951, the battalion was at 116% of its authorized enlisted strength, but because of the small number of black officers in all components of the Army and the demands of combat in Korea, the 171st had only 76% of its authorized officer strength.¹²

Training during the remainder of 1950 proceeded under several handicaps. When winter arrived at McCoy, the 171st learned first-hand about the "non-suitability of this area for basic training." Guardsmen sent to schools, while an investment in future capability, reduced the number of personnel available to train the fillers. Shortages of organizational equipment, especially jeeps, interfered with following ATP 19-300, as did a shortage of necessary training aids and publications. All three battalions had to deal with the arrival of more fillers after starting ATP 19-300. To prevent disruption of the training program already established, each battalion set up separate recruit detachments to conduct basic training for the new fillers,
thinning out further their available resources.\textsuperscript{13}

By the end of January 1951, the 163d had finished seventeen of ATP 19-300's eighteen weeks of training, the 168th fifteen weeks, and the 171st ten weeks, though each had a recruit detachment finishing basic training. The battalions' operational readiness ratings, as determined by Army Field Forces, remained very low; 31\% for the 163d, 22\% for the 168th and 19\% for the 171st. (The 163d's rating included the proviso that its equipment status permitted employment "after minor corrective action." The 171st's equipment status did not "permit employment of unit without correction of major deficiencies.") The battalion commanders placed their units at significantly higher levels; Weber estimated 50\% for the 163d, O'Connell, 30\% for the 168th and Blackwell 40\% for the 171st.\textsuperscript{14}

While January's ratings were not very high, the month did promise a good year for the three battalions, with training well underway and units beginning to receive the benefits of personnel returning from service schools. However, 1951 would not fulfill its early promise.

The 171st MPB was the first to see the promise turn sour. The segregated Army, hard pressed to find facilities to train its large number of black draftees and enlistees, sent 151 of them to the 171st in February, forcing the battalion to start another recruit training cycle in
addition to its collective training under ATP 19-300. In March, all three battalions felt the effects of the casualties the Chinese had inflicted upon Eighth Army in Korea. Each battalion suffered a levy of its enlisted personnel: the 163d sent 167 men overseas, the 168th transferred 212 enlisted men to the 101st Airborne Division (at this time a training unit), and the 171st sent 100 men to Far East Command. In return, all three battalions in March received further shipments of untrained enlisted men, forcing them to start new recruit training detachments that drained away trained officers and NCOs from unit training. (By the end of March, the 171st had four provisional training companies in operation.) During March, troop trains from reception centers delivered 253 men to the 163d, 275 to the 168th and 121 to the 171st.\textsuperscript{15}

Pressured by the demands of combat in Korea and the NATO military buildup during 1951, the Army found in these three MP battalions both a convenient source of trained replacements for overseas service and a place to give basic training to new soldiers. This pressure also began to erode, to different degrees, the Guard identity of each battalion. Levies took Guardsmen away from those they knew and sent them overseas as individual replacements. Other Guardsmen either received hardship discharges from active duty or went home when their enlistments expired. As 1951
neared its end, battalions began receiving more short timers, men rotated back to the ZI from Korea or Europe with only a few months left on their active duty service. With little to motivate them, these men usually contributed little to their new units before their discharge.  

During 1951, the 163d lost a total of 12 officers and 350 enlisted men to levies, including at least one Guardsmen later killed in action in Korea, and received 33 officer and 385 enlisted fillers. Among those the 168th lost to levies were the battalion commander and operations officer, and the battalion ran 875 enlisted through basic training during 1951. The 171st suffered the most under these conditions; 671 men joined the battalion, 300 were transferred out, and 76 Guardsmen and 31 Reservists whose enlistments had expired were discharged. Because the number of black draftees and enlistees exceeded the needs of black units in the ZI, the 171st found itself the recipient of far more soldiers than it needed. Its enlisted strength peaked in June at 174% (when the 272d Field Artillery, preparing to leave for Germany, dumped 275 excess enlisted men into the 171st) and ended the year at 159%. The battalion’s officer strength never kept pace, dipping as low as 53% available for duty in June, October and December. The 171st complained that many of these men, sent to it simply because it was the one of the few black units available to take them, were unfit for
the demands of military police work.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to personnel turbulence, there were other factors affecting the battalions' efforts to become combat ready. The 171st continued to struggle with winter weather at McCoy. The 163d and 171st continued to suffer from equipment shortages, especially vehicles. All three battalions temporarily lost the services of officers and enlisted sent to schools. Other officers and enlisted were lost to temporary military police duties such as prisoner escort, post police, stockade guards, courtesy patrols on trains, convoy escort, and industrial plant security. Beginning in April, the 168th provided a security detachment for the Hampton Roads, Virginia, Port of Embarkation. The battalions also devoted time to escorting visiting VIPs, activities in nearby communities such as parades, and providing honor guards for funerals of men killed in Korea.\textsuperscript{18}

Under these burdens, the battalions soldiered on in their training programs. The AFF inspection team that visited all three battalions in March found the training programs in the 168th and 171st to be satisfactory and outstanding in the 163d, with a readiness rating of 37\% for the 171st, 33\% for the 163d and 5\% for the 168th. Battalion commanders and the AFF inspectors agreed that the period needed to reach 100\% readiness for the 171st was three
months, four months for the 163d and five months for the 168th.19

The culmination of an ATP was the Army Training Test (ATT). The personnel turbulence and the need to first move fillers through basic training, then integrate them into collective training pushed back the date of the 163d’s ATT until 20-22 August. The battalion scored 84.4%, earning a rating of excellent. The 171st took its ATT on 7-8 June and failed, not a surprise given the problems the battalion encountered at McCoy. Later that month, in accordance with the AFF inspection team’s recommendation, the 171st moved from McCoy to Fort Custer. There it retook the test in August, earning a rating of satisfactory with a 77.7% score.20

The 168th did not take an ATT in 1951. Instead, its graduation exam came during Exercise Southern Pine, the multi-divisional maneuver held in North Carolina. The battalion spent June training for this exercise, then left Meade in early July, returning in early September. The exercise provided excellent training and gave morale in the battalion a big boost, as the troops had "a chance to practice some of the things they had learned in the classroom."21

With the end of ATP 19-300, the three battalions settled into the routine they would follow until their
return to state control in July 1952. The battalions would try to perform tactical training to maintain combat readiness while burdened with three significant training distractions. The first was that by early 1952 it became clear these battalions would not be deployed into harm’s way; this removed a major motivation to focus on combat readiness and encouraged the growth of a garrison mentality. A garrison mentality was further encouraged by taskings to provide administrative military police support in the Zone of the Interior. This included post policing, stockade guards, convoy escorts, courtesy patrols on trains, and providing security detachments.²²

The third distraction was the Army’s continuing use of these battalions to support operations in Korea and Europe. Levies for overseas service stripped trained officers and enlisted men, including Guardsmen, from units, tearing down the level of collective expertise and the Guard character of units. Fillers arrived to take the place of those levied, but they often were of little use in establishing and maintaining combat readiness. Many continued to be short timer rotates from Korea and Europe, dumped into the battalions to wait out the end of their active duty service; their motivation to take training seriously was usually slight. A significant percentage of short timers did not hold military police MOSs, further complicating training.
Other fillers were fresh graduates of basic training or newly commissioned officers, and often before they could be integrated into the unit, they were placed on orders for overseas service or sent to service schools and then sent overseas.

These distractions placed unrelenting pressure on the MP battalions. While preparing to participate in 1952's multi-divisional maneuver, Exercise Long Horn, the 163d was not allowed to postpone sending ten of its junior officers to the PMG School. While at Exercise Long Horn, overseas levies, discharges, and early release of Guardsmen took 7 officers and 105 enlisted from the battalion, which, the battalion remarked, "reflected in numbers approximately the same losses the organization might have suffered in combat without replacements."23

The battalions spent their last ten to eleven months on active duty trapped between these demands on their time and manpower. The Guard character of these units, especially the 163d MPB and 168th MPB, eroded to the point where they could not longer be considered Guard units. The 171st MPB maintained the greatest degree of Guard character before demobilization. Racial segregation policies limited the number of units to which its Guardsmen could be transferred during 1951 and racial integration in the ZI during 1952 had not been completed by the time the 171st left Federal
service.

In addition to levies for overseas service, the 171st noted in early 1952 that the "continued silence on the probable use of the battalion has hampered the overall efficiency of the unit. Because of repetitious training, National Guardsmen, Reservists and Inductees have also become disgruntled. These men have lost the enthusiasm and devotion to duty that an assigned operational mission would have developed."24

While many individual Guard military policemen did receive an operational mission, courtesy of levies for overseas service, as units these three MP battalions found policing the Zone of the Interior during a limited mobilization a very unsatisfying active duty mission.

Waiting for the Soviet Air Force

Believing that World War III, like its predecessor, would be a long struggle whose outcome depended in large part on effective industrial mobilization, American war plans called for unleashing its Strategic Air Command upon Soviet industry. Fearing that the Soviet Air Force would attempt to return the favor air defense of the continental United States became a major concern for military planners. But with declining defense budgets, many other pressing commitments, and without an easily identifiable Soviet
bomber capability, the Army devoted few resources from the Regular Army to air defense. Instead, Army planners turned to the National Guard as the key component in dealing with this threat. Therefore, during the reorganization of the Guard after World War II, Army planners made a significant investment in AAA units in the new troop list.25

Fearing that Korea might be the opening shot of World War III, during 1950 the Army ordered a significant mobilization of Guard AAA units. AAA units dominated the first two increments of Guard units ordered to active duty during July. By the end of September, seventeen 90mm AAA gun battalions, four 120mm AAA gun Battalions, twenty-two Signal Radar Maintenance Units (SRMU), nine AAA operations detachments, eight group headquarters, and three brigade headquarters were in Federal service. Of these units, the Army sent to Camp Stewart, Georgia, near Savannah, fourteen 90mm gun battalions, four group headquarters, and five operations detachments, all assigned to the 51st AAA Brigade, a Pennsylvania unit commanded by veteran Guard coast artillery officer Brigadier General Charles C. Curtis.26

The AAA units Army Field Forces ordered to Stewart shared the same set of problems common to all Guard units mobilized in 1950. The level of AAA experience among officers varied considerably.27 Enlisted personnel
strength and skill suffered from the same problems of turbulence and limited training that affected other types of Guard units. Units had less than extensive practice at the complex tasks of shooting aircraft out of the sky or of coordinating an air defense. What AAA equipment they did have was often obsolescent and worn out.²⁸

Three of the groups, ten of the battalions and ten of the SRMUs assigned to the 51st Brigade went first to Camp Gordon, Georgia. There in the August heat of Georgia, 310 officers, 70 warrant officers, and 4,390 enlisted men began acclimatizing to active duty life. Recalled Reservists and 1,806 newly enlisted fillers fresh from reception centers joined the Guardsmen, forcing units to set up separate recruit training detachments for basic training.³⁹ At Gordon, there was some confusion over what training program to follow, as the battalions arrived on post before their higher headquarters; once the group and brigade headquarters arrived later in August, they imposed their own ideas of what to put on the training schedules. Because Gordon was only a temporary station, until Stewart was reasonably ready for the brigade, training at Gordon consisted of some basic training for the enlisted fillers and cadre training for Guardsmen not conducting the basic training. Battalions held classes at night for officers in AAA gunnery and for NCOs in training methods. Also, units started sending
Guardsmen on temporary duty to attend various Army schools; by the end of December, 1,629 officers and enlisted men from the 51st Brigade had been ordered to various service school courses.  

From 22 September to 17 October, the brigade moved south from Gordon to Camp Stewart, receiving as a bonus "excellent training" in convoy operations. (The relatively short move took such an extended period because each group had to organize provisional truck companies to shuttle battalions to Stewart since most units did not have sufficient vehicles to move themselves.) In many ways, Stewart was obsolescent and worn out, like much of the brigade's equipment. Established in 1942, during World War II it had been used as an AAA replacement training center, but in the postwar period Stewart was used mainly for Guard and Reserve training. Third Army operated an AAA Training Center at Stewart, but by September 1950 the post's facilities were in poor shape and its staff not prepared for the challenges of supporting an AAA brigade. Nevertheless, it was the best available site east of the Mississippi.  

Shortly after the 51st Brigade opened its headquarters at Stewart, it took command of the 224th AAA Group and its four battalions, which had moved directly to Stewart from their home stations. By 29 September, the brigade's strength stood at 426 officers, 104 warrant officers, and
9,934 enlisted men. All units of the brigade, except brigade headquarters, moved into tents and began the individual training phase of the ATP. General Curtis, a warrant officer from the 703d AAA wrote, was "tough, plenty tough, a perfectionist." The brigade's radar officer remembered that Curtis "was quite demanding." Determined to bring the brigade's units to combat readiness as soon as possible, Curtis ordered cross-leveling of equipment and personnel within the brigade. Those units which entered active duty with a high percentage of equipment and qualified personnel had to give up some of these to less fortunate units. Brigade, groups, and battalions continued operating a system of schools in various subjects to refresh and improve the skills of Guardsmen and recalled Reservists, providing "much needed and valuable training." The Army Training Program for 90mm AAA gun battalions called for a twenty-eight week cycle of training, beginning with basic soldier skills, followed by each soldier's specific Military Occupational Specialty (MOS), then progressing through section, battery and battalion level collective training. The ATP was a sound plan, but units at Stewart encountered quite a good deal of friction in trying to follow the ATP from October to December 1950. The disparity in skill levels within units caused
significant problems. Draftees and Guardsmen with little experience needed much training in basic and specialty skills before they could contribute to unit collective training with more experienced Guardsmen. In the rush to begin specialty skill and unit training, some units which arrived at Stewart under strength moved quickly through basic training; the 294 fillers assigned to the 710th AAA had twelve days of basic training, then moved on with Guardsmen to advanced individual training. The 80 fillers assigned to the 703d received four weeks of basic training in a provisional training battery.35

Attendance at service schools resulted in the absence of many key personnel needed to conduct training. The 736th AAA sent 81 men to schools, which "seriously impeded the training program." The 710th AAA, struggling with a large number of enlisted fillers and inexperienced Guardsmen, found the loss of key personnel to schools "resulted in inefficient instruction and loss of valuable adequate training for both fillers and previously partially trained guardsmen." Officers sent to the AAA School at Ft. Bliss discovered their courses there included instruction only on the latest AAA equipment, not the obsolescent equipment that most Guard units used, leaving much of the school training useless to their current situation.36

School attendance also meant that units lacked
sufficient mechanics to repair equipment. Their absence contributed to significant deadline rates in units, where equipment, often already worn from long use, was now subjected to the tender mercies of inexperienced enlisted Guardsmen and fillers learning their trade. Unfortunately for the 51st AAA Brigade, as an AFF inspection confirmed in February 1951, Stewart's signal and ordnance repair facilities were poorly managed and lacked a sense of urgency about their work, preventing them from providing effective support to units on post.37

Camp Stewart's unreadiness in 1950 affected the brigade in other ways. The 703d's Chief Warrant Officer Walter Hayes wrote home that it was "very common place" to see cows, pigs and mules grazing on the lawn of post headquarters.38 During their first two months on post, units found that repairing and improving facilities interfered with training activities. By the end of the year, troops were still living under canvas, without proper winterization, leading to an above average number of men on sick call with respiratory ailments. The need to rebuild Stewart's small arms ranges meant that some units finished the individual training phase of the ATP without soldiers firing their personal weapons, forcing them to insert weapons qualification into the unit training phase of the ATP.39

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Training may have been the first priority for units, but the demands of Army administrative routine never slackened. The units' switch from Guard to Regular Army administrative systems and an inadequate supply of references and blank forms further complicated the paperwork battles. However, Regular Army training teams from the AAA School at Ft. Bliss did visit Stewart, training officers and specialists on several subjects, most importantly AAA range operations.40

In December, two new sources of friction appeared at Stewart. As a result of the serious losses in men and equipment suffered by Eighth Army in Korea, and the limits imposed by only a partial national mobilization, AAA units training in the ZI were ordered to reorganize under a reduced Table of Organization and Equipment. This decision often left units that had come to Stewart short of officers, and those that had sent many officers to schools, without enough officers to both conduct training and carry out the myriad of other duties required to keep a unit functioning. The reduced authorizations left units that were short of equipment, or had obsolescent or worn out items, with little hope that their requisitions for replacements would be filled in the foreseeable future.41

Also in December, the brigade's only all-black battalion, New York's 715th AAA, received an additional
group of enlisted fillers. To avoid burdening the battalion, the 209th Group established a provisional training battery for these fillers and other black fillers, sent to two non-brigade units at Stewart, for a total of 150 men.\textsuperscript{42}

The ATP ran on a very tight schedule. It did not allow for such factors as increased maintenance demands, poor logistical support from the training site, fillers who had not been to basic training, a training site that needed extensive rehabilitation, and shortages of mission essential equipment. In the rush to accomplish so many tasks without all of the resources the ATP assumed units would have, the 703d AAA found it "exceedingly difficult to maintain continuity toward any one goal." As a result, some units, particularly those with large numbers of draftee fillers and few qualified officers and NCOs present, fell behind their more fortunate fellow units. In the 736th AAA during 1950, troops "trained on the equipment of an AAA Battalion but section training was secondary to the training received in basic subjects."\textsuperscript{43}

By the end of December, two of the groups had finished the individual training phase of the ATP and the battalions of the other two groups had only two or three more weeks to go in this phase. The 224th Group's battalions were the first to fire their 90mm guns on the range, beginning on 4
December. The new year would begin as the old one had ended at Stewart; Chief Hayes of the 703d wrote home to Maine that the "pace remains terrific--there just aren’t enough hours in the day to get caught up."44

The new year would be one of "transition and achievement" for the AAA units at Stewart.45 One of the early transitions was the transfer of General Curtis and his 51st Brigade headquarters in early March to take command of the Chicago area AAA defenses. Army Field Forces had been pushing for this move for some time, as Brigade headquarters and the Third Army AAA Training Center clashed over how to run the ATP for subordinate units, creating what an AFF inspector diplomatically called "a problem of command relations that adversely affects training." With the departure of the 51st, the Third Army AAA Training Center took charge of training while the 197th AAA Group took over many of the brigade’s administrative functions.46

Units proceeded at their own pace through the ATP, moving with enthusiasm into the collective training phase. Section crew drills, field training exercises, radar tracking practice, and service practice firings provided a sense of purpose and accomplishment, bringing units together and building esprit. Poor logistical support from the Stewart facilities and equipment shortages still created friction in following the ATP. Working in favor of the
units at Stewart were the post’s large size and good weather, along with the availability of aircraft at nearby Hunter Air Force Base for use in training. Additionally, visits by instructor teams from the AAA School were very helpful, especially in training officers in fire control techniques.47

Personnel turbulence still remained a source of friction in early 1951. Since the Army’s training base had to focus on supplying Eighth Army in Korea, units in the ZI had to provide basic and much advanced individual training to new recruits. Stewart received thousands of untrained enlisted fillers, fresh from reception centers. To avoid disrupting the gun battalions’ ATP, each AAA group headquarters formed provisional training units, though battalions had to provide the cadre to staff these units. The 209th Group received 816 enlisted fillers; the 197th Group provided six weeks of basic and five weeks of advanced individual training to enlisted fillers. Once the new fillers completed their individual training, they were distributed among the battalions and integrated into the units’ collective training cycle.48

This method, not foreseen in the ATP, resulted in some battalions’ strength swelling beyond their personnel authorization, causing problems in training and supervision for the qualified officers and NCOs available in the
battalions. Because the Army's segregation policy required black draftees be sent to black units, the 715th AAA had over 900 enlisted men assigned to it by early April. But some white units were not far behind; the 703d AAA had 938 enlisted men assigned in April and the 736th AAA in May had 884 enlisted men assigned.49

Despite the friction, all units completed their ATPs by early summer 1951. Before leaving Stewart, excess enlisted men were transferred out of units. From Georgia, units scattered across the eastern half of the United States, positioned around major metropolitan and industrial areas, watching and waiting for the Soviet Air Force.50

They were not alone. Fear that the Chinese intervention in Korea was part of Stalin's plan to weaken American defenses in other areas had motivated a major air defense buildup in the ZI. The Army, in three increments between January and May 1951, tapped the Guard for nineteen more 90mm gun battalions, one 120mm gun battalion, one automatic weapons battalion, three group headquarters, four operations detachments, and three SRMUs. AAA units ordered to active duty in 1951 encountered most of the same problems that dogged units mobilized during 1950.51

By September 1951, mobilized Guard units made up a significant percentage of Army Antiaircraft Command: 60% of brigade headquarters, 50% of group headquarters, 60% of
operations detachments, 52% of SRMUs, 31% of 120mm gun battalions, and 75% of 90mm gun battalions in Army Antiaircraft Command. However, behind these numbers, there were significant weaknesses in Army Antiaircraft Command.52

A major problem for AAA units was that before June 1950, there had been little real work done on establishing an effective air defense network in the ZI. Only in May 1950 had an ad hoc interservice committee selected sixty areas in the country deemed critical enough to warrant AAA protection, though this list was soon trimmed to twenty-three areas to be guarded by sixty-six AAA battalions. Army Antiaircraft Command itself was only established in July 1950, headed by a major general assisted by a staff of about twenty. Units leaving Stewart often encountered a good deal of confusion and delay, as the Army scrambled to construct an AAA system in the ZI. Group and brigade headquarters had to construct detailed AAA defense plans for the areas they were assigned to guard.53

Some AAA units set up housekeeping on established posts. Support from these installations varied. Often, AAA units were unwelcomed interlopers, adding one more burden on post facilities already taxed by taking care of many units and usually not prepared to support the unique requirements of an AAA unit. The 209th Group, when it arrived at Indiantown Gap, found the post "not equipped to cater to the
problems of T/O&E AA units." However, "an aggressive program" by post officials, supported by Second Army, "very shortly" remedied the problem. Many posts did not have maneuver areas large enough for AAA units to conduct field training exercises (FTX). The 209th Group made arrangements with the Pennsylvania Wildlife Commission to use a nearby state park for its gun battalions to conduct FTXs.  

Other units were sent to posts either closed or placed in caretaker status after World War II. Often these posts required a good deal of work by units to make them habitable, let alone suitable for placing AAA weapons. The 197th Group found all the kitchen equipment removed and heating equipment rendered inoperative at Ft. Banks, Massachusetts. A "major task of area clean-up and improvement" was needed at Ft. Hancock, New Jersey, only recently reopened when the 703d AAA Gun Battalion arrived. In some cases, units occupied these reactivated posts before the Army provided a garrison commander and staff, forcing unit commanders and staffs to perform both sets of duties.  

Gun battalions' new home stations often were not near the areas units had to defend, forcing gun battalions to establish remote operating sites through which they rotated firing batteries. AAA units, including some battalion headquarters, on their own had to survey possible sites and
negotiate with the property owners for access to the land, then supervise construction of the sites and link the sites by radio and commercial phone lines to AAA operations centers. The experiences of acquiring sites, the 197th Group remarked, "could be compiled in an essay which would embody many elements of pathos and humor." An additional burden on units was winterizing the sites, a task that often needed a good deal of troop labor to be accomplished in time.55

These demands also meant that units, once they left Stewart, had few opportunities to fire their weapons, usually just once a year. As most posts did not have ranges for AAA weapons, many gun battalions had to make long trips to the nearest AAA ranges. The 713th AAA, stationed at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, had to move some of its firing batteries 300 miles to fire a service practice in September. However, once plugged into area air defense networks, operations staffs could get significant practice at their tasks, particularly from group, brigade and AAA command post exercises. Eastern Army AAA Command held an air defense exercise 28 August to 18 October 1951, combining command post exercises, tracking military and civilian aircraft, and moving firing batteries to remote sites; the 197th Group described this "an outstanding training experience."57

However, these problems were not the greatest drags on
maintaining combat readiness once units left Stewart. Army Antiaircraft Command fell victim to the Army's manpower dilemma and the Truman Administration's decision for only a partial mobilization of the economy for war; its units suffered extensive personnel turbulence and significant shortages in qualified personnel and modern AAA equipment.

Units lost personnel, mainly enlisted men, from discharges for hardship and expiration of enlistment, from release of involuntarily recalled Reservists, and from transfers. However, levies for overseas service gutted units in Army Antiaircraft Command. The 736th AAA lost 10 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 114 enlisted men to Far East Command (FECOM) and 2 officers to European Command (EUCOM). The 745th AAA during 1951 lost 14 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 361 enlisted men, and gained 14 officers, 4 warrant officers, and 448 enlisted men. The 715th AAA lost four of its five battery commanders and all its battalion staff officers to overseas levies.

These levies for overseas service hit Guard units especially hard, as it broke the promise of "Go With Those You Know." Chief Hayes in the 703d AAA wrote home that those selected for levies "are not too enthusiastic about going; however, they're adopting what seems to be the only attitude to take ('What the Hell')."

These levies hit Guard units especially hard because
the most experienced and qualified, and thus first to be levied, tended to be Guardsmen. Guard AAA units, once they completed their ATP and moved to an operational site, soon began to lose their Guard character, particularly among the unit's officers, as levies stripped away Guardsmen. Chief Hayes wrote home in mid-July that the 703d AAA "is being torn asunder." And like all units in Army Antiaircraft Command, levies destroyed the cohesion, teamwork, and esprit units built up over long days and nights of serving together.61

In replacing qualified and experienced personnel, units faced several hurdles. Reduced personnel authorizations left the remaining qualified and experienced personnel stretched thin, trying to cover all the responsibilities of a unit. Replacements usually came from two sources. Most enlisted replacements were fresh from training centers, so units at least no longer had to provide basic training, though some units did not get all the replacements required, and these soldiers lacked the expertise of experience. To make up for this missing expertise, brigades and groups organized unit schools in such topics as fire control gunnery, radar, meteorology, and the duties of gun section chiefs.62

Junior officers were a mix of newly commissioned lieutenants and recalled Reservists. The first had
training, but no experience and were often in units only for the six months duty in the ZI required before they could be shipped overseas. Other new lieutenants were assigned, then promptly disappeared for months as they took the AAA Officer Basic Course at Ft. Bliss. Reservists usually had World War II experience, though not always in AAA, but some lacked motivation with their lives interrupted a second time for military service.

The other major source of replacements was returnees from Korea and, to a lesser degree, Europe. This group included a number of Regulars, and Reservists and Guardsmen on extended active duty, but many were short timers, draftees, Reservists, and Guardsmen, waiting out their last few months of active duty before release. These men usually lacked any motivation to perform their duties in any but the most perfunctory manner.

Personnel turbulence was further aggravated by several other factors. Not all of the returnees and recalled Reservists were AAA specialists; of the fourteen officers received by the 703d AAA in the last quarter of 1951, only one was a qualified AAA officer. Many of the enlisted returnees from Korea, as a going away present from their units, had received promotions and MOS qualifications that made it difficult to fit them into an AAA unit's Table of Organization. The reduced T/Os the Army imposed on AAA
units in the ZI forced many personnel, particularly officers, to carry additional duties. This often made it difficult to man remote sites, conduct training, and perform garrison housekeeping duties. The lack of an obvious threat, the slow pace of equipment modernization and the routines of garrison life, the 736th AAA noted, made "it difficult for the average soldier to see the full importance of AAA in this defense situation." Some units commented that the lack of any obvious goal in post-cycle training, compared to the ATP, further aggravated the problem of motivating soldiers.

Another major frustration was equipment. Many units left Stewart without their full complement of equipment or with obsolescent equipment, in part because Third Army held back from filling requisitions due to confusion over how to apply the reduced Tables of Equipment. While at Indiantown Gap, firing batteries of the 705th AAA had to share equipment so that they could train at full equipment strength. The 736th AAA arrived at Ft. Meade still short two 90mm guns, the 715th AAA four 90mm guns; both, along with other units lacked other major items of equipment, particularly vehicles. The age and worn condition of the equipment and a shortage of parts, together with the inexperience of many maintenance personnel, helped drag down readiness in units. Worn out M7 generators kept the 705th's
readiness low until the battalion reached Okinawa, where it received a set of rebuilt M7s. The 713th noted that with the exception of one SCR-584 radar, all the major items of equipment in the battalion were old and required "constant and careful checking and maintenance." Gradually, as parts became available and worn equipment was replaced, and those soldiers not levied gained maintenance experience, equipment readiness rates usually rose. At Ft. Meade, the 736th exchanged most of its elderly vehicle fleet for new ones, though it still remained short of enough tractors "for complete mobility."\(^{67}\)

Modernization of equipment, particularly 90mm guns, radars, directors, and generators, proceeded slowly. The arrival of modern equipment, such as M2 90mm guns, could cause difficulties, since many maintenance personnel were unfamiliar with the new items. When the 736th AAA received the new T-33 fire control system, it discovered that its M1A2 90mm guns could not be used with new system. Ordered by its brigade commander to use the T-33 with its M1A1 90mm guns while at a service practice, the 703d not only could not successfully link the two, it discovered that the actual range of the T-33's acquisition radar to be only 35,000 yards, far short of the designed 90,000 yards range.\(^{68}\)

Only three Guard AAA units saw service in Korea: Florida's 227th AAA Group headquarters, Pennsylvania's 213th
AAA Gun Battalion, and New York's 773d AAA Gun Battalion. All arrived in Korea after the war's mobile phase ended and their service was uneventful. Several others deployed elsewhere in the Pacific as part of the worldwide American military buildup, though not without many frustrations, including in some cases a lack of support from post staffs. The 705th AAA Gun Battalion at Indiantown Gap received an alert order in August 1951 for movement to Okinawa; as it prepared for deployment during September, the post staff subjected the battalion to an unnecessary move across the post, an inspection that "reduced itself to absurdity," and issued the battalion combat unserviceable equipment to make up shortages before departure.

Units mobilized in 1950 focused during 1952 on preparing for their return to state control. The Army decided not to retain AAA units in Federal service beyond the release date of the Guardsmen. Instead, draftees, Reservists and Regular Army personnel would gradually replace the departing Guardsmen in an unit and when the Guard unit reverted to state control, only the unit colors would be returned to the state; all the unit equipment would remain in Federal service under a new designation.

Personnel turbulence varied among units, but remained a problem during 1952. Units continued to receive the same quality of replacements as they had 1951, but in 1952 the
Army began racial integration of the AAA units in the ZI through the replacement system. By July, three per cent of the personnel in units under the 197th Group were black.  

In January 1952, all the 713th AAA's warrant officers and enlisted men were frozen in place, protected against levies for overseas service to help smooth the Guard phase-out later in the year. The 736th AAA had its enlisted men frozen in place in February. Enlisted fillers, new graduates of the AAA School at Fort Bliss, arrived at the 713th AAA in January; many were paired with Guardsmen and 1950 draftees whom they would replace later in the year. However, officers remained subject to levies; the 713th AAA's commander left for Alaska in March 1952.

The 715th AAA, because of racial segregation, continued to have far more enlisted men assigned than most AAA battalions in the ZI. In January 1952 it had 728 enlisted; when the 715th handed over its site to the 34th AAA Gun Battalion in May, it had 810 enlisted. But the 715th AAA did not receive protection from levies, losing nineteen enlisted men to FECOM and ten to EUCOM. It also remained short of officers, at one point having only eighteen present for duty, in part because the battalion lost six officers and five warrant officers to transfers.

Impediments to effective training continue to thrive during the new year. Personnel turbulence and the competing
demands on the personnel allowed under the reduced T/Os remained a strong source of friction. Many soldiers assigned to Army Antiaircraft Command still found it hard to believe there was a realistic threat to prepare against, even though units kept up an information program among troops for "entrenching in the minds of the personnel the importance of this assignment and the seriousness of this mission." The major concern, however, was the degree of individual skills among unit members. As a result, battalions and groups continued to run schools for both officers and enlisted men in such subjects as gunnery, radar operations, fire control procedures, and maintenance. Units also sent new personnel to Army schools for the training needed to replace departing Guardsmen and 1950 draftees.

Higher echelon air defense exercises and practice alerts kept units busy with collective training, though live fire exercises remained rare. The major concern, however, was the degree of individual skills among unit members. As a result, battalions and groups continued to run schools for both officers and enlisted men in such subjects as gunnery, radar operations, fire control procedures, and maintenance. Units also sent new personnel to Army schools for the training needed to replace departing Guardsmen and 1950 draftees.

Equipment readiness and modernization still bedeviled units in 1952. The 713th AAA's SCR-584 radars, M9 directors and M1A2 90mm guns "continued to be sources of trouble." The battalion did have valid requisitions on M33 radars and M2 90mm guns, but these items did not arrive before the phase-out of the Guard battalion. The 736th AAA, on the other hand, received its T-33 fire control system during
in March 1952 its M2 90mm guns. The quality of maintenance support from supporting installations for AAA specific items varied, as did support for much of the obsolete equipment units possessed, such as radios.\textsuperscript{78}

Once relieved from assignment to Army Antiaircraft Command, Guard units turned over their equipment and sites to newly activated Regular Army units, and returned to a post in or near their home state for final outprocessing. The number of remaining Guardsmen in each units varied from a handful to a large part of those who entered active duty with the unit. Guard AAA units mobilized in 1951 were released from active duty in early 1953, having gone through experiences much the same as those called in 1950.\textsuperscript{79}

After returning to state control, Guard AAA units began the process of rebuilding. The Army planned to integrate Guard units returned to state control into the ZI's AAA defense, looking ahead to inevitable postwar budget cuts and hoping to utilize the experience Guardsmen gained while in Federal service. With expected improvements in early warning systems, the Army believed that there would be sufficient notice to alert Guard AAA units in time to defend against Soviet bombers.

Like other released Guard units, AAA units only brought home their unit designations; all unit equipment remained behind in the Regular Army. However, personnel was a more
important factor in the rebuilding effort, for Guard AAA units throughout the 1950s were equipped with obsolescent hand-me-downs from the Regular Army. Also like other Guard units, rebuilding would take several years and varied from unit to unit, depending in large measure on the legacy of active duty in each unit. The 713th AAA believed that it had a "nucleus of key personnel in each battery" upon which to rebuild the battalion. The 715th AAA, on the other hand, did not have this core of experienced personnel upon which to rebuild the battalion, though it was in far better shape than the 685th AAA, which returned home with only twenty-six enlisted men and no officers.80

Since Soviet TU-4 bombers never came streaking over the Arctic to attempt the incineration of urban industrial America, evaluation of Guard AAA units mobilized and assigned to air defense of the ZI cannot be based on the evidence of combat. It is clear that Army planners regarded this threat as a secondary concern compared to the hot war in Korea and NATO's military buildup, particularly given that early warning of attacks and Air Force interceptors, not Army AAA units, were the key weapons of continental air defense. The personnel turbulence and slow equipment modernization units of Army AAA Command experienced clearly demonstrate the Army's priorities.

Because of personnel turbulence and equipment
shortcomings, Guard AAA units faced a major struggle to maintain their combat readiness once they left their mobilization training sites. Fortunately, during the Korean War, the Soviets never had the capability to test that combat readiness by mounting the kind of massive strategic bombing offensive that the Allies had inflicted on the Axis during World War II.81

"Disappointments and Distresses:" The 37th Infantry Division

The 37th (Buckeye) Infantry Division of the Ohio National Guard had a short and unhappy Korean War. A division with a proud record of service in the two world wars, it was not ordered into Federal service until early 1952 and it never deployed overseas. Indeed, by the end of the war, it had ceased to exist as an Ohio National Guard division; the Army stripped the 37th of almost all the Guardsmen who entered active duty with it, using them to provide individual replacements for units overseas despite the pleas of the division commander and Ohio’s governor to keep the division together. This unhappy experience was not unique to the 37th during the Korean War; three other divisions that mobilized but remained in the ZI suffered the same fate. For these Guard units, the Korean War truly was a time of "disappointments and distresses."82
The Buckeye Division, 1917-1951

The 37th Infantry Division during its first thirty-four years earned a reputation as one of the better Guard divisions and a reputation as a division that carefully protected its Guard and Ohio character. In 1917, Ohio's Adjutant General ignored War Department orders to designate Ohio units to serve in a division being formed mainly out of units from Southern states, and Ohio's governor successfully appealed to the President for Ohio to form its own division. Ohio draftees brought the 37th up to full strength, helping to preserve the division's Buckeye identity. Shipped to France in June 1918, the 37th Division, under a Regular Army commanding general, spent 77 days on the line at a cost of 5,387 casualties. 

In the postwar reshuffling of Guard divisions, Ohio retained the 37th as an Ohio-only division. In 1940, when it entered Federal service a second time, the first large shipment of draftees sent to the division were from Ohio. The 37th's commander in 1940, Major General Robert S. Beightler, was the only National Guard division commander to lead his division from mobilization to demobilization during World War II. Beightler's division during the war maintained a high level of identity as both a Guard and an Ohio formation as it fought in the Northern Solomons and the Philippines, suffering 5,960 casualties and earning a
reputation as one of the best Army divisions in the Pacific. In December 1945 the Army returned the division to state control, though by then most of the surviving Ohio Guardsmen already had rotated home and been discharged.

After the 37th Infantry Division returned to state control, Governor Frank Lausche gave Brigadier General Leo Kreber the job of rebuilding the division. Born in Ohio in 1896, Kreber attended West Point with the class of 1919. Graduating early in 1918 because of the Great War, Kreber did not get into combat in Europe, though he did spend fifteen months with the Army of Occupation in Germany. He resigned his commission in 1922 and returned to Columbus, joining the family business. That same year he received a commission in the Guard as a field artillery officer; by 1936 he commanded the 136th Field Artillery Regiment. In 1940 he took command of the division’s artillery, a position he held until 1946. During World War II, Kreber received the Silver Star, a Purple Heart, the Distinguished Service Medal, and the Legion of Merit.

The 37th’s rebuilding effort after 1945 proceeded quickly; in 1948 the 37th received Federal recognition, one of the first three Guard divisions to receive it after 1945. In January 1949, Kreber was appointed Ohio Adjutant General, giving him the two top positions in the Ohio National Guard, which he would hold until mobilization in 1952. Kreber was devoted to the 37th and the National Guard, serving
frequently after 1945 as a vice-president of the National Guard Association. 85

Kreber made his long time associate his long-time associate, Brigadier General Kenneth Cooper, his successor as Division Artillery Commander. Born in 1896, Cooper enlisted in the 37th's 135th Field Artillery in May 1917, serving in France as a section chief. After the war he enlisted in the Guard and held positions from first sergeant to lieutenant colonel. In 1940 he succeeded Kreber as commander of the 136th Field Artillery and spent most of the war as Kreber's executive officer. When Kreber became Ohio Adjutant General, he made Cooper the Assistant Adjutant General. 86

The division chief of staff in 1951 was Colonel Harold Hays. Born in 1897 and commissioned in 1923 as an infantry officer in the 37th, during World War II he served as a battalion commander and G-1 in the division. Returning to the 37th in 1947 as the G-1, Hays became chief of staff in 1949. The four division assistant chiefs of staff, with an average age of 39, had all served as enlisted men in the interwar 37th; three of the four had been Guard junior officers at mobilization in 1940, and the fourth was commissioned in 1941. Only the G-2 had served with the 37th throughout World War II; the others were transferred out of the division before it entered combat in 1943. Two rejoined
the 37th in 1946, the other two in 1947.\textsuperscript{87}

The division's infantry regimental commanders were S. T. Del Corso (145th), G.C. Schiele (147th), and D.E. Schultz (148th). Del Corso, age 38, and Schultz, age 45, were long-time Buckeyes: they served as enlisted men during the interwar period in their regiments, were commissioned in their regiments, finished World War II commanding their regiments, and then reorganized their regiments in the postwar Guard. Schiele, age 45, was a Reserve officer in 1941; he spent World War II as an instructor at the Infantry School and as a staff officer in China. In 1946, he received a colonel's commission in the Guard and command of the 147th.\textsuperscript{88}

The nine infantry battalion commanders averaged 38 years in age. All had been in the 37th at mobilization in 1940: eight as officers and one as an enlisted men, though two of the officers were Guard enlisted with NGUS commissions activated at mobilization and one had been a Reserve officer who switched to the Guard just before mobilization. The four field artillery battalion commanders averaged 39 years in age. None had been long-serving Buckeyes before World War II; one was a Reserve officer who joined the 37th just before mobilization, one was drafted and commissioned during the war, and two had been Reserve officers at mobilization in 1941.\textsuperscript{89}
The four separate battalion commanders, with an average age of 38, had an uneven level of experience. Major D.E. Putnam (112th Medical) had no military experience before being commissioned in the Guard in 1947. Lieutenant Colonel L.B. Tipton (137th AAA) was drafted in 1941 and commissioned a coast artillery officer in 1943; ending the war a captain, he joined the Guard in 1947 as coast artillery captain and was promoted to lieutenant colonel just before the battalion entered Federal service in 1952. Both Lieutenant Colonel H.E. Gordon (137th Tank) and Major A.E. Szorady (112th Engineers) were Guard enlisted men in 1940 and commissioned in 1942, though Gordon spent the war as an infantry officer. Both ended the war as captains and rejoined the Guard in 1947 as captains.90

Colonel Tipton’s 137th AAA Battalion was part of the Ohio National Guard’s answer to the question of African-American Guardsmen. Unlike the unfortunate Boston battalion of the 372d Infantry Regiment, converted into the 272d Field Artillery Battalion, the Ohio battalion of the regiment became the separate all-black 372d Infantry Battalion. However, this single battalion could not accommodate the increased number of blacks now living in Ohio who wished to serve in the Guard, so Kreber selected one of the AAA gun battalions assigned to Ohio, the 183d, to be a second all-black battalion. When the Army in 1948 added an automatic
weapons AAA battalion to infantry division T/Os, Kreber converted the 183d into the 137th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion.  

While the 37th did not escape the problems that afflicted Guard units during this period, it maintained its reputation as one of the best Guard divisions. National Guard Bureau inspectors visiting the 37th at summer training commented that the "fine spirit and enthusiasm of all, plus their hard work in order to get the most out of their 15 days field training, was very noticeable." In 1950, the NGB rated the 37th's field training as Excellent, its training support as Excellent, and its statistical ratings as Satisfactory.  

Passed over for mobilization by the Army Chief of Staff both in August 1950 and in December 1950, despite Army Field Forces listing it as one of the best Guard divisions, in July 1951 the 37th held its summer training at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. The 37th held its summer training in 1940, its last before mobilization for World War II, and in 1951, rumors abounded that the 37th would again be mobilized after ending its summer training. Governor Lausche made his annual visit to summer training, at one point being "captured" by members of the 145th Infantry. However, the 37th took a greater interest in another visitor, General Mark W. Clark, the Chief of Army Field Forces, who inspected
the 37th's training in the field with Kreber. At the conclusion of his visit, Clark addressed the 37th's senior commanders and staff, and while he could not say anything definite, he left the impression among his audience that the 37th would soon be ordered to active duty.94

Mobilization

Secretary of the Army Frank Pace called Governor Lausche on 12 September 1951, officially informing him that the 37th would enter Federal service on 15 January 1952, reporting to Camp Polk, Louisiana for a twenty-four month tour. The Army stated that the 37th was needed to help maintain the Army's General Reserve, as was Illinois' 44th Infantry Division, notified at the same time that it would enter Federal service in February. Prior to this, the Army had taken into Federal service from Ohio eight separate companies, three headquarters detachments, a band and the 987th Armored Field Artillery Battalion in 1950, and a 90mm AAA gun battalion in May 1951. However, the callup of these units, while important for their hometowns, did not match the effect on Ohio of the 37th leaving for active duty.95

Governor Lausche issued a statement on 12 September: "It is with regret that I have learned that the 37th Division of Ohio has been called. However, in the face of the obvious efforts of Stalin and his politburo to continue
their aggression toward the objective of dominating the world, the call is understandable."\textsuperscript{96}

The next day, a \textit{Columbus Evening Dispatch} editorial discussed its "unpleasant duty" to note the callup of the 37th: "As Ohio's great National Guard division again girds for war, again to demonstrate the merit of the Guard when such demonstrations should be superfluous, it is an occasion for pride that Ohio can again furnish a military force of so distinguished a caliber and tradition.\textsuperscript{97}

Ohio newspapers speculated whether the 37th would go to Korea or find itself stripped for overseas replacements. Some articles recalled that the Army Chief of Staff earlier in the year had said that Guard units on active duty would provide replacements for units in Korea. General Kreber did not address this question in his comments on the alert notice. He said only that the division was below strength and that he did not know if the Army would have the 37th recruit to fill the shortages or whether it would supply the division with draftees at Camp Polk. He added: "The Division is in good shape. The morale is high and the training which they received in camp was of the best.\textsuperscript{98}

In late 1950, Army Field Forces analyzed the induction of Guard units into Federal service earlier in the year. The AFF study echoed many of the conclusions made by unit commanders at the time: conflicting directives from higher
echelons, poor support in the change over from Guard to Regular Army administrative and supply systems, the disruptive effect of staggered arrival of fillers, and most importantly, the loss to service school quotas of trained personnel urgently needed during the early stages of the Master Training Program. AFF attempted to incorporate these findings in the induction process for units mobilized in early 1951, but the brief interval between the study and the second wave of mobilization, along with the press of events following the shock of Chinese intervention, defeated these efforts.99

With the 37th and 44th Infantry Divisions, AFF was able to put some of the study’s recommendations into effect. The divisions would have at least four months between receiving the alert notice and entering Federal service. This interval allowed Guardsmen to put their civilian affairs in order in a more measured way than enjoyed by Guardsmen mobilized earlier. However, the major bottleneck of induction still had not been fixed, for the National Guard and the Regular Army continued to use two different sets of administrative procedures, once again forcing Guard units to convert their administration to an unfamiliar system.100

Not all members of the 37th were able to use those four months to settle their affairs. Since the AFF study identified key personnel attending service schools during
the early part of the MTP as a major training distractor, AFF had inserted the four month period between alert and induction mainly so units could send as many men as possible to service schools and have them back in the unit by the time it entered Federal service. Kreber vigorously exploited this program; by 15 January 1952, 516 officers and warrant officers and 2,222 enlisted men had graduated or were completing their courses at various Army schools.¹⁰¹

In addition to assigning men to Army schools, the division also had to deal with requests by about 370 of its members for deferments or exemptions from active duty. The division leadership took a hard line on this matter, reflected in a comment by Major Earl Ward (the Division Headquarters Commandant) on the day of the alert notice: "It was not a surprise to those who went in with their eyes wide open, but it was a shock to those who joined up for the money."¹⁰²

Like other governors, Governor Lausche sought to insulate himself from the politically charged issue of deferments and exemptions. A board of three senior field grade officers in each major unit of the division evaluated requests for deferment or exemption. Unfavorable decisions could be appealed to Kreber. How many requests were approved and on what grounds cannot be established with the available evidence. However, it appears that the two main
reasons for these requests were, as in 1950 and earlier in
1951, family hardship and employment in a critical defense
industry job.\textsuperscript{103}

Like the 28th and 45th Infantry Divisions, one of the
37th's general officers would not enter Federal service with
his division. Brigadier General Cecil Whitcomb, Assistant
Division Commander and a Buckeye infantryman since 1917,
retired at age 52 shortly after the division received its
alert notice. The commander of the 148th Infantry, Colonel
Schultz, was promoted to fill the vacancy; Schultz's
executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Radcliffe,
took command of the regiment and received his colonel's
eagle.\textsuperscript{104}

**Training A Combat Division, 1952**

On 15 January 1952 the 37th Infantry Division entered
Federal service for a twenty-four month tour. The division
reported for active duty with a strength of 678 officers,
135 warrant officers, and 6,011 enlisted men---46.1% of its
full strength Table of Organization.\textsuperscript{105} Unlike previous
division mobilizations during the war, the longer period
between alert and induction meant that the 37th could begin
moving to its training site as soon as it was inducted.
Most units assembled at their armories for the short
ceremony that formally marked the transition from state to
Federal service. Troop trains formed up and began crossing Ohio, stopping in towns and cities to pick up companies or batteries and their equipment, then headed south. Because there was not enough rolling stock available to move all of the 37th at once, not every unit left on the 15th and it took ten days to assemble the division at Camp Polk. Cincinnati, with the largest number of 37th units, held a parade on the night of 22 January to send off the 147th Infantry and the 134th Field Artillery. Several thousand people watched as "(m)any of the feminine farewell wishers were running on the sidewalks trying to keep up with their husbands or boyfriends and attempting to take pictures."^106

Camp Polk had remained a busy place after the departure of the 45th Infantry Division in 1951. Many non-divisional units of the General Reserve were stationed at the post, as was the headquarters of XV Corps. Rumors in Ohio that Polk was a swampy hellhole of decrepit facilities turned out to be unfounded, as some of the wartime budget had found its way into renovating the post. When the 37th arrived there in January 1952, unlike the 45th in September 1950, it found buildings in good shape. While relations with the local civilians were on the whole good, the area's economy since late 1950 had become dependent on various methods of separating the soldier from as much of his paycheck as possible. This included substandard housing for soldiers’
families, a number of whom went south to join their men. Designed as a training facility, Polk had little family housing and those families who managed to get a spot in the trailer park on post considered themselves lucky. Unfortunately, not much money had been invested in Polk's morale support activities, a major problem in a post isolated from any major city and now filled with many men used to the amenities of city life. The post exchange and the commissary were poorly stocked and managed—the commissary would close for its monthly inventory the same day as end-of-month payday for soldiers.¹⁰⁷

The 37th's mission after arriving at Polk "was to train its units to the point of combat efficiency."¹⁰⁸ To accomplish this mission, the 37th relied on the same Army Field Forces' Master Training Program used for other mobilized divisions, with several modifications. Because Polk still lacked adequate facilities to train AAA units, the 137th AAA Battalion moved directly from Ohio to Fort Bliss, Texas to undertake its ATP at the AAA School. The 37th would spend four to six weeks preparing to receive its fillers, but during this period, Regular Army instructor teams would train cadres from each company or battery on subjects Guard units often had difficulty in retaining proficiency in, such as crew served weapons (artillery, mortars, recoilless rifles), maintenance of equipment, and
Signal Corps operations.

Another major change in the MTP for the 37th concerned draftee fillers, of which the division received 4,050 by 1 April. Unlike 1950, those sent to the 37th had first received basic training at a Replacement Training Center before being shipped to the division. In addition to the draftees, AFF planned to send the 37th a large number of officers and men already in the service, hoping their experience—especially returnees from Korea—would make it easier for the division to become combat effective. AFF planned for the experienced personnel to be at Polk when the 37th arrived in January, to give them time to be absorbed into the division before the draftees were to arrive, six to eight weeks later.109

The 37th received 3,950 personnel transferred in from other units, about half of them returnees from Korea. The division's advance party sent to Polk a month before the division arrived proved too few and too overwhelmed by their many other tasks to properly supervise these men. Many of the rotatees had bad cases of short-timer's syndrome or carried a grudge against the Army. Some while in Korea had been promised their choice of station in the ZI and few had chosen Camp Polk. Others received Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) from their former units for which they were not school-trained and for which their Korean
experience had only the faintest of connections. (For
example, infantrymen who had been company radio operators
were assigned Signal Corps MOSs.) Often this had been done
as a way to promote men, with the result that school-trained
Guardsmen found themselves working for NCOs who knew less
about the MOS than they did. A freeze on promotions for
enlisted Guardsmen during the first eighteen months of the
37th's Federal service did not help this situation.

Fourth Army, under which the 37th served, had the
responsibility for screening and processing the rotatees, but
Fourth Army had not done a very good job. The
administrative paperwork on many of these men was in
shambles; some actually were technically Absent Without
Leave (AWOL) or found their pay stopped. Some had pay
deductions made because of incorrect or missing clothing and
equipment records. Other rotatees found themselves
assigned to MOSs for which they were physically unqualified,
often as the result of wounds received in Korea. Finally, a
significant number of the returned combat veterans "did a
lot of drinking," according to one Guard field artillery
lieutenant, and openly resented assignment to a National
Guard division. Kreber's evaluation of these men was that
they "were not uniformly excellent" and that "many returnees
became problems either through violations of discipline or
in less spectacular but equally effective ways."
The infusion of draftees and veterans did desegregate the division. The 37th entered Federal service as the Army received reports from Far East Command on the success of racial integration there. In addition, the Army could not afford to further burden the few all-black units in the ZI with even more excess soldiers when it had a division from a northern state that could absorb many black draftees without fears of political backlash in the state. By September 1952, the last days of the "Ohio" 37th, the division's batteries and companies, with the exception of the all-black 137th AAA Battalion, averaged five to seven African-American enlisted men out of a total of between 85 (in artillery batteries) and 247 (37th Ordnance Company). There is no evidence of African-American officers in these units. The 137th AAA remained an all-black battalion until the end of the "Ohio" 37th. No reasons for this battalion's exemption from integration are in the surviving documents, but it may be the result of the battalion's separation from the division until August 1952, and of a widespread reluctance in the Army at this time to whites, particularly white officers, serving under the command of black officers.\(^{111}\)

While the 37th dealt with the administrative nightmare bequeathed to it by Fourth Army, Army Field Forces cut back the time allowed for just this sort of thing. AFF ordered the division to begin the training cycle on 28 January.
Processing at times broke down into gridlock. The division formed a provisional replacement company to try to handle the waves of troops---draftees and returnees---rolling into the Camp Polk railroad depot. Between 31 January and 31 March, 7,232 enlisted men and 91 officers reported in to the division. This personnel turbulence was not as damaging as it could have been because most of it occurred during the period set aside for Basic Individual Combat Training (28 January to 22 March), and for all but the newest Guardsmen this was refresher training.

Other obstacles to training dogged the 37th after it had reached full strength and sorted out most of the personnel paperwork. The modified MTP still did not allow enough time, the 37th complained, for maintenance of equipment. This was particularly important given that the division was short of equipment, especially vehicles. Polk still had only limited facilities for training an entire infantry division, most notably in regards to the division artillery; the 37th’s gunners could only train on short range fire missions.

Exiled to Fort Bliss until August 1952 because Polk still lacked adequate facilities to train AAA units, the 137th AAA Battalion’s ATP did not go well. It failed ATTs and its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Tipton, was relieved and replaced by a white officer, Major Frank R. Nairn.
Major Nairn remained the only white officer in the battalion until levies for overseas service destroyed the "Ohio" 37th in early 1953.\textsuperscript{114}

XV Corps Headquarters became a major problem for General Kreber and his Buckeyes. The Department of the Army had given Fourth Army the responsibility to supervise the division. But this did not stop XV Corps from exercising its rank. Kreber reported "unnecessary harassing by Corps' inspectors located at this post making inspections for lack of anything else to do" and that the Corps' "constant inspection defeated its own purpose." He added that "(c)omplaints to the XV Corps Commander changed only methods."\textsuperscript{115}

Guardsmen and outside inspectors agreed that the training the 37th received at the individual and small unit level was very good. This success rested on the ability and experience of the veteran Guard officers and NCOs and the large number of personnel who had attended schools after the alert notice. In April, inspectors from AFF complimented the 37th, saying that overall, the division was doing an "excellent" job.\textsuperscript{116}

The high point of the Korean War for the 37th was May 1952. General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, visited the division 12-13 May, complimenting the division on its progress and, to the bitter amusement of some,
congratulating it on the large number of men who voluntarily attended schools before January.¹¹⁷

On 16-17 May Governor Lausche visited the 37th. After a luncheon hosted by the officers' wives (where he stuck his head in the kitchen and asked if there was anyone from Columbus in there), Kreber took the Governor on a tour of the division. In the 148th Infantry, Lausche asked one soldier how he liked Ohio. The man was from North Carolina, to which the Governor responded with a blush, "Oh, I forgot I'm not in Ohio." On the 17th, the division passed in review in the Governor's honor, with Major General Roscoe Woodruff, the XV Corps Commander, and Lieutenant General Maxwell D. Taylor of the Army General Staff also on the reviewing stand with Lausche and Kreber. Afterwards, Lausche addressed the troops:

"We wish that you would not have to be in uniform serving your country, but we must be reasonable about it. No dictator in the world was ever content with his conquests. There is grief, and pain and inconvenience in serving your country. But this sacrifice is repaid many times in future years in the knowledge that you have served your country."¹¹⁸
The Destruction of the "Ohio" 37th

The "grief, and pain and inconvenience" for the 37th soon multiplied significantly; in May the division received its first levy for overseas service. Though small in number and counterbalanced by the arrival of some replacements, these early levies were in their way as damaging as the later larger levies. Many of the initial levies called for key personnel and specialists in the division. Their skills and experience could not be readily replaced by the newly commissioned officers and draftees who were the bulk of the incoming personnel in this period. These levies also affected training by disrupting unit cohesion and lowering morale, especially among Guardsmen who now had good reason to fear that "Go With Those You Know" was just a hollow slogan. 119

The 37th soldiered on, completing battalion ATTs by 26 July and regimental combat team ATTs by 31 August. Slightly ahead of schedule, it finished its training cycle with a three day division field exercise 3-6 September. It then moved into post-cycle training designed to correct weaknesses and maintain strengths revealed by the field training exercises. In mid-October, it reached the highest Operational Readiness (OR) rate it would attain while still mainly an "Ohio" unit, a rating of 65% C. This meant that the 37th had reached 65% of its potential combat
effectiveness as an organization, but that "its equipment status does not permit operational employment of unit without correction of major equipment deficiencies." (emphasis in original)\textsuperscript{120}

However, just as the division reached its best readiness rate to date, the Army General Staff changed the 37th's mission, part of the Army's response to the dilemmas created by the "inflexible response" of its manpower policies. Instead of a tactical unit of the General Reserve, the 37th became a training division, placed on a reduced T/O and assigned the mission of training individual replacements. At the same time the Army placed large levies on the 37th for a quick infusion of trained manpower. Since the Army General Staff did not plan to deploy the 37th overseas, the division could be used to meet both needs.\textsuperscript{121}

And used is how many men in the 37th felt by early October 1952. The new mission, increasing levies, the isolation of Camp Polk, and a training schedule that remained demanding combined with all the normal aggravations of Army life to create a feeling of frustration and futility among many men. These tensions came into public view with a series of articles in Ohio newspapers, beginning on 2 October. The headline of \textit{The Akron Beacon Journal}'s lead story on page one read "Kreber 'On Carpet'?". Datelined Washington, the story by two of the paper's staff writers

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listed complaints by members of the 37th that had triggered an investigation by the Army's Inspector General. Troops were "bitter" about the breaking up of the division and "resentful that they must spend their time in sparsely settled, dreary western Louisiana." The bulk of the article concerned allegations of pressure to buy a copy of the division history and to join the National Guard Association.

The next day the Beacon Journal's top story was "Kreber Guaranteed to Sell 37th Book." Also datelined Washington and by the same reporters, this story alleged that Kreber had guaranteed the F.J. Heer Company of Columbus $35,000 for 7,000 copies of the book. According to a "reliable source," pressure to buy the book began when sales fell short of that goal and Heer had had to raise the print run to 10,000 in order to make a profit. The story emphasized that there was "no indication that the 37th Division or any of its officers would profit in any way by the book sale." However, it also emphasized that Walter Heer, Sr., the firm's president, was chairman of the Franklin County Democratic Party. (And as every reader knew, Lausche---a Democrat---was running for reelection.) The story quoted Kreber as saying that companies in Texas, Louisiana, and Ohio had bid on the project and he felt that an Ohio firm should have the job. With a "negotiated low bid," Heer got the job because according to Kreber the "Heer firm gave more for the money
than any of the other companies that bid on the project."
The story concluded by pointing out that a major problem
with selling the book was that only about 7,000 men in the
division were Guardsmen.

The Beacon Journal sent one of the reporters on this
story to Polk, where he obviously gained a new perspective
on things. A 6 October story on page two was headlined
"Pentagon Blamed for Low Morale of 37th" and "Top Brass
Kills Spirit of Division." According to the reporter,
Kreber was "reluctant to talk about the breakup policy" and
that it was "known that Kreber was disappointed, but now
feels there is nothing that can be done about it." The
story suggested that perhaps the Regular Army did not "want
a National Guard division to capture too much attention or
glory." It concluded that "(h)ow much evidence there is to
back this theory is impossible to determine. However, it is
widely known that regular Army men look down their noses at
National Guard outfits and frequently find ways of putting
them in a bad light." One more article appeared the next
day, this one on frictions within the 37th between
Guardsmen, draftees and rotatees as a source of low morale,
blaming the problem on the Army's policy of "dumping three
distinct groups" into the division. Then the story faded
away.

Only the Beacon Journal aggressively followed the
story. None of the major papers in Cleveland, Cincinnati, or Columbus sent a reporter to Polk to check out the story. The Cleveland Plain Dealer did carry an article on 3 October headlined "Army Probe of Low Morale in 37th at Polk Discounted." It quoted a division spokesman that the Inspector General's investigation "comes as a complete surprise to us." The Plain Dealer contacted the Fourth Army's chief of staff, who denied rumors of disciplinary action against Kreber, adding that the Fourth Army Inspector General had investigated the charges in August and nothing came of it.\textsuperscript{122}

The 37th's problems reappeared in public with a 16 October Youngstown Vindicator story headlined "Youngstowners Charge 'Fix' in 37th Shipments." A soldier had called the paper the night before, claiming that there was an investigation at Polk, begun after complaints from men of Youngstown's Company D, 145th Infantry, of whether men on levy for Korea had bribed soldiers in the 37th's personnel section to change their orders to duty in Europe. In a follow up article the next day, Kreber was quoted as saying that while the final report was not in, he was satisfied that the charges were groundless and that no further action was being taken. According to the article, Kreber believed that the charge was the result of normal soldier complaints caused by being sent where they did not want to go.
Fourth Army’s Inspector General concluded its investigation of the 37th in late 1952. The investigation found no evidence of bribes influencing personnel assignments, of misconduct in the award of the book contract, of pressure on soldiers to buy the book, or "undue pressure" on officers to join the National Guard Association. The Inspector General did fault the division’s senior leadership for overemphasizing joining the NGA and purchasing the book, particularly the policy of granting duty day passes for units that had 100% subscription for the book.\textsuperscript{123}

These stories and rumors led to the 37th finally making the national media for the first time since a brief notice in \textit{The New York Times} on its alert notification the previous September. \textit{Newsweek}'s 20 October "Periscope" section included a paragraph headlined "Low Morale":

The National Guard is having morale trouble again. One major general is voluntarily returning to inactive status while a full-scale investigation is under way at Camp Polk, where the 37th Ohio Guard division is training. Favoritism and low-caliber officers seem to be at the bottom of the trouble.

Kreber did not respond publicly to these allegations. Instead, the 37th’s G-2, Lieutenant Colonel Archibald
Rodgers, wrote to *Newsweek*. Rodgers had served in the 37th throughout World War II, including a tour as Kreber's intelligence officer.

In the letter, published in the magazine's 24 November issue, Rodgers wrote that "my indignation arises from the reflection upon the officers as a group and on the division, not from any reflection on me personally." Rodgers, "as an individual without any official knowledge or sanction" admitted that "morale is not good in the 37th at the present time. At least it is not good by the standards of the 37th during World War II." But he noted that morale throughout the military was "far below the standards of World War II." Rodgers blamed this on the nature of a "'police action'", which did not "stimulate men to the achievements of a major war" or produce much interest among civilians. Last, Rodgers blamed a military "overburdened with red tape." The excerpt of the letter published concluded with "Yes, sir, morale is not as good in the 37th as it was when we were kicking around Japanese who outnumbered us in the Pacific, but I am certain that morale in the 37th is today far above the average for the Army."\(^{124}\)

In his 1952 command report, Kreber commented on the effects of the change of mission and the levies with his usual understated style: "The change of mission of the 37th Division caused an obvious drop in morale and
efficiency. As the dust settled from all this press notice, the new mission and the levies quickly swamped the 37th; by 31 December its trainee load was 2,019. Between 31 July and 31 December, the 37th's permanently assigned enlisted strength fell from 14,047 to 7,715. Officer strength in this period actually increased from 939 to 1,099, but that was deceptive. Many experienced officers came down on levy; their replacements were new second lieutenants sent to the 37th for a short tour of duty as instructors before going overseas. For all overseas theaters in 1952 the 37th provided 5,965 replacements, 59% of them going to Far East Command. By the end of 1952, the change of mission and the massive levies had wrecked the "Ohio" 37th Infantry Division.

A Year In Purgatory: Training Replacements for a Limited War

In late 1952, Kreber and his staff had believed that they could meet the replacement training mission by converting only the 148th Regimental Combat Team to a training formation. This would allow the rest of the division, even at reduced strength, to continue on with unit training and maintain the cadre essential for the division's return to a combat ready force. But the trainee load assigned to the 37th "expanded rapidly" and in January 1953
all three infantry regiments, all of the division artillery, and the 112th Engineer Battalion had to be converted to training replacements. The remainder of the division was placed in general support of these training formations. The number of trainees rose rapidly, from 4,678 to its peak in April 1953 of 10,261.127

During these four months, the division continued to lose permanent party (men assigned to the division, as opposed to men sent to Polk for training) to overseas levies---2,719 total, of which 64% went to the Far East. During this time it received few permanent replacements, and many of these were short-timer returnees from Korea, fresh graduates of advanced individual training (soon subject to levies themselves), misfits unloaded on the 37th by other units, and "a deluge" of brand new second lieutenants, also subject to levies and many still needing to attend their branch officer basic course.128

The 37th struggled on, its Ohio origin now reflected mainly by the division's senior staff and its three general officers. The division established its own schools to help its depleted and shaky cadre learn the skills needed to train the flood of replacements, perform the minimum housekeeping tasks required to keep the division running, and hold on to a shred of the ability to reconstitute the division as a combat unit. At times the 37th was so short

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of instructors that it had to borrow men from other units at Polk. The good instructors the division did possess had to work long hours and on weekends, unlike other units at Polk which operated almost in peacetime routines, leading to a "tendency for poor morale to develop." Shortages of equipment forced the division to consolidate most of it at division level. This meant that most equipment did not have a dedicated operator, resulting in a steady stream of users who could care less about maintaining the equipment and creating more work for the few skilled mechanics. Expendable supplies also were in shortage, including ammunition to the point the division had to restrict rifle firing to just trainees.129

With the July 1953 armistice in Korea, the demand for replacements slackened and the division began to look towards rebuilding itself as a combat ready force.110 The rebuilding effort started in November, as the last of the Ohio contingent began to reach their twenty-fourth month of active duty. On 1 January 1954 Kreber turned the 37th over to Major General Phillip D. Ginder, a Regular Army officer whose previous assignment had been commander of the 45th Infantry Division in Korea. Kreber returned to Columbus without fanfare, where Lausche again appointed him Ohio's Adjutant General.131

There is little available evidence on what Kreber
thought of his two years as a division commander in Federal service. He did recommend after the first year that "unit integrity at all levels be maintained as far as possible from activation to combat employment." Given Kreber’s efforts to prevent the stripping of his division, it is safe to say that the destruction of the 37th’s unit integrity was a major disappointment, made more bitter by the division’s excellent performance in combat during World War II under a Guard commander.

In 1952, the Ohio National Guard organized a shadow 37th Infantry Division, creating holding detachments that paralleled the company/battery organization of the 37th. These were designed to provide a home in the Ohio National Guard for men, mainly veterans and, after late 1953, men of the 37th released from active duty, who would be used to rebuild the 37th when it returned to Ohio. The Army endorsed this system in early 1954 by bringing these holding detachments into the NGUS system developed for the four Guard divisions mobilized in 1950. Shortly after his return from Federal service, Ohio established the 37th Infantry Division (NGUS) with Kreber as the commander.

On 15 June 1954 in a ceremony at Fort Riley, Kansas, the Army returned the 37th Infantry Division’s colors to Ohio, the now Regular Army division being redesignated the 10th Infantry Division. The next day the division in Ohio
dropped its NGUS suffix. The Ohio National Guard’s 37th Infantry Division was back home. Neither Kreber nor Lausche attended the ceremonies at Fort Riley.\textsuperscript{135}

Conclusion

For most Army National Guard units mobilized for the Korean War, their Federal service was deeply unsatisfying. Kept in the ZI either to guard against the Soviet Air Force or to reconstitute the General Reserve, these units soon fell victim to what John Kendall has so aptly described as the "inflexible response" of Army manpower planning. Having planned only for World War III, the Army instead had to wage a hot war in Korea while building up its forces for what it saw as the greater long-term threat, a cold war in Europe, doing both simultaneously with only a portion of the nation’s resources mobilized for these tasks.

Under these conditions, it was only a matter of time before hard-pressed Army planners would turn for relief to those Guard units not marked for immediate use in Korea. The decision to strip Guard units of trained manpower, along with the sometimes brutal use of the Inactive Reserves, offered the Army its only hope of dealing with the dilemma within which it found itself emeshed. However, this decision was a calculated risk, for it destroyed the combat readiness of almost the entire General Reserve and severely
compromised Army Antiaircraft Command. Had the Soviets come crashing across the Inner German Border or flying over the Arctic, or had American leaders wished to deploy Army forces elsewhere in harm's way, the Army's capacity to quickly and effectively respond would have been questionable.

None of these events did occur, so the Army survived this gamble. However, the Army's decisions on how to use mobilized Guard units in the Zone of the Interior left in its wake bitterness and distrust among Guardsmen, their families, and their supporters. These emotions would become one of the most powerful and most visible reactions to life "under Army orders" for the Army Guard during the Korean War.
1. By September 1951, mobilized Guard units were either assigned to or on orders to the following areas:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th># Mobilized</th>
<th>Far East</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>ZI</th>
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<td>Division</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>AAA Gun Bn</td>
<td>43</td>
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<td>40</td>
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<tr>
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<td>26</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truck Co</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
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<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>SRMU</td>
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<td>25</td>
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<td>Band</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>15</td>
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<td>AAA Group HQs</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to these three main areas, part of one regimental combat team was sent to Iceland; one regimental combat team was stationed on Puerto Rico; and one regimental combat team and an ordnance company were sent to Alaska. "Directory and Station List of the United States Army, 4 September 1951," copy in U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
2. The Army ordered two other National Guard MP battalions to active duty during 1950, the 174th from Missouri, which remained in the ZI, and the 175th from Kansas, which deployed to Germany. These five were all the organized MP battalions in the Guard in 1950. (There were four other MP battalions on the Guard troop list, but they had not yet been organized by 1950.) Unlike some other branches, mobilized Guard units would only make up a small part of the Army's MP strength during the Korean War. By September 1951, the Army had a total of 24 MP battalions (5 in Far East Command, 8 in Europe, 11 in the ZI), 6 battalion headquarters detachments (all in Far East Command), and 85 separate companies (34 in Far East Command, 18 in Europe, 33 in the ZI). National Guard Bureau, "Induction & Release of Army National Guard Units 1950-1956," copy in U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.; Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1950 (Washington: National Guard Bureau, 1951); The Adjutant General, "Directory and Station List of the United States Army, 4 September 1951," copy in the U.S. Army War College Library, Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

3. Command Report, 1950, 163d MP Battalion, Box 9 (Military Police), RG 338, NA; William F. Dyer, compiler, "168th M.P. Battalion;" Command Report, 1950, 171st MP Battalion, Box 4718, RG 407, NA. Mr. William Donnegan, Brentwood, Tennessee, a veteran of the 168th, kindly provided me Mr. Dyer's work. In 1940, the regimental headquarters and Company A of the 372d Infantry were in the District of Columbia.

4. National Guard Register for 1939 and 1951. Born in New York, Weber graduated from the University of Maryland in 1933. That same year, while still a Guardsman, he accepted a commission as an infantry second lieutenant in the Army Reserve. The next year he left the Guard, but in 1936 he resigned his Reserve commission and reenlisted in the Guard. In 1937 he accepted an infantry lieutenant's commission in the National Guard of the United States, a rank he would hold only upon mobilization. Commissioned into the Tennessee Guard as an infantry major in 1947, the 168th's O'Connell was promoted to lieutenant colonel in March 1950.

5. This and the preceding paragraph are based on a comparison of units' officer rosters with the 1951 National Guard Register. The 168th had five officers commissioned in the Guard in 1950 and two after alert notification; the 171st had three and three, respectively. The 163d's commander was a 1942 graduate of the special wartime course at the Command and General Staff School.
6. Command Reports, 1950, 163d, 168th and 171st MP Battalions; O&M Branch, National Guard Bureau, "National Guard Units Alerted by Order of the Secretary of the Army," File 325.42 Gen, Box 1083, Army National Guard Bureau Decimal File 1949-1950, RG 168, NA.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number on hand/number authorized</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Warrants</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
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<td>25/36</td>
<td>4/9</td>
<td>365/748</td>
</tr>
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<td>24/25</td>
<td>6/6</td>
<td>281/689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>171st</td>
<td>26/34</td>
<td>4/9</td>
<td>291/748</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Command Reports, 1950, 163d, 168th 171st MP Battalions; "MP Battalion From District Is Federalized," Washington Post, September 4, 1950, p.IB. The 171st converted from Guard to Regular Army supply procedures "with considerable difficulty, due to the lack of necessary forms, pertinent publications and unfamiliarity of supply personnel with Army personnel." It had to rent typewriters to deal with all the paperwork involved.


9. Provost Marshal Section, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, Memorandum for Chief of Army Field Forces, 5 April 1951, Subject: Report of Inspection of Military Police and Military Government Units and Staff Sections, Office of the Provost Marshal General, Fifth Army; and Second Army Area, 23 March-3 April 1951, Box 33 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; Command Report, 1950, 171st MP Battalion. Colonel Blackwell commented to the AFF team that McCoy was "entirely unsatisfactory for this particular unit."

10. In addition to MP skills, the battalions used service schools and courses at their training site to train Guardsmen in various other skills such as supply, maintenance, and administration. Command Reports, 1950, 163d, 168th, and 171st MP Battalions.

11. Command Report, 1950, 168th MP Battalion. O'Connell was so pleased with this move that at the end of 1950 he contemplated doing the same with his NCOs. There is no mention of a similar shuffling by the commanders of the 163d and 171st, perhaps because these battalions, drawn from urban America, did not have the kin networks often found in Guard units drawn from small town America, as was the 168th.

12. Command Reports, 1950, 163d, 168th, 171st MP Battalions; Command Report, 1951, 171st MP Battalion, Box 5307, RG 407, NA. Because of racial segregation policies, five white officers assigned to the 171st in 1951 were soon transferred out of the battalion, even though at the time the battalion had only 60% of
its authorized officer strength.

13. Ibid. The 168th received more fillers in November, the 163d in December. The 163d found its 30 new fillers to be "excellent," having been "carefully screened" for service with the military police. The 171st had the greatest problem, receiving 101 fillers in December. Unit Journal, December 1950, 171st MP Battalion, Box 9 (Military Police), RG 338, NA.


16. Indeed, short timers often harmed units, as the 171st's commander noted: "Many men holding T/O&E positions have been deprived of promotion because of Korean rotatees and other personnel have been transferred in grade into the battalion." Command Report, 1951, 171st MP Battalion.

17. Command Reports, 1951, 163d, 168th, 171st MP Battalions; "Report of Inspection of Military Police and Military Government Units and Staff Sections;" "D.C. Soldier Killed, Three Hurt in Korea," Washington Post, July 8, 1952, p.22. Of the 1,126 enlisted assigned to the 171st in December 1951, 346 had scored below 70 on the AGCT. Not all untrained enlisted fillers remained with their battalion; often after completing basic training, these fillers would be used to meet levies. Newly assigned junior officers often spent little time with the unit and, except in the 171st, often were in excess to the number of available slots. At the end of 1951, seventeen of thirty-five company grade officers assigned to the 168th were not in a T/O slot, being carried instead as unassigned, casual, student, or in transit.

18. Ibid. The 168th's detachment at Hampton Roads began with two officers and forty enlisted on ninety days temporary duty. By December 1951, the detachment's size was down to twenty-one enlisted.


22. For an analysis of the detrimental effects of administrative military police duties on combat readiness, see Provost Marshal Section, Office, Chief of Army Field Forces, "Report of Staff Visit and Inspection of Military Police Units in Second Army," 15 November 1951, Box 33 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

23. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Command Report, 1952, 163d, 168th, 171st MP Battalions, Box (Military Police), RG 338, NA. Between January and June 1952, the 163d lost 29 officers and 264 enlisted to levies, 6 officers and 107 enlisted to discharges, and received 11 officer and 354 enlisted fillers.

24. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Command Report, 1951, 168th MP Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 163d MP Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 171st MP Battalion; Headquarters Journal, 1952, 171st MP Battalion, Box 9 (MP Battalions), RG 338, NA. The 171st was the only one of the three battalions to keep a Guard commander while on active duty. Colonel Blackwell remained in command until April 1952, when he left active duty, replaced by his Guard executive officer. In the 168th, Colonel O'Connell was replaced first by a Reserve major and then, in early 1952 after his graduation from the Officer Advanced Course at the PMG School, a Reserve lieutenant colonel. Colonel Weber left the 163d in August 1951, replaced at first by his Guard executive officer and then in January 1952 by Regular Army lieutenant colonel.

The 163d seconded the 171st's observations: the "continual and repetitious training" and the "continual and sporadic shipment of replacements" had during 1952 "to some degree created a morale problem" and "adversely affected efficiency and the establishment of an esprit de corps."

25. By June 1950, there were the following organized Guard AAA units: fifty 90mm gun battalions, five 120mm gun battalions, thirty-eight automatic weapons battalions, forty-one group headquarters, twelve brigade headquarters, twelve operations detachments, and twenty-five signal radar maintenance units (SRMU). One group and one brigade headquarters, two operations detachments, four automatic weapons battalions, and fifteen SRMUs were on the troop list, but had not yet been organized. Annual Report of the Chief, National Guard Bureau, Fiscal Year Ending 30 June 1950 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), pp.54-74.

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On early postwar air defense planning, see Colonel Stephen
P. Moeller, "Vigilant and Invincible: United States Army Air
I wish to thank Ms Patricia M. Rhodes, Air Defense Artillery
Branch Historian at Ft. Bliss, Texas, for bringing this article
to my attention. On war planning, see Steven T. Ross, American
War Plans, 1945-1950: Strategies for Defeating the Soviet Union

26. National Guard Bureau, "Induction and Release of Army
National Guard Units, 1950-1956," copy in U.S. Army Center of
Military History; Memorandum, 23 February 1951, from Inspector of
Artillery to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Report of
Inspection of AAA Units, Camp Stewart, Georgia, 19-21 February
1951," Box 40 (Inspection Reports) RG 337, NA. The AAA group
headquarters were the 197th (New Hampshire), 209th (New York),
216th (Minnesota), and 224th (Virginia). The operations
detachments were the 105th (New York), 115th (Washington), 151st
(Pennsylvania), 172d (Connecticut), and 173d (Massachusetts).
The 90mm gun battalions were the 101st (Georgia), 102d (New
York), 213th (Pennsylvania), 238th (Connecticut), 250th
(Georgia), 703d (Maine), 705th (Rhode Island), 707th
(Pennsylvania), 710th (Virginia), 711th (Alabama), 713th (South
Carolina), 715th (New York), 736th (Delaware), and 745th
(Connecticut).

Born in 1893, an enlisted Guardsman during the Mexican
Border Crisis, commissioned in the infantry during World War I,
Curtis had been a Guard coast artillery officer since 1922.
Ordered to active duty as a colonel in 1940, he had commanded the
51st (then an Army of the United States formation) in combat
during the 1944-1945 campaign in northwestern Europe. Returning
home, he accepted a Guard brigadier general’s commission in 1946
and Governor Edward Martin appointed him commander of the AAA
brigade assigned to Pennsylvania. After "a short delay," the new
brigade received the lineage of the wartime 51st AAA Brigade.
The 51st had been organized at Fort Bliss, Texas in February
1943 and inactivated in December 1945 at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
Headquarters Units and Operations Detachments, 51st AAA Brigade
(Atlanta: Albert Love, 1951), p.33; Shelby L. Stanton, Order of
Battle U.S. Army World War II, (Novato, California: Presidio
Press, 1984), p.430; National Guard Register for 1951. Many of
the units Army Field Forces assigned to the 51st at Stewart had
stronger connections to the 1940 Guard. The splitting of Guard
coast artillery regiments during World War II into separate
battalions gave postwar Guard AAA units a rich source upon which
to draw their lineages. For example, the 197th and 216th Groups
headquarters descended from the 197th and 216th Coast Artillery
Regiments, the 703d AAA Battalion descended from the 243d Coast
Artillery Regiment, and the 173d Operations Detachment descended

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from the 241st Coast Artillery Regiment.

27. National Guard Register 1951. The 216th Group’s commander had been a Guard field artillery officer from 1925 to 1946, while his executive officer (XO) had been commissioned a Reserve coast artilleryman in 1939, but rebranched into the infantry during the war, and the operations officer, after five years enlisted Guard service, had been commissioned a coast artilleryman during the war. The 197th Group’s commander had been a coast artillery officer since 1931, his XO since 1939 (and graduated from the AAA Officer Advanced Course in 1945), and the operations officer since 1937.

Experience in the 90mm AAA gun battalions also varied. In the 703d AAA (Maine), the commander had been commissioned a Guard coast artilleryman in 1938, but had spent much of the war as an adjutant general officer, returning to the Guard and coast artillery in 1947. Both his XO and operations officer had enlisted in the Guard in 1939 and been commissioned as coast artillerymen during the war, though the operations officer had only rejoined the Guard in June 1950. In the 705th AAA (Rhode Island), the commander had enlisted in the Guard in 1940, then received a Guard coast artillery commission shortly before mobilization in 1940. His XO had eleven years Guard enlisted service before he too received a Guard coast artillery commission shortly before mobilization in 1940, while the operations officer had seven years enlisted Guard service before he also received a Guard coast artillery commission in 1940. In the 710th AAA (Virginia), the commander had served three years as an enlisted Guardsman, held a Reserve field artillery commission for five years, and served four years during the war as a Marine Corps officer before receiving a Guard coast artillery major’s commission in 1946. The battalion XO had been commissioned a Reserve coast artilleryman in 1941, served four years on active duty during the war, and been commissioned a Guard coast artillery lieutenant in 1946; the operations officer had been commissioned in the infantry during the war and as a Guard coast artilleryman in 1948. In the 715th AAA (New York), the commander had served four years as an enlisted Guardsman before receiving a Guard infantry commission. Rebranched a coast artillery officer shortly before mobilization two years later, he ended the war a captain and was commissioned a Guard coast artillery major in 1948. The XO had enlisted in the Guard and been commissioned a coast artillery officer shortly before mobilization in 1941, attended the AAA Officer Advanced Course in 1945, and rejoined the Guard in 1948 as a coast artillery major; the operations officer had been commissioned into the chemical warfare service during the war and commissioned as a Guard coast artillery officer in 1949.

Each 90mm AAA gun battalion had four firing batteries; of
the sixteen battery commanders, only one in the 705th and two in the 715th served during World War II as coast artillery officers. Of the remaining thirteen commanders, all had been commissioned during the war: five in the Army Air Forces, three in the infantry, three in the field artillery, and two in the quartermaster corps. Of the remaining battery grade officers in the battalions, two in the 703d, five in the 705th, one in the 710th, and three in the 715th served as coast artillery officers during the war. Eighteen others were commissioned during the war; infantry, with seven, was the most numerous wartime branch. The 703d had six World War II enlisted veterans commissioned into the postwar Guard, the 705th one, the 710th three and the 715th five. Only the 710th had officers, both 1947 VMI graduates, without military service during World War II. The 705th had two officers commissioned after receiving the alert notice in July 1950, the 710th also two, and the 715th four. (The 703d had two officers who resigned from the Reserve and took Guard commissions after the alert notification.) In the 115th Operations Detachment, assigned to the 216th Group, the commander had been commissioned in the infantry during World War II, becoming an AAA officer only in 1947; the operations officer had the same career. In the 172d Operations Detachment, assigned to the 197th Group, the commander had been a coast artillery officer since 1936, graduating from the Coast Artillery National Guard Officer’s Course in 1940, and the operations officer had been commissioned in the coast artillery during the war, joining the Guard in 1948.

28. For example, units had M1 or M1A1 90mm guns instead of the newer M2 models, M7 instead of M9 directors, and older models of other equipment such as power generators. The 715th AAA had twelve of its sixteen authorized 90mm guns (nine of the twelve on hand were unserviceable) and only eight of its twenty authorized tractors. On the other hand, the 703d AAA had 100% of its 90mm guns and tractors on hand when mobilized. When the 710th AAA first fired its M1A1 90mm guns in December, evaluation of the weapons showed that 70% of them were unfit for combat operations. Lieutenant Donald Perkins, mobilized in 1950 as part of New Mexico’s 716th AAA Gun Battalion, recalled that his battery had only one of its four 90mm guns. Command Report, 1950, 197 AAA Group, Box 4589, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 209th AAA Group, Box 4589, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 715th AAA Battalion, Box 4576, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 703d AAA Battalion, Box 4576, RG 407, NA; Command Report, 1950, 710th AAA Battalion, Box 4576, RG 407, NA; Donald Perkins, Korean War Veterans Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute.
29. The prewar Guard reduced tables of organization meant that all units needed some fillers to reach the levels called for by full-strength tables of organization. However, the brigade's units entered active duty with significant differences in strength (figures are in Officers/Warrants/Enlisted):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Full Strength</th>
<th>August 1950</th>
<th>% Full</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>197th Group HQs</td>
<td>14/7/84</td>
<td>13/3/70</td>
<td>88.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>209th Group HQs</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>10/5/65</td>
<td>76.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>703d Battalion</td>
<td>31/7/767</td>
<td>30/7/552</td>
<td>73.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>705th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>23/5/299</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>21/7/336</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>713th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>27/2/593</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>715th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>26/4/382</td>
<td>51.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>736th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>22/5/293</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>745th Battalion</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>26/7/432</td>
<td>57.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Unit Command Reports for 1950.

California's 746th AAA Gun Battalion, a 120mm gun battalion sent to Ft. Lewis after mobilization, noted that recalled enlisted Reservists assigned to the battalion were invaluable, filling many key NCO positions "with excellent results." Command Report, 1950, 746th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4576, RG 407, NA.

30. The most notable cadre training was brigade schools on radar and the 90mm gun. These were designed to standardize training in subordinate units to be conducted later under the ATP; 120 men attended gun school and 90 the radar school.


32. James D. Christie, Korean War Veterans Survey, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; Letter, 11 August 1950, Walter Hayes to Brigadier General George M. Carter, Walter Hayes Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania. (Hayes had served during World War II with the 703d's coast artillery predecessor; in 1950 he was the 703d's personnel officer and, before mobilization, had worked as a civilian unit administrator for the battalion.) In a 12 October 1950 letter to Carter, Hayes added.
that Curtis was a "very strict disciplinarian. He sure keeps us jumping." General Carter was Maine's Adjutant General. Curtis's decision caused considerable grumbling from some units, like the 703d, forced to transfer equipment. Hayes, in a 1 February 1951 letter to the Assistant Adjutant General of Maine, wrote that now "we are left in a bad way and have to borrow equipment when we fire---it just doesn't work out." However, the 197th Group noted that these transfers of equipment eased the maintenance burden on the well-equipped units, as the demands of schools and training fillers had left few qualified mechanics available to work on their equipment. Command Report, 1950, 197th AAA Group.


34. Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion of training at Stewart during October-December 1950 is based on the command reports of the 51st AAA Brigade, the 197th and 209th AAA Groups, and the AAA battalions.

35. Command Report, 1950, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1950, 703d AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1950, 710th AAA Gun Battalion. The standard basic training cycle at this time in the Regular Army was fourteen weeks.


37. Ibid.

38. Letter, 12 October 1950, Hayes to Brigadier General Carter, Hayes Papers, USAMHI. This situation was not unique to Stewart; on many of the World War II posts put into standby status after V-J Day, the government made some extra money by allowing local farmers to use post property to graze their livestock.

39. All the battalion command reports for 1950 comment on the unreadiness of Camp Stewart as a training site for mobilized units.


41. For 90mm gun battalions, the full strength personnel authorization was 31 officers, 7 warrants, and 723 enlisted; the reduced personnel authorization was 23 officers, 8 warrant
officers and 572 enlisted. Command Report, 1951, 705th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4789, RG 407, NA.

42. The 746th AAA at Ft. Lewis also received untrained fillers in December, forcing it to set up a separate training detachment with cadre drawn from the battalion. In addition to its own 199 recruits, 5th AAA Group assigned it an additional 154 recruits just for basic training.

43. Command Reports, 1950, 703d and 736th AAA Gun Battalions.

44. Letter, 1 February 1951, Hayes to Colonel Hart (Assistant Adjutant General of Maine), Hayes Papers, USAMHI; Command Report, 1950, 51st AAA Brigade.

45. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group, Box 4815, RG 407, NA.


48. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 209th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 705th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. The 746th AAA at Ft Lewis faced similar problems. In February 1951, it received two shipments of recruits, of 450 and 550 respectively, attached to the battalion for only basic training. Command Report, 1951, 746th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 4790, RG 407, NA.

49. Ibid. The 715th AAA suffered another training distractor in March, when the 82d Airborne Division's 80th Airborne AAA Battalion came to Stewart for its service practice firing. The paratroopers provoked fights in clubs with soldiers of the 715th. The Third Army AAA Training Center had many criticisms of how the 80th conducted its service practice and the battalion's overall discipline; the battalion's light observation plane landed on Georgia Route 144, a two-lane highway that runs through Stewart. Memorandum, Colonel J.F. Howell to Chief, Army Field Forces,
50. Sources for this paragraph are the same as for note 49. The areas defended included Chicago, Pittsburgh, upstate New York, New York City, Philadelphia, Boston, the upper Great Lakes, and the District of Columbia. By September 1951, the units that had come together at Stewart in September 1950 were stationed as follows: 51st Brigade, Chicago; 197th Group, Ft. Banks, Massachusetts; 209th Group, Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania; 216th Group, Camp McCoy, Wisconsin; 224th Group, Fort Dix, New Jersey; 101st AAA Bn, Camp McCoy; 102d AAA Bn, Indiantown Gap; 213th AAA Bn, Fort Dix; 238th AAA Bn, Fort Devens, Massachusetts; 250th AAA Bn, Fort Custer, Michigan; 703d AAA Bn, Fort Hancock, New Jersey; 705th AAA Bn, Indiantown Gap; 707th AAA Bn, Fort Dix; 710th AAA Bn, Fort Myer, Virginia; 711th AAA Bn, Fort Custer; 713th AAA Bn, Camp McCoy; 715th AAA Bn, Fort Totten, New York; 736th AAA Bn, Fort Meade, Maryland; 745th AAA Bn, Fort Banks. "Directory and Station List, 4 September 1951."


52. "Directory and Station List, 4 September 1951." Army Antiaircraft Command's largest commitment was to defending New York City, with four 90mm and two 120mm gun battalions. The next most heavily defended sites were Washington, D.C., with two 120mm and two 90mm gun battalions, and the Hanford, Washington nuclear weapons production facility, with four 120mm gun battalions. An inspection trip in early August 1951 by an officer on the staff of Army Field Forces' Inspector of Artillery revealed serious problems with the operational readiness of AAA units in New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. Of the seven AAA gun battalions (six Guard and one Regular Army) visited, the highest readiness rate was 67%, the lowest 44%, and the average was 56%.

Memorandum, 15 August 1951, Lieutenant Colonel Page E. Smith to Chief, Army Field Forces, Subject: "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units at Fort Totten, N.Y.; Fort Tilden, N.Y.; Fort Banks, Massachusetts; Fort Devens, Massachusetts; Indiantown Gap Military Reservation, Pennsylvania; and Headquarters Eastern Army Antiaircraft Command, Middleton, N.Y. during the period 7-11 August 1951," Box 28 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

53. Sometimes the rushed nature of establishing the AAA network worked to a unit's advantage; the 51st Brigade enlisted lived in a Chicago hotel. Army Antiaircraft Command, moving from New York to Colorado in January 1951 to collocate with the Air Force's Air
Defense Command, could not find room at Ent Air Force Base and thus moved into the basement of a hotel in nearby Colorado Springs. Moeller, "Vigilant and Invincible," p.12; Command Report, 1952, 51st AAA Brigade, Box 5539, RG 407, NA; James Christie, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI. On constructing an AAA defense plan, see Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group. Units developed AAA defense plans to doctrinal standards, without always having all the necessary units and equipment on hand. Also, units had the handicap that AAA defense of major urban and industrial areas had not been a significant part of the training conducted under the ATP. Command Report, 1951, 713th AAA Gun Battalion.


55. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion; "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units, 7-11 August 1951." Recently reopened posts posed another problem in that they lacked existing stockpiles of forms, manuals and office supplies. The 703d had to beg forms from nearby posts and individuals had to buy office supplies with their own money. A major problem in this area was that the battalion "has been unable to draw a single paper clip since its arrival at Fort Hancock and paper clip snitching is prevalent in the battalion headquarters."

56. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. One basic load of AAA ammunition was usually kept on the site. The 736th AAA recommended that firing batteries be permanently based at their field firing positions, both for a more efficient response to air attacks and to "impress upon the troops the importance of their mission." The 713th AAA ended its long commute in November 1951 when it moved from Camp McCoy to Ft. Sheridan in Chicago. Command Report, 1951, 713th AAA Gun Battalion. Two of the 715th AAA's firing batteries had sites built on garbage fills. Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion.

57. The Army Field Forces standard for an AAA gun battalion was four live fire exercises a year: three service practices and the Army Training Test. With infrequent opportunities for live fire service practices, poor weather at the service practice site that grounded target aircraft could have a significant effect on maintaining combat readiness. Despite these problems, the 745th AAA Battalion found that firing battery training on remote sites "developed a high degree of initiative among the firing batteries." Operations detachments made extensive use of
"canned" exercises and radar crews frequently practiced by tracking civilian aircraft, but this was only a partial solution, as civilian aircraft rarely flew at the courses, speeds, and altitudes expected of enemy bombers. Some units, like the 736th AAA Battalion, kept sharp by helping non-mobilized Guard units during those units' summer training. Units of the 197th AAA Group, once on site in Massachusetts, had a unique training distractor: supporting Project Lincoln, an Air Force study of air defense run by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 209 AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 713th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 745th AAA Gun Battalion; "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units, 7-11 August."

58. One of the most important transfers occurred in the 705th AAA. The commanding general of Eastern Army Antiaircraft Command was so impressed by the 705th that in August 1951 he had the battalion commander transferred to his staff to lead a special training inspection team within the command. Command Report, 1951, 705th AAA Gun Battalion. In the 736th AAA, fifteen Guardsmen were discharged during 1951 for expiration of term of service. Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion.

59. Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 745th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 715th AAA Gun Battalion; "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units, 7-11 August;" Letter, 19 July 1951, Hayes to Colonel L.M. Hart, Hayes Papers, USAMHI. By the end of 1951, only 39% of the enlisted Guardsmen inducted with the battalion remained with the 736th AAA.

60. Letter, 18 May 1951, Hayes to Colonel L.M. Hart, Hayes Papers, USAMHI.

61. Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. See also Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 745th AAA Gun Battalion; "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units, 7-11 August;" Letter, 19 July 1951, Hayes to Colonel L.M. Hart, Hayes Papers, USAMHI. By the end of 1951, only 39% of the enlisted Guardsmen inducted with the battalion remained with the 736th AAA.

Adding salt to the wounds, many of the AAA qualified officers and enlisted levied for overseas service did not serve in AAA units overseas. The 713th AAA found that of 106 enlisted sent overseas from the battalion, only 16 went to AAA gun battalions and only 9 went to AAA automatic weapons units. Command Report, 1951, 713th AAA Gun Battalion. Many of these AAA soldiers ended up in Field Artillery units because the Army in 1947 began consolidating the Coast Artillery and Field Artillery into a single Artillery branch. This arrangement did not work
out, as the technical skills required in AAA were rather different from those required in field artillery. See the discussion in chapter three concerning the 45th Division Artillery and separate FA battalions in Korea. For the experience of an enlisted Guard AAA soldier sent to a field artillery unit in Korea, see William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953* (Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: White Mane Publishing, 1996), pp.251-252. On the merger of the two branches, see Boyd L. Dastrup, *King of Battle: A Branch History of the U.S. Army's Field Artillery* (Fort Monroe, Virginia: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), 244-246, 288-290.

The low point for the 703d AAA was July, when it had only 14 officers present for duty. Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion. The loss of trained personnel to overseas levies also affected AAA units in the western half of the United States. See Command Report, 1951, 746th AAA Gun Battalion.

62. Command Report, 1951, 209th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion. Promised 150 enlisted replacements from basic training centers after arriving at Ft. Hancock, the 703d received only 110 men. Because of the Army's racial segregation policy, the 715th AAA was never short of enlisted, though their degree of training and experience often was on the same level as white battalions. The 715th, like white battalions, suffered from a shortage of officers. At the end of 1951, the 715th had 27 officers, 7 warrants and 728 enlisted. During the year, its officer strength had dipped as low as thirteen present for duty. Command Report, 1951, 715th AAA Gun Battalion.


64. The "majority" of officer replacements received by the 736th AAA during 1951 were Category IV-17 Reservists. (Category IV-17 meant that the officer had been recalled for seventeen months.) Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. The 703d AAA, in the last quarter of 1951 received fourteen new officers; seven were Reservists, four were Korean rotatees, and three were returnees from elsewhere overseas. Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion.

65. During 1951, the 736th AAA received twenty-seven rotatees from Korea after the battalion arrived at Ft. Meade. Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion.
66. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. The 736th's commander ended his command report by noting "that morale is not necessarily a result of physical surroundings; it is based on spirit within the unit, belief in the ability of the unit, and belief in the unit's mission." The 197th AAA Group organized a troop information program designed to "acquaint personnel with the reasons which lie behind these equipment shortages to include the overall military objectives of the United States and its obligations in other parts of the world. It is believed that this effort has been beneficial in the sense that problems, if understood, do not loom so large." Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group.

67. Command Report, 1951, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1951, 705th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 736th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1951, 713th AAA Gun Battalion; "Report of Staff Visit to AAA Units, 7-11 August 1951." The 716th AAA's Lieutenant Donald Perkins recalled that even when his battery had its requisition for three 90mm guns filled, he "was always upset by the condition of my guns. Those 90mm guns were beyond service life, which affected their accuracy adversely." Perkins, Korean War Veterans Survey, USAMHI.

68. Ibid. When it switched back to the SCR-584 radar and M9 director at its service practice, the 703d's score was the best fired by a 90mm gun battalion in the 16th AAA Group. Command Report, 1951, 703d AAA Gun Battalion.

69. Berebitsky, A Very Long Weekend, pp.237-238, 242-245. The 227 AAA Group, mobilized in May 1951, arrived in Korea in March 1952 and controlled six AAA battalions in the air defense of the southern part of the country. The 213th AAA Gun Battalion, mobilized in August 1950 and trained at Stewart, arrived in Korea in November 1951; two firing batteries were stationed at Pusan and two at Inchon. The 773d AAA Gun Battalion, mobilized in May 1951, arrived in Korea in October 1952 and guarded the K-55 airbase near Osan.

70. Command Report, 1951, 705th AAA Gun Battalion; "Directory and Station List 4 September 1951." The Guardsmen of the 705th remained on Okinawa until May 1952, when they were phased-out for return to the ZI and the newly activated 85th AAA Gun Battalion took over the unit's site, equipment, and non-Guard personnel. The senior returning Guardsmen recommended that "no unit should be sent overseas with such a short anticipated tour. Orientation is no sooner finished and constructive value toward the command realized when the tour is completed." Command Report, 1952,
705th AAA Gun Battalion, box 5521, RG 407, NA.

71. Command Report, 197th AAA Group, Box 5559, RG 407, NA. The 715th AAA, as part of the air defense of New York City, had an additional problem with Korean rottees and others with little active duty time left to serve when they reported in to the battalion. Many of these soldiers "overstayed passes and furloughs in an attempt to reconnoiter civilian prospects for employment." Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion.


73. Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion. From the AAA School at Ft. Bliss, the 715th AAA received 118 graduates of basic training; the battalion received an additional 139 enlisted transferred from elsewhere in the ZI and from overseas. The Guard commander of the battalion was returned to the executive officer position, replaced in February with a lieutenant colonel. (Major John Y. Woodruff had entered active duty as the executive officer, but took command later in 1950 at Stewart when the battalion commander was relieved.)

74. Inspections, and preparing for inspections, by all the echelons above battalion also consumed a good deal of time and effort, as did parades and other public relations activities. Command Report, 1952, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1952, 713th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion. The 715th AAA reported problems in manning its operations center, as the "best available men" in the battalion were "in great demand in the individual batteries;" when a good crew in the center had been put together, personnel turbulence would then break it up. As a result, the battalion developed a system where the target plots from the brigade operations center went directly to firing batteries on remote sites as well as to the battalion operations center.

75. Command Report, 1952, 713th AAA Gun Battalion, Box 5523, RG 407, NA.

76. Alerts for the under-equipped units could be difficult. When the AFF's Artillery Inspector, a major general, visited the air defenses around New York City in January 1952, he ordered all the battalions to move out to their firing positions. The 703d AAA's Chief Hayes wrote home that "[E]veryone gather up their broken down equipment, assembled what rolling stock was available and made a bee-line for their positions. Regardless of my description, it went off beautifully. Can't help wondering tho' what those poor fellas are doing to keep warm tonite---no tents, stoves and only half equipped with sleeping bags." Letter, 30
January 1952, Hayes to Colonel Elliot C. Goodwin, USAMHI.

77. Command Report, 1952, 197th AAA Group; Command Report, 1952, 713th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. Rotates from Korea remained a problem, both with their motivation and because so many continued to arrive without AAA specific MOSs. Efforts to get those rotatees with significant time remaining in service to attend service schools to learn AAA MOSs met with, the 713th AAA found, with an "unsatisfactory" response form Korean veterans.

78. Command Report, 1952, 713th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 715th AAA Gun Battalion; Command Report, 1952, 736th AAA Gun Battalion. The 715th also had requisitions for M2 90mm guns and M33 radars that were not filled before the Guard phase-out.

79. Figures are Officers/Warrants/Enlisted:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1952</th>
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<tr>
<td>713th AAA Bn</td>
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<td>7/1/280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>715th AAA Bn</td>
<td>26/4/382</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>197th AAA Gp</td>
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<td>3/2/31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


82. The other divisions were the 31st (Mississippi/Alabama) and 47th (Minnesota/North Dakota), mobilized in early 1951, and the 44th (Illinois), mobilized with the 37th in early 1952. "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units."
The quote is from a letter from Governor Frank Lausche of Ohio to Mrs. Bessie Mutersbaugh, February 21, 1952, File 1952 Adjutant General-General, Box 8, Frank Lausche Papers, Ohio Historical Society.


84. The 37th’s leadership during the interwar period stressed the need for developing military skills, while the Ohio National Guard’s interwar leaders, astute players in Ohio politics since much of their budget came from the state, also kept the Ohio Guard "reasonably well funded" and maintained good relations with both political parties. Robert L. Daugherty, Weathering the Peace: The Ohio National Guard in the Interver Years, 1919-1940 (Laeham, Maryland: 1992). Quotation is from pp.202-203.

Many of the senior officers and senior non-commissioned officers of the 37th in 1951 had served under Beightler during World War II. The standard account of the 37th’s World War II service is Stanley A. Frankel, The 37th Infantry Division In World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948). On Beightler's very determined, and largely successful efforts to maintain the 37th’s Guard and Ohio character, see William M. Donnelly, "Keeping the Buckeye in the Buckeye Division: Major General Robert S. Beightler and the 37th Infantry Division, 1940-1945," Ohio History, forthcoming.


By 1951, the division had 92 company/battery sized units in 56 Ohio communities. Forty-one communities only had one unit each while Cincinnati had the most with fourteen. The organization of the 37th and the distribution of its units in Ohio are based on the listing of units and their home stations in Riehm, Pictorial History. The 137th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion was manned by African-Americans, the first time they had been allowed to serve in the previously all-white division.
86. Cooper’s decorations included the Silver Star and the Purple Heart. National Guard Register 1951; NGB, General Officers, p.18; Riehm, Pictorial History, p.6.

After such long service together, the two men worked well with each other and often adopted a "good cop/bad cop" style. Physically a much more imposing man than Kreber, Cooper was a "General Patton type person" and artillery expert. Most people respected his abilities but were afraid of him. Cooper’s two trademark signatures were his dog Bozo, who followed him everywhere, and an intense dislike of the Regular Army. The close relationship between Kreber and Cooper also led to a marginalization of the Assistant Division Commander’s role. In 1951, this was Brigadier General Cecil Whitcomb. Born in 1899, Whitcomb enlisted in the 145th in 1917, served in France with the 37th, rejoined the 145th in 1921, and was commissioned in the Guard in 1922. At mobilization in 1940, he commanded a battalion in the 145th; in 1943 he took command of the 145th and led it in combat until May 1945, after which he served as an assistant division chief of staff and a staff officer in Army Ground Forces. Returning to Ohio, he became Assistant Division Commander in 1946.

87. Riehm, Pictorial History, p.18-19; National Guard Register 1951.

88. National Guard Register 1951.

89. National Guard Register 1951.

91. Only Szorady had been to a branch officer course. National Guard Register 1951.

91. Lowell D. Black, "The Negro Volunteer Militia Units of the Ohio National Guard, 1870-1954: The Struggle for Military Recognition and Equality in the State of Ohio" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1976), pp.338-343. Of the twenty-two other officers identified in the 137th, ten had been officers during World War II, though none had experience as a coast artillery officer during the war. Two had been enlisted in the 372d Infantry in 1940. One was a 1944 graduate of the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course, three were postwar graduates of the Artillery Officer Associate Officer Basic Course, and one had graduated from the AAA Associate Officer Basic Course. National Guard Register 1951.
92. Twenty to twenty-five per cent of the division's NCOs were veterans and the division assigned them to key positions. The division faced the typical problems among its junior enlisted of high turnover (estimated at between 30 to 40% for 1949) and a lack of experience. A National Guard Bureau inspection team at the 1949 summer training commented that it "was most evident that the large majority of the enlisted personnel were very young."

"Report of Visit to Civilian Components Summer Tng Activities by LTC Cotter, GSC, Classification & Stds Branch, Pers. & Admin Div, 6 AUG 49", File 333.4 Gen 1949, Box 1087, RG 168, NA; "Training Survey Class A Ratings Army National Guard 1950", File 353 General 1951, Box 1293, RG 168, NA.


94. Riehm, Pictorial History, p.13. Clark wrote that the 37th had "enjoyed a profitable training period" at McCoy and that the training had shown the signs of effective prior planning and preparation. Letter, 25 August 1951, General Mark W. Clark to Lieutenant General Stephen J. Chamberlain, Box 43 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

95. Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 12, 1951; Memo from MG Kreber to Governor Lausche 19 Dec 51, File Adjutant General 1951, Box 8, Lausche Papers, OHS; Riehm, Pictorial History, p.13; "Induction and Release of Army National Guard Units, 1950-1956."

96. Columbus Evening Dispatch, 12 September 1951.

97. Columbus Evening Dispatch, 13 September 1951.

98. Cincinnati Enquirer 12 September 1951; Columbus Evening Dispatch 12 September 1951; Akron Beacon Journal, 12 September 1951.


100. Riehm, pp.13-14. Robert Walker, a lieutenant in the 148th Infantry, commented on the changeover in administrative procedures: "This was a mess!", Robert Walker, comments on draft
of this section, 3 July 1993 (hereafter Walker, "Comments").

101. Mobilization in the Korean War, p.50; Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division, Box 4024, RG 407, NA.


103. The letters requesting Lausche's intervention are in two files, Adjutant General-General 1951 and Adjutant General-General 1952, in Box 8 of the Lausche Papers.

Lausche's office had been handling requests for help from servicemen and their families since the start of the war, though there was little his office could do for men on active duty except refer the case to the Ohio Adjutant General’s Office, which then made inquiries through Army channels. This lack of influence with the regular military services is made clear in Lausche’s response to a woman from Chicago who wrote him in Slovenian, asking that he help her get her son discharged as her other son had been killed at Okinawa. Lausche (the son of Slovenian immigrants) answered: "There is nothing I can do to help you. I have tried in similar cases in Ohio...but at no time have I been able to give any help. I would if I thought it would be of any aid to you but I am sure that my intervention will not achieve your wishes." After the 37th entered active duty, more of his constituents turned to the governor for help in dealing with the military, but they discovered he had little influence to relieve the "disappointments and distresses" created by military service in a limited war. The first quote is from Lausche’s reply to Mrs Katie Faganel’s March 17, 1952 letter. The second is from Lausche’s February 21, 1952 letter to Mrs Bessie Muterbough of Dover, Ohio.

104. Radcliffe, age 43, had served five years as an enlisted Guardsman before being commissioned in the 148th Infantry. A company commander in the regiment in 1940, Radcliffe served with the 148th throughout the war, including tours as regimental operations officer and as a battalion commander. He had been Schultz’s executive officer since the regiment was organized in the postwar Guard. Riehm, Pictorial History, pp. 14, 243; National Guard Register 1951.

105. With public disillusionment over the war growing steadily by late 1951, few signed up between alert and induction to go with those they knew. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division.


111. The extent of racial integration in the 37th by September 1952 is based on the photographs of individuals for each company or battery in Riehm, Pictorial History. All the respondents to the "37th Division, 1950-1954 Survey" (who are white) did not note any difficulties with this process. The Staff Section Report in the 1952 Command Report noted that the "integration of negroes in the command has taken place without untoward incident except that the Post Exchange barber shops seem to have difficulty providing service for negroes." On the reluctance of many in the Army before and during the Korean War to having blacks command whites, see William T. Bowers, William M. Hammond, and George L. MacGarrigle, Black Soldier, White Army: The 24th Infantry Regiment in Korea (Washington: Center of Military History, 1996) and MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp.440-441.

The Army did not integrate the 31st Infantry Division (Mississippi/Alabama) until after its Guard commander and most Guardsmen had left the division; the division attracted a good deal of press attention while in Federal service with its band, outfitted in Confederate Army uniforms. See "Army OKs Uniforms of 'Rebels'," Pittsburgh Courier, May 10, 1952, p.5; "'Dixie' Division Band Keeps Confederate Gray," Army Times, April 12, 1952, p.1. Unnamed "Pentagon officials" told Army Times that there had been no written orders not to integrate the 31st; "'[I]t just worked out that way.'"


114. Black, "The Negro Volunteer Militia Units of the Ohio National Guard, 1870-1954" op. cit. Major Nairn, born in 1916, had received a Reserve field artillery commission in 1941. Ordered to active duty later that year, he ended the war a captain. Nairn joined the Guard in 1946 as a field artillery captain and was promoted to major in 1949. National Guard Register 1951.

115. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division. An AFF inspection team visiting the 37th in July 1952 noted that the division was conducting infantry battalion ATTs "without obvious support from Fourth Army or XV Corps." "Report of Staff Visit to 37th Infantry Division at Camp Polk, Louisiana to Observe Conduct of ATT No 7-26, 22-25 July 1952," Box 64 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA.

XV Corps had been commanded since its activation in March 1952 by Major General Roscoe Woodruff. Woodruff was named commander of one of the corps assigned to land on D-Day in France. However, Omar Bradley, First Army commander, was concerned over Woodruff's lack of experience and relieved him of command without prejudice before the invasion in favor of an officer who had commanded a division in combat in the Pacific. Woodruff later commanded the 24th Infantry Division in combat in the Pacific, where his assistant division commander was the future Chief, National Guard Bureau, Kenneth Cramer. Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, A General's Life: An Autobiography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp.223-224. Robert Walker considered the Corps Commander "a SOB", Walker, "Comments." According to Doile Lama, the 37th did manage to get even with XV Corps when members of the division stole a goat and locked it in the Corps Commander's office over the weekend, where it thoroughly demolished everything in the office. Lama, "Phonecon."

116. "Report of Inspection of 37th Infantry Division, Camp Polk, Louisiana, During the Period 23-25 April 1952," Box 64 (Inspection Reports), RG 337, NA; "37th Div. Wins Praise For Training Progress," Army Times, May 3, 1952, p.12. Doile Lama believed that "(o)ur...training was as good or better than training I received at other locations," Lama, "Survey". Del Corso, who commanded a company, a battalion, and the 145th Infantry in the Pacific, rated the training as good as the training in World War II, Del Corso, "Survey". Alden Stilson believed that the training "was very good-compared well with WWII. As long as 37 Div HQ left us alone we were OK. Div HQ was filled with incompetent political appointments." Stilson, "Survey."
117. Riehm, *Pictorial History*, p.307. For the bitter amusement, see comments in letters in the Alden Stilson File, Box 8 Lausche Papers.

118. *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, 17 and 18 May 1952.

119. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division; Lama, "Survey" and "Phonecon." AFF inspectors visiting the 37th in July to observe infantry battalion ATTs noted that morale in the division "needs improvement." They found a "lackadaisical attitude" among both officers and enlisted, which the AFF team blamed on the effects of levies for overseas service and rumors that the division would be converted from a tactical to a training unit. "Report of Staff Visit, 22-25 July 1952."

120. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division. The rise and fall of the 37th's OR rating in 1952 can be followed in the monthly reports compiled by the Army G-3, "Readiness Dates of Major Units in the U.S.," in File G-3 322 (Cases 61-80), Box 197, RG 319, NA.

121. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division; "Tac Units to Give Basic," *Army Times*, September 6, 1952, p.1; Hanson W. Baldwin, "Army Faces Wide Cuts," *The New York Times*, July 17, 1952, p.4. An Army Field Forces study of 9 April 1952 had warned of the ill effects of levies on mobilized Guard and Reserve units. A draft of a reply to this study by the Army G-3 stated that "a complete drop in the operational readiness of the General Reserve was understood and approved by the Chief of Staff." Only the 82d Airborne Division would be maintained at a high OR rate because of "the difficulties due to personnel limitations in terms of total requirements." File G-3/322 (Cases 141-160), Box 197 RG 319, NA.

122. While this story faded from public view and no charges were ever officially filed, some continue to believe that Kreber benefitted personally from the book's sale. Alden Stilson Jr. called it "this rotten business." Stilson, "Survey" However, Doile Lama "never felt any pressure on buying this book" and "never observed any impact on morale". He believed that the rumors "did not originate with members of the NG." During this time he served as the adjutant of the 136th Field Artillery Battalion and attended several meetings about the book at Division Artillery Headquarters or at Division Headquarters. Lama, "Survey."

124. Newsweek's comment on the letter was that the article had "referred to the 37th only to illustrate a situation in several National Guard units. Of course, the 37th, like other divisions, has its excellent officers too."


126. Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division. By 20 January 1953, the Army G-3 rated the 37th (and the other three mobilized Guard divisions remaining in the ZI) as "Operationally Ineffective", Memo, 7 March 1952, Assistant Chief of Staff G-3 to Chief of Staff U.S. Army, Subject: Operational Readiness of Major Units in the U.S., File G-3/320.2, Box 86, RG 319, NA.

127. Command Report, 1 January 1953-30 April 1953, 37th Infantry Division, Box 4024, RG 407, NA.


129. Command Report, January-April 1953, 37th Infantry Division. The gradual thinning out of the last of the senior Ohio officers can be followed in the division's General Orders for 1953, File General Orders 37th Division 1953-Record Set, Box 92, RG 338, NA.

130. See Letter, 4th Army Headquarters, 7 July 1953, Subject: Reconstitution of the Training Base, Supporting Units and General Reserve During FY 1954, File G-3/320.2 (Cases 101-120), Box 87, RG 319, NA.

131. See the program for the ceremony returning the 37th's colors to Ohio, File 314.7 Military Histories HQs 10th Division 1954, Box 80, RG 338, NA; "Kreber Waves 'Bye' At Review," Army Times, December 26, 1953, p.20. Columbus Evening Dispatch January 5, 1954.


133. After his return to Ohio, Kreber again rebuilt the 37th. He remained its commander until 1956 and Adjutant General of Ohio until his retirement in 1959. This also was the 37th Infantry Division's final wartime service; the Army disbanded it in 1968 during a reorganization of the Guard and replaced it with a separate infantry brigade.

134. See the Ohio Adjutant General's Annual Reports of 1953 and 1954 for details on the shadow 37th Infantry Division.
135. The 37th moved to Riley when the Army deactivated Polk in the postwar drawdown. On the return of the 37th’s colors to Ohio, see *The National Guardsman* (August 1954), pp.20-21; *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, June 18, 1954; and the Ohio Adjutant General’s 1954 Annual Report. Major General Beightler, now retired from the Regular Army, attended the presentation of the returned colors by Governor Lausche to Kreber and the division held later in the summer during the 37th’s annual training.
For the most part, Guard units in Federal service received little attention from the national press during the Korean War. These units usually appeared in the national press only when something appeared to have gone wrong with them or when someone wished to score points against the Guard.¹

State and hometown newspapers usually gave units mobilized in 1950 extensive coverage until they departed for their training station; units mobilized during 1951 and 1952 usually received far less coverage, with the exception of the four infantry divisions. All non-divisional units suffered a sharp decline in press attention after they left their home stations. Most newspapers decided not to send reporters to check up on these units, and relied on Army press releases and letters home from Guardsman for what coverage they did provide. Divisions received greater coverage from the major newspapers in their home states; reporters visited training camps and a few accompanied the four divisions deployed
overseas.\textsuperscript{2}

While the fate of mobilized units rarely concerned the greater public, there were two groups within American society that did care a great deal about what happened to Army National Guard units "under Army orders." There were those, most notably the National Guard Association, concerned primarily with defending the Guard as an institution. Others, such as mobilized Guardsmen and their families, focused on the individual Guardsman and his unit's experiences while in Federal service. There was some overlap between these two groups in their concerns, most noticeably on the disturbing hollowness of "Go With Those You Know" for many units, but these two groups had different priorities. The NGA worked on the national level to protect the Guard's institutional position, while units and their supporters worked mainly on what immediately affected Guardsmen and their units.

Both groups watched carefully for anything that appeared to be attempts by the Regular Army to slight or injure the Guard or Guardsmen. Both groups attempted to mobilize countervailing political pressure against the Regular Army by appealing to governors, members of Congress, and crucial constituencies within political coalitions. For the most part, these attempts produced little satisfaction; major policy decisions (not ordering the entire Army National Guard into Federal service, individual instead of unit rotation in
Korea, and stripping units in the ZI for replacements) were not overturned. Even with lower level issues, such as the amount of training a unit received before deploying overseas, retention of Guardsmen as unit commanders, and dates for release from active duty, the political pressure mobilized by Guardsmen and their supporters rarely had a decisive influence.³

"The Rape of Our Army and Air National Guard Units Must Stop"

In September 1950, General Mark W. Clark, Chief, Army Field Forces, sent a message to "the National Guard in the active service of the United States." Clark told them that "[W]e of the Regular Army are grateful that in this time of world crisis you are once more joined with us to help defeat the enemies of freedom." However, in past wars Americans "had a comfortable margin of time to expand our Army--to properly train and equip a civilian Army. Now there is no such margin of time for preparation. Readiness is vital." He noted that the nation "has long relied heavily on its citizen-soldiery in times of crisis," thus allowing the Regular Army to remain small. This policy worked during World War II; now, Clark wrote, "the readiness of our National Guard may well mean the difference between victory and defeat in the crisis at hand."⁴

History was also on the minds of many senior Guardsmen like the NGA's president, Ellard Walsh, and Major General 480
Raymond Fleming, Cramer’s replacement as Chief, National Guard Bureau. For them, the story of the Guard in wartime revolved around Uptonian Regulars abusing the Guard during mobilization, belittling its contributions, and attempting to prevent its postwar reconstruction. These Guard officers kept a close watch on Regulars’ handling of the Guard during this new war. Mobilized Guardsmen, outside of Regular Army channels, kept their state’s senior officers and key politicians informed of what was happening to units. A number of adjutants general, governors, and members of Congress personally checked up on their mobilized units at training camps in the Zone of the Interior. A number of Congressmen and governors of national prominence, such as Thomas Dewey and Earl Warren, looked in on their state’s units during trips overseas. Also kept up to date by formal and informal channels on what was happening to units in Federal service was the National Guard Association. State officials, and especially the NGA, publicized the successes of mobilized units, particularly those sent to Korea. Not surprisingly, they did not discuss publicly units with significant problems.5

Generally, the Army’s initial use of mobilized Guard units between September and November met with the senior Guard leaders’ approval.6 Senior Guard leaders also praised the performance of mobilized Guard units. At the annual meeting

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of the National Guard Association in October 1950, Major General Fleming reported that while "[P]erhaps earlier than we expected, the National Guard has been put to the test for which it exists--preparedness as an M-Day force. So far, I believe we have met the test well."

However, Fleming was "concerned with the future when National Guard units are released from Federal service." Concerning senior Guardsmen's greatest fear, Fleming promised that he and the NGB were committed to the integrity of Guard units, and that the Army Chief of Staff "has indicated many times that the integrity of National Guard units will be maintained." Fleming stated that the NGB's position was that "all inducted National Guard units be relieved as complete organizations, returned to State status as complete organizations, and not as individuals to reform themselves into a unit." 7

For a time it appeared that Fleming and other senior Guardsmen would get their way on unit integrity. In December 1950, Army Field Forces instructed commanders of armies in the ZI to avoid, as much as possible, raiding mobilized Guard and Reserve units for personnel needed to fill units on orders for Korea. This practice, AFF warned, would "jeopardize their training base;" this had to be avoided as "these units are the most important part of our present potential for rebuilding the General Reserve." 8
But with casualties mounting in Korea, the Truman Administration's decisions for only partial mobilization and a NATO military expansion, the depletion of the Inactive Reserve during the summer, and the Army's difficulties in expanding its training base, senior Guardsmen worried that the Army would violate Guard unit integrity as a quick fix for its manpower dilemma.

In December 1950, the NGA proposed that the remainder of the Army Guard still in state service be mobilized in several increments, brought to full strength, and used to bring the war to an end. Attempting to tap into increasing unease over the growing number of young draftee casualties in Korea, the NGA claimed that this would end the need to draft eighteen year olds. Given that the Army could barely support the Guard units it already had in Federal service, it was no surprise that the Army did not accept the NGA's estimate of the situation.

The rotation policy adopted in 1951 generated the biggest fight between the NGA and the Army during the war. The Army's decision for individual instead of unit rotation in Korea greatly concerned Walsh and other senior Guardsmen; Walsh believed that this policy was the "crux of our real troubles." The NGA did not oppose rotation per se; it argued that the war's burden should be more widely shared by ordering into Federal service "all of the remaining Army National Guard or
at least a substantial portion thereof." This policy would allow what Walsh believed was the best solution: "a return to the historic concept of relieving battle-weary organizations and units with comparable organizations and units."

The rotation issue, Walsh wrote in late 1951, "has occupied the attention of the Association to a greater degree than any other." The NGA attended "innumerable and seemingly, endless conferences" with Department of the Army, the NGB, and members of Congress, but "no reasonable solution has been found for the problem and even though a solution is found, such will not undo the damage which has been done." Walsh demanded that it "will not suffice for those in authority to contend there is not solution, for there is, and it must be found. The rape of our Army and Air National Guard units must stop." He feared that "the maintenance of a strong reserve hereafter may prove an impossible task" as the levies for overseas service on Guard units made a mockery of "Go With Those You Know."

The Army rejected unit rotation. Officially, it cited logistical limitations; under partial mobilization, the Army did not have the funds, material, and supplies to mobilize, train, and deploy a force of Guard units in the numbers called for by the NGA. While not officially mentioned, two traditional views of the Guard held by many Regulars probably affected decision making. First, Guardsmen were not up to the
responsibilities of training large formations and leading them in combat. Second, mobilized Guard units brought extensive political baggage with them which Regulars found distasteful and difficult to handle.

Raymond S. McLain, the most successful Guardsman of his generation and now a Regular Army lieutenant general, supported the Army’s decision on rotation with another argument. McLain, no fan of the NGA—he believed it was dominated by persons who used it "to serve their individual purposes"—disagreed strongly with Walsh and the NGA. McLain argued that rotation by units during a partial mobilization would leave a unit "in worse shape the day it is mustered out than the day it was mustered in" because many of the competent soldiers would stay on extended active duty or be integrated into the Regulars, while others would leave the Guard after returning home to avoid another disruption of their families and careers.10

By the time Walsh sounded his warning, most mobilized Guard units remaining in the ZI had already suffered heavy losses from levies, and General Kreber’s 37th Infantry Division would soon be gutted. For Kreber, a long time NGA activist and a key figure in Robert Beightler’s effort during the last war to keep the 37th a "Guard" division while in Federal service, the Army’s rotation policy was a bitter turn of events.
Like other constituents, he sought the help of his governor, who readily obliged. Replying to Governor Frank Lausche's letter objecting to levies on the 37th, Secretary of the Army Frank Pace in June 1952 explained the reasons for the Army's policy and promised that National Guard Bureau staff officers would visit Kreber and Major General Albert Henderson, Kreber's successor as Ohio Adjutant General.\textsuperscript{11}

On 19 July Henderson sent Lausche a memo outlining the results of his meeting with the NGB officers. The visitors showed Henderson the levies projected for Guard units in Federal service during the remainder of 1952. According to Henderson, the figures were "so high that every available army organization will be depleted to such an extent that they will not be available for combat service nor will it be possible to consider the National Guard units as military representatives of the respective states."\textsuperscript{12}

Kreber returned to Columbus on 4 July and discussed the situation with Lausche. Kreber had received a briefing from the Department of the Army on levies planned for the near future. On 22 July he wrote Lausche, suggesting that the governor again write Secretary Pace, using the enclosed letter prepared by Kreber. Kreber stated that if present trends continued "we cannot hope to have as good an organization as we had last January on coming into active service." He added that Lausche would have the support of
every member of Congress if they saw that he was "following up on this - and I quote certain individuals, 'rape of the National Guard.'"\(^{13}\)

Lausche sent Kreber's draft unchanged to Pace. The answer came in a 22 August letter from Fred Korth, the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Forces. (Korth explained that he answered Lausche's letter as Pace was "temporarily absent from Washington"). Korth's letter reviewed the Army's reasons for stripping the General Reserve in the ZI to provide replacements for units overseas. It stressed that there was no legal requirement that Guard unit integrity must maintained, merely that it was desirable. The letter mentioned the fine record of the 37th and closed with: "...I share your regret that we are unable to maintain the complete integrity of the National Guard units. I earnestly hope that I have demonstrated that the Army's action in this matter, taken in all good faith, was one of necessity rather than one of choice."\(^{14}\)

Many Guardsmen doubted the Army's "good faith" in this matter. But neither Ellard Walsh's lobbying at the Pentagon and the Capitol nor Leo Kreber's enlisting state political figures could stop the levies on Guard units left in the ZI. Congress, the NGA's major point of leverage at the national level, was not willing to go beyond rhetorical measures on this issue. It accepted the Army's need as too pressing and
the NGA's alternative as too politically unacceptable in what was already a most unpopular war. State officials had no leverage with which they could move the Army to reverse its policy. The failure to prevent or stop the levying of mobilized Guard units was for senior Guardsmen a painful example of how the Guard's autonomy had been compromised since 1940, and particularly since the start of the Cold War, "by a massive expansion of federal authority in military affairs."

"A Few People Have Had To Bear Untold Hardships"

For Guardsmen, their families, and their communities, Federal service generated concern focused on the individual and his unit: would Guard units be properly prepared for combat, would Guardsmen bear an unequally heavy burden of service compared to other sources of manpower, and would "Go With Those You Know" be honored? Also, the many World War II veterans in the Guard shared with their Reservist peers a feeling of double jeopardy, that they would twice in their lives, and within such a short period of time, be called upon to serve their nation on active duty.

From the time it received the alert notice to the time when the last Guardsman left Federal service, mobilized units' soldiers and their supporters kept state political figures aware of their concerns. After the unit's alert
notice arrived, governors received requests for deferrals or excusals from Federal service. Guardsmen who appealed, particularly World War II veterans, usually based their requests most often on claims that Federal service would create extreme financial hardship for their families. Guardsmen and their wives who appealed rarely mentioned that they had willingly accepted drill pay despite the obligation of active duty that their dual state-Federal oaths carried. Those who did take notice of this fact parried it by stating that they had joined the Guard believing that active duty would only be for defense against attacks on their state or for World War III, not for service in war for Korea.

The other major source of letters to governors after alert was mothers pleading that their sons were too young to enter Federal service at age seventeen. The responses to these request varied from state to state, but most governors sought to insulate themselves from such emotional issues by referring requests to special boards created by the state’s adjutant general.¹⁶

Once in Federal service, some Guardsmen and their families again looked to state political figures for help, this time to obtain an early release from active duty. Again, the major reason cited in these requests was financial hardship for families created by the absence of their primary breadwinner, often compounded by the illness
or disability of other family members. With units now in Federal service, governors had no authority to grant such requests; some variation on the theme "It's a Regular Army matter now" occurs frequently in this correspondence. Governors were limited generally to referring the case to the state adjutant general, who could help constituents navigate the Department of the Army's bureaucratic reefs.¹⁷

Of course, some constituents are more equal than others. In December 1951, Nanticoke, Pennsylvania scrap dealer John Allan appealed to Governor Fine for his son's release from Federal service. The son had come down on levy for overseas service; the father claimed the son was needed at home to run the business as he was too ill to manage it on his own. Governor Fine instructed his adjutant general to intervene, as "I do know this situation and it is most worthy." The Adjutant General reported back six days later that he had obtained a delay in the lieutenant's port call and that he had advised the father on how to appeal for a hardship discharge. In March 1952, the father wrote Governor Fine that the lieutenant had received his hardship discharge and that "[Y]our assistance has been most deeply appreciated." While the gratitude was no doubt pleasing to Governor Fine, it is doubtful that his assistance had proved more influential than Army regulations governing hardship discharges.¹⁸
One case that might have had a larger influence on Army policy arose from Army Field Force's 1951 revised mobilization plan providing a four month period between alert and induction in order to send Guardsmen to service schools. Alden Stilson, Jr, was a 37th Infantry Division field artillery lieutenant and World War II combat veteran sent to Fort Sill in October 1951, three months before the 37th entered Federal service. He came down on levy for Korea in 1952 still without any definitive answer on whether or not his school time counted as part of his required twenty-four months of Federal service. Stilson believed it should count, but the 37th held that it did not.

Angered, Stilson turned to his father and fellow officers for assistance in appealing the division's decision. What especially irritated Stilson and the other officers was, contrary to the division's claims, they had not volunteered for early active duty but had been ordered by their commanders to attend the service schools. Stilson's father began collecting statements from officers in the 37th on this subject; in these statements, the officers stated that units had school quotas assigned to them by Division Headquarters. Major Robert Wirthlin, the Division Aviation Officer, stated that General Kreber had told him that school quotas would be filled, one way or the other. Other officers stated that unit commanders assigned
them to school slots involuntarily. What upset all these officers was that their orders for the schools stated that they had volunteered for this duty.

Alden Stilson, Sr. owned a major consulting engineering firm in Columbus and was a Reserve colonel who commanded an engineer brigade. He used the officer statements solicited by his son in a letter writing campaign during the fall of 1952. Stilson wanted the Army to set his son’s active duty start date in October 1951, not January 1952. He wrote and talked with Governor Lausche several times and also contacted Senator John Bricker in Washington. In December 1952 the Army decided to set the active duty start date for those sent to schools in 1951 at the day they reported to the school. Exactly how much influence Stilson’s efforts had on this decision is impossible to say, though he did get a personal letter from the Army’s Adjutant General announcing the decision. For his part, Stilson gave Lausche a good deal of the credit. He told the governor that he would make sure that the "boys" did not forget "that their Governor has an interest in their welfare and in giving them their just due." Lausche’s answered that if "I at all contributed to the solution...I am more than repaid by the graciousness of your letter."19

Another source of grievances, and thus of appeals to politicians for help, was the belief among some Guardsmen,
particularly World War II veterans, and their families that the Guard should be mobilized only for defense of the continental United States or for World War III with the Soviets. Mobilization for a war in Korea was very frustrating for these Guardsmen, especially when they were stripped from their unit for service in Korea or when their unit went to Europe instead of Korea.

Frustration grew to anger for some during 1951 when Guardsmen and their families learned of the Defense Department’s plan for the early release of involuntarily recalled Inactive Reservists and the Selective Service system’s plan to hold draft deferment examinations for undergraduate college students. Sergeant Ellsworth Linker, a World War II veteran of the 28th Infantry Division serving in Korea with Pennsylvania’s 176th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, wrote Governor Fine about the early release of Reservists and noted that Guardsmen veterans of the last war "deserve a break also." Sergeant George Harris, serving in Korea with North Carolina’s 378th Combat Engineer Battalion, complained to his governor about the same issue, arguing that "[S]ix months in this stinking hole is enough for anybody."20

Writing Governor Fine in April 1951, shortly after his AAA gun battalion received its alert notice, a World War II veteran graduate student complained that it was "grossly
unfair" for him to have to leave school when "non-veteran freshman can be deferred." (A fad on college campuses of panty raids during this period did nothing to improve the tempers of aggrieved Guardsmen and their families.) In Pittsburgh, the 28th Infantry Division's orders for Germany were the last straw for some, sparking a heated exchange in the letters section of the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette during August and September 1951. "Two Veterans' Wives" on 31 August asked why their husbands had to go to Germany when "there are single men, in and out of uniform, who have never served overseas?" Another veteran's wife on 5 September wrote that she "wholeheartedly" agreed with her two peers and that she was "furious" at college draft deferments.²¹

For many Guardsmen, their families, and their communities, alert notices in 1950 and early 1951 brought with them fears that units would be sent in harm's way unprepared for combat, fears enhanced by news reports from Korea of poorly prepared Regular units defeated with heavy losses. This was a constant, if low-key concern in Oklahoma about the 45th Infantry Division. Wyoming's Adjutant General used the possible political repercussions of poorly prepared Guard units committed to combat as a tool in his efforts to help the 300th Armored Field Artillery Battalion. Relatives of 40th Infantry Division soldiers made similar complaints when the 40th was ordered to Korea. The Army's
levies on Guard units left in the ZI meant that this concern extended to units not ordered to Korea. Shortly after the 31st Infantry Division (Alabama/Mississippi) entered Federal service in January 1951, Mississippi's Senator John Stennis requested "that these men be thoroughly and fully trained before being shipped out for service in Korea."\(^{22}\)

The greatest amount of concern expressed over a unit's preparedness for combat service came from Arkansas, home of the 936th and 937th Field Artillery Battalions and of Secretary of the Army Frank Pace. Shortly after the two battalions sailed for Korea, before completing their ATPs, rumors began circulating in the state that the battalions would be committed to combat as soon as they arrived. Arkansas politicians began sending letters and telegrams to the President, Secretary Pace, General MacArthur, and General Ridgway demanding, as Representative Boyd Tackett telegraphed Ridgway, that the battalions "will not be committed to combat until they are trained." Since Eighth Army, well aware of the battalions' deficiencies, already had planned a training program for the new units, it is unlikely that the politicians' efforts did more than reinforce Regulars' negative perceptions about Guard units.\(^{23}\)

The return of Guard units to state control was another topic that concerned Guardsmen and their supporters.
Beginning in mid-1952, the Army began releasing units from Federal service as it had done at the end of World War II. Guardsmen returned as individuals or in relatively small groups, spread out over a period of days or weeks, without their unit equipment, which the Army retained. Once again, Guardsmen would have to build units from scratch in the postwar period. Some units, especially those which had deployed overseas, would return to state control several years after their Guardsmen did, as the Army decided to keep these unit designations in Federal service. This decision angered many Guardsmen and the units' communities, who turned to their local and state politicians for relief, but to no avail.

The Army's treatment of mobilized Guard units created bitterness among some Guardsmen and reinforced traditional Guard prejudices against the Regular Army. According to the Idaho Adjutant General, "[A] lot of people have lost their confidence in planning at the higher levels...In recent months, it appears sometimes to Unit Commanders that the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army just don't give a damn what happens to their organizations." The 378th Combat Engineer Battalion's Sergeant George Harris wrote that after the experience of mobilization for the Korean War, the Army "will find it much harder the next time to find veterans to volunteer their services to the Guard
because of the unscrupulous treatment they have received. They have learned their lesson."

Ellard Walsh's dire warning that this treatment would cripple the postwar Guard did not come to pass. However, it is clear that from 1951 to at least several years after the armistice the destruction of unit integrity in many Guard units left a legacy that added an additional obstacle to Guard recruiting. It also added another example for many Guardsmen that the Regular Army could not be trusted to properly use mobilized Guard units.26

In the end, there was little Guardsmen could do to influence significantly life "under Army orders" for either units or individuals. In a few instances, their efforts may have had some influence, such as the return of purged officers to the 272d Field Artillery Battalion or the revision in Lieutenant Stilson's active duty start date.

But when the Army believed an issue--such as which units to mobilize, the use of levies for overseas service, or the retention of unit colors on active duty--was crucial to accomplishing its assigned missions, no protests from Guardsmen and their supporters could get the Army to change its mind. As governors and other political figures realized, the alternative courses of action in many of these cases would be even more unpopular among an even greater number of citizens. What they could usually only offer
Guardsmen and their supporters was the cold comfort given by North Carolina's Governor W. Kerr Scott: "we must remember that there have been many critical times in the history of this great Country of ours in which a few people have had to bear untold hardships and suffering in order to preserve our free way of life." 

Conclusions and Lessons from Service "Under Army Orders"

Like the Regular Army and the nation both institutions served, the Army National Guard was prepared neither for the material nor for the psychological challenges created by the Korean War. The war caught the Army Guard at a particularly vulnerable moment. Most units had not completed the training cycle planned by the National Guard Bureau for units activated or reactivated after World War II. The Guard, like the Regular Army, had major personnel problems and equipment deficiencies. After the war began, both components suffered from the Army's personnel dilemma, its small inventory of equipment and supplies, and the restrictions on resources created by the Truman Administration's decision for only a partial national mobilization.

Between 1945 and 1950, both the National Guard Association and the National Guard Bureau used the symbolism of the Minutemen in arguing that the Guard had a crucial
role in the Cold War. However, they and Army Field Forces understood that Guard units would not be able to spring to arms and enter combat on or shortly after M-Day. Army Field Forces' plans for training mobilized units were generally sound and AFF devoted much effort to supervising their execution. During 1950 and 1951, the actual course of events, particularly the decision for a limited mobilization, undermined the assumptions that had guided mobilization planning. Without effective contingency plans, the Army had to improvise on the run, kicking up sand that generated significant friction for mobilized Guard units.

Limited mobilization also raised questions of fairness and equality of sacrifice, particularly concerning which units to order into Federal service and which units to deploy overseas. Most Guardsmen and their families did not feel the sense of betrayal widespread among involuntarily recalled Inactive Reservists. However, many did wonder why they had to give up their civilian lives when the majority of Guard units mobilized went either to Europe or remained in the ZI. Levies for overseas service on units in the ZI only intensified these feelings, especially among the many World War II veterans.

The political effects of this question played a large part in General Collins' decision to deploy the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions to Korea. Collins believed that the
Army's creditability with both the Guard and Congress would be badly damaged if these divisions were not committed to combat. Future Army senior leaders, when facing a similar situation, would do well to remember Collins' example; to do otherwise mocks the Total Army concept and will escalate tensions between the two components.

The destruction of unit integrity by levies on units left in the ZI was a major blow to a force recruited to a significant degree on the promise "Go With Those You Know." This decision, which for older Guardsmen was rubbing salt in similar wounds from the world wars, did much to destroy the Army's creditability with many Guardsmen and their supporters, and helped perpetuate Guard-Regular tensions.

Given the small size of today's Regular Army, the Army may face a similar dilemma if it suffers heavy casualties early in a conflict or if a war drags on. If possible, the Army should turn first to unit rotation, both for combat effectiveness and equality of sacrifice. If it sees no alternative to levying Guard units for replacements, then it must do a better job at explaining this decision to the Guard.

The Korean War did not change the Guard's position as the Army's first-line combat reserve force, but the dominance of the Army over the fate of mobilized Guard units remained unbroken. Guardsmen and their supporters were not
shy about voicing their displeasure over real or imagined injuries and insults done to mobilized units and individuals. Congress, the Department of the Army, and senior commanders all heard from those upset over the treatment of Guardsmen in Federal service.

These efforts to change Regular Army decisions concerning mobilized Guard units rarely had much effect. Proposed alternatives were deemed too costly, politically and fiscally, by the Army, Congress, or the President. In other cases, the Army believed the complaints to be unwarranted intrusions into areas of its professional expertise. Future use of the Guard will generate similar efforts and the Army must be prepared to handle them with sensitivity; to dismiss these efforts as just Guard politicking will only offend politicians and inflame tensions with the Guard.

One area of great political sensitivity for both the Regular Army and the Guard was the role of African-Americans in both institutions. Race does not appear to have affected Army decisions on which units to order into Federal service. Still, the posting of almost all the black non-divisional units inducted during 1950 to Camp McCoy, Wisconsin was most likely done to avoid the friction of stationing such units at posts in border or southern states.

Once in Federal service, Guard units became caught up
in the controversies generated by Army race policies and efforts by African-Americans to improve their condition in American society. The Army preferred to avoid this issue, if possible, when it came to Guard units in Federal service. In the Zone of the Interior, the Army rarely tried to change the racial composition of a Guard unit until 1952, and then only when the unit was close to the end of its active duty service and most of its original Guardsmen were gone.

Guard units sent overseas generally were integrated as part of the theater commander's integration program. This policy was met without overt resistance by white Guardsmen, though some disliked it and others, particularly unit commanders in Europe, complained that all-black units used the integration process to unload all their problem troops on other units. Only with the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions in Japan and the 196th Regimental Combat Team in Alaska did the Department of the Army intervene to postpone racial integration of Guard units.

The treatment of all-black Guard units varied. Transportation units sent to Korea integrated without fuss as part of Far East Command’s program. The 715th AAA Gun Battalion and the 137th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion, left in the ZI, remained almost completely all-black until the end of their existence as a Guard unit on active duty. With all-black Guard units at Camp McCoy, and particularly
the 272d Field Artillery Battalion, their difficulties did have roots in Army and Guard policies concerning African-Americans and the prejudices of white officers. The solution, as the 272d finally showed in Germany, was to eliminate all-black units and focus on the fundamentals of unit success: good leadership and good training.

The 272d Field Artillery Battalion's performance demonstrated that in the Guard, like in the Regular Army, the quality of a unit's leadership was the most important variable in determining a unit's success or failure. Many senior Guard officers were well aware of this and emphasized the importance of recruiting skilled and experienced officers and NCOs after 1945. However, the demand for these leaders outstripped the available supply, and the lack of Army school slots and very limited training time made it difficult to create such leaders in state service.

Once in Federal service, Guard units benefitted from infusions of trained and experienced Reserve leaders, and a small number of Regulars. With access to Army schools and time to practice their craft provided by active duty, units' Guard leaders generally performed as well as those in Regular units during this period: a small number were revealed as incompetent, some muddled through, the great majority did a good job, and a few excelled.

In terms of unit performance, the lessons of the Army
National Guard during the Korean War are best summarized by looking at the extremes of performance. The most notable failure in this study, the 272d Field Artillery Battalion, was the result of an unfortunate intersection of almost every negative influence on unit performance possible during this period: inadequate prewar preparation, a poor choice of mobilization training site, little effective supervision by higher headquarters, extreme personnel turbulence, a large number of poor quality fillers, the racial climate of the period, and leadership unequal to the demands placed upon it.

The success of the non-divisional field artillery battalions sent to Korea in early 1951 occurred despite notable friction and was the result of good prewar preparation, good fillers, completion of a well-designed training program before commitment to combat, and leadership equal to the demands placed upon it.

During the Korean War there were no mass antiwar protests or attempts to block the mobilization of Guard units, as there would be during the Vietnam War. Much of the reason for this difference is in the nature of the two wars and in the character of American society during these periods.

Still, the large numbers of Guardsmen and Reservists during the Korean War who boarded trains and left their
loved ones behind and honorably performed their duties provided the Truman Administration an important sign of consent from the people for its decision to go to war for a place most Americans knew nothing about. Lyndon Johnson’s refusal to risk obtaining similar consent for America’s next war was one of his many mistakes.
NOTES

1. TIME magazine during 1951 was especially hostile towards the National Guard. See "Antiquated National Guard," August 27, 1951, p.22, and "Bleats From the Guard," November 5, 1951, p.22. The former article concluded with "[U]ntil the Defense Department finds the courage to stand up to the politically powerful National Guard Association, U.S. defense is going to waste billions of dollars and much precious manpower on an antiquated and disruptive form of military organization." The New York Times noted, briefly, the departure and return of New York Guard units, major milestones such as the deployment of Guard divisions to Germany and Korea, and protests from the NGA. Its military affairs correspondent, Hanson Baldwin, occasionally discussed Guard issues, but usually in the context of larger issues such as American strategy, force structure, and training exercises.

2. This paragraph is based on a review of the newspapers listed in the bibliography.

3. Concern about or opposition to the Regular Army’s use of the Guard did not lead to opposition to the war, though some in each group did come to question the Truman Administration’s strategy, usually lining up with Asia Firsters who believed that the United States had to get to the root of its problems in Asia by destroying the Communist regime in China. While written after the armistice, the best expression of this view is by Jim Dan Hill in his The Minute Man In Peace and War: A History of the National Guard (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1964), pp. 503-514. For a review of the literature on why opposition to the Korean War did not create the same turmoil as opposition to the Vietnam War, see Gary L. Huey, "Public Opinion and the Korean War," in Lester H. Brune, ed., The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research, (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), pp.409-417.

4. General Mark Clark, "'...the difference between victory and defeat...’" The National Guardsman (September 1950), pp.12-13. The stripping of the inadequate General Reserve and the use of Inactive Reservists, Walsh believed, pointedly demonstrated the folly of the failure of Congress and the American people after World War II to enact true universal military service as designed
by George Marshall. If they had, Guard and Reserve units either could have been kept at full or nearly full strength, or there would be a vast pool of trained men who would need only quick refresher training before units they were sent to as fillers would be ready to deploy. E.A. Walsh, "It Might Have Been," The National Guardsman (September 1950), pp.10-11.

5. For examples of mobilized Guardsmen keeping Guardsmen at home updated, see the Walter Hayes and William H. Abendroth Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania; General File, Box 39, John S. Fine Papers, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Box 8, Frank Lausche Papers, Ohio Historical Society, Columbus, Ohio. On politicians and adjutants general visiting units in the ZI, see "Posting the Guard" in 1951 and 1952 issues of The National Guardsman. On visits to units overseas, see the discussion in chapter three of the 45th Infantry Division; Kerry L. Diminyatz, "The 40th Infantry Division in the Korean Conflict: The Employment of the California National Guard in an Undeclared War" (MA Thesis, Sonoma State University, 1990), pp.49-52; Command Report, July 1951, 101st Signal Battalion, Box 5404, RG 407, NA; Command Report, July 1951, 955th Field Artillery Battalion, Box 5219, RG 407, NA.

The NGA noted in the "Posting the Guard" section of The National Guardsman the achievements of units and individuals on active duty; the same magazine began a new feature in 1951, "In Combat...In Korea" devoted to Guard units deployed there. The NGA as usual kept a close eye especially on any new legislation the Army desired that would affect the Guard. See for example Transcript of Conference, 3 April 1952, Subject: Carrier Unit Bill, Secretary of the General Staff Decimal File 1951-1952, Box 720, RG 319, NA. Attending the conference were Walsh and Major General William Harrison, Massachusetts' Adjutant General and President of the Adjutants General Association.

6. Letter, 21 July 1950, Major General Fleming to General J. Lawton Collins, National Guard Bureau Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 1059, RG 168, NA; Letter, 26 July 1950, Ellard Walsh to All Adjutants General and Commanding Generals, File 1, Box 1, Department of Military Affairs, Record Group 19, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Memorandum For Record, 24 October 1950, Remarks of Chief of Staff to the National Guard Association Conference on 23 October, Box 16, Matthew B. Ridgway Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

7. This and the preceding paragraph are based on Official Proceedings of the National Guard Association of the United States General Conference 1950, pp.49-50. President Ellard Walsh
of the NGA thanked Fleming for "that most enlightening address."

8. Letter, 13 December 1950, General Mark Clark, Army Field Forces Decimal File 1949-1950, Box 304, RG 337, NA. Clark sent a copy of the letter to each army commander, addressing them on a first name basis.


10. For the Army’s justification of individual rotation in Korea, see Earl D. Johnson, "Rotation," The National Guardsman (March 1952), pp. 2-6. Johnson was Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Forces. On the NGA’s position, see "The President’s Report," The National Guardsman (November 1951), and Ellard A. Walsh, Address to the Army War College, 5 February 1953, in National Guard Association of the United States, The Nation’s National Guard (Buffalo: Baker, Jones, Haussauer, 1954), pp.49-51. Lieutenant General Raymond S. McLain, "Comments on Certain Aspects of the National Guard, 8 August 1951," copy in U.S. Army Military history Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.

However, some lower-ranking Guardsmen in units deployed to Korea and their families shared Walsh’s preference for unit over individual rotation. See File 325, Secretary of the General Staff Decimal File 1951-1952, Box 720, RG 319, NA.

11. Letter, 30 June 1952, Frank Pace to Governor Lausche, File National Guard-Ohio’s 37th Infantry Division, Box 8, Lausche Papers.

12. Memo, 19 July 1952, Adjutant General to Governor Lausche, File National Guard-Ohio’s 37th Infantry Division, Box 8, Lausche Papers.

13. Letter, 22 July 1952, Kreber to Lausche, File National Guard-Ohio’s 37th Infantry Division, Box 8, Lausche Papers. In words that would have sent the blood pressure of an Uptonian Regular soaring, Kreber closed his letter with "I hope you and Mrs. Lausche are both well and wishing you every success in the coming elections."

14. Letter, AUG 22 1952, Assistant Secretary of the Army Fred Korth to Governor Lausche, File National Guard-Ohio’s 37th Infantry Division, Box 8, Lausche Papers. The 37th wasn’t the only mobilized Ohio Guard unit that feared the destruction of unit integrity; the enlisted of Battery A, 182d AAA Gun Battalion wrote Lausche asking his help in preventing the breaking up of the unit while in Federal service. Memorandum, August 7, 1951,
Governor Lausche to Major General Kreber, File AG-General, 1951, Box 8, Lausche Papers.


16. For examples of these requests, see: Box 45, W. Kerr Scott Papers, North Carolina Department of Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina; Box 13, Subject File Governor 1947-1951, James H. Duff Papers, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania; Box 8, Lausche Papers. Not as common a request was the one made on behalf of Charles Curtis. While a major general in the Pennsylvania Guard, Curtis was entering Federal service with his 51st AAA Brigade as a brigadier general, his Federally recognized rank. A fellow Allentowner wrote Duff's assistant secretary asking if there was any way to get Curtis inducted as a major general, as "[W]e, in Allentown, know that he is most deserving." Letter, August 17, 1950, Robert Feustermacher to Charles F. Rugaber, Box 13, Subject File Governor 1947-1951, Duff Papers.

17. These pleas for help were not limited to Guardsmen; draftees and recalled Reservists also sought the help of their state politicians. See Subject File, Boxes 7 and 8, Fine Papers; Lausche Papers, Box 8.

18. The son was a lieutenant in the 967th Armored Field Artillery Battalion, which had entered Federal service in May 1951. The correspondence on this case is in File 13, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. Some family members viewed the question of hardship discharges as a class issue. Mrs. Ann Martin wrote that it "seems there is no use for a poor person to raise a son so that he can help and then have him taken away from you." Letter, September 16, 1951, Mrs Ann Martin to Governor Fine, File 15, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. With the battle lines in Korea largely static after mid-1951, more hardship and dependency discharges were granted; see unit command reports for units discussed in chapters three, four, five and six.

19. This story can be followed in the Alden Stilson File in Box 8 of the Lausche Papers. The quotes are taken from Stilson's 2 December 1952 letter to Lausche and Lausche's 4 December 1952
reply. In the 37th's 1952 command report, Kreber's first recommendation concerning future mobilizations was "that period spent at service schools prior to activation be in addition to the period of service for which the unit is inducted." Command Report, 1952, 37th Infantry Division, Box 4024, RG 407, NA.

Forty years later, the memory of this incident was still strong for Alden Stilson, Jr. He "resigned from the National Guard immediately when I got home because of the absolutely rotten politics in the Guard." He joined the Army Reserve, eventually becoming a major general before his retirement. He found nothing positive in Kreber as a division commander: "Maj. Gen. Kreber should have been sent to prison!" Stilson, "Survey."

20. Letter, 19 August 1951, Sergeant Ellsworth Linker to Governor Fine, File 14, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers; Letter, 4 September 1951 Sergeant George Harris to Governor Scott, Box 80, Scott Papers. Some in the Utah field artillery battalions sent to Korea had similar sentiments; see letter, September 18, 1951, Senator Arthur Watkins, File 325, Box 720, Secretary of the General Staff Decimal File 1951-1952, RG 319, NA. A variation on this theme arose from the Army's decision to allow enlisted Guardsmen to leave active duty one year after their Guard enlistment had expired. This meant that some young men, not veterans of the last war, who had enlisted in 1947 and 1948, left Federal service during 1951 and 1952 before many World War II veterans were eligible to do so. See Letter, January 5, 1952, Sergeant Percy Snater to Governor Fine, File 16, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. Snater's letter was co-signed by thirteen other members of the 28th Infantry Division.

21. Letter, 12 April 1951, Lieutenant F.J. Noecker to Governor Fine, File 15, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. See also Letter, August 2, 1951, Mrs. Edna Everette to Governor Fine, File 12, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. The wives writing to the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette also attracted some spirited rebuttals, including one on 13 September from a mother with a son currently serving in Korea who wrote that the government should send to Korea "married men from 21 to 30 who are hiding behind baby buggies."

For an overview of this issue, see George Q. Flynn, "The Draft and College Deferments During the Korean War," The Historian (May 1988), pp.369-385. About 78% of all students who took the test qualified for deferment. Flynn cites public opinion polling that show that angry Guardsmen and their families were in the minority concerning this issue, particularly after the war stalemated in mid-1951, when a majority of Americans approved of student deferments.
22. While the 31st would never leave the ZI, many of its Guardsmen were levied as individual replacements for service in Korea. Stennis' letter is in Case 276, File 353, Assistant Chief of Staff G3 Decimal File 1951, Box 495, RG 319, NA. See also Case 608, File 353, Assistant Chief of Staff G3 Decimal File 1951, Box 501, RG 319, NA; "G.I. Kin To End Protests," The New York Times, February 27, 1952, p.2.

The practice in Korea of assigning Guardsmen levied from units in the ZI to positions for which they did not have the proper training or experience also generated concern. One AAA officer's wife wrote her governor that assigning her husband to a field artillery unit in Korea was "ridiculous." Letter, September 28, 1951, Mrs. Celeste Rau to Governor Fine, File 16, Box 8, Subject File, Fine Papers. Some concerned family members contacted their governors when rumors of unpreparedness for combat appeared in the hometowns of units ordered to Korea. One woman claimed that the 987th Armored Field Artillery's commander had returned to Ohio shortly before deploying and said that his battalion was "well trained when he knew it was not true." Letter, February 21, 1951, Mrs. Ruth E. Fetzer to Governor Lausche, File 1951-1952 National Guard, General, Box 8, Lausche Papers.

23. When Ridgway on 7 March 1951 mentioned this political interest to MacArthur, "he laughed and made some remark about the politicians." Ridgway, Memorandum For Record, 8 March 1951, Subject: General MacArthur's 7 March 51 Visit, Special File Dec 50-Mar 51, Box 20, Ridgway Papers, USAMHI. Congressman Tackett's telegram to Ridgway is in Box 17, Ridgway Papers. Department of the Army involvement is in Case 346, File 353, Assistant Chief of Staff G3 Decimal File 1951, Box 497, RG 319, NA. See also the following 1951 articles in Northwest Arkansas Times: "Guard Training Being Pushed Says Trimble," February 28, p.1; "Guard To Receive Full Training Says MacArthur," March 3, p.1; "Proud Of Honor In Going To Korea Says Member of 936th National Guard Unit," March 20, p.1; "Sergeant In Korea Reports Guard Units Well Supplied With Rations and Equipment," March 21, p.1.

24. For examples of the return of Guardsmen from Federal service, see chapters three, four, five and six.

25. Letters, telegrams, and petitions opposing this policy are in File 325, Box 720, Secretary of the General Staff Decimal File 1951-1952, RG 319, NA.

26. This and the preceding paragraph are based on: Letter, 30 January 1952, Brigadier General John E. Walsh to Brigadier General William H. Abendroth, Personal File October 1951-March 1952, Abendroth Papers, USAMHI; Letter, 4 September 1951, Harris
to Scott. For comments from adjutants general concerning the harmful effects of partial Guard mobilization and stripping of mobilized units, see Lieutenant Colonel William B. Rose, "Training the National Guard," Army War College Student Thesis, 1954, copy in USAMHI. For his thesis, Rose solicited comments on this issue from adjutants general, though he does not identify which adjutants general made which comments. Also see Nicholas Kafkalas Oral History, USAMHI and LaVern Weber Oral History, USAMHI.

27. Letter, October 10, 1951, Governor W. Kerr Scott to Sergeant George H. Harris, Box 80, Scott Papers.
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APPENDIX A

UNIT OFFICER PROFILES

The following unit officer profiles are based on: rosters in unit command reports, rosters in unit historical files, published government reports, unofficial unit yearbooks, and National Guard Register 1951.
28th Infantry Division  (Pennsylvania)

109th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 12

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Marine Corps</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Ambulance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordnance</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Branch School Military Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World War II Rifle and Heavy Weapons Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II Infantry Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College Graduates

Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 2

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 14

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 32  Born out of state: 2

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After Mobilization Alert: 3

Average Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Average Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majors:</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains:</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants:</td>
<td>30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenants:</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
110th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 17

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
- Infantry: 14
- Air Force: 6
- Quartermaster: 3
- Adjutant General: 2
- Field Artillery: 2
- Navy Chaplain: 2
- Cavalry: 1
- Ordnance: 1
- Coast Artillery: 1
- Medical Corps: 1
- Engineers: 1

Branch School Military Education
- Post 1945 Infantry Officer Basic Course: 1
- Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course: 2

College Graduates
- Pre 1945: 6
- Post 1945: 2

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 21

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 52
Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
- 1946: 0
- 1947: 16
- 1948: 16
- 1949: 17
- 1950: 5

After Mobilization Alert: 3

Average Age
- Majors: 35
- Captains: 32
- 1st Lieutenants: 30
- 2d Lieutenants: 29
112th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers:  4
Enlisted:  17

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:  Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Infantry     18  Motor Ambulance     1
Air Force    9   U.S. Marine Corps  1
Cavalry      1   Ordnance          1
Chaplain     1   Chemical          1
Transportation 1  Field Artillery  1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Rifle and Heavy Weapons Course 1
World War II Infantry Officer Basic Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course 3
Post 1945 Associate Command and General Staff School 2

College Graduates  Pre 1945:  4 / Post 1945:  7

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:  22

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:  0

Born in state:  52  Born out of state:  7

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946-  1
1947-  21
1948-  16
1949-  16
1950-  6
After Mobilization Alert-  3

Average Age
Majors:  38.5
Captains:  32
1st Lieutenants:  28.8
2d Lieutenants:  27.8
107th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 11

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 7  Motor Ambulance 1
Air Force 9  Military Police 1
Armored Force 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Field Artillery Battery Officer Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 2

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 15  Born out of state: 2

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 8
1948- 4
1949- 2
1950- 3
After Mobilization Alert - 0

Average Age
Majors: 31
Captains: 31.6
1st Lieutenants: 27.5
2d Lieutenants: 27.3
108th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 4

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery: 4
Cavalry: 1
Air Force: 1
U.S. Marine Corps: 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course: 1

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 6

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 13
Born out of state: 0

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 3
1948- 2
1949- 2
1950- 1
After Mobilization Alert: 5

Average Age
Majors: na
Captains: 30
1st Lieutenants: 28
2d Lieutenants: 25
109th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 3
Enlisted: 1

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery: 2
Infantry: 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course: 2
World War II Field Artillery Officer Basic Course: 1
Post 1945 Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course: 1

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 1  /  Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 0

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 6  Born out of state: 1

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 1
1947- 5
1948- 1
1949- 0
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Majors: 36
Captains: 34
1st Lieutenants: 35
2d Lieutenants: na
229th Field Artillery Battalion

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**

Officers: 1  
Enlisted: 2

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** 1

**World War II Commissions**

Field Artillery: 2  
Air Force: 2

**Branch School Military Education**

World War II Battery Officer Course: 1

**College Graduates**  
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 1

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:** 6

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:** 0

**Born in state:** 14  
**Born out of state:** 0

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**

1946: 1  
1947: 2  
1948: 2  
1949: 5  
1950: 1  
After Mobilization Alert: 3

**Average Age**

Majors: 30  
Captains: 34  
1st Lieutenants: 30  
2d Lieutenants: 27.6
899th Antiaircraft Artillery (AW) Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 2

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 1

World War II Commissions
Air Force 3  Coast Artillery 1
Field Artillery 1  Chemical 1
Infantry 1

Branch School Military Education
none for antiaircraft artillery

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 2

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post
1945 Guard: 3

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II
Experience: 0

Born in state: 8  Born out of state: 3

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 1
1947- 2
1948- 3
1949- 5
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Majors: 40.5
Captains: 31.5
1st Lieutenants: 29
2d Lieutenants: 29
628th Tank Battalion

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 1

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** 1

**World War II Commissions**
Field Artillery: 2
Infantry: 1
Chemical: 1
Engineer: 1

**Branch School Military Education**
none for armor

**College Graduates**  
Pre 1945: 1  /  Post 1945: 0

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:** 3

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:** 0

Born in state: 9  
Born out of state: 1

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**
1946- 0  
1947- 0  
1948- 0  
1949- 8  
1950- 2  
After Mobilization Alert- 0

**Average Age**
Majors: 33
Captains: 33.3
1st Lieutenants: 32
2d Lieutenants: 27

536
103d Engineer (Combat) Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 3

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Engineer 8
Air Force 2
Quartermaster 1
Cavalry 1

Branch School Military Education
none for engineer

College Graduates Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 1

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 12 Born out of state: 3

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 5
1948- 5
1949- 3
1950- 1

After Mobilization Alert- 1

Average Age
Majors: 42
Captains: 30.7
1st Lieutenants: 31.4
2d Lieutenants: 23
37th Infantry Division (Ohio)

145th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 7
Enlisted: 21 Ohio/ 2 Pennsylvania

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Infantry 31 Signal 1
Air Force 4 Chaplain 1
Field Artillery 2 Coast Artillery 1
Engineer 1 Motor Ambulance 1
Ordnance 1 U.S. Navy 1

Branch School Military Education
Pre World War II Infantry National Guard Course 1
Pre World War II Associate Command and General Staff 1
World War II Infantry Battalion Commander/Staff 4
World War II Infantry Company Officer Course 2
World War II Command and General Staff 1
World War II Infantry Officer Advanced Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates Pre 1945: 10 / Post 1945: 18

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 52
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 8

Born in state: 93 Born out of state: 19

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 4
1947- 31
1948- 12
1949- 22
1950- 17
1951- 9
After Mobilization Alert- 12

Average Age
Majors: 40 Captains: 32
1st Lieutenants: 29 2d Lieutenants: 25.7

538
148th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 23

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 1-Infantry

World War II Commissions
Infantry 29  Engineer  1
Air Force  3  Coast Artillery  1
Field Artillery  3  Signal  1
Cavalry  2  Chaplain  1
Quartermaster  2  Motor Ambulance  1

Branch School Military Education
Pre World War II Infantry National Guard Course  1
World War II Rifle and Heavy Weapons Course  2
World War II Infantry Special Officer Basic Course  1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course  4
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Advanced Course  1

College Graduates  Pre 1945:  1  /  Post 1945:  7

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:  43

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:  14

Born in state:  91  Born out of state:  14

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946-  4
1947- 30
1948- 19
1949- 16
1950- 14
1951-  8
After Mobilization Alert-  14

Average Age
Majors:  36.7
Captains:  32
1st Lieutenants:  28.4
2d Lieutenants:  25
134th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 2

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 1-Field Artillery

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 6
Infantry 1
Coast Artillery 1
Air Force 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates Pre 1945: 3 / Post 1945: 6

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 13

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 3

Born in state: 17 Born out of state: 9

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 4
1948- 5
1949- 5
1950- 4
1951- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 4

Average Age
Majors: 37.5
Captains: 32.5
1st Lieutenants: 28
2d Lieutenants: 26
136th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 3

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 3
Field Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 4
Infantry 1
Air Force 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 1
Post 1945 Special Command and General Staff Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 3 / Post 1945: 3

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 7
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 5

Born in state: 16 Born out of state: 6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 1
1947- 3
1948- 5
1949- 5
1950- 1
1951- 2
After Mobilization Alert- 5

Average Age
Majors: 36.7
Captains: 35.8
1st Lieutenants: 29.7
2d Lieutenants: 24

541
140th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 4

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Field Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 5
Air Force 1
Motor Ambulance 1
Signal 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course 1
Post 1945 Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 4

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 7
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 4

Born in state: 18 Born out of state: 4

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 2
1947- 2
1948- 2
1949- 5
1950- 5
1951- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 6

Average Age
Majors: 39
Captains: 31.7
1st Lieutenants: 30
2d Lieutenants: 26
137th Antiaircraft (AW) Battalion

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**
Officers: 0  
Enlisted: 3

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** Field Artillery- 1

**World War II Commissions**
Coast Artillery 1  
Infantry 5  
Field Artillery 2  
Quartermaster 1  
Cavalry 1  
Motor Ambulance 1

**Branch School Military Education**
Post 1945 Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 3  
Post 1945 AAA Associate Officer Basic Course 1  
Post 1945 Artillery Communications Course 1

**College Graduates** Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 1

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:** 7

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:** 3

**Born in state:** 11  
**Born out of state:** 12

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**
1946- 0  
1947- 2  
1948- 5  
1949- 7  
1950- 1  
1951- 7

**After Mobilization Alert:** 1

**Average Age**
Majors: 37  
Captains: 33.8  
1st Lieutenants: 29.7  
2d Lieutenants: 27
137th Tank Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 3

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Infantry 5  Field Artillery 1
Air Force 3  Coast Artillery 1
Ordnance 1  Signal 1

Branch School Military Education
none for armor

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 3  /  Post 1945: 5

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 8
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 10  Born out of state: 12

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 2
1948- 6
1949- 7
1950- 4
1951- 1
After Mobilization Alert- 2

Average Age
Majors: 37.5
Captains: 32.8
1st Lieutenants: 29.8
2d Lieutenants: 26
112th Engineer (Combat) Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 3

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Engineer 5  Field Artillery 1
Air Force 2  Signal 1
Quartermaster 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Engineer Company Officer Course 3
Post 1945 Engineer Associate Advanced Course 3

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 5

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 7

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 15  Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 6
1948- 1
1949- 8
1950- 2
1951- 2
After Mobilization Alert- 1

Average Age
Majors: 35
Captains: 33
1st Lieutenants: 29.7
2d Lieutenants: 25
45th Infantry Division  (Oklahoma)

179th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 12

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Infantry 10
Field Artillery 4
Air Force 2

Branch School Military Education
World War II Company Officer Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 9

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 21

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 2

Born in state: 37  Born out of state: 9

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 5
1947- 7
1948- 5
1949- 9
1950- 7

After Mobilization Alert- 13

Average Age
Majors: 32
Captains: 29.8
1st Lieutenants: 28
2d Lieutenants: 27
180th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 17

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 3

World War II Commissions
Air Force 15 U.S. Navy 2
Infantry 11 Quartermaster 1
Field Artillery 4 Cavalry 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Infantry Company Officer Course 1
World War II Rifle and Heavy Weapons Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Officer Advanced Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Basic Course 1
Post 1945 Associate Command and General Staff 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 7 / Post 1945: 23

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 42

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 5

Born in state: 65  Born out of state: 24

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 16
1947- 12
1948- 13
1949- 15
1950- 11
After Mobilization Alert- 23

Average Age
Majors: 39
Captains: 30.7
1st Lieutenants: 30
2d Lieutenants: 25.8
279th Infantry Regiment

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 20

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 3
Medical- 1

World War II Commissions
Infantry 12 AUS 1
Air Force 12 U.S. Marine Corps 1
Ordnance 2 Coast Artillery 1
Motor Ambulance 2 Signal 1
Cavalry 1 U.S. Coast Guard 1
Chaplain 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Rifle and Heavy Weapons Course 1
World War II Infantry Officer Basic Course 2
World War II Infantry Officer Advanced Course 1
Post 1945 Infantry Associate Officer Advanced Course 2
Post 1945 Armor Associate Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 10 / Post 1945: 25

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post
1945 Guard: 38

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II
Experience: 6

Born in state: 70 Born out of state: 15

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 9
1947- 5
1948- 14
1949- 23
1950- 12
After Mobilization Alert- 22

Average Age
Majors: 34.8
Captains: 28
1st Lieutenants: 28
2d Lieutenants: 26
158th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers:  2
Enlisted:  4

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:  0

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery  6
Air Force  3
Infantry  1
U.S. Marine Corps  1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Field Artillery
Battery Officer Course  3
Post 1945 Field Artillery
Associate Officer Basic Course  3

College Graduates
Pre 1945:  2 / Post 1945:  7

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:  15

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:  0

Born in state:  24  Born out of state:  6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946-  4
1947-  3
1948-  4
1949-  10
1950-  3
After Mobilization Alert-  6

Average Age
Majors:  37
Captains:  32.5
1st Lieutenants:  27
2d Lieutenants:  26
171st Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 8

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 11
Cavalry 1
Engineer 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Field Artillery
Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 8

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 11

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 24 Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 4
1947- 4
1948- 5
1949- 6
1950- 3
After Mobilization Alert - 7

Average Age
Majors: 34
Captains: 33
1st Lieutenants: 27.8
2d Lieutenants: 25.7
189th Field Artillery Battalion

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 4
Enlisted: 5

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Field Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 6
Air Force 5
Motor Ambulance 1
Signal 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Special Battery Officer Course 5
Post 1945 Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 1
Post 1945 Artillery Officer Basic Course 2
Post 1945 Field Artillery Field Officer Course 1
Light Aviation Officer Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 5

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 6

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 20 Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 5
1947- 2
1948- 3
1949- 11
1950- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Majors: 40
Captains: 31
1st Lieutenants: 29.8
2d Lieutenants: 29
245th Tank Battalion

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 2

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps**
- Field Artillery: 1
- Engineer: 1

**World War II Commissions**
- Infantry: 2
- Air Force: 2
- Signal: 1
- Quartermaster: 1
- Field Artillery: 1

**Branch School Military Education**
- Post 1945 Associate Armor Officer Basic Course: 4

**College Graduates**
- Pre 1945: 2
- Post 1945: 0

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard**
- 5

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience**
- 0

**Born in state**: 9  **Born out of state**: 7

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard**
- 1946: 1
- 1947: 1
- 1948: 3
- 1949: 6
- 1950: 3

**After Mobilization Alert**: 2

**Average Age**
- Majors: 33
- Captains: 32.8
- 1st Lieutenants: 32
- 2d Lieutenants: 26.6
47th Infantry Division (Minnesota/North Dakota)

164th Infantry Regiment (North Dakota)

Pre World War II Guardsmen

Officers: 10
Enlisted: 31

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:

World War II Commissions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Military Police</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Motor Ambulance</td>
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</table>

Branch School Military Education

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>Enlisted</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre World War II Infantry National Guard Course</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War II Battalion Commander &amp;</td>
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<tr>
<td>Staff Officer Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War II Infantry Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World War II Command and General Staff Course</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post 1945 Infantry Associate</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Advanced Course</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

College Graduates

Pre 1945: 12 / Post 1945: 13

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 55

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 5

Born in state: 69
Born out of state: 32

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 2
1947- 25
1948- 14
1949- 26
1950- 14

After Mobilization Alert- 20

Average Age

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>35.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>33.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>28.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenants</td>
<td>26.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

553
188th Field Artillery Battalion (North Dakota)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 7

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 2
Field Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery: 5
Air Force: 2
Infantry: 1
Motor Ambulance: 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Field Artillery Battery Officer Course: 1
Post 1945 AAA & Guided Missile Associate Officer Basic Course: 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 5 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 13

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 23 Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 8
1948- 7
1949- 8
1950- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 1

Average Age
Majors: 38
Captains: 35
1st Lieutenants: 26
2d Lieutenants: 26
Non-Divisional Units

145th Field Artillery Battalion (Utah)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 8

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Coast Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 5
Air Force 3
Ordnance 1
Infantry 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course 1
World War II Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course 1
Post 1945 Field Artillery Associate Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 6
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 17 Born out of state: 2

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 5
1948- 2
1949- 5
1950- 2
After Mobilization Alert- 5

Average Age
Majors: 37
Captains: 30.8
1st Lieutenants: 30
2d Lieutenants: 25.8
194th Field Artillery (Iowa)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 0

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Field Artillery 2

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 4
Infantry 3
Coast Artillery 2
Quartermaster 1
Air Force 1
Ordnance 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Field Artillery
Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 3 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 13

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 22
Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 5
1948- 11
1949- 6
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 5

Average Age
Majors: 32
Captains: 33
1st Lieutenants: 29
2d Lieutenants: 28.8

556
204th Field Artillery Battalion (Utah)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 6

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Coast Artillery- 2

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery  4  Infantry  2
Coast Artillery  2  Quartermaster  1
Air Force  2  Engineer  1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course  1
World War II Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course  1

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 6  /  Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 5

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 2

Born in state: 19  Born out of state: 2

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 3
1947- 3
1948- 4
1949- 4
1950- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 3

Average Age
Majors: 42
Captains: 31
1st Lieutenants: 29.8
2d Lieutenants: 26
213th Field Artillery Battalion (Utah)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 9

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Field Artillery - 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 7, Cavalry 1
Infantry 3, Quartermaster 1
Air Force 3, U.S. Navy 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 3

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 6

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 18, Born out of state: 6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 7
1948- 3
1949- 7
1950- 3
After Mobilization Alert- 4

Average Age
Majors: 34
Captains: 30
1st Lieutenants: 30.6
2d Lieutenants: 28
235th Field Artillery Observation Battalion (Pennsylvania)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 2

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Field Artillery 6
Air Force 1
Chemical 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 3 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 3
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 12 Born out of state: 2

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 0
1948- 9
1949- 5
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Majors: 32.5
Captains: 31.5
1st Lieutenants: 29
2d Lieutenants: 32
272d Field Artillery Battalion  (Massachusetts)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 7
Enlisted: 11

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Dental Corps - 1

World War II Commissions
Infantry 8
Air Force 3
Motor Ambulance 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Field Artillery
Associate Officer Basic Course 3

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 10

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 22
Born out of state: 8

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 13
1948- 3
1949- 9
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 5

Average Age
Majors: 35.5
Captains: 34.6
1st Lieutenants: 29.8
2d Lieutenants: 28.8
987th Armored Field Artillery  (Ohio)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 2

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Field Artillery- 2

World War II Commissions
Air Force 4 Engineer 1
Field Artillery 3 Adjutant General 1
Infantry 2 Transportation 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Battery Officer Course 1
Post 1945 Field Artillery
Associate Officer Basic Course 1
Post 1945 Armor
Associate Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 4

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 8

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 19  Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 6
1948- 3
1949- 9
1950- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 2

Average Age
Majors: 40
Captains: 32.8
1st Lieutenants: 30.5
2d Lieutenants: 29.6
197th AAA Group Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
(New Hampshire)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 0

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Coast Artillery- 1
Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Coast Artillery 1 Quartermaster 1
Field Artillery 1 U.S. Navy 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II AAA Officer Advanced Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 3 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 3
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 5 Born out of state: 6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 5
1948- 2
1949- 3
1950- 1
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Field Grades: 40
Captains: 37.5
1st Lieutenants: 29
2d Lieutenants: 27.6
216th AAA Group Headquarters and Headquarters Battery
(Minnesota)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 5

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Coast
Artillery - 1

World War II Commissions
Coast Artillery - 4
Infantry - 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II AAA Officer Advanced Course - 1
Post 1945 Associate
Command and General Staff Course - 1

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 0 / Post 1945: 2

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 0
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 7   Born out of state: 1

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 5
1947- 1
1948- 2
1949- 0
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Field Grades: 37
Captains: 31
1st Lieutenants: 34
2d Lieutenants: na
685th AAA Gun Battalion (Massachusetts)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 6

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Coast Artillery 2  Quartermaster 1
Air Force 2  Signal 1
Field Artillery 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 AAA Associate Officer Basic Course 2

College Graduates Pre 1945: 2 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 9

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in state: 15 Born out of state: 4

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 0
1948- 7
1949- 5
1950- 3
1951- 1

After Mobilization Alert- 3

Average Age
Majors: 39.5
Captains: 34
1st Lieutenants: 31
2d Lieutenants: 28.6

564
703d AAA Gun Battalion  (Maine)

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**

Officers: 0  
Enlisted: 8

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** 0

**World War II Commissions**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coast Artillery</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infantry</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Ambulance</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quartermaster</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chaplain</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Field Artillery</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Navy</td>
<td>1</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Branch School Military Education**

Post 1945 AAA Associate Officer Basic Course  1

**College Graduates**

Pre 1945: 4  /  Post 1945: 3

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:**  5

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:**  1

**Born in state:**  22  
**Born out of state:**  6

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**

1946- 0
1947- 9
1948- 3
1949- 8
1950- 4

**After Mobilization Alert:**  4

**Average Age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Age</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Majors</td>
<td>33</td>
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<tr>
<td>Captains</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st Lieutenants</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2d Lieutenants</td>
<td>29.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
705th AAA Gun Battalion  (Rhode Island)

Pre World War II Guardsmen  
Officers: 3  
Enlisted: 4  

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions  
Coast Artillery 5  Motor Ambulance 1  
Infantry 4  Signal 1  
Field Artillery 1  Air Force 1

Branch School  Military Education  
Post 1945 Artillery  
Associate Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates  
Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 3

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 9  
Born out of state: 10

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:  
1946- 1  
1947- 8  
1948- 4  
1949- 3  
1950- 1  
After Mobilization Alert- 2

Average Age  
Majors: 37  
Captains: 32  
1st Lieutenants: 31  
2d Lieutenants: 28
710th AAA Gun Battalion  (Virginia)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers:  0
Enlisted:  0

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:  Coast Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Air Force  2        U.S. Navy  1
Infantry   2        Quartermaster  1
Coast Artillery  1  Transportation  1
Field Artillery  1

Branch School Military Education
no AAA

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 3

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:  5

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:  2

Born in state:  12    Born out of state:  4

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946-  1
1947-  2
1948-  7
1949-  2
1950-  3
After Mobilization Alert-  2

Average Age
Majors:   35
Captains: 31.9
1st Lieutenants: 26.5
2d Lieutenants: 29.7
715th AAA Gun Battalion  (New York)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 8

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Coast Artillery 5  Quartermaster 1
Infantry 3  Transportation 1
Field Artillery 1  Chemical 1
Air Force 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II AAA Officer Advanced Course 2

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 5 / Post 1945: 5

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 9

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 10  Born out of state: 14

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 0
1948- 9
1949- 6
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 9 (6 from Inactive Guard)

Average Age
Majors: 34.6
Captains: 34.8
1st Lieutenants: 29.4
2d Lieutenants: 28
109th Engineer Combat Battalion   (South Dakota)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 3

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Engineer     2
Infantry     2
Field Artillery 2
Air Force   1

Branch School Military Education
none

College Graduates   Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 0

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 3

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 7    Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 7
1948- 3
1949- 2
1950- 0
After Mobilization Alert- 0

Average Age
Majors: 37
Captains: 33
1st Lieutenants: 31
2d Lieutenants: na
115th Engineer Combat Battalion  (Utah)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 1

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:  Field Artillery- 1

World War II Commissions
Engineer 3  Motor Ambulance  1
Air Force 1  Field Artillery 1
Infantry 1

Branch School Military Education
none for engineer

College Graduates  Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 5

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 7

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 2

Born in state: 10  Born out of state: 6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:

After Mobilization Alert- 2

Average Age
Majors: na  Captains: 30
1st Lieutenants: 29  2d Lieutenants: 26
231st Engineer (Combat) Battalion (Army) (North Dakota)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 1
Enlisted: 8

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Engineer 3 Infantry 1
Air Force 3 Signal 1
Field Artillery 1 Dental 1
U.S. Navy 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Associate Engineer Officer Basic Course 1

College Graduates Pre 1945: 4 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 10

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 18 Born out of state: 5

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 4
1947- 2
1948- 6
1949- 4
1950- 4
After Mobilization Alert- 3

Average Age
Majors: 31
Captains: 33.6
1st Lieutenants: 28
2d Lieutenants: 28
645th Engineer Combat Battalion (Pennsylvania)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 0

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Quartermaster 3 Chemical 1
Air Force 2 Infantry 1
Motor Ambulance 1 Coast Artillery 1

Branch School Military Education
none for engineer

College Graduates Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 2
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

Born in state: 5 Born out of state: 6

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 0
1948- 2
1949- 5
1950- 1

After Mobilization Alert- 3

Average Age
Majors: 31
Captains: 29.8
1st Lieutenants: 28.6
2d Lieutenants: na
163d Military Police Battalion (District of Columbia)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 5

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: 0

World War II Commissions
Infantry 8
Air Force 2
Chemical 2
Field Artillery 1
Ordnance 1

Branch School Military Education
World War II Command and General Staff Course 1
Post 1945 CIC Officer Investigator Course 1

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 2

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard: 6
Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 1

Born in DC: 5
Born out of DC: 19

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 3
1947- 5
1948- 3
1949- 1
1950- 9
After Mobilization Alert- 3

Average Age
Majors: 34
Captains: 30
1st Lieutenants: 29
2d Lieutenants: 28
168th Military Police Battalion (Tennessee)

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**
Officers: 0
Enlisted: 8

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps**: 0

**World War II Commissions**
- Infantry: 5
- Military Police: 1
- Air Force: 3
- Signal: 1
- U.S. Marine Corps: 2

**Branch School Military Education**
- Post 1945 Military Police
- Associate Officer Basic Course: 1
- Post 1945 CIC Officer Investigator Course: 1

**College Graduates**
- Pre 1945: 0 / Post 1945: 0

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard**: 10

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience: 0

**Born in state**: 20 **Born out of state**: 2

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard**:
- 1946- 0
- 1947- 7
- 1948- 4
- 1949- 4
- 1950- 5

After Mobilization Alert: 2

**Average Age**
- Majors: na
- Captains: 32
- 1st Lieutenants: 28.5
- 2d Lieutenants: 27.8
171st Military Police Battalion  (District of Columbia)

Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers: 2
Enlisted: 5

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps: Infantry- 1

World War II Commissions
Infantry 3 Ordnance 1
Air Force 3 Signal 1
Coast Artillery 2 Engineer 1

Branch School Military Education
Post 1945 Military Police
Associate Officer Basic Course 3

College Graduates
Pre 1945: 5 / Post 1945: 1

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post
1945 Guard: 12

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II
Experience: 0

Born in DC: 12 Born out of DC: 14

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1946- 0
1947- 5
1948- 9
1949- 5
1950- 2

After Mobilization Alert- 5

Average Age
Majors: 42
Captains: 34.8
1st Lieutenants: 29.9
2d Lieutenants: 27.6
107th Transportation Company (Alabama)

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**

Officers: 0  
Enlisted: 1

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** Infantry- 1

**World War II Commissions**

none

**Branch School Military Education**

none

**College Graduates**  
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 1

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:** 3

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:** 0

**Born in state:** 4  
**Born out of state:** 0

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**

- 1946- 0
- 1947- 1
- 1948- 1
- 1949- 0
- 1950- 1

**After Mobilization Alert- 1**

**Average Age**

- Captain: 41
- 1st Lieutenants: 27
- 2d Lieutenants: 31
715th Transportation Company  (District of Columbia)

**Pre World War II Guardsmen**
Officers: 0  
Enlisted: 0

**Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:** 0

**World War II Commissions**
Infantry 1

**Branch School Military Education**
World War II Infantry Motor Officer Course 1

**College Graduates**  
Pre 1945: 1 / Post 1945: 0

**World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:** 2

**Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:** 0

Born in DC: 1  
Born out of DC: 2

**Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:**
1946- 0  
1947- 1  
1948- 1  
1949- 1  
1950- 0

After Mobilization Alert- 0

**Average Age**
Captain: 33  
1st Lieutenants: na  
2d Lieutenants: 29
Pre World War II Guardsmen
Officers:
Enlisted:

Pre World War II Officer Reserve Corps:

World War II Commissions

Branch School Military Education

College Graduates  Pre 1945:  /  Post 1945:

World War II Enlisted Veterans Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard:

Commissioned in Post 1945 Guard Without World War II Experience:

Born in state:  Born out of state:

Commissioning Dates in Post 1945 Guard:
1945-
1947-
1948-
1949-
1950-
After Mobilization Alert-

Average Age
Majors:
Captains:
1st Lieutenants:
2d Lieutenants: