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GIDDENS' STRUCTURATION THEORY AND THE STUDY OF POLICY DISCOURSE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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The Ohio State University
1997

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Approved by
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Graduate Program in Communication
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ABSTRACT

This study consists of development of an approach to policy analysis derived from Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. It grows out of an emergent body of literature known as the "Argumentative Turn" in policy analysis. This literature advances policy studies by placing communication at the center. It explains failures of mainstream policy analysis that treats communication as unproblematic. The argumentative turn itself, however, can be critiqued for inadequately explaining relations of action and constraint, and the interplay of power. Giddens' structuration theory focuses specifically on issues of agency and structure as recursively related to one another through the articulation of communication, norms and power. The research questions for the study are: can our understanding of communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?

The developed analytic approach contributes to the study of policy in two related ways. It bridges analysis of the "micro" and the "macro," and of agency and structure, by focusing on metaphor in
policy discourse. In this approach situated uses of modes of discourse are linked to their reproduction as institutionalized symbolic orders. It also enables explanation of the interrelations of communication with legitimation and, especially, with power, by treating discourse and symbolization as practices related to a wide array of other practices reproduced across time and space.

The study contributes to social theory by showing that institutional analysis and strategic-conduct analysis are overlapping perspectives, rather than distinct approaches. It also demonstrates that conceptualizing structure as rules, rather than as both rules and resources, is more consistent with Giddens' overall emphasis on process.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish thank my adviser, Rohan Samarajiva, for his confidence in my work, his insight, and his patient guidance throughout graduate school and this dissertation. He is due most of the credit for getting me started in looking at policy through the lens of social theory.

Brenda Dervin is also due thanks. Whether in graduate seminars or on research projects, working with her has always been intellectually inspiring, and personally gratifying. Parties at her house were always wonderful, too!

Joseph Pilotta has also inspired me, and led me to insights regarding social theory I might not have reached otherwise. I especially want to thank him for leading the impromptu graduate seminar on Nietzsche several years ago.

Friends due thanks include Linda and Vince Berdayes, Rob Huesca and Rod Metts. All have provided encouragement, advice and a sympathetic ear. Divakar Goswami helped me immensely by obtaining signatures and filing forms for me when I couldn't be there myself.

Finally, I thank my parents for years of love and support, and Tina, without whose patience, encouragement and confidence in me, I might not have made it through this project.
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PUBLICATION


FIELDS OF STUDY

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The Argumentative Turn in Policy Analysis

In recent years, language and communication have received considerable attention among those studying policy analysis and planning in the U.S. and Europe. Some scholars have gone so far as to state that what philosopher Richard Rorty called the "linguistic turn" has reached policy analysis (e.g., Fischer and Forester 1993, p. 5; Hajer 1993, p. 45), or, alternatively, label the burgeoning interest as an "argumentative" or "rhetorical turn" (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Throgmorton 1996, p. 5, respectively). This linguistic, rhetorical, or as I shall refer to it, argumentative turn in policy analysis and planning is the starting point for this dissertation.

The argumentative turn focuses on communication in policy making--the language and communicative practices which shape, and are shaped by, the policy process. Contributors to the growing literature are from varied academic backgrounds, including Planning,

---

1 I follow Forester in referring "to city planners, program evaluators, managers and administrators of public programs, policy analysts, budget analysts, as 'planning analysts,' 'planners,' or 'policy analysts'... interchangeably. The similarities among all these roles outshadow their differences" (1993a, 166 n.2).

In the balance of this chapter, I first describe the historical context of policy analysis and planning out of which the argumentative turn in policy analysis has arisen. I then present a brief overview and analysis of the literature of the argumentative turn, pointing out some strengths and weaknesses. Finally, I pose the central research questions of this dissertation: "can our understanding of the communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?"

**Historical Context of the Argumentative Turn**

The argumentative turn in policy analysis grows out of a specific historical context. A primary factor in its development is recognition of problems with the assumptions and approaches of "policy science" as an objective, apolitical, expertise based problem solving activity. In the United States in the late 19th century, Charles Francis Adams,
inspired by his readings of Mill and Comte, developed the idea of "regulatory commissions as expert, apolitical bodies," which would scientifically and rationally oversee industry and society (Streeter 1996, p.51-52). Through the early twentieth century, city planning boards, state public utility commissions and the Federal Reserve Board all emerged under this central assumption "that scientific planning should guide societal change" (Throgmorton 1996, p.4). In between the World Wars, various other government institutions came into being based on this assumption (e.g., the Federal Radio, and subsequently, Federal Communications Commission, and various New Deal agencies including the Tennessee Valley Authority, the Rural Electrification administration, the Civil Works Administration, etc.).

At the end of the Second World War, the assumption was reenforced and gained momentum. Military operations research directly influenced the "policy sciences", shifting focus from single clearly defined decisions to "complex decision situations" and, eventually, "the problems of government on a large scale" (Tribe 1972, p. 68). There was a corresponding shift to a specific set of "scientific" methodological tools which included statistics, economics and systems theory (Tribe 1972).

Beginning in the 1950s, and accelerating in the 1960s, however, many policy analysts and planners were beginning to recognize "their evident inability to manage modern economies, guide urban development, or solve long-standing social problems" (Throgmorton 1996, p.4). As evidenced by the civil rights, anti-war, feminist and environmental movements, and the reactions to them, values are
contestable, and there were great tensions and divisions over political values in U.S. society. Policy analysis itself was recognized as often reflecting biases found in society as a whole. It was value laden and political, whether explicitly or implicitly. Further, the OPEC oil embargo and its economic consequences dramatically demonstrated that many things are beyond the control of rational planners. Finally, it was increasingly recognized that implemented plans and policies have unintended consequences. In Throgmorton’s words, policy analysts and planners had assumed that they could specify goals that perfectly represented society’s values, use lawlike scientific generalizations and associated predictions to choose the one best way of achieving those goals, and count on some central authority to implement their preferred alternative. None of those assumptions proved valid in the America of the 1960s (Throgmorton 1996, p. 26).

This realization has contributed to a fragmentation of policy analysis and planning (Throgmorton 1996). Even as policy analysis apparently flourished, proliferating throughout all levels of government, planners and analysts were losing any clear shared sense of what their role was (Radin 1997). Thus, in policy analysis today some analysts, recognizing that change is a highly politicized process, “attach themselves directly to political actors” (Radin 1997, p. 210). Others seek only to influence change incrementally, by providing advice to decision makers generally. Still others advocate for particular constituencies or causes, or serve as hired guns for interest groups (Radin 1997, Streeter 1996, Throgmorton 1996). These developments can be characterized as a move from a belief
that analysis "focuses on a single conversation between the advisor and the ruler" to recognition of "multiple conversations taking place at once" (Radin 1997, p. 214). And in these multiple conversations, the "modernist...proclaimed ability to discover Truth...and to perfectly represent the public interest...[has become] just one of many voices" (Throgmorton 1996, p. 31). This has led one scholar of planning to characterize analysts and planners as confronting a "postmodern abyss" (Beauregard 1991).

**Argumentative Turn Literature: Four Approaches**

This erosion of analysts' and planners' core assumptions, together with the subsequent recognition of the multiplicity of voices in policy processes, have been major impetuses to the argumentative turn. In trying to deal with and account for these phenomena, analysts have had to acknowledge that persuasion, argumentation, participation and interpretation are important parts of policy practices—an acknowledgement inconsistent with the traditional instrumental reasoning. To address these concerns, policy analysts have had to seek new theoretical and practical tools. They have turned to the fields of literary criticism and theory, argumentation, philosophy, ethnography and cultural studies to find them.

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2 An important influence in this turn has been the recognition of the significance of argument and discourse in the particular social sciences from which policy analysts have traditionally borrowed theory and methods. For example, economist D. McCloskey is frequently cited in the argumentative turn literature for his arguments to the effect that economics constitutes a rhetoric (McCloskey 1985, 1992; See also Nelson, Megill & McCloskey 1987).
The literature can be classified in terms of how the authors approach these problems. I have identified four basic stances taken by contributors to the argumentative turn. They are (1) forensic structure approaches, (2) framing and narrative approaches, (3) participatory and emancipatory approaches, and (4) explanatory approaches. The first three are closely related. In fact, they can be understood as being hierarchical, rather than mutually exclusive. That is, authors who address concerns classified in set (3) are also concerned, whether implicitly or explicitly, with the those of sets (2) and (1), and those classified in set (2) also address the concerns of (1). The majority of the literature can be classified as falling into one of these three sets. The fourth set is comprised, thus far, of only a few studies. But in what follows I shall argue that the literature I have classified into the fourth set is superior to that of the other sets, because it provides more complete explanation of policy processes. I begin by briefly describing the concerns associated with each of the sets. I then present and critique examples of the first three categories, before moving on to consider the strengths and weaknesses of contributions to the fourth category.

The four approaches can be described as follows.

(1) Forensic structure approaches: Recognition that there is likely to be no single, uncontested, scientifically valid solution to a given social problem has led to interest in the role of persuasion and argumentation in policy formation. Analysts are interested in how traditional policy analytic findings in fact serve as
evidence in value-laden policy debates, and in how persuasive, argumentative techniques are structured and can be utilized in this process.

(2) Framing and narrative approaches: Recognition that the definitions of social/policy problems are themselves value laden has led to an interest in the language and thought processes used in such definition, and beyond this, interest in the ways entire approaches to policy are rooted in particular frames or narratives. Analysts address ways the same set of circumstances may or may not be defined as problematic, depending on the frame or narrative involved, the degree to which the frame or narrative implicitly limits or determines the range of possible policy actions, and ways that analysts can mediate between different frames.

(3) Participatory and emancipatory approaches to policy analysis: Recognition that definition of problems, development of solutions, and successful implementation of policies are all influenced by who has a voice in the policy process has led to a focus on who participates and how they communicate with one another. Analysts addressing these issues express interest in varying degree in ways of facilitating greater and broader participation among various involved or affected parties, stress the importance of dialogue over argument, consensus over
compromise, and see the goal of addressing frame conflict not simply in terms of defining or resolving problems, but in terms of emancipation.

(4) Explanatory approaches: Whereas analysts in the above categories can be understood as addressing questions about how to change/improve policy analysis, I have classified authors into this category because they more explicitly address questions such as "why do policy analysts do what they do?" or "what are the conditions that make policy analysis possible?"

**Three Expertise Centered Approaches**

I have grouped the first three categories together because they can be viewed as hierarchically related to one another, but also because they share a common set of assumptions about policy analysts as experts. I will discuss these assumptions in more detail below. Each of the three approaches has been expressed in relatively "pure" form by analysts who were early advocates of the study of communication in policy processes.³ Alice M. Rivlin, eventual

³ Work dealing with language, interpretation and other communicative aspects of policy analysis and planning really does not acquire the critical mass to be viewed as a body of literature until the mid 1980s. It is not explicitly recognized and identified as a linguistic, rhetorical or argumentative turn until the 1990s. It should be noted, too, that the ultimate influence of the argumentative turn on the field of policy analysis as a whole remains to be seen. For example, as Dryzek argues, the "rethinking of the field's methodological and theoretical foundations" that undergirds the argumentative turn "has not really affected the substance of techniques taught in graduate schools of public policy, public affairs, public administration, and so forth" (1993, p. 215).
director of the Office of Management and Budget under President Clinton, and subsequently vice-chair of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve, expressed some of the central interests of the forensic structure approaches in a 1973 article. She argued that "a new tradition of forensic social science" was emerging, "in which scholars. . .writ[e] briefs for or against particular policy positions. . . bring[ing] together all the evidence that supports their side of the argument, leaving to the brief writers of the other side the job of picking apart the case" (1973, p. 25). She approved of this trend as reducing hypocrisy and claims of objectivity. She went on to suggest that

there have to be some rules [to] guard against misrepresentation of facts or findings. . . . Moreover, the evidence has to be available for examination by the other side and by the judge and jury--the policy makers and the public. In particular, statistical manipulations should be described fully enough for others to reproduce and question them (1973, p.26).

Donald Schön, along with Martin Rein (Schön 1979, Rein & Schön 1979, Schon & Rein 1994) has long been interested in framing, or "problem setting," in social policy. He explored many of the concerns which I have associated with the framing and narrative approaches in a 1979 chapter. His approach centers on the language of problem framing, specifically on metaphors. A fundamental flaw in policy analysis as practice, according to Schön, is that the field is dominated by an "instrumentalist position" (1979, p. 261). This is the "view that development of social policy ought to be considered as a problem solving enterprise" (Schön 1979, p. 255). This position is based on
the assumption "that we know...the problems of cities, the problems of the economy, the problems of population control, but that we cannot yet solve them" (1979, p. 260-61). Contra this view, Schón argues that

the social situations confronting us have turned out to be far more complex than we had supposed...unexpected problems created by our search for acceptable means to the ends we have chosen reveals (as in the cases of health and welfare policies) a stubborn conflict of ends traceable to the problem setting itself (1979, p. 262).

He suggests that problems are set or framed in terms of "the 'stories' people tell about troublesome situations" (1979, p. 255). These narratives play a role in the ways a "view of social reality" is constructed through "a process of naming and framing" (1979, p. 264; author's emphasis). Often there are "metaphors underlying the stories which generate problem setting and set the directions of problem solving" (Schön 1979, p.255). He illustrates the role metaphor can play in structuring understanding with a non-policy, "technological example" (1979, p. 257), in which researchers working on developing synthetic bristles for paint brushes had a breakthrough when one of them realized that "a paintbrush is a kind of a pump" (1976, p. 257). The metaphor is specifically "generative...in the sense that it generated new perceptions, explanations and inventions" (1979, p. 259).

Schön argues that not all metaphors are generative in this sense, noting that when the researchers "spoke of painting as 'masking a surface'...[it] did not...give rise to a new view of the problem" (1979, p. 259).
In the case of policy, according to Schöen, problems are constructed "out of the vague and indeterminate reality which John Dewey. . . called the problematic situation" (1979, p. 264). That is, "things are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation" (1979, p. 264). This process of naming and framing enables "the 'normative leap from data to recommendations, from facts to values, from 'is' to 'ought'" (Schöen 1979, p.265). But in the case of policy formulation, unlike the case of paintbrush development, the underlying "generative metaphors are ordinarily tacit. Often we are unaware of the metaphors that shape our perception and understanding of social situations" (1979, p. 266-7).

Schöen illustrates his argument using examples from the history of urban housing policies. He presents two of the "stories" that have been told about urban housing in different periods. Each sets out a very different view of "what is wrong and what needs fixing" (1979, p.262). And "each in its time guided the writing of legislation [and] the formation of policy" (1979, p. 264). In the fifties, the dominant story was one of blight or illness. Schöen presents an excerpt from an opinion on an urban renewal program written by Justice Douglas, who discusses urban neighborhoods in terms of a community which was "blighted" and seemed "as though possessed of a congenital disease" (Schöen 1979, p.262-3). The underlying metaphor of this story centers on contrasts of disease and health, casting the community as an ailing character. As Schöen notes, "in our ideas about disease. . . there is already an evaluation" (1979, p. 265), and
thus implicitly a prescription for action. The "blight must be
removed ('unsanitary and unsightly' buildings must be torn down)
and the area must be returned to its former state" (1979, p. 265).

In the sixties, according to Schön, a new story emerged, which
"expressed negative reactions to urban renewal" (1979, p. 264). This
story was based on a metaphor of "the slum as 'a natural
community' . . . 'folk community' or 'urban village'" (1979, p. 265).
Schön presents an excerpt from a study in which the "slum" is
compared to "the communities so often observed in folk cultures",
(1979, p. 263-4). When viewed from this perspective, "what is
wrong is that the natural community . . . is threatened with
destruction . . . by the very prophylaxis undertaken in the name of
'urban renewal'" (1979, p. 265). As with the previous story, the
central metaphor implicitly conveys a "sense of the good which is to
be sought and the evil which is to be avoided" (1979, p. 265).
Nature, and thus "'natural communities' should be preserved" (1979,
p. 265).

Schön argues that each of these metaphoric constructs rests on a
dualism--"health/disease" and "nature/artifice"-- which "derives
normative force from . . . purposes . . . values [and] images which have
long been powerful in our culture" (1979, p. 266). It is this
normatively charged dualism which makes "the diagnosis and the
prescription look obvious" for a situation that otherwise would seem
"complex, uncertain and indeterminate" (1979, p. 266). "This sense
of obviousness of what is wrong and what needs fixing is the hallmark of generative metaphor in the field of social policy" (1979, p. 266).

Schön recommends "a kind of policy-analytic literary criticism" in which the analyst interprets the problem-setting story and "the metaphor which is generative of it" (1979, p. 267). This allows analysts to consider critically not only the similarities, but also the differences between the policy situation and the one in terms of which it has been defined. Such an approach can also be useful in revealing and mitigating "frame conflict": situations where the ends the participants seek may be "incommensurable because they are embedded in conflicting frames that lead . . . to construct[ion of] incompatible meanings for the situation" (Schön 1979, p. 269). Such dilemmas, by definition are unresolvable from the instrumental perspective (1979, p. 269).

When the researcher's concern shifts from conflicting frames to the variety of participants in the process, according to my schema, the work can be classified as falling into the participatory or emancipatory approaches. Dryzek (1982) clearly enunciates the basic concerns I associate with this set. He argues for "policy analysis as hermeneutic activity," in his 1982 article of that title. He describes the hermeneutic approach as distinct from a variety of traditional approaches to policy analysis. He argues that the hermeneutic approach can be used in all policy situations, and that more traditional approaches could serve as subsidiary to it (p. 323-324). He states that the hermeneutic approach can be thought of "as
a circuitous but sure route to a given destination. . .[the other approaches] offer shortcuts to the same destination under the right circumstances; but if the circumstances are not right these shortcuts are dead ends" (p. 326). At a minimum, in his view, the hermeneutic approach is essential for formulating successful policy for "a wide range of 'messy situations of policy choice" (1982, p.326), including the most complex and important issues (1982, p. 322).

Dryzek draws on what he refers to as "the phenomenological critique of mainstream behavioral science" (1982, p. 310) and, especially, the critical hermeneutics of Habermas (p. 327, fn. 12). The former is relevant, he argues, because, "phenomenology sees individuals as agents acting in social situations in pursuit of their goals, as opposed to data points for the testing of hypotheses. . . . Phenomenological explanations rely upon an understanding of the logic of the situation in which individuals find themselves." (1982, p. 310).

In Dryzek's view policy analysis, if it is to succeed, must involve recognition of the political mindsets of the policy actors who will consider the policy (1982, p. 311), as well as of the "social reality [of] individuals affected by a policy" (1982, p. 322). It is precisely due to inadequacy on these counts, according to Dryzek, that "all too often policy analyses are rejected" (1982, p. 311) or fail upon implementation (1982, p. 322). In conceptualizing how policy analysts should deal with these requirements Dryzek draws on critical hermeneutics. He presents the role of the policy analyst as one of seeking "a mediation (or confrontation)" (1982, p. 322), or a
dialogue, between the "frames of reference of analysts and actors" (1982, p. 322), and those affected by the policies. The desired result, he argues, drawing on hermeneutic philosopher Gadamer, is an extension of the horizons of the various participants, "a synthesis of the best [of each of the] frameworks" (1982, p. 322). Policy analysis practiced thus is "emancipatory" in the sense of "raising the consciousness" of those involved (1982, p. 323). The emphasis on mediating between various frames of reference is obviously similar to that expressed by Schöns. But Schöns and subsequent analysts interested in framing tend to consider frames in terms of the bases for different expert approaches employed by policy analysts. And the emphasis in mitigating frame conflicts seems to be to get on with solving problems. Dryzek and subsequent advocates of participatory approaches place emphasis on the frames of reference of those affected by the policies as well (i.e., everyday people), and stress participation and dialogue in addressing conflict, and view the ultimate goal as emancipatory.

More recent contributors to the argumentative turn in policy analysis have developed more sophisticated theoretical and methodological approaches, but most can still be classified according to the typology I have suggested. Majone, for example, advances analysis of argumentation and persuasion well beyond the outlines

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5 Thus Dryzek, in a later publication, states that "a frame of reference is akin to a language or even a culture shared by a tribe of experts" (1993, p. 222) and is able to enumerate "the major frames of reference available in the policy analytic field . . . welfare economic, public choice, social structure, information processing, and political philosophy" (1993, p. 222; also, Bobrow & Dryzek 1987).
sketched in by Rivlin, but can be understood as paying attention almost exclusively to the same issues. He calls for recognition of the rhetorical over the instrumental in policy analysis (1989, p. 33). He illustrates that traditional 'scientific' policy analysis has in fact long involved argumentation, persuasion, and subjective value judgements, and critiques the field not because of this involvement, but rather because the argument, persuasion and dependence on values have remained unacknowledged and unexamined (1989, p. 8, p. 23, p. 35). He prescribes systematic, explicitly structured adversarial procedures for policy making (1989, p. 40) such as those hinted at by Rivlin, including development of "craft skills...a repertoire of procedures and judgements" (1989, p. 44) to provide standards of quality for evidence, "since perfection of data is impossible" (1989, p. 47).

But he also devotes considerable attention to explaining argument in policy processes. For example, he details constraints analysts face in their persuasive strategies, distinguishing them according to the degree that they are value centered or "objective," self- or other-imposed, long- or short-term, and so on (1989, p. 83). He also notes that some "man-made" constraints that are objective for given policy participants in the short-term "can be relaxed in the long run" (1989, p. 83).

He notes that different policy participants can draw on different types of resources. But

the comparative advantage that various types of resources give to their owners depends on institutional factors. Any given
institutional framework tends to favor some resources over others. . . rule changes can create new resources as well as affect the value of existing ones (1989, p. 102).

Finally, based on his differentiation of short- versus long-term constraints, Majone develops a conceptualization of institutional change based on an "extension of the model of rational choice," (1989, p. 96). It assumes that actors in the policy process, rather than single-mindedly pursuing specific outcomes, also consciously devote some of their resources to "influenc[ing] the institutional mechanisms that will produce future streams of valued outcomes" (1989, p. 97). He thus distinguishes between policy arguments that aim for changes in substantive rules, and arguments aimed at institutional change, which involve changes in procedural rules.

Other policy analysts/scholars whose work falls within the forensic category are Propper & Reneman (1994) and You (1990). These authors apply structural models to policy argumentation. Propper & Reneman argue that a policy theory, defined narrowly as "the body of assumptions or hypotheses of an actor forming the basis of a policy" (1994, p. 274), can be analyzed structurally as an argument involving causal, normative and descriptive premises. You modifies Toulmin's model of argument structure and applies it to questions of public utility rate of return regulation.

Another structural approach which has gained popularity involves focus on narrative rather than argument structure. Like the forensic analysts, advocates of narrative approaches tend to be interested in the ways an understanding of structural forms can be strategically applied in the policy process. But I classify their work
with the framing approaches because they tend to move beyond just a descriptive interest in use of structures or forms. They are also given to explicit consideration of the way narratives shape policy actors' perceptions of reality.

Kaplan (1986, 1993) and Roe (1989, 1992, 1994, Hukkinen, Roe & Rochlin 1990) for example, each bring simplified versions of structural analysis borrowed from literary criticism to bear on policy stories. They each set out structural criteria for what constitutes a good policy story. For both, these criteria include that it must have a beginning, a middle and an end (Kaplan 1993, p. 17, Roe 1989, p. 251-52). Kaplan further argues that it is this organization, "requir[ing] the establishment of a readable, coherent plot," which gives narrative its power as an analytic tool (1993, p. 172), and that the "truth" of a narrative can be judged in terms of the "internal connections among the five core elements of narrative: agent, act, scene, agency, and purpose" (1993, p. 178).

Both argue that skill in creating and analyzing narratives is essential for policy analysts. But they view narrative skill as a supplement to the traditional, rational/scientific approaches. Kaplan suggests that analysts rely on narrative only in situations where no external or "broadly agreed upon criteria exist," because they can help the policy analyst "impos[e] order on complexity" and arrive at policy recommendations (Kaplan 1986, p. 768). Roe likewise argues that narrative analysis should be considered as just one more of the many "elements found in the analyst's toolkit" (Roe 1989, p. 253), reserved "only for those policy problems recognizably so complex"
and uncertain that stories . . . of necessity become the way problems are articulated: the absence of adequate statistical, methodological, or legal specification does not permit otherwise" (1989, p. 267). He further argues that the proper policy analytic function of narrative analysis is to make complex situations "more amenable to the conventional policy analytical tools of microeconomics, statistics, organization theory and legal analysis" (Roe 1992, p. 563-5; see also Hukkinen, Roe & Rochlin 1990, p. 307).

Kaplan, citing Gadamer and Ricoeur, specifically states that the power of narratives as policy analytic tools lies in the fact that, "like metaphors," they allow us to organize, understand and explain experiences (1993, p.172). And Roe parallels Schön in that he is concerned with mediating between competing policy narratives or perspectives. He recommends that in such cases, policy analysts should "compare the two sets of narratives in order to generate the metastory 'told' by the comparison", then determine "if or how" the metastory recasts the problem so that . . . the more traditional policy analytic tools can be brought to bear on it" (1993, p. 563).6

Schön and Rein continue to be concerned with framing and frame conflict. In their most recent work (1994), consistent with Schön's earlier piece, they argue that seemingly unresolvable policy problems are often based in different underlying frames. Through frame reflection, policy analysts can identify these frames, and

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6 Ironically, he cites Lyotard as inspiration for the idea of developing metastories as part of an expert based approach (1993, p. 563-564), although Lyotard diagnosed metanarratives as problematic, and stated "objections against the unquestioning acceptance of an instrumental conception of knowledge" (Lyotard 1984, 18 et passim).
construct meta-frames that account for or accommodate the range of different perspectives. Among others whose work can be understood as dealing with issues of framing one telecommunication policy scholar, Sawhney (1996), stands out.\(^7\) Sawhney's approach resonates with Schöhn's, in that he addresses metaphor. However, he is specifically concerned with ways institutional (business and regulatory) contexts of new communication technologies may be influenced by the metaphors used to describe the technologies. He calls for analysts not only to forecast, but also to proactively shape emerging technologies and their contexts by intervening in metaphoric descriptions.

In common with Kaplan and Roe, Sawhney expresses a certain ambivalence about his approach and his reasons for using it. He implies that it may be only a second best to more traditional methods, in particular formal models, but he also argues that metaphor analysis may be necessary in technology forecasting because formal models cannot deal with the ambiguity and "sheer complexity of the processes leading to the development of a large technical system"(1996, p. 291).

Sawhney notes that a new technology is often described metaphorically in terms of existing technologies. The metaphors used tend to influence people's perceptions of the actual physical

\(^7\) The telecommunication scholars that I treat here and those who identify their field more broadly as policy analysis and planning appear mutually unaware of one another's work. Nevertheless, they clearly address the same basic concerns, and are influenced by some of the same streams of philosophy and social theory.
capabilities of the new technology, but also play a role in "defin[ing] the value system which will shape our decisions regarding how we as a community live within the new technological world and, if necessary, provide guidelines for the design of new institutions" (1996, p. 303).

It should be stressed that Sawhney does not view metaphors as simply determining the shape of new technologies. He also notes the importance of what he calls, following Cherry, the actual "liberties of action" off a new technology, that is, its potential for extending control over the environment (1996, p.295). If the new technology's liberties of action are very different from the old one's, then the influence of the metaphoric association is likely to fade as the new potentials are recognized (1996, p.295).

He turns to the history of radio in illustrating these concepts. As new technology developed, many people involved in the development viewed it metaphorically in terms of wireless telegraphy. This had the effect of blinding them to the potential of point to multi-point communication, or broadcasting. When it eventually became clear to all involved that the telegraphy comparison was inadequate to describe the potentials, a new metaphor became dominant: "broadcasting" (1996, p. 297).

This better defined radio's true potential, but "proved to be a weak heuristic device for organizing broadcasting as an institution" (1996, p. 297). Eventually, "newspaper of the Air' became the

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8 Sawhney points out that telegraphy itself was initially developed as a "trunk/feeder" system under the influence of conceptual frameworks derived from the postal system (p.294-5).
dominant metaphor" over alternatives based on the human voice (e.g., "the town crier") because it offered stronger "suggestions regarding institutional practices" (1996, p. 297).

Sawhney turns to the more recent "information superhighway" metaphor in discussing the forecasting and proactive shaping of new technologies. He suggests "a two-pronged strategy" (1996, p. 303) for analysts, consistent with his foci on technological liberties of action on the one hand, and the framing of institutional values on the other. Regarding the former, creative metaphors should be applied "to help us... explore the possibilities of new liberties of action" (1996, p. 303) that may not be captured in the "Information superhighway" metaphor. But with regard to the latter, he notes the importance of framing in struggles over how technologies will be used. He points out, for example, that when consumer advocates call "for creation of 'public lanes' on the 'information superhighway'... they unwittingly accept the 'information superhighway' frame and thereby reduce the debate to a squabble about relatively minor details" (1996, p. 305). Thus he suggests more caution in this step, because we are no longer in the discovery mode. Instead we... choose one metaphor which will help us make wise decisions regarding the sociocultural issues raised by the new technologies. This choice is of the utmost importance because the metaphors frame the phenomenon in such a way that one set of characteristics get emphasized and the others downplayed (1996, p. 305).

I argued above that the categories I have defined for the argumentative turn literatures can be understood as hierarchical, and Dunn's approach (1993) supports this contention. In common
with advocates of the forensic approach, he is concerned with the structure of arguments. Indeed, like You, he argues for applying Toulmin's structural model of argument to the policy process. Yet his interest in the model is due in part to the fact that it permits and even compels a reflective and critical examination of assumptions that constitute the worldview, ideology, or frame of reference of stakeholders. ...[and] may be extended ...to yield a typology of standards, rules or tests for assessing and challenging the truth or utility of knowledge claims (1993, p. 265).

Finally, his approach shades into the participatory or emancipatory category, because he assumes that this process of assessing knowledge claims should include the claims of "policymakers, scientists and citizens at large" (1993, p. 256), and is necessary to achieve "a rationally motivated consensus" (1993, p. 262). And he explicitly, if briefly, briefly argues that Toulmin's model and the related typologies of knowledge claims have the potential to facilitate development of a critical or emancipatory social science as envisioned by Habermas (Dunn 1993, p. 267, p.277).

Dryzek's more recent work (1993) continues to exemplify the participatory or emancipatory approach, as well. He advocates "radicalizing the argumentative turn" (1993, p. 227). He argues that the basis for policy action must be consensus, but that consensus can be reached under all kinds of of conditions, through reference to many kinds of standards, and on the part of all kinds of groups, not all of which are equally defensible. The conditions of consensus formation might well be distorted by the influence of hierarchies based on prestige, professional status, or argumentative ability (1993, p. 227).
He goes on to suggest other ways the process might be distorted, and finally argues that to overcome problems of the present system and potential future distortions, "there should be as few restrictions as possible on competent participation in policy discourse and the kinds of arguments that can be advanced, normative as well as empirical" (1993, p. 229).

**Critique of Expertise Centered Approaches**

While it is possible to individually critique each of the studies reviewed above in terms of apparent correspondence to real events, logic, internal consistency, etc., it will be more useful for the present project to critique the literature by category. Thus, I will refer to a perceived strength or weakness of a particular study, in terms of it being illustrative of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach or category of literature as a whole.

My criticisms of the the literature considered thus far center on issues of explanation and unquestioned assumptions. The argumentative turn literature grows out of attempts to explain the perceived failure of the rational problem solving approach to policy. Contributors approach this explanation by questioning the assumptions on which the approach was based. But some assumptions have received more attention than others. Conceiving of the approaches hierarchically again, the approaches higher in the hierarchy incorporate explicit analysis of assumptions unquestioned at lower levels. Yet there are assumptions which remain
unquestioned even at the level of the emancipatory/participatory approaches, and which thus pervade all the approaches.

Majone and other recent forensic approach analysts advance conceptualization of argumentation in the policy process well beyond Rivlin, whose piece is largely a recognition and celebration of the fact that analysts were starting to admit that values pervaded technocratic thinking. But Majone's and other forensic analysts' explanatory powers are limited by their reliance on rational choice models (Majone 1989, p. 96). A rational choice approach to policy, as Streeter argues "tends to reduce policy events to the functions they serve for policy participants" (1987, p. 189). Thus, although Majone is oft quoted by other contributors to the argumentative turn for his claim that "as politicians know only too well but social scientists too often forget, public policy is made of language" (Majone 1989, p. 1), he and other forensic analysts devote virtually no attention to language itself. They assume it to be a transparent carrier of policy actors intentions. Related to this, despite Majone's interest in enablement and constraint, he does not consider constraints that may not be recognized as such by policy participants--for example the kinds of constraints on thinking which may be posed by unreflective use of a particular frame, style of language or mode of discourse.

Also related to the forensic analysts' reliance on rational choice models is their narrow focus on advice for policy practice. Dryzek notes of Majone that he "takes the (United States) political status quo as given, in its constitutive principles, if not its institutional details" (Dryzek 1993, p. 216), and again the criticism is relevant to the
forensic literature as a whole. Though recent contributions have more substance than Rivlin's germinal article, they still have something of a quality of recognition and acceptance. That is, authors may stress that policy analysis never did closely resemble its claimed ideals, but having applauded this recognition, they do little to explain the conditions which allow the field to exist as it does. And there is no room in their analyses for considering outcomes different from those intended by policy makers, or for looking at the ways policy process participants mediate power relationships for larger collectives such as interest groups, classes, society as a whole.

The framing and narrative approach analysts explicitly address some aspects of policy communication which I have critiqued the forensic analysts for ignoring. By definition, they do indeed recognize the importance of language— that the ways analysts think or speak about policy situations constrain their possible choices. The narrative analysts' approaches also advance our understanding of policy beyond the forensic approaches with the recognition that stories influence or persuade an audience in ways which may be more subtle than an argument. But the tendency of these analysts to describe narrative analysis as just another tool limits its explanatory usefulness. For example, applying narrative analysis to the activities of the analysts themselves, rather than just to the policy problems they are dealing with, would seem to be out of the question.

Those who address frame conflict or competing stories have also recognized that even within a structural argument model such as those proposed by Majone or You, that different participants will
recognize different kinds of evidence, and have different normative criteria for weighing the same evidence. Nonetheless, the framing and narrative approaches tend to stress adjudication or compromise between competing frames or narratives as a matter of practical necessity for analysts. They tend not to take a normative stand themselves. And, fundamentally, they attempt no explanation of why different participants might rely on different frames or narratives.

Because of this, framing/narrative approach analysts run a risk in dealing with frame conflict, of not dealing adequately with causes of conflict. At one point Schön mentions "frame conflicts that take the form of regional, ethnic and class divisions" (Schön 1979, p.269). It is certainly the case that aspects of such divisions may have to do with different ways of seeing things. But it seems far more likely that it is the regional, ethnic and class divisions which take the form of frame conflict (among other forms) rather than the reverse.

Even Sawhney, who does explicitly acknowledge that framing is likely to involve struggle among those with different interests (1996 p.305), fails to explicitly address the specific ways that different interests might be invested in different frames. And though he states that "we should choose very carefully" in framing the issues around the NII(1996, p.305), it is far from clear in his analysis with whom the choice actually lies. One is left asking what the actual

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9 In this they risk relativism, as Dryzek points out (1993, p.222-227).
dynamics in such framing might be, and why some voices might be heeded and others ignored.

In fact, though I class Sawhney with the framing approach, this last criticism is also relevant to the participatory/emancipatory literature. The framing and narrative approach analysts tend to dodge the issue of deciding between values. The contributors to the participatory/emancipatory approaches confront this issue. They not only explicitly state their valuation of more open participation, but tend to call for development of criteria or standards to assess value laden knowledge claims within a framework of more participatory, emancipatory dialogue. But they tend not to address the details of implementing their prescriptions. Dryzek's discussion of the emancipatory benefits of fusing horizons, or Dunn's concept of standards for rational consensus do not address the point that those who have political or economic advantage will see no benefit in expanding their own horizons on issues where inequities may play a causative role, and are likely to resist any process that would expand others' horizons on these issues. In short, while participatory/emancipatory approach authors feel that problems of communication are an impediment to a fairer system they do not address system impediments to instituting fairer communication processes. Their explanation of the system is incomplete.

Finally, too, there is one set of assumptions which remains unquestioned across all sets I have described as expertise centered approaches. Contributors to all the different categories I have presented continue to assume that the role of the policy analyst as
problem solver and expert is an important one, despite the fact that they also tend to explicitly state that the various claims of expertise have been a part of the constellation of problems which the argumentative turn is supposed to overcome.

The assumption that policy analysts remain problem solving experts is fairly obvious in the forensic and the framing and narrative literatures. Recommendations that analysts develop their argumentative or story telling skills simply reflect the assumption that the nature of the problems have shifted to persuasion, but that the analyst should still play a central role. But even the participatory or emancipatory analysts implicitly endorse the idea of expertise, though in more subtle form. Dryzek's comment on "competent participation" (1993, p. 229), for example, suggests both a qualification of expertise on the part of participants, and an endorsement of expertise on the part of those who will have to determine and enforce standards of competency.

My evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the literature discussed thus far turns on the related issues of explanation and the questioning of assumptions. Forensic analysts recognized that traditional policy science failed to address the nature of argument and debate in policy formulation, and explained why and how these are important. Framing and narrative analysts have gone farther, explaining how frames shaped by language and values influence what policy analysts recognize as problems and as solutions. Participatory/emancipatory analysts recognize that some frames have been privileged over others, and call for more participatory
approaches which allow normative judgement between different frames, and consensus rather than compromise among those with different views.

But even the participatory/emancipatory analysts retain unquestioned assumptions, and have failed to explain the nature of the policy process adequately so that we can understand how their recommendations are to be enacted. To state this in a different way, the various contributors to the expertise based literature have tended to address their descriptive and explanatory efforts to questions such as "what do policy analysts actually do?", "what should policy analysts be doing?", "why don't policy analysts always agree with each other?", and so forth. These are certainly important questions, but I would suggest that a different line of questioning might yield far more explanatory data, much of it of relevance to these issues. This line of inquiry is exemplified by questions such as "why and how do policy analysts do what they do?" or, to paraphrase Streeter, himself paraphrasing Kant, "what are the conditions that make policy analysis possible?" (see Streeter 1996, p. xi). Finally, too, an unstated question on which the entire relevance of the argumentative turn seems to be predicated is "what are the links between the practices of participants in policy processes, and the outcomes of specific policy issues?" These are the kinds of questions addressed by the final group of analysts I shall consider.
Explanatory Approaches

The authors considered in this section all share an interest in more complete explanation than the other argumentative turn authors. They come at this interest from a variety of perspectives, however.\(^{10}\) Forester and Throgmorton clearly associate themselves with policy analysis, and their inquiries grow out of desire to explicitly inform the practices of planners and analysts. Parsons appears to have less of a link to the world of practicing analysts, and more interest in sociological explanation. Streeter comes from a Cultural Studies background, and though broadcast policy has long been the focus of his research, he has tended to explicitly distance himself from the practices of policy analysts.

Parsons, Throgmorton and Streeter all set out to explain specific policy or regulatory situations. Forester's concern, however, is more methodological. He focuses on what he calls practice stories. Unlike the work of the narrative analysts, this focus does not involve the strategic improvement of stories, or structural analysis of competing stories used in policy debates. Rather, he is interested in what we can learn about policy analysis and planning—and what planners and analysts themselves learn—from the "stories" they tell each other (1993, p.188).

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\(^{10}\) I base my comments about the authors' perspectives on the types of journals they publish in (e.g., Policy Sciences for Throgmorton versus Journal of Communication for Parsons or Streeter), their own stated objectives or objections, and what the overall tone of their writings reveals of their assumptions about their audiences.
He presents two examples. One is an excerpt from an open-ended interview with "a recent professional school graduate" (1993, p. 189), who talks about her first job as a planner. The other is an excerpt from a transcript of a "planners' staff meeting in a small city" (1993, p. 192). In the first instance, the planner talks about her involvement in preparing a zoning proposal. She discusses such things as the fragility of a consensus that she had a part in forming, her perception of the city council members attitudes about planners and the public, her uneasiness and disillusionment with the political nature of her job, and her satisfaction with accomplishing "the little things" that let her feel that she "can make a difference" (Forester 1993, p.189-90). Forester notes that among the things we can learn from this story are not only insights about the planner herself, but about planners' roles, the dynamics of the process, "timing and politics" (1993, p. 191), and so forth.

In the staff meeting transcript, the planners discuss their views of how they are perceived by citizens, the press, city council, what projects have contributed to the perceptions, why they received blame, appropriately or not, etc. They also discuss what they might have done in the past to counter incorrect perceptions, and what they might do in the future (1993, p.193-4). Forester concludes that we can learn from such stories because they enact

the play of power, the selective focusing of attention, the expression of self, the presumptions of 'us and them,' and the creation of reputations--the shaping of expectations of what is and is not possible, the production of (more or less) politically

Parsons' study is of particular interest for the present project in that he presents his examination as an application of Anthony Giddens' theory of structuration (1989, p. 14). Like Sawhney, he is concerned with how communication technologies come to be defined. But he focuses on the historical development of cable television "from the late 1940s to the early 1960s" (1989, p.10). He argues "that the evolution of . . . definitions [of new technologies] is driven not by the technology itself but by knowledgeable agents engaged in strategic conduct." (1989, 16). In common with Sawhney, he argues that new technologies are defined in terms of old or existing technologies, but he specifically explores how conflicts over definition arise due to different political and economic interests of different agents.

Parsons presents a history of the evolving definition of CATV (Community Antenna Television). He argues that definitional disputes between CATV operators and broadcasters began in the 1950s, and accelerated in the 1960s, as cable expanded into the markets of more and more broadcasters (1989, p.17-18). Broadcasters sought to have CATV classified as a common carrier, so that it would be subject to FCC regulation. CATV operators sought to walk a fine line. In order to avoid copyright problems, they argued that their systems were simply passive receivers, and that operators did not control content. But to avoid being viewed as common carriers, according to Parsons, CATV operators argued that they were not in fact an extension of the broadcast system, but rather of the
viewers' home antenna systems (1989, p. 19-21). Parsons concludes by noting that the definitional disputes are on "issues not of fact but of law" (1989, p. 249), in that the various definitions grew not out of the material nature of the medium, but "social perceptions" of the agents involved. He argues generally that the complexity of policy interactions and outcomes can best be understood in terms of Giddens' conceptualization of unintended consequences: "The resolution of the conflict results in both intended and unintended consequences that alter the characteristics of the system, and thereby the rules that further inform and constrain interaction and decision making" (1989, p. 16).

Throgmorton (1991, 1993, 1996) deals with persuasion, language and the interaction of agents and structural factors in his examinations of public utility planning. He argues that planning is best conceptualized "as a form of persuasive and constitutive storytelling about the future" (p. xiv). But his treatment is far more subtle and complex than any of the expertise centered narrative approaches. In fact, he synthesizes some of the most intriguing aspects of narrative, framing and emancipatory approaches, incorporating as well ideas about policy roles and audiences, through a loose application of Fish's concept of interpretive communities and Rorty's conceptualization of normal and abnormal discourses.

He argues that in any specific planning or policy situation there are likely to be multiple storytellers and stories, and that "no one rhetoric has a prima facie right to be privileged over others." (1996, p. 38). This leads him "to ask what makes one interpretation more
persuasive than any other" (1996, p.38). Answering this, he argues, requires looking not only at arguments, but at arguments as they are presented to audiences.

He suggests that modern planning can be understood as involving different roles, interpretive communities, and normal & abnormal discourses. Planners, for instance, might fill any one of three primary, or "pure" roles (1996, p. 43): scientific planners, advocates or politicians. Planners in each role have a corresponding audience whom they try to persuade of the value of their work.

Throgmorton argues that

conversation within these disparate audiences can be thought of as 'normal discourses'... within 'interpretive communities'.... Each of these communities has 'an agreed-upon set of conventions about what counts as a relevant contribution, what counts as answering a question, what counts as having a good argument for that answer, or a good criticism of it' (Throgmorton 1996, p. 42).

Disagreements within communities are addressed using common criteria and norms. But differences between the rhetorics of the different interpretive communities are stark (Throgmorton 1996, 42). For persuasion to take place between members of different communities, dialogue must take place between them as each tries to understand the other from the starting point of their own community's norms and traditions. Citing Gadamer and Geertz, Throgmorton states that "successful dialogue would produce a shared understanding, or 'fusion of horizons'... that reflects a transformation of the initial positions of both communities. They would construct a new common language" (1996, p. 42-43), and new
roles and interpretive communities would arise based on the new shared understandings.

Throgmorton also argues that actual planning involves a "messy and often chaotic interplay" of participants in diverse roles, using diverse rhetorics, which it is impossible to accurately depict with neat, simple models or "fixed principles" (1996, p. 45-46). Rather, he suggests that the process is better "characterized as a flow of utterances, replies and counterreplies" —in short, a story, which occurs in a setting, and has "real flesh and blood characters who seek to direct the flow through oral and written texts" (1996, p. 45-46). In this conceptualization "planners are future oriented story tellers" (1996, p. 46). Because planners telling their stories are also participants in the stories others with different views are telling in a flow of utterances, replies and counterreplies, "the participants are both characters and joint authors. . . . they take part in actions not entirely of their own making." And the future, though "partly the result of the intentionality of human action" remains unpredictable (1996, p. 47).

Throgmorton's conceptualizations of planning process as narrative, and of the involvement of different interpretive communities in planning prove to have great explanatory power when he applies them to electric power planning and rate-making in northern Illinois from the late 1960s through the early 1990s. During this period, Commonwealth Edison constructed several nuclear reactor generating stations. After experiencing both staggering cost overruns on construction, and a far slower growth in
demand for electricity than they had anticipated, they attempted to recover costs with rate increases. Throgmorton argues convincingly that many of the interactions between Commonwealth Edison officials, the Commissioners and staff of the Illinois Commerce Commission, members of various activist and consumer groups, Chicago politicians, and various consultants and other individuals, can be explained in terms of people in different roles, with different rhetorical norms, being frustrated in their attempts to persuade one another. Likewise his conception of lived narrative captures nicely the temporal contexts of planning, the way effects of individuals' actions are mediated, and the complexity of a process where the future remains unpredictable.

The final scholar I will consider, Streeter, has made several explanatory forays into communication aspects of the telecommunication policy process. In one study (1987), he argues that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the 'new' technology of cable, previously called community antenna television (CATV), was in large part discursively constructed. He points out that cable technology really was not new—the various types of "equipment used...were just variations on the technologies used throughout the television industry" (Streeter 1987, p. 179). But the discourse of cable, incorporating a "utopian subtheme" (1987, p. 178), reflected a "tendency to abstract complex issues into a simple and autonomous technology" (Streeter 1987, p. 179).

This new discourse, advanced in discussions intended to influence policy formulation, tended to obscure the actual political
and economic conditions out of which cable emerged. This made it "possible to speak of cable not as an embodiment of social contradictions and dilemmas but as a solution to them" (1987, p.180; author's emphasis). While various groups with very different policy goals contributed to the discourse, the nature of the discourse was to obscure these differences. Thus, Streeter argues, the discourse was ultimately a necessary, though not sufficient, cause of a "regulatory about face" (1987, 175). Finally, he argues that in terms of the discourse and the aspirations of most of the participants, 'cable television' has failed to live up to the promises.

Streeter's recent and ambitious book on broadcast policy (1996) is more complex. In it he explores the socio-political construction of U.S. corporate commercial broadcasting. He again focuses on discourse and its intersection with politics, law and, especially, bureaucratic regulatory administration in shaping broadcasting. He argues that while government regulation is traditionally viewed as limiting or constraining commercial broadcasters, in fact regulation's greatest power in the U.S. has been creative. Specifically, it is through regulation that the system has been created and maintained as commercial and corporate.

The particular discourse, or set of discourses which he argues condition policy making and regulatory practices he calls "corporate liberalism."¹¹ This is a more complex and subtle discursive structure than the utopian discourse of new technologies identified in his

¹¹ Streeter does not claim credit for coining this term. He draws on Unger, Chandler, Sklar and others in developing his conceptualization.
earlier work. Corporate liberal discourse, according to Streeter, arose out of a need to reconcile the corporate form of capitalism with classical liberal thinking. The latter had emphasized a private realm defined in terms of free market competition and the individual as property owner, as distinct from a collective political realm of constraint, but corporations "threatened to blur that line" (1996, p. 51).

The discourse as described by Streeter obscures the contradictory corporate liberal principles (1996, p. 58). Based in functionalist metaphors of society as machine, the discourse represented a shift in emphasis, from formal boundaries of property and rights in legal thinking, and from classical competition in economic thinking, to system maintenance and the balancing of interests. The discourse incorporates assumptions about corporate organization and government bureaucracy as truly representing the most beneficial organization of society, assumptions about the benefits of technology and orderly progress, and assumptions about the benefits of expertise, whether scientific in policy making, or managerial in administration.

Streeter sees policy actors as carriers of this discourse. It is, according to Streeter,

a very real, but largely taken-for-granted ideological and political economic framework. . . . This framework does not rigidly dictate economic and political behavior, but it sets the terms and broad boundaries of acceptable action within which interest group struggles can take place (Streeter 1996, 33).
Like Throgmorton, he argues that the regulatory arena can be treated as an interpretive community. The norms of discourse in this community, based on assumptions about expertise and practicality, limit who can participate, and what kind of discourses will be heeded. He identifies and convincingly describes the roles of commissioners/judges, lawyers /lobbyists; and policy analysts. Each roles has particular qualities ascribed to it, but all implicitly involve endorsement of the corporate liberal discourse, and the subsidiary discourse of technocratic expertise.

Streeter argues that within this discursive and regulatory framework, both spectrum allocation/licensing, and copyright laws have involved ambiguities and shifts as to the legal constitution of property. He argues that these shifts, in the long run, have always favored commercial over non-profit development of broadcasting, and corporate over individual, entrepreneurial efforts. He suggests that both the discourses and the policy roles can change over time. But he also explicitly argues that efforts aimed at change within the system have had little if any effect on the basic patterns of the broadcasting/telecommunications industries.

He presents, for example, a view of successive generations of "'Young Turk' policy activists' who claim to offer...an idea or approach that can transcend the irrational quality of business as usual in Washington" (1996, p. 150). These have included "left wing Roosevelt-era trustbusters... 'wired nation' fans of cable television's utopian promises" and more recently "deregulatory economists" (1996, p. 150). He argues that they all had an impact, but in general
their ideas "met with lukewarm success at best" (1996, p. 151). Their and others' attempts at change "generally functioned not to introduce dramatic new levels of openness" (1996, p. 313) or to change the basic structure of the industries, "but to readjust center-periphery relations and allow for the negotiation of tensions between the twin drives toward expansion and stability endemic to the corporate form of organization" (1996, p. 313).

Related to this, he argues that participants' attitudes about the process really have shifted over the years. In this view, early politicians, regulators, and corporate managers felt a genuine, if paternalistic, optimism that they truly did know, or could determine, what was best for the "unassimilated mass" of citizens (Streeter 1996, p. 47). In more recent years, he suggests, there is "a negative tone in policy work" (1996, p. 151). While expertise is still a qualification for participation, regulators have grown skeptical of its power, and "once-vaunted ideals are treated as simple practical necessities" (1996, p. 151).

He concludes the book with a call for new ways of thinking that step outside the corporate liberal dichotomy of public interest versus profit and freedom of speech. In discussing how cyberspace should be "created" as property, he argues that "the question should not be, How can we protect public interests from private interests? but, what kind of property relations do we, as a democratic community, wish to create?" (1996, p. 323). He goes on to state that

12 The phrase is Theodore Vail's. Vail is generally credited as president of AT&T with saving the company from disaster and ending an era of destructive competition by negotiating to have it treated as a regulated monopoly.
the public interest, if it were no longer seen as a qualification to preexisting private control, might be opened up to more substantive, and specific, interpretations: for example, in terms of the public sphere, of places and situations conducive to the involvement of all citizens in full public dialogue on matters of interest and importance (1996, p. 324).

Critiques of the Explanatory Literature

Forester's focus on practice stories offers great potential for describing the day-to-day world of planners or analysts. But Forester does not give us a sense of how to relate this kind of study back to actual plans or policies that are formulated or implemented. Further, his approach allows us to address what constraints planners or analysts encounter on a daily basis, but not necessarily how those constraints come about. These potential weaknesses, I think, grow out of the fact that he does not explicitly address the conditions that make policy analysis possible at an abstract level. That is, he does not ask why there is such a thing as policy analysis. While his approach allows us access to the day-to-day world of planners and analysts in a powerful way, it is far from clear that this "bottom up" approach will provide us with insights into the nature of policy making at the level of society, or into policy and politics at the level of history.

Parsons presents the conflict between broadcasters and CATV operators in terms of Giddens' conceptualization of a dialectic of control. However, his discussion addresses almost exclusively the intentional, strategic behaviors of agents. The structural
enablements/constraints--of political, regulatory and/or legal institutions, of language itself--are either assumed or left out. For instance, he does not consider the degree to which the whole concept of technology as socially constructed, yet structurally constraining, may be relevant. Thus, when he is discussing the defining of new technologies he clearly feels that it can be understood in terms of agents' self-interested struggles with one another. But he gives the impression that the technologies themselves come to society from some unspecified place or process, and must then be named, "definitionally reconstituted such that the new becomes comfortable and acceptable" (1989, 16). He does not address the possibility, as suggested by Sawhney, that technology and definition might evolve together, or that a technology itself may be consciously "looked for and developed with with certain purposes and practices already in mind," (Williams 1990, 13).

Furthermore, it is not clear how he really draws on the concepts of structuration. Giddens has produced a large volume of highly complex theory. Parsons does not address this. He simply applies a fraction of Giddens' terminology, superficially, and I think superfluously, to a history of different interests' competing to define the regulatory status of cable. Thus, his conclusion that "existing patterns of domination were reproduced but at the same time fundamentally altered if only by the fact that a new agent--cable--had been introduced" is not particularly convincing as evidence of
structural change, and it is unclear that his particular use of structuration concepts contributes anything of significance to the study.

Throgmorton's theorization of the planning/policy analytic process in terms of an interpretive community provides great explanatory power. But he leaves some important aspects of the situation he describes unexplained or untheorized. The most notable of these turns on the issue of power differentials among planning participants. For while he argues "that capitalist democracies bias institutional processes (the rules of the game) in favor of wealthy business and individuals." (1996, p. 53), he does not explain how these processes bias. When it comes to explaining problems in the electrical power planning process in Illinois, he has a tendency to reduce them all to that which he has theorized so well, the norms and language of policy interactions. He has not conceptualized or explained power in any detail, so in the case of concrete analysis, he ignores it. Throgmorton also implies that understanding physical context—or in narrative terms, "the settings in which important events take place," is important for fully explaining policy or planning events (1996, p. xv). But he describes contexts or settings in a somewhat disconnected way, as "interludes" between chapters (e.g., p 122, 141), and never really links them in any significant way to the rest of his analysis.

A more concrete aspect he leaves unexplored is the nature of the courts and legal decisions. He repeatedly refers to various rate decisions made by the Illinois Commerce Commission which were overturned on appeal, but the courts remain a "black box," from which mysterious rulings issue.
Much of Streeter's argument about the discursive construction of cable television is persuasive. However, his study can be criticized on several counts. For one thing, despite various disclaimers, the bulk of his argument suggests that the utopian discourse of new technologies is totally determining. He leaves no room for recognition of choices on the part of policy participants. Closely related to this, he does not make clear how the discourse originated and evolved. The discourse of autonomous technology as he presents it appears autonomous itself. And finally, he concludes that most of the participants in the cable discourse were disappointed in its final outcome. This not entirely accurate. Some of the large corporations involved in the entertainment industry today experienced their first growth as the result of their involvement in cable. Time-Warner is a notable example. This would suggest that certain powerful groups in fact benefited from their participation in the cable discourse.

Streeter's stance in his more recent study is somewhat different. Here he argues at length that few long term benefits to any except corporate interests are likely to arise from the policy process. Although this book offers the most powerful explanatory account of policy/regulatory processes of any of the works discussed here, it is not without weaknesses. Streeter treats some important issues inconsistently. He argues, for example, that the true power of the discursive norms of telecommunication regulation as interpretive community is that suggestions not couched in terms that endorse corporate liberalism are rejected as irrelevant. In this vein, he argues that treatment of the proposals put forward in the F.C.C. staff
authored "Blue Book," published in 1946, can be taken as token of the "obliviousness" with which challenges to the corporate liberal structure are treated (1996, p.147).

Yet, the report in question was indeed produced by insiders and published as an official policy document. And rather than being ignored as irrelevant, or failing to catch the attention of regulators at the time, in Streeter's own words, "it met with vociferous opposition from the industry." Though it "was thoroughly rejected," (1996, p.147), there can be no doubt that it was, indeed taken seriously at the time.

The weight of his argument seems to be for indictment of the entire system. He implicates not just the F.R.C. and F.C.C., but the executive branch (in the form of the Department of Commerce under secretary Hoover, and the Wilson administration generally), Congress for being susceptible to corporate influence in the creation and maintenance of first the F.R.C. and F.C.C., and the courts for relying on corporate liberal patterns of thought in interpretations of copyright law. He presents a view of the past in which regulatory and legal processes have virtually always enabled corporately organized interests to gain and maintain economic and political advantage. Individual corporations may lose out in a given situation, but to some other corporation or corporations. This is not determinist in quite the way his earlier piece is, as it involves not just the discourse, but also individuals representing corporate interests, who actively use the discourse in adjusting to, co-opting or obscuring alternative ways of thinking. Nevertheless, it leaves little room for alternatives.
Thus, when Streeter calls for discussing new ways of thinking about property at the end of the book, given his lack of faith in the legal and political system, it is unclear what fora he expects such discussion to take place in. We can only conclude that either the outlook is indeed bleak, or that perhaps he has overdrawn the power of corporate liberalism to control and incorporate change.

Problem & Research Question

The examples of the argumentative turn in policy analysis which I find to be the most powerful, Forester's, Throgmorton's, and especially Streeter's, turn on attempts to explain the complexities of policy and planning processes in terms of practices of individuals, and their interactions in conditions of constraint. Forester's study is tentative, and as I have argued, largely methodological. Throgmorton and Streeter are concerned with constraints which are social in character, but relatively objective to any given individual who confronts them. Throgmorton in particular, and Streeter in the earlier piece exhibit weaknesses with regard to conceptualizations of power. Other weaknesses include Streeter's apparent, implicit *a priori* assignment of a deterministic power to corporate liberal discourse in the F.C.C. and the courts, and Throgmorton's less than satisfying attempts to deal with context.

Both the strengths and weaknesses of these explanatory studies revolve around issues of the nature of choice versus constraint, the interrelation of communication in the policy process with other normative behaviors, and the play of power, etc. Though I critiqued
Parsons in part for the way he applied Anthony Giddens' structuration theory, the actual application of the theory itself still seems to offer potential for improving on the explanatory accounts of these scholars. Giddens' theory, after all, addresses questions of individual choice and social constraint in terms of the articulation of agency and structure. He is one of the most influential, arguably the most systematic, and undoubtedly the most prolific of thinkers on these issues today.

An essential part of his theorizing centers on the interrelations of communication, norms and power. And his assessment of the problems and challenges of modernity as rooted in large measure in attempts at the reflexive regulation of society resonates with the concerns about the failure of technocratic expertise which underlie development of the argumentative turn.

Despite these apparent strengths, there is a problem. As I argued in critiquing Parsons, the complexity and level of abstraction of Giddens' theory mean that it does not lend itself easily to application. Giddens has developed structuration theory over a number of years, and across a considerable body of writing, and at a highly abstract level as an ontology of social life. This has led some critics to argue that Giddens' conceptualizations are essentially irrelevant to empirical research (e.g., Gregson, 1989). Thus, a first step in attempting to apply structuration theory is to adequately understand the complex systems of thought. If, for example, it is revealed to incorporate major inconsistencies, the project of trying to apply it communication in the policy process may be pointless.
Given all this, the concerns of this dissertation can be summarized broadly in terms of asking whether our understanding of the communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature? In the following chapters I will set out to answer these two, related questions.

Outline of Chapters

In Chapter 2 I set out my methodology for developing an approach from structuration theory. This involves exegesis of Giddens' theory and advice on research, and a gradual move from the abstract and general realm of theory to more concrete and specific conceptualization of policy practices. I begin the exegetic task in Chapter 3, addressing Giddens theory as an "ontology of social life." I identify the major themes and issues of structuration theory, clarify several aspects with regard to which Giddens is vague or inconsistent, and criticize some aspects of his conceptualization which seem to me irreconcilable with the overall gist of the theory. In Chapter 4 I apply exegesis to Giddens' specific advice on conducting social analysis, and extract principles and procedures which can be applied to general analysis of discourse.

In Chapter 5 I synthesize a structuration based approach for analysis of ideology in policy discourse and symbolization. The approach is a systematic set of procedures. It focuses on metaphor
as the core of ideological discourse, but I stress that in such analysis metaphor is more important for what it conceals than what it reveals. Finally, in Chapter 6 I discuss my approach and my exegesis of structuration theory in terms of contributions to the argumentative turn in policy analysis, to policy studies generally, and to the realm of social theory.
CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGY

Introduction

My intent in this dissertation is to develop an approach to policy discourse derived from Giddens' structuration theory. But what is the proper method for developing methodology and method? More specifically, how does one move from an ontological "meta-theory," as Giddens' conceptualizations have been termed (Wendt 1987, Shields 1994, 1995), to procedures for empirical research? Although there is a vast literature on methodology and method in the social sciences, such questions are rarely explicitly addressed. Granted, discussion of the operationalizing of concepts or aspects of "first order" theories is not uncommon in texts on method (e.g. Fawcett & Downs 1986, p. 21-48, Nachmias & Nachmias 1981, p. 33-37), but such theories do not approach the scope of Giddens' structuration theory, and the approaches generally assume that understanding of theory itself is unproblematic. Such cannot be assumed in the case of the present study.

Andrew Sayer states that

it is quite extraordinary to compare the attention given in social science courses to 'methods' in the narrow sense of statistical techniques, interviewing and survey methods and the like with
the blithe disregard given to questions of how we conceptualize, theorize and abstract" (1992, p. 2).

He argues instead for "a broad view of 'method' which covers the clarification of modes of explanation and understanding, the nature of abstraction, as well as the familiar subjects of research design and methods of analysis" (1992, p. 3). My project is consistent with such a broad view of method. I am concerned primarily with conceptualizing communication in policy processes. The study is thus methodological in the sense of suggesting what kinds of questions should be asked.

Sayer also stresses that "method is a practical matter" (1992, 4). He recommends that it be conceptualized as one corner of a triangle, the other corners of which are the object of study and the purpose of study. "Each corner needs to be considered in relation to the other two" (1992, 4). My purpose in this dissertation is clear, as stated above. However, this purpose essentially leaves me with two major objects of study. The ultimate focus is policy discourse, but it is necessary first to focus on Giddens' theorizations, which cannot be treated as transparent. They must be interpreted in the form of exegesis. Once I have interpreted structuration theory, my field of view must expand to include not only my interpretation of abstract

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1 It can be argued, of course, that theses and dissertations of traditional form in the social sciences all have two objects of study (in which case, my project might be said to have three). Generally, we focus on a particular object related to our purpose. But as part of the process we also focus on and analyze a body of literature. Out of this analysis our overall purpose and selection of object of study are (putatively, at least) derived. Normally, the methods of interpretation for the literature review are largely left implicit, a precedent which I have (mercifully) chosen to follow.
structuration theory, but also more concrete conceptualizations of policy discourse.

There are no precise recipes for either exegesis or the move from abstract to concrete. However, it is possible to proceed in a theoretically informed way. Thus I use this chapter to make clear the theoretical influences on my reasoning, and to make my "reasoning processes more transparent and self conscious" (Sayer 1992, p. 143).

Exegesis

Exegesis of Giddens' structuration theory is more than simply background for subsequent method development. As Zigmunt Bauman puts it, "Giddens' power of synthesis has few equals, but its products are scattered over a large number of volumes which themselves demand a synthesizing effort" (1989, p. 34). My undertaking in the following two chapters is such a synthesis.

The exegetic component can be understood as having two aspects, explanation and critique/evaluation. As far as explanation goes, as Bauman notes in the quote above, Giddens develops his theory across several volumes. Perhaps because his ideas are complex, subtle, and often highly abstract, at times his development of a particular point or concept in a given text is ambiguous or vague. And as Bauman has further pointed out, "many a formulation represents a stage in the development of an as yet incomplete theory, and has been . . . superseded at some later stage" (1989, p. 34).
Because of these characteristics, I have often found it necessary in considering particular conceptualizations in structuration theory to examine and compare how Giddens treats them in two, or even several, of the volumes. While this process seems cumbersome, I have found it enlightening. It amounts to a form of triangulation in interpretation. That is, it brings to bear two or more perspectives on the same point or object, the 'objects' in this case being points of Giddens' conceptualization. This differs from forms of triangulation that emphasize applying different methods, different investigators, or bringing different theories to bear (see, e.g., Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p.305-6, Creswell 1994, p. 174, Janesick 1994, p. 214-215). Nevertheless, it is consistent with triangulation identified as "the use of multiple and different sources" (Lincoln & Guba 1984, p. 305), or "data triangulation" (Janesick 1994, p. 214), even though in this instance the different sources all themselves have the same source: Giddens.

Occasionally in my reading of Giddens I have encountered concepts which appear important to the approach I intend to develop, but which are dealt with in only one of his works, and are ambiguous or incompletely developed. In such cases I have turned---sparingly---to some of the sources Giddens cites as influences on his ideas as a means of triangulation.

Obviously, exegesis is interpretation, as the root of the word implies. To the degree possible, I try to reveal, or leave a trace of,

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2 This is particularly the case in his treatment of symbolic orders/modes of discourse as institutions.
the processes by which I arrive at my conclusions. Related to this, I frequently want to give full sense of the complexity or subtlety of Giddens' thought, especially when it has been necessary to deal with the passages from two or more of his works. For these reasons, my treatment of Giddens' theorization tends to be "quote rich." That is, I tend to quote him rather than paraphrase--or rather, I tend to offer Giddens' words in addition to my interpretations of them.

With regard to the evaluative aspects of exegesis, two approaches to evaluating theory appear to be consistently recognized in literature on theory and research: internal or formal consistency and, broadly stated, empirical adequacy (e.g., Camilleri 1970, p. 71-72, Fawcett & Downs 1986, p. 172-176). Sayer argues that while these are usually treated as "two different and apparently separate ways" of evaluating theory, in actuality,

because of the interdependence of sense and reference and the conceptual and the empirical, they cannot be treated as entirely separate. The empirical success of a theory is affected by how the networks of sense-relations are constructed and how resultant expectations and actions relate to the actual structure of the world. . . . And looking at it from the other direction, the coherence of any system of concepts which attempts to enable reference to, and action within, the world cannot be judged independently of its empirical reference and the results of social practice (Sayer 1992, p. 58).

My critique of Giddens' conceptualizations largely takes the form of evaluation of internal consistency. But as Sayer's insights suggest, reference to the empirical is clearly implicated in the critiques. And,
of course, a testing of the empirical adequacy of structuration theory is implicit in the overall purpose of the study.

From Abstract to Concrete

Moving from Giddens' theorizations to a theory based analytic approach to policy discourse requires a broadened field of view. Giddens' theorizations (or my interpretation of them) remain an object of study. But I must also relate them to policy discourse as object of study. Sayer describes the reasoning process of moving "from the abstract to the concrete" (1992, p. 140-146), and my approach is largely--though not completely--congruent with his. It will be useful to outline the process as he describes it before noting the ways mine differs.

Sayer argues convincingly that theory should be understood as an examined way of conceptualizing something (1992, p. 50-51 and passim). Abstraction is a major process in theorizing (though it is not exclusive just to theory). As he defines it,

an abstract concept, or abstraction, isolates in thought a one-sided or partial aspect of an object. What we abstract from are the many other aspects which together constitute concrete objects such as people, economics, nations, institutions, activities, and so on (Sayer 1992, p.87).

In developing social theory, an especially important function of abstraction properly performed, according to Sayer, is the distinguishing of necessary from contingent relationships between objects (Sayer 1992, pp. 88-99). But while necessary relationships can be recognized through abstraction, the particular form that
necessary relations take will vary with the contingencies of different concrete situations. Thus, the form of contingent relations "must always be an empirical question, that is one which must be answered by observing actual cases" (Sayer 1992, p. 143). By way of example of this, Sayer considers the relationships of capitalism and patriarchy. He notes, for example that in the abstract, "it is contingent whether capitalists or workers are male or female. At this level capital is 'sex-blind'" (1992, p. 91). However, capitalist relationships in concrete form are almost always gendered--that is, "patriarchy and capitalism take advantage of one another" (1992, p. 91).

Sayer associates the move from theory to empirical research as one of "moving step by step towards the concrete" (1992, p. 140). Thus, he argues,

theoretical claims . . . must be combined with empirically discovered knowledge of contingently-related phenomena. . . . the contingently-related conditions are never inert, but are themselves the product of causal processes and have their own causal powers and liabilities. Although the coming together of the two or more entities may be contingent, what occurs when they are so combined happens necessarily in virtue of their natures.

Now no theory of society could be expected to know the nature and form of these contingent relations in advance, purely on the basis of theoretical claims. The move from abstract to concrete must therefore combine theoretical claims with empirical research aimed at discovering 1 which kinds of objects are present. . . 2 what are the contingent forms they take. . . and 3 under what conditions do they exist in this environment. Because of the need to incorporate empirical knowledge of contingencies at each stage, the move from abstract to concrete

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cannot be deductive, for the conclusions are not wholly derivable from or 'contained' within the meaning of the premises (1992, p. 140-142).

Sayer illustrates this process using Marxist theory as an example (Figure 1). He refers to his figure as a "hierarchy of types of concepts which might lie behind a conceptualization of a concrete event or conjuncture" (1992 p. 140). The category of "transhistorical claims" is a subcategory of the "foundations of historical materialism," and includes such claims, for example as "people must be able to reproduce themselves and hence to find food and shelter as a necessary condition of being able to produce art, science, etc." (1992, p. 140). From transhistorical claims, he moves through historically specific concepts such as 'feudalism' or 'surplus value', through the 'tendencies' or mechanisms which are possessed by social phenomena . . . towards the more 'concrete' levels at which these are experienced or 'lived' (Sayer 1992, p. 140).

The process I follow in moving from Giddens' abstract conceptualizations to more concrete policy situations parallels but is not identical to Sayer's. First, I would like to clarify a point that may be equally applicable to Sayer's example. Then I will examine how the respective natures of Giddens' body of theorization, and of my particular objective in this study lead to variations from Sayer's approach.

It should be noted that, although as Sayer makes clear, abstraction and generalization are not to be confused (Sayer 1992, p. 86-103), the move from abstract to concrete involving a body of theory as complex, systematic and subtle as Giddens' structuration
theory (or for that matter, historical materialism), is also a move
from general to specific. As Giddens states, "the main tenets of
structuration theory. . . are intended to apply over the whole range
of human social activity, in any and every context of action" (Giddens

It is also important to note that, unlike the case of historical
materialism as used illustratively by Sayer, Giddens 1) not only
theorizes structuration as an ontology of social life, but also
specifically gives advice, though still at a fairly abstract level, on how
to approach research from a structuration perspective, and 2) endorses by way of example several studies which he feels capture
the full potential of structuration sensitized research. In moving
from the abstract to the concrete, and from the general to the
specific, I include in my synthesis not only specific aspects of
structuration theory, but also Giddens' advice on approaching
research, and insights that I have gained--through the process of
abstraction--from selected studies Giddens has mentioned.

Another important point that Sayer makes is that "in developing
concrete analysis. . . any social theory has to incorporate knowledge
produced outside its own range" (Sayer 1992, p. 142). Consistent
with this, in moving from structuration theory to the study of policy
discourse I draw on insights from policy literature. I make these
differences from Sayer's approach explicit in my diagram (Figure 2).
Other differences in my process as compared to Sayer's, as reflected
in Figure 2, stem from my belief that his separate conceptualization
of "foundations" and "transhistorical claims" is redundant, and that
the bottom portion of his figure is unnecessarily vague, and excessively complex for my purposes.

A final point from Sayer is in order in discussing my procedures for moving from theory to research. He states that this movement from abstract to concrete is less in evidence in the interpretation of meaning. . . . rather our understanding follows hermeneutic circles or spirals, relating parts to wholes, and elements to what precedes them and what is expected to follow them. . . . to the extent that social relations and practices are concept dependent. . . . the movement from abstract to concrete must be combined with interpretive understanding (Sayer 1992, p. 143).

I have already explained my procedures for interpreting structuration theory. Interpretation also plays a role in my abstraction of insights from other studies.

**Conclusion**

In this chapter I argue that there are no recipes for moving from a complex theoretical ontology like Giddens' structuration theory to empirical research. In light of this I devote my discussion to making the reasoning processes I use in subsequent chapters transparent or self-conscious. I first discuss exegesis of Giddens theory. Exegesis involves interpretation and critique. In interpreting Giddens, I triangulate on particularly difficult concepts by comparing how he has dealt with them across the breadth of his writing. In some cases I also turn to sources he cites as influences as an additional perspective in triangulating.

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As far as critique of Giddens' theory, I identify two basic approaches: evaluation of internal consistency and evaluation of practical adequacy. I will rely primarily on critique of internal consistency, but as Sayer argues, judgements of internal consistency are inevitably linked to the consistency of the theories with the concrete practices conceptualized. Evaluation of the theory's practical adequacy is in any case implicit in the entire project of developing an approach to policy discourse.

Finally, I present in some detail the "step-by-step" process of my reasoning in moving from abstract theory to concrete situations of empirical research. The move from abstract to concrete also involves a move from general to specific when dealing with a set of ontological conceptualizations as broad or encompassing as structuration theory. In the current case, I draw not only on my interpretations of Giddens' structuration theory, but also on Giddens' own advice on empirical research, and incorporate insights abstracted from studies which Giddens cites approvingly. The final step involves incorporating knowledge from policy analytic literature about concrete policy situations.
Figure 1: Relationship of abstract and concrete in application of Marxist theory
Structuration theory as
ontology (conceptions of
agency, structure, society, etc)  
Giddens on structuration
sensitized research

Abstractions of necessary
relationships involved in
discourse/symbolic
(synthesis of what kinds
of relationships to look
for and how to look for them)

Insights on procedures
abstracted from other studies

Abstractions of relationships
specific to policy
discourse/symbolic

Contingently related
conditions (as abstracted
from policy literature)

Synthesis of relationships and
conditions: policy discourse/symbolic
as concrete, in specific situations

--- my reasoning processes

--- linked in reasoning of
the scholars/authors of
the theory/research.

Figure 2: Abstract to concrete reasoning processes
for this study

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CHAPTER 3
STRUCTURATION THEORY: EXEGESIS

Introduction

In the first chapter I identify and review a growing body of policy-analytic literature which addresses communication—language and communicative practices—in policy processes. I critique the strengths and weaknesses of contributions to this 'Argumentative Turn' in policy analysis, and conclude by suggesting that development of approaches informed by Anthony Giddens' structuration theory might mark a significant improvement in the literature. In this vein, I pose the following as the central questions for this dissertation: can our understanding of the communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?

My purpose in this chapter is to develop an understanding of structuration theory that will serve as conceptual base for answering these questions. Thus this chapter consists of summary, explanation and critique—in short, exegesis—of Giddens'
structuration theory. To this end, I have divided this chapter into several sections, each of which is devoted to consideration of one or several of Giddens' major conceptualizations or themes. Critiques of aspects of Giddens' thought are included in the relevant section.

I begin by providing some general background on structuration theory. I then proceed, in order, through sections devoted to Giddens' conceptualizations of agency, structure, time & space, social systems, and institutions, structural principles and contradiction. In addition to his theory, Giddens also offers some advice on conducting social research, but to the degree possible, I will reserve treatment of this for the following chapter.

Structuration Theory: Background

Giddens suggests that social theorists "should be concerned first and foremost with reworking conceptions of human being and human doing, social reproduction and transformation" (1984, p.xx). He argues that the emphasis of his structuration theory is more ontological than epistemological (Giddens 1989, p.294; 1990b, p.300), characterizing his work, in fact, as an "ontology of social life" (Giddens 1990b, 310; 1991b, 201). This assessment of structuration by Giddens is consistent with those of several commentators on the theory who variously label it as meta-theory (e.g., Shields 1994, p.35) or "analytical' rather than 'substantive' theory" (Wendt 1987, p.355).
Nevertheless, Giddens has advanced his ontological conceptualization on the back, so to speak, of his epistemological/methodological critiques.¹ And he clearly feels that structuration theory is relevant to actual empirical analysis. Chapter 6 of *The Constitution of Society* (1984), for example, is entirely devoted to the issue.²

The impetus for development of structuration theory was what Giddens sees as the respective inadequacies of functionalist, structuralist, and hermeneutic/interpretive approaches (1984, p.1). He argues that

the differences between these perspectives have often been taken to be epistemological, whereas they are in fact also ontological. What is at issue is how the concepts of action, meaning and subjectivity should be specified and how they might relate to notions of structure and constraint. If interpretive sociologies are founded, as it were, upon an imperialism of the subject, functionalism and structuralism propose an imperialism of the social object (1984, p. 2).³

¹ Thrift goes so far as to suggest that "one might argue whether these ontological moves aren't really epistemological moves brought in by the back door" (Thrift 1993, 113).

² As noted above, in what follows, I have attempted, to the degree possible, to separate the two concerns, but only in the interest of clarity of presentation. I do not see debates as to the degree of ontology vs. epistemology implicit in Giddens' formulations as particularly fruitful. It should be self evident that concern with the ontological and the epistemological are only relatively separable in any case. It is enough to note, with the advocates of the 'meta-theory' and 'analytical theory' labels, that when it comes to understanding specific situations, "while structuration theory provides abstract ingredients for social explanations, it cannot by itself explain specific social processes" (Shields 1994, 39).

³ Giddens treats structuralism and functionalism together in discussing structuration theory in this particular passage from *The Constitution of Society* (1984). He justifies this based on his observation that "both ... strongly emphasize the pre-eminence of the social whole over its individual parts (i.e., its constituent actors, human subjects). ... both tend toward a
Giddens "rejects the dualism of 'the individual' and 'society'" (1993, p.4). He argues that "neither subject (human agent) nor object ('society' or social institutions) should be regarded as having primacy" (1993, p.8). Rather, "the basic domain of the social sciences. . . is neither the experience of the individual actor, nor the existence of any form of societal totality, but social practices ordered across space and time" (1984, p. 2).

The term "structuration," Giddens informs us, refers "as Derrida puts it, [to] 'the structuring of structure'" (Giddens 1979, p. 61). That is, structuration reflects a concern with how the patterning of society and interaction come about. Giddens states that "the term appears quite often in the writings of French speaking authors, but . . . had rarely been used in English" prior to his appropriation of it (Giddens 1991b, p. 202).

He traces his first use of the term to *The class structure of advanced societies* (1973). He used it there, he states, in trying to explain that "classes as such are neither groups nor communities, but various features of class systems can provide the 'structuring' basis of group affiliations" (Giddens 1991b, p. 202). Initially he used the term "without. . . reflecting upon its likely importance as a general naturalistic standpoint, and both are inclined toward objectivism" (1984, 1). Elsewhere, however, he notes the fundamental differences between them, and argues that "structuralist theory offers the possibility. . . of formulating a more satisfactory understanding of the social totality than . . . functionalism." Among other things, rather than presenting society "as a pattern of relations between parts. . . Saussure's structural linguistics. . . suggests the notion that society, like language, should be regarded as a 'virtual system' with recursive properties" (1979, 47). Structuralist thought is in fact one of the major influences apparent in Giddens' work.
concept in social theory" (Giddens 1991b, p. 202). Since then, however, he has devoted several books (Giddens 1977, 1979, 1982, 1984, 1993\textsuperscript{4}), and numerous articles and chapters in edited volumes (e.g., Giddens 1981a, 1985, 1989, 1990b, 1991b) to developing structuration theory.\textsuperscript{5}

Simply put, structuration theory revolves around the argument that social systems endure across time and space because they exhibit recursive, or self reproducing qualities. However, this should not be understood in teleological terms. Giddens approves the focus of functionalism in "emphasiz[ing] the significance of unintended

\textsuperscript{4}I have relied on the second edition of *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretive Sociologies* (1993). This edition was slightly revised from the original 1976 edition, according to Giddens (1993, 15), and includes an additional introduction. Unfortunately, pagination differs from the first edition, making cross-referencing difficult.

\textsuperscript{5} Giddens states: "I regard structuration theory as only one part of my writings as a whole" (Giddens 1991, 201). His other projects, however, are overall consistent with, and related to structuration theory. For example *A contemporary critique of historical materialism, vol. 1: Power, property and the state* (Giddens 1981b) and *The nation state and violence: Volume two of a contemporary critique of historical materialism* (Giddens 1987) can be understood as attempts to conceptualize the nature of the modern nation state, especially in contrast to other types of societies. At the same time, structuration theory "informs" the whole project (Giddens 1981b, 26), and in both volumes, Giddens extends structuration conceptualizations relevant to time-space and power. Likewise, his more recent works, *The consequences of modernity* (Giddens 1990a), *Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern age* (Giddens 1991a), *The transformation of intimacy: Sexuality, love and eroticism in modern societies* (Giddens 1992), and *Beyond left and right: The future of radical politics* (Giddens 1994) can all be understood in terms of "the empirical implications of structuration theory . . .pursued primarily through the introduction of considerations--concerned with particular types of social system and their transformation--which are not part of the theory itself" (Giddens 1989, 300-301). Specifically, all address in some way "the shattering impact of modernity" (Giddens 1989, 301). It is also possible to read Giddens 1991a and Giddens 1992 as "address[ing] centrally questions of individual identity, motivation and personality that. . .were poorly handled in his earlier works" (Jary & Jary 1995, 114).
consequences of action, especially in so far as such consequences occur in a regular way and are therefore involved in the reproduction of institutionalized aspects of social systems" (1984, p. xxxi). But that is the only aspect of functionalism which he endorses. In fact, he characterizes the influence of functionalism in the social sciences as "largely pernicious" (1984, p. xxxi). And he repeatedly and categorically rejects the idea that "societies or social systems have 'needs'. . . [S]ystems have no needs, save in a sense quite different from that which functionalist authors have in mind. . . therefore, to identify 'system needs' is not to explain anything at all: there is nothing which can count as 'functionalist explanation'" (1981, p. 16-17, author's emphasis).

Thus, "according to the theory of structuration, social systems have no purposes, reasons or needs whatsoever; only human individuals do" (Giddens 1979, p.7). The recursive qualities of social systems, rather, arise from social practices. Purposive agents or "social actors... express themselves as actors" by drawing on rules and resources, or structuring properties of social systems. Thus, "in and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions" or rules and resources "that make these activities possible" (Giddens 1984, p. 2). In developing this approach, Giddens conceptualizes the nature of agents and agency, structure, how agency and structure are

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6 One of Giddens' earliest detailed elaborations of structuration theory in fact grow out of his critique of functionalism (1977, p. 96-134). He even suggests that "the theory of structuration... could be read as a non-functionalist manifesto" (1979, p.7, author's emphasis).
articulated through interaction/practices within specific contexts, and how these practices constitute social systems.

Agents & Agency

With regard to agents and agency, Giddens acknowledges "a hermeneutic starting point" for Structuration Theory in that he views recognition of agents' knowledgeable as essential (1984, p. 2-3). By definition agents are knowledgeable. Their knowledgeable is both based in, and expressed through their reflexivity. Giddens explains that reflexivity "should be understood not merely as self consciousness but as the monitored character of the ongoing flow of social life" (1984, p. 2). Actors routinely and continuously monitor their own behavior, the behavior of other actors, and aspects of environment or context (1993, p.120, 1979, p.56, 1984, p. 5).

This reflexive monitoring involves both rationalization of conduct, and concepts of competence. Rationalization for Giddens means that agents "routinely and for the most part without fuss--maintain a continuing 'theoretical understanding' of the grounds for their activity" (1984, p. 5). Competence involves the idea that agents not only monitor their own and others' behaviors, but expect the same level of reflexive monitoring and rationalization of action on the part of other actors (1993, p.120, 1984, p. 6). Giddens stresses that the cognition and action associated with reflexive monitoring cannot be conceived of as an aggregate, or series of separate events.
Rather, "[h]uman action occurs as a durée, a continuous flow of conduct" (1984, p. 3, see also 1979, p. 55).

Another important aspect of agency as defined by Giddens has to do with his conceptualization of power. I present and critique this conceptualization in some detail in what follows. But for the present it is sufficient to note that he conceives of power at its most basic, "in the sense of transformative capacity. In this sense, the most all-embracing meaning of 'power', power is logically prior to subjectivity, to the reflexive monitoring of conduct" (1984, p. 15). Thus, to be an agent is to be able to deploy (chronically, in the flow of daily life) a range of causal powers, including that of influencing those deployed by others. Action depends upon the capability of the individual to 'make a difference' to a pre-existing state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses the capability to 'make a difference', that is, to exercise some sort of power. (1984, p. 14).

Related to this, Giddens wants to get away from definitions of agency based only on intentions, such as, for example, "for an item of behaviour to count as action, whoever perpetrates it must intend to do so" (1984, p. 8). He argues that, while "the durée of day-to-day life occurs as a flow of intentional action. . .acts have unintentional consequences" (1984, p. 8). An individual, then, is the agent of the unintended as well as intended outcomes of her intentional action. A mundane example is that of a person driving a car. She is engaging in intentional behavior. Running a stoplight, or hitting a pedestrian are normally not intentional consequences, but are still linked to the intentional action. Thus,
Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place. ... Agency concerns events of which an individual is a perpetrator, in the sense that the individual could, at any phase in a given sequence of conduct, have acted differently (1984, p. 9).

Reflexive monitoring, rationalization and acting are all based in, or draw on, the actor's stocks of social or mutual knowledge (1979, p. 56-57, 1984, p. 4). Giddens distinguishes what can be thought of as three layers of knowledgeability: discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and an unconscious. "Discursive consciousness" refers to "what actors are able to say, or give verbal expression to, about social conditions, especially the conditions of their own action" (Giddens 1984, p.374). Drawing on Garfinkle and Harré, Giddens associates discursive consciousness with the concept of accountability in the double sense of actors being able to offer accounts of their actions (Giddens 1979, p.57) and also of being able to justify them normatively (Giddens 1984, p.30).

But "the discursive capabilities. . . of actors [do] not exhaust the connections between 'stocks of knowledge' and action" (Giddens 1979, p.57). Simply put, "practical consciousness refers to tacit knowledge that is skillfully employed in the enactment of courses of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively" (Giddens 1982, p.31). Practical consciousness is not to be confused with the unconscious. While there "there are barriers" between the unconscious and discursive consciousness (Giddens 1984, p. 7),
the line between discursive and practical consciousness is fluctuating and permeable, both in the experience of the individual agent and as regards comparisons between actors in different contexts of social activity (1984, p. 4).

The unconscious for Giddens is the source of what he terms motivation, as distinct from intentions. Motivation reflects a desire or need for ontological security, and thus is concerned with tension or anxiety management. Giddens draws on Erikson in tracing unconscious motivation originally to the infant's experiences of learning to trust a parent to return on a regular basis: "'trust' . . . is understood as . . . the initial awakening of a sense that absence does not signify desertion" (Giddens 1984, p. 53). Motivation as Giddens means the term does not come into play directly in specific day-to-day behaviors, but finds expression, in part, in the very routineness of these behaviors.

Giddens' conceptualizations of reflexivity, discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the unconscious as involving knowledge become clearer when explained in terms of their relation to sensory perception and memory. In brief, consistent with his comments on action and reflexivity noted above, Giddens argues that

perception is not an aggregate of discrete 'perceptions' but a flow actively integrated with the movement of the body in time-space. Perception is organized via anticipatory schemata whereby the individual anticipates new incoming information while simultaneously digesting old . . . . Because schemata are anticipations they are . . . 'the medium whereby the past affects the future', which is 'identical with the underlying mechanisms of memory' (Giddens 1984, p. 46, quoting Neisser).
Thus, if the 'present' is not cut off from the flow of action, 'memory' can be nothing other than a way of describing the knowledgeability of human agents. [If we understand] memory as the temporal constitution of consciousness . . . then discursive and practical consciousness refer to psychological mechanisms of recall, as utilized in contexts of action. Discursive consciousness connotes those forms of recall which the actor is able to express verbally. Practical consciousness involves recall to which the agent has access in the durée of action without being able to express what he or she thereby knows. The unconscious refers to modes of recall to which the agent does not have direct access because there is a negative 'bar' of some kind inhibiting its unmediated incorporation within the reflexive monitoring of conduct and . . . discursive consciousness. The origins of the 'bar' are of two related sorts. First, since the earliest experiences of the infant shaping the basic security system whereby anxiety is canalized, or controlled, predate differentiated linguistic competence, they are likely to remain thereafter 'outside the bounds' of discursive consciousness. Second, the unconscious contains repressions which inhibit discursive formulation (Giddens 1984, p. 49, author's emphasis)

Structure & Structuration

The way Giddens conceives the articulation of structure and agency is of course fundamental to the notion of duality of structure. He identifies in social relations . . . both a syntagmatic dimension, involving the reproduction of situated practices, and a paradigmatic dimension involving a virtual order of 'modes of structuring' recursively implicated in such reproduction (1984, p.17).

In other words, he distinguishes between actual patterns of practice occurring and observable in time and space, and the rules and
resources, as he terms them, which do not have actual material existence in time and space, but which are implicated in the patterning of practice across time and space.

Giddens uses the term "social systems" to refer to the actual patterns of practice and relations (1984, p. 377). He reserves the term "structure" to refer to the virtual order, conceived of as rules and resources. These are drawn on by actors in interaction, and thus are produced and reproduced (Giddens 1979, p. 65-67; 1984, p. 16-17):

social systems, as reproduced social practices, do not have 'structures' but rather exhibit 'structural properties' and that structure exists, as time-space presence, only in its instantiations in such practices and as memory traces orienting the conduct of knowledgeable human agents.(Giddens 1984, p. 17).

Structuralist thought has influenced this central conceptualization of Giddens' theory although he is critical of many aspects of structuralism. In particular, he ultimately traces his conceptualization of the duality of structure to the relationship conceived by Saussure between parole, actual uttered speech, at the syntagmatic level, and langue, the virtual order of a language as a totality at the paradigmatic (Giddens 1982, p.33-34). While he warns against "the idea of Lévi-Strauss, that 'society is like a language", he states that "the study of language certainly helps cast light upon some basic characteristics of social activity as a whole" (Giddens 1993, p. 8; see also Giddens 1993, p.109; Giddens 1979, p.4). "This is not...because social life is like a language [but] because
language is such an important feature of social activity that it
expresses some of its most generic qualities" (Giddens 1986, 534; see
also 1977, 129). Not surprisingly given this, many of his
illustrations of the process of duality of structure are based on
language use, as shall become apparent below (e.g., Giddens 1982, p.
1982, p. 10-11; etc.)

The articulation between agency and structure turns on the
notion of "unacknowledged conditions of action" and a particular type
of "unintended consequences of action" (Giddens 1979, p. 56). The
unacknowledged conditions include most of the rules and resources
agents draw on in their intentional social interaction. In drawing on
them, agents produce and reproduce both social practices and the
virtual rule set. Giddens notes, for example, that

[w]hen a speaker utters his sentence, he or she draws upon the
range of syntactical and other rules in order to do so. But the
very process of drawing upon those rules, or structural
properties, serves to reproduce the overall totality which is
language. Language exists only insofar as it is produced and
reproduced in contingent contexts of social life in this fashion
(Giddens 1986, p. 534).

The rules are conceived as unacknowledged conditions, of course,
because for an actor drawing on the rules is "something which is
done, accomplished . . . but not in full cognizance of how he or she
does it" (Giddens 1993, p. 109). They are unintended outcomes
because actors do not draw on rules for the purpose of reproducing
them. Rather, they are the medium through which actors are able 'go on', to produce social interaction, and accomplish activities.

To the degree that the rules are indeed unacknowledged, they can be associated with practical consciousness:

to 'know English' is to know an enormously complicated set of rules and principles, and the contexts of their applications. To know English is not to be able to formulate discursively those rules or principles: linguists have devoted a great deal of labour to formulating what we already 'know' (Giddens 1982, p. 31-32).

In this sense, as Giddens puts it, "the structural properties of social systems are embedded in practical consciousness, in 'knowing how to go on' in a whole diversity of contexts of social life" (Giddens 1981, p. 27).

But while the structural properties can thus be understood as embedded in the practical consciousness of individual actors, they are obviously social in character:

[w]hat I have designated as the structural components of social interaction are not properties of individuals, but of collectivities or social systems. This can be illuminated by reference to speech acts and language. Speech acts are always the situated products of particular actors, and presuppose, for example, knowledge of (ability to use) syntactical rules whereby those acts are generated; but those rules, as such, are properties of the language community. To avoid the reification potential in such phrases as 'properties of the collectivity', however, it is essential to stress that such properties exist only in and through their reproduction in concrete acts (Giddens 1977, p. 126).

It is also important to note that because agents use or draw on structure in 'bringing off' interaction, Giddens rejects any simple
"identification of structure with constraint. . . structure is both enabling and constraining" (Giddens 1979, p. 70). For example:

[s]ince any language constrains thought (and action) in the sense that it presumes a range of framed, rule governed properties, the process of language learning sets certain limits to cognition and activity. But by the very same token the learning of a language greatly expands the cognitive and practical capacities of the individual (Giddens 1984, p. 170).

Giddens sets out specifically how he intends the idea of rules as structure or structuring property to be understood:

In structuralist traditions there is usually ambiguity over whether structures refer to a matrix of admissible transformations within a set or to rules of transformation governing the matrix. I treat structure, in its most elemental meaning at least, as referring to such rules (and resources). It is misleading, however, to speak of 'rules of transformation' because all rules are inherently transformational. Structure thus refers to the structuring properties allowing the 'binding' of time-space, the properties which make it possible for discernibly similar social practices to exist across varying spans of time and space and which lend them 'systemic' form (Giddens 1984, p. 17).

Giddens statement that "all social rules are transformational" (1979, p. 64) can be understood in two ways, which reflect the two aspects of the duality of structure. One sense is that drawing on rules enables actors to bring off interaction, that rules are enabling as above. At the same time, rules as structuring property underlie the patterning of different social practices (the 'matrix of admissible transformations' above) in time and space.

7 His concept of resources as structure is treated and critiqued at length below.
He notes that in philosophy and social theory, social "[r]ules are often thought of in connection with games, as formalized prescriptions", such as the rules of the game of chess. But "[t]he rules implicated in the reproduction of social systems are not generally like this" (Giddens 1984, p. 17-18). Social rules are not as "fixed" or "formalized", nor are they, generally, "established in a lexicon" (Giddens 1979, p. 67). And "[e]ven those which are codified as laws are characteristically subject to a far greater diversity of contestations than the rules of games" (Giddens 1984, p. 18).

Related to this is the mistaken tendency to identify "knowing rules with knowing how to formulate rules, which are two different things." This was illustrated above in the example on speaking a language versus ability to enunciate the rules of grammar and syntax. Giddens also notes that

[r]ules are often treated in the singular, as if they could be related to specific instances or pieces of conduct. But this is highly misleading if regarded as analogous to the operation of social life, in which practices are sustained in conjunction with more or less loosely organized sets (Giddens 1984, p. 18).

Indeed, he has stated that "no social practice expresses, or can be explicated in terms of, a single rule. . . . Rather, practices are situated within intersecting sets of rules and resources that ultimately express features of the totality" (Giddens 1979, p. 82).

I noted above that Giddens views all rules as transformational. Reacting to treatments which suggest that there are two types of rules, "'constitutive' and 'regulative," he also argues that "all social rules have both constitutive and regulative (sanctioning) aspects to
them" (Giddens 1979, 66, emphasis added). What he means by this is that all rules "relate on the one hand to the constitution of meaning and on the other to the sanctioning of modes of social conduct" (Giddens 1984, p.18, author's emphasis).

Finally, he argues that "the ways we make sense of our own actions and the actions of others, and the ways in which we generate meaning in the world, are in an elemental sense methodological" (Giddens 1986, p. 538). That is, in practice, "[t]he operations of practical consciousness enmesh rules and the 'methodological' interpretation of rules in the continuity of practice" (Giddens 1979, p. 68). Given all these points, Giddens cites Wittgenstein in suggesting that social rules should not be conceived of as strict, discrete, clearly identifiable entities:

'remember that in general we don't use language according to strict rules--it hasn't been taught to us by means of strict rules, either'. In children's games, at least those which are practiced by children's groups themselves, or transmitted informally from generation to generation, there is no lexicon of formal rules, and it may be an essential characteristic of the rules which do exist that they cannot be strictly defined. Such is the case, Wittgenstein argues, with most of the concepts employed in ordinary language. We cannot clearly delimit them in a lexical sense: 'not because we don't know their real definition, but because there is no real "definition" to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules' (Giddens 1979, p. 68).

Giddens identifies three dimensions through or along which the duality of structure and agency can be analysed as operating in social systems: domination<->power; signification<->communication; and
sanction<->legitimation (1979, p.81-2, 97, 1984, p. 29) (see Figure 1). These correspond respectively to the three qualities he identifies with all social rules, as noted above: that they are transformational, and have constitutive and regulative aspects. But Giddens stresses that

the differentiation of signification, domination and legitimation is an analytical one. If signification is fundamentally structured in and through language, language at the same time expresses aspects of domination; and the codes that are involved in signification have normative force. [Domination is] only mobilized in conjunction with signifying and normative elements; and, finally, legitimation necessarily involves signification as well as playing a major part in co-ordinating forms of domination (Giddens 1979, p. 106-7; see also 1984, p. 28-29; 1993, p. 110).

Thus, at the risk of redundancy, it is important to note that Giddens' diagram is potentially misleading:

the classification given [in the figure] does not represent a typology of interaction or structures, but a portrayal of dimensions that are combined in differing ways in social practices. The communication of meaning does not take place separately from the operation of relations of power, or outside the context of normative sanctions. All social practices involve these three elements (Giddens 1979, p. 82).

The ways these three dimensions are mutually involved in all social practices is illustrated in examples throughout the remainder of this section.

Giddens portrays these dimensions as involving three levels: structure, interaction, and between them, modality. Because he
does not treat the specific modalities of facility and norm in any detail, it will be useful to discuss modalities in generic terms before considering each of the dimensions in detail.

The modalities are central to Giddens' conceptualization. They "refer to the mediation of interaction and structure in processes of social reproduction" (1993, p. 129). As he conceives them, "modalities of structuration are drawn upon by actors in the production of interaction, but at the same time are the media of the reproduction of the structural components of systems of interaction" (1979, p. 81). From the perspective of actors,

the modalities are. . . stocks of knowledge and resources employed. . . in the constitution of interaction as a skilled and knowledgeable accomplishment. . . . Where strategic conduct is placed under an *epoché*, the modalities represent rules and resources considered as institutional features of systems of social interaction (1979, p. 81).

**Domination<->Power**

"Power" Giddens argues "is not a description of a state of affairs, but a capability" (Giddens 1979, 68). As noted above, he equates power at its most basic with the 'transformative capacity' implicit in agency. His emphasis on this "most all-embracing meaning of 'power'" (Giddens 1984, p. 15) grows out of desire to escape limitations of what he sees as the two perspectives on power.

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8 Giddens generally uses the term 'dimension' to refer to what I have called levels (structure, modality and interaction) as well as to describe the typology of structure<->interaction relationships. For the sake of simplicity, I will refer only to the latter categories as dimensions.
dominant in different approaches to social science. In one view, "power [is] above all a property of society or the social system" (Giddens 1984, p. 15). In the other, power is "defined in terms of intent or the will, as the power to achieve desired and intended outcomes" (Giddens 1984, p.15).

Power in each of these two views corresponds to one aspect of the duality of structure as conceived by Giddens: power as a virtual, structural property of the collective, and power as used or expressed by agents in interaction. Thus, "[t]he point is not to eliminate one of these types of conception at the expense of the other, but to" reconcile them as related (Giddens 1984, p.15).

Power broadly equated with transformational capacity is involved in all social interaction, including actions of signification and legitimation. But in terms of the domination<->power dimension, as depicted in the figure, he applies the term in a more specialized sense.

Although in the sense of transformative capacity power is implied in the very notion of action, I shall henceforth employ the term 'power' as a sub-category of 'transformative capacity', to refer to interaction where transformative capacity is \textit{harnessed to actors' attempts to get others to comply with their wants}. Power, in this relational sense, concerns the capability of actors to secure outcomes where the realisation of these outcomes depends upon the agency of others. The use of power in interaction thus can be understood in terms of the facilities that participants bring to and mobilize as elements of the production of that interaction, thereby influencing its course. Social systems are constituted as regularised practices: power within social systems can thus be treated as involving
reproduced relations of autonomy and dependence in social interaction.

Giddens goes on to state that within these reproduced relations,

[p]ower relations...are always two-way, even if the power of one actor or party in a social relation is minimal compared to another. Power relations are relations of autonomy and dependence, but even the most autonomous agent is in some degree dependent, and the most dependent actor or party in a relationship retains some autonomy (Giddens 1979, p. 93).

He refers to this two-way flow as "the dialectic of control in social systems" (Giddens 1979, p.16).

"Domination," for Giddens "is not a concept that carries an intrinsically negative connotation" (Giddens 1987, p. 9). Rather, he sees it, in the form of "institutional mediation of power" as a characteristic of "all social systems of any duration" (Giddens 1987, p. 9). Nor should power and domination be confused with the ideas either of struggle/conflict, or sectional interests. Although these certainly revolve around issues of power and domination, they are not inherent in power per se (Giddens 1984, p. 257).

Related to this, Giddens views power as both enabling and constraining. It "is not inherently oppressive... Power is the capacity to achieve outcomes; whether or not these are connected to sectional interests is not germane to its definition" (1984, 257).

Giddens also suggests, influenced by a wide range of theorists, including Lukes, Bachrach and Baratz, and Foucault that power "is
typically at its most intense and durable when running silently through the repetition of institutionalized practices" (1987, 9).

As noted above, Giddens generally refers to structure in terms of rules and resources. The latter term, however, he distinguishes as specifically designating the structural, virtual properties of the power<-> domination modality. Thus, for example, another way of thinking about the dialectic of control is that "[s]tructures of domination involve asymmetries of resources employed in the sustaining of power relations in and between systems of interaction" (Giddens 1979, p. 93, author's emphasis).

He specifies two types of resource which agents employ in the course of their transformative actions: allocative and authoritative. Giddens has variously defined allocative resources as referring "to dominion over material facilities, including material goods and the natural forces that may be harnessed in their production" (Giddens 1987, p.7) and "to forms of transformative capacity--generating command over objects, goods or material phenomena" (Giddens 1984, p. 33). Authoritative resources refers to "the means of dominion over the activities of human beings themselves" (1987, 7), or "to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors" (1984, 33).

He categorizes what he sees as the different forms of allocative and authoritative resources:

[t]he major forms of allocative resource found in any society can be said to be as follows:

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(a) Material features of the environment (raw materials, material power sources).
(b) Means of material production/reproduction (instruments of production, technology).
(c) Produced goods (artefacts created by the interaction of (a) and (b)).

The major forms of authoritative resource found in any society can be identified as follows:
(a) Organization of social time-space (the temporal-spatial constitution of society).
(b) Production/reproduction of the human body (organization and relations of human beings in society).
(c) Organization of human life-chances (constitution of chances of self-development and self expression) (Giddens 1981b, p. 51-52).

He goes on to explain that

[t]he three forms of authoritative resources are less self-explanatory than the allocative resources. By the 'organization of social time-space', I refer to the localization of practices in a society, [in terms of 'locale', as defined below]. By the 'production/reproduction of the human body' I mean . . . the distribution of human beings in society across time-space. Under (c), the 'organization of life-chances', I mean the distribution of the capabilities of actors to achieve particular styles of life or modes of self-realization in definite types of society. The forms of authoritative resources, like allocative resources, are not 'possessed' by individual actors, but are features of the societal totality (Giddens 1981b, p. 51-52).

This scheme is susceptible to criticism of at least two types. One has to do with the classification of resources, especially allocative resources, as virtual structure. The other concerns the actual separability of the two types of resources. With regard to
the first, Giddens himself acknowledges a difficulty, and attempts to address it:

Some forms of allocative resource (such as raw materials, land, etc.) might seem to have a 'real existence' in a way which I have claimed that structural properties as a whole do not. In the sense of having a time-space 'presence', in a certain way such is obviously the case. But their 'materiality' does not affect the fact that such phenomena become resources, in the manner in which I apply the term here, only when incorporated within processes of structuration. The transformational character of resources is logically equivalent to, as well as inherently bound up with the instantiation of, that of codes and normative sanctions. (1984, p. 33).

Elsewhere, he has attempted to explain the relationship as follows:

. . . the material existents involved in resources (a) are the content, or the 'vehicles', of resources, in a parallel manner to the 'substance' of codes and norms, and (b) as instantiated in power relations in social systems only operate in conjunction with codes and norms. (Allocation is only 'property' as instantiated in conjunction with rules of signification and legitimation). The transformational character of resources is just as basic as that of rules: which is why I employ the term 'transformational capacity' as an intrinsic feature of human agency. Resources, however, provide the material levers of all transformations of empirical contents, including those involved in the operation of codes and norms (1979, p.104, Author's emphasis).

Giddens makes important points in these statements about the inter-relatedness of operations of domination, legitimation and signification. However, his arguments for treating resources (allocative in particular) as virtual are not particularly convincing,
nor even consistent. Since all rules are transformational, and all transformations of empirical contents involve 'material levers', logically we must either include a material aspect to the structural level of each of the dimensions (rendering the concept of a separation of paradigmatic and syntagmatic analytically useless), or specify that the structural level of the domination<->power dimension is somehow different from those of both the other dimensions.

The other criticism, the questioning the separability of allocative and authoritative resources, can be illustrated with an example. Imagine a police officer coercively encouraging members of a crowd to disperse or to move out of a street (the situation could equally well be a political protest or the aftermath of a college football game). Suppose the officer brandishes her nightstick, and the members of the crowd cooperate by attempting to back away. The nightstick clearly fits the category of 'produced goods' noted above. Yet the officer is using the nightstick, successfully, to induce certain behavior on the part of others, and the coercion is effective as such because the coerced parties see the potential, or feel the actual use of force, as affecting their options regarding, in Giddens' terms, 'organization of human life-chances' and 'production/reproduction of the human body'. In this case, is the nightstick an allocative or an authoritative resource, or is it both at once?
These two criticisms are related, and the problems each highlights can be resolved without sacrificing what is useful about Giddens' conceptualization. To the degree that all rule governed activities involve power as broadly defined, and to the degree that we accept Giddens' statement, quoted above, that allocative "resources... provide the material levers of all transformations of empirical contents" (1979, p.104, Author's emphasis), then, as Mouzelis argues, when speaking of structural or virtual components, it is more useful "to refer simply to rules, including rules entailing the mobilization of material resources" (Mouzelis 1991, p. 43, fn. 2, author's emphasis).

Part of the difficulty in the example is also related to the fact that material things are characterized as allocative resources, while authoritative seem to be genuinely virtual. I do not, however, intend that the example support an argument that the distinctions between allocation and authorization are meaningless or useless. Quite the contrary, I think Giddens has convincingly argued that in addressing domination, to ignore authority, or subordinate it to allocation, as in some Marxist approaches, is problematic. Likewise, approaches which attempt to subordinate allocation to authorization are flawed (Giddens 1979, pp.100-101).

Rather, I want the example to illustrate that the problem lies in thinking of allocation and authorization in terms of things--i.e.,

9 Of course, the police officer is also reliant on legitimation and signification, and draws fairly unambiguously on authoritative resources of domination, as well. For example, the crowd may hesitate to over-power the officer because she represents the 'legitimate authority of the state.'
"resources"--rather than processes. Giddens jumps back and forth between a focus on the two as processes and the two as types of resource. I would suggest that the former way of thinking is more productive, and more consistent with Giddens' overall theorizing. If we focus on processes, then, we can assume that authorization and allocation will each involve virtual rules and material resources, but the types of rules and processes amount to different forms, or at least different aspects, of domination. From this perspective, it is unsurprising and unproblematic to view the police officer as drawing on a cluster of material resources and a cluster of symbolic, legitimizing and dominatory rules to enact authority at the level of co-presence.

Legitimation<->Sanction

The legitimation<->sanction dimension of the duality of structure is concerned with norms. As with power, so too norms, considered generically, are involved in or pervade the other dimensions of the duality of structure at a fundamental level. Structure is defined in structuration theory in terms of virtual rule sets, and rules and rule oriented behavior are by definition normative. Giddens does not appear to state explicitly, as he does in the case of power, that he views the sanction<->legitimation dimension as a sub-category of the regulative nature of rules generally, but this is clearly a safe inference.
As such a sub-category, this dimension can be conceptualized in terms of

the actualisation of *rights* and the enactment of *obligations*. . . . [H]owever. . . *the symmetry between these may be broken in actual social conduct*. . . [T]he norms implicated in systems of social interaction have at every moment to be sustained and reproduced in the flow of social encounters. What from the structural point of view. . . appears as a normatively co-ordinated legitimate order, in which rights and obligations are merely two aspects of norms, from the point of view of strategic conduct represents *claims*, whose realization is contingent upon the successful mobilization of obligations through the medium of the responses of other actors (Giddens 1979, p. 86, see also Giddens 1993, p.114, 1982, p. 86).

Consistent with this, legitimation and sanctioning can operate in terms of a largely unquestioned "moral commitment", but conformity can also be based on "acknowledgement of sanctions" (Giddens 1979, 86-87, also Giddens 1993, 114-115)\(^\text{10}\). This distinction can be stated differently,

on an abstract level, in terms of whether the resources which are mobilized to produce the sanction are 'internal': that is, draw upon elements of the actors personality, or 'external': that is draw upon features of the context of interaction (Giddens 1993, p.115-116).

\(^{10}\) Current lay debates about legally defined legitimation<->sanction issues such as capital punishment or sentencing of drug users demonstrate that the boundaries between normative order as accepted moral order and as explicitly functioning through recognition of sanctions are often likely to be blurred.
Sanctions, whether internal or external, can also be positive or negative, reward or punishment. Giddens suggests that this is best conceived as "two modes of sanctioning" since there is no clear cut division between the types of sanctions, and they may be combined in varying ways. . . . [For example] the threatened withholding of a promised reward can be a punitive gesture. . . and the possibility of avoidance or of release from coercive measures can serve as inducement (Giddens 1979, p. 94, author's emphasis).

Likewise, Giddens notes that

the actualization of 'internal sanctions' may draw upon a positive moral commitment of the actor, or negatively upon anxiety, fear or guilt. . . . and no 'external' sanction can be effective unless it brings into play an 'internal' one: a reward is only such if it impinges upon a person's wants (Giddens 1993, p.116).

The relationship to the domination<-->power dimension is evident in the very idea of sanctioning. Giddens notes, for example, that "[n]ormative sanctions are a generic type of resource drawn upon in power relations" (Giddens 1979, 86). By the same token, normative behavior is always meaningful, in the sense that, however implicitly, a 'right way' of doing things is recognized. Apparent conformity to norms or failure to conform can be laced with communicative intent, and is likely to be interpreted with such intent, and the respective positive or negative sanctioning of appropriate behavior or transgressions is inherently also an act of signification.

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The operation of legitimation<->sanctioning is evident in legal institutions and codified law (Giddens 1984, p. 31). However, Giddens also stresses the importance of recognizing the power of legitimation<->sanctioning operations in routine, day-to-day situations of co-presence as one of the most important bases of social systems (1984, p. 23, p. 64). His conceptualization of normative behavior at this level has been influenced by Goffman (Giddens 1984, p. 68-92).

In particular, Giddens notes ways that interaction between individuals is normatively bounded and regulated. Encounters are marked off as encounters, both temporally and spatially. Competent agents maintain turn taking behaviors within encounters, and engage in different appropriate behaviors for different environments or locales, as exemplified in Goffman's conceptualization of front and back regions (Giddens 1984, p. 68-92). Giddens also argues that a whole range of what seem to be mundane or trivial sanctions are fundamental to the maintaining of tact in everyday life. And while the content of what counts as 'being tactful' may vary widely, the significance of tact in otherwise very different societies or cultures is impossible to dispute. Tact--a latent conceptual agreement among participants in interaction contexts--seems to be the main mechanism that sustains 'trust' or ontological security over long time-space spans (Giddens 1984, p. 75).

A fundamental normative component or aspect of any behavior in conditions of co-presence is what Goffman refers to as "'exhibit[ing] presence'" (quoted in Giddens 1984, p. 79). In Giddens'
words, this means "being seen as a capable agent' [which] is intrinsic to what agency is" (Giddens 1984, p. 80). This is discussed in terms of reflexive monitoring, rationalization and competence in the section above on agency.

Exhibiting presence concerns managing appearances, not just at the level of dress and adornment, but

more complex. . . the chronic monitoring of the arrangement of clothing, in relation to bodily posture. . . . [T]he normative expectations in which bodily control and appearance are grounded concern not merely the trappings of adornment or the gross parameters of motor behaviour but precisely the kind of 'sustained control' which simultaneously 'carries' and demonstrates agency (Giddens 1984, p. 80).

All of these tact maintaining behaviors involve

a bewildering range of skills which agents deploy in the production and reproduction of action. Such skills are founded first and foremost in the normatively regulated control of what might seem, even more than turn-taking, to be the tiniest, most insignificant details of bodily movement or expression (Giddens 1984, p.78)

Thus, "the twin themes of the control of the body in fields of action in co-presence and the pervasive influence of face are essential to the whole of Goffman's writings" (Giddens 1984, 67).

In addition to tempo-spatial positioning, Giddens recognizes that actors are also normatively "positioned relationally" (Giddens 1984, p.83), or socially.

Social positions are constituted structurally as specific intersections of signification, domination and legitimation which relates to the typification of agents. A social position
involves the specification of a definite 'identity' within a network of social relations, that identity, however, being a 'category' to which a particular range of normative sanctions is relevant" (Giddens 1984, p. 83).

Or, as he has stated elsewhere

A social position [is] a social identity that carries with it a certain range (however diffusely specified) of prerogatives and obligations that an actor who is accorded that identity (or is an 'incumbent' of that position) may activate or carry out: these prerogatives and obligations constitute the role-prescriptions associated with that position. A social identity is essentially a category, or a typification, made on the basis of some definite social criteria: occupation, kin relation, age-grade, etc (Giddens 1979, p.117-118).11

Signification<->Communication

Giddens informs us that "[i]n the study of signification, as a structural feature of social systems, the rules, or aspects of rules, that are of interest are codes, or modes of coding" (Giddens 1979, p.97 author's emphasis). Just as Giddens treats the domination<->power and the legitimation<->sanction dimensions respectively as

11 Giddens is uncomfortable with using the term "role" to describe this social positioning, as its use has tended, in his view, to obscure agency and to reify the agency-structure duality. He argues that even such disparate uses of the term as Parsons' and Goffman's "have a definite affinity. Each tends to emphasize the 'given' character of roles, thereby serving to express the dualism of action and structure characteristic of so many areas of social theory. The script is written the stage set, and actors do the best they can with the parts prepared for them" (Giddens 1984, p. 84). Obviously, his use of the terminology of social positions involving 'role-prescriptions' avoids this connotation. He also argues that the dramaturgical metaphor implies that the rights and obligations are clearly defined as expectations. This is normally true "only [in] definite settings of interaction. . . a specific locale or type of locale in which regularized encounters in conditions of co-presence take place. . . associated with a more clear-cut closure of relationships than is found in social systems as a whole" (Giddens 1984, p. 86). He is willing to allow the usefulness of the term role for examining such situations.
subcategories of the transformative capacity and regulative nature of rules generally, so he regards the relationships represented by the signification<->communication dimension as a sub-category or special case of the constitution of meaning common to all rule governed interaction.

The meaning of utterances as 'communicative acts'... can... always be distinguished from the meaning of action, or the identification of action as particular acts. A communicative act is one in which an actor's purpose, or one of an actor's purposes, is linked to the achievement of passing along information to others. Such 'information', of course, does not have to be solely of a propositional sort, but can be comprised within an attempt to persuade or influence others to respond in a particular way... chopping wood, and many other forms of action, are not communicative acts in this sense. There is, in sum, a difference between making sense of what someone is doing when he or she is doing something... and making sense of how others make sense of what he or she says or does in efforts at communication (Giddens 1993, p.94).

This analytic distinction of the signification<->communication dimension of structuration as based in communicative intent should not be taken to mean that Giddens views the constitution of meaning in communication simply in terms of communicative intent. Consistent with his theorization of the duality of structure, he wishes to avoid the reductionism both of "philosophers [who] have tried to derive overall theories of meaning or communication from communicative intent" (Giddens 1984, p. 29) and of what he characterizes as "[t]he retreat into the code" (Giddens 1984, p. 32) associated with structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers who view meaning simply as "governed by the structural ordering of sign
systems." Rather, he regards these as aspects of the duality of structure (Giddens 1984, p. 30). Drawing on the later Wittgenstein, he argues that we should look at language as "a situated product" (1979, p. 35), the meaning of which derives from the fact that it expresses and is expressed in practices (1979, p.38).

Thus, quoting Eco, Giddens notes that

'a signification system is an autonomous semiotic construct that has an abstract mode of existence independent of any possible communicative act it makes possible [and that] every act of communication to or between human beings... presupposes a signification system as its necessary condition' (Giddens 1979, p. 98, author's emphasis).

Nevertheless, he insists that "the semantic has priority over the semiotic" (Giddens 1979, p. 98). First, "[w]e cannot simply identify pre-existing codes which generate messages, since the 'messages' also enter into the reconstruction of 'codes' in the duality of structure in interaction" (Giddens 1979, p. 99). Furthermore, "meaning... cannot be grasped simply in terms of a lexicon" (1993, p.25); "meaningfulness' is actively and continually negotiated, not merely the programmed communication of already established meanings" (1993, p. 111).

Codes, according to Giddens, are "multiform," or exhibit "multivalent" relationships both on a "temporal axis" of utterances unfolding, and also on the "vertical" axis of the "syntagmatic/paradigmatic distinction." Thus, "in social interaction the 'messages' are always 'texts' in the sense in which they are
generated from, and express a plurality of codes" (Giddens 1979, p. 99). Thus, "meaning must be treated as grounded in the 'contexts of use' of language" (Giddens 1979, p. 98). And

[i]n the production of meaning in interaction, context cannot be treated as merely the 'environment' or 'background' of the use of language. The context of interaction is in some degree shaped and organized as an integral part of that interaction as a communicative encounter. The reflexive monitoring of conduct in interaction involves the routine drawing upon of physical, social and temporal context in the sustaining of accountability; but the drawing upon of context at the same time recreates these elements as contextual relevances (Giddens 1979, p. 83-4, author's emphasis).

Temporal and spatial context enter into communication in the form of "the time space boundaries (usually having symbolic or physical markers) around interaction strips" (1984, p. 282), that is, the same boundaries discussed above in the section on legitimation<->sanction. Temporal context is also involved, along with social context, in the ways that "actors sustain the meaning of what they say and do through routinely incorporating 'what went before' and anticipations of 'what will come next into the present encounter" (1979, p. 84). A fundamental way that physical and social context are drawn upon and recreated in interaction involves zoning of appropriate behaviours, as highlighted in Giddens' conceptualization of locales and regionalization (explained in detail in the section on Time & Space) and as illustrated in "Goffman's contrasts of front and back regions" (1979. p. 207).
Giddens argues convincingly, following Ziff, that all relevant aspects of context cannot themselves be expressed linguistically (1979, 84; 1993, 112). This can be related back to his reading of the later Wittgenstein:

Language is... intimately dependent on the non-linguistic, or what cannot be put into words... But what cannot be said is no longer a mysterious metaphysics that cannot even be talked about. What cannot be said is, on the contrary, prosaic and mundane. It is what has to be done: the meanings of linguistic items are intrinsically involved with the practices that comprise forms of life (1979, p. 34).

With regard to physical and temporal context, and the social context of practices, 'what cannot be said' must nevertheless be accounted for and interpreted by agents in the course of maintaining interaction. They do so according to Giddens, by drawing on what he characterizes as interpretive schemes, the modality of the Signification<->Communication dimension. He defines interpretive schemes as

standardised elements of stocks of knowledge, applied by actors in the production of interaction. Interpretive schemes form the core of the mutual knowledge whereby an accountable universe of meaning is sustained through and in processes of interaction.... The 'mutual knowledge' thus employed and reconstituted in social encounters can be regarded as the medium whereby the interweaving of locutionary and illocutionary elements is ordered (Giddens 1979, 83-4)

He specifies that

[s]uch interpretive schemes ('typifications') can be regarded analytically as a series of generative rules for the uptake of the illocutionary force of utterances. Mutual knowledge is
'background knowledge' in the sense that that it is taken for granted, and mostly remains unarticulated; on the other hand, it is not part of the 'background' in the sense that it is constantly actualized, displayed and modified by members of society in the course of their interaction. Taken-for-granted knowledge, in other words, is never fully taken for granted, and the relevance of some particular element to an encounter may have to be 'demonstrated', and sometimes fought for, by the actor; it is not appropriated ready made by the actors, but is produced and reproduced anew by them as part of the continuity of their lives (Giddens 1993, p. 113-114).

Interpretive schemes—and by extension the other modalities—involves the enmeshing of rules and their methodological interpretation, as noted above in discussion of rules generally. Clearly, the mutual knowledge of interpretive schemes involves more than just knowledge of the linguistic code. Knowing how to interpret and use language in context implies knowledge of the context. Giddens states that these "stocks of knowledge are the same as those whereby [agents] are able to make accounts, offer reasons, etc." (Giddens 1984, p. 29), and the same "taken-for-granted 'knowledge' which actors assume others possess, if they are 'competent' members of society" (Giddens 1993, p. 112-113), as discussed in this chapter in the section on agency. Finally, this underlines once again that the distinction of the three dimensions, and of the modalities of each, is only analytical:

The idea of 'accountability' in everyday English gives cogent expression to the intersection of interpretive schemes and norms. To be 'accountable' for one's activities is both to explicate the reasons for them and to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be 'justified' (Giddens 1984, p. 30).
Thus far, discussion of the Signification<->Communication dimension of the duality of structure has focused on language. But communication is not solely linguistic. Giddens endorses Barthes' view "that the linguistic sign is... the 'fatal relay' of all modes of signification, since language is such a permeating feature of human social activity" (Giddens 1979, p. 99). But he also notes "the most important contribution to emanate from semiotics: the emphasis that all kinds of contents, not just spoken or written words, can become caught up in signification" (Giddens 1979, p.99).

Also important to Giddens' overall conceptualization of the duality of structure and of social and system integration is his recognition that

just as utterance may be both an act--something which is 'done'--and a 'communicative act', so something which is 'done' may also have communicative intent. The efforts that actors make to create specific sorts of impressions on others from the cues which they engineer their actions to 'give off' are well analysed in the writings of Erving Goffman (Giddens 1993, p.94).

An example that Giddens gives in discussing social encounters simultaneously illustrates not only the importance of context, and the overlapping of the communicative, power and normative dimensions in interaction, but also the complex ways that linguistic and non-linguistic communication are related to one another. He notes that certain physical contexts may "threaten to fracture...closure" of an encounter between two individuals, that is, they make it difficult to maintain the impression of privacy in an encounter:
in very constricted spaces, such as lifts, it is virtually impossible to sustain a posture of not listening. In Anglo-American society, at least, the tendency in such a situation is to suspend communication [but] contexts of encounters such as these may directly express asymmetries of power. Thus if, say, two individuals in a lift continue to carry on their talk regardless of their surroundings of overly close proximity to others, it may very well be that they thereby demonstrate to those who are their subordinates or inferiors their indifference to the sustaining of civil inattention in such a context. However, they may nevertheless betray a certain concern about deviating from a norm that ordinarily would be observed, and hence they may talk even more loudly than they would in other circumstances (Giddens 1984, p. 76).

**Time & Space**

Giddens, as noted previously, argues that the appropriate focus of social science is the ordering or patterning of social practices across time and space. Thus it is not surprising that he states that "an ontology of time-space as constitutive of social practices is basic to the conception of structuration, which begins from temporality and thus, in one sense, 'history'" (1984, p.3). In section I will first explicate how Giddens conceptualizes time and space. I will then explain the concepts and categories he derives for understanding the involvement of time and space with social practice, and the ways his conceptualization of time-space underlie or are related to virtually all of the concepts treated thus far.

Giddens notes that "time is perhaps the most enigmatic feature of human experiences" (1984, p.34). Thus it is not surprising that his conceptualization of time-space is complex, and explication of it is a particularly difficult task. As a way of approaching this task, I begin with a statement in which Giddens presents his most fundamental
Giddens states:

I have no dispute with [Parsons'] assertion that 'the' problem of social theory is 'the problem of order'. But rather than understanding 'order' in opposition to 'disintegration', I oppose the term to chaos or formlessness. The problem of order in social theory is how form occurs in social relations, or (put in another fashion) how social systems 'bind' time and space. All social activity is formed in three conjoined moments of difference: temporally, structurally (in the language of semiotics, paradigmatically), and spatially; the conjunction of these expresses the situated character of social practices. The 'binding' of time and space in social systems always has to be examined historically, in terms of the bounded know ledgeability of human action (Giddens 1981b, p.30).

What Giddens means by formlessness and the 'binding' of time-space grows directly out of his conceptualization of the nature of time-space. He is influenced especially by Heidegger, and through Heidegger, Leibnitz in formulating this conceptualization. He states that:

according to Leibnitz, we cannot speak of time and space as non-relational 'containers', because they are not, as such, 'existents'. We can only grasp time and space in terms of the relations of things and events: they are the modes in which relations between objects and events are expressed (1981b, p. 30-31).

Putting this in another way, and developing it, Giddens presents Heidegger's insight that "time is manifest in the chronic reciprocity of Being and non-Being. Being exists in the coming-to-be of presence" (Giddens 1981b, 31). But presence is not to be confused with "'the present' [or] the 'point in space'" [1981b, p.31]. Likewise, with the
concept of being: "for Heidegger, \textit{seiend} is a verb form: every existent is a be-ing that is temporal" (Giddens 1979, p.54). Thus, time is presented as "the infinity of the emergence of being from nothingness" (Giddens 1984, p.34).

Related to this, Giddens notes that "we must resist the notion that calculation or 'measurement' of time-space gives us the clue to its true nature" (1981b, p. 32). Rather measurable time-space is derived—that is, imposed on time-space relations in Western culture. . . . The calculation of time and space have been taken to express their character. Time is thus presumed to be composed of 'instants', a space of 'points'. Since (in the terms of Zeno's paradox) every instant can be subdivided without end, it has often been supposed that time may be spoken of as composed of 'durationless instants', space as composed of 'dimensionless points'. . . . Replacing the conception of instants with that of intervals. . . took over too much of the view it was trying to supplant, supposing that the essence of time-space is to be found in its 'mensurability'. . . . To overcome this kind of difficulty we have to acknowledge, following Heidegger, that intervals are not instants, and neither is time-space 'composed' of them. Rather, intervals are \textit{structured differences} that give form to content, whether this be hours on a clock, notes in a musical rhythm, or centimeters on a ruler. To say this, in other words, is to reaffirm time-space as 'presencing', rather than as 'contentless form' in which objects exist" (Giddens 1981b, p. 33-34).

It is precisely this 'giving form to content' of 'structured differences' that Giddens refers to as the binding of time-space. But Giddens argues that "what Heidegger appears to ignore. . . is the necessary insertion of a paradigmatic dimension in time-space relations" (1979, p. 54). That is, Giddens argues that the way time-
space is given form through presence is in practices in which the virtual structures of rules and resources are drawn on.

Thus, what Giddens means by 'three conjoined moments of difference' is difference in space, in time and in the virtual, structuring code. Elsewhere, using Derridean terminology, he describes the "threefold connotation of différence" thus: "social practices occur not just as transformations of a virtual order of differences . . . and differences in time (repetition), but also in physical space" (Giddens 1979, p.46 author's emphasis).

It should be apparent that the particular sense of 'the situated character of social practices' as expressed in this conjunction is important to much of what has been explicated above. It underlies Giddens emphasis on action and consciousness as durée or flow, as well as his related conceptualization of perception as a flow including memory in the form of practical consciousness, discursive consciousness and the unconscious.

Further influenced by Heidegger and, to a lesser extent, Derrida (Giddens 1981b, p.38), Giddens also extends the concept of 'presence' to involve a stress on presence and absence. This emphasis has epistemological as well as ontological importance: according to Giddens, the way to develop understanding of the tempo-spatial nature of practices is to concentrate "upon aspects and modalities of presence and absence in human social relations" (1981b, p. 38). He goes so far as to suggest that "the social totality" can best be
understood "as relations of presence and absence recursively ordered" (1979, p. 255).

According to Giddens, "presence is a time-space notion, just as absence refers to 'distances' in both time and space from a particular set of experiences or events" (1981b, p.38). Giddens also links the concept of presence and absence to the traditional distinction between micro- and macro- sociological analysis,¹² or something like it. . . . The distinction can be treated as focusing upon the differences between social interaction where others are present, and social interaction where others are absent. The traditional term 'face-to-face interaction' perhaps will do to refer to the former, but we have no established term to refer to the latter. It should be clear, however, that the difference between these can only be adequately expressed in terms of time-space analysis (1981a, p.173).

Thus

all social interaction . . .occurs across time and space. All social interaction intermingles presence and absence. Such intermingling is always both complicated and subtle, and can be taken to express modes in which structures are drawn upon to incorporate the long-term durée of institutions within the contingent social act. Structures convey time across time-space of indeterminate length (Giddens 1981b, p. 38).

The emphasis as Giddens develops it here is that presence-absence hinges on structures as the media which involve/incorporate the physically absent. For example, Giddens notes that "the most

¹² It should be noted here that in general Giddens is skeptical of the micro-macro- distinction, at least at the level of social theory: "there can be no theoretical defence for supposing that the personal encounters of day-to-day life can be conceptually separated from the long-term institutional development of society" (1981a, p.173).
casual exchange of words involves the speaker in the long term history of the language via which their words are formed" (1982, p.11). One implication of this is that current speakers are thus involved with other speakers temporally (historically) absent or distant.

In addition to virtual structures, material technologies are involved as media in the coordination of presence and absence, or the binding of time and space. Thus:

different processes of presencing and absencing are achieved in the human body, its media of sensory exchange with the world and others, and the extensions of those media made possible by varying forms of technology" (Giddens 1982b, p.37).

Giddens goes on to state that

in those societies which possess no writing, where there exists no physical 'imprint' of past time, the past is contained in the deep impress which tradition holds over the routinisation of daily experiences. But the symbolic mark, writing, is incomparably the most potent means of extending experience in time-space (1981b, p. 38-39).

And in an earlier work, he states that

All social interaction involves mediation in so far as as there are always 'vehicles' that 'carry' social interchanges across spatial and temporal gaps. In societies . . . where interaction is predominantly . . . face to face. . .the mediating vehicles are those supplied by the faculties of spatial presence. Writing and other media of communication (telephone, television, merchandised modes of transportation) bind much greater distances in time and space (1979, p. 103).

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13 Of course, structure is implicated in the social construction and use of material technologies themselves.
The ability to bracket time-space Giddens has also labeled "storage capacity" (1981b, p.5). Storage capacity has been expanded considerably by successive communication technologies beginning with writing, then including such administrative techniques as "accounting and filing," and finally, electronic technologies (1987, p. 145). Influenced by Weber, and by Foucault's concepts of disciplinary power, Giddens argues that this increased storage capacity forms "the basis of . . . surveillance activities" that undergird the power of modern states and organizations (1981b, p. 5, see also 1987, p. 144-145 and passim).

As discussed above, Giddens largely relates 'presence' to 'co-presence' as that term is normally used in social research. It involves the corporeality, or sense perceptions of interactants (even the earlier noted reference to "distances." . . from. . .experiences or events" (1981b, p.38) implies corporeality). He notes, using Goffman's terminology, for example, that

although the 'full conditions of co-presence' exist only in unmediated contact between those who are physically present, mediated contacts that permit some of the intricacies of co-presence are made possible in the modern era by electronic communications, most notably the telephone (Giddens 1984, p.68, see also 1981b, p.40, 1979, p. 204 on written letters, telephone and television).

But Giddens also uses the presence-absence terminology to refer to the relationship between structures and practices. Thus, for example, he states that "structures exist paradigmatically, as an absent set of differences, temporally 'present' only in their
instantiation, in the constituting moments of social systems" (Giddens 1979, p. 64). Although Giddens does not appear to state this explicitly anywhere, the dialectic of presence-absence is another way of expressing the 'threefold connotation of différance' noted above. This becomes clear in a discussion of presence and absence in terms of moment and totality:

According to the notion of the duality of structure, rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the production and reproduction of interaction, but are thereby also reconstituted through interaction. Structure is thus the mode in which the relation between moment and totality expresses itself in social reproduction. . . . That is to say, the differences which constitute social systems reflect a dialectic of presences and absences in space and time. But these are only brought into being and reproduced via the virtual order of differences, expressed in the duality of structure. The differences that constitute structures, and are constituted structurally, relate 'part' to 'whole' in the sense in which the utterance of a grammatical sentence presupposes the absent corpus of syntactical rules that constitute the language as a totality. The importance of this relation of moment and totality for social theory cannot be exaggerated, since it involves a dialectic of presence and absence which ties the most minor or trivial forms of action to structural properties of the overall society (and logically, to the development of mankind as a whole) (Giddens 1979, p. 71).

Presence occurs as expression of time and space, and in presence virtual rules and resources are instantiated in practice. Absence occurs across time and space, and between the virtual or paradigmatic whole of structure and its syntagmatic instantiation.

Giddens further develops his conceptualization of time by recognizing what he variously refers to as "three planes of
temporality" (Giddens 1981b, p.19), or "three layers of temporality" (1981b p.28). Each of these is involved in every moment of social reproduction. There is the temporality of immediate experience, the continuous flow of day-to-day life: what Schutz... calls the *durée* of activity. Second there is the temporality of *Dasein*, the life-cycle of the organism. Third, there is what Braudel calls the *longue durée* of institutional time: the long-term sedimentation or development of social institutions. It is essential to see that these interpenetrate and that, according to the theorem of the duality of structure, every moment of social interaction, implicated in the 'passing away' of the organism, is likewise involved with the *longue durée* of institutions. The most trivial exchange of words implicates the speakers in the long-term history of the language in which these words are formed, and at the same time in the continuing reproduction of that language. . . . In the theory of structuration I am explicitly concerned to reject the idea that either form of *durée* has logical primacy over the other" (Giddens 1981b, p.19-20).

Put in slightly different terms,

... 

temporality enters into the reproduction of social systems in a threefold way: . . . in the immediate nexus of interaction, as contingently accomplished or 'brought off' by actors. . . . in the reproduction of personnel of social systems, as beings with a finite life span. . . anchored in biological reproduction. . . [and] in the reproduction of institutions, sedimented in the *longue durée* of historical time (Giddens 1979, p. 96).

Finally, with regard to time and space, two other sets of conceptualizations which Giddens introduces should be noted: time-space distanciation, and regionalization and locales. Giddens introduces the term "time-space distanciation" for describing or categorizing specific corporeal presence-absence situations (1981b, p. 91). Time space distanciation is linked to a society's degree of storage capacity:
the structuration of all social systems occurs in time-space, but also 'brackets' time-space relations; every social system in some way stretches across time space. Time-space distanciation refers to the modes in which such 'stretching' takes place or, to shift the metaphor slightly, how social systems are 'embedded' in time and space. In the smaller societies, hunters and gatherers or settled independent agricultural communities, time-space distanciation occurs primarily as a result of two connected features of societal organisation: the grounding of legitimation in tradition, and the role played by kinship in the structuration of social relations. . . . these societies involve above all presence . . . there are relatively few social transactions with others who are physically absent. In these societies, human memory . . . is the principle 'storage container' which 'brackets' time-space (Giddens 1981b, p.4-5).

Giddens concepts of 'regionalization' and 'locales' have been influenced by Goffman, as well as by various time geographers.14 As noted in the sub-section on Signification<->Communication, contexts are caught up, or drawn on as part of interaction, and in the process are themselves reconstituted as significant features. Giddens uses these terms to address ways that context (especially, but not exclusively, spatial context), is managed in such a way as to shape the interactions. The term regionalization refers "to the zoning of time-space in relation to routinized practices" (1984, p.119). Thus a house, for example, is regionalized, or zoned. The different parts of the house--bedroom versus kitchen--"are zoned differently in time as well as space" (1984, p. 119). Regionalization can also be understood in terms of what Goffman describes as front and back

14 On the influence of Goffman see e.g., Giddens 1979, pp. 207-210; on time-geographers, especially Hägerstrand, see e.g., Giddens 1984, pp. 110-119.
regions, "whereby various potentially compromising features of interaction are kept absent or hidden" (Giddens 1979, p.207).

Regionalization as Giddens defines it occurs "either within or between locales" (Giddens 1984, p.376). "Locales", according to Giddens, "refer to the use of space to provide the settings of interaction, the settings of interaction in turn being essential to specifying its contextuality" (Giddens 1984, p.118, author's emphasis). In the example above, the house can be understood as locale, distinguished from the more public regions external to it. The concept of locale is especially important because it associates ideas about power with time-space contexts:

locales refer to settings of interaction, including the physical aspects of setting--their architecture--within which systemic aspects of interaction and social relations are concentrated. The proximate aspects of settings are chronically employed by actors in the constitution of interaction. . . . settings also are everywhere involved in the reproduction of institutional activities. . . . a dwelling is a locale displaying specific architectural features. . . . socially relevant in so far as they are bound up with the distribution and the character of behavior. . . locales include . . . settings of very wide time-space extension, from cities to nation-states and beyond. Certain types of locale form 'power containers'--circumscribed areas for the generation of administrative power (1987, p.12-13).15

15 Compare this to Foucault's statement: "A whole history remains to be written of spaces--which at the same time would be the history of powers (both these terms in the plural)--from the great strategies of geo-politics to the little tactics of the habitat, institutional architecture from the classroom to the design of hospitals. . . . Anchorage in a space is an economico-political form which needs to be studied in detail" (Foucault 1980, p. 149 italics in original).
Social Systems: Social & System Integration

It was noted above that Giddens uses the term social system to refer to the tempo-spatial patterning of relations through reproduced practices. While stressing that "social systems are composed of interactions" (Giddens 1981b, p. 41-42), he also uses "the term... as equivalent to 'group' or 'collectivity'" (Giddens 1981b, p.41), as distinct from virtual structure. He suggests that "a social system is... a 'structured totality'" (Giddens 1979, p.64), but also stresses that "the term 'social system' should not be understood to designate only clusters of social relations whose boundaries are clearly set off from others. The degree of systemness is variable" (Giddens 1984, p.165). Consistent with this, Giddens addresses the concept of societies as social systems:

All societies both are social systems and at the same time are constituted by the intersection of multiple social systems. Such multiple social systems may be fully 'internal' to societies, or they may cross-cut the 'inside' and the 'outside', forming a diversity of possible modes of connection between societal totalities and intersocietal systems (Giddens 1984, p. 164).

The degree of systemness is defined in terms of the degree of interdependence, or integration. Acknowledging the influence of systems theory, he stresses interdependence as basic to social systems:

The concept of social system, understood its broadest sense, refers to reproduced interdependence of action: in other words, to 'a relationship in which changes in one or more component parts initiate change in other component parts, and these changes, in
turn, produce changes in the parts in which the original changes occurred' (Giddens 1979, p. 73 authors emphasis, quoting Etzioni).

Integration, then,

refers to the degree of interdependence of action, or 'systemness', that is involved in any mode of system reproduction. 'Integration' can be defined therefore as regularized ties, interchanges, or 'reciprocity of practices' between either actors or collectivities (Giddens 1979, p. 76).

It is important to note that in structuration theory, "integration is not synonymous with 'cohesion', and certainly not with 'consensus'" (Giddens 1979, p. 76 author's emphasis). Rather, "the integration of social systems is always crucially connected to the distribution of power within them" (1977, p.124). Thus, "'reciprocity of practices' has to be understood as involving regularized relations of autonomy and dependence between the parties concerned" (Giddens 1979, p. 76), that is, "imbalanced exchanges in terms of resources that are applied in interaction" (Giddens 1977, p. 124).

Giddens makes "a distinction between social integration and system integration . . . in order to recognise contrasts between various levels of the articulation of interaction" (Giddens 1979, p. 74, author's emphasis). Initially, he defines social integration as "integration within systems of interaction. . . . in social integration the 'parts' are purposive actors." System integration he distinguishes as "integration of or 'between' systems of interaction. . . . In system integration, the 'parts' are collectivities, or systems of social systems" (Giddens 1977, p. 124-125; see also 1979, p. 76-77). Subsequently, he modifies or clarifies these definitions: "Social integration. . . .
means systemness on the level of face to face interaction. System integration refers to connections with those who are physically absent in time or space" (Giddens 1984, p. 28), or "reciprocity between actors or collectivities across extended time-space, outside conditions of co-presence" (1984, p. 377).\footnote{In a footnote Giddens argues that "the fault" of not initially making clear that the difference between social and system integration hinges "upon a distinction between co-presence and absence in social relations" rather than one between links among individuals versus links between collectivities "was not too consequential" because "they are in any case closely overlapping" (Giddens 1984, p. 39, n.32). I would argue that though the difference was perhaps clear to Giddens all along, for anyone attempting to apply structuration theory in social analysis, the differences in the formulation are indeed significant. The clarified formulation is more inclusive, and more consistent with his above mentioned emphasis on examining "aspects and modalities of presence and absence in human social relations" (1981b, 38). Further, as I argue below, the original formulation applied to empirical research could easily lead the type of functionalist-teleological explanations which Giddens categorically rejects.}

This revised definition is very important in that it makes clear that when Giddens talks about differences in time-space distanciation, and "the differences between social interaction where others are present, and social interaction where others are absent" (1981a, p. 173), as quoted above in the section on Time & Space, he is in fact talking about social versus system integration. Social and system integration always are intertwined, and sometimes clearly overlap. The example noted above that any speech act implicates the speaker in the history of that language is a case in point. In such instances, according to Giddens, "social and system integration are the same process" (1979, p.78).
In fact, Giddens argues that system integration as analytically separable from social integration is a comparatively recent development in human society. He links its emergence to changes in societal organization, and to the related or underlying changes in technologies of storage capacity, as defined above. He identifies three basic types of societies, Tribal, Class-Divided (associated with advent of states with urban administrative centers but agrarian economies), and Class (modern nation-states, with capitalist and/or industrial economies), which succeed one other in order as dominant types of society in the world. He has devoted considerable effort to analysis of each, and differences between them (1984, p. 181-185, 1981b,1987). Running from tribal to class societies, there are several changes or shifts: increasing time-space distanciation; increasing differentiation of social and system integration associated with changes in "dominant locale organization" (for Tribal societies, villages, for Class-Divided, "symbiosis of city and countryside, for Class Society, "the 'created environment'"); and increasing power/influence of the State in system integration as administrative powers of surveillance increase.

In traditional societies, "contexts of co-presence were always the main 'carrying contexts' of interaction." Thus, Giddens suggests that for tribal societies, for example, "it makes sense to say that . . . there is something of a fusion of social and system integration" (1984, p. 143, see also 1984, p. 182). "It is only with
the advent of cities—and in modern times, with the urbanism of the 'created environment'—that a significant development of system integration becomes possible" (1984, p. xxvi). This "larger time-space stretch" according to Giddens, is possible because "cities establish a centralization of resources—especially administrative resources" (1984, p. 143). A city is thus "a 'storage container' around which agrarian states are built. The differentiation of city and countryside is the means of the separation of social and system integration" (1984, p. 183). A key factor in this time-space stretching and expansion of administrative storage capacity is invention/development "of writing, the prime mode of collation and storage of information in class divided societies" (1984, p. 200. see also 1979, p. 204, 1981b, p. 94-95, 1984, p. 182).

Giddens argues that development of writing also has ramifications for system integration because it allows a changed sense of society: "the nature of tradition becomes altered, changing the sense in which human beings live 'in' history. . . . The introduction of writing means that tradition becomes visible as tradition, a specific way, among others, of doing things. ' Tradition' which is known as such is no longer a time-honoured basis of custom but a discursive phenomenon open to interrogation" (1984, p. 201). This particular type of awareness of tradition is a condition for the emergence of the kind of "reflexive self-regulation," or conscious attempts to "make history," (that is, to
control social organization and reproduction) which is characteristic of modern societies according to Giddens, and which in turn contributes to still greater expansion of surveillance (1984, p.199-206).

Thus, in modern, class societies, "differentiation of system and social integration" has continued, as the ability to bind greater expanses of time and space has increased. "Surveillance—the coding of information relevant to the administration of subject populations, plus their direct supervision by officials and administrators of all sorts—becomes a key mechanism furthering the breaking away of system from social integration" (1984, p.184). Electronic communication and information technologies have obviously contributed to this enhanced surveillance capability, and, equally obviously, have also allowed greater time-space extension at the level of personal relations which do not necessarily involve surveillance. In modern class society, "the old city-countryside relation is replaced by a sprawling expansion of manufactures or 'created environment'" (1984, 184). "Modern capitalism is. . . . the first genuinely global type of societal organization" 91984, p. 183). Also, "for the first time. . . .absence in space no longer hinders systems co-ordination" (1984, p. 185).

Even for modern Class Societies, of course, "the systemness of social integration is fundamental to the systemness of society as a whole." Although "[s]ystem integration cannot be adequately conceptualized via the modalities of social integration. . . the latter
is always the chief prop of the former, via the reproduction of institutions in the duality of structure" (1979, p. 77, author's emphasis).

Giddens also examines system integration, or "interdependence of system parts" in terms of different "levels of systemness", (1979, p. 79) or types of circumstances that may prevail in social systems relative to the 'interdependence of parts', which are progressively more inclusive. These are, shortly expressed, regulation, self-regulation, and reflexive self-regulation (Giddens 1977, 116-117).17

The first two types he defines respectively in terms of "homeostatic causal processes" and "self regulation through feedback" (1979, p.78).

As Giddens defines it, "a homeostatic process involves a loop of causally interrelated elements" (1977, p.116) in which the forces "operate most 'blindly'. . . [it] is a more 'primitive' process" (1979, p.78). Self-regulation through feedback involves "a homeostatic process that is coordinated through a control apparatus" (Giddens 1977, 116-117):

in physical systems, the simplest type of feed-back scheme involves three elements: receptor, control apparatus and effector, through which messages pass. Feed-back mechanisms may promote stasis: but unlike homeostatic processes, they can also be directional, propelling controlled change. A fairly direct

17 In CS (1984) Giddens discusses only "homeostatic system reproduction" and reflexive self-regulation (1984, p.27-28), having reduced the "levels of 'systemness'" to two, "for purposes of simplification" (fn 30, p. 39).
parallel may be drawn between such feed-back effects and processes involved in social systems (Giddens 1979, p78-79).

The third type, reflexive self-regulation, is "the deliberate accomplishment of such coordination by actors in pursuit of rationalized ends" (Giddens 1977, 116-117).

Giddens offers as

[a] n example of the first . . . the 'vicious cycle' of circumstances whereby poverty, poor educational achievement, and unemployment are interconnected, such that any attempt to modify, say, educational attainment tends to be defeated by the causal loop that interconnects the three states of affairs (Giddens 1977, 116-117).

He expands on this topic to present examples of self regulation through feed-back and reflexive self regulation:

[i]f, however, we consider the influence of children's overall educational career upon the other factors, it might emerge that an examination taken on entry to secondary school is a crucial filter that exerts a controlling influence upon other elements in the cycle. . . . In such a circumstance, the examinations can be regarded as the equivalent of an information control apparatus in the mechanical feedback system. The feed-back effect here might govern a regularised process of directional change: such as progressive transfer of children from working-class backgrounds into white-collar occupations, in conjunction with a relative expansion of the white-collar sector. Now let us suppose that, on the basis of studies of the community, school and work, the Ministry of Education applies knowledge of the poverty cycle to intervene in that cycle: in this case the reflexive monitoring of action rejoins the organization of social systems, and becomes a guiding influence in it (1979, p. 79).

The distinction between these types or levels of system integration is important in Giddens' scheme in at least two ways. First, with regard to structuration as ontology of social life, Giddens
wants to make clear that "the unintended consequences of action stretch beyond the recursive effects of the duality of structure" (1979, p. 78). Second, the distinction of reflexive self-regulation is itself important for Giddens in several ways. He views "the expansion of attempts at reflexive self-regulation at the level of system integration [as]... one of the principle features of the contemporary world" (1979, p. 79). As such, it is important both in Giddens' theorization, and in his applied studies of the nature of the modern nation state and "the shattering impact of modernity" generally (Giddens 1989, p.301).

Despite the importance of underlining unintended effects, though, Giddens terminology for describing the first two 'levels'—homeostatic, feedback, control mechanism, etc.—is troubling. While influenced by systems theory, Giddens' ideas on social systems also partake of his critiques of functionalism, and what he sees as functionalist aspects of various approaches to incorporating systems theory in the social sciences. As noted above, Giddens insists that he does not accept explanations of social systems as "self-regulating" in a teleological sense, yet these terms retain such a sense. Indeed, his statement above that "a fairly direct parallel may be drawn between such [mechanical] feed-back effects and processes involved in social systems" (Giddens 1979, p. 78-79) seems to be in direct contrast to a statement just a few pages earlier that "reflexive monitoring of action among human actors cannot be adequately grasped in terms of principles of teleology applicable to mechanical systems" (Giddens
1979, p. 75). A related critique applies to his original formulation or definition of system integration, which suggests, at least, some type of collective will or reflexivity of a different order than that of individual actors.

One might argue that the terminology is justified by the bracketing of actor's reflexivity inherent in institutional analysis. Nevertheless, I question whether the explanatory power of formulation in terms of homeostasis and feedback loops is in any way superior to explaining such phenomena in terms of open systems in which unintended consequences are systematically reproduced as conditions for subsequent action. Indeed, regarding the example given above of the 'vicious cycle' of poverty, poor school performance and poor employment opportunities, Giddens himself elsewhere praises a particular ethnographic study of a working class school for approaching the cycle from the latter, rather than the former perspective.18

Finally, with regard to structure and social systems, it should be noted that Giddens repeatedly stresses that the emphasis on reproduction of structural characteristics and social systems in structuration theory does not preclude transformation. On the contrary,

change is regarded as inherent in every circumstance of the reproduction of a system of interaction, because every act of

18 Giddens' treatment of the study is addressed in more detail in the section on Institutional Analysis and Analysis of Strategic Conduct, below.
reproduction is *ipso facto* an act of production, in which society is created afresh in a novel set of circumstances" (Giddens 1977, 123; see also 1979, 114; 1993, 8).

**Institutions & Structural Principles**

'Institutions', 'structural principles', 'structures', and structural contradiction' are all terms that Giddens uses in very particular ways. They refer to different aspects of the duality of structure in societies. The first is concerned with characteristics of syntagmatic, tempo-spatially patterned practices, and the latter three with the virtual or paradigmatic dimension.

**Institutions**

Giddens quotes Radcliffe-Brown in describing "institutions... as 'standardised modes of behaviour' which play a basic part in the time-space constitution of social systems. The standardisation of behaviour in time-space... involves its chronic *reconstitution* in contingent contexts of day-to-day social activity" (1979, p. 96). He specifies further that he means by the term those modes of behavior, or "structured social practices that have a broad spatial and temporal extension: that are structured in what the historian Braudel calls the *longue durée* of time, and which are followed or acknowledged by the majority of members of society" (1981a, p.164). One further quote (from yet another of Giddens' works) suggests that not all

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19 In *Constitution of Society* (1984), Giddens also explicitly defines "structural properties." However, he uses the term inconsistently, and I do not see that it contributes significantly to his conceptualizations. Therefore I will not explain or use the term.
structured social practices qualify as institutions, but only "those. . . which have the greatest time-space extension within" societal totalities (Giddens 1984, p.17).

For the purpose of analysis Giddens recognizes four types of institutions, or classes of institutional order: symbolic orders/modes of discourse, political institutions, economic institutions and legal institutions (1984, p. 31).\textsuperscript{20} The classificatory scheme as Giddens lays it out associates each type of institution primarily with one of the three dimensions of the duality of structure examined earlier, while explicitly acknowledging that each type involves the interrelation of all three dimensions (Figure 2). Symbolic orders/modes of discourse, obviously, are primarily associated with signification. Political institutions and economic institutions are respectively associated with authoritative and allocative structures of domination. Legal institutions (including those informal modes of sanctioning which have great time-space expansion) are associated with structures of legitimation.

Giddens argues that "there are symbolic, political, economic and legal/repressive institutional elements in all societies" (1981b, p.47), not simply in those with explicit formal differentiation of the orders. For example, he notes that "the work of anthropologists demonstrates effectively enough that there are 'political' phenomena--to do with the ordering of authority relations--in all societies" (1984, p. 34).

\textsuperscript{20} In \textit{Central Problems in Social Theory} (1979) and \textit{Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism} (1981b) Giddens labels the final institutional category "law/modes of sanctioning" (1979, p. 107, 1981b, p. 47).
But he warns against the "tendency . . to 'read back' into traditional cultures concepts that have meaning only in the context" of modern societies. This warning presumably applies to conceptualizing all types of institutions, but Giddens makes the point especially with regard to conceptualizing the economic (1984, p. 34). Thus,

it is not scarcity of resources as such, far less struggles or sectional interests centered upon distribution, that is the main feature of the economic. Rather, the sphere of the 'economic' is given by the inherently constitutive role of allocative resources in the structuration of societal totalities (1984, p.34).

With regard to Giddens' graphic presentation of the typology of institutions (Figure 2), it should be noted that "the lines connecting signification-domination-legitimation are not, of course, causal connections, but merely indicate interdependence. The first letter in each line indicates the direction of analytical focus" (1979, p. 107). This highlights the importance of focusing on all dimensions of the duality of structure in analyzing institutions of whatever type. Nevertheless, even in terms of analytic focus, as opposed to causality, the directionality is of questionable usefulness. It is possible that one might want to emphasize the legitimating aspects of political institutions over signification, or give primary emphasis to the relations between legitimation and signification when looking at modes of sanction, as Goffman does implicitly in much of his work.

By way of example in further discussing institutions I will focus in a bit more detail on Giddens' conceptualization of symbolic orders/modes of discourse. I select this particular institutional type in part because I feel that it is less self evident what Giddens means
by symbolic orders/modes of discourse than for the other types, but also because I want to deal in some detail with discourse in policy processes in subsequent chapters.

Giddens does not explicitly define symbolic orders and modes of discourse, beyond the fairly abstract note that they "constitute the 'cultural' aspects of social systems" (1984, p. 39, fn. 43). However, it is possible to infer some sense of how he views them from his discussions. It seems clear (if unsurprising) that he views symbolic orders and modes of discourse as something people draw on or produce, with varying degrees of discursive awareness, in organizing their perceptions of reality and their own behavior. He includes as "modes of discourse...the formalized discourses of the intellectual disciplines" (1979, p. 191), and views "science" as one among "other types of discourse" (1979, p. 108).

Though Giddens is not entirely consistent, he tends to use "modes of discourse" to refer to specialized ways of talking, writing or thinking. "Symbols" and "symbol systems" generally refer to structure. Given that he cites Geertz as a major influence (Giddens 1979, p. 192), it is probably safe to apply Geertz's definition of symbol systems as "patterns of interworking meanings" (Geertz 1964, p. 56).

While "the sign may be accepted as the basic element of signification" (1979, p. 97), Giddens follows Ricoeur in distinguishing as a symbol 'any structure of signification in which a direct, primary literal meaning designates, in addition, another meaning which is indirect, secondary and figurative and which can be
apprehended only through the first'. Symbols draw upon the 'surplus of meaning' inherent in signification as a whole; it seems reasonable to claim that such surplus of meaning can be grasped as the conjunction of metaphor and metonymy within symbolic orders (1979, p. 107).

Thus, if we accept... that symbolism relates, as Ricoeur says, 'the multiplicity of meaning to the equivocalness of being' we are able to see that the 'breakthrough of language towards something other than itself', marked by symbolism, expresses the potency of symbols in stimulating new meanings. The metaphorical and metonymical associations of symbols are as important in science as in other types of discourse: metaphor, indeed, may be at the very root of innovation in scientific theories (1979, p. 108).

Giddens also states that "metaphor is perhaps at the heart of linguistic innovations" (1993, p. 155) generally.

However, Giddens makes clear in his analysis of ideology (considered in more detail in Chapter 4) that he also views symbolic orders as involving more deeply "embedded" or "buried" features, linked to "unconscious sources of conduct" (1979, p. 191-2). He says, for example, that "ideological elements are likely to be deeply sedimented in both a psychological and an historical sense" (1979, p. 192). Unfortunately, he gives us no basis to grasp how these two aspects of symbols—as involved in innovations in language and yet also as historically deeply sedimented, unconscious influences on behavior—are related to one another. I shall return to this problem in a subsequent chapter.

We can get a clearer idea of what Giddens means by symbol system from his treatment of nationalism. He defines nationalism as
"the affiliation of individuals to a set of symbols and beliefs emphasizing communality among the members of a political order" (1987, p. 116). He informs us that nationalism has a "symbolic content" which he specifically elucidates in terms of a "symbol system" (1987, p. 216). At the most general level, content includes "a conception of a homeland" tied to "a myth of origin, conferring cultural autonomy upon the community which is held to be the bearer of these ideals" (1987, p. 216). Identification (and symbolic and psychological affiliation) "with an 'in-group' coupled with a differentiation from, or rejection of, 'out-groups"' is also likely to figure in this symbol system, (1981b, p. 195). Likewise, in some cases "regressive identification with a leader-figure, and the symbols represented by that figure or comprised in his or her doctrines" (1981b, p.195) is not uncommon. Though all the symbols are related to one another, there may be inconsistencies, tension or contradictions between some of them. For instance, a nationalistic discourse may incorporate both democratic and xenophobic symbolic elements.

Structural Principles, Structures & Contradiction

Structural principles, as stated most simply by Giddens, are "basic 'principles of organization'" of a society (1981b, p.26). He has also characterized them as "an institutionalized set of interconnections which govern system reproduction" (1979, p. 141). As such, they can be understood as involved in, or underlying, both
"a multiplicity of transformation/mediation relations" (1981b, p. 27) and "the overall institutional alignment of a society or type of society" (1984, p. 376). Giddens states that "identification of structural principles, and their conjunctures in intersocietal systems, represents the most comprehensive level of institutional analysis," (1984, p. 185).

Recall from the discussion on rules, above, that Giddens warns that it is a mistake to conceive of rules as being applied in the singular in social life. Rather, he suggests, "practices are sustained in conjunction with more or less loosely organized sets" of rules (Giddens 1984, p. 18). In Constitution of Society (although he is not always consistent in earlier works) he specifies a distinction between "'structure' as a generic term [and] 'structures' in the plural" (1984, p. 23, 38-9). 'Structures' refers to such specific "rule-resource sets, involved in the institutional articulation of social systems" (1984, p.185).

Structural principles underlie the organization of these sets, and the relationship among the rules in the set can be understood, according to Giddens, as involving 'transformation/mediation relations:'

The notions of transformation and mediation do not apply only to the structuring of interaction in real time-space, they are also essentially involved in analysing structures themselves. When mediation and transformation are taken together, they can be said to concern the convertibility of rules and resources (1979, p.104).
Some examples will help clarify what Giddens means by structural principles and structures, and how the two are related to each other. It was noted in the section on Social Systems that Giddens recognizes three basic types of society: tribal societies, class-divided societies and class societies. For each of these he identifies the axis of what he sees as its most basic structural principles:

In tribal societies or small oral cultures, the dominant structural principle operates along an axis relating tradition and kinship, embedding themselves in time and space. . . . The dominant structural principle of class-divided society. . . is to be found along an axis relating urban areas to their rural hinterlands. . . . The distinctive structural principle of the class societies of modern capitalism is to be found in the disembedding, yet interconnecting, of state and economic institutions (1984, p. 182-183).

As example of structural organization enabled by the dominant structural principle of class societies, Giddens discusses private property, money, capital and labor, drawing on analyses by Marx. He notes that "although private property is not in any way distinctive to modern capitalism, certain definite modes of the convertibility of private property are" (1979, p. 105). He goes on to argue that "the central structural components of the capitalist mode of production involve the convertibility relations" presented as follows:

private property : money : capital : labour contract : profit
(1979, p. 104-105)

Reading from left to right, the first relationship expresses convertibility between private property and money specific to "the universalizing of the commodity form" (1984, p. 186), or generalized
circulation of commodities, in which "money, Marx says, is 'the metamorphosed shape of all other commodities, the result of their general alienation" (1984, p. 186). This relationship is associated with changes in the form of "private property in the means of production" from the feudal form which was based mainly in land, to the capitalist form in which "a diversity of goods become freely alienable" (1984, p. 186). It also involves development of a money economy.

The second relationship expresses convertibility of money and capital. As originally and famously analyzed by Marx, a change in the nature of the circulation of commodities results in capital. In its simple form, commodity circulation is presented as C-M-C (commodity-money-commodity). In this form, a commodity is sold for money, which is converted into a different commodity, which the seller of the original commodity uses or consumes. In this case, the end result is a use value (the use of the commodity) qualitatively different from the original use value, and money simply facilitates the exchange. But in the relationship M-C-M, a commodity is bought in order to be sold. Use value is no longer a concern. The money at the end of the transactions has presumably changed in quantity, but it is the same quality. In Giddens' words, "capital trades not in use values, but in exchange values" (1984, p. 187).

The next link in the set expresses the convertibility of money/capital and labor power through the labor contract. This represents the difference between mercantile and industrial capital.
This structural relationship also "presumes a major process of social change. . . . a massive expropriation of workers from control of their means of production, such that they have to offer their labour power for sale on the market in order to attain a livelihood" (1984, p.187-8). The basis of the standard labor contract is payment for amount of time worked. Because labor power is unique among commodities in producing value, this arrangement allows the extraction of surplus value, or profit, by allowing the capitalist to contract the worker to work for more than just the "necessary labour time"--the amount of labor time required to produce enough value to pay the worker a living wage, or "what is demanded to insure the survival of those who supply labour" (1984, p. 188). The result is "surplus labour, the source of profit" (1984, p. 188). Thus, the last link expresses convertibility of labor and profit.21

These examples give a sense of what Giddens means by structural principles and structures. He also identifies contradiction as fundamental to social organization. He distinguishes two types relevant to human society: existential contradiction and structural contradiction. The first he describes as "an elemental aspect of human existence. . . . in the sense that life is predicated upon nature,

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21 A point should be made with regard to my treatment of Giddens' treatment of institutions, structural principles and structures. I have generally addressed the distinctions as substantive aspects of structuration theory. And they are. However, in his discussion of these concepts in The Constitution of Society, (1984) Giddens is constantly moving back and forth between the nature of institutions and structure, and their analysis. To the degree possible, I have separated out the methodological aspects of his discussion, and reserved them, as I have previously noted, for treatment in the next chapter.

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yet is not of nature and is set off against it" (1984, p. 193). Giddens
devotes comparatively little space to explaining existential
contradiction, but notes that it underlies, or "becomes translated into
structural contradiction, which is really its only medium" (1979, p.
161).

In traditional societies, Giddens argues, existential contradiction
predominates, but for class divided and class societies, structural
contradiction predominates. As Giddens conceptualizes it,
contradiction is fundamental to the structural principles of these two
types of society. Structural principles "operate in contradiction" in
that they "operate in terms of one another, yet also contravene one
another" (1984, p. 193). This is the definition of structural
contradiction.

For class divided societies, Giddens recognizes the state "to be a
contradictory formation" in that it expresses "a symbiotic/
antagonistic relation of city to countryside." The form of this is that
the cities, "as power containers," represent a break with ahistorical
tradition in their dynamic potential, yet state power, not yet based
exclusively on surveillance, relies, especially outside the city, on
tradition, as for example "symbolized in persistently religious form"
(1984, p. 196). He argues that "the primary contradiction of the
capitalist (nation-) state is to be found in the mode in which a

22 He states parenthetically that "the adjective 'contradictory'" may be
"preferable to the noun form, 'contradiction', since the latter tends to imply
static relations . . . whereas social contradictions are always in a process of
movement" (1979, p. 142).
'private' sphere of 'civil society' is created by, but is separate from and in tension with, the 'public sphere' of the state" (1984, p. 197). In *Constitution of Society*, he argues that this contradiction is "at least roughly parallel to the classical formulation of the capitalist contradiction between 'private appropriation' and 'socialized production'" (1984, p. 197), though he has earlier argued, in *Central Problems in Social Theory*, that "the primary contradiction" is "between private appropriation and socialized production" (1979, p. 194), and views the separation of political and economic as an ideological obscuration of the the contradiction. In any case, for class-divided and class societies "the state is regarded as the focus (although not as such the origin) of . . . structural contradiction" (1984, p. 194).

In class divided and class societies, as the names imply, contradiction is connected with class domination. "The structural characteristics of [these types of society] are basically governed by the character of the connections between authorisation and allocation: especially . . . between authority and property" (1979, p. 162-163, author's emphasis). Thus, "contradiction is mediated through sectional group formation" (1979, p. 162, author's emphasis). In other words, "contradictions tend to involve divisions of interest between different groupings or categories of people" (1984, p. 198).

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23 This may represent a shift in what Giddens considers the primary contradiction of class societies. He has also changed his thoughts about the nature of structural contradiction itself since his earliest works (see 1979, p. 276, fn. 23).
Despite this, Giddens repeatedly stresses that in structuration theory, contradiction and conflict, though often related, do not express an identity. First, conflict occurs at the syntagmatic level, as social practice between actors. Giddens, contrary to some in the Marxist tradition, reserves the term contradiction for properties of the structural, or paradigmatic realm. While conflict often coincides with it, "contradiction does not inevitably breed conflict" because in different circumstances actors may be unaware, unable or unmotivated to act on their interests" (1984, p. 198-199). In the case of agents being unaware, ideological aspects of discourse and the symbolic are implicated.

Finally, Giddens distinguishes between primary structural contradictions "which enter into the constitution of societal totalities" and secondary contradictions, "which . . . are brought into being by primary contradictions" (1984, p. 193). In capitalist states there are two aspects to the primary contradiction. Just as the private sphere is dependent on but in tension with the state, so too state political power is dependent "indirectly--through . . . taxation and . . . the capital market" on private accumulation, which the state is prohibited from directly organizing (1984, p. 314-315). Thus, "the very conditions that make possible the state's existence call into play, and depend upon, mechanisms that run counter to state power" (1984, p. 315). These two aspects find expression in a secondary
contradiction between the "hegemony of nation-state" and the "internationalisation of capital" (1979, p. 143, see also 1984, p. 197-198).

Another way of explaining the primary contradiction of capitalist society, Giddens argues, is that "while the state depends upon the commodity form, it also depends simultaneously upon negating the commodity form" (1984, p. 315). This primary contradiction, according to Giddens, plays out "in the push and pull between commodification, de-commodification and re-commodification" by political actors of such services as health care and mass transit (1984, p. 315-316), or in "urban renewal/decay cycles" (1979, p. 143). Such secondary contradictions are often implicated in, or expressed in terms of, "perverse consequences" (1984, p. 317) of policy implementation.

Giddens give several examples of such perverse policy consequences. I will quote from the two clearest examples:

In the United States, supplementary insurance benefits were introduced to improve the lot of old people on low incomes. But these had the effect of raising the level of their income such that they received a few dollars over the requirements of eligibility for state medical aid. Consequently, medical coverage was denied to them, so that they were worse off than before (1984, p. 316).

and

A large-scale effort was made in the late 1960s to try to prevent a recurrence of riots in the Ghettos of Detroit by providing increased welfare benefits and employment opportunities. However, large numbers of poor people were attracted the the city from outside to take advantage of the programmes.
many...were unable to find jobs, and thus swelled the ranks of the unemployed. . . . others took jobs which might otherwise have have fallen to the city's own chronically unemployed. the conditions diagnosed as conducive to the outbreak of rioting were thus augmented rather than reduced (1984, p. 317).

Obviously, such "perverse consequences" can be related to the literature of the argumentative turn in policy analysis, as discussed in Chapter 1.

Several comments can be made here about Giddens various conceptualizations treated above. First, Giddens' concentration on identifying the structural principles and structures of modern class societies should not be taken to mean that he necessarily views class society as the only form society can take in modernity. Giddens leaves open the possibility even in Central Problems in Social Theory for classification of other of types, including state socialist society (1979, p. 144, see also 1984, p. 222, fn 17; p. 184).

However, his identification of the "disembedding, yet interconnecting, of state and economic institutions" as nexus of "the distinctive structural principle" for modern class societies (Giddens 1984, pp. 182-3, emphasis added) is problematic. First, he is inconsistent in this claim, as noted above. Further, he has devoted considerable effort to examining the shaping of modernity in terms of "the intersection of capitalism, industrialism and the nation-state system," and "four 'institutional clusterings'. . .heightened surveillance, capitalistic enterprise, industrial production and the centralized control of the means of violence. None is wholly reducible to the others" (1987, p.4-5, and passim). These "four
institutional clusterings" can be taken to suggest that there may be other structural principles at work, and one that springs to mind is that which underlies disciplinary structures as analyzed by Foucault (1979, 1980).

Although Foucault's analysis clearly influenced Giddens' conceptualization of state surveillance, it is important to note that Foucault demonstrates that the arrays of disciplinary power crosses the divide between the disembedded public and private, and in some degree underlies economic or allocative, as well as political or administrative processes in capitalist societies. It also embodies its own set of contradictions, distinct from those between civil society and the public sphere (Giddens 1984, p. 197), including the way in which disciplinary arrays simultaneously individualize and homogenize through techniques of formal classification of norms and deviance. The structures or rule sets which might be identified in association with this structural principle would intersect with those of the fundamental principle Giddens identifies--especially, for example, regarding division of labor (Giddens 1984, p. 191)-- but would not be reducible to that principle. This recognition in no way diminishes the importance of the public-private nexus, nor is it necessarily inconsistent with Giddens overall conceptualization, but can serve to emphasize that even at the level of analysis of structural principles we should beware of seeking a single totalizing dynamic.
Conclusion

This chapter is devoted to exegesis of Anthony Giddens' structuration theory. By way of summary, I begin by briefly considering the background for Giddens development of the theory, and then, in separate sections, proceed to explain and critique some of Giddens' key conceptualizations. Important aspects of structuration theory which I explore include Giddens' conceptualizations of agents and agency, structure, time and space, the integration of social systems, institutions, structural principles and structural contradictions.

Giddens argues that he intends the theory as an 'ontology of social life,' but I demonstrate throughout the chapter that, at least at an abstract level, he also has much to say about epistemology and methodology in the social sciences. He developed structuration theory as an attempt to overcome the dualism of agency and structure which has predominated in the social sciences. He argues that agency and structure must be conceptualized as a duality--that each is possible only though its articulation with the other. He also argues that human society is recursive, and that its reproduction is brought about precisely through the articulation of agency and structure. Thus, for Giddens, the appropriate focus of social science is on social practices ordered across space and time.

Giddens views agents as reflexive, knowledgeable, and motivated, and classifies their knowledgeability and motivation in terms of discursive consciousness, practical consciousness and the
unconscious. Agents are such, by definition, in their ability to accomplish outcomes, but they are able to accomplish outcomes only by drawing on structure. Structure he regards as rules and resources, drawn on by agents to produce interaction. In addition to interacting, agents reproduce the rules and resources by drawing on them. Thus, rules and resources are conceptualized as the (usually) unacknowledged conditions and outcomes of action. An important conclusion to be drawn from Giddens treatment of agency and structure is that agents are knowledgeable, but that their knowledgeability is bounded "on the one hand by the unconscious and on the other by unacknowledged conditions/unintended consequences of action" (Giddens 1984, p. 282).

Giddens identifies three dimensions along which the articulation of agency and structure can be examined, domination<->power, legitimation<->sanction and signification<->communication. He further distinguishes the domination<->power dimension in terms of two types of process--authoritative and allocative. He stresses that the distinctions between the dimensions is an analytical rather than substantive one, as all rules are transformational, constitutive and regulative.

With regard to time and space, Giddens argues that they "do not exist 'in themselves', but only as properties of extants" (Giddens 1990, p. 299). He conceptualizes interaction in terms of a 'threefold

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24 I have, however, criticized his use of the term 'resources,' as I shall review below.
connotation of difference' or presencing and absencing: difference across time, across space and within the virtual system of rules. He presents several analytical concepts for describing time and space situations: time-space distanciation, regionalization and locales.

He distinguishes virtual structures from the actual patterning of interaction in time and space, which he conceptualizes in terms of social systems. Social systems are chronically reproduced sets of relationships or patterns of interaction. He distinguishes two types of integration in social systems. Social integration refers to interaction at the level of co-presence. System integration is that which occurs between those spatially and/or temporally absent. He argues that when system integration occurs only through structure, as in the case of spoken language, tradition, etc., social and system integration are the same process. But beginning with the invention of writing, and corresponding to the emergence of what he characterizes as class divided societies, as opposed to traditional societies, social and system integration become increasingly separated. This separation is furthered by subsequent invention of other communication and information technologies, and changing organization of modern class societies. Giddens conceptualizes such technologies in terms of 'storage capacity,' and notes their key role in facilitating administrative power in the form of surveillance--which he views as a central feature of modern class societies.

Giddens argues that the patterning of society can be analyzed in terms of institutions, structural principles, structural contradictions
and structures. Institutions he defines as standardized modes of behavior with broad spatial and temporal extension. He identifies four types of institutions, symbolic orders/modes of discourse, legal institutions and political and economic institutions.

Structural principles are the most abstract principles of organization of a society. They underlie structures conceived of as related sets of rules, which organize or enable transformations or conversions. An example of a structural principle of modern society is the separation of public and private. A set of transformation or convertibility relations which is based in this is the convertibility of money, capital, labor and profit. Giddens also identifies structural contradictions as important. Structural contradictions run along the same axes as structural principles—thus for modern society he notes the contradictions inherent in having "a civil society" created by, but . . . separate from and in tension with . . . the state" (1984, p. 197). He further distinguishes between primary contradictions, and secondary contradictions which play out in specific, concrete relations. Giddens warns that though conflict and contradiction are related, the relationship is a complex one, and not a matter of one-to-one correspondence.

I critique Giddens on several counts. His use of the term "resources" to designate both virtual structures and the 'material levers' of structuration for the domination<->power dimension is confusing and unnecessary. Rules is the approrite term. I further question the consistency and usefulness of his conceptualizing
various aspects of social system integration in terms of homeostatic causal processes and self-regulating feedback loops. I reject attempts implicit in his examples to find a single primary structural principle or contradiction for any type of or specific society. Even at the most abstract level of structural analysis, it is more likely that we will find a broader array of organizing principles and contradictions which are related to one another, but, to paraphrase Giddens, not reducible to one another. Finally, too, I note that Giddens suggests that symbolic orders and modes of discourse turn on the metaphorical. He sees metaphor as functioning in creation of new meaning systems, but also as functioning in deeply embedded ways of thinking and practice. He does not adequately explain this relationship, which I return to in Chapter 5.

Despite these criticisms, it is obvious that I am, by and large, convinced by Giddens' attempt to develop an ontology of social life in which agency and structure express a duality rather than a dualism. And I feel that several emphases emerge from my examination of structuration theory that are especially significant for the development of an approach to policy discourse. At the most general level these include recognition of the bounded knowledgeability of agents; the importance of looking at the routine--which emerges as key in both the constitution of agents as subjects and in the reproduction of structure and social systems. More specifically, his conceptualization of the state as
locus of contradictions, and his treatment of secondary contradictions as implicated in perverse policy outcomes are both relevant to the current project.
Figure 3

(Source: Giddens 1984, p.29)
S - D - L  Symbolic orders/modes of discourse
D(auth) - S - L  Political institutions
D(alloc) - S - L  Economic institutions
L - D - S  Law/modes of sanction

where S = signification, D = domination, L = legitimation

(Source: Giddens 1981b, p. 47)

Figure 4
CHAPTER 4
FROM THEORY TO RESEARCH: GIDDENS ON ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 1 of this dissertation is a critical review of literature of the argumentative turn in policy analysis. In it I pose two related questions: can our understanding of the communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?

Chapter 3 consists of exegesis of Giddens' structuration theory as ontology of social life. In this chapter, consistent with my discussion in Chapter 2, I begin to move from the abstract and general level of structuration theory to more concrete and specific issues of research. However, I still proceed by way of exegesis, this time of Giddens' advice on approaches to research.

Can Structuration Theory be Applied?

As noted at the beginning of the previous chapter, Giddens views structuration theory primarily as an ontology of social life. However, his ontological observations are intertwined with commentary on the...

But his recommendations are initially confusing. On the one hand, he repeatedly stresses that structuration theory is too broad to be incorporated "en bloc" or "as a whole" in any given research project. (Giddens 1989, p. 294 and 1990b, pp. 310-11, respectively). Rather, he advocates its use "in a sparing and critical fashion" (1991b, p. 213), "its concepts . . . regarded as sensitizing devices, to be used in a selective way in thinking about research questions or interpreting findings" (1991b, p. 213). On the other hand, in some of these discussions he provides lists of issues, which he variously identifies as "guidelines" (1984, p. 284), "principle empirical concerns" (1989, p. 297), "principles or precepts" (1990b, p. 311), or "aspects of structuration theory" (1984, p.281, 1990b p. 313) which he feels are generally important for empirical research. In a 1989 chapter Giddens asks the hypothetical question "what would a structurationist programme of research for modern social science look like?" (1989, p. 300), and proceeds to answer it by listing five characteristics such a program would follow. Yet in a 1991 chapter, he states outright that structuration theory "is not a research programme. . . . its concepts. . . . do not furnish a distinctive research
programme in the manner, for example, of Garfinkle's ethnomethodology" (1991, p. 213).

It is possible to understand Giddens' inconsistencies as being largely a matter of vocabulary, however. I interpret his protestations that structuration does not constitute a research program as closely related to his assertions that he has "an eclectic approach to method" (1989, p. 296), and that "in indicating some of the implications of structuration theory for social analysis" he does "not mean to suggest that there is only one format of research that everyone henceforth should adopt" (1984, p. 327). Here he seems to be talking about some thing very similar to Sayer's "'methods' in the narrow sense" (1992, p. 2), as discussed in Chapter 2. His various lists of guidelines, principles or precepts, on the other hand, are fairly general and abstract. Though they are "procedural" (Giddens 1990b, p. 312), it is at a level logically prior to use of method in this narrow sense. They address ways of thinking about one's research topic.

**Five Principles of Social Analysis: What To look At, How To Look**

One might hope that Giddens' various lists would be immediately useful in moving toward specific research projects, even though they remain at a fairly general level. But once again, Giddens cannot be accused of presentational clarity, especially if one compares the recommendations across the various works. He may, for example, present a set of three structuration derived guidelines for orientation of social research in one discussion, and in another list three precepts...
as central to social analysis, yet the two sets seem, at best, only peripherally related to one another. But a careful reading of the various presentations—supplemented with examination of comments on research which Giddens makes in the midst of his more ontological reflections—allows abstraction of a recurrent set of central research issues or procedural caveats, and synthesis of the links between them.

His more or less direct advice on research can be understood as addressing, at a general level, what to look at, and how to look at it (or what kinds of relationships to look for). Stated simply, what we should look at, according to Giddens, is social practices, or the reproduction of practices across time and space. Stated equally simply, we should look at practices in terms of the contexts of practice, the knowledgeability of agents, power or the dialectic of control, and the nature of constraint.

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1 For example, in *The Constitution of Society* (1984) Giddens first lists 10 points which "taken together represent the aspects of structuration theory which impinge most generally upon problems of empirical research in the social sciences" (1984, p. 281). He then proceeds to argue that the 10 points suggest three "guidelines for the overall orientation of research" (1984, p. 284). The first guideline—or set of guidelines, really—he develops from the claim that "all social research has a necessarily cultural, ethnographic or 'anthropological' aspect to it" (1984, p. 284). The second set of guidelines he derives (presentationally, at least) from the claim that "it is important in social research to be sensitive to the complex skills which actors have in co-ordinating the contexts of their day-to-day behaviour" (1984, p. 285). The third set begins from the claim "the social analyst must also be sensitive to the time-space constitution of social life" (1984, p. 286). In the 1990 chapter, he specifically refers again to the "principles or precepts relevant to the overall orientation of social research" (1990, p. 311) listed in *The Constitution of Society*. Presumably (though he does not make this clear) he is referring to the 10 points. He argues again that that "these can essentially be reduced to three," but this time he proceeds to call them "contextual sensitivity, the complexity of human intentionality and the subtlety of social constraint" (1990, p. 311).
Reproduction of Practices

Giddens argues that from the perspective of structuration theory, "the prime underlying orientation, both of planning of the investigation and the interpretation of its results, would be towards examining the complexities of action/structure relationships. This is a mixed process of observation and decoding "(Giddens 1989, p. 297-298, author's emphasis). He repeatedly states that attempting to detail rules and resources is an inappropriate approach to these complexities. Rather, the focus should be on the reproduction of practices across time and space (Giddens 1989, p. 257, 1989, p. 298, 1990b, p. 301, 1990b, p. 313). He also states in at least one work that the appropriate focus is the "ordering of institutions across time and space" (1989, p. 300), but since in structuration terms, institutions are defined as standardized modes of practice, this is really much the same thing.

This focus on practices is appropriate to the study of both situated actors, and social systems stretching across time space, because the two, in the view of structuration theory, are implicated in one another. That is, the day-to-day, routine activities of situated actors express aspects of the social totality, yet are also implicated in the reproduction and change of the totality across wide expanses of time-space (Giddens 1984, p. 282, 1989, p. 300, 1990b, p. 301-302).

Thus:

analyzing a social system. . . . involves analyzing forms of interaction, and their overlap with social relations, which are expressed in a given cluster of practices. . . . Structuration theory lays considerable emphasis upon the intersection of day-to-day
activities, even of the most routine and trivial kind, with larger institutional forms, including those spanning wide areas of time-space (Giddens 1990b, p. 313, see also 1989, p. 300).

Contextuality

"Contextual sensitivity" Giddens informs us, is of "overriding significance. . . in the description, and explanation of social activities or forms of social order" (Giddens 1990b, p. 311, also 1984, p. 282). As was noted in Chapter 3, social practices are always situated, or contextual. Actors draw on spatial, temporal and social context in practice, or as Giddens puts, in controlling interaction (1984, p. 282). Because social context can be understood in terms of different contexts of co-presence (Giddens 1990b, p. 301-302), contextual sensitivity involves more than just awareness of actors' immediate locale:

'Contextuality' here refers to 1) the intermingling of presence and absence in human conduct, and 2) the intersections of knowledgeability and the causal conditions of action. A sensitivity to the intertwining of presence and absence involves above all an awareness of the modes in which social activities organize, and are organized in, time and space. This does not mean just that social events happen 'somewhere', in a particular locale or set of locales. Rather, it concerns the intrusion of 'distance', in time as well as space, into the situated actions of individuals (Giddens 1990b, p. 311).

Thus, contextual sensitivity is important in understanding not just the interactions of situated agents, but also the coordination of social systems:

the social analyst must. . . be sensitive to the time-space constitution of social life. . . . Analysing the time-space co-ordination of social activities means studying the contextual
features of locales through which actors move in their daily
dpaths and the regionalization of locales stretching away across
time-space. As I have accentuated frequently, such analysis is
inherent in the explanation of time-space distanciation and
hence in the examination of the heterogeneous and complex
nature assumed by larger societal totalities and by intersocietal

Knowledgeability

The implications of the knowledgeability of actors whose
practices are studied are multiple and complex for the researcher.
Giddens stresses that researchers need "to be sensitive to the
complex skills which actors have in co-ordinating the contexts of
their day-to-day behaviour" (1984, p. 285). He sometimes explains
such sensitivity in terms of all research having "an ethnographic . . .
aspect" or "moment" (1984, p. 284, 1989, p. 294, 1990b, p. 314). In
other words, it is important for the researcher to have a sense of
actors' reasons for what they do in coordinating their
interactions/practices, at the levels of both practical and discursive
consciousness. Awareness of actors' reasons, in Giddens view, must
form part of the study of regularities in social systems, even if the
study is of long-term, historical scope, and the regularities are
attributable to unintended consequences of action:

social life may very often be predictable in its course. . . . But
such predictability is in many of its aspects 'made to happen' by
social actors; it does not happen in spite of the reasons they have
for their conduct. If the study of unintended consequences and
unacknowledged conditions of action is a major part of social
research, we should none the less stress that such consequences
and conditions are always to be interpreted within the flow of
intentional conduct. We have to include here the relation
between reflexively monitored and unintended aspects of the reproduction of social systems, and the 'longitudinal' aspect of unintended consequences of contingent acts in historically significant circumstances (1984 p. 285-6)

The concept of unintended consequences—as well as unacknowledged conditions—of action also draws attention to the bounds of knowability. One aspect of the bounds of knowledge which is important to researchers is discussed below in terms of constraint. But another aspect has to do with what Giddens calls the double hermeneutic of social research.

What he means by a double hermeneutic is that, on the one hand, social research has the aforementioned ethnographic moment. It is hermeneutic in the sense that the social researcher must make sense of situations, acts etc. which are already constituted as meaningful by those who are being researched. The "double" of the term derives from the fact that there is also a hermeneutic flow, so to speak, in the other direction: "there is no mechanism of social organization or social reproduction identified by social analysts which lay actors cannot also get to know about and actively incorporate into what they do" (1984, p., see also 1984, p. 374, 1982, p. 7, 14). Giddens states that he has come to see this aspect of the double hermeneutic as more and more important to social research over the years.

Recognition of the possible consequences of research for those whose actions are the subject of enquiry is intrinsic to social investigation. . . . However, the reflexive 'return' of social science findings to their 'subject matter' is a much more complex matter than is ordinarily perceived. . . . For such findings, together with theories and concepts, can constitutively reorder basic
characteristics of social life in ways which range far beyond immediate contexts of research. The practical outcomes of such a process may well be outside the effective control of the social scientific community as a whole, let alone the individual. Yet awareness of these reflexive complexities should be part of the conceptual skills of every researcher. . . . [because] some of the most important problems facing social science today derive from just this phenomenon (1990b, p. 314-315).

Dialectic of Control

Giddens insists that "the study of power cannot be regarded as a second-order consideration in the social sciences" (1984, p. 283; see also 1990b, p. 313). Power is studied, in structuration theory, in terms of the dialectic of control, as discussed in Chapter 3. The study of the dialectic of control is obviously intertwined with the study of context, knowledgeability and constraint, because what resources agents can bring into play in relations of dominance and compliance will vary depending on their situation and knowledge. In particular, according to Giddens,

discursive awareness plays an important part in the dialectic of control, because a clearly formulated understanding of the situations of one's actions can contribute directly to transforming them. . . . on the whole it tends to be true that those holding most power in any given social system tend to have a greater discursive understanding of that system than people in subordinate positions. Indeed, this is usually an element of the very differential in power itself. Thus levels of discursive penetration are a major aspect of ideology, where ideology is understood as modes of signification that serve to legitimate unequal power. However, in examining levels of discursive penetration, we have to be careful to have an ethnographically 'thick' (in Geertz's sense) understanding of discourse--something that is especially important in respect of the less powerful. . . . 'Discourse' is not just what can be expressed propositionally, as

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stated beliefs. Humour, irony, sarcasm, expletives and even the calculated use of silences may form part of the discursive understanding of social circumstances—and may be closely tied to practices either of an adaptive or more subversive kind (1990b, p. 314).

**Constraint**

The importance of studying constraint is implicit in much of the discussion of the other issues, above. Structure, by definition in structuration theory, is both enabling and constraining, and the need to think about structural constraint in analyzing the bounds of knowledgeability, time-space distanciation, and the dialectic of control is self evident. However, Giddens explicitly highlights what he feels are some particularly important points about constraint relative to research. First, "no unitary meaning can be given to 'constraint' in social analysis. Constraints associated with the structural properties of social systems are only one type among several others" (1984, p. 283). These other types include material or physical constraints (e.g., physical and sensory limits of the body in particular contexts) and what Giddens refers to as the constraints of power experienced as sanctions (1984, p. 174-179). The three types of constraint are related to one another in operation, and it is important to analyze the nature of this relationship.

The other points have to do with researching what he describes as "the subtlety of social constraint" (1990b, p. 311), and its links to knowledgeability of agents. In particular,

There are some forms, and some contexts, of structural constraint that have an implacable character. Yet it is highly important to see that all social constraints are mediated through
agents reasons. Structural constraint cannot be pictured as like a causal force in nature and as bluntly enforcing a single course of action—or at any rate, 'enforce' here presumes a certain interpretation of agents intentionality. . . . Take the example of the situation of the wage worker, as diagnosed by Marx. Having been rendered propertyless, the wage worker is 'forced' to sell her or his labour power to an employer in order to maintain a livelihood. Yet 'force' in this sense is not equivalent to a force of nature, and many features of the labour contract, and immanent possibilities of change, flow from the fact that this is so. A person can refuse a contract from any one particular employer if other job offers are available; labour can be withdrawn, especially in a collective way, providing a significant sanction; workers can go slow, 'work to rule' or develop other tactics providing a certain amount of control over the labour task; not least important from a Marxist point of view, they might gain an understanding of the origins of the constraints to which they are subject, and use such insights to contest the overall system of production (1990b, p. 312).

Institutional Analysis and Analysis of Strategic Conduct

Giddens argues that the issues/caveats discussed above are relevant to all social research. As such, they remain at both a general and an abstract level. They provide objectives for a research process, but do not tell us how to meet the objectives in any given research project (e.g., how does one set about exploring policy analytic practices in terms of context, the dialectic of control, etc.?). Though he never informs us of precisely how to go about researching specific situations, he does move toward more specific, concrete research practices in his discussions of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct.

Determining just how Giddens conceptualizes these two approaches is challenging, as this is yet another set of concepts which
he treats somewhat ambiguously. He provides definitions of each, as well as various comments, and detailed summaries of studies which he feels exemplify each. A full sense of how he conceptualizes institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct emerges only through comparison of these different treatments across his writings. In particular, the issue of just what he means by methodological bracketing or epoché, is key in resolving ambiguities and apparent contradictions.

In the glossary at the end of The Constitution of Society, Giddens defines institutional analysis as

social analysis which places in suspension the skills and awareness of actors, treating institutions as chronically reproduced rules and resources (1984, p. 375).

Analysis of strategic conduct, on the other hand, is defined there as

social analysis which places in suspension institutions as socially reproduced, concentrating upon how actors reflexively monitor what they do; how actors draw upon rules and resources in the constitution of interaction (1984, p. 373).

These glossary definitions could be read as endorsements of the two approaches as distinct methodological modes. But such an endorsement on Giddens' part is inconsistent with some of the provisos noted above as relevant to all social research. Most obviously, the claim that all research has an ethnographic moment, and the recommendation that all researchers be sensitive to the skills/knowledgeability of actors seem inconsistent with an approach which places "in suspension" precisely those skills.
Giddens' earliest definition of the two is in *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979). In the process of discussing social and system integration he states:

At this point I want to introduce a distinction... between institutional analysis and the analysis of strategic conduct... The point of this distinction is to indicate two principal ways in which the study of system properties may be approached in the social sciences: each of which is separated out from the other, however, only by methodological *epoché*. To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements—rules and resources—in their social relations. 'Structure' here appears as actors' mobilization of discursive and practical consciousness in social encounters. Institutional analysis, on the other hand, places an *epoché* upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems. It is essential to see that this is only a methodological bracketing: these are not two sides of a dualism, they express a duality, the duality of structure (Giddens 1979, p. 80)

In this definition Giddens emphasizes more strongly that he views the bracketing of either approach as purely methodological: the focus of either type of analysis should not be understood as compromising his ontological assertions that agency and structure are duality rather than dualism. But it is necessary to move beyond the definitions to grasp just how Giddens' perceives the two approaches should be used in social research.

First, it should be noted that while it is possible to interpret the above definitions by Giddens as implying that he has invented these two approaches, comments he makes elsewhere indicate that he views the two as broad approaches used historically in social analysis. Further, it is clear from these comments that he feels that
as used traditionally the two approaches in fact have not accounted for the duality of agency and structure, but have addressed the two as a dualism. His insistence that the bracketing of either approach is purely methodological is rooted in his conclusion that too exclusive a focus on the domain of either results in incomplete explanation.

Thus, he criticizes Goffman (despite the acknowledged influence of Goffman on his thinking) for too exclusive a focus on strategic conduct:

Goffman's sociology . . . has not developed an account of institutions, of history or structural transformation. Institutions appear as unexplained parameters within which actors organise their practical activities. This is therefore in the end more than a methodological 'bracketing': it reflects the dualism of action and structure that has been noted earlier" (1981, p. 81).

In like manner, but at greater length, he criticizes the particular form of institutional analysis in the social sciences in which the identification of generalizations is tied to the search for universal laws. He notes that

those who speak of the the explanatory objectives of the social sciences as bound up with the discovery of laws do not do so when outcomes are more or less completely intended. Thus, for example, the drivers of cars regularly stop when traffic lights are red, and start off again when they go green. But no one suggests that stopping at traffic lights can be represented as a law of human social conduct. . . . The fact that such examples are not talked of as laws, even though the behavior involved is very regular, indicates that the problem of laws in social science is very much bound up with unintended consequences, unacknowledged conditions and constraint (1984, p. 343-344)

He goes on to argue that with such an approach "comes the inclination to reduce knowledge imputed to actors to a minimum,
thus broadening the scope for the operation of causal mechanisms which have their effects independently of the reasons individuals have for what they do" (1984, p. 345).

Contra this view, in the perspective of structuration theory, reasons are causes. . . . The rationalization of action is causally implicated, in a chronic manner, in the continuation of day-to-day actions. The rationalization of action, in other words, is a major element in the range of causal powers than [sic] an individual, qua agent, displays. This is so because doing something for reasons means applying an understanding of 'what is called for' in a given set of circumstances in such a way as to shape whatever is done in those circumstances (1984, p. 345).

Consistent with the discussion of constraint, above, he notes that there are also "causal factors which influence action without operating through its rationalization. . . . all action occurs in contexts that, for any single actor, include many elements which that actor neither helped to bring into being nor has any significant control over" (1984, p. 345-46). To the degree that such conditions contribute to regularized unintended outcomes, it is possible to draw generalizations. But since agents' knowledge about the conditions influencing the generalization is causally relevant to that generalization, these conditions can be altered by changes in such knowledge. [Thus] in the case of generalizations in social science, the causal mechanisms are inherently unstable (1984, p. 346-7).

It is in this sense that he argues that those who take institutional analysis to comprise the whole field of sociology in toto mistake a methodological procedure for an ontological reality. . . . If the study of unintended consequences and unacknowledged conditions of action is a major part of social
research, we should none the less stress that such consequences and conditions are always to be interpreted within the flow of intentional conduct (1984, p.285, see also Giddens 1990b, p. 311).

An exclusive focus on either institutional or strategic conduct analysis, then, provides incomplete explanation. But must one apply both approaches in a given analysis in order to assess and explain causality? While Giddens does not appear anywhere to actually object to some kind of jumping back and forth between methodological brackets, we can infer that such an approach is not necessary. He suggests that in practice the bracketing or epoché is far from absolute even at a methodological level. Rather, he views each approach as related to the other, and even as leading into the other.

In Central Problems in Social Theory (1979), after defining the two approaches, Giddens goes on to associate them with the modalities of structuration:

when institutional analysis is bracketed, the modalities are treated as stocks of knowledge and resources employed by actors in the constitution of interaction as a skilled and knowledgeable accomplishment. . . . Where strategic conduct is placed under an epoché, the modalities represent rules and resources considered as institutional features of systems of social interaction. The level of modality thus provides the coupling elements whereby the bracketing of strategic or institutional analysis is dissolved in favor of an acknowledgement of their interrelation (1979, p. 81).

In The Constitution of Society (1984), he states of the two approaches: "since this is a difference of emphasis, there is no clear-cut line that can be drawn between these, and each, crucially, has to be in principle rounded out by a concentration upon the duality of
structure" (Giddens 1984, p. 288). He then proceeds to discuss analysis of strategic conduct not as a matter of bracketing institutions as chronically reproduced, but as a matter of "giving primacy to discursive and practical consciousness, and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries" (Giddens 1984, p. 288 emphasis added).

Giddens also provides two diagrams in Constitution of Society that help to clarify what he means by emphasis or giving of primacy (Figures 5 & 6). The pair of vertical arrows on the right edge in each of these represents the two modes of analysis, with the upward arrow representing institutional analysis and the downward one analysis of strategic conduct. Giddens presents each of these diagrams in the context of specific discussions. The first (Figure 5), immediately follows the above noted references to emphasis and giving of primacy. It is at the beginning of a detailed summary of and commentary on a study which he uses to illustrate strategic conduct analysis.²

The second (Figure 6) he specifically discusses in terms of showing "what is involved in making the conceptual move from the analysis of strategic conduct to examination of the duality of structure" (1984, p. 298). I shall return to Figure 6 in discussing Giddens' various examples of the two types of analysis. What is important to grasp at a general level at this point is that both diagrams or models depict the two approaches not only as

² This explains why the labeling with regard to the realm of strategic conduct is so much more detailed than that for institutions.
overlapping, but as moving toward one another's origins. Conceptualize the two approaches in terms of bracketing or *epoché* is somewhat misleading. We must think in terms of giving primacy or emphasis, and of starting points—in short, of perspectives on the duality of structure that allows us to move toward the articulation of structure and agency.

**From an Institutional Perspective**

All of this discussion on bracketing, emphasis, and perspectives remains abstract. How, given an *epoché* on strategic conduct (or on institutions as chronically reproduced) should we move toward agents' knowledgeability (or toward the wide time-space distanciation of institutions) in actual research situations? Giddens provides guidance on these issues by way of the examples he presents to illustrate the approaches.

I will consider the case of institutional analysis first, and will look at three examples. Although the ultimate aim is to understand how institutional analysis can incorporate concern with actors' rationality, I will begin with an example in which the brackets on actors' consciousness remains absolute. I want to include this example primarily because it provides insight into some important aspects of institutional analysis as conceptualized by Giddens.

Giddens identifies three levels of abstractness in institutional analysis. Analysis of structural principles/contradictions represents the most abstract level. Analysis of rule sets or structures (as opposed to the generic "structure") is the next level (1984, p. 189).
The third level is "the lowest level of abstraction, the isolating of elements or axes of structuration" (1984, p. 189).

I discussed his treatment of structural principles and rule sets in Chapter 3, in the section devoted to structural principles. By way of example of the least abstract level, Giddens turns to Marx's analysis of the processes of change in the division of labor within manufacture workshops, and its relation to the division of labor "outside, the 'division of labour in society,'" (1984, p.189-191).

Within the workshops, workers' labor processes are deskilled and routinized, and become coordinated with machine production. The labor process becomes "a productive mechanism whose parts are human beings" (1984, p. 189). The division of labor in society as a whole, on the other hand, has to do with competition within sectors and "purchase and sale of products" between sectors of industry. Division of labor within the workshop and within society clearly "react upon one another," yet one cannot be reduced to the other (1984, p. 190).

Giddens' main point is that "the division of labor" as an axis of structuration, "links the broader structural characteristics of capitalism [structural principles and structures] with the more proximate organization of the industrial enterprise" (1989, p. 189). But a more important (and closely related) point for explaining institutional analysis, which Giddens touches on but does not

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3 As I noted in a footnote in the discussion of structural principles and structures in the preceding chapter, Giddens presents his conceptualization of these theoretically substantive concepts and of their analysis together.

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develop, is that this analysis: "preserves the *epoché* of institutional analysis, but brings the level of study closer to the direct examination of co-presence" (1984, p. 189). In other words, though such analysis still does not involve agents' reflexive rationales, accountability, choices, etc., it moves us closer, because it represents a shift from analysis of virtual structure as principles or rule sets, to analysis of actual practices. Just as Giddens has stated that there is no definite cut-off line that can be drawn between analysis of strategic conduct and institutional analysis, so he stresses that "there is no definite cut-off point between the three levels of abstraction" in institutional analysis, and "one task obviously merges into the other" (1984, p. 189).

Giddens presents this example, and the discussion of levels of abstraction of institutional analysis, in the process of explaining the nature of structure from a primarily ontological perspective. Nevertheless, even in this discussion, he stresses that "all the structural relations indicated above, at whatever level, have to be examined as conditions of system reproduction. . . . structural properties of social systems are the medium and outcome of the contingently accomplished activities of situated actors" (1984, p. 191). He also critiques Marx as often treating "the relations between structural properties. . . as having their own 'inner dynamics', as functional necessities rather than continually reproduced conditions" and adds that "the overall conditions of systems reproduction are in no way 'guaranteed' by the structural relations. . . . Nor does
analysing these relations in virtual time-space explain in any way how they came about" (1984, p. 192).

The other two examples of institutional analysis that I will deal with are not open to such criticism, as they do address the knowledgeability of individuals. They also call attention to the perhaps obvious fact that institutional analysis involves not only abstractness of varying degree, but also generality. That is, to use Giddens' terminology, it is concerned with practices institutionalized across time and/or space. Of the two studies, the first is primarily concerned with practices across expanses of space, or more properly, numbers of people, and the other with institutional stability and change across time.

The first is a study by Gambetta, which addresses issues of educational opportunity among high school students in Italy. Giddens states that "for the purposes of institutional analysis we are often interested in... larg[e] aggregates," and notes that this study relied on questionnaires and interviews with approximately 3,000 individuals (1984, p. 304). Giddens states that Gambetta framed his research question in such a way as to highlight the nature of structural constraint.

In taking up various educational options, he asks, are individuals 'pushed' or do they 'jump'? In what sense, if any, are there forces akin to those portrayed by 'structural sociologists' which impel individuals into specific courses of action? (1984, p. 305).

According to Giddens, Gambetta initially reports his research in terms of correlations with demographic categories. But he is not
satisfied to simply report that "an 'upper-class' child has four times the chance of reaching higher education than one from a 'working-class' background" (1984, p. 305). Rather, his question "leads him to go beyond the usual confines of structural sociology" (1984, p. 308). By statistically controlling for various inter-class differences, Gambetta is able to show, among other things, that

working-class children are more likely than others to be weeded out at a relatively early stage in terms of leaving school at the earliest available opportunity. But those who do stay on are more likely to go to university than higher-class children who stay on (1984, p. 306).

He also shows that "working-class children are considerably more responsive to lack of educational success, prior to the initial decision of whether to stay on in school or leave, than are higher class children" (1984, p. 306). Finally, Gambetta concludes that

higher class families tend more or less automatically to keep their children in education beyond the ordinary school leaving age. . . . working class parents do not tend to keep their children in education unless there is some particular reason to do so--an exceptionally gifted child, one particularly motivated to remain in school, and so on. . . . [but that] once the commitment has been made, there is a greater cultural and material 'investment' to be protected than in the case of the higher-class children (1984, p. 306-7).

thus, though starting from an institutional perspective, Gambetta is able to interpret his findings in terms of intentional activity.

The other example of institutional analysis, a study by Ingham, likewise focuses eventually on agency. The study addresses how the London financial center known as "the City. . . . has maintained its pre-eminence over Britain's industrial capital" (1984, p. 319). The
study covers approximately 200 years of history, yet still incorporates conceptualization of purposive conduct and its intended and unintended outcomes as an essential part of its explanation (1984, p. 319-325).

According to Giddens, Marx and subsequent Marxist theorists have attempted to "explain... the role of the City in terms mainly of the endogenous conceptions of capitalist development" (Giddens 1984, p. 320). That is, they analyzed the City in terms of determinist rules or principles of capitalist development, abstracted from any rational agents. These explanations predicted that the dominance of the City, based in finance capital, would wane with the growth of British industrial capital. In fact, such was not the case: the City remained the major international finance center through the growth of industrial capital, and even after Britain's industrial pre-eminence faded.

Ingham, according to Giddens, argues among other things that the development of the City is more complex than the endogenous theories of capitalism allow for. Its traits must be understood in terms of international monetary exchange and "the nature of nation states" (1984, p. 321). Political as well as economic factors played a role in its sustained dominance. Ingham analyzes the phenomena in terms of the intended and unintended consequences of a series of fiscal reforms. Reforms introduced in the early 19th century were intended mainly to cope with the long-standing debts that the state had accumulated, exacerbated by the Napoleonic Wars. The result,
however, was to further a concentration of monied interests, separate from the industrial entrepreneurs, in the City institutions. The burgeoning wealth of the city made possible the survival of certain sectors of the aristocracy when faced by the diminishing agrarian economy. . . . As part of a 'gentlemanly exchange', City merchants and bankers in turn acquired the trappings of aristocracy. These same processes led to the perpetuation, and indeed strengthening, of 'pre-industrial' commercial capitalism. The City . . . . became strongly centralized under the control of the Bank of England. . . . oriented first and foremost to maintaining the stable role of sterling as a 'trusted' form of world money. A further important aspect of this process was the state's fiscal policy in ensuring sterling's formal validity, which the City's narrow economic activity alone could not guarantee (1984, p. 321).

Thus, according to Giddens, Ingham's study demonstrates that the City's initial attainment of predominance

was largely the unintended outcome of fiscal measures instituted for other reasons. . . . But. . . subsequent policies defending and expanding its power were usually of a quite different sort. . . . policies promoted by groups either in banking or in the Treasury, or both, were actively and successfully directed at defending the privileged role of City organizations (1984, p. 323-324).

Giddens goes on to argue that the survival of the City "can be adequately understood only in terms of shifting allegiances and coalitions between strategically placed groupings of individuals, sometimes having outcomes that none of them intended" (1984, p. 325).

In some ways these final two examples are very different. Gambetta focuses on institutions at a given point in time, in the form of patterns of conduct detectable at an aggregate level. Ingham focuses on institutional stability and change across an expanse of time. But in each the researcher focuses on strategic conduct from an
institutional perspective, and the way each researcher achieves this is similar, at least at an abstract level. Each researcher takes identification of apparent patterns as starting point, rather than as an end in itself. That is, rather than treating the patterns as explanatory in their own right, both Gambetta and Ingham set about trying to explain the patterns. In each case this leads them to explore the complexities in a more concrete and specific way, and each eventually arrives at strategic conduct of actors and/or groups of individuals as one, but not the only, causal factor in the patterning of the practices.

**From a Strategic Conduct Perspective**

Giddens presents the second of the previously noted diagrams (Figure 6) in the context of assessing how analysis of strategic conduct can approach the duality of structure. He discusses "making the conceptual move" (1984, p. 298) as follows:

transferring analysis from the situated activities of strategically placed actors means studying, first, the connections between the regionalization of their contexts of action and wider forms of regionalization; second, the embeddedness of their activities in time--how far they reproduce practices, or aspects of practices, that are long established; third, the modes of time-space distanciation which link the activities and relationships in question to overall societies or to inter-societal systems (1984, p. 298).

As with institutional analysis, what he means is best illustrated by considering the examples he presents. I will summarize two examples: first an extended hypothetical research project which Giddens proposes; then an actual research study which he
summarizes at length. Giddens develops the hypothetical research project to address the question of how concepts from structuration theory might "be used as sensitizing devices" in a study of "marriage relationships and the break-up of marriage" (1989, p. 297). He states that such a study should be grounded "in an attempt to examine stasis and change in the reproduction of institutionalized practices" (1989, p. 298). To accomplish this he suggests beginning by addressing the way partners' expectations about marriage are "constituted in and through regular habits, strategies of behaviour and so forth which partners follow, inside and outside the relationship" (1989, p. 298). Thus he argues that the researcher should examine the "marital relationship" in terms of its relationship to "other kin ties and obligations" (1989, p. 298). This involves "study of the 'everyday' or 'day-to-day' . . . many seemingly trivial or mundane features of what people do being the actual 'groundwork' of larger-scale institutions" (1989, p. 298).

Giddens suggests, for instance, that in the case of matrilocal marriages, one might look at the practice which women have of popping in to see their mothers on a regular and routine basis. Where such a practice exists, it expresses informal conventions which are reconstituted in its very enactment. The practice may be relatively 'untheorized' by those concerned, since it is simply accepted as what is 'done' in the area. Alternatively, a greater range of skillful, strategic thinking may be involved where the practice for one reason or another has come under pressure. Thus if husbands now expect wives to spend more time in the home. . . or if they expect wives to take on paid employment--various more calculative and 'thought-through' modes of sustaining the mother daughter relationship might be devised (1989, p. 298).
To "discern the structural properties of systems of relationships in which people's activities are engaged" we must relate the day-to-day practices as studied to the durability of institutions. . . . In empirical terms, this immediately means an 'opening out' across time and space. In other words, it necessitates a historical or developmental perspective and a sensitivity to variations in location. In the case of the hypothetical research project, this would involve. . . . ideally at least--a thoroughgoing study of the contextualities of institutionalized patterns of interaction. For instance, the pattern of daughters popping in to see mothers might be temporally sedimented as tradition and spatially organized via locales in which a considerable degree of gender segregation is maintained--through a combination of matrilocality and a male 'pub and club' pattern (1989, p. 299).

Giddens goes on to argue that such practices can be mapped in terms of structural sets, or "the mutual convertibility of rules and resources in one domain of action into those pertaining to others" (1989, p. 299), which was discussed in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. For example, regarding the hypothetical study, one might show that marriage relationships, gender and labour markets are connected. . . . gender divisions represent differential 'convertible currency' in labour markets, since the institutionalized practices which prevail in the economic domain mostly favor men rather than women. Labour market characteristics articulate with the domain of family life, which in turn helps restructure gender (1989, p. 299).

These relationships can be expressed in terms of conversions such as "marriage relationships : gender : labour markets : marriage relationships" (1989, p. 299). Analysis of such structural sets, of course, is institutional analysis, as discussed above.
The other example of analysis of strategic conduct that addresses the duality of structure is from *The Constitution of Society* (1984). Giddens treats in detail an ethnographic study by Willis on "a group of working-class children in school located in a poor area of Birmingham" (1984, p. 289). My treatment of Giddens' treatment is also fairly detailed, because I want to capture some of the subtleties of actual concrete research that the hypothetical example above lacks.

Giddens begins discussion of Willis' study by offering three tenets for analysis of strategic conduct: "the need to avoid impoverished accounts of agents' knowledgeability; a sophisticated account of motivation; and an interpretation of the dialectic of control" (1984, p. 289). With regard to the first tenet, he notes approvingly that Willis looks beyond propositional discursive knowledge, such as students might state outright to a researcher about their relationship with teachers. The researcher must also take note of the knowledge expressed in "modes of expression which are often treated as uninteresting in sociological research--such as humour, sarcasm and irony" (1984, p. 290).

Willis' analysis of knowledgeability of individuals within the specific locale of the school shows how "the lads"--the rebellious or nonconformist group of students researched--demonstrate a particular grasp of the power relations, or dialectic of control between themselves and the teachers at the levels of both discursive and practical consciousness:
Because they actively contest the authority relations of the school, they are adept at picking out where the bases of the teachers' claims to authority lie, and where their weakest points are as the wielders of discipline and as individual personalities. They have invented 'experiments with trust without ever having read Garfinkle: 'Let's send him to Coventry when he comes', 'Let's laugh at everything he says', 'Let's pretend we can't understand and say, 'how do you mean?' all the time'" (Giddens 1984, p. 291, quoting Willis).

A fuller understanding of the dialectic of control in this situation emerges from Willis' comparing the "respective views" of "both 'the lads' and their teachers" as "specialists in the theory and practice of authority" according to Giddens (1984, p. 292). In particular, he notes that "teachers recognize that they need the support of the conformist children to make the sanctions available to them stick, and that power cannot be exercised effectively if punitive sanctions have to be applied frequently" (1984, p. 292). However, while "teachers know this. . . 'the lads' know that they know it. Hence 'the lads' are able to exploit it to their own advantage. . . . subverting the mechanics of disciplinary power in the classroom" (1984, p. 292).

As for motivation, Giddens illustrates his concept using Willis' ethnographic study as a starting point. He argues that regarding 'the lads' as skilled and knowledgeable agents suggests a different view of their motivation from that implied in the 'official' view of them as 'louts' or 'wreckers' unable to appreciate the importance of the educational opportunities the school offers. . . . The motives which prompt their activities and

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4 Note that Giddens use of 'motivation' here, though it clearly has some overlap, is not entirely consistent with his prescribed use of the term in relation to the unconscious and the ontological security of individuals, as discussed in Chapter 1 in the section on agency.
underlie the reasons they have for what they do cannot be well-
explicated as a result of a deficient understanding of the school
system or its relations with other aspects of the social milieu
that are the backdrop to their lives. Rather, it is because they
know a great deal about the school and the other contexts in
which they move that they act as they do. . . . Certainly [too], they
realize that their chances of getting anything other than inferior
and unedifying jobs are poor, and this realization influences
their rebellious attitudes towards the school. . . . It might be
plausible to infer a general underlying motivational pattern--
perhaps partly unconscious--of an attempt to establish modes of
conduct which inject some kind of color into a drab set of life
prospects that are, however diffusely, accurately seen as such

With regard to addressing the duality of structure, Giddens notes
enthusiastically of Willis' study that "although the group studied was
quite small. . . [the] research is both compelling in its detail, and
suggestive in drawing implications that range far beyond the context
in which the study was actually carried out" (1984, p. 289). In
particular, he argues that it is "not only a superb ethnographic
study. . . it is also an attempt to indicate how the activities of 'the
lads', within a restricted context, contribute to the reproduction of
larger institutional forms" (1984, p. 293)—in this case, institutional
forms very similar to the 'vicious cycle' of poverty, educational
performance, and employment prospects noted in Chapter 3 of this
dissertation, in the section on Social Systems.

The way that Willis accomplishes this, at least as reported by
Giddens, is in a gradual widening out to broader contexts, relating the
behaviour of 'the lads' in the context of the school first to their
experiences in other contexts, but also to wider institutional patterns
in society. For example,
the attitudes and conduct of 'the lads' are certainly not wholly invented *de novo* by them; they draw upon a fund of experience built into their lives outside the school and built up historically within working-class communities in general (Giddens 1984, p. 299).

"The Lads" learn, for example, attitudes about work from "stories related by adults about life on the shop floor" (1984, p. 299). They also draw themes from the "symbolic forms of youth culture" for their "counter-school culture" (1984, p. 299). Willis does not treat the behavior of "the lads" as simply determined by this "fund of experience," according to Giddens. Rather, they draw on, and reproduce it, "innovatively, not in a mechanical fashion" (1984, p. 299).

Giddens also notes that the practices of the teachers in the school can be treated in similar fashion: "as a reflexively monitored social phenomenon, the national school system makes use of sociological research and psychology. Both have filtered down into the practical organization of this particular school" (Giddens 1984, p. 300). "The lads" intersect with this academic research especially in terms of "vocational guidance."

Careers guidance... is taken seriously inside the school [but] as Willis shows... reflects middle-class values and aspirations. Centered upon 'work', the views promulgated tend to contrast rather vigorously with the attitudes and ideas about work which . . . 'the lads' have picked up . . . . They make fun of, or are indifferent towards, the material provided in careers lessons. . . . they consider that they have insights into the true character of work denied to the conformist children--and perhaps they do (1984, p. 300)

Nevertheless, what Willis shows, according to Giddens, as his study moves into a still wider time-space framework, is that this
knowledge of "the lads", though perhaps valid at one level, is still bounded, and their use of it leads them into unintended consequences. Specifically, for example, seeing "the future as 'flat" anyway, "they are not interested in choosing particular jobs... they drift into what they do" and thus "commit themselves to a life of generalized labor... motivated by a desire for the best wages that can be got immediately and by the presumption that work is essentially disagreeable" (Giddens 1984, p. 301). In short, they help to reproduce labor power as an abstract, generalized commodity as analyzed by Marx as a necessary condition to the labor contract on which industrial authority is based (1984, pp. 301-303).

Giddens makes clear that this aspect of Willis' analysis of strategic conduct is now directly focused on the duality of structure. And moving beyond Willis actual study, he suggests, just as he does in the hypothetical example of the study of marriage above, that now analysis of "the situated activities the counter-school culture" can merge easily into consideration of structural rule sets, or relations of transformation. In particular, he suggests as relevant the following sets: "private property : money : capital : labour contract : industrial authority" and "private property : money : educational advantage : occupational position" (Giddens 1984, p. 302).

In each of the examples of strategic conduct analysis considered, the researcher arrives at consideration of societal patterns and rule sets or structures not so much through specifically abandoning an *epoché* as through the gradual "opening out' across time and space" (1989, p. 299) that Giddens mentions. As in the case of the examples...
of institutional analysis, in the abstract this can be viewed as resulting from the researchers' desire to fully explain the conditions of what they research, though in this case it is situated practices which are being explained, rather than broad patterns of practice across time and space.

**Levels of Abstraction, Points of Entry**

One of the fundamental findings of my treatment thus far of Giddens' presentations of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct is that there is overlap between the two in terms of what they focus on and how they address explanation. In fact, Giddens suggests that there is an even greater degree of flexibility in application of the perspectives than my treatment thus far suggests. In discussing structuration sensitized research, and critiquing "the traditional debate between 'qualitative' and 'quantitative' methods in social research" (1984, p. 327), he presents another diagram (Figure 7) in which he identifies four levels of research ranging from "hermeneutic elucidation of frames of meaning" through "specification of institutional orders" (1984, p. 327).

He makes it clear that "the methodological 'insertion' of the research investigator into whatever material is the object of study can be made at any of the four levels" (1984, pp. 327-8). As we might expect, given the the inter-relation of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct, Giddens notes that regardless of the researcher's level of entry, the other levels are also important. While he again stresses that "all social research presumes a hermeneutic
moment" (1984, p. 327-8, see also 1991, p. 219), he goes on to state that "the presumption" of the hermeneutic moment "may remain latent where the researcher draws upon mutual knowledge that is unexplicated because researcher and research inhabit a common cultural milieu "(1984, p. 328). Nevertheless, the "essential significance of (1)" as explanatory must not be repressed.

But while

hermeneutic aspects of social research are not necessarily illuminating to those who are the subjects of that research, since their main outcome is the elucidation of settings of action considered as 'alien milieux', such is not the case with the investigation of practical consciousness. Studying practical consciousness means investigating what agents already know, but by definition it is normally illuminating to them if this is expressed discursively. . . . interpretation of practical consciousness is a necessary element, implicitly understood or explicitly stated, of broader features of social conduct. . . . identifying the bounds of agents' knowledgeability in the shifting contexts of time and space is fundamental to social science. The investigation of (3), however, presumes some considerable knowledge of levels (1), (2) and (4) (1984, p. 328).

Thus,

Gambetta's study can be used to focus upon some of the same problems as those investigated by Willis. Gambetta's data concern a large number of individuals, Willis's material only a handful. Gambetta's work involves a battery of sophisticated research methods, while Willis' study consists wholly of ethnographic reporting. But Gambetta's research, no less than that of Willis, presupposes a grasp of situated action and meanings without which the formal categories of the theoretical metalanguage of the researcher would have neither sense nor application. All so-called 'quantitative' data, when scrutinized, turn out to be composites of 'qualitative' --i.e., contextually located and indexical--interpretations produced by situated researchers, coders, government officials and others. The
hermeneutic problems posed by ethnographic research also exist in the case of quantitative studies. . . . (1984, p. 333).

In short, then, we should picture institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct, in the ideal, as starting at opposite points--societal totalities/institutional orders and the hermeneutic moment, respectively--and moving toward one another. But in the reality of a given research study, we may be more interested in focusing on something in between these points, and aspects of the other levels may already be relatively clear. Thus, from case to case, just what must be elucidated in detail will vary. Researchers must nevertheless make sure that all levels are accounted for

Some Critiques of Giddens

Before moving on to consideration of what Giddens has to say about researching discourse and the symbolic, I would like to briefly address two scholars' criticisms of Giddens' conceptualization of analysis of strategic conduct and institutional analysis. Both Cohen (1989) and Stones (1991) have argued that the two approaches are inadequate to account for all necessary perspectives in social analysis. Cohen, for example, argues that between these two approaches,

no consideration is made for the time-space configuration of system patterns. To conceive of the time-space patterning of interactions from the standpoint of the analysis of strategic conduct would entail the introduction of so many details of social praxis that the patterning itself would almost certainly fade from view. Institutional analysis, on the other hand, is intended to facilitate the apprehension of the interwoven rules and resources that 'bind' social systems (1989, p. 89).
He proceeds to insist that a third level of bracketing is necessary. In this perspective, which he refers to as systems analysis, temporary brackets screen off both the structural properties of social systems and the contingencies of interactions that depart from institutionalised regimes. What remains in view is the ordering and the articulations between interactions in time and space (1989, p. 89).

As should be clear from my treatment of Giddens' discussions of institutional analysis, Cohen's argument that the bracketing of institutional analysis does not allow for examination of the time-space patterning of social systems is simply wrong. Presumably, Cohen relied on Giddens' explicit definitions of institutional and strategic context analysis—which, as I have noted, can be critiqued for their ambiguity. But Giddens' discussion of the three levels of abstractness of institutional analysis makes it clear that while institutional analysis is indeed concerned with structures and structural principles, it is also concerned, at the level of axes of structuration, with their articulation with practices, especially, by definition, patterned practices. Finally, too, the examples Giddens gives of institutional analysis all involve analysis of practices—not abstract specifications of rules and resources. In fact, there is no need for a level of systems analysis bracketing—such a level is already specified.

Stones endorses Cohen's proposal, and calls for yet another level of bracketing,

strategic context analysis [which] would be used where the problem being addressed called for a knowledge of the strategic
terrain which faces or faced an agent and which constituted the the range of possibilities and limits to the possible (1991, p. 676).

This differs from strategic conduct analysis, according to Stones, in that it relies not just on the agent's knowledge of the enablements and constraints, structural and otherwise, but "also allows the social theorist a perspective from which to assess the range of potential courses of action and probable consequences, and then measure this against that of the lay actor" (Stones 1991, p. 676).

But if we accept Giddens five provisos as applying to all social analysis, then we must assume that even when approaching practices from the perspective of strategic conduct analysis we must look at them not just in terms of agents' knowledgeability, but also in terms of contextuality, the nature of constraint, and the bounds of knowledgeability. And the examples of strategic analysis Giddens provides demonstrate how one can consider the subtle interplay of bounded knowledgeability, situated practices, and unintended consequences through gradually opening out the focus of the study across time and space.

The major critique that can be made of Giddens' treatment of the two modes of analysis is in regard to clarity. The emphasis on bracketing or *epoché* as used in the formal definitions does not fit well with the styles of analysis Giddens actually prescribes and endorses. It is not clear whether this is due to oversight on Giddens' part, or that Bauman's insight is once again relevant, that Giddens' concepts on this count have gone through several stages of development (Bauman 1989, p. 34).
Before concluding this chapter I would like to consider two of Giddens' discussions in which he specifically addresses analysis of communication. The first one I will consider forms part of a response to a critic in an edited volume. Giddens' main point is to clarify his conceptualization of structure and its analysis, but it obviously also provides insight into researching discourse. It is very brief, and rather than summarize it, I simply quote Giddens. The second is Giddens' detailed treatment of ideology and ideological analysis from *Central Problems in Social Theory* (1979). This discussion I summarize in some detail. These two discussions are the most directly relevant of any that Giddens provides for analysis of communication processes, and thus are especially important for developing structuration based approaches to communication in policy analysis.

Giddens briefly discusses as example how and why one might investigate how the noun 'the Left' is used in day-to-day discourse. . . . One could study how the notion appears in the talk of situated groups (say, trade union leaders). While one could not subsume this under any specific rule, the semantic content of the phrase, as used in such talk, is no doubt rich and varied: the term is sometimes used in a pejorative way, while among other individuals, or in other contexts, it has more positive meanings. Analysing the texture of such usages would help us understand aspects of the production and reproduction of unions as organizations, their relation to managerial strata and business firms, and more besides. It would at the same time sensitize us to aspects of the power relations within and between such collectivities. It would not be a 'part' of the systemic relationships involved, but rather a contributing element in their
institutional reproduction—a 'structuring feature', which is all I mean by my generic use of the notion of structure (1989, p. 257).

Giddens' treatment of ideology is far more detailed. First, it should be noted that analysis of ideology as Giddens defines it involves examination of "how structures of signification are mobilised to legitimate sectional interests of hegemonic groups" (1979, p. 188), or in other words, "looking for the modes in which domination is concealed as domination . . . and the ways in which power is harnessed to conceal sectional interests" (1979, p. 193). Thus, analysis of ideology involves analysis of the intertwining of all three dimensions of the duality of structure: signification-communication, legitimation-sanction, and domination-power.

After extensive exegesis and commentary on the history of both the concept of ideology and its analysis (1979, pp. 165-188), Giddens specifies that he does not accept definitions which equate all of language, or all symbol systems with ideology. Nor does he accept that ideology is a particular symbol system, to be contrasted, for example, with science. Rather,

there is no such thing as an ideology: there are only ideological aspects of symbol systems. . . . any type of idea system may be ideological. . . . to treat a symbol-system as an ideology is to study it as ideological (1979, p.187, emphasis in original).

He notes that specifying just what a given individual's or group's interests might be can problematic, but

there is one sectional interest. . . . of dominant groups which is peculiarly universal: an interest in maintaining the existing order of domination, since such an order of domination ipso
facto involves an asymmetrical distribution of resources that can be drawn upon to satisfy wants (1979, p. 190).

He recognizes three "principal ideological forms" (1979, 193), through which this is accomplished, and which can be understood in terms of their contributions to maintaining the status quo. These are: "the representation of sectional interests as universal ones"; "the denial or transmutation of contradictions"; and "the naturalisation of the present: reification" (1979, 193-195).

The first of these is associated with "the need to sustain legitimacy through the claim to represent the interests of the community as a whole" (1979, 193). Giddens argues that such claims continue to conceal domination, but they also can offer up potential for real change in a society. Thus,

'freedom of contract', for example, is still today in substantial degree an ideological prop to the power of capital. On the other hand... freedom of contract has also been at the same time an important element facilitating a real extension of the rights of workers, through its connection to the collective wielding of power on the part of labour. . . . The expansion of the 'democratic' half of the liberal-democratic couplet provides another example of the universalising potential contained in originally sectional political ideals (1979, p. 193-4).

The second ideological form arises according to Giddens because obscuring system contradictions can reduce the possibility of social conflict. That is because "the translation of system contradiction into social conflict depends upon various factors, including the degree of penetration that actors have of the structural conditions of their actions" (1979, p. 194). He argues that, for capitalist society, the location of "the primary contradiction between private appropriation
and socialised production" is obscured or disguised by political ideology of separate political and economic domains. Thus, "the political is supposed ideologically to concern only the incorporation of the citizen in political society, as regulated primarily by the franchise. Conflict that occurs outside this sphere, particularly economic conflict, is declared to be 'non-political,'" thus justifying keeping "industrial conflict... 'out of politics'--or 'politics... out of the workplace'" (1979, p. 194).

The third type of ideology, reification, concerns "forms of signification which 'naturalize' the existing state of affairs, inhibiting recognition of the mutable, historical character of human society... [and] in which social relations appear to have the fixed and immutable character of natural laws" (1979, p. 195). Giddens notes that "the question of reification is of course immediately relevant to ideological features of the social sciences themselves" (1979, p. 196). He argues that approaches which treat social science "generalizations as laws of the same logical character as those found in the natural sciences" and those which "fail to analyses causal regularities in definite forms of human society" may both have "ideological connotations" (1979, p. 196). But he also notes that "the reifying character of naturalistic versions of sociology--those which have dominated... the 'orthodox consensus'--expresses deeply-formed elements of the content of lived experience, which it helps reinforce" (1979, p. 196). An example of reification in the social sciences which comes to mind is the recent revival of interest in 'research findings' that the impoverished generally, and people of African descent in
particular, 'naturally' will live in poverty because they are genetically inclined to possess lower I.Q.s than the privileged, primarily white elites (Herrnstein and Murray, 1994).

Giddens also addresses analysis of ideology in terms of the two levels of strategic conduct analysis and institutional analysis:

To study ideology as strategic action is to concentrate [on it] in its most 'conscious' and 'superficial' form, as discourse. . .the use of artifice or direct manipulation of communication by those in dominant classes or groups in furthering their sectional interests. . .To examine ideology institutionally is to show how symbolic orders sustain forms of domination in the everyday context of 'lived experience'. . .to seek to identify the most basic structural elements which connect signification and legitimation in such a way as to favour dominant interests. The most 'buried' forms. . .connecting unconscious sources of conduct with structural asymmetries of resources. . .are likely to be deeply sedimented in both a psychological and an historical sense (1979, p.190-192).5

By way of example of the latter type, he notes "the repressions sustaining 'privacy' and 'self-discipline' in day-to-day life" which can be linked with the operation "of front and back differentiations" which in turn result in the "'order' and 'discipline' of daily life, including but not limited to the routines of industrial labour" (1979, p. 192).

Giddens' brief, hypothetical example involving the phrase "the Left" gives insight into how the general approach of strategic conduct analysis might be applied in the specific case of analysis of discourse.

5 Compare Giddens' two levels of analysis of ideology to Deetz's treatment of discourse in terms of two levels, which he terms ideology and propaganda (1992, p. 135-139).
Implicit in what he says we again see the opening up across space—and potentially time as well—in exploring the implications of the phrase in different contexts. The use of the phrase pejoratively, positively, etc. in different contexts can be traced out in terms of power relations, as he notes, but also in terms of legitimation and sanctioning.

As to Giddens' treatment of ideology, a variety of possibilities suggest themselves as relevant to analysis of policy. First, the ideological is, by definition, tied up with power relations. Each level of analysis of ideology is likely to have double significance for analysis of policy discourse, for participants in policy processes themselves live and work in a web of power relations, but also engage in a process that mediates, in a sense, power relations affecting different interest groups, or members the populace as a whole.

In other words we are likely to gain insights about the dialectic of control in a given policy process through ideological analysis (e.g., what powers does an FCC staff member have in relationship to an FCC Commissioner?). But we are also likely to gain insights about the dialectic of control between interests groups in society (e.g., who historically has had "standing"—i.e., the right to participate—in given policy venues, and why?).

Finally, too, I read the examples that Giddens gives of the two levels to be, as it were, the ends of a continuum. Many aspects of discourse and the symbolic are likely to lie somewhere in between discourse at the most conscious level, and symbols so deeply buried
as to operate at an unconscious level. We can offer many instances of language, for example, that conceal domination at a much less conscious level than manipulation, but are not so deeply embedded as the example of public and private behaviors that Giddens offers.

Conclusions

In this chapter I continue my exegesis of Giddens, but shift from consideration of his ontological conceptualizations to an emphasis on his views of the significance of structuration theory for research practices. This represents a step in the move from the abstract of theory to concrete empirical research.

Exegesis of Giddens' most general and abstract advice on research reveals that across his writings he consistently addresses the same set of issues. Though he labels them differently in different writings, and collapses them together in different ways, it is possible to tease these out as five principles or provisos for research, all of which are related, but none of which can be reduced to any of the others.

The first of these five principles can be understood as broadly addressing what to look at in social analysis, and the remainder as addressing what to look for or how to look. What we should look at, according to Giddens, is social practices across time and space. The analysis of social practice must be approached in terms of contextuality, the knowledgeableability of agents, the dialectic of control (or power relations), and the nature of constraint.
One of the fundamental findings of this chapter, which follows from these insights, is that institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct, as identified by Giddens, should be conceived of as two perspectives on the duality of structure which merge into one another, rather than as two distinct and separate approaches to social analysis. Indeed Giddens himself is critical of various historical uses of each approach which failed to account for the articulation of structure and agency, and I suggest that his formal definitions of the two in terms of bracketing are potentially misleading.

How each of these approaches should be applied becomes clear only through consideration of the actual examples Giddens provides. In the case of institutional analysis, a researcher must address strategic conduct of agents to fully explain the patterning of social practices across time and space, or the virtual rule sets and structural principles which underlie the patterning. Agents' reasons are causally implicated even in the largely unintended consequences of institutional reproduction.

In the case of analysis of strategic conduct, the researcher arrives at consideration of societal patterns and rule sets or structures not through specifically abandoning an *epoché*, but by gradually "opening out" the scope of the study across time and space from the situated activities of specific agents. This opening out results from the researchers' attempt to fully explain the conditions which enable or constrain the activity of situated individuals, but it also sheds light on the the reproduction of these conditions as unintended consequences of action.

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Giddens implies that these two types, institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct, are, as described, ideals. That is, a researcher may choose as point of entry some level in between the extremes of the hermeneutic moment and institutional orders. Further, in some research it will not be necessary to explicitly deal with some levels in detail because, because they will already be self evident to researcher and audience. Nevertheless, it is important that researchers understand the relationship between the levels, and to make this explicit as part of explanation.

Critiques by various scholars of Giddens' treatments of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct are based on an incomplete understanding of how he conceptualizes the two approaches. But Giddens bears some responsibility for misunderstandings, because the formal definitions he provides are ambiguous.

Finally, Giddens discusses analysis of discourse and the symbolic in only a few places. Of particular importance are his brief hypothetical treatment of the term "the Left," and his extensive treatment of ideology and its analysis. We can read the former as providing us with a good example of how to apply strategic conduct analysis to discourse. Giddens suggest considering the nuances of use of the term across different contexts as a way into analysis of the dialect of control.

With regard to ideology, Giddens notes that there is no such thing as an ideology, but that any discourse or symbol system can be analyzed as ideological--that is, analyzed with regard to how it
conceals domination as such. He identifies different types of ideological meaning, and discusses analysis of the ideological in terms of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct. On this latter point, he distinguishes between discourse used as manipulation at a conscious level, and the symbolic, at a "buried" level, enacted as lived experience. Finally, I argue that ideological analysis is essential to analysis of policy discourse, since such discourse involves the dialect of control in two ways--the actual power relations within policy making contexts, and the power relations for groups or the society at large which policy makers mediate.
hermeneutic moment
reflexive monitoring of action
rationalization of action
motivation

duality of structure
SYSTEM INTEGRATION

discursive consciousness
practical consciousness
unconscious

Source: Giddens 1984, p. 289

Figure 5
intersection of regions $\rightarrow$ spatial spread away from the immediate contexts of interaction

routinization $\rightarrow$ temporal spread away from the immediate contexts of interaction

time-space distanciation

forms of societal totality

(Source: Giddens 1984, p. 298)

Figure 6
Hermenutic Elucidation of Frames of Meaning (1)

Investigation of Context and Form of Practical Consciousness (The Unconscious) (2)

Identification of Bounds of Knowledgeability (3)

Specification of Institutional Orders (4)

Source: (Giddens 1984, p. 327).

Figure 7
CHAPTER 5
STRUCTURATION APPLIED

Introduction

From a structuration perspective, the purpose of doing social research is to provide explanatory accounts. The research questions for this study are: can our understanding of the communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?

In the two preceding chapters I review and interpret Giddens' theory and advice on research. In this chapter I address the more specific question by developing a structuration based approach to modes of discourse and symbolization in policy processes. The approach is synthesized out of structuration theory, other theory and research generally consistent with structuration theory, and knowledge of the policy process drawn from the argumentative turn and other policy analytic literature. This represents the final step in the move from abstract and general to concrete and specific, as discussed in Chapter 2, and depicted in Figure 2.
The approach I have developed allows explanation of policy in terms of contradiction, power relations and legitimation, all as expressed through, but also shaped by, discourse and the symbolic. The approach also, significantly 1) links analysis of discourse/symbolization as practices to analysis of other practices, and 2) links analysis of situated practices of policy actors to analysis of broader patterns of practice across time and space. Analysis of the ideological in policy discourse and symbolization is central to the approach, and a key to identifying and analyzing ideology, in turn, is metaphor. The approach is graphically represented in Figures 8, 9 and 10. I begin explanation of the approach by identifying how I have represented the basic concepts of structuration theory in the figures. I next argue for the relevance of paying attention to metaphor in ideological analysis, and then proceed to explain the procedures of my approach, and their significance.

The Approach and Structuration Basics

Figures 8, 9 and 10 should be understood as being superimposable on one another. They are also superimposable on Figures 5, 6 and 7, (presented in the preceding chapter), from which I have derived some of their elements. Figures 8 and 9 depict in the abstract what the approach focuses on and reveals. Figure 10 highlights in point form the actual procedures involved in analysis. The basic lay-out of the figures expresses structuration theory's concern with the articulation of structure and agency. Situated activities of individuals are placed at the top of the figures. Time-
space distanciation, as indicated in Figure 8, increases going down the page. Institutional aspects—structure and actual patterns of institutionalized behavior, are placed at the bottom.

Modes of discourse/symbolic orders are represented by the column to the right of center in Figures 8 and 9. I define modes of discourse and symbolization broadly, as specific ways of speaking, thinking about or acting toward issues, with discourse being, in Giddens words, at a more "'conscious' and 'superficial'" level, and the symbolic at a more "'buried,'" level, "deeply sedimented in both a psychological and an historical sense" (1979, 190-192). That is, modes of discourse are treated as analytically closer to the realm of strategic conduct, and symbolism as more institutionalized, consistent with findings of Chapter 3. I assume that with greater and greater time-space distanciation, modes of discourse shade into symbolic orders. Symbolic orders and modes of discourse involve the intertwining of all three dimensions of structuration: signification, domination and legitimation (Figure 8).

Also represented in Figure 9 are the relationships between structural principles and rule sets, and especially emphasized, those between primary and secondary contradictions. Primary contradictions, as purely structural, are represented at the bottom. Secondary contradictions, as derived from primary, but expressed at the level of policy practice, are closer to the top. Giddens' two ideal approaches to social research are represented in all three figures by

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1The quoted phrases are from Giddens' discussion of ideology, which I have analyzed at length in Chapter 4.
the pair of arrows at the right margin. The upward pointing arrow represents institutional analysis, the downward arrow represents analysis of strategic conduct. I will return to discussion of some of the more subtle aspects of these figures below.

**Ideology, Metaphor & Contradiction**

Analysis of the ideological should play a role in any approach to policy discourse. Giddens recommends that we pay attention to the dialectic of control in any social system that we investigate. This advice is doubly significant for the study of policy. Policy makers are caught up in the power relations of the specific contexts of the policy making process, as explored by Forester in his examination of policy stories. But they are also, by definition, involved in mediating power relations between individuals and among various collectives, across regions and nations, at the level of system integration. The analysis of ideological aspects of policy discourse or symbolization will alert us to instances in which the discourse or symbolization masks domination. By definition, ideological analysis involves the investigation of the intertwining of domination, legitimation and signification.

Ideological aspects of modes of discourse, as I will argue below, coagulate around metaphor. Ideology, in turn, masks not only domination, but the structural or system contradictions that domination operates along or coincides with. Exposure of domination is desirable in and of itself. But if we accept Giddens' argument about the nature of what he calls secondary contradictions (as
discussed in Chapter 3), then ideological analysis can also provide insight into why certain policies fail. For Giddens links secondary contradictions--those which are brought about with varying directness by the primary, structural contradictions--to perverse outcomes, policy outcomes in particular. To the degree that analysis of metaphor can provide insight into the ideological and contradictory in policy formulation, then, it will provide superior explanation of policy processes.

Giddens implicates metaphor in the symbolic, and in emergence of new meaning in both specialized modes of discourse and in "natural language," as discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, he credits Schön for the recognition that metaphor is involved in emergence of new meaning because it "both produces and expresses... a 'displacement of concepts': the connection of disparate frames in a way which is initially 'unusual'" (Giddens 1993, p. 155). As I also noted in Chapter 3, however, Giddens does not trace out the full

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2 For purposes of the discussion that follows I define metaphor broadly to include metonymy, synecdoche, etc. In more narrow definitions, metonymy is a figure of speech in which the name of one thing is used to designate another with which it is associated or contiguous, as in "crown" for king. Synecdoche involves substitution of the name of a part for that of a whole, or vice versa. Giddens, in the noted discussions sometimes refers not just to metaphor, but "the conjunction of metaphor and metonomy" (Giddens 1979, p. 107). I follow Barthes in preferring "to evade Jakobson's opposition between metaphor and metonymy, for if metonomy by its origin is a figure of contiguity, it nevertheless functions finally as a substitute of the signifier, that is as a metaphor" (Barthes 1977, fn.2 p.50). I am also influenced in this by Ruegg (1979) who argues convincingly that distinctions between contiguity in metonomy and substitution in metaphor are not in actual practice so clear as to allow reduction to the dichotomy Jakobson insists on. I do not feel that rejecting Jakobson's assertions (1956, 1960) weakens Giddens' argument about the surplus of meaning in metaphor.
implications of metaphor for analysis of the ideological or of contradictions.

Before entering into somewhat abstract discussion of the relationship of metaphor, ideology and contradiction, it will be useful to consider an example of how metaphor relates to the ideological and the masking of contradictions. We can reconsider the so-called generative metaphors which Schöns identifies, discussed in Chapter 1, from an ideological perspective. Recall that Schon distinguishes two metaphors which he argues implicitly guided successive generations of urban housing policy. In the 1950s the dominant metaphor was slum as blight or illness, as expressed in the opinion of Justice Douglas which Schon quotes. In the sixties this was replaced by a metaphor of slums as natural communities or urban villages.

Viewing slums as blight or illness can clearly be understood as masking domination. A blight or disease is certainly not healthy, but neither is it linked to a particular politico-economic and cultural organization of society. A blight, as Schon suggests, might be treatable by radical intervention of humans, but in our general conceptions, occurs outside of any human social causation. In this sense, it is natural. Defining slums in terms of 'natural' or folk communities' or 'urban villages' obscures inequalities in allocative and authoritative processes in a similar fashion. Slums are things that just happen, and in fact, they have a positive aspect to them. Either construct, slum as blight, or as natural community, can be understood as partaking of reification, the naturalization of the present. Slums are presented as a natural, if not a healthy,
phenomenon. But each, more fundamentally, can be understood in terms of the second ideological form which Giddens identifies, the denial or transmutation of contradictions, as discussed in Chapter 4.

That is, the problem definition in each case is based on or derived from a metaphor which obscures the politico-economic relations which underlie the very condition being addressed. Obviously, policies derived from such definitions are unlikely to "solve" the defined problem. And they may exacerbate it, in the manner that Giddens labels as "perverse outcomes" (1984, p. 316). It can be argued that such has been the case for successive generations of urban housing policy. Such perverse outcomes, in other words, turn on secondary contradictions, and in part result from, or are expressions of the primary contradictions of capitalist society: the tensions between public and private spheres and between socialized production and private accumulation.

How does this approach to metaphor in policy discourse differ from that of Schön and other contributors to the literature reviewed in Chapter 1? At its most basic level, this approach shifts emphasis from what the metaphor shows, to what and how it conceals. That is, Schön and Sawhney specifically and primarily, and Throgmorton and Kaplan in passing, all focus on the power of metaphor in shaping perceptions and actions in certain directions. Sawhney alone among these focuses on the way metaphors allow or enable certain actions

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3In fact, of the three ideological forms Giddens recognizes, it appears that both reification and "the representation of sectional interests as universal ones" (1979, p. 193), can be reduced to the other form, the obscuring of contradiction, at least in their more superficial instances.
that favor the powerful. But the ideological approach I have
developed focuses on the way metaphor directs attention away from
relationships of domination.

Considering metaphor in this way opens up possibilities that
Schön's approach in particular closes off. Schön focuses on what he
labels as "tacit generative metaphors" (Schön 1979, p. 256). He
argues that such metaphors are the norm in policy processes. They
allow a transfer not only of perceptions, but attitudes and values
from situations with simple, definite interpretations, to situations
that are "complex, uncertain and indeterminate" (Schön 1979, p.266),
without our necessarily being conscious of the metaphor itself. 4
(1979, p. 266-7).

But there are obvious examples of metaphor in policy
discourse which do not simplify in the way Schön argues.
Metaphors serve as the central point of organization for the kind
of ambiguous discourse Streeter implicates in socio-political
construction of cable television as new technology (1989). As
Streeter points out, the term "cable," around which the discourse
he discusses coagulated, is itself "synecdoche" (1987, p. 178), or
for the purposes laid out in this study, metaphorical.
The ambiguity in this construct, as Streeter argues, can allow "some
to look out on the field and see a very different view" than others
(1989, p. 175). This can contribute to a sense "of unity and

4 Edelman likewise argues that metaphors in political language play a key role
in “simplifying and giving meaning to complex and bewildering” situations
(Edelman 1971, p.65)
coherence where there actually [is] a variety of conflicting motivations, attitudes and opinions" (Streeter 1989, p. 175).^  

Streeter's more recent work on corporate liberalism and broadcasting regulation also offers examples of highly complex modes of discourse and symbolization which turn on and are legitimated in terms of central, ambiguous metaphors. One is the discourse of regulatory expertise as turning on and justified in terms of the functionalist metaphor of society as machine, another is the more deeply embedded, symbolic metaphor of the "the public interest." Another example of such an ambiguous discourse organized around a central metaphor is that associated with the concept of an "information highway" in recent public and policy discourse, which simultaneously embodies egalitarian, social good and corporate-profit emphases (Berdajes 1996).

A shift of focus from the generative power of metaphor to its obscuring power also allows us to advance beyond problems posed by Schöen's treatment of the tacit nature of metaphoric associations in policy discourse. The problem for Schöen turns on how metaphors can influence us without our recognizing them as such. He suggests that policy metaphors most often operate tacitly, because they are not explicitly stated. Yet even in the example he presents, Justice Douglas does state the metaphor of slum as blighted in his opinion. And we can come up with many other examples of cases where

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^ Edelman (1971) also argues that ambiguity plays an important role in political language.

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metaphors are stated outright in policy discourse, yet we tend not to
treat them explicitly as metaphors. The tacit nature of such
metaphors stems from their having been literalized in some degree.\(^6\)
That is, they are no longer consciously recognized as metaphoric
constructs, though they are not, perhaps, literalized to the degree of
what is labeled in common usage as "dead" metaphor.

Literalized metaphors can be understood as being standardized
or institutionalized. That is, they tend to be involved in
symbolization across wider expanses of time and space. This is
represented by the flow of metaphor toward the bottom of the
modes of discourse/symbolization in Figure 9. I think the
assumption that many literalized metaphors influence our
perceptions at a less than fully conscious level, in the way Schön and
others suggest, is a valid one. And analysis of the "sedimented"
meanings of such metaphors can provide insight into policy

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\(^6\) I do not want to enter in any detail here into the voluminous debates as to
whether there is such a thing as literal as compared to metaphorical language,
etc. In brief, though, my view is consistent with Eco's: "even the most
ingenious metaphors are made from the detritus of other metaphors" (Eco
1984, p. 129). I do not find arguments to the effect that there is such a thing as
non-metaphorical language use particularly convincing. Lakoff and Johnson,
for example, argue that metaphoric concepts are grounded in the non-
metaphorical expressions of more immediately physical basis. They support
their argument with an example centering on the word "in" as a spatial
concept. They suggest that many uses of the word "in", e.g., "Harry is in love"
and "Harry is in the Elks" are metaphorical, but that a usage such as "Harry is
in the kitchen" is not (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 59-60). Regardless of whether
we accept the distinction between these 'metaphorical' and 'literal' uses of the
word 'in', focusing on a single word tells us little about the use of the word in
context, or the nature of a language as a whole. In their own example of
'literal' language use, e.g., Lakoff and Johnson ignore the metaphorical
derivation of the word "kitchen."
But not all literalized metaphors, when unpacked, hand us useful concepts. We can turn again to the term "cable" as treated by Streeter, as a case in point. It is hard to imagine that any values, positive or negative, turn simply on the substitution of this term for a complex set of relationships. Nevertheless, the metaphor conceals the complexity of the relationships, including the contradictions, with its very vagueness.

But how do we set about to study how metaphor obscures, rather than how it generates associations? This requires an approach that goes beyond just interpreting what a metaphor means, or what kinds of values or pre-judgements it hands users, although such interpretation will still be relevant. To systematically address metaphor as ideological requires systematizing Giddens' advice on analysis. We should focus on metaphor centered modes of policy discourse or symbolization as practice. Fully explaining these as practice means examining their relations to other practices and

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7 Their analysis as institutions can also be problematic, however. Eco states that "the 'deadest' trope can work 'like new' for... any 'virgin' subject, approaching for the first time the complexity of the semiosis" (1984, p. 128). And Richards has noted that "however stone dead (some) metaphors seem, we can easily wake them up" (Richards 1934, p. 101). However, it is also true that a resurrected or freshly awakened metaphor can mean different things to people in modern contexts than they meant to those in the original context of usage.

8 Another example of a term which conceals with its very vagueness is the term "the left," treated by Giddens as a hypothetical issue of research. Any values that may have been associated with the side of the parliament in which radicals have historically been seated are lost to most modern users of the term. Nevertheless, as Giddens suggests, the same term is used across different contexts, both positively and pejoratively, to express a host of values, concepts and behaviors, including many that are contradictory.
contexts. As Connell notes, discourse and symbolization cannot be treated "as a closed system" (1989, p. 242).9

Giddens provides us ways of relating discourse or symbolization to other practices, and of examining the articulation of structure and agency in practice, with his two basic approaches to research, institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct. Strategic conduct analysis in the ideal starts from analysis of specific, situated use of metaphor by specific actors, and expands out to consider use of the metaphor or the discourse that centers on it by other actors, across other contexts. A researcher explaining strategic conduct must eventually address the unacknowledged conditions for and unintended consequences of the action. From an institutional analysis perspective, we start by addressing ways that the metaphor, or the mode of discourse or symbolization centered on it, is standardized, or in other words, shows temporal and spatial extension. We move toward interpreting and explaining this standardization in part in terms of the situated actions or practices of specific agents.10

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9 Connell acknowledges Giddens as an influence, though he is critical of some aspects of structuration theory. Giddens, in turn, quotes Connell favorably for the insight on discourse not being a closed system (Giddens 1991b, p. 215-216).

10 Note that even at the start each perspective may be implicated in the other. At the level of analysis of strategic conduct, for example, a researcher may set out initially simply to identify discourses used in situated contexts, as in Forester's examination of practice stories. But in other cases as in Giddens' hypothetical treatment of the term "the left," the researcher is likely to focus on a term or discourse she already recognizes as standardized to some degree, even though the exact nature of the standardization is not clear.
Of course, one of the important findings of Chapter 4 is precisely that the two approaches to analysis as presented by Giddens are ideals. For a variety of reasons—practicality, pre-existing knowledge of a situation, etc., researchers are likely to step into the research somewhere in between the starting points of the two ideals. Regardless of the level of entry for the researcher, however, complete explanation of the social relations being researched will require that both institutions and the intentional behavior of individuals be acknowledged, and their articulation accounted for.

Figure 10 lists in point form the procedures necessary to systematically analyze discourse and symbolization as ideological, and as practices related to other practices, and suggests how these procedures relate to the ideals of institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct. To the degree possible we must pay attention to who uses the metaphor and accompanying discourse, and how they use it. Grasping the "semantic content" of the metaphor, in Giddens' words (1989, p. 257), involves much more than just an interpretation of what the metaphoric comparison means. It involves determining whether the metaphor is used in a negative or positive way, humorously, ironically, etc., across different contexts. This will tell us something about how people understand the discourse. But it also gives us insight into structure-agency articulation and the reproduction of practices, to the degree that we learn something about the values or norms drawn on in specific contexts, and about the dialectic of control within and between groups. Comparing any insights gained in this way about power relations to any formal or
officially sanctioned description of the power relationships among the individuals or across the contexts will tell us even more.

Following Connell, we would also be well advised to trace the origins of such discourses. In his study of sexual ideology, he notes that intellectuals are socially constituted as experts or "specialists... within gender relations" (1989, p. 242). That is, intellectuals, (in that they do intellectual work) often play an expert role in the creation and maintenance of ideologies. Although policy discourses are not so pervasive as sexual ideologies, clearly intellectuals in Connell's sense of the word do play a role in constituting, maintaining and changing policy discourses and symbolization that justify or critique particular policy practices. Tracking who originates or modifies a given discourse, and considering the social, political or economic roles or group affiliations of these individuals, can reveal much to us about the long term continuity or change of an institution, and, again, provide insight about the dialectic of control.

It is also fundamentally important to look at any policy practices which grow out of the symbolization or discourse, or which the discourse serves to justify or explain. In and of itself, this will provide insights into how structures are reproduced or changed, and combined with other evidence it offers us entry into ideological aspects of the discourse. Likewise we should consider the success or failure of the policies upon implementation. And finally, whether or

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11In the case of sexual ideology, Connell recognizes as experts "priests, journalists, advertisers, politicians, psychiatrists, designers...playwrights and film-makers, actors and actresses, novelists, musicians, movement activists and academics" (1989, p. 255).
not we have been able to track the originators and revisers of the
discourse, we should look for consistency or change in the use of the
discourse, its meaning, and its relationship to other discourses and
practices across time.

Such analysis of the use of a metaphor, then, leads us into
comparisons of the power relations between different individuals
and groups, comparisons of the intentions and outcomes of policy
practices, comparisons between the linguistic meaning and practical
application of a phrase, comparison of the use of the same symbol or
mode of discourse across expanses of time and space, and so on. It is
through this process, starting with a focus on metaphor, and tracing
out a complex web of relations, that we gain insight into whether the
discourse or symbolization coagulating around the metaphor is
concealing domination as such, whether practices which the discourse
inspires or justifies reproduce relations of domination, and whether
this is taking place along lines of structural contradiction. Thus, in
Figure 9 the horizontal arrows emerging from the vertical arrows of
strategic conduct and institutional analysis represent a direction of
focus through metaphor to ideology and contradiction. The list in
Figure 10 should not, of course, be taken to indicate order of analysis,
as researchers may enter the research process at different points.
However, to the degree that it is practical and possible, the
researcher should account for all the points on the scale.

This approach obviously does not constitute a method in the
"narrow sense" of technique (Sayer 1992, p. 2). Different methods in
this sense may be useful at different levels of analysis. For example,
at the level of situated use, participant observation might be useful. Participant observation might also be useful in assessing the level of various actors' discursive penetration of the discourse, but a structured, open ended interview could provide this information as well. At the level of the standardization of the metaphor or discourse across time, the methods of historical research would be in order. And so forth.

The list of procedures is formidable, and a major criticism of this approach is that compliance with all the procedures is a Herculean task. There is some validity to this criticism. However, different researchers have different concerns, and may legitimately emphasize some aspects more than others. Further, I assume that in many cases of the examination of policy discourse, researchers will be able to fill in or account for some of the levels through drawing on existing policy research.

This approach was developed with the intent of examining the ideological aspects of policy discourse and symbolization. However, it also offers considerable explanatory power with regard to other aspects of causation where domination or contradiction may not be as relevant. It incorporates, for example, something akin to Schön's approach to metaphor, and should allow us to recognize metaphoric policy descriptions that oversimplify complex situations, or metaphor influenced prescriptions which transfer inappropriate valuations to policy situations. And as part of the interpretive process by which we recognize contradiction, we will also be able to focus on other aspects of structure, looking for example for the type of rule sets or
transformation relations that Giddens identifies as the actual points of articulation of structure and agency.

Conclusion

In this chapter I draw on my findings concerning Giddens' structuration theory and his advice on social analysis, and on my knowledge of policy processes to synthesize an approach to analysis of policy discourse and symbolization. The approach is designed primarily to reveal ideological aspects of policy discourse or symbolization—that is, ways that discourse or symbolization conceal domination or institutionalized inequities. The approach turns on analysis of metaphor, but unlike argumentative turn approaches concerned with metaphor, this approach is designed to explain not only what metaphor reveals, but also, especially, what it conceals.

In order to determine what the metaphoric discourse or symbolization conceals, my approach requires researchers to treat policy discourse and symbolization as practices, and relate them to other practices. They must also relate the situated discursive and other practices of specific policy actors to reproduced or standardized practices across other contexts, or across wider expanses of time and space. This is accomplished by following the procedures listed in Figure 10. Through this process researchers gain insight into the articulation of structure and agency, but also into the power relations or dialectic of control both within the specific contexts of policy making, and across the larger social systems which policies affect.
Because the procedures also require comparison of a discourse with the actual policy practices which it inspires or justifies, and with the outcomes of these policy practices, the researcher is able to determine whether perverse policy outcomes are expressions of secondary contradiction, and thus related to domination or institutionalized inequities.

Finally, although the primary intent of the approach is analysis of the ideological in policy discourse/symbolization, because of its scope it also offers great potential for explaining other aspects of policy practices. Implicit in the approach is that it will reveal details about inappropriate policy prescriptions derived from metaphors. It also allows researchers to investigate relationships between the day-to-day world of policy actors and more far reaching events, for example, how the constraints policy actors work within are related to other aspects of behavior outside the policy arena, and how the constraints also affect formulation of specific policies. I discuss the significance of the approach in more detail in the final chapter.
Figure 8: Analysis of policy discourse and symbolization

*= Institutional Analysis  \quad \downarrow = Analysis of Strategic Conduct
Figure 9: Analysis of policy discourse and symbolization
• Focus on relevant metaphor as used by particular individuals in particular context.

• Who uses the metaphor
• Subtleties of use within and across contexts/groups: positive or negative use, irony, humor, etc.
• Discursive penetration of users, audience, those affected by policy practices
• Discursive meaning of metaphor: kind of relationship expressed; implicit values or prescriptions.
• Nature of policy practices inspired or justified by metaphoric discourse/symbolization
• Outcomes of policy practices
• Officially sanctioned definition of power relations

• Historical continuity or changes in use of discourse and/or related policy practices

↑ = Institutional Analysis    ↓ = Analysis of Strategic Conduct

Figure 10: Structuration based approach
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS

Summary

In Chapter 1 I argue that more powerful explanations of communication in policy analysis are needed. I introduce a body of literature, which I call the "argumentative turn" in policy analysis, which developed out of a recognition that the traditional assumptions about policy analysis as an objective, apolitical, problem solving technique were problematic. Contributors to the literature, realizing that persuasion, argument, interpretation and participation all play an important part in formulation and implementation of policies, set out to explain communication in the policy process. I argue that even the most powerful contributions to the literature exhibit weakness when it comes to explaining issues of choice versus constraint, the interrelation of communication with other normative behaviors, and the play of power in policy processes. I suggest that Giddens' structuration theory offers potential for overcoming these weaknesses, since it addresses questions of constraint, power, norms and communication in terms of the articulation of agency and structure.

I note, however, that Giddens' theorizations do not lend themselves directly to research applications, as they are highly
complex and abstract, and he presents them in terms of an ontology of social life. I further note that some critics have questioned whether Giddens' theory is in fact of any use for empirical research. Therefore I pose my research questions as follows: can our understanding of communication in policy processes be improved through application of structuration theory; and more narrowly, can an approach to policy discourse be developed from Giddens' structuration theory which provides better explanatory accounts than the current argumentative turn literature?

In Chapter 2 I set out methodological guidelines for proceeding from the abstract and general level of Giddens' theory to the more concrete and specific examination of policy discourse and symbolization. I establish that the study involves two aspects: exegesis of Giddens vast and abstract body of theory and advice on research; and synthesis of the insights derived from the exegesis with knowledge of concrete policy practices into a structuration based approach to policy discourse.

In Chapter 3 I begin the exegetic task, addressing Giddens' theory. I note occasional inconsistencies, and question some of his conceptualizations, but overall find his ontological arguments convincing. Of particular relevance for policy analysis are his insights into the way primary, structural contradictions cause secondary contradictions which are often expressed in terms of perverse outcomes of policies. In Chapter 4 I address Giddens' advice on research. I find that his two recommended approaches to analysis, institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct are
best understood as a matter of perspective or starting point. Institutional analysis begins with consideration of practices as standardized across time and space, and strategic conduct analysis begins with examination of the situated practices of specific agents. But each perspective must "move toward" the other if practices are to be completely explained.

Finally in Chapter 5 I derive an approach for analysis of policy discourse. It centers on metaphor, but unlike approaches to metaphor developed by various argumentative turn contributors, this approach stresses considering what metaphor is concealing, rather than what it reveals or prescribes. This approach can provide considerable explanatory power for many aspects of policy discourse, but in particular, allows us to trace ideological implications, and the effects of structural contradictions.

Discussion

This study advances scholarly thought in three related ways. First, the approach to policy discourse developed here offers considerable potential for explaining the nature of policy discourse in specific cases in a way that is superior to the approaches of the argumentative turn literature to date, as reviewed in Chapter 1. Second, the aspects of structuration theory I have highlighted throughout Chapters 3 and 4 explain factors which condition the policy process at a more general level. Third, the thorough exegesis of structuration theory contributes to the realm of social theory generally.
Contribution to the Argumentative Turn

The approach I have developed represents a unique contribution to the argumentative turn in policy analysis, and for that matter, to policy studies in general, because of its scope with regard to the linking of what are sometimes referred to as the "micro" and "macro" in social analysis, and because of the way it enables the researcher to explore the interrelations of communication with legitimation and, especially, power, in policy practices. I will discuss these contributions in more detail in terms of the way that the approach overcomes the previously identified weaknesses of the argumentative turn literature.

In Chapter 1 I critique the literature of the argumentative turn on the basis that it offers inadequate explanatory accounts. I argue that the weaknesses of the explanations offered in the expertise centered contributions spring from unstated or unexamined assumptions, especially those about the role of the policy analyst and about the nature of power relations in policy processes. Leaving these assumptions unquestioned, I argue, means that the contributors concentrate on questions of what policy analysts do or should be doing, without addressing the nature of the policy process itself, including policy analysis.

With regard to the contributions that I label as explanatory, the weaknesses I recognize vary with the individual studies. Forester's approach offers great potential for description of the day-to-day situations that policy analysts and planners face, but it remains to be
seen if he can or will apply it in a way that gets behind the
descriptive, and explains, for example the relationship between this
day-to-day world and specific policy issues. Throgmorton offers
interesting conceptualizations of communication processes, but in
common with the expertise centered analysts, has not conceptualized
the play of power relations in the policy process, despite his
assurance that they are important. Even Streeter, whose
explanations are the most compelling of the argumentative turn
literature, can be critiqued. In one contribution he assumes up front
that discourse determines other aspects of the policy process, leaving
little room to explain power relations or agency. In his more recent
contribution, he does not adequately link his recommendations for
change back to his own analysis and explanation.

I will first address conceptualizations of power relationships,
since weaknesses here seem the most pervasive across the literature.
The approach I have developed is concerned explicitly with power.
Informed by structuration theory, it begins from the assumption that
policies mediate, and policy participants are involved in mediation of,
power relations between individuals and groups across regions and
nations at the level of system integration. It further assumes that
power relations inevitably involve systematically reproduced
relations of domination, or autonomy and dependence, and that those
who are dominant in such relations have an interest in concealing
that domination in order to maintain the status quo. Finally, it is
assumed that reproduction of regularized relationships of domination
draws on contradictory aspects of structure, or contradictory structural principles.

The procedures of the approach lead the researcher to look for specific power relations through descriptions of both what the policy participants do, and what the conditions are for their action. That is, the procedures address situated use of metaphoric discourse, but also the long term institutionalization of the metaphor or discourse in relation to other practices, and the relations between the situated use and practices across greater expanses of space. The linking of the situated with, in Giddens’ terms, time and space distanciation, and of structure and agency allows the researcher to avoid the potential shortcomings of Forester's approach. The procedures tell us what to look at.

Because the approach focuses attention on power relations, and on the linking of the situated with time-space distanciation, it also bridges two different conceptual stances regarding language and discourse in the argumentative turn literature, and moves beyond them. Schön and Sawhney are concerned primarily with the ways that language directs attention—that is, what metaphors point to or prescribe. In his study of cable television, Streeter is more concerned with ambiguity, with the ways a metaphor centered discourse allows room for different interpretations, but at the same time serves to mask those differences. The approach developed here leads the researcher to examine a discourse from each of these perspectives. But it also leads the researcher to look directly at the relationships the discourse ostensibly addresses, and determine if
the discourse is concealing domination. It allows the researcher, in other words, to systematically examine the kinds of relationships Streeter is concerned with in his broad study of corporate liberal discourse and the regulation of electronic communication.

As I noted in Chapter 1, I recognize this most recent study by Streeter study as the most powerful explanatory contribution to the argumentative turn literature thus far. My critique of this piece can be understood as centering not so much on the relationships Streeter identifies, as on problems with his interpretations of them, and with his prescriptions for action. Structuration theory is useful in addressing these problems. But consideration of this moves discussion beyond the specific contributions of the approach I have developed, to the contributions of structuration theory more generally to the study of policy. Therefore, I will treat it in the section below.

**Structuration and the Explanation of Policy**

The procedures for analysis of policy discourse developed in this dissertation guide the researcher in addressing policy discourse and symbolization in terms of structuration theory. But this approach does not exhaust the possibilities for application of structuration theory to policy. Other approaches might be developed which would follow the general form of my approach at an abstract level—that is, the gradual widening out from, or narrowing in on, situated practices.
But these approaches could focus primarily on other institutional
types: legal, political or economic, rather than modes of
discourse/symbolization.

It is also possible to apply structuration theory in interpreting
the findings of studies which did not utilize a structuration sensitized
approach. In many cases, such after-the-fact analysis is likely to
center partly on critique of the researchers' assumptions. But it can
also involve adaptation and synthesis.

I will consider Streeter's most recent work to show how
application of application of structuration theory can avoid the kind
of inconsistencies in explaining regulatory processes for which I
critiqued him in the first chapter. I noted there that the weight of
Streeter's argument suggests that the entire political, legal and
regulatory process as exemplified in broadcasting regulation is
hopelessly biased. He argues that all attempts for change historically
have either been ignored or eventually subverted into the normal
discourse of corporate liberalism. Thus when he calls for discussing
new ways of defining property, more participatory processes and so
on, it is not clear how or where he could expect such discussions to
take place, or how significant change might be brought about, short
of political revolution or an epistemic shift.

First, I would like to again suggest that while much of his
argument is convincing, he overstates the power of corporate
capitalist interests and the discourse to always prevail. I argued in
Chapter 1 to the effect that Streeter overdraws his conclusions based
on the evidence he provides. Here I would like to relate his conceptualizations of policy, discourse and contradiction to structuration theory.

Streeter discusses corporate liberal discourse in terms of "strategies for overcoming" the contradictions between liberalism's emphasis on individuals as property holders and the collective corporate capitalist form (1996, p. 51). Expertise was assumed to mediate between the interests of corporate capital, individuals as property owners, labor, etc. But, as noted above and in Chapter 1, in Streeter's view corporate capital's long term interests were always favored in this configuration. The particular contradiction Streeter recognizes can, of course, be understood as a secondary contradiction, in Giddens' terms, deriving from the primary contradictions of private accumulation and social production, and public and private realms which are mutually dependent on one another, yet mutually antagonistic.

Viewed in these terms, Streeter's argument itself can be understood as expressive of a secondary contradiction. He claims to reject the system through which the primary contradictions are expressed and reconstituted, yet he cannot escape the terms of the contradiction when calling for a more participatory public sphere and new definitions of property. We can also address Streeter's assumptions in terms of Giddens' critique of what he refers to as the "thinly veiled functionalism" of "much contemporary Marxist writing on the state" (1981b, p. 215, see also 1979, 111-115).
Streeter consciously distances himself from aspects of Marxist thought in this study (e.g., 1996, p. 314-315). And at least one Marxist scholar has criticized his conceptualizations of property (Schiller 1997). Nevertheless, Streeter does interpret state activities, albeit at an implicit level, in terms of the functions they serve for reproduction of the capitalist system. Giddens' conceptualization of the state and contradiction offers more flexibility. First, in structuration theory, the economic is not granted any *a priori* determining power over the political—not even in the final instance. Second, contradiction from the perspective of structuration theory can be understood in terms of opportunity for system transformation. Contradiction corresponds with differences in interest, and with domination, as discussed in Chapter 3. To the degree that the contradiction is recognized, those who are subordinated have an opportunity to press for change. And this need not take the form of revolution. As Giddens suggests in his treatment of ideology, discussed in Chapter 4, concepts such as "freedom of contract" or "the 'democratic' half of the liberal-democratic couplet" (1979, p. 194) have indeed served primarily as ideology--i.e., have masked domination as such--but also have had real emancipatory potential. And it has been through pushing, as it were, on the emancipatory potential of the contradictions, or of their ideological expression, that "'citizenship rights' have been achieved through the active intervention of labour movements in the political arena" (Giddens 1981b, p. 14).
Thus, from the perspective of structuration theory, positive change is possible within the political realm. It must be fought for, there are no guarantees of final outcomes on a given issue, and the struggle is likely to be on-going. But there is potential that Streeter refuses to recognize.

I would like to offer one more example of how structuration theory can be applied in interpretation of completed policy studies. For the sake of convenience I will again consider Streeter's recent study. It is possible to derive from Streeter's analysis the types of rule sets or transformation relationships which Giddens discusses as a level of abstraction of institutional analysis, as treated in Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation.

In conceptualizing the regulatory arena as interpretive community, Streeter demonstrates that expertise, mastery of method, advanced degrees, etc. are essentially requirements for gaining entry to and participating in the policy process (1996, p. 132-142). We can derive or abstract at least one set of rules, or transformation relationships from this:

\[ \text{education : credentials : policy participation.} \]

This set of rules/transformations can be related to others that Giddens' has identified, for example:

\[ \text{private property : money : educational advantage : occupational position} \]

and

\[ \text{private property : money : capital : labour contract : industrial authority (Giddens 1984, p. 302).} \]
Linking the rule sets derived from Streeter's study to these sets allows us to begin to consider at an abstract level ways that policy analytic practices are linked to spatially and temporally broader patterns of practice—especially with regard to domination and privilege—in society.

Structuration based approaches to policy would thus avoid the kind of short-comings for which I have critiqued Streeter. And they offer potential for improved explanation of policy practices generally, not just when communication is the primary focus. Finally, various insights from structuration theory can be applied in interpreting results from studies that did not utilize a structuration based approach.

**Contribution to Social Theory**

The ultimate intent in this study has been to develop an approach or approaches to policy analysis that can provide better explanatory accounts of policy communication processes. In the process of developing this approach, however, I devote considerable effort to exegesis of Giddens' structuration theory. In addition to contributing to the theorizing of policy processes, this exegesis contributes to the broader field of social theory. Many scholars have written on Giddens' theories, but few, I would argue, have treated them in the depth that I have.

My interpretations advance the literature on Giddens' theory in several areas. The most significant contribution, I would argue, is
the recognition that institutional analysis and analysis of strategic conduct are best understood not as two distinct approaches, but as two perspectives that have different starting points, but which should move toward one another's origins with regard to explaining human practices. This understanding of the two approaches is more consistent with Giddens' overall theorizing than one which treats them as two distinct approaches. And the approaches to analysis which such an interpretation leads to, as exemplified by the approach to policy discourse developed here, are likely to yield more powerful explanatory accounts than supposedly structuration based approaches which require the researcher to somehow jump back and forth between the two understood rigidly in terms of "brackets."

Another important contributions at the level of social theory relates to the recognition that Giddens' conceptualization of resources is problematic. Conceiving of structure simply as rules, rather than rules and resources is more logically consistent with his overall treatment of structure. More fundamentally, such conceptualization stresses that power and domination, whether authoritative or allocative, are processes rather than things.

Another contribution is my argument that Giddens himself risks being accused of a functionalist stance when he insists on utilizing the terminology of homeostatic loops and feedback to describe aspects of social system reproduction. Finally, too, my specific conceptualization of the role of metaphor in ideological aspects of modes of discourse and the symbolic advances structuration theory itself.
Closing Thoughts

This analysis, as it stands, is of course, partial. It is necessary to apply the structuration based approach to policy discourse in order to fully assess its usefulness in providing explanatory accounts of the policy process. Such application is the next stage in my research agenda. My expectation is that the approach will enable us to learn more about the ways power relations are concealed in policy process, especially at the institutional level of discourse and symbolic orders.

Though I have argued throughout of the need for better explanatory accounts of policy processes, I do not view explanation in and of itself as the ultimate aim of policy research. Rather, better understanding will facilitate intervention. I critiqued the analysts whose work I have classified as participatory/emancipatory approaches for not adequately conceptualizing power processes. I also critiqued Streeter on the grounds that though he has conceptualized power relations, he has not related that conceptualization in any realistic way to his call for changing the system.

Despite my criticisms, I share with these scholars a conviction that current policy outcomes tend to favor the interests of those who are already privileged. I am concerned with effecting change, both through the policy process, and where possible, in the nature of policy institutions themselves, to off-set such institutionalized privilege. Recognizing the opportunity for such change depends on first recognizing the instances where policies or processes are
reproducing or reinforcing such privilege. Revealing domination is a necessary, though not sufficient step toward challenging it.
LIST OF REFERENCES


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