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SPROUTING AT THE GRASSROOTS:
ORGANIZED LABOR'S POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
AND MEMBER'S POLITICAL ACTIVISM

DISSESSATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Eric S. Heberlig, M.A.

The Ohio State University
1997

Dissertation Committee:
Professor Gregory A. Caldeira, Adviser
Professor Herbert Asher
Professor Randall B. Ripley

Approved by

Adviser
Department of Political Science
ABSTRACT

I examine how interest groups—in particular, labor unions—attempt to mobilize their members to participate in electoral and grassroots lobbying campaigns and, drawing from organizational and social psychology, explain why members participate in group-sponsored political activities. Data are drawn from personal interviews of officers of Ohio labor unions and 1992 and 1994 post-election telephone surveys of Ohio labor union members. Interviews are the basis for describing organized labor's political structures and political mobilization techniques. I explain why organized labor let its grassroots lobbying structures deteriorate and how labor is attempting to rebuild them. I discuss the place of Labor '96 within these strategy changes.

I find that the mobilization process is critical to understanding how and why members participate in group-sponsored political activities. Members are likely to respond positively when asked. I find that group leaders, because they have limited time and resources for political mobilization, seek out the members who are most accessible to them and who are likely to be able to participate effectively. The member's "civic skills" (education) are particularly important in explaining who is asked to participate. The emphasis on skills and education in political mobilization even within labor unions points out the sources of the social class bias traditionally found in political participation.
I find that a member's compliance with requests to engage in political activities is based on her level of commitment to the organization as well as her level of agreement with the political positions of the organization. Commitment is even more important in explaining members' participation in group's grassroots lobbying campaigns than in electoral campaign activities. This demonstrates the importance of a member's relationship with the sponsoring organization in determining whether she will comply with requests for political action.

I conclude that understanding the dynamics of organizational mobilization is critical to understanding political participation.
Dedicated to my parents
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this dissertation is due to the assistance of many. First, I wish to thank my dissertation committee, particularly adviser Greg Caldeira, for their intellectual guidance and helpful advice. In addition, at many points in the project, Peter Radcliffe provided advice on methodological issues and cheerfully helped do battle with uncooperative statistics programs.

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I am extremely grateful to the many labor union officers and activists who generously gave their time, often more than once, to sit for interviews. The following individuals deserve special thanks for helping me “open doors” to get interviews: Michael Billirakis, Bill Burga, Dave Kolbe, Carol Pierce Mix, C.J. Slanika, and Patty Tutoki.

Finally, I thank my parents for instilling in me the desire to learn, for always pushing me to do better, for their patience through what must have seemed a never-ending process, and for their constant love and support.
VITA

March 25, 1970.................Born - Abington, Pennsylvania
1992 - present......................Graduate Teaching and Research Associate,
                                The Ohio State University
1995....................................M.A. Political Science, Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science
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<td>AFSCME</td>
<td>American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Workers</td>
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"The grassroots are the shock troops of political action." -- An Ohio Education Association (OEA) activist

"When doing electoral mobilizations, [our union] staff tries to 'wake up' the legislative chairs of the local COPE committees. To get activists, we often have to go around the local COPE committee to talk to the local president. ...We have trouble getting volunteers." -- An Ohio Union's Political Director

"I was furious at the [education] changes being proposed by the legislature. I didn't want to see 20 years worth of hard work disappear in three months. ...The OEA provided a list of local presidents, a booklet on how to run the campaign, and pre-printed materials including a sample agenda for the meeting, letters, etc. It was well thought-out. You could wing it with the OEA's book if necessary. ...Besides meetings, I sent letters to local presidents and followed them up with phone calls. ...Besides urging our members to send letters and make phone class, we sent petitions and encouraged members to attend Lobby Days. ...We brought teachers from Michigan to one of our meetings. Michigan has already gone through this and the teachers had failed to mobilize effectively. So the Michigan teachers could tell what happened to them. This makes it clear to our members that it could happen to them too." -- A OEA activist

"Ninety percent of legislators are good people who want to do the right thing. They're not going to be bought off, particularly with press attention on them. Membership mobilization and organizational strength in the district matter because they are potential votes and one thing legislators care about is votes." -- An Ohio labor lobbyist
One of the central purposes of interest groups in the American political arena is to represent the interests, preferences, and passions of their members before government. One strategy interest groups use to do this is grassroots mobilization that attempts to use group members themselves to influence government on behalf of the group. Members can write letters to legislators on important issues, join in protests, and help elect public officials sympathetic to the group's cause. Some impressionistic evidence indicates that the use of grassroots mobilization as a strategy of interest group influence has increased in recent years (Cigler and Loomis 1995; H. Smith 1988, Chap 9). Such grassroots mobilization may be an important source of information for policymakers regarding the consequences of proposals on their constituents (Wright 1996). Thus, grassroots participation by members of interest groups may play an important role in influencing public policy by helping to place sympathetic officials in office, creating access for the group's lobbyists, and in affecting policymakers' perceptions of their constituents' interests.

Yet interest groups face collective action problems in mobilizing members (Olson 1965). As rational economic decision-makers, members will not contribute to the production of collective goods unless the benefits of participation outweigh the costs and their individual contribution makes the difference in allowing the collective good to be produced. They would prefer to ride "free," acquiring the benefits of group membership and letting others make the contributions necessary to produce those benefits. Groups may solve the collective action dilemma in order to organize by attracting members based on selective benefits or by engaging in political action as a "by-product" of their economic organization (Olson 1965), but groups face the free rider problem again if they need to mobilize existing members for group-sponsored grassroots
political action. Despite these barriers, some members of interest groups do participate in group mobilizations. This raises a central question: why are some members able to overcome the urge to free ride in order to participate; and others, not?

Leadership and organization are potential solutions to the collective action problem. Hence, mobilization by group leaders is a key to member involvement in political action. But how do group leaders persuade members to engage in activities for the collective benefit of the organization when such activities are beyond the conditions of employment or of group membership? In addition, there is often a diversity of political interests and priorities among group members and power in organizations often is decentralized to different organizational units. How is the organization able to mobilize cohesively for political action despite these obstacles?

While Olson's identification of the collective action problem in organized group formation has spurred substantial effort to explain why members join interest groups, political scientists know little about the activism of members in interest groups (Cigler 1994). With the significant exceptions of Knoke's studies of voluntary associations (1981, 1982, 1988, 1990) and Rothenberg's study of Common Cause (1992), there has been little empirical work on why members of interest groups become activists within an organization or how groups attempt to mobilize their members for political action. There are several likely reasons for this omission: many interest groups are composed of institutional members rather than individuals (Salisbury 1984), members of many citizens' groups have no more than a "checkbook affiliation" and leave lobbying and organizational activities to the staff (Berry 1977; Hayes 1986; Godwin 1988), and data on member participation within organizations are difficult to gather.
This study will link group leadership efforts at mobilization to rank-and-file participation. It will explore organized labor's mobilization structures, the creation of opportunities to participate in politics by unions, the process of political mobilization, who is contacted to participate in union political activities, why members respond to group mobilization appeals, and the differences in mobilization and participation between electoral campaigns and grassroots lobbying campaigns.

My argument is that when membership activism is needed as a political resource, group leadership attempts to mobilize by lowering the costs and raising the benefits of participation to members. This includes creating opportunities to participate, educating members about the personal impact of political issues and candidates on their lives, letting members know how to participate, providing "easy" ways of participating, providing rewards for participation, and placing social pressure on members to participate. Still, despite the efforts of group leadership, some members join in group activities and others do not. Drawing from organizational and social psychology, I argue that a member's commitment to the group is the critical theoretical variable in explaining why some members participate. Commitment leads members to place to greater personal significance on group outcomes because she identifies with the group as part of her self-concept.

This framework is central to the model developed in this dissertation to explain member activism in interest groups. I also develop a research design to test this model on the electoral and grassroots lobbying participation by members of Ohio labor unions. Testing the model will help us understand why some members overcome the incentives to free ride in an effort to produce collective goods.
The Collective Action Dilemma

Group leaders attempt to achieve their political ends by strategically mobilizing members to support candidates and policies that will bring benefits to the group (Uhlman 1989a; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). It seems reasonable to expect that both group leaders and members would desire an increase in the benefits that may accrue to them due to favorable public policy. At the same time, it would seem that the free rider problem identified by Olson (1965) is just as acute a barrier to activism as it is for individuals to join a group.

Olson argues that rational individuals will not join organizations if they can receive the collective goods produced by the organization, which members of the group by definition cannot be excluded from consuming (p. 14), without paying to help produce it. The individual would rather be a "free rider," accepting the benefits of group activity, allowing others to bear the costs. This is particularly true in groups in which the contribution of any one individual makes no perceptible increase in the probability that group benefits will be produced (i.e., a large group). Under these conditions, no group would be organized since no rational individual would want to bear the costs to provide collective goods for others. To overcome the free rider problem, Olson argues that groups must gain members either through coercion or selective incentives. The selective incentive is available only to members of the group.

Olson has been criticized over the years from many different perspectives. Some have argued that individuals may not be as willing to free ride as Olson's rational actor. In experiments, people are willing to contribute to the good of the collectivity rather than free ride (Marwell and Ames 1979, 1980; Brewer and Kramer 1986; Loewenstein, Thompson, and Bazerman 1989; Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell 1990). People join "public interest" groups...
which have few selective incentives to offer (Berry 1977). Even for economic interest groups such as business, labor, and farm organizations, factors other than material incentives exert a substantial influence on participation (Moe 1980; Knoke 1988, 1990).

Thus, many have argued that the type of benefits accruing from group participation must be expanded beyond Olson's accent on material incentives. Members also join groups in response to the incentive of solidarity and expressive benefits (Clark and Wilson 1961; Salisbury 1969; Wilson 1973; Moe 1980; Knoke 1990). Similarly, individuals may become activists within the group in order to enjoy interaction with other activists (Uhlaner 1986, 1989b; Opp 1986) and/or to feel that they are making an impact on public policy in an area of intense interest.

**Leadership and Mobilization**

Leadership is another solution to the collective action problem (Bianco and Bates 1990; Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Young 1971). Groups can be organized by the efforts of an entrepreneur or patron (Salisbury 1969; Walker 1983) to make joining a group a relatively low-cost activity. Entrepreneurs help to overcome the free rider problem by signaling to potential members that the group is a viable means of attaining their goals (Ainsworth and Sened 1993), by providing the opportunities to participate, and by subsidizing the cost of participation (Salisbury 1969). They can offer potential members an attractive combination of group benefits in order to entice them to join (King and Walker 1991).

Once members have joined and their activism is needed to produce collective goods, leaders can mobilize members by making direct requests for participation in group activities. I follow Rosenau's definition of mobilization:
In an organizational context, mobilization occurs when someone in the organization attempts to generate political acts from members. In the process of mobilization, leaders often can manipulate some of the benefits and/or costs of participation in order to increase the probability that members will participate (Uhlaner 1986, 1989a; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Without clear reasons and opportunities, the other responsibilities of life are likely to take precedence over group participation. Thus, leaders subsidize the cost of participation by informing members of events in the political arena, making members aware of opportunities to participate, by framing their mobilization appeals to connect the values of the members to the activity being undertaken by the group, and by clarifying the benefits of action and the risks of inaction for the member. Moreover, mobilization appeals by the leader assures the member that others in the group will also be involved, that the individual will not be a "sucker" for contributing while others free ride (Levi 1988, Uhlaner 1989b, Chong 1991). Given the considerable uncertainty regarding the probability of the group's ability to achieve its goals in many political situations, leaders' exhortations that the individual must participate for the group to succeed may lead members to believe that their contribution will be effective (Moe 1980). In short, the "mobilization model" of political participation (Leighley 1995) asserts that the participation of individuals is a response to social cues and opportunities provided by someone asking the individual to participate.

---

1 Others have used the term "mobilization" to include the organization of a group in the first place (Walker 1991) or to include an activity by anyone that increases the likelihood that someone else will participate in politics (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, 133) refer to the process of generating political participation through requests by others as "recruitment" of activists in order to avoid the multiple meanings of mobilization.
Research has found that the structure of opportunities (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Wilson and Orum 1976) and the mobilization activities of political leaders significantly increase individuals' participation in political activities (Leighley 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Knoke 1982, 1988, 1990; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Zipp and Smith 1979; Rogers, Bulterra and Barb 1975). Yet we know little about how mobilization works or when and why it is effective. For example, although many studies find that membership in organizations increases the likelihood that an individual participates in politics, different reasons have been offered as explanations. Activists may be likely both to join groups and to participate in politics. In this case, political activists are recruited into the organization because of the organization's opportunities for political activism, rather than organizational activities themselves causing greater political participation of the members. Or, individuals may learn about politics through group communications (Verba and Nie 1972; Pollock 1982; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990) or learn the "civic skills" necessary for political participation (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) through their activity in organizations. Or the organization may be responsible for mobilizing its members to become involved in politics by contacting members and making specific requests (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992).

Recent studies have demonstrated the impact of direct mobilization of interest groups on members' political participation. Knoke (1982, 1988, 1990) finds that group "mobilization efforts" increase member's participation in group

---

\(^2\) Measured as the frequency (never, rarely, sometimes, regularly) with which officials claimed the group "call[s] upon ordinary members to make any of the following types of contributions": (1) to contact government officials on behalf of the [org. name]; (2) to write letters to newspapers or magazines; (3) to participate in demonstrations or picketing; (4) to work in political candidates' campaigns." (Knoke 1990, p. 198)
"external" activities. Using Knok'e's data set, Leighley (1996) finds evidence for both "intentional" and "unintentional" mobilization effects in interest groups. In terms of activism within the group, Rothenberg (1992, 141) found that 77% of Common Cause activists had been asked to participate by fellow members or by Common Cause itself and 23% of activists volunteered by contacting Common Cause themselves. Unfortunately, the question on which these findings are based was asked of activists only, not the full sample. Thus, Rothenberg is unable to assess the impact of mobilization on member activism.

Yet many of the above studies that find organizational membership increases individual political participation fail to address issues of causality (Leighley 1996; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). These studies have been unable to state whether members of organizations participate more in politics because of group activities or because they are natural activists who join groups in addition to the other political activities in which they are engaged. I will attempt to address the problem of causality. First, as will be described in detail later, I will study a primarily economic organization, labor unions. Members are likely to join for the economic and work-related benefits, rather than opportunities to participate in politics. Second, I examine political activities sponsored by unions and member responses to these opportunities, not member political participation on their own, which strengthens the claim that union activity is the "cause" of member participation.

Other details of the mechanisms of mobilization are unclear. For example, who do group leaders mobilize? As noted by Leighley (1996, 448):

---

3 She measures intentional mobilization by the average frequency with which the group asks its members to engage in each type of participation (see previous footnote) on behalf of the group. "Unintentional mobilization is an interaction term consisting of the extent to which the group engages in practices associated with participatory democracy (e.g., high levels of interaction or policy debate) multiplied by the individual's level of activity within the group." (p. 452)
"With one exception—the activity level of the group member within the group—little evidence regarding how specific individual characteristics structure the mobilization process have been offered."

Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, Chap. 6) argue that political elites, because they have limited resources for mobilization, target their mobilization activities towards individuals who are most likely to respond with the political message the mobilizer desires. To explain which individuals are mobilized by political parties, they suggest four characteristics of relevance here: the individual's resources, her strength of party identification, her level of social involvement, and the characteristics of the campaigns. Corresponding characteristics are likely to affect mobilization contacts in interest groups: member resources, her level of political agreement with the organization, her level of activity within the organization, and the organizational context in which mobilization takes place (e.g., the activity level of the organization, the geographic political strength of the organization, and the targeting of effort and resources by the organization). In addition, given that mobilization depends on communicating with members to let them know what they can do and why they should do it, the individual's level of reliance on the organization for political information is likely to affect her probability of being mobilized.

Yet mobilization does not necessarily equal participation. Members can turn down the request. The difficulty of getting members to accede to requests for political action is noted by James N. Rosenau (1974, 408): "If getting family and friends to make simple and clear responses is often a vexing and delicate task, getting unknown persons to give time, energy or money on behalf of distant goals that may or may not be realized seems awesome." So why do some members who are mobilized respond while others do not?
Participation In Group Political Activities

The free rider problem still stands as a barrier to member participation. It may have been solved once to get the individual to join the organization. Thereafter, activism is an additional contribution (besides dues) the group may need members to make to produce the collective good. The free rider logic now applies to activists within a group: even if the good is provided only to group members, why should any one member be active in producing the good, if everyone else will benefit without being active? It is costly to be active (e.g., in time and effort), and unless the group provides particular selective incentives to activists only, the active members receive no more than the inactive members. Therefore, it is rational to be inactive, let someone else do all the work, yet still collect the benefits of membership.

Although, as Olson observes, the individual may have little objective impact on the probability of the provision of the collective good, psychologists have found that people estimate probabilities poorly (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1982). Similarly, Moe (1980) argues that individuals do not have complete information and may be mislead by the exhortations of group leaders regarding their actual contribution to the collective good. Because of imperfect information, efficacious group members are likely to overestimate their impact on the provision of collective goods. Therefore, individuals may become activists in the group because they highly value the collective good and believe their participation makes a greater impact than it actually does.

Rothenberg (1988, 1992) picks up on Moe's observation of imperfect information. Rothenberg argues that individuals join groups without a thorough knowledge of the benefits a particular group offers. In fact, they join in order to find out whether membership is worthwhile because many of the costs and
benefits of membership may be observable only through participation. After joining, members learn about the organization and about the costs and benefits of membership. If membership is worth the cost, they renew their membership; if not, they quit.

Rothenberg argues that the same experiential model applies to decisions to become active within the organization. Members are given opportunities to become active and thus to learn about the cost and benefits of activism. They then decide whether, and if so, how active to become. In his analysis of activism at Common Cause (1992, 127-57), Rothenberg found support for his experiential learning theory: members, because they were uncertain about the purposes of the group when joining, were not likely to become activists right away. Once they learned about the costs and benefits of activism, they were more likely to become activists. However, the increase in the probability that the member will become an activist is subject to diminishing returns over time; if a member is not attracted to the benefits of activism within a few years of joining, she will not participate regardless of the length of time she is a member of the organization.

The success of Rothenberg's theory rests on his measure of learning, the logarithmic term of the number of years the individual has been a member of Common Cause. He goes to great pains to show that members' knowledge about Common Cause's organization and issue positions increases with tenure in the organization (Rothenberg 1988, 1138-40; 1992, 102-8). Yet he uses tenure rather than knowledge about the organization in his models of retention.
and activism.\textsuperscript{4} The problem is that time in the organization likely is related to many other things other than learning.\textsuperscript{5}

Doubt about using years of membership as the key theoretical variable is intensified when other researchers use the same measurement to stand for other theoretical constructs. For example, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 130-3) use the logarithmic term of years lived in the community as a measure of social involvement and integration in the community in predicting political participation. Knoke (1988, 1990) finds that tenure in the organization is related to several types of activism, but uses it as a control variable (1988, 319) and attributes no importance to it substantively. Thus, we are left wondering why time is related to activism (is it really learning, or is it "social integration," or something else?) and whether that "something else" should be the central theoretical variable.

\textbf{Compliance Theory}

Proponents of compliance theory (see Levi 1988; Brehm and Gates 1996) argue that there are three bases of compliance with the law or with one's job responsibilities: coercive, instrumental, and ideological. Coercive compliance occurs when any individual obeys a request in order to avoid punishment. Instrumental compliance occurs in order to receive promised rewards for cooperating (i.e., selective incentives). Few organizations are able

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\item[4] His rationale is that years in the organization is a continuous measure, which makes it feasible to test his hypothesis of diminishing returns (Rothenberg 1992, 111). This allows him to integrate joining, retention, and activism decisions under one theoretical rubric of experiential learning. Moreover, since learning is a process which occurs over time, it requires a time-sensitive measure in a cross-sectional design; current knowledge is a static measure. Last, if he had used organizational knowledge as a measure of learning, he would have been open to the criticism that any relationship between knowledge and activism might be due to activists learning more about the organization.
\item[5] As Kornell (1978) notes, time has no theoretical meaning and can be used to support the validity of multiple theories. It is descriptive rather than explanatory.
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to gain compliance with requests for political activism through coercion or by offering substantial selective incentives to activists only. Levi (1988, 50-1) argues that individuals may comply with laws not because coercion or incentives motivate their self-interest, but because of ideological reasons. She argues that an individual complies with requests because of "a strongly held normative or ideological convictions." In other words, they comply because they think they should. Although she notes the failure of others to be specific in stating how "norms" (Ullman-Margalit 1977) or "purposive benefits" (Wilson 1973; Moe 1980) could be observed and measured (see also Green and Shapiro 1994, Chap. 5), her conceptualization is no more convincing: "[I treat] ideology as a residual category for those situations in which self-interest is clearly not explanatory." (p. 51)

I offer two bases of ideological compliance to explain interest group member's consent with requests to participate: their agreement with the political positions of the organization and their commitment to the organization. First, members may participate because of agreement with the political positions of the organization. They participate in order to advance their own and the organization's political preferences. This is a straightforward explanation for why members of political interest groups participate in group political activities. Yet not all members join organizations based on the political positions of the group. Some members join without knowledge of group positions, and indeed join in order to find out (Rothenberg 1988, 1992). They can then drop out if the organization does not meet their needs. The majority of interest groups, however, are organized primarily for non-political purposes (Salisbury 1984, Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Walker 1991). These organizations become involved in politics as they see their interests affected in
the political arena. They may mobilize their members as one strategy of political influence, but members have not joined in order to participate in politics nor based on the political positions of the organization. So for members of many interest groups, agreement with the group's positions is not assured.

**Organizational Commitment and Social Identity Theory**

I argue that a second basis of ideological compliance is a member's commitment to the organization. Commitment is based on the member's psychological identification with the organization. Social identity theory argues that individuals form a personal identity based on their membership in social groups. Individuals categorize others in terms of "in-groups" and "out-groups" -- people like me and those unlike me (Brewer 1979). Psychological identification with the in-group makes the group an important source of norms, values, and social comparisons for the member, thus making the group subjectively important in determining the member's actions. They tend to act favorably towards members of their "in-group," less favorably towards members of "out-groups," and, in situations where there is uncertainty as to how they should behave, will use their stereotype of what a "good" group member would do to determine their own behavior (Turner 1987).

Organizational psychologists have developed the concept of "organizational commitment" to explain individual's retaining membership in the organization and in helping the group attain collective goals (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982). Parallel to social identity theory, commitment to the organization means that the individual is not merely a member of the group, but psychologically identifies with the organization. Being a member of the group is a salient part of her self-identity (Kelly 1993). Organizational commitment is expected to play a prominent role in the political participation of union members.
since those loyal to the group are more likely to comply with requests for activity based on their willingness to respond to group norms, to do what "good" group members are doing in the given situation.

For many individuals, memberships in political interest groups are unlikely to be central to their self-identities. Joining a political group may give the individual pleasure from a sense of "symbolic solidarity" (Oliver and Furman 1989) with others they agree with, but other social groups, such as family, church, and occupation are likely to be more salient in defining "who I am." When demands on one's time and energy compete, groups to whom one is psychologically committed are more likely to receive one's active contribution. Thus, being a member is one thing, but being psychologically committed to the group to the extent that one is drawn to activism by this loyalty is another.

Definitions of commitment usually follow the three factors conceptualized by Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1982, 27): 1) a strong belief and acceptance of the organization's goals and values; 2) a willingness to exert considerable effort on behalf of the organization; and 3) a strong desire to maintain membership in the organization. As applied to unions, commitment usually is defined based on four factors developed by Gordon and associates (1980): 1) union loyalty (sense of pride and awareness of benefits); 2) responsibility to the union (acknowledgement and acceptance of union expectations of member support); 3) willingness to work (willingness to serve the union "beyond the call of duty"); and 4) belief in unionism (support for the concept of unionism in general).

Since commitment is partially based on a member's desire to maintain membership in the organization, it should correlate positively with tenure in the organization (Rothenberg's "learning"). Nevertheless, members who are committed to the organization should be more active regardless of their tenure.
The common denominator in subsequent research in both organizational and union psychology has been on the "loyalty" component of commitment (O'Reilly and Chatman 1986; Fullagar, McCoy, and Shull 1992; Kelloway and Barling 1993). As argued by O'Reilly and Chatman (1986), the emphasis on loyalty is appropriate because it focuses on the psychological basis of attachment to the organization rather than the likely consequences of that attachment (willingness to work and retention).

Commitment may serve as a basis for the overcoming of the free rider problem by providing the link between individual and collective concerns. The salience of the individual's common social identity may result in greater weight being given to collective gains over individual gains (Kelly 1993). The member focuses on her responsibility to the group or on doing her "fair" share, rather than on taking advantage of others by free riding.\(^6\) Gross (1995) has found that members who are committed to the organization are more likely to be motivated to be activists by normative incentives (e.g., democratic duties) than for material or solidarity incentives. This is not to say that individual and group interests are synonymous; at times they may diverge, but the group's interests are important personally to the committed member (Conover 1984).

Group identity has been found to be an important factor in overcoming the free-rider problem in experimental settings (Dawes et al. 1990, Brewer and Kramer 1986), in encouraging political participation (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981), in structuring evaluation of political issues (Conover 1984), and in voting for pro-feminist presidential candidates by feminists (Cook 1993).

\(^6\) Economically-oriented scholars tend to define interdependent preferences as synonymous with altruism (Taylor 1987; Hardin 1982), while more philosophically-oriented scholars refer to altruism as occurring only in the absence of self-interest (e.g. Jenks 1990; Elster 1990). Whether it is altruism or not, commitment occurs when the group's interests take on personal significance for the member.
In organizational settings, commitment has predicted pro-social behaviors in corporations (O'Reilly and Chatman 1986, Kirchmeyer 1992, Schaubroeck and Ganster 1991), participation in union activities (Kelloway and Barling 1993, Fullagar and Barling 1989, Gordon et al. 1980, Thacker, Fields and Barclay 1990, Huszczo 1983), and politically, voting for union-endorsed candidates by union members (Asher, Heberlig, Ripley, and Snyder 1996) and participating actively in pro-choice or pro-life groups (Gross 1995).

Knoke previously has incorporated organizational commitment into the study of interest groups. He and Wood (1981, 3) hypothesized that commitment was the result of member attraction to organizational incentives and resulted in member contribution of time and resources in the organization. They tested the relationship between variables only at an organizational level (pp. 48, 115). Although they found that level of commitment and amount of participation were significantly related (p. 24), the small number of organizations in the sample prevented them from doing multivariate tests (p. 128).

Knoke (1982) used the same data set to test a model of individual member participation in political activities, but failed to include member commitment in the model. In later work, Knoke (1988, 1990) again tests models of various forms of member activism in the group, but in each case uses commitment as one of a series of dependent variables. He never uses psychological commitment as a predictor of behavioral participation.7 Thus, Knoke provides an inadequate test of the proposition that commitment to the group helps members to overcome the urge to free ride.

7 Knoke's apparent rationale for not including commitment as an independent variable in the models of behavioral participation: *Given the complex patterns of member involvement that can occur, the distinct behavioral and attitudinal dimensions must be analyzed separately.* (1990, 163) This statement directly contradicts the model he and Wood (1981) developed, yet he never explains why this portion of the model is no longer valid.
A Model of Member Activism in Interest Groups

Essentially, there are three elements necessary for grassroots mobilizations by interest groups: organizational structures to facilitate mobilization and member participation, the act of mobilization itself through contacting members with requests for participation, and member compliance with the mobilization request. Without structures in place to communicate with members and to let them know when their contributions are needed for group success, leaders cannot mobilize their members. Nor can leaders effectively offer incentives to members or monitor member compliance. Two organizational mechanisms that facilitate mobilization are assigning staff or special volunteer teams responsibility for generating responses and/or creating decentralized structures that allow for use of personal appeals and social pressures. Organizational structures are a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for mobilization and member participation. Organized labor's structures for political mobilization and strategic decision-making processes will be the focus of Chapter 2.

Members may participate voluntarily, but without the group asking them to participate, the numbers of volunteers is likely to be low and, if voluntarism is uncoordinated, participation may come at times and in ways that may not help the group produce the collective good. Thus, understanding who group leaders attempt to mobilize and how leaders attempt to mobilize them becomes important.

For purposes of empirical tests, I will conceptualize the mobilization of members by group contacts and participation of members as a three-stage process. First, I examine the characteristics of members who are aware of organizationally-sponsored opportunities to participate and who receive
mobilization contacts requesting that they participate. Second, I will examine the characteristics of members who participate in their group's political activities. Finally, I will evaluate the effects of mobilization contacts on participation.

In the mobilization stage, the following characteristics of members are likely to affect the probability of receiving a request from the organization. First, receiving an invitation to participate in an organization's political activities depends on having a local leadership that is likely to mobilize. Members are more likely to be contacted by organizations that have infrastructure and staff or volunteer leadership available for and active in grassroots mobilization. Second, given limited mobilization resources, leaders are most likely to contact members who are most available for political action: those who have a higher levels of group participation aside from political activities. Third, leaders are most likely to mobilize those who can respond effectively and appropriately to the organization's requests. Thus, members with higher levels of resources useful for political action, such as higher levels of education and income, are more likely to be mobilized. Leaders are most likely to mobilize members who will respond in a way that advances the group's policy positions. So they are more likely to contact members who have higher levels of agreement with the political positions of the group. Finally, some members are more likely to "hear" appeals for political action than others. For example, members who rely on the organization for political information are more likely to notice mobilization appeals. Members who are interested in politics also may be more attentive to political messages and mobilization appeals in regular organizational communications. Similarly, leaders would be likely to contact members who have expressed an interest in politics -- such members are more likely to be
willing to get involved. The details and empirical tests of the contacting model will be presented in Chapter 3.

The second stage examines the characteristics of members who participate in group-sponsored political activities. As with contacting, several member characteristics are likely to be important in explaining participation. While political agreement with the organization is an obvious basis for ideological compliance, member participation also is based on her commitment to the group. Individuals for whom group membership and group success are important are likely to participate in activities they believe will benefit the group. They will act as they believe "good" group members do. Other aspects of the relationship between the member and the organization are likely to affect participation and need to be controlled. First, we need to control for recruitment effects to assure that members are participating because of their commitment to or agreement with the group and not because they joined the group in order to avail themselves of its opportunities for political involvement. Second, Rothenberg's findings (1992) that members "learn" the costs and benefits of activism need to be taken into account. Third, members who believe it is appropriate for the organization to be involved in politics are more likely to participate.

Alternatively, member participation in group-sponsored political activities may have little to do with the member's relationship with the group. The member may be more likely to participate in any type of political activity, whether sponsored by the group or not. The literature on political participation has long found that individuals with higher levels of interest in politics, higher levels of political efficacy, and high levels of resources such as education are more likely to participate in politics (see Verba and Nie 1972). Or, participation
may have little to do with characteristics of the individual, but a lot to do with the group context and group norms regarding political action (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993). Organizations that are traditionally politically active may have group norms encouraging political participation or provide more political communications that persuade members of the need to be politically active (Verba and Nie 1972; Pollock 1982; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990). The details and empirical tests of the participation model appear in Chapter 4.

There are likely to be some differences in the explanations of member participation in grassroots lobbying versus electoral campaigns. Electoral choice is structured by partisanship and ideology whereas issue involvement is based on narrow areas of concern--the "niche" of the group (Browne 1990). Partisanship is likely to matter more in electoral participation since candidates and endorsees have party labels; issues do not. It is easier for members to discover their agreement or disagreement with the group on electoral activities where candidates come with quickly understood party labels than on group issue activities, which often lack heuristic labels or clear connections to ideological interests. Commitment is likely to matter more for issue participation than for electoral participation. If members are committed to the group and they see its interests (and their own) being impacted by public officials, they are likely to respond to this threat to help the group. But threats to group positions are often less clear or less salient in an electoral context in which many other issues, candidate characteristics, and party affiliations matter too. Organizational electoral activities that support candidates of the opposite party discourage the contributions of committed members who differ in their partisanship. The differences between electoral and grassroots lobbying participation are the focus of Chapter 5.
Finally, who is mobilized affects who participates. In order to understand how and why members participate in group-sponsored political action, we need to separate the effects of mobilization from other characteristics of the member or her organizational context that influence participation. For example, certain members may only participate because they are more likely to be asked and to have social pressures placed on them, while other members may participate with less prodding. Who volunteers? Who is unlikely to volunteer but likely to respond when asked? Who is not likely to participate regardless? To establish that member commitment is critical to explaining member participation in group political activities, we need to demonstrate that members' level of commitment influences participation independent of mobilization as well as other individual and contextual characteristics. The effect of mobilization on participation is examined in Chapter 6.

**Organized Labor and Grassroots Politics**

Organized labor provides an excellent context in which to study how interest groups mobilize their members for political activities and why members participate in the political activities of organizations to which they belong. Organized labor has long been active in American politics (Greenstone 1977; Wilson 1979; West 1980). Government action and the legal environment are important constraints on the ability of labor unions to organize and to engage in collective bargaining. Recent high-profile disputes in Congress over striker replacement legislation and the Teamwork for Employees And Managers Act (TEAM) attest to the contemporary relevance of labor issues in American politics. Organized labor is also involved in a wide-range of issues that affect "working people" in general rather than just labor union members, including health care, the minimum wage, and foreign trade agreements.
In the past election cycle, organized labor substantially intensified its efforts at political mobilization. During the 104th Congress, organized labor mobilized its members and sponsored television and radio ads in targeted congressional districts in opposition to several provisions of the Republican budget and the Contract with America. During the 1996 election, the AFL-CIO launched "Labor '96," devoting $35 million above its normal political expenditures to help Democratic congressional candidates: $25 million for advertising, much of the rest for training 175 grassroots organizers, each of whom recruited volunteers, in 102 targeted congressional districts.

One of the resources organized labor has to influence public policy is the activism of its members. During elections, unions recruit volunteers to help union-endorsed candidates, sponsor voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives with members as the foot-soldiers, solicit campaign contributions from members to give to candidates through union Political Action Committees, and use union communication networks to urge members to vote for union-endorsed candidates. Bok and Dunlop (1970) have argued that labor has its greatest political impact through its ability to provide services with manpower rather than through offering endorsements or campaign contributions. Indeed, Schlozman and Tierney (1986, 105) found that membership was more important as an "organizational resource" to labor unions than for any other type of interest group. Outside of elections, unions inform their members of the actions of government, explain how the issues being debated affect unions and the members personally, urge their members to contact public officials, and make it easier for members to contact public officials by providing sample letters, post cards, talking points, 1-800 phone numbers, and so on.

* The precise values were provided in interviews by national AFL-CIO political officers.
Empirical studies also have demonstrated the central role organized labor plays in American politics. Unions are the primary interest group involved at the grassroots level in campaigns for Democratic congressional candidates (Herrnson 1995). Unions are influential players in Democratic party presidential nomination conventions, even since the reforms of the 1970s that allowed greater independence by party delegates (Rapoport, Stone, and Abramowitz 1991). Unions are more active in attempting to mobilize their members for political activities than other economic and social organizations (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, Chap. 13; Knoke 1990, Chap. 10).

Moreover, the grassroots political activities in which labor unions engage have a political impact. Union endorsements of candidates influence the way labor union members vote (Asher, Heberlig, Ripley, and Snyder 1996; Juravich and Shergold 1988; Converse and Campbell 1968; Kornhauser, Sheppard, and Mayer 1956). Grassroots activity in congressional elections is a significant predictor of challengers' vote shares (Herrnson 1995, 123). Last, grassroots contacts by constituents influence the voting behavior of members of Congress on legislation (West 1988; R. Smith 1993; Fowler and Shaiko 1987).

Organized labor also offers a group context particularly suitable for testing the hypotheses advanced above to explain why interest group members participate in group sponsored political activities. First, unions are primarily economic organizations. Members join for the job-related protections and benefits or because of closed shop-requirements that make union membership mandatory. Thus, it is highly unlikely that members join unions in order to be political activists, which helps me address the problem of causality of activists joining in order to take advantage of the group's opportunities for political involvement. Second, because membership is not based on political
considerations, members may disagree with the political positions of the group. We cannot assume that members participate in organizational political activities in order to advance the political beliefs they share with the organization. For example, the disagreements between union officers and rank-and-file members on social welfare and civil rights issues are well documented (see Masters and Delaney 1987b for a review). Yet members who may not agree with the general political positions of the organization, but who are committed to the group and its survival, may be willing to join in political action for the benefit of the group.

Third, organized labor's traditional electoral support of the Democratic Party allows us to test for the difference between member's willingness to participate in more partisan union electoral campaign activities and less partisan grassroots lobbying activities.

Thus, organized labor provides a set of organizations very much involved in grassroots political action. Their contemporary political activism provides an excellent opportunity to study how interest groups mobilize their members for political action and why the members participate in collective action.

**Studying Labor in Ohio**

Ohio provides an excellent context for the study of organized labor's political mobilization. Union interviewees at the national level were united in their classification of Ohio as one of their most politically active and innovative states. They cited several reasons for this. First, Ohio has a solid membership base and a tradition of union activism. In 1995, there were 885,200 union members in Ohio (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996), which was the sixth highest union population among the 50 states. From a different perspective, 18.5% of the workforce in Ohio are union members (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996), which ranks Ohio 14th out of 50 states.
Second, Ohio has the staff within its organizational structure to mount effective political mobilizations. Ohio has staff in the central office devoted to politics full-time. In addition, the Ohio AFL-CIO has four central bodies [regional councils] with full-time officers. Part of their duties include political mobilization. Other states have central office staff devoted to politics only part time and part-time central body officers. Thus, other states have less staff capacity to engage in political mobilizations. Third, national leaders credit the state officers in Ohio with taking a pro-active approach to making changes in organized labor's political strategies in both elections and grassroots lobbying in recent years. For example, in interviews after the 1996 elections, officials at the national level described changes they were planning to implement nationally that Ohio officers were in the process of implementing when I interviewed them a year earlier. Because of critical importance of Ohio in presidential elections, national and state officers have developed close coordination. One national political officer summarized his view of Ohio labor's political abilities when he pointed out that Ohio was chosen for a bus tour for AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney to rally members during the 1996 presidential campaign: "Ohio was the only state where it could easily be pulled off."

Thus, organized labor Ohio provides a context at the forefront of union political action. The negative side of Ohio's reputation in labor politics is that it is not representative of labor politics in other states. The findings here are likely to show labor at its highest level of innovativeness and effectiveness.

Research Design

The data to explore the hypotheses regarding union political mobilization and member participation come primarily from two sources. The first is a survey of rank-and-file union members in Ohio. The surveys provide data on union
members' political activities as well as their individual characteristics that could be related to their willingness to engage in political activities. The second source is a series of interviews conducted with officers of and political activists in labor unions in Ohio. The interviews provide descriptive data on how labor unions attempt to mobilize their members for political action as well as some quantifiable data on union political mobilization. Using both interviews and surveys allows for an integration of elite and rank-and-file perspectives on union political mobilization and its effectiveness in generating participation from members.

The sources of data on the rank-and-file members of Ohio labor unions are telephone surveys of union members in Ohio conducted immediately following the 1992 and 1994 elections. The Ohio Union Surveys were conducted by the Polimetrics Laboratory at Ohio State University as part of a study of union member's voting and political behavior (Asher, Ripley, and Snyder 1991a). The samples were drawn from three lists of union members in Ohio provided by the Ohio AFL-CIO, the Ohio Education Association (OEA), and the Ohio Civil Service Employees Association (OCSEA). OCSEA is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, but the membership lists were provided separately, so separate samples were drawn. Each list was sampled systematically proportional to its size in the total population (Asher et al. 1991b, 4-6). There were 613 completed interviews in 1992 and also 613 in 1994.

The general purpose of the elite interviews was to find out how labor unions attempt to mobilize their members for grassroots electoral and lobbying activities. The interviews were semi-structured, using open-ended questions, so each interviewee was asked about the same general topics but allowed to emphasize the aspects of her union's political activities with which she was
most familiar. For example, discussions with state and regional officers and staff focused on strategic decision making, mobilizing local unions, and coordination between member electoral mobilizations, Political Action Committee contributions, grassroots lobbying, and insider lobbying. I questioned local officers and activists about what types of contacts and assistance they get from state, regional, and international officers, and how they attempt to mobilize their members for various political activities. (Appendix A contains the basic interview schedule.)

Not all union internationals had an officer interviewed, but the largest and most politically active (according to the Ohio AFL-CIO central office) did. All unions that had more than 15 respondents combined between the 1992 and 1994 surveys had a representative interviewed. A variety of perspectives were obtained by interviewing central office personnel, some lobbyists, some international officers, some local officers, and some local activists.* In total, 56 people in Ohio were interviewed; additionally, eight national union political officers were interviewed in Washington. (Appendix B contains a list of interviewees.)

Some questions were asked for the purpose of coding to combine the interview data with the survey data: where their union local leaderships were most active geographically in attempting to mobilize members politically, and which unions in Ohio they perceived to be most active politically. Other data on union mobilization, such as which legislative districts were targeted in 1992 and 1994, were obtained from the central offices of the Ohio AFL-CIO and OEA.

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* I interviewed union representatives, usually members of state union councils, that were recommended by the state central offices. Thus, interviewees were not chosen by systematic sampling.
Conclusion

To influence public policy, interest groups may need their members to contribute more than dues. They may need their members to let government officials know their perceptions of the consequences of proposals under consideration, that the position of the group is supported, or merely that there are constituents who know and care what the government is doing on a given issue. Signs of concern on an issue from constituents may even be necessary to create access for the group's lobbyist. Groups may need their members to contribute time and money to help candidates who favor the policy positions of the group attain election to office. For some groups, judicious use of activism by members may be an important resource in maintaining the organization and achieving desired policy outcomes.

Many interest groups, however, face the same problems in mobilizing existing members as in attracting those members in the first place. That is, members can receive the collective goods that result from group efforts whether they are personally active or not. The "logic" of collective action dictates that they free ride on the work of others.

Nevertheless, just as some individuals join public interest groups instead of free riding, some members are active in helping the group produce the collective good. Groups facilitate member participation by creating organizational structures which allow them to reduce the costs of member participation and by contacting members to keep them informed of political issues and to request their participation in group political activities. In particular, groups use staff and decentralized structures as means to institutionalize mechanisms that emphasize personal contracts and social pressures to mobilize members. Members comply with requests for participation when they
are committed to the group, not just when they agree with the political positions of the group. The collective interest of the group has a personal significance to the committed member.

This model is an improvement over existing conceptions of participation in interest groups because it combines an examination of the effects of organizational structure, mobilization activities, and member characteristics on participation. It explores both elite activities and member responses. Moreover, organizational commitment, which social identity theory and organizational psychology predict will be critical to explaining member participation, can be measured and tested with cross-sectional data on union member participation in the political activities of their unions in Ohio. The results of this analysis will help explain why some individuals reject the urge to free ride and instead join in cooperative efforts to produce collective goods. The collective action "dilemma" may still exist, but we will understand a bit better why it is less of a dilemma for some than others.
CHAPTER 2

UNION POLITICAL MOBILIZATION:
STRUCTURES AND STRATEGIES

Interest groups face collective action problems in mobilizing members. Even if they solve the problem in order to organize, groups face it again if they need to mobilize existing members for group-sponsored grassroots political action. A special problem of unions and other professional and institutional groups is that members join for job-related reasons other than the group's political positions. This solves the start-up problem, but the collective action problem remains if additional contributions are needed for the group to be effective politically.

Perhaps in the ideal Weberian bureaucracy, the officers of the organization would define group interests in the political environment, design a strategic action plan, and oversee its implementation by succeeding rungs of the organizational chain-of-command. Mobilization would occur in a top-down fashion. Indeed, in organized labor, the union central offices monitor the political world, make strategic decisions, and persuade their executive boards and conventions of members to support those decisions.

But then comes the collective action problem. Members are being asked to engage in activities beyond the conditions of their employment in order to
benefit the organization as a whole -- there is no legal means of “coercing” their participation (Levi 1988). Even if members agree on the issues, why should any one individual become involved in supporting collective goods unless her personal contribution is the difference between the good being produced or not produced? Furthermore, the “peak association” of organized labor, the AFL-CIO, is a federation and faces a multi-level collection action problem: how to get different international unions, their local affiliates, as well as rank and file members, to participate in collective action. At the same time, the central offices confront a diversity of interests among their memberships. Different unions see different issues as salient. Leaders and rank-and-file see different issues as politically salient (e.g., work issues vs. social/moral issues). The task is to mobilize and act cohesively despite differences.

Unions address the collective action problem in two ways. First, organized labor maintains a fragmented and decentralized political structure. Fragmentation and decentralization allow mobilization by focusing appeals based on social bonds and organizational loyalties (see also Wright 1996, p. 163). Members are more likely to respond to more proximate agents and to messages framed to meet their specific interests rather than the more general, collective interests of “the labor movement” or the working class. This structure’s liability is that mobilization depends on many local officers who have other responsibilities and interests besides politics. Second, union central offices act to facilitate members’ ability to participate through education and mobilization efforts to lower the information and transaction costs of activism.

Engaging in member mobilization is a costly activity. It takes considerable effort to keep members informed of events in the political environment and to persuade them to act for the collective good of the
organization. As a result, when unions could rely on inside political access to government through their relations with the Democratic party, the costly behavior of member mobilization was deemphasized in favor of less costly negotiations between party leaders and labor lobbyists and officers. Now that the Democrats are no longer a majority in the Ohio legislature or Congress, an active membership is again a necessary resource for informing public officials of union member preferences. Educating and mobilizing members on issues, in turn, becomes a way of making a link between group norms, individual member preferences on job-related issues, and elections.

**The Importance of Union Political Mobilization**

Interest groups enter the political arena in order to promote or protect their organizational or members' interests vis-a-vis government action. Unions are organized primarily to service employer-employee relations and most members join, or are compelled to join, on this basis. Members are unlikely to join a union based on its political positions and activities. The disagreements between rank-and-file union members and union officers have long been documented (see Masters and Delaney 1987b for a review). Thus, union political action is a classic example of Olson’s by-product theory (1965, pp. 132-7): members join for non-political selective benefits, but once they are members, the organization can use their contributions for other purposes.

Political organization is a by-product of economic organization.

Still, polls of union officers and members in Ohio show considerable support for union political action. A 1982 survey of AFL-CIO local officers in Ohio found that 49% thought labor should spend more time on politics; only 11% thought labor spent too much time on politics (Clark 1982). The Ohio Union Surveys of rank-and-file members have found that, between 1990 and
In 1994, 63% to 73% of members supported unions giving endorsements, 87% to 92% supported union voter registration drives, and 48% to 53% supported unions collecting campaign contributions. In 1994, 62% of members supported lobbying the legislature. These results show substantial support for union political action.

Interviewees, political activists all, placed great importance on union political action and member mobilization. Indeed, a core of the mobilizing message is explaining why unions, and hence the members themselves, must be involved in politics. An officer of the United Food and Commercial Workers eloquently described the relationship between political action, organizing, and collective bargaining as the “three legs of a stool”:

Each is necessary to support the others. Politics affects our ability to organize and to be successful in collective bargaining. For example, because of legal restrictions, it is difficult to organize. It takes three years to settle a dispute before the National Labor Relations Board, by which time the organizing drive is dead. And if we can’t organize, it is harder to protect our members because a non-union competitor can move into town. Organizing and collective bargaining give us the membership strength to be effective in the political arena.

Similarly, an OEA activist repeats the message he uses to urge teachers to become involved politically: “Everything in education is political: the existence of schools; how, what, and who we teach is determined by politics; salaries; retirement; and politics occurs at both the state and local levels.”

Active rank-and-file members are a key resource in union political effectiveness. One OEA activist states the necessity of mobilizing members: “Some teachers have the longstanding mind set that ‘Educators should be educators’ and should not be involved in politics. My job is to convince them
that they must be involved." The District Political and Legislative Director for the
United Steelworkers of America, explains the importance of mobilizing
members with reference to the Campaign Finance Reform bill\textsuperscript{10} passed in Ohio
(S.B. 8):

S.B. 8 may actually be a blessing in disguise. It woke us up. It will
force us to put more effort into the political education and
mobilization of our members. ...Our clout before was in money,
because we couldn't deliver a coherent voting bloc. Now our
ability to give money is limited.

Others noted that even before campaign finance reform in Ohio, organized
labor could not outspend business.\textsuperscript{11} Its members time and efforts were
resources that had to be used to compete.

Members also are an important resource in lobbying the legislature.
John Wright (1996, p. 71) calls grassroots lobbying campaigns
"miniexperiments in political mobilization," because they are tests of how
constituents may react to specific issues and positions on Election Day.
Mobilizing members to contact their legislator shows the political risk in defying
the group position.

In addition, grassroots lobbying complements insider lobbying. One way
is by creating access for the group's lobbyist, because he or she is "speaking
for" constituents. A union lobbyist strongly argued the importance of an active
membership in helping the union legislatively:

\textsuperscript{10} Ohio's campaign finance reform prevented unions from using dues money for contributions
directly to candidates or parties in Ohio elections and placed restrictions on how they could raise
PAC contributions which could be given directly to candidates or parties.

\textsuperscript{11} According to the Center for Responsive Politics, in 1992 at the national level, business PACs
outspent labor PACs $132 million to $42.3 million (Kosterlitz 1996).
Grassroots mobilization is very much coordinated with inside lobbying. My job is to link the energizing of the rank-and-file with my personal relationships with the legislators; to mesh these two facets together. Legislators are easier to deal with and are more willing to work with you after they have received a stack of letters from members in their district. Letters get the legislators to listen.

Similarly, another lobbyist explains the informational role of grassroots lobbying in complementing insider lobbying:

Letters and faxes are important in that they help bring credibility to what I say. It shows the members share my position. Legislators will often brush aside my lobbying by saying, "I haven't heard this from my constituents." A grassroots mobilization means that they are hearing this from their constituents.

Grassroots lobbying is a way to verify claims made by insider lobbying. Thus, members are a source of both substantive and political information that lawmakers wish to take into account. The ability of a group to use its members to help convey the intensity of group positions both through electoral activism and grassroots lobbying may be a key to its ability to influence public policy.

**Union Political Organization**

Even if member involvement is a priority, there is still the dilemma of devising methods to get members involved when needed. Perhaps in the ideal bureaucracy, managers at the top would give the marching orders and those in the hierarchy below would march. But organized interests face the problem of free riders in mobilizing their members: why should any one member be active when their contribution is unlikely to make a difference in producing the collective good? Organized labor faces the additional difficulty of a lack of consensus on priorities and positions. Different concerns are salient to unions.
in different markets, different issues are salient to officers versus rank-and-file members (Form 1995). And, because members have not joined the union based on their political agreement with the organization, those who disagree with union political positions are unlikely to help in union political action.

Due to these problems, union political organization is fragmented and decentralized. Political organization is fragmented -- each union wants to ability to address the issues most salient to itself without having to convince other unions to contribute to the effort. Political organization is decentralized, based on the autonomy of union locals. This may create the flexibility to allow locals the ability to do what works best in mobilizing their own members. At the same time, since local officers are elected, not only must they find ways to appeal to members for contributions necessary for union political success, but they must remain responsive their members by not making demands of their members that are likely to cost them support. In some locals, this means no political demands are made on members.

**Fragmentation**

Ohio unions have several independent and quasi-independent political structures. First is the AFL-CIO and its Committee on Political Education (COPE). The AFL-CIO is a federation, so each member union may participate in political activities through COPE and/or through its international's own political structure. This creates coordination problems within the AFL-CIO itself (Bok and Dunlop 1970), let alone across the entire labor movement. COPE traditionally has focused on electoral mobilization, relying on the internationals for political education (Form 1995). Some internationals' political operations are more integrated into COPE than others. Second is the Building Trades Council (BTC), the construction unions. They are all members of the AFL-CIO and
COPE, but the BTC serves as an additional structure through which they can work politically. Interviewees from Building Trades unions claimed to engage in political activities through both their local Building Trades Council and through AFL-CIO central bodies. Third are the United Auto Workers (UAW), and AFSCME/OCSEA/OAPSE (hereafter AFSCME), the civil servant union “cluster” that have merged their political operations in Ohio. The UAW and AFSCME are members of the AFL-CIO, but have their own separate political structures and operations, though both profess to coordinate their political activities with the AFL-CIO. Fourth is the Ohio Education Association. It is not affiliated with the AFL-CIO and has its own political organization, Educator’s Political Action Committee (EPAC). Last is the Teamsters. They were not part of the survey, so no representatives from the Teamsters were interviewed.

**Decentralization**

All internationals have national, state or district (multi-state), and local levels. The AFL-CIO has its national office, the Ohio central office, and “central bodies” organized on a county or multi-county level. The unions with political structures independent of COPE also have local organizations: Local Building Trades Councils, AFSCME Area PEOPLE Committees (APCs), UAW Community Action Program (CAP) Councils, and OEA local EPAC Councils. All have similar structures with substantial local autonomy. These local units screen candidates and make endorsements of local and state legislative candidates subject to state convention approval. For the most part, these local units make the real decisions about how to get rank-and-file members involved.

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12 This merger proved to be only temporary as OCSEA left in the spring of 1996. Nevertheless, because they were merged when the survey and interview data were collected for this dissertation, I will continue to discuss them as a single political organization.

13 During the 1996 election, the UAW, AFSCME, and the Teamsters integrated their political operations with the AFL-CIO.
Central Bodies and Local Electoral Structures

AFL-CIO central body structure includes a convention, composed of delegates from all dues-paying locals in the county, and an executive board, made up of members elected by the convention. Delegates are elected or appointed (the method is up to the local) to the central body convention. Locals are entitled to representation basically proportional to the size of their membership, though small unions are entitled to a minimum of 2 delegates, and the ratio of delegate allotment per size of local membership decreases for extremely large locals (e.g., from 1 delegate per 300 members to 1 delegate per 500 members).

The central bodies make local endorsements and decide which electoral activities to undertake. Delegates to the central bodies and local officers (if they are different) are the primary recruiters of volunteers for political activities. The AFL-CIO provides "Activist Network" volunteer cards in order to sign up members for union political activities, but the central bodies keep these lists of volunteers. Similar lists exist in other unions and are kept at the regional or local level as well. The only way in which central bodies are limited in their autonomy occurs if the state does not endorse a candidate for a state-wide or federal race or fails to approve central body state legislative candidate endorsements. In this case, the central body cannot work on behalf of the candidate. Local unions still have the option of endorsing and working for candidates not endorsed by the central body, but must work on their own, without central body communication and coordination. Moreover, candidates who do not receive an endorsement cannot use the AFL-CIO membership list for mailings or phone calls, an extremely valuable resource for making contact with potentially sympathetic voters.
With some minor variations, the Local Building Trades Councils, AFSCME PEOPLE Committees, and UAW CAP Councils operate in similar ways. The OEA's local EPAC councils work a bit differently. OEA's EPAC Councils are temporary organizations formed only for the purpose of screening and endorsing candidates for the state legislature. The OEA has a separate, parallel structure for "governance" or internal union policy matters. The local EPAC councils are organized along Ohio House and Senate district lines, with each school district in the legislative district entitled to a representative. Locals designate their own representative through election or appointment. The temporary nature of the local EPAC committees can be seen from an OEA Executive Committee member's explanation of the requirement that Council representatives must give money to EPAC: "Participants must be EPAC contributors, but there is no requirement on how much has to be contributed. So if somebody comes into the meeting and they haven't contributed, we'll hand them an [EPAC] envelope and ask them to put in a dollar." Besides making the endorsement recommendation, the local council recommends whether EPAC should make a financial contribution to the candidate. Both recommendations must be approved by the State EPAC Council and the OEA Convention. Without a permanent local political organization, OEA's strategic election plan is made by OEA staff and the state EPAC Council. Implementation relies on OEA staff, state EPAC Council members, representatives on other OEA governance councils (OEA Executive Committee, OEA state convention delegates, OEA District Associations), and local officers. OEA locals make decisions and undertake mobilizations for local school board races and levies.

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14 Endorsement recommendations for the U.S. House of Representatives are made by district members of NEA's Congressional Contact Team, its grassroots lobbying organization. The recommendation must be approved by the NEA Convention.
Locals of some internationals have their own COPE committees. These committees provide a ready source of mobilizable members when rank-and-file participation is necessary. Their primary function is to raise money for COPE and their international's PAC. Before campaign finance reform in Ohio in 1995, locals could have their own PACs. Many internationals' PACs have a formula whereby a certain percentage of the funds raised by the local can be returned to it for use in local races. In some internationals, the local COPE committee can make their own endorsements independent of the international's and COPE central body endorsements. In AFSCME, members who work for an officeholder are given the power to veto the APC endorsement of that individual. These features obviously create coordination problems for coherent political action within the labor movement, but provide evidence of local autonomy in labor political mobilization.

Localism in the Mobilization of Members

The benefits and risks of the emphasis on localism in union political mobilization can be seen by examining tactics used to solicit PAC contributions and to recruit participants in political activities. These tactics also show the ways unions attempt to lower the cost of participation for rank-and-file members. Indeed, the emphasis on making it easier for members and complaints by officers and activists regarding the difficulty of recruiting volunteers to participate demonstrates the lack of "coercive" or "instrumental" methods (Levi 1988, Brehm and Gates 1996) of obtaining compliance to requests for participation. Those who have coercive abilities are unlikely to respond to questions regarding how they get members to participate by shaking their heads and quipping "We beg," or "I hope your study will tell me." As the following discussion will indicate, there are some instrumental incentives that can be
used to entice members to participate, but by and large, these incentives are weak. Members participate for ideological reasons -- because they think they should -- and because leaders have made it easy for them to do so.

First, we will examine some tactics of union political fundraising. Unions' emphasis on localism is an important element of manipulating the costs and benefits of fundraising. Contributions are raised from rank-and-file members by local officers and activists, so that there is some social pressure to accede to the request, pressure that would not be present in a request from an unknown staffer from central office. In the words of one OEA activist: "The number one reason for giving is to please the person who asked. The keys to getting a contribution are friendship, credibility, and personal contact." Using recruiters known to the individual who can credibly invoke the norms of proper group behavior raises the costs of not participating. Indeed, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, 140-2) have found that individuals are most likely to agree to participate in politics when asked by someone they know personally.

Unions try to make it easy to contribute by using payroll deductions, where the member agrees to have a certain amount deducted from each paycheck for the PAC. An OEA activist opines: "The key to fundraising is simplification. By making the contribution automatic, you make the member's job easier." However, payroll deductions must be negotiated as part of a collective bargaining agreement, so not all locals have them. Moreover, the 1995 Campaign Finance Reform law in Ohio attempts to outlaw payroll deductions as a method of collecting PAC money. This provision is currently under injunction and is not being enforced. For unions without the payroll deduction option in their contracts, or if ban on payroll deductions takes effect, other methods used to make contributions easy include getting member
permission for automatic transfers from bank accounts, or for payroll deductions from their local credit union, or using credit card contributions.

Unions also use instrumental rewards systems to encourage PAC contributions. OEA gives prizes (e.g., a dinner) and recognition to the school buildings, locals, and OEA districts that raise the most PAC money. An International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) officer describes their method:

We have developed a reward system to encourage members to solicit contributions. For example, we give away appliances our members make so it doesn't cost us anything [he points out the TV, VCR, and TV cabinet in the room]. Sign up 25 members on the COPE checkoff, get a watch; sign up 10, get a tote bag or jacket with the IUE COPE symbol.

The prizes give members an incentive to participate, the recognition is a social reward for those who follow group norms and offers an example of appropriate group behavior to others.

Similarly, the personal touch and lowering cost of participation matter in tactics used to recruit activists. Many agreed with the comments of one OEA activist: "A letter won't do. It's hard to say 'No' in person." Of course, many unions lower their mobilizing costs by keeping lists of people who have participated in political activities in the past and relying on members who are active in all elements of union activity, particularly officers.

Inevitably, new activists are needed. One OEA activist joked that he starts by asking "friends and people who owe you." Others were more serious about asking people who owe you. An officer of the Plumbers and Pipefitters explains: "Once the union helps an individual, we use that as leverage to get them involved. Our message is: 'We helped you out when you needed it,
you've seen how union political action is important, why don't you return the favor to benefit someone else?"

An example of how the cost of participation can be lowered for new members comes from Building Trades apprenticeship programs. New members must go through the training programs to be certified and get full benefits. Although the benefits of unionism and political action are part of the curriculum, the Plumbers and Pipefitters also allow apprentices one night of schooling off to go out and work with a veteran activist on political activities. Moreover, "the social aspect helps and makes them want to come back."

Another successful tactic in recruiting new volunteers is to find people who are interested in politics and give them something "doable" as a starter. Members, particularly ones who have not been politically active, can be "scared off" if they are asked to do a lot at once. One union officer explains in the context of getting volunteers for Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) drives:

You have to give them [volunteers] a reasonable workload. A reasonable workload is one run on Sunday when people are more likely to be at home. The member is less likely to get frustrated at not being able reach people and slack off and end up in a bar before their second or third runs [if GOTV were on Election Day rather than Sunday]. I did this myself once upon a time. ... If a member is frustrated by too many runs or too many people not at home, they won't enjoy it and won't come back. If it is a reasonable amount of work, they will enjoy it and will come back.

Others agreed that once a member initially becomes involved, she will be willing to undertake more.

Instrumental incentives matter too in generating voluntary activities. Obviously having to take time off work, especially unpaid, makes it more difficult to participate in union activities, so unions try to remove this barrier. Some unions provide members with "lost time," or paid time off work for union
activities. The equivalent in the OEA is "Association Days" that members can take to participate in Lobby Days when teachers visit their legislators in Columbus. However, Association Days (and lost time) must be negotiated in the contract, and it is up to the district superintendent to decide whether Lobby Day activities count as an Association Day or a personal day.

Thus, the advantage of decentralization in political mobilization is that it allows local officers to personalize their appeals to members and use social pressure and appeals to organizational and group loyalty to recruit participants. The disadvantage of decentralization is that union central offices rely on others for mobilization. For example, a 1982 survey of Ohio union officers found that less than 20% of Ohio locals were "very active" in races for governor, the Ohio legislature, Congress, and local mayoral or county commissioner races. About one-quarter of the locals were "somewhat active" and a clear majority, 60%, were classified as "not very active" by their officer (Clark 1982). Whatever benefits there may be to decentralization and the personal touch, such benefits cannot be realized if local officers do not mobilize.

Staff at the central offices believe that some local officers avoid communicating with their members on political issues because the local officers must be elected and want to avoid divisive issues. They do not want to lose votes by talking about political endorsements with which their members might disagree. If local officers do not mobilize their members, the central office is limited in their ability to get members politically involved. This may be particularly problematic in a targeted race where central office seeks extra member activism, but is stymied by unresponsive local leadership.
State-level and International Electoral Structures

State central offices, including those of the unions working outside of COPE, attempt to promote and facilitate local political mobilization. They provide communications, training, and staff assistance to central bodies and locals, particularly in areas where there is no full-time central body staff. This includes doing the logistical work that makes it easy for member to show up and make calls at phone banks or know where to go for literature drops or Get-Out-The-Vote drives. International unions play a similar role for their locals. The state central offices and executive boards make strategic decisions on state level races, including which races to target and how to allocate campaign contributions and staff time. They screen and endorse state-wide candidates. State conventions approve strategic plans, state-wide candidate endorsements, and central body endorsements of congressional and state legislative candidates.

Central offices make the key strategic decisions, particularly on which races to target. Once these decisions are made, state officers spend considerable time and effort touring the state promoting the plans to local officers and activists. Although the state officers allocate most of the money, the importance of local autonomy is shown by the fact that state officers need to persuade the locals to mobilize activists and to contribute services to make the overall plan effective.

Electoral Targeting

All interviewees claim that their unions target races for extra resources and effort. Given that unions have limited resources in money and in-kind contributions, they cannot give their maximum effort to every race. Unions want to target their efforts where those efforts have the greatest probability of making
a difference in the outcome. Likewise, given that members have other demands on their time, unions only want to push members to participate when their contributions can make a difference. Constantly badgering members to participate may only lead to burn-out.

Ohio unions claim their first priority is helping incumbent “friends” in marginal districts. Polling and voter registration data are used to determine which races are close and need extra assistance. Thereafter, they will consider targeting open seat races where a candidate has taken pro-union positions. Of course, they will still help friends in little electoral danger, but these races are not targeted. Likewise, races where pro-union candidates have little chance of winning are ignored. Statewide polling throughout the election allows the central offices to tell if untargeted races unexpectedly become close and allow them to inform their locals in the district and provide extra assistance.

Targeting decisions are made in close coordination with the state parties. The Ohio AFL-CIO works particularly closely with the Democratic legislative party caucuses. In fact, they traditionally gave their campaign contributions for Ohio House candidates in a lump sum to Speaker Verne Riffe and the House Democratic Campaign Committee and let them allocate it to targeted districts.

The AFL-CIO member unions for the most part follow the targeting decisions of the AFL-CIO and its central bodies. The unions are represented on the AFL-CIO Executive Board and Convention for state races and on their central bodies for local races, so they are part of the targeting decisions. Different targeting choices occur when some internationals support particular Republican legislators who, though they generally do not vote as unions would like, have supported a particular sector of unions on an important issue. For example, in 1996, the building trades unions supported 14 Republicans in Ohio.
House races, twelve of whom helped block changes to prevailing wage laws crucial to construction unions. In many cases, the AFL-CIO endorsed their Democratic opponents. Similarly, the OEA frequently endorses Republicans sympathetic to them on educational issues.

When asked what is done differently in a targeted race, the common response was: spending more money, often the maximum allowed. Many did not mention extra efforts to mobilize grassroots members in those targeted districts until they were asked. To some extent, this is because central offices and internationals can allocate money and staff time, but must rely on others for grassroots mobilization. Thus, the central offices must convince the central bodies and locals to be more active in mobilizing their members in a targeted race. The fact that the race is targeted is part of the message used to appeal to officers and members—they should be active in this race because of its extreme importance to the union. In a targeted race, local activists work more closely with the candidate's campaign. The candidate lets the unions know what he or she needs them to do and the unions try to provide the volunteers to get it done. If a candidate in a targeted race does not approach the unions, the unions will go the candidate to ask what needs to be done. AFSCME, for example, will not target a race unless the union is "an integral part" of the candidate's campaign and fundraising strategy.

**Staff as Mobilizers**

State and national union staff also play an important role in targeted races. Besides acting as coordinators between locals and central bodies within the state, as they do for all union activities, staff often are assigned to assist with targeted campaigns. If unions are restricted in their ability to mobilize rank-and-file participation in certain districts because of a lack of membership base or
local officer's disinterest in politics, staff assistance and money are the key resources that can be shifted wherever needed. Staff from the national office can be loaned to the state, particularly for presidential campaigns and targeted congressional races. The AFL-CIO, as part of Labor '96, as well as the NEA, put special emphasis on placing staff and into targeted congressional districts during the 1996 elections in an effort to increase grassroots mobilization. State staff can be assigned to state-wide races, congressional races, and state legislative races. Staff act as the link between the candidate's campaign and the unions. An AFSCME political staffer explains his role on Ohio Attorney General Lee Fisher's campaign in 1994 and on targeted legislative campaigns:

I attended their [the Fisher campaign's] strategy meetings, worked with their campaign, raised money for the candidate, took the candidate's message to union meetings to speak on his behalf, took the candidate to union meetings. I help to link the candidate to the APCs: link what the candidate needs with what the APCs can provide. 

...[Additionally, in targeted legislative districts], I do detailed research on the district, really getting to know the details of the region and the campaign. We know the district and the campaign much better than professional campaign consultants who aren't around.

However, in their work with campaigns, union staff are legally restricted to contacting union members.15

Another important role of the political staffs of both the state and the internationals is training local officers and activists in how to undertake political activities. If one barrier to political participation is not knowing how to engage in political activities, unions seek to lower the cost of participation by providing this type of information. The District Political Coordinator for the Communication Workers of America explains: "Ignorance, not knowing what to do or what they

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15 Otherwise, dues money, which pays union staff's salary, is being spent to benefit particular parties or candidates. Only PAC money can be spent to benefit parties or candidates directly.
can do, is the main excuse for not participating. So the key in getting members
to participate is to show people what to do.” Staff put together manuals on how
to run a phone bank, how to run a Get-Out-The-Vote (GOTV) or a voter
registration campaign, how to write newsletters, how to solicit PAC
contributions, how to write or meet with a member of Congress, and so on.
Political topics are a staple activity at union leadership training sessions. The
federal employees unions put special emphasis in their training on what
members can and cannot do under Hatch Act restrictions, and what new
political activities locals and members now can undertake since Hatch Act
reform. Federal and state central offices as well as individual internationals
develop and distribute “score cards” for members of the legislature as a way of
educating their members about the stances of incumbents on labor issues in
order to influence both local endorsements and members’ voting. Although the
decision to engage in political activities is still left to the local and its members,
the training provided by state and international staff lowers the information costs
of political action.

Communications

Coordination of communication is a core responsibility of central offices.
The goal is to create messages that will be effective in appealing to members
across the labor movement to become active and to vote for endorsed
candidates. National union political officers thought the “America Needs a
Raise” theme of Labor ‘96 was much more effective in appealing across
fragmented unions than appeals in previous elections. Still, the emphasis on
localism remains evident in the creation of communications. General themes
are most effective when they can be tailored as necessary to the specific needs
of different unions and various members’ interests.
In addition to general communications for monthly magazines or election flyers, state and central body political staffs create targeted communications for specific locals and races. Targeted messages are necessary because of the diversity of interests among the different member unions of the AFL-CIO and the variety of local political contexts in which those unions operate. For example, the central office will develop letters about candidates and their positions on issues important to the local union president. Beyond the targeted message, the COPE Manual recommends that the letters be copied onto local union letterhead and distributed with the signature of the local union president, because “union members are more likely to respond to information received directly from their local union.” (Ohio AFL-CIO 1994a, CC-1)

Apart from participation in COPE, most AFL-CIO internationals have their own PACs. They make their own endorsements for president. National conventions approve state/local recommendations for congressional endorsements. Targeting and PAC allocation decisions are made at the national or district level, though often with input from local officers. Since the internationals are represented in COPE and are part of the COPE decision making process, all interviewees claim their endorsements and targeted races are the same 90+% of the time.16

Thus, the decentralized union structures permit considerable local autonomy in electoral mobilization. Local units make local endorsements, decide what electoral activities to undertake, and mobilize the rank and file as necessary to carry out those activities. The central offices make the strategic decisions in state-wide races and targeting decisions in state legislative races and lower the transaction costs by providing training, information, and

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16 Many internationals only target races where they have membership strength. In other races of interest, they rely on the AFL-CIO and other unions with membership strength in those areas.
communications assistance, but rely on local units to implement union electoral action. The process of union electoral mobilization hardly follows a top-down model.

**Grassroots Lobbying Structures**

Mobilization for grassroots lobbying follows more of a top-down model. This is ironic given that the purpose of grassroots strategies is to show constituent support for group issue positions. Where locals and their officers are primarily involved in production and local business, a key responsibility of the central offices is to monitor government for actions that could help or hurt unions. If unions are to mobilize their officers and/or rank-and-file members, they must get the information about the bills, the union positions, what to do, and when to do it from those with the information—the lobbyists. This means that issue mobilization is more of a top-down process: lobbyists send the substantive and tactical information out to central bodies and local officers in order to get the membership to contact public officials about the issues.

At the state level, unions generally use the same structures for grassroots lobbying mobilizations as for electoral mobilizations. For lobbying Congress, national unions have additional and more sophisticated structures. Using existing communication channels lowers the cost of information transmission since separate structures do not have to be established and maintained. The downside is that political communications must compete with other organizational messages and are not targeted most efficiently at those members most likely to respond to political mobilization appeals.

**Mobilization for Grassroots Lobbying**

The basic process of grassroots lobbying mobilization starts with the lobbyist sending issue alerts by letter, phone, fax, e-mail, etc., to central body
officers and/or local officers, who then pass the information on to the rank-and-file through flyers, meeting announcements, or messages from union stewards. E-mail, Web pages, and 800 numbers for legislative updates are the latest technological tools used to keep members informed of current events in the legislature. Requests for members to contact public officials as well as longer-term education on political issues are featured in regular union publications sent to rank-and-file members by the central offices, the internationals, and, if it has a newsletter, their own local. Sending political information through the regular communication channels lowers the cost of mobilizing.

Unions ease the cost of participation by providing talking points for phone calls, providing sample letters or even just have the member sign letter copies (though the sample letters may be written by local activists or officers instead of lobbyists), having members write letters at union meetings and mailing it for them, letting them know who their legislator is so they write to the correct person, and providing pre-printed postcards for members to send. The national AFL-CIO helps to facilitate rank-and-file phone mobilizations by providing a 1-800 number that automatically forwards the call to the office of the member of the Congress who represents the area from which the call was placed. Thus, unions go to great lengths to make grassroots contacting a low-cost activity for rank-and-file members even to the point of down-playing the conventional wisdom that original and/or hand-written letters are more informative to legislators than copied letters and pre-printed postcards.  

Lobbyists and activists disagreed on whether having a large number of member contacts or fewer, but more original, contacts are more effective with Ohio legislators. Some did not think letters or phone calls mattered at all without sustained personal contact between legislators and union members at home.
Despite these efforts, a general "call-to-arms" in meetings or newsletters probably does not generate many letters or phone calls from the rank-and-file.\(^8\) For many members, other demands on their time and interests are more pressing than becoming informed on an issue and taking the time and effort to write or call a public official on behalf of their union. One union lobbyist sarcastically noted: "Our newsletters ask members to write their legislators about issues. We can generate about five letters this way." As one OEA activist explained, follow-through is needed to get members or officers to respond to mobilization appeals: "I sent letters to all the local presidents and then followed them up with phone calls. Based on my past experience as a local president, I know it's all too easy to put a letter from the OEA aside." Similarly, a political director of the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) stated:

Before this new structure,\(^9\) USWA would send letters to locals who would announce the mobilization appeal at the meetings. The problem was that there was no organization, no follow-up. We relied on members to follow through on their own. An additional problem is the low attendance at meetings. We usually get 30-40 out of a local of 1000, unless there are elections or a threat of dues being raised.

Some locals follow-through by having members write or sign the letters at union meetings, so that officers can make sure it is done. Others have taken cellular phones to union meetings or the teacher's lounge and passed it around with a union calling card.

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\(^8\) Some exceptions to this general rule may be when the issue is non-partisan, directly effects members' pocketbooks, and when the union has engaged in long-term member education on the importance of the issue to the union and the members personally.

\(^9\) The "new structure" refers to the merger of the Steelworkers, Rubber Workers, and Machinists, the reconfiguration of their district structure, and the institution of new local legislative mobilization teams in response to the perceived deficiencies described in this quote.
Legislative Action Committees

Another method for improving responses to grassroots mobilization appeals is to institutionalize response teams. The AFL-CIO and many internationals, including the NEA, AFSCME, and UAW, have Legislative Action Committees (LACs) which all work in a similar manner. LACs consist mainly of union officers who are the first point of contact from national lobbyists. LAC members are then responsible for contacting their member of Congress, and, if appropriate, mobilizing a rank-and-file contacting campaign. A successful grassroots campaign depends on the LAC member's ability to organize the campaign; there is no infrastructure to assist them (Form 1995, 316).

LAC members also attempt to meet with their member of Congress several times a year, either in the district or while in Washington for union conferences. In Washington, conference attendees are briefed on salient issues, given "talking points" explaining the union position, and then trooped to Capitol Hill for prescheduled meetings with members of Congress. Further opportunities to meet with members of Congress may occur at evening receptions. The congressional contacts mainly involves officers, though some internationals make special efforts to get rank-and-file members to attend the conferences and the Capitol Hill sessions. For example, the United Rubber Workers (prior to merging with the United Steelworkers of America) would rotate rank-and-file conference attendees in order to give as many members as possible the experience.

LAC members who personally know the member of Congress can be a source of information for Washington lobbyists. An officer of the United Food

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* The AFL-CIO's Legislative Action Councils are a recent invention, started in the earlier 1980s in selected "swing" congressional districts (see Keller 1982 a, b). The AFL-CIO has been slowly increasing the number of congressional districts with LACs.
and Commercial Workers (UFCW) explained: "I've known [Congressman Tom] Sawyer since his days in local politics in Akron. So a UFCW lobbyist will call and ask me to call Sawyer to find out where he is on an issue or to find out what the inside scoop is on legislative action." These personal connections are an exception to union lobbyists' general skepticism about the quality of feedback they get from their members' contacts with legislators. A lobbyist for AFSCME, explains the concern with their member reports on contacts with legislators:

The APC reports are really just anecdotal reports on APC officer contacts with the legislator. Their value is questionable given legislators' ability not to commit to anything while being friendly and receptive. But these contacts are useful just because they let the legislator know that there are members in their district who are interested.

Moreover, several lobbyists argued that constant personal contact in the district is more effective than letter writing and phone calling campaigns because it provides the constant oversight and consistent reinforcement of the union message that mass mobilization campaigns do not.

**Grassroots Lobbying the Ohio Legislature**

There is less institutionalized structure for union grassroots lobbying at the state level, with the significant exception of the OEA. OEA has traditionally held monthly Lobby Days. OEA Lobby Days work much like the Washington legislative conferences and Lobby Days held by many unions and interest groups. Teachers from around the state come to Columbus for issue briefings at OEA headquarters. They then go to prearranged meetings with their representatives.

AFSCME is the only other Ohio union which has a regularly scheduled Lobby Day, held once per year. Other unions mobilize members to come to
Columbus to meet with their legislator or attend hearings as critical issues arise. Some large locals have legislative or issue committees that provide a source of respondents to grassroots appeals, but most unions rely on members responding to issue mobilizations through the regular union communication sources. When union member to legislator lobbying does occur, unions mainly rely on officer contacts rather than rank-and-file mobilization. For example, the AFL-CIO maintains list of union officers who know their legislator. Union officers are a significant resource to help with lobbying since several large internationals do not have state-level lobbyists and rely on the Ohio AFL-CIO to let them know of threats in state government. These unions then send their own officers to lobby or rely on the AFL-CIO's lobbyists.

The Ohio AFL-CIO relies on the internationals for grassroots issue mobilizations. Part of the problem is inherent in the nature of a federation: different internationals disagree or are interested in different issues. In these situations, the AFL-CIO does not take a leadership role. Despite labor's overall commitment to protect "working people," it faces disagreement on what that entails and a collective action problem in getting unions and their members to contribute to causes that are of ambiguous benefit to themselves. For example, the most aggressive recent grassroots mobilization was by the Building Trades unions to protect prevailing wage, but non-construction unions did not get involved. Other issues which affect all unions such as worker's compensation, collective bargaining rules, and campaign finance reform are highly salient to officers, but are hard to inform and mobilize rank-and-file members on. Special mailings by central office are not done because of the expense and out-of-date centralized mailing lists. Many admitted that grassroots lobbying mobilizing structures were much weaker than electoral mobilization structures.
Targeting Grassroots Lobbying

Because of the weakness of union grassroots lobbying structures, targeting certain members to contact their legislators is not an important element in lobbying strategy (with the exception of OEA and its stronger grassroots lobbying structures). Like grassroots lobbying in general, targeting seems to occur at the more elite contacting level than at the mass membership level. That is, if a certain legislator is targeted, officers in the district will be contacted and the importance of getting in touch with their legislator on this issue will be stressed. Targeting certain legislators is an important part of insider lobbying.

But it does not occur as much in grassroots mobilizations. First, most grassroots mobilization alerts generally are faxed/mailed out to all officers or put in the regular union publications that go to everyone rather directed only to certain legislative districts. The second problem can be called the “data base” problem. Even when the unions want to do targeted mailings to rank and file members in certain legislative districts (which is not often since it is very expensive), it is difficult to determine which members should receive the mailing since the unions’ membership lists are not organized by legislative districts. Members are listed by zip code. But legislative districts, particularly in the Ohio House, are not organized by zip code; some zip codes are split into 3 legislative districts. Thus, it is hard to contact the right union members. The unions increasingly are including legislative districts in their computer files of members to make targeting easier.

Grassroots targeting seems to occur in three ways. First, unions will attempt to mobilize the members affected most directly by a particularly issue. For example, when mobilizing on worker’s compensation reform, some unions
made special efforts to contact members who had been injured; unions with retiree clubs used Congress' cuts to Medicare targeted these clubs for mobilization in opposition to the 1996 budget proposals. Second, if the union has a Congressional Contact Team, only those members in the targeted districts will be asked to respond. But these Teams are made of a few officers and activists rather than involving the rank and file. The final condition is when rank and file members are urged to write, call, etc., by their officers. In this case, only officers in the targeted district urge their members to get involved. Increased use of e-mail/faxes directly to job sites also is making targeting easier, but that type of communication typically goes to officers rather than the rank and file directly.

**Inside Access and the Deterioration of Grassroots Structures**

The reason unions let their ability to mobilize grassroots pressure on the legislature deteriorate in Ohio speaks to the dynamics of legislative access. Labor's current efforts to reinvigorate their grassroots structures demonstrate the importance of group membership as a political resource for gaining access when inside access is no longer assured.

With the Democrats in control of Congress and the Ohio House, and unions strongly in the Democratic coalition, labor access was through the party. It was inside access. Unions did not need to "fire up" the rank-and-file members to get things done in the legislature. Maintaining a grassroots network, keeping members educated and informed, and mobilizing them when necessary is costly. When labor could use inside connections instead, why engage in the cost of grassroots mobilizations?

In Congress, through the 1980s, the effectiveness of labor lobbyists was largely a result of their close interactions with the activist Democratic party
leaders who pushed labor's liberal agenda. Taylor Dark (1996, 90) argues: "These contacts [informal, daily contacts between Speaker Wright's staff and labor lobbyists] were so extensive that the community of labor lobbyists became, in effect, an arm of the Democratic leadership." Even though labor was attempting to increase its grassroots lobbying capacity during the 1980s (Starobin 1989; Keller 1982a, b), change came slowly. Ohio Democratic Congressman Tony Hall reported scant grassroots contacts from union members despite a strong labor presence in his Dayton district: "I don't think labor does a very good job of educating the rank and file, so I get few letters from them." (quoted in Morehouse 1988, 1520) Others have noted the same phenomenon among other groups in the Democratic coalition. Democratic pollster Stanley B. Greenberg comments:

> Democrat-allied groups have atrophied because with Democratic control of Congress, they could achieve their goals by lobbying the right committees. 'Being effective' meant being effective in Washington, D.C., and membership became mainly a source of funds. (quoted in Kosterlitz 1996, p. 475)

So despite labor's large membership, the structures were not in place to create constituent pressure on members of Congress.

Similarly, in Ohio, when labor wanted something, it would go to House Speaker Verne Riffe. If Riffe agreed, labor got what it wanted; if Riffe did not agree, it did not matter what labor did. So access was between labor officials, lobbyists and Riffe. The president of one Ohio international expresses this particularly well:

> Over the past ten to fifteen years, the labor leadership has been complacent in dealing with its own members. They could always rely on the House Democrats, even with a Republican governor and Republican Senate. There was no need for rallying to get
members involved. They [labor] didn't necessarily have any gains, but they didn't have any losses either; there were no threats. So they had no system in place for when the day did come that they couldn't rely on the House Democrats anymore.

The way several unions strategically used insider and outsider lobbying reinforced their tendency to rely on insider contacts with the Democrats. An officer of an Ohio international describes their lobbying strategy, which relied on local union officers, rather than lobbyists, for "inside" lobbying:

Grassroots mobilization helps when the legislator doesn't know our officers well. For our friends we rely on inside lobbying. We may do a grassroots mobilization for a friend after the fact, to help them justify their position. (italics added)

For them, grassroots mobilization helps to gain access for union officers to engage in face-to-face lobbying. These comments also reveal the importance of using constituent support, contrived or not, as a way to explain one's vote to other interested parties (Fenno 1978; Kingdon 1989). A lobbyist describes other strategic reasons not to mobilize rank-and-file pressure on friends:

We don't target friends [for grassroots campaigns] because some are conscientious about responding to constituents and this just gives them more work to do. And some members can get out of hand and offend legislators with whom you need good relations or with whom you've already worked out a deal with inside lobbying.

Now that the Democrats control neither Congress nor the Ohio legislature, labor no longer has its inside access but doesn't have much of a grassroots mobilization structure either. Thus, it is difficult to let members of the legislature know constituent preferences on labor issues since only some labor lobbyists have broad access to Republicans and the ability to create grassroots pressure is lacking.
Because of their new political situation, labor leaders in Ohio currently are attempting to make innovative efforts at communicating with members and getting them involved in grassroots lobbying efforts. The OEA reacted particularly forcefully to threats to past gains they saw in the Republican-controlled Ohio legislature. In January 1995, OEA established a new grassroots lobbying structure, called Core Groups, to assure that legislators would hear from their constituents on education issues. The Core Groups currently are independent from, but organized parallel to, their electoral mobilization structure (EPAC).

The Core Groups are organized along state senate district lines and are chaired by members of the OEA Executive Board, composed of mostly of teachers elected from OEA’s nine districts and Ohio’s representatives to the NEA Board of Directors. The Core Groups held meetings in each senate district with local officers and activists to plan what activities each group thought were most appropriate for their members and their legislators. So even though mobilization occurs in a more top-down way than electoral mobilizations, the Core Group structure provides considerable local flexibility in implementing grassroots mobilizations. Many Core Groups developed phone chains to piggy-back on school districts’ “snow day” phone chains in order to institutionalize a method of quickly mobilizing rank-and-file members. Another common Core Group activity is to schedule regular weekend breakfast meetings with their legislators in order to provide regular opportunities for OEA members and legislators to share information and to get to know one another. Several OEA activists thought legislators who know your name and face would take the information provided in subsequent letters and Lobby Day visits more seriously.

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21 The Executive Board also has members representing retired teachers, support staff, and college staff.
Some found that legislators would call them personally or the OEA office in Columbus on educational issues after meeting them as a constituent OEA representative. In the future, OEA plans to merge its existing EPAC electoral structure with the Core Groups to create a unified political structure that clearly links OEA issues and electoral activities.

Some internationals are trying to institutionalize grassroots lobbying structures much like OEA. The Ohio AFL-CIO, while still relying on the internationals themselves for issue mobilization structures, is implementing additional ways to communicate directly with rank-and-file members rather than merely relying on local officers. They have started a voting scorecard for Ohio legislators, and a toll-free legislative hotline and a computer on-line service that members can use for legislative updates and appeals to contact their representative.

They are also engaging in activities to attract public attention for labor's message. Labor rallies were organized at the Statehouse in November of 1995, and protests were organized when U.S. House Speaker Newt Gingrich came to Columbus. The Cleveland central body sponsors a weekly radio show, "America's Work Force," that gives labor news and promotes a "working class perspective" on politics. Some union officers describe it as one of the few liberal alternatives to Rush Limbaugh. The national AFL-CIO engaged in a highly-publicized advertising blitz during its "Labor '96" campaign during the 1996 elections. The AFL-CIO's intention in Labor '96 was not just to help elect more Democrats to Congress. Rather, it was to strengthen, and in many places create, its grassroots political structures and to improve the image of unions with the public and its own members by highlighting union support of issues important to "working families" (health care, retirement, education). By creating
local political structures during the election, labor officials hope that these structures can be maintained for grassroots lobbying after the election.

**The Issue/Electoral Connection**

Union officers believe that reinvigorating the grassroots on issues will help in their attempts at electoral mobilization as well. Electoral education efforts usually started along with the volunteer mobilization, two months before the election, giving unions little time to inform their members about candidates. Since unions were not asking their members to contact legislators on issues in between elections, they were not effectively educating their members about labor issues either. So when it came time to vote, members did not understand why they should support the candidates endorsed by labor -- they did not see the connection between what public officials were doing (or could do) and their jobs and livelihood. Because grassroots lobbying will force unions to educate their members on the issues, and will demonstrate to members which officials are responsive to their concerns, the electoral connection will be reestablished.

One lobbyist clearly drew the connection between grassroots lobbying and electoral activities when he noted that they would sometimes target a legislator in their grassroots lobbying mobilization who they knew would not vote the pro-labor position: “Mobilizing against opponents who we target is obviously not done in an attempt to change their vote. It is for the political education of our members—to show them that the legislator is unresponsive to their concerns so they will be active against the legislator in the next election.” Issue activism is a means of educating members about their representatives and provides a way to influence their electoral behavior.

It has been known for years that unions have difficulty delivering their members as a coherent bloc of votes. Many expressed frustration at members
using social issues (especially gun control and abortion) as the basis for their voting decisions rather than job-related considerations. Many believe that members do not understand how what is going on in the legislature affects their ability to do their job. A lobbyist for the state employees union hammered the point home: "We have to get our members to legislators as their bosses." She continued with an anecdote about a phone conversation with a member:

He was startled that the Republicans in the legislature were cutting funds for his program. He said he had voted for the Republicans, but didn't expect this. I asked him why he voted for the Republicans. He said, "Because of 'moral issues': guns, abortion, homosexuality." He didn't consider their [Republican's] positions on how they could affect him at work.

Union leaders know that many members will not be swayed by endorsements, but think they need to make sure that work considerations are at least an element of members' voting calculations. One union officer explains:

Some members get quite upset and send me nasty letters when they oppose our endorsements. But the union isn't considering all issues, and can't. Likewise, if abortion or gun control is that important to members, they'll go ahead and vote on the basis of it. Our job is to make labor issues something to think about when voting—that members at least consider workplace issues in deciding how to vote.

Many union officers believe an improved issue mobilization capacity would help forge the educational link to voting. To get members to engage in grassroots lobbying, the union must demonstrate to the member why the issue is important and how it affects them personally. Thereafter, the member is better able to understand how legislators' positions on these issues matters. By participating in grassroots lobbying campaigns, members will understand the threat to their interest posed by unfriendly legislators and will decide on their
own to vote against them without feeling pressured by the union. The reason why unions endorse certain candidates becomes clearer and as does the desirability of supporting those endorsements. Issues become the link to voting. The current "threatening" environment of the anti-labor actions of Congress and the Ohio legislature helps them make the linkage between issues and elections, and between personal concerns and the political arena. An officer of the Service Employees International Union describes the connection between labor's current political and economic difficulties and the reinvigoration of members at the grassroots: "Setbacks will help the unions mobilize their members politically by showing them [members] how politics matters."

**Issues and Partisanship**

Issues can be used to overcome partisan divisions. If members are convinced that endorsements are based on issues important to them, rather than partisanship, they are more likely to support endorsees from the opposite party. An OEA activist explains how she uses the EPAC questionnaire that candidates fill out in order to get the OEA endorsement to persuade members to support endorsees:

> I review how candidates answered the most important questions. This helps show members why a certain candidate was endorsed. For incumbents, I show their OEA voting score. ...In the 1992 presidential race, they [NEA] developed a "fact sheet", creating a side-by-side comparison of Bush and Clinton on educational issues to show why they had endorsed Clinton. ...Doing the questionnaire comparisons is a big help in educating skeptical members, but strong Democrats or Republicans won't be convinced no matter what.

Issues also become the basis for overcoming partisanship in recruiting political activists. OEA activists report that some Republican teachers are
unwilling to engage in OEA electoral campaign activities because they perceive the OEA mostly supports Democrats. So they try to get these members involved on issues, which helps them to understand the connection between educational issues and the electoral arena. They are then more able to be convinced to contribute to OEA campaign activities as well. Thus, issues become leverage to induce electoral activism.

The use of issues in electoral mobilization efforts allows for targeted messages to members across different unions. Unions can base their appeals on issues of greatest salience to their own members. Representatives of teachers and civil service unions report that their members are not interested in and do not respond to “typical labor issues.” For the sake of mobilization, they do not have to do so. OEA can use educational issues to appeal to its members, civil servants unions can use prison or transportation or health issues to appeal to segments of their diverse membership, building trades unions can use prevailing wage, industrial unions can use foreign trade issues, and so on. Fragmented and decentralized labor political organizations are better able to target these messages to their own members rather than relying on a homogeneous labor appeal.

Conclusion

Organized labor faces a tradeoff in being politically effective. On the one hand, it is most effective legislatively when it acts as part of a liberal coalition to push issues benefiting people beyond union members; organized labor has been less successful acting alone to push legislation benefiting labor unions (Greenstone 1977; Wilson 1979; but see Form 1995, p. 312). In this case, labor is one faction of the Democratic party coalition. On the other hand, if active members are a key political resource, labor officials believe that appeals to
support the labor movement generally or "working class" issues are not the most effective way to mobilize members. Successful appeals are more targeted to the members' personal finances and employment conditions. This is due to the collective action problem: members are less likely to free ride when their own selective benefits are at stake rather than collective benefits for the labor movement or the working class. In this case, unions act more as interest groups, rather than a faction of the Democratic party. Although fragmentation may hurt organized labor's ability to act cohesively as a promoter of working class interests (Form 1995), it does help each union appeal to the interests of its own members. But to the extent that fragmentation makes labor mobilization dependent on many different local officers with varying willingness to undertake the costs of mobilization, mobilization appeals may be scattered, rather than targeted.

Member mobilization may be less crucial for political success if lobbying coalitions or insider access, particularly through the Democratic party, are the only resources necessary. But if an active membership is necessary to demonstrate the electoral clout of labor, create insider access, and/or to bring credibility to inside lobbying messages, it is necessary to frame messages in ways that appeal to labor's diverse membership. Perhaps one reason organized labor has been less successful in Congress on "labor issues" is its lack of ability to mobilize grassroots lobbying from members and the lack of cohesive voting to make lobbying electorally credible.

Targeted appeals and decentralized political structures are not the only method of union political mobilization. Unions attempt to lower the information and transaction costs of political participation. Information costs are lowered by the central office's monitoring of the political environment and signaling to
members how, when, and why their activism is needed. Over the longer term, they lower the costs of participation by educating members on the political process, so members know what to do, and by educating them on political issues, so members know why they are doing it. Unions lower the transaction costs of participation by making it easier for members to become involved politically. Through dues checkoffs, they make it easy to contribute to PAC. By providing talking points, sample letters, and pre-printed postcards, they make it easy to contact legislators. By making strategic targeting decisions, they can mobilize members only when needed and use them when they are likely to be most effective.

The examination of union political mobilization will continue in Chapter 3 where a model will be developed to explain which union members are mobilized. To help understand the interrelationships between mobilization and participation, Chapter 6 will expand the model of member political participation to estimate the effects of union mobilization on member participation.
CHAPTER 3

WHO IS CONTACTED?: MOBILIZING THE RANK-AND-FILE

To the strategic group leader, the membership is a potentially valuable resource the organization can use to attempt to influence public policy. Electoral mobilizations can help place sympathetic candidates into office and help the group earn lobbying access thereafter. Cohesive group support can be offered by group leaders in exchange for candidates' policy positions favorable to the group (Uhlaner 1989 a, b). Although not all interest groups are membership organizations (Salisbury 1984) and not all membership organizations attempt to involve their members beyond paying dues (Berry 1977, Hayes 1986, Godwin 1988), many groups engage in influence activities that rely on member activism (Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Walker 1991). But given that group leaders have limited resources to undertake mobilizations, like time and energy, they must strategically ask those members most likely to respond.

Group leaders recruit activists because they believe that if individuals are asked to participate in politics they are more likely to participate than if members must volunteer on their own. But if members are likely to respond when asked, explaining who participates involves explaining who gets asked to participate. Yet, as described in Chapter 1, we know little about the mechanics of interest
group membership mobilization. Chapter 2 focused on organized labor's political structures, strategies, and the creation of opportunities for member to participate in political action. Here the focus will be on explaining labor's contacts with members during electoral mobilization campaigns. Who do unions ask to participate? Which members are aware of opportunities to participate and the invitations put before them by group leaders?

I find differences between three elements of the mobilization process. Members who perceive greater numbers of opportunities to participate in union political activities have politically active locals, are accessible to union leaders, and are attentive to political information from their union. Members who are asked to participate share these characteristics, but also are highly educated. Education and accessibility to union leaders alone explain greater numbers of requests to participate. In short, the member's level of education is the most important variable in explaining who is mobilized in unions. This is due in part, but not exclusively, to the mobilization efforts of the Ohio Education Association.

**Why Mobilize?**

Although we could easily assume that members would want to engage in activities that would help the organization produce selective or collective benefits for themselves and their compatriots, the incentive to free ride on the contributions of others serve as barriers to such group efforts (Olson 1965). In addition, there are informational barriers to member political participation in organizational political activities. Simply put, there are a variety of details members must know in order to engage in group political action: what is happening in the political arena, how these events affect their personal and the organization's interests, what they can do about it, and when, where, and how to get involved effectively. In the words of one Ohio Education Association
(OEA) activist: "Mobilizing works best when you bring the 'road show' to the people: bring [OEA] officers to local meetings, provide legislative updates. If members know what is happening and the implications of it, members will have the motivation. If your give them the means, they will do it. Let them know what they can do."

As the discussion of the deterioration of organized labor's grassroots structures in Chapter 2 indicates, many interviewees believe that a group's ability to mobilize its members effectively depends on constant and long-term education. An OEA activist argues: "The key [to their success] is that it is a constant mobilization process. When OEA trains EPAC representatives, they stress the key to the job is keeping members informed: keep in contact, answer their questions, give them information." Though groups can and do educate their members about issues that are not in the forefront of current political debate so that members will be informed if and when the issue does reach the political agenda, much issue education is part of the immediate mobilization effort. That is, members are informed about the issue, how it applies to them and why they should do something about it at the same time the organization is asking them to do something about it. Union leaders admit that in most issues and electoral mobilizations, member education occurs more through contacts at the time of mobilization than through long-term educational efforts.

Contacts not only provide the relevant information regarding what to do and why, but also places social pressure on the member to accede to requests to join in the group effort. An OEA member explains the importance of social pressures in his fundraising efforts: "The number one reason for giving is to please the person who asked." The AFL-CIO Phone Bank manual (PM-8), in bold and capital letters, states quite clearly: "TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE,
PROSPECTS SHOULD BE ASKED TO VOLUNTEER BY PEOPLE THEY KNOW. IT MAKES IT MUCH HARDER FOR THEM TO SAY 'NO.' Organized labor's decentralized political structure and emphasis on localism in political mobilization supports this view. The benefits of this strategy are confirmed by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady's finding that individuals are most likely respond positively to mobilization requests when the request comes from a personal acquaintance (1995, 142).

Union leaders understand the necessity of making personal contacts with members during the mobilization process. One put it concisely: "If you don't ask, nobody will do it." Another argued: "It takes a local leader recruiting and saying 'We're going to do it.' You don't get participation from putting a flyer on the bulletin board. You get it from going face-to-face, nose-to-nose, toe-to-toe, asking people. That's what works." Similarly, the AFL-CIO's "Checkoff Yes" pamphlet (p. 13) on how to raise COPE (Committee On Political Education) contributions argues emphatically: "Members will respond...there's proof of that. An AFL-CIO national poll of union members showed 64 percent of members willing to contribute to their union PAC if they're approached." Thus, to explain member participation in group political action, it is important to understand who is contacted by the group.

Limits to Mobilization

The same decentralized structures that may facilitate union member political mobilization through personal contacts have a liability as well. Having local leaders ask their own members may increase the probability that members respond, but first local leaders must be convinced to recruit their members. In addition, information inevitably is lost as it is passed through the organization. An OEA state officer illustrates the problem as he describes OEA's efforts to
educate their members during their 1995 mobilization on state budget issues:

We ran a poll early in the budget process that found the central office staff was very aware of the issues, local presidents were highly aware, but a bit less so than the central office, but low levels of information among the rank-and-file. Information was getting to local presidents but not filtering down rank-and-file members. Since the poll, OEA has been bringing local presidents to central office to encourage them to communicate regarding the issues with their members.

Central offices can provide coordination, training and assistance, but unless local officers contact their members and make requests for political participation, member mobilization is unlikely to generate much activity.

There are several important obstacles that impede local officers from contacting their members. First, both local officers and local members have competing demands on their time. Some large locals have enough officers and staff that one person can be assigned to organize the local's political activities as part of his or her job responsibilities, but many locals do not have the resources to afford this luxury. For most, union political action is one activity the officer should do along with many activities he or she must do to manage the internal affairs of the local; this may include involvement in collective bargaining, grievance procedures, internal finances, union committees, internal communications and external reports, and so on. Faced with limited time and many demands on that time, political action can get lost in the shuffle.

Furthermore, officers at time must request participation from members in non-political union activities. Like their officers, members' time is limited and faces multiple demands of family, work, recreation, and other voluntary activities. Thus, local officers must decide when to ask members for additional contributions and for what purposes. An officer of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Works argues: "You pick and choose where you
ask members to get involved. You don’t want to ask them to do too much too often. We are also asking them to volunteer for non-political union activities, such as organizing, so we don’t want to over-ask.” An OEA activist concurs: “People can’t be bothered every week. You must mobilize them judiciously.” The risk in trying to limit the number of times you ask is that you do not ask at all. Note the first and last sentences of an international officer’s explanation of the difficulties of mobilizing members: “Our members have too many other activities competing for their time. ...Maybe we need to ask more.”

The second obstacle to local officer political mobilization is that union officers are elected by their members. Local officers especially, like others who run for office, can be reticent about discussing subjects or making requests that might risk losing the votes of their constituents. An Ohio Building Trades Council officer asserts: “We have a problem in getting [political] activists. Local leaders are afraid to ask their members to get politically involved, so political activities are done mainly by officers. Talking about politics risks offending the members. Local leaders must stand for election and don’t want to alienate their members.” The problem some local officers have talking politics with members reinforces the point that union members are not members of the organization because of their political agreement with the organization and thus are not necessarily likely to be mobilized or to participate based merely on their preexisting agreement with the positions of the group.

The electoral motivation of local officers is at the base of a second reason suggested for a lack of local political mobilization. An officer and local president of a building trades union colorfully characterizes the motivation of some local officers: “Our problem in the past is that our business reps. have done a piss poor job of disseminating information. They wouldn’t share it. They needed to
be reelected and thought that information gave them a source of power." Even if information on union political action gives a local officer an additional source of power, hoarding that information defeats the purpose of mobilizing for the organization as a whole.22

To some extent, the willingness of local officers to mobilize depends on the political environment. Several interviewees argued that the threats to unions, social programs, and education pushed by Republicans in Congress and in the Ohio legislature made members more receptive to political discussions at work. Stagnant wages and threats of plant closings are economic conditions that contributed to greater attention to possible political solutions. Thus, local officers felt less inhibited in broaching political topics because union issues were more politically salient. One international officer observed that the current political and economic environment "is making a big difference in members' political interest. You can see on the shop floor, people are more interested in talking about politics and listening to officers on politics. Before they were more interested in work problems. Officers now are talking more about politics because they have an audience."

Third, even if local leaders are interested in political action, recruitment of member for voluntary political action is not the highest priority in COPE electoral mobilizations. The "fundamental activities" of COPE are: endorsements of candidates, voter registration, political education, Get Out The Vote drives, and coordination with other community groups (National Association of Letter Carriers 1994; Form 1995, p. 296). Much of this activity is technically

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22 Although officers and activists from the OEA also noted political divisions within their membership, they had few complaints about local officer's unwillingness to discuss OEA positions. One teacher suggested a reason: "Other organizations have the problem of hoarding information since information is a source of power. We don't have this problem. Teaching is about sharing information. This helps make our mobilization structure work."
"non-partisan" so unions can reach out beyond their own membership. Recruiting volunteers to help with campaign activities or even to contribute PAC money thus may not be the focus of a local officer's political activities. A comment from the United Auto Worker's Ohio Community Action Program Coordinator is revealing, given that the UAW has the reputation of being one of the most politically active unions in Ohio (see Table 3.3): "The primary activity we try to get rank-and-file members to do is to talk to relatives about voting for endorsed candidates. Members are scared off if you ask them to do too much." Similarly, one AFL-CIO Central Body executive asserted that he seeks quality member participation over mass mobilization: "You can have too many people. The key is not the number of people, but getting people who can do the job." Other interviewees indicated that the primary activities they ask of rank-and-file are getting registered, becoming educated, and getting out to vote, not necessarily voluntarism. Union staff does most of the "activist" work.

Despite these problems, unions still are more active in political mobilization and are more successful at producing campaign volunteers than other organizations (Knoke 1990, 199; Herrnson 1995, 70, 197). Officers alone cannot undertake labor-intensive electoral activities such as leafletting, voter registrations, get out the vote drives, and filling PAC coffers. Indeed, the Ohio AFL-CIO COPE 1994 Phone Bank Manual (p. 7) clearly, and in bold in the original, urges officers to seek out volunteers: "All key campaign officials should make every effort -- at every opportunity they have -- to increase the volunteer

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22 Union staff contacts regarding political action must be with union members and union dues money cannot fund political communications to non-members that expressly endorse certain candidates or parties (through PAC money can) in federal elections (see Delaney 1991; Wright 1982 for reviews of legal restrictions on union political activity).

24 Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, pp. 384-8) estimate that churches may actually produce more political volunteers because, though unions have higher efforts at political mobilization, many more people are members of churches than unions.
force, whether for their own specific area of responsibility or for other activities. Volunteer recruitment is *everyone's job.* Even if informing members about endorsed candidates and getting them to the polls are higher priorities, promoting voluntarism is still a core union political activity.

In sum, there are costs of political mobilization to local officers in terms of time, energy, and member support, which may create uneven mobilization effort across local unions. Yet if members are likely to respond positively when asked, as asserted by AFL-CIO manuals, explaining which members are asked to participate by local officers may be a key to explaining which members actually participate.

**Explaining Mobilization: Who is Contacted?**

The literature on political participation, until recently, has focused on exploring the attributes of political participants rather than examining the processes by which individuals are enticed into political action (Leighley 1995; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995, 134). Thus, there are few guideposts to use to predict who is likely to be contacted with requests for political action. Moreover, given the suspicion of many that mobilization, like participation itself, is structured by socioeconomic status (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, Chap. 5), who labor leaders would mobilize from their more working-class membership is not immediately clear. Those already active in the organization are likely to be contacted (Verba and Nie 1972), since they are most available and most likely to engage in additional group-oriented activities, but other member characteristics that would structure the mobilization process have not been studied (Leighley 1996, 448).

Some insight into elite contacting is provided by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993). They argue that elites have limited resources for mobilization
and will use those resources strategically to contact individuals who are most likely to respond as the mobilizer desires. In their model of contacts by political parties, they find that respondent resources, strength of party identification, social involvement, and characteristics of the campaigns increase the probability of being contacted (p. 164).

The Ohio AFL-CIO COPE Phone Bank Manual (1994b, 7) suggests characteristics of prospective political activists for which union officers should look. Consistent with Rosenstone and Hansen’s theory, the Manual advises recruiting the members who are most accessible (and thus easiest to contact at low cost) and who are most likely to respond favorably to a union appeal for political activity due to their availability of time, political interest, or gratitude towards the union. The list includes members who are already active in the union (local officers, meeting attendees, volunteers for other union activities), members who are politically vocal, members who have benefited personally from recent union action (e.g., a successful grievance), friends and relatives of members, and retirees. In addition, unions commonly pass out volunteer cards and keep lists of activists who have helped in past political activities in order to use them as the first line of contacts when new opportunities arise.

Based on Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), the Ohio AFL-CIO Phone Bank Manual, and earlier discussions of the process of grassroots mobilizations, union officers are likely to use their limited resources (e.g., time, energy) for mobilization strategically and will attempt to mobilize those members who are most likely to respond as desired. I hypothesize four general characteristics of the member will be positively related to union political recruitment. First, mobilization depends on the local union context -- whether someone is making requests of others to participate. An individual is more
likely to be mobilized if she is a member of a local where officers or other activists are likely to ask the member to participate in political activities. Second, given that officers have limited time for political mobilization activities, the member is more likely to receive a request if she is accessible to union officers to be mobilized. Third, union officers are likely to ask the members who are most likely to respond effectively and appropriately (in the view of the mobilizer) to mobilization appeals. Finally, whether the member notices opportunities and invitations to participate in politics does not depend solely on the activities of the group leadership. Some members are more likely to “hear” political mobilization appeals than others. For example, members who are uninterested in politics or who do not look to their union for political information are less likely to be aware of the mobilization activities of their union.

To understand the process of mobilization, we must recognize that mobilization is not a single event. In fact, we can conceive of the process of organizational mobilization as occurring through three stages. First, a member must be aware that her group is sponsoring political events, that it is providing opportunities for her to participate. Creating an awareness of opportunities is a minimal criterion for mobilization to be effective; members cannot respond to mobilization if they are unaware it is occurring. The dependent variable for this stage of the process will be labeled “Awareness of Opportunities.” A second element of the mobilization process is that the individual is contacted by someone in the organization and asked to participate in a political event. Being contacted is likely to increase the probability that an individual will participate in the opportunities provided by the organization. Here the dependent variable is labeled “Receiving Contacts.” Third, an individual can receive multiple requests from the organization to participate in a variety of political activities. The more
requests an individual receives, the more likely she is to participate in one or multiple events. The dependent variable for receiving multiple contacts is labeled "Mobilization."

It is likely that the independent variables affect each stage of the mobilization process in somewhat different ways. To the extent they do so, they will help us understand the dynamics of the mobilization process. In my discussion of specific hypotheses, I will attempt to distinguish the effects of the independent variables on each stage of the mobilization process. An overview of the hypotheses is presented in Figure 3.1.

**Local Union Context.** As made clear in the description of the barriers to local officers mobilizing their members for political activities, we cannot assume that members have equal opportunities to participate in union political action either because their union local did not get involved in any political action or because the member was unaware of the activities that their union did sponsor. Furthermore, as one union officer stated straightforwardly: "It is clear that local union leadership is absolutely the key [to member mobilization and participation]." The probability that local union officers will mobilize will be taken into account in three ways: the traditional level of political mobilization of the member's international, the traditional levels of union political mobilization where the member lives, and whether the member lives in legislative districts targeted by their union for extra campaign assistance.

If an international is traditionally more active in politics, it should create more opportunities for its members to participate in politics and its members are more likely to be contacted with requests to engage in political action. Additionally, politically active unions should be especially effective in mobilizing members for multiple activities. Unions that have traditionally been active in
politics are likely to have a broad and consistent political program in place and officers who are experienced at recruiting members to participate. In short, the union has the infrastructure present to allow for political mobilization.

Union members who live in regions where union leaders traditionally are active in political mobilization should have more opportunities to participate and are more likely to be contacted with requests for political participation. In the Ohio AFL-CIO, this largely means urban areas in Ohio. Part of the reason for this is organizational: urban areas have more union infrastructure, including central bodies with full-time staff, officers, and members. The District Political Director of the Communications Workers of America explains the advantages of political mobilization in urban areas:

Urban areas tend to be more active than rural areas. There is little variation because all officers understand the importance of political involvement. Urban areas have some advantages for a couple of reasons. They tend to have larger locals which are better [at mobilizing] because they have more financial resources and more volunteers to draw upon. Having a large concentration of members at the same place is important in mobilization because it is easier to pass out information when lots of members are leaving one or two buildings at the end of a shift—like a politician working the plant gate. You can concentrate your mobilization efforts and get lots of volunteers. But in rural areas, members are not all in one place; it is harder when member are spread out because you have to visit many locations.

Like politically active internationals, geographical infrastructure should be particularly important in producing mobilization requests for a variety of union political activities.

Another reason for the AFL-CIO's urban-based mobilization is strategic. The Ohio AFL-CIO staff admitted that they do not encourage rural locals to mobilize since active rural areas would turn out Republicans -- individuals less
likely to vote for most of organized labor's endorsed candidates. Greenstone (1977, 24) notes that the Democratic party traditionally has valued its alliance with organized labor, not because of labor's ability to swing its members' votes, but because labor can affect the size of the Democrat's urban majorities (presumably through labor's ability to affect the turnout of its own members and its ability to form coalitions with other urban, Democratically-oriented groups).

Members living in legislative districts with races that are targeted by organized labor should have more opportunities and should be more likely to be mobilized. Given limited resources, unions attempt to prioritize their resources where they are most likely to make a difference in affecting the outcome of a campaign. Money, staff, communications, and efforts at local volunteer mobilization are the major resources that can be shifted towards targeted races. For example, an Ohio AFL-CIO staff member notes that apart from the staff's duties coordinating Central Bodies, internationals, and other community groups, "The bulk of our effort is spent on targeted districts; very little is spent on safe or lost districts." Much of the AFL-CIO's targeting is based on "underperforming" precincts and is aimed at turning out those sympathetic to labor's candidates, not just their own members. Although interviewees claimed to make special effort to get local officers and activists to recruit more volunteers in targeted races, few discussed rank-and-file mobilization when asked what they do differently in a targeted district until asked about it directly. In combination with the barriers to getting local officers to mobilize their members in general, this suggests that the relationship between living in a targeted legislative district and mobilization may not be strong. In addition, unless a

25 This strategy is being reconsidered after the 1996 elections. Anticipating the number of statewide races in 1998, the Ohio AFL-CIO COPE director explained: "A vote in Williams county [rural] is as good as a vote in Cuyahoga county [Cleveland]."
district is typically active in politics, targeting is only likely to induce leaders to do something, rather than to go all out and mobilize on a wide variety of activities. That is, targeting is likely to make more of a difference in producing single contacts requesting participation than broad mobilization for many campaign events.

**Member's Accessibility.** Members who are most accessible to union officers are most likely to be aware of opportunities and most likely to be mobilized. Those who are most accessible are those who are active in the organization and thus in contact with group leaders. This hypothesis is consistent with findings that those who are more active in the internal activity of organizations are more likely to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972, Pollock 1982, Baumgartner and Walker 1988). Those who are active in the organization are available to group leaders to be mobilized with little effort. The fact that they are already engaged in group activity suggests they may be willing to do more. An OEA activist explains both the benefits and the costs of this mobilization strategy: “You get volunteers for phone banks, etc., through personal contact. You ask people you know will do it. ...The problem becomes that people who are already most active are continually getting pestered.” Given the ease leaders have in contacting these members, those who are accessible are particularly likely to be invited to engage in multiple activities.

**Members who respond appropriately.** Leaders are more likely to contact those who are able to contribute effectively to union political action. As found in previous studies (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), those with greater "resources" to participate effectively in politics are likely to be contacted. The member’s level of education is a resource that is likely to matter in union mobilization. Education is highly related to many “civic
skills" that are necessary to participate effectively in politics: making decisions in group settings, planning, organizing, making speeches and presentations, and so on (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). Thus, education acts as a proxy for political skills. Officers ask capable individuals to participate because they have observed their skills in the workplace; officers are not likely to be aware of the level of educational attainment of potential activists. Given the variety of political skills to which education contributes, it is a characteristic that is likely to promote requests for involvement in a number of political activities.

Another resource that generally would affect requests, particularly for PAC contributions, is income. Unions, however, have more of a working class constituency than many organizations and accept donations so low that level of income is less relevant. For example, the United Food and Commercial Workers, who organize many low income grocery store employees, encourage a standard dues checkoff of $2 per year to their PAC—an amount hardly out of reach of any worker who wants to contribute.26

Finally, leaders are likely to contact those who are likely to respond with the political message desired by the group, particularly for multiple events. A member who disagrees may be asked by an officer unaware of the member’s political positions, but the officer is unlikely to ask multiple times if aware of the member’s disagreements. The AFL-CIO staff confirmed the strategy of attempting to mobilize those who support the union’s political positions when stating that they do not encourage rural unions to mobilize because rural areas would turn out Republican voters rather than those who are likely to vote for union endorsed candidates. As a result of such a strategy, those who disagree would also be aware of fewer union political activities. Yet much union political

26 Income is not included in the statistical models, since, in addition to these reasons, once education is controlled, it makes no contribution to the model.
activity is centered around local races and union officers claim that they do endorse and work for Republican candidates for local offices. Building trades and teachers' unions especially have histories of greater bipartisanship than other unions. So Republican members would not necessarily be excluded from union political mobilization. In sum, members who perceive themselves to be in political agreement with the union are more likely to be contacted to participate in union political action.

Likelihood of “hearing” mobilization appeals. Group leaders can send out general invitations to members to participate, for example, at a meeting or in a newsletter, but members are likely to vary in the extent to which they “hear” appeals for political action. That is, the extent to which members are aware of organizational political mobilization is partially dependent on the characteristics of the members themselves, not the efforts of group leaders alone. Several member characteristics seem of particular relevance.

First, members who are interested in and pay attention to politics would be more likely to note leader discussions of union political activities. In addition, as described above, the AFL-CIO specifically recommends officers mobilize members who are politically vocal. Political interest should be minimally necessary to perceive opportunities and single requests for participation, but many people are likely to be “interested” or to “pay attention” to politics without seeking out political interactions with co-workers. Therefore, interest is more likely to be related to requests for participation mobilization in a single activity than for a wide variety of activities.

The second characteristic likely to affect a member’s awareness of opportunities and hearing of mobilization appeals is her level of dependence

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87 Given organized labor's Democratic bend, the member's party identification and ideology were used as alternative measures of political agreement with the union but results did not differ.
en the union for political information. Even if a member is not particularly
interested in politics, if the union is her only source of political information, the
union may have an effect on her political perceptions. Information transmission
is central to political mobilization: group leaders let members know how their
interests are affected in the political arena, what they can do about it, and when
they should do it. Members are more likely to hear a greater number of
mobilization appeals to the extent they rely on the union for information about
politics.

Interviews suggest that many union officers believe that tenure in the
union is related to member’s willingness to hear political appeals. To use
Rothenberg’s language (1992), older members are more likely to have
“learned” the benefits of union political action. They know that current benefits
were not always available and that it took political mobilization to produce them.
Younger members, on the other hand, sometimes were described by officers
with the worst stereotypes of “Generation X”: cynical, apathetic, lazy, self-
absorbed—characteristics that do not lend themselves to seeking opportunities
for activism or to political mobilization by leaders. Moreover, to the extent that it
is less costly to mobilize those who have participated in the past rather than
recruit from a new population, leaders are likely to appeal to the members with
whom they are more familiar. Likewise, it is also less costly to continue to urge
these same experienced members to engage in multiple activities.

The last characteristic that may effect member’s ability to hear
mobilization appeals is based on their recruitment to the organization. If the
member joined in order to avail themselves of the opportunities to participate in
politics, they are more likely to be aware of opportunities and to hear political
mobilization appeals. Indeed, Fiorito (1987) has found that some individuals
join unions because of union political activities. These political activists in unions should be especially likely to place themselves in positions to be asked to participate in multiple political activities. Thus, those who have joined the union voluntarily may be more likely to hear requests for political participation.

**Measurement**

**Dependent Variables**

In studying organizational mobilization, we must be assured that the individual is participating in political activities sponsored by the group rather than free-lancing in politics outside of the organizational context. To address this concern, the Ohio Union Survey asked members whether their union sponsored a given political activity (e.g., phone banks) as a screening question. If the member responded that their union did not offer the activity, clearly any involvement of the individual in that activity was not driven by their union, thus they were not subsequently asked whether they participated in the activity. If the member replied that their union had sponsored the activity, the member was then asked whether their union had asked them to participate. This is the question on which the Contacting and Mobilization dependent variables are based. Finally, members were asked whether they participated or not in the given activity.

Three dependent variables will be used in this chapter as measures of different facets of the mobilization process: perceived opportunities, being contacted by the union, and the number of invitations for electoral participation received by the member, labeled mobilization.

**Perceived Opportunities.** First is a count of the number of political activities the member perceives her union sponsored, in other words, the number of opportunities the member perceives to participate in union political
activities. This is the screening question discussed above. The actual question reads: "I am going to read you a list of election and campaign related activities that unions and union members sometimes perform to affect the voting of union members. Did your union: participate in phone banks; distribute campaign literature; place campaign yard signs; register voters; provide opportunities to meet with candidates, such as candidates' nights or gate visits by candidates; raise money to contribute to candidates or issues; work at party headquarters?"

Table 3.1 presents the distribution of perceived opportunities in the 1992 and 1994 elections: the number and percentage of members who perceived each number of union sponsored electoral activities. Slightly more members perceived their unions as offering at least one opportunity in 1994 than in 1992, 88% to 82% respectively. Similarly, members generally perceived their unions as sponsoring a slightly larger number of activities in 1994 than in 1992. The opportunities measure is based on member perceptions only; we have no measure of the actual political activities of the thousands of locals across Ohio.

The 1994 survey included questions on whether the member was asked by anyone in their union to participate in the given political activities, a direct measure of mobilization. This measure follows Rosenau's definition of mobilization: "The mobilized act occurs only in response to requests for support...". (1974, 99) Recall that members were only asked about requests to participate if they had affirmed their union offered the activity.

**Receiving Contacts.** The "contact" measure refers to whether the member was asked to participate in any political activities. It is a dichotomous variable: asked or not.

**Mobilization.** "Mobilization" is the count of the number of activities in which the union requested the member participate. The distribution of
mobilization is shown in Table 3.2. Nearly one-half of Ohio union members, 46.2% (283), were asked to participate in at least one union electoral activity in 1994. One-fifth of members, 21.5% (132) received requests to participate in multiple activities.

**Independent Variables**

**Local Union Context.** The data for the union context variables were gathered during the interviews with international officers. Union's Political Activity. Each officer was asked to name the international unions he or she perceived as being most politically active in Ohio. Many at first stated that most unions were politically active, but when pressed could name the unions they thought were most active. Many also named internationals they perceived as being moderately politically active. To construct a scale rating the level of political activity of each union, one point was given to an international for each respondent who named it as one of the most active unions. One-half point was given to an international for each respondent who named it as moderately active. So each international's score on the Active Union scale is the total points the union received based on nominations by union international officers during the interviews. These scores are presented in Table 3.3. The scale ranges from 15.5 to 0 with a median of 6. Survey respondents received the score of the international of which they are a member.

**Geographical Political Activity.** The union's active regions score is based on ratings given by the union central office staff. The score is a dummy variable (1=lives in a geographically active region; 0=lives in a less active region). In accordance with the advice of the Ohio AFL-CIO officer and staff

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28 This question was asked of international officers, not local OEA activists.

29 International officers were each asked where their unions were most active geographically in Ohio. But given the low number of survey respondents per international, the central office ratings produced less error.
interviewees, AFL-CIO respondents were coded as living in a geographically active region if they lived in an urban county where the AFL-CIO Central Bodies have full-time staff. Counties coded as politically active for AFL-CIO unions were: Cuyahoga, Franklin, Hamilton, Lucas, Mahoning, Montgomery, Stark, Summit, Trumbull. One difficulty the AFL-CIO staff had with their own assessment of where unions were most active in mobilizing their members was that the areas they named also were the areas where unions have the greatest organizational strength. The staff suspected that these urban unions often do not work as hard in mobilizing because they can rely on their numbers.

OEA respondents were coded as living in a geographically active region if they live in a county or OEA district that was identified as being politically active by the five OEA central office officers and staff interviewees. Regions identified as politically active for the OEA were: OEA Districts 3, 4, 5, and 6 (Northeast, East-central, East and Southeast); Clark, Franklin, Hamilton, Lucas, Montgomery counties; and former Ohio Senators Montgomery’s and Snyder’s districts in northwest and southeast Ohio, respectively.

OCSEA respondents were coded as living in a geographically active region if they lived in a county identified as being one of the most politically active by the four political directors of AFSCME Ohio. The following counties

\footnote{Sen. Snyder was the Chair of the Ohio Senate Education Committee and an antagonist of the OEA.}
were coded as active for members of the OCSEA: Cuyahoga, Hamilton, Lorain, Lucas, Mahoning, Montgomery, Portage, Summit, Trumbull.\textsuperscript{31}

**Targeted districts.** Targeted districts were measured by the total number of targeted legislative districts (congressional, Ohio Senate, Ohio House) in which the member lived. For example, if a member lived in a zip code where all three races were targeted, she would receive a score of three; whereas if she lived in a zip code in which the Ohio Senate race was targeted, but not the congressional or a Ohio House race, she would receive a score of one. The rationale for this cumulative measure of targeting is that the more races that are targeted where the member lives in, the greater the likelihood she will be contacted to participate in one or more of the races.

Targeted congressional, Ohio Senate and Ohio House districts were obtained from the union central offices. Respondents were coded into legislative districts based on their zip codes. Lists of zip codes by legislative districts were obtained from the Ohio Secretary of State's Office. There are a couple problems with this measurement. First, legislative districts are not drawn to conform neatly to zip codes. For example, in 1992, 25% of respondents lived in zip codes that crossed multiple Ohio Senate district lines and an additional 17% lived in zip codes that crossed Ohio House district lines. Where this

\textsuperscript{31} Though all four AFSCME interviewees mentioned that many political activists come from Franklin county, this was only because of the large number of members that live there working for the state government in Columbus. One stated directly: "For the size of our membership in Franklin county, we have low levels of participation." They attributed the inactivity of Franklin county members to greater concern with and enforcement of the "Little Hatch Act," which bars public employees from being involved in partisan or candidate campaigns. The staff argued that supervisors are more aggressive in intimidating employees in Franklin county, and thus members have greater fear of getting caught. Governor Voinovich also sends Hatch Act reminders in paychecks before elections. Members outside of Franklin county have less fear of being punished for engaging in union political activities since their bosses often encourage them to be involved in the races of local politicians. Thus, since the supervisors themselves encourage skirting the law, they ignore union political activity. But in Columbus city politics, public employees have "a history of non-involvement." Therefore, OCSEA members living in Franklin county were coded as living in an inactive region.
occurred, the respondent was placed in the district listed as predominant for that zip code by the Secretary of State. Nevertheless, it is likely that there is considerable error in this coding scheme. A second problem with this measure is that it only accounts for legislative races; it leaves many other important local races unaccounted for.

**Participation within the union.** The member’s level of accessibility to union officers for mobilization is measured by the member’s level of activity within the union. It is measured by whether the member claims to have ever taken part in union grievance procedures, strikes, picketing, or contract negotiations (1=yes; 0=no).

**Level of education.** A member’s level of education is a proxy for her resources and skills for political action. The measure for the respondent’s level of education is based on the following three questions: 1) “What is the highest grade of school or year of college you completed?”; 2) “Did you receive a high school diploma or GED?”; 3) What was the last degree you received?.” The responses from these three questions were recoded into a seven category scale: grade school or less; 9 to 12 years; High school diploma or GED; some college, non-degree; associate’s degree; Bachelor’s degree; and post-graduate degree.

**Political proximity to union leaders.** Perceived political proximity with the organization is calculated by summing the absolute values of the differences between the member’s party identification and ideology and her perception of her union leaders’ party identifications and ideologies. Partisan proximity is based on the difference between the respondent’s answer to two questions: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?,” and “Generally speaking, do you
usually think of leaders of labor unions as Republicans, Democrats, Independents, or what?". Ideological proximity is based on the difference between the respondent’s answer to the following two questions: “We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. What would you call yourself, very liberal, somewhat liberal, middle of the road, somewhat conservative, very conservative, or don’t you think of yourself in these terms?” and to “And how about labor union leaders?” [same five options]. The party and ideological proximity scales were then added together into a single scale and inverted so that the higher the member’s level of political agreement with union leaders, the more likely she should be to be contacted to participate in union political activities. The proximity scores measure only whether members perceive themselves to be in agreement with union leaders, not whether their perceptions were accurate.

Political interest. The member’s level of interest in politics is measured by the member’s estimate of how much attention she pays to politics (1-5 scale).

Informational dependence. The member’s level of dependence on the union for political information is measured by the following: “Here is a list of sources from which people get information about government, public affairs, candidates and issues. For each of the sources, please tell me if it was very important, somewhat important, or not at all important in helping you decide how to vote: Labor unions.”

Organizational tenure. The member’s tenure in the union is measured by the respondent’s estimate of the total years she has belonged to a labor union.

32 Respondents answering “I don’t think of myself in those terms” were recoded as “middle of the road.”

33 A number of members did not know the party and/or ideology of their leaders. To avoid losing these cases for the statistical models, those who answered “Don’t know” to any of the leader questions were recoded at the mean. Members who answered “Don’t know” or who refused to answer any question on their own partisanship or ideology retained missing values.
**Voluntary membership.** The control for recruitment, whether the individual may have joined in order to participate in political activities, is measured dichotomously based on whether she joined voluntarily or was "coerced" by a closed shop (1=voluntary membership; 0=required membership).

A description of the means, standard deviations, and ranges of the independent variables are presented in Table 3.4.

**Results**

Multivariate models are necessary to establish the independent effects of the independent variables on the mobilization of members. First I will present the model of the number of opportunities the member perceives to participate, followed by contacting—whether or not the member was asked to participate in any union political activities—and then mobilization, the number of activities in which the member was asked to participate.

**Opportunities**

The model of perceived opportunities can be estimated with data from both the 1992 and 1994 elections. Members of the United Auto Workers (UAW) were included in the 1994 AFL-CIO list, but not in the 1992 list. To provide accurate comparisons between the two elections, we need to compare the same populations. Therefore, the 1994 results presented here excluded UAW respondents (N=68), which accounts for the lower number of cases in the 1994 model.\(^4\) The models are estimated using Ordinary Least Squared (OLS)

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\(^4\) Estimating the 1994 model with UAW members included produces few substantive differences. The most substantial change, for example, is that living in a region of politically active unions is statistically significant at a traditionally acceptable level (p=.03) rather than a more marginal level (p=.09).
The results of the models for both elections are presented in Table 3.5.

The results reveal that members are significantly more likely to perceive their union is involved in larger numbers of political activities in both elections if they are members of more traditionally politically active unions, if they are more available to union officers through participation in non-political union activities, and if they are more reliant on the union for political information. Other traits are significantly related to perceptions of higher levels of union activity in one of the elections: high levels of interest in politics in 1992, and living in a region of union political activity in 1994 (at a marginal level of significance, p= .09). This is evidence that the local union's political context, a member's accessibility to be mobilized, and the member's likelihood of hearing mobilization appeals increase the probability that members will perceive union-sponsored opportunities for political participation. At the same time, unions seem rather ineffective in increasing opportunities or making members more aware of opportunities in targeted legislative districts or for the members most likely to participate appropriately.

The dependent variable is a count of the number of electoral activities the member thought her union sponsored, so ideally, poisson regression would be used. However, to estimate a poisson model properly, we need to control for the exposure rate: the number of opportunities for the event to occur. We have no measure of this—in fact, perceived opportunities will be used as the exposure rate to estimate poisson models later in this dissertation. While the STATA statistical package assumes a default exposure rate if the actual rate is unknown, the model's chi-square value failed to reject the null hypothesis that the equation did not produce a poisson distribution. Thereafter, the model was estimated using negative binomial regression, another procedure appropriate for count models. These results failed to reject the null hypothesis for the 1992 data. To maintain consistent estimation procedures, OLS regression is used for both years. The substantive differences between the results of the various models are minor.

Additionally, to account for possible heteroskedasticity due to cluster effects from members sample from the same internationals, the models also were estimate using Huber variance estimates grouped by the politically active union scale. The results were not substantively different than those reported.
Receiving Contacts

Next we examine whether or not the member was asked to participate in political activities. The dependent variable is dichotomous (asked versus not asked), so the model is estimated using probit to account for the non-linear nature of the relationship (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). A linear estimation procedure such as Ordinary Least Squares Regression is inappropriate when the distribution of values of the dependent variable is bounded from below (0) and from above (1). The cumulative normal distribution, probit's functional form, is appropriate for the nominal level of measurement of the dependent variable.

The same independent variables are used in the contacting model as in the perceived opportunities models. Because probit coefficients are based on a cumulative normal distribution, single unit changes in the coefficient produce varying amounts of change in the dependent variable, depending on the point on the cumulative normal distribution function on which the value of the independent variable lies. Therefore, I calculated the amount of change in the dependent variable produced by a change from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable while other independent variables were held at their respective means. The change score is interpreted as the change in probability of a member's being asked to participate in a union political event given a change from the lowest to the highest value of the independent variable. Table 3.6 displays the results.

The results offer considerable support for several of the hypotheses regarding whom is invited to participate. Measures of the member's likelihood of responding appropriately, the local union context, the member's availability, and the member's likelihood of hearing mobilization appeals are significantly related to union political contacts. First, the member's level of education clearly
has the greatest impact on the probability that the member will be asked to participate in union political activities, as indicated by the change scores. This is a noteworthy finding given that education is not related to member perceptions of opportunities. Union leaders actually seek out more highly educated members to request that they participate in union political activities. Why they do so will be analyzed later in the chapter.

Second, local union political context influences the probability of contacts. Individuals who are members of unions that are traditionally more politically active and/or who live in regions of traditional union political activity are significantly more likely to be asked. Both produce moderate changes in the probability of being contacted. Third, members who are active in non-political union activities are more likely to face requests to participate. Finally, two of the “hearing” variables play notable roles. The higher the level of the member’s interest in politics, the more likely she is to be asked to participate.* The member’s level of interest in politics produces a similar change score in the probability of being contacted as the politically active union scale. A member’s level of reliance on the union for political information also produces a moderate level of change in the probability of being contacted to participate, but the coefficient fails to attain traditional levels of statistical significance by a small amount (p=.13).

The contacting model provides additional evidence of organized labor’s difficulties in targeting members. The number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives is unrelated to their probability of being contacted.

* Some caution should be used in interpreting the relationship between political interest and contacts. When Huber variance estimators are used to adjust for sample cluster effects (grouped on the active union scale), political interest loses its statistical significance (p=.13). At the same time, voluntary membership in the union becomes marginally significant (p=.07) in explaining variation in union contacts.
Neither is the member’s level political agreement with the union. Clearly union officers are not asking only the members likely to produce the political message the union desires.

**Mobilization**

Mobilization is the number of requests the member received to participate in union electoral activities. It is a count of discrete (nominal-level) events and thus poisson regression is the appropriate estimate technique (King 1989, 48-51, 122-4). A linear form of estimation is inappropriate since values are constrained to take positive values (one cannot be asked to participate in negative events). Probit is inappropriate since the distribution of the dependent variable, though it is bounded from below at zero, is not bounded from above at one. A poisson distribution takes on an exponential form.

There are two elements necessary to estimate a poisson regression model properly. First is the incident rate: the rate at which the events occur. Here the incident rate is the number of requests per election. The second element is the exposure rate, which when multiplied by the incident rate, produces the expected number of observed events. When estimating the incident rate, the exposure rate needs to be controlled, since the greater the exposure to opportunities for occurrence, the higher the number of events is likely to be. Fortunately, we have an adequate measure of the exposure rate available in the Ohio Union Survey: the number of opportunities for political participation the member perceives her union sponsored (examined earlier in this chapter). In accounting for a member’s level of exposure in estimating the poisson regression model, members who perceived their unions sponsored no political activities (N=77) were excluded from analysis because they were not
"exposed" to any opportunities to participate. This explains the substantial drop in the number of cases between the contacting and mobilization models.

The values of the coefficients from the poisson regression estimations are based on the non-linear poisson distribution and cannot be be interpreted straightforwardly as producing a constant unit of change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. Thus change scores were calculated based on a change from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable while all other independent variables in the model were held constant at their means. Given that the poisson model is estimating the number of political activities engaged in by the member, the change score is interpreted as the increase (or decrease) in the estimated number of requests for political participation received by the member given a change from the minimum to the maximum value of the independent variable and given the opportunity to participate in one political activity (the exposure).

The results of the mobilization model are reported in Table 3.7. Although the contacting model indicated several differences between those who are asked versus those who are not asked to participate, the mobilization model indicates that there are few variables that distinguish the number of requests for participation members are likely to receive. Only two variables, the member's level of education and her level of participation within the union are statistically significant. As the change scores indicate, the member's level of education has the largest impact on the number of requests for participation the member is likely to receive. As in the contacting model, union leaders apparently are most

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37 STATA 4.0 cannot calculate poisson regression models with Huber variance estimators, so we cannot make adjustments for sample clustering effects. However, OLS regression models for mobilization were run with Huber estimators grouped by the active union scale (those who perceived no union sponsored activities were excluded). The only change is that voluntary membership becomes marginally significant (p= .10).
likely seek out those with the civic skills to participate effectively. Members who are active in the union also are likely to be subject to more requests for political participation. Active members are more likely to be accessible when union leaders need to recruit members for political action. Membership in a politically active union produces the same estimated change in number of requests the member is likely to receive as being an active member of the union, but its coefficient is not statistically significant.

The Probability of Being Contacted

As a final way of helping us understand the nature of union political mobilization, I calculated the probability of being asked to participate in union political activities based on hypothetical values for four of the variables that produce large impacts on receiving a request to participate (the Contacting model): the activity level of the member's union, the activity level of the member within the union, the member's levels of political interest and education. One variable represents each variable "category" in the model: local union mobilization activity, the member's availability for mobilization, the member's likelihood of hearing mobilization appeals, and the member's resources for effective participation. The calculations are based on the coefficients of the Contacting Model (Table 3.6) with the remaining variables held at their respective means.

As reported in Table 3.8, with all four variables at their lowest value (and other independent variables at their means), the probability of a member being asked is extremely low—only 4%. Yet with all four taking on their highest values, the member would have an 85% probability of being asked to participate. The results also confirm the crucial roles played by education and the level of political activity of a member's international in the mobilization process. A
member of an extremely active union or with post-graduate education have a higher probability of being asked to participate (59% and 68% respectively) than a member who is both active in her union and extremely interested in politics (56%). The highly educated member also has a higher probability of being contacted than an active member of a politically active union (65%). Combining membership in a politically active union and a high level of education member produces a 79% probability of receiving a request to participate. In the end, given that a mean values for all variables in the model produce a 46% probability of being contacted, these estimated probabilities show substantial increases in the likelihood of being asked to participate produced by the critical variables in the model.

**Education and Mobilization**

The findings that education is the predominant variable in explaining contacts for political participation and mobilization for multiple political activities is quite striking given that the context for this study is organized labor. Yet we can still question why the member’s level of education exerts such a powerful influence over whether she is asked to participate. Are union leaders more likely to recognize the “civic skills” of highly educated members? Are highly educated members more likely to be officers or highly involved in internal union activities and thus more available to union leaders for political mobilization? Or are highly educated members most likely to be mobilized by teachers’ unions rather than the more working class AFL-CIO?

**Education and Union Participation.** Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996) argue that education increases the probability of political participation, not only by increasing “cognitive proficiency,” but also by increasing an individual’s status in social networks:
Citizens who are at the center of society also end up at the center of political networks. Proximity to those who make policy decisions, along with accessibility to sources of relevant policy information, is easier and consequently less costly for those closer to the center of social and political networks. (45-6)

I would add that social proximity to political activists also increases the probability that the individual will be mobilized.

If highly educated members are more likely to be mobilized because of their accessibility to union officers through internal participation, level of education and internal participation should be positively correlated. Table 3.9 shows this is not the case; education and internal participation are negatively correlated. However, Table 3.9 also shows some clear differences in the relationship between education and internal participation between the union samples. Although there is a negative relationship between education and internal participation for AFL-CIO members, there is a moderately positive relationship between level of education and internal participation for OEA members.

Indeed, estimating separate models of contacting (any vs. no requests for political participation) for the OEA, OCSEA, and AFL-CIO samples demonstrates different mobilization dynamics between the unions in terms on the importance of education and internal participation. Table 3.10 compares the coefficients and significance levels of the internal participation and education variables from the full contacting model for each union sample. For OEA members both the member's level of education and level of internal participation are statistically significant (and are the only significant variables in the model) indicating that each has independent effects. For OEA members, accessibility for mobilization and education as a “resource” for effective...
participation both contribute to the likelihood of being asked to participate politically. For OCSEA members, both level of education and level of internal participation are statistically significant in explaining political contacts. However, the coefficient for level of education is negatively signed; more highly educated members are less likely to be asked to participate in the civil servant's union. But for members of the AFL-CIO, neither level of education nor internal participation are significantly related to being contacted for political action. Yet the member's level of education is not totally irrelevant for mobilization in the AFL-CIO. Estimates from the poisson equation of mobilization (number of contacts) for the AFL-CIO sample show that the higher the member's level of education, the greater the number of times the member is likely to be asked to participate in union political activities (p = .09). Thus, higher levels of education leads to greater political mobilization for OEA members, somewhat greater mobilization for AFL-CIO members, but no greater mobilization for OCSEA members. With both level of education and accessibility to union leaders included in the models, this is evidence, at least in the context of labor unions, that when education influences mobilization, it is based on members' skills not just their status in social networks.

**OEA Mobilization.** Alternatively, education may be highly related to political mobilization because the teachers' union is disproportionately likely to mobilize. If so, and if members of the teacher's union tend to be more highly educated, education may have its large impact on mobilization in models with the combined union samples because of the higher mobilization efforts of the OEA. The first piece of evidence for this hypothesis is displayed in Table 3.11. It shows that more members of the OEA were contacted with requests for

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*Education is not significant in either the OCSEA or OEA sample models of mobilization. Level of internal participation is significant only in the OCSEA model of mobilization.*
political participation than members of the AFL-CIO or the OCSEA. OEA members also have significantly higher levels of education than members of other unions (Chi-square p-value = .00). This is evidence that education has a large influence on union mobilization because of the greater mobilization efforts of the OEA contacting their highly educated members.

To test this further, I created an interaction term between level of education and OEA membership and entered this term into the contacting and mobilization models for all union samples (Tables 3.6 and 3.7). The four variables of concern are displayed in Table 3.12. The probit estimation of contacting shows that the interaction term is positively signed and statistically significant. But, as indicated by the negatively signed linear term for OEA membership, less educated members of the OEA are significantly less likely to be contacted. Furthermore, the linear term for education now fails to achieve statistical significance. This indicates that a member's level of education does not affect the likelihood of being contacted for political activities in unions beside the OEA. Finally, even controlling for education, level of union participation remains a statistically significant explanatory variable. This demonstrates that education has a substantial impact on the probability of a member receiving a request to participate in a single event because the OEA is more likely to contact its members and OEA members are more highly educated than other union members.

The results are different, however, in the mobilization model. The impact of education on recruitment for multiple events is not due to the OEA. In the mobilization model, the level of union participation and the linear term for level of education achieve statistical significance, but OEA membership and the

* The Politically Active Union scale was removed from the models since an individual union from the scale (OEA) was entered into the equation.
interaction term do not. Thus, education still plays an important role in explaining multiple requests for political participation even once OEA mobilization is controlled. Union leaders apparently seek out members with the civic skills necessary to engage in a wide-variety of political activities.

This excursion to explain why education influences union mobilization is important because of the consequences it has for interest group representation. It is well known that the interest group system is "biased" in favor of higher social status organizations (Schattschneider 1960; Schlozman and Tierney 1986), and that participation in America is "biased" towards individuals of higher social classes (e.g., Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). If labor unions are one of the few organized interests that seeks to represent and to mobilize the working class, and they too disproportionately mobilize their more highly educated members, unions would be contributing to the class bias in political participation in America. The "bias" towards the more highly educated in labor union mobilization is found to be the result of two factors: the higher rates of political contacting by the teachers' union of its more highly educated membership and the AFL-CIO's contacting of more highly educated members for participation in a variety of political activities. The latter finding is particularly noteworthy. Union leaders evidently recognize that different skills are necessary to participate in a variety of political activities and seek out members with the civic skills to engage successfully in these events.

Discussion and Conclusion

Although the general importance of organizational mobilization as a source of generating political participation has long been understood, little has been documented beyond the fact that members who are active in organizations are more likely to participate in politics. Given the impediments to
political mobilization that the interviews uncovered, understanding who gets
asked to participate takes on added importance. Why members participate will
be examined in the following chapter, but this chapter attempts to provide the
link between organizational activity and member participation by examining the
provision of opportunities and attempts by leaders to recruit members for
political action.

I hypothesized that there would be multiple bases to the mobilization
process: the level of political activism by the local leadership, the member's
accessibility for mobilization, the member's likelihood of "hearing" appeals for
political action, and, because elites are likely to mobilize strategically, the
member's ability to respond effectively and with the correct political message.
The evidence showed that member perception of opportunities to participate is
based on local political context, particularly membership in a traditionally active
international, accessibility through participation in internal union activities, and
dependence on the union for political information, but not on whether the
member is likely to respond effectively.

The evidence supports all four elements in explaining who is asked to
participate in union political activities. The member's level of education was
particularly important in explaining mobilization contacts, providing evidence
that union leaders seek out those with the resources to participate effectively for
union political action. Membership in a politically active union, living in a region
of traditional union political activity, participation in the union, and higher levels
of political interest also significantly help explain who receives requests for
participation.

Finally, we examined the number of request for participation directed to a
member. Although I hypothesized that many of variables would be even more
important in explaining multiple contacts than a single contact, results found few characteristics that distinguish many contacts from a few. This may be due in part to controlling for the "exposure" to opportunities to participate in the model. If so, this is solid evidence that we cannot explain political mobilization and participation without accounting for elite activity in generating opportunities for participation (see also Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) and letting individuals know that these opportunities exist. We will explore the effect of opportunities on mobilization and participation further in Chapter 6. It is noteworthy that the mobilization model confirmed the centrality of the member's level of education and their level of activity within the union as critical to being sought out for participation in many activities.

Two variables are important in distinguishing between the slightly different dynamics of being aware of political opportunities provided by the union and being asked to participate: reliance on the union for political information and education. The perceived opportunities model is the only model in which the member's level of dependence on the union for political information was statistically significant. This suggests the importance of awareness in discovering what your union is doing, but also shows that mobilization is not based on awareness alone -- union leaders actually are more likely to ask members with other characteristics, such as political interest and education, to participate.

A member's level of education is not related to member's perceptions of opportunities to participate, but clearly is the most important variable in explaining contacting and mobilization. This is evidence that union leaders attempt to involve those members with the "civic skills" necessary to participate effectively in politics, and education is the basic civic skill (Verba, Schlozman,
and Brady 1995). Although the higher rates of mobilization by the OEA accounts for some of the impact of education, this finding reveals that biases towards those with greater resources exist in mobilization even in organized labor, in spite of its traditional emphasis on the working class. It also suggests that the critical role that individual resources play in political participation (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995) may not only be due to the superior ability of individuals with greater resources to participate, but may also be the result of the propensity for these individuals to be sought out by others and encouraged to participate. This will be tested further in later chapters.

The lack of a relationship between residence in targeted districts and the three dependent variables confirms the difficulty of targeting discussed by interviewees in Chapter 2 as well as the low priority member mobilization seems to have in union targeting efforts. Similarly, the lack of a relationship between the members' level of political agreement and the dependent variables shows the ineffectiveness of leaders' “targeting” members who can deliver to the union's political message. This suggests that leaders have difficulty in identifying the political stances of individual members and so are equally likely to ask members who disagree with the union as those who agree. It could also be due to the fact that most union political information is distributed to the membership as a whole in union publications and bulletin boards and at union meetings, and that member perception of these appeals is not related to their political agreement with the union. In any case, this contrasts with findings on education: leaders are most likely to contact members with the resources to

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40 The organization of teachers and civil servants by labor has increased the heterogeneity of labor's membership (Form 1985, 1995) and thus provides greater opportunities to mobilize those with higher levels of education. Organized labor's fragmented political structures (Chap. 2; Form 1995), allow leaders of each international to appeal to the work-related interests of each segment of its constituency without “turning off” professionalized members with purely working class appeals.
participate effectively, but not those who are most likely to deliver the political message the union desires. The difficulties unions have had in targeting volunteer efforts evidently have not gone unnoticed: in its Labor '96 campaign, the AFL-CIO made a substantial investment in money and personnel in targeted congressional districts in order to create greater grassroots participation and to create grassroots structures that will make future grassroots mobilizations easier.

The evidence in this chapter shows important differences between members who are likely to be mobilized and those who are not—that the process of making requests for participation introduces a critical intermediary step in generating individual participation. It is particularly noteworthy that local union context and the member's level of education are central to structuring the mobilization process. It is also noteworthy that the dynamics of mobilization differ in important ways between the union samples. Yet ultimately, we are concerned with who is mobilized because we suspect that this affects who participates. We now turn to the question of who participates and why.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Opportunities</th>
<th>Contact</th>
<th>Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Dependence</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>No hypothesis</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: High, Moderate, and Low rankings represent the size of the hypothesized relationship between the independent and dependent variable.

Figure 3.1: The Size of the Hypothesized Relationships between Independent and Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Activities</th>
<th>Number of Members</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: The Number of Opportunities to Participate in Union Political Activities as Perceived by Ohio Union Members, 1992 and 1994
Table 3.2: The Number of Times Ohio Union Members Were Asked to Participate in Union-Sponsored Political Activities, 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of requests</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>24.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME)</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel Workers</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Auto Workers (UAW)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpenters</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Education Association (NEA)</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Employees International Union (SEIU)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication Workers of America (CWA)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating Engineers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumbers and Pipefitters</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Rubber Workers</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Federation of Teachers</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio Civil Servant Employee Association (OCSEA)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborers</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheetmetal Workers</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Mine Workers</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boilermakers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Painters</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Workers</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Each international's score is the number of nominations that international received from international officers interviewed in Ohio. Unions highly active in politics were given 1 point; moderately active unions were given one-half point.

Table 3.3: Scale Scores of Ohio Internationals Based on Their Level of Political Activity
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>1992 Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>1994 Mean</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>4.03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>6.19</td>
<td>4.34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.634</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.724</td>
<td>.817</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.658</td>
<td>.475</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.624</td>
<td>.485</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Dependence</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.757</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.84</td>
<td>.777</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.854</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.41</td>
<td>.772</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>.499</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4.06</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>5.39</td>
<td>1.88</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables for Mobilization Models
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.035**</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.072***</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.288*</td>
<td>.171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.483***</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.588***</td>
<td>.187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.498***</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.036</td>
<td>.113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Dependence</td>
<td>.508***</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.251**</td>
<td>.116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.152</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.048</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>-.050</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.655</td>
<td>.462</td>
<td>.652</td>
<td>.590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 509
Adjusted $R^2 = .129$

Number of cases: 416
Adjusted $R^2 = .074$

Notes: 1) *** $p < .01$; ** $p < .05$; * $p < .10$ (two-tailed)
2) Members of the United Auto Workers were excluded from the original 1994 model to facilitate accurate comparisons to the 1992 sample.

Table 3.5: Comparison of the Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of the 1992 and 1994 Models for Perceived Opportunities
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.384</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.48</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.418</td>
<td>.149</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.198</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Dependence</td>
<td>.141</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>.008</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.154</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.204</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.96</td>
<td>-.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.80</td>
<td>.492</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases= 416

Pseudo $R^2$= .112

Log Likelihood= -255.45

% Predicted Correctly=67.3%

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 3.6: Probit Estimates of Union Contacts of Members for Electoral Participation
### Table 3.7: Poisson Regression Estimates of Member Mobilization, The Number of Union Requests for Electoral Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.109</td>
<td>.21</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.056</td>
<td>.066</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>-.053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.304</td>
<td>.132</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.50</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informational Dependence</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.075</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.006</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.112</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.210</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.413</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.88</td>
<td>.398</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases = 367  
Log Likelihood = -409.49

Pseudo R² = .062

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Union</th>
<th>Active Member</th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Probability of Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low Grade School</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.460</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.561</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.595</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.654</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.682</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>.716</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.792</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.857</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results are based on the Probit equation in Table 3.7. All other independent variables were held at their respective mean values.

Table 3.8: Predicted Probabilities of Being Asked to Participate in Union Political Activities Under Hypothetical Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>r</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full</td>
<td>-.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>-.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSEA</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.9: Correlations Between Level of Education and Level of Union Participation By Union Sample
Variable | Sample | Coefficient | P-value
--- | --- | --- | ---
Education | AFL-CIO | .112 | .29
 | OEA | .409 | .01
 | OCSEA | -.324 | .06
Union Participation | AFL-CIO | .266 | .22
 | OEA | .540 | .05
 | OCSEA | 1.21 | .01

Table 3.10: Probit Coefficients and P-Values of Education and Union Participation Variables from the Contacting Model by Union Sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Sample</th>
<th>% Contacted</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSEA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.11: Proportion of Members Contacted for Political Participation by Union Sample
### Contacting Model (Probit)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEA * Education</td>
<td>.66</td>
<td>.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA member</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Mobilization Model (Poisson)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEA * Education</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA member</td>
<td>-.19</td>
<td>.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union Participation</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.12: Union Participation and the Interaction Between OEA membership and Education in Explaining Union Political Contacting and Mobilization
MEMBER'S PARTICIPATION IN UNION ELECTORAL ACTIVITIES

To this point, we have focused on the processes of union political mobilization and the organizational context in which that mobilization occurs. We now turn to the question of why members respond. When the union urges its members to join in collective political action, why do some members join in while others do not? In this chapter, I develop a model of member political participation and test it using the 1992 and 1994 Ohio Union Surveys. In both elections, I find that members participate in union political activities based on their commitment to the organization and their agreement with its political positions even when controlling for traditional explanations of political participation and the local union context.

Participation in Union Electoral Activities

In Chapter 1, three bases of compliance were described: coercive, instrumental, and ideological (Levi 1988; Brehm and Gates 1996). Coercive compliance occurs when an individual obeys a request in order to avoid punishment. Instrumental compliance occurs in order to receive promised benefits. As described in Chapter 2, labor unions have limited coercive or instrumental powers in order to induce members' participation in political activities. Instead, unions mobilize largely by making it easier for members who want to participate to do so. Thus, compliance with requests for participation in
union political activity rests on ideological compliance: members participate because they think they should.

I further argued in Chapter 1 that there are two bases of ideological compliance. First, members may participate because of agreement with the political positions of the organization. They participate in order to advance their own and the organization's political preferences. Despite the intuitiveness of this explanation, we cannot assume that members share the political positions of the organization. For example, not all interest groups are organized primarily to be involved in politics (Salisbury 1984; Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Walker 1991), so the degree to which members share or are willing to respond to the organization's political positions is uncertain. And even in expressly political groups, not all members join based on the political positions of the group (Rothenberg 1988, 1992).

Member disagreement with the political positions of the union is a particularly relevant barrier to member participation in union political activities. Members are likely to have joined for the work-related benefits and/or because of closed shop requirements where union membership was necessary to obtain the job. Like other professional associations and unlike many citizen's interest groups, members are unlikely to join based solely on the political positions of the union. Even if members agree with the political positions of the union, they face the incentive to free ride: why contribute time and effort for the collective good when one's individual contribution probably will not make a difference and the costs of participating may outweigh the benefits (Olson 1965)?

Thus, the second basis of ideological compliance, organizational commitment, becomes important. Members may still respond to group appeals because they think they should, but not necessarily because they agree with the
political positions of the group. I expect organizational commitment to play a prominent role in union member political participation since those loyal to the group are more likely to comply with requests for activity based on their willingness to respond to group norms, to do what “good” group members are doing in the given situation. In terms of social identity theory, because an individual's self-identity is based on her liking of in-groups and disliking of out-groups, she will act in a manner consistent with the way others “like me” are acting (Turner 1987). Committed members are more likely to be willing to contribute their “fair share” towards group endeavors than to be looking to free ride off the efforts of others. While organizational commitment explains pro-social behaviors in corporations (O'Reilly and Chatman 1986; Kirchmeyer 1992; Schaubroeck and Ganster 1991) and participation in internal union activities (Kelloway and Barling 1993; Thacker, Fields and Barclay 1990; Fullagar and Barling 1989; Huszczo 1983; Gordon et al., 1980), less attention has been paid to the effect of organizational commitment on member activity in the political arena where relevance of shared individual and organizational goals may be more tenuous since the member may not see the connection between group goals and political events.

Yet even if organizational commitment is related to group-oriented political participation, other individual socio-demographic and attitudinal characteristics are likely to be related to political participation as well. A correctly specified model would need to account for alternative explanations of political participation.

Data Analysis Strategy

In order to examine possible explanations for member participation in union political activities thoroughly, I present four models in this chapter. Two
models differ based on their dependent variable. My intent with the first
dependent variable, labeled participation, is to examine the characteristics of
members who engage in one union electoral activity or engage in none at all.
My intent with the second dependent variable, labeled activism, is to examine
the number of union electoral activities in which a member engages.
Throughout my discussion of hypotheses, I will explain how and why I expect
independent variables to affect these two dependent variables differently.

The two other versions of the models differ based on the number of
independent variables used to explain participation or activism. First, the Union
Attitudes Model is a rudimentary model that only examines the effects of the
member's attitudes towards and her experiences within the organization on her
willingness to engage in union-sponsored political activities. If organizational
commitment is not significantly related to participation in union political activities
in a reduced model, we need not add additional controls to assure the
robustness of the relationship. The Union Attitudes Model expresses the
probability that a member will participate in union political activities as:

$$\Pr(\text{participate}) = f(\text{attitudes toward the union}).$$

The second model, the Expanded Model, extends the Union Attitudes Model to
control for alternative explanations besides attitudes towards the organization
that could explain member political participation. The expanded model will be
tested with data from both the 1992 and 1994 elections to help assure the
generalizability of the findings.

**Union Attitudes Model**

The Union Attitudes model focuses on the effects of the member's
attitudes toward the union on her probability of political participation. It directly
examines the relationship between a member's political agreement with the
union and commitment to the union as the central explanatory variables as identified by the compliance and social identity theories advanced above. At the same time the model will account for other elements of the member’s relationship with her union that could influence her willingness to participate in organizational activities.

**Commitment.** The first variable in the model is commitment to the union. Members for whom group membership is an important part of their social identity should be more willing to join in group-sponsored activities. Participation demonstrates to the member herself, and to others in the group, that she is acting as a “good group member” ought to behave in the given situation. Commitment should have a relatively greater impact on activism than participation since only highly committed members are likely to undertake the heavy costs of engaging in multiple activities.

Interviews confirm that union officers believe that the their most committed members are those who are most likely to engage in union-sponsored political action. An officer of the Plumbers and Pipefitters describes their political activists: “Generally they’re the same group of people who do everything; the same people who work around the building [the union hall]. They’re the regulars, so they seem to show up without much arm-twisting.” Similarly, an OEA activist explains why they try to recruit only certain people for the local’s Core Group phone chain:

Locally, the union’s function is seen as a safeguard for protecting individual teacher’s rights. ...Thus, the political components are not always aspects of the union activist at the local level. ...So the local people on the telephone list are those who care about the association and what it stands for.
In other words, these are people who are not necessarily politically active to begin with, but are committed to the group. In order to protect the group, they can be drawn into political action.

Political Agreement. Political agreement with the organization is the other ideological basis of compliance. Clearly, members who share the political objectives of the organization should be more willing to respond to its appeals to become involved in the political arena. Conversely, members who consider the group's political goals antithetical to their own should be less willing to help promote group goals in the political arena. Previous studies show union members perceive a gap between their own political preferences and those of union leaders. Members generally perceive union leaders to be more liberal and more affiliated with the Democratic party than they, the rank-and-file, are (Fields, Masters, and Thacker 1987; Masters and Delaney 1987b). Yet the closer the political beliefs of the member correspond to the political goals of the organization, the more willing the member should be to participate in organizational political activities. Political agreement is likely to be somewhat more important in explaining activism than participation. Members who are not totally supportive of the union's political goals might engage in one activity to appease the individual who asked, but they are unlikely to participate often; only those who strongly agree with the union's political positions and strongly wish to see them advanced will participate in multiple events.

Interviews indicate that union political messages are intended to promote political issues that (union activists think) are important to members on the job and/or issues that affect the families of union members (such as Medicare and education). The Political Director of the United Steel Workers explains how unions must make the connection to members' personal political interests in
order to persuade them to be politically active:

This is the key educational task that the union must do: show members how politics and policies affect them individually. ...[T]he union needs to show them how bills and budget cuts pushed by the Republicans will make a difference to them personally. For example, cutting student aid means working longer hours to put your kid through school at a cost of spending less time with family or fishing.

Members who believe that the union is working to protect their personal values through political action are more likely to participate, particularly when they believe these values are threatened.

**Appropriateness.** Union members who believe that political involvement is appropriate for unions should be more likely to participate in union political activities (Converse and Campbell 1968). Concerns regarding the propriety of organizational political involvement are likely to occur among the memberships of predominantly economic organizations, whose members have not joined out of support for the political positions of the group or the opportunity to become involved in politics. Surveys of union members show that substantial numbers of members do not believe unions should engage in political activities (Fields, Masters, and Thacker 1987), though, as reported in Chapter 2, the Ohio Union Surveys show considerable support for union political activities among rank-and-file members. In other group contexts, Hildreth (1994) has found that church members were unlikely to participate in their church's efforts in the sanctuary movement (housing political refugees) if disobeying the law was the most important consideration in their decision to become involved. Opps (1989) found that individuals who do not approve of protests as a means of political action are less likely to participate. Appropriateness is likely to be relatively
more important in explaining participation in a single event than multiple events. Belief that union political action is appropriate is likely to be necessary to participate, but it is unlikely to promote engagement in multiple events.

Interviewees emphasized the importance of persuading members of the appropriateness, indeed the necessity, of union political action in order for the union to provide the benefits and workplace conditions that members desire. One activist of the Ohio Education Association (OEA) explains: "Everything in education is political: the existence of schools; how, what, and who we teach is determined by politics; salaries; retirement; and politics occurs at both the state and local levels." Another OEA activist makes the connection to his mobilizing appeal: "Some teachers have the longstanding mind-set that 'Educators should be educators' and should not be involved in politics. My job is to convince them that they must be involved." Members who accept the notion that, like it or not, politics is central to the way they do their job and to achieve their goals at work are more likely to be politically involved through the union.

Learning/Tenure. Rothenberg (1988, 1992) argues that tenure, a proxy for "learning" the costs and benefits of activism, is critical to explaining member's participation in interest groups. Furthermore, he argues that the impact of learning on participation is subject to diminishing marginal returns: the probability that a member will become an activist increases less rapidly over time. While the deficiencies of his arguments and empirical tests of them have been detailed in Chapter 1, given his findings, we need to take into account the effects of "learning" on member's political participation in unions. Those who have "learned" the benefits of activism should be especially likely to engage in multiple political activities.
Interviewees agreed that members with longer tenures in the union were more likely to be politically active. Many indicated that older members have knowledge of what it was like before many union protections, and in fact, fought for the protections and benefits current members take for granted. In part, this is a generational effect, but long-term members also are more likely to see and understand the benefits of union action due to their experiences. Therefore, older members often are the easiest to activate and sometimes are able to transfer their enthusiasm to younger members. The President of the Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters puts it especially well: “older members who went out on strike before collective bargaining [for public employees, established in Ohio in 1984] are effective at educating the younger members as to the necessity of being politically involved.” Although the close social interaction and time lulls of the fire hall probably allow for more effective socialization than in other occupations, similar comments were made by other activists.

**Voluntary Membership.** The final variable in the Union Attitudes Model is whether the member joined the union voluntarily or because of a closed shop that compelled membership in order to get the job. I expect that those who were forced to join would be less likely to engage in activities beyond the requirements of work to help an organization of which they otherwise would not be a member; those who join voluntarily would be more responsive to pleas to help the group. In essence, we control for recruitment effects: the possibility that the member joined the union based on its political positions or opportunities to become involved in politics (Fiorito 1987) and is politically active because of this rather than for other reasons. If the member is joining for the opportunity to engage in union political activities, she is likely to take full
advantage and participate often. Thus, voluntary membership should be relatively more important in explaining activism than participation.

Thus, the results of the Union Attitudes Model should show that commitment, political agreement with the union, belief in the appropriateness of union political action, tenure or "learning," and voluntary membership in the union should be positively related to member political participation in union political action.

The Expanded Model

The Expanded Model adds additional variables to the Union Attitudes Model that are likely to affect political participation. It controls for member and union characteristics that, instead of the member's commitment to the union, could explain member's participation in union political activities. The first set of variables are those that have long been standards in the explanation of political participation such as the member's political resources and attitudes. Political attitudes account for a member's general attitudes towards the political system, which are distinct from union attitudes based on the member's relationship with a specific organization. The second set of variables examines the contextual effects of the member's union environment on her level of political involvement. Controlling for union context assures that it is the characteristics of the individual member rather than the characteristics of the union's political activities that influence political participation. The probability that a member will participate in union political activities is expressed in the Expanded Model as:

\[ \text{Pr(participate)} = f(\text{attitudes towards the union, political attitudes, political resources, union context}). \]

Political Attitudes. Political efficacy and interest are attitudinal variables that have long been central to the explanation of political participation (see
Verba and Nie 1972). Clearly those who care about political issues and who think they can make a difference in the political arena are more likely to participate in organizationally-sponsored political activities. Here they are included in the model as control variables, not in an attempt to add anything new to our understanding of political participation. High levels of both interest and efficacy are likely to be necessary for an individual to participate in political activities, but are probably not important in impelling her to be an activist in multiple events.

**Political Resources.** Education plays a central role in individuals' ability to participate in politics. As thoroughly documented by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, pp. 433-6), education exerts a powerful direct and indirect impact on people's ability to become involved in politics (c.f., Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Education is the prime determinant of income, which affects individuals' ability to make campaign contributions. Education develops one's cognitive skills for understanding the political world. Finally, education develops the civic skills, such as communication and organizational ability, necessary to engage in many political activities. Because a variety of skills are necessary to participate in a variety of electoral activities, education should be especially important in explaining activism in multiple events.

**Union Context.** If no one is an island, we would expect that union members would be influenced to participate by the organizational context surrounding them (see Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993). Knoke (1990) finds that group context is related to member participation within interest groups. As

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"Income also is a common predictor of political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Verba and Nie 1972). So I entered income into several variations of the model. However, once education is controlled, income is not a statistically significant predictor of participation, activism, or contacting public officials, adds no explanatory value, and does not substantially effect the estimation of other variables in the model. Thus, income is not included in the results reported below."
discussed in Chapter 3, part of the influence of union context would flow through explicit union attempts at mobilization: union officers and activists encouraging members to participate. Mobilization also could have an indirect influence through persuading members to agree with union political positions, to see the importance and appropriateness of union political involvement, and by increasing members' political efficacy by showing them how they can make a difference in the political arena. The direct effects of union mobilization on political participation will be examined in Chapter 6.

Union context may also influence member participation through routes other than direct mobilization. Some unions may have norms encouraging participation. Or union context may influence participation through "unintentional mobilization" by exposing members to political discussion (Verba and Nie 1972, Pollock 1982, Leighley 1996). This possibility will be examined in Chapter 6. Three contextual variables are of particular relevance for encouraging political activism by union members.

**Union International's Activity.** First, members of politically active unions would be expected to be more likely to participate in politics. Apart from the possibility of greater mobilizing activities by politically active unions, unions with a tradition of political activism may have group norms and social pressures to participate, making it more likely that members will comply with requests to participate. Members of politically active unions should be especially likely to participate in multiple events.

**Geographical Activity.** Second, members living in regions where unions tend to be active politically would be more likely to participate. An OEA activist concluded: "Where you see strong, credible leadership, you see more political activity." An International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers officer, whose
views were echoed by many others, asserted: "Where we have a presence we do pretty well." Most industrial and construction unions are likely to have more of "a presence" in urban areas. According to the Ohio AFL-CIO staff, there is basically an urban/rural division in terms of where unions are active in Ohio: urban unions are active, rural unions aren't. Urban areas are advantaged because they have union infrastructure: central bodies with full time staff to coordinate efforts, large unions with enough officers that some can devote time to political activities as part of their duties, and history of union political activism. Members living in traditionally active regions should be more likely to be activists than participate in one activity only.

Teacher and civil servant unions are less concentrated in urban areas. In fact, of the urban areas in Ohio, the Ohio Education Association (OEA) only organizes school districts in Columbus, Dayton, and Youngstown. But where these unions have politically active local leaderships and a history of political action, members are more likely to be politically involved.

**Targeted Districts.** Members also may be more politically active in districts targeted by their union. One would expect that part of the reason for this would be that unions put more effort into mobilizing in targeted districts, though the analysis in Chapter 3 provides no evidence of this. But unions may be more effective in generating participation in targeted districts apart from greater efforts. Interviews indicate that the targeting of hometown legislative district by the union is used as part of the mobilizing message to members to convey the importance of getting involved in this election. An officer of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers states simply:

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42 The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) organizes the other urban districts in Ohio. Although it is affiliated with the AFL-CIO, it tends to operate independently of COPE and the OEA in political action.
"We tell members that this race is targeted and that we need their help." The effectiveness of targeting grassroots activism is constrained by local control. Although the central offices and conventions make the targeting decisions and can reallocate money and staff time, they must rely on local officers to increase their grassroots efforts in targeted districts. If members were unlikely to be active without the special appeal of a targeted race, they may participate once in response to the priority of the race, but are unlikely to become political activists -- suddenly engaging in a variety of political activities.

The Expanded Model, then, adds traditional political participation variables and union contextual variables to the explanation of union member political participation. My expectations are that higher levels of political efficacy, interest and education will result in greater political participation, as will membership in a politically active union, residing in a region of union activism, and living in a targeted district(s). By adding these variables to the model, we not only expand our explanation of union member political participation, but also assure that commitment to the union helps explain member participation in union political activities even after other alternative explanations are controlled. A summary of hypotheses is present in Figure 4.1.

**Measurement**

**Dependent Variables**

The actual involvement of members in the electoral campaign activities sponsored by the union will be measured in two different ways, by both participation and activism. Participation is measured by whether the member claims to have participated in any of the electoral activities asked about in the Ohio Union Survey. Activism is the intensity and frequency of participation, measured as the total number of activities in which the member claims to have
participated. Table 4.1 shows the number of activities in which respondents participated in 1992 and 1994. In 1992, nearly one-quarter of the sample, 23.5% (144), claimed to have participated in at least one union electoral activity. Slightly more members claimed to have participated in union electoral activities in 1994, 28.2% (173).

The number of members who engaged in each type of union-sponsored activity is presented in Table 4.2. The activities inquired about were: calling on a phone bank, distributing campaign literature, placing campaign signs, registering voters, attending union-sponsored candidate meetings, donating campaign money to the union, and working at party headquarters. In both years, more members donated money or attended meeting with candidates than engaged in other types of electoral activities. These two activities probably were the most popular because unions make them easiest to do: members can donate money by payroll deductions or by quickly writing a check when asked, and can meet candidates at the gate when leaving work or at a union meeting they were attending anyway. Little additional time or effort would be necessary to undertake these two activities.

Members were asked if they participated in a union political event only after they had affirmatively answered a screening question that asked whether their union had sponsored the given activity. Thus, we have confidence that we are measuring respondents' organizationally-related political acts rather than their general participation in politics outside the union context.

**Independent Variables**

**Commitment.** Union commitment is measured by a composite variable based on the member's belief in the union movement, personal importance of union membership, and "polar affect" towards unions. The member's belief in
the union movement was measured by her level of agreement (1-5 scale) with the statement: “I believe in the union movement and what it’s done for workers in America.” The personal importance of union membership was measured by the question: “In general, how important is your labor union membership to you?” [very, somewhat, not important].

“Polar affect” measures not only the liking of members of one’s own group but also dislike of the members of an outgroup (Miller, Gurin, Gurin, and Malanchuk 1981, 496). It is measured by the difference between the feeling thermometer ratings of labor unions and big business. Subtracting union and business thermometer ratings also allows for a better comparison of thermometer ratings across individuals by providing the difference in the "warmth" of feeling from an anchor (Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989). The polar affect score was divided into approximately equal quintiles by number of cases so that all three variables in the index would be weighted equally. The index ranges from 3 to 15 (3=low commitment, 15=high commitment). The commitment scale has a moderate-to-high reliability score of .67 in 1994, and in 1992, .70 (Chronbach's alpha). Due to the skew of the resulting commitment scale (skewness= -.549 in 1992 and -.609 in 1994), the twelve categories were collapsed into five with approximately equal number of respondents per category (skewness= .159 in 1992 and -.045 in 1994).

Despite the potential ambiguities of measuring a psychological construct such as commitment, there has been substantial consistency across organizational psychology, union psychology, and sociology in its operationalization and measurement. Perhaps this is because all have adapted measures from organizational psychology (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1979) to fit their own context. In fact, in union psychology, much of the

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43 The three categories were rescaled to be weighted equally to the other variables in the commitment index.
debate has surrounded how many factors there "really" are (Gordon et al. 1980; Friedman and Harvey 1986; Thacker, Fields, and Tetrick 1989), and how to develop a shorter scale\textsuperscript{44} (Kelloway, Catano, and Southwell 1992), rather than on the content of the commitment scales. Appendix C contains examples of organizational commitment measurements from sociology and organizational and union psychology. Because I use secondary data, I must rely on questions that are as similar as possible to questions others have designed for the purpose of measuring commitment. Although the full battery of questions usually used to develop commitment scales are not available in the Ohio Union Surveys, some questions are quite similar to those in the "official" scales. In the end, the measure is nearly identical to that used by Cook (1989) as a measure of feminist group consciousness.\textsuperscript{45}

\textbf{Political Agreement.} Perceived political agreement with the organization is calculated by summing the absolute values of the differences between the member's party identification and ideology and her perception of her union leaders' party identifications and ideologies. Interviews indicate that while Ohio unions tend to support Democratic candidates for state and national offices, at times they support Republicans for local offices. Moreover, much of the political activities of local unions are directed towards local politics. Local officers and local members may be more supportive of and willing to work for Republican candidates than union officers at the central body, state office, or international

\textsuperscript{44} The original union scale, developed by Gordon et al. (1980), is 37 items. This creates a rather long survey if one wants to ask anything else.

\textsuperscript{45} Cook's measure of feminist consciousness is based on a 7-point scale regarding the respondent's attitude toward women having equal roles in society + a relative feeling thermometer score (feeling thermometer rating of the women's liberation movement - personal mean of other feeling thermometer ratings of social groups available/personal mean). (1989, 77)
levels. Thus, it would be inappropriate to specify *a priori* that all union political activities are likely to attract members who are Democrats and liberals.

Partisan proximity is based on the difference between the respondent's answer to two questions: "Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, and Independent, or what?", and "Generally speaking, do you usually think of leaders of labor unions as Republicans, Democrats, Independents, or what?". Ideological proximity is based on the difference between the respondent's answer to these two questions: "We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. What would you call yourself, very liberal, somewhat liberal, middle of the road, somewhat conservative, very conservative, or don't you think of yourself in these terms?" and to "And how about labor union leaders?" [same five options].

A number of members did not know the party and/or ideology of their leaders. Members are likely to participate in union political activities only if they are *both* aware of the unions political positions and agree with those positions. Members are unlikely to participate, based on support for the political positions of the organization, if they do not know what the organization's political positions are. Nor are they likely to participate in the political activities of an organization with which they disagree. In other words, those who disagree with union political positions and those who do not know union political positions are likely to behave the same way—they are unlikely to participate. Therefore, those who answered "Don't know" to any of the leader questions were recoded as disagreeing.\(^{47}\) Recoding those members unaware of the political positions of

\(^{46}\) Respondents answering "I don't think of myself in those terms" were recoded as "middle of the road."

\(^{47}\) Members who answered "Don't know" or who refused to answer any question on their own partisanship, ideology or issue position retained missing values.
their union leadership makes the political agreement measure used here different than the political proximity to leadership variable used in Chapter 3.4

The partisan and ideological agreement scales were then added together into a single scale and inverted so that the higher the member's level of political agreement with union leaders, the more likely she is to participate in union-sponsored political activities. The scale measures only whether members perceive themselves to be in agreement with union leaders, not whether their perceptions were accurate.

**Appropriateness.** A union member's belief in the appropriateness of union political activity is measured by the number of political activities (out of three) the member thought it was 'OK' for unions to perform. The exact questions were: "Is it OK or not OK for labor unions to try to affect their members by endorsing candidates and issues?"; "Is it OK or not OK for labor unions to register people to vote and try to promote voting in general?"; and "Is it OK or not OK for labor unions to donate money to candidates?"

**Learning/Tenure.** Tenure in the union, or "learning" in Rothenberg's model of member activism in Common Cause, will be operationalized to capture diminishing marginal returns by using both the linear and logarithmic (natural log) terms of the number of years the respondent has been a union member (Rothenberg 1992, 110).

**Political Efficacy.** Union members' political efficacy can be measured in the 1994 survey by an index based on respondent's level of agreement, on a 1-5 scale, with three standard American National Election Study efficacy statements: "Public officials don't care what people like me think;" "People like

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4 Awareness of union positions was not taken into account in the mobilization models because part of the intent of the mobilization process is to inform members. That is, if members with higher levels of information about union political positions are more likely to receive requests to participate, it is likely that the request itself provided them with the greater levels of information.
me don't have a say in what government does;" and "Politics and government seem so complicated." A measure of efficacy is not available in the 1992 survey. Therefore, the 1994 models will be estimated a second time without the efficacy measure in order to compare the results to the 1992 results.

Voluntary membership, the member's level of interest in politics and level of education, and the three union context variables, the level of political activity of her international, the traditional level of union political activity where the member lives, and the number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives, were all used previously in the models of mobilization in Chapter 3. Their measurements are the same as described earlier.

A description of the means, standard deviations, and ranges of the independent variables are presented in Table 4.3.

Results

1994 Union Attitudes Model Results

Multivariate models are necessary to establish that each variable influences the probability of participation independently of the others. Since there are some differences between the 1992 and 1994 surveys, and the 1994 data allows for a more complete test of the hypotheses advanced above, participation and activism during the 1994 elections will be estimated first. Comparisons between the two elections will be made later in the chapter.

As a first step in testing the key hypotheses regarding organizational commitment and participation in union-sponsored political activities, a "reduced" model will be estimated. The Union Attitudes Model examines the effects of the member's attitudes towards and experience within the union on political participation without controlling for the possible effects of standard individual characteristics related to participation or the union political context.
Participation. Since electoral participation is a dichotomous dependent variable (the member participated or not), it should be estimated by using a non-linear procedure such as probit (Aldrich and Nelson 1984). Table 4.4 shows the probit model for union member's participation in a single political act sponsored by their union during the 1994 elections. The model offers support for most of the hypotheses advanced above. All variables are correctly signed. A member's political agreement with the union, belief in the appropriateness of union political activities, and joining the union voluntarily are all positively related to participation at statistically significant levels. Commitment to the union is positively related to participation in a single act at marginally significant levels (p<.10).

Since probit coefficients are based on a cumulative normal distribution, they cannot be interpreted straightforwardly as a one unit change in an independent variable producing a constant unit of change in the dependent variable. As in Chapter 3, to allow for interpretation of the coefficients, I calculated the amount of change produced in the dependent variable by a increase from the minimum to the maximum value of each independent variable. While the score of one independent variable was being increased, all others were held constant at their respective means. The change scores for each independent variable on participation are similar and modest in magnitude. Learning (the logarithmic term for tenure), despite its failure to attain statistical significance, produces a slightly higher change in participation than the other variables. While the Pseudo R$^2$ of .073 does not seem to explain a substantial amount of variation in participation, it is similar to the adjusted R$^2$ of .06 found by Rapoport, Stone, and Abromowitz (1991, 200) in predicting the campaign participation of party activists.
Activism. Activism should be estimated using a poisson regression model. Poisson models are used to estimate the count of the number of occurrences of an event, which is appropriate given that activism is measured based on a count of the number of political activities engaged in by the member. A detailed description of the estimation technique for poisson regression equations is provided in Chapter 3. Here the incident rate is the number of political activities engaged in by the member per election. As in Chapter 3, the exposure rate is the number of political activities the respondent claims were offered by her union in response to questions about a list of specific activities (listed in Table 4.2). In accounting for a member's level of exposure, members who perceived their unions sponsored no political activities (N=77) were excluded from analysis because they were not "exposed" to any opportunities to participate. This accounts for the substantial drop in the number of cases between the participation and activism models.

The results of the activism model, participation in multiple electoral campaign activities, offer strong support for the hypotheses. These findings are presented in Table 4.5. Here all the variables are statistically significant and correctly signed (no predictions were made for the linear term of tenure), though appropriateness attains a marginal level of significance (p< .10). The major differences between the model for activism and participation is that commitment and learning (logarithmic term of tenure) are significant at the traditional .05 level. As predicted, commitment and learning are more important in explaining why members engage in multiple political acts than in one act only.

49 The Goodness-of-fit Chi-square values in the models presented below indicate that we can reject the null hypothesis that the dependent variable does not have a poisson distribution. As further confirmation, the activism models also were estimated using negative binomial regression. The likelihood-ratio test's Chi-square values from the negative binomial estimations confirm the conclusion that the dependent variable has a poisson distribution. These results were consistent in both 1992 and 1994.
As in Chapter 3, the values of the coefficients from the poisson regression estimations are based on the non-linear poisson distribution and cannot be interpreted straightforwardly as producing a constant unit of change in the dependent variable for each unit change in the independent variable. Thus change scores were calculated based on an increase from the minimum to maximum value of the independent variable while all other independent variables in the model were held constant at their means. Given that the poisson model estimates the number of political activities engaged in by the member, the change score is interpreted as the increase (or decrease) in the estimated number of union-sponsored political activities engaged in by the member given a one standard deviation change in the given independent variable and given the opportunity to participate in one political activity (the exposure). As in the participation model, the change scores are modestly sized, with learning (the logarithmic term of tenure) and voluntary membership accounting for the largest increases in political activities joined in by members.

**Expanded Model Results**

**Participation.** The member's attitudes toward unions, however, are not the only factors likely to affect political participation and activism. Table 4.6 presents the results of the full probit model for member participation in union-sponsored political activities during the 1994 elections. Several findings are notable. First, adding the political participation and union context variables increase the Pseudo-$R^2$ to .139, indicating that these variables increase the amount of variation in participation explained by the model. Second, all variables for which hypotheses were offered are related to participation in the predicted direction. Third, all three union context variables, membership in a politically active union, residing in a region of traditional union political activity,
and the number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives, explain participation in one political event at statistically significant levels. In fact, membership in a politically active union and residing in a region of union political activity have two of the highest change scores in the model. A fourth finding of the full model is that standard political participation variables add little to our explanation of members' participation in union political activities. The member's level of interest in politics attains a marginal level of significance (p < .10). Neither of the other standard political participation variables, efficacy nor education, achieve an acceptable level of statistical significance.

The statistical control for the political participation, and union context variables in the participation model do change the estimate of the union attitudes variables from the Union Attitudes Model. Both commitment and appropriateness have slightly lower coefficients and slightly higher standard errors, resulting in both variables' failure to achieve standard levels of statistical significance in the full model. However, the member's level of political agreement with the union and voluntary membership remain statistically significant influences on member participation.

The largest amounts of change in the probability of participation are produced by the union political activity scale. A change in membership from a union with a reputation for inactivity to a union with the highest reputation for political action, produces a 27% increase in the probability that the individual will participate. Learning (the logarithmic tenure term) also produces a change score nearly as large, though learning's coefficient is not statistically significant. All variables, except the linear term for tenure, increase the probability the member's participation in union political activities.
**Activism.** The Expanded Model of activism is presented in Table 4.7. As in previous poisson equations, taking the member’s exposure to opportunities to participate into account results in a lower number of cases in the analysis, since those who perceived no opportunities to participate were excluded.

Some differences from the participation model are apparent. Commitment and learning (the log of tenure) are statistically significant for activism where they were not for the full model of participation. Both were hypothesized to be more important in explaining joining in multiple acts than merely participating in one. None of the political attitudes or resources variables is statistically significant in explaining activism in multiple activities. Political interest was hypothesized to be more important in explaining participation in a single event, so its lack of significance here somewhat supports that hypothesis. Some changes from the Expanded Participation Model also are evident in the union context variables. The active union scale and residing in a region of union political activity retain their statistical significance in explaining member activism. However, the number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives, which was significant in explaining participation in a single event, is not a significant predictor of participation in multiple events. This is consistent with the hypothesis that being implored to participate because of living in a priority district might impel a member to do something, but not much more than she would be willing to do otherwise. Thus, the major findings of this comparison of the Expanded Participation and Activism Models indicate that commitment and “learning” help explain why members engage in multiple union-sponsored political activities more so than they explain the choice to participate at all.
The change scores again indicate a modest impact on the increase in the number of political activities per opportunity in which the member is likely to engage for all independent variables. Learning (tenure logged) creates the largest change in activism, followed in magnitude of change by being a member of a more politically active union, and commitment.

1994 Summary. The analyses of union member participation and activism in union-sponsored political activities offer substantial support for the theory advanced here. In the Union Attitudes Model, union attitudes were significantly related to participation and activism in a multivariate context. When controlling for standard political participation and union context variables, political agreement with the union and voluntary membership retained their significance in predicting participation in a single act; all union attitudes, with the exception of appropriateness, were significant predictors of activism even with the added controls. The more a member is committed to the union, the more she is likely to engage in greater numbers of union political activities.

The Expanded Model demonstrated the important effects of union context in the 1994 elections. The active union scale and living in a region of union political activity were significantly related to both participation and activism and produced two of the larger changes in the probability of member participation and activism. The Expanded Model also demonstrated the relative lack of importance of standard political attitudes and resources variables in 1994 once member attitudes towards the union and her social context are controlled.

Finally, the change scores produced by each of the independent variables in the participation and activism models were quite modest. No one factor appears to be the key to whether or not a member joins in union political action. Similarly, the low Pseudo-$R^2$ values indicate that even with
success of model in producing variables positively related to participation and activism, there still is a lot of variation in participation in union political activities left to be explained.

**Participation and Activism in 1992 vs. 1994**

Since an Ohio Union Survey was completed after both the 1992 and 1994 elections, we can use the 1992 data to help establish the generalizability of the above results beyond the context of a single election. There are two important differences between the 1992 and 1994 surveys that are relevant for estimating the participation and activism models presented above. First, there were no political efficacy scale questions asked in the 1992 survey. Second, the United Auto Workers, whose Community Action Program operates independently of the AFL-CIO's Committee On Political Education (see Chapter 2), had no members on the COPE list from which the AFL-CIO sample was taken in 1992. By 1994, the UAW had merged its membership list with the Ohio AFL-CIO's, resulting in 68 UAW respondents in the 1994 sample. To make appropriate comparisons between the 1992 and 1994 surveys, then, we need to be making comparisons with the same variables and between members of the same population. Thus, the 1994 model will be reestimated without the efficacy variable and without UAW members in order to facilitate comparison to the 1992 data.

**Participation.** The results of the full participation model for both 1994 and 1992 are presented in Table 4.8. Similarities and differences both are apparent between the participation estimates for each election. One critical similarity is the almost identical coefficients and change scores for commitment and political agreement, the variables of central theoretical importance. For example, the coefficient for commitment is .126 in 1992 and .121 in 1994, while the change
scores are .147 and .172 respectively. For political agreement, the 1992 coefficient is .054 and in 1994 it is .056; likewise the change scores are a nearly identical .123 in 1992 and .130 in 1994. Moreover, each is statistically significant in both years. Other similarities are that voluntary membership and level of education are both at least marginally significant (p< .10) in both years.

Yet there are also notable differences between the two elections. Perhaps most importantly, none of the union context variables are statistically significant in 1992. Where membership in a politically active union and residence in an area of active union political activity make two of the larger contributions to the change in probability of a member’s participation in union political activity in 1994, neither make a difference (statistically) in the probability of participation in 1992.

Though contextual variables make less of a difference in explaining participation in 1992 than in 1994, the characteristics of the individual member make more of a difference. The member’s belief in the appropriateness of union political activities, “learning” (tenure logged) and political interest are member characteristics that are positively and significantly related to participation in 1992, but not in 1994.

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It should be noted that commitment fails to attain statistical significance in the full model in 1994 when the UAW members are in the sample (Table 4.6).

The crucial differences in the active union scale between 1992 and 1994 lie in the unions with the highest scores on the scale. Respondents from AFSCME and the Steel Workers had lower rates of participation in 1992 than in 1994: AFSCME had a 20% participation rate in 1992 (N=15) versus 50% in 1994 (N=12); the Steel Workers had a participation rate of 17.7% in 1992 (N=62) versus 30% in 1994 (N=40). The low participation rate of members of unions at the top of the active union scale in 1992 leads to no relationship between the scale and member political participation and activism. Subtracting these unions from the overall participation leads to similar aggregate rates of participation among the remaining unions: 24.3% in 1992 and 26.6% in 1994.

There are substantial differences in the number of urban versus rural respondents between the 1992 and 1994 samples. In 1992, 45% (N=276) of the members came from urban counties, 25.7% of whom engaged in political activities, while in 1994, only 29% (N=179) of respondents came from urban counties, yet 36% of them participated in union political activities.
The change scores indicate that learning, the active union scale, and commitment create the largest increases in the probability of participation in the 1994 election. In the 1992 election, learning again makes the largest impact on participation, followed by her belief in the appropriateness of union political activities, level of commitment, level of education, and level of political agreement closely bunched together. Other variables have a small impact on the probability of participation in both years.

**Activism.** Like the participation models, comparisons of the full activism models presented in Table 4.9 show both similarities and differences between the two elections. The union attitudes variables demonstrate considerable similarities across the two elections. Commitment, voluntary membership, and learning (tenure logged) are statistically significant in both years. A member's level of political agreement and education are at least marginally significant (p< .10) in both elections.

There are some differences between the political attitudes and resources variables between the two elections. Most noticeable is the difference in political interest. As in the participation model presented above, political interest is statistically significant in 1992. It is not in 1994. Although the member's level of education is at least marginally significant in both years, its coefficient and significance level are higher in 1992.

The greatest difference between the 1992 and 1994 activism models is two of the union context variables. This is consistent with the results of the participation models. The active union scale and living in a region of union political activism both are significant predictors of member activism in 1994, yet neither are in 1992. Although living in an area of politically active unions is

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52 Like the participation models, the efficacy variable and UAW members were excluded in the 1994 analysis so that the results would be comparable to the 1992 analysis.
positively related to member activism in 1992 as it is in 1994, the active union scale is incorrectly signed in 1992.

All change scores are quite modest in magnitude, though the relative impacts of the independent variables change across the elections. Learning (tenure logged) consistently has the largest impact on the estimated number of activities engaged in by the member. Thereafter, in 1992, the member's levels of political interest, commitment, and political agreement have the largest impacts on activism. The level of political activity of a member's union and a member's level of commitment have the next largest effects on the number of political activities engaged in by the member in 1994.

Summary of Election Comparisons. The comparisons of the participation and activism models between the 1992 and 1994 elections provide substantial support for the central hypothesis advanced in this study. In comparison to the substantial changes in the political participation and union context variables across the two elections, the coefficients and significance levels of member's commitment to the union exhibit remarkable stability as explanatory variables of both participation and activism in union-sponsored political activities. The member's level of political agreement with the union likewise was at least marginally significant in explaining both participation and activism in both elections. Given the instability of other explanatory variables across elections and across models, the stability of commitment and political agreement adds confidence to our ability to generalize about the theoretical importance of these variables in explaining member participation in interest group political activities.

Discussion and Conclusion

Interest groups may need the contributions of their membership in order to help elect candidates who support the group's positions to public office.
Groups can engage in numerous activities to use their membership as resource in the electoral process, for example, by endorsing candidates and communicating these endorsements to their membership in order to influence member's votes, collecting and dispersing campaign contributions, mobilizing like-minded voters through registration and get-out-the-vote drives, and recruiting volunteers to support the campaigns of friendly candidates. Yet for membership mobilization to be an effective group strategy, members must actually answer to the call to action; they must mobilize.

Members face two principal barriers to joining in group political activities. First, they may not agree with the intended outcomes of the activity. Particularly for interest groups where members have not joined the organization based on the group's political positions (the majority of organized interests), members may not agree with the political positions of the group and, therefore, are unlikely to help it achieve those political goals. Similarly, members may not believe the organization should be involved in political action, that it is inappropriate for a "non-political" group. Even if members do agree with the political positions of the group and share the desire for the collective goods the group seeks to produce through political action, they still face the incentive to free-ride: to receive the collective goods produced by the group while letting other members carry the burden of the effort necessary to produce the good. So why do members participate?

I argue, and the evidence in the chapter supports, that members participate in group political action for two "ideological" reasons (ideological in the sense that members think they should participate, not necessarily in order to receive rewards or avoid punishment [Levi 1988]). First, members participate based on their level of political agreement with the group. They think they
should participate in order to see that their personal and the group's collective values are represented in the political arena. Second, regardless of whether they agree with the group's political positions, members participate out of commitment to the group. Committed members think they should participate because the group and its success are important to them. They participate because that is the appropriate behavior of a good group member. Participation confirms their status in the group to themselves and other members. The evidence for commitment was particularly strong for member political activism—participation in a number of group political activities.

Other potential explanations for member participation in group political events also were explored, including other attitudes towards and experiences within the union, traditional explanations of political participation (political attitudes and resources), and elements of the union political context to which the member was subject. It should be noted that commitment was a statistically significant variable in the same equations as Rothenberg's "learning" measure and was significant in some equations in which learning failed to attain statistical significance. Even assuming that Rothenberg's measure of learning is appropriate, these results indicate that member commitment to the organization adds to our understanding of member activism in interest groups.

Member's participation and activism also were compared across two elections to help establish the generalizability of the findings. These variations in the models help to strengthen the confidence in the theories. While many other variables produced substantially different affects on political engagement across dependent variables and/or elections, commitment and political agreement were two of the more consistent variables. Political agreement was at least marginally statistically significant in all models; commitment failed to
reach statistical significance only the full model for participation in a single event in 1994.

A couple differences between the models are particularly remarkable. First, individual characteristics and union context variables had very different relationships with political participation and activism between the two elections. Political interest especially mattered a great deal in explaining participation in 1992, but it did not in 1994. Political context, being a member of a politically active union and living in a region of union political activism, mattered a great deal in explaining participation in 1994, but did not 1992. The failure of the living in targeted legislative districts to explain member political participation or activism in all but one model variation, while perhaps in part due to the weakness of the measure, confirms the interview findings of Chapters 2 and 3 that targeting of grassroots member activity does not seem to be a high priority of union political action. Money and staff effort are easy resources to target, members' time and effort are not.

Though the findings from only two elections should not be over-interpreted, the stability of the member's attitudes towards the organization in explaining participation in the organization's political activities is potentially important. Members who are committed to the organization, agree with its political positions, and who have "learned" the costs and benefits of activism are more likely to participate regardless of the events of any particular political season. Whereas the pressures for political activity from their union environment (their international and regional councils) may change from election to election. Likewise, campaigns in any given election may be more or less effective in tapping member political interest and turning it into activism. Members participating based on their relationship with the group create a stable
core of activists who can be drawn on to support the group, others may be inspired to join temporarily in group activities based on their reaction to the outside political world.

The findings presented in this chapter are important because they demonstrate the importance commitment or group identity in explaining electoral participation in an organizational setting. Political agreement alone, particularly when membership is not based on politics, does not explain member's willingness to support group political action. These findings also suggest that, while persuasion and education of members regarding the political positions of the group is important, there is also a political payoff for groups engendering a sense of personal importance of membership among their constituents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variable</th>
<th>Participation</th>
<th>Activism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learning/tenure</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: High, Moderate, and Low rankings represent the size of the hypothesized relationship between the independent and dependent variable.

Figure 4.1: The Size of the Hypothesized Relationships between Independent and Dependent Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of activities</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1: The Extent of Participation in Union Electoral Activities by Members
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number of members</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phone banks</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature distribution</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Placing signs</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registering voters</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candidate meetings</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donating money</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party headquarters</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.2: Types of Electoral Activities in Which Union Members Participated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>1992</th>
<th>1994</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>S.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>1.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>.942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>2.59</td>
<td>.865</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>.459</td>
<td>.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>3.25</td>
<td>.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>4.28</td>
<td>1.69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>4.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.470</td>
<td>.499</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.457</td>
<td>.634</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics of Independent Variables for the Participation and Activism Models

157
Table 4.4: Probit Estimates of Union Member Participation in Union Electoral Activities, Union Attitudes Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.051</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.207</td>
<td>.071</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.360</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>.001</td>
<td>.014</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.237</td>
<td>.167</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.68</td>
<td>.377</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 545  
Pseudo R^2 = .073  
Log Likelihood= -300.93  
Predicted correctly: 72.3%

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 4.5: Poisson Regression Estimates of the Union Member Activism in Union Electoral Activities, Union Attitudes Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.145</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.517</td>
<td>.122</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.105</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>-.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.435</td>
<td>.191</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.69</td>
<td>.386</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 475  
Pseudo R^2 = .059  
Log Likelihood= -422.35

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.094</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.080</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.311</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.002</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>-.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.054</td>
<td>.040</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.159</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.082</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.015</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.370</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.175</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.34</td>
<td>.563</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 502  
Log Likelihood = -254.14  
Pseudo $R^2 = .139$  
Predicted correctly: 74.3%

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 4.6: Probit Estimates of Union Member Participation in Union Electoral Activities, Expanded Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.063</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.100</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.485</td>
<td>.143</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>-.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.449</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.056</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.043</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.29</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.284</td>
<td>.135</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.028</td>
<td>.084</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.78</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases= 437
Log Likelihood= -372.64
Pseudo R² = .090

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 4.7: Poisson Regression Estimates of Union Member Activism In Union Electoral Activities, Expanded Model
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.126**</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.121**</td>
<td>.172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.054**</td>
<td>.123</td>
<td>.056**</td>
<td>.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.197***</td>
<td>.155</td>
<td>.124</td>
<td>.106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.224*</td>
<td>.065</td>
<td>.348**</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>-.125</td>
<td>-.004</td>
<td>-.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.473**</td>
<td>.426</td>
<td>.287</td>
<td>.286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.330***</td>
<td>.087</td>
<td>.116</td>
<td>.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.078*</td>
<td>.131</td>
<td>.112*</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>-.007</td>
<td>-.032</td>
<td>.049***</td>
<td>.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>-.075</td>
<td>-.022</td>
<td>.421***</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.091</td>
<td>-.072</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.01***</td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.16***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 561
Log Likelihood= -.272.75
Pseudo R²=.116
Predicted correctly: 76.0%

Number of cases: 463
Log Likelihood= -226.89
Pseudo R²=.150
Predicted correctly: 76.7%

Notes: 1) *** p< .01; ** p< .05; * p< .10 (two-tailed)
2) The efficacy variable and members of the United Auto Workers were excluded from the original 1994 model to facilitate accurate comparisons to the 1992 sample.

Table 4.8: Comparison of Probit Estimates for the 1992 and 1994 Expanded Models of Participation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>1992 Coefficient</th>
<th>Change</th>
<th>1994 Coefficient</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.178***</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.159***</td>
<td>.120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.092***</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.052*</td>
<td>.065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.336**</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.501***</td>
<td>.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.030*</td>
<td>-.154</td>
<td>-.025</td>
<td>-.164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.549**</td>
<td>.248</td>
<td>.501**</td>
<td>.268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.317***</td>
<td>.093</td>
<td>.003</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.107**</td>
<td>.077</td>
<td>.094*</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>-.017</td>
<td>-.031</td>
<td>.047**</td>
<td>.125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.029</td>
<td>.004</td>
<td>.296**</td>
<td>.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.057</td>
<td>-.019</td>
<td>-.046</td>
<td>-.060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.71***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 461  
Log Likelihood = -336.40  
Pseudo R² = .099

Number of cases: 399  
Log Likelihood = -330.56  
Pseudo R² = .096

Note: 1) *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .10 (two-tailed)

2) The efficacy variable and members of the United Auto Workers were excluded from the original 1994 model to facilitate accurate comparisons to the 1992 sample.

Table 4.9: Comparison of Poisson Regression Estimates for the 1992 and 1994 Expanded Models of Activism
CHAPTER 5

MOBILIZATION AND PARTICIPATION

IN GRASSROOTS LOBBYING

According to several observers, technological change has allowed interest groups to increase the usage of grassroots lobbying as a strategy for influencing public policy (Cigler and Loomis 1995). Grassroots lobbying occurs when interest group members are mobilized to contact public officials directly rather than merely relying on the group's lobbyist to speak for them in insider lobbying. Innovations in communications technologies, including phones, faxes, and e-mail, make it easier for interest group representatives to educate and mobilize their members across the country to contact public officials on behalf of the group. And it makes it easier for members to do so. If legislators are more likely to respond to the perceived desires of constituents back home than the self-serving arguments of lobbyists in Washington or the state capital (e.g., Kingdon 1989; Browne 1995), grassroots lobbying is a potentially effective means for interest groups to influence public policy. But mobilizing the grassroots requires the expenditure of substantial time and effort by the organization. Thus, lobbyists are likely to mobilize the grassroots only when it is likely to be effective, that is, when members are likely to respond as desired. So how do lobbyists decide when to use grassroots strategies?
Furthermore, for the strategy actually to work, members must respond to group mobilization appeals and contact their legislator. Why do members respond? The reasons for member mobilization and participation in grassroots lobbying campaigns basically are similar to those that explained mobilization and participation in election campaign activities. In short, members receive mobilization requests because of the political activism of their local union leaders, the member’s accessibility to union leaders for mobilization, the member’s likelihood of hearing political appeals, and the member’s ability to deliver the political messages desired by the union. Members’ responses to mobilization appeals are explained by their commitment to the union and political agreement with the union, as was emphasized in the last chapter, as well as their attitudes towards politics, and the social context in their local union environment.

Having already explained theoretically and demonstrated empirically the importance of these variables in the electoral context, rather than merely repeating the same arguments for a new dependent variable, in this chapter I focus on explaining why grassroots lobbying and electoral activities are analyzed separately instead of including them in the same scale of union political activities. Part of the reason for this is that unions themselves treat these activities separately (while realizing that they should be complementary if the group is to be effective politically). As described in Chapter 2, although some unions have different structures for electoral activities and grassroots lobbying, unions that do use the same structures for both grassroots activities traditionally have used them differently for elections than for lobbying. Here I will focus on explaining the decisions of unions to activate their grassroots structures rather than engaging in insider lobbying only.
Another reason for analyzing lobbying and electoral mobilizations separately is theoretical. Using the concept of "issue niches," I argue that groups have a competitive advantage over other sources of information in taking positions on their "core" issues -- issues central to organizational survival. Groups are less likely to have a competitive advantage in the electoral arena where one group's cues must compete with political parties, candidates, and other social groups for the attention of individuals. Specifically, I argue that members are more likely to respond to group lobbying mobilization appeals on the organization's "core" issues rather than those more peripheral to their membership in the organization. I use interviews with Ohio labor officers to test this hypothesis. Second, I again focus on the critical role of member commitment to the organization in explaining the type of members who are likely to respond to lobbying mobilization appeals. I argue that understanding the nature of commitment is critical to explaining the difference in member participation in lobbying campaigns versus electoral campaigns.

**Lobbying with a Competitive Advantage**

Organized interests lobby in order to influence policy outcomes. They are most likely to achieve access and to influence legislators when they can provide information that helps reduce policy makers' uncertainty regarding constituent preferences and the electoral implications of legislation, procedures and strategies of the legislative process, and the likely policy outcomes of legislation (Wright 1996, 82-95). Collecting information is costly; groups that provide information at a lower cost and/or with greater accuracy than their competitors (other groups, parties, constituents) are more likely to achieve access to legislators (Hansen 1991). Given the potential costs to a public official's career of heeding incorrect advice, legislators are most likely to grant
access to groups who can demonstrate the credibility and reliability of the information they provide. There are several ways groups can demonstrate the credibility and reliability of their information.

First, groups can form coalitions. Coalitions show a broad constituency in favor of a position. Support from other groups, especially those without an obvious "self-interest" in the outcome of the policy contest, add credibility to the group's arguments. Coalitions may rely on insider lobbying or use grassroots mobilizations since coalition members may have access to different legislators as well as constituency strength in a variety of districts.

Second, if an issue reoccurs over time, events can demonstrate the correctness of a group's position (Hansen 1991). In the short term, grassroots mobilizations help demonstrate the credibility of a lobbyist's arguments. If constituents respond actively to a lobbying campaign, they might also mobilize in a similar fashion during an election. In this way, grassroots lobbying is a "field experiment" in electoral mobilization (Wright 1996, 90). Similarly, grassroots contacts are a credible source of information on the consequences of policy (Browne 1995, Wright 1996). After all, members are the true experts -- their work and day-to-day activities are the "issue" under discussion.

Third, a group is at an advantage in providing information to legislators when it has a "competitive advantage" in the provision of that information (Hansen 1991). That is, the group is valuable to the legislator when it can supply substantively and politically accurate information that is not easily available from other sources such as political parties or constituents directly. A group is most likely to have a competitive advantage on issues within its "niche" -- issues on which it is expert and no one else is. Browne (1990) argues that interest groups focus on lobbying on issues within their niche because there are
costs to becoming expert on an issue in acquiring information, in monitoring
government, and in gaining access to public officials to share information. If a
group makes these investments only to have a competing group supply
information to public officials instead, the group has lost its investment.
Therefore, groups have an incentive to lobby on a narrow selection of issues,
their “niche,” where they can gain access and provide information to public
officials with little competition from others to improve the probability of their
investment “paying off.”

Hansen (1991) and Browne (1990) have discussed a group’s
competitive advantage and the role of niches in creating that advantage mainly
from an elite perspective: how legislators decide when to grant a group access
and on which issues groups choose to lobby. But the group’s competitive
advantage is also likely to be important in creating a response from group
members during grassroots mobilizations. A group’s position must be credible
and salient to members for them to sacrifice time, effort, and/or money on behalf
of the group. The group is most credible in making political appeals to
members under two conditions. The first is when there are no credible
alternative sources of information to the member. When members have no
alternative sources of information on how to behave they are more likely to
follow the only available cue. Second, members are more likely to respond to
group appeals on issues that are salient to them. Issues that are most likely to
be salient to members in an organizational context are those that are central to
their reason for membership in the organization. Members of environmental
groups join to advance the causes of clean air and water; union members join
for workplace protections and benefits. Thus, before policy makers and
members alike, groups are most credible taking positions in their “niche”—on issues on which they specialize and do not have competition.

A study of organized labor provides an opportunity to study a case where the organization lobbies on on a wide variety of issues, not only those in their “niche” of employer-employee relations. Indeed, Gray and Lowery (1996, 108) suggest that we should be concerned with “niche width”—the level of specialization entailed in a niche.” Labor, then, would have a broad niche width. Although labor’s broad niche may allow them to take positions credibly on many issues for public officials, it is likely that unions can only successfully get members to respond to grassroots mobilization appeals on issues closer to the core purpose of the union—protection of members’ rights and benefits in the workplace. On issues more peripheral to the union’s relationship with its members, the union’s position may be less credible to members in comparison to other social cues and thus members would be less likely to respond to union mobilization appeals.

The Breadth of Lobbying by Organized Labor

Although there may be advantages for an interest group to limit its position taking to issues on which it can demonstrate a competitive advantage to legislators and its members, labor unions, especially the AFL-CIO and UAW, have long taken positions on a wide variety of issues well beyond those that directly affect collective bargaining (Greenstone 1977; G. Wilson 1979; Heinz, Laumann, Nelson, and Salisbury 1992). The philosophy is expressed by John J. Sweeney, president of the AFL-CIO (1995-present): “When we participate in politics, we shouldn’t act as one more special interest group. We need to act as a social movement that represents working people throughout the society—union members and nonmembers alike.” (1996, 106) Unions have taken a
leadership role in promoting some of the priorities of the liberal coalition such as raising the minimum wage, introducing family leave and national health care, and protecting social welfare programs and affirmative action. A union officer explained why many unions are involved in a variety of issues outside of the workplace context: “Issues that might not directly affect unions are also labor issues. For example, we’re very involved in Medicare and Medicaid. They have an immediate effect on the families of our members, so they are labor issues too.” When asked how he decided whether or not to get involved on an issue, one lobbyist replied with an expansive conception of his duties: “My rule of thumb is any issue that affects working families.” Another officer proudly showed me a newspaper article that called him a “warrior for the middle class.”

Interviews confirm the traditional perception that many labor unions mobilize on a wide variety of issues. Interviewees were asked about the type of issues on which their union has mobilized in recent legislative sessions. A majority said they mobilized on a wide variety of issues: the Ohio AFL-CIO central office, all four Central body officers, and ten international officers (four of whom said they mostly rely on the Ohio AFL-CIO and Central Bodies for issue mobilizations). Five international officers replied that they engage in grassroots lobbying only on issues that directly affect their membership. Two international officers said they do not engage in grassroots lobbying mobilization often, but when they do, it is on issues limited to their membership. One officer said they had not engaged in grassroots lobbying mobilizations recently. As Table 5.1 demonstrates, the industrial unions of the old Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) tend to have broader niche widths, while professional and construction unions tend to have narrower niche widths.
Coordination of Lobbying

The fact that the AFL-CIO is a federation of international unions is critical to understanding the broad niche width of organized labor and its consequences for lobbying strategy. All unions in this study, with the significant exception of the Ohio Education Association (OEA), are members of the AFL-CIO. As a federation, the AFL-CIO faces some barriers to coordinating lobbying strategies across unions. First, unions that organize similar sectors of the work force may be in competition with one another. If there are unions with varying positions on an issue, the federation is unlikely to become involved. For example, on the issue of state or local governments contracting out services to private companies, there is often a conflict between public employees unions, who want government employees to do the job, and construction unions, who want their members to be able to compete for the work. In these cases, the federation is not likely to become involved. Conversely, different unions may organize different sectors of the work force and therefore priorities and the salience of particular issues vary across unions. In fact, a survey of unions at the national level found union internationals can have quite distinct sets of issues on which they lobby (Masters and Delaney 1987a). The federation usually takes the lead on issues that affect unions in general, but lets issues that affect certain types of unions only (and thus does not interest most federation members) to the internationals themselves.

Nevertheless, the AFL-CIO attempts to coordinate lobbying strategy among its member unions. This is achieved in regular biweekly meetings of union lobbyists at AFL-CIO headquarters in Columbus, and weekly meetings of

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53 Interviewees report that when conflict exists between international positions, rather than working a cross-purposes, the unions usually agree to preserve the status quo. The union that could potentially benefit from a change "sits it out."

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union lobbyists in Washington. Even the construction and public employees unions that engage in grassroots lobbying on the narrow set of issues of special concern to them coordinate their insider lobbying closely with the AFL-CIO (with the exceptions of the teachers' unions, OEA and OFT): they take the "lead" on issues that affect their members most directly, but assist in inside lobbying coalitions that affect unions generally.

The AFL-CIO plays a central coordinating role in grassroots mobilizations too. The industrial unions that tend to engage in grassroots mobilizations on a wide variety of issues generally claim they rely on the issue mobilization choices and generalized mobilization appeals of the Ohio AFL-CIO. Several interviewees stated that they totally rely on the Ohio AFL-CIO and its Central Bodies for grassroots mobilizations rather than mobilizing through the organizational structures of the international. Some do not have their own lobbyists to monitor government activity in Columbus. If lobbyists at the AFL-CIO let them know they need to get involved, the international officers themselves do the lobbying. They thus depend on the federation for all issue information. If grassroots lobbying is part of the strategy, they will pass the information on to their members and urge them to act, but the initiative and the strategy is in the hands of the Ohio AFL-CIO.

The Consequences of Niche Width for Lobbying Strategy

The broad niche width of organized labor has consequences for its strategic choices regarding the use of inside or grassroots tactics. Insider lobbying by unions on a wide variety of issues is possible at low cost especially when done in coalition with other liberal groups and when access is provided through the party leadership (Dark 1996). Yet sometimes the positions advocated by union lobbyists in Washington appear to be at variance with the
policy preferences of rank-and-file union members (Heldman and Knight 1980). For many interest groups, one would expect this to cause significant internal maintenance and external credibility problems.

But unlike other membership groups, labor unions' political position-taking is not necessary to attract individuals to join the group. Politically, unions are classic by-product organizations (Olson 1965). Their resources for political action are a result of their organization of workers on labor-management issues. Members join for work-related benefits or because of closed-shop agreements, not necessarily because they support the political positions of their union. In terms of niche theory, Gray and Lowery (1996, 96) argue that several niche resources are necessary for organizational survival: members, access to selective benefits, finances, access to the policy making process, and government action that makes the group's lobbying legitimate. They also argue that these niche resources are multidimensional and not necessarily interdependent. Labor's critical political niche resource, its policy access through the Democratic party leadership, has been independent of its other niche resources. As long as labor could protect its political interests through its access, other niche resources could remain independent of political efforts. Unions could maintain their broad niche width for the purposes of inside lobbying and be assured of a hearing without fear of losing membership or other niche resources to competing groups.  

But organized labor's broad niche width is likely to be important in outside lobbying strategies that require member mobilization. Members are unlikely to sacrifice time and effort to support the union on positions unrelated to

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54 Labor's loss of access through the Democratic party's loss of majority status in Congress and the Ohio legislature has led to a reassessment of the independence of labor's positions from the preferences of its membership. There is greater emphasis on polling the priorities of rank-and-file members and educating the members on issues the leadership believes are important.
their membership in the organization. The breadth of organized labor's position-taking and lobbying allows for an exploration of the conditions under which members respond. Members are less likely to respond in circumstances where group cues are less credible. So unions may be less likely attempt to mobilize the grassroots on the broad liberal-coalition issues, and may only use member mobilization as an influence strategy on narrower union-specific issues. Alternatively, unions may use grassroots mobilization strategies on non-union issues as well as union issues, but members may be less likely to participate in mobilizations on issues not central to their specific workplace concerns.

Decisions to Mobilize the Grassroots

Organizing an effective grassroots lobbying campaign is costly in terms of the time and effort it takes to inform and mobilize members. So unions face the choice of whether or not to involve the rank-and-file on a particular issue in actual legislative situations, even when the union is willing to mobilize its members on a wide variety of issues. Interviewees cited many conditions that influence whether a grassroots strategy is likely to be used. Three of these conditions, the importance of the issue, salience of the issue to members, and the number of members affected by the issue help show how the subtleties of potential member response affects whether and how grassroots strategies are used.

The number of members directly affected by the legislation is an important consideration because grassroots mobilization is costly to undertake, yet must produce substantial response from members in order to influence public officials. From the perspective of a legislator, the number of contacts from a grassroots lobbying campaign is a measure of constituent intensity; it
demonstrates the extent to which constituents care about the issue and the possibility that the legislator's behavior on the issue could produce electoral consequences (Wright 1996; Frantzich 1986). If few responses from members are likely to be generated, there is not likely to be much constituent pressure on legislators, so insider lobbying may be a more efficient strategy.55

Even if large numbers of members are potentially affected by an issue, the issue's salience to members is considered in determining whether or not to use a grassroots strategy. If members are not interested in the issue and do not respond to mobilization appeals, there is unlikely to be much legislative payoff for the union's investment in effort to mobilize. In 1995, the national AFL-CIO polled its membership to help determine priority issues on which to mobilize the grassroots in doing battle with the new Republican Congress.

An issue's complexity is an important element in determining member interest and likelihood of responding. Several lobbyists admitted that one of their most difficult tasks is to explain issues in an "understandable" way to members in order to convince them of the importance of mobilizing. They see it as their duty to educate their members. Yet for some, grassroots mobilization may not be used as a strategy even on issues that are central to the union's maintenance of its members' benefits when the issues are deemed too complex for members to understand. This can be seen in a building trades union lobbyist's explanation of why his union mobilized on prevailing wage, but not on worker's compensation reform: "Prevailing wage is a complex issue and workers didn't understand how it affected their wages. So we began educating

55 That said, the aggregate number of responses from rank-and-file members is not always a concern. Several lobbyists noted that grassroots mobilizations can be successful when only "elite" contacts are made between union officers and legislators, especially when the officer has been active in the legislator's past campaigns. This would seem to be effective only in convincing "friendly" legislators, however, not necessarily the swing votes since unions would be less likely to have close campaign ties to irregular supporters.
our members on it about six years ago so they would be ready. We showed them how prevailing wage works." In contrast, he said regarding worker's compensation: "Members don't understand it. They only look at it when they get hurt. Only about 20% appreciate it. Most consider it a welfare program. So we usually deal with worker's comp as part of a coalition with other unions, not through member mobilization."

Finally, grassroots strategies are most likely to be used on issues of critical importance to the union—"survival" issues in the words of several unions lobbyists and officers. It is an inefficient use of organizational resources to mobilize on issues that are not important. But how do unions define the level of an issue's "importance?" OEA uses a four-level priority ranking scale. Its first priority is state educational funding. Since public education is dependent on government funding, it is "constant number one priority" of the OEA, according to an OEA officer. The second priority is defending eight core past legislative victories. As explained by an OEA officer, "If we're attacked on these, it's war." The third level of priority includes issues that the OEA is trying to pass in the legislature and is the same seven issues every year. The lower rank of these items in the priority scale is explained by an OEA officer: "Since things are easier to kill than pass in the legislature, these are items OEA would like to have, but can live without. Therefore, other priorities often take precedent." The fourth priority is 300 position statements that OEA state conventions have taken that are used to endorse or oppose specific bills before the legislature. According to the OEA officer, "Our level of activity on the bill depends on how the bill affects issue priorities in the other three tiers. If the bill doesn't strongly

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56 At the same time, the lobbyist noted that the union primarily relied on inside lobbying; prevailing wage was the only issue on which they had attempted a grassroots mobilization recently.
affect issues in the other tiers, OEA doesn't get involved, other than perhaps making a statement. We don't cry wolf." These priority levels are used both to allocate insider lobbying effort and to determine when grassroots mobilization is necessary. In the 1995-6 session of the Ohio Legislature, for example, four out of the eight of OEA's core issues in level 2 were threatened so, in combination with regular funding concerns, grassroots mobilizations were quite frequent. Other union lobbyists did not explain their prioritizing this systematically, but similar ideas seem to be behind their priorities nevertheless.

The implications of these grassroots mobilization decision rules are that even unions that have broad niche widths do not necessarily mobilize their members on all issues on which the union takes a position and engages in insider lobbying. One officer, after discussing the wide variety of issues in which they are involved, (and after complaining that by lobbying for benefits for non-members, unions give individuals less incentive to join unions that already provide such benefits through collective bargaining) notes they don't mobilize on all issues: "Affirmative action and equal pay for women are issues we lobby on but don't mobilize our members because the, well, white men on the factory floor probably wouldn't support these issues." His comments supports the hypothesis that members are not likely to respond as the organization desires on positions that are "peripheral" to membership in the organization.

**Expectations of Members' Responsiveness**

If the issue was important to the union (which many unions define broadly), officers claimed that they would attempt grassroots mobilizations regardless of the level of member support or understanding. At the same time, most admitted they realistically expect less participation from members. One officer of the Ohio AFL-CIO voiced the general sentiment: "Even though we
know the membership may not agree with our position or understand the issue, we attempt to mobilize anyway. But we expect less members response."

Similarly, an OEA activist explains their mobilization on rather arcane issues:

Other issues, such as the State Professional Standards and Licensure Board\textsuperscript{67} are just as important [as tenure and retirement], but are harder to communicate to members. So we put more effort into educating members on these issues. We continually stress them in Ohio Schools [OEA’s monthly magazine] and keep them in the forefront at conferences. Realistically, we expect that members will be less responsive on these issues.

In these situations, despite attempts to use grassroots lobbying as part of the influence strategy, officers and lobbyists know that success likely depends on insider lobbying.

The difficulty unions have in mobilizing members on issues not central to their own protections and benefits can been seen by examining officer discussions of member responses to “union issues.” Many officers, particularly from the industrial unions that mobilize on a broad variety of issues, noted that they often attempt to mobilize their members on issues that do not directly affect the industry they organize, but that do affect unions in other industries.

Essentially, the officers are following a norm of reciprocity among unions: our members will help you out when you need it with the expectation that you will help us out when we need it. But members do not necessary respond well to calls to participate in activities that affect only other unions and not their own.

An officer of one union committed to this strategy complains:

It’s tough enough to motivate members on our own issues, let alone on other’s. Members don’t want to help public employees

\textsuperscript{67} The State Professional Standards and Licensure Board sets teacher certification standards. A majority of the members of the board are teachers and the OEA was fighting a proposal by Governor Voinovich which would have eliminated the teacher’s majority.
because that will raise their taxes. They don’t want to help the auto workers because that will raise the cost of their car. Others don’t want to help us because it will raise their utility bills.

Many stated that helping the members make a connection to the core concerns of their own union was critical to getting members involved. An OEA activist explains: “Members are more active in school board races. In these races, they engage in more ‘hands-on’ activities. They actually do literature drops, putting up signs. Members are less ‘hands-on’ in state and federal races because they don’t see the education connection in these races.”

Although the AFL-CIO produces general mobilization messages and coordinates between unions, it often relies on the internationals themselves to motivate their members on issues of special concern to the union itself and to produce more targeted mobilization appeals. The fragmented structures of organized labor and variety of interests of different unions make this possible, if not necessary. A United Auto Workers officer describes their attempts at targeting issue mobilization appeals to those most likely to respond: “We concentrate on our own members as do the other internationals of the federation. We focus on issues specific to the UAW. We use more specific messages for different groups when we can: retirees, unemployed members, active members, issues important in specific communities.” Similarly, lobbyists for AFSCME and the state civil servants union (OCSEA) claimed that almost all of their grassroots lobbying mobilization occurred with only a small segment of the membership: transportation workers mobilize on highway maintenance,

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56 Indeed, as one labor lobbyist argued, “The AFL-CIO has an identity problem. They are a federation, so they don’t know exactly who they are and don’t really have ‘members’ of their own.” Union members may be committed to their own international and respond to its appeals based on its services to them in the workplace, but the AFL-CIO would have trouble tapping directly into this commitment to the union. For example, one of the OEA’s mobilization messages to members is, “You are the OEA.” As a federation, it seems unlikely that the AFL-CIO could use “You are the AFL-CIO” as an effective mobilizing message.
corrections officers on prison issues, and so on. The major exception to this is the industrial unions that rely almost totally on the AFL-CIO and its Central Bodies for their lobbying and grassroots mobilization activities. Because they depend on the generalized federation issue information and strategy, little membership targeting seems to occur.

Yet just because issues are not central to the member-union relationship does not mean that union can never get members involved in these issues. The task for the union is to make the connection to workplace issues or the worker's general well-being. One OEA activist explains:

We get involved in educational or public employee issues, not other labor issues. Education and the rights of individual members are our primary concerns. Member issues include retirement and [teacher] certification. Education issues often concern funding. ...NEA has gotten into other issues with a more tenuous connection to education, but it makes an effort to explain the link to education to members. For example, the effort to restrict guns near schools was not explained as an issue of gun control, but as a matter of combating violence in schools.

A lobbyist for the state employees' union makes a similar point:

Another part of the problem [of mobilizing members] is that many partisan and labor issues are not attractive to our members. So our members won't get involved with them, since they don't see how they are affected. For example, to get members involved in worker's comp, we had to approach the issue as: we, as state workers, are the ones who deliver the services, so we need to have input into how that service is delivered, not as a typical labor issue.

The need to frame the issue in a way that will interest members and to educate them on how the issue will impact them was stressed by lobbyists, though they admitted that this is a difficult task.

Thus, despite the commitment of many unions to be politically involved on a wide variety of issues, potential membership reaction is a central
consideration in choosing when to engage in grassroots lobbying. The number of members affected and the level of interest affect whether the union invests its limited effort and resources in grassroots mobilizations. Unions are less likely to mobilize members on issues on which less member response is expected. Still, concerns regarding member response can be overridden by the "importance" of the issue to the union. In the case of "survival" issues, unions devote more effort into educating their members.

**Testing Member Responses to Core Issues: Lobbying vs. Elections**

Ideally, we would want to test the type of issues on which members were willing to respond in grassroots lobbying mobilizations rather than merely relying on lobbyist perceptions. Unfortunately, the Ohio Union Surveys did not ask members about the specific issues on which they were asked to participate.

However, we can make a distinction between participation in grassroots lobbying and participation in electoral campaigns and test whether members were more willing to respond to mobilization appeals on issues than in elections. Although a comparison between issue and electoral participation does not directly address the question of differential response to core versus peripheral issues, there are some important similarities that make the comparison worthwhile. Group positions and lobbying are likely to be more credible with legislators and with their own members on the narrower issues on which the group has a competitive advantage over other sources of information. For members, the group is likely to have a more of a competitive advantage in the grassroots lobbying context than in an electoral context. Groups may be the only source of relevant information or cues in issue mobilizations. Members rely on the group's lobbyists for information on how the political arena affects their interests and what they can do about it. In contrast, the electoral campaign
context provides alternative cues for group members such as party identification, other group identifications, attitudes towards candidates, and so on. Members can use the many sources of information easily available in the electoral context to make decisions regarding how to allocate their time, effort, and attention. In short, the interest group's position is only one of many that the individual can take into consideration. In electoral arena, parties have the competitive advantage; on issues, groups have the competitive advantage (Hansen 1991).

If group positions are more credible to members in the issue context because of the competitive advantage of the group, and if the group mobilizes on its core rather than peripheral issues, members are likely to respond to grassroots lobbying mobilization appeals than to electoral appeals. To test member responsiveness to issue versus electoral participation requests, I divided the number of participatory acts by the member by the number of times she was mobilized for grassroots and for electoral activities.

There are no differences in the response rates between grassroots lobbying and electoral participation. In grassroots lobbying mobilizations, members responded 0.48 times per request. In election campaigns, members respond 0.49 times per request. Members' response rates are remarkably similar. This may be due to the fact that union grassroots lobbying structures are weaker than their electoral mobilization structures (Chapter 2) or because many unions mobilize on peripheral issues. Regardless, in 1994, Ohio union members did not respond at different rates to issue and electoral appeals.

Which Members Engage in Grassroots Lobbying

Regardless of the aggregate level of member response to mobilization appeals, individual members vary in their willingness to engage in grassroots
lobbying. Even if the issue is critically important to the union and lobbyists expect that it will be highly salient to members, some members will contact public officials and others will not. In particular, committed members are most likely to respond to mobilization appeals when the core interests of the organization are at stake. Ideally, the relationship between commitment and issue response would appear as presented in Table 5.2: committed members would be highly likely to respond on core issues, and moderately likely to respond on peripheral issues; less committed members would be moderately likely to respond on core issues and unlikely to respond on peripheral issues. As above, I have no measure of the issues on which members are mobilizing, so I cannot directly test which members respond to core versus peripheral issues. Still, members are more likely to perceive core organizational issues at stake in grassroots lobbying campaigns rather than election campaigns. I will test this using the 1994 Ohio Union Survey by comparing models of member participation in grassroots lobbying campaigns versus the election campaign participation model of last chapter.

Because electoral choice is structured by partisanship and ideology whereas issue involvement is based on narrow areas of concern—the "niche" of the group (Browne 1990)—partisanship is likely to matter more in electoral participation whereas commitment to the organization is likely to matter more in issue participation. If members are committed to the group and they see its interests (and their own) being impacted by public officials, they are likely to respond to this threat to help the group. But threats to group positions are often less clear or less salient in an electoral context in which many other issues, candidate characteristics, and party affiliations matter too. The group is more likely to have a competitive advantage on issues and members committed to the
organization are most likely to follow group cues when such cues are clearest. Whereas in elections, organizational electoral activities that support candidates of the opposite party discourage the contributions of committed members who differ in their partisanship. In short, committed members are more likely to respond on issues because the organization is important to them and there are not alternatives to group cues that would suggest they behave differently.

These hypotheses mesh with the discussion in Chapter 2 where union officers and activists would involve recruits in issue mobilizations first in order to get them involved in electoral activities later. Some members are willing to mobilize on issues that affect themselves personally and affect the organization, but not if the activity is seen as an attack on their political party. This is particularly a problem when the union is perceived as only supporting Democrats. An OEA activist states: "I think teachers respond best on issues that hit close to home, that have a personal impact, and that are non-partisan." If an additional group identity, party identification, intrudes on the group's mobilization message, even committed members are less likely to respond.

With these hypothesized differences between the results of the electoral campaign models and the grassroots lobbying model in mind, I follow the same strategy for analyzing grassroots lobbying as I have for analyzing electoral campaign activity. I first explain why members are mobilized for grassroots lobbying by their union. I then explain why members participate in union grassroots lobbying campaigns.

**Modeling Lobbying Mobilization**

My hypotheses and measurements for grassroots lobbying mobilizations largely follow those presented in Chapter 3 for electoral mobilization. Therefore, I will only briefly review them here while highlighting the few
differences between the models. I expect issue mobilization to be based on four general characteristics: the activity of local union leaders, the member's accessibility to leaders for mobilization, the member's resources for effective participation in union political activities, and the member's likelihood of hearing mobilization appeals. The variables measuring each of these factors are basically the same as the electoral mobilization model.

The activity of local union leaders is measured by the politically active union scale, areas where the union is traditionally active in political mobilizations, and the number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives. These three union activity variables may be less influential in lobbying mobilization than in electoral mobilizations. As discussed in Chapter 2, union leaders admitted letting their grassroots lobbying structures deteriorate in favor of inside lobbying. If so, the political structures are likely to be ineffective in contacting members to lobby and in securing their participation.

Targeting is the only variable measured differently here than previously. Targeting is measured by the committee memberships of the legislators who represent the district. As before, a respondent's score on the targeted measure is the total number of targeted districts in which she lives (Congress + Ohio Senate + Ohio House). Respondents were coded into legislative districts based on their zip code and the predominant legislative district for that zip code.

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I chose to measure targeting based on legislators committee assignments for several reasons. First, as political scientists have observed since Woodrow Wilson (1956/1885), most legislative policy making occurs in committee. If interest groups want to influence the legislative agenda and the contents of legislation, they are most likely to do it at the committee level. Committee members, then, would be targets because they are the ones present to influence the legislation (Hall 1987; Hall and Wayman 1990). Second, while Ohio lobbyists claimed they would mobilize the grassroots at any stage of the legislative process, they observed that legislators need to be persuaded before the party caucus takes a position on an issue (i.e., before a bill reaches the floor). With the strong party discipline that exists in the Ohio legislature, if the party caucus takes a position on an issue, members are bound to vote for the caucus position unless released by party leaders. Since this process prevents substantial modification of bills favored by the majority party on the floor, the place to influence legislators and the contents of legislation is in committee.
as provided by the Ohio Secretary of State (see Chapter 3). Union members were coded as living in a targeted congressional district if their member of Congress served on the Education and Labor Committee (now Education and the Workplace) or the Labor subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee since these committees have jurisdiction over labor and educational issues. In addition, members of Building Trades unions were coded as living in a targeted district if their member of Congress served on the Public Works committee because of its jurisdiction over authorization of federal construction projects. Because of differences in committee jurisdictions in the Ohio legislature, coding of targeted districts was done by union type. Members of the teachers' unions, OEA and OFT, were coded as living in a targeted House or targeted Senate district if their representative or Senator served on the respective chamber's Education committee or the Education subcommittee of the Appropriations committee. Members of public employee unions (who are not teachers, e.g., AFSCME, OCSEA, firefighters) were coded as living in a targeted House or Senate district if their representative served on the State and Local Government committees. Members of the remaining AFL-CIO unions were coded as living in a targeted House or Senate district if their representative served on the Commerce and Labor Committees. Additionally, members of Building Trades unions were coded as living in a targeted district if their representative in the Ohio House served on the Development subcommittee of the Appropriations committee. Finally, any union member who lived in the district of a party leader in the Ohio legislature (leaders, assistant leaders, and whips) was coded as living in a targeted district.\(^{60}\)

\(^{60}\) I constructed several variations of this measure (without party leaders, committee chairs and ranking minority members only, Democratic members only). The substantive results reported below do not change. No variation approaches statistical significance in any model.
Members are more likely to receive mobilization requests if they are accessible to union leaders. As before, this will be measured by the member’s level of participation in the internal activities of the union.

Third, if union leaders seek out those members who are most likely to be able to participate effectively and deliver the political message desired by the union, lobbying mobilization should be related to the member’s level of education and her level of political proximity to union leaders. Again, these variables are measured as they were for electoral mobilization.¹

Last, members are more likely to report requests to participate in grassroots lobbying campaigns if they are likely to seek out and “hear” union political information. The member’s level of interest in politics, level of reliance on the union for political information, length of tenure in the union, and whether she joined the union voluntarily use the same measures as in Chapter 3.

Of course, the dependent variable does differ. Mobilization for grassroots lobbying is measured by the member’s response to the query: “In the past two years,”¹² has your union asked you to phone or write any elected official about

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¹ Given that the political agreement measure is based on perceived agreement of party identification and ideology with union leaders, and my earlier argument that issue positions are the relevant cue in grassroots mobilizations, I devised several alternative measures of political agreement that included the members agreement with union leaders on government involvement in the economy, abortion, health care, and affirmative action. The results were no different than those produced by the original measure.

¹² Two years is the length of a legislative session in both Congress and the Ohio legislature. Although the respondents could be contacted other public officials besides legislators, responses to the 1996 survey show that the issues on which members are being asked to mobilize overwhelmingly are issues before Congress or the Ohio legislature rather than local issues.
any political issues? This question was asked only in the 1994 survey, thus comparative data to 1992 are unavailable. Fifty-seven percent (350) members claimed to have been asked by their union to engage in grassroots lobbying. Since members could respond dichotomously "yes" or "no", probit will be used as the statistical estimation technique. Probit and the calculation of change scores are explained in Chapter 3.

**Lobbying Mobilization Results**

The results presented in Table 5.3 show that the explanations for contacts for participation in grassroots lobbying are quite similar to the explanation for contacts for participation in electoral activities -- with the critical exception of the local union context variables. The member's level of participation in the internal life of the union, her level of political interest, and her level of education all are statistically significant predictors of requests to lobby. According to the change scores, the member's level of interest in politics has the largest amount of impact on whether the member will receive a request to engage in grassroots lobbying. These variables show that a member's availability to union leaders, her likelihood of hearing political requests, and her resources for participation explain lobbying mobilization.

Importantly, the local union context variables are not significantly related to lobbying mobilization -- whereas both the union political activity scale and residence in a region of traditional union political mobilization were significant in explaining electoral contacts. This evidence supports union officials' ___

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___ This measure of lobbying mobilization is superior to those used by Rosenstone and Hansen (1993, 226) for explaining why individuals write their member of Congress. They do not have a direct measure of mobilization so they rely on a series of contextual variables which are likely to measure more than requests to participate alone: percentage of population that worked for a political party; percentage of Senators and representatives serving first two years of their terms; the natural log of the number of bills introduced that year; Presidential speeches in the last week requesting letters to Congress; unemployment rate; last four weeks of session; and the natural log of the number of bills of the floor. (See Goldstein 1995, 6)
admission (in Ohio and Washington) that their grassroots lobbying structures are underdeveloped. Based on the strength of union political structures, officers could predict where their electoral mobilization would occur, but such structures are unable to predict grassroots lobbying mobilization.

To help us further understand union lobbying mobilization, I calculated the probability of being asked to participate in union grassroots lobbying based on hypothetical values for the same four variables as were used in predicted probability of receiving electoral participation requests in Chapter 3: the activity level of the member's union, the activity level of the member within the union, and the member's levels of political interest and education. One variable represents each variable "category" in the model: local union mobilization activity, the member's availability for mobilization, the member's likelihood of hearing mobilization appeals, and the member's resources for effective participation. The calculations are based on the coefficients of the Grassroots Lobbying Mobilization Model (Table 5.3) with the remaining variables held at their respective means.

As reported in Table 5.4, with all four variables at their lowest value (and other independent variables at their means), the probability of a member being asked is extremely low--only 16%. Yet with all four taking on their highest values, the member would have an 83% probability of being asked to participate. The results also confirm the crucial roles played by the member's level of education in the mobilization process. A member with post-graduate education has the same probability of being asked to participate than a member who is both active in her union and a member of an extremely active union (70%). Combining other variables with a high level of education member produce even higher probabilities of receiving a request to participate. For
example, a member who has both high levels of education and of political interest has a 75% probability of being mobilized for grassroots lobbying. In the end, given that the mean values for all variables in the model produce a 60% probability of being contacted, these estimated probabilities show substantial increases in the likelihood of being asked to participate produced by the critical variables in the model.

**Modeling Participation in Grassroots Lobbying**

Member's participation in union grassroots lobbying campaigns is hypothesized to be explained by similar concepts as electoral participation. That is, members will participate in the grassroots mobilizations of their union based on their commitment to the union as well as their agreement with the political positions of the union. Committed members, for whom organizational membership is personally important, will be more willing to make contributions for the collective good of the organization when its interests are threatened in the political arena. Likewise, members who are aware of and agree with the political positions of the group will be more willing to participate in order to advance their own political beliefs as well as the organization's. As in electoral participation, other member relationships with the organization will also increase the probability that she participates in lobbying activities: the extent to which she believes lobbying is an appropriate political activity for the organization, the extent to which the member has "learned" the costs and benefits of activism in the group (for which organizational tenure is a proxy [Rothenberg 1992]), and whether the member joined in order to participate in politics (voluntary membership). Of these variables, only the appropriateness of lobbying is a different measure than the appropriateness measure in the
electoral participation models.\textsuperscript{44} It is measured by the respondent's answer to the question, "Is it OK or not OK for labor unions to lobby elected officials?". The response is a three point scale: OK, it depends (if volunteered), or not OK.

Alternatively, traditional explanations of individual political participation including interest in politics, political efficacy, and resources for political participation (education), may explain participation in grassroots lobbying. These variables are measured as they were for electoral participation.

Pressures of the social environment may sway the individual to join in group political activities. The traditional level of political activity of the member's union, the level of union political activity in the member's region, and the number of targeted legislative districts in which the member lives are elements of the local union context that may push the individual to participation in grassroots lobbying. Both union political activity and geographical political activity are measured as in Chapter 3; legislative targeting is measured as described earlier in the chapter for grassroots lobbying mobilization. As in the mobilization hypotheses, if union grassroots lobbying structures are underdeveloped, these contextual variables may be ineffective in explaining lobbying participation by members.

Since we are studying organizationally-related political acts, rather than political participation in general, members were only asked if they had engaged in grassroots lobbying after they had affirmed that their union had asked them to engage in such activity. Specifically, members were asked, "In the past two years, has your union asked you to phone or write any elected official about any political issues?" If the member responded "Yes", they were then asked, "Did

\textsuperscript{44} I also created several variations of the political agreement variable to incorporate member’s perceived agreement with union leaders on various issues rather than just partisan and ideological agreement. The results, however, do not differ.
you do it?" This second question is the measure of participation in grassroots lobbying. Respondents were only asked this question in the 1994 survey; twenty-eight percent (170) of the members responded that they had participated. Probit is again used as the statistical estimation procedure since the dependent variable is dichotomous.

**Lobbying Participation Results**

The grassroots lobbying participation results, as presented in Table 5.5, support the theory of organizational participation advanced in this dissertation by demonstrating the importance of commitment and political agreement in explaining member participation in union lobbying campaigns. Both are statistically significant and produce notable increases in the probability that the member will engage in lobbying. Commitment, in fact, has a larger change score than any other variable in the model. The member's level of education and level of political interest are the other statistically significant variables in explaining lobbying participation. "Learning" the benefits of activism (natural log of tenure), while not statistically significant, and level of education produce change scores essentially as large as commitment's. Consistent with the fears of union officers regarding the strength of their grassroots lobbying structures, none of the union context variables are significantly related to participation.

To help demonstrate the importance of organizational commitment in explaining member's participation in grassroots lobbying, I calculated the probability of participating in union grassroots lobbying based on hypothetical values for four important variables in the model: the politically active union scale, the member's level of political interest, her political agreement with the union, and her commitment to the union. The calculations are based on the
coefficients of the Grassroots Lobbying Participation Model (Table 5.5) with the remaining variables held at their respective means.

As Table 5.6 demonstrates, these four variables alone are critical to explaining member participation in grassroots lobbying. When these four variables are at their lowest values, there is almost no chance that the member will participate (.009%)! Conversely, when all four variables take on the maximum value, the probability of the member's participation is 64%, well above the 22% probability of participation when all variables are at their mean values. The importance of commitment in the model is shown by the fact that the most committed members participate at higher levels in grassroots lobbying (40%) than members who are both highly interested in politics and in total political agreement with the union or who are members of an extremely active international and in total political agreement with the union. Combinations of high levels of commitment with maximum values of the other variables produce even higher probabilities that the member will engage in grassroots lobbying.

**Lobbying vs. Electoral Participation**

Based the competitive advantage of interest groups on issues rather than electoral positions, I hypothesized that committed members would be more likely to respond to group mobilization appeals for grassroots lobbying campaigns than electoral campaigns. Table 5.7 compares selected variables from the lobbying participation model (Table 5.5) and the electoral participation model from Chapter 4 (Table 4.6). Both are the results of probit models based on whether the member participated in a single campaign or lobbying event or not. Although there are numerous similarities between the results of lobbying and electoral participation models, I will highlight some of the differences in order to show support for my hypotheses.
As predicted, member commitment to the union has a larger impact on member participation in grassroots lobbying than on electoral participation. In the lobbying model, commitment is statistically significant and the change score is three times the size of the score in the elections model. Committed members are more likely to participate when organization interests have a clear competitive advantage uncluttered by other political cues. The changes in the relationship between commitment and participation between the two contexts are all the more notable given that the relationship between the member's political agreement with the union and participation is statistically significant and the size of its change score is nearly identical in the two models.

The model comparisons in Table 5.7 also clearly show the differences in effectiveness of union political structures in promoting electoral versus lobbying participation. All three variables, the politically active union scale, the union's level of political activity geographically, and targeted districts are statistically significant explanatory variables and produce moderate changes in the probability of participation for electoral participation, but not for lobbying participation.

Finally, the member's level of education is a statistically significant and influential variable in explaining lobbying, but not electoral, participation. As in our exploration of electoral mobilization in Chapter 3, I question whether education has a large influence on lobbying participation because of the activities of the OEA.

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These conclusions also hold true for the 1992 electoral participation models. Although commitment was a statistically significant variable and produced a larger change score in the 1992 than 1994 election model, the 1992 electoral participation commitment change score is still half that of the 1994 grassroots lobbying participation commitment change score (.147 versus .307).
The Role of Education Reprised: Inter-Union Differences

In Chapter 3, I found that part of the explanation for why highly educated members were more likely to be mobilized for union electoral campaign activities was that the OEA was more active than the OCSEA or AFL-CIO unions in contacting their members and that OEA members were more highly educated than members of the other unions. Here, I will test whether this is also the reason for the importance of members' education levels in explaining lobbying mobilization and participation.

Preliminary evidence shows that these are indeed plausible explanations. As shown in Table 5.8, the OEA mobilizes its members for grassroots lobbying at higher rates and a higher proportion of OEA members participate than members of the OCSEA or AFL-CIO. And, OEA members have significantly higher levels of education than members of the other unions (Chi-square p-value= .00).

To test the impact of education and OEA membership on grassroots lobbying mobilization and participation further, I ran the models for each union sample separately. Then I ran the mobilization and participation models with all three sample combined, but added a term to the equation for OEA membership and a term interacting level of education and OEA membership. I will discuss the mobilization models first.

In the separate models of mobilization for each union sample, evidence supports the role of the OEA in mobilizing educated members for grassroots lobbying (table not presented). In the OEA model, education is significantly related to receiving requests to engage in lobbying on behalf of the union.

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* The politically active union scale was removed from both models since an individual union from the scale (OEA) was being entered separately into the equation.
(p= .05). For the OCSEA and AFL-CIO models, members' levels of education are not related to mobilization requests at statistically significant levels.

The combined sample model with the interaction term, also provides evidence supporting the OEA's role in mobilizing educated members (table not presented). The interaction term is statistically significant at a marginal level (p= .06). Thus, those who are highly educated and OEA members are more likely to be asked to engage in grassroots lobbying. Furthermore, the linear term for OEA membership is negatively signed and marginally significant (p= .09). This result indicates that OEA members who are less highly educated are less likely to be asked to participate in lobbying activities. The linear term for education is not significant. The results of the mobilization equation with OEA membership and education level interaction are quite similar to those obtained for the electoral contacting model with interaction in Chapter 3. It too had a positive interaction term and negative linear term for OEA membership.

Although the mobilization models show the importance of OEA activity in explaining the importance of the member's level of education in grassroots lobbying mobilization, OEA activity does not appear to explain the significance of education in member's participation in grassroots lobbying (table not presented). The member's level of education is not a significant explanatory variable in the OEA sample model of lobbying participation. Nor is education significant in the OCSEA or AFL-CIO sample models. Likewise, in the interaction model, neither the interaction nor linear terms for OEA membership nor level of education are significant explanatory variables. Thus, education is not important in explaining grassroots lobbying participation because of the disproportionate emphasis it receives in any particular union.
A possible reason that education significantly contributes to explaining member participation in grassroots lobbying but not election activity is the differences in skills required to engage in each. To engage in grassroots lobbying requires the member to be skilled and self-assured enough in her writing and speaking abilities to display them publicly before a government official. These skills are honed by education. Such communication skills may be relevant for some volunteer activities in election campaigns, but are not necessary for many others such as distributing campaign literature, placing yard signs, attending candidate meetings, or giving small contributions through payroll deductions. A member's level of education may help to explain her participation in grassroots lobbying because education provides the skills necessary to become involved confidently and successfully.

Discussion and Conclusion

The evidence presented in this chapter shows that there are important similarities between member's mobilization for and participation in grassroots lobbying and electoral campaign activities. Similarities are apparent in the evidence that members are mobilized based on their accessibility to union leaders, their likelihood of hearing political appeals, and their resources for participating in union political action. Also, the mobilization of the OEA plays a critical role in attempting to recruit highly educated union members for both lobbying and electoral activities. In addition, members participate in both lobbying and election activities based on their commitment to the union and their agreement with its political positions.

Yet the evidence also shows important differences in the explanations of why members participate in grassroots lobbying, some of which are predictable based on member's responses to the competitive advantage of
groups in giving cues on issues. To explain why grassroots lobbying activities should be analyzed separately from electoral activities, I argued that groups are more credible before both public officials and their own members on issues on which the group has a competitive advantage over other sources of political information. This has lead to several insights about the role of group membership in group strategic decision making. Because interest groups inevitably have limited resources for political mobilization, if only because local officers and activists have competing demands on their limited time, decisions regarding when to engage in grassroots lobbying campaigns incorporate expectations of how members are likely to respond. If the group cannot succeed in achieving its policy goals through insider lobbying alone and member mobilization is necessary for group success, to invest in a mobilization and have members fail to respond is a waste the group’s resources in addition to a policy defeat.

Thus, even groups such as organized labor that mobilize on wide variety of issues, perhaps even without the support of their members, face potential limits to their credibility without member support. This is particularly true for labor since it has lost what had been its critical political resource -- its access to the majority leadership in Congress and the Ohio legislature through the Democratic party leadership. Without representing members on issues, not only may members fail to mobilize in grassroots campaigns, but messages delivered through insider lobbying may lack political credibility since members will not back up the position of the lobbyist in the voting booth. A national AFL-CIO political director admits this problem in explaining their efforts in Labor '96:

Taking Congress was never really our goal. Our goal was to create a permanent infrastructure that we don’t need to recreate every election. Infrastructure allows for accountability once the
candidate is in office -- whether Republicans or Democrats. The end of any political program is to deliver policies beneficial to members. The Democrats couldn't pass our legislation either.

Without grassroots support from members, unions could not hold public officials accountable. While they were able to win some victories on priorities issue in the late 1980s and early 1990s through their close coordination with the Democratic leadership in Congress, they were more successful on issues that benefited broad constituencies than on issues that benefited unions more narrowly (Dark 1996). Hence AFL-CIO President John J. Sweeney's emphasis in Project '96:

If these messages [the AFL-CIO's 1996 ad campaign in marginal Republican congressional districts] are our 'air war,' our most important fight will be our 'ground war' -- our effort to build a grassroots movement of working people all across America. ...[W]e're devoting our effort to information, education, and mobilization, so that we can build political power for working Americans. (1996, 100-1)

The weakness of grassroots lobbying structures admitted by labor officials was supported empirically in this chapter. The evidence showed clear differences between the effect of political structures in increasing the probability that members would be mobilized for and participate in union election campaign activities, but these structures had no impact on mobilization and participation in grassroots lobbying. These findings lend support to the current emphasis of union leaders to improve grassroots lobbying structures.

A group's competitive advantage on issues helped to explain the relative importance of organizational commitment in participation in grassroots lobbying versus election campaign activities. Evidence showed that committed members are most likely to participate where the organization's interests are most clearly at stake -- on issue mobilizations where the organization has a competitive
advantage in persuading them that organizational interests are being impacted in the political arena and that their efforts are necessary to protect the organization to which they are loyal. In the issue context, there is less competition for their loyalties from non-organizational cues. The difference in the role of commitment in grassroots lobbying versus elections is made more apparent by the fact that the member's political agreement with the group exerts nearly equal impacts on the probability of participation in either context.

All this is not to say that unions or other interest groups should only lobby on or attempt to mobilize on narrow issues in their “niche.” Members may mobilize more easily on issues on which the group has a competitive advantage, but this does not mean they will never mobilize. To do so, however, requires the investment in educating and persuading members as to how the issue relates to the purpose of the organization, affects their membership in the organization, and why it is important for them to respond. This just makes it more necessary to have an effective grassroots lobbying structure to educate and persuade members in the long-term and mobilize them at the appropriate time in the short-term.
**Union type** | **N** (Broad) | **N** (Narrow)
--- | --- | ---
Industrial Internationals | 8 | 0
Construction or Public Employee Internationals | 2 | 7

Note: Data from interviews. Only international officers are counted, not state central office staff, Central body officers, or local activists.

Table 5.1 Breadth of Issues on which Member Mobilizations Occur by Ohio Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committed</th>
<th>Less Committed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Core Issue</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peripheral Issue</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.2 The Hypothesized Likelihood of Participation in Grassroots Lobbying Based on the Member's Level of Commitment and the Niche Breadth of the Issue
### Table 5.3 Probit Estimates of Whether the Union Member Was Asked to Contact a Public Official by Their Union

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politically active union</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically active</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.136</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.012</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active in Union</td>
<td>.423</td>
<td>.146</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.250</td>
<td>.090</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Dependence</td>
<td>.119</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.092</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.007</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>.005</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.97</td>
<td>.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Proximity</td>
<td>.010</td>
<td>.032</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.78</td>
<td>.463</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 416  
Pseudo R$^2$ = .062  
Log likelihood = -260.92  
% predicted correctly = 64%

Note: Results are based on the Probit equation in Table 5.3. All other independent variables were held at their respective mean values.

### Table 5.4 Predicted Probabilities of Being Asked to Participate in Grassroots Lobbying Under Hypothetical Conditions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Union</th>
<th>Active Member</th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Probability of Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Grade School</td>
<td>.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Post-Graduate</td>
<td>.83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results are based on the Probit equation in Table 5.3. All other independent variables were held at their respective mean values.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.265</td>
<td>.058</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp of Lobbying</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.079</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (lin)</td>
<td>.002</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.91</td>
<td>.026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (nl)</td>
<td>.305</td>
<td>.195</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.153</td>
<td>.41</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.225</td>
<td>.098</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.028</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.064</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically active union</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.016</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically active</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.49</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.083</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.4.82</td>
<td>.579</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 487  
Pseudo $R^2$= .174  
Log Likelihood= -234.94  
% predicted correctly= 74.5%

Table 5.5: Probit Estimates of Whether the Union Member Participated in Grassroots Lobbying

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Active Union</th>
<th>Political Agreement</th>
<th>Political Interest</th>
<th>Level of Commitment</th>
<th>Probability of Contact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most Active</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>Hi</td>
<td>.64</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Results are based on the Probit equation in Table 5.5. All other independent variables were held at their respective mean values.

Table 5.6: Predicted Probabilities of Participating in Grassroots Lobbying Under Hypothetical Conditions

202
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Lobbying</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Elections</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Coefficient</td>
<td>Change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.265***</td>
<td>.307</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.076</td>
<td>.158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.076***</td>
<td>.169</td>
<td>.067***</td>
<td>.158</td>
<td>.081</td>
<td>.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.192***</td>
<td>.301</td>
<td>.053***</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Active Union</td>
<td>.024</td>
<td>.114</td>
<td>.372***</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.150</td>
<td>.150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>-.098</td>
<td>-.029</td>
<td>.372***</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.035</td>
<td>.176**</td>
<td>.176</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: ***p<.01; **p<.05

Table 5.7: Comparison of the Effect of Selected Variables on Participation in Grassroots Lobbying Versus Election Campaign Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Union Sample</th>
<th>% Contacted</th>
<th>% Participating</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFL-CIO</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEA</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCSEA</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.8: Proportion of Members Contacted for and Participating in Grassroots Lobbying Campaigns by Union Sample
CHAPTER 6

THE EFFECT OF OPPORTUNITIES AND
MOBILIZATION ON MEMBER'S PARTICIPATION

In past chapters, we have examined mobilization and participation, but have analyzed them separately. But we have reason to believe that the number of opportunities available to members and the amount of mobilization will affect the extent to which members participate. In order to understand how and why members participate in group-sponsored political action, we need to separate the effects of mobilization from other member and organizational characteristics that influence participation. In addition, if some members are more likely than others to perceive opportunities to participate and/or be asked to participate, they may be no more likely to participate politically once higher levels of opportunities and mobilization are controlled. For example, we have found highly educated members are much more likely to be mobilized. If highly educated members are more likely to participate, it may not be because of their greater resources or ability to participate, but because they are more likely to be recruited. To understand the mobilization process and why members participate, we need to understand how one stage of the process affects later stages. This is the intent of this chapter.
In a more practical sense, union leaders certainly expect that who is
asked to participate affects who actually participates. For example, during the
1996 election, the AFL-CIO sent 2,500 organizers across the country to recruit
campaign volunteers and create local activist cadres. The recent emphasis on
improving grassroots structures is based on the premise that giving staff or
volunteer coordinators the responsibility for organizing local political action
teams will increase members’ participation in union political action. A national
AFL-CIO official explains the importance of their grassroots efforts in Labor ‘96:

Our goal was to create a permanent infrastructure so we don’t
need to recreate it every election. After the election, it remains in
place to hold the elected official accountable [through grassroots
lobbying]....We built a local base of all-purpose activists. ...We
started LACs [Legislative Action Councils] in areas where they
didn’t exit. The activist base is helpful to everyone on all levels
[federal, state, and local] and will have long-term benefits.

An Ohio Building Trades Council officer describes their plans for future
campaigns: “Our changes for next year are based on our learning from the
Ohio Supreme Court Justice Andrew] Douglas race. We had a retired member
act as a permanent volunteer coordinate that was a big success. We want to
institute that in the future for other races.” Similarly, one of the reasons national
union officers see Ohio as one of the most effective states for union political
mobilization is that it has one central office staff person devoted full-time to
politics as well as four full-time Central Body officers on a regional level. From
national’s point of view, organized labor in Ohio can generate grassroots
activism because it has the mobilizers in place to recruit activists.

Analyzing the 1994 Ohio Union Survey, I find that mobilization plays a
critical role in explaining union member’s political participation. In fact, once
opportunities and mobilization are controlled, few other variables are
statistically significant in explaining electoral participation. I then examine voluntary and mobilized activities separately. Evidence shows that the organizational context and the member's relationship with the organization, including her level of commitment and political agreement, are particularly important for understanding why members respond to mobilization appeals.

The Role of Mobilization in Explaining Political Participation

Though we intuitively understand that political mobilization is an important influence on individual political participation, there has been surprisingly little empirical documentation. The focus in the political participation literature has been on describing the characteristics of individuals who participate in politics rather than on exploring the potential affects of the social context in which individuals live (Leighley 1995; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1993). Explanations of why individuals participate have centered on how an individual's skills, resources, and social status make political participation easier or more difficult. To the degree that we have ignored the impact of political context, including the mobilization efforts of political elites, we may overestimate the impact of individual attitudes and resources on political participation. Without including both mobilization and individual characteristics in our models, we cannot draw conclusions regarding the relative contributions of each in generating political participation (Leighley 1995, pp. 186-7). Although variables measuring both individuals' attitudes and union contexts were included in participation models in previous chapters, the measures of political mobilization were not.

Neither has the political participation literature accounted for the impact of the structure of opportunities on participation (cf. Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). The literature on social movements has stressed the importance
"political opportunity structures" provided by political elites that facilitate the ability of individuals to join together collectively (Tarrow 1994, McAdam 1982, Constanin 1992). Just as a willing individual cannot join an interest group unless there are groups available to join (Hansen 1985), it is more difficult to participate politically when no opportunities are easily available. Indeed, one of the basic roles of organizations in mobilizing individuals politically is to create opportunities.

With the exception of controlling for perceived number of opportunities available to the member in the "exposure rate" of the poisson regression equations, this study has not accounted for the political opportunity structure either. In explaining why members participate and how group mobilization activities affects their participation, we need to account for the structure of opportunities.

As a concrete example of how accounting for the effects of mobilization might influence our understanding of political participation, we can examine the well-documented impact of level of education on political participation. Recently, Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry (1996, pp. 73-4) have found education does not directly affect participation in "difficult" political activities. Rather, its impact is mediated by social network status, and less importantly, by organizational membership. More precisely, education increases political participation by increasing the individual's occupational status and income, which in turn increases the individual's organizational memberships and her interaction with political activists and officials. Education does not influence

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67 "Difficult" political activities are defined as: contacting government officials, taking part in campaigns for candidates or parties, serving on a local community board or council or attending these meetings, and engaging in informal political action in their community (Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996, pp. 26-7). The first two measures closely parallel the participation variables used in this study.
participation by increasing the individual's verbal skills once the social network
variables are controlled. Nie and associates explain that the impact of an
individual's higher status in social networks on political participation is the result
of the increased likelihood that a high status individual will receive information
on policy and will have greater ability to have her message heard and
responded to by public officials. Yet they do not take into account the fact that
highly educated/high status individuals may be more likely to participate
because they are more likely to be asked by others--either because of their
accessibility to political activists or because their greater civic skills make them
likely to be able to participate effectively. Given our findings that education is
critical to union electoral and lobbying mobilization and participation in
grassroots lobbying, controlling the effects of elite mobilization may help explain
why education and social network centrality influence political participation.

**Organizations and Participation**

Individuals who are members of organizations are more likely to be
active in politics (Verba and Nie 1972, Pollock 1982, Baumgartner and Walker
1988). Several explanations for this consistent finding have been offered. First,
individuals who join organizations may be community-minded, natural activists
who would be politically active regardless of their organizational affiliations.
They may join organizations as a manifestation of their activism and/or to take
advantage of the opportunities for political action provided by the organization.
Second, members of organizations may be more likely to participate in politics
because of "unintentional" mobilization. That is, the member is not directly
asked to undertake political acts, but based on discussions about politics with
other group members (Verba and Nie 1972; Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990) or
by learning and practicing "civic skills" within the organization (Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1995), the individual is drawn into political activities. Finally, individuals who belong to organizations may be more likely to participate in politics because they are intentionally mobilized -- someone in the organization asks them to become politically involved.

**Causality.** This chapter confronts each of these explanations. To this point, the studies of organizational membership and political participation have been unable to address questions of causality: do organizations cause members to participate in politics or do members join organizations in order to participate? This question is particularly relevant given Leighley’s finding (1996) that individuals’ probability of participation is affected by the reasons they joined the group: those who join for the political benefits offered by the group are more likely to join in political action.

I attempt to address the issue of causality in several different ways. First, the subject of study, labor unions, eases worries about political activists joining the organization to engage in politics to some extent. The primary function of unions is to act as an intermediary in employer-employee relations. Members are likely to join the union for occupational benefits or because closed-shop agreements compel them to join, not because of possible opportunities to participate in politics. Still, the desire to participate in union political activities has been found to be a reason why individuals join unions (Fiorito 1987). Thus, I control whether the member joined voluntarily, and therefore potentially for political reasons, in the models.

The second means of addressing the causality issue is to limit the study of political participation to those activities sponsored by the union. Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 371) argue:
When it is the institution that takes the initiative—that is, when the company suggests that it might be wise to write one's Senator about a pending piece of legislation or when the minister comments on some political issue in the course of the Sunday sermon—there is more reason to assume that institutional action is generating political participation than vice versa.

I analyze political activities sponsored by unions and member responses to these opportunities, not member political participation on their own, which strengthens the claim that union activity is the "cause" of member participation.

The survey design focused on the process of organizational mobilization of member participation to help address the causality issue. The Ohio Union Survey asked members whether their union sponsored a given political activity (e.g., phone banks) as a screening question. If the member responded that their union did not offer the activity, clearly any involvement of the individual in that activity was not driven by their union, thus they were not subsequently asked whether they participated in the activity.

Intentional vs. Unintentional mobilization. To some extent, studying only labor unions and the research design aimed at addressing causality issue limits our ability to confront the question of whether the organization generates political participation through direct requests for action or through members becoming self-motivated through political discussions at work or the skills they learn on the job. Labor unions have long been highly active in attempting to educate and mobilize their members in the political arena by direct officer/staff to rank-and-file member contacts. Unions are not bridge clubs (Erickson and Nosanchuk 1990) where overt political advocacy and mobilization would be unexpected and probably uniformly perceived as inappropriate by members. Because of unions' efforts at intentional mobilization, there may be little evidence of "unintentional" mobilization.
Likewise, the survey does not inquire about any political acts undertaken by the member outside of the union context. To the extent that the skills learned in workplace and political discussions in the union hall encourage the individual to engage in political activities not sponsored by her union, we are underestimating "unintentional" mobilization.

Still, as explained in Chapters 2 and 3, the autonomy of local unions in political mobilization does create variation in the extent to which union members are likely to receive direct requests to participate in politics. Thus, we can control for the extent to which union context accounts for opportunities, mobilization, and participation separately. If local union context still increases the probability of participation even after controlling for opportunities and mobilization, "unintentional" mobilization may be occurring. Similarly, to the degree that members' levels of political interest, efficacy, and/or education ("civic skills") remain significant in explaining participation after direct mobilization is controlled, unintentional mobilization may be occurring.68

The survey design allows for some tests of the existence of unintentional mobilization. Though members were only asked the mobilization and participation questions if their union had sponsored an activity, members were asked the participation question regardless of whether or not someone in their union urged them to participate. Thus, members could participate without being intentionally mobilized. In fact, 39 members committed 44 political acts (25% of the total) that were not solicited by their union. We can analyze the extent to which members who volunteer are different from those who respond to mobilization requests.

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68 I will not be able to argue that the union is "causing" unintentional mobilization. That is, membership in the union may not be increasing the individual's interest in politics, efficacy or civic skills and thus increasing their political participation. Members may have had these attributes before joining the union.
**Intentional Mobilization.** Despite the literature's emphasis on individual attitudes and resources in explaining political participation, research has found that the mobilization activities of political leaders significantly increase individuals' participation in political activities (Leighley 1996; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Knoke 1982, 1988, 1990; Klandermans and Oegema 1987; Zipp and Smith 1979; Rogers, Bultema and Barb 1975). In interest groups, Knoke (1982, 1988, 1990) finds that group "mobilization efforts" increase members' participation in group "external" activities. Using Knoke's data, Leighley (1996) finds evidence for both "intentional" and "unintentional" mobilization effects in interest groups.

In terms of activism within the group, Rothenberg (1992, 141) found that 77% of Common Cause activists had been asked to participate by fellow members or by Common Cause itself, while 23% of activists volunteered by contacting Common Cause on their own. Unfortunately, the question on which these findings are based was asked of activists only, not the full sample. Thus, Rothenberg is unable to measure the impact of mobilization on member

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69 Measured as the frequency (never, rarely, sometimes, regularly) with which officials claimed the group "call[s] upon ordinary members to make any of the following types of contributions": (1) to contact government officials on behalf of the [org. name]; (2) to write letters to newspapers or magazines; (3) to participate in demonstrations or picketing; (4) to work in political candidates' campaigns." (Knoke 1990, p. 198)

70 She measures intentional mobilization by the average frequency with which the group asks its members to engage in each type of participation (see previous footnote) on behalf of the group. "Unintentional mobilization is an interaction term consisting of the extent to which the group engages in practices associated with participatory democracy (e.g., high levels of interaction or policy debate) multiplied by the individual's level of activity within the group." (p. 452)

71 Interestingly, if one recalculates the number of Common Cause volunteers to include members who both contacted the organization themselves and were contacted by the organization (in addition to those who only contacted the organization themselves), the proportion of activists who are volunteers in Common Cause is almost identical to the proportion of activists who are volunteers in the 1994 Ohio Union Survey: 28% and 27% respectively.
activism. His conclusion that members who have "learned" the costs and benefits of activism (i.e., the natural logarithm of organizational tenure) are more likely to become activists may not hold true if organizational mobilization were controlled. Veteran members may be more likely to be activists because they are more likely to be recruited by others in the group.

The question remains why some of those who are asked to participate do so while others decline the request. Earlier, I hypothesized, and was largely supported by the evidence, that participation in union political activities is based on member’s level of commitment to the union, their political agreement with the union, their attitudes towards and resources for political participation, and their local union context. These hypotheses also should help explain why some members respond to mobilization invitations. Yet, to the degree that our findings have already demonstrated that many of these same characteristics explain the perception of opportunities and reception of mobilization requests, they may no longer explain participation once mobilization is controlled. For example, the member’s level of education and local union context are important in explaining the reception of mobilization appeals. But these members may not be more likely than others to respond to those appeals. Highly educated members and members of politically active unions be more likely to participate because they are more likely to be asked and not because their greater civic skills make it easier for them to participate or the esprit de corp and traditions of their union makes them more responsive to recruitment attempts.

**Data Analysis Strategy**

The data analysis is presented in several stages. First, I analyze the affect of opportunities and union mobilization on member participation. At the same time, we determine whether the same variables continue to influence
participation once the level of mobilization is controlled. Second, to explore who responds to union mobilization requests versus who volunteers for union political action, I analyze cases of voluntarism and mobilized activity separately.

The Effect of Mobilization. To analyze the impact of mobilization and opportunities on participation, the dependent and independent variables will be the same as used in earlier chapters. Opportunities is the number of electoral activities the member perceived her union to have sponsored. Mobilization is whether or not, and the number of times, the member was asked to participate politically by her union. The participation, activism, and grassroots lobbying dependent variables also are measured as they were in previous analyses. Participation is whether or not the member joined in any union electoral activities; activism is a count of the number of political activities in which the member joined; grassroots lobbying is whether or not the member contacted a public official on behalf of her union.

Voluntarism vs. Response to Mobilization. To analyze voluntary and mobilized activities separately, the dependent variables are modified. The first dependent variable will be whether or not the respondent volunteered to participate in any union political event. Thereafter, the electoral participation and activism dependent variables are the same as in previous chapters with the important exception that voluntary acts are eliminated -- only mobilized acts are included. This is done so that we can test who is responding to mobilization appeals and why. This analysis would be biased if members who were not mobilized but participated were included in the estimation.

The first dependent variable to be analyzed will be whether or not the member volunteered to participate in a union electoral event (volunteered=1;
did not volunteer=0). Members were counted as volunteering if they affirmed that their union had sponsored a given electoral activity and that they had participated in this activity, yet claimed that they had not been asked to participate in the activity by someone in their union. Members were counted as volunteers if they participated in at least one event despite a lack of an invitation—even if they participated in response to mobilization requests for other events. Thirty-nine members volunteered for at least one union political activity.

To analyze who responds to mobilization requests, members who voluntarily engaged in electoral activities were removed from the dependent variable. Table 6.1 shows the number and proportion of responses to requests for electoral participation. The table demonstrates that the more a member was asked to participate, the more she participated. The question remains, why some members accede to a higher number of requests than others.

Alternatives for Analyzing Opportunities. Several methods were attempted in order to assess the affect of the number of opportunities available to a member on her political participation. The problem in accurately estimating the effect of opportunities is that we do not have a measure of the actual political activities undertaken by the many local unions in Ohio. We only have measured the member's perception of opportunities made available by their union. And, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, several variables that are important

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72 This applies to electoral events only; the opportunity and mobilization questions were not distinct in measuring grassroots lobbying recruitment. For grassroots lobbying, we can only analyzed whether or not members responded to requests for participation. This is consistent with the perspective presented here and elsewhere (e.g., Loomis 1983), that grassroots lobbying is a top-down process, with organizational lobbyists generating communications from the group's members to public officials.

73 As before, the events are: phone banks, campaign literature distribution, yard sign placement, voter registration, candidate meeting attendance, donating PAC money, and party headquarters work.
in explaining the number of union political events noticed by a member, such as the member's level of participation in internal union activities and level of interest in politics, are unlikely to be related to the actual opportunities available. In one sense, all union members have some opportunity to participate even if their local is not active. The internationals themselves and regional councils (e.g., OEA districts, Ohio AFSCME's Area People Committees, AFL-CIO Central Bodies) sponsor political activities. Nevertheless, the opportunities realistically available to most members are those undertaken by their locals.

The probit results presented in this chapter will account for the impact of opportunities by eliminating those members who perceived none from the equations. That is, the models will estimate the impact of the independent variable on participation, given that the member perceived an opportunity to participate. In each case, I will note any difference between the presented results and those estimated with all cases included (the results tend to be the same substantively).

I tried other methods of accounting for the impact of opportunities and mobilization on participation with little success. For example, I estimated each equation as a two-stage model. I estimated the number of opportunities (or the number of mobilization requests) available to the member in the first stage, created an instrumental variable from this estimation, and included the instrumental variable in the second stage of the equation that estimates participation. The problem with this method is that I had few variables in the first stage of the model that were different from or uncorrelated with variables in the second stage of the model. In the second stage results, variables that had also been included in the first stage were not statistically significant or were
significant but incorrectly signed due to collinearity with the instrumental variable. When I removed the variables used to estimate the first stage from the second stage, the instrumental variable for opportunities (or mobilization) would be statistically significant and would create a high change in the probability that the member would participate, but no other variables in the model changed their results. These results will not be presented in this chapter.

Thus, results presented below will be based on actual survey responses of the number of opportunities the member perceived and the number of mobilization requests she received.

The Effect of Mobilization and Opportunities on Participation

Although the political participation literature as a whole has focused on the impact of individual attributes on political participation, studies that have incorporated mobilization activities have found that receiving requests to engage in political action substantially increases the probability that the individual will do so. Here I reestimate the electoral participation and activism models first presented in Chapter 4 to include the effects of mobilization and opportunities on the likelihood of participation. All other independent variables in the model are the same as originally presented.

Electoral Participation

First I estimated the electoral participation model -- whether or not the member engaged in any union political activity. Probit was the estimation technique used for this dichotomous dependent variable. To account for the fact that members who did not have the opportunity provided by their union could not participate in union political activities, members who perceived their union sponsored zero electoral activities were excluded from the model. Thus, the model will estimate the effect of each independent variable on the
probability of union political participation, given the opportunity. The model also accounts for the potential effects of mobilization through use of a dichotomous variable: whether or not the member was asked by their union to participate in any union electoral activity.

Table 6.2 displays the results. Whether or not the member receives a mobilization request clearly plays an important role in whether or not the member participates. Mobilization is statistically significant and has a very large change score: receiving an invitation to participate in a union political activity increases the probability that a member will participate by over 40%. A high level of perceived political agreement with union leaders and membership in very politically active unions also significantly increase the likelihood that a member will participate, even after controlling for opportunities and mobilization. Whether the member has joined the union voluntarily, which as been used to control for whether the member joined the union in order to engage in political action, is statistically significant at a marginal level. These results confirm those of Chapter 4.

However, controlling for mobilization affects other variables in the model. The member's level of political interest, residence in a region of union political activism, and residence in targeted legislative districts no longer affect participation at statistically significant levels. Evidently, these members are more likely to participate because they are more likely to be mobilized. Similarly, a member's level of education has been found to be strongly related to mobilization (Chapter 3), but not electoral participation (Chapter 4) in union activities. Here we see that once mobilization is controlled, the negative sign indicates that higher levels of education may decrease the likelihood of

74 Including those without opportunities (N=65) does not change the results. The amount of explained variance, though, is slightly higher with them included: Pseudo $R^2 .350 > .308$. 218
participation in union political action, though the result is not statistically significant. Especially in view of consistent findings of the political participation literature that highly educated citizens are more likely to participate in politics, the failure of educated members to respond to the high level of appeals aimed at them by their unions is quite remarkable.

Electoral Activism

As in Chapter 4, a member's political activism is measured by the count of the number of union political activities in which she engaged. Thus, the estimation technique is also the same: poisson regression. The exposure rate in the poisson equation already controls for the number of opportunities for political participation available to the member. Mobilization is measured as a count of the number of political events for which the member received an invitation to participate from her union; it is not a dichotomous variable as in the participation equation.

The greater the number of requests received by the member, the more events in which she is likely to participate. In fact, with the number of mobilization requests controlled, only one other independent variable retains its statistical significance: whether the member lives in a region of union political activism. That fact that this regional variable remains significant offers some evidence that unintentional mobilization is occurring. That is, intentional mobilization through direct requests alone is not causing members in traditionally active regions be more politically active than others.

The change scores confirm the crucial importance of mobilization: only the number of requests has a very large impact on number of activities in which

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75 The Chi-square value of the poisson equation does not allow for rejection of null hypothesis that a poisson model is inappropriate. However, results from negative binomial model indicate that a poisson distribution is present. Substantively, the results are the same.
members engage. The impact of controlling for mobilization can be seen quite dramatically by comparing the results of Table 6.3 to the results of the activism model that does not control for mobilization in Table 4.9. Commitment, political agreement, “learning” (log of tenure), and the political activity level of the member’s international all are no longer statistically significant. Joining the union voluntarily becomes marginally significant.

These findings offer strong evidence that the short answer to the question, “Why do members participate in group political activities?”, is, “Because they were asked.” The models clearly demonstrate that little else influences a member’s level of political participation once we account for levels of mobilization. There are several possible interpretations of why this occurs.

Substantive interpretation. Given that mobilization requires expending limited time and effort, mobilizers are going to attempt to recruit individuals who are most likely to participate when asked. So individuals with characteristics that lead to political participation are also those with the characteristics that lead to receiving invitations to participate. In practice, union officers are likely to ask those who have participated in political activities in the past or who have indicated a willingness to engage in politics on volunteer cards unions ask members to fill out. A 1982 survey of local union officers in Ohio found that 59% of locals only ask those members who “generally do political work” to participate in election campaign activities (Clark 1982). Thus, past participation leads to current invitations to participate.

In addition, once mobilizers ask those who are likely to respond positively, other factors that I have not measure are likely to help determine whether the member will respond. For example, the member may be generally willing to participate in union political action, but has competing demands on
her time when events occur. Or the member may not be interested in the candidates their union is helping that year. In the words of one union political operative discussing problems recruiting political activists during the 1996 election:

Part of the problem was that the Clinton race overshadowed all the others and he had a large lead. There was a lack of excitement about local races. It also hurt that the Democrats recruited some poor quality candidates. The candidate would come into a meeting and our members who say, “Where’d they get this guy?” You need attractive candidates to get members to want to work for them.

If the activists who attend union meetings cannot be persuaded to work for a candidate on behalf of the union, it is unlikely that many of the non-activists in the rank-and-file will respond either.

Methodological interpretation. Particularly in the poisson equation, relatively few members are asked to participate, or actually participate, in a high number of events. Thus, there is considerable error in the estimation, leading to many insignificant variables. Still, Table 6.1 clearly shows that the more often members are asked to participate, the more often they participate. Since mobilization requests would explain a substantial amount of the variation in activism, little systematic variation is left for other independent variables to explain. We are left with the random reasons that prevent people from becoming involved.

These results clearly demonstrate the importance of mobilization in explaining political participation in union electoral activities. The more often members are asked, the more likely they are to participate, regardless of their

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76 However, Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995) have found that an individual’s amount of free time available for volunteer activities is unrelated to political participation. Those who want to participate make time.
other attitudes toward politics or their union. What is left unanswered is why some members respond positively to mobilization appeals while others are capable of saying "No." We will take up this question next.

**Voluntarism Versus Mobilization**

Although direct mobilization is one route to participation and is clearly important in the union context, not all participation is the result of direct mobilization. People voluntarily engage in political action and are "indirectly mobilized" in organizations by conversations about politics (Verba and Nie 1972) or by civic skills learned within the organization (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995). To understand the potentially different dynamics of voluntarism versus mobilized activity, this section distinguishes between members who volunteer and those who are mobilized and analyzes them separately.

Given that past research on political participation rarely has made distinctions between voluntary and mobilized participation, the literature provides no straightforward hypotheses on how and why volunteers should differ from those who respond to requests from others. Past studies that have consistently documented the importance of personal resources (e.g., education) and attitudes towards politics (e.g., political interest and efficacy) have been conducted outside of organizational contexts. Therefore, I expect education, political interest, and political efficacy to be related to voluntary participation and less related to responsiveness to organizational mobilization efforts. Individuals with these characteristics are likely to seek out opportunities to participate in politics rather than relying on the organization to seek them out and badger them to get involved. And, to the extent that a member joins the union in order to take advantage of opportunities to be involved politically, voluntary membership should be related to voluntary political participation.

222
On the other hand, I expect those independent variables based on a member's relationship with the union to be more strongly related to responsiveness to mobilization than to voluntarism. This is because members must take into account the value of the organization that is making the appeal as much as their taste for the political tasks they are being asked to perform. If they value the organization, they are likely to respond positively; if they do not, they are unlikely to respond positively. Whereas, in voluntary action, the member's relationship with the organization would be less salient -- the member is deciding whether or not to participate without pressure from the organization. Members who are committed to the union, who agree with it politically, who believe that union political activities are appropriate, and who have "learned" the costs and benefits of activism through long tenures in the union should be more likely to respond positively to mobilization appeals. Likewise, local union political context should be more related to mobilization responsiveness than to voluntarism (unless "unintentional" mobilization is occurring). Members of traditionally politically active internationals, members who live in regions of union political activism, and members who live in targeted legislative districts should be more likely to respond to mobilization appeals.

**Voluntarism**

The dependent variable here dichotomizes between those members who voluntarily participated in any union political event versus those who did not volunteer. Volunteers were members who responded 'yes' to inquiries about their participation in union political events, but responded 'no' to questions regarding whether anyone in their union asked them to participate. Members who participated but were mobilized are classified as "not volunteers"
just as those members who did not participate at all. Given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, probit is used as the estimation procedure.

As displayed in Table 6.4, two variables significantly increase the likelihood that a member will volunteer for union political action: membership in a traditionally active international, and as predicted, voluntary membership in the union. That members of traditionally active unions are more likely to volunteer and are more likely to be mobilized (Chapter 3) helps confirm why these internationals have earned their reputation. Not only is the international aggressive in attempting to generate political action, but its members show up regardless of whether they were asked. This may also be evidence that unintentional mobilization is occurring in these unions -- because politics is often discussed, members are more likely to be stimulated to become involved on their own (Verba and Nie 1972). That voluntary membership is significant perhaps confirms the importance of controlling for this measure as a proxy for the possibility that the member joined for the union’s political benefits — the opportunity to participate in politics. That is, we are controlling for individual’s propensity to participate in politics regardless of organizational mobilization.

Interestingly, a member’s level of education is negatively related to voluntarism at a statistically significant level. Given the consistent findings of the political participation literature regarding the importance of education in explaining political participation, the finding that higher levels of education is actually likely to make a union member less likely to volunteer is quite remarkable. This may suggest the importance of accounting for mobilization in explaining why the highly educated are more likely to participate in politics. That is, the highly educated may be more likely to be politically involved because they are more likely to be recruited by others and not because they are
more willing to seek out opportunities to become politically active on their own. Alternatively, the highly educated may behave differently in the union context than elsewhere. Given that the traditionally image of unions as working class organizations, the highly educated may be less likely to seek out opportunities to participate in this environment than in other environments that appeal to and recruit other individuals more similar to themselves.

Still, the change scores indicate that no variable creates a substantial impact on the probability that a member will volunteer, confirming, along with the few number of significant variables and the low Pseudo $R^2$, that the act of volunteering is somewhat of an unpredictable event. Indeed, many of the variables that have been statistically significant in other models are not significant in explaining voluntarism.

**Responding to Mobilization Appeals**

Now that we know who participates and who volunteers, the question turns to explaining who responds to mobilization appeals. Which members respond when asked? To test this, a dependent variable was created that eliminates activities undertaken voluntarily — only the number of mobilized acts were counted. A poisson regression model will be used as the estimation procedure since the dependent variable is a count of the number of mobilized activities. As always, the poisson model uses the number of perceived opportunities available for participation to control for the exposure rate.

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77 The 93.7% predicted correctly is misleading. The only cases predicted correctly are those who do not volunteer. The model predicts no one will volunteer. This supports the argument that voluntarism, at least in the union context, is a rather unpredictable occurrence.
As Table 6.5 shows, the independent variables in the model do quite well in explaining the number of times a member responds to mobilization appeals. Most of the variables are statistically significant. Consistent with the theory presented in this dissertation, the greater the level of a member's commitment to the union and the greater her level of political agreement with the union, the more often she will participate when asked. Support is also found for Rothenberg's theory of organizational learning: the longer an individual has been a member of the organization, and presumably the more she knows about the costs and benefits of activism, the more likely she is to respond to recruitment efforts. As indicated by the logarithmic term, this is subject to diminishing returns, the increase in the probability that the member will respond slows over time. Finally, members who have joined voluntarily, who are members of traditionally active unions, and who live in regions of union political activism, are significantly more likely to respond when asked. The change scores of produced by most independent variables are relatively small and equal in magnitude, indicating that no one variable is especially crucial for explaining why members respond to mobilization appeals.

The political attitudes and resources variables (level of education, political interest and political efficacy) present some intriguing findings in comparison to the voluntarism model and the traditional findings of the political participation literature. Unlike the voluntarism model, education is positively and significantly related to mobilization responses. At least in the union context, highly educated members are willing to participate when asked, but are unlikely

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78 When the number of mobilization requests is controlled, only level of mobilization and residence in a region of traditional union political action are significant. These results are like those in Table 6.3 above which also controls for the number of appeals.
to volunteer. This puts special emphasis on union officials seeking out educated members to request their involvement.

Like education, political interest and efficacy traditionally are crucial to explaining political participation, but, in this model of response to mobilization appeals they are two of the few variables that are not statistically significant. However, they were positively signed and close to marginal significance in the voluntarism model (interest $p = .13$; efficacy $p = .17$). This offers some support for the hypothesis above that high levels of efficacy and interest would be more related voluntarism than to waiting to respond to mobilization requests, since these individuals would seek out political events on their own rather than waiting for someone else to invite them. Together, these findings show that union members with low political interest and efficacy are just as likely to participate when asked as those with high interest and efficacy, ceteris paribus, yet are less likely to seek out political tasks on their own.

A final notable comparison between the voluntarism and response to mobilization models is the sign of the appropriateness variable. Although appropriateness is not statistically significant in either model, it is positively related to responses to mobilization appeals (and close to significance, $p = .11$), but is negatively related to voluntarism. This suggests that members who believe union political involvement is improper participate "on their own" as volunteers rather than responding to mobilization efforts they frown upon. Whereas, members who believe union political action is appropriate are more willing to respond to invitations from the organization.

Modeling member responses to union mobilization appeals provides support for the explanations of organizational political participation advanced in this dissertation. Members who are committed to the union, who agree with the
union politically, and who are a politicized union context are likely to respond to union mobilization appeals. Comparisons of the voluntarism and mobilization response analyses suggest important differences between mobilized and voluntary behavior in union political action. Results suggest that members with high levels of political interest and efficacy are more likely to volunteer on their own, while members with high levels of education and belief in the appropriateness of union political activities are more likely to respond to mobilization appeals rather than volunteering.

**Responding to Grassroots Lobbying Appeals**

Finally, we can examine who responds to mobilization appeals by reestimating the model for participation in union grassroots lobbying. Unlike the electoral activities questions, members were not asked separate questions about perceived opportunities and mobilization. This is consistent with the description of grassroots lobbying mobilization as a top-down process (Chapter 2, Loomis 1983), with organizational lobbyists generating communications from the group's members to public officials. In Chapter 5, we examined which members were likely to participate in union grassroots lobbying. Here we examine which members respond when asked; those who were not asked cannot respond. As in Chapter 5, the model estimating which members participate is estimated using probit given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable.78

The results, shown in Table 6.6, confirm the major explanations of why members participate in grassroots lobbying presented in Chapter 5. The member's level of commitment to the union and her level of education are still statistically significant and changes from their minimum to their maximum

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78 Using a two-stage model, the only differences are that the logarithmic term for tenure and the member's level of interest in politics are statistically significant.
values produce a 40% increase in the probability that the member will engage in grassroots lobbying. Committed members respond when the organization about which they care needs their help persuading public officials. Highly educated members have the communications skills, and perhaps the social contacts with political elites, to respond confidently to requests to contact public officials. The member's level of political agreement with union leaders also remains an important explanation of why members lobby. But once opportunities are controlled, the member's level of interest in politics no longer significantly affects their probability of participation. A member's level of political interest affects whether or not she will perceive the opportunity to participate, not whether she will respond to that opportunity when available.

Residence in a region of traditional union political activism becomes negatively related to lobbying participation at a marginally significant level. Either lobbyist mobilization activities or member reactions may explain this. Both explanations are based on the fact that areas in which unions are traditionally active tend to be represented by Democrats who are likely to support the union position. In the 103rd Congress (1993-4), about which grassroots lobbying questions were asked in the 1994 survey, 80% of the congressional districts (8/10) in the geographically active regions of the Ohio AFL-CIO were represented by Democrats, though Democrats held only 56% of the congressional seats in Ohio. In the active regions of the OEA, Democrats held 71% of the seats (10/14). In the Ohio Senate, despite a 19 to 14

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* Education is significant due to more than just OEA activity. In fact, education is not significant in model run for any union sample individually. If an term interacting OEA membership and education is included in the full sample model, along with their linear terms, none of the three variables is significant.

* Regions of union political active are measured based on elite interviews, the details of which are described in Chapter 3.
Republican majority, Democrats represented 59% (10/17) of the active AFL-CIO regions and 58% (14/24) of the active OEA regions. In the 1992-4 session of the Ohio Legislature, Democrats held a slight majority (54%) in the Ohio House (53 to 46), yet Democrats represented 63% of House districts (31/49) in active AFL-CIO regions and 66% of the districts (44/67) in active OEA regions. Clearly, Democrats "over-represented" legislative districts in areas where Ohio unions are traditionally active.

From the elite perspective, unions would not necessarily engage in grassroots lobbying mobilizations in districts where they had friends in the legislature (see Chapter 2 for details). Some union lobbyists said they rely on inside lobbying with traditional union supporters rather than mobilizing grassroots contacts. Similarly, a lobbyist for a building trades union noted that they did not mobilize their members to contact friends during the 1995 mobilization on prevailing wage: "We did not contact any Democrats until some complained that they weren't hearing anything on the issue. So we sent them thank-you notes for supporting the union position on prevailing wage." So lobbyists do not necessarily ask members to contact legislators in regions where unions are traditionally most active in elections.

From the member's perspective, responding to mobilization appeals is unnecessary if they assume their legislator will vote the union position anyway. Why spend the effort to mobilize and contact a public official when it will not make a difference? A union lobbyist explains: "The most important variable [in persuading members to respond] is convincing members that . . . this legislator is important to lobby. The big problem is members taking pro-[union] legislators for granted and not communicating with them." So even if the union is attempting to get members involved in grassroots lobbying in regions where
unions are typically active in elections, members may not think it is necessary to mobilize given the past support of their legislator. Since regions where unions are active electorally in Ohio tend to be represented by pro-labor Democrats, members may see no need to mobilize to have their preferences supported by their legislators.

Regardless, these results demonstrate the importance of member’s organizational commitment and level of education in respond to appeals to “write your legislator.” This confirms the hypotheses presented in Chapter 5 on why the dynamics of grassroots lobbying mobilization and participation differ from electoral mobilization and participation. In elections, a group member has multiple cues on how to act from parties, ideology, candidates, and other social groups, not just her union. Whereas, in the grassroots lobbying context, only the union is making a mobilization appeal to the member’s loyalty; other social identifications are less salient.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Mobilization matters. It provides a critical intermediary link that draws individuals into politics. Members who received a mobilization request, or multiple requests, were much more likely to be politically active in their union. Indeed, the change scores for the mobilization variables in both the electoral participation and activism models were several times the magnitude of other independent variables. In addition, some explanations of why members participate in union political action discussed in Chapter 4 need to be reassessed once mobilization is controlled. Members who are interested in politics, from regions of traditional union activism, and from targeted legislative districts are no more likely than others to participate once mobilization is accounted for. And in the activism model, few variables besides mobilization
help explain the number of political activities in which a member engages. To know a member has participated often is to know she has been asked often.

To the extent that previous studies of political participation have not accounted for political mobilization, and who is likely to be mobilized, we give more credit to individual attitudes and resources than is warranted; and we give less credit to social incentives that lead people to comply when asked. Individual characteristics currently associated with political participation may be so only because these people are more likely to be asked -- not necessarily because they are more likely to volunteer or to respond when asked.

The critical importance of mobilization demonstrated in this chapter also puts more emphasis on elite behavior; it puts politics back into the process. This is because, if individuals who are asked are much more likely than others to participate, to understand who participates and why requires explaining who mobilizers ask to participate and why. Moreover, the importance of elites creating a context conducive to political activism is particularly evident in the fact that traditionally politically active internationals and traditionally active regions are both more likely to engage in intentional mobilization (Chapter 3) and to have members participate even after intentional mobilization is controlled (as demonstrated in this chapter), perhaps because of unintentional mobilization that results from a highly political environment.

The evidence presented in this chapter also provides some important distinctions between the dynamics of voluntarism and mobilized participation. These differences are critical for understanding how organizations play a role in affecting individual political action. That members who joined the union voluntarily are more likely to volunteer indicates the importance of accounting for the fact that individuals may join politically active organizations in order to
have the opportunity to participate in politics (see also Leighley 1996). In this case, political participation is not "caused" by the organization, but by the individual's desire to be politically active — which leads her both to join the organization and to participate in politics. Evidence that members with high levels of political interest and efficacy are more likely to volunteer than to respond to mobilization appeals (though not statistically significant), suggests that politicized individuals need less encouragement from others to become politically active. At the same time, however, these same results suggest that organizational mobilization plays an important role in drawing less politically interested and efficacious individuals into the political process; they would not get involved politically on their own, but will if someone asks them.

The importance of the organization in generating political action can be seen especially clearly in the model of responses to mobilization appeals. While political interest and efficacy were not statistically significant, almost all the variables measuring the member's attitudes toward the union and the local union context were in explaining which members respond to mobilization requests. Members committed to the union, who agree with the union politically, and who have "learned" the costs and benefits of union activism were more likely to respond when asked. So were members from traditionally active internationals and members from regions of union political activism. This demonstrates the importance of the context of the request. Members do not respond merely because they are asked; they respond because they have an incentive not to free ride — because they are committed and care about the maintenance of the organization, because they agree with the political goals of the organization, and because the local conditions provides a social context conducive to collective political action.
The importance of organizational mobilization can also be seen in the role of education in union political mobilization and participation. The finding that highly educated individuals are significantly more likely to be asked to participate (Chapter 3 and 5) and to respond to mobilization requests, but are significantly less likely to volunteer (as demonstrated here), if generalizable beyond the union context, provides an important correction to our understanding of the nature of the class bias traditionally found in political participation. Recent explanations of the class bias in participation have focused on the fact that wealthy, highly educated individuals have more personal resources and "civic skills" that make it easier for them than those without these skills and resources to overcome barriers to political participation (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995) or because they are more likely to know public officials and therefore feel that their involvement will be effective (Nie, Junn, Stehlik-Barry 1996). However, the evidence here suggests that highly educated individuals are more likely to become active because someone is more likely to seek them out and ask them to become involved, and once asked, they are likely to respond. This is not to dismiss the importance of skills and resources. Indeed, it is likely that highly educated members are more likely to participate in grassroots lobbying than in electoral activities (Chapter 5 and 6), because confidence in one's communication skills would be especially important in one's willingness to contact public officials.

This chapter provides for a more subtle understanding of the process of political mobilization and participation. We have demonstrated that mobilization is clearly important for understanding who participates and why. This analysis has shown how our understanding of political participation can be changed once taking elite efforts into account. It has also confirmed other findings of
earlier chapters. But it is important to emphasize the subtleties of the mobilization process. Members do not just participate because they are asked. The member’s relationship with the organization and organizational context in which the request is made are crucial to understanding whether the member will comply with the request. Moreover, organizational requests may be able to increase the probability that individuals who otherwise would not participate in politics will join in. To the extent that the dynamics of mobilization have not be appreciated previously, we are better able to understand why individuals participate collectively in political action and why organizations are important in helping to overcome the incentives to free ride.
### Table 6.1: The Number of Union Electoral Events In Which Ohio Labor Union Members Participated By the Number of Mobilization Requests Received

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobilization Requests</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Who Respond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>329</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>19</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>7</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Participation</strong></td>
<td>465</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>N=612</td>
<td></td>
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### Probabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.041</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>.066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.02</td>
<td>.154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.074</td>
<td>.096</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
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<td>.166</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.079</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
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<td>215</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.052</td>
<td>.047</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.106</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>.104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.023</td>
<td>.068</td>
<td>.74</td>
<td>-.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.039</td>
<td>.019</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.229</td>
<td>.157</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.140</td>
<td>.091</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted by Union</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>.172</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-3.91</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 437  
Pseudo R² = .308  
Log Likelihood = -188.65  
Predicted correctly: 73.5%

Note: 1) Significance tests are two-tailed.
2) Change scores are based on a change from the minimum to the maximum value of the given independent variable with all other independent variables held constant at their mean values.

Table 6.2: Probit Estimates of Union Member Participation in Union Electoral Activities Controlling for Mobilization, Members Who Perceived Opportunities Only
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
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<td>.058</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
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<td>.028</td>
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<td>.019</td>
</tr>
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<td>Appropriateness</td>
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<td>.095</td>
<td>.76</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
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<td>.145</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.031</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
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<td>Tenure (log)</td>
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<td>.194</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.112</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.038</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.072</td>
<td>.089</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.040</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>-.029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.302</td>
<td>.139</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.067</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.026</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
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<td>.035</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.868</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>.572</td>
<td>.00</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases= 437  
Log Likelihood= -328.18  
Pseudo $R^2$ = .20  

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 6.3: Poisson Regression Estimates of Union Member Activism In Union Electoral Activities, Controlling for Mobilization
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Commitment</td>
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<td>.21</td>
<td>.016</td>
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<td>Political Agreement</td>
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<td>.014</td>
</tr>
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<td>Appropriateness</td>
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<td>-.009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.434</td>
<td>.219</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>.013</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
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<td>.93</td>
<td>-.003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.17</td>
<td>.034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.224</td>
<td>.148</td>
<td>.13</td>
<td>.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-.170</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.023</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.296</td>
<td>.201</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.180</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.05</td>
<td>.845</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases: 502  
Log Likelihood= -104.25  
Pseudo $R^2 = .104$  
Predicted correctly: 93.7%

Note: 1) Significance tests are two-tailed.  
2) Change scores are based on a change from the minimum to the maximum value of the given independent variable with all other independent variables held constant at their mean values.

Table 6.4: Probit Estimates of Electoral Voluntarism
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.113</td>
<td>.060</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.030</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>.164</td>
<td>.102</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary membership</td>
<td>.479</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (linear)</td>
<td>-.034</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>-.115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (log)</td>
<td>.613</td>
<td>.232</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.044</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.037</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>-.015</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.88</td>
<td>-.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.115</td>
<td>.062</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>.057</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Union</td>
<td>.053</td>
<td>.018</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically Active</td>
<td>.292</td>
<td>.147</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>-.083</td>
<td>.094</td>
<td>.37</td>
<td>-.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.77</td>
<td>.630</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of cases = 437  
Pseudo R$^2$ = .103
Log Likelihood = -337.08

Note: Significance tests are two-tailed.

Table 6.5: Poisson Regression Estimates of Union Member Response to Mobilization Appeals
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>S.E.</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>.293</td>
<td>.073</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.429</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Agreement</td>
<td>.097</td>
<td>.033</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approp of Lobbying</td>
<td>-.006</td>
<td>.099</td>
<td>.95</td>
<td>.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (lin)</td>
<td>.026</td>
<td>.021</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>.759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenure (nl)</td>
<td>-.005</td>
<td>.255</td>
<td>.99</td>
<td>-.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary Membership</td>
<td>.037</td>
<td>.182</td>
<td>.84</td>
<td>.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
<td>.061</td>
<td>.125</td>
<td>.63</td>
<td>.069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficacy</td>
<td>.057</td>
<td>.049</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>.197</td>
<td>.078</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically active union</td>
<td>.017</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>.39</td>
<td>.101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographically active</td>
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<td>.172</td>
<td>.06</td>
<td>-.122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted</td>
<td>.055</td>
<td>.101</td>
<td>.58</td>
<td>.064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-.350</td>
<td>.782</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N= 280
Pseudo $R^2= .158$
Log Likelihood= -163.13
% predicted correctly= 70.0%

Table 6.6: Probit Estimates of Union Members' Participation in Grassroots Lobbying, Members Who Perceived Opportunities Only
CHAPTER 7

GROUP MEMBERSHIP AS A POLITICAL RESOURCE

Studies of interest groups tend to focus either on the activities of group leaders or the activities of group members, but often do not thoroughly investigate the interactions between leaders and members. Studies of interest group organization often have focused on the individual member in an attempt to explain why one would join an interest group (e.g., Olson 1965), though Salisbury (1969) and Walker (1982) have emphasized the importance of elites in the formation of interest groups. Studies of interest group activities, however, have largely focused on elite activities and have given comparatively less attention to the role of the members. For example, there are many studies of Political Action Committee contributions to legislators, but scant research on other electoral activities of interest groups, including the contribution of member's time. Similarly, studies of lobbying have focused on the activities of lobbyists in Washington, not on members' reactions. Texts and surveys of interest groups (e.g., Schlozman and Tierney 1986, Walker 1991) dutifully describe the interest group activities in which group members can be involved, and use media reports to describe member's responses to group mobilizations, but systematic studies of interactions between group leaders and members are few. Moe (1980), Knoke (1991), and Rothenberg (1992), are the important
exceptions. This dissertation seeks to add to our knowledge of leader-member relations by examining how groups mobilize their members and why members participate.

Interest groups use a variety of strategies and seek access to many government institutions in their efforts to influence public policy. “Inside” strategies rely on contacts between staff of the interest group, such as lobbyists, with public officials. Yet the group may wish to gain access to new officials, to influence which officials are in office through elections, or to demonstrate constituent support for their positions. An active membership may be necessary to accomplish these tasks. Given that time and resources for political mobilization are limited, how do groups recruit activists from their memberships? How do they seek to increase the likelihood that members will respond effectively? Why do members respond, given the costs of time and effort to participate and the incentives to free ride off the contributions of others?

Review of Findings

Mobilization

These questions are particularly apt for organized labor. Although unions have elaborate organizational structures and large staffs that many other membership organizations, particularly public interest groups, do not have, much union activity is devoted to collective bargaining rather than political mobilization. Likewise, although local organizations and officers provide the ability to engage in active face-to-face recruitment of political activists, the autonomy of local unions requires that these local officers choose to mobilize their members.

Furthermore, members do not join unions to show support for union political positions. They join for the selective benefits, in terms of workplace
protections, wages, and benefits, provided by the union's collective bargaining, or because closed shop agreements compel them to join. Thus, the political positions taken by the union are not always priorities for or supported by individual members. Assuming vigorous attempts to mobilize politically by local leaders, members still are not guaranteed to respond to appeals for political mobilization. They may not desire the collective good at stake, or even if they do, may not want to make the individual sacrifices to secure it.

Proponents of compliance theory offer three reasons why individuals comply with requests to do something: coercion, instrumental benefits (selective benefits in Olsonian terminology), and ideology. Although members can be coerced to join unions by closed shop agreements, unions have no ability to coerce members to undertake responsibilities outside of the workplace context. They cannot force their members to volunteer for community service or for political action. Unions do have some instrumental, selective benefits for activists: some unions offer prizes for those who solicit PAC contributions, some offer food at political events, some offer "lost time" (paid days off work) for political activities. These incentives are not universal across internationals and interviewees generally believe their effectiveness as enticements is marginal.

Social interaction with others can also be considered an instrumental benefit (Clark and Wilson 1961, Salisbury 1969). Social benefits could be derived from participating in union political activities such as attending candidate meetings, working phone banks, or working with teams on get-out-the-vote drives. Many other activities are not particularly social, such as contributing to the PAC, putting up a yard sign, or writing one's legislator. Perhaps the greatest social incentive is the personal mobilization request from others in the union. Of course, the better descriptor, rather than "incentive,"
would be that the member seeks to avoid social disapprobation that would result from rejecting the request. Face-to-face mobilization places social pressure on members to accede to requests for political participation.

The main function of union political mobilization structures, however, is to lower the costs of participation for members. Although personal requests raise the cost of not participating, much of the rest of the purpose of union mobilization efforts is to make it easier for those inclined to participate to do so. Unions lower the information and transaction costs of participation. At the most basic level, unions provide opportunities to participate in politics. Limited time and information are likely to prevent all but the most politically motivated members from seeking out political opportunities in the community. Because of union mobilization activities, they do not have to; their local, international, and/or central body provides opportunities for them. The union takes care of the planning, organization, and logistics; the member just has to show up and participate. Second, participating in politics requires substantial information about what to do, when, and how. Union mobilization provides this information and the training to engage in politics effectively. Finally, unions use various techniques to make participation simple. These include using payroll deductions for PAC contributions so the money automatically comes out of one's paychecks or making an evening of political action a credit option towards accreditation in a building trades apprenticeship program. By lowering the costs of participation, unions make it easier for those who would want to participate anyway to do so.

This brings us to the third basis for compliance: ideology. Individuals comply with requests because they think they should. In the context of organizational political mobilization, I offered two bases of ideological
compliance: agreement with the political goals of the organization and commitment to the organization. Those who participate because of agreement with the political goals of the organization contribute to achieving the collective goods from public policy that they and the organization desire. But as often noted, member agreement with the political positions of interest groups is not assured, particularly in the case of organized labor. Those who participate because of commitment to the organization are willing to make sacrifices that will contribute the maintenance of an organization that they value. Indeed, commitment means that membership is personally important to the member. They rely on it for cues as to the proper behavior for good group members -- people “like them.”

The empirical findings in this dissertation demonstrate considerable support for the importance of mobilization and the ideological reasons for compliance, commitment and political agreement, in explaining members’ participation in union political activities. In fact, receiving requests was also found to be critically important to explaining participation, as demonstrated in Chapter 6. Indeed, the simplest finding of this dissertation might be that members participate because someone asked them to. But simple should not mean simplistic. We are thus led to two additional questions that suggest more interesting and complex answers to participation question: who is asked to participate, and who responds when asked?

If those who are asked to tend to participate, to understand who participates requires understanding who is asked and why they are asked. Rather than reviewing all the findings in minute detail, I will highlight the major findings. The first step to understanding which rank-and-file members are asked to participate is understanding which local officers are engaging in
mobilization. If local leaders are not active in attempting to get members involved, members are unlikely to be aware of their opportunities for involvement, let alone engage in them voluntarily.

Assuming that the local officers mobilize, my premise to understanding the process of group officials making requests of members for political action is that officials' time and effort for political mobilization is limited. Officers have other responsibilities within the organization, in addition to families and other leisure pursuits. Though they can potentially “ask” all their members to participate through announcements in newsletters or on the bulletin board, these methods are unlikely to catch the attention of many members and do not provide any social pressure to participate. Leaders are likely to mobilize strategically in making personal requests for political participation: they seek to achieve maximum response from members given their limited time and resources for mobilization. In this vein, they ask those members who are easily accessible to them, that is, those who can be mobilized at low cost. Second, they mobilize those who have the skills (education) to mobilize effectively. However, they did not ask only those members who agreed with the union politically and who would be most likely to deliver the political messages desired by the union. Officers have limited information about their members, especially personal beliefs such as political preferences, and thus are likely to ask those who they think will respond, not necessary those who broadly agree with union political positions.

Finally, regardless of the level of and strategy of mobilization by local officers, some members pay more attention to political appeals from their union than others, and thus, are more likely to recall political mobilization requests. Members who are extremely interested in politics, who rely on their union for
political information, and who have join the union in order to avail themselves of
the opportunity to participate in its political activities are more likely to "hear"
political mobilization appeals.

The results of the analyses of the mobilization process demonstrate that
the mobilization process can be explained in a systematic manner: some
members are predictably more likely to be aware of opportunities to participate,
some members are predictably more likely to be asked to participate. Since this
study, and others, document that individuals are likely to participate when
asked, future studies of political participation need to give more careful attention
to taking into account how who is asked affects who participates.

**Participation**

However, being asked to participate does not equal participation. Many
members turn down requests; others volunteer without receiving requests. The
two ideological bases of compliance, organizational commitment and political
agreement, were supported by considerable evidence even controlling for
prominent alternative hypotheses such as organizational learning, political
attitudes and resources, and organizational context. Political agreement was a
statistically significant explanatory variable in all model variations; commitment
was statistically significant in all model variations, with the exception of
participating (or not) in electoral activities in 1994. The significance of
commitment and political agreement were consistent across two elections, 1992
and 1994, in responding to electoral mobilization appeals, and across two
different venues for political participation, elections and grassroots lobbying,
while the significance of other variables was less consistent.

A member's level of organizational commitment is particularly important
in explaining participation in grassroots lobbying mobilizations. When
legislative action threatens a group that is personally important, the committed member responds. Groups have a competitive advantage in providing behavioral cues on issues. Particularly on the "core" issues related to the member's purpose for joining the organization, the lobbying context is unlikely to provide alternative group cues that are salient in elections (namely, party affiliation, ideology, candidate appeals, and other social and interest group cues).

These findings have implications for union critics who argue that unions do not "represent" their members politically (e.g., Heldman and Knight 1980). Members are not reliant on the union to speak for them only; they can speak for themselves politically. By their actions or inactions they show their support, or lack of it, for union positions. To the extent members do not generate constituent lobbying pressure or cast their votes to support union positions, politicians have few incentives to support union lobbying positions. The evidence here shows that unions do seem to be representing the opinions of their activist members. Those most committed to the union are likely to participate politically as are those who agree with the union's political positions. These same members are likely to follow union endorsements as voting cues (Asher, Heberlig, Ripley, and Snyder 1996).

The final perspective on political participation in an organizational context was provided by comparing voluntary to mobilized activities. The member's relationship with the organization, including commitment, political agreement, tenure, and organizational context, were especially important to understanding mobilized activities. Members who are generally on "good terms" with the organization are more likely to respond positively when it asks them to make contributions beyond the call of duty. This points to the
importance of understanding the context of the request for understanding mobilized behavior. To the extent that previous studies of political participation have ignored social context generally, and mobilization specifically, they may have overestimated the impact of individual characteristics on political participation.

**Skills, Education, and Participation**

Some of the more interesting findings in this dissertation have to do with the importance of the member's level of education in explaining mobilization and participation. On one hand, it would not have been surprising for education to have been consistently significantly related to political participation. After all, education has been a central variable in explaining political participation for as long as political scientists have studied the subject (see Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry 1996). Yet industrial and craft unions are not organizations that would we would typically expect to mobilize the high status individuals, given their traditional working class membership and rhetoric. Moreover, the member's level of education was not consistently a significant explanatory variable for participation, unlike models of participation outside the union context. In fact, education was negatively related to electoral voluntarism at a statistically significant level.

Yet the member's level of education was clearly the most important variable in explaining mobilization. Even controlling for the mobilization activities of the OEA, education was significantly related to requests for participation in multiple events. While the "mobilization of bias" in interest group activities is well known (Schattschneider 1960, Schlozman and Tierney 1986), the fact that unions too mobilize their high status members is quite interesting. In fact, it points out a persistent problem in political mobilization in the United
States -- that individuals of lower social status, particularly those with few skills, are extremely hard to mobilize (Wilson 1973). Even within unions, there is an organizational imperative in political mobilization: leaders ask those members they think have the skills and abilities to get the job done. Education is the basis for many civic skills important to participation in a variety of political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995).

The importance of requisite skills can be seen by comparing the role of education in explaining grassroots lobbying participation to electoral participation. Education was one of the most important variables in explaining participation in grassroots lobbying, but was often not significant in explaining electoral participation. The result was not due to differential mobilization by the OEA. I argued instead that education was more important for explaining grassroots lobbying because lobbying requires the confident use of communication skills. After all, one is writing or phoning a public official -- a potentially intimidating experience for one without confidence in her persuasive abilities. Participation in many electoral activities (e.g., making PAC contributions, placing yard signs, distributing campaign literature), on the other hand, does not require effective communication skills. Such skills are honed through education.

The implications of bias in mobilization can be seen in an additional way. My findings indicate that the those who are accessible to the mobilizers are also more likely to receive requests to participate. Given that in most organizations the mobilizer is likely to be of high social status herself, if she asks those most likely to be accessible to her (e.g., her friends, acquaintances, and co-workers), she is likely to be asking individuals of similar social status. Under this scenario, the mobilization process compounds the class bias in political
participation (see also Rosenstone and Hansen 1994, 238-41). Thus, part of the class bias we see in participation in American politics may be the result of elite mobilization, rather than high status individuals merely having superior resources.

All this is not to say that unions are being hypocritical in their working class rhetoric. Even if unions do not mobilize those of least social status among their own membership, other union political activities are directed at mobilizing the working class. Unions target their non-partisan voter registration and Get-Out-The-Vote drives to mobilize non-members in precincts with high levels of working class, low income, and/or minority voters with the intention of increasing the turnout rates of those voters most likely to support union-endorsed candidates (i.e., Democrats). Unions engage in substantial coalitional activities during elections with other interest groups, some of which are financially supported by labor (A. Philip Randolph Institute [African-americans], Coalition of Labor Union Women, Council of Senior Citizens, League for Latin American Advancement, and Frontlash [college students]), whose memberships are dominated by the non-elite. More extensive efforts at mobilizing the less advantaged, can create greater levels of participatory equality (Rosenstone and Hansen 1994, 241-7). And in lobbying, unions often take positions and join in coalitions with other liberal groups to support the perceived interest of the working and lower classes.

Nevertheless, these findings suggest the difficulty inherent in trying to represent all sectors of society equally. Representation can be achieved by others "speaking for" the segments of society that are less likely to participate politically, but without being able to speak for themselves, there may be distortion in the presentation of their interests. Those representing others may
present the interests of others in ways that benefit themselves. Similarly, the unequal patterns of mobilization and participation should lead us to question one of the core premises of pluralism -- that social groups have relatively equal ability to organize and mobilize when their interests are affected in the political arena. They do not.

Lessons for Union Leaders

The most basic lesson is that to get members to participate, they must be asked. Roughly half of those asked to participate in either lobbying or electoral activities complied, which indicates substantial success in getting members to respond when they are asked. Though this high response rate is likely to decrease as a broader cross-section of members are asked, the aggregate number of participants will increase. In addition, the probability that local officers were politically active (local union context) was important in explaining the number of opportunities members perceived for political participation, whether they were mobilized, and whether they participated in electoral activities. On the other hand, local union context was not important in explaining mobilization or participation in grassroots lobbying. The electoral results show the importance of local structures—they can be effective in mobilization and generating participation. Although union leaders admitted weaknesses in the grassroots lobbying structures, and these results not only confirm their observations, but should provide extra incentive to improve them. Finally, a member's residence in a targeted district was rarely a significant explanatory variable. Although union leaders were aware of problems here too, if targeted districts are of highest priority and/or races where additional contributions from members are most likely to make a difference, targeting of membership mobilization must be improved to increase the ability of labor to
obtain the desired outcomes. In the end, mobilization is costly in terms of the organizational resources it consumes, but it pays dividends in generating participation from members.

Second, there are potential political payoffs to keeping members satisfied with the performance of the union so that they remain committed to the organization and willing to respond to its requests. There also are potential payoffs to political education programs that demonstrate the connection between the union's political priorities and positions and the member's own. To the extent that mobilization appeals are framed to tap into member's commitment or agreement, they are more likely to generate responses from members.

The differences in the importance of political agreement versus commitment in elections in comparison to grassroots lobbying suggest that effective mobilization messages might be framed differently for each activity. Since commitment was more important in explaining members' participation in grassroots lobbying, mobilization appeals should focus on threats to organizational maintenance and the continuation of the benefits members joined to receive. Appeals should attempt to tap the "core" issues on which group cues have a competitive advantage with members. The narrow "core" issue appeals of grassroots lobbying are likely to be less effective in mobilizing in elections. Alternative cues from party, ideology and candidates are likely to be more salient. Thus, political agreement, measured in terms of partisanship and ideology, was more important than organizational commitment in explaining members' participation in elections. Mobilization appeals should thus be broader than those in grassroots lobbying — they should synthesize organizational and personal interests with the broader framework of issues
salient in the election. This makes it easier for the member to understand the connection between organizational interests and choices in the election.

Still, recent economic trends and political events highlight potential difficulties for organized labor's attempts to engage in more effective political mobilizations. First, a smaller percentage of the workforce is organized by unions than in the past. Sectors of the economy traditionally organized by labor, such as manufacturing, have stagnated or shrunk, while more lightly organized service industries have grown (Form 1985, 1995). Thus, unions have a smaller constituency to mobilize politically. With a smaller membership base, additional mobilization of members is necessary just to maintain a relatively constant level of constituent pressure. In the long run, without greater organization to provide a constant or expanding membership base, labor may be fighting an uphill battle.

However, the potential risk of greater organization is a more diverse membership. Although diversity can have many benefits, it makes priority setting and coordination among the interests of different unions more difficult. It exacerbates the persistent problem of fragmentation across organized labor (Bok and Dunlop 1970, Form 1995). Thus, labor's ability to mobilize members behind a single political agenda becomes more difficult.

Second, union membership strength is not equally distributed across the country. Its member base is in the Northeast, Midwest, and West coast. Yet the population of the United States is shifting to the South and Southwest, where "right-to-work" laws make union organizing difficult. The political consequence of population shifts is that the decennial apportionment and redistricting of Congress increases representation in regions of minimal union organizational strength and decreases representation in regions of union organizational
strength. The result is fewer members of Congress with high concentrations of union members in their districts. With less of a base in Congress, labor must do more to expand its supportive coalition. This could be accomplished by organizing in new areas, creating grassroots cadres in new districts, or reliance on coalitions with other interest groups that do have constituent strength in these regions. The use of other political resources, such as PAC contributions and independent expenditures, may also be important in helping to expand labor's political base in Congress, though such expenditures are of questionable influence without a constituent base (Wright 1989, 1990).

Third, the partisan landscape in state legislatures and Congress has shifted away from the Democratic party, labor's traditional ally. In the past, labor could rely on inside lobbying and its access to the Democratic party leadership to achieve its legislative goals. The education of and mobilization of members is costly; costs that did not need to be paid when Democrats protected labor's interests. The result of a feeble grassroots mobilization structure was that labor could generate little constituent pressure on Democrats when party and labor interests diverged. The situation worsened when the Republicans gained majorities in Congress and state legislatures. Labor thereby lost its inside access and did not have the ability to generate constituent pressure necessary to create access or to provide demonstrations of constituent intensity on labor positions. Moreover, without the member education provided by mobilization, members would not necessarily hold legislators accountable for anti-labor votes. Without electoral consequences, there is little political incentive for legislators to listen to unionized constituents. Thus, without grassroots pressure, it will be difficult for labor to expand its legislative coalitions as necessary to influence public policy.
Such increased grassroots strength and efforts are most necessary in politically marginal districts, where a legislator must be wary of offending a bloc of voters who will make their voting decisions based on a single issue. Shows of intensity from some interested constituents could gain the legislator’s support on critical issues. An active grassroots presence in the district of “friends” in the legislature could help keep the legislator voting consistently as desired. Grassroots contacts may also be helpful in “counteractive lobbying,” where friends must be lobbied in order to shore up their support after they have been lobbied by the opposing coalition (Austen-Smith and Wright 1994). In addition, to the degree that there are close personal contacts between the legislator and members of the group, the legislator can be a valuable source of intelligence to the group on the inside activities of the legislature. Empirical evidence showing that residence in targeted districts is unrelated to grassroots lobbying participation and that residence in active union areas, which are likely to be represented by labor-friendly Democrats, is negatively related to response to lobbying appeals suggests that labor is currently in a weak position to maintain and expand its legislative coalitions through constituent pressure.

Thus, greater emphasis on organizing, creating structures to mobilize members (especially for grassroots lobbying), and asking members to participate are extremely important. Organized labor’s recent integrated strategy of organizing, improving its public image, and recreating grassroots political structures, are designed to achieve these ends. Though political successes were apparent as a result of the Labor ‘96 campaign (raising the minimum wage, passage of the Kassebaum-Kennedy health care act, framing of several major issues during the election, reelection of President Clinton, and pick-up of Democratic seats in Congress), to be politically successful in the long
term, this effort cannot be limited to a single election. These efforts are costly and difficult to sustain. The strategic commitment and resources must remain available to do so.

Questions for Future Research

A single study inevitably cannot answer all questions. This one is no different. One concern common to any study is the extent to which the findings are generalizable beyond the specific context of the study. Where possible, I have attempted to compare the results of the 1994 survey to those of the 1992 survey; the completion of a post-1996 election Ohio Union survey will allow for a test of generalizability to an additional election.\footnote{Preliminary analysis indicates that the results hold for the critical theoretical variables, commitment and political agreement, for both electoral activities and grassroots lobbying in 1996.}

Another question of generalizability common to the study of interest groups is to what extent the findings from a single group sector, in this case organized labor, can be generalized to other interest groups. My theoretical expectations regarding the processes of mobilization, participation within organizations, the difference between grassroots lobbying and electoral participation, and compliance with requests for political action were developed to apply to any organized interest. In addition, I tried to account for the distinctiveness of unions wherever possible, for example, by controlling for voluntary membership in all models. Although I would not expect substantial differences if other groups were studied, the correctness of this belief should be subject to empirical test. Some findings in particular should be tested on samples of the general population: political interest and efficacy are more important in explaining voluntary than mobilized participation; education has a negative relationship with voluntarism, but a positive relationship with response to mobilization requests.
A second tack for future study would be the dynamics of mobilization and participation across time. This study shares the limitation of much social science survey research in being a cross-sectional snapshot of a dynamic process. A panel design could address several additional questions that I was unable to here. For example, we would expect not only that mobilization affects participation but that participation affects mobilization. Those who participate at time A are likely to be asked to participate at a later time. The dynamics between voluntary and mobilized activities may be similar: those who volunteer at time A are likely to be mobilized at time B. The attitudes of those who participate might be changed as a result of their participation in politics or the organization. A cross-time design would help us sort out the causal connections between the various moving parts of the mobilization process.

Questions regarding the dynamics of mobilization lead to questions of the processes of organizational learning which can result in changes in organizational structures and strategies across time. These questions could include: How and why do elites choose to recruit certain people?; How do the people they choose to recruit vary across time or across different activities?; How does the opportunity to use alternative tactics, such as elite contacts (e.g., insider lobbying, staff work on campaigns) or coalitional activities, affect the choice of when and how to use grassroots mobilization?; How do external political, economic, and social changes affect the strategic choices made?; In short, how do interest groups learn and adapt their strategies over time? Wherever possible, I used interviews to discuss these changes within labor. More systematic attention needs to be devoted to these questions.

This study, then, provides only a starting point for the study of political mobilization by organizations and political activism of members within them.
APPENDIX A

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

Separate schedules were developed for Ohio and Washington, D.C., interviews. But in each place, the same basic questionnaire was used for all interviews, though appropriate union name was substituted. Questions were not necessarily asked in this order. Interviews focused on the questions on which the interviewee had greatest expertise.

Ohio Interview Schedule
Describe purpose of project: Learning how the [union name] mobilizes members for grassroots political activities such as helping with elections, contributing campaign money, and contacting public officials. Interviews with union officials will be used to supplement survey data of rank-and-file members.

1) What is your position in the AFL-CIO/international? How long have you been in this position? How does this position involve you in union political activities? How long have you been active in union political activities?

2) I'm interested in how the AFL-CIO attempts to get grassroots members involved in its political activities. How does the AFL-CIO attempt to get members involved in electoral activities? Does this vary by type of race: local vs. state; targeted races?

3) What is your role in electoral mobilization? For example, in the past election, what did you do to try to get members involved? Was this different than usual?
   a) Do you have a special list of activists that have helped in the past? How do you decide who to contact?
4) I'm also interested in how the AFL-CIO mobilizes its members to contact public officials about issues important to unions. What is your role in this process? For example, what was done to get members to contact state legislators regarding NAFTA, worker's compensation reform, threats to bargaining rights, or other issues on which the AFL-CIO mobilized?

5) Geographically, in which areas are unions more politically active (use map)? For example, which regions are average or more or less than average? How specific can you be: counties, legislative districts? Which member unions of the AFL-CIO are more politically active? Why do you think those unions are more active?

6) How much effect does the political environment have on your bargaining environment? How effective are locals in your area in having an impact on the political environment?

7) Our survey data shows that members perceived that their union undertook more electoral activities in 1994 than in 1992 and members also participated in more activities. Do you have any explanation for this?

Washington Interview Schedule

Describe purpose of interviews: To provide a national perspective on the dissertation interviews and surveys I've done on organized labor's political mobilization activities in Ohio. I'm exploring what unions do to mobilize their members and why members participate. Interviews complement the survey data I have on rank-and-file members in Ohio.

1) Position and political mobilization responsibilities of interviewee.

2) Describe any recent changes in the political mobilization strategies of the union including: volunteer recruitment, fundraising, communications, grassroots lobbying.

   a) How were these strategies different in this past election or past session of Congress than previously?

   b) Why were the changes made? What was the process strategic decision making that lead to the changes?
c) Does the union political staff normally have post-election or post-congressional session "debriefings" to evaluate current practices and to make future plans? How do these play a role in organizational learning?

3) Almost inevitably there are some tensions between different parts of an organization. How do you at the national level interact with or coordinate state/regional/district/local union political action? How do you coordinate with other internationals, the AFL-CIO as a federation, other interest groups, and/or political parties?

4) To what extent are there variations across the country in your union's political mobilization strategies? What are the reasons for this variation? How is union political mobilization in Ohio similar to or different from political mobilization in other states?
APPENDIX B

LIST OF INTERVIEWEES

Initial interviews were done with Central Office officers and staff of the Ohio AFL-CIO and Ohio Education Association. These interviewees recommended other Ohio union representatives to be interviewed. After the 1996 elections, Ohio central office contacts also recommended interviewees in Washington, D.C.

Ackerman, Karen. Staff Director, AFL-CIO COPE.
Acton, Richard. Executive Secretary, Cleveland Federation of Labor.
Allen, Gary. Vice-President, Ohio Education Association.
Bell, Tom. Staff Representative, Ohio AFL-CIO.
Billirakis, Michael. President, Ohio Education Association.
Bowen, David. OEA Executive Board, Southeast District.
Burga, William. President Ohio AFL-CIO.
Burke, Diane. Associate Director, Legislative Affairs, AFSCME.
Caridas, Kim. Associate Director, AFSCME Ohio (OCSEA).
Codispoti, Leonard. OEA Executive Board, Northeast District.
Darr, Kent. Communications Director, Ohio AFL-CIO.
Day, Donald. Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio AFL-CIO.
Ditmer, Dodie. Assistant to the Vice President and Political Coordinator, District 5, Communications Workers of America.
Douglas, Andy. Ohio Supreme Court Justice.
Duffy, Pat. Administrative Assistant, Dayton-Miami Regional Labor Council.
Dunleavy, Marty. Political Director, American Federation of Government Workers.
Eckhardt, Ralph. Associate Director, AFSCME Ohio (OAPSE).
Eskeson, Connie. OEA Executive Board, Northeast District.
Farrington, Robert Y. Secretary-Treasurer, Ohio State Building and Construction Trades Council.
Foster, Judith. OEA Executive Board, Southeast District.
Frost-Brooks, Patricia. OEA Executive Board, Northeast District.
Glaser, Marty. Vice President, Service Employees International Union Joint Council 25.

Hazlett, William. OEA Executive Board, Northeast District.


Kendall-Freas, Guy. OEA Executive Board, North Central District.

Kolbe, Dave. COPE Director, Ohio AFL-CIO.

Kopp, Robert E. State Coordinator, Ohio State Community Action Program Council, United Auto Workers.

Lauridsen, David. Associate Director, AFSCME Ohio (AFSCME).

Leibensperger, William. OEA Executive Board, Central District.

Lewis, Tom. Lobbyist, International Union of Operating Engineers.

Malone, Ron. Political Director, AFSCME Ohio.

Margulies, Pam. Executive Manager of Advocacy Programs, Ohio Education Association.

Martin, Dan. Political and Legislative Director, United Steel Workers of America.

McGriff, Mary. OEA Executive Board, Southwest District.

McTaggart, Herbert “Bud”. Executive Assistant, Cleveland Federation of Labor.

Meyer, William A. Executive Assistant to the President, Local 880, United Food and Commercial Workers.

Miller, LeRoy. OEA Executive Board, West District.

Miller, Lois P. Coordinator of Field Services, Ohio Federation of Teachers.

Mitchell, Larry. Staff Representative, Ohio AFL-CIO.

Mix, Carol Pierce. Director of Governmental Services, Ohio Education Association.

Radford, V. Daniel. Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Cincinnati AFL-CIO Labor Council.

Reuther, Alan. Legislative Director, United Auto Workers.

Rittenhouse, William. Executive Secretary-Treasurer, Columbus-Franklin County AFL-CIO.

Scott, Rick. Associate Director, Political Action, AFSCME.

Sears, William. OEA Executive Board, Southwest District.

Shields, Bob. President, Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters.

Skinner, Lyle. COPE Director, District 1, United Rubber Workers.


Streeter, Diane. OEA Executive Board, North Central District.

Sundermeyer, William. Executive Director, Ohio Education Association.

Taylor, Peggy. Legislative Director, AFL-CIO.

Tutoki, Patricia. Staff Representative, Ohio AFL-CIO.

Wagner, John D. President, Ohio State Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters.

Walsh, Rich. AFL-CIO COPE, former Director.
Watts, Kevin. Director of Legislative Affairs, Ohio Association of Professional Fire Fighters.
Wells, Wesley. Executive Director, Dayton-Miami Regional Labor Council.
Willier, Sandra. OEA Executive Board, Northwest District.
Witte, Paul J. International Vice President, Fourth District, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers.
Zanella, Phil, Jr. Business Representative, Local 1663, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers.
SURVEY QUESTIONS MEASURING ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT
IN OTHER DISCIPLINES

Organizational Psychology. Mowday, Porter, and Steers (1979)
1) I am willing to put in a great deal of effort beyond that normally expected in order to help this organization be successful.
2) I talk up this organization to my friends as a great organization to work for.
3) I feel very little loyalty to this organization. (R)
4) I would accept almost any type of job assignment in order to keep working for this organization.
5) I find that my values and the organization's values are very similar.
6) I am proud to tell others that I am part of this organization.
7) I could just as well be working for a different organization as long as the type of work were similar. (R)
8) This organization really inspires the very best in me in the way of job performance.
9) It would take very little change in my present circumstances to cause me to leave this organization. (R)
10) I am extremely glad that I chose this organization to work for over others I was considering at the time I joined.
11) There's not too much to be gained by sticking with this organization indefinitely. (R)
12) Often, I find it difficult to agree with this organization's policies on important matters relating to its employees. (R)
13) I really care about the fate of this organization.
14) For me this is the best of all possible organizations for which to work.
15) Deciding to work for this organization was a definite mistake on my part. (R)
Union Psychology. Short scale: Kelloway, Catano, and Southwell (1992)

Loyalty
1) I talk up the union to my friends as a great organization to belong to.
2) There's a lot to be gained by joining the union.
3) Deciding to join the union was a smart move on my part.
4) Based on what I now know, and what I believe I can expect in the future, I plan to be a member of the union the rest of the time I work for the company.
5) The record of the union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done.
6) I feel a sense of pride in being a part of the union.

Willingness to work for the union
7) I am willing to put in a great deal of time to make the union successful.
8) If asked I would run for elected office in the union.
9) If asked I would serve on a committee for the union.

Responsibility to the union
10) Every member must be willing to take the time and risk of filing a grievance.
11) It is the duty of every member to keep his/her ears open for information that might be useful to the union.
12) It is every member's responsibility to see that the other members' 'live up to' the collective agreement.
13) It is every member's duty to support or help another worker use the grievance procedure.

1) I am indifferent about being a member of this organization.
2) To be perfectly honest, I don't care what this organization says or does.
3) What this organization stands for is very important to me.
4) Personally, how committed do you feel to (organization name)?
5) Suppose you local organization were in real danger of going out of existence. How much effort would your be willing to spend in order to prevent this?
6) I feel a sense of pride in being a member of (organization name).
7) It is important to me to maintain the values of the organization.
8) This organization would deserve my support even if I were unable to participate.
9) There are very few things more important in my life than this organization.
10) My membership in this organization influences most aspects of my life.
11) I have put so much time and effort into this organization that it would be difficult for me to leave.
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