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THE ONSET OF REGIME TRANSITION
FROM SINGLE TO MULTIPARTY POLITICS:
A CASE STUDY OF TANZANIA

DISSESSATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
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Political Science Graduate Program
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ABSTRACT

Using the case of Tanzania, this research analyzes the causes for the onset of transition to multipartyism- a phenomenon which has pervaded the Africancontinent in the past decade. This aspect of the transition is notably understudied in the body of democratic transition literature to-date which focuses mainly, rather, on the transition process only once it has begun and, then, on its ability to achieve successful democratic consolidation.

While current research is largely impressionistic and untested, hypotheses have been derived from the literature and empirically tested through interviews conducted with Tanzanian political leaders- leaders who were involved in the country's implementation of multipartyism. The following proposed causal factors are tested: elite disunity, economic change, domestic opposition, political donor aid contingency, and democratic global political change. The findings suggest the relevance of each of these factors, in addition to their interrelation and combined effect upon the leadership to undertake multiparty transition in 1992.
Dedicated to my wonderful parents
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I wish to thank the Tanzanian Commission on Science and Technology for granting me a research permit which enabled this study.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE POTENTIAL CAUSAL DETERMINANTS OF TANZANIA'S MULTIPARTY TRANSITION

The world has witnessed an unprecedented number of transitions to multiparty democracy in the past decade. Previously single-party authoritarian regimes are giving way to liberalization of the political system and paving the way for democratization. Theoretical efforts, to date, however, provide only marginal assistance in understanding the forces which prompt this fundamental system change. This author sets out to put to rigorous test the causal components of the democratization process which are put forth by transition theorists. Looking at the single case of the 1992 Tanzanian transition, the research relies heavily on interview data collected from among the Tanzanian political leaders.

The Tanzanian transition is a case which cannot be readily explained by the existence of forces commonly associated with prompting democratic transition, such as explosive mass rioting or vivid international pressure under the threat of the withholding of vitally-needed aid funds, as in the case of neighboring Kenya.

In the years preceding the Tanzanian transition, neither of these two powerful stimuli were present. Tanzania's independence leader and
first president, Julius Nyerere, had managed to keep Tanzania's many ethnic, religious, and racial groups at peace since its independence, which is much more than can be said for the majority of other African nations. An economic recovery program (ERP) was implemented in the mid 1980's and, by most accounts, was significantly improving Tanzania's economy. IMF money and World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) were introduced following the ERP and the peaceful election of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985. When Nyerere was also to hand over control of the Party to Mwinyi in 1990, Mwinyi appeared to have consolidated his power—heading both the state and party organs. The cause, therefore, of President Mwinyi's decision to liberalize the political system in 1992 and allow for the holding of the first national-level multiparty elections in Tanzania's thirty-year history in 1995 is not so readily obvious.

Multiparty democracy in Tanzania can be said to have begun in February of 1991 with President Ali Hassan Mwinyi's appointment of a commission headed by Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to assess the level of domestic popular support for the continuation of the country's single-party political system. Tanzania had been a de jure single-party state since 1965 and never before 1991 had such a referendum been sought. Upon the Nyalali Commission's submission of its report to Mwinyi in February of 1992, the President endorsed its recommendation for transition to multipartyism. This Commission's recommendation and the President's subsequent endorsement, in fact, were actually made in spite of the Commission's finding that only twenty percent of the Tanzanians interviewed desired such a change. According to the Nyalali Report, of the 36,299 Tanzanians interviewed, 77.2 percent supported
the maintenance of the one-party leadership and 21 percent favored multipartyism. However, of the 77.2 percent who supported the one-party system, 55 percent advocated reforms within the existing system.

It was the ratification of multipartyism by the ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi's* (CCM) Extraordinary National Party Conference which was held on February 18-20, 1992 and the three amendments to the 1977 Constitution approved by the Union Parliament and the Zanzibari House of Representatives by 1992-3 which sealed the fate of single-party politics in Tanzania.¹

The importance of understanding the causal determinants of the Tanzanian transition may prove instrumental in furthering understanding of similar political development in more than half of the African countries within the past decade. This change, on a continent which largely broke away from European colonialism over three decades ago, is interpreted by some as the second African independence. It represents a dramatic departure from the previously dominant single-party post-colonial African authoritarian regimes.² Following independence and the concurrent colonial installation of formally democratic political systems in former colonies, numerous nationalist leaders seized control of these ruling systems and instituted, for the most part, closed governing systems headed either by civilian or military single-party or no-party regimes. They have largely been able to hold onto power either continuously or through successive leadership with varying,

¹ *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* translates into *Revolutionary Party*.

² Authoritarian regimes can be defined as "political systems with significant procedural proscriptions on political contestation and inclusiveness" (Share 1987: 527).
though relatively low, levels of tolerance for political challenge and opposition, that is, until recently.

Today's transitions from single to multiparty politics have created what has come to be known as a wave of democratization: "a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the opposite direction during that period of time" (Huntington 1991: 15). The magnitude of this democratic wave is illustrated by the holding, or putting on the agenda, of multiparty elections for the first time, in 1992 alone, in the African countries of Algeria, Angola, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Seychelles, and Togo. Since 1989, multi-party elections have also been held in Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Sao Tome/Principe and Zambia and in Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, Zaire and Zimbabwe, elections were scheduled for 1994 or 1995. More recent, however questionable, moves toward democratization have also been seen in the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Morocco and Sierra Leone.

The implementation of multiparty politics by single-party leaders is a theoretically puzzling phenomenon as it entails moves toward political liberalization which inherently promote a more inclusive governing system than the more exclusionary politics of the previous rule. Such an increase in political inclusiveness and participation

\[\text{\footnotesize 3 Derived largely from } \textit{Africa News}, \text{ V. 37, N. 5, November 23-December 6, 1992, p. 8.}\]
(see Dahl 1971), makes possible the ouster of the very political leadership which introduced it as leaders are required to compromise or relinquish their power through interaction with, and in response to, public opposition. If, as some scholars point out, public office is indeed an institution used by leaders to enhance their power (Jackson and Rosberg 1985: 303), there must exist some additional factor or factors which prompt the leadership to initiate such a seemingly fundamental political change, without which the move toward multipartyism appears irrational.

These factors may be generated by changes in the political, economic and/or social environment which alter the leadership's assessment of the relative costs and benefits of maintaining a single-party system compared to those which would be incurred with the implementation of multiparty transition. Accordingly, multiparty transition takes place when ruling elites assess such political liberalization to be the more cost-effective alternative based upon the rationale of political self-preservation. This rationale holds that elites implement "only those manageable reforms which [they] calculate are necessary to maintain themselves in power" (Bratton and Van de Walle 1992: 421).

Political system cost assessment focusing on the role of domestic political opposition has been described by Dahl in the following axioms:

(1) the likelihood that the government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected cost of suppression increases; (2) the likelihood that the government will tolerate an opposition increases as the expected cost of toleration decreases; (3) the more the cost of suppression exceeds the cost of toleration, the greater the chance for a competitive
regime to become politically relevant at this stage (Dahl 1971: 15).

The regime's goal in implementing political liberalization, using this cost-benefit analysis is, thus, to achieve or maintain its best possible position in terms of maximum power and influence levels.

Decalo pointedly accuses "transitional" regimes of strategically maneuvering for power vis-a-vis political opposition under the façade of political liberalization. Accordingly,

By their flexibility when political opposition groups are still timid, disorganized, self-exiled, and political reform still [is] but a hope, _[the regime is] able to dictate the pace of reform and rules, avoiding executive-shackling national conference pressures while maintaining the centrality of their role in any political outcome (Decalo 1992: 27).

Ruling elites, thereby, act to preempt situations in which their level of power would compare unfavorably to that of the opposition. By undertaking political liberalization, according to Decalo, these leaders 'take the wind out of the opposition's sails' to the extent that the latter can no longer claim that the incumbent system or leadership is wholly undemocratic. The opposition is forced to engage the leadership in a more difficult battle over which method of governance would be more democratic with each side claiming to aspire to higher democratic ideals. However, it is important to realize that while this move toward political liberalization represents "in no small measure another means of political control by the state" (Chazan 1986: 56), it also suggests that there has been recognition by the state of pressure for increased popular political participation.
It is the causes for this reassessment on the part of the Tanzanian leadership of the relative costs of continued single partyism- the cost of suppressing domestic political and other forms of democratic pressures- that this research aims to identify.

The body of democratic transition literature provides the theoretical tools with which to analyze political liberalization. Several causal explanations are provided regarding both the array of possible causal factors of democratic transition and their possible interrelations.

While the transition literature, from which the hypotheses for this study are derived, is extensive, its usefulness is, however, severely compromised by the fact that rigorous study of the factors which cause multiparty transition is virtually nonexistent. Analysis, rather, has been focused largely on ascertaining the dynamics of political change only once transition has been initiated, thereby, not addressing the totality of the phenomenon. For its part, where the literature has addressed the onset of transition, it tends to be impressionistic and not rigorously tested.4

Transition can be viewed as a multi-staged phenomenon consisting of its onset, its process, and its outcome or the possibility of

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4 Two efforts at empirical analysis of transition onset have been conducted by Donald Share in "Democratization in Spain: Searching for Explanation" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Ninth annual European Studies Conference at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, October 11-13, 1984) and David Pion-Berlin in "Military Breakdowns and Redemocratization in Argentina" in Liberation and Redemocratization in Latin America, edited by George A. Lopez and Michael Stohl (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). These are single case studies which have tested only some of the variables suggested in the literature. The purpose of the findings is limited to explaining the case without effort to devise theoretical frameworks to which other cases can be compared.
democratic consolidation.\(^5\) Onset refers to the 'how' and 'why' of the transition's initial undertaking and its understanding necessitates the exploration of those factors which cause incumbent leaders to initiate such system change. *Process* can be seen to comprise the methods by which the change is carried out. *Processes* tend to be distinguished by the varying extents of control exerted by the incumbent regime over the transition. Study of the *outcome*, or the final stage, of transition focuses on the subsequent ability of the transition to result in a successful *consolidation* of democracy —to avoid being replaced or derailed by another non-democratic political system.

It is necessary to devote greater study to the first stage, not only to better understand it as a separate entity, but also to understand the ways in which its characteristics may affect the latter two stages (Schmitter 1985: 132).

The second significant shortcoming of the transition literature regards its case selection. While Africanist scholars have contributed and continue to contribute to democratization theory, the majority of the theoretical transition literature is not informed by African experiences but, rather, has been generated from almost exclusive study of Latin American and Southern European politics. Africa, with its many instances of transition, is notably understudied. This limits the

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\(^5\) Though the three stages of transition are interconnected and, therefore, difficult to definitively distinguish, I have attempted to separate the literature into that which deals with *process* and that which addresses transition *outcome* as follows:

**Process**


**Outcome**

global generalizability of these theories. It is important both for better understanding of the phenomenon on that continent and for Africa's potential contribution to the transition literature that cases be drawn from Africa.

The literature, nonetheless, can and does provide the basis for the generation of several testable hypotheses regarding the causal components of multiparty transition. It identifies the causal factors that affect the cost-benefit calculations of policy-makers as economic change, global democratization, democratic donor aid contingency, domestic opposition, and elite disunity. It is upon these theoretical assertions that this research is focused.

It has been argued by transition theorists that change in the economic situation can have effect upon the onset of political transition. Focus on this variable has generated the following three hypotheses: long-term economic growth and modernization prompts democratization; short-term economic growth leads to multiparty transition; and, economic decline or crisis is necessary for the onset of multiparty transition. While, on the surface, the coexistence of economic growth and development, on the one hand, and economic decline, on the other, may appear contradictory, the hypotheses need not be entirely mutually exclusive as some economic indicators may experience decline while others simultaneously undergo growth.

The theorized interrelation between economic change and political transition derives from modernization theory which has developed over the past three decades. The work of Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens has provided an overview of modernization theory described as a "structural-functional conception of social order, society, polity
and economy — seen as a more or less well-functioning system integrated primarily by shared values and cultural premises" (Rueschemeyer et al.: 5). Accordingly, democracy arises due to its functionalist fit with the advanced industrial economy. This theory holds that capitalist economic growth prompts social mobilization which ultimately translates into a form of democratic political system as the level of political opposition increases (Rothchild and Foley 1988: 237). Relatedly, economic development is seen to require democracy, for only a democratic political system can provide the freedom of economic movement necessary for economic growth. For Cardoso,

given the very high sensitivity of [an authoritarian] regime to attaining and sustaining a balance between functionally differentiated hierarchically structured, privileged orders, (the armed forces, civil servants, church, industry, commerce, agriculture, etc.),—[its autonomy is further compromised by its need to] continually cope with and adjust its policy patterns to the differential effect of such generic processes as economic growth, urbanization, inflation, changes in terms and volume of foreign trade, technological innovation, emigration, demographic increases, inflows of foreign capital, evolution of wage structures, secularization, etc. (Cardoso 1979: 14).6

The modernization indicators which will be looked at include levels of urbanization, literacy and education, access to information through the mass media and to transportation. A rise in these indicators is seen by modernization theorists to prompt the social mobilization necessary to create a political opposition to the current non-democratic political system.

Cross-national comparative analyses which have contributed to this theory include Lipset's study of the effect of industrialization's

6 See Lemarchand 1992, pp. 98-9, on the impact of structural adjustment programs and the establishment of socio-economic order.
resultant increase in wealth, communication and equality on strength of societal classes. His findings suggest that industrialization results in a larger middle class and a more modest lower and upper class. This middle class is "by its nature moderate and this in turn increases the probability of stable democratic forms of government" (Rueschemeyer et al.: 14). Cutright's quantitative cross national study elicits the finding that societies tend toward an equilibrium of their interdependent systems and that the "greater the division of labor and structural differentiation in economic and social demand, the more complex and specialized the political institutions will be" (Rueschemeyer et al.: 15).

More recent studies (Bollen 1979, Bollen and Jackman 1985, Muller 1988 referenced in Rueschemeyer et al.) have looked into the effect of the timing of development on political democratization and the interrelated concept of income inequality. According to Muller, income inequality does not have direct effect upon the onset of democracy, though, it is closely related to the likelihood of maintaining democracy. Hannon and Carroll's cross-national study (1981) produced the finding that economic development indeed could lead to one of four different types of political structures, one of which is democracy.

Karl de Schweinitz and Max Weber represent some of the earliest theorists in this tradition who utilized the comparative historical approach. Their independently arrived at general conclusions support the notion that the global environment has changed so that no longer can countries achieve democracy in the same manner as the Western countries had done centuries ago. Therefore, the Western path which entailed the development of a capitalist economy is not necessarily the
means toward democratization in today's Third World. In fact, they each concluded that capitalism today makes for a hostile environment for fledgling democracies. Dependencia theorists as well as world systems theorist Emanuel Wallerstein would also challenge the notion that the Western route to democracy was relevant to developing countries today.

Recent comparative historical studies which address this interrelation between capitalist development and democracy include O'Donnell's work (1979) in which he concluded that democracy did not follow economic development in South America. Rather, there was an "elective affinity" between advanced capitalism in dependent political economies and bureaucratic authoritarianism (Rueschemeyer et al.: 22). Barrington Moore's monumental comparative study (1972) determined there to be three historical pathways to political modernity: toward democracy, fascism, and Communist dictatorship. The path selection, also, is not voluntaristic but rather historically determined by the early capitalist experience (Rueschemeyer et al.: 23). Skocpol (1979) challenged this assumption, arguing that the path to democracy was determined by the state which plays an intermediary role between international and domestic power (Rueschemeyer et al.: 23).

Challenge to the findings of quantitative cross-national theoretical models is also evident in studies which have yielded credibility to the connection between increasing societal frustration resulting from economic decline to calls for political transition. The growing discontent in society in reaction to declining economic standards translates, accordingly, into a decrease in the popular legitimacy afforded to the political leadership. Such reasoning was
espoused by Bratton, for example, in his analysis of Zambia's economic crisis. He explains that "as poverty trickled up and deprivation touched every social class in Zambia's urbanized society, people began to blame the occupants of the commanding heights: the party-state leaders themselves" (Bratton 1994: 124).

Brynen has also explained the Jordanian move to democratization as resultant from economic decline. Accordingly, the transition was, in large part, due to

the decline of petro revenue— which resulted in a collapse of economic supports upon which the neo-patrimonial system had been constructed [and, as a result, Jordan experienced a decline in its international interest and worth.] In turn, there [arose the]... need for the regime to negotiate a new social contract with society which [led]... to political liberalization and partial democratization (Brynen 1992: 70).

As Rothchild and Foley explain,

the more the relatively disadvantaged are able to accumulate resources, the less they will be inclined to accept a state-enforced situation of inequality, and their demands for a significant restructuring of political power and economic opportunities will increase accordingly. Failure of the state to respond to or repress these demands seems certain to have a conflict-producing effect: The demands of the less advantaged will escalate, bringing about a sharp but inconclusive reaction from those in power (Rothchild and Foley 1988: 237).

It has also been argued that short-term economic growth creates a sense that "the economy [is] in good hands and [can] withstand minor changes in the political system" (Viola and Mainwaring 1985: 203).

Macro-economic indicators will be relied upon to illustrate short-term economic growth and decline. They include calculations of
gross national product (GNP), gross domestic product (GDP), balance of trade, government investment, cost of living, and currency exchange rate.

The recent work done by Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens (1992) endeavors, similarly, to find the linkage between capitalist development and democracy. It employs the methodological framework of 'analytic induction' which attempts to transcend this seeming impasse between quantitative cross national theoretical models which have generally found there to be direct correlation between these variables, and the studies which utilize the more qualitative comparative historical methodology and have largely found reason to challenge such interrelation. The authors, in essence, combine the two methods by conducting multiple comparative historical studies based upon previous theory.\(^7\) The use of multiple cases over time and the comparative awareness mitigate the concern over the inherent inability of historical single case studies to account for the structural dimension as a result of their emphasis on state voluntarism. Analysis of structural change over time and across cases aims to compensate for this limitation.

The authors observe that capitalist development affects democracy by changing the class structure in a society, specifically, by strengthening the middle classes, a la Lipset. Accordingly, "capitalist development is associated with democracy because it transforms the class structure, strengthening the working and middle classes and weakening the landed upper class. It was not the

\(^7\) Single-case quantitative studies invite the criticism of being void of theoretical direction.
capitalist market nor the capitalists as the new domestic force, but rather the contradictions of capitalism that advanced the cause of democracy" (Rueschemeyer et al. 1992: 7). While they agree "with modernization theory and pluralism on the positive effect of social mobilization and the development of formally autonomous social organization and groups on democracy... their research reveals that... the political effect of the growth of civil society can only be understood in connection with its articulation with the structure of class power" (Rueschemeyer et al.: 274). Specifically, "it is the growth of a counter-hegemony of subordinate classes and especially the working class - developed and sustained by the autonomous organization and growth of trade unions, working class parties and similar groups - that is critical for the promotion of democracy" (Rueschemeyer et al.: 50). As economic growth is experienced by one societal group and economic decline is experienced by another, their findings would support the compatibility between the two seemingly contradictory hypotheses presented above.

It may be helpful to depict their findings in this simple diagram (Figure 1).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 1.** Class structure and democratization/multiparty transition

The three hypothesized interrelations between economic and political development can be illustrated as follows:
Analysis will be conducted to determine whether any of these variants on the causal role of economic developments is capable of explaining the onset of Tanzania's multiparty transition.

The second factor elicited from the literature is the influence of global democratization. Accordingly, there is a contagion effect whereby a seemingly global transition to democracy can affect transition to multipartyism in a given country. This phenomenon was seen to be greatly evidenced following the 1989 collapse of the one-party communist political systems in Eastern Europe. The East's demise, accordingly, served as indication to one-party leaders elsewhere of their inevitable fate. It is alternatively held that their collapse triggered the response of domestic political forces to
challenge the legitimacy claims of single-party authoritarian regimes. These arguments suggest a contagion or demonstration-effect whereby events abroad influence domestic politics. According to Huntington,

successful democratization occurs in one country and this encourages democratization in other countries, either because they seem to face similar problems or because democratization elsewhere suggests that democratization might be a cure for their problems, or because the country that has democratized is powerful and/or viewed as a political cultural model (Huntington 1991: 100).

Soares has identified the causal role of politics abroad in the case of the Brazilian transition. Brazil's regime, accordingly, took note of the socio-political conflict in the neighboring countries of Chile, Uruguay and, especially, Argentina and realized "that without the hope of peaceful democratic change through elections, an ever-increasing proportion of the Brazilian population could become potentially violent opponents of the regime" (Soares 1986: 276).

Share and Mainwaring have argued, independently, that a favorable international climate, while it cannot generate political transition, can favorably affect it. Accordingly,

An international environment that actively encourages democracy facilitates democratization, but it is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Democratization can occur in an unfavorable international climate just as authoritarian regimes can survive in a hostile environment. Authoritarian regimes either can be well insulated or can use foreign pressure to enhance their legitimacy. International ostracism can make the elites more insecure, more nationalistic, and less willing to democratize (Share and Mainwaring 1986: 201).
Other theorists, rather, look toward the domestic forces of internal opposition as serving as the primary causal factor in prompting democratization, generating the hypothesis that an increase in domestic opposition can affect the onset of transition. These forces include any individual or group of individuals outside of the regime who challenge the legitimacy of the authoritarian system in favor of democratization. The ability of certain individuals or groups in society to influence such political change varies with the positions which they hold within society. As Diamond explains, "the greater the number, size, autonomy, resourcefulness, variety and democratic orientation of popular organizations in civil society, the greater will be the prospects for some kind of movement away from rigid authoritarianism and for subsequent movement toward semi-democracy and later democracy" (Diamond 1989b: 25). For Taylor and Jodice, the defining characteristics of domestic opposition forces are their level of organization, influence, composition, selection of targets, and manner and success at demand articulation (Taylor and Jodice 1983: 16-60).

Similarly, Stepan has explained that,

the larger and stronger these various non- or anti-authoritarian subsystems grow, the more effectively they can perform the other tasks of democratic

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8 See also Michael Bratton, "Beyond Autocracy: Civil Society in Africa", (working paper for the Inaugural Seminar of the Governance in Africa Program, The Carter Center of Emory University, 1989) wherein he advocates continued study of the relationships between civil society and the state in Africa in effort to "identify degrees of action from disengagement to engagement, whether initiated from state sources (to ignore, register, monitor, coordinate, coopt, reorganize, or dissolve voluntary organizations) or societal sources (to keep a low profile, to fulfill bare legal requirements, to selectively collaborate with government, or to engage in policy advocacy)."
opposition: contesting the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime, raising the costs of maintaining it, and generally grinding it down while building support for a democratic alternative (Stepan 1993: 65).

Higley and Burton suggest that the conditions and orientations of mass variables "establish fields of opposition and constraint to which elites must respond —[in view of the fact that] elites always need mass support" (Higley and Burton 1989: 22). In the case of Brazil, Lamounier has similarly concluded that

the importance of the movements of so-called civil society— the student and religious movements, and those by professional associations and finally by trade unions— was not so much that they forced the beginning of the abertura [or liberalization of the political system], but that little by little they created informal, but effective constraints on the dictatorial exercise of power (Lamounier 1989: 71).

For Bruneau, Brazil's transition was brought about by the regime's need "to broaden the basis of [its]... support [because]... the authoritarian regime was less valued by important economic groups and there was concern [by members of society] that the state was too large and pervasive" (Bruneau 1992: 260).

Some theorists have suggested that the non-elite domestic opposition requisite for generating regime transition stems from the inherent structural limitations of authoritarian regimes. Accordingly, these regimes intrinsically experience a steady decline in subject support over time and must resort to liberalization to appease growing opposition. For Schmitter, authoritarian rule entails

the deliberate cultivation of compliance rather than enthusiasm; the use of intermediary associations for
social control rather than popular mobilization; the inability of their anti-utopian, 'realistic' ideology to compete with the attractions of utopian liberalism, socialism, communism, etc.; the declining marginal returns from repeated appeals to patriotism, national heritage, external enemies, etc., [and] the sheer complacency of [long-term politicians]—[which] all conspire to [limit the popular support they achieve] (Schmitter 1975: 17-8).

Linz explains, however, that despite the fact that authoritarian regimes lack sound legitimacy, they do receive a type of support that is based on transient self-interests and he suggests the following process whereby support for authoritarian regimes undergoes change in form and intensity over time:

The active committed support and the most bitter opposition would characterize the first phase while at the later stage, the authoritarian regime would be more dependent on a passive support and passive opposition. This second phase would lead to growing cynicism, opportunism, and corruption and in certain sectors of the society and the younger generation, to growing active opposition. For a variety of reasons, the whole range of pseudo-semi oppositions appear within the system and in some cases link with various social forces and institutions with the alegal and even illegal opposition (Linz 1982: 20).

The regime then resorts to liberalization as a response to the growing opposition,

though it is unlikely to be satisfactory as the preeminence of rule of law will decrease the incentives for societal participation in the regime institutions, including the party. There will be constant testing of limits of freedom and power and regime response with repression and, thus, a reversal of the liberalization process, will amount to rising frustration and opposition (Linz 1982: 20).
Other theorists look to the role played by external actors upon whom authoritarian regimes are also dependent for support. Other state actors, particularly during the Cold War years, have provided vital supplies of economic, military and political support. They hold that, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, African states will assume a marginalized role in future world politics. The potentiality that these sources of support will disappear in the absence of the superpower rivalry for Third World alliances is of great concern to, particularly, single-party authoritarian leaders worldwide, whose domestic support base is, at best, uncertain. Whatever previous importance they may have had as 'pawns' in the game of domination and influence played by the superpowers is now gone. Accordingly,

The collapse of global Marxism created a unipolar world that at one stroke eliminated the Cold War. And with it disappeared any artificially enhanced global value that Third World states had been able to extort from the former Cold War protagonists. What literally transpired was a massive devaluation in the 'worth of Africa'. African states were transformed from Cold War pawns, into irrelevant international clutter (Decalo 1992: 17).

As aid becomes increasingly difficult to acquire, the argument holds that the desperation of underdeveloped Third World states forces them to accept assistance which is tied with conditionality. At the same time, donor states, no longer rivaling for allies, can more carefully choose the recipients of their aid as well as the programs which they are willing to finance. For the purposes of this research, it is significant that the political contingency of 'democratization' is now being tied to disbursement of some Western aid, and it is this
contingency which is seen to have great effect on triggering multiparty transitions. The hypothesis that stems from this literature is that donor aid which carries with it the contingency of multiparty transition plays a causal role in such transitions in recipient countries.

Looking to explain the factors which brought about the southern European transitions of the 1970's, Tovias has looked toward the causal impact of democratic contingency tied to foreign aid. While arguing that "the international economic context has certainly not facilitated democratic consolidation in Greece, Spain and Portugal", he does suggest that "it may be said to have contributed to the acceleration of the transition from dictatorship to democracy (in particular, in Spain). This was both because of international and European support for the new democratic systems as well as a strong commitment in the three countries to their success" (Tovias 1984: 169).

While foreign influence may only have been an accelerating force in the case of these transitions, it is possible that its role has changed in more recent years. The tying of political contingency of democracy to aid is a relatively new policy and it is possible that it is also a geographically-bound phenomenon. Decalo explains that, in the case of Africa in the late 1980's, external actors had a considerable role to play in political transition processes. Accordingly,

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9 This dynamic has not been extensively studied, to date. USAID, though, has recently engaged in this area of research and has issued several case-study analyses.
the process of redemocratization [in Africa] is a sort of return to square one -decolonization, though from domestic politically hegemonic groups- but, given the severe aid conditionalities that can be expected, this 'second independence' may well be a virtual recolonization by global donor agents, very much in the saddle in a unipolar world with only one source of capital, greatly in demand (Decalo 1992: 29).

With fewer donors and a greater unity among those that remain, recipient bargaining power becomes limited, aid becomes more difficult to acquire and recipients have little choice but to accept almost any aid, even that which is tied with contingencies.

Scholars have also pointed to the causal role played by the existence of domestic elite disunity in the democratization process, generating the following hypothesis: Disunity among elites is a necessary causal variable for the onset of transition from single to multi-party politics. As the literature explains when there is agreement among elites over the rules of the political system, no challenge is presented to the political status quo. Consensually unified elites, accordingly,

(1) share a large tacit consensus about rules and codes of political conduct amounting to 'restrained partisanship'…and (2) they participate in a more or less comprehensively integrated structure of interaction that provides them with relatively reliable and effective access to each other and to the most central decision-makers (Higley and Burton 1989: 19).

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10 Elites have been defined as individuals "who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley and Burton 1989: 18).
Incohesion among elites is explained as a situation in which some members seek support more from groups outside of the regime than from fellow elites within the regime. Disunified elites can be described as those who

(1) share few or no understandings about the properties of political conduct, [and] (2) engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectional boundaries (Higley and Burton 1989: 17).

The hypothesis is derived from the fact that divergent elites force the regime as a whole to undergo reform for the purpose of re-establishing elite unity and, in so doing, attain its maximal power relative to other societal forces. This reform can take the form of fundamental regime transformation when the majority of the leadership assess this to be a cost-effective solution in the face of internal discord. The direction and extent of regime change is based upon the demands of the divergent elites as well as on the intensity of the opposition which they pose to the political status quo. This intensity level, in large part, reflects the relative levels of influence or power which these elites have within the political system.

It is debated whether or not such diversity stems from challenge from outside of the ruling group or from within the group itself. Non-elite challenge to the political system, accordingly, has the capacity to divide the leadership- with some holding fast to the political status quo while others are inclined to align with the reformers. Alternatively, some theorists assert that such elite division is solely generated from forces within the leadership itself as "some members of
the authoritarian coalition always had the intention of defusing a threat and restoring democracy after an interregnum" (Share and Mainwaring 1986: 185).

Through analysis of the Spanish case, Share has demonstrated that, while other factors played a role in contributing to the intensity of the crisis, it was the internal political struggles among elites that were directly responsible for the transition (Share 1984). Similarly, Maravall and Santamaria have suggested that the regime's inability to adapt itself to rapidly changing and unexpected circumstances — is usually expressed by a manifest decline in the regime's internal cohesion and/or by a loss of its capacity to repress conflicts and prevent the emergence of any type of alternative mode of government (Maravall and Santamaria 1986: 72).

This manifest decline in internal cohesion of the regime results from changing circumstances which alone, without elite division, they assert would not result in political transition. Przeworski, too, has offered explanation of the demise of a regime based upon the role of elite disunity. He argues that democratic compromise between a cohesive authoritarian regime and political opposition does not occur. When division develops among elites, compromise among discordant elites can result in political transition. According to Przeworski, a regime begins to crack if some members of the ruling bloc go outside for support. If the regime itself is cohesive or tightly controlled, then a compromise solution cannot emerge. Consequently most dictatorial regimes we have known fell only on the battlefield, in an external or civil war. Popular

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11 He also explains that transition can be brought about through military victory, alternatively, without compromise.
unrest in the face of a cohesive power bloc places the resolution of political conflicts in the relations of physical force (Przeworski 1988: 23).

Schmitter has also argued the significance of elite division in triggering the onset of multiparty transition. He explains that "the sources of contradiction necessary if not sufficient for the overthrow of authoritarian rule lie within the regime itself, within the apparatuses of the state, not outside it in its relations with civil society—" (Schmitter 1975: 18). He suggests that the demise of authoritarian regimes requires either

a crisis of leadership succession [which precipitates] - a conflict of uncertain outcome over the identity of individuals occupying commanding roles within the authoritarian regime, [or] a crisis of policy adaptation in which some new event or accumulation of past mistakes makes it imperative, not merely to change personnel or form, but to change the substance of policy to the benefit and burden of groups other than those which were previously part of the regime (Schmitter 1985: 126).

For Diamond, too, "the most successful path of democratic evolution was a sequence in which political competition first developed within a relatively small circle of opposition elites, then gradually expanded to incorporate an increasing proportion of the population as legitimate participants" (Diamond 1989a: 144). Looking at the case of Turkey, Sunar and Sayari come to a similar conclusion. They suggest that

changes in the Ottoman empire were hardly initiated from the periphery with social forces bursting in upon the political center. Nor were they generated by conflicts between the center and the periphery. Instead the impulse to change stemmed from within the
state, and was transmitted by intra-elite conflict. The focus of change was the state itself, either in the form of restoration or reform (Sunar and Sayari 1986: 167).

While acknowledging the impact of other factors upon transition, Schmitter, too, identifies as ultimately causal the role played by division among elites. Accordingly,

'objective' constraints and 'subjective' opponents articulate persistent strains and episodic pressures that exacerbate internal cleavages, upset delicate balances between established hierarchical orders, weaken the resolve of regime supporters to act, and decrease the viability of certain preemptive and repressive policy options. However, alone, without such prior 'reflexive' changes within the governing apparatus itself, they are not likely to be sufficient to threaten the regime, much less overthrow it (Schmitter 1975: 20-21).

Schmitter and O'Donnell recognize the importance of elite cohesiveness in preventing transition and, alternatively, the significance of elite incohesion in enabling such fundamental regime change. While domestic opposition may prompt an incohesive elite to implement reform, such opposition would have little effect upon a cohesive leadership. Accordingly,

where dissent is high and regime self-confidence low, unless the hard-liners are prepared to invest more and more in repression, which may be a self-defeating proposition, the transition will be imposed by a mobilized opposition. Conversely, no transition can be forced purely by opponents against a regime which maintains the cohesion, capacity, and disposition to apply repression (Schmitter and O'Donnell 1986: 21, italics added).
From the democratization literature can be gleaned an hypothesized interrelationship between these proposed causal factors. Figure 5 below illustrates the plausible interrelation of these five factors which will be tested with the in-depth study of each of these factors in the subsequent chapters.

![Figure 5. Interrelation of proposed causal factors](image)

It is suggested that the two more "distal" factors of economic decline and global democratization have both direct and indirect effect upon the outcome of an elite decision to undergo multiparty transition. These factors alter the context in which ruling elites make calculations and formulate policy and affect their reassessment of the relative costs and benefits of maintaining a single party political system in favor of political reform. Changes in these distal factors can be directly perceived by the ruling elites or they can affect change in the possible intervening, or more proximal, variables of domestic opposition and donor aid contingency which, in turn, can prompt elite disunity and democratic transition. As illustrated, while
these intervening variables can be explained by the distal factors, they can be influenced by each other and by action taken by elites.

Both elite disunity and the decision to implement multiparty transition are hypothesized to be affected by a combination of the distal and intervening factors. Elite disunity is a necessary but not sufficient factor of the elite decision to undergo democratic transition, as elite incohesion can also manifest itself in political transformations of types other than democratization. The characteristics of the disunity which are likely to result in political liberalization will be more fully addressed in Chapter 6.

Analysis of each of the factors is presented in the order suggested in Figure 5, with the two more distal factors of economic decline and global democratization dealt with in Chapters 2 and 3, followed by analysis of the intervening variables of domestic non-elite opposition and donor aid contingency in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 addresses the factor of elite disunity and the elite decision to implement multiparty transition.

Each chapter's findings regarding the relevance of a particular factor to the Tanzanian transition, as well as its interrelation with other factors in prompting the transition, is based largely upon data collected from interviews. These interviews were conducted with members of Tanzania's ruling party, CCM, and government as well as with leaders from among Tanzania's political opposition forces. For the purpose of assessing the significance of and existence of democratic aid contingencies, in Chapter 5, interviews were also conducted with representatives of relevant donor states and multilateral donor aid agencies.
The interviews were designed to provide insight into the relevance of the hypotheses derived from the transition literature and to identify other possible factors and factor interrelations relevant to the onset of Tanzania's multiparty transition. The government members interviewed were all members of the ruling party at the time of the transition. The opposition leaders were politically active to the extent that, upon the legalization of multiple parties, most had founded or were part of partially organized parties which were prepared to mobilize support upon their legalization in 1992. In addition to opposition leaders, interviews were also conducted with religious leaders, journalists, and academics. While varying responses given by the different interviewees, or groups of interviewees, may suggest divergence within the Tanzanian political community, such findings are not directly relevant to this study, though they may help to discern non-elite and elite political positioning, as dealt with, respectively, in Chapters 4 and 6.

The questions posed to the interviewees were open-ended and aimed at assessing their perceptions of the causes of the transition, specifically, the causes of the government's establishment of the Nyali Commission and of its subsequent legalization of multipartyism.

Statistical data was also collected for the purpose of achieving background information against which the interview data can be interpreted and understood. Where its findings either support or contrast with descriptions of the political developments as perceived by its leaders may suggest the relevance of the statistical data to democratic developments in the case of Tanzania. Importantly, it is the interpretations of the facts by the Tanzanian political actors,
rather than the facts themselves, which direct policy-making and which, in this case, resulted in multiparty political transition.

The final chapter (Chapter 7) will attempt to summarize and interrelate the findings of the preceding chapters and present a refined model of the interrelations among the causal determinants of the onset of multiparty transition as played out in the case of Tanzania.
CHAPTER 2

ECONOMIC CHANGE

The existence of an economic change prior to the 1992 Tanzanian political transition and analysis of its possible causal role in prompting political liberalization is examined in this chapter. Figure 6 below, which represents the relevant portion of Figure 5 in Chapter 1, illustrates the hypothesized means by which economic change can affect political transition.

Figure 6. Economic change and multiparty transition

Trajectories a and c represent the indirect effect of economic change through the intermediate variables of, respectively, domestic opposition and donor aid contingency. Trajectory b illustrates a direct causal relation between economic change and democratic transition. The interview data will be relied upon to assess the
relevance of each of these hypothesized causal trajectories to the onset of the Tanzanian transition.

Before proceeding to explore the interrelation between these variables in the case of Tanzania in 1992, it must be clarified that the types of economic change which the transition literature identifies as causally related to democratic transition regard changes in economic performance. The literature has proposed the causal roles played by three types of change in the performance of the economy: modernization with long-term effects of development and industrialization, short-term economic growth and economic decline or crisis. Whether Tanzania experienced aspects of all three of these phenomena reflected in different economic indicators, or whether only one or two trends were apparent in the years prior to 1992 will be assessed. The transition literature does not attribute change in economic policy to have direct causal impact upon democratic transition. However, to put the economic performance experiences of Tanzania in perspective, it is important to understand the significant economic policy changes which were implemented by the leadership in the years immediately preceding the 1992 transition. These changes, afterall, are likely to have affected economic performance. The economic policies of the 1980’s through 1992 will be analyzed. A similar historical review of economic performance trends will follow.

Despite the economic crisis of the early 1980’s explained in large part by the 1973 and 1979 oil price hikes and declining commodity prices, Tanzania held strong against pressures to adopt the standard International Monetary Fund (IMF) economic recovery package aimed at economic growth through economic restructuring. This restructuring
would have entailed, in addition to other reforms, currency devaluation, increased bank lending rates, cutbacks in government spending and social services, and the lifting of most price controls. Such adjustments, Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere believed, threatened the socialist principles of Tanzania's economy and he declared that "people who think that Tanzania will change her cherished policies of Socialism and Self-reliance because of the current economic difficulties are wasting their time".¹² Nyerere, instead, proposed his own economic adjustment agenda which was to have more support within the Tanzanian leadership following the 1979 resignation of the Tanzanian Finance Minister, Edwin Mtei, who had favored acceptance of the IMF package. Nyerere's economic reforms would, however, prove unacceptable to the IMF, and the donor community responded to Tanzania's impasse with the Fund with an unwillingness to provide her with much needed economic assistance.¹³

In July 1980, Tanzania had reached an agreement with the Fund for a loan of $100 million and for 200 million SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) for balance of payment support for imports over the next two years. She was also to receive $7 million in 1980 for "compensatory financing", to protect her against a fall in world market prices of its export crops".¹⁴ Tanzania agreed, in return, to four economic reforms, including a decrease in government spending and a compromise regarding

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¹³ Ibid.

currency devaluation. This agreement was to collapse, however, after only three months as a result of disagreement over loan conditions.\textsuperscript{15}

According to a World Bank report\textsuperscript{16}, Tanzania's serious economic decline accompanied by growing external debt prompted a drastic cut in foreign aid to Tanzania after 1981. This decrease in external revenue meant that Tanzania no longer had the supply of foreign exchange necessary to maintain her prior level of imports. As a result, the country experienced a shortage of goods which, in turn, triggered the emergence of large unofficial parallel, or 'black', markets for both goods and foreign exchange. This unofficial market would grow rapidly from 1980 to the present. It was

only in the mid to late 1980's, as an extended range of consumer goods [had] entered more freely into the domestic market and the severe shortages common in the past had disappeared, [that] the size of the parallel economy remained more stable. It [continued] to represent, nevertheless, an important part of the domestic economy, not least because the new [public] institutions and channels of commerce developed during this period [proved] difficult to dismantle.\textsuperscript{17}

The activity of this "parallel economy" would be the focus of a government crack-down which began in 1983.

Tanzania's failure to keep up its payment of interest and principal on Bank loans resulted in the withholding of World Bank funds in 1982. The World Bank, however, viewed these difficulties with


Tanzania as temporary in nature, as they were due largely to harvest problems. It was confident that the delay, which had been experienced before with Tanzania, would be resolved in a short period of time.\(^{18}\)

The goods shortages continued, however, forcing the Tanzanian leadership to implement economic reforms which would enable it to enter into structural adjustment programs (SAPs) with the World Bank in 1982 and 1985. Once again, however, the tentative and limited nature of the Nyerere government's implementation of these reforms resulted in an unwillingness on the part of external lenders to provide Tanzania with vital assistance. The international donor community was most critical of Nyerere's refusal to adjust the exchange rate of the Tanzanian shilling (Tsh) sufficiently to accurately reflect the currency's value on the global market.

In 1984, Tanzania's Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Professor Kighoma Halima, announced an austerity measure in response to IMF demands. It included a twenty-five percent devaluation of the Tsh and a cut in the government subsidy of maize meal. These reform attempts were also viewed by the Fund as insufficient. Nyerere explained that his government's reluctance to adopt harsher tactics aimed at economic restructuring was based upon the fear that drastic changes in the currency value and subsidies would result in social upheaval. In addition, he argued that the prescribed IMF reforms "would penalize those sectors of the population least able to bear the added hardship".\(^{19}\) Therefore, the Tanzanian government tried to


\(^{19}\) Ibid., September 15-October 14, 1984, p. 7453.
appease, or 'sugar-coat', even those 'minor' reforms which it had agreed to implement with an increase in the minimum wage and with an increase of some producer prices -actions which were in direct violation of the IMF's policy prescription.

Nyerere referred to the IMF conditions to Third World nations as 'inappropriate' and as a 'kind of international authoritarianism', and predicted an inevitable confrontation between the North and the South.20 He poignantly argued that "it is immoral that in Africa people are starving- and we have to live on charity, and this year Africa will be paying billions of dollars to help the bankers balance their books... If the rich refuse to discuss methods by which the Third World can repay its debts, should we continue to try to pay on the terms set, even at the cost of letting our people starve?"21 In early 1985, Nyerere explained his desire to reach an acceptable agreement with the IMF, but one that would not "force our people onto the streets and force us to turn the police force against them"22.

Agreement would be reached between Tanzania and the donor agencies with Mwinyi's election to the presidency in 1985, and with the economic recovery plan (ERP) which he set in motion in 1986. Mwinyi, in his first address to the Tanzanian Parliament, stated that he would resume negotiations with the IMF and World Bank on the condition that "any agreement must be favorable to the Tanzanian people"23. In an

21 Ibid., April 30, 1985, p. 7680.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., November 30, 1985, p. 7958.
apparent effort to attract donor goodwill, Mwinyi thanked "all friendly countries and international agencies which continued to assist... [Tanzania] in revamping [her]... ailing economy".24 Emphasizing his commitment to the revitalization of the economy and citing the future role for international assistance in Tanzania's economic recovery, Mwinyi assured that, "in the next five years, [Tanzania's] economic problems [would be]... minimized, if not solved totally, by all of the resources at [her]... disposal and with the assistance of friendly nations".25

Import would be one area of the economy which would be greatly affected by the economic reforms of the mid-1980's. Since the introduction of World Bank structural adjustment, tariffs and taxes have been reduced significantly. In addition, in 1984 under Nyerere's leadership, Tanzania had independently introduced an own funds import scheme which permitted individuals to import certain consumer, intermediate and capital goods "using unofficial sources of foreign exchange" (Mans 1994: 371). This policy was soon extended to cover most all goods, in accordance with Bank wishes, and was to quickly account for approximately forty percent of Tanzanian imports. Own funds policy, too, indirectly encouraged 'unofficial' exporting, while official exporting continued to be held back by expenses incurred for licensing and registration (Mans 1994: 374).

Import liberalization continued with the introduction in 1987 of the open general license which gave importers "access on a first-come

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24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

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first-served basis to foreign exchange for a few agricultural and transport sector imports specified on a positive list" (Mans 1994: 371). With pressure from the Bank, this positive list grew in subsequent years, enhancing the overall market-based, as opposed to administrative, character of foreign exchange management. As of 1993, the list covered approximately twenty percent of all non-oil imports (Mans 1994: 372).

Additionally, tariffs have been reduced in accordance with the World Bank's industrial restructuring and trade adjustment credit requirements (Mans 1994: 373). By 1992/3, the maximum tariff rate stood at 40 percent, while many duties were being lifted and sales taxes were being lowered (Mans 1994: 373).

By the mid-1980's, the Tanzanian exporting sector was also seen to be in considerable need of liberalization. Tanzanian Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya argued that the country's poor economic situation resulted in large part from its inadequate foreign exchange earnings from exports which, as of 1986, fell short by three-quarters to two-thirds of that which was required. As Msuya explained in 1986, In general, the agricultural crop production has been falling, while small rise has taken place in the production of a few crops. Industrial production has continued to fall year after year, with industries currently producing at thirty percent below average capacity. The provision of services, including transport, water, education and health, has been poor due to lack of facilities, spare parts and a number of drugs -[due to] scarcity of foreign exchange. The same problem has emerged in connection with foreign debt arrears, which the country has failed to repay at the required time.26

In mid-1986, Mwinyi adopted an IMF-supported austerity plan which met with the approval of bilateral donors and led them to agree upon a rescheduling of Tanzania's debt—arranging for Tanzania to repay its loans with an interest rate of 2.5 percent until payments are resumed. Tanzanian representatives met with the Paris Club for the first time in nine years in September of 1986 and an agreement was reached for a rescheduling of at least $600m in government-to-government debt falling between Oct. 1, 1986 and Sept. 31, 1987 and the rescheduling of principal, interest and all arrears up to September 30, 1986. Terms include a five-year grace period and repayments during the subsequent ten years. This, Tanzania's first rescheduling, was made possible by the government's agreement with the IMF, which approved a SDR 64.2m ($77.5m) standby facility on August 28, 1986. This meeting also resulted in the Swedish government's offer to write-off Tanzania's bilateral debt which had, by June of 1986, reached USD 23.8 million. Other major bilateral donors would soon follow suit.

The rescheduling prompted Mwinyi's 1988 pronouncement that "some capital is now growing, though very, very slowly. Because of the breathing space, this is helping us. Fortunately at the same time, we had two successive years of good rain and our people managed to produce as much food as possible—so much so that we are faced with the problems of plenty—." Mwinyi also proclaimed his agreement with the

IMF to have been a victory for Tanzania since he had been able to successfully resist accepting some of the IMF's conditions which he argued would be detrimental to Tanzanians. While he accepted, for example, the Fund's request that he decrease the number of public institutions, he agreed to do so gradually and only when it appeared necessary. He also had opposed the IMF's recommendation that pay raises be frozen and that free public services be cut, and agreed to a devaluation of the Tsh to Tsh 40 to the dollar, instead of the IMF-suggested rate of Tsh 150 to the dollar.

In 1987, Tanzania negotiated its first structural adjustment facility (SAF) with the IMF. This was followed by a subsequent SAF in 1988, and a third in 1990. The World Bank also made available structural adjustment credits for industry, agriculture and finance sector reforms beginning, respectively, in 1988, 1990, and 1991 (Mans 1994: 355). In 1989, Mwinyi initiated the second phase of his economic recovery program (ERP II). In addition to the economic focus of ERP I, ERP II called for reform within the social sectors and increased government expenditure on education and health care (Mans 1994: 383).

30 "Loans under the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) are provided on concessional terms to low-income developing countries to support 3 to 4-year economic reform programs designed to strengthen their balance of payments and improve their growth prospects. An eligible member can borrow up to [50] percent of its quota over the program period. SAF loans carry an interest rate of 1/2 of one percent and are repayable within 5-1/2 to 10 years after disbursement.", IMF, External Relations Department, Washington, D.C.

31 However, as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) suggests, the ability of the government to provide services to the poor in Tanzania had always been problematic and, therefore, the decline in public spending during the crisis years had, in effect, little impact upon the poor, (U.S. Agency for International Development, 1993. "Africa: Growth Renewed, Hope Rekindled; A Report on the Performance of the Development Fund for Africa, 1988-1992", p. 20). Thus, any increase in public spending for social services should also
In late 1989, donors pledged USD 865 million worth of aid to Tanzania for the upcoming year. While the amount requested by the Tanzanian delegation had been USD 1.3 billion, the discrepancy was expected to be made up with private funds and debt re-scheduling.\textsuperscript{32} At the end of the third SAF program with the IMF in 1991, Mwinyi negotiated a three-year enhanced structural adjustment facility (ESAF) arrangement with the IMF to support ERP II. Both ERP I and ERP II received support from the donor community.

These economic policy adjustments can be viewed in terms of their effects on modernization and on short-term economic performance. Looking first at the performance indicators of modernization, the findings suggest relatively little advance in Tanzania's socio-economic structural development in the last two decades—certainly no significant level of advancement that could be seen to have prompted the 1992 political transition. There indeed has been an increase in the percent of Tanzanians living in urban areas. The percentage of urbanization, in fact, increased from a low of 16.5 percent in 1980, steadily increasing to a high of 34.0 percent in 1991.\textsuperscript{33} However, this positive rate of growth of urbanization would not be matched by similar increase in other socio-economic indicators theorized to be indicative of modernization. Theorists argue that the enhanced flow of


\textsuperscript{33} International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook 1993, pp. 590-591.
information and increased communication are characteristics of a modernizing economy. The flow of information can be assessed by observing the access which the population has to the media which serves as an information source. Types of media includes newspapers, radio and television.

The circulation of daily newspapers per one thousand inhabitants registered at 4 in 1975. This increased to 11 in 1980, decreased to 5 in 1985, and slightly improved to a total of 8 per 1000 in 1992.\(^{34}\) Similarly, little to modest gain was made in the number of televisions and radios per 1000 inhabitants. With regard to televisions, the number of television owners per 1000 remained at 0 from 1975 through 1985, and only saw an increase to 2 in 1992.\(^{35}\) The number of radios owned by Tanzanians also stayed relatively the same totaling 15 per 1000 inhabitants in 1975, 16 in 1980, 17 in 1985, and showing an increase only in 1992 to 25.\(^{36}\)

The number of telephones in a society is also argued to be indicative of the level of development as they enable communication and, in so doing, further the flow of information. Tanzania, however, exhibited a similarly static trend in the number of telephones per 100 inhabitants, as the figure stood at .3 in 1970, increased slightly to .4 in 1975, held at .5 for the years 1979-1987, and then resumed their 1970 rate of .3 for the years 1987 through 1991.\(^{37}\)


\(^{35}\) Ibid., p. 124

\(^{36}\) Ibid.

Trends in available transport is also argued to be a measure of modernization, enhancing communication and interaction among members of society. With regard to the number of motor vehicles in use in Tanzania, a level of 49,000 passenger cars was reached by 1984 and maintained until 1989. The number would then drop to 44,000.38

The flow of information requires a literate population and Tanzania’s literacy rate was the highest in independent Africa in the mid-1980’s, reaching a level of 75-85 percent (Yeager 1989: 159). However, primary school enrollment fell steadily from a high of 93.0 percent of children in the primary school age group to 63.0 percent in 1990.39 This decrease can, in part, be explained by the population growth which increased from approximately 17,988,724 in 1978 to 22,304,000 in 1985 for a total increase of nearly 24 percent.40

The socio-structural indicators of modernization and development suggest that there has not been significant increase in the level of information and communication available to the average Tanzanian through radio, televisions and telephones. Transport facility, as suggested by the number of passenger cars in use, suggests, in fact, a slight absolute decline. Literacy had been a high priority of President Nyerere to which Tanzania’s high literacy rate attests. However, even that accomplishment has been faltering with decreasing literacy along with declining primary school enrollments. Therefore, except for Tanzania’s trend toward greater urbanization, the socio-

structural trends which are held by modernization theorists to lead to pressures from below for increased political participation are not witnessed in Tanzania’s historical experience. Rather, these indicators largely registered decline in the past years which pose challenge to the theory that changing social attitudes along with modernization brought about Tanzania’s 1992 democratic transition.

The second and third hypotheses focus on the more short-term economic developments of either growth or decline which can be assessed using such macro-economic indicators as GDP, GNP, Balance of Trade and Value of the Tanzanian Currency (inflation) and the more consumer-level indicators as GNP per capita and the consumer price index, as well as such social indicators as government expenditures on health and education. As they have affect upon longer-term socio-economic trends and developments, they also play a role in affecting modernization. Therefore, the hypotheses are not discreet but, rather, are intrinsically overlapping.

The macroeconomic indicators are analyzed below for the purpose of assessing any changes in actual economic performance that may have experienced prior to the 1992 political transition. Again, this statistical data provides the background necessary for understanding of the causal interpretations of the role of the economy on bringing about the political transition as provided by the interviewees.

The United Republic of Tanzania’s Bureau of Statistics divides the overall economic performance of the country of the past two decades into three distinct periods: 1976-1980, 1981-1983, and 1983-1992, and subdivides the latter period into pre- and post-1986 years, with the latter subdivision corresponding to the years in which the economic
recovery programs (ERPs) were implemented. Accordingly, the period of 1976-1980, which extends the present study somewhat, experienced an average annual growth rate 2 percent. The worst economic performance was experienced between the years 1981 and 1983 when the average annual growth rate fell to a low of -.76 percent. The post-1983 years saw a generally increasing rate of average annual growth (see Graphs 1 and 2). The post-1986 years distinguish themselves with the annual growth rate exceeding the annual population growth rate of 2.8 percent, reaching 5.09 percent in 1987, following the 1985 low of 2.63 percent. Specific developments with regard to different economic indicators are now explored to more vividly paint the Tanzanian economic experience immediately prior to 1992.

Of the more national-level economic indicators, the trend in Tanzania's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was one of considerable growth since 1984/5, as illustrated in Graph 1. Though imperceptible on the graph as a result of its scale, from 1980/1 to 1983/4, the average annual rate of growth in GDP was .3 percent, with a low of -.7 percent in 82/83 and a high of .8 percent for 1980/1. From 1984/5 through 1990/1, however, an average annual growth of approximately 4.0 percent was reached, with a high 5.2 percent reached in 1987/88.42

The agricultural sector, which has accounted for approximately one-half of the total GDP, experienced growth considerable enough to surpass the population growth rate following the implementation of the


ERPs. In the period 1976-1980, agriculture accounted for an average of 40.8 percent of the Gross Domestic Product. The average percentage of agriculture of the GNP from 1980 to 1982 grew to 53 percent. From 1983 to 1985, that percentage reached 56 percent, and from 1986-1991, it registered at almost 60 percent. Based on constant prices, while the average annual rate of growth of the agriculture sector held steady at 2 percent for each of the years 1980/1 and 1982/3, it experienced an average growth of 4 percent for 1983/4 to 1984/5, and an average of approximately 5 percent for the years 1985/6 to 1990/1.43

Similar upward trend is perceptible for the industrial sector, where the average annual rate of growth was at its low of -35 percent in 1980/1, and it recovered somewhat to an average of -6.5 percent for 1981/2-1982/3 and -1.4 percent for 1983/4-1986/7. It achieved positive growth at an average high of 6 percent for 1987/8 to 1988/9. However, the industrial average annual growth rate would then decrease to -.5 percent from 1989/90 to 1990/1.44 Despite the fluctuations, this general improvement in industrial output likely reflected increased capacity utilization, efficiency, and diversification into more efficient activities (Mans 1994: 360). This general industrial growth, however, would not result in an increasing percentage of GNP made up by industry. From a high of 15.6 percent of GNP in 1980, the years 1981-1985 saw a decline to an average of 9 percent, and a further decrease to an approximate 7 percent in the years 1986-1991.45

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
The effects of the ERPs on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, while largely positive, have been compromised by insufficient reforms and denationalization efforts. With regard to agriculture, the favorable weather conditions of the late 1980's may distort the ERP affects on agricultural production. Food grain production, in fact, doubled, contributing to a boost in the country's food security and to a lowering of real food prices. However, with the marketing channels "dominated by inefficient cooperative unions at the farm level and government boards at the point of export" (Mans 1994: 401), the producers' share of their product's export value approximated only 40 percent. While this figure of producer terms of trade reflects an increase from the meager level of 28 percent in 1985, it still remained insufficient (Mans 1994: 402; see Graph 5 for overall terms of trade fluctuation).

Tanzania's Gross National Product (GNP) fluctuated relatively little (between .007 and .03 percent) in the first half of the 1980's (see Graph 2), from .06 percent in 1980/1, to .005 and .006 percent, respectively, over the next two years, and it rose again by .004 percent from 1983/4 and, by .03 percent in 1984/5.46 Beginning in 1985, however, gradual increase in GNP is apparent from a total of Tsh 174,742 million in 1985 to an estimated 213,187 million in 1991. The post-1985 average annual rate of growth of GNP was 3.4 percent.

In the years immediately prior to the Tanzanian political transition the country's currency was sharply devalued to unprecedented levels. This devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling was the result of

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46 Ibid.
efforts on the part of the leadership to reduce the overvaluation of the exchange rate in favor of market-determined value. Following an increase in value relative to the US dollar (USD) in 1980/1 by 8.4 percent, the value of the Tsh experienced an average annual decline of 15.9 percent between 1981/2 and 1984/5, and 63.7 percent from 1985/6 through 1989/90 (see Graph 3). 47 In fact, the cumulative devaluation of the real effective exchange rate exceeded 80 percent in the years 1986-1991 (Mans 1994: 360). This average annual percentage devaluation, though, has decreased somewhat in the years following 1990 (Mans 1994: 386). Despite a general decline in inflation since 1986, however, in 1994 the Tsh remained over-valued by an estimated 30 percent (Mans 1994: 405). This overvaluation would contribute significantly to the increasingly unfavorable balance of trade depicted in Graph 4.

The absolute growth of imports, as well as the growth of imports as percentage of GDP, has been steady since the implementation of the "own funds" scheme in 1984 which enabled Tanzanians to use foreign exchange from unofficial sources, (illustrated in Graph 4). This growth trend continued with the 1987 creation of the World Bank's "open general license facility" and the post-1988 gradual tariff and sales tax reductions (Mans 1994: 369). While the percentage growth of imports between the years 1980 and 1991 continuously fluctuated between positive and negative figures, a notable upward trend is discernible. For 1980/1-1982/3, the average annual growth of value of imports based upon current prices registered at -4.3 percent. For the years 1983/4-

1986/7, this average leveled off at zero percent and, for the years 1987/8-1990/1, it reached positive 10.6 percent.

The increase in the value of exports, however, could not keep up with that of imports as the balance of payments figures indicate (Graph 4). The average annual growth of exports during the years 1980/1-1982/3 was -8.7 percent. This figure improved marginally in the years 1983/4-1986/7 to an average of -7.3 percent. By the late 1980's, however, positive growth in the value of Tanzanian exports was attained with the annual average growth rate for 1987/8-1990/1 reaching positive 8.5 percent. Even taking into account unofficial levels of exports which fell under the "own funds" scheme, the growth was not nearly as impressive as that of Tanzania's imports, and producer prices in the ERP years averaged only 59 percent of export price— a level lower than the 72.5 percent average of the 1981-5 crisis years (Mans 1994: 371).

Tanzania's annual percent balance of trade has been negative since 1980/1. However, this trade gap has been narrowed and widened over the course of the decade and several trends are perceptible. The trade ratio fluctuated considerably in the early 1980's with a high of 54 percent from 1980 to 1981 and a low of -103 percent for 1981 to 1982. For the next two years, the gap between imports and exports would grow at an average rate of 14.1 percent. For the years 1984/5 and 1985/6, the average would fall to a negative 22.6 percent. This negative growth would be temporarily relieved by a 7.8 percent increase in the trade ratio in 1986/7, but would plummet again in 1987/8 to a
negative 29.0 percent and remain in negative territory with an average of -5.5 percent for the years 1988/9 through 1990/1.48

Balance of payments figures experienced a slight improvement in the years 1980/1 and 1982/3 as the gap between import and export levels decreased by 17.3 percent and 36.5 percent, respectively. However, for the year in between, 1981/2, the gap would widen by 19.6 percent. The balance of payments deficit would resume its decline in 1983/4 by 27.1 percent, followed by a rate of 43 percent in 1984/5. The decline continued from 1985/6 through 1990/1 at an average of -9.2 percent, with a relative high of -22.3 percent in 1985/6 and a relative low of -1.4 percent for 1988/9.49 The post-reform increase in exports is explained to have resulted from the "significant increase in nontraditional agricultural and manufactured products" (Mans 1994: 390), in addition to "improved producer prices, better availability of agricultural inputs, and an expansion of nontraditional exports".50

In response to Tanzania's declining balance of trade, the World Bank development assistance, in support of ERP, "has concentrated on balance-of-payments support to enhance the country's import capacity and on the process of policy reform", contrasting with the Bank's earlier focus upon project assistance.51 This support for import


49 Ibid., pp. 590-1.

50 IMF Survey- National Economies, "Tanzanian Restores Economic Growth and Speeds Structural Change with IMF Support", Feb. 22, 1993, p. 61. The figures in Graph 4 represent only trade through official channels and not that which had been undertaken through unofficial illegal channels.

capacity was begun modestly in 1982/3 and accelerated with the advent of the ERP to approximately USD 380 million per year by the early 1990's, or about one-third of total yearly imports.52 Such foreign assistance comes with a price and, as Graph 6 illustrates, Tanzania's external debt has more than doubled since 1983. The total external debt as a percentage of total exports increased from 318 percent in 1980 to 1071 percent in 1990. Additionally, the total debt service as a percentage of total exports also rose, from 20 percent in 1980 to 26 percent in 1990 (Bagachwa and Mbelle 1993b: 19). This debt further burdened the Tanzanian economy by curtailing both savings and investment, as well as the purchasing of necessary imports (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992b: 35-6).

The value of these huge foreign aid sums, however, was mitigated by the increasing costs faced by Tanzania's economy. When the assistance of USD 6 billion during the ERP period is adjusted for the changes in the terms of trade (see Graph 5), the average net real assistance increased by only 9 percent of the average net transfers of the crisis years (Mans 1994: 391). Due to numerous changing factors, the average real net transfers per capita have actually declined in the ERP years (Mans 1994: 391). Foreign aid, nonetheless, has helped the Tanzanian leadership to deal with its fiscal deficit. Previously, the deficit was financed almost exclusively through national banks. Foreign assistance has contributed to a decrease in the deficit from 12.1 percent of the GDP prior to the ERP to 3.1 percent following its implementation.

52 Ibid., p. 121.

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Another positive trend in the Tanzanian economy is the decreasing rate of inflation. The World Bank has reported that the average annual inflation rate in the pre-crisis period of 1970-1980 registered at 14.0 percent. This was followed by an average rate of 31.0 percent for the crisis years of 1981-1985 and by the slightly smaller average rate of 25.7 percent in the ERP years of 1986-1991 (Mans 1994: 356). The World Bank continues to call for greater government enforcement of monetary controls to further control inflation which remains at unacceptably high levels (Mans 1994: 387).

As with the rate of inflation, a positive trend is visible with regard to the rate of investment prior to the 1992 transition, though the levels achieved remain far from adequate in the eyes of the international donor community and, as the World Bank claims, of Tanzanians (Mans 1994: 388). While overall government investment has risen both in absolute value (see Graph 7) and as a percentage of GDP to 38 percent in the ERP period from a level of 23 percent in 1976, and 15 percent in 1984, it is still considered to be quite insufficient. This is largely due to the fact that most investment is compromised by relatively low levels of efficiency and, hence, low rates of return (Mans 1994: 388).

As of 1991, private investment accounted for 26 percent of GDP, or 68 percent of total investment. This level was up from 10 and 9 percent of GDP in 1976 and 1984, respectively. Much of this investment was of foreign, as opposed to domestic, savings which mainly derives from the public sector, with a relatively low to negative amount coming from private savings (Mans 1994: 388). While domestic savings experienced an increase from the 1984 level of 7 percent of GDP,

The ability of Tanzanians to engage in saving has been curtailed by the continued high levels of inflation, despite the decline in the inflationary rate.\footnote{This is resultant from a combination of such factors as de-nationalized companies seeking to increase their profits and increased expenditure on imports. Another possible cause for increased prices is an increase in the minimum wage. Indeed such a raise came into effect with the 1989-90 budget. It was raised from Tsh 1,645 to Tsh 2,075 a month, while taxable income was raised from Tsh 1,500 to Tsh 1,900 and income tax was lowered by five percent. However, these wage hikes were insufficient to offset inflation, (\textit{Africa Research Bulletin-Economic Series}, August 31, 1989, p. 9642).} Since 1986, also, the budget has called for price hikes on certain items classified as 'luxury' as well as increased school tuitions. Consumer savings have been further curtailed by the continued devaluation of the Tsh.\footnote{Ibid., p. 9643.}

The study of consumer investment and savings, as well as producer prices, move the research toward evaluation of the impact of the more aggregate economic trends upon the individual Tanzanian consumer. Regarding government investment in social services, investment in primary health care and education declined in the years under study despite increased government expenditures. These investments were compromised by a combination of increased demand, misallocation of...
resources and poor financial management (Mans 1994: 407). Such increase in demand resulted from the post-ERP increase in incomes and consumption levels analyzed below.

Government expenditure on education declined in terms of percentage of GDP, from 3.9 to 1.5 to 1.1 percent in 1980, 1985 and 1991 respectively, despite a steady, albeit slight, increase in absolute investment in education since 1985, from Tsh 772 million to 929 million, in 1992, at constant prices.\(^5\) Enrollment at the first and third levels declined, respectively, for those years by .07 and 8.1 percent. Only at the secondary level has school enrollment increased, and done so by more than 130 percent.\(^6\)

Public expenditure on health care also fell, from 1.8 percent of GDP in 1980 to 1.1 percent in 1985, but it then regained some ground with 1.5 percent in 1991\(^7\). This percentage decline occurred despite the fact that this sector experienced a gain in absolute terms, from Tsh 224 million in 1980 to 382 million in 1992, at constant prices.\(^8\) The central government's investment in public safety experienced a slight increase, from 1.3 percent of GDP in 1980, to 1.8 percent in 1985 and 1.9 percent in 1991.\(^9\)


\(^6\) Figures derived from UN Statistical Yearbook, 1992, p. 68.

\(^7\) UN Statistical Yearbook, 1992, pp. 220-1.


A similarly positive trend is perceptible with regard to per capita consumption levels which recovered in the post-reform period from the decline which was caused, in part, by the earlier severe goods shortages. As Graph 8 illustrates, per capita GDP rates experienced a precipitous decline from 1980 to 1983. This would be followed by a notable increase beginning in 1984 and continuing through 1992. In the pre-reform years of 1980 through 1983, the average per capita GDP declined by an average rate of 3.8 percent. From 1983 to 1985, this rate of change would actually grow by an average annual rate of 1 percent. In the post-reform period, this average annual rate increased slightly to 1.3 percent, with the 1991-2 increase reaching a record 2.9 percent.61

Population growth affects the GNP per capita figures and the Tanzanian population indeed experienced a considerable population increase from 18,098,000 in 1980 to an estimated 25,201,000 in 1991. The average annual growth rate of the population over this 11 year period has been 3 percent, fluctuating from a low of 2.8 percent in the years 1985/6 and 1986/7 and a high of 3.3 percent in 1988/9.62

Tanzanian consumers were challenged by a negative trend in the minimum wage which, by 1986, had plunged to a level one third lower than that of 1970. While the ERP years did experience some wage hikes, the adjustments were insufficient as they were unable to keep pace with the increasing cost of living (Mans 1994: 378). In fact, the average

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wage adjusted for the cost of living experienced a significant decline from USD 1174 in 1980, to USD 1041 in 1985, to an estimated USD 319 in 1990.63

The cost-of-living trend has been directly and negatively affected by the increasing rate of inflation reflected in the consumer price index (CPI). Graph 9 depicts the considerable increase in the CPI for food for Tanzanians over the past decade, emphasized by comparison with the U.S. CPI for food shown for these same years.64 While the annual percent increase in the U.S. figure averaged 4 percent, that for Tanzania averaged a relatively high 28 percent. Tanzanian non-food CPI also increased substantially from an index of 100 in 1982/3 to 373 in 1987/88 for an average annual rate of increase of over thirty percent.65 The urban cost of living index also experienced an increase, growing by 256.8 percent since 1986. From a level of 85.1 in 1976, the rate rose substantially to 775.2 in 1986 and, by 1990, it had reached 1,990.8 (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992b: 39).

Another indicator of the worsening economic conditions for Tanzanians is the significant jump in the retail price cost of living index for Dar es Salaam's minimum wage earners. Following an actual improvement in 1986 from the 1976 level of 989 to 787.9, that figure grew by 281.9 percent to a level of 2,220.8 in 1990 (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992b: 39-40).

63 UN Statistical Yearbook, 1992.

64 Ibid., p. 348.

In sum, statistical analysis of Tanzania's economic performance suggests that, with the exception of the balance and terms of trade, Tanzania's more national-level economic indicators have responded favorably to the ERPs implemented in the mid 1980's. While the trade imbalance has resulted in the rise in external debt, the increased level of aid is seen to enable the country to make its necessary imports. Also, there has been a considerable decline in the value of the Tanzanian currency. While this, too, is a negative trend, the reduction has been undertaken as a means to better enable Tanzania to operate in the global market and can, thereby, be considered to have longer-term positive effects. Thus, a general climb in the aggregate-level economic indicators is suggested and may offer support for the hypothesis that economic growth and development affect democratic transition. Indeed, according to both World Bank and Tanzanian economic sources, the Tanzanian economy has undergone a "turn around" with regard to economic performance in all sectors of the economy since the crisis of the early 1980's and the implementation of the 1986 reforms (Mans 1994: 355).

This climb is also reflected in such economic indicators as the level of government investment in the social sector, including health, education and public safety. Also, perhaps in large part due to the stemming of goods shortages with the growth in imports, the consumer-level indicator of per capita consumption has experienced an increase over this pre-transition period. There has also been a rise in the per capita GDP reflective of the general GDP growth over the past decade. Again, these national-level findings may offer support to the
hypothesis that economic growth, through rising economic expectations which fuels domestic opposition, prompts democratic political change.

However, other individual-level indicators, such as minimum wage, producer prices and costs of living experienced an apparent decline in performance during this period. Consumer price indices have also risen which adversely affect the Tanzanian consumer. It is plausible that these negative trends suggest the relevance of the hypothesized interrelation between economic decline and political transition to democracy in the case of Tanzania despite the fact that such decline is not perceived by the major international economic organizations nor by the Tanzanian government itself to be illustrative of Tanzania’s general pre-transition economic experience.

While Tanzanian and international economic experts contend that there indeed has been considerable growth, particularly at the aggregate level, they are simultaneously aware that the levels of growth may be inadequate to sustain Tanzania’s economy. Some hold that, in spite of the record high general levels of growth, the economy remains unquestionably and woefully unable to combat the country’s poverty. As summarized in an IMF report,

although after seven years [since 1985] the environment for higher economic growth has improved, the results are only partially encouraging. Economic growth has only slightly exceeded population growth, and officially measured domestic savings have deteriorated. Meanwhile, Tanzania’s dependency on foreign assistance has increased, which has led to a deterioration of the current account of the balance of payments. This development has given rise to an increasingly heated debate about whether real adjustment is taking place in Tanzania or whether
foreign aid is postponing rather than supporting adjustment.\textsuperscript{66}

The data collected, which was largely derived from World Bank, IMF and United Nations statistical sources is, by its nature, of questionable reliability. Due to the many factors which make collection of this information difficult, especially in Third World nations such as Tanzania, the data is likely to be incomplete and possibly even inaccurate. Some of the indicators were derived from Tanzanian sources which may, likewise, be incomplete or based upon estimates in circumstances wherein accurate tallies are not possible. The objectivity of Tanzanian government sources may also be mitigated somewhat as leaders may attempt to skew information for the purpose of furthering their political agendas. However, these are the best and most reliable sources of economic information which are available. Interpretation of the Tanzanian economic experiences by those interviewed will aid in identifying economic trends prior to 1992, in addition to providing assessment of the causal role which these factors played in prompting the democratic transition.

As the statistical data cannot provide information on the causal relation between economic change and political transition- its contribution being, at best, correlational- it is only through interpretation by individuals who were involved in bringing about the democratic transition that any causal understanding can be attained.

For this reason, the study now turns to the interpretations provided by interviews with members of Tanzania's political leadership.

It has been suggested that the interviewees can offer insight into the economic performance developments in the years preceding the transition. The interviewees—whether they be of the ruling party, CCM, or members of the political opposition—should be relatively equally able to make such assessments. However, it will be necessary to distinguish between these two groups of interviewees when dealing with the second issue: that of the causal relation between economic change and political transition. After all, non-government leaders, by virtue of their non-participation in government deliberations, are less likely to be capable of ascertaining the considerations which went into the government's decision to implement multiparty transition.

Attention will first be directed toward understanding trends in economic performance as perceived by Tanzania's political players—both of CCM and of the opposition (for which both categories of interviewees are equally suited).

From the interviews, it became evident that the Tanzanian economic experience of recent years was one of considerable economic decline and crisis. Some of the interviewees made the connection between the poor economic performance and the onset of democratization while others suggested that the events were unrelated. Significantly, those who did interpret a causal relation between these two events tended to be of the ruling party while opposition leaders, however aware of the economic crisis, cited other causal variables. They particularly cited the causal impact of the related factor of donor pressure for democratization. The relation between donor policy and 61
the economic crisis exists as economic decline translates into Tanzania's greater dependency upon the donors. Such increased dependency leaves little room for negotiation and, ultimately, a desperate recipient state must accept almost any contingency tied to much needed aid. Another finding from the interview data is the suggestion of the possible causal role played by economic policy change— the economic liberalization of the mid-1980's. This observation adds a causal trajectory to Figure 5 of Chapter 1 and Figure 6 of this chapter.

Looking first at the factor of economic performance change as perceived by the CCM leadership, one National Assembly member explained that there was no doubt that the country's economic performance throughout the 1980's and early 1990's had declined. He, however, was intent on absolving Tanzania's socialist economic policy of any blame. After all, he argued, "similar economic problems occurred and were taking place in capitalist and multiparty systems".

A representative of the Ministry of Finance acknowledged the recent poor performance of the Tanzanian economy and described the necessary actions being undertaken by the country's leadership to enhance the productivity of the economy rather dramatically under the guidance of the international donor organizations. Accordingly, "the World Bank supported economic liberalization to increase efficiency. It advocated a change in the parastatal sector and to disengage the government from non-productive sectors and ventures. It advocates a decreased role of the government in the productive sector through the privatization of the parastatals."
Several Members of Parliament also held that the Tanzanian recent economic experience has decidedly been one of decline. One noted the continuing shortage of foodstuffs and increasing levels of unemployment. Another argued that Tanzania's poor economic performance record was particularly dismal on the Islands of Zanzibar.

A veteran politician and Parliamentarian explained that Tanzania's economic experience was indeed one of poor performance which was the result of failures of the current socialist economic system which was ignoring the needs of the people. He also argued that it was the advocates and supporters of the current socialist system would "take advantage of a capitalist system. [That is because] the corrupt elements of a socialist system will continue to benefit from the system within capitalism as they already have the foundations set up for business". He suggested that "parastatals should be left (or abandoned) and opened up to competition. An economic program must be decided upon. There must be coordination. There is a need for an industrial base, but a national one, and the only way to guarantee that is with government intervention in the economy, in industry."

An academic who served as a member of the Nyalali Commission also supported the notion that the Tanzanian economy was not performing well in the years prior to the transition. He termed this economic decline "the failure of development" and blamed it, in part, on "the liberalization and stabilization prescribed by the IMF and World Bank (including donor agencies)" (Luanda 1994:3).

Outside of CCM, another academic who had previously served as an ambassador to Tanzania explained that the increasingly dismal economic situation of Tanzanians was evident by the fact that
people are hungry, uneducated and not receiving proper health care. There have been no alternatives for employment other than in/through CCM. This has led to the socioeconomic crisis because of the lack of contradiction which has stifled economic development. Though, there has been some social development. Almost every village has a primary school and dispensary. But social development and consumption must be maintained by economic development and, therefore, it, too, is failing. By the end of the 1970's, an acute crisis arose and, by the early 1980's, there was both an economic and social crisis- the situation having been exacerbated by the war with Uganda [1979] and the collapse of the East African Community [EAC] in 1977 which meant that Tanzania had to develop its own infrastructure. The 1981-2 economic crisis brought about a battle between Nyerere and the IMF/World Bank.

The impact of this controversy played out as follows:

The early World Bank policy had been in support of capitalist, rural progressive development. Since the late 1950's, their emphasis was on export crop production [and] since 1979, the IMF has been working jointly with the World Bank.

Nyerere opposed the capitalist reforms. He maintained that there continued to be party supremacy and that the government was to be the implementor of party policy regardless of the economic situation. Loans, according to the Party, were to go to the distribution of social services rather than to production. The loans then came to a halt. A crisis erupted and there was corruption in the institutions resulting from a shortage of goods. This is a common experience in developing countries.

For opposition leaders, too, the bleakness of Tanzania's recent economic experience was readily apparent citing the "shortage of almost everything" by the time of the transition, and the rampant economic corruption that plagued Tanzanian economic development efforts.

Was there a connection, though, between this economic decline in the pre-transition years and the onset of multiparty transition in
1992? Among the Members of Parliament who were interviewed, assessment of the causal connection would vary. While one MP held that "economic problems are tied to economic liberalization but that does not necessarily entail political liberalization", another offered the reverse relation between these two factors arguing that "political liberalization leads to and necessitates free market economics".

The economic decline, another argued, triggered the democratic transition by creating "a widening of income gaps and the differences became very visible [and] those without began to call for change". He, thereby, also identified the role played by the intermediate variable of domestic opposition which, affected by the declining economy, put pressure upon the leadership for political change.

A representative from the Zanzibari island of Pemba argued that "democratization is related to wealth. It is an idea of the wealthy". The people of the Islands, accordingly, were convinced by the wealthy of the country that multiparty democracy would bring about wealth and, because of the poverty on the Islands, political liberalization was supported. However, he contends that, because of the continued post-1992 poverty of the Islands, "if the Commission [the Nyalali Commission] were conducting its polling now [July 1994], after the country has experienced some multipartyism and there has not been economic improvement, the people will no longer see linkage between multipartyism and economic growth".

In addition to Parliament Members, an insider's perspective can be gleaned from the statements given by non-government leaders who served on the government's Nyalali Commission. According to one such academician, "political change was resultant from the economic crisis
of the 1980's, the liberalization and stabilization programmes prescribed by the IMF and World Bank—and [the loss]—of legitimacy of the single-party monopolization of the political economy (Luanda 1994: 3).

Turning to those outside of the government, a fellow academic and previous ambassador to Tanzania also suggested the existence of such a linkage. He argued that because of the poor socio-economic situation, "there is need for a popular democracy to bring about development. In other words, a democracy with liberal, cultural, social and economic dimensions, or a socialist political system with a capitalist economy".

None of the opposition leaders directly cited the causal relation between the decline of the economic performance and the onset of multiparty transition in Tanzania. However, they, as would some government members, suggest a causal connection between economic policy change and the political change to multiparty democracy. This direct causal relation is not hypothesized by the transition theorists. However, modernization theory would suggest that these two factors are indeed causally related, however indirectly through the intervening variable of economic and industrial development and growth.

Referring to economic policy, as opposed to performance, change, a representative of the Ministry of Finance, while offering no direct connection between economic policy change and political change, did make clear that Tanzania was indeed undergoing fundamental economic policy change in the years preceding the transition. As aforestated, he explained that "the World Bank supported economic liberalization to increase efficiency. It advocated a change in the parastatal sector and [the disengagement of] the government from non-productive sectors
and ventures. It advocates a decreased role of the government in the productive sector through the privatization of the parastatals."

This economic policy change, an MP explains, "could have been a chaotic change. But, it was well controlled by Nyerere's policy: development to the common people, equality (including gender equality), and unity with purpose. Effort to remove capitalists and exploiters was not successful but it led to educated socialism through state mechanism and produced those able to lead a free market economy. [The only problem was that] they lacked capital." He reneged somewhat on his assertion that the economic policy change was in the best interest of Tanzanians arguing that, despite poor socialist economic performance, "Nyerere's Ujamaa villages and cooperatives remain popular. The literacy rate is greater than 85 percent and the people who supported Nyerere's policies continue to support CCM."

An academic offered an interpretation of the relation between this economic policy and the political change to multipartyism, arguing that "political changes were not brought about by economic liberalization". Accordingly, "there were no strong economic interests and therefore economic liberalization did not force political liberalization. The 1987 [economic] changes created a 'nouveau riche' who supported continuation of the single-party system. They sought the stability of no changes. They were dependent upon the government for contacts and connections."

For another Nyalali Commission member and academic, the reverse was true. He explained that the February 1991 Zanzibar Declaration by the National Executive Committee of the CCM "sounded the death knell of the Arusha Declaration [which entailed the legitimation of single-party
politics]. The Zanzibar Declaration [which] permits CCM members as well as leaders to acquire shares in private companies, to draw more than one salary and to become landlords, signals the loss of legitimacy of the State/Party" (Luanda 1994: 6).

Similarly, a former Finance Ministry official and present-day political opposition leader explained that "economic liberalization is intrinsically tied to political liberalization. There is a need for openness to challenge ideas and [this is simply not possible] within the framework of CCM." A religious leader, however, would counter this assessment, holding that the economic policy change "just legalized that which they [the government officials] already were involved in. Therefore, economic change did not create a source of opposition to the [single-party] regime".

An academic and former ambassador to Tanzania related the two phenomena, suggesting that there was a need for further economic policy change, in part, because of the introduction of a democratic political system. Accordingly,

a model must be designed, significantly, though, with a role for the state. Remote areas require government action for their development because market forces will not provide them with the necessary social services. For agriculture, they need tools, seeds, etc. for there to be production. They also need markets and infrastructure. With the mid-1980's liberalization, some areas were unable to sell their crops. Therefore, there is a need for a combination of the economic system with democracy; a philosophical view for developing countries. It must mean the development and fulfillment of human rights with provisions and satisfaction of basic human needs which, holistically, are 1) liberty and liberal democracy, 2) meeting economic and social needs, and 3) meeting development needs.
In sum, the interviewee findings appear to support the claim that the economic experience of Tanzania in the pre-transition years was one of decline and not of growth. Therefore, this revelation modifies the causal hypotheses generated by the body of transition literature and requires that the factor of "economic change" which is represented in Figures 5 and 6, in chapters 1 and 2, respectively, be changed to "economic decline". This finding challenges the arguments that modernization and economic growth, respectively, cause multiparty transition, at least in the recent Tanzanian case. Only the proposed hypothesis that economic performance decline has causal relation with democratic transition is supported. Additionally, the hypotheses that economic policy change prompts democratic transition was suggested by the interviewees.

Regarding the causal relation between such economic decline and the onset of multiparty transition, the interview responses have offered support for all three of the trajectories illustrated in Figure 6. The existence of a trajectory b (direct relation between economic change and political transition) has been supported by such claims as "political change was resultant from the economic crisis of the 1980's"; "people are hungry, uneducated and not receiving proper health care. There is need for a popular democracy to bring about development"; and "the poor economic conditions on the Tanzanian islands led to the islanders' support of democratic transition". However some interviewees did not mention economic change at all as a cause of the transition and others specifically challenged the notion that it played any causal role and argued that there simply was no inherent linkage between economic and political liberalization.
It also was suggested that economic grievances played a significant role in the multiparty transition, which would confirm the existence of trajectory a, which depicts the causal connection between economic decline and multiparty transition through the intermediary factor of domestic opposition. As one MP explained, "it was only in the late 1980's and early 1990's that such complaints could be freely aired". Accordingly, this was possible in the context of Nyerere's campaign to revitalize the Party which encouraged open participation in the one-party versus multiple party debate. For one opposition leader, "the pressure for change came from civic institutions such as the Chamber of Commerce, farmers, workers, cooperatives. There were economic problems and they demanded change. Especially in 1985, when the pressure was also applied by the general people because there was a shortage of just about everything." For another, "after independence, Nyerere saw to it that the people had no voice and therefore he was unaware of what they wanted. They have simply been dragged around. They have had to cue for food and, without a voice, they have been unable to create an uprising against the laws of the country." It is this economic destitution that has led Tanzanians today to try to reclaim their political "voice". However, and as will be dealt with in the following chapter, this opposition leader asserts that despite the growing domestic opposition generated in part by a declining economy, it was only with foreign pressures for democratic change that the transition ever came about.

A former member of the Finance Ministry and a present opposition leader argued that it is difficult to distinguish economy-driven opposition from politically-driven opposition. The two are
intrinsically related particularly because "one had to disguise challenge to the single-party system with calls for greater [economic] efficiency, accountability, etc." One opposition leader even suggested that, with the societal discontent brought about by the economic hardships and, relatedly, the high level corruption, "if CCM continues to be corrupt _ and makes few changes, there will be bloodshed. They are sitting on explosives. [It is uncertain] how well controlled the army is by the government [and, furthermore, it is likely that the] bloodshed will come from civil society. While there are no divisions in Tanzanian society along the lines of those in Rwanda, there is a unified opposition against the corrupt government."

Have the interviewee findings similarly supported the inclusion of trajectory c which connects economic change (decline) to democratization through the intervening variable of democratic donor aid contingency? One opposition leader specifically argued that "the economic vulnerability of Tanzania enabled the international donor community to call for political liberalization, though there was no direct pressure applied". Another suggested that while foreign donor pressure was the driving force of the transition, the donors were responding to the economic crisis situation inside of Tanzania. Accordingly, "the donors want to see greater accountability in the country [and] these international actors want for the Tanzanian people to have more say through trade unions".

As it has been suggested that the relative significance of the responses by members of the ruling party/state may be greater than the causal interpretations given by non-government members, it is of significance that a Parliamentarian also suggested the role of the
intermediary role played by democratic donor aid contingencies. He argued that "the decline in the economy led to greater influence of the lending institutions [upon the Tanzanian government for democratic change]." Another explained that, by pointing out the economic differences between Tanzania and other countries of the world—"showing Tanzania how it compared with other nations," the international lending institutions prevailed upon the Tanzanian government to undertake democratization.

It should be noted that because of the likely interest which politicians have of crediting actions which they take as having emanated from domestic concern—preferably, from within the leadership itself, the existence of this trajectory was not readily identified by the majority of Parliamentarians or other government and Party members interviewed. Therefore, as will be the case with the findings of Chapter 5, which specifically addresses the factor of democratic donor aid contingency, the omission can perhaps be better explained by political reasons than by its actual irrelevance to the transition. Nonetheless, members of the government did indeed support all three of the hypothesized causal trajectories emanating from economic performance decline.

The additional factor of economic policy change in the form of economic liberalization, or the change from a predominantly socialist to a predominantly capitalist economic system, was identified by some as having a causal effect upon multiparty transition. All five of the interviewees who made reference to this relation were academics, with some having served on the Nyalali commission and others involved presently in opposition politics. Notably, one from each category
dismissed this causal connection based upon the assessment that the economic policy changes had the effect of generating, and maintaining, the support among the "nouveau riche" for the single-party political system for which they credited their economic successes.

**Conclusion**

Other than the possible addition of a causal trajectory from economic policy change to democratic transition, no other direct or indirect causal factors relating to economic change were suggested. Nor were the reverse hypotheses, in which domestic opposition and/or donor aid contingency have effect on political transition through the intervening variable of economic change, suggested. (Such suggestions would require that the uni-directional character of the causal arrows be altered to reflect reciprocal causality).

Therefore, the direct trajectory from economic policy change to political transition is added to Figure 6, in addition to the specification of economic performance decline as the relevant economic performance change. Despite some of the statistical findings, there was no suggestion by those interviewed that there had been economic growth and, therefore, no suggestion that socio-economic modernization or development as indicated by short-term macro-economic growth had played a causal role in bringing about the Tanzanian political transition.

While the national-level economic statistics, in particular, tend to generally support the notion that the Tanzanian economy has made great strides since the implementation of reform in 1986, the economic change responsible for affecting political liberalization was perceived
by the interviewees as *performance decline* in Tanzania's recent history. It would appear that the negative effects of the economy were much more pervasive in forming the interviewees' perceptions about Tanzania's recent economic experience than were its positive experiences. This may, as suggested earlier, result from the fact that it has largely been the more consumer-level indicators which have fared poorly in recent years and these are the very factors about which the average Tanzanian and, therefore, their representatives, are very much aware.

It should not be overlooked that some of the interviewees emphatically denied that any change in the economy played a role in the political transition. However, this does not negate the perceptions of the other political leaders and, thus, it does not disprove the possible causal interrelation between economic decline and transition to multiparty politics in the case of Tanzania.

The modifications to Figure 6 are illustrated in Figure 7 below.

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 7.** Economic liberalization and decline and multiparty transition

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Chapter 3 will now proceed to analyze the other more distally-related factor of global democratization.
Graph 1. Tanzania's gross domestic product (millions of 1987 Tsh).

Graph 2. Tanzania's gross national product (millions of 1987 Tsh).

(Source: The World Bank. World Tables 1993)
Graph 3. Value of the Tsh in terms of the USD.

Graph 4. Tanzania's balance of trade (millions of USD).

(Source: The World Bank. World Tables 1993)
Graph 5. Tanzania's terms of trade (Index 1987=100).
Graph 6. Tanzania's external debt (millions of USD).

(Source: U.N. Statistical Yearbook, 1992)
Graph 7. Tanzanian central government's direct investment (millions of USD).

Graph 8. Tanzania's GDP per capita (at 1976 prices, Tsh)

(Source: National Accounts of Tanzania, 1976-1992)
Graph 9. Consumer price index for food (1980=100).

(Source: UN Statistical Yearbook, 1993)
Chapter 3 looks at the causal significance of the proposed factor of global political change with regard to the onset of multiparty transition in Tanzania. Based upon Figure 5 in Chapter 1, Figure 8 below highlights the proposed interrelations of global democratization as it relates directly to the decision to undergo multiparty transition and indirectly through the intermediary variables of domestic opposition and donor aid contingency. Respectively, these routes are labeled trajectories \( f \), \( d \) and \( e \).

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 8. Global democratization and multiparty transition**

Trajectory \( d \) represents the theory that the occurrence of one or more external transitions prompts proponents of multipartyism in Tanzania to take action against their authoritarian leadership.
Domestic opposition forces, accordingly, identify with the multiparty activists in the external transitional country or countries.

As trajectory e illustrates, democratization abroad may also influence donor nations to push for political liberalization in light of the current global trends. Donor nations, themselves, tend to be largely democratic and, for both political and economic reasons, they may encourage democratization in countries to whom they give assistance (see Chapter 5). This effect, it is argued, has become increasingly relevant following the collapse of the communist world which has forced Third World nations to rely largely upon the West for assistance.

Trajectory f illustrates a direct relation between global democratization and the elite decision to undertake multiparty transition. This is based on the reasoning that an increase in global democratization can serve as indication to domestic single-party leaders of their inevitable fate thereby triggering multiparty transition through the effect of demonstration or contagion (Lutz 1989; Huntington 1991).

The research tests these hypotheses to determine whether or not there exists a causal relation between an increase in the number of global transitions to democracy and the onset of the Tanzanian transition in 1992. Interviews with Tanzanian political leaders will be relied upon to establish the relevance of this correlation to the case of Tanzania. Presentation of the global democratization experiences in the years prior to the Tanzanian transition will provide the historical background necessary to understand the explanations of the interviewees. These global transition events are located along a time-line in Table 1.
As Table 1 depicts, nearly one hundred and twenty transitions to multiparty politics have occurred globally since 1970. While 1980 serves as the general starting year for the analyses of the other four factors in this research, the base year of 1970 has been selected for the examination of the effects of this variable upon Tanzanian politics. This starting point has been selected as the Tanzanian transition is seen to fall within the “third wave of democratization” which extends from the early 1970's to the present. This democratization wave is defined as "a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposition direction during that period of time" (Huntington 1991: 15). The two previous democratization waves in modern times are identified as having taken place between 1828 and 1926, and from 1943 to 1962. Since Huntington suggests an interrelation between transitions within a single wave, the inclusion of his hypothesized early-wave transitions (those that occurred in the 1970's) may enhance this study and its findings, and the omission of these early cases serves little analytical value.

For the factor of global democratization to have had causal effect upon Tanzania's transition, a greater number of global political transitions to multipartyism needed to have taken place in the years immediately preceding 1992 than occurred in years previous. If such

67 Analysis of the ‘transitions in the opposite direction’ will be conducted below and is represented in Table 2 and Graph 11.

68 While the Tanzanian transition officially took place in 1992, government debate over the relative virtues of single and multiparty political system began one to two years earlier (see Chapter 5), manifested in the 1991 creation of the Nyalali Commission.
an increase did not occur, or had it occurred at other times considerably earlier than 1992, it would be plausible to conclude that this variable was not a significant causal determinant of the Tanzanian transition. Afterall, should a significant increase in global transitions have occurred a decade or so before 1992, if this variable is relevant, the Tanzanian transition should have taken place at that time. That it did not would either suggest the irrelevance of this variable or the necessary interrelation between global transitions and another factor which was not simultaneously present at that earlier date but which was existent in 1992. Should 1992 follow a declining trend in global democratization, the theory would also not be supported.

Numerous countries have undertaken multiparty transition in the years preceding the 1992 Tanzanian transition. Not all of these transitions, however, have manifested in a consolidated democracy. The possibility or actuality that these states may revert, or have reverted, subsequently, to single-party politics, or that elections and party formation may be, or have since been, seriously compromised by corrupt practices of the ruling party, does not however negate the initial introduction of multipartyism. Effort is made, therefore, to identify the time at which multiparty transition was implemented in external states regardless of the possible negligible political change following the transition or subsequent moves away from democracy.

This task of identifying the dates of multiparty implementation around the world is necessarily fraught with difficulties due to the enormous number of cases and the subsequent need to summarily
categorize political systems and to discern instances of fundamental shift in policy from single- to multipartyism. For this study, the official political system is seen to have undergone fundamental change toward democratization if there is any move, even if only in policy and not practice, away from single-party authoritarianism toward the creation of a pluralist multiparty political system. The assessments are largely based upon international observation by scholarly studies, secondary news sources and analyses by international political watch groups, notably *Freedom House*.

Graph 10 illustrates that the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, in fact, do display relatively large numbers of transition cases compared to prior years, with ten occurring in 1989, thirty-seven in 1991 and thirty in 1990. With only three to four cases in each of the years 1983 through 1988, 1982 stands out, relatively, as another 'transition year' with a high of six cases. The years 1970 through 1982 exhibited a total of only fourteen transition cases, with one occurring in each of the years 1970, 1973, 1976, 1978, 1979 and 1981, three cases in 1974, and five in 1977.

Thus, the hypothesized interrelation between an increase in the number of global transitions and the prompting of additional transitions appears to be upheld in the case of Tanzania. Though, the value of this finding would be compromised if the number of transitions from multipartyism to single-partyism, or reverse transitions, also experienced a comparable increase in the years immediately preceding 1992. It is necessary, therefore, to test the opposite hypothesis which would hold that an increase in the number of countries which experience transition from multipartyism to single-partyism, or reverse
transition, would tend to deter subsequent democratic transitions in other countries. In other words, as the number of transitions away from multiparty politics increases, the likelihood of multiparty transition in other states is likely to decline. A predominance of reverse transitions would influence other states to not engage in political liberalization but, rather, to maintain, or revert to, single party politics.

What is evident from Table 2 and the corresponding Graph 11 is that since 1970 the highest number of democratic reversals took place in the years 1981 and 1991, each with five cases—a considerably small number relative to the number of forward political transitions in the early 1990's. The years 1973, 1976, 1980 and 1982 each experienced two such cases, while 1977, 1986, 1989, 1990 and 1992 each witnessed one political 'reversal'. However, the relative absolute value of these transitions is unknown. A more significant observation perhaps is that the graph of reversals is dual-peaked, suggesting that the impact of the events of 1991 should have been similar to those of 1981. The fact that transition in Tanzania did not take place immediately after 1981 challenges its relevance.

The only means by which this hypothesis could be substantiated would be to view the small number of forward transitions in 1992 as resultant from the relatively high number of reversals in the year prior. Though, this adaptation of the theory is negated by the relatively high number of forward transitions occurring a decade earlier in 1982, despite the record high reversals in 1981. These findings further justify exploration of the relationship between global forward transitions and the Tanzanian multiparty transition of 1992.
The significance of the relatively high 1989, 1990 and 1991 showings will now be more closely examined along the lines of two classifications of transitional states which may help us to better understand their influence upon the Tanzanian transition. First, the economic and political relations between the transitional countries and Tanzania will be explored in terms of trade and alliances, followed by the assessment of the significance of economic and political similarities.

The countries which experienced transition during these years are then subdivided for the purpose of better understanding the relative significance or influence vis-a-vis Tanzania. Transitional states are classified according to their interrelations and/or similarities with Tanzania. The classification scheme is based on the following two hypotheses. The first holds that the greater and/or more significant the political and/or economic relations are between a country x and Tanzania, the more influential country x's political change will be on the Tanzanian political system. The second hypothesis asserts that the greater the political and/or economic similarities are between a country x and Tanzania, the more influential country x's political change will be upon political reform in Tanzania.

To test the first hypothesis, trade relations between Tanzania and countries undergoing political transition to multipartyism are examined. In addition to individual bilateral trade relations, attention will be given to Tanzania's relations with other states

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69 While bilateral aid relations would also be of significance, no aid donor to Tanzania has undergone political transition in the years under study.
through membership in the multinational political/economic organizations of the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Front Line States (FLS), and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the Group of 77 (G77) within the United Nations. As membership in an organization creates a political and/or economic relationship as well as a similarity, this hypothesis necessarily overlaps with the second hypothesis.

This second hypothesis, which suggests the importance of similarities between Tanzania and other countries undergoing political transition, entails analysis of transitional countries based upon their geographic location and political/economic ideology—a factor that was quite divisive especially during the Cold War years.

Trade relations between Tanzania and those countries which underwent political transition between 1970 and 1992 are depicted in terms of percentage of Tanzania's total imports and exports on Graph 12. In the 1970's, Tanzania had trade relations with the following transitional countries: Thailand, Brazil, Greece, Nigeria, Spain, and India. Tanzanian export value to these countries ranged from USD .33 million to Nigeria to USD 40.88 million to India. Value of imports ranged from a low of USD .01 million from Greece to a high of USD 38.08 million from India. As illustrated, this level of trade with India represented Tanzania's highest percentage of trade with a transitional country at any time since 1970.

In 1982, the countries undergoing multiparty transition with whom Tanzania had trade relations were Singapore and Kuwait, with relations with Singapore accounting for 4.0 percent of Tanzanian exports and
almost 3.0 percent of imports, and with that of Kuwait totaling .02 percent of exports and approximately 1.6 percent of imports. Between 1983 and 1988, Tanzania's politically-liberalizing trading partners included Turkey, Pakistan, Sudan, South Korea, Algeria and Hungary, with the percentage of total export value ranging from .02 percent with Turkey to 1.0 percent with Pakistan. The import statistics varied from a low of .01 percent of Tanzania's total coming from Turkey in 1983, and a high of .8 percent generated from trade with South Korea in 1987.

While the percentages of total trade between Tanzania and the countries undergoing transition were virtually unchanged in 1989, the number of liberalizing trading partners increased to four: The Soviet Union, Jordan, Tunisia and Brazil. In 1990, despite the global wave of liberalization, only Cote d'Ivoire and Rwanda, of the transitional countries, had trade relations with Tanzania, amounting to USD .4 million of her export trade and USD 1.02 million of her import trade.

While it is virtually impossible to discern the relative significance of the different levels of trade with transitional countries or of the change in the absolute number of such trading partners, it is apparent that the highest level of trade with transitional states occurred in 1977 with India and in 1982, with Singapore, and less so with Pakistan and Cote d'Ivoire in 1982 and 1990, respectively. 1991, too, witnessed an increase in trade relations with democratizing states amounting to over 3.0 percent of both total exports and imports. Exports to Kenya, alone, amounted to approximately USD 6.2 million while imports valued USD 36.7 million. Tanzania's economically less significant democratizing trading partners in 1991 were Algeria and Zambia.
Alone, thus, this factor does not appear to correlate highly with the onset of multiparty transition in the case of Tanzania due to the fact that trade relations with India which amounted to an estimated USD 40.88 million in export and USD 38.08 million in import in 1977, (the highest of all percentage trade with transitional partners in the two decades studied), did not bring about Tanzanian multiparty transition at that time.

The second type of relation (which is also a type of similarity) existent between Tanzania and transitional countries is that of political alliance. Tanzania has been an active member in international and regional organizations and, for the theories to be valid, multiparty transitions in other member countries are likely to influence Tanzanian politics. They should at least have an influence greater than that of countries without relations with Tanzania. Two such organizations are The Front Line States (FLS), and its economic offshoot, the Southern African Development and Cooperation Council (SADCC). Also discussed are Tanzania's roles in the East African Community (EAC), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and the United Nations voting groups: The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and The Group of 77 (G77).

The political union of FLS included the states which bordered the white-dominated southern Africa- Angola, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania. SADCC was formed at a meeting of FLS in Arusha, Tanzania in 1979 and was made up of FLS members and Lesotho, Swaziland, Malawi, and Zimbabwe. The objectives of the FLS and SADCC, which have changed considerably since the political transition to majority rule in South Africa in 1992, were to "1) reduce economic dependence on South
Africa; 2) forge links to establish equitable regional integration; 3) mobilize natural resources to promote implementation of national and regional policies; and 4) secure international support for SADCC's strategy of economic liberalization. These goals have entailed the building of TanZam and Tazara Railways and other projects which enabled the landlocked countries of Zambia, Zimbabwe, Burundi, Rwanda, Zaire, Uganda, Malawi and Botswana to get their goods to the coastal port of Dar es Salaam, without having to use the Cape, as the other traditional routes through Angola and Mozambique were virtually unusable due to the civil wars raging in those countries (Yeager 1989: 174 n26).

Tanzania has also provided "refugee assistance, office facilities, training camps, and rights of passage for movements seeking liberation in Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Angola" (Yeager 1989: 127). It supplied material and moral support for the liberation organizations in Namibia and South Africa and accommodated political and ethnic refugee populations from Mozambique, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire (Yeager 1989: 127). Tanzanian troops were also engaged in the fighting in Mozambique on behalf of RENAMO, a commitment which proved very expensive for Tanzania.

The FLS and SADCC members who experienced multiparty transition prior to the 1992 Tanzanian transition were Namibia in 1989, Mozambique and Rwanda in 1990, and Angola and Zambia in 1991. The closeness of the timing of these transitions with that of Tanzania in 1992 suggests a strong correlation. It is important to note, however, that it was

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only later that Malawi and the new SADCC member South Africa were to undergo similar political change.

Tanzania has also been involved in the political and economic union of the East African Community (EAC) which comprised Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The organization was formed in the 1960's but, by 1970, it was falling apart due to disagreements on policy. It was formally ended between Tanzania and Uganda with the 1971 Amin coup, and between Tanzania and Kenya in 1977 with the Tanzania/Kenya border closing. This five hundred mile border was reopened in 1983 at which time the EAC also somewhat resumed its functioning. Relations with Uganda resumed only after Tanzanian troops succeeded in defending the Tanzanian-Ugandan border in 1979 and ultimately ousted Ugandan leader Idi Amin.

Of these two partners, Kenya underwent multiparty transition in 1991, the timing of which may suggest that it had some affect upon the 1992 Tanzanian transition. EAC member Uganda, however, held strongly to its no-party system and only later in 1996 would the Ugandan leadership allow multipartyism.71

Tanzania, under the leadership of President Nyerere, also played an active role in the formation and direction of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). As this organization encompasses all countries in Africa (with the pre-1992 exception of South Africa, and the other minority-dominated southern African states prior to their respective political liberations), in addition to the economic and political

71 Many would argue, despite President Museveni's declaration, that his National Revolutionary Movement (NRM) constitutes a political party and, thus, that Uganda has been ruled by a de facto single party political system.
relations shared by these nations, they also share the similarity of being African (addressed below). This is another example of the non-exclusive nature of these hypotheses.

Table 1 identifies the African transitions within the category of OAU membership which is denoted with a number "4" under the country name. Graph 13 more vividly compares African with non-African transition occurrences. It is apparent that the number of African transitions to multipartyism more than tripled in 1990 and increased again in 1991. 1990 witnessed political change in Cameroon, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe. In 1991, Algeria, Angola, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Mauritania, Seychelles, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Togo and Zambia underwent such change. Prior transitions in Africa were relatively few. They occurred in 1979 in Ghana, 1981 in Tunisia, 1982 in Mauritius, 1986 in Sudan, 1988 in Algeria, and 1989 in Namibia with its independence. This clear increase in the number of OAU member states which underwent multiparty transition beginning in the early 1990's would offer support to the proposition that the Tanzanian transition was influenced by the growing number of democratic transitions in other African or OAU countries.

Beyond Africa, Tanzania has been a member of the Non-Aligned Movement and Group of 77 of the United Nations. The Group of 77, which now consists of well over one hundred members, is an organization of developing states with the aim of acting together to further Third
World global economic and trade interests.\footnote{The Group of 77, as of 1986, also includes four non-UN members: the two Koreas, Tonga, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization.} The Non-Aligned Movement, which was created under the leadership of former Yugoslav President Marshal Tito in 1961, has as its purpose the exploration of common foreign policy of Third World states, independent of the superpowers. As of 1986, NAM had one hundred members.\footnote{NAM has also included the following non-UN members: North Korea, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, (PLO), and the South West African Peoples' Organization, (SWAPO).} Unlike the regional organizations mentioned above, these UN groups include all of the countries listed in Table 1 with the exceptions of the southern European states of Spain, Greece and Portugal; the Asian states of Mongolia, Burma, Papua-New Guinea and Thailand; the Middle Eastern state of Turkey; and the Eastern European states of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and the USSR. The large number of transitional states falling within these UN groups is concordant with the fact that it has largely been countries of the developing world which have undergone multiparty transition in recent years.

Turning now to the \textit{similarities} which transitional states share with Tanzania, transitions in fellow African countries numbered two in the 1970's (Nigeria and Ghana), six in the 1980's (Tunisia in 1981 and 1989, Sudan, Algeria, Benin and Namibia), and twenty-seven within the two-year period, 1990-1992 (see Graph 4).\footnote{The similarity of "African-ness" largely overlaps with the relational category of OAU membership.} A strong correlation, therefore, appears to exist between the increase in number of African transitions and the onset of Tanzania's 1992 transition.
The second similarity examined is the economic and political characteristic of socialism in transitional states. In Africa, Afro-Socialism, and later, Afro-Communism were strategies undertaken largely by leaders of African independence movements in the mid-1900's. As such, they have been connected with nationalist sentiment and purpose. It was seen to be a doctrine which offered an alternative to the 'exploitative' colonialist Western capitalist model. The state was to play a larger role in the economic development of these states than it would theoretically under capitalism. Such state control was believed to be the only possible means of comprehensively re-directing 'dependent' African states from the capitalist world system—redefining their production strategies and interaction with the West with regard to trade.

In general, a developing socialist state can be identified as one which "has usually nationalized all of the modern sector—except possibly some foreign investment—and claims central government jurisdiction over the lands and its products, with only temporary assignment of land to individuals or cooperatives" (Gastil 1982: 36). A capitalist Third World state, conversely, "has a capitalist modern sector and a traditionalist agricultural sector, combined in some cases with new agricultural products either on family farm or agribusiness models" (Gastil 1982: 36).

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75 The 1960's saw the rise of African communist or more orthodox Marxist African scholars and political leaders in reaction to the seeming economic failures of Afro-socialism both nationally and across the continent. This new move in Africa toward a more rigorous interpretation of Marxist-Leninist doctrine in countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique and Angola, adhered to the notion of the need for a Vanguard Party to rapidly lead the country to communism.
Gastil has provided classification of states with the five political/economic categories of capitalist, mixed capitalist, mixed capitalist-statist, mixed socialist, and socialist/statist. For the purposes of this study, these categories have been collapsed in two: predominantly capitalist and predominantly socialist/statist. States which are defined as socialist/statist run the gamut from strict Marxist Communist to mixed statist systems, while capitalist, capitalist-statist, and mixed capitalist make up the other category (Gastil 1984: 43-44). The only transitional country described as falling midway between the two extremes, as mixed capitalist-statist, was Kuwait and it, therefore, it is not categorized as belonging to either of the groups.\textsuperscript{76} The number of socialist/statist transitional states is illustrated in Graph 14.

There were two transitional states which fit into the category of socialist in 1988; three in 1989; twenty seven in 1990; and seventeen in 1991; followed by Tanzania and South Africa in 1992. An increase in the number of socialist transition cases is, therefore, apparent in the years leading up to 1992. This is especially the case in 1990 and 1991, which suggests a strong correlation between ideological similarity and external political influence in Tanzania's adoption of multiparty politics.

The third similarity factor of geographic proximity of transitional states to Tanzania. This category has largely been subsumed within the analysis of the OAU and regional organizations'...\textsuperscript{76} Other, non-transitional, states falling into this category in 1991 are Malta, Nauru, Sri Lanka, and Eritrea (since its independence from Ethiopia in 1991).
memberships (SADCC, FLS and EAC). The states which are immediately proximal to Tanzania are Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique. Of these neighboring states, multiparty transition prior to 1992 was undertaken in Rwanda in 1989, Mozambique in 1990, and Kenya and Zambia in 1991.

Slightly more distant are the cases of Sudan (1986), Namibia (1989), and Angola (1991). Geographic proximity also appears to be directly correlated with the Tanzanian transition as nearby countries, with the exceptions of Uganda and Malawi, experienced similar political change in the years immediately prior to 1992.

The findings, thus, also suggest that, in addition to the trade and political relations, the similarities which may plausibly affect a country to be influenced by another's politics were abundantly represented in the countries which underwent political transition prior to 1992. Again, though, it is virtually impossible to discern the relative impact of the characteristics due to their significant overlap. The interviews with Tanzanian political leaders will move this study from one of identifying correlations to understanding the causal significance of these relations and similarities to the Tanzanian political transition.

For the opposition leaders interviewed, the causal effect of global democratization was significant only as it prompted donors to apply direct pressure to the Tanzanian government to implement multiparty transition. Considerable support for the causal relevance of global democratization on the Tanzanian transition, however, was

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77 Sudan underwent a subsequent reversal of its transition in 1989.
given by the Tanzanian government members interviewed. Accordingly, one member of Parliament explained that of particular importance were the political developments "in Eastern Europe and also in Kenya". Another similarly held that "the USSR had politically and militarily lent support to the Tanzanian one-party system" and that with the advent of the demise of the Soviet Empire and of the democratization in the former Soviet areas, the political system in Tanzania, too, suffered a legitimacy crisis. It was also stressed that democratization was the new "general international approach" and it was necessary that Tanzania "march with the times".

Suggesting the relevance of trajectory e which illustrates the causal relation of global democratization on multiparty transition through the intervening variable of donor aid contingency, another MP argued that "external forces seized the moment to lead to multipartyism due to political changes in Eastern Europe. This situation led to a call for global change and Tanzania cannot remain unaffected". Furthermore, "Tanzania's transition was unavoidable because others are doing it and liberty and human rights are to be adhered to and Tanzania has a history or advocating such rights". His causal interpretation offers support both to the trajectory e in Figure 7 which suggests that global democratization has effect upon donor aid contingency as well as direct linkage through trajectory f.

For another, Mwinyi simply did not want to be the "odd person out". Another would add that "it was the proper time for change and the Tanzanian government was exclusively responsible for bringing it about. It was CCM's own realization and its desire to give others a chance in politics. This was happening throughout the world." While 102
showing awareness of global democratic transitions, this interviewee, however, appears to downplay its significance relative to the government reassessment of the value of multiparty politics in prompting that of Tanzania. A member of the government-appointed Department of Information and Broadcasting would conversely argue that the Tanzanian transition "was simply due to the collapse of the USSR".

Extolling CCM's "self-realization" of the need to implement multiparty transition, another MP explained that "CCM had risen up to the world's changes. The external situation (even that of neighboring Zambia and Kenya) resulted in Tanzanian political opposition in favor of multiparty transition. (This argument would offer support to the relevance of trajectory d through the factor of domestic opposition). He went on to explain that "changes were activated, or forced, by internal and external forces which were interrelated". The external situation was one of a "new mood" which was "indicated by conditions the world-over". However, he continued, there is "no documentation of any such external pressure" on Tanzania. Rather, Tanzania was able to "read the handwriting on the wall". Furthermore, by the time the donors (discussed in Chapter 5) would talk of democratization as a condition for aid, "we were doing it anyway". Another MP similarly argued that "Tanzanians learned from the democratic experiences abroad", suggesting the intervening variable of domestic opposition.

Another parliamentarian also held that, while "the internal need for change was being aired, the world was simultaneously experiencing change, notably in Eastern Europe". He suggested, thereby, that both of the factors (domestic opposition and global democratization), independently, had effect upon Tanzania's transition. A veteran
parliamentarian would echo this interpretation claiming that "external changes and internal forces played distinct roles in prompting Tanzania's transition".

Another MP asserted that global political change was the chief cause of the Tanzanian transition, "particularly the democratic transitions which were undertaken in Eastern Europe and Africa". He offered support for the relevance of trajectory d, stating that "internal reactions to such global changes became open, though informal". Also interrelating the global democratic experience with donor aid contingency, this interviewee argued that "the donor community had influence upon Nyerere to move along with the international community, but he was prepared."

Public statements made by CCM Vice Chairman Kawawa and CCM Secretary General Horace Kolimba also strongly supported the existence of a causal connection between this factor and the onset of multipartyism in Tanzania. Kawawa explained that "Political pluralism was the current fashion worldwide and Tanzania could not afford to be left behind stuck in a system the entire world was rejecting" (McHenry 1992: 20). Kolimba told the CCM Extraordinary Conference in 1992 that Tanzania should adopt multi-partyism because "the switch to multiparty politics was proper because this was the fashionable political system" (cited in McHenry 1992: 20).

An academic and Nyali Commission member explained that Tanzanian leaders were "fearful of the Kenyan situation" and, therefore, acted by implementing transition "to avoid a split within the ruling party", as some supported democratic change. He also went on to explain that "Zambia's transition had influence on Tanzania" more
so than Kenya because the latter "has not undergone transition yet [as of 1994]. Also, there is Mozambique and, [as for Tanzania] we do not want to be the last."

A second academic who served on the Nyalali Commission explained that "CCM was aware of the fate of the European one-party system". As one of multiple factors, another argued that "the events in Eastern Europe proved quite contagious. The overthrow of State/Party communist regimes there encouraged explicit questioning of the legitimacy of the State/Party in Tanzania" (Luanda 1994, 3-4).

In a more general analysis of all African democratic transitions, an academic who had previously served as an ambassador to Tanzania explained that "the collapse of the Soviet bloc had an impact on Africa. The impact was more political than economic because the World Bank and IMF already had a [economic] role in Africa. This led to an increase in political agitation in Africa, including the calling for multiparty reforms and national constitutional conferences." He, thereby, offered support for the relevance of trajectory d by identifying the intermediary role played by domestic "political agitation".

As explained in Chapter 2, by virtue of their position in government, state and party leaders are generally better able to provide analysis for the causal components of governmental decisions—in this case, the decision by the Tanzanian leadership to implement multiparty transition, than those political activists who are outside of the ruling circle. However, because of the possibility that members of the leadership present only those interpretations which they believe will put their actions in a favorable light, interpretations by
societal leaders are also valuable. They may suggest causal components not identified by State/Party leaders or they may stress the import of one factor over another.

The interviews with societal leaders, in fact, did present some different interpretations. It was not so much, for example, the general trend of global democratization which prompted the Tanzanian transition but, rather, the pressure applied by external (donor) forces, in large part because of these global changes, which effected the transition. There was no "self-realization" by CCM which was influenced by global developments. While one opposition leader did explain that "the change came after the failure of communism in Russia", he (rather incorrectly) continued to explain that this was the case because "CCM got money from especially the USSR, but also from China, East Germany, and others and now it had to turn to the West. The West opposed a one-party system and, therefore, Tanzania would not continue to receive a substantial amount of aid if it continued to suppress opposition."

Another similarly held that "multipartyism is an international issue. CCM refused it at first, but accepted it due to pressure from within and from outside." This interviewee would go on to explain that the pressure from outside was not in the form of contagion but, rather, it was generated from the international lending organization of the "IMF which forced Mwinyi to make [political] changes." (Donor and IMF/World Bank pressure for democratization will be discussed at greater length in Chapter 5).

A former member of the Tanzania Finance Ministry and current political opposition leader would also explain that, while bilateral
pressure may have affected Tanzania's transition, it is also a fact that "there has generally been a world trend with the collapse of the USSR". But, he does not causally relate this "world trend" to Tanzanian democratization.

Conclusion

The findings from the global data suggest that there indeed was a considerable increase the amount of democratization taking place globally in the years immediately preceding the onset of multiparty transition in Tanzania. In fact, for each of the subdivisions of transitional states, based upon their possible relation or similarity with Tanzania, a rise in the number of multiparty transitions is apparent in the late 1980's and early 1990's.

The interviews provide a causal link between the global transitions and that of Tanzania in 1992. This causal connection is primarily cited by the members of the ruling party. While their assessments, as explained above, may more accurately depict the considerations of decision-makers involved in the decision to undertake multiparty transition compared to interpretations given by Tanzanians outside the ruling circles, their value may be mitigated somewhat by the motivation to make their leadership look good. For many of the Party leaders interviewed, the leadership reassessed the values of single-party politics after seeing what was happening elsewhere in the world.78

78 This 'reassessment' by Party member of the virtues of maintaining a single-party system as opposed to undergoing transition to multiparty politics is revisited in Chapter 6. Reassessment of norms of leadership by elites within the ruling circle suggest the potential existence of elite disunity.
The interpretations provided by the opposition and civic leaders interviewed, however, tells a somewhat different story. Accordingly, CCM did not adopt multipartyism voluntarily and there was no reassessment of the values of the different governing systems. The causal role of global democratization resulted, rather, from CCM's necessary re-calculation of the availability and source of international funds. The Party saw itself increasingly dependent on Western assistance and therefore underwent democratization so as to appease its donors. This interpretation, while different from that espoused by some of the ruling elite interviewed, similarly perceives a causal role for global democratization in bringing about the Tanzanian transition. It suggests, however, the additional and paramount role played by the intervening variable of donor aid contingency.

As the interviews offered support for the relevance of trajectories d, e, and f and no additional causal trajectories were identified, no modification needs to be made to the interrelations of Figure 8. Chapters 4 and 5 will now turn, respectively, to analysis of the proposed intervening variables of domestic opposition and democratic donor aid contingency which are proposed to be affected by the two distal factors and which are theorized to have subsequent impact upon the outcome of multiparty transition.
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* denotes year of independence
1- Trading partner with Tanzania 5- NAM
2- SADCC/FLS 6- G77
3- EAC 7- Socialist
4- OAU 8- Capitalist

Table 1. Global political transitions to multiparty politics
Table 1 (continued).

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*denotes year of independence

1-trading partner 5-NAM
2-SADCC/FELS 6-G77
3-EAC 7-Socialist
4-OUA 8-Capitalist
Graph 10. Global transitions from single to multiparty politics
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Table 2. Global reverse transitions from multiparty politics
Graph 11. Global reverse transitions from multi- to single-party politics
Graph 12. Tanzanian percentage of trade with transitional countries

(Source: Derived from IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbooks 1979, 1986, 1993)
Graph 13. African and non-African multiparty transitions
Graph 14. Transitions from single to multiparty politics by economic orientation
CHAPTER 4

DOMESTIC OPPOSITION

Transition theorists have suggested the causal role played by domestic opposition in the onset of multiparty transition. This chapter seeks to empirically test this factor's causal relevance by identifying incidents of Tanzanian domestic opposition which preceded the 1992 implementation of political transition. Should a trend toward an increase in the number of opposition incidents exist immediately prior to 1992, a positive correlation between the two phenomena would be suggested. Alternatively, should a decreasing trend in opposition events be found, or should there have been increases in opposition activity at other times in Tanzania's history which were obviously not followed by democratic transition, the causal significance of this variable would be mitigated.

The theorized causal interrelations between this factor of domestic opposition and the other proposed factors in the onset of multiparty transition are represented below in Figure 9. This figure depicts the relevant segment of Figure 5, Chapter 1 with regard to the role played by domestic opposition.
Figure 9. Domestic opposition and multiparty transition

Trajectories a and b represent the ways in which this factor are hypothesized to affect the outcome of multiparty transition. As explained in Chapter 1, the variable of domestic opposition, along with that of donor aid contingency, is seen to be an intervening variable between the distals of economic change and global democratization and the outcome of multiparty transition. The intervening variables may themselves be interconnected based upon the logic that an unstable domestic political situation may prompt the international donors to become more aggressive in its contingency policy either because they see an opening for acceptance of greater regulation or they are acting to head off a destabilized domestic situation which would likely jeopardize their aid efforts (see Chapter 5).\textsuperscript{79}

As trajectory b illustrates, this proposed intervening variable is theorized to have effect upon elite disunity and the decision to

\textsuperscript{79} Chapter 5 addresses the reverse direction of this trajectory according to which increased donor aid contingency placed upon the Tanzania leadership may serve to indicate regime weakness to the domestic opposition. Afterall, should the regime acquiesce to donor demands, its legitimacy may appear diminished and the opposition may see its opportunity to act. Furthermore, there may be direct or indirect assistance and support from the donors to the multiparty forces.
implement multipartyism. It is theorized that an increase in domestic opposition may cause some members of the regime to seek alliance with the opposition and, in so doing, challenge the political status quo. In Figure 5, Chapter 1, it is also indicated that this relation may be reflexive as elite disunity may also have effect upon domestic opposition (see Chapter 6).

The opposition events which have been reported in both Tanzanian and international media sources since 1980 will be analyzed in an effort to identify any general trends which may exist. Attempt will be made to operationalize opposition events for the purpose of facilitating meaningful comparison. Having provided background to the domestic situation, the findings from interviews with members of the Tanzanian ruling party and with opposition leaders will be presented. Interviewee interpretations of the role of this variable will then be analyzed, as in the case of the other four factors, to shed light on the causal significance of domestic opposition on the Tanzanian transition.

Categorization of Domestic Opposition

Scholars have attempted to categorize and operationalize domestic opposition and these efforts will be used to the extent possible to analyze and compare such events in Tanzania's recent history. Below is discussed a categorization by Shin which includes identification of the

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80 Chapter 6 looks at the effects of decreasing legitimacy of the leadership as some of its members are seen to challenge its basic tenets. The incohesion, it is held, strengthens the cause of domestic opposition forces—those members of society who want to see a change in the political status quo.
tactic, source, scale and demands characteristic to the opposition events, followed by two more general categorizations of such activity in Tanzania. These efforts is severely compromised by the limited amount of available information. The control of the media by the ruling party as well as the limited foreign news coverage contributes significantly to this problem. Subjective reporting is also a problem as government media may down-play the significance of domestic opposition forces for the purpose of making the ruling party appear more popular than it, in fact, is. Foreign commentary and reporting may also provide a voice for Tanzanian émigrés with a political agenda.

During these pre-transition years, the Tanzanian media was constrained by the Newspaper Act (Act Number 3 of 1976) which was subsequently deemed unconstitutional by the Nyali Commission. This Act gave the government permission to hide public information which it deemed secret even if the information did not fall within the scope of the State Secrets Act. It also enabled the authorities to close papers whose reporting they deemed to be obscene or libelous against the government. Another problem faced by journalists was the liability which the government placed upon the printers by requiring that they file an affidavit with the Registrar of Newspapers. It, therefore, was difficult to find printers willing to print controversial reports. In sum, the Commission accused the leadership, "apart from controlling the dissemination of information through the ownership of various forms of

news media, — [of engaging] itself into censorship of information given to the public".82

The 1976 Tanzania News Agency Act (SHIHATA Act, Act Number 14), was also condemned by the Commission as unconstitutional. According to this Act, SHIHATA is to be the sole institution which may collect and distribute news inside and outside of Tanzania.83

Through the late 1980's, private publications did not exist. The government published its Daily News and Sunday News. The Party had its Uhuru and Mzalendo. The Trade Union Federation also published its paper, Mfanyakazi, which was the only publication which, on occasion, challenged, though ever so slightly, the official party line.

Also, the Tanzanian Journalists Association (TAJA) has been controlled by the party and government and continues to be headed by presidential appointees. Additional limitation on press freedom includes the 40 percent tax on paper which made private publications almost prohibitively expensive both to produce and to sell.

In 1987, the foreign publications: Africa Events, New African and African Business became available in Dar es Salaam. Also, the indigenous private publication of the Business Times began in 1987, followed by the Family Mirror in 1988. Acts 3 and 14, however, continued to exist, and these new publications were subject to party/government censorship. The other two forms of public media, television and radio, remained firmly in the control of CCM and the state in the years under study. (As of 1994, efforts were still being

82 Ibid., p. 48.
83 Ibid., p. 49.
made to privatize the radio and one private television station was achieved).

Type, Source, Scale and Demands

These limitations make it virtually impossible to effectively utilize the political opposition scale devised by Shin which classifies opposition incidents in terms of their type, source, scale and demands. Shin's categories of "type" are protest demonstration, political strike, riot, armed attack and political assassination. "Source" categories include insurgents, ethnic minorities, students, workers, intellectuals, religious groups, military and the general population. "Scale" is determined by the number of participants, number of events, duration of events, geographic location, the number dead or injured and physical damage. "Demands" can address, among other issues, democratization, foreign policy, elections, political actors, nationalism, political institutions, specific laws, economics and social issues (Shin 1983).

Even in instances where the information is available to identify the characteristics, Shin has not provided a method for combining these aspects and comparing events to assess relative significance vis-a-vis political change. His effort, however, which does include categorization of government response, is aimed at understanding the type of opposition activity which tends to generate particular government response. He is, therefore, not suggesting a model with which to rank opposition events based upon the combinations of these four characteristics. Perhaps such a model would be elusive at best due to the inordinate numbers of variables involved.
Union versus Zanzibari

Tanzanian opposition events can be divided into those which challenge the Union government and those which challenge the government of Zanzibar. However, it is oftentimes difficult to make this distinction. Zanzibari political opposition has largely been directed at the Zanzibari government's relation with the Union, along with calls for greater democracy. Both issues directly affect the Union government. Determination of the relative causal significance of these opposition events will be made through analysis of government responses to the events as well as through analysis of the interviewees' interpretations.

Zanzibari opposition in the pre-transition period can be understood in light of several major developments. With its revolution in 1964 and the overthrow of the Omani sultanate, animosities on the island came to a head and its President, Abeid Karume, in April of 1964, called upon Nyerere for assistance and protection. In that year, a constitutional agreement was reached between the leaders which united the states of Tanganyika and Zanzibar into the United Republic of Tanzania.

Ever since the formation of Tanzania, groups within Zanzibar have called for a re-negotiation of the Union agreement, accusing the Union of draining the economic vitality from the islands and politically dominating it. Mainlanders, too, have voiced opposition to the Union arrangement and have accused the Islands of adversely affecting the economic and political development of Tanganyika. Recently the Muslim-Christian rift has been augmented and exacerbated for the purpose of
further dividing the country. The Zanzibari population is approximately ninety-nine percent Muslim, while the majority of Tanzanian mainlanders population are Christian (forty percent). Nearly thirty percent of mainlanders, however, are Muslim (Yeager 1989: 47), and their population is concentrated in the coastal region.

Reformist versus Transformist

A more theoretical distinction between incidents of opposition is the significance of the issue being challenged, which resembles Shin's category of 'demands'. Where the events aim at modifying the existing regime they can be classified as reformist in orientation. When opposition demands pose fundamental challenge to the existence of the regime, its orientation can be termed transformist. Realistically, these two opposition types may represent extremes of a continuum, between which opposition event fall. As Gurr explains,

there is a very substantial difference in the form, intensity, and potential effect of conflict episodes that focus on limited issues -such as particular policies and personalities -in contrast with conflicts in which the structure of authority or the integrity of the state is at issue (Gurr 1991: 168).

Gurr attempts to combine the notion of issue (transformist versus reformist) with the conflict's intensity level (or Shin's "scale" category). He defines intense domestic opposition or conflict as that which "usually involves mobilization of people based on several overlapping identities: ethnicity and class, class and political association, ethnicity and politics" (Gurr 1991: 168). Political association is seen to often be the key element to successful
opposition. It tends, accordingly, to be manifested in demonstrations by workers, riots by ethnic minorities, and secessionist movements "by leaders who make selective political appeals to communal and class groups and use the organizational tactics of modern political movements" (Gurr 1991: 168). When occupational and class interests form the basis of group mobilization and the discontent is of reformist nature — that is, over policies and distribution issues, the method of protest is likely to be strikes and boycotts and/or economic sabotage. When these groups advocate transformation, the method of opposition is likely to take the form of peasant rebellions and/or urban uprisings. Gurr further explains that when the groups have political associations as their primary base, reformist aims tend to entail political riots and demonstrations while transformist agendas tend to translate into political revolts and revolutionary movements.

Gurr has explained that a significantly threatening, or transformist, character of opposition is likely to arise in cases of highly stratified society, wherein the current system of government has endorsed or accepted inegalitarian measures of rule. This situation is likely to lead to unrest among the disadvantaged and the determination that only by changing the leadership and the governing system itself, can equality be achieved. This is not to suggest that the disadvantaged will be more magnanimous if and when they assume power than the incumbent leadership. They, too, may seek power and then subjugate others. Nonetheless, that drive for egalitarianism or advantage is likely to challenge the incumbent leadership, especially in a society in which the ruling elite command considerable power, both politically and economically.
Inegalitarianism can take many forms and effect numerous aspects of, and groupings within, society. It is likely that the extent and focus of the inequality, compounded by the level of organization and strength of those who are disadvantaged, determine the opposition's credibility and effectiveness in challenging the political status quo. Gurr also maintains that the rifts between advantaged and disadvantaged societal elements are intensified and the likelihood of state violence is increased in situations wherein, minority elites in highly stratified societies — have gained and maintained power through violence, and — have organized instruments of violence such as secret police, revolutionary militia, or special military contingents at their personal disposal (Gurr 1991: 173).

The distinction between reformist and transformist opposition is based, thus, on the content of the conflict and, relatedly, the effects which it has on the leadership. By its very nature, transformist opposition poses greater challenge to the fundamental tenets of the incumbent political system than does reformist challenge which seeks only reform within the current structure.

However, as will become apparent in the analysis below, the ability to distinguish between these orientations is oftentimes problematic. For example, continuous and strong reformist demands which are not heeded by the regime may assume a transformist character and take on a more politically threatening agenda. Alternatively, transformist demands can be appeased by regime concessions and may be modified (however temporarily) to a more reformist nature. This modification may serve to achieve intermediate goals at a period in
time when the opposition assesses that calls for fundamental regime transformation are too costly relative to the benefits to be acquired through more moderate challenge.

The distinction is further blurred when calls for reform violate lawful means of political expression and, therefore, of necessity, such demands take on a more transformist character. In a closed political society, any type of protest is likely to challenge the political status quo which entails repression of opposition. In such societies, channels of public participation in politics and political decision-making is so restricted that any effort to influence or change government policy challenges the politics of exclusion and, thereby, challenges the fundamentals of the political system itself. Only in more open pluralist political societies would groups within society have the right to challenge the government's policies. The closed and open natures of regimes may be viewed as opposite ends of a continuum with most governments falling somewhere in-between and, therefore, distinction between reformist and transformist opposition activity is plausible and useful.

To better understand the cause of modulation between relatively peaceful to riotous opposition, or between reformist and transformist intent, Gurr explains the need to trace the complex interactions between activists' tactics and demands with the government's response to them (Gurr 1991: 175). That government reaction to opposition forces may, in turn, effect these forces is a theory which can be tested through the conducting of interviews with government leaders and will be dealt with in Chapter 6. In this chapter, government action vis-a-vis the opposition will be traced for the purpose of identifying
the existence of opposition activity as well as for its indication of
the significance of those opposition forces as perceived by the
leadership. The interview responses will also serve this end.

Government response can be operationalized and measured as
follows. It can be either conciliatory or repressive vis-a-vis the
opposition. Using Shin's model, a positive, or concessionary, action
by the government is one in which the authorities' actions "are
congruent with the manifest demands of the protesters" (Shin 1983:
396). A negative action, on the other hand, entails the repression of
protesters or opponents.

Migdal terms these acts by government toward the opposition as
"politics of survival" tactics. Weak states faced with strong
societies resort to such survival tactics as appointments and removals
from office ("the big shuffle"), non-merit appointments, and "dirty
tricks" which include illegal imprisonment, illegal deportation, quick
changes in the law to remove key figures, the weakening or destroying
of groups in general, and preempting the emergence of competing power
centers (Migdal 1988: 214-226).84

Identification of governmental action toward domestic political
opposition, therefore, serves not only to identify perceived opposition
but to assess its significance to the leadership based upon the nature
of the response. Both positive and negative response suggest that the
government is interpreting opposition activity to be significant to the

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84 See also Gurr 1991, p. 159. In an effort to explain why weak or
unstable states continue to exist in Africa, Gurr suggests that "their
effectiveness might... be credited to the success of autocrats in
building mass parties that serve simultaneously as channels of
participation, means of upward mobility, and instruments of political
control".

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extent that the cost of addressing opposition demands, in either of the manners selected, is less costly than ignoring it. The causal connection between domestic opposition and government response/action, however, is at best uncertain. There is confusion over whether opposition activity prompted government response or whether it actually resulted from government action. It is also difficult to pinpoint with certainty the specific actions which either side may be responding to.

Following the presentation of the reported opposition events, the interview findings will help to shed light on the perceived causal connections between political opposition incidents and the decision to undertake multiparty transition.

Domestic Opposition Events

Analysis of opposition events begins in 1980 and continues through 1991 in an effort to identify any trends in opposition activity leading up to the 1992 transition.

In 1980, anti-government action took the form of a coup attempt to oust Zanzibar President Aboud Jumbe in which sixteen plotters were caught. They were reportedly opposing Zanzibar's endorsement of Nyerere's socialism which they believed was hurting the Island's economy. The incident appears to be of transformist character as effort was not taken to merely make change within the existing governing system but to depose of the leadership as well as its political ideology.


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In 1981, a similar effort to oust the incumbent leadership took place on the mainland. There was an army mutiny in Mwanza, a district located in the north of Tanzania.\textsuperscript{86} The mutineers called for Nyerere's resignation and complained of the forced socialism and goods shortages which had led to general unrest in the country. The Union leadership centered in Dar es Salaam may not have been as directly affected as had the Zanzibari government in 1980 but the transformist nature of this second attempt is apparent and the government responded similarly with the arrest of the plotters.

Prior to the coup attempt, the army officers had submitted a list of grievances and had been immediately arrested.\textsuperscript{87} The submission of a petition may be viewed as relatively reformist in comparison to the following effort to physically remove the leadership. These actions would be later seen to prompt the hijacking of a Tanzanian airliner in 1982.

The hijacking was carried out by a group of youths from the Mwanza district who called themselves the Tanzanian Action Front or the self-alleged revolutionary youth movement of Tanzania of which the government claimed no knowledge. They, too, called for Nyerere's resignation and protested the food, drug, and other shortages faced by the country resultant from "forced socialism."\textsuperscript{88} The airliner was scheduled to land in Dar es Salaam but was instead forced to fly to Essex Airport in the UK. The hijackers announced their intent to meet


\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid.
with the self-exiled Tanzanian dissident Oscar Kambona who was residing in England. Kambona had left high office in Tanzania in the late 1960's and lived in the UK where he founded the Movement for Free and Popular Democracy and publicly denounced the non-democratic nature of Tanzanian politics on numerous occasions. Kambona, however, made known that he was not affiliated with this coup effort. In September of 1982, the youths were sentenced by the government.

In 1983, another coup attempt is reported to have taken place in Tanzania in which 27 soldiers and civilians were charged with attempting to overthrow the government. The Zambian press reported the involvement of 600 soldiers and 1,000 civilians—numbers which were denied by Tanzanian authorities. Thirty individuals were charged with high treason and nine escaped. The reasoning behind this coup effort was the general disquiet regarding the government's handling of the economic crisis. Of the thirty charged, three were lieutenants-colonel, one was a major, eight were captains, and one was a sergeant in the Tanzanian militia. There was also a pilot, university lecturer, mechanic, five businessmen and six members of the Tanzanian Air Force who had defected to the Comoros the previous year. The highest ranking political official involved was Christopher Ngaiza, an assistant to President Nyerere.

According to Amnesty International, when the two principal defectors escaped from custody to Kenya in June of 1983, the

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90 Keesings, September 15, 1983.

91 Ibid.
authorities withdrew the treason charges against the other twenty-eight but served them with detention orders of unlimited duration.\textsuperscript{92} It was later confirmed by the government that the charges were dropped for the purpose of holding the accused under presidential detention orders and avoiding public trials.\textsuperscript{93} The escape of the two detainees resulted in the resignation of Tanzania's Home Affairs Minister Abdallah Natepe and the Commissioner of Prisons Gabriel Geneya. Natepe was replaced in September of 1983 with Salmin Amour who was later to become Zanzibar's President.\textsuperscript{94}

International news sources suggest that the severity of the opposition on the Islands to his leadership led to Zanzibar President Jumbe's resignation from office in 1984.\textsuperscript{95} It was reported that islander discontent over perceived decline in Zanzibar's autonomy from the mainland created great opposition to Jumbe who remained very close to Nyerere and to the maintenance of the Union. While the specific incidents of opposition are not presented in the news sources, their significance may be suggested by the conciliatory response of the government in the form of the resignation.

No acts of political opposition were recorded in the year 1985. Nor did any government activity during that year suggest a response to domestic discontent. However, it was reported the following year that between 1984 and 1986, human rights advocate James Mapalala was

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Amnesty International Annual} 1984.

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, June 1983.

\textsuperscript{94} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, September 1983; \textit{Kesings}, June 12 and 19, 1983.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, January 1984.
arrested at least six times. His fellow advocate Mwinyijuma Othuman Upindo was reported to have been arrested at least three times. In 1986, Mapalala was detained without charge or trial, suspected of attempting to overthrow the government by circulating a petition started in 1984 which called for the repeal of the law which authorized only one political party in Tanzania. According to reports, in just a few weeks, 320,000 Tanzanians had signed. The petitions were sent to leading officials of the Tanzanian government and CCM. Successfully, in January of 1989, Mapalala went on a hunger strike to demand his release. Soon thereafter he founded the Civil and Human Rights Movement of Tanzania which he was clear to explain was not a political party. Had he tried to register it as a party, it would have been banned by law.

Mapalala’s activity appear to lean toward transformist as he called for multiparty transition and the actions of the government to quiet him serve to stress the significance of his opposition. His release in 1989 may be an example of a positive government response.

No incidents of opposition activity are recorded for 1987. In what can perhaps be viewed as indication of an easing of government repression of dissent, a government critic and former senior officer, Joseph Kassela Bantu, who had been living in exile following detention, returned to Tanzania in March of 1987 with official assurances of his safety. He was later to be placed under house arrest in Njombe,


97 Ibid.
southeast Tanzania, one year later in March of 1988. Thus, for the year 1987, a positive action by the government may be interpreted while a negative response to political opposition is apparent in 1988. However, there is no reporting of the actions, if any, taken by Kassela Bantu leading up to his house arrest.

The government took other actions to limit the voice of the opposition in the year 1988. It enacted curbs on the press, allowing authorities to jail journalists for up to five years for writing articles critical of the government. Also, journalists working on the Island without government accreditation would now face a USD 300 fine or three years in jail. Authorities also secured the right to ban imports of publications deemed hostile and to punish any individuals who possessed such materials. Moves were made, too, to control foreign correspondence. These government actions seem to suggest a perception by the leadership of threat posed by the societal political opposition forces and a resultant negative response.

In 1988 there was also opposition activity in the form of a Zanzibari demonstration. One person was killed and eleven people were seriously injured. It is suggested that the demonstration followed a statement by Sofia Kawawa (head of the official women's organization and wife of CCM Secretary General Rashidi Kawawa) in which she challenged the party to amend the Islamic law which permits polygamy. This would suggest a more reformist political action,

100 FBIS, May 16, 1988, p. 9.
101 Africa Confidential, V. 29, No. 12, June 17, 1988, p. 5.
especially if she were representing the position of her husband and the Party on the status and role of Muslim women. The government response was to imprison twenty seven demonstrators for disturbing the peace, four of whom were released soon thereafter. Several more were released by July of 1990.

Opposition activity in Zanzibar again erupted in 1989 with rioting alleged to have been a response to the declining economy and the diminishing autonomy of the Islands vis-a-vis the mainland. The government claimed that the rioting was fomented by anti-government agents based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Twenty-eight rioters were placed into custody, of which 15 were soon released.\textsuperscript{102}

Seif Sheriff Hamadi, who had been dismissed from the government in 1988 following disagreement with President Wakil over the value of the Union (Wakil was accused of seeking its dissolution), was detained in 1989 for having organized illegal political meetings of his Islamic Fundamentalist Party, \textit{Bismullah}.\textsuperscript{103} The illegality of political party formation made this a \textit{transformist} act. Hamadi's detention is clearly indicative of a negative government response.

Further challenge to the Tanzanian Union was expressed by Tanzanian dissidents in this year who opened offices in the United States, Britain and in Arab states.\textsuperscript{104} The Tanzanian government was not reported to have taken any responsive action to these calls by Zanzibari separatists.

\textsuperscript{102} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, May 13, 1989.

\textsuperscript{103} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, September, 1989.

\textsuperscript{104} \textit{African Contemporary Record 1988-9}, August 1989.
As mentioned above, human rights activist James Mapalala was released in 1989. This suggests a positive action taken on the part of the Tanzanian government to a political activist. Mapalala proceeded to begin a second petition which, within one year, was said to have more than 100,000 signatures. He was working from the base of an association which he founded called the Civil and Human Rights Movement of Tanzania and by avoiding the illegality of claiming this association to be a political party he may, in fact, have posed challenge to Tanzanian politics in a more reformist manner than had he not abided by Tanzanian law. This appears to be an example of an effort to disguise or limit transformist ambitions with reformist action.

Of both reformist and transformist nature is the April 1990 student strike at the Universities of Dar es Salaam and Morogoro and Sokoine University. The students were protesting, among other things, recent cuts in fellowships and institutional corruption, along with the undemocratic nature of the Tanzanian regime. Perhaps in solidarity with the students (though this is unclear in the reporting), a simultaneous doctor's strike took place at the Muhimbili Hospital in Dar es Salaam. Unlike the students, however, the doctors ended the strike and resumed work following orders from President Mwinyi on April 16. The students, however, refused to return to classes, and Mwinyi shut the University of Dar es Salaam down. The President blamed "foreign enemies of infiltrating the country and disturbing the peace

and using some of Tanzania's youth to implement their plots". The University (Tanzania's only University) was not to reopen until October of 1991. From that time through February of 1992, the students would continue to boycott fees under the new 'cost-sharing' scheme and protest "state encroachment on academic freedom" (Barkan 1994: 64).

Also in this year, the self-exiled political activist Oscar Kambona informed CCM Chairman Nyerere of his desire to participate not only in debate about multipartyism but also in multiparty elections if and when they take place. Kambona had formed the Tanzanian Democratic Front, an umbrella group of pro-democracy activists living outside of Tanzania. His organization included such groups as the Zanzibar Organization, Harakati za Mabadiliko ya Kidemokrasi (HAMAKI), the Tanzanian Youth Democratic Movement, the Tanzania Action Front and NUNA led by Lubovick Mwijage. The Tanzania Democratic Front urged the repeal of clauses 3 and 77 from the constitution which would enable the legal formation of other parties and of political affiliations. No direct response from Nyerere was reported which may suggest the leadership's perception of the action as being of little significance. However, the possibility that government response was simply not made public is plausible.

In 1990, in Tanzania, Mapalala was to make a speech picked up by foreign reporters in which he stated that there was

no such thing as guaranteed freedom of expression in Tanzania and never will there be until the government allows fair elections. ...Unity and socialism were just an umbrella many of these [officials] sat under to hide the fact that they used their positions for

personal gain. It's all lies. There's no democracy here. There is no freedom. And they can arrest you for even thinking that way.\textsuperscript{109}

This demonstrates a clear and strong vocalization of political opposition to the undemocratic nature of the Tanzanian system, especially when considering that it had international audience. It is curious that Mapalala was able to make such a statement to foreign journalists without having been stopped by Tanzanian authorities. Nor did the Tanzanian government take any publicized action in response to this statement.

In August of 1990 more than 200 Islanders were detained after having boycotted the October elections, accused of attending illegal meetings and possessing seditious documents.\textsuperscript{110} This is a clear demonstration of political opposition to the Tanzanian, as well as Zanzibari, government and of strong punitive action taken by the government to stem it.

Perhaps apolitical and more reformist than transformist, in February of 1991, the Tanzania's Worker's Union (JUWATA) announced that it would meet in May to discuss its rejection of CCM control. JUWATA Secretary General Ceprian Manyanda is quoted as saying that the meeting would discuss a new constitution and regulations that would safeguard the management of JUWATA as an independent body. JUWATA will still continue to be the sole body of authority over workers in the government and private parastatals and companies in the country. But JUWATA in its new form will be a democracy and have representatives from all


\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Amnesty International}, August 28, 1990 and September 18, 1990.
working areas from the branch level up to the national level.\textsuperscript{111}

In fact, in August 1991, JUWATA was made a self-reliant association with permission to draft a new constitution. A new independent confederation of trade unions was formed - The Organization of Tanzania Trade Unions (OTTU). Mwinyi explained that "although the economic situation is improving slightly and inflation has been reduced from 30 percent to 19 percent, it is still necessary to increase efforts in the production sector and to fight for greater productivity".\textsuperscript{112} He suggested that "the association launch projects that will help in achieving self-reliance, adding that it should have the freedom to decide on its own business especially at this time of political changes in the world".\textsuperscript{113} To observers, however, "it was clear that the government, though willing to concede more autonomy to OTTU, was not ready to countenance independent trade unions with wage-bargaining rights" (Barkan 1994: 65).

In March, one month after the government's creation of the Nyalali Commission to review the one-party state, Mwinyi banned all opposition political groups. This was in apparent reaction to the rejection of the presidential commission by multiparty supporters. Mwinyi announced that "although the commission is at work, I have to warn that constitutionally this is still a one-party state".\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{111} FBIS, February 7, 1991, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{112} FBIS, August 19, 1991, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
The activists had planned a national seminar for April 11 and were united in their opposition to the formation of the Nyalali Commission. According to the chairman of the newly formed Steering Committee of the Seminar on the Course of the Transition to Multi-party Democracy, the former and first Justice Minister Abdullah Fundikira, this Commission was "merely a populist and bureaucratic measure by the government to 'cool the tempers of the restless people wanting genuine democracy now'".

The Vice Chairmanship of the Steering Committee was held by the political detainee and civil rights activist James Mapalala and civil rights lawyer Mabere Marando served as its Secretary. The other members were the veteran journalist Ndimbara Tefambwage, Kananga Tumbo, Joseph Kasella Bantu, R. H. Seseme, Kamara Kasupa, Prince Bagenda, Mashaka Chimoto and Ringo Tenga. Several of these men would go on to head political parties upon their legalization in 1992.

Perhaps in response to the formation of the Steering Committee, the government newspaper, UHURU, ran a front-page story which urged the screening of multiparty advocates by Tanzanians. CCM member Husayn Kababi proposed to CCM Vice Chairman Rashidi Rawawa at a public rally in Missungwi district that leaders of the former Tanzania African National Union (TANU) who left the party and who are now calling for a multiparty system present themselves to citizens so they may be screened on their multiparty stand. The present call for a multiparty system is an act of provocation since some of those calling for many parties were TANU's founders who could have criticized the party when it went astray. ...Such

115 Ibid.

individuals should be brought forward by the party so we can question them on why they are now calling for a multiparty system.\textsuperscript{117}

James Mapalala was to later resign from this position citing the "dominance of the Steering Committee by 'old men' as a key reason ... [and] that its composition was not nationally representative [with] six out of the ten members ... from the Tabora region".\textsuperscript{118}

In May of 1991 Fundikira and former dissident Oscar Kambona were scheduled to travel to Washington, D.C. to meet with the National Endowment for Democracy. Kambona, however, was to have difficulty obtaining a visa from the U.S. This difficulty is presumed to have been related to Kambona's possible connection with the 1982 hijackers. One of the hijackers, Mousa Membar, died in a hospital in Dar es Salaam in mid-May after having completed a jail sentence in Britain and having been incarcerated in Tanzania since September 1990. Critics have held that the Tanzanian government refused to have an independent autopsy conducted and Kambona along with some foreign commentators asserted that Membar "had been lured back to Tanzania by the security services and had been forced to make a tape incriminating Kambona in the hijacking and alleging that he was planning another". Kambona also accused the Tanzanian authorities of giving this tape to American officials in an effort to discredit the opposition movement and to stand in the way of the issuance of a visa. These accusations serve as

\textsuperscript{117} FBIS, March 15, 1991, p. 8.

\textsuperscript{118} Africa Confidential, V. 32, N. 11, May 1991.
probable indication of a negative government action vis-a-vis political opposition.\textsuperscript{119}

In October of 1991, the government threatened to ban private newspapers and magazines "for their alleged irresponsible journalism and unprofessional conduct".\textsuperscript{120} According to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, "although the government recognized the role of newspapers and magazines in national development the conduct of some of them, especially the private ones, was deplorable. ... Although the government had during the last session of the national assembly registered its dissatisfaction with the conduct of such papers the trend is gaining momentum".\textsuperscript{121}

This threat by CCM, however, may not have been directly targeted at political opposition. According to the Ministry, headed by future Tanzanian president Benjamin Mkapa, it was responding to such wrongful allegations as the government’s intent to legalize abortion, limit each family to only two children and to the papers commentary "on issues before courts of law and publishing pornographic literature and obscene materials".\textsuperscript{122}

Journalists responded with open criticism of Mkapa himself who had worked as managing editor of the \textit{Daily}. According to the chairman of the Tanzanian Journalists Association, Roger Maguaza, "Mkapa's statement was a disincentive to journalists who are working in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{119} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{120} \textit{FBIS}, October 17, 1991, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{121} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
appalling conditions. We are extremely disappointed to see that the minister responsible for the profession—and himself a journalist—chose this line he has taken.\textsuperscript{123}

Over Dar es Salaam Radio, in that same year, the Tanzanian government warned "that it would take legal action against any citizens who hold demonstrations in violation of the relevant laws and regulations". This warning was issued, accordingly, in response to the "utterances by a few individuals who hoped to participate in an illegal demonstration on various pretexts".\textsuperscript{124} It was suggested that "some of these pretexts are claims of solidarity with and congratulations to the people of Zambia following their general election".\textsuperscript{125} This admission by the government may suggest the pro-democracy, hence, transformist content of the illegal demonstrations.

Also in 1991, James Mapalala declared the formation of a political party named the Civic Party since the government had refused registration of his Civil and Legal Rights Movement. He explained that the government has always regarded human rights groups as political opposition in spite of the fact that Tanzania is a signatory of the Human Rights covenants. "We have realized that we cannot fight for human rights without having political power. Times are changing. Tanzania is now a de facto multiparty state [wherein] the bill on rights supersedes those sections on the one-party system."\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{123} FBIS, December 11, 1991, pp. 7-8.

\textsuperscript{124} FBIS, November 5, 1991, p. 6.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} FBIS, November 19, 1991, p. 5.
Chief Fundikira had announced the formation of his political party the previous week. He announced that he had created the Union for Multiparty Democracy because "Tanzanians were tired after enduring three decades of arbitrary rule under which legitimate dissent was equated to treason". The formation of these two unlawful political societies was quickly responded to with the brief arrests of both Mapalala and Fundikira, along with Mapalala's number two man Rajah Buseseme on November 22. Following their release, "the two opposition leaders have said that in the event of the introduction of a multiparty system and the calling of a snap election early next year they are going to form a coalition to fight the sole ruling party, the CCM".

Mapalala announced that he had been well treated during his arrest and publicly exclaimed: "Do not worry! Even the police are on our side. I can confidently say that the Armed Forces are on our side."

Later that month, CCM Vice Chairman Rashidi Kawawa in apparent response to the growing opposition activity announced that "the party does not want to see chaos while political reforms are being ushered in. The people themselves should determine peacefully whether they want one party or multiple political parties and not the few individuals who want to cause confusion to bring about such reforms."

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127 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
He further explained that

if many parties were to be created in the country, CCM would welcome them, and he called on newly enrolled and established party members to prepare to strengthen the CCM to see it so electoral victory. CCM was not afraid of multiparty politics since it had established its legitimacy with its supporters.131

In 1991, the Steering Committee for the Transition Towards a Multiparty system denounced the Nyalali Commission as serving the sole interests of CCM. Additionally, a the pro-multiparty stance was taken by the University of Dar es Salaam Law Society and the Tanzanian Chamber of Commerce and internal calls for multipartyism came from the Reverend Christopher Mtikila and Kambona's Tanzania Democratic Front.

Analysis

In sum, there does appear to have been a slight increase in the absolute number of opposition incidents reported for the years 1989, 1990 and 1991, compared to those of earlier years. However, it is impossible to compare the severity of the three efforts by opposition movements to depose the political leadership in the early 1980's -two directed at Nyerere and his government and one directed at Zanzibar's President Aboud Jumbe- with the more numerous, yet more limited, actions of the later years.

As will be explained in Chapter 6, CCM chairman Nyerere in the late 1980's began to suggest the need for multiple political parties due to the growing complacency and non-democratic nature of CCM. With

131 Ibid.
this opening, it is possible that the opposition began to see its moment for vocalization. This perceived opening may explain the increase in number of opposition incidents in 1989-91 without there having been an increase in opposition sentiment in the Tanzanian community. It was also in 1991 that the Mwinyi government appointed the Nyalali Commission to look into the level of support which the single-party system had among Tanzanians. This action, too, may have provided an opening for opposition activists to take action. Therefore, the data can only provide information on opposition activity and not on the actual amount of opposition existent within the Tanzanian community.

The problems with the classification of opposition activity along the lines of Shin and Gurr became apparent with the data analysis. Difficulty in assessing reformist as opposed to transformist orientation was encountered when characterizing the early 1980's protests against the government's handling of the economic crisis. This was the case also with regard to the demonstration in Zanzibar in 1988, the Zanzibari riots of 1989, Fundikira's formation of the Islamic Fundamentalist Party in 1989 and the students' and doctors' strikes of 1990. While posing some reformist-type challenges, such as the students concern about proposed tuition hikes, the fact that these protests also included denunciation of the socialist system and the political leadership suggests a transformist component.

The limited reports also disallow accurate comparison of the characteristics labeled in Shin's model. The actors are not always known, nor is their number. It is often uncertain what the issue being opposed is. These limitations are apparent in the incidents of 1983.
coup attempt (wherein the Zambian press reported a significantly larger number of participants than did the Tanzanian authorities), the Zanzibari demonstration, riot and mainland student and doctors' strikes.

With regard to the absolute numbers of government responses to opposition activity, there appears also to have been an increase in 1988 through 1991. In the years 1980 through 1986, a total of only one or two responses to opposition was reported per year while the number rose to three in 1988, dropped to two in 1989, registered four in 1990, and reached a high of eight in 1991. With the growth in opposition incidents discussed above, it makes sense that the government response would rise accordingly.

There were only a few cases of seemingly positive response to opposition activity. However, even this determination is difficult to make without understanding of the motivation behind the response. For example, in 1987 Joseph Kassela Bantu was given assurances of safety should he choose to return to Tanzania from exile. Within one year of his return, however, he was placed under house arrest. Similarly difficult to categorize are the release of political prisoners, including those held following demonstrations or riots.

Perhaps more clearly positive was the granting of independence to the workers organization, JUWATA, from CCM in 1991. The formation of the Nyalali Commission may appear to be an effort by the regime to acquiesce to the democratic opposition. However, and as subsequent events may suggest, its creation also appeared to have been an effort by the regime to control the transition process.
Mixed government reaction to the opposition seemed to continue in 1990 and 1991. Drastic measure in the form of the closing of the University may suggest a desperate move on the part of the leadership to stem opposition. However, the same year, James Mapalala managed to give an interview which was picked up by the foreign media in which he condemned the undemocratic nature of the Tanzanian regime and did so without any apparent government retaliation. It may be accurate to conclude that as 1992 approached, the government was finding it harder to silence the political domestic opposition, even if that opposition was growing in response to the leadership's own consideration of multipartyism—a consideration which will be more fully addressed in Chapter 6 on elite disunity.

In sum, it is very difficult to even assess whether or not a correlation exists between the incidents of opposition and the multiparty transition in Tanzania. While both the opposition data and the government response data suggest a greater absolute number of opposition incidents in the years immediately preceding 1992, it is virtually impossible to assess the relative significances of each of these incidents ranging from the seemingly geographically-limited coup attempts in the early 1980's to the comparatively peaceful democratization protests of the late 1980's and early 1990's.

The interview findings presented below will attempt to ascertain the causal significance of domestic opposition while gaining insight into the actions of the opposition leaders as well as of the leadership in the past decade and a half.
Eighteen of the thirty-two Tanzania political actors interviewed, in fact, cited the causal role of domestic opposition in prompting the onset of transition to multipartyism in 1992. Of this eighteen, however, only three were opposition leaders themselves. As the responses indicate (as was the case with the variable of global democratization in the previous chapter), the CCM leadership appeared inclined to perceive the transition as having resulted from the Party's response to domestic concerns rather than it having been forced by elements outside of the leadership. As a high level appointed official of the National Assembly explained, "CCM opted to institute the multiparty transition when it did instead of waiting for the opposition to comprise more than the twenty percent found by the Nyalali Commission. Any increase in the domestic opposition would likely disrupt things." He also held that the opposition as of 1992 was not very strong and it would be unlikely that it would be able to draw leaders away from CCM. However, despite the weakness of the opposition, the interviewee saw the opposition to have been a chief motivation behind the adoption of multipartyism.

Another high ranking officer echoed that, "by 1991, there was already a substantially large minority in the country which was actively demanding a change to political pluralism and their voices could no longer be ignored".

For those academics who served on the Nyalali Commission, domestic opposition was also seen to be one of several factors which triggered the transition. One interviewee, accordingly, cited the advocacy for change by such forces as James Mapalala and the University
of Dar es Salaam Law Society. According to Dr. Nestor Luanda, "Tanzanians responded by making known their dissatisfaction with the status quo" and "Nyerere's campaign [to revitalize the party] provided an opportunity for the masses to voice their grievances openly to participate in the single- versus multiparty debate" (Luanda 1993: 3-4). He cited the anti-government protest of University students with led to the closing of the main campus in Dar es Salaam in May of 1990 for a full year. He noted that this had been the first time that student anti-government actions received the support from the Academic Staff Assembly. As he explained, the incident led to the removal of three lecturers from the University. They were given bureaucratic jobs elsewhere. Condemnation of this government response by the domestic and international press, though, were able to bring about their reinstatement (Luanda 1993: 7).

Luanda explained that "when the University re-opened in October of 1991, students boycotted classes in protest over the expulsion of 83 students who refused to sign official bonds binding them against 'illegal' behaviour on campus. [However] with the support of several colleges in Dar es Salaam, the University students filed a successful court action against the State/Party" (Luanda 1993: 7). The University's vice-chancellor was removed after the incident. Luanda also cited the political opposition activities of civic groups such as Christopher Mtikila's Liberty Desk and the National Convention for Civil Rights headed by Abdullah Fundikira. He specified however, that such groups were civic and not political in nature.

According to a third Commission member and academic, while political opposition to the single-party state existed, it was
relatively insignificant. Accordingly, "there was no sizable demonstration, though, there was a sizable group of articulate individuals - academics and professionals - who wanted political change". He explained that the 20 percent showing of the opposition in the Commission's finding was high relative to the last poll taken by the Kawawa Commission of 1965. Accordingly, the 1965 Commission found less than five percent of the society supportive of multipartyism.

A mixed, or uncertain, response was also given by several members of Parliament who cited a causal connection between domestic opposition and the onset of multiparty transition. According to one such Parliamentarian, "internal reactions to global political changes became open, though informal". Though, suggesting that it was only with the transition that opposition could be freely voiced, this interviewee explained that "it was previously dangerous for such pro-democratic positions to come into the open". Returning, however, to the significance of domestic opposition, he suggested that "the change in Tanzania to multipartyism is unavoidable and, therefore, the government acted properly as it sought the views of the people". Their views, accordingly, were shaped by the "shortages of foodstuffs and unemployment which led to the call for change. There was a widening of income gaps and the differences became very visible. Those without began to call for change". Furthermore, domestic forces were responding to the "misuse of power by a few individuals within the authoritarian government and companies and the people were seeking a newer alternative world".

A national member for women explained that "there was an increase in the people's awareness and their desire for democracy and the
government could not neglect the minority - the 20 percent discovered by the Nyalali Commission". She held, however, that there was no internal pressure for change. For another, there did exist agitation from domestic forces such as Mapalala's activities in the 1980's, but "they were not strong" and "their lack of strength then is indicated by their lack of it now".

Other parliament members tended to perceive a causal role of domestic opposition forces in giving rise to the 1992 democratic transition. According to one, internal forces such as Reverend Mtikila's Liberty Desk in 1988-1989, existed prior to 1992. He held that there was 'free press' in which there were open debates about the necessity of multipartyism, and such debates were also relatively free within the Party paper.

Another representative explained that the internal and external forces were interrelated. Domestic calls for multipartyism go as far back as pre-1961 independence. Accordingly, "after the 1958 elections and subsequent independence, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) got all of the seats and there was no room for other parties". He continued to explain that there was "a great demand by Tanzanian institutions such as religious, academic, etc. for change to democracy. There has been a steady increase in political activism along with increased membership in the CCM which amounted to bringing new ideas into the party." Thus, he offers a defense of the continued strength of CCM and of its continuing commitment to multipartyism as the democratic electoral victories of TANU, and later CCM, were responsible for the single-party system.
A Zanzibari representative implied that the government was forced to turn to multipartyism because of the domestic pressure resultant from society's desire for economic growth. He even suggested that with the poor economic performance in the few years following 1992, the islands, at least, would no longer support multiparty transition. Several others suggested that there was indeed growth in the domestic opposition as society became increasingly critical of the general complacency of the government and, perhaps relatedly, to the single-party restrictive political system. These forces included academicians, the Chamber of Commerce, political activist Mapalala and the University.

It was also cited that at the 1987 Symposium in Arusha for the twentieth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration, a paper given by the University professor Issa Shiivji in which he called for multipartyism. Accordingly, however, 1987 was too early to have had effect because it preceded the great global changes. A connection is suggested, therefore, between the phenomena of global democratization and domestic opposition (discussed in Chapter 3). The statement implies that, without international change, domestic opposition alone was unable to effect the Tanzanian transition.

For those who were actually involved in opposition politics, the responses were, on the whole, very different from those given by the CCM leaders. Of the opposition and civic leaders interviewed, only two credited domestic opposition activity with having influenced the transition. Two others were uncertain as to its role. However, these two, in addition to the majority of others interviewed, adamantly held that the chief causal role was played by external forces—either by
global political changes or by the contingencies set by the international donor community. As one civil rights activist and party leader passionately argued, "the opposition has never been given a voice under Nyerere and continues not to be given one even following the developments of 1992". According to a freelance journalist, "the government has always handled the opposition with threats and with the military, using as justification for these [negative] actions the accusations that these forces were operating with and for foreign agents". According to the General Secretary of one the nascent political parties,

Tanzania has not been an open society and therefore the government does not know what people want. Patriotism has been nationalized despite alienation of its citizens. The nation belonged to Nyerere and he acted alone. Ujamaa socialism is just a name. We are socialist in Tanzania by tradition and, therefore, Nyerere made a wrong move forcing socialism, forcing people who didn't even know one another to interact. While he can be credited with keeping the country from falling apart along tribal lines, he wiped out civic associations. Therefore, there is nothing [for today's opposition] to use and everyone is poor and fears the government.

An ex-government official and present leader of the opposition further explained that, until now, "both internal and external calls for multipartyism had to be disguised with calls for greater efficiency, accountability, etc. Therefore, open opposition to the single-party system could not exist according to law".

Without external pressure, another leader of the opposition lamented, change would not have come about when it did. "Perhaps, it would have achieved transition on its own but only at a later date. [Afterall,] the struggle for multipartyism has gone on since 1984. At
that time a documentary paper was written to the CCM Committee by two deputy secretary generals, one from the mainland, Mashota and one from the islands, Nasoro.\textsuperscript{132} This offended the government."

The interviewee also cited The Legal and Civil Rights Movement led by Mapalala and Seseme and in existence since 1988. He explained that the influence of international forces is exemplified by Amnesty International and Sweden's roles in bringing about the release of Mapalala who had been imprisoned for more than three years in 1989. The opposition activity of Seif Shariff Hamadi, (the believed winner of the 1995 presidential elections on the Islands), is also noted. Thus, there were calls for change since 1984, but they failed to achieve democratic transition and met, instead, with government suppression.

The general difference between the responses of CCM loyalists and opposition leaders is that the former cite early opposition activity as having had a causal impact upon the 1992 transition. For the latter, however, while these opposition incidents did indeed take place, they were unable to have any positive effect upon political reform because they were immediately and unjustly silenced by the leadership. As the opposition and civic leaders make clear, it was only the pressure which was applied from the outside which enabled the opposition forces in Tanzania to have any voice. They argue that despite the monumental official political changes of 1992, that voice still remains stifled.

\textsuperscript{132} This incident was not made public and, therefore, is not recorded in the previous section.
Conclusion

Despite the varied responses, the interrelation between domestic opposition and the elite decision to implement multipartyism represented in Figure 9 remains plausible. However, the interviews did not substantiate the proposed connection between domestic opposition and donor aid contingency represented by trajectory a. The set of interviews conducted with representatives of the international donor community, which are presented in Chapter 5, may offer the support necessary to maintain that connection. However, at this time, the findings of this chapter would lead to the omission of this trajectory as illustrated in the revision of Figure 9 presented below as Figure 10.

![Figure 10. Domestic opposition and multiparty transition (modified)](image)

The problems with the data presented in the chapter make it difficult to definitively assess trends in opposition activity. However, the absolute number of opposition events reported does suggest an increasing trend in the years immediately preceding the 1992 transition. Though, even that finding is problematic when taking into account the simultaneous suggestions from within the leadership that multipartyism was being considered. While the interviewees, in sum,
were aware of the opposition events which occurred in recent Tanzanian history, they were notably divided over the perceived causal significance which the incidents had on the 1992 transition.

Chapter 5 now addresses the possible causal effect of donor aid contingency upon the Tanzanian transition.
Chapter 5

DEMOCRATIC DONOR AID CONTINGENCY

Chapter 5 looks at the role played by democratic contingency tied to donor aid grants in the onset of multiparty transition in Tanzania. This factor is one of the two hypothesized intermediate variables represented in Figure 5, Chapter 1. Inclusion of this factor is based on the theory that the donor countries have been able to exert greater control over their money due, in part, to the creation of a unipolar international system following the end of the Cold War. The argument holds that the dissolution of the Eastern bloc limited the ability of aid recipients to play donors off of one another -restricting their capacity to control, or to choose among, conditionalities tied to aid.

Consideration of the effect of donor aid contingency as an intervening causal variable of multiparty transition in Tanzania is based upon the hypothesis that, with the addition of democratic contingency to donor aid, the Tanzanian government, so as to maintain its aid flow, underwent multiparty transition in 1992. This chapter deals with the portion of Figure 5 of Chapter 1 which is represented below as Figure 11.
Analysis begins with a survey of the official policies of the largest aid donors to Tanzania as they, more so than other smaller donors, are likely to have wielded the greatest amount of influence over Tanzanian policy. They are, in order of descending aid volume: Sweden, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan, Canada, Finland, and the United States. The intent is to determine whether or not these donor countries did attach a democratic contingency to foreign aid and, if so, what the timing of this contingency was relative to the 1992 Tanzanian political transition. As with the other variables, if variance in the donor aid policies occurred at considerably earlier or multiple times throughout the time period studied, the correlation between this factor and the 1992 reform would be undermined. Conversely, should the implementation of democratic donor aid contingency be found to immediately precede 1992, correlation between the two occurrences is substantiated.

As in the other chapters, direct causal linkage between this variable and the outcome of multiparty transition in Tanzania is most

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OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries (various years).
accurately assessed through interviews with Tanzanian political leaders involved in the transition. The findings from such interviews will follow the presentation of specific foreign aid policies and actual aid transfers. The policies and the documents containing them were largely provided by Embassy representatives in Dar es Salaam and in the respective home country offices. Where documentation was non-existent, the representatives often provided verbal explanation of their national aid policies and disbursements.

Official statements or publications by the leadership of the donor countries provide the best information available concerning the policy bases for aid transfer. The ability of these documents to shed light on the approximate date of incorporation of the democratic contingency to aid, however, is accurate to the extent that Tanzanian decision-makers were likely to have been aware of these statements—a determination most accurately made through interviews with such Tanzanian leaders. Also, any mentions of political contingency made prior to the official policy declarations, perhaps in private donor-recipient meetings, remain largely undisclosed.

The logical indicator or measure of shifts in donor aid policy is aid levels. Following the analysis of the official donor policies will be a presentation of the actual aid transfer figures from these eleven donor countries to Tanzania. Unfortunately, there is no one definitive manifestation in terms of aid transfer levels which corresponds to democratic aid contingency. It is uncertain whether, for example, a donor country would choose to support democratization in a single party state through the punitive measure of decreasing aid. They may, conversely, choose to maintain current aid levels supplemented with
democratic guidance or warn of potential disruption of aid flows should transition not occur. The other alternative is to increase aid amounts for the purpose of enhancing the level of control by the donor over the recipient government and economy in an effort to attain greater leverage to implement political reform.

This indicator becomes even more imprecise when considering the number of other factors which may affect aid flow. Such factors which include economic recession in donor countries and overall decrease in donor aid budgets will be discussed with regard to transfers from specific donor nations.

Aid Policy and Transfer to Tanzania

(a) Dependency and Debt

Donor contingency on aid to Tanzania is especially significant due to the considerable extent of the latter's dependency and, thus, its susceptibility to external demands and controls in the interest of securing needed funds. As of 1994, Tanzania's debt stood at 39 percent of its GDP and, in 1991 (prior to the transition), 14 percent of its export income went to servicing its debt. The situation is likely to continue to deteriorate as experts predict that, without additional debt relief, Tanzania's debt service will soon comprise approximately 35 percent of its export income.

With regard to bilateral debt, however, donor governments have agreed to reschedule the debt owed to them by the Lesser Developed

134 SIDA Development Cooperation with Tanzania 1994/5-1996/7, Embassy of Sweden, Development Cooperation Office, June 2, 1994, pp. 4-5.

135 Ibid., p. 5.
Countries (LDCs) in accordance with the agreement signed at the Toronto economic summit in 1988. According to this agreement, donor nations pledged to lessen the economic burden of debt on these developing countries through "generous rescheduling of official bilateral non-concessional debt (provided at market rates) for severely indebted low-income countries that have undertaken economic reform programs".136

The Toronto agreement, however, is unlikely to provide the necessary debt relief due to the fact that Tanzania's debt repayment is now going exclusively to multilateral donor agencies which do not offer relief on loan debts. The problem has escalated as 1994 saw an increase in multilateral loan assistance to Tanzania from the previous year - a development which directly translates into greater debt service in the future.137

A glimpse at the post-transition Tanzanian economy shows that the situation was even worsened by the dramatic decline in bilateral assistance in late 1994-1995 as Tanzania's relations with the multilateral donors of the IMF and the World Bank were suspended. Tanzania had been unable to meet its loan repayment schedule, and its economic development was increasingly hindered by corruption and fraud.138 When this crisis of the Tanzanian state (the 'scandal') became evident to the donor community, Tanzania's major creditors threatened sanctions if the economic situation was not improved by


137 Ibid.

February of 1995. In a statement made by Tanzania's largest donor, Sweden, Tanzania was warned that her ability to solve her economic problems "will be decisive not only for a continued support from these institutions but also for a continued extensive support from the bilateral donors." Norway and Sweden, in fact, did suspend their aid. This crisis situation was to abate as the Mwinyi government succeeded to identify the individuals involved in the scandal and implemented system changes to prevent its recurrence and the necessary aid flow was revived.

(b) General Donor Aid Democratic Contingency Policy

Bilaterals

The timeline on Graph 15 illustrates the dates of incorporation of democratic contingency into the aid policies of the eleven chief donor states to Tanzania. It is evident, indeed, that implementation of democratic contingency in foreign aid policies clustered around the year 1990, with Canada initiating its incorporation in 1987 and Japan, following the others, in 1992.

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141 Africa Research Bulletin, Political Series, 32/1, December-January, 1995, p. 11981. Whether this action has effect upon Tanzania's transition will be of interest. Due to Tanzania's need, however, for international financial assistance, it is more plausible that the country will move to undertake even greater economic reform to appease the donors and thus, must abide by their aid contingencies.

142 Interview with representative of Canadian International Development Agency, (CIDA), Quebec, October 1995.
The call for democracy as the desirable political system of Third World recipient states, as expressed by members of the First World's donor nations, began back in the mid-1900's, concordant with the Cold War and the West's advocacy of free market multiparty democracies as a superior alternative to the socialist single-party model espoused by the East. However, while earlier pronouncements of the value of democratization were heard well before the late 1980's with, for example, the United States' and Sweden's claims that democracy had been a guiding principle of diplomacy since 1960 and 1978, respectively,^1^ the use of aid to further this 'democratic' goal would only arise after the Cold War had ended. Aid would, accordingly, in theory be used to reward moves toward democratization and threats of its withholding would reflect punitive measure taken against those recipient states whose policies were not in-keeping with political liberalization. Various rationales were given for this contingency. Largely touted were the universal regard for basic human rights and the interrelation between accountable, stable governments and economic development.^1^


^1^ Inter Nationes Bonn Press, Report bilateral "Commitment to democracy and the rule of law in Africa; The FRG supports democratization processes", 1993. This reorientation of German development policy places even greater emphasis on the fact that human beings represent the focal point of the development process. This is also plausible economically: democratic control and participative structures are more likely to prevent development funds being squandered on prestige projects or disappearing without a trace. In this context, an improvement in the effectiveness and durability of development efforts is the explicit objective. See also British House of Commons, Session 1990-91, Foreign Affairs Committee, First Report, UK Policy Towards South Africa and the Other States of the Region, Volume 1, March 4, 1991, p. xxiv. "These principles are not options, but essential for economic development. If they are permanently to
Citing the 1986 United Nations General Assembly Declaration of the Right to Development, Canada and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1987, began the earliest calls for democracy. The conference established that "the human person is the central subject of development and should be the active participant and beneficiary of the right to development".145 In that year, along with other measures to improve cooperation between donor and recipient states, CIDA "announced its intention to establish an institute for human rights and democratic development".146 Concern for democracy, however, was not specifically mentioned under the Principles and Priorities of Canada's Official Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, which includes poverty alleviation, structural adjustment, increased participation of women, environmentally sound development, food security, and energy availability.

Stated more explicitly in 1993, in reaction to the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna held that year, CIDA proclaimed that human rights and democracy are integral to development.

Accordingly, "the policies and approaches of all partners in development need to reflect the symbiotic relationship of human rights, democratic development and food governance with other elements that make development sustainable. In the post-Cold War world, people everywhere are demanding greater respect for their rights. They want a voice in how and by whom they are governed." 147

Canada's unwillingness to apply punitive measures in the face of non-democratization would later set it apart from some of the other donor nations. CIDA explained that this reluctance derived from the general ineffectiveness of implementation of political conditionality as a "means to change behaviour of offending governments". Accordingly, "conditionality is often a short-hand for sanctions. Choosing to impose such conditions is an admission of the failure of our policies to promote human rights and democracy, rather than a cure for the problem".148 CIDA believes its "leverage in countries is often far greater than the dollar amounts of [its]... ODA contributions [and, that] being committed to a country 'for the long haul' allows [it]... to engage in more meaningful ways in the development process, than by withdrawing precipitously in the face of sudden political reversals".149

Following Canada chronologically, Denmark in 1989 declared democracy to be one of the major objectives of its aid program - an objective which it had been carrying out through small projects since

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147 Ibid., (italics added).
148 Ibid., p. 2.
149 Ibid., p. 3.
1988. These projects which, from 1988 to 1993, totaled more than USD 90 million, aimed at promoting human rights and democracy.150 These practical activities and their funding have mostly been planned and implemented locally through Danish Embassies which are specially authorised to grant assistance for small-scale projects (below USD 0.5 million). In addition, more comprehensive programmes are drawn up jointly by the governments of the recipient countries and the Danish International Development Agency, (Danida). Many of these schemes are also planned and implemented through Danish, international and Third World NGO's.151

In 1989, the Danish Parliament, agreed on seven criteria for the selection of the developing countries which would receive its development assistance of which one is "the prospect of achieving effective progress in furthering respect for human rights and promoting democracy."152 This focus was reinforced in 1990 in the Joint Communiqué issued by the Nordic Ministers of Development Cooperation and, again, in late 1991, with the adoption of a comprehensive policy resolution by the Council of Ministers of the European Community on human rights, democracy and development.153 Accordingly,


151 See breakdown of Danish Development Assistance in Human Rights and Democracy 1988-1993, p.11; including USD 1.5 million to electoral processes of total of USD 91 million.


153 Ibid., p. 8.
the Nordic countries will continue to utilize the opportunities which development co-operation provides for an open dialogue on development issues. As part of this dialogue the Nordic countries intend to express their views on the decisively important role which democracy plays in development and progress. A lack of progress in the democratization process will have an effect on the willingness of donors to participate in development co-operation efforts.  

Referring to the Nordic Ministers Communiqués of 1990 through 1993, Danish aid policy would reflect

the emphasis on positive measures -such as support for the growth of a free press- rather than negative or punitive sanctions. Nevertheless the very concept of development co-operation implies that assistance cannot continue to [be given] to countries with which donors are unable to establish an agreed basis for future collaboration -in other words in cases of persistent grave violations of human rights or failure to implement democratic reforms.

The Joint Nordic Statement made at the Consultative Group (CG)-Meeting in Paris, June 1991 made official that,

the conviction that democracy, as a means of selecting those who should govern a country, is superior to other systems of government, is deeply rooted in our countries. In our way to look at democracy, it must -among other things- provide a right to express views freely and allow different groups and opinions to influence political decisions. This is our belief. We cannot force it on anybody else, nor do we want to. But it cannot be avoided that public opinion in the African nations is being influenced from our countries in this as well as in other respects, and it cannot be avoided that


development assistance is an intermediary of this influence.156

According to Danida, "in most developing countries where Denmark has engaged in a dialogue with the authorities on such issues, useful practical agreements have emerged on Danish assistance for initiatives to promote respect for human rights, democratic development and better government".157 Though, in cases in which cooperation regarding human rights or the quality of government situation was not forthcoming, Denmark, together with other donor countries delivered a political response, "deploying differentiated but coordinated restrictive measures. Malawi, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Sudan are examples where development co-operation has been scaled down or discontinued".158

Italy, too, in 1989 incorporated reference to the significance of democracy in its definition of donor-assisted development. Referring to the principal of integration agreed upon in the Final Document of the Non-Aligned Conference held in Belgrade in 1989, the Italian Foreign Ministry explained that,

[such] integration is achieved through the exercise of freedom, democracy and pluralism -in essence, the rights first codified at the international level by the UN. Freedom, complementarity and solidarity must be the guiding principles of a new coexistence. [And] the logic of integration is negated when countries import technology while ignoring the fact

157 Ibid., (italics added).
158 Ibid.
that economic progress and democracy are two sides of the same coin.¹⁵⁹

In a statement made before the United Nations General Assembly in 1990, Italy’s Foreign Minister reiterated the need for simultaneous economic and political reform for development to occur. Accordingly,

Democratic institutions and respect for human rights are essential in the effective development of human resources and an equitable growth that meets the basic social and economic needs of all people. Aspects other than greater economic efficiency are of equal importance in the attainment of equitable and sustainable development: open, accountable political systems and the respect of individual rights represent a vital element for effective and equitable operation of economic systems.¹⁶⁰

Furthermore, despite the greater dispersion of donor funds with the independence of transitional states in Central and Eastern Europe, the Minister stressed the continued commitment of European Community (EC) members to the developing world.¹⁶¹

Finland, in 1990, following the lead of the Nordic Conference, also called for democratization in recipient countries and stated a willingness to take punitive action in the form of aid sanctioning should that contingency not be met. Finnish aid policy, re-oriented and re-figured in light of the Finnish economic recession of the

¹⁵⁹ Permanent Mission of Italy to the UN, Statement by H. E. Mr. Gianni de Michelis, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Italy on Behalf of the EC and its Member States, at the 45th session of the General Assembly, NY, Sept. 25, 1990, pp. 33-35, (italics added).

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., (italics added).

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 36.
1990's, has been guided by the following principles set down officially in 1992:

- To sustain large-scale poverty alleviation in developing countries;
- To ward off global environmental threats by assisting developing countries to improve their environment;
- To promote democracy, equality and the respect of human rights in developing countries.

It is emphasized that sustainable development is only achievable when the recipient country bears the main responsibility for her own development. External support can only be supplementary and provided for a limited duration.\(^{162}\)

For Finland,

although the long-term aid programmes have not been used as immediate 'rewards' or 'punishments' for political developments, [it has been] emphasized in the dialogue with her recipient countries that she considers democratic rule and respect for human rights to be a condition \textit{sin qua non} for long-term, sustainable development and, consequently, for her development aid.\(^{163}\)

For the Netherlands, too, consideration of 'good governance' and democracy as contingent for aid began in, approximately, 1990.\(^{164}\)

Dutch support for democratization is largely channeled through non-governmental organization (NGOs) which have "proved very important in


helping to bring about a democratic pluralist structure of society and in attaining both civil and political human rights."\(^{165}\)

**Norway** also began to speak of development assistance as coterminous with democratization in 1990. Her actions were a direct result of the afore-mentioned Nordic statements issued in 1990 and 1991.\(^{165}\)

**Sweden** would also begin to actively support democratization in her recipient nations in 1990. Democratic development was encouraged as one of the Swedish International Development Authority's (SIDA) five goals toward attaining the overall aim of raising the standard of living of poor people. Democratization, accordingly, would help "bring about conditions that give people greater influence over development on local, regional and national levels".\(^{167}\) SIDA's other four goals have been economic growth, economic and social equality, economic and political independence of states, and environmental quality.\(^{168}\)

As of 1990, Swedish aid allocation to recipient states was to be determined by the following criteria: "(1) How can democratic development be achieved? [and] (2) What is the position regarding respect for human rights and freedom?", in addition to the more purely economic considerations of "(3) What progress is being made in the


\(^{168}\) Ibid.
development of a market economy? and (4) How efficiently does the recipient country manage development assistance resources provided by Sweden? Swedish expenditure specifically designated to further the promotion of democratic development began in the fiscal year 1990/1 and its sum would increase dramatically from a level of SEK 500,000 in 1991/2, to SEK 3 million in 1992/3.

1990 also saw calls by Great Britain for 'good governance' and her threat that, if such calls were not heeded, in extreme cases, aid would be cut off. 'Good governance', accordingly, characterizes a government

[whose] legitimacy [is] attained through general participation and consent of people regarding the government and their country's development; [which is] accountable for the use of resources and performance; [which is] competent in deciding and implementing appropriate policies; and [which] respects and promotes...human rights and the rule of law.

According to the British Foreign Ministry,

countries which tend towards pluralism, public accountability, respect for the rule of law, human rights, market principles, should be encouraged. Governments which persist with repressive policies, corrupt management, wasteful discredited economic systems should not expect us to support their folly

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170 Ibid., p. 29.

171 "Good Government: Putting Policy into Practice", Speech by Baroness Chalker, Minister of Overseas Development, July 6, 1994 at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Overseas Development Administration.
with scarce aid sources which could be used better elsewhere.\textsuperscript{172}

With regard to the unequivocal punitive action to be taken by Britain should this democratic contingency tied to aid not be met, the Government explained that,

where there is a complete disregard for the principles of good government, the Government will not hesitate to reduce sharply or cut off aid altogether, as in the Sudan and Somalia. In these circumstances, we would simply maintain humanitarian assistance and channel resources through non-government organizations to those in need. In less extreme cases, however, a more modulated approach is adopted concentrating on policy dialogue and persuasion at the highest levels and emphasizing the importance that we and other donors attach to positive action in this area.\textsuperscript{173}

In the case of southern African\textsuperscript{174} development, in particular, official British policy is based upon the following four observations about the pertinence and importance of democratization:

First, the old argument that tribal and regional divisions in Africa make it impossible to construct a workable multi-party democracy seems no longer to be a bar to the introduction or preservation of democracy in southern Africa. Second, democracy is in itself not enough to create stable societies in which economic development can occur. There needs also to be good, efficient and incorrupt government --'good


\textsuperscript{174} Southern Africa is a regional grouping of which Tanzania is considered a part.
governance'. Third, there is no single model of democracy which may be simply adopted in each country. Certain principles, however, are essential. They are a multi-party democracy, with free elections and freedom of the press; the rule of law; an independent judiciary, an efficient and uncorrupt government and civil service; and a separation between the state and the party in power. Finally, it should be brought home to these countries of southern Africa that these principles are not options, but essential for economic development. If they are permanently to emerge from poverty, they will need to create wealth for all of their people, not only a section of them; and they will need to do so with the consent and co-operation of their people. 175

In an address given in Nigeria, the British Foreign Secretary explained that her country's concern for a recipient's political accountability and pluralism is based upon the belief that

basic freedoms are crucially important: the freedom of association, freedom of assembly, freedom of the press. - Pluralism means distributing political power throughout the state government, parliament, the media, the business community, the judiciary, the universities, other traditional structures, rather than concentrating it in a single pair of hands... [And] collectively, the international community, led by the World Bank, has much to offer, drawing on experience elsewhere. 176

The United States, too was to implement democratic contingency upon aid in 1990. According to a statement made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen,

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176 Edited transcript of an address given by the foreign secretary, Mr. Douglas Hurd, to the Nigerian Institute for International Affairs in Abuja, Tuesday, January 5, 1993, pp. 4-6.
it is our policy to encourage democratization throughout the [African] continent. We are doing this by making our support for political and economic pluralism clear at the highest levels of every African government. And our aid program is bolstering the cause of free markets and democracy. USAID's objective is to assist nations throughout the world to reduce poverty, ignorance, and malnutrition and to assist developing nations to 'realize their full national potential through the development of open and democratic societies and the dynamism of free markets and individual initiative'. To meet these objectives, USAID's programs will be guided by the principles of 'support for free markets and broad-based economic growth and support for democracy'. The US is providing assistance to strengthen these institutions and values on which democracy rests -accountability and transparency in government, a free press, an independent judiciary, the rule of law- institutions and values that are essential if African countries are to attract the outside investment necessary for sustained economic growth. We are also providing newly democratizing African states with expertise and some financial assistance to help smooth the difficult transition process.¹⁷⁷

Mr. Cohen asserted that the U.S. funds for foreign aid were limited and that, therefore, the US intends to pay special attention to Africa's democracies and to countries that are actively engaged in the democratization process. As we have told our African interlocutors on more than one occasion, those

¹⁷⁷ US Dept of State Dispatch, Bureau of Public Affairs, 11-19-90, 1/12, Herman J, Cohen, "Democratic Change in Africa", p.272. US Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa is given through: "1) The Development Fund for Africa (DFA), established in 1987, which promotes economic growth and equitable distribution specifically in Africa, and its resources were increased by 44% in 1991 to $800 million. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) emphasizes expenditure under DFA in the following critical sectors: agricultural production in connection with preservation of natural resources, health, voluntary family planning, education, and income generation; 2) The Economic Support Fund (ESF) which provides economic assistance for support of US Government economic, political, and security interests; 3) PL 480, which provides food aid under Titles I, II, and III and Section 416, is a concessional loan and grant program to governments, private organizations, and the World Food Program". (US Department of State Dispatch, January 6, 1992, Feature: SSA and the US- Part 2, 3/1, pp. 8-9).
countries that fail to respond—or worse, suppress—popular demands for democratization will find themselves in an ever more disadvantageous position in the competition for assistance and private investment. African people have so clearly demonstrated that they want freedom. And I am confident that truly representative government will prevail throughout the continent.  

Mr. Cohen further explained that,

Mainly, from the USAID system, [there] will be growing amounts of assistance for 'governance' [which] is the entire process that will enable people to participate and to fulfill their work. The US supports efforts towards democracy on the belief that human rights cannot be secured in Africa without political pluralism.

Secretary of State James Baker also suggested the weight of democratic reform in considerations of American aid. In his proposal for budget allocation for the fiscal year 1992, the State Department proposed a new regional Support for Democracy Fund "designed to encourage the growing movement toward responsible governance in Africa, particularly the trend toward pluralist democracy".

Germany, in 1991, also called for democratization, or the participation of the general population in political life, as one of its five criteria aimed at increasing the quality of German foreign

178 Ibid., (italics added).
aid. The other four criteria are the respect for human rights, guarantee of legality, creation of a pro-market economic system and a state trading policy orientated toward development. 181

Accordingly, the German Foreign Ministry announced that "substantial cuts can be expected by countries whose [political] framework conditions fall short of expectations, while other States undertaking positive changes are in line for big increase in aid." 182 The Foreign Minister claimed, interestingly enough, to have been guided by Julius Nyerere's statement that "Africa's democracy deficit is of greater significance today than its foreign currency deficit". 183 According to this new focus, German economic support is now tied to democratization based upon the rationale that "democratic control and participative structures are more likely to prevent development funds [from] being squandered on prestige projects or disappearing without a trace". 184

As the Minister explained,

it is not the case of imposing a western constitutional model on African states which have their own cultural and political traditions. ...The protection of minorities, the rule of law, freedom from torture, democratic elections, freedom of the press and information, and other basic civil rights are enshrined in the UN international agreement, which has been signed by most countries, and which


182 Ibid.

183 Ibid.

were also emphatically reaffirmed at the Human Rights World Conference in Vienna in 1993.\textsuperscript{185}

German efforts to enhance African development, he stressed, would be undertaken more so than in the past in cooperation with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Community (EC).\textsuperscript{186}

The last of the eleven major donors to Tanzania to officially state the significance of political reform toward democratic pluralism and tie it to foreign aid was Japan in 1992. It called for the ensuring of democratization and 'good governance' through the development of human resources and socio-economic infrastructure and the guaranteeing of basic human needs (BHN). Japan also supports the enhancement of the global values of freedom, human rights, democracy, peace and prosperity, and the intrinsic interrelation among nations which necessitates stability and development throughout the world, and has pledged to implement its Official Development Assistance (ODA) to achieve these goals.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{Multilaterals}

The linkage between 'good governance' and economic development was further advocated by the international lending institution of the World Bank. While this is an organization which has interests

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item Ibid.
\item Ibid., p. 8.
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separate from those of the bilateral aid donors, it nevertheless cannot help but be influenced by the latter as they provide the funding necessary to implement its projects. Accordingly, from the late 1980's- early 1990's, there have been an increasing number of co-investments of the World Bank with bilateral donors and it is possible that the latter's political contingencies are attached to these investments.188

In a report submitted by the World Bank in 1989, direct mention was made of the need for political reform in Sub-Saharan African states for the purpose of achieving sustainable economic growth. This open concern for the politics of recipient nations drastically departs from previous World Bank rhetoric and policy which dealt only with purely economic concerns. In 1989, the World Bank began to advise that Africa needs not just less government but better government -government that concentrates its efforts less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be productive. [And] ultimately, better governance requires political renewal. This means a concerted attack on corruption from the highest to the lowest levels. This can be done by setting a good example, by strengthening accountability by encouraging public debate, and by nurturing a free press. It also means empowering women and the poor by fostering grassroots and NGO's, such as farmers' associations, cooperatives, and women's groups.189

Furthermore,

Efforts to create an enabling environment and to build local capacities will be wasted if the political context is not favorable. The only way


living standards will be raised and basic needs met is through growth in the productive sectors. That requires investment. But a loss of confidence is discouraging investors and producers alike. It is not just the unpredictability of policies that discourages investment, but also the uncertainty about their interpretation and application by officials. This problem is exacerbated by the frequent lack of a reliable legal framework to enforce contracts. The rule of law needs to be established. In many instances this implies rehabilitation of the judicial system, independence for the judiciary, scrupulous respect for the law and human rights at every level of government, transparent accounting of public monies, and independent public auditors responsible to a representative legislature, not to an executive. Independent institutions are necessary to ensure public accountability.

The widespread perception in many countries is that the appropriation of the machinery of government by the elite to serve their own interests is at the root of this crisis of governance. The willingness of the donor community to tolerate impropriety —by failing to insist on scrupulous conduct by their own suppliers, by not ensuring that funds are properly used, by overlooking inadequate accounting and auditing, and by tolerating generally lax procurement procedures— aggravates the malaise.190

The World Bank seeks to promote economic development through economic planning with its long-term financing of development projects and structural adjustment programs (SAPs), its International Development Association which provides countries with a GNP of less than USD 400 a year with special financial assistance, and its support of private enterprise through the International Finance Corporation.

Unlike the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has not advised directly on political matters but, rather, remains a more purely economic institution. Its role is to oversee the international monetary system by "promoting exchange stability and

190 Ibid., p. 192.
orderly exchange relations among its member countries, assisting members who experience temporary balance of payments difficulties by supplying short- to medium-term credits, and supplementing the currency reserves of its members through the allocation of SDRs (special drawing rights).".\textsuperscript{191}

IMF loans differ with regard to the duration and characteristics of the projects it supports. Both of its loan types: the Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) and the Enhanced Structural Facility (BSAF), have been granted to many developing countries, including Tanzania. Specifically,

SAF loans are provided on concessional terms to low-income developing countries to support 3 to 4-year economic programs designed to strengthen their balance of payments and improve their growth prospects. An eligible member can borrow up to 50% of its quota over the program period. SAF loans carry an interest rate of 1/2 of 1% and are repayable within 5 1/2 to 10 years after disbursement.

[BSAF loans] have characteristics similar to SAF loans, but the economic objectives they support are expected to be more ambitious, and the amount of the loan can be up to 180% of a country's quota (or up to 225% in exceptional cases). The repayment period and the interest rate are identical to the SAF.\textsuperscript{192}

Thus, while there is coordination between IMF and World Bank policies, the former, despite accusations to the contrary by scholars and numerous Tanzanian political leaders (see below), does not directly place political conditions upon its loans. Though, the Fund does rely

\textsuperscript{191} "The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank at a Glance". Document provided by the International Monetary Fund.

\textsuperscript{192} "IMF; The Financing Role of the IMF". External Relations Department, Washington, D.C., p. 20431.
on quota subscriptions from member states for its financial resources and, thus, only indirectly can bilateral contingencies be reflected in Fund policy. As one donor official explained this misconception, "the most important difference between multilateral and bilateral development co-operation activities is that the former is much more visible and comprehensive internationally - and this naturally heightens its foreign policy significance". 193

In sum, thus, along with the World Bank, bilateral aid has been conditioned by a growing concern of donors for political reform in recipient states so as to enhance accountability and transparency of economic transactions as well as to support human rights. Such aid contingency began to be applied in the late 1980's and, by 1992, all of Tanzania's major donors were on-board, thereby suggesting a considerable degree of correlation between the timing of these policy changes and the 1992 Tanzanian transition. The translation of these general aid policies to aid flows to Tanzania during these years will be examined below.

(c) Actual Aid to Tanzania

Following a presentation of the background of Tanzanian economic policy and aid receipt, the specific aid from the major donor nations since 1980 will be analyzed and illustrated in Figure 12. These aid transfers will help to explain the bilateral aid relationships which Tanzania has had over the past decade with its largest donors. As afore-stated, however, the relation between these figures, as well as

193 Ministry for Foreign Affairs, "Finland's Development Co-operation in the 1900's, Helsinki, 1993, pp. 24-25.

183
the previous sections' presentation of the donors' bilateral aid policy with the onset of multiparty transition in Tanzania, remains at best correlational. Its causal impact may be better assessed through the analysis of the interview findings which follow.

**Background Statistics: General Tanzanian -Donor Community Relations.**

In brief, prior to the early 1980's, Nyerere's type of socialism attracted large amounts of aid, especially from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. In the 1970's, in fact, these three states supplied about forty percent of Tanzania's total aid. However, the early to mid-1980's found the donor community largely unified in its criticism of Tanzania's internal politico-economic situation. In general, the West was dissatisfied with Tanzania's macro-economic policy and, by 1983-5, donors began to reassess their prior approach to Tanzanian development and aid levels experienced a general decline. Tanzania's economic reform in the early 1980's was marked only by "some tentative steps toward reform with the structural adjustment program of 1982-1985, [and] government reform measures had a limited impact on [the] severe internal and external imbalances and did not elicit the external assistance needed from the donor community, primarily because of inappropriate exchange-rate policies". While the donors may not have supported the notion of economic liberalization earlier, they began to agree on the need for such reform.

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As explained by the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the donor philosophy behind providing aid for development underwent considerable change from its pre-1980 and early 1980 form to the late 1980's. Accordingly,

In the past, discussion of the developing countries' own economic policy was pushed into the background by the desire of colonies for economic as well as political independence. This was based on a form of economic thinking that stressed dependence on the industrial countries as the initial cause of the developing countries' problems and the assumption that investment was the key to development. Things began to change [however] as indebtedness forced the developing countries to re-examine their economic policies.

Donors [became] more attentive to SAP goals in addition to projects; more open economy and integration into world trade, despite [the] negative effects of SAPs on recipient states. This formed an integral part of the broadly accepted principle that all countries are ultimately responsible for their own development, and that it is primarily the policy adopted by the developing country concerned which determines the course of its development. 196

With the change in leadership in 1985, however, and Tanzania's agreement to accept the World Bank structural adjustment program, her aid was to resume with no noticeable decline from the pre-1982 levels. Tanzanian President Mwinyi instituted considerable economic reform by mid-1986 with the Economic Recovery Program (ERP I) and the acceptance of another SAP. Largely, the major donor states reacted to these economic reforms with resumed high levels of aid, marking a 'momentous' turning point in the country's receipt of foreign assistance, according to the World Bank.

The ERP I, accordingly, resulted from "the change in the top political leadership [with which] came an open admission that the previous economic policies had not worked and that alternative solutions needed to be found for arresting the economic collapse."\textsuperscript{197} It is significant that, with the ERP I, President Mwinyi opened his country up to the influence of Western donor states more than Nyerere had permitted in previous years. Along with Mwinyi's inability to receive unconditioned assistance, as Nyerere had been able to do, presumably, largely due to the existence of the East-West rivalry, Tanzania's second president was, for the first time in Tanzania's history, having to make policy concessions directly based upon prescriptions of external financial supporters.

\textbf{Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Policy/Transfers Specific to Tanzania.}

The aid transfer figures for the years 1980 through 1992 are presented in Figure 12. The countries analyzed are Tanzania's major aid donors and they are presented in order of descending volume of aid transfer, with Sweden giving, on average, the most assistance and, the United States, the least. Aid volume figures are given in millions of US dollars, and are represented in graph-form for the purpose of determining the existence of any patterns or trends in Tanzania's receipt of foreign assistance during this time period prior to her 1992 implementation of political reform.

\textsuperscript{197} Rashid Faruqee and Ishrat Husain, "Adjustment in Seven African Countries", Chap. 1, in \textit{Adjustment in Africa: Lessons from Country Case Studies}, p. 2.
These donors can be subdivided according to the trend in their aid flow to Tanzania following their implementation of the democratic contingency. The first grouping includes Sweden, the Netherlands, and Norway, from whom Tanzania has experienced a generally constant decline in aid since the respective implementations of democratic contingency. In the second grouping, an increase in aid is noticeable and there appears to have been a maintenance of aid levels in the third. As the interviews will make apparent, it is inaccurate to presume a causal relationship between the implementation of democratic aid contingency and the subsequent aid flow to recipient nations due to the plethora of possible alternative foreign aid determinants. These findings will be combined with policy findings and, more importantly, with the perceptions of Tanzanian leaders acquired through interviews. The analysis of the Tanzanian interviews is presented below to more strongly make a determination of causal significance.

Of the first subdivision, the figures for Sweden show a slight decline between the years 1980 and 1985, an increase of almost one hundred percent in 1985 and fluctuations between increases and decreases hovering around USD 90 million through 1989. 1990, however, shows a considerable increase in aid volume to a record high of over one hundred and USD 40 million. Sweden's aid, though, would decline somewhat in 1991, and then, much more significantly, to approximately its 1989 rate, in 1992.

This decline in the early 1990's occurred despite awareness on the part of Swedish aid officials of the 'dramatic' political reforms being undertaken in Tanzania. In fact, SIDA acknowledged, specifically, that multipartyism had been introduced, that elections to
the Tanzanian national parliament had been scheduled to be held in 1995, and that "CCM is slowly adapting to the multiparty system, [as] the internal debate has increased and both parliament and the media are today acting more independently of the ruling party".198

According to the Netherlands Development Cooperation (NDC), the significant decrease in Dutch aid during the period of 1983 to 1985 was a response to Tanzania's macro-economic policy which the entire donor community severely criticized. Higher aid levels were to resume in 1985 but, since 1990, the level would decrease. This decline was, in part, the result of such incidental factors as the underspending of funds allocated to Tanzania in 1992, and "partly by more structural factors, such as the distribution of Netherlands aid funds over a larger number of developing countries."199

Since 1992, Dutch aid has continued to decline in volume to Tanzania despite the fact that the NDC applauds the Tanzania's economic and political reform programme, stressing that it is not Tanzanian internal policies that account for the fluctuations.200

The agency, however, has expressed its skepticism about the likelihood for continued Tanzanian economic political reform, due to its belief that it is the NGO's in much of the developing world which bring about political pluralism, secure human and civil rights and


199 Ibid.

200 Agreed Minutes of the Mid Term Review on Development Cooperation between the Governments of the URT and the Kingdom of the Netherlands on February 1, 1994 in Dar es Salaam, p. 3.
economic development, and NGO activity in Tanzania is quite limited. This inadequacy is blamed on the strong central control exerted by the government which stands in the way of such grassroots organization. Therefore, it is possible that any backsliding in Tanzania's commitment to democratic reform, such as postponement of elections, may result in a re-evaluation of the Netherlands' aid commitment.

The figures for Norway indicate a similar decrease in aid volume following the implementation of political contingency. This occurred after a general increase in aid through 1990, despite the slight dips of 1981, 1984 and 1988. According to Ministry officials, no political contingency upon aid had been specifically directed toward Tanzania. Though, "a Norwegian ministerial statement was issued in which democratic development for all countries was encouraged and it was clear to Tanzanian officials that conditions were being set for continued high level bilateral support".

In an apparent affirmation of Norway's concern for political liberalization in Tanzania, in a joint Nordic statement given in 1991, Norway expressed its welcoming of "discussion on these [political reform] matters -now taking place in Tanzania, initiated by far-sighted leaders of the country [and] -that the government, through the

201 Ibid., p. 87.
202 Ibid., p. 358.
Presidential Commission on single or multipartyism, has responded to the challenge. 205

Despite Norway's support for the political reform measures taken in Tanzania in the early 1990's, its aid level would decrease in response to other factors. Those cited by official and unofficial sources are Tanzania's abandonment of Nyerere's economic goals of redistribution and the increase in the number of aid recipients with the addition of Ethiopia and Uganda and the newly independent nations of Eastern Europe and Palestine and Eritrea without simultaneous increase in the aid budget. Also cited was the growing level of donor fatigue as more than USD 1 million had been given to Tanzania over the past thirty years and Norwegians were beginning to question whether or not it had any positive effect upon Tanzanian development.

The second grouping of countries includes Denmark, the United Kingdom and Japan. These countries rank, respectively, fifth, sixth and eighth among Tanzania's top eleven donors. Their aid records to Tanzania exhibit a general upward trend in the years following their respective inclusion of the political contingency of democracy tied to aid.

The aid flow of Denmark has exhibited, on average, a continual growth in aid transfer since 1984, with the exception of a dip in 1985 and one, again, in 1987. In 1992, it reached a level comparable to that of the aid volume transferred by the previously larger donors states of Sweden and Norway.

Denmark, as is the case with the donors of the first group, is content with the level of political reform being initiated in Tanzania. Its ministry, along with the others, is in fact presently focused on the handling of local elections and on preparation for the national parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for late 1995.

As for the United Kingdom, good governance and accountability had been stressed to Tanzania and other aid recipients and its consideration has played a significant part in British aid distribution. Britain has offered support for conferences geared toward teaching about democracy, established the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, and sponsored trips for Tanzanian members of Parliament to England to view the workings of the British Parliament. Britain, also, provides monetary assistance to Tanzania for elections.

British aid to Tanzania since 1990 has increased, especially with regard to expenditure for famine relief. The large increase in British aid in the financial year 1992/3 can be explained by the considerable rise in debt relief and some "drug related assistance funded by the Home Office and FCO". In fact, allocation of funds for these two causes, alone, increased from £90,000 in 1989/90 to £7,309,000 in 1991/2, decreased by approximately two-thirds in 1991/2, and then rose to an all-time high of £32,920,000 in 1992/3.

207 Ibid.
208 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
Japan is the third donor country which showed an increase in aid funds to Tanzania following its announced aid contingency of democratization. Considerable increase in aid volume had occurred since 1987. The level drastically fell in 1989, but resumed its upward trend in 1990.

Japanese aid increase prior to 1989 may be a result of its adoption of Emergency Economic Measures in May of 1987 at the Venice Summit. These measures included its commitment to support structural adjustment efforts by sub-Saharan African countries and other LLDCs through the provision of non-project grant aid totaling approximately USD 500 million over a three-year period. During the three years from FY 1987 to FY 1989, Japan provided this assistance totaling Y61.7 billion to 26 African countries and, thus, met its initial target of approximately USD 500 million.211

Furthermore, Japan extended its debt relief to Lower Lesser Developed Countries (LLDCs) with its 1988 Fourth Medium-Term Target for ODA.212 At the Toronto Summit, Japan announced that from FY 1989 onwards the scope of its debt relief to LLDCs would be expanded to include agreements concluded with Japan between the end of FY 1978 and FY 1987. As a consequence of this decision, debt relief is now available for an additional Y680 billion (USD 5.5 billion) in ODA loans covered by agreements concluded between Japan and LLDCs during that 10-year period.

212 Ibid., p. 92.
The third subdivision of donor states includes Germany, Italy, Canada, Finland and the United States. Based upon the ODA figures, on the average, the aid level to Tanzania following the inception of democratic aid contingency remained the same as it had been in the years prior to the policy change.

In the case of Germany, the 1990 level of USD 61 million was followed by an increase to USD 75 million in 1991 and a subsequent decrease in 1992 to USD 69 million. Despite the inclusion of democratic contingency in its overall aid program, "negotiations and consultations between the embassy and the Tanzanian government were carried out with regard to the economic and political situation in Tanzania, but no specific political contingencies upon aid were set".213

Nonetheless, Germany would express her satisfaction with Tanzanian political reform. The minutes of a German-Tanzanian meeting on economic cooperation reveal that Germany believed that Tanzania's "decision to introduce a multiparty system signified greater participation by the population in the process of forming political opinions. This would give the people more opportunities to share in economic life. [And] for the German government, the creation of scope for individual initiative was an important criterion for the form and extent of development cooperation."214


According to the Office of Cooperation of the Italian Foreign Ministry, the fluctuations in aid from Italy to Tanzania were not reflective of Tanzania's domestic political reform. Rather, the 'chaotic' nature of the aid transfer can, for one, be more accurately attributed to the considerable recent instability of the Italian government. Importantly, too, money available for foreign aid has decreased and, therefore, active Italian involvement in the affairs of certain recipient states requires a diminution in aid transfer to other recipients. This was the case with the 1988-89 Mozambique peace project which likely channeled aid money that would otherwise have gone to Tanzania and other recipients instead to Mozambique. After reaching a high of USD 196 million in 1987, Italian aid to Tanzania did, indeed, drop severely in 1988 and 1989.

The Ministry further explained that fluctuations in aid levels usually are the result of policies set up in prior years, as aid agreements are likely to be good for period of several years. Therefore, political changes in a recipient state, such as that in Tanzania in the early 1990's, would be unlikely to significantly affect aid transfer for those years as the levels have already been largely established. This reality, it was stressed, does not compromise the strong support which the Italian government gives to moves toward political liberalization.

216 Ibid.
217 Ibid.
Specifically, cuts were made in the Italian Ministry's aid budget in 1991 and, then, again in 1993, with the last cut amounting to over two-thirds of the budget of cooperation. Politically, the Italian government has decided to tighten cooperation funds because of the lack of control of the funds once they are dispersed. Accordingly, Tanzanian aid, therefore, has not been decreased in a punitive manner in reaction to the latter's politics prior to the transition, nor has Tanzania been rewarded with enhanced aid following 1992. The Italian Ministry of Cooperation explained that cutting aid periodically in a punitive manner would, in fact, cost the donor state more than to maintain the agreed-upon aid level.\textsuperscript{218} Italy, rather, has relied upon constructive dialogue, cooperation, and economic assistance to achieve social stability in its recipient states.\textsuperscript{219}

Canada's aid levels to Tanzania fluctuated the least of all the donors within this category. Its early 1980 levels reflected a considerably large ODA program. Tanzania would, also, during those years, absorb some of the credit that had been allotted to several other recipient countries due to the fact that the latter were having difficulty getting their programs to be operative.\textsuperscript{220}

In the mid- to late 1980's, and in particular, 1987 and 1988, Canadian aid was affected by budget cuts. While Tanzania remained Canada's largest African aid recipient, other southern African countries were 'coming on line' and this entailed a reallocation of aid

\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{219} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{220} Interview with representative of CIDA, Quebec, October 18, 1995.

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money. Also, since the mid-1980's, economic conditionalities had become more commonly tied to aid transfer along the lines of those imposed by the structural adjustment programs of the World Bank and this factor, too, would affect aid flows. Though, accordingly, the ability of donor countries to enforce these conditionalities was often largely restricted which necessarily compromised the effectiveness of these stipulations. As a Ministry representative explained, for example, "oftentimes the conditionality would require the recipient to provide a percentage of the equipment or budget necessary for a project for the purpose of enhancing recipient responsibility and preventing aid dependency, yet the recipient country was simply unable to meet the requirements. Such situations amounted to defeat of the effectiveness of some of the more stringent economic conditionalities." The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) also suggests the possibility that fluctuation in aid transfer may, in part, be in response to the completion of one project, followed by an hiatus during which aid flows decrease, after which new projects may be undertaken and funds, again, increase.

Canada does look more favorably upon countries which have undertaken political reform to improve governance, accountability, transparency, and the level of popular participation. These reforms, accordingly, create a barrier to high levels of corruption which is intolerable to donors who want to see positive development.

221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
results from their efforts. CIDA asserts, though, that Canada had no reason to take punitive action against Tanzania in reaction to corruption, unaccountability and lack of government transparency, at least, not before the scandal of 1994. Other countries which did experience such withholding of aid were Ghana in the late 1970's and Kenya in the early 1990's. In fact, since 1989, especially, donors see the Tanzanian government as taking responsibility for its economic development much more so than it had in previous years.224

Though Canada did incorporate multipartyism as a contingency for its aid in 1987, some allowance was made for the single-party politics of Tanzania. The Tanzanian leadership was believed to be following a vision (of Nyerere) which was respected and, in comparison to other sub-Saharan aid recipients, it was not seen to be at odds with concerns of donors.225 Canada and, to a greater, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands have basically given aid unconditionally to Tanzania "on faith", trusting the integrity of Nyerere and his socio-economic and political vision.226 This respect carried into the Mwinyi years but would be shaken with the 1994 scandal. In addition to this admiration for Nyerere and his policies, presently, Tanzania's democratic transition has been given "strong marks" by Canada, especially when compared to the much more ingenuine transitions undertaken by other states, namely Kenya.227

224 Ibid.
225 Ibid.
226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
Finland began its aid program to Tanzania with the Joint Nordic Programs in the 1980's and Tanzania has always been one of its largest recipients. The late 1980's saw relatively large outlays of Finnish assistance corresponding with its efforts to upgrade the harbor in Dar es Salaam.

Economic recession hit Finland in the early 1990's, directly resulting in a reduction in foreign aid expenditure. This reduction in aid funds, compounded by the increase in number of recipient states with the new Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States of the former Soviet Union (CIS) prompted the reevaluation of policy foundations, goals and achievements.

Following the highest level of aid transfer reached in 1991 (approximately .8 percent of Finnish GNP), in subsequent years the ODA figure was to fall to .4 percent of GNP. It is possible that the growth in aid disbursement to Tanzania experienced in the years 1985 to 1988 turned around in 1989 as a result of this decrease in overall funding. However, since Finland's official implementation of democratic aid contingency in 1990, Tanzanian aid receipt has only dropped slightly and, compared to the years previous to the contingency, it has remained, on the average, the same.

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228 Interview with representative of the Foreign Affairs Ministry, Embassy of Finland, Washington, D.C., October 1995.

229 Ibid.

According to the Finnish Ministry, its aid policy to Tanzania, however, is not solely determined by events internal to Finland. On the contrary, developments in Tanzania, too, have generally affected such disbursement as Finnish aid is responsive to the compatibility of its development priorities with those implemented by Tanzanian authorities.\(^{231}\)

As for the Finnish aid contingency of political pluralism which is in-keeping with structural adjustment policy's calls for greater accountability and legitimacy of governments, the decrease in Finnish aid to Tanzania does not reflect her dissatisfaction with Tanzanian political reform. Rather, as suggested by a Ministry official, Finland would very much like to be able to increase its financial support to Tanzania in recent years in light of the positive democratic changes which the latter has undertaken but, due to cutbacks in the aid budget, is unable to do so.\(^{232}\)

Aid from the United States to Tanzania also remained at relatively the same level before and after the former's formal inclusion of the contingency of democratization in aid policy. According to an embassy representative, "the United States never threatened the Tanzanian government to undertake multiparty transition, though, admittedly, the calls for transparency and accountability do have political overtones".\(^{233}\)

\(^{231}\) Ibid.

\(^{232}\) Ibid.

U.S. officials, along with other donor representatives, have been closely monitoring Tanzania's political changes and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Dar es Salaam has assessed that the transition has been satisfactorily implemented. In fact, Tanzania is applauded for its democratization which began with the legalization of multiple political parties "about one and one half years before the donors expected it". Furthermore, they believe that, despite its problems, the execution of political reform in Tanzania is far ahead of that of neighboring Kenya.

The U.S. Embassy official added that, although the Tanzanian by-elections were not perfect, the donor community, including the United States, was reasonably content with their handling and outcomes. CCM, they have observed, is intent to win, though it has not destroyed the press nor the opposition blatantly. As for the continued support to be given by donors including USAID, "unless there is an unanticipated level of willful mismanagement, the donors will not pull out".

American aid is granted on a comparative basis and Tanzania is ranked third in sub-Saharan Africa, and that position, accordingly, is

235 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
unlikely to change. Tanzania can likely expect to continue to receive in the neighborhood of USD 25 to 30 million in upcoming years.239

U.S. action to further democratization in Tanzania has taken place largely through the funding of NGO's believed to be non-partisan. Their focus is on economic and social welfare and, as they are part of civil society, support for them enhances institution-building.240 Also, the United States has funded segments of Radio Tanzania for the National Electoral Commission. As afore-mentioned, the NEC is a CCM-appointed institution and, therefore, the non-partisan nature of the U.S.' electoral support may be, in fact, compromised.

(d) Preliminary Findings

Looking at the graphs of Figure 12, no clear pattern of change in aid disbursement appears to correlate with the changes in aid policy. The three different possible outcomes in aid levels following a change in aid policy: decrease, increase and maintenance of aid levels are all represented in the study of aid transfer trends to Tanzania from its major donors. Thus, democratic contingency policy is not clearly accompanied by any one type of aid-level change. This holds despite the fact that donors, almost unanimously, have asserted that Tanzania more than satisfactory has abided by the wishes of the donor countries regarding political reform.

The inclusion of democratic contingency in general aid policy, however, more conclusively correlates with the onset of multiparty

239 Ibid.
240 Ibid.

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transition. The timing of the inclusion of the stipulation of good governance and democracy in aid policies does take place immediately prior to Tanzania's political transition to multipartyism. The role of the donor community was even noted by former CCM Chairman Nyerere who argued in criticism of donor policy that "the international financial institution had no right to force developing countries to embrace capitalism or introduce multi-party rule". While the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, to which Nyerere speaks, do not themselves place political contingency upon their funds, joint donor-World Bank investments do include the bilateral donors' aid policies which, since the late 1980's, were likely to entail such contingency.

Not only have the effects of the donor community been largely omitted from analysis of the onset of transition, but foreign aid's effects upon the latter two transition stages of process and consolidation is also severely understudied. According to numerous opposition leaders, the Tanzanian transition process is unlikely to move ahead with further changes that would increase its democratic nature without additional pressure from the West. One went so far as to suggest the need for economic sanctions along the lines of those enacted in the face of South African apartheid and the refusal of aid as occurred in the case of Kenya, in reaction to Moi's resistance to political reform.

243 Interview with the leader of the Tanzania Democratic Alliance Party (TADFA), June 1994.
These and other findings from interviews conducted with Tanzanian opposition leaders and ruling elite are presented below for the purpose of assessing the relevance of the statistical as well as foreign donor representative interview findings above to the 1992 Tanzanian transition. It will become apparent that there was a marked difference between the perceptions held by members of the CCM leadership and the present leadership of the civic and political opposition. Of course, homogeneity within either of these subdivisions or others was by no means complete nor is its existence or non-existence critical for this study.

Interviews

Approximately twenty CCM officials (including members of Parliament) were interviewed, out of which eleven suggested the possible impact of the international donor community and its pressures for democratization on the Tanzanian 1992 transition. Very significantly, however, nine of these eleven political elite were convinced that either the pressure was indirect, CCM would have enacted the transition even had there not been external pressure, and/or that donor aid contingency was merely a contributing factor which was overshadowed in its significance by other internal political developments. Another significant finding is that these eleven came from a pool of twenty Party leaders interviewed, suggesting that nearly half of those elite interviewed did not cite the causal significance of the international factor of donor pressure. For opposition and societal leaders, on the other hand, the causal relation between

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democratic donor aid contingency and multiparty transition was direct and of paramount significance to bringing about the country's multiparty transition.

Of the eleven CCM members who supported this causal relation, two distinguished leaders of The Bunge (the National Assembly) asserted that pressure for political change was indeed exerted by the West but that the causal impetus also consisted of internal calls for democratization. For one, the pressure exerted by the West on Tanzania could be compared to that which was exerted on Zambia's UNIP which ultimately led Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda to hold elections. Kaunda had grossly overestimated national support and his opponent Frederick Chiluba won handily. While the international role may be comparable in the two cases, "CCM and UNIP's respective support bases are not". Accordingly, CCM is believed to be much more involved in all levels of society and is believed to have considerable grassroots support.

For the other Bunge leader, external aid conditionalities were definitely an issue at the time of the Tanzanian transition, however, they were overshadowed by the internal developments. Accordingly, the 1992 political reform coincided with "a time when greater external pressures were being exerted on virtually every African country, particularly by multiparty and bilateral agencies who were making the political democratization question an important part of aid conditionalities for each of the recipient countries".

Another high ranking official whose position in the Finance Ministry makes him uniquely able to answer questions about external economic matters (all of which go through his office) offered a more
skeptical interpretation of the effects of the donor community on Tanzanian politics. According to him, the transition was unquestionably not brought about by international pressure. Rather, the World Bank supported economic liberalization to increase efficiency. It advocated a change in the parastatal sector and _[disengagement of]_ the government from non-productive sectors and ventures. It advocates a decreased role of the government in the productive sector via privatization of the parastatals. While the external community urged political change, it was not a condition for aid money as it was for Kenya. Such urging took place in discussions in which there was mention of the need for good governance. Also, there was bilateral pressure but not conditions. Canada and the United States promoted the growth of the private sector and, therefore, were practically supportive of economic change. Money was given, not through the government, but through private ventures. External countries do not support opposition parties, and the government has allowed discussions to take place between donors and the opposition. The Tanzanian government meets with donors in the Consultative Group (CG). Unlike Malawi and Kenya who have missed CG meetings because they would not privatize nor enact political change, Tanzania has not missed any of its meetings due to its relatively smooth transition.

According to this official, there is no talk about political change now between Tanzania and the international donor community. Though, as of 1994, "there has been a reduction in the scale of aid which Tanzania is receiving, particularly by bilateral donors such as the Nordic countries, the United States and France, and Canadian aid has been cut by seventy percent and thirty percent of the current aid is going to the private sector and NGOs". He explains, that the likely cause of this decrease in aid is that the former Eastern bloc states and Germany are receiving more aid now than ever.

He does allow for the possibility that, in light of the World Bank's criteria for funding of proposed projects, it is possible that
external donors are monitoring the current political change but without any application of pressure. Accordingly, "donors have implied that they are pleased with Tanzania's political changes". (This admission may actually suggest the importance which the interviewee afford the approval of the international donor community). Despite his earlier pronouncements to the contrary, he also suggested that the Bank has great concern for economic efficiency and accountability in recipient states and is, thereby, interested in political change only as a means toward that end. Political change, however, he stresses, is not an end in itself. This specification does not seem to diminish the causal significance of the donors' impact but, rather, reinforces it. It does, however, provide valuable insight into the Ministry's perception of the motivation behind the aid contingency programs.

Of the three academics interviewed who had served as members of the Nyalali Commission, all were tentative in their assertion that donor pressure triggered the transition. However, they all affirmed that such pressure did indeed exist. An example given by one of these members is his experience heading a group of academics and politicians to meet with officials in Scandinavia. The Tanzanian group was told, accordingly, "in a polite way, that they [the donors] wanted to see multipartyism". He explains that it was suggested that multipartyism was the better form of government for Tanzania and that, for these Tanzanian representatives, "it was necessary [only] to read between the lines ...to see that economic aid will be contingent upon such political change". He continued, however, to explain that "the [Tanzanian] change would have appeared anyway. It just benefited from the external support. The government could have withstood the international
pressure but the costs, later, would have been too high." It is unclear from this statement whether the suggested costs would have amounted from increasing internal pressures for change or if, indeed, there was the possibility that Tanzania would have to face a considerable decrease in foreign aid in reaction to its resistance to political reform.

While the second academic/Nyalali Commission member also held that the causal component of the Tanzanian transition included a complex array of factors, he held that a large impetus resulted from the liberalization and stabilization programmes prescribed by the IMF and World Bank, in addition to the policies of bilateral donor agencies. The third member more strongly denied the significance of the causal role of donor aid contingency in the 1992 transition. He identified IMF and World Bank policy as merely a contributing factor. He stressed that no specific transition requests were made of Tanzania but, rather, these agencies employed the same policies to Tanzania as they did to other countries and, therefore, these calls for political reform, while existent, "were not very influential".

Seven of the twelve members of Parliament also suggested a possible influential role of donor aid contingency upon the Tanzanian transition. However, as with the other CCM members discussed above, four of these seven stressed the indirect manner in which such pressure may have been applied and the secondary nature of its role in prompting the transition. Internal dynamics, rather, were seen to have played the primary role in triggering transition while donor pressure merely supported it. According to one representative,
there was bilateral and multilateral aid contingencies which supported change. They were catalysts which prompted the internal factors [actors] to begin thinking about change. Though, there was no imposition of political change. Rather, the external forces helped to show Tanzania how it compared with other nations. They, therefore, assisted by pointing out comparisons. The key point, however, is that the government then acted to avoid disorder and conflicts [presumably, of domestic nature].

The relative insignificance of the causal role of aid contingency is echoed in the following responses. One Parliament member suggested that the donor community did not have direct effect upon political change. Specifically, it did not employ "a direct carrot and stick approach as it had done with Kenya". Another suggested that while such pressures did exist they were only indirectly felt by the Tanzanian government. Such pressures were placed upon aid perhaps "through the grapevine". One of the National Members suggested that the donor community was able to influence Nyerere to move ahead with the international community on the issue of multiparty political transition, however, "Nyerere was prepared" and, in essence, acted on his own accord to begin discussion of the relative virtues of single versus multiparty politics in Tanzania.

Only one of these seven Parliament members gave a response which more definitively ties the influence of the donor community to the Tanzanian transition. Accordingly, he explained that "there was a simultaneous or coincidental external IMF and WB pressure which catalyzed or quickened the pace of Tanzanian political reform. The external forces did not want to appear to be dictatorial and therefore, such pressure was applied behind the scenes. This pressure was later
put in writing at the Paris Club." Accordingly, "external forces seized the moment to lead to multipartyism due to the political changes in Eastern Europe by calling for all to follow this apparent global change". He further explains that "Tanzania cannot remain unaffected. While the external donors did not apply strict ultimatums for political transition, they did apply guidelines."

Of the non-CCM respondents interviewed, a grouping which consisted of opposition and civic leaders, all strongly held that it was the international donor community which, virtually single-handedly, brought about the multiparty reform in Tanzania. It was argued by one opposition leader that the donor states wanted to see "greater accountability in the country [and] that they want for the Tanzanian people to have more say through such organizations as trade unions". Along similar lines, a secretary general of another leading opposition party argued that "outside pressure from the donor community found there to be misgovernance, or an inability of the Tanzanian government to control resources. There was no checks and balances system nor transparency and therefore no economic success. During the Cold War, the Tanzanian government was able to lobby for money by playing the countries of the East off those of the West." Accordingly, no longer was that the case, and the Tanzanian leadership had only to turn to the West and was, therefore, susceptible, to the contingencies tied with Western aid disbursements.

A somewhat factually incorrect interpretation of Tanzania's chief aid partners (as the previous section suggests, The Soviet Union and China were not Tanzania's major donors) was given by one opposition leader who held that "CCM previously had gotten money from, especially,
the Soviet Union, but also from Germany and China, etc. Now it had to
turn to the West". However, the West, he explained, "opposed a one-
party system and therefore Tanzania would not continue to receive a
substantial amount of aid if it continued to suppress opposition".
Another interviewee argued that the external pressure for multipartyism
was the chief causal factor followed in significance by domestic
opposition. External pressure, accordingly, was able to force "the
government which was not interested in multipartyism" to enact such
political reform. The interviewee also suggested the "there must be
internal weakness for foreign force to have an effect" but did not
specifically state that domestic opposition led to the enactment of
donor aid contingencies. This connection would have substantiated a
reflexive nature of trajectory a (a connection which was refuted in the
findings of Chapter 4).

Another opposition leader held that internal opposition would
eventually have brought about multiparty transition and its onset
occurred in 1992 because of the actions taken by donor countries.
Another interviewee also acknowledged the role played by domestic
forces but admitted that "without external pressure there would not
have been change". Tying in the multilateral lending institutions, one
leader explained that there indeed was bilateral donor pressure for
political liberalization in Tanzania and "it is the bilaterals who
control the IMF and World Bank through money lending". He reiterated,
though, that "it was not a policy of the IMF itself to advocate
multipartyism". One interviewee, however, offers ultimate credit to
the IMF with having forced Mwinyi to make the political changes,
asserting that without IMF pressures, "there would never have been change".

Finally, it was argued by several political and civic opposition leaders that not only was international donor pressure the cause of the transition but, as stated above, that the pressure must continue to be applied for the purpose of controlling the rampant corruption existent among the country's leadership. As cited in the previous chapter, a civic leader explained that civilian protest and legal opposition needs to be protected by the international community. After all, "it was only in the face of international pressure that the Mwinyi government agreed to reopen the University of Dar es Salaam" after having shut it down for a year in reaction to student protests in 1990. Without such continued influence by the donor community, he asserted, "the government will go on handling the opposition with threats and the military, justifying their actions by brandishing them foreign agents".

Conclusion

The factor of democratic donor aid contingency is seen to have considerable support both with the statistical findings of the first section of this chapter and with the interview findings, especially of the opposition leaders. As with the distal factor of global democratization and the intervening variable of opposition, the influence of the donor community may have been down-played by the members of the Tanzanian leadership who were interviewed in the interest of preserving the notion that the power of the leadership is not compromised by the influence of outside forces. For the opposition leaders interviewed, however, there appears to be no compunction
against identifying or inflating the dependence of the CCM leadership upon external forces for the very reason that it compromises the legitimacy of the incumbent leadership. In fact, all opposition leaders interviewed cited the causal significance of bilateral and/or multilateral external donors in prompting the Tanzanian transition.

The interviews, particularly with the opposition leaders, thus, provide support for the inclusion of trajectory a in Figure 11. A possible secondary role played by domestic opposition forces in pressuring the Tanzanian government to implement multiparty transition was suggested, including the notion that donor pressure empowered domestic opposition forces. While some suggest that domestic forces may have alone been able to bring about political reform in the future, the 1992 date of transition was a direct result of the calls for multipartyism made by the international community.

All the other statements which suggest the direct role of the international donor community in prompting transition through influence on the Tanzanian leadership inherently support the existence of Figure 10's trajectory b. Therefore, the data and interview findings from this chapter do not offer cause to modify these trajectories as presented in Figure 11. As will be examined in Chapter 6 which addresses the effects of elite disunity, the suggestion in the model of the interrelation of the proposed causal factors (Figure 5 of Chapter 1) of the reflexive nature of trajectory b received no support from the interviewees. No mention was made of the effect of Tanzanian elite division on the donor community and the latter's imposition of democratic aid contingency. However, Nyerere's acceptance of the need for multipartyism in Tanzania may have made it easier for some of the
donor nations, particularly those who have held him and his ideology in great esteem, to suggest the need for Tanzanian political reform. However, there is no evidence provided herein to offer support for that notion.

To reiterate, the data collected both from the statistics and from the interviews of donor representatives and of Tanzanian elite do indeed emphasize the need for the inclusion of the factor of democratic donor aid contingency in the understanding of the causal components of the Tanzanian multiparty transition.

Chapter 6 proceeds to study the specific effect of division within the Tanzanian ruling elite on their decision to implement transition to multipartyism in 1992.
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*approximate date based upon related Netherlands Development Cooperation information.

Graph 15. Implementation of democratic donor aid contingency
Figure 12. Total net overseas development assistance (disbursements) to Tanzania (in millions USD)
Figure 12 (continued)

Graphs showing data from Italy, Japan, Canada, Finland, and the United States over the years 1980 to 1992.
This chapter looks at the role played by the factor of elite disunity in the onset of multiparty transition. As introduced in Chapter 1, elite disunity entails division within the group of ruling elite. Some transition theorists hold that, just as elite unity or cohesion is required for democratic consolidation to be achieved, regime collapse and/or the transition from single to multi-partyism requires that there be incohesion among the elite. The theory holds that such incohesion undermines the legitimacy and challenges the political power of the incumbent political regime or system. The aim of this chapter is to identify and compare instances of elite disunity during the decade preceding the 1992 Tanzanian transition in an effort to discern possible trends in elite incohesion which may suggest its causal relevance to the onset of multipartyism. The possible causal interrelations of this factor are illustrated in that segment of Figure 5 of Chapter 1 represented below as Figure 13.

Figure 13. Elite disunity and multiparty transition.
The reciprocal relationship between the factor of elite disunity and the intervening variables of domestic opposition and donor aid contingency of Figure 5 was, in part, disproved in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively. It was determined that there was no apparent causal connection from the intervening variables to elite disunity. Chapter 6 looks at whether the opposite directions are plausible, from elite disunity to either of the intervening variables. It also looks at trajectory c which suggests causal linkage between elite division and the decision to implement multiparty transition.

Before presenting and analyzing the relevant events data, it is necessary to define the terms elite and disunity (defined by the actors, issue, and tactic) so as to create an operationalizable definition of the phenomenon of elite disunity. The research will proceed to identify incidents of elite division in Tanzania in the years prior to 1992 in an effort to determine whether any correlation can be drawn between their occurrence and the onset of multiparty transition.

Elites

Elites have been defined as individuals "who are able, by virtue of their authoritative positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially" (Higley and Burton 1989: 18). It is plausible that in relatively tightly controlled political and economic states such powerful organizations and movements are necessarily tied into the leadership, suggesting that such individuals are to be found.
particularly in government leadership positions. In more socio-politically and economically open societies, the elite would likely comprise business people, academics, and civic and non-ruling political leaders.

Tanzania has been a relatively closed, single-party state which has espoused a socialist ideology. Therefore, there have been virtually no powerful political, economic or social enterprises separate from the state. The individuals who wield power in Tanzania, and who can be considered ruling elite, include members of the executive, legislature, and judiciary as well as highly placed government or party appointees at the local levels and within the military. The category of Tanzanian elite can be further narrowed in light of the fact that, despite the existence of eleven High Courts and a legislative body, many assert that the rule of law is undermined largely by executive whim and, therefore, the effort and/or ability of the legislature and judiciary to challenge the executive has been negligible. Decision-making is, for the most part, conducted solely by the Party leadership, the President and his cabinet.

The legislature's role is oftentimes seen as that of rubber-stamping executive proposals which are highly influenced and determined by Party interests. According to Shivji, "with the evolution of the Tanzanian one-party system into a state-party monopolizing politics, the party whip system was replaced by the ubiquitous national-assembly-as-a-party committee system", instead of creating the environment for open debate in Parliament that Nyerere believed could better be achieved in a single-party political system (Shivji 1994: 23-4).
According to Barkan, "the state apparatus, particularly the regional and district administration, was subordinated to TANU [and later to CCM, and the] representative institutions elected directly by the people, particularly the National Assembly, were subordinated to the party and reduced in importance. [Thus] although Tanzania continued to hold parliamentary elections every five years, the National Assembly ceased to be an independent forum for the deliberation of public policy" (Barkan 1994b: 6).

While elections for the legislature have been held every five years since 1965, the candidates must be approved by the Party. The Party presents the voters with a choice of two candidates and one in the case of the executive for which the voter votes either yes or no. Van Donge and Liviga explain the parliamentary election proceedings as follows:

There is no limit to the number of candidates that can put themselves forward, but they must first face a primary election in a party assembly at constituency level: the District party Conference. Only two candidates will face the general electorate in the final contest, and normally the two who [come in]... on top in the primary will be selected. Candidates must, however, be approved by the Party hierarchy. The District Political Committee (DPC) and the Regional Political Committee (RPC) forward their recommendations to the Central Committee (CC). The final power of vote is in the hands of the National Executive Committee (NEC) and they can overrule all previous recommendations (Van Donge and Liviga 1990: 2).

The high number of turnovers in the Tanzanian parliament has been cited as indication that the Party does not control the outcome of the elections — that the voters do exert control over the process (Van Donge and Liviga 1990:2). Their control, however, is mitigated by the
Party's power of ultimate candidate selection. The hierarchies within the government and party structures are presented below in Figures 14 and 15.

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**Figure 14. Tanzanian State leadership.**

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President
  | Prime Minister/ First Vice President
  | Second Vice President
  | Cabinet of Ministers 244
  | National Assembly (256 members in 1992)
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**Figure 15. Tanzanian Party leadership.**

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Party Chairperson
  | National Executive Committee
  | Central Committee
  | Secretariat:

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245 With the 1992 constitution, the number of departments within the Secretariat were reduced to three: Economic Planning, Mass Mobilization and Political Propaganda, and Finance.
The Party apparatus, with offices paralleling all levels of state institutions, was designed by Nyerere to direct and control the government. In fact, "would-be [parliamentary] candidates [have been] screened by a series of party committees at the district, regional, and national levels, which select two candidates to stand for each seat" (Barkan 1994b: 6). The civil service has similarly been controlled by the party as state and parastatal agencies are overseen by party institutions, creating a situation in which employment and advancement has generally been based upon party loyalty, with the inherent deleterious effects on efficiency and production (Barkan 1994b: 6).

Despite Nyerere's original designs, the power balance between the Party and the State would undergo significant changes in the 1980's. Party supremacy over the government was to decline over time. This decline in control has taken place despite efforts by CCM to limit government power. In 1975, the Party succeeded in procuring a constitutional amendment which provided, officially, for Party supremacy, though the effort proved unsuccessful in altering the political reality (McHenry 1992: 7). Nyerere explained that, despite the fact that government leaders also were Party members (the President until 1985 was also the Party Chairman), their role as government officials tended to overshadow that of party affiliates due to the immediacy of government work and the little time, thus, remaining for Party work (McHenry 1992: 7).

As will be demonstrated in the analysis that follows, the State and Party have each struggled to dominate the Tanzanian political scene. This confrontation has especially surfaced with the separation
of the leadership of the two entities in 1985, with the appointment of Ali Hassan Mwinyi to the Union Presidency while Julius Nyerere maintained the chairmanship of CCM. This is exemplified by the government's conclusion of the IMF agreement in 1986 which entailed economic reforms fundamentally unacceptable to the Party (McHenry 1992: 7). Even with Nyerere's retirement in 1990 from the leadership of the Party, President Mwinyi has had to carefully balance the two institutions, selectively appointing, dismissing, and re-shuffling the leaders within each. His maneuvering, and that of Nyerere before him, aimed at limiting the discord within the ruling apparatus. Despite his resignations from State and Party leadership, Nyerere remains a strong force in Tanzania (as will be further discussed below). His advocacy of reform of the single-party system and his continued opposition to the economic reforms of Mwinyi have played a major role in directing Tanzanian politics and contributing to the elite incohesion in recent years. Attempts at operationalization of elite disunity are expounded below, followed by analysis of this factor in the pre-1992 Tanzanian political context.

Disunity

Elites are considered unified when consensus is reached on the rules and codes of political conduct, on political institutions and on formal and informal political networks and decision-making is peaceful. This is the elite characteristic believed to be one of the requisite components for a consolidated democracy. Such elite unity, along with extensive mass participation in elections and other institutional processes that constitute procedural democracy (so long as distortion
of such participation through corruption is kept to a minimum) is likely to result in a stable and resilient political system (Higley and Moore 1981).

Alternatively (and of direct relevance to this study), instability has been tied to the existence of incohesion or disunity among elites. As Chazan explains, elite disunity results from the fact that "the aim of vying elites is to affect political decisions to strengthen their position in the hierarchy, to have a say in the molding of policy and, as a result, to increase their share of the political pie. [And] the objective of these demands... is to alter the uses of state power" (Chazan 1988a: 184). As Higley and Burton explain, these disunified elites "share few or no understandings about the properties of political conduct, [and] ...engage in only limited and sporadic interactions across factional or sectional boundaries (Higley and Burton 1989: 17). Accordingly, some of these elites seek the support which they need to remain in power from outside the regime, having assessed that the advantages of staying in power outweigh the costs of democratizing (opening the political system to a larger number of individuals) (Przeworski 1988: 23). This creation of outside sources of political power results in a weakened and further delegitimized regime.

The methods of identification and operationalization of incidents of elite disunity have not, to date, been sufficiently dealt with by transition scholars. This research identifies a set of criteria with which to assess the relative influence or intensity of elite disunity incidents on political transition. Such criteria include the actors position within the political hierarchy, the issues or targets at which
their challenge is directed, and the tactics or means of expression used to air their discordant views. These criteria will be identified to the extent possible in an effort to compare elite disunity events.

In addition to news reports of elite opposition events, identification of opposition among the ruling elite will rely, in part, on reports of actions taken by government which are seen to be aimed at fellow elites who have posed challenge to the system. This is similar to the method of identification employed in Chapter 3 which dealt with non-elite opposition events. (Evidence of possible government responses to such events provided an additional source with which to recognize opposition activity). With government-controlled media, such events go largely un-reported. Also, the leadership may try to disguise or hide divisions within its ranks for the sake of bolstering its semblance of homogeneity and its stability and, ultimately, its legitimacy.

Referring to government action taken to stifle elite dissent, Chazan has explained that the shuffling of positions within the leadership is indicative of efforts to weaken discordant or potentially discordant elites. Other similar actions taken by the leadership include, in order of increasing harshness, demotions, dismissals, arrests or forced exile, and even executions which, however, has not been a tactic employed by the Tanzanian government.

The three interrelated characteristics of elite opposition: actor, issue and tactic are elaborated below.
Distinguishing and Measuring Elite Disunity Events

I. The Actors

Scarritt differentiates elites' relative influence over policy and policy change in terms of the level of their position within the government. There are those at the top and those of the middle level, "with the latter controlling smaller but still disproportionate supply or various media [power, money, influence, and the power to implement commitments]" (Scarritt 1980: 12). The level of elite status, for Schmitter, is determined by elite's dependence upon the regime with "those whose office or status is primarily dependent upon the regime [being less influential than]... those whose support is courted, whose opinions are solicited and whose actions are encouraged and subsidized by the regime, but whose position and property are independent of it" (Schmitter 1985: 8). The more that the discordant elite is seen to be a sole expert in an aspect of governance (with some types of expertise more highly valued than others) the more significant to the regime will be their opposition and the greater the likelihood that they will succeed in eliciting accommodation to their calls for change. The less the regime perceives the opposing elites to provide an indispensable service, the less significant will be these elites' impact in prompting regime change.

Determination of the relative status of elites within the regime is complex though the official hierarchies presented in Figures 14 and 15 are helpful.
II. Issue

The issue over which the elites disagree may also be indication of their positions within the hierarchy as those with greater power may be more willing to challenge issues more central to the system. Those with less power or influence may oppose only minor policies or, at least, use these complaints as cover for larger ones.

The distinction made between reformist and transformist opposition in Chapter 3 is relevant also with regard to categorization of elite disunity. Elite opposition that takes exception to specific policies or endorses reform would intrinsically be less likely to pose challenge to the system as a whole than would that which advocates fundamental system transformation. Opposition which actually challenges the fundamental bases of the political status quo is far more relevant to the study of regime transition.

As was the case with efforts aimed at identifying domestic opposition, reformist and transformist elite opposition incidents are oftentimes difficult to distinguish from one another. The former may evolve into the latter as it achieves its aims. Alternatively, as transformist opposition is successfully controlled or repressed by the system, its proponents may settle for systematic reforms short of their original goals. It may prove most helpful to see reformist-type and transformist-type opposition as two ends of a continuum. As only transformist opposition can lead to political transformation in the form of multiparty transition, transformist issues need to be further defined in terms of the Tanzanian political context.

There are two issues in particular with which this research deals and views as potentially transformist in nature within the Tanzanian
post-1980 context. These are the advocacy of a capitalist economy and of a multiparty political system. A summary look into recent Tanzanian history helps to determine the transformist or reformist nature of these issues. The specifics of the events will be more fully analyzed below in the chronological presentation of elite disunity events from 1980 to 1992.

It is argued that an issue loses its transformist nature when it is incorporated into the State or Party-line as it no longer poses threat to the leadership's legitimacy. This presumption guides the categorization of elite opposition. Challenging Ujamaa socialism which has been the basic tenet of CCM ideology was an impossibility in the time of Nyerere's leadership. Nyerere could not reconcile Ujamaa with capitalist reform and, hence, any talk of capitalism was transformist—threatening the legitimacy of the incumbent leadership and its ideology. With the coming to power of Mwinyi in 1985, however, who had endorsed some capitalist reforms as President of Zanzibar, the new Union President was able to reconcile calls for changes to Ujamaa economic policy with reform. After 1985, therefore, calls from within elite ruling circles for fundamental economic reform to capitalism were of a more reformist, rather than transformist, nature.

Similarly, with regard to the advocacy of multiparty politics, the distinction between its reformist versus transformist character is muddied by the changes in the positions held by the leadership and, thus, to the extent that these advocacies challenged the aims of the leadership. Single-partyism, as Ujamaa socialism, was fundamental to the Arusha Declaration. While it was not an ideologically-based tenet
but, rather, it was adopted in response to the perceived popularity of CCM in the mid-1960's.

While economic changes in the mid-1980's made Mwinyi increasingly receptive to attacks on Ujamaa socialism, advocacy of multiparty politics remained a direct challenge to the CCM leadership. Afterall, if it is arguable that other parties should have the right to rule, the legitimacy of the Party and State is severely undercut. While Nyerere was President, it is plausible to consider attacks on the single-party system to have been antithetical to the regime and, thus, transformist. Under Mwinyi, the issue was less clear.

Before 1992, Mwinyi was not in agreement with the call for multipartyism but, as will be seen, he was careful not to harshly oppose it. This leads to the depiction of advocacy of multipartyism in the years prior to 1985 as more transformist than in the years following Nyerere's advocacy of such in the years 1986-1990. Once Mwinyi himself openly discussed the issue and created the Nyalali Commission to officially assess the popular support for transition in 1991, it is plausible to regard such advocacy of democratization as more reformist than transformist in nature. It can be asserted that, generally, a previously transformist position once incorporated by the leadership becomes more reformist.

Using Chazan's contention that elites are motivated by concerns for increased political power, the selection of issues challenged by elites (as well as their targets, which will be explained below) is plausibly based upon their calculations of the likelihood of acceptance by the regime. Modifications, as well as enhancements, to the issues being challenged reflect their assessments of the political realities.
As in Chapter 3, the response of the regime to discordant elites, helps to identify elite disunity events and to discern government interpretation of their level of threat (or the reformist or transformist nature). Chazan explains that the regime's response to elite opposition directly reflects the nature of the issue being challenged. Accordingly,

the more personalized are elite demands, the lower the level of confrontation. The more generalized and contradictory, the higher the level of tension and the more varied the techniques employed to stem them. Most governments have gone to great lengths to avoid the consolidation of permanent elite factions through purposely narrowing the size of elite groups or through engineering the constant circulation of elites (Chazan 1988a: 186).

Such manipulation of elites by the regime, if successful, increases government stability. If mishandled, that stability is likely to be challenged (Chazan 1988a: 186). Therefore, the combination of the issue with the government response will enable determination of the relative reformist or transformist nature of the opposition. For this research, again, the goal is to identify any trends in the more transformist elite opposition behavior which coincides with the implementation of multiparty transition in Tanzania in 1992.

III. The Tactic

The third characteristic of elite opposition is the tactic or medium employed by the discordant elite or elites to express the challenge. It has already been suggested that disunified elites achieve influence over the regime through incorporation of new support
bases within the politicized population. This observation points to
the significance of the type and size of audience sought and achieved
by discordant elites in their efforts at influencing political change.

If the airing of conflictual views is limited to the confines of, for
example, a cabinet meeting, the discord can be more readily
controlled by the regime, whether through repression or concession,
than had it been aired to larger bodies such as to Parliament. The
largest of audiences is reached when discord is aired over the public
media. However, Tanzanian government control of the media has
curtailed use of this forum for its opponents. When there is official
Tanzanian media coverage of elite opposition incidents the presumption
can be made that there is either, at one extreme, an ulterior motive by
the Party/Government media censors served by such publication or, at
the other extreme, an inability of the regime to suppress the
expression the discord. Foreign press reports also may reveal evidence
of Tanzanian elite disunity.

The target, actor and issue for all elite disunity events will be
sought for the purpose of comparing the events and determining any
trends in recent Tanzanian history.

Elite Disunity Events, 1980-1992

The instances of apparent elite disunity, both as directly
reported and indirectly reported through leadership reactions, are
presented chronologically in the years preceding the 1992 political
transition. These events are analyzed in terms of their defining
characteristics (actor, issue, tactic) in an effort to identify any
trends that may suggest a relationship between this variable and the
1992 outcome of multiparty transition. To reiterate, in such a relatively closed political system, it is difficult and, oftentimes, impossible to assess not only who the discordant elites (the actors) are, what the is disagreement about (the issue) and, oftentimes, what action was taken to which the government may have been responding (the tactic).

The different possible types of elite disunity along with possible related government responses help discern the relative significance of the incidents -the extent to which they challenge the regime's legitimacy. As in the previous chapters, heavy reliance will placed on the perceptions of those ruling elites and opposition leaders interviewed to gage the causal significance of this factor in bringing about the onset of multiparty transition. The interview findings will follow presentation of the events data for the years 1980 to 1992.

Elite disunity in the year 1980 can be subdivided into that which took challenged the economic situation and policy and that which posed a more direct political challenge. The worsening state of the economy caused not only public repudiation in the form of the defeat at the polls in October of approximately one half of the incumbent MP's seeking re-election but the subsequent "sweeping" changes made by Nyerere within his own cabinet (Legum 1982: B330). Among the major governmental changes, Edward Sokoine resigned as Prime Minister and was replaced by Cleopa David Msuya, the former Minister of Information and Culture. Msuya, in turn, was replaced by Foreign Minister Benjamin Mkapa, whose position was taken over by Tanzania's UN Ambassador Salim Ahmed Salim. One difficulty, as aforementioned, in assessing the significance of these events is that while it is possible to identify
the actors as relatively high-level within the government, both the issue as well as the tactic are undisclosed.

Discord within the Party was exemplified by the November appointment of fifty new regional secretaries and a new executive secretary of the party, Daudi Mwakawago, who had previously been the head of the Kivukoni Ideological College. The former executive secretary Pius Msekwa became regional secretary of Tabora and thirteen branch chairmen were dismissed in reaction to their alleged capitalist and corrupt practices (Legum 1982: B329). This concern over economic corruption was addressed by Mwakawago over Radio Dar es Salaam. He announced that the country was "witnessing a lust for money which was increasing daily. This lust manifested itself through illicit trade, bribery, fraud, theft and embezzlement" (Legum 1982: B329). He urged that the activities of some party leaders be curbed as they were going against the Arusha Declaration's code of conduct by engaging in business and other private activities "motivated by greed" (Legum 1982: B329). The use of the public media to voice this discord as well as the relatively high political positions within the Party of the elites targeted is apparent. As for the nature of the issue of economic change, as the actors did not organize and directly confront the socialist system, the opposition or disunity appears to be more reformist than transformist in nature.

Also in 1980, two party members were expelled having allegedly cooperated with Idi Amin's forces during the 1978 Ugandan occupation of the Kagera region of Tanzania. Former army chief Lieutenant General Abdallah Twalipo was promoted to Minister of Defense, and the head of Tanzanian People's Defense Force in November. This appears to have
been an incident of high level discord involving traitorous disloyalty which is intrinsically transformist. In August of that year, in an apparent effort to court the military, the government paper *The Daily News*, lauded the army's political role. Again, a possible high level of actor is involved in the discord: the military leadership versus the State. The tactic employed by the State is denunciation over the public media.

While it was generally reported that Prime Minister Sokoine's resignation was due to his "poor health", it is speculated that his increasing popularity and the likelihood that he would succeed Nyerere posed challenge to the President, and his resignation was, perhaps, evidence of elite disunity (Legum 1982: B326). The closed nature of the system prevents determination of the issue and tactic.

In sum, Nyerere seemed to be in total control 1980, despite his disapproval of economic activities of largely low level Party members, or 'secondary leadership' (Legum 1982: B326). Where there were incidents of discontent and conflict, shuffling within the Party and Government, as well as expulsions and 'forced' resignations, appeared to successfully re-solidify Nyerere's control without any outstanding divisions. The harshness, however, of the leadership's treatment of discordant elites may offer insight into the significance which they accorded these incidents.

1981 saw the continuation of the Anti-Corruption campaign, spearheaded by the CCM Executive Committee. Minister for Communication and Transport and Chairman of the Air Tanzania Corporation, Augustine Mwingira, was dismissed on corruption charges (Legum 1982: B330). Mwingira was replaced by Ibrahim Kaduna, former Minister of Trade,
whose position was, in turn, filled by Colonel Ali Mchumo, former Deputy Minister for Home Affairs. Abel Mwanga, the Minister of State in the Prime Minister's Office lost his Parliamentary seat when the Tanzanian High court determined that his election in October 1980 had been influenced by distribution of food in exchange for votes.

In June, using the very powerful tactic of the public radio, requests were made by some undecided Party leaders for the privatization of business. Nyerere immediately objected, holding that such reform would actually amount to the reversal of Ujamaa socialist policy. The following month, in seeming support of President Nyerere, the CCM Vice Chairman also reacted by publicly asserting the leadership's continued support for socialism and its disapproval of economic change.

1981, thus, appears to display evidence of internal challenge to the regime with the publicly aired repudiation of economic policy which elicited direct response from both the Party Chairman Nyerere and Vice Chairman Aboud Jumbe. The regime's perception of elite disunity was further exemplified by the continued dismissal of elites charged with economic corruption.

The year 1982 began with continued high level elite dismissals on charges of economic corruption, including that of Minister of Agriculture Joseph Mungai. General Abdullah Twalipo was demoted from Defense Minister to Minister for Special Duties at the State House, possibly due to the fact that he presided over the armed forces during the newly revealed 1980 coup plot. He was replaced by Brigadier

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246 Keesings, 1981.

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Muhidin Kimario from Home Affairs, whose position was filled, in turn, by Abdallah Natepe.

The leadership's determination to combat economic corruption was reiterated in a paper entitled Economic War written by the Minister of State, Kigoma Malima, in which he proposed that "the Party should give back to workers and peasants the power to fight sabotage, bribery, theft and other misuse of public property" -a position supported by Nyerere (Legum 1983: B275). This incident is evidence of high level leadership using public media to combat economic corruption within its ranks.

For undisclosed reasons, Mwakawago did not stand for reelection to secretary general of CCM, but remained in the Ministry of Information. The former Prime Minister Rashidi Kawawa filled his place. Nyerere was reelected party chairman, and Aboud Jumbe maintained his position as Party Vice-Chairman (Legum 1983: B285).

On the whole, 1982 witnessed types of elite disunity similar to those experienced in the two years prior. A few elites were again charged with economic corruption and were replaced.

In January 1983, an alleged conspiracy against the government was uncovered by the Tanzanian army. Thirty soldiers were charged with high treason and nine had fled the country. The effort began in the north Tanzanian garrison and involved three lieutenants-colonel, one major, eight captains, eight lieutenants and one sergeant, in addition to an assistant to the President, Christopher Ngaiza. While the issue was clearly of transformist nature, the actors were relatively mid-level within the leadership and their discontent was readily quieted with their arrests. It was also during this month that Zanzibari
President and Vice Chairman of CCM, Aboud Jumbe, resigned. His action followed his diminishing popularity to the growing perception on the islands that Zanzibar's autonomy vis-a-vis the mainland was decreasing.\textsuperscript{247} Ali Hassan Mwinyi was elected Zanzibar President in August and Sokoine was reinstated as Prime Minister. Sokoine's popularity is viewed to have been a plus, as Jumbe's unpopularity had increasingly limited his power.\textsuperscript{248}

1983 also saw high-level discord resulting in dismissals. Five ministers were let go, including the Natural Resource and Tourism Minister G. Kahama who was publicly charged with economic corruption. He was replaced by the right-wing former Ambassador to the United States, Paul Bomani.\textsuperscript{249}

Nyerere spoke to economic corruption in his May Day address:

\begin{quote}
We are beginning to have capitalism in our midst: they are our uncles, and the names are the same as ours. This is a good thing because it helps us better to understand the meaning of capitalism. We used to have a radio programme called 'Capitalism is Savagery'. We think it is a joke. But capitalism is a mysterious disease; it is a disease of greed, and a disease that has no end (Legum 1984: B284).
\end{quote}

Prime Minister Cleopa Msuya was officially moved to Minister of Finance, a position he had been unofficially occupying.\textsuperscript{250} His new

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{247} FBIS, January 29, 1983.


\textsuperscript{249} Bomani is seen as a leader in Mwanza region. This region is of national importance because of cotton production and the existence of much tension there due to inadequate government payments to producers and reports of disturbance in the local militia.

\end{footnotes}
role was seen to be limited in light of the fact that the previous Finance Minister Amir Jamal still had an office in the State House and has responsibility for Structural Adjustment Programs.\(^{251}\) (Jamal is reported to have resigned due to poor health).\(^{252}\) Though, Msuya did have the responsibility of negotiating with the IMF and World Bank.

Abdallah Natepe resigned as Minister of Home Affairs in June, and was replaced in September by future Zanzibar President Salmin Amour. His resignation, along with that of Ganga Gabriel Geneya, Commissioner of Prisons, is likely to have been related to the escape on June 12, 1983, of two accused in the January 1983 coup plot.\(^{253}\)

These cabinet changes have been characterized as minor\(^{254}\) and, as with 1982 National Executive Committee changes, Legum explains that "it is hard to see any ideological line in the shifts. Basically, they were imposed/made possible by health considerations, and beyond that, the goal was fairly clearly tighter economic management" (Legum 1984: B286).

For undisclosed reasons, twenty-two CCM Party Branch Secretaries were dismissed in March of 1984.\(^{255}\) Prime Minister Sokoine was killed in a car accident in April and was succeeded by ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs Salim Ahmed Salim. Future Tanzania President Benjamin Mkapa left his post as Ambassador to the United States to fill his former

\(^{251}\) *Africa Confidential*, V. 24, N.6, March 16, 1983.


\(^{253}\) *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1983; FBIS, October 29, 1983. This plot was organized by low level military personnel together with civilians.

\(^{254}\) FBIS, September 28, 1983.

position of Foreign Affairs Minister. Salim, it is held, was being groomed for succession to the Presidency with Nyerere's upcoming resignation. Additional dismissals occurred in August as four regional party chairmen were dropped.

Except for the unproven charge that Sokoine's death was a political assassination orchestrated from within the high levels of the government, 1984 appears to have been a year in which high level elite disunity was not readily apparent. The dismissals that did take place involved relatively low-to-middle level elites, except for the removal of Clement George Kahama, Minister of State in the President's Office, for his alleged economic impropriety.

Perhaps in an effort to avert the discord from within the armed forces since January 1983, measures had been taken by the State to appease the military. The members of the Tanzanian People's Defense Force, TPDF, were granted preferential access to medical facilities and schools for their children, as well as access to items not available to the general population (which had oftentimes been items seized from alleged economic saboteurs). Another privilege granted to the TPDF was duty-free beer, priced at Tsh 5.5, compared to the price of Tsh 25 charged to the public (Legum 1985: B278). This effort by the government to appease discontent among, particularly, the military leadership, may be suggestive of a fear of elite disunity.

On February 5, 1985, Mwalimu Nyerere discussed the importance of the one-party political system on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of CCM. Nyerere expounded upon the virtues of the Tanzanian single-party political system as follows:
Our party is the symbol and pillar of our country's unity. Playing around with the unity of our party is tantamount to playing around with our independence and our country's sovereignty... [The Party provides] a sound basis for development and security... [It is] the custodian of our people's democracy... A multiplicity of parties disrupts unity—penetrates injustice as opposed to democracy, because [it is] made up of groupings. Our party— is a democratic party— a party of the masses... It is neither tribal nor religious, it is a party for all the people of Tanzania (Legum 1986: B366).

Nyerere also addressed the virtues of socialism which were protected by the one-party system. If socialism were not protected, he argued, a multiparty system was likely to develop in which "most likely [there would be]— one party for the exploiters who would use governmental powers to oppress the exploited majority [and]— the majority would never be satisfied with a party of exploiters" (Legum 1986: B367). Mwinyi, upon his election later that year, again expressed his commitment to socialism and to Tanzanian self-reliance—the tenets of the Arusha Declaration.256

Before Nyerere resigned from the Presidency, (while retaining his chairmanship of the Party at until 1990), he saw to it that a bill was passed which would limit the 'sweeping powers' of the presidency in light of the upcoming presidential succession. The position of Second Vice President was reintroduced—a role previously held by a member of Parliament. It was also decided that should the President be from Zanzibar, the Prime Minister, and not the President of Zanzibar, would

be the First Vice President of the Union.  A two five-year term limit was also imposed upon the presidency.

Nyerere introduced the issue of multiparty politics as a possible positive path for Tanzania in the future but not at the present time. He explained that there was no room in Tanzania currently for multiple parties. Accordingly, the time will come "when we have achieved what the U.S. has achieved, when you have two major parties and both of them are in consensus. That's a kind of single-party system, so the basic capitalist system is not being challenged at all! It's a pleasure, I wish I had that kind of system. We'll get there".

The significance of Nyerere's speech was augmented in light of the 1984 Zanzibari political discord stemming from the pro-secessionist sentiment. The secessionist movement came to a head with the dispatching of mainland troops to the Islands and the resignation of Zanzibari President Aboud Jumbe. The one-party political system, in addition to the Tanzania Union situation, was viewed by Islanders as having negative effect upon the lives of Zanzibaris.

Also in 1985, specific acts were taken the government to redress present challenges to the system. In February, Brigadier Ramadhani Haji Faki, Zanzibar's former Chief Minister who had resigned in February of 1984, was removed from NEC membership, charged with "polluting atmosphere in Tanzanian isles...". In May, Nyerere also

257 At that time the likely successor was seen to be the Zanzibari Salim Ahmed Salim.

258 Nyerere had already been re-elected twice, thereby having served three five-year terms.


sacked nine senior officials in Capital Development Authority accused of embezzling public funds. Among these was the highly-placed Commissioner of Income Tax, Baltazar Mwenda.

Following the withdrawal of candidacy of both Prime Minister Salim and CCM Secretary-General Rashidi Kawawa, the Tanzanian Vice President and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar (Zanzibar President) Ali Hassan Mwinyi was nominated to succeed Nyerere as Union President in November of 1985.261 Despite the fact that his nomination was officially endorsed by the military, it has been said that "the army has made its support for his nomination conditional on the understanding that he should be only a transitional president and that Former Attorney General and Minister of Justice Joseph Warioba -a Kuria- should be appointed as president-in-waiting".262 Accordingly, the plan of both the army and Nyerere is alleged to have been that the latter would advise Mwinyi later that he should not seek re-election in 1990. Rather, "both of them [Mwinyi and Kawawa] should step down and let Warioba be appointed to the two posts of presidency and chairmanship of the CCM, thus removing the anomaly of one president for the country and a separate chairman for the party".263 In so doing, the leaders would ensure a continuous and stable leadership.

261 Idris Wakil was nominated Zanzibari President in October.
263 Ibid.
Nyerere also sought to achieve stability through his control over the military. Nyerere's Kuria kinsman\textsuperscript{264} have always dominated the Tanzanian army and, since his 'colleague', Ugandan President Milton Obote, was overthrown the 1971 coup by his Army General Idi Amin, Nyerere has worked hard to ensure its loyalty.\textsuperscript{265} Nyerere, in 1984, allegedly proposed that the army be granted regional status thereby giving it a powerful voice in the ruling of the country to prevent it from some day resorting to military means of expression.\textsuperscript{266}

In 1985, Mwinyi did not immediately make notable changes in the cabinet and pledged his commitment to the continuation of Nyerere's policies. The new post of First Vice President (Prime Minister), though, was filled by Joseph Warioba, and Salim Ahmed Salim was appointed the Second Vice President in addition to his role as Minister of Defense. The Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya retained his position and this was interpreted by some as indicative of the continuation, or resurgence, of the pragmatists influence within the leadership and control of economic planning (explained below).\textsuperscript{267}

Indicative, perhaps, of a solidarity between the armed forces and the new administration, Mwinyi's nomination had the support of the National Peoples' Defense Force and its leader Commander Musuguri.\textsuperscript{268}

\textsuperscript{264} The Kurias are from north and south Mara region, which borders Kenya in the north, and the more westerly Bunda areas close to Lake Victoria. Related clans within the tribe include the Watimbaru, Wakiroba, Wakikizu, Waikoma and Wajita.

\textsuperscript{265} Africa Confidential, V. 28, N. 22, November 4, 1987, p. 3.

\textsuperscript{266} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{267} See Legum 1987, pp. 450-455.

\textsuperscript{268} FBIS, October 27, 1985, p. R1.

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The significance lies in the military's role in the 1983 conspiracy to overthrow the government and Mwinyi's apparent success as attaining its future allegiance to his government, stemming any similar reprisal.

While disagreement over economic strategy continued among the leaders, neither the Nyerere nor Mwinyi administrations undertook notable reforms. Furthermore, the disunity did not translate into actions reported either by Tanzanian or foreign news sources. Thus, the level of elite discord remained weak relative to the overall strength of the regime, similar to the situation in previous years. However, with Mwinyi's appointment to the Presidency while Nyerere remained CCM chairperson, the year 1986 would bring with it greater discord between the State and Party.

Nyerere had served a total of twenty-four years as Prime Minister and fifteen years as President when he resigned in 1985. In the course of his leadership, Nyerere had sought to develop a socialist economy and a democratic political system, guaranteeing true representation for the Tanzanian people. As of 1985, the Party was divided over which economic direction the country should take, illustrated by the large number of accusations of economic corruption among the party leadership. The discontent was growing at the grassroots and Nyerere, who still held the role of party chairman, sought to revitalize the CCM by continuing to identify and dismiss corrupt officials. 1986 saw the suspension of six party leaders in Tanga region so charged.

With the 1986 IMF agreements, the inconsistency between the economic policies of Nyerere and of his successor Mwinyi became more apparent. Both leaders, however, maintained that there was little disagreement between them and, more generally, between the Party and
the State. Nyerere referred to claims of his opposition to Mwinyi's economic changes as mere "fabrications", while Mwinyi gave assurances that the new Tanzania-IMF relations do not change Tanzania's principles of socialism and self-reliance. In a public announcement Nyerere explained that

although the Party is the supreme organ in the Republic, it 'cannot and must not try to run the country. It cannot decide on particular taxes, or on the allocation of... foreign exchange. It cannot run diplomatic relations. If it tries to do such things, the result, at best, would be inefficiency and unfairness and, at worst, chaos' (Legum 1987: B424).

Nyerere viewed the Party's role to be, rather, the setting of the direction and the basic policies of the country, and relaying the concerns of the people -"keeping constant watch... to guide the Government" (Legum 1987: B424).

On June, 7 1986, Nyerere made his first mention of the need to question the virtue of a one-party political system based upon his assessment of the inefficiencies of CCM. In what can be viewed as advocacy of political transformation, Nyerere, quoted in the Times of Zambia, asserted that

single party breeds complacency among [the] electorate and their elected representatives because there is an absence of political challenge to keep leaders of the ruling party on their toes... Party leaders in some areas (of Tanzania) have became so complacent they don't even hold any meetings... Others didn't bother to hold elections to fill vacant party posts.269

A month later, Mwinyi criticized poor leadership as contributing significantly to the country's ills. He warned that "he would not hesitate to take disciplinary steps, including dismissal, against any neglectful or inefficient official", stressing that administrators would be held accountable for the work of their departments. Mwinyi would wait until 1990 to enter into the multiparty versus single-party debate. This suggests that for the interim years, the two leaders would disagree not only over economic policy, but over Tanzania's political system. Nyerere's critique of the one-party political system, along with Mwinyi's challenge to the economic policies of his predecessor, suggest elite disunity at the highest level. The division of power, with the leadership of the Government and of the Party falling into two different hands, appears to have generated the first major challenge to Tanzanian elite cohesion.

The year 1987 witnessed both the continuation of the government and party crackdown on economic corruption as well as the continued reshuffling of ministers reflecting the increasingly distinct division between the more conservative economic ideologues and those who supported Mwinyi's reform moves -reformers or pragmatists. With a media controlled largely by the Government and Party, the debate had not been publicized and the Government/Party maintained cohesion both outwardly and even inwardly, as members continued to give almost unconditional support to their leaders President Mwinyi and CCM Chairman Nyerere.

270 FBIS, July 1986, R1.
Nyerere reintroduced into debate the issue of the inefficiencies of Tanzania's single-party political system, a view he first publicized a year earlier. On February 5, 1987, on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the Arusha Declaration, Nyerere explained that,

[the] democracy within the Party has been weakened. It is extremely difficult for leaders to realize what is in the people's minds. They have no way of determining what their problems are. In a one-party system if the Party itself is not constantly vigilant and if its activities are not carried out democratically, the nation will not achieve complete democracy in the end. There is a danger that the people may become isolated from their Government, and the Government itself may become alienated from the people.\textsuperscript{271}

Announcing in March of 1987 that the IMF "is not a friend of Tanzania or of any poor country" and referring to Tanzania's 1986 agreement with the IMF as only a "temporary measure", Nyerere also made clear his disapproval of current Tanzanian economic policy under Mwinyi (Legum 1988: B428-9). Nyerere's opinion is still quite highly regarded despite his resignation from the Presidency. It has been suggested that "whatever his title, [he]... is still the most influential man in Tanzania, and his is a voice clearly critical of economic reform".\textsuperscript{272}

The campaign against economic corruption continued with the forced resignation of Major General Silas Mayunga and Joseph Macha, two top officials of Kilimanjaro branch of CCM, in response to their imposition of levies on locals in violation of party regulations (neither reformist nor transformist in nature but, rather, criminal).


\textsuperscript{272} Africa Confidential, V. 28, N. 6, March 18, 1987.
The former was replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel Gasper Augustine Ninza who had been the head of Kivukoni Ideological College. This discord may be seen as middle-level and it may suggest an effort by the State to appease the Party with the appointment of a Party ideologue. Though, in December of 1987, three CCM ideologues were dismissed by Mwinyi in a cabinet shuffle.273

With the appointment of Christian Kisanji to Minister of Works and Manpower in place of Paul Bomani, Bomani attained the position of Minister for Local Government, Coops and Crop Marketing replacing party ideologue Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru. Ngombale-Mwiru was not given another position within the government but, instead, assumed full time party responsibilities heading the party's ideology and political education sector.274 Similarly, socialist ideologue Daudi Mwakawago was "freed" of his governmental responsibilities as the former Secretary General of the Union of Tanzania Workers (UWT) Joseph Rwegasira assumed Mwakawago's previous post as Minister of Industry and Trade. According to an official statement, Mwakawago was enabled to devote more time to his role as CCM Administrative Secretary, in charge of propaganda and mass mobilization.275 Another party ideologue, Gertrude Mongella, also lost her governmental position of Minister of Lands, National Resources and Tourism. She was replaced by CCM Secretary of Mobilization and Propaganda, Arcado Ntagazwa. Mongella, though, remained a Minister without Portfolio in charge of party


275 Ibid.
affairs in addition to her post as CCM Secretary for Public Services (Legum 1989: B413).276

Other ideologues who were demoted or removed over the next year and a half were Rashidi Kawawa (CCM Secretary-General and Governmental Minister without Portfolio), Professor Kighoma Ali Malima (former Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs), Mustapha Nyang'Anyi (Elected member of the Central Committee of CCM and Governmental Minister of Communication and Works), and Damos Mbogaro (Minister of State for Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning). Such re-shuffling has been interpreted as an effort by Mwinyi to purge his cabinet of socialist ideologues who stood in the way of carrying out his IMF reforms (Legum 1989: B409).277

The Minister of Planning and Economic Affairs, Malima, on the other hand, is speculated to have been moved to head the Ministry of Education because "his rigid, academic approach to policy has, since 1982, led to growing erosion of his policy influence—especially with the party—relative to that of the hard-line 'pragmatists', exemplified by the Minister of State in the President's Office, Amir Jamal, and Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya (Legum 1986: 389-90). Malima may be viewed as populist (politically left and committed to a path toward socialism and advocating national economic self-sufficiency) (Legum 1987: 452). Pragmatists, alternatively, are seen to be those who, among other aims, want to bolster economic efficiency but not through

276 See also, FBIS, January 15, 1988.


249
fundamental disruptive changes, unless obviously necessary (Legum 1987: 452).

While Mwinyi took actions to limit Party influence, Nyerere simultaneously made moves to strengthen CCM. At the Third CCM Congress in Dodoma held October 22-31, a new Central Committee was appointed. Its new configuration amounted to a stronger CCM radical wing which would pose greater challenge to government liberalization of the economy.278

Following questioning on his earlier condemnation of Tanzania's one-party system, both by the Western media and by CCM members, Mwalimu Nyerere explained that he did not, in fact, endorse multipartyism. He reiterated, rather, that "members of a single party tend to be slack and that they forget their obligation to strengthen the party because of the lack of opposition. [Furthermore] even important party meetings tend to be overlooked".279 He advocated that the party needed to be revived.280 Nyerere explained that "multi-partyism has even greater problems—[that] antagonism and even fighting result from differences between parties".281

1987 appears to have witnessed a continued high incidence of elite disunity. Specifically, high-level party ideologues were removed from the government. Nyerere continued to challenge CCM's and the

280 Ibid.
single-party system's efficiency, while Mwinyi continued his moves toward greater economic reform.

In 1988, in an act which suggests a considerable divide between Party and Government, Secretary-General of CCM Rashidi Kawawa warned of the need for Parliament members to support the Party. He threatened that "the party will not tolerate leaders in positions of authority who use their positions to go against the party. The party would not accept any person who opposed it in the country's national institutions [and] that the CCM would ensure that all party leaders were believers in the Ujamaa policy and self-reliance".\textsuperscript{282}

The Party continued its strengthening through the cleansing itself of those seen to have compromised its image and credibility. May saw the resignation of regional party officials and the expelling of seven leaders of the CCM on charges of sabotaging the "party and disrupting the unity of Tanzania"\textsuperscript{283} -one of whom was the former chief minister of the revolutionary government of Zanzibar, Seif Shariff Hamad. (Hamad was the alleged victor in the 1995 Presidential elections held in Zanzibar). Others dismissed were Zanzibar minister of agriculture and National Executive Committee member, Soud Yusuf Mgeni, Seuliman Sief Hamad, deputy speaker of the Zanzibar House of Representatives, Member of Parliament and the Party Executive Committee Khatibu Hassan Nasib, and House of Representative delegates Shabaani Khamis Mlooo and Ali Haji Pandu.\textsuperscript{284}

\textsuperscript{282} FBIS, April 21, 1988, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{283} FBIS, May 16, 1988, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{284} Ibid.
In general, thereby, the discordant elites were relatively highly-placed Party officials. The specific reasons behind their dismissals were, largely, not made public, though the accusations made by the Government imply that these individuals held beliefs which strongly differed from CCM doctrine.

Observers have noted that although the presidential succession was peaceful, "Nyerere's lingering political influence hampered Mwinyi's efforts to consolidate his position as President. These two leaders also disagreed about the nature of Tanzania's foreign and domestic politics" (Legum 1990: B409). For example, Mwinyi opposed Tanzania's military intervention into Mozambique because of the negative economic implications it would have for Tanzania. Nyerere was in favor of supporting Maputo against the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) rebels, in the name of Front Line State (FLS) solidarity' (Legum 1990: B409). While Mwinyi gave in and agreed to militarily intervene in Mozambique, tension remained between the two Tanzanian leaders (Legum 1990: B409). Thus, while news sources suggested the existence of elite disunity over this matter, the fact that it was reconciled may compromise its significance. The issue may also not be considered to be one of great significance when compared to those which affect major system reform or transformation.

Events in 1988 suggest that Mwinyi made changes within the leadership to bolster his support and authority. In September, upon the retirement of David B. Msuguri, Mwinyi appointed a new Defense Chief, Commander of the Army's Thirtieth Division General Ernest Mwitakiaro. It is noteworthy that Mwitakiaro, (in addition to Vice President Warioba), while a Mwinyi loyalist is of the same tribal
affiliation as Nyerere. General Tumamiel Kiwelu, another noted Mwinyi loyalist, assumed the position of Chief of Staff.\textsuperscript{285} As mentioned above, Nyerere had placed numerous Kuria in military leadership positions and had, thus, been able to maintain the military's loyalty. Some analysts hold that, through these appointments, "President [Mwinyi] not only strengthened his control over the army but also improved his ability to out-maneuver Nyerere who often relied on the military's political support" (Legum 1990: B409).

Mwinyi also made some minor changes in his ministerial council. Taken together, the events of 1988, following the implementation of the IMF reforms, point to a widening rift between Mwinyi and Nyerere and their respective followers. Mwinyi appeared to be strengthening his hand vis-a-vis Nyerere. Nyerere, meanwhile, was re-defining CCM's political role and ideological tenets in light of Mwinyi's economic reforms and, in no small part, the secessionist tendencies on the Islands.

Into 1989, Mwinyi continued to crack down on economic saboteurs, warning Tanzanians of economic 'enemies' in their midst.\textsuperscript{286} As part of a new round of 'extensive' cabinet changes\textsuperscript{287}, two new ministries were created in March of that year. They were that of Local Government, Community Development, Cooperatives and Marketing, to be headed by Paul Bomani (former Minister of Local Government, Cooperatives and Crop Marketing), and Labor, Culture and Social Services under the direction


\textsuperscript{286} \textit{FBIS}, February 7, 1989, pp. 11-12.

\textsuperscript{287} \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, April 15, 1989.
of Christian Kisanji (former Minister of Works and Manpower). In September, the Ministry of Information was established under the leadership of Ambassador Hassan Diria, formerly the Minister of State in the President's Office in charge of information organs.

Later that year, Mwinyi abolished the post of Deputy Prime Minister and took personal charge over the Defense Ministry. Five ministers were re-shuffled but Warioba was retained as Prime Minister. These, in addition to other changes, were interpreted as actions aimed at balancing the power between the mainland and Zanzibar.

Party leader and noted socialist hard-liner in CCM, Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru, addressed the changes that were occurring in Eastern Europe and their relevance to Tanzania. He argued that "Tanzania should not be swayed by sweeping changes in socialist countries in Europe, since conditions which gave room for current changes do not exist here". He was referring to the lack of political freedom he perceived in Europe compared to the more democratic nature of the Tanzanian system. He warned that "socialism cannot be separated from democracy". The implication of these statements is both the defense of socialist economic policy and, perhaps, of the continuation of the one-party state under a stronger CCM.

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292 Ibid.
293 While Nyerere had opened the single-party versus multiparty debate as early as 1987, his desire to strengthen and cleanse CCM to make it into an effective single ruling party, presumably, enabled his
The rift over economic policy between State and Party leaders and within these institutions, thus, continued. Challenge posed to the maintenance of the single-party system was relatively muted in 1989. Even Nyerere's call for political multipartyism to counter the non-democratic tendencies of the current leadership was modified by his 1988 challenge to the virtue of multipartyism. The call for multipartyism may also have been further muted by Nyerere's lack of support on this issue from members of the Party.

In February of 1990, the Zanzibari government repealed the Leadership Investment Code which was "first adopted in 1967 as the Arusha Resolution and later incorporated into the CCM Constitution to bind all members". According to the Code, "Party members are not allowed to have shares in capitalist companies, to become directors of such companies, to earn more than one salary and to own houses for renting." These 1990 Zanzibari Resolutions, as they were called, legalized outside investment by government officials (Mmuya and Chaligha 1992b: 44). This was seen to be a major challenge to the continued relevance of the Arusha Declaration and, on the mainland, many leaders began a successful fight for its repeal in the Union constitution.

Within the Union leadership, the lines of division became more visible, with the pro-IMF leaders President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Finance Minister Cleopa Msuya and Prime Minister Joseph Warioba facing those supporters within the party to denounce multipartyism, in support of continued one-party rule.

295 Ibid.
who opposed IMF reforms, consisting, basically, of Julius Nyerere and the three outspoken ideologues Daudi Mwakawago, Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru and Gertrude Mongella.

Commenting on the fate of the one-party systems in Eastern Europe, Nyerere explained that those parties lacked domestic roots because of their imposition by the Soviet Union, in addition to their inability to satisfy politically, economically, and culturally the needs of the people. He stressed, however, that one of the lessons which ought to be learned by countries such as Tanzania who were in the process of building socialism, was that they needed to work more closely with the citizens.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin, February 26, 1990, p. 8.}

However, his criticism of Tanzania's political system continued. He explained that "Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a single party is G-d's wish. If the one-party state didn't work in Eastern Europe, why should it work in Tanzania or the rest of Africa?"\footnote{New York Times, February 27, 1990.} This is not to suggest his waning support for CCM or his lack of faith in the general single-party system. Quoted in the Tanzania Daily News, Nyerere explained, "I don't propagate long live the one-party system, but I do propagate long live CCM. I want it to live forever and crush all opposition parties that may crop up in the future..." (McHenry 1992: 14).

Simultaneously, though, ruling party chief Ngombale-Mwiru continued to defend the virtues of socialism and of the Tanzanian political system in a statement made in February of 1990, in which he
explained that there indeed was a clear distinction between the concepts of *Ujamaa* (Tanzania's form of socialism) and Marxism.298 Thus, while Nyerere's disagreement with the state leadership continued so, too, did he face challenge from the Party ideologues. In April, a CCM symposium on Eastern Europe was held in which party members expressed their continued support for the one-party political system.299

In March of 1990, Mwinyi dismissed all his ministers. However, he immediately re-appointed Prime Minister Warioba. The dismissals, he explained, resulted from the need for better supervision of the ministries in light of the deep-rooted economic corruption and inefficiency. He explained that many of the ministers, themselves, were innocent of such corruption. Among those dropped were Alnoor Kassum of Energy and Minerals, Minister of Health Aaron Chidua, Arcado Ntagazwa of Lands, Natural Resources, and Gertrude Mongella who was without portfolio. The new cabinet could be "seen as an attempt by Mwinyi to secure support in the cabinet for a new investment code which had reportedly provoked dissent among some socialist ministers".300

The State's position vis-a-vis multiparty politics was first publicly elicited in a response by Mwinyi to questioning during his visit to Nairobi in May of 1990. He announced that "the question of a single or a multi-party for Tanzania had not been finalized".301

299 FBIS, April 6, 1990, pp. 21-2.
300 FBIS, March 15, 1990, pp. 7-9.
Referring to press allegations that Tanzania had decided to maintain single-partyism, he explained that "the reports were misleading because for that country, both systems were possible, but none had been preferred to the other".\textsuperscript{302} He elaborated that,

if Tanzania had to have either of the systems, then it would be the choice of the people. Discussions were still underway to select what was good and then have the people educated on both the systems before asking them to pick one. [And] taking to a multi-party system should not be preferred just for the sake of it, but rather, it must be seen to be the best for the country.\textsuperscript{303}

Despite the differences both within the State and the Party and between them, all were in agreement over the necessary treatment of the striking University of Dar es Salaam students in 1990. The students were protesting tuition price hikes and other immediate University problems. They were also calling for multiparty democracy for Tanzania. CCM leaders supported the President's action to close the University which is Tanzania's only university. It, in fact, was to remain closed for one year.\textsuperscript{304} In addition to general Party support for his actions, Nyerere, too, expressed his confidence with Mwinyi and the job he was doing as President.\textsuperscript{305} This endorsement came after Nyerere's announcement on May 29 that he would resign from the post of Party chairman and bestowing that role upon the President.\textsuperscript{306}

\textsuperscript{302} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{303} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{304} FBIS, May 23, 1990, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{305} FBIS, June 11, 1990, p. 4.

\textsuperscript{306} Africa Confidential, v. 31, N. 12, June 15, 1990, p. 4.
To observers, it was unclear whether or not Nyerere's resignation would lessen his influence in the Party and government and, thereby, strengthen Mwinyi. Some observers have argued that, until now, vital levers of power have remained outside Mwinyi's grasp. Not only is the 20-strong Party Central Committee still packed with Nyerere appointees, but the vital Defense Commission, which has oversight of security, is under the effective control of Warioba, who acts as its secretary. The Armed Forces too are headed by Nyerere loyalists. Nyerere long ago headed off the possibility of a coup by putting Kuria tribesmen from his own district at the top and simultaneously securing lower-rank personnel as the armed forces' political representatives in the National Assembly, so as to keep the generals looking over their shoulders. Nevertheless, Mwinyi has an important ally in the person of Major-General Abdallah Said Natepe, secretary-general of the armed forces and a member of both the Central Committee and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council. Mwinyi has also got his own man, Major-General Makame Rashid, as head of the National Service organization.\(^{307}\)

In July, Nyerere reiterated his concern that the one-party system may not be right for Tanzania. In an address to members of the Tanzania Youth Organization, Nyerere posed the question that "if the party (CCM) failed to oversee the running of the economy the work it is currently entrusted with, why shouldn't there be other parties?"\(^ {308}\) Though, he warned against following others' actions blindly without carefully assessing the advantages and disadvantages of either system for Tanzania. Tanzania must not unquestioningly be persuaded by the political reform pressures being placed upon developing countries by

\(^{307}\) Ibid.

\(^{308}\) FBIS, July 20, 1990, p.16.
Western powers through the ideological contingencies being placed upon economic assistance.\textsuperscript{309}

In August of 1990, Nyerere again cautioned Tanzanians from accepting multipartyism blindly. He explained that

\begin{quote}
\textit{it would be demeaning to drop the one-party system and follow the current changes or satisfy capitalist demands simply in order to secure aid. \textemdash [And] if Tanzania decides to follow the multiparty system and then later finds the system not suitable, it will be embarrassing to revert to one-party democracy. He therefore urged citizens to give themselves enough time to study the multiparty system instead of hastily making decision which, he said, could bring about divisions and turmoil.}\textsuperscript{310}
\end{quote}

While Nyerere's disappointments with the efficiencies and accomplishments of CCM continued, he nonetheless remained reticent to encourage multiple political parties, especially when such pluralist democracy was being linked to capitalism and advocated by outside forces. Nyerere found himself on the side of international donors in his support for political reform but found their proposals for economic change to be unacceptable for the continuation of the socialist democracy he had envisioned for Tanzania.

While he firmly held that socialism was the preferred path for his country, he also held that the country should remain 'self-reliant' and independent. Furthermore, as he would later explain, his espousal of the belief that multi-partyism may be desirable was based upon his

\textsuperscript{309} Ibid. Democracy as a Western aid contingency is addressed in Chapter 5.

\textsuperscript{310} FBIS, October 17, 1990, pp. 3-4.
presumption that all parties would remain socialist in orientation and would be formed from elements within CCM itself.\textsuperscript{311}

The year ended with the re-election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi to the Presidency, as he secured 95.5 percent of the vote.\textsuperscript{312} Former Prime Minister Joseph Warioba was replaced by a former high commissioner to the U.K., John Malecela. The parliamentary elections also saw the removal of thirty-three MPs, including the veteran politician and Nyerere loyalist, Paul Bomani.

In sum, 1990 was a year of continued tension between the leaders, with Mwinyi, through his succession to the post of CCM Chairman, perhaps gaining the advantage over Nyerere. However, his appointment to Party head was endorsed by Nyerere, a fact which may somewhat compromise this assessment.

Having only publicly addressed the possibility of multiparty transition once, in May of 1990, President Mwinyi took a dramatic step toward the inception of fundamental political change with the creation of a Commission designed to determine the future of single-party politics in Tanzania. The Nyalali Commission was announced on February

\textsuperscript{311} As described in the previous chapter, division within the ruling party was not the foundation for organized opposition, but, rather, other societal actors began to organize. In fact, the presumption that CCM and considerable grassroots support throughout the country, at least as of 1994, led many of the discordant elites to remain loyal to the party and to pitch CCM as a reforming party. As the interviews elicited, many CCM leaders may agree with positions held by the political opposition parties formed after their legalization in 1992. However, at the time of the national elections scheduled for 1995, none perceived that these other parties would be able to gain the legitimacy necessary to win elections and, therefore, were not tempted to join with the opposition or create other political parties.

\textsuperscript{312} Of the 7,288,255 Tanzanians registered to vote, 5,441,286, or 74.7 percent cast their votes. The Tanzanian population in 1990 totaled 24 million, \textit{Africa Research Bulletin}, November 1-30, 1990, pp. 9899-9900.
23, 1990. It was so named after its chairman, Chief Justice Francis Nyalali. The Commission was made of nineteen members and their job was to assess the wishes of the Tanzanian people regarding the fate of single-party leadership. Mwinyi explained that "the ongoing debate has been sanctioned by the party [and the Commission has been instructed to] complete its task in one year. [It] is expected to cover 100 districts of the country before presenting its report. Mwinyi warned the Commission against displaying any political biases when collecting and reporting citizens' viewpoints. Mwinyi denied reports that the government was standing in the way of free and open debate among citizens regarding single versus multiparty politics outside of the framework of the appointed Commission. The President asserted, however, that

This debate must be continued and carried out according to the country's laws. ...[And] the discussions being undertaken by various groups in the country must have full regard for the constitutions of such groups, and it such groups have not been registered or wish to debate issues outside of their constitutions such as changes, then they must seek government approval.

313 The Deputy Chairman was Abdul Wakagi Masud Burafia, former chief justice of Zanzibar. "Other representatives from Tanzania mainland were]- Comrade Titus Budodi, the Mwanza CCM regional chairman; Comrade Lawi Nangwanda Sijaona; Comrade Pius Msekwa; Dr. Wilbert Chagula; Comrade Crispin Tungaraza; Ambassador Tatu Nuru; Comrade Kindu Dili; Comrade Ezare Chirima; Comrade Mabere Marandu; and Comrade Juma Mwakashu. Representatives from Zanzibar [were]- Comrade Abud Maalim, Professor Harub Uthman, Comrade Ali Juma Shanfuna, Comrade Zaina Hamis Amir, Comrade Salum Juma Uthman, Comrade Juma Khamis Simai, Comrade Usi Khamis Haji, Comrade Umar Uthman Makungu, and Comrade Pandu Amir Kifisho." FBIS, February 27, 1991, p. 6.


315 Ibid.

316 Ibid., p. 7.
The cabinet was reshuffled following the October parliamentary elections. Joseph Warioba lost his parliamentary seat and, later, resigned from the Ministry of Regional Administration after the National Executive Committee of the Party determined his 1990 election to Parliament to have been invalid alleging that votes had been garnered through abusive uses of power.\footnote{Africa Research Bulletin, November 1991.}

In a minor cabinet reshuffling, the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulrahman Kinan, became the Minister of State for Defense. Former Minister of Agriculture and Co-ops Anna Abdallah was moved to Minister of State in the Prime Minister's office. She was replaced by Amrani Mayagila who previously held the position of Minister of State for Defense and Conscription.\footnote{FBIS, October 29, 1991, p. 10.} In November of 1991, there was reshuffling by the President, also, of his Principal Secretaries.\footnote{FBIS, November 6, 1991, p. 9.}

In line with Mwinyi's position, the CCM Chairman Rashidi Kawawa announced that the future of Tanzanian politics would be in the hands of the public, through the presentation of the Nyalali Commission report to be completed in early 1992.\footnote{FBIS, February 25, 1992, p. 11.}

Following the years of cabinet shuffling by Mwinyi to achieve complete support for his agendas, Nyerere's exit from politics, and the President's apparent willingness to entertain the possibility of a
multiparty transition in Tanzania, elite dissent seemed to have reached a low point in 1992. Those hindering the adoption of economic reform had been removed from the cabinet and the issue of single versus multipartyism was being channeled into a new arena—that of a Presidentially-appointed Commission. Advocacy from within the elite body of either economic (especially since the repeal of the Investment Code) or political reform was no longer as harmful to regime. It could now be incorporated either into policy (capitalist economics) or into debate (multiparty politics).

In early January of 1992, the Nyalali Commission submitted its findings to the President. Their findings suggested that nearly eighty percent of Tanzanians supported the single-party system though some wanted to see reforms to be made within it. Only approximately twenty percent supported adoption of multiparty politics. However, the Commission advised the President to adopt multipartyism.

The National Executive Committee (NEC) of CCM, consisting of 177 members, began its deliberations on January 17. It was reported that "about twenty speakers advised that it was time that Tanzania reintroduced multiparty politics".\(^{321}\) The speakers demanded, however, that constitutional, historical, and political steps be taken to safeguard the country against any adverse political and security consequences that might be caused by the introduction of political pluralism".\(^{322}\) The Party's national conference was set for February 18, at which time the decisions made by the NEC were to be ratified.

\(^{321}\) FBIS, January 21, 1992, p. 11.

\(^{322}\) Ibid.
The NEC issued the following announcement:

After careful analysis of the proposal by the Presidential Commission presented to us by the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, we, the members of the NEC who met in Dodoma from 17-20 January, unanimously agree to present to the special national conference the proposal presented by the Presidential Commission - that a multiparty system be introduced in Tanzania.\(^{323}\)

They further discussed that requirements would be placed upon political parties in an effort to ensure that they have a national following, and do not reflect tribal, religious, racial or regional divisions. This stipulation was in accordance with recommendations made by Nyerere in a speech given February 18. He stated that it is only "under such conditions, [that] major reforms in the political structure can be made without threatening our country's peace and security and all Tanzanians without discrimination will be free to join a party of their choice or not to join any party".\(^{324}\)

The NEC proposed the need to change the Party constitution in addition to the country's constitution to reflect its new status. The members also recommended that, "during the period from the end of the special national conference to a general election under a multiparty system, the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, the Zanzibar Council of Representatives, and the Zanzibar Revolutionary Government, which were elected in 1990 in accordance with the Constitution, shall

\(^{323}\) Ibid., p. 12.

\(^{324}\) FBIS, February 19, 1992, pp. 7-8.
continue ruling our country and the CCM shall continue to be the ruling party". 325

As the clear majority of Tanzanians were not in favor of multiparty transition, according to the Nyalali Commission findings, some have described the endorsement of multipartyism as 'ironic'. Afterall, "a non-liberal democratic path was followed to create a more liberal democratic system" (McHenry 1992: 13). Mwinyi offered a four-fold explanation of his action, citing political, security, democratic, and global reasons. Among his political justifications, Mwinyi (rather unconvincingly) explained that

CCM is not afraid of one or more parties. -[It] is supported by the citizens. Eighty percent of the people who support us, support the CCM. Why then, should we be afraid? 326

Regarding his concern for security, Mwinyi stressed that "CCM did not want to provide a loophole for those in the opposition who seek pretexts to disrupt peace, unity and stability in our country." 327 The President further explained the importance of democracy to Tanzania. In a rather confused statement, Mwinyi explained that "we have always had democracy in our country, a democracy of one party. However, inside that one party no one who is truthful can say we did not have a democracy. In some aspects, I think our democracy is more comprehensive than what will come later." 328 He cited the need to

327 Ibid.
328 Ibid.
address the twenty percent of the population that want multiple parties.

Fourth, Mwinyi's global consideration which prompted the transition is based on his perception that "all countries in Africa are affected by the trend of multi-partyism ...and if you tarry you will remain behind. ...We do not want to keep Tanzania as an island, an island of a government party, a one-party government. Let us keep up with the times. Let us not lose our momentum."329

Just as the Nyalali Commission had served to channel both elite and non-elite discord regarding the single versus multi-party debate, so, too, did the implementation of the new political system. The transition to multipartyism allowed, and continues to allow, for elites, as well as non-elites, to join political parties other than CCM. On the question of economic reform, as well as on the fate of the Union, debate continues within CCM and in the party platforms of opposing political parties.

With political transformation and economic reform more widely accepted in Tanzania and the channels for political participation increased, 1992 exhibited greater unity within the ruling party as it prepared to defend its survival. The research now turns to examination of the perceptions of CCM and political opposition leadership in an effort to assess the relevance of elite disunity in ultimately prompting the Tanzanian transition to multipartyism in 1992.

Many of the interviewees suggested the causal role played by self-criticism within CCM which involved the re-evaluation of the political situation and the ultimate conclusion that multiparty transition was necessary and desirable for Tanzania. This self-criticism may be viewed as comparable to the academic concept of elite disunity as the initiation of criticism from within the ruling party to the leadership's fundamental premise of single-party rule must have entailed disagreement, or disunity, among the leaders. It is unlikely, after all, that all party leaders simultaneously embraced the virtues of multipartyism as the events above have shown. For a group, such as the group of Tanzanian ruling elite, to undertake fundamental change, different ideas must have been introduced into this leadership circle. The different ideas were supported by those members bold enough to present them.

Perhaps, due the secrecy of the cabinet level of the Tanzanian government, the interviewees, while convinced of the role played by such disunity, are generally unable to specifically name those individuals who posed challenge the political status quo. However, there was one strong elite figure whose advocacy of multiparty transition is apparent and is cited by a number of the Tanzanian interviewees. That individual is the former Tanzanian President and Party Chairperson, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere. While he held no formal position within the leadership apparatus of the 1992 Tanzanian government, he was still considered the 'Father of the Nation' and his opinions were widely regarded. In fact, both within Tanzania and outside of the country criticism of Nyerere and his policies during his
leadership are very much stifled. For example, a representative of the Swedish Embassy explained that, despite Sweden's reevaluations of its aid policy to Tanzania and its disappointment over the relatively low level of Tanzanian development in spite of the huge outlay of Swedish funds, the Swedish government restrains from criticizing the former Tanzanian leader. His political and economic ideology remains respected and his commitment to his goals remains revered. Even amongst today's Tanzanian opposition leaders, most of whom fiercely condemn Tanzania's history of silencing opposition, some refrain from overly condemning President Nyerere. He was oftentimes excused from blame for the sufferings of his people while his underlings were held largely responsible. His socio-economic and political visions, too, receive respect even within these circles.

Most of the support for elite disunity prior to and causally related to the multiparty transition was given by the CCM leaders, themselves. However, opposition leaders, for the most part, did not identify disunity or division among elite as having prompted the transition. They did not credit some leaders with greater commitment to democratization than others.

The specific interview findings were as follows. Two high level officials of the National Assembly very strongly asserted that reconsideration within the CCM itself played a positive role in promoting the multiparty transition. According to one, "the government decided, despite the [Nyalali Commission] results to change to multipartyism to avoid chaos and to have the transformation easily done, rather than to wait for the twenty percent to increase and to disrupt things. This way a good constitution can be drawn up without
pressure." Not only does this statement support the notion that the ruling elite acted of their own accord but it did so as a result of fear of a growing domestic opposition (see Chapter 4).

According to the other official, while both external and internal political developments were having great effect upon prompting the transition, "there was a substantially large minority within CCM itself who were not at all happy with the way their own party was operating". This statement not only suggests that opposition from outside of the party was forcing the party to reconsider its policies but that opposition from within the party itself was triggering such reevaluation.

Three academics who served as members of the Nyali Commission also supported the causal role played by division within the elite ruling circles. One member explained that the 1982 discussion of change in the Zanzibari constitution prompted consideration of multipartyism and change in the Union constitution among party members. He also believed that the "chief cause of the transition was opposition within the ruling party or a self criticism or an awareness of its failures and problems".

The second of these members would offer a more complex interpretation of the causal role of elite disunity. He held that the Tanzanian leadership was fearful of a split within CCM similar to that which the Kenyan party, KANU, was experiencing. He explained that "there were differences within CCM but they have been patched up, thereby giving a semblance of unity". Such differences included the issues regarding Zanzibar, specifically its joining with the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the formation of the
Group of 55 which calls for the formation of a separate Tanganyikan government to counter what they see to be Zanzibari over-representation. (Tanzania presently has a two-government system: a Union and a Zanzibari government). He acknowledged, however, that "within CCM there is corruption and inefficiency. There also is a lack of consensus within the ruling circles exemplified by the lack of voting in the National Executive Committee (NEC) and in Parliament". He continued that "there were differences of opinion within the Party. They wanted to seem as though they were initiating change to multipartyism themselves and not acting under pressure leading to the subsequent creation of the 1-year commission." This interviewee thereby suggests that elite disunity was present at the time of the transition and he implies that outside pressures were fomenting differences of opinion within the Party regarding the plausibility of maintaining the single-party system. The outcome of this disunity was a seemingly consensual decision to undertake multiparty transition.

The third academic/Commission member raised an additional dimension to elite disunity: the role of ex-President Julius Nyerere as explained above. Accordingly, it was "Nyerere's campaign to revitalize the Party which not only led the masses to openly voice their grievances" but to his condemnation of Party politics in the publication of the Arusha Declaration and Ten Years After. Cited in this book are violations of democracy, mediocrity and stupidity of the party and of some of the leaders. The publication The Party Program 1987-2002 contains even more criticism with regard to the State/Party (Luanda 1994: 6). He also explains that,
During the 1990 General Elections, there was a marked emphasis on renewal, on retrenchment, on criticism and self-criticism. There was a sense in which the legitimacy of the dominant ideology, the political system and the state/party were put on trial. [Furthermore] the February 1991 Zanzibar Declaration by the National Executive Committee of CCM sounded the death knell of the Arusha Declaration. The Zanzibar Declaration permits CCM members as well as leaders to acquire shares in private companies, to draw more than one salary and to become landlords. It turned the popular Arusha Declaration on its head [signaling the] loss of legitimacy of the state/party (Luanda 1994: 6).

Of the eight parliament members who suggested that elite disunity or CCM self-criticism played a role in the onset of multiparty transition, two specifically cited that the role played by Nyerere. Accordingly, "Mwalimu was pro-multipartyism and favored increased liberalization of the government". For the other, Nyerere's declaration that "such change was right", triggered reevaluation of the entrenched single-party CCM ideology. A third parliamentarian also suggests that Nyerere played an instrumental role simply by leaving the government/party. "His departure -[accordingly] left President Mwinyi without an argument for the continuation of the one-party state".

For other parliamentarians, the Group of 55 was cited as indication of the existence of division within the CCM leadership. Also, one representative argued that, "this was the proper time for change and the government was exclusively responsible for bringing it about. It was CCM's own realization, or self-realization, and CCM desired to give others a chance in politics." The government, furthermore, "took the initiative of asking people of their preference through the Nyalali Commission in an effort to elicit their fears of
war and chaos" which the interviewee apparently perceived to be imminent following implementation of political transition.

Similarly, a representative from Pemba (one of the two major Zanzibari islands) explained that "there was internal discussion within CCM and the Parliament accepted the decision. The consideration of political change was made in order to maintain peace in the region. Why not listen to criticism is probably what Mwinyi was thinking."

Along the lines suggested by one of the academicians, another parliamentary representative also suggested that "perhaps there were divisions within the CCM and NEC but they were not visible". The argument that the decision for transition emanated from within CCM itself was more skeptically explained by another member who directly tied concern for foreign aid with the implementation of transition. Accordingly, he explained that, within the leadership, "Mwinyi did not want to be the odd person out. [Also] many in the government are not democratic. They are simply putting on a show for the outside and for ex-government officials [leaders of the present opposition forces] to get foreign money." He furthered that "there is a tendency for fascism in Africa and it can possibly erupt in Tanzania". Tanzania, he continued, "could have an autocratic government with suppression as the rich in Parliament now want to protect their property and interests".

Only one of the opposition leaders cited a division within CCM as possibly causal to the transition. He explained that the government was divided by those who supported multipartyism and those who argued for the maintenance of single party politics. He even mentioned two such 'reformers' by name. They, in fact, are Parliamentarians who gave
interviews for this research and are prominent members of the Group of 55.

A religious leader also suggested the impact of Nyerere's attack on the continuing virtues of the Party and his advocacy of multipartyism as evidence of disunity among the ruling elites. He added that CCM had a history of little division within its ranks, especially since the mid-1980's with the economic reforms which, in fact, behooved the economic interests of its members who were (as cited in Chapter 2) already involved in capitalistic exploits.

Conclusion

The data from the news sources suggest that Mwinyi's succession to the Presidency in 1985 triggered greater divergence on both economic and political policy than Tanzania had openly experienced in the preceding five years. This division came to a head in 1986-7 with Nyerere's suggestion of the possibility of multipartyism, along with his condemnation of Mwinyi's IMF agreement. This elite incohesion appears to have decreased considerably with Nyerere's retirement from the Party Chairmanship in 1990 and with the 1991 formation of the Presidential Nyalali Commission.

With regard to this set of data, it is unclear whether the phenomenon of elite disunity played a direct role in the prompting of Tanzania's 1992 multiparty transition. If the theories contend that simple increase in elite opposition events, or elite disunity, translate into transition, then the theories appear to hold true in the case of Tanzania. Such an increase in disunity appears to have come to a head in 1990-1, and the transition would be implemented in 1992. It
would appear that the creation of the Nyalali Commission tempered Nyerere's challenge to the current political system and indicated Mwinyi's apparent willingness to debate the issue.

Major cabinet reshuffling was, basically, completed by Mwinyi by the late 1980's, and the early 1990's saw a cabinet much in support of its leader. Party leader, Rashidi Kawawa, also expressed the Party's support for the President's method of assessing the viability and popular support for political transition.

Perhaps the situation of general elite consensus from 1991-2 provided the appropriate atmosphere for political transformation is carried out. At such a time, the leadership appeared to be under no great internal pressure or threat to undergo such change. The absence of elite division may have served to cushion the change by virtually guaranteeing a formidable CCM victory in subsequent elections, even if they are to involve multiple parties. Also, it is plausible that the Government (and Party) concessions necessary to achieve this elite cohesion were triggered by prior demands made by discordant elite, notably by the leaders Nyerere and Mwinyi. According to this interpretation, prior elite dissent alerted the leaders of the need for major reassessments of the status quo and, thus, calls for reform were tolerated and, more or less, openly debated to the point at which significant incohesion was no longer perceptible.

This finding from the data that elite disunity can bring about elite self-criticism that prompts consideration of regime transformation which, in turn, tempers elite division is not supported by the interviews. As the interviews provide the real basis for assessing causality, the causal role of elite consensus prior to the
decision to undertake multiparty transition is not substantiated. Future cross-national study of similar transition events would shed light on this observation.

From the interviews conducted largely with members of Tanzania's ruling elite, there is considerable support for the notion that elite disunity or self-criticism within CCM was responsible for the onset of multipartyism in 1992. The interviewees alternatively cite the existence of division within the Mwinyi cabinet, within Parliament and within the general body of CCM. Some also specifically identify a rift between the incumbent party leadership and the ex-President Nyerere who came to espouse multiparty transition as a result of his disappointment with the democratic performance of CCM.

With regard to the relevance of Figure 13 to the findings from the interviews, no support was found for the inclusion of a causal trajectory from elite disunity to either of the intervening variables of domestic opposition (trajectory a) or to donor aid (trajectory b). The inclusion of trajectory c, the relationship between elite disunity and the decision to undertake multiparty transition was demonstrated through the interviews to be quite relevant to the onset of the Tanzanian transition. It should be noted that interviews with opposition leaders, however, did not generally come to the same finding. This, however, does not negate the perceptions of the ruling elite interviewed though it does raise question about their objectivity.

With these modifications of Figure 13, a new figure, Figure 16 more accurately illustrates the interconnections of factors as
discovered in this chapter with elite disunity affecting only one outcome: the decision to undertake multiparty transition.

Figure 16. Elite disunity and multiparty transition (modified)

Conclusions based upon the findings from this and previous chapters will be presented in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This research has aimed to identify the causal factors in the transition to multipartyism in the case of Tanzania; what influences single-party leaders to relinquish political power by opening the political system to greater participation in the form of multiple political parties? Without an understanding of the contributing factors, this action appears irrational. This is one area in the study of democratic transitions which has not been rigorously analyzed in the transition literature to-date.

The selection of the transition in Tanzania also contributes to the transition theory by applying it outside of its traditional focus on Latin America, Southern Europe and, most recently, Eastern Europe. The inclusion of African cases to the study of transition serves to extend the scope and generalizability of the democratization literature and may, additionally, offer refinement to current theory. The need to incorporate African cases in the literature becomes apparent in light of the fact that more than one-third of the African continent has undergone democratization within the past decade and African countries during those years have accounted for the majority of global transitions.
Existing treatments of transition suffer from several deficiencies. The onset of transition is rarely studied as a critical component of democratization. Secondly, specific hypotheses causally relating socio-political and economic factors to the onset of transition are, for the most part, not offered. Third, the suggestions of plausible causally-related factors are largely devoid of any empirically supportive evidence.

A careful reading of the literature generates five possible causal factors, along with proposed interrelations among them. The factors are economic change which refers to either a decline or growth in economic performance; global democratization, or the international democratic trend; domestic political opposition; donor aid contingency which ties democratization to aid transfers; and elite disunity, or the division among elites regarding fundamental aspects of the political-economic system.

This research has sought to empirically test this derived model of the onset of transition. Through the analysis of causal interpretations derived from interviews with highly placed members of the Tanzanian political community, along with statistical data and news sources, the hypotheses are tested and a refined model of the causes of democratic transition is generated.

It was amidst considerable change in a number of the proposed causal factors that the government of President Mwinyi created the Nyalali Commission in 1991 to assess the level of national support for multiparty transition and decided in early 1992 to implement such transition occurred. At that time, economic conditions were worsening
for the average Tanzanian, with wage levels less than those of twenty years prior and there were ever present food and goods shortages.

This economic crisis seemed to increase the reliance of Tanzania on foreign support in the form of loans and grants. At a time when there appeared to be a global consensus on the merits of democratization, notably with the demise of the Soviet Empire, donors began to more vociferously call for democratization as a condition for aid receipt. Socialist economic policy, too, came into disfavor with the apparent failure of communism in Eastern Europe and this seemed to seal the fate of socialist states elsewhere who were now pressured to undertake economic, in addition to political, reform.

The findings illustrate that this pressure need not have been directed at a specific recipient country. Rather, democratic conditionality became a global policy of Western donors and recipient states understood the consequences of continued single-party political systems. The incorporation of calls for democratization in the foreign aid statements of donor countries in the late 1980's highlights the role of the donor aid contingency on the onset of democratic transition.

Many recipient states were vulnerable to such aid contingency as their poor economic performances made them heavily reliant upon these Western donors. Mwinyi argued this very point in November of 1995 (with one week left in office) when he criticized Western attempts to replace socialist-oriented regimes in developing countries with Western democracy after the fall of Communism in the former Soviet Union. Such efforts were strongly exerted to install leadership that could smoothly serve foreign interests —[and] developing countries have bowed to such efforts.
because of poverty. Democracy in developing countries should be allowed to take [an] evolutionary course. 

The collapse of the socialist Soviet bloc not only may have changed general global perceptions of the relative value of democracy, but it left developing countries without a second set of potential donors, thus, depriving them of the leverage necessary to play donors off one another and to, thereby resist aid conditionalities.

The critical role played by the international community has been discounted by those scholars who credit internal domestic opposition movements for much of the world's democratizations. An increase in domestic political participation, afterall, constitutes a democratic base upon which to structure a democratic system. Doro has summarized the African transition experience as follows:

Just as military leaders could observe and imitate their cohorts in other African states in the 1960's [the decade of African independence], so emergent independent centers of power in African civil society- students, church groups, unions, women's organizations- learned from their counterparts in the early 1990's. Their search for remedies against arbitrary government was characterized by demands for accountability and deeply felt rejection of past political behavior. 

Contrary to the domestic opposition argument, in the case of Tanzania, while there was domestic opposition, it does not appear to have played a significant role in prompting the transition. There was


a notable increase in opposition activity especially since 1990, but it appears that this increase in societal political activity was a response to, not a cause of, Nyerere's calls for multipartyism. With Nyerere's advocacy of political liberalization came a greater tolerance by the leadership for dissent, as Nyerere continued to be held in great esteem. Therefore, it may be incorrect to look toward increasing domestic opposition for explanation of the political transition. Rather, it would appear that calls from within the governing circles for liberalization, in effect, opened up the participation channels to some degree and opponents of the regime were less systematically repressed.

While there is no reliable way to definitively assess the impact which such movements had on the regime, and despite the CCM leaders' statements which credited opposition leaders for the transition, the opposition leaders themselves reported having been repressed to the point of being ineffectual.

Even CCM leaders and Nyalali Commission members who credited opposition activity, in part, for the transition, simultaneously lauded CCM's high level of domestic popular support as indicated in the Commission's Report. According to the Nyalali Commission's findings, nearly eighty percent of the Tanzanians interviewed favored maintenance of the single-party state over transition to multiparty politics. The opposition's voice, therefore, could not have been very powerful in forcing change if, at most, it had only the support of twenty percent of the population.

In theory, these pressures, from both the domestic and the international communities, affect transition by generating calls from
within the body of ruling elite for fundamental system change. Elite disunity is evident in the pre-transition years of Tanzania, especially since 1985 and the election of Ali Hassan Mwinyi as President while Nyerere maintained leadership of the Party. Nyerere advocated multipartyism for the purpose of revitalizing CCM which he believed had become complacent and non-responsive to the needs of people. He argued that the Party needed competition to force it to, once again, become the Party of the people of Tanzania. Mwinyi resisted calls for political liberalization until 1991 when he assigned the Nyalali Commission to assess popular opinion with regard to the single party-multiparty debate.

According to the majority of Party members interviewed, the transition to multipartyism resulted from an increased level of self-criticism among CCM leaders. This self-criticism is comparable to elite disunity as some elites pose challenge to the system while others continue to support the political status quo. In addition to the rifts between Mwinyi and Nyerere, these interviewees also cited similar divisions among members of Mwinyi's cabinet, within the Parliament and within the Party. Non-CCM leaders, however, offered little support for the inclusion of elite disunity as a causal factor in the transition perhaps because such admission would bestow credibility upon those pro-democracy advocates within the Party.

Based largely upon the interviews, it appears that the factor of economic performance change needs to be changed to economic decline. It was also suggested that an additional causal role may be played by the factor of economic policy change or economic liberalization. Accordingly, economic privatization directly results in calls for
political liberalization stemming from the need by individuals to exert more control over their lives and livelihoods.

Support was similarly given for the inclusion of global political democratization as a causal determinant of the Tanzanian transition. For the CCM members interviewed, especially, external experiences with democratization of previously single-party socialist systems had significant influence on Tanzania's leaders to undertake similar reform. From the non-government interviewees, the role played by the East's demise and the global democratization experience was only significant in so far as it was able to add strength to the calls for democratization of the Western donor countries. Some CCM representatives supported this interpretation while the majority held firmly to causal interpretations which credited CCM and Tanzanians, alone, with promoting Tanzania's democratization. This effort to credit individuals within the Party for the transition offered support to causal role played by the factor of elite disunity—whereby members from within the ruling elite called for multiparty transition.

While domestic opposition seems not to have played as much of a causal role in prompting the Tanzanian transition as the other four variables, it is difficult to discount its effect. The relative weights of the perceptions of the different interviewees and those of the five identified factors, is difficult to determine. As discussed, while CCM members may be in a better position to gauge causality due to their closeness to the actual decision-making process, their own political agendas may somewhat compromise their objectivity. Non-CCM members, too, have their own political agendas. Causal explanations given by Tanzanian academics both in and out of government may, due to
their greater familiarity with political theorizing, better assess causation than non-academics. However, they, too, may be guided by political interests and their better understanding of the implications behind identification of the relevance of certain factors which may incline them to selectively disclose the causal components.

In addition to offering support for the relevance of these five causal factors in the case of Tanzania, the research has also contributed to the understanding of the interrelations among these factors. It has been demonstrated that, in addition to having possible direct effect upon causing the elite disunity which results in the elite decision to implement multipartyism, the factors of economic decline and global democratization also have effect upon the two intermediate factors of domestic opposition and donor aid contingency. Economic decline has triggered growing domestic discontent with the political system while, simultaneously, it has made it necessary for Tanzania to become more reliant upon foreign assistance. This reliance has enabled donor states to attach contingencies to their aid transfers. It has also been suggested that increased calls from the donor community for democratization have served to empower domestic opposition groups to similarly apply pressure for political reform.

It has been hypothesized that the factor of elite disunity is necessarily affected by the other four causal factors and it, in turn, is able to bring about multiparty reform. This has been supported by the evidence of the leadership's reactions to Tanzania's declining economy and the need for foreign assistance, along with their awareness of global democratization trends and growing domestic calls for political reform.
The statistical data and new sources assist in placing the interviewees' interpretations in a more tangible socio-political and economic context. Alone, this data can only provide correlational findings. However, taken together with the interview data, this dual-method approach elicits greater confidence in the findings.

Through this rigorous method of study, the theories of transition onset have been tested and refined. A tentative model has been created, based upon analysis of the Tanzanian case, with which to better understand the onset of transition. The revised model is represented in Figure 17 below.

![Figure 17](image-url)

Figure 17. Interrelation of proposed causal factors (modified)

This study has been able to generate hypotheses about the causes of the onset of transition from the body of transition literature. It has also attempted to incorporate interview and statistical data with which to test these hypotheses. In the end, this research was able to
modify, however tentatively, the causal model based upon empirical study.

This research has moved the study of transition toward a better understanding of the causal components of the transition process. It has also set the stage for much needed subsequent study, particularly of cross-national nature. Multiple case studies would enhance this research by suggesting the particularities of the Tanzanian transition case and by identifying its more universal components. The Tanzanian case may be unique in some of its aspects and the five variables and their interactions may not hold up in cross-national analysis. Comparison will also undoubtedly shed light on interpretation of the onset of the Tanzanian transition in ways in which a single-case study cannot.

With similar transitional activity being undertaken in much of Africa and, in particular, in the neighboring states of Kenya, Zambia, Uganda, Mozambique and Malawi and perhaps in the less stable states of Rwanda and Burundi, the cases from which to select are numerous.

Beyond the implementation of multiparty politics, the means that are applied to achieve democratization and the likelihood of democratic consolidation can only be understood in light of the factors responsible for bringing it about. At a time when numerous countries have attempted democratization, but only a handful appear willing or able to go beyond the initial 'opening' to substantively change the system and to institutionalize wide participation and politicization, scholarly efforts must focus on identifying the initial impetus for transition to understand the, perhaps, proscribed aims of the
transitional leadership and forces necessary to carry through further democratic changes.
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