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To

MARILYN WALDMAN

Teacher and friend
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Although this project has now come to a close, it is still, in a sense, incomplete without the presence and guidance of my late professor, Dr. Marilyn Waldman. I thank her for all the help and encouragement she has given me over the years, both as a professor and as a friend, and hope this project and my future work will live up to her expectations.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This project examines images of India as revealed in the writings of German Orientalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I study these images in the context of trends in intellectual and social reform in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century India, especially those initiated by the Brahma Samaj, a reformist society with syncretic beliefs and goals started in 1828 by Rammohun Roy (1772-1833). I shall examine in particular writings of the German Indologists Friedrich Max Mueller (1823-1900), Paul Deussen (1845-1919), and Richard Garbe (1857-1927), and ideas associated with the Indian thinkers Rammohun Roy, Keshub Chunder Sen (1838-1884), Protap Chunder Mozoomdar (1840-1905), Swami Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883), and Swami Vivekananda (1863-1902).

My intention is to contrast these contemporaneous sets of ideas in order to study the relationship between political and economic power and intellectual attitudes. While my frame of reference is the debate on Orientalism that has evolved over the past two decades since the
publications of Edward Said’s *Orientalism,*¹ as well as the related discussion on postcoloniality, my conclusions will differ substantially from several recent postcolonial and post-Orientalist critiques. My study of German Orientalism does not support, in particular, the clear linkage posited by some scholars between Orientalist scholarship and European colonial power or hegemony. I suggest, rather, that German Orientalism was more a reflection of European power than a contributing factor to its emergence and growth.

German Orientalism was not the focus of Said’s initial critique, and neither has it received as much attention or criticism as English or French Orientalism in subsequent studies by other writers. One obvious reason is the relative lack of German involvement in European overseas expansion and colonialism from roughly the eighteenth to the twentieth century. Since much of Said’s critique was aimed at exposing the ties between Orientalist scholarship and colonial power, German Orientalism is not a natural candidate for Saidian-style scrutiny. But Said was aware of his omission of German Orientalism, and tried to preempt critics by arguing that German Orientalism was not as important as French or English Orientalism (see pages 13-14, 93-94 below).
Said's argument with respect to German Orientalism is, however, a weak one. First, I argue that German Orientalism was not an isolated phenomenon, but rather an integral part of European scholarship and ideas as a whole. Influences flowed from German scholars to non-German European scholars and vice-versa. Second, the relatively low profile of Germany in colonial and overseas affairs was a misleading indicator of Germany's political and economic strength in the mid- and late nineteenth century. At least vis-a-vis non-Western countries, Germany, or more specifically Germans, as my study shows, commanded as much political, economic, and social authority as did nationals of the major colonial powers. The writings of German scholars should therefore reflect, as much or as little as English or French scholarship, the links between power and scholarship. And although the Germans, unlike the British, the French, the Portugese, and the Dutch, never established a political presence in India, the German intellectual involvement with India was nevertheless an intense and sustained one. Last, but very importantly, German Orientalism generated ideas that resemble very closely those espoused by two aggressively chauvinistic groups in the twentieth century: the perpetrators of racial persecution and violence in Europe, and the proponents of Hindu nationalism in India.
German Orientalism is for these reasons as important and appropriate a topic for post-Orientalist discussion as any other school of scholarship. As Rosane Rocher has noted, "by failing to examine German scholarship...[Said's sweeping indictment of Orientalist scholarship] shies away from confronting the crucial issue of what may be attributable to colonial conditions and what may not." She also correctly observes that Said extends to India his discussion on the Middle East by means of a "dittoing procedure founded on sparse documentation."²

I am not searching here for evidence to demonstrate how India influenced Germany, or vice versa. I am interested rather in examining German Orientalist ideas to ascertain if they were part of a broader Western structure of power vis-à-vis the "Orient." The ideas of Indian thinkers will serve as a point of comparison to the Western views under study. My intention, again, is not to discover how one influenced or shaped the other, but rather to locate points of contact or divergence. Intellectual trends in nineteenth-century India, especially those associated with the Brahmo Samaj, are an appropriate focus of comparison because they were an amalgam of Indian and Western ideas. While the immediate stimulus to which they were reacting was the British one, a study of their points of contact with other Western traditions would provide new insights into the nature of both nineteenth-century Western
overseas expansion and the response - in this case, Indian - to this new pervasive presence. The direct contacts that were established between some of the European and Indian thinkers mentioned here lend an added interest and importance to the story.

It is worth stating at the outset that this is not another exercise in unmasking the so-called hegemony of Western systems and knowledge. German Orientalism, as I show in this study, does not lend itself unqualifiedly to the "hegemony thesis" with which studies of Orientalism in the last two decades have come to be associated. More generally, it is my position that political and economic hegemony does not explain everything, and that the study of the Orient was not always a project with colonial or imperial overtones. The time has indeed come, as Wendy Doniger puts it, for "a strategy of anti-anti-Orientalism," as well as for one of "post-post-structuralism." By this I do not mean overturning the critique as it now exists, but rather moving beyond simplistic criticisms of Orientalists and their work, while keeping in mind that the present critique is indeed what provides much of the stimulus for my discussion. For example, instead of seeing an act of aggression, as anti-Orientalists do, in Orientalists' scholarly "penetration" of other cultures, it is possible to see also, at least in some instances, "an act of love."³
I also do not use the term "Orientalist" as what Bernard Lewis calls a "term of abuse," but as one of convenience. I shall use the term "Orient" in a similar fashion, to denote primarily the geographical and cultural area studied by European scholars. I do argue, however, that there is substance to some of the charges - which I discuss below - made by critics of Orientalism. These charges can apply to German Orientalism as well, and to dismiss the entire critique out of hand is therefore untenable.4

My approach in this study will be principally to examine these German scholars' positions with regard to the contemporary Orient. At first glance, German Orientalism, or any Orientalism for that matter, was concerned mainly with antiquity, and social movements such as the Brahmo Samaj with modernity. But modernity was also very much an implicit concern among Orientalists, just as antiquity played an important role in the way Indian thinkers wished to redefine and reshape contemporary India. It is this implicit concern among Orientalists with the modern Orient, or modernity in the Orient, that is my main guiding interest in this study. There is, in the existing literature, no examination so far of German Orientalists and their attitudes and ideas in a British colonial setting. This project, by conducting precisely such a
study, adds new dimensions and complexities to the discussion of Orientalism.

The Indian travel journals of Deussen and Garbe, and essays, lectures, and letters of Max Mueller will form the basis of my discussion on the views of these Orientalists on contemporary India. I shall also compare these views with their ideas on ancient India; this comparison is as revealing of the nature of Orientalist scholarship as the discussion on colonial power and knowledge. Equally useful will be a comparison of Deussen's and Garbe's observations on modern India with those of Max Mueller, an Orientalist of equal stature, but one who never visited India. On the other hand, Deussen and Garbe never enjoyed the fame and publicity which Max Mueller received even outside scholarly circles. Between Deussen and Garbe there were also differences. While Garbe was very critical and even disdainful of almost everything he saw in India, Deussen's attitude was more charitable, and he continued to admire India even after the hardships of his visit to that country. The three scholars together reflect, therefore, a broad range of backgrounds and perspectives.

I will also explore, as necessary, the German intellectual tradition out of which these thinkers emerged, in particular the ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), Wilhelm von Humboldt
(1767-1835), and Georg Hegel (1770-1831). Herder, though usually not viewed as an Orientalist, was in a sense the founder of scholarly Orientalism in Germany, especially with regard to India. Herder was also one of the pioneers of Romantic thought in Germany, which developed partly as a reaction to the rationalist ideas of Herder’s famous teacher, Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). But although Herder wrote extensively on the Orient, the institutionalization of the field began with the Schlegel brothers. Friedrich Schlegel acquired greater fame as an Orientalist and is also the better known of the two, although August W. Schlegel became the first occupant of a chair for Indology at the University of Bonn in 1818; this was the first such academic appointment in Germany. Wilhelm von Humboldt, in addition to being a professional linguist and Sanskritist, was also very prominent in German public life in the early nineteenth century. His work therefore provides some idea of how "mainstream" Indology and Orientalist scholarship was in German intellectual life in the nineteenth century. Hegel needs no justification for his inclusion in any discussion of nineteenth-century European ideas. More specifically, however, Hegel, the non-Orientalist, wrote a significant amount on Asian societies including India and these writings can be compared very usefully with the ideas of later German Indologists.
I shall contrast, at various points in this discussion, this body of European ideas with what Indian thinkers themselves were saying at the time about modernity and antiquity, a large part of which was a response to, or a derivative of, what European Orientalists were expounding on India. Some of these individuals travelled to Europe and wrote about their experiences, their perceptions of Europe, and East-West relations. I draw on these travel memoirs, scholarly tracts written by these thinkers, as well as correspondence between them and European scholars.

What I present here then is an attempt to redraw the map of Orientalism by exploring an area that has not received much attention in this debate, namely, the relationship between scholars without explicit colonial backing - such as the Germans I study here - and the Orient of the mid- to late nineteenth century, which was predominantly under European colonial rule or influence.


5. It has become customary in the secondary literature to use the distinctive prefix "Max" when referring to Friedrich Max Mueller's last name, and I shall henceforth follow this practice. I also spell Max Mueller's name with "ue" rather than the German "ü" in keeping with Max Mueller's partly Anglicized identity (at least in some external respects) as a result of his lifelong residence in England.

CHAPTER II

SURVEY OF THE DEBATE ON ORIENTALISM

Introduction: Said's Critique and Its Antecedents

Post-Orientalist and postcolonial studies, unlike other well-trodden areas of history, are still relatively new "fields." It is perhaps not even appropriate to call them fields of historical inquiry, given the wide range of disciplines which postcolonial scholars represent. More importantly, the methodologies and sources used in postcolonial studies are such that the area is interdisciplinary virtually by definition. In this chapter, I discuss the way in which the debate on Orientalism has evolved over the last two decades. The work done in this area has, however, grown so rapidly that it is impossible to carry out an exhaustive survey of the literature. The following discussion focuses, therefore, on scholars and works which I deem representative of the main trends so far in this debate.

Writing in 1995, seventeen years after the publication of his now famous book Orientalism, Edward Said observed that the tremendous response to this work and the
"local discussions" it continues to generate "went far beyond anything I was thinking about when I wrote the book." The book has been translated into at least a dozen languages and gone through numerous editions. The result, Said writes, is that "Orientalism now seems to me like a collective book which has superseded me as its author...."\(^1\)

The critique of Orientalism which portrays it as an integral part of the European imperial project does indeed owe much of its momentum to the attack launched by Said in his book Orientalism in the late 1970s. The work has been both admired and criticized intensely, and seems set to take its place alongside such classics of non-Western "replies" to Western power as Frantz Fanon's The Wretched of the Earth.\(^2\) Said's work gave rise to numerous other studies, some imitating his method directly, others modifying his methods and thesis.

While the attention which is now focused on critiques of Orientalism is due largely to Said's work, we should keep in mind that he was not the first to raise these issues, and nor did his ideas emerge suddenly in a vacuum. Among modern scholars, Marshall Hodgson, a historian at the University of Chicago until his death in 1968, developed a trenchant and sustained critique of Western constructions of the Orient and of the non-Western world. His ideas, which are now being rediscovered, are acquiring renewed
importance in the context of recent discussions on postcoloniality, globalization, and multiculturalism, and merit a separate discussion by themselves.\textsuperscript{3} Bryan Turner's Marx and the End of Orientalism appeared in 1978, with conclusions and methodologies similar but not identical to those of Said.\textsuperscript{4} And going beyond the confines of recent discussions, there are numerous instances of scholars voicing the same concerns, though not in the same strident and focused fashion as Said and other recent writers.\textsuperscript{5}

In Orientalism, Said argues, with considerable vehemence, that the study of the Orient by European scholars was and is imbued with imperial motives and overtones. The book focuses mainly on the Islamic Orient, and English and French depictions of it. Although this is clearly a limitation on the study, as Said himself has acknowledged, the thrust of Said's argument has definitely been carried over to studies on other regions.

Said offers several reasons for choosing "the Anglo-French-American experience of the Arabs and Islam" as his focus in Orientalism. To cover all European ideas on the Orient, for example, would have been an impossible task. But this mechanical constraint aside, Said also maintains that "the sheer quality, consistency, and mass of British, French, and American writing on the Orient lifts it above the doubtless crucial work done in Germany, Italy, Russia, and elsewhere." In particular, he "[regrets] not taking
more account of the scientific prestige that accrued to
German scholarship by the middle of the nineteenth century,
whose neglect was made into a denunciation of insular
British scholars by George Eliot.  "6

While it is difficult to judge which nations produced
better scholarship than others, part of the reason for
Said's choice - which he never fully acknowledges - is also
undoubtedly his area of expertise, as well as his personal
background, which is Palestinian Arab. He does admit that
"the personal investment in this study derives from my
awareness of being an 'Oriental' as a child growing up in
two British colonies (Palestine and Egypt)." 7 But this is
not quite the same as acknowledging that the "Orient"
extends to other regions beyond the Middle East, and that
the issue of Orientalism applies to them somewhat
differently than the West Asian experience. Some of the
criticism that has been levelled subsequently at his work
could have been preempted if Said had not been so adamant
about the importance of his specific area of study and the
arguments that apply to it.

Orientalism, in Said's words, was - or still is - "a
corporate institution for dealing with the Orient -
dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing
views of it, describing it, by teaching it, ruling over
it." It was thus fundamentally a "discourse," an "ensemble"
of relationships between works, writers, audiences, and
institutions which "suffused the activity [of Orientalist scholars] with meaning, intelligibility, and reality."8

Orientalist discourse, according to Said, contributed significantly to the construction of Europe's "Other," which was, in the case of the "Near East," i.e., the Islamic Orient, both threatening and enchanting. It was threatening because it supposedly represented the precise opposite of European civilization: Islam was undemocratic, despotic, static, and irrational. It was, at the same time, enchanting in the sense that it was a land of mystery, fairy-tales, and exotic beauty.9

Culture, according to this critique, is constructed by demarcating the Self from this Other. This entails designating a boundary which delineates "what is extrinsic or intrinsic to that culture." This, in turn, introduces a "proprietary" aspect to the notion of culture. "Culture," according to Said, "is not merely something to which one belongs, but something that one possesses." This sense of who "we" are, and who "they" are, is sustained, Said has argued, by the processes of both "filiation" and "affiliation." Filiation refers to "direct genealogical descent." When filiation fails, that is, when ethnicity fails to provide a clear sense of culture, affiliation comes into play. It is "provided by institutions, associations, and communities whose social existence was not in fact guaranteed by biology."10 The discipline and
practice of Orientalism was thus one such institution or community, tied together by the common purpose of studying and constructing that which is not Europe, namely the Orient.

The Orient, in addition to serving as the cultural counter-point to Europe, has also, critics (including Said) argue, served as a locus of desire for those studying it. As a feminine counterpoint to a masculine and strong West, the Orient was an object to be conquered and possessed, whether through scholarship or geopolitical conquest. In general, the critique of Orientalism has paralleled and stimulated the growth of critiques by other marginalized or out-of-power groups. Annelies Moors has noted, for example, the similarities in the "way 'women' and the 'the Orient' have been represented in Western discourse"; both have been "orientalized," or "feminized" as the internal or external other. This does not imply, of course, that feminism, especially in its postmodern variants, and anti-Orientalism are identical simply by virtue of their oppositional stance, or because they both "critique essentialism." One point of divergence, according to Moors, is postmodern feminism's view of power as diffuse, as resulting from the power to "define" in mainly texts and discourses. Anti-Orientalism, she believes, addresses the political and economic sources of power more explicitly. I shall discuss
these issues again in the discussion below on postcoloniality and anti-Orientalism.  

An illustration of such feminized constructions of the Orient is Hegel's early nineteenth-century description of India as a "Land of Desire" which was being "penetrated" by Western nations in order to gain access to its "treasures." Jenny Sharpe traces the origins of such ideas to the new sub-discipline of Orientalism that was being formalized beginning in the late eighteenth century. In her discussion of William Jones (1746-1794), the pioneer British Orientalist, Sharpe suggests that Jones perpetrated a violence of sorts on the land of desire via the "sun," or light, shed by Orientalist scholarship and by the British colonizing presence with which such scholarship was associated. Like Said, Sharpe points to the imperial "efficacy" of all Orientalist scholarship. In the case of India, she argues, the efficacy could result as much from "sympathy and identity," as from the "hostility and alterity" which, according to Said, has historically characterized Western attitudes toward the Middle East. Jones, Sharpe argues, was searching for affinities, rather than differences, but there was "violent forcing" (of affinities) all the same, pointing thereby to the aggression or violence directed at a feminized object that underlies Orientalist scholarship.
The argument that European culture has been predicated as much on the negation of the Other, as on internal evolution, is being increasingly acknowledged and echoed by Western scholars as well, that is, if one can describe Said as a non-Western scholar. Michael Geyer, a European historian, has argued, that "Orientalist imaginaries," are one of several records of "distantiation," i.e. distancing from the Other. Others include "migration and laws of race relations, the differential traffic in goods and capital (including human beings) between North and South, as well as [records of] colonial regimes."\(^{16}\)

Geyer also draws the attention of his fellow Europeanists to the "fierce critique" launched by postcolonial scholars which makes it impossible for Western academics to keep on conducting business as usual. Like Said, Geyer maintains that any talk of a European identity is necessarily based on a "European/Western privilege of hegemony that elides what one might call the epistemic quality of Europe."\(^{17}\) Dietrich Krusche makes the same point when he argues that "Europe has, in the course of European-dominated history, been brought into sharper focus by what is outside or on its margins." Krusche adds that this process is no longer an abstract "clash between two imaginary world principles, but has in fact long been historical reality."\(^{18}\)
While the preceding sketch of Said's critique points to its poststructuralist underpinnings, there is certainly a strong Marxist strain in it as well, in which, as Annelies Moors has noted, raw domination and power - the product of economic and political supremacy - are studied in association with the scholarly practice of Orientalism. Whether the two perspectives can be integrated in a coherent fashion is a much-debated issue in postcolonial criticism in general, and can therefore be discussed more meaningfully in conjunction with a broader examination of postcoloniality. 19

It will be useful at this point to compare the ideas of Said with those of Marshall Hodgson, since such a comparison highlights well some additional aspects of Said's critique. Hodgson's methods and vocabulary seem, at first reading, almost quaint next to the intricacies of post-Orientalist and postcolonial critiques. His writings show, however, that it is possible to make virtually the same points without an esoteric and inaccessible terminology.

For both Hodgson and Said, as Edmund Burke III points out in his introduction to a new anthology of Hodgson's writings, the starting point or fundamental concern is the same, namely that "Western civilization as a discourse is predicated upon a deeply rooted sense of the moral as well as cultural superiority of Western Europe to the rest of
humanity." Hodgson and Said also have in common, as Burke points out further, their critiques of "essentialism" as a mode of cultural inquiry. And for both, it is critical in any social or cultural investigation to identify what Hodgson termed "pre-commitments" or ideological biases on the part of the observer. All these aspects, Burke argues, allowed Hodgson to "anticipate in important ways the work of Foucault, Said, and others," even though "the concept of discourse was unavailable to [him]." Interestingly enough, Orientalism contains no references to either Hodgson or his principal work, *The Venture of Islam*.

In an essay entitled "World History and a World Outlook," written in 1944, Hodgson objected strongly to the use of the terms "Orient" and "Occident" to refer to two supposedly equal "halves" of world civilization. In fact, the term "Orient" itself was anathema to him, fully aware as he was of all its Western connotations, and challenging and rectifying these notions became a recurring concern in his work. "Is there anything more absurd than our use of the words 'Eastern' or 'Oriental'?" he asked. The "East," for one, he argued, was far weightier in world civilization than the "West," and to suggest that they were somehow equal or comparable was unduly elevating to the West and demeaning to the East. The West, or Europe, in Hodgson’s view, had been for most of human history except the last few centuries a fringe region of the larger Eurasian zone.
of civilization, while the East comprised several highly
developed civilizations, each of which was comparable in
its own right to so-called European civilization. The
equation of East and West, he wrote, rested on the arrogant
assumption that "our culture is the equal of the sum of the
others."23

Hodgson used his area of specialization, Islamic
history, as a "strategic point" to critique not only
specific concepts such as the Orient, but as Burke
correctly notes, "the discourse on Western civilization" as
a whole.24 One area in particular on which he focused his
critique was what is known today in postcolonial critiques
as the "discourse of modernity." Hodgson disputed the
thesis that modernity - a term he was also very critical of
- is a condition exclusive to the West, or that only
European societies, since their earliest origins, possessed
the prerequisites for crossing the supposedly great divide
between the premodern and the modern condition.25

Said, like Hodgson, has also been annoyed by the
division of the world into the Orient and the Occident and
the related notion that desirable attributes such as
modernity and rationality reside only in the Occident. The
primary thrust of Said's critique, has, of course, been
directed at scholarship on the Islamic Orient. The real or
imagined divide between Islam and the West, which has
evolved over the centuries - for a host of reasons - into a condition of mutual antipathy, seems to underlie at least some of the emotion and anger in Said's work. Said himself, given his secular tendencies, does not profess sympathies toward any religion, and if he does write at all with any sense of identity or belonging, it is probably as an Arab.

In Orientalism and other writings such as Covering Islam, Said appears to be impatient and annoyed with the West for what he sees as a constant misrepresentation and demonization of "Islamic societies" by academic scholars as well as the media. Understandably, Said's attack generated more immediate enthusiasm and debate among Muslim scholars as well as non-Muslim Islamicists than among scholars of other regions, although Said has distanced himself definitively from perspectives which present him or his work as defending Islam or "championing Arabism." It was never his intention, he writes, "to perpetuate the hostility between two rival political and cultural monolithic blocks whose construction I was describing, and whose terrible effects I was trying to reduce."27

To be fair, Said has also expressed dismay at the fact that Orientalism has come to be seen as a general subaltern statement, as "the wretched of the earth talking back," rather than as a multicultural critique in which the crossing of boundaries is more important than maintaining them. Orientalism, Said maintains, was not for or against
the West, although that it is the way it has been read, especially in the Arab world. It is an interesting commentary on Said's critique that its reception in the West - at least among liberal, left-leaning groups - has been more satisfying to Said than reactions to it from Arabs and Muslims outside the West; in fact, the response from within the Muslim world to Said's scholarship has been decidedly negative. There is the added complication that one must distinguish between those Arabs who are relatively "Westernized" or live and work in the West, and those who are not. Among Arabs - it is not sure of which group - Orientalism, Said writes, has been "correctly perceived as Eurocentric" in its methods and choice of sources. The countries Said lists where his work has generated the reactions he had hoped for is remarkable: they are either Western, mainly English-speaking societies such as Australia and the United States, or formerly colonized regions, such as the Caribbean or the Indian sub-continent, where significant English-speaking or Westernized strata exist. Within these countries, his critique has been most influential in areas which are now associated with liberal or even radical positions in the Western academy: "the analysis of subaltern history, literary criticism, postcolonial anthropology, and feminist and minority discourses," to name a few.
Orientalism and the Postcolonial Critique

Of late, the terms "post-Orientalist" and "post-colonial" have been used increasingly in conjunction with one another, even to the point of becoming synonymous. The term "post-Orientalist" describes scholarship, culture, and politics after the critique of Orientalist ideas was developed, a critique which, as the term suggests, has signalled a new phase in writing and debate, especially on the Third World.

"Postcolonial" refers to the intellectual climate, again mainly among non-Western thinkers, after the end of colonialism, although its connotations are varied and go beyond the literal meaning of the word. Thus, the postcolonial writer is one who is no longer constrained, or tries not to be constrained, by the rules set by supposedly hegemonic, Western-colonial or other entities. But apart from this "broad anti-imperialist emancipatory" position, postcolonial theory and practice, as Linda Hutcheon has correctly noted, is hard to pinpoint. The label, she says, "has created complications of its own," arising partly from the difficulties in situating oneself among the specific "multiple constituencies" of class, gender, sexuality, religion, and race which postcolonial scholarship has to address while avoiding a totalizing or homogenizing agenda.30
The postcolonial and the post-Orientalist position claim to share a newfound freedom from rules as well as representations imposed earlier by those in power. What they also share, as two (unsympathetic) writers have noted, is a new style of scholarship in which "Said's characteristic blending of themes [such as 'third world' histories and cultures, Foucauldian approaches to power, engaged 'politics of difference,' and postmodernist approaches on the decentered and the heterogenous] has become virtually a paradigm for a new generation of historians and anthropologists."\textsuperscript{31} David Lelyfeld has pointed to the interest in "colonial discourse" as a unifying element in this brand of scholarship which emerged "in the wake of Said's Orientalism" among anthropologists, historians, and literary theorists of South Asian origin. Although colonial discourse, for these scholars, was "infiltrated" by hegemonic Western categories, the infiltration did not work only in one direction. Colonial hegemonic texts were also influenced by the presence and ideas of the colonized, and together they gave rise to colonial discourse.\textsuperscript{32}

An essay entitled "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories of the Third World" by Gyan Prakash, could thus just as well have been on postcolonial histories. Prakash has little disagreement with Said when he says that "Orientalism was a European enterprise, [and] the Indians
figured as inert objects," and that "colonial dominance produced the East-West construct." In the Indian context, as Prakash points out, there was the additional twist that the East-West construct, or "binary opposition" as he calls it, was also put forward as a cause or justification for colonial rule. The West, according to the Orientalist construct, was more in touch with the material world, while the East was religious and other-worldly. People of the East, therefore, needed Westerners to guide them in matters of politics and economics.33

In the post-Orientalist world, which Prakash describes as "postfoundational" and decentered, the "destabilization of identities and crossing of carefully policed boundaries promise a new, third world historiography that will resist both nativist romanticization and Orientalist distancing."34 The dismantling of old definitions, subjects, and especially "binarisms" is also central to Sara Suleri's depiction of the postcolonial world. These binarisms include demarcations such as colonizer and colonized, mother country and colony, Orient and Occident, and masculine and feminine. Historical analysis, Suleri writes, that relies on such binarisms, even if it tries to restore the colonized or subaltern to their rightful place in history, perpetuates the very hierarchy it seeks to overturn. Suleri argues, for example, that the discourse of nationhood
ensures perpetual follower status for the colonized, by making the numerical hierarchy of "first" and "third" worlds impossible to overcome.³⁵

Changing the discourse of nationhood, or "disfiguring" it, as Prakash puts it, is indeed one of the principal concerns of postcolonial writers. The discourse, as originally configured, envisaged the transition of colonies or former colonies, or the transition of the Orient, toward Occidental-style modernity, statehood, and capitalism. This transition would take place along the path already charted by the modern nations of the West. This discourse, Partha Chatterjee argues in The Nation and its Fragments, has continued into the postcolonial era, with the result that the non-Western world appears to be a "perpetual consumer of modernity" for whom the path of historical change or evolution has already been mapped out by Europe.³⁶

Using the vocabulary of Michel Foucault, Chatterjee argues against this imposition of the "normalizing project" of nationalist modernity on the formerly colonized world, and describes his work as a search for the "fragmented resistances" to this project, as a "contestation in a field of power."³⁷ Chatterjee also points repeatedly in his work to links between Orientalist scholarship and nationalist history. The Orientalists were instrumental in "recovering and reconstructing" the history of India, and this struck a
sympathetic chord among Indians who saw in this new discipline of Indology the means for developing their historical consciousness. Orientalist scholarship also emphasized India's ancient glory, as opposed to its present servile and weak condition, and this was perfect material for creating national pride, or perhaps the idea of nationhood itself. Just as classical Greece was a significant component in the story of how modern European nations came to be, a classical age - the Vedic period - was found for India as well. And like modern Europe, India would also have a dark, medieval age and an enlightened modern one, thereby putting in place, or forcing on India, a European-style history of the march to modernity.38

Said's own work has also taken a turn towards merging post-Orientalist and post-colonial critiques. In Culture and Imperialism, Said sees Orientalism and Orientalists as just one component of a larger Eurocentric vision and endeavor which seeks to marginalize and dominate non-Western cultures.39 In the past, this project was carried out principally through colonial control. In the world after colonialism, the pattern continues, visible in such phenomena as the North-South relationship. It is sustained by the structure of the global economy and ancillary mechanisms such as the First World media. Said sees little difference in the agenda of Orientalists and that of modern conservative scholars such as Allan Bloom who extol the
"supreme value of purely Western humanities," intimately tied as they both are to the Western hegemonizing project.40

The message in Culture and Imperialism is not totally different from the thesis of Orientalism, but the scope of the new work is broader, almost too broad perhaps. It is an oppositional work, seeking to carry on the process of decolonization, not just in social structures but in the mind as well. Said sees postcolonial studies as part of this process of "adversarial internationalization in an age of continued imperial structures." He describes this as the "voyage in," that is a voyage by "a dissenting native" into a "space hitherto inviolable, and now invaded and re-examined critically."41 Evaluating the work of Ranajit Guha, the virtual founder of the school of subaltern studies in Indian historiography, Said points to the "dismantling of imperial historiography" in postcolonial writing.42 "The irony," he writes, "is that a native does the job, mastering not only sources and materials, but the overpowering abstractions whose traces in the minds of imperialists themselves were scarcely discernible when they originated."43

Guha’s work, and that of the subaltern school in general, draws heavily on the ideas of Antonio Gramsci, as does Said’s own work in Orientalism and after. Gramsci’s work has aided post-Orientalist and postcolonial scholars
in developing the notion of subaltern consciousness, as well as in their professed task of dismantling the ideology and practice of hegemony. The specific variant of hegemony that these scholars attack has two components: "the universalizing tendency of capital," à la Marx, and Western liberal bourgeois thought which, according to Guha, has for the last two hundred years viewed "Improvement" [sic] at home and abroad as its principal task. While this notion of Improvement has been seen by Western hegemonic institutions and their non-Western collaborators as universal or neutral in nature, subaltern studies points to the existence of alternate moralities and legalities that go against the prevailing hegemony.44 Said too, in his critique of Orientalism, has used Gramsci's ideas and vocabulary to attack the idea of neutral, objective scholarship. He has found particularly useful Gramsci's notion of a "political society" that "reaches into such realms of civil society as the academy" and allows intellectuals to work as agents of hegemony.45

Another Indian scholar whom Said sees as part of this stream is Gauri Viswanathan. Her book, **Masks of Conquest**, examines the role of cultural tools in colonial domination, in particular the introduction of English literature into the curriculum of schools and colleges in India in the nineteenth century. Viswanathan's work, which Said admires, points therefore to the collusion between Western
intellectual productions and mechanisms of imperial control. It is also, like other postcolonial and post-Orientalist writing, a "voyage in," since it challenges the "integrity" of a supposedly pure, Western space - in this case, the academic discipline of English literature. Although Viswanathan's thesis is not identical to the critique of Orientalism, the two intersect, in part because the imposition of English literature in India was the sequel to Orientalist scholarship which created and perpetuated the idea of an ontological difference between East and West. The "Anglicization" of India was therefore intimately connected to the former "Orientalization" of India.46

The critique of Orientalism and the critique of colonialism, or the concepts post-Orientalist and postcolonial, have thus become increasingly conflated. The overlap is partly because, as mentioned, they both claim to represent a contestation of Western colonial power and ideas. But they overlap also because Orientalism and colonialism were, in one view, part of the same project, i.e., they sustained and supported each other. Orientalism also, as Partha Chatterjee argues, supplied the intellectual basis for the subsequent discourse on the nation-state by unearthing histories and origins of the Orient that were hitherto unknown to Orientals themselves. By doing this, Orientalism thus implicated itself in the
"normalizing" processes of colonization and the emergence of nationhood. The present study will, in part, examine to what extent the two critiques - that of Orientalism, and that of colonialism - can be separated, despite their current close association.

Chatterjee's and other postcolonial writers such as Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's use of Foucault points to another shared aspect of the postcolonial and the post-Orientalist positions, namely their self-professed affinity with poststructuralist and postmodernist ideas. While there are some scholars who view Said's work as flimsy and lacking in rigor as a result of his reliance on freewheeling, poststructuralist ideas, others have welcomed precisely this aspect of Said's methodology as an injection of fresh ideas and approaches into academic disciplines, especially those which value rigorous, positivist methods. Said himself states, in Orientalism, that he is greatly indebted to Foucault for his methodology and framework although some differences remain.

The debt lies mainly in Said's use of the notion of a "discursive formation" which, in his view, describes best the field of Orientalist scholarship. Orientalism was a discursive formation, or a discourse, and not simply an academic discipline or field of study, because it was a conversation about the Orient in which the West decided what would be admissible and what would not, as opposed to
the question of what was true and what was false. That is, the rules by which the conversation was carried on, and by implication, the participants in the conversation, were decided by Westerners. These participants, Said points out, cited and referred to each other in their work. The result was a web of relationships between works, audiences, and some particular aspects of the Orient, or a "strategic formation," in which "groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, density, and referential power among themselves." What such a discursive formation acquires, and needs to sustain itself, is power. What it aspires to, however, according to Foucault, is "truth," and it is society's need to generate truths that cause discursive formations to come into being, for such formations are in essence truth-generating mechanisms. Societies thus have their "regimes of truth" constituted by techniques, procedures, and institutions, which together work toward "the production, regulation, distribution, circulation, and operation of statements." Truth, Foucault also maintained, "is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it." The relation between power and knowledge, or rather power and truth, is critical to Foucault's idea of a discourse, and it is in this sense, namely as a system for creating, acquiring, and maintaining power that Said
describes Orientalism as a discourse. Said also points out Foucault's contention that although "the fact of writing [converts] the power relationship...into 'mere' written words, writing is a way of disguising the awesome materiality of so tightly controlled and managed a production." This formulation is, of course, quite removed from the everyday truism that "knowledge is power," although critiques of Orientalism such as Said's could be interpreted, and not incorrectly, as saying just that.

The use of knowledge to acquire and maintain power points to economic, political or social hegemony through institutions and structures such as trade and colonialism, and could be termed a Marxist or quasi-Marxist approach. This view of Orientalism, that is as a tool for sustaining colonial and economic exploitation, is certainly part of Said's argument. But the appeal to Foucault and poststructuralist theories by postcolonial and post-Orientalist scholars prevents a straightforward reading of these critiques as Marxist positions.

Following the postmodernist threads in Said's critique, Christopher Pinney has argued that Orientalism was part of the project of progress and normalization that has characterized European society since around 1800. Pinney interprets Foucault as saying that normalization, i.e. the growth of disciplinary power, along with "progress," "diminish the Other's ability to speak back."
Examining photographic evidence collected in India in the late nineteenth century by anthropologists and other scholars, Pinney maintains that the acquisition and classification of knowledge — in this case, visual images of a non-Western society such as India — were indeed part of the attempt to normalize and control the Other. Pinney supports the Saidian critique by arguing that the very act of "writing back" which Said and others have set in motion is perhaps what is most disconcerting to established interests. The silencing of such voices, he writes, was precisely what colonial control and Western scholarship have attempted all along, by situating the native on a "normalizing grid" of positivist knowledge.56

Extensions of Said's Critique

Scholars of Muslim or Arab origin, or those sympathetic to Muslim or Arab causes — and I am speaking mainly of those connected to the Western academy — have by and large viewed Said's critique as an act of cultural affirmation against the predations of the West, and have used it as such in their own work. An anthology entitled "Orientalism, Islam, and Islamists," published in the United States in 1984 with contributions from several countries, is a good example of such Orientalism-inspired, robustly aggressive scholarship. In it, both Orientalism and Orientalists come in for a round of criticism as strong
and unrelenting as Said's original critique. While there is solid new scholarship in the volume that goes beyond Said's work, the basic premises remain the same: Orientalism was a body of knowledge closely associated with political power, developed by scholars with little affection for Islam no matter how vast their erudition, and its main effect on Western audiences has been to deepen misperceptions and misunderstandings of Islam.  

Gordon Pruett launches an attack, for example, which hostile commentators might almost call "fundamentalist" in tone. Pruett, who is, interestingly enough, a Western academic, charges Orientalists with studying Islam from the outside in a cold, academic fashion, treating it as though it were a "cultural artifact requiring interpretation by outsiders." What such scholars fail to see or participate in, according to Pruett, is the "transcendent truth" inherent in the religion through its very name or definition, "Islam," which means surrender to the will of God. This act of faith, or belief, Pruett argues, does not need further explanation. Orientalists, he says, have worked on the assumption that Islam is not an act of submission, that it is something else which objective scholarship can reveal. Pruett also attacks Orientalists, Gustave von Grunebaum in particular, for suggesting that Islam "needs reform," or that it is antithetical to social and political progress. Pruett's answer to this charge
comes, again, from "within" Islam. The very act of submission to God, he argues, and the act of living by this principle, require, by definition, constant reform in all areas of life. It is difficult to say whether this is the kind of radical Islamic critique from which Said would distance himself. But even if arguments of the kind Pruett advances do not find a place in Said's more secular work, one can certainly imagine Said's work giving rise to more radical offshoots such as this, no matter how much Said protests that this is a misreading of his ideas. Other essays in the same volume take individual Orientalists including famous figures such as Hamilton Gibb and Kenneth Cragg as the object of their criticism. Sulayman Nyang and Samir Abed-Rabbo subject Bernard Lewis to a particularly severe attack, calling him "a product of the British experience of empire," a writer whose works were "designed to generate and sustain support for Israel," and a threat to "international peace and security." There is some grudging admiration of these Orientalists' achievements, but the overall evaluations are extremely negative.

More nuanced offshoots of Orientalism are to be found in Theory, Politics, and the Arab World, another anthology with several Muslim or Arab writers (based in the West) as well as some Western scholars. The essays in this volume, while certainly not as polemical as Orientalism, are still premised on the methodology and perspectives guiding Said.
They are strongly shaped by postmodernist approaches, especially those emerging from anthropology and sociology, as well as political science, and are a good example of how far the critique of Orientalism has in fact developed in range and complexity since Said's initial salvo.\(^\text{61}\)

While Said's work and that of the scholars discussed above has focused almost entirely on Islamic West Asia, or even exclusively on the Levant, there is now no dearth of studies that extend his ideas and approach to other zones, as well as to other thematic areas.

Ronald Inden, for example, has applied Said's method fairly meticulously to India, and arrived at an indictment of the way in which India has been "imagined" by Westerners. Paraphrasing Said, Inden argues that "the knowledge of the Orientalist is [privileged] in relation to that of the Orientals," and that it "has appropriated the power to represent the Oriental." With reference to India, Inden asserts that "in many respects, the intellectual activities of the Orientalist have produced even in India the very Orient which is constructed in its discourse."\(^\text{62}\) John Hawley, without explicitly imitating Said's work in the way Inden does, develops a similar point when he argues that Hinduism, as a word denoting a formal religion, as well as the "reality," was virtually a European invention. The terms "Hindu" and "Hinduism" he writes, are both, to an
extent, "strangers in India itself." Echoing Said, Hawley contends that the construction of Hinduism was very much a part of the consolidation of British imperial rule, at least from the late eighteenth century on. Prior to that, European curiosity about the Orient was not always tinged with ulterior colonial motives, as Hawley's discussion of the example of Roberto de Nobili, an Italian missionary of the seventeenth century, shows.

A study by Richard Minear, in which he tests the critique of Orientalism in the area of Japanese studies, throws up interesting parallels with the study of India. Minear argues that the leading Western historians of Japan in the past century have all by and large subscribed to the idea of a fundamental divide between East and West. Working on this assumption, they have then constructed an essence, or essential character of Japan which would clearly delineate it from the West. The principal elements of this character appear to be a "leaning toward subtlety and sensitivity than to clarity of analysis," or toward "aesthetic achievements" rather than "speculative philosophy," and a tendency to be less democratically-minded than the West. These traits are not seen as inferior to those of the West. Rather, as has been the fashion among "open-minded" Western scholars - and still is in today's environment of decreed cultural tolerance and relativism - they are simply seen as different.
As for Said's thesis, Minear believes that while there are several differences between the Japanese case and Said's area of interest, Said's contribution provides a much-needed stimulus to the field of Japanese studies. The approaches and assumptions of "Japanists" have gone, Minear feels, too long unquestioned, in part due to "insensitivity to the permanent vestiges of this problem," that is, the problem of Orientalist attitudes and assumptions in scholarship on Japan.65

The differences in Japan's case, according to Minear, were, first, that Japan was never a colony, even though it did, for brief periods, feel the impact of Western military power. Second, there was no close cultural tie or proximity between the West and Japan similar to that between Said's Orient (or West Asia) and the West. And lastly, the Japanese did not rely on European Orientalists to unearth their own past or to bestow on themselves a sense of national identity.

We can observe a parallel here between the relationship between Western scholars and Japan, and German Orientalists and India. While India was never politically or economically subordinate to Germany, "the set of attitudes" that went along with growing European power in general was to be found among Germans as well. "Orientalist attitudes" could therefore be found "even in the absence of domination."66 Also, as in most Orientalist scholarship,
Western writings on Japan tend to reflect an air of superiority, and a firm belief in the greater strength of the "Western tradition." This, as my project shows, is true of German scholarship on India as well.

Another characteristic of Japanese studies, and Oriental studies in general in the West is the tendency to view the East, or its essence, as "unchanging." For example, in an essay on "Japanese Aesthetics," Donald Keene, an acclaimed Western scholar, writes that the Western visitor to Japan will initially be disappointed with the manifestations of modernity such as "fast-food shops, the ugliness of commercial signs, and the blank looks on the faces of people hurrying to their places of business." But the past, Keene reassures us, is still very much alive, and can be found above all in "aesthetic preferences" that find "surprising outlets for expression - a box of sushi, a display of laquered zori, branches of artificial maple leaves along a commercial street." 67

Richard Storry, in his History of Modern Japan, also points to such aesthetic elements as being the essence of a Japan that has not significantly evolved over time, at least not in a cultural sense. Storry quotes George Sansom, whom he describes as one of the wisest experts on Japan, to say that there seems to be a warmth and depth in their love of beauty which qualifies them as a race apart, or at least distinguishes them from the Greeks, as the
features of a Buddhist image expressing love and mercy differ from the cold marble countenances of an Apollo or Artemis.

Sansom's comments, Storry acknowledges, were with reference to the Heian period, but adds - in keeping with the thesis of an unchanging East - that they "seem hardly less apposite to the present day."

These perspectives illustrate, of course, the notion of an unchanging divide between East and West. But they also confirm the thesis of the feminization of the Orient mentioned earlier. This picture of the subtle, sensitive Orient, and the rigorous, analytical West, constructed in the mid- and late twentieth century, is hardly different from Hegel's early nineteenth-century image of the effeminate East, with the difference that Hegel's open contempt has been replaced by tolerance and relativism.

Orientalist scholarship on India, too, reveals consistently the picture of an India that does not evolve over time. But while aesthetic sensibility is seen as the defining and constant essence of Japan, in the case of India, Western scholars, including relatively recent ones, have identified a social institution, the caste system, as its essence. The caste system is, of course, an example of a hierarchical ordering of society, something which is not uncommon in history. What supposedly distinguishes the caste system, though, from social structures elsewhere is that it eliminates politics and political change in the way
these terms are understood in the West. Politics, which requires rational, analytical thought as well as the ability to question existing structures, is replaced by an irrational, preordained system that has continued unquestioned virtually since the beginning of civilized society. Among German scholars, such ideas are to be found, for example, in the writings of Johann Gottfried Herder, Schlegel, Hegel, Humboldt, as well as the three Indologists we are focusing on here, Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe.

The discussion on Orientalism has, as Said himself has noted, gone far beyond the initial scope of his study. The anti-Orientalist critique has been used, for example, to analyze the political and cultural construct of "the Balkans" in European studies.

R. S. Newman has found evidence supporting Said's theses in the images propagated by postage stamps during the colonial era. With regard to the Indian subcontinent, he argues that the colonial powers created a picture of South Asia that had little to do with the realities of the region. The images tended to project imperial power, usually in a "colonial-picturesque" manner. The intended audience was stamp collectors back home, for whom India was just "another hot and exotic part of the Empire." The stamps also juxtaposed images of supposed Indian backwardness with symbols of progress such as railways
which had been introduced into India by the British. Postage stamps, Newman concludes, were "an integral part of the whole system of representation of India which... aided by officials, artists, [and] travellers... created the India of our imagination." Newman's observations, as we shall see in subsequent chapters, can apply very well to the picture of India constructed by the German Orientalists I examine, especially the ones who travelled to India.

Yet another criticism of Orientalist scholarship comes from Martin Bernal. Bernal, writing in the framework of the debate on the emergence of the "Western canon," identifies nineteenth-century Orientalism as a critical component in the development of racist, anti-Semitic ideas that fed into both political nationalism and the supposedly mainstream school of Western history and civilization. This school is mainstream, because it sees a direct and logical line of development from the ancient Greeks to the Germanic tribes, to Latin Christendom, and from there via the Renaissance and the Enlightenment to Western modernity. The main actors in this process, to simplify a complex debate, were whites, or Caucasians of European origin, or to use the Orientalist term, Indo-Europeans. Non-Caucasians - the "minorities" of today's social scene - did not, in the "mainstream" view which Bernal is attacking, play any significant role in this process.
There is even debate about Orientalism in the area of environmental studies and activism. Both environmentalists and developers in the West, according to one writer, tend to regard the environment of the East, or more accurately of the South, as a space which they have the power to describe, analyze, and speak for, or represent, in much the same manner as the Orientalists of an earlier era. The people and the environment of non-Western regions have to be represented, because, as Marx put it in his frequently cited remark, "they cannot represent themselves."74

Said's Critics and Alternative Approaches to Orientalism

There are those, of course, who disagree with the thesis that violence, aggression, or hegemony is innate to all Orientalist scholarship. These scholars maintain that scholarship of the Orientalist kind, or any intellectual activity that has a cross-cultural aspect cannot be reduced solely to relations of power. There is, they say, scholarly activity that can take place for its own sake, without ulterior or implicit motives. David Kopf, a leading scholar of the history of British Orientalism in India as well as of the Brahmo Samaj, has been a severe critic of Said. Tapan Ray Chaudhuri and A. S. Kejariwal, to name just two writers, have argued that intellectual exchanges between colonizer and colonized, or Orientalist scholarship in the colonial setting, were not shaped by the political and
economic hegemony of the colonizing power. And along with criticism of the post-Orientalist position, there are, as I discuss below (pp. 61-63), critics of the postcolonial school too. And, not least, some Orientalists themselves have responded to the charges brought against them, most prominently Bernard Lewis, who has made Edward Said the target of many blistering attacks.\textsuperscript{75}

David Kopf has described Said's work as "intellectual mischief" from which the history of Orientalist scholarship needs to be "salvaged." He is equally critical of other scholars who have followed Said's approach. He has accused David Gordon, for example, of "[parroting] Said" and his "crude but popular vision," and "wearing Said's influence like an albatross around his neck." Kopf argues, first, that Said's picture of Orientalism is essentially a fabrication, based on shoddy scholarship and highly suspect methodology. "An entertaining style of scribbling and a casual manner of discourse with historic name-dropping" is how Kopf describes Said's method. The evidence Said presents to support his points is, in Kopf's opinion, totally inadequate, and the result is not history, but "historical fiction."\textsuperscript{77}

Kopf also launches an attack on the credentials of non-Western or Asian writers in general who, according to Kopf, cannot sort out their post-colonial identity conflicts, but can write with dexterity about these crises
in a foreign language. Kopf counts V. S. Naipaul, Salman Rushdie, and of course, Said among such writers, and discusses them with a disdain and contempt that would be perhaps hard to find even among the most arrogant Orientalists of the nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{78} This attack, which Kopf makes almost as an aside to his main argument, weakens his own position greatly, if anything. It demonstrates precisely Said's point about the arrogance and sense of power, lurking not far beneath the surface, among some Western scholars toward the societies and peoples they study - which is really what Said's critique of Orientalism is all about.

On a less rhetorical note, Kopf makes the point that Said's thesis about Orientalism and the Islamic world simply cannot be extended without qualification to Orientalist work on other regions on the world. It does not apply in particular, from Kopf's perspective, to British Orientalist scholarship on India in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Kopf's principal works are devoted in fact to developing a thesis totally at odds with Said's ideas. In \textit{British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance}, and \textit{The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind} (especially the former), Kopf's main argument is that British Orientalism had a positive and healthful effect on Indian society and ideas, and that the exchange of ideas between the British and the Indians, at
least in the period Kopf discusses, was not tainted by the motives and attitudes which Said sees as typical of all Orientalist writing.79

One argument which Kopf develops to refute Said involves, however, in its own way, a distortion of some terms and facts. Kopf points to the Anglicist-Orientalist conflict in British-Indian history, and the ultimate defeat of the Orientalists by the Anglicists, in an attempt to demonstrate that Orientalism had, in fact, been criticized by Europeans themselves long before the emergence of postcolonial voices criticizing Orientalism.80 But this is certainly not what Said means by "Orientalism." Orientalism, to Said, represents certain attitudes and a position of power vis-à-vis one’s object of study. The "Orientalist" in the expression "Anglicist-Orientalist controversy" refers more to a specific colonial policy in a specific region and time than to the broader issues of power, privilege, and representation which Said addresses. Like his attack on upstart postcolonial Asian intellectuals, this argument of Kopf’s also sidesteps Said’s point completely.

If non-polemical, non-adversarial studies of Orientalism are what Kopf regards as good scholarship, A. Leslie Willson’s A Mythical Image: The Ideal of India in German Romanticism would probably meet his criteria.81 So too would Wilhelm Halbfass’s India and Europe, Raymond
Schwab’s earlier, magisterial Oriental Renaissance, and, of course, Kopf’s own British Orientalism and The Brahmo Samaj. On intellectual exchanges or influences between the colonizers and Indians in general, Eric Stokes’ The English Utilitarians and India and Geraldine Forbes’ Positivism in Bengal are examples of "pre-postcolonial" scholarship. Stokes, in fact, is "Eurocentric" in a way that is now almost old-fashioned, focusing mainly on Europeans and devoting little attention to ideas generated by Indians.

Indians are firmly in the center of Forbes’ Positivism in Bengal, although European positivists are the principal "agents" in the dialogue; Indians react to Western influences. Forbes clearly points to colonial subjugation as a factor shaping these Indian responses, but in a manner quite different from that of Said and other postcolonial scholars. The vocabulary – in the broad sense of the term – is different, and whether this alone accounts for the apparent gap between earlier and more recent, poststructuralist-influenced work is not certain. Forbes’ work is also not adversarial or rhetorical, and neither is "ambivalence" in colonial exchanges as critical to her discussion as it is to postcolonial scholarship.

Leslie Willson, in A Mythical Image, is fully aware that German Orientalist work on India was geared more to Germany’s own needs than to those of India, and that the
Orientalist picture of India was partly a fabulous invention. But there is no rhetoric of the kind one encounters in more recent writings. There is no adversary in Willson's story. The "discovery" of India by Orientalists, and the uses to which it was put, receives a positive evaluation from Willson. But there are no provocative conclusions of the kind Kopf makes about this scholarship "being good for them," that is for Indians' self-esteem and image. Even though India was a "sweet illusion," it enriched and added "brilliance" as well as "direction and contour" to European Romantic thought. Both Schwab and Willson are interested more in the European self-image, and Orientalism's impact on this image, than with its impact on the Orient itself. Future Western writers, Willson concludes, will continue to be inspired by "the pulse that throbs still in India" and "seek to measure that ancient rhythm whose essence ever remains sweet illusion." It is a benign judgement, devoid of the rancor and animosity of the postcolonial critiques. Willson, like Schwab, praises the unifying effect of Orientalist scholarship on global culture. Rather than dividing the world into Orient and Occident, or "we" and "they," Orientalists, in this view, expanded the intellectual and spiritual horizons of Europe by finding common origins and traits.
Raymond Schwab’s *The Oriental Renaissance* might also seem simplistic next to the postcolonial, poststructuralist interpretations of today, but it demonstrates, in fact, that sophisticated studies of Orientalism were possible even before this whole controversy began. The original French version of Schwab’s book appeared in 1950, and it was not until 1984 that it was translated into English. Schwab’s principal thesis in this work is that Europe’s intellectual discovery of the East, especially India, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, was tantamount to a second Renaissance. This Oriental Renaissance, which was intimately tied to the Romantic intellectual project, represented, according to Schwab, a sharper divide in both European and global history than the first Renaissance as conventionally defined. The first Renaissance, Schwab argues, was an insular European phenomenon. Western humanism, he writes, had hitherto been "a family matter inside a hermetic little middle Mediterranean room." Now, after being exposed to Eastern ideas, the West completes its first, unfinished Renaissance, the "world becomes truly round," and a new humanism emerges that is less "crippled," by virtue of being more "inclusive." European Romanticism, was the force behind this awakening, but it was also more than just a stimulus. Romanticism itself, Schwab maintains, was a child of the Oriental Renaissance, rather than the contrary and, in today’s parlance,
Eurocentric thesis. Romanticism, he states, was nothing else than "an oriental irruption of the intellect." This is a grand and charitable observation, with which it is hard for "Orientals" to take issue. Schwab's ideas are not, moreover, flimsy rhetoric. They are backed by voluminous and painstaking detail, the result of which is a definitive and encyclopaedic work on Orientalist scholarship, at least on India. Said himself, for all his antipathy toward Orientalism and Orientalists, praises Schwab for the cosmopolitan, humanistic vision of his work as well as for its scope and detail. Dualities and oppositions such as Orient and Occident, Said writes, are blurred and drawn into a "vast human portrait" by Schwab. Said does take Schwab to task for not looking at political factors, but his overall evaluation remains positive.

Schwab's theme of an Oriental Renaissance that widened European horizons dramatically and thereby enriched European culture is still being echoed, ironically enough, by scholars of a conservative bent. Julian Robinson, for example, in a study in which he compresses into thirty odd pages what Schwab did in over six hundred, describes the impact of the Orient on European thought as a very positive one. But that the storm over Orientalism has perhaps not yet made a significant dent in "mainstream" Western studies is suggested by Robinson's opening remark: "The impact of the Islamic Orient has usually not been given a central
place in the history of European ideas." Robinson chides scholars such as Said and Rana Kabbani for their "fashionable critical view" of the European experience of the Orient as an aspect of European political assertion. He also describes Martin Bernal's *Black Athena* pejoratively as "remarkable," a fairly standard evaluation of Bernal's work by conservative Western scholars. Robinson makes the unfashionable but interesting point, though, that "the European reaction to the Orient was an appeal against the commercial values and mechanistic world-view of Western Europe," a point which, he says, is not acknowledged by critics of Orientalism.  

O. P. Kejariwal, in *The Asiatic Society of Bengal*, provides ample evidence and arguments to support critics of the anti-Orientalist critique. British Orientalist work in India, at least in the period he discusses, 1784-1838, was not a handmaiden, he argues, of British imperialism. On the contrary, the two goals—scholarship and colonial rule—were often at loggerheads. Kejariwal develops the case convincingly that there was little financial connection or coordination of any kind between British scholars and colonial administrators. Scholars like William Jones, Henry Colebrooke, and numerous others, Kejariwal maintains, were guided solely by genuine curiosity about and fascination with India.
To add more grist to the mill of those opposed to Said, Kejariwal provides evidence to show that Indians did not know or care sufficiently about their own history until European Orientalists discovered it for them. This discovery then provided the impetus for Indians to redefine and develop their own cultural identity, as happened, according to Kopf, in Bengal following the initial wave of British Orientalism in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Ultimately, both Kopf and Kejariwal argue, this process led to the rise of nationalism in India. The emergence of the Indian nation-state can therefore be traced back, by this reasoning, to European Orientalism.92

The argument is really not much different from Partha Chatterjee's, with the difference that Kejariwal and Kopf see the rise of nationhood as a positive outcome of Orientalism, while critics like Chatterjee see it as proof of the complicity of Orientalism in the establishment of hegemonic Western models in Asia and elsewhere. Kejariwal and Kopf also conveniently equate the rise of nationalism in India with the rise, by and large, of a Hindu nationalism. The fact that Muslims and other religious minorities, as well as marginalized and disempowered groups such as women and peasants, were left out both by Orientalism and by the Indian nationalist movement, is, in
fact, one of Chatterjee's central arguments, and one that does not figure prominently in Kopf or Kejariwal.

Said's original position has also been challenged and modified by Javed Majeed in his study of James Mill's *History of British India.* Majeed disagrees specifically with the hypothesis that Mill's ideas were the "unproblematic reflection" of clearly defined structures of power. On the contrary, Majeed argues, there were contradictions within the tradition of which Mill was a product, and the *History* reflected these contradictions. Far from being an expression of British hegemony, the *History* was "first and foremost an attack on the ruling British ideology of the time." It was also an attack on the Orientalist mode of scholarship which William Jones had initiated. Colonial power was more fragile than Said's depiction of it, and the *History*, Majeed concludes, reflected the uncertainty and hesitancy of British rule, rather than its confidence.

Problems of Disciplinarity and Legitimacy in the Post-Orientalist and Postcolonial Critiques

The critique of Orientalism is not anchored in any one discipline, nor does it target the manifestations of Orientalism in any specific discipline. Said is affiliated with the field of literary criticism, and so are many other scholars of the postcolonial school, but the critique they have set in motion has disturbed, so to speak, a broad
range of disciplines. The discipline of history has developed a love-hate relationship with the critique of Orientalism and its best-known exponent, Said. It has a similar relationship with one of Said's main inspirations, Foucault, and with postmodernist approaches in general.

From the time Said's *Orientalism* appeared on the scene, Said has been attacked, by David Kopf for example, as erroneous and irrelevant, mainly because his methods did not resemble those of the positivist historian. In the same symposium of essays in which Kopf makes these charges, another historian, Michael Dalby, praises Said for precisely the same reasons, namely his refusal to construct and "tell a story" in the traditional historical fashion. Conventional historical explanation, according to Dalby, "[rather] grandly takes 'change over time' as its ultimate object, but all too often lamely settles for lists of events or ideas in chronological order." Dalby sees both Said and Foucault as having freed themselves from this kind of history, focusing instead on "contiguities rather than causal connections," and "discontinuity and difference rather than continuity." Dalby acknowledges that it is not clear for whom, that is scholars in which discipline, Said's critique is intended, although it is certainly a refutation of "a field of scholarship." If, as Dalby suggests, it is Orientalists for whom it is meant, the
problem still persists, since Orientalism is not quite a clearly-defined discipline.

The discussion is very similar to that on Foucault’s place vis-à-vis the historical profession. Patricia O’Brien, a historian, has pointed to Foucault’s "perceived marginality as a historian" along with the intense engagement with his ideas by historians. In a manner virtually identical to that of Said’s critics, critics of Foucault too, O’Brien notes, point to his "deficiencies, lack of method, disregard for data, [oversimplifications] and abstractions as indicators of the historical invalidity of Foucault’s work." But Foucault did write history, O’Brien argues, a history organized around the "principle of power." And at the methodological center of this history, as in Said’s discussion of Orientalism, is discourse, that is, "the search for regularities in discursive formation.”

Following Foucault has its pitfalls too, of course. Foucault’s frame of reference remained by and large "Western culture," or the Western tradition, a fact which non-Western, postcolonial writers have been quick to point out. James Clifford has pointed out that Said shares the assumptions of "theorists of discontinuity and deconstruction such as Foucault and Derrida, [who] continue to set their analyses within and against a Western totality." Clifford attempts to rescue Said from this
predicament by describing, for example, as "relapses"
Said's tendency to use the same essentializing modes [which
he] attacks, and by arguing that Said's work does not so
much "undermine the notion of a substantial Orient as it
makes problematic 'the Occident.'" 99

But Said also diverges from Foucault, in a way
perhaps that makes him less "slippery" than Foucault, and
thereby easier to situate and also to criticize. This
divergence lies in Said's unmistakeable use of Marxist
methodology and ideas. Said, when detached from his
Foucauldian ideas, is saying that colonialism was the
material base on which Orientalism, the superstructure, was
constructed.

While historians are still cautiously debating the
merits and usefulness of post-Orientalist critiques,
sociologists and anthropologists have acknowledged more
readily the importance of the issues being raised. The
"problem of Orientalist perspectives" has become virtually
a standard methodological issue in many areas of
sociological inquiry. Part of the reason, of course, is
that these disciplines have traditionally had the "study of
the Other," especially the so-called non-modern, non-
Western Other, as their principal focus of study. But
historians cannot really claim that they do not have to
deal with this issue. Lila Abu-Lughod says with regard to
anthropology that while the "totalizing opposition" between
East and West is no longer current, other "dichotomies such as primitive/modern and black/white" are still salient.\textsuperscript{100} In the discipline of history, not only are dichotomies such as premodern-modern, sedentary-nomadic, literate-oral, traditional-progressive, and static-changing still key categories of analysis, but even the East-West divide is by and large intact in modern historiography. The profession remains neatly divided into scholars of Western societies and those of non-Western societies.

The "adversarial position" which Said explicitly espouses (but disclaims equally explicitly elsewhere) can, however, lead to the same essentializing tendency and the clear demarcation of boundaries which Said challenges.\textsuperscript{101} For Said, it is very clear who the adversary is: it is the West. In an essay on Rudyard Kipling's novel, \textit{Kim}, Said sees in the book above all the clash between the dominating West and the dominated East, the clash between "the British" and "the Indians."\textsuperscript{102} Every detail, every nuance in the book is seen as fitting this mold. Said is unwilling to grant any quarter to Kipling, principally, it would appear, because Kipling, like the novel's hero, is white and therefore "on the other side." There is no evidence here of Clifford's suggestion of Said making the Occident problematic. If Kipling, the supposedly imperial writer, saw the line clearly drawn between East and West, there is no attempt by Said, either, to blur it.
Said is also conspicuously silent on the fact that all through his severe condemnation of "the West" and its depiction of the East, he writes in a Western language for a largely Western audience. Said expresses few self-doubts about the nature of this exercise in the way, for example, another postcolonial writer, Salman Rushdie, does in his work. And in a more mechanical sense, Said hardly if ever refers to non-Western sources and authors in his work. The same is true of some other postcolonial writings, such as Gauri Viswanathan's *Masks of Conquest* and Sara Suleri's *The Rhetoric of English India*. This could, on one hand, be dismissed as a seemingly minor matter, since the object of these critiques is presumably to question the way in which the Orient has been constructed, rather than provide a "correct" picture as against the "wrong" picture constructed by Orientalism. But the West-centered insularity displayed in these works does provide support for the arguments of those who see the participants in this exercise as simply accomplices or "collaborators" in a global, capitalistic process.  

The postcolonial critique ranges itself against the "encroachments" of Western capital, or capitalism, as well as Western epistemology, or reason. Formal colonialism has been the most visible manifestation of this encroachment, and the first contestations of this phenomenon came, in fact, from non-Western nationalist-
Marxist scholars, long before the rise of the postcolonial school. Postcolonial criticism claims to differ, however, from this earlier strain of "adversarial" thought by trying to break free from the discourse of nationalism and modernity in which earlier anti-colonial writing was still presumably trapped. Being aware of discursive confines is certainly a first step toward developing one's own rules. But postcolonial thought, like its precursors, is also, I would argue, trapped or implicated in a Western discourse, this time not of modernity, but postmodernity.

A particularly fierce critique along these lines has come from Rosalind O'Hanlon and David Washbrook. The specific target of their attack is the position espoused by Gyan Prakash in the essay discussed earlier, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories." But the points they raise constitute, in effect, a broad criticism of both post-Orientalist and postcolonial scholarship. Prakash, in turn, has provided an equally vehement counter-refutation. Said has taken note of this debate, and feels that Prakash's approach, especially his "mobile poststructuralism," is the winner, as is the work of other postcolonial writers such as Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak and Ashish Nandy.

O'Hanlon and Washbrook, like Prakash, see Said as having provided a major part of the stimulus that led to the postcolonial critiques. But the problem, according to O'Hanlon and Washbrook, is that this starting point, which
has become a widely emulated model, is itself flawed and inconsistent. The inconsistencies result mainly, they argue, from Said’s reliance on postmodernist approaches and perspectives, which are seen as incompatible with the "conventional humanism" which Said professes, as well as with the emancipatory political agenda which Said also endorses. In response to this criticism, Said admits to the inconsistencies as well as the "residual humanism" in his approach, and offers no apologies. Orientalism, he writes, "is a partisan book, not a theoretical machine." Moreover, Said claims that he tried to preserve in his critique the "variability and unpredictability of Orientalism itself," as well as its ability to "move, anger, surprise, and even delight." It is for these reasons, he says, that he values the methodological flexibility of scholars such as Prakash more than the certitudes of "academics of a rigorous and unyielding stripe."

As for Prakash’s postcolonial perspective, O’Hanlon’s and Washbrook’s critique focuses on the claim to "post-foundationality." Capitalism and its emergence are viewed as the "foundation" of earlier historical writing by both colonial writers and the early nationalist-Marxist schools that wrote in reaction to colonial rule, as well as by later "well-meaning" exponents of development and modernization. O’Hanlon and Washbrook maintain that the
rejection of foundations, derived from the postmodernist work of Jacques Derrida, is not of much use in the "basic, inescapably active, and interventionist task of historical interpretation," and may even be an "intellectual cul-de-sac." Furthermore, they argue that simply writing about capitalism's development does not necessarily make one an accomplice in capitalist hegemony.\textsuperscript{112}

Arif Dirlik goes one step further and charges, with justification I believe, that postcolonial scholars are in fact collaborators in and beneficiaries of the global, liberal capitalist order. They have created the category of "postcolonial," he argues, in order to carve out a niche for themselves in a world that rewards those who develop new marketable "products," academic or otherwise. It can be argued that, even more than the "native collaborators" of the colonial era, the postcolonial school has yet to generate, as Dirlik puts it, "a thoroughgoing criticism of its own ideology and formulate practices of resistance against the system of which it is a product."\textsuperscript{113}

If the prerequisite for a successful attack on this system is, as Christopher Pinney suggests, "calling upon resources of power completely outside of the normalizing grid," Said and most postcolonial celebrities certainly do not meet the criterion. The example Pinney points to of such a source of power lying outside the system is the early twentieth-century Indian politician and thinker,
Mohandas Gandhi, who used non-violence as a successful political tool because it represented "a space of autonomy" which had not, at the time, been understood or "translated" by Western scholarship. Perhaps the outpouring of Western writing and discussion on Gandhi in the past few decades - which the 1983 film *Gandhi* brought to a heady climax for a global audience - represents precisely such an attempt, though a belated one, to master this space. But such speculation apart, it could indeed be said of Gandhi and his tactics that they lay outside the realm of colonial discourse. But this description does not apply, I believe, to the present wave of postcolonial critics who are so firmly planted within a Western, "hegemonic" space - the well-endowed Western university - that their critique borders on the very discourse of normalization which it attacks.

Gyan Prakash's reply to O'Hanlon and Washbrook is that their critique is yet another attempt to establish definitive "mastery" over a "space" that is necessarily ambivalent. It is possible, he argues, to combine postmodernist insights with a Marxist liberationist agenda, by using Marxism to "historicize the emergence of capitalism," and deconstruction to point to its origins as "a nineteenth-century European discourse that universalized the mode-of-production narrative." Prakash also seizes on a phrase O'Hanlon and Washbrook use about riding two horses
at the same time, one Marxist and the other poststructuralist. The metaphor, he says, is reminiscent of an actual episode in British India when Indian candidates for the civil service were disqualified on the grounds that they did not possess horse-riding skills. Pointing to "this lack in the Indian," according to Prakash, helped the British "[contain] the threat of the English-speaking Indian" and thus preserve the "binary structure of colonizer and colonized." The metaphor of the rider is thus worth pursuing, Prakash maintains, because "it illustrates what is at issue in the desire for mastery over ambivalence." But Prakash’s analogy is an ironic and unfortunate one. It points, for one, to the interest of the postcolonial school in language and theory, as though this is where the real battle for freedom from hegemony has to be fought. It is also a glaring illustration of Bipan Chandra’s comments about self-styled champions of the subaltern remaining tied to elitist evidence and modes of argumentation.

The history of the global spread of capitalism has also been challenged from another direction, namely by sociologists and political scientists of the world-systems school, led by Immanuel Wallerstein. But while this school – which is more avowedly Marxist than the poststructuralist group – documents the rise and spread of Western capitalist hegemony since the fifteenth century, it
remains, as David Washbrook argues, firmly rooted in the Western discourse or "sociology" of modernity. Put simply, the terms and categories of analysis have not changed, and perhaps not even the assumptions and conclusions. The teleology of Western history - in which the West leads and the rest follow, and perhaps ultimately reach the Western model - remains intact in world-systems theory. Washbrook correctly points out that "this is Orientalism all over again, albeit in an inverted form that is morally 'well-meant'." Critiques such as those stemming from world-system analysis and postcolonial theory - which see themselves in an adversarial or oppositional role to Western power - thus also perhaps contain within themselves the very tendencies they attack, rooted as they are in "the habits of Western humanism."

The "European Other" and Other "Orientalisms"

Said's critique of Orientalism, and of those who have followed his approach, is focused almost exclusively on the West's constructions of the East. Both the post-Orientalist and the postcolonial positions, which take the West as their adversary, ignore the possibility of their critiques being applied in reverse. They also do not look outside of the West-non-West encounter for possible instances of the construction of Otherness and the exercise of hegemonic power. This story of the dominance of the West and what it
has perpetrated, to the virtual exclusion of other areas of injustice, could very well be described, as Alok Bhalla does, as a "revenge history."¹²⁰ That by itself does not invalidate the postcolonial critiques. But it does draw them closer to the same category of politically-motivated or "tainted" scholarship which they denounce. Moreover, through their critical and unrelenting gaze on the entity called the West, they are perhaps creating as questionable a picture of their Other as Orientalists had drawn of the East. And indeed, going by scholarship in this area, postcolonial and post-Orientalist critiques have become sub-disciplines by themselves, to which phrases such as "discursive formation" or "a system for citing texts and authors" could just as easily be applied as it could to Orientalism.

Edward Graham, testing Said's hypotheses with respect to East Asia, has pointed almost mockingly to China's historical construction of the "barbarian Other" living outside the walls of Chinese civilization. The Chinese thus created "an imaginative geography [Said's phrase] of barbarian lands, a set of ideas which undercut the barbarians' sense of themselves, while it justified Chinese manipulation and exploitation. Graham concludes that Said's model of Orientalism is indeed applicable to the Chinese view of non-Western peoples."¹²¹ Although he hastens to add that this does not detract in any way from the validity of
Said's critique, it, in fact, does. Said's critique is fundamentally incompatible with extensions of his approach beyond the Western world. It is not simply, as Graham suggests, "a concept of "otherism" as a cultural artifact" applied to Western perceptions of Asia in the colonial era. The colonial setting and Western dominance are a vital element in his theory, and not merely examples of Otherness.

Tapan Raychaudhuri, while not attacking Said or the post-Orientalist critique as explicitly as Kopf, has produced arguments and evidence that are not in agreement with either postcolonial or post-Orientalist ideas. Raychaudhuri does not see the East-West colonial encounter of the last two centuries as dictated solely by Western hegemony and the imperatives of colonialism. In Europe Reconsidered, he examines the ideas of three nineteenth-century Indian thinkers about the European Other. While the colonial setting, Raychaudhuri admits, was clearly a factor shaping their ideas, these individuals were not totally subservient to their colonial masters. Neither were they a tabula rasa on which Europeans imprinted ideas as they wished. There was on the contrary, a deliberate and informed engagement with the West in which the Indians chose certain elements of European culture and rejected others. "Contact with the West and the experience of colonial rule," he has argued elsewhere, "are two
analytically separable categories." As for contact with the East, which was the case with Orientalists, Raychaudhuri writes that "the Orientalists did not see the civilizations of Asia exclusively as Europe's other, nor did they de-emphasize altogether the shared inheritance of mankind."\(^\text{123}\)

The investigation of Eastern perceptions or constructions of the West has come to be, wrongly, I believe, detached from the study of Orientalism or European views of Asian societies. Said devotes very little attention to this issue. Raychaudhuri, writing on Indian perceptions of Europe, almost apologizes for bringing in issues from "the debate on Orientalism."\(^\text{124}\) But, as Chaudhuri's work itself reveals, the two are intricately connected. Stephen Hay's work, in particular his *Asian Ideas of East and West*, and Stephen Tanaka's *Japan's Orient* are also interesting examples of the connections between Orientalism, as defined by Said's school, and cross-cultural "gazes" in other directions.\(^\text{125}\)

The Orientalist view of Asia as a "pre-modern" region steeped in mysticism and religion was an active ingredient in the process whereby Asians in the nineteenth century constructed their image of themselves as well as that of the West. Their views were a product of the East-West encounter, but were certainly not the result solely of political and economic subordination. One Indian thinker
after another, from Rammohun Roy in the early nineteenth century to Gandhi in the early twentieth, addressed the Orientalist construct of the modern, industrialized West versus the non-modernized but morally superior East. At times they rejected it, but at times they also seized it eagerly. Raychaudhuri points out that Indian social scientists like Dadabhai Naoroji and R. C. Dutt were interested more in the lack of modernization in India than in the "evil inherent in modern civilization." Gandhi, on the other hand, is the best known among those who viewed modern Western culture as materialistic and morally deficient. As an alternative, he offered the morally and physically "more healthful" lifestyle of unindustrialized, rural India. Another vocal champion of the same idea was Swami Vivekananda, who spoke at the World Conference of Religions in Chicago in 1893 and was transformed into a saintly hero of sorts by his denunciation of Western materialistic values and his message of spiritual salvation offered by Eastern civilizations.

The Brahmo Samaj, the reformist society established by Rammohun Roy (1774-1833), had a long history of grappling with this Orientalist construct. The Samaj (society) was in a sense very traditional, for example in its desire to reform Indian society through a return to the "pure" teachings of the original Hindu scriptures, the Vedas, although it was also in some respects very
unconventional and even Western in its ideas. Famous Brahmos (members of the Brahmo Samaj) such as Rammohun Roy and Keshub Chunder Sen, for all their admiration and emulation of "enlightened" European society, often resorted to the notion of an India that was spiritually superior to the West, perhaps as a defensive measure against the pressures of Westernization and colonial power. Orientalist scholarship, which glorified India's past and its "wisdom," provided these Indians with the means to construct an identity of which they could be proud, even under colonial subordination. David Kopf makes this point in *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*. But what Kopf sees as the positive effect of Orientalism, i.e., the sense of cultural pride which ultimately fostered a sense of nationhood, was also the consequence of accepting the Orientalist construction of India's past and its "glorious heritage."

It was thus the Orientalist picture of the Other, in this case of the non-materialistic, passive East, that served as the basis for the construction of the Hindu self. Since the emergence of "national pride" was, therefore, evidently a product of Europeans telling Indians - mainly Hindus, to be precise - what to be proud of, it is debatable whether this outcome was really as positive and beneficial as Kopf, Nirad Chaudhuri, and Kejariwal make it out to be.
Rabindranath Tagore, the Nobel laureate for literature in 1913, and a Brahmo, was another Indian thinker who strongly endorsed and wielded as an intellectual weapon the notion of a materialistic West and spiritual East. Stephen Hay has argued that Tagore and other Indian intellectuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries obtained this idea "directly from their English conquerors." As Asians in general, not just Indians, Hay argues, became familiar with Orientalist scholarship, "they came to think of themselves as being what the Westerners told them they were: "Eastern" and "Oriental." In India, in particular, the Orientalist constructions of East and West were not simply imposed on a colonized populace, but were an "expression of the symbiosis" between ruler and ruled that was "[articulated by intellectuals] on both sides of the partnership." 128 Said's approach does not admit of any such symbiosis or collaboration. For Said, Orientalism was a gaze in one direction only: the colonizer looking at the colonized, the oppressor looking at the oppressed. The absence in the post-Orientalist critique of any significant discussion of non-Western perceptions of the West is striking, and detracts significantly from its credibility.

Furthermore, Asian societies looked at other Asian societies as well, and not just at the West. Stephen Tanaka's Japan's Orient is an excellent study, for example, of the way Japan developed a picture of other Asian
societies, notably China, and used it, as Said's model would predict, to construct Japan's own history and further Japanese interests. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as Japan modernized, Westernized, and cut itself off from its Tokugawa past, Japanese intellectuals employed the ideas of toyo and shina to develop Japan's new identity. Toyo referred to the "eastern seas" or the Orient, while shina was the term used for China. These terms, while fairly nebulous and open to interpretation, were used to describe what Japan was supposedly not: Asiatic, backward, not modern. They signified Japan's difference vis-à-vis the Asian continent, which although the source of Japanese history and culture, now represented a place Japan was evolving away from or leaving behind to become Asia's only European nation. In keeping with this new-found identity, Japanese scholars even developed a discipline, toyoshi, which studied and evaluated the history of the East according to modern European criteria. It was, according to Tanaka, Japan's version of "Oriental Studies." It allowed the Japanese to establish themselves as "the authority on Asia," and at the same time "engage in a dialogue with the West," presumably as an equal. Tanaka sees a direct parallel between Japan's constructions of toyo, and the Orient of nineteenth-century European, especially German, Romantics. Just as with the Romantics and the Orient, the construction of toyo by
Japanese scholars, writes Tanaka, was "an attempt to extract from the past the datum for a positivistic history," or in other words, to find origins that would foster a sense of national identity.  

That the "Orientalist syndrome" was not restricted to the West also emerges from a study by Timothy Mitchell of Orientalist attitudes as seen at a world exhibition held in Paris in 1889. Interestingly enough, this is not Mitchell's main thesis, which is still within Said's theoretical territory of the hegemonic West and the subjugated, or in this case the "observed" East. Mitchell points to what he sees as the modern, Western trait of wanting to represent, in text, image, or otherwise, the reality of everything one encounters; nothing has been quite comprehended or mastered until it has been represented. Pursued to its logical extreme, this tendency ultimately pushes aside reality altogether and wishes to view the world solely through endless representations. This, Mitchell suggests, was part of the problem with Western Orientalism: the constructions of the Orient, such as those at the nineteenth-century French exposition Mitchell discusses, took center stage, while the Orient itself - the real Orient - remained a pale and pathetic imitation of this construction. This distinction between representation and reality corresponded, Mitchell argues, to the dichotomy of West and non-West, where the non-West "[lacked] the meaning and the
order which only colonialism," and presumably colonial representation, could bring.\textsuperscript{130}

Mitchell's conclusion from this discussion, however, leads into territory which he does not adequately explore, and which also calls into question some essential aspects of Said's critique. Orientalism, Mitchell concludes, "is not just a nineteenth-century instance of some general historical problem of how one culture portrays another, nor just an aspect of colonial domination";\textsuperscript{131} it is, rather, symptomatic of the condition of modernity itself. Modernity, of course, according to the post-Orientalist and postcolonial critiques, is primarily a Western condition; it is a corollary of the European Enlightenment, and requires that all humankind ultimately succumb, through political or intellectual suasion, to its self-evident logic.

There is, however, a certain inverted Orientalism in the position that only the West has attained a state of civilizational complexity, from which it "inflicts" scholarship and conquest on less advanced cultures. It is also a simplification to assume that only that which is recent is at a more advanced stage of development. If, following Marshall Hodgson, we consider urban, literate, and socially complex societies anywhere and at any time to be at an "advanced" level of civilization, then Orientalism occurs whenever any literate group writes about others,
whether in recent history or earlier. Graham's discussion of China is a case in point. Catherine Martin has argued that Herodotus, the ancient historian, did employ "discursive strategies [which would make him] the prototypical Western Orientalist." But all knowledge, she also points out, is based on the "observation of difference and its translation from the unknown idea to the known concept."\(^{133}\)

Michel de Certeau, in developing a definition of "ethnology," identifies orality, spatiality, alterity and unconsciousness as the attributes of a "primitive society" which set it apart from the modern observer or ethnographer whose constructions are marked by the opposite notions of writing, temporality, identity, and consciousness. De Certeau also argues that what separates the ethnographer from the historian is the former's interest in what is unwritten, or in "unconscious conditions of social life," while history seeks out "conscious expressions" that have been put down in writing.\(^{134}\)

Orientalists did not, as a rule, study "primitive societies" of the kind de Certeau has in mind. In fact, in many instances, they went to the written texts of a "high civilization." Interestingly though, they often did not credit the documents they studied with a consciousness or sense of history in the way, de Certeau argues, historians do with "the documents of Western activity."\(^{135}\)
The confrontation between the Orientalist and the Orient was probably never polarized in the way de Certeau constructs the modern-primitive divide. But the question remains - and it is one which has been raised frequently ever since the appearance of Said’s critique - whether the critique applies to any observer-observed situation, including but not restricted to those situations where the observer writes about the other. Said has consistently played down this issue, or has defended his omission of other "Orientalisms" and "colonialisms." Said hardly discusses, for example, Chinese, Ottoman, or Japanese imperialism. Amal Rassam, while not condemning Said’s theories, has wondered whether Said’s belief in the ubiquitousness of imperialism, racism, and ethnocentrism among "all advanced cultures" in their dealings with "other" cultures is consistent with his singling out of Europe’s failure to rise above this tendency. The unintended implication is that the West should be judged by its own achievements and standards which are, by this line of reasoning, superior to others. Catherine Martin has also accused Said of "reifying" the West and Western Orientalism by virtually ignoring all examples, outside of the West, in his "history of domination."
Conclusion to Chapter

As we can see from the above discussion, the field of poscolonial and post-Orientalist studies has become a highly contentious one. It is clear from the examples we have discussed that the post-Orientalist critique has, in fact, become more than just a criticism of eighteenth- or nineteenth-century Western writings about the Middle East or the Orient. It is now virtually a critique of all Western writings and ideas on the non-Western world, regardless of academic discipline or regional focus. It is a new paradigm for non-Western scholars in the humanities, one which has virtually generated a new field or discipline in its own right.

Given this shape the critique of Orientalism has acquired, it is also not surprising that it has polarized the field of "non-Western studies" in the West, or in Western-style academies around the world. Judging by the existing scholarship, Western writers are by and large annoyed by and opposed to the critique, while non-Western scholars regard this new paradigm as a means of finally "talking back" to the "hegemon." As the overlap of the anti-Orientalist and the postcolonial critiques suggests, this polarized intellectual landscape, where Western and non-Western scholars are ranged against each other, has a lot to do with the global political landscape since the end of colonialism.
The dismantling of colonialism began after the Second World War and completed its course by the sixties. The former colonies have, therefore, been free from formal Western domination for several decades now. The postcolonial critique thus represents a maturing or a coming of age of formerly colonized voices, as well as, in part, a transition to a new generation of scholars. These voices are now speaking freely and with newly-gained confidence, and it is not surprising that what they are saying sounds "shrill" to "mature" Western ears.

On the other hand, it can also be argued that the post-colonial critique - using the term to include the post-Orientalist critique, as well - is a sign of dissatisfaction with the manner in which the process of political and intellectual decolonization has unfolded over the last few decades. The postcolonial critique is, in this sense, an expression of desperation against the fact that the end of colonialism has given way to the neo-colonial age in which Western hegemony is still a fact of life. It is also an expression of disappointment with the failure of postcolonial regimes to "deliver," that is, to achieve a satisfactory level of physical and moral well-being at home and some semblance of economic and intellectual parity with the West. Postcolonial criticism is, in this respect, not entirely different from "colonial criticism," in which the
colonizer was seen as the cause of internal distress and external disparity.

There is, however, yet another twist to this story. The problem with postcolonial criticism and critics, Said included, is that it is being generated largely by Western-trained intellectuals writing and speaking to a Western or Western-trained audience. Postcolonial criticism is therefore, in a very essential sense, precisely that which it attacks, namely, a discourse in which the parameters are derived from the West. The charge could therefore be levelled that postcolonial criticism, far from representing the voices of the suppressed, really represents the voices of the elite talking to each other. To the extent this is true, there is a parallel in this present study: the Orientalists I discuss, irrespective of whether they criticized or admired Indians, were firmly embedded in a dialogue with the Indian elite, especially upper-caste Hindus. As I show in this project, Orientalism, or Indology, was by its very definition and methodology a discourse confined to the elite. The same could well apply to a critique of it, as well.
NOTES


3. See pages 19-21 below.


5. Stephen Hay has discussed, for example, the ideas of the early twentieth century Indian intellectuals, Benoy Sarkar and M. N. Roy, both of whom were critical of the romanticized image of a spiritual, morally elevated, but also passive India, as against the materialistic and progress-minded West. This picture may have been developed first by European Orientalists, but many Indians accepted and propagated it too. Sarkar and Roy were reacting, in fact, mainly to the ideas of Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941), the Indian poet and writer. See Stephen Hay, Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and his Critics in Japan, China, and India (Harvard University Press, 1970), 259-263.


7. Ibid., 25.

8. Ibid., 3, 20, 95.

9. A non-academic, but very illustrative example is the current Disney version of the story of Aladdin. The book conjures up an Orient that is about as exotic as it can be, with chaotic bazaars, monkeys, scheming, bearded, dark-skinned merchants, magic carpets, a villain named "Jafar," a hero with distinctly European features albeit clad in Eastern clothes, and a social and political structure that is marked by arbitrary and autocratic decision-making. The Walt Disney Company, Disney's Aladdin (Racine, Wis.: Western Publishing Company, 1992).


12. See pages 24-35 below.

13. "There is a beauty of a peculiar kind in women," Hegel wrote, "a beauty of enervation," which is to be seen, for example, in women after childbirth, or during "a magical, somnabulic sleep." The skin has a "light and lovely roseate hue" and the "features, the light of the eye, the position of the mouth, appear soft, yielding, and relaxed. . . . Such a beauty we find also in its loveliest form in the Indian world." But this beauty, he adds, attractive as it may seem at first glance, does not stand up to the light of "Human Dignity and Freedom." G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, trans. J. Sibree (Colonial Press, 1899; repr., New York: Dover Publications, 1956), 140, 142.


15. Ibid., 28-29, 41.


17. Ibid., 318.


19. See pages 61-63 below.


24. Burke, xv.


36. Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 5. See also Stuart Jay Harten’s discussion of the place of the Orient in the world-historical narrative of Hegel according to which the Occident developed from Eastern origins but transcended them, or left them behind, in the course of its own distinctive historical evolution; in "Raising the Veil of History: Orientalism, Classicism, and the Birth of Western
Civilization in Hegel's Berlin Lecture Courses of the 1820's" (Ph. D. diss., Cornell University, 1985).


38. Ibid., 88, 97-98.


40. Ibid., 322-23, 17.

41. Ibid., 244.


46. See Gauri Viswanathan, *Masks of Conquest* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). While the specific focus of Viswanathan's argument is somewhat different from Said's, she arrives at conclusions that are very similar. Said, in *Culture and Imperialism*, points to Viswanathan's work as being in agreement with his own position.


48. See "The Post-modern Condition: The End of Politics?" in Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, *The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues*, ed. Sarah Harasym (New York: Routledge, 1990), 17-34. Spivak argues that the value of a post-modern perspective is that it makes traditional texts and interpretations problematic, by pointing to vulnerabilities rather than certainties, and to "the other side of individuals" rather than collectivities. The poststructural enterprise, she also argues, is intimately linked to getting closer to the margin, and to "unlearning privilege"(27-28, 30).
49. See pages 56-57 below.

50. For Said, unlike Foucault, the imprint of individual authors does count (Orientalism, 3, 23), a point which critics of Said have been quick to point out. See, for example, Hartmut Fahndreich, "Orientalismus und Orientalismus: Ueberlegungen zu Edward Said, Michel Foucault und westlichen 'Islamstudien'," [Orientalism and Orientalism: Reflections on Edward Said, Michel Foucault, and "Islamic Studies" in the West] Die Welt des Islams (Netherlands) 28 (1988): 178-186.

51. See Paul Rabinow, "Representations are Social Facts," in Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography, ed. James Clifford and George E. Marcus (University of California Press, 1986), 236-241, for a discussion of Foucault's ideas on discursive formations, and on the relationship between knowledge and power. Rabinow quotes Foucault as positing that "a proposition must fulfill some onerous and complex conditions before it can be admitted within a discipline,"(238) and that "truth is to be understood as a system of ordered procedures for the production, regulation, distribution, circulation and operation of statements. Truth is linked in a circular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it"(240).


56. Ibid., 146-47, 144.


59. Ibid., 44-45, 64-79, and passim.


65. Ibid., 514, 516.

66. Ibid., 514-15.


70. See Nicholas Dirks, "Castes of Mind," Representations 37 (Winter 1992): 56-78, for a summary of this debate.


78. Ibid., 20-21. Kopf describes V. S. Naipaul as an "incredibly gifted Indian writer of English who was born in Trinidad, but actually spent most of his life in London, [and] has never been able to transcend a love-hate relationship with an India which he only visited for the first time a few years ago.

"Then there is Salman Rushdie, another Indian with a superb mastery over English but a total lack of self-control over his identity conflicts, every twist and turn of which are expressed in fictional style of shameless power that may provide therapy for the author but arouses homicidal rage among the true believers."


80. In the 1830s, the British East India Company reversed its policy of promoting Orientalist scholarship and education in India, and launched a program of "Anglicization." Macaulay's Minute on Education of 1835 is usually seen as the key statement of ideas on this issue. The policy of Anglicization, Macaulay noted, would help the
British administer their empire better by having at their disposal an educated class of natives who would act as loyal intermediaries between the British and the natives of India. See any standard history of India such as Stanley Wolpert’s *A New History of India* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989).


84. Willson, 240.

85. Ibid., 242.

86. Schwab, 16.

87. Ibid., 482.


90. Ibid., 102, 131-132.


92. Ibid., chap. 1 passim.

94. Ibid., 195-197; Asma Agzenay also criticizes the totalizing tendencies in Said's approach, in "Theoretical Approaches to the 'Other' of Europe: Between Fact and Fiction" (Ph. D. diss., University of Nottingham, England, 1989).


97. Ibid., 31, 35, 36.

98. Aijaz Ahmad, 145-146.


101. He espouses it in *Culture and Imperialism* (1993) and disclaims it in his 1995 "Afterword" on *Orientalism*.


   This word: "shame." No, I must write it in its original form, not in this peculiar language tainted by wrong concepts and the accumulated detritus of its owners' unrepented past, this Angrezi (English) in which I am forced to write, and so for ever alter what is written....

104. See page 63 below.

105. Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986); Chatterjee argues that "derivative nationalism" in the Third World has been unable to resist the twin assault of reason and capital in the guise of modernization.


108. Said, "An Afterword," 45; O’Hanlon and Washbrook also criticize James Clifford and postmodernist anthropology which they see as shaped by the *Orientalism* paradigm.

109. O’Hanlon and Washbrook, 155-158.

110. Ibid., 156.


112. O’Hanlon and Washbrook, 144-146.


118. Ibid., 492, 501.


124. Ibid., 161.


126. Raychaudhuri, "Europe in India's Xenology," 180; Richard Attenborough's film *Gandhi* (1983) also eulogizes this idealized contrast between East and West.


131. Ibid., 314.


135. Ibid., 210. This is evident, in varying degrees, in the ideas of the Orientalists I focus on here, Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe.

137. Martin, 526. In an essay on "Yeats and Decolonization," for example, Said maintains that Western imperialism has been qualitatively different from all others in history; in Terry Eagleton, Frederic Jameson, and Edward Said, Nationalism, Colonialism, and Literature (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1990), 69-95.
CHAPTER III

GERMAN ORIENTALISM

German Orientalism, Romanticism, and the Post-Orientalist Debate

German Orientalism has, on the whole, not been subjected to the same scathing criticism which Said and others have directed at British, American, and French Orientalism. Said's critique has, however, influenced this area, at least by provoking studies which test his hypotheses with regard to German Orientalism, although the volume of scholarship is sparse compared to work on other countries. In Orientalism, Said does point to his omission of German Orientalism as a problem in the study, but justifies this by arguing that it was not as significant as British or French Orientalism, in terms of scholarly achievement, as well as in its connections with colonialism. At the same time, he notes that German Orientalism shared with Anglo-French and later American Orientalism "a kind of intellectual authority over the Orient within Western culture." I have discussed earlier
why this omission of German Orientalism is more serious than Said claims it is.¹

Most studies so far on German Orientalism tend to conclude that Said’s thesis of scholarship serving and being intimately tied to political hegemony needs to be modified in the German case. The present study draws similar conclusions. Some scholars even reject Said’s thesis altogether. This is not surprising, since Germany was not long a major colonial power, although it is important to note that it did not lack ambition in this regard and that it even succeeded in establishing a limited but strong colonial presence in Asia and Africa.² Despite this overall cautious stance toward Said’s thesis, however, it must be acknowledged that even the studies which partly or completely reject his conclusions are profoundly influenced by his method. It would seem as though there is no escaping the issues Said has raised, even if one is of the opinion that he is wrong.

We should note here that colonialism is not, even in Said’s critique, the sole component of the historical context in which Orientalism is situated. The other important dimension, one which is seemingly less invidious than colonial expansion, is European Romanticism.³ In Germany, the origins of Romanticism are inseparable from the figure of Herder, who, as we have seen, is also inseparable from the origins of German Orientalism.
Herder's ideas were, to a large extent, a reaction against the rationalistic philosophy of Immanuel Kant, Herder's former teacher, and the principal figure of the German Enlightenment. The Romantic revolution which Herder set in motion valued the local as opposed to the universal, faith - primarily Christian - as opposed to reason, and tradition and the past over progress and the future. The French Revolution and its decisive break with tradition and continuity, and the spread, or imposition, of rational, enlightened principles and codes in Germany via the expansion of Napoleonic France, provided further impetus to Germans to rebel against reason and the Enlightenment. It is not my intention here to spell out all the details of the origins and development of German Romanticism, especially in what I would call its "intra-European" form. This history has been told in countless works.

But an understanding of the basic tenets of Romanticism is essential to any discussion of Orientalism, or Indology, and Romanticism thus figures prominently in Said's book Orientalism, as well. The defining principles or characteristics of the Romantic position that I deem most useful for my present discussion are those to which Raymond Schwab points in his work. I thus follow Schwab, and to a certain extent, Said, in viewing Romanticism not as a broader category in which Orientalism can be subsumed, but as Orientalism itself (see the discussion on Schwab on
Romanticism and Orientalism, in this view, are one and the same thing. They represent, in this form, the "extra-European" face of Romanticism, but one that is no less critical to an understanding of it than its purely "internal" European form.

Orientalists and Indologists shared with other Romantics the love of the local, the exotic, and the unique. They also imbibed from the Romantic movement the urge to find origins, and the view that languages and societies - the two are intimately related in the Romantic perspective - grow in an organic fashion, like plants and other living organisms. A corollary of this, one which was subscribed to by some Orientalists (such as Wilhelm von Humboldt), was that "better" languages and societies would evolve more organically than "inferior" ones. Orientalists also shared the inconsistencies and inherent contradictions of the Romantic position. They thus wished to admire and preserve local diversity, while striving at the same time to find a global unity, or a common humanity, that would reconcile disparate cultures and histories. To close this discussion of Romanticism, I would argue that the ideas, attitudes, and actions of the Indologists I examine in the following chapters are not simply examples or illustrations of the broader phenomenon of Romanticism, but, rather, constitute Romanticism itself.
There is a clear difference in the style and tone of argumentation between pre-Orientalism and post-Orientalism studies of German perceptions of the Orient, with the history of European Romanticism, rather than the current debate on Orientalism, providing, I would argue, the parameters for discussion in the earlier works.

A. Leslie Willson's work, discussed earlier, is a good example of such pre-Orientalism scholarship. It should be said, to Willson's credit, that he does acknowledge the role the Orient played in the construction of the European self, although in language quite different from that of recent critiques. Further removed than Willson's work from later postcolonial scholarship are Walther Leifer's *India and the Germans* and *Bombay and the Germans*. Though admittedly not very analytical, consisting as it does mainly of a chronological survey of influences in both directions, Leifer's work is clearly influenced by a tradition, going back to the Romantics, of presenting the "Indo-German connection" in a glowing light. Leifer attempts to list virtually all Indo-German contacts since the European Middle Ages and presents them all as examples of a rich bond between the two countries.

Vridagiri Ganeshan's book-length studies *Das Indienerlebnis Hermann Hesses* and *Das Indienbild deutscher Dichter um 1900* were published in 1974 and 1975, only a few years before the appearance of *Orientalism*. There is no
reference to Said in either one of these works and little indication of the storm that was about to burst over this entire area of study. Jean Sedlar’s India in the Mind of Germany is another work that skirts the Orientalism controversy altogether, although it was published in 1982. Admittedly, Sedlar focuses on F. W. J. Schelling (1775-1854) and Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860), and elements which their philosophies and Indian thought have in common. While she does begin her work with a history of European images of India and of Orientalist scholarship in particular, nowhere in this history is there any discussion of possible connections between scholarship and political power in the manner of Said and later scholars. This, of course, does not render the work less insightful or significant. In fact, Sedlar’s work is proof, as is Ganeshan’s, that solid contributions can be made in this field without taking the poststructuralist or postcolonial route. While Ganeshan does discuss the social and political contexts in which the German authors worked, her discussion and conclusions are "gentle" compared to later work.

Ganeshan’s investigation of Hesse and India was carried out in the middle of the Hesse wave in the West in the 1970s, especially among the younger generation who sought alternatives to the technocratic, affluent world of the postwar period. But this Euro-centered "motive" does not, in Ganeshan’s analysis, discredit or tarnish Hesse
himself. Ganeshan's evaluation of Hesse and his "use" of India remains a very positive and even approving one, and she draws a parallel between Hesse's and the modern Indian thinker S. Radhakrishnan's suspicion of modern industrial prosperity and their emphasis on a shared humanity between East and West. Ganeshan does not seriously question the spiritual East - materialistic West construct to which Hesse (and Radhakrishnan) subscribed, a notion that originated in Western Orientalism and was accepted and propagated, as we have seen above, by subsequent generations of both Europeans and Asians. In her second work, on German poets and India around the turn of the century, Ganeshan also describes the encounter as a positive and fruitful one, testifying to the greatness and maturity of both Indian culture and the Germans who "learned" from it.

It is an interesting commentary on studies of German Orientalism on India, or Indology, that even relatively recent works such as Ganeshan's contained virtually no discussion of questions of power or politics in scholarship. Viewed differently, it is also proof of the overwhelming strength of the scholarly tradition, or construct, of alleged Indo-German linguistic and cultural affinity, to the point where even studies of that tradition become part of that tradition itself.
It is appropriate to mention here that my own involvement with Germany and the German language is also partly the product of this German-Indian tradition, since it was through the support and seemingly limitless funds of the German government (through its cultural wing, the Goethe Institut, which is especially active in India), that I learned the German language. The present study, while at first glance a continuation of the scholarly intercourse between India and Germany, is also an attempt to step outside this tradition, and examine it from a critical and non-romantic perspective.

Since Said's Orientalism, it has become standard practice to examine various areas of Western intellectual endeavor using Said's criteria, and German writings on the Orient in general - not just on India - have experienced their share of such examinations. Some of these studies, for example Rolf Goebel's work on China in the German imagination, follow Said closely, including his conclusions. Goebel states unequivocally that the term "orientalism" in his work "denotes the network of knowledge, power, and writing by which China has for centuries been conceptualized, represented, appreciated, and criticized" in Western literature and scholarship. Donna Heizer has investigated how German Jewish authors in the early twentieth century wrote about, or used, the
Muslim Orient, partly as a means of defining for themselves their identity as "Westerners," although Jews were often not seen as such by the majority culture within the West. In general, however, the emotion and anger that characterizes, for example, much of the work on Orientalism with regard to Islamic or Arab countries is absent in critiques of German Orientalism.

Andrea Fuchs-Sumiyoshi has argued, for example, that Said's accusation that Orientalism constructed a West and an East (including the Islamic East) that were fundamentally opposed and hostile to each other simply does not hold for representations of the Orient in German literature, at least not in the authors and works she examines. Fuchs-Sumiyoshi's arguments, in Orientalismus in der deutschen Literatur [Orientalism in German Literature], are in fact quite similar to Ganeshan's: Herder and Goethe did not see the Orient as a threatening, inferior, or even different Other, but as parts of a common humanity, or a humanism that would be built on both Eastern and Western foundations. Goethe, she notes, went so far as to write that if "Islam" means surrendering to God, then "we all live and die in Islam." The same attitudes toward the Orient, Fuchs-Sumiyoshi argues, can be read in the works of more modern writers such as Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Thomas Mann: the theme of the Orient as an equal
intellectual partner in a dialogue resulting in a union, not separation, of East and West.¹¹

Said’s notion of Orientalism, Fuchs-Sumiyoshi believes, needs redefinition in the area of German literary constructions of the Orient. As for Said’s remarks on an "intellectual authority" over the Orient that was common to all Western "Orientalism," Fuchs-Sumiyoshi maintains that the idea is so broad as to lack all analytical power, especially if "Orientalism" is meant to refer to anything written about the Orient by Westerners for a Western audience, simply because it is written from the outside.¹² The attitudes of the Orientalists I study here seem, however, to support Said’s observation. Intellectual authority of the Orient is clearly discernible in their ideas, and, in fact, in the absence of strong political or economic authority - although these are not absent either - it is their intellectual confidence that typifies their relationship with the Orient and Orientals.

Christiane Guenther, in a work that is clearly influenced in its approach by recent studies of Orientalism, arrives at conclusions that are surprisingly similar to those of Fuchs-Sumiyoshi and Ganeshan.¹³ The writings of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German authors she examines remind us, she argues, of the fact that the West needs the East, especially its non-material aspects, and that West and East have to work
together in an interdependent world. The weight and
durability of the German Romantic tradition is again
clearly evident here: there is no trenchant adversarialism,
and "harmony" rather than antipathy prevails.

Ludwig Ammann and Christiane Pfeifer also reach
conclusions that are different from Said's, but as not as
radically as those of Fuchs-Sumiyoshi. In Oestliche Spiegel
[Eastern Mirrors], a survey of German ideas on the East as
reflected in various genres of writing from 1800 to 1850,
Ammann finds that German perceptions were not dominated by
ethnocentricism or hostility toward the Orient, although
these attitudes were certainly present. A fascination
with what were seen as the civilized elements of the
Orient, or the elements worthy of emulation, also
characterized these ideas. Ammann, like Ulrich Erker-
Sonnabend in another essay on German travelogues from the
East in the late nineteenth century, finds German
perceptions of the East during this period marked above all
by ambivalence: admiration and repulsion, for example, were
to be found side by side. While this is not a
particularly complex insight, it is not as blatantly
condemnatory of the European observer as other critiques.

In the end, Ammann argues, the sum of these divergent
and ambivalent attitudes says more about oneself and one's
own society than about the other. But this observation, he
adds, as well as the statement that images of the Other
tend to be ethnocentric, are not "sensational discoveries" made by anti-Orientalists, literary critics, or ethnologists, but rather a "hermeneutic truism." Ammann also finds, not surprisingly, little explicit connection between the German image of the Orient and German colonialism. He does concede, though, that negative evaluations of the modern condition of Oriental society might have made it easier to embark on and justify colonizing adventures, whether by Germany or other European nations. The present study presents ample evidence of such negative evaluations by German Orientalists.

Interestingly enough, both Amman and Guenther, after their discussions of the East-West symbiosis, appear to assert their faith in the greater strength of the Western tradition, much in the manner of earlier Orientalists. Guenther ascribes the meeting of East and West primarily to the openness of the West to new influences, which in turn she sees as the result of the Enlightenment. Guenther also subscribes to a perspective that was formerly aptly called Romantic, and could today be called a Western left-liberal position, or perhaps, in Germany, the "green" perspective: the idea of the East or the non-West as more pure than the West, and the desire to protect this pristine East from the encroachments of the West, in part so that Westerners can continue to find a place of refuge away from the spiritual and material pollution of the West. Ammann, after his
analysis of German writings on the Orient, notes that what these authors discovered for themselves was above all the fundamental divide between Eastern and Western civilizations, with modernity and its manifestations residing clearly in the West.\textsuperscript{18}

Christiane Pfeifer, in her study of the poet Heinrich Heine (1797-1856) and the Islamic Orient, finds some evidence of constructions of an Orient opposed to the West in its values and societal characteristics. Heine, she finds, admired a mythical Orient, while looking down on the "despotism" and "backwardness" of the real contemporary East. But in some respects, Heine's picture went against the stereotype. He did not, according to Pfeifer, see the East as "unchanging," nor did he see it as a threat. Her conclusions are therefore more nuanced than Said's. What Pfeifer sees above all in Heine's depictions of the Orient is a gendered construction of the Other. The Orient, she argues, was seen as embodying not the cultural opposite of the West, but rather the antithesis of male values: the Orient was beautiful and sensual, as well as passive, modest, and childlike. Perceptions such as these, Pfeifer argues, were responsible in part for Heine's virtual silence on European, especially French, colonizing expeditions into Islamic North Africa.\textsuperscript{19}
German Colonialism: An Overview

While Germany was never a colonial power on the scale of England, France, or Holland, it had by the late nineteenth century made several moves in this direction. In East Asia, Germany had joined the club of Western powers that had entered into "unequal treaties" with China. These treaties provided trading privileges on very favorable terms, as well as the main legal concession extracted by all Western nations, namely, "extraterritoriality" for their citizens in all legal proceedings. Citizens of Western nations could thus be tried only by the courts of their own countries. To extract these rights, German warships were dispatched on several occasions to the coastal waters of China as "shows of force." By the early twentieth century, Germany had established a colonial stronghold in the province of Shandong in China, as well as in several islands of the Pacific. Germany had to cede these possessions, mainly to Japan, in the wake of its defeat in the First World War.

The so-called "scramble for Africa" in the nineteenth century received its official confirmation, in a sense, at the famous Berlin Conference of 1885, where sub-Saharan Africa was carved up by the European powers. The Bismarckian establishment, which helped convene this meeting, was by this time making no secret of Germany's commitment to becoming a colonial power in the manner of
other European nations. This was partly to derive benefits from trade, but it was also, very importantly, a political tool to amplify nationalistic sentiments and thereby divert attention from domestic social problems.

The continent of Africa was where Germany developed its most extensive and sustained colonial holdings. These were mainly in Southwest Africa (Namibia), Togo, Cameroon, East Africa, and to a limited extent in Morocco. Whether Germany derived significant economic benefits from these colonies is not entirely clear. It is certain, though, that Germans shared the prevailing European attitudes of the time regarding race and the preordained superiority of the white nations, perhaps to an even greater degree than other Europeans. Laws prohibiting miscegenation were in place in Southwest Africa and Samoa, for example, by the early twentieth century. The legacy of such laws and the ideas which gave rise to them remained highly visible in Namibia until very recently.²¹

Lewis Pyenson has argued that Germany's conventional colonial forays in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were accompanied by cultural and scientific imperialism in the form of German scholars and scientists fanning out to regions such as Argentina, Samoa, China, and Japan. These scholars saw themselves, according to Pyenson, as "bearers of civilization [who would] communicate a correct vision of nature's laws." German scientists
overseas, Pyenson believes, did not directly generate economic profits for Germany, but contributed instead to "imperialist prestige" among "rival imperial capitals" as well as among the locals who saw the activities of these scholars as impressive manifestations of European power.²²

My present study examines whether a similar argument could be made for the German Indologists in question. While there are obvious differences between the activities of scientists and philologists, my study suggests that an imperial "aura" of power and authority did surround even these private scholars of Indian culture. But this aura, while it certainly added to Germany's prestige in the colonial context, was more a projection than a cause of growing European power, a phenomenon in which Germany was as much a participant as other European nations.

German Orientalism and India

German Indologists, i.e., Orientalists who studied Indian culture and philosophy, were motivated in their researches to a large extent by the linguistic and racial affinity which they believed to exist among the nations of the "Indo-European" or "Indo-Germanic" ethno-linguistic family. This family included, among others, the peoples of northern Europe, Persia, and India, and was frequently contrasted by Indologists with the "Semitic family of
nations." While this Indo-European structure did not directly manifest itself in all their works, it was a constant underlying current in German Orientalists' work on India. Through their study of India and Iran, these German scholars - who were all strongly influenced by the Romantic tradition in Germany - sought to unearth the "childhood" of the Indo-European family, and thereby establish their own cultural lineage.

The principal methodological tool in this process was the discipline of philology, that is, the study of language as a means to understanding culture, history, and society. Philology was at the core of Indology in Germany. It was through the study of language that Indologists sought to derive the character and traits of Indo-European societies. Philology was also central to German scholarship in the humanities, as a whole, in the nineteenth century, culminating in the figure of the philologist-philosopher, Nietzsche. Philological science in nineteenth-century Germany was, as Joan DeJean has observed, "an intellectual totality, a world unto itself that at the same time gave access to the essence of nations." 

Friedrich Schlegel, for example, who admired intensely what he considered to be the Indo-European societies of Asia, considered the ancient Indian language, Sanskrit, to be the mother, or root, of all Indo-European languages. Schlegel used this premise to identify several
parallels between Germany and the Indo-European societies of the East, mainly Persia and India. He contrasted this entire "family" of nations with those of the Semitic group whose languages and cultural traits, he argued, were entirely different from those of Indo-Europeans.

Franz Bopp (1791-1867), a pioneer in comparative linguistics, set up a hierarchy among societies based on how close their languages were to "the perfect language," Sanskrit. Among the closest, he claimed, were "Greek and Latin among the ancient languages, the Germanic dialects among the languages of modern Europe, and Persian among the Asian languages." The distinctiveness of this language family - which was, by implication, an ethnic family, as well - from all others was a pivotal element in Bopp's work and ideas. "The true nature of Sanskrit and related languages," he argued, "can be seen most clearly by contrasting them with the roots of the Semitic languages." Bopp was a professor of linguistics at the University of Berlin, where he was a contemporary and friend of Hegel, who taught philosophy at the same university from 1818 to 1831.

This alleged affinity among Indo-European societies was, of course, not a German discovery. William Jones, the British Orientalist, is usually credited with having made the first pronouncement on this issue, although he too had not made a radical and unexpected discovery. Edgar Polomé
Ill has pointed out, for example, that Jones' contribution of "bringing Sanskrit into the context of a developing historical and comparative framework to language study" was the logical outcome of the work done by numerous scholars before him, especially on the Continent. As early as the 1580s, Filippo Sassetti, who travelled to India, listed words that were common to Sanskrit and Italian. And in 1686, Andreas Jaeger, a Swedish scholar, posited the existence of a Caucasian mother tongue from which the Germanic languages of Europe, as well as Persian, were derived. Particularly helpful to Jones' later achievements, Polomé argues, was the "fundamental work done in the eighteenth century in the field of Celtic and Germanic studies." William Jones' contribution was really to confirm these suspicions by placing the "missing link," namely Sanskrit, in the puzzle.27 Once this was done, the concept of "Indo-European" emerged and became part of the received linguistic and anthropological wisdom of the nineteenth century.

In 1823, the German philologist Heinrich Klaproth (1783-1835) injected yet another term and idea into this field, namely, "Indo-Germanic," a term that was meant to signify the special connection which Germans, more than the other nations of Europe, supposedly had with the Indo-European past and heritage.28 Interest in, and work on
this alleged Indo-German connection took, I would argue, two different but related forms in Germany.

The first was a broadly-diffused interest in the supposed linguistic and racial links between Germany and India (and also Iran). Several German thinkers and writers in the nineteenth, as well as the twentieth century, while not professional scholars of India, took a keen interest in Indian philosophy and culture. Their ideas consequently reveal strong influences from Indian thought. Two prominent Germans in this category were Arthur Schopenhauer (1788-1860) in the mid-nineteenth century and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) in the late nineteenth.

While Schopenhauer never became a full-time Orientalist, he read extensively in the Hindu and Buddhist scriptures. The centrality of metaphysics in Schopenhauer’s work, that is, the desire to transcend the world of the senses and arrive at higher, eternal truths received strong confirmation and support from Indian philosophy, which Schopenhauer, following the ideas of his fellow German scholars of the time, saw as a creation of the Indo-European mind. In line with this theory, Schopenhauer also believed that all the insights of Western philosophy had already been anticipated and developed in Asia, particularly India. Nietzsche, while even less of an India-expert than Schopenhauer, was also strongly influenced by Indian and Asian ideas, not least through the many
Indologists who were among his close acquaintances and friends. Nietzsche's contemporary and friend Richard Wagner (1813-1883), the composer, and extoller of Germanic values, was also thoroughly exposed to this sustained German interest in India and Indo-European theories. Nietzsche met Wagner for the first time at the home of an Indologist, F. Brockhaus, who was Wagner's brother-in-law. The meeting was arranged by another Indologist, E. Windisch, a friend of Nietzsche. And, as I discuss in chapter Five below, Nietzsche's closest friend, from his school-days until the very end of his life, was the Indologist Paul Deussen. In the twentieth century, this German fascination with India found a global audience through the works of the novelist Hermann Hesse.

The other current of German interest in India was constituted by the professional discipline of Indology, which grew on the foundations laid by, among others, the Schlegels, Franz Bopp, Othmar Frank (1770-1840), and Christian Lassen (1800-1876). Early German Indologists worked closely with other European, especially French Orientalists, among them the famous Eugene Burnouf (1801-1852). Indology, we should also note, was descended directly from the early non-professional Romantic dabblers. For example, Friedrich Maier, one of the first professional Indologists, was a student of Herder. Maier's translations of Indian texts such as the Gita were published in the
Asiatisches Magazin [Asian Journal], a periodical which Heinrich Klaproth issued from the Mecca of German Romanticism, Weimar. Indology, as Raymond Schwab has noted, was thus very close, from the start, to the German Romantic movement.  

By the mid-nineteenth century, Indology was a firmly established academic discipline in Germany. The Deutsche Morgeländische Gesellschaft (German Oriental Society) was founded in 1845, and began publishing shortly thereafter a journal, the Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft (Journal of the German Oriental Society). Hermann Brockhaus, a professional Sanskritist, was among its principal founder-editors. Both the society and its journal have, with some short breaks, continued to occupy an important place in Orientalist scholarship in Germany until the present day. By the late nineteenth century, numerous universities in Germany had professorships in Indology. Another important journal, the Indogermanische Forschungen (Indo-German Researches), was founded in 1892. 

The three Indologists I discuss in this study, Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe, were not only well-known and leading figures in this field, but were also direct intellectual heirs of the pioneers of the discipline. They were thus, in a sense, bearers of the original and mainstream traditions of Indology. Max Mueller had studied
under the German scholars Bopp, Brockhaus, and Lassen, as well as with Burnouf in Paris. Deussen also learned his Sanskrit from Lassen, while Garbe had been a student of Rudolf Roth at the University of Tübingen. Roth, who had studied under Burnouf in France, had published a history of the Vedas in 1846, and completed in 1875 a seven-volume dictionary of Sanskrit. On Roth’s death in 1895, Garbe was invited to fill Roth’s chair at Tübingen. Max Mueller’s work on Sanskrit and the Vedas, Deussen’s numerous publications on Indian philosophy, particularly the Upanishads, and Garbe’s work on the Gita, as well as on Christianity’s relationship to Indian religions, have ensured for all three a lasting name in this field.32

As Indians in the nineteenth century became increasingly aware of European Orientalist research, the hypothesis of racial affinity between Indians and Europeans was welcomed, particularly by upper-caste Hindus. These Hindus were receptive to any ideas which would reinforce their own image and position, a position which was perhaps based on a perceived racial distinction going back to remote antiquity. Hindus, and indeed all Indians, were also at this point in the country’s history, chafing under the humiliation of rule by a European power. They therefore welcomed any suggestion, especially from Europeans, that would assuage their sensibilities and confirm their “past
"glory" and this is exactly what German Orientalists provided. Kopf and Kejariwal have pointed to the supposedly rejuvenating effect of British Orientalism on Indians. A similar argument could easily be developed for German Orientalism, as well, possibly even more so than its British counterpart. Nirad Chaudhuri, for example, in his biography of Max Mueller, has developed such a case.\(^{33}\)

Romila Thapar, like Kejariwal and other historians, classifies the scholarship guided by this line of thinking, i. e., the hypothesis of the Indo-European family, as the first school of modern historical writing on ancient India. This school comprised nineteenth-century Orientalists and Indologists, among whom Thapar counts pioneer British scholar-administrators such as William Jones, Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765-1837), and H. H. Wilson (1786-1860), as well as later scholars like Max Mueller who had "a purely academic interest in India." Thapar also argues that "the most influential theory to emerge from Indological studies in the 19th century was the Theory of the Aryan Race," although she does not subscribe to the view that this was beneficial to the Indian mind.\(^{34}\) It is also customary to portray these scholars as sympathetic to India and to draw a contrast between them and what is described as the next school, characterized by the critical and utilitarian tone of James Mill (1773-1836) and his *History of British India*.\(^{35}\)
While this interpretation is correct as far as British ideas are concerned, it cannot be extended without modification to scholarship generated in other countries. It is inappropriate to view all European Orientalist scholarship as one homogeneous body, whose characteristics can be derived by extrapolating from the British case. The conventional argument also fails to note that the distinction between these schools was not just one of earlier and later, but also that of British and German.

Early German Romantics such as Herder and Schlegel were already saying about race and national origins what professional Indologists would argue in the mid- and late nineteenth century, in the seemingly more rigorous language of philology. Wilhelm von Humboldt, a German philologist whose writings on Sanskrit, India, and the Indo-European family would put him firmly among the romantic Indologists, was a contemporary of James Mill. Max Mueller, whom one can also similarly describe as a romantic scholar of India, lived and worked in the second half of the nineteenth century. Paul Deussen and Richard Garbe worked in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, and in their writings, too, the influence of traditional Indology is evident. What further complicates the picture is that while all the Orientalists named here could be described as progressive, liberal, or utilitarian in their overall world-view, with regard to India or the East, as I show in
this study, they often lapsed into a conservative, or romantic mode. Political, cultural, and social conditions in the modern Orient thus often appeared to them to be part of the natural and justified order of things. The chronology - once we broaden our scrutiny beyond British scholarship - therefore does not lend itself to easy periodization, and neither can labels such as "romantic" and "utilitarian" be used in a straightforward fashion.

One could perhaps ignore these issues if British and German scholarship were totally unrelated. But this was not the case. As Hermann Tull has noted, Indology in the second half of the nineteenth century rested on a curious "marriage of British and German scholarship." The British had been the pioneers, at least in the field, but, as Tull argues, "despite (or, perhaps because of) Britain's interest in India, by the middle of the nineteenth century the most diligent Sanskritists were to be found in the German universities." This is not surprising, since by this time, the Orientalist phase of British rule in India was over, and the Anglicists had had their way. Romantic interpretations of India now became the preserve of the Continentals, especially the Germans, who were already cut off from India politically, and who further "isolated themselves from the 'living' Indian tradition." They did this by, for example, by disparaging native commentaries on the Vedas, or deliberately ignoring aspects of Indian
culture that appeared "tasteless and monstrous" in favor of what they considered more refined.38

The conventional division of Orientalist scholarship on India into the pioneering romantic school, and the later utilitarian group is thus oversimplified. There is little doubt that British scholars of the late eighteenth century built on findings that had been made by other European scholars. There was, however, more to this than just linguistics. British scholars' borrowings from the Continent, and vice versa, ensured an overlap in ideas that went beyond the study of language. These ideas related to the Orient and its historical place and role with respect to Europe, and were part of the intellectual edifice that is labelled Romanticism.

German linguistic work, however scientific, was intimately tied to Romantic visions. Linda Dowling has argued that British attitudes to the study of Indo-European languages were indelibly stamped by this "German philological tradition," with its strong Romantic leanings. This remained true well into the nineteenth century, at the time when Max Mueller was working at Oxford and drawing overflow crowds for his lectures on language. It is ironic that Max Mueller was such a success in England, at least with the lay public, given the fact that for many Britishers the study of Sanskrit and Indo-European languages had generated discomfort by "proving a thoroughly
unwelcome kinship between Briton and Brahmin. This discomfort had been effectively supressed when the supposedly radical shift from Romantic or Orientalist to utilitarian attitudes had occurred among the British in the early nineteenth century. Max Mueller clearly tapped into a reservoir of sentiment that was still Romantic, or "Orientalist," as opposed to Anglicist, to the extent that Britishers were willing to hear and applaud Mueller’s flights of fancy regarding India, Europe, and the Aryan family.

German Orientalist scholarship was established before history and fiction went their separate ways in the Western academy. Early German commentators on the Orient were not rigorous scholars in the way history and historians defined scholarship, especially after Leopold von Ranke (1795–1886). These early Orientalists were also not positivists for whom human society was part of an objective reality that could be reconstructed through scientific observation and study. They were, if anything, sentimentalists for whom the study of the Orient was often driven by a "soft" moral, spiritual, or humanistic agenda. Max Mueller, for example, by clinging to this school of Orientalism in the late nineteenth century rendered himself anachronistic. Max Mueller’s writings resemble more those of Herder than they do the work of his "scientific" contemporaries. Max Mueller’s works, like Herder’s, read
more like literature than history. The Romantic and the early Orientalist were both, as Leslie Willson has pointed out, basically involved in "myth-making" and preferred, in keeping with their poetic bent, "a convincing impossibility to an unconvincing possibility." Willson also points to the lack of disciplinary affiliation or loyalty among the Romantics, whose "expansive spirit" sought to find a common origin for disparate human endeavors such as "religion, language, and art."  

Early German Orientalists (or scholars who wrote on the Orient) in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were also intellectually, socially, and politically a conservative group. They were part of the early German Romantic movement, which, as Hannah Arendt has noted, comprised "representatives of conservative interests, who had formulated the main tenets of a conservative ideology."  

This conservatism, as I argue in this study, stemmed partly from the inherently elitist nature of European Orientalist scholarship, which was concerned mainly with the high texts of non-European societies from remote antiquity. The conservatism of Orientalism and Orientalists was also due in large part to their affinity with the Romantic movement, which, by its affirmation of the past, of tradition, and of continuity, was also fundamentally opposed to changes in the prevailing order.
Anti-Semitism, as Leon Poliakov has shown, was an integral component of nineteenth-century European, in particular German nationalism, and in this area too, the early Orientalists provided fuel for later agitators. Johann-David Michaelis (1717-1791), one of the leading Hebrew scholars of his time, had campaigned actively against Jewish emancipation. One of Herder's students, Friedrich Graeter (1768-1830), founded the journal, Bragur, to propagate virtues from the old Nordic-Germanic epics and sagas. Friedrich Schlegel himself was a close friend and associate of Metternich, the Austrian politician whose name became synonymous with conservatism in Europe after the Congress of Vienna. While there were certainly some changes by the time we get to Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe, I shall show in this study that elements of the earlier conservatism persisted. Attitudes towards Jews constituted one area where basic premises did not change. The other element in the conservatism of these later scholars was a more global, as opposed to an intra-European one, and tended to confirm and support in various ways the status quo of East and West.

On the Indian side of this story too there were conservative interests at work. While most of the Indian thinkers I discuss were active social reformers, they were certainly not radical in their attitudes, that is, they did not want drastic social change. In some cases, where their
personal interests were affected, they could even go directly against the grain of reform. This was to be expected, since they were all from the upper economic or social tiers of society. Orientalist scholarship also resonated well with these Indians because the theory of the Indo-European or Aryan roots of the upper castes in India provided a boost to their flagging self-image and pride in the age of colonial rule.

Conclusion to Chapter

In my survey of the post-Orientalist and post-colonial critiques I indicated that while what I have called the "hegemony thesis" is overly reductionist, dismissing all links between political and economic power and academic production is also an extreme and untenable position. German Orientalism occupied the grey area between these extremes. My project focuses on works by the three German Orientalists mentioned earlier in order to map this uncertain area in which German Orientalism was located in the colonial environment of the late nineteenth century.

The examination of German Orientalism complicates the anti-Orientalist critique. My particular approach in this study, which involves examining German Orientalists' perceptions of a country that had been colonized by another European power, makes it even harder to draw clear conclusions. Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe were engaged
with India and yet disengaged at the same time. The identification of the sources, mechanisms, and effects of intellectual and political power, which the Saidian critique purports to do, is therefore considerably more difficult in the cases I examine than in Said's original discussion.

The discussion that follows in the next chapters makes problematic various categories and concepts such as progressive, conservative, traditional, modern, and hegemonic. This follows from the ambivalence that typified the relationship between the German scholars discussed here and the East. The evidence I present shows that these categories, questionable as they are, become even more suspect when we cross cultural boundaries. Romantic admiration for India coexisted in these individuals' minds with rationalist disdain. Love of Indian antiquity and the urge to preserve a pristine India was combined with the desire to see European-style reforms and institutions established everywhere. And conservatism in some areas, for example in the matter of colonial rule in India, mingled with attitudes that were progressive by nineteenth-century European standards.
NOTES


2. See pages 106-108 below.


   In part, presenting these contacts in glowing terms was Leifer’s job as a cultural diplomat (as director of the Max Mueller Bhavan, the Indian chapter of the Goethe Institute in Bombay). But, on the other hand, the sustained and expensive cultural involvement of Germans in India since World War II, manifested for example in the high-profile scholarly and cultural activities of the Goethe Institutes, is itself an outcome and continuation of the long German love-affair with India that began in the eighteenth century.


10. In contrast to Goebel's work, Ernst Rose's Blick nach Osten (Bern, Switzerland: Verlag Peter Lang, 1981) and the anthology edited by Guenther Debon and Adrian Hsia, Goethe and China - China and Goethe (Bern, Switzerland: Verlag Peter Lang, 1985) are examinations of German perceptions of China that do not share Said's approach or concerns.

11. Andrea Fuchs-Sumiyoshi, Orientalismus in der deutschen Literatur [Orientalism in German Literature] (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlag, 1984), 95, 156.

12. Ibid., 158-59.


16. Ammann, 152, 44.

17. Guenther, 286-287.


20. German colonialism is discussed in most standard texts on German history, as well as in more specialized works that have either German colonial history or colonialism in Asia or Africa as their focus. See, for example, Woodruff D. Smith, *The German Colonial Empire* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1978); Bill Freund, *The Making of Contemporary Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Wilfried Westphal, *Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien* [History of the German Colonies] (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1984); and Hermann Hiery, *The Neglected War: The German South Pacific and the Influence of World War I* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1995).


25. Schlegel argued, for example, that "the caste of warriors in India...and the aristocracy of the country are founded on exactly the same principle as the hereditary nobility of Germany." Friedrich Schlegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1846), 143.


30. Schwab, 58.


32. Nirad Chaudhuri, *Scholar Extraordinary*, chapters 2 and 3; Roy and Gidwani, s. v. "Roth, Rudolf," "Garbe, Richard." The Vedas, the Upanishads, and the Gita are all ancient Indian texts on philosophy and religion. I explain them in more detail in the chapters on Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe.


38. Tull, 30-31.


41. I am using the term "positivist" in the way it has been understood since the work of the nineteenth-century French philosopher Comte. See Christopher G. A. Bryant’s *Positivism in Social Theory and Research* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 11-56, for an exposition of the basic tenets of positivist philosophy.


46. An example of such conservatism is the marriage in 1874 of Keshub Chunder Sen’s daughter, thirteen years old at the time, to a wealthy prince. While Keshub had been active and outspoken in the campaign against child marriage, this clearly did not prevent him from compromising his beliefs when it came to his personal interests. Keshub offered convoluted intellectual justifications for this action, and corresponded with Max Mueller on this issue; Max Mueller gave Keshub the support he wanted. I discuss this again in Chapter 3 below. See Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
Introduction

If there was ever a German who fit the stereotype of the romantic Indologist searching in the East for the true origins of "Indo-European culture," it was Friedrich Max Mueller (1823-1900). Writing more than half a century after pioneers like Herder and Schlegel, a time in which Europeans came into closer contact and thus acquired greater familiarity with non-Europeans than ever before, Max Mueller took to praising the "glory and wisdom" of India with more passion than virtually any German scholar before him. This intense admiration for India, along with a certain condescension which he displayed, on occasion, toward Indians and Indian culture makes it difficult to assign a precise location or label to Max Mueller in the current debate on Orientalism.

While I do not intend here to provide a full biographical sketch of Max Mueller, one facet of his life deserves discussion at the outset: Max Mueller, although I
describe him as a German scholar, spent his entire professional life in England, at the university of Oxford. Arriving there at the age of twenty three, as a young scholar working on an edition of the ancient Indian text, the Rig-Veda, Max Mueller went on to receive a master’s degree and eventually became a professor at the university. This career was, however, not entirely smooth; the principal "obstacle," or complicating factor, was that he was a German with very German ideas in an English environment. From his early days in England as a provincial lad thrown into the sophisticated high society of Oxford, to the time many years later when he lost a contest for a prestigious academic position to the British Indologist Monier-Williams, Max Mueller’s "Germanness" appears to have remained a problematic element in his social and professional life in Britain. Looking back on his life, in his Autobiography, Max Mueller observed that even after so many years in England, his position there remained a "peculiar" one. Although his "political allegiance," he noted, "was due and was gladly given to England, still I was, and have always remained, a German."

Whether Max Mueller’s Germanness was a real or perceived problem at Oxford or not, he did recieve his basic university education in Germany, and the imprint of German thought was therefore, expectedly, to stay with him for life. In the area of Indology in particular, his ideas
were certainly not very different from those of earlier German thinkers such as Herder, Bopp, Schlegel, and Humboldt. India held a fascination for these scholars primarily because they viewed it as part of the "Aryan" or Indo-European family. Max Mueller also propagated the constant theme of German Orientalists about how fundamentally different the families of Indo-European and Semitic languages were. This alleged difference formed the cornerstone of much of their work, not just with regard to languages, but in their reflections on society and history in general. In this respect, Max Mueller's work and insights were hardly original. Throughout his writings, he invariably exalts the place of Sanskrit and the Indo-European language family, but rarely adding anything new to what Schlegel, Bopp, and others had already said countless times before him.²

Writing in the late nineteenth century, though, Max Mueller probably felt more strongly than his predecessors the need to be scientific and rigorous in his work. Whether he succeeded in this or not is by no means clear, and the question has generated considerable controversy both in his own life-time and in the present. An American contemporary of Max Mueller, William Whitney, a Sanskritist from Yale University, wrote a critique in 1892 of Max Mueller's work that bordered on vicious caricature. Whitney, who had been engaged in a running battle with Max Mueller for several
decades, mocked among other things Max Mueller’s claim that his field, the study of language, was as rigorous as a "physical science." Whitney likened it more to "a science of artistic expression." It is true that grand visions, bordering on myths, appeared to guide Max Mueller’s work and his language and style of argumentation were also more often than not impassioned and even hyperbolic. Such traits, combined with a marked tendency to be partial to Christianity, certainly tended to undermine the scientificity and objectivity of his work and rendered him something of an anachronism in the late nineteenth-century academy.

Max Mueller certainly saw himself as a philologist who worked in a scientific fashion with the hard evidence of language. What he did primarily with languages was compare them in order to arrive at their beginnings, or "roots." He further classified languages into families or groups, among which the principal division was that between Indo-European and all others. The very fact that such classifications were possible was proof, he argued, of the scientific and non-arbitrary nature of the field of linguistic studies. It showed, he claimed, that languages had "grown up in natural order and according to rational rule." Today, such an exercise might seem fraught with dangers, especially that of making judgements about the relative worth and sophistication of different groups of
languages, and by implication the societies or races which spoke them. Max Mueller consistently denied any such intentions, claiming that the science of language did not imply anything about the superiority or inferiority of individual races.  

Max Mueller's work and interests, however, went far beyond the scientific study of language. A prolific writer, Max Mueller wrote in the manner of a wide-ranging social scientist, making pronouncements on topics both ancient and modern. By doing so he acquired a high profile but also laid himself open to scrutiny and criticism. His linguistic researches, however, remained the foundation for his forays into other fields, or at least gave him the courage to discuss matters beyond his area of specialization. With regard to India or the East, in particular, his knowledge of the scriptures and languages of antiquity imbued him, it seems, with the belief that he was equipped to analyze and comment on all aspects of Indian life and society, both ancient and modern.

The Search for Aryan Antiquity

There is no doubt that Max Mueller was extremely well-versed in Indian philosophy, religion, and languages, and that his contributions to Indology were of considerable significance. The search for Aryan connections, however, remained a steady and almost simplistic theme - to the
point of obsession - in all his work, and one that often threatened to interfere with the objectivity and quality of his scholarship.

There were for Max Mueller two points of focus in this search. One was the Vedas, the ancient scripture of the Hindus, which he regarded as the oldest Aryan document. The second was the language of the Vedas, Sanskrit, which he also viewed as the product of an Aryan "golden age." Max Mueller venerated both the Vedas and Sanskrit, to the point that every essay, book, or speech he authored would have a reference to, if not a lengthy elaboration of, the common Aryan origins of India and the Germanic nations of Europe and the exalted place of the Vedas and Sanskrit in this scheme. As far as India was concerned, he viewed every facet of Indian society and culture, both old and recent, through the filter of "Aryan," Sanskritic culture and the Vedas.

Four different lectures, for example, which Max Mueller delivered over the quarter century between 1868 and 1892 all had as their principal theme the notion of shared Aryan origins. In this story, Sanskrit naturally played a pivotal role. In his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1868 on the "value of comparative philology as a field of comparative study," Max Mueller outlined the growth of this academic field, virtually equating it with the study of
Sanskrit in the West. He dated this, in turn, from the founding of the Asiatic Society of Bengal by William Jones in 1784 and the discovery of the "unity" of the Indo-European family. "A kind of silent conviction began to spread," he said, "that there must be in Sanskrit a remedy for all evils; people could not rest until every word in Greek or Latin had, in some disguise or other, been discovered in Sanskrit." Sanskrit, he went on to assert, constitutes the core of the science of comparative philology, and without a knowledge of Sanskrit it is impossible to navigate the field. Apparent anomalies in Greek grammar, he claimed, can be resolved by studying similar phenomena in their "most primitive working, such as we can watch it in the Vedic Sanskrit." Comparative grammar, he argued, thus produces in the end "a reign of law most wonderful, yet perfectly rational and intelligible." By comparative grammar, as we have seen, Max Mueller meant above all the study of Sanskrit.

In a lecture in 1870 on "The Migration of Fables," Max Mueller tried to construct a common ancestry for all Indo-European peoples by establishing similarities in folk tales and fables. It is possible, he suggested in this talk, that Aryans, such as "Indians, Persians, Greeks, Romans, Celts, Germans, and Slaves [sic]," carried with them from their "pro-ethnic" period - that is, the age when they were supposedly still one single Aryan tribe - not
only their languages but their myths and legends as well. The examples Max Mueller provided to support this theory were all very pastoral: stories of milkmaids, stolen cows, and village life. A modern German proverb which claims that "the dawn [or morning] has gold in its mouth" was strongly reminiscent, according to Max Mueller, of Aryan poetic myths about the gold-laden dawn, myths which stem from the "long-forgotten forest of our common Aryan home."^9

Max Mueller's address to the International Congress of Orientalists in London in 1874, in which he was "President of the Aryan Section," touched again on the same Indo-European idea. Orientalist scholarship, Max Mueller argued in this lecture, has lifted the curtain between East and West. "Our old forgotten home stands before us again in bright colors and definite outlines...and we feel rich in the past...of our noble Aryan family." Numerous elements of European civilization, he claimed, have come from the East. Greeks and Hindus, both of course Indo-Europeans, have arrived, he said, at the same conclusions on philosophical issues. While he went on to argue that these were parallel, unrelated developments which showed that "what is possible in one country is also possible in another," the fact that both countries were, in Max Mueller's scheme, Indo-European was not incidental.\textsuperscript{10}

As a minor corrective to this Aryan-centered vision, though, he went on to expand the notion of the East to
include "Aryan, Semitic, [and] Hamitic." The corrective was, however, an unintended anomaly, almost a careless statement on Max Mueller's part. When he argued subsequently that "the East is ours, [and] we are its heirs," he was clearly referring, as he always did, to the "Aryan East."^11

In the same lecture, Max Mueller also described the Vedas as "the oldest books of the Aryan world," and emphasized the importance of studying them in a professional manner. Referring to a comparison made by "the Dean of St. Paul's" between the Psalms and the Vedas, in which the Psalms were judged to be superior to the Vedas, Max Mueller noted that while this was true, one should not forget that the "the [Vedas] are Aryan, the Psalms Semitic." The Vedas' value lay precisely in the fact that they reflected "a primitive and rude state of society" but one that was nonetheless Aryan and therefore reflected what "man was, what we were [emphasis added], before we reached the level of David, the level of Homer, the level of Zoroaster." He concluded his speech by quoting some verses from the Vedas, verses which he said "thousands of years ago may have been addressed to a similar meeting of Aryan fellow-men."^12

In an earlier work from 1859, Max Mueller had talked in even broader terms about the significance of the Vedas. These books, he claimed, belonged to "the history of the
world," and were indispensable as "man continues to take an interest in the history of his race." Almost as an afterthought, he added that they would be part of the records of the "Aryan branch of mankind."\(^{13}\)

Eighteen years later in his 1892 address to the Ninth International Congress of Orientalists, Max Mueller's predominant theme was the same: the East, especially India, as the repository of the oldest thoughts and traditions of the "Aryan family of nations." One of the principal tasks of Orientalists, he said, was to break down the barriers that had been erected between East and West by demonstrating that the East was "near to our thoughts, near to our hearts," even though it might seem "strange and indifferent" at first sight. Generations of classical Western scholarship had conditioned Europeans to take the East-West divide as given, but Orientalists now had evidence to show that "the complete break between East and West did not exist from the beginning."\(^{14}\) This was, however, not the broad, neutral remark that might seem appropriate for the president of a conference. For Max Mueller, the overcoming of the distance between East and West meant only one thing, and that was the unearthing of the common origins of the Indo-European family and, even more specifically, the Sanskritic bond between India and Europe. While he did take note of other linguistic and ethnic groupings and their achievements and shared
heritage, this was all of secondary importance in his grand scheme.

He noted, for example, that there was in history a "powerful Semitic confederacy," that is a bond which connected diverse cultural groups such as "Phoenician, Hebrew, Babylonian, and Arabic." This group, whose development paralleled that of the Aryan group, had considerable achievements to boast of. "We," that is, presumably, the non-Semitic nations of Europe, were still according to Max Mueller, building on the foundations which this Semitic family had laid, or, in his own ornate language, still using the "armour and swords which they had wielded...in our wars of liberation from error, and in our conquests of truth." He even conceded that the earliest written productions of the Semites pre-dated the oldest documents in Sanskrit and Greek. But there had also been considerable cultural exchange, Max Mueller argued, in ancient times between Semitic and non-Semitic (though not necessarily Aryan) peoples; the civilization of Mesopotamia, for example, rested on the achievements of non-Semitic tribes.\(^\text{15}\)

Max Mueller also firmly maintained that the Aryan race originated in Asia and not in Europe as some other scholars claimed.\(^\text{16}\) He did not want to "join in the jubilant chorus that like all good things, our noble ancestors, the Aryas [\textit{sic}], came from Germany." The
original Aryan race, he asserted, actually had a common language, "proto-Aryan," of which languages such as Sanskrit, Greek and Latin were almost dialects, or at least "remnants of a great mass of dialectic variety." As Steven Connor has noted, such views separated Max Mueller from many contemporary philologists by moving him away from sober science to the realm of mythology. That "etymological analysis led back to these Aryan roots," Connor writes, was a fairly acceptable view. But Max Mueller went further and insisted that there was once a real language, spoken by real people whose social conditions could be reconstructed from this linguistic evidence. This idea of a proto-Indo-European tribe and an associated proto-Indo-European language has since been accepted by virtually all scholars in the field, although considerable debate persists regarding the exact location of the Urheimat (original home) of this tribe, as well as the nature of the language they spoke. In the case of Max Mueller, though, while scholarly arguments were present, believing in the existence of an original Indo-European tribe was almost an act of faith, the result of his unshakable belief in the identity of language and thought or, indeed, language and mythology.

Interestingly enough, when it came to discussing the possibility of a prehistoric language which both the Aryan and the Semitic families had in common, Max Mueller
proclaimed his incompetence. While the idea of a proto-
Aryan language which contained the roots of languages as
diverse as Celtic and Hindi made perfect sense to Max
Mueller, he described a possible similar Aryan-Semitic
blend as "a linguistic protoplasm" which was "too
jellylike, too indefinite" to be handled by students of
language. A scholarly resolution of this question was not
possible, he said, and the matter was better left to
philosophers.20 Ideographs of different societies (China
and Egypt, for example) were bound to share certain
elements, regardless of whether these societies had had
contacts or not. It was the same for the "very indefinite
roots of language which are supposed to be shared in common
by the Semitic and Aryan families of speech."21

It could be claimed that Max Mueller's interpretation
of history, although warped by mythology and theological
beliefs, was a benevolent one to the extent that it argued
against the separation of Eastern and Western civilization
and advocated a more unified approach. It was not accurate,
but perhaps desirable, just as the world histories of
Romantics like Herder, while not as accurate as the works
of later "scientific" historians, sought to convey a sense
of humanity or world-community.22 Max Mueller told an
English audience, for example, that India was not "a
distant, strange, or...curious country....[It] has its
place in the Indo-European world, it has its place in our own history."23 But at the same time, the East-West contacts which he spoke of and held dear were evidently not strong enough to obliterate totally the strangeness of the East. Even India, his Aryan home, had produced a religion and philosophy, he wrote, that "come upon us like meteors from a distant planet." The de-Occidentalization which he recommended to Westerners who wished to understand the East had evidently not completed its course with Max Mueller himself.24

Max Mueller's search for Aryan affinities extended to his discourses on modern-day Indians as well, whom he saw as kindred Indo-Europeans. In a tribute to the Indian reformer Rammohun Roy, delivered in 1883 on the fiftieth anniversary of Rammohun's death, Max Muller's principal concern appeared to be to portray Rammohun as a true Aryan, one who was related by both "blood" and intellect to the Aryans of Europe. Rammohun Roy's achievements were therefore, according to Mueller, Aryan triumphs. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in this speech, Max Mueller was obsessed by race. He concluded his speech with an appeal to "allow this true Aryan nobleman a place among those who deserve to be called great and good."25

There were many Hindus, especially from the upper castes of India, who echoed the ideas of Max Mueller and other Indologists on the Aryan origins of Indian, or
rather, Hindu culture since these theories supported their social and political platforms. These included prominent thinkers and reformers such as the Brahma Keshub Chunder Sen, the Hindu reformer Dayanand Saraswati, and the Hindu nationalist leader Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856-1920). While some of these individuals may not have been exposed directly to the writings of European Indologists or been in personal contact with them, the Hindu nationalism they espoused was certainly helped by the presence of a large body of scholarship promoting the same ideas. A comfortable intellectual relationship developed between upper-class Hindus and the European scholars who studied and glorified their "Aryan" ethnic origins. There were Indians, to be sure, who did not docilely follow Max Mueller and other Orientalists in proclaiming the glory of "Aryan culture" in Indian antiquity. One such dissenter, Jotirao Phule, was, as one might expect, of lower-caste origins.

Max Mueller asserted that by "race" he did not refer to physical attributes but rather to linguistic and, presumably, the resulting cultural affinities. The notion of the "Aryas," he claimed, had nothing to do with "skulls, or hair or eyes, or skin," and that "the golden hair, the blue eyes, and the noble profile of the Aryas is pure invention, unless we are prepared to say that Socrates, the wisest of the Greeks, was not an Aryan, but a Mongolian." By
the term "Arya," he argued "we predicate nothing but language." 

This strong disclaimer notwithstanding, his biography of Rammohun Roy, for one, provides strong evidence that "race," for Max Mueller, implied ethnic affinities as well. Max Mueller wanted to impress upon his English audience in Bristol that this "dark-skinned stranger" was, in fact, one of them. This was because he was an "Indo-European, speaking the same speech, thinking the same thoughts," and was "estranged from us by no greater changes than what some thousand years may have wrought in that language which his ancestors and ours once spoke together." Max Mueller pointed out, however, that this "kinship," although not devoid of the bond of "flesh and blood," was even stronger by virtue of being an *intellectual* one (emphasis original), because "language is thicker than blood." Max Mueller described Rammohun's visit to England as a reunion of "the two great branches of the Aryan race." These branches, he said, shared a "common language," a "common faith," and also "common origins." 

"Language" and "origins" were for Max Mueller in this instance closely intertwined, in contradiction of his professed view about "Aryan" being about nothing but language.

Nirad Chaudhuri, author of a very adulatory biography of Max Mueller published in 1974, was aware of the charges increasingly levelled against what he calls the "racialist"
theories of Indologists. Chaudhuri did anticipate the arguments of later writers that Max Mueller's work was laden with racist implications. Chaudhuri therefore came to a preemptive defense of Max Mueller by pointing out that "the two words 'Aryan' and 'race' have become some sort of red rag to contemporary radicals." Chaudhuri argued that Max Mueller made a clear distinction between "blood" and "language," and that he also stated explicitly that "Aryan, in scientific language, is utterly inapplicable to race. It means language and nothing but language." Chaudhuri's interpretation of Max Mueller's views is, however, not supported by the evidence.

It is evident that Max Mueller, in his writings and talks, repeatedly stressed the intellectual aspect of the Aryan relationship, almost as if to downplay any possible inferences that could be derived from his scholarship. But in spite of his efforts, race, in a physical sense, is never too far from his discussion. While it is language and thought that, according to Max Mueller, tie all Indo-Europeans together, it is a small step from this view to the construction of ethnic links as well. And he himself found it on occasion difficult not to take this step. "The evidence of language," he wrote, "is irrefragable," with regard to the common ancestry that he posited for Indians, Greeks, Italians, Slavonians, Germans, and Celts. This evidence, he continued, makes it possible to detect the
"relationship between the swarthy natives of India and their conquerors, whether Alexander or Clive," and convinces the "English soldier that the same blood was running in his veins and in the veins of the dark Bengalese."\(^{32}\) As I discuss below, Max Mueller was not fundamentally opposed to the British domination of India which he rationalized as a reunification of the Aryan family.\(^{33}\)

Two disciplines, the "Science of Language" and the "Science of Religion," allowed one, according to Max Mueller, to rise to "higher historical standpoints" from which "new horizons" open up. His argument was that these new horizons would enable one to look beyond current differences between, say, Europeans, on the one hand, and Indians and Persians, on the other, and realize that they all are essentially descended of the same "fathers of the Aryan race, that noble race to which we ourselves belong."\(^{34}\)

Rammohun Roy, for example, Max Mueller noted, was a Brahmin by birth. And despite Rammohun's intense admiration for Christianity and his broad education, "he remained a Brahmin to the end." He was, therefore, perceived by most Europeans as "a non-Christian, a heathen." But the higher intellectual elevations Max Mueller spoke of allow us, he claimed, to realize that Rammohun, the "dark-skinned stranger," was nonetheless a member of one of two branches
of the same Aryan family. One branch, the "North-Western" one, had "marched towards the home of the setting sun, till they reached that small peninsula [called] Europe, which became the stage of what we are apt to call the history of the whole world." Such a "Eurocentric" view of history, as we might call it today, was thus not alien to Max Mueller's intellectual universe. Neither had it been alien to seminal German thinkers like Hegel, who had declared earlier in the century that "the true theatre of history is...the temperate zone, or rather its northern half," and that "the History of the World travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History." 35

The South-Eastern branch of the Aryan family "set out to discover," according to Max Mueller, "the home of the rising sun, till they reached their earthly paradise in the [land] of the Five Rivers, and further still, along the shores of the Ganges and the Jumnah." 36 Max Mueller was further intent on showing that the branch to which Rammohun belonged was not an insignificant one. He argued therefore that "though these South-Eastern Aryans are seldom mentioned in our Histories of the world, we should bear in mind that India alone has more inhabitants at the present moment than the whole of Europe."

While Max Mueller presented the Aryan family - whether ethnic or linguistic - as simply one among many, it is clear that he regarded the Aryan group as superior to
all the others. To his English audience listening to his talk on Rammohun, he spoke of the Aryan family as "that noble race to which we ourselves belong, and which has since been divided into Greeks and Romans, Celts and Slavs on one side, and Indians and Persians on the other."  

Max Mueller's evaluation of the relative worth and standing in history of these two alleged branches of the Aryan family was a convoluted one. He argued at length, on one hand, in support of the equal merits of the two branches, although these merits were, he argued, of different kinds. The strength of the northern branch lay in action, while the southern branch developed the art of speculation and introspection. At the same time, Max Mueller asserted that the "mainstream of the Aryan nations has always flowed towards the northwest." The "impulse" that drove them to the north, he wrote, "was as irresistible as the spell which, in our own times, sends the Celtic tribes towards the prairies or the regions of gold across the Atlantic."  

These north-western Aryans, he also claimed, had "carried to their fullest growth all the elements of active life with which our nature is endowed," and had "perfected society and morals."  

Over the course of history, Max Mueller argued, both Germanic nations and Indian society have moved away from, or have continued to reflect diluted or corrupted forms of,
the Aryan ideal. He pointed out, however, that what Europeans would ultimately find "in ancient Sanskrit literature and cannot find anywhere else" is this ideal, namely "the Aryan man."^40

It was the age when the migrations that split the Aryan family had supposedly not yet taken place that Max Mueller regarded as the golden age of his race. "In the hymns of the Rig-Veda," Mueller wrote, it is still possible to observe this "earlier phase" in the evolution of the Aryan family. In the later phase, the phase with which we are more familiar with from our modern experience, the Aryan is to be found "as Greek, Roman, German, Celt, and Slav," but "in an entirely new character." This new character, brought about by the northern migrations, is one in which "his active and political energies are called out and brought to their highest perfection." In India, on the other hand, it was the "[passive and meditative] side of the human character" that flowered.^41

For Max Mueller, as for many other German Indologists, the "original" book of the Hindus, the Vedas, was the prime scholarly evidence of the Aryan connections between Europe and India. Max Mueller regarded the Vedas as the repository of Aryan thought in its "purest" form. Moreover, unlike the religions and thought of Greece, Egypt, Babylon, or Phoenicia, Vedic thought, Max Mueller
argued, had not been tainted by any foreign influence. It was unique, since it had "grown entirely on native soil," and therefore contained ideas that could be found nowhere else.\(^42\) The central task in his life, as he saw it, was that of "making the Veda accessible to the students of Europe," and "publishing for the first time the text and commentary of the Rig-Veda, the oldest book of the Aryan race."\(^43\)

In his autobiography, composed at the very end of his life (he died in 1900), Max Mueller returned to the notion of the Vedas as a reflection of the childhood and even early "immaturity" of the Aryan family. Although he seemingly distanced himself from the pronouncements of early India-enthusiasts who had wanted to see the origin of all culture and civilization in India, Max Mueller did not retreat from his view of India as the origin at least of all Aryan culture. The Vedas, he conceded, did not contain the answers to all questions of history and language, nor did the existence of words and ideas in the Vedas that are found in classical Western texts as well automatically shed new light on the Western tradition. One might even be ashamed, he remarked, of "some of the dreams of the early spring of man's sojourn on earth," but they were nevertheless "enchanting dreams," and they also "threw light over the grey darkness which preceded it." These dreams referred, of course, to the Vedas. We should note
here that, in contradiction to his initial warning about extrapolating too much from the Vedas, he does describe this period as the spring of all mankind, and not just the Indo-European family. Or, perhaps, the Indo-European family was, for Max Mueller, the one that counted the most in the history of "man."

When discussing the Vedas, Max Mueller never failed to note that it would disappoint Europeans who expected too much from it. It did not always contain philosophy that was profound or mature by modern European standards, nor was the book a revelation of "man in his most primitive state." It would not "tell us the secrets of Adam and Eve." The Vedas did have antecedents, Max Mueller pointed out: it was like "an oak tree, with circles within circles." But in spite of all its shortcomings, it was also, Max Mueller maintained, the oldest document that could be called a "real book." The works of the Chinese, the Egyptians, the Babylonians, and the Jews could not, he argued, meet this description. More importantly, he claimed, the Vedas revealed a "a layer of thought which could be explored nowhere else," and while some of these thoughts could be described as childish, such as the fear of the sun tumbling down from the sky, the poets who composed the Vedas were not ashamed, Max Mueller pointed out, of expressing such fears, and were therefore indeed representative of the earliest stages of human development. No matter what the
objections, Max Mueller was thus clearly unwilling to abandon his staunch belief in the sanctity and exalted position of the Vedas.45

The language of the Vedas, Sanskrit, was by implication another central point in Max Mueller's search for Aryan roots. While he conceded that Sanskrit was "in one sense, [a] dead language," in fact one that died "more than two thousand years ago," he argued essentially that Sanskrit was very much a living presence in the cultural life of modern India.

Max Mueller was aware that the Anglicization or Westernization of Indians was proceeding apace, and that there were those who maintained that "at the present moment, [after] a century of English rule, Sanskrit literature has ceased to be a motive power in India," and that scholars could learn nothing from it about contemporary India. And yet, given the "continuity," Mueller wrote, that existed between the past and present in India, despite all the "social convulsions, religious reforms, and foreign invasions" which India had experienced, "Sanskrit may be said to be the only language that is spoken over the whole extent of that vast country."46

On a less abstract level, Max Mueller noted that even in modern India, the ancient epics are still read in Sanskrit to crowds gathered in villages or to visitors at
temples. These recitations in Sanskrit, he wrote, succeeded in conveying to the audience the plots and passions of these stories, so much so that when the hero of the epic returns to his kingdom after his period of banishment, "the houses of the village are adorned with lamps and garlands." Max Mueller admitted that the audiences needed an interpretation from the reader but argued that "there must be some few people present who understand, or think they understand." At any rate, there are, he noted, "many Brahmins who, without much material incentive know the whole of the Rig Veda by heart, [and] what applies to the Rig Veda applies to many other books." Max Mueller was clearly implying here that Sanskrit is perceived as "more of a dead language than it really is." And even if it were dead, Max Mueller concludes that "all the living languages of India, both Aryan and Dravidian, draw their very life and soul from Sanskrit."^

Tomoko Masuzawa has pointed to the overwhelming emphasis that Max Mueller placed on language and words in his search for the prehistoric, presumably Aryan, mind. She argues that the result was an exaggerated conflation of language and thought, or language and mythology, which was in keeping with Max Mueller's view of smooth, "organic" transitions from "nature to language, and vice versa." In fact it was more the latter, that is, the transition from language to nature, which Max Mueller's work focused on,
with his conclusion (in his own words) that "mythology is inevitable, it [is] an inherent necessity of language, if we recognize in language the outward form and manifestation of thought; it is, in fact, the dark shadow which language throws on thought." Masuzawa is concerned with "the turn of the argument from philology to mythology" which she sees in Max Mueller's thinking, and concludes that "Max Mueller lets himself succumb to the powerful shadow of language." For Max Mueller, mythology, above all the mythology contained in the Vedas, merges with and becomes the history, or rather prehistory, of the "Aryan peoples." To extend Masuzawa's argument, there is in Max Mueller's system a smooth, "natural" transition from language to society and from philology to history as well.

Max Mueller, as Nirad Chaudhuri has noted, was indeed concerned essentially with prehistory rather than history. In the absence, therefore, of what could be described as tangible historical evidence to support his ideas, Max Mueller did not see anything wrong in seizing on language and mythology as his evidence. From his perspective this may have seemed a sound and scientific procedure. But modern scholarship, especially in history, since the mid-nineteenth century has tended to attach a low value to mythology or, more broadly, ideas, as scholarly evidence. The best kind of historical material is still considered to be hard evidence, whether in the form of
"hard copies" in archives or physical artifacts found through archaeological excavations.

The German Romantic tradition, to which Max Mueller was indebted, had an uneasy and ambiguous relationship with this positivist approach. On one hand positivism was by definition not in accordance with the Romantic world-view. On the other hand, the Romantics did seize on the growth of modern, positivistic history, as well as of Orientalist and Indo-European studies, to further their romantic nationalist agenda, given the symbiotic relationship between modern history and the ethno-culturally defined nation-state. Martin Bernal, in Black Athena, has discussed the relationship between European nationalism, Romanticism, and Orientalism. Bernal points, for example, to the end of the European Enlightenment's fascination with China, and the increasing fascination with India and Iran after the discovery of the "Indo-European connection." This was accompanied by the demotion of Judaic mythologies, since the Semitic Other provided one of the boundaries for constructing what Benedict Anderson has called the "imagined community" of a nation to which certain people belong and others do not.

There were also philologists contemporary with Max Mueller who did not take lightly what they perceived as Max Mueller's "easy" relationship with language and the uses to which he put the evidence of language. That is, they did
not approve of either the methodology or the content of his work. One such critic was William Whitney, mentioned above. Whitney, who had started criticizing Max Mueller in the 1860s, concluded almost thirty years later that Max Mueller had learned nothing over a lifetime of scholarship and that his views in the 1890s were as flawed as they had been at the outset. Given the reputation Max Mueller enjoyed as the leading authority on language, especially with the English-speaking public, it was therefore necessary, Whitney observed, to subject his work to a thorough examination.\textsuperscript{52}

Reviewing a new and revised edition in 1891 of Max Mueller’s \textit{Science of Language}, first published in 1861, Whitney attacked Max Mueller’s attempt to equate thought and language. Whitney ridiculed Max Mueller’s notion of the "one and indivisible character of language and thought," and argued instead that it was indeed possible to think and "know" without the use of words. At issue implicitly was the elevated and prime status Max Mueller wished to accord to language among all human cultural achievements, especially since this was the underlying premise for much of his work, including work outside the field of language. Max Mueller had asserted, for example, that language was the principal characteristic separating human beings and animals. Whitney argued that this was an instance of Max Mueller’s exaggerated sense of his own importance and that
of the field he studied. A more sensible position would have been to say that "[language] is a barrier, and the one which, as a professed student of language, I most notice and appreciate."\(^{53}\)

Whitney also criticized Max Mueller's categorization of all languages into two or three "families," chiefly the Aryan and the Semitic. In his earlier works, Max Mueller had suggested a third group, the Turanian, but in the book Whitney reviews, he had moved away from this idea. At any rate, Aryan and Semitic were the only two families which truly deserved that label, Max Mueller had claimed. Whitney countered that this was unwarranted, since many other families with sophisticated linguistic structures had been discovered, and Max Mueller himself had acknowledged their existence in his latest work. The only reason, Whitney observed, for "limiting the name 'family' to Aryan and Semitic [would be that] these two are such extremely respectable old families, whose fame is spread through all the earth." Max Mueller's position in this regard was all the more untenable, Whitney continued, given his belief that "one dialect is as good as another, the uncultivated as the cultivated, the obscure as the noted, the recent as the ancient." This was, on Whitney's part, an interesting and deliberately distorted interpretation of Max Mueller's ideas, since despite all his claims to cultural neutrality, Max Mueller considered the Aryan family superior to all
others. As for the group "Turanian," Whitney pointed out that...it was a fabrication in the first place, "a catch-all" for all languages outside the Aryan and Semitic groups, and its repudiation was not a big step forward, either.54

In his Autobiography, Max Mueller conceded that he had made mistakes concerning the category "Turanian." But he also defended himself by arguing that a letter he had written on this subject dated from 1854 but "still continued to be criticized as if it had been published last year." He could not, he remarked, "possibly have known in 1854 what has been discovered since...," just as in other fields of scholarship no one was criticized for not knowing what was discovered later. More generally, Max Mueller observed that "all of our knowledge, whatever show we make of it, is very imperfect," possibly a veiled response to the barrage of criticism to which he was subjected during his lifetime.55

While Whitney did not specifically target the Aryan myth-building in Max Mueller's work, focusing instead on the flaws in his logic and methodology, there were those who did not accept the glorification of the Aryan language family that was so fundamental to Max Mueller's scholarship. Robert Brown, Jun., [sic] argued, for example, in a work in 1898 against what he regarded as the dominance of the "Aryan school of mythology." Brown used Max
Mueller's work on philology and mythology, as well as Max Mueller's debate with one of his critics, Andrew Lang, to develop and distinguish what he termed the "Aryo-Semitic" school. Brown's thesis was that the Semitic influence on ancient Greek thought had been totally ignored by scholars such as Max Mueller. Max Mueller, Brown argued, was so taken up with the Aryan origins of Western civilization that he was "utterly disinclined [to] admit even the most familiar cases of Semitic influence in Hellas." Max Mueller's work or, indeed, mission in life was to identify etymological relationships between words in Sanskrit and words in Greek and other Indo-European languages. He focused in particular, as Brown points out, on the names of gods in the Vedic and the Greek pantheons, and found "equations" between several of them. Max Mueller's intention was to establish that all "Aryan" nations derived their mythologies from a single, common source, and thereby to prove the unity of the Aryan family, as distinct from other ethnic or cultural groupings such as Semitic or Sinic.

It is true, as Romila Thapar has argued, that the study of ancient India, and in particular the "village community of early Vedic society" was regarded by Indologists as "the rediscovery of the roots of ancient European society." But many of these Indologists,
including Max Mueller, went farther and assumed, explicitly
or tacitly, that India had not changed significantly since
ancient or premodern times, or at least not as much as the
West.

In the writings of German Indologists, the past and
present of the Orient often become indistinguishable.
With regard to the West, though, the same scholars were
very aware of a clear break which they evidently believed
had occurred between the premodern and the modern
periods. In India, on the other hand, the original
society and structures of the Indo-European tribes had
supposedly preserved themselves in their original form or
something very close to it. History, Max Mueller claimed,
"[teaches] us that there is continuity which binds together
the present and the past, the East and the West." For
Indologists, it was the supposedly common origins of Aryan
nations - origins that they believed could still be seen in
modern India - that were the vital factor in this
continuity. In this regard, Max Mueller could be described
as a "typical" Orientalist - in the pejorative sense of the
word - for whom the dichotomy of a static, unchanging East
versus a progress-oriented, dynamic West was a completely
acceptable and perhaps even desirable picture.

While for German scholars the Indian village, with
its supposedly ur-Aryan features, was a nice intellectual
construct, this was also an instance where "apolitical"
German scholarship intersected with the reality of European domination over India, in other words, with British colonial rule. Ronald Inden has pointed out that the idealization of the Indian village by Western Indologists rested mainly on the information that was becoming available through the administrative mechanisms of the British government in India, such as surveys and colonial officers in the field. British interest in "village India," Inden argues, was, of course, driven not by any search for Aryan roots but by the desire to rule efficiently. It was also, Inden argues, predicated on the premise that India, as an "ancient land" and therefore the antithesis of European modernity, was constituted by villages. The social and economic structures of these villages reflected, furthermore, a state of society which Europe had left behind in the course of its modernization: agrarian, non-competitive, and communal. While modern Europe was organized and could be studied in terms of nation-states, India could be best understood by studying the village as a basic political and social unit. For the colonial rulers, these arguments led to the useful conclusion that India had to be governed from outside, since the ancient had always to give way to and be dominated by the modern. For Indologists, such as Max Mueller, the Indian village was, in addition, a "living descendant" of the Aryan society of antiquity. There were, however, British scholars, Inden
points out, such as Henry Baden-Powell who, unlike the Germans, saw India as constituted primarily by Dravidians, the non-Aryan people who inhabited India even before the Aryan invasions.⁶⁰

Max Mueller, Caste, and Modern India

The Indo-European or so-called Aryan origins of Indians — or at least those Indians who came to constitute the Hindu upper castes (Brahmins) —, and the Vedas which documented these origins, can, theoretically, be interpreted as the historical basis or "justification" for the existence of castes in India.⁶¹ This is based on the assumption that caste originated with the distinction between fair Aryans and dark non-Aryans, or Dravidians, the Aryans constituting the Hindu upper castes and the non-Aryans the lower castes. The Aryans, according to this view, invaded India and imposed the caste system which placed the indigenous Dravidians at the bottom of the hierarchy.⁶²

Early German scholars such as Herder and Schlegel, while still not clearly articulating this Indo-European construct, had a clear sense of Indian Brahmins being "a chosen people." In their writings on India, while pointing to some of the injustices of the caste system, they lavished more praise than criticism on the Brahmins, their wisdom, and the caste system, which the Brahmins'
supposedly superior moral and intellectual abilities had allowed them to create and maintain. The Brahmins' power over the other castes of India was based, according to Herder, on their wisdom rather than their physical strength. The "system of the Brahmins," he speculated, "when it was first established, was good; otherwise it could not have spread so wide, penetrated so deep, and endured so long." The religion and culture of the Brahmins, he also claimed, was "more learned, more humane,..., [and] more noble" than those of the other sects of the "eastern world."63

Schlegel, who was younger to Herder, was certainly exposed more than Herder to the theory of Indo-European migrations and affinities which was being developed and solidified in the early nineteenth century. Schlegel delved into Biblical mythology to justify the superior status of the Brahmins, arguing that the Brahmins were descended from the race of Seth, as opposed to Cain, and were therefore endowed with the power to preserve themselves "in their original purity and high hereditary dignity." This power, he believed, had been conferred by the early patriarchs ("hoary grandsires") of this race on their "sons and grandsons."64 Schlegel also saw the caste system as a very positive and desirable institution, one that was in some respects better than hierarchical social structures elsewhere. The lowest castes, he argued, for example, were
not slaves who could be bought or sold, in contrast to ancient Greece and Rome and even the modern colonies of Europe. Women too, he argued, had more rights and dignity under the caste system than in other societies.  

Max Mueller’s ideas were entirely in accordance with this notion of a divide in Indian history between the Aryan invaders and the original non-Aryan inhabitants. But times had changed since the early German Orientalists, and given the heightened European involvement in, and knowledge of India by the late nineteenth century, Max Mueller could not make grand pronouncements on Indian society in the manner of earlier scholars. Max Mueller had to acknowledge, for example, that Indian society was a lot more complex than just a neat division into castes, or into Aryans and non-Aryans. He also, like most Europeans in the mid- to late nineteenth century, viewed the caste system as symptomatic of the "backwardness" of Indian society as compared to Europe. He therefore admired and supported reform efforts such as those initiated by the Brahmo Samaj to overcome the divisions of caste.

In a biographical essay written in 1872 on Henry Thomas Colebrooke (1765-1837), the English colonial officer who was also a Sanskritist and scholar of Indian subjects, Max Mueller presented at length Colebrooke’s ideas on caste and other Indian matters.  

It is worth examining this essay in some detail, first, because the ideas expressed in
it were considerably more nuanced and complex than Max Mueller's own idealized portrayals of Indian society, and second, because it is possible that Max Mueller chose this mode as a convenient and, so to speak, schizophrenic way of expressing ideas that were at odds with his own romanticized India-picture. Colebrooke was also, we should note, writing more than fifty years before Max Mueller. One reason for the greater sophistication of Colebrooke's views was certainly the fact that Max Mueller had never set foot in India, while Colebrooke had spent almost all his working life there, thirty-three years to be precise. We should also note that Max Mueller did not disagree with any of Colebrooke's statements. On the contrary, he clearly considered them to be sound and wrote of them approvingly, almost to the point where they seem to be his own.

Colebrooke, according to Max Mueller, considered the caste system an arrangement that grew out of "the simple division of freemen and slaves." This structure existed among the Hindus before they came from the "northern mountains" into India. Max Mueller points out that Colebrooke's analysis of caste clearly portrays it not as something "artificial" or unique to India, but rather a natural outgrowth of social structures that were to be found in other nations, as well, at least in "all ancient nations." Social occupation was, for Colebrooke, the major determinant of caste. "Menial offices and mechanical labor
were deemed unworthy of freemen in other countries besides India" and therefore those who performed these tasks comprised the lowest class, the Sudras. The Brahmins, in turn, were a class of people who by virtue of their "superior knowledge and the austerity of their lives," had acquired power over other sections of society. The Kshatriyas were kings, princes and soldiers by profession.67

Max Mueller goes on to cite extensively an essay by Colebrooke entitled "Remarks on the Husbandry and Internal Commerce of Bengal." The long passage he selects essentially argues against the depiction of caste as a rigid and orthodox structure which hampered the social and economic evolution of Hindus. Max Mueller clearly agrees with Colebrooke's position since he describes the essay as a reply to the "erroneous views then prevalent as to the supposed barriers which caste placed against the free development of the Hindus."68

Colebrooke argued that the institution of caste was not at odds with economic development. Contrary to popular opinion, he said, the system was flexible enough to be able to respond to new or increased needs, especially economic ones. "The professions," he asserted, "were not separated by an impassable line." The three upper castes, the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and Vaisyas, argued Colebrooke, "are not absolutely restricted to their own appointed
occupations. Commerce and agriculture are universally permitted." As for the lowest caste, the Sudras, who in his estimate comprised around four-fifths of the population, Colebrooke believed that they were "allowed to prosecute any manufacture." He did argue, though, that this flexibility was due in part to the British government. In the past, for example, Colebrooke maintained, "it was [the] duty of a Hindu magistrate to restrain the encroachments of inferior tribes on the occupations of superior castes." This is, however, the only example which Colebrooke cites of social mobility that was legislated by the British. In general, he seemed to imply that Indian society was mobile of its own accord, without outside intervention.69

Colebrooke also pointed out that all this talk of rigid caste boundaries did not apply to Muslims, anyway. He noted further that Muslims constituted a sizeable segment of the country's population. From Max Mueller's writings one can hardly surmise that communities other than Hindus live in India. For Max Mueller, Deussen, and for most German Indologists, India and Indian society were virtually synonymous with the Hindus, who, in their estimation, were kindred in culture and ethnicity with Germans and other Europeans. These scholars tended to view Muslims and other communities in India as foreign to the Indian mainstream, notwithstanding their centuries-old presence in the subcontinent.
Max Mueller himself maintained that the caste system in its modern form was an elaborate strategem on the part of the Brahmins to preserve their position and privileges in society. The Vedas, which the Brahmins invoked in support of this system, provided, according to Max Mueller, no justification for this system and it was to conceal such facts that the Brahmins were reluctant for so long to make the Vedas accessible to the public. At any rate, only a few Brahmins actually knew how to read and interpret these texts. The rest knew only smatterings which they had committed to memory without comprehending their meaning and which they "muttered" at various ceremonies. Some even claimed, according to Max Mueller, that their lack of comprehension actually made the hymns more "efficacious."  

European scholars, however, Max Mueller wrote, had succeeded in breaking through this resistance and laying open for everyone the contents of these books. These researches had proved definitively that the Vedas provide no authority for "the offensive privileges claimed by the Brahmins, no authority for the degraded position of the Sudras." The few verses which seemed to point to a caste-based division of society were, European scholars had shown, of later origin than most hymns in the Rig Veda. The Vedas also did not contain anything, Max Mueller continued, to justify other social evils such as child-marriage or
widow-burning (sati). The Vedas, as he always maintained, were free of later corruptions of the kind found in the Puranas and the Tantras; they were expressions of a pure and simple faith in God and "a belief in the moral government of the world." 

Writing in the 1960s, the French sociologist Louis Dumont argued that Max Mueller's theory of the origin of caste was a "complex" one, based on "distinctions relating to birth, social situation, and degree of education." Dumont's observation, which is based on Max Mueller's statements in Chips from a German Workshop, is in agreement with the tone of the essay on Colebrooke. But it is not compatible with the thrust of Max Mueller's writings in their entirety, which, through their unquestioning acceptance of the theory of the Indo-European or Aryan family, its supposedly distinctive traits, and its outward migrations from Central Asia, point to race as the primary determinant of caste in India. The instances where he added socio-economic, non-racial factors to this monocausal view, such as his essay on Colebrooke, did not negate the fundamental premises of his work and their implications for the origins of caste. These different perspectives, even if they seemed to contradict each other, were all part of Max Mueller's ideas, and contributed to inconsistencies in his ideas on change and the prevailing order.
But regardless of its origins, caste, or rather caste in its modern manifestations, was in Max Mueller's opinion a totally undesirable institution, and he lauded the efforts of the British government to eradicate it. Caste considerations should not play any role whatsoever, he suggested, in government employment, such as the army. Soldiers of all castes "must live together and mess together," and those who cannot must stay away. Caste should also be ignored, he said, in other public institutions such as schools, hospitals and railways. That is, no assistance (such as providing separate railway carriages) ought to be given by the government to help segregate different castes. He did warn, though, against proceeding with too much haste or disregard for the sentiments of Indians in these matters, especially since they considered caste to be a crucial part of their religion. The point, however, according to Max Mueller, was to make them see that it was not, since their own scriptures did not sanction it.

Max Mueller, although on one hand a romantic Indologist who understood and "appreciated" the alleged Aryan-non-Aryan division in the Indian caste system, was also well-informed about the aims and methods of reform movements in India in the nineteenth century. He was closely acquainted with reform-minded Indians and was very supportive of their efforts. One such Indian was Keshub
Chunder Sen, the prominent Brahmo Samaj leader. Keshub and Max Mueller corresponded frequently with each other, and had also met in the course of Keshub’s visit to England in 1870.

In his biographical sketch of Keshub, Max Mueller noted that Keshub, despite his non-Brahmanic origins, had a highly privileged upbringing, owing to the high positions which his grandfather and father had held in the British government. It was also a fairly orthodox upbringing and one against which Keshub rebelled by joining the Brahmo Samaj and becoming one of its most radical members, at least until the controversy over his thirteen-year old daughter’s marriage in 1878. Keshub went against the declared principles of the Brahmo Samaj in order to marry his daughter off to a wealthy prince at an early age. Keshub, writes Max Mueller, was brought up as a Bhakta, "that is as a boy who would bathe every morning, put on a silk dhoti, and have his body anointed with sandalwood powder," a description of a devout Hindu that sounds like a caricature today but was evidently part of Max Mueller’s perception of what an orthodox Hindu would be like. Max Mueller went on to write approvingly of Keshub’s rebellion against the strictures of caste and his subsequent affiliation with the Brahmo Samaj. In the mid-1860s, Keshub broke with Debendranath Tagore, who was then the leader of the Brahmo Samaj, ostensibly over the issue of
the sacred thread which all Brahmins were required to wear, although there were other ideological differences as well. It is instructive to examine Max Mueller's account of this controversy since it reveals his own attitudes towards progress and reform. Max Mueller wrote that while Debendranath's group was unwilling to end altogether their attachment to essential Hindu or national customs, Keshub was searching "more and more beyond the narrow frontiers of India," and even looking to the Bible and the Koran for spiritual guidance. But Max Mueller argued that the differences between the two groups were not really fundamental in nature. He went on to list several moral principles and beliefs which, he claims, were common to both groups. Implicit in this exercise seemed to be a desire on the part of Max Mueller to play down the differences between conservatives and radicals, between those who held on to traditional, conservative ideas and those who professed to be more liberal or progressive, given his own ambiguous position in this regard. The ambiguity resulted from his intellectual commitment to the idea of the Aryan origins of the Indian upper castes - a ramification of his work on the Indo-European language family - and his social commitment to building "modern" societies.

Max Mueller certainly believed in the "need for reform" in nineteenth-century India. In his biographies of
Keshub, Dayanand Swaraswati and Rammohun Roy, Max Mueller presented these figures as valiant reformers who were engaged in pulling their country out of the degeneration into which it had "slipped." Max Mueller stressed, of course, the degeneration vis-à-vis the earlier Vedic past and how the reformers about whom he was writing were attempting to recover this lost tradition. Describing, for example, Rammohun’s efforts to draw his own mother away from idol-worship, Max Mueller remarked on the "hideous idol which she worshipped in the fetid air of [the] temple," and said that "in all these trials, Rammohun Roy had nothing to support him but his belief in the Veda."79

But Max Mueller presented two kinds of arguments to justify reform in a non-Western society such as India. One was the appeal to what he saw as the true indigenous sources, in this case, the Vedas. Reform inspired by these sources would therefore be a rejuvenation of older traditions which had fallen into degeneracy, that is a return to India’s supposedly golden Vedic past. The other was an appeal to modern, Western notions of what constituted a just society and the reforms that Europeans were in the process of legislating and implementing at home in the nineteenth century. Max Mueller listed approvingly, for example, the various reform activities which Keshub launched after his return from England, such as a boarding house, industrial schools, night schools, a "Normal School
for training lady-teachers," and the Indian Reform
Association "with its five branches for Female Improvement,
Education, Cheap Literature, Temperance, and Charity." Max Mueller's overall argument was that both native and
foreign traditions were needed to bring about the desired
changes. It is interesting, however, to compare Max
Mueller's views on Indian reformers who were to some degree
Western-inspired, with his views on those who drew
principally on Indian sources. His admiration for Indian
culture notwithstanding, Max Mueller clearly thought more
highly of reformers who drew on Western traditions and was
more optimistic about their efforts.

Social reform was, of course, the main item on the
Brahmo Samaj's agenda. A major effort in this area had been
the campaign against sati, or the immolation of widows,
which had been pursued vigorously in the early nineteenth
century by Rammohun Roy. This was an issue on which the
question of right and wrong, liberal and conservative, was
fairly easy to distinguish, notwithstanding the nuanced
debate that has surrounded the topic ever since. That is
to say, it was relatively easy to take a firm stance on the
"progressive" side on this question, and Max Mueller did so
in his writings.

The same progressive tone is also very much in
evidence in Max Mueller's essay on Henry Colebrooke.
Colebrooke was, of course, working as a British
administrator in India, and his approach to Indian matters was therefore necessarily a "modern," or at least contemporary, one. That is, along with his studies on Indian antiquity, he was also concerned with the need for "improvement" in Indian society. Max Mueller did not disagree with this. It is possible that Max Mueller was reluctant to challenge even remotely the views of someone who knew contemporary India as intimately as Colebrooke did. But this apart, he did side wholeheartedly with reformers who wanted to eliminate or change the caste system in order to "modernize" India.

Max Mueller was also not so naïve as to let caste interfere in his estimation of individual Indians. One example of this was his relationship with Keshub Chunder Sen. Keshub was not a Brahmin and therefore theoretically not Max Muller’s perfect "Aryan." But Max Mueller took no note of this fact in his writings and correspondence, and it did not seem to play any significant role in his opinion of Keshub. Of course, it could be argued that Keshub was high enough in the social structure to allow his caste to be overlooked. Max Mueller did bring up the issue in connection with Keshub’s promotion to the rank of a "minister" in the Brahmo Samaj in 1864. Max Mueller’s intention in this case was to point out the conservatism of Indians who thought of themselves as being in the forefront of reform. "It must not be forgotten," Max Mueller writes,
"that Keshub Chunder Sen was not of Brahmanic descent." His appointment as minister was, therefore, according to Max Mueller, an affront to other Brahmos who, "however much they might strive to be free from prejudice, could not forget [that] all religious functions belonged by right to Brahmans and Brahmans only." 85

The paradox, though, in Max Mueller’s work is that along with his enthusiasm for reform and even Westernization in India, he implies in his other writings that the structure and customs of Indian society were justifiable and valid since they were, after all, derived from the ancient traditions of the Aryans. Put differently, Max Mueller’s elaborate scholarship on the Aryan - non-Aryan divide in Indian society and on the antiquity and pedigree of Indian customs appeared to be in accordance with a conservative, non-reformist outlook on India. In his Autobiography, he wrote:

What India teaches us is that in a state advancing toward civilization, there must be always two castes of men, a caste of Brahmans or of thinkers, and a caste of Kshatriyas, who are to fight; possibly other castes also of those who are to work and of those who are to serve. Great wars went on in India, but...the peasants in their villages remained quiet, accepting the consequences, whatever they might be....86

Also at odds with Max Mueller’s apparently progressive position on India was his basic approach to the study of (other) societies as an academic field. Max Mueller’s discipline, Indology, and Oriental studies in
Europe in general, were by nature marked by elitist, conservative attitudes. They offered little that might have been of interest to a broad domestic audience or of relevance to nineteenth-century European social realities. Orientalists were content to look outward to non-European societies and study, principally, their early history, an occupation which certainly provided for them, among other things, a refuge from the fast-paced social and economic change of nineteenth-century Europe. The maintenance of the status quo, at home and abroad, was very conducive to such an exercise. Orientalist scholarship, particularly German Indology, to the extent it was political, buttressed the prevailing order by providing part of the philosophy for an aggressive nationalism that would exclude whoever was seen as the "Other."

Max Mueller, in his study of Indian society, focused on the high culture of antiquity and did not use any sociological approaches. He was aware of this, and admitted that it was the "high road, [or] the high mountain-path of literature" running through Indian history that he was interested in. This path, he argued further, was "hardly visible to [the] millions of human beings in the daily struggle of life. [The] true history of the world must always be the history of the few." To eliminate all further doubt as to his views on historical forces, he asserted that "as we measure the Himalaya by the height of Mount
Everest, we must take the true measure of India from the poets of the Vedas, the sages of the Upanishads,\textsuperscript{87} [and] not from the millions who are born and die in their villages, and who have never for one moment been roused out of their drowsy dream of life." Max Mueller stressed that it was Sanskrit that had always been the medium of this high culture. The common languages, such as Prakrit,\textsuperscript{88} were used by "women and inferior characters," for example in the plays of Kalidasa,\textsuperscript{89} a fact which, according to Max Mueller, was "not without historical significance."	extsuperscript{90}

Uma Chakravarti has pointed to this highly marginalized status of women in Max Mueller's commentaries, as well as in the society that he most admired and studied, namely the India of the Vedic period. Max Mueller, Chakravarti notes, was not disturbed in the least by the inferior status of women in the Vedic age. In fact, his picture of the Aryan golden age was a male reconstruction and glorification of a decidedly patriarchal society.\textsuperscript{91} The fact that Max Mueller supported contemporary social reform aimed at improving the position of women was not a negation of these ideas. A fundamentally conservative outlook and the concomitant desire to leave things as they are coexisted in Max Mueller's mind with a desire to be progressive and modern. If the two tendencies intersected at all, it was mainly in the form of the conservative side
checking and dampening his progressivism, rather than the other way around.

If we were to define "conservative" as supporting the existing order or being against radical change, Max Mueller’s position was an ambivalent one. Like many nineteenth-century intellectuals, he supported or paid lip service to reform, both at home and abroad. But the reforms that he advocated, and which Indians such as Keshub tried to implement, were, as we have seen, very much of the moderate, bourgeois kind: temperance, schools for the poor, and "useful" education for women. Max Mueller and the Indians he admired were certainly not proponents of radical challenges to the existing system.

Labels such as "conservative" and "progressive" are difficult to apply without qualification to the Indologists we are examining here and Max Mueller is no exception to this problem. I argue in this study, however, that the academic agenda of Indology tended to lean to the conservative side. In addition to the reasons mentioned above (p. 178), it was conservative in terms of what it sought to derive from the study of the Orient. The Orient was not studied to benefit the Orient, but to enrich Europe, principally with regard to its self-perception and esteem, as opposed to economic enrichment. This is not to imply that Indologists had to denigrate the Orient to make Europe look more glorious or civilized, as, according to
Edward Said, was the case with Orientalist scholarship on the Islamic East.\textsuperscript{92} Rather, it was the appropriation of the culture and history of the Orient - glorified and romanticized, if necessary - that was sufficient for the reinforcement of the Self.

Max Mueller, Colonialism, and European Dominance

Max Mueller's attitude towards Britain's empire in India was in keeping with what I have described as his conservative outlook and temper. For all his admiration for India as the fount of all things Aryan, he never undertook any fundamental critique of the British Empire in India. His attitude could be described as opportunistic, given the fact that he spent most of his life on British soil and the British system had played host to his professional and social successes. His criticism, if it could be called that, of British rule or attitudes was meagre in comparison to the praise he lavished on the Raj on every possible occasion. "England is at present," he said in 1892, "the greatest Oriental Empire the world has ever known.... England has realized the dream of Alexander, the marriage of the East and the West."\textsuperscript{93} But despite such views, Max Mueller cannot, I argue, be seen as an Orientalist who worked in tandem with imperial interests. A more accurate characterization of him would be that of a relatively innocuous German scholar, resident in England, who tried
his best to describe British rule in India in as positive a light as possible.

Max Mueller was not exceptional. Neither Paul Deussen nor Richard Garbe ever directly condemned British control over India. In fact, there is a tone of inevitability or resignation in all their writings regarding England’s or Europe’s domination over India, a sense that, given the way history had unfolded, it had to happen. Of the three, the closest anyone came to actually criticizing the British for maintaining an empire in India was Deussen. The one who showered the most praise — bordering at times on hyperbole — was Max Mueller, also the only one of the three who had never been to India. The ideas of these late nineteenth-century scholars on European political and economic dominance in the world were similar to those of early nineteenth-century thinkers such as Hegel, despite the very different nature of their engagement with the East. For Hegel, the Eastern civilizations of antiquity were but an episode of world history, a stepping stone on the way to the rise of the West. Hegel was never interested in Eastern societies per se. For Indologists, Eastern civilizations, at least those of antiquity, were an object of study and interest by themselves, even if they were a passing, temporary phase in world history. What they all shared was their low evaluation of, or in some cases contempt for, contemporary Asian societies.
In 1854, Max Mueller readily agreed to a request from Sir Charles Trevelyan to put together a manual that would assist the British military in negotiating the unfamiliar cultural and linguistic terrain in which the Crimean war was being fought. Max Mueller’s approach to this task revealed not so much his complicity in a militaristic cause - such a conclusion would be too far-fetched - as his essentially apolitical intellectual position. Max Mueller was not, in this instance, consciously allying himself with those who wielded power. In all likelihood, he was flattered that his abstract scholarship was for once being deemed worthy of so practical an application as fighting a war. On the other hand, Max Mueller’s apolitical stance could veer fairly easily in conservative directions, or at least in directions that were supportive of the establishment and the status quo. An example of this was the book that resulted from Trevelyan’s request, *The Languages of the Seat of War in the East*.

In his request to Max Mueller, Trevelyan made it clear that he was interested in this project essentially for reasons of politics and state. He wrote:

> I know, from my Indian experience, that a knowledge of the native languages is an indispensable preliminary to understanding and taking an interest in native races, as well as to acquiring their goodwill and gaining influence over them. Without it, officers charged with important public affairs, feeling themselves at the mercy of a class of interpreters whose moral character is often of a very questionable
kind, live in a state of chronic irritation with the 
natives, which is extremely adverse [to] the 
satisfactory transaction of business.94

Max Mueller reproduced Trevelyan's request in the 
preface to the book and added his own response. He deplored 
above all the relative lack of interest and patronage in 
England for the study of Oriental languages, compared to 
other European countries such as France, Austria, Russia, 
Denmark, and Prussia.95 Max Mueller found it remarkable 
that England, a colonial power which had so much more to do 
with the East than any of these countries, lagged behind 
the others in the area of Oriental learning.96 He did not 
note that perhaps it was precisely because of its close 
political involvement that England was evidently 
uninterested in the culture of the East, as opposed to its 
politics. England had also arguably "outgrown" its early 
admiration for Asian culture, having chosen deliberately, 
at least in India, to go the route of "Anglicization."97

Max Mueller's relationships with individual Indians, 
both by correspondence and in person, also provide insights 
into his attitudes toward relationships of power and 
inequality between the Western and the non-Western world in 
the age of colonialism. In Max Mueller's exchanges with his 
Indian correspondents, it is not difficult to perceive a 
note of bemused condescension. This attitude, in the case 
of German Indologists, should have been different from that
of the English since it was supposed to have been tempered by respect for India's past and its achievements. There was also the additional factor of the lack of German political involvement in India, a fact of which German scholars were very conscious.

Max Mueller spent much of his academic career at Oxford, and was therefore constantly confronted with the issue of British rule in India. Deussen and Garbe confronted British rule in its actuality during their travels in India. All three, including Max Mueller, appeared to use and perhaps to relish their "distance" from the contemporary reality of India to comment as outsiders on Indian society and the British presence. But when the need arose, they dropped this detachment and addressed certain issues as Europeans who knew better than Indians on most affairs, rather than as Germans who were not involved in the colonial subjection of India and therefore had nothing to say on modern Indian society. The absence of German political interests in India did, however, pose a problem at times for Max Mueller, the outsider in English society. Speaking to young British officers going out to India, for example, he admitted that while in Germany and other countries of Europe "there is a vague charm connected with the name of India," in England "a student of Sanskrit is generally considered a bore." He then tried to convince his non-German audience that the study of Indian culture,
and Sanskrit literature in particular, was worth the effort even for British civil servants. He went on to expound on the cultural heritage of India, its Indo-European pedigree, and related matters, all better suited to Germans involved in the appreciation of India than to Britishers involved in its subjugation.²⁸

There is no doubt that, in one sense, Max Mueller viewed Keshub Chunder Sen and other Indian thinkers as intellectual colleagues, acknowledged their competence, and exchanged views with them as equals. Max Mueller was anxious to point out, for example, that he was aware of Europeans "who have been in India, [who] write on India, [who] profess to have studied the language and literature of India," and who yet speak even of the most learned, the best and wisest of [Indians], of men in knowledge, manners, and character infinitely their superiors, as of so many ignorant and naughty children. Have we not conquered India, they seem to say, do we not govern India, and should we not know better than [Indians] what is the right course which Indian social and religious reformers ought to follow?²⁹

Max Mueller appears to imply here - and perhaps rightly so - that he was not one of these condescending Europeans, mainly on the strength of his closer acquaintance with Indian culture and thought, or at least Indian thought of antiquity. He, unlike the Englishmen he described, knew that "on some of the highest problems of human thought, the East has shed more light than the West."³⁰
Such a foundation for respect and equality could be a shaky one, though. To begin with, it was not entirely logical to argue that modern Indians, or modern anyone for that matter, were worthy of respect simply because their society had, in the distant past, produced works of intellectual sophistication. Max Mueller and other Germans such as Deussen were aware of this problem. They knew that however equal or superior India might have been in the past vis-à-vis the West, in the world they were living in, India was not an equal, at least not by the yardsticks of the West in the late nineteenth century. This awareness, even if an implicit one, manifested itself in their scholarly writings, as well as in their friendships and intellectual exchanges with individual Indians.

Germans admired India as Orientalists but pitied India as European observers of the contemporary scene. Similarly, they admired individual Indians on account of their being "Hindus," that is, for being repositories or carriers of the ancient "Aryan" tradition. But at the same time they saw Indians as contemporaries who were struggling to keep up with the modern, or Western, world and therefore in need of guidance.

Letters exchanged between Max Mueller and Keshub Chunder Sen, for example, show Keshub more often than not in the position of "supplicant," asking for support, respect, or approval. Max Mueller, for his part, was
usually generous in handing these out without much reservation. There is a distinct tone, though, in Max Mueller's letters of being in the role of a teacher. At times he was almost patronizing, as if to a child in need of instruction. Even in areas such as the Indian scriptures, especially the Vedas, Max Mueller suggested that Indians had not yet learned to study it in quite the same way as Europeans and therefore needed assistance.¹⁰¹

This relationship is not surprising if we consider that the Indians in question were looking to the West and Western ideas in part to rejuvenate their own society. One would expect that at least in the case of Indologists like Max Mueller, the condescension would be somewhat tempered, and indeed it was to an extent. One does not find among German Orientalists the patronizing disdain towards non-European societies expressed by colonial administrators and even British Indologists.¹⁰² But the condescension was unmistakably there, even in discussions of things Oriental. The political and economic relationship between East and West was there, not so much as a direct cause of condescension at an individual level but as an intangible backdrop.

Nirad Chaudhuri has argued that in contrast to the tone of scorn and intense dislike which characterized the attitude of many Britishers toward Indians in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Max Mueller
provided a refreshing note of empathy and appreciation. Chaudhuri observes, for example, that Max Mueller argued at length against the view that Indians were by nature given to lying or that their character was generally infirm.¹⁰³ Max Mueller did so both publicly and privately, especially in connection with the Ilbert Bill, which was proposed in 1883.¹⁰⁴ This earned him, as Chaudhuri notes, the gratitude of numerous Indian scholars and public figures. Chaudhuri argues that such views grew out of and further encouraged Max Mueller’s close and genuine friendships with many Indians.

But while Chaudhuri correctly notes that these friendships were based on "[mutual] respect and admiration,"¹⁰⁵ his overall admiration for Max Mueller leads him to overlook Max Mueller’s fundamental position of strength or power vis-à-vis Indians. In almost all the cases he discusses, it was the Indians who looked to Max Mueller for approval or support for their intellectual positions or efforts at social reform.¹⁰⁶ Indians, to be sure, reciprocated and gave Max Mueller their approval. But this approval was of a different kind. It was more gratitude than approval and was by no means as critical to Max Mueller’s position and status in Europe as his approval was to them.

It is true, from a twisted perspective, that the effect of Max Mueller’s researches in comparative philology
was, as Chaudhuri argues, beneficial or good for the Indian psyche. This is perhaps especially true if one equates India with Hindus which both Max Mueller and Chaudhuri were not averse to doing. To Chaudhuri, a "positive influence" of Max Mueller's work is that it "brought into existence a more rational and a [more] self-conscious Aryanism among modern Hindus." This "Aryan pride," Chaudhuri claims, had "enabled them [to] survive under foreign rule, [and] to despise their foreign rulers, whether Muslim or British." According to Chaudhuri, this pride lacked a "historical basis" until Max Mueller's work provided it. The argument is, however, a specious one. It holds only if one excludes from the Indian nation all except Hindus of the upper castes. The cultural tonic of Orientalist scholarship on the Indo-Europeans did not work for Muslims or the Hindu lower-castes, or other large and unquestionably Indian communities such as Christians and Buddhists, thus revealing the limited horizons of Max Mueller's school of Indology.

The notion of a pure Aryan or Germanic tribe which migrated to different regions of the world in prehistoric times was used or abused within Europe, as well, where it fueled the rising tide of nationalistic sentiment in the nineteenth century. The "clearly Germanic" nations of Europe such as Britain, Germany, and Scandinavia, or the "northern branch" of the Aryan family, to use Max Mueller's
terminology, should of course have been most receptive to scholarship on Indo-Germanic origins. But others too, enamored perhaps of the "vigor and vitality" of the Germanic tribes, were eager to jump onto the Germanic bandwagon, and even deny their non-Germanic roots if necessary.

Martin Thom has noted, for example, the strain of "Germanism" in French nationalist thought in the nineteenth century propagated by Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and Eugene Burnouf (1801-1852) among others. This school of thought looked to the Franks, a Germanic people, as the founders of the French nation. It was the Franks, the argument goes, who injected "barbarian" energy and vigor into the decaying and corrupt Roman system. Modern critiques of Orientalist and Indo-European scholarship, such as Edward Said's and Martin Bernal's, Thom argues, have "tended to view 'Orientalism' or 'Indo-Germanism' as a virtually all-pervasive quality of mid-nineteenth-century scholarship."

It is important, Thom maintains, to note the existence of other, equally well-developed schools of thought, which looked to "tribes outside the narrow circle of Aryanism to challenge intellectual orthodoxies attaching to Indo-Germanist doctrine." Carlo Cattaneo, as well as the Année Sociologique school, for example, were opposed to Indo-Europeanism. Cattaneo, according to Thom, saw "the urban traditions of Egypt, Phoenicia, and Asia Minor," and not
"Aryan nomadic tribes," as having provided the foundation for Mediterranean civilization. For Jewish intellectuals, in particular, it was important, Thom notes, "to respond to the anti-Semitism of fin-de-siècle Europe by locating an elementary form of the religious life beyond...that of Roman, Greek, or ancient Indian society."  

These arguments have parallels in India, where an even stronger case could be made for the non-Aryan origins of the nation. This is certainly true in terms of sheer numbers (if only the upper castes are considered Aryan), and also, as Romila Thapar has argued, in terms of the centrality of the Indo-European or Vedic influence in shaping the national culture of India. Thapar contends, in a manner similar to Cattaneo's approach to French history, that it is, in fact, the settled, citied culture of the Indus valley civilization (c. 2500-1600 B. C.), and not the culture of the later nomadic Aryan invaders, that should be viewed as more pivotal to the subsequent history of the subcontinent.  

We have seen earlier that Max Mueller was aware of what he perceived as the different paths followed by the "northern" and "southern" branches of "the Aryan race." At times, though, his inordinate stress on and elaboration of this construct leads one to wonder whether Max Mueller was perhaps using it to quell his own and his readers'
uneasiness regarding the divergence in modern times and the alleged unity in the prehistoric period among the branches of the Aryan race. Max Mueller knew that Europeans in the nineteenth century were busy making their "home on earth as comfortable as it can be with steam and gas and electricity," but he questioned whether they were "really so much happier than the Hindu in his primitive homestead."  

Max Mueller attempted to explain the contemporary divergence among the branches of the Aryan race by pointing to the different terrain and climate to which each wing migrated. The southern branch, he argued, went to a region that was naturally fertile and abundant. In this land, he maintained, quoting the Vedas, "there [was] fruit on the trees, [which] everyone who likes may pluck without trouble." There was also "cold and sweet water in the pure rivers." It was this abundance, Max Mueller argued, that fostered the "passive, meditative, and philosophical" side of human nature in the south, while in the north it was the "active, combative, and political" side that found conditions conducive to its growth. The European environment, he argued, was a harsh one which promoted "the conflict of interest between small communities" and "the instinct of self-preservation." Europeans, therefore, lead a "fighting life," and "work till [they] can work no
longer" and it is this work that has produced the marvels and comforts of modern Western civilization.\textsuperscript{112}

It is remarkable, of course, that this picture of plenty in the south and scarcity in the north was the reverse of what was increasingly the reality of the nineteenth century. It was in the West that industrialization was producing material abundance, while in most other regions of the world, for a variety of reasons, the pattern of unsatisfactory material conditions that characterizes the contemporary "Third World" was already beginning to emerge.

To Max Mueller, this development did not point to the inferiority of India vis-à-vis the West but simply to two different ways of life. In fact, he argued that the Indian way of life was perhaps better and not one to be despised. It is not clear, though, from the tone of Max Mueller's comments whether he genuinely believed in this point of view or whether it was an attempt to comfort himself and whoever else that might be chafing under the contemporary gap between the two branches of the Aryan family.

Max Mueller chided Western scholars who were critical of ancient Indian literature by arguing that it is not a "work of the nineteenth century," or "an enemy to be defeated." It is true, he said, that the Vedas are full of "childish, silly, even to our minds monstrous
misconceptions." But it is possible, he continued, for Westerners to discover valuable "germs of truth" in these texts, essentially because they provide a perspective on a way of life quite opposed to that of the north. It is a perspective, Max Mueller argued, that the north needs to learn in order to balance its obsession with ceaseless work and "toiling and building up our own happiness on the ruins of the happiness of our neighbours." This was probably as close as Max Mueller could get to a blunt critique of colonialism. In the north, "hours of rest and meditation are few and far between. It was the same as long as we know the history of the Teutonic races." The south, Max Mueller implied, teaches the north that there is more to life than the unending search for perfection in the material world, and that "life is but a journey from one village to another."

But for all his respect for the road the Indian branch of the Aryans had taken, Max Mueller also echoed wholeheartedly the Hegelian idea of history and civilization moving from the East to the West. Using the same metaphor as Hegel, Max Mueller spoke of the sun moving from East to West and maintained that the human race, too, had similarly "[progressed] triumphantly" in the same direction. Orientalist scholarship, he said at the 1892 Congress of Orientalists, had demonstrated "the historical development of the human race, beginning on the Asiatic
continent, and reaching its highest consummation [in]... Europe." Max Mueller's only deviation from Hegel - and this too might have been a rhetorical flourish in a speech at an Orientalists' Congress - was that he disavowed the idea of a sharp break in this world-historical movement. There was instead, he asserted, "an unbroken continuity" from East to West. He argued, for example, that even the Mediterranean, the conventional boundary between East and West, was in fact more a "connecting link" than a barrier between Asia and Europe.\textsuperscript{114}

**Max Mueller, Christianity, and Hinduism**

In his writings as a whole, Max Mueller does come across as an enlightened, secular, and progressive individual who respected all cultures and creeds. One could argue that he even took some pains to project this image. But at the same time, one could just as easily conclude from his writings that this was an individual with strong religious convictions. These convictions were, moreover, often decidedly Christian rather than universal in nature. Both during his own lifetime and after, the question of Max Mueller's relation to Christianity has elicited considerable debate, with Max Mueller himself at times fanning the controversy. While Max Mueller was not the first or only "scientific" scholar to hold religious convictions, the issue, in his case, takes on an added
relevance since much of his life's work was on non-Christian cultures, particularly Hindu India.

Notwithstanding his voluminous scholarship on the virtues of Indian civilization, it would seem from some of his writings that Max Mueller still considered Christianity to be the most civilized religion in the world, one that was ahead of others in terms of its historical and philosophical maturity. Other religions would thus be stepping-stones or transit-points on the way to the ultimate adoption of Christianity or at least the recognition of its superior merits. Hinduism, despite its Aryan origins, he regarded as a spent force with little to offer for the future evolution of humankind.

Maurice Olender has argued that Christian beliefs and zeal were intimately connected to Indo-European studies in the nineteenth century. Christianity, he argues, occupied for Orientalist scholars such as Ernest Renan (1823-1892), Adolphe Pictet (1799-1875), and Max Mueller, a pivotal place in the Indo-European universe. With regard to Max Mueller in particular, Olender charges that his "theological presuppositions" shaped virtually his entire scholarship. Like Herder a century before him, Max Mueller tried his best to accord equal recognition to all religions and cultures (including those seen as uncivilized), but could not help reaffirming in the end what he believed to be the elevated status of Christianity.
A more direct and almost violent attack directed specifically at Max Mueller has been made by Brahm Datt Bharti in an unusual work entitled Max Mueller: A Lifelong Masquerade (the inside story of a secular Christian missionary who masqueraded all his lifetime from behind the mask of literature and philology and mortgaged his pen, intellect and scholarship to wreck Hinduism). Bharti accuses Max Mueller of being a mercenary who was hired by the English, starting with the East India Company and subsequently English universities, to further their own imperial goals. They tried to do this, Bharti claims, by exposing the inadequacies of Indian cultural and social productions and thereby win Indians over to Christianity. For example, the Vedas were to be presented to the world not as the enlightened, monotheistic philosophy they had been made out to be by the Brahmos but as the source of a superstitious, polytheistic world-view. Max Mueller was the man hired to do this job of "exposing" the Vedas, the first step in which would be translating it.118

Max Mueller, Bharti argues, was a willing accomplice in this project of subverting Hinduism mainly for two reasons. One was that he was at heart a "Christian zealot" for whom the undermining of other religions, subtly or otherwise, presented no serious moral or intellectual problems. This is the principal theme of Bharti's book, as is obvious from the title. But Bharti also suggests that
Max Mueller took on the job of translating the Vedas, as well as pursuing Sanskrit scholarship in a broader sense, because of strictly financial considerations. It was a lucrative offer, and Max Mueller was almost penniless at the time. Along with this financial desperation, Bharti argues, went a lack of competence. Max Mueller’s training was inadequate, given the magnitude of the task, a fact which both he and his employers knew. He was chosen over other, more qualified candidates on account of his religious predilections, and also because he was competent in English. The content and language of the Vedas, Bharti maintains, were simply too difficult for someone of Max Mueller’s training and background to master. As a result, Max Mueller displayed all through his professional life a fundamental inability to comprehend Sanskrit scholarship. For this, he was criticized by Indian scholars, among them Dayanand Saraswati, a prominent Hindu reformist and an authority on the ancient texts. Dayanand had evidently compared Max Mueller to a child learning to walk when it came to understanding the Vedas. There is a strange irony here if it is true, as J. T. F. Jordens has suggested, that Dayanand relied heavily on Max Mueller’s translations of the Rig-Veda to further his own knowledge of Sanskrit literature.
In his correspondence with Indians, in particular those associated with the Brahmo Samaj, Max Mueller often discussed the merits and drawbacks of Christianity and Hinduism, as well as the question of conversion to Christianity. Such exchanges took place with Keshub Chunder Sen, who had founded an eclectic organization called the Church of the New Dispensation, and with P. C. Mozoomdar. While it is clear from these letters, as well as from his biographical sketch of Keshub, that Max Mueller saw Keshub as an intelligent, highly educated individual, he did not think it inappropriate to give him advice and instruction, especially on religion and Christianity.

Max Mueller knew full well that Keshub was very favorably inclined toward Christianity. It is possible that for this reason he regarded him as more progressive than most Indians. In an article in the Times of London in 1880, Max Mueller noted that "Keshub Chunder Sen has had no time made a secret of his feelings for Christ." But at the same time, Keshub was, to Max Mueller, something less than a true Christian and therefore less intellectually able and mature than Europeans. When Sophia Collet (1822-1894), an Englishwoman who was closely associated with the Brahmos in the late nineteenth century, condemned Keshub’s actions in the matter of his daughter’s marriage, Max Mueller wrote to Keshub that "she judges you unfairly, because she forgets that you are a Hindu and a Brahma [sic], and not at the
same time an Englishman and a Christian, in her sense of the word. She expects too much from you, and that shows after all how she respects and honors you." Had he been a Christian in a formal sense, Max Mueller wrote in another letter, Keshub would have had to follow Christian laws and rituals, that is, presumably, he would not have been permitted to marry his daughter off while she was still a minor. But since he was a Hindu, "though a believer in Christ," his Christian friends had no right, Max Mueller believed, to have reservations about a marriage which was fully in accordance with "the ancient customs of his country."  

On another occasion, Max Mueller chided Keshub at length in a letter for being too hyperbolic in his praise of Christ. He began by stating that a proper understanding of "the true character of Christ" was the most difficult subject in their relationship and went on to suggest that Keshub's oriental nature and tendencies stood in the way of his acquiring this knowledge. What made Christianity unique among all religions of the world, Max Mueller argued, was "a new conception of the relation between God and man," reflected above all in the idea of Christ as the son of God. The divine and the human come closer to each other in Christianity, he argued, than in any other religion, with the result that humanity is elevated to a new level. This was in contrast to the Semitic conception of God, as well
as to pagan forms of worship among the Greeks and Romans; Semitic views, as we have seen, represented the antithesis of everything Max Mueller considered good and glorious. Hyperbolic imagery, ecstatic poetry, and panegyric, to which Max Mueller believed Keshub, being an Oriental, was accustomed, were therefore inappropriate for Christ. Such meaningless and exaggerated outpourings, he said, were "a real danger in all religions, especially in the religions of the East." ¹²⁴

Keshub's own position on Christianity can be surmised from the following observations he made in a tract called "Asia's Message to Europe":

The world's manhood repudiates and puts off the baby clothes of sectarian bigotry...Only the broad of each sect shall for the present come forward, unite, and fraternize in the centre... Who can better represent this centre than Christ Jesus?...Christ's identity with all mankind is indeed a grand mystery which Christian Europe seems yet unable to understand...In Christ's bosom we are all unified...Christ stands in the holy land between Asia and Europe. ¹²⁵

While these remarks seem to indicate a definite partiality to Christianity, there was also a strong cosmopolitan side to Keshub. Thus, in an essay on "The Eclecticism of the New Dispensation," Keshub explained that "our position is not that truths are to be found in all religions, but that all the established religions of the world are true." ¹²⁶ Such eclectic ideas on religion were, of course, at the core of the Brahma Samaj's philosophy, going back to its founder-member Rammohun Roy. Ramomohun's
very first published work had been a tract entitled
Tuhftatul Muwahhiddin (c. 1800), in which he had argued
that all religions drew on the same "natural inspiration
from God," but had been distorted by the priesthood who
erected walls of dogmas and creeds to cause strife among
different communities.\textsuperscript{127}

Looking back later on his acquaintance with Keshub,
Max Mueller felt that Keshub was "more of a true Christian
than many who called themselves Christians....Only he
thought Christianity should not be confined to a small
sect, but should comprehend all religions." Moreover, the
Brahmo movement, which had been developed by thinkers like
Keshub, and its founder, Rammohun Roy, was "saturated with
Christian sentiments." Rammohun Roy and men like him knew
that "their religion was behind the time, and as a social
institution, could not stand long against Christianity."
Christianity, Max Mueller seemed to feel, had lost a golden
opportunity to make advances in India. The missionaries,
foolishly enough, wanted "unconditional surrender and
submission, not union and conciliation." Although Max
Mueller made these remarks with reference to Rammohun Roy,
they were part of his reminiscences on Keshub and extended
clearly to the entire Brahmo community.\textsuperscript{128}

We have seen how Max Mueller viewed modern reforms as
more characteristic of Western, or rather Christian,
society than of Indian or Hindu society. That is, despite
his admiration for Hinduism, he was inclined to the view that it was not good enough for the needs of the modern world. Max Mueller quoted Keshub, for example, as saying that he had come to England to "study the spirit of Christian philanthropy, of Christian charity, and honourable Christian self-denial." It was in this spirit, according to Max Mueller, that Keshub studied "institutions [for] the improvement of the young, the succour of the sick, and the punishment of criminals."¹²⁹

Keshub, according to Max Mueller, began to recognize towards the end of his life the "historical superiority" of Christianity over all other religions.¹³⁰ As for Rammohun Roy, Max Mueller claimed that Christianity had been the principal reason for his trip to England. "Rammohun," he wrote, "had studied Christianity before, he had seen its workings among the English residents in India; but he wished to see a whole Christian country."¹³¹

Ramtonoo Lahiri (1813-1898) was another Brahmo of whose moral principles and ideas Max Mueller thought highly. Ramtonoo, a close associate of Keshub, was a radical who not only took the usual steps of condemning caste and other undesirable customs but even, in Max Mueller's words, "in order to shame those who denounced beef-eating as sinful, [paraded] the streets with beef in [his] hands, inviting the people to...eat it." Max Mueller also points out that Ramtonoo was a decade ahead of other
Brahmos in discarding the Brahmanical sacred thread, a step as radical as eating beef. For these ideas, he was respected by Europeans but shunned by his own countrymen. A significant influence in Ramtonoo’s upbringing had been his tutelage by the fiery young Christian Henry Derozio (1807-1831), and "it was Christian morality," Max Mueller writes, "as preached by Derozio that appealed most strongly to the heart of Ramtonoo and his fellow-pupils, many of them very distinguished in later life, the fathers...of the present generation of reformers." Christianity was thus, in Max Mueller’s view, at the core of the Brahmo Samaj’s reformist and modern ideas.

In a letter written to P. C. Mozoomdar of the Brahmo Samaj in 1899, which dealt almost entirely with the issue of conversion to Christianity, Max Mueller told his Indian friend that "for many years I have watched your efforts to purify the popular religion of India and...to bring it nearer to the purity and perfection [of] Christianity." Clearly "talking down" to his Indian correspondent, Max Mueller congratulated him for the enlightened reforms which the Brahmo Samaj had instituted but said that the members of the Society should agree among themselves as to "how much of [your] ancient religion you are willing to give up, if not as utterly false, still as antiquated." Once the members of the movement were united, they would be able to
face any Christian missionary with confidence. In fact, he continued, they could read for themselves the New Testament and "judge for [themselves] whether the words of Christ, as contained in it, satisfy you or not." 

In this letter, Max Mueller teeters on the edge, inviting Mozoomdar on one hand to declare himself a Christian but saying at the same time that there was really no need for him to join any of the established churches since he, like Rammohun Roy and Keshub Chunder Sen before him, were already in spirit "true followers of Christ." The various churches, Max Mueller believed, had only impeded the progress of Christianity. The declarations of Keshub's institution, the Church of the New Dispensation, Max Mueller continued, had made it abundantly clear that its followers were acceptable in every way to bona fide Christians and that "you [Mozoomdar] do not see how near you really are to us." So as not "to appear to be sailing under false colours" Max Mueller conceded that he himself was indeed a member of the English Church. But this church, he claimed, was more free and independent of the priesthood than any other church. Still on a see-saw, Max Mueller urged Mozoomdar to find out whether he could perhaps join the Church of England but only as a lay member "who would stay aloof from all ecclesiastical constitutions and orders." Max Mueller concluded by asking Mozoomdar to state the difficulties which were preventing him and his
countrymen from "openly following Christ." A bridge had already been built, he said, and if only Mozoomdar would step across it, he would "find many friends to welcome you on the other shore," among whom none would be happier than the writer of the letter.  

A letter such as this generated, as might be expected, considerable controversy in India. Mozoomdar himself did not answer Max Mueller for a while but instead published the letter, along with a rejoinder, in some Indian newspapers. Some missionary papers apparently interpreted the letter as, at last, an open stand by Max Mueller on the side of Christianity. In the meantime the vicar of Max Mueller's church defended him against charges levelled at the Diocesan Conference at Oxford that Max Mueller had advocated the conversion of Indians to Christianity without requiring them to believe in "the divinity of our Lord." For many years "the conversion of the enlightened classes of India has interested the Professor," the vicar wrote, and argued that, given Mozoomdar's own statements and ideas, the professor was justified "in offering him and his followers the right hand of Christian fellowship." Mozoomdar himself finally wrote to Max Mueller that while "the acceptance of the religion of Christ [presumably by the Brahmo-Samaj] is not only possible, but an actual fact at the present moment," the matter of the name would have to wait.
Even before Mozoomdar’s reply, Max Mueller, responding to the controversy in the Indian papers and in England, wrote again to Mozoomdar in November 1899 urging him and his co-workers, even more directly this time, to consider becoming Christians even in name. Since their movement owed so much to Christianity, Max Mueller suggested, one should “be above public opinion in these matters” and acknowledge this debt openly. "The name is a small matter," he said, but added: "Only I thought that truth and gratitude would declare in favour of Christian Brahmos, or Christian Aryas." A "Christian Arya," would, of course, embody for Max Mueller the best of everything he admired in the East and the West.

In a final letter to Mozoomdar in March 1900, Max Mueller was again restrained on the question of formal conversion but strident in declaring that Mozoomdar and his colleagues in the Brahmo Samaj were for all practical purposes Christian. He told Mozoomdar that while he was definitely "not trying to convert you and your friends to Christianity," going by the Indians’ own statements and writings, he could not but believe that "you are Christ’s and in that sense you are Christians." The tone of these remarks is very much in keeping with what the Saidian critique describes as Orientalist condescension and lays Max Mueller open, with justification, to the charge of being a stereotypical European Orientalist.
Max Mueller further wished to know from Mozoomdar what defects in "our Reformed Christianity" were still preventing him and his friends from taking the decisive step. Even the English Church, he conceded in his deliberately honest and open-minded style, contained both good and bad elements. As proof of his openness, Max Mueller also conceded that there were several elements in "your religion" from which Christianity would benefit.\textsuperscript{137}

While this is certainly not a zealous missionary's letter, one gets the impression that the secular, rational side which Max Mueller presents here is almost designed to win over the sceptical Brahmo, while the underlying thrust of the argument is still that he should formally convert. "I only wish you," he wrote, "to honour the name of Christ, to whom you owe the best part of your present religion." He ended with a statement that could be interpreted in different ways: "Religion, [in the true sense of that word]," he said, "should unite us, not separate us."\textsuperscript{138}

It is worth noting that despite Max Mueller's respect for the Hinduism of antiquity, the contemporary Indians he admired stood outside the mainstream of traditional Hindu culture. Brahmos such as Keshub and Mozoomdar were obvious examples. There were other Indians, whom I discuss below, who had actually converted to Christianity. Max Mueller admired them not explicitly because they had converted but because of their work in other areas. That they also
happened to be Christians was a happy coincidence. Max Mueller also admired certain Parsis, members of the community of Zoroastrians who had emigrated to India from Persia several centuries earlier to escape religious persecution. In contrast to these Indians whose ideas and work Max Mueller saw as worthwhile and progressive stood Dayanand Saraswati, one of the foremost Hindu leaders and reformers of the nineteenth century. Max Mueller's evaluation of him was, on the whole, a negative one, mainly because Max Mueller considered his ideas too traditionally Hindu.  

Both Keshub Chunder Sen and P. C. Mozoomdar, while strongly sympathetic to Christianity, did not, so to speak, step over the edge and formally pronounce themselves Christians. Their Christianity, they maintained, was of a kind that was too cosmopolitan and rational to allow incorporation into any formal, sectarian church. In his correspondence with and writings on these individuals Max Mueller too struck a tone that was equally open-minded and non-sectarian and agreed with them that, given the nature and strength of their ideas, the formal step was superfluous.

Max Mueller took a slightly different stance, though, when discussing Nehemiah Goreh, an Indian who, unlike Keshub and Mozoomdar, had actually taken the formal plunge into Christianity. Going along with the ideas of his
subject, Max Mueller’s tone now becomes more approving and openly endorsing of Christianity. Max Mueller sympathized with Goreh’s observation that England was far from being a Christian country and that if what was being practised in England in the mid-nineteenth century was Christianity, then "[he was] not a Christian." Although this sounded "ominous" to Max Mueller, he clearly respected Goreh’s views, as well his policy of staying away from all missionaries. Goreh, like Rammohun Roy before him, was well-versed in Hinduism as well as in Islam before he embarked on a study of the Bible. His approach, therefore, was as eclectic as any Brahmo intellectual’s. But unlike the cautious Brahmos, Nehemiah apparently could not resist, by his own account, the "purity" of Christianity. It is easy to understand, Max Mueller remarks, "how this purity must have told on a mind that had waded through the impurities of the sombre worship of Shiva and the lascivious innuendos of the legends of Krishna and the shepherdesses." While such fables, he continued, were usually described as allegories, they were not "edifying" under any description, and it was no surprise to Max Mueller that "a pure mind, sickened by them, should turn with a delightful relief to the pure and fresh atmosphere of Christianity."140

Another Indian whom Max Mueller held in high esteem was Pandita Ramabai (1858-1922), who, as a widow in the
late nineteenth century, had taken the bold step of travelling with a child to England to study medicine. She did not realize this goal, partly for reasons of health. In dire financial and mental straits, she had sought help from Max Mueller at Oxford, which he generously gave. She even lived at Max Mueller's house for a while. She had also found refuge with an English order of nuns with which she had been familiar from her hometown, Poona. But this act of kindness, according to Max Mueller, did not win her over to Christianity, at least not immediately. On the contrary, she apparently told the sisters that in spite of her gratitude she would never become a Christian because in her opinion, "a good Brahmani is quite as good as a good Christian." Ramabai did, however, eventually convert to Christianity.  

In keeping with the temper of the times, Max Mueller was interested in the eradication of social ills in India such as child marriage. He therefore also admired Behramji Malabari, a Parsi, who had been active in the campaign to abolish this practice. Max Mueller noted, however, that Malabari was an "outsider" to Hindu society and that Hindus "did not like to be lectured" to by such individuals. Hindus, he said, liked to have their "[dirty linen] washed at home by their own washerwomen," that is, if they wanted it washed at all. The Hindus' own ancient books, he informed Malabari, did not contain any sanction whatsoever
for marrying off girls at an early age. The institution of child marriage, Max Mueller continued, was, surprisingly enough, defended by another Indian, Anandibai Joshi, a Hindu woman who had attained the distinction of receiving a medical degree in the United States in 1886. Anandibai, according to Max Mueller, was, like Malabari, very "enlightened," but evidently not progressive enough to be willing to condemn an undesirable practice within her own community. Ramabai, on the other hand, he wrote in a letter to Malabari in 1890, was what an Indian woman can and should be, and he urged Malabari to give her all the help she needed in her work. Max Mueller also noted that Ramabai had recently converted to Christianity - and he could "quite understand her motives" - although she now had to prove that "a good Christian can be a good Brahmani." This was in reference to Ramabai's earlier remark before she converted.  

A difficult case from Max Mueller's perspective was Dayanand Saraswati, the founder of the Arya Samaj, a society started in the 1870s that was dedicated to social and religious reform based on strictly defined Hindu traditions. In contrast to the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj categorically rejected Western and other "non-Indian" ideas. But Dayanand, as Max Mueller himself noted, was very much a progressive, even in the then-prevailing European sense of the word. "He denounced idolatry and polytheism,"
Max Mueller wrote, "he even repudiated caste, and allowed widow remarriages." Max Mueller was also aware that Dayanand's movement was attracting many more followers than the Brahmo Samaj. And yet, Max Mueller could not overcome his fundamental reservations about Dayanand's ideas and approach and give him unconditional support. The principal problem, as Max Mueller saw it, was that Dayanand was too strongly rooted in Vedic traditions to be able to effect real change in Indian society. According to Max Mueller, Dayanand's view of the Vedas as a divine revelation was unshakeable, a belief which, along with his ignorance of English, limited his horizons severely. The Brahmo Samaj, on the other hand, possessed "more vitality, more real reasonableness" than the Arya Samaj; one reason, he argued, was that they had given up their belief in the divine origins of the Vedas and were thus ready to "adopt human reason as the only guide to human truth." Max Mueller called Dayanand's movement a "liberal orthodoxy" which would crumble at the slightest contact with Western thought. The Brahmo Samaj, on the other hand, "does not fear the West; on the contrary, they welcome it," and it was they, rather than Dayanand's followers, Max Mueller believed, who would bring about "a complete regeneration in the religious life of India."
Guru Datta, a close associate of Dayanand in the Arya Samaj in the 1880s, criticized Max Mueller and other European Sanskritists for constructing what he saw as a distorted picture of Vedic civilization. While Indologists, including Max Mueller, regarded the Vedas as valuable documents, they also tended to see them as products of an early and even "immature" stage of civilization. Guru Datta and his mentor Dayanand, on the other hand, wanted to view Vedic society as a highly advanced one in which science, technology, and philosophy were all very developed. Western Orientalist scholarship, as Kenneth Jones has noted, "undercut the Arya conception of a golden age, and in so doing made Europeans the sole possessors of modernity." Jones also points out that the work of scholars such as Max Mueller was very useful to Christian missionaries who wanted to undermine the claims of the Arya Samaj concerning the achievements of the Vedic age.\footnote{148}

An interesting and ironic contrast to these individuals is provided by the Maharashtrian reformer Jotirao Phule (d. 1890), who, as Rosalind O'Hanlon has noted, consistently attacked the idea of the "glorious Aryan origins" of Indian society.\footnote{169} Phule, who was born into a low-caste family, attended Scottish mission schools, where he evidently imbibed an egalitarian and reformist outlook on society and politics. He subsequently espoused the ideas of leaders like the legendary Maharashtrian,
Shivaji, and George Washington, and the thinker Thomas Paine, whose works he studied in depth. Phule, O’Hanlon points out, drew heavily on the work of European Orientalists and was perhaps one of the earliest Indians to do so. He even accepted the historical construct of the Aryan invasions that overwhelmed the indigenes and their culture and thereby shaped Indian or Hindu society forever. But having accepted this, he parted company with those who, like Max Mueller, saw the Aryans as a noble race who brought fresh vigor and civilization to the land. Phule, on the contrary, condemned these early Aryans, describing them as "usurpers" and robbers who expropriated the land of the original inhabitants. Through conflict, at times violent, that lasted centuries, the invaders gradually subjugated the locals. They then developed, Phule charged, the hierarchy of caste in which they relegated their former enemies to the lowest positions in society. At the top they placed the Brahmin priests, who through their "exclusive" knowledge of the scriptures and the language in which they were written, Sanskrit, perpetuated the oppressive social divisions that formed the core of the caste system. Phule, therefore, as O’Hanlon notes, "turned the interpretation of the Aryan past upside down." According to him, the golden age was not the Aryan era but precisely the pre-Aryan period in which society was made up primarily of warriors and farmers and there was no sizeable priestly class. It
was the values of these farmers and warriors, and not those of the Aryans, that were worth preserving the most in the Indian tradition, Phule claimed.\footnote{150}

For our discussion here of Max Mueller’s ideas regarding Christianity and Eastern societies, it is striking that Phule, an ardent anti-Aryan, had received just the kind of education Max Mueller wished all Indians to have: Western, and Christian-influenced, if not outright Christian, and imparted by dedicated missionaries. The result of this training was also what Max Mueller wanted it to be: a progressive, secular outlook, and the desire to rid Hindu society of corruptions such as the caste system. Only Phule did this with the twist that he rejected outright the "Aryan values" that were so central to Max Mueller’s vision. Most of those who did accept Max Mueller’s "Aryan values," like Keshub, were by no means as radical as Phule. They were, unlike Phule, born into the upper echelons of society and a complete overturning of the status quo was not what they had in mind.

If Max Mueller was restrained and secular in his writings and correspondence with Indians, what stance might he adopt when addressing a strictly Christian audience? To be fair, he did not shed his secularism altogether. In his lecture on "Missions," for example, delivered in Westminster Abbey in 1873, Max Mueller did not shrink from describing the work of progressive Indian reformers as
"examples of a true Christian life," even though they were not formally Christians, and Christian missionaries in India had turned their backs on them. He compared these Indians to early heretics in Christianity, such as the Arians, who had also been denied entry into the established church but to whom Christianity was nonetheless deeply indebted.\textsuperscript{151}

But along with these secular views, Max Mueller also presented to his Westminster audience a strong endorsement of the beneficial effects of Christianity on Indian, especially Hindu society. The inroads made by monotheistic Islam, he believed, had already forced Hinduism to reform itself for the better, especially through the efforts of syncretic thinkers like Nanak (1489-1538) and Kabir (15th century). A similar effect on Hinduism, though "in a much higher degree," was again in progress, he said, through the "mere presence of Christianity," whose first representatives were secular Indians like Rammohun Roy. As for the missionaries themselves, regardless of whether they succeeded in converting Indians to formal Christianity or not, there was no doubt that they had "infused new vigor into the stereotyped life of the vast populations placed under English rule," and that Indians would be as a result better citizens of the Empire.\textsuperscript{152}

The benefits of missionary work, Max Mueller remarked, could not be calculated in precise, financial
terms. Referring to "political economists" who claimed that every convert cost 200£., he commented that every European child was born "as much a heathen as the child of a Melanesian cannibal." But it cost much more than 200£. to raise the European child as a Christian. The benefits, he argued, were not to be calculated "grain by grain," but rather like that of a tree whose fruit would be far in excess of the initial investment. In India, he said, citing one Bishop Patteson, the one mistake or tactical error which missionaries were prone to make was to attempt to produce out of natives "English Christians." Unable to "think themselves into the state of the Eastern mind," the missionaries tried to go too far and "denationalize these races." The trick, so to speak, was to change as little as possible, and thus presumably allow the religion to advance in a manner suited to local traditions and needs.153

Conclusion to Chapter

Of all Orientalists and Indologists who have written on India since the eighteenth century, Max Mueller is perhaps the most famous in India, even outside scholarly circles. Some of this current fame is due to the public relations activities of the German government, which has maintained, since several decades, branches of its principal cultural organ, the Goethe Institut, in all major cities of India. These institutes, which are called Max
Mueller Bhavans (houses), maintain a high profile as sponsors of cultural and scholarly events and projects, including the promotion and teaching of the German language. The city of Poona in western India, where German studies as a formal academic discipline was first introduced in India, is today host to the largest Max Mueller Bhavan.

The choice of Max Mueller as a modern-day symbol for cultural and scholarly traffic between India and Germany is not accidental. As we have seen, Max Mueller was well acquainted with many prominent Indians during his own lifetime. His passion for India endeared him to Indians at a time when the colonial subjugation of India by Britain was firmly entrenched. The idea Max Mueller propagated constantly through his books, essays, and lectures, namely, that India and Europe were kindred societies, bound together by a common Indo-European past, found a very receptive audience among Indians, especially Hindus of the upper castes. In England too, as even his contemporary critics acknowledged, he was famous even beyond academic circles and was considered the leading authority on language in the English-speaking world.154

And yet, despite his fame and achievements, Max Mueller turns out on closer examination to be a paradoxical figure. Of the three Indologists we are studying here, he remains the hardest to characterize and situate. While a
detailed examination of his scholarship itself falls outside the scope of this study, the similarities between Max Mueller’s ideas and pronouncements on language and those of earlier German scholars are so strong that one wonders what new insights Max Mueller really contributed to this field. That India was home to the earliest cultural accomplishments of the "Indo-European family" had been said by Herder, Schlegel, Bopp, Humboldt and others before him. It was the fundamental premise and received wisdom in the discipline of Indology in Germany. Max Mueller appears to have made an entire career out of this basic belief or hypothesis. While this simple, direct message appealed to lay audiences and readers, both at home and abroad, and contributed to his popularity, it was certainly not an example of pioneering scholarship.

Also adding to Max Mueller’s somewhat odd status, both in his professional field and outside of it, was his lifelong residence in England as a German scholar of India. This should not, by itself, have been a problem. But Max Mueller’s “Germanness,” which manifested itself, for example, in an admiration for India that was almost excessive, made him appear out of place in the English environment. Max Mueller’s exaltation of India as a fellow Aryan nation was totally at odds with British colonial imperatives.
Max Mueller's religious attitudes, especially his strong attachment to Christianity, was also a problematic element in his intellectual outlook. For all his admiration for the Vedic age in India and the religion it gave rise to, namely, Hinduism, Max Mueller clearly believed that the world was moving inexorably toward Christianity. The accusation that Max Mueller was intent on destroying Hinduism deliberately is far-fetched. But Max Mueller did see Hinduism, as well the culture associated with it, as one that had been superseded by more dynamic and mature forces in world history, despite Hinduism's "Aryan" pedigree. He therefore did not hesitate to point out the "corruptions" of Hinduism and supported those who wanted to introduce "progressive" measures. But Max Mueller's progressivism, too, was of an ambiguous and selective kind. On the central political issue facing Indians in the late nineteenth century, that is, British domination over India, Max Mueller sided, albeit tacitly, with the British.

And yet, Max Mueller does not fit the Saidian description of an Orientalist whose work is an outgrowth of, or ancillary to, imperialist projects. As I have argued in this chapter, Max Mueller, despite his engagement with modern India and Indians, remained detached from the issue of colonial rule in India. Like the other Germans I discuss in the next chapters, Max Mueller's Orientalism did not have this clear "external," or overseas dimension. But this
brand of Orientalism did engage in a different kind of expansion, one in which the colonization of time, rather than geographical space, was the principal concern. The time Max Mueller and other Germans colonized or "conquered" was the early period of Indian history, the age in which the Indo-European tribes entered India from the north and created their "southern" version of "Aryan culture." To the extent Max Mueller was an Orientalist, in the way the term is being used today, it would be mainly because he "used" the Orient in the way he wished, which was principally to meet an "internal" need. This internal need was the desire to establish an ethnic and cultural pedigree for "his race" that would be both unique and distinguished. The notion of the Indo-European family, which occupied most of his energies, met this need perfectly.
NOTES


2. See section on "German Orientalism and India" in chapter 3, pages 108-112 above.


5. F. Max Mueller, "On the Stratification of Language," Lecture delivered at the University of Cambridge on 29 May 1868 (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1868), 7. This work is replete with geographical metaphors and terminology and even algebraic formulations.

6. See pages 144-147 below.

7. The Vedas are a collection of four books, the earliest of which, the Rig-Veda, was composed before 1000 B. C. The expression "Vedic literature" refers collectively to the Rig-Veda and the other three books, the Sama, Yajur, and Atharva Vedas. The Rig-Veda is a collection of hymns dedicated to the gods of the Indo-European tribes who entered the Indian subcontinent from around 1500 B. C. See Romila Thapar, A History of India, vol. 1 (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1966), 29-31.


11. Ibid., 326, 331.

12. Ibid., 352-353.


15. Ibid., 19, 26, 45.


21. Ibid., 43-44.
22. Johann G. Herder's *Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man* is a prime example of this genre of historical writing. "Notwithstanding the varieties of the human form," Herder states in this work, "there is but one and the same species of man throughout the whole of our earth" (163-166); he returns to this idea repeatedly in this work.

Linda Orr, in "The Revenge of Literature: A History of History," discusses the disciplinary tension between fables and literature on the one hand, and "accurate history" on the other. This tension, as she points out, has crystallized since the last century around the ideas of the German historian, Leopold von Ranke (1795-1886); in *New Literary History*, vol. 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1986): 1-22.


32. Max Mueller, *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, 12-13. In 1855, Max Mueller had voiced the same ideas, using virtually the same language, in *Languages of the Seat of War in the East* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1855), 29. The findings of philologists, he wrote, had made it impossible, even for "an English jury," to "reject the claim of a common descent and a legitimate relationship between Hindu, Greek and Teuton."

33. See pages 181-182 below.


36. The Land of the Five Rivers refers to the northern province of Punjab in India.


39. Ibid., 14.


41. Ibid.


44. Max Mueller, My Autobiography: A Fragment, 144-146.

45. Ibid., 188-190.


47. Since he had never been to India, it is not clear from where Max Mueller got this information. There certainly is some element of poetic exaggeration to his description.

48. Ibid., 10-11.


50. Chaudhuri, 89.


52. Whitney, 1, 3.

53. Ibid., 27-29, 30, 32.

54. Ibid., 46, 49.


58. The universal histories written by Herder and Schlegel, for example, began with the East and moved on to the West, thus implying that nothing changed in the East after a certain point in time, while European nations continued to evolve and move into the modern period. Characteristic of the historical evolution of Western nations, according to Herder, was their ability to change the natural environment around them. Eastern peoples, in contrast, have been shaped by nature instead of shaping it.

For Schlegel, China was the logical starting point of world history, because "it occupies the extreme point of Eastern Asia." His history then moves westwards to modern Europe. Even Paul Deussen's *History of Philosophy* bears a strong resemblance to these earlier histories: the first volumes deal with Eastern philosophy and the later ones with the West. See J. G. Herder, *Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit* [Ideas Toward a Philosophy of the History of Mankind] (Darmstadt, Germany: Joseph Melzer Verlag, 1966), 160-164; Friedrich Schlegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London: Henry Bohn, 1846), 115; Paul Deussen, *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* [Universal History of Philosophy] (Leipzig, Germany: F. A. Brockhaus, 1894).


62. This standard picture is, of course, a highly simplified one. See, for example, Madhav Deshpande, "Aryans, Non-Aryans, and the Brahmanas: Processes of Indigenization," *Journal of Indo-European Studies* 21, nos. 3, 4 (May 1980): 215-236. Deshpande points to the extensive racial intermixing that has taken place in India since ancient times, and argues that caste-consciousness and caste-identity have been based more on cultural rather than racial perceptions and definitions.


67. Ibid., 246.

68. Ibid., 248.

69. Ibid., 249-250.


71. The Puranas and Tantras are collections of stories, part-mythical and part-historical, composed between 500 B. C. and A. D. 500, i. e., after the Vedas. These stories depict the history of Indian (Indo-European) society, starting with the mythical king Manu, and then trace the history of his descendants over several generations. These works are literary rather than historical and therefore do not always agree with the history reconstructed from the Vedas and archaeological evidence. See Thapar, *History of India*, 28.
72. Max Mueller, "Caste," 305, 306, 308; see also Max Mueller's *A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature*, 56-58, for a discussion of how Vedic traditions came to be distorted and "violated" in later times.


74. See pages 177-181 below.


76. F. Max Mueller, *Keshub Chunder Sen*, ed. Nanda Mukerjee (Calcutta, India: S. Gupta and Brothers, date of publication not provided), 3; Max Mueller, "Keshub Chunder Sen," in *Biographical Essays*, 51, 54. Where Max Mueller got this description of a Bhakta from, or what Keshub did as one, is not well documented in his essay; it was most probably an educated guess on Max Mueller's part.

77. Ibid., 8.

78. Max Mueller also gave Keshub his tacit support when Keshub's thirteen year-old daughter was married off to a wealthy prince, in blatant violation of the stand of the Brahmo Samaj against child-marriages; while many Indians condemned Keshub in no uncertain terms, leading ultimately to a split in the Brahmo Samaj, Max Mueller wrote to Keshub that, despite his misgivings, he "understood" why Keshub had gone ahead with the marriage. "Letters of Keshub Chunder Sen, F. Max Mueller, and Protap Chunder Mozumdar," in *Biographical Essays*, 107-112.


81. See the discussion on Dayanand Saraswati in the section on Christianity (pages 213-215 below).


87. The Upanishads are philosophical works composed from c. 700 B.C. on, presumably by Indo-European settlers in northern India. See Thapar, *History of India*, 33.

88. One of several popular variants of Sanskrit spoken in towns and villages in India from around 600 B.C. See Thapar, *History of India*, 63. Classical Sanskrit became increasingly the language of the Brahman elite.

89. A famous Sanskrit poet and playwright, who was employed at the court of the king Chandra Gupta II (r. A.D. 375-415). See Wolpert, 89.


93. Max Mueller, "Address to Ninth International Congress of Orientalists," 67. Max Mueller also frequently referred to his Indian acquaintances, especially Brahmos like Keshub, as loyal subjects of the British Empire. These Indians, too, saw themselves as such; see, for example,
Keshub’s praise for British rule in Sen, "England's Duties to India."

94. Max Mueller, The Languages of the Seat of War, iv, v.
95. Ibid., ix-x.
96. Ibid., x-xii.

97. See "German Orientalism and India" in chapter 3 above, pages xxx-xxx.
100. Ibid., 104.

102. See, for example, Monier-Williams' Modern India and the Indians (London: Truebner and Co., Ludgate Hill, 1879). Monier-Williams' record of his travels in India reads more like a colonial administrator's diary than that of an Indologist.

103. Chaudhuri, Scholar Extraordinary, 304-310.
104. See, for example, "Truthful Character of Hindus," in Max Mueller, India: What Can it Teach Us?, 34-75. The Ilbert Bill had been introduced in 1883 by Sir Courtney Ilbert, as a progressive measure, to allow Indians in the British Judicial Service to try cases in which Europeans were involved. A tremendous uproar followed and, in a public campaign, the resident British community in India claimed that Indians were incompetent to judge Europeans, given their alleged weak character traits such as a propensity to lie. The bill was withdrawn. See Wolpert, 256-257.

105. Chaudhuri, 299.
106. Ibid., part 3, chapter 3.
107. Ibid., 311-318.
108. Ibid., 316.

110. Romila Thapar, Interpreting Early India, 9-11, 18-19.


112. Ibid., 22, 25.

113. Ibid., 23, 24, 25.


115. "History seems to teach," Max Mueller argued, "that the whole human race required a gradual education before, in the fullness of time, it could be admitted to the truths of Christianity." Buddhism was an example of this "education," albeit one that would "prepare the way of Christ...through its very errors." Max Mueller, A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, 32.


119. Ibid., chap. 2, chap. 4 passim.

120. Ibid., chap. 5 passim, 77-78. See Max Mueller, My Autobiography, 174, 197-198, for Max Mueller’s own account of the difficulties he encountered in translating the Rig-Veda. See also "Prospectus" to The Sacred Hymns of the Brahmanas, in appendix to Max Mueller, "On the Stratification of Language," Lecture delivered at the University of Cambridge on 29 May 1868 (London: Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1868), for Max Mueller’s comments on the impossibility of making sense of all sections of the Rig-Veda.


123. Ibid., 106, 111.

124. Ibid., 125.


126. Ibid., 49.


130. Ibid., 80.


134. Ibid., 415-416.

135. Ibid., 418-419.

136. Ibid., 419.

137. Ibid., 429.

138. Ibid.

139. See pages 213-215 below.


141. Ibid., 140; Ramabai had been raised in an upper-caste though not wealthy family of Sanskrit scholars and was herself well-versed in the scriptures. Radha Kumar, A History of Doing (New Delhi: Kali for Women, 1993), 25-27.


150. Ibid., 149-150.


152. Ibid., 43-44.

153. Ibid., 39, 49-50.

CHAPTER V

AN ORIENTALIST IN THE ORIENT: PAUL DEUSSEN

Introduction

Paul Deussen (1845-1919) was one of the leading German Indologists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. A philosopher by profession (he was a professor at the University of Kiel from 1889 on), Deussen was not as famous or intellectually flamboyant a figure as Max Mueller. His work and interests did not lie in the direction of establishing affinities within the Indo-European family or proving the Indo-Germanic bond, at least not in Max Mueller’s strident fashion. Deussen’s professional writings were almost entirely on philosophy, both Eastern and Western, and were not aimed at a lay public.

This is not to say that Deussen was oblivious to or uninfluenced by the German tradition which viewed India as a source and repository of "Aryan" traditions that were supposedly intimately tied to Germanic culture. His work does attempt to show a bond, in a romantic sense, between India and Germany, and his interest in and veneration for
ancient Indian culture were clearly rooted in the German Orientialist tradition. But his methodology and conclusions, while firmly within this tradition, but sober, and without the zeal of early scholars such as Schlegel or later adherents such as Max Mueller. His perceptions and evaluation of modern India, which I examine here, were also colored strongly by the German tradition of Indology. This tradition, I argue, tempered his observations on Indian society and lessened the impact of the power that he possessed as a European in nineteenth-century India.

There are two dimensions to Deussen's contribution to the East-West dialogue. One is evident in his own work, in which he demonstrates the proximity of the ideas of the German philosophers Immanuel Kant and Arthur Schopenhauer to Indian philosophy, particularly that of the Vedanta (end of, or conclusion to the Vedas). While the work and life of Deussen has, on the whole, not been the subject of much scholarly scrutiny, this aspect of his work has received relatively more attention and acknowledgement than others.¹

The other less known and less studied side of Deussen's role in the East-West encounter was his lifelong friendship with Friedrich Nietzsche and the role he played in familiarizing Nietzsche with Indian philosophy. This relationship was significant for several reasons. It shows, first, that a seminal, Western thinker of Nietzsche's
stature constantly encountered Eastern philosophical systems through a scholar whose credentials were entirely "acceptable" to him. These ideas from Asian philosophy, whether he liked them or not, became part of the intellectual framework in which Nietzsche operated. Nietzsche's work, in fact, is permeated by both direct and implicit use of Asian philosophy, although this is not entirely attributable to Deussen.²

As for Deussen himself, his proximity to Nietzsche, a vocal critic of modernity, was per force a strong influence on his own thinking, in spite of differences that arose between them, mainly on account of their views on the philosophy of Schopenhauer.³ The work of Deussen which I focus on in the following discussion, Memories of India, reveals, I argue, Deussen as a late Romantic who was not totally comfortable within Western modernity and therefore sought answers outside of it.⁴ At the same time, though, Deussen's respect for Indian philosophy was marked by a certain condescension and a belief in the greater vitality of Western thought.

Deussen, like many Orientalists, began his career in Western classical studies, writing his doctoral thesis on Plato. He also received a teaching license for Greek, Latin, German, Hebrew, and religion.⁵ He began learning Sanskrit under the famous scholar Christian Lassen in Bonn in the 1860s and continued at Berlin, where in 1881 he
received the right to hold lectures (Habilitation) with a manuscript of Das System des Vedanta (The System of the Vedanta [end of, or conclusion to the Vedas]) as one of his publications. Deussen continued to write prodigiously on Indian and Western philosophy and religion, and also translated the Upanishads and parts of the ancient Indian epic, the Mahabharata. I do not intend, in this present study, to focus on Deussen's philosophical works or his interpretations of Western philosophy, although some references will be unavoidable.

In the winter of 1892-93, Deussen and his wife, Marie, travelled to India and Ceylon for six months. Private journeys by Germans to countries outside Europe were becoming more frequent at this time, thanks to the widespread availability of steamship and rail lines. Germany was also by this time maturing as a capitalist, industrial power, which bestowed the necessary affluence on its citizens to travel overseas. Accounts of these travels also began to be published and were consumed by an eager reading public. While Deussen's travelogue was one among many in this genre, it was unique in that it was written by a person who was highly informed about the culture of the country he was visiting. India, Deussen wrote, had been his "intellectual home" for decades even before he visited it. In the Memories, Deussen does not, however, dwell at any length on issues of philosophy, concentrating instead
on recording his observations of contemporary Indian society. This book, while not part of his professional writings, is nonetheless a particularly rich and valuable source, providing as it does a rare perspective on the modern Orient by an individual whose life-work lay in the study of Indian antiquity.

Deussen himself stated that one of the reasons he wrote his India travelogue was that it was possible for him, in spite of the short duration of his trip, to learn more about India than was usually the case for Europeans. This, he claimed, was because he did not share the perspectives and interests of the English, and also because it was not in keeping with his character to view something negatively, simply because it happened to be the loser or the subordinated.

Deussen's experience was unusual in the degree of its direct, face-to-face encounter between a European Orientalist scholar and India. Deussen travelled as a private scholar and tourist, and not in any official capacity. This allowed him to do virtually as he pleased, with regard to both his travel itinerary, and getting to know Indians from a wide range of social strata. Another interesting aspect of this memoir is that it is not written by a Britisher. Few Britishers in India could escape being close to, or closely identified with, the surrounding structure of power. Deussen, a German, was somewhat free
from this constraint, although the fact that he was, like the British, a European played no small role in his self-perception, and in Indians' perception of him.

Indian Antiquity and Philosophy

Deussen, like other German scholars before him, admired India intensely. The cause of this admiration, which was also his primary reason for visiting India, was what he saw as the bond of Sanskrit and Sanskritic (Vedic) knowledge between India and Germany. His knowledge of India had begun with his study of the Vedas, which he refers to time and again as the original repository of Sanskritic knowledge. Unlike Max Mueller though, Deussen does not dwell explicitly on the "Aryan theme," although this is by no means absent in his discussion. Deussen, in effect, replaces Max Mueller's term "Aryan," with the less provocative and more scholarly notion of "Sanskritic."

Deussen described his arrival in India as stepping "with indescribable emotions" on the country's "holy soil." While his travels took him to places and people that had little direct connection with Sanskrit scholarship, he attempted, at all times, to gather as much knowledge as possible about the country's Vedic traditions. Wherever possible, he visited the local Sanskrit college and had his acquaintances arrange meetings with Sanskrit
scholars or people well-versed in Hindu traditions. This had been, of course, his professional interest, his "daily bread" as he calls it, for the preceding twenty years of his life. An improvement in his mastery of Sanskrit, especially the spoken language, was one of the specific goals he had set for himself on this trip, and by his own evaluation, he exceeded his objectives.  

Deussen asserted that the philosophical system of the Vedanta "belonged to the best works of metaphysical depth" that had been written in the course of human history. Through the work of Kant, Deussen further argued, Europe had developed a philosophy that was intimately related to the Vedanta, and which also provided the scientific foundation that the Vedanta lacked. It was his knowledge of the Vedanta and his deep respect for its teachings that enabled him, Deussen wrote, to break through the wall that separated Europeans from Indians.  

The Vedanta, according to Deussen, constituted in modern times, as it did in antiquity, the foundation of all intellectual and spiritual life in India. While the lower strata found solace in the worship of idols, the thinking Hindu drew his spiritual inspiration from the Vedanta and knew that all the different gods in Hinduism stood for the one omnipresent soul, or Atman. Deussen also commented, in addition, that the thinking Hindu would relegate to his family - presumably the women and children - the
ritualistic worship of these different gods, while recognizing for himself the higher philosophical truth behind them.\textsuperscript{12}

In conjunction with Shankara's commentaries,\textsuperscript{13} the Vedanta represented, Deussen argued, a system of thought that was equal to the best Occidental philosophy had produced, such as the ideas of Plato and Kant. Deussen placed Kant above both the Vedanta and Platonism, mainly on account of the scientific rigor of his thought. But all three appealed strongly to Deussen because of their metaphysical component, that is, the underlying premise that the world as perceived by the senses is illusion, or \textit{maya} according to Shankara, "shadows according to Plato," and "appearance" according to Kant. We see in this, Deussen wrote, "the concordance of Indian, German, and Greek metaphysics" or "the same doctrine in three different parts of the world."\textsuperscript{14}

While Deussen was not as ardent an exponent as Max Mueller of the theory of the Indo-European family, these remarks do bear a close resemblance to numerous others made by German scholars. There is the clear suggestion of an affinity among the Greek, the Indian, and the German - the same branches of the Indo-European family which philologists spoke of so often.\textsuperscript{15} The "kinship," this time, was seen in the area of metaphysics, not language.
Deussen had clearly imbibed the theories of the Romantic scholars of Indo-Germanic philology.

Deussen viewed the alleged cultural divide between the Indo-Germans and all others as one of the decisive aspects of world history. But he did attach, nonetheless, great value to the achievements of the Semitic peoples, who along with the Indo-Germans, he argued, have been the two main exponents of high philosophy. The Egyptians and Chinese played limited, secondary roles, and apart from these groups, no others, Deussen maintained, have contributed anything worthy of study.¹⁶

Like Schlegel, Franz Bopp, and Humboldt, Deussen believed in a clear dividing line in language, race, and thought, between Indo-European and Semitic. The three societies whose philosophies he discusses - Greece, India, and Germany - were, of course, on the Indo-European side of the divide. In a discussion of morality and the Vedanta, Deussen commented that the reason why one should love one's neighbor as oneself is to be found not in the Bible, but in the Vedas, the Bible being "not yet quite free of Semitic realism."¹⁷

The story of the Indo-European family and its splintering and migrations away from its original home in Central Asia is recounted by Deussen in his History of Philosophy exactly as it had been told by German philologists before him. Deussen describes Indians as a
"brother-tribe" in relation to the other groups in Europe and Persia, this being one of the starting assumptions to his study of Indian culture. This Indian splinter, Deussen writes, was cut off more completely from other related groups than any other branch of the family. From its earliest beginnings up to the time of its maturation, it did not absorb outside influences of any kind. By the time the Greeks and the Muslims invaded India, Indian culture, Deussen argues, was already so rigid and closed to everything outside its boundaries that the invaders, instead of influencing the locals, had no choice but to be assimilated into Indian society themselves. The result was that India developed a culture that was totally unique and original, and therefore all the more important in the history of religion and philosophy.

While looking for India’s past glory and Indo-European heritage, it was specifically the Hindu past that Deussen was interested in. During his travels in India, at Delhi, he was not particularly impressed by the buildings and ruins from the Muslim Mughal period. At the Old Fort (Purana Quila), he was interested more in the Hindu ruins that lay under the currently visible Mughal constructions. Because it was Aryan, the Hindu past, to Deussen, represented the authentic India in a way the Muslim elements could not. Deussen, like Max Mueller, thus
equated Indian culture with Hindu culture, to the exclusion of other communities.

Heinrich Scholz, in a commentary on Deussen's life and work written shortly after his death in 1919, argued that Deussen intentionally omitted from his works aspects of Indian thought that would have appeared too strange or exotic to the Western reader. Scholz did not make this point as a criticism but rather as proof that Deussen wanted to bridge the gap between the Indian and the Western mind. Deussen knew very well, Scholz argued, that such a gap existed and was of sufficient magnitude to separate Europeans "initially and perhaps for ever from this peculiar way of thinking." But Deussen, Scholz continued, evidently did not consider these exotic and unfamiliar aspects important enough to be presented in all their detail to Western readers. Rather, he saw this exotic side of Indian philosophy as the shell which hid the universal truths that were its real core. In this spirit, he extracted various philosophical concepts from their "Indian atmosphere" and established in a deft manner their identity with the ideas of Kant and Schopenhauer. The best products of Indian thought were thus presented in an accessible manner to people whose ideas and assumptions were fundamentally different. Deussen's presentation of Indian philosophical systems was thus more than just a bland or
neutral translation. It was, in fact, a highly personal and subjective interpretation in which Deussen had a clear "agenda." But this agenda, in Scholz's view, was a laudable one.²²

Prabhu Dutt Shastri, an Indian philosopher who had been personally acquainted with Deussen, also described Deussen as one of the rare European thinkers who truly understood Indian thought and were also capable of interpreting it for a Western audience. In this category, Shastri also included Schopenhauer, one of Deussen's early and most significant influences. Deussen and Schopenhauer, Shastri wrote, "are the only two names that can be associated with a serious and systematic study of our most esoteric doctrines of philosophy." Shastri also argued that as in many systems of Indian thought, including Buddhism, the starting point of Schopenhauer's investigations was the fact of human suffering and misery.²³ Praise for Schopenhauer and Deussen was to be expected in this case since Shastri was writing in a special number of the *Journal of the Schopenhauer Society* that had been dedicated entirely to the theme "India and Europe." The Schopenhauer Society had, furthermore, been founded by Deussen himself.²⁴

But even allowing for this happy constellation of circumstances, Shastri's point was a valid one, and remains relevant to any discussion of Deussen's work. While
Schopenhauer was perhaps not the direct source of Deussen's interest in Sanskrit and Indian philosophy, Schopenhauer's philosophy and outlook had enough in common with the Vedanta to allow Deussen to remain an ardent admirer of both. Indians would be surprised, Deussen noted, to discover in German philosophy the "scientific substruction of their own philosophy" of the Vedanta. This had been done, he argued, by Kant and his disciple Schopenhauer, who had proved "with mathematical evidence" that "space, time, and causality are not, as we naturally believe, eternal fundamentals of an objective reality, but merely subjective innate perceptual forms of our own intellect." This scientifically derived insight was, in Deussen's words, in accordance with "the deepest thought of the esoteric Vedanta that the world is maya, is illusion, is not the very reality."\(^{25}\)

Shastri made his eulogizing remarks on Deussen and Schopenhauer at a time when, in contrast to the mood today, it was acceptable for Indian scholars to present Orientalism and Orientalists in a very positive light. Shastri was especially appreciative of German Orientalism. He believed that "India owes a debt of gratitude to this great country [Germany] for the sympathetic and vigorous efforts...to further research in Indian philosophy and culture," and even went so far as to describe Germany as "along with India, my spiritual home."\(^{26}\)
Ronald Inden, a more recent scholar, in his highly critical *Imagining India*, does not see much difference between Deussen and other European Orientalists, insofar as they all saw the East as the origin but not the site of the mature state of philosophy and culture. This is in spite of Deussen’s assertion that the Upanishads contained precisely the same ideas that were developed later by Western philosophers such as Plato and even moderns such as Kant. Inden maintains that Deussen saw in the “inner, imaginative thought of the Upanishads, the origin of both Eastern and Western philosophy.”

Indologists, according to Inden, fell into one of two categories: empiricist and idealist. Among the former he counts British utilitarian scholars like James Mill and H. H. Wilson, whose approach he describes as “positivist in epistemology and secular or materialist in ontology.” Opposed to this school were the idealists, both religious and philosophical, who tended to be Germans influenced by Romanticism. Hegel, who criticized the Romantics, was the odd person out in the list of Germans who wrote on India. While also very much an idealist — a tautology, since the term "idealistic" in philosophy is derived virtually from the Hegelian definition — Hegel was at the same time an idealist of a "rationalist" hue, and his conclusions on the value of India and Indian culture in world history.
resembled those of the empiricists more than those of the German Romantics.  

Deussen, Inden rightly notes, belonged clearly to the idealist school of Indology. But in spite of Deussen's benign and respectful view of Indian civilization, he too, Inden argues, like Schlegel and Hegel before him, saw Indian philosophy (including the Vedanta) as "the products of a mind dominated by the imagination," as opposed to the rational intellect. Most importantly, according to Inden, Deussen also shared, in essence, Hegel's view of the human mind and its creations as originating in the East, but coming to fruition only much later in the West.

Inden, in his eagerness to critique Orientalism, places such disparate figures as Schlegel, Hegel, and Deussen under the label "idealistic." He concludes, further, that even his own materialist-idealist dichotomy is not a very meaningful one. The two camps drew so heavily on each other's constructions, he argues, that they collapsed into one, with Max Mueller forming one vital bridge between the two schools. What all European writers on India had in common, Inden continues, was the belief in essences, as well as the view that imagination, and not reason, governed the "disordered" world of Indian thought. "The neat dichotomies of Indological discourse" were thus confirmed.
Wilhelm Halbfass, a philosopher, offers a kinder reading of Deussen’s philosophical schematic. There is in Deussen’s history of philosophy, he argues, no "pyramid" in which later developments, presumably Western, take their place on top of earlier foundations. The pyramid, rather, if one exists at all in Deussen’s framework, was "complete from its inception," and all parts of it were "as old as the world itself." This pyramid could, however, be viewed from different perspectives. It also possessed a "summit" which had to be reached by "somebody." It is true, as Halbfass notes, that Deussen saw the same essential truths, or "inner points of unity" shared by Plato, Kant, and Shankara. This was not the same, though, as arguing categorically that there was no movement or "progress" from simple to complex, a position which would refute the Hegelian view. Deussen did see Kant, for example, as refining the work of earlier philosophers, both Eastern and Western. As Halbfass concedes, Deussen was perhaps simply not sufficiently concerned with the historicity of ideas, preferring to look instead for the philosophia perennis. Halbfass rightly contrasts Deussen with Max Mueller in this regard. For Deussen, unlike Max Mueller, the historical evolution of the "Aryan family" from its Indian origins, for example, was not a primary focus of investigation.³

The organization of Deussen’s History of Philosophy does follow the pattern adopted by so many other Europeans
before him: he starts with the East and antiquity, and moves in time and space to modernity and the West. But in contrast to Hegel, for example, who clearly saw the philosophy of the East as superseded by that of the West, Deussen is at pains to present Indian thought not as the "infancy" of later, more mature systems, but as an equal of Western philosophy. His reason for incorporating Indian philosophy into a general history of philosophy was primarily, he wrote, to rid Westerners of their tremendously narrow and one-sided vision, and to make them realize that there can be other interpretations of the world than the one Hegel described as the only rationally possible way. At the same time, the strong resemblances between the philosophy of the Vedanta and that of a modern thinker such as Kant was the result, he argued, not of any historical exchanges or links, but simply of the fact that similarly endowed human beings were studying the same creations of nature. It is not surprising therefore that they arrived at the same conclusions, albeit stated and developed differently. In a manner reminiscent of Herder and Goethe, Deussen thus argued that while the study of Indian thought would expand Western horizons through knowledge of the unfamiliar, it would also ultimately point to a common humanity.
The Encounter with Modern India

By the time Deussen made his trip to India, in the late nineteenth century, there was little doubt about India's weakness vis-à-vis Europe, in terms of political and industrial strength. Put differently, there was little doubt in most Europeans' minds regarding European "superiority" in the world at large. Deussen was no exception to this rule, although in his case such perceptions were tempered by his familiarity with what he viewed as India's contributions to world civilization.

Foremost among these contributions were, in Deussen's opinion, the Upanishads and the Vedanta. His knowledge of these, he wrote, was very useful in understanding India during his trip, perhaps more useful than his knowledge of Sanskrit. The Vedas, in his opinion, had the same significance for "all Indians" as the Bible did for Europeans. By "Indians" Deussen evidently meant all Hindus, since his observation would certainly not apply to Muslims, Christians, Jews, or Buddhists in India. All "higher spiritual and intellectual life in India," according to Deussen, was based on the Vedanta. His close familiarity with and the high esteem in which he held the teachings of the Vedanta helped him, Deussen writes, to break through the barrier that usually separates Europeans from Indians. Indians were amazed, he noted, to meet someone from another country who was more at home in their holy scriptures than
perhaps they themselves were.\textsuperscript{35} Again, "holy scriptures" clearly did not refer to the Koran or the Bible, for example, which were and still are for millions of Indians sacred texts.

While it is difficult to corroborate or refute such subjective observations, one can argue that there was some element of exaggeration to them. Deussen wrote these passages after his trip, and, as is evident from the Memories, he came to know mainly Hindus from the upper strata. Moreover, his more intensive contacts were mainly with the traditional elite, as opposed to the newly emerging Westernized class. His views on the importance of Vedic knowledge in modern India reflected, therefore, the pattern of his social interactions.

Deussen constantly compared and measured the India he encountered - its society as well as its natural environment - against what he believed India was like in the Vedic age. Watching a sunrise from a train window, for example, he was reminded of Vedic verses he had learned from the Sanskrit scholar Christian Lassen in 1865. He could now finally see for himself, he noted, the vivid and beautiful colors which the hymn described.\textsuperscript{36}

But while German scholars were searching avidly for the Indo-European past which they believed was reflected in India’s Sanskritic heritage, there were Indians in the
nineteenth century who had somewhat different ideas about
the same past. Deussen's veneration of Sanskrit in the late
nineteenth century provides, for example, an interesting
contrast with the views expressed by the prominent Indian
reformer Rammohun Roy more than half a century earlier. In
1823, in a letter to William Pitt (Lord Amherst), Rammohun
made absolutely clear his view that knowledge of Sanskrit
as well as of the Vedanta - precisely the two areas so
close to Deussen - was useless and even an impediment to
progress in the modern world. The occasion for this letter
was a decision by the British to set up a college for the
study of Sanskrit. Rammohun vehemently opposed the proposed
move, declaring that what India needed instead was schools
for modern disciplines such as mathematics, chemistry, and
"other useful sciences." He went on to mock the niceties of
Sanskrit grammar, as well as the supposedly profound
questions in the Vedanta concerning the soul and the
illusory nature of reality. What the proposed school would
perpetuate in India, he said, was a state of knowledge
similar to that in Europe before the time of Bacon. In
other words, it would "keep the country in darkness." 37

Deussen, despite his fascination with and love for
Sanskrit, would probably not have disagreed entirely with
the thrust of Ramohun's argument. While he himself had
studied Sanskrit and the Upanishads single-mindedly for
years, it is clear from his account that he did not always
think highly of Indian scholars, or pandits, who had done the same. In other words, he did not believe that Sanskritic knowledge alone would produce the qualities and outlook which he valued in a scholar. In the *Memories*, Deussen portrays the Indian pandits and scholars he met as learned in a certain sense, but at the same time out-of-date, naïve and even clownish in a modern setting. He clearly did not see them as the progressive stratum of Indian society, even though from a professional standpoint it was these people he was most interested in seeking out and conversing with while in India.

At several places in India, Deussen visited just the kind of institution Rammohun had condemned more than half a century ago - a Sanskrit college. At a college in Baroda, he envied the fluency of the pandits in the language, which he said was to be expected since they began at the age of six and worked hard all their lives at little else. He noted that at a certain stage in their education some scholars branched off into language and literature while others studied the sciences, based, however, on old Sanskrit texts. These books still assumed, for example, that the earth was the center of the universe. Few scholars, Deussen comments, dared even to acknowledge the Copernican system, let alone declare their belief in it. The content and style of the lecture he attended disappointed Deussen, especially since the class seemed to
have been set up to impress him. There was also the reciting of Sanskrit poems by way of greeting, and the sitting on the floor, and writing without the aid of desks or any such support, none of which seemed to impress or make logical sense to Deussen.

While in Baroda, Deussen also happened to receive an invitation from Dhruva, a Sanskrit scholar, to visit him at home. Deussen’s description of the living conditions of this scholar, while seemingly neutral and without judgement, leaves no doubt about the sorry image which modern-day Sanskrit scholars presented to Deussen. The scholar’s home clearly came as a shock: the sparseness of furniture and other household items was of a kind, Deussen notes, that probably existed in Europe in the Middle Ages.

On another occasion, Deussen was offered a plate of fruit by a Sanskrit scholar. The fruit was, however, of dubious quality. Deussen was able to pick out with great difficulty a banana, however, which also turned out to be totally inedible, and after biting off a piece, he was forced to go around the corner and get rid of it. The material conditions of these scholars was clearly unpalatable to Deussen, and the reason he recounted this incident, he states explicitly, was to illustrate how poor and yet supposedly free from material desires these
scholars were. But Deussen clearly pitied their poverty more than he admired their presumed lack of greed or desire.40

A somewhat stranger kind of scholarly poverty came to Deussen’s attention while on a visit to Benares, the center of Sanskrit learning in India. The Maharaja (prince) of Benares, who was a patron of Sanskrit, took Deussen to visit a well-known pandit. This scholar, who lived in a garden, was totally naked when he received Deussen and the Maharaja. It was amazing to see, Deussen recounts, how this man who possessed nothing received the elegant and wealthy prince with a paternal air. Deussen entered into a philosophical discussion with this scholar, although his mind, from the moment he met him, was concerned mainly with avoiding an embarrassing meeting between this naked scholar and his wife who was supposed to arrive any moment.41

This scholar’s poverty was an unusual one, since wealthy patrons made sure he received enough for his sustenance. Even the garden he lived in was a large and beautiful one that had been placed at his disposal by an admiring patron. Apart from his nakedness and poverty, Deussen does not specifically note anything wrong with this pundit. He and wife even visited him a second time, with another German couple, and were struck by his gallant and courteous behavior towards the women. But the overall picture we get of this individual remains a ridiculous and
bizarre one. This scholar, whatever the depth of his learning, was certainly not someone Deussen took seriously.\textsuperscript{42}

Soon after arriving in India, Deussen had hired the services of a young scholar, Veniram, in order to practice Sanskrit. The scholar was evidently competent, and Deussen was very satisfied with the results. But apart from his expertise in Sanskrit, Veniram, according to Deussen, was a man totally cut off from the modern world. He had no knowledge of English and had no desire to learn it, either. He was unable to comprehend a map on which Deussen wanted to show him his travel itinerary. The study of English, Veniram believed, was impure and blasphemous, and his revulsion extended even to the letters of the English alphabet. Like all adult Indians, Deussen writes, Veniram was married but had left behind his wife and child in his village and was earning his living through the arduous job of comparing and cataloging manuscripts at Elphinstone College in Bombay.\textsuperscript{43}

Veniram's daily lifestyle, according to Deussen, was a very rigid one. Starting his day at four in the morning, he worked without eating anything until eleven o'clock, when he had his first of two daily meals. He prepared his own food and carried out all other household chores himself, as well, since apparently no other member of his caste was
available to perform them for him. On one occasion, in the middle of a lesson, Deussen noticed a certain nervousness about Veniram. The reason, he soon discovered, was the presence in the room of Deussen’s personal attendant, Lalu, who belonged to a lower caste. Veniram declared that if the man were to touch him, he would have to bathe and change his clothes before entering his own home. That an individual like Veniram, despite his scholarly credentials, was also not a respected, regular member of society in British India is evident from the fact that he was initially refused entry at the elegant, European-style hotel where Deussen was staying. Deussen’s portrayal of Veniram, while on the whole not a negative one, depicts him as somewhat odd and idiosyncratic, and not entirely "normal" by Western standards of thought and behavior.

Deussen also attended, for a while, lectures at the Sanskrit College of the University of Benares. In contrast to the rest of the University, which had become Anglicized, the Sanskrit college, Deussen noted, had retained a totally Indian character. As at Baroda, all disciplines, including the sciences, were taught solely on the basis of the ancient texts. The resultant style of teaching reminded one, Deussen writes, of European universities in the Middle Ages, especially in the way debates were settled by invoking word for word the authorities of antiquity. This in turn, Deussen observed, resulted in even intelligent
individuals becoming totally inhibited and constrained in their thinking. Superstitions abounded even among the learned, who believed, for example, that snakes were incarnations of ancestors’s souls, or that dying in Benares was a guarantee of immediate salvation. \textsuperscript{45} The works of Indian scholars therefore, in Deussen’s view, needed "correction" by European scholars despite the fact that Europeans could never attain the same level of proficiency in Sanskrit as these scholars. \textsuperscript{46}

On another occasion, in Lahore, Deussen met a group of Indian scholars with whom he entered into a discussion on astronomy. To his amazement, Deussen writes, he discovered that these learned men, still relying on their indigenous books, believed that the sun and the heavens revolved at great speed around the earth once every twenty-four hours. Deussen makes a weak effort to excuse this - since he tried to give Indians the benefit of the doubt whenever possible - by attributing it to the different appearance of the night sky in the southern hemisphere, where the pole star is difficult to find. \textsuperscript{47}

Deussen, for all his appreciation of Indian philosophy, clearly felt or acquired the belief, as he travelled through India, that he was dealing with people who were essentially naïve. This naïvete, it appears from Deussen’s writings, was evident in their social behavior and attitudes, especially when confronted with Europeans.
Europeans, therefore, by implication, set the standard for sophisticated or "mature" behavior, or were better acquainted with the rules of conduct in a modern society.

When Deussen went to Mathura, for example, he was told with "genuine Indian naïvete" that the entire Arya Samaj of the town was assembled and waiting for him to go directly from the train station and deliver a lecture. There was thus no consideration for the fact that he had just arrived in the city, and that he might be too exhausted at the end of the day to lecture. "Dear friends," he told the group at the station - using at least in his memoirs the informal pronoun "ihr" used to address children or subordinates - "it is eight in the evening, we have not eaten since midday and are tired from our trip. Look at the cook there in the white apron - he is urging us to eat dinner." Deussen and his wife ended up eating a hasty dinner and going out briefly to meet the members of the Arya Samaj and promising that he would deliver his lecture the next afternoon.

The next day, however, another deputation came to meet him, this time from the Dharma Samaj, a rival organization to the Arya Samaj. This group asked him to lecture at their society instead of the Arya Samaj, since they claimed that the Dharma Samaj had a larger following in the town. They simply demanded, therefore, that Deussen cancel the promised lecture at the Arya Samaj. Deussen
replied that he had absolutely no intention of breaking a promise he had made, a principle which, from Deussen’s telling of the incident, evidently did not mean much to the Indians. The Dharma Samaj members then demanded that Deussen deliver a second lecture at the Dharma Samaj in addition to the one already scheduled. At this point, Deussen writes, he put his foot down. He was, he told them, in India principally for his own enjoyment, and he had no intention of delivering two lectures in the same city.\textsuperscript{51}

The naïvete of Indians, according to Deussen’s narrative, was, however, not limited to their social etiquette. It extended to their ideas and way of thinking, as well, even in religion and philosophy. Deussen visited Vrindaban, the legendary birthplace of the god Krishna. He explains that this was where Krishna is supposed to have grown up and played his mischievous pranks on the young cowgirls, especially that of hiding their clothes while they bathed and returning them only after desperate pleas. This anecdote, Deussen notes, is often depicted in paintings and sculptures. The fact that the mischievous Krishna is revered in ornate temples as a god is, Deussen comments, "perfectly in accordance with the naïvete which has permeated and deformed religion and sport everywhere in India."\textsuperscript{52}

On another occasion, Deussen jestingly notes that because Sanskrit could be followed, at least partly, by
almost all classes and professions in India, some Indians seemed to think that this was true everywhere in the world. A letter, for example, was once mailed to him in Germany with the address and his name in its Sanskritized form, Devasena, along with hyperbolic titles of adulation, all written in Sanskrit. The letter did eventually reach him, though, "to the credit of the German postal service," as Deussen put it. The efficiency of European institutions could evidently cut through or decipher even the most garbled or incoherent of Oriental texts.\footnote{53}

As another example of Indians' naivete or ignorance of the modern world - the two were perhaps not unrelated from an outsider's perspective - Deussen narrates an encounter with a scholar who was a doctor trained in Ayurveda, or indigenous medicine. Deussen asked the doctor for his definition of fever. The doctor replied that fever resulted from a wrong combination of the three body fluids, namely wind, phlegm, and bile. Deussen asked him how he would cure a fever, upon which the doctor named a "frightening number of drugs which are to be crushed, mixed, and administered to the patient."\footnote{54}

In areas such as astronomy and medicine, Deussen was thus left in no doubt as to the backwardness or ignorance of Indians compared to the progress made by the West. The assertions which he found absurd were, however, based on books of the same antiquity which Deussen so admired and
whose sophistication he acknowledged in the area of metaphysics.

Deussen did note and illustrate with examples the proficiency of native scholars in Sanskrit. Although this was intended as praise, to balance the negatives — as Deussen always did in his journal — it was a small, weak concession. Knowing Sanskrit fluently and memorizing difficult texts was clearly not an outstanding achievement, since this is what the scholars’ profession required of them. They still did not, from Deussen’s perspective, possess the ability to analyze rationally and critically what they had painstakingly committed to memory.55

As unimpressive to Deussen as Sanskrit scholars were modern-day "stagings" of rituals based on ancient texts. A vagna, or fire ceremony, he witnessed, for example, evidently struck him as little more than a comic spectacle in which Deussen’s principal role turned out to be that of financier. All the three priests did was to chant, without any strict assignment of parts, verses from the Vedas and throw various objects periodically into the fire. These objects included butter, a certain variety of grass, various grains, and fruit. All in all, it was a show, a pathetic one judging by Deussen’s description, and it had little in common with the real fire sacrifice of antiquity.56
One exception, if one can call it that, to Deussen's low estimation of the results of Sanskritic knowledge in modern society was, ironically enough, his evaluation of the Arya Samaj, the same society whose members he had found so troublesome in Mathura. The Arya Samaj, while not a scholarly society, was based on the revival of Vedic traditions and its social-reformist approach to Sanskritic traditions was evidently more beneficial in Deussen's opinion than scholarly immersion in them.

Thus, for example, Deussen writes, one often encounters at train stations in India a clerk or official behind whose glasses one sees "a loving benevolence and a certain contemplative air." One could almost always assume, Deussen writes, that such a person belonged to the Arya Samaj. One could then start a conversation on this basis, whereupon "the most cordial relations would develop." Deussen writes that he did not have the opportunity ever to witness an Arya Samaj prayer meeting although he did receive an invitation. He learned, however, to his evident satisfaction, that hymns from the Vedas and other scriptures were recited and discussed at such meetings.  

When Deussen arrived in Calcutta, the first thing he witnessed at the train station was the profusion of self-styled "acsetics" or holy men along the banks of the Hooghly river. These ascetics were each plying their own
special "trades" - one had his arm perpetually up in the air, another had bound up one leg, and yet another lay on a bed of wooden nails. They were all surrounded by crowds of onlookers as is the case, Deussen notes, with tinkers in Europe. Now and then, a spectator would throw a coin at the ascetics, and this, Deussen writes, appeared to be the main purpose of this exercise.\textsuperscript{58}

Deussen also recounts how he was often asked, in informal discussions with Indians, which caste he belonged to. To this he would reply without hesitation that he was a Sudra, that is a person of the lowest caste. This, Deussen writes, was a perfectly correct answer, since all foreigners were, according to the theory of caste, Sudras. But this response provoked such bewilderment and dismay among his listeners that he decided to modify his answer to suit the ideas and expectations of the audience. He therefore changed his reply and said that he had been born a Brahmin in his previous life, but was born again as a European, because of some sin that he had committed. He now hoped, through the study of the Vedas, his visit to India, and his pilgrimages to holy places and holy men, to jump the intervening castes the next time around and be born again directly as a Brahmin. This story, Deussen writes, usually provoked mirth in his audience, although on one occasion it was taken seriously by a female penitent.\textsuperscript{59}

Deussen was thus generally unimpressed by the Indians
he met, at least with regard to their personality and bearing, even if he respected them for their learning. One of the few Indians he was impressed by in an immediate, visual sense was a soldier, an aide to a British officer in the Northwest provinces. This soldier possessed authority and a commanding presence of a kind Deussen had not encountered before in India: tall, strong, with a gaze that reflected courage, clarity of thought, and a resolve which no would dare oppose — qualities that most Indians evidently did not possess. This man, who had been promoted to a high rank in the army, was a local, that is a native of the north west region where the inhabitants were supposedly more sturdy and virile than the average Hindu farther to the south — notions which Deussen, the India-expert, had certainly imbibed or was familiar with. The ten soldiers with "brown Hindu faces," whom the local officer placed at the disposal of Deussen and his wife as protection during an excursion were, on the other hand, not as impressive or reassuring to Deussen as this man.

Deussen and Colonial Power

Deussen disliked intensely British attitudes of disdain and arrogance as rulers of India. During the sea voyage to India, his co-passengers included several young Englishmen who were probably on their way to take up positions as well-paid officers in government or business
in India. But one could already sense, Deussen writes, their arrogance. All they did on the ship was indulge in loud and boisterous fun, leading Deussen to describe them as "birds of prey swooping in on their kill." 61

When Deussen left Bombay for Peshawar, a crowd of well-wishers and acquaintances gathered at the train station to see him off. In the same train compartment as the Deussens was a young Englishman. Deussen, pointing to the Indians, told the Englishman that these were the numerous people he had befriended in a few short weeks in Bombay. To this, the Englishman replied with an air of importance that "that may well be the case, but we have to rule, and that is quite another matter." This comment, as well as some subsequent inconsiderate behavior during the journey (which was also presumably in keeping with his arrogance) did not endear the Englishman at all to Deussen. 62

Deussen never comments favorably on Europeans who conducted themselves or spoke as this Englishman did. On the other hand, while in Madras, he was very pleased with a German, Professor Oppert, who taught Sanskrit and who mingled without any inhibitions with his Indian students. 63 Oppert was, of course, a German, and moreover, a scholar of Sanskrit, factors which certainly predisposed him to socialize freely with Indians. One of the few Englishmen in Deussen's memoirs who got along well with
Indians was one who had made it his policy to "treat Indians like children."\(^4\)

One cannot dispute, however, the fact that Deussen, unlike many Europeans on an expressly colonial mission, genuinely desired to seek out and get to know Indians. Shortly before he and his wife embarked for India they had spent time at the ninth Congress of Orientalists in London. They had acquired at this meeting a large number of letters of introduction from academics, high officials and military officers. Deussen writes that they made use of these letters, which gave them ample access to the "hospitable" circles of highly placed Britishers in India. These letters were not useful, however, in facilitating close contacts with the locals, and it was such contacts which they "desired most of all." In this regard, letters from Europeans, according to Deussen, were more a hindrance than a help.\(^5\)

But at the same time, there was another side to Deussen that refrained from condemning outright the British colonial presence in India. Deussen seemed to appreciate, for example, the "stability" and the law and order which British rule had brought to India. British administration, along with material changes such as railroads, hotels, and the telegraph, undoubtedly enabled private European citizens like Deussen to make such journeys in the first place, and Deussen was not unappreciative of this fact. At
the Northwest Frontier near Afghanistan - long the stuff of exotic tales - Deussen paused at the end of the road to the Khyber Pass and reflected on the fact that this was the last geographical point of British rule, to "whose authority he had to be grateful for allowing them to travel in as much safety throughout all of India as at home."

Between this edge of the British empire and Afghanistan, anarchy prevailed, the result, Deussen writes, of the desire for autonomy among numerous "so-called independent tribes." In this region, he comments, there was no public safety, and feuds and bloodshed occurred at the slightest provocation.66

Deussen did not have to strain himself to find evidence everywhere he went of the vast political and economic gulf that separated him, the German, from the vast majority of Indians. Deussen recorded this evidence faithfully in his travelogue, without much commentary or moral pronouncement. One can discern, however, a note of consternation and surprise, as well as revulsion, in his reactions to the physical destitution he encountered. He was clearly repulsed, for example, by the sight of a beggar whom he describes as a "young, well-built man, virtually naked, with long and dishevelled hair, and his body smeared with ash in a horrible manner." Deussen seemed to be certain that this was no holy man, but rather a beggar who
was pretending to be one in order to evoke a certain response among those who saw him.67

In this respect, Deussen was obviously more in touch with Indian reality than Max Mueller, who had never travelled to India. Deussen knew that modern India was not a "land of holy men." While Max Mueller did not make any specific statements to the contrary, the image he held of India was never tempered by reality in the way Deussen's was. Deussen was also more sophisticated than some late twentieth-century observers who still consider the ascetic or "holy man" to be in some sense emblematic of Indian society.68

At the encounter with the beggar-ascetic, Deussen was also surrounded by a crowd of curious onlookers, each one of whom, he writes, tried to throw in his own bit of knowledge about the place. As he was leaving, Deussen gave the eldest of the bystanders a rupee, with instructions to share it in a fair manner. But several others at once began following Deussen and complained that they would not get anything by this procedure. Deussen then went back, got change for the rupee, and handed out a few pennies to all present in accordance with their "merit and dignity," that is, presumably, in an arbitrary fashion. "This act of justice," Deussen writes - and not without a touch of humor - was greeted with great applause. From this encounter, Deussen moved back to the stratum of Indian society to
which he was accustomed, namely that of a rich Vaisya (merchant), and subsequently attended a gathering of scholars in his honor. The smooth transition in Deussen’s narrative from the poor to the privileged and the well-off creates the distinct impression that Deussen had slipped into a mode where he accepted as natural or inevitable the country’s hierarchies, inequities, and castes.

Deussen had ample opportunity in India to see firsthand the privileges which the mere fact of being European brought in a colonized country. One did not have to be British to have access to these privileges. In Kanpur, in northern India, Deussen was the guest of a young German who was living in the city as the representative of a trading company. This encounter gave Deussen further opportunity to witness firsthand the power and benefits that even a non-British and professionally junior European enjoyed in India.

The young German, Mr. Bassler, lived in a bungalow all by himself, but had, Deussen notes, all the amenities and creature comforts one needed. This gave the Deussens a "pleasant picture" of how a young German bachelor, "transplanted to India, could set himself up in a comfortable fashion." The bungalow was located in the middle of a huge compound, and had several spacious halls and bedrooms. In contrast to his experiences at most hotels
and inns in India, Deussen found nothing to complain about in the furnishings at Bassler's bungalow. And although Bassler lived all alone in this huge mansion, there was no reason to fear for one's safety, since Bassler owned a virtual arsenal of "solid and elegant" weapons. These weapons, Deussen notes, had been supplied free of charge by the English government to all Europeans living in India. At the same, Indians were prevented from owning weapons by high taxes and other regulations. The result, Deussen concludes, was that in the event of a rebellion, a well-armed, even if somewhat untrained army of Europeans would be ready to "burst forth from the soil."^70

Again, it is understandable, though ironic, that the first thing Deussen discusses at length about India in his memoirs is the quality and price of the services available in various hotels. He also writes about the advantages and drawbacks of having a servant who would accompany them everywhere. While such discussions were certainly, to an extent, the natural consequence of keeping a travel diary, they are, nonetheless, very revealing of his situation in the colonial setting. While the inequities of India such as the caste system were undesirable to progress-minded Europeans, Deussen's travel notes show that he, like many other Europeans and Indians, also clearly benefited from these gradations and inequities. The disparity in living conditions between India and Europe was clearly a major
issue, and Deussen made every effort to ensure that he and his wife would have access to the same level of material comforts to which they were accustomed in Europe.

Deussen writes that for reasons of health, he would always select the best hotel in every place he visited in India. In some of the smaller provincial towns, there might be no hotel at all, and they would then have to stay in a "dak bungalow," a creation of the British Raj that has survived until the present day. This was essentially an inn owned and run by the state to house officials travelling on work, especially in remote areas. The furnishings in the rooms of these bungalows, Deussen writes, were quite "primitive," and the beds were "free of insects, but average, and usually without a mosquito net." The doors often had no proper locking mechanism, and on one occasion the Deussens were "left with no choice but to barricade themselves in with their luggage." Deussen found the quality of service in these establishments quite mediocre. The prices charged for the meals were fixed by the authorities, but the quality of the food depended on the "skills, goodwill, and ambition" of the cook, who was almost always a Muslim. Once in a while, Deussen writes, they would get a good meal at a dakbungalow, especially if some Indian had written a letter of introduction for them.
At some places, there was not even a dakbungalow and they had to stay at the "waiting room," another colonial creation, of the local train station. If this was already occupied, the "obliging and courteous" stationmaster would allow the visitor to stay in a train carriage. Both options, according to Deussen, were free of charge, but not to be highly recommended.\footnote{72}

Deussen does not mention, of course, that such options were at this time available almost only to senior colonial officials or Europeans. The fact that Deussen, although not a British colonial official, could avail himself of these options is an illustration of the status and power an individual had in a colony simply by being European or white. Being white was associated with authority, for example by the "friendly" station-master. Deussen too derived tangible and intangible benefits in India by virtue of being white, or European. But, at least according to his memoirs, Deussen did not abuse this power. He was, however, intellectually too incisive not to have become aware of this in the course of his travels, although he does not discuss this issue at any point in his memoirs. On the contrary, the \textit{Memories} give the distinct impression that he tried to dissociate and distance himself from European power, even if unsuccessfully at times.

Deussen hired from the start of his travels in India a servant who would help him and his wife with their chores
and accompany them everywhere. This, as he soon discovered, was the practice among most Europeans in India, and was virtually a necessity, he writes, without which it would be impossible for a newcomer to navigate his or her way through travel arrangements, shopping, and other errands. The average wage for such a servant was twenty rupees a month, out of which, Deussen notes, he could clothe and feed himself adequately and still send half his salary to his family at home. By way of comparison, the average price for a room with board in the hotel Deussen stayed at in Bombay was about five rupees a day. A room in a less luxurious _dak bungalow_ cost one rupee and the total cost of Deussen’s journey was somewhere between three and four thousand marks, a mark being at the time worth between 1.25 and 1.33 rupees.\(^3\)

Deussen and his wife had neglected, he writes, to get a recommendation from friends for a reliable servant, and the first person they employed, Lalu, did not turn out to be a good hire. When he failed, on one occasion, to perform his duties satisfactorily after having had too much drink, Deussen dismissed him, although in a very generous and fatherly fashion. Along with his dues and a return ticket to Bombay, Deussen also gave him some stern advice for the future.\(^4\)

This entire transaction could be seen, of course, as proof that Deussen was as much a colonial master as any
other European at the time. Or, it also arguably shows that he was, if not colonial in his dealings, firmly on the side that possessed more more economic and social clout, and that he did not hesitate to use it when necessary. Deussen also invariably travelled first class on trains, and secured for himself and his wife a private compartment whenever possible. His style of living, as far as his food and clothing were concerned, was fairly colonial. Meals, at least at the better hotels, were of a scale and variety that was totally out of reach for most Indians: bed tea, brought in by a servant, a lavish breakfast, lunch with cold meats, and a large dinner consisting of "soup, fish, meats, poultry, vegetables, dessert," and invariably the fruits of the season. European wine and beer were also available at "reasonable" prices, reasonable, that is, for Europeans. To be fair, Deussen and his wife did not actively seek out this lavish lifestyle. It so happened that the hotels they stayed in offered "European-style" service. The Deussens were careful, in fact, not to indulge in heavy eating, and to avoid alcoholic drinks as far as possible, mainly for reasons of health.75

To conclude from this, however, that Deussen was an insensitive Orientalist for whom India was an exotic object of study while European colonialism shielded him from the realities of the land is an unwarranted simplification. Anti-Orientalist critiques, though, tend to argue along
precisely these lines, equating in a general manner the affiliation with "white power" on one hand, and the ability, on the other, to comment on or represent the Orient in whatever manner one wishes. Deussen's high regard for the achievements of Indian antiquity was certainly accompanied by the need to protect himself from the inconveniences, both material and social, of modern India as much as possible. In fact, his semi-colonial status while in India arguably colored his attitude toward everything Indian, whether modern or ancient. His scepticism regarding Indian interpretations of the ancient (Indian) scriptures was, in part, a reflection of this.

But even conceding all this, it would be inappropriate to describe Deussen as an "Orientalist" in Said's sense of the word. First, the benefits he derived from his status in India were also available to Indians who had the means. While the number of such Indians was admittedly small, those who could afford it - for example the various princes and aristocrats Deussen encountered - did not hesitate to avail themselves of even greater luxuries than Deussen ever enjoyed, whether in India or in Germany. Later, both before and after the end of colonialism, an increasing number of Indians from the expanding middle class - not just princes - could also live in a "colonial style," even if this meant distancing
themselves both materially and socially from the vast majority of their countrypeople.

For Deussen, a middle-class European on a six-month trip to India in the 1890s, it was virtually inevitable, and even understandable, that he would live like a typical European in the colonies. What could still make Deussen the target of post-Orientalist and postcolonial criticism, though, is the fact that he was an outsider, a Westerner, whose ideas were generated in the context of growing European power - power which translated for Deussen into a comfortable colonial lifestyle in India. More bluntly, his race - the fact that he was white - would discredit, if not the content of his pronouncements on India, at least the nature of the exercise.77

Aijaz Ahmad has pointed to the unmistakable anti-Western sentiment that is fundamental to the critique of Orientalism, notwithstanding the desire of postcolonial scholars to do away with binarisms such as East and West, or white and non-white.78 The very fact that Deussen is under scrutiny in this present study, for example, in a manner that is clearly the outcome of anti-Orientalist critiques, is due in large measure to the fact that Deussen was a white European writing on a non-European society in the colonial era. If the charge of "practicing Orientalism" can be levelled at Deussen, it would be principally because he was a German and an outsider, and much less, if at all,
on the basis of his "Orientalist attitudes" - unless Orientalist attitudes are defined to be those of any European observing the Orient, especially during the colonial age.

Change, or the Absence of It

Deussen was as concerned as any "thinking European" in the nineteenth century with the social backwardness of the Orient and the subsequent need for reform and progress. At a dinner with Colonel Jacob, his English host in Jaipur, Deussen entered into a discussion on the question of child marriages in India. After some weak apologies for the practice - which Deussen was wont to offer for most things in India with which he was not comfortable or that he disliked - he went on to list the dangers associated with it, such as the possibility of the young girl being widowed early and remaining single for the rest of her life. Deussen's criticism of child marriage was fairly sober and balanced. Many Indians at the time, as Deussen himself points out, were also highly critical of the practice. Deussen's description of the practice, however, portrayed it as the result of blind, unthinking adherence to time-honored practices, such as the "rule" among all castes that girls had to be married by the age of eleven.79

There is the suggestion in Deussen's account that a certain passivity is central to this whole exercise. This
is evident in the way the marriage is planned, namely, by the parents. The bride and the groom do not have much say in the matter. The process also excludes, Deussen writes, the "magic" as well as the uncertainties of romance and courtship as practiced in the West, where "girls and mothers" try to "ensnare" a man, through flirting, ingratiation, or other means. The disadvantage of this Western system of finding a mate, Deussen notes, is that some women end up as spinsters. In India, on the other hand, this rarely happens, he believes, since arrangements are made to find a partner for everyone. If it so happens that there are more young women than men of a certain caste in a community, then some men take two wives in order to "accommodate" everyone.80

It is not clear what Deussen’s source of information was in these matters. At any rate, while Deussen seemingly presents the security and safety which the Indian system provides as a positive outcome, which prevents for example the "empty existence" of spinsters in the West, the message in Deussen’s text is, in fact, precisely the opposite: the existence of spinsters is clearly an unavoidable by-product of the dynamism of the Western system. Like a free market, Deussen implies, it casts aside some but generates, on the whole, the energy, excitement, and decision-making that is evidently so critical to Western society and that produces a "healthy crop" in the Darwinian sense.
Contrasted with this is the culturally-ordained "safety" of the East, which, as is also clear from Deussen's account, is synonymous with "stagnation" and lack of progress. Deussen also notes that the biggest problem from child marriages was that the young women, themselves hardly a healthy, mature lot, bore children who were weak. This, coupled with the absence of meat in the diet, was probably the principal reason, Deussen concluded, why Indians' abilities were generally below that of Europeans, even though they possessed the same level of intelligence. A process in which free, individual decision-making was absent clearly did not lead to socially desirable results.

Acceptance, even if of a slightly different kind, was also, according to Deussen, the reason behind the cheerful countenance of a blind scholar he met, who also happened to be clothed in the barest manner possible. Upon Deussen's inquiring after the cause of his blindness, the man replied with an air of satisfied good cheer that it was the result of a sin committed in an earlier birth. This belief in the transmigration of souls, Deussen comments, remains in modern times, as it did in the past, the basis of all Indian religion. Presumably, like the custom of early arranged marriages, it provided security and "comfort against life's tribulations," with the difference that it was a strong incentive to lead a righteous life.
It does not appear, though, that by "righteous" Deussen meant modern or progressive social behavior. Any convergence with behavior or norms that were desirable from a Western viewpoint was unlikely. The meaning or justification behind ideas such as transmigration, according to Deussen, was utterly alien and incomprehensible to the Western mind, which is dependent on constraints of time and space. What follows from these observations is that the Indian mind is not constrained by, or does not comprehend, temporal and spatial boundaries. That is, the Indian's state of mind is compatible with complacency and the absence of any desire to bring about change here and now.

As for concrete social reform, Deussen believed that of all the different societies that were emerging in India around this time, the Arya Samaj held out the most promise. Max Mueller, as we have noted, favored the Brahmo Samaj. Deussen felt that both the Brahmo Samaj and the Dharma Samaj were extreme in their positions. The former had absorbed a host of foreign and Christian elements, while the Dharma Samaj tolerated extreme indigenous views and practices such as idol-worship. The Arya Samaj, on the other hand, kept both foreign and local "corruptions" at arm's length, trying instead to reject all "degeneracy" and return to the teachings of the Vedas.
Vivekananda and Deussen

Among the various Indians Deussen came to know over the years, one of the best known from the Indian perspective, was Swami Vivekananda. Vivekananda and Deussen were contemporaries, and had in common an intense admiration for and interest in the Vedanta. The two met in Kiel and London, and Vivekananda also met Max Mueller several times at Oxford. In the following section, I examine the encounter between Vivekananda and Deussen, and also contrast their views on various subjects, both Indian and otherwise.

In an essay on the Orientalist scholar Christian Lassen, Deussen, and Max Mueller, probably written in the late nineteenth century, Vivekananda appeared almost to anticipate later attacks on Orientalists. Describing these scholars as "heroic," Vivekananda wondered "what interest except their pure and unselfish love of knowledge could German scholars have had at that time in Indian literature." Scholars such as Max Mueller and Deussen, Vivekananda wrote, were India's "truest friends," whose attitude to Indian culture was "reverential, sympathetic, and learned." It was precisely such genuine friends, he argued, whose help India needed very much.82

During his travels to Europe and America, it was Vivekananda's characteristic style to embrace people and ideas of all stripes without hostility or rancor of any
kind. His comments on Deussen and Max Mueller make one suspect, though, that there were, in his view, other Europeans who did not have the same love and admiration for India. Being German probably helped Max Mueller and Deussen since it eliminated any political animosity that might have resulted from a colonial relationship.

From the German point of view, as well, the absence of colonial connections certainly helped German scholars to strike up personal relationships with Indians and even court them in a manner which might not have "befitted" an Englishman at the time. While in Kiel, Prabhu Dutt Shastri was a close friend of Deussen. The two took walks together to the Kiel canal, during which they sometimes spoke in Sanskrit and Deussen recited passages from the Gita and the Upanishads. Deussen's encounter with Vivekananda during the latter's visit to Europe in 1896 was another example of Deussen's unconstrained interaction with Indians. Deussen's relaxed and uninhibited attitude toward Indians was, as we have seen, reflected in his account of his Indian travels. But whatever residual or unavoidable colonial attitudes he may have displayed while in India, at home in Kiel, removed from the colonial setting, Deussen was, at least by one account, even more enthusiastic about welcoming and cultivating Indians in an informal and cordial manner.

When Vivekananda arrived in Kiel from London, Deussen at once sent him an invitation to join the Deussens for
breakfast at their residence the next day. Vivekananda and his party accepted and reached Deussen's house at ten o'clock the following morning. The two soon entered into a discussion of Sanskrit, the Vedanta, the valuable work done by Max Mueller, and other such matters. Deussen read to the Swami some of his favorite passages from the Upanishads, as well as from a talk Deussen had delivered before the Bombay branch of the Royal Asiatic Society in 1893, and remarked that a new movement seemed to be under way which would "in the future, make India the spiritual leader of the nations."^84

Deussen's attitude toward Vivekananda, at least at a professional level, was quite different from his reactions to most Indian scholars he met during his Indian journey. Whether this was because, as I have suggested, he was in a setting where power considerations did not enter the picture, or whether it was due to Vivekananda's own style and personality is hard to tell. Certainly, in sharp contrast to the nebulous and unscientific style which, according to Deussen, characterized the discourse of the pundits he met in India, Vivekananda appeared to possess a sharpness of mind and a rational, quietly persuasive style of argument which appealed to Deussen. Discussing some translations Deussen was doing, Vivekananda said that "clearness of definition" was of greater importance than elegance. Although the two disagreed on the rendering of
some passages, Deussen was eventually convinced by Vivekananda's "vigorous and lucid interpretations, ...his firmness of conviction, and yet such delicacy of perception," qualities which, going by Deussen's journal, were totally lacking in the scholars he talked to in India.\(^5\)

After these conversations, when Vivekananda wished to take leave, Deussen and his wife apparently insisted that he stay for dinner and subsequently for a birthday party for the Deussen's three-year old daughter Erica. The party was a lively one, and the Deussens entertained and made their guests feel at home in every way possible. Vivekananda later described as "one of the most pleasing episodes in my life" the time he had spent in Kiel (and later in England) with "the ardent Vedantist" Deussen, his gentle wife, ... and his little daughter.\(^6\) Vivekananda's day with the Deussens continued even after the birthday party with a trip to an industrial exhibition in the city of Kiel. At Deussen's insistence, the party spent the next day as well sightseeing in and around Kiel.\(^7\)

As Vivekananda made plans to return to London after his trip to the Continent, Deussen tried to persuade him to extend his stay in Kiel so that they might be able to discuss philosophical matters further. As Vivekananda was not in a position to do this, since he wanted to "put his work on a solid basis before returning to India," Deussen
announced his intention to meet him again at Hamburg and then accompany him, via Holland, to London. In Holland, Deussen and the Swami’s party spent three days in Amsterdam visiting the art galleries, among other things.88

Deussen then accompanied them to London, where they spent several weeks in separate establishments. During this time, Deussen and Vivekananda met frequently to discuss Indian philosophy, especially the Vedanta. According to the author of this account, Deussen realized as a result of his discussions with Vivekananda that "one must become deoccidentalized, as it were, in order to master the spirit of the Hindu philosophical systems."89 The striking aspect of this entire encounter is that Deussen, who while in India was concerned mainly with getting away from people who wanted to spend too much time with him, was the pursuer, so to speak, of Vivekananda.

At the same time, Deussen’s relationship with Vivekananda was also arguably tinged with a certain condescension and European arrogance. Deussen had clearly been willing to spend a considerable length of time with Vivekananda to discuss matters of professional interest. And judging by his eagerness at the time to travel from one place to another with Vivekananda, he certainly did not consider this exchange a waste of time. Writing several years later, though, in his autobiography, Deussen
presented at least some aspects of the encounter in a somewhat different light.\textsuperscript{90}

In Amsterdam, where he had accompanied Vivekananda and his party, Deussen's autobiography notes that he had to conduct negotiations for hotel rooms since none of his companions knew Dutch. He requested two single rooms and one double, but since all that was available were two double rooms, he was forced, "for good or bad, to share one of the rooms with our brown brother from the East." He did this with strong misgivings, since, he wrote, "the memory of Indian ways that I retained from my trip to India was still vivid." His fears were evidently confirmed when the first thing "the holy man did ...was to light a short English pipe." Deussen therefore had to open the door and window, and "give him a little lecture" on the harmful effects of sleeping in a room full of smoke. Of course, the entire episode could have been avoided, we may note, if Deussen had not invited himself along.\textsuperscript{91}

Deussen was also amused by the fact that Vivekananda, who was supposed to be an Indian "saint," was "somewhat impetuous in character, a young man abounding with health, with full red cheeks." Vivekananda was also evidently not constrained in his diet by caste considerations or ascetic leanings, a fact which Deussen duly noted. At a restaurant in Amsterdam, Deussen and the others each took one serving of a dish for themselves, since the prices were high.
Vivekananda, though, Deussen recalled, did not hesitate to help himself to two servings. To add to the irony, as a saint, he did not have any money with him, and his English hosts therefore paid his bill.\textsuperscript{92}

Deussen once confronted Vivekananda with the observation that as a person who "ate well, drank well, smoked all day, and deprived himself of nothing," he was indeed "a queer sort of saint." To this Vivekananda replied that he did in fact adhere to the two vows he had made, namely to avoid gold (money) and abstain from sex. Deussen comments that it was easy for him to avoid money, since others paid for him. As for the second vow, Deussen wrote that "like many a young Catholic priest overflowing with vitality and health, he exerted himself bravely to struggle against the temptations of the flesh."\textsuperscript{93} While these comments were not entirely caustic, they are reminiscent of the descriptions in his \textit{Memories} of odd and comic holy men.

Of his exchanges with Vivekananda on professional matters, Deussen wrote almost nothing in his autobiography, except to say that in England "they met every day and did many things together." An English acquaintance of Vivekananda noted at the time that the Swami’s warm references in a letter to his friendship with Deussen was "very good news – for Deussen."\textsuperscript{94}
The enthusiasm and warmth which Deussen supposedly displayed toward Vivekananda was either somewhat exaggerated by the authors, one Mrs. Sevier and her husband Captain Sevier, who were probably Vivekananda’s admirers, or was perhaps no longer sharp enough in Deussen’s memory to be reflected in his autobiography. It is likely that the Seviers were eager, like disciples of any master, to portray Vivekananda in as favorable a light as possible, and in particular to document the respect and admiration he received even from Europeans. But even allowing for this, the fact remains that Deussen did not shun Vivekananda’s company. Rather, as we have seen, the opposite was the case.

Besides being well acquainted with Indian philosophy, Deussen, having travelled to India, was also aware of current social and political conditions in India. Deussen did evidently bring up the subject of India’s “terrible poverty” and its beggars in his conversations with Vivekananda, but according to S. N. Dhar, a biographer of Vivekananda, he was “discreet” on the topic of India’s abject condition and the “state of appalling poverty to which she had been reduced under British rule.” Dhar suggests that the “friendly and prolonged discussions” between the two did not result in either a concurrence of views on questions of Indian philosophy or a candid discussion of India’s political subjection to a European
power. Citing Romain Rolland, Dhar notes that Deussen may not have fully understood "the tragic seriousness that lay at the bottom of [Vivekananda's] heart, obsessed as it was by his miserable people."  

Germans, Dhar argues, had also begun to favor the more militant wing of the Indian nationalist movement, and Deussen was at pains to stay away from such questions, especially in the company of the ex-British Army officer Captain Sevier. In contrast to Max Mueller, Dhar notes, who was well-connected in British government circles and could therefore express freely his views on India, Deussen needed "the good graces of Anglo-Indian officials and the sympathies of fellow Orientalists in England." Deussen, Dhar concludes, therefore had to be cautious in expressing any political views before an Indian who was perhaps "not in the good books of the rulers of his country." Dhar finds, on the whole, Deussen's "reticence" in his autobiography on the subject of Vivekananda somewhat puzzling. While Dhar's arguments are plausible, it is equally likely that Deussen's primary interest in meeting Vivekananda was to discuss his professional interest, namely philosophy, and that contemporary political issues were not uppermost in his mind.

Vivekananda, for his part, had acquired considerable familiarity with contemporary political conditions in Europe. He knew well that Germany was making rapid strides
as a major economic and military power, to the point perhaps where it would surpass Britain. Just before their visit to Kiel, Vivekananda and his entourage had travelled to Cologne and Berlin, the German capital. While in Kiel, Vivekananda visited an industrial exhibition and a newly opened harbor and canal. The latter were of strategic significance for the German navy. Dhar writes that their "formal opening with much fanfare by the Kaiser had caused uneasiness in England." We do not know whether Vivekananda was aware of such views or was informed about them by Deussen. At any rate, Vivekananda was very impressed by Germany’s material prowess, which he contrasted – in keeping with popular European wisdom – with the "softer," but more "civilized and artistic" society of France. He later noted:

Today Germany is dictator to all Europe, her place is above all!...Germany has given man and woman compulsory education, making illiteracy punishable by law, and today she is enjoying the fruits of that tree. The German army is the foremost in reputation...German manufacture of commodities has beaten even England! German merchandise and the Germans themselves are slowly obtaining a monopoly even in the English colonies. At the behest of the German Emperor all the nations have ungrudgingly submitted to the lead of the German Generalissimo in the battle-fields of China!

If the encounter with Indian reality and the country’s destitution shaped Deussen’s attitudes toward India and Indians, did the prosperity of Germany have any impact on Vivekananda’s interaction with Deussen? In other words, did this encounter between an Orientalist and an
"Occidentalist" take place in a vacuum, divorced from the political and social background of the personae? The answer, I believe, is that political and social factors in the grand sense did not play a significant part in their interaction. This does not imply a total refutation of the anti-Orientalist position, since even in this innocuous and relatively insignificant encounter, some sense of "who is where on the power spectrum" was not altogether absent.

Deussen was right, in a way, about Vivekananda being a queer sort of saint and not conforming to the stereotypical, Orientalist image of an Indian holy man or, indeed, to any stereotypical "Eastern" personality type. Vivekananda is perhaps the only Hindu spiritualist ever to have condemned the vegetarianism that is supposedly characteristic of Hindu lifestyles. Although "the taking of life is undoubtedly sinful," he said, vegetarianism led to a weak and passive outlook, one that was totally inappropriate for the modern world. Deussen too, as we have seen earlier, believed that a meat-based diet would be beneficial for Indians. The fact of being ruled by a predominantly meat-eating nation obviously weighed heavily on Vivekananda. "The slavery of a thousand years," he maintained, "was more dreadful than the [lives of millions of animals]." Japan, in his opinion, was a good example of what a nourishing, non-vegetarian diet could do.
Vivekananda was an iconoclast, irreverent when necessary toward his own society and religion as well as toward the West, even to the point of being arrogant. His personality defied Orientalist imageries, and what he said about Hindu society was often sharply at odds with the sympathy and respect which Orientalists always professed for Indian culture. And yet, on other occasions, he expressed views which showed how well he had absorbed Orientalist "wisdom" about India and the East. These contradictions did not, however, produce incoherence. Rather, he used them to very positive effect. Deussen, during his Indian travels, had encountered few people with as much self-assurance and flamboyance as Vivekananda. On the contrary, timidity, a desire to please Europeans, and a lack of dignified bearing had struck Deussen as characteristic of most Indians.

In contrast to the praise heaped on Hinduism by German Orientalists, who saw it as a strong, Aryan religion, Vivekananda criticized Hinduism ferociously on numerous occasions, especially the Orientalist clichés about its noble Indo-Germanic origins and exalted status. He mocked the Hindu disdain for "material civilization," arguing that it was a case of sour grapes. It is possible, he continued, that there were a few hundred thousand truly spiritual people in India. But this was no reason for the remaining millions to suffer needlessly from material
deprivations or conquest by foreign nations who were better versed in material skills. "I do not believe in a God," he wrote, "who cannot give me bread here, giving me eternal bliss in heaven!" At least in its present state, i.e., removed from its original form in the scriptures, Hinduism, Vivekananda claimed, "was neither the path of knowledge, nor that of reason," but rather "a dire irreligion of 'don't touchism.'"  

Vivekananda also ridiculed the theory originated by Orientalists and eagerly accepted by Indians of the Indo-European, Aryan origins of Indians. Reminiscing on his European travels, Vivekananda noted that in Europe the same regulations applied to all "natives," regardless of their caste back in India. Half-angry, half-jesting, Vivekananda thanked the English government for making him feel "for a moment at least...one with the whole body of natives," particularly since he was not of the "Aryan," Brahmin caste to begin with. It was currently the fashion, he noted, for people of all social classes and callings in India to claim Aryan ancestry and then make outrageous claims - presumably similar to the assertions Orientalists were making in more sober and scientific language. Indians claimed for example, Vivekananda wrote, that they and the English were "cousins-german" to each other, and they had come to the country from outside, like the English. Even their "forefathers looked just like the English, only living under the
tropical sun of India has made them black!" Evil customs, Vivekananda joked, such as child-marriage and image worship were corruptions introduced by non-Aryan peoples.102

But while all this was meant to be a joke, he could also at times take the Aryan – non-Aryan distinction quite seriously. Writing in the same Memoirs in which he made these remarks, he described the people of Turkey (which he visited during his travels) as a cross between "Aryan and Semitic" stock. Their intermingling with "Sanskrit-speaking races" and the people of Kandahar and Persia, Vivekananda wrote, had produced people such as the Afghans "to whom war is a passion and who have frequently oppressed India." In Persia, the cause of the country’s present malaise, he wrote, was that the rulers were of "uncivilized, Turkish stock," while their subjects were

the descendants of the highly civilized ancient Persians, who were Aryans. In this way, the Empire of Constantinople, the last political arena of the Greeks and the Romans, the descendants of civilized Aryans – has been ruined under the blasting feet of powerful, barbarous Turkey. The Mogul Emperors of India were exceptions...perhaps that was due to an admixture of Hindu ideas and Hindu blood.103

Along with this low regard for nations he considered non-Aryan, Vivekananda, for all his universalism and cosmopolitanism, – like Deussen – also held Islamic societies in contempt. Still on the subject of the Turks, Vivekananda wrote that they were initially Buddhists from Central Asia. Before they converted to Islam, they were, in his opinion, a very cultured community open to the
civilizing influences of the people they conquered. But after they took to Islam, all they could evidently do was wage war and plunder. In addition, they gradually lost their learning and civilization, and the same happened in the lands they conquered. The Afghans, Vivekananda wrote, have as a result of their conversion to Islam become "so uncivilized and illiterate" that they now fail completely to appreciate the value of the Buddhist statues and temples that exist in their country, regarding them instead as the work of incomprehensible spirits.

At the World Parliament of Religions at Chicago in 1893, Vivekananda presented himself as very much the Hindu messenger of a Hindu nation. Islam found almost no mention in the speeches he delivered. The three religions of the East, which he said would help mould "the universal religion" of the future, were Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Buddhism. These three religions, he said, had stood the shocks of time and had thereby proved "their internal strength." Islam was conspicuously missing from this list. The universal religion he spoke of "would have no place for persecution or intolerance in its polity, and would recognize a divinity in every man or woman."

Vivekananda's low regard for Muslims was shared wholeheartedly by Deussen. Muslims did not figure prominently in Deussen's travel journal and when he did discuss them it was in very disparaging terms.
claimed that "the character of the Hindu and that of the Muslim are very different." The basic traits of the latter, he commented, are "fanaticism, a tendency to be violent, and greed." Anyone who has visited Egypt or Palestine, he wrote, and has observed the behavior of Muslims there, will observe the same traits in India, perhaps with some slight moderation. But the greed of the Muslims does not translate into an entrepreneurial drive, as it does, he argues, in the case of their "racial brothers," the Jews. The Jew, he writes, is also "addicted to profit," but is also sober and thrifty, and can therefore attain a level of prosperity that is somewhat frightening to his Christian fellow citizens. The Muslim, in contrast, saves only in order to throw it all away uselessly as quickly as possible. Deussen wrote that these opinions were often confirmed in India, by Hindus or non-Muslims one would suppose, who assured him that this was indeed the typical behavior of Muslims. As servants, however, Deussen believed, Muslims were "more useful" than Hindus because they were not burdened by prejudices of caste.

Vivekananda also echoed in all earnestness German thinkers' ideas on the allegedly fundamental civilizational divide between the Aryan family and the Semitic family. His remarks, for example, on the differences between Aryan and Semitic notions of religion and spirituality could have been penned in their entirety by a Schlegel or a Humboldt.
There is the suggestion in all these authors' writings of Semitic ideas being not quite as perfect as Aryan ones.

In the Semitic group of religions, Vivekananda claimed, the notion of God is not linked to any idea of a human soul: "man was composed of certain mind and material particles, and that was all." In the Aryan approach to religion, God was comprehended via man and the soul. This was the approach taken, for example, in the Vedas, supposedly the oldest Aryan texts. The former approach to religion, Vivekananda emphasized, is "peculiarly Semitic," the latter "peculiarly Aryan." Vivekananda, echoing Orientalist ideas about an "unchanging East," then suggests that the original Aryan approach to religion has been better preserved in India than in Europe. Aryans, he wrote, always sought divinity within their own selves. European paintings of people in religious attitudes thus always show them looking upwards, outside themselves, while in the Indian religious pose, the eyes are closed and the individual looks inward.109

Vivekananda also endorsed the idea, beloved of all German Orientalists, of different branches of the Aryan family developing in separate but related ways in the different geographical regions to which they migrated. In India, he believed, the climate was too hot for people to work continuously and they therefore took to introspection and religion. The "power of mind," as opposed to material
power, was what they sought to develop. The other branch of the Aryan family went to the "smaller and picturesque" region of Greece, where the climate being milder, they led a more active life and "developed the external arts and outward liberty." Their descendants were, of course, modern-day Europeans. Indians, on the other hand, developed spiritual liberty, and the only thing they were willing to defend was, therefore, religion, and not their country. The two branches of the Aryan family thus developed, according to Vivekananda, two aspects of liberty - spiritual and social - although each society, if it were to emphasize only one aspect, would remain one-sided. Absence of spiritual liberty, though, Vivekananda believed, was "a greater defect" than the lack of social liberty.110

Conclusion to Chapter

Studies of German Orientalism seeking to "test" Said’s hypotheses in the area of German scholarship usually end up finding, as we have noted earlier, that his theories cannot be extended easily to Germany. These studies do not find the clear linkage between colonial motives and scholarship which Said suggests. In fact, they often confirm the opposite, namely, that empathy, genuine respect, and the desire to find a "shared humanity" shaped the encounter.

Deussen’s ideas, at first glance, would fit this description. His philosophical writings are sufficiently
removed from the world of colonial power. As for his actual encounter with the East and his record of it, whether it fits Said's description of Orientalism depends on the definition one uses. The fact that Deussen, without any official recommendation or reason, received ten Indian soldiers to escort him to a border outpost is perhaps proof that Germany and Germans were firmly within the Western structure of power vis-à-vis the Orient at the end of the nineteenth century. That Germany and Britain would, within two decades, be involved in a catastrophic war in Europe was not reflected in the slightest degree in a "remote corner of the Orient" where Deussen was simply another fellow European.

It may even be possible to set aside these tenuous connections between Deussen's status in India and Western colonial power, and thereby refute Said's claims to a degree. But Said's label of "Orientalist" could, unfortunately, still be applied to Deussen. Said's conception of "Orientalism" is, as Aijaz Ahmad has noted, "a monolithic, Manichean discourse." This discourse has primacy [over] the processes of conquest and political economy" and resembles a "cage" from which none may escape. Ahmad singles out this aspect of Said's critique, namely its depiction of Orientalism as a discourse in the manner of Foucault, that makes his ideas unique - though not necessarily in a positive way - among the numerous studies
that have been done on cultural domination and colonial conquest. The portrayal of Orientalism as a discourse, Ahmad notes further, has gone hand in hand with a broadening of the meaning of "Orientalist" to include "all Europeans who had ever thought or said or done anything at all pertaining to anything non-European."  

Seen in this fashion, Deussen's observations and views on India are very much within the discursive universe of Orientalism. From another angle, it could also be argued that, in simpler terms, Deussen displayed the same condescension and Europeans-know-better attitude that, according to the Saidian critique, characterized all Orientalists. But that by itself does not consign Deussen to the rubbish-heap of Orientalism, nor does it totally nullify his efforts, clearly evident throughout the Memories, to distance himself from European privileges and power.

Deussen's Memories is a work principally of ethnography rather than philosophy. To the role of ethnographer, Deussen brings the added perspective of the Indologist who respects and even venerates the culture he is observing. But in spite of this veneration and awe of India's past accomplishments, Deussen's observations of modern India are firmly rooted in what Richard Shweder describes as the Nietzschean null-reference argument which
continues to shape Western anthropological inquiry even today.\textsuperscript{112}

The Nietzschean premise in the study of other cultures is, according to Schweder, that "tradition-based reality posits are imaginary phantoms of mind." In other words, whatever in a society or tradition cannot be understood through positivist approaches is "nonsense," or represents a pre-modern, pre-rational stage of development in that culture.\textsuperscript{113} Max Mueller, while hardly a rigorous scientist himself, was also anchored in this premise when he denounced certain aspects of Indian or Hindu culture as folly, ignorance, or superstition, or as deviations from rational, Western-style standards. Deussen's account of India is tolerant of traditions and beliefs that "do not make sense" to him, but at the same time, his attitude is clearly a condescending one. Whatever does not measure up to his standards of correct thinking he looks down on as naïve or childlike, something Indians could grow out of if only they saw the light of rationality.

The null-reference argument is also at odds with what Clifford Geertz believes to be the job of anthropologists or observers of the Other: to depict the Other in such a way as to "reduce puzzlement," that is, to portray the practices of the Other as "normal" or "logical" while retaining their particularity. The anthropologist's goal in doing this, according to Geertz, should be "the enlargement
of the universe of human discourse." The ethnographer ought, Geertz argues, to talk to the object of one's study, rather than talk for it; such a change in attitudes would reduce some of the mystery and difficulty of doing ethnography. Deussen, in spite of his deep respect for Indian culture and his lifelong efforts to bring it within the universe of Western thought, portrayed India, at least in the Memories, as different, as something which could be described but not fully comprehended by the Westerner. It would remain, therefore, a puzzle, whose workings were not entirely logical or normal.

Orientalist scholarship, according to Elleke Boehmer, attempted to "exercise mastery [by] naming a foreign land and making of that land and its ways a textual artifact." This was true, she argues, at least of eighteenth-century Orientalist scholarship in India. And along with the productions of textual artifacts, Orientalists were busy "gaining command over ... texts" in order to "undermine the local monopoly on [legal] knowledge." Described in this fashion, Orientalist scholarship, with the implicit motives described above, was certainly what even someone as apolitical as Deussen was engaged in, let alone the more explicitly power-conscious discourse of British writers such as Monier-Williams.

Deussen did attempt to master texts, if not to gain mastery over the land, to provide in part a "better"
interpretation of these texts than Indian scholars were
deemed capable of. Deussen did make clear on numerous
occasions that Indian texts were in better hands when
Europeans examined them. Deussen also created out of his
encounter with India and its ways a textual artifact in
which he tried to understand "the bizarre and apparently
unintelligible strangeness with which he came into
contact."° Deussen also displayed, in the Memories, what
David Spurr describes as the syndrome of the "weary,
disillusioned colonial" who invokes this weariness partly
in order to make sense of his experience or to convey "the
fact that for [him] the experience does not make sense."
Weariness is evident throughout Deussen's India journal: in
his meetings and conversations with Indians who do not
observe European etiquette, both social and intellectual;
at hotels where the service is substandard; on trips in
which travel arrangements always turn out to be different
from what had been promised; in meetings with holy men who
are basically out to trick people out of their money; and
in general, in encounters that are not quite what they seem
to the rational European eye. The whole experience is
exhausting, above all intellectually, and the writer, says
Spurr, "confesses to something like inadequacy as well as
to a general ennui."°

Deussen's travel journal fits Boehmer's and Spurr's
definition of "colonial discourse" surprisingly well. But
it is, nevertheless, a leap, I would contend, to include Deussen's work in this category, given his extreme detachment from colonial concerns. The problem lies perhaps not with Deussen's odd status but with the term itself. "Colonial discourse" appears to apply to any "textual artifact" produced by an individual who writes on a society other than his own, especially one which is not on a par with his own society in terms of power and access to material and intellectual resources. It could also apply to anything written in the colonial era by Westerners on other regions of the world. An example of European writing on Asia or Africa in the eighteenth or nineteenth century that does not smack of colonial discourse would be virtually impossible to find. Max Mueller's, Deussen's, and Garbe's writings on India would therefore all be, according to this definition, colonial discourse, making an examination of their colonial content almost superfluous. Such a position is, however, in my view, untenable and unsupported by a closer examination of the evidence. The term "colonial discourse," thus appears to be almost too broad to be a useful analytical tool.

Deussen's Memories are characterized by a distinct sense of knowing what India and Indians are about, a knowledge that did not or could not exist the other way around. Deussen also conveys the impression that he knew
more about India than Indians themselves. To some extent, this was true since Deussen was a professional Indologist, which most Indians are not, although much of the knowledge he had on this account was about ancient and not contemporary India. But this feeling of omniscience also clearly stemmed from the awareness of belonging to a civilization which had evidently made objective understanding and the acquisition of universal knowledge its business.

Deussen’s tone in the Memories also reminds one of the Orientalist refrain of India and the Orient being the "cradle," or the infancy, of civilization, from which the mature, adult civilization of the West evolved, while the Orient did not succeed in growing beyond this infant phase. Indians, therefore, were still "childlike" in their behavior and intellectual makeup, and were best treated as such.

It would be an exaggeration to say that Deussen subscribed knowingly to such a view. He was much too intellectually sophisticated for that. Besides, his book on India is not a philosophical tract but rather an account of his day-to-day encounters with India and Indians. He therefore, appropriately enough, does not enter into any detailed philosophical discussions in this book.

It was the metaphysical side of human thought and philosophy that Deussen saw as India’s strength, as opposed
to the realism and materialism of "the more active but less contemplative branches of the great Indo-Aryan family in Europe." This was, of course, an echo of Max Mueller's refrain. While it was muted or almost absent in Deussen's *Memories*, he could evidently on occasion voice the same sentiments. And like Max Mueller, Deussen also liked to describe these metaphysical or non-materialist leanings as offsetting more than adequately the material hardships of contemporary India. They were "for poor India in so many misfortunes a great consolation," wrote Deussen. India's material backwardness, in this view, did not really matter when compared to her spiritual achievements. While Deussen took this position in a philosophical tract, in the *Memories*, which was presumably a more informal work, India's material shortcomings are clearly disturbing enough to take up a major part of the book.

Dietmar Rothmund has argued that the association of Orientalism and Indology with a conservative bent of mind can be traced back to Schlegel and the intellectual environment in Germany after the French Revolution. The French Revolution, with its decisive rejection of continuity and tradition, produced a reaction in Germany in which precisely these elements became sought after, almost as a nationalist reflex. India, Rothmund argues, with its several-thousand-year old tradition, therefore appealed strongly to German Romantics. While the liberal German
scholars of the time, Rothmund writes, turned to America, conservatives like Schlegel sought inspiration in the Orient and India. Along with this search for continuity, Rothmund argues, Schlegel also "discovered the essential affinity of Indian thought with the profound pessimism of the conservative mind of all ages." In opposition to this conservative perspective stood ideas of "progress and liberal emancipation."122

Deussen, as I have argued, was firmly ensconced in the German tradition of romantic Indology. Deussen shared this tradition's conservatism in the sense that he was somewhat apathetic toward India's current problems and concerns. His account of India clearly sees a society in relative decay and decline, and he even offers at times suggestions for a way out of this morasse. But there is no urgency in Deussen's writings about the need for change. Or, perhaps, it was not one of his central concerns. One almost gets the impression that he regarded the current state of affairs in India - its status as a colony, its poverty, the oppressiveness of the caste system and other inequities - as a natural, inevitable outcome of the tradition in which he was so interested. Max Mueller, who was much more visible as a public figure than Deussen, did intervene actively at times in contemporary Indian affairs, even if from a distance, and was almost always supportive of the Indian (as opposed to the European) point of view.
But Max Mueller, like Deussen, was conservative. Neither one of them advocated radical changes in the status quo.

But having said this, I would still point, in the case of Deussen, to the redeeming elements. Along with the conservatism of the Romantic tradition of which he was a product, Deussen also inherited the idea of a common "humanity" that was so important to the early German Romantics. This idea, as Samson Knoll has pointed out, had been first articulated by Herder a hundred years earlier and had left a lasting imprint on German ideas about the "global community." It entailed, as Knoll notes, a strong preoccupation with the religious and ethical aspects of the "condition of human beings in society." Central to this notion was also a variant of what we today call "cultural relativism," an attitude which Deussen displays fairly consistently in the Memories by portraying India as "different but equal." ¹²³

To summarize, I would argue that Deussen does not provide good evidence to support the Saidian anti-Orientalist critique, unless one stretches the definitions of Orientalism and Orientalist to the point where they lose all analytical power. Deussen was the least "imperial" of all the three Indologists we are examining here. And although his study of India was arguably driven by the same internal needs as in the case of Max Mueller, that is, to confirm, and elaborate on, Indo-European or Indo-Germanic
affinities, Deussen was above all a professional philosopher for whom Indo-Germanism was not the primary scholarly concern. Max Mueller was not a philosopher but a philologist. He was, therefore, closer to the origins and "true spirit" of Indology and Oriental studies than Deussen, since philology was where the Indo-European story had begun. If Deussen was at all an Orientalist, in Said's sense of the term, it was an inescapable consequence of who he was, what he did, and the time in which he lived. Deussen himself tried hard not to be an Orientalist.
NOTES


5. My sources of biographical information on Deussen are the works by Rollmann and Halbfass cited above; Heinrich Scholz, "Paul Deussen," Kant Studien 24 (1920): 304-317; and Neue Deutsche Biographie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1957), s. v. "Deussen, Paul Jakob."


7. Deussen, Memories, 1.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 18.

10. Ibid., 2.

11. Memories, 4.
12. Ibid.

13. Shankara (c. 780-820) was a Brahmin scholar from southern India who held that the world around us is illusion (maya). The Vedanta (end of the Vedas), which Shankara interpreted, is based on the philosophy of the Upanishads. Shankara’s interpretation of the Vedanta still forms the core of Hindu philosophy. See Romila Thapar, History of India, vol. 1 (Hammondsworth, England: Penguin Books, 1966), 185.


15. See “German Orientalism and India” in Chapter 3 above, pages 108-123.


18. Alexander the Great entered the Indian subcontinent in 327 B.C. The Greek campaign lasted two years, without any spectacular successes, but Greek kings (Indo-Greeks) subsequently established a kingdom in the province of Bactria in northwest India. Bactria became the site of considerable cultural fusion. See Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 56-57, 70-72.

   Muslim Arab attacks on northwest India occurred in the eighth century A.D. From c. 1000 A.D., Mahmud of Ghazni’s raids begin, marking the beginning of sustained Muslim involvement and presence in India. Wolpert, 104-108.


20. Ibid., 10.


28. Ibid., 90, 93.

29. Ibid., 94, 103-104.

30. Ibid., 104-105.


34. See the discussion of Andrea Fuchs-Sumiyoshi’s work in chapter 3, pages 101-102.


36. Ibid., 74.


39. Ibid., 53.

40. Ibid., 113.

41. Ibid., 134-137.

42. Ibid.

43. Ibid., 31.

44. Ibid., 32-33.

45. Ibid., 137-40.
46. Ibid., 99-100.
47. Ibid., 98.

48. The Arya Samaj (society) was a Hindu revivalist and reformist society founded in India in the 1870s by Dayanand Saraswati (1824-1883). Dayanand advocated a return to the religion of the Vedas and attacked what he perceived as the degeneracy and corruptions of modern Hinduism. The Samaj quickly attracted a large following and is still a large and influential organization in India today. See Kenneth Jones, *Arya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in 19th-century Punjab* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).


50. Deussen is presumably referring to the Dharma Sabha, an organization founded in 1886 by a priest, Din Dayalu. While its goals were similar to those of the Arya Samaj, the Dharma Sabha was more supportive of Hindu orthodox practices such as the caste system and sought to defend such practices against both internal and external critics. See Kenneth Jones, *Socio-religious Reform Movements in British India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 77-81.


52. Ibid., 111.


55. Ibid., 137-140.
56. Ibid., 40-41.
57. Ibid., 87.
58. Ibid., 152.
59. Ibid., 73-74.
60. Ibid., 92-93.
61. Ibid., 14-15.
62. Ibid., 45.
63. Ibid., 216.
64. Ibid., 71.
65. Ibid., 4-5.
66. Ibid., 90.
67. Ibid., 117.
69. Deussen, Memories, 117.
70. Ibid., 121.
71. Ibid., 19-20.
72. Ibid., 20.
73. Ibid., 19, 21.
74. Ibid., 24-25, 119-120.
75. Ibid., 23.
76. The local ruler's mansion, where Deussen and his wife lived while in Baroda, was evidently so grand and luxurious that even Deussen seemed to run out of superlatives. Ibid., 47-48.
77. Ronald Inden argues along these lines, i.e., criticizes Deussen, in Imagining India.
79. Memories., 71-73.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid., 70.

83. Shastri, 28.


85. Ibid., 160, and passim.

86. Vivekananda, 164.

87. Article by Mrs. Sevier, 161.

88. Ibid., 162.

89. Ibid.


91. Ibid., 287.

92. Ibid., 288.

93. Ibid.


96. Ibid., 826.

97. Ibid., 823.


100. Ibid., 207.
101. Ibid., 304.
103. Ibid., 98-99.
104. Ibid.
107. A similar disparaging attitude towards Muslims is to be found in the writings of Schlegel. Discussing the practice of polygamy, for example, Schlegel claimed that while this custom was to found in both India and the Muslim countries, in India it was not as prevalent as in the Islamic world and it was, furthermore, not practised "with the same degree of licentiousness, nor with the same unlimited and despotic control." In Hindu India, he argued, women could, despite polygamy, exercise all the rights of their caste. Friedrich Schlegel, *The Philosophy of History in a Course of Lectures*, trans. James B. Robertson (London: Henry G. Bohn, 1859), 145.
110. Ibid., 51-52.
111. Ahmad, "Between Orientalism and Historicism," 138-140.
113. Ibid., 42, 50.
115. Lionel Gossman has argued that along with the emerging discipline of anthropology in the nineteenth century, "romantic historiography," that is, "the Romantic idea of
'the Other,' and of history as the discovery and decipherment of the Other's languages," sought, with a certain "imperiousness," to define and integrate the Other into its discourse. Ranke, whose ideas on the writing of history contributed to the rise of this historiography, spoke of "bringing to light" or "unriddling" the puzzle of the past, just as anthropologists tried to decipher the space of the Other. Both anthropology and Romantic historiography, Gossman argues, were "implicated in the nineteenth-century ideology of progress and the white man's burden." Lionel Gossman, "History as Decipherment: Romantic Historiography and the Discovery of the Other," New Literary History 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1986): 50, 51.


117. See, for example, Monier-Williams, Modern India and the Indians (London: Trübner and Co., Ludgate Hill, 1879).


119. Spurr, 154-155. A similar weary tone is also evident in the writings of the modern British-Indian-West Indian writer V. S. Naipaul. India: A Wounded Civilization (New York: Knopf, 1977) is a good example. While Naipaul is sometimes seen as a postcolonial "Third World voice," others accuse him of colonial arrogance in his commentaries on the non-Western world.


121. Ibid.


CHAPTER VI

RICHARD GARBE’S INDIA

Introduction

Richard Garbe (1857-1927) was a German Indologist who acquired a reputation in the late nineteenth century through his scholarship on Indian philosophy, particularly his attempt to reconstruct the Bhagavad-Gita in its original form. After studying at the University of Tübingen, Garbe lectured at Königsberg from 1878 on. In 1885, Garbe went to India and spent over a year there travelling, as well as taking a regular course of study at the University of Benares. This trip was financed by the Prussian government through its Ministry of Culture and the Royal Academy of Sciences in Berlin. In 1895, Garbe accepted the offer of a professorship at the University of Tübingen, where he lived until his death.2

Garbe kept a detailed record of his experiences in India which he published for the first time in 1889 under the title Indian Travel Sketches. The foreword to the 1889 edition of this work starts with the blunt statement that the book is not about a "land of wonder," unlike many
popular works which sought to cater to the tastes of the market. Garbe warns the reader that he will describe as objectively as possible, without distortion or exaggeration, the hardships of life in India and the many negative aspects of the country and its people which are visible to anyone who is willing to recognize them. This did not mean, however, that he found nothing worthy of admiration or love in India. He found much there that was "great and beautiful," such as Muslim architectural achievements, the landscape of the Himalayas, and the beauty of Ceylon. It is worth noting that in this initial, cursory list, anything connected with Hindu, supposedly "mainstream" Indian society and culture is conspicuously missing.

Writing thirty-five years later, Garbe noted in a new foreword that he thought it best to let the vigorous tone and enthusiasm of the first edition stand. As for its content, he felt that only minimal changes were required, such as new statistics on population and so forth. The bulk of the descriptions was, however, as accurate as when he first wrote it, essentially because India was a country that did not change. The basic patterns of Indian society had been that way for centuries, he believed, and would continue to be so for many more. It was true, he wrote, that contact with Western civilization in the previous few decades had significantly changed the appearance of the
country, mainly through technological innovations such as motorcars, electric trams, and typewriters. But all these, in his opinion, were changes on the surface which had destroyed some of the romance of India but not its core. This unchanging nature was visible most of all, Garbe believed, in the city which takes up a major part of his story, namely Benares, the "ancient and holy center of Hinduism."

At the end of his sea voyage to India, as he was taking in his first view of India from the ship, one of Garbe's fellow passengers, an English officer, "put a friendly hand on his shoulder" and assured Garbe that he would view the same scene with greater satisfaction when he stood again at the same spot after his voyage was over. Looking back, Garbe believed the Englishman was right.

Garbe's trip to India was, with rare exceptions, a very unpleasant experience for him, both physically and intellectually. He was drawn to the country, like other Indologists, by its "ancient culture and deep wisdom." Whether he found this or not when he visited the land is not entirely clear. What is evident from his travel diary is that he found more to despise and be repelled by than to admire. This was true of things both ancient and modern. The physical environment, whether natural or man-made, did not, for the most part, appeal to him. As for the people and their culture, one has to search hard in his account
for even a hint of praise. What his observations show consistently is disdain, contempt, and even utter dislike. It appears remarkable, after reading this account, that he had actually in the first place devoted himself professionally to anything remotely connected with India. His reactions to India also do not appear, to judge by his own description, to have come to him as a total surprise or disappointment. While he may have harbored some romantic notions about India before his trip, they were certainly not as rosy or gushing as Max Mueller's. Garbe seemed to be half-expecting what he found.

Deussen too, in his India journal, had not waxed eloquent about the country, its modern culture, and the people. There are sections where his distaste and revulsion towards what he encountered are apparent. But Deussen was gentle, even polite, in his descriptions. He tried consistently to overcome his negative reactions, to find reasons that would explain or mitigate the shortcomings he perceived, and to point to other praiseworthy aspects of Indian life in order to balance the picture as far as possible. Deussen also, it appears from his account, travelled to India trying honestly to put aside ingrained ideas about Western superiority. There is in his journal, from the start, a constant effort to dissociate himself from Europeans and the power which they enjoyed over Asians.
There is little attempt in Garbe’s story to be either gentle or polite. Garbe speaks his mind openly and with little restraint on everything. More often than not, of course, his reactions are negative. He describes, whenever necessary, his disgust and contempt in the plainest possible terms. Nothing unpleasant is glossed over. There is also little effort on his part to offer possible explanations for the "lack of refinement and culture" that he finds. Instead, the shortcomings are presented as intrinsic to Indian culture, as traits that are bound to exist in Oriental, non-European societies. All one could do, therefore, was to flee such unpleasantness as far as possible and take refuge among more civilized surroundings and people. Time and again while in India, Garbe fled, so to speak, to the company and hospitality of resident Europeans. From his description, these homes and the social intercourse they offered appear as oases of civilization in an otherwise repugnant land. These interludes appear, in fact, to be among the few experiences in his travels that he really enjoyed and remembered fondly.

Garbe had also read Deussen’s account of his travels in India, and noted in his own travelogue, clearly with reference to Deussen’s charitable views on India, that no one should be allowed to pass a judgement on India without having experienced at least one summer and the rainy season there.® These seasons were clearly, in Garbe’s opinion,
when India was at its worst. Deussen and his wife had travelled in the winter months.

Garbe provides perfect material for the Saidian critique of Orientalism: the Orient for him is a career to which he devotes himself wholeheartedly but with little sympathy or love. The people of the Orient are also part of this object that needs to be studied, understood, and described. At times they are aids or tools that one must use to understand the Orient, but more often they are obstacles or hindrances in this exercise. To complete the picture, he finds, with few exceptions, the real Orient to be a repugnant and distasteful place that is distinctly inferior to Europe.

**Garbe, the Modern World and Modern India**

The attitudes and ideas which Garbe brought to India - for example on the relative historical significance of Europe and the Orient, on race, and on characteristic nineteenth-century European concerns such as "progress" - provided the lens through which he viewed modern Indian society. The following is a discussion of some of these ideas and preconceptions.

**Prelude to the Orient**

Garbe’s account of his approach to India, the sea voyage, like Deussen’s, provides reliable clues to what was
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to come. From Egypt on, the story becomes a list of the horrors of the Orient. In Alexandria, where he disembarked for the first time at a non-European port, the Orient hit him with all its noise, dirt, and chaos. "Brown and black scoundrel-faces," eager to sell their wares and tricks, clambered on board even before the ship reached shore and badgered the passengers so unrelentingly that "they could save themselves only with physical force." For the first time, he learned, Garbe writes, of the tremendous gap, or "chasm," that separated the white man from the non-European.\textsuperscript{10} Also in Alexandria, as he strolled through the garden of the Khedive, his European companions reached down, in full view of the garden supervisor, to pluck some flowers to adorn the dining table back on the ship. When Garbe asked whether they were allowed to pluck flowers there, the reply was a mirthful, "Of course not, but as a European one can do anything in the Orient."\textsuperscript{11}

Alexandria, during the sea voyage, also gave Garbe a glimpse of what he might expect in the Orient besides its people and customs: the weather or, more specifically, the heat. Garbe's account reads like that of a traveller setting foot on a different planet, where the physical environment is one in which only the natives can survive. Europeans, endowed with a fundamentally different constitution could survive only by using special strategies or techniques.
On the ship, for example, Garbe quickly learned from veteran India-hands how to stretch one's legs in the morning breeze in a way that would improve circulation in the extremities. Such techniques of relaxation which tone the health become a necessity, Garbe writes, for the European in the Orient. The heat in Alexandria, while a sharp change from European conditions, was in hindsight, for Garbe, almost a refreshing memory after confronting the heat in India. The blinding sunlight was also a new element, notes Garbe, and one which Europeans had to guard against by wearing shaded glasses. In Port Said, the *pankha*, the manually operated ceiling fan, was used for the first time as the temperature climbed, a device which, according to Garbe, was an absolute necessity in India day and night for Europeans for eight months of the year.

On a funnier note, Garbe writes that in Aden, as he watched local lads perform stunts in the waters of the harbor for the benefit of the ship’s passengers, he was concerned about the danger of sharks. He was informed, however, that only Europeans were attacked by sharks; natives were almost always left alone. It is not clear whether Garbe genuinely believed this or whether he was reporting it in jest, but this was clearly an early example of the "immature" ideas and "naïvete" he would encounter repeatedly in India.
The gap separating Europeans and non-Europeans which Garbe got a glimpse of during this voyage included, of course, the difference in material prosperity and living conditions, evidently as apparent by the 1880s as it is today. Egypt's poverty was striking for Garbe, probably even more so after the luxurious life-style on board his Austrian ship. Port Said, for example, especially the "native city," presented a horrible picture of filth and decay. Children covered with scabs played in the streets, and there was nothing but dry, scorched earth all around. The "garden of the city" was a so-called traffic round-about in the European quarter which boasted a few miserable, wilting flowers, and where an Egyptian band sometimes played. At a German bar nearby, Garbe notes, one could buy a bottle of beer for 1 1/2 francs. Destitute and desperate Egyptians offered their services as guides to Europeans, catching their attention first with a few broken and unsolicited greetings in the appropriate European language. Later, while his ship sailed through the Suez canal, youngsters ran insistently along the banks shouting "Johnny! Bakshish!" until a pastry or something similar was thrown to them. In a footnote, Garbe explains that the term "Johnny" was used by Europeans to refer to Asians of the lower classes. These lads, he says, in their ignorance, were using it to address Europeans. Already before arriving in India, Garbe was learning well that the white
man in the Orient was king and the locals were at his mercy, waiting for handouts.

Race

In his account of the sea voyage, Garbe also makes abundantly clear which racial groups were, in his opinion, worthy of respect and which were not. The Germans and the English on board the ship quickly formed, he writes, a social alliance, one which excluded "southerners" such as the Italians, Greeks, Egyptians, and even the French. The group which comprised, as he put it, those of "Germanic origin" conducted itself with quiet dignity, in contrast to the loud and boisterous behavior of the "Alexandria people," so called by the others because they disembarked at Alexandria. Even at social events on the ship, such as dances, the Anglo-Germans would keep to themselves and look with pride, and perhaps some envy, Garbe writes, at the unrestrained merry-making of the southerners. Garbe adds that he was to learn later how one gets accustomed in India to considering only those of Germanic origin as "full-blooded Europeans" and the Latins as "lesser" people.¹⁶

The ship on which he went to India was run by an Austrian line, and he had nothing but praise for the crew. The ship's doctor for example, a "German-Austrian," was, according to Garbe, an extremely caring and polite man. His return voyage, in contrast, was not as pleasant. The ship's
captain, in particular, a "pan-Slavic Dalmatian," was very unfriendly, and Garbe evidently gathered later that he was extremely hostile to Germans and their language.\(^{17}\)

In Ceylon, a country which made a very favorable impression on him in contrast to India, the pleasantness of his stay was enhanced by the hospitality of a resident German businessman, Mr. Freudenberg. In the restful quiet of this German's villa, Garbe was able to recuperate from the malaria which he had contracted in India. Freudenberg's "well-informed advice" on the country and its ways was also an invaluable help to Garbe. Garbe describes at length and with evident pride the factory which Freudenberg operated for the production of coconut oil and other related products. The factory was an impressive product, Garbe writes, of German knowledge and hard work, and this, along with Freudenberg's other accomplishments, such as constructing an electric tram system, secured great regard on the island for both Freudenberg and Germany. He notes further, with considerable anguish, that the factory was destroyed by the British during the First World War.\(^{18}\)

Garbe's strong feelings for his homeland were perhaps most evident at a party on the ship which took him to India. To mark the birthday of the crown prince of Germany, the ship's officers hosted a party replete with toasts, first to the Austrian emperor - since they were on an Austrian ship - and then to the German Kaiser. The band
struck up a favorite German melody, "Wacht am Rhein," (Watch on the Rhein) and the ship, which had already been proudly flying the German flag all day, was lit up with torches and fireworks. Next, the band played more patriotic tunes - "Heil dir im Siegerkranz" (Hail to the victor) - and just before the dance began, "Deutschland, Deutschland über alles" (Germany above all). Garbe was very moved by it all, especially since, as he notes, one feels more patriotic at a distance from home, although he was reluctant to describe his compatriots in the Orient as the best Germany had to offer.19

While Germans or Germanic peoples were at the top of Garbe's civilizational hierarchy, other cultural groups received rankings that were linked closely to their ethnicities. Among the various notions of superiority which Garbe brought with him to India, supposed racial or ethnic gradations thus played an important part, and Garbe did not shrink from making explicit and often crude connections between "blood" and cultural and social advancement. After arriving, for example, in Bombay, Garbe noted the bewildering ethnic mix in the city. Among them were the "Portugese," who were invariably the waitors and servants in hotels. Garbe portrays these people virtually as mongrels, the pitiable products of interracial mixing between Portugese and Indians (the Portugese had a colony in the Indian province of Goa). One could mistake them for
Latins, he observes, had it not been for their "pathetic builds" and their dark skin. They are, he writes, lazy, dirty, and lacking in ambition, and in spite of being Christian, decidedly an "inferior breed of humans." It is unfortunate, Garbe continues, that they do not share the prejudices of Hindus and Muslims on food and drink since this means that they like the same things as their European masters, especially drink. Their knowledge of English, however, leaves the European visitor with no choice but to hire one of them as a travelling servant.\(^{20}\)

"Eurasians," of whom these Indo-Portugese were one example, were, according to Garbe, more visible and conducted themselves with more self-assurance in Calcutta than anywhere else in India. These "miserable hybrids," Garbe observes, would love to be European or at least to look like Europeans, and one therefore sees them wear dazzlingly clean and elegant garments in a manner that suggested that they were born to them. In reality, it was an open secret, Garbe notes, that these clothes had been rented out to them by washermen who had access to the clothes of resident Europeans.\(^{21}\)

Garbe did claim to be taken aback, though, by the manner in which resident Europeans in India classified people depending on how European their origins were. The new arrival in India would be shocked, he writes, by the fact that even those with a tiny fraction of non-European
blood were shunned by the European community. During the
time he was in Benares, a young British army doctor had
apparently created a scandal by getting engaged to a
"Eurasian" woman. This woman's father was a full-blooded
European, and she herself had been brought up entirely in
England. "What exactly is wrong with this engagement?" an
astonished Garbe asked the resident Europeans.²²

But despite his surprise, Garbe was at the same time
quite "understanding" of the desire to keep the races
apart. The principle of segregation, inhuman though it may
seem, was, he notes, justified since the products of
miscegenation did not in most cases measure up "physically,
morally, and intellectually" to good European society. The
Eurasian element in their blood would "erupt," sometimes in
an ugly fashion, in their physical appearance once every
couple of generations. Although "southern" dark hair and
skin, Garbe notes, are often admired by Germans, in keeping
with a somewhat "unnatural taste," India would certainly
not be the place to find the best examples of such southern
features.²³

Garbe describes how these Eurasians have built up a
color hierarchy among themselves, with everyone trying to
claim as much European blood as possible or attributing the
darkness of his or her features to "Irish, French, Spanish,
or southern European" ancestry. The proportion of European
blood was often, he notes, denoted disparagingly in terms
of "annas in a rupee," that is as fractions of a coin. Garbe's conclusion is that where the Indian element predominates in these "mixeds," it is evident that "nature is averse to the mingling of the two races, for the products are often weak and misshapen human specimens for whom there is no appropriate place in the world." The British government, according to Garbe, often did not know what to do with them, and assigned them mediocre jobs such as ticket-collecting on trains or teaching at lower-level schools, since they were quite incapable of taking over positions of real responsibility.\textsuperscript{26}

Jews were another racial group towards whom Garbe seemed to be inherently ill-disposed. During his voyage to India, he had encountered Jewish merchants in Aden who, with their "dirty locks on both sides of their faces" and persistent and apparently dishonest ways of selling their wares reminded him strongly of Polish Jews. One had to fend them off, Garbe writes, with a mild shove or a blow, upon which a significant reduction in price would follow. He once saw, he claims, a ship-hand aged ten or twelve push down a flight of stairs eight Jewish peddlers who wanted to enter the first-class section. But so insensitive were they to this humiliation, Garbe observes, that "they laughed and picked themselves up and began ascending the stairs once again!"\textsuperscript{25}
Such ideas on race had, of course, a long pedigree in the German Orientalist tradition, as well as in scholarship that would not strictly be called "Orientalist." In the early nineteenth century, Friedrich Schlegel admired India and its Aryan heritage fervently but at the same time admired the Germans even more. Like Max Mueller in the late nineteenth century and Raymond Schwab again in the mid-twentieth, Schlegel did contend that the discovery and study of Indian philosophy and culture in Europe would lead to nothing less than a second Renaissance, comparable to the one set in motion by the discovery of classical learning in "Italy and Germany" in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.26

But in his writings which have Europe as their focus, for example his Lectures on Modern History, Schlegel adopted a different tone towards the Orient.27 Looking at this work alone, it is quite evident that Schlegel held the German race and Germanic nations to epitomize all that is good and noble in humanity. In fact, the Lectures appear to be little more than a barely disguised panegyric of the German race. The Germanic nations represented to Schlegel the origin of all positive developments since the beginnings of civilization, as well as the culmination of these developments, although he maintained that the Germanic nations are all of "Asiatic origin." It is these Asiatic nations, he argued, that have, with insignificant
variations in timing and degree, developed the essentials of civilization such as the use of iron, money, and an alphabet. Non-Asiatic groups, such as the "American savages," did not, wrote Schlegel, as late as the "discovery" of the New World possess these elements.\textsuperscript{28}

When studying Schlegel's discussions on the Orient, it is thus interesting to keep in mind his unqualified and almost aggressive admiration for anything German or Germanic.\textsuperscript{29} A similar caution would be appropriate for Garbe's work as well. While Schlegel repeatedly referred to Asia, especially India and Persia, as the source of all virtues and wisdom, it is their migratory "descendants," the Germans of Europe, whose place in history was clearly uppermost in his scheme of things. His exaltation of Asia was also not as unqualified as that reserved for the Germans. As is clear from the foregoing discussion, he did not hesitate to point to deficiencies and undesirable traits among Asian peoples. In Germans, in contrast, he saw absolutely nothing undesirable, and he was also quite unwilling to brook even the slightest criticism of Germans by other scholars.

Garbe's ideas on race and civilizational advancement are also strikingly reminiscent of Wilhelm von Humboldt's writings in the mid-nineteenth century. Humboldt (1767-1835), a wide-ranging scholar and linguist, wrote extensively on Sanskrit and the Indo-European language or
ethnic group. In his introduction to his study on the Kawi language, a work also known by itself as The Diversity of Human Language—Structure and its Influence on the Mental Development of Mankind, Humboldt posited a close correspondence between a nation's position in the hierarchy of civilization and development, as he saw it, and its language. He argued that "imperfect" languages would act as checks on intellectual development but also suggested that a nation's language was a function of its strength, which was, to a degree, innate. What this really amounted to was an assertion of the preordained triumph of the "Indo-European race," along with the preordained and irreversible decline of all others, especially the Semitic ones.

The intimate relationship among race, language, and culture, which for Humboldt - and arguably for Garbe, too - was both an assumption and a conclusion, is illustrated in an especially vivid manner in his discussion "The Distribution of the Malayan Races," in the Kawi Introduction. The discussion is very similar to Garbe's evaluation of "mixed" and "pure" racial types. The ethnic composition of the population on the Malayan archipelago, according to Humboldt, reveals various shades of color ranging from black to brown to light brown. The level of social complexity and development of these different groups
would appear to vary, from Humboldt’s discussion, in direct correlation with skin color.

The groups that Humboldt regards as belonging to "the more or less light brown among whites in general" are also those who have developed social institutions to the point where "it would be wrong to exclude them entirely from the comity of civilized nations." But they are not entirely civilized either, a fact which, Humboldt implies, is in accordance with their intermediate position on the ladder of color. Thus, there are some elements among these ethnic groups, Humboldt maintains, who "still tolerate barbaric customs incompatible with civilized human behavior." And there is yet another group in these islands which, according to Humboldt, ranks even lower than the brown races in their level of civilization: the members of this group are black. The Negroid race to which this group belongs, Humboldt continues, is distinguished from lighter races through its "greater savagery and lack of culture, and the variations in this respect are doubtless due solely to closer or remoter contacts with strains of the latter."31

Humboldt also held a very low opinion of the Chinese, whom he considered to "physiologically" incapable of the same accomplishments as speakers of "noble languages," such as the "Indians, Persians, Greeks, Latins, and Germans." The language, customs, script, art, science, and morals of
the Chinese were, he claimed, "sad confirmation" of the fact that even "the highest of cultures" would always be tiresome, difficult, and intellectually and emotionally deficient as long as its creators belonged to a race of dubious worth. This, he said, was true despite all the claims of European scholars of China as to the value and greatness of Chinese civilization. Garbe's own comments about race and character were no different from Humboldt's equation of physiological "soundness" and intellectual and moral worth.

Survival in the East

The issue of "survival" for Europeans in the harsh conditions of Asia was a constant concern in Garbe's travelogue. Survival meant, of course, in addition to getting through the heat and dirt and illnesses, living a reasonably decent and satisfying life by European standards.

Among the various places Garbe visited in India, Calcutta evidently made a very favorable impression on him, mainly because, he writes, the living standards and general condition of Europeans there were better than in any other city he had seen. Part of the reason for this was probably the fact that Calcutta was at this time the seat of British administration in India. Europeans in Calcutta, Garbe writes, "look healthy and fresh, and their social life is
lively and vigorous.\textsuperscript{33} The climate was of a kind suited to Europeans, and the material comforts of life which, according to Garbe, "were not a luxury but a necessary prerequisite for Europeans to function effectively," were to be found in greater abundance in a "Calcutta household" than elsewhere in India.\textsuperscript{34}

Also adding to the charm of Calcutta were the local Europeans, who lived in very well-appointed homes and were extremely open and hospitable to anyone, presumably European, who happened to be travelling through the city. This is what Garbe meant when he wrote that the good Indian tradition of welcoming and entertaining recommended guests was still very much alive in Calcutta. His own stay, Garbe notes, in the luxurious and friendly home of a resident German scholar, Rudolf Hoernle, made his visit to Calcutta an especially beautiful and memorable one. Given such favorable attributes, Calcutta, Garbe writes, certainly did not deserve the very negative review it had received from an Italian traveller a few years earlier. The "hysterical Southerner," Garbe remarks, had called it a "stinking city" which a European visited at grave risk to his life and would be lucky to get away from alive. In Garbe's own very positive introduction to his description of Calcutta, it is interesting to note, however, that Indians find no mention at all. One wonders, in fact, if the city is not populated
entirely by Europeans. The attractiveness of Calcutta, in Garbe’s account, derives solely from the benefits and the pleasant life it offers to Europeans.

The heat and the stresses of life in Benares, where he spent most of his time in India, were what drove Garbe to take a vacation in Darjeeling, a "hill station" in Bengal built by the British to get physical and psychological respite from their lives in the hot plains. Darjeeling was one of many such stations in India, and it was customary for the British to get away as much as possible in the summer months to the cool climates and Europe-like flora and fauna of these towns. We should note that this practice has carried over into the post-colonial period as well, especially among the upper middle classes of India, who also view these hill-stations as cool escapes from the heat of the plains, just as the British did. Life in the hill-stations in the colonial era, however, was perhaps for the "average European" grander and more stylish than it is today for the average Indian vacationer. Garbe, while not British, was also one such European and enjoyed all the delights that a playground for colonial rulers had to offer.

A critique of an Orientalist such as Garbe, however, which charges complicity between Orientalists and imperialism and imputes colonial attitudes to all European
actions and ideas, cannot ignore this continuum in colonial and postcolonial practices. Garbe's need to escape the heat, dirt and unappetizing poverty of India, while certainly a very colonial attitude, is echoed wholeheartedly today by affluent Indians. While the postcolonial critique, especially the school of subaltern studies developed by Ranajit Guha, Partha Chatterjee and others, does take this continuity between the colonial and the post-colonial periods into account, the "blame" for this presumably parasitic lifestyle is put squarely on the British. Indians imitated British ways, but they were not the originators. The argument is not entirely sound, especially when we consider that the Mughals, whose rule preceded that of the British, were as parasitical and exploitative as the British or the Indian ruling class in later centuries. To point solely to British colonial rule as the source of all ills in Indian society is thus not entirely justified.

Garbe, unlike Deussen, evidently relished the benefits which the colonial infrastructure in India provided. In his journal, he offers no apologies or explanations, nor does he attempt to distance himself from the structures of power. He was full of admiration and gratitude, for example, for the British engineer who had constructed the zig-zag railroad to Darjeeling, an engineering feat without which Europeans would never have
been able to enjoy the town. In Darjeeling, where he took to the "hill-station life" with alacrity, the only distancing he did was vis-à-vis the social life of the British, which he found a bit shallow for his sedate scholarly tastes. The non-stop rounds of picnics and dances get in the way, he advises, of true relaxation and enjoyment of the mountain environment. But that apart, he notes how delighted he was to enter his comfortable hotel room and finally to enjoy a fire-place after all the months in the heat. His evaluation of life in Darjeeling focuses almost entirely on Europeans. It is their well-being that makes Darjeeling, in his opinion, a good place to live. The rosy cheeks of European children in Darjeeling and the happy countenances of all Europeans were a pleasure to watch, he writes, after the drained and sallow faces in the "hellish furnace" below. The town, he notes, is almost entirely European in flavor, with houses separated by gardens and parks. All Europeans also hire, he writes, ponies for getting around town, and a lady gets, in addition to her pony, a "Dandy" as well as three "Bhutia carriers" who were at the disposal of the Mem Sahib (wife of the master) all the time.36

Garbe got another respite from what was for him the stifling and jarring cultural and physical environment of India, and especially Benares, when, in August 1886, he was ordered by his doctor to get away as quickly as possible to
Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to recover from a severe attack of malaria. The illness itself had come almost as a brutal climax to the torturous heat of summer followed by the slush, dirt, and mosquitoes brought on by the incessant rain of the monsoon season, a far cry from the pristine southern idyll to which the early Indo-Europeans had supposedly come. Benares, and perhaps India, became a little too much for Garbe. An English friend's prophecy that after the summer things got even worse seemed to be coming true. The attack of malaria was a nightmarish experience for Garbe, and he believed that he barely escaped with his life.37

Ceylon, where he thus found himself, provided for Garbe a break not just from the oppressive heat and illness but from India itself. In spite of its proximity to India, Garbe notes in his journal, Ceylon was culturally and socially, as well as in terms of its vegetation, a totally different land. It was a country which he had dreamed of visiting for a long time, a place that in his imagination was "magical" and blessed." The dominant religion, for a start, was not the Hinduism that he both studied and despised at the same time, but Buddhism. This alone should have provided Garbe with some intellectual relief, or at least a change.38
Garbe and the Colonial Environment

Garbe appeared to "understand" well why the British were in India or why their presence was required in India. He was also in agreement with the professed goals of the British project in India, namely, to bring good administration and progress and to spread Western-style enlightenment. Garbe clearly felt that these elements were sorely lacking in India and that it was the duty of the British, or rather Europeans in general, to introduce them into the country. Far from having moral objections or doubts, he thus appreciated fully "the white man's burden" in the land of the natives.

Garbe viewed the colonial British presence in India as a European presence, one with which he could identify closely during his stay there. In his descriptions of "European Life in India," there is almost no condemnation of the Western presence and no desire to see the Indians left to themselves. Virtually everything the Europeans did in India, from the minutiae of their households to their larger political and social policies, made sense to Garbe. Some Europeans, such as English missionaries, did make mistakes in Garbe's opinion, and he was quick to point them out and criticize them. But this criticism was not aimed at the European project per se, but rather at elements which hindered the British government from functioning as efficiently as it should have. Garbe, as his comments
abundantly show, also considered India a difficult place to live and to contend with, and he therefore sympathized with the British for the "problems" they faced in carrying through their mission. In summary, Garbe, the German, blended easily and perfectly into the British colonial establishment in India, both from his own perspective and from that of the Indian "subjects" around him. To most Indians, the sahib was a sahib, and whether he was German or English did not matter in the least.

Garbe lived in most respects like any other resident European in India in the late nineteenth or, for that matter, even the twentieth century. Affluent Indians and expatriate Westerners live in this style even today. Garbe had a retinue of servants, or at least various attendants and hangers-on who were willing to listen to his commands. These commands could range from critical matters such as the regularity of the manually-operated fan, or pankha, a vital necessity for Garbe in the extreme heat of India, to frivolous things such as wanting a snake-charmer to repeat a certain trick. Garbe listed over fifteen kinds of servants which, according to him, were part of the average European household in India.\(^{39}\) There were the bearer, the gardener, the cook, the water-carrier, and so on. While Garbe, not being part of the formal British structure, as well as being more transitory, did not have the full range of colonial trappings, he did not lack access to any people
or to any conveniences or comforts that he wished. He was always welcomed by the British as one of their own. While travelling by train for the very first time in India, he was invited by an Englishman to be his house guest for two weeks and join him on hunts. In Benares, the local British regiment, the 17th Bengal Cavalry, made him an honorary member of the officers’ mess. He was thus entitled to visit their base and avail himself of their hospitality whenever he wished.

It was these relationships with other Europeans and with Indians which, more than the actual details of his home or lifestyle, identified Garbe firmly with the European ruling class. Like the British, Garbe also viewed Indians as generally naïve and childish. One had, accordingly, to humor them like children to establish a rapport and get one’s work done.

Garbe recounted with relish, for example, a story told to him by a well-known English officer, H. H. Risley, who had been assigned to carry out a census among some native tribes in Bengal. On hearing that an English official wanted to conduct some business with them, these tribespeople had apparently fled into the forest. Risley then gathered from one man they managed to get hold of that they believed that the English intended to treat them with a special medicine and then transport them to work as coolies in the tea plantations of Assam. Risley reminded
the man that the British had sent them rice ("did we not?") during the last famine. It was for the same reason, Risley told them, that the Queen wanted to know how many of them were there, so that she would know exactly how much rice to send during the next famine. If, however, they insisted on being "silly" and did not let themselves be counted, they would starve. On being thus reassured, the entire tribe then emerged from hiding and eagerly answered all the questions of the census officials. On another occasion, Risley had to invent a story about the Queen of England and the Tsar of Russia making a wager on who had more subjects. If they, that is the tribespeople, ran away and did not allow the officials to count them, the Queen would lose the game, and "that would be a terrible disgrace for all of us." This story was apparently as effective as the one about the famine.41

These stories told by an Englishman became part of Garbe's reminiscences in his travel diary. What Garbe wanted to illustrate through these anecdotes was, in addition to the ignorance of these "nature creatures," the intense fear that most Indians felt towards the British. This fear, Garbe conjectured, might have had its origins in the fierce manner in which the British had put down the rebellion of 1857.42 At any rate, this fear, together with the innate Indian "instinct for servility and subservience," Garbe argued, ensured that the sahib was
treated virtually like a god. The European, Garbe noted, was "safe" wherever he or she travelled, even in the remotest and "uncivilized" regions. If anything, the European often found that this exaggerated respect or awe got in the way of what he or she wanted to accomplish.43

Garbe, too, in spite of not being British, experienced first-hand on numerous occasions this awe and servility, as well as the ignorance. He even concluded that the achievements in the area of law and order and administration of the famed Indian Civil Service had undoubtedly been made easier by the natural servility of the Hindus. The hostility which the different Indian races felt toward each other also evidently helped, he noted. These attitudes, Garbe believed, were to be found not just in the "lower" social strata in India, but among the upper classes as well. The net result of this awe and ignorance, Garbe argued, was an insurmountable gulf that separated Europeans and Indians.44

While in Benares, Garbe was often addressed by his servants as "Your English Excellency" or "Your Lordship" (Bahadur), or "Protector of the Poor".45 If reprimanded - although Garbe himself evidently did not reprimand his servants - they would reply, "You are my father and mother," meaning that they were totally dependent for their well-being on the sahib's benevolence - and this despite Garbe's being just "a harmless, private person." Garbe was
also assured by his servants that they worked for him not for the money but on account of his "good name and reputation." Such exaggerated sentiments and expressions were typical of Indians, Garbe notes, and at times they even bordered on the absurd. To express thanks, an Indian would say something patently meaningless to a European, such as, "May God quickly make you Viceroy." The absence of a phrase denoting "Thank you" was partly responsible for these awkward expressions, Garbe believed.46

It was possible, though, that Garbe was taking what people said too literally and not realizing that the Indians, too, might have been perfectly aware of the meaninglessness of such statements but used them nonetheless because they made sense when embedded in their own language and were perhaps even elegant ways of expressing respect and gratitude. To Garbe, however, Western-style restraint had no place in this society and thus had to give way to "Oriental hyperbole." An Indian acquaintance once spoke to Garbe about the "two sons" which a local, well-respected European had, knowing full that the man had only one. It was the "imperial plural," as a mark of respect, that made the man talk in this manner, Garbe surmised.47

As for the Indians' "immaturity" and ignorance of the outside world, Garbe, like the Englishman Risley, had his own share of anecdotes. Exchanges with servants in
particular, he noted, were marked by an astounding lack of maturity. He once asked his servant, Sobhan, to catch for him a few of the green parrots that constantly flew around in his veranda in Benares. Sobhan agreed, adding that he would concentrate on the young ones, since "they spoke Hindustani." "Only Hindustani?" asked Garbe with a smile. No, they would speak English too, Sobhan replied, if "Your Lordship" would teach them. This naivete was accentuated by linguistic constructions which, in Garbe's view, verged on the ridiculous. Garbe noted in particular the "odd" practice of forming plurals by adding the suffix "people," or "folk." More than one pundit would thus be "pundit-people," and children would be "child-people." This became even more comic, Garbe observed, when extended to animals, as for example in the phrases "horse-folk," or "tiger-folk."48

In contrast to India, Garbe found Ceylon, also a British colony, to be far more agreeable. The Sinhalese, he noted, were in general more sociable and pleasant than Hindus, especially since they did not share their caste prejudices and other superstitions. Even the "half-castes," or the Eurasians, of Ceylon, he writes, created a more favorable impression, being more responsible and trustworthy than their counterparts in India. In general, people seemed to be more literate, knowledgeable, and
cultured, and the knowledge of English had percolated to
different classes of society to a degree that was still
unimaginable in India. The vast majority of Indians, Garbe
writes, knew little or nothing of the language of their
rulers. Garbe’s favorable impressions of “Ceylonese
society” were further enhanced, as we have noted before
(p. 332), by the hospitality of the resident Germans, who
had made a name for themselves by running a very successful
coconut-processing plant. The comfort of their villa, and
the care he received from his countrymen as he convalesced
from his illness, merged into the very pleasant picture of
Ceylon that formed in his mind.49

But although he was pleased with the social life and
structures he found in Ceylon, Garbe was disappointed by
the religion, or at least by the way in which it was
practised. The Buddhist temples, as well as the priests,
failed to impress him. Worship in these temples, he notes,
consisted exactly of the same distasteful mumbo-jumbo as in
Hindu temples in India. The priests were considerably less
learned than they claimed to be and often displayed the
same ignorance and immaturity with regard to the outside
world as the pundits of Benares. Their libraries contained
very few books or manuscripts, and what little there was
seemed to be there by chance. What did, in contrast,
contain a significant number of valuable manuscripts and
works of art was the local museum, run by an Englishman,
Mr. Haly, who took the time to show Garbe the "impressive library" and the numerous examples of local arts and crafts in his collection.  

The Search for Past Glory

Garbe's distaste for the India he actually encountered should be evident from the preceding discussion. This distaste could not but color the way he viewed ancient India, as well. As a professional Indologist, however, he had no choice but to search out the positive aspects of India's culture and history, even if only from the past. The German tradition within which he was working made this need even more compelling, since the primary stimulus and assumption behind German Indological scholarship was the idea of the Aryan golden age of antiquity which India had supposedly nurtured.

This professional interest is, of course, what led him to travel to Benares and study there for a year with Sanskrit scholars. Sanskrit was the bread and butter of Garbe's scholarly life, as it was of Deussen's, and the language had long been venerated by German scholars as the original language of the Aryan family. The impact of the city of Benares, though, was so overpowering for Garbe that the study of India's Sanskritic heritage could not be separated and viewed in isolation from the immediate
physical and cultural environment in which he pursued his scholarship.

Like all Europeans, and especially Orientalists and Indologists, Garbe went to Benares, he writes, with strong pre-conceived images of a beautiful city steeped in tradition where one would encounter meditating Hindus and grand temples amidst lush tropical vegetation, and marble steps leading down to the Ganges. Utter disappointment, Garbe writes, awaits every European who expects to find such a city. In what is one of the longest chapters in his book, Garbe leaves little doubt as to why this must be so, painting in detail the picture of Benares that is today as famous as the romanticized image may have been earlier: a dirty, overpopulated, dilapidated city, where physical destitution and deterioration and social customs have become indistinguishably intertwined.\(^{51}\)

Garbe adds that he was different from the typical European tourist who spent two days at the most in Benares and then left with highly unpleasant feelings. Garbe's work required him to spend a full year in the city and work closely with Brahmin scholars. He therefore had more opportunity to observe the people of Benares and their customs, which, he notes, were richer, more authentic, and less influenced by the West than anywhere else in India. The judgements of the passing European traveller are therefore, according to Garbe, not quite correct. But Garbe
does not explain why these opinions are incorrect, nor do his own observations present a positive or admirable side of Benares which would mitigate the usual dismal picture. Garbe’s description of Benares and its scholars remains, on the whole, negative in the extreme.

In the following discussion, I focus on Garbe’s Sanskrit studies and his interactions with the local scholars since his connection with Indian antiquity is most apparent in this area. It is clear from Garbe’s account that while he may have had some respect for the intellectual creations of ancient India, his view of those who were supposed to be transmitting this knowledge to him, the modern-day pandits, was on the whole a poor one. In this respect, his experiences and reactions were very similar to those of Deussen.

In Benares, Garbe came fairly quickly to the conclusion that the notion of a direct intellectual line connecting the ancient Sanskrit texts, mainly the Vedas, to modern Hinduism was a myth. Especially at the popular level, Hinduism, with what Garbe saw as its grotesque gods and other shallow trappings, was far removed from the Aryan gods and ideas of the Vedas. Most of the gods worshipped by contemporary Hindus were derived mainly, he believed, from those of the original, non-Aryan inhabitants. The idea of "our Aryan brothers in India" - so dear to Max Mueller - was at any rate another hopelessly false myth, Garbe
claimed. Not only in religion, but in racial composition as well, Aryan origins had been diluted to the point where only a miniscule fraction of the ethnic make-up of Hindus could be called "Aryan." The presence everywhere in India of strong Aryan influences in language did not, Garbe argued, refute this in the slightest. While even non-Aryans had adopted the linguistic forms of the invaders, in racial and cultural terms the gap between the mixed population and the original Aryans became ever wider. The repulsive customs of this mixed people, Garbe continued, came not from the Aryans but from "the darker side." I am not primarily concerned here with the veracity of such observations. I am interested, rather, in the fact that Garbe made such observations at all, believing them to be based on sound knowledge, and the manner in which such ideas shaped his view of India as well as of himself.

The pandits, or scholars, whom Garbe encountered in Benares were, Garbe notes, very different from the broad mass of superstitious and uncultured Hindus whose customs provoked the preceding remarks. The pandits - which is how Garbe refers to them - were quiet, reserved, and hardworking individuals who looked down on the uneducated majority and their popular forms of worship. The breadth of their learning was staggering, and for the European Indologist it was, therefore, an invaluable experience to study with them. The scholars of the stricter, older school
usually had no knowledge whatsoever of European languages or Western methods of scholarship and showed no interest in finding about them, either. They appeared to be content, Garbe writes, with their contemptuous attitude toward European scholars and their analyses. Their entire way of thinking was so totally at odds with Western approaches that the Western scholar was left with no choice but to adapt himself to the Indian perspective as far as possible. The European had to absorb the mass of information which the pandits possessed but cast aside totally these scholars’ views on the historical origins or evolution of the ideas they studied. Anyone who started his studies with these pandits, Garbe believed, would never develop into a genuine scholar.54

It is clear from Garbe’s account that he considered the pandits to be intellectually very immature and unsophisticated, at least by Western criteria. They were for him like a reference work which contained all the bare facts but nothing that could be called a serious interpretation. From his description of his tutorials in Benares, it sounds as though he was the teacher who had to educate the pandits. One had to be forever alert, he writes, and not merely follow what the pandits were saying but also monitor them closely. For there were times when they would attempt, Garbe observes, to bluff their way through a passage they did not understand. To admit that
they did not know something was evidently totally alien to their style. Garbe could not get the pandits to discuss things in what he considered plain, logical language. Everything was convoluted to the point where it made no sense, and explanatory examples were always from the "fabricated world of gods and demons," rather than from everyday life. Garbe adds, evidently in jest, that his tribulations with the pandits were more or less tolerable in the cool winter months. But in the summer, with his energies and spirit already sapped by heat and illness, the idiosyncracies of these scholars, Garbe remembers, were a severe test of his patience.

Like Deussen, Garbe found most Indians to be naïve, intellectually as well as socially. The Sanskrit pandits, despite all their erudition, were evidently no exception. Their questions about Europe displayed, going by Garbe's account, not simply an ignorance of the world outside their own spheres but a childish lack of sophistication in their general intellectual outlook and manner. One pandit asked Garbe whether Bismarck understood Sanskrit, to which Garbe replied that Bismarck had better things to do. The pandit evidently did not grasp the irony in Garbe's remark, for he pressed further and inquired whether Bismarck was at all interested in scholarly matters, since it was beyond his comprehension that there could be anything more important than learning Sanskrit. On another occasion, a pandit asked
Garbe where a dog he saw, a "black poodle," came from. When Garbe replied that it was probably from England, he was asked whether such dogs were born in Germany, as well.⁵⁷ Garbe was also once dragged, as mediator and judge, into a comic dispute involving a pandit who had been cheated by a rice merchant.⁵⁸

The pandits' ignorance was compounded, Garbe notes, by their astonishing, undisguised, and, in Garbe's opinion, unjustified arrogance, the result of a narrow vision and overspecialization. Garbe soon adopted the local custom and flattered pandits in ornate language, which the pandits accepted in a matter-of-fact way with no attempt to return compliments or discount the flattery. Their demeanor reflected, again, a childlike mind that failed to see deliberate untruths or irony. To their publications, which were small, the pandits would append numerous high-sounding titles and achievements, almost all self-conferred. An example of such a title would be "composer of a hundred verses in twenty-four minutes." The cover of the book would often be adorned by a picture which was totally unrelated to the contents of the work. If Garbe asked about the reason for inserting such illustrations, the answer would invariably be "to look at." The pandits were also evidently not made any more personable by the fact that they always seemed to be afflicted with colds and coughs and by their practice of shaving only on Sundays.⁵⁹
While Garbe was thus evidently appalled by the strange ways and attitudes of the pandits of Benares and the antiquated Sanskritic world they inhabited, it is useful to consider here Peter van der Veer's argument about the closeness and even convergence of "Brahmanical" and Indological discourse. Indologists, van der Veer points out, focused almost entirely on "the study of Brahmanical traditions in Sanskrit texts." The Indologists' picture of India was therefore bound to mirror in certain ways the ideas of the class which had maintained itself as the sole authors, guardians, and interpreters of these texts, namely Brahmins and upper-class Hindus. In certain fundamental ways, commentaries on Indian society such as Garbe's were thus within the same discursive universe as "orthodox" Hindu constructions. The point of convergence van der Veer highlights is the equation of Hinduism with Indianness, to the exclusion of other religious communities, primarily Muslims but also Christians and others. This convergence was not significantly disturbed by disagreement between Orientalists and Indian scholars on specific details, as was often the case for Garbe. Not surprisingly, Orientalist scholarship became, as we have noted often in this study, a reservoir that fed Indian or Hindu nationalism, thus completing the circle which began with "Orientalism [feeding] on an existing, dominant discourse carried by a Brahmin elite."
As for the language of Indian antiquity, Sanskrit, Garbe noted that, at least among learned Brahmins such as the pandits he met, the language could almost be termed a "living language," more so than Latin in modern Europe. Garbe was very pleased to see that among certain Brahmins the language was kept alive, even if somewhat artificially, by making youngsters learn and use it constantly from a very early age. Among those fluent in it, Sanskrit could thus be used to discuss even mundane day-to-day matters in the contemporary world, especially since it possessed an immense vocabulary, larger than that of ancient Greek. Garbe recorded without irony or qualification his intense admiration for the pandits' complete command over the language.\footnote{61}

Benares was extraordinarily rich in Sanskrit manuscripts, Garbe writes, but systematic care and access were totally absent. It was extremely difficult for Europeans to acquire these documents since the Brahmins who owned them were very reluctant even to display them to a European, let alone sell them. Childish excuses were offered to avoid keeping promises to show them. Some manuscripts were occasionally thrown into the Ganges as sacrifices. The local English officials apparently displayed an indifference to such happenings and to Indian scholarship in general, which, Garbe remarks, was incomprehensible to a German. A German government in
Benares, Garbe thought, would have done so much more to preserve these manuscripts! As it happened, a German Indologist, Dr. Thibaut, was the principal of the local Government College. But even his services, Garbe felt, were not used by the British in a manner that would have helped Sanskrit scholarship.62

Garbe was thus, on the whole, unimpressed by the Hinduism he encountered in Benares as well by its principal exponents, the pandits. This is further supported by an examination of his novel about Benares and its pandits (see pages 365-373 below). As we have seen, he was equally disillusioned, while in Ceylon, by the other ancient religion of India, Buddhism. But while Hinduism was nonetheless well established and admired in the Indo-European pantheon, antipathy toward Buddhism had long been a characteristic of the German Orientalist tradition. Schlegel, for example, had argued a century earlier that the strength of Chinese society had been eroded by, among other things, the introduction of Buddhism from India by way of Tibet. Schlegel had denounced Buddhism in no uncertain terms as a religion of no merit whatsoever, describing it as "a diabolical mimicry of Christianity," with a system of "metaphysics" that was "wearisomely prolix and unintelligible."63 He also believed Buddhism, like Daoism, to be "an absolute system of atheism," an aspect
that was particularly disturbing to Schlegel, the devout Catholic. Schlegel blamed Buddhism for propagating such social practices as polygamy and even worse, polyandry. Polyandry, he wrote, is "infinitely more repugnant, [destructive] of morality, [and] more debasing to the male character" than polygamy, and is "legally established" in Buddhist nations. Schlegel's denunciation of Buddhism came in spite of the fact that it originated in India, a country to which he was partial in an almost fanatical manner. The Orientalists' search for past glory - in the early as well as in the late nineteenth century - was therefore confined to the subcontinent's Hindu heritage.

"The Redemption of the Aryan"

Outside of the notes in his travel journal, Garbe also made abundantly clear his feelings about Benares, its pandits, its customs, and Hinduism (especially as practiced and interpreted by Brahmins) in a novel published in English in 1894, entitled The Redemption of the Brahman [sic]. The tone of the book is entirely in keeping with the vigorous cynicism towards Indian customs and beliefs which pervades the Sketches. the social setting which Garbe constructs for the plot is bleaker than what he describes in the travelogue, and the "redemption" for the Brahmin in the story comes only when he jettisons all his social, cultural, and religious beliefs and ties to the society
around him. Not restrained by the need to be "factual," as in his travelogue, Garbe builds a plot and characters that allow him to make a scathing commentary on Indian society and a rather charitable one on British colonial rule.

The Brahmin in the story is one who, curiously enough, like Garbe himself, comes to Benares from a "distant land" to study its Brahmanical traditions and texts. His "firm, energetic features, of a strongly marked foreign type," set him apart even at the outset from the Hindu rabble around him. Threatened by a Muslim mob during a religious procession, the Brahmin, Ramchandra, finds refuge in the home of a wealthy merchant, Krishnadas. Krishnadas lives with his daughter Gopa and his widowed sister Lilavati. Gopa is married to a philandering husband who lives in a distant province and whom she has hardly seen, while Lilavati had been "widowed" as a little child when her husband, also a child, died of smallpox. The wretched existence of Lilavati who, in accordance with the dictates of Hinduism and its high priests, has led a secluded and highly restricted life, forms the backdrop for the first half of the story. Lilavati dies when, in the course of a severe illness, she is denied water because widows are supposed to fast on certain days.

Ramchandra's studies are meanwhile being financially supported by Krishnadas, who sees this as a privilege rather than a burden and is honored by the visits
Ramchandra, the Brahmin, pays to his merchant home. Ramchandra is smitten by Gopa who is exceedingly beautiful and has, in addition, intelligence, social charm, and good taste. "Oriental excess" was clearly not her style. She was not "according to the usual custom of the land, overladen with jewels; only a tasteful golden ornament hung upon her forehead." She was also "of stately size and voluptuous form [and] her features were nobly chiselled." Garbe's heroine thus seemed to be an un-Indian beauty, almost a Renaissance Venus.

Ramchandra also strikes up a friendship with an Englishman, Mr. White. White, the local judge, is interested in Indian philosophy and languages and has employed Ramchandra as his tutor. But while White is the one who is technically the pupil, it is Ramchandra who seems to be learning and widening his horizons more from this encounter; the similarity with Garbe's own experience with the pandits of Benares is striking. Ramchandra moves closer to White's intellectual position, thereby distancing himself from other Brahmin pandits and their ideas. Ramchandra, who like Gopa is already almost European in physical appearance, is thus moving, also like Gopa, towards European-style intellectual enlightenment. Shocked and inspired by White's ideas and actions, such as leading a blind untouchable by the hand, Ramchandra is plagued by
doubts, for example, about the customs which had led Lilavati to her death.

To construct the setting for this plot, Garbe describes facets of life in Benares that clearly draw on his personal experiences in the city. Two Englishmen, for example, witness a festival in a Hindu temple and are disgusted by what they perceive as the dirt, chaos, noise, and undisciplined behavior of the worshippers. Throughout the story, it is the Europeans, like the ones at this festival, who are omniscient. They know what is wrong with Indian society, what Indians lack, and what they could be with proper instruction and guidance. Garbe's views, as recorded in his travel sketches, are very similar to those of these Englishmen.

At the temple, hundreds of monkeys crawl with impunity all over the structure and snatch eagerly at the food offered to them by the adoring pilgrims. At times, the monkeys run off to the trees with the offerings and drop them into the seething crowd of Hindus below who were "pushing, reviling, and shrieking" to get to the hideous goddess, Durga, and "[give] her wreaths of flowers, or [pour] milk, rice, and grain on the floor without discrimination." These offerings then decomposed in the hot sun, emitting "a fearful stench, of which the thronging masses did not seem to take notice." The priests, meanwhile, driven more by avarice than devotion, exhorted
the crowd to offer more cash than food to the goddess. All in all, this temple scene represents, to Garbe and his fellow European observers, the ultimate in non-Europeanness in India, a virtual nightmare in which the polar opposites of supposedly European traits such as restraint, order, cleanliness, and rational attitudes prevail.

To further delineate the ostensibly incomprehensible cultural and moral environment in which Europeans had to live in India, Garbe describes an exchange between the judge, White, and his Indian servants. These servants, it appears, were such compulsive liars that they had lost the ability to comprehend what was morally wrong or reprehensible about lying. The lies, in this instance, related to the supposed reasons for the breakage of a glass and a lamp in the judge's house and a discrepancy in the accounts which the servants had to provide for the daily household expenditures. The explanations provided were evidently incredible and bizarre to European ears: the glass "broke by itself" and "a muskrat ran into the lamp." But White did not challenge these explanations, having learned long ago "the coolness which all Europeans must acquire in India if they wish to avoid constant vexation." Stern warnings were appropriate, though, as was "a [significant] look at the whip," and the servants "quaked" and pleaded with their master, and promised that the lapses would not happen again.
All this clearly did not, in Garbe's portrayal, make White a brutal domestic tyrant. White remains a good man with high moral and ethical principles. His stern behavior with the servants was as unavoidable and presumably as well-meant as that of a parent with wayward children. If anyone was in the wrong, it was the servants who, while telling lies with no scruples or hesitation, refused on supposedly moral grounds to have anything to do with an "untouchable" boy who had come to deliver a basket of fruit to White. The boy was the son of the blind untouchable whom White had earlier helped find his way. White points out to his servants their reprehensible behavior and reprimands them severely. White remains till the end of the story, as he is in this episode, the embodiment of reason, high morality, and a progressive, modern outlook. The Indians, that is those whose character and abilities are of the right kind, become more and more like White, or come to see reason and light under his tutelage.

The pivotal element in the final stage of the story is Gopa's "widowhood," brought about by her husband's accidental death. Her father, Krishnadas, is determined not to let Gopa suffer the same horrible fate as his sister, and resists the threats and pleas of his community to make Gopa conform to the norms of Hindu widowhood - cutting her hair short, for example, and donning austere clothing. Ramchandra, meanwhile, is further undergoing his
intellectual transformation. He admits to White for the first time, for example, that he does not understand a passage he is supposed to teach. This is an allusion to Garbe’s complaint, from his own experience, about the pandits of Benares never admitting their lack of knowledge on any text or issue. By admitting his ignorance, Ramchandra thus moves closer to the European ideal of self-critique and self-doubt, especially in the pursuit of knowledge.

Having established a closer intellectual rapport, White proceeds to make Ramchandra more European in his emotional attitudes as well. His love for Gopa, he tells Ramchandra, should take precedence over all superstitions, caste prejudices, and pressures from the community, and he should, furthermore, express it in a forthright manner, as opposed to the presumably "unspoken love" among lovers in India or perhaps even loveless marriages. Ramchandra proceeds to do so and is thus on the path to self-realization and self-fulfilment, European style, to the exclusion, if necessary, of all people and circumstances around him. Not only does he state his love for Gopa, he also embraces her in the presence of her father, again a very un-Indian act but one that is clearly, in Garbe’s opinion, the only logical and honest way to behave. The forces of reason - Ramchandra, White, Krishnadas, and Gopa - all finally converge. The Indians in this group have
all been expelled from their castes and face a hard life ahead, but they do not care any longer, and enjoy their newfound freedom and happiness. White presides benevolently over the gathering, satisfied that he has made at least a few people see the light. The last words of the story belong to him: to Gopa, who prostrates herself in front of him, he delivers "a gentle reproach" that "one must not kneel before man." To Ramchandra, he affirms that "you have restored in me the belief in your people, which I had lost. In you I see the future of this country." 74

Garbe could not have written a more severe indictment of traditional Hindu society and customs than what he presented in the Redemption. In it, Garbe said what he could not say in the Sketches and left no doubt as to his utter revulsion for Benares, its religion, and its high priests. 75 There appears to be a silver lining in this story in the form of the Indians who liberate themselves from ignorance and superstition and act in a "rational" and enlightened manner. But the story-line is too contrived for this to be a genuine expression of hope and optimism on Garbe's part. The novel conveys the impression that a rational outcome such as the one described at the end is too good ever to happen, mainly because it is utterly incompatible with the social and religious environment of Hindu India. It is interesting to note, however, that the Indian heroes of the novel are all Hindus, and the central
character is a Brahmin. Muslims figure only marginally in the novel, in the initial street-fighting that throws Ramchandra at Krishnadas's doorstep. At no place in the novel does Garbe present a Muslim individual or Muslim beliefs and practices as desirable alternatives to the corruptions of Hinduism. The only desirable alternatives, in Garbe's view, are the ideas embodied in the Englishman White.

Garbe on Akbar

Garbe could, however, on occasion, admire a particular facet of Indian culture with no apparent reservations or qualifications. As mentioned earlier, Garbe appeared to prefer the accomplishments of the Muslim tradition in India to those of the Hindu tradition. This was ironic, given the alleged continuity, rooted in the Vedas, between the ancient Aryan age and modern Hindu beliefs and traditions. Early in his travel sketches, Garbe pointed to Muslim architecture as one of the few things that had impressed him favorably in India. Garbe also harbored great admiration for the sixteenth-century Mughal ruler Akbar (1542-1605) and eulogized him in a tract he wrote in 1909 to mark the birthday of the king of Württemberg. The almost unqualified praise which he showered on Akbar was given, of course, at a forum far removed from the unpleasant realities of contemporary
India. It was also delivered on an occasion when hyperbolic praise for a monarch was not inappropriate. And not least, the person Garbe chose as the recipient of his praise, Akbar, had already been canonized, so to speak, in Indian academic as well as popular discourse among both Muslims and Hindus. That is, it was not in any way a bold or difficult step to lavish praise on Akbar.

But having pointed out these limitations, one should be fair to Garbe and note that his admiration for Akbar seemed to be genuine and based on sound historical knowledge. The work begins, though, on a characteristically negative note: The Indologist, who wishes to delve into Indian history, Garbe states, will find to his disappointment that the country is very poor in historical sources. If, furthermore, he is interested in studying great personalities, he will search in vain for such individuals in Indian antiquity or the medieval period, not because there are none in Indian history, but because their historical traces are to be found mainly in fictional documents which cannot be used to reconstruct the past accurately.  

Indians, Garbe observed, are not historically inclined. Speculations and "dreams" about non-earthly worlds and previous and future lives, rather than historical reality, he argued, have consumed the energies of Indian thinkers. Only with the arrival of Muslims in
India was this veil of myth and legend lifted. Muslim rule, according to Garbe, marks the beginning of the new or modern era in India, and the history of India is from here on written by foreigners.  

Such comments were not new in the European tradition. Schlegel, in 1828, had argued that "Indians have no regular histories, no works of real historical science....[All] their conceptions of human affairs and events are exclusively mythological." Hegel, in 1830, described India as a land without history, in the sense of not having a recorded history (unlike China), as well as not "making history" in a conscious and deliberate fashion. India, in Hegel's view, has been acted upon by world-historical actors instead of acting herself. And exactly as Garbe was to do sixty years later, Hegel pointed to "dreams" rather than "historical truth" as the natural condition and product of the Indian mind. Hegel had also identified foreign observers, including Muslim historians, as the only reliable source of historical information on India.

But while Garbe grants Muslim writers a fair degree of reliability, he makes clear that he is by no means enamoured of their culture or of the personalities they described. Continuing his bleak introduction to the life of Akbar, Garbe launches into a scathing attack on Islam, describing it as a distortion of what a religion should be and one, furthermore, that is characterized by fanaticism
and fatalism. These two traits, he argued, have together worked on unsophisticated peoples and resulted in the role Islam has played in the history of the world. The history of India since about 1000 A.D., when the first Muslim conquerors arrived in India, until the 1700s, when the Mughal dynasty came to an end, was, according to Garbe, a tale of plunder, slaughter, and horror. A high point of this story, Garbe notes, was the invasion by Timur, a descendant of the Mongols, who "slaughtered hundreds of thousands of prisoners because it became too inconvenient to herd them along." Aurangzeb, the last of the Moghuls, Garbe adds, was another cruel and whimsical despot whose horrible actions have left a lasting fear of Muslims among the Hindu population of India to this day.81

Such is the backdrop against which Garbe proceeds to paint his picture of Akbar, the third Moghul emperor, as one of the wisest and noblest rulers in the history of the world. Garbe then wrestles with the question of whether Akbar was an aberration in this tradition as well as in the time in which he lived, which Garbe describes as "an era of treachery, greed, and selfishness." Everything about Akbar, he notes, is utterly at odds with what one might expect from a person who was, among other things, a Muslim and a descendant of the dreadful Timur. But a closer look at Akbar's antecedents, Garbe continues, reveals a different picture. From his father and grandfather, Akbar inherited a
love for scientific knowledge and art, while his childhood in exile toughened him into an individual of energy and resolve. And not least, he was fortunate to have had as his private tutor a brilliant thinker, an "enlightened and broadminded" Persian, Mir Abdullatif, who laid the foundations for Akbar's later religious and ethical attitudes. And yet, despite all these favorable circumstances and explanations, Garbe concluded that Akbar's genius was to be attributed mainly to his own person, since with no other Muslim ruler did these strains in the Muslim tradition take root and develop as they did with Akbar. "Akbar is unique," Garbe pronounces, "in the history of Islam."  

This antipathy toward Islam did not stop Garbe, however, from expressing unreserved admiration, in his travel diary, for the architectural feats of Muslims in India. He went so far as to say that it was principally the pomp and splendour of the Mughal courts, as described by European travellers, that had given India its reputation as "a land of wonder." The impression had spread mistakenly, however, that the entire country was as fabulous as the Mughal courts. In Delhi and Agra, Garbe was awestruck by the grandeur and craftsmanship invested in the mosques and forts. The famous Taj Mahal surpassed even the high expectations with which he had come; it was probably the only thing in India about which he could make such a
remark. He did add, though, that the historical record is silent on who the master architect was behind this construction. Based on other information from the time, it was highly likely, Garbe argues, that a French architect, Austin de Bordeaux, designed the building or was certainly closely involved with its construction. To underscore his point that the wonders of India were nothing but the wonders of Muslim art and architecture, Garbe remarks that leaving Agra amounted to leaving behind the glories of India, especially if one's next destination, as Garbe's happened to be, was Allahabad, the city sacred to Hindus at the confluence of the rivers Ganges and the Yamuna.

While Garbe clearly depicted Akbar as an oddity in the Muslim political and cultural tradition, his account also conveys the impression that not being a Hindu was a useful asset for Akbar. That is, from Garbe's discussion, it appears as though a Hindu would not have had the vision and the greatness to accomplish all the things that Akbar did. It was also probably helpful that Akbar was not a "real native" of India, since he was the descendant of foreign invaders. Writing about the Rajputs, the warrior Hindus who were coopted and given high and responsible positions in Akbar's court, Garbe remarks that they are "a bold, chivalrous, and reliable people who cherish their freedom and are proud of their race, and are totally different in character and type from other Hindus." The
visitor who arrives in Rajputana, Garbe writes, feels as though he has been transported to another world where instead of the usual weak, yielding, and subservient populace of other regions of India, one encounters strong, resolute individuals. The men, for example, are imposing and armed with swords, and their flashing eyes and full beards add to their stature. It is interesting to recall that one of the few Indians Deussen admitted to being impressed by was, similarly, a tall, strong soldier in the northwest provinces.

Garbe's portrait of Akbar is highly idealized, and, as noted earlier, is meant to add to the pomp of another king's birthday. There is, therefore, an element of hyperbole which contrasts sharply, for example, with the utterly cynical tone of the Sketches. But even allowing for this, Garbe's work on Akbar reflects some of the same attitudes towards India and Indians that were expressed in the Sketches. While Akbar is depicted in every respect as an enlightened and rational ruler, he is portrayed as pursuing his goals single-handedly, totally against the natural tendencies of Indian society. Like a wise patriarch, he has to chide and coerce his subjects into doing what is good for them, usually against their will and natural inclination, much like the British three centuries later. For example, corruption, oppression, and deception by feudal landlords were so ingrained, Garbe writes, that
they continued even after Akbar had passed laws to improve the system. Severe punishments then had to be meted out even to very high provincial officials. These cases were, however, exceptions to Akbar's benign and merciful policies.

Also against the grain of Indian tradition were Akbar's ideas on religion. Tension and conflict between the Hindu majority in India and their Muslim rulers was already by Akbar's time a hallmark of Indian society. Akbar's ideas on the universality of all religions and his attempts to establish a syncretic faith were, going by Garbe's account, completely at odds with prevailing ideas among both Muslims and Hindus.

As for Akbar's attitudes toward his own religion, Islam, Garbe argues that although Akbar had been raised as a Muslim and was very diligent in observing the rites and customs of his religion, he lost faith in Islam later in his adult life. A principal cause of this disillusionment was the ulema, the scholars of Islam who, according to Garbe, had a vested interest in propagating orthodoxies. In debates which Akbar organized at his court among exponents of various faiths, Garbe writes, the ulema invariably cut a sorry figure. Their arguments and proofs were unconvincing, and soon Akbar and the Islamic establishment found themselves in open confrontation. To the dismay of the ulema, Akbar declared himself the supreme
authority in the land on all religious matters and relegated Islam to a secondary position, at least in his own intellectual universe. He began to view the origins of the Koran, Garbe writes, as human and flawed, rather than divine, and even disputed works and sayings attributed to the Prophet Mohammed. All in all, Akbar, according to Garbe, developed an intense dislike for Islam and everything associated with it.

It was not just the Muslim ulema, however, whom Garbe ridiculed through his interpretation of Akbar’s ideas. Garbe also presents in a very poor light the Jesuit priests who tried to convert Akbar to Christianity. In Garbe’s account, these priests appear as shallow, dogmatic, and as manipulative as the ulema. They misread completely, Garbe argues, Akbar’s invitation to come to his court and present their ideas, seeing it more as an opportunity to seize a dominant place for their religion and themselves rather than as a chance to engage in a genuine debate. And even though their arguments were always impressive, given their training in rhetoric, Akbar was far too sophisticated to be taken in by their apparent cleverness. He knew all about their "greed for power" and such institutions as the Inquisition to allow them even the smallest foothold in his political or religious world.

There is a difference, though, between Garbe’s discussion of the Ulema and that of the Jesuits. With the
former, it is not just the priests and scholars but the religion, Islam, itself that is the problem. It is depicted as too flawed and weak to achieve any real success with intelligent, critical people such as Akbar. When he turns to the Jesuits, Garbe never criticizes Christianity itself. It is rather the messengers whom he describes as incompetent and unworthy of respect. Garbe acknowledges that Akbar, for political reasons, would never have converted to Christianity, even if he were to be fully convinced of its intellectual worth. But whatever little chance the religion might have had of making inroads into Indian society was destroyed, according to Garbe, by the foolishness of the Jesuits. Garbe himself was not opposed to the prospect of Christianity gaining a following in India. In fact, he stated clearly in his travel diary that he "would welcome a large-scale conversion to Christianity in India as the first step toward well-being and progress."92

In summary, Garbe's evaluation of Akbar was, on one hand, in keeping with the dislike for Hindu culture and admiration for Muslim achievements which he professed, for example, in the Sketches. But at the same time, Garbe presented Akbar as quite unrepresentative of the Muslim tradition in India. Akbar, by Garbe's account, appeared to be a fluke, both in the Muslim environment and in the broader Indian cultural setting. His praise for Akbar was,
therefore, not a negation of the extremely dismal view of everything Indian that he presents in the *Sketches*. In fact, Garbe’s portrait of Akbar, by presenting him as the only worthwhile political entity India has ever produced, displays the same arrogance and patronizing tone that characterizes the *Sketches*.

**Conclusion to Chapter**

German Orientalism, Sheldon Pollock has argued, cannot fit Said’s model of an "ideological formation" first, because Germans never stopped admiring India as an "Aryan brotherland" and the original home of Indo-European civilization, and second, because the political needs of Germany were quite different from those of England or France. Distancing from and control over the Other, aided by supposedly scientific scholarship, was, according to Pollock, directed *inwards* in the German case, and not toward the Other in non-European regions, as in British or French Orientalism. More precisely, the German Other was the Jew, and German Orientalism’s complicity in the process of marginalizing this "Oriental within" became all too clear, as Pollock demonstrates, in the Nazi era, when Indology and many Indologists became active collaborators of the "Aryan" establishment.\(^3\)

In the second part of his argument, Pollock defines Orientalism broadly as any ideological system that
perpetuates hierarchy and inequality. Using this definition, he points to the "Orientalism" that existed within India before the advent of Western colonialism. This internal, pre-modern Orientalism was similar to modern German Orientalism in that it was also aimed at acquiring control over the Other within. This "indigenous discourse of power" had been created, of course, by the Brahmin class, and then subsequently, in tautological fashion, given legitimacy and confirmation by Western Orientalists who "elevated certain Brahmanic formulations to the level of hegemonic text." The argument is similar to Peter van der Heer's thesis of Orientalists and Brahmins feeding off each other to exclude all "Others," which was for both groups the non-Aryan, from their discourse and from the realm of legitimacy.

These arguments are illustrated well through the case of Garbe. For all his contempt for the Brahmin pandits, it was they who supplied the raison d'être for his trip. It was to listen to their Sanskritic sermons, to read and, if possible, acquire manuscripts of the texts these pundits considered sacred, and to absorb the undiluted Indianness of the city that he came to hate, Benares, that Garbe went to India. The Hindu priestly class was vital to Garbe's intellectual existence, and Garbe in turn, by being their student, elevated their status and power considerably in a society in which power ultimately lay with Europeans.
As for the notion of internal othering, Garbe’s ideas both support and refute the point. To start with, if Garbe’s study of India was aimed solely, even if not explicitly, at establishing the lineage of the Indo-Aryan race and thereby buttressing German ideas about ethnic uniqueness and superiority, especially vis-à-vis Semites and other "non-Aryans" within Europe, then the reasons Edward Said offers, for example, for omitting German Orientalism from his scrutiny would be somewhat justified. As we have seen earlier, Said has noted that his critics have pointed to his omission of German Orientalism from his book as a shortcoming. If internal othering was the only sub-motif in German writings such as those of Garbe, then Said, with his attention fixed firmly on the Orient-Occident polarity and explicit connections between Orientalism and colonial power, would be right in omitting it from his study.

But, from the writings of Garbe and Deussen, it is evident that internal othering was not the only sub-motif. While the Indo-Aryan theme certainly drove them to approach and study India in the way they did, their supposedly informal travel journals - in which they let down their guard - reveal the colonial face of German Orientalism, as well. If British Orientalism in the eighteenth century was part of the slowly unfolding project of imperial control over India, as Jenny Sharpe has suggested, Garbe’s work in
India in the late nineteenth century was even more so. In the terminology of the Orientalist-Anglicist debate in early British colonial policy in India, Garbe the Orientalist was more akin to the "bad," progress-oriented, colonizing Anglicists than the "good," leave-Indian-culture-alone Orientalists.

Garbe shared little of the supposed sympathy and respect for Indian culture which the British Orientalists professed. For him, India was a job devoid of all romance and it is evident from his remarks that he found colonial rule in India a blessing which allowed him to perform this job efficiently. In turn, his job also allowed colonial rule - or European domination - to function more efficiently, since the knowledge-gathering in which he was engaged was part of the white man's burden around the globe: he had to preserve manuscripts, ferret out information from scholars, and interpret Indian ideas in a way the native pandits could not. This sense of "duty" or responsibility, the idea that he was doing India as well as Europe a favor, allowed him, for example, to admire and establish a closeness with the British engineer who had constructed a narrow-gauge railway through difficult terrain to the hill-station of Darjeeling. Garbe noted in his diary how grateful Europeans living in the region should be to this man for what he had accomplished, just as Europeans would presumably be to Garbe for his scholarship.
on India. While Garbe's contribution was less tangible than a railroad, both he and the British engineer were engaged in the same European task of bringing progress or shedding light where there was none, as well as adding to the intellectual or physical well-being of Europeans.

Recent scholarship on colonialism, as Nicholas Dirks has noted, has taken "cultural technologies" of conquest and control more as its object of study than the earlier writing, which focused on political, economic, and military mechanisms of colonial rule. Colonialism, Dirks argues further, has become "a metaphor for the subtle relationship between power and knowledge, between culture and control." One kind of knowledge which more than others "might never have been invented without a colonial theater" was anthropological knowledge about the Other and his or her culture. Garbe the philosopher was, in the Orient, also the anthropologist engaged in the reconstruction and classification of traditional societies and cultures, an exercise which was instrumental in "creating oppositions such as European and Asian, modern and traditional, West and East." 98

The nature of Garbe's work in Benares would be described today as "fieldwork," that is, the collection of "raw data" which the scholar would then process and interpret. He had his "native informants," the pundits, whose "utterances" had to be made intelligible to a home
audience. An interesting twist, though, in Garbe's encounter with the natives - a dimension which does not receive great attention even in modern anthropological writings - is that the natives in this case possessed a highly literate culture in which the written text was as authoritative as in modern Western cultures. In a discussion, for example, on "the formation and breakdown of ethnographic authority in twentieth-century social anthropology," James Clifford remains largely focused on the relationship between the literate Western observer and the "illiterate, oral" peoples which he or she studies. Transcribing these oral cultures into a written text remains central to the anthropological project. Although Clifford remains intentionally focused on the "discipline" of anthropology as opposed to the broader problem of "the representation of otherness," the intense self-questioning to which Clifford subjects his discipline generates issues that are relevant even to someone as removed from professional anthropology as Garbe.

Did Garbe's stint in India, his "experience" in the "field," confer more authority on him as an interpreter of Indian culture? Clifford points to various criteria which have been used by anthropologists to assess "experiential authority." Mastery of the native language has been and perhaps still is considered a major prerequisite for an experience in the field to be worth its while. In addition,
the student of the "other" culture is traditionally assumed to develop some form of "rapport," empathy, or even friendship with the observed. Such rapport, in conjunction with "significant exposure" to the field, either in terms of duration or intensity of exposure — witness the now-fashionable notion of "immersion" in a foreign culture for students needing a quick, "real" supplement to their academic curricula — would allow one to develop a "feel" for or intuitive insights into the particular culture. But even with all these reassuring attributes, the world which experiential authority constructs remains subjective and not "dialogical or intersubjective." For the anthropologist, the experience thus remains "my experience." Along with other forms of anthropological authority, experiential authority, too, has thus been challenged by postmodern and postcolonial critiques.

Garbe certainly "immersed" himself in the cultural and scholarly environment of Benares. He acquired considerable mastery over the language used by scholars, Sanskrit, although he had virtually no knowledge of living languages such as Hindi. While his knowledge of Sanskrit gave him some authority to evaluate the pandits of Benares in their professional sphere, it is debatable whether this knowledge would have allowed him greater insights into contemporary culture or even to develop a rapport with his
local informants, i.e., the pandits. The situation was somewhat akin to knowing Latin but no modern European language in nineteenth-century Europe. It does not appear from Garbe's journal that he established any personal relationship or friendship with any of the scholars with whom he studied. On the contrary, his relationship with them was marked by a certain tension, distrust, and a lack of empathy. Garbe and the Indian scholars consistently viewed each other's ways as strange. The only example of a rapport between Europeans and Indians one finds in Garbe's writings is in the fictional setting of his utopian novel *The Redemption of the Brahman*.

John MacKenzie, arguing against the established critique of Orientalism, has pointed out that Orientalists, far from denigrating or ridiculing the Orient, were frequently looking to the Orient to criticize or even to subvert the values of their own societies, or to enrich their own cultural universe. Even if this implied "using" the Orient for selfish ends, there was little harm done because the interaction with Asian ideas was a creative process from which many worthwhile and valuable products emerged. Said's critique, MacKenzie argues, resembles precisely what Said seeks to overturn: a "monolithic, binary discourse" which pits the Orient against the Occident and impedes the very cultural understanding which it wants to promote. MacKenzie's
examples are drawn from the area of the arts, but this does not invalidate his arguments, especially since the anti-Orientalist critique itself and the related postcolonial discussion are among the most free-ranging and non-disciplinary debates to date. In *Culture and Imperialism*, for example, Said devotes an entire section to a discussion of Verdi’s opera *Aida.*

Jayant Lele makes the same points as MacKenzie when he points to the "Occidentalism" which the critique of Orientalism has inadvertently created. Lele maintains that those who "suspect the entire Western tradition, including its earlier critical-revolutionary moments, as a conspiracy, seem to join those whom they oppose as oppressors," mainly by joining their Western colleagues in the modern or postmodern "Western fragmentation of life and thought." Lele also points to the many good contributions to our body of knowledge, still relevant today, that came out of the tradition condemned by Said for its supposedly shoddy treatment of the Orient.

Several good works, in the form of scholarly texts and lectures, also undoubtedly resulted from Garbe’s encounter with India. In this respect, his dislike and contempt for the India he saw can be seen as irrelevant. Scholarship, one might argue, should be evaluated on its own merits, without bringing in extraneous considerations. But this is precisely what Said questions, and in a case
such as Garbe's, justifiably so. Not that one has to love or admire a society to be able to study it well. While Said ignores the case of German Orientalism (even in his later reflections on Orientalism), the German Indologists we are studying here - especially the ones who went to India - were clearly on the colonizer's side of the ruler-ruled divide in the colonial setting. As Europeans - and their travel journals consistently reflect this - they automatically became part of the Western colonial presence and were treated as such. Garbe's revulsion towards India therefore took on a shape which was intimately tied to colonial domination and control over the country. Even his solid, scholarly work, therefore, becomes a little less perfect when we consider that the study of the Orient was for him little more than a knowledge-gathering mission about a less competent and, at the time, subordinate society.
NOTES

1. A philosophical discourse contained within the ancient Indian epic, the Mahabharata.


3. Garbe, Sketches, xi-xii.

4. Ibid., xiii-xiv.

5. Ibid., 16.

6. Ibid.

7. Christiane Günther, in her survey of German writing on the Orient, Aufbruch nach Asien: Kulturelle Fremde in der deutschen Literatur um 1900 [Off to Asia: Cultural Others in German Literature around 1900] (Munich: indicium verlag, 1988), 49-50, has noted this sharp difference in attitude between Deussen and Garbe. Hermann Hesse's accusation in 1931, she writes, that Indologists at the turn of the century always discussed India with an air of condescension, could well apply to Garbe but not to Deussen. She quotes Deussen as saying that the principal benefit of Indian knowledge was that it made Westerners aware of the one-sidedness of their own world view.

8. Garbe, Sketches, 142-143.


11. Ibid., 7.


13. Ibid., 9.

14. Ibid., chap. 1 passim.

15. Ibid., 8-9.

16. Ibid., 4-5.
17. Ibid., 5.
18. Ibid., 129-130, 135-137.
19. Ibid., 15.
20. Ibid., 20.
21. Ibid., 95.
22. Ibid., 166-167.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 13.


28. Ibid., 17.

29. Schlegel admired, for example, the society and culture of the English, a Germanic people, but accused the Gauls of barbarism and blood-sacrifices. Ibid., 2-3, 26.


32. *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm von Humboldt und August Wilhelm Schlegel* [Letters exchanged between Wilhelm von Humboldt and August Wilhelm Schlegel], ed. Albert Leitzmann
(Halle A. S., Germany: Verlag von Max Niemayer, 1908), 72-73.


34. Ibid., 87.


37. Ibid., 123-126.

38. Ibid., 126, 130.

39. This is debatable. There are numerous accounts of Europeans in India, including Britishers, who struggled to make ends meet. See Sara J. Duncan's "A Mother in India," based partly on her own experiences in India, in *Stories from the Raj: From Kipling to Independence*, ed. Saros Cowasjee (New Delhi: Indus/HarperCollins India, 1992), 74-118. Also see Charles Allen's *Plain Tales from the Raj* (Andre Deutsch and British Broadcasting Corporation, U. K., 1975; Calcutta: Rupa, 1992), 47-48, 56-57, in which he describes the plight of men, as opposed to officers, in the British Indian Army.


41. Ibid., 164-165.

42. In 1857, Indian sepoys (soldiers) of the British Indian army in Meerut in northern India rose in revolt against their British masters. The revolt quickly spread to many provinces of India, but the British, partly through the use of the telegraph, were able to coordinate their strategies effectively and put down the "Mutiny," as it has come to be known. Some of the troops who had rebelled were given harsh and unusual punishments such as being blown apart from the mouth of a cannon. See Bipan Chandra and others, *India's Struggle for Independence* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1989), 31-41.


44. Ibid., 169.

45. Ibid., 159.

46. Ibid., 162.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., 159.
49. Ibid., 129-131.
50. Ibid., 131-132.
51. Ibid., 50.
52. Ibid., 57, 58.
53. Ibid., 57.
54. Ibid., 58-59, 61.
55. Ibid., 61.
56. Ibid., 62.
57. Ibid., 64.
58. Ibid., 69-71.
59. Ibid., 65.


61. Garbe, Sketches, 66.

62. Ibid., 71-73.


64. Ibid., 131-132.

65. Ibid., 135.


67. Ibid., 2.

68. Ibid., 6.

69. See Garbe, Sketches, chap. 4.
70. Garbe, *Redemption*, chap. 5 passim.

71. Ibid., 31-33.

72. Ibid., 56-58.


74. Garbe, *Redemption*, 82.


77. Ibid., 1.

78. Ibid., 2. Garbe uses the term Neuzeit which I have translated as the "new or modern" age.


82. Ibid., 5-6.


84. Ibid., 46-47.


90. Ibid., 34-36.

91. Ibid., 37-41.

92. Garbe, *Sketches*, 171. In a scholarly work published in 1914 Garbe argued that while many similarities could be identified between Indian religious thought and Christianity, the two systems had developed independently of each other. While a weak case could be made for the connections between Buddhism and Christianity, there were no points of contact whatsoever, he argued, in the evolution of Hinduism and Christianity. This book, while less opinionated than the *Sketches*, supports Garbe's view of Christian thought and actions as being totally alien to the Indian temper. See Garbe, *Indien und das Christentum* [India and Christianity] (Tübingen: Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1914).


94. Ibid., 77, 96.

95. See Peter van der Heer, "The Foreign Hand."


100. Ibid., 34, 35.

101. Ibid., 37.

102. A pandit was once extremely annoyed, Garbe writes, when Garbe asked him questions that went beyond his area of expertise. "I have taught two sahibs before you," said the pandit, "and their thoughts were always on the same track as mine. You, on the other hand, ask questions that call my
competence into question. I must conclude, therefore, that you are stupider than the others." Garbe, Sketches, 61.


106. Said, "Orientalism Reconsidered," in Literature, Politics, and Theory, ed. Francis Barker and others (London: Metheun, 1986), 211. "[Other problems proposed by some of my critics]," Said writes, "like my exclusion of German Orientalism, which no one has given any reason for me to have included - have frankly struck me as superficial or trivial, and there seems to be no point in even responding to them."
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

German Orientalists and India

This study has attempted to situate German Orientalism and German Orientalists in the nineteenth-century framework of Europe's relations with Asian nations, Indian ideas on change and tradition, and the ideas of Europeans on progress, national identity, and their rights and obligations with regard to non-European peoples. The experiences and ideas of the three German Indologists I have examined suggest that they occupied an uncertain place in this terrain. The uncertainty resulted from two factors: their country's lack of involvement in colonialism in India, and their country's intense intellectual involvement with India's cultural heritage. My methodological approach in this exercise has been to examine these Germans' perceptions and images of India as recorded in their travel journals and other writings.

India in the nineteenth century was a society in the midst of tremendous change. It was, in this sense, the precise opposite of the supposedly unchanging and pure
India of Vedic or Indo-European antiquity that was at the heart of these scholars' interest in India. India, by the late nineteenth century, had already been under British domination for nearly a century, and had before that been ruled for over two centuries by another "foreign" people, the Mughals. This history ensured that the India these German scholars would encounter was saturated with influences from Europe as well as from the Islamic world. India was no longer an "untainted" Hindu society. The ideas of the Indians we have discussed here reflect fully how "un-Indian" India and Indians had become through these diverse influences - a fact that comes as a surprise to many visitors to India even today. Deussen and Garbe encountered this India during their travels, while Max Mueller constructed it through written works and his numerous Indian acquaintances. While none of them expected contemporary India to be what it was like in antiquity, the dissonance between their romanticized picture of the Indo-European past and the landscape of modern India was, nonetheless, jarring in the extreme and their writings consistently show them struggling with this problem.

A different interpretation is, however, also possible. The confusion and flux of modern India, which Deussen and Garbe in particular experienced to the full, did not, it can be argued, disturb their world-view. Modern India and modern Indians, by this line of reasoning, did
not really interest them. To the extent it did, it was the interest any educated tourist would have in a foreign country. That is, modern India and Indian antiquity were, for these scholars, two separate compartments. One was their professional interest or job, and the other an object of curiosity that was related to their professions, but not central to it. If it was part of their jobs, modern India was at best a vehicle for unearthing information on ancient India, a place where fieldwork had to be undertaken to further one's career. Edward Said's observations on the Western academy are relevant here. Said has pointed to Western or Western-trained intellectuals as agents of hegemony for whom the Orient was a space to be conquered, colonized, and represented. While the Germans I have discussed were not colonizers, they did have the power and resources to appropriate and represent India's culture and society in the way they wished. For Western intellectuals, both in the nineteenth century and today, non-Western societies are often playgrounds where information can be gathered for purposes that enrich - materially or intellectually - more the observer than the observed.

Indology in Germany was, to a large extent, driven by such an internal need. This need did not have to do with the maintenance of distant colonies, but rather with defining a German national identity that was predicated significantly on race. For Max Mueller and Garbe, race was
clearly a critical issue in the study of societies. In the case of Deussen, the issue was not as visible, but was still very much present in his discussions of Vedic India, Sanskrit, and Brahmin scholars. It was very clear in the minds of all three scholars who was of Indo-European descent in India, and who was not. Indo-European studies pointed to upper-caste Hindus as the true remnants of the Indo-European migrations to India. And outside India too, in a global sense, these Indologists knew exactly who was on their side of the Indo-European divide and who was on the other, non-Indo-European side: in Europe, it was the Semite, through whose exclusion the community of nation was being increasingly defined.¹

It could be argued that, at least in India, such scholarly distinctions did not really matter since in the age of colonialism the racial line was there for everyone to see: white and non-white. This was certainly the case for Deussen and Garbe, who, in the British colonial environment, saw Indians and Europeans clearly arrayed on different sides of a racial boundary. They themselves felt more "at home" in the company of Europeans and the differences between themselves and resident Britishers appeared to be minor or even non-existent compared to the cultural gap that separated all Europeans from Indians. The European bond that connected Germans and Britishers in India was an immediate, tangible one which put Germans such
as Deussen and Garbe definitively on the colonizer’s side of the power relation. The Indo-European bond between Indians and Germans was, in contrast, abstract, remote, and virtually meaningless. As for the Indo-British bond which Max Mueller spoke of, it too was of no consequence for political, cultural or social relations between Indians and Britishers. In the face of the exigencies of colonial rule, such theories were little more than curiosities. Max Mueller, despite his immense knowledge about India, never fully appreciated this, namely, the insignificance of the Indo-European construct for real-world political relations, especially in the colonial context. It is for this reason that Max Mueller was such an oddity, perhaps even a misfit, in Britain in the late nineteenth century. Garbe and Deussen, on the other hand, through their first-hand knowledge of India, did appreciate the irrelevance of Indo-European studies in the contemporary Indian setting. It is clear from their travel diaries that they did not see modern India as an Aryan "brother nation." India was, to them, more like a museum where they hoped to find and study fossilized remnants of the distant Indo-European past. The living India was, first and foremost, a European colony.

As we have seen earlier, some Indians, too, shared Orientalist notions of a common Indo-European past for both Indians and the Germanic nations of Europe. It is true that such notions contributed, in part, to a rising Indian
national consciousness in the nineteenth century. But this consciousness, as the school of subaltern studies has argued forcefully, was hollow. It was limited to male, upper-caste Hindus and for them, too, Indo-European pride was not the principal factor fueling their nationalism. What was uppermost in their minds, as it was for Deussen and Garbe while in India, was the reality of European domination. For the Indians who echoed Orientalist ideas, the identity these ideas helped to solidify was principally intra-Indian, that is, the identity of the upper castes and the privileged classes versus all the rest, and that of Hindus versus all Muslims.

This discussion on nineteenth-century ideas, both Indian and European, of what it means to be "Indo-European" is far from being an arcane academic debate. In the Indian context, the issue is still one of critical importance, given the debates that are still raging over the cultural identity of the Indian nation. The "communal problem" in India, that is, the social and political conflicts between Hindus and Muslims, decisively shaped the nature of the Indian anti-colonial movement. Today, the problem has taken on an added urgency, given the rise of a brand of nationalism that seeks to define India primarily as a Hindu nation, to the exclusion of other communities. Caste conflict, which revolves around the privileges and power of the Hindu upper castes and the efforts of the "lower"
castes to achieve a more equitable distribution of power and opportunity, has also been one of the principal forces shaping Indian society and politics in the colonial and postcolonial eras. While in some cases, the battle has, to some extent, been won by the lower castes (through "affirmative action" programs and public campaigns), the line still continues to be drawn between the upper and the lower castes.

In both these areas, that is, caste conflict and Hindu-Muslim conflict, the ideological underpinnings of the actions of Hindus and the upper castes are intimately tied to the idea of a Hindu polity that was created and transmitted by the Indo-Europeans or "Aryans" who came to India several thousand years ago. While this theory is, in most instances, an assumption of which most people are only vaguely aware, there are also those who can articulate these ideas with frightening clarity. The term "Aryan," for example, is thrown around with impunity in India even today.³ The work of German Indologists may not have been the source of these ideas, but they certainly gave these ideas respectability and a supposedly scientific basis. To Max Mueller and Deussen, India was a Hindu nation. Garbe too, despite his misgivings about modern Hinduism and admiration for Muslim achievements, came to India primarily to investigate Hindu culture and spent most of his time and energy studying under the pandits at Benares. In the
colonial setting of the late nineteenth century, these Germans, as I have shown in this study, clearly enjoyed all the benefits of being on the European side of the colonial equation. This position of privilege, along with their formal non-involvement in contemporary Indian affairs, allowed them a remarkable degree of freedom to view and interpret India as they liked. India thus continued to be the home of ancient Indo-European culture, while condescension, dislike, and even indifference, marked their attitudes towards the European colony that was contemporary India.

The ideas and energies of the independence movement in India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were, of course, directed against the British. German Indologists, as is to be expected, virtually did not exist in this political landscape. If anything, they provided solace to the Indian psyche. But beyond that, the general attitude towards them, compared to the feelings aroused by the British, was one of indifference. German Indologists, for their part, buttressed by their position as "honorary colonialists," treated India as an Indo-European playground, an attitude which aroused no ire among Indians. While some Indians, for example the leaders of the Arya Samaj, may have criticized Max Mueller on certain details of his theories, there was no fundamental disagreement between the Indologists' construction of India and that of
the Hindu revivalists. The enthusiastic reception accorded to Paul Deussen by the Arya Samaj in Mathura is testimony to this. The near-colonial status enjoyed by these Germans in India gave an added significance to this happy convergence of views.

In Europe, the proximity of the views espoused by German nationalists and anti-Semites in the twentieth century to the Indologists' constructions of the Indo-European universe are almost too obvious to need elaboration. Not everything in German history, however, led inexorably to the catastrophic events of the 1930s and '40s, and I do not wish to draw large conclusions here on the complicity of Indologists in the turn German history took in the twentieth century. From our study here of German Indology in the British colonial setting, I would point, however, to the imperiousness and even arrogance toward the Orient which these apolitical German scholars shared with British colonial rulers. This imperiousness had parallels, both in the "Indo-European arrogance" that was central to their scholarship, as well as in the cultural and political arrogance, based on racial theories, that determined in part the course of German history in the first half of this century.

Also common to Indology and right-wing, anti-Semitic movements in Europe - and to Hindu nationalism in India, as
well — was the social and political conservatism that marked these scholars’ outlook, most visibly in the case of Max Mueller. This conservatism was rooted in the nature of their discipline which sought primarily to reconstruct the remote and "pure" origins of their "own" culture. In the Indian context, their conservatism was most apparent in their attitudes to British colonial rule, which they were all reluctant to criticize.

The Anti-Orientalist Critique Today

While this study has examined Orientalism and Orientalists, it is still not clear, I would argue, what exactly the term "Orient" denotes in this debate. For Said, the Orient is primarily the Middle East. For the Germans we have studied here, India was the Orient, at least in their professional writings. In Deussen's and Garbe's accounts of their voyages to India, however, the Orient clearly begins as soon as they leave Europe, that is, somewhere in the Mediterranean. Orientalism, one suspects, was not just about the Middle East, or India, or even the European construct of "Asia." The problem of Orientalism is, I would argue, a larger issue, one that extends to European perceptions of the non-Western world in general, and arguably to images constructed by dominant cultures everywhere of "Others" with less power.
The tremendous reaction worldwide to Said’s original book *Orientalism*, and the debates and sub-disciplines on Orientalism that have emerged since, do indicate that the anti-Orientalist critique has become more than just a critique of nineteenth-century European Orientalist scholarship. As we have noted, the anti-Orientalist critique is now part of the larger postcolonial critique, although postcolonial writing itself was generated by Said’s critique among others.

Critics in the West, as well as in Asia, have raised objections to Said’s critique on grounds of both methodology and content. The book *Orientalism* is arguably not the most rigorous of scholarship. It is polemical and the evidence it marshals comes from a few elite texts. Both what it includes and what it omits have been criticized for presenting a skewed and incomplete picture. But interestingly enough, despite the intense debate that has raged back and forth over Orientalism, Said’s critique will not go away. Emulation of his work still abounds, and there is hardly a piece of scholarship nowadays from the Third World, or from thinkers of Third World origin, that does not contain at least a passing reference to Said and his critique. While there is some truth to the view that the divide between the Orient and the Occident, and therefore the discussion pertaining to this division, has been superseded by the rise of a new global and postmodern
culture, this still does not, I believe, signal the end of the post-Orientalist critique.

The term "Third World" provides a clue to the new shape and direction the anti- or post-Orientalist critique has taken. The durability and strength of the critique derives perhaps from what Said calls the "oppositional consciousness" which the critique of Orientalism shares with other formerly suppressed voices such as women, people of color, and formerly colonized societies. In replies to his critics, as well in his newer works such as Culture and Imperialism, the thrust of the critique seems to have shifted towards forming alliances with groups and projects that have been "undertaken out of similar impulses as those fuelling the anti-Orientalist critique." All these projects flow, Said maintains, from a "decentered consciousness," and the desire to "[end] dominating, coercive systems of knowledge."®

A Corrective, and a Personal Thought

Postmodernist thought, regardless of whether we accept or reject it for our own specific purposes or disciplines, has at least delivered a useful warning against "totalizing" modes of thought, or, to use Said's own phrase, coercive systems of knowledge. Viewing Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe, as we are tempted to do here, as embodiments or agents of grand changes and trends such
as colonialism, industrialization, and nationalism is precisely such a totalizing approach, one that does not do justice to the specific local situations in which individual actions are played out. Pursuing this train of thought to its extreme, one could argue that Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe were simply individuals who were interested in India out of sheer curiosity. This is not a rejection of all connections between individual ideas and behavior and structural changes at the societal level, but rather a corrective to, and an attempt to balance, the critique of Orientalism which often lapses into the other extreme, namely, the same totalizing mode it seeks to avoid. These lapses occur, for example, when too much is ascribed to political hegemony, or when the "West" is pitted as a monolithic entity against the Orient.

The examination of structures of power is at the center of the critique of Orientalism. My discussion here of these German Indologists has also been primarily a study of the mechanisms and sources of power. The realities of European economic and political power and colonial domination determined, as I have argued, a large part of these individuals' relationships with India and Indians. But this does not automatically make them villains, as critiques of Orientalism have, by and large, tended to do. There remains in the actions, ideas, and motives of the three Orientalists we have studied here an unexplained
element, one that cannot be explained away by the analytical tool of "hegemony."

This argument is not simply a reaffirmation of the claim made by defenders of Orientalism that genuine intellectual fascination guided the work of Orientalists, a fascination that was apolitical or innocent. The Saidian position is correct in pointing out that scholarship, particularly in the modern, institutionalized Western academy is never innocent or untouched by issues of power. My argument is, rather, that there was, indeed, in these Orientalists' dealings with India and Indians an element of power that cannot be explained by what has become the standard anti-Orientalist approach.

This unexplained element, as I am calling it, can perhaps be best described by the commonplace notion of "an air of superiority." This attitude, as I have said earlier, reflected power, but did not produce it in a tangible, material sense. Postcolonial and post-Orientalist critiques have, of course, an explanation for this attitude of superiority, as well: the Enlightenment tradition in Europe since the eighteenth century, which has endowed "the autonomous subject" with the right to observe, analyze, and construct as he pleases. In simpler terms, it is "Western arrogance," the legacy of the Scientific Revolution and the Enlightenment, that is supposedly the key to understanding the behavior of "the white man" in the last three
centuries. In response, I would point out, as I have done earlier in this study, that arrogance has been a hallmark of all supposedly civilized peoples' attitudes towards their "Others." Islamic, Chinese, and Indian civilizations have consistently displayed this trait. Max Mueller, Deussen, and Garbe were all sufficiently fascinated by India to devote their entire lives to studying it. Perhaps it was a misguided infatuation, the result of the German Orientalist tradition, that led them to do so. But arrogance alone, however one defines the term, could not have sustained a life-time of involvement.

On a personal note, this study has also been for me an exercise in self-situating. This is true, I suspect, of many post-Orientalist critiques and discussions, since this debate has been developed, starting with Said, by individuals in the West or with Westernized backgrounds and training and the entire discussion has thus remained very much within the "discursive universe" of the Western academy. This applies to me, as well, and I would argue that post-Orientalist criticism - which, as should be apparent from this study, is not necessarily anti-Orientalist - is a device for "Third World intellectuals" to re-examine their perspectives on their own societies. These perspectives, under the weight of colonization and Westernization, have become fairly Western themselves and
are often seen as such by others in the Third World. V. S. Naipaul and Salman Rushdie are two prime examples of this phenomenon. Examining Orientalist ideas is, therefore, in part, a surrogate means of studying ideas that have been internalized over the last two centuries by Indian and possibly other non-Western thinkers, as well.
NOTES


3. See, for example, Bhagwan S. Gidwani’s *The Return of the Aryans* (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), in which he glorifies the supposedly Aryan origins of Indian culture. The book has, not surprisingly, an unmistakeable Hindu slant.


5. For a discussion of this issue, see Jürgen Lutt, "Indische Wurzeln des Nationalsozialismus?" [Indian Roots of National Socialism?], *Zeitschrift fur Kulturaustausch* 37, no. 3 (1987): 468-479.


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