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FROM NEUTRALITY TO NATO:
THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES
AND DEFENSE POLICY, 1905-1955
VOLUME I

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

David G. Thompson, M.A.

* * * * *

The Ohio State University
1996

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Adviser
Department of History
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1996
After gaining full independence from Sweden in 1905, Norway faced the challenge of maintaining its sovereignty as a small state caught in the midst of rivalries and conflicts among the great powers. Although Norwegian leaders sought neutrality, the armed forces played an important part in this policy through the end of World War I. After 1918, economic depression and the apparent absence of international threats both contributed to a steep decline in Norwegian defense spending and capabilities. Meanwhile, during much of the interwar period, army planners concerned themselves more with the specter of a Bolshevik revolution than with the apparently remote possibility of a foreign invasion. Although the Labor government that took office in 1935 did make some belated efforts toward rearmament, Norway lacked any clear military strategy or unified defense policy on the eve of World War II.

The German invasion that began on 9 April 1940 was a momentous event in the history of modern Norway, not least because it compelled subsequent Norwegian leaders to develop more viable and hard-headed plans for national security. The wartime experience of the defeat, occupation, resistance, and government-in-exile all contributed to a complex political situation in the immediate postwar period. Although the Norwegian public after 1945 generally agreed that the country should have a strong defense, uncertainty over the future of East-West relations initially obscured the need for rapid rehabilitation of the armed forces. Beginning in 1948, however, the apparent danger of a Soviet invasion galvanized the government to put defense near the top of its agenda. NATO membership in 1949 and participation in the American
Military Assistance Program beginning in 1950 both reflected Norway's choice of collective security over non-alignment.

The effect of World War II on subsequent Norwegian defense policy was neither simple nor direct, for the period spanning the war indicates considerable continuity as well as change. Nevertheless, the "April 9th syndrome" has become a deeply-engrained part of the national consciousness.
Dedicated to my grandfather,
Reverend Charles C. Peterson
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To begin, I want to thank several agencies and organizations whose generous support has made this project possible. I never could have remained in graduate school without the benefit of a teaching assistantship provided by the Ohio State University Department of History. A partial scholarship from Saint Olaf College helped defray the cost of the 1992 International Summer School in Oslo, along with a travel grant from the Norwegian Information Service, which provided a second grant in 1993-94 as well. Further support came from the Norwegian Marshall Fund, and from the Ohio State University's Graduate School Alumni Research Award. Finally, and perhaps most important of all, a grant from the Fulbright Foundation allowed me to work in Oslo throughout the 1994-95 academic year.

Many individuals also contributed to this project. For its shortcomings I can blame only myself; but if the text does exhibit any literary merit, the credit is due largely to my primary advisor, Dr. Williamson Murray, who made me realize how much I still had to learn when I had thought I was already a good writer. He also took me aboard as a paid research assistant during a difficult lapse in my departmental funding, an experience which taught me a great deal about editing books.

My second advisor, Dr. Allan Millett, has my gratitude especially for his early confidence in my potential as a graduate student, and for introducing me to Dr. Olav Riste, head of the Institute for Defense Studies (Institutt for forsvarsstudier), Oslo. Although they still may not agree with some of my conclusions. Dr. Riste and his colleague Tom Kristianson helped to improve my work by reading early drafts of several chapters and pointing out a number of problems. Dr. Nils Ivar Agøy of the Høgskolen i Telemark also provided valuable comments, and my
understanding of the internal security issue owes a great deal to his excellent work.

My third reader at Ohio State, Dr. Alan Beyerchen, deserves special thanks for agreeing to join the committee on short notice, as well as for the many other occasions on which he has provided thoughtful and challenging suggestions and guidance over the past several years. I am grateful to Dr. Marilyn Blackwell, also of the Ohio State University, not only for teaching me how to read Norwegian, but also for introducing me to the community of Scandinavian scholars represented by the Society for Advancement of Scandinavian Study. Per Madsen of the Norwegian National Archives (Riksarkivet) spent a good deal of time initiating me into the mysteries of Norwegian military records and reviewing my applications for access to restricted files. Historian Lars Borgersrud kindly introduced me to Svein Blindheim, a veteran of Company Linge who later became an outspoken critic of Norwegian policy in the Cold War. Although many Norwegians now regard Mr. Blindheim with disapproval, I am grateful for the hospitality and generous assistance that he gave me when I visited his home in January 1995. Also deserving my warm thanks are the staff of the Norwegian Armed Forces Museum Library (Forsvarsmuseetsbiblioteket) in Oslo, especially Gerd, Mette, and Eyvind, whose daily cheerfulness I appreciated even more than all the professional help they gave me.

No comments here could possibly do justice to the love and support that all of my family members have given me over the years, especially during the more difficult parts of this seemingly endless period in graduate school. In particular, however, I want to thank my grandmother, Doris Peterson, for helping to pay for my first trip to Norway, and my mother, Reverend Carol Peterson, for taking care of my dear old cat Riff-Raff in 1994-95.

As I turn finally to friends, I find that Stein Rypern of Sørumsand, Norway, occupies a special place. Ever since I embarked on the initial stages of this project in 1991, he has provided a tremendous amount of encouragement and practical assistance, initially through our e-mail correspondence and later as a valued friend in Oslo. Last but very far from least, I want to name Steve Rader and Dr. David Hunnicutt,
two of the best pals a guy could ever wish for. Not many things really seem to improve with age, but in our case, friendship truly has.
VITA

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PUBLICATIONS


FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: History

Minor Fields: Military History
   Early Modern Europe
   United States History to 1877
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<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command, Europe (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLANT</td>
<td>Allied Command, Atlantic (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFNORTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces, North (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANCC</td>
<td>Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Artillery regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASW</td>
<td>Anti-Submarine Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOAC</td>
<td>British Overseas Airways Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>Distriktkommando (Norwegian Army district commands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKF</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Finnmark (Kirkenes region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKN</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Nord-Norge (Narvik region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKS</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Sørlandet (Kristiansand region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKT</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Trøndelag (Trondheim region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKV</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Vestlandet (Bergen region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DKØ</td>
<td>Distriktkommando Østlandet (Oslo region)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DNA</td>
<td>Det Norske Arbeiderpartiet (Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Dragoon regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECA</td>
<td>Economic Cooperation Administration (Marshall Plan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD</td>
<td>Forsvarsdepartementet (Norwegian Department of Defense)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FD/E</td>
<td>Forsvarets Etterretningskontor (Norwegian Defense Intelligence Office)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFK</td>
<td>Flyvåpenes Felleskommando (Norwegian Joint Air Arms)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FKA</td>
<td>Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMB</td>
<td>Forsvarsmuseetsbiblioteket (Defense Museum Library, Oslo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOK</td>
<td>Forsvarets Overkommando, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Forsvarets Overkommando, 1942-46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GS</td>
<td>Generalstaben (Norwegian Army General Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GPO</td>
<td>Government Printing Office (U.S.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HMSO</td>
<td>His/Her Majesty's Stationery Office (U.K.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOK</td>
<td>Hærens Overkommando (Norwegian Army High Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HV</td>
<td>Heimevern (Norwegian Home Guard militia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ID</td>
<td>Innenriks departementet (Dept. of Interior under occupation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFS</td>
<td>Institut for forsvarsstudier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGS</td>
<td>Imperial General Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IHF</td>
<td>Institutt for Historisk Forskning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Infantry regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAMAG</td>
<td>Joint American Military Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KA</td>
<td>Kommanderende Admiral (Norwegian Commanding Admiral)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kat.</td>
<td>Katalognummer (catalog number in Riksarkivet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KG</td>
<td>Kommanderende General (Norwegian Commanding General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KHA</td>
<td>Krigshistoriske Avdeling</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAAG</td>
<td>Military Assistance Advisory Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAP</td>
<td>Military Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILORG</td>
<td>Militær Organisasjonen (Norwegian resistance group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTB</td>
<td>Motor Torpedo Boat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTDP</td>
<td>Medium-Term Defense Plan (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MU 1946</td>
<td>Militære undersøkelseskommisjonen av 1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NA</td>
<td>National Archives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAO RPG</td>
<td>North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NER PG</td>
<td>Northern European Regional Planning Group (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORMASH</td>
<td>Norwegian Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (Korea)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHCOM</td>
<td>NATO Northern Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Nasjonal Samling (Vidkun Quisling's political party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OKW</td>
<td>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces High Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSS</td>
<td>Office of Strategic Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RA</td>
<td>Riksarkivet (Norwegian National Archives, Oslo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Royal Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RG</td>
<td>Record Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command (U.S. Air Force)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBNF</td>
<td>Senior British Naval Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>Sjøforsvar distrikt (Norwegian naval district command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFHQ</td>
<td>Special Forces Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHAEF</td>
<td>Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIS</td>
<td>Secret Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIV ORG</td>
<td>Sivil Organisasjonen (Norwegian civilian resistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOE</td>
<td>Special Operations Executive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOK</td>
<td>Sjøforsvarets Overkommando (Norwegian Navy High Command)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STDP</td>
<td>Short-Term Defense Plan (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV</td>
<td>Samfunnsvernet (right-wing paramilitary group)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TK</td>
<td>Tysklandskommando (Norwegian Army Command, Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UD</td>
<td>Utenriksdepartementet (Norwegian Foreign Ministry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK 1945</td>
<td>Undersøkelseskommisjonen av 1945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAAF</td>
<td>United States Army Air Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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INTRODUCTION

HISTORIOGRAPHY AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

When raising the subject of Norwegian military policy among American historians, the present author sometimes has received the response, only half-joking, "Did they have one?" The prevailing image of modern Norway seems to be of a remote yet idyllic, highly civilized country with pacifist tendencies that left it helpless in the face of German aggression in 1940. People who are somewhat more familiar with Norwegian history generally attribute the lack of a viable defense policy in the 1930s to the rise of the social-democratic Norwegian Labor Party (Arbeiderpartiet), which took office in 1935. Although these assumptions do have a substantial grain of truth, the history of Norwegian defense policy in fact is more complex than almost anyone, at least outside of Norway, has yet understood.

The story of the Norwegian campaign in 1940 is a familiar one, yet the almost exclusive focus on British and German sources has produced a picture that is at best incomplete, and at worst, distorted and misleading. To obtain a more balanced and comprehensive understanding of the campaign, one must explore the background and perspective of the Norwegians themselves. Above all, this task requires a synthesis of Norwegian historiography, the great majority of which remains unavailable in English.

The standard account of the 1940 campaign has long been T.K. Derry's excellent volume of the British army's official history series. Inevitably, however, even though Derry is an authoritative scholar of Norwegian history, this work focused on the story of the Allied
intervention, at the expense of the role of the Norwegian forces and the context of their development in the interwar period. Subsequent works in English generally have showed the same emphasis.¹ A more recent work by François Kersaudy has placed more emphasis on the relative importance of the Norwegian Army, but he too makes only passing reference to the development of Norwegian defense policy over the preceding decades.²

Historiography in the Norwegian language presents a more intricate picture. Published between 1952 and 1971, the multi-volume official histories of the 1940 campaign explored virtually every aspect of the fighting in microscopic detail.³ Nils Ørvik meanwhile produced a valuable two-volume study of Norwegian security policy between the wars, which examined the drift from a robust form of armed neutrality, through nominal commitment to the collective security of the League of Nations, then a return to token neutrality, and finally a belated effort toward rearmament. Olav Riste also produced the standard account of Norway's role in World War I (in English, based on his Oxford dissertation), which suggests numerous parallels as well as contrasts with the situation in 1939-40.⁴

However, the standard Norwegian literature also has its shortcomings. Although there is a wealth of information on more specific sub-topics, there is no comprehensive study of military policy throughout the period in question, which ought to include the confrontation with Sweden that led to Norway's independence in 1905.⁵ Furthermore, recent scholarship has revealed a significant weakness in the official histories and works such as Ørvik's, which failed to disclose the importance of internal security issues in the interwar period. Although this subject remained almost completely unpublicized prior to 1978, domestic labor unrest and alleged communist subversion became a major preoccupation of the military leadership in Norway between the wars.⁶ Several authors also have reassessed the role of Vidkun Quisling as defense minister in 1931-33, which most previous accounts had dismissed or cited merely as evidence of his incompetence.⁷

The history of Norwegian resistance to the occupation has received considerable attention elsewhere and will not be the main focus of this study. Several aspects of this period do require careful examination,
however. In contrast to the exploits of the underground, the policy of
the Norwegian government in London and the operations of the forces-in-
exile remain relatively obscure. A crucial problem was the government's
struggle for legitimacy on the "Home Front," where many people despised
the exiled politicians almost as much as they hated the Germans. The
nature of the Norwegian relationship with the Allies also requires more
attention than it has yet received in English. The authoritative work
in this area is Olav Riste's two-volume London-regjeringen, but
unfortunately it too remains inaccessible to readers unfamiliar with the
language.8 The fact that a significant number of Norwegian volunteers
fought for the Germans in Russia also deserves recognition, along with a
reassessment of the motives of some of the men who took part.

Few scholars have considered the relationship of Norway's wartime
experience to the development of its postwar defense policy. In the
minds of Norwegians, the date 9 April 1940 came to symbolize the need
for a stronger military. The changes in policy that resulted, however,
were by no means as clear, simple, or direct as one might suppose.
Although the Norwegian government again moved closer to the Western
Powers in response to the Prague crisis and related events in 1948, the
initial policy of non-alignment and "bridge-building" in 1945-47 had
much in common with the prewar emphasis on neutrality. Even after
joining NATO in 1949, Norway sought to minimize defense spending. Only
after the outbreak of the Korean conflict did the government launch a
truly serious military buildup, which benefitted from American material
assistance and culminated in a series of massive exercises in 1952-54. Thus,
while many historians regard 9 April 1940 as a watershed in
Norwegian policy, this interpretation sometimes has led to over-
simplification and disregard for the considerable strands of continuity
spanning the war, a tendency which this study will attempt to correct.9

The legacy of April 9 was by no means entirely advantageous to the
Norwegian military, either. The prewar officer corps was largely
discredited as a result of its defeat, which in many cases had taken the
form of capitulation after only token resistance, if any. Following the
liberation in May 1945, the public demanded a thorough investigation of
what had gone wrong in 1940. The government proceeded to purge
approximately 1,000 officers on various grounds, yet in many cases the investigations never ran their full course. The report of the main military investigation, for example, remained classified until 1978-79.\textsuperscript{10} This fact has prompted several revisionist authors, whom one observer has called "the historians of indignation," to charge the Labor Party and its allies in the military establishment with staging a general coverup, while making scapegoats of selected opponents and forging a "national alibi".\textsuperscript{11}

The intention of the present work is not to single out any particular individuals as responsible for what happened in 1940. One could argue that the real culprit was the majority of the population itself, which simply could not see the need for more vigorous defense efforts until it was too late. This, however, is not a sufficient explanation; and the chapters that follow will reveal numerous misconceptions and failures of leadership that paved the way for the German victory. Yet at the same time, one must keep in mind that what appear in retrospect to be foolish mistakes generally were sensible decisions based on the limited information available to the leaders who made them. The challenge here is not to find fault, but rather to explain why people did what they did.

The fundamental purpose of this study, then, is to answer the question, what was Norway's defense policy during the country's first fifty years of independence, and how did the policy change as a result of World War II? Above all, this requires treatment of the period 1940-45 within the larger context of Norwegian history. As one historian has noted, "Precisely because the five years were so unique, they have often been treated in isolation, torn out of the historical fabric."\textsuperscript{12}

The reader should understand that the emphasis here will be on the military aspect of defense rather than on diplomacy, although the latter generally has played the leading role in Norway's overall security policy. However un-warlike the modern Norwegian national character may appear, Norway does have a military history; and the time has come for a comprehensive assessment of it.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION


5. For a guide to the military literature, see Arne Odd Johnsen and Gunnar Christie Wasberg, Norsk militærhistorisk bibliografi (Oslo: Gyllandal, 1969), with a supplementary volume by Harald Sandvik (1977). The literature on 1905 is extensive, although most of it concerns the diplomatic aspect rather than the military standoff. See Kaare Haukaas, Litteraturen om 1905 (Oslo, 1956).

6. Lars Borgersrud was the first historian to publicize the existence and scope of the internal security measures. See Ottar Strømme (pseud.), Den hemmelige haren: Den hemmelige militære organisasjonen mot <<indre uro>> i Norge fra 1918 til 1940 (Oslo: Oktober forlag, 1978). Borgersrud's own leftist agenda has tended to influence his work so much that one must regard many of his conclusions with scepticism. Nevertheless, two other scholars have confirmed and amplified most of the same essential facts he uncovered, if not his interpretation. See Fredrik Fagertun, "Militærmakten og <<den indre fienden>>, 1918-1940."


8. Olav Riste. <<London-regjeringa>>: Norge i krigsalliansen 1940-1945, 2 vol. (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1973-79). Even some Norwegians find difficulty in reading Riste's work because of his preference for writing in the **mynorsk** variant of the Norwegian language, which differs considerably from the more standard **bokmål**.


11. Examples of such revisionists include Sverre Hartmann, Lars Borgersrud, and Kjell Fjortoft. Of these, Fjortoft is the most prolific and controversial. See **Aftenposten**, 22 March 1995.

CHAPTER 1

INDEPENDENCE AND ARMED NEUTRALITY, 1905-1918

BACKGROUND: NORWAY FROM THE VIKING AGE TO 1814

Following the heyday of the Vikings (ca. 793 - 1066 A.D.), Norway remained an independent kingdom until the fourteenth century, when the Black Death ravaged the country and virtually annihilated the aristocracy. As a result, Norway fell under Danish control and remained a pawn of the neighboring powers for more than four hundred years.

During the long period of Danish domination, which Norwegian nationalists later dubbed the "four hundred years' night" (førhundreårsnatten), Norway became involved in numerous wars with Sweden, beginning with the Kalmar War of 1611-13. When the Danes attempted to raise the Norwegian militia (Leidangen), however, it proved unreliable and prone to mass desertions. As a result, the Danish king Christian IV instituted a series of ordinances in 1614, 1624-25, and 1628, which established a standing army in Norway. The new system was based on the concept of the led, in which every four farms (or by 1700, every two) had to provide one soldier, including equipment and upkeep, on a year-round basis. At the outset, this system generated a total strength of about 6,250 men; and although in practice they remained closely tied to their local districts, they proved much more cohesive and effective than the old militia.

Norway became a major theater in the Great Northern War of 1700-1721, during which Denmark allied with Russia against Sweden beginning in 1709. Although best remembered for his battles in the East such as
Narva and Poltava. Sweden's warrior-king Charles XII met his fate in Norway, while besieging the fortress of Halden in 1716. During this conflict, the Norwegian Army introduced its first specialized ski companies in 1711-18, which proved their value in screening the long, sparsely-populated frontier between the key fortifications. The Danish/Norwegian fleet meanwhile engaged the Swedes heavily at sea. Although Norwegians made up about 40 percent of the Danish Navy's manpower, nearly all of the officers were Danish. There was at least one notable exception, however: Peter Wessel, better known as Tordenskiold ("Thunder Shield"). Born of modest circumstances in Trondheim in 1690, he obtained a commission and already commanded his first ship at age 21, by virtue of his extraordinary talents as a seaman and leader. A series of dramatic victories (most notably Dynekilen in 1716, where he destroyed the entire Swedish flotilla supporting Charles XII's advance) resulted in his ennoblement and promotion to rear-admiral in 1718.

Norway enjoyed an unprecedented period of peace in the decades after 1720, which brought relatively few changes in the military sphere. The origins of professional officer education appeared in 1750, however, with the establishment of the Military Mathematical School in Oslo. Reorganized into an exclusively military academy after 1798, this institution eventually became the gateway through which all Norwegian career officers had to pass.

The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars precipitated Norway's revival as a modern nation. Following Nelson's bombardment of Copenhagen in 1801, the British launched a second, more decisive raid on the Danish capital in October 1807, carrying off 75 warships as prizes and 92 ship-loads of valuable naval stores. The Danes responded to this ruthless violation of their neutrality by allying themselves with Napoleon and officially declared war on Britain in November 1807. As a result of Denmark's adherence to the Continental System, Norway found itself under blockade by the Royal Navy, which proved disastrous, given the population's great dependence on maritime trade and coastal communications. Norwegians therefore came to remember the period 1807-14 as the "bark-bread years" (barkebrødårene), when the enforced
isolation brought much of the population to the brink of starvation, and in some cases beyond it.

The loss of almost the entire Danish fleet to the British left Norway bereft of seaward defenses. In 1808, the remnants of the Danish Navy in Norway comprised no more than a single armed brig, five galleys, and three gunboats. However, a crash program of local construction and the capture of several British prizes soon produced impressive results: by 1814 the Norwegian fleet had grown to 7 brigs, 8 armed schooners, 2 cutters, 46 galleys, and 51 gunboats, plus an extensive array of shore batteries backed by local militia. For the most part, the British did not find it worthwhile to invest much effort in attacks on the Norwegian coastline and contented themselves with occasional forays against the Archangel trade. Nevertheless, the Royal Navy demonstrated its ability to exert its supremacy even close inshore when HMS Dictator (74) destroyed a Danish frigate that had sought shelter in a Norwegian fiord in 1812.5

Sweden meanwhile sought to take advantage of the situation by attacking Norway in 1808-9. Even without Danish support, however, the Norwegian Army managed to repulse the invasion, largely because of Sweden's simultaneous problems in Finland, which the Russians conquered in 1809. This disaster brought about major changes in Swedish policy. Under the leadership of the pragmatic Crown Prince Bernadotte (a former French marshal who eventually ascended the throne as Karl Johan), the Swedes sensed the turning of the tide against Napoleon and joined the Coalition in time to secure a promise of Norway as consolation prize. The Danes, meanwhile, remained loyal to Napoleon until the collapse of French power forced them to sign the treaty of Kiel on 14 January 1814, ceding Norway to Sweden.6

Before the Swedes could claim their prize, developments in Norway took their own course. Prior to 1807, few Norwegians even had considered challenging the status quo of Danish rule. The interruption of communications with Copenhagen by Britain's control of the Skaggerak, however, inevitably led to greater autonomy (for example, the founding of the University of Oslo in 1811). The Danish viceroy in Christiania, Prince Christian Frederik, became popular for identifying himself with
Norway's own interests against those of Copenhagen. Consequently, public opinion among the literate Norwegian bourgeoisie, whose commercial interests suffered greatly from the blockade, inclined increasingly toward independence.'

News of the Treaty of Kiel provoked general outrage in Norway. Although only a narrow segment of the population so far had embraced the idea of independence on philosophical and economic grounds, the prospect of being handed over to Sweden was anathema to nearly everyone. The Swedes, after all, had been traditional enemies for over 200 years. Local elections in early 1814 thus sent representatives to a constitutional convention, which met at the town of Eidsvoll in April. Acting on the principle of popular sovereignty and drawing consciously on American and French examples, the 112 delegates drew up the document that has remained Norway's legal basis of government ever since, and now is the world's second oldest written constitution still in effect. The popular Danish Prince Christian Frederik thus became constitutional monarch of Norway, sharing power with the parliament, known as the Storting.

Despite considerable sympathy among Whigs in London, Norwegian hopes for full independence were soon dashed against the hard reality of power politics. Karl Johan was prepared to claim his prize by force if necessary. As long as there still appeared to be some hope of British intervention, the Norwegians also would fight; but their military preparations left much to be desired when the Swedish invasion began in August 1814.

One problem was that the Norwegians had reorganized their traditional regiments into a new system of brigades only a few months before, and there had been no time to work through the ensuing disruption. Another problem stemmed from the mistaken assumption that the Swedes would follow the same axis of advance as in 1808-9, aiming for Christiania by the most direct route from the east. Perhaps the defenders ought to have anticipated a more creative approach from a protégé of Napoleon. Karl Johan attained operational surprise by attacking from the south, advancing along the coast with the Swedish fleet in close support.
Christian Frederik proved inept as a military commander, ordering the premature withdrawal of Norwegian galleys which might have harassed the Swedish flank, while many subordinate Norwegian generals quarreled among themselves. The defenders did score a few local successes, for example the stubborn resistance of Fredriksten fortress. When the Swedes threatened to execute the commander if he did not surrender, he replied, "I am an old, worn-out man and will soon die anyway... continue firing!" The main Norwegian field army, however, lost cohesion as it attempted to wheel southward, and morale began to collapse. By mid-August, after two weeks of resistance, the Norwegians had no choice but to negotiate.9

Sweden's victory resulted in the Convention of Moss, which unified the two countries under a dual monarchy. By this point, however, Karl Johan had grown worried that the Allies in Vienna might soon withdraw their support for his claim to Norway, particularly if fighting dragged on in Norway. He therefore adopted a conciliatory policy to assure a prompt settlement, allowing the Eidsvoll constitution to remain in effect. The only basic modification was that within the new dual monarchy, Norway would have the Swedish king as head of state instead of a separate Norwegian crown. Control of foreign policy thus passed into Swedish hands, but in matters of internal government and taxation, Norway retained virtual independence.10

The role of the Norwegian military in the crisis of 1814 later became a matter of considerable debate. In retrospect, the Norwegian Army naturally preferred to regard its defeat as inevitable because of overwhelming odds, yet not in vain, since the defenders at least had compelled Karl Johan to moderate his originally unconditional demands. Antimilitary critics later attacked this version of the story as a myth, alleging that the defense was a total fiasco, and that only the diplomatic situation vis-à-vis the Allies had compelled Karl Johan to accept the Eidsvoll constitution. As in so many historiographical debates, the truth probably lies somewhere in between: but there is no doubt that the military played a key role in the emergence of Norwegian nationalism. As one Norwegian general later argued, "It was thanks to
the army... that the Norwegian people in 1814 dared to demand a say in their own fate, and obtained it."\textsuperscript{11}

THE NORWEGIAN MILITARY UNDER THE UNION WITH SWEDEN AFTER 1815

The Eidsvoll constitution specified command of the armed forces as one of the king's prerogatives, a provision which carried over in the union with Sweden. Within the dual monarchy, however, Norway maintained a separate military organization which for practical purposes was under the control of the Storting.\textsuperscript{12}

With the traditional Swedish threat no longer relevant, the Norwegian lawmakers sharply reduced the size of the Army in order to save money and spur the country's economic recovery. In a major reorganization in 1816-18, the number of line troops fell from 33,000 to only 12,000. Of these, 2,000 were long-service regulars (hvervede, or geworbne), and the rest were five-year conscripts aged 22-27. After 1837, the government also created a 9,000-man reserve known as the Landvern, but this initially amounted only to an unorganized pool of manpower. The fledgling Norwegian Navy meanwhile dwindled rapidly for lack of maintenance, although it did receive a new, permanent base at Horten (on the southwest side of the Oslofjord), with the establishment of a naval dockyard in 1820.\textsuperscript{13}

With virtually no native Norwegian aristocracy to draw upon, the officer corps was almost exclusively bourgeois. One of Karl Johan's first acts as King of Norway in 1815 was to decree that henceforth, all army officers must pass the final examination at the military academy, known as Den kongelige norsk krigsskole (Royal Norwegian Military School) following reorganization in 1820; and this proved an important step in the process of military professionalization. Non-commissioned officers were more broadly recruited and received training at decentralized schools (underoffiserskoler), which had been established at the district-level in 1791-1804.\textsuperscript{14} Farmers made up the vast majority of the rank and file, for although the constitution had established universal military obligation in principle, in practice townsmen could almost always obtain exemptions or purchase substitutes. This issue
reflected a general tension between town and countryside, which was one of the basic political issues of the period.\textsuperscript{15}

The Schleswig-Holstein crisis of 1848 revealed serious weaknesses in the Norwegian Army, when Sweden mobilized to support the Danes in their confrontation with Prussia over the contested province. In particular, it became clear that the recruiting system required a thorough overhaul, which led to a new conscription law in 1854. In addition to creating an organized reserve, the new law also closed some of the loopholes through which townspeople had evaded conscription. Substitution remained common, however, until it was finally abolished in 1876. A further series of reforms sponsored by the Liberal (Venstre) Party gradually improved the lot of the common soldier in the latter half of the century, for example by the abolition of flogging in 1866 and of deductions for food and quarters, which ate up almost all of a soldier's pay prior to 1873.\textsuperscript{16}

As the Industrial Revolution spread to Norway with its attendant social disruption and labor unrest, the Army became increasingly involved in suppressing domestic disorder. In 1850-51, the Army took extensive precautions against a possible insurrection by followers of labor activist Marcus Thrane. This movement disintegrated following his exile to America, but a new wave of disturbances arose in 1878, during which troops intervened on numerous occasions. Although there were no deaths in these incidents, troops did kill at least one demonstrator in 1881.\textsuperscript{17}

In addition to promoting moderate social reforms, the Norwegian Liberal Party became increasingly committed to reviving the movement for national independence. Expansion and control of the military thus became a crucial area of contention in the constitutional struggle with Sweden. The Schleswig-Holstein crisis of 1863-64 had further repercussions for Norway, as King Charles of Sweden hoped to strengthen the Union by appealing to the principle of Scandinavian solidarity against Prussia. Accordingly, the Union Defense Committee proposed an expansion of the Norwegian military, for possible operations in Jutland under Swedish command. Changes in the size or structure of the armed
forces required the approval of the Storting, however, which was always suspicious of Swedish motives.

Although the Norwegians rejected most of the Swedish plan, the Storting did pass a law in March 1863 that extended the period of line service from five to seven years (including the final two as members of the krigsforskerkninna, or line reserve), which brought the total line strength to 18,000. Unlike the Landvern, these troops, as well as a company of royal guards established in 1857, were legally subject to foreign service under Swedish command, and the Swedish and Norwegian staffs collaborated closely. After 1864, however, the Storting began gradually reducing the proportion of line troops by shifting resources to the Landvern and Landstorm (third-line reserve), which were legally restricted to home service.18

The Norwegian Navy entered a period of revival in the 1860s, beginning with the construction of its first two steam frigates. Further naval appropriations in 1866-72 produced four monitors, which for that time were quite advanced in design and well-suited to coastal defense. The Norwegian Navy took another leap in technological development with the acquisition of a torpedo boat in 1873, the first such craft in any fleet. Rather than simply relinquishing these new units to Swedish command, the Storting specifically legislated that their operations must focus on defense of the Norwegian coast.19

Although the practical terms of the Union remained moderate, it became increasingly odious to Norwegians in an era of rising nationalism. In matters of language, literature, art, music, and folklore, Norway found its modern identity in the course of the nineteenth century. Practically every aspect of cultural self-awareness contributed to resentment of Swedish authority. A crucial point in the constitutional struggle came in 1884, when the Storting successfully asserted its authority over the appointment of cabinet ministers by impeaching several Swedish appointees. While the situation hung in the balance, it seemed possible that Stockholm might resort to a military coup to overthrow the Storting. Apart from sending in Swedish troops, the King also could still rely upon the loyalty of the Norwegian officer corps, the great majority of whom remained conservative monarchists.20
The Norwegian rank and file, however, seemed less reliable; and their officers took steps to disable thousands of rifles, lest they fall into the hands of the nationalists. Patriotic volunteer rifle clubs (known as folkevæpningssamlagene, or skytterlagene) presented an additional factor in the crisis. The Liberals had begun encouraging the formation of such groups in 1881-82 as a form of insurance against an anti-parliamentary coup. The King initially vetoed appropriations to support the clubs, but they flourished through voluntary contributions and may have helped to deter precipitous action by the conservatives in 1884. In any event, the Swedes backed down, and the Storting thus gained de facto control over appointment of Norwegian cabinet ministers.

Johan Sverdrup, leader of the Liberals, was the key figure in the struggle for parliamentary rule. Following this triumph, he turned his attention to further military reforms in 1885-87, which again had implications for the relationship with Sweden. The new system, known as the Hjorth-Sverdrup organization, designated thirteen annual classes for conscription and reduced the number of classes in the line from seven to five. The remaining eight were divided equally between the Landvern and the Landstorm. The new ordinance also reduced the total training period of line troops from 162 to only 90 days (42-70 days upon initial conscription, depending on branch, plus later refresher exercises) and limited the number of troops available for war service to 18,000 without the Storting's prior approval. With the exception of the token Royal Guard company, the regulars were disbanded entirely. The Swedes sought to amend the constitutional restriction that barred the Norwegian Landvern and Landstorm from foreign service, but predictably the Storting refused. The new ordinance also established a system of tenure for NCOs, who until this point had been subject to arbitrary discharge if suspected of liberal sympathies. In practice, therefore, Sweden had little control over the Norwegian military after 1887.
MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE INDEPENDENCE CRISIS, 1891-1905

The Norwegian independence movement gained strength during the 1890s, with the issue of consular representation as a specific focus. The Norwegian shipping industry by this time spanned the globe, and demands increased for a separate system of diplomatic representation to oversee Norwegian interests abroad. During the period 1891-95, the Storting, influenced largely by the Radical Liberals, took a hard line in negotiations with the Swedes. Except for briefly higher appropriations in 1892, however, the Liberals kept the Norwegian military weak, preferring to rely on hopes of international support, with the rifle clubs as a last resort in case of outright invasion by the Swedes. No other countries were willing to exert significant pressure on Norway's behalf, however, and the Swedes stood firm. The Swedish general staff meanwhile began preparing detailed plans for the possible occupation of Norway in 1893, and the Swedish Crown Prince Gustaf spoke lightly of a "military parade" to seize Christiania. Norwegian officers loyal to Stockholm disabled weapons in outlying arsenals to prevent their falling into the hands of nationalist insurgents, and they reinforced the more reliable garrison in the capital. On 7 June 1895, the Storting recognized that its position had become untenable and voted to reopen the negotiations on Sweden's terms.

In the wake of this humiliating setback, a nationalist, pro-defense group known as Norges forsvarsforening (the Norwegian Defense Association) launched an extensive publicity campaign to promote rearmament, and the Liberals reversed their previous policy. Raising loans, the Storting granted special military appropriations beginning with 17 million kroner in 1895. Half of this initial sum went for the construction of two armored coast-defense battleships (Harald Hårfagre and Tordenskjold), three more torpedo boats, rearmament of the monitors, and acquisition of new mines and torpedoes. Two additional coast-defense ships (Norge and Eidsvold) followed in 1898-1900, at a cost of 15.5 million kroner. A special commission in 1896 studied the options for improving coastal fortifications, and construction proceeded at
several key points. Coast artillery officer H. Georg Stang observed the American siege of Santiago, Cuba, in 1898; and drawing upon this experience, he made extensive recommendations as a member of the Norwegian military fortification committee the following year.\textsuperscript{26} New legislation in 1897 meanwhile extended conscription to the northern counties (Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark, known generally as North Norway), which previously had been exempted because of their thin population and general poverty. Between 1895 and 1905, the Storting also increased the period of service in the line and Landvern to six years each, as well as increasing the number of training days.\textsuperscript{27}

The political attitude of the Norwegian officer corps meanwhile remained in doubt. The Storting appointed a committee to investigate the precautions officers had taken against their own troops in 1884-93, and the revelations apparently proved sufficiently embarrassing to cause many officers to reconsider their attitudes toward the nationalist cause. Although much of the Conservative (Høyre) Party remained sceptical of independence as late as March 1905, the rising spirit of nationalism gradually pervaded the mainstream of the officer corps by imperceptible degrees.\textsuperscript{28}

The reorientation of the armed forces grew increasingly obvious after 1901, when Stang became Minister of Defense, in response to demands from the Radical Liberals for renewed action on the consular issue and other national claims against Sweden. Stang launched a vigorous program to insure that next time the Storting reached an impasse with Stockholm, the Swedes would not hold all the military cards as in 1895. With naval construction and coastal fortification programs already in full swing, Stang focused his efforts on the Army. In addition to the excellent 6.5-mm Krag-Jørgensen rifle, Norwegian troops acquired Hotchkiss machine guns, rapid-fire 75-mm field guns, and 105-mm howitzers. Stang also directed construction of a system of small fortresses and supporting field-works in southeastern Norway, known as the Glomma Line, designed to delay a Swedish advance while the main Norwegian forces mobilized. Although the Swedes also increased their military spending during this period, by 1905 the Norwegian Army probably had gained at least a slight technological edge in firepower.\textsuperscript{29}
When a new crisis arose in spring 1905 over the appointment of a new cabinet, the Liberal Party again took the lead for independence; but this time it was able to present a solid front in a coalition with the more conservative United Party, under the leadership of the Bergen shipowner Christian Michelsen. On 7 June 1905, exactly ten years after the humiliation of 1895, Michelsen declared that King Oscar had effectively abdicated by declaring his inability to appoint a new cabinet. The Storting passed a decisive resolution to dissolve the Union, and June 7 thus became the anniversary of Norway’s re-emergence as a fully independent nation. In August, a plebiscite with 85 percent voter turnout confirmed overwhelming support for independence. It remained to be seen, however, whether Sweden would accept the fait accompli without resorting to military force.

The Storting secured loans of £2 million in Britain to support emergency defense preparations and dispatched the renowned explorer Fridtjof Nansen on a special diplomatic mission to London. Nansen hoped that British influence would help bring about a peaceful settlement with Stockholm but feared the worst. It would be the "greatest misfortune," he warned in a letter to the British Prime Minister.

... if Sweden should go so far as to attack us: that would naturally be nearly suicide for both nations. Sweden is not so much stronger that she should conquer us easily, and even if she could, she cannot keep us.... I remember well that you laughed at the idea of a war between Sweden and Norway as an 'absurd folly'. But that folly is in this moment not quite so impossible as I wish it were. There is in this moment a very strong feeling in Sweden in favour of an attack on Norway.

Despite Nansen's efforts to gain support, the great powers all refrained from direct intervention in the Scandinavian dispute, in part because of preoccupations with the simultaneous Russo-Japanese War and the First Moroccan Crisis. Thus, it fell to Norway and Sweden to resolve their own differences. During summer 1905, as negotiations hung in the balance, the Storting mobilized 22,500 troops to man the Glomma Line, and the Norwegian fleet attained a high degree of readiness.
Swedes mustered over 40,000 men along the border and concentrated their fleet in the Kattegat. Although they would bear the burden of the offensive should negotiations fail, they could also draw upon nearly the full military resources of the country, with the potential Russian threat temporarily neutralized by the war with Japan. The Norwegian naval commander-in-chief planned to exploit the possibilities of tactical defense by concentrating his limited forces in the Oslofjord and allowing the Swedes to come to him. The naval chief of staff favored a more aggressive strategy, however, resulting in the same kind of dissention that plagued the campaign of 1814.

Negotiations at Karlstad eventually led to a compromise that fall, in which Sweden conceded Norwegian independence in exchange for relatively minor concessions. As in the case of 1814, various interpretations later arose over the role of the military in securing Norway's interests. Leftists emphasized the role of Swedish public opinion, particularly that of organized labor, which mounted a peace demonstration in Stockholm with 40,000 marchers at the height of the crisis. It is amply clear, however, that Norway's determined military posture was an essential prerequisite for independence. One additional factor that may have influenced Swedish calculations was the fact that the Swedish Army was still in a state of disruption after the belated introduction of general conscription in 1901, to replace the antiquated system of inndelingsverket (the Swedish equivalent of the Legd, which Norway had abolished ca. 1799-1808). In the long run, this was a necessary step for modernization; but in 1905, the short-term effects probably remained detrimental to Sweden's striking power.

The main Norwegian concession at Karlstad was to demolish border fortifications, with the exception of those at Kongsvinger and Halden because of their historical significance. (The former fortress would retain its present armament but receive no additional improvements, and the latter was disarmed.) Both countries accepted a demilitarized zone within 12 miles of the border south of the 61st parallel. The conventions permanently excluded troops from this zone, except in cases of public disorder or war with a third party. Both parties pledged to accept the results of arbitration by the Hague in case of future
disputes. Most important, as part of the agreement, King Oscar II formally abdicated the Norwegian throne on 26 October 1905.38

Although the crisis with Sweden had passed, Norway still faced the question of whether its newly-independent government would remain a monarchy, as called for in the constitution of 1814, or become a republic. Republican sentiment was strong, with advocates including both the senior admiral, Christian Sparre, and the Chief of the General Staff, Haakon Hansen.39 Conservative opinion prevailed, however, and the Storting offered the crown to Prince Carl of Denmark. Although alerted to this possibility early in the crisis, Carl had determined wisely to avoid provoking Sweden, and he made his own candidacy formal only after the Bernadottes had renounced the throne. Carl also insisted on another plebiscite, to insure that his invitation was based on broad, popular support. The vote took place on 12-13 November 1905, with about 75 percent turn-out, and revealed 87.9 percent support for monarchy. Carl chose the name Haakon VII and the motto Alt for Norge ("all for Norway"), and he arrived in Norway in December with his English wife and infant son Olav. Ninety-one years after the disappointment and humiliation of 1814, Norway had made good its aspirations to statehood.40

NORWEGIAN MILITARY POLICY UNDER THE NEW MONARCHY, 1905-1914

Having gained independence, Norwegians generally preferred to turn their backs on foreign and military affairs after 1905. The long period of peace since 1814 and the decline of tension with Sweden made the prospect of war seem remote, and there was also a general sense of optimism regarding peaceful resolution of disputes through arbitration. Norwegians thus preferred to focus their attention on domestic issues, as reflected in the contemporary political slogan, "the new working-day." Major issues of the time included the construction of hydroelectric plants under the Norsk Hydro monopoly (established in 1905), the restriction of foreign investments by the Concession Laws, and rising demands by the trade unions and socialist Labor Party (Den Norske Arbeiderpartiet, or DNA). Other disputes involved efforts to
standardize the Norwegian language and differing forms of religious observance. Norway's foreign policy, many people felt, should be "no foreign policy." The surge of general public enthusiasm for defense leading up to 1905 thus waned considerably in the immediate aftermath of independence.41

Signs of increasing tension among the great powers already had become evident by 1905, however; and following independence the Norwegian government sought renewed diplomatic assurances of integrity. In 1855, during the Crimean War, Britain and France had signed the "November Treaty" guaranteeing Swedish and Norwegian security against Russia. With the demise of the Scandinavian Union in 1905, however, the continued validity of the guarantee (which in fact meant little by this time anyway) came into doubt. With the help of King Haakon's contacts in London, Norway obtained a new four-power Integrity Treaty, signed on 2 November 1907. Britain, France, Germany, and Russia all guaranteed the integrity of Norway, in return for a Norwegian pledge not to cede any territory. The result was comforting to many Norwegians but in fact did not have much practical significance. In particular, the treaty made no mention of respect for neutrality in case of war among the great powers. Diplomatic mechanisms aside, Norwegian policy depended ultimately on Britain for security.42

King Haakon proved to be an extraordinarily fortunate choice for the throne, for he displayed modesty, charm, and sound judgement throughout his long reign, which lasted until his death in 1957. He was born as Christian Frederik Carl Georg Valdemar Axel, second son of the Danish Crown Prince, on 3 August 1872. As a youth, Carl chose to become a naval cadet and made his first voyage in 1886 in the frigate Jylland. Although he was a rather mediocre student, he obtained a regular commission in 1893 and served aboard a succession of Danish warships up to 1905. The Danish Navy in those years was behind the times with respect to technical developments such as steam power, due largely to the parliament's policy since 1864 giving priority in defense appropriations to the Army and the project of fortifying Copenhagen from a landward attack, at the expense of the Navy. Nevertheless, Carl was alert to the dramatic changes underway in naval technology, and he
developed a broad interest in military affairs. A further important influence on Prince Carl was his marriage to Maud, the youngest child of the Prince of Wales, on 22 July 1896. Even after the move to Norway, Haakon and Maud maintained close relations with her family, a fact which helps to explain the Norwegian monarch's deep sympathy for England. In contrast, he displayed a distinct wariness toward Germany even before World War I.⁴³

To his credit, Haakon fully understood and accepted the limitations of his authority. His unpretentious attitude and active contact with the public (especially in the more remote parts of the country, such as the volatile northern counties) gradually won over many former republicans. Regarding political questions, Haakon's basic policy was to avoid making public statements and to confine his advice to the privacy of cabinet meetings. Article 26 of the constitution had assigned the monarch full control of diplomacy, including treaties and declarations of war; but the Storting passed an amendment shortly after independence to transfer such authority to the cabinet. The king retained command of armed forces, however, as established in Article 25. The Storting of course determined the budget, and the cabinet, in the person of the Defense Minister, was responsible for most areas of military policy. Because the definition of the king's role left a considerable gray area, however, the cabinet generally consulted him regarding any significant issue affecting the military. For his part, Haakon refrained from any attempt to exercise his authority directly and only issued orders through the Defense Minister. The King's clearest prerogatives were to prescribe regulations regarding drill and ceremonies, admittedly fairly trivial issues; but in practice, he also exercised considerable influence over appointment of officers and other major business such as changes in organization. As Haakon's biographer Tim Greve concludes.

... the fact that the new King at once took an active personal interest in military questions was not due solely to his training as a naval officer. It was quite plainly his duty as head of state and as the highest military
Haakon considered one of his most important responsibilities as monarch to be the cultivation of unity and professionalism in the armed forces. However, a series of unseemly scandals, personal feuds, and petty ambitions meanwhile sowed dissention and eroded the military's public image. One such case, the "Admirals' Affair" (Admiralsaken), involved the untimely dispute over naval strategy in May 1905. In the aftermath of the crisis, the chief of staff Rear-Admiral Børresen demanded a formal court-martial over a reprimand he had received from the Commanding Admiral, Vice-Admiral Sparre. The matter hung like a pall over the Navy for several years, and in 1908 the King encouraged the cabinet to take steps to settle the scandal. The cabinet fully supported Sparre, which probably was the correct thing to do; but critics charged that Sparre was relying on his Liberal political connections against Børresen's superior professional competence. The government supported Sparre's refusal to appoint a court-martial. The case finally went before a civil court of arbitration in 1909, which ruled that Sparre's choice of a defensive strategy had been correct, since it was by then public knowledge that the Swedes had indeed planned to launch a large-scale attack on the Oslofjord in the event of war. The court also ruled, however, that Sparre had exceeded his authority in reprimanding the chief of staff—a remarkable conclusion, considering that the latter had not only publicly challenged but ridiculed what should have been highly secret operational plans on the eve of a potential war.45

Haakon hoped to avoid such unseemly squabbles in the future by appointing one of his particular confidants, Commodore Karl Dawes, to head the Naval College with a mandate to inculcate a better sense of professional corporatism among cadets. As we shall see in later chapters, however, the "Admirals' Affair" was by no means the last such controversy to involve the Navy.46

The Army suffered a less notorious but similarly embarrassing scandal in 1907-12, involving a feud between the commandant of Agdenes
fortress (at the mouth of Trondheimsfjord) and his subordinates. The commandant alienated his officers so completely that the abyssmal morale and inefficiency of the garrison became a matter of public disgrace. The chief of coastal artillery General Holtfodt attempted to minimize the damage by transferring the unpopular commandant to Tønsberg fortress, but a similar situation soon developed there as well. The net result contributed to the dissipation of much of the prestige the military had gained from its role in 1905.47

King Haakon had concluded as early as 1907 that the Army required comprehensive reorganization, and after careful consideration he presented a proposal to the cabinet. However, a further series of personal squabbles delayed implementation of the project. In May 1907, the Defense Minister, 63-year-old Lieutenant-General C.W.E.B. Olssön, resigned in protest over the fact that the King had met privately with various other officers to discuss the reorganization scheme. Prime Minister Michelsen had approved this meeting beforehand, however, and temporarily added the Defense Ministry to his own portfolio to minimize the disruption of Olssön's resignation.48

Further turnover of defense ministers complicated the final adoption of the reorganization program. Michelsen resigned in November 1907, after which Commodore Dawes briefly assumed the office. In April 1908, a new government headed by Gunnar Knudsen decided to replace Dawes with Lieutenant-Colonel H.D. Lowzow, a cavalry officer, for political reasons. Lowzow tried to exploit the opportunity by asking for promotion to general in command of the cavalry arm as part of the bargain. This doubtless would have stirred resentment among three other, more senior officers, over whose heads Lowzow would have been promoted. Fortunately for the service, Haakon intervened before the cabinet could take official action. Summoning cabinet member Edward Heftye for a private and frank discussion, the King made it clear that political motives did not warrant such meddling in the system of seniority. Perhaps even more shrewdly, he pointed out that the extra promotion would require amendment of the budget. At the full cabinet's request, Haakon then met directly with Lowzow and convinced him to assume office without the military promotion.49
Plans for military reform also began to face serious opposition from the radical labor movement, which regarded the armed forces as a tool of capitalist oppression. Social-democratic youth groups, closely associated with the rising Labor Party, adopted increasingly strident anti-military rhetoric and took the image of a broken rifle as their symbol. The leftist alternative for defense reorganization called for a "people's army" based on the tradition of the volunteer rifle clubs, and for the complete abolition of the traditional military. Lowzow fanned the flames of such activism with a series of tactless public statements. In the Storting, for example, he announced bluntly that the primary purpose of the Army was now to maintain domestic order. Although the government promptly denied that this was the case, the socialists long remembered Lowzow's remarks and took them to represent the unspoken views of the officer corps as a whole.50

Officers became increasingly concerned over the effect of socialist propaganda on conscripts, especially after a series of non-violent, apparently unrelated, but alarming incidents of passive disobedience in summer 1911. The General Staff urged the government to ban radical newspapers such as Klassekampen and Direkte Aktion, which frequently incited military strikes; but no such blanket censorship resulted.51

In 1912, the Navy became involved in one of the opening rounds of a new era of labor disputes, when a strike by the engineering crews of coastal steamers temporarily brought traffic to a halt. Since the steamers provided the only means of communication with many remote areas of the country, the strike constituted a serious crisis. The government reacted by placing the vessels under naval command and assigning naval crews to take over their operation. The strike ended through negotiation before the Navy actually took possession of the ships. Nevertheless, the incident outraged the labor movement and added to the impression that the military was a strike-breaking tool of the bourgeoisie.52

Despite leftist opposition, the chairman of the Storting's military committee Jens K.M. Bratlie pushed through the reform program based on Haakon's proposals in 1909, and the new system came into effect
in 1911. One important part of the package was to eliminate vestiges of nineteenth-century discrimination in the application of conscription laws, a reform which appealed to the democratic impulse and helped to overcome leftist opposition. Reversing the policy of the late Union period, the new system increased the period of service in the line to twelve years, plus an additional eight in the Landverns. All men remained liable for service in the Landstorm up to age 55. The reforms also restored the regimental traditions of the Danish period, which Karl Johan had abolished in 1818.

The main organizational feature of the 1909 system was the creation of six regional district commands, each corresponding to a division made up of one or two combined-arms brigades, which corrected the main weaknesses of the 1887 system. Although there were important modifications in 1927-33, the general outline of the 1909 system remained the basic structure of the Norwegian Army through 1940, with the following allocation of infantry regiments:

1st Division: Østlandet (Halden): regiments 1-3
2nd Division: Østlandet (Oslo): regiments 4-6
3rd Division: Sørlandet (Kristiansand): regiments 7-8
4th Division: Vestlandet (Bergen): regiments 9-10
5th Division: Trøndelag (Trondheim): regiments 11-13
6th Division: North Norway: regiments 14-16

Each infantry regiment had two or three line battalions and one Landverns battalion. In addition, there were three battalion-sized cavalry (dragoon) regiments and four separate infantry battalions. Initial training (rekrutskole) for conscripts amounted to 48 days for infantry, 92 days for artillery, and 102 days for cavalry, plus 24 days of unit exercises, and 24-day refresher exercises (repetisjonsøvelser) in the second, third, and seventh years following. Total training for infantry thus amounted to 144 days, somewhat less than the 180 days typical on the continent but respectable nevertheless.63

Officer training by this time reflected important distinctions among reservists, professionals, and the technical elite. Non-commissioned ranks up to ensign (fenrik) underwent training at the district-level underofficerskolene. Officer-candidates could achieve
the rank of second lieutenant by completing a one-year course in the lower division of the Krigsskole, but this amounted only to a form of reserve commission with almost no hope of further promotion. To qualify for a regular commission and promotion beyond junior grade, officers had to complete the more demanding upper division at the Krigsskole as well, totalling three years. Finally, to qualify for the General Staff or technical branches such as artillery or engineers, an officer had to complete the demanding curriculum of the War College (Militær høyskolen).54

Sweden and Russia remained the major threats in Norwegian military planning up to 1914.55 By 1912, however, frequent exercises by Kaiser Wilhelm's High Sea Fleet off the Norwegian coast also began to indicate the possibility that an Anglo-German naval war in the North Sea could involve Norway. A General Staff contingency plan drafted by Major Johan L'Orange in 1913-14 anticipated Norway's strategic position in the coming war quite accurately and emphasized the need for early mobilization of strong Army covering forces to support the coastal fortresses, especially at Kristiansand, which seemed the most likely target of a British or German landing.56

As war clouds gathered, the preparedness movement headed by Norges Forsvarsforeningen gained considerable headway, drawing support from both Liberals and Conservatives, with the King's whole-hearted encouragement. The Knudsen government maintained a substantial defense budget and extended the final prewar regimental exercises to thirty days. As one historian concluded, "On the whole, the Norwegian Army at the outbreak of the war was of sufficient size to meet minimum requirements of neutral defence, and the soldiers were satisfactorily trained."57

The Storting also increased the period of naval service from six to twelve months shortly before the war. Fiscal constraints and unlucky timing left the Navy short of major warships, however. The Storting appropriated 20 million kroner for new construction in 1912, a major commitment that resulted largely to the war scare associated with the Second Moroccan Crisis. Part of the money went toward small vessels, and the rest went for construction of two additional, modern coast-defense ships in Britain. These were not completed until after the
outbreak of war, however, upon which the Royal Navy requisitioned them for its own use. New construction completed between 1906 and 1914 thus amounted to only three destroyers, three torpedo boats, and four submarines.\textsuperscript{58}

The year 1912 also witnessed the advent of Norwegian military aviation, on the initiative of three submarine officers who raised private funds to purchase an airplane from Germany for trial purposes. The Army and Navy subsequently developed separate air services. Resources were minimal, and the aircraft available at first had little military value. Considering that the British services had only inaugurated their own air arms that same year, however, the Norwegian efforts indicate a surprising degree of foresight and initiative.\textsuperscript{59}

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR: NORWEGIAN NEUTRALITY

Upon the outbreak of war in August 1914, the Norwegian government declared its neutrality and promptly mobilized the Navy and coastal fortresses as a precaution.\textsuperscript{60} In an article in the leading conservative paper \textit{Aftenposten} on August 2, a member of the General Staff remarked that "On our Russian borders hostilities are unthinkable for the time being." The real danger, he observed, was that "both England and Germany would in a maritime war be greatly interested in possessing a good and safe port on our coast." By this time, as one historian later concluded, "A German or an English attempt to secure naval bases on the Norwegian coast were the two serious possibilities as envisaged by strategic planning in Norway--with the latter apparently regarded as the more likely one."\textsuperscript{61}

If King Haakon had had his way, Norway probably would have joined the Entente at the outset. At the Cabinet Council on August 2, he reportedly advocated an active alliance with Britain as the only means of assuring the food supply and guarding against the possibility of Russian aggression. The government was did not share the King's degree of sympathy for England, however, and was determined to uphold its policy of neutrality.\textsuperscript{62}
The most immediate diplomatic concern was the uncertainty over Sweden's attitude, which seemed to favor Germany. On August 8, however, Norway and Sweden agreed upon a joint statement in which each country pledged "to maintain to the uttermost [sic] its neutrality toward all the belligerent powers. The two governments, in addition, have exchanged binding assurances to prevent the possibility that the European conflict shall lead either kingdom to adopt measures hostile to the other."\(^6\) Although the practical significance of the agreement was not great, it did help to thaw the chilly relations which had existed since 1905.\(^4\)

It remained to be seen whether Britain and Germany would respect Norway's neutrality as the great naval campaign unfolded in the North Sea. Perhaps surprisingly, considering the High Sea Fleet's frequent pre-war visits to the fjords, the Germans never seriously considered any attempt to seize a Norwegian base. A faction in the naval staff headed by Wolfgang Wegener eventually did advocate such a move; but such ideas gained little influence until the eve of the next war. The British had considered the possibility more closely in the years before 1914, however, and this was part of the reason for their deliberate omission of any statement regarding neutrality in the 1907 Integrity guarantee.\(^6\) The British never implemented their plan either. However, their gradual escalation of economic warfare placed the neutrals in an increasingly difficult position, with the result that by 1918, Norway's neutrality amounted to little more than a formality.

**THE ALLIED BLOCKADE AND ECONOMIC COERCION VERSUS NORWAY**

The British blockade of Germany initially had many loopholes; and until late 1916, Norway actually tended to benefit from the war, due to higher demand and prices for its exports. Of the greatest value to Germany were Norwegian pyrites, containing sulphur which was essential in the production of munitions. The Norwegians were well aware of this, as shown in a speech by Foreign Minister Ihlen to the Storting in May 1915:
Norway is now the only source which can supply Germany with the sulphur needed for the manufacture of ammunition, and our exports of pyrites have thus been enormously increased. The pyrites export to Germany, which used to average 3,000 tons monthly, rose in February to 25,000 tons, and in March to 28,000 tons. With a sulphuric content of 43 per cent this means 12,000 tons of sulphur, which is of the greatest importance to Germany. I understand that England is about to act in this matter.66

Ihlen was correct, and the British soon had a powerful lever with which to apply pressure. Although Norway produced large amounts of unrefined copper, the country depended heavily on imports of refined copper from the United States, especially for the large-scale program of hydro-electric power plant construction then in progress. By early 1915, the British had secured almost total control over American copper exports. They then suspended all such shipments to Norway, which soon brought the entire Norwegian electrification program to a standstill. In August 1916, the Norwegian Government reluctantly agreed to restrict its copper-pyrite exports to Germany, in exchange for the resumption of refined copper imports. The British remained dissatisfied with the Copper Agreement, however, because the specific wording of the document left the Norwegians free to continue exporting the sulphur-containing pyrites, which were even more important to Germany than copper.67

In 1916, the British also moved to cut off the supply of Norwegian fish to Germany by exerting pressure for a special Anglo-Norwegian fisheries agreement. The main British weapon in this instance was the Norwegian dependence on British imports of equipment and supplies used by the fishermen themselves. The agreement, reached in August 1916, established that 85 percent of Norwegian fish would be sold to Britain at fixed prices. The remaining 15 percent generally continued to find its way to Germany, however.68

The pyrite and fishery disputes led to the most serious crisis in Anglo-Norwegian relations during the war. On 23 December 1916, the British announced a coal embargo against Norway, in order to force the Norwegians to accept strict Allied interpretations of the previous agreements. The embargo produced a great deal of hardship in Norway because of the country's almost total dependence on imported coal for
heating. Britain finally lifted the embargo on 17 February 1917, after Norway promised to cut off all pyrite exports to Germany. The Germans apparently accepted this as inevitable, and perhaps counted themselves lucky to continue receiving a portion of Norwegian fish.\(^6\)\(^9\)

In 1917-18, American efforts to tighten the blockade led to additional pressure on Norway, in the form of a new embargo on a variety of goods. In winter 1917-18, shortages of food and other necessities in Norway temporarily swung public opinion somewhat against the Allies. Nevertheless, bowing to the inevitable, the Norwegian government sent Fridtjof Nansen to Washington as a special representative in the trade negotiations. The result was a new agreement on 30 April 1918, which took effect on May 10 and further reduced exports to Germany.\(^7\)\(^0\)

**Norway and the U-boat Campaign**

Norway's neutrality meanwhile had suffered encroachments from another quarter as Germany launched its counter-blockade of Britain by unrestricted submarine warfare beginning in February 1915. Although Norwegian shipping losses did rise considerably in the following months, they were not catastrophic. Consequently, the Norwegian Government's initial protests were fairly muted.\(^7\)\(^1\) In late 1916, however, the situation changed rapidly when the Germans sent three U-boats to attack shipping in the Arctic, which was a vital artery of Allied supplies to Russia. A rapid succession of losses to Norwegian ships, several with dramatic loss of life, produced a massive public outcry and demands for action.\(^7\)\(^2\)

Although with questionable logic, the press led many people to assume that the U-boats must have reached the Arctic by taking advantage of Norwegian territorial waters to avoid British patrols. The issue of barring submarines from neutral waters already had arisen the previous year, ironically because of Allied submarines hugging the Swedish coast to operate in the Baltic. As a result, Sweden had issued a decree barring all submarines from its maritime territory and had urged Norway to follow suit. The Norwegians declined, partly on the advice of Commanding Admiral Dawes, who objected that such a ban would be
unenforceable. By fall 1916, however, he had come to favor the ban: and it took effect on October 20.73

The Norwegian decree drew a vehement protest from Germany, which regarded the measure as pro-Allied. The ominous German reaction produced a general war scare in Norway. The Norwegian government refused to withdraw the decree but tried to maintain relations with Germany by trade concessions, to the limited extent still possible within the existing agreements with Britain. This helped to maintain Norwegian-German relations on reasonably good terms for a few more months but led in turn to further pressure from Britain in the form of the coal embargo.74

The British also pressed the Norwegians to take action against German agents who apparently were operating quite freely, especially in North Norway, with widespread sympathy among the local population. The Norwegian government essentially told the British to mind their own business, however; and counter-espionage measures remained minimal in the absence of any effective surveillance organization.75

When the U-boats began their final phase of unrestricted attacks in February 1917, Norwegian losses mounted sharply. Twenty-nine Norwegian steamers were sunk that month, and in March the number climbed to fifty-two, which amounted to 108,065 of the total 590,000 tons lost that month world-wide. Public opinion in Norway swung sharply against Germany. As the German minister later wrote, his departure from Christiania "caused no regrets on my part: the unfriendly attitude of the people made us feel as if in enemy territory."76

In April 1917, in response to the increasing losses to U-boats, the Norwegian government and Shipowners' Association made a secret Tonnage Agreement with Britain, whereby armed and escorted British ships took over the most dangerous routes around the British Isles and in the North Sea, guaranteeing the supply of coal to Norway. In return, Norwegian ships were made available for Entente purposes on safer, more distant routes. Although the Agreement itself remained a well-kept secret until long after the war, the Germans soon suspected such collaboration, as it became obvious that Norwegian shipping was integrated with the Allied convoy system.77
By the closing months of the war in 1918, the Allies had organized regular convoys to Bergen and co-operated closely with the Norwegian Navy in the transfer of escort near the terminus. The final phase in such collaboration occurred that fall, as the British and Americans put the finishing touches on the North Sea barrage, the vast deployment of over 70,000 mines designed to prevent U-boats from reaching the Atlantic. To close the final loophole, the Allies demanded that the Norwegians extend the barrage with a mine-field of their own, inside the three-mile territorial limit. Reluctantly, under heavy diplomatic and economic pressure, the Norwegian government finally agreed to this on September 26, and the Norwegian Navy carried out the operation in October. Germany protested, of course, but the war ended before the consequences could play out any further.70

THE ROLE OF DETERRENCE, 1914-18

The events outlined above demonstrate how greatly Norwegian policy favored the Allies. One wonders, therefore, how Norway managed to remain at least technically neutral. The essential reason was that both sides drew some benefits from Norwegian neutrality, while remaining uncertain of the consequences otherwise. The Norwegian armed forces played a subsidiary yet significant role in such calculations.

Germany's policy reflected the inferiority its navy. The Royal Navy was almost certain to win any extended contest for control of Norwegian waters, and German planners never considered an invasion viable. Thus, there was little the Germans could do as the Allies gradually pinched off Norwegian exports. As Britain's minister in Christiania Sir M. de Cardonnel Findlay observed in 1918, "the danger of forcing Norway into the war is fully appreciated by the German Government, and will be carefully avoided by them on the ground that any such development would give the enemies of Germany a naval base on the Norwegian coast."79

Nevertheless, in spring 1917, the German high command became increasingly concerned over intelligence reports indicating that Britain was on the verge of forcing Norway into the war. Ludendorff in
particular believed that the British were about to seize a base in Norway, and he directed the General Staff to prepare a contingency plan, KRIEGSFALL NORWEGEN, which mainly contemplated mine-laying off the Norwegian coast and zeppelin raids on Norwegian industrial targets. After June 1917, when the expected British move never came, the German anxiety dissipated.80

The British decision of whether to force Norway fully into the war was a difficult one. In fall 1916 and again in mid-1917, the War Cabinet debated the issue of encouraging Norway to join the Entente. This seemed a likely prospect due to the deterioration of Norwegian-German relations over the U-boat issue and the Rautenfels sabotage affair. Beyond that, Britain could apply further economic pressure, or even unilaterally attempt to occupy a base such as Stavanger. The situation was especially promising after the United States entered the war, and the Norwegian government almost certainly would have provided a base for American naval forces had the United States made them available.81

Despite the advantages of having Norway as an ally, the Imperial General Staff recommended continued neutrality for several reasons. One was the likelihood that Germany would occupy Denmark in response to Norway entering the war. Another factor was uncertainty over Sweden's potential reaction, for not even the Royal Navy could protect Norway from invasion if Sweden sided with Germany. Finally, although a Norwegian base would be useful for light naval forces and aircraft, the British simply did not have sufficient forces to spare. At most, they were prepared to commit twenty aircraft and a dozen anti-aircraft guns for Norway's defense, but this still would leave crucial targets such as the Norsk Hydro plants vulnerable to possible German air attacks.82 The Americans could have tipped the scales to bring Norway into the war, but they proved unwilling to commit the necessary forces.83

Thus, Norway's formal neutrality remained intact, however tattered by pragmatic concessions, until the end of the war. The main reasons for this were beyond Norwegian control. Nevertheless, the fact that Norway stood ready to defend itself, at least against outright territorial violations, also played a significant role. In particular,
the British had to reckon that an attempt on their part to occupy a Norwegian base might meet with armed resistance, with unforeseeable consequences. Although the British military attaché to Scandinavia during the war, Rear-Admiral M.W. Consett, did not consider the Norwegian Army to be a "reliable instrument of war," one could not entirely overlook the fact that it had a full mobilization strength of over 150,000 men.84

Moreover, the Army's quality improved significantly during the war, thanks largely to the efforts of General Holtfodt (previously chief of coastal artillery), who became Defense Minister on 8 August 1914. Alongside Prime Minister Knudsen and Foreign Minister Ihlen, Holtfodt became a central figure in the cabinet and played a prominent role in pushing large defense appropriations through the Storting. He carefully avoided involvement in other political issues, and this fact, together with his widely-acknowledged professional competence, gave him powerful influence in purely military affairs. In overcoming opposition to proposed budgets in the Storting, he seldom compromised and frequently resorted to votes of confidence, on one occasion no less than nine times in a single morning. As a parliamentary tactician, he was crude but remarkably effective. Meanwhile, he also cracked down on public criticism of official policy by members of the officer corps, making sure that no sequel to the Sparre-Børresen feud arose.85

Wartime preparedness measures included the extension of naval conscription from 12 to 18 months, the extension of initial Army recruit training from 48 to 90 days, extension of regimental exercises from 24 to 30 days, and lowering of the conscription age from 22 to 21 years. This last step yielded a one-time windfall bonus of manpower, which the Army used to activate an additional infantry regiment, four new reserve battalions, and another independent battalion. At the height of tension in 1917, the Army's total mobilization strength amounted to 158,777 men and 260 guns.86

The Norwegian Navy, while small, also could have posed considerable complications to an invader if the government decided to fight; and in contrast to the Army, the British attaché Consett regarded the Navy as "smart, efficient and well disciplined."87 As one Norwegian
officer later argued in 1925, "Had we not had an armed neutrality guard at sea during the World War, there can be no doubt that our coast would have become a theater of war: had we possessed somewhat stronger naval forces, then our trade agreements with the western powers surely would have been more advantageous for us." Admiral Consett, however, essentially discounted the possibility of armed Norwegian resistance when he assessed Allied mistakes in prosecuting the economic campaign against Germany. Allowing the Netherlands and Scandinavia to remain neutral had worked greatly to Germany's advantage, he argued, by providing gaping loopholes in the blockade. "[I]t was chiefly our trade itself with Germany's neutral neighbors," he concluded, "that undermined the power of the fleet, succoured our enemies and nearly led to our defeat." The Allies thus ought to have put much greater economic pressure on the neutrals, even at the risk of provoking German occupation of those countries, since such a move would have turned them from sources of supply into economic liabilities anyway. Finally, the Allies also ought to have gone ahead and established an advanced naval base in Norway, against which Consett was sure the Norwegians would have mounted only formal protests. "The maintenance of a Norwegian base . . . would absorb shipping and naval forces employed in other services: but this notwithstanding, Norway's entry would give greatly increased striking force to our Navy and would accentuate the risk to all German war vessels that put to sea." A significant faction in the German Reichsmarine meanwhile concluded that in a future war, Germany must avoid its previous mistakes by seizing Norwegian bases in order to secure access to the Atlantic. This view found expression with the publication of Admiral Wolfgang Wegener's Seestrategie des Weltkrieges in 1929, a book for which Hitler later expressed "unbounded admiration" and which clearly influenced the events of 1940.

In retrospect, it seems that the survival of Norwegian neutrality in 1914-18 resulted from a combination of deterrence and Allied irresolution. In the years directly following the war, however, a more naive interpretation tended to prevail. As one author put it in 1932, "... at the core of all considerations throughout the war could be
found the determined will of the Norwegian people to keep the peace."
The simple resolution not to bloody one's hands by joining in a war, it
seemed, was what really mattered. "In her ability to remain neutral."
the author concluded. "Norway demonstrated to the world that it is
possible for a nation to maintain peace with honor, even under the most
extreme provocation, if it has the will to do so."
It would take the
catastrophe of April 1940 to drive home the fallacy of this assumption.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1. The lead system was something of an anomaly, with few if any parallels outside Scandinavia. It offered considerable advantages, however, producing an army that was both professional yet nationally homogenous in character (although the official language of command remained German until 1772). Johannes Schiotz, "Den norske hær, 1628 til nu", in Fr. Abel, ed., Den norske hære og flåete (Kristiania: Abels, 1914), 11-18. In addition to creating the new army, Christian IV extensively rebuilt Oslo as his provincial capital in Norway and immodestly renamed it Christiania. The city finally changed its name back to Oslo in 1924.

2. Tordenskiold remains Norway's most famous naval hero. Ironically, he survived the Great Northern War only to die in a duel with a Swedish colonel in 1720. Guthorm Kavli, I Tordenskiolds kjølvann (Oslo: Schibsted, 1990).


12. Article 25 of the constitution states that the Norwegian armed forces "must not be left to the disposal or service of foreign powers, and no foreign soldiers, except auxiliaries against hostile invasion, must be called into the Kingdom without the consent of the National Assembly."


19. Berg, "Forsvarsmakten", 147; Derry, *History of Modern Norway*, 90. 94. The Norwegian monitors displaced between 1,500 and 2,000 tons, had a speed of six to eight knots, and mounted two 27-cm rifled muzzle-loaders.

20. As late as 1894, the chief of the general staff estimated that 90 percent of Norwegian officers would support the crown in the event of a "parliamentary revolt". Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>", 34.

21. This movement had as its main ideological basis Article 27 of the constitution, which begins, "The Government has no right to employ military power against members of the state . . . "

39


24. Berg, "Forsvarets plan"; Derry, *History of Modern Norway*, 139-40; Gleditsch, *Foran en ny verdenskrig*, 98. The main weakness of the 1887 plan, identified by Berg, was that the peacetime administrative organization did not correspond to the tactical organization of brigades for field service, which meant that mobilization would entail major disruption. The system also failed to establish permanent combined-arms formations.


26. Derry, *History of Modern Norway*, 153; Berg, "Forsvarets plan", 148. Stang (1858-1907) was deeply interested in technical issues, and among his many achievements was the invention of a range-finder which remained in service through 1940. The most important of the new fortifications was Oscarsborg fortress, at the narrowest point in the Oslofjord, which already had received a new battery of three 28-cm Krupp guns in 1892-93, the same ones that would sink the Blücher almost 50 years later. Othar Lislegaard and Torbjørn Børte, *Skuddene som reddet Norge? Senkingen av <<Blücher>> 9. april 1940* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975), 9, 13.


33. Norwegian intelligence reports monitoring the Swedish build-up are found in "Generalstabens efterretningskontors rapport fra sommeren 1905": RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, Box 229. Norwegian efforts relied heavily on local civilian officials and patriotic private citizens.

34. Stein Moen, "Marinen i 1905", Forsvarsmafseets årbok 1980, 49-53. Sweden held a considerable numerical superiority at sea, as shown by the following comparisons (Swedish / Norwegian). Coastal battleships: 11 / 4, torpedo-cruisers: 4 / 0, destroyers: 2 / 1, torpedo boats: 23 / 18, gunboats: 1 / 4, minelayers: 1 / 0, submarines: 1 / 0. Moen concluded that even accounting for Norwegian coastal fortifications, the Swedes probably could have forced their way up the Oslofjord; but it would have been a costly affair.


36. Monsen, Sannheten om Militærvesenet, 6; Holm, "Forsvaret og 1905", 32-33. A thesis in progress at the University of Oslo by hovedfag student Roy Andersen will examine the relationship of Norwegian and Swedish military policies to the independence issue.

37. Folket i forsvaret: Krigsmakten i ett socialhistorisk perspektiv (Umeå, Sweden: Historiska institutionen vid Umeå universitet, 1983); review by Terje Holm, Historisk tidskrift 64 (1, 1985): 104-5.


40. Ibid., 32-3. For further analysis of the failure of republicanism in Norway, see Terje I. Leiren. "The Role of Kingship in the Monarchist-Republican Debate in Norway, 1905," The Historian (197?): 268-78. Leiren concludes, "Republicanism failed to win majority support because it could not make the historical connection with Norway's independent past. For Norwegians, the concept of kingship had come to be associated with the concept of Norway as an independent nation."


"Isolasjonisme, atlantisk samarbeid og nordpolitikk," IFS Info (2/1996). Sweden temporarily obstructed passage of the new integrity treaty, which angered many Norwegians and gave rise to a movement to abrogate the Karlstad conventions by rebuilding fortifications inside the neutral zone. This did not take place, but bitter memories of 1905 remained an obstacle to improved relations with Sweden for many years to come. Greve. Haakon VII. 52-4.

43. The Danes bore a long-lasting grudge against Germany for the loss of Schleswig-Holstein in 1864. Ibid., 3-12. For an earlier biography of Haakon, see Maurice Michel, Haakon, King of Norway (London: Allen & Unwin, 1958).

44. Greve, Haakon VII. 43-4.


46. Dawes (1861-1941) had served as Haakon's equerry (adjutant), and the two men apparently shared many ideas on military reform. Dawes later served briefly as Defense Minister (see below), and then as Commanding Admiral of the Navy from 1910 to 1919. Like Haakon, Dawes was an Anglophile, as became apparent during World War I. Ibid., 61, 195: Riste The Neutral Ally, 180.


48. Olsson already had taken offense over a trivial matter, when the King neglected to consult him regarding the assignment of ceremonial attaches for a visit by the Danish royal family. Greve. Haakon VII, 55.


53. Nils Ørvik. Sikkerhetspolitikken 1920-1939: Fra forhistorien til 9. april 1940, vol. I (Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum, 1960), 58-60. Lieutenant-Colonel Sophus Christensen, probably Norway's most prominent pro-defense publicist in this period, led an active campaign to extend training to a full year; but the reactionary political views from which his argument stemmed, including the assertion that the army was a more important pillar of society than the parliament, probably did the cause more harm than good. Agøy. "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>", 61-62.


42
55. The worst Norwegian strategic nightmare of this period was the possibility of a Swedish-German alliance, which probably was not as far-fetched in 1905-14 as it may seem in retrospect. Public consciousness of lingering tension with Sweden also helped to counteract the growth of pacifism. See Lindberg, Scandinavia in Great Power Politics.

56. Examples of the Norwegian war-plans of this period are found in "Utkast til Forsvarsplan (concept): Krig med Sverige", May 1908; "Utkast til Forsvarsplan: Krig med Rusland", June 1910; and "ad Forsvarsplanen: Alternative C. Forholdsregler for at havde neutraliteten", 1913-14: RA. GS(III), kat.1256.2/16. box 353. The Norwegian general staff considered it quite possible that the Russians would try to annex North Norway to improve their maritime position in compensation for the defeat by Japan. L'Orange's plan also pointed out the need for coastal fortifications to cover the approaches to Narvik--a hole that still remained unplugged 25 years later.

57. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 31-32. On the character of the preparedness movement throughout this era, see Rolf Graff, Forsvarsforeningen i Norge gjennom femti år, 1886-1936 (Oslo, 1936).

58. Derry, History of Modern Norway, 183-4; Riste, The Neutral Ally, 31, 241: Berg, "Forsvarsakten", 156. The two coast-defense ships would have been named Bjørgvin and Nidaros (archaic names for Bergen and Trondheim). They had a displacement of 5,700 tons, a speed of 13 knots, and an armament of two 9.2" and six 6" guns. In British service they became HMS Glatton and Gorgon. Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I (New York: Military Press, 1990), 63.


60. For the official history of the Norwegian Navy's wartime neutrality patrols, see Marinens nøutralitetservernt, 1914-1919 (Christiania, 1921). and Marinen: Nøutralitetsvernet 1914-1918, samt nøutralitetservernt avvikling 1918-1919 (Oslo, 1940).


64. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 37-41.


68. Ibid., 96-107; Vigness, The Neutrality of Norway, 70-84.

69. Ibid., 64-69; Riste, The Neutral Ally, 162-6.

70. Ibid., 191-211; Vigness, The Neutrality of Norway, 137-63.


72. The ordeal of survivors of the S.S. Ravn, sunk on 29 September 1916 off the North Cape, provides a particularly harrowing example of the conditions faced by Norwegian seamen and the consequent public reaction. Vigness, The Neutrality of Norway, 87.


74. Ibid., 139-48; Vigness, The Neutrality of Norway, 93-104.

75. M. de C. Findlay to UD, 15-16 October 1916; 6.DK to FD, 21 October 1916; RA: KA, kat. 1256.3/10, box 1244. There was no national police agency until 1937. Although the Norwegian army general staff had established an intelligence section in 1905, it amounted to almost nothing prior to 1914. Defense minister Holtfodt greatly expanded the intelligence staff beginning 17 October 1914: but it still lacked the resources or official mandate to mount domestic surveillance on a large scale. See Agøy, "Militærstaten og <<den indre fiende>>", 84. As the following chapter will show, the general staff by 1918 became increasingly preoccupied with domestic labor unrest.

76. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 175; Vigness, The Neutrality of Norway, 105-23. Anti-German feelings in Norway reached a peak following the Rautenfels affair, which involved the arrest of several German diplomatic couriers who were found to be carrying explosives clearly intended for sabotage of Norwegian ships.

77. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 176-79. The Tonnage Agreement apparently remained secret at least until 1932, since Vigness made no reference to it.

78. Derry, History of Modern Norway, 285-86; Riste, The Neutral Ally, 212-24. It took more than a year to sweep the tens of thousands of mines after the war, a process in which the Norwegian navy also co-operated closely with the allies. "Minerydding, 1918-19"; RA: KA, kat. 1256.3/10, box 1244.

79. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 211.

81. Admiral Dawes, who had never made any secret of his pro-Western sympathies, went so far as to advocate such an American naval deployment publicly. One observer described him as "a brave, honest man, but barbarously outspoken"—an impression echoed by a British diplomat who felt that his statements in 1917 had become counter-productive. Greve, Haakon VII. 61, 195; Riste The Neutral Ally, 180.

82. The Norwegians accomplished little in the way of air defense prior to spring 1917, when they undertook the hasty conversion of a dozen 75-mm guns to anti-aircraft mounts and obtained a dozen more modern guns of similar caliber from France and Britain, plus some searchlights and telephone equipment. Anti-aircraft artillery attained permanent status as an army regiment after the war. "Luftforsvaret": RA, GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 295.

83. Riste, The Neutral Ally, 148-52, 168, 179-91. Some American naval officers apparently felt that the British were all-too-eager to commit an American battle squadron to a forward base in Norway that the Royal Navy meanwhile considered too exposed for its own ships, perhaps with the post-war naval balance in mind.

84. M.W.W.P. Consett, The Triumph of Unarmed Forces: An account of the transactions by which Germany during the Great War was able to obtain supplies prior to her collapse under the pressure of economic forces (London: Williams and Norgate, 1923), 107.

85. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>", 81-83. Holtfodt was a protegé of Georg Stang. The previous defense minister, Vilhelm Keilhau, was aged 69 and clearly lacked the energy and decisiveness demanded by the wartime crisis. Greve, Haakon VII. 63-64.

86. Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, I:58-59; Berg, "Forsvaretsmakten", 158; "Det norske hærs krigssstyrke", February 1917: RA, GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 298. Including reservists, the officer corps numbered 3810. Total strength in horses was 31,926. See appendix for more detailed figures. On the results of winter exercises, see K. Vilh. Amundsen, Vinterøvelser: Erfaringer fra senere aars vinterøvelser (Fredrikshald: E. Sem, 1918).


88. Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, I:184. Ørvik adds his own observation that "Even just a few sea-going submarines, combined with a strong coast defense, would have made Norway a significant power in northern Europe."

89. Consett, Triumph of Unarmed Forces. xii-xiii. 93-97. 108.

CHAPTER 2

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND "THE INTERNAL FOE." 1918-1933

NORWAY'S POSITION IN POST-WAR DIPLOMACY. 1919-20

Having remained neutral in the war, Norway was not directly involved in the negotiations at Versailles in 1919. However, the Norwegian minister in France, Count Wedel Jarlsberg, did try to assert Norway's interest in three issues: compensation for shipping losses during the war, rectification of the Arctic frontier with Russia, and possession of the Svalbard Archipelago (Spitzbergen). ¹

Norwegian shipping losses in the course of the war had amounted to nearly 900 vessels, totalling over 1.25 million tons, and approximately 2,000 sailors killed. Nevertheless, due to Norway's failure to join the Allies as a full belligerent, the Versailles settlement included no compensation. Families of the sailors who had perished did, however, receive a modest fund of 6.6 million marks through a separate settlement with Germany in 1928. ²

The other two issues worked out more in Norway's favor. Negotiations surrounding Finland's independence from Russia settled long-standing territorial questions in the Arctic. As a result, Norway no longer shared a direct border with Russia (or as it had become by that point, the Soviet Union). The temporary neutralization of Russian influence also facilitated the conclusion of a treaty concerning Spitzbergen on 9 February 1920, which acknowledged Norwegian sovereignty over the islands, provided that they remained demilitarized and open to economic development by all signatories. Although not among the
original signatories, the Soviet Union eventually endorsed the treaty as well in 1924; and the Soviets subsequently developed a considerable coal-mining settlement in the interwar period.\(^3\)

Probably the most difficult foreign policy question Norway faced in the immediate aftermath of the war was whether to join the League of Nations. The general concept of the League was congenial to long-term Norwegian security interests, which relied heavily on international law and arbitration. However, other considerations made the overall Norwegian attitude toward the League ambivalent. One factor was that the country only recently had secured its independence, and most Norwegians were opposed to any significant concessions of national sovereignty (a phenomenon that reappeared when Norway twice rejected EU-membership in 1972 and 1994).

Specifically, the League’s commitment to enforce collective security raised the most doubts in Norway. A binding agreement to participate in sanctions (potentially including military action) could compromise the country’s future neutrality. Furthermore, in the 1920s it was difficult to conceive of a situation in which Norway might become the victim of direct aggression and thus stand to benefit from League protection. Relations with Sweden had improved substantially since 1905, and Germany and Russia no longer posed a significant threat. The only other power with the ability to attack Norway was Britain, and such a scenario was simply implausible. In 1922, even the Norwegian General Staff admitted the absence of significant threats and concluded that rather than adding to Norway’s security, League commitments would merely force Norway “to take part in operations of war which we otherwise could have kept out of.”\(^4\)

Norwegian representatives tried unsuccessfully to gain admission to the League on special terms similar to those of Switzerland, which waived that country’s obligation to participate in collective action against an aggressor. After exhausting that possibility, Norway went ahead and joined the League anyway, for two main reasons. One was that given the presently uncontestable strength of Britain and France, the prospect of another major war seemed remote. Thus, the possibility of being drawn into a conflict because of the League appeared to be purely
hypothetical. The other main reason was simply to avoid the potentially negative consequences of not joining. Non-members might find themselves excluded economically from vast areas controlled by League states, and the other prominent non-members, Germany and Russia, carried an ideological stigma which Norway wished to avoid as well.\footnote{5} The Norwegian government thus committed itself, in theory, to a policy of collective security. As we shall see, however, neutrality remained the practical basis of Norwegian military policy.

**REPERCUSSIONS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION**

In the diplomatic sphere, at least in the short term, the Russian Revolution had proved somewhat advantageous to Norway by removing Russia from the stage of great-power negotiations. The Revolution also heightened social tension, however, and prompted fears (or for some, hopes) that bolshevism would soon prevail Norway as well. An early warning sign appeared in an isolated but radical strike by syndicalist coal-miners at the small Norwegian settlement on Spitzbergen in July 1917, which the Navy quickly suppressed with an armed expedition.\footnote{6}

In January 1918, the Russian example inspired Norwegian workers and soldiers in Oslo and Trondheim to set up their own councils on the Soviet model, and the already radical Labor Party grew increasingly militant. Rumors circulated that the Norwegian socialist leaders had received binding promises from the Russian government that it would send 50,000 troops to Norway in the event of a successful coup there. In retrospect it is clear that even if such promises were made, Lenin's regime was in no position to make good on them and indeed would have its hands full fighting for its own existence over the next three years. This rumor, however, marks the beginning of a fear that would persist well into the Cold War: the possibility that a domestic communist movement would provide the Soviet Union with a pretext for intervention.\footnote{7}

A Labor Party conference in March 1918 seemed to point in the same direction, when the majority led by Martin Tranmæl adopted the following resolution:
As a revolutionary class-war party, social democracy cannot recognize the right of the propertied classes to the economic exploitation and oppression of the working class, even if that exploitation and oppression are based upon a majority among the representatives of the people. The Norwegian Labor Party must therefore reserve for itself the right to resort to revolutionary mass action in the struggle for the economic emancipation of the working class.8

The Norwegian military regarded such threats seriously and began taking precautions against possible bolshevik plots in February 1918. These measures focused on securing arsenals and identifying communist sympathizers within the ranks, in order to assure that the government could rely on the loyalty of at least certain key units in a crisis. As it turned out, 1918 passed without any large-scale violence in Norway; but the military demonstrated on several occasions that it was prepared to use force if necessary. The Royal Guard, supported by a machine gun company, turned out in full kit in response to a mass demonstration by the Christiania Workers' Councils in front of the Storting on March 5. Later that spring, the Army and Navy both deployed major units in a show of force at Sulitjelma and Kirkenes in North Norway, which effectively overawed the would-be revolutionaries and demonstrated the government's monopoly of military power. The government also banned the sale of firearms beginning in March. Socialist papers began urging workers to join and take over the government-sponsored rifle clubs, which remained exempt from the ban; but in June 1918, the organization revised its membership rules to exclude undesirable applicants on an arbitrary basis.9

Although no evidence of material preparations for an armed revolution in Norway has ever come to light, Norwegian trade union and Labor Party leaders did make at least general plans for an insurrection in November 1918. In the event, they had to conclude that the time was not yet ripe; but they meanwhile encouraged military and bourgeois paranoia by deliberate hoaxes to lead the authorities on fruitless searches for secret caches of weapons.10

One leftist historian argues that the fact the revolutionary councils never actually took up arms was due largely to the influence of
moderate elements within the Labor Party, but he also emphasizes that the military demonstrations "exposed in a convincing manner the weakness of the council movement and syndicalists in the face of bourgeois military power. It was first and foremost the military who won the struggle in spring 1918--and pacifism in the labor movement which lost."\textsuperscript{11}

In the course of the disturbances in 1918, the military authorities grew increasingly worried over the reliability of Army units; and district commanders provided varying estimates of which units probably would obey orders to fire on civilians. The situation was most acute in North Norway, where the 6th Division commander wrote, "Even if one could pick out and assemble presumably reliable men from the various districts, one cannot be sure that they would obey orders to use live ammunition against the population."\textsuperscript{12} When compelled to mobilize troops in such situations, military commanders therefore relied as far as possible on standing units such as the Royal Guards and junior officer-candidates from the various district schools, men who were more likely to follow orders than the rank and file. In retrospect, the cases of collective disobedience among conscripted soldiers that did appear in 1918 stemmed almost exclusively from dissatisfaction with food and other relatively petty grievances, rather than political radicalism.\textsuperscript{13}

Nevertheless, fears of mutiny prompted the beginning of a secret effort to maintain accurate lists of "reliable" personnel, a quest that was to preoccupy much, and perhaps even most of Norwegian military planning for the next twenty years.

The end of the war and a brief economic upturn in 1919-20 provided a respite in the domestic crisis. In this period, the Storting also enacted several landmark social reforms, including universal rights to an eight-hour workday and twelve days' paid vacation per year. The postwar trade boom proved short-lived, however, and beginning in 1920 Norway slid into a prolonged depression that essentially continued until World War II. As a result, labor disputes again intensified; and the threat of revolution, openly endorsed by the Labor Party, set the tone for most of the interwar period.\textsuperscript{14}
MILITARY REDUCTIONS IN THE 1920s

A common misconception concerning Norwegian history is that the Norwegian Labor Party was solely to blame for dismantling the country's defenses after it came to power in 1935. In fact, however, a series of previous governments by the bourgeois (i.e., non-Marxist) parties already had reduced the Norwegian military almost to non-existence by the early 1930s.15

In 1920, the Liberal Party appointed a defense commission to recommend appropriate military changes in light of the new international situation. The commission's report urged major reductions, which the Storting readily enacted that same year. The defense reorganization of 1920 retained the same basic organization of 1909, but with a generally reduced level of readiness. In practice, this meant less training and significant cuts in supplies and new equipment.

The area least affected by the cutbacks was North Norway, where the assessments of 1920-22 identified the greatest potential for continuing tension. In addition to the menace of Soviet Russia, newly independent Finland presented an uncertain factor, with possible designs on Norwegian territory, particularly since East Finnmark contained a significant Finnish ethnic minority. Apart from this region, however, the military was hard-pressed to identify any plausible external threat.16

Although the military tried to maintain its existing organization with reduced funds by lowering the frequency of refresher exercises and unit maneuvers, by 1925-26 it became clear that an administrative reorganization was imperative. Pointing to the Locarno Pact of October 1925 as evidence of how far the danger of war had receded, the Defense Department appointed a General Staff commission in 1926 to study alternatives for further economization. "If the budget is to be reduced so far as indicated in the commission's mandate," the panel concluded, "it is impossible to avoid major reductions and changes. But the Commanding General has tried insofar as possible to uphold the Army's structure so that improvements can occur without difficulty, when conditions warrant." [Emphasis in original.] Rejecting proposals for a
very small, professional army to replace the conscription and mobilization system, the report argued that "No matter how good it is, a small army cannot defend our far-flung country, with its many separate operational theaters."\textsuperscript{17}

Based on this line of reasoning, the resulting Defense Act of 1927 still produced little change in paper organization; but in reality, the Army was on its way to becoming a hollow shell for lack of personnel, training, and material. Although it did not officially take effect until 1 January 1930, the 1927 ordinance included several highly significant measures. One was to reduce the annual intake of conscripts to only two-thirds of those eligible, with exemptions determined by lottery. Those still called would now receive a total of only 108 days' training, including refresher exercises (repetisjonsøvelser) in subsequent years, instead of the previous 144 days. Other revisions reduced the size of the Royal Guard and eliminated the garrison company in Trondheim.

Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the cutbacks involved reduction and restructuring of the officer corps. Up to 1927, the Army had approximately 1,100 professional officers (K-officers, graduates of the Krigsskole) and 2,600 junior officers and NCOs (underoffiserer). Under the new ordinance, the numbers fell to 600 and 800, respectively. To make up part of the difference, the Army introduced a new category of unpaid reserve (vernepliktige) officers, slated to fill an additional 1,100 positions in case of mobilization. Due to the lack of periodic unit exercises and other forms of refresher training, however, these officers had little opportunity to maintain their competence.\textsuperscript{18}

In the consolidation process, the Army also abolished the underoffiser designation and introduced a new system that technically made no distinction between commissioned and non-commissioned officers. Since the system bears little resemblance to those of most other countries, some further explanation is appropriate. Graduates of the district NCO-schools (underoffiserskole, redesignated befalsskole under the new system), were called B-officers. They initially received the rank of either corporal or sergeant after training but could expect routine promotion up to the rank of captain. Graduates of the Krigskole
(K-officers) automatically became lieutenants, but in some cases they would now be subordinate to B-officers of superior rank, whereas previously any K-officer was automatically superior to any underoffiser. In short, while the Norwegians retained the designations of corporal and sergeant, in effect they abandoned the concept of professional non-commissioned officers. The move was popular in its appeal to the country's egalitarian tendencies, but it was to have serious, adverse repercussions for the Army's effectiveness.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY

Although the 1927 act occurred under a Conservative government, the key political figure of the period was Johan Ludwig Mowinckel, leader of the Liberals, who served three times as Prime Minister in 1924-26, 1928-31, and 1933-35. He had been an advocate of defense during the crises of 1905 and 1914-18, but in the 1920s he apparently concluded that the World War really had been "the war to end all wars," and he adjusted his views on military policy accordingly. In the era of Locarno and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, of course, such ideas were the norm.

A faction of Mowinckel's party, the Independent Liberals (Frisinnede Venstre), favored reducing the defense budget even further to only 30 million kroner, on the assumption that the military's only function was to provide a token neutrality patrol. The main spokesman for this argument was Rolf Thommessen. "Whatever the military may say," he argued during the finance debate in 1929.

... there is no denying that this is an extraordinarily favorable time for reduction of the defense budget. Our strategic situation has undergone a considerable change for the better, due to the favorable--and I will venture to say, permanently favorable--relations achieved with the nation that we formerly armed ourselves against [i.e., Sweden]... No one can convince me that there will be another major war in Europe, so long as the present generation is alive. But if we are to reduce the defense budget, it must occur along different principles than we have followed previously. ... If the military is to avoid internal dissolution, we
must make a choice: we must place the main emphasis on either the army or the navy. We cannot maintain both. I believe that our geography, our traditions, our entire national genius, and the thrust of our foreign policy all indicate that we [should] give priority to the navy.21

According to Thommessen's proposal, the Navy would receive twenty million kroner per year and the Army only ten, with the latter becoming merely a cadre organization.22 Not surprisingly, the Army objected strenuously. A budget of only ten million kroner per year, the Commanding General argued, would leave the country almost totally defenseless on land, and the corresponding increase in naval strength would be marginal at best, even were the Navy to receive the entire defense budget of thirty million. "A small fleet such as ours must inevitably remain," he reasoned, "incurs the risk of catastrophic defeat and destruction in a very short time, which would then leave the country entirely exposed."23

Mowinckel instructed both services to prepare alternative estimates based on ten, fifteen, or twenty million-kroner budgets for evaluation; and the staffs scrambled to develop appropriate force structures. Mowinckel eventually settled on thirty-two million kroner as the new target for defense spending, to be divided between the two services on a roughly equal basis. Thus, although the Army had fended off the worst case of only ten million kroner per year, declining funds nevertheless resulted in a further reduction of infantry training to a mere seventy-two days. By 1931, the number of Army K-officers in full-time service had fallen to only 470.24 Declining admissions to the Krigsskole during the 1920s meanwhile meant that the reduction of the officer corps was not merely a short-term phenomenon. (See appendix.) By the late 1930s, these lean years would leave a disproportionate number of the remaining officers approaching retirement age with an acute shortage of younger men to succeed them.

The Navy found itself in similar straits. In 1914, the Norwegian Navy had amounted to a modern force, with 1 armored coast-defense ships, 3 destroyers (the Draug class, 300 tons), 23 small torpedo boats (45-95 tons), 3 submarines (the 'A' class, 350 tons), and 7 minelayers (250
Wartime construction in 1914-18 included 3 more minelayers (the *Frøya* of 750 tons, and two of the *Glommen* class, 350 tons), 3 large torpedo boats (the *Trygg* class, 220 tons), and 6 more submarines (the 'B' class, 550 tons). However, many of these vessels were of indifferent design and material quality, most being the products of civilian firms unfamiliar with specialized naval construction. Several ships, moreover, remained unfinished when the war ended; and work immediately slowed almost to a halt.

The Defense Commission of 1920 attempted to lay down a medium- to long-term plan for maintenance and modernization of the Navy that would reflect the new international situation. Recognizing that recent technological developments had changed the nature of war at sea a great deal, and would continue to do so, the Commission established a subsidiary naval panel to study the problem and present recommendations. This committee argued that the Navy's most important role in a hypothetical conflict would be to oppose a hostile blockade of the Norwegian coast and protect trade; and to this end, it proposed an annual construction budget of 9.5 million kroner in order to build 4 super-destroyers (2,400 tons, 15-cm guns, 36 knots), 9 smaller destroyers (1,100 tons, 12-cm guns, 36 knots), 18 submarines, 11 minelayers, and 36 MTBs (motor torpedo boats). The Defense Commission concluded that this was unrealistic and instead proposed a more modest goal of 6 gunboats (1,600 tons, 15-cm guns, 15 knots) and 12 torpedo boats (300 tons), plus most of the smaller vessels called for by the other plan, for an annual budget of 5 million kroner.

The Conservative Party and most naval officers criticized the proposed gunboats as essentially useless, since their slow speed would make them sitting ducks against either torpedos or more heavily-gunned opponents. What Norway needed, they argued, was cruisers, or at least a few large super-destroyers. The acquisition of such "artillery ships" as the kernel of a blue-water navy eventually became the main object of a naval league, *Norges Sjøforsvar*, founded in 1926. Unfortunately for this campaign, however, another significant faction existed in Norwegian naval thought, favoring a purely coastal (skjergårds, or skerry) defense analogous to the gunboat and galley fleet of 1807-14. The modern
equivalent proposed by Captain F. Beutlich consisted of small submarines, minelayers, and MTBs, which seemed to offer far more "bang for the buck" than larger, seagoing artillery vessels. Opponents of naval spending thus found it convenient that not even the Navy itself could agree on what type of fleet the country should have.

As it turned out, the Storting refused to initiate any new construction after 1920, funding only the slow, fitful completion of the vessels left over from the wartime program, the main object in fact being merely to keep the 500 workers at the naval dockyard at Horten on the payroll. The situation remained thus until 1927-28, when it became necessary either to begin some new project or to close the yard. In order to minimize pacifist opposition, the Liberals (under Mowinckel's second government) proposed a fisheries patrol vessel instead of the destroyer recommended by the Defense Department; and this eventually produced the *Fridtjof Nansen* (1,300 tons, two 10-cm guns, 15 knots), completed in 1931 at a cost of 1.66 million kroner. Although militarily all but useless, the *Nansen* represented a shrewdly allocated pork barrel that served Mowinckel's purposes by winning support among diverse groups such as pacifists, fishermen who wanted protection against foreign competitors, and some quixotic neo-imperialists, who believed ships of this type would help to assert Norway's claim to Greenland against Denmark.

Mowinckel's call for alternative plans based on twenty, fifteen, and ten million kroner in 1929 provided another occasion for the Navy to state what kind of structure it really wanted, albeit on a smaller scale than the previous proposal in 1920. (See appendix.) The fifteen million-kroner alternative eventually became the theoretical goal of the Defense Act of 1933, but it ended up giving way to further political compromises in the Storting, as the following chapter will explain.

Following completion of the *Nansen*, the Storting again had to decide how to keep the workers at Horten busy. This time the result was a large minelayer, the *Olav Trygvasson* (four 12-cm guns, two torpedo-tubes, 21 knots). Ironically, although it was glad at least to get a warship, the Navy did not have any real use for such a vessel. While mines were popular among Norwegian politicians as a supposedly

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inoffensive weapon, the country's coastline in fact was poorly suited to minefields in most places, since deep water usually extended so close inshore. The Navy thus felt it could make do with a limited number of small minelayers such as it already possessed, with the possible addition of auxiliaries easily converted from civilian vessels in an emergency. What the Navy wanted most was a well-armed destroyer, and by default the Trygvason ended up performing a destroyer's role, despite her slow speed, excessive displacement, and weak torpedo armament. In six years of service from 1934 to 1940, the ship almost never carried or practiced with mines.29

The Labor Party meanwhile had developed a plan to abolish the existing Navy altogether and replace it with a civilianized coast guard consisting solely of torpedo boats. The logic behind torpedo armament in this case was muddled, as revealed in one debate when a critic asked Labor to elaborate on the possible consequences if one of its innocuous boats ever actually had to fire a shot in anger. Not surprisingly, Labor could offer no coherent reply, given its self-avowed lack of any military policy, rational or otherwise.30

Mowinckel's ideas make for an interesting comparison with those of Labor. He his basic assumptions in a speech in Bergen in 1929:

Our defense must now constitute a definite guard for our neutrality. Nothing more . . . As regards land strategy, the situation is quite clear when we reflect upon the arbitration treaties which bind together the whole of the North. As regards sea strategy, we must remember that it is Britain which rules the northern seas, and that this will presumably be the case for a long time to come.31

Unlike Labor, Mowinckel did consider it important to maintain the trappings of a navy, with ranks, uniforms, and flags. However, he considered its real mission as nothing more than to provide floating signposts to demarcate the three-mile limit. It was pointless, he believed, to build expensive, dangerous warships when practically any kind of craft could provide his version of a neutrality watch. Most of the craft that flew the Norwegian naval ensign in 1914-18, Mowinckel observed, "... were vessels with which the farmers travelled back and
forth daily with their milk bottles. They were chartered vessels, but under the Navy's flag they were good enough to keep watch over our neutrality in an effective manner." What Mowinckel wanted was essentially "a navy without ships," as one historian later put it.32

A variety of critics such as Norges forsvarsforening, former defense minister Holtfodt, and various individual officers in both services condemned the successive cutbacks as reckless and irresponsible. Mowinckel effectively silenced many potential objections from the Army, however, by appointing a co-operative political ally, Kristian K. Laake, as Commanding General on 6 February 1931. Although Laake had achieved high marks in his military education and became a member of the General Staff, he left that body in 1912 after attaining only the second-lowest rank (adjoint). His appointment to head the Army thus violated a well-established precedent that Commanding Generals be former Chiefs of the General Staff, and his colleagues almost universally regarded him as a political favorite, due to his long-time membership in the Liberal Party. In fairness, one must concede that no matter who had become Commanding General in the 1930s, he probably could not have made much headway against prevailing conditions. In numerous specific instances, however, culminating on 5-9 April 1940, Laake proved unequal to the challenges that lay ahead.33

King Haakon also expressed grave reservations regarding the extent of disarmament, but his scrupulous adherence to his constitutional role prevented him from voicing any direct, public criticism of the government's policy. He could at least take some satisfaction, however, from the fact that the young Crown Prince Olav displayed not only an active interest in military affairs, but also impressive aptitude. Olav earned extraordinarily high marks at the Militær høyskole in 1921-24, signifying the beginning of a life-long devotion to the cause of national defense.34

POLITICAL FRAGMENTATION AND ANTI-MILITARISM

The reductions in Norwegian defense were closely related to domestic issues as well as foreign policy. Specifically, the economic
depression and the associated rise of the Labor Party were dominant factors in interwar politics. In addition, an electoral reform providing for proportional representation in 1919 made it possible for minor parties to secure seats in the Storting, which in turn led to a general fragmentation of the traditional parliamentary blocs. Formerly absolute Liberal or Conservative majorities gave way to a series of unstable coalition governments.

One new party that emerged from proportional representation was the Agrarian (Bonde) Party, formed in 1920. The Agrarians stood for the interests of Norwegian farmers and emphasized the wholesome traditions of rural life in contrast to urban licentiousness--particularly the labor movement. Agrarian rhetoric sometimes assumed a racist character; and in the course of the depression, the Party embodied a great deal of anger generated by farm foreclosures and general hardship. Thus, among the major parties, the Agrarians in most respects stood closest to the subsequent Norwegian fascist movement of the 1930s.35

The Labor Party also experienced divisions in the aftermath of World War I, mainly over the issue of co-operation with Moscow. The radical majority's decision to join the Comintern in 1919 drove moderates to form the Social Democratic Party in 1920. Most Social Democrats soon returned to the fold, however, because in 1923 the Labor majority reversed itself and broke with Moscow. This in turn prompted the remaining radicals to break off and form the Norwegian Communist Party that same year.36 The election of 1927 resulted in a major victory for Labor, making it the largest party in the Storting with fifty-nine seats, although it still fell short of an absolute majority. Divisions among the other parties led King Haakon to the controversial decision to invite Labor to form its first government, headed by Christopher Hornsrud, in 1928; and although this lasted less than three weeks before being toppled by a new bourgeois coalition, it represented an important breakthrough for Labor by showing that it was now ready to abide by the rules of the parliamentary system. Although Labor lost ground in the next election, its subsequent recovery stemmed from its increasingly moderate position, which espoused Keynesian economic theory rather than Marxist revolution.37
Despite this trend toward moderation, Labor leaders' rhetoric remained highly inflammatory, particularly with regard to military issues. In 1924-25, Labor launched a civil disobedience campaign against conscription, urging working-class youth not to report for basic training when called up. Only about fifty men responded, however, and the Party abandoned the effort after Tramæl and several other leaders received prison sentences. Nevertheless, Labor in the 1920s remained firmly committed to abolition of the bourgeois military. Thus, when the Hornsrud cabinet took office in 1928, the military naturally felt alarmed. The Defense Minister was Frederik Monsen, one of the most radical anti-military agitators in Norway. The government's swift demise came as a relief to those in uniform, and Monsen was unable to use his power of office to obtain any sensitive information from the Defense Department or the General Staff.

Shortly after his brief tenure as Defense Minister, Monsen published a pamphlet outlining Labor's continued anti-military platform and ideology. Beginning with a historical survey, he rejected the notion that the Norwegian military had ever served any real purpose other than to control and oppress the people. "Militarism," he argued, "is inevitably associated with capitalist society, its maintenance, and its exercise of power." Furthermore, modern technology and the huge sums devoted to armaments by the great powers had made it impossible for a small country to mount a viable defense. Thus, the only real solution to security problems would be the final triumph of global Marxist revolution. Monsen expressed hope that at least in Norway, the Labor movement could exert its will politically and disband the military through legal means; but he warned that the bourgeois militarists were unlikely to relinquish their grip on power voluntarily. "If the way forward to a socialist society leads through armed struggle," he concluded, "then the working class must in time take steps to establish the necessary organization and means of force."

Conservative critic Olaf Benneche replied with a systematic rebuttal of Monsen's arguments and offered no apology for the fact that the military stood ready to oppose revolution with force. Monsen had claimed that the military was a danger to the working class; but what he
really meant, Benneche argued, was that it posed an obstacle to communist dictatorship.

It is neither love of peace nor any other idealism that stands behind Mr. Monsen’s struggle against defense. . . . Our defense is to be systematically destroyed by denial of appropriations and by agitation among the youth called to military service, while a 'red army' grows in secrecy, ready to support the dictatorship of the proletariat with armed force.41

INTERNAL SECURITY PLANS VS. "THE INTERNAL FOE"

The military had indeed taken steps to prepare for a communist uprising, and the General Staff developed secret contingency plans for "silent mobilization" of specially screened units, known as ordensvern and vaktvern, against domestic disorders.42 Although the nature and extent of such plans remains controversial in Norway, it seems safe to say that the "internal enemy" became the Norwegian military's paramount concern during the 1920s.43

In spring 1919, the Defense Department Security Committee (a temporary entity to co-ordinate measures versus civil unrest) expanded the Royal Guards from two companies to four, without prior approval by the Storting. Shortly thereafter, the Army also established a standing garrison company in Trondheim, reflecting the belief that such units would be more reliable than conscripts.44

At least a few officers meanwhile looked to Germany for lessons in crushing an urban insurrection. The archives of the General Staff contain a report entitled, "Military Experiences from the Suppression of Internal Disorders in Germany." marked strictly confidential, which expressed glowing admiration for the tactics and results of the notorious Freikorps that broke the Spartacist uprisings of 1919. The document set out the principles for bringing the full weight of military firepower to bear against urban crowds in close quarters, recommending among other things that "Warning shots are forbidden. They serve only to inflame and strengthen the enemy's courage. Fire for effect, on the other hand, after three warnings, can work wonders."  Apart from

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specific tactics, the report summarized its overall point as follows: "If one has decided to employ armed force in order to fulfill one's mission, or sees one's own troops threatened, then all spiritual and material means must be committed in order to assure victory."45

Following the lull in 1919-20, labor conflicts built up to another confrontation, the "Great Strike" (Storstreiken) of 26 May - 10 June 1921. With two weeks' warning of the impending action, the government was well prepared; and in the face of restrained but visible military precautions, the strike collapsed. In the aftermath, workers suffered widespread wage-cuts averaging 17 percent, union memberships declined sharply, and the Conservative Party emerged as the main winner in the next election. Army intelligence reports indicated that the leaders who had called the strike had little sympathy among the rank and file, but some radicals concluded that the failure was due simply to their lack of armed force and vowed that next time, things would be different.46

The general strike did involve at least one embarrassing scandal for the Army, which resulted from a series of secret orders to conduct surveillance of civilians suspected of subversive activities. Most officers showed no compunctions in carrying out such operations, but Lieutenant Abraham Johan Christensen saw the matter differently. Concluding that the orders were unconstitutional, he went public and created an uproar that one historian has described as "a Norwegian Dreyfus Affair." Charged with violation of military secrecy, Christensen lost his commission and received a prison sentence of thirty days.47

The prospect of chronic unrest led the General Staff in 1922 to draft comprehensive regulations for military intervention in civil disturbances. The new policy emphasized a clear demarcation of authority between the police and the military, specifying that such intervention could take only two forms:

a. At the request of the police, a military unit takes over the guarding of a specific establishment, railroad line, or area, etc.

b. At the request of the police, a military unit is detailed to help intervene against rioting.

In both of these cases, the military commander retains full
authority over his unit and full responsibility for its conduct. The police cannot intervene with regard to the manner in which the military commander performs his mission. ⁴⁸

Along with preparations for such deliberate action came renewed concerns over the vulnerability of many arsenals to possible seizure in the opening stages of an uprising. Given the expense of mounting permanent guards at numerous installations, the only solutions seemed to be to gather the contents of outlying armories into a few centralized locations, or else to disable the weapons by removing key components such as firing pins and store them separately. Either of these alternatives would hinder the process of general mobilization; but under the circumstances, the internal threat took priority. The Army chose the second option for reasons of secrecy, and by 1923, orders required all six district commands to take strict precautions in securing all weapons not under direct and reliable guard. ⁴⁹

Secrecy was the overriding consideration in planning against the internal threat. On the one hand, officers recognized that this was desirable on purely military grounds, lest potential insurrectionists infiltrate Army units or otherwise sabotage the mobilization apparatus. ⁵⁰ On the other hand, the military leadership also was aware that public revelations of such planning could have disastrous political consequences. The policy therefore was to limit the circulation of such plans as much as possible. In 1927, for example, IR.12 (the infantry regiment based in Trondheim) requested permission to brief some junior officers and NCOs slated for duty in Ordensvern detachments, because otherwise, orientation would cost valuable time in the midst of an actual crisis. The reply was negative, emphasizing that "In the opinion of the General Staff, as few people as possible should be brought in on the plans in question." ⁵¹

On-going labor disputes, sometimes violent although almost never involving fatalities, meanwhile led to the formation of several unofficial or semi-official right-wing groups. The first of these was Norges Samfundshjelp, a strike-breaking labor organization formed in 1920 by a league of Norwegian industrialists with government backing.
This group played an important role in the defeat of the general strike in 1921. In 1923, Samfundshjelp began developing a secret paramilitary security arm, Samfundsvernet (SV), under the leadership of professional Army officers in an unofficial capacity. The group had about 3,000 carefully-screened members by 1925, mostly in Oslo; and in 1928 the group went public, receiving semi-official sanction as a police auxiliary. SV members received small-arms training and drilled in crowd-dispersal tactics.

Ironically, some leftists regarded the reductions of the officer corps in 1927-30 and the exemption of conscripts as elements in an anti-Labor plot, designed to prevent any working-class influence from creeping into the armed forces. In fact, many officers and officials in the Defense Department did advocate automatic expulsion from the military of any communists or socialists (i.e., from the general mobilization rolls, as well as the secret Ordensvern). The main reason that such screening never became official policy probably was the practical impossibility of conducting any meaningful investigation of the political backgrounds of thousands of men every year. To a certain extent, however, there was an unwritten policy to this effect regarding officers, as illustrated by the dismissal of a sergeant in 1925 solely on the grounds of his casual association with the Labor Party. This episode fostered a widespread belief that the officer corps as "undemocratic." Ironically, some critics also interpreted the conversion to the new system of B-officers as another anti-democratic measure. Even Rolf Thommessen's plan to reduce the Army to cadre status aroused suspicion in some quarters, because under such a plan the SV might have assumed a larger auxiliary role.

The apparent lack of official action to contain the "red menace" also evoked a general sense of frustration with parliamentary politics in conservative circles, prompting Christian Michelson and Fridtjof Nansen to organize the so-called Fedrelandslaget (League of the Fatherland) in 1925, which gained a peak membership of about 100,000 in 1930. The goal of the organization was to establish a stable government of "National Unity" based on personal prestige and a broad coalition of the non-Marxist parties, and to outlaw both the Labor and Communist
In the election of 1930, several prominent officers, notably Major-General Gulbranson and Navy Captain Riiser-Larsen (who at that point was chairman of the SV), actively campaigned against the Labor Party. The socialists and communists, they alleged, were gathering secret arms caches in preparation for a violent bolshevik revolution that could begin at almost any moment. Extensive investigations failed to turn up any valid evidence of such a conspiracy, but the alarming accusations probably contributed to the substantial defeat Labor suffered at the polls.56

QUISLING'S DEFENSE MINISTRY, 1931-33

The Fedrelandslaget disintegrated following Nansen's death in 1930, but it inspired the ambitions of Vidkun Quisling, who hoped to assume Nansen's mantle of leadership. Quisling had begun a promising career as a General Staff officer in 1911-21, but in the 1920s he chose to resign in order to pursue League of Nations relief work in the Soviet Union under Nansen. After brief flirtation with the Norwegian communists, he quickly shifted to the opposite fringe and by the early 1930s had gained prominence as an outspoken leader of the radical right. His essential views included contempt for parliamentary politics, admiration of Italian Fascism and German Nazism, belief in Nordic racial superiority, anti-Semitism, and fanatical anti-communism. In particular, Quisling developed the unshakeable conviction that the Norwegian Labor Party was fundamentally treasonous. These points formed the platform of his first attempt at political organization, the proto-Nazi Nordiske Folkereisning ("Nordic People's Uprising"), forerunner of the subsequent Nasjonal Samling (NS) Party.57

One of Quisling's closest associates and sympathizers was Captain A.F. Munthe of the General Staff, who believed that the danger of a communist uprising was entering a critical stage. In his capacity as chief of the mobilization section in January 1931, Munthe drafted a highly secret memorandum that represents the most extreme point of the Army's plans for domestic conflict. Whereas previous plans had focused on defensive measures, Munthe's document, discreetly entitled
"Memorandum Concerning Precautions Under Extraordinary Conditions," amounted to a campaign plan for civil war. Munthe anticipated the need for large-scale counteroffensives to recapture regions of the country under communist control. The most extraordinary part of the memorandum was designated Plan 'Y', which stated, "'The coup' may possibly come from 'above'--from a sitting Labor government . . ." Precisely what would constitute "the coup," and thus put his plan in motion, Munthe did not specify; but he clearly was flirting with treason himself by plotting to overthrow a potentially legal government.58

Munthe apparently counted on a favorable reaction to the plan from his superiors; but the new Commanding General, Laake, proved less sympathetic than his predecessor and probably recognized the dangerous implications of the plan. A subsequent revision of the document in October 1931 deleted the references to a "coup from above."59

Meanwhile, however, Quisling's political movement seemed to awaken considerable support in the Agrarian Party and the Independent Liberals, as well as from the declining Fedrelandslaget and various other anti-Labor groups. As a result, the Agrarians decided to invite Quisling into the government as Defense Minister when they formed a cabinet in May 1931, headed by Peter Kolstad.

Almost immediately upon assuming office, the Kolstad government had to deal with another major labor dispute. Following an incident on 8 June 1931 when striking dock-workers at Menstad beat up three policemen, the cabinet quickly decided on a forceful response and dispatched a company of the Royal Guards and four warships to restore order.60

Although the public assumed that Quisling as Defense Minister must have taken a leading role in this controversial decision, the record shows that in fact he said little during the debate and merely implemented the decision reached by his colleagues. Historian Oddvar K. Hoidal has interpreted this as evidence of indecision or simple apathy on Quisling's part; but another recent biographer, Hans Fredrik Dahl, has argued that Quisling's attitude actually reflected thoughtful reservations toward the employment of troops in such a role. Fearing that any direct clash between the military and strikers would be
counter-productive. Quisling meanwhile arranged the substitution of civilian for military guards at a Trondheim arsenal, "in order to avoid provoking unnecessary unrest." In any case, the fact that most Labor Party leaders privately agreed with the cabinet's decision at Menstad did not prevent them from making political hay from Quisling's consequent reputation as a hard-liner; and he soon became a liability to the government in the Storting and at the polls.61

During his tenure as Defense Minister, Quisling's main responsibility was to help draft the comprehensive defense reorganization plan which eventually passed into law in February 1933, just before he left office with the fall of the Agrarian government. Mowinckel already had established the basic outlines of the plan under his previous cabinet, with the reduced annual sum of thirty million kroner for defense and the rationale that Norway faced no significant threat of war. Although the Agrarian Party was more pro-defense than the Liberals in principle, Quisling and his colleagues in practice achieved no substantial improvement of the Norwegian military. On the contrary, the downward trend in defense budgets continued throughout their tenure, and the period of training for recruits fell further to only sixty days. The Agrarian Party's rhetorical advocacy of a strong defense counted for little, given the prevailing economic crisis, which reached its worst during this period when unemployment peaked at 33 percent in 1933.62

Quisling's main contribution to the Defense Act of 1933 (whose other aspects the following chapter will examine in more detail) was to introduce an official organization for voluntary military training, which he hoped would help to compensate for the concurrent reduction of the ordinary forces. Known as the Leidang (recalling the traditional militia of the Viking age, a favorite theme in Quisling's imagination), the volunteer units would form an integral part of the armed forces, with access to weapons, ammunition, and training facilities under Army supervision.63

Critics alleged that Quisling's plan was actually just a pretext for another right-wing, anti-Labor militia similar to Samfundsvernet, this time with full government sanction and support. Nevertheless, the
Liberal Party concluded that since military-minded youth were likely to seek out and join some such organization in any case, it had better be under official supervision; and the Leidang became part of the official budget in 1933-35. The Leidang never amounted to much, however, receiving only a token appropriation of 15,000 kroner and recruiting only about 1,000 members. The organization disappeared altogether when the Labor government cut off its funding in 1935-36.64

Apart from establishing the Leidang, Quisling as Defense Minister accomplished little of apparent significance other than to embarrass the Agrarians by embroiling himself in a series of heated exchanges with Labor critics and becoming involved in several bizarre controversies. Quisling's main preoccupation in the course of 1932 was a Storting proposition, known as Quislingsaken, in which he sought to demonstrate the Labor Party's allegedly treasonous links to Moscow.65 The evidence came mainly from the General Staff, which had been keeping watch over leftist activity since 1918; but much of the material stemmed from before the Labor Party's break with Moscow in 1923, and most of the rest was either implausible or unverifiable. As head of the operations division of the General Staff in 1930-31, Quisling's associate Munthe took a particular interest in such matters and tried hard to confirm widespread rumors that the Labor Party was gathering secret caches of arms to form a workers' militia and red guards to spearhead a coup. Quisling's support soon evaporated, however, when material evidence of any such conspiracy failed to surface. Moreover, Munthe's investigation provided rhetorical ammunition for Labor in the Storting when the extent of his mixture of political activities with official duty came to light. The Quisling proposition expired in committee, and the rest of the cabinet increasingly tried to distance itself from the controversial Defense Minister.66

Another specific controversy that involved Quisling, the Kullman case, illustrates the divided state of opinion in Norway at the time, even within the military itself. In 1932, Navy Captain Olaf Kullmann, commander of the torpedo battery of Oscarsborg Fortress, addressed a pacifist disarmament conference in Amsterdam. Despite his profession, he had become an ardent anti-militarist, convinced that capitalist
warmongers were preparing to attack the benign Soviet Union. "The war has already begun," he announced. "Even in the small country I come from, an officer who is also a member of the government [i.e., Quisling] has inaugurated the campaign of agitation against the Soviet Union. Should the criminals dare to start the war," he concluded, "the officers must strike." Upon returning to Norway, Kullmann made even more explicit statements to the effect that in case of war, he would not hesitate to use force against the government.67

As one might suppose, the Navy promptly dismissed Kullman when it learned of his statements. The Labor Party, however, soon made his case a cause célèbre, as expressed by Martin Tramæl at a pro-Kullmann rally in September 1932:

... the battle against war is no isolated battle. If we want to strike down war, then we must strike down capitalism and build up a new society based on physical and spiritual labor. We have a political party which has promoted its demands, which has submitted positive proposals. But we must do more. We must mobilize the working class to take direct action against war. Our strongest weapon is the general strike, first and foremost against the transportation and munitions industries. And when it becomes necessary, it must be supplemented with the military strike.68

Quisling seized upon these statements to charge Kullman and several Labor leaders including Tramæl with outright treason. Kullman, Quisling alleged, was "an integral link" in a conspiracy "intended to paralyze our defense for the benefit of a communist revolution." Briefly, Quisling drew considerable interest, due to the general sense of economic crisis, the perceived threat of revolution, and the apparent helplessness of the parliamentary system. The affair eventually blew over, however, along with the wider allegations of Labor's revolutionary conspiracy; and in the final months of the Agrarian government in winter 1932-33. Quisling's attention turned to an unproductive personal feud with the Prime Minister, Hundseid. Kullman never suffered punishment beyond expulsion from service, and the Agrarian government fell in 1933, leaving Mowinckel to form yet another Liberal cabinet.69
Among the many charges Quisling later faced in 1945 was that as Defense Minister, he had deliberately undermined military preparedness. Whatever else one may say about him, however, it would be unfair to make him a scapegoat for Norway's interwar defense policy. Despite his political ineptitude and penchant for neo-Viking fantasies, he did display clearer insight into the problems of security than many other politicians of the time. "It is a great temptation for other powers to have a weak country between them," he warned the Storting at one point:

... and it is a great danger to peace. One should not give himself over to illusions. There can come a day when the illusions burst like soap bubbles. It is difficult to discuss things that are only hypotheses; and the military service, the art of war, rests on hypothesis as a matter of routine. But one day, reality suddenly stands there more frightful than anything.  

One recognizes in this speech the conservative, cautionary view shared by many reasonable, loyal patriots. Perhaps a more politically astute Defense Minister might have obtained a slightly more favorable compromise for the military budget; but in 1931-33, significantly higher defense spending in the middle of an unprecedented economic crisis was a practical impossibility. As one Quisling biographer concludes,

Any political party which advocated increased defense expenditures at a time of low wages, high unemployment, and numerous bankruptcies and foreclosures would have committed political suicide. Military expenditures were cut back as much as possible, with the bottom being reached, ironically enough, at the very time Quisling served as Minister of Defense. Neither he nor any other politician could have prevented this.

One might even regard Quisling as a pathetic and almost comical figure, tilting at windmills while the defense budget dwindled. Recent research by historian Nils Ivar Agøy, however, has revealed a previously overlooked aspect of Quisling's activities as Defense Minister that casts the entire period in a different light. To put it briefly, it now appears that Quisling made specific, substantial preparations to declare
martial law and silence his political opponents through mass-arrests and seizure of the media.

The keystone in Quisling's conspiracy was a document entitled "Regulations concerning areas under military jurisdiction" (Bestemmelser vedrørende militært område), dated 25 January 1932, a revised version of the previous 1922 regulations. Although the changes appeared minor on the surface, Agøy has identified a subtle pattern of semantic finesse and calculated ambiguities that theoretically made it possible for the Defense Minister to invoke the Army's secret, counter-revolutionary ordensvern plans on his own authority. Previously, requests for military intervention in civil disturbances had to originate from local police officials and pass through the Justice Department; but according to the letter of the new regulations, the Defense Minister himself could now launch the process on his own initiative.

Other obscure documents among Quisling's papers from this period reveal plans to justify the hypothetical action as a pre-emptive measure against an imminent communist insurrection, and to draw support from existing organizations such as Samfundshjelp against the general strike that was likely to follow. (One wonders whether Quisling ever studied the fate of the abortive Kapp Putsch in Germany.) In the same period, beginning in December 1931, he also expanded the existing ordensvern organization to include two new, larger units in the Oslo area: the Guard Regiment, consisting of 1,600 men, and the 1st Light Regiment, a motorized unit of 650 men based at Gardermoen. He also attempted to establish a separate radio network with which to contact the district commands directly from the Defense Department, although this project never reached fruition.72

Quisling's plans attracted little attention, embedded as they were in the mass of routine administration. It remains unclear exactly who else, if anyone, was directly involved; but the likely candidates among his associates in Nordiske Folkereisning, the SV, the Leidang, and the General Staff were numerous. Munthe, whose own thinking clearly ran along similar lines, was no longer on the General Staff after 1931 but subsequently held an equally important position as chief of the staff of the 2nd Division, whose district included Oslo. Laake presented an
obstacle, perhaps not only on political grounds but also because he apparently resented Quisling's meddling in specific service affairs that were traditionally the province of the Commanding General rather than the Defense Minister. Nevertheless, the general raised no objections to the January 1932 regulations, which remained in effect for two years. "Until then," concludes Agøy, "they lay like unexploded bombs in the secret archives of the district commands. A telephone call from the Defense Minister would have been enough to activate them."73

Given the extent of such preparations, one wonders why Quisling never tried to implement them. The most important reason probably is that he was waiting for a plausible pretext, such as a parliamentary endorsement of his motion to outlaw the leftist parties. What he needed was something akin to the Reichstag fire, but apparently he lacked the resolution, ruthlessness, or imagination to manufacture such an incident. He also clearly over-estimated his chances of gaining control of the government through legal means.

In any case, it is difficult to imagine how the hypothetical Oslo Putsch ever could have prospered. Most military commanders probably would have accepted orders from the Defense Minister at least initially, but Quisling's plans for political action in the following stage were vague. His ideas involved dissolving the Storting and revising the constitution along corporatist lines. Such concepts were less far-fetched in the midst of the prevailing economic crisis than they may seem today, but they still ran counter to the deeply-held values of the great majority of Norwegians.74

Thus, the revelation of Quisling's secret plans still leaves one with the impression that he had little grasp of political realities in Norway. The conspiracy does, however, help to put various events of his defense ministry in a more coherent context. For example, no previous authors were able to provide any plausible explanation for Quisling's bizarre behavior following an alleged break-in and assault on his person in the Defense Department in February 1932. The identity of the intruder, if he existed, remains a mystery; but Agøy's hypothesis at least suggests why Quisling failed to summon the police directly to his office, from which he first had to remove documents concerning the
His pursuit of the Quislingsaken in the Storting also takes on new significance as a potential prelude to his further plans. Overall, it now seems that there was much more to Quisling's defense ministry than met the eye. As Agøy concludes, "Quisling was essentially one of the most active Defense Ministers of the interwar period in preparing the society for a civil war. Criticism from various quarters that he was a passive or weak cabinet minister has not taken into account this aspect of his activity, which was mostly secret."76

THE REVOLUTIONARY THREAT: PERCEPTIONS AND REALITY

Having examined the extent of Quisling's right-wing conspiracy, one must return to the question of whether a communist revolution in Norway ever was a real danger, or whether it was merely a figment of paranoid imaginations. In retrospect it is easy to forget the radical nature of the Labor Party before it entered the mainstream of Norwegian politics, to say nothing of the hard-core communists who really did take their orders directly from Moscow. On the one hand, it seems significant that the class struggle in Norway seldom if ever resulted in armed violence as it did in so many other countries; there were no terrorist bombings or massacres of demonstrators. Yet on the other hand, in the years around 1930 there seemed good reason to expect such events in the near future, with much of the evidence coming from the mouths of the Labor leaders themselves.

Doubts over the Army's reliability in case of a major public disturbance stemmed largely from the efforts of various radicals to spread anti-military propaganda among conscripts. One specific example of such agitation occurred in June 1932, when activists attempted to circulate inflammatory pamphlets and handbills among recruits enroute to basic training. One leaflet exhorted,

Working youth, recognize your duty! . . . The bourgeois army that you have joined exists to defend the interests of the capitalists against the working people. . . . Comrade! If you are called out against struggling, demonstrating workers, . . . then go over to their side. Array yourselves
in the front ranks and join in the battle against strike-breakers and the reduction of wages. . . . Put yourself in the service of the revolution, as a soldier of the revolutionary movement—not as a soldier of the capitalist Norway.77

Another booklet aimed at conscripts, entitled Think and Choose, urged them to organize soldiers' councils and to undertake acts of passive resistance. In particular, it provided the lyrics to a song that it suggested would be appropriate on marches:

They fool us with songs
Of home and father earth!
Comrades! What will be
Our answer? Yes, mutiny!
Forward, forward, forward!78

Quisling was by no means the only one who believed the leftists were actively building up their own underground army in preparation for a Trotskyite coup. Right-wing papers derided Labor's gestures toward moderation after 1928 and argued that they were merely a smokescreen for the true agenda.79 In November 1930, even the relatively sober Oslo Aftenavis gave an alarming account of secret revolutionary preparations. Bolsheviks, the paper reported, were receiving arms shipments from German liquor smugglers near Trondheim. (Like the United States, Norway at that time was undergoing an experiment with prohibition.)80 A few weeks later, Labor publicly acknowledged the formation of a workers' defense organization called Arbeidervern but denied that it was an armed militia; its mission was simply to protect the working class against intimidation and illegal assaults by right-wing thugs.

Our aim is not to form a workers' guard armed with firearms. . . . alarmed citizens can spare themselves the trouble of hunting for "communist arms caches". They exist only in the fantasies of some petty-bourgeois who are frightened out of their wits, among the stupidest of the bourgeois herd.81

It now seems clear that such denials were true. For all their talk of revolution, most Labor leaders loathed violence; and had there
been any significant efforts to stockpile arms for an insurrection. the Army with its network of auxiliaries and informers surely would have found out. Yet at the time, it did not take an unbalanced mind to feel concerned about such possibilities. In a period when the entire social order seemed up for grabs, mistrust and fear were inevitable on both sides.

Although the Norwegian military's security precautions thus seem to represent a considerable overreaction to a threat that was essentially illusory, they were devoted to the protection of a representative government. The other side, in word if not deed, represented the threat of dictatorship by a minority. In the event, Labor ultimately pursued its ends through the lawful political process; but had the armed forces not assured legal stability, that same process might never have survived to bear fruit.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

1. Non-Norwegians usually refer to the islands as Spitzbergen, but technically that means only one of them, whereas Svalbard indicates the entire group.


7. A Norwegian army captain learned of the rumor from press contacts in Bergen. 4.DK to KG, 25 January 1918: RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 303.


9. The Sulitjelma incident involved an obstruction of justice when almost the entire population of the remote community prevented police from arresting a prominent draft-evader and pacifist agitator. Johan
10. Transmæl perpetrated one such hoax and embarrassed both the police and Army intelligence by proving that they had been reading his mail. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>", 89-90, 101-2.

11. Stromme, Den hemmelige hæren, 43.


15. See appendix for tables summarizing the composition of the Storting and cabinets, and the trend of defense expenditures in this period.

16. Tom Kristiansen, Fra Europas utkant til strategisk brennpunkt: Trusselvurderinger og militære tiltak i nord fra 1900 til 1940, Forsvarsstudier 6/1993 (Oslo: IFS, 1993), 21; Knut Einar Eriksen and Einar Nliem, Den finske fare: sikkerhetsproblemer og minority-politikk i nord, 1860-1940 (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1981). Norwegian fears notwithstanding, there is no evidence that the Finnish government ever developed any plans to occupy Norwegian territory; nor did the Finns maintain any significant military forces in the Far North during the interwar period. Örvik, Sikkerhetspolitikk. I:138-39: Ali Pylkkänen, "Petsamo--den finska >>kolonisationsgarnisonen<<", Militärhistorisk Tidskrift (Sweden, 1994): 54-81. Although most scholars have dismissed the Finnish threat as "fanciful," the growth of the right-wing Lapua movement ca. 1930-33 was a legitimate cause for worry. The fact that Helsinki was the only place Norway maintained a military attaché up to 1940 suggests the relative degree of Norwegian concern.

17. "Generalstabskommisjonen av 1926": RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 276. Regarding the expense of a small, professional army, an earlier study had concluded that a force of only 5,000 regulars would require a budget of 28-29 million kroner, about double what the Army was receiving anyway. "Angående omkostningene ved en hvervet hær": RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 166.


20. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 14-17. A contemporary statement by Fridtjof Nansen illustrates the idealistic mood that characterized this period: "International problems can no longer be solved by wars between nations. Warfare is negative, and will, sooner or later, lead to destruction, while good-will and co-operation are positive and supply the only safe basis for building a better future." Fridtjof Nansen, "What I Believe", The Forum (New York, December 1929): 365; cited in Vignes, The Neutrality of Norway, 171. Nansen himself remained an advocate of defense, serving as president of the military society Norges forsvarsforening from 1915 until his death in 1930; but many admirers nevertheless came to identify his name with pacifism.


22. Supporters of this idea drew encouragement from a simultaneous movement in Denmark, which aimed at abolishing that country's small military altogether and replacing it with a minimal, non-military neutrality guard and coast guard. "Det danske avrustningsforslag": RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 166. Although the Danes never formally enacted this idea, in practice their interwar military policy amounted to virtual disarmament.

23. "Hærordning til 20, 15, eller 10 mil. kr.", undated note [1929?]: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 166. The Norwegian Navy's almost complete annihilation in the space of a few hours on 9 April 1940 demonstrated the correctness of this logic.


25. As Storting representative Alf Mjøen remarked in 1929, "One mine can destroy an entire 30 million-kroner dreadnought." Stortingstidende 1929-A, 557; Rolf Tveten, "En marine uten fartøy? Striden om marinen, 1928-1933", FHFSS Notat (2, 1986): 23. The one thing both factions seemed to agree on was the value of submarines, on the strength of their apparent achievements in 1914-18. The Norwegians generally failed, however, to distinguish between the roles of commerce-destruction and coastal defense, in the latter of which submarines had achieved little. Ibid., 30-31. For a later elaboration of the argument for a coastal-defense navy based on small craft, see Rob. Jo. [pseud.], Sivilt vanvidd og militær fornuft. Foran 9. april (Stavanger: Dreyer, 1949).

27. This last issue almost produced a mini-arms race between the two countries, with projected plans for several classes of armed icebreakers. However, the Hague ruling in 1931 (in Denmark's favor) essentially ended the dispute. Ibid., 10-16.


29. Another basic problem with mines, which the government never seemed to grasp, was that it would have to give permission to lay them before they would do any good—a hazardous step, since accidents would be sure to follow. In World War I, the Norwegians never laid any mines other than a few small electrically-controlled fields at coastal forts and the field at Utsira in October 1918, which completed the Allied North Sea barrage. Tveten, "En marine uten fartøyer?", 21-24.

30. Labor's plan, worked out largely by Captain Olaf Kullman, called for 18 torpedo-boats (300 tons, two 7.6-cm guns, two torpedo-tubes, 25 knots), at a total cost of 2 million kroner. Ørvik, Sikkerhetspolitikken, I:128-33; Tveten, "En marine uten fartøyer?", 36-37.


35. Oddvar K. Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), 45-49; Nordstrom, Dictionary, 53-55. Hoidal's work is probably the best biography of Quisling available in English, but it has received significant criticism in Norway. See review by Øystein Sørensen in Dagbladet, 14 October 1988.


38. The Communist/Labor split in 1923 also diverted attention and energy from Trannæl's campaign. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <den indre fiende>.", 268-69; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 316.


42. "Regler for opsetning og anvendelse av sikkerhetsvakter, ordensvern og jernbanekvakter i tilfelle av indre uroligheter". April 1922: RA, GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 449.

43. The two main studies in this area prior to Agøy's work are Fredrik Fagertun. "Militære makten og <<den indre fienden>>, 1918-1940," Forsvarsstudier IV (1985): 225-70; and Strømme. Den hemmelige hæren.


45. "Strengt konfidentielt: Militære erfaringer fra kampene til undertrykkelser av de indre uroligheter i Tyskland". [1920?-]: RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 309. The file unfortunately does not indicate the report's author or the extent of its influence in official circles; but Agøy describes a similar document, "Direktiver for gatekamp," circulated by the local command responsible for the Oslo area (Akershus kommandantskap). "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 215-16. The General Staff meanwhile made secret preparations for the tactical defense of the Defense Department building in Oslo, in anticipation of a Trotskyite attempt to decapitate the military administration. Ibid., 235-36.

46. "Storstreiken 1921": RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 309: Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 164-77. During the strike, the military paid particular attention to the situation in Kirkenes because of possible Russian intervention. Reports indicated that the system of discreet mobilization of selected detachments by hand-delivered orders worked well. Akershus kommandantskap to KG, 24 November 1921: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 266. Holtfodt also contributed to breaking the strike. Following his tenure as Defense Minister, he became director of the National Railways (NSB) in 1919-22, in which capacity he remained in close contact with the Defense Department regarding labor problems. The aristocratic Royal Norwegian Automobile Club (KNA) also played a role in military plans as an auxiliary transport service during this period. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 157-58, 242-43.

47. Ibid., 197-207.

49. "Sikkerhetsforanstaltninger. Opbevaring av våpen og ammunisjon", June - October 1921: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 266; and correspondence between general staff and district commands, March 1923: RA, GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 449.

50. An intelligence report in 1924, for example, indicated considerable alarm over suspected infiltration of the ranks. "Kommunistenes illegale arbeide i hær og flåte", 5.DK to KG, 1 April 1924: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 266. This led to a proposal for the placement of informers and agents-provocateurs among enlisted men, but it is unclear whether such systematic and potentially divisive measures went into effect.

51. GS to DK.5, March 1927: RA, GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 449.

52. "Til Norges Industriforbund: Angående Borgersamfundets selvforsvar", 21 April 1921: RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 309. This document summarized the industrial leaders' view that in the event of a strike, "There must be organized bourgeois manpower to fill vacant work-places . . . [and] This work must be protected."

53. S.V. Haandbok for Pelotonsbefalet (Oslo: Kildahls Boktrykkeri, 1927). Among the early leaders of the SV was Major Ragnvald Hvoslef, former commander of the Royal Guards, who later became one of Quisling's foremost associates. Other notable leaders of the SV were A.D. Dahl, who commanded forces in North Norway in 1940 and 1944-45, and Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen, who commanded the Norwegian air forces in 1941-45. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 249-59, 281.

54. Thommessen himself was an SV-supporter. Ibid., 271-79.

55. Untitled document, 28 November 1925: RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 309.


57. Hoidal, Quisling, 50-53. The minutes and list of attendees at the initial meeting on 17 March 1931 are found in "Dokumenter og korrespondens vedr. Quislingsakten": RA, GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 368. See also, Nordiske Folkereisninger i Norge: Retningslinjer og Lover (Oslo: Malling'ske Bogtrykkeri, 1931). Quisling was by no means the only Norwegian fascist with a Marxist background: see Øystein Sørensen, Fra Marx til Quisling: Fem socialisters vei til NS (Oslo: Aventura, 1983).

58. The parallels between Munthe's scenario and what occurred in Spain a few years later are remarkable. Until recently, the authorship of the document remained in doubt. Agøy, however, concludes that Munthe definitely wrote it, and the present author's own findings confirmed this independently. "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 301; "P.M. angående foranstaltninger under særskilte forhold", January 1931. RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 449.


61. Hoidal, Quisling, 85-87; Hans Fredrik Dahl. Vidkun Quisling: en fører blir til (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1991), 170-72. An aftershock of the Menstad affair came in 1933 with the revelation that the civil guards employed at Trondheim, and possibly elsewhere, were actually members of Samfundsvernet. This fact suggests that Quisling may have been more concerned with the political reliability of the guards rather than simple discretion. P. Meland, "Ledingen: Våbnede organisasjoner utenfor forsvaret. Et vaktthold i Trondheim i 1931", Dagbladet, 23 Jan. 1933. A subsequent article referred to "Quisling's civil guard during the great conflict of 1931--when fascist youths armed with pistols guarded the military depot in Trondheim. Normal soldiers were not trusted for guard duty!" Den 17de Mai, 28 Jan. 1933.


64. Hoidal, Quisling, 52-53, 114; Dahl, Vidkun Quisling, 182-86. The two biographers disagree on this point as well: Hoidal dismisses the Leidang as an example of Quisling's anti-Labor paranoia and delusions of grandeur, while Dahl argues that it represented a sincere attempt to cope with the problems of defense on a shoestring budget. Agøy concludes that although the Leidang never had internal security as an avowed purpose, it did have innumerable links with the SV and Nasjonal Samling. For example, in 1933-34, the officer in charge of Leidang training, Carl Stenersen, was also the commander of Quisling's bodyguards, known as the Hird. In addition to other critics, the B-officers' association (Befalslaget) condemned the Leidang as a pet project by the K-officers to increase their extra-legal authority. Agøy. "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 344-48.

65. Storting Dokument nr. 8 (1932).

66. "Angående Quislingssakens konsekvenser" [1932?]: RA. GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 368; Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 377. Although the predominantly bourgeois committee agreed in principle with many of the accusations against Labor, it recognized that it was absurd to talk of banning the largest political party in the country. Banning the Communist party was a more realistic possibility but also would have been politically unwise, since it would merely have strengthened Labor's vote.
67. Hoidal, Quisling, 97-98.
68. Ibid., 98.
69. Ibid., 98-113, 156.
70. Dahl, Vidkun Quisling, 187.
71. Hoidal, Quisling, 300.
72. Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>>," 314-15, 362-75. The General Staff meanwhile also revived its plans for tactical defense of the Defense Department premises, which had lapsed in the latter 1920s; and Guard officers developed a new manual for urban combat that was reminiscent of the 1920 "Gatekamp" study. Ibid., 310-11, 332-33.
73. Ibid., 309, 316, 373.
74. Ibid., 362-67. Among other problems, any such extra-legal adventure would have had to reckon with the opposition of King Haakon, the ultimate object of most officers' loyalty.
75. Ibid., 376.
76. Ibid., 361.
77. RA. KG(IV). kat. 1256.2/15. box 202.
79. See for example "Nyt program!", Samfundet: Organ for Bergens Samfundshjelp 9-23 Aug. 1928, and "Voldsanvendelse som politisk kampmiddel: Litt dokumentasjon," Ibid., 16 April 1930. The latter article ridiculed Labor's claim that it would gladly renounce the doctrine of armed revolution, provided not only Samfundsvernet but also the Army were both disbanded first.
80. "De røde garder i Norge", Oslo Aftenavis 14 November 1930. Based on information provided by Samfundsvernet, the article reported detailed figures of 2,000 revolutionaries in and around Trondheim, 1,600 in Bergen, and 5,000 in Oslo, supposedly including "red guards" equipped with automatic weapons and flame-throwers.
CHAPTER 3

THE "ETIQUETTE DEFENSE." 1933-1939

THE DEFENSE ACT OF 1933

By the time a coalition of the Norwegian Liberals and Labor toppled the Agrarian government in March 1933, allowing Mowinckel to form his third and final cabinet, Hitler's accession to power in Germany already pointed toward a collapse of international order in Europe. The change in government in Norway made almost no difference in defense policy, however, because the Agrarians and the Liberals essentially agreed on the need to reduce military spending to the absolute minimum. Toward this end, the Storting already had enacted the defense reorganization plan in February 1933, just before Quisling left office.

Although the plan's details took shape under Quisling's defense ministry, its political origins lay in Mowinckel's previous government during 1929-31. Determined to reduce the defense budget to thirty million kroner, Mowinckel had solicited a report from Major Otto Ruge of the General Staff to help justify the potential risks of further reductions. As one of the Army's most talented and respected officers, despite his relatively junior rank, Ruge stood in a position of considerable influence. He realized, however, that at least in the foreseeable future, the military would have to subsist on an extremely limited budget. He naturally agreed with his colleagues that the stronger Norway's defense, the better. As of 1929-30, however, he felt compelled to admit that the country faced no plausible threat of war in the immediate future. He was also convinced that the armed forces were
not going to receive substantially more money than Mowinckel's proposed thirty million kroner, no matter what the officer corps asked for or demanded. "We must therefore organize ourselves," Ruge argued.

such that we can reconstitute a strong defense at some point in the future, when it may become necessary. Since such a thorough change in the international situation seldom occurs suddenly, we will receive some warning, some years to adjust to the new situation. For the time being, we need only a basic stem from which the future organization can develop.2

The key premise of the defense reorganization thus was en forutseende utenriksledelse--"a far-sighted foreign policy". Not surprisingly, many of Ruge's colleagues regarded his pronouncement as a betrayal of the service, since he seemed to condone the virtual dismantling of the armed forces. Ruge defended his view, however, by arguing that they would do the service even greater harm if they failed to bow to the reality of the present situation and tried to maintain the existing organization with inadequate funds.

If one is to economize on everything except the framework, what use is the framework without any contents? . . . I have seen for myself how the officer corps's capability has deteriorated over the last 10-15 years without exercises. If appropriations are now to decline even further, but the framework is to be maintained, the whole thing will finally be nothing but a paper organization.3

Ruge's logic represented a basic departure from the emphasis of the 1927 system, which still aimed at upholding some approximation of a war-fighting force. King Haakon, already sensing the dangerous trend in Germany, opposed the new plan; but ultimately he could only bow to the will of the parliament. Haakon remembered Ruge's role in the affair, however, and subsequently bore a lingering grudge against him because of it. A considerable number of other officers also regarded Ruge as an opportunist who had sponsored the "Bankruptcy Ordinance" for the sake of his own career.4
The resulting Defense Act of 1933 formed the basis of Norwegian military organization up to 1940. On a superficial level, the plan indicated little change in the Army's existing structure, retaining the six district commands, called divisions, with their corresponding field brigades, sixteen infantry regiments, two independent battalions in North Norway, three dragoon regiments, and three artillery regiments. On closer inspection, however, several substantial changes in organization did take place. Previously, the divisions and regiments had been tactical organizations; but after 1933, they became merely administrative entities. Henceforth, the tactical units were to be the six field brigades, each of four battalions, while the remaining battalions would theoretically be subordinate directly to Army headquarters. Thus, it is important to understand that after 1933, the Norwegian "divisions" were a misnomer. Rather than maneuver units, they were basically just training commands; and most of the division chiefs ended up regarding themselves more as administrators than as combat commanders. As it turned out, the dichotomy between peacetime organizational structure and the chain-of-command upon mobilization contributed significantly to the disastrous confusion in April 1940.

Another change reassigned control of the coastal artillery arm to the Navy, the two organizations now coming under the designation Sjøforsvaret ("Sea Defense"). The rationale for this move was that they both had the same essential mission--defense of the seaward frontier--and needed to co-operate more closely than the Army / Navy demarcation allowed. In retrospect, however, the change probably was a mistake, for it seemed to imply that the Army no longer need concern itself with coastal defense. On 9-10 April 1940, several key coastal fortifications fell to landward assaults for lack of covering forces; and this failure suggests an organizational seam, which the following chapter will discuss in further detail.

For the remaining branches of the Army, the 1933 organization projected three possible levels of mobilization, with corresponding numbers of personnel per infantry regiment: 1. Routine summer training in peacetime (four hundred men in one battalion; one annual class); 2. Partial mobilization by unit rotation (1,100 men in two battalions; four
annual classes), to provide a neutrality guard. 3. Full war mobilization (3,700 men in four battalions; twelve classes plus Landvern). In fact, however, the third option was no longer possible, a point which the Commanding General emphasized strongly. By 1940, after four classes had been trained back up to the standard of eighty-four days, the second option should provide "units sufficiently trained so that they can be used immediately as a neutrality watch, and can be sent into battle after some further training." Beyond that, the new ordinance would suffice only "to form a usable basis for further expansion of the neutrality guard to an effective war defense." In adopting the cutbacks embodied in the reorganization, he said, the government must understand that it no longer possessed a viable defense.8

Apart from the lack of funds for training and material, the critical problem was a shortage of officers. The new organization tried to reshuffle the few remaining active-duty personnel to conform to the reality of the situation; there really was no way to make ends meet. A comparison of the numbers of active-duty officers under the 1909, 1927, and 1933 ordinances illustrates the situation. (See appendix.)9 To make up some of the shortfall, the Army relied more than ever on reserve officers: 192 captains, 308 lieutenants, 332 ensigns (fenrik), and 278 sergeants.10 However, these men received little opportunity to practice their skills, due to the minimal provisions for refresher exercises; and their shortcomings became apparent upon the Army's partial mobilization in winter 1939-40. Many B-officers meanwhile attacked the 1933 plan because the cuts from active duty fell disproportionately on their category, thus strengthening the K-officers' hold on senior positions. One critic denounced the new ordinance as "a blatantly reactionary attempt to fill all command positions from a certain class of the population and to impose orthodoxy on the officer corps."12

Regardless of who occupied the top positions, the lack of funds for large-scale exercises in the 1920s already had led to a lack of experience among senior commanders. By 1932, none of the divisional or regimental commanders had ever actually commanded assembled units of that size in maneuvers. Only a third of the regimental commanders had
even commanded an assembled battalion, and only one-seventh of the
battalion commanders had done so.\textsuperscript{13}

The politicians who sponsored the plan were happy to absolve the
military authorities of responsibility for war-readiness. As the
Storting resolution put it, the reduced organization "relies upon far-
sighted foreign policy that will promptly take the initiative to
strengthen the military if the situation becomes threatening." A
subsequent stage of the legislative process returned to this theme,
stating, "The majority of the committee confirms this [assumption] and
underlines the increased responsibility the new ordinance places upon
the political authorities."\textsuperscript{14}

The rhetoric surrounding the 1933 plan claimed that it actually
would provide some improvements in quality, with savings from the
reduction of officers and unit establishments transferred to the
modernization of equipment and early restoration of infantry training to
84 days. By 1940, at the end of the projected transitional period, the
new system theoretically would provide a small but adequately trained
and equipped body of troops suitable for mobilization as a neutrality
guard on short notice. In fact, however, the alleged qualitative
improvements were empty promises. For the time being, infantry training
remained limited to sixty days (the initial forty-eight-day recruit
school, plus one twelve-day refresher period a few years later), and it
remained to be seen whether the Storting would pay for anything more.
At that point, a more pressing question seemed to be whether it would
instead decide to dissolve the military altogether.\textsuperscript{15}

As Ole Berg later pointed out, the new scheme was in one sense a
throwback to the flawed scheme of 1887, in which the peacetime
organization did not correspond to that for mobilization. Even if the
Storting followed through with the modest increases projected to train
the neutrality guard by 1940, these detachments could mobilize only by
cannibalizing other units for both personnel and equipment. In reality,
the new plan provided no basis for mobilization; it was merely a
rationalization for disarmament. Thus, when the new ordinance came into
effect under Mowinckel's government in 1933-35, it marked the nadir of
Norwegian defense in the interwar period.\textsuperscript{16}

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The Navy fared little better than the Army under the new ordinance. As the Olav Trygvasson neared completion in 1933, the Storting grudgingly prepared to allocate a trickle of money to keep the dockyard in business. According to the Defense Act of 1933, the naval program ought to provide three cruisers and three destroyers as the core of a modernized fleet; and the Navy was eager to start work on its first cruiser. It became clear, however, that at present the legislature would grant nothing more than a destroyer. This, in turn, would absorb nearly the entire construction budget for several years to come, pushing the possibility of a cruiser into the indefinite future. In order to hold open the chance of starting a cruiser sooner, the Navy therefore produced an economical design for a small destroyer in 1933, which eventually took to the water as the Sleipner in 1937, followed by the Ager, Gyller, and Odin, plus two others (Tor and Balder) unfinished by 1940. Although officially designated torpedo boats in order to appeal to enthusiasts of such craft in the Storting, the new ships were actually more like destroyer escorts or frigates, suited mainly for an oceangoing ASW role. They displaced 713 tons under full load, with an armament of three 10-cm guns and two torpedo tubes, and a speed of 32 knots. All in all, they were not bad ships; and two of them, the Ager and the Sleipner, served well in the coming war. The problem was that the ships simply were too small and too few, and they were all the Norwegian Navy received before the storm broke in 1940.

MILITARY POLICY OF THE LABOR PARTY

In supporting Mowinckel's plan in 1933, the Labor Party demonstrated an increasing willingness to compromise. Although the socialists remained committed to abolition of the bourgeois military in principle, most of them now agreed that the path of progress led through the parliamentary system rather than revolution. Some Labor leaders also had begun to realize that for the foreseeable future, at least some minimal, quasi-military organization was inevitable, given the existing international system. In 1931-32, the party began consulting with military and legal experts on the practical issues of replacing the
traditional armed forces with a civilianized neutrality watch, backed by a broad-based workers' militia. The basic concept actually was not far removed from the Defense Act of 1933, in that they both envisioned an expansible army with only a small nucleus on permanent duty. Labor, however, was fixated with the notion of abolishing the trappings of military service, regardless of any practical similarities between final results. One point that arose in such discussions was the question of international law, when an expert pointed out that members of a civil defense organization would be liable to summary execution as francs-tireurs if they opposed another nation's uniformed forces. The socialist visionaries had little patience for such distinctions, however, when their ultimate goal was a global utopia.18

In a surprise move in March 1935, the Labor Party formed a coalition with the Agrarians, arranged by a delicate compromise on taxation and farm subsidies. As a result, Labor formed its second government, headed by former lumberjack Johan Nygaardsvold, which ended up remaining in office through the end of World War II. Monsen again became Defense Minister, and the new Foreign Minister was Halvdan Koht, a noted historian with impressive academic credentials but no previous firsthand experience in the field of diplomacy.19

Although the Army's secret Ordensvern plans already had declined greatly in significance since 1933, Labor's assumption of power presented the officers with a bizarre dilemma. As A.F. Munthe's 1931 memorandum had foreseen, the "internal foe" itself had now become the legal government through ordinary political means. The two most obvious courses of action were almost equally unappealing: plot an illegal military coup to unseat the cabinet and dissolve the Storting, as Quisling had envisioned, or co-operate loyally with the new Defense Minister, despite his anti-military background and agenda.

As it turned out, Laake and Ruge initially followed a middle path, by no means actively conspiring against the government but at the same time concealing the existence of the internal security plans from Torp and Monsen.20 By fall 1936, however, following Labor's strong showing in the October election, Laake apparently concluded that this situation
could not continue much longer, and that the later Monsen finally learned of the plans, the worse the consequences would be.

It remains unclear how much the general actually revealed, but in any case he did brief Monsen at least on the existence of Ordensvern detachments in Oslo. Surprisingly, the Defense Minister reacted mildly and refrained from making a public scandal of the issue. By this time, he was growing increasingly concerned over the international situation and had abandoned his earlier, more radical agenda for dissolving the armed forces. Moreover, since the Ordensvern system now amounted to little more than a mass of paperwork anyway, the matter seemed much less significant than it would have a few years earlier. In any case, Monsen made no real effort to dismantle the internal security system, and the Army gradually did so of its own accord.\textsuperscript{21}

A new, more innocuous version of the regulations for intervention in civil disorders in January 1934 already had replaced Quisling's "time bomb," curtailing the authority of local and district commanders to act on their own discretion. The regimental staffs meanwhile found it increasingly difficult and irrelevant to maintain separate lists of "reliable" soldiers. In March 1937, for example, IR.2 reported that approximately 80 percent of its men supported the Labor party. "Under these circumstances," the report concluded, "the Regiment must suggest that [it] be excused from maintaining an Ordensvern detachment."\textsuperscript{22}

In May 1937, Laake granted a general dispensation to the 2nd Division, which henceforth slated normal mobilization units for hypothetical internal security tasks, although still trying to keep tabs on particular agitators. In conference with the six district commanders on 20-23 April 1938, Laake finally decided to abandon the Ordensvern system altogether, effective 1 January 1939. Henceforth, in order to simplify staff work, the Army consolidated its previously separate "partial" and "silent" mobilization plans into a single alternative, the only remaining option being full, public mobilization.\textsuperscript{23}

Even most of the conservative professional officers gradually concluded meanwhile that the Labor party was no longer a revolutionary threat, as the Nygaardsvold government proved its willingness to play by parliamentary rules. Although no statistics are available, various
personal accounts and anecdotal sources seem to agree that NS-membership among officers declined sharply (along with the party's general fortunes) after 1935.

Thus, by 1938-39, the Army leadership essentially reconciled itself, however grudgingly, to co-operation with the Labor government: and the specter of armed class conflict faded from view. In addition, the worsening international situation increasingly redirected attention back to questions of defense against external threats. However, this shift was largely imperceptible, and many leftists remained highly suspicious of the officer corps's motives and loyalty as the issue of rearmament came to the fore.

In principle, the Labor government clung to the plan for a complete abolition of the existing, bourgeois-dominated military system and its replacement by a working-class militia. Labor still lacked an absolute majority in the Storting, however, and none of the other parties would agree to such a radical measure. In effect, the socialists had to accept what pacifist Ingvald Førre denounced as a corrupt bargain: continuation of the 1933 defense plan. The Labor Party effectively acknowledged this at its convention in 1936, when the official platform pointedly omitted the traditional call for disarmament. "I want to emphasize," said Torp by way of excuse for the apparent compromise, "that in fact Norway has disarmed, from a military perspective."24

Ruge tended to agree; and while deploring the state to which the military had been reduced, he did not believe that Labor's accession to power had made much difference. As he remarked in 1935, given the prevailing views of defense in every major party, with the possible exception of the Conservatives, "it did not matter which political coalition controlled the government."25

Nevertheless, at the annual Labor party conference in May 1936, it became clear that the majority of socialists still regarded the armed forces as a bastion of militarism and a potential threat to social progress, adopting the following resolution:
The Norwegian Labor Party will oppose any policy of military armament. The military service will be converted to a civil defense watch [vaktvern]. The objective over the coming three years is to prepare for this conversion, among other things by introducing a new officer system to assure that recruitment will come from the broad basis of the population.26

The government adopted a policy designed to "democratize" the military by replacing bourgeois officers with socialists. At least one premise of the plan was correct: the majority of existing officers did support the non-Marxist parties, and the number of Labor sympathizers was especially small among graduates of the Krigsskole. As Captain Øyvin Øi argued, this situation had been practically inevitable. "So long as the labor movement ideologically and programmatically took exception to the military as an institution, there would be an adversarial relationship between the party and the professional officer corps as a matter of course; no man can serve two masters."27 Another officer argued that if the officer corps had assumed an elitist character, then the politicians had only themselves to blame, because reductions in pay had made a military career all but impossible for anyone without an independent source of income.28 The statistics of officer candidates admitted to the Befalskolene in 1937, for example, do indicate something less than a faithful cross-section of the population. (See appendix.)29

Even with control of the Ministry of Defense, Labor found it impossible to dismiss career officers with permanent commissions without some specific justification until they reached retirement age; they were, after all, civil servants with job security. A Storting military reform committee headed by Einar Gerhardsen therefore tried to approach the problem from the bottom-up, by encouraging sons of lower class families to apply for commissions.30 The results, however, were negligible. The basic problem that many Labor leaders tended to overlook was that the unequal class representation in the officer corps was due at least partly to the attitude of the lower class itself, which harbored a deep distrust of the military. "The fact that at this point, sons of workers are not represented in the officer corps the extent that
is reasonable and desirable," argued one editorial. "has nothing to do with 'the system.' It is a consequence of the workers' own lack of interest in the country's defense throughout the years up until now." In any case, the editorial argued.

"Undoubtedly," concluded Oi, "the agitation for democratization of the national defense has contributed to restraining the preparations for war." The government meanwhile appointed several more compliant, pro-Labor officers to senior positions, continuing the trend that Mowinckel had begun with Laake, of placing politics before professional qualifications. In November 1937, Colonel Thomas Hartvig Gulliksen became chief of Army aviation, despite his distinctly limited experience in that field. His main qualification apparently was that he was a stalwart member of the Labor Party. A few months later in 1938, Henry
Diesen became Commanding Admiral of the Navy, although most other naval officers apparently believed the post should have gone to Carsten Tank-Nielsen. As one officer later recalled, "We regarded [Diesen] as a Labor Party man, not particularly competent..." Although Diesen apparently never actually joined the Labor Party, he acquired a reputation as a shameless political opportunist, who also had supported the Conservatives and the Liberals at various times.35

Quisling's NS (Nasjonal Samling) Party, which he founded shortly after the end of his tenure as Defense Minister in 1933, meanwhile played little role in the defense debate, other than to taint the armed forces by association in the eyes of many leftists. Despite Quisling's protests to the contrary, his party generally came across as an obvious, distasteful, and inept copy of Hitler's NSDAP. Thus, while nationalism was an essential component of support for fascism in many countries, in Norway it often worked the other way, tending more to reject the NS as a foreign element. Nazi-style slogans, uniforms, rituals, and ideology gained little purchase in Norway even at the height of labor unrest in 1929-33; and as the economic crisis abated somewhat in the later 1930s, Quisling's movement dwindled to relative insignificance.36

Nevertheless, Quisling's reputation helped assure that defense advocacy in Norway during the late 1930s remained a thankless task, and even moderate pro-defense advocates often found themselves branded as warmongers. Especially within the Labor Party, support for the military seemed to represent betrayal of the social agenda, on which the Party was making tangible but precarious gains. Moreover, given the practical impossibility of purging the existing military, support for defense seemed to play into the hands of Quisling and his supporters within the officer corps, such as Munthe and Hvoslef, whose exact numbers were unknown. Even if the majority of officers probably had no wish to challenge parliamentary authority, a military coup seemed an especially frightening possibility in light of Franco's example.37

Leftist historian Lars Borgersrud later summarized the Labor government's uncertainty over defense policy. Even though relations with the military improved considerably after 1935, he argued.
The party's leadership still had not arrived at any clarification of what line to pursue in the question of defense policy. Should one listen to those who predicted that a new war could come to Norway as a strategic surprise attack, a Blitzkrieg, without the kind of prior warning that had been traditional among states before the World War of 1914-18? Or was such talk merely a pretext for persons and groups who sought an arms buildup in Norway for other reasons—for example, domestic political considerations? Or because they sought to involve Norway in a foreign policy adventure against the Soviet Union? There was in other words a climate for "cheap" solutions in the Norwegian defense debate.38

CHANGES IN FOREIGN POLICY, 1933-36: ABANDONMENT OF THE LEAGUE

The withdrawal of Germany (and to a lesser extent, Japan) from the League of Nations caused Norwegian leaders to reconsider Norway's commitment to that organization. According to Article 16 of the League charter, members were obligated to participate in sanctions against an aggressor state. Norway had joined the League with great reluctance because of this clause, which conflicted with the preferred policy of neutrality. At that time, however, the risk of war had seemed so remote, and the power of the Western Allies so great, that the compromise was acceptable. Already by 1933, however, the situation had changed a great deal, and the government began seeking room to maneuver.

Mowinckel in particular was determined to free Norway from the League obligation, but unilateral action to that effect seemed to carry unacceptable risks of its own. He therefore began sounding out the other "Oslo States" (Scandinavia and the Low Countries, which had negotiated a tariff agreement in 1930) concerning the possibility of a joint renunciation of Article 16. At a meeting of the Nordic foreign ministers in September 1934, the Swedes and Danes accepted Mowinckel's initiative and began preparing the ground. Remarkably, they agreed that the impending great power conflict seemed to have little to do with ideology, and that it would not make much difference which side won. The Oslo States' overriding interest was merely to remain neutral.39

The movement to return to a policy of full neutrality gained headway when the Nygaardsvold government took office in 1935.
Throughout the 1920s, the Labor Party had denounced the League of Nations as a capitalist alliance against the Soviet Union. After Germany withdrew from the League and the Soviets joined it in 1934, this no longer seemed to be the case; but by that time, the majority of Labor had come to favor neutrality regardless. Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht played the leading role in the effort to dismantle the system of obligatory sanctions. Although his interpretation of neutrality was loose enough to admit the continued possibility of sanctions short of military action, he saw Norway's most important role as that of a mediator between other hostile states.40

The failure of the League to take decisive action in the Ethiopian Crisis destroyed what little confidence remained in collective security. The Italian invasion seemed such a clear case of aggression that even Norway, along with a number of other small states, supported a firm response by the League. When Britain and France refused to confront Mussolini militarily, however, or even to impose serious economic sanctions, the League clearly had nothing to offer. On 1 July 1936, Norway and six other minor powers therefore issued a joint statement declaring that they no longer considered themselves bound by Article 16.41

One remaining possibility for collective security would have been a defensive alliance among the Scandinavian states, a subject that attracted considerable interest. An article in 1937, for example, pointed out that together, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland could muster twenty-one divisions, and that without great exertions they could also produce a combined air force of 500 bombers.42 Although King Haakon remained distrustful of Sweden and more inclined toward cooperation with Britain, Koht saw great value in a neutral Scandinavian bloc. This interest, however, remained limited to diplomatic cooperation without military obligations.

The essential obstacle to a Scandinavian alliance was that the various members faced different threats. Finland, in the face of the Soviet menace, was eager to conclude binding agreements with almost any potential sources of assistance. Denmark, for whom defense against Germany was essentially impossible, sought above all to remain neutral.
Sweden, while interested in the possibility of active alliances with its neighbors, was unwilling to make a commitment to Finland unless Norway joined in as well; and a lingering dispute over the Åland Islands also soured relations between Sweden and Finland. Norway, feeling the least threatened, saw little to gain and much to lose in a binding alliance. Simple self-interest seemed to dictate neutrality, for in the mentalité of the period, people seemed unable to conceive of their own security depending ultimately on that of their neighbors. Norwegians also found the prospect of implicit Swedish leadership within such an alliance unappealing. A firm commitment from Britain, such as Sweden and Finland sought in 1937, might have served to bring the Nordic states together regardless; but Neville Chamberlain's government offered no such guarantee. Ultimately, Norway took British protection for granted, even in the absence of a specific agreement.43

THE REVIVAL OF DEFENSE, 1936-39: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE

With the rising threat of war and the effective collapse of the League as an instrument of collective security, the premises of the Norwegian defense reductions were no longer valid. However unwise they may appear in retrospect, major cutbacks in military spending in the 1920s and early 1930s were a foregone conclusion, given the economic, political, and ideological climate. Thus, there is little use in criticizing decisions made during that period. After 1936, however, the Norwegian government's failure to take adequate precautions is difficult to understand. (See appendix for illustration of the sluggish rise in defense spending during this period.)

In the wake of the Ethiopian Crisis, the government heard calls from many quarters for increased emphasis on defense. The military and naval commanders-in-chief argued that their services at present could not even fulfill the minimal requirements of a neutrality guard, and they requested an emergency, supplementary defense appropriation of forty million kroner per year for the next three years.44 Some historians have argued that while Labor's response to the worsening international situation after 1936 clearly was inadequate, the
military's own budget proposals were unrealistic and would have had a substantially adverse impact on Norway's balance of trade. Others, however, have argued that there was actually a good deal of slack in the Norwegian economy and budget, which could have accommodated substantially higher defense spending without any serious repercussions. Such was the view of the Commanding General in 1927, at least, who pointed out that Norwegians were spending 274 million kroner annually on candy, tobacco, and alcohol, which amounted to approximately five times the defense budget.45

In 1936 the government did restore full conscription, which, which since 1927 had been limited to only about two-thirds of each annual class. The training period for infantry also rose to seventy-two days, although according to the schedule projected by the 1933 act it should by now have been eighty-four.46 In general, the government resisted fulfilling the qualitative requirements of the 1933 plan, which called for improvements in equipment as well as training. The dominant majority of the Labor Party, including Nygaardsvold, Koht, and Monsen, remained firmly opposed to any significant increase in defense spending. While acknowledging the bankruptcy of the League's sanctions policy, Koht dismissing the further implications of the Ethiopian Crisis and the Spanish Civil War and condemned those who he claimed were "using the present political situation in the world to scare us and get us to agree to bigger military expenditure than we would have agreed to otherwise."47 Nygaardsvold referred to irresponsible attempts to incite "panic" in the Storting, noting in his diary that the government was facing heavy pressure from "right-wing forces" which had "worked up a sheer armaments fever."48 In early 1936 Monsen threatened to resign as Defense Minister if the government carried out the projected increase of the training period to eighty-four days, and he had his way.49

At the same time, however, other members of the party had begun to fear that the Western Powers might violate Norwegian territory in Finnmark as part of an attack on the Soviet Union. Among the most vocal of these was Martin Tranmæl, an ironic situation considering his previous efforts to abolish the military altogether. In November 1936, the government tried to kill two birds with one stone by answering the
military's request for emergency funds with a special appropriation of 3.8 million kroner, to be used specifically for improving the defense of the northern counties. The Labor leaders seemed to regard this solution with a degree of smug satisfaction; for while they could claim on the one hand that they had granted a concession to the defense lobby, on the other hand they could also point out that less than half of the money was actually destined for the military, the majority being slated for road construction.50

Ironically, the military itself regarded road construction in the North as a high priority. Finnish road-building seemed likely to extend influence and sway the ultimate allegiance of Norwegian subjects unless corresponding projects improved communications on the other side of the border as well. The Norwegian military was also highly suspicious of Finnish proposals for an international Arctic highway to run through the Lyngen-Skibotn area. "Connection to the Finnish road net . . . would open a new invasion route from Finland. This is undesirable from a military standpoint," concluded the General Staff.51

Even in the leanest years for defense in the interwar period, the northern counties had remained an object of some concern for Norwegian politicians. One problem was the question of assimilating Finnish, Sami (i.e., Lappish), and (to a minor extent) Russian ethnic minorities in the region. Furthermore, in terms of political geography, the northern counties were the most radical part of Norway. Were a revolution to break out, it seemed most likely to ignite first in the North, with the added danger of Soviet intervention close at hand. The rise of the right-wing Lapua movement in Finland also raised the specter of territorial conflict with that nation, and some Norwegians also worried about the possibility of a Swedish attempt to annex the Narvik region. Finally, as reflected in the special grant of November 1936, Labor leaders feared a possible Western (especially German) attempt to strike at Russia through Norwegian territory. Norwegian sovereignty over the region meanwhile was almost purely nominal. The Army pointed out in 1936, for example, that even in the regional capital of Tromsø, there was no control whatsoever of foreigners entering or leaving the country; anyone at all could come and go at will from ships in the harbor.52
In the absence of any other national agencies to handle the task, the Norwegian Army eventually developed a considerable surveillance network in the northern counties to try to keep tabs on foreigners and other suspicious individuals. Although concerns over social unrest and conflict with Finland or Sweden dwindled in the late 1930s, the northern counties continued to absorb much of the limited resources for Norwegian defense.53

By 1936, King Haakon had become gravely concerned over the need to renovate the country's neglected defenses, and he tried in every way possible within the constitutional limits of his authority to convince the government of the seriousness of the situation. Even in the 1920s, Haakon had regarded Germany as a potential threat. The Nazi takeover greatly increased his apprehension, especially after he read Mein Kampf in 1935. As professional officers in their own right, the King and Crown Prince both were painfully aware of the pathetic state of Norway's defenses. On the other hand, as they also were aware, no one in the cabinet had any interest, let alone experience or competence, in military affairs; and many of them, including the Defense Minister Monsen, continued to regard the officer corps with suspicion and sometimes outright contempt. With all of these things in mind, Haakon tried to strike the most persuasive balance when he discussed the issue of defense with the cabinet. Meeting with Nygaardsvold in December 1936, the King argued that the threatening international situation demanded a much greater financial commitment to defense than the trivial sum the government recently had approved. In particular, he pointed out that Norway's renewed emphasis on neutrality as its basic foreign policy had to include corresponding military measures, even if only to provide an effective neutrality guard. Haakon suggested a precautionary mobilization of the coastal defenses (which normally were almost completely unmanned), increased resources for training, and provision of at least a rudimentary air defense system as the minimum demands of prudence. However, his opinion counted for little, and the cabinet found it easy to ignore his advice.54

Nevertheless, the increasing sense of crisis in 1937 compelled the government to accept another supplementary defense grant of 21 million
kroner, to be spread over the following three years, allocated as follows: 8.3 million to the Navy and coast artillery, 5.5 million for air defense, 3.2 million to the Army, and 2 million each for civil defense and road construction in North Norway. The cabinet continued to oppose extension of the training period, however, beyond seventy-two days. A preparedness movement was gaining headway gradually in the Storting, but the specific issues at stake seemed trivial to the point of irrelevance. As one moderately pro-defense representative put it, "We can hardly throw the country into a political crisis merely for the sake of a few training days!"

As Chief of the General Staff, Ruge generally played a role similar to Laake's in dampening public criticism of the government by members of the officer corps. Although this clearly was the proper policy with regard to the principles of military professionalism, it also led many hard-liners to assign Ruge a share of the blame for the overall weakness of the defense policy. Ruge tended to alienate officers of a traditional bent, such as C.G. Fleischer, who regarded him as unorthodox. The increasing atmosphere of controversy finally led Ruge to resign in 1938, before the normal end of his tenure, after which he became inspector-general of infantry. Colonel R. Hatledal succeeded him as Chief of the General Staff.

The German-Austrian Anschluss in early 1938 sufficed to rouse Nygaardsvold and his colleagues slightly, leading to a supplementary defense appropriation of 52.3 million kroner on 31 March 1938. Of the total amount, however, much went to non-military purposes: 15.0 million for strategic stockpiles, 8.0 million for electrification projects, and 2.0 million each for civil defense and payment of national debt. In early summer 1938, the King again tried to awaken the government to the urgent need for action, this time appealing to Monsen and focusing on the issue of air raid precautions. Many other countries by this time had undertaken extensive civil defense programs to construct shelters, conduct exercises, provide gas masks, and organize evacuation plans; but a general sense of complacency still prevailed in Norway. The King pointed out that not even the royal palace had a bomb shelter, and he
asked whether the cabinet had given any thought to what might occur in case of an air attack during one of its own meetings.59

In response to the Munich Crisis in fall 1938, the government finally authorized eighty-four training days for conscripts, this time with Monsen’s grudging approval. The government regarded this only as a temporary step, however, taken with the greatest reluctance; and the normal budget remained based on seventy-two days. Only ten representatives in the Storting opposed the increase in training after Munich, but one of these diehards was Mowinckel, who stubbornly proclaimed his lack of faith in the power of armaments to protect the country.60

In winter 1938-39, King Haakon continued his campaign for defense and warned the cabinet that maintaining neutrality in a war between Britain and Germany might be impossible, regardless of Norway’s wishes. As in the previous war, he argued, the belligerents probably would interfere with neutral shipping. Koht replied that the government could simply recall Norwegian vessels to port if a crisis arose, in order to keep them out of harm’s way; but Haakon pointed out that Britain might regard this in itself as a threatening move. The King also warned that the flow of iron ore through Narvik would become a strategic objective for the belligerents.61

Still the government did little. In April 1939, following the Hitler’s occupation of Prague, the military chiefs requested an emergency appropriation of eighty million kroner for essential supplies and training. Even Koht now showed some concern, but he and Nygaardsvold still anchored the majority of the government in firm opposition to any serious program of rearmament. Ironically, Monsen now amounted to a hawk in relation to his colleagues, and he prevailed upon them to support another special defense grant of eighteen million kroner. As a result of Conservative and Agrarian demands, the Storting subsequently increased this sum to twenty million. When rumors indicated that the military chiefs were considering a threat of mass resignation if the government refused to step up the pace of rearmament, however, Monsen reacted sharply, emphasizing that the cabinet would stand firm against any such form of blackmail.62
During the final months of peace, the King and Crown Prince tried
to demonstrate their concern through increasingly frequent inspections
of various military establishments and meetings with officers and
numerous civic groups. Olav also led a new campaign for voluntary
military training and rifle practice. In keeping with his role as a
constitutional monarch, however, Haakon remained strictly non-partisan
in his speeches, which muted the frustration he surely felt toward the
Labor government.63

As war loomed ever nearer and the Storting grudgingly appropriated
modest increases for defense, Norway had to consider purchasing arms
abroad. Following a visit by Crown Prince Olav and Princess Märtha to
the United States, which helped to generate sympathy for Norway,
American Secretary of State Cordell Hull in April 1939 privately
suggested to Koht that Norway act quickly if it wished to place orders
for American arms. Although United States presently would be happy to
sell Norway modern fighter aircraft, for example, this might not be
possible once war had broken out. Koht, however, showed little interest
and took his time in responding to the proposal.64 In summer 1939, a
Norwegian delegation including several Army pilots visited the United
States to conduct trials of several aircraft types; and this process led
to a contract for thirty-six Curtiss Hawk 75 fighters, later followed by
a second order for thirty-six more.65 The Norwegians also eventually
ordered thirty-six Douglas scout bombers and twenty-four Northrop float
planes; but none of the American aircraft were yet in service by April
1940. The only modern aircraft Norway obtained in 1938-39 were four
Caproni 310 bombers and six He-115 seaplanes, purchased from Italy and
Germany.66

Overall, the emergency defense appropriations of 1936-39 did
little more than alleviate some of the most grievous problems resulting
from the earlier cutbacks. Starved even for normal maintenance funds,
the armed forces found it necessary to attend to a wide variety of
basic, mundane needs before devoting any of the new funds to expansion
and modernization. One might consider an analogy to rain falling on
ground that is so parched, it must first soak up a good deal of water
before any will accumulate.67 In any case, even once orders for new
equipment were placed, it would take many months for money to produce tangible results at the end of the acquisitions pipeline. At the outbreak of war, the Norwegian forces remained essentially hollow, lacking even the minimal stocks of equipment and supplies called for by the 1933 organization plan.68

PROFESSIONAL MILITARY VIEWS OF THE COMING WAR

One must not over-generalize when referring to Norway's failure to anticipate and prepare for the impending catastrophe of April 1940. Norwegian military men tried hard to discern the shape the next war would take, and to reconcile their almost nonexistent material resources with the threats such a conflict would pose.

For example, at least one Norwegian officer foresaw the potential impact of German air power on the Royal Navy's control of Norwegian waters. Navy Captain Sjøvik hit the nail on the head with his prediction that in the coming war, aircraft would greatly reduce the ability of surface warships to operate in the vicinity of enemy bases. "There can be hardly any doubt," he concluded, "that the modern air forces of the great powers, both in their effectiveness and demand for bases, are among the factors that have increased the danger and possibility of a direct attack upon our country."69 Publishing in a professional journal, however, Sjøvik essentially was preaching to the choir; and his analysis made little if any impression on the government's thinking.

In light of the obviously increasing role of air power in modern warfare, a significant debate arose in Norway over proposals for a unified and independent air force that would incorporate the separate and subordinate Army and naval air arms that had existed since 1912, and possibly absorb the Army's anti-aircraft artillery as well. This issue had arisen periodically since 1916 but faced predictable opposition, particularly from the Navy, which was determined to maintain its own aviation branch. Support for an independent air force gathered strength in the 1930s as the importance of air power became increasingly apparent, culminating in a strong endorsement by Ruge in 1936.70 A
committee appointed by the Storting concluded, however, that the time was not yet ripe for a unified air service, given the lack of resources necessary for such a reorganization and the emphatic opposition of the Navy.\textsuperscript{71} Thus, at the outbreak of war in 1939 Norway still had two separate, miniature air services, neither equipped to play a meaningful role in modern warfare.\textsuperscript{72}

Another prominent issue among Norwegian Army officers in the late 1930s was the role of tanks in modern war and their degree of relevance to Norway in particular. Several Norwegian military journals presented a series of articles on this theme, by which one can trace the outlines of a lively debate.\textsuperscript{73}

Professional opinion generally fell into two camps. One espoused the visionary doctrines of Fuller and Guderian, et al, regarding massive armored attacks as a revolutionary development that would completely change the face of warfare. The other camp argued that proponents of armored warfare had grossly over-sold their product, that high-velocity anti-tank guns had renewed the superiority of defensive firepower, and that the next war would consequently be another one of position and attrition. Both factions drew upon current reports of the shifting fortunes of armored operations in the Spanish Civil War for evidence, much of which seemed contradictory.\textsuperscript{74} In general, the latter group seemed to represent prevailing opinion; and even tank enthusiasts had to admit that predictions of a military revolution probably had been premature. "Both the war in Spain and the war in China," wrote artillery officer Odd Graham, "show that the theory of a rapid war is only a dream. The experiences from Spain, at least, emphasize that anti-tank guns, tanks, traps, and obstacles stop [other] tanks just as completely as trenches and machine guns stopped infantry in the World War."\textsuperscript{75} No one could deny that tanks would still play at least an important supporting role in infantry attacks, but countermeasures seemed clearly to have blunted their initial shock value. "The primary means of stopping an armored attack," concluded another prominent Norwegian military author, "is the anti-tank gun."\textsuperscript{76}

A source of concern even among many skeptics of armored warfare, however, was the simple fact that the Norwegian Army possessed not a
single anti-tank gun, let alone any tanks. As another officer wrote in 1937:

We have not a single specialized anti-tank weapon, and probably will not receive any for several years to come. Even should the financial authorities become more open-handed toward the military than heretofore, the initial purchases probably will be other things. We therefore remain completely defenseless in this area. Nor can we gain any experience in the use of such weapons! 77

The closest thing to a tank that the Norwegian Army obtained before the war was a single L.120 tracked chassis purchased from Sweden in 1936. Trials revealed that it was mechanically unreliable and prone to bog down in snow. and the Army considered good offroad mobility a crucial attribute for local conditions. Nevertheless, the inspector-general for cavalry pressed for the establishment of at least a small trials unit, at an estimated cost of 200,000 kroner, in order to gain some basic, practical experience in the field. The question, he argued, concerned not only the cavalry, but the other arms as well. "In a war, we are going to encounter enemy tanks; is that the first time the Army will ever get to see any?" 78

With hindsight, it seems difficult to understand how so many Norwegian military officers, as well as the civilian political authorities, could have remained indifferent to the need for anti-tank weapons and training. Events in the Norwegian campaign of 1940 were to show not only the devastating tactical advantage the Germans gained with just a handful of light tanks, but also the great difference that even a dozen or so anti-tank guns could have made for the defenders." As Holtermann emphasized, budgets were extremely tight, and the list of competing demands was almost infinite. Nevertheless, even under those circumstances, it seems clear that the Norwegians could have obtained the guns (perhaps 37-mm Bofors from Sweden) to equip at least a few small anti-tank detachments, had the senior professional officers made this a high enough priority; but they did not.

The explanation lies mainly in the overestimation of the obstacles Norwegian geography would present to the employment of armored fighting
vehicles. After pointing out Norway's dangerous lack of anti-tank weapons, the author quoted above went on to moderate the sense of alarm by adding, "On the other hand, our country is generally less suitable for the use of tanks than many other places. By using the terrain, in many cases we can mitigate the lack of weapons. When it comes to defense against tanks--as in many other cases--we must therefore in part seek other solutions than abroad."80

In the course of field maneuvers and (more commonly) staff exercises, the Norwegians tried to estimate how useful tanks would be under local conditions. Probably the most important such wargame was the General Staff exercise in fall 1936, which simulated defense against a mechanized attack in the vicinity of Hamar. In the course of the exercise, the referees ruled that the attacking forces were unable to get their tanks across a river, and the defenders thus held their ground for the allotted time. The published evaluation of results observed that "It is not easy to operate with tanks in Norway--even in Hedmark [the relatively flat region northeast of Oslo]." Quoting the Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung, the assessment concluded that "The danger (from the defender's standpoint) consists only in letting oneself panic."81

Others such as Wrede Holm remained less sanguine. "In considering how an attacker may use tanks in Norway," he wrote, "we must first recognize clearly that no power will attack our country without bringing such vehicles.... Neither our country's character as a secondary theater of war, nor its forests and mountains will prevent an attacker from using tanks here as well." Considering the Norwegian Army's almost total lack of preparation for anti-tank defense, he suggested that panic among the troops was a likely possibility. "Will their morale hold up?.... Or will there be panic, disintegration, and defeat? Would that those responsible for our units, equipped and trained as they are, could answer with certainty and a clear conscience."82

By 1939, there was clear evidence of increasing concern over the tank problem. The General Staff developed detailed plans for the establishment of anti-tank units, to be equipped with 20- and 37-mm weapons, based on the conclusion that rate-of-fire and portability were
more important than range and penetrating power. Endless delays hindered the project, however, and other efforts focused on the possible use of field artillery in a direct-fire role as a stopgap. A new, lightweight 75-mm mountain gun, the M/39, was scheduled to appear in 1939-40 and seemed well suited as a dual-purpose weapon. However, this program also suffered delays due to lack of appropriations and bottlenecks in the acquisitions process; and the gun had yet to arrive in any significant numbers by spring 1940. The Army also introduced a new set of tactical directives in 1938, which theoretically improved integration of the respective combat arms, giving infantry commanders more direct control over existing field guns. Given the shortage of artillery support at all levels of the Norwegian tables of organization, however, which amounted to only about one-third of that typical on the continent, any such redistribution of assets meant robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Another, potentially more practical effort to prepare for an encounter with tanks involved the training of combat engineers. The Norwegian Army traditionally had relied much more on fixed fortifications than on hasty field works, but in the late 1930s the importance of tactical obstacles became increasingly obvious, along with the need for mobile, multiple-purpose units to create them. In the summer 1938 combined maneuvers of the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the defending forces included for the first time a motorized pioneer company, which received a prominent place in the exercise. However, the unit had received only eighteen hours of prior training in specialized engineering tasks. As a result, the company commander admitted afterward, "Both technically and tactically, the creation of obstacles failed to meet the challenges posed by this important and demanding form of combat." Nor did the engineers or anyone else seem to learn much of value from the maneuvers. The crucial problem, the pioneer commander explained, was that in almost every case, the staff officers controlling the exercise simply designated imaginary obstacles, typically with placards reading "bridge blown" or "road blocked," instead of requiring or even allowing time for the actual work. Granted, under peacetime conditions, the Army obviously could not blow up real bridges or fell
many trees across narrow mountain roads; but the requirement and possibility for more practical, realistic training was clear.85

At least one officer, O. B. Skaathun, recognized that given the many specific weaknesses of the Norwegian Army, its best and perhaps only hope of stopping a hypothetical invasion was to nip it at the bud. Skaathun reasoned that an attack on Norway almost inevitably must come by sea, and that the invader thus would have to begin by seizing a bridgehead. It would be folly for the Norwegian Army to allow hostile forces to land unopposed, and then to fight them in the interior after they had gained a position in depth. The only logical thing was to fight a "battle on the beach," where the attacker would be most vulnerable. Yet remarkably, Norwegian tactical directives and exercises paid almost no attention whatsoever to the specific problems of defending coastal positions.86

Captain Øivin Øi presented a remarkably prescient assessment of the danger facing Norway, in an article entitled "Strategisk overfall", a phrase implying the worst-case scenario of an unheralded attack striking like a bolt from the blue. "The most important possibilities we must reckon with," he argued, were:

1) During a war in the North Sea, one of the sides seeks to secure a base on our south or west coast. Germany may do this in order to gain a base to break an English blockade, and a base for air operations against the British isles. England may do it in order to obtain a base securing the flank of its blockade line, in order to hinder German supplies along our coast, or to pre-empt a German operation.

2) In the course of military operations adjacent to northern Norway, opponents of Russia require bases in northern Norway in order to attack Russia's air and naval base in the Murmansk area. For its part, Russia may wish to secure its sea communications and supplies, and to extend the radius of action of its naval and air forces with the help of bases in northern Norway.

An enemy operation to obtain such a base on our coast must come as a strategic surprise if it is to have a chance of success.87

In fact, even before this article, Ruge had put his finger even more directly on the German threat in a September 1938 memorandum to
Laake. "We must reckon with the possibility," he wrote, "that a German attack on Norway can begin without any significant [warning] reports reaching us or the intelligence services of the great powers."88

Unfortunately for Norway, Ruge's and Øi's penetrating analyses found no expression in any centralized strategic planning. While paying lip service to the principle of close co-operation, the Army and Navy in fact shared no unified strategy. Army staff exercises seldom if ever specified the identity of their hypothetical opponents, but the premises often indicated clearly that they would be the British. Wargames of the 1st and 3rd Divisions in winter 1938-39, for example, as well as the General Staff examination of September 1939, all involved operations to contain and counterattack a landing on the southwest coast in the vicinity of Larvik or Kristiansand by an enemy with naval superiority but no land-based air cover. The 4th Division, however, based its exercises on the assumption of British assistance against a German seizure of Stavanger.89

The Norwegian Navy meanwhile was more inclined to regard Germany as the primary threat, and based its strategic thinking on the need to fight a delaying action in the Skaggerak to buy time for British naval power to come into play.90 A strategic summary by the Commanding Admiral in 1936 included several penetrating observations. First, he referred to the writings of Admiral Wolfgang Wegener as evidence of Germany's interest in Norwegian bases.91 The summary then discussed the significance of modern air power, which now had made it possible for the Germans to maintain a line of communications across the Skaggerak once they had secured a foothold in Norway, something they could not have contemplated in the last war. Norway's defense still depended ultimately on Britain, he concluded; but the Royal Navy's superiority was no longer absolute, and the Norwegian forces had to be ready to meet an all-out invasion with their own resources.92

Of the two services, the Navy generally showed a superior capacity for coherent strategic analysis; but neither one could forge an effective overall policy in the absence of sound political leadership. As a result, Norway's defense apparatus was like a ship with some conscientious crewmen, but no captain or navigator.
CONCLUSIONS ON THE FAILURE OF NORWEGIAN SECURITY POLICY

The essential reasons for Norway's military weakness in 1939-40 were political and social. First, there was the economic depression; second, the corresponding demands of fiscal economy, combined with the apparent lack of external threats during the 1920s and early 30s; third, the anti-military agenda of the Labor Party; and fourth, the combination of pacifism and resignation that prevented the government from adopting or even rationally debating a viable defense policy, even after some leaders had begun to awaken to the impending danger.

Norway was hardly unique in its efforts to reduce government spending during the depression, a policy which reflected the conventional wisdom of the time, clearly evident in Britain and the United States as well. The superficial tranquility of international relations in the 1920s also had the same debilitating effect on defense in these and other countries as in Norway. Pacifism was another widespread phenomenon common among the Western countries, albeit especially strong in Scandinavia. These factors suffice to explain the decline of Norwegian defense at least through 1933, aggravated by the specific policies of Mowinckel's third government. To understand Norway's failure to rearm even after 1936, however, when the other democracies had at least begun to awaken to the Nazi threat, one must turn to the final two reasons noted above.

Despite the common perception of Scandinavia as an idyllic model of social progress and tranquility, Norway's transition to an industrial economy involved potentially explosive class conflict. By 1920, the economic transformation was essentially complete, resulting above all from the newfound abundance of hydroelectric power; but the political implications remained unresolved. Marxist ideology, military intervention against strikes, and mutual prejudice all contributed to the adversarial relationship of the Labor Party and the armed forces. Thus, even when faced with the need to strengthen the country's defenses against threats from abroad, the Nygaardsvold government remained largely preoccupied with its perception of domestic militarism.
By 1936 Labor leaders needed a thorough reassessment of their priorities, but they had been wedded to their familiar rhetoric for so long that they found it impossible to adjust their position accordingly. "Does the party really think that the military administration poses any danger to the working people in Norway?" asked one editorial, expressing many officers' sense of exasperation. "The thought is fantastic to those who know our military, and we are convinced that the Labor party's leading and thinking men finally have moved beyond this misconception." Why then could they not adopt a viable defense policy? "The explanation is perhaps that they still feel bound by their previous agitation against the military."94

The other Norwegian political parties all bear some responsibility for the lack of defense as well. This is most true of Mowinckel and the Liberals, who became Labor's coalition partners in 1936. The Agrarians and Conservatives spoke out more strongly for defense, especially the latter party's leader C.J. Hambro, whom one might characterize as a Norwegian counterpart of Winston Churchill. Neither opposition party as a whole, however, viewed the need for defense as sufficiently pressing to warrant compromise on other issues, which might have brought down the government by detaching the Liberals. As it was, Conservative motions for votes of no confidence amounted to hollow gestures in the face of the majority coalition.95

The overwhelming majority of Norwegians agreed that the country must try its utmost to remain neutral in a great power conflict. Given the information available at the time, this conclusion was essentially sound, and it stemmed from a legitimate sense of self-interest as well as pacifism. The problem was that too few people realized the essential role of deterrence in the successful maintenance of neutrality. Hardly anyone seemed to understand that the mere desire to avoid war might not suffice. Some went so far as to argue, however, that even if a great power should invade Norway, it would be better to submit to temporary occupation rather than wage a futile and costly war. The example of Belgium in 1914 was a favorite theme among opponents of stronger defense in the 1930s. As one such author concluded.
If they [the Belgian government] had let the German troops march through, the Belgian population clearly would have suffered much less from the war.... For a small country in a modern war between the great powers, a 'well-organized defense' is much more of a danger than a guarantee of safety.... We should most emphatically avoid playing the role of Belgium in 1914.96

The "Belgian" argument assumed that any occupation would be temporary and that the "good" side eventually would win regardless of what Norway did. Nevertheless, it seemed especially compelling in light of the terrifying power of air attacks, as envisioned in the 1930s. For Norway, the prospect of war threatened to shatter the entire edifice of fragile progress achieved since the turn of the century, based on hydroelectricity and other public works projects. Thus, even infringements of sovereignty appeared preferable to wholesale destruction.97

One of the most basic premises of Norwegian foreign and defense policy was that Britain would continue to control the North Sea, protecting Norway from the possibility of seaborne invasion by any other power. The Norwegian government's preoccupation with the British all but blinded it to the German threat, in both a strategic sense and the immediate crisis on the eve of the invasion. Norwegian confidence in British sea power was misplaced. Although doubts arose over apparent British military weakness in 1937, the substantial rearmament programs launched in 1938-39 generally restored Norwegian faith in British protection. One crucial miscalculation was the failure to grasp the significance of developments in aviation, which in 1940 allowed the Luftwaffe to cancel out much of the Royal Navy's superiority. Even if air power had proved less effective than it did in fact, the British probably still could not have controlled the Skagerrak. By occupying Denmark, the Germans could dominate the southern coast of Norway in spite of their naval weakness. Thus, even given an optimistic assessment of British capabilities, it seems hard to understand how anyone could have avoided the conclusion that at least Oslo and the south coast were vulnerable. Nevertheless, even well-informed Norwegians generally found it easy to believe otherwise.98

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Given the operative assumption, the most important consideration seemed to be to avoid provoking the British themselves, who were the only ones actually capable of invading Norway (apart from the now remote prospects of conflict with Sweden, Finland, or the Soviet Union). Thus, the whole issue of defense appeared largely irrelevant. In fact (one could argue as the Liberals did), trying to build up the military would be counterproductive, since the British would interpret it as directed against them, indicating a Norwegian tilt toward Germany. The muddled thinking of the late 1930s led many Norwegians to conclude that whatever the theoretical possibility of an attack, it was senseless to try to construct a serious defense. Norway, they argued, simply did not have the resources to make even a pretense of resistance against an actual invasion. Thus, even the marginal improvements taken in hand after 1936 were not really aimed at preparing the Norwegian armed forces to fight. According to the postwar committee that investigated the background of the catastrophe in 1940, "At no time did the [prewar] government ever take up for fundamental, comprehensive debate the question of what missions our military actually should perform." As Lieutenant-General Ole Berg later observed.

A significant problem with the whole defense organization was the prevailing uncertainty over its mission. This was not specified. Should the military provide only an "etiquette defense", a neutrality watch that would come into play only against accidental violations and confine itself to observing, reporting, and protesting any deliberate, more serious violations; or should there be a fight to the death?

The Defense Act of 1933 hardly provided for the latter, and the government never gave any clear indication that it would fight under any circumstances. Countless statements by Labor leaders contributed to the overall impression that if push came to shove, their ultimate determination was to avoid violence. "The neutrality guard will only be employed in bloodless operations." said Nygaardsvold in 1937: and his colleague Stostad spoke of "guarding the coasts, not with cannons ... but by showing the flag." General Laake sometimes contributed
further to the impression that the armed forces' real purpose was merely
to provide a token presence. "Neutrality violations at sea shall be
warded off [avverges] and coastal traffic maintained," he pronounced in
a vague description of the military's missions shortly before the war.
"Attempts to occupy Norwegian territory and use it as a base for
operations or for the transit of troops and material, shall be repelled
[avvises]." The tepid ambiguity of his phrasing seemed significant.\[102\]

If Britain truly had been the only power capable of invading
Norway, then perhaps this policy would have made sense. Even Koht, who
tended to distrust the British, recognized that above all else, Norway
must avoid being drawn into a war on Germany's side. The lessons of the
"Bark-bread years" of the Napoleonic Wars, as well as World War I,
remained clear: Norway must remain on good terms with Britain in order
to preserve its vital maritime trade, as well as for ideological
reasons. Because of the overriding nature of this concern, the British
could exact almost any concessions they wished. As Mowinckel put it.
"Whatever happens, a war against England is entirely ruled out."\[103\]

Logically, this line of reasoning might have prompted serious
discussion of a military alliance with Britain, given the basic affinity
of the two nations in opposition to Nazism. Given the realities of
Norwegian politics and public opinion, however, such an alliance was
impossible. A characteristic speech in the Storting in May 1939
illuminates the opposition facing the Labor party's modest program of
rearmament even at that late date. The government, said the speaker,
now favored larger sums for defense, but it had a hidden agenda.

Shall we fire on the English Navy when it comes in to land,
or shall we join them? I have no doubt what the Labor Party
thinks.... It is a military alliance against Germany and
Italy that they want, but they dare not admit it.... We
have never been able, and never will be able to oppose
either German or Italian fascism through armed force. We
have one enemy, and it is within our own borders. We have
poverty, we have unemployment."\[104\]

Even if Germany could not invade Norway directly, an alliance with
Britain seemed sure to bring a rain of destruction from the Luftwaffe.
One also wonders how the pro-German element of the officer corps would have reacted to such an alliance, let alone one that included the Soviet Union.

The essential flaw in the Norwegian policy was its failure to recognize that it could not have the best of both worlds. The policy pursued mutually exclusive goals without acknowledging the contradictions. The actual basis of the Nygaardsvold government's policy was above all to avoid conflict with Britain, while attempting to conceal this fact from Germany. With respect to defense, these two objectives were diametrically opposed. Whatever effect of Norwegian military weakness on British calculations, the signal to Germany was clear. "Norway can count on its neutrality being respected only if she also can defend herself," the German minister Von Neuhaus reported to the Auswärtiges Amt in 1937. The following year, in light of the continuing failure to rearm, he concluded that "In a war, Norway will do what England requires." An Abwehr report from Oslo on the eve of the war agreed, "In a conflict, Norway will always stand on England's side." However hard Koht and the rest of the Norwegian cabinet tried to conceal this fact by fastidious pronouncements of neutrality, the physical fact of military weakness remained. In short, the Norwegians succeeded in deluding only themselves.


3. Ibid., 187.


5. "Opsetningene av stridende linjetropper ved mobilisering i 1. omgang", 1932: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 168.

6. The problem was most apparent in the case of the 3rd Division, whose commander General Liljedahl used the technicalities of the system as an excuse to abandon his post. Liljedahl to FKA, 20 March 1954; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 86.

7. Admiralstaben, "Forslag om ny ordning av Sjøforsvaret: Kystartilleriet". 24 October 1932, FMB: q359.3.


10. "Ny hærordning", 1932: RA, KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 168; Innstilling fra undersøkelseskommissionen av 1945 (Oslo: Aschheoug. 1946) [subsequently, UK 1945], 9-12.
11. The above figures include sergeants as officers because of the reorganization of the officer corps that took effect in 1930. (See previous chapter.) Subsequently, there were no long-service Norwegian NCOs. Squad-leaders were themselves conscripts who received little more training than other enlisted men. O. Lindbäck-Larsen, "Et uløst befalssørsøl - Et forslag", Vår hør 27 (11, 3 June 1938): 81-83. This article proposed building on the small number of enlisted men who had served six-month tours of duty with the Royal Guards or the South Varanger Garrison Company at Kirkenes, which were the Army's only true standing units; but nothing came of the idea.


15. Correspondence from the district commands regarding the recruit schools for 1933 indicate that local civilian interests often curtailed training. RA: KG(IV). kat. 1256.2/15, box 202. One way in which the military tried to "sell" itself to civilian society was by offering an alternative, non-combatant forestry recruit school, which the Storting funded separately and the Army hoped would provide a useful pool of skilled foremen for pioneer units. Of the 320 hours in the training program, however, only fourteen actually focused on military engineering. Nevertheless, the program continued through 1940, illustrating the primacy of civilian interests in forming Norwegian defense policy. "Skogrekruttskoler". RA: KG(IV). kat. 1256.2/15, box 192.


19. UK 1945, 17. Labor party chairman and fellow anti-military activist Oscar Torp temporarily replaced Monsen as Defense Minister from 20 December 1935 to 15 August 1936 when the latter became ill. For brief biographical sketches of Nygaardsvold and Koht, see Byron J. Nordstrom.
20. Their predecessor as Defense Minister in Mowinckel's last government, Anderssen-Rysst, in 1933-35 learned little if anything of such plans either. Nils Ivar Agøy, "Militæretaten og <<den indre fiende>> fra 1905 til 1940: Hemmelige sikkerhetsstyrker i Norge sett i et skandinavisk perspektiv" (Doctoral diss.: University of Oslo, 1994), 426.

21. Ibid., 427-35. See also Fredrik Fagertun, "Militærmakten og <<den indre fiende>>, 1918-1940." Forsvarsstudier IV (1985): 225-70. and Otter Strømme [pseud.]. Den hemmelige høren: Den hemmelige militære organisasjonen mot <<indre uro>> i Norge fra 1918 til 1940 (Oslo: Oktober forlag, 1978). It also remains unclear whether Monsen informed any of the other cabinet-members of the Ordensvern system. If he did, however, then Justice Minister Trygve Lie, who was among the Labor Party's pro-defense advocates, probably agreed that the matter should remain confidential. Agøy speculates from statements Monsen made in 1948 that Monsen actually saw only the tip of the iceberg and remained largely ignorant of the full extent of the internal security plans. Fagertun, however, argues that Monsen did know most of the relevant facts and regarded the system as a potentially useful safeguard against right-wing extremists, although there appears to be no real evidence to support this conclusion. See Fredrik Fagertun, Forsvarsminister Monsens innvirkning i den indre mobiliseringsordninga 1936/37 (Unpublished manuscript: University of Tromsø, 1980). Borgersrud essentially argues that Monsen sold out once in power and neglected his duty to expose the affair.


23. Ibid., 416-18, 424.

24. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 52, 61. The bourgeois parties exercised powerful influence especially through their continued ability to block social and economic reforms, which Labor regarded as its top priorities. See Svein Dahl. Høyre og staten: Høyres holdning til statlige inngrep i det økonomiske liv i mellom-krigstiden (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985).


33. Øivin Øl, "La defense nationale de la Norvege", Le Nord (1939). 33. Koht's views on defense in the 1930s are found in his memoir, Rikspolitisk dagbok, 1933-1940 (Oslo: Tiden Norsk forlag, 1985). A recent biographer of Nygaardsvold, while sympathetic in many respects, has also acknowledged how stubbornly the Prime Minister and his circle fought against the defense advocates within their own party. Harald Berntsen, I malstrømmen: Johan Nygaardsvold. 1879-1952 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1991), 439-56. Other prominent opponents of rearmament were Magnus Nilssen and Sverre Støstad.

34. Jens Erik Normann, Rittmesterens testamente (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1987), 53-54. In fact, although he had flown balloons, Gulliksen was not an airplane pilot.

35. Diesen's critics later joked that the only party he had never joined was the NS, because they wouldn't have him. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986). 31, 112.


37. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 54-57. For insights concerning Norwegian Labor’s reactions to the Spanish Civil War, see the memoir of Haakon Lie, Loftsrysting (Oslo: Norsk forlag, 1980).


39. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 21-23.
40. Ibid., 24-27.

41. Ibid., 28-29.

42. Aftenposten, 26 February 1937.


44. Greve, Haakon VII, 115.


46. Eriksen and Moland, Hvor uforberedt var vi 9. april?, 9. The Storting also failed to fund the projected refresher training for previous classes.

47. Christensen, Vårt Folks Historie, IX:111.


51. "Innstillings VII fra Finnmarksnevnden", 15 March 1939. RA: GS(IV). kat. 1256.2/16. box 303. This proposed route was where the Germans constructed a highway in 1941-44. The Swedes had similar apprehensions of Finnish ambitions in the north, and the Norwegian and Swedish general staffs met secretly at least once in 1937 to share ideas for scuttling the Finnish version of the international highway. Nils Ørvik, notes of interview w/ Col. Hatledal, 25 October 1957. RA: FKA. kat.1256.0/02. box 167.

52. 6.DK to KG. 18 November 1936. RA: GS(IV). kat. 1256.2/16. box 303.

54. Greve, Haakon VII. 102, 115-16.


56. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 62; Derry, History of Modern Norway. 357.

57. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 80. Some of Quisling's followers later characterized Ruge as a "democratic" political schemer and alleged that as Chief of Staff, he systematically purged those who opposed his ideas. Prof. Schnitler, IHF, to Hagelin, Dept. of the Interior; "P.M. om general Ruge". 30 March 1942; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.

58. The strategic supplies included food and stockpiles of raw materials likely to be unavailable in wartime. "Kommanderende Generals budgetforslag for 1939/40", RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 462. Three million kroner allocated to expansion of domestic aircraft production produced no results by 1940. UK 1945, 35.


60. Christensen, Vårt folks historie, IX:114: Derry, History of Modern Norway. 358. Even at eighty-four days, Norway's training period remained by far the shortest of any European military. For comparison, Sweden provided 175 days, Denmark 190, and Finland 390. "Kommanderende Generals budgetforslag for 1939/40", RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 462.


65. "Hærens flygevåpens ny jager". Vår hær 28 (18, 23 November 1939): 149-50. The Norwegian pilots were Captains Motzfeldt and Reistad.

66. The Caproni deal was a unique transaction in which Italy accepted consignments of Norwegian fish as payment-in-kind. Normann. Rittmesterens testamente. 54.

67. See appendix for a breakdown of the allocation of emergency funds provided to the army between November 1936 and October 1939, indicating the wide variety of competing demands. For reference, ca. 1937-38 it cost approximately 1.7 million kroner to equip an infantry battalion: and per diem costs were between four and five kroner per soldier. HØK to FD. "P.M.: Oppsetning av en norsk hærvæpning utenfor Norge". 21 June 1940; Den norske regjerings virksomhet fra 9 april 1940 til 22 juni 1945. Departementenes meldinger. vol. IV: Forsvarsdepartementet (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1948). 156-57. In fall 1939, Laake reported that the total, estimated material deficiencies amounted to 152 million kroner. As the postwar investigation concluded, "It is true that the government eventually proposed and received [emergency defense] appropriations that were considerable in relation to the regular defense expenditures, but to a great extent the [extra] money had to be used to fill the holes in the ordinary budget." UK 1945. 32. 45.

68. Ammunition stocks, for example, fell far below the projected ten-day requirements estimated by the General Staff. The following chapter will provide more detail on this issue.

70. "Luftforsvarsutredningen ved Oberst Ruge", 28 December 1936, RA: GS(III). kat. 1256.2/16, box 316. Ruge argued on much the same grounds that had supported transfer of the coast artillery to the Navy in 1932-33: all elements of air defense faced a new, common front. His proposal therefore encompassed not only the two aviation arms, but also the army's anti-aircraft artillery, an observer corps, and civil defense organizations.

71. "Flyverådets uttalelse om spørsmålet 'Videre utvikling av luftforsvaret'", 31 January 1936, RA: GS(II). kat. 1256.2/16, box 296: UK 1945, 35. The committee did not object to the merging of the two aviation arms in principle but specifically opposed removing the anti-aircraft artillery from Army control.

72. As of 1 January 1940, the Army had 60 aircraft and the Navy 53. Ibid. For an authoritative overview of the air force unification issue, see Olav Riste, "Slow Take-Off: The Pre-History of the Royal Norwegian Air Force, 1912-1944", Forsvarsstudier V (1986): 219-34. In retrospect, the creation of a unified Norwegian air force in the late 1930s probably would not have made much difference in 1940. It is possible, however, that jurisdictional squabbling contributed to the failure of coastal air reconnaissance. (See following chapter.)


74. An example of the first view appeared naturally enough under the name of a cavalry officer: Rittmester Wrede Holm, "Panservognaktikk". Norsk militært tidsskrift 100 (1937): 287-307. Another account of armored successes in Spain was Odd Graham, "De moderne stridsvogner i den spanske borgerkrig". Norsk artilleri-tidsskrift (1938): 86-92. Examples of the other, more skeptical view include Øyvinn Øi, "Kampvognene i den spanske borgerkrig", and "Militærerfaringer fra den spanske borgerkrig". Norsk militært tidsskrift 100 (1937): 343-49. 450-57: and Helmuth Klotz, Den spanske krigs militær lærdommer, trans. from the German and abridged by Trond Hegna (Oslo: Tiden forlag, 1938). This last book was translated and published in Norway at the instigation of Labor leader Haakon Lie, who recognized its potential to help divide and conquer professional agitation for rearmament.


78. General inspector for cavalry to KG, 31 March 1938, RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 403. The cavalry also lobbied to obtain armored cars, with the modest goal of one three-car troop in each of the three dragoon regiments, at an estimated total cost of 840,000 kroner. General Laake concluded that the price was too high, however, given the Army's existing shortage of trucks and horse-drawn transport. "Disponering av nøytralitetsvernfondet ... motorisering", 15 August 1938, Ibid.

79. Consider, for example, the successful holding-action of the British 15th Brigade at Kvam, thanks largely to a pair of French-made 25-mm guns. The Winter War contained many other examples of how even one or two guns could make a decisive difference.

80. Holtermann, "Forsvar mot stridsvogner", 311. Among various possibilities for stopping or hindering tanks, other than dedicated anti-tank guns, he listed artillery, machine guns, hand grenades, gas, smoke, mines, and engineering obstacles. However, he neglected to point out that the Norwegian Army was either critically short or totally bereft of most of these assets as well.


83. Following trials with borrowed samples of several prospective guns in 1937, the Army bureaucracy bogged down in fruitless debate over the relative merits of dual-purpose anti-aircraft carriages for the projected 20-mm guns, and of 37-mm versus 40-mm guns, the latter of which were not yet available but theoretically might share ammunition with anti-aircraft guns already on order. "Panser skyts, 1936-40", RA: KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 201.

84. Opinions over the 1938 directives were divided. See respective articles by O. Strugstad and Roscher Nielsen, both entitled "Våre nye taktiske direkter", Norsk artilleri-tidsskrift (1939): 60-73, 136-41. Paragraph 29 of the directives seems to summarize the essentially insoluble dilemma facing the under-equipped Army and the consequent resort to wishful thinking. "Our army's training and equipment are such that as a rule, we should attempt to fight under conditions where the infantry can manage without strong artillery support, and where the enemy receives no opportunity to exploit his possible superiority in artillery, aircraft, and armor. We must fight cautiously, yet operate with daring, being on the look-out for opportunity and grasping it quickly when it appears." [Emphasis in original.] The practical value of such dicta clearly was minimal.


88. P.M. Ruge to Laake, 9 September 1938; NA: T-312, reel 988, 9181087. The Germans were impressed by Ruge's insight when they captured the Norwegian archives in 1940 and translated this document.

89. RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 240: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 198.


91. The British meanwhile paid no attention to Wegener's work until spring 1939, and even then it failed to shake the assumption that Germany could never invade Norway in the face of British sea power. Donald Cameron Watt, "British Intelligence and the Coming of the Second World War in Europe", in Ernest R. May, ed., Knowing One's Enemies: Intelligence Assessment Before the Two World Wars (Princeton, 1986), 260.

92. "Sjøforsvarets gjenreisning: Kommanderende Admirals skrivelse av 16. november 1936", FMB: q359.3. The document proved less far-sighted in its specific recommendations for naval construction, however, urging the replacement of the four old armored ships with a similar class. The proposed ships would have displaced about 4,500 tons, with an armament of four 20.3-cm guns, four 12-cm, and four 40-mm, and a top speed of 22 knots, at a cost of 18 million kroner. The vessels probably would not have proved much more useful than the old ships.


95. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 58-75.

96. Kristian Gleditsch, Foran en ny verdenskrig (Oslo: Fram Forlag, 1935), 92. 104. This book represents the typical pattern of the genre: first a detailed and vivid description of the horrors and destruction associated with modern war, and then the conclusion that for a small country, resistance would be useless. Paradoxically, Gleditsch also painted an alarming picture of war-like preparations in Nazi Germany; but he drew no logical implications for the increasing risk to Norway and recognized no contradiction in simultaneous opposition to both war and fascism. By the end of the book, arrived at the orthodox Labor
argument that the only way to abolish militarism was the introduction of world-wide socialism--under the circumstances, a futile utopian fantasy.

97. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 86.


99. UK 1945, 43.


102. "Kommanderende Generals budgetforslag for 1939/40", RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 462. In theory, the body that should have provided the main forum for a proper debate of security policy was the Defense Council (Forsvarsrådet), which was supposed to meet at least four times per year, composed of the King, the relevant cabinet ministers, and the military chiefs. For no clear reason, however, the Council lapsed just when it was most important, meeting on the average only twice per year in 1934-37, and not at all in 1938-39 until after the war began. UK 1945, 46. Koht's insistence on sole authority in foreign policy probably was the main reason, along with the cabinet's general contempt for the King's advice in military matters.


105. Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 94. Ørvik indicates that Neuhaus's predecessor Dr. Sahm already had drawn a similar conclusion in 1936, allegedly based in part on a newspaper article by General Laake that emphasized neutrality as the nation's paramount concern: Aftenposten. 26 June 1936. In fact, the General's position in the article was quite reasonable: but the lack of reference to national honor or independence struck Sahm as significant. Sahm to Auswärtiges Amt, 4 July 1936; Pol. VI. Norden 13. cited in Ørvik, Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk, 87.

CHAPTER 4

NORWAY AND THE "PHONY WAR," 1939-1940

OUTBREAK OF WAR: NORWEGIAN AFFIRMATION OF NEUTRALITY

In the final months leading up to September 1939, the Norwegian government reaffirmed its commitment to maintain neutral. In an effort to manipulate Roosevelt's April 1939 peace initiative to its own advantage, Germany that same month proposed a non-aggression pact with Norway. The Norwegian government responded negatively, however, with a communique issued on the national holiday May 17:

... Considering that Norway does not feel herself threatened by Germany, and that Norway, maintaining her principle of neutrality, integrity and independence does not intend to conclude non-aggression pact with any other country, the Norwegian Government has communicated to the Government of the Reich that it does not consider a treaty of the type suggested necessary.¹

A few months earlier, Norway also had rebuffed similar British overtures. As Carl Hambro explained, "... a neutrality guaranteed from one quarter ceases to be neutral if the case arises." Denmark, however, did sign a non-aggression pact with Germany, reflecting the former's essentially indefensible geographic and military position.²

The ominous implications of the Hitler-Stalin Pact led to a hasty meeting of the Scandinavian foreign ministers in Oslo on August 30-31. Once again, they emphasized their intention to remain neutral and to cooperate with each other economically in case of a general war, which
now appeared all but inevitable. Norway's official declaration of
neutrality followed on September 1, putting into effect the specific
rules of navigation established jointly with the other Scandinavian
states the previous year. Germany replied in guarded terms, warning
that it would take steps to protect its interests if necessary. Britain
offered no immediate response.³

The Norwegian cabinet authorized limited mobilization of the
Norwegian Navy beginning on August 28. In order to provide small craft
for picket duties, the Navy requisitioned approximately 50 fishing
smacks and other coastal boats, which received token armament and crews
drawn from reserve personnel. While the provision of watch boats was an
essential measure, however, the overall extent of mobilization was
practically negligible. Although the coastal artillery also mobilized
partially, the batteries received only one-third their normal complement
of personnel. Moreover, the government refused to authorize the laying
of defensive mine-fields. The Army's partial mobilization initially
included four infantry battalions, one artillery battery, a bicycle
company, and six Landvern companies assigned to coastal fortresses.⁴

Two branches that did mobilize fully were aviation and anti-
aircraft artillery. Air raid precautions and civil defense plans took
shape, yet they struck many observers as farcical.⁵ Max Manus later
described Oslo's first big drill with more than a little irony:

Everyone was quite excited; there was a peculiar, almost
dramatic mood over the town. Oslo's entire air defense
organization, with all three searchlights [!], would be
involved. Now we heard the drone of aircraft motors in the
distance, and there came Norway's proud air force: four (or
was it seven?) planes. In any case, it seemed to us that
the place was swarming with them. We had never seen so many
at one time. Don't say the war caught us unprepared.⁶

A German agent conveyed a similar impression when he reported on
the progress of the partial mobilization. "The entire affair proceeds
in a 'Norwegian' manner, that is, in its own good time. Thus, every few
days one reads in the paper that the Commanding Admiral has called up
fifty or perhaps a hundred men." The report admitted that Norwegian
pilots were good flyers but concluded, "It is entirely impossible to compare these people with our standards."  

Reports of unidentified aircraft began flowing into the defense department almost immediately. Although most were probably false alarms, some of them clearly represented airspace violations by the belligerent powers. It was impossible to identify the intruders at high altitude, however; and the handful of Norwegian fighters proved incapable of intercepting them. In order to avoid provocative incidents and civilian casualties from the fall of spent ammunition, standing orders forbade the use of live ammunition against aircraft "unless it is completely clear that they intend to undertake hostile actions against our country." 

Apart from the somewhat greater fear of bombing, the parallels with the situation in World War I were readily apparent and widely appreciated in Norway. Once again, Germany faced the Western Allies in a war at sea, with each side declaring a blockade against the other, placing their respective neutral trading partners in difficult positions. As before, however, the initial anxiety over a possible surprise attack passed fairly quickly once hostilities had commenced without any immediate and direct impact on Norway. As one Oslo newspaper had reasoned in August 1914.

If it had been Germany's purpose to establish herself in Norway it could scarcely be doubted that Germany would have done so immediately when she saw that war with England was inevitable and before the Norwegian authorities had adopted the measures which later were adopted to protect our neutrality.

The same logic seemed valid in 1939, and Foreign Minister Koht offered reassurance in a speech to the Storting on September 8 that he considered the risk of military violations of Norway's neutrality to be considerably less than in the previous war. Koht recognized that both sides would calculate neutral Norway's economic value in a cynical, self-interested manner; and he emphasized the need to offer mutual compensatory benefits to both sides. He was certain, however, that
Germany would not want to sacrifice the important benefits it received from Norwegian neutrality under the status quo. Ultimately, even if the Germans did desire to occupy Norway, there was always the Royal Navy, now relatively even stronger than before; and on 16 September 1939, the British minister in Oslo Cecil Dormer offered private but formal assurance that Britain would intervene if Germany attempted to invade Norway.12

The parallels between 1914 and 1939 were obvious. If Germany had declined to attack Norway in World War I, when it was in a position to challenge the Royal Navy openly (at least under certain circumstances), then the chances of such an attack seemed negligible in 1939-40, when Britain's relative naval superiority was much greater. (See appendix.) In focusing on this obvious calculation, however, the Norwegian leadership (and for that matter, the British) failed to account for the impact of new technology (i.e., air power) on the conduct of war at sea. In fact, as the first few days of the invasion proved, the Royal Navy no longer could operate safely near enemy airbases without strong air cover of its own. The general failure to grasp this fact resulted in a dangerous sense of false security.

NORWAY AND THE ALLIED BLOCKADE, 1939-40

Another basic change the Norwegians failed to grasp was that in 1939-40, the Allies derived much less benefit from Norwegian neutrality than they had in the previous war. In World War I, at least until the Bolshevik Revolution, the Leads had provided a valuable corridor of safety for shipments of war material to Russia. This helped to counterbalance the fact that German freighters also found sanctuary in neutral Scandinavian waters. In 1939-40 the situation was much more to Germany's relative advantage, with Soviet Russia a pro-German neutral and the Leads a gaping loophole in the Allied blockade, as Churchill quickly recognized. Consequently, the Allies had more reason to infringe upon Norway's neutrality than to respect it; yet Norwegian leaders seemed largely oblivious to this fact.13
Norwegian neutrality offered Germany several advantages. First, Norwegian exports of fish, whale oil, and minerals continued to play a significant role in the German economy. Interruption of the supply of these products would not be immediately catastrophic, since the Germans had begun stockpiling them as early as 1936; but they were still a significant factor.

Second, the Norwegian coast offered German shipping protection from the British blockade. German merchantmen which were abroad at the outbreak of war had only to reach the Norwegian coast to find safety, and dozens did so; whereas otherwise, hardly any of them could have slipped through the heavily-patrolled entrances to the North Sea. By the same token, neutral Norway offered a gateway to the high seas for outgoing blockade-runners, including disguised commerce-raiders.

Third, and most important, Norway provided a vital conduit for the export of Swedish iron ore to Germany. Swedish mines at Kiruna and Gallivare had come to play an increasingly vital role in German industry. During the summer, most of the ore travelled overland to the northern Swedish port of Luleå, and thence to Germany by sea. In winter, however, the Gulf of Bothnia froze, blocking that route and leaving only the smaller port of Oxelösund for access to the Baltic. Oxelösund could handle only about 20 percent of the iron ore traffic, and the only other route during those months was by railroad to the port of Narvik in northern Norway, which remains ice-free all year due to the influence of the Gulf Stream. From there, German ore-carriers could travel all the way home in relative safety by remaining inside the Leads.¹⁴

Hitler was well aware of these benefits, and numerous sources indicate that he fully intended to leave Scandinavia alone as long as Britain did the same. There was one other factor, however: the possible value of Norwegian bases for German air and naval operations against the British isles. As early as 3 October 1939, commander-in-chief of the Kriegsmarine Admiral Raeder submitted a memorandum to Hitler, proposing the acquisition of northern bases, either by co-operation with the Soviets or in Norway.¹⁵
In fact, the need for forward bases had emerged as a prominent idea in the development of German naval strategy during the interwar period, most notably in the writings of Admiral Wolfgang Wegener. A contemporary of Raeder, Wegener during World War I had advocated seizing Danish bases in order to break out of the "dead corner" of the North Sea in which the German fleet was confined. In the 1920s, he expanded this idea into more ambitious terms, arguing that to prevail in a naval war with Britain, Germany needed bases in Norway and France as well. Apparently intimidated by Wegener's intellectual qualities, Raeder excluded him from the Kriegsmarine and tried to purge his followers as well; but the idea of Norwegian bases took root nonetheless.16

Hitler shelved Raeder's proposal, at least for the time being, because of the more important advantages of Norwegian neutrality. Until the ambitious 'Z' Plan of naval construction bore fruit, the German fleet would be too weak to gain much benefit from such bases anyway. In the meantime, the neutral Leads offered much surer protection to the vital flow of iron ore.

Across the North Sea, meanwhile, Winston Churchill once again had become First Lord of the Admiralty and was seeking ways to carry the war to the enemy with his characteristic vigor. His attention turned at once to the Baltic, where he hoped to revive Jackie Fisher's old scheme of sending a battle squadron through the Danish belts, thus severing German communications with Scandinavia and drawing that region fully into the Allied camp. This scheme, code-named Operation CATHARINE, failed to account for the effectiveness of German air power, and in retrospect it probably would have been a disaster.17

Churchill continued to focus on Scandinavia, however, and soon grasped the significance of the iron ore traffic to the German war economy. On 19 September 1939, he proposed to the War Cabinet that the Royal Navy lay mines inside Norwegian territorial waters, citing the extension of the Allied northern barrage of 1918 as a precedent. This action would effectively block the route of German freighters by driving them into international waters where the Royal Navy could seize them, thus stopping the flow of iron ore to Germany. Initially, at least, the
other cabinet-members appeared enthusiastic; and Churchill directed the Admiralty to make all preparations for action in the near future.18

At least one other important consideration compelled the British to wait, however: the need to secure the services of Norwegian shipping, particularly tankers, through a comprehensive charter agreement. In September Churchill expressed optimism that the Board of Trade could conclude such an agreement within a few days; but in fact the negotiations dragged on until mid-November, as the Norwegians tried in vain to obtain concessions regarding continued trade with Germany.19

The Board of Trade also met frustration in its effort to monopolize the purchase of iron ore directly from Sweden. In the meantime, the plan to mine the Leads remained on hold.20

Even Churchill himself harbored some doubts over the wisdom of his plan, because of its potential effect on public opinion in other neutral countries, above all the United States. He considered it quite unlikely that Norway would retaliate with economic sanctions or other substantial measures to protest the mining, since prevailing sentiments in Norway were clearly pro-Allied. Yet there appeared to be the risk that such a violation might cede the moral high ground in the eyes of the Americans, whose eventual assistance Churchill already regarded as highly important. Ultimately, he concluded that the repercussions of his plan would not be too severe, "so long as it is unaccompanied by inhumanity of any kind." As one of the few so far who seemed to recognize the gravity of the Nazi threat, he reasoned that

... Small nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and freedom. The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its protection and enforcement. It would not be right or rational that the Aggressor Power should gain one set of advantages by tearing up all laws, and another set by sheltering behind the innate respect for law of its opponents. Humanity, rather than legality, must be our guide.21

Churchill, however, was in no position to dictate Allied strategy, for he had to work within a system hampered by ineffective bureaucracy.
wishful thinking, and indecision. Time and again throughout winter 1939-40, caution prevailed over efforts to take the initiative.\textsuperscript{22} By the time Britain had obtained the charter of Norwegian shipping in November, the northern Baltic had begun to freeze and the winter ore traffic through Narvik was in full swing. Nevertheless, it appeared preferable to await some valid pretext, if such were likely to arise in the near future; and in late 1939, events seemed headed in that direction.

At the beginning of November, the American steamer \textit{City of Flint} entered Norwegian waters on the way to Germany, with a prize crew on board after being captured by the pocket battleship \textit{Deutschland}. At first the Norwegians dared not intervene, even though the Germans clearly had seized the ship in violation of neutral rights. International law offered no clear guide to Norway's rights or responsibilities in such a case, and the government concluded that it could not interfere as long as the ship remained underway. When the \textit{City of Flint} anchored briefly at Haugesund on November 3, however, the Norwegian minelayer \textit{Olay Tryggvason} promptly sent a boarding party and took the Germans into custody, turning the ship back over to its American crew. Germany responded with grave threats, and although the Hague Convention clearly mandated the Norwegian action, the incident seemed to indicate a pro-Allied tilt in Norwegian policy regarding the Leads.\textsuperscript{23}

As if to compensate for the outcome of the \textit{City of Flint} affair, in another case later that same month the Norwegians granted an exception favorable to Germany. The German naval auxiliary \textit{Westerwald}, also enroute to Germany, sought to pass through the Bergen naval district while staying inside the three-mile limit. Article 2 of Norway's official rules of neutrality prohibited warships from entering coastal defense zones, of which Bergen was one. The Germans of course maintained that the \textit{Westerwald} was not a warship; but a close inspection, as called for by Norwegian regulations, surely would have revealed otherwise. In order to avoid provoking Germany further, Koht and the naval commander-in-chief overruled the local commander and permitted the \textit{Westerwald} to proceed without an inspection. Among other
things, the incident had a depressing effect on morale in the Norwegian Navy, blotting out much of the pride over the Olay Tryggvason's recent action.24

Several further incidents in early December seemed to indicate that the Germans were determined to have it both ways in the Leads, demanding sanctuary for the own ships while denying the same to others. On December 8, 11, and 13, U-boats sank one Greek and two British merchant ships just off the Norwegian coast. In fact, only one of the British ships was definitely inside the three-mile limit.25 Regardless, the British seized upon these losses as grounds for further pressure, with a warning to Norway on 6 January 1940 that seemed to lay the diplomatic groundwork for Churchill's mine-laying plan:

German naval forces have made Norwegian waters a theater of war and have in practice deprived them of their neutral character. . . . His Majesty's Government are, therefore, taking appropriate dispositions to prevent the use of Norwegian territorial waters by German ships and trade. To achieve this purpose it would be necessary to enter and operate in those waters.26

Yet again, no immediate action followed, for additional developments seemed about to provide an even more favorable solution to the problem.

REPERCUSSIONS OF THE RUSSO-FINNISH WINTER WAR

On 30 November 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Finland, following the Finns' refusal to comply fully with an ultimatum demanding territorial concessions on the approaches to Leningrad. Germany made no protest, in keeping with the terms of the Hitler-Stalin pact, which had assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere of control.27 Although Allied and neutral sympathies lay overwhelmingly with Finland, a rapid and total Soviet victory appeared inevitable.28 During December and early January, however, the heavily outnumbered and under-equipped Finns repulsed the attackers on all fronts, inflicting huge losses on the poorly-prepared Soviet Army, whose organization still was largely a shambles in the aftermath of Stalin's purges.29
The Winter War had important repercussions for Norway in several respects. For one, it helped to bridge the gap between Labor and the bourgeois parties, by uniting them in outrage against this latest case of aggression. Even before the Winter War, the Hitler-Stalin pact had produced such feelings of betrayal that only a tiny fraction of the most fanatical Norwegian communists remained loyal or even sympathetic to Moscow. When the rump League of Nations voted to expel the Soviet Union in December 1939, at the urging of Carl Hambro who had just become President of the Assembly. Norwegian support for the gesture was virtually unanimous. The Nygaardsvold government still stopped short of declaring war on the Soviet Union, partly because the Germans warned they would intervene if either Norway or Sweden abandoned their neutrality to side openly with Finland. In any case, the Norwegian military seemed far too weak even to defend its own territory, let alone muster an expeditionary force. The almost universal condemnation of Soviet aggression did help to dispel some of the chronic opposition between the Norwegian military and the Labor party, however, and prompted further emergency defense appropriations by the Storting.

Given the uncertainty over Soviet intentions, the Norwegian Defense Minister Monsen had warned General Laake as early as 10 October 1939 to prepare for precautionary mobilization of the 6th Division, the northernmost military district facing the Finnish border. Although Norway at that time had no direct border with the Soviet Union, only a narrow strip of Finnish territory lay in between; and the list of Soviet demands included this area. Norwegian defenses in the region were minimal, despite the relatively high priority they received in the anemic prewar budgets. The sparse population in Finnmark supported only two local units, the Alta and Varanger infantry battalions; and the government could not keep these on active duty for any extended period without inflicting serious economic hardship on the associated families and communities. A shortage of cold weather barracks would also be an obstacle to mid-winter mobilization. Nevertheless, it was imperative to maintain at least a viable neutrality watch, to monitor possible Soviet violations or, as soon became necessary, to disarm and intern Finnish troops forced to seek refuge across the border. Moreover, the Norwegian
legation in Berlin conveyed rumors that the Soviets intended to pursue further annexations of Norwegian territory once Finnish resistance had collapsed, a possibility which Koht took seriously. The Norwegian Army presented the cabinet with alarming intelligence reports that indicated 50-60,000 Russian troops in the Murmansk area. "The most likely case," wrote Laake,

"indeed the most reasonable--is to assume that the attack will include northern Norway, and not merely East Finnmark or Finnmark in its entirety. The greatest likelihood is that the attack will encompass all of northern Norway, at least as far south as Narvik. The latter seems to be the most probable strategic objective."

In light of these dire warnings, the government in mid-December authorized the 6th Division commander, General Fleischer, to send two additional battalions to East Finnmark. Combined with the Alta Battalion, a motorized artillery battery, and a detachment of scout aircraft, the reinforcements formed a brigade and established patrols and observation posts along the border and coast. Despite the difficulty of such operations in winter, the troops also constructed field fortifications, in case the Soviets crossed the frontier in strength.

In the midst of this crisis, Monsen meanwhile had fallen ill again, and for several weeks Koht functioned as temporary Defense Minister in addition to his normal post as Foreign Minister. The cabinet soon concluded, however, that the situation called for a professional officer to replace Monsen. The most likely candidates seemed to be Fleischer or Ruge. The former, however, was already playing a crucial role in command of the 6th Division; and although Ruge had a record of reasonably good relations with the Labor party in the past, the cabinet apparently feared that he would prove too difficult to manage. Instead, Nygaardsvold and Koht selected a relative non-entity, Colonel Birger Ljungberg. Although a competent regimental officer, he had no outstanding qualifications for the job other than his lack of emphatic political views or influence. What the cabinet wanted was a
technocrat who would attend to the routine administration of the military without trying to interfere in policy. Nygaardsvold told Ljungberg this bluntly on the day he took office, 22 December 1939. "There is a lot [of technical paperwork] to take care of, and our defense affairs need to be handled in an orderly and expeditious manner. In my view, this is what you need to concern yourself with. We will deal with and take responsibility for policy." Ljungberg accepted this stipulation and thus from the outset played only a limited, strictly subordinate role in the cabinet. The contrast with Holtfodt's energetic leadership in the previous war is striking, and the consequences were disastrous. Even at the time, at least one member of the government apparently had some forebodings. Minister of justice Trygve Lie later wrote,

Where is the boundary for a defense minister between administrative and political matters? How can a cabinet minister responsible for the preparedness of national defense in a period of crisis fulfill his mission without also having a say in the political circumstances and outlook for the future? I do not believe it was wise to limit the new Defense Minister's responsibility and authority . . .

Despite the General Staff's alarming intelligence reports, the Winter War ultimately resulted in no serious breaches of Norway's neutrality, for in fact the Soviets had no immediate designs on Norwegian territory. Soviet aircraft violated Norwegian airspace on numerous occasions, however; and although official apologies usually followed, Fleischer soon demanded more flexible rules of engagement. The government finally agreed to lift the ban on live ammunition on March 5, just before the Finnish armistice.

Fleischer's troops rendered assistance to approximately 1,200 Finnish refugees who crossed the border to escape the Soviet advance, as well as interning about 80 Finnish soldiers. Despite the official policy of neutrality, private Norwegian citizens also formed a volunteer battalion of about 725 men to fight in Finland. The Norwegian Army was reluctant to grant foreign leave to officers, due to the critical shortage in Norwegian units; but the General Staff eventually decided to
release a limited number, lest Norwegian volunteers be forced to serve under foreign officers.\footnote{40}

After a brief period of training, the battalion joined a brigade of Swedish volunteers on the front at Salla, just north of the Arctic Circle. Temperatures of minus forty degrees centigrade and Soviet bombardments soon reduced the unit to only about 125 men, mainly through the hasty departure of the less resolute volunteers who had not reckoned with the harsh reality of war when they decided to join up. The remainder stuck it out, however, and fought a number of small unit actions in the closing weeks of the war. Finally, they repulsed a battalion-strength probing attack just before the ceasefire in March 1940, which cost the Soviets over 100 dead.\footnote{41}

In the closing weeks of the war, the Norwegian government also provided the Finns with twelve 75-mm guns and ancillary equipment. In return, the Norwegian Army obtained numerous reports of how the Finns had managed to halt tanks by various expedients such as hand grenades and molotov cocktails.\footnote{42}

Until the armistice there remained the possibility of Western Allied intervention on Finland's behalf. In retrospect, it would seem the height of folly for the Western Allies to have contemplated war with the Soviet Union, thus perhaps driving Hitler and Stalin into even closer co-operation. At the time, however, it appeared that the Soviet Union already had become a \textit{de facto} member of the Axis; and throughout the "Phony War" prior to the catastrophes of 1940, the Western Allies generally did not appreciate the gravity of their situation \textit{vis à vis} Germany.

The only way substantial Allied assistance could reach Finland was by landing at Narvik and passing overland through northern Sweden. Churchill immediately grasped the significance of this possibility for the iron ore problem. "If Narvik was to become a kind of Allied base to supply the Finns," he wrote, "it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to Germany."\footnote{43} In fact, the prospect of establishing a theater of operations in Scandinavia became the Allies' main hope for avoiding another deadlock on the Western Front.
The obvious sympathy for Finland in Norway and Sweden seemed to suggest that they would soon grant passage, and the prospect of such voluntary cooperation appealed greatly to British cabinet-members who lacked the stomach for a unilateral violation of neutrality. In consequence, the Allied governments clung to a "wait and see" attitude after Norway and Sweden rejected an initial proposal on 27 December 1939. Churchill continued to urge the immediate implementation of his mine-field plan, pointing out that the window of opportunity was closing with every passing day of winter: but the prevailing argument remained, "Don't spoil the big plan for the sake of the small." The French were particularly eager to turn Scandinavia into a major theater of operations, rather than simply blocking the Leads, hoping thereby to divert the impending German western offensive.

From the neutrals' point of view, the Allied proposal offered only disaster. They did agree to the passage of war material and private volunteers, but Germany had made clear that it would retaliate severely to any entry of Allied troops into Scandinavia. Combined with the danger of provoking the Soviets, this more than cancelled out any potential security the Allies might offer. Thus, when the Allies sought a definite answer through confidential inquiries on 2 March 1940, Norway and Sweden refused. A formal appeal by Finland might yet have put the Allied plan in motion, with profound consequences for the course of the war; but the matter finally expired when Finnish government instead agreed to Soviet terms on March 12. The Allies then promptly abandoned most of their preparations for the expedition.

In the face of the possible Allied expedition, the Norwegian and Swedish general staffs held secret conferences on 7-8 January 1940, again just before the Finnish armistice in March, and again on April 3-4 to discuss co-ordinated operations and mutual assistance. The Swedes held that in the event of an Allied landing, "German intervention [in context, assistance] is not ruled out, but should not be accepted before the western powers' attack has begun." Whatever the private opinions of the Norwegian officers involved in this discussion, they must have experienced some doubts over the strategic wisdom, let alone the
political viability, of an alliance with Sweden and Germany against the western powers.

The Finnish crisis thus confronted Norway with a profound dilemma. Conflicting with the desire to help Finland was the conviction that Norway must remain neutral. Above all else, however, remained the private determination of Koht and his colleagues that whatever else happened, they must never blunder into a war with Britain. As Koht later explained,

I shared with the great majority of my fellow-countrymen the conviction that Norway could never ally itself with Nazi Germany. [But] I wanted nobody to know that I thought in this manner. No party ought to be able to reckon with me or with my country as a certain associate in its fight. Otherwise no neutrality would be possible. But in the war raging between Germany and the Western Powers I never for a moment hesitated about what decision to take if Norway should be definitely compelled to choose. All moral and material considerations, her democratic ideals as well as her seafaring interests, drove her to the side of Great Britain. We had to resist all attempts against our neutrality as long and as hard as possible, but never go to the wrong side, that of tyranny and aggression.49

Following the Allied diplomatic notes of March 2, the Norwegian cabinet had to reckon with the possibility that the Allies would attempt to land regardless of whether they had permission. In this event, Koht concluded, "we ought to content ourselves with a protest." Nygaardsvold agreed, and thus the garrisons at Narvik and other likely landing points received no orders to prepare an active defense. It hardly occurred to anyone that the arriving soldiers might be German instead of British.50

THE INCEPTION OF OPERATION WESERÜBUNG

By the end of the Winter War, Hitler already had come to the conclusion that the British would soon take over Norway, and that Germany must therefore strike first. Although Norwegian neutrality remained advantageous for the same reasons outlined above, several factors eventually changed the Führer's mind. As the planned offensive
in the West experienced successive delays in the autumn and winter of 1939-40. Admiral Raeder continued to argue the need for naval bases on the Norwegian coast, to support a blockade strategy against Britain. In December Raeder met with Vidkun Quisling, through the latter's previous contact with Alfred Rosenberg, head of the Nazi Party's Foreign Political Office. Following the almost total demise of his Nasional Samling party in Norway, Quisling had turned to Germany for encouragement and financial subsidies. In Berlin, he claimed that the Nygaardsvold government already had made secret plans to throw in with Britain, while greatly exaggerating his own stature as leader of a pro-German opposition. Raeder arranged for Quisling to meet Hitler on two occasions, December 14 and 18; and these interviews led to the creation of a small OKW planning staff to draft STUDIE NORD, a general appreciation of the situation as a basis for further contingency planning.

After reviewing STUDIE NORD in January, the Naval Staff recommended strongly against any move on Norway, arguing that a unilateral British occupation was unlikely. In any case, the Royal Navy's superiority would pose unacceptable hazards to a German landing operation. Raeder acknowledged the risks but directed that planning proceed anyway, if only as a precaution against unforeseen developments. Further delays in the western offensive and increasing concern over the possibility of Allied action renewed Hitler's interest, and at the end of January he ordered the creation of an inter-service staff to make detailed (although still tentative) plans for the occupation of Norway, under the code-name Operation WESERÜBUNG.

In February, another naval incident provided the decisive evidence in Hitler's mind that Germany could derive little further benefit from Norwegian neutrality. Following the destruction of the pocket battleship Graf Spee in the South Atlantic, the supply ship Altmark had made its way carefully back toward Germany with a load of British prisoners, avoiding Allied patrols by virtue of indirect routes and poor weather. Upon reaching the Norwegian coast, the Altmark proceeded south through the Leads, escorted by a pair of Norwegian torpedo boats. According to the Norwegian neutrality guard regulations, the ship could
not pass through the Bergen naval zone without undergoing a full inspection; but the German captain refused to allow it. Nevertheless, the prisoners managed to attract the attention of a Norwegian officer on deck by pounding an SOS signal on pipes and gesturing through open ventilators. When the local Norwegian commander Captain Stamsø reported this to Oslo and requested instructions, Diesen decided not to press the issue. As he later wrote to Ljungberg:

I was informed [of the German refusal to allow a further search], but concluded in accordance with the decision in the Westerwald affair that I could not insist on further inspection, which in the event would have required force. I therefore ordered the 2nd Sea Defense District to let the ship pass in its capacity as a naval auxiliary.

With the approval of the Foreign Secretary, Churchill then ordered a destroyer flotilla under Captain Philip Vian to enter Norwegian territorial waters and free the prisoners, even if this should lead to an engagement with the Norwegian escorts. On the night of February 16-17, HMS Cossack pursued the Altmark into the Jøssingfiord southeast of Egersund, brushing aside the protests of the Norwegian escorts. The Norwegians held their fire, later claiming force majeure; and the only casualties of the operation were several Germans killed or wounded in a firefight with the British boarding party.

In the aftermath of the Altmark incident, the British and Norwegians defended their respective actions and forbearance in terms of legalistic hair-splitting over the precise implications of neutral rights and responsibilities. The Storting meanwhile appropriated the relatively colossal sum of two hundred million kroner for further emergency defense measures on February 22, in apparent recognition of how dangerous the situation had become; but by this point the money was far too late.

All of this was irrelevant to Hitler, because the affair had revealed two basic facts: Britain would not be bound by legal arguments, and Norway would not resist British violations with force. As one Norwegian officer put it, "A single shot at this point might have spared
the country from the catastrophe of war. Our conduct made plain to the entire world that we were unable--or unwilling--to fulfill our obligations as a neutral state." The event also seemed to confirm Quisling's claims that the Nygaardsvold government was pro-British. Churchill seems not to have appreciated the full significance of such a flagrant breach of Norwegian neutrality. Focusing instead upon the dramatic but relatively insignificant objective of freeing the 300 prisoners, he showed his hand too early, suggesting an ironic parallel with the premature appearance of Allied warships off the Dardanelles in 1915.59

As a direct result of the Altmark incident, Hitler increased the tempo of preparations for WESERÜBUNG and on February 20 appointed General Nikolaus von Falkenhorst as commander of the operation. As evidence accumulated in early March that the Allies were on the verge of launching their expedition on the pretext of aid to Finland, the Germans scrambled to prepare their own operation at a frenzied pace.60 Following the Russo-Finnish armistice of March 12, the apparent cancellation of the Allied plan caused some degree of relaxation. Nevertheless, Hitler ordered the Wehrmacht to proceed with preparations for the Norwegian operation, because he was convinced that further British interference would make Norway "a permanent seat of unrest" unless Germany took prompt, decisive military action.61

Although many officers argued that WESERÜBUNG should wait at least until after FALL GELB (the western offensive), operational considerations drove the plan forward. The Kriegsmarine had already suspended other operations as early as March 4, in order to accumulate a "surge" of U-boats off Norway; and by mid-April, the arctic nights would become too short to cover the approach of the northern landing forces. Persistent ice jams in the Danish belts imposed a further delay in late March, but on April 2 Hitler reached a definite decision, ordering WESERÜBUNG to commence one week later, on April 9.62

The Germans went to great lengths to preserve secrecy, because the operation depended heavily on surprise. The first wave of the assault would involve landings at six crucial points, timed to coincide at 0545 (WESERZEIT) on April 9. The Narvik force, designated Group 1, consisted
of the lightly-equipped 139th Regiment (2,000 troops) of the 3rd Mountain Division, carried aboard 10 destroyers, with the battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau as a covering force. It clearly would be difficult to reinforce this group once the British reacted, but supplies would be available from the holds of pre-positioned transports posing as empty ore-carriers and the whaling factory ship Jan Wellem. Unless the British got there first, the Germans expected little or no initial resistance.

The 3rd Division's other regiment, the 138th, would land at Trondheim with 1,700 men from the heavy cruiser Hipper and 4 destroyers, designated Group 2. There the Norwegian defenses might pose a greater danger, due to the presence of the old fortress of Agdenes at the mouth of the fjord; but the Germans counted on bluff and confusion to carry them through, plus suppressing fire from the warships if necessary.

Group 3 at Bergen consisted of the light cruisers Köln and Königsberg, the auxiliaries Bremse and Karl Peters, 3 torpedo boats, and 5 E-boats, carrying 2 battalions (1,900 men) of the 69th Infantry Division. As at Trondheim, Norwegian coastal batteries might offer some resistance; but surprise should give the invaders a crucial edge. To the south, 2 more battalions of the same division would land by air to occupy Stavanger, after a Luftwaffe parachute company had captured the crucial Sola airfield, which the Germans knew was virtually defenseless.

On the south coast of Norway, Group 4 would occupy Kristiansand with a reinforced battalion (1,100 men) of the 163rd Infantry Division, carried and supported by the light cruiser Karlsruhe, the auxiliary Tsingtau, three torpedo boats, and seven E-boats. This group would also make a subsidiary landing at the adjacent port of Arendal, while to the west the separate Group 6 (150 men aboard four minesweepers) occupied the cable station at Egersund.

Finally, the hub of the entire operation would rest on the successful landing of Group 5 at Oslo, through which the bulk of all reinforcements must pass to complete the occupation. There more than anywhere else, the Germans counted on surprise to execute a coup de main. The naval forces consisted of the newly commissioned heavy cruiser Blücher, the pocket battleship Lützow, the light cruiser Emden.
three torpedo boats, and eight minesweepers, carrying two battalions (2,000 men) of the 163rd Infantry Division, plus various administrative detachments. Their objective was to dash past the old but potentially dangerous Norwegian fortress of Oscarsborg, in order to seize the capital at dawn, before the government could organize any resistance or even understand what was happening. In support of the naval landing, two parachute companies were to seize Fornebu airfield (which lies immediately adjacent to the city), after which Luftwaffe transports would fly in two more battalions of the 163rd Division.54

Due to the limited space available aboard the warships, the initial landing forces amounted to a total of only 8,850 men—hardly adequate to overcome a prepared defense. With surprise, however, the invaders once ashore could quickly dislocate resistance by occupying most of the major Norwegian military installations. To consolidate the main bridgehead at Oslo, 8,000 additional German troops would arrive by air within the first three days; and 16,700 more would arrive by sea transport within the first week, with 40,000 more to follow. Although all of the Army units involved except for the mountain divisions were reserve formations, by the time the operation commenced they had achieved a high pitch of training and combat-readiness, in marked contrast to their opponents. Nearly every German unit down to the company level included members familiar with the Norwegian language and geography, many of whom had spent extended periods in the country before the war as Wienerbarn (Austrian war orphans sheltered temporarily by Norwegian families after World War I) or Wandervögel. Above all, the Germans had clear orders and objectives, and a determination to achieve them by whatever means necessary, however ruthless.65

To support the occupation of Norway and to assure control of the Skaggerak, Hitler also had decided to occupy Denmark, with an operation code-named WESERÜBUNG SÜD. Since the Danish military was a negligible quantity, the German 170th and 198th Infantry Divisions and the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade should have little difficulty in securing the country within two days, aided by small-scale airborne and naval landings to seize the crucial bridges over the Belts intact. Airfields in northern Jutland would provide an essential staging area for aircraft
flying sorties to Norway. Luftwaffe forces committed to the operation included approximately 1,000 aircraft of the X Air Corps, of the following types: 500 transports (Ju-52), 290 bombers (He-111 and Ju-88), 70 twin-engine fighters (Me-110), 40 dive-bombers (Ju-87), 40 long-range reconnaissance, 30 coastal reconnaissance (flying boats), and 30 single-engine fighters (Me-109).

Granted initial success, the final outcome of WESERÜBUNG would depend on whether the Oslo forces could link up with the other groups quickly enough to prevent the latter from being overwhelmed by Allied counterattacks. The British seemed to be the only major threat, for if all went according to plan the Norwegian King, government, and communications all would be in German hands within the first few hours, thus ending any chance for organized resistance before it could. With luck, Hitler hoped for another bloodless occupation on the Austrian model.

"Every member of the Wehrmacht," a directive emphasized, "must realize that he is not entering an enemy country, but rather that the troops are intervening in Norway to protect the country and its inhabitants." The challenge would be to convince the Norwegians of this. In retrospect, as the Germans themselves later concluded, the operational directives for WESERÜBUNG placed too much emphasis on the assumption that the Norwegians would offer no resistance, although this may have been necessary at least to some extent in order to inspire confidence in such a risky plan.

In general, German intelligence on the composition and character of the Norwegian military was excellent. For example, Abwehr reports indentified practically every one of the crucial problems that troubled conscientious Norwegian military leaders, including the shortage of officers, the lack of modern artillery, the ambiguous mission of the neutrality guard units. The conclusions, however, went a bit too far. "Against an attack by army units of a great power," stated one report, "the Norwegian Army can offer no significant resistance." Yet despite repeated efforts, the Abwehr failed to learn the exact nature of the Norwegian neutrality forces' rules of engagement; and the invaders remained uncertain over the actual armament and condition of several of
the coastal fortresses. Thus, some unpleasant surprises awaited the Germans as well as the Norwegians on WESERTAG.\textsuperscript{70}

BELATED IMPLEMENTATION OF BRITISH MINING OPERATION

On the other side, meanwhile, the Allies finally mustered enough resolve to put Churchill's long-delayed mining operation into effect. On March 28 the Anglo-French Supreme War Council resolved in favor; and on April 3, the British cabinet made its final decision to go ahead. Ironically, it was already too late to have much impact on the flow of iron ore, since the Baltic ice would soon melt and the Luleå route would be available again until the following autumn. By then, the Germans probably would have stockpiled enough ore to last through the winter of 1940-41 even with the Narvik route closed. As Churchill ruefully observed, "One can hardly find a more perfect example of the impotence and fatuity of waging war by committee or rather by groups of committees."\textsuperscript{71}

Nevertheless, the First Lord and his colleagues still hoped to accrue some benefit by challenging Germany in a region where the Royal Navy's power seemed decisive. On April 5, apparently buoyed by the prospect of positive action, Neville Chamberlain made an optimistic speech in which he remarked that Hitler had "missed the bus."\textsuperscript{72}

Churchill elected to call the mining operating WILFRED, after a popular cartoon character of the day, in reference to the idea that the action itself was innocent and harmless. The immediate forces involved were indeed small, with only a few destroyers to perform the actual mine-laying--one field near Narvik, and another farther south, between Trondheim and Bergen. When the Admiralty learned on April 5 that the Norwegians had stationed their two armored coast-defense ships at Narvik, however, the battlecruiser Renown joined the operation to provide cover, insuring that the Norwegian Navy would not risk a confrontation. Finally, in anticipation of possible German reactions against Norway, elements of the 49th Infantry Division remained on standby alert, ready to sail for Norwegian ports on short notice. Code-named R.4, the contingency plan envisioned landings at Narvik.
Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger to forestall German occupation of these vital points; but the cabinet refused to authorize any such action until German action against Norway was irrefutably imminent. In retrospect, this was a crucial mistake, because it left the initiative to the Germans. At the time, however, the decision seemed sound, given the understandable but mistaken assumption that the Royal Navy's superiority would assure what one later would call "escalation control" as the situation developed.

FAILURE OF ALLIED AND NORWEGIAN INTELLIGENCE

Allied intelligence failed to piece together what in retrospect seem obvious clues of the German invasion, until it was too late. Probably the single most definite and accurate warning came early on April 6 from the British minister to Denmark, who received information by way of the U.S. ambassador that Hitler had ordered an operation to occupy Narvik and Denmark, to commence on the 8th. The British Foreign Office rejected this, however, noting that "A German descent on Narvik is surely out of the question"; and Naval Intelligence assumed that the report must have mistaken Narvik for Larvik, a port in southern Norway near the mouth of the Oslofjord. Even when RAF reconnaissance aircraft reported German warships moving north on April 7-8, the Admiralty concluded that this could only mean an attempted breakout to the North Atlantic. Accordingly, even though the Home Fleet put to sea from Scapa Flow, it failed to intercept the German groups closing on the Norwegian coast, except for the destroyer H.M.S. Glowworm's chance encounter with the Hipper off Trondheim. Sightings of German ships in the Kattegat and Skaggerak by Allied submarines, including the sinking of a troop-laden transport on the 8th, provided further evidence that a landing was imminent; but the muddled organization of British intelligence and command failed to assess and convey the information in time for it to be of value. Only on the morning of the 9th, with the Germans already ashore in Norway, did the truth finally dawn; and by then the Royal Navy already had missed its best opportunity to thwart the invasion.

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If Britain's extensive intelligence organization failed to recognize WESERÜBUNG in time, then it probably is not surprising that the Norwegians failed as well. Nevertheless, the government in Oslo did receive numerous indications of the impending danger in the days leading up to April 9. On April 5 the Allies conveyed their evidence of the general concentration of German troops and shipping in northern ports, and that same day the Norwegian legation in Berlin sent an urgent telegram to Oslo warning that an invasion was imminent. By this time, however, the Foreign Minister had come to regard this source as a boy who cried wolf. On Christmas eve 1939, acting on a warning from Berlin, the government had placed the Navy on the highest state of alert and ordered the coastal forts fully manned, only to find that it had been a false alarm. A similar case followed in February 1940; and thus, the final warning in early April gained little attention. Short of general mobilization, there did not seem to be much the government could do. Koht later defended the cabinet's inaction as follows.

In certain accounts the fact that the Army was not mobilized has been unduly stressed. But until just before the invasion there seemed to be no need for a general mobilisation. In fact, there was good reason to believe that the country was comparatively well protected against aggression from the south, and as to the western and northern part of the country, it might be thought that the British fleet, operating in the North Sea and even farther north, would be able to prevent any attack coming from Germany. As a consequence, the rumours of German plans could evoke no particular panic.

"The Germans," he admitted, "themselves gave a kind of warning in the way peculiar to them." That night, April 5, the German legation in Oslo showed an assemblage of important Norwegian guests a film of the bombardment of Warsaw with the conclusion, "For this they could thank their English and French friends." The implied threat to Norway was obvious, but Koht and his colleagues failed to draw definite conclusions." Colonel Hans Oster of the Abwehr apparently attempted meanwhile to warn the Scandinavians of the impending invasion by way of the Dutch military attache in Berlin. Major Sas; but the Dutch and
Danish diplomatic apparatus failed to take the tip seriously or pass it on the Norwegians. 78

The Norwegian leaders' attention remained fixed on Britain, whose minister to Oslo Cecil Dormer gave them something else to consider on April 5: an official diplomatic note warning that the Allies now intended to tighten their blockade of Germany through further naval action. This note was the diplomatic prelude to Operation WILFRED, which commenced on the morning of the 8th, followed by a further British statement justifying the action. The Norwegian government spent the rest of the day drafting its official protest and debating the situation in the Storting, almost totally oblivious to the simultaneous events foreshadowing the German attack. Oslo newspapers on April 8 reported the sinking of the Rio de Janeiro off the south coast, complete with the survivors' admission that they were enroute to Bergen; and the Norwegian legation in London conveyed the latest British reports of German warships heading north.

On April 5, 6, and 8, the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Hatledal, attempted to bypass Laake by appealing directly to Ljungberg for the immediate mobilization of at least the field brigades in southern Norway. The Defense Minister, however, merely instructed Hatledal to have the staff prepare an estimate of what this would cost. The rest of the cabinet did not learn of Hatledal's alarm until April 8, nor did Ljungberg or Koht inform any of their colleagues of the various warnings their departments received on April 5-8 from diplomatic sources regarding the movement of ships from Germany. 79 In his determination to avoid being drawn into the war "on the wrong side," he apparently feared that mobilization would cause the Norwegian forces to fight the British, who he expected to occupy the western ports at almost any moment. After the war, Laake attempted to explain the failure to mobilize. "The government counted on England, and . . . it assumed that there would be no hostilities on land [in Norway]. If a German attack came, England would help us to repulse it, and if there came an English attack, we were not to fight." 80 In any case, neither he nor Diesen exerted any significant pressure on the cabinet to mobilize. Koht meanwhile apparently believed that Norway's southern coast was quite well-
defended, a misconception that demonstrates both his ignorance of military affairs and Ljungberg's failure to provide any meaningful orientation. Nor did Nygaardsvold provide any effective leadership. As the postwar investigation concluded,

The Prime Minister should have gathered the [reins of] foreign and defense policy in his hands and conducted it with strength and initiative, as [he did] previously with domestic policy. This did not occur. Koht continued in his department, Ljungberg in his, and the military chiefs in their offices. There was in these days no unification of these authorities, and the Prime Minister was not in the picture.81

In response to the now-numerous reports of German ships in the Kattegat on April 8, the cabinet did authorize the limited mobilization of a few battalions in the Østfold district, southeast of Oslo; and the Navy went on alert status, mainly on the initiative of the district commanders in the absence of orders from Diesen.82 On adjourning that evening about 2000, however, the cabinet instructed the General Staff to go home for the night; the government would continue its deliberations the next day, but in the meantime there would be no further decision regarding mobilization. One officer described the reaction to this news: "The first impression was horror, then almost rage. If we had understood little of the government's attitude earlier that day, we now understood nothing. Troops of two foreign great powers stood on the country's threshold, and nothing was going to be done."83 Only a few hours later, the Oslo air raid sirens signalled the beginning of the German attack; and the cabinet hastily re-assembled at the Foreign Ministry. WESERÜBUNG was in full swing.84

STATE OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES ON THE EVE OF INVASION

The overall picture which emerges of Norway on the eve of the invasion is one of confusion and disarray. Preoccupied with the latest British violation of Norwegian waters and further possible actions to follow, the Nygaardsvold cabinet gave the military virtually no warning
to prepare for combat. The cabinet seemed paralyzed by uncertainty, and the military chiefs shared the failure of their civilian colleagues. Colonel Birger Ljungberg had recently replaced Monsen as Defense Minister, but Ljungberg's professional background seemed to confer little insight. The Commanding General of the Army remained Kristian Laake, Mowinckel's ineffectual political appointee of the 1930s. Ironically, Laake's 65th birthday fell on 9 April 1940; and on the eve of retirement he failed utterly to grasp the fact that the institution to which he had devoted his career was about to face its supreme test. Only the Navy, under Commanding Admiral Diesen, and Fleischer's brigade in Finnmark were on anything like a war footing prior to the invasion.

In comparison, the Norwegian defenses in April 1940 presented only a pale reflection of the deterrent forces arrayed in 1914-18. Since September 1939, the Storting had provided further emergency funds to make up for lost time in reviving the military; but six months later, most of the projected improvements were still in the pipeline. Furthermore, although many Norwegian officers did everything they could to prepare their units for war, economy remained a major consideration; and a dismaying sense of complacency hampered essential preparations.

One critical aspect of defense that drew considerable but belated attention was aviation. An initial consignment of Curtiss P-36 Hawks finally arrived in Norway about the end of March, along with several American technicians. On April 9 these still lay mostly cratered and unassembled at Kjeller airfield, none yet operational. The specially-designed Northrop N3P float-planes, meanwhile, were still in production. Had Norway placed its order for these a year earlier, they might well have been in service to track the approach of the invasion groups in April 1940. An order for eight MTBs from Britain, which might have proved formidable weapons against German ships in confined waters, also came too late. The only imported arms of any consequence to reach Norway in time for action in 1940 were a dozen Gloster Gladiators from Britain, obsolescent biplanes that the RAF already considered surplus. These comprised Norway's single fighter squadron, based at Fornebu.

One of the most dismaying oversights on the Norwegians' part was their failure to defend the airfields, especially Fornebu and Sola. The
batteries of the Army's anti-aircraft regiment were scattered among a variety of targets that seemed most exposed to bombardment, but these did not include the airfields, whose only defenses were a handful of relatively useless machine guns.88

The Army took little if any notice of the possibility of a parachute assault, although a professional officers' journal presented at least one report of such developments abroad, shortly before the war.89 The Defense Department did recognize that there was nothing to prevent hostile aircraft from simply landing unopposed at Sola and debarking troops directly onto the runway; and engineers drew up plans for a pair of concrete pillboxes for 20-mm guns. The project languished until the outbreak of war, when a concerned civilian, ship-owner Thomas Olsen, offered to finance construction of the emplacements out of his own pocket. The Defense Department accepted the offer and ordered the Army engineers to proceed with construction as soon as possible; yet no guns were in place by April 9.90

The 3rd Division meanwhile made other preparations to block the runways at Sola and Kjevik (the airfield near Kristiansand) with physical obstacles. Since the airfields must remain open to friendly traffic unless directly threatened with capture, the plans called for removable barriers that could be pulled across the runways on short notice. Due to an alleged "slip of the pen," however, the barriers at Kjevik turned out to be too short to cover the full width of the runway; and those at Sola remained incomplete on 9 April 1940, even though the Commanding General had authorized their construction seven months earlier. There is no indication of any plans at all to block Fornebu.91

The coastal artillery batteries, probably the most crucial link in the defenses, remained only partially manned; and the cabinet still had not given permission to lay defensive mine-fields, an essential precaution for barring the approaches to the crucial ports. According to some accounts, the cabinet specifically ordered some of the coastal defenses not to fire on Allied ships, which allegedly caused confusion and hesitation at several points on April 9, notably Kristiansand. No documentary evidence of such an order (before the invasion began) ever
has come to light, however, although the Germans ransacked captured Norwegian records in search of it.\textsuperscript{92}

Although the Navy and coast artillery had been in service more-or-less continually since the outbreak of the war, they faced serious obstacles to effective training. In order to provide neutrality patrols, the Navy had to spread its handful of vessels so thinly that there were almost no opportunities for tactical exercises; nor did the coastal fortresses find scope for any significant maneuvers or target practice.\textsuperscript{93}

The coastal forts also remained nearly devoid of covering troops. According to mobilization plans, only a handful of Landvergn companies were slated for this critical task; and even had everything gone smoothly, there would have been a delay of several days before the troops arrived at the forts. At the outbreak of the war in September 1939, the partial mobilization of the neutrality guard forces did include six of the Landvergn companies; but in October, four of them were demobilized again without replacement. The remaining two companies were scattered by platoons among the various batteries in the Oslofjord and made little difference against the German assault.\textsuperscript{94}

As discussed in the previous chapter, the transfer of the coastal artillery to naval control probably contributed to this fatal gap in the defenses.\textsuperscript{95} Another example was the failure to emplace any guns to cover the approaches to Narvik. The Army made at least two specific proposals for this in 1937-39, offering to provide surplus 10.5- or 12-cm guns in storage at Kongsberg. The Navy expressed little interest and never carried out the plan, however, arguing that the key point for the defense of the northern counties was Tromsø.\textsuperscript{96} Inter-service co-operation generally depended on informal contacts at the district level, with variable results. The Army’s 4th District Command at Bergen, for example, seemed to enjoy fairly smooth relations with the Navy, while the 3rd District at Kristiansand complained of frequent failures to relay information.\textsuperscript{97}

A particular point of inter-service contention resulted from the 3rd District’s proposal on 16 January 1940 to begin using Army aircraft (specifically, a small squadron of Caproni twin-engined bombers based at
Sola) for maritime reconnaissance. Although admitting that the Navy lacked sufficient aircraft to perform this task on its own, the Commanding Admiral insisted that this must remain the exclusive province of his service. As if to underline its point, the Navy left the Army completely in the dark about the progress of the Altmark incident; and although Jossingfjord lay only about 80 km from Sola, the Army bomber squadron first learned of what had happened from the press. Despite the obvious need for coastal reconnaissance, both the service chiefs eventually agreed that sending Norwegian aircraft out over international waters was too risky, since they might come under attack by belligerent aircraft in cases of mistaken identity. Thus, the only planes with any chance of spotting the approaching German invasion forces in April 1940 were those flying at extreme range from Britain. One receives the impression in this case that General Laake simply did not want to rock the boat by arguing with his counterpart, and the Army aviators doubtless perceived a lack of representation in Oslo. An independent air force command might well have pursued the issue with more determination.

The Army’s ground forces, meanwhile, remained bogged down in a transitional state, with several key projects nearing fruition yet short of tangible results. The cavalry, for example, was finally about to convert its last few horse squadrons into motorized units, while still pursuing the cherished but hopeless goal of a few armored cars. Plans were also afoot to reorganize the Royal Guards into a motorized infantry battalion, but this scheme also remained unrealized by April 9.

Ammunition stocks remained far below the General Staff’s minimal requirements, based on estimated expenditure for ten days of combat. The Army also had yet to receive a single anti-tank gun, despite the prewar evaluations described in the previous chapter. Funds provided in 1938 had led to an order of 20-mm guns from the Norwegian ordnance factory at Kongsberg, but the first batch of 4 pieces would not be ready before late May 1940. Debate continued meanwhile over whether to purchase a 37- or 40-mm gun from a foreign supplier, or whether to launch domestic production. An American supplier, the American Armaments Corporation, offered immediate delivery of a lightweight 37-mm
gun: but the Army was reluctant to buy an expensive, somewhat inferior, and incompatible weapon if they could obtain something better a few months later. Colonel Ruge expressed the dilemma they faced.

If the situation is such that we can afford to wait, we obviously should avoid such a complication of our ordinance [i.e., multiple types of the same caliber]. But if we may find ourselves at war in the course of this year, the disadvantage of having several types of guns is preferable to facing an attack without any anti-tank guns at all.101

On 27 February 1940, the Defense Department finally decided to order a batch of sixteen 37-mm guns, with 32,000 rounds of ammunition, from Germany, which promised delivery in the course of April.102 The irony here requires little comment; but it is also interesting to note that even if the Norwegians had obtained these guns, they were slated to equip an initial anti-tank company in Finnmark, not southern Norway.103

The Army bureaucracy also spun its wheels in establishing specialized blocking units (sperreavdelinger), combat engineering companies intended to create field obstacles, especially against tanks. Reams of correspondence piled up without practical result, despite vivid evidence of the importance of such units. As the Commanding General observed.

According to available reports of the engagements in Finnish ridge- and forest terrain, combat engineers and anti-tank guns have played a prominent role. Our terrain is similar to Finland's in many respects. We must therefore reckon with the necessity of fighting against motorized units to an extent for which we are not yet prepared. It has become even clearer than before that combat engineer units are an absolutely necessary link in our defense.104

Despite the evidence from Finland, none of the projected engineer companies had yet materialized by April 1940. Most of the necessary construction and demolition equipment was readily available from civilian sources, but cumbersome bureaucracy hampered improvisation.105 The greatest problem, however, was the lack of qualified officers.106 In January 1940, the Commanding General reported a shortfall of seventy
engineer officers even to man the existing handful of construction and bridging companies. The other arms suffered as well, with shortages of 370 officers for the infantry, 360 for the artillery, and 45 for the cavalry.\textsuperscript{107}

Here was probably the most inevitable consequence of the interwar cutbacks, as the shortage of qualified leadership cropped up again and again in almost every aspect of the Army's efforts to increase its readiness. In the course of fall 1939 and the following winter, the line battalions mobilized in rotations of about five at a time (not including those in Finnmark), according to the limited neutrality measures adopted by the government in lieu of full mobilization.\textsuperscript{108} The first group remained in service for 60 days, carrying out remedial training with reasonably good results. After that, however, the rotation period became only 45 days, and winter weather imposed additional restrictions on training.\textsuperscript{109}

As Inspector-General of the infantry, Colonel Ruge closely observed the training of the neutrality watch units; and he found the results far from satisfactory. Although morale generally appeared good, he wrote, the battalions still were not combat-ready by the end of their rotations. Among the reasons for this, Ruge listed the following problems:

\begin{itemize}
\item --Lack of equipment, particularly mortars and radios, in addition to more mundane but essential items such as tents, stoves, and field kitchens.\textsuperscript{110}
\item --Shortage of barracks and other facilities, which seriously hampered training during the winter months.
\item --Detachment of personnel for guard duty and labor details, which reduced time available for training.
\item --The uneven state of prior training among older and more recent annual classes, the former of which generally needed to repeat basic training from scratch.\textsuperscript{111}
\item --Lack of trained specialists, particularly in mortar, machine gun, and communications units, as well as teamsters.
\item --Shortage of qualified officers.
\end{itemize}
Ruge proposed solutions for all of these problems, focusing on extension of the call-up period to 90 days, extension of the summer 1940 recruit school to 120 days, and the provision of special remedial courses for officers and specialists. Of all the difficulties, however, the lack of competent officers seemed both the most crucial and the most intractable. In general, he found that the platoon leaders were adequate, having completed officer training fairly recently. The majority of company commanders, however, were old, rusty, and ineffective, for lack of current technical knowledge and familiarity with the routine of command. The battalion commanders were much the same: and while Ruge was willing to give them the benefit of the doubt in assuming that most were probably still capable of command in the field, he found that they had proved themselves unequal to the task of training their units. In his recommendations, Ruge concluded with the following warning.

If we now heed the lessons of what we have seen in the battalions of the first rotation, and carry out these measures (extended training and courses), and if the materiel meanwhile is put in order, then I will venture to say that the field battalions will present a very different appearance when they are called up for the second rotation (or for war). I believe I dare say that then, we will have infantry that can fight upon mobilization. So far, we have not.

Laaке agreed in principle with Ruge's proposals; and by fall 1940, the Army probably would have improved its readiness a great deal. In the event, however, the clock ran out before any of the remedies took effect. On the eve of the invasion, most of the battalions on duty in southern Norway had just rotated on April 1. This meant that the limited number of men already in uniform had only just begun their refresher training, while those who had completed it had already gone home. In northern Norway the schedule was somewhat different, and the troops of General Fleischer's 6th Division had been in service for two to three months, some longer, giving them a valuable fund of recent field experience. Even there, however, the units were by no means fully
combat-ready, as Fleischer recognized when assessing the value of the winter training:

The experience this has yielded is such that after complete mobilization, despite obvious shortfalls in personnel, training, and equipment—our battalions are indeed to be regarded as such, and can be entrusted with individual tasks; but initially these should be limited to the purely defensive.

[The troops] are capable of relatively rapid movement in rough terrain, but only after further exercises under favorable conditions could they meet the demands in connection with maneuver under fire.\textsuperscript{116}

For all their handicaps, ranging from the specific circumstances of the situation on April 8-9 to the general anti-militarism prevalent in Norway during the 1930s, the Norwegian forces gave a remarkably good account of themselves in 1940, as the following chapter will show. Factors beyond their control, such as Allied bungling and German air supremacy, contributed greatly to the defeat. Nevertheless, as one Norwegian historian has argued. "... it is at least possible to imagine that better prepared Norwegian defences might have led to failure for the German assault."\textsuperscript{117} More likely, they would have forced Hitler to call off the operation. Another historian concluded,

It is certainly doubtful that alertness would have enabled so small a nation to turn defeat into victory against such overwhelming strength, but it is clear that prompt and full mobilization, better communications, and a well-planned defense of the airfields could have considerably delayed the German incursions, to the great advantage of the British coming to their assistance.\textsuperscript{118}

As Otto Ruge put it, "The German attack on 9 April 1940 was such an inherently hazardous undertaking that by all indications, it never would have been attempted had the Norwegian military been mobilized in time..."\textsuperscript{119} Even with all the weaknesses described above, the Norwegian Army still held one potentially decisive advantage up to the final days before the attack: by occupying the crucial ports, it could have opposed the initial German landings. The Germans were ruthless and
efficient, but they lacked the training, doctrine, and specialized equipment to mount an effective amphibious assault against even hastily prepared defenses. The British diplomatic note and other warnings on April 5 provided ample grounds for the Norwegian cabinet to order full mobilization, and this would have presented Hitler with an agonizing choice between aborting WESERÜBUNG or facing likely disaster on April 9.

For the reasons outlined in Koht's previously-quoted explanation, however, the cabinet did nothing. As Captain L'Orange put it, "When the Norwegian Army was thrown into combat against the world's most powerful war machine, it was in a position worse than that of an army that already has suffered a decisive defeat." Writing shortly after the campaign, Ruge, on whom the all-but-hopeless burden of command was to fall, summed up the consequences of the government's failure.

If we had been reasonably prepared, our starting position during the first days would have been quite different from what it was. The Germans would have been stopped or thrown back into the sea. We would have gained time; the Allies would have gained time; and they would have had a Norwegian Army to work with instead of the small bands of freedom fighters which were all I could offer them."
NOTES TO CHAPTER 4


3. Norway and the War. 27; Ørvik, Decline of Neutrality. 219: Documents on German Foreign Policy, VII, 408, 502.


8. For a report on the Norwegian fighter squadron's operations in 1939-40, see "Jagervingens virksomhet fra mobiliseringen 1939 og til krigens slutt i Norge i 1940." RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 160. Problems stemmed from inadequacies in the system of observation and warning posts, as well as from the inferior performance of the fighters themselves. KG to Gen.Insp. for Hærensflygevåpen. "Bedring av varslingssystemet for jageravdelingenes krav," 3 February 1940, RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 264. The impotence against such intrusions
was ironic given the great concern of the Norwegian military with censoring civilian aerial photography prior to the war. "Sensur av fotografier fra luften, 1937-39," RA: GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 259. Most of the early violations probably were British, and German reports from Oslo complained that the Norwegian press simply refused to state the obvious fact because of anti-German bias. NA: T-77, reel 1027, 2499058ff.

9. KG, 6 September 1939, RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 353.


11. Órvik, Decline of Neutrality, 220-22. For Koht's own accounts of this period, see Norsk utenrikspolitikk fram til 9. april 1940 (Oslo: Tiden forlag, 1947), and his later memoir For fred og friedom i krigstid, 1939-1940 (Oslo: Tiden forlag, 1957).


13. Órvik, Decline of Neutrality, 222-23.


22. For an analysis of the Allies' failure, see Murray, *Change in the European Balance of Power*. 340-47.


24. Reports from Laks and Snøgg to KA, 19/23 November 1939: RA: KA, kat. 1256.3/10, box 1600. One officer complained to Diesen in the aftermath of the Altmark incident, "I still do not understand why the Westerwald was exempted from the inspection demanded by my orders . . . " Trøndelag Sjøforsvaravsnitt to KA, 21 February 1940: Ibid.

25. KA to FD, "Senking av handelsskip i norsk territorialfarvann". December 1939: RA: KA, kat. 1256.3/10, box 1600. It was unclear at the time whether torpedoes or mines were responsible, but postwar investigation proved the former. Salmon, "Scandinavia in British Strategy." 88.


30. NA: T-78, reel 1, 672907.

31. Carl J. Hambro, I Saw it Happen in Norway (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940). 63, 74, 78; Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded. 27. One indication of the improved spirit of co-operation between Labor and the military authorities was their effort to launch a new scheme for voluntary military training, headed by the Crown Prince, Colonel L'Orange, and Olav's old friend Major Østgaard, in conjunction with Haakon Lie. There were still some disagreements, however, which suggest Labor still had ideas of "democratization" on its agenda. KG to DK'ene, 17 January 1940; KG to Haakon Lie, Sec. for AIF's Landskomité for frivillig militærupplæring, 3 April 1940; RA: GS(III). kat. 1256.2/16, box 294. The Germans later took interest in the lists of participants in this program, as a guide to potential troublemakers under the occupation. "Freiwillig. militärischer Unterrichtslehrgang (Teilnehmer). Norwegen F/6. 26 April 1940". RA: GS(IV). kat. 1256.2/16. box 293.


34. Trygve Sandvik, Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge 1940, vol. I (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1965). 32-7. The extended mobilization of these units imposed considerable hardship on the local population. 6.DK to KG, 11 January 1940, RA: GS(II). kat. 1256.2/16, box 375. The extent of the government's and General Staff's preoccupation with North Norway prompted the iconoclastic Norwegian historian Svein Blindheim to describe the buildup as an "over-mobilization against the wrong foe .. ." Dag og tid. 29 April 1993.


36. Ibid. 78.
37. Ibid., 79.

38. Fleisher's first request for permission to fire came as early as 27 October 1939, when Soviet reconnaissance flights near Petsamo began straying over Norway. 6.DK to KG, 27 October 1939 and 16 January 1940; KG to 6.DK, 5 March 1940; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 353.

39. Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded, 23-4. 34; Sandvik, Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge, I:34. With up to three full divisions at their disposal, the Soviets captured Petsamo with relative ease, since the Finns had only a single reinforced battalion in the area.


41. Manus, Det vil helst gå godt, 25-31. The remnants of the battalion were still in Finland on April 9 and hastened home to fight the Germans. Many of the volunteers, including Manus, later became active members of the resistance; but others ended up fighting the Soviets once again on the Eastern Front.


46. KG to FD, "Transit av frivillige til Finnland," 29 January 1940, RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 294.


49. Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded, 34: Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII:695-97.
50. Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded, 34. The Germans later captured notes of this cabinet meeting, which they published as evidence of Anglo-Norwegian collusion. Auswärtiges Amt 1940 Nr.4: Dokumente zur english-französischen Politik der Kriegsausweitung, published as Britain's Designs on Norway (New York: German Library of Information, 1940) for American consumption. Norwegian historian Tim Greve argued that if the British had entered Norway uninvited, violent incidents might have resulted despite the cabinet's attitude; and in any case, the British had scarcely considered the problems of administering what would have become essentially occupied territory. "[T]his is only one of many cogent reasons," he concluded, "why all well-wishers to the Allied cause must be glad that this grandiose yet ill-thought-out operation never became a reality." Greve, Haakon VII, 127.

51. Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 1939-1945, with a Foreword by Jak P. Mallmann Showell (London: Greenhill Books, 1990), 63-67; Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII:515, 519, 532-33, 546. The source of Quisling's subsidy apparently was no secret in Norway; see "Nazi-propaganda i Norge med tysk pengestøtte", Arbeiderbladet 20 September 1939.

52. Taylor, March of Conquest, 86-89; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 7-10. Quisling provided the Germans with information on Norwegian coastal defenses based on his previous knowledge as Defense Minister, but some of it apparently was inaccurate, in particular his assurance that Oscarsborg fortress presented no significant threat. Oddvar K. Hoidal, Quisling: A Study in Treason (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1989), 313-52.

53. Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII:663; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 12-14.

54. To the British, the Norwegian government subsequently denied any knowledge that there had been prisoners aboard the ship; but this clearly was not true. NA: T-78, reel 1, 672907.

55. KA to FD, 24 February 1940; RA: KA, kat.1256.3/10, box 1598.


57. UK 1945, 53, 60-61; Correspondence between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Norwegian Government respecting the German steamer "Altmark," London, 17th February-15th March, 1940 (London: HMSO, 1950). In a legal sense, the British justification was shaky at best: and the Norwegians had good reason to feel themselves wronged.

59. Both sides naturally exploited the Altmark affair for its propaganda value. The British emphasized the allegedly cruel treatment of prisoners aboard the German ship; see Thomas Foley, I was an Altmark Prisoner (London: Aldor, 1940). The Germans meanwhile cited the incident as evidence of British disregard for the rights of neutral states; see Wolfgang Schmidt, Altmark: ein neuer Übergriff britischer Arroganz (Bonn, 1940) and Friedrich Frisch, Der Überfall auf die "Altmark", England ohne Maske, Nr. 9 (Berlin, 1940). Both sides also produced numerous translations of their respective versions for the benefit of foreign audiences.

60. "Weisung für 'Fall Weserübung,'" 1 March 1940. NA: T-312. reel 981, 9173230: Taylor, March of Conquest, 90-92: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 83-84. Among other measures, the Luftwaffe stepped up reconnaissance flights over Norway, which the Norwegians still proved incapable of intercepting. KG to Luftv~ernregimentet, "Fremmede fly over Østlandet," 27 March 1940. RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16. box 264.

61. Kriegstagebuch Nr. 1, Gruppe XXI, 13 March 1940; NA: T-312. reel 980, 9172058; "Englischer Zugriff in Norwegen", Ibid. reel 981; Salmon, "Scandinavia in British Strategy." 199-200. The German minister in Oslo, Bräuer, argued against an invasion of Norway; and in fact his assessments of both British and Norwegian policy were quite accurate. However, Rosenberg's agent in Oslo, Scheidt, contradicted Bräuer; and these reports apparently had more influence than did Bräuer's. Documents of German Foreign Policy, VIII:791, 846, 932.

62. NA: T-312, reel 981, 9173230; Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 90-91; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 16-22.

63. The pocket battleship Lützow originally was slated to carry an additional 400 troops to Narvik until she developed engine problems on April 6, which reduced her speed and caused her transfer to the Oslo group instead. NA: T-312, reel 980, 9172058.

64. For details of the Oslo plan, see Kriegstagebuch Nr.1, Gruppe XXI, Anlage 14, 14 March 1940; NA: T-312, reel 980, 9172058.

65. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 27-34; Bernard Ash, Norway 1940 (London: Cassell, 1964), 47. One other feature of the German preparations that was the method of combat loading, which placed a variety of material and sub-units in each vessel, in order to minimize the effects of inevitable losses in transit. Gruppe XXI's after-action report emphasized how important this "Noah's Ark" technique had been. NA: T-312, reel 990, 9182634.

67. On the co-ordination of military and political measures, see Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D (1937-1945), IX (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956), 68, 72, 84.

68. "Richtlinien für das Verhalten im persönlichen Verkehr mit der norwegischen Bevölkerung," NA: T-77, reel 978. See also the OKW directive to Falkenhorst, 12 March 1940, concerning the intention to allow both the existing Danish and Norwegian governments to continue functioning as normally as possible. Ibid., reel 1430, 275.


70. "Die Wehrmacht Norwegens, 1937 Oktober - 1940 April," NA: T-312, reel 981. 9172795: Anl.bd. zum Kriegstagebuch Nr.1. Ibid., 9172925: Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, 89. The German reports noted the context of political polarization that had undermined support for the Norwegian military. Unfortunately, the present author has been unable to locate the Abwehr's biographical analyses of Norwegian officers, which would be extraordinarily interesting. Gruppe XXI's after-action report mentioned, however, that the Abwehr had provided these at least down to the level of the regimental commanders, and that they had been "especially good" and "very useful." Gruppe XXI Erfahrungsbericht, 20 July 1940; NA: T-312, reel 990, 9182634.


73. The plan was closely related to the previous contingency plan AVONMOUTH from March. Salmon, "Scandinavia in British Strategy." 261. The troops slated for R.4 were Territorials with grave deficiencies in training and equipment that cost them dearly when they met the Germans in Norway. Ash. Norway 1940. 23-43. The British lack of intelligence on conditions in Norway was also appalling, although Britain did have agents at work there. Cruickshank. SOE in Scandinavia, 50-54; Svein Blindheim, "Ei omvurdering av Noregs krig." Dag og tid (9 Mar. 1989): 4; and Malcolm Munthe, Sweet is War (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1954). 50-54.


76. As one historian put it with an ironic mixture of British arrogance and self-reproach, "Of course the Norwegians were fools: so were we." Ash, *Norway 1940*. 35.


78. Major Sæ to General Hvinden Haug, 21 August 1947, RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 167.


80. Ibid., 78.

81. Ibid., 109. If ever the Forsvarsrådet could have made a crucial difference, it surely was then: but no such conference occurred.

82. Ibid., 108. The Navy also ordered all coastal navigation lights extinguished south of Bergen.

83. Captain Hans L'Orange, "Krigsdagbok fra felttoget i Norge." 12; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 103.

84. Buckley, *Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe*, 13-14; Koht, *Norway: Neutral and Invaded*, 58-60. In fairness, one must also concede that at least in the Bergen district, the Norwegian Navy had done just about everything it could to prepare for hostilities, given the constraints imposed by the cabinet's indecisiveness. See Jon Rustung Hegland, *Marineholmens historie: en skildring av sjøforsvaret i Bergens Distrikt, 1807-1962* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1966); also private correspondence with Stein Jørgen Rypern, 1992, with reference to Rolf Scheen, *Norges sjøkrig, 1939-1940*, 2 vol. (Bergen: Grieg, 1947). Olav Riste, *Weserübung: Det perfekte strategiske overfall?*, Forsvarsstudier 4/1990 (Oslo: IFS, 1990), also presents a general vindication of the government and attempts to dismiss the "popular myth that adequate warnings were received but not heeded." The present author remains unconvinced of this but agrees that Norway lacked "anything that could properly be called organs for the collection and analysis of military-political intelligence." (Ibid., 27)

85. Correspondence of Kjeller aircraft factory to GS, March 1940: RA: GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 303.


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88. See appendix for details of the Anti-Aircraft Regiment's disposition.


90. FD to KG, "Beskyttelse av Sola flyplass." 17 December 1938; FD to Gen.Insp. for Ingeniørvåpnet. "Bygging av kassematter". 6 September 1939; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 264. Rumors later surfaced that a German firm involved in the construction had somehow sabotaged the project, but this is a myth. See Norsk militært tidsskrift 109 (1950): 199.

91. 3.DK to KG, 3 September 1939; KG to 3.DK, 4 September 1939; GS(III) to 3.DK, 4 April 1940; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 373. In fairness, one must admit that blocking a large airfield is a more difficult task than it may first appear, particularly at Sola, where all around the actual landing strips were broad, flat, grassy fields quite capable of receiving Ju-52s. "Plan for sperring av Stavanger flyplass Sola." 28 March 1940, Ibid.

92. NA: T-78, reel 1, 672907. The German report stated conclusively. "Für die Annahme, daß der norwegische Admiralstab den Küstenbefestigungen und den Schiffen den Befehl erteilt habe, den Engländern bei etwaigem Eindringen keinen Widerstand entgegenzusetzen, finden sich keine Unterlagen."

93. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge 1940. 15. The Navy also suffered from the interwar reductions of active-duty personnel, although the consequences generally were less visible than in the Army. For example, in 1914, ten of twenty-one crewmen aboard the torpedo boat Kjell were regular, long-service personnel. In 1939, however, every many except the lieutenant in command was a conscript. UK 1945, 33.

94. Ibid., 50, 63, 67.

95. In fairness to the Army, however, one must also note that the Navy seemed satisfied with the forces assigned. In working out the new scheme following the Defense Act of 1933, the Commanding Admiral did argue that it would be preferable for the fortresses to include infantry garrisons organic to the coast artillery branch, but economy prevailed. KA to KG, 5 February 1935, RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 325.

97. GS to KA, "Vakthold langs kysten. Strategisk overfall," 4 July 1939, GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 325; 4.DK to KG, 30 March 1940; 3.DK to KG, 19 February 1940; KG to KA, "Samarbeide mellom land- og sjøforsvarsmyndigheter," 27 March 1940; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 294.

98. 3.DK to KG, 16 January 1940; KA to KG, 31 January 1940; Bombevingen to Gen.Insp. for Hærensflygevåpen, 26 February 1940; KG to Hærensflygevåpen. "Fjernoppklaring utover sjøen." 23 February 1940; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 325. The Navy apparently rejected a Swedish proposal for joint maritime air reconnaissance for the same reason. UK 1945, 35.


100. See appendix for detailed figures of ammunition stocks. See also Terje Holm, 1940 - igjen? (Oslo: Forsvaresmuseet, 1987), 23.

101. Ruge to KG, 22 December 1939, RA: KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 201. The Quartermaster-General provided a technical comparison of the various American, Swedish, and German guns theoretically available: Generalfelttøymesteren to FD, 20 January 1940, Ibid.

102. KG to FD, 23 March 1940; FD to KG, 3 April 1940; RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 403.

103. FD to KG, 6 March 1940, RA: KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 201. Further 37- or 40-mm guns eventually would have equipped an anti-tank company for each of the six brigades, and every infantry battalion was to receive two of the 20-mm guns from Kongsberg, based on experience drawn from Finland. GS to FD, 29 February 1940; and KG to FD, 20 March 1940, Ibid.

104. KG to FD, 20 January 1940, RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 268.

105. For example, any proposal for a local fortification, however minor, had to be routed through the Corps of Engineers (Ingeniørvåpnet) to the Defense Department, and then to the Commanding General, Commanding Admiral, and Chief of the Coastal Artillery, before returning to the originating unit by the same route. UK 1945, 31.


109. Lindbæk-Larsen, Kriqen i Norge 1940, 14-15. The shortening of the rotation period was intended both to distribute the burden more evenly among the regions that supplied the conscripts and to hasten the time by which all battalions would have received at least minimal refresher training.

110. Other deficiencies, even for the mobilized forces in Finnmark, included mines, sandbags, barbed wire, and hand grenades. The Norwegian Army did have something called the Aasens håndgranat which dated from World War I, but by 1939 the ordnance department deemed it so unreliable and dangerous that it was no longer issued. Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 88.

111. Following the belated restoration of 84-days training beginning in 1938, only the last two annual classes were on this standard, those previous having had only 72, 60, or 48 days. UK 1945, 31-32.


114. KG to FD, 29 December 1939, RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 294.

115. The units on duty as of April 8 were as follows (dates of mobilization in parentheses). Trandum: 1 infantry battalion (March 28). Fredrikstad: 1 artillery battalion (March 15). Oslo: 3 Royal Guard companies. Terningmoen: 1 Guard company (recent recruits). Garderemoen: 1 artillery battery (April 2). Oslofjord forts: 2 Landvern companies (March 15). Southwestern Norway: 2 infantry battalions (March 28), 1 bicycle company, 1 detached infantry company. Ulven/Voss: 1 infantry battalion (March 28), 1 pioneer company (in process of demobilization). Trøndelag: 1 dragoon regiment, 1 infantry battalion (both in process of mobilization). North Norway: 4 infantry battalions, 1 mountain artillery battalion, 2 motorized artillery batteries, 1 garrison company, 1 40-mm anti-aircraft battery, 1 pioneer company. UK 1945, 65.


118. Taylor, March of Conquest, 151.


THE ATTACK ON OSLOFJORD: OSCARSBORG, HORTEN, AND RAUØY

The various German groups involved in WESERÜBUNG closed in on their objectives during the early hours of April 9, in order to execute synchronized landings at 0415 (local time) with uniform surprise. Due to the fact that Oslo lay about forty miles inland, however, the German naval group slated to occupy the capital had to approach the entrance to the fjord late on April 8, led by the brand-new heavy cruiser Blücher, followed by the pocket battleship Lützow, the light cruiser Emden, and several torpedo boats and minelayers. The Norwegian picket boat Pol III (a requisitioned whaler) spotted the interlopers in the outer approaches to the fjord about 2315 and fired a warning shot, as well as a signal rocket, only to be riddled by a fusillade from the torpedo boat Albatros.¹

The outlying Norwegian coastal battery at Rauøy (an island on the east side of the fjord) spotted the rocket and fired warning shots at the ships a few minutes later, at 2332. When the ships gave no reply, the battery briefly fired for effect, from 2336 to 2343, at a range of about 4500 meters; but due to the poor visibility, they managed only four shots before the targets disappeared, with no hits. Since none of the shots were even near-misses, the Germans thought they were all warning shots and therefore did not return fire. Another battery at Bolærne had a somewhat better opportunity to fire, with the ships in
view for 15 minutes at a range of about 3600 meters; but the commander ordered only warning shots.²

Initial reports of these incidents reached Oslo shortly thereafter, causing the civil defense system to sound the air raid sirens. The cabinet gathered hastily to reassess the situation but reached no significant decisions, other than to give the Navy permission to lay mines. Even a few hours earlier this might have done some good, but by this time it was too late.

According to the WESERÜBUNG plan, the German ships were to pass the narrowest and most dangerous part of the fjord above Drøbak at WESERZEIT, 0415, in order to arrive off Oslo at first light. There, specially briefed detachments from the Blücher would storm ashore and seize the vital organs of the Norwegian government before they could organize a response, thus decapitating the Norwegian military and presenting the rest of the country with a fait accompli. The Germans did not reckon, however, with the cool-headedness of Colonel Birger Christian Eriksen, commander of Oscarsborg fortress, which occupied an island in the narrowest part of the fjord like a cork in a bottleneck. The fort's main batteries consisted of three 28-cm guns (ironically bought from Krupp) at Kaholmen on the island, plus a battery of 15-cm guns at Kopås on the east side of the fjord. With only enough men for skeleton crews on two of the 28-cm guns, Eriksen realized that they probably would not have time to reload after the first salvo; and he therefore ordered them to hold their fire until the leading target closed to point-blank range. Seeing no searchlights or other signs of activity as they approached the narrows, the Germans also held their fire.

Finally, at 0421 when the Blücher was only 1800 meters distant, Eriksen gave the order to open fire; and at that range even his inexperienced gunners could not miss. Two massive shells smashed into the cruiser's superstructure, followed by approximately thirteen 15-cm hits from the Kopås battery. The ship ploughed on, past the Norwegian guns' field of fire and into the sights of a land-mounted torpedo battery (another relic of the late 1800s). Two torpedoes slammed into the Blücher, leaving her dead in the water. The Germans dropped anchor
and still had some hope of saving the ship until a 10.5-cm magazine exploded at 0530, sealing her fate. The ship sank at 0622, taking nearly 1,000 men with her, including most of the Gestapo detachments and the staff of the 163rd Infantry Division.3

Not having spotted the torpedo wakes, the Germans assumed that the Blücher had struck mines; and the following ships therefore made a hasty withdrawal. The Kopås battery fired on the Lützow and Emden at a range of about 3,000 meters until they disappeared at 0440, scoring hits on both ships and temporarily disabling the former's forward main turret. Although the Germans answered with heavy return fire, it was entirely ineffectual, and the Norwegian batteries suffered no casualties. The 28-cm Kaholmen battery might have scored further hits had it fired again; but Eriksen ordered it not to, in order to avoid "unnecessary bloodshed," as he later explained. In his view, the fortress already had fulfilled its mission according to the neutrality rules once the ships had begun to withdraw; and as far as he knew, having received no orders from the government or high command, the country was not at war. The Germans subsequently landed some of the surviving troops farther down the fjord at Moss and Son, but the initial attempt to seize Oslo by coup de main had failed, with profound consequences.4

While the Blücher, Lützow, and Emden made their ill-fated dash for Oslo, a smaller force consisting of the torpedo boats Albatros and Kondor and the minesweepers R-17 and R-27 headed for the main Norwegian naval base at Horten on the southwest side of the Oslofjord. The Germans entered the harbor about 0435 and succeeded in landing a few troops, but the ships came under fire from the Norwegian minelayer Olav Tryggvesson. The R-17 blew up about 0520, and the R-27 was damaged, along with the Norwegian minesweeper Rauma. The German commander decided to withdraw and wait for reinforcements, which soon arrived in the form of the Lützow and Emden about 0700. The Norwegian commander, Admiral Smith-Johannsen, agreed to parley, and the Germans warned that unless he agreed to an immediate ceasefire, they would bombard the town. Daunted by the sight of the Lützow's guns and the impending attack of the Luftwaffe, he surrendered his forces at 0735, handing over all of the ships and dockyard facilities fully intact.5
Although Smith-Johannsen later insisted that he never had intended to give up anything more than the immediate ships and shore installations at Horten, the initial order that went out seemed to indicate that the surrender terms applied to the entire 1st Sea Defense District, which included not only the Oslofjord but the whole south coast. The battery at Rauøy meanwhile was holding its own against a German landing party, until the message arrived from Horten at 0800: "Cease fire. We have surrendered." By the time the mistake was corrected, the battery was in German hands. As Smith-Johannsen later put it, "This resulted from a regrettable misunderstanding."6

THE FALL OF NARVIK

At Narvik, the ten troop-laden German destroyers were fortunate to evade the British minelaying group and its covering force. As the Germans entered the Ofotfjord, however, they encountered Norwegian watch boats which reported their approach to the naval commander at Narvik, Per Askim. Meanwhile, following initial reports of the German attack on Oslofjord, Askim received an order from Commanding Admiral Diesen not to fire on British ships. The only units immediately available to Askim were the obsolete coast-defense ships Norge and Eidsvold. In order to maintain telephone contact with Oslo, Askim kept the Norge moored at Narvik and sent the Eidsvold down the fog-bound fjord to investigate.7

The Germans, meanwhile, had detached several destroyers to make subsidiary landings. In the fjord below Narvik they sought to capture a pair of Norwegian coastal batteries, only to discover that these did not exist.8 To the north, however, another detachment occupied the Norwegian Army depot at Elvegårdsmaoen without resistance, thus depriving Fleischer's 6th Division of one of its main logistical bases.9 The remaining 3 German destroyers proceeded on to Narvik.

The Eidsvold encountered the German destroyers at a range of only about 500 yards, due to dense fog, which one witness described "as though made to order for the Germans." The Norwegians initially fired only a warning shot. The German naval commander Commodore Bonte had orders not to fire first, and he sent a boat to determine the
Norwegians' intentions. The Eidsvold's commander, Captain Willoch, replied that he would fight and ordered his men to open fire; but due to reasons that remain obscure, the first shots were delayed. Staring down the muzzles of the Norwegian heavy guns at point-blank range, General Dietl convinced Bonte to fire first. The Germans launched a salvo of four torpedoes, three of which hit. The Eidsvold sank almost instantly about 0440, taking down all but six of her 181-man crew, without having fired a single shot in reply. The Norge opened fire immediately as the Germans approached Narvik a few minutes later and got off four rounds of 21-cm and about eight rounds of 15-cm. Yet despite the short range of less than 1000 yards, the Norwegians scored no hits before two torpedoes struck the old ship. The Norge followed her sister-ship to the bottom about 0455, with 90 survivors from the crew of 191.

In retrospect, Askim's decision to divide his two ships was a mistake, as was the Eidsvold's initial hesitation to fire; and the Norge's failure to score any hits reflects little credit on her crew's gunnery skills. The heavy fog apparently played a crucial role, and in better visibility the Germans might well have suffered considerable damage from the old but still dangerous Norwegian guns. The tragic casualty figures between the two ships represented Norway's largest loss of life in any single action during the war.

The Norwegian troops in Narvik amounted to two rifle companies and a 40-mm anti-aircraft battery under Colonel Konrad Sundlo. He was one of Quisling's most ardent followers; and in retrospect, his response to the invasion ought to have come as no surprise. On the evening of April 8, General Fleischer ordered Sundlo to reinforce Narvik with an infantry battalion from Elvegårdsmoen, but Sundlo did nothing. When Dietl's men went ashore following the destruction of Askim's ships, Sundlo ordered his men to surrender, in direct violation of Fleischer's explicit orders to fight. Fleischer was able to contact Sundlo's deputy Major Omdal, who bluffed his way past the Germans with about 200 men to take up a blocking position astride the railroad to Sweden. The Germans overwhelmed and captured most of this group on April 16; but their independent action at least showed clearly that Sundlo's treasonous capitulation was solely his own responsibility. Admittedly, given the
circumstances, the handful of Norwegian troops in Narvik on April 9 could hardly have held the town, outnumbered as they were by nearly ten to one. Nevertheless, Sundlo could have withdrawn in fighting order and attempted to harass the Germans by other means.15

Following the loss of Narvik, General Fleischer began the difficult process of mobilizing the rest of his forces and transferring them southward against the unexpected threat.16 Up to this point, the 6th Division's attention had remained focused almost entirely to the east, due to chronic fears that a local uprising in Finnmark would provide a pretext for a Soviet invasion.17 The bulk of Fleischer's forces, three infantry battalions (I/12, II/14, and the Varanger Battalion) and a motorized artillery battery, were therefore in Finnmark; and it would take several weeks to move them southward, due to deep snow and other forms of "friction." Fleischer's subordinate in the south, Colonel Løken, meanwhile assembled one infantry battalion (II/15) and the 3rd Mountain Artillery Battalion, with the task of preventing the Germans from reaching the airfield at Bardufoss before the rest of the 6th Division arrived.18

THE FALL OF TRONDHEIM

The narrow mouth of the fjord leading to Trondheim was guarded by Agdenes fortress, consisting of three separate batteries (Brettingen and Hysnes on the northeast side of the fjord, Håmbåra on the southwest) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fridtjof Jacobsen. Like the other coastal fortresses under the neutrality organization, the installation was only partially manned, with skeleton crews for only the northeastern batteries, totalling four 21-cm and five 15-cm guns. Despite an initial warning of the attack on Oslofjord, Jacobsen did not bother to put his men on alert until he received a further signal at 0300 from the line of patrol boats on the outer approaches to Trondheim, about 14 km from the fortress, reporting unidentified warships entering the fjord. The Norwegians were uncertain of the ships' identity at first, but in fact they were the *Hipper* and four destroyers.
Jacobsen decided to open fire, but there was a fatal delay of 12-13 minutes in manning the guns because the over-worked crews had been busy hauling ammunition from the magazines, which lay a considerable distance behind the batteries themselves. The ships entered the narrows at high speed, and the Norwegians only had time for nine shots (roughly two salvoes) before the targets passed beyond the field of fire. There were no hits, and the Hipper replied with two salvoes from her after turrets, which did no direct damage to the fortress but temporarily cut off its electrical power.\^{19}

While the Hipper and two destroyers continued up the fjord to Trondheim, the other two destroyers began landing troops to take the fortress. As visibility improved about 0700, the Norwegians could have opened fire again on the two destroyers; but Jacobsen decided not to, later explaining that he had thought it best not to "provoke" or "irritate" them further. A surfaced U-boat brazenly entered the fjord on the surface shortly thereafter, presenting an ideal target; but Jacobsen ordered an initial warning shot, according to a strict interpretation of the neutrality watch instructions. The U-boat promptly disappeared by diving.\^{20}

By early afternoon on April 9, German infantry was closing in on the vulnerable landward side of the fortress, which lacked any covering troops. Jacobsen detailed his men to improvise a defense with a handful of anti-aircraft machine guns, and a brief skirmish ensued, in which two Norwegians were wounded. (The number of German casualties is unclear, possibly as many as 22.) Concluding that honor had been served, Jacobsen surrendered at 1515, without disabling any of the guns or other facilities. The well-prepared Germans promptly manned these with naval gun crews specifically detailed for the purpose, and two days later they drove off a pair of British destroyers tentatively probing the outer fjord.\^{21}

The German landing forces meanwhile occupied Trondheim unopposed, as the only Norwegian soldiers in town were the administrative elements of the 5th Division headquarters and the unmobilized 12th Infantry Regiment and 3rd Artillery Regiment. Those two regiments' actual mobilization points and equipment depots were at Værnes airfield east of
the city; however, which the Germans failed to reach on April 9; and with resolute leadership, the Norwegians might yet have managed to rally. The district commander General Laurantzson made no effort to organize a defense, however; and on the night of April 9-10 he specifically ordered his subordinate units not to mobilize, in accordance with Quisling's radio broadcast (see below) rather than Koht's. Laurantzson's co-operative attitude prompted the German commander to send the following report to Falkenhorst on April 9: "Landing in Trondheim complete. Norwegian division commander ordered no resistance. Good relations with local authorities."  

THE FALL OF BERGEN

At Bergen the headquarters of the 2nd Sea Defense District, under Admiral Tank-Nielsen, was relatively alert, closely monitoring reports of suspicious vessels heading northward. Almost immediately after receiving the first report of the attack on Oslofjord about 0015, the Navy requested that the Army provide covering troops for the fortress at Bergen; and the district commander General Steffens quickly agreed. The nearest unit, however, was the 1st Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment at Ulven, about 20 km east of the city; and the movement took several hours.

The outer line of watch boats meanwhile detected the approach of German ships about 0100. The Germans attempted to pass themselves off as British by responding to an initial challenge in English, but the ruse failed. Tank-Nielsen then attempted to bring his meager forces into action, resulting in a series of futile, unco-ordinated attacks on the approaching ships. The minelayer Tyr laid a last-minute minefield in the Germans' path, but apparently the weapons did not have time to arm before the Germans passed. The torpedo boat Storm attacked without result, as did a pair of 65-mm guns on the island of Lerøy; and a pair of seaplanes dropped a few poorly-aimed bombs. Another torpedo boat, the Brand, had an excellent opportunity to fire as the Germans entered the harbor; but the young officer in command simply lost his wits and did nothing. The destroyer Garm also blundered into the German ships...
without realizing what was going on, and hastily withdrew without attacking.\textsuperscript{24}

The Köln, the gunnery training ship Bremse, two torpedo boats, and several troop-laden merchant ships entered the inner fjord about 0400. The fortress commander, Lieutenant Colonel Willoch, withheld fire for several crucial minutes to avoid hitting the merchant vessels, although in retrospect they clearly were high-value, legitimate military targets. The Bergen fortress consisted of two main batteries, Kvarven and Hellen, which between them mounted six 21-cm guns and three 24-cm howitzers. Visibility was poor, and there was no power for the searchlights, due to Tank-Nielsen's earlier decision to order a blackout of the entire area.\textsuperscript{25} When they finally opened fire, the gun crews also experienced frequent malfunctions such as broken firing pins that hampered their fire considerably. Although the Bremse did suffer some damage, the other three ships entered the inner harbor unscathed, where they immediately began landing troops in the safety of the fortress's dead zone. About 0445, however, the Königsberg belatedly approached the harbor on its own, having paused to disembark some troops in boats in the outer fjord. This time the Norwegian fire was more accurate, scoring three 21-cm hits that disabled the cruiser's machinery. As a consequence, the Königsberg had to remain at Bergen when the other ships withdrew, and British aircraft sank her at dawn on April 10.\textsuperscript{26}

The belated hits did not suffice to save Bergen, however. A bombing attack helped suppress the Hellen battery, and troops of the German 159th Infantry Regiment assaulted Kvarven shortly after 0600. Still lacking any infantry support, the Norwegian garrison put up a creditable fight, killing 10 Germans and wounding 17 others; but the situation seemed hopeless. Willoch surrendered the fortress intact at 0620. As at Agdenes, the Germans manned the guns immediately. By that time the town was also in German hands. About half of the Norwegian infantry battalion from Ulven (I/9) arrived in Bergen just as the Germans were landing, but the unit played no part in the action and retreated eastward, along with Steffens and Tank-Nielsen. Norwegian casualties in the battle for the fortress were 8 dead, 18 wounded.\textsuperscript{27}
Although one concrete pillbox was in place, the vital Sola airfield near Stavanger remained practically undefended. An infantry battalion (1/2) was encamped only a few kilometers away, but only two platoons were at the airfield itself, along with a few aircraft. Most of the latter (two Caproni Ca.310s and six Fokker biplanes) took off and escaped just before the first German aircraft arrived, about 0715. An hour of bombing and strafing scattered and suppressed the handful of Norwegian troops, who thus presented little resistance when eleven Ju-52s arrived about 0820 to drop a company of the 1st Fallschirmjäger Regiment. A few of the Norwegians did put up a stubborn fight, however, most notably R.G. Johansen, who held out alone in the single blockhouse with an automatic rifle, killing several Germans, until finally wounded by grenades.

The Germans had not been able to spare any warships for a landing at Stavanger, and this proved embarrassing when a pair of unescorted freighters loaded with guns and equipment blundered into the Norwegian destroyers /Eger and Draua near Stavanger. The /Eger sank one, and the crew of the other scuttled their own ship when the Draua sent a boarding party. This success proved short-lived, however, when German aircraft sank the /Eger; and the Draua fled to Britain without accomplishing anything further. The loss of the two ships presented only a minor setback as reinforcements began pouring into Sola by air. By the end of April 9, two whole battalions were on the ground, with more to follow; and three other supply ships had arrived safely at Stavanger. The Norwegian battalion at Madla might conceivably have retaken Sola with an immediate, determined counterattack; but the local commander, Colonel Spørck, instead ordered the unit to withdraw eastward to Sandnes.

The small German detachments at Egersund and Arendal also gained their objectives with little difficulty, despite the presence of Norwegian torpedo boats in those ports. Heavy fog screened the invaders' approach, and by the time the defenders realized what was occurring, the troops were already ashore.
The German ships approaching Kristiansand, led by the light cruiser Karlsruhe, were initially unable to find the entrance to the harbor due to poor visibility. When they did head in at 0530, the powerful Norwegian battery at Odderoya (two 21-cm guns, six 15-cm, and four 24-cm howitzers) promptly opened fire and scored at least one 15-cm hit on the cruiser, at a range of about 8000 meters. The Germans briefly withdrew while the Luftwaffe bombed the fortress, but the Norwegians opened fire again when the ships approached a second time about 0600. Again the Germans withdrew, the cruiser's guns having no apparent effect on the fort; and the entire landing now seemed in doubt. At 0840 the group commander signalled to Falkenhorst's headquarters, "Kristiansand not yet secured. Battery not yet suppressed, request air support."31

The Norwegians, however, were approaching their breaking point under incessant air attack, particularly after a bomb detonated one of the magazines. The fortress commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Fosby, received orders not to fire on British ships, which seemed to imply that Allied forces were close at hand. When the Germans approached a third time at 1030, the Norwegian fire-control post reported that the ships were French; and Fosby failed to check this information himself. As a result, the fortress did not open fire, and this time the Germans finally reached the inner harbor, where they swiftly landed their troops. The fortress surrendered at 1100, here again with the guns intact, which the Germans promptly manned. Norwegian losses were 8 dead, 40 wounded.32

Although the Odderøya battery put up a spirited fight in the first two engagements, other aspects of the action at Kristiansand reflected no credit on the commanders involved. The secondary battery at Gleoddin, mounting three 15-cm guns, never opened fire at all; nor did any of the four Norwegian warships lying in the harbor, the destroyers Odin and Gyller (both modern units of the Sleipner class) and the submarines B-2 and B-5. All four ships surrendered to the Germans intact. The postwar investigation assigned most of the blame to the
local naval commander, Commodore Wigers, for failing to issue explicit orders to fight; but it also criticized the four ships' commanders for their "inordinantly passive conduct."³³

After the precarious initial stage, the German landing developed into another overwhelming success. As at Trondheim and Bergen, there were practically no Norwegian troops in Kristiansand. The district commander General Liljedahl and his staff fled northward into the Setesdal valley. The Germans meanwhile occupied the nearby Kjevik airfield unopposed, providing another vital staging area for the Luftwaffe.³⁴

CAPTURE OF FORNEBU AND EVACUATION OF OSLO

Unaware of the initial repulse of the German ships in the Oslofjord, the German minister Kurt Bräuer met with Koht at dawn and presented an ultimatum, which essentially demanded a complete abdication of sovereignty to the occupation forces, even though it promised to maintain the nation's integrity and control of domestic affairs. Without the expected presence of troops to coerce a favorable response, however, the demands served only to crystallize the Norwegian government's determination to resist. After brief consultation with his colleagues, Koht answered Bräuer with a quotation from Hitler, saying that "... the nation that bowed meekly to an aggressor without offering resistance was not worthy to live." The German naval attache meanwhile waited in vain on the waterfront to guide the expected troops to their objectives, as the Norwegians organized an emergency evacuation of the government from the city.³⁵

While preparing for their hasty departure from Oslo, the cabinet members belatedly decided to order complete mobilization. Due to confusion and ignorance of the technicalities of the mobilization system, however, Koht's instructions to Ljungberg specified only the brigades in southern Norway (i.e., districts 1-4), probably since Koht knew that the 6th Brigade in North Norway already was in service. As a professional officer, Ljungberg surely must have understood the system himself; but incredibly, he neither explained the issue to Koht nor took
it upon himself to change the order to general mobilization. As a result, the mobilization order technically applied only to the units specifically slated to form the field brigades, which left out many others such as artillery battalions and engineer companies slated as Army assets, as well as the entire Trondheim district. Furthermore, following the consolidation of the mobilization options in 1938-39, partial mobilization inevitably meant silent mobilization, which in turn meant that orders would only go out by mail and units would not begin assembly for another two days. When the chief of the General Staff Colonel Hatledal learned of the order, he allegedly blurted to Ljungberg, "Are you insane?"\textsuperscript{37} Laake, meanwhile, was completely out of the picture, having left Oslo on April 8 to celebrate his birthday. Arriving at the defense department after considerable delay on April 9, he found that the General Staff already had evacuated with the government; and he spent the remainder of the day hitch-hiking northward to catch up.\textsuperscript{38}

By lucky accident, Koht referred to "full mobilization" in a brief radio broadcast from the train station just before leaving the city, which at least indicated the government's intention to the public and helped to mitigate the bungled instruction to the General Staff. Later that day, however, while the situation in the capital remained highly uncertain, Vidkun Quisling declared himself head of a new government on his own authority and made another radio broadcast, rescinding the mobilization and ordering full cooperation with the Germans. As a result, the mobilization process became almost entirely a matter of individual initiative, with each man left to decide for himself whose orders to follow. Few Norwegians heeded Quisling's instructions, and most of the men liable for mobilization conscientiously reported to the nearest military unit; but with prewar plans and tables of organization now largely irrelevant, the process was chaotic at best. In retrospect, the government's failure to issue a clear and unequivocal call to arms on April 9 was a crucial mistake.\textsuperscript{39}

The WESERÜBUNG plan called for the seizure of Fornebu airport by two companies of Luftwaffe paratroops at dawn, but the transports could not locate the objective due to fog and turned back to land in Denmark.
instead. As the weather cleared after 0500, however, Me-110s and bombers found Fornebu and subjected it to a withering attack, as well as the less important military airfield at Kjeller, east of the city. A few of the Norwegian Gladiators managed to take off from Fornebu and shot down five German aircraft, but these were not enough to make much difference. Disregarding an order to abort and wait for the arrival of the paratroops. Ju-52 transports in the first followup wave began landing at Fornebu at 0838, opposed only by Norwegian ground crewmen with a few machine guns. As a result of this remarkable display of initiative, the vital airfield was soon in German hands. By noon there were six companies on the ground, and the leading elements marched directly into downtown Oslo unopposed.

Had the Norwegian leadership responded with more resolution, a hasty but determined defense (or better yet, an improvised counterattack on Fornebu) might yet have checked the air-landed German troops on the outskirts of Oslo, buying time for the government to resolve a more rational, coherent policy. Apart from the fighter squadron and scattered anti-aircraft batteries, the only troops in the city were three companies of the Royal Guards, totalling about 500 men. An infantry battalion (II/5) was on duty at the nearby Trandum barracks and might have reached the city within about an hour, given better leadership. However, none of the men responsible made any serious effort to defend Oslo. The first impulses were merely to evacuate the King and government and to avoid the loss of life and property. In the process of evacuation, no one took charge of the military situation. The men most directly responsible were General Hvinden Haug, chief of the 2nd Division, whose headquarters was in the capital, and Lieutenant-Colonel Graff-Wang, commander of the Royal Guards. The Guards did send one company on a patrol toward Fornebu, but its orders were ambiguous. The patrol never made contact, and the Germans simply slipped past it on their way downtown.

As the royal family, the cabinet, and most of the hastily-assembled Storting fled the city by train, the government left the chief of police and the commandant of the Akershus castle with orders to cooperate with the Germans in maintaining peace and order in the city.
One bright spot in the confusion was the initiative of some civilians who quietly and efficiently smuggled the national gold reserve out of town in an assortment of commandeered trucks. However, no one bothered to order the Royal Guards or any of the anti-aircraft units out of the city, and these all fell under the terms of the capitulation. As a consequence, these troops remained on duty in Oslo, in uniform, until April 19, standing guard outside the Storting side-by-side with the Germans, while other Norwegian troops were fighting to the north. The German commander in Oslo reported on April 10, "Situation calm in Oslo. Loyal co-operation with Norwegian commandant. Norwegian anti-aircraft commander in Oslo has declared himself willing to conduct air defense against English and French aircraft." This paradoxical situation surely contributed to the general mood of confusion, which worked everywhere to the Germans' advantage.

ESCAPE AND PURSUIT OF THE GOVERNMENT TO MIDTSKOGEN

The fall of the capital represented a major disaster, but the most important fact nevertheless was that the King and government had escaped. In the long-run, this fact became extremely important, because it meant that Norway would continue to fight, even in exile, rather than compromising with the invaders as did the Danes. (The Danish government had capitulated on the morning of the 9th after only token resistance.) Yet the situation remained extremely fluid, and the Germans still hoped to salvage the original plan if possible. A further combination of blunders, defeatism, and possibly outright collusion among the Norwegian leadership nearly made this possible on the night of April 9-10.

In an effort to retrieve the situation on his own initiative, the German air attaché in Oslo Major Eberhard Spiller organized a company of paratroops (who had finally landed at Fornebu on their second attempt, with the airfield already in friendly hands) to pursue the Norwegians on the afternoon of the 9th. Piling aboard several commandeered buses, they drove toward Hamar, where the government and Storting had fled after escaping Oslo that morning. Remarkably, they met no opposition whatsoever as they drove northward, although at several points they went
directly past columns of armed Norwegian troops. The officer primarily responsible was again General Hvinden Haug, who failed to organize any systematic roadblocks north of the city or provide his units with any relevant orders. So pervasive was the sense of shock and confusion that when Spiller's party drove past, none of the junior Norwegian officers on hand was prepared to take the initiative and open fire on his own authority.46

The Norwegian government that evening continued on from Hamar to Elverum, farther north; but Spiller refused to give up the chase. He clearly understood the overall concept of the invasion plan and fully grasped the importance of decapitating the Norwegian government at the outset, in order to present the population with a \textit{fait accompli} and preempt any further, organized resistance. At 1800, apparently acting on his own initiative since General Laake was still out of touch, Colonel Hatledal ordered Hvinden Haug to demolish roads and bridges if necessary to delay the Germans north of Oslo; but the General apparently did nothing to that effect.47 Various reports and rumors reached Elverum that evening indicating the approach of Spiller's column, and Hatledal took his own steps to organize roadblocks. A mixed assortment of trainees from the nearby infantry rifle school at Terningmoen, civilian volunteers, a few men from the 5th Infantry Regiment, and a platoon of the Royal Guards with two machine guns thus gathered at Midtskogen, just south of Elverum, and improvised a barricade shortly before midnight. Spiller apparently tried to bluff his way through yet again, but this time the Norwegians opened fire, fatally wounding the audacious attache. Concluding that they had pushed their luck as far as it would go, the Germans withdrew and headed back toward Oslo.48

While almost totally insignificant in absolute military terms, the brief skirmish at Midtskogen had tremendous political importance. Together with the destruction of the \textit{Blücher}, it kept the Norwegian government from falling into German hands, and thus held open the possibility for subsequent resistance to the invasion. Thus, it is not surprising that many people later tried to obtain a share of the credit for holding the roadblock; and a persistent debate arose over who was actually in command.49

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The most important figure probably was Hatledal, who was frantically engaged in the hours leading up to midnight, trying to obtain unequivocal orders from the cabinet that he could pass on to the rest of the Army, telling it simply to fight. Halvdan Koht, who so carefully had gathered the threads of power into his own hands up to that point (for example by obtaining the submissive Ljungberg as Defense Minister), was no help at all; and some sources indicate that he actually gave orders for the men at the roadblocks not to fire. Otto Ruge also played a part in stiffening the government's resolve, reportedly telling Ljungberg, "I only want to say one thing, and it is that now, you must not negotiate with the swine." 

The "Spiller Raid," as it became known in Norway, had a remarkable epilogue as the paratroops drove back to Oslo early on April 10. Sometime shortly after midnight, Hvinden Haug sent the following order to the scattered elements of the four battalions under his command north of Oslo: "Should units meet individual vehicles carrying foreign soldiers, combat is to be avoided if at all possible." Whatever the reasons behind it, this order clearly contributed to the fiasco that followed when Spiller's men encountered a succession of Norwegian columns and outposts—in some cases the same ones they had passed the previous afternoon. Although heavily outnumbered, the Germans had their weapons at the ready, while the Norwegians did not; and unit after unit suddenly found itself "in the bag." Without firing a shot, the paratroops disarmed hundreds of Norwegians and drove into Oslo the next morning with over 200 prisoners (including 80 officers), 500 rifles, 4 field guns, and several machine guns, leaving a trail of disarmed, confused, and humiliated Norwegians all along the road to Hamar.

As the sun rose on the second day of the invasion, prospects for resistance appeared bleak indeed. Yet there was one additional action on April 9 that proved crucial in the outcome of the subsequent campaign. At sea west of Bergen, the Luftwaffe attacked the British Home Fleet. Although the Germans managed to sink only one destroyer in several hours of heavy bombing, they gained an important moral victory over the British leadership. Admiral Forbes, commander-in-chief of the Home Fleet, learned that his ships had expended almost half of their
anti-aircraft ammunition in this single engagement; and a dud hit on his flagship Rodney convinced him that further attempts to approach the coast within range of German air power would result in heavy losses. After this, with few exceptions, the Royal Navy dared not approach the Norwegian coast south of Narvik during daylight, and risked only submarines to attack the vital German supply route in the Skagerrak. Churchill summed up the psychological impact of the German surprise attack when he admitted on April 10, "We have been completely outwitted." 

APRIL 10-11: THE NORWEGIAN DECISION TO FIGHT

While the Germans sought to consolidate and reinforce their still-tenuous hold on Oslo, the Norwegian cabinet and parliament met in emergency sessions at Elverum and the village of Nybergsund to determine their course of action. Obtaining safe conduct through the roadblocks, Bräuer met briefly with Koht and King Haakon, in a final effort to negotiate a Danish-style solution. Although the cabinet seemed to waver, the King stood firm in his opposition to any accommodation with the invaders, threatening abdication if government adopted such a course. Haakon's resolution set an example for the ministers, and once again they rejected the German terms, which at the Führer's foolish insistence now included Quisling's appointment as Prime Minister.

Colonel Otto Ruge also bolstered the ministers' resolve with his professional opinion that the campaign was not yet irretrievably lost. Bräuer had no choice but to return to Oslo empty-handed, and henceforth the Germans bent their efforts toward killing Haakon rather than taking him alive or securing his support. Cold-blooded bombing attacks on Elverum and Nybergsund on April 10-11, clearly aimed at the King and Crown Prince, only narrowly missed their targets while claiming a number of civilian lives.

Most accounts of these incidents tend to emphasize the cabinet's courageous decision to reject the German demands, and to oppose the invasion regardless of the odds. Looking at the episode from another perspective, however, one may be struck by the fact that most of the
cabinet, in any case Nygaardsvold and Koht, were ready to accept the German occupation as a fait accompli, if only the invaders would recognize the legitimate government.

Given the government's decision to reject German terms, the Norwegians faced the basic question of what practical means remained available to resist the invaders. Not surprisingly, the general mood was one of pessimism, given the fact that every one of the country's major ports, including the capital, was already in enemy hands. Arriving at the government's temporary quarters after his nightmarish journey on the 9th, General Laake counseled surrender and requested to be relieved, showing symptoms of nervous collapse. Ironically, his 65th birthday had fallen on April 9, and the cabinet approved his retirement to make way—belatedly—for a more vigorous and effective leader.

The cabinet settled upon Colonel Ruge as its choice for the new commander-in-chief, due mainly to his fighting spirit and relative optimism. King Haakon was reluctant to confirm the appointment, recalling Ruge's role in the passage of the Defense Act of 1933, against the King's opposition. Nevertheless, Haakon recognized that Ruge now was probably the best man for the job and set aside this grudge. Although something of a dark horse among his colleagues, Ruge probably benefitted also from his relatively good relations with the Labor party in the 1930s.58

While the government was still making up its mind what to do, the immediate responsibility for containing the Germans around Oslo remained in the hands of General Hvinden Haug. He continued to display little initiative or competence, and his already demoralized battalions suffered a further series of embarrassments on April 10-11. The Norwegians did not sever telephone connections with Oslo until April 13, and until about that point, the "front line" north of the city remained extremely fluid.59 As late as the morning of April 11, for example, a German officer apparently walked into the telephone exchange in Hamar unmolested and listened in on conversations among Hvinden Haug and his subordinates. NS-members and others with no desire to fight found it easy to desert from Norwegian units, and at least a few of them went
into Oslo to report to Quisling, who almost certainly passed on the information to the Germans.60  

Whatever the role of treachery, the Germans easily out-flanked the initial, poorly-sited Norwegian blocking position at Andelva (a few kilometers south of the southern tip of Lake Mjøsa), which caused the defenders (II/IR.4) to withdraw without a fight.61 Norwegian troops northwest of Oslo at Hønefoss, elements of IR.6, meanwhile still had orders from their commander Colonel Mork merely to present written protests if they encountered German patrols.62  

Ruge took command on April 11 at Rena (northeast of Elverum), where the General Staff (redesignated the Army High Command upon mobilization) had set up a makeshift headquarters. He found the officers bedraggled and diss spirited, preoccupied with recriminations against the government rather than with efforts to organize the defense. Everyone seemed to take it for granted that the military situation was hopeless.63  

Thus, Ruge's initial task was more a matter of instilling some fighting spirit in his staff and commanders than of making strategic decisions. Initially, Ruge's only direct telephone communications were with Hvinden Haug, Jensen (commanding DR.2), and Hiorth (commanding IR.5).64 In order to re-establish some co-ordination and control of more distant units, Ruge quickly appointed a series of special deputies, selected for their can-do attitude and desire to fight, regardless of rank. Examples of these "roving commissars" (Borgersrud's phrase) were Lieutenant Riise-Hansen (sent to the 1st Division), Lieutenant A.B. Nielsen (sent to IR.6, later followed by Major Helset), Colonel Strugstad (to IR.5, which remained under the nominal command of Colonel Hiorth, a well-known NS-member), and Lieutenant-Colonel Beichmann (who was too late to prevent the surrender of IR.3). Ruge also relieved much of the General Staff, including Hatledal, probably undeservedly, whom he replaced with Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg. Other members such as Lieutenant-Colonels Wrede Holm and A.F. Munthe retained their formal posts, but in practice ceded responsibility to other members of Ruge's new, improvised staff organization. Two other examples of such housecleaning were the quartermaster-general, Colonel Ravnsborg, and the
chief of Army aviation. Colonel Gullicksen, who were sent to Britain with the nominal, face-saving assignment of obtaining arms.\textsuperscript{65} Ruge also ordered the arrest of Rittmester Harald Normann, chief of the Army aviation school, who decided on his own authority to send his remaining aircraft and personnel across the border into Sweden on April 15.\textsuperscript{66}

Despite a severe shortage of reliable intelligence, Ruge meanwhile was able to form a reasonably accurate picture of the overall situation and to shape his own strategy accordingly. "Given the situation," he recollected shortly after the campaign.

We had to be prepared to sacrifice Østlandet [the province southeast of Oslo], and perhaps even all of southern Norway: but we could plan on holding northern Norway, because England surely would not allow the Germans to hold Narvik. I pointed out further [to the cabinet] that if we received help from the Allies quickly enough, we might hope to retake Trondheim, and in that case we would have the entire country north of Dovre as a basis for continuing the war. But no matter how things went, we must in any case take up the struggle for the sake of the future. To give in without a fight would be fatal to the national consciousness.\textsuperscript{67}

To write off Østlandet was no small thing, for this region contained most of Norway's precious farmland and a large portion of the population. Nevertheless, with Oslo in German hands, the best Ruge could hope for would be to extract as many troops as possible from the cul de sac before they were cut off. Meanwhile, the fragmented Norwegian forces in other areas must fight on their own for as long as possible, to tie down the invaders and prevent the other German lodgments from linking up with the main forces from Oslo. Ultimately, Ruge understood that the entire campaign would hinge upon Allied intervention. His main goal, therefore, was to buy time for the arrival of Allied forces, by delaying and harassing the Germans for as long as possible. With prompt and decisive action, Ruge believed the Allies could recapture Trondheim, which would secure their rear for a subsequent counteroffensive toward Oslo. Communications were so poor, however, and the overall situation so confused, that Ruge was almost
powerless to impose any kind of unified plan on his scattered forces before a further succession of disasters occurred.

THE SITUATION AT TRONDHEIM, APRIL 10-16

The German lodgement at Trondheim appeared vulnerable, but the Germans gained several crucial advantages in the first two days. The captured coastal fortifications at the mouth of the Trondheimfjord provided some protection against the Royal Navy; and on April 10, the vital Værnes airfield east of Trondheim also fell into German hands intact. With enterprising leadership, the Norwegian troops in the area might well have held the airfield at least long enough to carry out some demolitions, evacuate the military equipment stored there, and conduct a fighting withdrawal to the north. Instead, the men at Værnes received direct orders from General Laurantzon, the district commander, not to fight and to surrender the airfield intact.68

As a result, most of the Norwegian units in the area never had a chance to mobilize, and the Luftwaffe received an advanced staging area to dominate central Norway. It was not until the early morning of April 11 that the makeshift 5th Division headquarters at Steinkjer finally issued orders to mobilize and fight. Although Laurantzon had fallen into the Germans' hands at Trondheim, they promptly released him and let him rejoin the remaining Norwegian units at Steinkjer, where he effectively continued to stifle active resistance. In the following weeks his nominal subordinate Colonel Getz, commanding the 13th Infantry Regiment, assumed de facto command of the entire area, until the General finally resigned his post officially for health reasons on April 27.69

With the Germans able to land troops at will along the inner fjord, Getz could do little more than establish a blocking position at Steinkjer, at the head of the fjord about 50 miles north of Trondheim, with his own regiment and motorized machine gun detachments of DR.3. Other small parties (eventually including elements of IR.11) organized makeshift roadblocks near Storen to the south of Trondheim, and for the time being the Germans lacked sufficient strength to advance further in that direction. Bad weather (and to a lesser extent, air attacks from
British carriers) hampered the arrival of German transports at Værnes, and by April 21 the forces at Trondheim still amounted to only 4,000 men. The question thus remained whether the Allies could mount an effective counterattack before the main German forces from Oslo broke through.70

THE FAILURE TO CONTEST OSLOFJORD, APRIL 10-14

The German forces in Oslo actually remained quite weak for several days after April 9. As it turned out, however, the Norwegians failed to take advantage of this; and the invaders quickly fanned out to snuff opposition in the surrounding districts, confident that plenty of reinforcements were pouring in behind them. This might not have been the case, had the Oslofjord fortresses and remaining elements of the Norwegian Navy managed to hold out for a few more days. For the Germans, it was imperative to secure the fjord immediately, so that the followup convoys bearing the main elements of the 163d and 196th Infantry Divisions could land at Oslo. At the end of the day on April 9, most of the Norwegian batteries guarding the fjord were still intact, including Oscarsborg; and there were two submarines (A-3 and A-4) in the lower fjord.

Admiral Diesen sent clear orders on the evening of April 9: "The forts are to be held as long as possible, after which the guns are to be destroyed and the forts evacuated." To the men on the scene, however, the situation soon appeared hopeless; and the batteries played little further role in the campaign. The Germans subjected Oscarsborg and Bolærne to repeated bombing on April 9-10; and although these attacks inflicted little material damage or loss of life, the Norwegian garrisons' morale plummeted due to their feeling of helplessness. Bolærne sighted a lone transport entering the fjord early on April 10; yet again, the commander ordered only warning shots, and the ship withdrew undamaged. By noon, after further bombardment, the enlisted men were so demoralized that they took it upon themselves to hoist a white flag, after which the officers decided that the situation was hopeless. The Germans occupied the fort that evening about 2000 on
April 10. Oscarsborg suffered a similar fate that same day, also enduring further bombing, against which there was no defense other than a few ineffective machine guns. About mid-day, German troops advancing up the east side of the fjord occupied the Kopås battery. Still without infantry support, Colonel Eriksen now regarded Oscarsborg as untenable and decided to surrender, although the garrison actually had suffered no casualties.

The last remaining batteries in the outer Oslo defenses were Håøy and Måkerøy, near Tønsberg, on the southwest side of the fjord. Remarkably, although the Germans did not occupy them until the evening of April 14, these positions never fired a shot. Måkerøy mounted the largest weapons in the Norwegian arsenal, a pair of 30.5-cm howitzers; and on April 11, the crews spotted a convoy of sixteen ships entering the fjord. Although the targets were within range, the commander decided not to open fire. Another large convoy appeared on April 14, but again the battery held its fire. Apparently observing a tacit truce, German aircraft frequently passed overhead but did not attack. Both batteries surrendered intact, despite Diesen's clear orders on the evening of April 9.

The only other Norwegian units that might have hindered the German convoys heading for Oslo were the submarines A-3 and A-4. (A third, the A-2, had been depth-charged and captured by two German minesweepers on April 9.) In theory, the remaining two were well-placed to attack ships entering the narrow confines of the fjord; but practical conditions made their task almost hopeless. Among other things, the subs' batteries were so worn-out that they could only creep a few miles at dead-slow speed before having to lie on the bottom or resurface. Moreover, there were German aircraft almost constantly overhead, and the submarines were so obsolete that their periscopes were incapable of tilting upward for a sky-search. Judging the chances of a successful attack to be near-zero, the commanders hid the two boats in shallow water near Tønsberg and eventually scuttled them a few days later. Thus, the initial German followup convoys arrived at Oslo intact on April 11-14.
Falkenhorst lost no time in thrusting the arriving units forward in makeshift Kampfgruppen, relying heavily on confiscated civilian vehicles for mobility. By April 12, it was clear that the original plan to avoid combat had failed; but he had no intention of losing the initiative. "It is imperative," he ordered, "to break the resistance of Norwegian troops ruthlessly." 74

The Germans were able to scatter and crush opposition south of Oslo almost before it could begin. The Norwegian forces based southeast of Oslo, in the district known as Østfold, made up most of the 1st Division, commanded by General Erichsen, whose headquarters was at Halden. His subordinate units on the east side of Oslofjord included the 1st and 2nd Infantry Regiments (minus one battalion in Rogaland, near Stavanger), the 1st Dragoon Regiment, and the 1st Artillery Regiment, plus additional artillery at Fossum fortress. These units had three days to assemble before the Germans advanced into the district on April 12, which one might suppose would have been sufficient time to achieve some semblance of order. This was not the case; and although Erichsen had approximately 5,000 men under arms, he never established control over his own units. Several factors contributed to the fatal confusion in Østfold. One was the lack of communication with the government or Ruge's headquarters during the first several days. Another was Erichsen's ineffective leadership and lack of initiative. An additional problem was a legacy of the prewar precautions against insurrection. Fearing the seizure of arsenals by communists, the Army in the 1920s and 30s had disabled many weapons and stored key components such as firing pins in separate, more secure locations. Although this system was cancelled in 1938-39, the 1st Division apparently had not gotten around to implementing many of the changes; and as a result, soldiers reporting for duty in April 1940 found that many of their weapons, particularly artillery pieces, were useless. Most of the missing components apparently were locked up in Oscarsborg fortress, which already had fallen to the Germans on April 10.75
Even worse than the loss of firepower was the effect that revelations of the disabled weapons had on morale. Rumors of treachery spread like wildfire, compounding the influence of Quisling-inspired subversives and defeatists. This contributed to an almost total breakdown of the chain of command, as units received orders to retreat before coming into contact with the enemy. Unsure of his own units' positions, let alone those of the Germans, Erichsen wanted to consolidate his units and establish control; but the rank and file soon began to suspect treachery among their own commanders. The initially deliberate withdrawal quickly degenerated into an uncontrollable retreat to the east, toward the Swedish border.

The only place where elements of the 1st Division presented any organized resistance was on the Glomma River, at Fossum bridge. With some support from 12-cm guns in the nearby Høytorp fort, a few hundred infantrymen and machine gunners delayed the Germans for about 12 hours on April 13; but the attackers soon broke the position with their own artillery support, and the defenders joined the general rout. One of the Norwegian officers involved later wrote that of the whole division, "My soldiers were the only ones who had really been in action..."76

By the time Ruge established tenuous contact with Erichsen, through the arrival of Riise-Hansen and by cumbersome telegrams relayed through Stockholm, the situation in Østfold was irretrievable. On the morning of April 14, Erichsen reported that he was attempting to regroup his forces along the east side of Rødenessjøen lake, around Ørje; but much of the division already was on its way into Sweden. Erichsen apparently believed that the Swedes would allow his men to recross into Norway farther north, but he admitted that "some units have gone over the border without orders." He clearly had lost control.77

Ruge had no reason to believe that the Swedes would allow Erichsen's men to return to Norway, and his orders were that if possible, the 1st Division should retreat northward along the Glomma to Kongsvinger, to make contact with the 2nd Division. "If not," the order concluded, "then continue operations where you are." By the time this message arrived on the night of April 14-15, however, Erichsen had made up his mind that the retreat into Sweden was inevitable; and the last of
his men crossed the border on April 16. The Swedes promptly interned them, and they played no further role in the campaign.78

Despite the fact that the Oslofjord lay in between, the area southwest of Oslo also lay technically within Erichsen's command district, including the important town of Kongsberg, site of Norway's main arms factory. The town was also the mobilization point of the 3rd Infantry Regiment, which had enough time to mobilize unmolested before the first German units approached on April 13. With about 2,500 men under his command, equipped according to plan and in relatively good order, the regiment ought to have held up the Germans for several days at least. The commander, however, Colonel E. Steen, decided simply to surrender instead; and the regiment laid down its arms on April 13 without firing a shot. Only a handful of more determined men disobeyed the order to surrender and escaped into the mountains of Telemark to organize a guerrilla campaign.79

Resistance by elements of the Norwegian 3rd Division north of Kristiansand ended in a similar debacle. Following the surrender of the coastal batteries and the German occupation of Kristiansand on the morning of April 9, the district commander General Einar Liljedahl and his staff fled northward to the training depot at Evje, in the Setesdal valley. In the following days, Liljedahl essentially abdicated responsibility to his subordinate Colonel Finn Backer, commander of the 7th Infantry Regiment, who tried to organize roadblocks north of Kristiansand. These efforts were complicated, however, by a flood of about 20,000 refugees whom the Germans encouraged to evacuate the town. Due to the rampant confusion and lack of clear orders or leadership, Norwegian troops at the first roadblocks allowed the Germans through without opening fire; and after this initial embarrassment, morale among the remaining units of the division plummeted.

When the Germans advanced in earnest on April 13 and bombed Evje, Liljedahl concluded that resistance was hopeless, especially after learning of that Kongsberg had surrendered. He therefore asked Ruge, with whom he now had at least tenuous communications, for permission to surrender the 3rd Division. Ruge refused to authorize a general capitulation and directed that if the position was truly untenable.
able-bodied volunteers should make every effort to escape through the mountains to join friendly forces elsewhere. Ruge's order concluded, "you will fight." Liljedahl, however, was unwilling to take charge. Leaving Backer in command, he abandoned his post and drove off on April 15 in an effort to join Colonel Spørck's group to the west. Backer then took it upon himself to surrender that same day, and the Germans thus captured 240 officers and 2,900 men. Casualties in Setesdal had been minimal, and the 3rd Division still had plenty of ammunition.

Elements of the Norwegian 2d and 8th Infantry Regiments, amounting to about 50 officers and 1,250 men under Colonel Spørck, continued to hold out near Stavanger, posing a potential threat to German control of the vital airfield there. However, the Norwegians lacked the strength to retake the objective themselves, and they had no effective communications with the British. On April 12, Spørck decided to march his men eastward to join the Norwegian forces in Setesdalen, but had to abandon that idea upon learning of the 3rd Division's surrender on April 15.

The RAF meanwhile bombed Sola repeatedly (35 times in April), and the Royal Navy subjected it to heavy shelling on April 17; but the Luftwaffe continued to operate from Stavanger, heavily damaging the cruiser HMS Suffolk as she withdrew following the bombardment. Transports also flew in elements of the 214th Division, relieving the battalions of the 69th, which rejoined the rest of that division at Bergen by sea. On April 20, the 214th Division began mopping-up operations and soon cornered Spørck's group at Dirdal, southeast of Stavanger, where they surrendered on the 23rd. Meanwhile, the Germans also hunted down and destroyed the few remaining Norwegian torpedo boats and other minor craft that had holed-up in the Sogn and Hardanger fjords.

RUGE'S DELAYING ACTIONS IN CENTRAL NORWAY. APRIL 14-21

The collapse of the Norwegian 1st and 3rd Divisions in the south freed Falkenhorst to concentrate on the drive toward Trondheim. The main weight of the attack thus fell upon the remaining elements of the
Norwegian 2nd Division, which had taken up positions around Lake Mjøsa under Ruge's command.85

Ruge expressed his overall intentions for the campaign in central Norway in a directive to Hvinden Haug and his other subordinates on April 15. In this illuminating document, the commanding general clearly admitted that they had no hope of containing the Germans on their own. "Under these circumstances," he wrote, "our mission in the eastern region is to buy time and hold out until help arrives, so that we then can co-operate with the Allied troops." With a bit of luck, he hoped to halt the Germans on a line running roughly from Dokka to the southern mouth of the Gudbrandsdal and to Rena, which would then form the start line for a counteroffensive as the Allied buildup tipped the balance of forces against the invaders. Ruge's directive also placed a high priority, however, on avoiding any decisive battles until the Allies arrived in force; his commanders were to conserve their forces, sacrificing territory rather than blood.86

By April 14, when the German drive for Trondheim began in earnest, the Norwegian forces had achieved at least some semblance of order. The disposition of Ruge's forces at this point was as follows: Group Hiorth, in vicinity of Elverum, in Glomma river valley: two battalions of IR.5, one company of pioneers. Group Hvinden Haug, in vicinity of Hamar, at south end of Lake Mjøsa: II/IR.5 (Løken), I/IR.4 (Torkildsen), DR.2 (Jensen), I/AR.2 (Hegstad), and another pioneer company. Group Mork, in vicinity of Hønufoss, at south end of Randsfjorden: elements of IR.6, IR.11. in Romsdalen, between Andalsnes and Dombås. Most units were on an improvised footing, with a mixed bag of volunteers and personnel from other units who had been unable to reach their assigned mobilization points. Ruge wrote on April 17, "[I] still have no overview of to what extent the units have been able to establish their planned organizations, but I assume, such as the mobilization has gone, that the composition of many units is essentially random."87

In conjunction with the beginning of the main advance northward from Oslo, Hitler meanwhile ordered another airborne attack, in which a parachute company was to seize the crucial railroad junction at Dombås. After landing on April 14, the Germans ensconced themselves in a
farmstead dominating the rail line. Elements of the Norwegian IR.11 and other local volunteers soon besieged them, however: and the relieving forces from Oslo were still far to the south. Short of food and ammunition and continually harassed by snipers, the Germans finally surrendered on April 19. Had they managed to hold the position, the British landing at Åndalsnes would have been unable to link up with Ruge's forces, and the King and government probably would have had to seek refuge in Sweden.88

The Norwegian groups in the south checked the Germans at several places on April 15-16. Group Mork held a strong position southeast of Hønefoss at Haugsbygd, and the Norwegians exploited their mobility on skis to launch a flanking attack at Bjørgeseter that temporarily sent the Germans reeling back in near-panic. A German officer later described his impression that at least in this case, the Norwegians were "athletically-trained troops who made up for their lack of military education with individual cleverness and good use of their familiarity with the terrain." Group Hvinden Haug meanwhile stopped the Germans temporarily at Stryken in Nordmarka as well.89

These initial Norwegian successes proved all-too-brief. On April 16 the Germans employed tanks for the first time in Norway, with devastating results, committing five light tanks against the position at Haugsbygda. Lacking any type of anti-tank defense whatsoever, the Norwegian battalion there disintegrated; and Colonel Mork ordered a precipitous withdrawal from his other positions at Bjørgeseter and Jevnaker as well. Mork and his staff compounded the ensuing confusion by allowing two retreating columns to become entangled in a traffic jam. In the wake of this fiasco, Ruge sacked Mork and replaced him with Colonel T. Dahl of IR.4.90

The Germans meanwhile developed another attack farther east, along the Glomma river. A column advancing northeastward from Oslo toward Kongsvinger on April 15 initially stalled when it encountered resistance from Company Benckert, an ad hoc unit that included about a hundred volunteers who had just returned from Finland. After some initial success, however, the defense disintegrated in the face of a deliberate German assault on April 16; and the scattered survivors either took to
the woods or fled north toward Elverum. Ruge ordered Major Rød, commander of the Landvern battalion of IR.4, to counterattack; but this effort proved futile.91

In retrospect, it appears that Colonel Hiorth ought to have pushed elements of his group farther south to support Benckert and Rød; but in fact there was no effective co-ordination. After learning that Hiorth had abandoned Elverum without a fight in response to Hvinden Haug's retreat from Tangen, Ruge on April 19 sent another "commissar," Colonel Strugstad, to keep an eye on Hiorth's command. Hiorth's units established their next position at Åsta, on the Glomma river just south of Rena; but Hiorth placed his own headquarters about 30 km to the rear, which did not bode well for the prospects of an active, determined defense.92

Group Hvinden Haug held a good position at Tangen, at the south end of Lake Mjøsa, on April 16. On the following day, however, the German 196th Infantry Division launched a bold operation to exploit the better progress on the west side of the lake. Under the personal leadership of the division commander, General Pellengahr, the Germans crossed the frozen lake from west to east and then turned south, thus threatening the Norwegians at Tangen from the rear. Hvinden Haug ordered a hasty retreat, despite which some of his forward units were cut off and forced to surrender at Strandlykkja. The remainder fell back to Åmark-Lundeshøgda, just south of Lillehammer, abandoning Hamar.93

One of Ruge's deputies, Major Askvig, visited Jensen's DR.2 on April 18 at Hamar, after the unit had been in action for several days, and reported on conditions there. Losses were few, and morale generally was good; but Jensen and Askvig both agreed that this depended heavily on the expectation of Allied reinforcements in the near future. The troops were convinced that they were better marksmen than the Germans, but Askvig reported that in general, rifle fire had little effect in battle. Automatic weapons were essential, in prepared, concealed positions. Finally, Askvig passed on Jensen's urgent request for hand grenades, of which the unit still had none.94
On April 20 the Germans renewed their attack along the east side of Lake Mjøsa and soon dislodged Hviden Haug's forces from their position south of Lillehammer, which fell to the Germans on April 21. The Norwegian troops west of Lake Mjøsa meanwhile fared no better under Colonel Dahl's leadership than they had under Mork. Although they succeeded in destroying at least one German tank at Hornskleiva on April 18 (?) using molotov cocktails, the German attack maintained its momentum. Dahl had a good opportunity for another flanking counterattack at Skreia, using the same ski-equipped battalion that had fought at Bjørgeseter: but instead he merely continued the retreat to Bråstad, due more to German progress on the east side of Lake Mjøsa than to pressure on his own front. Morale among Dahl's troops declined steadily as a result of the continual, exhausting, apparently unwarranted retreat, until by April 21 some units were on the brink of mutiny.

Farther west, in the valleys of Begndal, Hallingdal, Numedal, and Valdres, elements of the Landvern battalion of IR.6 attempted to block the German 163rd Infantry Division in its drive to link up with the isolated bridgehead at Bergen. The Norwegians took up successive positions at Hen and Hallingby, beginning on April 14, and then fell back to Bagn, where they halted the Germans for several days.

The situation in western Norway meanwhile was a relative backwater. After seizing the Bergen on April 9, the elements of the German 69th Infantry Division there were unable to prevent most of General Steffens's 4th Division from mobilizing at Voss, 45 miles to the east. Lacking the strength to defeat this concentration on their own, the Germans remained essentially on the defensive during the first week of the campaign. Steffens, meanwhile, might have attempted to retake the port; but this would not have yielded much value.

On April 18, Ruge therefore ordered the bulk of Steffens's forces, organized as the 4th Brigade under Colonel G. Østbye, to move eastward, where they relieved the Landvern battalion of IR.6 in Valdres on April 19-20. The arrival of the reinforcements caught the Germans momentarily off-balance, and a limited Norwegian counterattack at Bagn on April 21 achieved dramatic success. Employing skis to take the road-
bound Germans on the flank. Østbye's men destroyed two tanks and took about 150 prisoners, along with three mortars, four machine guns, and a large quantity of infantry weapons, vehicles, and other supplies. Unnerved by the sudden appearance of the ski troops, the Germans on the night of April 21-22 retreated in disorder all the way back to Hønefoss.100

German intelligence initially misidentified Østbye's brigade as an Allied force, and this may have added to Falkenhorst's sense of alarm when he learned of the retreat to Hønefoss. The situation between Randsfjorden and Lake Mjøsa meanwhile was developing well for the invaders, as Group Dahl continued its hasty, demoralizing retreat. By April 22, the Germans had driven Dahl's forces into the Gausdal valley, a cul de sac that branches off to the northwest of Gudbrandsdalen, effectively isolating this group from the rest of the Norwegian forces. This allowed Falkenhorst to shut down the attack in Gausdalen, leaving only a covering force to bottle up Dahl's forces, and thus to reinforce the attacks in both Valdres and Gudbrandsdalen.101

Despite the fall of Lillehammer and Rena on April 21 and the ill-considered retreat of Group Dahl into Gausdalen, Ruge now regarded the overall situation with some optimism. His forces in central Norway had been in action for a week since the beginning of the deliberate German advance on April 14, and the attackers had yet to pass the stop line projected in the directive of April 15. "The operations so far," he wrote to Hvinden Haug on April 22, "thus have developed more favorably than I had dared hope."102 Writing to Ljungberg that same day, Ruge went so far as to say, "In practical terms, as far as I now can see, the crisis is over."103

Ruge's attitude on April 22 seems remarkable in retrospect, considering that by this time his forces were suffering severely from fatigue and shortages of ammunition and other supplies.104 Practically every unit had been in almost continuous action or movement since the beginning of the campaign, and beyond a certain point no amount of courage or determination could compensate for total exhaustion. The essential reason for Ruge's premature sense of relief was that at long last, Allied reinforcements had begun to arrive in Norway: first at
Harstad near Narvik on April 14, then at Namsos north of Trondheim on April 16, and finally at Andalsnes on April 18. For ten days, the scattered Norwegian ground forces had fought alone. Now it was up to the Allies to vindicate Ruge's assumption.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

1. Erik Anker Steen, *Norges sjøkrig 1940-45*, vol. II: Det tyske angrep i Oslofjorden og på Norges sørkyst (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1954), 29-31. The Pol-III's captain, Wielding-Olsen, was killed in the encounter and has been remembered as a martyr, the first Norwegian casualty of the invasion. (His statue in Horten bears the inscription, "He showed the way.") Although he certainly displayed great courage, many subsequent accounts have tended to over-dramatize the incident. Lars Borgersrud, *<Unngå å irritere fienden...> - Krigen i Norge 1940 - eventyr og virkelighet* (Oslo: Forlaget Oktober, 1981), presents a rather cynical corrective.


4. Telford Taylor, *The March of Conquest: The German Victories in Western Europe, 1940* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958), 115-20; Steen, *Norges sjøkrig*, II:61-63, 66; Lindbæk-Larssen, *Krigen i Norge*. 35. Arguably, the shots from Oscarsborg were the most important of the entire campaign, since they enabled the government to escape from Oslo before the Germans arrived. Otherwise, all resistance might have ceased on the first day. See Othar Lislegaard and Torbjørn Børte, *Skuddene som reddet Norge? Senkingen av <Blücher>> 9. april 1940* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1975). Borgersrud argues, however, that Eriksen's status as a national hero is exaggerated, since his disposition was essentially the same as that of the other fortress commanders; but at the very least, the Colonel deserves credit for making the first shots count. Borgersrud, *Unngå å irritere fienden*, 22.

6. Smith-Johannsen to IHF, 3 April 1941; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 180. See also box 194 for reports regarding Rauøy.

7. Erik Anker Steen, Norges sjøkrig 1940-45, vol. IV: Sjøforsvarets kamper og virke i Nord-Norge 1940 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1958), 64. There were also two Norwegian submarines at Ramsund near Harstad, but neither was operational on April 9. Rapport fra den militære undersøkelseskommisjon av 1946 avgitt mai 1950, NOU 1979: 47 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1979) [henceforth, MU 1946], 120-23.

8. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 146, suggests a humorous aspect to the image of the Germans floundering through waist-deep snow in their desperate search for the non-existent guns.

9. The Germans subsequently made extensive use of uniforms and equipment taken at Elvegårdsmoen, particularly to outfit the stranded crews of the destroyers which the British sank on April 10-13. The loss of this material prevented the mobilization of two Norwegian battalions (I/15 and the Hålogaland Engineer Battalion). MU 1946, 125.

10. Steen, Norges sjøkrig, IV:64-70.


12. Although wounded, Askim survived and later became a member of the postwar military investigative commission. MU 1946, 120-23.

13. The mayor of Narvik later wrote of Sundlo, "We knew that he was a reactionary . . . [and] showed extreme sympathy for Fascism. He had once been in Russia and knew some Russian and, therefore, regarded himself as an expert on the Red Peril. He was also anti-British and a Jew baiter . . . he attempted to redeem his slightly ridiculous personality through speechmaking on strong men and Viking exploits." Broch, The Mountains Wait, 71. Sundlo became the object of an official investigation in 1937, following allegations in the Labor press that he had invited a German Nazi photographer on an extensive tour of the depot at Elvegårdsmoen. The allegations were essentially true; but when the Army concluded that he had violated no regulations, the issue came to nothing. "Nazifotografer på norske ekserserplasser," Arbeideren, 9 October 1937. One wonders whether the fact that fellow NS-member A.F. Munthe was head of the Defense Department legal staff at the time had anything to do with the outcome of the investigation. KG to FD, "Beskyldninger mot oberst Sundlo", 19 November 1937: RA: GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 259.

14. MU 1946, 125. 131-32. A few of Omdal's men eventually reached other units of the 6th Division.
15. Taylor, *March of Conquest*, 125. Remarkably, although the postwar trial found Sundlo guilty on other counts, it did not convict him of treason for his actions on April 9. "Straffesaken mot ob. Konrad Sundlo," RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 141; *Norsk Retstidende* 113 (1948): 854-86. Sundlo maintained that he had never actually disobeyed any direct orders, and he remained unrepentant in his convictions, as revealed in correspondence with the FKA in 1963. He gave his initial self-justification in a radio speech on 3 July 1940; NA: T-312, reel 988, 9181382.

16. Fleischer ordered full mobilization on his own initiative, ignoring the fact that the government's order on April 9 technically did not apply to his district. Interview with A.D. Dahl, cited in Chr. Christensen, *De som heiste flagget* (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 90.

17. One indication of the Norwegian Army's fixation on Finnmark is the fact that Ruge had just completed an inspection tour of the units there in the last week before the invasion. The notorious Jonas Lie, chief of the Norwegian State Police and later arch-collaborator with the Gestapo, was also in Finnmark on April 9 leading the hunt for communist agents. Borgersrud, *Unngå å irritere fienden*, 152-53.


19. The fortress did have its own auxiliary power-plant, but it was out of commission due to the limited nature of the neutrality establishment. Erik Anker Steen, *Norges sjøkrig 1940-45*, vol. III: Sjøforsvarets kamper og virke på Vestlandet og i Trøndelag i 1940 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1956), 211-13.

20. Ibid., 237.

21. Ibid., 246-48; Borgersrud, *Unngå å irritere fienden*, 24-25. The postwar investigation criticized Jacobsen's passive conduct, and in 1949 he served a sixty-day sentence for neglect of duty. MU 1946, 47-48; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 197.

22. "Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI," NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440; Lindbäck-Larsen, 28-9, 108-9. At his postwar trial, Laurantzon denied that he had countermanded any mobilization orders and argued that technically, the order for partial mobilization applied only to the 1st - 4th Divisions. The court nevertheless handed down a sentence of sixty days. "Straffesak mot gen.maj. Jacob Ager Laurantzon. 5 March 1948": RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 109.

23. The volume of message traffic on April 8 alone, including reports of dozens of merchant ships requiring inspection and escort, indicates the dimensions of the Navy's daily responsibilities during the neutrality watch. It also helps to illustrate the amount of "noise" that
surrounded the clues of the impending invasion. "Inngående meldinger - Marineholmen Bergen"; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 185-86.

24. RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 186; Steen, Norges sjøkrig, III:59-88.

25. As at Agdenes, the fortress's own power-plant was out of service. Kvarven also possessed a land-mounted torpedo battery that might have dealt the Germans heavy punishment, but it too was unmanned.


27. 69. Division. Abt.Ia, "Bericht über besondere Ereignisse Bergen, den 10.4.1940," NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173609; Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 27-8; Steen, Norges sjøkrig, III:91-114. The postwar investigation criticized Willoch's delay in opening fire but did not lead to any legal prosecution. MU 1946, 42. Part of the reason the I/9 withdrew from Bergen without a fight was the presence of crowds of civilians. As one officer put it, "People were wandering in the streets to see the show, as though it were a maneuver." The Germans exploited the situation and forced the Norwegians to abandon further positions by infiltrating the columns of civilian vehicles fleeing eastward later that day. Hans L'Orange, "Krigsdagbok fra felttoget i Norge, April - Juni 1940," p.41; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 103.


29. Steen, Norges sjøkrig, III:159-76. The post-war investigation absolved Spørck of any direct blame for the debacle. MU 1946, 96.


32. Steen, Norges sjøkrig, II:206-27. Erroneous accounts of the flag incident have appeared in a number of English works. According to reliable German sources, the report must have resulted from a signal flag that closely resembled the tricolor, rather than from a deliberate ruse de guerre. The heart of the matter, however, seems to be that the Norwegian garrison, or at least Fosby, simply had lost the will to fight. In a report written in May 1940, he claimed that further resistance would have been futile. RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 194.

33. MU 1946, 35.

34. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 49-51.

36. UK 1945, 100-101.

37. Otto Ruge, Felttoget: General Otto Ruges erindringer fra kampene april-juni 1940, ed. with introduction by Olav Riste (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1989), 13. Hatledal subsequently ignored the order and did his best to implement full mobilization anyway, but in the absence of communications with any but the 2nd District it made little difference. UK, 1945, 112.


41. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 52; Fredrik Meyer, Hærens og marinens flyvåpen, 1912-1945 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1973), 78-86: "Jagervingens virksomhet fra mobiliseringen 1939 og til krigens slutt i Norge i 1940." RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 160. Although the air battle over Oslo was as dramatic as it was brief, Borgersrud pointed out that the Norwegian pilots probably would have accomplished more by simply parking their planes on the runway to obstruct the German landing. Unngå å irritere fienden, 24. Norwegian aircraft subsequently played little role in the campaign, mainly for lack of fuel and bases. By making do with low-octane gasoline, however, a few surviving Fokkers did provide useful scouting and liaison service.

42. Borgersrud suggests that the patrol’s failure to engage the Germans probably had something to do with the fact that the commander, Captain Winsnes, was a member of NS. Later that day, Quisling specifically named Winsnes to guard the former’s provisional headquarters at the Continental Hotel. Unngå å irritere fienden, 54.

43. The evacuation of the gold has become another national legend, sometimes subject to dramatic embellishment; but the bare facts are amazing enough. Hans Christian Adamson and Per Klem, Blood on the Midnight Sun (New York: Norton, 1964) offers a fairly sober account. A colorful but unreliable version is Dorothy Baden-Powell, Pimpernel Gold: How Norway Foiled the Nazis (New York: St. Martin’s, 1978).
44. Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI, NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440.
Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 53-57. In honoring the letter of
the capitulation, the Norwegians went so far as to disband two other
Guard companies that had escaped the city. Those that remained in the
capital became objects of public contempt for their perceived
collaboration, while most of the anti-aircraft crews apparently deserted
when Quisling and the Germans attempted to press them into service
against the British. Lindbäck-Larsen. 35-37.

45. Spiller apparently played an active and central role in gathering
intelligence for WESERÜBUNG. In February 1940, for example, he
persuaded the chief of the Norwegian Army aviation branch, Colonel
Gullichsen, to let him inspect the fighter squadron at Fornebu, despite
vehement protests by the unit commander, Captain Erling Munthe-Dahl.
Meyer. Hærens og marinens flyvåpen, 66-67. Falkenhorst emphasized after
the war that Spiller's action on April 9 had nothing to do with the
invasion plan. "It was entirely Spiller's private war . . . completely
unforeseen." "Bericht und Vernehmung des Generalobersten von
Falkenhorst," 18 September 1945: RA: FO. kat. 1256.1/01, box 77.

46. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 58-63. In an ironic tragedy,
one of the few men to offer resistance that afternoon was Captain Øyvinn
Øi of the General Staff, shot at a German check-point near Oslo when he
refused to surrender. He must have died with a sense of bitter
vindication for having seen his worst predictions of the "strategisk
overfall" fulfilled. E.O. Hjelle. "Øyvinn Øi," Forsvaret og samfunnet

47. KG to Hvinden Haug, 9 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.


49. Various, often conflicting first-hand reports are found in RA: FKA,
kat. 1256.0/02, box 71. For a thorough analysis, see Anton Olstad.
"Hvem hadde kommandoen på Midtskogen?" Norsk militært tidsskrift (12.
1980): 519-21. Olstad concludes that Colonel Hans Hiorth, CO of IR.5,
deserves primary credit for ordering the defense of the roadblocks.
Hiorth had been an NS member but refused to co-operate with Quisling on
April 9.

50. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 63-66. Koht still hoped to
pursue negotiations with Bräuer the following day.

april 1940," 30 April 1955: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22. Mølster,
who was present as one of Ruge's staff officers, reports that Ruge also
told King Haakon, "The important thing now is to keep hold of your
cabinet ministers by the ears."

52. Issued from Gardermoen, 10 April 1940, probably sometime before
0330. RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.
53. Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI. NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440. An enlisted man, Arthur Olaf Haugerud wrote a first-hand report of the capture of his unit, the 1st Battery, 2nd Artillery Regiment, at Strandløkken about 0700 on April 10; and he also alleged seeing a party of Germans meet with a group of senior Norwegian officers at Gardermoen late the previous night. The officer who evaluated the report in April 1940, however, dismissed the alleged meeting as "fantasy." RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60. Borgersrud stops just short of accusing Hvinden Haug of treason but clearly implies that the last thing the general wanted to do was to fight the Germans. Unngå å irritere fienden. 66-72. The postwar investigation concluded otherwise, stating, "The Commission cannot regard Major-General Hvinden Haug's dispositions as an example of deliberate compliance [ettergivenghet] toward the enemy, nor of unwillingness to fight." MU 1946, 73. Nevertheless, his actions in the period April 9-11 suggest a defeatist attitude at best.

54. Taylor, March of Conquest, 99; Olav Riste, "Air Power, Sea Power, and Weserübung," in ACTA No. 2 (Manhattan, Kansas: Military Affairs/Aerospace Historian Publishing, 1977), 125-27; Roskill, War at Sea, II:171. For another study emphasizing the interplay of air and sea power, see J.L. Moulton, The Norwegian Campaign of 1940: A Study of Warfare in Three Dimensions (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1966). Among other points, Moulton compares the campaign with the later one at Guadalcanal and draws some interesting parallels, such as the crucial importance of seizing key airfields at the outset.


57. Ruge, Felittoget, 21-23; Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX:117, 123. Bräuer continued to argue with Berlin that Quisling was the only real obstacle to an accommodation. Ibid., 129, 142. In fact, the Germans set him aside almost immediately in favor of an administrative council endorsed by the Norwegian Supreme Court; but the window of opportunity for a settlement with the King and cabinet had closed. Ibid., 159-62, 168.

58. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 80; Kersaudy, Norway 1940. 100-02, 105-06; Greve, Haakon VII. 135.

59. Order from Ruge, 13 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.
60. German records contain a series of reports from a "civil patrol" in Oslo ca. April 11-12. Appendix to Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI. NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440. One of the few well-documented cases was that of a corporal who deserted from IR.4 (Bn. Løken) on the night of April 9-10 and provided Quisling with a written report. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 72-75. Borgersrud believes that Hvinden Haug probably collaborated actively with the Germans on April 9-10 and continued to do so at least passively until Ruge established control after April 11. The postwar investigation never pursued this question to its conclusion, however—in Borgersrud's opinion, because to do so would have implicated too many additional figures still in positions of authority after the war. The full truth is unlikely ever to emerge. Ibid., 75-79.

61. Ibid.: KG to Torkildsen, 11 April 1940, RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

62. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 83-84.

63. Margaret Reid and Leif C. Rolstad, April 1940: En krigsdagbok (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1980), 30-32.


65. Gullicksen's successor as aviation chief was Captain Øen, who together with Pran had told Ruge on April 13 that almost all the remaining pilots agreed Gullicksen must go. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 85-88, 114, 129-31. Munthe's main assignment during the following weeks apparently was to distribute the recipe for "Hitler cocktails," the Norwegian adaptation of the famous Finnish expedient against tanks. "Bensinflaske." 19 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

66. HOK to 2.Div., 16 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60; Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 129-31. After the war, Normann sued Ruge but lost the case. H. Normann, Rettssak mot HOK 1940 (Oslo: Eget forlag, 1953). Normann defended his action on the grounds that the aircraft were unarmed trainers (mostly Tiger Moths) of no combat value, and that he believed the Swedes would soon join the war on Norway's side. Although he probably did exceed his authority in this matter, the arrest actually stemmed mainly from an unfounded rumor that he had somehow known about the invasion beforehand, supposedly indicated by his evacuation of the aircraft from Kjeller on April 8. The destruction of his reputation and career, and the repercussions for his family, were tragic. Jens Erik Normann, Rittmesterens testamente (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1987).

68. At least one officer at Værnes, Major R. Holtermann, had the initiative to lead fifty artillerymen to the old fortress of Hegra a few miles to the east. With a makeshift garrison totalling 284 people (including several women), they repulsed a series of German attacks beginning on April 15 and continued to hold out for three weeks. Holtermann hoped to use the fort's four 10.5-cm guns to support the flank of an eventual counterattack from the north; but this never developed, and the guns lacked the range to bombard the airfield. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 146-49.


70. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 110-11; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 78.

71. At least in this case, the Norwegians did disable their guns before surrendering. In fact, only one of the battery's three 15-cm guns was still operable on April 10 anyway, due to mechanical failures in the breech-mechanisms. Steen, Norges sjøkrig, II:145-55. The postwar investigation concluded that it was impossible to determine who had raised the white flag, and that the officers involved had done their best under the circumstances. MU 1946, 37-38.

72. Steen, Norges sjøkrig, II:164-67. The Måkerøy battery commander later cited a combination of reasons for holding his fire, including poor visibility, inadequate fire-control instruments, shortage of ammunition, and lack of anti-aircraft defense. In fairness, the chances of the slow-firing howitzers hitting moving targets at such long range (ca. 14,000 meters) were minimal; and the battery's specific orders did seem to support this decision. Nevertheless, self-preservation seems to have been the highest priority; and even near-misses by such heavy shells might well have caused the Germans to withdraw, thus delaying the arrival of the vital reinforcements. Report of Captain R. Wølner, 20 May 1940, RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 194; MU 1946, 36-37.

73. Sigurd Valvatne, Med norske ubåter i kamp (Oslo: J.W. Eides forlag, 1954); Steen, Norges sjøkrig, II:90-95, 169. Apparently the subs never received Diesen's order on the evening of April 9, which had directed them to inflict as much damage as possible and then escape westward. ("Fartøyene tiføyer fienden den skade de er i stand til og søker deretter å komme vekk--eventuelt vestover.") Ibid., 149. The post-war investigation criticized the two sub commanders for their lack of determination, and for voluntarily informing the Germans that they had scuttled, which gave the invaders one less thing to worry about. MU 1946, 34.

74. "Operationsbefehl für die Besetzung von Südnorwegen", 12 April 1940; NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173609.

75. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 88-90; Ottar Strømme [pseud.], Stille mobilisering (Oslo, 1977), 83-111. Borgersrud probably exaggerated the significance of this factor, however. See Terje H.
Much of the unusable equipment was due to simple lack of maintenance. For example, 75 percent of the 10.5-cm guns slated to equip an artillery battalion at Fossum fortress had no tires. "Rapporten fra Kommandanten - Fossumstrøkets festning", 12 February 1941; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 49.

76. "Rapport fra kapt. Helge Gleditsch, Askimdetasjementet," RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 49. The Fossum fortress, a relic of the independence crisis with Sweden, was ill-sited to defend against an attack from the west and surrendered on the afternoon of April 14 after suffering just one casualty. "Rapport fra Kommandanten - Fossumstrøkets festning." Ibid. See also Svein Blindheim, Officer i krig og fred (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1981), 40-53.

77. 1.Div. to HOK, 14 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 49. The official history of this portion of the campaign is W. Faye, Operasjonene i Østfold (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1963).

78. HOK to 1.Div., 15 April 1940, RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 49; Ruge. Felttoget. 26: Carl J. Hambro, I Saw it Happen in Norway (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940). 81-82. Sources differ on the respective roles of simple confusion and deliberate fifth-column activity in the disintegration of the 1st Division. A Swedish report indicated that the total numbers of Norwegian troops and equipment interned were 4,610 men, approximately 400 vehicles, 12 artillery pieces with 10 tons of ammunition, and 200 machine guns. "Flykingstrømmen frå Norge den 15.-22. april," RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 204.

79. Ziemke. German Northern Theater. 65-67: Borgersrud. Unngå å irritere fienden, 86-87. See also J. Johnsen, Operasjonene ved Kongsberg, i Telemark og Rødal (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1956). Ruge apparently had little faith in Steen's initiative to begin with and sent one of his most trusted aides, Beichmann, as "commissar." However, the latter was unable to reach Kongsberg in time to prevent the surrender.

80. W. Faye, Operasjonene i Kristiansand-Setesdalsavsnittet (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1953): Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 60-61: Ziemke. German Northern Theater, 85-86: Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 87; MU 1946, 92. Liljedahl later argued that technically, according to the system established by the 1933 ordinance, he was no longer in command once mobilization began. The court that tried him in 1947 found little merit in this defense, however, and sentenced him to 60 days' confinement. "Straffesak mot generalmajor Einar Liljedahl", 19 May 1947; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 86. Backer apparently salvaged his reputation by escaping Norway to join the forces in Britain and received a promotion to major-general in October 1945. He also stood trial in 1947 for the surrender in 1940 but received an acquittal. "Straffesak mot generalmajor Finn Backer", 24 February 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 94.
81. Lindbæk-Larsen, Krigen i Norge. 129; Borgersrud. Unngå å irritere fienden. 138. In fact, the British had inserted some agents in the area shortly before April 9, in preparation for the R.4 operation; but no effective liaison resulted. See Malcolm Munthe, Sweet is War (London: Gerald Duckworth. 1954). 50ff.

82. The Suffolk fired for 48 minutes but landed few shells on the airfield itself, destroying only two seaplanes and damaging two others. Firing at the extreme range of about 20,000 yards, the cruiser depended heavily on spotter aircraft whose radios proved defective; and due to logistical disorganization, the ship's magazines did not have the best type of ammunition for the job. Helgesen. Kampen om Sola. 99-103.


84. One of the last was the elderly torpedo boat Stegg, sunk in the Hardangerfjord on April 20 by an armed German whaler and the gunnery ship Bremse. Excerpts from journal of Øivind Schau, cited in Christensen. De som heiste flået. 37-54.

85. During the period April 12-20, the various Norwegian units were designated as "groups" named for their commanders, e.g. Dahl, Hvinden Haug, and Hiorth, all subordinate to Ruge's headquarters; and technically the 2nd Division did not exist. On April 20, however, Ruge consolidated groups Dahl and Hvinden Haug under the latter's command and officially redesignated them as the 2nd Division, which remained subordinate to Ruge along with group Hiorth, the 4th Brigade, and the 11th Infantry Regiment. For the sake of continuity, the present author has elected to continue referring to the forces in central Norway, i.e. the Gausdal, Gudbrandsdal, and Østerdal valleys, as the 2nd Division throughout. HØK to groups Dahl and Hvinden Haug. 20 April 1940; RA: FKA, no. 1256.0/02, box 60.

86. Ruge to Gruppen Hvinden Haug, "Direktiv." 15 April 1940; RA: FKA, no. 1256.0/02, box 60. A leaflet the following day said essentially the same thing to the troops and civilian volunteers. (See Appendix.)

87. Gruppen Hvinden Haug, 13 April 1940; Ruge to Hvinden Haug, 17 April 1940; RA: FKA, no. 1256.0/02, box 60. On April 13, for example, Løken's and Torkildsen's battalions amounted to about 550 and 250 men, respectively. Staff notes [by Major Sæbø?]. 13 April 1940: Ibid.

88. Ziemke. German Northern Theater. 69-70. For personal recollections of the German side of the ill-fated Dombås operation, as well as other aspects of the campaign, see Sven T. Arneberg and Kristian Hosar. Vi dro mot Nord: Feldtoget i Norge i april 1940, skildret av tyske soldater og offiserer (Oslo, Østfold, Akershus, Hedmark, Oppland, Møre og Romsdal) (Oslo: Aventura forlag, 1989). Ironically, one of the Norwegian officers who fought most heroically and was wounded at Dombås, fenrik
Tor Marstrander, had been a member of NS ever since 1933. Svein Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fan: dei norske frontkjempemarane (Oslo: Noregs boklag, 1977), 49; and several other Norwegian officers who figured prominently in the action later fought for the Germans on the Eastern Front. This fact may help explain why the Dombås episode received relatively little attention in Norwegian historiography until recently. Svein Blindheim, "Nordmenn i <<ukjent>> krig." Gudbrandsdalen Lillehammer Tilskuer (8 October 1993), 33.

89. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 69; Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 92, 128.

90. Ibid., 94-96.

91. Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 72-75. The Kongsvinger fortress was essentially a museum, with no garrison or usable artillery other than a pair of 19th-century antique field-pieces that Benckert's men briefly manned. The fortress commander, Major Hoch-Nielsen, was an unabashed Nazi-sympathizer and refused to issue weapons to the Landvern unit based there, which technically had not been ordered to mobilize; but Benckert's men broke into the arsenal regardless. See Max Manus, Det vil helst gå godt (Oslo: P.F. Steenballes boghande, 1945). The Germans subsequently decided to treat any foreign volunteers they captured in Norway as criminals. "Entscheidung O.K.W. zur Frage Finnlandfreiwillige", 5 May 1940; NA: T-312, reel 988. "Soweit solche Nichtnorweger nicht im Kampfe erschossen werden, sind sie vor ein Standgericht zu stellen." The great majority of them, however, apparently managed to escape to Sweden.

92. J. Jensen, Operasjonene i Glåmadalføret, Trysil og Rendalen (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1953). Hiorth's situation report on the morning of April 18 indicates that his group was under little pressure, and that the Germans facing it were unsupported. RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 114.

93. Ibid., 100-101: Lindbäck-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 78-80.

94. Report of Major Askvig, 18 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

95. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 70-73.


98. Had the Allies managed to retake Bergen, the port would have come under attack from German aircraft based only about 100 miles away at Sola. Bergen lacked its own airfield from which to mount fighter cover; and finally, the route inland to central Norway was long and difficult.

99. Lindbæk-Larsen, Krigen i Norge, 28, 85. The battalion of IR.6 by that time was close to the breaking-point, but Østbye's leadership helped to rally the shaken unit. Captain Hans L'Orange. "Krigsdagbok fra felttoget i Norge." 98-100; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02. box 103.

100. N. Hertzberg. Operasjonene i Ådalen og i Valdres (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1962). Interrogation revealed that the German troops had received almost no rest or food for several days before the counterattack. L'Orange, "Krigsdagbok", 130; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 103.


102. HOK to 2.Div, "Direktiv", 22 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

103. Ruge to Ljungberg, 22 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.

104. The supply report for April 20-21 indicated that the forces in Gudbrandsdalen had only about 1,000 rounds of 75-mm ammunition and 200 mortar rounds. RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 446.
Surprisingly, Norway had no military or naval attaché in London (or anywhere else, for that matter, except Finland) until 16 April 1940, when the ambassador appointed naval Captain J. Jacobsen and Army Captain N.R. Petersen, who happened to be in Britain for other reasons. Although the visit to London by Koht and Ljungberg in early May did not accomplish much else, it did lead to the appointment of a more extensive "Norwegian Military and Naval Mission" headed by Major-General Steffens (following his escape from the Bergen district) and Commodore E. Corneliussen, charged with procuring war material and recruiting and training Norwegian forces abroad.¹ Among the highest priorities of the original Norwegian mission to London was to form a new Norwegian fighter squadron with British aircraft, for commitment to Norway as soon as possible. The British, however, were more interested in simply absorbing Norwegian pilots into existing RAF units; and the efforts to form new Norwegian units in Britain produced no useful results before the campaign ended.²

The Allied expeditions in response to the German invasion meanwhile proceeded without any co-ordination or advice from the Norwegians. Considering the fact that the British already had units standing by for immediate execution of plan R.4 on April 8, one wonders why it took so long to set things in motion. The essential reason for the delay and confusion which ensued was poor organization and
unrealistic thinking at practically every level of the British command structure.

During the Winter War the British had assembled substantial forces for deployment to Scandinavia, including the 5th Battalion Scots Guards, a special unit made up of volunteers with skiing experience. With the end of the Russo-Finnish conflict, however, all these preparations went out the window; and the 5th Scots Guards disbanded on March 20. The remaining forces earmarked for Operation R consisted nominally of the 49th (Territorial) Division, primarily the 146th and 148th Infantry Brigades. These units suffered from a general lack of training and motivation, reflecting the prevailing atmosphere of complacency during the "Phony War" in Britain. In most units their equipment also fell short of the theoretical establishment.

Nevertheless, the units assigned to support Operation WILFRED, in case the Germans retaliated, at least were combat-loaded and ready for departure on short notice: but a hasty and ill-advised decision by First Sea Lord Dudley Pound threw these preparations into disarray as well. On the evening of April 7, after receiving the initial reports of German heavy ships at sea, Pound ordered the troops to disembark from the cruiser squadron which was to transport them to the southern objectives, so the ships could join the Home Fleet unencumbered.

Other, better-trained units of the 24th Guards Brigade aboard transports earmarked for Narvik, could not depart for several more days due to a lack of escorts. In the mad scramble to get ships to sea, the carrier Furious also sailed without her fighter squadron, the absence of which left the fleet without even that dubious degree of air cover. These orders reflected Pound's conviction that the Germans were simply launching a raid into the Atlantic—a misconception shared by others as well, but for which he bears a large share of responsibility. As a result of all this confusion, combined with the moral effect of the German air attacks on the Home Fleet off Bergen on April 9, the Allied response to WESERÜBUNG was slow and disjointed.

Although anxious for reinforcements to halt the Germans north of Oslo, Ruge initially believed that the Allies' first priority should be to recapture Trondheim, to provide a secure base for subsequent
operations southward. The British minister Sir Cecil Dormer and the newly-appointed military attache King-Salter passed on Ruge's recommendation to London, by way of a radio link established by British MI-6 agent Frank Foley. Although the British initially planned to send everything available to Narvik, a wave of optimism following the destruction of the German destroyers there on April 13 led to the reassignment of several brigades to central Norway, in order to recapture Trondheim as Ruge suggested. The Royal Navy also considered a plan for a direct naval attack on Trondheim, code-named HAMMER; but the Admiralty ultimately rejected the idea as too hazardous, due to German air superiority and control of Agdenes fortress. Instead, the Army would mount a deliberate, two-pronged advance by land. The 148th Brigade, under Brigadier-General Morgan, would land south of Trondheim at Åndalsnes; and the 146th, under the colorful Carton de Wiart, would land at Namsos to the north. Code-named SICKLE and MAURICE, respectively, these forces were then to converge on the objective in a pincer movement while Ruge's forces held the Germans in check north of Oslo.

The leading elements of the 148th Brigade landed at Åndalsnes on April 18, and Brigadier Morgan arrived at Ruge's headquarters at Øyer the following day. The first encounter between the two generals was a stormy one, for their respective governments had yet to work out any agreement for unified command. Following his own orders, Morgan had tried to take charge of Norwegian railroad personnel at Dombås and ordered the demolition of tracks to the south. Ruge angrily countermanded this order, which would have severed his own communications, and emphasized that his units would collapse entirely if not relieved within the next few days. Morgan's own orders presented him with a dilemma, because his brigade was supposed to support and cooperate with Ruge's forces while simultaneously attacking Trondheim. Although the initial orders were ambiguous on the question of subordination to Ruge's command, the IGS sent a message through Foley on April 20 stating flatly that Morgan was not subject to Norwegian orders.

Ruge meanwhile told King-Salter and the French military attache that "Norway was not some African colony" and that he would resign
unless the Allies recognized him as commander-in-chief. All of the Allied representatives present seemed to agree that Ruge was the only man with any hope of mastering the situation, and King-Salter helped convince Morgan to accept Ruge's orders on an unofficial basis. Foley also convinced King-Salter to pocket the telegram from the IGS, with the result that for several days, the British leadership in London was unaware that Ruge was functioning as the de facto Allied commander-in-chief in central Norway.

Morgan thus allowed his units to be committed piecemeal on April 20-21, to bolster the increasingly desperate Norwegian forces under Hvinden Haug. The arrival of the British troops briefly buoyed Norwegian morale; but they proved woefully unprepared for winter combat. The Norwegians found they would also have to supply the British units, increasing the strain on the 2nd Division's improvised logistics.

Colonel Jensen, commanding DR.2, whom the British were supposed to relieve on the eastern shore of Lake Mjøsa, soon realized that the new arrivals would be of little help. It was, as he later remarked with some charity, "A difficult job; in a strange land, in frost and snow, with dark, thick woods in all directions. It might be difficult enough for us--for them it was infinitely worse."

In their initial encounter with the Germans at Balberg on April 22, the British failed to secure their flanks and hastily abandoned the position when a German patrol from Machine Gun Battalion 13 enveloped them from the east and took fifty prisoners. The defense at Balberg had been supposed to gain time for Norwegian forces to rest, regroup, and dig-in for a determined defense at Tretten; but in the event, the British had to take over at Tretten themselves. The only cohesive Norwegian unit available was DR.2, which Ruge placed under Morgan's command. Although Ruge tried to downplay the significance of Balberg, referring to it as "the Englishmen's little panic," the incident spelled the beginning of the end of resistance in central Norway, as it became increasingly clear that the British were no more capable of stopping the Germans than were the Norwegian themselves.

At Tretten, the Gudbrandsdal valley narrows to a gorge, and the road crosses a river; and the Norwegians already had completed some
hasty fortifications when the British arrived. Thus, if held with sufficient determination, the position seemed likely to stop the Germans cold. However, the British failed to heed the advice of the Norwegian liaison officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Beichmann, who had helped lay out the position and urged them to occupy a forward outpost at Sletten. The German attack began about 1330 on April 23, led by five tanks and supported by 105-mm artillery. Beichmann later described the results:

> It was not very long before the Territorials showed signs of disintegration. More and more came running back without their weapons or equipment, badly shaken-up and terrified. Before they could be stopped, some of them seized vehicles and forced them to drive northward. Some of them drove all the way to Heidal and Otta.

The remnants of Jensen's DR.2 meanwhile held their ground on the left flank, only to find themselves cut off when the British abandoned the bridge in the middle of the position and commandeered most of the Norwegians' own trucks. "Brigadier Morgan," Beichmann concluded, "was terribly ashamed of his own men and praised the [Norwegian] dragoons, who he said had been 'splendid'."12

The survivors of this debacle retreated in disorder, leaving the Germans to advance almost unopposed. By the 24th, the attackers had reached Vinstra, only about 40 miles from the vital junction at Dombås. The 148th Brigade ceased to exist as a cohesive unit and played no further part in the campaign.13

The Norwegian 4th Brigade's dramatic success on April 21 meanwhile proved short-lived when the Germans renewed their attack a few days later, now reinforced by units transferred from Gausdalen. The Norwegians continued to hold their own on April 22-23; but on the 24th, the battalion I/IR.10 defending a crucial position at Heljerasten bridge (between the north end of Randsfjorden and Fagernes) suddenly disintegrated in panic. The unit was well dug-in, and Østbye was relying on it as an anchor for the entire brigade. The battalion apparently became severely fatigued from constant German probes and harassing fire, and the troops had not received a proper meal for
several days. Colonel Østbye made an admirable attempt to rally the broken troops, sacked the battalion commander (Major L.M.E. Sæter), and attempted to organize a counterattack. His subordinates balked, however; and he then replaced another battalion commander, Major Haanes, whom the colonel concluded had lost his nerve. The brigade then fell back to positions on the Tonsåsen ridge, where the battle continued on April 25-27; but the unexpected disaster at Høljerasten bridge proved decisive. Østbye later wrote, "It was a tremendous disappointment to me that Høljerasten fell without any significant fight, especially without any infantry combat. The artillery was outstanding, the machine guns war good, but the infantry was lousy. The whole thing was abandoned very quickly." Although formal resistance continued, news of the collapse on other fronts added to a general mood of hopelessness. As the brigade chief of staff put it, "Further resistance seems to be nothing more than sheer obstinace by a fanatical government." The Germans, he also noted, "had a contempt for death and aggressiveness that were incomprehensible by Norwegian standards." Abandoning Tonsåsen on April 27, the now demoralized and defeated 4th Brigade, still consisting of 300 officers and 3200 men, retreated northward to Lomen (or Fagernes?), where Østbye surrendered on May 1.

The 69th Division meanwhile had broken out of Bergen, taking advantage of the Germans' effective control of the Hardangerfjord to move troops by boat in a flanking movement against Voss from the south, via Ålvik, Bordalen, and Granvin. The main Norwegian position at Skjervet collapsed on April 24, due mainly to a dispute between two majors (Løvestad and Treider) over who was in command. Both departed to argue their cases before Steffens, leaving an inexperienced captain in command when the Germans attacked. Following this fiasco, Steffens decided on April 25 to withdraw his remaining forces across the Sognfjord to the north, and the Germans entered Voss on April 26. Now isolated, Steffens concluded his men could accomplish nothing further and ordered them to demobilize on April 30. The Germans occupied the three-mile-long Gravhals railroad tunnel at Myrdal essentially intact on May 1, and they made contact with the forces advancing west from Oslo the following day."
Following the 148th Brigade came the 15th, under Brigadier Smythe, landing at Åndalsnes on April 23. Due to the disaster at Tretten, the 15th had to move south into the Gudbrandsdal as well, rather than attacking toward Trondheim as called for by the pincer concept. By this time, Ruge's only remaining effective unit was Battalion Navelsaker (II/IR.11), which the Germans destroyed when it tried to hold another delaying position at Vinstra.¹⁸ Group Dahl still amounted to about 3500 men with 10 guns in Gausdal, but as early as April 22, the battalion commanders there apparently all agreed that the situation was hopeless. Rather than trying to cross the intervening mountains to link up with the friendly forces in Valdres or Gudbrandsdalen (a difficult but not impossible task), as Ruge had ordered, Dahl opened negotiations with the Germans that led to the surrender of his forces on the night of April 29-30.¹⁹

On April 25, Ruge issued another general directive that betrayed an increasing sense of desperation. In another effort to downplay the poor showing of the British at Tretten, he urged his men to remember that Allied forces were also operating on other fronts, where their successes were simply not yet apparent. "He who gives up," Ruge concluded, "is of no use to the country. He is a coward and a failure, and will be treated accordingly. He is a disgrace to Norway."²⁰

The British 15th Brigade checked the Germans at Kvam on April 25, holding its ground despite heavy losses to one company of the 1st Battalion, King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry.²¹ General Paget arrived at Ruge's headquarters on April 26 and promised that Allied troops would now continue to arrive in central Norway at the rate of 2,000 per day, until they reached a total of five or six divisions. This news once again caused brief optimism, and Ruge wrote again that "The crisis is over."²² With his own forces now almost non-existent, Ruge acknowledged Paget as commander-in-chief in central Norway.²³

Better trained and equipped than the 148th Brigade, the 15th Brigade gave a good account of itself in holding actions at Kvam, Kjørem, and Otta on April 25-28. With the British holding the front.
Ruge tried to rally Hvinden Haug's remaining troops in Romsdalen. By this time, however, defeatism was almost universal; and desertion was widespread. Battalion commander Torkildsen reported on April 28, for example, his "distinct impression" that very few of his unit's many losses were casualties or prisoners.

German air power now came fully into play against the Allies' tenuous lines of communication. Beginning on April 26, the Luftwaffe practically obliterated Åndalsnes and the nearby port of Molde. Lacking an airfield, the British could provide only token air support, in the form of an RAF Gladiator squadron that operated briefly from the frozen Lake Lesjaskog. Logistical disorganization prevented more than a few of the Gladiators from taking off, and a combination of spring melting and German bombs soon made the lake unusable. The failure of this effort dealt yet another blow to Norwegian confidence in the Allies, since Ruge had emphasized the arrival of the British fighters in his efforts to bolster his men's flagging morale on April 25.

Unaided by the British, Norwegian forces in the Østerdal meanwhile had given way under the weight of German motorized forces (the 11th Motorized Rifle Brigade?) with tank and air support. Following the collapse of the position at Åsta and the fall of Rena on April 21, Colonel Hjorth apparently regarded the situation as hopeless. Ruge finally relieved Hjorth on April 24 and gave Strugstad formal command; but the German advance continued, reaching Røros on April 24-25. Some of Hjorth's men sought refuge in Sweden, and organized resistance in the Østerdal essentially collapsed with the fall of a final position at Koppang on April 26 (?), although isolated groups continued to harass German movements until May 2. After breaking through elements of IR.11 at Storfossen, the attackers linked up with units of the 181st Division advancing south from Trondheim, at Berkåk on April 30.

The bombing of Åndalsnes and Molde prompted the British decision to evacuate central Norway, of which Paget informed Ruge on April 28. The 15th Brigade conducted another creditable delaying action at Dombås on April 30, then withdrew up Romsdalen toward Åndalsnes. The narrow valley became the scene of countless traffic jams, as hundreds of commandeered vehicles jammed the few roads. The British completed the
evacuation on May 2. Beichmann described a final meeting with Paget and his staff just before their embarkation, at which many of the British officers "had tears in their eyes, and one of them sobbed out loud . . ."

The British withdrawal represented an agonizing disappointment to Ruge and the Norwegian government. Some of the cabinet argued that they must re-open negotiations with the Germans, since their earlier, reluctant decision to fight had rested solely on the hope of effective intervention by the Allies. King Haakon once again helped to rally his ministers; however, and they boarded a British cruiser at Molde, to establish a temporary capital at Tromsø.

The government also ordered Ruge to North Norway. Most of his staff officers were once again thoroughly demoralized and more bitter than ever toward the government. In attempting to rally them, Ruge therefore appealed to their personal loyalty and asked for volunteers to accompany him. "I have no use," he told them, "for anyone except those who believe in my cause." He thus convinced most of them to come along.

Before leaving, Ruge gave Hvinden Haug authority to surrender, observing that "Since the English troops are being withdrawn from the area, the situation here is completely changed. . . . Without external assistance, our troops will not be able to hold against a serious German attack." Ruge went on to emphasize his agreement with the government's decision to continue resistance in North Norway, however, and directed that before the 2nd Division surrendered, any men who were willing should attempt to escape in small parties to join friendly forces north of Trondheim. Hvinden Haug made no such efforts, and on May 3, the remaining 123 officers and 2,500 men of his command surrendered as a body. Nor did he order the destruction of the remaining equipment or ammunition which, together with that surrendered by Group Dahl, amounted to 13 field guns with 10,500 rounds, 4 anti-aircraft guns, 64 mortars with 1,000 rounds, 7,300 rifles, 441 machine guns and automatic rifles, 16,000 hand grenades, and 300 tons of other ammunition.
FAILURE OF THE ALLIED EXPEDITION AT NAMSOS

The 146th Brigade landed at Namsos on April 16, followed by the French 5th Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs-Alpins on the 19th, in order to carry out the northern part of the SICKLE/MAURICE pincer movement. These forces arrived in an almost hopeless logistical muddle, however, and quickly proved incapable of staging an advance on Trondheim. Instead, the forces at Namsos suddenly found themselves on the defensive when the numerically inferior Germans outflanked them with a surprise landing in the fjord at Steinkjer on April 21. "The combat value of the English troops here," the Trondheim group reported to Falkenhorst, "is minimal."32 By April 23, the local Allied commanders already were contemplating evacuation. Thus, the northern part of the intended pincer attack on Trondheim never materialized, despite the fact that by April 26, the Allied and Norwegian forces at Namsos amounted to no less than fifteen infantry battalions and nine artillery batteries.33

Following the defeat at Steinkjer on April 21, the British 146th Brigade undertook no further action. The French 5th Demi-Brigade of Chasseurs Alpins displayed somewhat more initiative, and its commander General Audet laid plans for an offensive around Lake Snåsen to outflank the Germans to the east, in co-ordination with the Norwegians. Before this operation materialized, however, the Luftwaffe almost completely destroyed Namsos in a relentless series of bombing attacks, crippling the Allied logistical base just as at Andalsnes. By April 28, the British commander Brigadier Carton de Wiart had concluded that the position was hopeless. Audet agreed, and the War Cabinet ordered the evacuation of Namsos.

Although the War Office informed Ruge on April 29 of its intention to evacuate Namsos,34 Getz did not find out until the final night, at 2240 hours on May 2, when he received written notes from de Wiart and Audet informing him of a fait accompli. The Allies abandoned a considerable amount of equipment, ammunition, and other supplies; but instead of turning these over to the Norwegians, they destroyed practically everything. To Getz and his men, the withdrawal, and especially the manner in which it occurred, amounted to a stab in the
back. That same night, Getz also received an order from Fleischer to detach a battalion temporarily loaned from the 6th Division, I/IR.14, which was to retreat northward to Mo. On the evening of May 3, Getz received further orders from Ruge (who had just arrived at Tromsø):

"Send as many of your troops as possible back toward Mosjøen. Attempt to make contact with the 6th Division's units there. The force will then be subordinate to General Fleischer. Demolish the road thoroughly as the troops withdraw. Obstacles must be defended."35

By that time, however, Getz and his main subordinate Wettre (commanding DR.3) had no intention of carrying on the fight. The sudden, unannounced Allied withdrawal had come as a betrayal of the meanest sort. Getz issued the following order of the day to his men on May 3:

Because England and France, for reasons unknown to us, have abandoned the attempt to aid us in our struggle and last night withdrew their forces at Namsos without warning, today we stand alone against the assembled German forces--already outflanked and taken in the rear by the Germans, on the line the English and French troops were supposed to hold. Alone, without the possibility of outside help, with ammunition for only one day of combat, and without aircraft, anti-aircraft defense, and other essential weapons, further resistance will only lead to total annihilation, without furthering any military purpose. Today I have therefore proposed an armistice to the German command...36

The Germans occupied Namsos on the morning of May 4, and Getz surrendered his remaining troops (100 officers and 1,950 men) that afternoon. In accordance with the terms of capitulation, the Norwegians undertook no destruction of roads, bridges, or equipment; nor were volunteers allowed to attempt to escape on their own. Total casualties among Getz's troops since April 9 amounted to 37 killed or missing, 32 wounded, and 13 prisoners.37

With the withdrawal of the Allied brigades and the collapse of the main Norwegian forces, the final remaining pockets of resistance in southern and central Norway could achieve no further purpose. Major Holtermann's stubborn garrison at Hegra surrendered on May 5. The last
holdouts in southern Norway were a few members of the 3rd Infantry Regiment who had essentially mutinied against Colonel Steen's order to surrender at Kongsberg on April 13. Under the leadership of 2nd Lieutenant Thor O. Hannevig, they retreated into the mountainous district of Telemark known as Vinjesvingen, and soon assembled about 400 volunteers, with warnings of German movements relayed through the civilian telephone system. In a series of raids and ambushes, they inflicted a number of small defeats on the enemy and evaded all pursuit. Hannevig finally dispersed the volunteers, hid their weapons in secret caches, and surrendered with only ten men on May 8. As Lars Borgersrud concluded, "Vinjesvingen showed that it was possible to mount effective resistance with very limited means, if patriotism and the will to fight were present."³⁸

The Norwegian campaign had yet to run its full course, however; for the German hold on Narvik remained tenuous and isolated, as the Allied counterattack gradually gathered way. Even with the abandonment of Namsos, 300 miles of difficult terrain still lay between the main German forces and the Dietl's beleaguered mountain troops at Narvik. Thus, it still seemed possible that the Norwegians and the Allies could halt the attackers well south of Narvik and recapture the port to establish a secure, long-term position in northern Norway. With these prospects in mind, the Norwegian cabinet, King Haakon, and General Ruge established a new, temporary seat of government at Tromsø.

Ruge provided the cabinet with his assessment of the situation on May 3. The essential question, as he saw it, was whether "Norway shall now give up and conclude an agreement with Germany, or whether we shall continue the war." Regarding the recent evacuations, Ruge observed that "The people feel betrayed by our friends. I have seen so among the officers around me. They were gripped by a powerful bitterness against the Allies; many felt that all was lost now, and that the only thing that remains is to seek an agreement with Germany. There are surely many civilians with the same thought at the moment."³⁹

Despite the crushing disappointments that had just occurred, however, Ruge urged the government to continue the fight. Regardless of what Norway did now, he argued, the Germans were going to occupy the
southern part of the country as long as it suited them; there would be no significant concessions. Norway still had a great deal to lose, however: for in the event of a Norwegian-German agreement, the British probably still would try to hold Narvik; and they probably would confiscate the merchant fleet as well. Furthermore, Norway would lose the international respect it had earned through its resistance thus far. At the same time, Ruge admitted,

... the decisive issue is who is going to win the war, Germany or the Allies. No one can say for certain. But all of history demonstrates that in such a general war, which always lasts a long time, the winner is the one that controls the sea and global trade. England does so, and is obliged to continue the war in order to survive as a great power.

The first thing now, Ruge concluded, was to try to determine the Allies' intentions. If they were willing to commit sufficient forces, particularly to establish solid air cover from bases around Bodø, Ruge argued that they might yet contemplate retaking Trondheim.40

THE NARVIK CAMPAIGN

In contrast to the situation in southern and central Norway, the campaign for Narvik placed the Germans on the defensive almost from the beginning. In two successive naval actions on April 10 and 13, the British annihilated the ten German destroyers that had transported General Dietl's troops of the 3rd Mountain Division. The second engagement, in which the battleship Warspite completely dominated the inner fjord, seriously demoralized the German troops, many of whom literally took to the hills to escape an apparently imminent Allied landing. Emboldened by the prospect of immediate liberation, the mayor of Narvik took over a German communications center on his own initiative, simply by walking in and demanding that the soldier on duty surrender his weapon. The British, however, were unprepared to exploit the opportunity by landing troops of their own; and the Germans soon recovered from their shock (among other things, arresting the mayor).41
By April 14, Dietl had established an outer line against Fleischer's forces 17 miles north of Narvik, and he began reorganizing survivors of the German destroyers as infantry, armed, equipped, and largely clothed from the Norwegian stocks captured at Elvegårdsmoen. Nevertheless, as the Norwegian units of the 6th Division redeployed from Finnmark and Allied troops began arriving at Harstad on April 14, the Germans clearly were on the defensive. Only a trickle of reinforcements could arrive by air or through Sweden, and it seemed to be only a matter of time before Narvik would change hands again.

Most of the Allied units were poorly prepared for the weather and terrain, and they found it impossible to advance until the spring thaw made inroads on the snow. Dietl meanwhile tried to maintain the initiative by pressing his units farther north, hoping to seize another Norwegian depot at Setermoen. Fleischer's forces checked the advance at Lapphaugen on April 24, and the Germans withdrew to a tourist hotel at Gratangen. Fleischer attempted to launch a two-pronged attack, with the I/IR.12 under Major Böckmann to enter the Gratangen valley through a line of mountains to the north, thus taking the Germans in the rear. Due to the snowstorm, however, Böckmann decided he must suspend the attack and get his men under shelter. Fleischer approved this decision, although Böckmann's brigade commander and most of his subordinates wanted to continue the attack. The enemy meanwhile learned exactly what was going on, because Böckmann talked to Fleischer on a telephone line that ran through the German-occupied Gratangen hotel. Defying the blizzard, the Germans on the night of April 25-26 counterattacked and caught Böckmann's battalion by surprise, the Norwegians having failed to take basic security precautions. As a result, I/IR.12 was practically wiped out, losing 40 killed, 60 wounded, and 170 prisoners—a humiliating fiasco for which strategic surprise or disrupted mobilization could offer no excuse.

After a pause to regroup from the sharp reverse at Gratangen, Fleischer's men resumed their advance with a deliberate assault at Lægastind on May 6, gradually pushing the Germans back toward Narvik on their landward flank. On April 29, having mobilized every possible unit.
in the region. Fleischer activated a second field brigade, the 7th, which made the 6th Division the only Norwegian "division" that actually functioned as such during the campaign. The retention of the battalions in East Finmark and at Alta and Tromsø reflected the Norwegians' continuing fear of a Soviet descent on that region, perhaps as part of some secret partition agreement with the Germans, as in the case of Poland.

Tensions meanwhile arose over the transfer of Ruge's headquarters to Tromsø, along with the government, following the evacuation from Åndalsnes. Fleischer had never gotten along well with Ruge anyway, and the imposition of the latter's Army headquarters (HOK) directly over the 6th Division inevitably caused friction. The government on May 18 named Ruge to the unprecedented post of Forsvarssjef, as commander-in-chief of both services, with headquarters now designated FOK (Forsvarets Overkommando, equivalent to the German OKW). This organizational reform had little practical meaning, but the cabinet apparently hoped it would facilitate co-operation with the Allies.

Fleischer nevertheless regarded Ruge's presence as completely superfluous, which Fleischer made plain in a letter on May 17. The 6th Division, Fleischer argued, had its own well-established way of doing things in North Norway: and he demanded the continuation of full autonomy, including matters of liaison with the Allied forces. When Ruge apparently refused to forward the letter to Ljungberg, Fleischer stated his views again even more bluntly on May 24. "There is," he wrote, "... nothing in the situation to make the proposed organization [the FOK] necessary." The only result would be continuation of

... the confusion in the chain of command that has prevailed ever since the FOK arrived in North Norway. For the time being, unfortunately, it is despite everything a question of only North Norway's--and no longer all of Norway's--defense, administration, and resources. You will surely understand that after a great many years in North Norway, I consider myself entitled to present my opinion on this matter."
Fleischer's emphasis on the loss of southern and central Norway clearly represented a particular barb against Ruge. Ruge refused to be baited, however, and tactfully defused the situation by assuring Fleischer that the FOK would not interfere in the 6th Division's affairs. As for liaison with the Allies, Ruge produced a compromise by assigning one of his own officers, Roscher-Nielsen, as chief contact officer, but with orders to report directly to Fleischer.49

By the second week of May, together with Fleischer's forces, the Allies had the equivalent of two full divisions in the vicinity of Narvik, including a French mountain brigade, a regiment of the Foreign Legion, and a Polish brigade.50 In addition to the recapture of Narvik, however, the Allies now had to reckon with the rapid advance of German forces moving northward from Trondheim through the district known as Hålogaland, spearheaded by the crack 2nd Mountain Division. Knowing that the fate of their comrades at Narvik was at stake, the Germans made amazingly rapid progress through what the British had regarded as impassable terrain. By May 10 the Germans were within 10 miles of Mosjøen, having covered almost 100 miles in only five days.

Following the surrender of the 5th Division at Namsos, the only Norwegian forces remaining between there and Narvik were two battalions: I/IR.14 (Major H. Sundlo) and Lv./IR.14. (Captain Sundby), under the overall command of Lieutenant-Colonel Nummedal. As Fleischer later concluded, "Neither the commander nor the troops were suited to the task at hand."51 The Landvern battalion was severely under-strength, particularly among officers, with three company commanders missing and the fourth serving as battalion commander.52 The other battalion was also somewhat under-strength; but apparently even more than the Landvern battalion, Sundlo's men were seriously demoralized by the Allied withdrawal from Namsos and the surrender of Getz's forces. If 7,000 Allied troops and 3,000 relatively well-armed and organized Norwegians had given up the fight, it was difficult for the 800-odd men of I/IR.14 to understand why they now must carry the burden alone. This mood reached such a pitch that on May 5, the battalion elected a committee of ten delegates, who sent the following telegram:
To the Norwegian supreme commander in northern Norway. The soldiers of I/IR.14 hereby wish to report, and demand an answer to the following, within 24 hours: 1. The battalion does not wish to see the district here become a battleground, because it believes that what can be achieved will not be worth the damage that will result. 2. The Battalion has no confidence in assistance from the Allied troops. 3. The battalion has so little support that the positions are untenable. We expect further orders or orientation by the specified deadline.53

Although this mutinous ultimatum apparently did not reach its destination, Ruge and Fleischer dispatched several of their most reliable deputies, including Lieutenant Riise-Hansen, Captain Ørnulf Dahl, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher-Nielsen, to take charge of Nummedal's dispirited forces. However, none of these "commissars" was able to reach Mosjøen before the Germans did.

Although the Allies intended to make a firm stand at Mosjøen, the Germans pre-empted this plan by out-flanking the position with a small-scale amphibious landing at Hemnesøy, near Mo, once again thumbing their noses at the Royal Navy. With the enemy in their rear, the Allied forces hastily withdrew northward; and the Germans entered Mosjøen on May 11.54

The rapid progress of the 2nd Mountain Division and the opening of the FALL GELB offensive on the Western Front indicated that time might not be entirely on the Allies' side at Narvik. The French general Béthouart, who had become the de facto coalition commander by virtue of his ability to negotiate with international colleagues, opened the final stages of the attack on Narvik on May 13. Supported by the Royal Navy, French troops successfully executed an opposed landing at Bjerkvik and Gjeisvik, while Norwegian troops with Allied support advanced from the north in a converging maneuver. The German naval troops on the scene proved unequal to the challenge of bombardment and close assault. However, the French and Norwegians failed to make contact in time to cut off the Germans; and the town of Bjerkvik suffered almost total destruction from the naval bombardment, with considerable loss of life. By the end of the day, the German positions on the Herjangs fjord had given way, leaving the Allies in control of the Øyjord Peninsula.
directly across the Rombaksfjord from Narvik, providing artillery positions and a staging area for the recapture of the town.56 Logistical difficulties delayed the final assault on Narvik, however; and in the meantime, the brunt of the fighting remained on the shoulders of Fleischer's men. Facing stubborn opposition in the vicinity of Jern Lake, they made slow but steady progress toward the vital railway between Narvik and Sweden.56 Dietl regarded this advance as the primary threat, because it threatened to cut off his position from the Swedish border. Accordingly, he left only a covering force in Narvik itself, shifting the German center-of-gravity to Bjørnefjell, where the railway crosses the Swedish border.

Meeting with Auchinleck at Harstad on May 16, Ruge and Fleischer urged the British to send more units to halt the Germans south of Bodø. The two Norwegian battalions (of IR.14), they admitted, "had had a hard time and were not at full fighting efficiency . . ." Fleischer also emphasized that his troops would soon face critical shortages of ammunition, and thus would need to re-arm with Allied equipment if the campaign went on much longer.57 Fleischer urged the Allies to press followup attacks to finish off the remnants of Dietl's force. He made it clear to his own subordinates, however, that there were distinct Norwegian interests at stake, which were not necessarily the same as those of the Allies.

It is vital that we conclude the Narvik operation as quickly as possible. From the purely Norwegian viewpoint, it does not make much difference whether the Germans are captured in Norway or interned in Sweden. But it is important that the Norwegian troops also play a significant role in the concluding phase of the Narvik operation. The supreme commander [Ruge] also considers it highly important that it be Norwegian troops who make contact with the Swedish [border] troops at Bjørnefjell . . . . The supreme commander emphasizes that it will not be in the national interest if Allied troops occupy this position.58

Narvik finally fell to a combined assault by French and Norwegian battalions on May 27-28. A Norwegian artillery battery positioned on Øyjord also played a vital role in breaking up a German counterattack.
which otherwise might have unhinged the Allied operation. The Polish
brigade meanwhile pushed eastward along the southern shore of the
Beisfjord. In the first week of June, the final days of the campaign,
the Germans fell back to a final position at Bjørnfjell, hoping some
miracle would spare them the ignominy of internment in Sweden.59

The German 2nd Mountain Division meanwhile made further,
remarkably swift progress in its drive to the north. After breaking a
British position at Stien on the night of May 17-18, the Germans
occupied Mo the evening of the 18th. The British and Norwegians made
several more stands at successive positions north of Mo during the
following week, despite heavy German air attacks on the base at Bodø.
The Germans also sank a transport carrying a battalion of the 24th
Guards Brigade, and that unit suffered further losses when a cruiser
got aground while ferrying another battalion. The British also sent a
group of five lightly-armed "Independent Companies" to Bodø under
Brigadier Sir Colin Gubbins; but these proved ineffective in combat.60
Nevertheless, by May 25, Allied forces at Bodø amounted to approximately
4,500 men, facing about 6,000 Germans; and the prospects of continued
resistance south of Bodø appeared reasonably bright.61

EVACUATION AND EXILE

As it turned out, the collapse of the Western Front following the
German breakthrough in the Ardennes made the Allied victory at Narvik
largely irrelevant. Facing the prospect of a German invasion of the
British isles, Churchill and his subordinates had little choice but to
recall the forces in northern Norway, which otherwise might have managed
to hold the area indefinitely, given an adequate flow of reinforcements.
The War Cabinet decided on May 23 that they must evacuate northern
Norway; and General Auchinleck (Allied commander-in-chief in northern
Norway since May 13) received orders on May 24-25 to evacuate his forces
as soon as possible. He and his subordinates decided to proceed with
the recapture of Narvik nevertheless, for its propaganda value and to
facilitate the re-embarkation; but it would soon fall into German hands
again anyway.62
Once the Allies had decided to withdraw from Narvik, the mission of the blocking forces at Bodø became pointless; and those units received the evacuation order on May 25 as well. With the 2nd Mountain Division hard on their heels, the British fell back and completed the evacuation of Bodø on May 31.\textsuperscript{63} The evacuation of Bodø came as a heavy blow to General Fleischer, who was counting on holding the Germans indefinitely, as far to the south as possible. As at Namsos, the Allies waited until the last moment to inform the Norwegians of the impending withdrawal from Narvik. Only on June 1 did Sir Cecil Dormer finally break the news to the government at Tromsø, and to General Ruge on the following day. The Norwegians then faced the agonizing decision of their next move.

Ruge and Fleischer initially hoped that if they could finish off the remnants of Dietl's forces by driving them into Sweden, then the 6th Division might be able to hold northern Norway indefinitely against the German forces advancing from the south. For this reason, the Norwegians kept up the pressure on Dietl with attacks continuing as late as June 8, despite melting snow which made movement extremely difficult.\textsuperscript{64} The Germans by this time were in truly dire straits, and had the attack continued, Dietl probably would have ordered his remaining men into Swedish internment within forty-eight hours. Falkenhorst later remarked, "I must honestly admit that at that point, Dietl was nearly finished."\textsuperscript{66}

Ultimately, without the support of the Allies, Fleischer's forces could offer little further resistance, due to shortages of ammunition and other supplies, to say nothing of their almost total lack of heavy weapons and air defense. The British once again showed no willingness to provide even minimal stocks of small arms. Ruge later expressed bitterness over the Allies' cynical abandonment of Norway, but he accepted the situation with characteristic stoicism and agreed to cover the evacuation. A hastily-conceived diplomatic initiative by Mowinckel proposed to demilitarize the Narvik area under Swedish supervision, leaving northern Norway unoccupied; but with the Allied evacuation, the Germans had no reason to grant this concession.\textsuperscript{66}
Thus, the only remaining choices were surrender or exile. Despite the grim prospect that Britain might soon collapse as well, King Haakon and his ministers decided to carry on the struggle from abroad, joining the Poles and the Dutch as governments-in-exile. A considerable number of highly-placed advisors urged the King not to leave the country; but he had no intention of becoming a German puppet. Haakon thus left Tromsø aboard HMS Devonshire on June 7.

The government requested but apparently did not directly order Ruge to accompany the evacuation. Ljungberg wrote, "General Ruge informed me that he could not come with to England, nor could the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel Hansson. General Fleischer was then ordered to come with."67 Ironically, Fleischer was among those urging the King and government not to leave the country either. The general argued that if they did, they would lose their legitimacy in the eyes of the public, thus leaving no obstacle to the creation of a German puppet regime. Koht, however, persuaded Fleischer not to pursue the issue with Haakon directly; and the general reluctantly joined the evacuation to England, sailing from Tromsø aboard the Fridtjof Nansen on June 8.68

The evacuation convoys narrowly escaped slaughter by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, which had arrived off Narvik undetected on a foray code-named Operation JUNO. By chance, after sinking the troopship Orama, they happened upon the carrier Glorious and made short work of her as well, along with the escorting destroyers Ardent and Acasta. In one of the Royal Navy's finest moments, however, the destroyers fought back and scored a torpedo hit that caused the Germans to withdraw. Thus, the otherwise disastrous encounter probably saved the Norwegian government from a similar fate.69

General Ruge remained behind to supervise the capitulation and demobilization of the 6th Division. The Norwegian troops loyally continued to hold the front until the Allies completed their evacuation on June 8. Some individual Norwegian soldiers and airmen chose exile as well, to help form the nucleus of new Norwegian forces in Britain; but Ruge and the government decided they could not call upon the existing units to leave Norway. Had they done so, the loss of so many able-
bodied men would have left northern Norway with a disastrous shortage of labor, inflicting unacceptable hardships on thousands of families. The welfare of the population had to take priority over the desire to strike back at the enemy with every available means. Thus, Ruge officially demobilized his men at Bardufoss on June 9; and an armistice with the Germans took effect on the following day. The booty in this case amounted to 33 artillery pieces, 410 machine guns, and approximately 10,000 rifles and pistols.70

To General Dietl's hard-pressed forces east of Narvik, the end of the campaign came as an eleventh-hour turn of fortune. Dietl later estimated that had the Allies renewed their attack, his men could have held out for only 24 to 48 hours before they would have had to withdraw into Sweden, accepting internment. Sweden almost certainly would have repatriated them soon in any case, but it would have been a more satisfactory moral victory for the Allies than the indefinite outcome that was actually the case. The Allied withdrawal also pre-empted further, desperate efforts by the German Navy and Luftwaffe to reinforce the Narvik area, which probably would have involved heavy losses. As it happened, the Germans were able to occupy northern Norway unopposed, and the rest of the 3rd Mountain Division arrived at Narvik and Tromsø by sea within a week of the armistice.71

CONCLUSIONS ON THE NORwegIAN CAMPAIGN

Norwegian forces might have kept considerable numbers of German troops tied down in subsidiary regions, had the Norwegian leadership called upon commanders to organize guerrilla operations. In fact, however, the government actively discouraged such efforts, for fear of German reprisals. Contrary to popular myths, guerrilla-style resistance occurred in 1940 only on rare occasions.72 The exploits of Lieutenant Hannevig's men in Vinjesvingen suggest what other Norwegian forces might have accomplished, had they split up into small parties and gone to ground, rather than surrendering en masse as usually was the case. One must also consider, however, the many civilian deaths that such tactics
would have entailed. Once again, the example of Belgium in 1914 weighed heavily in the minds of the Norwegian leaders.

In the event, casualties in the Norwegian campaign were remarkably light, at least in comparison to later stages of the war in other places. Not including losses at sea, casualties in the campaign were approximately as follows: 73 German: 1,028 killed and 1,604 wounded. British: 1,869 killed and wounded (no separate figures available). Norwegian military: 586 killed and approximately 650 wounded, plus approximately 185-300 civilian deaths. French and Polish: 170 killed and approximately 360 wounded. By the standards of later campaigns in the war, these numbers appear remarkably small, even considering the relatively small numbers of troops engaged, which were approximately 100,000 Germans, 38,000 Allied, and 50,000 Norwegians. 74

Traditional Norwegian accounts have tended to portray the campaign as a matter of last-ditch, almost fanatical resistance; but this was seldom the case. One popular myth, for example, alleges that when the Germans compelled several civilian bus drivers to carry troops to the front, they sacrificed themselves by deliberately driving off a cliff at Sollihøgda, carrying dozens of horrified German soldiers with them into the bottom of the gorge below. "This story has been repeated as a fact in a series of books since the war," observes Borgersrud; "but it is pure fantasy." Overall, he argues, "The fact that so few people were killed and wounded is the surest proof available that the entire campaign was undramatic." 75

Many accounts also have emphasized the pervasive pacifist attitude of the Norwegian population as a major explanation for the failure to mount more determined resistance. Otto Ruge argued that there was little evidence of this, however, once people faced the reality of the German invasion. Formerly adamant anti-militarists often placed themselves in the forefront of the resistance. As Ruge later put it, "Paradoxically, one can almost say that the same people who previously had been most strongly opposed to defense were now often the most ardent in battle." 76

Nevertheless, participation in the defense was uneven at best. One factor that surely reduced Norwegian military effectiveness was the
fact that the troops had little time, if any, to undergo what a later commander has described as the "transition to war process." Preparation for combat requires psychological adjustment as well as material readiness and organization, and in many cases the Norwegians simply found themselves overtaken by events. As another author put it, "The peaceful disposition of the population was so deeply engrained that it took time before people understood the seriousness of the situation." In a newspaper article shortly after the campaign, General Carl Erichsen (whose 1st Division had fled into Sweden) blamed the defeat on a general softness in Norwegian social values. "The public spirit in Norway and Finland were quite different," he argued, "although pacifism and anti-militarism were prevalent in both countries. In Finland, freedom and independence took first place, while in Norway the most important thing was the standard of living." Norway had done its best under the circumstances, he concluded. "But a nation cannot alter its mentality overnight, any more than a neutrality guard can immediately wage an all-out struggle for existence."

THE ISSUE OF TREACHERY AND DEFEATISM

Even taking into account the psychological impact of the surprise attack, however, one still faces the question of why there were so many failures of leadership in the Norwegian forces. One of the most central and controversial questions concerning Norway's defeat is to what extent it was due to Nazi sympathy, active or otherwise, within the officer corps. There is no simple answer. One problem is that there still are no numbers available to indicate how many officers actually belonged to the NS before the war. A few scraps of information suggest that the proportion was large. For example, three of the Army's sixteen regimental commanders (Colonels Sundlo, Hiorth, and Frølich-Hansen), just under 20 percent, were NS-members, as were the chiefs of the mobilization offices in both the General Staff and the defense department (Munthe and Kjelstrup). Moreover, it seems likely that the proportion was even higher among junior officers. Referring to an
unidentified unit, Quisling noted in his diary on 6 March 1940, "Of the battalion's 40 officers, 8 are NS, 10 are sympathetic, 14 are neutral, and 8 are opposed." Among captured Norwegian officers, the German 163rd Division noted a general "respect for German military efficiency and a tendency toward the German way of thinking, in some cases outright sympathy . . . ."  

A more definite fact is that approximately 1,150 officers either joined Quisling's party during the war or maintained their previous membership. Borgersrud argues that no one who joined the NS afterward was likely to have had much enthusiasm for fighting the Germans in 1940, either. "For example, when the chief of the coastal artillery division of the admiralty staff, Major Ingolf Hoel, joined the NS two weeks after the capitulation in North Norway, one has the impression that he could not have been much of an anti-Nazi in the preceding weeks either."  

This, however, is not necessarily a valid assumption. For example, Fenrik Tor Marstrander, who joined Quisling's party in 1933, played a leading part in the defeat of the German paratroops at Dombås, suffering a serious wound in the process. One tends to assume that members of the NS were pro-German, which generally was true; yet they were also Norwegian nationalists. When the Germans attacked, these two impulses suddenly came into opposition. On the whole, the latter probably prevailed at least as often as did the former.  

Regarding the reluctance of many commanders to open fire on April 9, Ruge later commented, "The surprising thing in my opinion is that in most places, commanders actually did offer resistance, even though they did not know in fact whether they were acting in accordance with or against the government's policy by commencing hostilities."  

Whatever the real extent of pro-German sympathy and defeatism among Norwegian officers, the British generally regarded the Norwegian Army as unreliable and riddled with traitors. Although this attitude was not entirely unfounded, it was counter-productive. As Borgersrud put it, "There were indeed a lot of Nazis among Norwegian officers. But instead of confronting the specific cases that arose, or clearing the air by presenting clear accusations, the British attitude [of unspoken mistrust] remained like a clammy hand over co-operation."
Apart from the issue of mistrust, the British often displayed simple arrogance and incompetence, a combination that left the Norwegians with a poor impression of the British in many respects. "Of the officers," wrote Beichmann, "some were first-class people.... But many of the rest did not measure up." The amateur character of British officers arriving in Norway with bags of golf clubs must have made a particularly start contrast with the rigorous efficiency of the Germans. Regarding the British enlisted ranks, Beichmann wrote that "To put it bluntly, they were often scared, hysterical, and easily seized by panic. They behaved more like one would imagine volatile southerners than like 'sturdy Englishmen.'" This applied mainly to the Territorials, he noted; but even the regulars, he claimed, sometimes displayed the same "tendency toward panic and lack of fighting spirit." Beichmann also noted the inadequacies of British equipment and tactics.87

The Germans tended to agree that in general, Norwegian troops had proved tougher opponents than the British. Falkenhorst's chief of staff Buschenhagen wrote. "In summary, the Norwegian troops were..... tougher and more determined than the well-equipped English troops, who immediately abandoned their positions, especially when subjected to air attack. The poor morale of the English troops in the course of the campaign was not without effect on the Norwegian troops."88

**COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS AND FLAWS OF THE NORWEGIAN ARMY**

One controversial question is to what extent the Norwegian Army was hampered in 1940 by a lingering preoccupation with its role as an anti-revolutionary police force during the interwar period. Borgersrud argued that not only budget constraints, but also the fixation with putting down civil unrest contributed greatly to the deterioration of war-fighting skills. "There was no need for the latest fighter aircraft or tanks to handle working-class unrest in the cities. Nor was there any need for field maneuvers or large-scale exercises every summer... . The result after 20 years was that the military had lost contact with tactical and technical military developments in the rest of Europe."89 Nils Ivar Agøy estimates that after 1935, the proportion of work by the
operations division of the General Staff devoted to internal security matters was only 4-6 percent; but in 1930-31, it was as high as 40-45 percent. "In the years [this] activity was highest," he concluded, "there cannot have been much time remaining for planning versus external enemies, since a large proportion of the staff's resources went into routine chores and work in connection with proposals for reorganization of the armed forces."\(^9\)

Furthermore, Borgersrud argued, "If the shortcomings in material were great, and war plans essentially did not exist, there was nevertheless another area in which the weaknesses were even greater. That was the mobilization system." Granted, the Army had abandoned the designation of separate Ordensvern units in 1937-38; but the mobilization scheme remained a byzantine, unwieldy structure nevertheless. As Borgersrud put it, "The military staff work thus had developed into a comprehensive bureaucracy, a vast chaos of paperwork that very few in the military apparatus understood."\(^9\)

The inextricable combination of "partial" and "silent" mobilization resulted in the government's absurd decision on April 9 to send out orders through the mail. The civilians in the cabinet had no grasp of the technical process of mobilization; and if Ljungberg understood it himself, he failed to explain it to his colleagues.

Ruge argued after the war that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the mobilization system. As the primary author of the 1933 system, however, he was hardly an objective judge; and in retrospect, it seems clear that he was wrong. The dichotomy of the peacetime administrative structure and the tactical field organization caused tremendous confusion and disruption. For example, Captain Hans L'Orange was a General Staff officer whose routine post was in the intelligence section in Oslo. Upon mobilization, however, he had to travel all the way to Voss to become chief of staff for the 4th Brigade. Under the circumstances, it was remarkable that he ever reached his post at all; hundreds of other officers and thousands of men never managed to join their assigned units, despite their best efforts.

Because the mobilization was so badly disrupted in most places, the Norwegian "units" that fought the Germans often bore little
resemblance to the Army's theoretical organization. Ad hoc collections of volunteers, many of whom had never even undergone basic training, inevitably lacked the cohesion and flexibility of an established military unit. Two major Norwegian units, however, the 4th Brigade and the 6th Division, were able to mobilize relatively unmolested; and the record of their combat performance reveals the inherent strengths and weaknesses of their equipment, training, and doctrine.

It would be difficult to overstate the importance of the advantage the Germans gained from tanks. As Østbye concluded, they had "colossal significance for carrying out offensive operations, even in mountainous terrain." The commander of Panzer Abteilung 40 wrote, "As the action in Norway has demonstrated, the use of tanks is entirely possible even in adverse circumstances, by employing the necessary supporting elements of the armored unit." Close co-operation with infantry and engineers was essential, as was the provision of a radio in every vehicle. In the first few days of the campaign, before any tanks were available, the Germans north of Oslo generally found it impossible to prevent the Norwegians from withdrawing unscathed after an ambush. "It was only after the arrival of the tanks," wrote General Pellengahr, "that we sometimes managed to break through with a frontal attack and inflict losses on the enemy."

The Norwegians were almost powerless to stop attacks spearheaded by tanks, due to their total lack of anti-tank weapons. Artillery pieces could double as anti-tank guns in a direct-fire role, despite the lack of armor-piercing ammunition. However, most Norwegian commanders seemed reluctant to commit their few guns to forward positions. The other main expedients versus tanks were molotov cocktails and concealed dynamite charges. With these various methods, the Norwegians disabled at least seven tanks; but the lack of proper anti-tank weapons nevertheless was a critical disadvantage.

The lack of effective anti-aircraft weapons was probably of equal importance. After the loss of the 75-mm batteries in Oslo, the Norwegians had nothing except machine guns, and these proved almost useless in an anti-aircraft role. "They often fired at low-flying
aircraft." Østbye reported, "and scored obvious hits, with no apparent result."96

Norwegian infantry doctrine also revealed several serious flaws, particularly in its narrow focus on the tactical defensive.97 The doctrine was based on the premise that commanders must keep losses to an absolute minimum, due to both the small size of the population and the high degree of political responsibility, as well as the vividly apparent lessons of World War I. The result at the most basic level was to disperse Norwegian infantry widely over the battlefield, which had several unforeseen, adverse consequences. These emerged in a postwar inquiry headed by Colonel Østbye, who wrote.

"If the campaign has taught me one thing," another officer wrote, "it is that one can make certain demands on the endurance of officers and men; but there is nevertheless a line than cannot be crossed. During the engagements at Flå, soldiers slept in the middle of a firefight."99

Many units were held on more-or-less constant alert status due to the general state of confusion. With the chain-of-command in disarray, subordinate commanders often had no idea when the Germans might appear: psychologically, there was no rear area. Thus, Norwegian soldiers were usually exhausted before they even came into action. The Germans in contrast maintained a more regular tempo of operations, recognizing the vital importance of rest. As one postwar assessment concluded, "One need not even attack an enemy who does not understand the need to sleep, for he destroys himself within a few days."100

One of the clearest examples of this was at Høljerasten bridge, where Østbye concluded that fatigue had played a decisive role in the
collapse of II/IR.10. On the night of April 23-24, the Germans pulled back most of their troops to rest and left only a few outposts in contact with the enemy. "In this instance," Østbye wrote, "one might have expected that the Norwegian battalion commander also would contented himself with a strong outpost behind the bridge, and let the majority of his people pull back for the night for some food and badly needed rest. But this was not done. The entire battalion lay in its positions all night long." In order to avoid such problems in a future war, he recommended much greater doctrinal emphasis on avoiding critical fatigue. "One should go so far as to require that the troops must be granted rest and sleep, even if it means interrupting or abandoning otherwise desirable operations. Only in the most serious situations, where there is no other choice, must one disregard the need for sleep and rest."

One must also note, however, that the exhaustion of Norwegian units resulted partly from deliberate efforts by the Germans. Since the terrain seldom allowed them to employ their numerical advantage on a wider front, the Germans often used it to maintain a more or less round-the-clock tempo, with one unit maintaining pressure on the Norwegians while another rested and regrouped. The commander of the 163rd Infantry Division, the unit that defeated Østbye's 4th Brigade, described the deliberate nature of such tactics. "The following has proved very effective in wearing out the opponent: storm troops are also committed after the so-called evening pause, and just before first light, in order to secure a favorable jumping-off point for the next day. In this way, one prevents the enemy from ever obtaining any rest. His power to resist fades rapidly."

Overall, the Norwegians suffered from a lack of leadership at every level. Part of the problem was simply the acute shortage of officers. Even units at authorized strength were short-handed, because of the skeletal nature of the 1933 ordinance. For example, an infantry battalion headquarters had only two officers: the CO, and a lieutenant as adjutant. Two sergeants rounded out the staff.

The problems ran deeper than a mere shortage of officers, however. Norwegian doctrine emphasized control at the expense of leadership, such
that commanders seldom had a clear picture of what was happening on the front line. One extreme example was that of Colonel Hjorth, who placed his headquarters 30 km behind the position his troops were supposed to hold in Østerdalen. Even a fighting commander such as Østbye found himself out of touch when his crucial position collapsed at Høljerasten bridge. As he concluded in his postwar report, "There is no doubt that the officers in our units generally were placed too far back. This was no fault of their own; they were where [doctrine said] they were supposed to be. It was the system that was at fault."103

For all his great achievements, Otto Ruge also had shortcomings as a leader. His most important influence on the character of the campaign was his directive on April 15. The reasoning behind Ruge's directive is clear. The last thing the Norwegians wanted to do was suffer heavy losses fighting on their own; for even if the Allies then arrived to win the campaign, their victory then would be at Norway's expense. Furthermore, it remained to be seen whether the Allied help would be effective; and Ruge was not about to squander his men's lives on speculation. By the time the extent of the Allied commitment became clear, he hoped to have his forces still essentially intact and in better order. A viable Norwegian Army would then make its full contribution to the counteroffensive, and it would also provide the government with essential leverage when dealing with the Allies—a very important consideration if they were to preserve Norwegian interests during a potential devastating re-conquest. The fate of Flanders in 1914-18 cannot have been far from Ruge's mind.

Ruge's directive also had significant flaws. The essentialy problem was that in emphasizing the exchange of space for time and the avoidance of decisive engagements, the plan failed to recognize the importance of local counterattacks. In addition to inflicting delays and casualties on the enemy, such attacks can play an essential part in keeping up the morale of troops conducting a withdrawal. The Norwegian Army had failed to assimilate this concept in its prewar training and doctrine. Commanders thus tended to perceive an all-or-nothing choice between holding a fixed position until overwhelmed, or retreating passively behind obstacles after a token exchange of fire. Ruge also
feared that his units would disintegrate almost immediately if they suffered significant casualties. In practice, however, light- to moderate losses in action seemed to have little adverse effect on morale, while "baptism by fire" was an essential factor in building the limited cohesion that some units did develop during the short campaign. In short, Norwegian soldiers generally were willing to fight and suffer losses; but the continual series of retreats, seldom if ever broken by local counterattacks or other visible successes, eventually wore down the spirits of even the most determined men. Thus, while Ruge represented a vital infusion of fighting spirit to his largely demoralized forces, his leadership also had its limitations. As Østbye concluded, "The directive was understandable, but it was not a battle cry that would instill courage and determination in the Norwegian officers and men. Such a cry was what was needed."

Almost every source seems to agree that as individuals, Norwegian soldiers had excellent military potential. The commander of the French Foreign Legion regiment at Narvik, for example, remarked to A.D. Dahl during the campaign, "Give me your battalion and I'll turn them into the world's best soldiers." Despite the arrogance behind the remark, the Frenchman apparently meant this as a compliment; and Dahl tended to agree. "We could have done that ourselves," he later concluded, "had we had equipment and training; we had excellent soldierly material. But I have never heard of any football team anywhere that became champions without practicing."

The average Norwegian soldier proved himself an excellent marksman, as many German reports also attested. The commander of the 181st Infantry Division wrote, for example, "The [typical] Norwegian fought skillfully, despite poor training, and he was a very good shot. He understood how to use the terrain much better than did the Englishman. Individual snipers in the trees fought cold-bloodedly and inflicted significant losses on the attackers."

It was also clear, however, that aimed rifle fire was no substitute for automatic weapons, of which the Norwegians had too few. Although the Madsen automatic rifle and Colt machine gun were useful weapons, both were also excessively heavy. Østbye's postwar
study recommended that every rifle company should receive an organic machine gun platoon, as well light mortars. Particularly in the mountains, mortars often proved more useful than field artillery; and the allocation of just two 81-mm mortars per battalion was clearly insufficient.

The Norwegian Army's greatest potential advantage over the Germans lay in the ability to move through roadless mountains using skis. As one German commander observed, "Our men, most of whom came from low-lying areas, remained essentially road-bound due to deep snow, while the enemy's ski units and familiarity with the mountains presented him with all sorts of opportunities."

The Norwegians had made no systematic effort in prewar training to exploit such possibilities. Although there were occasional successes such as the counterattack in Hallingdal on April 21, on the whole the Norwegians remained just as road-bound as the enemy. German after-action reports indicated both the effectiveness and rarity of counterattacks by Norwegian ski troops.

Even though the Norwegian soldier's overall value in battle generally was small, and even though his conduct usually remained passive, he occasionally mounted an active defense, in contrast to the English. . . . These skillful, rapid, and silent ski attacks, followed by sudden and violent fusillades, were a complete surprise to the Germans initially took a toll on their nerves. They always remained small-scale undertakings, however, that had no great significance.

Although almost all Norwegian soldiers were competent skiers, few units actually used skis during the campaign. Apart from the 6th Division, which was relatively well-equipped for winter operations, the only units that received skis were the following: two companies of the 4th Brigade, one company of the Royal Guards, one battalion of IR.4, one company of IR.6, part of one company of IR.5, and part of DR.3.

As Østbye concluded, "In reality, our winter organization up to 1940 was based on improvisation. Apart from a few small detachments, our units were not trained in winter." Thus, even when units did have
oversights that prewar training would have corrected. During the first two weeks of May, for example, the 6th Division lost a large number of men to temporary snow-blindness because their hastily-assembled equipment did not include sunglasses. In short, it took more than soldiers with skis to make an effective ski unit, even when the men knew how to ski. "The most important lesson one can draw from the improvised ski units," Østbye wrote, "is that this is a weak and ineffective form of organization." 112

Only the 6th Division operated long enough to display much improvement in the course of the campaign. At the beginning, as shown by the fiasco at Gratangen, there was a tendency to flinch from the hardships of mere movement and survival in the harshness of the arctic climate and terrain. By the end, however, they had largely overcome these problems; and Fleischer's battalions had begun to resemble a hardened, experienced combat organization. "The units suffered much," he wrote: "But they became tough and . . . learnt how to take care of themselves. They became units that could be used in war." However, the time when such troops could have made a real difference was on April 9, not two months later.113

The Germans in Norway were not without their own shortcomings. After-action reports revealed the need for dedicated ski units, more heavy mortars, trained snipers with telescopic sights, and better winter clothing. (In many cases German troops resorted to wearing clothing and boots captured from the Norwegians and the Allies.)

Among the Germans' greatest advantages, however, was their ability to adapt to local conditions and to develop new tactics on the spot, thanks to superior leadership. The successful assault at Haugsbygda, for example, became a model for the composition of advancing columns. Wherever possible, the Germans placed a tank platoon in the spearhead, followed by a platoon of assault engineers in armored trucks, an infantry company, and an artillery battery, with relief and exploitation forces close behind. Along with the tanks, the forward deployment of artillery proved a key ingredient. As Pellangahr explained.
The artillery was always placed far forward in the column, so that some of the Kampfgruppe's strongest firepower was immediately available when one encountered the enemy. This prompt response of fire-support and the psychological effect of the shells contributed significantly to breaking the resistance rapidly.114

With the possible exception of Fleischer's forces, the Germans also seem to have grasped the essential nature of mountain warfare better than the Norwegians. As one German commander concluded, "It is not enough simply to defend the obstacles as the Norwegians do; one must also guard his flanks by occupying the surrounding mountain peaks. The Norwegians thought it was impossible to undertake such envelopments, but we have proven that it can be done."115 Another German commander said much the same:

It proved consistently true that the only way to take the enemy positions was to out-flank them. This required time-consuming climbs to the surrounding heights. When this was done, however, as a rule the enemy retreated immediately. The best time for attack was the early morning hours. The British and Norwegians let themselves be taken by surprise over and over again.116

STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN

Although the Germans got off lightly some respects, their naval losses were severe: a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, ten destroyers, and six U-boats, plus heavy damage to the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Lützow. The Allies lost an aircraft carrier, two light cruisers, nine destroyers, and six submarines; but these amounted to only a small proportion of the Royal Navy's strength. The German losses, however, practically obliterated the Kriegsmarine's surface forces in summer 1940.

The capture of Norwegian vessels actually offset the German losses to some extent. A large proportion of the Norwegian casualties in 1940 resulted from the sinking of the Norge and Fidsyld at Narvik. Most of the rest of the Norwegian Navy surrendered wholesale at Horten and
Kristiansand, leaving its ships fully intact. The vessels captured included the coast-defense ships Harald Harfagre and Tordenskjold, the small destroyers Odin, Gyller, and Troll, the minelayer Olay Tryggvason, eight smaller minelayers, ten torpedo boats, seven minesweepers, and five old submarines.117

Nevertheless, after its losses off Norway, the Kriegsmarine could muster no more than three cruisers and four destroyers to support a possible invasion of Britain in summer 1940. One historian has concluded, "In retrospect, the destruction of virtually half of Germany's strength in cruisers and destroyers and the wounds suffered by Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, and Lützow appear to have been the most important strategic results of the campaign. In this ultimate sense, Weserübung cost the Wehrmacht more than the victory was worth." He argues furthermore that by foregoing WESERÜBUNG, the Germans could have begun their Western Front offensive several weeks earlier, which could have increased the chances of a successful invasion of Britain. Admittedly, however, "... this conclusion emerges only in retrospect and in the light of the situation created by the Wehrmacht's sweeping victory in the Battle of France."118

Ironically, the supposedly critical iron ore route through Narvik proved otherwise in the aftermath of the invasion. The Germans' own demolition of Narvik's port facilities, to prevent their use by the Allies following the counterattack of May 27-28, meant that the iron ore route remained closed for many months. In 1941, the volume of iron ore flowing through Narvik averaged only 9 percent of the prewar quantity; and even in 1943 it reached only 27 percent. Nevertheless, with Germany in fairly secure control of the Baltic, it was possible to increase shipments by that route and to accumulate stocks during the summer months. The capture of additional sources of iron ore in Belgium and France also reduced the importance of the northern mines. Overall, the supply of Swedish ore presented no critical bottleneck to German industry, at least until the closing stages of the war.119 A British staff study in 1941 concluded that "the importance of Narvik in this context [i.e., the supply of iron ore to Germany] has previously been greatly over-estimated."120
Earl F. Ziemke has argued that on the strategic level, at least in hindsight, Hitler's decision to invade Norway before France and the Low Countries was a mistake. Following their crushing victory on the continent, Ziemke argued, the Germans probably could have occupied Norway at their leisure in the summer or fall of 1940, with much less interference from the British. Thus, the timing of WESERÜBUNG did not make much more sense than that of the belated WILFRED.121

Oddvar Hoidal disagrees, however, arguing that if the Germans had waited, the British probably would have occupied Norway in response to the invasion of the Low Countries in May. Even with the subsequent strain on British resources, the Germans might have found it much more difficult to take Norway without the critical element of surprise they enjoyed on April 9. Furthermore, Norway under British control would have presented a serious threat to BARBAROSSA, providing both a secure supply route to Murmansk and a potential threat to German control of the Baltic.122

The loss of southern and central Norway had major political repercussions in London, where Neville Chamberlain now faced a barrage of condemnation in the House of Commons. The government narrowly survived a vote of confidence on May 8; but with such a slim margin of support, Chamberlain finally agreed to step down on May 10, to make way for a coalition government headed by Churchill. This, at least, was one positive result of the Norwegian disaster, for it finally swept away the ineffectual leadership responsible for the Munich fiasco and the inactivity of the Phony War, as well as the most recent debacle. Had Chamberlain still been in office when France fell, Churchill and his Allies might not have been able to stem a fatal tide of defeatism.123

WESERÜBUNG succeeded in conquering Norway, but it failed in its original conception as a coup d'etat. In the original plan, the invaders were to seize Oslo so quickly that the King, government, and military administration would be captured before any organized resistance could take form. Two brief but decisive events ended that possibility: the salvo from the guns of Oscarsborg fortress that destroyed the Blücher, and the fusillade at Midtskogen the following night, which killed Major Spiller and saved the government again. As a
result, the Norwegian leaders had time to rally, and Falkenhorst had no choice but to scrap the plan for a swift, bloodless occupation.¹²⁴
NOTES TO CHAPTER 6


5. Foley operated in Berlin during much of the interwar period before taking charge of operations in Oslo in August 1939. He and his secretary Margaret Reid played a key role at Ruge's headquarters throughout the April campaign. Margaret Reid and Leif C. Rolstad, April 1940: En krigsdaabok (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1980).

6. Ruge to Ljungberg, 22 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22. Ruge's actual words were "... at Norge ikke var noen negerstat."


8. HOK to 2.Div. "Forpleiningen av de engelske tropper", 22 April 1940. RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 446. A German report, apparently based on interviews with Norwegians in Dombås after the campaign, mentioned the prevalence of sporting gear and liquor among the English officers' baggage, and their preoccupation with finding comfortable quarters for themselves. NA: T-315, reel 1542, 742.

10. Derry, *The Campaign in Norway*, 108-10; Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI, NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440; Borgersrud, *Ungå å irritere fienden*. 118. The action at Balberg was actually the first clash between British and German troops in World War II, with the possible exception of a few minor incidents on the sector of the Maginot Line occupied by a British division in winter 1939-40. Balberg was also notable for the rare appearance of the early German "Neubaufahrzeug" heavy tank. Ibid., 129.

11. HOK to 2.Div., 23 April 1940, RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

12. Beichmann, "Det britiske felttog i Norge", 4 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.


14. Borgersrud, *Ungå å irritere fienden*. 112; Lindbäck-Larsen, *Kriger i Norge 1940* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1965), 100. So distraught was Østbye on April 24 that he allegedly considered suicide. "And it was my own regiment," Østbye lamented, that had disgraced itself. L'Orange, "Krigsdagbok fra felttoget i Norge", 148; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 103.

15. Ibid., 159, 164. One must bear in mind, however, that L'Orange was an NS-sympathizer, even though he served loyally during the campaign.

16. Lindbäck-Larsen, *Kriger i Norge*. 101-5. Borgersrud argues that most accounts have exaggerated the extent of German numerical superiority and the impact of air support in these actions, and that the Germans essentially beat the 4th Brigade on a man-for-man basis. *Ungå å irritere fienden*. 113.


18. Lindbäck-Larsen, *Kriger i Norge*. 93-94; Borgersrud, *Ungå å irritere fienden*. 119. Previously, this battalion had been involved in the capture of the German paratroops at Dombås, while most of the rest of IR.11 blocked the Germans at Trondheim from moving southward.

19. HOK to 2.Div., 23 April 1940: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60. Ruge apparently must share the blame with Dahl for allowing this group to be cornered in Gausdalen. The loss of the artillery was particularly costly.

20. Message from Ruge to all troops, 25 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.
21. 15th Brigade situation report, 2340 hours, 25 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

22. R. Roscher-Nielsen, Krigen i Norge april-juni 1940, p.254; cited in Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 120.

23. Ruge noted to Hvinden Haug on April 26 that Paget had "made a good impression." RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

24. HOK to Hvinden Haug, 27 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.

25. Torkildsen to HOK (?), 28 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60. The battalion's remaining strength at that point was 335 men with five machine guns and ten automatic rifles.

26. For a contemporary but sometimes unreliable account, see Victor MacClure, Gladiators over Norway (London: W.H. Allen, 1942). Several Norwegians challenged a number of MacClure's assertions regarding the RAF's relations with the Norwegian forces in 1940. One critic observing acidly that MacClure must have thought English was "a secret Masonic code among Englishmen" if he believed the book's inaccuracies would pass unnoticed in Norway. Odd Lindbäck-Larsen and A. Hagemann, "Gladiatorer over Norge: Et intermesso i Lavangen," Vår tid (April 1947): 303-8.

27. HOK situation report, 1600 hours, 25 April 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.


29. Beichmann, 4 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 75-76.

30. According to most accounts, the volunteers simply responded to Ruge's inspiring leadership; but at least one source, albeit a questionable one, alleges that most of them gave in only after Ruge angrily demanded the resignation of anyone who refused to join him. Prof. Schnitler, IFS, to Hagelin, Dept. of the Interior: "P.M. om general Ruge", 30 March 1942; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.

31. Ruge to Hvinden Haug, 30 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, boxes 22, 60 (two separate letters): Per Gunnar Gabrielsen, "Kamp eller kapitulasjon? Noen viktige militørpolitiske spørsmå vurdert ut fra Hærens Overkommando og 2. Divisjons disposisjoner 9/4 - 5/5 1940" (Hovedoppgave thesis: University of Oslo, 1980), 129. The actual number of prisoners appears uncertain and may have been as high as 3,500. Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI, NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 77.

33. G. Østbye, Operasjonene i Nord-Trøndelag (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1964); Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 78-80; Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 147. A German enlisted man aptly summarized the Allied failure when he entitled his memoir of the campaign, "Von Steinkjer nach Namsos! Der Tommy und Poilu kam, sah und lief." (From Steinkjer to Namsos: Where Tommy and Poilu came, saw, and ran.) NA: T-315, reel 1542, 742.

34. Ruge, P.M., 3 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22. Ruge apparently lacked communications with Getz while enroute from Andalsnes to Tromsø.

35. O.B. Getz, Fra krigen i Nord-Trøndelag 1940 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1940), 144, 146, 155.

36. Ibid., 153.

37. Ibid., 156-60; Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 80-81; Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 148-49; Kersaudy, Norway 1940, 181. The Allies apparently believed the Norwegians at Namsos had no intention of fighting the Germans in any case. This assumption probably stemmed mainly from a failure to appreciate the fact that Getz had superceded Laurantzon. Whatever the reasons behind the Allied behavior, it left Getz so bitter that the Germans apparently were pleased to allow publication of his memoir a few months later.

38. Lindbæk-Larsen, Krig i Norge, 125, 136-38; Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 124-26.

39. A German assessment of public opinion in the same period, however, concluded that many Norwegians acknowledged the necessity of the withdrawal. "Es wird z.T. sogar der Rückzug Englands aus Südnorwegen nicht als Verrat, sondern also taktisches englisches Manöver aufgefasst." Stimmungsumschwung in der Bevölkerung, NA: T-312, reel 988.

40. Ruge, P.M., 3 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.


42. When the Norwegians captured Germans in these uniforms later in the campaign, the French urged summary execution; but the Norwegians refrained. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 91.
43. Ziemke, German Northern Theater. 88. The Norwegian Navy contributed to isolating the Germans on April 13 when three Norwegian He-115 seaplanes from Tromsø bombed and strafed Ju-52s on a frozen lake. RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 190.


45. See appendix for the division's order of battle as of May 7-8. The 7th Brigade remained a distinctly ad hoc formation, however, with only a minimal, improvised staff and support elements. Interview with A.D. Dahl, cited in Christensen, De some heiste flagget, 92. The lack of officers was so severe, in fact, that Dahl resorted to filling some staff positions (e.g., transport and communications) with civilians who had no military training at all.

46. See Sverre Hartmann, Søkelys på 1940: Var Soviet farligere enn fienden? (Oslo: Pax Forlag, 1971). The following chapter will examine this issue in more detail.

47. Fleischer to FD, "De administrative forhold i Nord-Norge," 17 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.

48. Fleischer to Ruge, 24 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 132.

49. Ruge to Ljungberg, 27 May 1940; Ruge to Fleischer, 28 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.


51. MU 1946 to Generaljurisdiktionsjefen for Hæren, 15 December 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 131.

52. Captain Finn Berg to IHF, 28 February 1942; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 109. Berg was the 5th Division chief of staff from April 9-27, after which Getz reassigned him to Nummedal's command.

53. MU 1946 to Generaljurisdiktionsjefen for Hæren, 15 December 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 131.
54. Ziemke, *German Northern Theater*. 95-97. The British might have avoided the loss of the transport and intercepted the German landing had they bothered to pay attention to local intelligence gathered by the Norwegian naval station at Bodø. "Rapport fra vpl. kaptein Kaaveland angående krigsdeltagelse i tiden 9/4 - 9/6 1940." 16 September 1943; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 190.


56. In the course of these operations, the Alta Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel O. Munthe-Kaas, played a leading role. However, the unit apparently received somewhat exaggerated publicity because of its distinctive designation and the fact that it was operating in a sector that was more accessible to journalists than the other Norwegian battalions' areas. "P.M. Ad krigens i 1940 i Troms-Narvikavsnittet." Colonel O. Munthe-Kaas, 6 November 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 132; Norsk militært tidsskrift 104 (1945): 58-60.

57. "Report on conversation held between Lt.-Gen. Auchinleck ... Ruge ... and Fleischer." 16 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 131. On May 10, the British told Ljungberg in London that a major shipment was already on its way to re-equip the Norwegian forces, including 7,000 rifles, 208 Bren guns, 60 40-mm Bofors guns, and 24 3.7" anti-aircraft guns: but apparently none of this ever materialized. Ljungberg, "Britisk og fransk hjelp til Norge." 14 May 1940, *Den norske regjerings virksomhet*. IV:214.


60. Derry, *The Campaign in Norway*. 180-2, 186. The Independent Companies were precursors of the Commandos, whose lack of heavy weapons made them ill-suited to sustained combat. Gubbins later went on to head the SOE.


63. Eighty-five miles of trackless, mountainous terrain still lay between the mostly-Austrian troops of the 2nd Division and their comrades at Narvik; but in a remarkable feat of endurance, a vanguard of expert volunteers pressed and eventually linked up with Dietl's men a few days after the fighting had ended. Ziemke, *German Northern Theater*. 98-99, 102-103.
64. The Alta Battalion, for example, was poised to renew the advance on June 9 when word of the armistice arrived. Interview with A.D. Dahl, cited in Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 94. In one of the final and hardest-fought actions of the campaign, a Norwegian detachment allegedly crossed through Swedish territory to take Hill 698, which nevertheless fell to a German counterattack a few hours later.


66. Had it borne fruit, the “Mowinckel Plan” might have resulted in a Norwegian counterpart to Vichy France. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 165-67.


68. Fleischer to FD, 4 June 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 198; C.J. Hambro, General Fleischers tragedie (Tønsberg: Tønsbergs aktietrykkeri, 1947), 6-9.

69. For an authoritative account of the strange circumstances surrounding this event, see John Winton, Carrier Glorious: The Life and Death of an Aircraft Carrier (London: Leo Cooper, 1986).

70. Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI. NA: T-312, reel 982, 9173440; Kersaudy, Norway 1940, 216-24; Rommetveit, Narvik 1940, 106; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, 150-51. The following chapter will discuss the controversial terms of the capitulation in more detail.

71. The German logistical situation in North Norway remained precarious until July, when Sweden granted limited overland transit rights. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 102-104; Rommetveit, Narvik 1940, 106.

72. Hitler acknowledged this fact when he ordered the release of Norwegian enlisted prisoners even while the campaign was still in progress. "Kunngjøring om forordning fra den tyske Rikskansler Adolf Hitler. Annerkjennelse av den norske hærs kampmetode." NA: T-315, reel 1542, 742. In cases where Norwegian volunteers might legally have fallen into the category of francs-tireurs, the Germans nevertheless appear generally to have given them the benefit of the doubt. 163rd Division, Erfahrungsbericht, 9.4. - 10.6.1940; Ibid., reel 1456, 87.

73. Ziemke, German Northern Theater, 109; Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, 151-52; Borgersrud, Unngå å irriterfienden, 31-32; Derry, The Campaign in Norway, 272; Walther Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940 (Göttingen: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1952), 221. The British and Germans each lost approximately 2,500 additional men at sea, and the Norwegians about 300.
74. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 31-33.

75. Ibid.

76. Ruge to UK 1945, "Ad Forsvarets tilstand pr. 9/4-1940." 5 February 1946; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 27.


79. Hamar Stiftstidningen, 9 July 40; cited from German translation. NA: T-312, reel 988, 9180818.

80. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 37.


82. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 36.


84. Such, at least, is the opinion of Svein Blindheim, expressed in an interview with the author on 19 January 1995. One notable example that adds to this impression is that of A.F. Munthe, who despite his close contacts with Quisling in the 1930s ended up in a German prison camp. See Halvard Sand Bakken, Adolf Fredrik Munthe, and Bernhard Paus, I tvo krigsfangenskap: Norske officerars opplevelser i Polen og Tyskland, 1942-1945 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1950).

85. Ruge to UK 1945, "Ad Forsvarets tilstand pr. 9/4-1940." 5 February 1946; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 27.

86. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden. 121.

87. Beichmann, 4 May 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60. One might regard some of this criticism as the pot calling the kettle black, given the Norwegian Army's own failings; but until this point, the Norwegians had tended to look up to the British as being in another league with higher standards.


89. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 40.

91. Ibid., 40-41.


93. Erfahrungsbericht, Pz.Abt.z.6.V.40; NA: T-312, reel 990. 9182634. The report also concluded that the Panzer II's 20-mm gun made it much more useful than the Panzer I, and that the Panzer IV was better still.

94. Cited in Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer."

95. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 128-29.

96. Østbye, "Innstilling fra Utvalget om erfaringer fra 1940," 43.

97. See W. Faye, Lærbok i stridskunst (Oslo: Hellestrøm & Nordahls, 1938).

98. Østbye, "Instilling fra Utvalget om erfaringer fra 1940."

99. Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer."

100. Ibid., quoting Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärische Zeitschrift 8/57.

101. Ibid.

102. Cited in Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer."

103. Østbye. "Innstilling fra Utvalget om erfaringer fra 1940."

104. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 92-94, 98-100: see also Gabrielsen, "Kamp eller kapitulasjon?". The prevailing concept of passive defense also tended to prompt premature withdrawals in response to those of neighboring friendly units, for fear of being out-flanked. Gabrielsen characterized the logic as: "I retreat because you retreat, because I retreat, because you retreat, etc."

105. Østbye. "Taktiske erfaringer."

106. Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 93.

107. Cited in Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer." For evidence of the Norwegian Army's efforts to uphold marksmanship among reservists during the lean years, see "Hærens skarpskytter-marke, 1932-1940," RA: KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 203.
108. See for example Major Askvig's report to Ruge, 18 April 1940; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.


110. Ibid.

111. Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer."

112. Østbye, "Innstilling fra Utvalget om erfaringer fra 1940." See also Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 127-28.


114. Cited in Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer." The CO, 222nd Artillery Regiment agreed that his guns almost never provided indirect fire during the campaign and usually operated as individual batteries or sections.

115. Report by CO, 69th Infantry Division, cited in Østbye, "Taktiske erfaringer."


117. Borgersrud, Unngå å irritere fienden, 43-47. The surrender of the Norwegian ships occurred in violation of paragraphs 73 and 75 of the naval regulations enacted on 5 May 1900, which required all commanders to avoid capture of their vessels and to fight to the last. The Germans also captured two larger destroyers that were under construction at Horten. One of them was completed during the war, while saboteurs destroyed the other. Jane's Fighting Ships, 1946-47 (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1947). 242.

118. Telford Taylor, March of Conquest, 153-54.

119. Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe, 152. The loss of French ore from Lorraine at the outbreak of the war had been one of the main reasons that Narvik became so important in 1939-40. See Williamson Murray, Change in the European Balance of Power, 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin (Princeton, 1984), 329-31.


122. Telford Taylor argues, however, that once FALL GELB began, the British could not have spared the assets to occupy Norway until 1943. *March of Conquest*, 153.

123. In one sense, however, it is ironic that Churchill emerged the victor from the political reshuffling, because his own mistakes as First Lord of the Admiralty (e.g., prematurely showing his hand in the Altmark incident) contributed to the Norwegian disaster. Kersaudy, *Norway 1940*, 186-95.

124. Ziemke, *German Northern Theater*, 65-66. One is struck by the fact that it took the Germans ten days to fight their way back to the point Spiller's column reached on April 9-10.
FROM NEUTRALITY TO NATO:
THE NORWEGIAN ARMED FORCES
AND DEFENSE POLICY, 1905-1955
VOLUME II

DISSERTATION

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The period 1940-45 represented a severe trial for Norway, from which emerged both far-sighted heroes and despicable villains. The vast majority of people caught up in the war, however, fell into neither of these categories; they were merely human beings who tried to cope with terrifying events beyond their control and stumbled toward a final outcome they could scarcely conceive.

Looking back on the war, most Norwegians prefer to dwell on the exploits of the resistance. As a visitor, one finds that almost everyone has a story to tell about some brave deed, either from personal recollection or family tradition. A great many such deeds were perfectly real, and their cumulative effect was a tremendous contribution to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Yet one must be wary of the impression that Norway was entirely different from other occupied nations such as France, where prolonged fence-sitting and collaboration preceded ultimate commitment to the Allied cause. Norwegians, too, had their doubts over how best to survive and regain their independence, above all in 1940-41, when the prospects of liberation through British victory appeared almost nil.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE IN LONDON

Following the collapse of the French Army in May-June 1940, the loss of Norway seemed almost trivial in comparison. With a German invasion of Britain an apparently imminent possibility, the exiled
Norwegian leaders in London could hardly regard the prospects of a victorious return to their country with much optimism; yet that was the final outcome on which they had staked their hopes when they decided to take refuge in Britain.¹

The government’s departure from Tromsø in June 1940 was so hasty and poorly-organized that to the public, it seemed much more like cowardly flight from responsibility than a stand on principle.² Not long after arriving in Britain, King Haakon began receiving petitions from prominent Norwegians both at home and in exile, urging him to set aside the cabinet and declare personal rule for the duration of the emergency. However, the King steadfastly supported the Labor government.³ The British government initially had little time to spare for the Norwegians, and in 1940 the government-in-exile amounted to almost nothing. The only figures to receive significant recognition were the King and General Fleischer, who remained in Scotland trying to form the collection of refugees and volunteers there into some kind of military force.

Norway did still have at least one powerful asset to offer, however: the merchant fleet. In fact, the bulk of Norwegian shipping already had been committed to the Allied war effort through charter agreements even before 9 April 1940. Subsequently, the government-in-exile effectively nationalized all Norwegian shipping through the creation of a unified emergency corporation, NORTRASHIP, which provided the government with substantial revenue. Together with the fact that the national gold reserve had accompanied the government to England as well, this meant that the Norwegian war effort in exile at least could pay its own bills.⁴

The Norwegian merchant fleet in 1940 included nearly two thousand vessels totalling nearly five million tons—the fourth largest national shipping industry in the world. Of particular value were Norwegian tankers, which amounted to about 20 percent of the world-wide tonnage of that type.⁵ As a result, the Allies received a huge addition to their sea transport capability that would prove invaluable in the coming struggle. In 1941, for example, 40 percent of all foreign ships entering British ports were Norwegian.⁶ In a recent analysis of the
The 1940 campaign, H.P. Wilmott termed the accession of the Norwegian merchant fleet to the Allies "the most significant aspect of German failure in the Norwegian campaign," calculating that the transfer effectively negated the next sixteen months of losses to U-boats.\(^7\)

Some members of the Norwegian cabinet, however, notably Foreign Minister Koht, remained far from fully committed to ultimate British victory. In July 1940, Koht extended a feeler to the Soviet ambassador in London as the first step in an effort to distance the government-in-exile from the apparently doomed British cause. When other members of the cabinet and their advisors learned of this, however, calls for Koht's replacement immediately followed. Nygaardsvold initially stuck by his colleague; nor did the British at first encourage Koht's removal, for fear that any such change might erode the cabinet's already tenuous legitimacy. The majority of the cabinet decisively overruled Koht's policy in November 1940, however, when it voted to conclude a formal military treaty with Britain; and the Foreign Minister resigned on November 19.\(^8\)

Koht's belated departure helped open the way toward closer Anglo-Norwegian relations and represented the end of the discredited neutrality policy. The new Foreign Minister, Trygve Lie, advocated wholehearted alliance with the western powers; and negotiations proceeded toward a formal Anglo-Norwegian military co-operation treaty that would ultimately assure "the complete liberation of Norway from German rule" as an unalterable Allied war aim.\(^9\)

The talks proceeded slowly, and in the meantime the embryonic forces-in-exile developed on the basis of informal arrangements with the respective British services. Before examining the formation of those forces in more detail, however, we must turn our attention to occupied Norway, where efforts were underway to develop a different sort of compromise.

**THE "HOME FRONT," SUMMER - AUTUMN 1940**

In summer 1940, an underground resistance campaign against the Germans in Norway was little more than a wish in the minds of scattered
individuals; and morale, with regard to hopes of liberation by the Allies, was low. A German official concluded in late June that the prevailing view among the population was that "reasonable co-operation with the Germans is the best guarantee for the future." Britain seemed likely to sue for peace any day, making Hitler's triumph complete. Apart from the apparent hopelessness of resistance, Norwegians also remained uncertain over what the Germans intended to do in Norway. Quisling initially played little role in the occupation regime. For the time being, the Germans set aside his self-proclaimed government and merely assigned him to an administrative post to oversee the dissolution of the Norwegian military.

Admittedly, many Norwegians even in summer 1940 continued to nurture hopes of Germany's ultimate defeat. "[The] population is convinced," a German report noted, "that King Haakon will return in triumph. People believe in English victory." A more realistic source of hope for sober minds, however, seemed to be the possibility of an early German victory that would leave no reason to continue the occupation. The majority of Norwegians therefore anticipated some form of accommodation with the Germans that would lead to their eventual withdrawal and the restoration of Norwegian sovereignty, and this majority included most of the Norwegian military leaders who remained in the country.

Before evacuating on June 7, the government had authorized General Ruge to surrender all remaining Norwegian forces in Norway. Ruge in turn delegated Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher-Nielsen to sign the actual instrument, which took place at Trondheim on June 10. The German text of the document indicated that the total surrender of all Norwegian military forces, regardless of location (die gesamten norwegischen Streitkräfte), whereas the Norwegian translation seemed to indicate a more limited surrender of only those forces still mobilized in Norway (gesamte being translated as samlede, the meaning of which is closer to "assembled" than "entire"). The Germans and the NS subsequently used this document to support their claim that the Norwegian forces-in-exile were illegal, since Norway had ceased to be at war with Germany on 10 June 1940.
The June 10 capitulation did not, however, require the immediate demobilization of two Norwegian battalions and one artillery battery still guarding East Finnmark, under the command of Colonel Faye. The reason was that Hitler feared that Stalin might seize the opportunity to annex the area if the surrender of Norwegian forces left a power vacuum before German forces could establish their presence, even though the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of August 1939 included no agreement on any partition of Norway. For the Germans, keeping the Norwegian battalions under arms was a purely pragmatic, temporary arrangement: but for the Norwegians, the stakes seemed much higher. Given the apparent certainty of German victory over France and Britain, it seemed clear to Ruge and the remaining civil administration that the only path toward future independence lay through negotiation and at least limited co-operation with the occupation forces.

For the professional officers in particular, the survival of the institution to which they had dedicated their lives seemed to be at stake. Norwegian historian Sverre Hartmann has alleged that Ruge and Roscher-Nielsen went so far as to sign a second, secret agreement with the Germans at Narvik on June 11—the controversial "Narvik avtalen," which formally and explicitly placed Faye's troops under German operational command. Faye later denied that he had ever been aware of any German presence in his chain-of-command. Formally, at least, his orders came from the civilian governor of Finnmark, Fylkesmann Gabrielsen. Other Norwegian historians including Olav Riste and Magne Skodvin have demonstrated flaws in Hartmann's work, and there is no conclusive evidence that Ruge or Roscher-Nielsen ever signed the alleged agreement at Narvik. German records indicate that the June 10 armistice explicitly placed the Finnmark forces under Gabrielsen's orders, but that when Hitler learned of this the following day, he ordered that the border guards must answer directly to German command.

Regardless of the technicalities, the fact clearly is that the remnants of the Norwegian Army under Ruge and Faye did co-operate with the Germans to avert possible Soviet designs on Finnmark in summer 1940. Whether or not Faye knew it, in June - August 1940 a German liaison officer, Major Neef, relayed orders from the OKW to Ruge's
headquarters (FOK), which in turn gave orders to Faye via Gabrielsen. Lindbæk-Larsen later explained the logic that prevailed at the time. "Is Russian occupation more dangerous for Finnmark than German?" he asked rhetorically. "Yes, one would be forced to answer in the affirmative. German occupation—as bad as it was—represented no danger that Finnmark would be [permanently] separated from Norway. Russian occupation would do so."²²

In addition to protecting Norway's long-term territorial interests, Ruge apparently hoped that the border police battalions would form the nucleus of the future Norwegian Army. Probably with the model of Von Seeckt's elite Reichswehr in mind, Ruge directed Faye to pursue a training program that would prepare the units for a cadre function, with every man qualified to assume a position at least one grade above his present one.²³ This scheme never bore fruit, however, because Hitler already had decided to disband the Norwegian units as soon as German forces arrived in sufficient strength. SS troops relieved Faye's forces by stages in July, and the last Norwegian unit in Finnmark was disbanded in August.²⁴ An order from the Administrative Council on 28 August 1940 declared the Norwegian armed forces officially dissolved as of October 1, with no uniform to be worn after that date. Administrative matters such as military pensions subsequently fell under the Finance Department, subject to German supervision.²⁵ A German report noted that many Norwegian officers were embittered by the permanent dissolution of the military, and the occupation authorities directed the civil administration to find other employment for them forthwith.²⁶

The Germans meanwhile consolidated the formerly decentralized Norwegian military archives, partly to facilitate analysis of captured documents that might be of interest for military or propaganda purposes, and partly to insure that recalcitrant Norwegian officers could not use old conscription records to organize resistance. Johannes Schiotz, former chief of the historical section of the Norwegian Army General Staff, initially served as the Norwegian civil administration's liaison to the German-controlled archives, but Professor Gudmund Schnitler, a Quisling sympathizer, soon replaced him. Schnitler then organized an extensive research project to debrief nearly every Norwegian officer who
had taken part in the 1940 campaign. In order to minimize the reluctance of some officers to provide information that might still have some military significance, Schnitler's office assumed the innocuous title, "Institute for Historical Research" (IHF). In fact, however, he eagerly forwarded to the Germans anything that he thought might be of value.27

Most of the remaining Norwegian hopes of accommodation, other than among the quislings, came to grief when the Germans unveiled a more definite occupation policy in September 1940. In April 1940, even before the conquest was complete, Hitler had appointed one of his most loyal and ruthless party officials, Josef Terboven, former Gauleiter of Essen, as Reichskommissar for the civil administration of occupied Norway.28 It was not until September 25, however, that Terboven spelled out Nazi intentions in an official policy statement, outlining the "New Order" to which the country must conform. Among the major provisions was a ban on all political parties other than the NS. Terboven also dissolved the Administrative Council and the Supreme Court, the last vestiges of legitimate government above the local level. Thus began a comprehensive program of political, social, and cultural Nazification, designed to subsume Norway into the new German empire in every respect.29

Although Terboven regarded Quisling with contempt, the latter and his associates meanwhile launched a new recruiting drive for the NS party, capitalizing on the general mood of confusion, hopelessness, and bitterness toward the Nygaardsvold government among the occupied population. The other parties seemed too stunned to mount any opposition, even before the Germans outlawed such activity.30

The main card in Quisling's weak hand versus the Germans was the possibility that he could help raise contingents of Norwegian volunteers to fight under German command. Beginning in January 1941, with Quisling's encouragement, about one thousand men did join the Waffen SS Regiment Nordland, which made up part of the Viking Division. Interest in such service remained sharply limited, however, until the attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 dramatically altered the situation and presented Quisling with new opportunities.31
One crucial weakness in the occupation regime that became apparent almost from the beginning, however, was its disunity. In fact, one might speak more accurately of at least three different regimes: the Wehrmacht, the Kriegsmarine, and the Reichskommissariat. Although both Terboven and the Wehrmacht chief in Norway General Falkenhorst despised Quisling, the German Navy regarded him as a useful tool for furthering its own interests and therefore sponsored his cause in Berlin, as did Rosenberg's branch of the Nazi party. Furthermore, German propaganda in Norway often proved remarkably inept. For example, a newsreel purported to show a jubilant crowd of Norwegians responding to some pro-German development, when in fact the scene was crudely-spliced footage of Crown Prince Olav's return from a prewar visit abroad.

Consequently, the lack of any rational, unified occupation policy left a relatively open field for the development of what Norwegians soon began to call the "Home Front" (Hjemmefronten). Nevertheless, even though the great majority of Norwegian hearts and minds began again to entertain hopes of eventual liberation as the outcome of the Battle of Britain became apparent, organized resistance had yet to begin on any significant scale.

Among the original organizers of the embryonic military resistance in Oslo were Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg, Major Olaf Helset, and Captain John Rognes; and in 1941 they adopted the name MILORG (Militær Organisasjonen) to distinguish their organization from its civilian counterpart, sometimes called SIVORG but better known as the Circle. Apart from helping to sustain morale under the occupation, however, MILORG was essentially useless unless and until it could establish effective communications and co-operation with the authorities in London. This turned out to be a long and difficult process. The majority of Norwegian officers on the nascent "Home Front" meanwhile remained passive, like most other people, preferring to wait and see how things developed before risking any active involvement with MILORG or attempting to reach Britain.
When the Norwegian government arrived in London in June 1940, the defense department formally absorbed the "Norwegian Military and Naval Mission" that had functioned there briefly under General Steffens and Commodore Corneliusen. In the initial arrangement for command of hypothetical forces-in-exile, General Fleischer became chief of HOK, with Capt. A.R. Pran as chief of staff. Diesen remained Commanding Admiral for the time being, despite widespread criticism over his role in the April 9 disaster.37

Fleischer presented an initial assessment of the prospects for raising Norwegian forces in a memorandum to Ljungberg on June 21, urging that the government immediately take steps to draft Norwegian residents in Britain, estimated at 2,500 males aged 20-35. Significantly, Fleischer also warned against likely British attempts to employ Norwegian troops in other campaigns not directly related to the liberation of Norway. According to his projections, the HOK could have a small brigade ready for offensive operations within 6-8 months, and capable of playing at least a limited role in defense of the British Isles within 2-3 months. About forty Norwegian pilots meanwhile could join British squadrons on a temporary basis almost immediately, but the general also emphasized the need to form separate Norwegian squadrons as soon as possible.38

By mid-July, there were about 1,500 men in the Norwegian reception camp at Dumfries, Scotland. Limited training began on 9 September 1940; but for the time being, the British could provide little more than uniforms, due to the desperate shortage of equipment following the losses at Dunkirk. Ljungberg agreed that conscription of Norwegian residents in Britain should go ahead as soon as possible, with registration of men up to age forty-five, although for the time being only those up to thirty-five would be called up. The government enacted the policy by royal decree on 13 December 1940. A full brigade of 3-4,000 men thus appeared feasible, assuming British equipment would be forthcoming.39
The cabinet decided meanwhile to demobilize the Norwegian troops interned in Sweden, who were mostly members of the former 1st Division. Fleischer argued that the government should at least encourage individual volunteers to remain in Sweden in hopes of later reaching Britain, but the cabinet rejected this idea. Although it made good sense from a purely military standpoint, the cabinet apparently believed it would have a negative impact on public opinion in Norway. "Under the present political circumstances," the government concluded, "there is no purpose in maintaining 4-5,000 Norwegian soldiers in Sweden." The internees thus returned to Norway on 11-18 August 1940.40

In retrospect, this decision appears to have been a mistake, since the internees theoretically might have formed a valuable cadre for the later Norwegian units that formed in Sweden in 1943-45. In summer 1940, however, the chances of Swedish co-operation in such a scheme were near zero.41 Meanwhile, many notable civilian figures were openly returning to Norway as well, for example Labor leader and future Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen.42 Many of the people who went back to Norway in this period later claimed that their intention all along was to organize underground resistance; but at the time the prevailing mood was simply one of resignation.

The issue of whether to demobilize the troops in Sweden marked the beginning of Fleischer's alienation from the cabinet in London. As C.J. Hambro later wrote, "The government clearly regarded Fleischer as an unpleasant personality. He spoke quite a different language than the majority of its members: he was interested [only] in military issues, not politics."43

The British initially proposed to organize two Norwegian independent companies for use in commando raids. Although Fleischer indicated his agreement in principle, his main motive probably was merely to try to obtain equipment as soon as possible. In general, he had little regard for unconventional warfare. As he had indicated in his memorandum of 21 June 1940, he had no intention of frittering away scarce resources in any operation not directly related to the liberation of Norway, such as raids conceived mainly for propaganda purposes.44
Nor did Fleischer have any intention of adopting British organization for Norwegian units. "The campaign in Norway," he wrote, "showed that our infantry organization for the most part was well-suited for operations in Norway, and indeed better than either the English and French with regard to supply and transport [trenoppssettingen]. . . . We should therefore continue on the basis of our [own] organization plans with minor modifications." Although the Norwegian forces would have to rely on motor transport while training in Britain, he argued that they should remain organized for re-conversion to horse transport for operations in Norway. The only significant shortcomings he identified concerned equipment, such as the lack of submachine guns, rifle grenades, and hand grenades.45

As it turned out, however, the Norwegians found themselves compelled to organize an infantry battalion on the British pattern. The unit was officially activated on 15 March 1941, at which point Fleischer transferred his own headquarters (HOK, at this point amounting to only 9 men) to London, leaving a brigade staff under Colonel O. Strugstad to oversee training in Scotland. The initial organization of the Norwegian Brigade included a headquarters, one infantry battalion (headquarters, headquarters company, and three rifle companies), and one artillery battery of four 75-mm guns, plus Newland Military Hospital, and another rifle company and a machine gun company still under training.46

Norwegian volunteers on Iceland meanwhile also formed a separate company under British command in fall 1940, together with a contingent of reinforcements from Scotland in January 1941. The Norwegian Company Iceland also provided a squad-sized detachment to occupy Jan Mayen in February 1941. Before his departure as Foreign Minister in November 1940, Koht also tried to obtain British agreement for Norwegian forces to occupy the Færøe Islands, apparently in the hope that this would pave the way for annexation of the islands from Denmark after the war. This scheme came to nothing, however, when even Fleischer had to admit that his troops were inadequate for the mission.47

The British provided logistical support for the Norwegian units, which lacked most of the non-combatant elements included in a normal brigade. Under an agreement that remained in effect from 1 January 1941
to 1 June 1944, the Norwegian government paid the British a per capita fee of £0.4.10 per day. in exchange for which the War Office supplied the Norwegian Army units from British Army logistics. The Norwegians meanwhile devoted their own limited supply organization mainly to the local manufacture of winter equipment, including parkas, skis, rucksacks, tents, stoves, and sleeping bags, the British examples of which were deemed inadequate for Norwegian conditions.48

Following Koht's demise in November 1940, negotiations culminated in the signing of a formal military co-operation treaty by Trygve Lie and Anthony Eden on 28 May 1941. The delay in this process reflected the fact that it amounted mainly to a rubber stamp on practical arrangements already established between the respective services. Since the treaty does represent the fundamental compromises that governed their collaboration, however, it warrants closer examination.

Article 1 made clear Britain's role as senior partner, but also the restrictions on employment of the Norwegian forces: "The Norwegian Armed Forces in the United Kingdom (comprising Land, Sea and Air Forces) shall be employed either for the defence of the United Kingdom or for the purpose of regaining Norway. They shall be organised and employed under British command, in its character as the Allied High Command . . . ."

Article 6 concerned the financial agreement: "The Norwegian Armed Forces shall be equipped, paid and maintained at the expense of the Norwegian Government." Appendix I, concerning land forces, emphasized the Norwegian determination to avoid being swallowed up piecemeal in the British Army:

The Norwegian Land Forces shall, as far as possible, retain the character of a Norwegian Force in respect of personnel, particularly as regards discipline, language, promotion and duties. . . . Norwegian units and formations shall be commanded by Norwegian officers. British organisation shall be adopted, but Norwegian regimental colours, and all distinctions of rank and badges of the Norwegian Army may be retained. (2) The Norwegian Land Forces shall be under British command, in its character as the Allied High Command, which may place units or formations under the commander of a superior British formation. It is understood that the Norwegian Land Forces will, as far as possible, be used as one unit.49
In appendices II and III, similar terms applied to the naval and air forces. The British agreed to provide ships on loan free of charge, but the Norwegians would pay for their maintenance. The most elaborate parts of the treaty, articles 2-5 and Appendix IV, mainly concerned legal jurisdiction over Norwegian personnel in Britain. The essential agreement was that British civil courts would try capital offenses, and Norwegian military courts would deal with all lesser cases concerning discipline and internal administration.

Anglo-Norwegian naval co-operation developed from the outset with relatively few problems, and one reason for this was that English had long been a central part of the curriculum at the Sjøkrigsskolen. The British also found that Norwegian petty officers and technical ratings measured up well to Royal Navy standards. Mainly on the initiative of Captain Edvard C. Danielsen, organization of a Norwegian naval headquarters in London had begun as early as 13 May 1940, well in advance of any decision by the government to form forces-in-exile. The Norwegians promptly agreed to full operational control by the Royal Navy, although the SOK retained authority over personnel and internal administration. The working agreement also provided that the British would keep the SOK fully informed over the current dispositions of Norwegian ships.

After helping establish naval co-operation in London in May-June 1940, Danielsen himself returned to Norway in a British submarine in summer 1940 to establish an underground coast-watcher organization at Horten, which provided a great deal of useful information until broken by the Gestapo in spring 1941. When the reports stopped coming, Danielsen sent his own son back to Norway to determine what had happened—a mission that would have been unnecessary had the Norwegian embassy in Stockholm co-operated in relaying information to London. However, the embassy at that point was still playing a double game, trying to hedge its bets in expectation of German victory.

The only Norwegian naval vessels that escaped to Britain in 1940 were the destroyers Sleipner and Draug, the patrol ship Fridtjof Nansen, the submarine B-1, and nine smaller craft, mostly armed trawlers and picket boats. The total number of naval personnel to reach Britain was 286
about four hundred. The Norwegians also obtained two Vosper MTBs from the batch of eight already on order before the invasion, but the Royal Navy commandeered the remainder. British yards meanwhile began refitting the larger Norwegian ships, and in fall 1940 they converted sixteen additional fishing boats and whalers into picket boats and minesweepers for use off Scotland.\(^5\)

By the end of 1941, the Norwegian Navy had taken over a number of additional ships, including three ex-American four-stack destroyers, four corvettes, and a submarine, plus smaller craft totalling twenty-three minesweepers, ten picketboats, eight motor launches, and three MTBs. The Navy's personnel by that point numbered 3,400. The Norwegians generally had little if any choice of what vessels they received, and some of them, especially the old American destroyers, were in poor condition. Given the desperate need for convoy escorts, however, the Norwegians simply had to make the best of what they got and hope that the situation eventually would allow replacement of the older ships with more modern types.\(^5\)

One of the old four-stackers, the *Saint Albans*, turned out to be the most successful Norwegian U-boat killer of the war when she sank one in August 1941 and another the following month. She also managed to shoot down a German plane on the Murmansk route in May 1942. Ironically, however, the *Saint Albans* initially was an unhappy ship. The first and second lieutenants complained to Danielsen that their skipper was showing signs of mental instability, refusing to share vital operational information with them. Danielsen accepted the protest, relieved the commander, and assigned a more popular officer whom the lieutenants had recommended.\(^5\)

The Norwegian air forces in Britain faced a more complicated task in forming units for combat. In May - June 1940 a total of approximately 150 Norwegian aviation personnel reached Britain, from both the Army and naval air arms: but they had no effective organization or aircraft. In command was Army Captain Bjarne Øen, who had succeeded the discredited Colonel Gulliksen as *de facto* chief of Army aviation when the latter went to France on a token assignment.\(^5\) The previous chief of naval aviation, Capt. Lützow-Holm, had remained in Norway; and
Captain Hjalmar Riiser-Larsen succeeded to the post in Britain. Since he was senior to Øen, Riiser-Larsen subsequently became chief of the unified air organization that developed.\(^\text{57}\)

Prior to the evacuation from North Norway, the Norwegian Military and Naval Mission in London already had agreed to a British proposal that Norwegian pilots join RAF squadrons under the Volunteer Reserve program, with the understanding that they would be released as soon as it was practical to form new, separate Norwegian squadrons. Not surprisingly, Øen agreed with Fleischer's view that this was essential, arguing, "We will not accomplish much if [all] our people join the Allied forces as individual volunteers. There should be Norwegian units that show our colors . . ."\(^\text{58}\)

Apart from the limited supply of manpower, the main problems were to obtain aircraft and training facilities. The only Norwegian aircraft in Britain in summer 1940 were five crated Curtiss Hawks that had been enroute to Oslo on April 9, and a handful of seaplanes. Apart from four He-115s, the seaplanes were useless; and the British concluded that the Heinkels would present unacceptable recognition problems, since the Germans also used the same type. Three more batches of new aircraft were on order from the United States, however: thirty-six more Hawks, thirty-six Douglas 8-A light bombers, and twenty-four Northrop N3P seaplanes, due for delivery by the end of the year.\(^\text{59}\)

The lack of facilities in Britain due to the RAF's own desperate training program, combined with the fact that the first available aircraft were going to be in America anyway, prompted the Norwegians to establish their own training base in Canada. Army air force Captain Motzfeldt was already in the United States on April 9 in connection with the Curtis and Douglas contracts, and he assisted Riiser-Larsen in obtaining the lease of Toronto's Island Airport, concluded in July. The first group of 120 aviators (ninety Army and thirty naval) sailed for Canada on July 21, headed by Captain Øen, and arrived at Toronto on August 4.\(^\text{60}\)

The facilities at Island Airport itself were minimal, especially since the field remained partially occupied by civilian aviation. The Norwegians therefore had to construct a separate camp nearby, dubbed
"Little Norway," which did not become available until 10 November 1940. Pilot training proceeded as aircraft arrived from the United States, along with a variety of other programs for technical personnel. The latter efforts proved an overall failure, since they did not meet RAF standards; and in 1942 the Norwegians began simply sending ground personnel directly to RAF schools in Britain. After initial flight training in Canada, pilots and navigators also went on to advanced and operational training units in Britain.61

Despite the long-standing rivalry between the Army and naval air arms, it was obvious to all concerned that the two services would have to co-operate in the joint training program. Although the two Norwegian air services retained their separate ranks and administration, the need for integration with the RAF led to the further establishment of a joint air forces command, the FFK (Flygevåpnetenes Felleskommando) in April 1941, headed by Riiser-Larsen, with Øen as chief of staff. The Navy presumably would have preferred its aircraft to operate directly under the Royal Navy, but the British system meant that seaplanes such as the Norwegian Northrops automatically fell under RAF Coastal Command. Riiser-Larsen's appointment probably helped to minimize opposition from the SOK staff in London, along with his promotion to vice-admiral in November 1941. As we shall see in the following chapter, however, the arrangement ultimately led to precisely what the Navy had long feared: a fully independent air force in which former Army aviators predominated.62

Equipped with Northrop N3Ps, 330 (Norwegian) Squadron, RAF Coastal Command, became the first operational Norwegian air unit in exile, officially activated at Reykjavik, Iceland, on 25 April 1941. Operated from subsidiary bases at Akureyri and Budareyri as well as Reykjavik, the squadron flew a total of 1,041 sorties before it transferred to Britain in summer 1942 and traded in the Northrops for Sunderlands and Catalinas. In this period, the squadron claimed a total of fifteen U-boats sighted, nine attacked, and seven damaged, as well as eight enemy aircraft damaged, but with no certain kills.63

The Norwegians initially considered equipping their first fighter squadron with the Curtis Hawks, but the British decided that it would be
better to provide Hurricanes in order to avoid maintenance problems, since the unit was going to rely mainly on RAF logistical support anyway. The RAF officially activated 331 (Norwegian) Squadron, Fighter Command, on 21 July 1941. In fall that year the unit traded Hurricanes for Spitfires and began operating from the Orkneys in defense of Scapa Flow, where it remained until May 1942. Total Norwegian air force personnel by the end of 1941 numbered two hundred officers and 1,400 enlisted men.64

THE MANPOWER ISSUE

In the process of building up forces-in-exile, the Norwegians initially needed equipment and facilities more than anything else. By 1941, however, it had become increasingly clear that the real bottleneck would be a shortage of manpower. The financial solvency of the government, the military co-operation agreements with Britain, and the growth of Allied war production all assured that the Norwegian forces would obtain the necessary material. Personnel were harder to come by.

The only method of recruitment directly within the power of the London government was conscription. Although the British co-operated in enforcing the draft of Norwegian residents in the U.K., this amounted to only a limited pool.65 The decree of December 1940 made Norwegian males aged 18-55 residing in Britain eligible for conscription, but initially only those up to age thirty-five were called up. The service chiefs soon made clear to the government that they must cast the net more widely.

In summer 1941, Lieutenant-Colonel Arne D. Dahl (a recent escapee from North Norway) travelled to the United States to investigate the possibility of drafting the estimated 8-10,000 Norwegian citizens living there as well; and on 28 November 1941, the government-in-exile enacted a measure to do so, which also applied to every other country with a significant number of emigrants.66

In America, Norway's plight was a popular cause that helped to erode the strength of isolationism in the Midwest, and Roosevelt's comment that America should "Look to Norway" as an inspiration for
resistance to Nazism became a favorite slogan for Norwegian publicists. The government-in-exile actively cultivated American sympathy by establishing the Norwegian Information Service in New York, which began publishing the periodical News of Norway in 1941.67

Nevertheless, Pearl Harbor resulted in almost all of the Norwegians in the United States joining the American forces instead, although the government there did allow such men to join the Norwegian forces if they preferred. Beginning in 1942, the Norwegians began drafting men in Britain up to age 55, due to the increasingly acute shortage of manpower, placing the older men in support units. That same year the government also enacted conscription of Norwegian women aged 18-40 living in Britain, although it was applied only to a limited extent.68

Another factor that Fleischer's original estimate of the manpower pool in Britain did not take into account was that a large proportion of the residents in Britain were merchant seamen. There were about 21,500 seamen in Norwegian merchant vessels as of 9 June 1940, plus about three thousand in the whaling fleet. A considerable number of temporarily unemployed seamen in Britain and other places did end up in the Army; but as attrition took its toll at sea, Manning the merchant ships became a vital concern. Accordingly, a resolution on 4 April 1941 formally exempted merchant seamen from conscription, and a further decision on 12 December 1941 extended the policy to men with no prior seagoing experience who were willing to sign on aboard merchant ships. In effect, this gave the shipping industry top priority in personnel, probably a sound decision in retrospect, but one which the armed services understandably found highly frustrating.69

Apart from conscription of Norwegian citizens abroad, the only potential source of manpower was the exodus of refugees from occupied Norway, most of whom were young men eager to volunteer for combat service with the forces in Britain. The number of such men initially was only a trickle, but the flow began to increase as it became clear that Britain was determined to fight on regardless of setbacks.

Ironically, only a few months after demobilizing the internees in Sweden, the government-in-exile did issue a general call for volunteers
to attempt to escape from Norway and come to Britain, especially anyone with flying experience. The Norwegian military staff in London also discreetly contacted a number of specific officers in Norway whose skills would be especially valuable, but such appeals never amounted to direct orders. A few such officers did heed the call and escaped, or simply did so on their own initiative; but most did not, often citing the parole they had given the Germans as a condition of their release. 70

In many cases, one of the conditions of the capitulation of Norwegian forces in April–June 1940 had been that while enlisted men and reserve officers could return to civilian life immediately, professional officers would remain prisoners of war unless they gave parole never again to bear arms against Germany during the present war. Ruge refused to give his own word but made clear to the rest of his officers that they were free to do so. Although a few others followed his example, most officers did give their parole, which complicated their decision of whether to attempt to escape and join the forces-in-exile. 71

Although few of the men reaching Britain from Norway were professional officers and many had no military training at all, they provided an important infusion of manpower. About two thousand men sailed to Britain in fishing boats or other small craft, and in the course of 1941 a total of about 1,300 others were evacuated in a series of British commando raids, which we will examine shortly. About five hundred volunteers also reached Britain via Sweden and the USSR while that route remained available. 72

As with the conscripts, however, most of the volunteers ended up in the air forces, the Navy, or the merchant fleet; and the Norwegian Army in Scotland remained little more than a token formation, repeatedly forced to release drafts of men to the other services. 73 Transfer of personnel from the Army to the other services began in July 1940 when the Navy obtained the release of sixty seamen. In October, another seventy men followed when the British offered the Norwegians one of the fifty old American destroyers (later followed by two more), provided they could man the ship promptly. Thirty more men followed by the end
of 1940, plus about another 160 whom the Norwegian government allowed to enlist in the Royal Navy."

Predictably, Fleischer objected bitterly to these raids on his own meager pool of manpower, and he tended to regard the relegation of the Army to low priority as a personal affront. This attitude did little to improve his standing with the government and also caused some exasperation among the British, who clearly viewed the Norwegian Navy as more immediately valuable than the miniature army in Scotland. When Fleischer complained to Ljungberg over the Army's low priority in October 1940, the latter showed little sympathy, arguing that Norway's main contributions to the war effort must be at sea and in the air."

The flow of volunteers from Norway thus became a central issue among the authorities in London, and about the only thing the service chiefs and cabinet all could agree on was that they wanted to obtain as many volunteers as possible. However, the escape routes remained almost completely beyond their control. Other than by fishing boat across the North Sea, a perilous proposition at best, the only significant route was to cross the border into Sweden. Resourceful and determined volunteers generally found it relatively easy to reach Sweden, but from there they still had to reach Britain.

Until June 1941, this involved a complicated, circuitous journey through neutral Finland, the USSR, and Turkey, thence through Allied-controlled territory in the Middle East and finally to Britain via the Cape of Good Hope. Although Swedish and Soviet policies in this period were substantially pro-German, and Finland was on its way to becoming a de facto member of the Axis as well, Norwegian refugees still managed to get through with the aid of money from London." In May 1941, Stalin severed diplomatic relations with the Nygaardsvold government for the sake of the pact with Hitler; but this did not have much direct effect on the transit of volunteers, coming as it did so shortly before BARBAROSSA closed that route anyway. The ambiguous loyalty of the Norwegian consulate in Stockholm also complicated matters until about mid-1941, but the British embassy there also functioned as a valuable point of contact."
The closure of the route through Finland and Russia left Sweden almost completely isolated; and by the end of 1941 there were nearly three thousand stranded Norwegian volunteers awaiting the opportunity to reach Britain. The only remaining alternative was the tenuous air transport route which the British maintained between Scotland and Stockholm under the auspices of BOAC (British Overseas Airways Corporation), but the available seats were severely limited. The Norwegian government already had decided in fall 1940 to establish its own flights and acquired two Lockheed Loadstar aircraft in spring 1941 for the purpose, soon followed by two more. Initially these also operated under BOAC control, under a compromise agreement where the British and Norwegians each controlled 50 percent of the seats.78

Unlike the conscripts abroad, only about 25 percent of the men from Sweden ended up in the merchant fleet, since few of them were experienced seamen. Nevertheless, the numbers of Norwegian passengers remained extremely limited: 141 in the latter half of 1941 and 291 in the first half of 1942.79 The armed services therefore became extremely jealous over the allocation of these recruits.

In August 1941, Admiral Diesen challenged the cabinet over assignment of the limited seats available on the Stockholm flights, threatening to resign if the government did not concede "absolute priority for qualified naval officers and naval technical personnel." This controversy had several aspects, only one of which was interservice rivalry. Diesen's ultimatum also represented a protest against Nygaardsvold's recent intervention to obtain a seat for his daughter-in-law, who had no significance to the war effort but wanted to come to England.80

Diesen's share of blame for the April 1940 fiasco also came into play, however: and the cabinet decided to call his bluff by accepting his resignation on 29 August 1941. Commodore E. Corneliussen officially succeeded him as chief of the SOK on 7 November 1941, with Danielsen as chief of staff, both men being promoted to vice-admiral; and Diesen received a token assignment as "recruiting officer" in Washington.81
The Norwegian authorities in exile initially had almost no contact with occupied Norway, apart from the reports of individual escapees. The British meanwhile were actively engaged in developing contacts with the "Home Front," but they remained suspicious of the Norwegian government and military leadership, fearing security leaks through carelessness and infiltration. In addition, it probably was clear to the British from the beginning that the Norwegian government's interests were not always identical to those of the Allies. Thus, the process of establishing contacts with the underground resistance and mounting special operations proceeded almost completely outside the purview of the Norwegian authorities in London.

In July 1940, Churchill reorganized the administration of clandestine operations under a single body, the SOE (Special Operations Executive), with Hugh Dalton as its first chief. SOE's mission, as Churchill put it with characteristic flair, was to "set Europe ablaze" by stirring up revolts and harassing the German armies of occupation by unconventional means. Due to the wide variety of circumstances in occupied countries, SOE's basic organization consisted of separate sections devoted to specific countries or regions; and Lieutenant James Chaworth-Musters, RNVR, became head of the Norwegian Section.

The SOE inherited from its predecessor, Section 'D', a sense of unrealistic optimism regarding the prospects of a general revolt against the Germans in Norway. With virtually no sources of information other than their own imaginations, British planners envisioned co-ordinated uprisings at key points early in 1941, aimed at overthrowing the occupation entirely, essentially unaided by regular Allied forces. At best, the scheme was impractical; and at worst, it threatened to plunge the Norwegian people into a bloodbath for no worthwhile purpose. What SOE needed most was timely, accurate information from Norwegians arriving in Britain with knowledge of the actual situation in their homeland. Recognizing this requirement, the Norwegian government appointed Captain Martin Linge as liaison with the SOE; and he took
charge of the difficult process of recruiting potential agents for missions to Norway.84

Linge's recruits for the SOE soon averaged twenty to twenty-five men per month, and in July 1941 they received the official designation Norwegian Independent Company No. 1, more generally known as the Linge Company. The agents received training at an SOE camp code-named Station XVII in Hertfordshire, and subsequently at a Norwegian camp called STS 41 at Fawley Court, Henley-on-Thames. Finally, in November 1941, the primary training area for the company moved to Special Training School XXVI in a remote area of Scotland.85

With the arrival of Norwegian refugees and improvements in the quality of intelligence, British plans for Norway gradually assumed a more realistic character; but effective co-ordination with the "Home Front" remained to be seen. Escapees brought numerous reports of the military resistance organization developing in Norway, but its true extent and character remained unclear to planners in Britain. By June 1941, MILORG had formed its own centralized command structure in Oslo, which reported its existence and loyalty to King Haakon but also expressed its general contempt for the Nygaardsvold cabinet. The SOE regarded MILORG's central apparatus as unnecessary and potentially dangerous, since it could not exercise effective control of subordinate cells outside the immediate vicinity of Oslo, and its leadership remained highly vulnerable to enemy action. The Germans demonstrated this point in early 1941 when they arrested one of the original organizers and forced another, Captain John Rognes, to flee to Sweden.

For the time being, therefore, the SOE pursued its own operations without regard to MILORG, and Company Linge provided detachments to accompany a series of British commando raids on Norway. The first of these was a descent on Svolvær in the remote Lofoten Islands west of Narvik on 4 March 1941, code-named Operation CLAYMORE. Fifty-two Norwegians participated in the operation, which in purely military terms amounted to a minor success. As the Germans concluded, the action demonstrated "that England, if it wishes and judges that the time is right, can land troops in Norway. Many Norwegians have interpreted the abduction of German sympathizers as a dire warning."86
However, the Norwegian government in London bitterly resented the fact that it had not received prior notice of the raid; and this marked the first of several such cases. One SOE official later admitted that the Norwegian government was "kept almost entirely in the dark as to our activities." due mainly to lack of confidence in the Nygaardsvold cabinet's commitment to British war aims. The British eventually developed considerable trust in certain members of the cabinet, notably Foreign Minister Trygve Lie; but the Prime Minister himself almost always remained outside the loop.

The official status of the Linge Company remained highly ambiguous. Linge regarded himself as directly subordinate to Norwegian Defense Minister Ljungberg, but apparently seldom told the latter anything confidential. Pay came partly from the British, partly from the intelligence section of the Norwegian Defense Ministry (FD/E). Overall, the Linge men had almost nothing to do with the Norwegian military prior to 1942.

The SOE meanwhile took charge of contacts with Norway via the North Sea route. In autumn and winter 1940-41, a considerable number of Norwegians escaped to Britain in fishing boats. Simple geography had always forced many of the inhabitants of western Norway to rely on sea communications for their livelihood, and even the Germans could not effectively control such movements at the local level without wrecking the entire economy. Thus, at least in the winter months of long nights and poor weather, it was relatively simple for experienced sailors in small but seaworthy fishing boats to slip across the North Sea undetected. However, the Germans increased the difficulty of such voyages by strictly rationing fuel and declaring a shoot-on-sight policy against any boat spotted more than fifty miles offshore.

Despite the risks involved, the British persuaded several escaped Norwegian crews to make return voyages to Norway and drop off agents. In December 1940 the SOE assigned Major L.H. Mitchell to organize such operations. Mitchell established a makeshift headquarters near Lerwick on Shetland, and recruited about thirty Norwegian fishermen and merchant sailors to man six requisitioned boats, designated the Shetlands Naval Unit. The craft were only fifty to seventy feet in length, and could
make only seven or eight knots; but they had several advantages. Although built of wood, they were extremely sturdy and able to withstand practically any weather. Most important, their appearance was so commonplace on the Norwegian coast that they were unlikely to attract much attention even in wartime. Increasingly elaborate German regulations and countermeasures presented ever-greater risks, but even Teutonic efficiency proved unable to seal Norway's vast coastline completely. In the first season of operations, from December 1940 to May 1941, the boats made fourteen trips, dropping off fifteen agents and picking up eighteen others, as well as thirty-nine other refugees.\(^9\)

Mitchell and his deputy, Sub-Lieutenant David Howarth, R.N., found that dealing with their independent-minded and unruly Norwegian crews called for great tact and patience. The group soon developed good working relations, however, and intensified its operations in winter 1941-42. The North Sea runs eventually began to seem so frequent and reliable that Norwegians referred to them as the "Shetlands Bus." In addition to ferrying agents, most missions involved the delivery of arms and supplies to MILORG, and each boat usually could carry about eight tons of cargo. The boats often returned to Britain crammed full of impromptu volunteers, usually young men eager to join the forces-in-exile, as well as other refugees who had been forced into hiding by the Gestapo.

Occasionally the boats also laid mines. The first such mission, by the specially-outfitted Nordsjøen, ended in a shipwreck; but under the command of the indomitable Leif "Shetlands" Larsen, the crew eventually returned to base by stealing another boat in Norway. This exploit demonstrated the crucial importance of using Norwegian volunteers who could pass among the local population. The Shetlands boats sometimes even ventured directly into Norwegian ports, blending in with hundreds of similar vessels still operating with German sanction. Although the Shetland unit did lose several boats and crews in 1941-42, successes continued to justify the risks. In 43 voyages that season, they landed 49 agents, brought back 6 agents as well as 56 other refugees, and delivered 117 tons of cargo.\(^9\)
An early British plan for a limited invasion of Norway in spring 1941 was Operation DYNAMITE, which envisioned seizing and holding a lodgement in the Stavanger area with a force of four divisions, in order to help seal off the North Sea. Given the lack of necessary forces and the demands in other theaters, however, this project had to remain on the back burner. BARBAROSSA suddenly cast new importance on Norway's position, however; and British planners scrambled to develop a response. In July 1941 their attention turned to Svalbard (Spitzbergen), which seemed to offer potential as an airbase for covering convoys to Murmansk. The Norwegian government agreed in principle to a plan for a joint occupation of the island with Canadian and Soviet troops, on condition that the USSR immediately restore diplomatic relations with the government-in-exile, which the Soviets had severed on 8 May 1941. Although Norwegian-Soviet relations did resume on 5 August 1941, a joint operation with Russian forces proved impractical; and the British developed their own plans for Svalbard.

In 1940-41, there were approximately 750 Norwegians and 1,850 Russians living on the island in connection with the coal mining industry. The Norwegian mines produced 300,000 tons of coal in 1939, with considerable capacity for expansion. The Germans initially showed no interest in the island, until an amateurish group of young patriots tried to commandeer an ice-breaker there in May 1941, only to fall into the hands of the Gestapo.

A conference of British, Norwegian, and Soviet representatives in London on 21 July 1941 prompted the Admiralty to send Admiral Philip Vian with a small force of cruisers and destroyers to reconnoiter Svalbard and report on the feasibility of establishing a base there. The SOK assigned Lieutenant Ragnvald Tamber as liaison officer to the expedition, which arrived at the island on July 31, under cover of a simultaneous carrier raid on Kirkenes and Petsamo. Tamber ended up remaining behind on Svalbard when Vian withdrew, in order to prevent any reports of the visit from leaking to the Germans in Norway before the British returned. In the meantime, the civilians were in a perilous
position, because they could not be sure which side would occupy the island first. The British meanwhile did not inform the Norwegian government of the situation on Svalbard, and Tamber relied on sheer bluff to maintain his one-man garrison, sending continued "all's well" radio reports to Tromsø and commandeering ships as they arrived.  

The British finally did consult the government-in-exile on 16 August 1941, after having decided to raid Svalbard in force and evacuate the entire population. Nygaardsvold essentially washed his hands of the affair by leaving it entirely up to the defense department; and since Ljungberg was unavailable, it fell to General Fleischer to decide how closely the Norwegian military should co-operate in the mission. On his own authority, he assigned a detachment of thirty-six men under Major A.R. Pran. The main force consisted of a Canadian battalion aboard the transport Empress of Canada, escorted by two cruisers and three destroyers, again under Vian, and the group arrived on August 24 to find that the Germans still had not established any presence on the island. The Norwegian mine directors convinced the British to forego complete destruction of their equipment, but 500,000 tons of accumulated coal went up in smoke despite their protests. The expedition withdrew on September 3, evacuating the Soviet civilians as well as the Norwegian population.  

The Norwegian government felt reasonably satisfied with the outcome of the Svalbard raid, but the episode did not represent any long-term solution of Anglo-Norwegian co-ordination problems. A possible invasion of North Norway stood high on the list of British contingency plans in fall 1941, but the Norwegians were kept almost entirely out of the picture. The Soviets appeared to be on the brink of collapse, and Norway seemed to be the only place where the meager British forces available could relieve some of the pressure on the eastern front. Another event that could have precipitated such an operation was a German attack on Sweden, which seemed to be an imminent possibility. In the meantime, Churchill temporarily suspended further commando raids on Norway, in order to avoid drawing enemy reinforcements to the region where Allied forces might soon have to return on a larger scale. The main invasion plan was code-named Operation AJAX.
In early September, Churchill ordered the Chiefs of Staff Subcommittee to begin planning "for landing a force in northern Norway (up to four divisions) at the end of January or beginning of February 1942, with the object of relieving pressure on the Russians." AJAX envisioned seizing Tromsø as a base to cover the passage of convoys to Murmansk and disrupt the lines of communication to German forces in Finnmark. Above all, however, the idea was to provide a symbolic "Second Front." The chiefs of staff, particularly General Dill, regarded AJAX as a fundamentally unsound concept—as one author put it, "a militarily unsound risk of scarce ground troops and scarcer naval vessels beyond the range of fighter cover, in appalling terrain and weather, and at the end of a supply line inferior to that of the enemy." The chiefs thus formed a solid front of professional opposition to head off Churchill's idea, and the plan officially collapsed on 12 October 1941 in the face of Admiral Pound's insistence that the Royal Navy must have land-based air cover."

In retrospect, most historians seem to agree with the British service chiefs that AJAX would have been a disaster. It is possible, however, that the operation could have succeeded. In the wake of further British commando raids in December 1941 (see below), Hitler concluded that an invasion of Norway was imminent. As a result, he assigned major reinforcements to Norway that increased the strength of the total garrison from about 100,000 to 250,000 men by mid-1942. By that point, the chances of a successful Allied assault were indeed remote. In winter 1941-42, however, the German land forces in North Norway amounted to only about two divisions; and while there were seven more in the south, it would have been extremely difficult to transfer them north of Trondheim or Bodo. Dietl's forces on the Murmansk front might have provided some reinforcements, but this would have relieved the Soviets. The Finns almost certainly would not have sent troops to fight in Norway. In light of these factors, AJAX might have succeeded, had the British executed the plan with resolution and competence; but given their track record in other cases, one can hardly take those conditions for granted.
Following the demise of AJAX, Churchill gave the go-ahead to further clandestine and commando raids by SOE and the DCO (Directorate of Combined Operations). The SOE developed a variety of imaginative plans for action in North Norway, including STUMPER, KITBAG, THRESHER, WALLAH, and ASCOT; but these ideas still displayed little grasp of the reality of local conditions in Norway. The SOE entertained vague hopes of sparking a general uprising among the population, but they had yet to establish local contacts or caches of weapons, explosives, and equipment. As the DCO finalized plans for a second raid on Lofoten, the SOE resolved "To rally the fishermen within, say, 100 miles [of Reine] ... to commit every form of nuisance and hindrance to the enemy." There is no indication of consideration given to the potential consequences of German reprisals against the population. Simultaneously, several Shetlands boats were to sabotage navigation lights along the Norwegian coast, in hopes of hindering the movement of German forces.101

Code-named ANKLET, the second Lofotens raid took place on 26 December 1941. Seventy-seven Norwegians from Linge's unit participated in the operation, which resulted in the capture of the small German garrison at Reine and a brief occupation of the town. The Royal Navy commander decided upon a hasty withdrawal, however, and left behind a number of quislings as well as disappointed volunteers. The local population thus suffered a wave of denunciations and arrests when the Germans reoccupied the town shortly thereafter, along with the demolition of any property belonging to English sympathizers.102

Meanwhile, a nearly simultaneous raid on the island of Måløy near Bergen, code-named ARCHERY, took place on December 27. Sixteen Norwegians took part in this operation, including Martin Linge himself, who was killed by machine gun fire while helping to rally the commandos against unexpectedly stiff resistance.103

Churchill was furious with the naval commanders of the Lofotens raid (Admirals Hamilton and Tovey) for their apparently premature decision to withdraw from Reine. Among those disgusted by the outcome were two British officers who had filmed the raid for propaganda, and they threw the film overboard to avoid it being used to glorify what had been in their eyes "a real dud show."104 Norwegian naval Lieutenant
Tamber, who had also accompanied the Lofoten raid following his role in the Svalbard operation, wrote shortly afterward to the Norwegian naval staff. "It is highly important that such stupid mistakes never be repeated in the future. The [Norwegian] government and a responsible military committee must establish a definite policy for raids on Norway... Landings in Norway must not involve the civilian population unless the forces are to remain there."105

The twin raids caused considerable damage to Norwegian morale, both on the "Home Front" and in the forces-in-exile. Many civilians at Reine had assumed that the landing was the beginning of a permanent reconquest of the region and thus showed their true colors prematurely. The British in fact had hoped to remain there for a considerable period, but the entire plan was vague in this regard. David Howarth suggested that had they established a permanent base at Reine, it would have been almost impossible for the Germans to reoccupy the islands due to their extraordinarily isolated geography. Given the fate of other towns such as Andalsnes and Namsos in 1940, however, it seems clear that the Luftwaffe would have bombed Reine to cinders within a few days. In any case, the episode resulted in a great deal of suffering among the local population and a feeling of betrayal by the British.106

The raids meanwhile also caused a crisis among the members of Company Linge, who experienced their leader's death as a serious blow. It became clear in the aftermath that they had been participating in operations that were unapproved by their own government and perhaps directly contrary to Norwegian interests. The SOE apparently also concluded that it was a waste to risk highly-trained Norwegian operatives in commando-style frontal assaults. For the time being, the Linge Company continued training in Scotland; but it remained to be seen what role if any it would play in the future.

Nevertheless, the raids made at least one important contribution to Allied victory. Unaware that the British in fact had abandoned AJAX, after the Reine and Måløy raids Hitler became more certain than ever that a British invasion of Norway was imminent. In conference with his senior officers on 22 January 1942, he declared that "Norway is the zone of destiny in this war."107 Accordingly, Norway assumed a high priority
in the allocation of German resources and received major reinforcements. By June 1944 the garrison amounted to more than 370,000 men, including an armored division. The German defenses in North Norway eventually rivalled those on the Channel coast: and hundreds of massive concrete fortifications still dot the region. Although these forces assured Hitler's firm grip on Norway, in retrospect they clearly could have played a more effective role in other theaters.108

THE NYGAARDSVOLD GOVERNMENT IN CRISIS

In addition to the problem of gaining a voice in British plans and operations concerning Norway, the government-in-exile faced a serious challenge to its authority from the "Home Front." The declaration of Terboven's "New Order" in September 1940 had helped to boost the London government's stock in public opinion, which until then had regarded the cabinet with almost universal contempt.109 Nevertheless, popular sentiments remained divided; and the dissention was more complicated than a simple polarization between quislings and patriots.

Many people seemed to hate the London government almost as much as the Germans, an impression that greatly alarmed the cabinet. In spring 1941, for example, a Norwegian representative in Stockholm wrote to Trygve Lie describing "a kind of Fatherland's League mentality" (in reference to the right-wing Fædrelandslaget movement ca. 1930) among much of the resistance: "... people who work energetically for the country's liberation, but who [also] show a strong desire to do away with [fæ et kraftig oppgjør] the old political parties afterward." As Lie put it shortly thereafter, the resistance thus seemed to represent a rebellion "both against the Nazis and against us, who sat in the government on April 9."110

The first real contact between MILORG and the Norwegian leadership in London in June 1941 indicated trouble ahead, when the government received a letter from resistance leaders addressed to King Haakon—a calculated gesture of contempt for the cabinet. "Weapons are not desired for the time being," the letter indicated, and sabotage efforts were "discouraged in the strongest terms" due to fear of German
reprisals. More encouraging contacts developed in October 1941, however, when two MILORG leaders (Colonel Johan Holst and Captain Jakob Schive) came to London in person and reported the underground army's membership as 20-25,000. Although they emphasized the general unpopularity of the Nygaardsvold cabinet among the population in Norway, the meetings did lead to official acknowledgement of MILORG by the government, an essential prerequisite for further co-operation.\[111\]

The government received a further challenge to its authority from the council of civilian resistance leaders known as the Circle, which formed in June 1941.\[112\] Paul Hartmann arrived in London as the group's emissary in September 1941 and presented the cabinet with various demands, among them that Ljungberg resign immediately as Defense Minister and that the entire cabinet resign immediately when the war was over. The government thus came to regard the Circle as a threat to its sovereignty, and as Olav Riste put it, "The road to co-operation and mutual trust thus would be both long and difficult."\[115\] However, the London government proved willing to grant many concessions, as long as these did not imply any formal surrender of constitutional legitimacy. For the time being, Nygaardsvold refused to offer any promises regarding resignation before the first postwar election. Hartmann joined the cabinet as an unofficial spokesman for the "Home Front," however; and it soon became clear that Ljungberg's days as Defense Minister were numbered.\[114\]

Ljungberg's position in the cabinet had always been weak, and as Defense Minister he inevitably bore a large share of blame for the defeat in 1940. Although the British seem to have regarded him as one of the more reliable members of the cabinet, he found himself increasingly embarrassed among his colleagues by his lack of knowledge of the Norwegian forces' activities under British control. He also seemed to lack any positive ideas for developing contacts and cooperation with the resistance, a central item on the government's agenda. As Trygve Lie told the British ambassador Collier in August 1941, the Defense Minister seemed to be "so preoccupied with examining his own conscience" for the failure to mobilize before April 9, that he was of little further use to the government.\[115\]
Nygaardsvold finally disposed of Ljungberg on 3 November 1941 by sending him on an essentially superfluous procurement mission to the United States. The Circle proposed Lieutenant-Colonel Roscher-Nielsen (who had recently escaped from Norway) as his replacement, but King Haakon vetoed this idea on the grounds that Roscher-Nielsen had given parole to the Germans. Fleischer was also a candidate, but the majority of the cabinet clearly had little regard for him by this point.

Labor party chairman Oscar Torp became the new Defense Minister, having filled the office on a temporary basis earlier that fall while Ljungberg was on vacation. As we shall see in the following chapter, Torp brought with him an agenda for a thorough reorganization of the department, which resulted in the creation of the FO (Forsvarets Overkommando, or unified armed forces high command) in February 1942.

Furthermore, there is good reason to regard Torp's takeover of the Defense Ministry as representing a basic, long-term re-orientation of the Labor Party's attitude toward defense issue. Until that point, the party essentially had treated the armed forces as an alien entity that was at best irrelevant, and at worst dangerous. Henceforth, however, defense policy became an integral and important, if still ultimately subordinate, element in the party's long-term program. The eventual result was a new spirit of co-operation, trust, and respect between Labor politicians and the professional military. All this would take time to develop, however; and as 1941 drew to a close, both the government and military authorities in London remained in a highly precarious position.

In retrospect, a considerable amount of difficulty between the British and the Norwegian authorities in London probably was inevitable, given the legacy of mutual mistrust following the fiasco in 1940. In any case, there were bound to be conflicts between the strategic necessities of Britain's global war effort and Norway's special interests. Even before the shake-up of the Norwegian defense department under Torp in 1942, the British showed some willingness to consult with the individuals whom they considered the more trustworthy members of the government, notably Trygve Lie; but closer consultation and regard for Norwegian interests demanded above all that the Norwegian government
unify and clarify its policy--in short, that it put its own house in order. Torp's takeover of the Defense Ministry proved to be the first step in that process, which laid the foundation for increasingly close and effective Allied co-operation.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

1. In summer 1940, the Norwegian government almost decided to evacuate from Britain to Canada; and for several months a ship remained standing by in case the Germans invaded. Olav Riste, London-regjeringa: Norge i krigs-alliansen, 1940-1945, vol. I (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1973), 18.

2. One Norwegian officer, who later rose to high rank, allegedly was so disgusted with the cabinet’s actions that he seriously contemplated assassinating Nygaardsvold at sea during the evacuation. Interview with a source who spoke on condition of anonymity, 21 April 1994.


5. In the course of the invasion, the Germans had sunk or captured forty-three vessels totalling 149,000 tons; but the vast majority of vessels escaped or were already abroad. Shortly after declaring his notional government on April 9, Quisling broadcast an order for all Norwegian ships to return to their home ports and place themselves at the disposal of the Germans. Not a single ship complied, however; and according to a traditional anecdote, one captain transmitted a personal reply inviting Quisling to "Kyss meg bak" ("Kiss my behind").


9. Derry, *History of Modern Norway*, 389. Looking beyond the goal of
liberation even in 1940-42, Lie also envisioned a permanent system of
post-war security based on close ties with the United States as well as
Britain. Chapter 10 will examine the development of this wartime
"Atlantic Policy" in more detail.

10. Reichskommissar für die besetzten Norwegischen Gebiete.

11. Documents on German Foreign Policy, Series D (1937-1945), IX
despised Quisling, but his patrons Raeder and Rosenberg, together with
Hitler's esteem, forced the occupation authorities to deal with him.
See Hans Fredrik Dahl, "The Question of Quisling: Aspects of the German
Occupation Regime in Norway", in *Neutralität und Totalitäre Aggression:*
Nordeuropa und die Grossmächte im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: Franz
Steiner Verlag, 1991), 195-204.


13. On the general state of uncertainty in Norway up to 25 September
1940, see Magne Skodvin, *Striden om okkupasjonsstyrer i Norge, fram til*
25. september 1940 (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1956). Kjell Fjortoft,
*På feil side: Den andre krigens* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1991), presents a
recent and controversial re-examination of Norwegian efforts to reach an
accommodation with the Germans in summer 1940, emphasizing the lengths
to which even many widely-respected leaders such as Ruge and Bishop
Berggrav were willing to go in dealing with the Germans. Fjortoft has
become a target of widespread criticism among mainstream Norwegian
historians, due partly to his background as a journalist.

14. NA: T-312, reel 985, 9176953. The argument over whether Norway
legally remained at war with Germany is complex, as indicated by
correspondence between Frede Castberg and F.H. Kjelstrup, ca. February
1961: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 198. Both sides took ambiguous
positions during the war. The Norwegian government in London initially
tried to hedge its bets so that it could claim never to have been a
British ally in case Germany won; and the Germans never signed a formal
peace treaty with Quisling's regime, preferring to withhold this reward
as incentive for collaboration.

15. The reported strength of Faye's forces as of June 19 was 100
officers. 165 NCOs, 1,700 men, 2,300 rifles, 135 machine guns, and 8
artillery pieces. *Tägliche Meldungen der Gruppe XXI, NA: T-312, reel*
982, 9173440.

16. In the wake of the government's evacuation and the dismissal of
quisling's would-be cabinet by the Germans, the highest organs of
civilian government remaining in Norway were the county governors
(fylkesmenn), the central Administrative Council (Administrasjons Råd)
in Oslo, and the Supreme Court.

18. Dagbladet, 31 July 1952. Faye's troops were redesignated accordingly as "border-guard police units."


21. The original revelations of this situation came in an earlier article by Hartmann: Dagbladet, 26 July 1952. Ruge himself indicated no dispute with Hartmann's claims: Ruge to FKA, 30 July 1952: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 199. The only major difference between Hartmann's 1952 article and the later series in 1970 was his allegation concerning the "Narvik avtalen" in the latter.


23. FOK to Faye, "Utdannelsen ved Grensevakt-politiavdelingene i Øst- Finnmark i tiden 1/7-1/10 1940," 24 June 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 199. See also NA: T-312, reel 1032, 9230573.


25. Generalstabens forvaltningskontor, "Opplosning av det norske forsvar," 6 September 1940: RA: GS(V), kat. 1256.2/16, box 274; "Rapport over arbeidet ved Demobiliseringskontoret i tiden 8/4 - 30/11 1940": RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 206. The Germans emphasized that the operative word was Auflösung rather than demobilization.

27. "Der Beauftragte des Chefs der Heeresarchive beim
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Norwegen in Oslo, 24.10.1940 - 31.7.1943." NA: T-78, reel 1; T-501, reel 357.

28. Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX:230, 389.


30. See for example a Labor Party pamphlet, "DNA Informasjon" (Oslo: DNA, July 1940), which called for meetings at the county level but essentially said nothing more than "Let's wait and see." An apparently objective German report concluded that many Norwegians regarded the dissolution of the traditional parties as a blessing in disguise, even though they rejected Quisling as an obvious German puppet. Abwehr report, 15 November 1940. NA: T-77, roll 1027, 2499058.

31. Svein Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fane: dei norske front-kjemparane (Oslo: Noregs boklag, 1977), 22-30. The following chapter will discuss the subject of Norwegian volunteers on the Russian Front in more detail.


33. Abwehr report, 17 October 1940. NA: T-77, roll 1027, 2499058. "The Norwegians noticed this," the report concluded, "and were outraged [sehr entrüstet] by it."

in rejecting Nazification, but some of his conclusions involve considerable over-simplification.


36. The resistance movement itself directed sympathizers to lie low for the time being. One leaflet read, "Norwegians! Our time will come, when we will resume the armed struggle. Until then: ice-cold calm and passive resistance." Abwehr report, 15 February 1941. NA: T-77, reel 1027, 2499058.

37. Den norske regjerings virksomhet fra 9 april 1940 til 22 juni 1945. Departementenes meldinger, vol. IV: Forsvarsdepartementet (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1948). 4. Steffens became nominal chief of the military mission to Canada, which in reality amounted to almost nothing since it did not include direct authority of the pilot training program at Toronto (see below). Although his role in the 1940 campaign was relatively uncontroversial, the government apparently regarded him as superfluous in exile and shuffled him among a succession of more-or-less token assignments.


39. FD, "Aide Memoire." 10 July 1940; Ibid., 137-38. For comparison, the total strengths of the various forces-in-exile in Britain as of November 1940 were as follows: 27,700 Polish, 4,720 Czech, 4,240 Dutch, 4,180 Free French, 2,413 Norwegian (plus 200 in Canada), and 945 Belgian. Riste, London-regjeringa. 1:42. Ironically, the first commandant of the camp at Dumfries, Carl Stenersen, was the former head of Quisling's Leidang militia-training program in the 1930s. He subsequently became second-in-command of the Norwegian Brigade in Scotland, until the London government apparently decided he was politically unreliable and assigned him to head the training mission at the U.S. Army Winter Warfare School on Iceland. Interview with Per Madsen, Riksarkivet, 26 January 1995.


42. Gerhardsen, Felleskap i krig og fred. 39-40.


47. The Norwegians did, however, provide another small garrison at British request for South Georgia during 1941-43, in order to prevent German commerce raiders from using the island as a rendezvous. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:23; Fjaerli, Den norske hær i Storbritannia, 207-13; Riste, London-regjeringa, I:33-34. Disguised commerce raiders effectively annihilated the Norwegian whaling fleet in Antarctic waters during this period.

48. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:13, 21. The successor to this arrangement was the Finance Treaty of 1944. (See chapter 9.)


50. Many Norwegian naval officers apparently were prepared to resign their commissions and join the Royal Navy if their government formally withdrew the war. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 11, 22-23, 33. Christensen argues that the Norwegian naval officers who went to Britain in 1940 deserve much greater credit
for organizing the war in exile than they ever received, because of subsequent distortions by the Labor Party.


52. Christensen, *De som heiste flagget*, 62-71.

53. *Den norske regjeringens virksomhet*, IV:4-5, 12, 25; FD, "Aide Memoire", 10 July 1940. Ibid., 137-38; Christensen, *De som heiste flagget*, 23. The original two MTBs were small, sixty-foot craft with a top speed of forty knots; but the the Norwegian flotilla that eventually formed in 1942 ended up receiving larger boats of the Fairmile type.


55. Ibid., 29; Christensen, *De som heiste flagget*, 55-61. This incident adds to the impression that going behind the back of one’s commanding officer was more common and acceptable in the Norwegian forces than, for example, in the U.S. Navy. Although the details were perhaps not so dramatic, the Saint Albans episode suggests parallels with Herman Wouk’s novel *The Caine Mutiny*.

56. Gulliksen obtained a short-lived agreement for pilot training in France, which became irrelevant when France capitulated.


60. Ibid., 38, 137-38.

61. The sequence theoretically amounted to sixty-five weeks, divided among basic flight school (usually obviated by previous flying experience in Norway), Service Flying Training School (Canada), Advanced Flying Unit (Britain), Operational Training Unit (Britain), and final orientation with an operational squadron. Ibid., 39. See also Little Norway in Pictures: R N A F in Canada (Toronto: Saunders, 1943).

63. Ibid., 42; Riiser-Larsen, "Royal Norwegian Air Forces", 7 June 1941: RA: F0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59; Cato Guhnfeldt, Sagan om de norske Northrop-flyene på Island (Oslo: Sem & Stenersen, 1981). Although the Northrops were remarkably fast for seaplanes, they proved unable to catch FW-200s in a stern chase; and their armament of four 50-caliber machine guns lacked the punch to destroy one on a single pass. Their depth-charge payload was also inadequate.

64. Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV:42, 45, 75. After getting some use out of the Hawks and Douglas 8-As as trainers in Canada, the Norwegians ended up selling the planes to Peru in 1941-43, at a roughly break-even price. In keeping with the May 1941 Military Treaty, meanwhile, they paid Britain a one-time fee of £180,000 for each of the two fighter squadrons (331 and 332), plus £520,000 per year, later reduced to £420,000, for maintenance and replacements. Ibid., 12-14.

65. Minutes of meeting between Commodore Corneliussen, Professor Wilhelm Keilhau, and British representatives, 28 October 1940: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 210.


67. For typical examples of Norwegian propaganda directed primarily at the American audience, see Carl J. Hambro, I Saw it Happen in Norway (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1940); Halvdan Koht, Norway: Neutral and Invaded (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1941); and Jacob S. Worm-Müller, Norway Revolts Against the Nazis (London: Lindsay Drummond, 1941). A bibliography of such wartime publications is found in Sigmund Skard, Bøker om Norges kamp: Bibliografiske samlinger (Washington, D.C.: Royal Norwegian Information Service, 1945). Among the Norwegians who toured America for public relations purposes during the war were Theodor Broch (the escaped mayor of Narvik), Halvdan Koht (following his resignation as Foreign Minister), and Crown-Princess Märtha, who gained sanctuary in the U.S. with her children after leaving Sweden through Petsamo.


70. Among the earliest officers to escape to Britain, other than the few who originally accompanied the government, was Lieutenant-Colonel Arne D. Dahl, former commander of the Alta Battalion and the 7th Brigade, who reached the Faeroes in a fishing boat in late 1940. Notable among others who left Norway in fall 1941 were Rittmester Bjørn Christophersen and Lieutenant-Colonel Johann Beichmann, who respectively became chief of the FO staff and chief of HOK in February 1942. ID to IHF, 11 July 1942: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 206.
71. NA: T-312. reel 988. 9180818: FOK to 6.DK. 12 June 1940; RA: FKA. kat. 1256.0/02, box 198. The Germans actually released some professional officers without demanding such a promise, but the policy apparently did apply to at least the majority. On Ruge's efforts in June 1940 to clarify the legal issue of the parole, see "Zu Gefangenschaft - Ehrenwort." Ibid., reel 1032. 9230573.


74. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:7.

75. Following a final transfer of fifty more men to the Norwegian Navy in July 1942, the government eventually did agree in principle to avoid any further drafts at the Army's expense, other than in special, individual cases. As we shall see, however, by that point Fleischer had already left the scene. Ibid., 7. Olav Riste regards the personnel issue as the main root of Fleischer's demise. London-regjeringa, I:41-42, 159.

76. As one British official lamented in early 1942, "If only we could occasionally win a battle we might find the Swedes more ready to be cheeky to Adolf." Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 81. On Swedish calculations of self-interest, see Martin Fritz, "Neutrality and Swedish Economic Interests," in Neutralität und Totalitäre Aggression. 311-34.

77. The definitive study of the traffic between Norway and Sweden during the war is Ragnar U1stein, Svensketrafikken. 3 vols. (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1974-77). For an authoritative account of Norwegian expatriates' activities in Sweden during the war, see Ole Kristian Grimnes, Et Flykningesamfunn vokser fram: Nordmenn i Sverige, 1940-45 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1969). Norwegians and other Allied sympathizers in Sweden turned out a steady stream of anti-Nazi propaganda during the war, much of it published under pseudonyms. See for example: Birger Ohlsson, Norsk Front: Det norska folkets frihetskamp, 1940-1941. trans. Ture Nerman (Stockholm: Federativs, 1941); and Halvard Graatopp, Vidkun Abraham Quisling: Ett varnande exempel (Stockholm: Trots Allt!, 1942).

78. BOAC paid for use of the Norwegian aircraft, and the agreement was formalized on 31 August 1942. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:10. In November 1942, the Norwegian government tried to obtain a greater share of seats on the Stockholm flights by linking the issue to the charter of Norwegian shipping, but the British recognized this as essentially a bluff. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:296.

79. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:11.
80. According to Chr. Christensen, Nygaardsvold also used his position to keep his otherwise-eligible son from being drafted in London, and the young couple spent the rest of the war enjoying themselves in the United States. *De som heiste flagget*, 110, 113.

81. *Den norske regjerings virksomhet*, IV:34; Riste, *London-regjeringen*, I:161. II:65-66; Christensen, *De som heiste flagget*, 110-12. The title "Commanding Admiral" apparently lapsed upon Diesen’s resignation, as had that of "Commanding General" following the evacuation from Tromsø. Although Riste characterizes the episode as a disappointment for Diesen, Christensen argues that the Admiral actually wanted to retire anyway, simply to avoid a difficult job. Many other officers clearly had a low opinion of him and regarded Corneliussen and Danielsen much more highly. As one officer later told Christensen, "We regarded [Diesen] as... badly lacking in initiative, in England as well as in the [1940] campaign. He [resigned] because he wanted to be a retired admiral." Ibid., 112. Nevertheless, Diesen again obtained an important operational command after the war. (See chapter 10.)


83. Cruickshank, *SOE in Scandinavia*, 1-2. In November 1940 the Norwegian Section was expanded to include all of Scandinavia, and a subsequent reorganization in 1941 established separate sub-sections for Denmark and Sweden.

84. Ibid., 55-56. For a biography of Martin Linge, see Espen Haavardsholm, *Martin Linge: Min morfar* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1993). Linge was a former actor and reserve officer who distinguished himself in the 1940 campaign.


86. Abwehr report, 15 March 1941; NA: T-77, reel 1027, 2499058. For further German reports on the raid and subsequent reprisals, see T-312, reel 1032, 9230402. The raid convinced Hitler that the British were sure to attack Norway in force once BARBAROSSA began, and he ordered 160 coastal artillery and anti-aircraft batteries to reinforce Norway. "Ausführungen des Führers auf dem Berghof am 12.3.1941 zur Lage". T-312, reel 993, 9186140: T-77, reel 1432, 436. Falkenhorst argued that the defenses must remain concentrated in a relatively small number of strongpoints, rather than trying to guard every little fishing village. The Kriegsmarine disagreed, however; and the Army/Navy dispute over coastal defense persisted throughout the war.
87. The papers of Commander Frank Stagg, who played a central role in the SOE and Combined Operations planning, indicate no contact with the Norwegian military other than Linge and his men, who at that point had practically no connection with the London government. Stagg Papers, RA: F0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 60.

88. Riste, London-regeringa, 1:109. Nygaardsvold wrote after the war that he had never regretted anything so much as his decision to replace Koht with Lie, because of the way the latter withheld information from the rest of the cabinet regarding his British contacts. Ibid., 121.

89. Ibid., 119.

90. The most authoritative account of travel to and from occupied Norway by the sea route is Ragnar Ullstein, Englandsfarten, 2 vols. (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1965-67). In addition to fishing boats, a few hardy souls managed to cross the North Sea in sailing yachts or other small craft. One example was Oluf Reed Olsen, a pilot who set sail with two comrades in a leaky, eighteen-foot lifeboat in September 1940. After fourteen days at sea, battling ferocious gales, they finally were spotted by the RAF and rescued by a destroyer. Oluf Reed Olsen, Two Eggs on My Plate, trans. F.H. Lyon (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1953), 59-117.


92. Ibid.; Howarth, Across to Norway, 20-75, 152. Howarth’s figures of personnel and material delivered differ slightly from Cruickshank’s; those cited here are the latter. The Shetland crews found it so easy to operate among friends in Norway that they subsequently began ordering and receiving replacement parts in Norway for their engines, which were difficult or impossible to obtain in Britain. Howarth, Across to Norway, 106-7.


94. Riste, London-regeringa, 1:135-37. Further plans for a joint Anglo-Soviet operation in winter 1941-42, code-named MARROW, involved a landing by Soviet and Norwegian troops at Petsamo with British air and naval support; but the scheme collapsed amid Soviet accusations that the British had leaked the plans to the Finns. The Norwegian authorities in London never learned of the idea, and it is doubtful that they would have agreed to violate Finnish territory. Norway severed relations with Finland in December 1941 but, like the United States, never declared war. Ibid., 194-95.


96. Ibid., 30-40.


101. "Operation ANKLET", 20 November 1941; Stagg Papers; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01. box 60. See also, "Extension of ASCOT", 8 November 1941: Ibid.

102. For a report of the punitive expedition, which the SS carried out in co-operation with the German Navy, see NA: T-501, reel 316, 390. The Wehrmacht commandant at Tromsø objected to the extent of the reprisals, on the grounds that few people had actively assisted the raiders.

103. Peter Young, Commando (New York: Ballantine, 1969), 16-37, 56-87; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 388. The Germans were impressed by the British use of armored landing craft and fire-support in the operation. See "Erfahrungen und Schlussfolgerungen aus dem engl. Angriff auf Maaløy." 22 January 1942: NA: T-312. reel 1032. 9230655.


106. Howarth, Across to Norway, 111-12. The subsidiary operation by the Shetlands boats also proved ill-conceived. Bad weather frustrated the plan and caused the disappearance of one boat with all hands--a clear lesson of what often happens when higher headquarters impose arbitrary orders without consulting the specialists who must carry them out. The British seemed to learn from this fiasco and subsequently gave the Shetland unit more leeway in planning its own operations. Ibid., 112-20.


110. Ibid., 125.

111. Ibid., 114-16. 166-67.

112. Among the key figures in this group were Paal Berg and Einar Gerhardsen, who became Prime Minister after the war. See Rolf Kluge, *Hjemmefront-ledelsen tar form – kretsen dannes sommeren 1941* (Oslo: Universitets-forlaget, 1970); Ole Kristian Grimnes, *Hjemmefrontens Ledelse* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1977); and Gerhardsen, *Felleskap i krig og fred*., 50-57.


114. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:17. 82. For Hartmann's view, see Paul Hartmann, *Bakfronten: Fra Oslo og London, 1939-1945* (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1955). He ended up functioning mainly as a financial advisor. On 8 February 1943, Nygaardsvold finally did promise that the cabinet would step down as soon as the liberation was complete (see chapter 8).

115. For example, the Norwegian destroyer Mansfield participated in a small raid on Øksfjord in Finnmark in April 1941, shortly after the first Lofoten raid; and although the SOK was involved in the planning, Ljungberg remained in the dark. Riste, London-regjeringa. I:118. 120. 155-56.

The Norwegian government in London deeply resented the fact that it had been excluded from planning for the commando raids of December 1941. For their part, the British continued to regard the Nygaardsvold cabinet with suspicion. Part of the problem concerned specific personalities. Nygaardsvold remained essentially a cypher in British eyes, incapable of strong leadership because of his unpopularity on the Home Front, yet indispensible for the sake of legitimacy. Koht's replacement by the far-sighted Trygve Lie as Foreign Minister at the end of 1940 helped matters somewhat, as did Mowinckel's belated departure from office. Yet it remained to be seen whether the Norwegians could achieve any real voice in Allied planning and operations concerning Norway.

The reorganization of the Norwegian defense department and military command in London in December 1941 - February 1942 remains a matter of controversy, with various historians presenting markedly different explanations of the true motives behind the changes. The primary, official reason was to improve co-operation with both the Allies and the home front. In fact, however, the shake-up involved personality clashes and professional intrigue as well as practical necessities.

On 2 October 1941, while acting as temporary Defense Minister during Ljungberg's absence, Torp formally asked the three services to
report on the status of plans for the liberation of Norway. The service chiefs all replied that essentially, they had no such plans, because they could proceed only in consultation with the British, who so far had refused to take the Norwegian military leadership into their confidence. As the HOK put it, "The British Army leadership thus far has only rarely sought co-operation with the HOK in questions concerning military operations in Norway, and the HOK has not had the opportunity to take the initiative in this regard." The SOK said simply, "For the Navy's part, no developed plans exist for an invasion of Norway." The FFK explained further that "Although there have been some conferences between British and Norwegian air officers on technical and operational matters, there is as yet no definite, institutionalized co-operation concerning [planning of] operations."1 Thus, as the postwar parliamentary investigation concluded, the situation at the end of 1941 was such that the British presumably were making plans affecting vital Norwegian interests, without the Norwegian authorities having any knowledge of or influence on the planning. Even more serious from the Norwegian perspective was the fact that several hundred Norwegians belonging to the so-called "Linge Company" were directly under British command.2

The December 1941 raids on Reine and Måløy dramatically underscored the problem, since Linge personnel participated in both operations, and the Norwegian government knew nothing of either one. Combined with Martin Linge's death in the latter operation, the situation resulted in a serious crisis of morale among the Norwegian SOE personnel, which Torp believed only a clear assertion of the exiled government's authority would resolve.

In addition to the British lack of confidence in the Norwegian leadership, part of the problem, especially with regard to the SOK and FFK, was that the existing staffs already were so preoccupied with day-to-day operational and administrative matters that they had few resources to spare for longer-term liberation planning. The existing staffs also lacked any formal relationship with MILORG, although that organization clearly was destined to play a central role in almost any
liberation scenario. Intelligence efforts also remained poorly co-ordinated. The Norwegian defense department had established an intelligence office, FD/E, in early 1941; but for the most part it merely forwarded raw reports from Norwegian sources to the British for analysis. A final argument in favor of organizational reform was the need for inter-service co-operation during eventual liberation operations.³

The main British interest in collaboration with the Norwegians involved special operations and the potential underground army represented by MILORG. Therefore, the issue of liberation planning was closely linked to the Norwegian government's relations with the Home Front.⁴ Torp soon came to favor the advice of Rittmester Bjørn Christophersen, who had participated in the early development of MILORG before escaping to Britain in October 1941 and also was closely acquainted with the Circle.⁵ Christophersen argued that the situation demanded a unified military staff.

The day can come at any time when the English may raise the question of invading Norway. It will then be necessary for the government immediately to appoint a single, responsible military advisor and negotiator. The man himself could be named today, but he will never be able to represent Norway satisfactorily in the questions of vital interest to our people that will arise, unless he has the support of an organ (a staff) that has thought through and prepared for Norwegian collaboration during the invasion beforehand. Such preparation requires time. We must form a unified armed forces staff as soon as possible.⁶

An additional reason for the overall decision to create the FO probably was the fact that most of the cabinet members, including Torp as Defense Minister, remained essentially ignorant of military affairs and wanted to avoid involvement in complicated inter-service questions by dealing with a single body representing all three services. The organization of the FO staff was as follows: I. Administration. II. Intelligence. III. Planning (operations & organization). IV. Issues concerning home front. V. Information service. (i.e., propaganda) VI. Communications (est. August 1942).⁷
The Navy had enjoyed de facto status as the senior service in exile up to this point and saw little benefit in subordination to a staff in which Army officers probably would predominate. The SOK therefore opposed Christophersen's plan. Nevertheless, by mid-January 1942, Torp had made up his mind to go ahead with the proposal, the British raids in December apparently being the final straw.

The main question then was, who would head the new staff? Many people, particularly in the Army, assumed that it would inevitably be Fleischer; but Torp already had rejected this possibility. On Christophersen's advice, he first offered the job to Lieutenant-Colonel Beichmann, another recent arrival from Norway. Beichmann declined, however, citing the fact that he had given parole and still had family members in Norway, and also that he did not want to bear responsibility for Allied decisions in which he might actually have no say.8

An additional factor in Beichmann's refusal probably was his loyalty to Fleischer, whom he considered the only rightful candidate for the job. Torp's second choice, however, after consulting with the King and the cabinet, was Major Wilhelm Hansteen, who had been military attaché to Finland until the severance of relations in December 1941. Although he was a General Staff officer, Hansteen's lack of seniority and experience (he had never commanded more than a company) made him a "dark horse": and few observers could have been more surprised than the major himself.9 On 3 February 1942, Torp gave him two days to decide. Several other officers approached Hansteen and pressured him to refuse the job, in order to present a solid front on Fleischer's behalf; but Hansteen decided to accept anyway. As a result, he received a temporary promotion to major-general, and Christophersen became FØ chief of staff with a promotion to colonel.10 Torp's official explanation of Hansteen's selection was as follows:

In the defense department's opinion it was important to appoint a man ... who could take up the task with fresh resources, unhampered by earlier, unsuccessful attempts to establish co-operation with the British, and unburdened by the many difficulties raised by the buildup of our forces. Furthermore, it was clear that the situation would demand great flexibility on the part of the Forsvarssjef ... Of the
officers available for the job in exile as of January 1942. The defense department considered Wilhelm Hansteen to be the man who to the greatest extent fulfilled the qualifications demanded by the position as Forsvarssjef.11

Many other sources, however, agree that whatever factors may have necessitated reorganization of the Norwegian military command in London, the government treated Fleischer unfairly. Foremost among such critics was C.J. Hambro, who took up the issue after the war as part of his general attack on the Labor Party, albeit with little result. Hambro charged that "the entire reorganization had purely personal motives," citing Torp's appointment and promotion of Christophersen, who became chief of the new defense staff, as a clear case of favoritism.12

Fleischer officially resigned as chief of HOK on 23 February 1942.13 As a superficial consolation, the government subsequently appointed him military attaché to Ottawa, with the additional face-saving title, "Chief of the Norwegian Forces in Canada." In fact, however, this was a humiliating banishment to limbo, given the fact that there essentially were no such forces, and the fact that his position had no real connection with the pilot training at Toronto. Fleischer apparently held out some hope returning to power in London until December 1942, when he committed suicide after receiving another appointment as attaché to Washington.14

Although this was indeed a tragic fate for the general who had commanded Norway's only major counteroffensive in 1940, his removal from London probably was necessary. The task that lay ahead had more to do with tact than with tactics. Despite his widely-acknowledged professional merits, Fleischer seemed to represent the stuffy, traditional character of the "old" Norwegian Army; and he clearly had little interest in special operations.15

Although the reorganization proved its worth in the long-run, the FO scheme at first had little support among Norwegian officers; and initially at least, the British no real advantage in the idea either. According to Christensen, the fundamental reason for Torp's interest in gaining control of the military apparatus in London was to assure that it did not combine forces with the home front politically. In this
sense, Torp's intervention effectively severed communications between the anti-cabinet opposition in London (such as Danielsen) and Norway. Had Torp's shake-up not occurred, it is conceivable that the Labor Party might have returned to Norway in a much weaker position than it ultimately did.\textsuperscript{16}

Torp probably would have liked to make Christophersen himself Forsværssjefer, but the latter apparently argued that too many other officers would resent this bitterly. Hansteen's main qualification for the job was simply that as military attache to Finland since 1937, he was practically the only Norwegian officer unconnected with the campaign in Norway. The cabinet may also have regarded it as desirable that Hansteen had no prior, special contacts with the British.\textsuperscript{17} According to Chr. Christensen, a Liberal critic of the Labor government, Hansteen also had political significance as a conservative; and the cabinet may also have viewed his appointment as an investment for the postwar political struggle.\textsuperscript{18}

Following the official creation of the FO in February 1942, it remained to work out practical working relationships between the new body and the SOK and FFK, which already had extensive contacts of their own with the respective British services. By July 1942, Hansteen and his staff concluded that the best solution was essentially to leave things as they were, but with the stipulation that the SOK and FFK must keep the FO informed of their contacts with the British in all cases.\textsuperscript{19} The creation of the FO left some ambiguity in the relationship of the new staff to the existing HOK, SOK, and FFK. In fall 1943, however, the government drafted a new set of directives that clarified the formal responsibilities of the four respective chiefs.\textsuperscript{20}

Intelligence collaboration also remained a sensitive issue, with a potential for rivalry between the newly-established FO intelligence section (FO.II) and the pre-existing FD/E (defense department intelligence section), which already had a fairly good working relationship with its British counterparts.\textsuperscript{21} As with the SOK and FFK, Hansteen's new organization essentially left the FD/E to carry on its business, and the two intelligence organizations eventually developed a fairly rational and effective division of labor.\textsuperscript{22} The FOII at first
concerned itself mainly with analyzing reports of domestic conditions in Norway, particularly compiling lists of collaborators for use in the liberation phase. Eventually, the FOII absorbed the FD/E-kontoret as of 1 July 1944.23

"FRONTKJEMPERNE": NORWEGIAN VOLUNTEERS ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT

While the Norwegian authorities in London struggled to formulate a coherent policy for the war in exile and to achieve greater influence in Allied planning, the struggle against Nazification on the "Home Front" hung in the balance. The German attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 had dramatically altered the situation in Norway. On the one hand, it opened the way for active resistance by Norwegian communist cells, which until then had remained passive in keeping with Moscow's pro-German policy. Soviet involvement in the war also encouraged hopes that the war might yet end in Germany's defeat. On the other hand, however, the attack on the USSR created new opportunities for German and quisling propaganda in Norway to exploit anti-communist sentiments. As one member of the resistance later lamented,

From the very beginning of the war the Germans had carried on an intense, fiery anti-Russian propaganda here, as in other countries. This propaganda had its effect and undoubtedly made a deep impression all over the country. I will not say that it directly injured us; but it did seriously hamper the common effort which was to be expected in a country like Norway. . . . And there were many who stood aside, because of hate or fear of Russia, when even the smallest contribution was asked of them, because they felt the Allied cause was too much affected by Communism.24

Moreover, the war in the East revived Quisling's hopes of recruiting large numbers of Norwegian volunteers for service under German command, thus to gain not only autonomy for his would-be regime, but also a share of the spoils from Russia's defeat.25 Although early recruiting had produced approximately one thousand Norwegian volunteers for the SS prior to June 1941, these men were for the most part already dedicated Nazis who did not represent the mainstream of Norwegian
society. The attack on Russia prompted a significant increase in volunteers, however, many of whom by no means regarded themselves as Nazis or German sympathizers. A considerable number of former Norwegian officers, many of them previously unassociated with Quisling, endorsed the recruiting effort in an open letter, encouraging the notion that volunteering would be a patriotic act.

A total of approximately 7,000 Norwegian volunteers served in various units under German command on the Eastern Front; 709 of them were killed in action, while another approximately 200 died in Soviet captivity. Although many of the volunteers undoubtedly were opportunists or dedicated Nazis, many others, especially in the case of the Norske Legion (a battalion-sized unit formed in July 1941), clearly believed they were acting as loyal patriots in Norway's best interest. One of the foremost Norwegian authorities on the postwar collaboration trials, concluded that that "among the east front volunteers . . . were a substantial proportion who acted from unselfish motives." The most typical reasons they cited were anti-bolshevism, solidarity with Finland, and hope that by volunteering they would hasten a voluntary German restoration of Norway's independence.

In 1941, Quisling originally promised the Germans 30,000 men in the Norske Legion, which he envisioned as the kernel of a new national military. Toward this end, he and his associates organized an extensive, top-heavy administrative structure in Norway, with district staffs similar to the prewar system. When recruiting for the Legion petered out short of two thousand volunteers by the end of 1941, however, the Germans dissolved Quisling's cherished military bureaucracy and took over the recruiting process themselves. By that time, fewer and fewer people could mistake service under German command for the road to restored independence.

Arthur Qvist, who commanded the Legion on the Leningrad front, later described the whole affair as "an unfortunate misunderstanding." As ludicrous as this may sound, he actually had a legitimate point, at least with regard to approximately one-third of his men who were not NSU-members and who were probably more in the vein of misguided patriots rather than Nazis by conviction. According to Qvist, "The Legion was
formed on 1 July 1941 as an apolitical and purely Norwegian unit. The intent ... was to lay the foundation of a new Norwegian Army that would contribute to the liberation of the country."  

The unit originally received Norwegian Army uniforms and always flew the Norwegian flag. Most of the men enlisted with the understanding that they would fight in Finland, seeing no difference between themselves and the volunteers in the Winter War. When they ended up on the Leningrad front directly under German command, Qvist described his men's relations with their Allies in idealized terms.

Life here at the front joins the Germanic brother-folk with strong bonds. All do their best to help one another, and comradeship is firm and unshakeable. Not only have the legionaries received fully equal treatment from all levels of command, but they have also won a degree of trust and respect, of which every Norwegian in the Legion is proud.

Not all of Qvist's men agreed, however. As one Norwegian volunteer wrote in November 1941.

The Germans have the flaw of contempt for anything that is not German. If the Germans win, the Norwegian people will survive—we volunteers are the guarantee of that. That is why we volunteered. All the talk about Greater Germanic unity that we now have to grit our teeth and listen to is an evangelism of stupidity and ignorance.

Although the Legion volunteers enlisted for only six months' service, the Germans refused to release them until mid-1943, by which time the unit had suffered 180 men killed. Despite the preceding disillusionments, about three hundred of the legionaries re-enlisted for further service; and this was probably where the most of the merely misguided individuals parted ways with the true Nazis.

The total number of Norwegian volunteers would have been enough to form a brigade or small division, but in fact they ended up serving mostly in mixed SS units. Predictably, these suffered considerably higher attrition than did the Norske Legion, which enjoyed some degree of political protection despite the weakness of Quisling's influence.
In the Waffen SS. Norwegians generally found themselves in mixed units with other nationalities rather than making up separate Norwegian formations. German propaganda usually claimed that Norwegian units were fighting in Finland, but in fact almost none did so. The Viking Division, for example, which included most of the early Norwegian SS-volunteers, was part of Army Group South. Part of the reason that few of the volunteers ended up in Finland as the expected was that the Finns did not want them, for fear of worsening relations with London.36

In 1943 the re-enlistees from the Norske Legion were combined with about seven hundred further volunteers obtained from a new recruiting drive by Quisling, as well as a mixed bag of other nationalities including Danes and ethnic Germans from Hungary and Rumania, to form the SS Panzergrenadier Regiment Norge. As part of the SS Panzergrenadier Division Nordland, the unit fought to the bitter end, annihilated almost to the last man in the final battles around Berlin.37 The SS also formed a Norwegian ski battalion, SS-SkjiegertalJon Norge, that fought under German command in northern Finland. In June 1944, the unit found itself cut off by a Russian attack at Kaprolat; and in the process of breaking out, the Norwegians lost 141 killed or missing out of three hundred. As Blindheim concluded, "It was the hardest blow that any Norwegian unit took during the war."38

TURNING POINT ON THE "HOME FRONT"

While Quisling's volunteers fought in Russia, the year 1942 proved to be the turning point in the civilian resistance to Nazification. The Lofoten and Måløy raids in December 1941 indirectly hindered Quisling's efforts to obtain more real authority; convinced an Allied invasion was imminent, Hitler was not about to loosen direct control over the country.39 Nevertheless, Quisling's contacts and patrons in the Kriegsmarine and Nazi party foreign branch obtained his appointment as "Minister-President" in early 1942, and NS membership climbed toward its peak as Russia appeared on the brink of collapse. In fact, however, Quisling's real power remained almost nil; and he never achieved the legitimacy he sought in the eyes of the population.40 Although

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encouraged by frequent promises, he never obtained a peace treaty with Germany that would have implied recognition of his government; nor did the Norwegian fascists gain what some had hoped would be a large share of the spoils of a defeated Russia.\textsuperscript{41}

Overall, the occupation regime failed in its efforts to incorporate Norway into the "New Order" of Europe. Although the Germans did manage to exploit the Norwegian economy to a large extent, the results fell far short of Nazi needs and expectations. Had the occupation lasted longer, Norwegians eventually would have had no choice but to accept their assigned place in Hitler's long-term plans, which would have entailed gross reductions in the standard of living. As it happened, however, Nazi economic plans as well as ideology found a hostile reception rather than Aryan solidarity.\textsuperscript{42}

The civilian resistance to Nazification rested on a fundamental unity of values in Norwegian society. As a result, Terboven's and Quisling's attempts to incorporate Norway into the "New Order" made little headway. Instead, German occupation troops confronted an "ice front" of passive resistance and thinly-veiled contempt.\textsuperscript{43} After some wavering in 1940, chief justice Paal Berg and the bishop Berggrav of the state church became central figures in the civil resistance. The formation of the Circle in 1941 led to increasingly close integration of a multitude of passive resistance efforts, for example among trade and professional organizations, hobby associations, and sports leagues. Illegal newspapers flourished as well, making a mockery of German censorship; and the German confiscation of radios in 1942 did little to hinder the distribution of Allied propaganda.\textsuperscript{44}

The Germans and their quisling auxiliaries ultimately failed in their efforts to impose national socialist ideology on Norway, but anti-Nazi sentiment among Norwegians was not nearly so unanimous as many later accounts suggest. On Hitler's orders, Terboven oversaw Quisling's installation as "Minister-President" of a puppet regime in 1942, a move designed to win increased co-operation from the population by lending the occupation a mask of legitimacy. The German SD (Sicherheitsdienst, or Security Police) monitored Norwegian public opinion with considerable attention, and in 1942-43 the Nazification campaign seemed to be making
some progress. Quisling's cause received a significant boost from the German attack on the Soviet Union, which tended to mitigate the occupation in the minds of some Norwegians who viewed Bolshevism as the greatest evil. Membership in the Nasjonal Samling party eventually reached a peak of 43,000; and while the great majority of these members were anything but dedicated Nazis, they did represent close to 5 percent of the total electorate.\textsuperscript{45}

On the other hand, the addition of the USSR to the Allied coalition brought new recruits to the other side as well: hard-core Norwegian communists who up to that point had followed Moscow's orders to co-operate with the Nazi regime. While few in number, some of these people came to play important roles in the resistance. However, they generally refused to integrate their efforts fully with those of the British-oriented organizations. Communist partisans tended to favor direct acts of sabotage and assassination, regardless of the consequences, which often meant brutal reprisals against the population. This fact undoubtedly had some impact in deepening the already existing rift between these radicals and the more moderate Labor majority.\textsuperscript{46}

The NS attempted to co-opt various organizations by installing collaborators in top positions and imposing Nazi policies and ideology from the top-down, with the ultimate goal of establishing a corporatist socio-economic system on the Italian fascist model.\textsuperscript{47} One Norwegian institution over which the Nazis did gain considerable control was the State Police, which became an important adjunct to the Gestapo under Quisling's confederate, Sverre Riisnæs. Although many Norwegian police remained loyal patriots and covertly aided the resistance, the Nazis ruthlessly weeded out suspects and deported 271 of them to camps in Germany by 1943.\textsuperscript{48}

In practically every other instance of attempted Nazification, however, the Norwegian population presented a solid front of opposition, despite the threat of deportation or confinement in one of the concentration camps in Norway, of which Grini was the most infamous.\textsuperscript{49} The national church provided an early inspiration by publishing a general protest against the occupation policies signed by the leading bishops, most of whom soon found themselves imprisoned but nevertheless
refused to recant. Labor unions proved similarly resistant to Nazification, setting up their own shadow organizations when quislings took over the nominal leadership positions. Probably the most decisive arena of civilian resistance, however, was in the schools, where the Nazis hoped to win control of Norway's future generations. Confronted with orders to begin teaching Nazi doctrines, the vast majority of Norwegian teachers steadfastly refused to comply. Quisling attempted to break the opposition by sending about seven hundred of the recalcitrants to perform forced labor in a prison camp at Kirkenes, where they endured appalling mistreatment; but even then, few gave in. The regime eventually saw no choice but to abandon the policy and release the prisoners, a humiliating defeat for Quisling and his flunkies.  

Ironically, as of early 1942, the great majority of former Norwegian officers remained at liberty on the Home Front, according to the terms of their parole in 1940. The London government sharpened its calls for officers to leave Norway and join the forces-in-exile. Although the response remained limited, the occupation authorities noted the increasing exodus; and the Department of the Interior (under German and quisling administration) issued an order on 9 May 1942 requiring all former officers under age 60 to register with the authorities by June 10, and declared those who had left to be no longer Norwegian citizens.  

The mass arrest did not take place, however, until 15 August 1943. As of September 1943, there were 1,089 Norwegian officers imprisoned in Germany. The fact that only six of these prisoners died in captivity indicates the relatively decent treatment they received. Many of the officers claimed after the war that they had had no warning of the roundup, and thus had no chance to go into hiding; while others apparently believed that the Germans would hold them only briefly. The Army officers' association concluded, however, that "officers with the will and courage to stay abreast of events could hardly have failed to learn of the impending arrest." In any event, the termination of the officers' parole helped to dispel the lingering ambiguity of Norway's status in the eyes of the population.
The Quisling regime subsequently tried various schemes to harness Norwegian manpower for the war in the East. By 1943, however, the turning tide of battle in the East and in North Africa was apparent; and the resistance had crystallized. When the occupation authorities finally launched a conscription effort in 1944, it quickly ended in a humiliating disaster for the Nazis, as the following chapter will explain.

Allied propaganda meanwhile continued to reach Norway despite the Germans' confiscation of household radio sets in 1942. Countless illegal receivers remained in operation, and resistance members transcribed radio news from London into underground newspapers and leaflets that circulated from hand to hand. Propaganda became an area of particular contention between Norwegian and British agencies. The SOE initially made its own plans for distributing material in occupied Norway, and 15 members of Company Linge received special training in propaganda. The Norwegian government in exile, however, strongly asserted its claim to exclusive authority. As an SOE report put it,

The Norwegian government regards all information propaganda and political warfare activities in Norway as being entirely its concern, as representative of the Norwegian people and servant of the Home Front. The government has always been and continues to be extremely jealous of what it considers to be 'interference from outside' in Norwegian domestic matters.  

One particular operation which angered the Norwegians greatly was the SOE's "Research Unit," a radio station in England broadcasting to the Norwegian public under the pretense of being an underground station inside Norway itself. The Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie confronted the British over this issue in autumn 1941 and exacted a sort of confession. The Norwegians subsequently gained partial control over the broadcasts, until the SOE abandoned the project the following year. Another confrontation followed in September 1942, when the Norwegians learned of an impending BBC broadcast that would have issued a general appeal for the population in Norway to undertake acts of sabotage on their own initiative, a hazardous proposition that threatened to
escalate the level of violence and civilian casualties on the Home Front. The Nygaardsvold government protested sharply and compelled the British to cancel the broadcast. After that, the situation settled into a compromise under which the Norwegian Information Office held effective veto power over the content of such programs. The Soviets, however, broadcast such appeals almost constantly; and on at least one occasion Nygaardsvold made a radio speech directly countermanding such instructions from Moscow.58

The FO meanwhile obtained at least partial control over SOE planning for propaganda activities inside Norway. In practice, however, MILORG vetoed most of the planned propaganda operations on the Home Front and argued that they would be of limited value at best, perhaps even counter-productive. Thus, at the insistence of the Nygaardsvold government and the Home Front leadership, the SOE generally refrained from efforts to influence directly the content of propaganda directed at the Norwegian population; and apart from its reliance on the London broadcasts as the main source of news, the illegal press remained largely a grass-roots affair. SOE agents did, however, make considerable efforts to demoralize German occupation troops in Norway, sometimes using "black" propaganda purporting to represent anti-Nazi organizations in Germany itself. Two such operations were DERBY in Trondheim and DURHAM in Oslo, the latter being another effort by the resourceful and many-faceted Max Manus. It is impossible to gauge the overall value of propaganda with precision, but there is probably a great deal of truth in the assessment of one resistance leader, who "believed that the only propaganda the Germans understood were bullets and high explosives."59

CONTINUING OPPOSITION TO THE NYGAARDSVOLD GOVERNMENT

Although the government-in-exile's relations with the Allies were improving, partly as a result of the reorganization of the defense department and military staff, the Nygaardsvold cabinet still faced serious political opposition from other Norwegians, both in London and on the Home Front. Naval officers were among the cabinet's chief
critics in exile, a fact that became apparent in the "Lieutenants' Letter" of 27 April 1942. In this episode, twenty-eight naval lieutenants endorsed a circular letter that indicted the government not only for its prewar policy, but also for its conduct of the war in exile, particularly Torp's appointment as Defense Minister. All of the officers were graduates of the Sjøkrigsskolen and thus represented a kind of professional elite, despite their junior rank.60

The lieutenants began their letter with a preamble that emphasized they would continue to perform their duty faithfully, and noting that normally it would have been the role of the Storting and the free press to voice criticism of the government. Given the extraordinary circumstances of the war in exile, however, the lieutenants felt themselves compelled to speak. "The government does not have our confidence," they wrote. "for the following reasons . . ." First they cited the cabinet's failure to strengthen the armed forces in 1935-40, and its failure to respond effectively to the German invasion. Then the lieutenants addressed the more immediate issues in exile, citing " . . . The government's failure abroad to insure that the resources available to Free Norway are utilized in a manner to maximize Norway's contribution to winning the war." Torp, they charged, had been an opponent of defense for so long before the war that his appointment as Defense Minister now was an outrage. Given the importance of the merchant marine in the war effort, that industry ought to have at least one representative in the cabinet; but it had none. As the most actively engaged service, meanwhile, the Navy ought to have priority on manpower; but instead, experienced seamen had been drafted into the Army in Scotland. "The government," the lieutenants concluded.

. . . has demonstrated that it does not understand the importance of the sea and the naval war that is in progress. . . . We are convinced that a government consisting mainly of men who were not in the cabinet on 9 April 1940, will have a better chance of meeting the present challenges. . . . because they will have the confidence of the people, which the present government in our opinion does not."
According to at least one account, upon receiving the letter, Nygaardsvold and Torp wrote to Admiral Corneliussen demanding that he place the twenty-eight lieutenants under arrest and prosecute them for insubordination. As the story goes, the admiral responded by tearing the ministers' letter to pieces. In any case, punishing the lieutenants directly was impractical, regardless of the legal aspect of the matter, since many of them held key positions under British command. Instead, Nygaardsvold turned to King Haakon for support. Although Haakon probably sympathized with the lieutenants to a great extent, he wrote back to them and told them plainly to keep their views to themselves and look to their duty, which effectively closed the episode.62

Christian Christensen alleged that the government punished many professional naval officers indirectly for the dissention in London by withholding promotions and decorations, while distributing these in abundance to "blue officers," who were civilian specialists commissioned on a purely temporary basis. The twenty-eight lieutenants who probably signed the letter suffered little in this regard, however, at least in the long run. Five were killed in action in 1943, but of the remaining twenty-three, no less than eighteen became commodores or admirals (or the equivalent ranks in the air force).63

The Navy also played a part in another political controversy concerning J.L. Mowinckel, who technically remained a member of the cabinet in Stockholm, 1940-42. (His title was "konsultativ statsråd" from April 1940.) Most people regarded him in same light as Koht and Ljungberg, not only for his general antimilitary prewar policy but also for his role in promoting negotiations with the Germans in summer 1940. Nygaardsvold began planning to shunt Mowinckel into an administrative job in the NORTRASHIP agency in New York as early as summer 1941, but the Prime Minister repeatedly put off the action, probably for fear of alienating other figures in Stockholm. In spring 1942, however, air forces chief Vice-Admiral Riiser-Larsen and thirteen other prominent Norwegians in London wrote to the cabinet demanding Mowinckel's resignation. After arriving in London, Mowinckel resigned on May 23.64

Although the "Lieutenants' Letter" was a relatively minor affair and the agreement to oust Mowinckel was nearly unanimous, a more serious
challenge to the government followed later that year, again from naval circles. An inflammatory letter dated 25 November 1942 circulated as a petition in the armed forces and the merchant fleet. It eventually gained 1,059 signatures, including Admiral Danielsen's, and thus became known as the "Danielsen Letter." The letter's central point was to demand the appointment of a special advisory body to balance the supposedly excessive power the cabinet had assumed in London, and to promote policy debate with input from circles other than just the Labor party--functions normally performed by Storting. The FO responded sharply on the government's behalf by issuing a general order prohibiting any organized political activity in the armed forces. The Seamen's Association helped to dismiss the issue in the merchant fleet, and the cabinet decisively rejected the proposal in May 1943, on the grounds that it was both impractical and unconstitutional.65

Although the "Danielsen Letter" failed to achieve its avowed object, it helped convince Nygaardsvold of the need to promise that the cabinet would resign directly after liberation. The combination of persistent attacks on its legitimacy from both the home front and opponents in London drove the government into a corner and forced it to compromise. Although the issue was largely symbolic, since there obviously would be new elections anyway soon after liberation, it did have considerable political importance. If the elections were delayed (as in fact they were, until late fall 1945), the cabinet could use the intervening period as a head-start on its ambitious plans for postwar socialization of the economy, perhaps exploiting essential reconstruction programs as a trojan horse. Trygve Lie believed such fears were the main root of opposition to the government during the war, and he played an important role in convincing Nygaardsvold to make the promise to resign, issued on 8 February 1943.66

The government made one more major concession to the Circle in fall 1943, yielding in a dispute over restoration of local government following liberation. After that, there was little further conflict as both groups increasingly recognized the need for close co-operation to protect Norwegian interests in disputes with the Allies.67 Many Norwegians both in London and on the Home Front remained bitter
opponents of the cabinet, but by 1943-44, Nygaardsvold and his remaining colleagues had effectively secured their position, thanks to Haakon, a series of prudent compromises, and the constitutional legitimacy of the cabinet.

REORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE FORCES-IN-EXILE, 1942-43

In conjunction with the creation of the FO in February 1942, the Norwegians reorganized the brigade in Scotland in order to increase its effectiveness as part of a possible invasion of Norway. The general re-prioritization placed new emphasis on provision of liaison personnel to Allied forces and preparing cadres for forces to be raised in liberated areas of Norway. Up to this point, the "brigade" in fact amounted to only a single motorized infantry battalion, organized on the normal British pattern, plus an artillery battery and a few other miscellaneous units. The new plan involved conversion of the battalion into three separate mountain infantry companies of 230-260 men each, tailored for operations in Norway in support of other Allied forces. Each company included a headquarters and signals platoon, three rifle platoons of three sections each, one heavy platoon of two mortar and two machine gun sections, a sapper section, medical section, and a transport and logistical platoon. The transport element included forty-one pack horses as well as trucks, and the companies could operate without resupply for up to two days. Logically, the Norwegian artillery battery ought to have converted to a mountain artillery unit as well; but the only available pack-howitzers required mules to carry them and proved too heavy for horses. Although the Norwegians eventually received some American material under Lend Lease, they continued to rely mainly on British equipment.

On paper, the new brigade organization also encompassed a Norwegian parachute company that had begun training in 1941 in conjunction with the nascent British 1st Airborne Division, and the Linge Company, now officially designated Norwegian Independent Company No. 1. In practice, however, these elements generally had little to do
with the other Norwegian units; and the "brigade" in reality was more of an administrative entity than a tactical unit.  

Major-General Beichmann, who had succeeded Fleischer as chief of HOK, opposed the reorganization, because it would cause the Norwegian forces to become over-specialized and thus unsuited to participate in any operations other than an invasion of Norway. If the war was to be decided elsewhere, then Norwegian troops should still play a part. "It would be detrimental to our Army and our people's morale," he wrote, "if our troops, after years of training, were denied the chance to take part in the battles that decide our country's fate." This, however, was exactly what was to follow; and the reorganization went ahead regardless of the HOK's opposition.

When United States forces completed their relief of British troops on Iceland in June 1942, the Norwegian company there came under American command, along with the winter warfare school which the British had established in 1941. The Norwegians apparently experienced some initial problems in dealing with the Americans, due partly to the lack of any prior formal agreement corresponding to the Anglo-Norwegian military treaty. In general, however, the Norwegians also found the Americans less inclined to make informal local arrangements and compromises. Nevertheless, by the time they left Iceland in spring 1944, the Norwegians had trained approximately three thousand American personnel in winter warfare, along with about one thousand British.

The Norwegian Navy meanwhile was growing steadily with the accession of ships from the Allies. Most of the new ships were British, although the old American destroyers continued to make up a large proportion of the Norwegian naval forces through 1942. As the U-boat menace subsided somewhat after spring 1943, the Norwegians gradually managed to phase-out some of their oldest ships, thus releasing scarce personnel to man newer vessels.

Sailing under British operational control, the Norwegians usually performed convoy escort duties in the Atlantic. Occasionally, Norwegian officers exercised operational control over larger forces. One example was the passage of convoy SC104, 10-19 October 1942, when Lt. Commander C.A. Monsen of HNMS Potentilla (a Flower class corvette) assumed
responsibility for the entire escort after the accompanying British destroyers had to withdraw. Monsen fought a series of close, desperate actions with attacking U-boats and brought his charges safely to port.75

Probably the two most actively engaged Norwegian ships were the Hunt class destroyers Glaisdale and Eskdale, which operated as part of a British flotilla in the English Channel and participated in numerous actions against German light surface forces. On 12-13 October, for example, the two ships contributed to the destruction of a German auxiliary cruiser; and the flotilla inflicted heavy losses on the Germans again on 11-12 December 1942 and 9-10 July 1943. The Eskdale, however, sank on 14 April 1943, and on 23 June 1944 the Glaisdale suffered irreparable damage from a mine while covering the buildup of the Normandy bridgehead. In December 1943, the Norwegian destroyer Stord also achieved notoriety as part of the force that sank the Scharnhorst off the North Cape. In winter 1944, on the next Murmansk convoy following the Scharnhorst's demise, the Stord also destroyed a U-boat.76

Norwegian submarines also figured in Allied efforts to hinder German use of Norwegian coastal waters. Only one Norwegian submarine escaped to Britain in 1940, and its obsolete condition limited its usefulness to training duties. The British eventually supplied the RNN with three 'U' class submarines, which proved well-suited for operations in constricted waters such as the Leads. However, the Norwegian boats often found it extremely difficult to strike at the Germans without killing innocent Norwegians as well, because most of the coastal traffic carried both military and civilian cargo and passengers. When in doubt, Norwegian submariners generally held their fire to spare the lives of their countrymen, which resulted in relatively few sinkings to their credit.77

The Norwegian air forces meanwhile played an increasingly active role in the war. By 1942, the training program in Canada was producing pilots at the rate of about one hundred per year. The "Little Norway" facility at Toronto's Island Airport soon proved inadequate, and the Norwegians eventually sold it and transferred to a new, larger base at Muskoka, about seventy miles from Toronto, in early 1943.78
In February 1942, the British assigned a twin-engined Catalina flying boat to the FFK for use in special operations from Shetland. Two more aircraft soon followed, and the unit was designated 1477 Norwegian Flight. The Catalinas proved invaluable for their ability to drop off and retrieve agents in the innumerable Norwegian fjords and inland lakes, but the unit also flew occasional maritime patrols as well.

At the end of 1942, 330 squadron transferred from Iceland to Oban in Scotland, where it exchanged its relatively short-range, worn-out Northrops for a combination of two-engined Catalinas and four-engined Sunderland flying boats. The unit subsequently operated from Shetland for remainder of the war. Then in May 1943, the British decided to create a Norwegian-manned flight of twin-engined Mosquito fighter-bombers as well, for maritime reconnaissance and anti-shipping strikes along the Norwegian coast. For administrative purposes, the Mosquito flight and 1477 Norwegian Flight were amalgamated to form 333 Squadron, which operated both aircraft types from May 1943 to September 1944.

Ironically, the Norwegians were not entirely pleased with the accession of these larger, more powerful aircraft, because they were also more difficult to maintain, requiring larger allocations of scarce manpower for ground crews and support staff. The Sunderlands also needed large numbers of enlisted aircrew. The FFK would have preferred instead to form a third fighter squadron and merge the Catalina flight with 330 Squadron, trading in that unit's Sunderlands in the bargain; but as usual, British desires prevailed. This problem prompted a continual exchange of correspondence between the FFK and the Air Ministry, concerning possible conversion of the squadron to twin-engined aircraft. The Norwegians pursued the issue right up to the end of the war, but the British considered the Sunderlands essential and simply took up the slack by assigning RAF personnel to the Norwegian unit.

The Norwegian fighter squadrons, now equipped with Spitfires, meanwhile hit their stride in 1942 and soon found all the action anyone could have desired after their initial exile in Scotland. 331 Squadron transferred to North Weald on 3 May 1942, and began conducting "Rhubarb" (strafing) missions and fighter sweeps across the Channel. In June, 332 Squadron moved to North Weald as well; and the two squadrons
remained in the same wing for the rest of war. In the course of three sorties to cover the ill-fated Dieppe raid on 19 August 1942, the Norwegians shot down fifteen enemy aircraft, plus five probables and fourteen damaged, for the loss of only two Spitfires. In November the squadrons traded in the Spitfire Mk.V for the superior Mk.IX, and in 1943 the Norwegian pilots scored so many kills that the two squadrons ranked first and third among among all Allied fighter squadrons in the U.K.\textsuperscript{83}

In summer 1943, the two Norwegian fighter squadrons combined to form 132 (Norwegian) Wing, which later included three other RAF squadrons as well. Apart from national prestige, the main significance of this move was to economize on personnel by merging the two squadrons' ground components into a single entity, designated 132 Norwegian Air Field H.Q. Henceforth, the two squadrons thus became closely integrated.\textsuperscript{84}

The Norwegians meanwhile continued their efforts to maintain and expand the air transport service between Scotland and Stockholm. The United States provided Norway with ten Lockheed Lodestars under Lend-Lease in 1942-44, as well as seven Dakotas and eight Norsemen in 1944-45, valued at a total of sixteen million kroner. The co-operative arrangement with BOAC broke down in fall 1943, however, when the British sharply reduced the schedule of flights in response to increased activity by German night-fighters over Norway. After cancelling the agreement on 16 October 1943, the Norwegians nevertheless maintained regular flights on their own schedule with few losses.\textsuperscript{85}

Initially, the Swedes interned Norwegian refugees in closely-controlled camps. As the tide of war turned, however, Stockholm became more co-operative with the Allies, opening new possibilities for the employment of this valuable pool of manpower. The London government received various proposals for training Norwegians in Sweden during 1942, which led to an agreement in April 1943 for the establishment of a series of "health camps" to provide low-profile, paramilitary training. The London government assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg (who already had become military attache to Stockholm on 11 January 1943) as chief
Norwegian military inspector for the program. By the end of 1943 there were twenty-seven camps in operation with 8,730 men.

The bulk of the men were to comprise "reserve police" battalions, while a smaller proportion (initially set at 1,250 men) were to form eight companies of regular national police (Rikspoliti). In the former case, the "police" designation was essentially a diplomatic fiction for the sake of Swedish scruples, the units being under military authority, whereas the police companies reported to a civilian police official. All of them were to receive light infantry weapons, and to facilitate training the Swedes released most of the equipment they had seized when the Norwegian 1st Division had crossed the border in April 1940. For the time being, however, the Swedes maintained strict control over the camps, and it was clear that the police units would not be allowed to engage in any active operations until the war reached its final stages.86

THE NORWEGIAN REOCCUPATION OF SPITZBERGEN

Following the British raid and evacuation of Svalbard in 1941, the Germans established a rudimentary airstrip and weather station on the island. The OKW apparently gave serious thought to developing it as a major base for attacks on Murmansk-bound convoys, but the bottom line was that the British could effectively isolate the island at will, making any German base there untenable.87

The Norwegian mine directors and government in London meanwhile began lobbying for another expedition to re-occupy Svalbard and resume coal production with a skeleton staff. When Nygaardsvold raised the idea with Churchill in early 1942, the latter allegedly replied, "Damn the [coal] pits--it's a war on!" The SOK eventually sold the Admiralty on a small expedition, however, designed mainly to deny the island to the Germans. Reconnaissance by Norwegian Catalinas from Shetland indicated no Germans at the main Norwegian mining settlement Longyearbyen, but RDF detected a weather station.

The ill-fated Operation FRITHAM thus set out for Svalbard on 30 April 1942, consisting of 60 ill-trained and lightly-armed Norwegians
aboard the ice-breaker Isbjørn and the smaller Selis. After the ships had left, further air reconnaissance discovered that there were Germans on the ground at Longyearbyen after all; but it proved impossible to recall the expedition because poor planning had failed to provide the proper equipment or procedures for radio contact at sea. Thus, when the two vessels arrived at Svalbard on May 14, they were promptly bombed and sunk by a flight of four FW-200 Condors. The survivors managed to escape across the ice and found refuge in the intact Soviet mining settlement, which the Germans had not occupied.

To pick up the pieces of this fiasco, the Norwegians convinced the British to help mount a relief expedition, which developed into a permanent occupation of the island: Operation GEARBOX. The first party of 135 men arrived at the island in July 1942 and included a detachment of the Norwegian Parachute Company, prepared to assault the enemy outpost at Longyearbyen; but the Germans evacuated by air shortly before the Norwegians arrived. Subsequent GEARBOX expeditions later that year strengthened the garrison with 40-mm and 10.5-cm guns, in order to drive off German aircraft and U-boats that frequently visited the island; and the Norwegians settled in for a long stay. For reasons that remain unclear, however, the Allies failed to attack the German weather station that continued to operate elsewhere on the island.88

In summer 1943, continuing pressure from the Norwegian mining interest prompted the government to order Hansteen to release almost 200 former Svalbard miners from military service in Scotland, in order to accompany a further expedition to the island, Operation Locomotive, and re-start coal production there. Svalbard coal had little if any value to the war effort, but the government was anxious to accumulate stocks for the immediate postwar period, both for domestic consumption and foreign exchange.89

Unfortunately for the Allies, loose talk among the Norwegians in London alerted German intelligence to the plan. Anxious to redeem itself in the Führer's eyes, the German naval high command decided to risk a raid on Svalbard with its heavy ships, code-named ZITRONELLA, reasoning that since the British Home Fleet was sure to cover Locomotive, it therefore would not be in the area beforehand. This
proved correct, and when the Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and nine destroyers arrived at Svalbard on 8 September 1943 carrying a battalion-strength landing party, they caught both the Admiralty and the Norwegian garrison totally by surprise. Most of the hundred-odd Norwegians managed to make a fighting withdrawal into the mountains or into mine shafts and thus evaded capture, but the garrison lost fourteen killed and thirty-three prisoners, along with two 10.5-cm guns, two 7.5-cm, and nine antiaircraft guns. The Germans also demolished practically everything of value before withdrawing. The Allies subsequently kept only a minimal outpost on Svalbard, and several German weather stations remained in operation in winter 1943-44.90

COMMANDO RAIDS AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS, 1942-43

As we have seen, the British raids on Norway in December 1941, together with Martin Linge's death, had produced what Olav Riste termed a "serious moral and disciplinary crisis" in the Linge Company. As an official postwar report of the defense department explained,

... Some of the company's members had begun to perceive a lack of Norwegian leadership and doubted whether they were serving their own country's interests by engaging in sabotage activities in Norway. The landing at Måløy seemed unnecessary at best, while there was general agreement among the Norwegians who had accompanied the expedition to Reine that the military significance of that raid did not warrant the reprisals. The crisis within the Linge Company was exacerbated by the fact that the unit's leader, Captain Martin Linge, was killed on Måløy.91

Torp went to Scotland to visit the unit on 30 January 1942 and assured the men that steps were now being taken to safeguard Norwegian interests in future Allied operations.92 Upon creation of the FO, the Linge Company finally received the official designation "Norwegian Independent Company no.1." and the Shetlands unit became the "Norwegian Naval Independent Unit." Both units became technically subordinate to the FO, although they remained under SOE control for operational purposes. The Linge men received an opportunity to transfer to a
regular Norwegian unit, and in spring 1942 the HOK assigned a Norwegian regular officer, Major Eivind Otto Hjelle, to command the unit in Scotland.93

Although the Linge men now had some assurance of closer contact with the Norwegian government, they soon began to resent the regimentation that Hjelle tried to impose on the unit. They were, after all, an irregular band of volunteers engaged in unconventional warfare. Following numerous complaints from the SOE men, the FO recognized the need for more flexible leadership and reassigned Hjelle to command the Krigsskole in London.94 A similar situation occurred in the "Shetlands Gang," whose rough-cut fishermen and other volunteers had no intention of submitting to the sort of naval discipline their new commander had in mind. Although the unit did theoretically become part of the Navy, the men won their point in practice and continued running the outfit in their own, uniquely effective manner.

In February 1942, the SOE and the newly-established FO formed the ANCC (Anglo-Norwegian Collaboration Committee) to co-ordinate activities in Norway, with Sir Charles Hambro of the SOE (a merchant banker) as chairman, later succeeded by Major-General Colin Gubbins and Brigadier E.E. Mockler Ferryman.95 The creation of the ANCC was an important step, reflecting the Norwegian government's dissatisfaction with previous unilateral British decisions regarding Norway (notably, the commando raids) and the determination to gain at least some influence over such decisions in the future. The new committee first met on 16 February 1942. Although it was no panacea, the new mechanism did lead to incremental improvements; and by the end of that year the Norwegians were playing a much greater role in SOE planning.96 In December 1942, the Norwegians established a new section of the FO staff, FO.IV, to oversee special operations and co-operation with the resistance. In early 1943, FO.IV transferred to offices physically separate from the rest of the FO staff, a move which symbolized FO IV's special contact with the SOE and relative insularity from the rest of the Norwegian military staff.97

Although the controversial results of December 1941 had put an end to large-scale commando raids on Norway, the British nevertheless
continued to pursue smaller-scale operations with more limited objectives in mind. The Norwegians continued to co-operate, and some of these efforts met with considerable success, thus feeding Hitler's fears of a major landing. In spring 1942, three Linge Company men carried out Operation REDSHANK, a sabotage mission against the Orkla pyrite mine in northern Norway. The leader of the team, Peter Deinboll, was intimately familiar with the target because his father was an engineer who had worked for the Orkla company. With the benefit of this expertise, the Linge men brought off their coup with complete success, utterly demolishing the electrical plant that served the mine and powered the adjacent railway, which brought production to a halt for an extended period. The saboteurs then escaped into Sweden.99

In September 1942, Company Linge detached two men to participate in a Combined Operations raid on the Glomfjord power station in western Norway, code-named Operation KNOTGRASS / UNICORN. With a total of twelve men, the commandos landed from a submarine at Bjerangfjord and made their way to the target by crossing the famous Svartisen (Black Glacier). After killing a German and securing several Norwegian guards, the raiders efficiently blew up the plant, which remained out of operation for many months. They had chosen a poor escape route (against one of the Linge men's sound advice), and only four managed to reach Sweden.99

One of the most dramatic exploits of Company Linge occurred in early 1942, when Odd Starheim had to bring his current mission to an early conclusion following a narrow escape from the Gestapo. Rather than returning to Britain through one of the normal routes, he decided to steal an entire ship; and with the help of five friends, he successfully hijacked the 600-ton coastal steamer Galtesund. This episode gave rise to deliberate plans for an even more ambitious operation, code-named CARHAMPTON, a latter-day "cutting out" expedition that attempted to capture an entire convoy. On 3 January 1943, Starheim landed near Flekkefjord with a force of 40 men, 12 of them RNN personnel and the rest from Company Linge; and after a week of reconnaissance, they attempted to seize 3 ships anchored near Abelsnes on January 10. Starheim had to abort the attempt when one of his parties failed to
secure a crucial German guard-post. On this occasion, some of the Linge men seemed to exhibit an uncharacteristic lack of discipline in the field, carelessly abandoning equipment that later alerted the Germans to their presence. Finding themselves on the run, most of the men had to disperse; but Starheim and a few others refused to give up and eventually captured the coastal steamer Tromøysund at Regefjord on February 28. German aircraft bombed and sank the ship at sea, and no survivors reached shore.100

In retrospect, SOE concluded that it would have been better simply to concentrate on sinking targets with limpet mines rather than trying to capture them intact. Another Linge man already thinking along these lines was Max Manus, one of the unit's most colorful figures. Even before the war, he had engaged in some illegal adventures in South America; and he also fought briefly against the Russians in the Winter War. During the initial months of the German occupation in 1940, he and some friends launched an underground propaganda campaign in Oslo. The Nazi police soon cracked the ring, however, and Manus barely escaped to Sweden in early 1941. From there, he eventually made the journey to Britain by the circuitous route of Finland, Russia, the Middle East, South Africa, the U.S., and Canada.101

After joining Company Linge and training throughout 1942, Manus and his partner Gregers Gram developed a daring plan to sabotage enemy shipping by placing limpet mines from canoes. SOE approved, and code-named the mission Operation MARDONIUS. The team parachuted near Oslo on 12/13 March 1943 and began recruiting and training a network of assistants. After several weeks' preparation, with the period of dark nights rapidly running out, they made their move against four ships in Oslo harbor. By a combination of luck and sheer audacity, Manus and his cohorts paddled directly under the noses of dozens of guards and made good their escape. The limpet mines proved unreliable, however; and on this occasion they sank only one ship. Nevertheless, Manus and his cohorts persevered and began experimenting with home-made, miniature torpedoes, with which they eventually crippled a destroyer.102

The British meanwhile decided to form another elite unit of Norwegian volunteers for raiding operations, as part of a multi-national
force designated 10 (Inter-Allied) Commando. The force was to include troops drawn from the various national forces-in-exile, as a sort of Foreign Legion representing the constellation of free governments opposing the Nazis. Although planning began in January 1942, the unit did not actually begin to assemble until July of that year. Officially activated on 1 October 1942, No. 5 Troop consisted of four officers and eighty-four men, under Captain Rolv Hauge.103 In fall 1942, 5 Troop detached a party of twelve men under Lieutenant Harald Risnes to begin raiding operations from Shetland, in conjunction with the MTBs of 30 (Norwegian) Flotilla.104

A series of five small but successful raids began on 22 November 1942. The largest and most important of these was Operation CARTOON, an ambitious attack on the Lillebo pyrite mines on the island of Stord on 23-24 January 1943.105 Although the raid attained most of its objectives for the loss of only one man, this turned out to be the last significant commando raid on Norway (as distinct from clandestine SOE operations), due to increasing pressure from the Norwegian government over the risk of reprisals.106 The commandos nevertheless continued to function as ships' troops for the MTBs through May 1943; and the boats scored a significant string of successes against German shipping on the west coast of Norway, for example the destruction of two ships totalling 10,000 tons on 13 March 1943. The MTBs often would lie up in the maze of islands and narrow fjords during daylight, with the commandos guarding against landward ambush while the crews rested, then carry out an attack and return to Shetland the following night—a tactic that repeatedly confounded the Germans.107 The Norwegian boats by the end of the war had sunk 21 merchant vessels totalling 160,000 tons, 1 destroyer, and 12 patrol craft, damaged 4 other merchant vessels and 1 U-boat, and shot down 3 aircraft.108

The Norwegian crews of the Shetland naval unit meanwhile continued to ply the waters off Norway in their diminutive fishing boats, delivering and picking up cargoes and passengers that aircraft could not handle. In late winter 1943, the Shetland unit attempted a particularly daring joint operation with a detachment of Company Linge, to try to insert a four-man team near Tromsø. While resistance organizations were
flourishing in the southern and central regions, the far northern
counties remained almost entirely inactive, due to the difficulty of
establishing contact from Britain. If the plan had gone properly, the
Linge men would have helped to organize the latent local resistance, and
then would have launched a series of sabotage operations against the
crucial German airfields that threatened Allied shipping on the route to
Murmansk. The mission ran afoul of a German patrol before the
landing party could get ashore, however; and only one man escaped to
tell the tale.

The most outstanding and successful skipper on the North Sea run
was Leif "Shetlands" Larsen, who ultimately received an extraordinary
array of decorations, including the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal
(Britain's highest award except the Victoria Cross, for which foreigners
are ineligible). One of his most bizarre exploits was an attempt to
disable the Tirpitz at Trondheim in 1942, code-named Operation TITLE.
The plan involved "Chariots," which were modified torpedoes ridden by
British frogmen, similar to the Italian craft which had crippled two
British battleships at Alexandria in December 1941. By concealing the
frogmen in a specially-constructed compartment belowdecks and towing the
Chariots under the keel, Larsen bluff ed his way past all of the German
defenses at Trondheim, and came within five miles of where the Tirpitz
lay. Tragically, at the last moment the tow lines broke, and the
Chariots sank irretrievably before the frogmen could mount and get them
underway. Larsen and his crew then had to scuttle their boat and escape
overland to Sweden.

In another episode in March 1943, while returning to Shetland
after dropping off cargo for MILORG in the Trøna Islands, Larsen's boat
came under a sustained strafing attack by two German seaplanes.
Although the Norwegians fired back with their makeshift armament of
machine guns, the Germans shot the boat to pieces, killing or wounding
almost the entire crew. Under cover of nightfall, Larsen and the other
survivors abandoned the sinking boat in a leaking dinghy. With little
hope of reaching Shetland, still 350 miles distant, Larsen instead
shaped an oblique course toward the Norwegian coast. With a combination
of luck and skill, he and his men reached the area of Ålesund, where
they hid out among friends and contacts for several weeks, eventually returning to Shetland by MTB.\textsuperscript{112}

Despite continued acts of heroism such as Larsen's, the Shetland unit's status came into doubt in spring 1943, when it became clear that the fishing boats no longer had a reasonable chance of evading increasingly effective German patrols. During the 1942-43 season of operations, the unit had lost five boats and 42 men. Navy MTBs operating from Lerwick, meanwhile, were proving effective in raids on the western Norwegian coast around Bergen, due to their high speed and heavier armament; but they lacked the range and seaworthiness to replace the fishing boats. The United States Navy provided a solution in the form of three 110-foot sub-chasers, delivered to the Shetlands in August 1943. These craft proved ideal, with just the right combination of speed, armament, range, and seaworthiness for the job. In thirty-four voyages during 1943-44 and ninety-four in the final year of the war, the sub-chasers never suffered a loss and kept open the vital North Sea route to Norway.\textsuperscript{113}

The Shetlands Naval Unit began as an independent organization, in effect a private navy, only loosely supervised by the SOE and fully outside the control of the Royal Norwegian Navy. The RNN became jealous of the unit's status almost from the beginning, however, and made persistent efforts to absorb it. In summer 1942, the Navy persuaded the British to appoint a conventionally-minded Norwegian officer to take formal command of the unit. However, the rough-cut civilian fishermen who made up the crews had no intention of submitting themselves to formal discipline, and morale plunged sharply. As Howarth observed, "It was a general defect of the Norwegian forces . . . that the ratings had no innate respect for the officers . . ." SOE soon recognized that the new arrangement was not working, and the Norwegian officer soon found himself reassigned--doubtless evoking a sense of smug satisfaction among the fishermen.\textsuperscript{114}

When the unit received the American sub-chasers, however, it also had to adopt naval signals codes, which required custody of an officer. SOE finally concluded an agreement with the RNN under which the crews received the designation: Norwegian Independent Naval Unit, equivalent
to Company Linge, with the men formally drafted into the Navy. Incidentally, along with their civilian status, they also lost their special pay rate, which probably accounted for much of the dissatisfaction. The skippers also received commissions in the RNN, although Larsen, for one, adamantly refused to attend any officer training. Given his already legendary reputation, the Navy eventually caved in and awarded his commission regardless, with the curious result that one of Norway's greatest naval heroes was a member of the Navy only by bureaucratic fiat.\textsuperscript{115}

Another series of SOE operations meanwhile involved a target of potentially incalculable importance: the Norsk Hydro plant at Vemork, which was the sole supplier of heavy water (H\textsubscript{2}O) for Germany's atomic weapons project.\textsuperscript{116} The operation began with the insertion of two small reconnaissance parties from Company Linge, code-named GROUSE and SWALLOW, in March and October 1942. British airborne troops under Combined Operations command, rather than the SOE, were to stage the actual attack, code-named Operation FRESHMAN; but on 3 November 1942, the two gliders carrying the assault force crashed short of the landing zone. The Germans executed the survivors in accordance with Hitler's notorious order concerning commandos.\textsuperscript{117}

The SOE men already on the ground remained undetected but had to endure severe hardships while hiding in the wilderness of the Hardanger Plateau. Undaunted, Company Linge planned its own attack on a smaller scale, code-named Operation GUNNERSIDE, and dropped an additional team of six men under Captain Knut Haukelid on 16/17 February 1943. After the teams made contact, they mounted the attack on February 27 and achieved spectacular success, destroying 3,000 lbs. of heavy water along with the irreplaceable production plant.

Following a further attack by USAAF bombers, the Germans decided to evacuate their remaining stockpile of heavy water to Germany; and the SOE once again assigned Haukelid to the job. Facing rigorous German security measures, he found that the only solution was to sink the ferry boat Hydro as it carried the vital cargo across Lake Tinnsvå, from whose depths there could be no hope of salvage. A few kilos of well-placed
explosives did the job, but also cost the lives of eighteen Norwegian passengers.

Ironically, it seems in retrospect that the Germans were pursuing a false lead in their concentration on heavy water as the key to producing a fission bomb. Nevertheless, the destruction of the heavy water probably helped to derail the program further, helping to assure that Hitler never received the ultimate V-weapon.118

ALLIED AIR RAIDS AND LIBERATION PLANNING

The American bombing raids on the heavy water plant at Vemork, along with several other air raids on Norway, prompted a heated debate over the selection of targets for such attacks. The government-in-exile first became concerned over Allied bombing policy when the RAF made a series of raids on fish oil factories in 1941-42. Norwegian canned and frozen fish were an important element of the German war economy, but most of the British raids affected the local food supply far more than the exports. In summer 1942, the Norwegian intelligence staffs (FO.II and FD/E) began providing detailed target lists to the Air Ministry, in order to try to minimize the damage to Norwegian interests. The British generally abided by Norwegian recommendations after that, and most of the subsequent disagreements arose with the Americans.

In July 1943, the USAF mounted several large raids on industrial targets and U-boat pens in Norway, causing considerable collateral damage and civilian casualties. One such raid involved 170 B-17s, which inflicted significant damage on a metal-processing plant at Herøya on July 24. Although the Americans counted the operation as a success, the Norwegian planners in London objected that the plant had not yet been in operation anyway, and that sabotage preparations had been well underway to disable production when the time came. The only beneficial result of the bombing raids that sabotage could not have provided was to deter the transfer of German fighter units from Norway to other theaters.119

A subsequent raid by 140 B-17s on Vemork and several nearby targets on 16 November 1943 showed further disregard for Norwegian advice and interests, and on November 30 Torp requested that Lie's
Foreign Ministry pursue the issue through diplomatic channels. The British replied more-or-less apologetically on 4 January 1944 that there had been a glitch in the targeting procedure: the mission had occurred on direct orders from the Combined Chiefs of Staff and therefore had circumvented the normal Air Ministry mechanism for consulting the Norwegian list. Although the tone was conciliatory, the British added that there could be no guarantee that further bombing might sometimes be necessary despite the Norwegian government's wishes in the future. However, consideration would always be given to sabotage alternative.120

The Norwegians also pursued the matter with the Americans. The USAAF and SHAEF offered no apologies, so the Norwegians turned to diplomatic channels through their ambassador in Washington. Ultimately, the State Department replied only that "In the opinion of the competent officials of the War Department, both attacks were necessary in the furtherance of the defeat of Germany."121 Despite occasional further incidents, the Allies generally did consult with the Norwegians before subsequent attacks. When the Allies wanted a specific target destroyed, the Norwegians often were able to achieve the desired results by sabotage, at least when the likely extent of civilian casualties from bombardment seemed to outweigh the risk of German reprisals.122

The Norwegians found the Allies somewhat more forthcoming on the issue of liberation planning than with regard to air operations. Improved contacts with the British services began with the first meeting of a new joint planning committee on 26 February 1942, with representatives from each of the respective services. Discussions remained theoretical, mostly involving the increasingly irrelevant DYNAMITE or AJAX plans for a landing in North Norway. These subsequently evolved into Operation JUPITER, which remained a theoretical alternative to a cross-Channel attack in 1943; but it was essentially a dead letter by fall 1942. Churchill strongly favored the plan, but the Americans effectively vetoed the idea. Hansteen probably began to understand the increasingly dominant American influence when he met Marshall on the latter's visit to London in April 1942. In any case, the Norwegian military leadership now could report to Torp that it
had at least some idea of the direction of Allied strategy regarding Norway.\textsuperscript{123}

Planning for liberation developed three basic scenarios: 1. Invasion, 2. Capitulation, 3. Evacuation. Planning for the second alternative anticipated the possibility that if the war continued elsewhere in Europe after the Germans in Norway surrendered, Norwegian forces might have to participate in a subsequent campaign. In this case, planner concluded, "German weapons and vehicles, etc., should be utilized by the police and military units. It may also be necessary to equip newly-established field units with German material as a temporary arrangement."\textsuperscript{124}

On 1 June 1943, the Norwegians activated a special pool of officers designated the Liaison Corps, directly subordinate to the HOK, in order to provide a pool of trained personnel for attachment to Allied units.\textsuperscript{125} The HOK also established a pool of cadre officers for eventual assignment to new units in Norway, either after or during the process of the liberation. Ironically, given the overall shortage of manpower, at this point there was actually a surplus of officers in relation to the few enlisted men in Britain; but it was clear that once the Army returned to Norway, there would be a serious shortage of leadership for re-establishing normal forces.\textsuperscript{126}

Despite the gradual trend toward closer collaboration that began in February 1942, the Allies still did not take the Norwegians much into confidence about invasion plans until 12 November 1943, when the British activated a new headquarters designated Scottish Command and asked the FO to appoint a Norwegian liaison committee for joint planning. Major-General Strugstad became chairman of this group, and the first conference with General Thorne, chief of Scottish Command, took place on 2-3 December 1943.\textsuperscript{127} Although the Norwegians remained in a distinctly subordinate role concerning overall strategy, under the new arrangement they at least gained a clear voice in key decisions concerning Norway. The Allies were still prone to place their own strategic interests before Norway's, as the following chapter will make clear; but at least the Norwegians were now privy to information about such decisions.
beforehand, rather than remaining in the dark as had been the case in the period 1940-41.

**CO-ORDINATION OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS WITH THE HOME FRONT**

Despite the depth of anti-Nazi sentiment among the Norwegian people and the more or less spontaneous growth of MILORG and other resistance organizations, it proved a prolonged and difficult process to coordinate the "Home Front" with the Norwegian and Allied war efforts abroad. The creation of the ANCC gradually improved contacts between the SOE and the Norwegian authorities in London, but neither of these groups had yet achieved any regular, effective working relationship with the underground. The focus of the problem was MILORG, which wanted to maintain its own central control apparatus in Oslo. The FO and SOE both regarded this as inefficient and dangerous, because any headquarters cell in Norway would always remain vulnerable to German action. The political nature of the London government's relations with the home front complicated matters, and several further fiascos in 1942 made MILORG leaders especially reluctant to relinquish operational control to London.

Probably the most tragic blunder of the entire special operations campaign in Norway resulted from a failure to co-ordinate separate missions by the SOE and the SIS, both of which attempted to land parties of agents near the remote village of Televåg within a few days of each other in April 1942. The situation resulted in a shoot-out between agents of the second group and members of the Gestapo who arrived to investigate rumors of the previous group's arrival. The Germans subsequently deported the local population and razed the entire village. If London could not manage its own operations properly, the MILORG leaders surely wondered, then how could it expect to control the Home Front as well?

The lack of confidence was mutual. Apart from the continuing vulnerability of MILORG's leadership and communications, the British perceived problems of naïveté and disunity among the Norwegian
underground organizations. One historian later put the matter bluntly, paraphrasing an official assessment of MILORG's problems in June 1942.

A special problem in Norway was the simplicity of the people, who had a childlike confidence that no one would give them away. . . . Further, there was the arrogance of the military class who assumed that they alone could defeat the enemy, although they were as much amateurs in the modern science of total war as the amateurs they criticized. . . . Another adverse factor was the low opinion held by many within Norway of the government in exile. . . .

The gradual inclusion of the FO in SOE planning did not always help matters from the perspective of the Home Front leadership, as illustrated in the strange story of operation BITTERN. Acting on a plan developed by the FO, the SOE recruited four Norwegians with decidedly shady backgrounds to form an assassination squad, for the purpose of killing a number of prominent quislings and German officials. The men received extensive training and special equipment for their deadly task, including silenced weapons and several types of poison. The most extraordinary item they drew from SOE stores, however, was a quantity of cocaine for their own use. As the requisition explained, two of the Norwegians

. . . have not moved in the past in the best society, but are exactly the type required. In connection with their peacetime activities they were in the habit of taking a few grains of cocaine in order to key them up. The work on which they will be engaged is of a much more nerve-wracking and important character. They have promised on all their gods (which are different from ours) that the cocaine will be used only in extreme circumstances . . .

The would-be assassins parachuted into Norway on 11 October 1942, but the local MILORG leadership became furious when it learned what they were up to. MILORG reported to London that the assassins had on their list of targets many people "whom we consider ought certainly not to be killed at present." The team therefore ended up sneaking out again through Sweden without killing anyone, after running great risks for no
purpose, due to the lack of effective communication between London and Oslo. The official postwar report of the Norwegian defense department mentioned the episode only in passing, but hinted at the sinister absurdity of it with dry understatement.

The BITTERN expedition was sent to Norway in autumn 1942 in order to assist the Home Front leadership in dealing with traitors. According to orders from the MILORG leadership, it was to train members of the organization in liquidation [methods], and possibly also to eliminate traitors if the Home Front leadership desired it. The expedition aroused criticism, [however,] because someone had not paid enough attention to the selection of the instructors.

The abortive mission illustrated the fact that the British, the Norwegians in London, and the Home Front leaders all had different priorities and agendas. Although the leaders of MILORG often sought a more active policy than their civilian counterparts in the Circle favored, they all agreed that BITTERN had been a potential disaster. The Circle condemned the heavy-handed plan as "grotesque." In the wake of BITTERN and the Televåg incident, MILORG specifically requested that the authorities in London order all agents and instructors bound for Norway in the future, "Don't shoot the Germans, even in self-defense."

The FO found itself in a difficult position as intermediary between British desires to "set Europe ablaze" and the Norwegian imperative to minimize civilian losses. Although passive resistance to Nazification of Norwegian society had won a series of decisive victories in 1942, the Home Front leadership wanted to avoid escalation of armed resistance. To activists like Max Manus, the Circle's insistence on passive resistance harkened back to the liberal pacifist line of the prewar period.

Disagreements also arose over the extent to which MILORG should support a hypothetical Allied invasion. The FO staff wrote to ask the MILORG Council's opinion in fall 1942:
Is it—in order to speed the outcome and thus shorten the period of the population's suffering—proper to employ all effective means on the home front? Or will the population's total losses be fewer if it remains essentially passive at the expense of waiting somewhat longer for liberation?\textsuperscript{135}

The military staff in London believed the former, and the head of MILORG Jens Chr. Hauge tended to agree.\textsuperscript{136} In the long-run, he argued, Norway would "derive strength and self-respect from the knowledge that liberation was not merely a gift from others, but also a result of its own efforts." The Circle, however, strongly opposed any form of "uprising," which it argued would be nothing but a "Children's Crusade" by "complete amateurs" that would lead only to vast, bloody reprisals.\textsuperscript{137}

Mutual understanding between London and Oslo gradually improved through better, more reliable radio communications, and through a series of important conferences. Arranging meetings between Home Front leaders and those in exile clearly was no easy matter, but it was imperative that the men on each end know, respect, and trust those on the other. Following initial, tentative, and by no means entirely constructive contacts in 1941, the first major conference occurred in fall 1942 when Captain J.K. Schive and several other representatives of both MILORG and the Circle visited London.\textsuperscript{138} The main result of this meeting was to improve relations between the SOE and MILORG. The Oslo representatives began to appreciate the advantages of relying mainly on London as the hub of communications, beyond the Gestapo's reach, especially since the SOE's network of stations in Norway was improving steadily in both numbers and reliability. Subsequently, the Oslo leadership relinquished what little operational control it had managed to develop above the local level. For its part, the SOE abandoned its previous policy of trying to keep its operations completely independent of MILORG. It had become clear that contact with local resistance groups was both inevitable and advantageous, provided that members observed a strict policy of compartmentalization. All parties came to agree that as a general guideline, MILORG's role was to remain passive, gradually extending its network and accumulating arms and training in preparation
to support an Allied invasion. In fact, as we know, the Allies now had no intention of launching such an operation; but it had to remain an apparent possibility, in order both to tie down German forces and to sustain Norwegian morale. MILORG would also play a prominent role in preserving law and order in the event of a German capitulation. The SOE, on the other hand, was to keep exclusive control of active sabotage efforts, sometimes calling on MILORG for support but taking care not to compromise its basic structure.139

Actual relations between the two organizations in the field varied at the local level, depending on specific circumstances and personalities. In Trondheim, for example, the SOE cell code-named LARK voluntarily integrated itself with MILORG. In the Hardanger region, SOE partisan groups RAVEN and PHEASANT, which had developed independently prior to the clarification of respective roles, also achieved smooth relations with neighboring MILORG groups. In Ålesund, however, SOE's ANTRUM organization fell into contemptuous rivalry with MILORG, with the former finally absorbing the latter.140 At best, competition produced hard feelings and wasted effort; and at worst, uncoordinated groups might compromise each other to the enemy, albeit unwittingly. Some degree of tension between MILORG personnel and the more actively engaged Linge agents probably was inevitable. As Max Manus complained, "The MILORG slogan 'Wait for The Day' has penetrated into the very blood of the members . . . Waiting can be quite a pleasant form of contribution, whereas all other forms carry with them danger and unpleasantness."141

The next major conference took place in Sweden in May 1943, when MILORG chief Hauge met with representatives from London to discuss the question of "whether, and to what extent, units of MILORG shall be employed during an invasion." As a result, Hauge accepted that the ultimate decision of this matter would be made in London. In the meantime, MILORG would concentrate on a gradual buildup, separate from any active SOE operations mounted from Britain. Furthermore, Hauge acknowledged his organization's formal subordination to FO IV, which gave the Norwegian military staff in London a more definite and influential position in dealing with the British.142
The Circle subsequently began to view MILORG in a more favorable light, as the civilian resistance leaders came to appreciate its potential value in preserving law and order and providing a tangible symbol of the resistance during liberation. As an additional incentive for closer cooperation from the home front, the FO apparently resorted to a form of "good cop / bad cop" routine, emphasizing the risk of extensive Allied infringements of Norwegian sovereignty during a postwar occupation if the Norwegians did not present a united front. The May 1943 meeting thus helped resolve lingering doubts over whether MILORG would acknowledge the sovereignty of the London government upon liberation. 

Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg became chief military inspector for the embryonic Norwegian "police troops" in Sweden, and from this position came to play an important role in the debate over resistance policy on the Home Front. Although he understood the risks involved, Berg urged more active sabotage efforts for several reasons, mainly preventive. One was to help forestall Allied air raids and the inevitable collateral damage to civilian targets. Another was simply to provide a controlled outlet for activists who otherwise might spark a large, spontaneous, and bloody but strategically useless action such as the Warsaw uprising. Finally, Berg and his colleagues in MILORG and the FO also feared that rigid adherence to the passive "readiness" policy would play into the hands of the communists, who would thus win the support of other activists by default. As the OSS concluded, "It would appear that Milorg . . . has entered upon a course of organizing for the sake of organizing." A further conference in Stockholm in March 1944 therefore resolved upon a "limited escalation" (en viss aktivisering) on the home front, if only to avoid losing control. 

The Home Front leadership became increasingly preoccupied with trying to prevent unauthorized actions by communist resistance cells, whose actions it characterized as the "assassination policy" (attentatlinje), in contrast to the official "readiness policy" (beredskapslinje). Communist leader Peder Furubotn had indicated his group's intention to wage its own war if the London government and home front leadership refused to sharpen their half-hearted policy; and by
early 1944. General Hansteen became concerned over the possible extent of communist influence within MILORG. Although the government continued to regard the communists as politically insignificant, the FO concluded that Furubotn and his followers represented "an interesting and dangerous phenomenon" that threatened to take over all active elements of the resistance.145

As the war in Europe entered what proved to be its final year, Norway's fate remained uncertain. To at least a few privileged individuals among the government-in-exile and military staff in Britain, it had become clear that the Allies would not attempt to liberate Norway by military means until after the impending Normandy invasion had run its course. The essential question for the Norwegian authorities then was how best to support the Allied strategy in order to hasten Germany's defeat, while at the same time minimizing the loss of Norwegian lives and property. In countless respects, especially in the sphere of resistance policy, these two goals were mutually exclusive. As the war ran its remaining course, the apparent divergence of Allied and Norwegian interests would led to serious disagreements that would affect the tone of postwar relations as well. Finally, the re-emergence of Russian power in the Arctic would raise new questions concerning Norway's future security.
NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

1. HOK to FD, 7 October 1941; SOK to FD, 9 October 1941; FFK to FD, 10 October 1941; Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV: 76; Olav Riste, "London-regjeringsa": Norge i krigsalliansen, 1940-1945. vol. I (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1973), 158.

2. Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV: 76.

3. Ibid., 76-77.

4. Reports from the home front in fall 1941 included some indications that the resistance leadership would rather deal exclusively with the military staff in London, as an expression of contempt for the Nygaardsvold government. This prompted Fleischer to write, "For my part, it was clear that from that point on I was on dangerous ground." Carl J. Hambro. General Fleischers tragedie (Tønsberg: Tønsbergs aktietrykkeri, 1947), 12.


8. Ironically, Beichmann headed the committee officially appointed to study Christophersen's proposal on 18 December 1941. Although a majority of the committee approved the plan on 19 January 1942, a minority including Beichmann and Fleischer's chief of staff Major Pran vigorously dissented. "Kongelig resolusjon av 6 februar 1942 om utnevnelse av major Wilhelm von Tangen Hansteen til generalmajor og om beordring av ham som Forsvarssjef"; Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV:172-73; Riste. London-regjeringsa. I:170-71, 181.

9. Hansteen obtained his commission in the infantry in 1917, passed the General Staff exam in 1928, became a captain 1931, served as chief of staff to the 5th Division in 1934-36, and became military attaché in Helsinki in 1937, with promotion to major in 1939. "Kongelig resolusjon av 6 februar 1942 om utnevnelse av major Wilhelm von Tangen Hansteen til generalmajor og om beordring av ham som Forsvarssjef"; Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV:172-73. Svein Blindheim speculates that


11. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:77. The official report also claimed that Christophersen's appointment as FO chief of staff was at Hansteen's own request; but the latter clearly had little if any choice in the matter.

12. Hambro, General Fleischers tragedie. 13. The Germans also may have contributed to Fleischer's demise by publishing a letter they found in the 6th Division's archives, in which he had urged the King and government not to go into exile in June 1940. Ibid., p.15-16. Riste, however, argues that this played no significant role in the decision not to make Fleischer Forsvaretsr. Ibid., p.182-83.

13. Fleischer wrote, "Due to the [re-organization of the armed forces command that has taken place, I find it proper to resign. I am willing to accept another appointment or command appropriate to my rank, or to be placed on temporarily inactive status, and hope that [the government] will considerate enough to avoid assigning me to to a subordinate position that can be better filled by a younger officer." Fleischer to FO, 7 February 1942; Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:77. When Hansteen called Fleischer shortly after becoming Forsvaretsr, presumably to smooth things over between them, Fleischer allegedly hung up. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 96-106.

14. Norsk militært tidsskrift 104 (1945): 3-10; Kgl.res. 20 March 1942, Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:78. Steffens, the previous head of the mission to Canada, meanwhile became military attaché in Moscow in late 1941. Fleischer's successors in Ottawa were Ljungberg and Erichsen. Hambro, General Fleischers tragedie. 14-17; FOK to Fleischer, 2 December 1942: RA: FKA. kat. 1256.0/02, box 132. One also ought to consider Fleischer's disappointment in 1942 in relation to his earlier hopes of appointment as Defense Minister instead of Ljungberg in 1939, or as Forsvarssjef instead of Ruge in May 1940. Christiansen, De som heiste flagget. 12-13.


16. Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 100.

17. Ibid., 101-4.
18. As it turned out, Hansteen did repay the Labor Party a favor in 1948 when a number of other senior officers "revolted" against Defense Minister Jens Chr. Hauge; see chapter 11. Hansteen's appointment as Forsvarsjef apparently met with approval on the Home Front, where it helped to dispel the impression that the Labor Party was monopolizing political power in London. Ibid., 106.


21. The Forsvarsdepartementets Etterretningskontor was created 1 January 1941. Agents were trained almost exclusively by the British, but they were distinct from Linge personnel and had somewhat closer ties with FD than the latter. Their most important function was reporting German ship movements. Of ca. 200 agents sent, 8 were killed in action, 15 were captured and executed, and 2 were lost in transit to Norway. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:101-103.


23. At that point the FD/E had 66 personnel. While the two intelligence offices co-existed in 1942-44, the FD/E handled actual operations by agents and FO.II handled analysis. FO.II was headed by Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Roscher Lund and included the following sub-sections: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Industrial. By 1945, FO.II had 223 personnel. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:103-107. For an OSS report on Norwegian naval intelligence, see NA: RG 226, entry 19, box 381, report XL 34543.


26. For a recent re-examination of the Norwegian volunteers on the Eastern Front, see Kjell Fjørtoft, Veien til Østfronten: Krigens mange ansikter (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1993). Per R. Johansen, Frontkjemper (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1992), is a memoir of a former NS-member and SS volunteer.

28. Svein Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fane: Dei norske frontkjemparane (Oslo: Noregs boklag, 1977), 7-9. About 8,000 additional men also tried to enlist but were rejected because SS recruiting standards remained so stringent until after Stalingrad.


30. A German report indicated that even many NS-members regarded the party as a means of regaining Norway's independence. Abwehr report, 15 November 1940. NA: T-77, reel 1027, 2499058.

31. Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fane. 35-58. Blindheim concluded, "if the Germans had been a bit less obstinate and better psychologists, the contribution of Norwegian volunteers could have assumed larger dimensions." Ibid., 40.

32. Qvist to Ruge. 30 August 1945; RA: F0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 90.

33. Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fane. 197.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 41-47; 51-54. The Legion was organized as a reinforced infantry battalion subordinate to SS Kampfgruppe Jeckeln, which included various other international contingents as well. The Legion never participated in any major attacks, and the Germans apparently did not have much confidence in the Norwegian officers, although the Kampfgruppe commander did write, "Wo die Norweger stehen kommen die Russen nie durch." Ibid., 45. For a fascinating account by one disgruntled volunteer who eventually defected to the Allies, see "Experiences of a Norwegian Eastern Front Volunteer," 20 August 1943. NA: RG 226, entry 16, box 918. report 77610. Norwegians on the Eastern Front also included a number of women who joined the German Red Cross, and after the war they also faced prosecution as collaborators. See Sigurd Senje, Dømte kvinner: Tyskerjenter og frontsøstre, 1940-45 (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1986), and Hanna Kvanmo, Dommen (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1990).


37. Ibid., 22-30, 66-78. A handful of Norwegians returned from Soviet captivity in 1946.

38. Ibid., 86. For a full account of the Norwegian SS ski battalion, see Sven T. Arneberg, Tragedie i Karelen: Norske skijegere i den Finske Fortsettelseskrigen 1941-44 (Oslo: Grøndahl og Dreyers forlag, 1993).


40. Ruge wrote an interesting memorandum to the OKW in January 1942, arguing that the effort to impose Quisling's regime on the population was counter-productive to both German and Norwegian interests. Ruge to
OKW. "P.M.: Forholdene i Norge", 30 January 1942; RA: FKA. kat. 1256.0/02, box 22. The OKW merely forwarded the letter to Quisling's administration. IHF to Hagelin. "P.M. om general Ruge", 30 March 1942; Ibid.

41. On what passed for foreign policy in Quisling's regime, see Kolsrud, "Kollaborasjon og imperialisme."

42. Alan S. Milward, The Fascist Economy in Norway (London: Oxford, 1972). For a more recent study of Norwegian industry under the occupation, see Jan Didriksen, Industrien under hakenkorset (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987). Although Norwegians remained relatively well-fed throughout the war compared with other populations under German occupation, living standards did decline sharply in absolute terms. See Guri Hjeltnes, Hverdagsliv i krig (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1987).


44. The foremost studies of the underground press are Hans Luihn, De illegale avisene: Den frie, hemmelige presse i Norge under okkupasjonen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1960), and the same author's later supplement, Det fjerde våpen: Den hemmelige presse i Norge, 1940-1945 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1981). Gunnar Christie Wasberg, Norge 1940-1945: Dokumenter i utvalg (Oslo: Olaf Norlis Forlag, 1965) and Kaare Haukaas, ed., "Faktregister for okkupasjonstiden", 3 vols. (1947), an unpublished manuscript available at the University of Oslo, provide collections of excerpts from the illegal papers as well as German propaganda.

45. On German efforts to monitor public opinion in Norway, see Tore Dyrhaug, Norge occupert! Tysk etterretning om Norge og nordmenn 1942-1945 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1985). Even at the peak of the NS membership drive, the Germans recognized that it was an essential failure. "Bericht über die innere Lage Norwegens," 15 May 1942; NA: T-312, reel 1028, 9225511. On the ideological disunity within the NS itself, see Øystein Sørensen, Hitler eller Quisling: Ideologiske brytninger i Nasjonal Samling, 1940-1945 (Oslo: J.W. Cappelens forlag, 1989).

46. For an OSS analysis of the communist underground press, see NA: RG 226, entry 14, box 345, NORWEGIAN UNDERGROUND PRESS. Direct insertion of agents by the Soviets apparently was confined to North Norway. Forty-five Norwegian expatriates comprised the Soviet equivalent of the
Linge Company and established an underground organization in Finnmark, but in 1943 the Germans captured and killed nearly all of them. See Kjell Fjertoft, Lille-Moskva: Den gleme kriegen (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1983). See also Hans Kr. Eriksen, Partisaner i Finnmark (Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1969), for an account of an earlier, similarly ill-fated mission in fall 1941.

47. Ironically, the Quisling regime's projected social welfare policies actually had much in common with the post-war Labor program. Øystein Sorensen, Verdens-krig og Velferd: Britiske, tyske og norske sosialpolitiske planer under annen verdenskrig (Oslo: Cappelens, 1993), and interview with the author, April 1994.

48. For a penetrating biography of Quisling's police minister, see Nils Johan Ringdal, Galmann til rett tid: NS-minister Sverre Riisnaes: en Psykobiografi (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1989). See also Ringdal's more general study of the police under the occupation, Mellom barken og veden: Politiet under okkupasjonen (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1987).


51. HOK to FD. "Innkalling av offiserer til utlandet 1942/43," 24 September 1945: RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 90. The most widely-issued call to officers in Norway, dated 17 March 1943, was phrased, "The government has use for you. Come through Sweden if you can find any way to leave the country. If necessary and possible, take your family with."


54. "Våre offiserer i Tyskland," Arbeiderbladet, 29 May 1945. One officer to escape the roundup was Sigurd Valvatne, who received warning of the order in time to cross into Sweden. After reaching Britain, he

55. Hærens Offisers-Forbund to FD. "Gransking av officerer." 11 September 1945; RA: F0. kat. 1256.1/01, box 90. An OSS report noted that a number of quisling officers were included in the arrest. NA: RG 226, entry 16, report 43746.

56. Olav Rytter, "Norske officerer går i fangenskap." 20 August 1943; RA: F0. kat. 1256.1/01, box 90. Falkenhorst later stated that the arrest stemmed from Terboven's suspicion that many of the officers had joined MILORG. "Bericht und Vernehmung des Generalobersten von Falkenhorst," 18 September 1945; RA: F0. kat. 1256.17/01, box 77. On the implications of the arrest for MILORG, see Charles Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia (New York: Oxford, 1986), 170-74.

57. Ibid., 208.


59. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 213-18, 220. However, Erik Gjems-Onstad, Psykologisk krigføring i Norge: DURHAM - hemmelige operasjoner i Trøndelag mot tyske okkupasjonsmakt, 1943-45 (Oslo: Sollia, 1981), argues that at least in the Trondheim area, propaganda actually was quite effective in demoralizing the Germans. The book contains some interesting reproductions of leaflets employed, for example an erotic photograph of a woman with anti-Nazi slogans printed on the reverse side.

60. Apparently only five men actually signed the letter first-hand, on behalf of the rest. None of the others later denied their endorsement, however, indicating that the five who signed for the rest probably did so in good faith. The main instigator was Tore Holthe. Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 111. 118.

61. Ibid., 108.

62. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:66: Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 109, 115-18. The King's private papers, which he destroyed shortly before his death in 1957, must have contained some interesting evidence of frustration with the cabinet. As always, however, his highest priority was to preserve the lawful constitutional order.

63. Ibid., 110, 117, 137-42. After the incident of the letter, the government's main opponents in London, including Sigbjørn Mustad, fylkesmann Trygve Útheim, and Prof. Johan Holst, tried to enlist the lieutenants in further efforts; but the latter refused to be drawn into any further political adventures.

65. Ibid., 67-70.

66. Ibid., 72-73.

67. Ibid., 83-89, 95-102. When recalcitrant elements of the Home Front attempted to form a "Freedom Council" in opposition to both the Circle and the London government in spring 1944, MILORG effectively stamped out the idea. NA: RG 226, entry 125, box 17, folder 256. Subsequently, the cabinet formulated its understanding with the Circle in a declaration in May 1944, acknowledging "the Norwegian home front leadership, which in consultation with the King and Government represents the free and fighting Norway." Finally, on 5 May 1945, the government granted the home front leadership a temporary but comprehensive mandate to maintain order and take over civil administrative functions during the liberation. Riste, *London-regjeringsa*. II:106, 109.


69. Eystein Fjærli, *Den norske hæren i Storbritannia. 1940-1945* (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1982), 156, 172. In winter 1944-45, the Norwegians also considered rearming the battery with 4.2-inch mortars but concluded that it still would have been essentially road-bound. RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 107. The Norwegians also formed a small coast-artillery unit in Scotland, formally subordinate to the SOK but under British operational control. The main reason for creating such a unit apparently was to employ former coast artillery personnel who had escaped from Norway, without re-training them in a different branch; but in retrospect one wonders whether the men might have proven more useful in the Navy or merchant marine. The unit grew from 27 men in September 1942 to 71 officers and 574 men by 1 May 1945. *Den norske regjeringsens virksomhet*. IV:36-37.

70. The United States and Norway signed a Lend-Lease treaty on 11 July 1942 which eventually provided considerable infusions of material to the Norwegian forces. Army equipment included weapons, vehicles, and radios valued at approximately one million kroner. Ibid., 15.

71. The Norwegian Parachute Company was activated in spring 1942, with a projected strength of 160, although only seventy-five parachute-trained men were initially available. Ibid., 17; Kåre Rodahl, *Tre år som fallskjermhopper* (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1945). Inevitably, the jump training produced many injuries; see *Det norske fallskjermkompani i Storbritannia 1942-45: Tjeneste, skadehypighet og senfølger, spesielt ryggbesvær i efterkrigstiden* (Krigsinvalideforbundet, 1986). The Norwegian commando troop (see below) also underwent parachute training at Ringway in August 1943. Arnfinn Haga, *Klar til storm: Med de norske commandos i annen verdenskrig* (Oslo: Cappelens, 1984), 88-90.

73. Fjærli, Den norske hær i Storbritannia. 228-29. Another aspect of U.S.-Norwegian co-operation in winter warfare was project PLOUGH, a British-inspired program to develop a lightweight tracked vehicle capable of moving over deep snow, originally intended for special operations in Norway. Lieutenant-Colonel A.D. Dahl became the chief Norwegian advisor to the project in Washington, which eventually produced the versatile "Weasel" amphibious tractor. Although it appeared too late to play a part in the war, it later served extensively with both American and Norwegian forces. Riste, London-regjeringen, I:205-6.

74. The venerable but nearly useless Draug, for example, was decommissioned 2 September 1943. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:28. Naval material provided to Norway under Lend-Lease was valued at about 12.5 million kroner, including the large sub-chaser King Håkon VII. Ibid., 15.


77. Sigurd Valvatne, Med Norske ubåter i kamp. Uredd was credited with 3,000 tons of shipping, plus a Saar class depot ship. Ula was credited with eight merchant vessels totalling 30,000 tons, plus one U-boat and one escort, and the third and final Norwegian boat. Utsira was credited with two vessels of 3,500 tons and two U-boats. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:30-31.

78. Riiser-Larsen, "Royal Norwegian Air Forces," 7 June 1941; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59; FFK to FO. "Salg av 'Lille Norge.'" 8 October 1942; Ibid. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:40. The United States supported the Norwegian pilot training program with Lend-Lease material, including fifty Fairchild trainers and expendables, valued at approximately nine million kroner. In fall 1944, the training program was transferred from Canada to RAF Winkleigh in Britain, under the terms of Finance Treaty (see next chapter), and finally to Norway in November-December 1945. Ibid., 15, 40.

79. 330 Squadron flew a total of approximately 700 operational sorties from Shetland in 1943-45, resulting in 15 U-boats sighted, 2 sunk, 2 probables, and 1 enemy aircraft damaged. Ibid., 42.

80. Ibid., 43.

81. Slessor to FFK, 11 March 1943; FFK to Air Ministry, 21 December 1943; Air Ministry to FFK. 22 February 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59. The British did make at least one concession, waiving the cost of
the aircraft themselves (£70,000 and £30,000 each for Sunderlands and Catalinas, respectively), although the Norwegian government still had to pay for their maintenance. \textit{Den norske regjeringens virksomhet}, IV:14.

82. Living conditions were poor at Skeabrae in the Orkneys, and the FFK warned the British in March 1942 that morale was becoming a problem. FFK to 331 Sqn., 6 March 1942, RA: FFK, kat. 1256.4/11, box 6. The squadron operations record book noted in January 1942 that "For six months past there have not been enough plates, cups and saucers to go round, so that often officers are forced to eat off the table without plates . . .". This, however, was by no means the most serious problem. In December 1941 the log noted, "We were ten weeks without undercarriage test trestles, and received dispensation from the daily undercarriage inspection from H.Q. 14 Group. This dispensation was not at all acceptable especially when one considers that the lives of the pilots are endangered by neglecting this important inspection."


85. \textit{Den norske regjeringens virksomhet}, IV:10-11, 15. The night-fighter threat also put an end to limited flights by Swedish civilian aircraft to Britain in 1942-43, whose seats had been allocated mainly for humanitarian purposes.


87. The following account is based on Fjærli, \textit{Krigen i Svalbard}, 48-93.

88. Jon Ulvensjøen, \textit{Brennpunkt Nord: Vårtjenesten 1940-45}. Forsvarsmuseums småskrift Nr.6 (Oslo: Forsvarsmuseum, 1991), provides an account of the various Norwegian weather stations in the Arctic and their German counterparts.
90. Ibid., 111-39; NA: T-312, reel 1050, 9250883; Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:23. Fjaerli describes heavy losses by the German landing party, but the unit that provided the troops, Grenadier Regiment 349 of the 230th Infantry Division, reported only one killed and six wounded, although additional casualties aboard the destroyers may have numbered about fifty. The Germans also reported the number of prisoners as more than sixty, but in this case the Norwegian figures probably are more reliable. NA: T-315, reel 1712, 662. In some respects the episode was reminiscent of 9 April 1940, although this time on a much smaller scale. One ironic aspect of the raid was that the German commander was Admiral Kummetz, whose flagship on 9 April 1940 had been the ill-fated Blücher. One may presume that he took some satisfaction from the sequel.


93. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:110. Hjelle became responsible for administration and discipline of the unit, while a British counterpart remained commandant of the camp itself.


95. Norwegian representatives on the committee were Major Leif Tronstad, Major John Rognes, and Lieutenant-Commander Marstrander, with the latter two later replaced by Lieutenant-Commander Bjarne Øen and Captain Thore Horve. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia. 3.


98. Deinboll returned to Orkla with another team in early 1943 and disabled a large ore carrier with limpet mines, and yet again that fall, when he and his men heavily damaged the railway to the mines. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 192-97.

99. Ibid., 203-4.

100. Ibid., 108-13.


103. Haga, Klar til storm, 24-30. The men came mostly from the former 4th infantry company in Scotland, which had disbanded in June 1942 when the battalion converted to independent mountain companies. The British
wisely refrained from interfering with disciplinary matters among the various national contingents of No. 10 Commando in most cases, but the Norwegians nevertheless developed a considerable reputation for licentiousness. As one anecdote goes, an Irish sergeant complained that the Norwegians were an undisciplined bunch, always given to discussion and comment whenever they received an order. "Sorry," said the Norwegian acting as No. 5 Troop's sergeant-major (a rank and concept alien to the Norwegian Army): "We have eighty-six generals [in this outfit], plus me as sergeant." Ibid., 37.

104. The flotilla consisted of eight boats and 208 men, commanded by Lieutenant Ragnvald Tamber, the same officer who had acted as military governor on Svalbard in August 1941. The MTBs were of a large and relatively slow but seaworthy Fairmile type: 115 feet long, powered by four 1250 horsepower Packard engines, top speed 31 knots, range 900 miles at 18 knots, armed with two 57-mm, one twin 20-mm, two twin machine guns, two torpedoes, and two depth-charges, with a crew of 26. The unit was later redesignated 54 (Norwegian) Flotilla in summer 1943. Ibid., 40-41.

105. Ibid., 51-69; Ian Dear, Ten Commando, 1942-1945 (New York: St. Martin's, 1989), 10-14, 63-72.

106. The Norwegian commandos wore British uniforms and insignia on raids, in order to minimize the likelihood of reprisals against the local population or execution in case of capture; but this made little difference, given Hitler's infamous order to execute all commandos.

107. Haga, Klar til storm, 70-81.

108. The Norwegians received a total of 29 MTBs and 9 motor launches during the war, of which 5 were lost. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:27-28, 31.


110. David Howarth, We Die Alone (London: Collins, 1955). Although the mission was a failure, the survivor Jan Balsrud's incredible resourcefulness and endurance in making good his escape stand as a tribute to the caliber of men who made up Company Linge.


113. Ibid., 268-76; Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 95-96, 277.
114. Howarth, Across to Norway, 100-104, 134, 162-63. In contrast to the episode of the disciplinarian officer in 1942, Howarth commented on the favorable impression Prince Olav made on his visit to the unit in fall of the same year. Olav, Howarth wrote, displayed "the certain way to win the affection and respect of the Norwegians, who would be very ready to despise an aloof and more conventionally dignified ruler." Ibid. 214-16.

115. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 96-97. Howarth's account differs somewhat on the issue of the Shetland unit's final status vis-à-vis the Norwegian Navy: he claims that the unit remained independent to the end, and in operational terms, this was essentially true. With regard to formal arrangements, however, Cruickshank's version appears more reliable.


117. For an account of the mission from the British perspective, see Richard Wiggan, Operation Freshman: The Rjukan Heavy Water Raid, 1942 (London: William Kimber, 1986); see also Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 198. A German-speaking member of 'X' Troop, 10 Commando, later claimed to have accompanied and survived the FRESHMAN fiasco, but the facts remain unclear to the present author. Dear, Ten Commando, 25. Concerning the enforcement of the commando order in Norway, see NA: T-501, reel 316, 420.


120. Ibid., 126-27.

121. State Department to Norwegian Ambassador, 25 January 1944; RA: F0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 60.

122. The most notable deviation from the principle of consultation after the above-noted American raid was an air attack by the Royal Navy on 17 May 1944 that destroyed a herring oil factory at Fosnavåg, which (at least according to the Norwegians) had little value to the Germans but was vital to the local economy. In response to further Norwegian protests, the Air Ministry and the Royal Navy agreed to consult more closely in planning for attacks on Norway in the future. British Ambassador Laurence Collier to Trygve Lie, 19 October 1944; RA: F0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 60. Nevertheless, the British disregarded the Norwegian targeting list at least once more, when the RAF bombed diesel oil tanks at Vallo on 25 April 1945, at the Royal Navy's request. Den norske


125. By the end of the war, this group included ninety-five officers. about thirty of whom were detached for special missions into Norway before the liberation. A total of about four hundred men received training for liaison duty. Ibid., 18-19.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid., 82. "Instruks for sjefen for den norske Militærmisjon," 25 July 1944; Ibid., 177-78. This directive defined Strugstad's position as liaison between FO and Thorne’s Scottish Command. Strugstad’s mission eventually comprised thirteen officers and twenty-three enlisted men. Ibid., 88.


130. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia. 174. On the final point, one ought to distinguish the common contempt for the Nygaardsvold cabinet from the almost universally high regard for the King and Crown Prince. An informal poll conducted in Oslo by Max Manus in spring 1943 generally confirmed these opinions. Ibid., 180-82: Manus, Det vil helst gå godt.


132. Ibid.

133. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:111.

135. Ibid., 34.

136. Hauge succeeded Lieutenant-Colonel Ole Berg as head of MILORG after the latter had to flee to Sweden in late 1942. Berg subsequently became the chief Norwegian military representative in Sweden. (See chapter 9.) Ibid., 33-34, 59.

137. Ibid., 35.

138. The others were Captain Osterras, Dr. Ole Malm, Arne Okkenhaug, and Arthur Hansen.

139. The FO's role in these negotiations amounted to that of a mediator, since it was hardly in a position to dictate to either the British or the Home Front. Cruickshank. SOE in Scandinavia. 179-80, 184.

140. Ibid., 180, 182-83. In the case of SOE's PHEASANT operation, the eventual working arrangement with MILORG involved circumventing the latter's nominal chief, the elderly and nearly deaf General Munthe, whose subordinates "had taken matters out of his hands without ever telling him they had done so." SOE agents played along, pretending to accept his orders "just to keep him quiet," while themselves assuming de facto control of his group's operations. Ibid. 186.

141. Ibid., 220.

142. Accompanying Hauge were two other key MILORG leaders, Olaf Helset and Wladimir Hansson. The London representatives included Ole Berg, Bjarne Øen, and J. Schive. Other major issues addressed were the need to discourage people from joining unsanctioned (i.e., communist) sabotage groups, and to develop an underground civil administration in order to minimize infringements of Norwegian sovereignty by Allied forces during the eventual liberation. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:112; Cruickshank. SOE in Scandinavia, 179-80, 184.


144. Ibid., 59, 63; NA: RG 226, entry 125, box 17, folder 260.

145. "Communist Activity in Norway." NA: RG 226. entry 125. box 17. folder 256. See also entry 21. reports L 53637 and 57292; Byron J. Nordstrom. Dictionary of Scandinavian History (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1986). 216-18; Riste, London-regjeringa. II:42-44, 63. The OSS concluded that Furubotn was by no means entirely subordinate to Moscow, and that the only real obstacle to closer Western co-operation with his organization was the attitude of the government-in-exile. In fact, SOE agents did utilize communist contacts to carry "liquidate" collaborators on at least a few occasions. See Gunnar Sønstebø, Rapport fra "Nr.24" (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1960). However, the communists apparently wasted considerable effort on actions that had little if any bearing on the outcome of the war, such as bank robberies merely to finance their own operations. (The mainstream resistance had no need for such
expedients, since London provided relatively abundant funds.) Christensen. *De som heiste flagget*. 119-20. In a work in progress, Lars Borgersrud nevertheless argues that the communists achieved much more than most historians so far have acknowledged, particularly in the area of shipping sabotage.
EVOLUTION OF LIBERATION PLANS

At the Quebec conference in August 1943, the combined chiefs of staff concluded that the best strategy for Norway was simply to keep as many German forces tied down there as possible. This decision led to the establishment of General Thorne's Scottish Command, with its Norwegian liaison personnel and specialized troops, and a series of updated case plans code-named RANKIN.\(^1\) RANKIN initially comprised three major variations. Case `A' involved a deliberate, opposed invasion; but by fall 1943, SHAEB made clear that this was unlikely. Although the Allies tried to foster the impression that such an invasion was imminent, as part of the general D-Day deception program, in reality Thorne's staff henceforth focused only on the other two cases: `B', which postulated a voluntary German withdrawal from Norway, and `C', which foresaw capitulation of the occupation forces as part of a general German collapse.\(^2\)

The total forces slated for Norway under RANKIN `C' were modest: the British 52nd Division, the Norwegian Brigade, an American infantry regiment plus the 99th Infantry Battalion, and one additional British brigade in reserve. Due to projected lack of shipping, however, even these forces might not reach Norway until six to twelve weeks after an armistice. Moreover, the plan essentially ignored North Norway. Clearly, liberating Norway was among the least of SHAEB's worries.\(^3\) Thorne's more detailed operational plans specified that if Allied forces
ever did invade Norway, the Norwegian units (with the possible exception of the parachute company) would not take part in the initial landings, but would enter the bridge-head as early reinforcements. Given the small numbers and special capabilities of the Norwegian forces, this policy made good sense.4

In the wake of the Allies' opportunistic bargain with Admiral Darlan's Vichy administration in North Africa, it occurred to the Norwegian government that the Allies might also contemplate a similar deal with Quisling. Although there is no evidence that anyone ever seriously considered the idea, such fears prompted the government to begin lobbying for Crown Prince Olav's appointment as commander-in-chief of Allied forces slated for Norway.5

Although the idea appeared fanciful given his modest military experience, the proposal assumed that he would be essentially a figurehead, with a British or American deputy exercising operational command. The point was to insure that Allied policy would remain firmly linked with the legitimate, constitutional government. The British predictably rejected the idea, since such a precedent would prompt similar demands by other governments-in-exile, and proposed instead that Olav become chief of the Norwegian military liaison mission attached to Thorne's Scottish Command, the headquarters responsible for hypothetical operations in Norway. To the Norwegians, however, such a subordinate position would have been beneath the Crown Prince's dignity.6

The matter became less important following the signing of the liberation treaties with the Allies in 1943-44, but the cabinet eventually concluded that it needed to put Olav in some type of conspicuous military position for the sake of royal and national prestige. This resulted in his formal appointment as Forsvarssjef on 30 June 1944, technically relieving Hansteen, although with the latter remaining as deputy. The cabinet apparently also hoped that loyalty to the crown would help persuade the independent communist resistance to accept orders from London.7

According to Hansteen, Olav's appointment was essentially a propaganda gesture for public consumption in Norway, a "facade" to mitigate the embarrassing fact that only a small fraction of the forces
that eventually liberated the country would be Norwegian. Both the government and the forces-in-exile would thus benefit from the Crown Prince's overwhelming popularity. Torp questioned the constitutionality of the move, since by definition a member of the royal family could not be responsible to a cabinet that was in turn responsible to the crown. The issue never became urgent, however, because like his father, Olav carefully avoided political controversies and filled the post in a soldierly and competent, if undramatic manner.8

One of the major questions concerning the FO staff in joint liberation planning was extent to which Norway would have to accept temporary Allied government. In a memorandum that established the basic Norwegian position in subsequent negotiations, Bjørn Christophersen recognized that Allied commanders inevitably must have ultimate authority in the initial phase of liberation, but with Norwegian deputies and civil advisors on their immediate staffs.9

As in other cases, the British proved more agreeable than the Americans: for while the former signed a binding treaty on liberation procedures on 19 May 1943, the latter tried to impose the AMGOT system, which would have treated Norway more as a defeated enemy than as a liberated ally. Apart from a certain degree of simple arrogance, the American position seems to have stemmed from a belief that the Norwegian administration was thoroughly infested with quislings and thus would require a more thorough rehabilitation than anything the Norwegians themselves were willing or able to undertake. With British support, however, the government-in-exile staved off such plans and obtained a favorable civil affairs treaty with the United States in May 1944.10

Preparations for handling civil affairs in liberated Norway included a six-week training course in London for thirty-one Allied civil affairs officers, including both military men and civil servants.11 Crown Prince Olav, Defense Minister Torp, and justice minister Terje Wold participated in a meeting with Thorne's staff on 11-15 August 1944, entitled Exercise PERCY, to discuss civil affairs policy during the eventual liberation.12 These consultations eventually resulted in the publication entitled the Norway Liberation Handbook, a manual of procedures and guidelines for Allied troops in dealing with
both the Germans and the civilian population. Among the changes implemented in the final draft at Norwegian insistence was the substitution of "liberation" for the word "occupation," which the British and Americans had used in many passages, obviously lifting paragraphs directly from the equivalent manual for Germany. By May 1945, there were twelve civil affairs officers attached to Thorne's staff and fourteen others assigned to the various British zone commanders.13

The Norwegian FO staff in London also devoted considerable attention to preparations for raising new forces in liberated areas. In order to provide legal authority for conscription in such areas, the government enacted an extraordinary conscription law on 24 March 1944. This law enabled temporary remobilization of previous conscripts as well as classes since 1940.14

As in other cases, however, the real problem lay more in the shortage of leadership than in manpower. The temporary surplus of officers in Britain allowed the creation of district cadre staffs, which by May 1945 included 201 officers.15 Thirty-five of them accompanied the Norwegian police units from Sweden during the liberation, and by the end of the war forty-seven other cadre officers were in Finnmark, from which the Germans already had withdrawn (see below). Thirty-five others went into Norway on covert missions, mostly as instructors for MILORG cells.16

NORWEGIAN POLICE TROOPS IN SWEDEN

In the final year of the war, the paramilitary Norwegian "police troops" in Sweden became an increasingly important element of Norwegian plans for liberation. On 5 February 1944, the military attaché in Stockholm established the tables of organization for the reserve police battalions, each to include 727 men, as follows: battalion headquarters, three rifle companies (each of three rifle platoons and two machine guns sections), a weapons company (two machine guns platoons, a mortar platoon, and an anti-tank platoon), and a service company (including motorcycle, communications, engineer, medical, and transport
detachments). Additional Rikspoliti (National Police) companies each consisted of a headquarters, a transport platoon, three police platoons, and one special platoon. The Rikspoliti companies were fully motorized, and the reserve police battalions were originally to be so as well. However, a shortage of trucks and requirements for off-road movement led to the decision on 21 August 1944 to adopt partial horse transport.

Expanding upon the original goals laid out in 1943, the Norwegians now projected ten Rikspoliti companies and twelve reserve police battalions. Although the Norwegian government regarded police service as obligatory, the Swedes refused to enforce formal conscription of refugees. This led to a considerable number of desertions from the camps, most frequently by men seeking employment in order to send money back to families in Norway. The Swedish government eventually helped to curtail such desertions by restricting terms of refugee status.

Manpower thus was relatively ample, but lack of equipment remained a serious obstacle to effective training. On 27 March 1944 the Norwegians presented a list of requirements for Swedish material, including 7,800 rifles, 3,600 submachine guns, 660 automatic rifles and machine guns, 180 mortars, 30 20-mm machine-cannons, and 15 37-mm antitank guns. The shopping list also included a wide variety of other material such as communications gear and ammunition. On 31 March 1944 the Swedes agreed in principle to meet the Norwegian requests, with the stipulation that most of the equipment would remain stored in Swedish depots until the government in Stockholm decided to permit actual mobilization of the Norwegian units. Small-arms training began in February 1944, but the Swedes apparently did not begin to provide any heavier weapons until 8 September 1944. By 30 December 1944, eight battalions had full infantry equipment but still lacked field artillery. About 75 percent of these men were prime recruits, aged 19-25; but the battalions still had serious shortcomings as a combat force. A German intelligence report described morale in the camps as poor and claimed that many of the men wished they had never left Norway.

In September 1944, Colonel Olaf Helset became acting chief of the police forces staff in Sweden, subordinate to the military attaché. Helset's challenge was to turn the loosely-organized battalions into a
usable combat force, and this demanded the organization of brigades with support units. The projected organization of each brigade included a headquarters and staff, a reconnaissance company, two or three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, a supply company, a truck company, and ambulance company, and a field hospital.

On 1-8 December 1944, the police units held their first significant field maneuver in Dalarne, Sweden. A total of approximately 4,800 men participated, including the following units: two improvised brigade staffs, three reserve police battalions (1, 2, and 5), two partial reserve battalions (7 and 8), two Rikspoliti companies (1 and 2), two partial Rikspoliti companies (3 and 4), one truck company, one field hospital, one improvised communications platoon, and one improvised "supply station." In overall command of the exercise was the Norwegian military attaché, Colonel Ole Berg, with Swedish Colonel N. Swedlund directing the actual training operations. The main result of the maneuvers was to demonstrate that the police troops were still far short of being effective combat units. The greatest problems apparently were at the battalion and brigade levels, because of the severe shortage of experienced officers.21 After meeting with a Swedish general who had just observed the maneuvers, a German agent reported, "These police formations cannot be described as military units, nor their exercises as real maneuvers. There is a general lack of leadership, energy, decisiveness, and unit cohesion."22

Training for a small artillery unit finally commenced in March 1945, and by May the total strength of the police units was approximately 14,300, organized into three brigades (which the Norwegians called groups). The formations still lacked adequate artillery and reconnaissance support, however. There was only one small motorized artillery battalion with two batteries of 75-mm guns obtained from the old 1st Division's formerly-interned material.23

A subsequent, larger exercise on 4-14 April 1945 included approximately 6,000 men, in the following units: two brigade staffs, one partial brigade staff, five Rikspoliti companies (4-8), five reserve police battalions (III, IV, VI-VIII), two truck companies, two partial supply companies, two field hospitals, and two ambulance companies. The
results this time indicated considerable improvements in operational capability.\textsuperscript{24} Nevertheless, as the war in Europe approached its bitter conclusion, it remained clear that the police troops constituted no viable assault force for an invasion of Norway against determined German resistance. If the occupation authorities chose to capitulate peacefully, the units in Sweden stood ready to help fill the power vacuum that would follow; but it remained to be seen how the Allies could overthrow Festung Norwegen if the enemy elected to fight on.

NORWEGIAN FORCES IN BRITAIN, 1944-45

On 4 October 1944, Norway and Britain concluded a revised finance treaty for the maintenance of the forces-in-exile, effective retroactively from 1 June 1944, to remain in effect until six months after the war's end. Under this agreement, Britain provided all equipment and maintenance (i.e., everything except pay) to the Norwegian Army free of charge. In return, Norway would provide services such as quarters and transport to British forces in Norway without payment after the liberation. This arrangement thus lasted until 8 November 1945.\textsuperscript{25}

Although the creation of the FFK had established a convenient mechanism for co-operation with the RAF, the question of officially and permanently merging the Army and naval air arms into an independent air force remained a matter of contention among the FO staff in London. Riiser-Larsen admitted that doing so would not present any great problems in the short-term, but he expressed reservations regarding the long-term wisdom of the idea, which clearly would have major repercussions in the structure of Norway's postwar military.\textsuperscript{26} As always, the Navy fought tooth-and-nail against the idea, frequently citing the RAF's control of naval aviation between the wars as a cautionary example.\textsuperscript{27}

In April 1943, the defense department had instructed the FFK to re-examine the question of formal unification of the two aviation branches into an independent air force. In its report on 31 July 1944, the FFK recommended in favor of the move, on grounds of both economy and operational efficiency. Predictably, the Navy remained opposed to the
In April 1944, the Norwegian fighter squadrons transferred to Bognor on the Channel coast, from which they participated in the pre-invasion air campaign, dropping 500-pound bombs. After providing air cover and ground support for the landings, buildup, and breakout stages of the Normandy operation, the squadrons transferred to the first of a series of advanced bases in France on 20 August 1944. In October they moved into Belgium, and by the end of December they were in Holland.30

As Luftwaffe opposition waned, the squadrons were increasingly devoted to ground-attack, often with heavy attrition. In support of the assault on Walcheren, for example, the Norwegians flew nearly one hundred close air support sorties, at a cost of seven aircraft and two pilots.31 On 29 December 1944, however, there was one more large air battle that turned out to be the Norwegians' greatest single success in air-to-air combat during the war. The day began with a violent engagement in which 331 Squadron destroyed four FW-190s but lost four Spitfires as well. On a subsequent sortie, however, the Norwegians had things all their way. Ten Spitfires were patrolling between Arnhem and Enschede when they encountered no less than twenty-five Me-109s. A slaughter ensued, in which the Norwegians claimed twelve kills and two damaged while suffering no friendly losses. The squadron's report concluded.

In view of the superiority in numbers of [enemy aircraft] and the results achieved it appears that the Hun pilots were inexperienced. On the other hand it is unusual that they go for attack even in superior strength and, no doubt, they had in keeness [sic] what they lacked in combat experience, resulting in a record day [for] 331(N) Squadron.32

The two squadrons finally returned to Britain on 26 April 1945 after eight months of continuous service. 331 Squadron's total, official
scores for the war were 114 kills, 23 probables, and 74 damaged; 332 Squadron was credited with 82 kills, 11.5 probables, and 49.5 damaged.3³

In September 1944, the ten-plane Mosquito flight of 333 Squadron formed the cadre of a new, separate squadron, number 334. The Catalinas of 333 Squadron meanwhile carried out twenty-two special operations, sank one U-boat, and damaged at least two others. The Mosquitos' total scores included eighteen kills, three probables, and two damaged, plus two U-boats sunk and one damaged.3⁴

Morale became a problem in some of the Norwegian squadrons during the closing months of the war, particularly 330 Squadron, which was still flying Sunderlands. As Riiser-Larsen wrote, "The Squadron has worked for 4 years in the Northern Area at remote and isolated places. This is bound to have a certain influence on the personnel ... No other Allied or British squadron has been employed for so long period under the same conditions." Yet again the FFK pressed for conversion of the squadron to different aircraft, but the British still refused, citing the overriding importance of the Sunderlands in coping with the resurgent U-boat threat.3⁵

The FO staff also attempted to withdraw the two Norwegian Spitfire squadrons from the continent and re-equip them with Mustangs, in order to provide long-range fighter cover for eventual landings in Norway. This also proved impossible, however, because withdrawing the two squadrons would have disrupted the entire 132 (Norwegian) Wing, which now included three other RAF squadrons as well, with Norwegian personnel filling many key positions in the combined organization. Such was the price of operational integration with the Allies.3⁶

The Royal Norwegian Navy meanwhile continued to play a relatively low-key but vital role in the relentless war at sea. In addition to the Battle of the Atlantic, Norwegian destroyers, MTBs, and minesweepers participated in the Normandy operation. It was off the invasion beaches, the first night after the landings, that the Norwegians suffered their worst naval loss since 1940, when a German S-Boat sank the fleet destroyer Svenner. By the end of the war, the Norwegians established an extensive chain of naval depots at Devonport, Liverpool, Dumbarton, Peterhead, Port Edgar, Edinburgh, Dundee, Skegness, Lerwick.
Scalloway, Reykjavik, Lunenburg (Canada), Travers Island (NY), and Kirkenes. They also appointed naval attachés to Britain, the United States, and Sweden. By May 1945 the Navy had a total strength of 1,116 officers and cadets, and 6,209 enlisted men.37

Manpower remained a matter of bitter contention among the respective services. In early 1944, the Norwegian-American Colonel Bernt Balchen of the USAF organized a long-range airlift code-named Operation BALDER, to transfer approximately two thousand Norwegians from Sweden to Scotland in U.S. aircraft. Conflicting priorities delayed the operation, however, and it did not begin until April 1944, after which the short summer nights became a problem. First priority on the BALDER flights went to prospective pilots, of whom there were about one hundred awaiting transport to Britain. After them, the Army was to receive the lion's share of the other recruits. The Norwegians originally had hoped to transfer some of the men who already had received some paramilitary training in the police camps, but the Swedes agreed to release only men who had not yet begun such training. By the time the airlift formally ended on 22 November 1944, the Americans had ferried a total of 1,578 men to Britain. Of these, 556 went to the Army, 359 to the air force(s), 251 to the Navy, 95 to the coast artillery, 271 to the merchant fleet, and 44 to civil administration.38

The high proportion of BALDER personnel assigned to the Army in Scotland reflected a partial shift in priorities as the war entered its final stages. Whereas previously the air forces, Navy, and merchant fleet had been the only forces with any real prospect of making a major contribution to victory, the increasingly imminent liberation of the home country in 1944 demanded combat-ready ground forces. With the infusion of manpower from Sweden, the HOK activated two new units: a reconnaissance squadron of fourteen officers and 223 men, equipped with armored cars, jeeps, and Bren-carriers, and a transport company of 2 officers, 59 men, and 35 heavy trucks.39

In August 1944, the withdrawal of the 52nd Lowland Division from Scotland for service on the continent caused a kind of crisis among the Norwegian units. The division's transfer made it obvious that no invasion of Norway was going to take place, and the Norwegian troops
almost unanimously demanded that they be sent to France as well. Otherwise, as the brigade commander Colonel Just warned HOK, morale would plummet and the highly-trained unit would wither on the vine. "The men," he concluded, ".. Would rather be under British than Norwegian command ... [because] the organization of the Norwegian land forces does not enjoy their confidence." In truth, the Norwegian "Brigade" was more an administrative entity than a tactical unit, and the troops understood that they were unlikely to see action as an independent force. Part of the reason they were so anxious to fight, meanwhile, was that they had begun to wear out their welcome among Scottish civilians, many of whom had watched their own men march off to die while the Norwegians became a permanent fixture. By summer 1944, as one officer recalled, ".. the Norwegian soldiers were receiving insults. Many no longer applied for furloughs because of it." The defense department took up the question of sending Norwegian troops to France on 22 August 1944, and the issue went to the cabinet for resolution. Despite the numerous appeals from the men in Scotland, the government concluded that given the small size of the Norwegian units available, these forces had to remain in reserve, lest unforeseen events lead to a sudden German withdrawal or surrender in Norway. Recognizing that this decision would be unpopular in the Army, the Defense Ministry spelled out the government's reasons clearly in its reply to the FO.

The only exceptions to the policy of retaining the Norwegian ground forces in Scotland were the Norwegian 5 Troop of 10 Inter-Allied Commando and the liaison officers attached to the 52nd Division. The latter were forty-eight in number, and they participated fully in the division's advance through France and the Low Countries, losing seven killed and ten wounded. The Norwegian government decided to recall these men as well in December 1944, which caused further anger and disappointment among many of the men concerned.

The Norwegian commando troop meanwhile landed in Normandy on 30 September 1944, as part of the British 4th Special Service Brigade. Attached to 41 Royal Marine Commando, the Norwegians participated in the
bloody amphibious assault on Walcheren on 1 November 1944, remaining in action until the last major German bastion on the island capitulated on November 8. Overall casualties among the commandos on Walcheren mounted to a devastating 50 percent, but 5 Troop was fortunate to lose only four dead. The only apparent explanation for this is simply good luck, because British reports indicated the Norwegians consistently attacked with extraordinary courage and determination. Appropriately enough, the first Allied cargo ship to pass the island on its way to Antwerp was a Norwegian freighter.45

THE FINNMARK CAMPAIGN, 1944-45

In autumn 1944, the German position in the far north became untenable, prompting a phased withdrawal and a ruthless scorched-earth policy that seemed to foreshadow the possible devastation of the entire country. In response, the Norwegians improvised a small expedition to reoccupy Finnmark and relieve the plight of refugees. What followed remains one of the least-known chapters of the war, but it had significant repercussions for Norway's relations with the Allies in the immediate postwar period.46

As early as spring 1944, the situation on the Eastern Front prompted the Norwegian staff in London to consider the possibility of a German withdrawal and Soviet advance into North Norway. Such a scenario inevitably awakened renewed fears of Soviet designs on Norwegian territory. As Trygve Lie's confidant Arne Ording noted privately in February 1944, "Remarkably enough, it appears that the English are not the least bit interested in North Norway."47 It therefore seemed imperative to reach a separate agreement with the Soviets concerning the liberation of Norwegian territory, and this led to a jurisdiction treaty on 16 May 1944, in conjunction with the American one. The decision to sign such a treaty was a difficult one for the Norwegians, since it amounted to a formal invitation of Russian forces into Norway. Since the Soviets clearly would pursue the Germans into Norway in any case if it suited them, however, there was no viable alternative.48
Although Norwegian-Soviet relations seemed to warm considerably with the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviets refused to make any definite military commitments. They did, however, respond enthusiastically to a proposal by General Steffens, the Norwegian military attaché in Moscow, for the transfer of Norwegian forces to the Murmansk front. The idea was to send most of the Norwegian recruits in Sweden to Russia, where the Soviets promised to equip them fully with the latest weapons in the Red Army's arsenal. The plan foundered, however, on a combination of scepticism in London and Swedish refusal to release the internees.\(^4\)

A meeting between Hansteen and Eisenhower's chief of staff Bedell-Smith in March 1944 seemed to indicate SHAEF's agreement in principle that the Allies would send forces to North Norway if the Germans evacuated the region.\(^5\) It subsequently became clear, however, that neither the British nor SHAEF would regard a German withdrawal from Finmark as sufficient cause to activate RANKIN Case 'B', a fact underlined by the detachment of the 52nd Division from Thorne's command in August 1944.\(^5\)

Events began moving quickly in Finland, with President Ryti's resignation on August 25 leading to a ceasefire with the Soviets on September 4 on condition that the Finns promptly expel all Germans from the country, if necessary by force. The Germans still had strong forces in Lapland, the Twentieth Mountain Army, now under General Lothar Rendulic following Dietl's death; and they initially planned to try to hold the Petsamo region despite Finland's defection. The defense plan was Operation BIRKE. After learning from Speer that the nickel mines there were no longer essential to German requirements, on October 3 Hitler authorized a phased withdrawal to a consolidated position at Lyngenfjord/Skibotn, code-named Operation NORDLICHT, in order to forestall a possible Allied amphibious attack on Rendulic's rear. Predictably, the plan emphasized the necessity of leaving behind nothing but scorched earth. On October 7, the Soviet Fourteenth Army opened a powerful offensive on the Murmansk front that forced the German XIX Mountain Corps back more rapidly than planned, and the first Russian forces entered Norway on October 18.\(^5\)
Soviet strategy did not call for a deep advance into Norway, and following the capture of Kirkenes on October 23, the Russians closed down the offensive. Molotov welcomed Norwegian ambassador Andvord's renewed proposal to send Norwegian units from Britain, however, since this would enable the further withdrawal of Soviet forces. As an initial step in this process, Molotov on October 18 invited the Norwegians to send a new military mission to north Russia. Colonel A. Dahl (veteran of the Narvik campaign) became head of the liaison mission, and on October 25 the FO directed that he and any forces to follow would be under temporary Soviet operational control. Dahl arrived at Murmansk on November 7, where he joined the Norwegian military attache General Steffens.

The Norwegians meanwhile opened discussions with Thorne's Scottish Command on October 19-25 regarding the logistics of the proposed expedition to the north. Although the British did not rule it out entirely, they refused to make any major commitments. Churchill was inclined to send everything the Allies could scrape together, including all of the Norwegian ground units; but General Ismay emphasized the need to hold most of these in reserve in case other developments required the activation of RANKIN in southern Norway. When Stalin learned that nothing more than a token contribution was forthcoming, he telegraphed to Churchill, "I must state that the Norwegian Ambassador in Moscow spoke to Molotov of more solid measures against the Germans on the part of the Norwegians. . . . Surely there are more available than that. This is their chance to go back to their country."

Thus, due to conflicting British and Allied priorities, the expedition to Finnmark initially amounted only to the 2nd Mountain Company, under the rather grandiose designation Force 138, which sailed from Scotland aboard HMS Berwick on October 30 and arrived at Murmansk on November 6. On November 9-10, the unit proceeded to Petsamo aboard Russian craft, and thence overland to Kirkenes by truck. The entire operation was code-named CROFTER.

The Soviets assigned the Norwegian company to patrol the no-man's land west of Kirkenes, and the unit quickly discovered the appalling
extent of destruction the Germans had left behind. As Dahl reported on November 18.

[Kirkenes] was practically unrecognizable. The infrastructure was totally demolished, no quays usable, telephone, telegraph, water pipes and toilets smashed. . . . The Germans are in the process of completely devastating Finnmark. The damage is worse than even the most pessimistic imagination could have conceived. . . . People are living in the woods."}

Bureaucratic disarray and jurisdictional squabbles among various Allied agencies delayed the dispatch of a convoy from Britain with relief supplies for the refugees. SHAEF finally released an allotment of 6,000 tons on November 28, but the allocation of shipping involved further delays.68

Although Dahl's troops initially were too few to mount any deliberate attacks on the retreating enemy, there were several skirmishes and small engagements as far-ranging Norwegian patrols encountered German stragglers in the course of the long Arctic night.59 The Norwegians meanwhile worked to augment their forces by various expedients. Almost immediately in December 1944, Dahl had begun recruiting able-bodied refugees to form new units, according to the special conscription law recently enacted by the government. Most of these special conscripts were veterans of the 1940 campaign, and by 25 January 1945 there were approximately 600 men in four companies, bolstered by a cadre of seventeen officers and three sergeants assigned from the district command pool in Britain. In February the Soviets released operational control of Dahl's units, at which point the Norwegians formally activated the Finnmark District Command. With his new autonomy and forces now numbering about 1,400 men, Dahl prepared to launch a sizeable attack on a German rear-guard position at Repparfjord on February 14; but the Germans retreated first, leaving the Norwegians to resume their arduous pursuit. By 16 March 1945, the local recruits amounted to two light infantry battalions.60

Although Dahl and his men were doing their best with the limited resources at hand, they desperately needed reinforcements, and above all

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supplies, to aid the roughly 40,000 refugees left behind by the ruthless Germans. USAF Colonel Bernt Balchen again entered the picture by organizing an airlift of Norwegian police troops from Sweden to Finnmark. By this point the Swedes had eased their previous restrictions on the release of such units for possible combat service, and the operation began in December 1944. Only ten C-47s were available, however, and given the severe weather, darkness, poor airfields, and distances involved, the flow of men and supplies amounted to only a trickle. Nevertheless, by the time the airlift ended in February, the Americans had transported Police Companies 1 and 2, elements of Reserve Police Battalion II, and a field hospital. With the arrival of these units, Dahl's forces numbered nearly 3,200 men by April 1945.61

In March and April 1945, the Norwegians also attempted to advance toward Tromso from Sweden overland, through the so-called Finnish corridor. The 1st Police Brigade, consisting of Police Company 3, Reserve Police Battalions 1 and 5, and support units totalling approximately 2,000 men, marched through Lappland with both Swedish and Finnish assistance and established a base at Karesuando. Severe winter conditions made the road practically impassable, however; and it proved impossible to mount a viable attack on the strong German position at Kilpisjärvi on the Norwegian border.62

The Norwegian government and military staff in London meanwhile pressured the Allies to mount a larger operation in North Norway. After learning of the destruction in Finnmark, the cabinet directed the FO to plan a landing that would cut off the German retreat and thus halt the progress of the scorched-earth policy. Although the logic of this idea was questionable, the FO proceeded to study the problem and presented the British with "An Appreciation of the Possibilities," dated 26 November 1944, of an amphibious landing in the Lofotens and the Bodø area. The official British reply on December 13 that there were no forces available surely came as no surprise to the FO.63

With the lives and welfare of thousands of Norwegians at stake, however, the government refused to leave the issue at that. Crown Prince Olav in his role as Forsvarssjef visited Washington in January 395
1945, in order to appeal directly to both Roosevelt and the Combined Chiefs of Staff for more supplies and reinforcements to Finnmark. Although Olav did meet with General Marshall, the President and other chiefs of staff were preoccupied with or already on their way to the impending Yalta conference; and the visit achieved little if anything.64

In March 1945, the Norwegian naval staff in London studied various possibilities for pushing westward more aggressively from advanced bases in Finnmark, but they concluded that German air and naval units based at Tromsø remained too great a threat to the meager Allied forces available.65 The only notable diversion of Allied forces the Norwegians were able to obtain for Finnmark was the brief detachment of three British destroyers from a Murmansk convoy to rescue about 500 refugees from the island of Sørøya on 14-16 February 1945.66

When the Norwegians continued to pursue their "Finnmark Plan" with the British, Thorne eventually advised the chiefs of staff that if the Norwegians were absolutely set upon the idea, the Allies had better consent to detach at least the rest of the Norwegian brigade in Scotland. SHAEF reluctantly agreed, with the understanding that there would be no question of further reinforcements; the Norwegians would be on their own and therefore had better not pursue the Germans too closely. Despite this grudging agreement in principle, however, the bottom line remained the lack of shipping; and the War Office effectively stonewalled the plan until VE-Day finally made it irrelevant.67

Part of the reason for the extreme British stinginess with shipping probably was the general anxiety over the eleventh-hour resurgence of the U-boat threat, in connection with the appearance of the advanced and highly dangerous Type XXI and XXIII "super-submarines." Nevertheless, the fact that the Norwegians could not even detach a few of their own merchant ships for an assignment so vital to their own interests must have been extraordinarily galling.

For the most part, the Norwegians (at least the leadership in London) understood and accepted the need to avoid diverting Allied forces from the decisive struggle on the continent. At times, however, the British military bureaucracy seemed to carry the principle of
"economy of force" too far, to the point of callous disregard for humanitarian considerations. For example, when the Norwegians urgently requested an allotment of prefabricated Nissen huts to provide shelter for refugees in Finnmark, the British replied that much to their regret, the entire stock of huts currently available in the U.K. was already slated for shipment to India.68

As Olav Riste concluded, "... there can be no doubt that the deeply discouraging treatment of the Finnmark Plan [by the British] contributed strongly to the cooling of relations between Norway and Great Britain at the end of the war."69 Overall, the episode illustrates how completely subordinate the Norwegian forces were to Allied control in operational matters; and the only immediate Allied interest in Finnmark was negative: to avoid diversion of scarce resources from the final, decisive push in Germany.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND THE HOME FRONT, 1944-45

In the final year of the war, the Home Front leadership and the authorities in London achieved a close working relationship as they struggled to prepare for the crisis of liberation. Following the landmark conference of May 1943, Home Front representatives again met with their London counterparts in Sweden in March 1944. The talks this time focused on MILORG's role in the three main variations of the RANKIN case plans, and on the question of whether the organization should undertake more limited preparatory operations in the meantime. Jens Christian Hauge visited London to pursue these questions in August 1944 and again in November. Numerous MILORG leaders also visited Sweden in connection with the police troops' field exercise in February - March 1945. By that point, London was also in daily contact with every MILORG district, via the SOE's extensive radio net.70 One way or another, "The Day" would arrive for MILORG to emerge from hiding. If the Germans chose to fight to the bitter end, however, the prospects were grim: MILORG could field only about 30,000 lightly-armed men, against more than ten times as many fully-equipped Germans. The worst scenario
envisioned a German "scorched earth" policy for Norway, which would leave the country in ruins and cripple the postwar economy.71

One of the specific questions facing the Allies was whether (and if so, how) to interdict the expected transfer of German forces from Norway to the south. In late 1944, these forces totalled more than 400,000 men. The SOE planned an ambitious wave of railroad sabotage in conjunction with the Normandy landings, but most of these operations proved abortive.72 SHAEF concluded subsequently that it would rather allow the Germans to withdraw from Norway anyway, on the grounds that it would be easier to destroy such forces on the continent than in fortified Norwegian positions.

As the United States assumed an increasing share of the burden in the war against Germany, the Americans also became involved in Norwegian special operations. In 1943, Colonel George S. Brewer of the OSS developed plans for guerrilla operations in Norway, involving the 99th Infantry Battalion, a special unit composed of Norwegian-Americans who were undergoing arctic combat training in Iceland. Neither the British nor the Norwegian authorities welcomed American interference in the already complicated situation, however, and they effectively joined forces to scuttle Brewer's project.73

The Americans did, however, obtain considerable influence in the overall direction of northern operations. Commander Unger Vetlesen, head of OSS's Norwegian desk, joined the ANCC in March 1943. The SOE and OSS established a combined section in London in September of that year, and in January 1944 the two agencies officially combined their Norwegian sections, with Vetlesen remaining the American representative. Finally, on 1 May 1944, the U.S., Britain, and Norway formed a three-way organization as part of the SFHQ (Special Forces Headquarters), responsible to SHAEF.74

The SOE meanwhile played a key role in foiling the occupation regime's great, final effort to draft Norwegian manpower for the Russian front. In spring 1944, the AT (Arbeidstjeneste: labor service, or pioneer corps) administration prepared to draft 75,000 young men, ostensibly for domestic projects but with the ultimate intention of military service under German command. The SOE soon learned of the plan
and assigned the "Oslo Gang." under the leadership of the veteran Linge
men Gunnar Sønsteby and Max Manus, to derail it. The agents proceeded
to launch an audacious daylight raid on the AT headquarters in downtown
Oslo, destroying not only irreplaceable conscription records but also
the machines used to print registration cards and other official
documents. With the AT administration in a shambles, the Nazis were
essentially powerless to implement their plan; and with ample warning
from the BBC and the underground press, thousands more Norwegian men
went into hiding to evade conscription.75

The draft-evaders, or "boys in the woods" as Norwegians came to
call them, presented MILORG with a new source of recruits. The SOE
assisted in organizing them by establishing a series of secret
wilderness camps to provide shelter, supplies, weapons, and training.
The camps were code-named Elg (Valdres valley), Orm (Glomma valley),
Hjort (Trøndelag), and Bjørn (Bergen region, sub-divided into East and
West). Most of them were so well hidden in remote areas that the
Germans never found them; but as we shall see below, Bjørn West was not
so lucky.76

A report by the FO.IV staff in December 1944 revealed that MILORG
was still far from ready for active operations. (See appendix.) In
response to the lack of equipment that the report indicated, the Allies
increased the priority of supplies to MILORG and mounted an impressive
series of air drops by the RAF and USAAF over Norway, sometimes with as
many as twenty aircraft on a single mission. The Germans seldom managed
to intercept Allied transport aircraft over Norway, but they showed
remarkable ingenuity in efforts to frustrate the air drops right up to
the end. German aircraft would often loiter over suspected areas at
night in hopes that the Norwegians on the ground would mistake them for
friends and light the drop-zone beacons. They also deployed paratroops
in a search-and-destroy role on at least one occasion. On 23 March
1945, a Ju-52 dropped a team directly on top of a MILORG party north of
Oslo; but the Norwegians managed to escape." The intrepid crews of the
"Shetland Bus" meanwhile continued their voyages to Norway as well,
providing an essential complement to the airlift.77

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Air drops to Bjørn West, which began in November 1944, eventually alerted the Germans to the camp's existence and led to a large-scale search-and-destroy operation in the final weeks of the war. Apparently after receiving a tip from a quisling informer, German patrols in late April 1945 began closing an "iron ring" around Bjørn West. The camp by this time had 259 men, under Captain Harald Risnes, formerly of the Norwegian commando troop; but only 160 of the men so far had effective combat training. Armed mainly with Bren Guns and American carbines, they faced a total of at least 800 German infantry in a series of skirmishes that lasted from April 28 until May 7. By virtue of superior tactics and knowledge of the terrain, the guerrillas inflicted 117 German casualties in return for only eight Norwegians killed. Then, on May 9, they "came down from the hills" to accept the German surrender in Bergen. Apart from their own skill, the defenders of Bjørn West benefited from the fact that the Germans failed to obtain any significant air or artillery support. Undoubtedly most of the German soldiers had little remaining enthusiasm by this point, either, for pressing home the attack; but the defense nevertheless represented an amazing exploit. Contrary to popular images, this was the only real example of a major, partisan-style engagement in Norway.79

By the end of the war, nearly all of MILORG's approximately 40,000 members had at least small arms. Total weapons air-dropped to MILORG included approximately 3,000 Bren guns, 7,000 Sten, 22,000 Lee-Enfield rifles, 7,000 U.S. carbines, 7 million rounds of ammunition, and 40 tons of explosive, with an estimated 75 percent rate of successful recovery.80

In fall 1944, SHAEF reversed its earlier decision and concluded that it would be better to interdict the transfer of German forces from Norway after all, due to the increasingly difficult situation of Allied armies on the Western Front. It also became apparent that German units presented more favorable targets to air power while packed into transport ships than when on the ground, and the withdrawal of Rendulic's army from Finnmark involved a major increase in such traffic. Attacking shipping in Norwegian waters presented political problems, however. When the FO learned in September 1944 that SHAEF had declared
open season on coastal traffic, the Norwegians quickly lodged a strong protest pointing out that local maritime commerce was essential to the survival of the local civilian population. As a compromise, the Norwegians proposed to exclude targets smaller than 1,500 tons not sailing in convoy, or any target smaller than 500 flying the Norwegian flag. The Admiralty refused to commit itself to such restrictions but did promise to review the rules of engagement in light of Norwegian interests.81

In October 1944, SHAEF ordered the SOE and MILORG to interdict the transfer of German troops as well, and this decision led to a further series of attacks on railway targets. After careful preparation, the first operations began on December 9. The single most tangible success was the destruction of an entire troop train crossing the Jørstad bridge in Trøndelag on 13 January 1945, and the bridge remained impassable for two weeks. The campaign culminated in a wave of co-ordinated operations on 14 March 1945, involving over 1,000 men in simultaneous attacks on dozens of crucial railroad installations throughout southern and central Norway. The SOE's "Oslo Gang" under Gunnar Sønstebyr again figured prominently in the effort by launching a daring attack on the headquarters building of the State Railways, which they totally demolished with high explosives, killing a number of Germans but no Norwegians.82

The results of these attacks impeded railway traffic in Norway for at least a month. In assessing the overall impact of the winter 1945 railroad-sabotage campaign, however, at least one historian has concluded that it actually made little difference, because German records indicate that the bottleneck in withdrawing forces from Norway was the crossing to Denmark rather than the movement of troops within Norway itself.83

Probably the single most dramatic success in the interdiction campaign belonged to Max Manus and his partner Roy Nielsen (Manus's previous partner Gregers Gram having lost his life in a shoot-out with Gestapo agents). Following a series of previous shipping sabotage attempts that yielded mixed results, they infiltrated the Oslo dockyards to lie in wait for a large transport ship. Knowing exactly where but
not when the ship would dock for loading, the two Linge agents hid beneath a concrete quay for several days, enduring numbing cold and hordes of rats. When the ship finally arrived on 15 January 1945, they placed ten limpet mines and then made good their escape by posing as workmen. The Donau subsequently went down with 1,500 German mountain troops and several hundred horses and vehicles on board.84

As the scale of destruction in Finnmark became apparent, MILORG and the SOE meanwhile began planning counter-sabotage operations to hinder such destruction in central and southern Norway, should the Germans attempt to execute a scorched-earth policy there as well. Three special missions concentrated on Norway's most important industries in the area of Kongsberg and Telemark, especially the crucial hydroelectric plants. Ironically, many of the same men who had planned and carried out the epic Norsk Hydro heavy water raid in 1943 now devoted themselves to preventing similar demolitions by the enemy. Another SOE mission, Operation POLAR BEAR, pre-empted the destruction of port facilities in southern Norway. In January 1945, Sub-Lieutenant Inge Stensland (one of several naval officers attached to Company Linge) organized the simultaneous hijacking of eleven tugs and a salvage vessel, all of which escaped to Sweden before the Germans could react. For good measure, Stensland returned to Norway and in April 1945 made off with two more vessels that the Germans apparently planned to sink as block-ships. Other anti-sabotage objectives included radio stations and telephone exchanges, factories, and bridges.85

In the final stages of planning for liberation, the Norwegians and British had to address the problem of transferring operational control of MILORG from the SOE to field commanders in Norway, once Allied forces entered the country. The Norwegian Army district headquarters staffs then were to establish themselves in Norway and assume control as quickly as possible, and the British agreed to the plan. The latter still displayed considerable reluctance in turning some details over to the Norwegians, however, for example when the DKØ, DKT, and DKN groups prepared to fly to Sweden on 4 April 1945 with a large number of secret documents among their files. Despite such lingering doubts over Norwegian security precautions, the transfer went ahead. The district
staffs made preparations to utilize local communications in Norway, with the collaboration of former employees of the public utilities who had escaped to Sweden.86

The regular officers of the FO reluctantly acknowledged that they would have to rely on the MILORG irregulars for a considerable period after the liberation, to fill the vacuum until other forces were available. In other newly-liberated countries such as France, Belgium, and Greece, the returning forces-in-exile usually had disarmed and disbanded partisan formations as quickly as possible; but in Norway this was not to be the case.87

THE SPECTER OF "FESTUNG NORWEGEN"

By late 1944, Thorne's Scottish Command had revised and consolidated the three previous RANKIN case plans into two basic alternatives, designated APOSTLE I and II, which assumed that the occupation regime in Norway would surrender either as part of a general German collapse, or else earlier while fighting still continued on the continent.88

The Norwegians in London remained dissatisfied with Allied liberation plans, because the forces slated for Norway amounted to only one British division and an American regimental combat team. Even if the Germans capitulated in good order, there would be long delays before Allied forces could establish physical control over most of the country, especially in the north. The Norwegians regarded three full divisions as the bare minimum requirement. In December 1944, Anthony Eden took up the issue of Norway's low priority with the British chiefs of staff, arguing that if destructive chaos resulted from a power vacuum during liberation, long-term Anglo-Norwegian relations would suffer as a consequence. If forces simply were not available, then they must tell the Norwegian government so frankly, so that the latter could pursue the possibility of Swedish intervention.89

In the final months of the war, Norwegian planners faced the nightmarish possibility that even when Germany collapsed, the occupation forces in Norway might refuse to surrender. The Wehrmacht commander-in-
chief in Norway. General Böhme, had a reputation as a hard-core Nazi; and the Festung Norwegen scenario appeared all-too-realistic, given the massive scale on which the Wehrmacht had fortified its positions. Even the cooler heads among the Wehrmacht leadership might yet hope that the longer they could hold out, the better terms would result from increasing friction between the Soviets and Western Allies. According to the latest variant of the APOSTLE I plans as of February 1945, even if the Germans surrendered peacefully, the first echelon of seaborne Allied forces would not arrive at Oslo, Kristiansand, and Stavanger until four weeks after the ceasefire, and two more weeks would elapse before a second wave reached Bergen, Trondheim, and Tromsø. APOSTLE included no alternative whatsoever for opposed landings. Due to the lack of shipping, Thorne's staff also developed an adjunct to APOSTLE code-named DOOMSDAY, which provided for smaller advanced parties of airborne troops and Norwegian police units from Sweden, designated Force 134, to enter Norway within the first week after a capitulation. Like APOSTLE, however, DOOMSDAY was based on the assumption of German cooperation and good discipline.

On 5 April 1945, King Haakon and the Crown Prince met with Churchill and asked for clarification of what the Allies would do if the Germans in Norway refused to surrender. Would the English ring their church bells in celebration of victory on the continent, even if Norway remained occupied? Churchill promised only that the war would continue, and Haakon warned that if the Allies dragged their feet, enduring Norwegian bitterness surely would result.

Churchill agreed with the Norwegian decision to encourage Swedish preparations to intervene in Norway in case of prolonged German resistance, and on April 10 the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed SHAEF to prepare contingency plans for joint operations with the Swedes. The Swedes did not rule out the possibility but refused to commit themselves, sharply rejecting a formal Norwegian request for mobilization on April 14.

The American government remained highly sceptical of Swedish intervention, on the grounds that it would open the door to Soviet forces as well, and might actually prove counter-productive in the
German decision of whether to surrender. As the American ambassador to Sweden argued, "Swedish mobilization now in anticipation of immediate collapse in Germany would provoke Norwegian uprisings and would thereby play lukewarm Wehrmacht into hands of Terboven and Gestapo crowd who could overbear military chiefs." 

On April 25, Eisenhower reported to Washington that if the Western Allies had to invade Norway on their own, the campaign might drag on through the end of the year, which obviously would delay the conclusion of the war in the Pacific as well. Even if they simply left "Fortress Norway" to wither on the vine, Churchill emphasized the problems that continuing harassment from even a few U-boats would present. The Americans therefore reluctantly agreed to pursue the Swedish option, and a SHAEF liaison team was about to depart for Stockholm in early May.

THE LIBERATION

Following Hitler's suicide and Admiral Karl Dönitz's short-lived succession as Führer, Heinrich Himmler sent SS intelligence chief General Walter Schellenberg to Stockholm on May 5 to try to arrange capitulation of the German forces in Norway and Denmark to Sweden instead of the Allies. This idea proved highly unrealistic, however, and came to nothing. Reichskommissar Terboven wanted to carry on resistance in Norway to the bitter end, but luckily that decision did not rest with him. On May 7, Dönitz issued orders from his headquarters at Flensburg, dismissing Terboven and directing the Wehrmacht commander in Norway, General Böhme, to surrender according to the terms signed at Rheims earlier that day. It remained to be seen how Böhme would react. Quisling meanwhile bowed to the inevitable and ordered his chief of police, General Søvik, not to offer any further resistance.

On 7 May 1945, London instructed MILORG to proceed with caution and to avoid unnecessary confrontations. No major Allied forces could reach Norway in strength for at least several days, and the balance of power there remained heavily in the Germans' favor. Home Front leaders on the spot, however, perceived the need to act more decisively, lest German discipline dissolve into a spree of looting, vandalism, and
random violence. Böhme meanwhile had resolved to follow Dönitz's orders and met with MILORG leaders at Lillehammer on the night of May 7-8 to make informal agreements. He indicated his willingness to co-operate, provided the underground refrained from any provocations or attempts at rough justice against German personnel. The MILORG leaders agreed, and that night their organization began its long-awaited general mobilization, with strict instructions to leave the Germans alone and concentrate on maintaining public order.98

All but a few Germans obediently withdrew to their barracks on May 8 as jubilation erupted in the streets. Terboven and one of his henchmen briefly resisted arrest by a special squad of Linge and MILORG men, then committed suicide, while a few other notorious war criminals attempted to go into hiding. Quisling made no such effort, protesting his innocence of any wrongdoing. There were a few violent clashes between MILORG and the Germans, including an incident at Kongsvinger, with a total of six casualties on the night of May 8-9; but in general both sides were careful to keep their distance.99 War correspondent Alan Moorehead described the bizarre formality of the German surrender:

... on the one side the local [MILORG] commander with a tiny bodyguard, in some sort of makeshift uniform, on the other the appropriate high German officer surrounded by the usual galaxy... The balance of forces was ludicrously disproportionate, but German respect for authority and discipline held good: local agreements were made promptly and respected; and there was no bloodshed and no destruction.100

A report from MILORG to Scotland on May 9 described the German conduct as "very co-operative and strictly correct."101

The initial delegation from Thorne's headquarters arrived in Oslo aboard a pair of Norwegian flying boats on the afternoon of May 8, carrying instructions to Böhme for the capitulation process. The delegation signalled to Scotland that the Germans had agreed to safe conduct of the initial Allied forces, and Operation DOOMSDAY commenced on May 9.

In the final week leading up to VE-Day, Thorne had learned that SHAEF had decided to release most of the British 1st Airborne Division
for Norway, and this veteran unit became the vanguard of the liberation forces, along with the Norwegian Parachute Company. On May 10-11, a fleet of 139 American C-46 transports landed approximately 2,000 men at Sola, while a similar force slated for Oslo attempted to land at Gardermoen. Ironically, dense ground fog prevented all but a small headquarters party of the British 1st Airborne Division from landing at Gardermoen as planned on May 10—the same problem that had plagued the Germans on 9 April 1940. The rest of the landing proceeded smoothly the following day, however.

The first of the Norwegian forces from Sweden meanwhile reached Oslo by train on the afternoon of May 10. By the following day, approximately 13,000 police troops had entered the country, organized into three groups corresponding to the district command structure. (See appendix.) By linking up rapidly with the local MILORG apparatus, the forces from Britain and Sweden thus helped to co-ordinate and consolidate a situation that all-too-easily could have degenerated into violent chaos.

Nevertheless, it was several weeks before the main DOOMSDAY forces arrived by sea, for example the Norwegian brigade from Scotland, which landed at Tromsø in late May. The Germans therefore remained in de facto control of their own camps long after the formal capitulation. German figures indicated the following estimates of personnel in Norway upon capitulation: 192,000 Army, 41,000 Navy, 40,000 Organization Todt, 27,500 Luftwaffe, and 10,000 police and SS, for a total of 310,000. In the course of repatriation, however, Thorne's command eventually put the total at 357,500, in addition to approximately 90,000 Soviet and Yugoslavian POWs.

An initial delegation from the government-in-exile, including the Crown Prince, arrived in Oslo along with General Thorne on May 13; and the Home Front leadership formally relinquished its temporary legal authority on May 14. The rest of the cabinet arrived on May 31, and the ministers were relieved to find that amid the euphoria of liberation, the public seemed to have forgotten their previous mistakes. King Haakon returned aboard a British warship on June 7, exactly five years after the evacuation from Tromsø; and Thorne declared the initial.
military phase of the liberation complete on that day. As promised, the cabinet submitted its resignation on June 12 and was then replaced by an interim coalition government of national unity, pending elections. The liberation thus followed the lines of a best-case scenario, as Jens Chr. Hauge observed:

If one considers the events leading up to the German capitulation in Norway, and if one has examined the liberation itself, . . . one receives the distinct impression that what actually occurred amounted to a miracle. We experienced the fulfillment of the 'ideal alternative.' . . . It could all-too-easily have gone otherwise.

CONCLUSIONS ON NORWAY'S WAR EXPERIENCE, 1940-45

Overall, 10,262 Norwegians died in the war, the largest category being losses in the merchant fleet, of which the enemy sank over two million tons, nearly half the prewar total. Nevertheless, in comparison to most other countries involved in the war, Norway's losses were remarkably light, amounting to 0.3 percent of the population. Even though nearly every Norwegian had lost a loved one or friend, or at least knew someone who had, the country as a whole seemed aware that things could have been much worse.

MILORG conducted its own victory parade of 15,000 men in Oslo on 9 June 1945, and continued to help maintain order until formally disbanding on July 15. The proud yet amateurish character of these "Home Forces" symbolized the popular, grassroots nature of Norway's successful resistance to Nazism: but it also represented the impending questions of Norway's future defense policy. It remained to be seen whether the country's leaders and electorate would take to heart the harsh lessons of defeat and occupation, or whether the complacency of the prewar years would reassert itself in response to new tensions among the great powers.

Overall, the Norwegian government-in-exile had been remarkably successful in its management of relations with the Allies and the Home Front. Although special Norwegian interests frequently suffered in the
hard-headed calculations of Allied strategy, the Norwegians in London made the most of their limited influence and won major concessions in several key issues. In comparison with the other governments-in-exile, the Norwegians displayed considerably more influence with the major Allies than their resources alone would have warranted.

The overall contrast between the Norwegian government's ignominious flight from the country in 1940 and its victorious return five years later is striking. For all its mistakes, chronic unpopularity, and unresolved blame for the April 1940 fiasco, the cabinet could justifiably claim that it had made the right decisions in all of the most important matters. It had backed the winning horse. Almost equally important, it had crafted the framework of a general political consensus for the postwar period, based on respect for the constitution and the rule of law.

No other government-in-exile returned home with such solid legitimacy; and no individual deserves greater credit for this fact than King Haakon, who upheld the constitution and supported the cabinet despite tremendous temptations of expediency. Norway left the war with much better political stability than many other newly-liberated countries, as well as much less physical destruction and loss of life. The Nygaardsvold government itself played an important role in preserving the constitutional order, but the real temptations confronted the King. Haakon might easily have exploited his contacts with the British and his popularity on the Home Front to declare personal rule for the duration of the emergency—a ploy that might have yielded considerable short-term benefits but probably would have carried a heavy political price in the long-run. Instead, he consistently used his influence to support the cabinet, a policy whose benefits became evident in the much more stable political situation of the decades that followed.**

Critics of the Labor Party emphasize the passiveness of Nygaardsvold in London. He never showed much grasp of international or military affairs, and his main preoccupation during the war was the government's relationship with the home front. In that area, at least, he showed a good sense of when to compromise and where to draw the line.
on matters of constitutional principle, although he ought to have yielded much earlier on the promise to resign after liberation.

Torp and Lie were the dynamic figures within the cabinet. The former also appears passive in his role as Defense Minister, having left almost the entire business of dealing with the Allies up to the FO staff. The extent of this latitude may seem especially surprising in light of the prewar antipathy between the military and Labor; but in London, the two groups found little room to quarrel. After replacing Fleischer with "new men" who were more amenable to the government, Torp was content to let them handle business. As with the Prime Minister, Torp's real interest lay in the realm of postwar politics, in his capacity as secretary of the Labor Party."112

Trygve Lie emerges ultimately as the most admirable member of the cabinet, showing remarkable foresight in his advocacy of an "Atlantic" policy, which the following chapter will examine in more detail. As Olav Riste put it, "The combination of Lie's charm, his pro-British inclination, his Atlantic policy, and his constant emphasis on coinciding Norwegian and Allied interests, was without a doubt the main reason that Norway soon obtained a position in the alliance that went far beyond what population, resources, and its overall power would have warranted."113

In military issues, the Norwegians had little influence in basic Allied strategy, such as the fundamental decision not to invade Norway. In retrospect, Norway probably would have suffered far greater destruction and loss of life had such an operation occurred; and even at the time, the government and FO clearly understood that early liberation had its drawbacks. Most of the men concerned probably were glad that the ultimate decision rested on someone else's shoulders. In more peripheral questions, however, at least after 1941, the Norwegians got their way more often than not. The Allies generally respected Norwegian interests in bombing policy. Norway won its case in the civil affairs issue, and by 1943 the FO had established substantial influence over special operations. The main disappointment was the failure to obtain more adequate resources for Finnmark in winter 1945.
Thus, although the record of success was hardly perfect, the Labor Party (if not the cabinet itself) emerged from the war in a strong position. The regular armed forces, however, seemed less secure in their reputation and prospects for future public support. Although the Navy and air force had conducted sustained operations in exile, the Army had almost no combat record to show in redemption for 1940. The outstanding images of the Norwegian contribution to Germany's defeat were almost all civilian in character: for example the unorthodox volunteers of the Linge Company, the amateur soldiers of MILORG, the civilian seamen of the merchant fleet, the unconventional fishermen's Navy of the "Shetlands Gang," the "boys in the woods," and the political prisoners of the Grini concentration camp. Overall, the popular myth in Norway ever since has been that the people rose up and reclaimed their own freedom, with little contribution from the regular men in uniform.114

Clearly, this widespread attitude has failed to acknowledge the often obscure, but nevertheless real and highly significant contributions of the regular armed forces in the war. Liberal publicist Chr. Christensen addressed this issue with a blunt response to his own rhetorical question, "Who fought?"

It was Norwegian naval officers who made sure that we as a nation ended up on the right side in the great war. It was their courage and commitment that assured Norway's role as an actual belligerent. . . . With all [due] respect for all forms of resistance activity, for prisoners, for the teachers' front, the church front, the sports leagues--it was the combatant officers and the men of the merchant fleet who were decisive.115

According to Christensen, the Labor Party deliberately took credit for the successes won by the loyal military, often behind-the-scenes in London, while exacting retribution on political opponents in uniform by withholding decorations and promotions.

The Norwegian government-in-exile was, apart from Trygve Lie, a helpless band of fugitives who generally presented only roadblocks to their [more] active, fighting countrymen.
... [Defense] Minister Oscar Torp, who never had time to visit a single one of the Navy's ships, held party meetings in the Defense Ministry [in his capacity as Labor Party chairman]. The fighting Norway, above all our officers, [were the ones who] concerned themselves with the successful outcome [of the war]--in spite of the Nygaardsvold government.\footnote{16}

Christensen's attack on Labor clearly involved exaggerations, but it does contribute to a more balanced assessment. In any case, the fact was that in 1945, the armed forces as an institution faced an uncertain future in Norway, due to their mixed legacy of prewar unpopularity, defeat in 1940, and low-profile role in the liberation. The social status of the traditional officer corps seemed in some respects even weaker at the war's end than before.

Several less-apparent underlying factors ultimately more than compensated for the blows to military prestige, however. One was the new direction in Norwegian diplomacy foreshadowed by Lie's far-sighted "Atlantic Policy." After some further uncertainty in the immediate postwar years, this new trend would result in the formalization of Norway's traditional reliance on Britain (and subsequently, the United States) for defense assistance. This in turn provided the Norwegian armed forces with a clearer rationale and a more specific, achievable set of objectives. Another new element to emerge from the wartime experience was a new and powerful, if vague, public consensus in favor of defense. Much of the population remained highly sceptical of the regular military, as personified in the "old" officer corps that seemed to have failed so badly in 1940; but the general demand now was to reform and strengthen, rather than to abolish or marginalize the military. Finally, the Labor Party itself emerged from the war with a new, more realistic attitude toward foreign policy and defense, and a better working relationship with the professional officer corps. The next five years would reveal whether the political and military leaders in Norway would succeed in taking advantage of the opportunities presented by these changes in the situation.

2. RANKIN Case 'B' later became ALADDIN, and Case 'C' became APOSTLE. Einar Grannes, I skyggen av Jupiter: Narrespill eller invasjon i nord?, describes the deception efforts to keep up the impression that an invasion of Norway was imminent.


5. Ruge first proposed the idea of making the Crown Prince Forsvarssjef of the force-in-exile on 7 June 1940, but the idea went no further at that point. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 105.


8. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:143-44. See also Hansteen, "Forsvarets Overkommandos virksomhet i Storbritannia i tiden februar 1942 til mai 1945," 12 January 1972; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 211. Part of Torp's reluctance to make Olav Forsvarssjef may also have stemmed from the fact that it meant setting aside Hansteen. Although Olav and Hansteen apparently worked well together, the latter undoubtedly felt some bitterness over the demotion and never discussed the matter subsequently. Christensen described Hansteen as cultivating an air of aloofness in order to hide a sensitive inner nature. De som heiste flagget, 104. Overall, Christensen concluded that Olav's appointment was part of the government's effort to shape the "historical-political alibi" that allowed the Labor Party to avoid the political fallout from 1940.

10. Ibid., 125-28, 132, 134. News of the liberation treaties caused considerable confusion and dismay in Norway, where many people feared that the Allies would impose their own form of occupation, particularly if the Soviets entered the country. NA: RG 226, entry 125, box 17, folder 256.


15. Ibid., 19, 23. In reference to the plans for organization of liberated district commands, see "Kgl. resolusjon av 2 june 1944: Bestemmelser om ansvarsområder og samarbeid forsåvidt angår Hæren og Sjøforsvaret m.v. under gjenereverelsen av Norge," and "Midlertidig instruks for D.K.-sjefer," Ibid., 179-82.

16. Ibid., 88.

17. Ibid., 59-60. The Norwegians relied extensively on Swedish training manuals and doctrine. "Taktiska anvisningar för ordningspolistjänst., utgiven av utbildningschefen vid utbildning av norsk polispersonal i Sverige" (Stockholm: Ivar Heggströms, 1944); FMB, box 355.354.1.


21. Ibid., 64.

22. Abwehr report, 7 December 1944; NA: T-77, reel 1419, 882. It is possible, however, that the Swedish informant deliberately tried to downplay the military character of the training, in order to minimize the deterioration of Swedish-German relations. The Germans had known about the police-training at least since January 1944. When the Swedes
responded to inquiries by asserting that the only purpose was to maintain order in the refugee camps, a German report observed sarcastically that it was "interesting that no chaotic conditions exist, and that order is maintained by Norwegian nationals." Ibid., 25 April 1944.


24. Ibid., 65.

25. Ibid., 14.

26. He was, after all, a naval officer. Riiser-Larsen, "Norges Luftforsvar", 3 December 1942; RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59.

27. See for example, G. Hovdenak. "Et eller to flygevåpen." 18 October 1944; RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59.


30. For a pictorial account of these movements, see Med Norske flygere på kontinentet (Oslo: Ass & Wahls Boktrykkeri, 1984).


33. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:42-43.

34. Ibid.

35. FFK to Air Ministry, 1 February 1945; RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59. There was also a good deal of grumbling in the squadron over inadequate leave for enlisted men.

36. FFK to FØ, 6 February 1945; RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 59. Some Norwegian leaders probably also felt frustrated by the fact that although their air force included a total of 2,582 men (including some Danes) by May 1945, approximately 1,600 others were serving in the RAF on a purely individual basis. Nigel Thomas, Foreign Volunteers of the Allied Forces, 1939-45. Osprey Men-at-Arms Series vol. 238 (London: Osprey, 1991), 12-13.

38. Ibid., 11. In order to prevent German infiltrators from using BALDER as a conduit, the British decided that all Norwegian personnel to be airlifted must have reached Sweden before 1 March 1944, when the operation began. Because of this restriction, the Norwegians actually ran out of qualified personnel and had to cancel several of the final flights for lack of personnel—an ironic situation in light of the previous quarrels over lack of seating. RA: FO. kat. 1256.1/01. box 23.

39. Some additional manpower came from Iceland, where the Norwegian garrison company formed in 1940-41 disbanded in 1944. The Norwegians initially hoped to equip the reconnaissance squadron with light tanks, but the British would not provide them. Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:17-18.

40. The three mountain companies, for example, each sent petitions. Ibid., 23-24.

41. Just to HOK, 24 July 1944: RA: FO. kat. 1256.1/01, box 22. The Norwegian artillery battery was particularly disrupted by the departure of its parent unit, the 186th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, on which it depended heavily for logistical support and other functions. Major H.T. Zeiner-Gundersen to HOK, "Batteriets fremtid," 24 July 1944; Ibid. Zeiner-Gundersen’s complaints were so strident that HOK relieved him as battery commander a few days later. The unit’s subsequent morale was "terribly low," with a prevailing feeling of "bitterness" toward the government and high command. "Fra Batteriet": Sørtrykk av artikkel i Norsk artilleri-tidsskrift, hefte 1-2 1955 (Bodø: Bodø boktrykkeri, n.d.). 74-78, 103.

42. Eystein Fjerlø, Den norske hær i Storbritannia, 1940-1945 (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1982), 89. E.O. Hauge, Skotsk jord og norsk himmel (Oslo: Cappelens, 1946), provides personal recollections of service in the brigade in Scotland, including disciplinary and morale problems. Among other impressions, many men seem to have returned home after the liberation with ideas about the need to "democratize" the postwar Army.

43. FD to FOK, "Operativ bruk av norsk befal og norske avdelinger utenfor Norge", 30 August 1944; Den norske regjerings virksomhet, IV:158-59. It is unclear whether the Allies would have agreed to the transfer of the Norwegian units to the continent in any case, given the need to maintain appearances that an invasion of Norway was still possible.

44. Ibid., 23-24; Fjerlø, Den norske hær i Storbritannia, 9. 90-91.

45. Ironically, 5 Troop went on to suffer heavier losses in a relatively minor engagement at Kapelsche Veer on 13 January 1945, after which the unit returned to England and remained in reserve until the end of the war. Haga, Klar til storm, 95-143, 150-68; Ian Dear, Ten Commando, 1942-1945 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1989). 63-72, 208-22.


48. Riste, London-regjeringa. II:166-72. The treaty set Norway apart from the Low Countries, which signed such agreements only with the Western Powers, and put Norway in a category with Czechoslovakia, which also signed a Soviet treaty in April 1944. This formal acknowledgement of a Soviet sphere of interest in North Norway set the stage for Norway's postwar policy of "reassurance" toward the Soviets in that region. The Czech parallel may also have heightened Norwegian anxiety in reaction to the Prague coup in 1948.

49. Ibid., 172-75, 315.

50. FO to HOK, "Memorandum Concerning a Relief Expedition to Eastern Finnmark." 15 March 1944: RA: FO. kat. 1256.1/01, box 22.


52. Ibid., 189-92. Jodl emphasized the military necessity of the scorched-earth policy in a letter to Bormann on 16 November 1944 and complained that Nazi Party officials were not co-operating. NA: T-77, reel 1419, 882. In order to forestall possible civilian interference, the Germans predictably seized a number of Finnish hostages during the withdrawal, which apparently helped only to dispel any lingering feelings of Waffenbruderschaft on the Finns' part. "Introduction of the hostage system in Northern Finland," stated a German report of 5 October 1944, "has already had a catastrophic effect on public opinion." Ibid., 978.


56. Two Norwegian corvettes and three minesweepers accompanied the Berwick convoy. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:97-98.


60. Ibid., 99-100. At least through February, the Soviets apparently supplied most of the logistical support and many of the weapons for Dahl's men. See "Rapporter fra oberst Dahl," RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 19.


62. *Den norske regjeringens virksomhet*, IV:68-69. Finnish forces in the area amounted to a regiment, but they had no intention of crossing the border, once they had fulfilled the terms of their armistice with the Soviets by expelling German forces from Finland.


65. SOK, "Vurdering over situasjonen i Nord-Norge med hensyn til videre sjøoperasjoner vestover med Kirkenes som hovedbasis," 15 March 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 18.

66. FO to Admiralty, "Relief Expedition to Sørøya," 1 February 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 18; SBNO North Russia to Admiralty, "Norwegian Refugees embarked in Merchant vessels of R.A.64." 19 February 1945; Ibid., box 22; *Den norske regjeringens virksomhet*, IV:100. Those rescued included 170 men, 136 women, and 196 children who had evaded the German roundup but then became the target of search-and-destroy raids by light German naval forces. Norwegian Catalina flying boats from Scotland also participated in the operation.


68. FO, "Supplies to Finnmark"; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 107.


72. Ibid., 204-5.

73. The only OSS mission that actually occurred in Norway during the war was Operation RYPE, a railroad sabotage team led by future CIA director William Colby, in March 1945. (See below.) Riste, London-regieringa. II:45-46.

74. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia. 3-4.

75. Max Manus, Det blir alvor (Oslo: P.F. Steenballes, 1946); Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia. 251-52; NA: RG 226, entry 21, report L48757.

76. Arnfinn Haga, Jernring rundt Bjørn West (Oslo: Cappelens, 1982), 9-11.

77. Trygve Christensen, Marka og kriken: Oslomarka, 1940-1945 (Oslo: Trygve Christensen. 1993), 54-56.

78. Between fall 1940 and spring 1945, the Shetland crews made a total of 203 trips to Norway, landing 219 official passengers and picking up 72, plus rescuing 352 other refugees, and delivering 308 tons of weapons, equipment, and supplies. In comparison, air drops by the RAF and USAAF landed a total of 200 agents to Norway, and actually provided the bulk of material delivered—a total of 1,104 tons. These missions led to the loss of 28 aircraft, however, a considerably greater cost than the Shetlands unit's handful of fishing boats. The "Bus" also provided transport in the opposite direction, something aircraft could not offer. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia. 277-78: David Howarth, Across to Norway (New York: William Sloane Associates. 1952), 277-78.

79. Haga, Jernring rundt Bjørn West, 11, 20ff. 183. See also, Thomas Nielsen, Bak de tyske linjer: Milorg-basen Bjørn West i Mafjordfjellene, 1944-1945 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1992), for another account of the episode. Surprisingly, Hitler ordered on 8 March 1945 that if German forces captured Norwegian irregulars, they were to be treated as normal prisoners of war, provided they had been operating as organized


81. Ibid., 85.

82. Ibid., 122; Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 242-44; Olav Riste and Berit Nokleby, Norway 1940-45: The Resistance Movement. Third edition (Oslo: Tano, 1986): 79-80. The co-ordinated attacks also involved three special parties from Britain, which parachuted into the Nordland region. One party was drawn from the Norwegian Parachute Company, and another was the OSS group under Major William Colby. The American mission, code-named RYPE, succeeded in destroying several portions of the rail line north of Steinkjer, and it was the only guerrilla-style operation in Norway during the war that was not carried out by Norwegian nationals. For the details, see NA: RG 226, entry 169, box 11, folder 101; entry 125, box 23, folders 330-31; and entry 115, box 51, folder 654.

83. Riste. London-regjeringa. II:244.

84. Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 242, 247-48. For an account of other sabotage in the Oslo area during the closing months of the war, see Tor Arne Barstad, Sabotasjen i Oslo-området, 1944-45 (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1975).

85. Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV:123-24; Cruickshank, SOE in Scandinavia, 249-51. There were approximately 100 agents from Britain operating in Norway on the various anti-sabotage missions by May 1945. One of the few casualties in the anti-sabotage program was Professor Leif Tronstad, who had masterminded the 1943 heavy water operation. Riste, London-regjeringa. II:266.

86. HOK to DKS, "Direktiv for DK sjefer vedrørende deres forhold til hjemmestyrkene." 5 May 1945: RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 32. The other two district staffs, DKS (Stavanger/Kristiansand) and DKV (Bergen) remained in Britain for eventual movement to Norway by sea, as part of Operation DOOMSDAY. Riste. London-regjeringa. II:268. The Norwegian commando troop also flew to Sweden to reinforce the police troops in April 1945, following its withdrawal from action in the Netherlands. Haga. Klar til storm. 170.

87. Ø. Dahl, "P.M.: Samarbeided mellom Milorg og DKene," 15 January 1945; RA: FØ, kat. 1256.1/01, box 32. Apart from the simple lack of other liberation forces, this difference also reflected the relative confidence of the London government in MILORG's political reliability, the communist threat apparently having receded.

88. Riste. London-regjeringa. II:242-43. Eisenhower apparently considered the latter case as highly improbable, since the German position in Norway was militarily so secure.

90. For detailed plans of these, see NA: T-501, reel 316, 541: "Bauprogramm 1944." An OSS report of 15 March 1945 concluded, however, that many Wehrmacht officers probably would seek asylum in Sweden rather than fight to the last. NA: RG 226, entry 21, report L 54883.

91. Riste, London-regjeringa. II:244-47.

92. Ibid., 253-54.

93. Ibid.

94. Ibid., 248-58. The Swedish military did develop a contingency plan, Operation RÅDDA NORGÉ ("Rescue Norway"); but surprisingly, Swedish intelligence seems to have underestimated the actual strength of German forces in Norway by nearly 50 percent. The Germans meanwhile were alert to the possibility of such intervention and had developed plans for a defensive line behind the Glomma River. NA: T-77, reel 1419, 978. The hypothetical intervention thus might have resulted in a debacle, especially given the apparent lack of enthusiasm for the idea among the Swedish population.


96. Ibid., 261, 264-65.

97. Ibid., 269-70; also documents displayed in liberation exhibit at Riksarkivet, May 1995. As late as April 29, Quisling apparently still entertained delusions that his government could somehow remain in office after the liberation. "Protokoll ført i statsråd den 29. april 1945." Ibid.

98. The capitulation instructions specified that the Wehrmacht was to take temporary responsibility for the conduct and maintenance of all Germans in Norway, including other personnel such as members of the SS, Organization Todt, etc. "Orders of the Allied Military Joint Commander to the Commander German Land Forces in Norway," revised 2 May 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 32. Jens Chr. Hauge, Frigjøringen (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1970) provides a good account of MILORG's role in these events.


104. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet. IV:69-70, 170-71: "Oversikt over Polititroppenes sammensetning og styrke ved overføringen til Norge." An officers' newspaper circulated in the police camps in 1945, Norsk kontakt: Organ for befall ved de norske politidelingene i Sverige, indicates how close the administrative links with the military staff in London had become.

105. NA: T-312. roll 1073, 9276215.


107. Ibid., 272-74. The Linge Company provided bodyguards for the royal family during the return to Oslo, which caused great anxiety for the men responsible, given the numbers of Nazi sympathizers still at large. Manus, Det blir alvor.


109. Chr. A.R. Christensen, ed., Vårt folks historie, vol. IX, (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1961), 476-77; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 387, 403. Shortly after the war, the Norwegian government published a set of commemorative volumes with photos and biographical summaries of those who had died: Våre falne, 1939-1945, 4 vol. (Oslo: Den norske stat, 1949-51). For comparison, Soviet deaths amounted to 6 percent. The United States was one of the few powers to sustain relatively lighter losses even than Norway, with 0.2 percent killed.

110. Derry, History of Modern Norway, 403.

111. The Greek and Yugoslav examples are the most striking contrasts, but even the Dutch government underwent a sort of extra-legal coup in London, with the replacement of the prime minister in September 1940. In contrast to Haakon, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina frequently acted on important issues without consulting her ministers--a heroic style with long-term penalties as well as short-term advantages. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:379-80.

112. Ibid., 384-93; Christensen, De som heiste flagget, 160. The journals of Paul Hartmann generally confirm that the London government spent relatively little time considering issues of wartime policy.

114. Christensen argued that the early establishment and higher profile of the Resistance Museum in Oslo (compared to the Armed Forces Museum, which remains tucked away in an obscure corner of Akershus Fortress) was symptomatic of such distorted emphasis. De som heiste flagget. 119. For reflections on Leif Larsen's particular status as a Norwegian folk-hero, see Ingvald Lunde, "Leif A. Larsen--Shetlands-Larsen: Symbolet og legenden." Norsk militært tidsskrift (2. 1994): 21-23.

115. Christensen, De som heiste flagget. 159.

116. Ibid., 159-60.
CHAPTER 10

UNCERTAIN PEACE, 1945-1947

WARTIME PLANS FOR POSTWAR SECURITY: THE "ATLANTIC POLICY"

From 1940 to 1945, in addition to the immediate tasks of maintaining Norwegian sovereignty, contributing to the defeat of Germany, and restoring lawful government in Norway, the Norwegian government in London had to reconsider previous assumptions regarding the country's long-term security in the postwar world. At least to a few far-sighted individuals, the German invasion had cast doubt upon the basic assumptions on which Norway's entire framework of security policy had rested up to 1940. One of these premises had been the supposed omnipotence of the Royal Navy, but the rise of air power and the general decline of British power had made this a slender reed to lean upon. Another article of faith in the prewar period was the sense of security conferred by impartial neutrality, the illusory nature of which Hitler made abundantly clear. A third basic assumption up to 1940, in consequence of those above, was that formal alliances offered more risks than advantages to Norway.¹

To a great extent, the prospect of Allied victory crowded all such considerations off the stage of attention. Germany, after all, was the author of aggression; and its defeat seemed to render theoretical security issues irrelevant. Yet, who could predict where postwar events might lead? Might not Germany somehow rise again, bent on yet another war of revenge? With Soviet Russia arrayed in the Allied coalition, the traditional menace from the East also seemed to have melted away: but
most Norwegian leaders soon came to reconsider this complacent assumption as well.

Probably the most forward-looking member of the Nygaardsvold cabinet in London was Trygve Lie, who replaced Halvdan Koht as Foreign Minister in November 1940. Even with the Battle of Britain raging overhead, Lie began to outline a new Norwegian foreign policy for the postwar world, based on the optimistic assumption that the Allied cause would somehow yet prevail. Lie made clear the new direction of Norway's foreign policy in a radio speech on 15 December 1940. Norway's natural allies, he argued, were Britain and the United States, by virtue of common economic interests as well as ideology. Although the immediate goal of course was to win the war and liberate Norway, Lie also looked beyond a merely temporary, wartime alliance of the Atlantic democracies.

Thus will we also lay the foundation for co-operation that can and will continue after the war: political co-operation that secures our national freedom, so that we will not risk being attacked [again] by arrogant and tyrannical aggressors, and economic co-operation . . .

One of the most obvious lessons of 1940 was that military co-operation among allies, even with the best intentions, poses great problems. At least one old assumption had proven correct: Britain and its allies had indeed come to Norway's aid. Their assistance, however, was too disorganized and poorly co-ordinated to be of much benefit. This realization prompted Lie and his colleagues in London to pursue the possibility of a formal alliance for the postwar period, to assure that if Norway ever found itself again under attack, it could depend on definite plans and preparations for Allied assistance.

Although no professional soldier, Lie saw clearly (as did Winston Churchill) that American intervention would be crucial. From the beginning, then, Lie's concepts extended well beyond the narrow, traditional parameters of Norwegian foreign policy. As John Lukacs has argued in retrospect, the conflict of 1939-41 amounted to "the last European war"; and subsequently, the decisive weight shifted to the
emerging continental super-powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Lie was among the first to recognize the future importance of the United States as a guarantor of European security, reflected in what he termed an "Atlantic Policy." The Norwegians were after all, in Lie's words, "a seafaring people, an ancient Atlantic Ocean people": and deep cultural traits as well as purely practical considerations prompted their westward orientation.

Few other leaders placed as much stock in the future of trans-Atlantic co-operation after the war, however. Most of the other members of the Nygaardsvold cabinet looked forward to the end of great power confrontations with Germany's defeat, which would make Lie's proposition irrelevant. For their part, the British favored the idea of permanent Norwegian bases for the Royal Navy after the war but by no means favored permanent American involvement in the region.

Lie's main advisor Dr. Arne Ording clearly foresaw postwar tension between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers, in which situation North Norway would inevitably become a "danger zone." In a meeting with the Dutch and Belgian foreign ministers van Kieffens and Spaak in fall 1941, Lie remarked that it was conceivable that future threats to European security could stem from elsewhere than Germany, with direct reference to Soviet designs on Finland. Although Lie did not necessarily want to make Norway into a "bulwark against communist expansion," he was determined to avoid diplomatic isolation in the face of possible Soviet pressure. The United Nations Declaration, which Norway and twenty-five other nations signed on 1 January 1942, pointed vaguely toward the kind of postwar collective security system that Lie had in mind. Meeting again with his Dutch and Belgian counterparts in April 1942, he obtained their agreement in principle that a firm American commitment would be essential for postwar stability in Europe. Yet Lie also wrote, "For God's sake, don't talk about bases. Talk about mutual defense arrangements."

Lie and Ording outlined their "Atlantic Policy" in an official position paper on 8 May 1942, "Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk" (main principles of Norwegian foreign policy). British foreign secretary Anthony Eden expressed considerable interest in the
possibility of a postwar Atlantic alliance, but the War Cabinet decided
in November 1942 that the issue would have to await further
clarifications of the future balance of power. Lie and Eden both
visited Washington in February - March 1943 to sound out the Americans
and found some encouragement. Nevertheless, it became increasingly
clear that the chief priority of American policy for postwar
arrangements was to include the Soviet Union within the larger framework
of a United Nations security system. Given the need in this context to
avoid alienating the Soviets, the possibility of a more exclusive
Atlantic alliance receded steadily in the closing years of the war; and
in any event it seemed to require good relations with the Soviets as
well as the West.8

The Norwegian government had to devote increasing attention to the
Soviet Union as World War II entered its closing stages. As Arne Ording
wrote in fall 1942,

The Russians have indicated an interest in our Atlantic
policy. We may thus be confronted with the following
choice: either to give bases only to the English and
Americans, which the Russians may regard as a provocation,
or else to give the Russians bases as well, which will cause
both strategic and domestic problems. Otherwise, [we could
also] pursue a new policy of neutrality, and this time
attempt to balance between the Western Powers and Russia in
the same way we tried to balance between Germany and the
Allies, with the familiar and deplorable result.9

While hastening Norway's liberation. Soviet victories also
increased the likelihood of renewed Soviet territorial ambitions,
particularly in the far north. American wartime policy did little to
discourage such possibilities. In a private meeting with Lie on 12
March 1943, Roosevelt proposed a "free harbors" concept, which would
have offered the Soviets a sort of "trusteeship" over Norway's Arctic
coast, perhaps in the form of U.N. supervision of Narvik.10 Not
surprisingly, the Norwegian government sharply rejected the idea. As
Lie wrote to the cabinet, "The question that was raised in this meeting
is in [my] eyes the most serious [threat] the government has faced since
arriving in London."11 In retrospect, it appears that Roosevelt's idea
stemmed mainly just from an inquiry by Molotov concerning the annexation of Petsamo, and that Lie overreacted. In any case, the episode had no direct consequences; but it did indicate the fact that the United States regarded the far north as lying mainly within the Soviet sphere of interest.12

Britain, as well as the United States, seemed to regard the Soviet occupation of Finnmark with equanimity, whereas the Norwegian government viewed it with considerable anxiety, wondering whether the "liberators" might prove as difficult to expel as the Germans. The Soviets confirmed these fears in November 1944, during a visit by Lie to Moscow at Soviet request. To begin with, Molotov assured the Norwegian minister that although the USSR would annex the former Finnish territory in the region of Petsamo, there would be no claims on Norwegian Finnmark; the new Soviet-Norwegian border would be the same as the previous Norwegian-Finnish one. On the final night of Lie's visit, however, November 11-12, Molotov announced that the Soviet Union now intended to annex Bear Island and to renegotiate the status of Svalbard.13

Although Molotov made no explicit connection between the two issues, the Norwegians immediately assumed that the Soviets intended to use their occupation of Finnmark as leverage to obtain concessions regarding the islands.14 A further cause for alarm was the fact that the United States apparently was willing to concede these demands, in exchange for Soviet acceptance of permanent American bases on Greenland and Iceland. As the potential loser in this quid pro quo, the Norwegian government opposed both sides of the bargain, urging the Americans as well as the Soviets to withdraw from the region promptly.15

Lie believed the Soviets hoped to pressure Norway into a bilateral agreement on Svalbard without reference to the other signatories of the 1920 treaty. In retrospect this appears not to have been the case, but the surprising fact is that the Norwegians themselves tried to keep the Western Powers out of the issue. The official Norwegian reply to Molotov's demands on 29 December 1944 agreed to further bilateral discussions on the question. Lie did not inform the British of the Soviet initiative until 11 January 1945, and even then he apparently did
so only because he suspected the Soviets would raise the issue at the forthcoming Yalta conference, and he wanted to get in the first word.

The Norwegians perceived two dangers: isolation in the face of Soviet pressure, and negotiations among the great powers that would dispose of Norwegian territory without reference to Norwegian interests. At least with regard to the far north, the former appeared already to be reality; and the only way to head off the latter seemed to be to deal with the Soviets directly, playing for time.16

As it turned out, the arctic islands were not high on Stalin's agenda, and the issue remained unresolved at the war's end. The Norwegians, however, were determined to stake their claim as firmly as possible and hastened to re-establish a physical presence on Bear Island. Shortly after arriving at Tromsø on 16 May 1945, the destroyer Stord touched at the island to land a small party of troops, without informing the Russians beforehand.17

NON-ALIGNMENT AND "BRIDGE-BUILDING"

Despite anxiety over the Svalbard issue and early rumblings of East-West tension over eastern Europe, most Norwegians remained relatively optimistic regarding prospects of world peace and focused instead on domestic issues in the aftermath of World War II. In the afterglow of liberation, some Norwegians even tended to gloss over the Soviet aggression and pro-German policy of 1939-41 in sympathetic terms.18

To the surprise of many observers, the Soviets withdrew from Finnmark in September 1945 without demanding any specific compensation. This gesture helped to allay some of the anxiety over Svalbard, and for the moment, Norwegian-Soviet relations were fairly good. At this point, Stalin probably entertained hopes of wooing Norway more or less voluntarily into his orbit, doubtless encouraged by communists' strong showing in the election of October 1945.

In fact, however, Communist appeal in Norway almost immediately fell behind the curve of rising fears of subversion and Soviet expansionism, from Labor as well as the bourgeois parties. In response

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to fears of Soviet infiltration and subversion, labor leaders cooperated with the state police in bugging the headquarters of the Norwegian Federation of Trade Unions, in order to weed out Communists—a controversial operation which lasted into the mid-1950s and remained secret for another forty years.19

Nevertheless, while determined to head off potential subversion at home, the Labor government devoted its efforts in foreign policy to cultivating good relations with the Soviets and "bridge-building" between east and west. This concept belonged primarily to Foreign Minister Halvard Lange, who replaced Lie when the latter became the first Secretary-General of the United Nations in 1946. In Lange's view, the apparent friction between the Western Powers and the USSR was merely an unfortunate after-effect of the war, and the best way to defuse the situation was to deal with both sides impartially, remaining "unbound by obligations, free of alliances." The postwar Prime Minister Einar Gerhardsen agreed, seeing Norway's role as "a sort of bridge-builder between East and West."20 Many Norwegians actually regarded the United States as more of a threat to world peace than the Soviet Union, as indicated in a public opinion poll in August 1946; and a clear majority within the Labor Party believed that the United States harbored ambitions of "world leadership."21

In December 1945, the American ambassador to Norway, Lithgow Osborne, summarized Norwegian foreign policy as: "1. Pro-UK-US to the greatest extent she dares. 2. Pro-Soviet to the extent she must. 3. Pro-UN to the greatest extent she can."22 Norwegian enthusiasm for the United Nations coincided with American hopes for that organization in the immediate postwar period. Norway underlined its policy of non-alignment, however, by compelling the Americans to withdraw from Jan Mayen in February 1946—a gesture that surely annoyed Truman and his advisors. With increasing concern over the threat of communist subversion, U.S. policy-makers grew impatient with Norway's ambivalence. Such fence-sitting was unacceptable in the emerging ideological struggle against communism, as containment became the guiding principle of American foreign policy.23
On the other side of the coin, following the Soviet withdrawal from Finnmark, Norway re-established full sovereignty there, including a military presence. At the risk of Soviet displeasure, a token garrison also deployed on Svalbard to underline Norway's territorial claim. According to the 1920 treaty governing Svalbard, the islands were to remain permanently demilitarized. Nevertheless, Norway maintained a small military garrison at Longyearbyen for the first few years after the war. This presence may have prompted a Soviet initiative in January 1947, which proposed a formal, permanent occupation of the islands by a combination of Russian and Norwegian forces. Unwilling to revise the original treaty, the Storting decisively rejected this proposal on 3 March 1947.24

According to Norway's wartime ambassador to the USSR Rolf Andvord, however, the Soviets actually favored at least limited Norwegian forces in the north as a buffer, provided Norway invited no other foreign powers as well. As Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge commented in September 1946, "... it is correct for us to maintain some forces in Kirkenes and on Svalbard, and the Russians expect this."25

Thus, due to the apparent lack of support for Norwegian interests by the Western Allies, Norwegian policy at the end of the war ironically had swung back to a form of non-alignment, as the only immediate way to resist Soviet demands. One may also interpret the apparent demise of the "Atlantic policy" as a return to Koht's policy of 1940, which sought to cultivate relations with the Soviets by avoiding too-close ties with the west, which seemed either unable or unwilling to protect Norway. In any event, Norway's diplomatic position at the war's end indicates that the link between the wartime alliance and the subsequent decision to join NATO was neither simple nor direct; and it also helps to explain the chronic ambivalence of Norwegian policy even long after 1949.

Lie's wartime advocacy of a trans-Atlantic pact proved somewhat ahead of its time, and the concept went on the back burner due to reservations among the great powers. The core of Roosevelt's policy for the postwar period was to cultivate good relations with Stalin, particularly to solicit Soviet support for the nascent United Nations. A defensive pact of the sort Norway desired might fuel Soviet paranoia.
thus endangering the larger prospect of a global security system. Norway soon emerged as a leading supporter of the United Nations as well; and perhaps a bit ironically, Trygve Lie became the organization's first Secretary-General in February 1946.26

WARTIME PLANS FOR POSTWAR MILITARY POLICY

In the overall scheme of Norwegian security policy for the immediate postwar era, the armed forces took a distinctly subordinate place after diplomatic efforts.27 Nevertheless, in London the Norwegian military staff did devote considerable thought to the problem of postwar defense, in anticipation of the opportunity to rebuild a military organization more rational and capable than that which had collapsed in 1940.

The government-in-exile had begun to consider postwar defense reform at least as early as 18 December 1941, when it appointed a Defense Department committee, Utvalg 3, to study the question in conjunction with Torp's general reorganization and the creation of the FO. Among the general questions the committee discussed were whether to unify the air arms, which service should control anti-aircraft and coast-defense artillery, and whether to retain the post of forsvarssjef and the FO staff in peacetime. When it reported in March 1942, however, the committee had few definite answers to offer.28

One of the main obstacles to any specific planning was uncertainty over the circumstances of Norway's eventual liberation. If the war against Germany were still in progress elsewhere when this occurred, then Norway's first military priority probably would be to organize new combat forces with Allied assistance to participate in the final stages of the war. Otherwise, the reconstitution of the postwar armed forces could proceed at a more deliberate pace with greater consideration for long-term rationalization and economy.

One thing the committee did take for granted, however, was that neutrality no longer would be the basis of Norwegian defense policy.29 Norway, the report asserted, lay
... at the intersection of North American, British, European, and Russian interests. Norway's only chance to secure its own national interests in the future will therefore lie in choosing its allies and organizing a joint defense with them. A Nordic defense league will not be sufficient in the face of the great power combinations that we must reckon with. Without going into further detail on the possibilities... one assumes that Norway primarily will seek and commit to a joint defense with Great Britain, the United States, and Canada, and that military cooperation with the other Nordic states will be discussed exclusively from that point of departure.30

The March 1942 report went on to outline a hypothetical order of battle for the postwar forces, proposing a Navy of 9,000 men and 174 vessels, including four cruisers; a coast artillery establishment of 10,000 men, ten major fortresses, and nine lesser forts; a unified air force of 9,000 men, sixteen squadrons, and 320 aircraft; an anti-aircraft branch of 10,800 men; and an Army of 137,000 men in twelve brigades (organized as six divisions and three corps). The proposal was essentially to scrap the 1933 ordinance and return to that of 1911, with the addition of modern equipment and local militia detachments (designated the heimevern, or Home Guard) to guard against surprise attack. In keeping with the assumption of an Atlantic alliance, these forces were to be equipped primarily with American and British material, and training and doctrine were to conform extensively to Allied standards as well.31

The initial inspiration for the Heimevern was the British Home Guard, but the Norwegians eventually devoted more attention to the model of the Swedish Hemvärn. Hansteen and Christophersen regarded the prospect of another coup de main, in the style of April 1940, as the central problem of Norway's future security. To stop such an attack, a conventional system of mobilization would never suffice. Instead, Norway must rely on a more decentralized scheme, emphasizing a "lightning defense" (lynforsvar--a counterpart to Blitzkrieg) that could never be decapitated through the loss of a few key depots or command centers--a concept deeply rooted in Norwegian culture, at least as far back as the volunteer rifle clubs of the 1880s. The combination of this
logic and the inherently popular appeal of such a "grass roots" style of defense assured that the Heimevern would find a place in the postwar reorganization.32

On 15 April 1944, the Defense Department presented the government with a more modest, short-term proposal for re-establishing initial postwar forces in the aftermath of liberation. "Forberedelser for reisning av Norges nye forsvar," for inclusion in the Labor party's "Arbeidsprogram" platform. Although the military services still hoped eventually to achieve the goals outlined in the 1942 plan, they now acknowledged the need for compromise. The 1944 plan proposed essentially to revive the 1933 organization during the transitional phase, to establish twenty infantry battalions within six months of war's end (one per regimental district, plus one in Finnmark and three based on the police forces from Sweden), plus four artillery battalions and three motorized recon squadrons, totalling about 40,000 men. Conscripts were to receive a full year's training, and the plan also proposed to re-establish a corps of professional non-commissioned officers. "In military service," the report argued, "one cannot avoid [the need for] 'foremen' any more than in civilian businesses and organizations with large numbers of people."33 Other elements of the 1944 plan called for naval vessels totalling 25,000 tons, twelve air squadrons, and coastal artillery similar to the prewar establishment.34

The two pillars of the plan for rebuilding a better military were longer training and the acquisition of Allied equipment. On the former point, the April 1944 document argued:

An initial training period of less than one year cannot be justified on a professional basis. This must now be regarded as an international minimum, and a succession of cases in the present war have indicated clearly that solid training of personnel and units is now more decisive than ever for effective action and to avoid unnecessary losses.

Regarding arms and equipment:

The result is that in reality, for many types of material, we must base our defense on the industry of a great power.
This also means that in peace, we must rely on equipment of the same type produced by a great power, or else which can easily be supplemented or replaced therefrom; and these must be the great power(s) that will most likely support us during a possible future war.35

The April 1944 report was the Defense Department's counterpart to the Foreign Ministry's "Hovedlinjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk." and both documents formed part of the Labor party's evolving platform for the first postwar election. The defense plan clearly reflected declining emphasis on Lie's original Atlantic policy. Norway, the report argued, "... must itself provide, insofar as possible, provide for its own defense, in order to protect both our own territory and our interests abroad, in order to avoid [excessive] dependence on our great allies that could easily develop to our disadvantage."36

The report still took it for granted, however, that Allied assistance was vital, and continued to advocate the permanent adoption of British and American equipment. The "lessons learned" character of the plan is readily apparent in its analysis of the need for countermeasures against a coup de main like that of 9 April 1940, arguing that Norway's involvement in any future war was likely to begin with a surprise attack.

The focus of our defense must therefore be 'lynforsvarets'. In other words, our defense must be capable of effective action on the shortest notice and bring as much force as possible to bear in an initial period, until help from our allies can arrive. And we must have a popular, national defense [folkeforsvar], in order to bring the country's full military power to bear when danger threatens.37

Ironically, the government apparently had not intended to include defense policy in its "Arbeidsprogram" at all—evidence that at least some key members of the cabinet still did not perceive what an important role the legacy of 9 April 1940 would play in postwar politics. When the cabinet discussed the Defense Department's proposal on 5 May 1944, some ministers expressed concern that the government might exceed its wartime mandate by adopting such resolutions for the postwar period.
The Home Front's representative Paul Hartmann supported the plan, however; and on May 11 it received tentative approval as part of the Labor party's program for reconstruction.\(^{38}\)

Although the April 1944 plan had not included any specific recommendation on the question of a unified air force, it contributed nevertheless to the government's decision to create a unified air force. The resolution cited the FO's concept of lynforsvaret and argued that a single air force would be able to bring its power to bear in a more rapid and concentrated manner than could two separate arms.\(^{39}\) Thus, although the provisional defense plan remained highly tentative, here at last was what had been missing before the war: a strategic framework that provided a rational relationship between Norway's diplomatic and defense policies, and defined a clear and specific mission for the armed forces.

The plans outlined above generally took it for granted that the postwar Norwegian forces would adopt Allied equipment, but it became increasingly apparent that obtaining the necessary material would be no simple matter. The FO initially raised the question of equipping postwar forces in fall 1942, but the Allies were unwilling to discuss anything beyond "current operational plans." The issue came up briefly at the Quebec conference in August 1943, where the Americans suggested a maximum Norwegian force of about 40,000 men in the immediate post-liberation phase. Then, in April 1944, an Allied committee planning for the occupation of Germany called for the participation a full Norwegian division, along with two Danish and twelve Dutch and Belgian, all to be equipped with British material.\(^{40}\)

The Norwegian requirements fell into two categories: minimal infantry weapons and equipment for temporary security battalions (vaktbataljoner) during the immediate post-liberation phase, and full equipment for normal field forces thereafter. Under the terms of the 1944 Finance Treaty, the British agreed to equip eighteen light infantry battalions (the Norwegians had requested twenty-six). SHAЕF still refused to discuss the provision of equipment for permanent postwar forces, however: and the Norwegians found that the chances of obtaining
such material from Britain were directly linked to the issue of participation in the occupation of Germany.\(^4\)

C.J. Hambro opposed Norwegian participation in the occupation, arguing that the Allies would withdraw within only two to three years anyway, and that all Norway would accomplish would be to worsen future relations with a resurgent Germany. Trygve Lie represented the prevailing Norwegian view, however, when he replied: "We have learned what German assurances of friendship are worth."\(^4\)2 Both Crown Prince Olav and General Hansteen were also reluctant to commit Norwegian forces to occupation duty too soon after the liberation, however, because they realized that re-establishing field units was going to be a long and difficult process. As an alternative to reliance on British material, the Norwegians in February 1945 briefly explored the possibility of obtaining Swedish equipment instead. The main problem with this idea was that payments for Swedish hardware would have to be in hard currency, whereas Norway had a large surplus of English pounds from wartime shipping arrangements.\(^4\)3

Thus, due largely to the need for British military assistance in rebuilding the armed forces, the Norwegian government in London agreed in principle to contribute troops for the occupation. The issue clearly would require a decision by the reconstituted Storting, however; and the nature of the wartime agreement remained highly confidential and tentative, to the degree that many high-ranking Norwegian officers were not even aware of the prospect. Hardly anyone could have conceived how greatly the implications of deploying troops to Germany would shape the character of the postwar Norwegian Army.

Overall, Norway distinctly distanced itself from the Western Allies in the final year of the war. The low priority the Allies assigned to Norway in the closing months of the war (particularly with regard to Finnmark) dispelled much of the gratitude that might otherwise have resulted from the preceding years of co-operation in London.\(^4\)4

Functional military ties, however, were persistent and real. In fall 1945, Army chief Ole Berg remarked, "There is hardly a Norwegian officer [who was] in the U.K. who has not undergone one or more [British] courses within his branch or has been attached at least
briefly to a British or other Allied staff or unit." The British also made available 200 places for Norwegian officers in training courses following the war, thus fostering continued integration of the respective military cultures. Although no formal defensive treaty bound them following the end of the war, the two countries' armed forces continued to co-operate in what Rolf Tamnes has described as a "semi-alliance." The subsequent participation of Norwegian troops in the occupation of Germany was only the most visible aspect of this co-operation.

Diplomatically, however, Britain indicated a policy of disengagement from the issue of Norway's relations with the Soviet Union. In 1945-47, Britain remained uninvolved in the Svalbard question and tacitly supported Norway's position discouraging any permanent American bases in the region. Only in 1948 did this position change as the British began trying to draw the United States into a firm commitment to European defense.

THE AFTERMATH OF LIBERATION

The Allied liberation forces in Norway initially consisted of only about two brigades, and the Germans remained in de facto control of most of the country for several weeks after May 8. The Norwegian forces from Britain arrived by degrees: the parachute company at Oslo and Stavanger on May 10-11, the commandos of No. 5 Troop along with the police troops from Sweden, the armored reconnaissance squadron at Oslo on May 17, and the two Spitfire squadrons at Gardermoen on May 22. Hansteen and Christophersen arrived in Oslo on May 26.

Also on May 26, the Norwegian brigade from Scotland (consisting of only the 1st and 3rd Mountain Companies, the 2nd having been in Finnmark since November 1944) arrived at Tromsø. Finding the Germans there co-operative but still armed and unsupervised, the Norwegians grew alarmed over the possibility that the Soviets would advance farther westward to secure the Troms region, thus extending their occupation of Norwegian territory, if the Western Allies did not promptly attend to the situation themselves. In response, General Thorne therefore agreed on
May 28 to divert the British 304th Brigade from Bergen to Tromsø. Although the Soviets maintained a full division in the Kirkenes region throughout summer 1945, they made no effort to occupy any further ground. The last Russian troops withdrew from Norwegian soil on 25 September 1945, and the British left Tromsø two days later.49

For all of the prior Norwegian concern over the civil affairs issue, there was remarkably little friction between the Allied forces in Norway and the civilian population.50 Thorne’s command faced three main tasks: delivering approximately 43,000 tons of relief supplies, disarming and guarding the Germans, and repatriating approximately 80,000 Soviet prisoners of war, along with about 10,000 other non-Norwegian displaced persons. Given these challenges and the presence of an effective and legitimate Norwegian government, the Allies generally were happy to leave civil administration to the Norwegians. As Thorne prepared to leave Oslo in late 1945, resistance leader Paal Berg told him that the conduct of the Allied forces had fully dispelled previous fears that their presence would be like a second occupation.51

Although a few British units remained in Norway somewhat longer (notably elements of the 30th Division, under Major-General D.A.H. Graham), the Allied presence in Norway essentially ended on 1 November 1945 when General Thorne left Oslo aboard HMS Diadem. He had proven himself the right man for a difficult job by helping to minimize friction during the often chaotic post-liberation phase. In an official letter of thanks, Prime Minister Gerhardsen promised Thorne that Norway “will not forget what it owes to Great Britain.”52

Following VE-Day and the triumphal parades of May and June, the wartime Norwegian forces demobilized rapidly. MILORG officially disbanded on July 15. The Scotland brigade remained at Tromsø throughout the summer, but the government granted early discharge to men needed to man ships for the approaching Antarctic whaling season. The remainder of the brigade finally arrived in Oslo for a belated victory parade on October 29, at which King Haakon remarked that they were the best-trained soldiers Norway ever had produced. The brigade officially disbanded on October 31. The police units from Sweden meanwhile began demobilizing on October 22 as well.53
Plans for permanent forces remained unresolved, and in the interim the Norwegian Army consisted almost solely of temporary security battalions equipped by the British, with only minimal training. These formations were spread thin, supervising the internment and repatriation of the Germans and Soviet prisoners. The forces available to police the assembly camps initially were so inadequate that the Allies allowed the Germans to retain some small arms in order to enforce discipline among their own men. Due to the lack of regular forces, some MILORG volunteers actually remained on duty as late as September 15. The vast numbers of Germans to be repatriated and mines to be cleared meant that the process dragged on well into 1946.54

Under the agreement reached in London (and incorporated in the overall APOSTLE liberation plan), the British were to provide small arms and basic equipment for eighteen Norwegian light infantry/security battalions (vaktbataljoner), each consisting of five rifle companies. The Norwegians subsequently converted twenty companies to administrative and support functions, however, when it became apparent that the original plan had not made sufficient allowance for logistical needs.55 Five battalions were slated for North Norway, three each for Østlandet, Vestlandet, and Trøndelag, and four for Sørlandet, where Kristiansand became the main port of embarkation for the repatriation of German prisoners. Eleven battalions were at least partially formed by late June, and the remaining seven formed in July, when the British material began arriving. It proved to be of poor quality, however, and Thorne admitted that Norway had a relatively low priority among other nations that also needed Allied equipment for temporary security forces.56

The vakt battalions initially relied on the call-up of previously-trained men from classes 1935-39. Enthusiasm for such service was understandably low. The conditions of service in the temporary battalions were poor, due largely to the lack of adequate barracks. Morale was low, for almost every man wanted merely to finish the onerous task of herding the Germans out of the country and return to civilian life.57 Drinking binges and driving accidents were rife. The government also was keenly aware that every man on guard duty represented the loss of labor that was desperately needed for
reconstruction tasks, especially in devastated Finnmark. Nevertheless, the total strength of Norwegian Army forces temporarily climbed from 25,679 on July 1 to a peak of 43,514 on August 1.\textsuperscript{58}

On 22 June 1945, shortly after returning to Oslo, the Nygaardsvold cabinet kept its promise by resigning to make way for a transition government headed by Einar Gerhardsen, with members untainted by responsibility for the debacle of 1940.\textsuperscript{59} Of the wartime ministers, only Foreign Minister Trygve Lie and Defense Minister Torp retained their positions. In the aftermath of liberation, the major political parties all agreed on a common program for reconstruction under the slogan, "work for everyone."\textsuperscript{60} C.J. Hambro headed an effort by Conservatives to capitalize on Labor's responsibility for the 1940 disaster, but the electorate proved more concerned with future domestic policy than with past mistakes. Even most members of the non-socialist parties now agreed with most of the Labor party's main ideas, and the first postwar elections on 8 October 1945 gave Labor an absolute majority in the Storting, with 76 seats out of 150. The communists also gained several seats (which turned out to be their greatest success ever in a Norwegian election), reflecting many people's admiration for the Soviet Union's role in defeating Germany. (See appendix.) For the time being, at least, the communists pursued a policy of co-operation with Labor, thus widening the government's marginal parliamentary majority. On November 1, a new all-Labor cabinet, again headed by Einar Gerhardsen, replaced the transitional government.\textsuperscript{61}

Although the public preferred to focus on the future and refused to punish the Labor party for 1940, there was nevertheless a massive problem left over from the war: the question of how to deal with former collaborators. Apart from a relatively small number of undisputable war criminals, there were tens of thousands of other Norwegians who had collaborated in some capacity, including entrepreneurs and laborers who had profited from construction of German fortifications and other installations. In order to mete out proper punishment, the Storting reinstated the death penalty for treason; and prompt but lawful prosecution led to the execution of twenty-five of the most egregious criminals, including Quisling himself, who died before a firing squad in
The vast majority of accused collaborators, however, ultimately received relatively lenient treatment, with most sentences commuted or assigned as public service. Although a total of nearly 90,000 people were prosecuted for collaboration, only about 18,000 received prison sentences, while another 28,000 received fines or other penalties. By 1952 nearly all prisoners had been released, and the last of them received amnesty in 1957. At the local and personal level, however, grudges born of the occupation have persisted down to the present day.

Apart from the punishment of collaborators, the public also demanded investigation of the causes and circumstances of the disaster in 1940. Two major imperatives concerning defense emerged from the new political consensus: those responsible for the defeat in 1940 must answer for their conduct, and the government must take steps to insure that no such disaster could happen again. "Aldri mer 9. april!" read numerous newspaper headlines—"Never another April 9th!"

The appearance of these demands coincided with the return of the Norwegian officers who had spent the latter part of the war as prisoners in Germany and Poland. The first group, consisting of 239 men who were either ill or aged over 55, arrived in Oslo on May 28; and the remaining 826 arrived on June 4. To their chagrin, most of the officers received something less than a heroes' welcome. In the eyes of many Norwegians, the circumstances of their arrest in 1943 indicated that most of the officers had meekly submitted to "honorable" (and relatively safe) confinement when their duty had been to join the underground or escape to England. Many of the POWs also had held key posts in April 1940, and these two issues prompted widespread demands for an investigation of official conduct.

Most of the officers initially returned to their prewar posts in their respective districts; but a considerable number of them chose to resign immediately, due to the force of local opinion. In order to free its hands for subsequent investigation and reassignment of personnel, the cabinet resolved on 3 August 1945 that "Assignments to specific positions in the military made before 10 June 1940 are cancelled. The previous occupants of the posts shall continue to draw pay, with
obligation to serve in administrative capacities appropriate to their ranks."\(^67\)

In August 1945 the interim government appointed an independent fact-finding commission (Undersøkelseskommissionen av 1945) chaired by supreme court justice Gustav Heiberg to investigate the conduct of top-ranking military officers, as well as the civil authorities, in connection with the events of 1940. Although the commission did not complete its final report until fall 1946, it soon became clear that the results would not satisfy everyone. Conservatives had hoped the commission would help discredit the Labor party by holding it responsible for the lack of an effective defense; but while the report eventually did level criticism at some members of the Nygaardsvold government (particularly Koht), the overall conclusions were remarkably restrained and had little effect on postwar politics. Partisans on the left meanwhile saw the commission as a means of purging the conservative officer corps, by revealing its alleged bungling and complicity during the invasion. They too were disappointed, however; for with such a broadly defined task, the commission had no time for a thorough investigation of any but the top-ranking officers, who emerged from the report relatively unscathed as well. As evidence of the mildness of the report, one may consider the following statement, which a minority of the committee wanted to include but the majority excised from the final draft:

The government should: 1. have taken more effective measures to strengthen the neutrality guard in winter 1939-40. 2. have arranged the integration and co-ordination that it must have known were necessary for the defense preparations. 3. have mobilized the Army in southern Norway by 5 April 1940 at the latest and made the mobilization order clear enough to leave no doubt what the government wanted. 4. have given the order to lay mines.\(^68\)

The Defense Department meanwhile had initiated its own investigation on 5 June 1945 in order to screen the entire officer corps for collaborators or others who had failed to perform their patriotic duty in 1940. Most of this process took place at the district level.

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where each of the six military regions established a committee consisting of a lawyer as chairman, one military officer, one sergeant, and one enlisted member of MILORG. A central committee (det sentrale granskings utvalget) in Oslo meanwhile reviewed the records of officers who had spent the war in Sweden or Britain. This process actually led to the dismissal of about 1,000 officers, but critics nevertheless doubted the thoroughness of such an "in-house" investigation.69

With so many stones apparently left unturned, the Gerhardsen government subsequently decided to appoint a second commission, the Military Investigative Commission of 1946 (militærundersøkelseskommisjonen av 1946), to scrutinize the conduct of the armed forces in 1940 in further detail. This panel consisted of five members, three of them civilian and two military, charged with a double task.70 First, the commission was to prepare a report in the same manner as the previous commission, but this time focusing specifically on the military leadership at all levels. Second, the commission of 1946 was also to function as a sort of grand jury, providing preliminary recommendations of which individual officers ought to stand trial in the military courts for neglect of duty or outright treason. Even without recommending legal prosecution, the commission had the potential to destroy many officers' careers.

Those at risk, however, had a valuable ally in the person of Colonel Johannes Schiotz, head of the Army's historical unit, whom the government assigned as a special advisor to the commission. Although not officially a member of the panel, Schiotz in fact had great influence over its deliberations. With the limited time and personnel available, and the lack of reliable documentary evidence, it was impossible for the commission to investigate every significant event in the campaign of 1940 from scratch. In most cases the panel found little choice but to rely on Schiotz's own assessments of after-action reports collected by his historical unit.71 Fortunately for most of the officers in question, Schiotz identified fully with their position. In fact, he regarded the whole investigation as a disgraceful, politically motivated hunt for scapegoats; and his attitude undoubtedly contributed...
to the commission's remarkably mild judgements in many controversial cases.  

In addition to Schiøtz's influence, the ambiguous nature of the commission's task contributed to a remarkable lack of concrete results. Although called upon to function as a sort of grand jury, the panel had no legal authority to subpoena witnesses or documents; nor did the officers in question have the usual rights of the accused, such as cross-examination. The commission ultimately recommended formal prosecution of about thirty officers. Yet when passed to the military justice system, only four cases out of thirty actually resulted in guilty verdicts, each with a token sentence of sixty days' confinement.

The outcome of the investigations left many observers with the impression that the military once again had "taken care of its own." Suspicions of a coverup stemmed largely from the fact that when the commission completed its final report in 1950, the Defense Department consigned it to the secret archives, declining to release it even to the Storting, let alone for publication. This decision reflected fears that the public would tend to misinterpret the report as an official history of the campaign, which it was not; and that if published, it would provoke charges of libel from some of the officers concerned. Finally, it seemed that the report might tend to undermine public and political support for the current defense program, which by that time involved a massive buildup.

THE ARMED FORCES IN TRANSITION, 1945-46

In general, World War II had given a tremendous boost to Norwegian patriotism, including support for the general concept of defense. In early 1946, for example, a Gallup poll showed that sixty-nine percent of Norwegians "wanted Norway to build up a strong defense," while only twenty-four percent were opposed. Within the Labor party, the figures were sixty and thirty-one percent, respectively--a remarkable change from the party's prewar character. Although some diehard anti-militarists pressed for a return to the old platform seeking a purely
civil defense, the party majority decisively rejected this notion. The party program included a firm commitment to defense: "The military will be built up according to the lessons of war experience, in order to provide for the national defense and to fulfill our international military obligations." As Leif Rolstad later observed.

One would suppose that with rationing of electricity, shortage of fuel, and other problems, the Norwegian people would have been sick and tired of everything related to the military. Surprisingly, this was not the case. Most people supported the creation of an adequately strong national defense.

This support, however, was inextricably linked with demands for reform of the old military system. Along with "never another April 9th," Norwegians demanded a "democratic defense" that would obliterate the stigma of the allegedly exclusive and incompetent prewar officer corps. "[T]here was no lack of candidates who wished to become officers." Rolstad wrote. "The young looked forward to being called in for recruit training; but there was also some concern over what sort of officers would train them. They would prefer men who had taken part in the war—even if these had a reputation for demanding a lot." 77

As these demands might suggest, the varied experiences of the war had split the officer corps itself into several different factions. First, there were the "German" officers, those who had held prewar commissions and generally sought to maintain continuity with service traditions. Many of these officers had ended up in German prison camps and thus, ironically, had little to do with waging the war after June 1940. 78 Next, there was another faction whose defining experience had been wartime service with the Norwegian forces in Britain. These "British" officers were mostly young men commissioned during the war, but some were also prewar officers who had followed the King and government into exile in 1940 or escaped later. Foremost among these were Hansteen and Christophersen. A third faction consisted of men who had attained rank through participation in the underground. Although relatively few men ended up with permanent military commissions in this
manner, their influence was significant, especially after Jens Christian Hauge became minister of defense. The few members of Company Linge who decided to pursue permanent commissions after the war also fell into this general category. Finally, there were a considerable number of "Swedish" officers—Norwegians who had received their training in Sweden either during or directly following the war. A group of 109 candidates began a six-month Swedish command course at Målsåker in April 1945, and twenty-five others attended the regular Swedish Krigsskole at Karlsberg in 1945-46.

Although the "German" officers had received a rather muted welcome on their return to Norway, they had at least one almost universally acclaimed hero among them: Otto Ruge. Shortly after taking office in June 1945, the Gerhardsen transitional government decided to reappoint Ruge as forsvarssjef, a post he had held during the closing weeks of the campaign in 1940. Ruge officially relieved the Crown Prince on July 15 and received a promotion to lieutenant-general.

Ruge had many sterling qualities, but his effectiveness as postwar chief of defense was hampered by the fact that he had spent the previous five years in isolation, with no part in the wartime planning that had taken place in London. Most observers apparently took it for granted that Ruge would retain Hansteen and Christophersen as deputies, but instead the new forsvarssjef arranged for their transfers and obtained the appointment of his own protege and comrade from the war years. Colonel Halvor Hansson, as chief of the defense staff with promotion to major-general. Colonel Ole Berg meanwhile became a major-general as well and replaced Beichmann as chief of the HOK. Hansteen became inspector general of the so far non-existent heimevern on September 1, a far cry from his exalted post as forsvarssjef in 1942-44. This abrupt shift in the top military leadership threw into doubt all of the planning that had taken place in London, and it also may have disrupted informal contacts with the Allies, who had developed good working relations with Hansteen and Christophersen but for whom Ruge was a relatively unknown quantity.

Ruge agreed in principle with the wartime planners that in the long run, the Army ought to be based on a full year's training for
conscripts. He considered it most important, however, to re-establish a fairly large mobilization army as quickly as possible, even if this required some compromises in quality. In his view, conflict could develop among the great powers quite soon, and Norway must not be caught unprepared. He would rather have a good army in time, than a perfect one too late. His plan therefore proposed to induct the manpower classes of 1940-45 with a brief training period of three months, using the same basic organization as the 1933 ordinance, and to provide them mainly with German arms and equipment from the massive stocks left by the surrender of the occupation forces. In this manner, Ruge intended to re-establish a relatively large mobilization force of at least modest quality within a year, while taking advantage of the spoils of war to limit costs.81

Ruge outlined his intentions for the press on August 10. Eight thousand men of the 1945 group were to receive one year's training in specialist branches (e.g., Navy, Air Force, armor, technical), beginning during winter 1945-46. The 1940-44 classes meanwhile were to receive three months' recruit training in three successive call-ups during 1945-46, including forty-five days of tactical exercises in larger units. Ten to fifteen percent of each class also would have the opportunity for a full year's voluntary service, during which the advanced training would provide reserve officers and additional specialists. Finally, Ruge announced the government's decision regarding the temporary draftees in the vakt battalions: "Barring the unexpected, the relief and/or return home of the forces currently on duty will begin about Sept. 15, and will probably be complete by the end of the year. . . . The relief will be effected through call-ups of previously trained personnel, and by recruits currently undergoing training or who will soon be called up."82

Thus, only 8,000 men were to receive a full year's training, most of them for the Navy and Air Force. It remained unclear how the rest of the 1945 group and successive classes would be handled. Ruge seemed to indicate that the three-month system would continue until about spring 1948. Many parties objected to the plan, because it seemed to start down the slippery slope of the same prewar follies: Norwegians were
inclined to believe that they could make good soldiers with minimal
training, and the government would naturally prefer to save money.
Advocates of a full year's training feared that their window of
opportunity was closing, and others objected that the need for haste
must not interfere with reform of the officer corps.83

Following Ruge’s initial announcement, the Army in November 1945
submitted to the Defense Department a three-year plan that attempted to
combine the short-term training scheme with long-term qualitative
improvement. The plan called for three months' training for classes
1940-45 within the next year. Subsequent classes beginning with 1946
meanwhile were to receive a full year’s training, with six-week
refresher exercises to follow. Ruge thus hoped to have it both ways.
creating both a relatively low-quality but large force for the
transitional period, and a higher-quality force over the course of
subsequent years.84

Ruge's plan rested on several assumptions. One was that the task
of repatriating the German prisoners and displaced persons would be
essentially completed by September 1945, and another was that Norway
could obtain as much of the captured German weapons and equipment as it
wanted. Both of these proved overly optimistic. A more fundamental
problem with Ruge’s plan, however, was the severe shortage of Army
officers, a problem already familiar from 1939-40 but now exacerbated by
the war.

In 1945-46, filling even the senior posts in the military
hierarchy was a slow and complicated process. On 3 August 1945 the
government officially ruled that all appointments prior to 10 June 1940
were no longer effective, a decision that disappointed some prewar
officers who expected to regain their old posts automatically. New
district chiefs were appointed on October 5, effective October 16; but
not until December 13-21 did new regimental commanders receive their
orders, effective 1 January 1946. Many other key positions, including
district chiefs of staff and deputy regimental commanders, remained
unfilled until August 1946; and the sluggish pace of this process
apparently caused a considerable number of officers to resign.85
The problem of filling out the bulk of the Army's more junior leadership was even more difficult. The Defense Department appointed a committee on 28 June 1945 with Hansson as chairman, to report on the problem of re-integrating and expanding the permanent officer corps. The committee assumed that there would be three basic leadership categories: non-commissioned officers (vervet befal), B-officers (essentially reservists, trained at befalsskoler), and K-officers (the elite, educated at the krigsskole). In its report on July 21, Hansson's committee estimated that the postwar Army would need about 800 K-officers to fill staff, school, recruit training, and command positions down to deputy company commanders. B-officers would provide platoon leaders and fill about 250 other administrative posts. B-officer candidates and NCOs now would be obligated to enlist for three years of active duty. The committee also established stricter age-limits, clearly reflecting the lesson from 1940 that effective combat leadership demanded great stamina. Finally, the report also established the rules of seniority by which the various forms of commissions would be re-integrated into a single corps.86

The report by Hansson's committee drew considerable opposition from the various Army officers' organizations, all of which regarded the plan as an attack on their respective prerogatives in one way or another. Young officers with wartime commissions objected to the fact that the remaining prewar officers were to retain their seniority, regardless of combat experience (or lack thereof). These men apparently had considerable influence in the newly-formed Hærens officerforbund, which broke with tradition by attempting to include all categories of officers. Many elder K-officers, on the other hand, objected to the new age limitations and expressed their opposition through their organization, Hærens Fastlønte Offiserers Landsforening and its publication, Vårt Vern. The loudest criticism, however, came from Norges befalslag, the association of B-officers, and its periodical Befalsbladet.87

The B-officers' chief complaints were that the new plan would exclude them from command above the platoon level, and that many highly capable men (especially those who had proven themselves through active
wartime service) would be denied regular commissions because admission to the Krigsskolen required an Exam. Artium certificate (conferred only on graduates of prestigious gymnas secondary schools). The plan to reintroduce a separate corps of NCOs (reviving the previously insignificant distinction between sergeants and lieutenants) also drew opposition. Once again, the issue of elitism and class discrimination was rearing its head.88

Oscar Torp reacted sharply to such criticism, arguing that "The officer corps was, is, and will be democratic." His role in this case illustrates how far his views had evolved since his early days as an outspoken anti-militarist and would-be revolutionary in the 1920s.89

The democratization issue also involved the nature of military discipline, and there were numerous demands for the abolition of what many people viewed as "Prussianism" in the prewar Army. It fell primarily to Torp's successor Hauge to address this matter.

Given the determination to raise professional standards for officer education, rebuilding the Army was something like trying to make bricks without straw; because the numbers of available K-officers in 1945 fell far short of the estimated requirements. Prewar graduates of Krigsskole classes 1906-40, after the elimination of mandatory retirees and others discredited during the war, numbered only about 200, most of whom were rapidly approaching retirement age as well. There were approximately 150 other officers who either had attended a special, condensed Krigsskole course in London in 1942-43 or else had undergone purely British officer-training programs. It remained to be seen how the Army could fill the remaining 450 positions without compromising its new, more rigorous standards.90

The good news was that there were many talented young officers with temporary, wartime commissions who were interested in making a career in the postwar forces. Recognizing the special qualifications of certain outstanding individuals, Hansson's committee resolved to waive the Krigsskole requirement and grant regular commissions directly to twenty-eight men. Ten others received provisional commissions contingent upon their completion of additional civilian education within a specified period, and fifty others were admitted to a special.
abbreviated one-year Krigsskole course that began along with the first regular two-year class on 15 November 1945. Ninety-nine of the 141 candidates in the first postwar Krigsskole class had served in the wartime forces. Twenty-five other men (mostly MILORG veterans) attended the Swedish officer school at Kalberg in 1945-46, after which they entered the upper division of the Norwegian Krigsskole. In addition, the Norwegians established a temporary, remedial artium course of one to three years in Oslo to provide the educational prerequisite for men with wartime experience who wished to apply to the regular Krigsskolen. In 1945-49 the Army held a total of four supplementary officer-training courses for 177 men, to upgrade their temporary wartime commissions to regular ones.

A new befalsskole course with 370 candidates also began at Terningmoen in fall 1945. The course of training now amounted to a full year, followed by a year of active service—a reduction from the three years called for by Hansson's committee, but nevertheless a major increase over the prewar training system for reserve officers. A sergeants' course for about 500 men meanwhile began at Fredrikstad as well. Non-commissioned officers now had to enlist for two years, divided into five months' basic recruit school, six and a half months' leadership course, three months' unit service as corporal, and the remainder as sergeant. Again, this was a considerable improvement over the prewar situation; yet the new system still failed to create a genuinely professional corps of senior enlisted men.

By 1 January 1946, there were nearly 2,000 officers and NCOs in the various courses. The training and education process would take time, however; and it would be several years before the Army would have anything like the kind of leadership called for by the July 1945 report. Nor were there sufficient officers to train both the mass of three-month conscripts called for by Ruge's plan and the one-year contingents of the postwar classes simultaneously. In order to meet the need for instructors in the training programs, the Army enlisted a considerable number of civilian specialists such as mechanics, cooks, and tradesmen, as non-commissioned officers for three-year terms with special pay bonuses. In the meantime, B-officers temporarily filled many of the
posts that ought to have gone to K-officers according to the Hansson committee.  

Ruge's assumption that Norway could rely on German equipment also proved premature. In fact, under the terms of the liberation treaties of 1944 and the guidelines established in the "Norway Liberation Handbook," the loot belonged exclusively to the Allied powers, of whom Norway technically was not a member, although the latter document did mention that the most modern and valuable portions of the captured material were to be turned over to the Norwegians. The general Allied policy, however, was to destroy German arms in order to discourage any future revival of a German armaments industry through a market for ammunition and spares. This issue already had arisen during the liberation on 15 May 1945 when the Norwegian military attaché to Britain Colonel Haneborg Hansen had learned of the British intentions in a meeting with the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. Hansen then prompted the Norwegian ambassador Eric Colban to assert Norway's claim to the material through diplomatic channels, but in the meantime the destruction was well underway.

On 10 August 1945, following a brief vacation before he assumed his duties as *forsvarssjef*, Ruge met with Major Leif Rolstad, who was chief of staff to the Norwegian liaison with the headquarters of Allied forces in Norway. Ruge had learned that the Allies were rapidly destroying most of the captured German material, which he regarded as Norwegian property. General Thorne apparently was sympathetic to the Norwegian interest and already had been interpreting the guidelines as much in Norway's favor as possible. Nevertheless, Ruge told Rolstad, "They must understand that we need all this material—it is what the Norwegian Army will have to make do with for the next 20 years!" In a private meeting that afternoon, Ruge and Thorne apparently reached an informal understanding that helped to smooth over the disagreement. In pressing their case, the Norwegians played down Ruge's actual intentions for the material, emphasizing that it was needed only for the short-term until sufficient Allied equipment became available. "It is under no circumstances the intention to base the Norwegian armed Forces [sic] on German war material," they assured Thorne, "but only a question of
getting over the first difficult and critical period." Nevertheless, the list of desired material was based on the full order of battle under Ruge's plan, including sixteen infantry regiments.97

In September the Norwegians reduced their demands to a shorter list supposedly based on the requirements of eighteen battalions, but the fate of the German material remained the most troublesome issue in the final months of the Allied presence in Norway.98 In his final press conference on Oct. 30 before leaving Oslo, Thorne commented,

I regret one thing: from the first day I arrived in the country, I should have made it clear to the Norwegian people that material left behind by the Germans belongs to the allied nations, here as well as in other formerly occupied countries. A great deal of war material was collected here in Norway; it was our mission to insure that it would not be used elsewhere.99

Apart from disagreement with the Allies, there were other factors making recycled German arms a less-than-ideal solution to Norway's military problem. As Rolstad recognized, second-hand material was unlikely to inspire confidence or respect in the eyes of the public, the Allies, or the troops themselves. Although many types of German weaponry remained superior to their British equivalents long after the war, re-equipment of the Norwegian forces with British material became synonymous in many people's minds with the principle of modernization.100

Regardless of these factors and the lack of Allied co-operation, the Norwegians managed to obtain a large quantity of German weapons and other equipment, ranging from Mauser rifles to heavy artillery and tanks (see appendix). Other than for the occupation brigades in Germany, this material formed the basis of the Army's equipment until the arrival of large-scale American military aid during the Korean War; and considerable numbers of German arms remained in service with heimevern units as late as the 1980s.101

Delays in the repatriation of the Germans and refugees presented further obstacles to the crash-training idea. This problem resulted mainly from the fact that many of the men in the repatriation camps came from the zone now occupied by the Soviets and therefore did not want to
return home. While these tens of thousands of individual cases filtered through the Allied bureaucracy, the German-built barracks in Norway remained unavailable for Ruge's training program; and when the facilities finally did become vacant, they required extensive cleaning and renovation.102

The continuing need to police the camps meanwhile absorbed nearly all the Norwegian Army's meager resources and delayed the resumption of regular recruit training. With the initial volunteers and MILORG personnel due for demobilization on 15 September 1945, the government decided in late August that it would have to call up the previously-trained classes 1935-39 for another three months. Enforcement of the draft was practically impossible, however, because of the disruption of record-keeping during the war (including the destruction of registration files to thwart the Nazi AT scheme in 1944). Response to the call-up therefore was spotty at best.

In any case, the government recognized the economic problem of tying up these older men for long. In fall 1945, the Defense Department therefore began drafting men from the untrained wartime classes as well, simply to fill the ranks of the vakt battalions, instead of sending them to recruit school as called for by Ruge's plan.103 On 22 December 1945, the Defense Department decided to end conscription of the pre-1940 classes, and in January 1946, the ratio of guards to remaining prisoners was reduced to one per five, with a maximum of 8,000 men per district, since every locale wanted as many guards and clean-up crews as possible. By 1 January 1946, when the Defense Department officially returned to a peacetime administrative footing, the number of Army personnel in service had fallen to 23,576.104

The election of October 1945 had a decisive, if indirect impact on the defense issue, because it led to the replacement of Torp as Defense Minister by Jens Christian Hauge, the former head of MILORG's civilian leadership.105 Following the liberation, Gerhardsen promptly had made Hauge a special secretary to the Prime Minister's office; and on November 1 the ambitious young attorney assumed the task of managing the Defense Department through the perplexing postwar transition. An
article in the press that month suggested what a confusing tangle of different but inter-related questions the defense issue had become.

There have been so many opinions and suggestions submitted concerning the organization of the military [recently] that it is difficult to find room for them all. There are many different issues. One writer insists that the young officers with war experience are not being used to good effect. Another thinks that not enough emphasis is being placed on tradition and continuity with the past. A third throws down the gauntlet to debate the Navy's significance relative to the Army. A fourth complains that German weapons and equipment are being destroyed, and thinks that we need every piece we can get our hands on. . . . In truth, the situation is quite confused.

Nevertheless, the article concluded.

It is inadequate simply to reinstate the old system on the argument that 'basically the war involved nothing particularly new.' In fact, it introduced a great many new things, including some things that cannot be addressed simply by regulations. It brought a new spirit to the task of training, it brought new insights regarding morale and combat effectiveness, and it mobilized completely new thinking about the military. 106

This argument represented Hauge's thinking. Although he was no professional soldier, his experience on the Home Front had informed him of the public's (and especially the youth's) hopes and expectations for future defense. He therefore was committed to a thorough reorganization of the military along the most modern lines possible, with "first-class British equipment." 107

Hauge's takeover of the Defense Ministry frustrated Ruge's plans in several respects. Most importantly, Hauge disapproved of Ruge's emphasis on hasty training of the 1940-45 classes and retention of the same basic organization of 1933. 108 The young Defense Minister regarded the postwar transitional period as a unique window of opportunity to effect long-term changes in the military. To resurrect what amounted to the same prewar Army would merely perpetuate the institutional flaws that had proven fatal in 1940. Hauge was especially concerned with
making a clean break from the class-consciousness that had pervaded the prewar period, lest such thinking again undermine public support for defense and dispel the sense of unity engendered by the war. The government's declaration of its general policy in the Storting in December 1945 indicated Hauge's principles.

In order to defend our country's freedom, welfare, and peace, and to fulfill our obligations as a member of the international security organization [i.e., the U.N.], an effective military will be organized, within the limits of the country's economic means. This will include due regard to the experiences of the recent war and developments in the realm of military technology. The time spent by youth in military service will be used in such a manner that it is also of use to them in civilian life. Officers will be recruited from all walks of life and will be educated in a democratic spirit.\textsuperscript{109}

Hauge was convinced that the only way to restore public confidence in the military was to infuse a new generation of enthusiastic, well-educated young officers who could identify with their men, and vice-versa, better than the those of the prewar period. This process would also help to dispel the popular notion that obtaining a commission depended on social class and political orientation.\textsuperscript{110} Perhaps influenced by his wartime contacts with the British, Hauge also considered it vital to re-organize and re-equip the new Army along the lines of the Western Allies: and above all, this meant extended training. Reverting to the prewar system, he warned, would forfeit the new public support for defense. Hauge adopted the view of the wartime planners in London who held "that our defense could only attain the necessary quality and a reasonable state of readiness if we introduced a conscription period of about one year."\textsuperscript{111}

Ruge's attitude toward future co-operation with the British also amounted to a fundamental disagreement with Hauge. Apart from purely technical assistance, limited mainly to the Air Force and Navy, the general had no intention of patterning the Norwegian forces on British lines and therefore rejected the proposal of a British military mission
to remain in Norway after the departure of Thorne's command. "The only thing to which we are committed." Ruge wrote.

is that we will not adopt German material beyond the initial period. Beyond purely technical assistance in the receipt of possible British equipment, there is therefore no Norwegian military desire to have a British military mission attached to HOK. On the contrary, it is desirable from a military perspective to eradicate as soon as possible anything that smacks of foreign involvement in Norwegian military affairs. Such involvement can easily lead to an inferiority complex among Norwegian officers that would be detrimental to the service.112

Just over a month after Hauge took office, Ruge submitted his resignation on December 8, effective 1 January 1946.113 Although there had been some rumors of friction with Hauge, the press reports were relatively muted. In a brief interview, when asked why he had resigned, the general carefully avoided the issue.

It's quite simple. I'm getting old. When I returned home last spring, I had already decided not to return to the service, after so many years' absence. But the Defense Minister at that time, Torp, asked me to help him in a difficult time. We were friends from 1940 and had always gotten along well, so I accepted his offer.... It was a purely personal relationship between minister Torp and me. I therefore intended to depart when he left the Defense Department last fall. Minister Torp asked me, however, to continue until the new Defense Minister had had time to orient himself. Therefore, I delayed my resignation until now. That's all there is to it.114

The government meanwhile published an official letter of thanks to Ruge for his great services, signed by both Gerhardsen and Hauge. Only Dagbladet ventured to remark, "It is clear that Mr. Ruge and Mr. Hauge have not gotten along as well as Mr. Ruge and Mr. Torp." Other issues soon pushed the reasons for Ruge's departure into the background. Apparently, no one desired to dwell on the matter, in many cases probably out of respect for the general.115
In private, however, Ruge put it bluntly: "There cannot be two chiefs [of the military]." The issue boiled down to a disagreement over the fundamental nature of civil-military relations in Norway. Ruge had demanded broad policy-making powers that would have violated the principles of parliamentary government. Gerhardsen, at least, was sorry to see Ruge go; but under the circumstances the government had little choice but to accept the resignation.\footnote{116}

Head of the Navy Admiral Corneliusen temporarily replaced Ruge as forsvarssjef, followed by General Hansson on 1 May 1946. As of 1 August 1946, however, the government abolished the position. The reorganized forsvarsstab (defense staff) then became a committee consisting of the chief of staff and the three service chiefs, reporting directly to the Defense Minister. The staff henceforth was to confine itself to strategic and operational matters, placing the civilian bureaucracy more directly in control of military administration.\footnote{117} Defending these changes against criticism from Sven Nielsen on 6 December 1946, Hauge argued that the FO had been equivalent to the German OKW, and that the British system was in fact a better model for civilian control of the military. At least in peacetime, the FO also seemed to present an unnecessary intermediary between the Defense Minister and the services. In any case, the reorganization and abolition of the FO helped clear the decks for Hauge to proceed with his plans.\footnote{118}

THE THREE-YEAR PLAN AND THE OCCUPATION OF GERMANY, 1946-47

Ruge's departure did not end the debate over training of the 1940-45 classes, for there were plenty of other advocates of the three-month crash-training scheme. However, the on-going drafts for the vakt battalions in winter 1945-46 steadily frittered away the pool of manpower not already exempted by wartime service or other circumstances: and in any case, it became increasingly clear that financial and leadership constraints made it impossible to train the wartime classes and the first postwar class simultaneously. The issue thus resolved into a choice between quantity or quality, and Hauge was determined to begin one-year service with the class of 1946.\footnote{119}
The issues of both training and equipment became directly linked with Norway's commitment to provide troops for the occupation of Germany. Although the Storting had yet to endorse the decision, the cabinet regarded itself as bound to fulfill the agreement made in London by the government-in-exile in 1944-45. As Hauge pointed out, Norway would lose face abroad if it sent hastily trained and poorly equipped contingents to Germany. National prestige and self-respect thus demanded modern, professional-looking troops to show the flag.\textsuperscript{120}

The Army leadership initially was not even aware of the government's commitment to participate in the occupation. The original version of the three-year plan presented in November 1945 made no reference to sending contingents to Germany. This resulted in a considerable embarrassment for HOK chief Ole Berg on a visit to London in January 1946: when the British asked him about the status of preparations for sending a Norwegian division to Germany, he had to confess that he knew nothing of such plans.\textsuperscript{121}

Ruge had argued that if necessary, Norway ought to withdraw from that agreement rather than sacrifice the short-term mobilization army. In March 1946, Army chief Ole Berg re-stated the case in a letter to the Defense Minister, with reference to the international situation.

Tension between the maritime powers and the greatest continental power appears to be growing steadily. Our position in an intersection of the great power blocs' spheres of interest presents a serious risk to our country, as long as we have no effective defense but instead are viewed as a power vacuum which each of the contenders must regard as a danger.\textsuperscript{122}

Hansson agreed with Berg and argued that time spent in Germany would be of little if any value to Norwegian troops anyway, since conditions were so different from those in Norway.

The government was also under pressure from other quarters, however, which demanded thorough, qualitative military reform rather than a short-sighted return to the old system. In the Storting on 25 March 1946, chairman of the military committee Sven Nielsen (Conservative) criticized the entire defense reorganization so far as a
fiasco that was well on its way toward squandering the unique opportunity for a fresh start after the war.123

On 8 April 1946, Ole Berg proposed a compromise in which the 1940-44 classes would not be drafted, but the 1945 class would receive a full year's training along with 1946. Hansson proposed a variation of this idea, to provide six months' training for the 1944-45 classes. The keyword of both plans was beredskapsstyrke: a "readiness force," to maintain at least some troops in Norway while the occupation contingent went to Germany. They and most of the other senior Army leadership remained opposed to Norwegian participation in the occupation, but the equipment issue provided additional impetus toward fulfillment of the agreement with Britain.

In the closing months of the war, the British had agreed in principle to equip a full Norwegian division for service in Germany, in addition to the minimally-armed vakt battalions. Following the liberation, however, Otto Ruge's intention was to rely on ex-German equipment rather than the British, while avoiding the obligation of sending troops to Germany. Although all captured German material technically belonged to the Allies, Norway did manage to obtain large portions of it at relatively low cost. Nevertheless, under Hauge's direction, Hansteen visited London in December 1945 to pursue the question of British equipment for the bulk of the Norwegian Army, independent of the occupation contingents. These talks resulted in a tentative agreement to equip two "reduced divisions," equivalent to one battalion per regiment (which corresponded to the intermediate force-structure of the three-year plan), in addition to the temporary loan of equipment for the occupation brigade.124

Based on the Hansteen deal, the Army submitted its shopping list to the Storting in 1946, in connection with the debate over allocation of the 300 million kroner special appropriations called for by the three-year plan. The requested items included 60,000 rifles, 10,000 submachine guns, 300 machine guns, 300 81-mm mortars, 1,000 light mortars, 200 field guns, 200 anti-aircraft guns, 400 anti-tank guns, and 2,000 anti-tank mortars (presumably PIAT).
These numbers appeared so vague, however, that the request drew sharp criticism from military committee chairman Sven Nielsen. Here was the Army requesting scarce funds for major equipment purchases when in fact it had not yet even resolved upon a permanent organization. Nielsen also pointed to vague estimates of the German material at hand, such as 145,000 rifles, 3,100 heavy infantry weapons, and 500 artillery pieces of various calibers, which suggested that the Army was not even sure what it had available. As a result of Nielsen's criticism of this apparently sloppy accounting, the Storting reduced the Army's special appropriation from 160 to 140 million kroner.\textsuperscript{125}

The Army presented a revised three-year plan to the Defense Department on 3 May 1946, to govern the period 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1949. The Storting, however, did not reach a decision on the defense issue until September 1946, and in the meantime recruit training remained at a standstill. The Storting approved participation in the occupation on 14 May 1946, but only by a brigade rather than the full division the British expected. Hauge and Erik Brofoss visited London in June to inform the British of this decision, which probably contributed to the delays and cancellations of some of the heavy equipment orders.\textsuperscript{126}

The Norwegian Army did purchase a considerable amount of British equipment in 1946-48, but it fell short of the goals of the "two reduced divisions" plan. This resulted not only from the lack of funding, but also from British failures to deliver on several major orders. The main cancellations included 132 armored cars and 135 wheeled armored personnel carriers intended to equip the three projected armored reconnaissance squadrons, and 128 25-pounder guns intended to re-equip the four artillery battalions, which instead had to rely on largely worn-out ex-German 105-mm pieces.\textsuperscript{127}

In order to determine the most effective permanent organization for the military, the Storting appointed a special defense commission on 9 July 1946, consisting of twenty members, with Trygve Bratteli (who later became Prime Minister) as chairman and Bjørn Christophersen as secretary. Its mandate was to recommend long-term plans to follow the completion of the three-year plan on 1 July 1949. In the event,
however, the committee did not complete its report until 7 November 1949; and by that time, events had made its conclusions largely irrelevant.  

When the Storting finally resolved upon a three-year defense plan in September 1946, the results represented the triumph of Hauge's agenda over the professional Army leadership. The legislators determined that there would be no further draft of pre-1946 classes, apart from participation in the Heimeverns and three months' voluntary paramilitary forestry service for those who wanted it. In order to provide a larger initial infusion of manpower, however, the Storting lowered the draft age from twenty-one to twenty, which effectively doubled the size of the 1946 class; and these men were to receive a full year's training, as well as fully modernized equipment. The cycle of deployments to Germany (beginning in February 1947) would be six months, which meant that the pool of trained manpower for mobilization in Norway would increase by about 4,000 men twice a year, beginning in fall 1947. At that rate, it would be four to five years before any of the home regiments approached normal strength. Pending completion of the defense commission's report, the Army's administrative structure would remain based on that of 1933.  

The modified three-year plan projected a normal annual budget of 80 million kroner for the Army, plus 100 million for the other two services combined, for the period 1946-49. Beyond the normal budget, the plan also called for a total of 300 million kroner in special appropriations for re-equipment, of which the Army originally was to receive 160 million, the Navy 100, the Air Force 30, and the coast artillery 9.  

In the course of debate over the three-year plan, Hauge also addressed the issue of democratization of the armed forces. The Defense Department, he assured the Storting, was committed to achieving an appropriate relationship between officers and enlisted men. Conscripts, he emphasized,  

... are citizens in a democratic state, who do their duty as Norwegians and exercise their national right. There
cannot and will not be any curtailments of their general rights and freedom, other than those necessary for the sake of effective military training and good military discipline... Norwegian public opinion requires that we move as far as possible in the direction of voluntary discipline. This requires on the one hand that officers respect their men's full human rights; and on the other, that the enlisted men understand the justification of the limitations on their freedom and the need for order and discipline.\textsuperscript{132}

One additional military issue that came before the Storting in connection with the three-year plan was the question of female service. During the war, the government-in-exile had established a uniformed women's auxiliary service and had even gone so far as to enact female conscription, although it was seldom applied in practice. After heated debate, Storting voted to abolish women's military service, even for volunteers, on 9 December 1946. Equal opportunity for women had yet to gain widespread political support in Norway, and the armed services did not re-open their ranks to women until the 1970s.\textsuperscript{133}

According to the revised three-year plan, the Army estimated that by 1 January 1949 it would have approximately 33,000 fully trained soldiers available for mobilization, plus another 17,000 partially trained, and 20,000 in the heimevern for local defense. As under the old 1933 system, the main tactical units would remain six field brigades of approximately 5,000 men. The mobilization options were revised for greater flexibility, however, with more decentralized distribution of armories throughout the brigade areas, as follows: 1st Brigade: Skedsmo - Lillestrøm - Løren area; 2nd Brigade: Eidsvoll area; 3rd Brigade: vicinity of Jæren; 4th Brigade: Voss, Hønefoss, or Stavanger; 5th Brigade: Værnes - Trondheim area, or Hamar - Elverum area; 6th Brigade: interior of Troms district. Tactical organization during 1947-51 was based closely on the British pattern (see appendix).\textsuperscript{134}

Beginning in 1947, the Army ran a parachute course for about 200 men per year, in order to form an airborne battalion (four companies of 150 men each) by 1949. In addition, the Norwegians drew upon the wartime experience of Linge and MILORG veterans to form three special
"sabotage groups" of fifty men each, intended for infiltration operations and guerrilla warfare in case of invasion.\(^{135}\)

Following the Russian withdrawal from Finnmark in September 1945, the Norwegians also faced the question of how to police the border, now that the Soviets had annexed the Petsamo region from Finland. A reserve police company initially provided a token presence, and in January 1946 the state police (Utrykningspolitiet) formed a special Finnmark Company to replace the temporary personnel. On 20 May 1946 the Army took over the border patrol, and in August 1947 the detachment received the designation it has borne ever since: the South Varanger Garrison, initially consisting of about 140 men.\(^{136}\)

In September 1946, the first normal postwar contingent of about 4,400 conscripts began training in preparation for deployment to Germany. The occupation brigades received numerical designations according to the year of their arrival in Germany, the first one being 471, followed by 472, 481, etc. The first group trained for seven months before moving to Germany in early 1947, under the command of Colonel Arthur Hauge; and most observers judged this to be adequate (although hardly ample) preparation. Subsequent contingents received less training, however, due to budgetary restrictions; and the quality of the brigades suffered in proportion.

The three-year plan had allocated an annual Army operating budget of 80 million kroner, but the Army leadership objected that it would need at least 117 million in order to provide twelve months' conscript training; nor would 80 million cover the expense of refresher exercises. In practice, the Storting actually did provide slightly higher appropriations in the three years that followed, but the extra funds went mainly to the heimverns. Beginning in 1947, the Army had to reduce the period of conscript service from twelve to ten months (nine for men not slated for Germany).\(^{137}\) As one recent study concluded, "Even though the total, actual appropriations [in 1946-48] were close to the goals established by the political authorities, the funds were insufficient for any true reconstruction of an effective military defense."\(^{138}\)

While the first contingent of conscripts was undergoing recruit school, a reconnaissance party of the designated brigade commander,
Colonel Arthur Hauge, and thirteen other officers visited Germany in October 1946 for orientation by the British. The Norwegian brigade would be attached to the British 5th Infantry Division as part of XXX Corps. In this period the Allies were still seriously concerned with the threat of partisan-style resistance by recalcitrant Germans, and the final stage of Norwegian training in preparation for the occupation included mock combat with enemy irregulars simulated by the heimevern. The actual deployment of Brigade 471 took place in January and February 1947, designated operation KLAUS.¹³⁹

In effect, the German commitment absorbed almost all of the Norwegian Army's resources for several years. As each contingent completed its ten-to-twelve months of service, the pool of trained manpower available for mobilization in Norway increased by about 4,000 men, twice a year; but it was a slow process. These personnel were scattered among their respective home districts and could not form viable mobilization units until enough subsequent contingents had completed training to provide sufficient manpower for each regiment. In the meantime, Norway remained practically bereft of ground forces other than the amateurish heimevern.

The government had appointed Hansteen Inspector General for the Home Guard on 1 September 1945, but at that point no real organization existed. After numerous meetings with former MILORG personnel, local organizations, and other authorities, Hansteen on 7 December 1945 presented a tentative plan for the Home Guard based on a volunteer system. In March 1946, however, the Storting rejected his proposal in favor of compulsory service.¹⁴⁰ The heimevern thus became an uneven mixture of rifle club enthusiasts, MILORG veterans, and conscripts not assigned to the occupation brigades. This policy helped to swell the ranks of the new organization, which seemed especially important since the normal Army was gaining strength so gradually; but the system also tended to dilute the heimevern's character as a popular militia.¹⁴¹

By May 1946, it became clear that Hauge and Hansteen disagreed over conscription for the heimevern, and this led to Hansteen's replacement by Colonel Mons Haukeland in September 1946, after which Hansteen became chief of the Germany Command (Tysklandskommando, or TK).
an administrative headquarters designed to oversee the rotation of the occupation contingents. The heimevern organization meanwhile became an organic part of the Army, rather than a separate service as originally envisioned. The three-year plan established that the men from classes 1940-45 who had not already served in the vakt battalions or some other capacity would subsequently be liable for 120 hours training with the heimevern. Combined with volunteers, many of whom were MILORG veterans, the conscripts provided the heimevern with a significant pool of manpower, at least on paper.

The heimevern amounted to Norway's only substantial ground defense in 1946-48, but it was no real substitute for a field army. Heimevern personnel generally received less than even the mandated 120 hours of training per year. Haukeland had few illusions when he wrote in November 1946, "We will not be able to reckon on having trained Home Guard units until well into autumn 1947, even if roadblock and some combat units can be set up now with rifle club members, etc. . . ."

THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE, 1945-47

The Norwegian Navy and Air Force shared some of the burden of mopping-up in the aftermath of the liberation, with responsibility for the harbors, coastal fortifications, and airfields. The approximately 350 coast artillery batteries that the Germans had left presented a particular challenge to the Navy, which had to reconstitute the coast artillery branch almost completely from scratch. The shortage of coastal artillery officers prompted the Navy to send a number of candidates to a three-year course in Sweden, but for several years there remained far more guns than crews to man them. By November 1947, the coast artillery still had only about 6,000 of the estimated 25,000 personnel required.

In general, however, the postwar transition posed fewer problems for these services than for the Army. The Navy had managed to assemble a corps of capable officers in London, and accomplished a great deal in setting up a training establishment there, where about 150 officers graduated from the wartime sjøkrigsskolen. Thus, with respect to
leadership, the Navy returned to peace in relatively good shape, with a
good deal of combat experience as well. The Air Force was also fairly
well provided with officers trained during the war.\textsuperscript{147}

In the investigation of "passive conduct," professional naval
officers generally made out much better than their Army colleagues. Of
the 181 naval officers with regular commissions in 1940, fully half had
joined the forces in exile, and nineteen others participated actively in
the resistance. Only seventeen were suspended after the war for
collaboration or lack of initiative. Ironically, Admiral Diesen again
received an active command, despite his role in 1940 and resignation in
London.\textsuperscript{148}

The Air Force squadrons that returned from exile already
represented a modern, well-trained, and battle-hardened force. Although
the wartime planners in London originally projected a much larger
postwar Air Force, the political and fiscal realities of 1945-48 meant
little opportunity for expansion. The special appropriations under the
three-year plan allocated 30 million kroner for the purchase of 186
aircraft, which corresponded to three Spitfire squadrons, two of
Mosquitos, one of Catalinas, and one transport squadron. In 1947, one
of the fighter squadrons converted to Vampire jets, an investment that
reflected the government's commitment to modern air defense.
Nevertheless, an American report that September concluded that "Between
lack of equipment, the effect of demobilization and low morale among the
pilots, current combat effectiveness is very low."\textsuperscript{149}

The Air Force and Defense Department also remained responsible for
civil air transport until 15 February 1946, when this shifted to the
transportation department.\textsuperscript{150} Unlike the Army, the Air Force had no
intention of utilizing captured German combat aircraft, although it did
end up operating two flights of Ju-52 transports for a considerable
period.\textsuperscript{151}

The Norwegian Navy suffered a considerable disappointment under
the three-year plan. Wartime planning had called for the formation of
at least three "tactical units," each to consist of one light cruiser,
two large destroyers, and four torpedo boats, in addition to expanded
submarine and MTB flotillas. In the aftermath of the war, Britain made
numerous vessels available at bargain prices; and the Norwegian Navy set its sights on acquiring the light cruiser Arethusa, which the British offered for only fifteen million kroner. The Storting refused, however, and the Navy never received its long-sought replacements for the old artillery ships.152

Despite the failure to obtain cruisers, the Navy had little cause to complain over its share of the budget in relation to the Army; and Hauge generally got along well with the naval leadership. The core of the fleet became the large destroyers Stord, Arendal (ex-HMS Badsworth), Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim, and Stavanger.153

The Norwegian Navy and Air Force maintained considerably closer contacts with their British counterparts following the war than did the Army. One naval issue that did cause some friction, however, was the fate of former German submarine pens in Bergen and Trondheim. As British military planners began to consider the likelihood of future conflict with the USSR, they worried that Norway might again become an unwilling base for enemy raids on Atlantic shipping. The Norwegians, however, were reluctant to undertake the extensive task of demolishing the German bunkers, because reconstruction of their war-damaged economy demanded all available resources. In response to continued pressure from Britain, however, the government eventually provided for partial demolition of the structures in 1946-48.154

CONCLUSIONS ON THE INTERIM POLICY OF 1945-47

Following the destruction of Nazi Germany, Norwegian policy-makers looked forward to co-operation and stability among the remaining great powers through the mechanism of the United Nations. With few apparent prospects of renewed tension, Norwegian policy initially focused on domestic reconstruction and settling of wartime accounts, while pursuing a foreign policy of non-alignment and "bridge-building" between East and West.

Although the Labor party's platform called for the re-establishment of strong military forces in principle, in practice the defense program suffered serious delays and shortfalls reminiscent of
the prewar period. Competing demands on the country's limited manpower and capital resources demanded tough choices, and there could be no quick solution to the disruption of Army training caused by the war.

The policy of Jens Christian Hauge, which prevailed over rival plans in 1946, was to create a relatively well-trained pool of manpower through the periodic rotation of contingents to Germany. This process had not even begun, however, more than a year after the liberation; and it would be several years before Norway again had anything like an adequate field army available for mobilization in a crisis.

Altogether, twelve contingents went to Germany in 1947-53, totalling about 50,000 men. In the long-run, these men did provide the basis for a better army, which came to enjoy much broader public support than its predecessor before the war. Hauge also argued that the occupation brigades were "a good school for our Army officers." Furthermore, the practical experience of co-operation with the Allies in Germany also helped prepare the ground for Norway's subsequent membership in NATO.165

The gradual training scheme rested on a dangerous assumption, however: that there would be no substantial risk of war within about ten years. This view clearly reflected the Labor government's foreign policy; but conservative critics, including many of the senior Army officers, regarded the Soviet danger as real and immediate. As Hauge later admitted, "The three-year plan was based on an optimistic assessment of the international situation; it gave a higher priority to qualitative improvement than to rapid expansion of the armed forces' size."156 In early 1948, the Norwegian Army was still seriously disorganized; and the rapid deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union indicated that Norway might need combat-ready home forces far sooner than Hauge's plan would provide.
1. On the changes wrought by the war experience, see Philip M. Burgess. *Elite Images and Foreign Policy Outcomes: A Study of Norway* ([Columbus, Ohio]: Ohio State University Press. [1968]). Although burdened with political science jargon, this book makes the interesting argument that the war did not really change the minds of pre-war leaders such as Nygaardsvold, Koht, and Mowinckel, but simply led to their replacement by a new generation with a different perspective.

2. Lie's efforts toward an alliance with Britain and the United States apparently began even before 9 April 1940, when he was Minister of Supply. See Svein Blindheim, "Ei omvurdering av Noregs krig." *Dag og tid* (9 March 1989): 4.


12. Ibid., 290.


14. Reports from Colonel Dahl in Finnmark meanwhile contributed to this assumption. "There is a great danger," he wrote, "that they [the Russians] will never leave, but that they regard [the region of] South Varanger to the foot of Varanger fjord and Tana as their sphere of interest and intend to move their border to this line." Ibid., 203.

15. Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North, 34; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 407; Olav Riste, "Svalbardkrisen 1944-1945," Forsvarsstudier I (1981): 20-36. See also, Ørjan Berner, Soviet Policies toward the Nordic Countries (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1986), and Sven G. Holtsmark, "The limits to Soviet influence: Soviet strategic interests in Norway and Denmark 1944-47," IFS Info (7/1994). Riste argues that the Western Powers did not simply write off Finnmark as a cynical act of Realpolitik. American policy at that point still was generally optimistic about postwar relations with Russia. The British were more hard-headed but lacked the means to oppose the Soviets without American support. The Norwegian-Soviet liberation treaty of 1944 also may have prompted them to wash their hands of the matter to a certain extent. The British chiefs of staff also contributed to dismissing the issue with their opinion that the islands were essentially useless as military bases. Riste, London-regjeringa, II:324, 330-33.


17. Ibid., 331; Admiralty to FO, 16 May 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 18.

18. See for example Max Manus, Det vil helst gå godt (Oslo: P.F. Steenballes forlag, 1945).


22. Ibid., 37.


25. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 38. The Soviets also preferred that the Norwegians demolish former German airbases in the north, especially at Kirkenes, but apparently did not press the issue too hard.


27. Riste, *London-regjerina*, II:347. The focus of Norwegian diplomacy, as we have seen, was a collective security scheme headed by the Western Powers or, failing that, the U.N.


29. Hansteen strongly endorsed Lie's Atlantic Policy. Hansteen, "P.M. Ad Utkast til hovedlingjer i norsk utenrikspolitikk," 2 June 1942; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 211.


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41. Norwegian Military Mission to Force 134, 13 January 1945: RA: F 0, kat. 1256.1/01, box 32; Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:93; Riste, London-regeringen, II:352. The Norwegians sought a commitment to equip at least six normal infantry battalions immediately following the war, for later expansion to twenty. At the Defense Department's request, the Foreign Ministry pursued the issue through diplomatic channels. to no avail.

42. Ibid., 357-58.

43. Ibid., 366-71. The Norwegians apparently never seriously considered anything but British or American aircraft and naval material.


45. Den norske regjeringens virksomhet, IV:19; Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 36.

46. Alfred Roscher Lund's intelligence organization, for example, maintained informal but close contacts with its Allied counterparts after 1945. Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 159-60.


49. Yngvar Ustvedt, Det varme freden - den kalde krigen. Det skjedde i Norge>. vol. I: 1945-52 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1978), 102; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 25; Riste, London-regjeringsa, II:234-36. One wonders whether the Norwegian anxiety over the situation at Tromsø also may have had something to do with their unilateral occupation of Bear Island, which the Russians might have regarded as a provocation. On the continued self-supervision of the German forces after VE-Day, see NA: T-312, reel 1073, 9276215ff. Further records, comprising about forty meters of shelf space, are available in the Riksarkivet but remain mostly uncatalogued: Deutscher Oberbefehlshaber Norwegen, 1945-46. See Knut Johannessen, Ole Kolsrud, and Dag Mangset, eds., Håndbok for Riksarkivet (Oslo: Ad Notam Gyldendal, 1992), 491.

50. An OSS report of 29 May 1945 stated, "Relations with Allied troops are good, but any British attempt to demand payment for upkeep of their troops will be resented. It is hoped that Allied troops will leave when the Germans do." NA: RG 226, entry 21, report L 56605.


53. Ibid., 44-45; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 25, 49; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 403. Despite the laurels won by No. 5 Troop, 10 Inter-Allied Commando, that unit also disbanded shortly after the liberation; and commandos never became part of the Norwegian Army's permanent establishment. Arnfinn Haga, Klar til storm: Med de norske commandos i annen verdenskrig (Oslo: Cappelens, 1984), 173.

54. There were still about 30,000 Germans in Norway on 1 January 1946, 13,453 on 1 July 1946, and 962 on 1 January 1947. About 250 of the latter figure were individuals on trial or serving sentences for war crimes. German prisoners were compelled to work on mine-clearing and ammunition disposal details, in which 178 died and approximately 240 were wounded. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 45-46; Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 36.


58. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 37-38; Breidlid, Høren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 47-48, 59, 68-70, 75.


62. For the official proceedings of Quisling's trial, see Straffesak mot Vidkun Abraham Lauritz Jonsson Quisling (Oslo: n.p., 1946), and Vidkun Quisling, Vidkun Quislings forsvarstale i lagmannsretten 1945 (Oslo: Historisk forlag, 1987). Quisling paradoxically pled innocent to the charges of treason, while freely admitting the facts of his 9 April 1940 putsch: in his own deluded mind, he apparently regarded himself as a misunderstood patriot to the end. Benjamin Vogt, Mennesket VIDKUN og forraederen QUISLING (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1965), represents an attempt to reconcile the apparent contradictions in Quisling's strange character.

63. Ustvedt, Den varme freden, 132-67; Gerhardsen, Samarbeid og strid, 60-61; Derry, History of Modern Norway, 404-5. The literature on this subject is considerable. Probably the most authoritative study is Johs. Andenaes, Det vanskelige oppgjøret: Rettsoppgjøret etter okkupasjonen. Second Edition (Oslo: Tanum-Norli, 1980). E. Cornelissen, "Det økonomiske landssvikoppgjøret" (Unpublished manuscript: University of Oslo, 1947), provides a contemporary analysis of cases against economic collaborators. O.H. Langeland (a former MIORG leader), Dømmers ikke (Oslo: Heim & Samfund, 1948), argues the merits of leniency; and as a result, the author found himself virtually ostracized by fellow veterans (according to an interview with Svein Blindheim, 19 January 1995). For an official report of the protracted legal process, see Norway, Justis- og politidepartementet, Om landsvikoppgjøret: Innstillning fra et utvalg nedsatt for å skaffe tilveie materiale til en innberetning fra Justis- departementet til Stortinget (Oslo: Mariendals, 1962). Terje Valen, De


66. See "Uten skning i befalskorpset." Arbeiderbladet, 28 May 1945, which asserted that Quisling had "influential and numerous" followers within the military. The Defense Department hastened to assure the public that "All officers' conduct will be properly investigated." Arbeiderbladet, 30 May 1945.

67. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 32, 34.


69. Militærorientering 1 (2, 15 Aug. 1945): 10; Befalsbladet 53 (9, 1947): 70; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 53-54. The records of the military screening committees are in Riksarkivet: Forsvarsdepartementet. 1945-47: Det sentrale granskingsutvalg for å granske befalets holdning og innsats under krigsårene 1940-45, shelf numbers 1B092 [31-54]. Access remains sharply restricted, however, as governed by the law of 10 Feb. 1967, §13b & §13e (forskeres taushetsplikt), because of the continuing sensitivity of numerous personal and family reputations. Significantly, the screening committees did not investigate officers' contacts with Quisling's party prior to 9 April 1940. FD to FO, "Undersøkelse av befal-retningslinjer for de lokale utvalg", 30 June 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 90.

70. The members were Supreme Court justice Erik Solem (chairman), historian Magnus Jensen, attorney Ivar F Golstad, Major-General Hansteen, and Commodore Per Askim: Rapport fra den Militære undersøkelseskommisjon av 1946 (Oslo: Oktober forlag, 1978).
71. After extensive editing, these reports later formed the main basis of the massive official history series, *Krigen i Norge 1940*. 15 vol. (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1952-71). RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02.


73. Ibid., 18; Breidlid, *Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig*, 118.

74. The report was finally published in 1979: *Rapport fra den militærundersøkelseskommissionen av 1946*. Access to the committee's full records in Riksarkivet remains restricted, however. Forsvarsdepartementet, Under-søkelseskommissionen 25.1.1946. shelf number 1B.092.[62-65].


76. St.meld. nr. 32 (1945-46), 1.

77. Rolstad, *Tysklandsbrigaden*, 23. Two examples of the "democratic defense" demands were in the communist newspaper *Friheten*: "Den demokratiske folkehær--vårt vern og feste," by cabinet minister Strand Johansen on 6 July 1945, and a letter on 18 July 1945 signed "A Field Soldier" which argued that the Army "must be democratic. . . . The Army must have the confidence of the people." Cited in Rolstad, 22-23. A lead article in *Arbeiderbladet*, 17 July 1945, indicated much the same.

78. Ruge was the most obvious example of this group, but his stature as a national hero and undoubted patriotism made him somewhat unrepresentative. His protegé Colonel Halvor Hansson provides a better example of the "German" faction and the mainstream Norwegian Army officer corps. According to Svein Blindheim, Hansson was a prewar member of the NS but refused to support Quisling's April 9 putsch. He became Ruge's chief of staff during the 1940 campaign, remained in Norway rather than going to Britain, and ended up in "honorable captivity" in Germany, thus playing no direct part in either the "people's war" of resistance or the forces-in-exile.


80. Breidlid, *Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig*, 54; Riste, *London-regjeringa*, II:271. Although Hansteen had played a central part in developing the heimevern concept thus far, he almost certainly regarded this appointment as a further disappointment, following his demotion to deputy Forsvarssjef in 1944.


83. The liberal Morgenbladet carried the large headline, "Ikke forsvarlig å slippe det gamle befalet løs på rekuttene" ("unjustifiable to put the old officers in charge of the [new] recruits"). Ibid., 40.


86. FD, "Innpasning i Hærens yrkesoffiserskorps av yngre offiser med ulike utdannelse og forutsetninger." 21 July 1945: RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 220; Militærorientering, 1/1945: Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 32-33: Breidlid. Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 56-57. The new age-limits were 60 for generals, 57 for colonels (and for lieutenants and captains in non-combatant branches), 53 for lieutenant-colonels, and 50 for majors.


88. Breidlid. Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 57. See also Arbeiderbladet, 13 August 1945, which sharply criticized Hansson's committee plan as elitist; cited by Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 23.

89. Militærorientering. 1 September 1945.

90. Den norske regjerings virksomhet. IV:19; Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. Breidlid. 56-57; Rolstad. Tysklandsbrigaden. 30-31. The Krigsskole in London had run from October 1942 to October 1943, with a lower division of forty-six candidates and an upper division of thirty others who had undergone befalsskole before the war. After completing the course in London, the upper division went directly to British units (mostly as platoon leaders in the 52nd Division), while the lower division received a further six to eight months of officer training in British schools.

91. Ibid., 34.


93. Ibid., 58-59. 79; Rolstad. Tysklandsbrigaden. 35.

94. Ibid.

96. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 19.


100. Ibid., 19-20.


102. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 40.

103. Part of the problem also was financial, since maintaining the vakt units in addition to recruit training effectively would have doubled the defense budget. Ibid.

104. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 48-49.

105. "De 8 nye statsråder." Arbeiderbladet, 3 November 1945. Hauge, born 15 May 1915, was extraordinarily young for a cabinet minister. He had been arrested in August 1941 for anti-NS agitation among other law students. Released in November, he became fully involved in resistance work after the Germans closed the University of Oslo in 1942. See Jens Chr. Hauge, Manuskripter: Taler, aviserartikler, fjernsyns- og radioprogrammer og notater med emne fra krigsårene og frigjøringen (Oslo: Tiden norsk forlag, 1988).


107. Ibid., 29. Hauge also was inclined to accept the assistance offered by the British in officer education, which many older Norwegian officers were not. Many younger officers apparently resented Hauge's appointment as well. As one lieutenant complained bitterly to an American officer, the new Defense Minister "knew nothing of the Army and its problems." NA: RG 226, entry 19, box 355, report XL 28761.

108. Ruge to Hauge, 8 November 1945; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.

109. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 29.
110. Hauge's predecessor as Defense Minister, Oscar Torp, had already begun to address this issue with an official policy statement, "Offiserkorpset var--er og blir demokratisk. Veien er fri for all evnerik ungdom." *Militær orientering* 1 (3, 1 Sep. 1945): 1, 18-19.


113. Ruge to King Haakon, 8 December 1945; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 22.


117. Reidar Godø, "Forsvarets ledelsesordning etter 1945." *Forsvarsstudier* III (1983-84): 187-231; Rolstad, *Tysklandsbrigaden*. 42. Although Hansson stayed on briefly as forsvarssjef, he resigned as chief of the defense staff already on 2 March 1946 when it became clear that the staff was to become directly subordinate to Hauge. Hansson subsequently became chief of the conscription office (Generalkriaskommisær /sjef for Utskrivningsvesenet).

118. Breidlid, *Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig*. 94-97. A further, more obscure bureaucratic reorganization of the Army followed in 1947, concerning the relationship among branches and technical arms, districts, the HOK, and the defense department. Hauge meanwhile delegated more administrative authority to the chiefs of specific arms (e.g., infantry, engineers, etc.), who received wider powers to assign officers as they saw fit, whereas before the war practically every appointment required personal approval by the Defense Minister. Ibid., 55-56.

119. Ibid., 62-63.

120. In addition, many Norwegians genuinely felt they owed a debt to Britain and the other allies for their wartime exertions on Norway's behalf, which Norway could now make good in part by sharing the burden of Germany's occupation.


122. Ibid., 77.

123. Ibid., 60.

124. Ibid., 65-68.
125. Ibid., 113-15.
128. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 126. The Army also appointed a committee chaired by Colonel Østbye to report on tactical and operational lessons drawn from the 1940 campaign. but apparently this had little impact on the actual policy and organization of 1946-48. "Innstilling fra utvalget om erfaringer fra 1940." 14 March 1947; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 27, and FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 13. The relative lack of importance the Army attributed to this task is apparent from the fact that the committee received only one month (February 1947) to complete its work.
129. Many of the men from the 1940-45 classes by this time had served three months in the vakt battalions. and many others were exempt from further service because of wartime service in MILORG or other circumstances. The forestry service provision reflected a shortage of commercial timbermen and a heavy demand for firewood because of reduced coal imports. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 41.
130. "Plan for en første reising av Norges forsvar (Treårsplanen)," 13 September 1946, St.meld., nr. 32 (1945-46); RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 53; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 75-78.
131. The total defense budget for 1946-47 amounted to 4 percent of Norway's GNP. For comparison, Denmark's defense budget in the same period was 1.8 percent of GNP. Sweden's was 5.3 percent. and Switzerland's was 6.9 percent. Ibid., 86, 113.
132. Stortingsmelding nr.32, "Treårsplanen" / "Plan for en første reising av Norges forsvar." 6 December 1946; cited by Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden. 25. Part of the context of these remarks was that some Storting members were still challenging the assumption that Norwegians needed military training equivalent to continental standards. since their supposedly innate military virtues already gave them such great advantages. On subsequent concerns over the psychological impact of military training on Norwegian youth, see L. Eitinger, Militærlivets innflytelse på unge norske menns psykiske liv. En klinisk og sosialpsykiatrisk undersøkelse (Drammen: Tangen-trykk, 195?).
133. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 102-103.
134. Ibid., 84-85, 112, 117.
135. Ibid., 79, 84.

136. The main reason that the police initially handled the border patrol was that the Army already was so over-burdened with guarding the Germans and trying to resume normal training. Ruge to FD, "Rikspoliti til Øst-Finnmark," 8 November 1945; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 160. From 1947 to 1950, the border patrol was under jurisdiction of the cavalry arm, thereafter the infantry. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 83; Otto H. Munthe-Kaas, Norges grensevakt i Nordøst fra 1918 til 1963 (Oslo: Gyldendal, 1964). 150-166.


138. Ibid., 93-94.


140. Pugh, "Guns in the Cupboard," 92-96.


143. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 41-42.

144. Pugh, "Guns in the Cupboard," 118-23.

145. Ibid., 98.

146. Forsvarsstaben, "Orientering om beredskapssituasjonen ved 3-årspериодens utløp 1. juli 1949," 1 November 1947; RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 19. Ruge expressed particular concern over the ex-German 30.5-cm and 40.6-cm batteries in North Norway, which he feared an attacker might seize by coup de main and use against Norwegian targets. Ruge to SOK, "Ad 3-årsplanen for kystartilleriet." 26 November 1946; Ibid. box 53.

147. Rolstad, Tysklandsbrigaden, 30.

148. Christensen, De som heiste flagget. 114, 121-23.

149. Forsvarsstaben, "Orientering om beredskapssituasjonen ved 3-årspериодens utløp 1. juli 1949," 1 November 1947; RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 19; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 115; CIA Research Reports, reel 3, 406.


153. Christensen, *De som heiste flagget*, 61, 152-54. The latter five vessels were sometimes called "super-destroyers" because of their heavy gun armament and advanced fire-control system. In 1948 the Norwegians also acquired four ex-German U-boats, three Type VII C and one type XXIII. Raymond V.B. Blackman, ed., *Jane's Fighting Ships, 1952-53* (London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co., 1953). 255.


CHAPTER 11

RELUCTANT ALLIANCE, 1948-55

INCREASING EAST/WEST TENSIONS, 1947-48

Following the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, in accordance with George F. Kennan's principle of containment, the Truman administration sought to achieve its ends primarily by non-military means. The centerpiece of this policy was the Marshall Plan, first announced in June 1947 and formally approved by Congress on 2 April 1948, designed to draw European nations safely into a western, non-communist orbit through economic aid.

Although Norway had emerged from the war with its economy in better shape than many others, the challenge of economic recovery was still immense. American aid was tempting, but accepting it also seemed to run the risk of antagonizing the Soviets, as it soon became clear that Stalin would not participate in the plan. Economic considerations proved paramount, and by accepting the Marshall Plan, Norway took an important step toward abandoning the policy of non-alignment in favor of closer western ties.

Through the end of 1947, few Norwegians felt much concern over the possibility of Soviet aggression; the rumblings of East-West tension seemed to be merely echoes of the war with Germany. In early 1948, however, a series of ominous events prompted important changes in Norwegian public opinion and policy. The communist coup in Czechoslovakia on 21-25 February 1948 raised immediate alarm over possible communist subversion in Norway. As one author put it, the
Soviet takeover in Prague "gave a great shock to Norwegians in general, when they saw a genuinely democratic people, which practiced a 'bridge-building' policy not unlike their own, pulled suddenly behind the Iron Curtain."

Further anxiety stemmed from the Soviet imposition of a "mutual assistance pact" on Finland that bore a distressing resemblance to those forced on the Baltic States in 1939-40. The timing of the proposal, which the Soviets presented to the Finns on 27 February 1948 only two days after the events in Prague, suggested that it was part of a unified policy. Under the implied threat of direct military occupation, Finland signed the agreement on 6 April 1948. The treaty made Finland a virtual protectorate, and a Prague-style coup seemed imminent in Helsinki as well. Moreover, there were widespread rumors in diplomatic circles that the Soviets were about to present similar demands to Norway, probably involving territorial adjustments in the far north.

The Berlin crisis further demonstrated both the Soviet determination to absorb occupied areas into a permanent sphere of influence, and the increasingly firm American commitment to support European clients in resisting further communist expansion. In March 1948 the Soviets began hindering access to West Berlin, and on 24 June 1948 they imposed a full ground blockade. The Anglo-American airlift to supply the city seemed to foreshadow inevitable escalation toward armed conflict.

NORWEGIAN DEFENSE POLICY IN DISARRAY

The foregoing events prompted a new round of intense debate in Norway over the Labor government's defense policy. Following the resignation of Otto Ruge as forsvarssjef (chief of the armed forces) in December 1945, Defense Minister Jens Christian Hauge had pushed through his controversial plan for the gradual training of conscripts by occupation duty in Germany; but professional military opposition to his administration remained strong. It seemed to many officers that the government again had relegated the armed forces to a low priority, and that the gradual pace of Hauge's program ignored the real danger that
war might break out in the near future. If war was indeed imminent, then the state of the Norwegian Army in 1947-48 was cause for alarm. (As noted in the previous chapter, the other services had emerged from the war in somewhat better condition.)

Some of the dissatisfaction among the officers had economic roots. The return of the armed services to a peacetime administrative footing on 1 January 1946 had entailed major reductions in pay. Lieutenants, for example, found their monthly salary reduced from 612 kroner to 365, and they also lost the previous benefit of free meals, valued at 2.85 kroner per diem. Living conditions on many posts were poor, especially in Finnmark where the displaced civilian population also still needed emergency shelter. The housing situation improved gradually in 1947-48, but the terms of service nevertheless offered little incentive for recruitment and retention of talented and ambitious men. By 1 July 1948, the Army had only 325 K-officers and 640 B-officers and NCOs--far fewer than the requirements set forth by Hansson's committee in 1945.

When the Storting failed to provide funding in accordance with the three-year plan of 1946, the Army had to reduce the basic period of conscript service from the prescribed twelve months to only nine (ten for the contingents bound for Germany). Except for the occupation brigade, the lack of funds for new equipment forced the Army to make do with a hodge-podge assortment of mostly worn-out old Norwegian, British, and German weapons that seemed to mock earlier hopes and promises of a modernized defense.

The defense staff warned privately in November 1947, "Military readiness as a whole must be described as weak... The situation has been greatly aggravated by the extraordinarily numerous resignations of capable officers that have taken place since the liberation." The staff emphasized the danger posed by the lack of coherent Army units in Norway. To be effective, troops must train together in peacetime rather than waiting until an actual mobilization to assemble; and under Hauge's plan, the rotation and subsequent dispersal of occupation contingents was doing nothing to alleviate the problem. The field artillery branch was in a particular state of disarray, following cancellation of the plan to acquire British guns. Furthermore, the report warned, the Army
as yet had taken no effective precautions to forestall another surprise attack. Although the newly-established *heimvern* (Home Guard) theoretically included about 30,000 men by 1947-48, the staff concluded that it was not yet "capable of operations in any meaningful context." The Navy and Air Force would be in somewhat better condition at least by the conclusion of the three-year program ending in 1949, but the anti-aircraft branch still lacked radar fire-control equipment. "Without such material," the report concluded, "our anti-aircraft artillery defense against modern warplanes will be [purely] illusory." An American report in September 1947 stated, "The entire air defense system is being reorganized, but at present, no real resistance could be offered against air attack." Moreover, it seemed to the Americans, the existing Norwegian policy also lacked any definite strategic framework. "Norway's military policy at present," the report concluded, "is characterized by indecision regarding the size and nature of the defense force best suited to future need."

During the period of the "bridge-building" policy in 1945-48, the government carefully refrained from any explicit assumptions that the Soviet Union was the primary threat. Norwegian officers indicated no doubt over the identities of their potential enemies and allies. In November 1945, for example, Major Lindbakk-Larsen outlined several likely war scenarios in which the Soviet Union obviously would be the enemy: invasion through Sweden, through Denmark, or through Finmark. Privately, in the Defense Department and to a lesser extent the Foreign Ministry as well, civilian officials shared much the same view, along with the assumption that Norway's *de facto* allies were Britain and the United States. Hauge told the Storting in 1946.

It is difficult to imagine that Norway could defend itself against an attack without allies, and it is necessary to recognize that Norway with its limited military and economic resources will not be able to hold out alone for any extended time against a military great power. But the Norwegian military must be able to hold out alone until we receive effective help from those [countries] who must [inevitably] be our allies."
The problem, however, was that in order for such allied assistance to be effective, the respective armed forces must develop specific plans and material preparations for co-operation ahead of time, which would compromise the "bridge-building" policy toward the Soviets. The Defense Department placed increasing emphasis on the need for such co-ordination, to avoid the kind of confusion and misunderstandings that prevailed in 1940; yet because of the formal adherence to non-alignment, no such planning could proceed apart from purely informal and personal staff contacts, which some historians have called the Anglo-Norwegian "semi-alliance."  

"THE REVOLT OF THE GENERALS"

Although Ruge had refrained from public comment on his disagreements with the defense policy since his resignation, he addressed a confidential letter to Prime Minister Gerhardsen on 15 September 1947, in which the general expressed grave concern over the state of the armed forces. Ruge drew an explicit parallel with the prewar situation and charged that the government was now misleading the public as to the true state of things, such that Norwegians did not understand how defenseless they really were. The general policy for rebuilding the Army already had changed three times since the war, Ruge wrote, and after more than two years the country still remained virtually disarmed on the ground, with little prospect of improvement for years to come because of the gradual nature of the training in Germany.  

Although the letter clearly implied that Ruge might soon turn to a public forum if the government did not take action, Gerhardsen apparently paid little attention. Then in early 1948, General Carl Erichsen declared publicly that Norway was essentially a military vacuum. Chief of the defense staff General Ole Berg declined to comment, thus implying his agreement with Erichsen while avoiding direct criticism of the government's policy.  

The real crisis began on 29 May 1948, when General Helset submitted his resignation as chief of the Army (HOK) in protest over
Hauge's defense policy. Then on June 10, Ruge addressed another letter to Gerhardsen, endorsing Helset's action and making clear that the government now had a serious problem on its hands. The issue moved to the Storting, where critics read the generals' charges and Hauge defended the Labor policy on 17 June 1948.

The essential complaint was that Hauge had consistently disregarded the advice of the professional military chiefs. Ruge emphasized the fundamental responsibility of the military authorities for preparedness, recalling the vacuum of leadership in the 1930s. The postwar policy so far had failed to rebuild a mobilization army, he argued, mainly because of the conflicting priority of sending troops to Germany. Ruge criticized the government-in-exile for having "given its word to contribute troops for the occupation of Germany, a promise that could not be broken and therefore later caused the government a great many problems and diverted the task of rebuilding the military into a path it otherwise would not have taken."

Helset further emphasized the failure to follow through on the three-year plan and the concealment of the real situation from the public, blaming Hauge in particular. The officer corps, Helset concluded, "... to a great extent has lost faith in the prospect of rebuilding the Army," resulting in the resignation of many of the best and the brightest to pursue civilian careers.

Hauge claimed that the recent special appropriation of 100 million kroner (see below) already had provided for the completion of the three-year plan, but Helset argued that even this would not make up for previous cuts. Helset also blamed Hauge for the decision to return 106 particular officers with pre-1940 commissions to duty in 1945-47, a move which many younger officers regarded as a failure to make good on the promise of a thorough house-cleaning.

Gerhardsen eventually curtailed the dispute over such specific issues by pointing out the more fundamental implications of the generals' assertions, which the Prime Minister claimed represented a challenge to civilian control of the military. "It seems as though [Helset] believes his mandate requires that the policy of the Defense
Department and the Government conform to his attitudes and decisions," the Prime Minister argued. Furthermore,

"... This aspect of the issue raises profound questions over the relationship between the central political authorities and the military bureaucracy. The general's statements indicate that his conception seems to conflict with the fundamental principles upon which a democratic government must be based." 19

The debate over Helset's resignation essentially ended there, and Hauge remained Defense Minister. It remained unclear, however, who would become the new Army chief. Wilhelm Beichmann agreed to serve in a purely temporary capacity, but many of the other senior officers staged a form of boycott in support of Helset. According to one author, when General A.D. Dahl learned that the government would offer the HOK to Hansteen, Dahl sent the latter a telegram: "No one must seek [to become] HOK."20 Hansteen accepted the appointment, however, and subsequently remained chief of the Army through 1956.21

Thus, the government fended off the "revolt of the generals" against Hauge; but the question remained whether Norway would take adequate steps to insure its security amid the escalating crisis of the Cold War. Although the generals failed to bring down the Defense Minister, the attendant publicity probably accelerated the government's elevation of the military to a much higher priority. Relations between Hauge and the Army leadership meanwhile remained uneasy, as the British military attaché noted:

The Defence Minister is a dominating personality, he mistrusts the Senior Officers whom he suspects of being obstructionists and of putting personal interests before those of the country. He therefore often rides roughshod over them, will not listen to, or rarely accepts, their recommendations with the result that there is an atmosphere of distrust.... 22
EMERGENCY DEFENSE MEASURES IN 1948

Even before the Helset episode, political developments indicated a distinct anti-Soviet shift in Norwegian policy. The coup in Prague had spelled the end of Norwegian Communist Party (NKP) as a significant political factor. The initial policy of co-operation with Labor already had broken down in the course of 1947, indicated by increasingly strident anti-communist editorials in the Labor organ Arbeiderbladet by prominent Labor leaders such as Tranmæl and party secretary Haakon Lie. Gerhardsen dispelled any remaining doubt over the government's attitude toward the communists in a speech on 29 February 1948, immediately following the events in Prague.

The problem for Norway is . . . primarily a domestic one. The thing that can threaten the Norwegian people's freedom and democracy is the danger represented by the existence of the Norwegian Communist Party. The most important task in the struggle for Norway's independence, democracy, and rule by law, is to reduce the influence of the communists and their party as much as possible.

Gerhardsen added, "We shall fight against the communists with democratic means and spiritual weapons." Nevertheless, the speech amounted to a political declaration of war. In April 1948 the Storting created a special subcommittee for foreign relations, which excluded all communist delegates from sensitive briefings. The communists also suffered from an internal split in 1948 between factions headed by Furubotn and Løvlien, and in the next election in 1949 the NKP lost all of the eleven parliamentary seats it had gained in 1945.

The Prague coup and the simultaneous Soviet pressure on Finland also prompted the first of a new series of emergency defense appropriations. On 16 March 1948, the Storting approved a supplementary defense grant of 100 million kroner, 81 million of which went to the armed forces and the remainder to the police and civil defense.

Efforts to step up the pace of rearmament were hampered, however, by the fact that the Army was still operating on the purely temporary, transitional administrative basis of the three-year plan. Legislators
wanted evidence that the Army had thought through its long-term needs quite thoroughly before the Storting would approve any major purchases of new equipment such as artillery and armored vehicles. To this end, the Hökrekomité (HOK) on 25 September 1948 presented the Bratteli commission (the long-drawn-out defense commission of 1946) with a six-year plan for the period 1 July 1949 to 30 June 1955. Among other things, the plan concluded that the current British pattern of organization was unsuited to Norway, where terrain still demanded greater reliance on horse transport. The Army therefore proposed new tables of organization to comprise three brigades, five separate infantry regiments, two independent battalions in Finnmark, cadre staffs for two more brigades, and non-brigaded units including two reconnaissance squadrons, twelve tank squadrons, one medium artillery regiment, two bridge companies, and local defense units totalling 144 infantry companies and six bicycle squadrons.27

The 1948 plan did represent movement toward a permanent, more rational organization, but the delay of the Bratteli commission's final report until November 1949 meant that events continued to outstrip the administrative reformers. Between 19 November - 10 December 1948, the Storting voted further emergency defense appropriations totalling 112 million kroner, of which 84 million went to the military. The Defense Department also received authorization to order up to 24 million kroner of additional material to be covered by later appropriations.28

A total of about 27,000 men participated in Army maneuvers in 1948. As one recent study concluded, however, "Even though conditions had improved somewhat, the Army was still made up of units that lacked cohesion and needed considerably more training before they could be reckoned as fully operational in the field."29 The shortage of officers and sergeants (competent or otherwise) remained a critical problem, with only about 350 of the latter having completed training by the end of 1948.

The decision in 1946 to give first priority to the provision of occupation troops for Germany seemed like both a sound investment and a wise cost-saving measure at the time, but by early 1949 it was clear that Hauge's premise of low international tension had been overly
optimistic. We must now turn our attention to the actual nature of the training in Germany and the problems it revealed.

NORWEGIAN BRIGADES IN GERMANY, 1947-50

The cornerstone of Hauge's defense policy was the gradual but supposedly thorough training of Norwegian troops in Germany, which would eventually fill the pool of manpower for mobilization units in Norway. In theory, the Norwegian occupation contingents were to adopt the organization of a British independent brigade group. A full unit of this type required nearly 6,000 men, but when the Storting set the size of each contingent at only 4,200 (plus 200 in the semi-permanent headquarters in Germany, TK), the Army had to modify the tables of organization. The main savings in personnel came from the fact that the Norwegians would again rely on the British for extensive logistical support, allowing the brigade to dispense with many of the usual non-combat elements. The Norwegians also eliminated their anti-tank and anti-aircraft batteries and reduced their field artillery battalion from three batteries to two. Although these units were relatively unimportant for occupation duty, their absence detracted from realistic operational maneuvers.

When Brigade 471 returned home from Germany in July 1947, Hauge congratulated the men on being "the best soldiers Norway has ever trained in peacetime." After that, however, subsequent contingents suffered from the reduction of recruit training from six months to only four, which left no time for brigade-level exercises in Norway prior to the deployment. Upon the arrival of Brigade 481, for example, Hansteen (who was then chief of the TK) noted that the new troops "showed clear signs of being green." The commander of Brigade 501, Colonel A.R. Pran, complained that "basic training is not yet complete when the units depart from Norway. At that point they have only about three months' training behind them, which in the case of this brigade also included about two weeks of Christmas leave. The units in Germany therefore require about another two to three months of elementary training [at the individual level]."
Fraternization became a matter of considerable concern for the brigade commanders in Germany. There was no absolute prohibition of contact with German civilians off-duty, but Norwegian commanders strongly discouraged it. The commander of Brigade 471, Colonel Arthur Hauge, foresaw that in case of civil disturbances (for example over food shortages), excessive association with the locals could undermine the discipline and effectiveness of the troops. "In the worst case," he wrote, "a situation could arise where they would take the side of the demonstrators, which would result in complete chaos." Hauge regarded the permissive American policy as a cautionary example. "Concerning the situation in the American zone," he wrote, "where fraternization is allowed in practically any form, the result has been a growing familiarity [forbrødring], such that one must pray to God and protect oneself against anything similar."³²

The Norwegian occupation area in Germany initially was in the Harz Mountains in the vicinity of Braunschweig and Göttingen, directly adjacent to the Soviet zone. As tension increased in early 1948, the Storting seriously considered early withdrawal of the troops and termination of the agreement with Britain. In September 1948, however, the British agreed to transfer the Norwegian brigade to Schleswig-Holstein, an area that was somewhat less exposed and whose defense was more directly relevant to Norwegian interests. The local German government opposed the assignment of Scandinavian troops to Schleswig-Holstein but had no say in the matter. The redeployment apparently helped overcome qualms in the Storting, which renewed the occupation treaty for another two years on 1 March 1949.³³

In October 1949, Denmark reduced its occupation contingent from a brigade to a battalion, which caused further anxiety over the exposed position of the Norwegian unit. The Norwegians requested British reinforcements to strengthen the sector and received an armored car regiment, but the continued escalation of tension with the Soviets led to further discussion of withdrawing or reducing the Norwegian contingent in 1949-50. Ironically, the decision not to do so appears to have hinged mainly on the problem of insufficient barracks to house the troops in Norway.³⁴
The main reason that Norway continued sending contingents to Germany, despite the increasing risk of war, was that it was cheaper and arguably more effective to train the troops there than at home. Although Norway paid Britain for the loan of equipment and provision of logistical support, the overall maintenance of the Norwegian troops in Germany still ended up costing considerably less than it would have in Norway. Opinions differed over the value of training in Germany. The schedule of rotations in February and August allowed little opportunity for winter training in Norway, and the terrain in the occupation areas (especially after the transfer to Schleswig-Holstein) bore little relation to the home country. Hansteen, however, argued that the chance to train with British forces and the superior facilities and maneuver areas more than compensated for the drawbacks. Exercises in Germany typically featured full-dress, battalion-scale attacks with live ammunition and artillery, tank, and air support; and the contact with British regulars clearly helped to raise Norwegian standards. Nevertheless, Hansteen warned. "If we are to train our forces under the prevailing conditions in Germany, then the need for refresher exercises [in Norway] is proportionally greater than normal."35

The essential problem with the training in Germany was that the contingents were only temporary formations with no relation to the permanent structure of the Norwegian Army. At the end of each deployment, the soldiers returned to their home districts, presumably retaining their individual skills but inevitably losing any unit cohesion that the occupation brigade had achieved. Almost every brigade commander emphasized this point in his final report, for example Colonel Ørnulf Dahl who warned. "The good training that the occupation brigades have provided their personnel will not be fully effective until the men receive further training with their own units in Norway."36 Hansteen's successor as chief of the TK, A.D. Dahl, wrote in September 1950.

At the conclusion of the rotation period, the brigade [501] has at least attained some cohesion and can operate as a brigade. But performance is by no means ideal, and there are serious problems that could be fatal in combat. It is now obvious to all concerned that ten months' training is
inadequate for modern forces, nor have responsible military authorities ever argued otherwise.\textsuperscript{37}

The lack of long-service non-commissioned officers proved to be another fundamental problem. As Ørnulf Dahl wrote:

It is clear from numerous reports that the sergeants represent absolutely the weakest link. . . . They feel little sense of association with the military. That is really the heart of the matter. The Army cannot escape the fact that it is imperative to have a permanent corps of non-commissioned officers who identify so closely with the military that they regard it as a way of life.

Under the existing system, there was little essential difference between sergeants and normal conscripts. Far from promoting discipline by example, sergeants tended to be the most frequent VD cases and alcohol abusers. Junior commissioned officers often were little better, Dahl noted; "... a large proportion of the [junior] officers . . . lack either the means or the will to take care of the welfare of their men."\textsuperscript{38}

Many officers urged a complete prohibition of alcohol during the deployments to Germany, but the senior commanders never went that far. Brigade 491 instituted alcohol rationing in the sergeants' mess, but Lindbåck-Larsen argued that the only real solution was fundamental reform of recruitment and training. The sergeants, he wrote, "often have difficulty finding their place in relation to [both] the officers and enlisted men, and they have little sense of duty beyond the basic conduct of drill." Numerous unit reports indicated poor morale and simple incompetence among the sergeants. "The brigade," concluded Lindbåck-Larsen, "has no confidence in the principle of training sergeants in separate schools without contact with military units."\textsuperscript{39}

Colonel A.R. Pran clearly felt disgusted with the number of disciplinary cases involving sergeants in his Brigade 501: six cases of drunkenness, six cases of forged furlough passes, and no less than thirty-five other cases of absence without leave. "Much greater emphasis must be placed on character development," he wrote. "and we must teach our leaders to
work. There is no avoiding the fact that some of them are simply lazy. Furthermore, their military knowledge is sometimes astonishingly small."40

At the end of Brigade 481's rotation, Dahl testified that the unit was combat-ready, but with distinct reservations. "If morale holds up, in the broadest sense of the word, then . . . the troops are reasonably prepared for combat against a trained opponent with modern equipment, on the condition that they be allowed to fight with the weapons and material with which they are now familiar." Dahl clearly had in mind here the fact that while the brigades in Germany were training with British arms, this equipment bore little relation to that of the mobilization units to which the individual soldiers would return. One might suppose that the colonel's point was to urge the prompt up-grading of the home units to British standards, but in fact this was not the case. He went on to evaluate the major items in the British arsenal and found many of them unsuited to Norwegian requirements. For example, the carriage of the 25-pounder gun was too weak for Norwegian terrain, and the gun's recoil system was prone to failure in cold weather, while the carriage of the 6-pounder had too little ground clearance.41

Another obstacle to effective training in Germany was the poor condition of much of the equipment the British provided. Brigade 481, for example, showed a decline in marksmanship which Dahl attributed to worn-out rifles. Poor leadership apparently compounded the problem when many officers decided that range practice with inaccurate weapons was a waste of their own time, an attitude that must have infected the enlisted men as well. Dahl also noted that the 3-inch mortars his brigade received were worn-out and inaccurate.

By 1949 the situation had become intolerable, when Brigade 491 requested a special investigation by British armorers, who judged fully 90 percent of the small arms unserviceable. The vehicles were also in a poor state of repair, and almost every one of the artillery battalion's 25-pounders required either replacement or a thorough (and time-consuming) overhaul in British workshops.

The essential problem, concluded Brigade 491's commander Colonel Lindbäck-Larsen, was that Norwegian armorers were "useless"—a strong
expression, he added, for which there unfortunately was ample documentation. "As long as we are here in Germany and can rely on British logistical support, these scandals represent 'merely' a loss of prestige; but at home in Norway, where we must maintain our own guns, it also involves a very significant economic issue." Brigade 492 brought its own rifles from Norway, but these were also in poor condition after use by previous recruits. Brigade 501 finally received new rifles, but by that time the artillery was again in critical condition, with fourteen of the sixteen 25-pounders requiring another thorough overhaul by the British. The brigade's radio equipment was also frequently inoperable.

Thus, the Norwegian brigades in Germany were hardly crack units by objective standards. However, the contact with British forces helped the Norwegians to raise their sights. Compared with the almost non-existent field exercises of the prewar Army, the training in Germany was excellent. The occupation deployments by no means solved all the Norwegian Army's problems, but the experience in Germany played a large role in shaping the subsequent buildup of the early 1950s.

THE ALLIANCE QUESTION: EUROPE, SCANDINAVIA, OR NATO?

Even before the Prague crisis, the announcement in January 1948 of the Bevin Plan, the initial British proposal for a European defense pact, prompted a revival of foreign policy debate in Norway, as it became apparent that there might be an alternative to "bridge-building." Norwegian Foreign Minister Halvard Lange discouraged the notion that Norway's basic policy was about to change, however. The U.N., he argued, must remain the primary focus of Norway's efforts, and joining a western alliance could undermine the larger organization. Lange's hesitation ("Nølepoltikk") drew considerable criticism, including parallels with Koht's policy in the 1930s; but the reluctance of the other Scandinavian states to join a western European defense pact strengthened his position. Norwegian leaders were also sceptical of any western European security pact that would not include the United States, for three main reasons. First, it would lack sufficient
military strength; second, it would encourage further American isolationism; and third, it would provoke the Soviets. The Low Countries had traditionally been especially anti-Soviet, and they would have greater relative influence within a purely European organization.⁴⁶

Apart from spurring the Storting to provide additional defense funds, the evidence of Soviet aggression in early 1948 also helped to overcome Norwegian reluctance regarding military contacts with the western powers. Hauge already had met informally with the American air and naval attachés in Oslo on 17 February 1948, but the events in Prague and Finland provided the context for further discussions with British Defense Minister A.W. Alexander in early March. On March 8, Lange met with the British and American ambassadors to explore possible security agreements. Lange also met privately with Bevin in Paris that same month.⁴⁷

Norwegian public opinion, however, remained considerably behind the curve of changing policy in the cabinet; and most Labor politicians remained staunchly opposed to any treaty that might force Norway into a war in which it otherwise could have remained neutral. The government therefore hoped to obtain an essentially unilateral guarantee by the western powers, without reciprocal obligations on Norway's part.

At that point, the maritime powers could offer little in the way of concrete military assistance. Britain and the United States both had undergone precipitous demobilizations since 1945, and France also remained weak, with its few military assets diverted increasingly to Indochina. Although we now know that the Soviet Army actually lacked the logistical capability to duplicate a German-style Blitzkrieg, at that time it appeared to many Western leaders that if Stalin ordered it, the Russians could reach the English Channel in a matter of a few weeks. In this context, the Western Powers realistically could offer Norway little more than moral encouragement, although the United States Navy did offer a useful demonstration of western sea power with a high-profile visit by the carrier Valley Forge to Bergen in spring 1948. American ambassador Charles Bay also suggested a visit by B-29 bombers to a Norwegian airbase, but the Norwegians rejected this idea as too provocative.⁴⁸
Norway's main hope for "having it both ways" was to create a Scandinavian defense union with Sweden and possibly Denmark, an arrangement that might combine most of the benefits of non-alignment with a guarantee of assistance from the Western Powers as well. In May 1948 the Swedish Foreign Minister visited Oslo to propose his country's plan for a Scandinavian Defense Union, and hopes initially ran high for an early agreement with the Western Powers. The divergence of Norwegian and Swedish interests in Finland, however, posed a serious obstacle just as it had in the 1930s. Arne Ording already had identified the problem clearly in 1943 when he wrote.

Norway cannot join in guaranteeing Finland’s security against Russia, even though we desire a free Finland. We may consider a treaty with Sweden, but only in connection with a guarantee from an international organization, that is to say from the Western Allies and Russia. The great problem arises in the case of conflict between them. In that case I argue for ties with the Western Powers, but one must reckon with the possibility that under such circumstances the Norwegian people will fall back on neutrality in a new form.

It soon became clear that Sweden was determined to maintain at least the formality of non-alignment, thus ruling out the possibility of integrating a Scandinavian pact within a larger Atlantic organization. Swedish Foreign Minister Christian Günther believed that "Sweden would obtain the same [benefits] from the Western Powers, regardless of its neutrality." In fall 1948 the Scandinavian countries commissioned a special study to try to find some solution to the problem, but the differences between the Swedish and the western demands proved irreconcilable. The United States and Britain were unwilling to extend a unilateral guarantee to a Scandinavian bloc that was not formally part of the Atlantic system, and the Americans in particular found the Swedish attitude irritating. A minute of the newly-formed National Security Council in September 1948 argued that the United States should make "perfectly clear to Sweden our dissatisfaction with her apparent failure to discriminate in its own mind and in its future planning between the West and the Soviet Union."
The Norwegians did everything they could to bridge the gap between their prospective allies. As Gerhardsen put it in November 1948, "[W]e must make the Western Powers understand that even though we realise the importance of Western assistance, the most important thing is to utilise the immediate military backing from Swedish defence." Hauge argued that the crux of the problem was to convince the Western Powers "that a Scandinavian pact without any formal link to other pacts is [nevertheless] a part of Western defence." He believed that in wartime, the Scandinavian bloc would ally itself with the Western Powers regardless of formal obligations, while its nominal neutrality would reduce the risk of war beginning in the first place.

Soviet policy opposed the formation of a Scandinavian bloc. One might assume that the Soviets would have preferred a neutral Nordic bloc rather than having Norway and Denmark incorporated directly in a western alliance. In fact, however, Moscow at this point regarded those two countries as essentially hostile in any case and feared that the Scandinavian Defense Union would simply drag Sweden and perhaps even Finland into the western camp as well.

In the American view, however, the symbolic value of formal membership in the prospective Atlantic alliance was highly important. An independent Scandinavian bloc would remain prone to slip into a Soviet orbit. Moreover, the chances of Denmark and Iceland joining the Atlantic alliance depended largely on whether Norway did so, and American air and naval strategy now recognized the critical value of bases and surveillance facilities in these countries.

Norway thus faced a difficult choice: it could obtain a guarantee from the Western Powers or Sweden, but not both. Several factors finally tipped the scales in favor of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization instead of the Scandinavian option. One was Norway's long-term western orientation, which had developed through commercial and cultural contacts over the course of several centuries. Another factor that surely had some effect was the widespread and lingering sense of bitterness toward Sweden for its often unhelpful neutrality in 1940-42, and perhaps to some extent even for the involuntary union of 1814-1905. The Swedish offer in 1948 also involved a number of stipulations, for
example that the guarantee of assistance would not apply in the event that Denmark or Norway became involved in a war through the presence of their occupation forces in Germany. Moreover, the Swedish terms of alliance would have demanded a much heavier burden of defense spending on Norway's part, which Norwegian leaders still hoped to avoid. When all of these factors became clear in a final round of negotiations in Oslo on 29-30 January 1949, Gerhardsen's government concluded that the Scandinavian Defense Union was a dead letter.56

The failure of the Nordic talks did not automatically mean that Norway would join NATO, however. The crucial event in that decision was the annual convention of the Labor party, 16-20 February 1949. By that time, Oscar Torp and Haakon Lie already had come out strongly in favor of NATO membership; yet there remained strong opposition headed by Natvig-Pedersen. Gerhardsen and his cabinet remained non-committal almost to the end.57 In any case, by the time of the convention, the Labor party leadership had made up its collective mind in favor of NATO and was determined to gain an endorsement from the assembled delegates. The means by which the leaders achieved this were questionable. For example, few delegates realized that such a momentous question was on the agenda, and most had no instructions from their local constituents. Given the great reluctance of most Norwegians to abandon the traditional policy of neutrality, the resulting vote of nearly 90 percent in favor of NATO membership represented a remarkable amount of political stage-management. With strong support from the Liberals and Agrarians, the government then obtained the almost unanimous approval of the Storting on 29 March 1949; and with this mandate, Lange formally signed the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949.58

NORWAY'S "SCREENING" POLICY AND THE "NORDIC BALANCE"

As things stood in early 1949, NATO's inability to provide immediate ground reinforcements to Norway did not appear critically important. What Norway wanted most was diplomatic support against possible Soviet demands and a place under the American nuclear umbrella, purposes that NATO membership served well. The alliance seemed to
involve few real obligations on Norway's part, and there were no plans to station Allied forces on Norwegian soil in peacetime. In fact, Lange made this an explicit precondition for joining, after having assured the Soviets on 1 February 1949 that his government would "make no agreement with other states which lays obligations upon Norway to open bases on Norwegian territory to the armed forces of foreign powers, so long as Norway is not attacked or exposed to threats of attack." At the time, the United States did not regard this as a significant reservation, since there were no plans to establish any major American military presence in Allied countries anyway. In any case, the Norwegian policy still left open the possibility of Allied deployments in response to more definite evidence of a Soviet threat.

Norway also imposed restrictions on NATO operations in the far north, especially the counties of Troms and Finnmark, which the Soviets regarded as a sensitive "buffer" area because of the proximity to the increasingly important naval and air bases on the Kola peninsula. Norway soon made clear that it respected Soviet concerns in this regard. In May 1949, Hauge outlined the policy. At least for the time being, he stated, it would be expedient for all parties involved

.... to let Northern Norway be in peace. Any military activity in this part of Norway which borders on Soviet Russia, for example in the form of extensive visits by air or naval forces, would at the present time have little or no purpose, while the damage done could be considerable.

Thus, the Norwegian leaders and public could feel that while enhancing their security through closer military cooperation with the Western Powers, they still were avoiding any undue provocation toward the Soviets. Subsequent authors have identified these apparently contradictory yet parallel policies as "integration and invitation" and "screening," respectively. In retrospect this dual-track policy, with periodic shifts in emphasis, has formed the basis of Norway's security policy ever since.

Another factor in Norway's apparently ambivalent policy was the need to maintain delicate relations in Scandinavia. Despite the parting
of ways over the question of NATO membership. Swedish co-operation with
the west remained an important, if uncertain possibility. Hauge in
particular believed strongly that even without persuading Sweden to join
the alliance, informal defense ties could be of great benefit. From
Norway's perspective, Sweden's essential role was simply to defend its
own territory and airspace, which automatically shielded Norway's long
eastern border. In this respect, Sweden could fulfill the same purpose
either by defending itself successfully or simply by remaining neutral,
provided that in the latter case it maintained its territorial integrity
and did not allow the transit of Soviet forces.63

The United States was less satisfied with Swedish neutrality and
wanted to obtain active assistance against the Soviets from day one of
any prospective war. In 1951, USAF Colonel Bernt Balchen headed a new
round of low-profile, exploratory negotiations with Stockholm, which
continued through 1954. The Norwegians, meanwhile, pursued their own
bilateral defense contacts. Neither of these efforts yielded obvious or
tangible results, but in fact the Swedish military developed extensive
covert contacts with NATO, especially in intelligence matters (see
below).64

In retrospect, although Swedish neutrality was anathema to
American hard-liners, it probably offered the best prospects of peace
and stability in northern Europe. In the aftermath of their defeat in
1944 and under the terms of the "mutual assistance pact" of 1948, the
Finns were basically at the Soviets' mercy. Finland might well have
waged another desperate struggle against an attempted occupation; but
with the Finnish military limited to a token force by the peace treaty
of 1946, it would have been a lost cause. Moreover, the Soviets held a
powerful bridgehead in their naval base at Porkala on the southern coast
of Finland, practically a stone's throw from Helsinki. A neutral Sweden
and a relatively non-threatening Norway offered an incentive for the
Soviets to leave Finland at least nominally independent. Had Sweden
allied itself openly with the Western Powers, or had Norway abandoned
its "screening" policy, the Soviets probably would have occupied Finland
in retaliation. On the other hand, the Soviets had to reckon with the
likelihood that if they occupied Finland on their own initiative, Sweden
probably would join NATO and provide the United States with bases to dominate the Baltic. Thus emerged the "Nordic balance" that was to characterize Scandinavian geopolitics throughout the Cold War.65

ALLIED INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION

Given the scarcity of information regarding Soviet strategic intentions and capabilities, as illustrated by the sudden revelation of the first Russian nuclear test in 1949, one of the most immediate and important benefits of closer co-operation between Norway and the Western Powers was in the area of intelligence. Above all, the USAF needed vital targeting information for nuclear strikes. By 1948 the CIA had begun a serious effort to develop a network of operatives behind the Iron Curtain, but progress was inevitably slow and unsteady.66

Norway was in a position to help, particularly with regard to SIGINT (signals intelligence, including the interception and analysis of radar and communications). In fact, the Norwegians already had made important progress in this area prior to joining NATO. According to the Norwegian scheme of responsibility, the Air Force handled radar analysis, while the defense intelligence staff (forsvarsstaben) handled communications. Ever since the war, the Norwegian Air Force had continued its wartime collaboration with the RAF in radar as well as other areas, which meant that the British generally had better (although still limited) access to Norwegian information than did the Americans, even through the early 1950s. Even the British had more trouble gaining access to Norwegian information about Soviet communications. The western agencies were suspicious of Wilhelm Evang, head of the defense intelligence staff, who had been a radical leftist in the 1930s. The CIA developed closer contact with Alfred Roscher Lund, who had been chief of Norwegian intelligence in London during the war and later became an aide to Trygve Lie as U.N. Secretary General in New York.67

One of the main benefits Norwegian intelligence could offer, despite the limited nature of its own resources, was access to information from Swedish sources. Sweden had developed an extensive SIGINT organization of its own during the war, aimed at monitoring the
Soviets as well as the Germans (and doubtless the Allies as well). This effort received an additional windfall in 1944, when the Finns evacuated their own SIGINT organization, code-named STELLA POLARIS, to Sweden.68

Thus, with an uneven but valuable combination of foreign contacts, Norwegian intelligence became an important asset to the Western Allies, even before the establishment of NATO. The first fruits of this collaboration for the United States came in July 1948, when the RAF passed on the results of Norwegian photo-reconnaissance flights over Svalbard. Ironically, although claiming its own sovereignty over the islands, the Norwegian government wanted to keep the flights secret to avoid friction with the Soviets. The flights revealed no sign of air bases that the Americans had believed the Russians were building, which helped at least temporarily to allay fears of a Soviet air attack on North America. Norwegian intelligence contacts paid additional dividends in January 1949, when the United States began to receive Swedish SIGINT data on Soviet activities in the Baltic region. A chain of ground-based SIGINT listening posts was in place in Finnmark by 1948-49. Ironically, the northern stations provided little intelligence of immediate value to the defense of Norwegian territory, for they were focused on Soviet strategic capabilities rather than on theater-level forces adjacent to Finnmark. Even after joining NATO, the Norwegians continued to withhold some intelligence regarding the region from their American allies, for example photos of close encounters between Norwegian fighters and MiGs in late 1952. On the whole, however, intelligence collaboration grew increasingly close and fruitful.69

Another area in which Norwegian and western intelligence agencies worked together was in preparation for the worst-case scenario of a Soviet occupation of Norway. Such preparations also began well before Norway joined NATO. The ominous possibility of a Soviet attack during the Norwegian military's transitional period of weakness prompted Evang's defense intelligence staff to establish a "stay behind" network as the basis of another resistance movement. Because of the need for secrecy, however, the network remained little more than a paper organization until the Americans became involved in 1949. By the early 1950s, there were numerous secret caches of weapons, explosives, and
supplies, and Norwegian personnel, including some veterans of the resistance and Company Linge, were working closely with the CIA.\textsuperscript{70} Drawing on wartime experience, the plans included three main components: one code-named LINDUS to handle intelligence-gathering, another called ROCK to mount sabotage and guerrilla operations, and a third named BLUE MIX to help smuggle key Allied personnel (such as downed aviators) out of enemy territory. In the later 1950s the U.S. Army Special Forces also made plans to infiltrate a Soviet-occupied Norway. As the prospects of conventional defense gradually improved with the progress of western rearmament, plans for underground resistance in Norway faded in importance; but with the memory of 1940-45 still fresh, such preparations became an integral feature of Norway's overall defense policy in the early Cold War.\textsuperscript{71}

**INTENSIFICATION OF THE COLD WAR, 1949-50**

Although the Soviets relaxed their blockade of West Berlin on 12 May 1949, tension soon increased even further. American policy reflected an increasing sense of crisis in late 1949 and early 1950, following the Soviet nuclear test and the communist victory in China. Norwegian policy reflected similar alarm. Even before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the emphasis clearly had shifted from "screening" toward "integration," to secure more definite commitments and material assistance from the Allies.

The initial organizations within NATO for developing closer military ties between Norway and its new allies were the NERPG (Northern European Regional Planning Group) and NAORPG (North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group), and the Norwegians began a determined campaign to structure the membership of these committees in their favor. Their main goals were to include a prominent American representative in the NERPG, lest this area become a forgotten sideshow, and to include a Norwegian representative in the NAORPG.\textsuperscript{72}

In 1949-50, however, British and American strategists generally regarded Scandinavia as untenable in the event of a global war with the Soviet Union, and they were therefore reluctant to make binding
operational commitments to Norway. Instead, the Western Powers responded by emphasizing the need to strengthen Norway's own defenses, which still remained poorly equipped and disorganized in many respects even in early 1950. In seeking to strengthen Allied commitments, the Norwegians by this point were looking more to the United States than to Britain, in part because of the prevailing view among British strategists that "Northern Europe was best defended in Germany." as one author later put it. American strategy seemed to assign Norway a higher priority.

The United States introduced the MAP (Military Assistance Program) to oversee the provision of material and training in friendly countries. Following the signature of a MAP treaty with Norway on 27 January 1950, the American MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) arrived in Oslo in spring 1950 to supervise the delivery of the weapons shipments and training of Norwegian forces in their use. Ironically, this program was not quite what the Norwegians had in mind as the goal of their "integration" policy, and the government in Oslo actually regarded the arrival of American advisors and equipment as a potential source of both political embarrassment and friction with the Soviet Union. The Norwegians therefore tried initially to keep the entire program secret, even on the American end. Not surprisingly, this proved impossible; but the Norwegian government continued to try to minimize publicity and sharply restricted the number of American personnel in the MAAG.

Despite the government's reservations, the Norwegian Army welcomed the chance to obtain more modern equipment at long last. In April 1950 the United States agreed to provide the following items based on Norwegian requests: 50 M-8 Greyhound armored cars, 39 M-24 Chaffee light tanks, 250 Weasel amphibious snow tractors, approximately 1,100 trucks, 794 jeeps, 5,407 BAR automatic rifles, 331 M1919 machine guns, 27,000 carbines, 61,190 M-1 rifles, 1,212 60-mm light mortars, 1,161 2.36-inch bazookas, and a total of 610 57-mm and 75-mm recoilless rifles. The Norwegians also requested 105-mm howitzers but failed to obtain these on the initial list. By June 1950, four reception depots, each with about 100-130 personnel, were ready to unload and store the first shipments at Oslo, Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim.
In the meantime, the Norwegian forces did make further progress toward combat readiness on their own in the course of 1949. The three services established a unified supreme command in North Norway, a move that reflected the increasing likelihood that this area would become a war zone. In summer 1949 the Army began constructing a formidable belt of obstacles and fortifications along projected stop-lines in Troms and the Skibotn valley. Heimevern units in Finnmark received extra allocations of refurbished ex-German 20-mm AA guns, and infantry units in southern Norway received a variety of British 6-pounder and ex-German 50-mm and 75-mm anti-tank guns, six per battalion. Another eminently practical measure was the creation of local-defense tank platoons to guard the vital airfields at Sola, Værnes, Bardufoss, Fornebu, Gardermoen, and Bodø against another surprise airborne landing.78

The long-awaited report of the defense commission of 1946 recommended the consolidation of the traditional sixteen infantry regiments into nine larger "combined regiments" that would correspond more closely to the actual distribution of population. The commission also recommended merging Army districts 1-2 and 3-4, and two of the five naval districts, in order to put all three services on the same territorial organization. The Army objected, however, that the combined Østland district would be too unwieldy, containing almost half the national population, and that districts 3 and 4 were too isolated geographically to form a single command.79

Rationalized inter-service organization therefore remained a problem for the future, but in 1949 the Defense Ministry introduced another reform designed to provide further insurance against "history repeating itself." Following the acquittals in 1947-48 of numerous officers who had surrendered prematurely in 1940, critics demanded further steps to prevent another such debacle. Referring to the controversial exhoneration of Colonel Steen, who had surrendered Infantry Regiment 3 at Kongsberg without firing a shot, Storting representative Watnebryn (Labor) argued that the court had based its judgement on a peculiar interpretation of a military officer's duty in time of war. This interpretation, he argued, was
... completely at odds with the obligations that must be placed on military leaders in the future. There must be no doubt that their foremost duty is to fight, individually and with their units, regardless of any circumstances such as an unclear situation, lack of specific orders, or appeals from the civilian population, etc. The obligation to offer resistance in war is so important that there ought not be any doubt that it is a punishable offense to surrender without sufficient reason.80

Hauge agreed with the need to clarify such responsibility, but he also reminded the Storting that part of the reason for the failure in 1940 was the general public contempt of military officers, as well as the lack of funding the armed forces had received—things that also must change if Norway were to put its defenses on a sound basis.

With this proviso, Hauge enacted a new set of standing orders, issued by royal proclamation on 10 June 1949. The regulations explicitly spelled out the duty of all military leaders to resist any armed attack to the utmost of their ability, even in the absence of specific instructions from higher authority. Ever since, these orders have been publicly posted in every Norwegian barracks as a constant reminder (see appendix).81

One additional reform issue that arose in 1949 involved numerous complaints by enlisted men that their time as conscripts was being largely wasted through ineffective training practices and the persistence of petty, "Prussian"-style discipline. Such criticism prompted the Storting to appoint an investigative committee on 22 January 1949 ("Tjenestetidsutvalget"), which reported on 19 January 1950. One result was the hiring of approximately 1,500 civilian personnel to perform routine services such as cooking, laundry, and building maintenance, thus unburdening conscripts for more purely military or leisure activities. The Defense Department also gave higher priority to the improvement of barracks and other facilities. Another consequence was the creation of a civilian ombudsman for military grievances in 1951.82

By late 1949, the Army's trained mobilization strength had reached 86,500 men, plus about 73,000 men in the heimeverns. The dispersal of
armories and resistance caches was still incomplete, but a large-scale exercise on 20 May 1950 demonstrated that the heimevern had become a useful force. Within three hours of the mobilization order, 37,847 personnel had reported for duty (46 percent of the 81,747 then on the rolls), and 69 percent of the heimevern's assigned local objectives were under guard. Within another three hours, 54,851 men were on duty (67 percent of the total), and heimevern units had secured all their assigned objectives. Given the fact that commanders had excused many individuals because of employment obligations or other reasons, the Army expressed satisfaction with the results.83

KOREAN WAR CRISIS: REPERCUSSIONS FOR NORWAY AND NATO

Even before the outbreak of war in Korea in 1950, Norway demonstrated a more serious commitment to defense than it had in the immediate postwar period. The military budget for 1949-50 was 250 million kroner, and the projected budget for 1950-51 was 278 million. Following the sudden communist invasion of South Korea on 25 June 1950, however, Norwegian defense efforts increased dramatically, and by 1954 the defense budget had risen to 718 million kroner.84 The Korean conflict clearly had a major impact on Norwegian policy, and on the development of NATO as a whole. With its obvious Russian backing, the North Korean attack seemed to foreshadow a global communist offensive that would soon spread to Europe. NATO therefore developed rapidly into something much more tangible than its members originally had intended.

In keeping with its commitment to the United Nations, the Norwegian government seriously considered sending at least a token contingent to Korea. The Army leadership argued against sending any combat units, however, because of the critical weakness of the home defenses. Nevertheless, Norway did contribute a field hospital unit, organized along American lines and designated the NORMASH, which remained in Korea from July 1951 to November 1954.85

If war were to spread to Central Europe, the Norwegian brigade in Germany clearly would find itself in harm's way. Already in summer 1949, the increasing tension with the Soviet Union had prompted the
Norwegians to draft plans for an emergency Dunkirk-style evacuation of the brigade from Germany. The initial plan was to withdraw to northern Jutland and embark at the small ports of Vejle, Horsens, Aarhus, Randers, and Aalborg, requisitioning Danish fishing boats if necessary. However, a subsequent memorandum that fall (presumably directed to the Defense Minister) argued that in case of war, the brigade should attempt to hold the line of the Kiel Canal. Denmark, the memo emphasized, was the best place to defend southern Norway; and with the brigade added to the two British and two Danish divisions in the area. NATO would stand a good chance of holding the canal for an extended period.

In July 1950, the government ordered the commander of Brigade 501 to hold the canal if possible but emphasized that the terms of the occupation treaty did not oblige him to accept orders from the British or Americans (see appendix). The ambiguous relationship of Allied forces in Schleswig-Holstein improved somewhat in September 1950 with the establishment of the NATO South Jutland Covering Force to coordinate the British, Norwegians, and Danes. It was not until March 1951, however, that Norway formally placed its brigade under NATO command when the Storting renewed the occupation treaty for a final two years.

Of more immediate concern to most Norwegians than the organization of NATO forces in Germany was the state of the home defenses in Norway. In fall 1950 the Army began planning a Maginot-style fortification at Lyngen in North Norway, dubbed the Oteren fort; and although the Defense Department subsequently cancelled this project in December 1951, numerous smaller pillboxes and other works were soon in place. Meanwhile, the general atmosphere of crisis prompted Hauge to address the Storting regarding the state of the defense program on 25 September 1950.

The Norwegian Army, which has been built up over the last four years, is numerically larger than it was before the war. The field units have on the average four to five times as much training as was previously the case... [and] the response time for mobilization is shorter (even though it is
The Army's depots are more decentralized than they were (even though they still are not decentralized enough) . . . The Army's permanent personnel--military and civilian--have been roughly tripled, from about 700 to about 2,000. Approximately 400 new professional officers have been trained. On the other hand, the [number of] reserve officers [distriktbefalet] has declined from about 1,000 to about 300. But this does not mean that we have the Army we need. The Army is too small to perform the missions that it will face.

The Defense Minister also assured his audience that "the possibility of a coup de main permeates all of our military thinking. Everything possible has been done and will be done to increase our preparedness against a coup. We will not be caught napping again."90

Hauge stated that although exercises were imperative, the government was not considering actual mobilization. On the night of 14-15 November 1950, however, an Air Force enlisted man apparently blew up an ammunition dump at Bardufoss. The motive remains unclear, but the incident prompted the government to undertake a limited mobilization in order to provide increased security at key installations. On 5 December 1950 the Defense Department ordered a further call-up of approximately 3,500 men for sixty days, and by 29 December 1950 the Army had formed three battalion-sized task forces in Østlandet, Sørlandet, and North Norway. These forces remained on duty until September 1951.91

In December 1950 the Storting passed a controversial act that granted the government sweeping emergency powers in case an invasion or fifth column activity should prevent the legislature from meeting. Here was another conscious response to the experience of 1940, when only by good chance had the Storting managed to assemble a hasty quorum to grant the Nygaardsvold cabinet a special mandate. In 1950-51 the Storting also passed a series of extraordinary taxes on chocolate, sugar, and liquor to help cover the sharp increase in defense spending.92 Norway could not have sustained the remarkable military buildup that followed, however, without the assistance of its powerful new ally, the United States.
AMERICAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

In Norway, as in most other NATO countries, partnership with the United States took the form of a division of labor. The main American contributions would be weapons and supplies, while Norway provided manpower and infrastructure. The main mechanism for this co-operation was the MDAP (Mutual Defense Assistance Program), through which the Americans contributed huge quantities of weaponry to modernize Allied forces.

Probably the most important part of the MDAP aid to Norway was for air defense and early warning systems. Beginning in 1951, the Norwegian Air Force received Republic F-84 Thunderjets to replace its Spitfires, Mosquitos, and Vampires. The F-84 eventually equipped six Norwegian squadrons and remained the mainstay until replaced by F-86 Sabres beginning about 1956. By the mid-1950s the Norwegians had built up to eight fully operational squadrons. The Americans also provided Nike surface-to-air missiles for the defense of Oslo and funds for the construction and improvement of air bases ranging from Lista in the south to Bardufoss in the north. Although the Navy had a relatively low priority, American aid also quickened the pace of modernization and eventually funded one-quarter of an eight-year construction program.

Although Army equipment was already on the way in spring 1950, deliveries accelerated sharply following the outbreak of the Korean conflict. The United States soon increased the allocation of equipment to Norway beyond the initial list, including 1,687 of the more powerful 3.5-inch bazookas (probably in response to the failure of the 2.36-inch type to penetrate T-34s in Korea) and, even more important to the Norwegians, seventy-two 105-mm howitzers. In 1951, the Norwegian Army abandoned the problematic British organization and restructured Norwegian infantry battalions on the American model. Brigade 511 in Germany partially replaced British equipment with the new American material, and this also was the first brigade since 471 to receive a full twelve months' training. The last three brigades, 512, 521, and 522, completed the transition to American organization and equipment.
The new Norwegian-American relationship was not all smooth sailing, however. The United States originally had not foreseen any problem with Norway's stipulation that Allied forces not be permanently stationed in the country. When the Norwegians restricted the number of MAAG personnel to only twenty-two, however, the Americans soon grew frustrated. Keeping a low profile as the Norwegians demanded made the advisors' task more difficult. The Americans soon found ways to overcome some of the restrictions. There were a variety of other pretexts for American military personnel in Norway, for example USAF personnel involved in SIGINT liaison; and in many cases these men ended up working closely with the MAAG. Nevertheless, the American presence remained a politically sensitive issue that the government felt it must limit carefully.  

Chief of the MAAG Admiral Ralph E. Jennings soon concluded that the Norwegians were not keeping up their end of the bargain. The Army, in particular, seemed amateurish and unprepared to utilize, or even properly store and maintain much of the material that was arriving. Jennings vented his frustration in a letter to Hauge on 20 June 1951.

It is the opinion of MAAG Norway that plans for proper maintenance of MDAP equipment must be made immediately or this equipment will deteriorate very rapidly. The following facts [sic] are listed for your information: a. Lack of trained maintenance and supply personnel in using units. b. Improper storage by using units. c. Lack of preventive maintenance at unit level. d. Failure of responsible personnel to make necessary inspections. e. Failure of using unit to unpack, clean, oil, inspect and maintain in combat readiness the MDAP equipment received.  

Jennings apparently was not satisfied with the initial Norwegian response, and on 6 July 1951 he wrote to his superior General Kibler, chief of the JAMAG (Joint American Military Advisory Group) in Europe. Hauge. Jennings claimed, had "not been willing to acknowledge [the] magnitude of [the] problem[.] and it is doubtful that [the] extent of our concern has gone beyond [the] Defense Ministry."  

Although the original letter included no specific ultimatum, Hauge reported shortly thereafter that Jennings intended to suspend the
that the [chief of the] MAAG has recommended to his superiors that delivery of significant quantities of material comprising the assistance program is to be postponed until further notice because [Norwegian] Army authorities, in MAAG's opinion, are not prepared to receive and utilize the material in the proper manner.

In order to forestall this threat, Hauge launched an emergency program dubbed REDMA (Rescue Military Assistance), which sought to clear the bottlenecks at various points in the system. Additional Heimevern personnel were called up for three months to help unpack and distribute shipments that had accumulated in warehouses, and approximately 250 new civilian personnel were hired to provide such labor in the future. REDMA also provided approximately one million kroner for the construction of additional storage facilities and garages. "The Department," Hauge concluded, "emphasizes in the strongest terms that Operation REDMA must be carried out absolutely as quickly as possible. By all indications, this will require decisiveness, delegation of authority, and initiative." 101

Had Jennings held the authority to suspend the arms deliveries, he probably would have done so. He did not, however; and other agencies became involved in the issue. Both the ECA (the Economic Cooperation Administration, which oversaw the Marshall Plan) and the State Department strongly discouraged such strong-arm tactics, on the grounds that they would aggravate Norwegian public opinion and probably scuttle the negotiations that were then in progress over basing rights (see below). Finally, Eisenhower as SACEUR had no intention of alienating sensitive allies through such a confrontation, and the deliveries continued as scheduled. 102

Another major disagreement between the United States and Norway concerned access to air bases. In summer 1950 the Norwegian government had welcomed symbolic visits by American air and naval units, but these events had little significance in real military terms. In fall 1950 the

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USAF proposed stationing a tactical fighter group permanently in Norway to help alleviate the shortage of Allied aircraft in the region, and SAC was also interested in gaining access to Norwegian bases as forward staging areas for nuclear strikes. The United States therefore presented a formal proposal to establish American bases at Sola and Gardermoen, but Norway rejected the idea on the grounds of the assurance given to the Soviets (and the Norwegian public) in 1949 that no foreign forces would be stationed on Norwegian soil.

This issue became the subject of lengthy negotiations in 1951-52. The American argument rested on a clause in the North Atlantic Treaty that obligated members to co-operate with regard to "military operating requirements." In summer 1952 the matter finally came to a vote in the Storting, which by a large majority refused to alter the exclusionary policy. By this point, however, a consensus had emerged in the Norwegian government favoring an informal compromise. Beginning in September 1952, the government began what one author later described as "a rather cautious campaign to educate the public in the issues involved." The Americans finally obtained limited concessions in the form of a secret protocol on 17 October 1952. While the 1949 policy formally remained in effect, the new arrangement in practice allowed temporary deployments of USAF tactical aircraft to Norwegian bases on an open-ended basis, as well as limited post-strike refueling of SAC bombers at Sola. Although the Americans remained far from satisfied, the compromise proved durable and essentially remained in effect throughout the Cold War.

Norwegian bases became especially important to NATO for maritime reconnaissance, in efforts to track the movements of Soviet warships from their northern bases. In December 1952, as a result of the compromise reached in October, the NATO Council authorized construction of a large airbase on Andøya (an island slightly northwest of Narvik), primarily for use by ACLANT ASW and reconnaissance aircraft. Allied funds enlarged the airfield at Bodø; and Ørlandet, near Trondheim, also became an important NATO airbase.
In fall 1950, NATO officially declared its policy of forward defense, which was intended to dispel any Soviet doubts over whether the United States really would fight in Europe. In fact, however, the declaration had little substance, given the overwhelming superiority of the Soviet Army. For the time being, the United States still held a clear advantage in nuclear weapons that could compensate for weakness on the ground; but as the Soviet nuclear arsenal grew, the deterrent would lose credibility. Clearly, NATO must strengthen its conventional forces. The NATO MTDP (Medium-Term Defense Plan) of December 1950 proposed to halt a Soviet attack with stop-lines in the northern region at the Kiel Canal, on the Danish island of Sjælland, and at Lyngen in northern Norway. For the time being, however, such goals were clearly unrealistic; and the actual contingency plans for 1951 were based on the STDP (Short-Term Defense Plan), which projected a withdrawal in Norway to bridgeheads at Trondheim and Stavanger.  

The creation of NORTHCOM (NATO Northern Command) in 1951 established an Allied operational headquarters responsible for defending Norway. The obvious southern boundary for the northern area would have been the Skaggerak, but the Norwegians feared that this division would leave them isolated with a low priority in the command structure. Intensive lobbying therefore led to the inclusion of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein in the NORTHCOM area as well. The Norwegians still feared that the Western Allies would regard Scandinavia as a sideshow, however. In determining who would fill the top command slots in NORTHCOM, the Americans and British advocated a Norwegian or Danish commander-in-chief, both to minimize their own commitments and to encourage Sweden to reconsider NATO membership. Norway, however, pressed for an American CINCNORTH, to act as "a hook in the nose of the U.S. Air Force." Eisenhower helped produce the compromise of a British CINC, Admiral Sir Patrick Brind, who took his post on 16 March 1951, with USAF General Robert K. Taylor as deputy air commander. In summer 1952, NORTHCOM's permanent headquarters became Kolsås, a suburb of Oslo, and the head of the Norwegian Army command in Germany (TK).
briefly became commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Schleswig-Holstein, until the withdrawal of the last Norwegian brigade in April 1953.\textsuperscript{109}

The counter-intuitive placement of the northern area boundary also reflected the fact that the defense of southern Norway depended heavily on control of Denmark and northern Germany. The NATO strategic guidance paper MC 14/1 emphasized this point in December 1952, anticipating that any serious Soviet effort to capture Scandinavia would begin by securing Denmark and then strike northward, as had the Germans in 1940. Denmark amounted to a weak link in the chain of Allied countries, with little more than token defenses of its own and political reservations similar to those in Norway against any high-profile Allied military presence. Hence, "the Danish Problem" that was to confound NATO planners for much of the next forty years. In 1953, for example, NORTHCOM's Emergency Defense Plan anticipated that Denmark would fall within the first eight days of a Soviet attack.\textsuperscript{110} As Brind put it in April 1953, ". . . the whole problem of the Northern European Command was Denmark - both strategically and politically." A later CINCORTH, General Sir Harold Pym, described the same problem:

In order to secure North Norway one had to be in full control of South Norway. In order to secure South Norway one had to control the Baltic approaches. In order to hold the Baltic approaches, one had to control the Danish isles and Jutland. And the key to Jutland is Schleswig-Holstein.\textsuperscript{111}

The relocation of the Norwegian Navy's main operational base from Horten to Bergen represented increasing integration in NATO's command structure.\textsuperscript{112} The Navy's low priority in the rearmament program left Norway especially dependent on Allied naval protection. The government therefore tried to make coastal defense an official NATO responsibility, but in 1952 the planning document MC 36 left this task in principle to each individual nation. As the Allied command structure evolved, there was further concern over the possible exclusion of Norway from the ACE (Allied Command, Europe--the area under SACEUR); but this was not the case, with the exception of Svalbard, which fell to the responsibility
of ACLANT. Still, Norway had little voice in the formulation of Allied naval strategy until 1954, when a Norwegian naval representative joined AFNORTH (Allied Forces, North)\textsuperscript{113}.

The effort to reconcile NATO's maritime priorities in the north led to the landmark exercise, MAINBRACE, in September 1952, the first large-scale naval maneuvers under NATO command. The operation involved approximately half a dozen carriers and numerous smaller ships, which practiced ASW, anti-surface warfare, and air support of simulated ground operations in the vicinity of Bodø. Norway's policy of non-provocation toward the Soviets again came into play, prohibiting the main Allied forces from operating beyond 68° north latitude or 24° east longitude. The amphibious component of the exercise practiced landing operations in Denmark rather than Norway.\textsuperscript{114}

Although MAINBRACE seemed encouraging to Norway's hopes of early and effective Allied assistance in a crisis, NATO's strategy for Scandinavia remained unresolved. Following a visit to the Norwegian exercise HØST (see below) in October 1952, Deputy SACEUR Montgomery raised the possibility of giving the northern flank top priority, on the theory that the Russians would break through in Germany no matter what the Allies did there, and that holding Scandinavia would at least provide a base for subsequent counterattacks. The Americans and continental Allies rejected Montgomery's idea, however, since it amounted to an admission that NATO could not hold Western Europe. The next major naval exercise in September-October 1953, Operation MARINER, focused more on the Atlantic than the northern flank.\textsuperscript{115}

The only long-term solution to Western Europe's vulnerability was to rebuild strong conventional forces to offset the Soviet Army. NATO conferences in Ottawa in fall 1951 and Lisbon in February 1952 set ambitious goals, but it soon became apparent that most members lacked either the means or the political will to meet them. The only realistic way of stopping the Russians in Germany (and Denmark) was to rearm the Germans themselves, but for obvious reasons, Norway and most of the other NATO members were ambivalent over this prospect. Nevertheless, the Allies moved toward arming Germany through the Rome treaty and the
creation of the WEU (West European Union) in 1954-55, which resulted in
the admission of the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO on 5 May 1955.

The addition of German military forces to NATO eventually brought
substantial improvements to Norway's strategic position. With stronger
ground forces on the central front, the Allies had better chances of
holding Denmark and keeping the Soviet Baltic fleet bottled up. As a
result, southern Norway was more secure, and Allied plans became
slightly more optimistic. In the period 1954-56, for example, NORTHCOM
contingency plans began to focus on operations in northern Norway,
rather than on clinging to a narrow bridgehead in the southwest. By the
late 1950s the Norwegian forces were concentrating their preparations on
the northern region as well.\textsuperscript{116}

\textbf{HIGH TIDE FOR NORWEGIAN DEFENSE: 1952-54}

Oscar Torp became Prime Minister of Norway when Gerhardsen
resigned on 19 November 1951. Torp inherited a difficult situation in
the cabinet, an intense disagreement between Hauge and finance minister
Meisdalshagen over the defense budget. The immediate issue was Hauge's
proposal for another supplementary appropriation of 120 million kroner
for the construction of permanent barracks and training facilities in
North Norway, which would be necessary for the termination of the
deployments to Germany. Torp supported Hauge, the finance minister
resigned, and the Storting approved the spending bill. By that point,
however, Hauge apparently had become too great a political liability to
remain in the cabinet; and he too resigned on 6 January 1952.\textsuperscript{117}

In fact, Hauge's departure meant little change in defense policy,
and his successor Nils Langhelle pursued the military buildup with equal
glory. A series of three division-scale field maneuvers in 1952 and
1954 proved to be the largest ever in Norway, including intensive
training with the new American weapons.\textsuperscript{118} The first major exercise,
VINTER, took place in winter 1952 in the Kongsvinger-Eidsvoll region.
Two brigades participated, making this the largest winter training
exercise in Norway up to that point. That fall, four brigades totalling
about 30,000 men took part in exercise H\textsuperscript{OST} in Vestfold, which was the
largest Norwegian maneuver since 1916. Another exercise in North Norway, TROMS, meanwhile involved another full brigade; and Norwegian air and naval units also took part in NATO's MAINBRACE operations. Although there were no maneuvers on that scale in 1953, the largest Army exercise ever to occur in Norway took place the following year: operation VINTER II in Østfold, which involved two full divisions. Another large exercise in North Norway in fall 1954, BLÅTIND, also involved the equivalent of nearly two divisions.119

The Army meanwhile underwent a major reorganization that resulted largely from a report by General Sir Andrew Thorne in October 1951. Possibly in connection with the complaints from Admiral Jennings about Norway's defense program, Eisenhower sent Thorne, who had dealt closely with the Norwegians in 1943-45, to study the situation and make recommendations. Among Thorne's suggestions were the establishment of permanent division cadre staffs, the extension of conscript service to eighteen months, the creation of two standing brigades, the return of anti-aircraft and coast-defense artillery to the Army, and the establishment of a professional corps of NCOs, which he argued was "desperately needed."120

The Norwegians adopted several of these measures within the next two years, and although there were some later modifications, the system that emerged remained the basis of Norwegian Army organization throughout the Cold War. By 1954 there were two division headquarters staffs, nine mobilization brigades, two standing brigades (Brigade North and Brigade South) composed of conscripts doing their initial service, and eight tank squadrons. Coast-defense and anti-aircraft artillery also returned to Army control, as Thorne had recommended, while the Heimevern again became a separate, co-equal service. The Storting also grudgingly extended conscript training to sixteen months. The Norwegians still did not adopt a professional corps of NCOs, however.121

The death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 and the final ceasefire in Korea on 27 July 1953 produced considerable reduction of tension in Europe and signalled the beginning of the end of Norway's crash buildup. By 1954, the Norwegian defense budget had almost tripled from what it had been in 1949-50, and the Storting at last decided that things had

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gone far enough. The Army's budget in 1954-56 fell from almost 400 million kroner to only 278 and declined further to 264 million for 1956-57. The other services meanwhile continued to increase slightly, indicating a significant shift in priorities that paralleled the "New Look" of the American armed forces during the same period. Faced with these cuts, the Norwegian Army had to cancel plans for division-scale exercises in 1955.

In 1950-52, Norwegian policy had sought to strengthen guarantees of NATO assistance in case of a Soviet invasion, which then seemed imminent. Beginning in 1953-54, however, the general relaxation of tension prompted renewed Norwegian emphasis on the "screening" policy. American ambassador Charles U. Bay wrote in July 1953 that the Norwegians were now "more inclined than they have previously been to question the soundness and stability of our judgment. There is a general feeling that too many Americans have an unduly emotional and alarmist attitude towards Communism . . ." Nevertheless, even though the "boom" in defense spending and cooperation with NATO during the Korean crisis proved only temporary, the "bust" that followed was purely relative. The Army had at last succeeded in rebuilding a combat-ready mobilization force of sufficient size to present a serious deterrent; and although the large maneuvers of 1952-54 did not recur, the improvements they reflected were permanent. Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s did Norway again subject its forces to cutbacks like those of the 1920s.


5. In winter 1945-46, some personnel literally suffered frostbite while sleeping in makeshift quarters where temperatures fell to -15 degrees C.


7. "Hæren har intet beredskap mot et kuppartet overfall . . . ."


9. CIA Research Reports, reel 3, 406. A report by the British air attaché was even more critical and concluded "... the organization of a modern air force is beyond the capabilities of the present generation of Norwegians." N. Borchgrevink, "Norsk forsvar gjennom britiske briller: De britiske forsvarsattachéers rapporter for året 1949. Vi fikk gode råd--hvor gode var de?" Forsvarsstudier III (1983-84): 247.
10. Lindbæk-Larsen, "P.M.: Det strategiske grunnlag for forsvarsordningen." November 1945: RA: FO/Forsvarsstabben. kat. 1256.1/02, box 13. He also warned that the three situations could occur in combination.


12. Ibid., 29.

13. Storting dokument nr. 10 (1948), 12-18; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 63-64.


15. Helset apparently had been considering such a move as early as September 1947, when he discussed it with the chief of the defense staff. A meeting with Hauge on 15 December 1947 apparently convinced Helset to delay action for the sake of political negotiations over a non-partisan defense budget. After resigning, Helset became chief of the Army southern district command (DKS). Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 122-24. See also Svein Blindheim, Offiser i krig og fred (Oslo: Det norske samlaget. 1981), 185-89, for a personal recollection of Helset's attitude.


17. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 123.

18. In fact, Hauge already had conceded this point largely on 29 April 1948 by accepting Helset's classification of 80 of the 106 officers as unsuitable for command positions. Ibid., 123-26.

19. Storting dokument nr. 10 (1948); Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 124.

20. ("Ingen må søke HOK.") Chr. Christensen, De som heiste flagget (Oslo: Cappelens, 1986), 104.

21. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 557. To appreciate the context of Hansteen's decision, one must recall both his extraordinary promotion in 1942 and his successive demotions and disappointments in 1944-46. Christiansen described Hansteen as having a sensitive nature which he tried to conceal behind an air of aloofness, and the general may well have concluded that he owed nothing to the elder fraternity of officers after the way Hage had set him aside in 1945. Hansteen's successor in 1956 was Bjørn Christophersen, another prominent figure from the forces-in-exile.

23. Eriksen. DNA og NATO. 74-80.


25. In fact, the communists still received about 100,000 votes in 1949, but recent changes in the electoral laws made it more difficult for small parties to gain seats. Eriksen. DNA og NATO. 74-80, 95; Gerhardsen. Samarbeid og strid. 71.


27. Another feature of the plan was to make regiments into tactical as well as administrative units, thus correcting the problem of separate wartime and peacetime organizations that was still a legacy of the 1933 ordinance. Altogether, the mobilization army by 1955 was to have 5,326 officers, 7,030 sergeants, and 106,450 enlisted men, plus approximately 105,000 men in the heimevern. Ibid., 127-32.

28. FD. "Ekstraordinære beredskapstiltak m.m. 1. januar 1949 - 30. juni 1950." 24 December 1948; RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 19; Breidlid. Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 105-106. The Army's portion of the eighty-four million was supposed to provide for the re-extension of conscript training to twelve months, but the HOK decided it was more important to induct the remainder of the 1945 class, who had slipped through the cracks in the previous compromises, for nine months in order to help flesh-out the still skeletal mobilization units. Other major parts of the 1948 grants went for airfield construction and the refurbishing of ex-German equipment. The additional twenty-four million went mainly for fire-control radar for anti-aircraft and coast-defense artillery, and to re-equip two fighter squadrons with Vampire jets.

29. Ibid., 107.

30. "Hilsen til Brig. 471 fra Forsvarsministeren". 26 July 1947; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 222; "Ekserserrapport Brigade 481"; Ibid., box 225; Breidlid. Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 80-81. 142, 144-45.


32. Brig. 471 to TK. 1 July 1947; RA: FKA, 1256.0/02, box 222. Later commanders eased the restrictions after the move to Schleswig-Holstein (see below), but most of the Norwegian troops apparently still had little interest in social contact even with Danish-speaking Germans. Lindbäck-Larsen. "Ekserserrapport Brigade 491." 5 October 1949; Ibid. box 225.

34. Ibid., 171; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 147-51. The main Storting debates on possible withdrawal from Germany occurred on 29 June and 18 November 1948. The Norwegian Brigade 482 relieved the British 16th Parachute Brigade in Schleswig-Holstein. Following the reduction of Denmark's contingent, it probably would have made sense to attach the Danish battalion directly to the Norwegian brigade, especially since some of the latter contingents sacrificed part of their infantry in order to provide more artillery. Such amalgamation apparently was impractical for political reasons.

35. Ibid., 143, 157-59. The typical expenditure of ammunition by the Norwegian contingents during their six-month tours gives some indication of the tempo of their training: 150 rounds per 25-pounder or 6-pounder gun, 3,700 rounds per Bren Gun, 700 rounds and 33 hand grenades per rifleman, 100 round per PIAT. 300 rounds per 2-inch mortar, 750 rounds per 3-inch mortar, 2,000 rounds per medium machine gun, and 4,700 pounds high explosive for the engineers. "Stores required for a Norwegian Brigade in Germany for a Six Months Period for Training Purposes," 24 February 1947; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 222. The British did not always deliver the requisite ammunition on time, however, as indicated by Lindbäck-Larsen, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 491," 5 October 1949; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.

36. Ørnulf Dahl, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 481," October 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.


38. Ørnulf Dahl, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 481," October 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.

39. Lindbäck-Larsen, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 491," 5 October 1949; RA: FKA, 1256.0/02, box 225. The next brigade commander agreed and argued that the same basic problem applied to many ensigns (fenrik: the next rank above sergeants) as well, whose training was similar to that of sergeants. L.G. Bryhn, "Eserserrapport Brigade 492," 31 March 1950; Ibid.


41. Ørnulf Dahl, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 481," October 1948; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225. Dahl asserted that the old Krag-Jørgensen rifle, the Colt machine gun, and the Norwegian 81-mm mortar all were better than their British counterparts. Other objects of criticism were British trucks, load-bearing equipment, and the PIAT.

42. Lindbäck-Larsen, "Ekserserrapport Brigade 491," 5 October 1949; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.

43. A.R. Pran, "Brigade 501 Ekserserrapport," 1 November 1950; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.
44. For a recent, illuminating study of Britain's, and particularly Bevin's role in the creation of the alliance, see John Baylis, The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-1949 (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1993). Baylis concludes that while developing the NATO option, Bevin also nursed hopes of an understanding with Stalin until the last moment.

45. Eriksen, DNA og NATO. 69-71. Much of the initial enthusiasm in the Norwegian Labor party for the Bevin Plan apparently stemmed from the mostly mistaken assumption that it represented a political and economic alliance of the respective social-democratic parties.


47. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North. 41: Derry, History of Modern Norway. 415.

48. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North. 42.

49. At this point, the British and Americans were especially eager to obtain Sweden's help in controlling the lower Baltic, where the Soviets otherwise would probably overrun Denmark in a matter of days and thus obtain access to the North Sea for their growing submarine fleet. The Norwegians meanwhile recognized that Sweden was the only power able to offer immediate military support, including ground forces. Jan-Erik Raadehed, "Swedish Forces to Aid Norway?: The Nordic Security Question, 1948-49," Forsvarsstudier V (1985): 11-41.


52. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North. 42-43.

53. Ibid., 43.


55. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North. 42-43.

56. Derry, History of Modern Norway. 416. For a study of the impact of defense spending on the Norwegian economy, which was high in the minds of the cabinet, see Tormod Andreassen, Forsvarets virkninger på norsk økonomi. Samfunnsøkonomiske studier Nr. 22 (Oslo: Statistisk sentralbyrå, 1972).

57. Contrary to the impression given by some accounts, Lange did not push for the NATO option until after it became clear that the Nordic alternative was impossible.

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58. Eriksen, DNA og NATO, 12-13, 218ff, 249. The only dissenting votes in the Storting were the eleven communists and two Labor delegates. For a firsthand account of the Labor Party meeting, see Johanne Aamlid, Ut av kurs: En førstehånds beretning fra Arbeiderpartiets lukkede landsmøte i 1949 der avgjørelsen om norsk medlemskap i NATO i realiteten ble tatt (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1966). For a collection of essays on both sides of the subsequent NATO debate, which by no means ended in 1949, see Herbjørn Sørebø, ed., Ja eller nei til NATO (Oslo: Det norske samlaget, 1968). Further examples of Norwegian anti-NATO protest literature are Kari Engholm, Norge - en NATO base (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1967), and Nils Petter Gleditsch and Sverre Lodgård, Krigsstaten Norge (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1970).


60. Ibid.; Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 60; Knut Einar Eriksen and Helge Pharo, "Norway and the early cold war: Conditional atlantic cooperation." IFS Info (5/1993).

61. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 60.


63. In a 1957 interview, Nils Ørvik asked former Swedish Foreign Minister Günther what Sweden's response would be in the event that the Soviets demanded limited transit rights for an occupation of North Norway, backed by a nuclear threat. Günther appeared annoyed at the question and said that of course Sweden would fight, but Ørvik remained sceptical. "Notat fra samtale med fhv. utenriksminister Chr. Günther, 23/5.1957"; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 167.


66. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 49-52.

67. NA: RG 226, entry 19, report XL 48765. Evang's appointment apparently owed more to political connections than to his qualifications.
for intelligence work, which were questionable. *Klassekampen*, 26 February 1994.

68. Evang's defense intelligence staff was also involved in the postwar reactivation of the remnants of the German intelligence network headed by Reinhard Gehlen. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 75.

69. Ibid., 50-52, 77-79.

70. Chr. Christiansen, «Av hensyn til rikets sikkerhet . . .» (Oslo: Cappelens, 1990); Blindheim, *Offiser i krig og fred*, 185-95. Revelations about the extent of these secret operations have produced media scandals on several occasions since the 1970s.

71. Ibid.; Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 50, 75-76.


73. Reports by the British military attachées in Oslo in 1949 rated the Norwegian forces quite poorly. Borchgrevink, "Norsk forsvaret gjennom britiske briller."

74. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 60, 64, 79-80.


76. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 60-61.

77. SD (Samordningsdirektoratet) to MAAG, "U.S. Department of Defense's Estimation of Delivery - MDAP 1950," 2 June 1950; RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 87; Breidlid, *Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig*, 215. Nils Sæbø was chief liaison officer with the American MAAG. The Norwegians considered requesting B-26s to equip a total of four projected light bomber/night fighter/recon squadrons, but the Air Force concluded that the type could not fulfill all three missions effectively. LOK to MAAG (via Forsvarsstaben/SD). "Equipping of

78. Breidlid, Høren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 108-111. The airfield tank platoons included thirty-two reconditioned Panzers Mk. III, as well as an early shipment of nine American M-24 Chaffees.


80. Breidlid, Høren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 119.


82. St. meld. nr. 14 (1950); Breidlid, Høren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 205-206.

83. Ibid., 111. 171.

84. Ibid., 167-68. The projected increase for 1950-51 prior to Korea was mainly devoted to the Air Force and anti-aircraft defenses, not the army. Indirectly, the Korean conflict also helped Norway to solve its postwar foreign exchange problem by raising shipping rates. Gerhardsen, Samarbeid og strid. 104-13.


86. "Utkast til plan for krisemessig evakuering av den norske brigade fra Tyskland." 7 July 1949; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02. box 225.


89. According to the original plan, the Oteren fort was to be completed by fall 1952 at a cost of 14 million kroner. It would have included 15-cm gun turrets, integral anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, and a garrison of 1,500 men. Ibid., 172-73. In 1952-54, the Norwegians also considered rebuilding fortifications on the old Glomma River line, to guard against a possible Soviet attack through Sweden; but this process never went beyond the planning stage. Ibid., 175.


94. Tammes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 65, 80. On 22 February 1951, chief of the naval staff addressed a letter to the King protesting the Navy's low priority in the build-up, to no avail. The Defense Department defended the principle of collectively balanced forces within NATO rather than independent national balanced forces. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 175.

95. MAAG to SD, "Rescheduling of Delivery MDAP supplies FY 50 Program." 19 July 1950: SD to MAAG, "Revised FY-51 Supplementary MDA Program - Norwegian Army," 20 October 1950: RA: FO/Forsvarsstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 87. This box also contains a long series of detailed reports on the arrival and contents of military cargo ships during 1950-51.

96. The reorganization meant the enlargement of each battalion from 721 to 922 personnel. Rifle companies each received a support platoon with three 57-mm recoilless rifles and three 60-mm mortars, and the battalion support company included eight heavy machine guns. The battalion headquarters company also received a new scout platoon. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 175.

97. The specific organization of the latter Norwegian brigades in Germany varied considerably. For example, Brigade 502 had a bicycle squadron in place of the previous armored recon squadron. The last four brigades, 511-522, sacrificed their third infantry battalion in order to provide personnel for additional support units such as an anti-tank battery, a 40-mm anti-aircraft battery, and a full artillery battalion. The arbitrary limit of 4,200 men per contingent meant that none of the brigades ever amounted to a well-rounded, full-strength unit. Ibid., 146-48. American influence is also apparent in the development of Norwegian officer education. See Rolf Eriksen, "The Norwegian Army

98. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 61. The MAAG also became an informal channel in disputes over Norway's place in NATO's developing command structure and overall strategy (see below). Despite the MAAG's friction with the Norwegians over other issues, the MAAG sometimes advocated Norwegian interests in this respect.

99. Jennings went on to propose the establishment of six "Light Aid Detachments," each composed of sixteen technicians and specialists, to assist delinquent units with essential maintenance. MAAG (Jennings) to Norwegian Ministry of Defense Rep. for MDAP, "Maintenance of MDAP Equipment," 19 April 1951: FD to HOK, SOK, LOK, "Vedlikehold av MDAP utstyr," 30 April 1951: RA: FO/Forsværstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 87. The light aid detachments were described in the U.S. Army T/O & E 6-9/1. See also Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 82-83, 88-89.

100. Ibid., 89.

101. FD to HOK, "Ekstraordinære tiltak for a påskynde utpakking og distribuering av materiell under MDAP: Operasjon REDMA." 17 August 1951: RA: FO/Forsværstaben, kat. 1256.1/02, box 87.

102. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 89. In November 1951 the ECC (European Coordinating Committee) again overruled an effort by the MAAG in Norway to put more pressure on the Norwegian buildup.

103. Goals associated with the MTDP (see below) called for nearly 1,000 tactical aircraft in the northern area, but even the projected buildup would leave Norway and Denmark with a combined total of less than half that figure. Ibid., 66.


105. Tamnes, *United States and the Cold War in the High North*, 72-74, 86. Ironically, SAC's need for staging in Norway declined rapidly after 1952 anyway, because of the extended ranges of the B-36 and B-52 and the increasing effectiveness of air-to-air refueling.

106. Ibid., 117-19.

107. Ibid., 66.

108. Ibid., 81-82, 156. Brind's replacement by General Mansergh in April 1953 confirmed the precedent of a British CINCNORTH.
109. Ibid., 82; Breidlid. Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig. 153-55; also Tamnes, "Kamp mot russerne på tysk jord?" The Allied forces in Schleswig-Holstein in 1952-53 were designated the 6th Division, which Breidlid claims had some relation to the later activation of the West German 6th Panzer-Grenadier Division in the same area. The increased presence of Allied officers in Oslo resulted in numerous complaints to the HOK over the failure of Norwegian personnel to salute. Breidlid. 214-15.

110. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North. 145.

111. Ibid., 144-45. Pyman wrote this in January 1962.


118. Ustvedt, Velstand - og nye farer, 14-16; Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 167.

119. Ibid., 209-10; Norsk artilleri-tidsskrift, særtrykk om øvelse Høst (Bodø boktrykkeri, 1953). See also various pamphlets and directives concerning exercises HØST and VINTER II, FMB: box 355.52. The HØST exercises drew criticism from the press over the conditions enlisted men had to endure, but the Army stood its ground. "If the boys from Oslo cannot manage to cover thirty kilometers at a moderate tempo," said Hansteen, "then we may as well pack it in." Ustvedt, Velstand - og nye farer, 28. The annual figures of man-days spent in military service illustrate the extraordinary scale of these exercises. In fiscal years 1952-54 they averaged 2,725,550, while the average for all other years 1950-1990 was only 442,897. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 541.

120. Ibid., 180. The British military attachées already had emphasized this problem for several years. Borchgrevink, "Norsk forsvar gjennom britiske briller," 250-52.

121. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 167, 186, 191, 200-201. From 1952 to 1983, confusion often stemmed from the Norwegian designation of the mobilization brigades as "combined regiments," a measure which both Thorne and the HOK had opposed but which the defense department insisted on implementing anyway. Ibid., 180, 185.

122. In addition to the preparations for conventional warfare, Norwegian officers in spring 1953 began receiving nuclear weapons training at the NATO Special Weapons School at Garmisch. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 160ff. In 1955, the Norwegians seriously considered adopting the pentagonal division organization for atomic warfare but never actually did so. Breidlid, Hæren etter Annen Verdenskrig, 190. They did, however, equip an artillery battalion with Honest John nuclear-capable rockets in the late 1950s, although they always insisted that no warheads were in place.

123. Ibid., 179, 210.

124. Tamnes, United States and the Cold War in the High North, 169.
On April 9, 1940, the German Wehrmacht began one of the most daring military operations in history, the combined air-sea-land invasion of Norway and Denmark, under the code-name Operation WESERÜBUNG. Hitler's decision to launch the operation was a dangerous gamble that defied conventional wisdom by challenging British naval superiority in the North Sea. Nevertheless, within two months the German forces had completely overrun Norway and Denmark, which remained occupied for the rest of the war.

To explain the surprising success of WESERÜBUNG, one might first blame the British for failing to intercept the Germans at sea before they could land, and for failing to provide effective assistance to the Norwegians once the campaign was underway. On the other side of the coin, one might also emphasize the Germans' operational and tactical proficiency, particularly their use of surprise and air power, which helped to cancel out the Royal Navy's advantage and practically paralyzed Allied ground operations.

An essential prerequisite of the invasion, however, was the weakness of Norwegian defenses, which allowed the invaders to gain their crucial bridgeheads almost unopposed. Most campaign histories mention the background of Norwegian military policy only in passing, taking it more or less for granted that a small, traditionally neutral country such as Norway would be unprepared to defend itself. Some blame the socialist government which had held office in Norway since 1935: but this explanation is somewhat misleading. To understand what happened in 1940, one must examine the history of Norwegian defense policy at least back to 1905.
Following nearly four hundred years of Danish rule, Norway came under Swedish domination in 1814 as part of the general settlement of the Napoleonic Wars. Nationalism flourished in the following decades, however; and by the 1890s it was clear that Norway desired full independence. The question was how far the Norwegians were willing to go to achieve it, and how far the Swedes would go to maintain the dual monarchy. Although Norway actually enjoyed great autonomy under the dual monarchy, a rising tide of nationalism gradually undermined the Union as the Storting (Norwegian parliament) increasingly asserted its sovereignty by political means. The Norwegians had to back off from their demands in 1895, when it became clear that Sweden might resort to military action in order to put down a "parliamentary coup." This setback proved only temporary, however, for in the following decade, the Storting built up substantial military forces of its own.

In June 1905, the Storting voted to dissolve the Union. For several weeks, the respective armed forces faced-off across the border while diplomats pursued negotiations that eventually led to Swedish acceptance of the fait accompli. The confrontation in 1905 never boiled over into armed conflict, but the military balance did have an important effect on the outcome. In addition to the role of diplomatic factors and Swedish public opinion, the prospect of heavy and protracted resistance by the well-prepared Norwegian forces surely helped convince the King and government in Stockholm that the cause was lost. The Storting then invited Prince Carl of Denmark to become Norway's constitutional monarch, and he accepted, adopting the name Haakon VII.

Public enthusiasm for defense in Norway waned considerably after 1905, especially in the growing labor movement. Having secured their independence, Norwegians subsequently turned most of their attention to domestic issues, particularly the construction of hydroelectric power plants, which spurred rapid industrialization and social change. At the same time, however, the government continued to maintain strong defenses because of the dangerous international situation. In addition to lingering tension with Sweden and the traditional threat of Russian
expansionism in Lappland. Norway now had to contend with the increasing prospect of an Anglo-German naval war in the North Sea. Among the leading advocates of defense was King Haakon, who distrusted the Germans deeply. With the support of the government and a patriotic citizens' preparedness movement, the King obtained passage of the Defense Act of 1909, which improved the Army's organization considerably. Thus, the Norwegian armed forces were still reasonably modern and efficient in 1914.

When World War I began, the Norwegian government lost no time in mobilizing the Navy and coast defenses, fearing that either the British or the Germans might attempt to seize an advanced base in Norway through a surprise landing. The Norwegian Navy, in particular, was conscious of precedents such as the Royal Navy's sudden attacks on Copenhagen in the Napoleonic Wars and the more recent Japanese coup at Port Arthur. The British had indeed contemplated seizing a base in Norway but ultimately discarded the idea, and the Germans never seriously considered it. At least part of the reason such plans never progressed, however, was that they had to reckon with the likelihood of serious resistance by the Norwegians. The belligerents eventually resorted to economic pressure instead, which resulted in considerable hardship for the Norwegian population, as well as the loss of over 800 merchant ships to German U-boats and mines.

Nevertheless, Norway's policy of armed neutrality at least kept the country itself from becoming a battleground. Had Norway appeared less resolute, for example by failing to place the Navy and coastal defenses on full alert, it is conceivable that the British might have decided to occupy a Norwegian base in 1915 or 1916. In that case, it is conceivable that Sweden might have thrown in with the Central Powers; and Norway might have found itself in a situation comparable to that of Greece, which played unwilling host to an Allied army and ultimately became fully embroiled in the war, with serious political disruption and infringements of sovereignty. However, the deterrent role of the armed forces in avoiding such straits quickly faded from public and political consciousness.

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In the aftermath of the war, Norway faced the difficult choice of whether to join the League of Nations. Although the general concept of the League was congenial to Norwegian ideals, the obligation to uphold collective security interfered with the desire to remain neutral in any future conflict. The Storting decided to join the League anyway, but it never made any provisions to support collective security in practice. Instead, the lack of apparent threats and the sense of security engendered by the League prompted a steady reduction in military spending after World War I. In addition, the Norwegian economy slid into its own Great Depression beginning as early as 1920, which placed further pressure on the deflating budget.

The main effect of the military cutbacks at first was on the acquisition of equipment and supplies, which came almost completely to a halt. By 1927, however, the cuts extended to personnel as well. In that year, the military began inducting only about two-thirds of the men eligible for conscription, with a reduced training period. The Army also had to discontinue annual regimental exercises and cut the number of active-duty officers by more than half. Subsequent cutbacks reduced the training period even further in 1929-33.

Some groups, including the King, the Conservative Party, and military officers, argued that the cutbacks had gone too far, leaving the country practically disarmed. At the other end of the political spectrum, however, the socialist Labor Party demanded the total abolition of the armed services, which it regarded as inherently hostile to the interests of the working class. In fact, the military had intervened in several major labor disputes since 1912, always on the side of owners and strike-breakers.

With the right and left so widely opposed, the arbiter of political power proved to be the Liberal Party, led by Johan Ludwig Mowinckel. Although Mowinckel was hardly alone in his views, he bears a large share of responsibility for the decline of Norway's defenses in the interwar period. Among other things, in 1931 he arranged the appointment of a political ally, Kristian Laake, as Commanding General
of the Army, a selection that insured minimal public criticism of the defense reductions from the officer corps.

Meanwhile, as early as 1918, the Norwegian General Staff became increasingly concerned with leftist activities that seemed to presage a Trotskyite coup d'État. The Army by 1922 had developed a system of highly secret mobilization plans to activate special internal security units, composed of men hand-picked for their political reliability. Known as the Ordensvern (as well as several other categories), these detachments generally bore no relation to the Army's normal order of battle. In effect, the Army became two separate ones: the normal conscript army for use against external foes, and a secret army designed for rapid, selective activation against domestic enemies. After 1923, the civilian government knew almost nothing of the special mobilization system; and while many mid-level as well as senior officers had to know something of the plans, they remained a closely-guarded secret.

Although the Ordensvern system never received a full-scale test, it demonstrated considerable ingenuity on the Army's part and probably would have presented a major obstacle to any leftist attempt to seize political power by force. In retrospect, there is almost no evidence of any serious plans, still less physical preparations, for such an insurrection. Labor leaders often styled themselves as Marxist revolutionaries for public consumption, but by the early 1930s their inflammatory rhetoric bore little relation to the increasingly moderate reality of the party's position. The elaborate military countermeasures therefore tend to seem like a great waste of time at best, the product of paranoid, over-active imaginations; but at the time, the "red menace" appeared all-too-real.

At the same time that many Liberals and Conservatives feared a violent communist takeover, leftists perceived a corresponding threat from anti-democratic extremists on the right wing. Given the well-known conservatism of the officer corps as a whole, Labor activists regarded the military as a bastion of opposition to the socialist agenda; and many of them feared that if they ever did gain power through the political process, they might in turn become the target of a coup by right-wing militarists. By 1933, Vidkun Quisling seemed to personify
this threat; and many leftists took it for granted that a large proportion of military officers belonged to, or at least sympathized with, his NS (Nasjonal Samling) Party. In any case, the predominantly bourgeois and agrarian social origins of the officer corps gave it a distinctly anti-socialist character.

Although specific numbers are still unavailable, fragmentary and anecdotal evidence indicates that a significant number of officers were indeed members of the NS and its antecedents in the 1930s. Without a doubt, support for Quisling among professional officers was proportionally greater than among the overall population. The question of whether his supporters in the military ever amounted to a real, significant threat to the government remains open to debate. In general, Norwegian military historians since the war have implied that Labor's distrust of the officer corps was unwarranted. A recent study has concluded, however, that while Quisling held office as Minister of Defense under an Agrarian government in 1931-33, he actually made detailed plans to manipulate the Ordensvern system in order to stage a coup. It remains unclear whether any officers actually participated in the plot, but Quisling clearly believed that he could rely on support from key members of the General Staff and the district commands. He apparently was waiting only for some pretext to give the coup a legal facade, and this context sheds new light on several aspects of his strange behavior as Defense Minister.

Tension decreased considerably after Johan Nygaardsvold's Labor government took office in 1935: and although many military men remained distinctly critical of the socialists, top leaders such as Laake and Colonel Otto Ruge recognized the need to develop a working relationship with the new cabinet. Laake in particular helped to deal with the problem by revealing at least part of the Ordensvern plans to the Labor Defense Minister Fredrik Monsen, who subsequently supported modest increases in the defense budget that seemed to belie his earlier anti-military rhetoric. Many Labor leaders, however, continued to regard the officer corps with suspicion, a factor that contributed heavily to the failure to rearm in time for the approaching crisis.
THE FAILURE TO REARM, 1933-1939

Reductions in the Norwegian defense budget in the 1920s were inevitable, given the absence of any major threat to the country's security from abroad after 1918. In 1927, the international situation still looked so placid that even the defense-minded Conservative Party agreed to a comprehensive military reorganization that made deep cuts in training and readiness. After that, the Liberals further reductions, culminating in the Defense Act of 1933, which effectively gutted the officer corps and left the armed forces little more than a paper organization and a collection of aging, unmanned ships.

The passage of the 1933 act coincided with the final weeks of the Agrarian government and Quisling's Defense Ministry, a fact that later prompted some people to make Quisling a scapegoat for the entire decline of the military between the wars. Regardless of his later treachery and other flaws, this judgement is unfair, because he oversaw development of the plan at the behest of the unassailable majority in the Storting, including most of the Agrarian party in whose cabinet he was serving, which demanded further defense cuts. The participation of the relatively pro-defense Agrarians in this policy underlines the fact that no single party bore responsibility for it.

Several parties also must share the blame for the inadequate response to developments after 1935. Even after Nygaardsvold's cabinet took office that year, Labor still lacked a parliamentary majority and thus had to rely on a coalition, first with the Agrarians and then with the Liberals. Greater resolution and a pro-defense consensus among the non-socialist parties could have produced a more viable policy in 1936-39. As it happened, the belated emergency appropriations that the military did receive were grossly inadequate. The economic crisis remained at the top of almost everyone's agenda until the war was at hand, and the preoccupation with fiscal economy frustrated efforts to revitalize the military at every turn.

The anti-military political climate is a familiar story that parallels events in the other Western democracies, but there is another aspect of the situation that most authors have neglected: the
institutional weaknesses and failures of the Norwegian armed forces themselves. Apologists for the defeat in 1940 generally have argued that given the severe lack of resources imposed by the politicians, the military made the best of what little it did receive. This was not always the case.

For example, politicians found it relatively easy to ignore the official recommendations of the Norwegian Navy regarding new construction, because many professional officers themselves disagreed sharply over the technical issues of what type of ships the country needed most. As a result, political considerations had an inordinate impact on the modest naval construction that did take place. The Navy's staunch opposition to proposals for a unified air force was another example of professional disunity that made it easier for the political authorities to ignore a vital defense issue. Professional conservatism also hampered the Army. A minority of forward-looking officers expressed increasing alarm over Norway's total lack of anti-tank weapons, pointing to recent lessons demonstrated in the Spanish Civil War. The majority of senior officers remained complacent, however, and failed to impress upon the government the urgent need to acquire such weapons.

Ultimate responsibility for the failure of the armed forces to make better use of their limited resources, and to play a more active role in the policy-making process, rests with the service chiefs, General Laake and Admiral Henry Diesen. Both of their appointments were due mainly to political factors, and many other officers regarded their professional qualifications as mediocre. Both their temperaments and the nature of their careers made the two chiefs reluctant to challenge the cabinet, for example by threatening to resign in protest against the low priority of defense. Ironically, the same respect for procedure and deference in civil-military relations that made Laake a stabilizing influence in 1931-36 tended to impede stronger defense efforts thereafter.

In fairness, one must concede that more forceful service chiefs or even a Defense Minister such as Holtfodt probably could not have made much headway against the prevailing wind of fatalism and muddled
strategic thinking. Defense policy (or as some would say, the lack thereof) rested on the usually unspoken but almost universal assumption that Germany could never directly threaten Norwegian territory, because of British sea power. It therefore seemed as though strong defenses were not only unnecessary, but counterproductive, since they might prompt undesirable resistance to a limited British landing, when the government's preferred policy would be only to lodge a formal protest. A separate but equally common line of argument held that because of technological developments, Norway no longer had the resources to mount any serious defense against a great power; modern war had made the policy of 1914-18 obsolete.

Such assumptions never received systematic scrutiny or analysis by any official body before the war. According to the postwar investigation, "At no time did the government ever take up for fundamental, comprehensive debate the question of what missions our military actually should perform." The government never gave any clear indication that it would fight under any circumstances. Numerous statements by Labor leaders contributed to the impression that if push came to shove, their ultimate determination was to avoid violence. "The neutrality guard will only be employed in bloodless operations." said Nygaardsvold in 1937; and another cabinet member spoke of "guarding the coasts, not with cannons . . . but by showing the flag.""}

If Britain truly had been the only power capable of invading Norway, then this policy might have been relatively sound. Even Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, who tended to distrust the British, recognized that above all else, Norway must avoid being drawn into a war on Germany's side. The lesson of the Napoleonic Wars (when Norway had suffered greatly under British blockade) seemed clear: Norway must remain on good terms with Britain in order to preserve its vital maritime trade, as well as for ideological reasons. As Mowinckel put it, "Whatever happens, a war against England is entirely ruled out."3

One might suppose that this line of reasoning would lead at least to serious discussion of an alliance with Britain, given the basic affinity of the two nations in opposition to Nazism. The more appealing prospect of neutrality, however, made an alliance politically
impossible. Even if Germany could not invade Norway directly, an alliance seemed sure to bring a rain of destruction from the Luftwaffe; and even if Norway's own forces were augmented, they seemed unlikely to make much difference in the outcome of a general war.

In 1936, the deteriorating international situation prompted Norway to re-evaluate its relationship to the League of Nations. Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia prompted even the pacifist Labor leaders to call on the League for firm action against Italy. When Britain and France failed to respond with effective sanctions, however, the Norwegian leaders concluded that the League had nothing to offer. Norway therefore joined with several other small states in renouncing their obligation to participate in collective security. Henceforth, they would rely on a policy of strict neutrality as the only way to avoid being drawn into the great-power conflict looming on the horizon. The Norwegian government also declined to join in a proposed defensive alliance with the other Scandinavian states. Norway felt less threatened than any of its neighbors, and the obligations of such a treaty seemed to outweigh the benefits.

To the limited extent that Norwegian policy-makers considered security issues at all, most of their attention focused on the three counties in the far north, Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark, where the danger seemed greatest for several reasons. One, especially following the outbreak of the Winter War in November 1939, was the possibility of Soviet aggression in the Arctic. Many Labor leaders, however, also feared that the Western Powers or Germany might violate Norwegian territory in order to attack the Soviets in that region. In addition there was some concern over an alleged "Finnish menace," a few radical advocates of a "Greater Finland" making sporadic efforts to stir unrest among Norway's significant Finnish ethnic minority in the North. Finally, observers such as the King recognized the long-term problem of poverty in the northern counties, which made the region a potential flashpoint for subversive activity. For all of these reasons, the paltry Norwegian defense efforts of the 1930s focused disproportionately in the Arctic, at the expense of the South; and although there were legitimate grounds for concern over these issues, in retrospect they
amounted to distractions from the much greater danger of German
aggression. The Munich Crisis in 1938 and Hitler's occupation of Prague
finally prodded the Storting to adopt limited measures toward
rearmament, but in retrospect these were too little, too late.

NORWEGIAN AMBIVALENCE AND GERMAN AGGRESSION

On the whole, Norwegian defense preparations still lacked any real
sense of urgency even in 1939-40, for two essential reasons. One was
the assumption that British sea power effectively ruled out the
possibility of a German invasion. The other was that the Norwegian
government had two conflicting goals, which it never clearly recognized
or resolved. It wanted to remain neutral, but above all it wanted to
avoid war against Britain. Thus, an active defense appeared not only
unnecessary, because of Germany's imagined impotence, but also
dangerous, because it might cause minor neutrality violations by the
British to escalate into full-scale conflict. Therefore, the government
called upon the Norwegian forces only to provide a token neutrality
watch, hoping to keep both sides at arm's length by appearing harmless
and impartial.

The essential flaw in the Norwegian policy was its failure to
recognize that it could not have the best of both worlds. The policy
pursued mutually exclusive goals, without acknowledging the
contradictions. The actual basis of the Nygaardsvold government's
policy was above all to avoid conflict with Britain, while attempting to
conceal this fact from Germany. With respect to defense, these two
objectives were diametrically opposed. Whatever the effect of Norwegian
military weakness on British calculations, the signal to Germany was
clear. "Norway can count on its neutrality being respected only if she
also can defend herself," the German minister in Oslo Von Neuhaus
reported to the Auswärtiges Amt in 1937. The following year, in light
of the continuing failure to rearm, he concluded that "In a war, Norway
will do what England requires."4 The Altmark incident seemed to provide
the final proof of this in Hitler's mind, and thus Operation WESERÜBUNG
took form.

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As the German task forces neared their objectives on the eve of the invasion, the Norwegian government was preoccupied with the simultaneous British Operation WILFRED. Winston Churchill's plan to cut off the supply of Swedish iron ore to Germany by mining Norwegian coastal waters. Awaiting a suitable pretext. British troops meanwhile stood by to occupy Norwegian ports according to plan R.4: but the Allied preparations proved hopelessly inadequate and inept in comparison to the ruthless efficiency of the German operation.

PERFORMANCE OF NORWEGIAN FORCES IN 1940

A balanced assessment of the achievements and failures of the Norwegian forces in the 1940 campaign must take into account the disadvantages under which they fought, factors that resulted from both the long-term neglect of the armed forces over the preceding twenty years and the more immediate circumstances leading up to 9 April 1940. Considering these constraints, one cannot help but admire the skill and determination that many Norwegians displayed in their struggle to repel the invaders. In giving credit where credit is due, however, many accounts have tended to gloss over the unpleasant fact that, regardless of the underlying reasons, the Norwegian forces did reveal numerous weaknesses, not all of which were simply the results of fiscal neglect.

In many popular Norwegian accounts of the campaign, a relative handful of heroic stories have provided welcome distractions from the humiliating series of fiascos, defeats, and capitulations that led to the country's occupation. For example, the dramatic episodes at Hegra and Vinjesvingen, where isolated bands of Norwegian troops and civilian volunteers held out for several weeks against heavy odds, have become a cherished part of the national folklore. In fact, however, these incidents had little impact on the overall course of the campaign. The subsequent underground resistance to the occupation has overshadowed the unpleasant events of 1940 to an even greater extent. Thus, at the risk of seeming unfair or disrespectful of the many brave and loyal people who did their best in a terrible situation, one must look beyond the prewar neglect of the armed forces and ask, what else went wrong?
First and foremost, the Army never was able to mobilize properly. This was primarily the fault of the government and the service chiefs, who failed to take sufficient precautionary measures on the eve of the invasion. Only after the attack was well underway on April 9 did the cabinet finally order mobilization, and bureaucratic confusion produced further delays. Rather than calling for immediate and general mobilization, as the situation clearly demanded, the cabinet specified partial and secret mobilization, which meant that the orders would go out by mail and troops would not begin reporting for duty until two days later. By lucky accident, the Foreign Minister referred to "general mobilization" in a brief radio broadcast just before fleeing the capital. Nevertheless, by then it was too late, for the Germans had breached the coastal defenses and already held most of the key Norwegian mobilization centers. Quisling compounded the confusion by announcing the formation of his own government and rescinding the mobilization orders. The inherent nature of the Army's mobilization system also complicated the problem. Many personnel were slated to join units far from their homes, which often proved impossible amid the chaos of April 1940. As a result, most of the units that did assemble were ad hoc collections of individuals who had never trained together before; and unit cohesion suffered accordingly.

The fact that men had to serve under unfamiliar officers probably contributed to widespread rumors of treachery and fifth-column activity. In fact, the postwar courts never convicted a single Norwegian officer of treason in connection with the 1940 campaign, unless one counts Quisling himself, who had long since retired from active duty. However, several senior officers did receive at least token prison sentences on lesser charges such as neglect of duty; and many other questionable cases never received full investigation.

In fact, the great majority of officers who had belonged to the NS ignored Quisling's orders and fought loyally (if not always enthusiastically) on the side of the King and cabinet. It remains open to speculation whether prior sympathy for Germany and the NS caused some officers to surrender prematurely or to remain passive when they could have acted more vigorously. There are, however, enough cases of former
Quisling sympathizers who distinguished themselves in action against the Germans to demonstrate that one cannot draw any sweeping conclusions of this nature. For example, one of the most outstanding individual heroes of the campaign was Fenrik (ensign) Tor Marstrander, who played a leading role in the defeat of the German paratroops at Dombås, despite the fact that he had been a founding member of the NS.5

Contrary to popular myth, the Norwegians in the course of the fighting often showed less understanding of local terrain and conditions than did the Germans. Although the individual skills of the average Norwegian soldier (especially skiing and marksmanship) offered great potential, the training, organization, and doctrine of the Army generally failed to exploit these advantages. Apart from the 6th Division in North Norway, few units were prepared to take the field under winter conditions. Although there were occasional exceptions, most Norwegian forces remained road-bound and vulnerable to flanking maneuvers, at which the Germans proved remarkably adept.

Norwegian operational doctrine also failed to address the problem of tempo, which demands a delicate balance between maintaining security and providing soldiers with adequate rest. As a result, many units found themselves physically exhausted at decisive moments, while others allowed the Germans to achieve devastating tactical surprise. Two respective examples are the defeats at Høljerasten bridge and Gratangen.

The leadership of General Otto Ruge (who replaced Laake at the outset of the campaign) also played a role in the failure to mount a more active, determined defense in central Norway. As traditional accounts have emphasized, Ruge deserves great credit for rallying the spirit of the nation in the immediate aftermath of April 9, when it seemed likely that the government would forego further resistance in favor of negotiations. In his specific conduct of the campaign, however, Ruge failed to appreciate the need to seize and retain the initiative at the local level wherever possible, and to achieve at least minor tactical victories, even at the cost of some casualties, simply to maintain morale. Instead, his directives essentially called upon commanders to avoid losses at almost any cost and authorized them to retreat at the first sign of a determined attack. Consequently, on the
decisive front in central Norway, the German advance quickly achieved a momentum that proved unstoppable; and many Norwegian units suffered a fatal loss of confidence even in the absence of any serious casualties.

One additional factor that badly damaged the Norwegian will to resist was the appalling disorganization and ineffectiveness of the Allied forces that tried to intervene. Ruge's strategy from the beginning was designed merely to delay the enemy until Allied reinforcements arrived in sufficient strength to turn the tide. The simple fact that the Germans had evaded the Royal Navy on April 9 already represented a major disappointment, but a considerable store of faith and confidence in British assistance still remained. When the first British troops arrived in central Norway on April 19-21, however, they quickly proved inferior not only to the Germans, but even to the exhausted and ill-equipped Norwegians themselves. Although the solid performance of the regular 15th Brigade partially compensated for the initial failures of the Territorials, the general concentration of Allied forces at Narvik seemed to suggest that saving the bulk of the population in southern Norway from occupation was low on their list of priorities. The successive evacuations from Åndalsnes, Namsos, and Narvik, in which the Allies showed almost complete disregard for Norwegian interests, left feelings of bitterness and mistrust that complicated cooperation with the resistance later in the war.

Overall, the performance of the Norwegian forces was mixed at best. Given the severe constraints under which they fought, however, many specific units and individuals achieved far more than anyone had a right to expect of them. One could say fairly that the Norwegian Army in 1940 had a considerable proportion of dead wood, but it was by no means rotten to the core.

WESERÜBUNG: A PYRRHIC VICTORY?

It may seem odd to suggest that the conquest of Norway was a mistake on Hitler's part, given the resounding victory the Wehrmacht achieved in spring 1940. In a longer view, however, one must consider what the original objectives of the invasion were. In conference with
General Falkenhorst in February 1940, Hitler stated three basic goals: to secure operational freedom for naval operations in the Atlantic, to secure the shipment route for iron-ore from Sweden, and to secure the northern flank of future German operations on the continent.

Many historians have emphasized the heavy naval losses the Germans suffered in taking Norway, which included a heavy cruiser, two light cruisers, ten destroyers, and six U-boats, as well as damage to many other vessels including the Scharnhorst, Gneisnau, and Lützow. For the time being there were almost no German warships available to exploit the operational freedom offered by the new bases in Norway, and this played an important role in the decision not to attempt an invasion of Britain. Nevertheless, in later stages of the war Norway did provide a valuable staging area for air and naval operations against Allied shipping, particularly the Murmansk convoys. Thus, WESERÜBUNG did achieve Hitler's first objective, albeit at high cost.

Ironically, the supposedly critical iron-ore route through Narvik proved otherwise in the aftermath of the invasion. The Germans' own demolition of Narvik's port facilities, to prevent their use by the Allies following the counter-attack of May 27-28, meant that the iron-ore route remained closed for many months. Nevertheless, with the German Navy in fairly secure control of the Baltic, it was possible to increase shipments by that route and to accumulate stocks during the summer months. The capture of additional sources of iron-ore in Belgium and France also reduced the importance of the northern mines. Overall, the supply of Swedish ore presented no critical bottleneck to German industry, at least until the closing stages of the war. In retrospect, the iron-ore objective appears less significant than either Hitler or the Allies imagined in 1940.

Had the Germans not invaded Norway when they did, however, then the issue might have become more complicated; and Hitler's northern flank would have remained vulnerable to British initiative. At least one historian has argued that on the strategic level, at least in hindsight, Hitler's decision to invade Norway before France and the Low Countries was a mistake. Following their crushing victory on the continent, the Germans probably could have occupied Norway at their
leisure in summer or fall 1940, with much less interference from the British. Had the Germans waited, however, then the British might have occupied bases in Norway in response to the invasion of the Low Countries in May, if not already in April. Even with the subsequent strain on British resources, the Germans might have found it much more difficult to take Norway without the critical element of surprise they enjoyed on April 9. Furthermore, Norway under British control could have presented a significant threat to BARBAROSSA, by providing both a secure supply route to Murmansk and a potential threat to German control of the Baltic. The only obvious military solution would have been to invade Sweden, with unforeseeable consequences.

One final argument against the strategic success of WESERÜBUNG is that as it turned out, Norway became a backwater in the latter stages of the war, tying down massive German resources that could have made a crucial difference in more decisive theaters. This was a real and important factor in the dilution of German power, especially in connection with Operation OVERLORD. Allied planners concluded in 1944-45 that Germany had more to gain than to lose by evacuating from Norway, since the Western Powers had almost no spare assets with which to develop a Scandinavian-based offensive. By that point, although Hitler never realized it, Norway clearly had outlived its usefulness to Germany.

Ultimately, assessments of WESERÜBUNG's strategic effectiveness depend upon counter-factual speculation. Thus, there can be no conclusive answer. Nevertheless, it seems to the present author that within the flawed framework of what passed for German strategy in World War II, the benefits of occupying Norway exceeded the costs.

DISILLUSIONMENT AND COLLABORATION IN NORWAY

Many traditional accounts give the impression that once the invasion began, the Norwegian government rallied admirably and conducted its policy throughout the rest of the war with a sense of resolution that contrasted sharply with its prewar mistakes and illusions. However, this was not always the case. In fact, the Nygaardsvold
cabinet accomplished little between 9 April and 7 June 1940. The necessity of evacuation to Britain seems to have taken the cabinet by surprise almost as much as did the invasion itself, and the government's departure occurred in a hasty, unplanned manner that left the remaining military authorities in Norway in doubt over their legal status and responsibilities.

In theory, the Allies might have been able to embark a considerable proportion of the Norwegian 6th Division along with the other forces evacuating from Narvik in early June. This possibility was unrealistic, however, for two main reasons. First, the Allies themselves preferred to leave the Norwegians as a covering force, to keep up the pressure on the remnants of the German 3rd Mountain Division and prevent interference with the difficult process of withdrawal. The British also regarded the Norwegian Army as unreliable and preferred to keep the evacuation secret until the last moment. Second, the Norwegian leadership considered it politically impossible to order conscripts to leave the country and carry on the war in exile. The cabinet did order a few professional officers, headed by General C.G. Fleischer, to accompany the evacuation; but this decision was a hasty one with no basis in longer-ranged planning. Hardly anyone except the British themselves could imagine that Germany would still lose the war, and the Norwegian government went into exile mainly for lack of alternatives, without any clear idea of what would follow.

In Norway, however, a more distinct, plausible, and pessimistic future was apparent. On the one hand, many Norwegian officers were bitter over the failure of the Allies to provide effective assistance to Norway; and it was easy for German and quisling propaganda to portray England as "Perfidious Albion." On the other hand, German domination of Europe seemed an inevitable reality; and the only path toward renewed independence seemed to be through accommodation. After all, the situation was not entirely unfamiliar, given the history of Swedish domination from 1814-1905. With this perspective, Ruge and many other officers looked forward to the re-establishment of Norwegian forces under German supervision, which they believed would form an important stepping-stone in the path to full restoration of sovereignty.
One additional factor was the fear that the Soviets might occupy and permanently annex East Finnmark, in the same manner that they had absorbed eastern Poland in 1939. Failing to appreciate the true nature of Nazi ambitions, several senior Norwegian officers concluded that the German occupation was a lesser threat to Norway's long-term interests. Hitler meanwhile also wanted to discourage any such temptation on Stalin's part, and for this reason Norwegian and German interests briefly seemed to coincide.

As a result, two Norwegian battalions remained on duty in East Finnmark until August 1940, by which time the Germans had consolidated their position in Norway sufficiently to put their own units in place. In the interim, the Norwegian units technically took their orders from the civil administration of North Norway, headed by fylkesmann Gabrielsen; but for practical purposes they were under German control—a source of later embarrassment that most historians have either overlooked or preferred to ignore.

Approximately seven thousand Norwegian volunteers (frontkiemperne) served under German command in 1941-45, and nearly one thousand of them either were killed in service or died in Soviet captivity. Not surprisingly, this is another aspect of the war that has found little place in traditional Norwegian accounts. The most difficult thing to understand in this context is that by no means all of the volunteers were Nazi sympathizers, and most of them apparently believed sincerely that they were acting in Norway's own best interests. Many of them, particularly those who re-enlisted in the SS when they could have mustered-out in 1943, were indeed Nazis by conviction; but many others were essentially decent men who made a bad decision for what seemed like good reasons. Johs. Andenæs, one of the foremost authorities on the postwar collaboration trials, concluded that "among the east front volunteers . . . were a substantial proportion who acted from unselfish motives." The most typical reasons they cited were anti-bolshevism, solidarity with Finland, and hope that by volunteering they would hasten a voluntary German restoration of Norway's independence.

The overall contribution of the Norwegian volunteers to the German war effort is impossible to quantify. Several of the Waffen SS units
they helped form (e.g., the Viking and Nordland divisions) played central roles in a long series of major battles. Given the vast scale of the Eastern Front, their numbers were a relative drop in the bucket; but given the small size of the forces-in-exile in Britain as well, the frontkjemperne represent a major aspect of Norway's involvement in the war.

THE LONDON GOVERNMENT AND FORCES-IN-EXILE

The Norwegian government-in-exile had little opportunity to influence the overall direction of Allied strategy. Apart from the basic decision to gamble on the ultimate defeat of Germany and place Norwegian forces under British command, the government concerned itself mainly with relations with the "Home Front" (i.e., the situation in occupied Norway), which was more a political issue than a military one. In general, the British used Norwegian ships and air squadrons in the same way as any other units, without reference to the government-in-exile. The Anglo-Norwegian Military Treaty of 28 May 1941 made it clear that while the Norwegian forces would retain their independent national character insofar as possible, they were firmly under British operational control. The SOE's Norwegian operatives, designated Norwegian Independent Company No. 1 (or more popularly, Company Linge, after its original leader, Captain Martin Linge), had only a token relationship to the Norwegian government and remained under British command for all practical purposes. The SOE also kept exclusive control over clandestine missions and contacts with the underground, denying the Norwegian government any opportunity to chart an independent policy in that respect.

In cases where Allied strategy and operations directly affected Norwegian interests, however, the Nygaardsvold government made active efforts to bring its influence to bear. The most important issue involved a series of British commando raids in 1941 that had a direct and sometimes disastrous impact on the civilian population. Finally, in December 1941, the abortive raid on Reine in the Lofoten Islands, which led to serious reprisals against the local population, prompted the
Norwegian government to insist on closer co-ordination of British planning and operations with Norwegian interests. Toward this end, the Norwegians reorganized their military staff in London by creating a unified Armed Forces High Command (Forsvarets Overkommando) in February 1942. Although the improvement was gradual, the FO eventually assumed an integral role in Allied policy toward Norway, especially with respect to contingency plans for liberation.

The main contributions of the Norwegian forces-in-exile were at sea and in the air. The Royal Norwegian Air Force (which officially absorbed the formerly separate Army and naval air arms in November 1944) eventually included five squadrons, all of which saw a great deal of active service. The Navy also played a central role in the Battle of the Atlantic, mostly manning ships provided by the British and Americans. Even more important, however, was the role of the Norwegian merchant fleet, which amounted to a major portion of the total shipping available to the Allied powers. The Norwegian merchant fleet in 1940 included nearly 2,000 vessels totalling nearly five million tons—the fourth largest national shipping industry in the world. In 1941, for example, 40 percent of all foreign ships entering British ports were Norwegian. The government-in-exile effectively nationalized all Norwegian shipping through the creation of a unified emergency corporation, Notraship; and this crucial source of revenue allowed Norway to maintain financial independence even in exile. This fact did not always translate directly into influence on Allied strategy, but it did place the country in a much stronger, more stable position in the immediate postwar period than would have been the case otherwise.

"NEVER AGAIN": POSTWAR POLICY AND THE LEGACY OF 9 APRIL 1940

Following the long-awaited liberation in May 1945, the phrase "never another April 9th" became a popular slogan in Norway, expressing a new public consensus in favor of a strong national defense. Several factors continued to complicate the issue, however; and the rehabilitation of the armed forces was neither as swift nor as decisive as one might suppose. In some respects, the new pro-defense consensus
was more apparent than real. The public demanded not only a more
effective defense in the future, but also a thorough investigation and
prosecution of the leaders responsible for the fiasco in 1940. As a
result, all officers had to undergo a screening process before returning
to duty after the war; and over a thousand were purged, many because of
irresolution in 1940, others because of collaboration during the
occupation.

This factor interfered with the process of re-establishing the
armed forces, especially in the Army, which suffered a severe shortage
of properly-qualified officers. At the same time, some critics objected
that the expulsion of officers discredited during the war had not gone
far enough. Thus, although relations between the Labor party and the
officer corps were far better than they had been before the war, the
latter remained an object of considerable suspicion and criticism in
some quarters. Material re-equipment also proved a serious obstacle to
the re-establishment of the armed forces. The Navy and Air Force were
relatively well off, with reasonably modern ships and aircraft obtained
mostly from Britain; but the Army had to resort mainly to using captured
German equipment. Although the German material was excellent in many
respects, much of it was badly worn-out and approaching obsolescence
(for example the artillery). Britain furnished equipment for the
succession of Norwegian brigades that participated in the occupation of
Germany, but the rest of the Army remained haphazardly equipped until it
began to receive American material after 1950.

When tensions with the Soviet Union increased sharply in 1948, the
Norwegian Army was still in a disrupted, transitional state, which
prompted Army chief of staff General Olaf Helset to resign in protest of
the government's inadequate defense policy. Helset's "revolt" had
little direct impact, but it did represent his determination not to
repeat the mistake of his predecessor Laake, who failed to challenge the
government in the period leading up to 9 April 1940.

In any event, the postwar government did respond decisively to the
Soviet threat, especially after the communist takeover in
Czechoslovakia. Although belated, the defense policy after 1948
displayed a sharp awareness of "lessons learned" from 1940, in four main
respects. First, the government and Storting granted the military a much larger budget than before. Although the service chiefs remained dissatisfied, they had far more to work with than had their predecessors in 1938-40. Second, the military's mission was now much clearer than on the eve of the last war. When the invasion began in 1940, no one was certain whether the government would go to war or simply accept the occupation after a formal protest. To rule out such fatal uncertainty in the future, the government in 1949 enacted a new set of regulations making it absolutely clear that whatever the circumstances, every Norwegian soldier, sailor, and airman, especially if he were an officer, must resist an invasion with every means at his disposal, even in the absence of specific orders. Third, the Army's new organization incorporated important safeguards against another surprise attack. For example, every important airfield received defenses against an airborne assault; armories and depots became more decentralized in order to avoid whole units being dislocated by the loss of a single installation; and the newly-created Home Guard (Heimevern) provided a network of local militia capable of rapid mobilization in a crisis. The fourth and perhaps most important aspect of "lessons learned" in the postwar Norwegian defense policy was the decision to join NATO in 1949. The formal commitment to a military alliance in peacetime represented a major departure from the traditional reliance on neutrality, and it also indicated the maturation of the Labor party's defense policy--a far cry from the muddled thinking in 1939.

* * *

The military history of modern Norway suggests a paradox in the national character. National pride, communal spirit, and commitment to popular sovereignty and independence have competed with anti-militarism and a general aversion to hierarchical authority in determining the nature and extent of support for military defense. The Norwegian spirit of egalitarianism has had immeasurable benefits, not the least of which are a strong democratic tradition and a broad distribution of prosperity among the population. When confronted with the Nazi threat, however,
the widespread distaste for military professionalism and authority in Norway jeopardized the survival of the state, and perhaps even the survival of democracy in Europe.

During the fifty years following Norway's successful bid for independence, the country faced two main threats to its security: German aggression and the rise of revolutionary Marxism. Once the Labor Party had abandoned its early radicalism in favor of evolutionary social democracy, the latter threat became more of an external one, in the form of Soviet Russia. Throughout the period in question, Norway's overall security policy consisted of two basic elements. The first, which played the leading role up to 1940 and again from 1944-47, was to promote international peace and stability, with neutrality as a fallback position in case of war. The second basic element, which came to the fore only as a result of the crises in 1940 and 1948, was to call upon the support and protection of Britain (or increasingly after 1948, the United States), whose own interests clearly dictated that Norway must not fall under the control of a hostile continental power.  

Despite the apparent dichotomy of these elements, the reliance on Britain as the ultimate guarantor of Norwegian security in fact extended back to 1905, or even, one might argue, to 1814, when the Norwegian patriots looked in vain for British endorsement of their independence. Peace or neutrality were Norway's first preference, but apart from the relatively minor fringe groups who looked to Moscow or Berlin, the nation's fundamental westward orientation never was in doubt.

What then was the significance of and relationship between 9 April 1940, and the decision to join NATO in 1949? Essentially, the German invasion proved that Norwegians could not take their security for granted as they had in the interwar period. Yet one must not oversimplify the connection between 1940 and Norway's Cold War policy after 1949. In the initial postwar period, despite the general consensus of public support for defense in principle, rehabilitation of the armed forces fell well below civilian reconstruction on the list of the government's priorities. The potential Soviet threat simply did not seem to warrant higher levels of military spending that would hamper economic recovery.
Following the communist coup in Prague in February 1948, however, the Labor Party demonstrated that it was determined not to repeat the mistakes that had led to 9 April 1940. With the deterioration of East-West relations and the onset of the Cold War, the Gerhardsen government realized that this policy was failing, and that it might lead to dangerous isolation. The Prague crisis, as well as the crisis over Berlin and Soviet demands on Finland, made an especially strong impression in Norway, which seemed to be the next item on Stalin's expansionist agenda. In response, Norway abandoned its lingering hopes for neutrality and committed itself to NATO in April 1949.11

Thus, the experience of 1940 did not lead directly to a fully articulated alliance policy after the war, but it conditioned Norway's response to the crisis of 1948.12 The decision to join NATO was merely the most obvious aspect of a more vigorous, hard-headed security policy. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and the attendant fear of a Soviet attack in Europe then led to the rapid development of functional Allied co-operation within NATO. The fiasco of 1940 provided irrefutable evidence that in order to function effectively in wartime, allied forces must co-ordinate their peacetime preparations.

Integration in matters such as war plans, command structures, communications, intelligence, equipment, training, and logistics all brought the Norwegian military into much closer contact with the Allies.

The defense budget tripled during the Korean conflict; and with the infusion of American material assistance, the armed forces by 1954 had regained a strength comparable to that during World War I. The experience of 1940 also informed special precautions against another "bolt from the blue" surprise attack. For example, armories were dispersed to the company level; new standing orders explicitly directed all leaders to consider themselves at war in case of invasion, even in the absence of specific orders to fight; and the heimeverv provided rapid-response local defense units to screen the main mobilization.

Fortunately, the Cold War never turned hot in Europe, and the new, improved Norwegian forces were never put to the test of combat. Even so, they served their purpose. By incorporating lessons learned from
the war, they gave substance to NATO's northern flank and helped to strengthen conventional deterrence in Europe.

Nevertheless, the problems Norway encountered in rebuilding its postwar defenses demonstrated the same fact that had emerged in 1936-40: a military buildup requires time as well as money. Had Stalin decided to occupy Norway ca. 1949-50, the Russians would have found the defenders still in a state of considerable disarray. Since then, defense has become a matter of broad consensus in Norway; but the recent collapse of the Soviet Union has prompted another round of major military reductions. Reasonable and inevitable as these may be, the West, no less than Norway itself, will do well to remember the hard-won experience of Norwegian defense.
NOTES TO CONCLUSION

1. Innstilling fra Undersøkelseskommissjonen av 1945 (Oslo: Aschehoug, 1946), 43.


6. In 1941, the volume of iron-ore flowing through Narvik averaged only nine percent of the pre-war quantity; and even in 1943 it reached only 27 percent. Christopher Buckley, Norway, the Commandos, Dieppe (London: HMSO, 1952), 152.


8. Cited in Blindheim, Nordmenn under Hitlers fane, 199.

9. These orders remain posted in every Norwegian barracks to this day. Kgl. res. 10. juni 1949: "Direktiver for militære befalingsmenn og militære sjefer ved væpnet angrep på Norge."


12. In this respect, Norway's case seems to support the conclusion of a forthcoming study of a more general historical issue. See Dan Reiter, Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars (Ithaca, New
York: Cornell University Press, 1996), which argues that specific formative events (such as catastrophic defeats), tend to inform subsequent national policies. This conclusion may appear obvious, yet as the present study illustrates, the actual nature of such causal relationships can be far more complex than they first appear.
APPENDIX A

Map of Norway

Norway
APPENDIX B

Social Origins of the Norwegian Army Officers, 1880-1960

Graduates of Krigsskole (percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lawyer</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clergy</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University professor</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doctor, dentist</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer, architect</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private clerical</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>21.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public schoolteacher</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tradesman</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unreported</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX C

Norwegian Governments, 1905-1955

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister</th>
<th>Years in Office</th>
<th>Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C. Michelsen</td>
<td>1905-07</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Løvland</td>
<td>1907-08</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Knudsen</td>
<td>1908-10</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W. Konow</td>
<td>1910-12</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Bratlie</td>
<td>1912-13</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Knudsen</td>
<td>1913-20</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ø. Halvorsen</td>
<td>1920-21</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ø. Blehr</td>
<td>1921-23</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ø. Halvorsen</td>
<td>1923</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Berge</td>
<td>1923-24</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Mowinckel</td>
<td>1924-26</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. Lykke</td>
<td>1926-28</td>
<td>Conservative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Hornsrud</td>
<td>1928</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Mowinckel</td>
<td>1928-31</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P. Kolstad</td>
<td>1931-32</td>
<td>Agrarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Hundseid</td>
<td>1932-33</td>
<td>Agrarian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Mowinckel</td>
<td>1933-35</td>
<td>Liberal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J. Nygaardsvold</td>
<td>1935-45</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Gerhardsen</td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>(all-party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E. Gerhardsen</td>
<td>1945-51</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ø. Torp</td>
<td>1951-55</td>
<td>Labor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX D

Representation of Political Parties in the Storting, 1918-45

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conservatives*</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberals</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrarians</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian People's Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Party</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist Party</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Including Frisinnede venstre, 1918-33.

APPENDIX E

Norwegian Army Strength, 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
<th>Field guns</th>
<th>Machine guns</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Division</td>
<td>14,419 + 8034</td>
<td>36 + 12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Division</td>
<td>15,508 + 7487</td>
<td>36 + 12</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Division</td>
<td>10,357 + 3353</td>
<td>20 + 6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Division</td>
<td>12,531 + 4423</td>
<td>20 + 6</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Division</td>
<td>15,458 + 5680</td>
<td>48 + 12</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Division</td>
<td>14,158 + 2421</td>
<td>8 + 0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fortresses</td>
<td>10,897 + 3870</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>93,328 + 32,268</td>
<td>168 + 48</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total combatants</td>
<td>128,596</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support / depots</td>
<td>30,181</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total strength</td>
<td>158,777</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Double figures indicate line + landvern.

Source: "Det norske hærs krigsstyrke". February 1917: RA. GS(II). kat. 1256.2/16, box 298.
APPENDIX F

Norwegian Defense Spending, 1918-1940

(Millions of kroner, including civil defense)

APPENDIX G

Candidates Admitted to *Krigskolen*, 1919-30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total 242</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: RA. KG(IV), kat. 1256.2/15, box 168.
## APPENDIX H

Alternative Plans for Norwegian Naval Construction, 1929

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of ships:</th>
<th>20 (millions of kroner)</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>10</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destroyers</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Torpedo-boats</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarines</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mine-layers</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTBs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### APPENDIX I

**Active-Duty Norwegian Army Officers: 1909-1933**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1927</th>
<th>1933</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major-General</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colonel</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lt.-Colonel</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>1,281</td>
<td>506</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign &amp; Sgt.</td>
<td>1,419</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>3,327</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>456</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Officers per Bn. 55 49 39

*Including unpaid reservists (vernepliktige).*

APPENDIX J

Social Origins of Norwegian B-class Officers, 1937

Occupations of fathers of candidates admitted to reserve officer training (befalskolene)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farmer</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laborer or craftsman</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>405</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The 405 candidates came from a pool of 1,004 applicants. Unfortunately, no figures are available for the backgrounds of the applicants who were rejected.

## APPENDIX K

Allocation of Emergency Funds for Norwegian Army, 1936-39 (not including normal operating budget)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>(thousands of kroner)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous goods &amp; supplies</td>
<td>7,505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft &amp; associated material</td>
<td>6,250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uniforms &amp; other textile goods</td>
<td>5,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of aircraft production</td>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA guns &amp; other air defense material</td>
<td>2,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Airfield construction, esp. in Finnmark</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supplies for defense of Finnmark</td>
<td>1,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trucks and wagons</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AA &amp; AT guns</td>
<td>555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction of barracks</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer training / staff exercises</td>
<td>480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas defense material</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical supplies</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optical instruments</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improvement of ammo production plant</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horses &amp; veterinary supplies</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine-guns</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications material</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for civilian rifle clubs</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

Total: 39,856

APPENDIX L

Disposition of Norwegian Anti-Aircraft Guns. Fall 1939

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>75mm M/32</th>
<th>75mm M/16</th>
<th>76mm L/28</th>
<th>40mm</th>
<th>20mm</th>
<th>MG lights</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kjeller</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horten</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raufoss</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kongsberg</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rjukan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herøya</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "Mobiliseringsoppgjøret for 1940", 15 September 1939. RA: GS(II), kat. 1256.2/16, box 208.
## APPENDIX M

### Landvern Companies Assigned to Coastal Fortresses, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battery or Fortress</th>
<th>Assigned Company</th>
<th>Assigned Mobilization</th>
<th>Time of Mobilization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outer Oslofjord</td>
<td>3Lv/IR.2 Oslo</td>
<td>noon. 2nd day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1Lv/IR.4</td>
<td>afternoon. 1st day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oscarsborg</td>
<td>3Lv/IR.3 Skien/Horten</td>
<td>evening. 1st day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1Lv/IR.6 Hönefoss/Oslo</td>
<td>afternoon. 3rd day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horten</td>
<td>2Lv/IR.5 Starum/Horten</td>
<td>afternoon. 2nd day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kristiansand</td>
<td>2Lv/IR.7 Gimlemoen</td>
<td>afternoon. 4th day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3Lv/</td>
<td>morning. 5th day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen</td>
<td>2Lv/IR.9 Bergen</td>
<td>noon. 4th day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3Lv/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agdenes</td>
<td>3Lv/IR.13 Selva</td>
<td>evening. 3rd day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4Lv/</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Agdenes was the fortress guarding Trondheim. All the companies listed belonged to the Landvern battalions of the regiments indicated, and were therefore among the least combat-ready elements of the army. According to the "partial, silent" mobilization order issued by the government on April 9, the "1st day" of mobilization was not until April 11.

Source: KA to 1.SD. 7 March 1939; KA to KG. 24 March 1936; KG to KA. 13 February 1936; RA: GS(III), kat. 1256.2/16, box 325.
APPENDIX N

Norwegian Army Ammunition Stocks, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ammo type</th>
<th>Est. 10-day Requirement</th>
<th>----as of 1 Feb. 40----</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.5-mm rifle</td>
<td>170,930,000</td>
<td>42,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.92-mm HMG</td>
<td>80,111,000</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.25-mm pistol</td>
<td>10,059,000</td>
<td>613,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5-mm pistol</td>
<td>4,024,000</td>
<td>1,960,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm gun &amp; how.</td>
<td>314,000</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>300,000</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm AA</td>
<td>200,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>150,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm AA</td>
<td>56,000</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm how.</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm gun</td>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Estimated requirements were based on the following expenditures per weapon per day: 40-100 per rifle, 2500 per automatic rifle, 25-56 per pistol, 1980-7920 per heavy machine gun, 200-400 per AA gun, 100 per mortar, 80-200 per gun or howitzer.

Source: Generalfeltøyemesteren to KG, "Anskaffelse av ammunisjon. 10 slagdagers behov", 1 February 1940, RA: GS(IV), kat. 1256.2/16, box 329.
APPENDIX 0

Norwegian Army Weapons, 1940

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.5-mm Krag-Jorgensen rifle / carbine</td>
<td>98,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.25-mm Colt automatic pistol</td>
<td>20,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5-mm Nagant revolver</td>
<td>10,406</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.5-mm Madsen automatic rifle</td>
<td>3,472</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.92-mm Colt heavy machine gun</td>
<td>1,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-mm AA gun</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81-mm mortar</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm mountain gun</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm mountain howitzer</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm field gun</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75-mm AA gun</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105-mm field gun</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120-mm field howitzer</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Hærens Våpentekniske korps to KG. 1 February 1940. RA: GS(IV). kat. 1256.2/16, box 329.
APPENDIX P

Norwegian Army Order of Battle for Full Mobilization. 1939-40

Army High Command (HOK) / communications detachment

1 army (armeeavdeling) command staff / communications company

1st District Command (Halden):
   1st Field Brigade / communications company
   Two infantry command (regimental) staffs
   Infantry Regiments 1, 2, and 3
   Dragoon Regiment 1
   Two 75-mm artillery battalions (tot. 5 btty.)

2nd District Command (Oslo):
   2nd Field Brigade / communications company
   Three infantry command (regimental) staffs
   Infantry Regiments 4, 5, and 6
   Royal Guard battalion
   Dragoon Regiment 2
   One motorized 120-mm artillery battalion (2 btty.)
   One motorized 105-mm artillery battalion (3 btty.)
   Two 75-mm artillery battalions (tot. 5 btty.)

3rd District Command (Kristiansand):
   3rd Field Brigade / communications company
   One infantry command (regimental) staff
   Infantry Regiments 7 and 8
   One bicycle / ski company
   One 75-mm mountain artillery battalion (2 btty.)

4th District Command (Bergen):
   4th Field Brigade / communications company
   One infantry command (regimental) staff
   Infantry Regiments 9 and 10
   One bicycle / ski company
   One 75-mm mountain artillery battalion (2 btty.)

5th District Command (Trondheim):
   5th Field Brigade / communications company
   One infantry command (regimental) staff
   Infantry Regiments 11, 12, and 13
   Dragoon Regiment 3
   Two 75-mm artillery battalions (2 btty. ea.)

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APPENDIX P (continued)

6th District Command (Harstad):
- 6th Field Brigade / communications company
- One infantry command (regimental) staff
- Infantry Regiments 14, 15, and 16
- Two separate infantry battalions: Alta and Varanger
- South Varanger Garrison Company (Kirkenes)
- One 75-mm mountain artillery battalion (2 btty.)

Army engineer assets:
- Six pioneer companies
  - Three landvern pioneer companies
  - Two motorized bridging companies

Anti-Aircraft Regiment (see table in Chapter 4)

Army aviation:
- One fighter squadron (Fornebu / Kjeller)
- One bomber squadron (Sola / Kjeller)
- Two reconnaissance / liaison squadrons
  (Kjeller, Værnes, Bardufoss)

Composition of an infantry regiment:
- Two line infantry battalions:
  - Headquarters
  - Three infantry companies (3 rifle platoons ea.)
  - One machine-gun company (incl. mortar section)
- One landvern infantry battalion:
  - (as line Bn., except 4 Plt./Co. instead of 3)

Composition of a dragoon regiment
- Headquarters
- Two mounted infantry squadrons (i.e., companies)
- One mounted machine-gun squadron
- Two cycle / ski companies
- One landvern bicycle / ski company
- One mortar platoon
- One motorized machine-gun squadron
  - (only a platoon in DR.3)

Note: Each infantry battalion consisted of a headquarters (14 men), a headquarters company (152 men), three rifle companies (181 men each), and a machine gun company (169 men, 9 machine guns).

APPENDIX Q

Leaflet issued by General Ruge, 16 April 1940

From Army Headquarters.

To everyone taking part in the defense: soldiers, telegraph, telephone, railroad, and highway personnel, and volunteer helpers of all kinds.

The war has lasted 8 days. We were taken by surprise, and things therefore looked rotten from the very beginning. But now we are beginning to get things in order, both at the battlefront and in the rear. For this, I thank you all. We have taken some hard knocks, and we must be prepared for more to come.

But we are not going to be fighting on our own any longer. England and France will intervene. English troops are already in the country.

Our mission is to hold things together until the help becomes effective, to organize ourselves and gather our strength.

But we shall accomplish this task just as we have managed so far, provided everyone continues to do his part, each in his own place.

Remember that the Germans don't have things easy either, split up as they are in isolated pockets all over the country, with limited communications only by air, and with all roads blocked by Norwegian troops.

Hold out and hold together, as until now. That's the way.

16/4-1940

Otto Ruge
Commanding General

Source: RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 60.
APPENDIX R

6th Division Order of Battle, ca. 7-8 May 1940
(exclusive of non-combatant elements)

Divisional headquarters (Fleischer: 102 men)

6th Brigade headquarters (Col. Løken: 161 men)
   I/IR.16 (ca. 800 men)
   II/IR.16 (ca. 800 men)
   I/IR.12 (764 men)
   Mountain Artillery Battery 7

7th Brigade headquarters (Col. Faye; minimal staff)
   II/IR.15 (ca. 800 men)
   Alta Battalion (797 men)
   One company of Lv./IR.16
   III. Mountain Artillery Bn., less 1 battery

Reorganizing at Finnsnes: I/IR.15 (640 men)

Hålogaland Engineer Battalion (378 men)

Hålogaland Aviation Detachment:
   187 men and ca. 6 Fokker aircraft at Bardufoss airfield

Setersmoen: Machine-Cannon Battery 6 (145 men; no guns?)

Alta garrison: training detachment of Alta Bn. (ca. 400 men)

Tromsø garrison: Lv./IR.16 (528 men), less 1 company

East Finnmark detachment:
   II/IR.14 (806 men)
   Varanger Battalion (1075 men)
   Varanger Garrison Company (198 men)
   Two motorized artillery batteries (140 men)

Hålogaland detachment:
   I/IR.14 (ca. 800 men)
   Lv./IR.14 (strength unknown)

APPENDIX S

Estimate of MILORG Capabilities, December 1944

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Weapons</th>
<th>Explosives</th>
<th>Training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S.E. Norway/Oslo</td>
<td>24,200</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S.W. Norway/Bergen</td>
<td>7400</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trondheim region</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>&quot;few&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Norway</td>
<td>850</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
<td>nil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>33,150</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: "F.O.IV. The Military Home Front: District Survey per 1 December 44"; RA: FO, kat. 1256.1/01, box 18.
APPENDIX T

Emergency Orders to the Norwegian Brigade in Germany, July 1950

Following a government decision on July 8, the Army High Command transmitted the following instructions to the commander of Norwegian forces in Germany on 11 July 1950:

According to the terms of the treaty now in effect with the British government concerning participation in the occupation of Germany, the [Norwegian] brigade is only to perform missions directly related to the occupation. In other words, the treaty gives neither the British nor anyone else the right to demand that the Norwegian brigade shall take part in the defense of the region of Germany where it is deployed, against external attack. It is necessary to maintain that fact as long as the treaty remains unaltered.

In the event that West Germany should come under armed attack from an outside power, the brigade commander is to seek specific instructions as soon as possible from Norwegian [political] authorities through the HOK [Army High Command].

If . . . circumstances prevent the brigade commander from receiving specific orders, he shall see to it that the entire brigade withdraws to the north side of the Kiel Canal and seek to prevent the attacker from crossing the Kiel Canal and [advancing] farther northward. This is both a regional and an independent Norwegian interest. If it becomes necessary, the brigade will conduct a fighting withdrawal northward into Denmark.

Source: HOK to TK. "Forholdsordre til brigaden i Tyskland". 11 July 1950; RA: FKA, kat. 1256.0/02, box 225.

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