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THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSENSUS DECISION MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY COMMITTEE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University by Audrey Lorraine Morrissette, B. A., M. A.

The Ohio State University
1996

Dissertation Committee:
Chadwick Alger
Donald Sylvan
Margaret Hermann

Approved by
Chadwick Alger
Adviser Dept. of Political Science
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1996
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VITA

March 8, 1964 ................ Born - Cleveland, Ohio

1988 .......................... B. A., San Diego State
University, San Diego, California

1991-1993 ........................ Graduate Teaching
Assistant, Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio

1993 .............................. M. A., Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio

1994-Present ........................ Graduate Teaching
Assistant, Ohio State
University, Columbus, Ohio

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FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

Statement of the Problem

The main objective of the United Nations is the maintenance of international peace and security. The Charter serves as the outline for the Organization's goals and objectives and a guide for the procedures developed for coordinating relations among members as well as formulating policy. It has been argued that there is a gap between what the Charter espouses and the Organization's ability to fulfill its objectives. This has prompted criticism regarding the effectiveness of the United Nations, particularly in the area of international peace and security. Exploring efforts to bridge this gap demonstrates that the effectiveness of the UN is reflected in its procedures, policies, and programs which have developed in practice. The United Nations is an organization which has transformed as its political context changed. Its flexibility and capacity to adjust in changing conditions, gives the UN the ability to take alternative action in the midst of decision stalemates.
The central goal of this research is to evaluate the UN's effectiveness by examining two developments in United Nations decision making which are examples of efforts undertaken in practice to improve the UN's performance in the area of international peace and security. The subjects of focus are the development of consensus decision making and the evolution of peacekeeping finance policy in the General Assembly's Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee.

With these two subjects as the focus, the following question is explored: What are the major determinants of the achievement of consensus, and what functions do they serve in the decision outcome? This research posits that there are factors in the negotiation process which have a decisive influence on the degree to which consensus can be reached.

Analysis of these two topics demonstrates how international organizations have performed in their tasks of developing and coordinating global policy. Efforts have been sought through changes in organizational structures, modes of operation, and procedures to garner the support of the members for addressing policy problems. With changing political contexts, approaches for addressing the problems have changed.

Evaluating the effectiveness of the UN in the area of international peace and security was achieved through an
evaluation of the transformation of the means it has utilized and the ends it has sought, either in formal constitutional agreements or in practice, to resolve peace and security problems.

Consensus Decision Making

Consensus decision making emerged from a history of international parliamentary processes in which multilateral agreements were sought to address global problems, such as preventing and ending wars. Its origins can be found in the decision making processes of the League of Nations, the first general purpose intergovernmental organization founded in 1920. The League's Assembly decisions were made by majority vote in the committees, but final approval on most issues required unanimity. However, if unanimity was not possible, "the resolution was changed to one expressing a wish or the sense of the Assembly, and then it could be treated as a procedural matter,"\(^1\) which required majority vote. If a member was not supportive of a resolution, an abstention could "sometimes be assured through bargaining and cooperation concerning the wording of resolutions for the purpose of removing or softening elements irritable to particular national sensibilities."\(^2\) It is from the use of these tactics that consensus decision making has its beginnings. Although, these tactics appear to circumvent the unanimity rule they actually demonstrate the purpose and utility of consensus decision making.
Because of the difficulty of reaching unanimous decisions, the process was often tedious and cumbersome. For instance, it prevented the organization from acting decisively in the case of Japan's invasion of Manchuria and Italy's invasion of Ethiopia. The United Nations, improving upon the procedures of the League, emphasized majority voting. United Nations Assembly decisions on substantive issues are made by two-thirds majority of the members present and voting, while procedural decisions are made by simple majority. According to Riggs and Plano, "consensus is the objective of Assembly politics." However, consensus was conceived as the level of agreement sufficient to pass a resolution. Currently, consensus refers to the adoption of a resolution without a vote.

After the post-WWII global structure emerged, Cold War rivalries developed, and decolonization dismantled the colonial empires, the membership of the United Nations increased, creating a majority of small states. This constituted an "automatic majority" in Assembly voting and challenged the strong minority of major financial contributors. This was a particular concern in the General Assembly where there is an equality rule, one country-one vote. Consensus decision making, meaning by no vote, has become the preferred mode because it allows for the inclusion of the interests of the majority and the
The protection of the interests of the strong minority in final decisions.

The emergence of consensus decision making in the General Assembly reflects a general trend occurring in the Organization as a whole. Miguel Marin-Bosch's study of voting in the General Assembly demonstrates that there was an increasing tendency towards consensus decisions. Table 1 demonstrates the figures revealing an increase in the number of resolutions adopted without a vote between 1975 and 1986. The table shows the ratio for the years, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985, and 1986, of the resolutions adopted by vote to those adopted without a vote. The ratio for 1993 was added to the Marin-Bosch figures to illustrate the substantial increase in resolutions adopted without a vote.

TABLE 1: The substantial increase in consensus decisions

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In addition, Riggs and Plano's discussion of UN decision making, citing the Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations, 1990, concludes that "in recent Assembly sessions, decisions by consensus have outnumbered decisions by majority vote." During the Forty-eighth Regular
Session, in 1993, eighty-one percent of the General Assembly resolutions and decisions were adopted without a vote.

Although total agreement is needed to adopt a resolution by consensus, it differs from unanimity. Consensus means that no formal objections have been made regarding a resolution. Unanimity means that every one has voted yes to adopt a resolution.

Consensus decision making has emerged, particularly in the General Assembly, because each member has an equal vote and there is no official mechanism to account for the disparities in the members' power and influence or the amounts contributed to the Organization's budget. This differs from the Security Council in which the five permanent members have the veto, and the financial institutions in the UN System which have weighted voting systems.

The special function of the General Assembly, through its Fifth Committee, to approve the budget reflects the separation of powers provided in the Charter for the Security Council and the General Assembly. The Security Council dominates in the areas of peace and security, having the power to take enforcement action. The General Assembly can make recommendations regarding the conflict if the Security Council has not taken the issue under consideration. However, in administrative and budgetary matters the General Assembly has primacy. The Assembly
interprets the implications of UN policies, and determines how UN activities and programs are financed. The UN regular biennial budget is prepared by the Secretariat and submitted for review by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), an expert reviewing committee, and the Fifth Committee. The ACABQ makes recommendations regarding cost justifications to the Fifth Committee for approval of the budget. Final approval of the budget is given in the General Assembly's plenary session.

Since 1986, consensus decisions have been the norm in the Fifth Committee budgetary process. Resolution 41/213, Annex II recommended that the Fifth Committee adopt a measure in which its recommendations on the outline of the program budget of the General Assembly would continue to make all possible efforts to establish "the broadest possible agreement." The major financial contributors were the proponents of the measures in Resolution 41/213, Annex II, stressing that the "use of consensus in establishing the framework of the United Nations budget" was essential for improving and reforming the Organization.

Consensus is the preferred method of arriving at decisions on the budget among the major contributors, because they are responsible for contributing the majority of the financial resources. Consensus provided an avenue for the major contributors to exert some influence in the absence of an official mechanism accounting for the
disparities in the members' financial capacities. Voting tended to produce majorities without the support of the members which had the power and influence to implement the decisions. Without the financial backing of the major contributors, the budget can not be properly financed. Consensus alleviates many of the implementation difficulties.

Critics of the use of consensus for arriving at decisions feel that it undermines the principles of the democratic structure envisioned in the Charter. One specific objection at the time of its adoption in the Fifth Committee came from the Bolivian delegation which expressed concern over the "trend in international forums to seek consensus or unanimity; it believed that democracy was based on the will of the majority, expressed by vote, while adoption by consensus, on the other hand, imposed criteria that masked the delegations' positions." In addition, critics believe that consensus decision making tends to produce vague resolutions and decisions which do not have a significant impact on the implementation of policy.

This analysis demonstrates that despite the criticism, the consensus measure has endured in the Fifth Committee to the extent that if a vote occurs, delegates view it as a failure to uphold the consensus norm for decisions regarding the budget. It is an important development to examine because it demonstrates how the United Nations decision
making has developed and transformed since it was founded. Inis Claude describes how the United Nations developed from the premise that "international order must be produced by deliberate contrivance and positive action," instead of the League's reliance upon "natural harmonies" among the WWI victors. How consensus decision making functions is a reflection of the tradition from which the UN emerged. Agreement regarding what is just and contributes to a lasting peace, must be achieved through extensive deliberation and cooperation.^^

The increased reliance on consensus decision making in the Fifth Committee represents an expansion of learning with regard to techniques for reaching agreement. For instance, one characteristic of the UN is the techniques it uses in practice to fulfill its objectives. The evolution of consensus decision making began with the tactics of parliamentary diplomacy used by decision makers to circumvent the unanimity rule in the League Assembly, then in the UN Assembly to foster a cohesive voting majority, and finally to reaching agreement by no vote. It demonstrates how norms of behavior and decision making processes have evolved in UN practice as result of the changing political context. Consensus is viewed as the most effective way of conducting the administrative and budgetary matters of the Organization. These are routine activities for which there
must be cohesion among the members to effectively and efficiently operate.

**Peacekeeping Finance Policy**

Peacekeeping is a development in United Nations practice which has its roots in the provisions outlined in the Charter to resolve conflicts between states. There are two chapters in the Charter which have given rise to peacekeeping. The first is Chapter VI which outlines provisions for the peaceful settlement of disputes. This involves several levels of third party diplomacy for ensuring that a settlement of a dispute can be achieved without the resort to force. Chapter VI recommends the use of a various array of diplomatic techniques: good offices, negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

The second is Chapter VII which outlines provisions for employing collective security measures, authorizing the Security Council to take military action to secure international peace and security. This occurs after the Security Council has determined that the conflict constitutes a breach of peace. Initially, Chapter VII gives guidelines for efforts to undertake before a collective security action is employed. After determined that a conflict is a breach of peace, the Security Council can decide to institute nonmilitary sanctions to secure compliance. If the nonmilitary actions prove inadequate,
the Security Council is authorized to initiate military measures.

The actual collective security measures begin with Article 43, which involves the UN's preparation for military action. It provides that countries make agreements regarding military force in advance. It also includes agreements on the numbers and types of forces to be utilized. The agreements must be negotiated and ratified in accordance with the states' respective constitutions. In accordance with Chapter VII agreements, air force contingents would be made available, and their plans would be determined by special agreements in advance. The plans for employing armed forces would be developed by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee. The Military Staff Committee would be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of armed forces placed under the disposal of the Security Council.

The significance of the collective security provisions is that they provide guidelines for a UN-mobilized force to repel the actions of an aggressor. In order for it to operate effectively there must be a consensus among the permanent members to take action, and the commitment to contribute forces under UN command for addressing the conflict. It was not intended to be used in conflicts in which any of the major powers were involved. The veto is a
check on the use of the collective security measures against a major power, because the founders believed that forces used against a major power would lead to a world war.

In sum, the application of Chapter VI and VII provisions led to the development of peacekeeping. Examining the use of diplomatic measures and the attempts to use collective security measures in addressing conflicts demonstrates how practical application of the provisions led to innovations in the strategies to control violence, making them more consistent with the conditions of the conflicts. These strategies were formulated in the spirit of the Charter provisions, leading to the establishment of relevant procedures for maintaining international peace and security. It is in the midst of the application of these two forms of conflict resolution measures that various peacekeeping efforts emerged, striking a balance between addressing the demands of controlling violence, the constraints of the preferences and interests of the member states, and upholding the principle of acting to maintain international peace and security.

Traditional peacekeeping emerged as a measure to supplement diplomatic activities for peaceful settlement once they were employed in a dispute. Because the mechanisms for implementing the enforcement measures provided for in Chapter seven were not operational, a vacuum developed between activities set forth to foster
peaceful settlement and the enforcement mechanisms for ensuring an enduring peace. The developments which have occurred in practice represent profound innovations which have extended UN options. For instance, the variations and combinations of Chapter VI and VII measures used to address conflicts have made it possible for the UN to be utilized in crises for which the actual provisions could not be applied.

Traditionally, peacekeeping was a measure utilized to freeze military action between two conflicting states. Small units of lightly armed soldiers, representing the UN, were placed in a neutral corridor between the disputants. The purpose of the units were to maintain order once a ceasefire was achieved. Their presence as a buffer was with the agreement of the disputing parties.

Traditional peacekeeping filled the vacuum in the conflict resolution process, operating as a measure to facilitate diplomatic activities. Raimo Varyrnen, in his article, "The UN in Conflict Resolution," discusses the purposes served by peacekeeping:

"Peacekeeping is feasible only when parties to the conflict and permanent Members of the Security Council prefer it to alternative courses of action...Peacekeeping operations have undisputed value in assuring collective security. They do not constitute, however, any solution to a dispute. Peacekeeping is, in the first place, a complement to the diplomatic activities by the Security Council, by the Secretary General, or by the parties themselves. The latter, of course, emphasized in the Charter (Article 33)."
From the beginning of its use in conflicts there were disputes among member states regarding the constitutionality of peacekeeping. In general, the controversy centered around whether Member states were obligated to support an activity not provided for in the Charter. These disputes arose in the consideration of early peacekeeping operations, the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Operations in the Congo, with the latter being particularly divisive. The General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding "the obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations in the matter of financing the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East." In 1962, the advisory opinion was decided upon the basis of the Charter provisions regarding "expenses of the Organization and the question of how these expenditures for the operations were to be apportioned." The Court ruled that the expenditures were expenses of the Organization, but that the "Assembly was not bound to apportion the peacekeeping expenses in the same way as they are apportioned for the regular budget of the United Nations, and that it might adopt whatever scale of assessment for these expenses that appeared just and fit under the circumstances."

The advisory opinion sparked conflict over whether the Court's advisory opinion would be upheld by the General Assembly, particularly the Fifth Committee. The Court's
opinion was upheld, yet opposition to it remained. Delegations, particularly the Soviet Union and France, questioned the legality of the Congo and UNEF operations on the basis that they violated Article 43 of the Charter and that the Charter only "authorized the Assembly to make recommendations to the Security Council and the Member states, but it did not empower the Assembly to take decisions on carrying out any action in the sphere of maintaining international peace and security." Therefore, the Court's opinion was not binding, because it bypassed the authority of the Security Council. In addition, there was opposition to the Court's opinion because there was a view that peacekeeping expenses did not fall within the scope of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter and did not represent the collective responsibility, and therefore members had no obligation to contribute to the operations. The principle parties, particularly colonial powers were viewed as responsible for the financing.

Given the controversial nature of the questions considered, the conflict over peacekeeping's constitutionality had a profound impact on the financial situation of the United Nations which was already in the midst of a financial crisis caused by the non-payment of arrears by Member states. Although the advisory opinion was accepted, it was not legally binding. The recommendations made by the General Assembly did not impose a legal
obligation on Member states which had not voted for them even if the required majority was obtained.

A Working Group was formed in 1962 to study special methods for financing peacekeeping operations and developing a special scale of assessments. A report was submitted during mid-1963, prompting the convening of a special session to consider the issues regarding the report. These issues and the arrears in contributions to peacekeeping funds remained items for review and approval in subsequent sessions. This led to the establishment of a special peacekeeping scale of assessment in 1973.

The General Assembly adopted a resolution (GA Resolution 3101 (XXVII)) for the financing of UNEF II in 1973 which became the model for all subsequent operations except the Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan which is financed under the regular budget. This resolution provided for the establishment of a special account, outside the regular budget to finance peacekeeping operations. The scale for determining peacekeeping assessments had four categories in to which the member states were divided. The category assignments were intended to reflect the Members varying capacities to contribute to the peacekeeping expenses: Group A, the five permanent members, pay a higher percentage, roughly 20-22 percent more for peacekeeping costs than if peacekeeping was assessed through the regular budget scale; Group B refers to economically developed
Members that are not permanent members of the Security Council, which are assessed at the same rate as for the regular budget; Group C refers to economically less developed states, assessed at one-fifth of regular budget assessment rate; and Group D refers to the poorest states, assessed at one-tenth of the regular budget assessment.\textsuperscript{17}

During the mid to late 1980s the United Nations experienced another financial crisis. This occurred mainly from the Member states' non-payment of their regular budget assessments, and unilateral cuts in assessments by the United States. Some Member states, including the United States, withheld their assessments because they did not support specific UN programs which "prejudiced the budgetary process and also the readiness of some Member states to rely on the United Nations for positive regional and global change."\textsuperscript{18} According to the Report of the Secretary General in 1986, the financial crisis resulted from eighteen member states withholding their assessments from the regular budget. As of December 31, 1985, the estimated deficit totalled $390.7 million: for peacekeeping $274.4 million, and under the regular budget, $116.3 million.\textsuperscript{19}

As a result of the financial difficulties related to regular budget and peacekeeping expenditures, cost-cutting and efficiency-building measures were proposed to curtail the crisis and address the political concerns of the member states.
The present financial crisis the Organization is experiencing also stems from the members' non-payment of their assessments but in a different context than in the past. The crisis has been exacerbated by the increasing demand for peacekeeping operations. During the period of 1987-94 the scope and size of peacekeeping operations have expanded, adding new financial liabilities. Despite the transformation of the scope and size of peacekeeping operations the approach for approving the individual peacekeeping budgets has remained ad hoc. In addition, commitments from member states for financing peacekeeping operations have not been forthcoming.

The problems of the "rising quantity and growing complexity of tasks in the areas of peacekeeping and conflict resolution will become worse if Member states do not promptly provide the resources needed for those expanded responsibilities." This has presented a particularly difficult challenge for the Organization in financing its activities. For the first time the budgets for peacekeeping operations have exceeded that of the regular budget by almost double.

According to many observers, the Organization has been able to operate despite the financial crises. However, the recent challenges exceed the Organization's ability to function: "It frequently has been argued that the UN has managed over the decades to muddle through its financing.
However, the growth in the number of operations taken on in recent years has made it more likely that a financial disaster could occur through overstretching the UN...unless, members of the Organization address themselves to the problems of financing these activities, a major tragedy affecting the credibility of the UN beckons."[21

Importance of the Topic

Evaluating peacekeeping finance policy in the context of consensus decision making demonstrates efforts to secure broad support for decisions on finance policy. Decisions on finance policy are important because Assembly decisions reached regarding finance have the force of law. They are not just recommendations, but the actual policies of the Organization. Therefore, they are not recommendations directed at altering the behavior of member states, but decisions with which members are obligated to comply.

Analyzing the development of peacekeeping finance policy in relation to consensus decision making demonstrates the United Nations' performance in the areas of peace and security.

This research is also important because it addresses concerns of international organization and international relations theorists regarding the development of testable theories of international organizations. It analyzes the processes and contexts which determine how decisions are reached, and ultimately how policy is formulated and
implemented. One major consideration in this examination is demonstrating how a particular issue becomes defined as a policy problem. Other considerations are how this definition, in light of the decision makers' interpretation of the Organization's objectives, guides the strategies pursued to address the problem and how this influences how the problem is eventually resolved. For instance, analysis of decision making processes regarding peacekeeping finance reveals how the United Nations grapples with its financial crisis and the difficulties with financing the regular and peacekeeping budgets.

Extant studies have not emphasized the decision making processes, focusing instead upon the outcomes. As a result, what is lacking currently are explanations for the factors which facilitate and inhibit agreement on policy intended to address a problem. In this particular case, the research is trying to determine what factors facilitate and inhibit the negotiation of consensus on peacekeeping finance. A survey of the various changes in the procedures and the objectives sought regarding the policy, can demonstrate the changes in how the problem has been defined. These changes reflect developments in the strategies and goals that are essential for effectively formulating new policies.

Ernst Haas, in his work, *When Knowledge is Power*, describes the main characteristics of international organizations, and how they address global problems. The
main objective of the organization is to solve a problem. Essential in the organization's consideration of a problem is defining what it is, what are the available means for addressing it, and what are the most effective strategies for fostering agreement among the decision makers regarding policy.

Developments in consensus decision making and peacekeeping policy, demonstrates Haas' propositions regarding international organizations. The formulation of peacekeeping finance policy is the result of the strategies and activities employed by decision makers to fully address the objectives of the Organization in its coordination of peacekeeping activities. As the conception of the problem alters among decision makers, new practices and strategies develop to address rising demands. The way in which the Organization has operated in this area, as in all areas, has been transformed as the global political environment has changed.

Determining how well the activities and programs correspond with the provisions in the Charter should be the basis for judging the UN's performance and successes in fulfilling the objectives of the Charter. Progress towards the goals occurs with the expansion of the interpretations of the provisions and their application in practice. The developments in practice demonstrate the UN's efforts to adapt its institutional structures and procedures and the
expansion of programs to increase its administrative efficiency and effectiveness. The work, United Nations, Divided Worlds, discusses the significance of flexibility and adaptability to the UN's ability to fulfill Charter objectives and maintain its relevance in a changing political context: "...adaptation and change in organizational structures, in procedures, and in practices is an organic process. It involves responding pragmatically, with elements of precedent and common law, to problems for which old frameworks or approaches are inadequate."  

The consensus which develops among the decision makers determines the measures which the UN can undertake in implementing its policies. The achievement of consensus regarding the financing of peacekeeping is a central issue because the UN's ability to achieve its objectives depends upon the efficiency of planning and the strength of the agreement among decision makers regarding the allocation of available financial resources.

The significance of peacekeeping has grown as it has been utilized in different conflicts, making a "coherent contribution towards securing peace in the spirit of the Charter." The key element in the evolution of peacekeeping is that, although it is not provided for in the Charter, it has developed into one of the Organization's primary activities.
Scope of the Research

A combination of documentary analysis, observation, and interviews was used to analyze the negotiation process in the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly regular session of 1993 and the factors which are most important in negotiating a consensus on peacekeeping finance. In general, I hypothesize that there are nine factors which have a decisive influence on the degree to which consensus can be achieved. These factors have the potential to either facilitate or inhibit consensus. Each of the factors, either in conjunction or interactively with the other factors, determine the level of agreement on the decision. Analysis of the factors is essential for determining the degree—that is strength or weakness—of consensus and the implications of the decisions for the implementation of peacekeeping finance policy.

The research is limited to one decision arena—the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. This arena was chosen for several reasons. First, a previous study was conducted in this committee in 1963, and it serves as the basis for the current research. Chadwick Alger's study, "Negotiating a Consensus of Peacekeeping Finance: the United Nations Special General Assembly Session of 1963," in Johann Kaufmann's work, Effective Negotiation, documents and compares the public and private negotiating activities in this committee. The study identifies nine factors which
facilitate consensus. The current research builds upon the findings of the Alger study, and explores the debate surrounding the utility of consensus decision making for General Assembly decisions on peacekeeping finance.

The current examination provides data for a comparative analysis of the development of consensus decision making and the development of peacekeeping policy in the Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee. Comparing Fifth Committee decision making in two cases thirty years apart offers insight on changes in how the nine factors affect the decision outcomes. In addition to the analysis of the factors, the effects of the organizational structure is examined.

**Contributions of the Research**

The central aspect of this research is its examination of problem resolution through analyzing the impact of the negotiation process and its context on the formulation and implementation of policy decisions. This task is achieved through analysis of the nine factors present in the negotiation process which contribute to consensus. Martin Rochester believes that this approach is central to expanding the knowledge base of the field of international organizations. He believes that conceiving of international organizations as a set of instruments for making and implementing international public policy facilitates the expansion of knowledge about the dynamics of international
institution building, permitting a more expansive vision of world order among scholars and practitioners.\textsuperscript{25}

The current research expands research on international organizations by surveying the development of consensus decision making and analyzing the factors which are "supportive of consensus processes."\textsuperscript{26} Further inquiry in this area offers insight on the policies which are produced from international organization's consideration of global problems.

Analyzing the major determinants of consensus and the function they serve in the decision outcome contributes to the expansion of knowledge regarding the formulation and implementation of global policy. This research accomplishes this through first hand observation of how these factors function in the negotiation process. The first hand observation is analyzed in conjunction with an examination of the implications of the decision outcomes. This is essential in determining whether a decision is the "true expression of common interest among states having the will and ability to do whatever its implementation requires or an expression of a purely "parliamentary win"."\textsuperscript{27}

Comparative analysis is conducted to demonstrate the factors' relevant importance to the achievement of consensus in the context of the Fifth Committee. The analysis demonstrates the reliability of the list of factors identified in the 1963 Alger study despite changes in the UN
structure, negotiation and deliberation procedures, and the global environment.

Theorists suggest that an organizational approach—one focusing on decision processes and institutional structures—to the analysis of international organizations provides a sound framework for theory development and empirical research. Kratochwil and Ruggie further state that a viable theory of international organization provides relevant proposals for formal organizations to implement in their policy. They believe that the study of formal organizations may reinvigorate the practice of formal organizations.28

Finally, the research increases the transparency of the decision process for scholars of international organizations and the organizational structure of the United Nations. Ernst Haas suggests that analysis of the dynamics of decision making and policy in international organization adds conceptual clarity to a theory of international organizations, and addresses the concerns of cognitive psychologists regarding misperceptions and bias in decision making processes. Increased transparency of the decision process can diminish, if not eliminate "some of the error and misperceptions stemming from systematic bias."29 In addition, transparency serves as a corrective for the types of distorted perceptions and interpretations which can occur
in a decision making unit. This is a key consideration in analyzing how a problem is approached and resolved.

Transparency fosters further inquiry regarding the processes, structures, and actors which produce policy. The Alger study on negotiating a consensus, suggests that further study on factors in the negotiation process would, ultimately, foster a deeper understanding of the United Nations' success in creating policy which fulfills its objectives, as well as the interests of its Member states.

Overview of Dissertation

Chapters

Chapter two is a discussion of the hypotheses developed regarding the variables which are most prominent in the negotiation or decision process. It discusses how these variables explain variation in consensus. The discussion includes the application of the propositions from the literature and an evaluation of their contribution to the understanding and explication of the variables. An analytic model is provided to graphically demonstrate the relationship of the variables to consensus and to each other.

Chapter three describes how the data were collected, outlining the research strategy utilized to investigate the problem. This discussion includes the explication of the methods, techniques, and sources employed in the investigation of the topic. Documentary analysis,
observation, and interviews were used to record the account of the activities and conditions which led to the achievement of consensus. A complete discussion of the effectiveness of these methods and techniques in researching the topic is given, as well as an explanation of their limitations and implications for discussing the topic.

Chapter four provides a comparative overview of the negotiation of a consensus on peacekeeping finance, pairing the narrative on the 1963 session with the narrative on the 1993 session. Comparisons are offered regarding the agendas, procedures, agenda item consideration, and outcomes, with emphasis on the 1993 case.

Chapter five reviews the patterns and trends and notes the relationships between the variables reported in the 1993 case. In addition, variation in the variables and outcomes are explained and demonstrated.

Chapter six is the comparative analysis of the results in the 1963 and 1993 cases involving consensus on peacekeeping finance. The results are interpreted and judgments are made regarding what the patterns reveal about consensus.

Chapter seven is a discussion of the conclusions drawn regarding the main subjects of the research and an evaluation of the relevance of the hypotheses to the results. The chapter concludes the dissertation with the
discussion of new information and outlines suggestions for future research.

Endnotes


27. Riggs and Plano, 1994, 84.


Overview

Two main objectives guide the presentation of the hypotheses: describing the dependent and independent variables and explaining their relationships. Consensus is the dependent variable, and the conditions under which consensus is achieved are the independent variables. Consensus is defined in terms of degrees, and the variables which are hypothesized to be strongly related to, or predictive of, the degrees of consensus are described. Discussion of the variables concludes with a description of the relationships which are hypothesized to exist between the variables.

Defining consensus in terms of degrees is useful in that it allows the short-term and long-term implications of the final decision to be identified. The short-term implications of consensus in committee are the collective support of the member states for a decision and their collective approval of the policy formulated as a result. The long-term implications are the actions taken as a result of the policy and the compliance of the member states with
the policy. Evaluating the extent to which implementation and compliance correspond with the policy formulated, demonstrate the significance of the activities and conditions which produced the policy. The decision outcome should reflect consensual knowledge, representing consensus at a given time among interested actors (consensus norm). This consensual knowledge serves as a guide to public policy designed to achieve some social goal.¹

Evaluation of the development of consensus, particularly the degree of consensus reached in committee, demonstrates how peacekeeping finance is defined by decision makers, as reflected in the negotiation process, and how this influences the decision outcome. How the Organization ultimately resolves the problem of peacekeeping finance hinges on the decision makers' collective definition. Evidence reveals that decision by consensus is an emerging practice in the United Nations'; reflecting changes in how decision makers define peacekeeping finance, and how they formulate policy. In other words, the new developments in peacekeeping finance policy are a result of changes in the means utilized and the goals sought in resolving the difficulties with peacekeeping finance.

These changes reflect the evolution of the Organization, particularly its ability to adjust and adapt through the expansion of services and activities. This ability is essential for meeting the growing needs and
Ernst Haas' discussion, in *When Knowledge is Power*, regarding the ability of organizations to evolve gives insight on how changes in the definition of a problem and the means utilized to resolve the problem occur:

My speculations concern the future of international organizations, but my assumptions force me to consider the future as a function of the history of collaboration as that history is experienced in the minds of collective actors: national and international bureaucracies. That history is the way "the problem to be solved" was seen at various times by the actors. What this book seeks to explain, then, is the change in the definition of the problem to be solved by a given organization. . .The task...is to explain the change in problem definition to make clear whether or how the implicit theories held by actors changed. ^

The variables identified for the evaluation of consensus are significant because they demonstrate the degree of consensus negotiated at particular times regarding peacekeeping finance and the development of a consensus norm between the 1963 Special Session of the General Assembly and the 1993 Regular Session.

The nine variables identified in the Alger study as facilitators in the development of consensus, ^ are the bases for nine hypotheses which attempt to demonstrate how consensus develops. These hypotheses explain how the effects described above, cumulatively determine the different degrees of consensus. An additional hypothesis
describes the negotiation framework and procedures in which consensus develops and how the variables relate.

In total, ten hypotheses were developed to categorize and explain how these variables function in the Fifth Committee's deliberations and their contribution to the negotiation of a consensus (Figure 1). The discussion of variables begins with a description of the negotiation framework and procedures under which the Fifth Committee operates (Hypothesis 1). To fully explicate the roles of the other variables, different categories of variables were identified and explained.

First there were variables which represented the context for negotiating a consensus. The context refers to the circumstances in which consensus occurs. Three variables represented the context: the degree of difference in state policies (Hypothesis 2); the development of subgroups (Hypothesis 3); and the networks of individuals (Hypothesis 4). Second, there were variables which represented the activities undertaken to initiate and facilitate negotiation of a consensus. Activities refer to the actions taken in negotiating a consensus. Three variables reflected these activities: the relationship between activity in public and private settings (Hypothesis 5); leadership and planning (Hypothesis 6); and international roles (Hypothesis 7). Third, there were variables which represented the motives underlying the
efforts to negotiate a consensus. Motives refer to the impulses that prompt action. Two variables reflected the motives: desire for consensus (Hypothesis 8) and overlapping interests (Hypothesis 9). Fourth, there was a variable which represented the characteristics of the participants in negotiation: individual characteristic and capabilities (Hypothesis 10).

Negotiation Framework and Procedures (Hypothesis 1)

Categories of Variables

Context
  Degree of difference in state policies (Hypothesis 2)
  Development of subgroups (Hypothesis 3)
  Networks of individuals (Hypothesis 4)

Activities
  Relationship between activity in public and private settings (Hypothesis 5)
  Leadership and planning (Hypothesis 6)
  International Roles (Hypothesis 7)

Motives
  Desire for a consensus (Hypothesis 8)
  Overlapping interests (Hypothesis 9)

Characteristics of participants
  Individual characteristics and capabilities (Hypothesis 10)

Figure 1: Variables which contribute to consensus

Dependent Variable

Consensus refers to the process of negotiation among decision makers in which a dominant view develops, sometimes from a series of conflicting views or positions. In the Fifth Committee, consensus refers to decisions reached
without voting. Traditionally, it referred to efforts in which sufficient agreement is obtained to pass a resolution by voting.4

There are two points to consider in the analysis of consensus. First, it is important to understand the process employed in attaining consensus. Second, it is important to demonstrate the quality of the outcome. The process employed in attaining consensus is of particular interest. However, fully explaining the process is central in demonstrating the quality of the outcome.

Consensus decision making developed as an alternative to majority voting which tended to polarize members instead of foster agreement. In addition, voting tends to solidify opposing positions and cuts off the negotiation process. Consensus keeps the negotiation process moving, allowing agreement to develop as decision makers bargain and negotiate.

Consensus is defined in terms of degrees, meaning the different levels of agreement possible in a final decision. The degrees of consensus can be demonstrated on a continuum, each reflecting the level of support for the decision and the existence or absence of dissent as demonstrated in Figure 2.
Extensive: unanimous support for the final decision; no objections

Strong: support from the major financial contributors and other developed countries; support beyond the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority; no formal objections

Moderate: at least the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority in support; summation of convergence; abstentions

Weak: minimum level of support; general, broad-based agreement; large number of explanations of position

None: consensus norm not upheld; formal objections; dissent led to a vote

Figure 2: Classification of the degrees of consensus

Extensive consensus is reflected in the decision which has unanimous support from all member states and that there were no objections to the final decision. Strong consensus refers to wide support for the final decision. This would have to include the support of the major financial contributors and other developed countries, reflecting support beyond the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority. There may be concerns or reservations noted by some member states. However, there would be no formal objections. Moderate consensus refers to support from at least the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority of the members. Summation of the convergence that exists is the basis for the final decisions. There would be a number of abstentions. Weak consensus refers to the minimum level of support for the final decision, reflecting general,
broad-based agreement among the member states. The only dissent would be reflected in a large number of explanations of position. Consensus is not achieved if the consensus norm under which the Fifth Committee operates is not upheld. Formal objections would be noted in the record, and the dissent would lead to a vote.

The decisions reached in the Fifth Committee tend to concentrate in the middle categories, either strong, moderate, or weak consensus. Extensive or no consensus are rare occurrences. There are three main ways in which consensus can be reached. It is important to understand these different processes to highlight the differences between consensus and the rare instances of unanimity and voting.

Riggs and Plano describe three main ways consensus can be represented or reflected in a decision. First, there is consensus by acclamation in which "the presiding officer simply announces his or her understanding that the measure commands general support and is hence to be considered adopted by consensus. This expedites the decision procedure when there is genuine consensus on an agreed text." If there was not a consensus on an agreed text, the decision makers would forego a final decision by conducting informal consultations to negotiate and foster agreement. This allows a genuine consensus to develop for which significant action can be taken.
The second way consensus can be reached is through the presiding officer's summation of the convergence of views regarding the issue. This is useful when there is general agreement among the decision makers regarding the action to be taken, but there are difficulties drafting a text which clearly represents the range of views. This in essence, avoids the disagreements over specific concerns or details. Everyone agrees to support the presiding officer's summation of the core issues to be addressed so that action can be taken, so that specific concerns and details can be addressed later.

The third way in which consensus can be reached is through the adoption of a consensus text, meaning that the decision makers are willing to support a particular text without a vote, despite the existence of substantial disagreement. "This permits a decision, without forcing a defeated minority to make its opposition or abstention part of the permanent public record, although some members may still choose to express their objections or reservations to the adopted text." If strong opposition or abstention are part of the permanent public record this may forestall further negotiation in that decision makers will feel obligated to uphold the positions they have taken publicly.

In light of the different manners in which consensus can be reached, the major challenge is to foster a consensus which reflects the maximum agreement on an issue, producing
significant action. The degree of consensus that is reached regarding an issue is particularly important in the context of the United Nations. The Organization can not accomplish much without the agreement of the majority of the members, particularly the major contributors. Riggs and Plano point out that "the United Nations can serve as a catalytic agent for mobilizing force for UN objectives when enough members are willing to cooperate." To fully understand consensus in this context it is important to note that in an international bureaucracy, the main task is to preserve the current mandate of the organization. However, this task is subject to preferences and relative strengths of members and their conflicting national aspirations and interests.

It is important that the conflicting interests are addressed and resolved, producing a decision or policy which can be effectively implemented. The trend towards decision by consensus was intended to produce decisions which are reflective of the size and composition of the decision majority. These decisions "confer the legitimacy of majority approval" of actions taken by the Organization. Sometimes although there is ambiguity in the language of texts, consensus avoids conflicts which specificity generates. Consensus develops after agreement is sought on general issues and as specific concerns are considered and negotiated.
The process of negotiation to overcome conflicting views produces a decision reflecting convergence on the action taken by the Organization. In the context of the Fifth Committee and peacekeeping finance, decisions are technical in the sense of the methods of how peacekeeping is funded, but political in the sense of members compliance in their support of the budgets that are drafted for financing peacekeeping. Conflicts do not arise over whether an operation should be deployed. The mandate is established by the Security Council. Politicized debate emerges over the degree to which the members are willing to commit funds for financing peacekeeping. This depends upon the degree of consensus reached regarding the budget estimates and their political will in support of a particular peacekeeping operation. In addition, even on technical issues, political considerations are evident. The degree of consensus reached regarding technical concerns will determine the criteria for determining the funds appropriated for peacekeeping. It is essential for the Fifth Committee to reach consensus regarding the budgets in order to adopt measures as policy. Political conflicts arise when national interests are at stake. Once the technical concerns are resolved they become practice (policy). Once political concerns are resolved, compliance is easier to secure.

Riggs and Plano demonstrate how these considerations affect compliance: "As one moves away from purely technical
activities to the more political subjects debated by the General Assembly and other UN organs, the degree of customary obedience declines markedly. States have not yet developed habits of indiscriminate compliance with General Assembly recommendations. The difference with regards to the Fifth Committee, decisions once decided upon become policy, they are not recommendations of state behavior. However, the members still may decide not to pay their assessment to the budget. It is more likely that there will be more substantial support in contributions if a substantial degree of consensus is achieved.
Independent Variables

Negotiation Framework and Procedures:  Hypothesis 1

If there is a negotiation framework and procedures under which deliberation can be manipulated or designed to facilitate collaboration on the issue, then decision makers are more likely to reach consensus.

In this analysis the negotiation framework and procedures under which the Fifth Committee operates refer to the consensus procedure which guides deliberation on issues. This is important to achieving consensus because the conditions can be manipulated to make the setting conducive for fostering agreement. The degree of consensus that is ultimately reached is determined by the manner in which the variables interact within the negotiation framework. Within this framework the norms and customary practice which facilitate consensus are fostered.

The multilateral nature of the decision making in this context "provides opportunities for the mutual approval of each other's policies, helping to stifle any political objections at home." Decision making in this context lessens the influence of the "narrow interest of the members states, or coalitions."

Multilateral decision making is designed to facilitate collaborative decisions, specifically, consensus. Ernst Haas' discussion of organizational design demonstrates how organizational structures may be manipulated to foster
political consensus. In this discussion he describes the important aspects of organization structures which are essential for a "better designed organization". He listed administrative arrangements, personnel practices, hierarchies and coordination patterns. He further states that there is a sequence requisite for the improved use of consensual knowledge. How this relates to the previous discussion of the importance of organizational structure to consensus is that there must be the sequence of these components in the negotiating setting for the achievement of consensus to be possible.

Organizational behavior literature offers understanding regarding the impact of the organizational structure on reaching a consensus. Cyert and March's work on decision making in complex organizations has found that deliberation is less conflictual despite the existence of disparate individual and subunits goals. One reason given is that decision makers are buffered from potentially competing goals by departmentalization and division of labor. In essence, problems tend to be addressed one at a time, and in different places rather than all at once and in the same place.16

John Ruggie in his edited work, Multilateralism Matters, describes how multilateral organizations function and the role of their structures in resolving problems: The multilateral organizations that did exist functioned
exclusively in the domain of coordination problems, where the task at hand was to devise mutually acceptable rules of the road and to change them as technology and other such factors changed."¹⁹ This supports the argument that organization structure is relevant to the achievement of consensus in that it fosters customary practices, relationships, and behavior patterns among decision makers to facilitate consensus.

Ness and Brechin's discussion of the technological links among various components in the organizational structure demonstrates how the structure translates and transmits the varying objectives into a single objective: "In short, technology links the organization with its environment creating a conduit through which influence, power, and materials pass. Relationships also exist between technology and another organization element—structure."²⁰

The negotiation framework and procedures of the Fifth Committee foster a culture of consensus. There is an assumption that consensus will be sought. The discourse in the committee socializes and educates delegates regarding consensus. For instance, the newly independent members from Eastern Europe and the countries from the former Soviet Union forced a vote on the scale of assessments during the 47th Session of the General Assembly. The new members had not been fully socialized into the consensus norm of the Fifth Committee.
Degree of Difference in the Policies of Participating States: Hypothesis 2

If there is a small degree of difference in the policies of the participating states after negotiation has been undertaken and at the time of final decision, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

The degree of difference in the policies of participating states is important to explaining variation in consensus in that the policies of the states are the bases for guiding the efforts of the decision makers which represent them. The policies will have some influence on whether the member will comply with the decision outcome, but the decision makers negotiate to get the best decision for the members possible within the constraints of the consensus. Divergence in the national policies of the members affects the decision maker's ability to bargain and negotiate. If the divergence in policies is substantial it the decision makers remain focused on national interests instead of seeking agreement to secure their interests through collaboration and compromise. The focus on narrow national interests is what the negotiation process attempts to overcome. If the policies differ in their approach to the issue, and decision makers polarize around these policies during negotiation, stalemates emerge. Without this convergence on issues there would be no willingness to uphold the consensus until there is proper consideration of
specific concerns. If convergence develops, then support for the final decision will increase. Specific concerns would be reflected in the "explanations of position".

The degree of difference in the policies of participating states may explain variation in consensus in that it determines the extent to which efforts would be pursued to foster agreement. This divergence prevents the varying perspectives from being incorporated into the overall decision making framework of the committee. Being translated into the collaborative objectives of the entire membership allows a common pursuit. National interests are yielded to pursue the objective of a single policy. A greater degree of difference does not allow decision makers to pursue specific interests because they do not believe interests are served by compromising specific interests to join the consensus.

Lawrence Finkelstein's discussion of comparative politics in the UN System demonstrates how the difference in national policies are overcome to reach a decision. Examination of this transformation into a single collaborative policy is important in determining the extent to which a consensus can be achieved.
The aspiration to make rules about the issue thus legitimately on the agenda inescapably involves effort to allocate values among the actors involved in the issues, especially the states...that often results in issues moving from the decentralized, unit veto end toward the centralized, majority end of the spectrum...Values can be, indeed they are, allocated by international organizations in "traditional" ways, with the consent of the relevant actors and without being imposed on them. International organizations in this sense are instruments of diplomacy that serve to clarify issues, facilitate exchange of knowledge about what is at stake, develop common understandings, and encourage agreement. The authority of the allocative decisions is the politics of sovereign consent. It may be expressed in voting or decisions by consensus."

Large differences in state policies can hinder the ability to reach consensus. The transformation of these policies into convergent views facilitates consensus. For example, once the views converge, the proposals from the Secretary General and the ACABQ recommendations can be approved as the final decision. When strong differences persist, then the ACABQ is the only guide or channel for accommodating conflicting views.

Development of Subgroups: Hypothesis 3

If subgroups develop which consolidate scattered and heterogeneous interests into a few key issues, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

The development of subgroups is important because in large bodies like the General Assembly committee, there are usually many scattered and heterogeneous interests. Subgroups provide channels for narrowing these varying interests down to a few key issues. There are two main
types of subgroups that emerge in the negotiation process. First, there are groups which occur as regional and ideological configurations around an issue. They form as a result of consolidating the scattered and varying interests of members. Second, the process of developing financial interest groups has grown and accelerated as the United Nations' membership has increased. The purpose of these subgroups are that they shift the focus of negotiation from conflicting or unrelated views to collective responsibility for resolving a problem.

This variable shapes the parameters in which decision makers communicate and test strategies. Decision makers are assured that the individual interests they represent will be considered and protected by the subgroups. This can lead to consensus because decision makers are more likely to agree to support decisions and proposals that they believe represent or are sensitive to their regional, ideological, and financial interests.

Riggs and Plano's discussion of groups in the United Nations' political process demonstrates the role of subgroups or caucusing groups and their significance to the development of consensus:
For nearly all members, the groups provide additional channels of communication and a forum for harmonizing views. Caucusing is an important means of building consensus at the group level, in some instances eliminating the need for an extensive series of bilateral negotiations. If the formulation of group positions add rigidity to UN decision making, that rigidity is mitigated by the gradual trend towards consensus decision making in UN meetings generally. As a further benefit, the caucus system saves time in meetings by permitting speaking assignments to be filled by one or a few from a group in place of the many who might otherwise speak.43

Consensus at the group level tends to support the development of consensus overall because critical interests are identified and incorporated into the decisions.

There are also working groups or committees which are assigned the task of addressing conflicting interests and conducting further negotiations. Working groups usually focus on specific problems which hinder further negotiation on the issue. They are different in that they usually consist of decision makers who have specific concerns about a problem. Their activities are conducted to hash out conflicting issues and determine what the interested parties will support. Decision makers who do not agree with the proposed policy have an opportunity to voice opposition and contribute to the revision of the proposal or the drafting of a new proposal. Proposals drafted by the working groups are supposed to develop an approach which summarizes the views of the members and is acceptable to all.44 These groups contribute to the development of consensus in that they provide another channel for decision makers opposed to
a particular proposal to have input in drafting the decision and the assurance that their concerns are reflected in the final decision.

There are also a small group of decision makers incumbent to the committee, which are informed regarding deliberations in the committee and its institutional history. They are usually very trusted and admired for their expertise in committee issues. They are helpful in that they are useful conduits for fostering compliance among other members. However, they can present a challenge to Secretariat proposals, as well as the expert review of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) which makes recommendations to Fifth Committee regarding the approval of the budget. Because they are respected by the other decision makers, they can often influence their support for a proposal. As the other decision makers identify this small group's position they may be persuaded in the direction of its support.

One example of the influence of the development of subgroups is the issue of the scales of assessment. The two main types of groups are regional and informal. The groups which developed on their own, such as the Rio Group and CANZ (Canada, Australia, New Zealand) strengthens the individual positions. These groups evolved over the years around more specific considerations and a diversity of issues not reflected in the larger regional groups.
The effect of the subgroups on consensus depends upon the makeup of the group and the issue that is being considered. The subgroups give members more of a scope from which to promote and convey their ideas. Cyert and March's concept of the dominant coalition supports this contention, and demonstrates the effects on the achievement of consensus:

Many goals, often conflicting, exist within a single organization. Further, not every individual or group can establish goals alone; rather, goals are negotiated. Coalitions form among individuals and groups within the organization. Negotiation occurs within and between such coalitions. The process of coalition building shapes the course of action to be followed by that organization...Consequently, changes in organizational goals will reflect changes in the organization's dominant coalition. This demonstrates how subgroups influence the decision outcome.

Networks of Individuals: Hypothesis 4

If networks develop among key individuals, then participants are more likely to reach a consensus.

Networks are a key element in the institutional environment of an international organization. Along with rules and belief systems, there are frameworks which develop among key individuals which could foster convergence of views on an issue. These networks are strategic vehicles that provide contacts that allows individuals to exercise leverage across groups. The networks reflect the interdependency of individual interests and capacities. The
networks form as a result of their active role in developing and implementing policy. According to Marvin Soroos, the networks of "active participants in the policy process usually form a much more closely knit community among themselves as they come into regular and frequent contact with one another." By virtue of their previous interactions, the networks provide a vehicle for decision makers to act in their own capacity, as opposed to the roles defined by the organization, i.e. chairman of a committee.

Networks of individuals may explain variation in consensus, in that the interaction across various levels of groups increases the relations among decision makers around common issues and provides a basis for negotiating agreement. The extent to which the decision makers depend upon the networks for information and bargaining determine the degree to which they influence consensus. The more network contacts decision makers have, or the more expansive their interactions across various levels of the organization are, determines the importance of the networks to achieving consensus.

Although most of the literature on networks focuses on organizational networks, it stresses that individuals interact in the networks. This interaction occurs within "a greater or less detailed framework of role demands, role expectations, role conflicts, and resultant role stress."
The interaction occurring in the networks reflects the relationships between the individuals which use the networks. The networks are shaped by the contacts that develop as a result of this interaction. The networks which form in organizations "emerge out of the interdependence of the participating units. Interdependence is understood in terms of the game-theoretical notion of "strategic interdependence": the ability of each participating actor to gain his ends is dependent on the behavior of other participating actors."\(^{30}\)

The notion of the network organizational strategy also supports the arguments surrounding the importance of networks. The Yearbook of World Problems and Human Potential, states that this approach "facilitates, catalyzes (rather than organizes) the emergence, growth, development, adaptation, and galvanization of organizational networks in response to problem networks."\(^{31}\) In addition, it contends that networks, as with any strategy, need to be coordinated:

"The challenge is to find the right means of facilitating whatever auto-coordination is possible, recognizing that to the extent that the degree of coordination is considered inadequate by one part of the network, it will attempt to elaborate tighter forms of coordination whatever the views of the other (possible alienated) parts for which a different approach may be successful (It is interesting to note that some of the more recently created United Nations structures place great emphasis on the the notion of networks and de-emphasize central organization, the United Nations University, the UN Environmental Programme's information service, the UNESCO/ICSU UNISIST system)."\(^{32}\)
Among decision makers in international organizations, coordination is directed towards achieving consensus on a single position. Judge and Scott focus on network analysis in the study of international organizations. Scott discusses network theory in the context of "informal organization", stressing that "informal networks will increase in importance as instruments for coordination and coalescence." Informal networks are valuable in negotiation, because they allow delegates to use personal contacts to facilitate agreement.

Networks perform important roles in the formulation and implementation of policy. Their importance should be taken into account in evaluating and funding organizations, and efforts should be made to increase the effectiveness with which such roles can be performed.

Although, these theorists are referring to interorganizational networks, their arguments are relevant in demonstrating networks within organizations, by individuals across committees or groups within committees.

The familiarity among the delegates is key for establishing a strong network for negotiating issues and reaching agreements. In short, unofficial or personal relationships facilitate negotiation and ultimately, agreement. One example of the importance of networks is the contacts between the delegates from Cameroon and Iran during the 47th session of the General Assembly. The delegate from
Cameroon had a problem with the methodology of the scheme of limits regarding the apportionment of the assessments of the budget. Although there was a consensus that a change was needed, Cameroon's financial responsibility would double.

By discussing the issue outside formal negotiation, the delegate found that Iran had the same problem. Two out of the entire membership could not get agreement in open forum to make changes or stop the implementation of the scheme of limits. However, meeting with delegates personally regarding their concerns, the two delegates were able to persuade other delegates to compromise. On the basis of personal contacts these two delegates were able to negotiate a more reasonable scale. In negotiation the relationships that have been established over time tend to be more persuasive in fostering agreement.

Leadership and Planning: Hypothesis 5

If there is strong leadership in support of an issue and a high level of participation in planning activities, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Activities undertaken before the actual negotiations begin have some impact on how the deliberations take shape as the session progresses. Preliminary negotiations and planning activities in the preparatory stage of the negotiations are essential for determining the initial positions of the decision makers as well as the critical and divisive issues which have to be negotiated. In addition,
these activities involve planning strategies to address unresolved issues carried over from previous sessions, and they influence whether issues are chosen for the agenda.

The leadership aspect of these activities refers to the positions are taken by the major financial contributors on a particular issue or package of issues. These contributors are key in that they influence many of the positions taken by the other members. It is particularly important to know what position the major contributors have taken regarding a proposal or resolution. Reaching a consensus can be hindered, if the major contributors can not take a leadership role in support of a proposal or resolution. If a leadership role is taken by the major contributors, they can direct how negotiations are undertaken. For instance, with the support of the major contributors guaranteed, consensus can be sought on general topics, and the specific concerns can be negotiated as the session progresses.

After surveying these positions, effective plans can be presented to the entire membership for initial reactions and concerns. Conflicting interests have to be resolved before an actual consensus can be reached. Without the leadership it would be difficult to reach a substantial degree of consensus, because it would not have the legitimacy, or reflect the political will, necessary to implement an effective policy. The leadership from the major
contributors also influences to the Secretariat's administrative plans for negotiations, driving the preparation for negotiations. For instance, ad hoc caucusing committees usually form at this stage, researching the background of the critical issues, reviewing information on new developments, and devising strategies.

Leadership and planning "gets the political process moving early enough so that necessary preliminaries have been concluded before decision day comes in the public arena." These are helpful in highlighting areas of convergence and divergence as well as identifying allies and opponents among the decision makers. It provides an opportunity to summarize positions and concerns regarding previous decisions and increases the awareness regarding the various interests that have to be addressed and resolved to cultivate agreement on a single position and secure compliance from the members.

With regard to peacekeeping finance policy, leadership and planning are essential for reaching a substantial consensus. This is needed for providing financial resources for peacekeeping operations. Most of the problems which presently exist are results of the lack of the administrative capacity to coordinate the deployment of peacekeeping missions. If there is no leadership in support of the proposals for funding peacekeeping, the members will not have confidence in the policies and will not comply.
In addition, the importance of planning activities to the achievement of a consensus on peacekeeping finance policy is underscored by efforts undertaken to provide information to decision makers and provide expert review of budget proposals. The more efficiently and effectively the Secretariat can produce viable proposals, the more the decision makers will be willing to comply with the policies.

Leroy Bennett addresses the issue of the importance of leadership to the progress of negotiation and to reaching a consensus. According to Bennett, leadership is shared by Secretariat personnel and governments of members states,\textsuperscript{37} and that the support of the United Nations in important tasks depends upon the members confidence in its competence to perform those tasks.\textsuperscript{38}

Peter Wilenski's discussion of the importance of the Secretariat's independent analyses regarding policies demonstrates the leadership potential of the Secretariat. Imaginative solutions, possibly equally acceptable to all, might emerge from these analyses. However, they are often left unconsidered and unrealized because there is a tendency to suppress or challenge independent analyses.\textsuperscript{39}

Bennett's and Wilenski's arguments support the contention that leadership and planning are important to reaching a consensus because if there is no support for proposals for the budget among major contributors and the planning for deliberations on the proposals is not
efficient, then a significant consensus regarding a policy may not develop.

Examples of how this variable affects the achievement of consensus are the budget decisions regarding the United Nations Operation in Somalia. It is an example of how the lack of sufficient leadership and planning hindered the achievement of consensus. A sufficient leadership failed to develop because there were concerns regarding the proposals for financing the peacekeeping operation. The poor quality of the proposal submitted to the Fifth Committee prompted challenges from the delegates. Haggling over the poorly drafted proposal and budget estimates reflected poor planning in their submission for approval.

Another example is the attempt to get the decision makers to reach a decision on a unified peacekeeping budget. It was placed on the Fifth Committee's meeting schedule late in December, 1993, and there had not been much deliberation. Without sufficient justification of the amounts estimated for the unified budget, the delegates rejected it, cutting the amount requested by almost two-thirds. Preliminary and on-going negotiation would have revealed positions on the unified budget proposal. Attempts to force a final decision without the proper preliminary negotiation led to its rejection.

In addition, difficulties and concerns regarding the budget estimates for the operations in Somalia and Bosnia
also demonstrate how leadership and planning can affect the achievement of consensus. There was a lot of difficulty in assembling troops for these operations, because there were concerns among the members that they would not be reimbursed for their troop contributions. Overall, the trend among the major financial contributors was to reduce their contribution for financing the budgets, reflecting that there was no true commitment to support the operations. Therefore, those responsible for less of the budget had no incentive for committing.

Emergence of International Roles: Hypothesis 6

If there is an emergence of international roles in which key individuals from various groups take on leadership responsibilities as representatives of key regional or ideological interests as opposed to their own national interests, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

International roles refer to elected or appointed positions over regional groups, committees, or working groups. Key individuals who are elected or appointed to the positions take on leadership roles to coordinate negotiations and deliberations. Their purpose is to represent the views of the collective membership and the United Nations. They orientate decision makers in the political process, mediate conflicting views, and promote group objectives. The responsibility of these international
roles is to reflect the key interests and issues which emerge in the negotiation process that are essential to reaching a decision, not any specific national interests that these individuals might have.

Consensus is more likely to develop with the emergence of a variety of international roles because the key issues and interests reflected in the subgroups are further consolidated under the tutelage of the individuals presiding over the groups. The consolidation of issues and interests depoliticizes the relations between factions. Group configurations form around collective support for a position or policy.

The emergence of a variety of international roles may explain variation in consensus in that these leadership roles foster cohesion among the decision makers within groups, and agreement across groups. As representatives of the international community they drive "negotiations as negotiators, chairs of negotiation sessions, regional groups, and committees." How this occurs varies as the groups collaborate with other subgroups. It is an effort to get an umbrella group to accept a position and negotiate with other groups to foster support. Consensus is facilitated by the tendency of groups to logroll and swap votes. The politics of the groups are characterized by trade-offs. For instance, decision makers link issues
across groups by asking one decision maker to agree on one issue with the promise of yielding on another issue.

Riggs and Plano's discussion supports the argument that efforts to coordinate negotiations on policy objectives can significantly affect the decision outcome: "The coordination of policy initiatives and UN voting has been the frequent product of consultation with considerable effect on voting outcomes." 41

In Lawrence Finkelstein's edited work, Politics of the United Nations System, theorists support the contention that individuals in international roles can effect the extent to which consensus can be reached: "In the complex setting of UNCLOS III, the role of individuals serving as chairmen was especially critical in producing the draft texts that became the object of further negotiations to narrow remaining differences and produce agreement. John Fobes has called attention to the role of executive heads as catalysts of consensus." 42

One example of how this variable is important to the achievement of consensus was the chair of the informal consultations regarding the scales of assessment. The scale of assessments is an issue which raises concerns and highlights the conflicting interests of the members. During the 47th Regular Session of the General Assembly there were long consultations on the scale of assessments. The consultation were chaired in the 47th Session and the 48th
Session by the ambassador of Barbados. As an experienced Fifth Committee member, he commanded the respect and confidence of everyone. The ambassador of Barbados has had a long tenure in the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. He won the confidence of those attending consultations. His impartiality was demonstrated in his coordination of the consultations. Negotiations were conducted with the intent of reaching a decision that everyone would accept.

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings: Hypothesis 7

Decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus in a setting providing public debate and private negotiation.

The relationship between the activity in public and private settings is important to achieving consensus on an issue because these two elements shape the context in which consensus eventually develops. The activity in the public setting is formal or general debate in which decision makers present their statements of formal policy and register opposition to proposals or decisions with which they disagree. The public debate represents the political backdrop from which consensus develops. Public debate allows issues to be raised and incorporated into the formal record to set the agenda for negotiations. Overall, the public debate maintains a record of changing positions. The
activity in the private setting is the informal consultations and negotiations which provide the opportunity to resolve conflictual issues. The private negotiation allows for confidentiality regarding specific concerns and the compromises reached in achieving consensus. In sum, it is the need for decision makers to debate agenda items publicly that keeps the private negotiations moving. Once the various positions and views have been comprehensively and publicly stated, there has to be some negotiation privately to foster convergence of the issues.

The relationship between activity in public and private settings might explain variation in consensus because they operate in conjunction, fostering agreement among the decision makers. The public debate provides a forum for decision makers to adhere to the instructions of their national governments. The private negotiations allows the decision makers more freedom to negotiate and bargain and more flexibility in making compromises. Because they have the opportunity to negotiate in private, many positions do not have to be aggressively publicized, keeping lines of communication open.

It is important to examine the relationship between activity in public and private settings particularly for negotiation on peacekeeping finance because there are very divisive issues involved in resolving this issue, in addition to technical issues which also have to be resolved
before consensus can be sought. Although examination of the activity in the public setting has been extensive, the significance of the activity in the private setting has not been emphasized in most analyses of international organizations. Raimo Vayrynen's examination of the role of the United Nations in conflict resolution concludes that many "quantitative studies regarding the UN and conflict resolution underestimate the importance of informal and non-public methods of negotiation." These efforts are undertaken to address the concerns of decision makers whose divergent views and interests forestall the achievement of consensus.

The ways in which activities in the private setting lead to the achievement of consensus is through a more extensive consideration of key issues. Ness and Brechin refer to these activities as "an elaborate ritual of conference diplomacy". The activities include the ritual of conferences, establishing agendas, coopting member state representatives (that is, buying votes), developing technical data for specific organizational purposes, and generating consensual resolutions. These functions legitimize the demands or interests of IGOs as they search for external resources. For instance, the support for the budget proposal to fund peacekeeping is significant if a significant degree of consensus has developed.
The relationship between the activity in public and private settings link the two main components of the consensus context. The public setting activities involve the formal presentation of the agenda items. The private setting activities involve informal consultations and informal/informal consultations to negotiate agreements. An example of its importance is the second phase of negotiations on the restructuring of the United Nations. With this issue, financial translation is key. It is relevant to peacekeeping finance in that it affects the overall financial situation of the organization. It is difficult, almost impossible, to effectively negotiate substantive, particularly technical issues with the entire membership. Some items can only be taken care of by small groups away from the public arena. The recess from the formal meetings undergirds the general debate, facilitating decisions on difficult issues.

Desire for Consensus: Hypothesis 8

If the extent to which there is a desire for consensus increases as negotiation progresses to the final decision, then the decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

The desire for consensus refers to the sentiments among the decision makers regarding the extent to which they demonstrate their desire for a consensus to be reached. On face value, this desire is assumed to be reflected in the
public statements made in general debate and positions taken in negotiations. In addition, if the decision makers appear willing to collaborate and compromise key concerns in an effort to reach a decision then this may reflect a desire for consensus. On face value it can also be assumed that the desire for consensus is reflected in the resolutions because they were passed by consensus. Also, the fact that they are engaging in the process of negotiation to address a problem it can be assumed that there is a desire for consensus. However, a deeper consideration of these assumptions raises two concerns regarding the demonstration of the desire of consensus. First, it is difficult to demonstrate the sentiments of the delegates. Second, many of the activities observed in the public arena and also the documents, hide the conflictual political concerns.

Fritz Gaenslen's discussion of how decision makers view their interests in relation to the existence of different viewpoints demonstrates how the extent to which there is a desire for consensus influences the degree of consensus that develops regarding the final decision. According to Gaenslen, theorists identify two different orientations of how decision makers conceive different viewpoints. One is that they view their different viewpoints in the context of mutual problems which should be resolved by collaborative efforts. The other is an orientation viewing disagreements as "zero-sum". His discussion cites Rubin and Brown's
research in which these orientations were induced in an experiment. This is accomplished by employing a "wide variety of bargaining games (with a wide variety of pay-off structures) geared to create certain norms. The experiment showed that where the experimenter created cooperative norms, participants were much more likely to aim for consensual outcomes than where experimenters created competitive norms." This supports the argument that the desire for consensus depends upon how the decision makers view the benefits of their interests in joining the consensus and their willingness to join the consensus is induced through negotiation.

Although it is difficult to capture the sentiments of the delegates regarding consensus, the desire for consensus can be demonstrated through the efforts undertaken to pursue consensus. An assessment of the delegates' commitment to a position or proposal can reflect their willingness to bargain and compromise. The consensus procedure in the Fifth Committee was instituted for approving budgets. The extent to which the delegates pursue the consensus norm is a professional challenge to which the delegates rise to optimize their governments' interests. Therefore, there is a willingness to yield to the consensus norm to the extent that their interests are considered in the negotiation of the consensus and the extent to which the consensus reflects their interests. For instance, if a decision is reached by
consensus, and there are many "explanations of position" listing concerns and reservations regarding the decision, then this demonstrates that there was a willingness to join the consensus in loyalty to the consensus norm, but not necessarily strong support for the decision.

One instance in which the desire for a consensus had an impact on whether consensus was achieved was the consideration of the scale during the Forty-seventh Regular General Assembly Session. The governments of the Ukraine and Belarus did not accept the scale assessment assigned to them. They had been assigned the scale of new members. They contended that their assessment should be based upon the scale calculated in 1945. Member states that were former Soviet republics were assigned assessments calculated on the basis of the USSR's scale. However, they did not feel that they should bear the burden of the difference between the USSR's scale and the Russian Federation scale which was lower. Division persisted, leading to a vote. This demonstrates that the countries opposing the scale assignment were not willing to bargain or compromise their positions to uphold the consensus norm.

Overlapping Interests: Hypothesis 9

If there is a significant amount of overlapping interests, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.
Overlapping interests refer to concerns among the decision makers which are linked by the common objectives pursued in the negotiation process. The efforts of the decision makers to reach agreement are based upon their desire to promote the interests as defined by policies of their states, and their interests in maintaining a persuasive leverage among their colleagues in the negotiation process. Gaenslen's discussion of the impact of "non-normative concerns or interests" demonstrates that decision makers may not only seek consensus because they ought to, but, in some instances, because they have to. Due to the linkage of the interests, decision makers may have to pursue consensus as the most effective way to fulfill their specific interests, both national and individual. The linkage does not necessarily refer to common interests, but to interests reflecting concerns on other issues which are linked as a means of negotiating unrelated issues.

Overlapping interests contribute to the development of consensus in that they foster an interdependent relationship among decision makers in which more benefits are perceived from joining the consensus. The studies of Robert Axelrod and Kenneth Oye regarding the evolution of cooperation consider the significance of interests and their role in decision outcomes: "Decision makers are likely to seek unanimous decisions to the extent that they expect future
dealings with one another and the extent that their mutual interdependence is characterized by interests that are sufficiently divergent so as to make a unilateral decision attractive and sufficiently convergent so as to make the gains of mutual cooperation exceed the gains of mutual exploitation.⁴⁸

Overlapping interests varies with delegations and issues. Decision makers often use some issues strategically in the promotion of interests. Interests may not necessarily be overlapping. However, often a decision is linked on an understanding that support will be given on another issue. Overlap on number of issues prompts decision makers to negotiate the issues as a package, providing an opportunity for trade-offs. Often delegates will not take a firm position on an issue if it is not possible to get support on another.

Overlapping interests are the basis of negotiation. Consensus is facilitated because sometimes overlapping interests narrow individual goals and objectives. The configurations of coalitions change because overlapping interests change with the consideration of different issues. For example, Brazil and Colombia may have specific concerns regarding two separate issues. Colombia may oppose the proposal to finance peacekeeping budgets under the regular budget. Brazil may give support to Colombia in part because the delegates believe that they can get support on another
issue. The other issue may be the length of the statistical base period (used to determined the members' capacity to pay). Brazil prefers a shorter statistical base period because the economic growth calculations reflect a lower capacity to pay than if the statistical base period was longer. Brazil's support of Colombia on the funding of peacekeeping operations under the regular budget was given with the belief that Colombia would reciprocate with support for Brazil's position on the length of the statistical base period.

Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities: Hypothesis 10

The more these important individual characteristics and capabilities are utilized in the negotiation process, then the decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus. Effective negotiators must possess these characteristics in order to achieve a consensus on an issue. These attributes are essential for negotiating a consensus: "commitment to the issue, knowledge of the issue, persistence in the face of slow progress and disappointment, capacity for hard work, and creative ideas to get around roadblocks."49 These characteristics or attributes are necessary among the decision makers to achieve a significant consensus. Consensus literature describes these characteristics as social psychological conditions which facilitate consensus. The explanations regarding the social
psychological conditions provide criteria for analyzing the negotiation process.

These conditions determine how the decision maker processes information in the effort to reach a consensus. The deliberative style adopted in the negotiation process is demonstrated through the collection of characteristics. Hastie, Penrod, and Pennington's work, *Inside the Jury*, identifies and discusses contrasting deliberative styles and how they affect decision outcomes. The analysis of jury behavior concludes that consensus-seeking groups tend to be evidence driven (data-driven), while majority-seeking groups have a verdict-driven (solution-driven) style. Consensus-seeking groups are data-driven in that the collection and exchange of information fosters agreement through this resource. The contact engendered by the importance of information sources fosters commitment from the decision makers. Agreement is reached as a result of efforts to build consensus.

Examination of the deliberative style supports the propositions that the adequate supply of individual characteristics and capabilities facilitate consensus. If it can be concluded that the decision makers will take an incrementalist approach, as found with consensus-seeking groups, as opposed to pursuing an immediate binding decision, then the more these characteristics are present in
the negotiation process, it is more likely that consensus will develop.

Ness and Brechin also allude to the importance of individual characteristics and capabilities in their discussion of the concept of organizational technology. This discussion demonstrates that these characteristics and capabilities influence the achievement of consensus: "Generally, the concept of organizational technology is broadly defined. It includes not only the machines and other hardware organizations use to achieve their ends, but also the skill, knowledge, training of employees; the approaches, strategies, and procedures utilized; and even the characteristics of the objects (inputs and outputs) on which the work is performed."\textsuperscript{50}

The existence of these characteristics among the key negotiators may explain variation in consensus in that they provide the measures for overcoming the difficulties with reaching a consensus, such as prolonged debate, extensive coverage of issues, and stalemates. Consistent and committed decision makers will continue to negotiate despite these difficulties, allowing a wider range of views, concerns, and interests to be considered.

There are two key elements involved with representing a country which influence the achievement of consensus, the governmental instructions guiding the efforts of the individual and the personality of the individual. For
example, some delegates had one instruction from their government. How specifically or broadly they represent the government's policies depends upon their individual personalities and decision making styles. Pursuing consensus can be a difficult and prolonged process. Delegates are committed to their government's position, but they must interpret and represent this position within the constraints of negotiation and compromise. The individual characteristics and capabilities must be present for meaningful negotiation to take place and consensus to develop.
Conclusion

Ten variables affecting consensus have been analyzed. This is important because decisions that can be effectively implemented have provisions for significant action. The explanations in the 1963 study regarding the relationships between the variables demonstrate their value in explaining variation in consensus. We have further illuminated the ten propositions by drawing on a wide array of literature.

The following analytic model for demonstrates the hypothesized relationships among the variables which facilitate consensus. It consists of three major parts, the political process, the decision makers' orientations and styles, and the decision outcomes (Figure 3), representing the major components of the consensus process (See Figure 1).

Political process
Context

Decision makers' orientations and styles

Activities ← Motives ← Characteristics of participants

Decision outcome
Consensus

Figure 3: Relationships of the variables
The political process make up the setting or circumstances in which decision making takes place, the negotiation context, and the actions taken by the decision makers. The decision makers' orientations and styles include the individual characteristics and capabilities that the decision makers possess and their motives regarding the issue. The decision outcome in this instance is the degree of consensus reached.

All of the variables contribute to consensus. However, the effects of each are different. There are some variables which have direct effects on consensus. While others have indirect effects on consensus. For instance, according to the model the activities undertaken by the decision makers in negotiation, the activity in public and private settings, leadership and planning and international roles have direct effects or immediate effects on the decision outcome. The negotiation context, the degree of difference in state policies, the development of subgroups, and the networks of individuals have indirect effects on the decision outcome. However, the negotiation context has a direct effect on the activities undertaken by the decision makers to reach a final decision. The decision makers' orientations and styles, individual characteristics, and motives which are the desire for a consensus and overlapping interests have indirect effects on the decision outcomes with the motives directly affecting the activities of the decision makers.
concurrently with the negotiation context, and individual characteristics and capabilities indirectly affecting the activities of decision makers and directly affecting their motives.

Although all of the variables are independent variables contributing to consensus, their relationship to each other affects their relationships to consensus. First, the activities of the decision makers and motives of the decision makers are intervening variables, meaning that they occur in between the other variables, affecting the direct relationship of consensus with the other variables. For instance, the activities intervene between the negotiation context and consensus. Motives intervene between individual characteristics and activities. The negotiation context and individual characteristics can be categorized as antecedent variables in that they are occurrences before the motives have an effect on the activities, and the negotiation context is the occurrence before the effect of the activities undertaken have an effect on the decision outcome.

Endnotes


4. There is a distinction between how consensus is viewed in the two studies examined. The 1963 Special Session study refers to the consensus reflected in the final vote. Whereas, the 1993 Regular Session study refers to the consensus which is reached without a vote. The consensus procedure has operated in the Fifth Committee since 1986. It was decided that all decisions on the budget must be reached by consensus.

5. The phrase "the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority" is used as a measure for comparison to demonstrate the range of support needed for passing a resolution which is substantive. If there was a vote, then a two-thirds majority would be needed for a resolution to become a viable policy. Although consensus is reached by no vote, this level of support is needed for a substantive policy. Decisions or policies with less than the equivalent of a two-thirds majority tend to be less substantive, i.e., resolutions making appeals for further review of an issue. The categories for the degrees of consensus developed for this study are a modification of the measurement of consensus found in Ernst Haas, "Regime Decay: Conflict Management and International Organizations, 1945-1981," International Organization 37 (2) (1983): 189-256. The categories in the present study are more consistent with the consensus that develops in the Fifth Committee.


7. Riggs and Plano, 57.

8. Riggs and Plano, 57.

9. Riggs and Plano, 70.


12. Riggs and Plano, 71.


17. Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power, 195.


23. Riggs and Plano, 83-84.


30. Jonsson, 42.


32. Yearbook of World Problems, 1122.
33. Jonsson, 40.


38. Bennett, 430.


41. Riggs and Plano, 79.

42. Finkelstein, 475.


45. Ness and Brechin, 252.


47. Gaenslen, 8.


50. Ness and Brechin, 256.
CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

Overview

The methodology consists of two main objectives: data collection and data analysis. This discussion covers the stages of each objective, outlining the tasks undertaken for collecting and analyzing the data. First, an overview was given regarding the research strategy guiding the field research at the United States. The discussion of the data collection follows. The data were collected by the use of three research methods: documentary research, observation, and interviews. The documents provided a record of the Fifth Committee's consideration of key issues. Observation was essential for a first-hand account of the public deliberations. The interviews provided a record of the impressions, attitudes, and perceptions of the decision makers regarding the importance of the variables chosen for analysis. A case study database was compiled to review the array of data that were collected.

The discussion of the data analysis outlines the methods of analysis applied to the data and the stages of the evaluation. The Alexander L. George method of
"structured, focused comparison" was used to analyze the data. The analysis involved the application of a theoretical framework to compare the 1963 Special General Assembly Session and the 1993 Forty-eighth Regular General Assembly Session. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the study.
Research Strategy

The research strategy employed to achieve the task of data collection was based heavily on the study conducted to analyze the negotiation of consensus on peacekeeping finance in 1963,¹ and a subsequent work regarding field research at the United Nations.² However, changes were made after research in the field began. Initially, the strategy was to observe the sessions of the Fifth Committee for the three-month period corresponding with the Forty-eighth Regular General Assembly Session (October, 1993 through December, 1993). During this time, my intent was to collect documents, observe meetings, and conduct interviews. However, I found that delegates, because of the number of meetings they had to attend, and because the issue upon which the research focused had not been discussed, were not available for interviews, nor felt it was helpful to comment on the topic at that time.

The following discussion is a brief description of the development of the research strategy and my initial experiences and observations in the field.

I arrived in New York City on October 1, 1993, approximately two weeks after the 48th Session of the General Assembly began. Initially, I had one interview scheduled for October 4, 1993. The first interview was with a former United States Ambassador. Afterwards, I obtained interviews from a former mediator for the Congo peacekeeping
mission and a delegate from the United States permanent mission. These interviews provided background information regarding the structure and deliberations of the Fifth Committee as well as information regarding the status of peacekeeping finance and related issues. After obtaining a pass, on the basis of my membership in the International Studies Association I was able to begin observation of the formal meetings.

The committee met every day mostly twice per day depending on the work schedule. I attended initially every other day, because the items upon which I wanted to focus were not yet being considered. After deliberations began on the scales of assessment, agenda item #127, October 21, 1993, I attended every day, as time permitted. I also observed the deliberations of other items related to peacekeeping finance. It became evident that coverage of the progress on items, such as the proposed budget agenda item #123, the financial situation of the UN, and improving the administrative efficiency of the organization, agenda items #124 and #121, would give insight on the item of focus, agenda item #138, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations.

While keeping regular attendance at meetings, I reviewed background information in documents mentioned in speeches during general debate. I conducted two important
interviews during the session with the Secretary of the Committee on Contributions and the Director of the Peacekeeping Finance Division of the Office of Program Planning, Budget, and Finance. These interviews provided information regarding the key areas of conflict among delegates, and the difficulties of financing peacekeeping.

The research strategy developed as I observed the deliberations on related financial issues. Due to delays in negotiations on the issues earlier on the agenda, the item of focus, agenda item #138, was pushed further down on the docket. However, I continued to observe general debate on the issues that would influence decisions on peacekeeping finance.

Observation of general debate provided a better understanding of the structure of the political process. Much had changed in the structure of negotiation in the Fifth Committee since the special session of 1963. Therefore, the research strategy had to be modified. The most evident change was the adoption of the consensus procedure. Voting is no longer the preferred method of decision making. Also, the Fifth Committee sessions are not limited to the regular General Assembly sessions or special sessions. The Fifth Committee meets year-around in resumed sessions, operating much like a Board of Directors.

As I observed the session, I identified the points of contention and agreement among delegates regarding financial
issues. I followed the schedule of the delegates as closely as possible, collecting documents as they were published. Observing the weekly general debate meetings kept me up-to-date on the committee's schedule, and gave me an opportunity to identify key players and the most vocal delegates. Access to the informal consultation sessions was not granted. The informal consultations involved working groups which focused on specific issues that were difficult to negotiate in general debate. Further negotiations and final deliberations were based upon drafted text produced in the informal consultations.

Interviews with the delegates of the Fifth Committee, including an interview with the Secretary of Fifth Committee, proceeded after the session ended. This was possible because most of the delegates schedules could accommodate interviews, whereas during the session, their work schedules were very busy. Interviews with the delegates were conducted between January 4, 1994 through March 4, 1994. I conducted a total of twenty-six formal interviews with delegates. The interviews were conducted in the Delegates Lounge and other locations at UN Headquarters, at the permanent missions, and one interview was conducted at Grand Central Station in New York City.
Research Methods

The primary purpose of the research methods was to explore and evaluate the variables identified in the 1963 study, corroborating its findings that the variables were determinants of consensus. The use of multiple research methods was essential for recording an accurate account of the political process: "By using a combination of observation, interviewing, and document analysis, the field worker is able to use different data sources to validate and cross-check findings...Using a combination of data types increases validity as the strengths of one approach can compensate for the weaknesses of another approach."^3 Documents were collected at each stage of the process as documented information was available and useful. Observation covered all the public aspects of the debates and discussions involving the decision makers throughout the session. The interviews with the decision makers were conducted to gain insight regarding the private aspects of the decision making process and the relevant importance of the variables to consensus.

Documentary Research

The first task was to collect the documents related to the negotiations in the Fifth Committee. Because there was a large volume of documents published regarding peacekeeping finance and related issues, I collected documents which provided background information on the proposals for
formulating peacekeeping finance policy. In addition, I also focused on documents providing information on the proposals for implementing peacekeeping finance policy.

The documents reviewed were reports of the Secretary General regarding the budget which were submitted to the Fifth Committee for approval. In addition, reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions were also reviewed. In addition, the Fifth Committee produces draft decisions and resolutions for debate, revision, and approval. In addition, copies of the delegates' public statements during general debate in the Fifth Committee were reviewed. Summary Reports produced by the Secretariat and Press Releases were also reviewed as records of the public activities and statements of the delegates and the administrators from the Secretariat. Reports and proposals from other committees related to peacekeeping finance were also reviewed. For instance, the Committee on Contributions and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations provided technical and political information on the issue.

Documentary analysis was useful in demonstrating the various levels of public debate in the Fifth Committee by providing a list and summary of the issues which had to be overcome before consensus could be reached as well as identifying points of convergence. The documents were important in that they were the written record which
summarized the development of the decision. Although much information is missing from the public record, documents retain some important information. For instance, although arguments over the addition or deletion of phrases or paragraphs are not retained, key issues are usually highlighted in the documents. These key issues provide an account of the different perspectives which shape negotiations. As a result, I could identify the key issues and alignments which affect peacekeeping finance policy.

The reports consist of proposals submitted for approval and the recommendations regarding the approval of the budgets. The public statements and Summary Records record the reactions of the delegates to the proposals and recommendations. The resolutions or decision texts represent the final decision reached in committee and the policy adopted by the Organization.

The documents provide a sound basis for summarizing how the delegates interpret the budget proposals and their options for revising or approving a budget. For instance, when the Secretary General's report for the proposed budget is submitted, it is reviewed by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and the estimates for the budget are reduced. Before the final approval of the budget, delegates review the recommendations of the ACABQ and ask for justifications for the budget estimates. The differences between what was proposed, recommended by
the ACABQ and what is decided in the final approval of the budget are where the gaps exist in the documentary information. However, they demonstrate that there has been examination of the issue, and that progress towards a final decision was made. How the decision was reached and the nature of the negotiation which produced the decision can not be determined from the documents. However, identifying the differences between the documents and aspects of the political process that they represent indicates that movement has been made on the issue.

The following questions guided the review of each type of document: 1) What were the key issues highlighted in the document? 2) What were the different categories of perspectives reflected in the text? 1. Amount of funds needed and requested (budgetary); 2. Reasons for support (political); 3. How to determine funding (technical); 4. Availability of sources (financial). 3) What was the nature of the language in the document (ie., specific, vague, forceful, conciliatory)? The categories for the first two questions were determined from the information identified in the text of the documents.
Observation

Observation of the deliberations on these agenda items, included two main tasks. The first task was determining the major characteristics of each agenda item. For instance, the major points of contention or the technical difficulties that had to be resolved. The second task was identifying the activities that the delegates engaged in to address these conditions. One example is the methodology for the scales of assessment. There were anomalies regarding the assignment of countries to the assessment categories. This had to be resolved before commitments were made regarding contributions to the budget. Observation, although it was limited to the public arena, provided a record of the political parameters of the negotiation process. This indicates that the need for public debate actually facilitated progress in the private negotiations.

The following questions guided the observation of the Fifth Committee formal meetings: 1) Were the speakers lists exhaustive in general debate? 2) What was the length of general debate before informal consultations were convened? 3) What activities did the delegates engage in during general debate? These questions demonstrate the structure of the deliberations for each agenda item.
First-hand examination of the political process provided an opportunity to assess if the variables were present and whether the hypothesized relationships existed. It was essential for identifying the indicators of the variables and their functions. This was achieved by listing the indicators of each variable in a chart, providing an example of each indicator which was observed during deliberations, and noting general observations that were consistent across the different agenda items (See Appendix A). These general observations not only demonstrate what the indicators are, but also what their roles are in the political process. The following is an example of how the indicator for the variable, Networks of Individuals, was identified and how the observations were noted:

**Networks of Individuals**: interconnections of individuals who have worked together previously

Indicator: diplomatic contacts

Examples: permanent representatives' contacts on ambassador level and delegates' contacts with Secretariat personnel

1. members of permanent missions
2. Secretariat personnel
3. colleagues in committee
4. colleagues in subgroups
5. interested parties

Observations:
1. channel for exchange of views within and across groups
2. facilitates ally configurations regarding issues
3. shape patterns and frequency of interaction
4. eases rivalries generated from official positions
5. appeal to personal contacts; use leverage with contacts

Figure 4: Example of a variable indicator
This format was used as a guide for identifying examples of each variable and noting the observations of each during the consideration of each agenda item.

The outline of the political process which was constructed from the observations provided a guide for demonstrating the relationships between the variables and explaining variation in consensus. In order to fully explain the variables' relative importance to consensus, it was essential to demonstrate the links between the activities and conditions in the political process to the final decision.
Interviews

I conducted a total of forty-six interviews regarding consensus in the Fifth Committee. In May, 1993, six formal interviews were conducted with various people knowledgeable about United Nations decision making (with three Secretariat representatives, two professors, and one NGO representative). During the Regular Session (October, 1993 through December, 1993), eight informal interviews, and four formal interviews were conducted (with two Secretariat representatives, one delegate, and a former mediator for the Congo peacekeeping mission). During the period of January, 1994 and March, 1994, twenty-seven formal interviews (with twenty-six delegates and one Secretariat representative) were conducted, and one written interview was received from a delegate. The following chart summarizes the types of interviews conducted, when the interviews were conducted, and with whom they were conducted.
INTERVIEWS

Types of Interviews Conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When Interviews Were Conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May, 1993</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October-December, 1993</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January-March, 1994</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With Whom the Interviews Were Conducted

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Role</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fifth Committee delegates</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretariat representatives</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Professors</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO representative</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Former mediator</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5: Types of Interviews

The strategy for compiling a sample was developed on the basis of conversations with members of the Secretariat and delegates regarding decision making in the Fifth Committee. At the core of all the issues regarding UN budgets was the scales of assessment, both for the regular budget and the peacekeeping budgets.

A special scale of assessment was developed for peacekeeping budgets. It is a modified version of the scale for the regular budget. Member states are distributed across four categories of groupings of countries which determine how much each member is assessed for contributions
to the budget. Decisions in the Fifth Committee are reached by consensus on all issues, but there must be support from certain segments of the membership for it to be significant. Given that the consensus decision must protect the interests of the key sectors of the membership, I felt that the sample should account for the importance of the major financial contributors as well as members from every economic perspective as reflected in the scale groupings.

Several interviews revealed that there are usually twenty-five to thirty active delegates which draft decisions, but other members make up a silent majority. Any sample representative of the Fifth Committee had to include the major contributors whose interests are pertinent in reaching the final decision. It was mandatory to have interviews from the delegates representing the five permanent members (P-5) and other major economic powers. The sample had to be geographically distributed in order to ensure that there were varying perspectives. I sampled countries from each group, developed, developing, and least developed scale categories, gathering a list of fifty states. Fifty states were chosen because in two initial interviews I was told that there may be at the most, fifty active delegates, although it was a high estimate.

I sent letters requesting interviews, and made follow-up telephone calls. Twenty-seven delegates who represented their countries at the Regular Session agreed
to be interviewed. Because the sample spans the four economic groups of the scale and were distributed across geographic regions, I am confident the sample gathered is representative of the Fifth Committee. Twenty-six member states were represented in the sample. The distribution by geographical region is as follows: ten from Europe; four from Africa; four from Latin America; four from Asia; two from North America; one from the Pacific Islands; and one from the Middle East. The distribution by economic groups is as follows: the five permanent members; eight developed countries; eleven developing countries; and two least developed countries.

Interviewing the decision makers was important because they operate under the conditions which the study is analyzing. The purpose of interviewing the delegates was to get the perspectives of the participants regarding the negotiation process and the variables they believed were most important for reaching a consensus. The kinds of information that the delegates provided were used to construct a profile of how consensus developed over the course of the session regarding peacekeeping finance and related issues.

Personal interviews were conducted using open-ended and closed-ended questions. The purpose of the questions was to prompt responses which demonstrate the delegates' attitudes regarding the issue and the negotiation process. This was
necessary for confirming or refuting the impressions of the researcher which developed from the documentary research and observation.

The open-ended questions were formulated to prompt responses which would allow the researcher to assess the competence and practical experience of the delegate regarding the negotiation process, as well as the delegates' knowledge of the various aspects of peacekeeping finance policy. Secondly, the questions sought to prompt responses which highlight the major developments in peacekeeping finance policy and demonstrate how it has evolved as an issue. This served as a check on the major developments identified by the researcher. Third, the questions sought to provide information for compiling a profile of consensus. A description of consensus compiled from the interviews was important for demonstrating the evolution of consensus in the Fifth Committee (See Appendix B).

Responses to the open-ended questions demonstrate the conditions under which a meaningful consensus develops, and to what extent it contributes to the decision outcome. Meaningful consensus refers to an outcome in which peacekeeping finance budgets are supported and policy is effectively implemented.
The closed-ended questions in the questionnaire (See Appendix C) asked the delegates to give their impression of how important each of the nine variables were to consensus. The variables were not presented directly. The questionnaire often gave a related term, providing an opportunity for the researcher to explain the variable verbally. For instance, for the variable, Leadership and Planning, different terms were used in the questionnaire. The terms, preliminary negotiation and planning activities, were used. Respondents tended to lead into a description of leadership which was necessary for preliminary negotiation and planning. The indirect approach tended to be more fruitful than listing the variables directly.

The responses given by the delegates provided a check on the assessments of the researcher regarding the relative importance of the variables to the achievement of consensus. The information compiled from the responses was used to corroborate the hypotheses upon which the research is based and assess the variables' relevance in the current political process (See Appendix D).

The purpose of the interviews was to discern and report how the decision makers "construe their world of experience from the way they talk about it." As a result, the attributes and characteristics which distinguish the degrees of consensus from each other were identified.
Methods Used for Data Analysis

Setting Up the Analytic Model

The main task of the research was to analyze the relative importance of the variables to consensus. This was achieved by comparing the results of the 1963 Special Session study and the 1993 Regular Session study. A comparative case design was employed to compare the results of the two studies.

The type of comparative case method used was Alexander L. George's "structured, focused comparison":

"A comparison of two or more cases are "focused" insofar as the investigator deals selectively with only those aspects of each case that are believed to be relevant to the research objectives and data requirements of the study. Similarly, controlled comparison is "structured" when the investigator, in designing the study, defines and standardizes the data requirements of the case studies that will be done. This is done by formulating theoretically relevant questions to ask of each case."⁶

Two sets of theoretical questions were applied to each case. The first set was developed to highlight the variables as the major determinants of consensus and determine how consensus varied in each case. The second set was developed to evaluate the implications of the final decisions.
EVALUATING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIABLES TO CONSENSUS

1. Describe the breadth, complexity, and universality of the key issues on which consensus was sought.

2. Describe the developments regarding the key issues prior to the convening of the session.

3. Describe the negotiation framework and procedures under which the Fifth Committee operates.

4. Describe the political process.
   1. What are the variables representing the context for negotiating a consensus?
      a. Degree of difference in state policies
      b. Development of subgroups
      c. Networks of individuals

   2. What are the variables which represent the activities undertaken to initiate and facilitate negotiation of a consensus?
      a. Leadership and planning
      b. International roles
      c. Relationship of activity in public and private settings

5. Describe the decision makers' orientations and styles.
   1. What are the variables which represent the motives underlying the efforts to negotiate a consensus?
      a. Desire for a consensus
      b. Overlapping interests

   2. What factor represents the characteristics of the participants?
      Individual characteristics and capabilities

EVALUATING THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINAL DECISIONS

1. Was the policy produced consistent with the outcome intended by the proposals?

2. What were the financial implications of the policy?

3. Was the policy politically viable?

4. Could the policy be implemented effectively?

Figure 6: Theoretical framework for evaluating the cases
The second set of questions is a typology for analyzing policy developed by Eugene Badrach. Badrach identifies "four main constraints which bear on the objective of designing policy that will work as intended: technical feasibility, economic and financial possibility, political viability, and administrative operability."⁹ These categories are useful in evaluating the final decisions, because they demonstrate the value and utility of a policy.

These questions provided a theoretical framework for predicting replication of results. It states the conditions under which consensus is likely to develop, highlighting the conditions under which it is not likely to develop.¹⁰ Both cases examine consensus negotiated on peacekeeping finance in the Fifth Committee. The 1963 case attributed the strength of consensus to the role of nine variables in the political process. The 1993 case examined the role of the nine variables or their counterparts in the achievement of consensus. Although evidence shows that in both cases the variables led to consensus, there were differences in the results. However, in the second case consensus appeared more dependent on the variables. The cross-case investigation predicted a theoretical replication in the two cases and "produced contrasting results, but for predictable reasons."¹¹
Application of the Theoretical Framework

The Forty-eighth Regular General Assembly Session of 1993. Five additional agenda items were examined regarding the coverage of peacekeeping finance. The theoretical questions were applied to each agenda item. Responses to the questions summarized the deliberation of the item and provided a description of the final decision. The responses were compiled into a case narrative. Case records were compiled for recording the documentary, observational, and survey information. Details from the case records were incorporated into the case narrative as needed. The case records and case narrative were used to explain the variation in consensus regarding each agenda item. This was achieved by demonstrating how the variables led to consensus.

The framework attempts to vary the outcome by choosing instances in which the degrees of consensus occur in order to identify the conditions and variables that appear to account for differences. In other words, it sorts out the conditions and variables which determine the different degrees of consensus. According to the George technique for structured, focused comparison, this means the each type of outcome of the dependent variable (i.e., instances in which strong consensus developed), was held constant in order to identify the independent and intervening variables associated with that outcome. A full description was
given for each final decision, including the type of issue, type of resolution, and the degree of consensus reached. This analysis provided a profile of consensus regarding each agenda item and overall.

The plan for the analysis was developed for properly presenting and analyzing the volume of data yielded from the application of the theoretical framework to the 1993 data. The framework asked several general questions which required information from multiple sources, i.e., documents, observation, and interviews. To ensure that the analysis was properly focused, the main components of the analysis had to be classified. Just as the variables had been categorized in Chapter II, the types of issues and the types of final decisions were also categorized. The analysis specified two categories of issues: controversial and non-controversial. Nine categories of final decisions were identified (See Chapter IV, page 234).

It was particularly important to specify different degrees of consensus and the types of issues. It is from these key classifications that the explanations regarding the relationships between the independent variables and consensus were derived. From these classifications explanations were derived which made a distinction between the degree of consensus reached on a controversial issue and the degree of consensus on a non-controversial issue. The
objective of the analysis was to identify the independent variables responsible for the different outcomes.

The analysis was proceeded by a presentation of the patterns and trends found in the data converging on five main topics: 1) most difficult issues; 2) nature of consensus; 3) factors important to peacekeeping finance; 4) roles of the variables in reaching consensus; and 5) description of the variables and the political process.

The next task was to explain the variation in the variable. This involved the specification of the models illustrating the relationships of the variables across the agenda items. The final task was to demonstrate and interpret the relative importance of the variables using the methods of agreement and difference to explicate the evidence from the 1993 case.

Given that the case narrative for the Special General Assembly Session of 1963 had already been compiled, the model was applied to sort out and organize the information needed for comparison. Subsequent works containing data collected at the Special Session of 1963\(^\text{13}\) were used for additional details. The variation of consensus was reviewed and the results were compared with the results from the 1993 study.
Limitations of the Study

This study was limited to a small segment of the UN membership and personnel. The population examined were the representatives of Member States assigned to the Fifth Committee, totalling one hundred eighty four delegates. This venue is very significant because of the Fifth Committee's special responsibilities. This committee is responsible for approving the budget of the UN System, and all UN activities. With regard to peacekeeping, it is perhaps the most significant UN body, outside the Security Council for determining the conditions under which peacekeeping missions are deployed.

Samples were limited to data sources which were readily accessible to the researcher. Documents, such as Summary Reports, Secretary General Reports, Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions Reports, as they related to the peacekeeping budget were collected. They were useful to the extent that they demonstrated the various points which the delegates negotiated regarding peacekeeping finance and related issues. However, the purpose was to construct a profile of the Committee overall. Observation of the delegates was limited to the public forum for general debate and during breaks. Although it was impossible to determine what was occurring during break periods, interaction patterns were noted in an effort to match those interaction patterns noted in the public forum.
Security clearance for observation purposes was not extended to the informal consultations and the smaller consultation sessions. Informal consultations were more intimate and available to all delegates, but mostly frequented by "interested" delegates. The systematic bias which may have been created by this limitation is addressed by the interviews conducted with the delegates and the Secretariat personnel. Their experience and insight regarding negotiations in the Fifth Committee are guards against misguided assumptions and faulty conclusions about the public realm of negotiation. Without access to the private negotiation setting, the personal interviews became critical for comparing and assessing the information gathered from documents and observation.

The delegates and Secretariat personnel interviewed were readily accessible to the researcher. Some of these individuals were very active in the decision making and appeared well versed in the issue and the negotiation process.

By focusing on this arena and its deliberation of peacekeeping finance policy, a better understanding was gained regarding the complexity of the budget process and the negotiation process. The study highlights the key aspects of the negotiations on budget proposal items. The study does not claim the ability to generalize to all contexts. However, from the perspective of the researcher,
similar results can be expected from the examination of negotiations in similar contexts and using similar procedures. Overall, the study uses systematic documentary and interview analysis to demonstrate how the development of consensus decision making in the Committee represents or reflects the uniqueness of UN decision making and to what extent does this affect its effectiveness in resolving global problems.

Endnotes


4. Public statements and Summary Records summarize the statements of the delegates in general debate. They are not verbatim records. Plenary records are verbatim.

5. In two interviews I interviewed two delegates (Brazil and Portugal). However, I counted them as if there was just one delegate interviewed. I also interviewed two delegates from the United States. However, they were interviewed separately (one at the beginning of the Regular Session and one in February, 1994). These interviews were counted separately.

6. Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Ireland, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Pakistan, Portugal, Russian Federation,
Singapore, Uganda, United Kingdom, and United States.

7. Michael Quinn Patton, 394.


11. Yin, 46.


CHAPTER IV
OVERVIEW OF CASES: 1963 AND 1993

Overview

The main objective of this chapter is to provide overviews of the Fifth Committee's deliberations during the 1963 Special Session and the 1993 Regular Session of the General Assembly. Using the theoretical framework provided in Chapter Three, the discussion pairs the narrative on the 1963 session with the narrative on the 1993 session. Comparisons are offered in four main areas: 1) agenda; 2) procedures; 3) agenda item consideration; and 4) outcomes.

The theoretical framework surveys the agenda, decision making procedures, and final decisions in each case. The narrative on the 1963 session summarizes the activities of the committee in negotiating a consensus and drafting policy on peacekeeping finance. The narrative on the 1993 session summarizes the activities of the committee in negotiating consensus regarding the administrative and budgetary aspects of UN peacekeeping operations and related financial issues. Information from the 1963 case is presented first in each section, followed by the discussion of the information from the 1993 case. The recap of the 1963 case is not extensive,
but provides a indication of how the theoretical framework was applied to the information, providing a broad context for its comparison with the 1993 case.
Agenda

For each case the discussion describes the breadth, complexity, and universality of the key issues on which consensus was sought, and describes the developments regarding the key issues prior to the convening of the session. The overviews the background of each case to demonstrate the context in which the issues were considered.

Negotiating A Consensus: 1963

Chadwick Alger's analysis of the 1963 Special Session of the General Assembly was based on careful observation of deliberations during the eight-week period of May 14, 1963 and June 27, 1963. Alger's analysis provided insight regarding the background of the Special Session, specifically the preparation efforts. In the discussion, variables which contribute to consensus were noted. The study suggested that further study of consensus decisions in the United Nations should begin with a deeper examination of these variables which is the objective of the current study.

There were key developments prior to the convening of the Special Session of 1963 that influenced the Fifth Committee's consideration of seven agenda items regarding financial matters. During the Seventeenth Regular Session of the General Assembly, an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice regarding the constitutionality of peacekeeping was accepted. The International Court of Justice decided that peacekeeping was
constitutionally sound, asserting that "the General Assembly was empowered to create legally binding financial obligations on member states by levying assessments for "expenses of the Organization" under Article 17 of the Charter."¹ This ruling declared that the member states were obligated to pay contributions for the United Nations Emergency Force and the United Nations Congo Operation because they were considered expenses of the United Nations.

Controversy surrounded this issue because peacekeeping was not explicitly sanctioned by the United Nations Charter. Opponents of the advisory opinion challenged the legality of the operations and asserted that they were not expenses of the Organization. With the acceptance of the advisory opinion, preliminary debate and negotiation were undertaken to resolve the conflict. Discussion of this issue among the delegates during the regular session resulted in the request for the Special Session. The objective of the Special Session was to draft policy that would provide guidelines for financing peacekeeping operations. In addition, the General Assembly formed a committee composed of twenty-one representatives to make recommendations to the General Assembly and attempt to develop a broad consensus on peacekeeping finance.

The Committee of Twenty-one held meetings during the period of January 29, 1963 to March 29, 1963. A broad consensus on peacekeeping finance failed to develop.
Divisions existed between developed and developing countries as well as between major financial contributors and the other financial interest groups. The variety of views expressed regarding peacekeeping finance demonstrates the breadth of this issue. Division among the various groups of member states and official sanction of peacekeeping by the International Court of Justice generated efforts to create a viable mandate for formulating peacekeeping finance.

The Committee of Twenty-one was not able to reach a broad consensus on peacekeeping. However, the Committee of Twenty-one produced a summation of the views of member states in four general areas:

"1. The financing of United Nations operations for the maintenance of peace and security is the collective responsibility of all State Members of the Organization.

2. The expenses of such operations should be apportioned among the member states to the extent that they are not covered by voluntary contributions or by some other agreed arrangement of the kind referred to above.

3. To the extent that the expenses were not covered by other means, the apportionment among the state members of the United Nations should be effective with due regard to their relative capacity to pay.

4. To this effect, a certain initial segment of the net costs should be assessed by all member states on the basis of the scale application to the regular budget."

This summation reflects the first key step towards the universality of peacekeeping finance. The objective for establishing true universality regarding this issue was
developing a formula for guiding peacekeeping finance policy.

The complexity of peacekeeping finance was reflected in the number of issues surveyed and considered during the Special Session. The package of decisions produced at the Special Session provided the criteria for developing peacekeeping finance policy. There were seven agenda items for which consensus was sought:

"The Special Session produced seven resolutions. These resolutions:

1. Provided general principles to serve as guidelines for the sharing of costs of future peacekeeping operations involving heavy expenditures,

2. authorized the Secretary-General to spend $6.58 million monthly for ONUC and UNEF between 1 July and 31 December 1963,

3. apportioned these costs among members,

4. appealed to members to pay their arrears for UNEF and ONUC,

5. extended the period in which United Nations bonds could be sold to 31 December 1963,

6. asked the Secretary-General to investigate the feasibility of establishing a voluntary contributions peace fund, and

7. continued a 21-nation working group devoted to developing more long-range solutions to the Organization's financial problems."
Regular Session of 1993

Introduction

Given the financial crisis under which the United Nations operates, several issues emerged that are critical for resolving the problems with financing peacekeeping operations. With the total amount of peacekeeping budgets exceeding the regular budget, the concerns regarding the administrative and budgetary aspects were substantial.

Consideration of the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations and related issues was undertaken amidst controversy over the methodology for the scales of assessments. Throughout the session, overarching issues, like the financial situation of the Organization and the proposed budget program were also considered. Progress on these issues was important to any progress regarding peacekeeping finance.

The main objectives for the Forty-eighth session were improving the financial situation of the Organization, fostering collective responsibility for financing the regular and peacekeeping budgets, and clarifying the methodology for determining the scales of assessment.

The Forty-eighth session produced nine resolutions and one decision on peacekeeping finance, the financial situation of the Organization, and the scale of assessments. The session also produced eight resolutions regarding the proposed regular budget. The decision and resolutions were
all adopted by no vote.

The resolutions addressed several broad areas of concern:

1. They confirmed that peacekeeping budget submissions would continue to be considered on an individual basis (A/48/227).

2. They provided guidelines for addressing the problem of late submission of peacekeeping budget estimates (A/48/227).

3. They provided guidelines for the continuation of the open-ended working group for consideration of the scales of assessment for the apportionment of peacekeeping expenses (A/48/472).

4. They endorsed the use of a support account for peacekeeping operations to cover the needs at UN Headquarters for the support of ongoing missions and prospective missions (A/48/226).

5. They established the rates of assessment for new member states and clarified the rates of assessment for existing groups of member states (A/48/223 A).

6. They proposed revision of the methodology for determining the scales of assessments for the regular budget and peacekeeping budgets (A/48/223 B-C).

Within the negotiation framework and procedures of the Fifth Committee the agenda items were negotiated concurrently, but progress on each item varied. For instance, while the delegates were deliberating in the general debate on one issue, they were negotiating other items in the informal consultations.

For each item profiled, the stages of deliberation are described. In addition, there is discussion regarding the roles of the Secretariat and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ).
Background

The scale of assessments, the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, improving the financial situation of the Organization, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget are covered in the narrative.

These agenda items were interrelated in that they affected the outcome of negotiations on peacekeeping finance. For instance, the review of efficiency, the financial situation of the Organization, and the proposed program budget are overarching issues which are considered routinely and are important to the overall functioning of the United Nations. The scale of assessments determines the assessed contributions of the member states for the program budget. It is critical that the methodology for determining the scale is clear and acceptable to member states. It was important to consider the proposals and concerns regarding these items before pursuing negotiations and decisions regarding peacekeeping finance (both the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations).

The precarious financial situation of the United Nations is an ongoing agenda item because member states continue to withhold payment of contributions and arrears.
As a result, the Organization had to borrow from peacekeeping reserve accounts which depleted available funding sources. In addition, the Organization had to defer reimbursements to troop-contributing states.

Among the proposals requested for consideration during the Forty-eighth session, was the proposal for developing incentives for encouraging full payment of contributions and arrears. In addition, there was a proposal for establishing a Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. Progress on the overarching financial crisis dictates the financial capacity of the Organization and the maintenance of its programs and activities.

The scale of assessments has been an ongoing agenda item for several years, because of the difficulties with developing an effective methodology. The composition of the different scale groupings have changed "due to a number of transfers among the groups by various countries and the increase in the number of member states." This not only affects the program budget, but also the special scale for peacekeeping operations. The criteria for the peacekeeping scale is determined from the scale for the program budget.

There were several proposals suggested for addressing problems with the scale of assessments during the Forty-eighth session. For instance, there were suggestions for establishing a scale with three groupings. In addition, there were suggestions for establishing a fifth group for
least developed countries only. Controversies arose mostly over the assignment of countries to scale groupings. If the scale was based upon just three groups, the rate of assessments of groups consisting of developed and non-permanent, developing, and least developed members would increase. Establishing a fifth group might spark opposition from members previously assigned to the fourth group, because of decreases in the rate of assessments for some members.

Developing the appropriate methodology for the scale of assessments persisted as a very controversial issue. Controversy regarding the assessed contributions of new members states had not been resolved from the previous Forty-seventh session. The conflicts over the scale concentrated on the placement of Ukraine and Belarus in the scale grouping designated for developed countries. They were being categorized as new members and their rate of assessment was based upon their relationship with the former Soviet Union. The placement of Ukraine and Belarus highlighted the anomalies in the scale. The Report of the Secretary General regarding the composition of the scale groupings set a figure of $5000 per capita income and above for countries placed in the scale grouping for developed countries. However, Ukraine and Belarus have per capita incomes lower than this figure.
During the Forty-seventh session, the Ukraine delegate noted that the Ukraine had been placed in the developed countries scale group despite the fact that Ukraine had a per capita income of less than $3000.6

Although there was a substantial majority in support of the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions regarding the rates of assessments, consensus by no vote failed to emerge. Divisions persisted despite consideration of the issue in informal consultations, forcing a final recorded vote. The decision to adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions was adopted by the following vote: 62 in favor, 15 against, and 19 abstentions. The vote in this instance occurred because of the failure of countries to reach a decision that was acceptable to all.

Correcting the anomalies in the scale methodology was critical to progress towards a consensus. Members opposing the decision to adopt the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions were not confident that their interests were fully acknowledged. Such an occurrence led to the inclusion of the issue on the Forty-eighth Session agenda, pending the review of the working group or the convening of informal consultations to resolve the differences.

At the beginning of the Forty-eighth session on September 21, 1993, a brief meeting was held to elect the chairman of the Fifth Committee. The delegate from Algeria was elected chairman by acclamation. The second meeting was
convened on September 29, 1993, covering preliminary issues such as the election of the vice-chairmen (delegates from Portugal and Argentina). Elections were followed by a statement from the Controller, representing the Secretariat, taking note of the objectives for the current session. He informed the delegates about the administrative difficulties which would affect the work of the Fifth Committee. In addition, the Controller fielded questions from delegates, clarifying procedures and reviewing the agenda.

One major difficulty noted was the delay in the submission of the completed proposed program budget. Because the proposed program budget was so critical to the work of the Fifth Committee, the delay would greatly impact the consideration of other agenda items and the work of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). Usually the ACABQ submitted its report regarding the review of the budget estimates by August of each year. The Controller predicted that the completed budget proposal would not be ready until the end of October. Usually the Fifth Committee had the budget proposal and the reports from the ACABQ at the beginning of the regular session. In light of this difficulty, the Controller proposed that until a normal budget review could resume, the Secretary General should be allowed to officially request the members to pay their contributions for the program budget.
Although there were different issues of concern among delegates, there appeared to be a shared belief that although there should be a thorough review of the budget, every effort should be made to have a final budget by the end of the regular session (December). Concern was expressed among delegates regarding the delay and also the suggestion that the Secretary General have authority to assess contributions. Many delegates expressed that they would not commit themselves to approval of the budget without the recommendations from the ACABQ. The United States delegate believed that it was essential to conduct a thorough review of the budget instead of "blindly endorsing the Secretariat's proposals."

The chairman of the ACABQ noted that the report of the Advisory Committee would not be ready before November. However, stressing the extensive duties of the Advisory Committee, he stated that the report could not be submitted before the end of the year.

At the third meeting the rapporteur was elected by acclamation, the delegate from Bangladesh. The deliberation continued on procedural matters such as the organization of the Fifth Committee's work and the rules of procedure.

It was noted for the record that the Fifth Committee would begin substantive work on October 20, 1993. The substantive work would begin with a statement by the Under Secretary General for Administration and Management
regarding the major issues on the Committee's agenda, like the review of efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, the proposed program budget for biennium 1994-95, the improvement of the financial situation, and the scale of assessments for the apportionment of expenses of the United Nations. The issue of the scale of assessments would be introduced to the Fifth Committee first. A limit of two weeks was set for general debate on each issue, providing ample time for negotiation in informal consultations.8

Consideration of the proposed program budget for 1994-1995 was scheduled for November 15, 1993 and the remainder of the session. Matters regarding the proposed program budget for 1992-1993 which had been deferred from the previous session were scheduled to begin the week of October 25, 1993. After concerns regarding the budgetary process were expressed, there was discussion regarding a feasible schedule of work for the Fifth Committee.
Delegates stressed the importance of particular issues which must be included on the agenda. For instance, the chairman of the Fifth Committee assured the delegates that there would be extensive consideration of the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the improvement of the financial situation of the Organization. Delegations reiterated their commitment to the approval of a thoroughly reviewed budget.
The Fifth Committee approved a tentative program of work in its fourth meeting, subject to revision as the Fifth Committee felt necessary. The program of work was submitted in chart form, providing a guide for following the progress of general debate and informal consultations on each issue. The tentative program of work was "adopted, as orally amended on the understanding that it would be adjusted as necessary." The list of agenda items on the Fifth Committee's tentative program of work as of October 11, 1993 is shown in Table 2.

Throughout the discussion of procedural matters, there were several references made to the consensus norm set for decisions on the budget. In addition, there were many statements regarding the delegates' commitment to and responsibility for budgetary matters. Despite the time constraints with the delays in the submission of reports, the delegates intended to ensure full justification for budget estimates before approval. In addition, proposals were made regarding alternative measures in the event that a program budget was not adopted.
Table 2: List of agenda items

1993 FIFTH COMMITTEE TENTATIVE PROGRAMME
OF WORK AS APPROVED BY THE COMMITTEE AT ITS
FOURTH MEETING ON OCTOBER 1, 1993

AGENDA ITEM

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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
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<tr>
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<td>Financial Reports</td>
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<td>121</td>
<td>Review of Efficiency of the UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>Programme Budget for 1992-1993</td>
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<td>123</td>
<td>Proposed Programme Budget for 1994-1995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Financial Situation of the UN</td>
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<td>Joint Inspection Unit</td>
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<td>Pattern of Conferences</td>
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<td>Scale of Assessments</td>
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<td>UN Pension System</td>
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<td>Financing of UNDOF and UNIFIL</td>
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<td>131</td>
<td>Financing of UNAVEM</td>
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<td>132</td>
<td>Financing of UNIKOM and other activities</td>
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<td>Financing of MINURSO</td>
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<td>Financing Peacekeeping Operations</td>
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<td>Financing ONUMOZ</td>
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<td>Financing of the International Tribunal</td>
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<td>Financing of the JN Observation Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>Programme Budget for 1990-1991</td>
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<td>Financing of UNOMUR (Uganda/Rwanda)</td>
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<td>Financing of UNMIH (Haiti)</td>
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<td>Financing of UNOMIL (Liberia)</td>
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<td>168</td>
<td>Personnel Questions</td>
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</table>

12 Report of ECOSOC

17 Appointments
Procedures

For each case the discussion describes the decision making framework and procedures under which the Fifth Committee operated, providing an overview of the type of deliberations undertaken to reach decisions and draft policy.

Negotiation and Procedures: 1963

The procedures and negotiation framework under which the Fifth Committee operated had a decisive influence on the achievement of consensus. It is within this negotiation framework and procedures that the variables which contribute to consensus interact. The negotiation framework facilitates deliberation and collaboration on the agenda items. From this emerges the drafts of decisions and eventually the final decisions. The key aspects of the negotiation framework that allows consensus to develop are public debate, behind the scenes negotiation, regional group meetings and private conversations carried out concurrent with the debate.\(^{10}\)

Public debate has two purposes with regard to the final decision. First, it provides a record of positions stated publicly and the various options for decision makers as reflected in draft resolutions and final decision. Second, public debate can provide some indication of the progress being made in negotiation. Without new developments, delegates were not likely to make public declarations
without a clear indication of the results of the negotiations. According to Alger, this "in some respects was helpful to the negotiators since it made it less likely that positions would be taken which could not be abandoned if they were in conflict with the results of the negotiations."^{11}

The procedures for consideration of issues were deliberations within a ten-member negotiation group with both developed and developing countries. Developed and developing countries were represented in two five-member components which conducted separate sessions. These deliberations, undertaken outside the public arena, allowing negotiators to review issues and develop consensus within each negotiating group, were then used to negotiate consensus with the opposing negotiating group.

The cycle through which an issue is considered and a consensus is negotiated is referred to in general terms as conference diplomacy. Conference diplomacy utilizes public and private settings, formal and informal methods, and official and personal contacts to achieve the objective of a consensus on an issue. In 1963 the public debate aspect consisted of "prepared general statements on each agenda item, followed by statements introducing resolutions and amendments and discussions of these, sometimes concluding with voting and explanations of votes."^{12} Negotiation occurred during the intervening stages of public debate, and
as the debate and negotiation proceeded, the draft decisions and resolution took on the character of the negotiations. When a sufficient level of agreement was reached a final vote was taken to determine whether the draft decision or resolution would become official policy. The reference to consensus in the Alger study was actually the level of agreement reflected in the final vote which was sufficient to pass a resolution.

Negotiation Framework and Procedures: 1993

To fully understand how agenda items are considered in the Fifth Committee, there must be a description of the negotiation framework, decision making procedures, method of negotiation, types of issues covered, and types of final decisions produced.

The negotiation framework and procedures under which all General Assembly committees operate include public debate, informal consultations, and working groups. Public debate is conducted in formal meetings to present the agenda, proposals for addressing agenda items, and statements of positions of the member states. Informal consultations are conducted to address specific concerns and thoroughly review the proposals for approval. Informal consultations usually involve scheduled discussion meetings after proposals and technical information is presented during public debate. These meetings serve as negotiating sessions for drafting decisions which will gain support and
approval from the committee. When agreement can not be reached in the informal consultations, these negotiating sessions are suspended so that smaller groups or individual delegates can confer. Referred to as informal-informals by the delegates, these smaller session are conducted as supplements to the informal consultations to address highly conflictual issues. In addition to these sessions, private conversations during public debate, in the corridors or in the Delegates Lounge provide opportunities for further negotiation outside the public arena.

The decision making procedures used in the Fifth Committee were established for reaching decisions by consensus or what Johann Kaufmann calls "conference decisions by consensus". The consensus procedure was established for reviewing and approving budgets. By avoiding voting on the budget, the Fifth Committee was able to thoroughly review and interpret the financial implications of the final decisions and produce cohesive policies. With the introduction of the consensus procedure, the Fifth Committee's deliberations were no longer confined to the regular session. It met in resumed session to complete the reviews and revisions of budgetary proposals and decisions.

The method of negotiation under which all General Assembly committees deliberate is called conference diplomacy. In general, it is the use of public debate and
private consultations for reaching decisions. Johann Kaufmann defines conference diplomacy as "the management of relations between governments and of relations between governments and intergovernmental organizations that takes place in international conferences," and negotiation as the "sum total of talks and contacts intended to solve conflicts or to work towards the common objectives of a conference." Tact and skill are essential for negotiating agreements on agenda items. The level of privacy and personal contact permitted keeps the formal or official positions from hindering agreement. The appearance of deceit is avoided and the delegates are able to speak more candidly about their concerns and intentions. In addition, it provides opportunities to dissenters to either join the supporting faction or negotiate to have their interests reflected in the final decision.

There are two main types of issues that come to bear in conference diplomacy and when seeking consensus: controversial and non-controversial. Controversial issues tend to be divisive issues, representing major challenges to the financial and political interests of member states. They usually incur more costs for member states. Examples of these issues would be proposals requesting drastic changes in the existing policy and proposals without clear objectives and justifications. Non-controversial issues tend to be routine issues which appear on the agenda from
year-to-year, and they are usually just a matter of review and approval. Examples of non-controversial issues are proposals making appeals to member states to comply with a policy and proposals requesting performance reports. Consensus on these issues is easy to achieve. While consensus for controversial issues are achieved through very difficult private negotiations, conference diplomacy, particularly the private negotiations, is important because it allows consensus to be reached on very divisive issues, while allowing delegates to adhere to their governments' instructions regarding the issues.

The consensus reflected in the final decision, decision taken without voting, frees the dissenters from having to formally object to the decision. On the other hand it allows supporters to accept a decision without having to formally vote yes. Amendments addressing the opposition makes it difficult for them to reject the final decision which includes their interests. Although the final decision may not fully reflect their instructions, they have followed their governments' policies within the constraints of the consensus process.

Several categories of final decisions and resolutions were produced in the Fifth Committee:

1. Formal measures and organs established to carry out proposals, i.e., Working Groups.

2. Recommendations for establishing new methodologies and mandates, i.e., revision of methodology criteria.
3. Instructions for implementing transitional plans for new mandates, ie., projected period for execution.

4. Statements outlining the stages for achieving the ultimate objective, ie., Medium-term plan.

5. Instructions for investigating the results of established plans and efforts to carry out mandates, ie., performance reports.

6. Recommendations specifying the merits of the proposals.

7. Appeals

8. Referrals to other parties for review, ie. Committee on Contributions and ACABQ.

9. Requests for performance reports, ie., evaluating progress of implemented plans.

The deliberation of the peacekeeping finance and related issues in the Fifth Committee in 1993 is demonstrated in the following tables. Table 3 shows the duration of general debate and the number of meetings held. Table 4 lists the number of informal consultations held.
Table 3: Public meetings

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Totals 11 6 3 8 16

For the proposed budget, the number of informal consultations held are noted in parentheses.
Agenda Item Consideration

Special Session of 1963

During the 1963 special session, agenda items were deliberated by means of a ten-member negotiating group, separate session of the two five-member components of the negotiating group, and sessions between negotiators and the groups of nations that they represented. The two five-member components represented the developing countries and the developed countries.\(^{17}\)

Two phases of negotiation produced seven resolutions reflecting the United Nations' policy on peacekeeping finance. The first phase consisted of a three-week period in which negotiators produced four resolutions for approval. The second phase of negotiations, twenty days of deliberation, involved the rejection and renegotiation of the general principles resolution. One week of deliberation the four resolutions were approved by the Committee and a plenary session, with an additional three resolutions approved to supplement the package of resolutions produced prior to the plenary.\(^{18}\)

Regular Session of 1993

The Fifth Committee no longer uses the negotiating group format. After issues have been considered in public debate, informal consultations are held to draft a consensus text. The negotiators are not representatives appointed by the formal regional groups, but delegates speaking on behalf
of individual governments, smaller regional and ideological groups, and financial interest groups. Sponsorship is not sought for the proposals, but a consensus is negotiated which reflects the varying interests of the main factions. In 1993, the Fifth Committee decided that two weeks would be dedicated to the general debate for each agenda item. After which, informal consultations were conducted to draft, negotiate, and approve the resolutions.

For the 1993 case the agenda items are described to demonstrate the types of issues which were considered and indicate the complexity and difficulties which characterized their consideration by the Fifth Committee.
Agenda Items: 1993

The Scale of Assessments

The scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations was a major issue of concern for delegates in the Fifth Committee during the Forty-eighth Session. The scale of assessments is a measure established to determine how much each member state contributes to finance the regular budget of the United Nations. It is based primarily on each state's capacity to pay. Capacity to pay is based upon national income per capita. Two mechanisms are used to prevent the rates at which states are assessed from shifting from year to year. The first mechanism is the statistical base period. Its purpose is to "smooth out abrupt changes in national income due to fluctuations in exchange rates and resource prices." The second mechanism is the scheme of limits which places further restraint on changes in assessment rates: "The rates of those countries paying more than five percent of the U. N. budget may change no more than 0.75 percent annually." 20

Conflicts emerged over the anomalies in the scale methodology to determine the capacity to pay. The concerns over the anomalies in the scales were sparked by the assignment of rates to member states previously belonging to the former Czechoslovakia, the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the former Yugoslavia referred to
as the Twenty-two Member States. The Committee on Contributions recommended that the rates for these new states be calculated by dividing the rate for the former consolidated states. The Committee on Contributions took in consideration the "political, legal, economic, and technical issues underlying the concerns of those states about the level of assessments of the former consolidated states, the manner in which the rates were distributed among them, and the perceived discrepancies between their individual rates of assessment and their ability to pay." As a result the Committee on Contributions undertook efforts to calculate the rates of assessments for these states which were more reflective of their current capacity to pay, and decided to develop a new scale of assessments.

The scale methodology was also a source of major concern for other member states, because any changes adopted would affect the amount of their contributions, either reducing or increasing the amounts. In its review of the scale methodology, the Committee on Contributions divided its components into three areas: income concepts, conversion of national income to United States dollars, and other elements (statistical base period, low per capita income allowance, and scheme of limits). Although all components of the methodology were of great concern of member states, most of the contention centered around the length of the statistical base period and the proposals to
phase out the scheme of limits.

The Fifth Committee began general debate on the scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations (agenda item #127) on October 21, 1993. The document under consideration was the Report of the Committee on Contributions A/48/11, which was personally presented to the Fifth Committee by the chairman of the Committee on Contributions.

The Committee on Contributions had concluded that the national income concept was still the soundest income concept for determining the scale of assessments. Market exchange rates (MERs) were preferred conversion rates according to the Committee. However, debate was inconclusive on the length of the statistical base period, the scheme of limits, and proposals for "linking the world per capita income average for automatic adjustments of the per capita income limit with the statistical base period."

Six formal meetings were held during the two week period allotted for general debate on the scale of assessments (October 21, 1993 through November 4, 1993). The chairman of the Fifth Committee summarized the formal statements of the delegates stating that "about half of the delegations advocated modification of the current methodology; a quarter favored the fully implementation of the mandate set out in resolution 46/221B; and the rest preferred more radical approaches."
One major point of convergence was support for a shorter statistical base period. In favor of this proposal were the Twenty-two Member States of Eastern Europe and developed states like the members of the European Union and the United States; however, for somewhat different reasons. The purpose of the shorter three-year statistical base period is to demonstrate current capacity to pay, reflecting economic growth within a shorter period than the standard ten-year period. The Twenty-two Member States of Eastern Europe would benefit from this change because their capacity to pay would be accurately reflected. Use of the shorter statistical base period would reduce the assessments based upon the consolidated states which had been inflated. Developed countries would benefit from the use of the shorter statistical base period because their responsibility would be decreased because contributions distributed across the other scale groupings would increase.

Another group converged around the recommendation to retain the ten-year statistical base period. Use of the ten-year standard for calculating the scale controls fluctuations in individual rates of assessments resulting from abrupt or temporary economic changes. The Rio Group supported this proposal which was cited in Resolution 46/221B. One benefit of the longer statistical base period is that temporary economic growth would not cause an increase in the individual rates of assessments. The Rio
Group also agreed with the recommendation of the Committee on Contributions that a nine-year statistical base period was technically superior to the ten-year standard, expressing a willingness to support a mandate for the nine-year standard. Countries such as Brazil and Singapore was in support of the longer statistical base periods.

The rationale given for instituting a nine-year standard is as follows: "In the case of the three-year scales and the ten-year base periods, every third year is included in four base periods which the other years only in three base periods. Consequently, every third year receives more weight in the calculation of successive scales than the years between. Any base period which is a multiple of three years would eliminate such distortions."

Another major point of convergence was over more radical approaches for modifying the scale of assessments such as the "clean slate" approach. The Canada, Australia and New Zealand (CANZ) group supported this approach which advocated a complete revamping of the scale. The "clean slate" approach proposes that a "country's rate of assessment be based only on its total national income as compared to the total world income." Proposals were introduced for base periods of one, three, and ten years. Many smaller countries opposed this approach because it tended to favor developed countries.
Throughout debate, delegates stressed the link between the statistical base period and the scheme of limits. They argued that the scheme of limits distorted the rates of assessments contributing to the arbitrary assignment of states into scale group despite their capacity to pay.

Public debate was suspended on this agenda item in favor of informal consultations. The ambassador of Barbados was asked to chair the informal consultations on the scale of assessments. Meanwhile, the Committee proceeded to consider the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations in public debate.

The scales of assessment of the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations permeates all aspects of financing the United Nations. Assessing the regular budget affects the programs and activities which the Organization undertakes. The most notable trend is that virtually all members wanted to pay less in their assessments. Problems stemmed from varying perspectives on persuading members to pay their individual assessments, and how members should be assessed to ensure equity and collective responsibility for expenses.

The scale of assessment was a controversial issue in that any changes in the methodology would affect all aspects of the scale, increasing the potential for opposition. It reflected the move to make radical changes in the mandate
for determining how expenses for the United Nations were to be apportioned. It had the potential for incurring more costs for member states, presenting a major challenge to their financial interests. Another reason why the scale of assessment was such a controversial issue is that there was no clear mandate to follow for the future. The divisiveness which led to the vote in the previous session had left the Committee on Contributions without a mandate for determining the new scale for the upcoming biennial budget.

Although perspectives regarding the scale were divided, there tended to be an eagerness to negotiate an equitable, acceptable methodology to ensure that the Committee on Contributions would have a mandate. Clearly motivated by the failure to reach consensus previously, delegates expressed enthusiasm about resolving the issue. The urgency of this issue is reflected in its placement on the work schedule first.

Within the period of one month and two weeks, eleven sessions of informal consultations on the scale of assessment were convened. General debate resumed on December 17, 1993 to give a progress report on the drafting of the scale. The chairman of the informal consultations reported that there was wide agreement on a draft report on the item which he prepared. However, there was still difficulties on specific points. The informal consultations were scheduled to end on December 18.
However, remaining difficulties made it necessary for the informal consultations to continue. At the next meeting, the chairman set the deadline for reaching agreement for December 21, 1993, joking that any further negotiations beyond that date would have to be conducted in Barbados.

Although the difficulties over specifics remained, consensus was reached on December 21, 1993, producing a final decision draft by the chairman. The chairman of the Fifth Committee noted the unique approach adopted by the chairman of the informal consultations. The chairman had conducted consultations with interest groups after which he drafted a paper that could serve as a possible resolution. The paper was drafted after five meetings with these groups. The drafted decision was a compromise which consolidated all of the major perspectives of the interest groups.

The compromise was reached as a result of the inability to reach agreement on a single statistical base period. The compromise was a new procedure for calculating the scale. Addressing concerns regarding the effects of the short and long statistical base periods, the draft resolution (A/C.5/48/L.13) requested the Committee on Contributions to calculate the next scale on the "basis of the average of two separate machine scales based on statistical base periods of seven and eight years, respectively." This average would be calculated before any adjustments would be applied, preventing fluctuations in individual rates of assessment.
Although the draft resolution was adopted without a vote, there were still issues that were left unresolved. However, this decision was a major step towards resolving the anomalies in the scale.

Outstanding concerns were the phasing out of the scheme of limits and the clarification of the guidelines for preparing the scale of assessments. After adoption of the draft resolution, nine delegates offered explanations of vote, concentrating on the issues of phasing the scheme of limits and the implications of the new guidelines for preparing the scale. The draft resolution was submitted for final approval and adopted by the General Assembly in the plenary session on the recommendations of the Fifth Committee on December 23, 1993.

There are two overarching agenda items related to the overall financing of the United Nations which impact the achievement of consensus on peacekeeping finance, the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations and improving the financial situation of the United Nations. Proposals for improving the efficiency and the financial situation of the United Nations were outlined in a report prepared by the Independent Advisory Group on United Nations Financing, sponsored by the Ford Foundation, under the co-chairmanship of Mr. Shijuro Ogata and Mr. Paul Volcker, entitled Financing an Effective United Nations. The report consisted of recommendations regarding the various options of funding the United Nations.

The Fifth Committee's deliberation on the review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations (agenda item #121) began October 28, 1993. Initially, general debate focused on the management of works of art in the United Nations in the first four formal meetings. On November 4, 1993, the Fifth Committee began to consider the proposals for fostering more accountability and efficiency in the operations of the United Nations. Consideration of the agenda item (#124), improving the financial situation of the United Nations
began on November 18, 1993.

Among the major proposals considered by the Fifth Committee were those outlined in the report of the Independent Advisory Group. The report supported the continuing use of the consensus procedure for approving the budget, because it was by far the most effective way to arrive at implementable decisions on the budget. Changes suggested in the report were changing the payment schedule of assessments, charging interest on late payment of assessments, raising the amount of the Working Capital Fund from $100 million to $200 million, and changing the statistical base period for determining capacity to pay from the ten-year standard to the three-year standard.

The payment schedule suggested in the report was four quarterly installments throughout the year. Usually assessments have been requested on January 1st of every year, and expected by January 31st. With the new payment schedule, assessments would be requested January, April, July, and October with the deadline of thirty days after each assessment. This is considered a better format because the United Nations spends the funds throughout the year.

Charging interest on late payments of assessments was suggested as a punitive measure to prompt members to pay their contributions and arrears in full and on time. Under the quarterly installments payment schedule, the interest payments would be deposited into the Working Capital Fund.
The assessment formula based on the three-year standard would lower the rate of assessments of countries experiencing "drastic economic changes". The ten-year standard did not account for this factor and tended to inflate the calculations for determining the capacity to pay.

General debate on the review of efficiency (agenda item #121) spanned almost the entire Forty-eighth Regular Session. However, informal consultations did not begin until November 30, 1993 with six sessions of informal consultations ending on December 10, 1993. General debate for improving the financial situation of the United Nations was undertaken in five formal meetings with three sessions of informal consultations ending December 11, 1993. These overarching issues and several positions centered around whether the review of efficiency and improving the financial situation should be continuous agenda items or should there be stages in which newly implemented structures and programs be allowed to operate, pending performance reports. The provisions in the final decision reflected the latter.
Financing peacekeeping is a central issue which faces the Fifth Committee each year. Because most of the peacekeeping operations are mandated in six-month intervals, it is a continuous consideration to provide funding for the operations. One of the major difficulties with financing peacekeeping is predicting the costs of each mission, both start-up costs and operations during deployment. Each mission is funded individually with separate accounts. The difficulty arises because the missions are "hard to accommodate in the UN and national budgets." Member states often claim that peacekeeping budgets are not fully clarified and justified. However, despite the concerns, member states view this as a central activity of the United Nations.

The complexity of the peacekeeping budgetary process adds to the difficulties of properly deploying peacekeeping missions. With more peacekeeping operations being deployed, more accounts have to be funded through the special scale of assessments for peacekeeping expenses. The complexity of the issue is reflected in the different channels through which funding is requested and appropriated. For instance, although many operations are funded under the special scale, there are some aspects of peacekeeping deployment that are financed from the regular budget. The regular budget
"covers the costs of running the Department of Peacekeeping Operations itself; the Department of Political Affairs which negotiates the settlements which peacekeeping operations they implement; and the wide range of central administrative, personnel, financial, legal, and logistical functions which support peacekeeping operations." This link sometimes hampers the proper assessments for peacekeeping.

The breadth of this issue is reflected in the new mandates and deployments which have increased since 1987. However, the administrative structure necessary for deployment is under extreme pressure. Staffing has not accompanied the increase in missions. The universality of the issue is demonstrated by the portion it represents in the overall expenses of the Organization. In addition, the willingness of delegates to consider peacekeeping budgets separately despite the number of operations under current mandates, demonstrates the universal support for peacekeeping among the member states.

For this agenda item the documents under consideration were the reports of the Secretary General on peacekeeping operations and the reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ). The positions regarding this agenda item centered around various proposals and recommendations outlined in these reports, as well as the Ogata-Volcker report on financing an effective
United Nations. These recommendations included proposals for adjusting assessment schedules and enhancing financial reserves, strengthening UN Headquarters capacity, revising the special scale of assessments, emphasizing UN administrative and management reform, and further consideration of long-term financial reforms. However, consideration of this agenda item in general debate focused on immediate funding of peacekeeping operations. All other issues of financing became intertwined with this agenda item.

Consideration of the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations was introduced on December 2, 1993 with the announcement that a decision on what procedures to undertake in the classification of state groupings for the special scale of assessments for peacekeeping was expected. The classification was necessary because of the changing nature of operations and the overwhelming need for more experts in this area. There were only twelve budget officers assigned to peacekeeping budgets (forty budget officers were assigned to work on the regular budget) at a time when total costs of peacekeeping far exceeded the regular budget.32

The most pressing issue was the relocation of Ukraine and Belarus to a lower scale grouping, the developing countries' scale category. The General Assembly in the Forty-seventh Regular Session established an Open-ended
Working Group to explore the question of groupings of states. During the Forty-seventh session there were three or four attempts to reach a decision without success. Problems arose because these states wanted to be removed from the developed category to the developing category. States currently assigned to the developed category wanted them to remain in that category. The removal of Ukraine and Belarus to a lower category would increase the assessment for countries remaining in the developed category. Deliberation was undertaken to revive the Open-Working Group for deciding the groupings of states.

After statements from the Secretary of the Committee on Contributions regarding states requesting to be placed in lower assessment groups, general debate proceeded on this item. After initial statements from countries directly involved, suggestions were made regarding the overall consideration of the issue. Procedural matters were explored regarding the extension of the mandate for the Working Group. It was decided that a limited mandate would be given to the Working Group to address the issue. Further action would be taken after the Working Group reported its progress to the Fifth Committee in late December, 1993. After suggestions that one-round of informal consultations were needed to decide the Fifth Committee's course of action, the rapporteur, the delegate from Bangladesh, was appointed chair of the informal consultations.
At the following formal meeting on December 3, 1993, the chairman specified those aspects of the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations (agenda item #138) that would be considered during the remainder of the regular session. Statements were given by Madagascar, Ukraine, and Belarus, which expressed the urgency of their situations and requested that their specific concerns be considered separate from the general issue of the apportionment of peacekeeping expenses.

The chairman summarized the Fifth Committee's decision to conduct informal consultations. There were three major elements of this decision. The first element was the time-frame for consideration of the issue. It was decided that substantive consideration should occur before the suspension of the Forty-eighth Regular Session. Second, the mandate of the Working Group was to focus exclusively with the question of classification, starting with the new member states. New members in 1993 were not included in the financing of peacekeeping and contributions to the regular budget. After consideration of the new member states the Fifth Committee dealt with the specific requests of Ukraine, Belarus, and Madagascar. Third, further action taken on these issues was based upon the findings of the Working Group. The other aspects of agenda item #138 were deferred until the resumed session.
The Fifth Committee returned to the consideration of financing peacekeeping operations on December 19, 1993, pending the report of the Open-ended Working Group. This occurred after informal consultation in the morning. The broader category of financing peacekeeping operations was considered in conjunction with individual peacekeeping operations (agenda items 130-139, 149, 160, 162, 164-66, 173-174).

Seventeen peacekeeping operations were the subject of the Secretary General's report. The report of the Secretary General was presented in a "consolidated format covering all seventeen peacekeeping operations." This format was adopted because of delays in receiving information from the field. The Controller gave a statement regarding the requests of the Secretary General in his report on peacekeeping operations. His statements reviewed the mandates and financial status for the operations. The seventeen missions were divided into three main categories: 1) existing missions having authorization the General Assembly; 2) existing missions without General Assembly financing authorization; and 3) new operations. The report requested authorization for category one missions until the end of 1993 or early 1994, authorization for missions in the second category extended through early 1994, and for new missions, new authorizations were issued. The Advisory Committee recommended "commitment authority" for some
operations and assessments for other operations. Commitment authority is a mechanism for dispensing funds for operations while the Fifth Committee continues to deliberate on final budget approvals. Commitment authority would end March 31, 1994 for the authorized peacekeeping operations.

The two aspects of financing peacekeeping operations differed in that the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations tended to be less controversial than the actual financing of operations. Many of the proposals for the administrative and budgetary aspects tended to be instructions for implementing transitional plans and appeals for investigating the results of newly established procedures. However, the proposals submitted for financing peacekeeping operations whose mandates were expired or close to expiring represented a drastic move. The report requesting the funds for peacekeeping operations was submitted as a unified budget. This was not consistent with conventional procedures.

Most delegates expressed concerns over the late submission of the unified peacekeeping budget proposal. Most felt that this format was inappropriate. The format did not provide full justification of estimates or funding requests. Due to time constraints and the number of items left to consider, the committee decided to hold informal consultations regarding peacekeeping operations requiring General Assembly authorization to operate beyond January 1,
1994. The delegate of Japan was appointed chairman. Resolving the concerns of delegates, seventeen draft decisions were submitted to the Fifth Committee. To resolve the concerns about full justification of estimates for peacekeeping, "resource requirements for each operations was presented on a case-by-case basis."

Resource requirements for each operation were drafted and presented on the basis of the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee. Informal consultations were held to address the reaction of the delegates to the unified budget. This facilitated the approval of commitment authority and assessments by delegates on justified resource requirements. In total, there were four formal meetings and eight sessions of informal consultations over the course of three weeks, ending December 21, 1993.

The Secretary General's report requested approximately $1,538,067,200 for all seventeen missions. The Advisory Committee recommended approximately $1,207,067,300 for the missions. The Fifth Committee approved $578 million in commitment authority and assessments on the basis of current cash balances in peacekeeping accounts of $380 million.
Proposed Program Budget

The United Nations program budget is the major agenda item considered for approval by the Fifth Committee. The review of the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations and the improving the financial situation of the United Nations agenda items are related to the review and approval of the program budget (regular budget). Any proposals undertaken must be considered in the context of the proposed program budget and reviewed to determine their financial implications. The format used by the United Nations is the biennium which is a two-year guideline for planning organizational goals, establishing programs to achieve the goals, and providing budgetary support for the programs. There are three main aspects of the budgetary process which influence the final approval of the proposed program budget: objectives, expert review, and cash reserves.

First, there was a framework in which the objectives regarding the proposed program budget were presented. The framework is called the medium-term plan, adopted by the General Assembly in 1990 and revised in 1991. The medium-term plan was developed as the "framework for the formation of the biennial program budgets. It covered the entire range of United Nations activities, both global and regional, describing them in major programs or chapters covering a broad sectoral area which themselves were broken
into programs and subprograms."

The medium-term plan allowed the Fifth Committee to review and evaluate the budget more thoroughly and justify the allocation of resources for programs.

Second, expert review of the budget proposals was essential for fully evaluating the budget estimates, and it fostered transparency in the budgetary process. There are two advisory organs which review the proposed budget and make recommendations to the Fifth Committee regarding final approval. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) is responsible for reviewing and evaluating the financial estimates and administrative aspects of the budget. The second advisory organ is the Committee on Programme and Coordination (CPC) which is responsible for evaluating programmatic aspects, and specifically, reviewing the content of the programs. The CPC is "a principle advisory body to the General Assembly on matters related to the medium-term plan and programme budget." The reports of these two advisory bodies, in addition to the Secretary General's report, are the major documents upon which final approval in the Fifth Committee is made.

Third, the Working Capital Fund serves as a cash reserve to cover the operating expenses of the United Nations, pending the payment of the assessments. Established in 1946, "it enables the Secretary General to
meet day-to-day operating expenses until sufficient assessed payments for the regular budget are received and to meet "unforeseen and extraordinary" expenses, until such time as the General Assembly acts to meet them." The financial crisis of the mid-1980s prompted increased use of the Working Capital Fund, depleting available resources. This resulted from the regular use of the Working Capital Fund to "meet day-to-day obligations and cover cash shortfalls due to late payment or non-payment of assessments." Consideration of the regular budget must include evaluation of resources for sustaining the Working Capital Fund.

The Secretary General prepares the budget, and he is required to justify the budget estimates. Budget estimates are usually inflated to strike a balance between the amounts requested by the Secretary General and the amounts recommended by the advisory organs. The advisory organs provides a check on proposed budget amounts, and they make the Secretary General more accountable to the member states regarding the budget. In recent years the Secretary General has had to prepare the biennial UN budget under the pressure of the "zero-growth budget" constraint required by the larger contributors to maintain efficiency.

The consideration of the proposed program budget for the biennium 1994-1995 began on November 24, 1993. Because of delays in the submission of the appropriate documents, there were serious time constraints on thoroughly reviewing
the budget. There were twenty-one formal meetings and
sixteen informal meetings before the plenary at the end of
the regular session. Actual approval of the budget occurred
before the end of the regular session and revisions of the
estimates were considered in resumed sessions. The time
constraints resulted in an intensive revision of the budget.
In the last month of the Forty-eighth session, general
debate was highly concentrated. Once informal consultations
began December 12, 1993, the informal consultations were
also highly concentrated, with most of the formal meetings
occurring in the morning and formal meetings and informal
consultations held throughout the afternoon and evenings.

The proposed program budget for biennium 1994-1995
"amounted to $2,749,064,000 which represented an increase of
$282 million compared to the revised appropriations for
biennium 1992-1993 and a net increase of $232 million when
income was taken into account."42 The budget was organized
around three broad policy objectives: "enhancing the
capacity of the Organization in the political and
humanitarian areas; strengthening the role of the
Organization in international, economic, and social
cooperation and to that end, furthering the implementation
of the restructuring of the Secretariat in economic and
social sectors; and increasing managerial responsibility and
administrative efficiency."43
Consensus was sought regarding the proposed program budget in three main areas: justification of estimates; accountability from the Secretariat; and revision of the medium-term plan. The concerns and efforts of the delegates focused on making the budgetary process transparent and efficient.

With regards to the budget estimates, there were many concerns among delegates regarding overestimates of requested resources and cost escalation without justification. This was a particular concern of the major financial contributors who were responsible for financing the major part of the UN budget. Although, all delegates were concerned about increases in their financial contributions, the major contributors pressed hard to limit growth in the budget from one biennium period to another. The proposed program budget for the 1994-1995 biennium, reflected a growth of one percent from the previous budget. Delegates were very meticulous in reviewing estimates. However, the delegates were critical of the tendency of the Secretariat to inflate the estimates as a strategy to negotiate for reasonable amounts.

Related to the justification of estimates is the overall accountability of the Secretariat to the member states. Without fully justified estimates, the budgetary process is undermined and budgets are approved without adequate review or full explication of its implications.
Delegates complained of the continuing attempt to make the Fifth Committee into a "rubber stamp" committee, without authority to question the Secretariat regarding its activities. Many conflicts arose regarding the Secretariat's attempts to circumvent rigorous review. Representatives from the Secretariat argued that a lot of time was wasted over budget estimates because the Fifth Committee is too strict with its approval authority. The perspective of Secretariat personnel was that the member states should have confidence in the estimates proposed by the Secretary General instead of undermining the credibility of the office by extensive review of reports.

The third major area in which consensus was sought was the revision of the medium-term plan, specifically the content and priorities of the medium-term plan. Also included in the consideration of this budget format was emphasis on the need for clarity in the budget document. From the perspective of the delegates, if documents are fully explicated and the budgetary process is transparent there would not be a need for extensive review. Close scrutiny of the reports and estimates for the proposed program budgets was necessary because of the poor quality of the documents. There were complaints regarding the proposed budget not adhering to the budget outline set forth in Resolutions 41/213 and 47/213. The budget outline consisted of broad sectors within which programs were categorized and
described. Another important issue involving the medium-term plan was the increasing importance of extrabudgetary resources to the total amount of funds. This was reflected in the delegates' consideration of the budget. Because of the time constraints, the delegations were determined to adopt the budget by the end of the session. However, additional appropriations were to be considered in the context of the Secretary General's performance report on the budget.

Intensive consideration of the budget sections was conducted during the last four weeks of the session. General debate on the 1994-1995 biennium started on November 24, 1993. There was a total of twenty-one formal meetings. Sixteen sessions of informal consultations were held between December 12, 1993 and December 16, 1993. The negotiation efforts were directed to approve the budget by the end of the regular session. Delegates undertook consideration of the budget with a sense of urgency, but with the clear objective that every effort would be made to conduct a thorough review of the budget sections before final approval. These objectives were achieved on December 22, 1993.
Outcomes

For each case a discussion of the outcomes provides a survey of the results of the deliberations and an evaluation of what they represent as products of the process. This discussion gives an indication of whether the policy drafted reflects the objectives of the decision makers and whether they are consistent with the proposals drafted by the decision makers.

Final Decisions: 1963

The final decisions for the items under consideration yielded seven resolutions which would serve as the framework for determining peacekeeping finance policy.

The first item was a resolution regarding the general principles of peacekeeping finance and a permanent scale of assessment. The resolution produced provided a general outline for the apportionment of the peacekeeping expenses which summarized and consolidation of views of member states regarding peacekeeping. It served as a standard for guiding the formulation of peacekeeping policy.

The financial implications of the framework was the sharing of costs of future peacekeeping operations with heavy expenditures. The resolution provided procedures for sharing financial burden among the members according to individual financial capacity.

The resolution was politically viable in that extensive consideration of the issue and negotiation were undertaken
to work out difficulties. The extensive review of the different views contributed to the significant sponsorship of the resolution by members which allowed its consideration for final approval in committee and plenary. The resolution had thirty-four sponsors: twelve from the Afro-Asian group, twelve from the Latin American group, and ten from the developed countries. The final vote was 92-11-3 (yes-no-abstain).

The resolution could be implemented effectively, because of the widespread sponsorship and support. There were reservations and concerns regarding the implications of the resolution. However, there was enough support for considering the long-term measures for peacekeeping finance.

The second and third resolutions authorized the temporary financing for the UNEF and ONUC peacekeeping operations for the period of July 1, 1963 to December 31, 1963. The costs were apportioned among members according to ad hoc measures developed for determining their capacities to pay. The ad hoc methodology was developed with the view to establishing a permanent scale methodology for determining the finance of future operations.

The financial implications of the resolutions were the apportioned costs incurred by the members for the operations. The monthly cost of 6.58 million dollars was apportioned among members. The resolutions reflected collective responsibility in that the developed and
developing countries agreed to a general pledge to contribute according to their share of the regular budget.

The political viability of the resolutions as reflected in their sponsorship and final votes demonstrated that the finance of the operations had significant support. The resolutions reflected the most acceptable compromises produced from the negotiations. Each of the resolutions had thirty sponsors: twelve from the Latin American group; ten from the developed group; and eight from the Afro-Asian group. The final votes were 80-11-16 for UNEF and 80-12-15 for ONUC.

The resolutions could be implemented to the extent that members complied with paying their shares of the costs and the arrears accrued while they waited for the ICJ advisory opinion and the subsequent General Assembly action. The members agreed to financing for specific periods so that they could better monitor the authorized disbursements.

The fourth resolution emphasized the arrears accrued regarding the UNEF and ONUC operations. This resolution accompanied the UNEF and ONUC resolutions. It was an appeal for compliance from members to continue finance of the operations for the authorized periods and to pay the arrears in full.

The financial implications for the members were that they had to contribute more finances to cover the arrears and the new finance mandates. Eventually cash shortages
resulted.

The resolution was politically viable as reflected in the significant support for the appeal. However, given the financial implications, compliance was questionable.

Implementation of the resolution was not an issue. If by its approval the members were prompted to pay the arrears, despite the financial constraints, then it was effective.

The three remaining resolutions regarding the UN Bonds, Peace Fund, and the Committee of Twenty-one, were not considered during the negotiations. However, they had overwhelming support from the members, having final votes of (92-12-4), (91-12-2), and (95-12-2), respectively.

Overall, the final decisions had the intended effects. They provided general outlines for the apportionment of the peacekeeping expenses, reinforced the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion, and reflected the support for the United Nations practices regarding peacekeeping operations.

The decision represented the product of the various views of the members as filtered through the negotiations. However they "exhibited scars of a long drawn-out battle and did not represent exactly what any one country or group of countries would have liked." The political viability of the decision is reflected in the resolutions' full consideration by the committee. Extensive consideration of
the resolutions through votes on individual clauses allowed
the consolidation of different views.

Final Decisions: 1993

Introduction

The resolutions approved and adopted by the Fifth
Committee during the Forty-eighth Regular Session were also
adopted in the eighty seventh plenary session of the General
Assembly on December 23, 1993. The Fifth Committee had been
allocated fifty-one agenda items to consider and approve.
The rapporteur of the Fifth Committee reported to the
plenary meeting that during the period of September 28, 1993
to December 22, 1993, the Fifth Committee held forty-six
formal meetings, numerous informal consultations, and that
all draft resolutions and decisions were adopted by
consensus. Among the reports on the fifty-one agenda items,
the resolutions on the five agenda items focused on in this
analysis and seventeen peacekeeping mission were also
reported.

Each item was presented individually and adopted.
Delegates were given the opportunity to make statements
regarding the final decisions if their positions had changed
since approval in committee or if they did not have recorded
statements during general debate. However, their statements
were limited to explanations of position. Of all of the
decisions adopted, the scale of assessments was the only
item having further statements from delegates. The
resolutions adopted in the Fifth Committee become policy under which the United Nations operates regarding financial and budgetary matters. It is important to consider the decision outcomes, their significance to the implementation of the policies, and the member states' compliance with the policies.

The criteria for evaluating the decision outcomes was described in Chapter Three based on Badrach's approach to policy analysis. The decision outcome for each agenda item examined in this study is evaluated by assessing the resolution produced. It is important to assess whether the policy produced is consistent with the outcomes requested in the initial proposals considered by the committee, describe the financial implications stemming from the policy, determine whether the policy is politically viable, and whether the policy could be effectively implemented.
The Scale of Assessments

The resolution produced regarding the scale of assessments was consistent with recommendations for resolving its difficulties. The objective was to provide a mandate so that a more reliable and simple scale methodology could be developed. The resolution was consistent with the initial proposals in that it provided a specific criteria for the scale methodology, consolidated and reflected the perspectives of the various financial interest groups, and provided follow-up instructions for evaluating the performance of the new scale methodology. For instance, one provision of the resolution was the application of ad hoc criteria for the period of 1995 through 1997. In addition, another provision requested a review of the implications at the Fiftieth Regular Session of the General Assembly.

The financial implications resulting from the ad hoc criteria would raise the rate of the countries having had recent economic growth for the period of 1995-1997, because the rate was based on an average of seven and eight-year statistical base periods instead of the ten-year standard. However, the rate was not increased as much as if the three-year statistical base period had been used. The financial implications were within the financial capacities of member states. The criteria applied for this period was agreed upon and approved. An overarching financial implication was that the mandate provided a basis for
appropriating funds. Without the mandate member states would not comply with their obligations to pay their assessed contributions.

The policy was politically viable. The political will existed among the member states to approve and comply with the policy. The benefits of the policy was that it distributed financial responsibility more equitably. The statistical base period calculation was more reflective of the member states’ capacities to pay. In addition, the financial responsibility borne by developing countries and countries with recent economic growth was not harsh. Overall, there was a better distribution of assessment rates across the scale groupings.

The policy produced in committee was implementable. It was a reliable criteria which specifically targeted the anomalies in the scale methodology. A probation period for its use provided follow-up on its progress as a policy. Performance reports added to its effectiveness because they allowed continuous review and consideration of the specific financial concerns of the member states.

After the adoption of the scale of assessments resolution (A/48/223 A, B, C) in the committee, there were further statements regarding the scale methodology. The delegations which gave explanations of position were Latvia (on behalf of Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia), Mexico, Kazakhstan, and Belarus (on behalf of Ukraine and Belarus).
Latvia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan commended the ambassador of Barbados for his skill and creativity as chairman of the informal consultations for the scale of assessments. They expressed gratitude regarding the efforts of the Fifth Committee to correct the problems created by the rates assessed the Twenty-two Member States, and the special problems experienced by the Ukraine and Belarus.

The delegation from Mexico stressed that it had joined the consensus based on its continuing belief that the "rights accorded by the Charter to certain Member States should correspond to the responsibilities which those States ought to assume in financing the Organization." The delegation felt that the resolution should have included a reference to the usefulness of exploring possible criteria for the apportionment of a fixed percentage of the costs of the United Nations for the permanent members of the Security Council. For the record, the delegation from Mexico reserved the right to raise the matter again.

The resolutions produced regarding the review of efficiency and improving the financial situation were consistent with the outcome intended by the proposals and recommendations. The recommendations requested further review of the administrative and financial efficiency of the United Nations. The resolutions produced in the Fifth Committee outlined instructions for improving the overall financial situation and the efficiency of the Organization. Measures were developed which would implement changes on a step-by-step basis. Included in the measures were proposals targeting specified areas for restructuring and consolidation of services. In addition, several measures were outlined in the resolutions to facilitate restructuring and consolidation efforts.

Plans were outlined for an oversight unit for evaluating the effectiveness of programs and activities and improving the management of programs and activities. The measures in the resolutions provided ad hoc arrangements until the proper structures were designed and developed for implementing the mandates. Revisions to the medium-term plan were outlined and instructions given regarding the benefits of the new format. The new format for the medium-term plan was designed to improve program planning for the budget.
The resolutions followed the design proposed for providing an appropriate system of accountability and responsibility for operating the United Nations and its programs. They also provide for a continuous review of progress of the financial crisis with the mandate for an ad hoc Working Group of Experts to provide recommendations and performance reports.

The financial implications of the policy are that the restructuring plans may cost more because plans have to be fully implemented. However, the resources would be better distributed and the member states would have more control over the allocation of resources. This could improve the flow of cash because if there was more administrative efficiency and budgetary accountability, member states would be more willing to pay their contributions.

The policy was politically viable in that many of the proposals and efforts appealed to the concerns of the major contributors. With their agreement they would be more likely to comply with their financial obligations. Because the administrative changes make the allocation of resources more transparent, member states would be able to trace the distribution and use of the resources. Compliance would be easier to foster.

Whether the policy was implementable depended upon the support and compliance from the member states regarding the restructuring efforts. Because the funds for activities and
programs were fully justified, they would be easier to implement. The plans outlined in the resolutions after being reviewed and approved were transitional instructions which would suffice until further review was undertaken and permanent procedures were implemented.
The Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Financing of Individual Peacekeeping Operations

The policy produced was consistent with the outcome intended by the proposals regarding the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations. They attempted to project for the future, reports that were more analytic. They made specific reference to the recommendations of the ACABQ regarding the reduction in the costs of peacekeeping operations and the implementation of cost-saving measures. The resolutions provided definitive instructions regarding the improvement of the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, and the enhancement of budget control by the member states. In addition to the other cost-saving measures, the resolutions requested review of the procedure for requesting commitment authority. The proposals and recommendations called for standard guidelines for financial arrangements and strengthening the internal audit function in the mission area and Headquarters for which the resolutions gave provision.

With regard to the financing of the individual peacekeeping operations, the final decisions on budget requests were not fully consistent with the outcomes intended by the proposals. The budget proposals requested appropriations for seventeen peacekeeping missions. The recommendations of the ACABQ were for commitment authority
because the budgets had not been approved. The recommendations regarding commitment authority were derived from the need to provide funds for the continuation of the operations until proper review and approval of the budgets. The presentation of the peacekeeping budgets in a unified report was not consistent with the proposals for thorough, proper budgetary review. The budget proposals for each operation were considered separately.

The financial implications of the final decision for the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations would be that there would be more funds and resources needed for resolving cash shortages, start-up costs and the continuation of mandates. The payment of contributions should improve because the scale criteria for the placement of new members was clarified.

With regard to financing individual peacekeeping operations the total amount approved for financing the seventeen missions under consideration was $578 million which was significantly lower than the amount recommended by the ACABQ for commitment authority ($1,207,067,300). However, once the Fifth Committee approved the budgets the assessments were adjusted accordingly.

The policy for guiding administrative and budgetary procedures for financing peacekeeping operations and the recommended amounts for continuing the operations under consideration were politically viable. As long as the
process maintained an ad hoc nature, the member states would support and comply with the policy outlined in the resolutions. Any efforts to establish an automatic commitment of funds would meet with opposition. The amounts approved reflected what the member states were willing to collectively appropriate for the continuation of the operations. Most likely the member states would comply with the amount approved in committee.

The policy produced was implementable. The appropriations could not be implemented beyond the amounts approved by the Fifth Committee. The decisions were reached to resolve conflicts, allowing further review and consideration of budgets, taking into account the concerns and problems of member states regarding their ability and willingness to pay contributions and arrears. The decisions reached did not exceed the member states' capacity to pay or comply.
Proposed Program Budget

The budget appropriations were reviewed and revised before final approval by the Fifth Committee. The proposals were consistent with the budget that was eventually adopted. The budget was approved by consensus, and it was based only on those amounts that were fully justified. The final appropriations of resources for biennium 1992-1993 were decided in December, 1993. The final appropriations were $2,411,404,000 for expenditures and $443,320,100 for income. This reflected a decrease of $56,054,200 (2.3 percent) from $2,467,458,200 appropriated by the General Assembly resolution 47/212B of May, 1993. Budget appropriations for biennium 1994-1995 were approved December, 1993, totalling $2,580,200,200 gross ($2,112,798,500 net) of which member states were assessed $1,198,902,550 for 1994. The proposed appropriations for biennium 1994-1995 had been $2,749,064,000, reflecting a growth of $25,324,200 which was one percent over the revised appropriations approved for biennium 1992-1993. A budget was produced by the end of the regular session. Although it was approved the budget still would be considered for revised and final appropriations, and it was subject to review for performance reports.

The financial implications of the budget were that member states would have additional financial obligations with the new budget, and they had a mandate from which to assess members. It did not fully address the financial
crisis, but it did not add more administrative and budgetary problems. The payment of contributions and arrears became more critical with the new budget, because the budget from the previous biennium had not been fully funded.

The budget outline was not fully political viable. The budget approved represented a general political agreement among the member states. Although the budget was approved by consensus, there were concerns regarding subsections of the budget. The member states were willing to support the approval of the budget despite their concerns because they wanted to ensure that a budget was submitted. Specific concerns or problems could be resolved after budget revisions and performance reports were submitted in resumed session. They committed funds for activities and programs important for the continuation of day-to-day operations.

The budget was implementable to the extent that funds were available for operations. Although the approval of the budget reflected agreement among the member states, everyone was not satisfied with the budget. Many sections were not fully explicated, but a workable budget outline was produced so that further and final revision could be undertaken. As the budget was fully justified, compliance followed.

Endnotes


20. McDermott, 46.


24. Summary Records A/C.5/SR.12, 1993, Section 15. The resolution mentioned in this citation, 46/221B, provided the initial proposals for revision of the scale of assessments. The main position of the resolution was that changes of the scale methodology should be based on a ten-year statistical base period.


31. Roper et. al., 27.

32. Roper et. al., 27.


39. Roper et. al., 45.

40. Roper et. al., 45.

41. Riggs and Plano, 87.


CHAPTER V
RESULTS FROM THE 1993 CASE

Overview

The objective of this chapter is the evaluation of the variables operating in the negotiation of consensus. Three sections outline the stages of the analysis of the political process and the decision makers' orientations and styles in the Fifth Committee's deliberations on peacekeeping finance and related issues. The first section presents the key patterns and trends from the documentary analysis and interviews which demonstrate the variables. The second section explains the variation in the variables and outcomes, evaluating how consensus varied regarding each agenda item. The observations noted regarding the agenda items in public debate are presented in this section to demonstrate the roles of the variables regarding consensus.

Consensus developed regarding five agenda items related to peacekeeping finance as expected and explained in the hypotheses. Quantitative and qualitative data compiled for this study, were essential for demonstrating the patterns and trends underlying the development of consensus and determining the variation in the variables across agenda items. The data tabulated and categorized from documents,
observation, and interviews were important for determining the effect of the relationships between the variables on consensus.²

Each research method provided information from which a general profile of the entire process was drafted. However, the combination of the information provided from all of the methods allowed the researcher to properly evaluate the variables. For instance, although the analysis confirmed that there are variables which are general to the political process, it also demonstrates that their relative importance to consensus varies according to the types of issues considered. In other words, it demonstrates that different degrees of consensus were reached on different types of decisions or resolutions, according to how the variables functioned during the consideration of different agenda items.
Presentation of Patterns and Trends

Documents provided information regarding the key issues considered in the drafting of the decision as well as the various perspectives which had to be addressed and resolved. This information was noted for each agenda item considered.

The interviews provided additional information regarding the major components which came to bear in the political process, most of which is reviewed in this chapter. Additional information included participants' evaluations of the major components of the process. This allowed the researcher to assess the variables' relationships to consensus. The information included details which the researcher could not have recognized as an outsider. In addition, the proper interpretation of the developments during negotiation depended upon the details provided in the interviews.

The following data were the responses to open-ended questions and closed-ended questions asked in the interviews and on the questionnaires.¹

Most Difficult Issues to Resolve

What are the most difficult issues to resolve regarding peacekeeping finance?

As covered in the case narrative, six main issues were listed as the most difficult issues to resolve regarding peacekeeping finance: 1) the scale of assessments; 2) the review of efficiency; 3) improving the financial situation;
4) the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations; 5) financing individual peacekeeping operations; and 6) the proposed program budget. The following data report the responses which reflect the respondents' perceptions of the issues which were most difficult to resolve in seeking consensus on peacekeeping finance.

Scale of Assessments

Eighteen percent of the respondents noted the scale of assessments, reflecting sixty-four percent of the respondents. The eighteen respondents noted four issues related to this item. Seventeen or ninety-four percent of the respondents noting this agenda item, stated that the scale should reflect collective responsibility; sixty-seven percent noting the reassignment of members to different scale groupings; sixty-one percent noting the methodology and the statistical base periods; and sixteen percent, the consolidation of scale groupings.

Table 5: Responses regarding the scale of assessments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Collective Responsibility</td>
<td>17 (94%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Reassignment of Groups</td>
<td>12 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Methodology</td>
<td>11 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Consolidation of Groups</td>
<td>3 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first three categories of perspectives reflected concerns regarding the collective financial responsibility
of the members and the rate of assessment each member incurred. These concerns later developed into very divisive factions regarding over how to evaluate the capacity to pay. For instance, the delegate from Iran noted that if the permanent members reduced their contributions, the share of the financial responsibility would have to be redistributed across the other scale groupings. This would increase the rate of assessments for other members. Opposition emerged, because most of the members believed that the permanent members should have special financial responsibility. The percentages illustrate that in their consideration of the scale, members' major concerns focused on how best to measure the capacity to pay and how to translate the decision into an equitable scale.

Review of Efficiency

Nine of the twenty-eight respondents noted the review of efficiency, reflecting thirty-two percent of the respondents. The nine respondents noted three issues related to this item. All nine respondents noted the restructuring of the Secretariat; Seven respondents or seventy-eight percent noted that there should be a change in the composition of the Security Council; and three respondents or thirty-three percent noted the establishment of an Inspector General.
Table 6: Responses regarding the review of efficiency

Total number of respondents: 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Restructuring Secretariat</td>
<td>9 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Composition of Security Council</td>
<td>7 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Inspector General</td>
<td>3 (33%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6 demonstrates that among a third of the respondents there was overwhelming concern regarding the United Nations' efficiency. Making the United Nations more efficient would require the consolidation of certain offices and deleting the overlap in services, as well as providing an overall leadership structure which was more reflective of the political and economic realities of the global environment. A major proposal from the United States was the strengthening of the internal auditing capacity by establishing the Office of the Inspector General. This would provide the proper oversight of United Nations activities and programs.

Improving the Financial Situation

Eleven of the twenty-eight respondents noted improving the financial situation, reflecting thirty-nine percent of the respondents. The eleven respondents noted four issues related to this agenda item. All eleven respondents noted the payment of assessments and arrears; sixty-four percent noted the payment of assessment by quarterly installments; twenty-seven percent noted private investment; and eighteen
percent noted that members should make their contributions from their defense budgets.

Table 7: Responses regarding improving the financial situation

Total Number of Respondents: 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Payment of assessments and arrears</td>
<td>11 (100%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Payment by installments</td>
<td>7 (64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Contributions from defense budget</td>
<td>2 (18%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 7 reflect the concerns among the delegates that the responsibility for improving the financial situation of the United Nations, although it was related to its need for efficiency, rested with the members. Although the Secretariat had to be accountable to the members, the members were responsible for paying their contributions. The recommendations issued by the Independent Advisory Group that the payment of contributions should be done in installments and that the contributions should be made from the defense budgets were particularly popular. Although these recommendations were noted as possibilities, most respondents wanted the United Nations to demonstrate more administrative and financial efficiency.
All twenty-eight respondents noted these two items. The respondents noted three issues related to these items. Sixty-eight percent noted that peacekeeping should be financed by the regular budget or the special scale for peacekeeping budgets; fifty-four percent noted whether there should be individual budgets or a unified budget; and forty-six percent noted the development of a permanent structure for determining finance of the peacekeeping operations.

Table 8: Responses regarding administrative and budgetary aspects of UN Peacekeeping Operations and Financing Individual Peacekeeping Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentages of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Finance under regular budget or special scale</td>
<td>19 (68%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unified vs. individual budgets</td>
<td>15 (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Permanent structure for determining finance</td>
<td>13 (46%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 demonstrates that the major concerns among the respondents concentrated in the area of financing peacekeeping operations under the regular budget or the special scale for financing peacekeeping operations. The concerns, particularly among Latin American delegates, emphasized the moves to eliminate the special scale. The delegate from Cuba, during the consideration of the
operation in South Africa, stated that each operation should be reviewed to determine its political and financial implications. This should be the standard that determines whether an operation should be financed under the regular budget or under a special scale.

Other concerns centered on whether the peacekeeping budgets should be reported in a unified budget or individual budget. During the Forty-eighth session, the delegates rejected the unified budget format, opting for the review of individual budgets to ensure that the Secretariat had justified all the budget estimates. In addition, there were responses which posited that the most effective way to facilitate the finance of operations was through a permanent structure which would review the requirements for each operation.

The Proposed Program Budget

Fourteen of the twenty-eight respondent noted the proposed program budget, reflecting 50 percent of the respondents. The fourteen respondents noted three issues related to this item. Ninety-three percent noted that the regular budget should be approved by consensus; sixty-four percent noted the need for a complete justification of budget estimates; and twenty-nine percent noted that the standard for approval budget should zero real growth.
Table 9: Responses regarding the proposed budget

Total Number of respondents: 14

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Approved by consensus</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(93%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Justification of estimates</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>(64%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Zero real growth</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(29%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 9 the responses show that the respondents believed that the Fifth Committee should continue to approve the budget by consensus. According to the delegate from Russia, this development was very important to the drafting and approval of the budget, avoiding disjointed budgets. The responses reveal that the accountability of the Secretariat regarding estimates is ensured through the thorough review of the proposed budget. The consensus procedure forced the Secretariat to fully justify its requests. In addition, the responses show that zero real growth in the budgets is an important standard for approving the budget which means that the delegates were concerned that growth in budget should be warranted and fully justified.

The patterns of responses in the preceding tables show not only that there were six main items which were considered important to peacekeeping finance, but that their complexity required careful consideration before negotiation could proceed. The administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations and the financing of
individual peacekeeping operations were considered the most difficult issues to resolve among the respondents.

Each of the issues related to the agenda items reflect the different perspectives held by different delegates or coalitions of delegates. These perspectives or concerns could have potentially hindered or facilitated negotiation. They reflect the parameters within which a moderating decision was drafted.

Description of the Nature of Consensus

A profile of consensus was compiled from tabulating the responses to the open-ended question regarding the factors they thought were most important to consensus, the main characteristics of consensus, their perceptions of consensus, and the role of commitment authority.

What are the factors that you believe are most important to achieving consensus?

Respondents noted five factors that were most important to consensus in their descriptions of the nature of consensus. Nineteen respondents or sixty-eight percent of the respondents noted time as a major factor regarding consensus. Eighteen respondents or 95 percent of the respondents noted that more time was needed for achieving consensus and twenty-one percent noted that the process was wasteful.
Table 10: Time

Total Number of Respondents: 19

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. More time needed</td>
<td>18 (95%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Process is wasteful</td>
<td>4 (21%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 10 show that the majority of the respondents felt that time was key in reaching consensus. Consensus decisions take more time, because more elaboration is needed for drafting and deliberation. These respondents felt that the process was effective in producing substantive decisions. However, a few respondents felt that the process was wasteful, and they preferred the deliberation of the other committees. They felt that voting was more decisive.

Relations with the Secretariat was noted by thirteen respondents or forty-six percent of the respondents. Seventy-seven percent noted that the vague explanations for budget requests affected relations; forty-six percent noted attempts by the Secretariat to force decisions; forty-six percent noted the delegates' lack of trust for the Secretariat; and twenty-three percent noted the Secretariat's resentment of the challenges from the delegates.
Table 11: Relations with the Secretariat

Total Number of Respondents: 13

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vague Explanations</td>
<td>10 (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Secretariat attempts to force a decision</td>
<td>6 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Delegates lack of trust for Secretariat</td>
<td>6 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Secretariat resent challenges from delegates</td>
<td>3 (23%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 11 show that the objective of achieving consensus was beset with conflicts between the Secretariat and the delegates. Delegates believe that the Secretariat tries to by-pass their review and approval by submitting vague explanations for their budget requests, and it tries to force decisions by imposing unrealistic deadlines for approval. The lack of trust prolongs the process of review and approval. According to the delegate from France that despite conflicts with the Secretariat, the Fifth Committee thoroughly reviews the proposals, and it was determined not become a "rubber stamp" committee. According to one Secretariat representative, there is resentment in the Secretariat regarding the challenges from the delegates. The representative believes that the delegates should have faith in the estimates.

Documents was noted as an important factor were noted by nine respondents or 32 percent of the respondents. Eighty-eight percent noted that the documents were not
submitted in a timely manner for review; forty-five percent noted that the documents were poorly drafted; and forty-five percent noted that the documents consisted of inflated estimates.

Table 12: Documents
Total Number of Respondents: 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Not submitted in a timely manner</td>
<td>8 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Poorly drafted</td>
<td>4 (45%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Overestimates</td>
<td>4 (45%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the responses in Table 12, documents are the key reference material which determine the review of the proposals. It is important that they are submitted in a timely manner and properly drafted to ensure an accurate review. Poorly drafted documents without the correct technical data and analysis tend to prolong the process, making the documents more difficult to review. In addition, overestimates are a concern among the delegates, because it forces them to take more time in distinguishing between need and waste.

Review from the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) was noted by nine respondents or 32 percent of the respondents as an important factor. Seventy-eight percent noted the ACABQ's cutting of the budget; sixty-seven percent noted the ACABQ's
justification of recommendations; and forty-four percent noted the ACABQ's expert assessments.

Table 13: ACABQ review

Total Number of Respondents: 9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Cut the budget</td>
<td>7  (78%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Justification of recommendations</td>
<td>6  (67%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Expert assessments</td>
<td>4  (44%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 shows that the respondents value the review of the ACABQ, because it is relied upon as a check on the Secretariat. The expertise of the ACABQ members fosters trust among the delegates regarding the review of estimates and recommendations. According to these respondents, many delegates will not allow a final decision on budget proposals until the ACABQ has submitted its recommendations.

Individual personalities was noted by twenty-nine percent of the respondents. Seventy-five percent noted the delegate's character and integrity; fifty percent noted the incumbent delegate's prestige; and thirty-eight percent the cohesion among the delegates.
Table 14: Individuals' personalities

Total Number Respondents: 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Character/integrity</td>
<td>6 (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Incumbent delegates' prestige</td>
<td>4 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Cohesion among delegates</td>
<td>3 (38%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As shown in Table 14, the majority of the respondents felt that the character and integrity of each delegate was important to the success and effectiveness of the negotiators. In addition, the prestige of incumbent delegates was important, because the more experience a delegate has in the committee the more time he or she has had to build a reputation among the colleagues. Also, the individual personalities was important to fostering cohesion among the delegates, reflecting general loyalty among colleagues.

The respondents noted three characteristics in their descriptions of the nature of consensus—advantages, disadvantages, and long-term implications. Twenty-three respondents (eighty-two percent) noted the advantages of consensus stressing four advantages: Sixty-five percent of the respondents noted that support of the policy in principle was an advantage; fifty-seven percent noted cohesion among delegates; forty-three percent noted that the minority interests were protected; and twenty-two percent noting its benefit in reaching instrumental goals.
Table 15: Advantages of consensus

Total Number of Respondents: 23

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Support policy in principle</td>
<td>15 (65%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Cohesion on decisions</td>
<td>13 (57%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Minority interests protected</td>
<td>10 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Benefit in reaching instrumental goals</td>
<td>5 (22%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 15 show that the majority of the respondents believed that the support of the policy in principle was the first step to gaining compliance from members until an overall consensus developed. The responses also reveal that producing cohesive decisions was essential for interpreting the level of commitment and potential for compliance among the members. According to the responses, consensus protected the interests of the powerful minority. This arena protects the interests of the major financial contributors, providing them with a veto over the decisions. Had there been a vote, their interests would have been challenged by an automatic voting majority. The responses also reveal that one benefit of consensus is that it allows a problem to be addressed in stages when the ultimate objective is not possible.

Sixteen respondents (fifty-seven percent) noted the disadvantages of consensus, stressing four disadvantages: Sixty-nine percent noted difficult negotiations; fifty percent noted that it was a time-consuming process;
thirty-one percent noted that the decisions are sometimes sidetracked; and twenty-five percent noted that the decisions are sometimes vague.

Table 15: Disadvantages of consensus

Total Number of Respondents: 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Difficult negotiations</td>
<td>11 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Time consuming process</td>
<td>8 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Decisions are sometimes sidetracked</td>
<td>5 (31%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Decisions are sometimes vague</td>
<td>4 (25%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 16 show that the majority of the respondents believed that difficult negotiations is a major disadvantage of consensus. Difficult negotiations require more effort, information, technical expertise, creativity and commitment from the delegates which also makes it a time consuming process. The respondents also noted the dangers and problems with consensus decisions. Sometimes the decisions are sidetracked, and the real issues may not be fully addressed. Also, vague decisions causes problems with the interpretation and implementation of the decisions.

Sixteen respondents (fifty-seven percent) noted the long-term implications, stressing four implications: Eighty-eight percent noted incremental progress; sixty-nine percent noted that consensus becomes a moderating influence in conflicts; forty-four percent noted that institutional
memory grows as precedents are set; and thirty-one percent noted that the ultimate goal is eventually reached.

Table 17: Long-term implications

Total Number of Respondents: 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Perspectives</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Incremental progress</td>
<td>14 (88%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Moderating influence</td>
<td>11 (66%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Institutional memory</td>
<td>7 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ultimate goal reached</td>
<td>5 (31%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses in Table 17 illustrate that the majority of the respondents believed that consensus allowed problems to be addressed incrementally which was essential for significant progress. Respondents also believed that the moderating influence of consensus resolved conflicts over policy by suspended finality in decision until consensus fully developed. In addition, the importance of consensus in producing precedents and transitional plans for the implementation of decisions usually resulted in a substantive consensus in the long-term.

Responses to the open-ended questions regarding the respondents' perceptions of consensus indicated three different descriptions. Twenty-one respondents or seventy-five percent of the respondents described consensus as a tool, twelve respondents or forty-two percent of the respondents described consensus as a goal, and eleven respondents or thirty-nine percent of the respondents
described consensus as a policy.

Table 18: Descriptions of consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptions</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Tool</td>
<td>21 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Goal</td>
<td>12 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Policy</td>
<td>11 (39%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 shows that most of the respondents described consensus as a tool in which it was used as a means to produce an appropriate policy. Secondly, it was described as a goal which means it was viewed as an objective or guide to evaluate progress and performance. Thirdly, it was described as a policy or plan in which procedural needs were addressed to facilitate substantive needs.

Six respondents gave responses describing the role of commitment authority in consensus: six respondents described it as an administrative procedure; three respondents described it as an executive mechanism; and three respondents described it as a financing tool.

Table 19: Role of commitment authority

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Descriptions</th>
<th>Number of Respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative Procedure</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Executive Mechanism</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Financing Tool</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Approximately one-fourth of the respondents noted the role of commitment authority in consensus decision making. First, it was described as an administrative procedure which
means that it was a measure for facilitating consensus. For instance, it provided an extension of time for considering an item. Second, it was described as an executive mechanism which means that it was a measure for overcoming gridlock. For instance, when agreement is not reached, the Secretary General has some leverage to appropriate funds for operations. Third, it was described as a financing tool which allowed the committee to appropriate initial funds for operations until final approval was given.

The patterns of responses in the preceding tables revealed that among the respondents, time and relations with the Secretariat are the factors they felt were most important and represented the biggest constraints on consensus. In their descriptions of consensus the respondents stressed the advantages of consensus more than the disadvantages and long-term effects. Among their perceptions of consensus, the respondents stressed the use of consensus as a tool. In addition, the role of commitment authority as an administrative procedure was stressed. The variety of responses describing the nature of consensus demonstrates the complexity of consensus decision making in the United Nations. The responses are consistent with the different functions of consensus noted in the literature.

Factors Important to Peacekeeping Finance

What are the factors that you believe are most important to achieving consensus on peacekeeping finance?
Eight additional factors were noted in responses to the open-ended question regarding the factors that they thought were most important to a consensus on peacekeeping finance. These factors were noted by ten respondents (thirty-six percent): six references regarding consensus and peacekeeping finance noted the financing of individual peacekeeping operations; five references regarding negotiations; five references regarding the political process; four references regarding the budgetary process; four references regarding the delegates' perceptions of individual peacekeeping operations; three references regarding administrative procedures; two references regarding the characteristics of the delegates; and two references regarding the decision outcomes on related issues.

Table 20: Factors important to peacekeeping finance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors Noted</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Financing Individual Pkos</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Negotiations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Political Process</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Budgetary Process</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Delegates' perceptions of Pkos</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Administrative procedures</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Characteristics of the delegates</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Decision outcomes</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The additional references made regarding factors important to consensus and peacekeeping finance demonstrate that the respondents view peacekeeping as a comprehensive
issue which is interdependently linked to other financial matters. The financing of individual peacekeeping operations and negotiations are the two major issues of concern.

The concern over individual peacekeeping operations shows that the respondents believed that how each operation was reviewed for political and financial implications affected how peacekeeping finance was determined, overall. Concern regarding negotiations did not involve decisions regarding the merits of operations, but over the financial implications. Political considerations affected the approval of finance in that they determined whether the delegates were lenient or harsh in their review. The respondents also believed that the political and budgetary process functioned as constraints on peacekeeping finance. They believe that these processes were necessary for gaining approval for operations, reflecting the commitment of the delegates to thorough review. These concerns and constraints affected the decision outcomes, determining whether delegates chose to extend commitment authority or approve a final budget.

Role of the Variables in Reaching Consensus

The following are responses given regarding the role each variable played was noted by the respondents in the questionnaire and in their explanations.
Degree of Difference in State Policies

Table 21 shows that there were thirty responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Eleven responses or thirty-seven percent of the responses indicated that this variable is important to consensus with five responses (sixteen percent) indicating that it was very important, and six responses (twenty percent), somewhat important. The responses in Table 21 reveal that the approximately fifty-three percent of the responses revealed that respondents were confident in the importance of this variable to the achievement of consensus. Approximately twenty percent were not as confident of its importance, and twenty percent were confident that it was not important to consensus.

Table 21: Questionnaire responses: degree of difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses of Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Important</td>
<td>11 (37%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Not important</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat important</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Very important</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The unsolicited responses regarding its importance indicated that it facilitates consensus, and its influence was significant. Among the forty-two responses given, seventeen responses or forty percent of the responses noted that it facilitates consensus, and sixteen or thirty-eight
percent of the responses noted that its influence was significant. The responses in Table 22 reveal that approximately seventy-eight percent of the responses revealed that the respondents were confident of this variable's influence on consensus.

Table 22: Unsolicited responses: degree of difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates Consensus</td>
<td>17 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>16 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>5 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>4 (10%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Development of Subgroups

Table 23 indicates thirty responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance the this variable. Twelve responses or forty percent of the responses indicated that this variable was important to consensus with nine responses or thirty percent of the responses indicating that it was very important and six responses or twenty percent of the responses indicating that it was somewhat important. Table 23 shows that approximately seventy percent of responses indicate that the respondents were confident of its importance and approximately twenty percent of the responses revealed that they were not as confident of its importance to consensus.
Table 23: Questionnaire responses: development of subgroups

Total Number of Responses: 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Important</td>
<td>12 (40%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Very Important</td>
<td>9 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat Important</td>
<td>6 (20%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Not Important</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Undecided</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The unsolicited responses regarding its importance indicated that it facilitates consensus. Among the fifty-six responses given, twenty-eight responses or fifty percent indicated that it facilitates consensus, and fifteen responses or twenty-seven percent of the responses indicated that its influence was significant. In Table 24 the responses show that seventy-seven percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's influence on consensus.

Table 24: Unsolicited responses: development of subgroups

Total Number of Responses: 56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates Consensus</td>
<td>28 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>15 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>7 (13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Networks of Individuals

Table 25 indicates twenty-eight responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable.
Fourteen responses or fifty percent of the responses indicated that this variable was very important to consensus with nine responses or thirty-two percent of the responses indicated that it was important, and four responses or fourteen percent indicating somewhat important. In Table 25, approximately eighty-two percent of the responses indicate that the respondents were confident of the variable's importance to consensus.

Table 25: Questionnaire responses: networks of individuals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Responses: 28</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat Important</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undecided</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the fifty-three unsolicited responses, twenty-eight responses or fifty-three percent of the responses indicated that this variable facilitates consensus, and sixteen responses or thirty percent of the responses indicated that its influence was significant. In Table 26, approximately eighty-three percent of the responses reveal that the respondents had confidence in the influence of this variable on consensus.
Table 26: Unsolicited responses: networks of individuals

Total Number of Responses: 53

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates Consensus</td>
<td>28 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>16 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>6 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits Consensus</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Undecided about influence</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leadership and Planning

Table 27 indicates thirty responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Thirteen responses or forty-three percent of the responses indicated that the variable was very important to consensus with nine responses or thirty percent indicated that it was important and five responses or sixteen percent indicating that it was not important. In Table 27, seventy-three percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of its importance to consensus.

Table 27: Questionnaire responses: leadership and planning

Total Number of Responses: 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
<td>13 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
<td>9 (30%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Not important</td>
<td>5 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somewhat Important</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Undecided</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the forty-four unsolicited responses, twenty-two responses or fifty percent of the responses indicated that
it facilitates consensus and twelve responses or twenty-seven percent indicated that its influence was significant. In Table 28, seventy-seven percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of this variable's influence on consensus.

Table 28: Unsolicited responses: leadership and planning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates consensus</td>
<td>22 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>12 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>8 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Roles

Table 29 shows that twenty-eight responses were given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Twenty-one responses or seventy-five percent of the responses indicated that the variable is very important to consensus with four responses or fourteen percent of the responses indicating that it was important, and two responses or seven percent of the responses indicating that it was not important. In Table 29, approximately eighty-nine percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the importance of this variable to consensus.
Table 29: Questionnaire responses: international roles

Total Number of Responses: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
<td>21 (75%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Not Important</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Somewhat important</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the fifty unsolicited responses, twenty-six responses or fifty-two percent facilitates consensus, and twenty-one responses or forty-two percent of the responses indicated that its influence was significant. In Table 30, approximately ninety-four percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's influence on consensus.

Table 30: Unsolicited responses: international roles

Total Number of Responses: 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates Consensus</td>
<td>26 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>21 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings

Table 31 indicates thirty-five responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Eighteen responses or fifty-one percent of the responses indicated that the variable was very important to consensus with eight responses or twenty-three percent of the
responses indicating that it was important, and six responses or seventeen percent indicating that it was somewhat important. In Table 31, seventy-four percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's importance to consensus.

Table 31: Questionnaire responses: relationship between activity in public and private settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
<td>18 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
<td>8 (23%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat Important</td>
<td>6 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Not Important</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the sixty-one unsolicited responses, twenty-eight responses or forty-six percent of the responses indicated that the variable facilitates consensus, and twenty-two responses or thirty-six responses indicated that its influence was significant. In Table 32, eighty-two percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the influence of this variable on consensus.

Table 32: Unsolicited responses: relationship between activity in public and private settings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates Consensus</td>
<td>28 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>22 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>10 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Desire for Consensus

Table 33 notes twenty-eight responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Twenty responses or seventy-one percent of the responses indicated that the variable was very important with four responses or fourteen percent of the response indicating that it was important. In Table 33, eighty-five percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident in the variable's importance to consensus.

Table 33: Questionnaire responses: desire for consensus
Total of Number of Responses: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
<td>20 (71%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat important</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Undecided</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the fifty unsolicited responses, twenty-seven responses or fifty-four percent of the responses indicated that the variable facilitates consensus with nineteen responses or thirty-eight percent of the responses indicating that its influence was significant and four responses or eight percent indicating that it was not significant. In Table 34, approximately ninety-two percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the influence of this variable on consensus.
Table 34: Unsolicited Responses: desire for consensus

Total Number of Responses: 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitate Consensus</td>
<td>27 (54%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>19 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>4 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>2 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overlapping Interests

Table 35 notes twenty-eight responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Twelve responses or forty-three percent of the responses indicated that the variable was important to consensus with ten responses or thirty-six percent of the responses indicating that it was very important, and four responses or fourteen percent indicating that it was somewhat important. In Table 35, approximately seventy-nine percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's importance to consensus.

Table 35: Questionnaire responses: overlapping interests

Total Number of Responses: 28

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Important</td>
<td>12 (43%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Very important</td>
<td>10 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Somewhat important</td>
<td>4 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Not important</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Undecided</td>
<td>1 (4%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Among the forty-four unsolicited responses, twenty-seven responses or sixty-one percent of the responses indicated that the variable facilitates consensus with twelve responses or twenty-seven percent of the responses indicating that its influence is significant. In Table 36, approximately eighty-eight percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's influence on consensus.

Table 36: Unsolicited responses: overlapping interests

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Responses: 44</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Responses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 37 notes twenty-nine responses given in the questionnaire regarding the importance of this variable. Twenty responses or sixty-nine percent of the response indicated that the variable was very important with seven responses or twenty-four percent indicating that it was important. In Table 37, ninety-three percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's importance to consensus.
Table 37: Questionnaire responses: supply of individual characteristics and capabilities

Total Number of Responses: 29

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentages of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Very Important</td>
<td>20 (69%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Important</td>
<td>7 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Not Important</td>
<td>2 (7%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Among the forty-nine unsolicited responses, twenty-six responses or fifty-three percent of the responses indicated that the variable facilitates consensus with seventeen responses or thirty-five percent indicating that its influence is significant. In Table 38, eighty-eight percent of the responses reveal that the respondents were confident of the variable's influence on consensus.

Table 38: Unsolicited responses: supply of individual characteristics and capabilities

Total Number of Responses: 49

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Facilitates consensus</td>
<td>26 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Influence is significant</td>
<td>17 (35%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Influence is not significant</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Inhibits consensus</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The responses noted in the questionnaires and the responses noted in explanations and from open-ended questions demonstrated that, overwhelmingly, the respondents felt that each variable was either important or very important to consensus.
Almost all of the responses indicated that each variable facilitates consensus and that the influence of each was significant to consensus. Respondents felt that consensus was influenced more by the decision makers' judgements regarding how to negotiate to secure their states' interests than the policies of their states. The patterns of responses support the hypothesis that the variables are determinants of consensus.

Descriptions of the Variables and the Political Process

Table 39 notes fifty-one responses given regarding the set of variables, indicating its utility in demonstrating consensus. The set was described as sufficient in twelve responses or twenty-four percent of the responses; as comprehensive in eleven responses or twenty-two percent of the responses; as generalizable in nine responses or eighteen percent of the responses; and as comparable in three responses or six percent of the responses. The set was described as not generalizable in eight responses or sixteen percent of the responses; and as not complete in eight responses or sixteen percent of the responses. In Table 39, approximately seventy percent of the responses show that the respondents believed that the list of variables was complete and sufficiently represented the political process.
Table 39: Profile of the nine variables in demonstrating consensus

Number of Unsolicited Responses

Total Number of Responses: 51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. List is sufficient</td>
<td>12 (24%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. List is comprehensive</td>
<td>11 (22%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. List is generalizable</td>
<td>9 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. List is not generalizable</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. List is not complete</td>
<td>8 (16%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. List is comparable</td>
<td>3 (6%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In their descriptions of the political process and the nine variables, respondents stressed four types of concerns: political, administrative, financial/economic, and technical. The categories of concerns demonstrate the significance of the variables in certain areas. Respondents noted areas in which they felt each variable had influence.

Degree of Difference in State Policies

Table 40 shows that there were forty references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the forty references, fifty percent noted political concerns and thirty percent noted administrative concerns. Approximately eighty-eight percent of the responses revealed that this variable had influence mostly in the political and administrative areas. These are the arenas in which the policies and instructions of the governments influence the duties of the delegates.
Table 40: Degree of difference

Total Number of References: 40

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>20 (50%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrative</td>
<td>15 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Financial</td>
<td>3 (8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Technical</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Development of Subgroups

Table 41 shows that there were forty-two references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the forty-two references, fifty-two percent noted political concerns and thirty-eight of the responses noted administrative concerns. Ninety percent of the responses reveal that this variable has influence in the political and administrative areas. It is in these arenas that ideological groups and regional groups have a significant influence.

Table 41: Development of subgroups

Total Number of References: 42

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>22 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrative</td>
<td>16 (38%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Financial</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Technical</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Networks of Individuals

Table 42 shows that there were thirty-four references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions
of this variable. Among the thirty-four references, fifty-three percent of the responses noted political concerns, twenty-one percent of the responses noted technical concerns, and eighteen percent noted administrative concerns. Influence in the political, technical, and administrative areas is understandable, given that this variable represents the exchange of technical information and also the building of political coalitions for negotiation.

Table 42: Networks of individuals

Total Number of References: 34

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>18 (53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Technical</td>
<td>7 (21%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Administrative</td>
<td>6 (18%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financial</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Leadership and Planning

Table 43 shows that there were fifty references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the thirty-four references, forty-six of the responses noted administrative concerns and thirty-four percent noted political concerns. In Table 43, eighty percent of the responses reveal that this variable has influence in administrative and political areas. This is understandable because the variable represents the political leverage used, and the administrative activities undertaken
to facilitate negotiation.

Table 43: Leadership and planning

Total Number of References: 50

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative</td>
<td>23  (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political</td>
<td>17  (34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Financial</td>
<td>6   (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Technical</td>
<td>4   (8%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

International Roles

Table 44 shows that there were forty-eight references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the forty-eight references, forty-six percent of the responses noted political concerns and thirty-three percent noted administrative concerns. In Table 44, forty-six percent of the responses reveal that the variable has influence mostly in the political area with sixty-three percent of the responses noting its influence in the administrative and technical areas. The types of roles having influence in these arenas are the chairmen which undertake political and administrative duties, Secretariat personnel which undertake administrative and technical duties, and the representatives of advisory organs which undertake technical duties.
Table 44: International roles

Total Number of References: 48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>22 (46%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrative</td>
<td>16 (33%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical</td>
<td>10 (21%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings

Table 45 notes that there were thirty-nine references made to three concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the thirty-nine references, fifty-one percent of the responses noted administrative concerns and thirty-four percent of the responses noted political concerns. In Table 45, eighty-seven percent of the responses reveal that this variable has influence in the administrative and political areas which is consistent with public debate and private consultation providing the administrative format for negotiating political concerns.

Table 45: Relationship between activity in public and private settings

Total Number of References: 39

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Administrative</td>
<td>20 (51%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political</td>
<td>14 (36%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical</td>
<td>5 (13%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Desire for Consensus

Table 46 shows that there were thirty-eight references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the thirty-eight references, fifty-three percent of the responses noted political concerns and thirty-four percent of the respondents noted administrative concerns. In Table 46, approximately eighty-seven percent of the responses reveal that this variable had influence in the political and administrative areas, which reflects that the political will influences the activities undertaken and the administrative procedures followed to seek consensus.

Table 46: Desire for consensus
Total Number of References: 38

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Political</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>(53%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Administrative</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>(34%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Technical</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>(11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Financial</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overlapping Interests

Table 47 shows that there were forty-eight references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the forty-eight references, forty-six percent of the responses noted political concerns and thirty-five percent of the responses noted administrative concerns. In Table 47, eighty-one percent of
the responses reveal that this variable has influence in the political and administrative areas, reflecting that linking issues and political concerns channeled through administrative activities has influence on the outcome.

Table 47: Overlapping interests

Total Number of References: 48

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number of References</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities

Table 48 shows that there were forty-three references made to four concerns noted in the respondents' descriptions of this variable. Among the forty-three references, forty-nine percent of the responses noted technical concerns and forty-four percent noted political concerns. In Table 48, ninety-two percent of the responses reveal that the variable has influence mostly in the technical and political areas. Among the characteristics of an effective negotiator, technical expertise and political leverage are essential for overcoming conflicting interests.
Table 48: Supply of individual characteristics and capabilities

Total Number of References: 43

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concerns</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of References Noted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Technical</td>
<td>21 (49%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Political</td>
<td>19 (44%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Financial</td>
<td>2 (5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Administrative</td>
<td>1 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These data demonstrate that with regard to final decisions and the conditions which facilitate them, respondents expressed tremendous concern for political and administrative issues as compared to financial and technical concerns. This is consistent with the concerns expressed in general debate regarding the administrative efficiency of the United Nations as a condition for further financial commitment from the member states. This is also consistent with the efforts undertaken to address the political interests of the member states by providing guidelines for improvements. Technical concerns figured more into the responses regarding individuals: Networks of individuals and individual characteristics and capabilities. Most respondents felt that the technical knowledge was essential for effective negotiators.
Explaining Variation

Overview

There are three main stages for explaining variation in the variables: 1) describe the relationship between the variables; 2) demonstrate the variation in the variables across each agenda item; and 3) interpret why the same variables produced different outcomes, i.e. different degree of consensus.

Relationships Between the Variables

To fully explain the variation in the consensus, the relationships between the variables and their relationships to consensus were demonstrated. Initially, a model was developed based upon the hypotheses derived from Chadwick Alger's study.

In Chapter II, the variables were described and divided into four different categories which reflect the components of the process that yield consensus (See Figure 1, page 35). Recall the model demonstrating the relationships of the variables from Chapter I (See Figure 3, page 77).

As further research and analysis were undertaken, other factors which might affect the relationships were identified and accounted for in the model. For instance, it was determined that the type of issue and the type of decisions reached or resolutions adopted should be considered in the explanation of variation in consensus outcomes.
There were two general types of issues upon which consensus was sought: controversial and non-controversial.

The controversial issues or agenda items were the scale of assessments and financing individual United Nations peacekeeping operations. In the consideration of the controversial issues, the variables representing the motives and characteristics of participants had more effect on the activities undertaken in negotiation, than the negotiation context variables. Although the context variables influence and contribute to consensus, it was the activities undertaken in negotiation that directly affected it. In highly divisive issues, the effects of the variables representing the motives and the characteristics of the participants were necessary for consensus to be sought and negotiated. The model was modified to account for this:

Political process
Context

\[ \text{Decision makers' orientations and styles} \]

\[ \text{Activities} \leftarrow \text{Motives} \leftarrow \text{Characteristics of participants} \]

Decision outcome
Consensus

Key: \(\rightarrow\) essential \(\rightarrow\) -- -- -- less essential

Figure 7: Relationships of the variables: controversial issues
The non-controversial issues and agenda items were the review of efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations, improving the financial situation of the United Nations, administrative and budgetary aspects of financing United Nations peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. In the consideration of non-controversial issues the context variables had more of an effect on the activities undertaken in negotiation of the decision. Although the motives and characteristics of participants influence and contribute to consensus, it was the activities that directly affect it. With routine issues which tend to be the regular business of the Fifth Committee or an issue which is not divisive, the context variables figure more into the process of reaching consensus (Figure 8).

**Political process**

Context

\[\text{Decision makers' orientations and styles}\]

\[\text{Activities} \leftarrow \text{Motives} \leftarrow \text{of participants}\]

\[\text{Decision outcome}\]

Consensus

Key: \[\text{essential} \quad \text{less essential}\]

Figure 8: Relationships of the variables: non-controversial issues
Among the decisions reached or resolutions adopted regarding the agenda items, there were several types identified: 1) Formal measures and organs established to carry out proposals; 2) proposals establishing new structures and mandates; 3) instructions for implementing transitional plans for new mandates; 4) outlining stages/steps for achieving ultimate objective; 5) instructions for investigating the results of established plans and efforts for carrying out mandates; 6) recommendations specifying merits of proposals; 7) appeals; 8) referrals to other parties for review; and 9) requests for performance reports.

Consideration of the types of final decisions reached as drafted in a resolution, provides further explanation regarding the degree of consensus and why it was reached. It does not refute that the variables influence consensus. It demonstrates their role in the process of considering a certain type of issue, and what the type of final decision reflects regarding the degree of consensus.

Therefore, to fully understand the role of the variables, there must be a review of how the variables functioned regarding the agenda item and the type of issue, and an explanation of what the type of final decision reveals about the degree of consensus.

Demonstrating the relationships between the variables and their relationships to consensus is important for
demonstrating variation. The model designed for this task was modified to account for the conditions that were found to have an effect on the degree of consensus reached. The original model illustrated the general relationships which could lead to consensus. In terms of evaluating different degrees of consensus, models had to be specified which would account for the types of issues upon which consensus was sought and the types of decisions reached or resolutions adopted.
Variation in the Variables

The following discussion records the conditions under which the degree of consensus was reached for each agenda item. These qualitative data presented here consist of examples of the variables observed and noted during the 1993 regular session. These data provide evidence of the variables whose relationships were illustrated in the models. Secondly, these data note the effect of the variable on the decision outcome, providing an indication of the importance of each variable. Finally, the discussion explains the variance in the variables, exploring what the variation in the variables demonstrates about each variable's independent role, and how it relates to the hypothesis posited regarding that variable.

The following data describes the role of the variables in achieving consensus regarding the scale of assessments, the review of efficiency, improving the financial situation, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations, financing individual peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. The role played by each of the variables was determined by matching the trends of the responses from the questionnaires with the observations of the researcher and the responses from the interviews. The observations provided specific information regarding the deliberation of the agenda items in public debate. These data enabled the researcher to identify the
indicators and characteristics of the variables as they existed in the Fifth Committee. In some instances, different indicators or characteristics came to bear in consideration of different agenda items.

Tables 49 through 54 record the examples of the variables as they existed in the Fifth Committee for each agenda item. They provide evidence of the variables and how they operated regarding each agenda item, demonstrating how the same variables can produce different outcomes when the type of issue is considered.

Examples of Variables Observed in the Fifth Committee

Table 49: Scale of Assessments (1)

(DD) Medium: states have different budget cycles for financing contributions
(DS) Financial interest groups and advisory organs
(NI) informal consultations: channel for exchange of views within and across groups
(LP) Working groups: providing overall guidance regarding objectives and goals
(IR) Chairman of informal consultations was key in drafting of the decision
(PP) Symbiotic relationship between different arenas allowed for exhaustive consideration
(DC) Strong support was a result of the interpretation of interests within the parameters of the consensus procedure
(OI) Financial interests interdependently linked to other financial matters
(ICC) Utilized to a major extent to produce decision on a difficult agenda item

The scale of assessments was a controversial, divisive issue which eventually resulted in a strong consensus on a decision which reflected a major change in the mandate. The examples of the variables observed regarding the
consideration of the scale of assessments are illustrated in Table 49. The examples indicate the specific conditions under which the consensus on the scale of assessments was negotiated. These examples provide further evidence of how the variables produced the decision. This occurred due to the harmonizing of the different positions and interests by most of the variables during negotiation (DS, NI, IR, PP, DC, ICC). Three variables tended to narrow the variety of different positions (DD, LP, OI). This produced a coherent decision which garnered wide support.

Table 50: Review of Efficiency (2)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Small degree of difference in state policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Advisory organs mostly played a role</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Informal consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>Secretariat drafting initial procedures to fulfill objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Representatives of advisory organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Moderate relationship which was complementary and supportive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Moderate support underlying collaborative efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>Political and financial interests interdependently linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Utilized to some extent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The review of efficiency was a non-controversial, routine issue which resulted in a weak consensus on a decision which reflected a review and update of the existing mandate. The decision implemented transitional plans for new mandates. The examples provided in Table 50 specify the conditions under which the consensus on the review of efficiency was negotiated. Most of the variables tended to narrow the variety of different positions (DD, DS, NI, LP, PP),
with two having the minimum effect in narrowing the variety of different positions and interests (DC, OI), and two harmonizing the different positions and interests (IR, ICC). This issue did not require much negotiation in that it produced a decision outlining instructions for investigating the results of the transitional plans.

Table 51: Improving the Financial Situation (3)

(DD) Small: All agreed that restructuring should be undertaken
(DS) Advisory organs
(NI) Strong contacts through diplomatic and personal relationships
(LP) Commitment to undertaking and reviewing proposals
(IR) Representative of advisory organs
(PP) Different arenas were complementary
(DC) Moderate support underlying the collaborative efforts
(OI) Financial and political interests interdependently linked
(ICC) Utilized to some extent

Improving the financial situation was a non-controversial, routine issue which was similar to the review of efficiency. The examples provided in Table 51 specify conditions under which the consensus on improving the financial situation was negotiated. The majority of the variables narrowed the variety of different positions and interests (DD, NI, LP, IR, PP, DC, ICC), and two harmonized the different positions and interests (DS, OI). This issue did not require much negotiation, but it resulted in a moderate consensus on a decision consisting of recommendations specifying the merits of existing proposals.
Table 52: Administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations (4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>Small: All support financing peacekeeping operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>Financial interest groups and advisory organs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>Strong contacts in addition to informal consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>ACABQ provided overall guidance regarding objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>Representatives of advisory organs and chair of the informal consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>Strong relationship between the different arenas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>Strong support reflected in the prioritization of objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>Financial and political interests interdependently linked</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>Utilized to some extent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The administrative and budgetary aspects of financing peacekeeping operations was a non-controversial issue which involved routine procedural matters outlined in the proposals. The conditions under which consensus was negotiated for the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations are indicated in Table 52. Just over half of the variables harmonized the different positions and interests (DS, NI, PP, DC, OI), with the remaining variables narrowing the variety of different positions and interests (DD, LP, IR, ICC). The negotiations, though not extensive, resulted in a strong consensus on a decision, specifying the merits of proposals, appeals for compliance, and referrals to other parties for review.
The financing of individual peacekeeping operations was a controversial issue consisting of a proposal requesting a major change in the mandate. The conditions under which consensus was negotiated for the financing of individual peacekeeping operations are indicated in Table 53. Different positions were polarized by the development of subgroups (DS). Four of the variables reinforced the variety of different positions and interests (IR, PP, DC, OI) which tended to lessen the narrowing of the variety of different positions and interests by the four remaining variables (DD, NI, LP, ICC). Most of the negotiation for this issue was deferred until the resumed session. However, commitment authority was given for financing operations.
until the final approval of the budgets. This decision reflected a weak consensus on the amount of funds appropriated under commitment authority.

Table 54: Proposed Program Budget (6)

(DD) Medium: Different budget cycles for financing contributions
(DS) Financial interest groups and advisory organs
(NI) Strong contacts shaped patterns and frequency of interaction
(LP) Drafting initial procedures to fulfill objectives
(IR) Representatives of Secretariat and advisory organs
(PP) Strong relationship which was complementary and supportive
(DC) Strong support underlying the collaborative efforts
(OI) Financial and political interests interdependently linked
(ICC) Utilized to a major extent for developing the draft decision and revising it until it was reflective of the collective will

The proposed program budget was a non-controversial issue involving a routine procedure of the committee. Negotiations were conducted under intense time constraints. The conditions under which consensus was negotiated for the approval of the proposed program budget are indicated in Table 54. The majority of the variables harmonized the different positions and interests (NI, LP, IR, PP, DC, OI, ICC) with two narrowing the variety of positions and interests (DD, DS). The intensive negotiations resulted in a strong consensus on the submission of an approved budget by the end of the regular session.
Roles of the Variables

To further demonstrate the conditions under which consensus was achieved for each agenda item, it was important to indicate the role played by each variable in the consideration of each agenda item. The roles were derived from the responses in the interviews regarding the importance and significance of each variable and the observations regarding the effects of each variable. Table 55 reports the roles of each variable per agenda item. The agenda items are identified by number and the variables by their abbreviations. The array of roles indicated are: large role (L); moderate role (M); and small role (S).

Table 55: Summary of the roles of the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Agenda Items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>L</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further examination of the variation in the variables through comparing each variable's role demonstrates the difference between what was posited in the hypotheses and what was revealed in the data.
Hypothesis 2

If there is a small degree of difference in the policies of the participating states after negotiation has been undertaken and at the time of the final decision, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses to the open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items revealed that this variable played a moderate role in the final decisions of all the agenda items, except in the final decision on the scale of assessments it played a large role.

The role of this variable was different from that posited in the hypothesis. The degree of difference in the state policies did not decrease as negotiations progressed. However, the degree to which the individual decision makers felt bound by their state policies decreased as negotiation proceeded.

Hypothesis 3

If subgroups develop which consolidate scattered and heterogeneous interests into a few key issues, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decisions of all the agenda items, except improving the financial situation where it played a moderate role.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data.
Coalitions of members, particularly those configuring around
specific issues, or in smaller regional groups tended to be most evident. Members on advisory committees were also evident.

Hypothesis 4

If networks develop among key individuals, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses from open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments, the review of efficiency, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. The variable played a moderate role in the final decisions of improving the financial situation and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations.

This hypothesis is substantiate by the data. Its role is most evident in the agenda items involving the revision of budgetary procedures and funding methodology.

Hypothesis 5

If there is strong leadership in support of an issue and a high level of participation in planning activities, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses from open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments, the administrative and budgetary aspects of
financing UN peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. It played a moderate role regarding improving the financial situation, and a small role regarding the review of efficiency and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data. Strong leadership was needed for progress on these items, particularly items involving the revision of the scale and the procedures for financing peacekeeping operations.

Hypothesis 6

If the emergence of international roles in which key individuals from various groups take on leadership responsibilities as representatives of key regional or ideological interests as opposed to their own national interests, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses from open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items, revealed that this variable played a large role regarding the scale of assessments, review of efficiency, the financing of individual peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. It played a moderate role regarding the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations and improving the financial situation.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data. Examples include consultation and technical assistance from
Secretariat personnel and the administrative activities of chairmen of informal consultations and representative of advisory organs.

Hypothesis 7

Decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus in a setting providing public debate and private negotiation.

Observations and responses from open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items, revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations, financing individual peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. It played moderate role regarding the review of efficiency and improving the financial situation.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data. When this variable played a large role it was as a result of its complementary affect on the negotiations.

Hypothesis 8

If the extent to which there is a desire for consensus increases as negotiation progresses to the final decision, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses from open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments and the proposed program budget. It played a moderate role regarding the review of efficiency, improving
the financial situation, and the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations. It played a small role regarding the financing of individual peacekeeping operations.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data. Its large role with the scale and the proposed budget occurred as a result of the time constraints and difficulties to draft an appropriate scale. Without the desire for a consensus, there would be no incentive for drafting a new mandate. It was necessary for intensive and extensive negotiation to proceed.

Hypothesis 9

If there is a significant amount of overlapping interests, then decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses to the open-ended questions revealed that this variable played a large role in the final decision of the scale of assessments and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations. It played a moderate role regarding improving the financial situation, the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations, and the proposed program budget. It played a small role regarding the review of efficiency.

The hypothesis is substantiated by the data. Its role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments and financing individual peacekeeping operations occurred as a
result of the overlap of financial interests.

Hypothesis 10

The more these important individual characteristics and capabilities (i.e., commitment to the issue, knowledge of the issue, persistence in the face of slow progress and disappointment, capacity for hard work, and creative ideas to get around roadblocks) are utilized in the negotiation process, then the decision makers are more likely to reach a consensus.

Observations and responses from the open-ended questions regarding specific agenda items revealed that the variable played a large role in the final decisions of the scale of assessments and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations. It played a moderate role regarding the review of efficiency, improving the financial situation, and the proposed program budget. It played a small role regarding the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations.

This hypothesis is substantiated by the data. Its role was more evident in the items the controversial items where these individual characteristics were needed to overcome political conflicts or constraints. It was less evident in which consideration of technical issues were deferred until resumed session.
Demonstrating the Variation in the Outcomes

The task of demonstrating the relative importance of the variables requires variation in the outcome. The analysis varied the outcome, holding constant the different degrees of consensus to identify the independent and intervening variables associated with that outcome. Instances in which different degrees of consensus occurred were selected in order to identify the conditions and variables that seemed to account for the difference in the outcomes. In short, to explain the relative importance of the variables, the researcher compared how the variables varied regarding each agenda item.

Two methods of analysis were used to determine the relationships between the variables and how they contribute to consensus: the method of agreement and the method of difference. As demonstrated by Alexander L. George, these methods sort out the similarities and the differences in the outcomes. They also demonstrate the variables or conditions which account for the similarities and differences. Figure 9 lists the types of agenda items, variables, and outcomes analyzed in the research.
AGENDA ITEMS, VARIABLES, AND OUTCOMES

Agenda Item 1 Scale of Assessments
2 Review of Efficiency
3 Improving the Financial Situation
4 Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing UN PKOs
5 Financing Individual PKOs
6 Proposed Program Budget

Type of Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Controversial</th>
<th>Non-Controversial</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C)</td>
<td>(NC)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Variables

Degree of Difference of State Policies (DD)
Development of Subgroups (DS)
Networks of Individuals (NI)
Leadership and Planning (LP)
International Roles (IR)
Activity in Public and Private Settings (PP)
Desire for Consensus (DC)
Overlapping Interests (OI)
Individual Characteristics/Capabilities (ICC)

Outcomes

Strong Consensus (S)
Moderate Consensus (M)
Weak Consensus (W)

Figure 9: Types of agenda items, variables, and outcomes

The method of agreement was employed first to demonstrate the variables which account for the similar outcomes, by excluding those variables which were not common to those agenda items having the same outcome. For instance, there were three agenda items (1, 4, 6) which resulted in strong consensus (S) and two agenda items which resulted in weak consensus (W). Figure 10 summarizes the variables which had a large role in the consideration of each agenda item and each final decision.
EXPLAINING THE SIMILARITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (C)</td>
<td>DD,DS,NI,LP,IR,PP,DC,OI,ICC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (NC)</td>
<td>DS,NI,LP, ,PP,</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 (NC)</td>
<td>DS,NI,LP,IR,PP,DC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DS,NI,LP,PP present in all items with same outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 (NC)</td>
<td>DS,NI, ,IR</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (C)</td>
<td>DS, , ,IR,PP, ,OI,ICC</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DS,IR present in both items with same outcomes

Figure 10: Method of agreement

Comparing the agenda items with strong consensus made it possible to identify which variables were common in all three instances of strong consensus. Figure 10 shows that four variables were present in the three instances in which strong consensus was reached: Development of Subgroups (DS); Networks of Individuals (NI); Leadership and Planning (LP); and Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings (PP). Figure 10 shows that there were two variables present in the two instances in which a weak consensus was reached: Development of Subgroups (DS) and International Roles (IR). According to the method of agreement, the variables that are common to an outcome can be, by definition, causally related to it. One anomaly was that the variable, Development of Subgroups (DS), was present in instances where strong consensus and weak
consensus were reached, revealing the difficulty with relying solely on this method for explaining the relationship of variables to the outcomes. Development of Subgroups (DS) may not be a true indicator of the relationships.

The method of difference was employed which asserts that the variables which are present whether or not the same outcome is reached can not, by definition, be causally related to the outcome. Therefore, Development of Subgroups (DS) should eliminated in the consideration of the variables accounting for the differences in the degrees of consensus. By employing the method of difference, those variables which accounted for the differences between the instances in which strong consensus was reached and those in which weak consensus was reached were identified. For instance, Figure 11 shows which variables accounted for the differences when the agenda items with strong consensus outcomes and weak consensus outcomes were compared.
### EXPLAINING THE DIFFERENCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (C)</td>
<td>DD, DS, NI, LP, IR, PP, DC, OI, ICC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, IR</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DD, LP, PP, DC, OI, ICC accounts for the difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 (C)</td>
<td>DD, DS, NI, LP, IR, PP, DC, OI, ICC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (C)</td>
<td>DS, IR, PP, OI, ICC</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DD, NI, LP, DC accounts for the difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, LP, PP</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, IR</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LP, IR, PP accounts for the difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, LP, PP</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (C)</td>
<td>DS, IR, PP, OI, ICC</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NI, LP, IR, OI, ICC accounts for the difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, LP, IR, PP, DC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, IR</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LP, PP, DC accounts for the difference

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Independent Variables</th>
<th>Dependent Variable Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6 (NC)</td>
<td>DS, NI, LP, IR, PP, DC</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (C)</td>
<td>DS, IR, PP, OI, ICC</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NI, LP, DC, OI, ICC accounts for the difference

Figure 11: Method of differences

In Figure 10, the instances in which controversial (C) and non-controversial (NC) issues resulted in the same outcome are noted. For the strong consensus outcomes there had to be at least certain variables (DS, NI, LP, PP). However, for the controversial issue (Agenda Item 1) all of the variables had significant influence in the outcome. This was the scale of assessment which represented a major
change in the mandate and the drafting of a new formula for
the scale which was a successful compromise for addressing
concerns of financing the budget. The non-controversial
issues had the least necessary for a strong consensus:
(Agenda Item 4) the Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of
Financing UN Peacekeeping Operations was not a demanding
mandate consisting of appeals and statements regarding the
merits of peacekeeping finance; (Agenda Item 6), in addition
to the least necessary for a strong consensus, had the
influence of (IR,DC) accounting for the outcome. The
proposed program budget (Agenda Item 6) was routine, but it
was produced under time constraints. It garnered strong
support because there was possibility of further review and
revision.

For the weak consensus outcomes, the least needed for
the outcome were (DS,IR) variables. However, for the
controversial issue (Agenda Item 5), in addition to the
least necessary, it required (PP,IO,ICC) for achieving the
weak consensus. This represented a firm rejection of the
proposed mandate, the financing of peacekeeping operations
by a unified budget. The final decision was commitment
authority for interim financing and outlining the steps for
achieving the ultimate goal. The weak consensus on the
financing was possible because the interim funding reflected
a lack of long-term commitment and precedents. The non-
controversial issue (Agenda Item 2) had in addition to the
least necessary, (NI) for a weak consensus. The Review of Efficiency (Agenda Item 2) was not a demanding issue, representing conservative instructions for investigating results and implementing transitional plans.

As stated earlier, the application of the method of difference to analyze the variables accounting for the difference in outcomes, further eliminates other variables which appear to influence common outcomes. Development of Subgroups has been eliminated because it was present in all instances of strong consensus and weak consensus outcomes. However, there are other variables which can be eliminated in some instances, but not others. For instance in Figure 11, there are three instances in which Networks of Individuals (NI) are present when strong and weak consensus was reached. Because (NI) was present in the comparison of Agenda Items 1 and 2, 4 and 2, and 6 and 2, it has to be eliminated as a cause for the differences between Agenda Items 1, 2, 4, and 6. The variable (IR) is eliminated as a cause of the differences in Agenda Items 1, 2, 5, and 6. The variable (PP) was eliminated as a cause of the differences in Agenda Items 1, 4, 5, and 6.

Comparison of Agenda Items 1 and 2 revealed that the difference in the outcomes resulted from variables (DD, LP, PP, DC, OI, ICC). The influence of these variables are further highlighted by the strong influence of all nine variables resulting in a strong consensus for Agenda Item 1.
Whereas NI, IR account for the weak consensus for Agenda Item 2. This reflects that there was more influence from the variables reflecting the motives and characteristics of participants.

Comparison of Agenda Items 1 and 5 revealed that the difference in outcomes resulted from variables (DD, NI, LP, DC). The influence of these variables are highlighted by the strong influence of all nine variables resulting in a strong consensus for Agenda Item 1. Although each had a strong influence from the variables reflecting the motives and characteristics of participants. The uniqueness of the influence of all the variables in Agenda Item 1, although Agenda Item 5 fits the pattern, these variables are highlighted as accounting for the difference between the two controversial issues.

Comparison of Agenda Items 4 and 2 revealed that the difference in the outcomes resulted from variables (LP, IR, PP). Both fit the pattern for non-controversial issues. However, because of the differences in the variables reflecting activities these variables are highlighted and account for the differences.

Comparison of Agenda Items 4 and 5 revealed that the difference in the outcome resulted from variables (NI, LP, IR, OI, ICC). Each is reflective of the model for controversial and non-controversial issues, highlighting these variables as a cause for the difference.
Comparison of Agenda Items 6 and 2 are consistent with the model for non-controversial issues, but highlighting the variables reflecting the negotiation context and activities. However, the differences are accounted for by the stronger influences of these types of variables in Agenda Item 6, highlighting variables (LP, PP, DC).

Comparison of Agenda Items 6 and 5 reveals that the differences between the non-controversial issue and the controversial issue highlights the variables reflecting the motives and characteristics of participants is due to their strong influence in Agenda Item 5. Both fit the patterns of non-controversial and controversial issues highlighting issues reflecting the negotiation context, motives, and characteristics of participants. The variables highlighted were (NI, LP, DC, OI, ICC).

The results are consistent and substantiate the models. When demonstrating which variables account for the differences in the outcomes, the influence of certain types of issues can be expected. The extent to which a controversial or non-controversial issue can yield a type of outcome (decision or resolution) is determined by the variables. Comparing the outcomes and checking whether they are consistent with the model for each type of issue demonstrates that the type of issue can also serve as a measure of the variables accounting for the differences in the outcomes.
According to George, there are "special difficulties with the controlled, comparison method in that there is a problem of validating the causal relationships inferred by these comparisons. Suggestions for correcting this problem includes the development of typologies as a "means of achieving control over variables in order to make controlled comparison feasible." The typology developed for achieving control and employed to check on the logical errors in addition to the typology for decision outcomes (ie, strong consensus, moderate consensus, weak consensus) was a typology of issues (ie, controversial, non-controversial). This typology was useful in that it provided a further standard for determining whether the outcomes reached and the causal relationships inferred were consistent with the conditions of the negotiations involving controversial and non-controversial issues. The use of these methods of comparison and typologies systematically eliminated the special difficulties in the analysis of covariance. It allowed the researcher to comfortably make generalizations about the results of the analysis. To further demonstrate the relationships of the variables, Table 56 demonstrates which categories of variables are necessary with each combination of type of issue and degree of consensus.
Table 56: Categories of variables necessary for each combination of type of issue and degree of consensus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controversial</td>
<td>Context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Motives*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Characteristics of Participants*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-controversial</td>
<td>Context*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: * stronger influence

Table 56 illustrates that context and activities are baselines for all decisions. However, context is less essential in controversial issues relative to non-controversial issues. The activities category of variables is less essential in non-controversial issues with weak consensus outcomes. The motives, activities, characteristics of participants categories of variables are baselines for controversial issues. However, when degree of consensus is considered, the motives are less essential in controversial issues with weak consensus outcomes. The context and activities categories of variables are baselines for non-controversial issues, particularly. However, when the degree of consensus is considered, activities is less essential in non-controversial issues with weak consensus outcomes.
The assessment of the combinations of variables according to the type of issue and degree of consensus shows that there are implications for policy. For controversial issues, concerns regarding the level of commitment to compliance emerge. For non-controversial issues, concerns regarding the execution of instructions for activities and programs emerge.

In terms of compliance to the policy produced, if a controversial issue results in a strong consensus outcome, one can predict that there would be more compliance. The strong consensus outcome reached on a controversial reflects a substantive decision and a high level of commitment to compliance. A controversial issue resulting in a weak consensus outcome reflects that there is less substance in the decision and less commitment to compliance.

In terms of the execution of instructions for activities and programs, if a non-controversial issue results in a strong consensus outcome, one can predict that it would be an instance in which further review and revision of existing policy would be undertaken. A non-controversial issue resulting in a weak consensus outcome would most likely be an instance in which appeals would be made regarding existing policy or performance reports would be requested.

Table 56 specifies that these combinations of variables are necessary, because there could be instances in which
more variables may contribute to the outcomes. The table illustrates the least necessary for achieving each combination of type of issue and degree of consensus.

Two examples from the study revealed that there are instances in which more variables can account for the outcomes in specific cases. Figure 10 shows the combinations of variables contributing to the outcomes for each agenda item. The scale of assessment was a controversial issue resulting in a strong consensus. All of the categories of the variables have a strong influence in this instance. However, Table 56 shows that context is less essential relative to the other categories of variables. Although all of the categories have a strong influence in this example, I postulate that the strong influence of the context was not necessary for the strong consensus outcome to occur.

The other example was the proposed program budget which was a non-controversial issue resulting in a strong consensus outcome. This agenda item had the combination of the context, activities, and motives categories of variables contributing the decision outcome. However, another agenda item which also had the non-controversial-strong consensus combination revealed that the least necessary for achieving this outcome was the strong influence of the context and activities categories of variables. The other examples from study, the financing of individual peacekeeping operations
and the review of efficiency, fit the models in Table 56 for controversial issue-weak consensus outcome and non-controversial issue-weak consensus outcome combinations, respectively.
Conclusion

The information used to compile the comparative overview and explain the variation in the variables was organized into a case study database from which data were applied in the analysis of the variables and consensus. Although every detail noted was not reported in the overview and the explanation of variation, a review of the data was provided in Appendix E to give evidence of the array of the data that were collected. Much of the data, particularly the role played by each variable per agenda item were not noted in Appendix E, but reported in the discussion of the variation. This information was drawn from observation and interviews. Appendix E consists of important points and issues listed from documents, specific information noted in observations, and responses tabulated from the interviews.

With a specific focus on the interviews, it was important to match the trends reflected in the responses to the questionnaire for each variable with how each variable played a role in the final decision reached regarding each agenda item. The quantitative data tabulated from the questionnaire responses supported the trends of the relative importance of each variable to consensus. The combination of qualitative data and quantitative data from the interviews revealed the role of the variables and how they demonstrate the conditions under which consensus was reached, and the differences in how they contributed to
consensus when the type of issue and type of final decision were considered.

What remains is the comparison of the previous study conducted in 1963 to fully explicate the conditions and circumstances under which consensus develops and identify the significant developments that have occurred since the findings of the 1963 study. By doing so, it reveals what is significant about its suggestions for further inquiry regarding consensus decision making, and to what extent the findings in the 1993 study succeeded in the development of a theory of consensus decision making.

Endnotes

1. Including the financing of seventeen individual peacekeeping operations, there were six main issues focused upon to explain consensus outcomes. Financing individual peacekeeping operations was treated as a sixth agenda item.

2. Most of the data is presented in Appendix E: Review of Data, particularly documentary information and the observations noted from general debate. Information tabulated from interviews and questionnaires are presented in percentages. Percentages have been rounded to the nearest hundredths place.

3. The categories of responses tabulated from the questionnaires and the open-ended questions were not given independent of each other. In some instances, different categories of responses were noted concurrently or multiple responses were given for clarity and understanding (See Appendix E). For instance, development of subgroups in an example. There were twenty-eight respondents, but there were thirty responses to the questionnaire and fifty-six responses tabulated from open-ended questions.

5. As Mill put it, both the method of agreement and the method of difference are "methods of elimination" which, as applied by the investigator, attempt to achieve the successive exclusion of the various circumstances which are found to accompany a phenomenon in a given instance, in order to ascertain what are those among them which can be absent consistently with the existence of the phenomenon. The Method of Agreement stands on the ground that whatever can be eliminated, is not connected with the phenomenon by any law. The Method of Difference has for its foundation, that whatever cannot be eliminated, is connected with the phenomenon by a law." Alexander L. George uses John Stuart Mill's descriptions of the method of agreement and the method of difference as quoted in Amital Etzioni and Fredrick L. Dubow (eds.) Comparative Perspectives: Theories and Methods (Boston: Little Brown, 1970), 207-208.

6. Agenda Item 3, Improving the Financial Situation is not listed because none of the variables had a large role in the final decision. All of the variables had a moderate influence. Moderate consensus was reached on the final decision, representing a middle ground between those agenda items which resulted in strong and weak consensus.

CHAPTER VI
COMPARISON OF THE RESULTS

Overview

This study's overall objective was to contribute to the development of a theory of consensus decision making. Among the types of case studies identified that contribute to theory development, the "heuristic" case study best describes this analysis. According to Harry Eckstein's description, the heuristic case study is used as a means "to learn more about the complexity of the problem studied, to develop further the existing explanatory framework, and to refine and elaborate the initially available theory employed by the investigator in order to provide an explanation of the particular case examined."¹

The main objective of this chapter was the comparison and the cumulation of the findings from the Chadwick Alger study of 1963 and this study. The variables identified as general to the political process were expected to contribute to consensus in the 1993 study. However, the results of the 1993 study not only confirmed this expectation, it also identified the conditions and circumstances under which different degrees of consensus were reached.

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The first task undertaken to conduct the comparative analysis was the application of the theoretical framework to provide a comparative overview of the two cases (Chapter IV). The second task was the comparison of the results from the 1993 analysis and the findings compiled by Chadwick Alger which was the objective of this chapter.
Nature of the Comparison

The comparison of the 1963 and 1993 case was difficult because the decision making procedures in the Fifth Committee were changed from voting in 1963 to the consensus procedure which has been used since 1986. Alger's use of the term "consensus" meant the arrival at a decision supported by most in a vote. By 1993, the committee had defined consensus as a situation in which all were willing to accept an outcome without a vote. This critical difference made the comparisons between the consensus decisions more interesting in that it revealed the striking differences in the implications of the outcomes of each case. Although comparisons can be made between 1963 and 1993 decisions on similar issues in the same committee, using the same variables, in 1993, consensus was an institutionalized practice in decision making. Therefore, its implications for the outcomes must be explored further.

In the 1963 case, consensus was measured on the basis of the final votes. Consensus demonstrated the level of agreement reflected in the vote. The measure appropriate for the 1963 context was the voting scheme developed by Haas, Butterworth, and Nye. Consensus was coded on the basis of the strength of the resolution adopted. The voting scheme is as follows:
Consensus

The extent of agreement is scaled in terms of power:

- **very wide**: The constitutional requirement for passing a resolution is met (or exceeded) by a wide margin.

- **wide**: The constitutional requirement for passing a resolution is met (or exceeded) without all large, middle, and smaller powers in the organization joining the majority.

- **weak**: One super power plus various other powers act to just meet the particular constitutional requirement.

- **none**: The constitutional requirement for making a decision is not met in the particular organization or organ.

In the 1993 case, consensus demonstrated the level of agreement reflected in the approval of a decision or resolution. A consensus scheme was developed to provide a measure for consensus which was appropriate for the 1993 context. Consensus was scaled by degrees and on the basis of the strength of the mandate reflected in the resolution. The consensus scheme as described in Chapter II is as follows:

**Degrees of Consensus**

- **Extensive**: unanimous support for the final decision; no objections

- **Strong**: support from the major financial contributors and other developed countries; support beyond the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority; no formal objections
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>at least the equivalent of a constitutional two-thirds majority in support; summation of convergence; abstentions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>minimum level of support; general, broad-based agreement; large number of explanations of positions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>consensus norm not upheld; formal objections; dissent led to a vote</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These differences raise an important comparative question regarding the analysis: What difference has this procedure made in the decision outcomes and resulting policies? The answer to this question is speculative. However, it is essential for fully addressing the question underlying the research: What are the major determinants of the achievement of consensus, and what functions do they serve in the decision outcome? The comparisons of the results offer explanations of the effect of the consensus procedure and what it demonstrates regarding the role of consensus in decision outcomes.
The Core of the Alger Results

In addition to the narrative in which Alger reports the negotiations during the General Assembly Special Session of 1963, he conducted two quantitative analyses which revealed significant conclusions regarding those variables which were most important to consensus on peacekeeping finance during the regular session of 1962 and the special session of 1963. The quantitative analyses highlighted regional groups, private negotiation between decision makers and their effects on consensus.

The first study "explored the possible relationships between observed private conversations during public sessions and the characteristics of individual participants, characteristics of nations, and regional alignments." The second study compared results from the analysis of the 1962 regular session and the 1963 special session:

The comparison "revealed changes in the participation in the national delegations in private conversation as these delegations (and their individual members) assumed key roles in negotiation taking place outside the committee and revealed rather conclusively that private conversations and not random behavior as some participants had asserted. Patterns of delegate participation in private conversation have strong relationships to negotiations outside the chamber and are remarkably different than patterns in public debate."

Negotiation and interaction were described in terms of the relation of interaction to the legislative process, interactions of individual nations, the relation of
interaction to national public speaking, regional group interaction, the relation between group interaction and voting, the relation between non-committee roles of individuals and interaction, and the relation between individual reputation for being capable and informed and interaction.
Results

The application of the theoretical framework to the Alger narrative and the use of the conclusions drawn from the quantitative analyses provided a standard for the comparison of the two cases. Analysis of the two cases highlighted the variables and the combination of variables most important to consensus. Despite the different conceptions of consensus, the results of the present analysis were consistent with Alger's results. The results revealed that the combination of the variables most important to consensus varied according to the type of issue under consideration.

Issues and Variables: 1963

Among the seven items considered at the special session of 1963, three were controversial and four were non-controversial. Negotiations produced four resolutions: general principles, two authorizing expenditures for UNEF and ONUC for the second half of 1963 and the apportionment of these expenses among members, and the collection of arrears in the payment of peacekeeping expenses. Three resolutions not considered in the negotiations were approved in committee: the continuation of the Working Group of Twenty-one, investigation of a voluntary peace fund, and extension of the period in which UN Bonds could be sold.

The variables identified by Alger clearly played roles in the achievement of consensus. The following discussion
reviews the general roles of variables in the 1963 analysis which provided the explanatory framework from which the explanations for the 1993 case were developed.

The degree of difference in the state policies determined the range of perspectives and the differences reflected in the variety of perspectives. The differences varied with the level of financial responsibility. The state policies of the members were mostly used as a bargaining guide in negotiations. The policies were eventually filtered through the political process to establish a middle ground upon which consensus could be sought.

The development of subgroups reflected regional group activity in negotiating teams which facilitated negotiation and the drafting of decisions to consolidate supportive views for specific resolutions.

The networks of individuals were reflected in the negotiators' reliance on their relationships with negotiators in opposing teams to settle the issues. One example is the instance in which a Swedish negotiator facilitated final settlement of an issue by approaching the Pakistani negotiator regarding an offer from the developed countries. Parlaying contacts into compromises and agreements contributes to final decisions.

Leadership and planning contributed to the agreements on the drafting of a permanent scale of assessment.
Although there was no strong leadership from the United States, Latin American negotiators provided a proposal for a permanent scale of assessment. Smaller developed countries supported compromises between the developed and developing countries.

International roles were undertaken by negotiators selected by the regional groups or individual member states to negotiate their positions on specific and draft resolutions. International roles were key for transferring information and mediating extreme points of view. For example the Canadian representative had a key role as the chairman of the Western countries negotiating team.

The relationship between activity in public and private settings was important for the progress of negotiation. Although there was not necessarily a relationship between negotiation progress and participation in the public debate, there was a relationship between high interaction and negotiation participation. The less formal arenas were utilized for promoting points of view and bargaining. The private arenas were particularly necessary for highly controversial issues. For instance, some delegations chose not to participate in the public debate regarding the legality of peacekeeping as an obligated expense. They chose instead to shed official constraints to make personal appeals to other delegates.
The desire for consensus was reflected in the negotiators willingness to accept the legality of UN peacekeeping operations. This was particularly evident with the apportionment of UNEF and ONUC expenses. The United states opposed the proposal that the developed countries have special burden for peacekeeping expenses. The willingness to facilitate agreement by offers to provide the portion that the United States was unwilling to pay demonstrates the desire to resolve the issue.

Overlapping interests drive negotiations, allowing conflicting perspectives to be consolidated. Bargaining was undertaken by linking related and unrelated issues. Consensus was pursued to the extent that the interests were maximized. For instance, the difficulties regarding the apportionment of contributions to UNEF and ONUC and the extent to which the resolutions commit the expenses was resolved by "replacing explicit commitment with a general pledge by each developed state to contribute according to its share of the regular budget."

Key individuals having the ability to negotiate and persuade are effective because their personal characteristics and capabilities allowed them to play pivotal roles in the achievement of consensus. Alger cites the "ingenuity" of the Canadian negotiator as a key element leading to the solution to the difficulties regarding the apportionment of UNEF and ONUC expenses. The experience of
the negotiator in UN financial affairs and his advocacy of
the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice
on peacekeeping finance through the General Assembly in
December, 1962.\footnote{7}

The relationships of the variables when considered by
the type of issue tended to follow a pattern similar to that
in the 1993 analysis. The Alger presentation of the
variables, however, demonstrated a different emphasis.
Figure 12 lists the different categories of the variables
which Alger emphasized to describe the political process.

CATEGORIES OF VARIABLES

Participation
  Leadership and Planning
  Networks of Individuals
  International Roles

Interaction
  Activity in Public and Private Settings
  Desire for Consensus

Negotiation
  Degree of Difference in State Policies
  Development of Subgroups
  Overlapping Interests

Characteristics of Participants
  Individual Characteristics and Capabilities

Figure 12: Categories of variables (1963)

Participation, interaction, and their relationship to
the progress of negotiation was central to Alger's
discussion of the relationships between the variables.
Figure 13 and Figure 14 illustrate the relationships
described between the variables for controversial and
non-controversial issues. The models were developed from
Alger's description of the relationships of the variables.

RELATIONSHIP OF THE VARIABLES: CONTROVERSIAL

Political Process
Participation

Decision Makers' Orientation and Style

Characteristics of Participants

Interaction

Negotiation

Decision Outcome
Vote (Consensus)

Key: ———— strong influence

Figure 13: Relationship of variables: controversial issues (1963)
The model for non-controversial issues is illustrated in Figure 14. It shows that participation had less influence on interaction, and interaction had less influence on negotiation. This reflects that less participation and interaction were needed for achieving consensus. The characteristics of the participants directly affected the participation, having a strong influence on it. However, the influence did not lead to strong influences between participation and interaction, and interaction and negotiation. Negotiation was the key element in that it directly affected and strongly influenced the decision outcome which was a vote.
With the controversial issues, participation and interaction were essential in determining consensus. Figure 13 shows that the characteristics of the participants directly and strongly affected participation. Participation, in turn, directly and strongly affected interaction. Negotiation was subsequently affected, and finally, it strongly affected the decision outcome. These models are suited for demonstrating the context of the 1963 political process, involving negotiating teams and voting.

The models demonstrate how the characteristics of the participants affected the participation in deliberation, and how their interaction affected their activities in negotiation. Negotiation, in turn, determined the vote. Participation would include the activities of the delegates prior to the sessions and the relationships established prior to deliberation of the issues, both determining how they interacted. For instance, interaction could have involved the efforts to gain sponsorship for a proposal. How the proposal was eventually negotiated depended upon the negotiating teams and the objectives sought. Finally, once a level of agreement had been reached, a vote would determine the final decision.

The differences in the conceptions of consensus highlight the different requirements for arriving at the intended decision, although the overall objective was for the decision to be translated into an effective policy. The
results from the 1963 analyses demonstrate that the participation and interaction categories of variables (See Figure 12) were the pivots upon which the political process produced consensus. These variables set the stage for negotiation which was structured to produce a draft decision upon which the delegates could vote.

The models developed for the 1993 context are suited for demonstrating the political process involving the reliance on informal consultations and no votes (See Figures 7 and 8, pages 232 and 233). The results from the 1993 analysis demonstrate that the activities category is the pivot upon which the political process and decision makers' orientation and styles produced a consensus. It is through the activities that the context and the motives and the characteristics of the participants influence the decision outcome. The differences in the studies reveal that there were different requirements for reaching the decision outcomes. In the 1993 case, the context, motives and characteristics of the participants functioned concurrently to produce the intended decision, consensus. In the 1963 case, the characteristics of the participants, participation, interaction and negotiation functioned in a linear sequence producing a vote.
Issues and Variables: 1993

Among the six agenda items focused upon at the 1993 regular session, two were controversial and four were non-controversial.

The addition of the consensus procedure to the deliberations of the Fifth Committee has extended the notion of reaching a consensus on a decision. As a result of the consensus procedure, the delegates have more scrutiny over the process. The consensus is built through a process of negotiation which fosters cohesion on decisions. A resolution is not submitted for approval until there is a consensus text reflective of the collective will. This has had an effect on the manner in which the variables function in the political process and the effect that the decision makers have on the outcomes. As a result of the consensus procedure, the personal contacts and personal characteristics of the decision makers tend to be more dominant, particularly in the deliberations of the controversial issues. The negotiation context tend to be more dominant in the deliberation of non-controversial issues. Overall, these variables tend to have more of a role in the outcome.

The degree of difference in state policies appeared to have more of an effect on the negotiations in the 1963 case. Peacekeeping finance was a relatively new issue and there was no precedent to guide the members' negotiations.
However, a general consensus has developed since 1963 which has guided the Committee's decision. There is a committee protocol which influences how the negotiations proceed. This variable has less of an effect on the immediate negotiations within the committee in the current context and more effect regarding compliance with adopted policy.

One example is the degree of difference in state policies regarding the review of efficiency and improving the financial situation. The degree of difference of state policies did exist to a moderate degree. However, policies and concerns focused on the development of an effective oversight mechanism. Most felt that this was the appropriate manner in which to address these issues. The existing structure proposed for oversight of United Nations operations was the Office of Inspections and Investigations. Many delegates criticized the reports of the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) on the restructuring and accountability of the United Nations. They argued that the reports were not analytic, and they tended to reiterate previous statements regarding existing problems without offering viable solutions.

Positions centered around views regarding the feasibility of the proposals and to what extent members would be willing to comply with the issues under consideration if they were adopted as policy. There were concerns regarding the implications of the policies for
member states collectively and individually. For instance, some delegates argued that the proposals to enact punitive measures for late payment of assessments was not feasible. The rationale of the contention was that if the payment of assessments in full and on time could not be enforced, then interest payments could not be enforced. However, there was general agreement that the proposals were worthy of review and consideration in light of the need for consolidating the operations of the United Nations.

Positions were divided on the proposals of the Secretary General and the proposal from the United States for a Inspector General. All agreed that a strong oversight mechanism was needed to insure efficiency and accountability, division persisted over how it should be undertaken. For the United States, the appointment of an Inspector General would resolve efficiency problems, but most importantly it was necessary before the United States would be confident to authorize payment of its contributions and arrears in full.

The development of subgroups is still an important variable in the political process. However, different types of subgroups have more of an effect. The formal regional framework has been replaced by smaller, sometimes temporary coalitions change. As a result of the consensus procedure, the development of subgroups is a dynamic occurrence and allows for more flexibility of movement within and between
groups. One major type of subgroup was the various financial interest groups which coincide with the scale of assessment groupings for determining the members' contributions.

The development of subgroups occurred in the form of financial interest groups. Although there were regional groups like the Rio Group and European Union, configurations tended to form around the issue and its perceived financial ramifications. For instance, the Twenty-two Member States were from the general region of Eastern Europe, but their concerns regarding the scales were not based upon a regional issue. Their concerns stemmed from the financial difficulties and their inability to fulfill their obligations to the Organization because they were assessed according the financial contributions of their former consolidated states. Different perspectives ranged from maintaining the mandate from the recommendations of the Committee on Contributions, to lowering the rates of assessments so that members can keep their obligations to the Organization, or to taking out the entitlements that prevent increases in the current rates.

Networks of individuals is still a very important variable in that the personal contacts and channels for exchange of views and information fosters further cohesion between the delegates. These contacts had the effect of unifying the delegates in their challenges to the
Secretariat regarding its proposals. One example is the effect of the networks of individuals regarding the consideration of the administrative and budgetary aspects of financing UN peacekeeping operations and the financing of individual peacekeeping operations.

The networks of individuals tended to reinforce the delegates' resolves to make the Secretariat fully justify the budget estimates for the peacekeeping operations. Although some were more vocal about their disapproval of the estimates for contributions for the operations, the delegates collectively rejected the Secretariat's estimates. Another example of the effect of the networks of individuals is their effect during deliberation of the proposed program budget. The networks of individuals allowed the key aspects of the budget to be reviewed fully despite time constraints. The volume of information that had to be covered in negotiation made it necessary to cover separate portions or chapters. The contribution of the networks was that they allowed delegates to collaborate on highly complex issues which could not be fully addressed without personal contacts. The networks allowed delegates to confer on budget proposals and effectively evaluate the conclusions of the ACABQ and the CPC.

Leadership and planning is also an important variable in that it may involve a representative of advisory organs or experienced delegates. The effect on the decision stems
from the ability to draft plans that provide guidance for addressing an issue as well as steps for implementation. This provides an objective for which other delegates can review and negotiate. An example of leadership and planning was the proposals drafted and submitted by the United States regarding the Office of the Inspector General. There have been appeals and proposals for improving efficiency of the Secretariat. The reports submitted by the United States outlined a plan for providing an internal audit and administrative oversight. The United States proposals were reviewed in addition to the proposals of the Committee on Programme and Coordination regarding the Office of Inspections and Investigations.

International roles are also very important as reflected in the activities of the chairs of the informal consultations. However, the representatives of advisory organs are international roles. They are not representing their own government and serve other members as consultants and experts regarding the issues. The delegates trust and rely on the recommendations of these advisory organs to guide their review and approval of the proposals. Examples include the effect of the ACABQ activities regarding the review of efficiency improving the financial situation, and the proposed program budget. With regard to these three agenda items the ACABQ had not submitted its technical conclusions and recommendations which were essential for the
delegates reviews because of delays in the submission of the budget to ACABQ. This prevented the delegates from reaching definitive decisions until the ACABQ had submitted its recommendations.

The relationship between the activity in public and private settings is still an important variable. The relationship between the arenas affects the decisions reached on the issues because it dictates how negotiations are undertaken. In the 1993 context, there was more emphasis on the private setting for negotiations. Public debate provide the overview of the issues and concerns of the delegates. Time is allotted for informal consultations in which delegates negotiate and draft decisions. The relationship is complementary. However, the private setting has the stronger effect on the decisions. In 1993, the private settings include the private conversations during public debate and smaller consultations groups called informal-informals. The informals consultations as scheduled negotiating sessions has the strongest effect on decisions. With very difficult issues, the informal-informals facilitate the work in the informal consultations. They provide an opportunity for delegates to confer about issues as they are being negotiated.

One example was the activity in the public and private settings with regard to the approval of the proposed program budget. The formal presentation of the budget proposals
occurred in the public arena. Also, the advisory organs
gave their estimates and conclusions in the public debate.
All of the sections of the budget and the accompanying
figures which were outlined in public debate were negotiated
in the informal consultations. During the last week of
negotiations several sessions of informal consultations were
conducted after the sections were presented. Smaller
consultation groups reviewed and negotiated details of the
funding requests which required clarification.

The desire for consensus is still an important variable
in that in the 1993 context, consensus was not only a goal,
but a process. The consensus procedure set a standard for
how a decision should be sought, and shaped how negotiations
were conducted. An example of how the desire for consensus
affected the decision is the approval of the proposed
program budget. The desire for consensus developed from the
delegates' desire to approve the budget by the end of the
regular session. It was reflected in the delegates' willingness to convene several meetings per day and until
the late hours of the morning to reach agreement. It was
standard procedure to submit the approved budget by the
January of each year, following the regular session.
Deviating from this practice would lead to more
administrative difficulties. Although many delegates were
not fully satisfied with the budget proposal, they approved
the budget to ensure that the Organization had a mandate for
the following biennium. Without a mandate for operation, the Organization would have exacerbated the existing financial crisis.

Overlapping interests also were very important to the decision, and they tended to have a stronger effect on the decision outcomes. Overlapping interests involve the linkage of issues important to the members and affect how they negotiate agreement on both unrelated and related issues. In the 1993 context, the linkage between issues were used among the members as leverage in the negotiations. The linkages played such a role that consensus could not be reached on some issues until other issues were fully reviewed and decisions were negotiated. This is most evident regarding the members' contributions for the regular budget and the special peacekeeping budget. The interests which overlaps the two scales were the members' shares of the budget, capacities to pay, and how their contributions would be determined.

One development was the United States' desire to reduce its share of the budget. If the United States' reduced its contribution, the contributions of the members would increase under the special scale. Latin American members viewed the move to reduce the United States' share of the contributions as a move to eliminate the special peacekeeping scale. This was not in their financial interest. They believed that the United State should retain
Another example of linkage of interests involved the payment of contributions for the budgets. There was an overlap of interests regarding the review of efficiency and improving the financial situation and administrative reform and restructuring in the Secretariat. The authorization of funds for the budget and the payment of contributions dictated the progress on these issues. This ensured that the funds were properly utilized.

The supply of individual characteristics and capabilities is also very important, but tended to be most evident in the consideration of controversial issues. The collection of personal characteristics needed for effective negotiators tended to play more of a role in the 1993 context in that with increased cohesion among the members.

The individual characteristics and capabilities of the decision makers which are key for maintaining stamina and steadfastness to produce appropriate policy for difficult issues were particularly important to the progress made on the scale methodology. These characteristics are essential for effective and productive decision makers. They are particularly needed for the full and expansive consideration of complex issues such as the scale of assessments. For example, dedication and creativity were needed for reaching the decisions on the scale of assessments. With the scale of assessment, a completely new mandate had to be
established. The scale was restructured representing a radical change in the mandate. The creativity and commitment among the members, and guidance by the chair of the informal consultations, resulted in the drafting of a scale which moderated the conflicting perspectives of the members.

In sum, the results from the 1993 analysis demonstrates how the variables affect the process and their contribution to the decision outcome. Although the variables are the same, evidence reveal that different indicators had an affect on the decision outcome.

Final Decisions: 1963 and 1993

When compared to the final decisions from the 1993 analysis, the final decisions from the 1963 analysis revealed some similarities. The General Principles resolution was similar to the Scales of Assessment resolution in that they both were controversial issues and their mandates called for radical change in existing policy. The UNEF and ONUC resolutions were similar to the Financing of Individual Peacekeeping Operations in the 1993 analysis. Given the votes on these resolutions and how consensus would have to be measured, the final decisions all had wide consensus. However, they probably were more reflective of "parliamentary" wins as opposed to consensus decisions which provided some indication of the possibility for compliance.
The following resolutions, Arrears, UN Bonds, Peace Fund, and the Committee of Twenty-one, were the less controversial issues. According to the votes, they reflected a wide consensus among the members in support of the resolutions. However, the degree of consensus was more reflective of the level of commitment expected from the members. These resolutions were not demanding, consisting of appeals, requests for performance reports, and statements regarding the merits of the proposals. They were similar to the Review of Efficiency, Improving the Financial Situation, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing UN Peacekeeping Operations, and the Proposed Program Budget resolutions and final decisions.

The initial comparison of the final decisions reveals that it is essential to consider the type of decision or resolutions when determining the degree of consensus achieved regarding an issue. The analysis also reveals that the same general types of resolutions were produced in both of the cases. However, it was important to consider the content of the resolutions to determine the requirements of their mandates and the potential for compliance from member states.

The differences in the two cases revealed that with the resolutions in the 1963 case, consensus would have to be coded on the basis of the final votes. This tends to cover the evidence of the potential for compliance from members.
Voting hides the existence of underlying dissent in abstentions or implicit problems with compliance. When consensus is considered in the context of degrees of consensus and the content of the resolution, as was done in the 1993 case, the potential for compliance is more evident regarding the decision outcome. The 1993 case revealed that the explanations of position in conjunction with the adoption of a consensus text reflected the underlying dissent in abstentions, and the problems with resolution content. In short, explanations of positions serve as indicators of the potential for compliance from members and the extent of their commitment to the mandate.
Conclusions

There were several core conclusions drawn from the Alger analyses which demonstrate what was necessary for achieving wide consensus on the seven resolutions regarding peacekeeping finance policy. The special session of 1963 was held to generate mandates for guiding policy. The decision makers attempted to interpret, apply, and implement Charter provisions in light of the ICJ ruling regarding the peacekeeping expenses. No historical standard existed previously to guide practice. Therefore, it was an attempt to formulate and specify policy regarding the finance of peacekeeping operations. The foundation was set for determining future policy.

The consideration of peacekeeping finance policy during the regular session of 1993, reflected thirty years of application of provisions and standards drafted at the special session of 1963. During that period, two major developments emerged which guided policy. In 1973, a special scale for peacekeeping operations and the consensus procedure established in 1986. In addition, there was more expertise in the area of finance among decision makers.

There were three main areas which demonstrate the major contrasts between the two cases: consensus, challenges, and new developments.

Consensus in both cases was similar in that the significance of the decisions depended upon the members'
willingness to accept and comply with the adopted policies. Consensus in the cases differs regarding the expectation of the mandates and the possibility for compliance. In 1963, the final votes did not necessarily demonstrate the commitment of the members to compliance. The decisions from 1993 reflected consistency between the delegates' commitment and the policy produced.

The major challenge in 1963 was determining the constitutionality of peacekeeping as an obligated expense. The main objective was the drafting of policy with a view to establishing a permanent peacekeeping scale. The major challenge in 1993 was ensuring collective financial responsibility among the members, maintaining the special peacekeeping scale, and implementing the modified scale of assessment for the regular budget.

The new developments regarding peacekeeping finance are highlighted when compared to the conclusions drawn from the 1963 analysis. Overall, there was more expertise in the area of peacekeeping finance. The same concerns recur, but there has been progress in the refinement of policy and procedures. Particularly, in comparison with the 1963 context, the process tends to be more subject to the scrutiny of the delegates. The analysis reveals that the variables at the focus of the 1993 analysis appeared to have a stronger role in consensus than that revealed in the Alger analyses. Analysis reveals that in the 1963 context
consensus was viewed as a goal or objective. Whereas it was viewed as a goal, tool, process, as well as a policy in the 1993 context.

In 1963, the outcome of a vote reflected sufficient agreement to pass a resolution. This actually split the support between those supporting the decision and those opposing the decision. The difficulty with a parliamentary win is that it may not be enough support for significant compliance. The outcome of consensus reflects support for the decision, ranging from the least common denominator to maximum agreement for adoption. The process of negotiation fostered under conference diplomacy continues until there is a decision acceptable enough for all the members to support.

The 1963 analysis revealed that the regional groups and the designated negotiating teams had important roles in the development of wide consensus. The 1993 analysis revealed that the financial interest groups, smaller regional groups, and groups forming regarding specific issues had important roles in the development of consensus. Their roles were evident in instances in which strong and weak consensus developed.

Alger's conclusion that extensive discussion and negotiation outside the public debate was vital for the achievement of high consensus in resolutions dealing with very controversial issues was confirmed by the 1993 results in which a strong consensus developed following the
consideration of a controversial issue.

The conclusion that interaction concurrent with public debate is a strong indicator of participation in negotiation was also confirmed by the 1993 analysis. Interviews revealed that informal consultations are the indicators of the negotiation of issues. The more controversial issues resulted in far more interaction among the decision makers indicated by the large number of scheduled and held informal consultations. This was particularly evident regarding the consideration of the scale of assessments.

The conclusion that the outcome of "parliamentary diplomacy" depends more on the presence of diplomats able and willing to play a variety of roles that mold divergent national policies into resolutions supportable by many nations was also confirmed in the 1993 analysis. The outcomes depended more on the presence of diplomats who are able and willing to play a variety of roles, particularly taking leadership roles in negotiation, either as a chair of informal consultation or an "interested party" to draft a moderating consensus text.

The conclusions regarding the relationship between interaction and legislative activity were drawn from the patterns noted regarding collaboration and mediation efforts. Interaction serves as a feedback system for public debate and it drives legislative activity. Alger's conclusion confirms the results of experimental research
with small groups by Leavitt and Mueller. The research indicated that "opportunity for feedback increases the accuracy of receptions of messages and increases receiver and sender confidence in their part in the communication process. These factors in turn increase amity, whereas the absence of feedback engenders greater hostility."\(^8\)

In the 1993 context, interaction also served as a feedback system for public debate. However, the consensus decision making process as a result of consensus procedure, provides additional feedback. After the consensus text is adopted, decision makers have the opportunity to give "explanations of position," providing an opportunity for clarifying their positions for the public record. The explanation of position is an indicator of the possibility of compliance and the extent to which members will or will not commit to the mandate.

Overall, underlying the differences in consensus in 1963 and 1993, are the changes in the global political environment and the developments in the United Nations decision making machinery. Johann Kaufmann's presentation of the Alger study of the Fifth Committee in the work, *Effective Negotiation*, noted its relevance to the present United Nations context in which a financial crisis persists.

Alger's evaluation of consensus reached on peacekeeping finance describes the origins of the policies drafted to address the financial crisis in the early 1960s following
the launching of the Congo peacekeeping mission. The crisis began initially because members challenged the constitutionality of peacekeeping as an obligated expense. The developments in the Fifth Committee regarding peacekeeping finance policy occurred particularly as a result of the increasing difficulties with the financial crisis. The special scale for financing peacekeeping operations and the consensus procedure were established to address the difficulties with financing the budgets. The consensus procedure, in particular, was established to provide a mechanism for drafting and approving cohesive budgets. The more effectively the budgets are drafted affects the approval of the peacekeeping budgets which are financed under the regular budget or the special peacekeeping scale.

The development of consensus decision making is reflective of an emerging trend in the United Nations, overall. It has taken the form of the consensus procedure in the Fifth Committee, because of the importance of the budget and the desire of the major contributors to maintain veto over decisions on the budget. However, the transformation of the decision making machinery is a probable result of the UN's ability to adapt and adjust its practices so that they are consistent with the members' collective legitimization of its policy. This is essential for ensuring compliance from the members.
The implications of the changes in decision making processes in the Fifth Committee are important because of the role played by this committee and its significance to UN policy. The Fifth (Administrative and Budgetary) Committee approves the budgets of the Organization, providing finance for all UN programs and activities. The Fifth Committee also interprets the financial implications of all decisions and policies, defining the role of the Organization in global governance. The analysis of the Fifth Committee provides insight regarding the effectiveness of global policy making.

Endnotes


CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSION

Overview

The preceding investigation was a comparative analysis of the development of consensus decision making in the United Nations General Assembly Administrative and Budgetary (Fifth) Committee, using the findings of a historical case to evaluate the latter case. The investigation was comparative on two stages. First, there was the comparative analysis within the latter case in which the instances in which different degrees of consensus were reached, and the instances in which consensus was reached on controversial and non-controversial issues were analyzed. Second, there was the comparison of the two cases, initially by a comparative overview of the cases, followed by a comparison of the results of the cases.

The investigation provides a comprehensive analysis of the development of consensus decision making, using two cases which examine the negotiation of consensus on peacekeeping finance: the 1963 Special Session and the 1993 Regular Session. The historical case from 1963 was the basis for the general theory that was applied to evaluate
the latter case. The comparative overview of the cases provided a broad context for the presentation of the results from the 1993 case and the comparison of these results with the results from the 1963 case.

The concluding chapter had four main objectives. The first objective was the summary of the theory of consensus decision making developed in the study. The theory was further explicated by discussing how the models demonstrated the relationships of the variables. To fully explain how the theory was developed, it was evaluated on how well the results corroborated the hypotheses. The second objective was the discussion of the significance of the theory. This was achieved through the description of the nature of consensus, and the discussion of the significance of the key variables. The third objective, assessing the generalizability of the theory, was achieved by discussing the major subjects of the study, and the relevance and use of key terms. The fourth objective, explaining the contribution of the theory, was achieved through the discussion of new information on the topic, and the consideration of topics future study.
Towards a Theory of Consensus Decision Making

The analysis began with a provisional theory developed from analyses which identified nine main factors which contribute to the achievement of consensus on UN decisions. The hypotheses developed to guide the analysis were supported by propositions in the literature. The case study design chosen to evaluate the variables was the structured, focused comparison which provided a general theoretical framework from which the appropriate lessons could be drawn from the two cases under consideration. The provisional theory highlights the set of variables general to the political process of the Fifth Committee, which made it possible to differentiate the lessons drawn from each case.

The analysis sought a deeper explanation of the consensus outcomes by considering the instances and circumstances under which the political process was affected by these variables. For instance, the analysis sought to identify the instances and the circumstances under which the presence of the variables resulted in different degrees of consensus. The analysis identified cases in which strong and weak consensus developed and explained the conditions which led to these outcomes. The resulting theory demonstrates that there were variables prevalent regarding different types of issues, resulting in different degrees of consensus.
The provisional theory was very useful in the analysis of the regular session of 1993 which demonstrates the rigor and reliability of the findings from the Alger study. Additions were made to the original theory to fully identify the differences in the two cases. In sum, the analysis specified the conditions under which different degrees of consensus develop.

The models developed to demonstrate the effects of the variables on consensus when the type of issue was considered were supported by the comparison of the variables most prevalent when strong consensus or weak consensus developed regarding specific agenda items. These models were further supported when compared to a model developed for an instance in which consensus was not achieved. Usually, at the least, a weak consensus is expected to result if the threats to consensus are not overcome. However, one recent instance of consensus failure occurred during the Forty-seventh Regular Session, involving the scale of assessments. Given that the scale of assessments was very controversial, according to the model for controversial issues, one should have expected the variables reflecting the motives and characteristics of the participants to have had the most effect facilitating consensus with the negotiation context having a lesser effect. In this instance, the motives of the participants which has a direct effect on the activities in negotiation did not operate as expected. Motives were not influenced by
a spirit of consensus. Nor did the negotiation context have the effect of influencing activities towards developing consensus. The process resulted in a vote, splitting the decision into majority and minority factions.

During the Forty-seventh Regular General Session, consensus failed to develop regarding the methodology for determining the scale of assessments. Opposition to the proposed scale emerged, particularly among the new admitted member states. Most of the new states were Eastern European countries and the former republics of the Soviet Union. The delegates representing these states would not support the adoption of the proposed scale, because it did not accurately reflect their countries' capacities to pay. The rates of assessments reflected in the proposed scale would put further stress on the countries' unstable economies. The delegates were unwilling to compromise their positions which resulted in a vote. The vote did not provide the instructions necessary for issuing a mandate for determining the scale.

The delegates from Singapore and Colombia stated that this occurred partly, because the newly admitted delegates were not informed or socialized in the mode of negotiation in the Fifth Committee. Each felt that a consensus could have been reached. However, the opposing faction wanted their interests specified in a final decision. This instance of the failure to reach a consensus was viewed as
an isolated incident, and that once the opposing faction realized how consensus could be used to facilitate their interests, they would join the collective in upholding the consensus norm.

The motives of the opposing factions were focused primarily on their interests, not so much on garnering support for their positions on the proposed scale. Their activities undertaken in negotiation primarily promoted these interests, further polarizing the factions. The context failed to develop the channels for collaboration. With the factions polarized, networks could not be used effectively for diplomatic appeals for cooperation. In turn, the activities undertaken in negotiation failed to produce a consensus. With clearly defined majority and minority factions, a vote was taken to record which faction would prevail in the final decision. This reflected a "parliamentary win" for the opposing faction. However, it could not be translated into an appropriate policy which could be implemented. The task of producing a consensus is required for issuing a mandate, whether it reflected maximum agreement or general support.

The main objective of the consensus procedure is to produce a consensus so that a mandate can be issued. The split decision in this instance did not provide a basis for issuing a mandate for the scale of assessment. Figure 15 demonstrates the failure to uphold the consensus norm:
FAILURE TO UPHOLD CONSENSUS NORM: VOTE ON THE SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS, 47TH REGULAR SESSION

Political Process
Context

Decision Makers'
Orientation and Style

V

Characteristics of
Activities <-- -- -- Motives <------ Participants

Decisions Outcome
Vote

Key: ———— strong influence  -- -- less influence

Figure 15: Failure to uphold the consensus norm

In sum, when the motives for fostering consensus are weak, the incentives to undertake activities for fostering consensus are limited. When the activities are undertaken without the influences of the motives and the negotiation context to facilitate consensus, a vote can be expected. The examination of this instance in which consensus failed to develop further supports the hypotheses stating that the presence of these variables in the political process contributes to the achievement of consensus.

Investigation of the 1993 case, using the hypotheses resulted in the drafting of models to demonstrate the patterns and conditions of the consensus outcomes. From these models "conditional generalizations" were formulated to account for the circumstances under which different degrees of consensus were achieved. The research addresses
itself to the conditions of the political process which produces effective policies. The theory provides general knowledge about consensus decisions to demonstrate the factors from which policy makers draw to negotiate and draft policy. In order for the policy maker to make effective use of the general knowledge for addressing a problem, political considerations and interests must be taken into account.

According to George's approach, the general knowledge provides a theoretical framework which identifies the critical variable-components of the political process to which the policy makers give specific content: "The generic knowledge (ie., empirical laws and causal patterns) is derived from systematic comparison of explanations of variance in outcomes of past efforts to make use of a particular strategy."¹ What the research has determined is that similar outcomes of consensus can have different causal patterns or explanations.² Consensus develops in different ways according to type of issue and final decision.

The hypotheses were credible in that they provided an effective guide for demonstrating how the consensus has developed in the Fifth Committee. Dissecting and exploring consensus in this context can lead to further understanding of how it functions and differs in other contexts.

The hypotheses led to the development of a theory which not only specified the conditions under which consensus is achieved, but also identified how these conditions affect
the formulation of appropriate policy. The theory demonstrates the circumstances encountered by decision makers in their efforts to implement a strategy to address a specific situation. The results are consistent with what the theory demonstrated about possible outcomes. According to George and Smoke several criteria which assess the viability of a theory. The present theory of consensus meets the criteria for determining a theory's capacity to demonstrate the actual conditions investigated:

Provide a selective summary of the critical elements to demonstrate the relation of the conditions to the outcomes; consider the conditions in qualitative terms; reinforce the judgments regarding the presence or absence of the conditions by describing and comparing the roles they played in the cases examined; and indicate that the same causal pattern can not be found in all cases of the successful outcome, but different combinations of the conditions can be expected in the different outcomes.

The Significance of the Theory

The Nature of Consensus

Understanding the nature of consensus in the Fifth Committee is essential for discussing its significance to the production of effective policies. As described by the respondents in Table 15 (See page 203), the advantages of consensus lie in the support garnered in principle. When all of the delegates join the consensus, cohesive decisions that reflect the convergence of views on the issues are translated into effective policies. In addition, the interests of the strong minority are protected. These
elements are essential for a policy to be effectively implemented.

Exploring the requirements for a substantive consensus highlights some of its disadvantages. As shown in Table 16 (See page 204), consensus is usually produced from difficult negotiations which require tremendous effort from the delegates to collaborate and compromise. Another disadvantage is that it is a time consuming process. More information is needed, and the conditions for acceptance must be clearly elaborated and negotiated. Within this context, decisions can be sidetracked, and they are sometimes vague. However, more time is needed to reach a final decision, because there are more stages of negotiation needed for reaching a final decision.

Table 17 (See page 205) shows that despite the disadvantages, consensus has long-term implications which reflect the effects of consensus decision making on policy. Among the responses noting the long-term implications, incremental progress towards a consensus norm is considered important. The consensus norm developing in the global environment is the long-term result of the activities undertaken, and the policy produced, at a given time. It provides a plan, format, and protocol for addressing issues related to a policy problem. Another implication is the moderating influence of consensus which fosters more equity and curtails conflict. In addition, the stages in which the
A consensus norm develops provide precedents for guiding future policy until the ultimate goal is reached.

The degree of consensus reached on an issue at a given time influences the effectiveness of the policy produced. Subsequently, the substance of the policy and the compliance gained at a given time, contributes to the development of a consensus norm which guides global governance.

The information in Table 56 (See page 260) is very important for illustrating the significance of the degree of consensus for implementing policy. The type of issue-decision outcome combinations demonstrated in Table 56 show that the degree of consensus is an indicator of the potential for compliance. The scale of assessment was a controversial issue upon which a strong consensus was reached. The mandate was issued for a new scale methodology for determining the contributions. The members approved this methodology, successfully moderating the conflicting interests. The new scale of assessment has been adopted a policy, and it is viewed as a major step towards achieving financial collective responsibility. Because a consensus was reached, the Committee on Contributions was able to issue a mandate which fostered policy development. In contrast, when a vote resulted, a mandate could not be issued. The example confirms that the degree of consensus has significance for the implementation of UN policy.
The Significance of Key Variables

The major task of the analysis in case study research is to maintain the chain of evidence which is consistency between the questions asked, the data collected, and the conclusions drawn. This is important particularly in analyses with multiple data sources, because it is important that the array of data collected is consistent with the research questions. The variables under investigation were posited to have had a decisive influence upon the negotiation of a consensus on key finance issues. The data collected to demonstrate this yielded patterns and trends that confirmed their influence and explained the variation in the variables across different agenda items. The results specified the various combinations of variables and the conditions under which they affect consensus.

The significance of the variables is corroborated by the responses given by the various United Nations delegates and Secretariat personnel.
Table 57: Summary of the responses regarding the importance of the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Important</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Important</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undecided</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 57 demonstrates that the responses concentrated in the very important and important categories. The variables with the most "very important" responses, reflected the activities in negotiation, the motives and individual characteristics of the participants. The responses demonstrate that the respondents believed that these variables were essential for achieving consensus. The responses reflect those variables which have a stronger influence regarding controversial issues. The variables with the most responses were IR, ICC, DC, PP, NI, and LP.

After responses were given in the questionnaire, respondents gave unsolicited comments, specifying the effect of each variable on consensus. The responses were placed in four categories as shown in Table 58.
Table 58: Summary of responses regarding the influence of the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitate Consensus</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence is Signif</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Influence is not Signif</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhibits Consensus</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 58, the responses reveal that the respondents believed that all of the variables facilitate consensus and that their influence was significant. When the responses for both categories were combined, the most responses concentrated in the activities, motives, and characteristics of the participants categories of variables. The variables with the most responses were PP, IR, DC, NI, DS, and ICC.

In addition to these responses, various concerns noted in the responses also demonstrated the significance of the variables. For instance, the respondents expressed political, administrative, technical, and financial concerns in their responses. The different categories reflect that their consideration of the variables prompted the respondents to identify areas in which they believed the variables had influence.
Overwhelmingly, political and administrative concerns were expressed most among the respondents. Table 59 shows that the context and activities variables had the most influence in these four areas. The variables with the most responses were LP, IR, DS, OI, DD, PP, NI.

Table 59: Summary of the responses noting concerns regarding the variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Responses</th>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DD</td>
<td>DS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administr</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to having the respondents answer the questionnaire, open-ended questions were asked regarding the factors most important to consensus and peacekeeping finance. Among the responses given, there were responses which duplicated the list of variables. Respondents gave these responses without being prompted. Eighteen, or sixty-four percent of the respondents, gave responses which duplicated the list of variables most important to consensus and peacekeeping finance.
Table 60: Responses duplicating the list of variables without prompting

Total Number of Responses: 35

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Number and Percentage of Responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>9 (26%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>6 (17%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LP</td>
<td>5 (14%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OI</td>
<td>4 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NI</td>
<td>3 (9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DC</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DS</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DD</td>
<td>1 (3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Table 60, the responses concentrated in the variables reflecting the activities in negotiation and the motives and characteristics of participants. The individual characteristics and capabilities had the most responses, twenty-six percent of the total responses which confirms the significance of this variable to consensus in the Fifth Committee. The relationship between the activity in public and private settings was not viewed as important as the informal consultations which were scheduled negotiating meetings in which resolutions were drafted. The respondents stressed the informal consultations and the informal-informal consultations as the key settings for negotiation. They felt that private conversations in public debate was helpful. However, they did not stress them in their responses. Leadership and planning, as well as international roles, overlapping interests, and networks of individuals, respectively, were also noted in the responses.
as key variables in the achievement of consensus. These variables were particularly key in the negotiations for controversial issues. These variables appear to be more dominant in the latter case in which consensus without a vote was prevalent. The nature of consensus required more reliance on the delegates' approval. With more involvement and interaction among the delegates, these variables would have more significance for consensus.

These responses and the responses regarding the entire list of variables (See Table 39, page 223), show that the respondents felt that the list adequately represented the political process in the Fifth Committee. Approximately seventy percent of the responses regarding the list noted its viability with the remaining responses questioning its generalizability and its completeness. The respondents specified that the variables reflected the conditions under which relations among the delegates are undertaken. Although this is sufficient, it was very important to recognize the importance of another factor outside the relations among member states, relations between the member states and the Secretariat.

Fourteen respondents (fifty percent) noted that the relations between the member states and the Secretariat affected the consensus. One clear difference in the studies was that in the earlier study, there appeared to be more reliance on the Secretariat's judgment of policy. Although
the policy was drafted and approved by the delegates, guidance from the Secretariat and the International Court of Justice ruling was evident in the negotiations. In the latter study, delegates challenged the Secretariat and scrutinized it more closely. The ACABQ, an expert review committee, provided guidance for delegates regarding proposals, providing a further check on the estimates submitted by the Secretariat.

The Meanings of Consensus

Consensus in the United Nations System

The two main subjects of consideration in the investigation and the budgetary process reflect key normative issues regarding the transformation of the United Nations decision making processes. The developments regarding consensus and peacekeeping finance reflect broader developments in global policy making. What the decision outcomes demonstrate regarding consensus is that the policy adopted at a specific time represents a stage towards establishing a broader consensus in the global community. The global consensus represents the ultimate goal which would allow the UN to operate as intended. The decision outcomes reflect the immediate results of negotiation. The degree of consensus achieved and the type of resolution adopted represents the policy adopted by the organization at a given time.
Tracing the development of consensus decision making from the League Assembly the UN Assembly plenary reveals a transformation from the ideal of unanimity to the consensus procedure established in the Fifth Committee. The consensus procedure differs from consensus in other contexts, such as unanimity and groupthink. Groupthink and unanimity both involve dominant coalitions or perspectives superseding the competing coalitions. What results from consensus in the context of conference diplomacy is a consolidation of options and perspectives, producing a cohesive UN policy. Groupthink is avoided because authority in conference diplomacy manifests horizontally. Despite political and economic influence of a dominating coalition, the decision making process does not limit consideration of competing options.

Conference diplomacy incorporates options, producing a hybrid of the conflicting perspectives. Conference diplomacy allows consensus to grow from a process intended to transmit global policy. The use of informal consultations under the consensus procedure serves as a corrective for the effects experienced in groupthink. Within the consultations decision makers appeal to personal sensibilities, opening the process to perspectives and options. The official stances which could lead to groupthink is shed in the informal consultations. There is no leader forcing a decision. For example, the influence of
the United States does not necessarily give the United States delegate authority to impose a decision. The United States' influence manifests in a broader sense. Its influence is most evident regarding financial constraints that limit United States willingness to comply with UN policy.

The decisions are usually incremental steps toward achieving ultimate goals. This is appropriate because the UN can not take action or place obligations on members beyond the collective legitimization extended by the members. Consensus decision making has facilitated the collective legitimization of UN policy because it allows the members to have closer scrutiny over the mandates. As a result, consensus decision-making is a growing trend in the UN General Assembly. Among the three hundred thirty-nine resolutions adopted in the Forty-eighth Regular Session, two hundred seventy-four resolutions were adopted without votes, eighty-one percent of the total number of resolutions.6

Consensus regarding peacekeeping finance is essential, because of the expansion of its scope as an activity of the United Nations. Peacekeeping has developed from a controversial activity which was the focus of a special session, to a full UN practice. On the other hand, criteria for peacekeeping finance and disputes about wider UN financing produce continuing disputes about peacekeeping budgets. This presents difficult challenges to conference
diplomacy.

Measures, such as commitment authority, resumed sessions, and explanations of position, used in the Fifth Committee help to curtail the challenges to conference diplomacy.

Commitment authority, not only, operates as a financing tool, but as an administrative procedure, allowing initial funding to be appropriated for peacekeeping operations until the actual budget is finalized. It gives the committee additional time for reviewing budget proposals more closely and provides needed funds to the operations. It is an executive measure, because it allows the Secretary General some leverage in authorizing funds to operations in the event that budgets are not finalized.

Resumed sessions alleviate time constraints, providing further opportunities for official review and approval of budgets. It also helps alleviate financing difficulties, because budgetary needs arise throughout the year. Explanations of position allow delegates to clarify their position and express their interpretation of the decision once it has been approved.

These measures allow conference diplomacy to function despite the difficulties with complex issues such as peacekeeping finance. Although concerns might arise regarding the long-term implications of decisions, dissension is curtailed by these measures. Consensus is
facilitated because the delegates' scrutiny of the over the issues is not hindered by extreme time constraints, and they have leverage over the implementation of the decisions.

Consensus Beyond the United Nations System

Given how consensus functions within the UN context, the use of the terms consensus and unanimity have stricter definitions than found in the decision making literature. Unanimity refers to decisions in which everyone votes yes. Consensus refers to decisions in which no one objects. A stricter definition for unanimity was needed to clearly distinguish it from this study's definition for a strong consensus. A stricter definition for consensus was needed to clearly distinguish it from the definition of consensus as the level of agreement reflected in a vote. This study makes a clearer distinction between the different modes of decision making to demonstrate how the transformation of UN decision making has influenced global policy making.

Majority vote refers to a specified majority supporting a decision by voting yes. Majority voting and unanimity impose finality on the decision, limiting the effects of negotiation. Consensus facilitates negotiation, allowing agreement to develop through collaboration and compromise. The consensus procedure and the unit veto of the major financial contributors in the Fifth Committee resemble unanimity. However, they do not impose debilitating constraints on negotiation. Although the objective is to
reach a consensus, the substance of the decision outcome is not a given. This investigation addresses itself to the substance of the decision outcome, the content of the policy, and the nature of the process which produced them. This is the reason for differentiating between the degrees of consensus and identifying the relevant variables. This investigation does not assume that the same outcomes are produced by the same variables. However, it does assume that the outcomes produced by these variables, under these conditions, can be generalized to similar contexts. In sum, if similar circumstances are present, then outcomes similar to those revealed in this investigation can be expected.

**Contribution of the Research**

**New Information**

The major contribution of the research is theory development. It applies a theory to a current context, determining the conditions under which different outcomes occur. In addition, it sorts out and specifies the circumstances of a particular case to demonstrate the utility of the theory. Related to this contribution, it contributes to the development of policy-relevant theory. It demonstrates the process which policy makers undertake when they design and implement policy. Identifying the conditions under which policy makers execute policy gives insight regarding the substance of the policy produced.
The developments occurring in the Fifth Committee are key indicators of the overall effectiveness of the Organization. The Fifth Committee reviews and approves the budgets under which the Organization operates. The decisions and resolutions adopted as policy in the Forty-eighth Regular Session in the Fifth Committee have been under review and projected performance analysis since 1993.

The implementation of two policies considered during the Forty-eighth Regular General Assembly Session in 1993 demonstrates the policy-relevance of the theory. These policies involve the implementation of the proposals regarding the scale of assessments and the finance of peacekeeping operations. The outcome of the consideration of the scale of assessment reflected a radical change in the existing policy which gained overwhelming support among the members, and the policy was implemented smoothly. The outcome of the consideration of the finance of peacekeeping operations was the change of the budget cycle to ease appropriation difficulties. This development reflects a change in an aspect of the existing policy which gained support from the members. These developments are consistent with the contentions of the study that the implications of the decision outcomes can be inferred from how the conditions manifested during the deliberations.
Most of the policies which were projected to take effect between 1995 and 1997 are presently being implemented in UN policy in the areas of the regular budget, peacekeeping finance, and reform and restructuring efforts. However, the financial crisis has persisted. In the latter part of 1995, the Organization essentially ran out of cash flows for covering regular budget expenditures. The Organization reverted to borrowing from its peacekeeping budgets, further jeopardizing peacekeeping finance.

The measures adopted for addressing peacekeeping finance difficulties are extremely important, and they will address the problem incrementally. However, there must be further commitment from member states to pay their contributions. Without the proper financial base from which to implement the package of measures adopted for reform and revitalization, further efforts would be undertaken in vain. The recent "unprecedented" cash shortfall may be the very development that might prompt members to pay their contributions in full.

Recent developments in policy represent prospects for viable changes which will improve the Organization's efficiency in financial matters. The scale of assessment drafted in 1993 has been implemented and appears agreeable to the members. The successful adoption and implementation of the mandate has occurred because it approximates the balance between collective financial responsibility among
the members and their relative capacities to pay.

The budgetary cycle for financing peacekeeping operations has been changed from the period covering 1 January to 31 December to the period covering 1 July to 30 June. This adjustment is more consistent with most of the budget cycles of member states. Budget estimates are to be considered and approved twice a year beginning with the period of 1 July 1996. This would facilitate earlier submission of budget estimates for review and approval. Previously, the first annual budget estimate was submitted during the regular session preceding the budget year under consideration. As experience develops regarding the implementation of policies, and improvements are made regarding the management of financial affairs, political considerations can be addressed. This would remove the major obstacles to the members' payment of their contributions. If there is trust and satisfaction in the policies, members would be more willing to comply.

New proposals for rapid response forces also offer prospects for easier financing of peacekeeping. The rapid response forces would require further scrutiny of the forces provided for UN action. Therefore, each member contributing troops could monitor the possible costs and manage expenditures for employing the forces. Because the agreements regarding the size and number of troops are made in advance, members would have better confidence regarding
the amounts of the contributions needed for the operations. One of the major complaints among the delegates regarded the Secretariat's lack of accountability in its budget estimates. Closer scrutiny of the troops and equipment needed for rapid response operations would alleviate concerns regarding overestimates.

Another prospect for improving the finance of peacekeeping could be voluntary contributions. Voluntary contributions could increase confidence in financing peacekeeping operations because members could monitor the amounts of funds contributed to operations. However, there must be standards for pledging certain amounts for particular operations to ensure an equitable distribution of influence among members.

Future Study

Further study regarding consensus decision making should include analysis of other arenas and its effect on the United Nations' capacity to implement global policy. For instance, future studies could explore consensus decision making in UNCTAD or the International Seabed Authority. UNCTAD utilizes negotiating teams similar to those utilized during the 1963 Special General Assembly Session. The structured groups have spokespersons to conduct negotiation. The International Seabed Authority provides a structure for developing consensus before provisions are implemented. A consensus decision procedure
is included in the institutions which oversee the execution of the treaty. The consensus procedure in the Fifth Committee operates similarly in that the goal is to produce a consensus text which all the delegates support and for which there is no formal objections. Negotiations and revisions are undertaken until agreement on the text has been reached. Further analysis would involve the identification of consensus decision making in practice in specific agencies and the evaluation of the type of consensus process under which each agency operates.

Analysis tracing consensus decision making throughout the United Nations System could help demonstrate the extent to which it has been institutionalized in UN decision making. A convention on consensus, outlining standards for deliberation and negotiation of an issue, is one area to explore. The procedural measures employed in drafting the Law of the Sea Treaty could provide a model. Within the decision making framework, groups of representatives negotiate consensus regarding a package of policies. Final approval of individual items is not given until full agreement is reached on all items.

Wider dissemination of consensus might be achieved by the use of procedures similar to those in the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). As cited by Ernst Haas, UNEP is a "catalytic" agency, meaning that it stimulates other agencies to adhere to specific standards in their
programming. However, it does not administer its own program.® A convention on consensus would provide the consultation for agencies regarding problem solving and policy formulation.

The present study has sought to, and any future inquiry should, demonstrate that the emergence of consensus decision making reflects a recognition that the modes of negotiation and diplomacy must be consistent with the relationships among the decision makers. The interdependent nature of the relationships among UN members states is beset with problems and conflicting interests. In order for global policy to fully address the difficulties, the processes which are utilized to resolve the problems must moderate the conflicts as well as foster cohesion and compliance.

Future study should also include the investigation of consensus decision making in arenas outside of the UN context. Given that the problem was framed in terms of decision making, the theory developed can be generalized to other decision making arenas. The research concludes that consensus decision making has significance in the evaluation of global policy making. It has contributed to the development of standards and norms which reflect progress and competence in global governance.

Consensus decision making is particularly appropriate for the UN arena, because the UN does not have an overarching authority to enforce its policies. It is
necessary to have the collective legitimization of the members to implement UN policies. However, consensus decision making can also have an effect in arenas, such as the United States Congress. The committees in Congress, and most organizations, have sought consensus, similar to that described in the Alger study of 1963. The findings of the present investigation provides insight regarding the contribution of several factors to the achievement of consensus, specifying their implications beyond the level of agreement reflected in a vote. The investigation highlights the benefits of assessing the substance of the consensus which is essential for fostering equity and ensuring compliance.

Endnotes


2. George 1993, 142.


BIBLIOGRAPHY


Secretariat Representatives of the United Nations.


OBSERVATIONS OF INDICATORS OF THE VARIABLES IN POLITICAL PROCESS

Degree of Difference of States Policies: differences on key elements and differences on peripheral elements

Indicator: positions on issues

Example: methodology for scale of assessments should be based upon a 10-year statistical base period

Observations:
1. relationship of the policies to positions taken on issues
2. range of different perspectives
3. extent to which delegates are guided by policies of government
4. small degree of differences contributes to consensus

Development of Subgroups: emergence of groups to facilitate negotiation

Indicator: coordination within groups

Example: Regional or ideological groups

Observations:
1. regional groups and perspectives
2. ideological groups (developing around issue)
3. financial interest groups
4. negotiating groups (1963); informal consultations (1993)
5. advisory organs

Networks of Individuals: interconnections of individuals who have worked together previously

Indicator: diplomatic contacts

Examples: permanent representatives' contacts on ambassador level and delegates' contacts with Secretariat personnel

Observations:
1. members of permanent missions
2. Secretariat personnel
3. colleagues in committee
4. colleagues in subgroups
5. interested parties

1. channel for exchange of views within and across groups
2. facilitates ally configurations regarding issues
3. shape patterns and frequency of interaction
4. eases rivalries generated from official positions
5. appeal to personal contacts; use leverage with con

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings:

Indicators: Formal and informal interactions

Example: Informal consultations convened after general debate to resolve difficult issues

Observations:
1. complementary and supportive
2. can be a constraint
3. symbiotic relationship of different arenas allows exhaustive consideration of difficult issues
4. variety of arenas and channels for negotiation

Leadership and Planning: capacity to guide or direct consideration of issues for developing a consensus.

Indicators: proposals, recommendations regarding issues, draft decisions by interested parties for consideration of issues

Example: submission of proposals for Inspector General to be considered for reviewing efficiency of UN

Observations:
1. role taken to show commitment to consideration of issues
2. provide overall guidance regarding objectives and goals
3. drafting initial procedures to fulfill objectives
4. setting standard for others to follow
5. spur and persuade dissenters to support consensus norm

International Roles: functions, such as diplomats, independent of national interests and policies

Indicators: elected, appointed positions for facilitating caucusing activities and negotiations

Example: chairs of committees and negotiation sessions

Observations:
1. committee chair
2. representatives of advisory organs
3. Secretariat representatives
4. chairs of negotiating sessions (1963)
   chairs of informal consultations (1993)
Desire for Consensus:
Indicator: appeals and collaboration efforts
Example: compromise some points to foster agreement; consensus norm emphasized
Observations:
1. motives underlying collaboration efforts
2. extent to which consensus norm is adhered to
3. interpretation of interests within parameters of consensus procedure
4. prioritization of objectives (individual vs. collective)

Overlapping Interests:
Indicator: common interests on another issue; sometimes related issue which influences decisions on issue under consideration
Example: trade-offs, linking issues
Observations:
1. interdependently linked by interests that are represented
2. dictate direction of communication patterns
3. source of harmony regarding issues
4. source of division regarding issues

Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities:
Indicator: effective and productive delegates
Example: commitment to the issue
Observations:
1. needed for developing draft decision and revising until reflective of collective will
2. needed for full and expansive consideration of issues
3. profile of an effective delegate
4. characteristics needed to maintain stamina, persistence and steadfastness to produce policy regarding difficult issues
APPENDIX B
CATEGORIES OF RESPONSES FOR OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

I. What are the most difficult issues to resolve regarding peacekeeping finance?

Central Issues Regarding Consensus on Peacekeeping Finance
1. Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial functioning of the United Nations
2. Proposed Biennial Budgets
3. Financial Situation of the United Nations
4. Scale of Assessments
5. Administrative and Budgetary Aspect of UN Peacekeeping Operations

Different Perspectives in Responses to the Question

Efficiency
1. Inspector General
2. Composition of Security Council
3. Rationalize/Restructure the Secretariat

Proposed Budget
1. Justification of estimates
2. Zero real growth in budgets
3. Approved by consensus

Financial Situation
1. Pay assessments and arrears
2. Installment payments schedule
3. Contributions from defense budget
4. Private investment

Scales of Assessment
1. Long or short statistical base periods
2. More collective responsibility
3. Condense to three groupings
4. Reassignments on basis of economic growth

Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of PKOs
1. Unified vs. individual budgets
2. Financing under regular budget scale or special scale
3. Permanent apparatus for planning and deploying pkos
II. What are the factors that you believe are most important to achieving consensus?

Factors most important
1. Time
2. Documents, ie. proposals, reports
3. ACABQ review
4. Individual personality of participants
5. Relations with the Secretariat

Different Perspectives in the Responses

Time
1. More time needed for consensus to properly review and negotiate
2. Time consuming, and wasteful
3. Not enough to fully address issues

Documents
1. Not submitted for review and approval in timely manner
2. Poorly drafted
3. Overestimates; estimates not justified

ACABQ review
1. Cut budget to reasonable and practical amounts
2. Expert assessments have credibility among delegates
3. Must justify estimate recommendations

Individual Personalities
1. Cohesion among delegates of Fifth Committee; loyalty
2. Seven or Eight incumbent delegates that are respected, trusted, maintain prestige among delegates; actually they are informal chairs
3. Credibility, respect, committed and agreeable

Relations with the Secretariat
1. Lack of trust
2. Try to force an answer by creating urgent situation
3. Vague explanations for estimates
4. Resent challenges made to Secretariat regarding estimates

III. Describe the nature of consensus and what it contributes to the decision outcome.

Consensus
1. Advantages
2. Disadvantages
3. Long-term implications
Different Perspectives in Responses

Advantages
1. Minority interests protected
2. Cohesion maintained
3. In principle, must support if joined consensus
4. Reach instrumental goals to reach ultimate

Disadvantages
1. Time consuming
2. Difficult negotiations
3. Decisions sometimes vague
4. Decisions sometimes sidetracked from true objective

Long-term implications
1. Incremental progress
2. Institutional memory; precedents set
3. Ultimate goal eventually reached through institutionalized customary practice
4. Moderating influence
APPENDIX C
QUESTIONNAIRE

Please give your impression of how important the following factors are to the achievement of consensus on the financing of peacekeeping operations. Briefly explain.

A high level of participation in planning activities and preliminary negotiation which gets the political process moving early enough so that necessary preliminaries have been concluded before decision day comes in the public arena.

a. very important
b. important
c. somewhat important
d. not important
e. undecided

Development of subgroups, such as regional groups and informal groups agreeing on certain issues, that permit scattered and heterogeneous interests to be narrowed down to a few key issues.

a. very important
b. important
c. somewhat important
d. not important
e. undecided

Networks of individuals in various delegations who have worked together on past occasions which provide a channel for communication for future negotiation.

a. very important
b. important
c. somewhat important
d. not important
e. undecided

Presence of an adequate supply of important characteristics and capabilities: knowledge of the issue, persistence in the face of slow progress and disappointment, capacity for hard work, creative ideas to get around roadblocks.

a. very important
b. important
c. somewhat important
d. not important
e. undecided
The institutional context (or negotiation setting) which provides for public discussion and private consultation.

a. very important  
b. important  
c. somewhat important  
d. not important  
e. undecided

The impartiality of key individuals who take on international roles as negotiators, chairs of negotiation sessions, regional groups, and committees.

a. very important  
b. important  
c. somewhat important  
d. not important  
e. undecided

Extent to which there is a desire for consensus.

a. very important  
b. important  
c. somewhat important  
d. not important  
e. undecided

Degree of difference in the positions of participating states at the beginning of negotiations.

a. very important  
b. important  
c. somewhat important  
d. not important  
e. undecided

Overlapping interests which cut across the major groups that are trying to reach agreement.

a. very important  
b. important  
c. somewhat important  
d. not important  
e. undecided
CODING FOR CLOSED-ENDED QUESTIONS

Questionnaire asked each participant to give their impression of how important the following factors are to the achievement of consensus on peacekeeping finance. They were also asked to briefly explain why they gave a particular answer.

Factors important to Consensus
1. Leadership and Planning
2. Development of Subgroups
3. Networks of Individuals
4. Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities
5. Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings
6. International Roles
7. Desire for Consensus
8. Degree of Difference in Policies of States
9. Overlapping Interests

Different Response Choices
1. Very important
2. Important
3. Somewhat important
4. Not important
5. Undecided

CODING FOR RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

Different Perspectives in Unsolicited Responses

Explanations for Answers Noted in Questionnaire
1. Influence on consensus is significant
2. Facilitates consensus
3. Influence on consensus is not significant
4. Inhibits consensus

Unsolicited Responses Noted in the Personal Interviews

Responses Regarding Set of Nine Factors in Demonstrating Consensus
1. List is comprehensive and representative
2. List is sufficient, generic list of factors important to consensus
3. List is not complete, other factors need to be noted
4. List is generalizable
5. List is not generalizable, unique to Fifth Committee
6. List is not comparable to factors in present context
Perceptions of Consensus: Description of Consensus
1. Consensus as a tool
2. Consensus as a goal
3. Consensus as a policy

Additional Factors Noted as Important to Peacekeeping
Finance: Noted in Ten interviews
1. financing peacekeeping operations
2. delegates' perceptions of pkos
3. budgetary process
4. administrative procedures
5. political process
6. characteristics of delegates
7. decision outcomes
8. negotiation

Role of "Commitment Authority" in Consensus
Noted in six interviews
1. executive mechanism
2. administrative procedure
3. financing tool

Four Types of Issues Stressed in Their Descriptions of the Political Process and Nine Variables
1. Political
2. Administrative
3. Financial
4. Technical
REVIEW OF THE DATA

Documentary Records

The volume of documents produced regarding the consideration of agenda items demonstrates the complexity of the political process. Several types of documents recorded the major components of deliberation. Each type of document provided information essential for describing the political process. Two types of documents are utilized for the consideration of agenda items by the member states. Reports of the Secretary General consist of proposals and budget estimates. Reports of advisory organs provide revisions, recommendations, and conclusions regarding the agenda items under consideration. Summary reports record the reactions, concerns, and positions of member states during general debate. Resolutions summarize the plan or policy agreed upon to address the issue. They are drafted during negotiations and approved in committee. Plenary meeting records provide verbatim accounts of the General Assembly's final approval of the decisions reached in committee.

The types of information noted and utilized from each type of document were the key issues highlighted in the documents, and the different categories of perspectives reflected in the text. The different perspectives reflected in the text: 1. The amount of funds needed and requested (budgetary); 2. The reasons for support (political); 3. The methods for determining funding (technical); and 4. The
availability of resources (financial). In addition, an assessment of the nature of the language in the documents. For instance, was the language specific, vague, forceful, conciliatory, analytic or technical?

Documentary information is presented for each agenda item included information regarding recommendations made to the Fifth Committee regarding the issue, the review and reactions from the Fifth Committee, and the approval of the final decisions by the Fifth Committee.

SCALE OF ASSESSMENTS


Recommendations of Independent Advisory Group

1. Countries must pay their assessed United Nations dues on time and in full to address shortfalls in contributions.

2. United Nations should require its member states to pay their dues in four quarterly installments, instead of in a single lump sum at the beginning of the year.

3. Raise the level of the Working Capital Fund from $100 million to $200 million with the difference financed by a one-time assessment of $100 million to replenish the Fund depleted to make up for member state arrears.

4. Regular budget assessment rate should be base on a three rather then the ten-year average of member states' gross domestic product to shift burden of financial responsibility from states to others.
Recommendations of Committee on Contributions

Scale Methodology Adjustment:

1. Change the statistical base period and apply existing scheme of limits during three-year scale period.
2. Broadening of the parameters of the scheme of limits.
3. "Clean slate" approach: No adjustment but complete revamping of methodology. Proposes that a country's rate of assessment be based only on its total national income as compared to the total world income.
4. Modification of the parameters of the low per capita income allowance formula and special adjustment for the permanent members of the Security Council.

Combine existing components of the present methodology and introduction of two new elements: Two hundred points for each permanent member. Three different gradients according to the size of economies by the level of per capita national income and size of populations.

Key Issues

1. Scale methodology
   a. Length of the statistical base period
   b. Criteria outlined in 46/221B
2. New member states assessments
   a. Ukraine and Belarus
   b. Former Soviet Republics
   c. Others

Perspectives

1. Revised methodology
   3-year, 9-year, and 10-year statistical base periods
2. Collective responsibility
3. Clean slate versus debt adjustments, phasing of scheme of limits

Perspectives Reflected in the Documents

1. All assessment rates for requesting amounts of resources must be justified. The scale must provide an equitable method for appropriating funds. The key is that there was division over fairness and whether financial responsibility was distributed equitably.
2. The reason for support was that the proposed criteria reflected a compromise that would be acceptable to all.

3. Funding was determined by existing standards. National income remained the criterion for capacity to pay; debt adjustment remains as a criterion, but efforts were put forth to phase scheme of limits.

4. The availability of funds depended upon the establishment of a standard criteria. More willingness to comply with assessments would emerge with a greater confidence in the scale methodology.

Nature of the language: Specific about concerns and issues to resolve the conflicts regarding assessments. Forceful with regard to the need to resolving and maintain the decision making structure. Simplified terminology and summary of the criteria to ease understanding.

REVIEW OF EFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND FINANCIAL FUNCTIONING OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND IMPROVING THE FINANCIAL SITUATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The recommendations presented for these two agenda items were also outlined in Financing an Effective United Nations: A Report of the Independent Advisory Group on United Nations Financing by Ogata and Volcker. The recommendations developed parallel the issues and perspectives outlined for improving the presentation of the program budget.

Key issues

1. Rationalization of services and the consolidation of structures
2. Design for oversight unit and internal audit mechanism
3. Management improvement
4. New format for medium-term plan
Perspectives

1. Restructure the Secretariat
2. Office of Inspections and Investigations/Inspector General
3. Management training at all levels
4. Analysis of effects of restructuring of programs

Perspectives Reflected in the Documents

1. Amounts needed and requested must be calculated reasonably; fully accountability and responsibility; amounts must be fully explicated and justified.

2. Reasons for support: Once measures are implemented the effectiveness of the UN could be improved. With reforms and restructuring and more transparency in operations, there would be more confidence regarding the programs and activities.

3. How funding is determined: Continuous review, revision and progress reports; approved through budgetary process for financing the regular program budget.

4. Availability of resources is determined by appropriations approved for the regular budget.

Nature of the language: Forceful about the needs for effective functioning; conciliatory regarding the need for all to be involved in decisions; forceful about making the Secretariat accountable and responsible to the member states; analytic regarding analysis and follow-up.

THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF FINANCING UN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND FINANCING INDIVIDUAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

Recommendations from the Independent Advisory Group in Financing and Effective United Nations

(key issues)

1. International community should be prepared to accept increased peacekeeping costs in next few years—due to change in scope and size of peacekeeping operations.

2. Because peacekeeping is an investment in security, governments should consider financing its future cost from national defense budgets because they would have more available funds.
3. $150 million revolving fund should be larger. Revolving Fund should be set at $400 million, financed by three annual assessments.

4. The United Nations might consider the merits of a unified peacekeeping budget, financed by a single annual assessment. This is achieved by estimating peacekeeping costs for each coming year and submitting a budget to the General Assembly for approval.

5. Secretary General should be permitted to obligate up to 20 percent of initial estimated cost of a peacekeeping operation once it is approved by the Security Council. This would be a reasonable amount to start with because the propose mission budget would not be cut by 80 percent.

6. Member states with above average per capita income, except for permanent members of the Security Council, should be included in the B-group of developed nations, which pay the same rate of assessment for both peacekeeping and the regular budget. This change should be phased in several years. Assessment formula should be applied according to the official standard.


1. Revised estimates for peacekeeping operations should be presented individually, not a consolidated budget.

2. Reports with more evaluation and analysis in terms of major expenditure items should be developed.

Perspectives on Seventeen Peacekeeping Operations

1. Unified budget versus individual budgets
2. Regular budget versus special peacekeeping scale
3. Permanent apparatus for planning and deploying pkos
4. Reserve accounts (Support Account and Peacekeeping Reserve Fund)
Table 61: Peacekeeping operations considered during the Forty-eighth Session of the General Assembly in the Fifth Committee

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda Item/Pko</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Document Number</th>
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<td>130 UNDOF and UNIFIL</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>A/48/812 and A/48/813</td>
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<tr>
<td>131 UNAVEM</td>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>A/48/814</td>
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<td>132 UNIKOM</td>
<td>Iraq-Kuwait</td>
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<td>136 UNPROFOR</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>A/48/819</td>
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<tr>
<td>137 UNOSOM</td>
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<td>149 ONUMOZ</td>
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<td>160 UNFICYP</td>
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<td>160 UN Observer Mission in Georgia</td>
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<td>164 UNOMUR</td>
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<td>173 UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
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<tr>
<td>174 Financing the Military Liaison Team in Cambodia</td>
<td>Cambodia</td>
<td>A/48/829</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. Approximately $1.5 billion requested totally for seventeen peacekeeping operations. ACABQ revised estimates approximately $1.2 billion.

2. Not fully supported; amounts not fully justified; further review wanted; approved $587 million in which commitment authority granted until further review and final approval at resumed session; funding granted for six-month mandates.

3. Funding determined by the regular budget scale or the peacekeeping scale. Members pay less in the assessments if determined under the regular budget.

4. Availability of resources: With a more acceptable scale easier to assess commitment authority appropriated funds for continuation of the peacekeeping operations.

Nature of the language: Specific in the Summary Reports regarding the different views of member states; vague in the Reports—budget estimates not fully explicated; conciliatory regarding the payment of assessments for peacekeeping operations; division on how payment should be determined; forceful with regard to the need for fully justified estimates.


Key Issues
1. Justification of budget estimates
2. Zero-real growth in the budgets (ideal)
3. Approved by consensus

Perspectives
1. Transparency, accountability, responsibility to members regarding proposals and budget estimates
2. Methodology for calculating, accounting for growth in the budget
3. New budget format for preparation of the program budget simplified

1. Amount of funds needed and requested: Budgetary decisions were made on the basis of the needs outlined in the Secretary General reports and the Advisory Committee for Administrative and Budgetary Questions and the Committee on Program and Coordination. They were also based on time constraints. However, the expert review was incomplete.

2. Reasons for support: (Political decisions) A decision had to be reached on the budget; approval of the budget would set a bad precedent and bad management practice to let a regular session pass without the submission of a budget outline in a budget year, leaving the Organization without a mandate. This would further hinder the work and effectiveness of the Organization.

3. How funding was determined: Restructuring and consolidation of offices and departments; revision of the methodology and format; had to determine costs, taking into account changes and transition from use of the old methodology to use of the new methodology and how it was adjusted from previously calculated budgets and the current biennium budget.

4. Availability of funding resources: This was determined by how much confidence members have in the estimates; revised estimates and final appropriations and performance reports

Nature of the language: Specific, technical language regarding the need for implementation of reform policies to facilitate the effective functioning of the budgetary process.
Observations

Several objectives guided the observation of the Fifth Committee's consideration of the five agenda items described in the case narrative. Three types of information were yielded from the deliberations of the Fifth Committee: the general elements of the political process; the ways in which the agenda items were considered, deliberated and negotiated; and the general observations consistent across agenda items. These objectives provide a framework for identifying the variables by examining the activities in which the delegates engaged during the consideration of the agenda items.

The description of the general elements of the political process was a result of background research, examination of documents, and initial observations of the formal meetings. In addition, observations regarding the negotiating activities and their settings were noted.

The following questions guided the observation of the formal meetings in the Fifth Committee: 1. Were the speakers lists exhaustive in general debate? 2. What was the length of general debate before informal consultations were convened? 3. What activities characterized general debate?
Scales of Assessment

1. Meetings: Nine formal, eleven informal consultations
   Consideration began October 21, 1993
   Informal consultations occurred between November 11 and
   December 18, 1993.

2. There were two weeks of general debate: exhaustive
   debate on a highly controversial item; extensive
   coverage in informal consultation to provide full
   review of concerns by delegates; full month of informal
   consultations.

3. Overview of issue:
   developments and recommendations
   consideration of implications of conclusions reached

Review of Efficiency and Financial Situation

1. Review of Efficiency: Fifteen formal meeting
   throughout session; six informal meetings between
   November 30 and December 10, 1993

   Financial Situation: Five formal meetings November 18
   to December 11, 1993; three informal consultations from
   December 2-8, 1993

2. Review of Efficiency took one month of general debate
   before informals began. Financial Situation took two
   weeks of general debate before informals began.

3. Activities during general debate
   considered immediate concerns
   deferring until resumed session

   Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of Financing
   UN Peacekeeping Operations and Financing Individual
   Peacekeeping Operations

   Four formal meetings and eight informal consultations.
   Formal: December 17-22, 1993
   Informal: December 2 (comments regarding pko finance),
   8-21, 1993.

1. Speakers lists were exhaustive, but more members wanted
   issue deferred to resumed session

2. Not many formal meetings of general debate; convened
   informal consultations to hash out main issue.
3. Resumed session convened (February 10, 1994): informal consultation to draft resolution for UNOMSA. UNOMSA was considered under the regular budget.

Proposed Program Budget

1. Twenty-four formal meetings allowed for consideration and deliberation
   three for biennium 1992-1993
   twenty-one for biennium 1994-1995

2. Formal debate continued alternately with informal consultations beginning on December 12, 1993. The total period allotted for formal debate approximately was just short of a month, with nine days available for intensive informal consultations.

3. Sixteen recorded informal consultations, beginning on December 12, 1993; sometimes with as many as four sessions of informal consultations in a single day; most often formal meetings were convened to cover routine issues and outline topics to cover in informal consultations.
OBSERVATIONS OF INDICATORS OF THE VARIABLES IN POLITICAL PROCESS

Lists of Indicators for Each Variable

**Degree of Difference of States Policies**: differences on key elements and differences on peripheral elements

Indicator: positions on issues

Example: methodology for scale of assessments should be based upon a 10-year statistical base period

Observations:
1. relationship of the policies to positions taken on issues
2. range of different perspectives
3. extent to which delegates are guided by policies of government
4. small degree of differences contributes to consensus

**Development of Subgroups**: emergence of groups to facilitate negotiation

Indicator: coordination within groups

Example: Regional or ideological groups

Observations:
1. regional groups and perspectives
2. ideological groups (developing around issue)
3. financial interest groups
4. negotiating groups (1963); informal consultations (1993)
5. advisory organs

**Networks of Individuals**: interconnections of individuals who have worked together previously

Indicator: diplomatic contacts

Examples: permanent representatives' contacts on ambassador level and delegates' contacts with Secretariat personnel

1. members of permanent missions
2. Secretariat personnel
3. colleagues in committee
4. colleagues in subgroups
5. interested parties
Observations:
1. channel for exchange of views within and across groups
2. facilitates ally configurations regarding issues
3. shape patterns and frequency of interaction
4. eases rivalries generated from official positions
5. appeal to personal contacts; use leverage with con

Leadership and Planning: capacity to guide or direct consideration of issues for developing a consensus.

Indicators: proposals, recommendations regarding issues, draft decisions by interested parties for consideration of issues

Example: submission of proposals for Inspector General to be considered for reviewing efficiency of UN

Observations:
1. role taken to show commitment to consideration of issues
2. provide overall guidance regarding objectives and goals
3. drafting initial procedures to fulfill objectives
4. setting standard for others to follow
5. spur and persuade dissenters to support consensus norm

International Roles: functions, such as diplomats, independent of national interests and policies

Indicators: elected, appointed positions for facilitating caucusing activities and negotiations

Example: chairs of committees and negotiation sessions

Observations:
1. committee chair
2. representatives of advisory organs
3. Secretariat representatives
4. chairs of negotiating sessions (1963)
   chairs of informal consultations (1993)

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings:

Indicators: Formal and informal interactions

Example: Informal consultations convened after general debate to resolve difficult issues
Observations:
1. complementary and supportive
2. can be a constraint
3. symbiotic relationship of different arenas allows exhaustive consideration of difficult issues
4. variety of arenas and channels for negotiation

Desire for Consensus:

Indicator: appeals and collaboration efforts

Example: compromise some points to foster agreement; consensus norm emphasized

Observations:
1. motives underlying collaboration efforts
2. extent to which consensus norm is adhered to
3. interpretation of interests within parameters of consensus procedure
4. prioritization of objectives (individual vs. collective)

Overlapping Interests:

Indicator: common interests on another issue; sometimes related issue which influences decisions on issue under consideration

Example: trade-offs, linking issues

Observations:
1. interdependently linked by interests that are represented
2. dictate direction of communication patterns
3. source of harmony regarding issues
4. source of division regarding issues

Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities:

Indicator: effective and productive delegates

Example: commitment to the issue

Observations:
1. needed for developing draft decision and revising until reflective of collective will
2. needed for full and expansive consideration of issues
3. profile of an effective delegate
4. characteristics needed to maintain stamina, persistence and steadfastness to produce policy regarding difficult issues
ROLES OF THE VARIABLES IN REACHING CONSENSUS

The following lists are the array of roles which each variable could play in reaching consensus and the range of possible effects that each variable could have had in the final decision.

Degree of Difference in State Policies
Development of Subgroups
Networks of Individuals
Leadership and Planning
International Roles
Relationship of Activity in Public and Private Settings
Desire for Consensus
Overlapping Interests
Individual Characteristics and Capabilities

To what degree did the variable play a role in reaching consensus?

1. Played a large role
2. Played a moderate role
3. Played a small role
4. Played no role

What effect did the variable have in the final decision?

1. Harmonized different positions/interests
2. Narrowed the variety of different positions/interests
3. Polarized the different positions/interests
4. Reinforced the variety of positions/interests
5. No visible effect
Interviews

Each personal interview consisted of three open-ended questions which were asked to provide an initial impression of issues important to peacekeeping finance and consensus. This provided a profile of consensus as a process and an outcome in peacekeeping finance policy from people who routinely engage in the process of formulating policy. Secondly, each respondent responded to a questionnaire in which the variables were described in some instances indirectly to encourage further discussion of the variables important to achieving consensus.

The open-ended questions asked respondents to list the most difficult issues to resolve regarding peacekeeping finance, factors which were most important to consensus, and to describe the nature of consensus reached regarding peacekeeping finance.

The five agenda items discussed in the narrative were noted in the responses as the most difficult issues. These responses were noted in the initial interviews and confirmed in subsequent interviews. They demonstrated what the delegates and the Secretariat personnel believed were the critical issues related to and influencing peacekeeping finance.
RESPONSES FROM THE OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

MOST DIFFICULT ISSUES

Scale of Assessments

18 of 28 respondents noted this item
4 issues related to this item were noted
1. Collective responsibility: noted by 17 respondents
2. Reassign scale groups: noted by 12 respondents
3. Methodology/statistical base periods: noted by 11 respondents
4. Consolidation of scale groups: noted by 3 respondents

Review of Efficiency

9 of 28 respondents noted this item
3 issues related to this item were noted
1. Restructuring the Secretariat: noted by 9 respondents
2. Composition of the Security Council: noted by 7 respondents
3. Inspector General: noted by 3 respondents

Improving the Financial Situation

11 of 28 respondents noted this item
4 issues related to this item were noted
1. Payment of assessments and arrears: noted by 11 respondents
2. Payment by installments: noted by 7 respondents
3. Private investment: noted by 3 respondents
4. Contributions made from defense budget: noted by 2 respondents

Administrative and Budgetary of PKOS and PKO Finance

All 28 respondents noted this item
3 issues related to this item were noted
1. Finance under regular budget or special PKO scale: noted by 19 respondents
2. Unified vs. individual budgets: noted by 15 respondents
3. Permanent structure for determining finance: noted by 13 respondents
Proposed Program Budget

14 of 28 respondents noted this item
3 issues related to this item were noted
1. Approved by consensus: noted by 13 respondents
2. Justification of estimates: noted by 9 respondents
3. Zero real growth: noted by 4 respondents

Five factors were noted in the responses which were viewed as most important to achieving consensus. The five factors repeatedly stressed were the time needed for consideration and reaching the final decision, the relations among delegates and the Secretariat, the quality of documents reviewed for final decision, the review of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, and the individual personalities of participants.

FACTORS MOST IMPORTANT TO CONSENSUS

Time

19 of 28 respondents noted this factor
2 issues related to this factor were noted
1. More time needed: noted by 18 respondents
2. Process is wasteful: noted by 4 respondents

Relations with the Secretariat

13 of 28 respondents noted this factor
4 issues related to this factor were noted
1. Vague explanations for budget requests: noted by 10 respondents
2. Attempts by Secretariat to force decisions: noted by 6 respondents
3. Delegates lack of trust of the Secretariat: noted by 6 respondents
4. Secretariat resent challenges from delegates: noted by 3 respondents
9 of 28 respondents noted this factor
3 issues related to this factor were noted
   1. Not submitted in a timely manner: noted by 8 respondents
   2. Poorly drafted: noted by 4 respondents
   3. Overestimates: noted by 4 respondents

ACABQ review

9 of 28 respondents noted this factor
3 issues related to this factor were noted
   1. Cut the budget: noted by 7 respondents
   2. Justify recommendations: noted by 6 respondents
   3. Expert assessments: noted by 4 respondents

Individual personalities

8 of 28 respondents noted this factor
3 issues related to this factor were noted
   1. Character/integrity: noted by 6 respondents
   2. Incumbent delegates' prestige: noted by 4 respondents
   3. Cohesion among delegates: noted by 3 respondents

Three main characteristics were noted regarding the nature of consensus and what it contributes to the decision outcome.

NATURE OF CONSENSUS

Advantages

23 of 28 respondents noted this characteristic
4 issues related to this characteristic were noted
   1. In principle, have to support the policy: noted by 15 respondents
   2. Cohesion on decisions: noted by 13 respondents
   3. Minority interests protected: noted by 10 respondents
   4. Benefit in reaching instrumental goals: noted by 5 respondents
Disadvantages

16 of 28 respondents noted this characteristic
4 issues related to this characteristic were noted
1. Difficult negotiation: noted by 11 respondents
2. Time consuming process: noted by 8 respondents
3. Decisions sometimes sidetracked: noted by 5 respondents
4. Decisions sometimes vague: noted by 4 respondents

Long-term Implications

16 of 28 respondents noted this characteristic
4 issues related to this characteristic were noted
1. Incremental progress: noted by 14 respondents
2. Moderating influence: noted by 11 respondents
3. Institutional memory; precedents set: noted by 7 respondents
4. Ultimate goal reached: noted by 5 respondents

The questionnaire consisted of the closed-ended questions which asked respondents to note how important the nine variables focused upon in the study were to the achievement of consensus. In addition to the answers noted on the questionnaire, respondents briefly gave explanations for their answers, yielding different open-ended responses.

There were several types of information yielded from the questionnaire responses and the explanations for the responses given. First, from the different response choices noted in the questionnaire, a profile was drafted for each variable. Second, from the different perspectives reflected in the explanations for answers noted in the questionnaire the profile of each variable was expanded. Third, each interview described the entire set of variables. These impressions were noted to evaluate the set of variables' relevance in the political process. Fourth, each interview
provided a description of consensus, demonstrating how the participants viewed its role in the political process. Fifth, a list of additional variables were compiled from the respondents' assessments of the set of variables under analysis. Sixth, the descriptions of "commitment authority" characterized in the interviews demonstrate its different roles in peacekeeping finance. Finally, respondents gave statements regarding political, financial, administrative, and technical concerns, demonstrating the complexity of peacekeeping finance.

RESPONSES FROM THE QUESTIONNAIRE

Degree of Difference in State Policies

Number of responses in questionnaire
11 important
6 not important
6 somewhat important
5 very important
2 undecided
---
30

Two interviews gave multiple responses
1. important at the beginning; not important during
2. not important at the beginning; important during

Number of unsolicited responses
17 facilitates consensus
16 influence is not significant
5 influence is significant
4 inhibits consensus
---
42
Development of Subgroups

Number of responses in questionnaire
12 important
9 very important
6 somewhat important
2 not important
1 undecided

Three interviews gave multiple responses
1. regional groups, very important; informal groups, somewhat important
2. overall somewhat important; regional groups, not important; informal groups, more important
3. regional groups, not important; informal groups, somewhat important

Number of unsolicited responses
28 facilitates consensus
15 influence is significant
7 influence is not significant
6 inhibits consensus

Two interviews gave multiple responses
1. informal groups, influence is significant; both regional and informal groups facilitate; regional can inhibit consensus
2. informal groups, influence is significant; both regional and informal groups facilitate consensus

Networks of Individuals

Number of responses in questionnaire
14 very important
9 important
4 somewhat important
1 undecided

28
Number of unsolicited responses
28 facilitates consensus
16 influence is significant
6 influence is not significant
2 not important
1 somewhat important
---
53

Leadership and Planning

Number of responses in questionnaire
13 very important
9 important
5 not important
2 somewhat important
1 undecided
---
30

Two interviews respondents gave multiple responses
1. leadership, not important; planning, very important
2. negotiation, important (considered leadership the main part of negotiation); planning, not important

Number of unsolicited responses
22 facilitates consensus
12 influence is significant
8 influence is not significant
2 inhibits consensus
---
44

Three interviews respondents gave multiple responses
1. planning, influence is significant; leadership, influence is not significant; planning, can facilitate and inhibit consensus
2. leadership, influence is significant; planning, influence is not significant; leadership facilitates consensus
3. leadership facilitates consensus

International Roles

Number of responses in questionnaire
21 very important
4 important
2 not important
1 somewhat important
---
28
Number of unsolicited responses
26 facilitates consensus
21 influence is significant
 3 influence is not significant
---
50

Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings

Number of responses in questionnaire
18 very important
 8 important
 6 somewhat important
 3 not important
---
35

Eleven interviews gave multiple responses
1. public activity, important; private activity, very important
2. public activity, not important; private activity, very important
3. private activity, very important
4. public activity, somewhat important; private activity, very important
5. public activity, important; private activity, very important
6. public activity, not important; private activity, important
7. public activity, not important; private activity, not important
8. public activity, important; private activity, very important
9. public activity, somewhat important; private activity, important
10. public activity, somewhat important; private activity, very important
11. public activity, important; private activity, very important

Number of unsolicited responses
28 facilitates consensus
22 influence is significant
10 influence is not significant
 1 inhibits consensus
---
61
Twelve interviews gave multiple responses

1. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate consensus
2. private activity, influence is significant; public activity, influence is not significant
3. private activity, influence is significant; private activity, facilitates consensus
4. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate consensus; public activity, influence is not significant
5. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate consensus
6. private activity, influence is significant and facilitates consensus; public activity, influence is significant and inhibits consensus
7. private activity, influence is significant and facilitates consensus; public activity, influence is not significant
8. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate; public activity, influence is not significant
9. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate
10. both facilitate; public activity, influence is not significant
11. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate; public activity, influence is not significant
12. private activity, influence is significant; both facilitate

Desire for Consensus

Number of responses in questionnaire
20 very important
4 important
3 somewhat important
1 undecided
---
28

Number of unsolicited responses
27 facilitates consensus
19 influence is significant
4 influence is not significant
2 inhibits consensus
---
50
Overlapping Interests

Number of responses in questionnaire
12 important
10 very important
4 somewhat important
1 not important
1 undecided
---
28

Number of unsolicited responses
27 facilitates consensus
12 influence is significant
5 influence is not significant
---
44

Supply of Individual Characteristics and Capabilities

Number of responses in questionnaire
20 very important
7 important
2 not important
---
29

Two interviews respondents gave multiple responses
1. "supply", not important; knowledge of issue, important
2. "supply", very important; persistence is key

Number of unsolicited responses
26 facilitates consensus
17 influence is significant
3 influence is not significant
3 inhibits consensus
---
49

One interview respondent gave multiple responses
knowledge of issue, influence is significant; "supply", influence is not significant
UNSOLICITED RESPONSES TO OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

Profile of Nine Variables in Demonstrating Consensus

Number of responses
- 12 List is sufficient
- 11 List is comprehensive
- 9 List is generalizable
- 8 List is not generalizable
- 8 List is not complete
- 3 List is comparable

---

51

Perceptions of Consensus: Description of Consensus

Number of responses
- 21 consensus as a tool
- 12 consensus as a goal
- 11 consensus as a policy

---

44

Additional Factors Noted as Important to Peacekeeping

Finance

Ten interviews provided further details, making reference to eight additional factors.
1. financing peacekeeping operations: 6 references
2. negotiation: 5 references
3. political process: 5 references
4. budgetary process: 4 references
5. delegates' perceptions of pkos: 4 references
6. administrative procedures: 3 references
7. characteristics of delegates: 2 references
8. decision outcomes: 2 references

Role of "Commitment Authority" in Consensus

Six interviews described three characteristics of "commitment authority".
1. administrative procedure: 6 references
2. executive mechanism: 3 references
3. financing tool: 3 references
FOUR TYPES OF CONCERNS IN THE DESCRIPTIONS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND NINE VARIABLES

**Degree of Difference in State Policies**

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**Development of Subgroups**

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**Networks of Individuals**

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**Leadership and Planning**

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**International Roles**

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Relationship Between Activity in Public and Private Settings

Number of references
20 Administrative
14 Political
  5 Technical
---
  39

Desire for Consensus

Number of references
20 Political
13 Administrative
  4 Technical
  1 Financial
---
  38

Overlapping Interests

Number of references
22 Political
17 Administrative
  7 Financial
  2 Technical
---
  48

Individual Characteristics

Number of references
21 Technical
19 Political
  2 Financial
  1 Administrative
---
  43