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LIQUIDATIONISM AND THE FAILURE OF UNITY: 
RUSSIAN SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
AND THE ST. PETERSBURG METALWORKERS' UNION, 
1906-1914

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for 
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School 
of The Ohio State University

By

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INTRODUCTION

In 1917, Russia leapt into the twentieth century utilizing nineteenth century political theories. A product of a long line of historical development within the Russian Revolutionary tradition, Leninism defeated every alternative political theory to become the guiding ideology of the new government. The most consistent Social Democratic alternative was Menshevism, born out of an organizational squabble at the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party's (RSDRP) Second Congress in 1903. From 1906 to 1914 and again in 1917, Menshevism gathered more adherents than its rival Bolshevism, yet the Party was defeated and outlawed in 1922. Although the reasons for its failure are complex, the "Liquidationist Controversy" was a major contributing factor.

Lenin, the theoretical leader of the Bolsheviks, used the term Liquidator to discredit reformers within the RSDRP after the 1905 revolution who maintained a determinist rather than a voluntarist interpretation of Marxism. According to the determinists, a socialist revolution could be successful only once a set of objective conditions were met, economically, socially and politically. Such a
revolution would follow advanced capitalism, the stage of history which would witness the creation of a confident, politically conscious working class aware of its opponents and the irreconcilability of its class interests with those of its enemies. Lenin subscribed to the voluntarist interpretation which placed a centralized party, the repository of the only correct doctrine at the head of the movement.

The problem of achieving socialism in Russia had long been a part of the regular discourse of radical thought. In the nineteenth century, the Russian intelligentsia, drawn to European theories of socialism, struggled with its application to Russia. The peculiarities of Russia's history: the persistence of serfdom, the near absence of a middle class and the associated lack of an industrial work force made revolution seem improbable in the near future. Revolutionary dreaming became the mainstay for a section of the intelligentsia which had lost all hope for liberal reform under the tsarist autocracy.¹ In the tradition of the utopian socialists and German idealists, Alexander Herzen identified the locus of the socialist seed in the peasant commune, a unique institution whose perseverance would allow Russia to avoid the ills of western industrial society.² The strategy of the Populists who followed Herzen's lead was not easily mapped out. If the
kernel of revolution rested in the peasantry, the radical's role in the revolutionary process was not clear. How would the peasantry achieve an understanding of its tasks?

Successive generations envisioned two methods by which the masses could achieve this understanding.\(^3\) Nicholas Chernyshevskii, a realist of the 1860s and author of the novel *What is to be Done?*, articulated the left position which assigned a central role to the professional, dedicated revolutionary who would direct and guide the masses toward socialism. In agreement was Peter Tkachev who published his ideas in the journal *Nabat* in the 1870s. Tkachev feared the rapid advance of capitalism would destroy the peasant commune and encouraged an immediate armed uprising. Theorists opposing this view insisted the revolutionary should combine with the masses, preparing them for revolution rather than leading them.

In the 1870s, the Populist party *Zemlia i Volia* (Land and Liberty) included both tendencies.\(^4\) Gradually, those with Chernyshevskii's conceptualization of the professional revolutionary formed *Narodnaia Volia* (People's Will) whose centralized Executive Committee advanced armed struggle to overthrow the government. On the right, *Chernyi peredel* (Black repartition) rejected terror and encouraged propaganda. Before the People's Will successfully assassinated Alexander II, however, Populists struggled with
increasing evidence of the development of a Russian working class.

During the last half of the nineteenth century, modernization created a working class, urban centers and new political groups. These changes had not produced a homogeneous society nationally or in the localities. Socially, economically and politically the nation remained deeply divided. The major cities of European Russia, St. Petersburg and Moscow differed drastically from each other and even more so from the provinces and countryside. Within the cities themselves, social identity crossed boundaries from temporary peasant-worker to skilled worker, from self-exiled intelligentsia to revolutionary. Russia was a complex mixture of cultures and individuals, some who would fit into any city in contemporary Europe and others who would appear more at home in a seventeenth century village.

The emerging working class exhibited this medley of characteristics - highly skilled, urban workers lived among seasonal, illiterate peasant-workers, artisans among service workers. The legacy of serfdom with its interminable deference to authority was carried to the workplace, hampering aspirations for an independent labor force until after the revolution of 1905. Yet, among these masses, visionaries inspired by Marxism described an
enlightened future, which according to its authors was applicable to the most advanced nations.®

In Geneva, Pavel Akselrod and George Plekhanov converted to Marxism and founded Gruppa Osvobozhdenie Truda, (Emancipation of Labor Group) the first Russian Social Democratic organization. Confirming the development of Russian capitalism, the Group theorized that the emerging proletariat must be aided by the radical intelligentsia to develop consciousness, ally with opposition forces and lead the struggle for revolution. Balancing the individual's will to bring about the promised new world against objective reality, the Group temporarily blended both tendencies of the Russian revolutionary past.®

In the 1890s, however, two revolutionary identities emerged. Plekhanov, joined by Lenin, offered a central role to the revolutionary. At every step, the intelligentsia, maintaining an identity separate from the workers, needed to guide the working class to prevent its slide into reformism. Akselrod maintained faith in the self-initiative of the proletariat which had to reach understanding on its own. The intelligentsia's identity could thus be merged with the proletariat in a broad independent organization.¹⁰ Without a Party, these two interpretations existed only in the abstract minds of a Russian emigre group with few contacts inside the country.
All that would change, as the theoretical discourse they established left the margins of the intellectuals' revolutionary organization and entered the mainstream of the workers' movement.

At the turn of the century, Marxist theory was tested in an emerging workers' movement influenced by its workplace environment and by revolutionary activists whose concepts would approach those prescribed by Akselrod. As the Social Democratic movement expanded, the rival interpretations produced the Economist controversy, which pitted those who favored a broad party organization against those who supported a narrow, centralized Party. Personalities, organizational squabbles and theory created a vitriolic debate in journal articles, pamphlets and at meetings which adversely affected the future history of Russian Marxism. Although the Social Democrats would organize the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party (RSDRP) in 1898, the conflicting theories produced its split into two factions the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in 1903.11

The meaning of these two terms, Bolshevism and Menshevism, changed over the course of their history. At the Second Congress of the RSDRP, the Bolsheviks won the majority on an organizational question, hence the name. The Mensheviks or minority were defeated. The debate involved definitions of the terms member, party and organization. In
the language of the Russian revolutionary, the partiia or loose political collaboration of all those sympathetic to the cause was distinguished from the narrow organizatsiia. After the Second Congress, these terms came to mean something different to both groups within Social Democracy. Mensheviks thought of the party in terms of a Social Democratic movement, while Lenin's definition of party was closer to that of an organization. Consequently, Social Democratic membership depended upon the changing factional definition of these terms. In 1905, when the party began to formulate Social Democratic tasks, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks recognized serious theoretical distinctions existed.

Opposition to the tsarist government had swept through Russian society. Liberals faced with the impotence of the state demanded its reform, especially after the massacre of peaceful protestors on Bloody Sunday, 9 January 1905. Peasants and workers responding to revolutionary propaganda and agitation joined a growing number of radical protests culminating in the October General Strike. To many Russians, the capitulation of the Tsar with promises of a constitutional compromise signaled the approach of real reform and civil liberties. Workers joined an array of legal and semi-legal associations, trade unions, clubs, cooperatives and educational societies which flourished during the days of freedom.
Social democrats who had only dreamed of becoming part of such a workers' movement relished their daily work of party and union meetings, organizing libraries, giving public lectures and sponsoring concerts. The most highly skilled, literate, urban workers belonged to the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union. Social Democrats (SDs) and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) assisted its early organization and Mensheviks dominated the union board until 1913. When Nicholas II's minister, Peter Stolypin, engineered the suppression of the Duma and the revision of the electoral law threatening to force the Party workers back into the underground, they resisted. Party reformers, primarily within the Menshevik camp, proposed locating the party center inside Russia rather than abroad and uniting the legal workers' movement with the illegal party to bring about a fully democratic revolution. The socialist revolution envisioned by the reformers would succeed only through workers' associations which could bring party doctrine in line with the masses, thereby joining Social Democracy and Russian realities.

Reform was considered heresy in the history of the Russian Revolutionary Party. In the tradition of the assault on Populism and the attack on Economism, Lenin denounced the reformers who threatened to "liquidate" the party. Using terms and language ready made from earlier
battles, Lenin condemned likvidarstvo (liquidationism) in every possible public forum - in meetings, pamphlets, the party press, and conferences. The resulting controversy created a schism within both factions between emigres and party activists in the workers' associations.

Within the Bolshevik Party, Lenin faced otzovists (recallists) and ultimatists on the left and Conciliators on the right. According to the otzovists, SD Duma deputies who resisted subordination to the Party Center were collaborating with the class enemy and should be recalled. Lenin labelled otzovism "liquidationism on the left" and called for a "struggle on two fronts" against these heresies. More extreme than the recallists, ultimatists directed the deputies to accept Central Committee control and continue revolutionary work. Finally, Bolshevik Conciliators had much in common with the "so-called liquidators" who desired above all unity of all Social Democratic elements, legal and illegal.

The Mensheviks also reacted differently to increased legal activity. Following Akselrod's concept of the party, the praktiki or rank and file party members who collaborated closely with workers' organizations, hoped to build an independent labor Party. Plekhanov and the Party Mensheviks agreed with Lenin that government persecution of the party and the workers' movement required the existence
of an illegal, centrally directed Party. Between Bolshevism and Menshevism, Trotsky published *Pravda* which summoned all factions to resolve their conflicts and unite the Social Democratic Party.

Despite factional splintering, rank and file party workers cooperated throughout the interrevolutionary period in the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and related workers' associations. Revolutionary identity seemed to fuse with the emerging worker identity and for a time run the same course. However, by 1912, a gap opened between union leaders close to Menshevik liquidationism and union members who took up the slogan of unity. Bolsheviks were able to win a majority on the Metallists' governing board and in other labor organizations throughout the city. The loss of Menshevik hegemony after 1912 and the consequent rise of the Bolshevik star has been attributed to "liquidationism." Given exaggerated significance by the growing social and political instability of the tsarist regime before World War I, Bolshevik gains in legal organizations give a false conception of Menshevism in this period.\(^{17}\) To fill gaps in the historical literature, this dissertation will study the activities of the Mensheviks in the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and examine the Liquidationist controversy.
Historians of the Russian Revolutionary movement have focused, almost without exception, on the leading theorists and the revolutionary years 1905 and 1917. Political definitions and affiliations were exaggerated by the absence of an examination of the period between the revolutions. Thus ignoring emerging revolutionary and working class identities after the failure of 1905, the 1917 Revolutions appear without social and political foundation. In these studies, the Bolshevik Party, in reality splintered from 1906 to 1914, instead becomes a Leninist possession. Menshevism receives a Bolshevized appraisal, which gives a false appearance of homogeneity within the Party faction and stresses political miscalculations. The present study places the revolutionary years within the context of the entire movement, thereby granting new interpretations to major events.

Biographies of leading theorists ignore the contributions of rank and file party activists and distort Party history. Since the leadership spent the interrevolutionary years in exile, factionalism is magnified and the reality of constant party collaboration within workers' associations ignored. It is a mistake to attempt to determine the social and intellectual characteristics of the sub-elite party members from the biographies of the
party hierarchy. Defining Menshevism or Bolshevism through biographies of theoretical leaders results in an interpretation from the top down.

Biographies incorrectly place the power struggle within the revolutionary movement among the leadership. While an examination of the debate between Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders assists the historian's understanding of the Social Democracy, rank and file debates deepen this understanding. Between the revolutions, sub-elites struggled with emigres laying claim to their identity as the "true" Social Democrats. In this process, Social Democrats created terms of discourse to control both the discussion and the workers' movement. Workers developed their social and political identity and their understanding of socialism in response to these debates. The discourse of this period and the emerging identities of workers and revolutionaries reflect the transformation of Russian society in the early twentieth century.

Social histories of the Russian workers also are largely limited to the revolutionary years. Soviet labor studies treat radicalization solely in political terms claiming the movement for the Bolsheviks and ignoring the contributions of "Menshevik-liquidators." Perhaps as a reaction to Soviet distortions, recent western studies overemphasize socio-economic causes of radicalization. An
examination of the history of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union demonstrates that workers used the "language of socialism" to express common grievances both economic and political by 1912. This study will demonstrate that the development of a new working class identity and its accompanying language was imparted by Social Democratic activists in workers' associations. As workers found their place in society and politics, moving away from its margins, they competed among themselves and with the intelligentsia for a central role in the determination of Russia's political direction.

This dissertation will discuss the development of new identities, the discourse of the revolutionary movement, and the struggle for centrality in the transformation of Russia through an examination of the activities of the Menshevik "liquidators" in the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union from 1906 to 1914. The "so-called Liquidators" assured survival of the workers' movement between the revolutions by concentrating on open, legal organization. The ensuing controversy shaped the political future of socialism and the workers' state in Russia. Laborers responding to social and economic pressures, given the rhetoric of Social Democracy by legal activists, and witnessing the political tactics of revolutionaries, increased their demands for reform in the interrevolutionary
period and turned toward revolution in 1917. Although the Mensheviks would be defeated by 1922, their activities from 1906 to 1914 generated both Leninism and the Soviet Revolution.

ENDNOTES


3The theme of "spontaneity" vs. "consciousness" is examined in Leopold Haimson's *Russian Marxists and the Origins of Bolshevism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1955).


7 On workers see Victoria Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion: Workers' Politics and Organizations in St. Petersburg and Moscow, 1900-1914 (Berkeley, Calif., 1983).


9 Plekhanov always believed the worker needed outside direction and organization, while Akselrod believed the proletariat could evolve and become conscious on its own. See Samuel Baron, Plekhanov, the Father of Russian Marxism (London, 1963); Abraham Ascher, Pavel Axelrod and the Development of Menshevism (Cambridge, Mass., 1972); Leopold Haimson, Russian Marxists, p.45.

10 Bonnell defines these theories as exogenous and endogenous respectively. See Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion, p. 8; Akselrod had also opposed Tkachev's centralized party. In Obshchina, he wrote that he supported a social organization "from the bottom up." The masses were not to be considered "as cannon fodder but as a force" with the "task of consciously breaking up the existing order and consciously establishing a new order on a totally new foundation." Obshchina, no.5 (1878).

Biography of a Russian Social Democrat (Cambridge, 1967); Bertram Wolfe, Three who made a Revolution (Boston, 1948).

\textsuperscript{12}See Solomon Schwarz, Russian Revolution of 1905: Workers' Movement and the Formation of Bolshevism and Menshevism (Chicago, 1967), pp. 204-5, for an insightful discussion of the different interpretations of these terms.

\textsuperscript{13}See Abraham Ascher, Revolution of 1905: Russia in Disarray (Stanford, 1988); Abraham Ascher, Revolution of 1905: Authority Restored (Stanford, 1992); Shmuel Galai, Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900-1905 (Cambridge, 1973); Gerald Surh, 1905 in Petersburg, Labor, Society and Revolution (Stanford, Calif., 1989); Leon Trotsky, 1905 (New York, 1971); Laura Engelstein, Moscow 1905: Working Class Organization and Political Conflict (Stanford, Calif., 1982); U.A. Shuster, Peterburgskie rabochie v 1905-1907 gg. (Leningrad, 1976); Teodor Shanin, Roots of Otherness: Russia's Turn of the Century, 2 vols. (New Haven, Conn., 1986).


\textsuperscript{15}See Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion; Geoffrey Swain, Russian Social Democracy; McKean, St. Petersburg. Useful memoir literature includes F. A. Bulkin, Na zare profdvizheniia: Istoriiia Petersburgskogo soiuza metallistov 1906-1914 gg. (Moscow, 1924); S. I. Somov, "Iz istorii sotsialdemokraticheskogo dvizheniia v Peterburge v 1905 godu, (Lichnye vospominaniia)" Byloe 4 (16) (April 1907):22-55; 5 (17) (May 1907):152-178.
SRs are often identified as neo-populists. They organized both workers and peasants throughout Russia. See Michael Melancon, *Stormy Petrels: The Socialist Revolutionaries in Russia's Labor Organizations, 1905-1914* (Pittsburgh, 1988).


This is not to say that the contribution of biography is insignificant. However, the nature of biography distorts social history. See Baron, *Plekhanov; Ascher, Axelrod; Getzler, Martov; Wolfe, Three who made a Revolution*.


For examples of Soviet labor studies see Ariuntov, Rabochee dvizhenie; M.S. Balabanov, Ot 1905 k 1917 godu: massovoe rabochee dvizhenie (Moscow, 1927); N.A. Ivanova, Struktura rabocheho klassa Rossii 1910-1914 (Moscow, 1987); E.E. Kruze, Peterburgskie rabochie v 1912-1914 godakh (Leningrad, 1961); A.G. Rashin, Formirovanie rabocheho klassa Rossii. Istoriko-ekonomicheskie ocherki (Moscow, 1958).

Heather Hogan, Forging Revolution: Metalworkers, Managers and the State in St. Petersburg, 1890-1914 (Bloomington, Indiana, 1993) attributes radicalization to labor management and factory reforms based upon rationalization.
CHAPTER I.

ORIGIN OF CONTROVERSY:
THE DISCOURSE OF RUSSIAN MARXISM BEFORE 1905

The Liquidators were activists in the interrevolutionary period who sought to identify themselves as the defenders of socialist orthodoxy by tracing their ideas through the medium of George Plekhanov and Pavel Akselrod to Karl Marx. The Bolsheviks, who opposed the liquidators from the left, also sought support in Marx. Liquidationism was not the first nor the last Social Democratic controversy whose direction was heavily influenced by ideological discourse. The theoretical thread which runs from Marx, through Russian Marxism to the Liquidationists on the right and Lenin on the left provided the terms of these controversies and should therefore be fully examined. Tied to definitions of class consciousness, the role of the revolutionary intelligentsia, and tasks of the Social Democratic Party, this thread binds not only Marx and the Liquidationists, but also produced the schism of the Party in 1903.

Theoretical foundations alone did not produce the conflict within Russian Social Democracy: theory is always
related to practice. When applying western Marxism to Russia, Social Democrats observed peculiarities in Russian political conditions that presented obstacles to an exact reproduction of western historical developments. The continued existence of the tsarist autocracy remained the primary obstacle. Once the tsar was overthrown, revolutionaries would be presented with the task of establishing a bourgeois democratic republic before a socialist revolution could follow. Marx identified the class struggle as the moving force in history but did not provide his adherents with a detailed blueprint for revolutionary change. In particular, Russian Marxists were left to contemplate the nature of the political party, the origins of class consciousness, and their own role in the revolutionary process. These issues would become central to the split of the Social Democratic Party in 1903, and to similar ideological "heresies": Economism at the turn of the century and Liquidationism after the 1905 Revolution.

In the late 1890s, the Economist controversy arose from a paradox within Marxist theory. Marxists agreed that once the proletariat became members of an organized party, political consciousness would develop and the proletariat would bring about revolution. However, disagreements arose, based upon interpretation, as to the exact means of this development. Consciousness could evolve from "being," that
is, by life experiences, or it could arise via propaganda distributed by the intelligentsia. Russian radicals tried to find their place in this formula and indeed discovered two possible paths to revolution. First of all, in a tightly organized hierarchical Party, the revolutionary could bring consciousness to the worker. Alternately, the proletariat through self-activity in a wide number of associations and societies could develop political consciousness and become part of a broad mass party. Those who chose the second alternative were accused of concentrating solely upon economic struggles and therefore labeled Economists by their opponents. Opposing the Economists, Akselrod and Lenin carried the paradox suggested by Plekhanov's interpretation of Marx to logical but separate ends.

Russians reading Marx looked in vain for a comprehensive organizational and tactical framework for political parties. Plekhanov, who adapted Marx to Russian socialism, relied upon the definition of the Party in *Communist Manifesto*:

Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-class parties....(they are) the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others . . . they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement.²
Therefore, the Party is submerged within and diffused throughout working class parties and, at the same time, its members are conscious of the revolutionary goals and general tactics necessary to achieve those goals. Marx offers both a broad and narrow definition of the term party. Marx and Engels also required the party to "support every revolutionary movement against the existing social and political order of things." This raised an important question for Russian Marxists: should the party cooperate with the bourgeoisie in overthrowing the tsarist autocracy? In a passage from his Address of the Central Committee of the Communist League Marx indicated such cooperation was not possible. He warned workers they should prepare for revolution by "taking up their position as an independent party . . . and by not allowing themselves to be misled for a single moment by the hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeoisie." From Marx, the party member acquires a dual identity as a conscious guiding party leader and an observer who follows objective reality. In addition to problems of revolutionary identity, if the Communists are to be the most politically conscious, and most organized part of the mass workers' party, parties such as those envisioned by Marx had to exist. But, what would be the nature of such parties in Russia? Furthermore, what, according to Marx, is the origin of worker consciousness,
and what is the role of the conscious revolutionary in developing political consciousness?

An individual becomes conscious of his class identity through the class struggle. In *German Ideology* Marx wrote "the separate individuals form a class in so far as they have to carry on a battle against a common class." This was also a theme of the *Manifesto*: "this organization of the proletarians into a class, and consequently into a political party, is continually being upset again by the competition between the workers themselves." This competition would be reduced by the formation of trade unions which Marx wrote in the *Manifesto* "are the fundamental step, necessary for class consciousness." Once workers established unions they would recognize the necessity of national unions as they discovered their common class interests. Marx also was determined that trade unions remain neutral. In a speech to a delegation of trade unionists in 1869, Marx stated

> If they wish to accomplish their tasks trade unions ought never to be attached to a political association, or place themselves under its tutelage. . . . trade unions are the school of socialism. It is in trade unions that workers educate themselves and become socialists because under their very eyes and every day the struggle with capital is taking place."

Therefore, workers' associations would be first of all class organizations, but would then mature into political parties. Conservative and radical Russian Marxists would accept these
premises. However, Marx did not separate the struggle of the working class into two separate conflicts - economic and political. In the Manifesto he insisted "every class struggle is a political struggle." Both economists and Liquidators would be accused of making this mistake.

The revolutionaries' role in the origin of working class identity was connected to its marginal role in Russian society. Marx observed that the revolutionary intelligentsia would arise from those members of the bourgeoisie whose interests no longer coincided with industrial progress. These bourgeois radicals would come to the assistance of the proletariat and help organize them into a political force. Further, Marx wrote in the Manifesto that as the revolution drew near even more sections of the bourgeoisie would break away from the ruling class and join the proletariat having "raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole." Therefore, the politically conscious revolutionaries must bring their knowledge to the proletariat and play a guiding role in the revolution.

The Russian emigres, George Plekhanov and Pavel Akselrod, took up this task in the 1880s. The two avenues by which these theorists came to Marx affected their eventual adaptation of the theory to Russian conditions. Plekhanov was a theorist who ascertained the reality of
Marxist theory primarily through careful study. Although he was active as a student in the populist tradition, his fundamental conversion was intellectual. Akselrod, on the other hand, became predisposed to Marxist theory through real life experiences as an impoverished Jew, and through contacts with the German Social Democratic Workers' Party. Boris Nicolaevskii wrote that Akselrod was the first "worker-Westernizer." These thinkers adopted Marxism at about the same time, nevertheless Plekhanov is credited with the development of Russian Marxism because of his publications. Both individuals contributed, though in complementary ways, to the reception of Marxism by Russian revolutionaries.

Plekhanov's major works *Socialism and the Political Struggle* (1883) and *Our Differences* (1885) marked a conversion in Russian revolutionary history. Populism with its fundamental belief in peasant socialism was beginning to wane. Students and the intelligentsia who had already begun to accept Marxism welcomed these theoretical works. Plekhanov argued that capitalism was inevitable and that Russia in the 1880s had in fact taken the same historical path as Western Europe. The autocracy would have to be overthrown, but to avoid a long period of capitalism, the Russian proletariat could play a different part than in the West. As part of a mass movement, and as
allies of the bourgeoisie, the proletariat would demand political rights in the bourgeois revolution. Once the autocracy was overthrown, the masses with their newly won political liberties, would turn on their old allies and begin the struggle for socialism. Plekhanov reminded revolutionaries that the Party could not determine consciousness in this process since Marx had declared the maxim "being determines consciousness." Therefore, he created a tactical problem for Social Democrats: if the stage of capitalism was abbreviated, proletarian consciousness could not properly develop through "being." As a remedy for this difficulty, Plekhanov adopted from the Communist Manifesto the vanguard role for the revolutionary intelligentsia. Marxists "must become the leader of the working class . . . must prepare it for an independent role" in Russian society.

Like Plekhanov, Pavel Akselrod, whom most Mensheviks looked upon as the Party's theoretical founder, passed through all the revolutionary phases of development from populism to anarchism to Marxism. Akselrod, the son of a Jewish tavern keeper, lived in isolation beyond the Pale and witnessed extreme material deprivation as a child. According to his biographer, his goal in the 1870s was to emancipate "the people" which he came to believe could occur "only if the masses were transformed into autonomous and
conscious actors in the political arena." His earliest independent Marxist pamphlets, *Workers' Movement and Social Democracy* (1885) and *Tasks of the Workers' Intelligentsia in Russia* (1887), defined tasks for advanced workers educated enough to understand theoretical doctrine. Since these workers comprehended common adversities they could express basic complaints to demonstrate the proletariat's inability to improve economic conditions without political liberties. Peasants who temporarily worked in the cities would carry this message back to the villages. As intermediaries between the intelligentsia and the laboring classes - both in the countryside and industrial centers - the workers' intelligentsia in "an independent labor association or labor party" could raise the consciousness of the entire nation. By early 1882, both Akselrod and Plekhanov had become committed Marxists and with Vera Zasulich formed *Gruppa Osvobozhdeni Truda, the Emancipation of Labor Group*, with the goal of translating and publishing Marx's works. The Group began soliciting funds and organizing student circles in Zurich and other cities. Inside Russia, as a result of this work, Marxist circles began to gain adherents. Personally involved for decades in the adaptation of Marxism to Russia, the emigres identified themselves with the doctrine and the movement they had helped to create. However, the Group was soon to be
challenged by a new Social Democratic cadre responsive to an emerging labor movement in St. Petersburg.

During the early 1890s, revolutionaries and radical liberals were unable to win widespread support for a unified attack on the autocracy. As a result of populist and liberal shortcomings, Marxism gathered into its ranks socialists who demanded practical political guidelines for their activity in workers' study circles. The activists in Russia disliked the heavy ideological tone of the Emancipation of Labor's propaganda. Plekhanov responded to this criticism in On the Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats during the Famine in Russia (1892) which established a link between the intellectual leaders and the masses and called for the formation of a "party" rather than a "sect." Plekhanov permitted the distinction between the propagandist who "gives many ideas to one or a few people" and the agitator "who gives one or only a few ideas to masses of people." Thus sanctioned by their theoretical leader and already achieving success in Vilna, the new Marxists, the "youngsters," adopted wholesale the tactics of agitation.

Included among the new Marxists in Russia was the future Bolshevik, V.I. Lenin who, like his colleagues, had travelled well worn paths of intellectual development. Lenin had first read the populists, then Marx, completing a
Russian translation of *Communist Manifesto* before attacking the populists in the style of Plekhanov's determinism in his first pamphlet, *What the Friends of the People Are* (1894).\textsuperscript{17} In this long polemical work based upon notes from his debate with the populist Nicholas Mikhailovskii, Lenin made the individual an historical actor but asked, "what guarantee is there that this activity will not remain an act isolated in a welter of contrary acts?"\textsuperscript{18} Lenin and his contemporary revolutionaries in the capital found an escape from isolation in agitational tactics.

The pamphlet *Ob agitatsii* was written by Arkadii Kremer with the assistance of Iulii Martov as a guidebook for the new tactics. The authors contended that the proletariat moves through progressive stages of development and should pursue the economic struggle as a temporary measure to achieve political consciousness.\textsuperscript{19} The radical intelligentsia using the tactics of economic agitation could transform the masses into heroes. Russian workers united through strikes against employers would realize mutual class interests. Thus attaining class identity, the proletariat as a whole would proceed to identify the capitalist class as its enemy and, ultimately, the fruits of economic struggle would produce a political movement confronting the state.\textsuperscript{20} Allied with the Emancipation of Labor Group in the new association Union of Social Democrats Abroad, the younger
Marxists adopted these tactics, writing a series of agitational pamphlets directed at specific factories.21

By 1897, economic agitation had produced a noticeable shift toward political consciousness indicated by increased political demands in the leaflets produced by strike committees in the factories.22 Many of the "youngsters" who had witnessed the success of agitational tactics had joined the veterans in emigration or suffered arrest in 1896-7. The consequent expansion of Social Democracy and the emergence of a working class movement, led to a crisis of identity in emigre circles and forced the Union Abroad to reconsider organizational tactics and Party formation.

During his imprisonment, Lenin completed a Draft and Explanation of a Program for the Social Democratic Party (1896) and Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats (1898) calling for the formation of a unified political party.23 Lenin's concept of the party would be challenged by those "youngsters" in the Union Abroad who favored a broad based workers' party. Continuing to interpret Marx through Plekhanov, Lenin placed the politically conscious revolutionary at the head of the Party instructing the Social Democrat "to assist this struggle of the Russian working class by developing the class consciousness of the workers, by promoting their organization, and by indicating
the aims and object of the struggle." Because of the lack
of political freedoms, Lenin warned Russian Marxists that
"without a strengthening and development of revolutionary
discipline, organization and underground activity, struggle
against the government is impossible." Further, he noted
that "the struggle of the Russian working class for its
emancipation is a political struggle, and its first aim is
to achieve political liberty." Lenin maintained Social
Democrats have "always insisted on the inseparable
connection between their socialist and democratic tasks." While the proletariat struggled economically with the
capitalists, the Party - that is the intelligentsia - had to
prevent the workers from limiting their battleground solely
to the economic field. When the acceptable level of
consciousness was achieved the sphere of opposition would
automatically shift from economics to politics. Such a
shift for Lenin, as for Plekhanov would be pushed along by
the revolutionaries in a Party organization which mirrored
the capitalist phases of development.

In On the question of the contemporary Tasks and
Tactics of Russian Social Democracy,(1898) Akselrod revealed
plans to organize

the Russian proletariat into an independent
political party, which is fighting for freedom, in part side by side and in alliance with the
bourgeois revolutionary factions (in so far as such exist), and also in part by drawing directly
into its ranks or carrying along behind it the
most people-loving and revolutionary elements of the intelligentsia."^21

Akselrod’s concept of the Russian proletariat’s tasks developed from his understanding of the peculiarities of Russian history. Social Democracy had emerged before the autocracy was defeated by a united bourgeois class thereby providing two enemies for the workers: the bourgeoisie and the monarchy. If the workers concentrated only on the economic struggle, the bourgeoisie might take on politics alone and refuse to support democracy once in power. However, the "economic struggle" prepared "workers for the understanding of the definitive aims of socialism" and could not be abandoned. A dual struggle against capitalism and the autocracy required political consciousness and self-initiative to maintain proletarian hegemony in the bourgeois revolution.28 In another pamphlet aimed at the "youngsters," Akselrod maintained an elevated role for the intelligentsia similar to Lenin’s view. He argued that the masses could not successfully overthrow the autocracy with spontaneous revolution in response to crises but instead that the masses had to be politically educated and conscious for the revolution to succeed. This education was to be the work of the intelligentsia.29

While Lenin and Akselrod agreed that Russian Marxists must struggle on two fronts, they viewed party organization and tactics from different starting points.
Lenin followed Plekhanov's direction of a Party from the top down, while Akselrod, always concerned with the masses saw the Party from the bottom up. Foreshadowing polarization in revolutionary doctrine, these early traces of a division were neglected as a result of immediate conflicts within International Socialism and Russian Marxism.

By 1898, tactical discourse gave way to an organizational struggle between the newly emigrated "youngsters" and the veterans. Although the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad gave editorial control to the veterans, the Group maintained a severe distaste for editing agitational literature. Plekhanov refused to relinquish even a small measure of control to the recent emigres. The "youngsters" resented the lack of democracy within the Union Abroad and demanded the right to work as equals on fundraising, publication and distribution of literature, and communications.

Events in Russia once again provoked a reexamination of doctrine and disrupted the fragile alliance within the Union Abroad. In St. Petersburg, a new journal, Rabochaia Mysl', attacked intellectual control of the revolutionary movement asserting that recent strikes proved "the worker has finally snatched his fate from the hands of his leaders and taken it into his own hands." Although lacking concrete doctrine, the Group identified the
journal's emphasis on agitation rather than propaganda as heresy and rebellion. Given the label of Economism, this ideological line became most extreme in the works of Sergei Prokopovich and his wife Ekaterina Kuskova.

In 1898, Prokopovich circulated a critical "Response to Akselrod's Brochure on the Question of the Contemporary Tasks." According to Prokopovich, the proletariat should develop "a mass movement not confined within the limits of plots or conspiracies." Workers should join all societies, organizations and trade unions and learn to organize themselves. Revolution had to be a "planned organized struggle" based upon conscious action by a large part of the proletariat. According to one historian of the period, Prokopovich's manuscript "came almost ten years too soon." It would have application after the 1905 revolution when a measure of legalization was granted workers' associations. In contemporary Russia, Social Democrats could not place their hopes in a strike movement or broad labor organization which could be crushed at any moment by the tsarist police. Therefore the attainment of democratic freedom remained the first goal of the movement.

At a meeting in St. Petersburg, Prokopovich's wife Kuskova jotted down notes extending her husband's tactical program. The manuscript fell into the hands of Lenin in Siberia and was published as part of a critique of those who
dared challenge Plekhanov and Akselrod. In the Credo, Kuskova separated the liberation campaign led by the intelligentsia from the "economic" workers' struggle. The revolutionary movement should spring from local conditions which would not be changed by a premature political revolution: "The talk about an independent workers' political party merely results from the transplantation of alien aims and achievements to our soil." Politics was reserved for radical liberals and entirely separated from the economic struggle. "Our Marxists," Kuskova complained "are much too contemptuous of the radical or liberal opposition activity of all the other non-worker strata of society. . . . For the Russian Marxist there is only one course: participation in, i.e., assistance to, the economic struggle of the proletariat, and participation in liberal opposition activity."33 The Prokopoviches' Economism was extreme: they left the Union Abroad and in 1903 entered the Liberation Union with the legal Marxist and economist, Peter Struve.34 Despite broad theoretical divergence, a public condemnation of their ideas did not occur in 1898.

The initial ideological discourse was carried out internally, between Akselrod and the editors of the new journal of the Union Abroad, Rabochee delo. The Group ended editorial collaboration with the Union Abroad after it voted not to uphold the Russian Social Democratic Party's
resolution calling for immediate political freedom as the first goal of Social Democracy, which was passed at the First Congress in Minsk. The first number of the new journal in April 1899 rejected comments made by Akselrod in his preface to Lenin's pamphlet *Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats*. Akselrod had welcomed Lenin's ideological divergence from the youngsters. The editors of *Rabochee delo* defended themselves, finding no contradictions between their ideas and Lenin's. They asserted that no Russian Social Democrat accepted "the possibility of only an economic struggle." Akselrod's muted reply in a letter to the editor hinted that some unidentified individuals associated with the new journal had abandoned socialist propaganda and the revolution. Had Akselrod substantiated his claims with references to the unpublished works of Prokopovich and Kuskova, they might have had a measure of validity. At any rate, these individuals were no longer members of the Union Abroad; indeed, other Union members had rejected their extreme position. Akselrod's personal difficulties with the Union Abroad were clearly the primary motivation for his attack. During 1898-99, he wrote several letters to Plekhanov advocating a complete organizational schism between the former members of the Group and *Rabochee delo*.35
Distracted by a split within International Marxism over the Revisionism of Eduard Bernstein, Plekhanov's attack on Economism was slow to materialize. His vacillation on the question of a split was ended by Rabochee delo's publication of Lenin's "Protest" signed by seventeen SDs in Siberia which included the text of Kuskova's Credo. Lenin grouped the editors of Rabochee delo with Kuskova under the label of "Economists" as heretics to orthodoxy who had revised revolutionary tactics by rejecting the dual struggle of Social Democracy and leaving the political struggle to the liberals. Following his protege's assault, Plekhanov's abrasive, almost vindictive pamphlet, "Vademecum for the Editorial Board of Rabochee Delo" paralleled his earlier attack on the Populists. He wrote that the "youngsters" were limiting the workers' consciousness since life or objective reality alone can not lead to revolution, only the consciousness which arises from an understanding of that life. Such understanding would be reached only if "with all the means at its disposal, the 'revolutionary bacillum' (whether it originates among the intelligentsia or among the workers) [should] aid the consciousness of the workers to lag as little as possible behind the real relations of a given society." The Economists, Plekhanov indicated, mistakenly confused the Social Democratic Party
with the working class despite Marx's clear definition of
the Party as the most advanced element of that class. 38

*Rabochee delo* denied the validity of the Economist
label. Plekhanov's attack was political, they argued,
designed to discredit those within the Union Abroad who
rejected his control and demanded a democratic organization.
What other motivation could explain why the attack had come
two years after the circulation of Prokopovich's manuscript
when he had already left the Union Abroad? The Union Abroad
prepared for the formal split which Plekhanov was determined
to engineer. By October 1901, a planned unification
congress became a farce when Lenin maligned the editors of
*Rabochee delo* and Feodor Dan led a walkout of members loyal
to Plekhanov and Akselrod. 39

After the failure of the congress, *Rabochee delo*
continued to advance organizational designs different from
those of Plekhanov and Lenin. The organizational scheme
proposed in *Iskra*, the new journal edited by Plekhanov,
Lenin and their allies, proposed a network of agents
directed by the center to carry out Party work in Russia.
*Rabochee delo* 's editors argued such a scheme could not
succeed in building a conscious revolutionary movement.
Social Democrats within the working class should guide the
developing labor movement and as workers gained confidence
in themselves Social Democracy would also expand. 40
editor who opposed a narrow, conspiratorial organization, insisted "a Social Democratic party is pointless without ties - alive, tight, broad - which bind it to the working masses and so it can grow . . . only from below, from the local organizations and from unification between them." True to Marx's dictum that the socialist revolution could be made only by the workers, these editors could not accept the subordination of the party to the intelligentsia. Political consciousness came from struggle not doctrine.

By 1901, Russian workers had become politicized and according to Allan Wildman, "there was not a trace of this dangerous heresy (Economism) in the Social Democratic movement." Nevertheless, the ideological debate over Economism continued within emigre circles and inside Russia. Historians of the period have posed a number of reasons for the persistence of this dispute. Traditionally, they accepted the definition of Economism offered by its opponents as a theory with a "definable content" and adherents who stressed economic struggle. Historical revisionists found that Economism was simply a label given to those who challenged the old guard. A thorough analysis suggests that the emigre leaders of Russian Marxism separated from Russian realities developed a theory founded on a set of terms whose definitions could not be altered. Individual personalities became bound to these theories upon
which an organization was founded. This handful of theorists, when faced with an expansion of the organization and changes they could not perceive from abroad, did not want to let the infant organization become independent. They had witnessed past failures of similar organizations, and their ideological father, Marx, was not known to be kind to those who sought to reform his basic doctrines. Personally, ideologically and politically, they believed the youngsters would take Russian Marxism along a dangerous path which would destroy or otherwise postpone all hopes for the success of revolution. To prevent the worst, they rooted out all forms of deviation and purged the party of those who challenged its founding doctrine. Inside Russia, *Iskra* waged a successful battle with the Union for leadership of the emerging Party which was to hold its Second Congress in 1903.

In the polemical style necessary for this crusade, Lenin's *What Is to Be Done?*, the blueprint for party organization, identified differences between *Iskra* and the Economists. If left to its own devices, Lenin warned, "the *spontaneous* development of the working-class movement" which the Economists advanced "leads to its subordination to bourgeois ideology, to *its development along the line of the Credo program;* for the spontaneous working-class movement is trade unionism." Agitational leaflets "organizing the
exposure of factory conditions. . . . could have served (if properly utilized by an organization of revolutionaries) as a beginning and a component part of Social-Democratic activity; but they could also have led ... to a 'purely trade union' struggle and to a non-Social-Democratic working-class movement." Especially critical of Martynov's slogan, "lending the economic struggle itself a political character," Lenin argued that Economism limited history to reform and ignored the "pressing needs of the working class for political knowledge and political training." The economists miscalculated since the 

the worker cannot develop political class consciousness from within the economic struggle . . . Class political consciousness can be brought to the workers only from without, that is, only from outside the economic struggle, from outside the sphere of relations between workers and employers.⁴⁶

Although Lenin and Plekhanov had serious disagreements before the Congress, their concept of the significance of theory was similar: "without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement." Throughout the prerevolutionary period, Plekhanov and Lenin developed this theory and willingly abandoned party members who rejected it, even if the opposition held a majority. Any theoretical assault was interpreted as a personal challenge and had to be unconditionally defeated since Plekhanov, and possibly Lenin, identified themselves through their doctrines.⁴⁷ On
differences of theoretical interpretation, Lenin wrote "only short-sighted people can consider factional disputes and a strict differentiation between shades of opinion inopportune or superfluous. The fate of Russian Social-Democracy for many years to come may depend on the strengthening of one or the other 'shade.'" Therefore, unity at the cost of correct theory could destroy Russian Social Democracy. Lenin placed his theoretical interpretation at the center of the movement and took to heart Marx's phrase that the Communist differs from the worker in knowing the correct path of history. In *What Is to Be Done?*, Lenin was fully in line with Marxist orthodoxy.

Lenin contended that "it would be absurd and harmful to *confound* [the workers' movement] with the organization of *revolutionaries.*" The rank and file Party members had the task of distributing propaganda and directing workers in trade unions, self-education societies, reading circles, and socialist and democratic circles. The economists fear of going beyond a level of instruction "'accessible' to the working masses" was unjustifiable. Such "subservience to spontaneity" limits organizational work to the current level of consciousness. Success rested entirely upon a Party of trained revolutionaries with "centralization of the secret functions not centralization of all the functions of the *movement.*" Although some Social
Democrats may have had reservations about Lenin's scheme of organization, they expressed little concern over the pamphlet, *What is to Done?* The emigres close to Plekhanov welcomed Lenin's expose of Economism and only later announced their disapproval of his work.

After the disintegration of the Union Abroad, the stage was set for the Second Congress. The former members of the Emancipation of Labor joined by Lenin, Alexander N. Potresov, and Iulii Martov were editors of *Iskra* and the theoretical journal *Zaria*. Among the six, a split soon developed most often apparent between Plekhanov and Lenin. Although Akselrod was rarely outspoken in his opposition to Lenin, he wrote Plekhanov that there were "a whole series of important questions" which the board needed to consider. Without public opposition before the Second Congress, Lenin was able to win support and the "questions" were postponed until the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party which met in 1903.

At the Second Congress, the ideas of the so-called Economists were apparent among newer members of the party. A.S. Martynov remained the most outspoken opponent of Lenin's strategy which he saw as a "conspiratorial, Jacobin plan of organization" which would not lead to "a class party of the proletariat." As described in numerous accounts, Lenin, who emerged as leader of the Bolsheviks, and Martov
as spokesman for the Mensheviks, disagreed over the definition of a party member. The future Menshevik, Egorov (E. Ia. Levin), immediately recognized that Martov's suggestion that a member give "regular assistance under the direction of one of [the Party's] organizations" would contribute to the establishment of a broad organization. Lenin required financial contributions and direct participation. Akselrod contended that everyone sympathetic to the cause of socialism must be allowed to join the party, while membership in the organization could be restricted. The term organization as defined by Akselrod referred to the illegal Party organization, while "party" signified the workers' independent political party. Akselrod agreed with Lenin that the Marxists needed a "fighting organization, strictly organized, consisting of professional revolutionaries" but not everyone could actively join such a group. By way of example, Akselrod remarked that it was acceptable for a professor in Russia to "consciously" support the party while not "actively" supporting it, and thereby, jeopardizing his livelihood. After Akselrod spoke, Plekhanov promoted Lenin's position. Ironically, he pronounced that intellectuals had to be banned from the party as "bourgeois individualists are usually also the representatives of every kind of individualism." He ridiculed Akselrod's "professor" quoting Engels: "When you
deal with a professor, you must first prepare for the very worst." Lenin's response to Akselrod seemed almost conciliatory in comparison. Although, he maintained his formulation would "protect the steadfastness, firmness, and purity of our party," he lost on the membership question by a vote of 23 to 28. The reminder of the sessions did not involve tactics but issues of membership on the Central Organs. The victory of delegates who supported Lenin is well documented. The Central Committee was reduced to three in opposition to the protests of Martov and others. Egorov noted that it was clear one group was trying to control the organization and to create a "compact majority" which votes "as one man, at the signal of its leader." Although a new editorial board was organized and the Mensheviks gained control of the journal, Iskra, the damage done by the Congress was permanent. Personal vindictive attacks, polemical assaults, and confusion followed the Congress. O. A. Ermanskii, a leading Menshevik, travelled West for an explanation of the split and concluded as many did that the conflict was the result of a struggle for personal power.

The formation of Menshevism and Bolshevism resulted directly from the Economist controversy. Akselrod's interpretation of the schism rested on the history of Russian Marxism. The formation of a party, he
wrote, was the means to getting to the end - the "creation of a politically mature working class." Social Democracy had to face internal threats of Economism and Revisionism just when severe opposition to autocracy was emerging. Consequently, Social Democrats feared a turn toward bourgeois tendencies in doctrine and tactics. Therefore the revolutionaries' endeavors to establish a party resulted in "organizational fetishism" and centralism. In the West, the Social Democratic parties were composed primarily of workers and therefore class consciousness developed within the proletarian movement. In Russia, consciousness was brought "from without" by intellectuals. Akselrod argued that if this continued permanently the "revolutionary political organization would use the Russian workers as cannon fodder" and workers would always be subordinated to the bourgeoisie. Only a broad based independent workers' party could prevent this. With respect to the intelligentsia, Akselrod noted that in the West, Social Democracy was established after the revolutionary intelligentsia were politically tied to the bourgeoisie in a constitutional state. In Russia, the radicals were alienated from the bourgeoisie, and thus removed, could assist the workers in the creation of a party. After completing this task, the revolutionary intelligentsia would give up hegemony in the party.⁵⁷
Akselrod's tactics were adopted by the Mensheviks and became the starting point for Liquidationism.

While Akselrod emerged as the leading theorist of Menshevism, Lenin's study *Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution*, written in June 1905, erected a major theoretical cornerstone of Bolshevism. In Lenin's assessment, during the bourgeois revolution the proletariat needed reenforcement to assure that they would not become a "subsidiary to the bourgeoisie." Such assistance could not come from the liberals as the Mensheviks proposed. Instead the true opponents of the Russian autocracy - the proletariat and the peasantry - should join forces to carry out the democratic revolution and institute the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry. Overseeing the redistribution of land, the creation of full democracy, radically improved living conditions and a higher standard of living, the revolution could then be carried to Europe. If the unity and consciousness of the proletariat and peasantry was not sufficiently advanced, Lenin predicted, the revolution would result in a "docked constitution" and the forces of reaction would join to end the revolution, as in nineteenth century Europe. *Two Tactics* separated Lenin and the Bolsheviks from the Mensheviks in the revolutionary period 1905-7.
The split at the Second Congress was ideological. By 1904 the differences between the two factions were clearly delineated. Although they would not be fully reflected inside Russia until 1905, Bolshevism and Menshevism resulted from inherent contradictions in Marxism and in the peculiarities of Russian history. Marx assigned two widely variant tasks to the bourgeoisie. The revolutionary intelligentsia who were part of the bourgeoisie were to guide the workers in the development of a party organization and in the development of class consciousness. However, once the proletariat became politically conscious the intelligentsia were to permit the independent, autonomous workers' party to carry out revolutionary tasks, serving only to remind the workers of their political tasks. Marx also encouraged trade union activity and economic struggle as a fundamental method for developing class consciousness, while simultaneously stressing the supremacy of the political struggle. Akselrod attempted to adapt this strategy along with its contradictions to Russian realities and in the process discovered Menshevism. His associates would base their definition of Liquidationism on his doctrine.

The Economist controversy also shaped future Russian revolutionary discourse. Throughout the early twentieth century, disagreements were publicly displayed in
written and spoken form. An opponent's views were distorted or associated with a greater more well-known evil in an "abrasive form of political discourse." Both groups expressed hostility toward one another in their journal articles and at meetings. The lack of a proper mode of discourse prevented prompt responses to Russian conditions which might require tactical changes. Rank and file members close to events in Russia had little effect on policy which remained the prerogative of the emigres. After 1905, another group of reformers, the Liquidators, would lobby for a new type of Party organization. Once again, Lenin would attempt to discredit his opponents by attributing to them beliefs they did not hold.

ENDNOTES


3 Ibid., 10:287.


The division relegating the economic struggle to the union and the political to the party was actually first adopted by the German trade unionist and organizer of the first socialist party in Germany, Ferdinand Lassalle. Marx, *Collected Works*, 6:493.

Ibid., 6:494.


B.N-skii "P.B.Akselrod (Osnovnye cherty politicheskoi biografii) Sotsialicheskii vestnik, no.15/16 (Aug. 18, 1925):10.


Ascher, Axelrod, p.4; Pavel Akselrod, *Perzhitoe i peredumannoe* (Berlin, 1924), pp. 70-71, 85, 96-98.


Baron, *Plekhanov*, pp. 140-42; Frankel, *Vladimir Akimov*, p.17.


Ibid., I:142.


The 1897 issue of *On Agitation* included a prologue by Akselrod which stated political action could never result from economic agitation. Plekhanov approved Akselrod's position on agitation. See Ascher, *Axelrod*, pp.128-30.

Allan Wildman's *Making of a Workers' Revolution* notes the increased political radicalism of the proletariat at this time.

For a differing interpretation of this work see Neil Harding's *Lenin's Political Thought*, vol. 1 (London, 1977) pp. 115-123. Harding states that "Lenin's argument was basically the same as that set out in *On Agitation*. Harding does not discuss the implications of Lenin's description of the role of the intelligentsia, rather he concentrates his analysis on Lenin's analysis of the economic struggle and the turn toward politics.

*Lenin, Tasks of the Russian Social Democrats,* CW, 2:349.

Ibid., p.96.

Ibid., p.328.


Samodeiatel'nost,' literally self activity, was a key term in Akselrod's work. Ibid., p.24.

Akselrod, *Pis'mo v redaktsiiu "Rabochago dela,"* (Geneva 1899).

*Rabochaia mysli* 1 (October 1897);1.


Frankel, *Akimov*, p.34; The pamphlet was published in Plekhanov, *Vademecum dlia redaktsii 'Rabochee dela', Sbornik materialov* (Geneva, 1900); See also Ascher, Axelrod, pp. 143-4.


Ascher divides the economist controversy into two periods, the first from 1897-99, dominated by Akselrod, see Ascher, *Axelrod*, pp. 125-167.

On Akselrod's motives see Ascher who views the conflict in ideological and organizational in its earlier stage. According to Ascher, Akselrod, like Plekhanov, feared the
"youngsters" were using Bernstein to "construct a new tendency." Ascher, Axelrod, pp.140-157; See also the correspondence between Akselrod and Plekhanov, Perепиska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B.Akselroda, (Moscow, 1925) II: 70,73,77,78-9 80-81,86.

37 The reduced role of the revolutionary intelligentsia in assisting the development of consciousness the Economists' tactics led Plekhanov to equate Economism with Revisionism. See Baron, Plekhanov, p. 186.


39 Frankel, Akimov, p.52.

40 Martynov, Sotsial'demokratiiia i rabochee klass (Prilozhenie k no. 11 'Rabochee dela'(Geneva 1902), p.30.


42 Wildman, Making of a Workers' Revolution, p.144.

43 Ascher, Axelrod, p.167.


45 Keep, Social Democracy, p.58. For a slightly different interpretation see Schapiro, Communist Party, pp.33-35. Schapiro denies the existence of Economism, but claims it was used by Lenin to build an organization.

46 Lenin, What is to be Done? Burning Questions of our Movement, (New York, 1969)

47 Baron, Plekhanov, p.208.

48 See Pis'ma P.B. Akselrod i Iu. O. Martova, 1901-16 (Berlin, 1924), p.45.


51 Ascher, Akselrod, p.183 citing Vtoroi s'ezd RSDRP: Protokoli (Moscow, 1959), p.119. Another future Menshevik, Akimov, also expressed concern about the lack of democracy.
in Lenin's plan. See Frankel, Akimov.

52. Ascher, Axelrod, pp. 262, 267.

53. Ibid., pp. 271-2.

54. Ibid., pp. 359-64, 367, 372-73.


56. A. Ermanskii Iz perezhitogo (1887-1921 gg.) (Moscow 1927) p. 68.

57. Pavel Akselrod, "Ob'edinenie rossiiskoi sotsialdemokratii i eia zadachi," Iskra no. 55 (15 Dec. 1903); no. 57 (15 January 1904).

58. In 1904-5, Lenin began to utilize examples from the French Revolution labelling his Menshevik opponents as Girondists probably in answer to criticism of Bolshevik Jacobinism. He wrote in Two Tactics, if the revolution is victorious, "we shall settle accounts with tsarism in the Jacobin, or if you like, in the plebeian way" and justified such actions by citing Marx on the French Revolution: "The whole French terrorism was nothing but a plebeian manner of settling accounts with the enemies of the bourgeoisie with absolutism, feudalism, and philistinism." In the next paragraph as Lenin often does, he qualified his reliance on "plebeian manners":

By our parallel, we merely want to explain that the representatives of the progressive class of the twentieth century, the proletariat, i.e., the Social Democrats, are divided into two wings (the opportunist and the revolutionary) similar to those into which the progressive class of the eighteenth century, the bourgeois were divided... Such polemical methods designed to discredit the opposition would become common after the Economist Controversy.


60. Baron, Plekhanov, p. 190.

61. Baron notes that the Group "could not easily adapt to changing needs of the movement," Ibid., p. 192.
CHAPTER II:

THE FLOWERING OF TRADE UNIONISM: THE ST. PETERSBURG METALWORKERS' UNION TO 1907

Products of the 1905-7 Revolution, the Menshevik party activists and the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union evolved along similar historical paths. Although workers had models for unionization and socialists had conceived tactics for assisting workers, only with the Days of Freedom in 1905 were these ideas given concrete form. The labor movement was shaped by the workers' history, by the socialist concept of working class tasks, and by the response of government and management to emerging worker activism. Given impetus by government legislation in early 1906, trade union organization provided an avenue for workers' entry onto the political stage, moving them from a place outside traditional social groups toward the central role they would play in 1917. Socialist activists travelled this path also, assisting workers in this transformation and in the process altering the path of Russian Social Democracy. The Petersburg Metalworkers' Union in its formative years graphically demonstrates the significance of this transformation.
St. Petersburg, the setting for this evolution was the most industrialized center in Russia providing employment for some of the most highly skilled, well paid, and literate workers of the empire. During the industrial upsurge of the last two decades of the nineteenth century, metalworking was the fastest growing industry employing 25% of all workers who came to the city. The largest armaments, machine tools and ship building plants were concentrated in the capital and its suburbs, drawing a vast number of immigrants from the countryside to the city. Seventy-five percent of the new workers travelled distances over 200 miles to their new home.

The workers came from two estates or soslovie in Russian society, the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie. In a cosmopolitan city such as St. Petersburg, however, such classification had become anachronistic since many, registered as peasants because of family background, were actually skilled workers, artisans, or even merchants. Because urbanization is requisite for radicalization, the distinctive qualities of Petersburg's working class population made it particularly susceptible to revolutionary agitators. The type of peasant-worker who maintained strong ties to the village, described by R. E. Johnson's study of Moscow, was not as characteristic of St. Petersburg. The vast differentiation between rural and urban culture was
more evident in St. Petersburg. The workers of the capital married less often than their counterparts in Moscow, faced a higher cost of living, and endured a more intensive work schedule. Coupled with rising literacy and education rates beginning in the 1890s, St. Petersburg more than any other Russian city witnessed the metamorphosis of the peasantry into the type of worker common to the trade union organizations of Western Europe.5

Precursors to Russian trade unions existed in the guilds and mutual aid societies of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Victoria Bonnell has admirably chronicled the process of union formation from these foundations.6 The state-regulated guilds were not directly influential in 1905, however, they had instilled workers with an identity according to specific occupation. The identification with a particular shop in a particular factory also stamped emerging unions with a tendency to organize according to craft.7 The consequent prestige associated with skill levels created an hierarchy in the workplace which was especially significant in the standing of metallists in the labor movement.

In the late nineteenth century, skilled and highly paid workers formed mutual aid associations which offered material benefits in the case of illness, injury or death. Printers, sales and service workers joined these societies.8
Metallists at Nevskii Ship and Machine Plant attempted to establish a citywide mutual aid society in the 1880s, but the project's initiators were arrested. By the turn of century, the state operated plants of Baltiiskii, Obukhov, and Sestroretskii had mutual aid funds. Members began to incorporate a collective identity through association with mutual aid societies.

The government's experiment with labor unions organized by the security police to undercut radical influence also taught Russian workers the benefits of collective action. The founder of this strategy, Sergei Zubatov, head of the Moscow Okhrana, believed trade unions would become reformist rather than revolutionary if the tsarist government mediated labor-management relations. In Petersburg, revolutionaries and industrialists were prepared to resist the importation of these societies. However, Father George Gapon, a protege of Zubatov, won government approval for the Assembly of Factory and Mill Workers which organized the fateful procession to the Winter Palace on 9 January 1905 — Bloody Sunday. "Gaponists," unionists affiliated with the police or other state officials, established two rivals of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers', the Mutual Aid Society of Machine Workers and the St. Petersburg General Workers' Union. U.A. Ushakov formed the Mutual Aid Society of Machine Workers when non-
factional Social Democrats came to dominate the Assembly's leadership. Although the Ushakovists demanded workers be directly represented in the Duma and called for complete civil liberties, they rejected strike action and participation in the Soviet. Remnants of the Ushakov Union existed until 1907. At Siemans-Halske Electro-Technical Works, Vasilii Smesov, a police spy, merged the local metallists' organization with the St. Petersburg General Workers' Union, an amalgamation of several unions from different industries. Socialist organizers argued the General Workers' Union "was a colossus with heavy feet" which lacked internal cohesion and encouraged metallists to join the industrial based union. Finally, their agitation proved successful when the Vasileostrov metallists' branch absorbed the Smesovists in 1907.

Socialists of all tendencies were active in the informal and formal, legal and illegal organizations which emerged in the period from 1904 to 1907. The revolutionary Social Democratic (SD) and Socialist Revolutionary (SR) party groups, weak quantitatively before 1905, recruited new members once they emerged from the underground. Commonly, Marxists claimed affiliation to the Bolshevik or Menshevik faction depending on the strength of that group locally. Other socialists remained unaffiliated or non-factional but worked closely with SDs and SRs in
workers' associations. Gapon recruited a socialist group around the lithographer, Aleksei Karelin, who had shunned direct party ties to make connections to workers with the "lowest consciousness." Throughout this period, socialists spoke at mass meetings held legally in universities and other public places and emphasized class struggle, the connection between economic and political struggle, and the goal of socialism. Socialists such as Vladimir Akimov, the defender of "economism" at the Second Congress of the RSDRP, assisted workers' groups, then slipped back into obscurity after the revolutionary fervor subsided. Active socialists since the 1890s, Vasilii Tsytsarin, a Bolshevik lathe operator, and Petr Aleksandrovich Zlydnev, a Menshevik at Obukhov, served in a leadership capacity among metalworkers during 1905. Socialists offered practical skills and tactical agendas to workers seeking empowerment politically and in the workplace.

Liberals also assisted workers' efforts to form unions. The Union of Liberation, formed in 1903, and the Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadet), established in 1905, had varying political reform strategies which significantly impacted workers' associations. Although they were not as active as SDs at the local level, liberals did serve important posts as editors of trade union newspapers, legal advisors and deputies to the Soviet and other central
institutions. The most prominent example was Georgii Nosar, a lawyer who helped workers draw up demands for the aborted Shidlovskii Commission, and as a representative of the Printers' Union served as chair of the Soviet of Workers' Deputies until his arrest in November.19

Throughout 1905, workers eagerly embraced collective organizations. They flocked to Assembly meetings at the end of 1904, and promptly elected factory committees or councils of elders to conduct strikes and mediate with management.20 After Bloody Sunday, the workers' previously held faith in the paternalism of the Tsarist government was irretrievably broken. The announcement of the election of worker representatives to the Shidlovskii Commission for the investigation of working conditions in St. Petersburg encouraged the already existing desire for formal organization, in effect, legitimizing a de facto condition.21 This is not to imply that legitimization was a major concern of the workers in 1905; indeed, they demanded control over their economic and political lives with all possible means and with all the fervor expected a social group, heretofore excluded from political recognition. The influence of this changing mood on the socialists coincided with the period of increasing socialist influence within the labor movement. It directly contributed to the formation of
the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and the reform movement within the RSDRP, "Liquidationism."

During 1905, Social Democrats observed metalworkers' central role in many key events. In January, the strike at the large metalworking plant at Putilov was the catalyst for Gapon's decision to present the Assembly's Petition to the tsar. workers at smaller plants followed larger plants out on strike realizing class solidarity could produce successful results. In the Vyborg district, St. Petersburg Metals often initiated broader strikes, while in the suburb of Schlusselburg Road, Obukhov, Nevskii Ship and Aleksandrovsk Machine Plants maintained a similar station. During preliminary meetings of electors to the Shidlovskii Commission, metallists demanded electors be given permission to meet as a group rather than separately by industry. They sought full immunity for deputies and added the threat of a general strike if their demands for freedom of speech and uncensored publication of minutes was rejected. Metallists were also prominent at workers' mass meetings held at the universities during September. The large plants of Obukhov, Putilov, Baltic and Franco-Russian joined strikes and made political demands three days before the October Manifesto promised civil liberties, and a representative form of government.
Despite these indications of metallists' radicalization, the historical relationship between workers and revolutionaries curbed socialist authority. Before 1905, workers and Party members shared perceptions of mutual hostility. Haunted by the specter of Economism, party theorists initially retained a "psychological block to legal trade union work" which they feared would tear workers away from the political struggle. Spontaneity, or uncontrolled strike activity by "unconscious" workers, was particularly disturbing to Mensheviks who relied upon the determinist theory of Marxism. Workers, likewise, resented the revolutionary intelligentsia's desire to direct their activities according to a preplanned theory. The workers' outlook presented in the pamphlet, *Workers and Intelligency in our Organizations*, written anonymously by "A worker," advanced a transfer of Party leadership to workers and summoned workers to independent activity. Metalworkers close to the party refused to participate in factionalism and appealed for Party unity.

The events of 1905 completely altered this relationship. Workers in unprecedented numbers began to organize trade unions to protect and further the achievements of the strike movement. Most often, in contrast with the past record of worker-intelligentsia hostility, workers sought assistance from both liberal and
socialist intellectuals. Assistance, not tutelage, was the aim of these initial contacts. Arriving in the capital in June, Viktor Grinevich, a Menshevik trade unionist, met over one-hundred shoemakers in the woods outside the city to direct their organizational efforts. Along with another Menshevik organizer, S. I. Somov [I.M. Peskin], Grinevich noted the workers' eagerness to learn about European labor and the everyday skills necessary to run a union. In late 1904, Somov worked with six to seven circles at the large Putilov plant and the Railroad Construction Plant in Narva district. Similar circles existed in Vasileostrov and on Petersburg Side. In early January, Somov attended a mass meeting of the Gaponist Assembly where the workers' demands for simple justice inspired a change in SD thinking. After this meeting SDs became the featured speakers at Assembly meetings and began to play a more central role in workers' meetings.²⁹

In the aftermath of 1905, Mensheviks hoped to generate a European style labor movement in Russia by breaking free "of the confines of the underground."³⁰ At the time of the Second Congress of the RSDRP in 1903, Iulii Martov's resolution on trade unions, calling for a "single organized class struggle" and party support for strikes "initiated by legal labor organizations" had little practical application.³¹ However, after Bloody Sunday,
delegates to the Menshevik All Russian Conference of Party Workers voted to assist unionization efforts and did not insist trade unions be subordinated to the Party. Delegates also planned to create a collective Party leadership supported by a functional city-wide committee organization. Mensheviks observed that the labor movement was developing without a corresponding increase in the party's influence. To attract worker activists into an independent labor party, Mensheviks began to call for active involvement in trade unions and in informal organizations such as workers' clubs.\textsuperscript{32}

Such alterations implied the need for deeper reform of the party organization. In Gorodskii district, Menshevik agitators noted the shortcomings of the underground which did not give the masses opportunities to experience Party life. To address this dilemma, the activists proposed linking the economic grievances of the workers to the Social Democratic Party. An editorial by Somov, formerly of\textit{ Rabochee delo} which was implicated in the Economist heresy, proposed democratization of the Party to give members "greater independence of action." Another from the circle of\textit{ Rabochee delo}, Aleksander S. Martynov, echoed this sentiment, suggesting SDs "reform our underground Party organization" into an open, broad workers' party.\textsuperscript{33} A syndicalist type of party based upon trade unions was
proposed by contributors to the short lived newspaper, 
Rabochii golos, which was associated with the "Economist",
Vladimir Akimov. Picking up the thread of Akselrod's
ideas these activists offered a link between theory and
practice after 1905, best exemplified by Akselrod's plan for
a workers' congress.

In a series of letters written to the Menshevik
Organizing Commission, Akselrod conceptualized the workers'
congress as a proletarian alternative to the Zemstvo or
Union of Unions' congress. Although Akselrod gave the
Mensheviks the organizational initiative, he intended the
workers' congress to serve as part of a gradual
transformation for the Party away from a party of
revolutionary intelligentsia into a proletarian organization
with SDs as the nucleus. Trotsky adopted the plan as a
path toward an all Russian Workers' Soviet, although unity
was a prerequisite for the planning of the congress. After the dissolution of the First Duma in 1906, this idea
became central to discussions of Mensheviks at Terioki,
Finland, twenty five miles from St. Petersburg, where
Akselrod presided over informal meetings of Party activists
and worker intellectuals. That summer, throughout Russia,
workers at mass meetings responded to the concept and over
fifteen pamphlets appeared on the subject. The idea of
the workers' congress became a moot point after June 1907,
but would be revived in factory meetings during the war in 1915 and 1916.

During the 1905-07 Revolution, the almost spontaneous creation of workers' associations forced the Bolshevik leadership to reconsider trade unions as a valid form of the labor movement. Initially, governed by Lenin's condemnation of trade unionism in *What is to be Done?*, Bolshevik policy left the arena open for the Mensheviks. Once Bolsheviks engaged themselves in trade union activity, they were determined to tie unions directly to the party and to maintain a conspiratorial, centralized underground party organization. In 1904, Lenin's widely distributed "Letter to a Comrade about our Organizational Tasks" reaffirmed the centralized structure. However, reformers did exist within the Bolshevik faction. Some Bolshevik members of the Central Committee (TsK), composed a "Declaration of unity" hoping for reconciliation with the Mensheviks. Although their idea came to naught, Bolshevik conciliators continued to work at the local level with other socialists throughout the interrevolutionary period.

In Russia, formal schisms did not dampen the desire for unity among workers. Even after the Petersburg Menshevik Group left the Petersburg Committee in late 1904, the discussion of unity was foremost among members in the rank and file who hoped for democratization of the Party.
Trotskyi remained its steadfast proponent. Of course the concept of unity in 1905 meant something different to each of the revolutionary actors: the workers, Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks interpreted unity as the readmission of the Mensheviks into their Party, while Mensheviks hoped for a federation of the existing factions. Workers simply wanted an end to factional squabbling and more control over their own organizations. On 18 October, both Petersburg factions merged to form the Federative Council and began to plan a Unification Congress. Locally, the announcement precipitated mergers between SD groups in factory and strike committees and informal workers' associations.42

The culmination of this cooperation was the Fourth Unification Congress at Stockholm in April 1906. Recognizing that workers were already organizing, the Mensheviks suggested party activists assist their efforts. The Menshevik resolution which proposed that the party and trade unions be linked "organically, in struggle and agitation" passed unanimously. Therefore, the official policy of the RSDRP was to assist workers in the formation of non-partisan trade unions.43 Despite the fact that the London Congress reversed this decision in May 1907, Party activists continued agitation in non-partisan unions. In
fact, most Bolshevik affiliated unions chose to reject party identification after unions were legalized in March 1906.

In addition to the Party, two other institutions impacted workers in 1905 and shaped the emerging workers' movement: the Soviet and the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. In the summer of 1905, the Menshevik Feodor Dan, called for the creation of a "network of elective organs of revolutionary self-government" established by rural and urban representatives to an All-Russian Assembly. In this vein, the Menshevik Petersburg Group called for elections of workers' committees which met on 13 October. At this meeting 562 representatives from Petersburg factories, including 351 metallists, requested an end to military conditions, amnesty for those convicted for political and religious reasons, a people's militia, and a Constituent Assembly. On 17 October, the Petersburg General Workers' Committee changed its name to the Soviet of Workers' Deputies. Although the Mensheviks hoped that the Soviet would be closely affiliated with the Party, workers demanded neutrality. Throughout its existence, the Soviet mediated workers' demands. When metalworkers at Nevskii Shipbuilding, Obukhov, Nobel, Lessner and other factories refused to work longer than eight hours, the Soviet adopted and coordinated this campaign. Fearing the workers' inability to win immediate concessions in the eight-hour day
campaign, the Soviet voted for union formation to carry on the struggle and called for an All-Russian Congress of Trade Unions. The Soviet, closest to the workers in 1905, "personified the link between "economic" and political struggle."\textsuperscript{51}

The socialist intellectuals influenced workers' organizations through the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. The brainstorm of participants at the First All Russian Conference of Trade Unions, its founders included popular socialist organizers such as the Mensheviks V.V. Sher, P. N. Kolokol'nikov, I. Kruglov, N.I. Chistov, and I.A. Isuv and the Bolsheviks M.G. Lunts and Stanislav Vol'skii. The liberationist and former "economist" S.N. Prokopovich and Nosar were also in attendance. Because of their familiarity with trade union experiences in the West, the participants recommended bureaus be established to coordinate and aid workers in forming trade unions. In the fall of 1905, Central Bureaus began to function in many cities of the empire and remained active for over a decade. Thirty-five Petersburg organizations sent representatives to the Central Bureau which included among its members the Mensheviks, Somov and Grinevich, the liberal professor, Vladimir Sviatoslavskii, and the Bolshevik, D.B. Riazanov.\textsuperscript{52} The Bureau published a journal, \textit{Professional'nyi soiuz},
moderated union-party relations and encouraged the formation of industrial-type unions.\textsuperscript{53}

The St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union resulted from the workers' sporadic attempts to organize at the factory level. Given conceptual support by left liberals and assistance by the socialist intelligentsia, the metallists did produce a charter in 1905. However, since the metallists were so active in the political events of 1905, the union would not be organized until 1906 or officially registered until 1907. Erratic, uncoordinated attempts by socialists and liberals to help metallists draft a union charter characterized the period of early organization. In February 1905, party activists at Vasileostrov began work on a union charter, but were arrested before completing this task.\textsuperscript{54} Kolokol'nikov credits liberals with explaining the trade union concept to the metallists early in the spring. In March, at the Smolensk evening school in Schlusselburg, Prokopovich proposed a loose confederation of trade unions not unlike the Union of Unions. This plan and a corresponding effort by the Menshevik, Iu. Larin, gained few followers.\textsuperscript{55} Instigated by the Nevskii Council of Elders, a union charter was drafted by representatives from Obukhov, Aleksandrovsk, and Putilov plants meeting in the cafeteria of Nevskii Shipbuilding.\textsuperscript{56} However, by August, the conflict between
Social Democrats and "gaponists," hindered widespread adoption of the draft proposal. In late September, Obukhov workers finished a draft constitution, but the October strikes shifted attention toward more immediate events.\(^5^7\) By this time, the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and the Nevskii Council of Elders, produced a charter for an industry-wide union, but the metallists turned their attention to the eight-hour day campaign.\(^5^8\) Instead of a centralized effort, individual factory committees drew up union charters often as part of their strike activity in November. At Obukhov, socialists were able to assist workers in the completion of a charter. A. O. Iatsinovich, the future president of the Metallists' Union, with the assistance of liberals in meetings held on the premises of the Free Economic Society, organized metallists at Odner and Beir.\(^5^9\) By the winter of 1905-6, the concept of organization among Petersburg metalworkers was widespread.

The *ustav* or charter drafted by the Nevskii Council of Elders and the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and adopted by the Factory committee on 15 November 1905, became the model for the entire union. Qualifications for membership were more democratic than those for participation in the Gaponist Assembly or the Shidlovskii Commission and gave metalworkers a sense of control over their lives. Members had to be workers in metallurgy at least 18 years
old and were admitted to the union "without regard to religion or nationality" if recommended by at least two other members. The offices of secretary, treasurer and chair were to be chosen annually at a general meeting by secret ballot and special elections would be held for the purpose of selecting a Central Committee. The workers' strong sense of injustice and demand for economic and political change is apparent in the tasks set out by the charter. Mutual aid remained a significant goal of the union, especially aid in the case of death, illness, or unemployment. A special Bureau for the Unemployed was planned to assist jobless members in the search for employment. To improve the standard of living, the charter's program called for a minimum wage, restrictions on child labor, a shorter work day, overtime pay, the repeal of the fine and penalty system, the organization of an arbitration board, and improvement of sanitary conditions. Liberals and socialists had certainly played a role in popularizing these ideas especially through Gapon's Assembly. Socialists also must have written several clauses such as the promise to "struggle for higher wages" and the obvious liberal-socialist compromise "to agitate in full legislative measure to assist workers in their struggle with capitalism." The use of the term Central Committee also indicates socialist influence. The charter confirmed
the Menshevik commitment to advance the intellectual level of union members by opening libraries, clubs, training and technical schools, and sponsoring public lectures. The founders also supported the Menshevik plan for a workers' congress. As workers and socialists began to cooperate in the open politicized environment of the Days of Freedom, their programs, as manifest in the Nevskii charter, were blended, and the possibilities for a European type labor movement seemed to be just beyond the horizon.

However, this optimism gradually began to wane when the particulars of the October Manifesto and other reforms became known. Especially after the defeat of the Moscow uprising in December, socialists began to recognize that liberals were withdrawing from the fray, workers were becoming weary of strikes and the autocracy's offerings were only skeletal remains of the democratic dreams of the fall. Unemployment, the result of demobilization and a worsening economy, crippled the workers' power, as employers began to remove "undesirable elements" from the work place. Party activists caught up in day to day open activity were reluctant to accept this pessimistic condition, especially after workers were given the right to organize "societies" in 1906.

The "Temporary Regulations on Unions and Societies" enacted on 4 March 1906, resulted from
deliberations which had taken place within the Ministry of Finance under V.N. Kovkovstov. After Bloody Sunday, Nicholas II, in council with his ministers, elevated the importance of these deliberations and established the Shidlovskii Commission to investigate working conditions. The Kovkovstov Commission's first draft of the law gave unions the power to defend their interests by forming confederations and collecting strike funds. Influenced by such liberals as Professor Sviatoslavskii, the commissioners portrayed owners and management as self-interested obstacles to reform. However, probably in reaction to the October strikes, the State Council revised the law, giving "societies" rather than unions the right to improve their lot through agreement and arbitration and mentioning nothing of strike funds. The rather vague law gave workers the right to initiate the establishment of societies which could provide mutual and legal aid, employment assistance, and establish libraries, trade schools, and reading rooms. Subsequent circulars banned Social Democratic activity within the unions and prevented public attendance at union meetings. On 2 December 1905, "economic" strikes were sanctioned in nongovernment enterprises, a term obviously open to a variety of interpretations. Another circular granted the gorodskoi nachalnik (city-chief) the authority to close any society which threatened "social security and
peace or takes on a clearly immoral tendency." Administrative unpredictability was further expanded by provisions for the oversight of registered societies through provincial and municipal Bureaus on Unions "for matters relating to associations" made up of local court and government officials. If the Bureaus refused legal registration of a union, the only recourse was an appeal to the State Senate. To register, unions submitted a charter explaining goals, rules of membership and a list of leaders for review by the bureau which had one month to consider legalization.

Because its publication coincided with the Second All Russian Conference on Trade Unions, the law was a catalyst for debate among union activists over legalization. Organized by the Central Bureau on Trade Unions, twenty-two delegates met in Petersburg from 24-28 February 1906. For five days, the delegates discussed negative and positive aspects to legal existence. A minority feared that registration would allow the state to quickly crush unions since civil liberties were not guaranteed and the gorodskoi nachalnik and provincial governor had virtually unlimited powers. Critics also argued registration would lessen the revolutionary mood of the workers. Riazanov, a leading spokesman for the minority viewpoint proposed unions register as "friendly societies" so that the workers who
favored registration would be placated and government interference in daily affairs reduced. The true trade union organization could continue its work underground. Grinevich, among the Menshevik majority at the conference, realized that many unions would attempt to register under the new law regardless of the revolutionaries' opinion and therefore needed the assistance of party activists. Representatives from the areas of the Jewish Bund rejected registration since unions in Vilna had been successfully organized illegally. I. Kruglov (Aleksandr Semenovich Orlov), a Menshevik party activist in the Moscow printers' union proposed the majority resolution. The delegates were to register where their organizations were weak, but where unions existed illegally, registration was not considered necessary. The majority of party activists, known as praktiki since they engaged in local practical activities, planned to utilize the law to strengthen unions where workers had been slow to organize illegally. However, just as the letter of the law was to be ignored by the associations, tactics adopted by this conference were not always followed at the factory or even the city level. Grinevich wrote that the Petersburg unions spent the entire month of March discussing compliance under the new law. Once the unions in St. Petersburg decided to register "there was almost no disagreement, only single, exceptional voices
resounded "boycott" the law of 4 March." According to F.A. Bulkin, a metalworker in St. Petersburg, most party activists concluded "there was no way out: an illegal union would at no time be able to unite these thousands of workers, unity without which the success of the economic struggle would be impossible." The praktiki immediately realized the need to overcome prejudice against legalization. They decided to use the law of 4 March, and "in the process . . . to expand the limits of the mongrel law on unions." The Menshevik Vasilii Vladimirovich Sher, an activist in the Moscow printers' union during the debate on registration remembered:

These conditions involved a curious web of contradictions between the law [of 4 March] and reality. The forces of revolution were still too imposing and real in this period for the limitations of the law on unions . . . to have been realized. Without exaggeration, it can be said that the law of 4 March began to be implemented by the government only after the dissolution of the Second Duma [in June 1907]. Until that time, we succeeded in expanding significantly the limits of the law."

In St. Petersburg, the first steps toward legalization of the metalworkers' union were taken in March, when initiative groups sprang up in many districts. The initiative groups worked with the Central Bureau of Trade Unions to begin preparatory work on union charters in illegal meetings among narrow circles of workers. The preparatory work was extensive. The activists discussed the
type of union - city-wide or district, which trades would be included, the form of membership, and dues. Through these efforts, according to Bulkin, "the idea of the creation of the trade union and its organizational forms gradually became the property of the masses."  

The Central Bureau members who directed the work included D.B. Riazanov, Grinevich, V. P. Tomskii and Kolokol'nikov. Tomskii was an experienced Bolshevik trade unionist who had returned from Germany in 1905. An intellectual, he served as union bookkeeper and edited the union journal, Rabochii po metallu. After October 1917, he represented the Soviet Union in Germany. Grinevich and Kolokol'nikov were Mensheviks, representative of the core of activists who flourished during the interrevolutionary period. These socialists gradually transformed themselves into "trade union bureaucrats" and remained active participants in workers' associations inside Russia. They occupied official posts of bookkeeper, treasurer, secretary and clerks for the first two to three years of the union's existence.  

By the end of April, the organizers prepared to broaden district work. No consensus existed on the question of centralization vs. district or regional organization. A more democratic union organized locally, nearer the masses, appealed to many activists. Gradually, these activists
hoped to merge the local unions into a centralized union. Others argued only a stronger centralized union could win concessions from united capital. The organizers planned a city-wide constituent meeting to draw up a charter, select a temporary board and an editorial commission of five to develop agitational writings.75

On 11 April 1906, the district initiative groups and the Central Bureau of Trade Unions produced a charter for consideration by a general assembly of metallists. The first constituent assembly of the Trade Union Society of Metalworkers was convened on 30 April 1906, in the Panina House.76 Two thousand delegates elected a Provisional Board of three representatives from each district to concentrate on expanding the membership. The Board, which included Iatsinovich, Tomskii, and Roman Malinovskii, who would later be recruited as a police spy, opened offices on Usachev Lane.77 The Assembly voted to create a centralized all-city union with seven district sections. However, a minority, which would gain strength through the months to follow, favored a federation of district organizations.

The dispersal of metalworking enterprises throughout St. Petersburg and, especially in the outskirts of the city, contributed to the district members resistance of centralization. To counter this tendency, the Provisional Board members attended a series of local
meetings to explain the purpose of the union and its charter. They also assisted the districts in leasing apartments, managing membership and financial records, and preparing membership tickets. By the middle of May, district organizational bureaus existed throughout the city representing over 1000 dues paying members. In the outlying districts, the largest factories monopolized the local bureaus giving them unequal weight in comparison to other factories. For example, in Nevskii, where the first union charter was produced, all eighteen representatives to the district bureaus were from three large factories. Here, members believed the district bureau "should be the leading organ of the union, in fact its government, and the board only its executive commission."\(^7\)

Union funds were scattered about in the districts furthering factory patriotism in the union. Only 7% of the 5389 rubles collected by the union was held in the all-city treasury. Therefore, for each member of the union there was only 53 kopecks in the treasury and for each metallist in Petersburg only 8 kopecks.\(^7\) The Provisional Board and party activists began to agitate for a centralized treasury to more efficiently channel assistance and to provide for regular publication of the union journal.

The all-city assembly, though scheduled twice, was never held. Police repression and persistent localism
hindered centralization efforts. In late June, district representatives met to evaluate the progress of unionization efforts. Approval was granted a test issue of the newspaper, *Rabochii po metallu*, for immediate distribution to union members. However, only a minority supported centralization under a permanent governing board. The majority of the Provisional Bureau, which included socialist organizers, believed it was necessary to strengthen the district council. They argued that "the general assembly must only consolidate and sanctify what is first done in the districts." In the end a compromise was reached. Plans went ahead for a general meeting, but in preparation for this meeting members were to intensify district-building projects.80

Workers considered unemployment assistance more necessary than a centrally directed organization. By 1906, demobilized soldiers and sailors, workers fired for striking or political activities and a declining economy swelled the ranks of the jobless and needy. Although the exact figures are disputed, estimates of the unemployed in St. Petersburg range from 15,000 to 40,000, including 20% of the city's metalworkers.81 A survey of 330 unemployed in Vyborg district reported only 29% had been fired for economic reasons. Thirty-four percent had participated in political strikes and another 15% in political activities, while 7.5%
had clashed with management. Of those registered as unemployed in 1906, 54.3% were skilled metalworkers and most of the 21.4% unskilled jobless workers had worked at state owned metalworking factories. Unions, charities and public institutions, ran 24 soup kitchens throughout the capital in the winter of 1905-6. Without significant encouragement from socialists, the jobless who frequented these canteens, in concert with their mood before the arrest of the Soviet, held informal meetings which culminated in the election of thirty representatives to a Council for the Unemployed. A grassroots organization, the Council sought to influence the city government to assist the unemployed by providing public works projects, and basic needs such as food, rent and medical care. Through a network of district councils, the central organization hoped to mobilize workers to demand basic improvements in their living conditions.

The Council for the Unemployed, which initially consisted of about 30 people, distributed 10,000 copies of a petition addressed to the City Duma requesting funds for public works. The response of unemployed and employed workers was extensive and by March, 90,000 to 100,000 participated in elections of workers' delegates to the Council. On 12 April, the City Duma promised a Council delegation 500,000 rubles for immediate assistance and
public works projects to be administered by a new commission which would include worker representatives.

Because of the success of the Council for the Unemployed, Social Democrats had to consider fuller ties to the new association. Initially, the Bolshevik dominated Petersburg Committee had feared the independence of the Council and considered expelling its members from the Party. The Mensheviks opposed public works projects not directed by the central government. Fearful that the Anarchist group, Workers' Conspiracy, would incite the unemployed to commit "expropriations" or other violent acts, thereby endangering the labor movement, Vladimir Voitinskii, a Bolshevik activist in the Council, urged SD support. Voitinskii connected the desire for "economic" demands to politics, noting that

at the present moment, the organization of the proletariat on the basis of a revolutionary slogan is impossible. On the contrary, the slogan of social work is so accessible to the very broad masses that on this basis it slowly unites all workers in a general yearning for the creation of an organization of their general will, a kind of "Soviet of Workers' Deputies."

After the City Duma granted funds for the unemployed, SDs generally agreed with Voitinskii. Still some Mensheviks were slow to join the work of the Council, deciding instead to focus their efforts on tying assistance for the unemployed to the workers' section of the Duma through the election of special representatives at the factory level.
The union response to unemployment reflected two conflicting concepts of union tasks - the worker's and the party's. Party intellectuals believed mutual aid to be dangerous, drawing the workers into "narrow" trade unionism and away from politics. Workers, familiar with former mutual aid societies, expected the material benefits of membership. Rank and file union organizers such as the Menshevik, Viktor Grinevich, contended that in times of massive unemployment the union had to be concerned with assistance since "the interests of the employed and the unemployed are one and the same." Influenced by the misery of the unemployed and the persistent demands of the workers, the Provisional Board appealed for contributions to a special unemployment fund.

Union directed unemployment assistance further weakened the already declining Council for the Unemployed. Because of the prominence of metallists among its contributors and members, the Council proposed a direct link with the Provisional Board of the Metalworkers' Union. However, such a link never materialized. During the summer of 1906, the Council was able to provide free meals in 32 soup kitchens, rent subsidies and assign jobs to the unemployed. However, a controversy developed over which workers' names should be added to job lists. Plagued by internal mismanagement and the general drift to the
political right among local authorities, the Council soon lost its popular support. After the new year, it was generally ineffective.\textsuperscript{90}

The early foray into unemployment assistance in 1906 and 1907 reenforced the workers' concept of union responsibility. Rank and file party members, both Bolshevik and Menshevik, also came to accept mutual aid as an obligation of the union. The Council for the Unemployed, largely without socialist influence, combined the "economic" tasks of material aid with politics identifying City Duma members as the class enemy. Voitinskii wrote that the workers in the Council realized the "city fathers" led lives separate from labor and poverty, and indeed, owned the very factories from which workers had been fired and the apartment buildings from which they had been evicted.\textsuperscript{91} A collective working class identity developed through repeated contact with government authorities in city-wide organizations such as the Council for the Unemployed.

The mobilization of labor in the Council for the Unemployed coincided with the assembly of the First State Duma from 27 April to 9 July 1906. Social fear of disorder created a more indulgent atmosphere and gave a boost to trade union organizing in the capital. In May and June, mass meetings of between 2000 and 6000 workers and activists were held in factories and on the outskirts of the city in
favor of the Duma. Given this outlet of expression, the labor movement utilized new methods to defend their interests and institutionalize their new status. Consistent demands for the right to strike and organize trade unions were accompanied by slowing down production to protest firing or carting foremen out of the factory in wheelbarrows. Although the union did not initiate strikes and protests, the board was forced to respond.

In its first two months of existence the union directed only one strike. However, by June, the situation had changed drastically: the union found itself supporting five different strikes against a more unified and unyielding owners' association - the Petersburg Society of Mill and Factory Owners (PSMFO). At Atlas Engineering Works attempts to fire workers were met with defiance, worker slowdown and protest. Demands included a reduction in the workday, abolition of fines and overtime, and wage increases. In Nevskii district, where Atlas was located only Obukhov, Aleksandrovskaia, and Nevskii factory delegates composed the district organizational bureau. Since Atlas workers did not vote to join the union until 21 June, the Nevskii branch reacted hesitantly to the protesters' calls for union support. No provision for strike funds existed in the law of 4 March, and the majority of the union's financial resources were held in the districts rather than
by the center. To circumvent these difficulties, a collection for an "unemployment fund" began in the factories which raised over 1000 rubles in July. The Metallists' Union, still in its infancy, and weak organizationally and financially was unable to secure victory for any of the strikes in the summer of 1906. In September, the District Delegate Council voted to limit material support for striking members to strikes approved, led and initiated by union.97

In June 1906, the first issue of the metallists' newspaper, Rabochii po metallu, was published, permitting a reevaluation of union tasks. By this time, socialist activists in the trade union, or praktiki, welcomed worker activism and embraced the broad labor movement whose birth they hoped to attend. Grinevich promoted broader agitation to bring in tens of thousands of members and decried the lack of funds necessary for such a broad struggle. Concurring with members that a strike fund was necessary, Grinevich also recognized the cultural role of the union:

If the masses are ignorant the political and economic struggle is impossible. . . . Up to now the worker was constrained, intellectually, fed what was given them by the 'benevolent command' or the 'liberal manufacturer.' Now the worker needs to take his own affairs into his own hands. The union should organize lectures, evenings (parties, soirees), courses, libraries, readings, enlightening excursions, addresses, doing everything that could raise the intellectual, moral and cultural level of the workers.98
Grinevich, like the workers, conceptually entwined the political and economic tasks of the union. Grinevich also indicated the intention of the praktiki to encourage workers' control, a persistent demand of the membership. An editorial in Rabochii po metallu, "First Steps of the Metalworkers' Union" endorsed the centralist position of the union leadership:

It was necessary to bring in a large number of workers so [the union] must stay close to them—they should always perceive it, feel it about them. Secondly, [the union] should merge into one whole, in which all its strength, force and the means of the separate parts voluntarily surrender to the general will and the decisions of the entire union.99

Despite the organizational problem, union membership continued to expand. On 1 June, the union had enrolled 885 dues paying members and by 15 July, the membership numbered 9544: in one and a half months the membership lists had grown by a factor of eleven. During this short period, the membership in Vyborg had increased from 100 to 2500, in Nevskii from 300 to 3500, and in Gorodskii from 102 to 991. In Vasileostrov district, where the metallists still competed with remnants of the Smesov union, members numbered 89 on 1 June and 523 on 15 July.100

As indicated by the following table, over half (54.1%) the membership came from ten factories of which only one had less than 1000 workers and four had more than 5000 workers:
Table 1: Union Membership in Large Factories (15 July 1906)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number employed:</th>
<th>Union members:</th>
<th>Percent:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aleksandrovskii</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>569</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevskii</td>
<td>5300</td>
<td>1380</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obukhov</td>
<td>4900</td>
<td>1268</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nobel</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>24.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. P. Metals</td>
<td>2100</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. P. Wagon</td>
<td>2300</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Franco-Russian</td>
<td>3500</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baltiiskii</td>
<td>5050</td>
<td>275</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Putilov</td>
<td>11700</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. P. Pipe Works</td>
<td>6100</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bulkin, Na zare, p. 152.

The "big three" of Nevskii district, Aleksandrovsk, Nevskii and Obukhov, clearly exceeded the norm in union representation. Their prestige among less skilled workers and their numerical strength was ineffective in the absence of a general assembly.

On 2 July, 88 delegates to the Delegate Council assembled to reconsider the union charter. The proportion of delegates to district membership gave the most seats to the Nevskii delegates. Vyborg, Gorodskii and Petersburg Districts were also well represented. No delegates arrived from Moscow or Vasileostrov Districts. With two opposed and four abstentions, delegates adopted a
centralized administrative and financial structure. Remaining questions on the agenda were postponed until the sitting of the all-city assembly planned for 9 July. However, the dissolution of the First Duma on this date prevented the complete victory of the centralists in a general assembly.

The First State Duma deputies, disunited and unable to reach a compromise with the reactionary Tsarist government, found locked doors when they planned to meet on Sunday morning, 9 July. The Duma's dissolution ushered in the repressive regime of the new Minister of Internal Affairs, Peter Stolypin. The government established martial law in the city and arrests of SDs, SRs and worker activists followed. Newspapers, clubs, unions and friendly societies were closed by the police. Political demonstrations swept through the city and in the Vyborg district, workers' protests forced the closing of service industries such as restaurants, liquor stores, and hotels. The Social Democratic Fraction in the Duma circulated an appeal to soldiers and sailors to resist the government, instigating mutinies in Sveaborg which spread to Kronstadt and Reval. Although Social Democrats were at first reluctant to call for an uprising, once the mutinies began, they appealed for a general strike. Before the date chosen for the beginning of the demonstration, the mutiny ended. With armed forces
defending the tsarist regime, Party activists could not sustain the workers' revolutionary fervor. After four days the strike was suspended.\textsuperscript{103}

On 28 July, a number of trade unions were officially closed by the government including the metallists' union. Offices of the board were sealed up, and the district sections were searched.\textsuperscript{104} An editorial in \textit{Rabochii po metallu} addressed the ever present question, "What is to be Done?:

Before us stands only one question, what should be done. In an illegal condition we of course can do nothing, it was impossible to hide in the crack of the underground the activities of the organization, which numbered up to 10,000. One cannot conduct the affairs of the union without meetings between the members. . . . At such a time, the border is obliterated between legal and illegal, between prohibition and permission; the condition is created, which does not acknowledge, but endures with power . . . Long term existence, even though difficult, all this is necessary. Our union did not die. It is not dying. It must not die. Long live the metalworkers union! \textsuperscript{105}

While the closing of the union ended operations of the Provisional Board, the police "passed by the district sections with relative indifference." City officials did not have sufficient information about the local branches from the investigative work of the district police officers. Thanks to this incompetence, some union branches continued to exist more or less normally. Police repression of the center, therefore reenforced the already existing separatist tendencies of the union.\textsuperscript{106}
In districts where localism and factory patriotism were strongest, the branches continued to function and recruit new members during the last half of 1906. The following table indicates this expansion:

Table 2: Union Membership, July 1906-January 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>Aug</th>
<th>Sept</th>
<th>Oct</th>
<th>Nov</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Jan</th>
<th>Jan. % of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nevskii</td>
<td>2480</td>
<td>3624</td>
<td>3650</td>
<td>3911</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>4102</td>
<td>4122</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyborg</td>
<td>1430</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2800</td>
<td>2572</td>
<td>2596</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersburg</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>940</td>
<td>981</td>
<td>1041</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1136</td>
<td>1172</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorodskii</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1066</td>
<td>1078</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narvskii</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>682</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>879</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vasileostrov</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>453</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>758</td>
<td>761</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6261</td>
<td>9737</td>
<td>9923</td>
<td>10180</td>
<td>10930</td>
<td>11226</td>
<td>11332</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bulkin, Na zare, Table #32, p. 190.

The Nevskii branch remained especially active despite arrests of thirty-seven unionists in November. Though Vyborg members voted to temporarily end recruitment, the district remained the second most powerful in terms of membership. Petersburg district continued to expand. In Narvskii, where the reactionary Black Hundreds continued to plague socialists and union members, the delegates were too frightened to meet and failed to pay dues. "A curious example of massive panic" was demonstrated according to Bulkin, by the Vasileostrov district's vote to rejoin the
Petersburg General Workers' Union to preserve legal activity. In most cases, only the district secretary and another member whose apartment housed the union office directed district operations. "District anarchism" seeped into the union apparatus, as each section kept its own books and distributed material benefits disregarding instructions from the center.¹⁰⁷

From August 1906 until after the union's registration, financial records indicate members received substantial strike benefits in relation to other grants from the union. As shown in Table 3, next to dues which amounted to 61% of the union's collections, members contributed to special funds for striking members and unemployment assistance. Likewise, 41% of the union's expenditures went to striking workers. Cultural development absorbed nearly as much of the union's financial resources as operating expenses. As local union leaders made most decisions concerning expenditures in this period, members in the districts must have greatly influenced spending. Workers expected the union to care for striking and unemployed members as well as offer cultural benefits through libraries, clubs and other informal associations.¹⁰⁸
Table 3: Union Financial Statement, August 1906-July 1907

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incoming funds</th>
<th>Sum in rubles</th>
<th>% of total</th>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>Sum in rubles</th>
<th>% of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Treasury in August</td>
<td>(5389)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Operating fees</td>
<td>2803</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment</td>
<td>1498</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Cultural Exp.</td>
<td>2111</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly dues</td>
<td>11039</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>4367</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal/literature</td>
<td>1407</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>Grants</td>
<td>926</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special funds</td>
<td>4155</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>455</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>18095</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10662</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bulkin, *Na zare*, Table #33, p. 191.

In addition to these benefits, the union journal edited by Mensheviks, Kolokol’nikov and A. Ginsburg (Naum) and the Bolshevik Tomskii, "reached local members, spoke to them about the life of the union, and made the members active, uniting them with their organization." Iatsinovich and Malinovskii, as secretary and president respectively, operated in the guise of journal editors. One of the journals most important functions was the promotion of worker participation in elections to the Second State Duma.

Throughout the winter of 1906-7, the Menshevik Peter Garvi did not find "a single trade union which has a negative attitude toward the Duma elections." The Metalworkers' journal asserted the value of using the electoral campaign to expose workers' "true friends and enemies." Union members were instructed in voter
registration and local union activists visited workers to insure all eligible voters turned out.\textsuperscript{110} The Social Democratic Party enthusiastically endorsed the electoral campaign.\textsuperscript{111} SDs promoted their party's candidates and warned "neutrality has nothing in common with political indifference." The Menshevik campaign slogan "unity at all costs" advocated a consideration of support for the strongest local candidate on the left, regardless of party affiliation. Many unions simply endorsed socialist candidates and the Nevskii district union considered putting forward union candidates. In the workers' curia, SDs received 47% of the vote and SRs 36%, which constituted a complete rejection of liberal bourgeois candidates.\textsuperscript{112} Indicative of a growing connection between workers and socialist \textit{praktiki} within Russia, the election campaign empowered metalworkers to voice grievances and select representatives which represented their class interests.

In addition to active participation in the electoral campaign in 1905-6, socialist activists in the union continued to grapple with the organizational question. Three years later, socialist unionists remembered a struggle for centralization against those who feared bureaucracy would constrict democratic impulses from below. Certainly, workers were among those who resisted the creation of a
bureaucratic union administration removed from the factory or shop and therefore, detached from their control. However, the democratic principle of organization touched the spirit of Menshevism among the praktiki and flowered into a party reform movement after 1907. Fueled by the necessity of cooperation in the labor movement during times of repression, it reached beyond the boundaries of faction and touched socialists of every persuasion. Union leaders Ginsburg, Kolokol'nikov and Tomskii, denied any factional basis existed for the development of the so called "opportunistic, line of least resistance." According to them, beginning in 1906, "the general line was to intervene actively to develop the class consciousness of the working class and to strengthen class organizations as long as an obvious danger did not threaten the open and united existence of the union." Directly, these praktiki hoped to connect the broad workers' movement to the socialist parties.

The Petersburg Metalworkers' Union's drive for legalization gained new ground with the loosening of censorship around the opening of Second Duma. Although remnants of the Gaponist organizations continued to exist the union president, Malinovskii contended the Metallists' Union possessed "the proper point of view in understanding the workers' interests, . . . [which] gives us the
possibility, of . . . avoiding false steps." As the Smesov and Petersburg General Workers' Union were still legal, implications of an incorrect, namely government-sponsored orientation, were justifiable. For these reasons, Malinovskii concluded, "While these organizations are alienated from the general proletariat movement they will take the characteristics of the pure locality, and will in all probability, not exist long." Predictably, as repression abated, the Smesov Union, died an "inglorious death", and once and for all, joined the Metallists' Union at a delegate council meeting on 15 April 1907.

The delegate council held five meetings from February to May to compose the final draft of the charter. The centralists considered the vote which endorsed the election of the governing board in a general assembly a victory. Separatists had wanted the board to be selected at district level meetings. On 15 May 1907, the government approved the union's charter which was modeled after the Nevskii Council of Elders charter accepted a year earlier. The Union of Workers in the Metalworking Industry operated legally until March 1912.

* * * *
The formation of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union rested on patterns of organization common to workers' organizations in this period. Seeded by mutual aid and "gaponist" societies, metalworkers possessed a collective memory which dictated the economic tasks and responsibilities of the union. Liberals attended the arrival of worker organization in Russia, but offered little to its spiritual development by 1907. Instead of the liberals, socialist orators voiced revolutionary goals in mass meetings during the fall of 1905. These political aims welded to "economic" duties were internalized through the actions of these same socialists as they, together with the workers, embraced "legal" work. The dual nature of union tasks, both economic and political, became part of the union charter adopted in 1907. The union was set upon a revolutionary path by its birth in the revolutionary swelter of 1905, but also incorporated reformist goals such as the eight hour day and limitations on injustices in the workplace such as child labor. A peculiarity of Russian history, the dual emergence of a labor movement and an active Social Democratic Party, combined practices which had been theoretically separated.

Although reaction in 1907 would temper this revolutionary fervor and bring reform to the fore, the cooling off period was only temporary. During the years of
reaction from 1907 to 1911, union activities were strengthened and broadened, especially through educational societies and clubs. Mensheviks occupied a central place in union formation and in workers' associations throughout these years. Developing together, these two groups, the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and the Menshevik praktiki, contributed to a mutual evolution, a shared destiny which at least for a time ran an identical course. Workers and socialist activists moved from the political margins toward the center, even in the absence of full constitutional freedoms according to the western model. While on the one hand a new working class identity developed as a result of the continued existence of the union and socialist influence, on the other the Menshevik praktiki influenced by the workers developed tactics suitable for the broad open labor movement. These two identities shaped by the experiences of the revolution reached full bloom from 1907 to 1912.

ENDNOTES

1See the excellent study Bater, St. Petersburg.

2Ibid., pp. 146-9, 302-7, 384-5; Suhr, 1905, pp. 20-21.

3All members of society had to register according to social group. Since there was no place for workers in this system, there is a natural tendency to place workers in the same category with peasants especially since the working class
resulted from recent rural-urban migration.

1See Johnson, *Peasant and Proletarian*.


3See Bonnell, *Roots of Rebellion* especially Chapters 2 and 3.


5S.N. Prokopovich, *K rabochemu voprosu v Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1905) pp.8-9,22; V.V. Sher, *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniiia rabochikh pechatnogo dela v Moskve* (Moscow, 1911) pp.73-5. Material aid was also granted political prisoners' families. See Wildman, *Making of a Workers' Revolution*, pp.94-100.


7Ibid., pp.80-86.

8S.N. Prokopovich, *K rabochemu voprosu v Rossii* (St. Petersburg, 1905) pp.8-9,22; V.V. Sher, *Istoriia professional'nogo dvizheniiia rabochikh pechatnogo dela v Moskve* (Moscow, 1911) pp.73-5. Material aid was also granted political prisoners' families. See Wildman, *Making of a Workers' Revolution*, pp.94-100.

9These dates encompass the actual period of oppositional activity which encompasses the term 1905 Revolution. Workers and Liberals organized in 1904. Bloody Sunday was
the catalyst for more radical strikes and from February to December 1905 many socialists and workers had expectations of revolution. In the countryside the peasant revolt continued into 1906. The final repression of hopes for democracy was the Stolypin "coup" of 3 June 1907.

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16 Bonnell, *Roots*, pp.168-9; Suhr, 1905, pp. 239-43 makes the point that workers sought assistance from all sorts of radical intellectuals.


19 The fact that liberals were more open and not as conspiratorial as the Party activists, initially drew workers to them according to Suhr, 1905, p. 243. See Shmuel Galai, *Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900-1905* (Cambridge, Eng.,1973).

20 See Abraham Ascher, *1905: Russia in Disarray*, pp.53-70; Bonnell, *Roots*, pp.106-17, 149; Suhr, 1905, pp.137-9, 204-7; See also Terrence Emmons, "Russia's Banquet Campaign," *California Slavic Studies*, 10 (1977):45-86.

21 Suhr makes this point in his discussion of worker organization. Suhr, 1905, p. 218.

22 The strike was initiated over the firing of Assembly members by a foreman loyal to the rival Ushakov union and therefore threatened the success of the Assembly throughout the capital. See Suhr, 1905, pp. 147-8.

23 Suhr who has studied the phenomenon of more radical suburbs in St. Petersburg compared with the center claims this position for the Baltic Shipyard in Vasilyevostrov, the Train Car Construction Plant in Narva and the Admiralty shipyards and Franco-Russian works in Kolomensk. See Suhr, 1905, pp. 185-6.
Schwarz notes that the Petersburg Menshevik Group originated the idea of a General Strike on the opening day of the Commission in solidarity with the deputies. He also indicates both the Bolshevik PK and the metallist electors had the idea of demanding immunity but does not indicate an organizational connection. Schwarz, 1905, p.117-8; Suhr gives the metalworkers credit for using the strike as a threat. Suhr, 1905, p. 216.

Ibid., pp. 323-4; Bonnell, Roots, p. 125.

This hostility was directly related to the Economist controversy which resulted in the flight of workers from the party. See Wildman, Workers' Revolution, pp. 89-90, 115-17, 251-53.

"Rabochii," Rabochie i intelligenty v nashikh organizatsiiakh (Geneva, 1904).

See the protest of "Group of Metal Plant Workers," Vpered no.14, (12 April 1905); For an appeal on unity at the Bolshevik meeting in Narva district see Proletarii no.8 (17 July 1905) cited by Suhr, 1905, p.213 ff.


Iu.O. Martov, Istoriiia rossiiskoi sotsial-demokratii (Petrograd-Moscow, 1924), pp.97-98. The Mensheviks had no clear policy according to Bonnell, Roots, p.154.

Schwarz, 1905, pp.147-8, p.146 citing Protokoly 2-go s'ezda RSDRP (Moscow 1932) p.547.

Published as Supplement to Iskra (100) (May 15/28 1905).(Pervaia obshcherusskaia konferentsiia partiinykh rabotnikov); Schwarz, 1905, pp.227-9, See especially Resolution on Informal Organizations, Resolution on Tarde Unions.

Somov, "May Day Successes and Failures" Iskra (100) cited by Schwarz, 1905, pp.152-3; Martynov, "Soviet of Workers' Deputies and our Party" Nachalo no.2 (15 November 1905).

"From the editors," Rabochii golos, no.1 (26 November 1905) cited by Schwarz, p. 324. According to Schwarz the majority of the contributors became Mensheviks.
See Chapter I above for a discussion of Akselrod's theories and the Economist controversy.

These were legal national meetings of members of these organizations held in 1904 and 1905. The Social Democrats interpreted these meetings according to class and therefore as bourgeois.


In 1904 Bolsheviks inside Russia complained there were too many Mensheviks to compete with in the workers' organizations. See for example the letter Zemliachka to Krupskaia, 19 Dec 1904, "*Perepiska N. Lenina i N.K.Kruskoi s Peterburgskoi organizatsieii*" *Proletarskaia revoliutsiia*, 1925 no.3 (38) p.21 cited by Schwarz pp.53-54.


Ibid., pp. 238-9 citing Bogdanov, "Concerning Unification" *Novaia Zhizn* no.5 (1 November 1905); Martov proposed rapid organization of a Congress for a united party. "Tasks of Unification," *Nachalo* no.8 (23 November 1905). It was announced 27 November in both factional newspapers that the Organizing Commission had formed to plan a unification congress. Schwarz, 1905, p.241-2.

\[KPSS \text{ v rezoliutsiiakh i resheniiakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK, 1898-1954} \text{ (Moscow, 1954)} \text{ p.131; RTsDNI, f.447, d.1-4.}\]

\[Grinevich, \text{Professional'noe dvizhenie rabochikh v Rossii} \text{ (St. Petersburg, 1908)} \text{ p.240; Schwarz, 1905, p.165; Bonnell, Roots, pp. 248-50; On the Congress see RTsDNI, f.337, o.1,d.1-30.}\]

\[Iskra No.101 (1 June 1905); Dan, \text{"The Present Situation," Iskra za dva goda}, (1906).\]
Evgenii Maevskii of the Menshevik Organizing Commission and S.S. Zborovskii (Kuzovlev) attended the meeting on 10 October, Schwarz, 1905, pp.169-70; Evgenii Maevskii, "Peterburgskii sovet rabochikh deputatov," Otkliki sovremennosti 5 (1906), pp. 1-11; Grinevich, "Ocherk razvitiiia rabochikh deputatov (do 26-go noviabria 1905 g.)" Obrazovanie 15 no.9 (September 1905), p.23.

Bulkin, Na zare, p.125.

Maevskii, p.10. On the fourteenth, the Menshevik S.S. Zborovskii was not able to speak and allowed the Liberationist Khrustalev (Nosar) to chair the meeting. Thereafter, until his arrest in November, Khrustalev was the recognized leader of the body. On Khrustalev see D.F. Sverchkov, Na zare revoliutsii (Moscow, 1921), p.100.


Also included in the walkout were St. Petersburg Metals, Siemans Halske and Aivaz Machine Building, Suhr, 1905, pp.347,351. The campaign was "launched by the Soviet" according to Bonnell, Roots, p.178.

Suhr, 1905, pp. 370-71, 393.

Riazanov was active in trade unions until the 1920s. Sviataslavskii's activity in trade unions is discussed in Kolokol'nikov and Rapaport, 1905-1907gg. v professional'nom dvizhenii (Moscow, 1925) pp.421-22. Kolokol'nikov worked most often in Moscow.


Bulkin, Na zare, pp. 124-5.

Though Prokopovich had made the acquaintance of a member of the Council of Elders his plan was rejected, lending little credence to the claims of Schwarz and Kolokol'nikov that liberals organized the union. Kats and Milonov, 1905, p.38;Schwarz, 1905, pp.149, 315-9; Kolokol'nikov and Rapoport, 1905-1907, pp. 23-26, 168-70; Kolokol'nikov, "Otryvyki," MIPDR 2:218.
Grinevich, "Ocherk," Obrazovanie, no. 8.(15) (1906): 225-6
Kolokol'nikov, "Otryvki" MIPDR 2:218; Bulkin, Na zare, p. 128.

Suhr, 1905, pp. 285-6; Materialy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii
i professional'noi organizatsii Peterburgskikh rabochikh po
metallu (St. Petersburg, 1909), p. 27; Bulkin, Na zare,
pp. 122-25.

Aleksei Buzinov, Za nevskoi zastovoi. Zapiski rabochego.
(Moscow-Leningrad, 1930) pp. 62, 81-89.

Bulkin, Na zare, p. 128; Kolokol'nikov, "Otryvki," MIPDR
4:277; Materialy po ekonomicheskom polozhenii, p. 27;
Buzinov, Za nevskoi zastovoi, pp. 62, 81-89, 54, 117;
Suhr, 1905, pp. 285-6; The historical role of The Free
Economic Society established in 1765, encouraged discussion
of economic modernization along the lines of western Europe.
Under Catherine II it awarded a prize for an essay calling
for the abolition of serfdom. Iatsinovich had joined the
Union of Struggle in 1901, been arrested and exiled to Tver.
In 1904 he returned to Petersburg and began to work at Odner
and Beir. Elected to the Provisional Board in 1906, he
served as president until 1910.

Assembly members had to be Russian and Orthodox. Electors
to the Shidlovskii Commission had to be at least 25 years
old, an age that excluded many young socialists. Bulkin, Na
zare, pp. 478-80.

Ibid., p. 127.

Materialy po ekonomicheskom polozhenii, pp. 124-5.

On the Commission and Rivalries of Ministries see Andrew
Varner. See also Suhr, 1905, pp. 200-204 on conflict and
origins of the Shidlovskii Commission.

On Sviataslavskii's role see, MIPDR 4:26; Bonnell, Roots,
pp. 197-8.

Grinevich, Professional'noe dvizhenie, pp. 82-3, 85, 93;
I. Borschenko, Russian Trade Unions in 1907-1917 (Moscow,
1959), pp. 8-9; Bulkin, Na zare, p. 240 cites article 35 of
the Rules; One Soviet historian has argued that the Tsarist
government had considered a more liberal law when the
workers' movement had been more radical in 1905. See D.
Antoshkin, Professional'noe dvizhenie v Rossii (Moscow,
The cities with Bureaus on Unions were St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kronstadt, Odessa, Kerch, Nikolaev, Sevastopol and Rostov-on-Don.

For the Text of law see Zakon 4-go marta 1906 goda o soiuzakh i obshchestvakh s posleduiushchimi k nemu raz'iasneniiami Pravitel'stviushchago senata i Ministerstva vnutrennikh del (St. Petersburg, 1906). The law was called temporary since the First State Duma had not yet met.

Of the delegates, two were Bolshevik, eleven Menshevik, five Bundists, one was the nonfactional SD, D.B. Riazanov and three delegates were non-party. Schwarz, 1905, pp.165-6.


Bulkin, Na zare, p. 131.

Bonnell, Roots, p.236 citing V. Sher, "Stranichka iz vospominanii" MIPDR 4:68; Sher was a close associate of Orlov in the printers' union, see Garvi, Revoliutsionnye silye, pp. 23-27.

Bulkin, Na zare, pp.132-3.

Ibid., pp. 132, 197-200.

Ibid., pp. 133-34.

Countess Sofia Panina was a feminist philanthropist. She was a director of the Russian Society for the Protection of Women organized in 1900 and was affiliated with the Kadets in 1917. See Richard Stites, Woman's Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860-1930 (Princeton, N.J. 1978), p.294.

Later this office would be moved to Tserkov St. building 12. On Malinovskii's career see Elwood, Roman Malinovsky: A Life without a Cause (Newtonville, Mass., 1977); On the early organization see GARF, f.6860, o.1, d.135, 1.53-59.
Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp.136-8, 187; Professional'nyi souiz no.20/21 (22 June 1907):30-32.


Ibid., p. 141-144.


Voitinskii, *Vestnik zhizni* #6 (23 March 1906); Bulkin, *Na zare*, p.136.


Hogan, *Forging Revolution*, pp.135-142.
This strike was in the technical office of Kharlambov factory in Gorodskii raion.

The strikes began 21 June at the Baltiiskii plant, 28 June at Kester and Iakovlev on the Petersburg Side, Kopeikina in Gorodskii, and Atlas at Nevskii gates. The PSMFO was reorganized from the Petersburg Industrial Society which was established in the textile industry in 1896-7. See Hogan, Forging Revolution for analysis of the Society's effort to rationalize industry and the metallists' response. On the strength of the factory owners see Bulkin, Na zare, pp. 145-6; Bonnell, Roots, pp.281-87.

Rabochii po metallu, no.1 (30 August 1906):6; no.2 (22 September 1906):3-4; See also Garvi, Zapiski Sotsial Demokrata, p. 46 on the prestige of Nevskii metalworkers in the union.; Hogan points to a gap between praktiki and the broad masses in 1906. Forging Revolution, p.142. Though this gap clearly existed it was in the process of being radically altered by workers' demands. The failure to support strikes was a result of organizational weakness and finances.

Grinevich "Tasks of the metallists' union" Rabochii po metallu, (22 June 1906).

"First steps of the metalworkers' union," Rabochii po metallu, (22 June 1906).

Despite the decision of the meeting of 22 April 1906 when the majority had voted to join the metallists' union some members at Smesov continued to fight for independence. Their efforts attracted workers at Sestroretsk in the suburbs where another section was opened. Until the Smesov union was defeated, the metallists' would have difficulty organizing in this district. Bulkin, Na zare, p.150-51. Membership statistics from the table p. 151.

Fifteen delegates arrived from Gorodskii district, eleven from Vyborg. Nevskii sent thirty-two representatives and Petersburg twenty-four. Five arrived from Narvskii and one from Sestroretska. Moscow and Vasileostrov representatives did not attend.


Bulkin makes a point of indicating the union began to practice democratic centralism at this point and stresses the control at the center through the illegal period. He contradicts his own interpretation of the union activity however, by pointing out that the union survived repression because it was not centralized. Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp. 154–5.

Ibid., p. 156; *Rabochii po metally*, 1 (22 June 1906).


*Materialy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii*, p. 38.


Ironically Malinovskii himself would be recruited by the police after his arrest in 1910. Ibid., pp. 182–3.

Ibid., p. 183.

Ibid., pp. 186–9.

The registration of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union on 15 May 1907, appeared at the time to be a triumph of worker and socialist endeavors during the revolutionary period. Unfortunately, this triumph was followed by defeat when the Duma was dissolved by Peter Stolypin on 3 June 1907. Prompting the "years of reaction," Stolypin's coup strangled aspirations for constitutional reform and invalidated plans for political modernization. Liberals accepted the constitutional crumbs and socialist leaders fled to safety abroad, stranding the waning labor movement on the sands of repression.

Rank and file party members with ties to the Menshevik Party refused to be crushed by the spreading counterrevolutionary sentiment. Suspended by the thread of Menshevik theory which rested on a democratic, broadly based labor movement, they resolved to skirt the edge of legality ever mindful of European models of modernization. As reaction consumed the revolutionary mood in the capital, union activists fought to preserve and unify a growing
number of workers' associations. Workers formed unions, clubs, and cooperatives and sent delegates to social congresses and conferences to express their grievances and opinions. Spurred on by legal activists, or party members who stressed work in the legal arena, workers refused to relinquish their newfound opportunities, and instead, tested the boundaries of Stolypin's "necktie." Reaction then, was still a time of expansion for workers' associations inside Russia.

Plagued by arrests and repression, the Central Bureau of Trade Unions, which had organized the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, nearly collapsed by the summer. Employers' organizations, which had also gained the right to organize in 1906, aggressively confronted unions. Five metalworking firms began to circulate blacklists and refused to negotiate with unions. By 1907, lockouts became widespread. The Okhrana was also mobilized to further repress union activities and arrested preeminent socialists throughout the capital. The Petersburg mayor instructed the union's governing board that activities were to be limited to the economic struggle. He threatened closure of the union in response to strike activity. In the face of government and employer offensives, the union concentrated on legislative measures, strengthening the union's infrastructure and recruiting members.¹ In contrast to the
revolutionary period, the union joined only sixteen strikes from 1908 to 1910. In place of strike activity, a flowering of legal activity occurred: cooperatives, libraries, lectures, clubs and cultural enlightenment became identifying characteristics of the labor movement during the years of reaction. At times these endeavors were a true alternative to militant, revolutionary activities, but often the activists aimed to continue revolutionary work behind the facade of legal work, promoting both reform and revolution simultaneously according to contemporary Russian conditions.

Once the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union was reorganized and legalized, board members began to consider methods which would assure its survival. Spurred on by Roman Malinovskii, the activists recognized the need to achieve financial security. A lathe operator at Langenzipen, Malinovskii had been selected as a delegate to the city-wide assembly which met on 30 April 1906. After the union began to operate legally, Malinovskii became secretary of the Petersburg district and in 1907 was elected secretary of the union with a salary of 50 rubles a month and expenses. Although Malinovskii was arrested and recruited as a police spy in 1910, according to Bulkin, he "was the soul of the union and ... to a remarkable degree, the union was obliged to him for its solidarity and the
growth of its central apparatus." As secretary, Malinovskii gave an accounting to the board of all city council and district meetings. He began to collect membership and financial statistics which demonstrated that up to 60% of union members paid dues for only six months in order to obtain unemployment benefits. Since 10% of the members were unemployed, subscriptions would have to be raised and benefits reduced if the union hoped to stay above board financially. Although the president of the union, Iatsinovich, vehemently objected, the board voted to raise dues by 10 kopecks and cut unemployment benefits from one-and-a-half to one ruble a week. Operating costs were also reduced first by cutting positions, then by decreasing the number of paid offices to one by 1909. Table 4 indicates that new enrollments did decrease over the first year of the union's legal existence but a stable, more reliable core continued to pay their dues. Malinovskii's policies secured and strengthened the union in the face of declining membership and increased repression.
Table 4: Membership Contributions as Percentage of Total Incoming Funds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributions</th>
<th>Until legalization</th>
<th>To 1 January 1908</th>
<th>To 1 July 1908</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enrollment fees</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Membership dues</td>
<td>47.4%</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>70.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of incoming funds</td>
<td>72.2%</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>74.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Materialy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii i professional'noi organizatsii Peterburgskikh rabochikh po metallu, (Petersburg, 1909), Appendix p. 16.

Unemployment assistance continued to consume union funds throughout the first year of its legal existence. The Council for the Unemployed had failed to successfully alleviate the crisis in the city and conflicts between union leadership and the Council contributed to a thoroughly ineffective distribution of assistance. Initially, the Council had rebuffed union recommendations resulting in permanently strained relations. Lacking support from liberals and unionized workers, the Council was finally dissolved and assistance nearly stopped. The union's financial resources, already strained, were insufficient to assist increasing numbers of jobless workers after the collapse of the Council for the Unemployed.³

Metallists lost jobs for political and economic reasons. A comparison of statistics for 1907 and 1908 illustrates a decline in strikes and political conflict in
the latter year. The absence of statistics for workers fired for political persuasion in 1908 suggests repression had been so thorough that many party activists did not risk exposure as representatives of a particular party. Likewise, the lack of statistics on arrests and exile in 1907, and its inclusion in 1908 indicates repression had increased. According to the table below, in 1907 repression of strikes and political activity caused unemployment in 42.5% of the cases. By 1908, this figure dropped to 26.9% fired for arrest and exile, strikes, conflicts and walkouts.

Table 5: Causes of Unemployment, 1907, 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason:</th>
<th>In 1907</th>
<th>% of cases</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
<th>In 1908</th>
<th>% of cases</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Absences or tardiness</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes, conflicts, lockouts</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>36.3%</td>
<td>259</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>For political persuasion</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests and exile</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military obligation, etc.</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Materialy ob ekonomicheskom polozhenii i professional'noi organizatsii Peterburgskikh rabochikh po metallu, p. 127.

Because of the increase in demands for unemployment assistance, the governing board recommended the
amount of aid offered each individual be reduced. In a general meeting, 4 November 1907, the union voted that assistance be granted only in the case of "extreme need" six weeks after being fired. The level of aid granted was 1 ruble, 50 kopecks a week for four weeks. After that time, single members would receive three rubles and married members five rubles a month. Throughout 1908, the board earmarked 80-130 rubles a week for unemployment assistance. A special Bureau of Labor was established to distribute funds from the center to the unemployed.

As the Metallists' Union began to strengthen its organization, spending patterns began to change reflecting a greater emphasis on cultural-enlightenment, legal, medical and unemployment assistance. During the second half of 1906, strikes declined and more funds were available for operating expenses, assistance, cultural and educational work. In 1908, a number of workers' clubs began to take over cultural work leaving more funds for material benefits to union members. The following table portrays these changes.
Table 6: Percentage of Total Expenditures of Union Budget, 1 June 1906-1 July 1908

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>1 June 1906-1 June 1907</th>
<th>1 June 1907-1 January 1908</th>
<th>1 January-1 July 1908</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operating expenses</td>
<td>31.3%</td>
<td>45.1%</td>
<td>32.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural/Educ.</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>31.1%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strikes</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance</td>
<td>7.3%</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other expenses</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Materialy, Appendix, p.16.

To complete this transformation, the union's financial affairs had to be completely reexamined. Corruption, unpaid loans and persistent district "patriotism" impeded financial security. Union funds were dispersed throughout the districts and controlled by treasurers who more often than not embezzled funds. Each branch had its own financial records and bookkeeping system. In one branch there was a special fund intended for unemployment, while in another no such fund existed. Sometimes assets were sent to the center, but in the district books this transfer of funds might be recorded as an expense for aid to striking workers. Unequal distribution of capital, inconsistencies in awarding grants and aid and the strength of the local union branch proved a counterweight to the board's endeavors to coordinate union activities. For example, the wealthiest district, Nevskii
branch, took in a total of 9355 rubles 49 kopecks by June
1907, followed by Vyborg branch which had incoming funds of
6040 rubles 17 kopecks and St. Petersburg Side with 4030
rubles, 55 kopecks. In the fall of 1907, Kasatkin, the
treasurer for Narva district, was exposed as an embezzler of
both district funds and assistance monies in the amount of
35 rubles sent from the central treasury. During 1907-8,
union officials misappropriated funds totaling 258 rubles 95
kopecks. Outstanding loans to the bakers' union, leading
activists and board members totalled 1421 rubles, 26
kopecks.  

In order to stabilize the union, the governing
board had to regulate financial affairs from the center.
The new union demanded an exact accounting of "every
kopeck." The governing board organized an Inspection
Commission to report on the financial affairs of the
branches so that a more effective central treasury could be
established. N. Aksenov, a worker from Vyborg branch,
chaired this commission which investigated nine branches and
the central board and found the union had taken in 14,933
rubles 10 kopecks in 1907. Bookkeeping was regularized and
step-by step the center gained greater control of the
direction of union finances.

The political and economic work of the union was
also severely limited by government authorities. In July
1907, president Iatsinovich's attempts to organize union delegate conferences at the district level constantly led to arrests. Iatsinovich appealed to the mayor for the release of those arrested. In response, the mayor reiterated his determination that union intervention in politics would not be tolerated. When the union requested permission to inform its members of the Duma's proposals for social insurance, the mayor declared the trade union was "not allocated this right" according to the Law of 4 March. Since, all union meetings were subjected to this sort of arbitrary government intervention, the number of meetings at the city and delegate council level began to decline. At the same time groups in factories and shops began to meet with more regularity and frequency. In effect, repression reenforced the tendency for district "patriotism."

While the union continued to struggle for stability, workers' clubs were organized throughout the city. Clubs facilitated both social and cultural development by providing lectures, evening schools, libraries and concerts. Initially, government repression of clubs was less severe since their political significance was not obvious. Clubs were often viable alternatives to union organizations as their activities overlapped, especially after the Stolypin coup. Eva Broido, a Menshevik active in St. Petersburg clubs wrote, the praktiki had established
many 'legal' strongholds. In the second half of 1907, she claims there were ten such clubs and from 1907-1914 a total of twenty were established city-wide. These associations attracted both union and non-union workers and permitted exchanges between Duma deputies, liberals and socialists providing a public arena for all spheres of educational, cultural, and political activities.

Legal activists, such as the Bolshevik S. Kanatchikov, were attracted to workers' clubs because authorities restricted the union's cultural and educational activities. Landlords often evicted the governing boards of the unions from their offices or raised rents so that it was impossible for them to fulfill their lease. The unions were able to retain only Panina House for general meetings. The police also refused to allow general meetings of the union to begin unless at least fifty members were present. If a member accidentally used the words "strike" or "union," those assembled would be dispersed. The Petersburg governor-general prohibited educational work by the unions since such activities were not specifically permitted by the Law of 4 March. His policy toward all labor activities was, "if it was not said, then it is forbidden." Authorities did not allow separate extraordinary meetings organized by the union on topical questions, such as alcoholism or hygiene. Even musical evenings were not considered part of the
union's permissible public activities. As a consequence of these restrictions, the metalworkers' membership began to decline.¹¹

Despite police harassment, Kanatchikov wrote that the metallists already maintained a very high level of cultural work in the city. Evening courses and five trips to museums had been organized in the Vasileostrov district.¹² However, educational societies could offer these services without suffering the same degree of repression as unions, a fact soon recognized by workers.¹³ One contemporary journal reported that workers at Baltic Shipbuilding organized a workers' club which rented offices and a piano. Although more than two-hundred members joined, the club became a "victim of interdepartmental confusion" because the naval ministry oversaw the plant and city officials were to approve the club.¹⁴

As clubs were established in the capital, agreements were made between unions and workers' clubs to share facilities and encourage interaction between their members. Since the government harassed unions for pursuing cultural activity, union boards often granted aid to clubs. Such cooperation was possible because the board members of these institutions overlapped. The Metalworkers' Union made an agreement with several clubs to borrow books for their union library. Unions also had agreements with an
alternative educational association, the Society of People's Universities, for reduced fees to lectures. If trade unions guaranteed 50 students, members would be charged one-half the ten kopeck fee. In addition, the Society agreed to offer six excursions to unionists. The wealth of cultural activities such as lectures, reading rooms, libraries, and musical evenings drew in significant numbers of workers, but metallists were especially drawn to the libraries of these clubs. While 80% of St. Petersburg's population was literate, 91.8% of the Metalworkers' Union could read. Kanatchikov remembers that, "In the majority of the clubs the most active were members of the trade unions."

For example, in the case of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union: fully 70% of the membership of St. Petersburg clubs were metalworkers. Two clubs were organized specifically around metalworking: at Obukhov, "Knowledge is Light" and "Science and Life" at Baltic Shipbuilding. "Science and Life" enrolled 85 metallists including two were women and sixteen unskilled workers. Altogether, this club included 903 workers. More than half the membership of "Source of Light and Knowledge" consisted of metalworkers, and a substantial percentage of the remaining members were printers. In April 1914, "Knowledge" enrolled 177 metalworkers out of 485.
Party and union activists formed several commissions to coordinate workers' associations. In January 1908, the Metalworkers' Union voted that an Interclub Commission be established to coordinate activities between unions and clubs. At the end of 1908, the Menshevik dominated Central Bureau of Trade Unions tried to mediate relations between the Society of People's Universities and trade unions to broaden the emerging labor movement. The Central Bureau requested and was granted two seats with voting rights on the executive board of the People's Universities. After this agreement was reached, the Society of People's Universities carried out all negotiations with St. Petersburg unions through the Central Bureau. Late in 1908, the Central Bureau broadened the scope of trade union activity to establish an Educational Commission which included four members of the Interclub Commission and the Central Bureau and two representatives from the cooperative societies. The Educational Commission was to make decisions on planning, opening new clubs, and the regulation of relations between clubs and other societies such as the People's Universities by a simple majority vote. The Central Bureau and cooperatives agreed to pay 1% of their revenue for the operation of the commission. By 1909, 15 educational societies were located in specific districts throughout the city.
Legal activists endeavored to utilize every available public arena to develop the independent workers' movement. For example, the charter of "Knowledge is Light," the society organized around Obukhov metallists, approved by the authorities 7 December 1907, declared the aim of the society was the "achievement by the members of all facets of education and cultural self-development" through "readings, lectures, literary evenings, reading rooms, libraries, educational outings, concerts, plays and so on." The highest governing body, the general assembly composed the charter, elected the governing board and approved its resolutions. The governing board of ten, elected for a six month term, directed daily business such as record-keeping, and managing the property and treasury of the society. Only the board summoned general meetings, and represented the society in its relations with the government, public service institutions and private individuals. A two-thirds majority of those present in the general assembly approved plans and projects of the society. At least two existing members had to nominate a potential member and a majority of the membership had to approve nominations. Members were expelled by a two-thirds majority in the case of non-payment of dues for a period of two months, and for noncompliance with the charter or committing acts which threatened the society's legal existence. The democratic nature of this
charter, much like that of union charters, provided workers with administrative experience and gave them control over their educational and cultural activities. Socialists often dominated the club's administration and organized courses and lectures to meet the needs of the workers. Constant contact in a democratic organization offered party activists the means to assess tactics among a wide number of workers.

Membership patterns, another gauge of worker activism, reflected a shifting allegiance dependent upon activities offered and current economic conditions. All clubs included an unauthorized contingent of members who did not pay dues. For example, in "Education" in Vyborg district, only 150-200 members actually fulfilled their obligations although the club noted 808 on their rosters. Another club, "Enlightenment," recorded 426 members on 1 Oct 1909, but 84 paid only enrollment fees and 35% paid fees for the first two or three months. Fifty-five percent of the members left just 2-3 months after joining. In some clubs, the influx and permanency of members was proportional to the frequency of lectures, in others, musical and dance evenings attracted a greater following. Worsening economic conditions made the clubs inaccessible to organized workers who despite the very low fees charged by clubs preferred to pay union dues which guaranteed some measure of security. During 1908-9, most clubs experienced a more acute turnover
in the membership than they had a year earlier. "Enlightenment" counted 470 members in 1908, but in May 1909 there were only 371 members. Likewise, in 1907-1908, there was an average of 66 at each lecture sponsored by "Enlightenment" and from 1908-9 attendance dropped to 55. During the last half of 1909, several clubs noted increases in attendance. The Bolshevik sponsored "Source of Light and Knowledge" in Vasileostrov had an average membership of 204 for 1910. "Knowledge is Light" grew from 275 in August 1910 to 450 by October. The Nekrasov society had a membership list of 264 in July 1909 which grew to 410 by the end of 1910. During 1911, both clubs and unions were repressed by the police and membership began to decline. All general meetings had to be held at specially approved times in the presence of a police officer or official inspector.21 Beginning in 1912, however this decline was completely reversed. "Knowledge is Light" had only 100 members in early 1912, in September lists grew to 170, and by October 308. Although there was a decline in the winter of 1913-14, by April 1914, this club had 585 members. These patterns hold for most of the clubs in St. Petersburg during the years of reaction.22

Women played an integral role as members and organizers of workers' clubs. One woman activist remembered successful recruitment of women after evening dances,
lectures and the opening of libraries. A growing number of evening schools often organized by women included courses for the illiterate. There was also a Women's Mutual Aid Society which remained in operation from 1907-13. In "Knowledge is Light," a club closely connected to the metalworkers' union, women comprised 30% of the membership in 1913. "Source of Light and Knowledge" counted only 3% women in 1909 but this grew to 20% by 1914. Of the ten clubs for which statistics exist on gender, nine had a peak membership of at least 11% women and eight had 20% or higher. Most of these women were under 25. A comparison of men to women in one club shows that among those under 25 women outnumber men, and for those thirty to forty there are more men than women. Most of the women members were younger than the males.23

The popularity of educational and cultural activities among working class men and women substantiates observations of socialist propagandists as early as the 1870s.24 As Russia industrialized, literacy increased and worker-intellectuals appeared through contact with the radical intelligentsia in reading circles. In factory groups and evening schools, workers ardently studied the natural sciences, literature, history and geography. After the legalization of educational societies, the experiences of early circle work could be extended to the broad labor
movement. An examination of lecture topics and attendance at lectures offered by "Knowledge is Light" reveals that the workers welcomed lectures on literature, the origin of man, cholera, ancient history, and natural sciences. "Knowledge is Light" planned 117 lectures, 82 of which were approved by the authorities. Statistics recorded by the society note that 5544 people attended 54 lectures as indicated below.

Table 7: "Knowledge is Light," Lectures and Attendance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Lectures</th>
<th>Total Attendance</th>
<th>Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Literature</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2947</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial history</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hygiene</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin of man</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political economy</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geography</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geology &amp; Biology</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cholera</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ancient history</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: S. Kanatchikov, "Rabochaia zhizn, Kul'turno-prosvetitel'naia deiatel'nost v peterburgskikh professional'nikh soiuzech," Vorozhdenie, no.5/6 (April 1909):54-5.

While average attendance at these lectures was 103, a stable group of only forty seems to have attended most lectures. Topics of current interest, basic knowledge, and epidemics
seemed to have been most popular with audiences. Practical topics such as business, economics, hygiene and physics were not as popular. The club also sponsored eight excursions with 315 participants and thirteen dances.25

Two hundred-fifty members of "Knowledge is Light" used the library collection of 1855 books. Eighty-five of these patrons were women. Fiction was the main staple of the libraries consisting of 1200 books in this collection. Social sciences was the subject of 455 volumes, natural sciences 65 and there were 175 different periodicals titles.

In six months, the society revenue was 1319 rubles 84 kopecks including dues of 477 rubles. Unlike unions, membership fees in the societies were not the major source of income. "Knowledge is Light" gained most of its revenue from lectures and concerts. For example, the society took in 220 rubles 98 kopecks during only three concerts. The record books listed 553 members of "Knowledge is Light" including 116 women.26 The peak membership was 650 in 1909 and the lowest enrollment of 350 was recorded in 1913.27

Memoirists have emphasized Social Democratic influence in the clubs. While it is true that workers acquired socialist propaganda, heard "lectures on current affairs," met with Duma representatives, and read a variety of educational and popular literature, not all clubs were the "pioneers of the new proletarian culture," and
"`colleges' of Marxism" evoked by the memories of Menshevik, Eva Broido. Although the Petersburg Okhrana called the clubs and trade unions "auxiliary organizations of the Petersburg Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party," the majority of workers' clubs remained politically neutral. Police sources indicate that only eight out of twenty-one clubs were governed by Social Democrats in this period including the Educational Societies of the Narva district, Moscow gates, and the Sampsonievskii Plant; "Light," at Nevskii Gates; "Knowledge is Light," at Obukhov, and the Typographers' Musical, Dramatic, and Educational Circle. Despite the rivalry of the Bolshevik "Source of Light and Knowledge," and the Menshevik "Enlightenment" in Vasileostrov most local activists cooperated in workers' associations. Party committees and the Central Bureau of Trade Unions frequently met under the auspices of meetings of the board of the clubs or enlightenment societies. "To discuss party business all manner of deceit was used by the party workers," such as completing political activity before the time scheduled for the meeting or leading the police away to the buffet during the lecture. Bribery of building managers was also practiced to assure the successful conclusion of business meetings.
Closer scrutiny of the Menshevik dominated “Enlightenment Society” which enrolled members from the Franco-Russian factory and the harbor, provides a fuller illustration of the activities and leadership of workers' clubs. The club rented a small apartment for 45 rubles a month on Zavodskaiia street. According to the Bolshevik Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, who attended the society's meetings in the spring of 1908:

Few workers were interested in the activities of the societies and rarely attended them. But all the alehouses and taverns of the districts were filled by the older and younger workers until late in the evening. Outside near the taverns, especially on holidays, scuffles and knifefights often occurred. Women workers with children on their arms stood on the street corners awaiting their drunken husbands. He also remembers that the club had only about 100 members and that many of these had formerly been associated with "gaponists," before joining the Social Democratic Party. His recollections are clearly biased by his Bolshevism. The "members," he enumerates are most likely those who attended lectures or other meetings rather than total membership.

"Enlightenment" actively recruited worker members as revealed by figures for lectures, membership and finances. In 1908, when attendance at lectures reached a peak, "Enlightenment" listed 470 members and an income of 1642 rubles. A total of 142 lectures were offered to the public, eighty-two dealing with social problems and thirty-three with literature. Lectures brought in 45.6% of the
club's revenue, dues 42% and two hundred rubles was collected from the sale of tea in the office. By 1 May 1909, membership declined to 371 which included 75 women. In the first half of the year, forty-nine lectures had been sponsored by the society attended by 2392. Fourteen excursions and eleven concerts had also been offered. The funds collected by the society decreased the first half of the year to 1180 rubles. The library collection housed 849 volumes even though the police had confiscated 900 books in December 1907. In 1910, enrollment continued to decline to 320 members. Average attendance also dropped to 43 for the year.

Public lectures and concerts offered for a fee to replenish "Enlightenment's" treasury were often attended by the entire SD faction of the Third State Duma. The history professor M.M. Kovalevskii, a member who had travelled abroad and frequently visited Karl Marx agreed to help raise funds in 1908 by giving a lecture on the theme "Karl Marx and Spencer." To divert the attention of the police, he interspersed the lecture with humorous tales about insignificant details such as descriptions of pastries Marx's wife had served on one of his visits. The society earned nearly 250 rubles from this lecture.

Insinuating a bourgeois cast existed among the Menshevik leadership of "Enlightenment," Tsvetkov-
Prosveshchenskii writes that, E.D. Kuskova, the unwilling author of the "Economist" Credo, came to the Enlightenment Society usually "under a veil" and "elegantly dressed." Since non-factional socialists would have been drawn to workers' clubs more frequently than to unions in the years of reaction, there was clearly some continuity in the leadership of clubs and the "gaponist" Assembly. However, a rejection of factions does not imply a rejection of socialism. Socialists of all tendencies ardently joined legal work in unions and clubs.

Delegates from St. Petersburg clubs and unions also attended a number of legal congresses which had the potential for addressing issues relevant to the working class and socialism. As each of these congresses was organized, legal activists advanced positions which challenged the old party hierarchy and the emigre leadership. Longing to connect with the workers, the praktiki prepared lectures, reports, questionnaires and leaflets which both informed and investigated all aspects of workers' lives and political opinions. As the metallist Bulkin remembers, "the workers intently followed the workers' congresses and the behavior of their delegates." Workers' groups at these congresses faced with the programs of socialists, liberals, and sometimes even reactionary political groups, openly expressed their own political
identity. The praktiki witnessed the evolution of worker demands at these public meetings, ever mindful of the necessity of merging the economic struggle with a broader, political struggle.

The Congress of People's Universities held in Petersburg from 3-7 January 1908, was the first national meeting during the years of reaction to include a workers' group. Iatsinovich and Malinovskii represented the Petersburg Metalworkers' and the trade unionists' Kolokol'nikov, Grinevich and Tomskii-Kopp were delegates from the Central Bureau. Reports were read at the Congress on illiteracy and the condition of education in Russia. Menshevik praktik A.V. Orlov gave a report "Concerning the Workers' Societies of Self-Education in St. Petersburg" and A.I. Iatsinovich "Concerning the Cultural-enlightenment Tasks of the Trade Unions." Iatsinovich reminded the delegates in slightly obscured Aesopian language that, "The working class must once again with pride indicate that only the realization of its social ideals, only the destruction of every exploitation secures the opportunity for the growth and prosperity of truly human cultures." The trade unionists and legal activists hoped to gain some control over the education of their constituency by winning support for a resolution that workers' organizations should have the right to determine the program
and suitable lecturers for social science lessons. In keeping with democratic principles they also asserted the right of nationalities to control courses and be educated in native languages. These proposals were rejected by the congress organizers. The workers' group realized their resolutions would not be adopted and walked out in protest.\textsuperscript{37}

The First National Congress of Cooperatives held in Moscow 16-21 April also included representatives of trade unions and workers' cooperatives. Volosov, a Menshevik active in organizing cooperatives in Moscow in 1911, remembered the differences between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in this period. Bolsheviks were "centralists" who hoped to organize "from above" presenting a completed charter to the workers, whereas Mensheviks would ask if the charter was acceptable, offer to consider amendments and encourage the administrators of the cooperative to vote according to the "will of the majority."\textsuperscript{38} Consumer and producer cooperatives were organized throughout Russia and included both organized and unorganized workers. As mass institutions, they offered both economic and political advancement to organized and non-affiliated workers. The Menshevik praktik Mark Broido recognized the popularity of cooperatives and agitated for greater collaboration between the cooperatives and unionists. He urged wider
participation of trade union representatives in the Cooperatives' Congress and the Congress of People's Universities to promote the "political formation of the masses." The Central Committee of the RSDRP(TsK) formed a Trade Union/Cooperative Commission which included the Moscow Bolshevik, Viktor Nogin (Makar) and M. Broido (Bragin). In December 1907, the TsK passed a resolution that each cooperative should have "a united group closely connected to a local party center." However, such cells were not established by the time of the congress.

The workers' group at the Congress consistently demanded that the cooperatives sell on credit to all workers, even those who were unemployed or striking. N.A. Skrypnik (pseudonym G.G. Ermolaev), representing the Workers' Union Cooperative of St. Petersburg, argued that cutting off credit in the case of strikes and lockouts would take on the "character of a social calamity." Malinovskii, the secretary of the metallists' union representing the cooperative "Toiler," opposed credit but reminded delegates that "in special instances (lockouts, strikes) credit is necessary. It goes without saying these cases represent disaster - disaster not only for the working class, but for all society. In these situations collaboration of the cooperatives with the trade unions which embraces broad circles of the proletariat is necessary." Another
representative of the workers' group, I.P. Pokrovskii, was silenced by the police when he attempted to discuss the capitalist causes of unemployment. Throughout the Congress, the workers' group attempted to demonstrate the need for greater cooperation of workers in all forms of legal organization.

Participation in the Congress of Women's Organizations, held in Petersburg 10-16 December 1908, was actually the culmination of weeks of preparation by unionists and party activists throughout the country. Beginning in October, sixty meetings were held in the capital to organize the workers' delegation to the congress. Over 800 women met to discuss maternity benefits, the causes of prostitution and other issues related to the feminist movement. Aleksandra Kollontai, representing the Textile Union, was one of the organizers. The Central Bureau of Trade Unions composed and distributed 8000 leaflets "To all the women workers of St. Petersburg" urging the widest possible participation in the upcoming congress. The Petersburg Committee (PK) resolved that Social Democrats participate in all preparations for the congress, but "demonstratively break" with the congress if a special proletarian section was not formed. Since the resolution addressed the method of protest to be used if PK aims were not met, Eva Broido disapproved of its language and no
agreement was reached on socialist tactics. The PK delegate was also not supported by the other delegates in his bid to march into the hall of the congress, unfurl a red banner and leave in protest. Legal activists sent as workers' delegates to the congress, dubbed "Menshevik liquidators" by the Bolshevik press, successfully resisted the reassertion of political authority by the PK.\textsuperscript{43} Most of the workers' group did walk out in a somewhat sporadic manner, because the congress organizers refused to publish their resolution calling for "democratic elections."\textsuperscript{44} The speakers from the workers' group reiterated the convictions of Aleksandra Kollontai, which tied the problems of women workers to capitalist exploitation. Some delegates recognized a differentiation between women workers at the conference and the delegates from liberal, Kadet circles. Both Kuskova and Ermanskii objected to the political timbre of the delegates who agreed with Kollontai. Nevertheless, most of the worker delegates, radicalized by the preparatory work of the legal activists, had little difficulty combining the woman question with their demands for an eight hour day, insurance, and political revolution. After the congress, the workers' delegation suggested they make presentations at party and trade union meetings as an "agitational group."\textsuperscript{45} This plan was not put into effect.
The appearance of the term "liquidator" at the women's congress reflected a growing ideological controversy among members of the RSDRP. After the onset of reaction in June 1907, party emigres focused their attention on strengthening the underground party at the expense of open legal work. Rank and file party members remained committed to trade unions and workers' associations where possibilities existed for the emergence of an independent labor movement. As the legal movement gained strength and as Mensheviks gained hegemony within workers' associations, an organizational struggle resulted which reflected basic theoretical differences and rested on the discourse of controversy created at the turn of the century during the "Economist" debates. The organizational conflict inside Russia was insignificant and not affected by directives from abroad. Lenin's following inside the country was especially weak. Independent of Lenin, a group of leftists, the otzovists (recallists) favored the resignation of SD Duma deputies and rejected conciliation, but they remained isolated. Arrests and the lack of support from abroad decimated their ranks, although they retained a small measure of support in Vasileostrov and Vyborg districts. Despite the resistance of Bolshevik otzovists, the tendency to reach compromise and draw workers into the decision-making process in newly opened public arenas dominated every
meeting of party activists during the years of reaction. The legal activists resented emigre efforts to curb legal work and began to call for reform of the party. In practical terms, "liquidationism" was nothing more than the flowering of legal workers' associations closely tied to rank and file socialists who constantly strove to involve workers in the economic struggle against capitalism and in the political struggle against the autocracy. The phenomenon can be called "liquidationism" recognizing its pejorative deviation, just as the term "Economism" was used to characterize the activity of SDs before 1903.

Workers' patronage of the "Theses on Insurance" further illustrates the application of "liquidationism." In April 1909, workers' delegates to the Congress of Factory and Plant Doctors were determined to win passage of the "Theses" which resulted from many months' work by trade unionists in St. Petersburg. The "Theses" were conceived in meetings of the Metalworkers' Union and the Menshevik Central Bureau of Trade Unions. Malinovskii had delivered a report on social insurance and organized a public hearing of legislation being considered by the government. When the government banned the public hearing, the Metalworkers' Union formed a subcommittee which composed the "Theses on Insurance" approved by the members. Accepting the Central Bureau and published in the Social Democratic press,
the unionists recommended that workers' councils, democratically elected in the district or at the factory, oversee the insurance program which should be supported by the state and employers through taxation. They also demanded 100% pay in the case of total disability. Legal activists successfully included demands for free trade unions, a constituent assembly and freedom of speech and assembly. The workers' delegation to the congress adopted the "Theses" and asked the Duma Deputy, I. Pokrovskii, to present them to the entire delegation. When Pokrovskii was not granted the floor, the workers and about twenty doctors walked out in protest. Despite this defeat, the legal activists had won recognition by being invited to participate in the conference and Malinovskii, representing the St. Petersburg Metalworkers was permitted to report on the issue of social insurance.

Legal activists who hoped to combine their illegal party work with the labor movement gained wide exposure to the masses through congresses and conferences. Such success encouraged even wider attention from the Okhrana. In March, the PK was arrested and throughout the spring police continued to suppress party members in the capital. Despite these arrests, planning continued throughout the city for the Congress on the Struggle against Alcoholism.
All classes, estates and social groups were represented at this congress, which met in Petersburg from 28 December 1909 to 7 January 1910. Again, the Central Bureau of Trade Unions publicized the event with leaflets illegally distributed to the workers. The Metalworkers' Union debated participation in this congress at all levels and the delegate council approved reports and delegates to the conference.50 Workers' associations began to choose delegates to the congress in late October. The Central Bureau wanted to send two delegates from every club, union, and party district but the gradonachal'nik ruled the congress was a public activity and refused to allow union delegates to attend. Metallists already elected as representatives of the union, including V.G. Chirkin, had to be substituted as a club or temperance society delegate.51 Malinovskii and 11 other delegates being instructed by a Duma deputy were arrested at a meeting on 15 November.

Despite these arrests, St. Petersburg sent a delegation of twenty-four workers to the congress, including Kanatchikov, Iatsinovich, and Chirkin, now representing the club "Light and Knowledge." The forty-three member workers' group hardened by the repression of its delegation before the congress, demanded a new political order. The workers submitted twelve reports to congress organizers from which ten were approved. The Bolshevik Magidov presented the
Central Bureau's survey of alcoholism among 12,000 Petersburg workers which found that 93% of all workers drank and half of these began before their seventeenth birthday. The report also documented a correlation between unskilled, lower paid workers and this disease. On the basis of the survey, Iatsinovich identified the need for "wider social-economic reform" in order to battle alcoholism. The metallist Chirkin stated in his report to the congress that "hard drinking will disappear along with capitalism, but the first stage of the struggle for workers' power will be the overthrow of the autocracy." The resolution of the workers' group at the congress demanded civil liberties, freedom of trade unions, speech and assembly. When the congress substituted the phrase "participation by broad sections of the population" for "free and democratic elections," the workers' group left in protest. Also represented at the congress were the "temperance societies and other religious and philanthropic organizations" as well as priests who promised "to cure people from the green serpent with religion." While the congress was taking place the government began to arrest legal activists in the capitals. The workers' delegates to the congress were arrested including Iatsinovich. Malinovskii, the secretary of the metalworkers', A. Ginsberg, editor of the journal, Chirkin and Bulkin were arrested. These arrests had little effect
on the development of the metalworkers' union which had begun to realize a revival in its membership especially in the districts. According to Bulkin, "the young guard had arrived."\(^{55}\)

Throughout 1908, in party meetings and legal congresses, the praktiki had shunned central party control and argued that a wider sphere of legal activity would permit the workers to direct their own movement. By 1909, their predictions seem to have been fulfilled. In the Metalworkers' Union, a purge of enrolled workers who were negligent in their dues actually strengthened the core of active members and brought the society out of debt. On 1 June 1909, when this purge began, 6011 workers claimed membership and by August only 2536 had reregistered. During the last quarter of the year, 600 new members joined the union and membership lists totalled 3678 or about 5% of all metalworkers in St. Petersburg.\(^{56}\)

From 1907-10, although there were seven different union boards, the Metalworkers' command structure remained stable. According to Bulkin, "there were not sharp differences, stormy clashes, reflecting the struggle of factions," on the board and "in spite of the frequency of changing lists, the work of the board went comparatively smoothly, without particular conflicts and vacillations." The only permanent members were Iatsinovich, Malinovskii and
Ershov. The new cadre of union leaders were educated by practical, spontaneous activity and required no assistance from the intelligentsia. Bulkin remembers that "in their reports one can note a kind of roughness, but they were written without the assistance of mentor intelligentsia."

One of the most popular presidents was K.A. Gvozdev from Saratov, a worker at Putilov first elected to the Board in 1910. A supporter of a "caring" union, he advocated a system of dividing and categorizing dues, and the formation of an independent union treasury for assistance. Arrested and exiled in 1911, he returned to Petersburg in 1914 and later served in the War Industries Committees. V. D. Rubtsov, according to Bulkin, possessed both the "nerve and spirit of the proletariat." He opposed Gvozdev's tendency toward mutual aid. Acquainted with the German workers' movement he remained a legal activist, close to the liquidators and the conciliators and an opponent of the influence of the intelligentsia. Nechaev was elected president because of his popularity with the workers but remained a bookish sort who relied on the practical experience of his secretary Iu. Volkov. Another independent practical worker was E. Kozin, who joined with the Shipbuilders' Union, where he had been secretary and president. The SR M.P. Zatonskii had also served as president of the union, collaborating closely with the
Mensheviks and writing in the journal under the pseudonym "Batrak." Mensheviks I.S. Astrov, A.E. Diubua and B.S. Baturskii contributed party influence to the union through their articles in the union journal. The predominance of Menshevik and pro-Menshevik activists among board members resulted from long term personal ties to workers in practical, legal organizations. As Bulkin asserts, this was "not the consequence of their ideological influence on the masses;" instead, the board was elected from those whom "the workers knew personally to be good workers." Bolsheviks Kubishkin and P. Nikolaev were elected to the union board and N.N. Krestinskii and Kozlovskii wrote for the union journal. However, Bolshevik influence was minor. Bolsheviks were more influential at the district level in Vasileostrov where Smirnov and Kuz'min were activists.57

Despite shifting leadership and police repression, the metalworkers' union maintained a cadre of about 4000 members and published a journal under seven different titles for the entire period of the years of reaction as follows:
Table 8: St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union Journals

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabochii po metalлу</td>
<td>30 August 1906-14 November 1907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuznets</td>
<td>2 December 1907-March 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vestnik rabochkikh po obrabotke metalla.</td>
<td>March 1907-July 1908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nadezhda</td>
<td>31 July 1908-Feb 1909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nash put</td>
<td>10 February 1909-29 April 1910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edinstvo</td>
<td>9 June 1910-25 August 1911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallist</td>
<td>26 September 1911-12 June 1914</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Arrests at the time of the Anti-alcoholism Congress and again in early 1911, resulted in a decline in membership as indicated by the Table 9 below.

Table 9: St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union Membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Members</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Percentage in Relation to 1 July 1907</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7655</td>
<td>1 July 1907</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9338</td>
<td>1 January 1908</td>
<td>122</td>
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<tr>
<td>9791</td>
<td>1 July 1908</td>
<td>128</td>
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<tr>
<td>6771</td>
<td>1 January 1909</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6011</td>
<td>1 July 1909</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3675</td>
<td>1 January 1910</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4037</td>
<td>1 July 1910</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3895</td>
<td>1 January 1911</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3735</td>
<td>1 July 1911</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4453</td>
<td>1 January 1912</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bulkin, Na zare, p. 216.
The three and a half thousand that remained, "this skeleton of the union, was its loyal guard." District membership for this same period was greatest in Vyborg, Vasileostrov and Nevskii. Table 10 indicates this distribution from 1908 to 1912.

Table 10: St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union Membership by District (1 January each year)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>1908(% of Total)</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912(% of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vasileostrov</td>
<td>500(16%)</td>
<td>1418</td>
<td>796</td>
<td>680</td>
<td>501(15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nevskii</td>
<td>2990(32%)</td>
<td>1488</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>435(13%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petersburg</td>
<td>836(9%)</td>
<td>436</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>824</td>
<td>631(19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vyborg</td>
<td>1264(14%)</td>
<td>643</td>
<td>508</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>650(19%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narvskii</td>
<td>830(8%)</td>
<td>697</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>384(11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gorodskii</td>
<td>932(10%)</td>
<td>1116</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>312(10%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>755(8%)</td>
<td>658</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>247(8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sestroretskii</td>
<td>145(1.5%)</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>111(3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kolpino</td>
<td>85 (1%)</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>65(1.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porokhovoe</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17(0.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>9338(100%)</td>
<td>6711</td>
<td>3678</td>
<td>3895</td>
<td>3553(100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Bulkin, Na zare, p. 217.

Attendance at meetings does not correspond favorably with the membership data in Table 10. As is indicated by Table 11 below, the lowest attendance at general meetings was reached in 1909 when an average of 840 or 12.4% of the total membership attended. At the district meetings the average
was 130 or about 17%. The highest attendance was in 1910 when 37.5% of members attended general meetings.

Table 11: Average Attendance at Union Meetings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>General</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>1750</td>
<td>2400</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>1378</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegate council</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Statistics on membership also show that workers joined the union more readily in metalworking enterprises which employed 50 to 1000 workers. In January 1908, factories with 50-200 workers provided 20% of the members, while enterprises from 200-500 produced 22% and those from 50-1000 yielded 14.5%. The age and pay of most union members indicate they probably expected to receive material assistance in times of joblessness and repression. Half the members made up to 1 ruble 50 kopecks and another 38.8% had wages of 2 rubles, 50 kopecks. The average pay of union members was 1 ruble 67 kopecks. Members 24 years of age or less comprised 28.9%, those 25-35 made up 45% and 23.5% of those who joined were 35-49. This left only 2.6% of the members who were fifty years of age or older. Although union members were relatively young and on the lower end of
the wage scale, they shared long term employment in metalworking. Over four-tenths of affiliated metallists had two to five years experience and another 26% had worked from five to ten years.\textsuperscript{39}

The organization these laborers joined was fast becoming a bureaucracy with expenses allocated to operating costs, assistance and educational work as illustrated in Table 12 below. The majority of funds spent for operation of the society were in the form of rent and stipends to officers. Printing and publishing the union journal consumed an average of 21.6% of total expenses or nearly all funds earmarked for cultural-enlightenment work.

Table 12: Comparison of Union Expenses, 1906-1912 (In percentage of total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses</th>
<th>1906</th>
<th>1907</th>
<th>1908</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1910</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1912</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>40.1</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>55.1</td>
<td>50.3</td>
<td>38.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cult/Enlmt</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>24.6</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>33.1</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aid</td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>39.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Members expected union assistance in the case of strikes and unemployment which comprised over 80% of all assistance spending. However, since strike assistance was two-and-one-half times that of unemployment, the board clearly
disregarded the illegality of strike funds and supported striking members.

Although the union's major expenditure was not unemployment assistance, many activists remember that the working masses were first attracted to the union by its promise of aid, but grew to understand its broader tasks. Bulkin recalls that:

Once beginning to pay membership fees, [the union member] was already on the alert for the fate of his 25 kopecks, and for this he began to read the journal, to attend meetings and, little by little, unwittingly became accustomed to the circle of general interests of the trade union movement.\(^{60}\)

The Metalworkers' Union offered medical and legal assistance to its members free of charge. At first, two or three politically "sympathetic" doctors and lawyers volunteered their services. Gradually, after trade union societies became more common, the term "union doctor" lost its political tinge and more doctors and lawyers offered their services to the union. By 1910, 32 doctors and dentists and 6 lawyers, listed in a directory on the first page of the union journal, donated time to aid union members. The legal and medical assistance provided metalworkers also attracted non-metallists to the union. By September 1908, non-metallists numbered 410 in 38 different enterprises in the city.\(^{61}\)

Union confrontations with factory owners were largely ineffective against organized employers in the
Society of Factory and Plant Owners. Often under the pretext of any expression of labor grievance, the owners responded with lockouts. Even factory owners considered to be liberal at factories such as Leont'ev relied upon the police to repress strikes. In five strikes at Leon'tev, the owners relied upon the systematic intervention of police and arrest of strike leaders and well known strikers. By 1911, factory conditions were better in comparison with other factories, but many of the gains from 1905-6 such as the eight hour day had been lost. Other demands affecting the workplace were expressed by workers and activists in the union journal. The editors consistently opposed overtime work especially during periods of growing unemployment, gifts to foremen and other administrators, informing and strike breaking.62

Political work was mediated through the illegal Central Bureau of Trade Unions which connected Third Duma members to the trade union. Malinovskii, Kanatchikov, and Kolokol'nikov were members of the executive board of the Central Bureau which voted early in 1909 to strengthen SD influence in the unions. According to the police, half the union members in the capital were Social Democrats by 1909. The Central Bureau also worked through the workers' commission of the Third Duma on insurance laws and freedom of trade unions.63
During the first six months of 1909, unemployment continued to threaten working class families. On 15 March 1909, the district union secretaries heard reports of layoffs at Neva, Obukhov, Aleksandrov and Baltic works. In response to the unemployment crisis, the administration approved the establishment of mutual aid funds at Baltic and Obukhov plants. Funds were also set up in the factories of Geisler, Langenzipen, and Leont'ev to broaden assistance. Although the union had voted repeatedly in 1906-7 that social work was to be offered by the state, the board offered aid to locked out workers. Now, despite a lack of sufficient funds, members wanted to extend this assistance to the unemployed, an issue debated in the journal throughout the spring. In May 1909, the board revived the plan to urge the City Duma to offer public works projects. In a decidedly political move, the union resolved to use the election campaign for seats in the City Duma as a platform for their public works project. In preparation, the board asked all union branches to survey local areas where public works projects could be pursued. Government authorities, always fearful of worker initiatives, suspended this project determining it to be "public" not union business. Despite the government repression, the metalworkers' journal summoned members to lobby the City Duma to continue the campaign for public works.
The first by-election campaign for a vacant seat in Third Duma also drew in union activists close to the Mensheviks. Social Democrats set up an electoral commission representing clubs and unions which distributed 2000 brochures explaining the candidates' position and the mechanics of voting. To win support for the SD candidate, the election commission also sponsored six public debates between the SD Sokolov and his Kadet opponent. Kanatchikov, representing the Central Bureau and the Duma deputy, Pokrovskii, edited the newspaper *Novyi Den* as part of the work of the election commission. Critics of the newspaper's orientation claimed it was oriented toward members of "society to woo away Kadet supporters."

Perhaps the editors had achieved a political adeptness which recognized contemporary political needs: the SD candidate had to win some support from the liberal camp to win the campaign. Also, worker groups consistently incorporated liberal demands in their political programs from 1907 to 1911. Rather than a betrayal of revolutionary goals, such political savvy simply reflects the application of Menshevik tactics which called for political democracy in the path toward socialism.

Bolshevik Party organizations had little influence over these events. The PK resolved on 9 August 1909 to participate in the election, but not to use "all resources".
Therefore, when V. Volosevich joined the electoral commission representing the PK, he had little intention of wholeheartedly supporting the SD candidate. The PK had few followers among legal activists inside Russia and even less support from abroad. Although committees continued to be elected they received no funds from the emigres and had little power in the capital.

By the fall of 1909, resolute in their determination to maintain their connection to the masses, legal activists aimed at reform of the Social Democratic party inside Russia. At two nonfaction meetings, several socialists proposed the establishment of a "non-party party" which would mediate activity between clubs and unions. In the language of earlier debates, the reformers hoped to create a party free of factions which would liberate workers' samodeitel'nost', or self-activity, as called for by Akselrod's promotion of a workers' congress. The majority rejected such a radical reform supporting a simple merger of the underground and legal party groups. Kanatchikov, Lebedev and Malinovskii voted against the "non-party party" because they feared SRs might dominate the executive board. Reminiscent of the "Economist" controversy, at least one delegate criticized these reforms as "opportunism."
The party reformers gained ground in the union movement after the arrests of board members early in 1910. Many of the new leaders had become activists through trade unions, leading strike committees and soviets in 1905-1907. Dedicated first to trade unions, they ignored party factionalism, sought conciliation, and worked in every feasible worker association.

The shift in leadership did not bring about changes in strategy. President Gvozdev planned to expand membership by increasing social assistance programs. When he learned that Petersburg printers had begun an independent mutual aid fund after the union board rejected a proposal favoring mutual aid, Gvozdev suggested that the Metalworkers' Union start its own mutual aid fund. The new secretary, V.D. Rubtsov disagreed and Kolokol'nikov reminded members that this issue had been settled two years earlier. In May 1910, at a general meeting the metalworkers voted against percentage subscriptions or dues based upon income to raise revenue to pay for mutual aid and the delegate council supported this position on 7 October 1910. A referendum to settle the conflict between the board and the delegate council interested only one-fourth of the membership. Just one board member, the SR Zatorskii, continued to recommend mutual aid to increase membership.
On the occasion of the death of Tolstoy, who was an adamant opponent of the death penalty, the issue of capital punishment was once again introduced into Duma debates. 3500 metallists and 1800 textile workers went on strike in the days following Tolstoy's death. The Central Bureau of Trade Unions, Duma deputies and students formed a strike committee to work out details for a citywide strike on 14 November. Before one of the planning meetings, Rubtsov and the other committee members were arrested. The Metallists' Union board criticized the adventurous actions of both Rubstov and the Central Bureau fearing arrests of leading workers activists and the closure of legal workers' associations. The new union leaders in keeping with the union decision of September 1907 to regulate its members' strike activity, clearly were not going to approve any activity which threatened the legal existence of the trade union. 73 Opposition to strikes would increasingly place the union board in opposition to the membership.

By 1911, a militant strike mood seized the metalworkers. There were thirteen strikes, most in the medium-sized plants where the union was strongest. Workers initiated most of these actions then sent a committee member to the board for approval. Because most of these strikes were unsuccessful, the board considered restricting its support to small factories where victory was more probable.
To discover grievances before members struck, the board decided to concentrate agitation in the factory at the shop level. The board also voted that union members should be involved in all arbitration. Unionists pressured Duma deputies to support legislative measures protecting workers interests and legalizing strikes.

At the district level, union members were less cautious. In 1911, when the board decided to allow district meetings to establish strike tactics for the union, members of Vasileostrov and Vyborg branch blamed the union board for the defeat of strikes at Nobel and Vulcan. Regardless of the conflict between the union board and the branches, the strike movement would continue to radicalize the workers especially after the massacre of workers at the Lena gold fields in 1912.

To protect the narrow margin of legality that survived the revolution of 1905-7, some legal activists began to push for legislative reform through the Social Democratic faction of the State Duma. The Menshevik Feodor Dan had agitated for freedom of coalition in order to build a truly independent working class party. After the closure of the Printers' Union, legal activists close to the metalworkers around the "liquidationist" paper, Nasha zaria joined this campaign. Along with representatives of the SD fraction, the Metallists' Union participated in drawing up a
legal plan "On the freedom of assembly and unions" and "On the freedom to strike." Agitation in the local factories was directed at summoning assemblies to sign a petition to the State Duma in favor of the legal project. This work gathered strength at the Congress of Handicraft Trades.  

In preparation for the Congress of Handicraft Trades held in St. Petersburg in January 1911, the metalworkers set up an Initiative Group within the union to organize the workers' delegation. The president of the union, K.A. Gvozdev, and the provocateur, V. M. Abrosimov were founders of this group. Gvozdev had been elected to the board of the union from Narva district in the spring of 1910 and was elected president in June. He was chosen to lead the workers' delegation of thirty-three from 14 cities whose actions were coordinated by the Duma deputies I.P. Pokrovskii and G.S. Kuznetsov. Gvozdev's opening statement which supported trade union freedom and civil liberties, was the result of a collaboration between the "liquidator," M.L. Kheisin and V.D. Bonch-Bruevich, a Bolshevik. An illegal meeting of the workers' delegates resolved to use the favorable situation presented by the assembly to organize the petition campaign for freedom of coalition on a nationwide scale. The Okhrana report on the Handicraft Congress identified party elements who "recognized the necessity of uniting all forms of the legal workers' movement" with the
"illegal apparatus and obligations to the SD program." The police agent also noted that the petition for freedom of coalition was widely distributed by congress delegates returning to the provinces. Activists, ignoring factionalism and independent of central control worked closely with the Social Democratic deputies at this congress and advanced the cause of legalism.

After the Congress on Handicrafts Trades, legal activists attending the conference continued to meet in the apartment of Duma deputy A.I. Predkaln. Dubbed the Meeting of Activists in the Legal Workers' Organizations and including party activists such as P. A. Garvi, the assembly resolved to form initiative groups of all local legal activists where the underground party did not exist. These initiative groups would combine the operations of legal and illegal activists first in the districts and then at the city level. They planned to organize a trade union conference and participate in the Second Congress of Factory Plant Doctors scheduled for May 1911. Unfortunately, after these optimistic plans were made most of the activists attending the meeting were arrested and exiled to Pskov. Just at the point when the legal activists had established themselves as an alternative to the old party hierarchy, arrests and exiles, coupled with a renewed attack by Lenin through his supporters in the Party defeated their aims.
By February 1911, all the clubs and trade unions supported by the initiative groups joined the petition campaign arranging for the arrival of petitions on the Fifth Anniversary of the Law of 4 March. The underground committees of the Social Democratic Party formed a General City Group which opposed the campaign since the petitions were addressed to the President of the Duma rather than the SD Faction of the Third Duma. On May Day, they organized a meeting of 2000 workers at Putilov who opposed the petition campaign calling instead for a strike and sending their protests to the SD deputies. Gvozdev wrote an article in support of the campaign for submission to the Duma newspaper Zvezda. However, the paper refused to take a stand on the issue resulting in its condemnation by trade unionists. Having approved the campaign at general meetings in May and October, the Metalworkers' Union distributed copies of Delo Zhizni, a weekly published by the editors of Nasha zaria which published a model petition. By early 1912, 14,000 signature were sent to the Duma.

The turn toward politics and increased strike activity alarmed local government authorities and employers' associations. On the evening of 9 February 1911, the police temporarily closed union offices for threatening "public security and order" in accordance with Article 35 of the Law of 4 March 1906. Although the union board asked city
officials for a review of this decision, it was upheld on 5 March. The mayor's office replied that union activities were suspended because the union had supported striking workers at Pintsh, improperly distributed aid, and allowed nonmembers to attend meetings. In response to this decision, the union board appealed to the Senate. Unexpectedly, the Senate ruled in favor of the union board. However, local authorities refused to be subdued. On 16 July 1911, the police chief appeared at a board meeting and demanded to attend. When board members protested this intervention at the police station, they were told the police had to be present at all meetings. Based on article 2 of the union charter which stated that only legal members and no "outside persons" were permitted to attend meetings, the board appealed to the governor-general and the Social Democratic Duma faction and refused to hold meetings on 23 and 30 July in the presence of the authorities.

At a board meeting on 22 August 1911, the police arrested four officers and two board members, including Gvozdev. The police also demanded the right to investigate financial records to trace the distribution of funds. At this point the union hovered "between life and death." Prepared to circumvent the authorities, the union's legal membership was shifted to a new union which had existed only on paper since 1908. The unionists had registered and
reported to the factory inspectorate membership and financial records of the Union of Workers in Metal which now absorbed the members of the suspended Union of Workers in the Metalworking Industry. Business meetings were held covertly while the police attended open meetings preoccupied with "small questions" such as assistance, misunderstandings with the branches, and payment for the union. On 27 August, the fate of the old union when the governor-general concurred with the ruling that police attend all meetings.

Persecution spread to the district branches of the union in an effort to strangle the activities of Petersburg's strongest union. In December 1911, union workers at Sestrovetskii branch were arrested. In the Kolpinskii branch, the union refused to give authorities access to membership lists citing articles 18 and 19 of the law, which stated that only members of the governing board and changes to the charter had to be reported. At one district meeting at Kolpinskii, sixty members attended, observed by the "police chief, his assistant, six constables, 3 policemen, and a gendarme." Throughout the districts, new enrollments continued to decline until the union's closure 15 March 1912 on the basis of materials seized in a raid of a board meeting on 4 February. 87

Why did the Petersburg Okhrana find the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union so dangerous? What activities did they
determine illegitimate public projects and programs? The police clearly objected to political endeavors such as consideration of legislation and the freedom of coalition campaign. All statements by worker groups which pressed for a constituent assembly, the extension of civil liberties, or attributed vices such as alcoholism or prostitution to capitalism were censured directly by the government, or indirectly by liberals at congresses and other public gatherings. Such repression reflected the growing assertiveness of workers and legal activists during the years of repression.

After 1907, workers conceptually combined the political and economic struggle in public meetings, clubs, cooperatives, unions and other associations which gained legal status by virtue of the Law of 4 March. Government repression stimulated the political voice of the worker. The employers' suppression of strikes and refusal to bargain with the union spawned the workers' economic voice. In this process, workers began their transformation from the political and social margins to the center. Assisted in all these actions by legal activists primarily, but not exclusively, tied to the Menshevik Party, workers discovered a collective identity shaped by socialist discourse.

Simultaneously, the legal activists labelled "liquidators" by their detractors, claimed a new identity
for themselves as the interpreters of Russian realities in the face of condemnation by emigres and the Party center. The resulting controversy within Social Democracy is the subject of a later chapter of this study.\(^8\) The practical impact of "liquidationism" was the emergence of a host of workers' associations connected to Social Democracy through the activities of the legal activists. Preserved by party members who refused to return to the underground, these worker associations became the locus of a radical labor movement in the years immediately preceding the First World War. The developing labor movement peppered by the life experiences of rank and file Mensheviks surfaced in these years of reaction as a modern, political force which threatened to topple the tsarist state.

ENDNOTES


\(^6\) *Ibid.*, Appendix, p. 4-5, 18.

\(^7\) Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp.206-8.

\(^8\) See Bulkin, *Na zare*, p. 315 for a list of these meetings.

10 S. Kanatchikov, "Rabochaia zhizn, Kul'turno-prosvetitel'naia deiatel'nost v peterburgskikh professional'nikh soiuzakh," *Vorozhdenie*, no.5/6, April 1909, p.51.


12 Kanatchikov, *Vorozhdenie*, p. 52.


14 I.D. Levin, "Rabochee klubi v Peterburge (1907-1914 gg.)" *MIPDR*, 3:90; *Rabochii po metallu*, no.21 (1907).


21 A.K. Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, *Mezhdu dvumia revoliutsiiami (1907-1916 g.g.)* (Moscow 1957) p. 9.


V.E. Bonnell, *Roots*, pp. 329-30 citing GARF, f.102 d.5, ch.57, opis' 11 1910, p.168. Vasileostrov remained a hotbed of Recallism, a left position of Bolshevism which opposed most legal activity and called for the resignation of SD Duma representatives. By this time the PK was dominated by Bolshevik Recallists and hostile to both Lenin and the Mensheviks. Despite its isolation, the Okhrana continued to be concerned about the PK's strength.


Ibid., p.10

Kanatchikov, *Vorozhdenie*, p.54.

Miliutin, *Vorozhdenie*, p.145.

Levin, *MIPDR* 3:94.


Volosov, Inter-University Project on the History of Menshevism, Columbia University, 1st interview 28 May 1960, pp.11-12.

M. Bragin, "Kooperativnii s'ezd" *Professional'nii vestnik*, no.20, (2 April 1908):3-4.

GARF, f. 111, o.5, d. 286, l.16, f.111, o.5, d.244; P.Kolokol'nikov, "Otryvki iz vospominanii," *MIPDR* 5:137. Broido also used the pseudonym Iakov.


Ibid., pp. 19-23; References to the actions of the liquidators were made in *Sotsial-demokrat*, no.4, (April 1909). The PK dominated by Recallists was isolated inside Russia and abroad.


Letunovskii, *Leninskaia taktika*, p. 24-5; Bulkin, *Na zare*, p. 214; Kuskova, "Zhenskii vopros i zhenskii sezd" *Obrazovanie* no.2 (1909); Ermanskii (Kogan) "Pervyi zhenskii sezd" *Dal* no.2 (1 Jan 1909); W. "Zhenskii sezd i rabochaia gruppa – pismo iz Peterburga" *Golos sotsial-demokrata* no.12 (March 1909).


"Pervyi sezd fabricnychk vrachei" *Edinstvo* no. 2 (5 March 1909); "Po Rossii" *Golos sotsial demokrata* no.14 (May 1909).

Tsvetkov-prosveschenskii, *Mezhdu*, pp.13-15; The PK and other socialists were arrested for planning a demonstration for 1 May 1909. The arrests netted N. P. Bogdanov who became a provocateur and eighteen others. See GARF f.111, o-5, d.263, l.55.


S. Tsederbaum (Ezhov, V.) "Sezd po borbe s piantsvom" *Vorozhdienie* no. 1 (1910):82-3.

V. Miliutin, "Rabochaia gruppa no sezde po borbe s alkogolizmom" *Vozrozhdenie* no.2 (1910), V.O. Tsederbaum (Rakitin I.) "Po Rossii-Peterburg" *Golos sotsial-demokrata* no. 19/20 (January/February 1910); O.A.Kogan, (Ermanskii)
"Fakty i mysli ob anti-alkogolnom sezde" Nasha zaria no.1 (January 1910); M. Kheisin, "V mire rabochikh" Nasha zaria no.1 (January 1910).


[^6]"Professional'noe obshchestvo rabochikh po metallu za 1909" Edinstvo no.13 (25 January 1910); "Iz zhizni i deiatelnosti obshchestva" regular column reporting membership and finances.

[^7]Bulkin, Na zare, pp. 223-25. Initials and further identification was not available for many of these trade unionists.

[^8]The police counted 11,200 members in 1907 and 6789 in 1909. Among these they considered 4011 to be SDs in 1907 and 3535 in 1909. For these and similar statistics on Petersburg unions, see GARF f.111, o.5, d.263, l.121-23.


[^10]Ibid., p.211.


[^14]V.T. "Voprosi vzaimopomoshchi v nashem soiuze" Edinstvo no.4 (23 April 1909); Bulkin, Na zare, p. 222.

[^15]Yuriii Ch (Garvi) "Gorodskie vybory v Peterburge" Edinstvo no.10 (22 Oct. 1909); Malinovskii (R.M.) "K voprosu ob obschestvennykh rabotakh" Edinstvo no. (7 July 1909).


68 Bulkin, Na zare, pp. 412, 416; Likvidator, "Polozhenie del Rossisskoi SD" Zaprosi zhizni no. 3 (21 Oct 1911).

69 M.B. "Iz rabochei zhizni" Sotsial demokrat no. 15/16, (30/12 Sept. 1910).

Malinovskii was among those arrested and at this point is thought to have been recruited as a police spy. See Carter Elwood, Roman Malinovsky.


72 "Iz zhizni i deiatel'nosti" Nash put (1910); Gvozdev, "O vzaimopomoshchi" Nash put no. 6 (30 Aug 1910).


74 A.V. "Chto delaet", Metallist no. 4 (10 Nov 1911).

75 "Iz zhizni i deiatel'nost'i obshchestva" Metallist no. 4 (10 Nov. 1911).

76 Bulkin, Na zare, pp. 228-31, citing Metallist, no. 1. (26 September 1911).

77 For information of the position of the board on strikes see Chapter 6 below.


79 Bulkin, Na zare, p. 232.
Bulkin, *Na zare*, p. 237 citing Doklad moskovskogo gradonachal'nikha ministra vnutrennikh del Kurlovy 18go marta 1911g. #253963.

Martov, "Sotsial demokratiia na remeslennom sezde" *Golos sotsial demokrata* no. 24 (Feb.1911); Zinoviev *Sotsial demokrata* no.23 (1911) on meeting and Letunovskii, *Leninskaia taktika*, p. 54.

The controversy in the upper echelons of the party and in the legal press in the subject of Chapter V below.

"Tolstovskie dni" *Nash put* no.10 (3 Dec 1910).


"Otvet Zvezde" *Delo zhizni* no. 5 (1911); Bronstein (Chatskii) "Zhizn pobezhdait" *Nasha zaria* no. 5 (1911):85; K. Gvozdev "Pismo Peterburgskim metallistam" *Novaia rabochaia gazeta* (24 Oct 1913); Iu. Chatskii "Zhizn pobezhdait" *Nasha zaria* no.5, (1911):86,88; Kuznetsov, "Rabochie i politicheskaia zhizn" *Zhivoe delo*, no.6 (24 February 1912):2; *Nash put* no. 17 (23 May 1911):10-11.

GARF, f.111, o. 5. d. 286, l.20-21; f. 111, o. 5, d. 244, l.34-38; Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp. 239-41.

Ibid., pp. 241-2.

See Chapter V below.
CHAPTER IV:

WHO WERE THE MENSHEVIKS?
A GROUP BIOGRAPHY

The Menshevik party activists so closely tied to the workers' associations between the revolutions do not fit the stereotypical mold of Menshevism. Rank and file Mensheviks were career activists who remained dedicated to socialism and to the revolutionary movement throughout their lives. They distinct from conservative social democrats separated from Russian realities by years of emigration and a cosmopolitan lifestyle. Three influences have led to this erroneous interpretation of the Mensheviks: the prominence of Menshevik emigres in the west, the Soviet need to continue ideological battles after 1917, and the tendency in both Western and Soviet historiography to interpret the Revolutionary movement working back from October.

The biographical literature which is preoccupied with Menshevik leaders and shaped by memoirs of Russian emigres published in the 1950s is best represented by Leopold Haimson's introduction to Making of Three Russian Revolutionaries.¹ Haimson advances characteristics which reflect fully the position of the cosmopolitan emigres,

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their total rejection of the impersonal disciplined structure outlined in Lenin's *What is to be Done?* and their dedication as veterans of circle work to a spirit of family closeness within the underground. Exposure to other languages and cultures gave extreme breadth to the "range of topics raised" among emigre Mensheviks. Although these characteristics accurately describe Menshevik leaders such as Iulii Martov and Feodor Dan, rank and file members who lacked higher education and experience abroad generally did not share these experiences. Menshevik emigres remembered best the revolutionary struggles of 1905-7 and 1917. They were also eager to distinguish themselves theoretically from the Bolsheviks, especially after the rise of Stalin. Many of these Mensheviks had in fact spent most of their time abroad and had been active only briefly in the Russian underground. Often their association with illegal work was restricted to the revolutionary years. Therefore, their personal experiences at the local level were limited primarily to correspondence with party activists. Because of their lack of firsthand information and their later ideological positions, they made only brief mention in their memoirs of the interrevolutionary periods of practical cooperation and unity.

Soviet interpretations of Menshevism supported the emigre accounts, emphasizing caution and theoretical
mistakes and labelling all Mensheviks who had fallen into the current of opportunism "liquidators." Accenting factional and theoretical differences, they demonstrated the superiority of their ideology not only in the past, but also in current party struggles, where real battles of a bureaucratic or political nature could be reduced to ideological name-calling. Soviet historians accused the Mensheviks of misunderstanding Russian reality; a compliment which was reciprocated.

By working backward from the revolution, western historians have trained themselves to look for missed opportunities, theoretical mistakes and other stepping stones on the way to defeat. The failure of Menshevism becomes the defeat of democracy and the Mensheviks, at least among historians subscribing to the totalitarian thesis of Soviet history, resemble members of the Democratic Party of the United States rather than revolutionaries. An examination of the full composition of the Menshevik Party reveals a more complex cohort based upon cooperation, aspirations of unity and far less theoretical debate. Rank and file Mensheviks exhibit a wider and more varied set of characteristics; a group biography can define Menshevism and the "Liquidationist" tendency between the revolutions, consequently providing a more historically accurate interpretation of the Russian revolutionary movement.
Biographies of one hundred forty-five individuals including fifteen women provided the raw material for the following examination. The *Biographical Dictionary of Menshevism* compiled by Boris Nicolaevsky and Anna Bourgina for the Menshevik Project at Columbia University was supplemented with biographies from memoir literature. For the purposes of this study, only persons who had spent some period of time in the capitals as revolutionary activists, members of the Duma or Soviet, or represented their local party organization at a congress, conference or national meeting were included. Most of these Mensheviks travelled to both capitals sometime during their revolutionary careers and so could have affected the revolutionary milieu of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union. They also helped to shape Menshevism or at least the perception of the party.

In his study, Haimson pinpoints cosmopolitanism as a cardinal feature of Menshevism. Revolutionaries who received an enlightened education and spent long years abroad in different countries developed an openness to other cultures and world views. Menshevik leaders such as Iulii Osipovich Martov epitomize this type of lifestyle. Although Martov's family was assimilated, they suffered under the pogroms and were repressed in the capital. Martov's sister Lidia Dan, asserted that these experiences predisposed the children to an oppositional world view.
Kept apart by their Jewishness, the children were nevertheless exposed through literature to biographies of enlightened, often rebellious Russian and western European historical figures and through discussions between their father and his friends to current political affairs. Like most revolutionaries in this period, Martov made friends with populists at the university, began to distribute illegal literature to students and workers, was arrested and after the famine of 1891, drawn into Marxism. Arrested and exiled again, Martov coauthored a tract on practical revolutionary activity, "On Agitation," which stressed the usefulness of the strike in promoting revolutionary consciousness. After returning to St. Petersburg to organize the Union of Struggle, Martov was again arrested, and exiled to Siberia. Martov joined Lenin and another prominent Menshevik, A. N. Potresov, in Munich after his release, where they began the publication of *Iskra*. Except for the revolutionary years, Martov lived abroad until his death in 1923. Emigration, years of exile and imprisonment, and an enlightened education, certainly shaped the cosmopolitan lifestyle of Martov. In fact, Lenin complained that when Martov was in London, he spent too much time in the cafes and travelling to the continent. How closely do patterns of education, emigration, arrest and exile among
Mensheviks as a group resemble the life experiences of Martov?

Reactionary governments have long recognized the possible and indeed probable danger of radicalism in education. Their fears are certainly justified by the prevalence of university level education among the Mensheviks. Although this factor was not reported in 66 (or 45.5%) cases, the majority of those who reported education attended the university (53 or 67.1%). Many of these individuals, like Martov, would know that attendance at the university was an act of enrollment in the revolutionary student movement, which permitted access to socialist literature and activities. Of the other Mensheviks reporting education, another 19% attended some form of technical institute and 6.3% were enrolled in the gymnasium. In addition to these forms of education, one individual attended a factory school, three had a parochial school background and one attended the seminary. Of the individuals whose educational level is not reported, at least nine were peasants and four were workers. Therefore, these individuals did not attend the university. If educational background was not recorded in the biographies, the individuals' social backgrounds may have restricted access to education. Even if a student entered a
university, repression may have prevented completion of a degree.

The mixed educational background indicated by the sample reveals the existence of two distinct types of Mensheviks. Those who obtained a university education would have retained their identity as intelligentsia regardless of long term connections with the workers. However, the majority of the Mensheviks lacked higher education permitting the development of a revolutionary identity closer to that of the worker. These distinct types reflect the continuity of worker-intelligentsia conflict apparent as early as the 1870s.

Because most university-educated persons did not enter from the workers and peasantry, education in itself suggests the extent of upper-class and middle-class participation in the movement. However, could such a conclusion be substantiated? In 61 biographies the subjects reported their social origins. The majority of these had an urban or small town background. On the one hand, only 18% were from the gentry class and 9.8% had a military background, while at the other extreme 10.1% were born to peasant families and 6.6% raised by workers. Between these two groups, we find the majority were from professional and merchant backgrounds or what for lack of a better term, we can label the middle class. Using the actual terms
included in the biographies, we can produce the following list:

Table 13: Father's occupation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>No.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Artisan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Businessman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Priest</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Forest warden</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peasants</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Industrialist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gentry</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Merchants</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Rabbis</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Notary</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zemstvo</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Petty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucrat</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Photographer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In reporting social origins, however, these biographies were exceptional. If, they were representative, nonetheless, the majority of our activists were indeed from the emerging middle class. However, the biographer did not know the social origins of some revolutionaries, perhaps because they came from an obscure peasant or worker background.

In Russia, ethnicity was associated with social origin. Restrictions on Jewish movement and education brought about two major streams of Jewish society. As in the case of Martov, there were educated, assimilated Jewish families. However, Jews were also common among artisans and clerks, and sometimes endured impoverished lives in urban ghettos. Based on place of birth, occupation, and
membership in the Bund, thirty-one revolutionaries (21%) were Jews. Their social origins place them in correlation with the middle class.  

The Mensheviks, like Russian society in general, were more heavily urban, industrial, and professional than their parents' generation. Ninety-three Mensheviks noted positions of employment:

Table 14: Occupations of Mensheviks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undefined</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Accountant</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Candymaker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Archivist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Mining Inst. Grad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass cutter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Bookbinder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Peasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metallist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bookkeeper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Pharmacist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gauger</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Business Mangr.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Physician</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Locksmith</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Commercial School</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Coop. Worker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Economist</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Teacher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Engineer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Theater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shoemaker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Zemstvo Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Literary Career</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Midwife</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Professionals such as teachers, professors, physicians, and lawyers were prominent. However, 30.1% were workers and among the workers, 35.7% were printers and another 35.7% were metallists, who contributed a fair share of the worker-
activists. Except for the candymaker, the workers were skilled artisans. Only one activist was recorded as a peasant.

Two typical workers were Feodor Afanas'evich Bulkin and Dmitrii Konstantinovich Glukhov. Bulkin was born in 1888 in St. Petersburg to a family of unskilled laborers, finished factory school and worked as a metalworker in the Baltic factory. He joined the RSDRP in 1904 and became active in Menshevik circles. In 1907, he served on the governing board of the metallists' union and as delegate to the London congress of the RSDRP from Petersburg. Close to the Menshevik "liquidators," he was one of the delegates to the anti-alcoholism congress who was arrested. Imprisoned, then exiled to Kharkhov and Vologda, he eventually went to Germany and began to write about the workers' movement. Bulkin collaborated with other Menshevik authors in Petersburg, Kazan, Samara, and Kharkhov and returned to Russia as editor of Golos Truda published in Samara. Secretary of the War Industries Committee in Samara, he was arrested in September 1916 and exiled to Siberia. Active in Menshevik groups, Bulkin continued propaganda and agitation throughout the revolutionary period. After 1917, he did not aggressively oppose the Bolsheviks and, in 1919, he settled in Kharkhov and joined the Communist Party, attempting to convince left Mensheviks to follow his example.
Glukhov was a peasant from Kaluga gubernia who became a metalworker in Petersburg. A Marxist after 1903, Glukhov was arrested at the meeting of the workers' deputies to the Soviet. In 1907, he joined the executive board of the Metallists' Union and chaired the cultural development society "Knowledge is Light" at Nevskii gates. Arrested in 1910, Glukhov organized Mensheviks in Orlov and in 1917 became a member of VTsIK, a candidate for the list of Mensheviks to the Constituent Assembly, and delegate to the Party Congress in 1917. Born a peasant, Glukhov was one of a growing number of new workers at the turn of the century in Russia.

In general, Menshevik revolutionaries did not follow in the footsteps of their parents. Only two revolutionaries joined the military, a decrease which is echoed by the absence of revolutionaries who returned to the estates after university. Even if their parents were businessmen, professionals, merchants, or gentry, revolutionaries did not always complete their education and often separated themselves from their social origins. For example, E.G. Bogoliubova, from a gentry family, first joined student circles in St. Petersburg. Through these contacts, she became a member of the Bolshevik Petersburg Committee in 1904. A Menshevik during 1905, she began agitation in Gorod district and was tried in absentia for
her activities. Forced to live illegally, she escaped to Chernigov gubernii, but returned to the capital in 1909. The first workers' club in Vasileostrov district was established by Bogoliubova. In 1913, she began to focus on insurance work as editor of the journal *Strakhovanie rabochikh* and in the insurance fund (kassa) at the Briansk factory in 1915. After February, she continued to be an active Menshevik in the Soviet and among workers' associations.

Some individuals who had become successful professionals actively promoted workers' organizations and joined the revolutionary movement. Petr Pavlovich Briukhanov was the son of a land surveyor who became a doctor. In Petersburg, he joined the Union of Struggle in 1896 and went into exile in Geneva where he became associated with Plekhanov. In 1911-12, Briukhanov became a sanatorium doctor and began his lifelong study of the life and labor of the Petersburg workers. In February 1917, he joined *Edinstvo* and became chair of the Nevskii district committee. After October, he continued his profession until his death in Voronezh in 1929.

Only 61 of the Mensheviks in this group followed professions that required higher education; they account for all of the university attendees. Perhaps the rest followed non-professional occupations and consequently did not count
as middle class. Many of the Menshevik activists were employed by unions and cooperatives; others were probably workers who held temporary jobs, maintaining shadowy existences to escape detection from the police and in effect joined the ranks of the professional revolutionaries. As practical workers they were not guided by theory; rather they were dedicated to a vision of a new Russia and sought whatever revolutionary means were possible at the time and in the particular place they settled. A number of individuals moved freely in and out of various revolutionary parties and travelled to different areas of the country by choice or under government order of exile as career activists. Analysis of emigration, arrest and exile may provide further proof of this hypothesis.

Emigration before 1917 certainly shaped the leadership of the revolutionary parties. Wresting them from Russian society, exile contributed to the development of a strikingly different world view. Tactical difficulties also resulted from emigration: Mensheviks who were allegedly dedicated to a broad workers' party would have been separated from the group they hoped to represent. However, only 15.2% of the revolutionaries in this study emigrated for the first time before 1903. Since the overwhelming majority of the activists in the interrevolutionary period joined before the Second Congress of the RSDRP, it is
interesting to note that for these emigration was not a shared experience.  

Table 15: Emigration 1903-1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date of Emigration</th>
<th>Before 1903</th>
<th>1903-1904</th>
<th>1905</th>
<th>1907-1914</th>
<th>Before 1917</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of cases</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent of Total to Date</td>
<td>15.2%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Therefore of the Mensheviks surveyed nearly three-fifths did not emigrate before the revolution of 1917. Furthermore, 46.9% never emigrated and nearly one-third were never abroad. Before 1917, the majority of the activists did not travel abroad and therefore would not be isolated geographically from the laboring classes and furthermore would not have been immersed in Continental culture. Cosmopolitanism was not a major element in the making of the rank and file activist, but rather a factor of identification for the leadership.

A revolutionary activist who never emigrated was Isaac Sergeevich Astrov (pseudonym Povos). He was first arrested in 1902 at the age of fifteen. A Menshevik in 1905, Povos promoted legal work between the revolutions and was labelled a liquidator. In Ekaterinoslav, he
unsuccessfully directed the local election campaign to the Fourth Duma. An internationalist during the war, Povos served on the Organizing Committee of the Foreign Secretariat and on the Central Committee of the Party in 1917. After October, he remained in the right opposition until his arrest in Odessa in 1922. Povos died from typhus on his way to exile that same year.

Another Menshevik who never went abroad was Nikolai Nikolaevich Andreev. Born in 1876 to a family in zemstvo service, Andreev joined before 1905. He was active in workers' clubs and in the Society of People's Universities from 1909 to 1914. In 1911 after a disagreement with the editors of Zvezda, Andreev drew closer to the Menshevik Party. From 1912 to 1917, while contributing to a number of revolutionary newspapers, he served in the Statistical Department of the City Council of St. Petersburg and after October worked in education.

Both of these individuals remained dedicated to practical activity and therefore are excellent examples of activists who would be disposed toward the liquidationist cause. Like the majority of Mensheviks they did not spend years abroad, but remained in Russia to oppose the tsarist regime.

Anna Ivanovna Dobrokhotova, ("Marfuma") also never left the country. She joined Iskra was arrested and exiled
to Siberia in 1903. She escaped and soon became a member of the Social Democratic organization in Petersburg, then in Rostov on Don. She moved to Moscow in time for the December Uprising in December 1905. After the defeat of the revolution, Dobrokhotova worked in Petersburg trade unions, especially with metalworkers. She remained a Menshevik after October and was arrested in 1921. Dobrokhotova died in 1924-5 in Riazan or Kaluga from hemorrhage of the brain. She never left Russia.

The majority of Mensheviks suffered arrest and internal exile sometime during their careers. However, among the individuals studied, forty-six were not arrested by the tsarist government. As represented in the graph below, arrests peaked in the revolutionary years 1905-7 and again in 1910. Long term patterns of arrest and exile affected those who joined before 1903. Of the sixty arrests reported before 1903, thirty one suffered repeat arrests sometime before 1917. Multiple arrests of individuals who were first arrested from 1903-1907 numbered only twelve and of those arrested initially after 1907 only eight were arrested repeatedly. Activists arrested after 1903 generally avoided rearrest, did not emigrate and so must have escaped internal exile, returned to the towns and capitals, and continued agitation and propaganda. A substantial number of Mensheviks, in fact, rejected legal
existence, never completed an education, never took up a steady occupation and lived as revolutionary activists until 1917.

Like arrest and emigration, circle work molded many of the activists of the period. Often resulting in arrest, this underground activity created a spirit of camaraderie and shared danger; it required mutual trust and respect among the revolutionaries who participated. Underground activity, if continued over long periods of time, could result in the formation of a psychology of separation from society, identification with a new social identity group, and singular devotion to the goals and
tactics of that new group. For Mensheviks involved in circle groups, these groups could take the place of familial support networks. Before 1903, more than half the Mensheviks studied participated in circle work. This can be explained by the fact that 54.5% of the individuals joined the Social Democratic movement in the 1890s or earlier when circle work predominated. Student circles attracted most of the Mensheviks during this period; only thirteen organized worker circles. Circles, however, were not exclusively Menshevik. There were populist circles as well as Marxist circles. If the activist joined a particular circle, this group's tendency did not dictate all future affiliations; the circle was simply a step on to different type of revolutionary organization. All revolutionary intelligentsia who became active before 1903 participated in this activity and those who joined after this period generally did not organize circles. If arrest unites the persecuted, the fact that approximately half the Social Democrats who joined in the 1890s suffered arrest might suggest possibilities for the formation of a clan or family structure in the movement. However, such a conclusion could only be upheld by proof that certain groups of activists continued to agree with each other throughout the tumultuous debates over tactics and organization which began in 1903. While many Menshevik leaders came through the revolution
with their original revolutionary conceptions intact, they were not always consistent. Event by event, at each fork in the road, Mensheviks, like Bolsheviks, took separate, sometimes conflicting, paths. There was no ideological or tactical stability in this movement.

Politically, those who became revolutionaries during the period before 1903 were drawn first to Marxism. Only 15.2% of the activists were populists before they became Marxists. There is also little evidence that they were tainted by "so-called economism"; just under one-tenth had belonged to the Union of Social Democrats Abroad or wrote for *Rabochee delo*. Furthermore only seven belonged to the Bund. After 1903, the Mensheviks, like the other revolutionary parties, included activists who had not participated in circles. Political and theoretical positions among the activists varied due to time, geography and personal associations not on a predisposition to a particular political ideology. Political identification with a particular tendency in the revolutionary movement would have to be influenced by the existence of activists of that orientation in the area and by the experiences of a circle of friendships and acquaintances in that region. If a Menshevik or Bolshevik committee was organized in a particular area, those inclined toward revolutionary activity would join the existing party. Local committees
could be organized from the center but might be difficult to establish in the presence of a long standing group of associates already drawn to a party. Generally, political orientation was a function of geography. Even in larger cities, the existence of a party faction on the shop floor led many workers to join that party without considering alternatives. Shop loyalties often contributed to strong resistance toward centralization or to an externally imposed structure. The influence of place and personal association, therefore, restricted the ideological commitment of the activist. Likewise, arrest and exile to another region led many revolutionaries to switch allegiances often, especially if they were activists throughout the revolutionary period.

If a revolutionary did not ideologically commit to the Menshevik, Bolshevik or SR party before becoming active, can we identify right and left tendencies within the movement? For example, a consistently right-wing Menshevik would have rejected terror before 1903, been an Economist in the 1890s, joined the Mensheviks immediately in 1903, remained a Menshevik throughout the revolution of 1905-7, become a liquidationist and then a defensist joining the WIG and left Russia soon after October to continue resistance to the Bolsheviks. In reality and despite Soviet interpretations of Menshevism, few revolutionaries meet such rigid criteria for identification within the right tendency.
One clear example of a rightest was Vladimir Osipovich Tsederbaum, Martov's younger brother, who wrote and worked under the name Levitskii. Levitskii was first arrested in Petersburg in 1899, then in 1902 for his part in the student movement. He worked in the Social Democratic movement in Dvinsk, Poltava, Kharkov, and Ekaterinoslav. In 1903, after being freed from prison, Levitskii fled illegally to Geneva and became a Menshevik. Associated with Liquidationism between the revolutions, he contributed to Nasha zaria, Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii and the defensist collection Samozashchita. After October, Levitskii was arrested, then participated in the Union of Rebirth. He was shot in June 1941.

A second long-term right Menshevik, Ivan Ivanovich Ladizhenskii, was born on a country estate in 1872. He joined the student movement in Petersburg and the Mensheviks after the Second Congress. A Menshevik after the split, he was also associated with the "liquidators." He served as a member of the Petrograd City Government from 1917 until his arrest in 1921. He was allowed to emigrate to Paris, then settled in the United States in 1940. Ladizhenskii contributed to the Menshevik publication Sotsialistichestskii vestnik until his death in 1957.

A third rightest, Mark Liber was born Mikhail Isakovich Gol'dman in 1880. He began political work in 1898
and was arrested the next year. Liber joined the Bund and the Union of Russian Social Democrats Abroad, and he was a delegate to the Second Congress of the RSDRP. A friend of Akimov and opponent of Lenin at the Second Congress, Liber is closely associated with the liquidators. Liber was a delegate at the Stockholm "Unity" Congress, the London Party Congress and a member of the Central Committee. Arrested in 1910 and 1915, he was a member of the August Bloc and a defensist. In February 1917, he became a leader of the Menshevik-SR Bloc, chaired VTsIK, and was on the Central Committee of the RSDRP and the Bund. A delegate to the Constituent Assembly, Liber left the Central Committee after the Bolsheviks took power. Although constantly under arrest, he remained active in SD organizations in the South as a leader of the right tendency. He was shot by the Communists in Alma-Ata in 1937.

A consideration of right Menshevism permits an examination of the label "liquidator." Fifty-three individuals from the sample were considered liquidators by their biographers. The correlation between activists in the period before 1903 and after 1907 indicates that 41 of 53 (77%) of the liquidators were praktiki, before the 1905 Revolution. Therefore, the new revolutionary culture which predominated after the Stolypin coup had strong precedent during the time of the "Economist" controversy. Many of
seasoned praktiki had been actively involved in agitation among workers before the "Days of Freedom." However, even among the liquidators, only eleven can be identified as members of the Union Abroad, collaborators with Rabochee delo or "Legal Marxists." The continuity in tactics was not paralleled by direct affiliation with those Lenin successfully branded as "Economists."

The liquidators' political affiliation was not constant. The majority left the country or were arrested after the October Revolution; however, fourteen, or 26.4%, remained. Twelve liquidators held government or party posts after 1917. Six Liquidators were Bolsheviks during the 1905 Revolution. From these statistics, "Liquidationism" can be identified as a tactical program determined as much by political conditions as ideology. That is, the praktiki always favored agitational work among the workers inside Russia. Practice, not theory, guided their endeavors.

Further examination of party affiliation demonstrates that Menshevik activists often had periods of membership in the Bolshevik Party, or were drawn at various times to associations with Trotsky's Pravda Group or Plekhanov's Party Mensheviks. Again, depending on their location, activists adopted varying tendencies such as liquidationism, defensism and internationalism. Acceptance of a particular tendency concerning the questions of party
organization and the war cannot be determined absolutely on the basis of the biographies since in many cases this information was unknown. Party activists did not adopt in every case the position of the right, or the left or the center, but apparently approached each episode in the revolutionary period differently. Since these theoretical shifts are usually reported in relation to arrest and exile, or movement to another region, it is apparent that personal associations and geography played the major role in affiliation. Just over one-tenth of the Mensheviks had been members of the Bolshevik Party in or before 1905. There are few instances of activists converting to Bolshevism in the interrevolutionary period. Mensheviks who joined the Communist Party after 1917 totalled 17.2%. Those close to Trotsky were a distinct minority. Only five were close to the Pravda group before the revolution and two were active in the Mezhraionka. The Plekhanovites were slightly more numerous with six in Edinstvo, and four Party Mensheviks. Just 22.8% of the persons surveyed were specifically identified as liquidators although this inclination was more common if activities in workers' clubs, trade unions, and contributions to the liquidationist papers, Luch and Nasha zaria, are considered evidence of this tendency. Only five were associated with the Initiative Group. During the war, the Menshevik party activists were more conservative as
defensism captured a third of the Mensheviks in this period. However, it should be noted once again that those on the far right who were both liquidationist and defensist numbered just twenty-one. Fewer Mensheviks took the left position of internationalism during the war: only 13.1% belonged to the internationalist tendency. Furthermore, Menshevik Internationalists usually did not agree with the liquidators before the war: only eight activists supported both tendencies. Therefore, left and right tendencies of Menshevism can not be simply peeled off to locate the center position throughout the entire revolutionary period. Issue by issue, there existed a left, right and central position and individual activists did not take an opinion based upon an overpowering dedication to left or right. Some Menshevik leaders may have acted in this manner, but the rank and file activists belonged to an always shifting bank of tactics, apart from any current or future interpretation of factionalism. Factionalism is this sense is fiction.

The examples of individuals who switched political allegiances throughout their careers as revolutionary activists are many. Born in 1868, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Rozhkov, who worked under the pseudonym Viacheslav, began his career among the ranks of the Bolsheviks as a newspaper editor and member of the Central Committee, the local Moscow and Petersburg Committees. He was a Bolshevik delegate to
the Stockholm and London Congresses. While in exile in Siberia in 1908, he crossed to the Mensheviks, began writing for *Nasha zaria* and sympathized with the liquidators. Viacheslav supported the Zimmerwald Internationalists during the war and in 1917 joined the Central Committee of the Menshevik Party. Arrested during time of the Kronstadt strike, he was imprisoned in Peter and Paul Fortress. In 1923, Viacheslav attempted to join the Communist Party. He died in 1927.

The biographies reflect patterns of Menshevik membership which could be predicted by the history of the party as a whole. The largest influx into the Menshevik Party occurred immediately after the Second Congress when 58 or 40% joined. Since initially, the Mensheviks after 1903 were actually the majority, these figures support the accepted interpretation of revolutionary historiography. The party continued to grow before 1905 with the enrollment of nineteen more members of the sample. The second influx into the Party occurred in the period 1905-7 when 44 or 30.3% joined, again demonstrating the success of the party committees inside Russia during the first revolutionary period. After the Stolypin coup, this expansion of party ranks was halted: only six joined between the revolutions and another seven in 1917. Expansion in membership before
1907, permitted the Mensheviks to remain active in the expanding labor movement.

The Menshevik Party was as a whole maintained its dedication to the establishment of a broad based mass party as reflected by the wide range of organized and networked activities indicated below:

Table 16: Menshevik Legal Activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to Social Congresses</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Journal editors</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to local or city Duma</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Trade Unions</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to State Duma</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Workers' clubs</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to Moscow Soviet</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Workers' Cooperatives</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to Petersburg Soviet</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Workers' Insurance</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delegates to other Soviet</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Women's movement</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Membership in workers' associations included 42% of the Menshevik activists sampled. Furthermore, if contributors to newspapers and journals are included with the editors, half the activists were participating actively in agitation and propaganda. Ten Mensheviks would later serve in the Provisional Government and twelve were elected to the Constituent Assembly. Party work also demanded the time of these revolutionaries. Nearly one-third were delegates to party congresses and one-fifth were at one time or another
members of the Central Committee of the RSDRP (Bolshevik or Menshevik). Leadership positions were not held by the majority of our sample; however, the overwhelming majority of our activists participated in daily organizing, agitation and propaganda at the local level.

These revolutionaries were in daily contact with Russian laborers and in many cases were themselves workers. The biographies of particular praktiki bring into reality the complex nature of their dedication to agitation and propaganda. Petr Garvi (Iurii, Iu. Chatskii) successfully organized workers throughout his revolutionary career. Born in Odessa in 1881, Garvi was arrested for agitational work among workers in 1902. He escaped Siberian exile and made his way to Paris and Geneva. Part of the "circle of those about to leave" for agitational work in Russia, Garvi was closely associated with Akselrod. In 1905, Garvi organized workers in Kiev, Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, Rostov, and Odessa. He promoted the establishment of the workers' congress and edited trade union publications in St. Petersburg. Considered a liquidator, Garvi refused to sit on the Russian Bureau of the TsK after 1910. Garvi was a founding member of the Initiative Group and a delegate to the Vienna Conference in 1912. As a member of the Menshevik OK, he was arrested and exiled in 1916. An trade union organizer and Menshevik in 1917, Garvi was arrested and
deported in 1923. He emigrated to New York where he remained an active Menshevik until his death in 1944.

Mikhail Grigor'evich Grinevich (Kogan) joined the ranks of revolutionaries in 1897 and a year later was a leading member of Union of Russian Social Democrats. A leading praktik both before and after 1905, Grinevich dedicated his career to trade union activity. In 1903, Grinevich was arrested and exiled to eastern Siberia. He escaped to St. Petersburg where he joined the Menshevik Party organization. In 1905, he joined the Soviet from the Union of Printers and chaired the Second Conference of Trade Unions in 1906. By 1912, his expertise in workers' associations led him to become active in Moscow's Museum of Labor and then in the Chuprovskii society dedicated to the question of the future of workers and working out collective agreements. Grinevich was a defensist during the war. At the Third Conference of Trade Unions in 1917 he was elected chair of VTsSPS which passed a resolution against coalition in the Provisional Government. After October, Grinevich remained a right Menshevik and authored works on the history of the Russian trade union movement.

Anatolii Eduardovich Diubua, who worked under the pseudonym O. Gorskii, was born in 1882 in Petersburg. A Bolshevik in 1905, he was a member of the Council for the Unemployed. Gorskii crossed over to the Mensheviks and
joined the editorial board of trade union organs and Nasha delo. A defensist during the war, he was at the front in 1917. After February, Gorskii joined the Ministry of labor in the Provisional Government and remained an active right Menshevik in Petersburg and Moscow after October. During the Civil War, he remained in the opposition, was arrested by the Cheka in 1918, exiled to Siberia and expelled in 1922-23. Gorskii remained a right Menshevik until the Second World War when he joined the left socialist group of F.I.Dan's Novyi Put' in New York.

Another worker activist was Pavel Nikolaevich Kolokol'nikov (K. Dmitriev). He joined the SDs in 1895 in Moscow as a member of the Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. He was also closely associated with the economists through the journal Rabochee delo. A Menshevik in 1903, he worked in Petersburg, Nizhnyi and Kiev. In 1905-6, he began to concentrate on establishing trade unions. At Stockholm, Kolokol'nikov was elected to the Central Committee of the Party and he continued to work in Petersburg trade unions until 1910. A defensist during the war, Kolokol'nikov was in the Ministry of Labor in 1917. After October, he left the Central Committee and joined the Right Mensheviks. Although he was repeatedly under arrest, he contributed to the trade union
press and authored works on history of unions and cooperatives.

Vladimir Mikhailovich Leshchinskii worked in the Petersburg Menshevik organization from 1906 until his arrest in 1925. A member of the candymakers' union, he was active in the Duma election campaign, the revolutionary press, and the kassa. After 1917, Leshchinskii established the Vasileostrov workers' club "Zaria" and was its chair until its closing by the Bolsheviks in 1918. He left politics until 1922, when he returned to active illegal Social Democratic work in the capitals. Leshchinskii was arrested and sentenced to two years in prison in 1925.

The biographies of Menshevik activists who concentrated agitation and propaganda in workers' associations are extensive. The examples provided demonstrate the devotion of the revolutionaries to the growing workers' movement before and after 1905 and are indicative of expanding Social Democratic influence.

Social Democracy in all its organizational forms greatly impacted the workers' movement. By 1912, the strike movement began to escalate and recruitment to the Bolshevik faction also began to increase. Analysis of increasing Bolshevik hegemony among the workers has led many historians of the revolution to conclude that the age of the workers and the activists directly contributed to this radicalism.
However, statistics on the age of the Menshevik rank and file reveal a much younger group than might be assumed from studies of the revolution. Among the sample, 122 reported age. Although the Bolsheviks enjoyed a rapid influx of younger recruits in 1917, in 1905 the Mensheviks were also very young. As indicated in the graph below, 40.9% were 25 or younger and 58.9% of the revolutionaries were thirty years of age or younger in 1905. Only 18.9% were over the age of 35. Of course, by 1917 these figures would indicate a much older group. At that time, 59% of the Mensheviks were older than 37. The 18.9% that was 35 or older in 1905 were now 52 and older. However, because the sample excludes Mensheviks who joined the party after 1914, these figures cannot be taken as proof that the party was out of touch with youth.¹⁰
Long term activity in the revolutionary movement generally involved many different political conversions both before and after 1917. Many party activists worked for years in propaganda and agitation and after the Soviet Revolution continued to work and live in Russia. Sometimes these individuals were arrested, but other Mensheviks lived out the remainder of their lives without continued repression. Many became members of the Bolshevik party after 1917 and worked successfully under the new government until the 1930s. If an individual revolutionary continued to support socialist goals regardless of party affiliation, the particulars of party ideology are clearly meaningless to that individual. Vision and dedication to revolutionary
goals, devotion to an aesthetic, often zealous utopianism, clearly governed the passions of these activists - not acceptance of any particular program. Factionalism which so many emigres remembered after 1917 may not have been as extreme as indicated by their memoirs during the interrevolutionary period.

After October fully 43.4% of the Mensheviks remained in Russia holding government and party jobs. Those having the most potential for influence were the 41 who held posts in the government, especially as members of Gosplan and VTsIK. Also it should be noted that the number of individuals who converted to the Communist Party comprises 35.3% of the individuals who never emigrated. Serving as a hard core of revolutionaries, these activists were clearly determined to establish revolutionary socialism regardless of the particular ideological creed. Mensheviks serving the Soviet government remain at their post as described in the following table:

Table 17: Government and Party Service after 1917 (last reported period of activity)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1917</th>
<th>After October</th>
<th>1920s</th>
<th>1930s</th>
<th>1950s</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percent of post-1917 activists ending service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>36.6%</th>
<th>41.5%</th>
<th>19.5%</th>
<th>2.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
These revolutionaries were employed in various positions. For example, Gosplan employed eight Mensheviks and sixteen held seats on VTsIK and so directly affected the economic and political environment after 1917. Seven former Mensheviks held teaching positions at the secondary level and at the university. Fifteen of those who remained in Russia after October worked outside the government and education. The majority of those who remained behind did not join the Communist Party, which numbered among its converts only twenty-four former Mensheviks or a total of 35.3% of those who never emigrated.

Of course, the careers of former Mensheviks were not always successful after October. As the historical literature demonstrates, there is a substantial record of repression especially of individuals who remained in the opposition. After October, forty-nine were arrested by the Communists and suffered varying degrees of punishment for their political transgressions. Some were permitted to emigrate, others sent to camps and by the 1930s arrested Mensheviks were shot. The following table details the treatment of arrested activists:
Table 18: Emigration and Arrest after October 1917

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Oct. 1917</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1920s</th>
<th>1930s</th>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of emigrations</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrests</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of those arrested we find varying patterns of punishment. All eight arrested in the 1930s were shot. A total of fourteen were allowed to emigrate after their arrests, but eight died in prison or on their way to exile. Nearly, two-fifths of the arrested Mensheviks were eventually released and spent the remainder of their lives in Russia. This brings the total emigration after the Bolsheviks took power to only 17.9%. Sixteen Mensheviks died in prison or were eventually shot in the 1930s while nineteen were released and lived out their lives in Soviet Russia. Other Mensheviks fled persecution or were forced into exile after October. Although total permanent emigration consisted of 23.4% of those studied, the majority or twenty-six left Russia after October. (Only eight left permanently before 1917) As emigration after October obviously increased among the Mensheviks after October, so did arrests. The first wave of arrests occurred during the period 1918-21, when a total of thirty three individuals were arrested: in 1920 and 1921 eleven were arrested each year. Another wave of
arrests began in the 30s especially surrounding the Menshevik trial of 1931.

Most of those who remained in Russia after October had long revolutionary careers and had been members of different parties. Attaching names to the statistics and detailing their pursuits illustrates their service to Social Democratic aims. Vladimir Aleksandrovich Bazarov, who practiced revolutionary activity under the pseudonym Sergei, was born in 1874 and joined the Social Democrats in 1895. He was a publicist, economist, and philosopher. A Bolshevik in 1905, Bazarov participated in the Stockholm Congress under the pseudonym Matveev. By 1910, Matveev was regularly contributing to *Nasha zaria* and was close to the liquidators. From 1915 to 1919, Matveev edited a number of revolutionary newspapers such as *Letopis'* and the Kharkov Menshevik journal *Mysl*. He worked in the Communist Academy in economics until 1930 when he was arrested.

Mikhail Lazorovich Vel'tman-Pavlovich (pseudonym Volonter) was first arrested at the age of 21 in 1892. After eighteen months in prison, he was exiled to Iakutsk gubernii for five years. At the end of his exile Vel'tman-Pavlovich settled in Odessa and Kishenev, joined the SDs, then travelled to Paris where he became a Menshevik after the split. He represented the Mensheviks at the Plenum of Central Committee in Paris in 1910, contributed to *Golos*
sotsial-demokrata, and supported the Internationalist position during the war. In February, Vel'tman-Pavlovich remained a Menshevik but after October crossed to the Bolsheviks and began to work in Narkomindel. Following the Soviet Revolution, he spent a many years in the Soviet apparatus and published a series of popular works on the history of imperialism in Europe, Asia and Africa.

Iakov-Iosif Moiseevich Grintsen remained in Russia after 1917. Born in 1865 in Odessa, he was arrested as a student member of the narodvoltsy. Exiled for six years to eastern Siberia, Grintsen emigrated and graduated from Berlin Higher Technical School for engineers-mechanics. Returning to Russia, he was again arrested in 1903, joined the Mensheviks and in 1905 worked in Odessa. A member of the Organizing Commission in 1906, he remained an active Menshevik throughout the revolutionary period. In 1922 Grintsen joined the Bolsheviks and participated in VSNKh. He was arrested in 1931 for ties with the Menshevik trial.

Another long term activist was Abram Moiseievich Ginzberg who worked under the pseudonyms Andrei, Grigorii, Efim, Naum (Naumov) and Veloks. He became a Social Democrat in 1897 and after the turn of the century was an illegal typesetter for revolutionary groups from throughout Russia until his arrest in 1902. Escaping exile in 1905, Ginzberg joined Menshevik organizations in Moscow and Riga, and from
1906 to 1910 was an active liquidator in St. Petersburg. Arrested again, he emerged in Kiev as an activist from 1912 to 1922. In 1928 Ginzberg was chair of the college of economic planning and Industrial Affairs Bureau in the Soviet government. In 1930, he was arrested with other former Mensheviks and sentenced to ten years in prison.

Another revolutionary who served the cause of Social Democracy throughout the revolutionary period was Emmanuil L'vovich Gurevich who took the pseudonyms Smirnov and K. Danovich. First arrested in 1884, he emigrated to Switzerland, joined the narodvoltsy and then became a Marxist. First a Legal Marxist he soon joined the Union of Social Democrats Abroad, then in 1905 joined the Mensheviks in Petersburg as an activist in the Duma. Arrested in 1911, Smirnov was exiled to Smolensk from 1913 to 1914 when he returned to active Menshevik work in Petersburg and Moscow and supported the defensists in the war. In August 1917, Smirnov left the Mensheviks and was employed in the Archives in Moscow and later in the Institute of Marxism-Leninism.

A "liquidator" who became a member of the Academy of Sciences in 1929 was Petr Maslov (Iks, Dzhon). An economist drawn in the agrarian question, Maslov became a Marxist in the 1890s and published articles on this question in a brochure with Lenin. A publicist and propagandist, Maslov remained in the right tendency and after October
became active in scientific and pedagogical activities. He died in 1946.

Vladimir Gustavovich Groman was also instrumental in Soviet economic planning after October. Like Maslov, he authored a project for the RSDRP program on the Agrarian question and he supported Akselrod's idea of a workers' congress. During the war and after February, he worked in rationing and food supply. Groman left the Menshevik party in 1922, and was active in statistics and planning until his conviction in the Menshevik trial of 1931.

Like Groman and Maslov, Mikhail Aleksandrovich Lur'e, who wrote under the name Iurii Larin, was a right Menshevik who was involved in Soviet economic planning. After his arrest for Marxist activities in 1902, he escaped exile and became an Menshevik propagandist in Kiev and Petersburg. Larin supported the plan for a workers' congress in 1905 and contributed to liquidationist journals. An internationalist during the war, Larin joined the Bolshevik party before October. As a communist, he was a leading thinker in regional economics and authored a national plan for industry. Long term activists such as Larin were numerous in the biographies collected for this study. More than the memoirists who wrote in the 1950s and 1960s, the lives of these revolutionaries provide an accurate picture of this wing of Social Democracy.
Menshevik praktiki between the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 were long term career activists. Those who joined before 1903 carried the kernel of practical agitational work into the interrevolutionary period; but this did not bind them to any particular theory. In contrast to the Menshevik leadership, many Mensheviks had sporadic periods of affiliation with the Bolsheviks or other party factions. Tight-knit circles of comrades may have enveloped the leaders, but the rank and file moved within a broad family of revolutionary associates adhering to all the variants of Marxist theory.

As a result of educational and social background, two distinct types of revolutionaries emerged. Although more than one-third of the sample completed a university education, their occupations placed them apart from a gentry or bourgeois culture. Unable to shed their intellectual identity, these activists assumed leadership positions in workers' associations. However, their social and educational background prevented a complete personal adaptation to working class identities. These Mensheviks remained separate but aspired for a reconnection with the masses. The Mensheviks whose social origins were those of the emerging middle class, often became workers or chose to
live illegal, shadowy existences inside Russia rather than follow the career paths of their parents. Certainly, by self-training as well as education the majority were members of the intelligentsia; however, the social background of the majority was not that of the intelligentsia.

The overwhelming majority of the rank and file remained in Russia throughout their lives; a minority emigrated temporarily before 1917. The connecting thread of revolutionary practice before and after 1905 theoretically bound Menshevism to the workers, and the praktiki to the label of liquidationism. Remaining after the Soviet Revolution, these Mensheviks demonstrated their devotion to a new Russia. Although this emerging nation eventually would abandon those who had attended its birth, their vision must be credited for its contribution to the revolutionary experiment in Russia.

ENDNOTES


2 See for example Istoriia kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza vol. 1 (Moscow, 1964); Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, A. K., Mezhdu revoliutsiama, 1906-1916

From the entire sample however only 36.6% were known to have attended the university.

These statistics also imply a general stereotype of Menshevism: that a substantial number of Jews joined the party in this period. Membership in the Band can be used to identify these individuals, but only 9 biographies recorded membership in this organization. It is true however that most Jews would have been occupied in the professional and merchant sector.

Georgian Mensheviks numbered only seven.

Throughout the period before 1917, of the individuals studied seven left Russia permanently.

However, among the highly educated propagandists common to the Party before 1903, this alienation did always lead to an abandonment of their identity as *intelligenty* perpetuating the worker/intelligentsia conflict of the 1880s and 1890s.

For a study of this right tendency see Ananin, "Rightest Tendency" Menshevik Project, Columbia University.

Although an exact count was not made of individuals joining after 1914, the research indicates that few joined the party after 1917 and therefore the Menshevik Party will continue to get older.

CHAPTER V.
"LIQUIDATORS" AND THE PARTY:
THE NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY

In 1908, St. Petersburg metalworkers and rank and file party workers began to read articles in the pages of the socialist press with titles such as "What is liquidationism?", "Liquidationism and anti-liquidationism" and "Around the liquidators." The underground party organization had in fact all but disappeared. Efforts to resuscitate its committees and connect them with the expanding workers' associations brought about a debate between the praktiki, practical party activists in the mass labor movement, and the emigres concerning tactics and organization. These debates sparked the "Liquidationist Controversy" in the Russian Revolutionary movement. At congresses, plenums, conferences and in the press, over the next four years, party leaders attempted to label, define and control newly emerging praktiki who resisted centralized control from abroad.

In reality, Russian activists of every political shade resented emigre attempts to subordinate and discipline their operations. The activists' revolt signaled the
appearance of a separate revolutionary culture, involving a new cadre of party workers, trained in unions, workers' clubs and cooperatives, and ignorant of early ideological disputes in their revolutionary heritage. In conflict with the conspiratorial, centralized party structure of the early revolutionary movement, the new rank and file asserted their independence from the emigres. The seasoned party professionals encountered activists at congresses and conferences, confronted them in the Marxist press and at party meetings, and finally attempted to rein them in with political devices. Unity - the call word of the day - was violated by the party hierarchy. As the activists and emigres splintered into factions, the revolutionary spirit which had begun to reemerge late in 1909 was undermined. In fact, the revolutionary drive which could have produced an overturn in 1914 according to Leopold Haimson and others, was well on its way when the liquidationist controversy hit the pages of the socialist press. By not recognizing the expanding strength of its own party base, both Menshevik and Bolshevik leaders crushed the newly emerging movement. They thus allowed more extreme political elements to gain strength in party organizations, and encouraged radical activists to come to the fore, while jettisoning the seasoned praktiki in the center.
Between the revolutions, the Menshevik Party existed in four separate groupings: emigres, *literaturny*, *praktiki* and worker activists.¹ Emigres Martov, Dan and Akselrod energetically denied the existence of liquidationism. Blinded by theory they neglected bold political steps which might have further isolated Lenin. They were assisted by intellectuals inside Russia, the *literaturny*, who shunned practical work but defended the party against charges of liquidationism in the Russian press. As unskilled politically as the emigres, their defense was also limited to discourse. The Menshevik *praktiki* whose concentration on legal work brought about the birth of a new group of party workers formed a bridge between the *literaturny* and the new cadre of worker activists. Often chosen as delegates to conferences and congresses, they favored reform of the party and maintained a revolutionary vision of Russia's future through the activities of an independent labor party. Representatives of the new culture, the worker activists were members of the legal and semilegal workers' associations who considered themselves members of a socialist party. Sometimes they joined the party, sometimes not, but they always voted for socialist candidates and platforms and avidly attended lectures, excursions, and other educational functions organized by party members. To varying degrees, each of
these groups carried the seed of a new revolutionary culture with a consistent organizational principle: the locus of power should not be the underground party.

A tendency toward "liquidationism" existed in the new culture which emerged during the 1905-7 Revolution. Chronologically, the struggle for reform can be divided into four periods. From the time of the Stolypin coup in June 1907 to 1908, Party congresses and conferences successfully condemned the drift toward legalism. However, when the Bolshevik Party inside Russia splintered in 1908-9, the Menshevik praktiki's yearning to strengthen the Party's legal base intensified. Despite condemnations by Lenin and the Party hierarchy, activists won concessions in 1910 and began to reorganize the Party inside Russia. From 1910 to 1912, especially in St. Petersburg, the "liquidationists" realized the growth of independent initiative among working class elements which they had anticipated. Beginning in 1912, Lenin engineered a split of the Duma faction, and risked everything to recapture the Party and to defeat forces for unity.²

During the first of these periods, from 1907 to 1908, the Party officially directed the actions of the Social Democratic Duma deputies. In July 1907, at the Third Conference of the RSDRP in Kotka, Finland, Lenin voted with the Menshevik delegates to approve participation in the
Third Duma. At the Fourth Conference, in November 1907, delegates resolved the TsK should direct SD deputies. The eighteen Social Democratic delegates, perhaps in imitation of the German socialist deputies under Bismarck, resisted control from abroad. They argued practicality required such self-reliance since a sporadic illegal committee could not advise the deputies as efficiently as informal Petersburg contacts.¹ Mensheviks and non-factional socialists including the publicist A. N. Potresov, Menshevik praktik I. A. Isuf, Professor Sviatlovskii and the liberationist S. N. Prokopovich had access in an advisory capacity to the Duma faction and functioned in place of a directing party body.⁴

The existence of this informal council and Lenin's vote against a boycott of Duma elections aggravated left Bolsheviks such as A. A. Bogdanov and A. V. Lunacharskii. In the spring of 1908, the left wing of the Bolshevik Party censured the Duma deputies and demanded their recall. Labelled "otzovists," from the Russian verb "to recall," these Bolsheviks demanded an end to all "legal" work in the Duma, trade unions, congresses, conferences and workers' associations. The otzovists believed government reaction made agitation in the open impossible and dangerous and that all organizing efforts should be concentrated on the underground. They consistently acted to weaken Duma
Trade union tactics were also governed by Party resolutions. At Stuttgart in August 1907, the International condemned union "neutrality," defined as the policy of some unions to reject formal ties to a properly constituted socialist party. Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks generally disregarded Party Congress resolutions requiring formal affiliation after 1906. Menshevik delegates to the Fourth and Fifth Congress promoted trade union neutrality a position also advanced by the praktiki in the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. The Central Bureau members, dominated by Mensheviks Kolokol'nikov, B. I. Magidov, N. I. Andreev, A. I. Ginzburg, and the Bolshevik Kanatchikov, recognized that workers shunned official party affiliation fearing government persecution. To further restrict the independence of local SD groups, the TsK formed the Trade Union Cooperative Commission to carry out decisions of the Congress and organize trade union leaders. The commission consisted of three representatives of the Russian Bureau of the TsK and two from the Bolshevik dominated Petersburg Committee (PK) both institutions which usually restricted legal activists. It also included one representative from the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and four from party groups of the textileworkers and metallists. Therefore,
even though the Party placed obstacles before the \textit{praktiki}, there was a growing consensus in 1907-8 on the validity of legal work.

Throughout 1907-8, two party institutions, the Russian Bureau of the TsK and the Petersburg Committee (PK) which were dominated by left Bolsheviks, consistently challenged the Menshevik \textit{praktiki} and the Duma faction. The Menshevik Ramishvili threatened to resign from the TsK, if another Menshevik was not added to the five member Russian Bureau. His untimely resignation on 24 February 1908 further reduced Menshevik influence on the central organs of the Party.\footnote{G} On 4 April 1908, SD Duma deputies introduced an interpellation on the persecution of trade unions and began to collect information from local workers.\footnote{Otzovists in the St. Petersburg Textile Workers' Union convinced members not to cooperate with the Duma's efforts. One PK Committee member, Sesitskii, used his "party veto" to reject any resolutions of the Metalworkers' Union which was in opposition to party resolutions.} The PK representative who observed meetings of the Menshevik dominated Central Bureau of Trade Unions demanded full voting rights in November 1908. In response, the Central Bureau voted to exclude all party representatives from meetings.\footnote{By 1908, Lenin's ideological disagreements with Bolsheviks on the left and Mensheviks on the right became
headlines in the socialist press. Lenin called for a "struggle on two fronts" against "liquidationism" on the left and the right. Although, Lenin successfully arranged the expulsion of the otzovists from the party, his polemical attack on the Mensheviks won few recruits among Bolshevik activists, who sought reconciliation with the Mensheviks. These Bolshevik "conciliators" included trade unionists such as I. P. Goldenberg, Kanatchikov, Lebedev of the Textile workers', and Roman Malinovskii of the Metalworkers' Union who struggled to establish politically independent trade unions. The Bolshevik split weakened Lenin's leadership and opened the door to the ascension of legal activists inside Russia. Lenin's only recourse was organizational struggle and polemics.

The discourse of this controversy recalled earlier debates between Lenin and the Economists. As in 1903, "unity," "party," "movement" and "member" defined the controversy for both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. Mensheviks traditionally defined these terms in the broadest sense. When evaluating trade union-party relations, Martov wrote that the unity of class forces in trade unions depended upon political non-affiliation. In this equation, Martov denoted "unity" as a combination of Marxist theory with unionized workers to produce a class conscious proletariat. The emigre Feodor Dan wrote in the Menshevik paper, Golos
sotsial-demokrata, that propaganda, agitation and organization were all necessary for the proper development of a working class political party. Propaganda, long the prerogative of socialist circles, implied revolutionary goals, while agitation temporarily postponed the revolution, focusing workers' demands on economic and political reform. In reply to the criticism that Mensheviks comprehended "cultural" not "revolutionary work," Dan explained that police repression prevented propaganda. Currently, the party could only direct agitation in the Duma fraction, the economic movement and trade unions and connect these actions to more significant political issues. The revived party organization had brought about a change in personnel. As the Party reorganized, Dan warned members to avoid the preservation of "fossils" which would create "barriers" to a unified party. Dan considered party cells an obstacle to a unified Party. Unity, then, according to Dan implied the inclusion of legal activists and therefore involved the "liquidation of the old party."¹⁶ Dan, like many Menshevik theorists, stood on the side of reform. A letter by "I.," published in Golos sotsial-demokrata, blamed the organizational crisis on the PK's hostility to the Duma faction and trade union work. The author, probably B. I. Gorev who used pseudonym "I.," summoned the praktiki to work toward unity within the movement.¹⁷ For Gorev, a praktik
rather than a theorist, unity was not a theory; it was a practice undertaken by members of a broad labor movement. Likewise the term "movement" had a status above that of "Party." For the Mensheviks, the Party was only a section of the revolutionary movement rather than the leading institution of that movement. In general, according to Menshevik traditions, all these terms - Party, movement, unity and member - involved the most democratic interpretations of Marx. These traditions linked theoretical Menshevism and "liquidationism."

The Menshevik attack on the old party structure reached a peak with the circulated letter of two Menshevik TsK members, Martynov and Gorev, in July 1908. The authors protested plans for a Party conference to be held abroad since the meeting could not include "vital and active elements of Social Democracy." To increase the authority of the praktiki, they suggested that the Central Committee, in itself a defunct "simple fiction," be replaced with an "Information Bureau." The organizational features of the conflict apparent in denunciations of Bolshevik expropriations echoed the moralizing tone often used by Martov against the Bolsheviks. Characterizing future participation in the TsK as "useless and giving rise to harmful organizational illusions" Gorev and Martynov threatened to resign if their suggestions were ignored. The
reference to "organizational illusions" alluded to the ortovists' use of the term "constitutional illusions" to describe Duma activities.\textsuperscript{18}

As anticipated, the Menshevik proposal "On the reorganization of the TsK" was condemned by the Party Plenum which met in Geneva in August 1908.\textsuperscript{19} Instead of reform, the Plenum voted to strengthen the underground and revive the Russian Bureau.\textsuperscript{20} However, the composition of the five member Russian Bureau of TsK conceded authority to the legalists. I. P. Gol'denberg, a former member of the Russian Bureau and the Trade Union Commission, represented the Bolsheviks and M. I. Broido, a praktik in cooperatives and trade unions, the Mensheviks. I. L. Iudin, the Bund's delegate, worked in the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and was close to the "liquidators." The Polish and Latvian SD groups, sometimes unpredictable in allegiance, were also represented.\textsuperscript{21} Despite this concession, legal activists remained suspicious of party institutions governed from abroad.

Suspicions were confirmed by the failure of Menshevik resolutions at the Fifth Party Conference in Paris, 21-27 December 1908. Menshevik delegates who were in a minority hoped to integrate the reemerging illegal components with the legalists.\textsuperscript{22} In a series of proposals the Caucasus delegation - Dan, Ramishvili, and Akselrod -
reaffirmed the Menshevik concept of party members as "conscious elements actively working in the name of revolutionary socialism in any section of the workers' movement." To strengthen the authority of the legal activists, Mensheviks proposed that emigres be prohibited from serving on the Russian Bureau. The activists also planned a joint conference of legal and illegal party groups. In reply to accusations of a "cult of legality" and the "negation of the illegal organization," the delegation reminded their critics that they were "delegates of an illegal party organization to an illegal conference." Further, the proposal that legal elements merge with the underground was in itself illegal. In this debate, the Mensheviks aimed to prevent their marginalization by the Party, by stating they were the truly illegal faction.

Menshevik delegates furthered their claims of legitimacy by challenging the voting status of Bolsheviks from St. Petersburg. As evidence, the Caucasus delegation reported that a Menshevik conference of delegates from seven districts representing 300 organized workers challenged the Petersburg Committee's right to represent the city since it constantly put up obstacles to unity. Conspiracy isolated the Party from the movement, the Caucasus delegation argued. In the absence of reform, the Party's "liquidation . . .
becomes inevitable" as the "Social Democratic movement will pass it by.\textsuperscript{27}

Lenin joined the struggle against the Menshevik delegates for identification as the representative of the legitimate Party. Using language similar to that used to isolate the "Economists," Lenin broadened the identification of the "liquidators" to include anyone who challenged the Party center as defined by the conference. The Leninist resolutions compelled the "minority to submit to party discipline, work loyally within the limits of a single establishment and its executive organs" and resolved that "rejection of this work signifies boycott of the party." In one resolution, Lenin summoned "all true party workers without regard to faction and tendencies" to struggle against those who wanted "to liquidate the existing RSDRP and to substitute shapeless, associations within the bounds of legality." Reaffirming the necessity of forming party cells in every factory, the conference delegates carried through Lenin's position.\textsuperscript{28} On the work of the TsK, the conference reaffirmed the existence of the Foreign Bureau of the TsK despite the opposition of the "Caucasus delegation" and advocated stronger control and connections to local, regional and national party organizations.\textsuperscript{29}

The defeat of the \textit{praktiki} at the Party conference shifted the struggle for reform to Russia. Since the Party
refused to acknowledge the growing authority of those who worked in trade unions, clubs and cooperatives, the Social Democratic movement's only recourse was to reject the existing Party. The praktik N. Chervanin (F. A. Lipkin) had already urged Petersburg Mensheviks to leave existing party organizations and form a non-party club-cooperative organization. The split of the Bolshevik faction and Lenin's isolation gave the Menshevik praktiki opportunities to build a Europeanized Social Democratic movement upon a mass foundation.

The unity of the Mensheviks displayed at the Fifth Party Conference was soon shattered. The Menshevik publicist Aleksandr N. Potresov wrote an article on the history of Russian political thought which was accepted for publication in the first volume of the five volume Obshchestvennoe dvizhenie v Rossii v nachale XX-go veka over Plekhanov's objections. Plekhanov's anger at the refusal of his fellow editors - Martov, Dan and Akselrod - to agree to his veto led to a formal split of the Menshevik faction. In December 1908, Plekhanov attacked his former colleagues as "liquidators" in Dnevnik sotsial-demokrata (Diary of a Social Democrat) leading to the formal establishment of the Party Mensheviks. Taking advantage of the split, the Bolshevik PK at this point reconciled with the local Party Mensheviks and encouraged a formal break with the Menshevik
center in Petersburg. However, the alliance of anti-liquidator forces in the city was too weak to attract forces sufficient for victory. Neither group could formulate a clear argument which convinced the workers their position was correct.

The possibilities for confusion were heightened with the simultaneous publication in the Bolshevik Proletarii and the Menshevik, Golos sotsial-demokrata (Voice of the Social Democrat) of the "Letter to SD comrades working on the trade unions educational societies, schools, cooperatives and other legal organizations" from the Vyborg Social Democrats. The Bolshevik paper was probably correct in identifying the authors as Menshevik since arrests around May Day had decimated Bolshevik ranks in the district. To the delight of the Bolsheviks, the Vyborg Party activists admitted that their decision to work in legal workers' associations had created a party organization plagued by "parochial politics" and "narrow local egoism." The "lack of discipline," they continued, had alienated the Duma fraction from the workers. Although their criticism appeared to be directed at the legalists, the authors of the letter adopted a slogan which both Menshevik praktiki and Bolsheviks interpreted as vindication of their positions: "Unity of the working class, unity in the ranks of the illegal RSDRP, do not abandon your legal work!"
The editors of *Golos sotsial-demokrata* praised the Vyborg comrades for "invit[ing] Social Democrats to implement tasks" already presented in its pages and in the resolutions of the Caucasus delegation at the all-party conference. They alleged *Proletarii*’s editors only "pretended to detect . . . steps away from the newspaper *Golos sotsial-demokrata*, and toward the decisions of the last Party conference."\(^{12}\)

*Proletarii* asserted the Vyborg letter proved that liquidationism was not an invention of the Bolsheviks.\(^{13}\) Claiming the slogan "Do not abandon legal work, unity in the ranks of the illegal RSDRP" as Bolshevik, *Proletarii* called for broadening the base of legal work and improving its quality. The editors denied they had ever opposed legal work, as accused by "liberal scribblers" and by some "Menshevik writers."\(^{34}\) The Bolsheviks bid for unity reflected the influence of the worker activists inside Russia who had joined informal and legal organizations in growing numbers since 1907. However, unity in the Bolshevik sense was not a merger of separate cultures to form something new, but a reunification of the legalists with the old underground apparatus.

SD *praktiki* and workers activists confused by newspapers articles and conference reports only dimly understood the ideological differences between the Bolshevik
and Menshevik factions. Manifestations of factionalism at the party center imparted a sense of uneasiness and confusion to these activists. After 1908, the only slogan advanced by both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was the call for unity - a slogan already accepted by the worker activists. How could the praktiki coordinate work in both legal and illegal spheres? Were they in turn in danger of becoming alienated from the workers? Did the situation call for a new type of social democratic revolutionary?

Throughout 1909, the praktiki and worker activists worked with the SD Duma faction in the by-election campaign of 1909. In trade unions and workers' clubs throughout the city, both Bolshevik and Menshevik party activists distributed leaflets and held six public meetings to support the SD candidate N. D. Sokolov's bid for a vacant Duma seat. The conciliator I. P. Goldenberg convinced Lenin to give financial support to a Duma newspaper, Novyi Den (New Day) which publicized the SD candidate's position. The Bolshevik conciliator Kanatchikov served as one of the editors of the newspaper, representing the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. The coalition of SD forces and their successful ties to the workers through trade unions and clubs turned out the Social Democratic vote in numbers similar to 1907.
In September, encouraged by their collaboration, party activists and trade unionists met to discuss the creation of a nonparty party. Six of the sixty attending voted that delegates be chosen from unions and clubs to a representative city-wide coordinating committee, a procedure modeled after the soviet. Present at the meeting were Bolshevik conciliators, Kanatchikov, Lebedov and Malinovskii who voted to concentrate activity on the legal arena so that the SDs "should become a solid mass, and not act separately but according to a definite plan," and also for the creation of an illegal organization of the most experienced workers who could lead political activity.38 At the rank and file level, the majority favored a merger of legal and illegal work. These proposals epitomize "liquidationism" in practice. The Party's rejection of resolutions defended by the Caucasus delegation at the Fifth Party Congress forced the praktiki to create conditions for an independent social democratic party inside Russia.

To coordinate the merger of legal and illegal groups another assembly of thirty-five to forty party workers endorsed the formation of initiative groups throughout the city.39 Trade unionists advanced collaboration of illegal and legal forces into one illegal SD Party to prevent the continued estrangement of SDs from each other. After this report, about twenty activists
participated in an "animated discussion" censured by the PK representative who took the "curious position" of announcing that such a merger was "already condemned at the Party conference" and that the meeting participants were "liquidators!" M.B., probably the Menshevik Broido, recorded the meeting's events and claimed that after November the activists in the capital were united with the exception of the now alienated Recallist PK. Inside Russia by 1909, many factions of the SD Party leaned toward unity and hoped to blot out the dividing lines between Bolshevik and Menshevik, between legalist and the underground.

As a response to St. Petersburg events, Mensheviks met in Paris to discuss organizing a meeting of legal activists. Throughout the latter half of 1909, conciliatory Bolsheviks Goldenberg, Rykov and Nogin also visited Martov abroad. Martov and the emigres wavered in their support for the praktiki. They feared the party practice of expanding the collection of individuals identified as political opponents. If the emigres were to aggressively challenge the label of Liquidationism, a final and complete split of the Social Democratic Party would result. The hesitant response of the emigres forced the hand of the praktiki in Russia.
Reform not liquidation of the Party defined the actions of the Menshevik praktiki. In an "Open Letter" published in Golos sotsial-demokrata in 1910, sixteen Menshevik praktiki identified reform of the party as a developing process within Russian Social Democracy. The activists acknowledged that "circles abroad" - opponents of "Menshevik Orthodoxy" - were trying to split the Menshevik wing of the Party. Taking aim at Plekhanov and the Party Mensheviks, they compared their rebellion to 1903 when the Mensheviks "raised the banner of revolt against bureaucratic centralism." The praktiki charged the party membership was alienated, demoralized and the party in a state of impending collapse. In order "not to break, but on the contrary to pick up the thread of the development of Menshevik thought" they encouraged SD activists to locate the party center in the workers' movement. True unity could only be achieved at the cost of the destruction of the old party. Workers' organizations would serve as the "fulcrum" for the formation of the "independent political movement." Attempting to turn the tables against their accusers, the praktiki argued the true "liquidators" were those "holding onto obsolete forms, preventing the free development of the party." Operating in dynamic party groups, the praktiki justified their perceptions by real life experiences rather than theory. The emigres had experienced an underground party that had
remained static and no longer existed. Now the Party was developing along predetermined lines in keeping with Menshevik and Russian Marxist ideology; the liquidators simply proposed an acceptance of reality.

More than any other platform the "Open Letter" defines Liquidationism. The authors accepted the collapse of the underground and based Social Democratic consciousness fully upon the proletariat itself. Lenin used this document, as he had used the Economist "Credo," to discredit the supporters of the new revolutionary culture. Most of the signatories, such as F.A. Chervanin and E.A. Maevskii remained on the right wing of the Party their whole lives, unlike the majority of Mensheviks. Since they frequently contributed to the Menshevik journals *Nasha zaria* and *Luch*, the newspapers were tainted with "liquidationism," just as *Rabochee delo* had been identified as "Economist." Any Menshevik who favored the cause of legalism, Lenin painted with the wide brush of "Ezhov and Co." and "the so-called liquidators."

Privately and in the press, the emigres praised the "Open Letter" and the struggle for equality. Dan accepted the emphasis on legal work, summoning SDs in a united party to a "Struggle for Equality." As the "Social Democratic vanguard," the *praktiki* should work to acquire full, legal rights for the workers' movement. On 7
January 1910, Akselrod, whose theory most closely resembled the right wing, praised the "tact and dignity" of the protestors in a letter to A.N. Potresov.\footnote{236}

A.N. Potresov's interpretation of the Party crisis closely resembled the "Open Letter." Potresov's literary defense of the "liquidators" provided kindling for Lenin's attack on the Mensheviks. A founder of the Petersburg Union of Struggle and Iskra, Potresov had criticized Lenin's centralization of the Party at the Second Congress. In a letter to the German Social Democrat, Karl Kautsky, Potresov admitted the Mensheviks around Akselrod should have joined workers' organizations as early as 1901.\footnote{237} Now in 1910, Potresov could correct earlier errors. One of only a few revolutionary intellectuals in St. Petersburg, Potresov defended a circle of Menshevik praktiki who worked in the open labor movement. His article "Critical Sketches" asserted that the Party's "old organizational forms" were powerless under current conditions. He noted the development of "the first cadres of [working class] intelligentsia," who would inherit the ideology of the old Party. According to Potresov, the new working class revolutionary culture would replace the old Party which had been structured around the intelligentsia.\footnote{238}

Reform seemed probable after the Plenum of the Central Committee met in Paris, 2-23 January 1910. Attended
by fourteen members of the TsK including Lenin, Martov and Trotsky, delegates attempted to sort out some of the factional disputes which had been growing since 1908.\textsuperscript{49} Conciliation and unity seemed to be the prescription offered by those attending the meeting. The Recallists expelled from the Party in 1909 were readmitted in their reformulation as the \textit{Vpered} (Forward) group. Funds under dispute but managed by the Bolsheviks were placed under the control of the TsK, then given into the custody of the German Social Democrats. The Bolshevik paper, \textit{Proletarii}, and the Menshevik \textit{Golos sotsial-demokrata} were to be discontinued and replaced by a revised, non-factional newspaper, \textit{Sotsial-demokrat}. The former Bolshevik editorial board now included Martov, Dan and the Polish SD, A. Varskii. Trotsky's \textit{Pravda}, which pursued a policy of Social Democratic unity, was also given financial backing. In addition to broadening the base of committee work the Conciliator Bolsheviks and Mensheviks rejected Lenin's position and voted that any "Social Democratic groups in the legal sphere, which were prepared to affiliate with the party" and "individual activists" could be represented at the Sixth Party Conference to be convened in six months. Voting status was to be determined at the conference.\textsuperscript{50}

Elated at the prospect of unity, the Menshevik editors of \textit{Golos sotsial-demokrata}, including Dan and Martov
praised the decisions taken at the Plenum which they asserted "liquidated" the split of the Party into Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. The majority of the leading party elements had accepted that a return to old organizational methods was impossible and factionalism ought to cease. The Menshevik emigres interpreted the delegates' approval of a resolution against liquidationism as a condemnation of elements which did not exist within their own faction. The resolution defined "liquidators" as Social Democrats who rejected "revolutionary goals" and who would "at any cost adjust themselves . . . to the new Russian constitution." If the editors of Golos sotsial-demokrata attacked this resolution, they would disrupt the process of unification initiated by the TsK Plenum. Unwilling to force a split, their interpretation of the meeting emphasized the conciliatory gestures made by the Bolsheviks at the Plenum.

While acknowledging Russia's historical peculiarities, the editors interpreted the revolutionary period through the lens of international Social Democracy. In Germany and France, the defeat of revolutionary forces had broken the movement in the years of reaction since the revolutionaries did not adjust to changing political conditions. European experiences taught that Party reform was necessary, however Mensheviks rejected the analogy between contemporary Russia and Germany at the time of the
exclusionary laws. When Bismarck's government attacked the socialists in the 1880s, German society and politics had advanced beyond the stage which presently existed in Russia. Constitutional order had allowed the development of a mass political party which had left the underground. Even though the party was again illegal, German Social Democracy had evolved a mass party base. In Russia, an illegal party operated in semi-legal workers' organizations. According to the Mensheviks, Russia's possibilities for revolutionary results were magnified by the Social Democratic leadership of the mass labor movement which was "beginning to speak in German." The only obstacles to Social Democratic progress were the foreign Party intellectuals who "preserved factional thought, attitudes and methods." Once factionalism was defeated Russia could be "apprenticed to the advanced countries of the west" and achieve revolutionary change. The TsK Plenum had set the Party on a new course of reform.52

The editors of Golos sotsial-demokrata met Trotsky's call for unity within the Russia Social Democratic movement. As planning began for the all-Party conference, Trotsky's connection to the praktiki inside Russia was sealed by their mutual agreement to give authority to legal activists. Lenin remained adamant in his rejection of reform: in the absence of democracy, the Party,
with the correct theory guiding it, had to be distinguished from the class whose interests and aims it promoted. Menshevik praktiki, Bolshevik conciliators and worker activists stood together in opposition to Lenin and would have held a majority if a genuine all-Party conference was held.

However, Menshevik and Bolshevik party leaders could obviously not resolve their differences on reform and "liquidationism" without intense political infighting. "Conciliationism" could not bridge over these differences. Akselrod warned the legalists that non-factionalism under present conditions "means behaving like an ostrich, means deceiving oneself and others," since only by factional organization could Party members achieve reform, "or to be more exact, a revolution in the Party." In a private letter to Potresov, Martov admitted that the final defeat of Leninism required a complete wrecking of the old Party. Martov and the other emigres refused to be responsible for such a schism.

After the TsK Plenum, Bolshevik conciliators, Nogin and Goldenberg, promptly began instituting the Party directives in St. Petersburg. The Russian Bureau of the TsK with two seats each for Bolsheviks and Mensheviks and one position for each of the three nationalities was responsible for planning the Sixth Conference. Goldenberg began work on
a project to revive the Duma newspaper *Novyi Den* with the assistance of Potresov and other Petersburg Mensheviks while Nogin attempted to recruit two Mensheviks to the Russian Bureau. Despite Nogin's efforts, Garvi, Isuf, and Ermolaev, who had been asked to join the work of the Russian Bureau in 1909, refused once again to be part of a Central Committee. Eventually Sverchkov, a Menshevik close to Trotsky accepted the responsibility and in May 1910, Russian Bureau delegates arrived in Moscow for their first meeting. Before the meeting began, Sverchkov met with representatives of the local Moscow journal, *Vozrozhdenie*, known to be sympathetic toward the right Mensheviks, possibly to convince another Menshevik to join the Russian Bureau. Before negotiations were complete, arrests ended the meetings and further damaged possibilities for unity and conciliation.55

The failure of organizational conciliation was coupled with the revival of factional newspapers. Lenin's polemical article "*K edinstvu (Toward unity)*" in *Sotsial-demokrat* led to the resignation of Martov and Dan from the editorial board.57 Therefore, the Menshevik emigres continued to publish *Golos sotsial-demokrata* as a rival to *Sotsial-demokrat*. In St. Petersburg, Potresov introduced the legal journal *Nasha zaria* with Garvi, Levitskii and Ermanskii included among the editors. Strongly aligned with
Party reformers, *Nasha zaria* was considered purely liquidationist by Lenin. In hopes of opposing the Menshevik journal, Lenin supported Goldenberg's plans for a Duma newspaper. At the Socialist International in Copenhagen, with Kollontai representing the Mensheviks, an agreement was reached to begin publication of *Zvezda (Star)* as the official organ of the deputies. The first issue appeared in December 1910. Despite a Bolshevik majority on the board, the newspaper supported conciliation and Potresov even collaborated with its editors. Lenin's only completely reliable Bolshevik organ remained *Rabochaia gazeta (Workers' newspaper)* which had first appeared in the fall of 1910. Inside Russia, Party workers could rely only on Trotsky's *Pravda* as the voice of conciliationism.

In addition to the splintering of the socialist press, party workers faced a general breakdown of all the central party bodies in 1910. At this moment, liquidationism in practice, that is, the unity of the revived underground and the legal workers' movement, could have been achieved. Hostile party emigres without a party base were politically impotent. Unfortunately, Menshevik emigres misjudged the extent of Lenin's isolation and ignored evidence of the strength of the reform movement inside Russia. "Liquidationism" was dead. The old Party organization was destroyed. Forces for a new reformed party
waited, needing guidance but unable to seek it among the intelligentsia who remained locked into old organizational patterns. The only means for the success of the Mensheviks was a complete break with Lenin and the old bureaucratic party. For all their polemics, the Menshevik leaders were unable to practice what they preached. Party unity lay in wait; no one ushered it into being.

The Sixth Party Conference, which should have ended the Party schism, instead rendered it absolute. Conference planning fell to the Foreign Bureau of the Central Committee (ZBTsK) which had added to its ranks the Menshevik B.I. Gorev and F.M. Iunov from the Bund. The new makeup of the TsK's Foreign Bureau brought it closer to the reformers. On 16 March, the Foreign Bureau released a letter from the emigre Mensheviks addressed "To all our comrades from abroad" calling for liquidation of the organizational split. The Foreign Bureau also denounced the political conflict in the Central Organ and refused in the absence of sufficient TsK members living abroad to call a plenum to plan the party conference. However, the Mensheviks at the center failed to use sentiment for unity to achieve reform.

In the absence of ZBTsK gestures toward summoning a Party conference, Lenin engineered the calling of TsK members living abroad to meet in Paris in June 1910. Gorev,
the only Menshevik present, protested the expropriation of rights belonging to the TsK and walked out. The remaining Bolsheviks formed the Foreign Organizing Commission (ZOK) which was directed to encourage elections in local organizations for delegates to the conference, to form the Russian Organizing Commission (ROK) to manage local work, and to invite representatives from other SD organizations to join the ZOK. The Bolshevik A.I. Rykov, as the representative of the defunct Russian Bureau, addressed invitations for the ZOK to all party organizations including Vpered, the Party Mensheviks and to Mensheviks associated with Golos sotsial-demokrata despite Lenin's opposition. Even in this small, unauthorized meeting conciliators appealed for party unity "without distinction to faction."6 However, the Mensheviks angered by Lenin's illegitimate actions refused to accept the invitation.

At this point, Trotskii, the first to call for a unity conference, realized his plans had been undermined and called for a meeting to discuss the Paris resolutions. In Bern from 20-23 August 1911, Trotskii met with representatives of the Bund, Latvian SDs and the Mensheviks to consider summoning a representative conference. Trotskii, Dan, Gorev, M.I. Liber of the Bund, and two other SDs formed the Organizing Commission (OK) as a rival to the Leninist ZOK. However, the OK hesitated to begin work in
earnest, hoping it would not be necessary to hold two separate conferences.

Lenin, the more skilled politician, immediately began to implement the Paris decisions. Three representatives were sent to Russia to establish contact with local organizations and set up the ROK. Although these representatives assumed affiliation with the ZOK only G.K. Orzhonikidze, a dependable Leninist, had its authorization. Local organizations throughout Russia accepted the call for a conference which they believed would unify the Party. In October, in spite of arrests of representatives from Moscow and St. Petersburg, three voting delegates meeting in Baku and then Tiflis designated themselves the ROK, passed resolutions rejecting their subordination to the ZOK and proclaimed, "Down with clannishness, factionalism, squabbling and quarreling; Long live the united, illegal, revolutionary RSDRP!" Now that a Russian-based committee existed, regardless of its unrepresentative nature, the Leninists could break with the ZOK which continued to seek a compromise with Vpered and the Party Mensheviks. The ROK took complete control of planning the "All-Party" conference scheduled to converge in Prague in January 1912. The two St. Petersburg delegates were E. P. Onufriev elected at "city-wide" meeting of fifteen delegates, and P. A.
Zalutskii, chosen by a Petersburg Committee which was no longer in existence. 67

The Prague conference achieved Lenin's unfulfilled objectives from the January Plenum. Repeating previous indictments, all attempts to increase the status of legal party activists was considered "liquidationism." For their admonishment of the TsK and other acts of disobedience, delegates resolved "the group Nasha zaria . . . by their conduct have finally placed themselves outside the party." No cooperation with liquidators was permitted in the elections to the Fourth State Duma. To reenforce tactical and programmatic unity, the conference delegates required that all communications with Russian organizations pass through the Central Committee. 68

After Prague plans went ahead for the Vienna conference promoted by Trotsky. First proposed by Trotsky in November 1910, seven months before Lenin's meeting in Paris, the Vienna conference did not take place until August 1912. All party groups received invitations including Lenin's TsK, Vpered, and the Party Mensheviks; the Leninists did not reply and Plekhanov refused to cooperate with Trotsky. 69

Inside Russia, the praktiki supported Trotsky's plans to unite the legal and illegal party. Some literatory around Nasha zaria remained suspicious of any proposals that
might result in the reestablishment of a party center abroad. However, when metalworkers at Narva district voted
support for the conference, the Petersburg Central
Initiative Group also agreed to send representatives. \(^7^0\)
After Lenin's conference, anti-Leninist groups planned to
summon a city-wide conference to elect delegates.
Conveniently timed arrests, perhaps with the instigation of
the police spy Malinovskii, prevented a mass meeting of
Petersburg activists. \(^7^1\)

The "Conference of RSDRP organizations" assembled
at the People's House in Vienna on 12 August 1912. A. N.
Smirnov, vice president of the Metalworkers' Union and V.
Abrosimov, a police spy, both represented the Petersburg
Initiative Group. As at Prague, many of the delegates
attending were emigres or activists conveniently abroad when
the meeting took place; however, their factional
affiliations were more diverse. \(^7^2\) In all eight Mensheviks,
four "liquidators," six nonfactionalists, one Bolshevik, a
Vperedist, four Bundists and four Latvians attended as
voting delegates, according to Trotsky.

Despite the disruptive efforts by police agents,
conciliatory resolutions prevailed. A resolution "On the
organizational forms of party building" suggested "the
existing and newly beginning illegal party organizations
should be adapted to the new forms and methods of the open
workers' movement." To broaden contact with the proletariat, the delegates agreed to increase participation in all forms of legal and illegal political institutions linked through the party to non-political workers' organizations. Only unity candidates arrived at through negotiation with all local SDs were to be supported in the upcoming elections to the Fourth State Duma. Finally, delegates elected a seven member Organizing Committee (OK) which would operate in Russia rather than a Central Committee located abroad. Based upon these resolutions, groups loyal to Vienna - the Mensheviks, Bundists and non-factional Social Democrats - identified themselves as the "August Bloc."

After 1912, the reformers pursued a legalistic battle against the Leninists, anticipating a wave of conciliation would obliterate the remnants of the old Party.

Inside Russia, the election campaign for the Fourth State Duma was already underway when delegates to Vienna fulfilled their mandates. Both conferences had drafted similar election platforms. However, Mensheviks, probably as a result of the instigation of the Initiative Group, advanced partial demands at the expense of long term objectives. At Vienna, delegates voted for the establishment of a "democratic republic" and "to create conditions for a revision" of the "agrarian question . . .
by means of confiscation of the landlord's land." Although critics asserted the "conditions" to be created involved political reform and legislative acts, the overall platform adopted at Vienna was equally as revolutionary as the Prague platform. Immediate demands for the election campaign included general, equal, direct and secret elections, the sovereignty of the people's representatives, freedom of assembly, speech and press, broad local self-government, the eight hour day, comprehensive insurance and democratization of the military.\textsuperscript{74} In short, the election platform was the traditional program minimum of the RSDRP.\textsuperscript{75} During the campaign, St. Petersburg workers comprehended little distinction between the Bolshevik and Menshevik platforms and sought a united SD platform.\textsuperscript{76} The paper schism manifest by Prague and Vienna continued to have no basis in Russian reality.

\* \* \*

At Prague, the delegates created Party institutions with the potential to create a monolithic Party and outlawed "Liquidators" and other dissident groups. Using political tactics learned in the Economist controversy, Lenin simplified the ideological battle by labelling all his opponents liquidators and continuing his assault on the reform movement. Convinced that only the Party with the correct theory could realize revolution,
Lenin tirelessly battled Menshevik emigres for a Party which did not yet exist. Isolated, acting in a disintegrating apparatus, Lenin seized the legitimizing label - unity - and used it to create a loyal cadre of Bolsheviks would serve as the nucleus of a pro-Leninist Party, a reprise of the Second Congress in 1903. At the local level, Petersburg Leninists had to develop new tactics to utilize the call for unity if the decisions at Prague were to be enforced.

Few Party reformers adhered to Lenin's definition of Liquidationism - the complete destruction of the underground party. Lenin's polemics and the weak defense of reform offered by Menshevik emigres intensified factionalism and generated conditions for reform. Locally, illegal party committees joined legal activists to demand a unified Party. If Menshevik leaders hoped to play a role in the reconstituted party, Lenin would have to be removed from the Party center. Unresponsive to reality, the Menshevik leadership abroad failed to comprehend the utter devastation of traditional organizational forms. Focusing only on the Liquidationist controversy, they could not act.

After 1912, as the Party hierarchy attempted to carry out the resolutions of Prague and Vienna, St. Petersburg praktiki and worker activists had the opportunity to found an independent unified working class political party. If questioned, both Lenin and Akselrod would have
agreed that the activists' success depended on the current level of the workers' political consciousness. The question of the day, namely, — would the proletariat have the capability to engineer a Party revolution? — would be answered during a period of revived revolutionary fervor in the prewar years.

ENDNOTES

1 These groups are not divided according to any sort of political or ideological label and so do not include "Party Mensheviks" or other political groups. Schapiro uses a similar classification. See Schapiro, _Communist Party_, pp. 102-3.

2 The last period from 1912-14 as it relates to events inside Russia is the subject of Chapter VI below.

3 Schapiro, _Communist Party_, pp. 100-101; M.A. Moskalev, _Biuro TsK RSDRP_, pp. 115, 119-120; At the Third Conference there were twenty-six delegates: nine Bolsheviks, ten Mensheviks, five Poles and two Latvians.

4 Prokopovich was labelled an Economist in 1901 and sought to organize the metallists union in 1905. Sviatoslavskii was close to the liberals and advised the Kovkovtsov Commission in 1905. Ibid., p. 123.

5 Some members of the left also embraced "god-building" a philosophical vision which replaced religion with a mystical socialism.


7 Moskalev, _Biuro TsK RSDRP_, p. 124.

8 Ibid, p. 130.

9 By this act the Duma presented information on the treatment of labor unions and, in effect, asked the government to explain its actions.
Sesitskii represented Vasileostrov district on the union board and was a police spy. The police throughout these years sought to disorganize socialist activities.


On the new organizational forms (Liquidators, recallists, Trotskyites, etc.) as viewed by the secret police see GARF f.111, o.5, d.263, l. 119-26.


See Chapter I above.


Letter signed I. Golos sotsial-demokrata, 4/5 (March 1908): 28. Nicolaevsky also used the pseudonym I. but this tactical line was consistently being pursued by Gorev at the time.

The letter was later published in Sotsial-demokrat, 13 (26(9) May 1911): 9 as "Perli likvidatorstvo."; Schapiro, Communist Party, p.113; The letter was signed by I. Dniprovskii and according to Sotsial-demokrata involved at least one editor of Golos sotsial-demokrata. The Soviet historian Moskalev also credits Gorev and Martynov as authors. See Moskalev, Biuro, pp. 130-1.

As predicted legal activists had difficulty attending the Plenum. Five Bolsheviks, three Mensheviks, one Pole, two Bundists and one Latvian attended.

The last member of the Russian Bureau was arrested in early 1908.

I. P. Goldenberg became a Menshevik in 1917 and represented the Petrograd Soviet at Stockholm in 1917. He was an active Social Democrat at the turn of the century during the Economist controversy. See Ascher p.163; Moskalev, Biuro, pp.131-2; "Iz deiatel'nosti Ts.K." Sotsial-demokrat no.2 (28(10) February 1909).
22 GARF, f.111, o.5, d.263, l.98; At the conference Gorev represented the Foreign delegation along with Bolsheviks, Taratuta and Bogdanov. Moskalev, Biuro, p.138.

23 F. Dan, "Posle buri" Golos sotsial-demokrata 1/2 (February 1908) and "Na sovremennuiu temu" Golos sotsial-demokrata 8/9 (July/Sept. 1908); Moskalev, Biuro, p. 137.


26 Otchet, p.10. Representation by district was as follows: 10 from Petersburg Side; 1 from Moscow district; 1 from Narvskii Gates; 3 from Vyborg; and 3 from Vasileostrov. Representatives from other districts were not indicated.

27 Again, the significance of the "movement" in relation to the "Party" must be noted. Otchet, pp. 5,9,32-33.


29 Ibid., p.217.

30 Proletarii 47-8 (18(5) Sept 1909); Moskalev, Biuro, p.148.


33 See Martov's editorial, Golos sotsial-demokrata, 13 (1909).


35 For a thorough treatment of praktiki activities in legal congresses see Chapter III above.

36 Goldenberg won acceptance for the newspaper at the Extended Meeting of the Editorial Board of Proletarii which condemned the otzovists. Subsidies to the PK were
discontinued as a result freeing funds for a newspaper. On 9 August, the PK voted not to waste its resources in the Sokolov campaign which promoted Duma activities.

37 O. Mitskevich, Sotsialdemokraticheskaia gazeta 'Novyi Den', Proletarskaia revoliutsiia no. 77/78, 1928.

38 Bulkin, "Soiuz metallistov i department politsii," Krasnaia letopis 8 (1923):225. See the Bolshevik account in Proletarii no.50 (1909).

39 The most significant of these groups, the Petersburg Initiative Group organized in 1911 at the Congress of Handicrafts' Trades would be closely identified with the Metalworkers' Union. See Chapter III above.


41 Schapiro, Communist Party, p. 113 citing I.S. Risk, Nicolaevsky collection; Swain, Russian Social Democracy, p. 92; Getzler, Martov, p. 126.


43 See chapter 4 above for biographical patterns among activists.


46 Plekhanov's betrayal was pardoned since Akselrod felt Lenin was taking advantage of an unfortunate quarrel among the Mensheviks. P.A. Berlin, V.S. Voitinsky, P.B. Nikolaevsky eds., Perepiska G.V. Plekhanova i P.B. Akselroda, (Moscow, 1925) p.195; Beginning in 1910, Akselrod gave a series of lectures maligning Lenin's attack on his
colleagues and agreeing with Potresov that liquidationism
did not exist. See Ascher, Akselrod, pp. 280-81.

47 Ascher, Akselrod, p.213 citing Potresov to Kautsky, 22 May
1904, Kautsky Archive LISH.

59, 61-2.

49 Moskalev, Biuro, p. 162.

50 Sotsial-demokrata, 11(13 February/31 January 1910) 10-11;
Swain, Russian Social Democracy, p. 94 citing Nicolaevsky,
Materialy, vol.2, item 32 notes by V.L. Shantsser; Leonard
Schapiro, Communist Party, pp. 116-7. Schapiro does not
mention the agreements concerning plans for the Sixth
Conference, but instead focuses on Lenin's determination to
resist implementation of the decisions of the Plenum.

51 "Polozhenie del v partii," Golos sotsialdemokrata 19/20


53 Nevskii golos 6 (1912) and Nasha zaria, 6 (1912).

54 Schapiro, Communist Party, p. 118 citing Martov to
Potresov, 23 February 1910.

55 "Razrushennaya legenda," Golos sotsial-demokrata 24
(Prilozhenie) (February 1911); Garvi, Revoliutsionnye
siluety, Introduction, p.9; Moskalev, Biuro, p. 165. Martov,
Martynov, Gorev and Ramishvili sent a letter to the Foreign
Bureau approving the withdrawal of the Mensheviks from the
Russian Bureau 27 April 1910, Moskalev, Biuro, p.167 citing
Party Archives, f.18, op39 ed.khr.36036; However, Martov
blamed Garvi, Isuv and Ermolaev for the failure of
implementation of the Plenum directives. Schapiro, Communist
Party citing Martov to Potresov, 17 April 1910.

56 L. Germanov, (Frumkin) "Iz partiinoi zhizni v 1910"
Proletarskaia revoliutsiiia, 5 (1922):232; "Razrushennaya
legenda" Golos sotsial demokrata 24 (February 1911); Garvi,
Revoliutsionnye siluety, introduction and p.9.

57 For examples of Lenin's condemnation of "liquidationism"
see "Golos likvidatorov protiv partii," "Otvet 'golos
sotsialdemokrata'" and "Za chto borot'sia?" Sotsial
demokrata, (23 March 1910); Partiia bol'shevikov, pp. 117-
123; Moskalev, Biuro, p.165.
Conciliation temporarily broke down over the petition campaign. See Chapter III above.

Martov, Spasiteli, p.35 claims Lenin used funds he should have turned over to the Germans for this newspaper.

Moskalev, Biuro, p. 165.

Ibid., p. 168.


"Iz perepiski TsK RSDRP s mestnymi bol'shevistskimi organizatsiiami 1911-12 gg." Voprosy istorii KPSS, 10 (1964):80. See also Sotsial demokrat no.23 (1 September 1911).


See Chapter III above for the formation of the Initiative Group in 1911. It was centered in the metalworkers' union and included its president, Gvozdev and Abrosimov the secretary who was a police spy.
"Iz perepiski TsK s mestnymi bolshevitskimi
organizatsiiami," Voprosy istorii KPSS, no.10, 1964, p.76; Pisma Akselroda i Martova, pp. 221n, 237n.; "Pismo iz
Peterburga," Pravda, no.25, (23 April-6 May 1912).

Exact affiliations are difficult to confirm. The
conference report states that 9 nonfactionalists, 5
Mensheviks, 4 Bolsheviks and one Party Menshevik attended as
voting delegates a total of 19 not 18 voting delegates. The
author also muddies his own conclusion by further describing
identification as three Mensheviks identified with the
Caucasus Mensheviks, 4 Bundists, 3 Latvians and a

R. Carter Elwood, ed., Izveshchenie o Konferentsii
Organizatsii RSDRP (New York, 1982), pp.15, 28-9; Schapiro,

Also included were demands for the abolition of all
nationalistic and religious organizations and exclusionary
laws, abolition of the Pale, and national equality, the
autonomy of Poland, and free compulsory general trading
schools. Ibid., p. 53.

See the introduction by R. Carter Elwood which asserts
Vienna and Prague divided the RSDRP finally into two
separate parties. Ibid, p.xxx.

See Chapter VI below.
CHAPTER VI.
LOSING HEGEMONY: THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT
AND THE ST. PETERSBURG METALWORKERS' UNION, 1912-1914

From 1912 to 1914, the Russian labor movement refused to align itself with either the Menshevik or Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Party leadership had claimed allegiance to social democratic unity until Lenin orchestrated a party schism in 1912. However, the formal division of the Social Democratic Party into separate conferences at Vienna and Prague was little noticed in St. Petersburg. Members of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and rank and file party members continued to demand the cessation of factional conflict. In place of a party identity, worker activists sought a united campaign against capital and the tsarist state.

Soviet and western historians have examined these years within the context of factional debate between Bolshevism and Menshevism. The historiography examines voting results by party and links increased strike activity with the election of more Bolsheviks to the governing boards of unions and clubs. Such bipolar thinking masks underlying support for a united Social Democratic workers' movement not
Unlike that aspired to by the "so-called liquidators." A careful analysis of the language used in both party and by union literature refutes a simplistic factional interpretation.

The unity campaign was expressed through elections to the Fourth State Duma, the social insurance campaign, collaborative political demonstrations, and in the labor press. An examination of the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union in the prewar years supports this interpretation of Social Democracy and the workers' movement. In all the phases of revolutionary activity, party activists of every political tendency cooperated with each other in an expanding, politically radicalized labor movement.

In contrast to the growing strength of labor, party institutions under the stress of government repression, an extensive police spy network, and emigre demands continued to fragment. A variety of socialist groups, disconnected from a centralizing party apparatus demanded organizational autonomy. Despite these signs of disintegration, the revival of radicalism and the formation of an array of new institutions offered hope for a unified workers' movement from 1912 to 1914. The possibility of unity rested in the arms of a Party, split in theory, still unified in practice.
Throughout 1912-14, the St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, in concert with socialists in the city, actively pursued alterations to the legislative, economic and political status quo leading one activist to observe the "union came close to having a general political character." Early in 1912, the union prepared for the Fourth Duma election campaign and the union journal which was published without interruption until 1914 printed instructions on the right to vote. The campaign for social insurance, a long term legislative project, was enjoined by both SDs and SRs. Often in conjunction with educational societies, the union sponsored public lectures on this project and articles reporting legislative progress through the Duma. At the workplace, union and party activists worked together to win collective bargaining rights. The employers' adoption of labor saving methods promoted by the American Frederick Winslow Taylor, were the target of union attacks. Finally, the union leadership took positions on the growing strike movement after the massacre of striking miners at Lena. In short, unionists and socialists witnessed a general mobilization of active workers.

As the economy grew and the strike movement expanded, Petersburg workers gained a sense of political power. The union journal increased its rate of publication to biweekly rather than weekly appearing to respond to the
enhanced expectations of its readers. However, the union leadership lagged behind the recovery. Locked into a cautious stance because of the years of reaction and repression, they gave little encouragement to protest.\(^4\)

During the months before the massacre of striking workers at Lena goldfields, the union proposed organizational reforms as a correction to a perceived gap between the leadership and rank and file members.\(^5\) No alterations were accepted.

The union leadership also responded poorly to workers' criticisms of the American system of scientific management. While the rank and file continued to oppose Taylorism, some board members recognized that modernization and improved production advanced Russia toward a socialist future.\(^6\) The union administration's continued vacillation allowed workers to continue their protests against the rationalization of industry in 1912.

Labor radicalism also challenged party institutions thinned by repression and political infighting. Emerging from Prague, the Leninists had few ties to local groups. Bolshevik conciliators in Kolpino, Neva, Gorodskii and Vasileostrov districts merged with the Vperedists from Petersburg Side and Vasileostrov to form the Central Group of Social Democratic Workers of St. Petersburg. Some individual Party Mensheviks, who upheld the authority of the illegal party joined the Central Group. Other nonfactional
SD circles included the "Group of Social Democratic Workers of St. Petersburg" in Vyborg district and the "Group of Social Democratic Workers" in Narva district which by 1912 was tied to the Menshevik Initiative Group. Finally the Mezhraionka or the Interdistrict Group became one of the most active SD groups in the capital. Close to Trotsky its members, included Bolshevik conciliators in the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, A.M. Novoselov, P.I. Nikolaev and A.S. Kiselev, and SD deputies A.F. Burianov and N.M. Egorov. The Mezhraionka denied the legitimacy of Prague and urged unity of all "revolutionary Social Democrats." In May 1914, linked through Burianov who became a Party Menshevik, the Mezhraionka collaborated to distribute Plekhanov's newspaper, *Edinstvo*. Throughout 1912-14, Social Democratic activists resisted central control and operated in both legal and illegal bodies.

The strongest Menshevik organization was the Central Initiative Group formed after a secret conference in January 1911. The Initiative Group hoped to unite both legal and illegal groups throughout Russia and included workers as well as Menshevik *praktiki* such as I.A. Isuv, V. Ezhov, I.S. Astrov, P.A. Garvi, K.A. Gvozdev, K.M. Ermolaev, Eva Broido, secretary of Organizational Committee and trade union leaders, A.N. Smirnov and V.M. Abrosimov. By end of 1912, six intellectuals and eight workers were members. In
all, seven district initiative groups were established at Moscow, Narva, Neva, Gorodskii, Vyborg, Petersburg Side and Vasileostrov encompassing a membership of around 100. By 1913, the predominance of intellectuals over workers in the Initiative Group was drastically altered. Although the Group's existence was sporadic, a total of sixteen workers, four of these members of the Metallists' Union, participated throughout the year. The active intellectuals were the veteran Menshevik, Dan, Isuv and S.M. Shvarts, a former Bolshevik. By the end of the year and into 1914, Dan and Martov began to encourage an expansion of illegal activity through the district initiative groups. The Central Initiative Group failed to recover from arrests in 1914.

The Menshevik central apparatus elected at the Vienna conference in August 1912 had a varied existence. The Menshevik Organization Committee (OK), included the trade unionist A.N. Smirnov, Garvi, Eva Broido, (secretary until her arrest in January 1913) and the lawyer, Batskii. Arrests hampered the Committee's endeavors. In late 1912, the OK set up district committees which were decimated by arrests in February 1913. Throughout 1913, the only successful meetings of the OK occurred in April. By early 1914, the Committee renewed legislative work calling for freedom of coalition, democratization of city governments and abolition of the Pale, but simultaneously
promoted the formation of more illegal cells. Menshevik cells existed in educational societies and trade unions throughout the capital before the war and Duma deputies met with Garvi, Dan, Martov and Baturskii to discuss political activity in clubs and the organization of insurance centers. The OK, Vperedists and Party Mensheviks formed the 3 July Bloc at the Unity Congress sponsored by the International and held in Brussels from 3-5 July 1914.\(^{15}\) The Menshevik network, though broad, was disconnected due to continual arrests. Yet it remained committed to uniting legal and illegal activists especially through the labor movement.

The only formal Bolshevik organization, the Petersburg Committee (PK), was not consistently loyal to Prague. Reincarnated repeatedly from 1912-14, the PK leadership fluctuated between conciliators, Vperedists and Leninists. In February 1912, all its members were workers, six from Putilov. Party activist I. Iurenev complained that the PK was not united and had no central leadership and E.P. Onufriev reported to Krupskaia the PK was affiliated with the Central Group which had denounced the Prague resolutions. While the PK actually sanctioned the Prague resolutions, they contended "true unity is only possible by means of joint work in the localities." Krupskaia's correspondence revealed "a letter from St. Petersburg informs us that the PK has spoken out in favor of the
Liquidators' conference. [Vienna]\(^{16}\) Arrests suppressed the PK in 1913 and 1914 which obliged the board of the Metallists' Union to take over its activities. In 1913, ten skilled metalworkers sat on the PK including the conciliator Kiselev, Mitrevich, assistant secretary of the union, and board members P.A. Mel'nikov and Ignatev. In February 1914, five of the eight members were metallists and either officers or activists from the two Vperedists strongholds, Vasileostrov or Vyborg districts.\(^{17}\) Party workers in the metallists' union noted in 1913, the "lack in St. Petersburg of strong party organizations capable of leading a general strike."\(^{18}\)

In the absence of centralized party groups, cooperative undertakings persisted. Early in 1912 two different groups tried to start a Marxist newspaper. The Bolshevik conciliators N. Baturin (the pseudonym of N. Zamiatin), an editor of Zvezda, and Frumkin (M.I. Germanov) created a fund for worker contributions to this venture.\(^{19}\) At the same time, the Initiative Group announced a project for a nonfactional newspaper edited by workers.\(^{20}\) Hoping to unite the two efforts the Initiative Group called a meeting in March to propose a merger. The Leninist TsK determined to dominate the venture; it used money under Lenin's personal control to discourage cooperation and pursue the establishment of a separate newspaper, Pravda. Zvezda
accepted Lenin's money and did not print the appeal of the metallists' union for contributions. The workers' newspaper to be called Rabochaia gazeta was only able to raise 300 rubles. Nevertheless at a meeting, 15 April 1912, set up by the Metallists and attended by 5-600 activists, only forty acquiesced to the Leninist characterization of Rabochaia gazeta as "liquidationist." The majority voted for workers' control of the newspaper and selected a board of eight to start publication on 22 April, the same date announced for the introduction of Pravda. Their arrest on 18 April 1912 smashed hopes for trade union control. Lenin's money along with the police spy network once again prevented unity and reinforced not only the party schism, but intellectual control of the press.

Instead of a workers' newspaper, both factions of the RSDRP introduced their own newspapers. The Bolsheviks with financial support from Lenin, began the publication of Pravda on 22 April 1912. The Leninist Kalinin stated that the paper would be a "nonfactionsal" Party paper including all Marxists but without unionists on the editorial board. The first editorial, by Stalin, stated:

In our opinion, a powerful and virile movement is inconceivable without disagreements - complete identity of views can exist only in the graveyard! But that does not mean that points of disagreement outweigh points of agreement. Far from it! ...Hence, Pravda will call, firstly and mainly, for unity in the proletarian class struggle, for unity at all costs.
Indeed, Lenin was unable to use the newspaper for polemics against the "liquidator-Mensheviks" until February 1914 when Kalinin became editor. The editorial board persisted in its recalcitrance, inducing Martov to note in a letter to Garvi, "The tone taken by Pravda undoubtedly testifies to the fact that Lenin has almost no one to serve as his conscience in Russia."

After the arrests of the editorial board which had been chosen to begin publication of Rabochaia gazeta, the Initiative Group lacked personnel and funds for continuing the project. Instead the OK, as rival to Lenin's TsK, launched a Menshevik journal, Luch. Mensheviks Astrov, Ezhov and Maevskii, formerly the publishers of the "liquidationist" Zhivoe delo, joined the new journal. The OK's appointment of Feodor Dan as editor of Luch, was designed to alter its bias. However, Dan was forced to rely on the same group of contributors. In the election and insurance campaigns, Luch promoted civil liberties, defended organizational methods and attacked the strike campaign. Politically Luch stood on the side of Vienna's unity platform and the editors remained steadfast opponents of Pravda.

In spite of the publication of factional newspapers, local activists cooperated in a number of political demonstrations during the prewar years. For May
Day 1912, the nonfactionalist group "Unity," the Central Group and local Socialist Revolutionaries formed the "Group of Worker Social Democrats." This organization summoned a "meeting of all Petersburg workers' organizations" to compose a May Day proclamation calling for the establishment of a democratic republic. When the Third Duma used its powers of interpellation to investigate the framing of the SD Second Duma fraction all activists cooperated in demonstrations at Narva and Vasileostrov. 28

Socialists and trade unions joined a number of collaborative projects throughout 1912-14. In 1912, activists once again were drawn to the idea of the workers' congress. A workers' party born at such a congress would not only avoid the tension between factions, but also consider projects of interest to all workers such as social insurance. 29 In 1913, the PK, Central Initiative Group, local SRs and unions attempted to reestablish the Central Bureau of Trade Unions. Again, the Okhrana arrested its members when they met on 5 May and continued to hinder their efforts detaining new members twice during the summer of 1913. Overlooking failure, activists in the capital repeatedly demonstrated their desire for unity and cooperation. 30 The trade union press continued to function as a centralizing institution throughout 1912-14. Metallist was published until 1914, and accepted contributions from
activists regardless of factional identity. The Okhrana credited the press with raising the consciousness of workers and, in effect, acting as the illegal underground party organization by spreading party ideas.³¹

Duma deputies also disseminated party ideas and unified the movement. Legislative measures such as freedom of assembly and the insurance law exposed workers to politics and demonstrated the failures of the pseudo-constitutional regime. Elections to the Fourth Duma allowed party and union activists to hold mass meetings, agitate in the factories and campaign for their party's candidates. The election platforms adopted at Vienna and Prague in 1912 appeared schismatic, driving a permanent wedge between the two factions - cautious, reformist Mensheviks on one side and revolutionary Bolsheviks on the other. In practical terms the Mensheviks at Vienna had called for unity and the Bolsheviks at Prague rejected cooperation with "liquidators" - directives which carried the potential for splitting party activists in St. Petersburg. However, preparation for Fourth Duma elections had already begun before the conferences. Socialist operatives and unionists placed the election campaign outside factional struggle, within the wider demands of the masses. In the capital, unity was the callword of the day.
Although there was tension between legalists and the underground in Russia, there was little support for the Prague decision to oppose the liquidators in elections to the workers' curia. The Initiative Group, which the Leninists branded as "liquidationist," had carried the slogan of unity to Vienna. The Third Duma deputies began campaign work initially without the Initiative Group but the group's ostracism was censured by a vote of five to two in the neutral "Mixed Group of Social Democrats" which emerged during the campaign. The Central Initiative Group, Party Mensheviks, and Bolshevik conciliators, met with the Menshevik editors of the local Nevskii golos in early July to discuss a united campaign. Throughout the spring and summer, the Initiative Group, "Mixed group," Printers' and Metallists' Unions worked with the SD deputies in the Third Duma on the election campaign.

In addition to these meetings, conciliators worked through the press and unions to establish a united campaign, repeatedly opposing emigre attempts to force a schism. In January 1912, the editorial board of Zvezda published M.I. Frumkin's article calling for a united SD platform and approving the Menshevik program, a position sanctioned by the newspaper two issues later. Pravda also adhered to the non-factional position in the election, rejecting publication of articles by Zinoviev or Lenin on electoral
tactics until September, when the Menshevik paper *Luch* first appeared.\textsuperscript{35} Trade unionists, whether as a result of the party activists' unity campaign or as its initiators continued to support nonfactionalism: in eight metallists plants, one paper mill and a textile mill, resolutions in favor of SD unity were adopted.\textsuperscript{36}

Party affiliation depended upon the strength of the local party groups. The Bolshevik Central Electoral Committee operated in Narva, Neva and Vasilieostrov districts while the Central Initiative Group set up the Labor Election Committee of representatives from all working class districts except Petersburg Side and Vyborg. The Labor Election Committee endorsed united lists and the Vienna program.\textsuperscript{37} While voter turnout was low, especially among unskilled or semiskilled workers, the electorate was clearly affiliated with SDs.\textsuperscript{38} Stalin's analysis of delegates' political affiliation produced forty-one SDs, fifteen "liquidators" and twenty-six "non-liquidators." The Menshevik Isuv reported thirty-three Mensheviks, twenty-five Bolsheviks, eleven "non-factionalists," and thirteen SDs were elected.\textsuperscript{39} Obviously, political identity was fluid and illdefined.

After delegates were chosen, *Pravda* editorialized that the delegates should choose "consistent labor democrats" whose names were printed in the paper on election
Government censorship of the legal daily required the use of such terms, however, their interpretation depended upon the perspective of the reader. Workers might consider any candidate active in the labor movement a "labor democrat." Pravda, however, clearly hoped to win support for its delegates. Adding to the possibilities for confusion, Stalin's "Mandate to the St. Petersburg deputy," written during October urged the SD faction to "act in unity and with its ranks closed" and to endorse the "full and uncurtailed demands of 1905." This directive was approved in meetings at Neva Shipyards and K. Ia. Pal' Textiles. Delegates voted to reject the use of factional lists in the process of choosing electors. However, results of the first elections held on 5 October were set aside after the government disqualified twenty delegates from the workers' curia. On 17 October, delegates elected three Mensheviks and two Bolsheviks, approved a resolution calling for SD unity in the second urban curia elections and endorsed Stalin's mandate. Stalin's use of the word "unity" was clarified by his insistence that no Menshevik could carry out his mandate. Stalin accused the Menshevik electors who refused to resign once his mandate was accepted as "playing at unity" in order "to smuggle their men through somehow." However, only one elector stepped down and from the five remaining the conservative provincial electoral assembly of
landowners, peasants and workers chose a *Pravdist* deputy, A. E. Badaev on 20 October. Petersburg workers supported only the call for unity in the Fourth Duma elections by electing a "Bolshevik" on the "vote of an Octobrist." In all six Bolshevik and seven Mensheviks made up the SD faction to the Fourth Duma. Most elected on unity platforms agreed with Chkeidze, a leading spokesperson for the faction who encouraged conciliation and cooperation. On 15 December, four Bolshevik deputies approved a merger of the Bolshevik and Menshevik newspapers and agreed to become collaborating editors. Such a position alarmed Lenin, now determined to split the faction in the Duma disregarding activists' hopes for unity in the capital.

The SD faction could have acted to unify the Party in the capital. Increasingly factionalism, aggravated by the emigres, damaged the possibilities for harmony among the deputies. Although unity platforms were the basis for their election, tension between deputies loyal to Lenin's TsK, and those connected to the OK, was apparent by the spring. On 7 December 1912, the SD faction read a compromise Declaration calling for popular representation and universal suffrage but not for freedom of coalition, a campaign supported by the Menshevik *praktiki*. At a succession of TsK meetings, Lenin pushed for an end to compromise. At Cracow, the TsK resolved that the six
Bolshevik Duma deputies end collaboration with the Menshevik Luch. After the meeting, four of the six agreed to sever their agreement with Luch, but rejected allegiance to Prague. The TsK members at Poronin on 27 July 1913 entertained conflicting reports on the prospects for unity. Malinovskii, continuing his role as provocateur, sided with Lenin against conciliation, while Pravda and Stalin informed the TsK that workers were tired of factional squabbling. However, the stage was set for the final split of the Duma faction. Badaev's resolution "unity in the Duma is possible and necessary" was qualified by an ultimatum that the seven Mensheviks grant equal representation to the six Bolsheviks. When the deputies met 16 October, the Bolsheviks accused the Mensheviks of using their majority to hinder Bolshevik access to committee assignments and public pronouncements. By 15 November, the Bolshevik deputies formed the "Fraction of the Social Democratic Workers." The split of the SD faction was a symptom of the failure of institutions and organizations to answer the workers' aspiration for unity. Constant tactical and organizational disagreements caused many workers to shun organization in the prewar years. The reaction of Party activists to the upsurge in strikes after the massacre of protesters in Lena also threatened the prosperity of legal organizations. While the Menshevik press first criticized
"strike fever" as a "dangerous illness," Bolshevik activists in the capital also feared the spontaneity of the masses would cause repression of the union and suppression of legal activities. After winning a majority of seats on the metallists' board, Bolsheviks actively began to implement the directives of Prague, moving into the legal arena and overtaking former Menshevik territory. However, their policies differed little from the former Menshevik administration of the union. Since 63% of the strikes in St. Petersburg from 1912 to 1914 involved metallists, both SD factions had to respond to the escalating strike movement. An examination of this response, the nature of Bolshevik victory, the individuals who governed the union and the governing board's actions after the Bolsheviks won a majority reveals little significance in Bolshevik hegemony.

From 1912 to 1914, protests initiated by the metallists and Social Democratic activists were either political in their initial conceptualization, or locally initiated in response to a particular economic or political policy of the factory administration or government. Both political demonstrations and strikes lacked coordination and central direction. The police repeatedly hindered attempts at citywide collaboration and workers' actions were equivocal. The workers' demands and motivations suggest
Petersburg metallists collectively opposed authority in all its forms and sought a united movement against those who attempted to wield political, economic or ideological power.

The first type of protests, political demonstrations, were regularly summoned on May Day and the anniversaries of 9 January and 4 April. After the news of the massacre of miners at the Lena Goldfields on 4 April 1912 reached the capital, the Menshevik deputy, G. S. Kuznetsov, local SDs and students called for a demonstration on Nevskii Prospect on Sunday, 15 April. However, activists in Narva and Moscow districts, more inclined toward political strikes than demonstrations, did little to inform workers of the planned protest. Meetings at Baltic Shipyards and the engineering plant at United Cables approved a five day stoppage beginning two weeks later, on May Day. Therefore students, rather than workers, dominated the protests on 15 April, while workers participated in a wave of spontaneous strikes from 14-22 April involving around 140,000.55

As May Day approached, students active in a study circle at Putilov piloted the establishment of 1 May Committees at Moscow, Narva, Petersburg and Vasileostrov districts. These committees with joint participation of all SD and SR groups except the Initiative Group formed the Central Bureau of 1 May Committees which distributed
leaflets calling for a strike, a democratic republic, Constituent Assembly, eight-hour day and land confiscation. In response to such widespread agitation, 150,000 laborers joined May Day strikes. The police, prepared for the protest, prevented convergence of strikers in the center and dispersed the demonstration. Although activists made efforts to coordinate strike activity after May Day, inviting formation of strike committees at district meetings, arrests curbed their success until August.

Local activists also ignored factionalism in political protests occurring in 1913. The PK, long celebrated bastion of Bolshevism, did not agitate for strikes on 9 January 1913: they advocated only factory meetings. Despite the lack of Bolshevik agitation, 71,000 walked off the job on the anniversary of Bloody Sunday. For May Day 1913, the OK, PK and TsK printed leaflets and the PK formed a strike committee with local SRs. Collaboration continued throughout 1914, when the Central Initiative Group, Bolsheviks, Mezhraionka and SRs coordinated strike plans for 9 January. Petersburg socialist groups also supported work stoppages when the Menshevik deputy, N.S. Chkheidze was arraigned for a speech given in the Duma and the left was expelled for fifteen sessions. On 23 March, metalworkers and party activists reorganized the PK and called for demonstrations on Good
Friday. Both Mensheviks and SRs agreed with the plans and the educational societies "Sampsonievskii" and "Science and Life" promoted the strike. Coordination continued on 4 April, May Day and in other protests even though party institutions were weak and decentralized.

In contrast to political demonstrations, party activists and the union administration of both factions often denounced strikes emerging from the shop floor or joined them only after they had begun. An economic upswing produced a labor shortage in 1912, which prevented concerted action by employers. The Petersburg Society of Manufacturers and Factory Owners (PSMFO) could not agree on a response to the massive strikes which began after Lena. Even though their 1912 Convention voted against union mediation in disputes, standardized black listing, rejected a minimum wage and pay for strikers, most PSMFO members did not confirm this agreement until March 1913. This time lag allowed for the expansion of worker unrest.

Local grievances were usually directed against factory reforms popularized as the "American system." As documented by Heather Hogan, many employers, utilizing the ideas of Taylor, radically altered the workplace with new scientific management techniques thereby contributing to the formation of a new worker class consciousness. Local strike demands illustrate this transformation.
The Mensheviks held a majority on the Union's governing board when a strike at Siemens-Halske against a May Day fine became a 91 day protest against factory reforms. Workers opposed recently decreased rates, time clocks and demanded a polite form of address, a council of elders, hot water, and extra pay for Saturday and preholiday work. In 1913, metallists walked off the job for 102 days at Lessner in Vyborg district after the suicide of Iakov Strongin who had been accused by the foreman of stealing brass screws. The strike committee consulted the union only after 82 days. The owners refused to bargain with the union, brought in strike breakers, blacklisted strikers and eventually defeated the strike.  

A change in the Metalworkers' Union Board did not produce a corresponding change in strike policy. In the summer 1913, a specialist in time work, Balik, was carted out of the factory in a wheelbarrow at New Aivaz industrial plant. Even though the majority of the newly elected interim board was Bolshevik, the union's response was cautious. On 28 July, the union passed a resolution condemning the use of wheelbarrows and refused to grant strike assistance until 17 August. The factory administration responded more promptly, closing the factory for six weeks while reforms were completed and then hiring
many replacements especially from the new pool of women and unskilled workers. The strike failed.

There were varied responses to the increased numbers of strikes among Petersburg activists. Union leaders noted that bourgeois society had abandoned workers who at the same time were developing a new consciousness or identity. The Bolshevik union president, A. S. Kiselev, reminded members that Balik, a student, was allied with the factory administration as was the foreman who charged Strongin with theft. Therefore, workers should comprehend their alienation from "society" in contrast to the period 1905-6. The alienation noted by Kiselev was caused by a multitude of factors including life experiences at the factory level, long term exposure to socialist propaganda and organization, the new worker associations and institutions, the press, and other modernizing influences. It had radicalized the working class.

Local activists participated in strikes and protests despite pronouncements of condemnation by emigres, party institutions, and theoretical leaders of both factions. The Menshevik August Conference at Vienna had delegated full responsibility for strike action to the union administration and urged members to appraise possibilities for victory before walking out. The Central Initiative Group opposed walkouts in June 1913 to protest charges
against 52 sailors of conspiracy to commit armed uprising. The PK had been arrested and did not initiate the strike. When 36,000 participated, Luch denounced the protest as "chaotic, prematurely weakening the forces of the working class."69

Menshevik literary responded to the strikes with some degree of alarm, as they were convinced government repression of unions was sure to follow continued work stoppages. Garvi condemned the "elemental nature" of strikes "preceding for the most part apart from the existing trade unions" a sentiment echoed confidentially by Dan and Martov.70 Dan and Martov also published articles predicting poor results from the strike movement. In the thick journal, Nasha zaria, Dan warned that "in the political struggle the strike is not always the sole expedient means."71 On the March walkouts which led to the closing of the union in 1914, Martov theorized "the elemental development of the recent wave of political stoppages has led the workers into a dead end."72 Leading Mensheviks were alarmed by the "spontaneity" of striking workers, "hotheads intoxicated by their own mood and the excitement reigning in St. Petersburg." The praktiki defended union organization against their critics who labelled unions a "harmful undertaking" which corrupted working class struggles. Ezhov suggested strikes be characterized as political or economic
and that activists should then direct work stoppages attacking the employers rather than the government. To critics such as Lenin such a proposal clearly reincarnated the heresy of economism. The veteran Mensheviks found themselves in the same political position as the veteran members of the Emancipation of Labor Group at the turn of the century. Both groups refused to comprehend the extent of their marginalization within the changing revolutionary movement. Instead, they unintentionally separated themselves from the expanding movement and in the process, destroyed its potential for fundamental historical change.

Leninists at Prague approved the formation of cells in legal organizations but the Bolshevik hierarchy moved slowly in this regard. Only after an increase in strike activity was noted did Lenin observe

the proletariat is drawing the masses into a revolutionary strike, which indissolubly links politics with economics, a strike which wins the support of the most backward sections by the success for an immediate improvement in the life of the workers, and at the same time rouses the people against the tsarist monarchy.

Rather that attempt to legitimize some strikes as economic, Lenin recognized political aims were part of the current movement and proclaimed "the great necessity and the great fundamental importance of precisely such intertwining."

While requiring a revolutionary stance of the strike
movement, the Bolsheviks moved more fully into the legal organizations. The TsK resolved in 1913:

Social Democrats must attract into all workers' societies the broadest possible circles of workers, inviting into membership all workers without distinction according to party views. But the Social Democrats within these societies must organize party groups [cells] and through long, systematic work within all these societies establish the very closest relations between them and the Social Democratic Party.  

Even the Leninist TsK tactics moved toward a combination of legal and illegal work. Lenin's political conversion is reminiscent of the Economist heresy. Lenin redefined the liquidators' program to discredit the Party reformers as "legalists" who rejected the underground. Then he adopted the tactical program of the heretics.

By 1914, Bolsheviks dominated the governing boards of most unions, educational societies and insurance assemblies as a result of this new policy. The decline of Menshevik hegemony in trade union and workers' societies has been interpreted as evidence of both the expanding radicalization of the politically conscious working class whose demands were enunciated by the Bolshevik program after the failure of the "liquidator" Mensheviks to offer effective leadership to the proletariat. Contemporaries overemphasized the extent of the Bolshevik victory, an error repeated by historians of the period who tallied the scores of the opposing factions without analyzing resolutions and
mandates in the meetings and institutions of workers' associations. Although, many analysts have recognized schism among Mensheviks, they assume Lenin directed Bolshevism after Prague. Such an interpretation can not be validated. To illustrate this, several problems must be considered. Did leadership tactics differ significantly within worker associations after the Bolsheviks replaced Mensheviks on the governing boards? Can a worker identity be gleamed from the demands and resolutions of worker groups in this period? If so, can a political affiliation be assigned Petersburg workers?

On 15 March 1912, the union was closed after the police attended a board meeting. Although the union was able to continue operation by using the charter of an alternative union which had been on the books since 1908, the unionists were unable to decisively respond to the events at Lena. By July, only 2100 members had been registered under the new union charter. Metallists were still active in union affairs but throughout the year many simply failed to officially join the union. Grievances emerged from the shop floor, elders directed strikes, organized strike committees and then demonstrations involving political and economic demands. Union leaders did not exist for such protests, as the union was legal only five months in 1912. In fact one activist recorded the
union was involved in only four of seventy strikes in 1912.80

On 21 April 1913, 700 to 800 members of the reorganized union met to elect an interim board. Zinoviev berated the old union board for spurning the underground and the SD Duma deputy as "isolated from the masses" in the petition campaign. Malinovskii, one of Pravda's candidates, reminded the assembly he had been the first secretary of the union. Pravda passed out copies of a list of suitable candidates which it called the "Marxist" slate. The rival Menshevik journal, Luch, objected to factional lists: traditionally candidates had been chosen from district meetings based on personality and local loyalties. The assembly elected a temporary governing board which included thirteen Bolsheviks, five Mensheviks, one SR and a non-party candidate. The conciliatory Bolshevik A.S. Kiselev, became president and Mensheviks V.M. Abrosimov and N.K. Morozov were named secretary and treasurer respectively. Two Bolsheviks, Kiselev and A.A. Mitrevich, and two Mensheviks, G.O. Baturskii and S. M. Shvarts, were placed on the editorial board of the trade union's journal, Metallist.81

Again at the election of the permanent board on 25 August, Luch and Pravda presented lists published in their papers and distributed at the door of the meeting. Police verified membership upon entry.82 The members attending
were reported as 3000, but later revised to 1800.®

Kiselev, a candidate on both lists, again castigated the "old" leadership for ignoring education thereby contributing to the workers' misunderstanding of strike tactics. The SD deputy, Kuznetsov, argued for a separation of economics and politics but whistling from the assembly caused him to end his speech.® Again, members elected the Pravda list which included only three Mensheviks among the 31 full and candidate members.®

Mensheviks were alarmed by their loss of predominance on the union board. The Menshevik activist Bulkin claimed Bolshevik intellectuals had joined the party and found it easy to manipulate politically unconscious workers who were limited by their "slave psychology." These Bolsheviks created factionalism in the union endangering the progress of unity.® Martov replied intellectuals could not influence or manipulate members since they had been arrested or exiled. However, laborers had a psychological need for guidance and strong leadership which the Bolshevik "lumpen proletariat" provided. According to Martov, the Bolsheviks in the union attacked the "liquidators" with more malevolence than employers or the government.®

Generational struggle was another contemporary explanation for Bolshevik victory. In a four part essay, the Menshevik Sher identified a struggle between old members
who advocated organizational methods of struggle and younger members who favored strike tactics. Expanding this interpretation, Rakitin (V.O.Tsederbaum) and B.I. Gorev (B.I. Gol'dman) identified the new members as young workers fresh from the countryside still possessing a "primitive peasant world view." Haimson's interpretation closely follows this formula identifying the workers as "impatient, romantic, singularly responsive to maximalist appeals."

However, a closer look at membership lists cannot substantiate these speculations. By 25 August, members numbered 5667. Figures for July indicate that 4600 had registered by that time. Of these 3416 were new and 1184 reenrolled. Therefore, in July 25.7% were reregistered members. Even if no prior members reenrolled in August, they would still account for 20.9% of the total. Approximately 100-150 members attending the general meeting voted for the Luch candidates. Table 19 illustrates probable voting patterns of returning members based on two assumptions. First, the proportion of old members attending the meeting was equal to those enrolled. Secondly, only old members would vote for Luch candidates. Of course, it is likely that a higher proportion of returning members attended the meeting than new members and voted in favor of Pravda's list.
Table 19: Probable Voting Patterns of Returning Members for the Metalworkers' Union Board, August 1913

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Returning Members</th>
<th>If 1800 attending</th>
<th>If 3000 attending</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20.9% Old Members</td>
<td>376 Old members</td>
<td>627 Old members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If 100 pro-Luch</td>
<td>26.6% pro-Luch returning members</td>
<td>15.9% pro-Luch returning members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If 150 pro-Luch</td>
<td>39.9% pro-Luch returning members</td>
<td>23.9% pro-Luch returning members</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If metalworkers were unhappy with the organizational tactics of the union board, this disgruntledness applied to both returning members and new recruits.⁹²

In 1914, workers also elected Bolshevik majorities to the governing boards of many educational societies and clubs. Bolsheviks, using the same tactics of presenting a "Marxist" slate, won a majority in "Science is Life" in February and in April at Sampsonievskii and "Source of Light and Knowledge." Mixed boards continued to exist in "Education," "Knowledge is Light," and "Education" in the Narva district.⁹³ Again, election tactics more than radical strike tactics contributed to Bolshevik success.

Bolshevik election tactics clearly produced a victory for the Pravda candidates. At Prague, the Bolsheviks resolved to "make broader use than before of every kind of legal opportunity" and agreed that "illegal party organizations must use all existing legal workers'
associations as bases for their activities among the masses." However, Lenin published only one article on trade unions in this period: "Metalworkers' strikes in 1912" serialized in Metallist.\textsuperscript{94} The Leninist TsK ignored legal work at Cracow and only at Poronin in September 1913, after their victory in the Metalworkers' Union elections in July, did the Leninists reinvoke the Prague resolution. During the Duma election campaign, workers' rejected factionalism and voted for unity. Now they had supported a "Marxist" slate which included many popular long term union activists. At Brussels in 1914, Lenin asserted Bolshevik hegemony proved the existence of an increased revolutionary consciousness among the laboring class.\textsuperscript{95} Was this Marxist slate an indication of ideological radicalism or simply successful campaigning on the part of Petersburg Bolsheviks?

Support for the Bolsheviks or Pravda did not necessarily translate as support for Lenin's position on party unity and cooperation. The "revolutionary hotheads" elected in 1913-14 included conciliators such as Kiselev and long term legal activists, Matveev, Sesitskii and Nikolaev. Nikolaev, first elected to the board in 1911, was a member of the "district meeting" on Vasileostrov, an unofficial Party group. Both Matveev and Sesitskii had been active since 1910. Sesitkii belonged to the Vpered camp as part of the Bologna Party school in 1910, then supported Trotsky,
and did not attend the Prague conference. V. M. Abrosimov, the police spy, was a peasant-worker from Tver elected secretary in 1912 and reelected to the board in 1913. He became union secretary in May.\textsuperscript{56}

After the new board was elected, dissension plagued union meetings. Conflicts continued over organizational methods and the strike struggle. At a general meeting in November 1913, another Menshevik, Iudin, maligned the board for the bad state of finances and poor membership numbers. The assembly became disruptive, Iudin had to postpone his remarks temporarily, then finished his comments decrying the lack of freedom of speech. The assembly voted confidence in the board. Another member suggested a Luch supporter be tried for insulting Kiselev and the police had to close the meeting to end the confusion. Kuznetsov and Abrosimov addressed branch meetings which also ended in chaos.\textsuperscript{57} Again in January, a speaker criticized the board for the lack of cultural work but the meeting proceeded smoothly. Members affirmed the traditional method of choosing the board through districts to arrive at one list and elected the Menshevik Smirnov and nonfactionalist Rubtsov to the board. Thereafter until the closing of the union in April 1914, no separate lists were presented.\textsuperscript{58}
Both before and after Bolshevik hegemony in the trade union movement, the metallists' governing board condemned strikes not directed by the union. After Lena, the Menshevik dominated board revived strike guidelines from 1907 which gave them the right to call off strikes considered unproductive and to have representatives on strike committees. The union leaders also argued that without an open, mass, democratic working class movement, conscious political action could not be successful. Strikes begun on the shop floor without the discipline, solidarity and support of the union would fail. In May 1912, Abrosimov admitted, "it was impossible for the union to respond in a lively fashion to the upsurge in economic disputes."

After the Bolsheviks gained control of the board, the union continued to register complaints about the spontaneous nature of strikes. From 25 August 1913 to 18 January 1914, 29 of 41 strikes began before the union was consulted. On 3 November 1913, Kiselev admitted "a majority of stoppages and conflicts proceed without any organizational influence on the part of the union." At the general meeting on 19 January 1914, strike assistance was restricted to those who had been members for at least one year. Both the PK and the union denounced the spontaneous strike activity which followed the closing of the labor
press from 6-12 March 1914.\textsuperscript{103} The Bolsheviks had been planning a strike for 4 April, the anniversary of Lena. On 12 March, too late, they decided to bring out the strike already planned.\textsuperscript{104} In response to the walkouts, 16 engineering and electrical firms joined a lockout from 20-24 March. The Bolsheviks and the union met on 21 March to determine an appropriate response to the employers' attack. The party workers supported a political strike, but the majority felt local committees were too weak. Before any compromise could be reached the union was closed 1 April 1914 under articles 33-35, for the disturbance of public order.\textsuperscript{105}

Petersburg workers continued to act independently of union and party activists. Ignoring the leadership, they staged strikes and walkouts without approval. The authority of both the party and the union was ignored. Further, workers in public meetings demanded unity within the movement. Even the police noted:

there is marked increase in the new conciliatory movement among workers in the rank and file of Social Democracy who are extremely dissatisfied with the political fervor and factional infighting between the pravdisti and the liquidators.\textsuperscript{106}

Kiselev called for an end to factionalism at a general meeting on 3 November, and on 19 January 1914 old election practices were renewed. In the elections to insurance
institutions in 1913-14 the movement reaffirmed the desire for unity.

On 23 June 1912, the Duma passed a "Law on Sickness Insurance." The law provided for kassy or benefit funds from worker and employer contributions managed by a board including worker representatives. Councils set up by the government, which also included workers, would administer the law. Representatives elected from eight Petersburg factories would work with employers to draw up model rules. Afterwards, the law would be extended, industry by industry, to other factories covered by the law.

Trade unionists had worked diligently on the insurance question for years. District and factory level meetings regularly heard reports on the progress of the law since its initiation in 1904. Vyborg and Vasileostrov districts passed the following resolution adopted by the union members in September 1911:

We think that government insurance to workers should cover without exclusion all wage workers and include all aspects of social insurance, that is, insurance in the case of illness, disability, old age, unemployment, pregnancy, maternity, widows and orphans.

Unionists wanted a single insurance body organized on a territorial basis completely controlled by workers to manage the fund. The government should finance the fund by taxing income, property and inheritance. As early as 1909, these
proposals had been promoted in the "Theses on Insurance" adopted by the Central Bureau of Trade Unions in 1909.

The revolutionary parties were united in their condemnation of the law for excluding municipal and state workers, railway workers, postal workers, domestic servants, artisans and agricultural workers. Mensheviks rejected the employer's control of the funds, the paucity of benefits, and the high contributions demanded from workers. All SDs opposed a boycott of elections to kassy boards and agreed fully with unionists' demands. A Bolshevik activist in the capital wrote, "there are no differences between the factions on this matter." Indeed, both factions in the capital approved the establishment of an All Russian Labor Insurance Congress, a concept clearly linked to the workers' congress. In December 1912, Bolsheviks proposed a joint insurance commission, but before the plan could be carried out the police arrested the participants. Bolsheviks, Danskii and Malinovskii were invited to serve on the board of the Menshevik organ, Strakhovanie rabochikh. Although they refused, Pravda did not attack the editorial policy of the new journal until the spring of 1913. Lenin, who saw the possibility of utilizing the insurance campaign for agitation, criticized the Petersburg Bolsheviks for their shortcomings.
Again the Mensheviks moved into the arena first. Baturskii, a lawyer and legal activist, and Shvarts, who had been a member of the Central Initiative Group in 1913, led the Menshevik Insurance Commission and began publishing their journal *Strakhovanie rabochikh* in December 1912.\textsuperscript{113} In *Luch*, Ezhov published model statutes which were later adopted in essence by the Bolshevik, Danskii.\textsuperscript{114} Ezhov reiterated demands for workers' control of the *kassy*, the highest possible benefits. Garvi, using the pseudonym Chatskii, in *Nevskii golos*, was the first SD to propose an All-Russian Labor Insurance Congress. N. N. Morozov, a Menshevik at the Semenov plant, encouraged the formation of the "Commission of Eight" in January 1913.\textsuperscript{115}

Initially, government implementation of the law also served to unite Petersburg activists. The first Council was appointed from delegates who had elected Badaev to the Fourth Duma. Trade unions protested and urged the government's appointees to resign at the first meeting of the Council on 24 November 1912.\textsuperscript{116} New elections specific to the insurance campaign were necessary to assure proper factory representation.

Instead of the government's Council, representatives elected from the eight pilot plants formed a Commission of Eight to draft model rules at a meeting in January 1913.\textsuperscript{117} Morozov, elected chair of the Commission,
suggested to the seventy assembled delegates that a general fund be established rather than factory-based funds.\textsuperscript{118} However, the police prevented legal meetings of the Commission of Eight. Malinovskii protested the government ban in the Duma and 20,000 workers joined a protest strike. Mass meetings held to defend the Commission continued to favor the general fund, but the Commission, after negotiations with employers, seemed to move away from this demand. In the end, only four of the eight factories continued to support the Commission. At this point, \textit{Pravda} expressed support for the general fund and warned the Commission that their expectations for establishing satisfactory rules were overly optimistic, as they were working with "unreasonable men."\textsuperscript{119}

As the time for adoption of model rules approached, factional conflict developed. On 13 May 1913, officials announced dates for industry adoption of model rules. The metalworkers were scheduled to be last which gave them an advantage over other industries in seeking alterations.\textsuperscript{120} As SD activists came to the fore to assist the councils in making changes, the focus of the campaign quickly became the general fund. The Mensheviks did not provide an unequivocal alternative to the Bolshevik's promotion of a general fund.\textsuperscript{121} Kolokol'nikov and others supported a fund based upon profession. Many Mensheviks
believed the general municipal fund could not realistically be administered due to the lack of cooperation among trade unions in the capital. Legal activists feared workers might boycott factory funds in favor of the general fund, or become disillusioned if they could not win its passage. Therefore, they maintained the general fund as a long term aim, and in some cases, encouraged the establishment of an industrial fund in its place. By August 1913, the Commission of Eight was becoming ineffective and the Bolsheviks proposed formation of an insurance center from kassy delegates to oversee the strike movement. In October, Bolsheviks began to publish Voprosy strakhovaniia with the slogan of the general fund. Initially, the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union voted financial support for the Bolshevik insurance journal. Then, after a confrontation between pro-Bolshevik members and those favoring unity, monies were granted the Menshevik journal as well.

In the insurance campaign, activists of both factions utilized the slogan of "unity." Pravdisti continued to define this term as the unity of anti-liquidationist elements in hopes of claiming center stage as the true Social Democrats. Menshevik praktiki and pro-Menshevik trade unionists still retained hope that party workers in legal and illegal arenas could work together in a
broad revolutionary movement free of factionalism. Menshevik insurance activists endorsed the unity platform asserting that, "divisiveness and fratricidal struggle among leading workers in the campaign is far worse, more senseless, than in political organizations embracing only the vanguard."¹²⁶

The Metalworkers' Union, like most trade unions, adopted the Bolshevik plan for a general fund. In September 1913, a mass meeting at Putilov voted for a city wide kassa and the highest benefits possible. By the end of the month, twelve of the largest plants accepted this plan, four rejecting earlier more conservative resolutions. The twelve factories set up an "Insurance center" and contacted fifty other factories to coordinate insurance work in the capital before being shut down by the police. In all, thirty-six metallist plants adopted this proposal. Pravda agreed with legal activists that if the general fund was not approved factory funds should be approved.¹²⁷

Elections for the central insurance bodies indicated delegate bias toward unity. The Bolshevik mandate for the election supported voting by slate and included a demand, known as Paragraph V, that the delegates inform the workers of their activities through the Bolshevik press. The Menshevik Bautskii rejected factionalism and Paragraph V.¹²⁸ On 18 December, twenty-three representative from kassa
boards agreed there were "no differences between the mandates" except for Paragraph V which was rejected. The Bolsheviks declared the assembly an "accidental meeting" and ignored its findings. Delegates from the kassy boards were arrested at a secret meeting three days later and electors chosen for the Petersburg Insurance Council refused to vote until those arrested were freed. The postponement only led to more confusion.

Before the rescheduled elections on 2 March 1914, the Bolsheviks issued a revised mandate which now stated in Paragraph VI "representatives of the workers must in all activity follow the decisions of the organized Marxists." With this revision, the Bolsheviks hoped to discredit groups considered outside the Party according to the Party resolutions at Prague in 1912. Both Mensheviks and SRs opposed this, the Mensheviks reminding the Bolsheviks "kassy are not party organs." On 2 March, forty-two of fifty-five kassy sent representatives totalling forty-seven to the electoral assembly. The twenty four delegates from Putilov who had previously made an agreement with the Bolshevik conciliator, Kiselev, and the rest of the Metalworkers' governing board denounced factionalism which, they asserted, overshadowed class interests. Ten other delegates joined the Putilov delegates in support of "mixed lists," that is delegate lists composed through negotiations between
Mensheviks and Bolsheviks. They also voted to accept a "united mandate" which amended Paragraph VI to publish reports in all labor press organs. The Metalworkers' unity could have persuaded the assembly to adopt a non-factional platform; however, at this point, another representative suggested labor delegates be "subordinated to the collective of the kassy." Since there was no such body, the proposal served only to further complicate the discussion. Delegates rejected this proposal and in the resulting confusion voted instead for the original version of Paragraph VI. Although delegates had voted in favor of "mixed lists" earlier, a compromise had not been reached before the vote was taken. Therefore, the delegates elected the Pravda list. Nevertheless, the Pravda list included two Mensheviks including P. I. Sudakov of the kassa board at St. Petersburg Metals, who had received the most votes in elections to the workers' curia of the Fourth Duma. Although five members and seven of ten alternates on the Insurance Council were Bolshevik, the vote was the result of a breakdown in unified tactics more than clear support for Bolshevik policies. Perhaps the presence of two Mensheviks on the Pravda list contributed to its success. Ten of the fifteen delegates were metallists which might indicate more support for trade union activists than for Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.
On 30 March 1914, elections were scheduled for the St. Petersburg Capital Insurance Board. In opposition to Paragraph VI, Mensheviks took up the idea of responsibility to the collective of kassy. Three days before the election, 17 kassy boards agreed in principle to a "mixed list" of candidates and "subordination to the collective." At the electoral assembly, on 30 March, fifty-three kassy sent delegates. Although thirty-seven said they were Pravdisti, and only seven Menshevik, four SRs, and five nonparty, votes on the issues of mixed lists and Paragraph VI were not predetermined. Of the twelve representatives who had directives from their kassa boards, eleven were to vote for non-fractional lists. When V.D. Rubstov, vice-chair of the Geisler kassa board, reported the vote from the meeting of the kassy boards, the changes were accepted by a vote of 31 to 22. However, delegates sidestepped unity again when 31 voted to merge the Bolshevik and Menshevik slogans into the amendment, the "collective of the kassy must be subordinated to the Marxist organization." At this point, twenty-eight delegates voted for the SR proposal of proportional representation and negotiations broke down. Again, the Pravda lists were accepted.

On 13 April, the elections to the Petersburg Provincial Board included electors from the capital not from the provinces. In this election, Rubstov won the
representatives' acceptance for a mixed list of candidates. Delegates approved another revision of the amendment which called for responsibility to the "representative body of sickness funds" to be subordinated to all Marxist leadership.\textsuperscript{137} Worker delegates interpreted this slogan as nonfactionalist and pro-unity.

A simple count of affiliation among those elected to the insurance councils gives the appearance of a Bolshevik victory. However, the Menshevik trade unionist Sher exaggerated the Bolshevik victory when he declared that "preponderance in St. Petersburg of the Pravdisti is without doubt."\textsuperscript{138} Many workers at large and small plants were excluded from participation, along with employees of most state factories. Also the \textit{kassa} boards, not general membership meetings, chose delegates. Clearly, the political identification of most delegates was Social Democratic although they opposed factionalism. They also chose delegates who already had won previous elections and must have been well known personalities. The fact that metallists were so dominant at the electoral assemblies and that a majority of those elected were metalworkers is more significant than their affiliation with Bolshevism.\textsuperscript{139}

By 1914, Petersburg metalworkers, radicalized by years of confrontation with the state and employers, had adopted what Hogan calls a "language of socialism." Long
term association with Russian Marxism first through propaganda circles, then from consistent contact with legal activists in workers' associations, had contributed to the rise of a self-reliant working class. Although the radicalized laborers did not identify with a particular faction, their discourse was closely connected to Russian Marxism which had consistently defined common class interests. Immediately before the war, the expression of class identity through political protests in solidarity with workers in other industries was apparent time after time. Though the metallists' were alienated by factionalism they fully accepted the Marxist message.

Bolshevism was not a clearly identifiable ideology from 1912 to 1914. In preparation for the Brussels conference in July 1914, Lenin wrote, "a majority of four-fifths of class-conscious workers of Russia have rallied around the decisions and bodies created by the January Conference of 1912." Of course, such a statement had little to do with reality. Although the Metallists' Union had elected a Bolshevik majority, compromise had been reached with the old leadership and with Mensheviks in the Insurance campaign under the direction of the conciliator Kiselev. There was no PK after July 1914 and after the split of the Duma fraction, circulation of Pravda began to
drop precipitously. Bolshevik conciliators, rather than Pravdisti, dominated the rank and file.

Despite the Bolshevik weakness, the Mensheviks were unable to reap many rewards by 1914. The Menshevik leadership by failing to alienate the Leninists before the Prague meeting in 1912, had little hope of implementing the unity platform afterwards. When strikes resulted from the Duma interpellation after the closing of the Metallists' Union, Luch accused the striking workers of "anarcho-syndicalism." Trotsky, the Caucasian Mensheviks, and seven Duma deputies denounced Luch's attitude toward strikes and condemned an article which categorized support for the underground as "deplorable" and the "psychology of irresponsibility." When Trotsky's agent, Semkovskii, met with Zhordania and Ramishvili in Petersburg in April 1913, they failed to alter the editorial board causing Trotsky to end his collaboration. In February 1914, Trotsky launched a new journal Bor'ba hoping to attract the workers and party activists to a united party. The Social Democratic Party and the working class had no organizational foundation.

In the 1920s, once liquidation had been established as the scapegoat for the failures of the prewar period, the activist Bulkin wrote:

the old union with its leanings toward liquidationism sowed distrust among the masses for union work. The workers did not perceive it as a leader of their struggle with capital. Among this
mass [that the union] alienated, a reaction against the union was beginning to grow. The spirit of gradualism and extreme timidity, a desire to protect the union from being closed . . . at the price of any compromise, including giving up the leadership of the economic struggle, in other words, doing all [those things] which the liquidators had been propagating in the union with such zeal — all of this not only worked against [the union's] popularity and influence in the growing movement of the Petersburg metalworkers, but . . . was undermining its authority in the eyes of the masses.

The tendency identified as "Liquidationism," however, called for the strengthening of both legal and illegal activities and Bulkin's characterization ignores this. Although unity required the continued existence of the union, the so-called liquidators did not insist on organization at the cost of revolution. Union leaders from all political tendencies — Bolshevik and Menshevik, liquidator and conciliator — wanted to preserve the institution they had dedicated most of their energies to administering.

The preservation of the union, in turn, protected the new revolutionary culture of "unity" which had evolved since 1905. The proponents of this culture, the Menshevik praktiki, won their long fought battle for unity at the Vienna conference in 1912. To complete this victory, the praktiki had to place themselves at the Party center and finalize the split with the Leninists who supported Prague. Unity could be won only by continuing factionalism. Further complicated by the praktiki's abhorrence of a Party center
as well as the concept of "leading the movement," the obstacles to Menshevik hegemony could not be overcome. In 1912-1914, the discourse of unity placed the workers, not the Russian Social Democratic Party, at the political center.

ENDNOTES

1See for example Bonnell, Roots of Rebellion; Swain, Social Democracy and the Legal Labour Movement; Heather Hogan, Forging Revolution; G.A. Arutiunov, Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v period novogo revoliutsionnogo pod'ema, 1910-1914 gg. (Moscow, 1975); E.E. Kruze, Polozhenie rabochego klassa Rossii v 1900-1914 gg., (Leningrad, 1976).

2The term socialists refers to all activists inside Russia who adopted Marxist tactics regardless of party affiliation. Therefore, SDs, SRs, and nonfactional SDs would come under the definition of this term.


4In fact, at least one commentator argued that these "spontaneous" strikes were more dangerous since the employers were organized. See Iurii Chatskii(Garvi), "Ocherednyia zadachi" Nash put 18(17 June 1911):6-7.

5Ibid., pp. 3-8; A number of articles appeared in the labor press under the title, "What is to be Done?" See for example Batrak (M.P.Zatonskii) "Chto delat," Metallist 3(27 October 1911):2-5; A.V. "Chto delat?" Metallist 4(10 November 1911):3-5; Metallist 5(26 November 1911):3-5; S. P-skii (F. Moravskii) "K voprosy 'Chto delat'?" Metallist 11(23 February 1912):4-5; V- "Opiat o tom zhe chto delat'" Metallist 13(7 April 1912): 4-5; G.A. "Eshche o tom, chto delat" Metallist 6(17 December 1911):10. The authors proposed strengthening factory groups, electing councils of elders, developing mutual aid, and expanding educational work.

1911):6; See Hogan, Forging Revolution, for an analysis of rationalization of industry and its effects on the metallists.


12Dan to Akselrod, 24 January 1912, 14 September 1912, Ibid., pp.245-6, 254; Dan to Garvi, April 1912, 13 August 1912, Pis'ma P.B. Akselroda i Iu. O. Martova, pp. 223, 252-3; McKean, St. Petersburg, p.108 citing GARF, f.102, DPOO 1913g. d.5 ch.57, 11.190, 201,311-12; pp. 107-8, citing GARF f.102, DPOO 1913g. d.5 ch.57, 11.2, 166,190,274-5,310-31.

13Listok organizatsionnogo komiteta po sozyvu obshchepartiinoi konferentsii, 3(1912):1

14McKean p. 108-9 citing f.102, DPOO 1913g, d.307, prod.III, 1.116.


17Sotsial demokrat, 31(28 June 1913);Listovki Peterburgskikh bol'shevikov. 1902-1917. Tom vtoroi, 1904-1917, (Leningrad, 1939),p. 77-78; McKean, St. Petersburg, p.112, citing GARF

See Nicolaevsky Collection, Series 16, Box 42, ff 7 for correspondence between Akselrod and Garvi on this issue. Lidia Dan attended one of these meetings and Trotsky also was interested in the project. Zhivoe delo, 2 (27 January 1912): 2.

Zvezda had been closed by the censors. The government had granted permission for the publication of a paper called Pravda by an official of the Holy Synod. The Duma deputy, Polataev, got permission to use this title. See Elwood, Russian Social Democracy, pp.209-11. Elwood concentrates on the plan to launch a workers' newspaper among Bolsheviks and Party Mensheviks. He does not mention the St. Petersburg plan to publish Rabochaia gazeta.


No article authored by Lenin was printed until 8 May 1912 and then not again until 12 July. In December 1912, 11 of 13 SD Duma deputies voted in favor of combining Pravda and the Menshevik paper, Luch. Elwood, Russian Social Democracy, pp.212-214; See also R.Carter Elwood, "Lenin and Pravda," Slavic Review 31, no.2 (June 1972):355-80.


See Astrov, *Nasha zaria*, 7-8 (1912).

Bonnell p.410, citing LGIA f.287, opis' 1, d.68a p.169; f.287, opis'1,d.16,p.131.; GARF DPOO f.102, opis'14,d.17,ch.57,1913, p.5; DPOO f.102, opis'122, d.61, ch.2,t.2, p.178,9.

Bonnell p.412 citing GARF DPOO f.102, d.341, 1913, pp.8-10.


*Nevskii golos*, 6(5 July 1912):1; "Uchastnik soveshchaniia, Pismo v redaktsiiu" *Nevskii golos*, 9(31 August 1912):3.


Zinoviev to Pravda editorial board, 21 July 1912, *Iz epokhi*, 3:188.

*Luch* 2(18 September 1912):2 ; 3(19 September 1912):3 ; *Pravda*, 120(18 September 1912):2 ; 121 (19 September 1912):2 ; 123 (21 September 1912):2.

*Sotsial demokrat*, nos.28-9, (18/5 November 1912); Luch, no.1 (16 Sept 1912):4; no.64, (December 1912): 2. For the Bolshevik platform see *Zvezda* no.13/49 (1 March 1912); no.23/59 (29 March 1912); For the Menshevik platform see *Nasha zaria* nos.7-8 (1911) and *Zhivoe delo* no.8 (9 March 1912).
38 Luch, 6 (22 September 1912): 1; 24 (13 October 1912): 1.

39 Oskarov (Isuv), "Itogi viborov po rabochei kurii" Nasha zaria, no. 9-10 (1912): 115; Stalin was in Petersburg illegally from October 1912 to February 1913, Stalin, "Results of the Elections of the Workers' Curia in St. Petersburg," Works, 2:263-8.

40 Sotsial demokrat 28-9 (18/5 November 1912); Pravda 125 (23 September 1912): 1; 135 (5 October 1912): 1; 143 (14 October 1912): 2.

41 Rabochee dvizhenie v Petrograde, p. 64-71; Hogan, Forging Revolution, p. 49.


43 A.E. Badaev from Nicolaev Railway works had been a Bolshevik since 1904. Luch 31 (21 Oct 1912): 1.

44 See A. Isuv, "Itogi viborov po rabochei kurii" Luch, no. 24 (13 October 1912); "Izbranie vyborshchikov" Pravda 125 (23 September 1912); "Eto-li edinstvo" Luch, 15 (3 October 1912); "Plody raskola" Luch, 31 (21 October 1912); "Sezd upolnomochennikh ot rabochikh" Pravda, 136 (6 October 1912); 145 (17 October 1912); 146 (18 October 1912); 148 (20 October 1912). Elwood finds similar results in the Ukraine where Bolsheviks who accepted compromise platforms or directly adopted Menshevik instructions were elected. See his Russian Social Democracy, pp. 184-5.

45 Luch, no. 10 (September 1912): 4; Novaia raboachaia gazeta no. 50 (2 July 1914): 2. Elections to the second urban curia on 25 October produced a united SD list including N.N. Krestinskii, N.D. Sokolov, and N.S. Chkeidze. Luch no. 29 (19 October 1912): 2; Pravda no. 153 (20 October 1912): 2; Sotsial demokrat, no. 30 (25/12 January 1913).

46 Malinovskii and Muranov opposed this. Luch, 78 (18 Dec 1912): 1.

47 G.I. Zaichkov, Bor'ba rabochikh deputatov gosudarstvennoi dumy protiv tsarizma v 1907-1914 gg. (Moscow 1981); A.E. Badaev, Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma (New York, 1973), pp. 43-44.

48 Lenin, CW, 18: 460-1; Pravda no. 167 (13 November 1912): 2; no. 47/251 (26 February 1913): 1; See also M.S. Olminskii,


Luch no. 53 (17 November 1912):1.

G. A. Arutunov, Rabochee dvizhenie, p. 258.

The scholarly discussions of strikes and the Bolshevik victory exaggerate and distort the reality in the movement. See for example Haimson and Charles Tilly, eds. Strikes, Wars, and Revolutions in an International Perspective: Strike Waves in the Late Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries (Cambridge, 1989). Haimson interprets the election of Bolsheviks as an indication of a younger cohort of Bolshevik workers who rejected Menshevism and pushed Russia to the brink of revolution before the war. Bonnell cites the election of Bolsheviks as a rejection of the reformist trade union. See Bonnell, Roots, pp.434-8

On the characterization of strikes see Haimson, Strikes, Wars and Revolutions.

Elwood blames the lack of coordination and spontaneous nature of the strikes on the lack of a viable underground organization. See Elwood, Russian Social Democracy, pp. 236-38.

RTsNDI, f.6860, o.1,d.173,1.4; Zvezda 31/67 (17 April 1912); Pravda(Vienna) 25 (6 May/23 April 1912):3.

Iakovlev, pp. 230-7, McKean p.90 citing GARF f.1405,op.530, d.824,11.82,88; f.102, DPOO 1912d.341,1.108.

Pravda 8 (1 May 1912); 9 (3 May 1912); Listovki Peterburgskikh bol'shevikov, 2:64-5; Iakovlev, pp.232, 234-5.

McKean p.91, citing f. 102, DPOO 1912g, d.341, 11.136-7,161,181;d.101, 11.81, 225-6.

Listovki, pp. 82-84; Pravda, 10/304, (3 May 1913):3; Luch, 100/86 (3 May 1913):2.

Listovki, pp. 88-90, 102-3; Novaia rabocheia gazeta, 8/26 (11 January 1914).

For a study of the PSMFO see Hogan, Forging Revolution, pp.212-13.


Zhivaia zhizn' 3 (13 July 1913): 3; M. Balabanov, Rabochee dvizhenie v Rossii v gody pod'ema 1912-14 gg. (Leningrad, 1927) p.54.

Kruze, Peterburgskie rabochie v 1912-14 godakh, (Leningrad, 1961), pp. 156-7; Pravda 116/320 (22 May 1913): 5.

By 1 September, six weeks into the strike 726 rubles was collected, and on 14 September a total of 1378. Metallist 5/29 (19 July 1913):6; 6(30) (10 August 1913):16; 7\31 (24 August 1913): 11-12; Hogan, Forging Revolution, pp. 225-6, claims the strike failed because of factional struggle in union, but the Bolsheviks already had taken control of the union board.

Metallist 7\31 (24 August 1913):4.

Izveshenie, pp.33-4.

Luch, 149/235 (2 July 1913):4.


Metallist 15 (1 June 1912):2; See also Ezhov, "Ot stikiinosti k organizatsii," Nevskii golos 1 (20 May 1912): 2.


Haimson does not analyze the specifics of the campaign only the result. See "Problem of Social Stability" *Slavic Review* 23 (December 1964) pp.619-42; 24 (March 1965), pp.1-22. Hogan also focuses on election results although she denies the concept of Bolshevik "hegemony" and postulates that the Bolshevik "way of seeing" rather than affiliation "informed metalworker militance." See Hogan, *Forging Revolution*, pp.241; Bonnell claims the election was the result of a rejection of Menshevik reformism because the workers were politically radicalized. Bonnell, *Roots*, pp.427-34.

The major exception to the rule is R. Carter Elwood's work which though published long ago is still ignored by many scholars of the period. See Elwood, *Russian Social Democracy*. Many scholars still use the formulation "Lenin and the Bolsheviks." See for example Hogan, *Forging Revolution*, pp.217-20.

"Iz zhizni i deiatelnosti obshchestva," *Metallist* 7 (30 December 1911).

Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp. 244-6; *Metallist* 17 (6 July 1912).


*Luch* 92\178 (23 April 1913): 2; Bulkin, *Na zare*, pp. 261-2, 270-2; *Pravda* 83\287 (10 April 1913):4 ; 92\296 (23 April 1913):4,7 ; 93\297 (24 April 1913):4 ; See also Rakitin, "Beregites metallisty," *Luch* 92\178 (22 April 1913); "Kratkii ocherk o zasedanii professionalnogo obshchestva rabochikh metallistov," *Metallist* 2 (22 May 1913). For Menshevik comments on the use of slates see Gvozdev, *Novaia rabochaia gazeta* 65 (25 Oct 1913): 1.

"Kogo vibirat," *Novaia rabochaia gazeta* 14 (24 August 1913); "Obiavlenie," *Novaia rabochaia gazeta*, 15 (25 August 1913); Articles on the meeting from *Nash put* can be found in GARF, f.6860, o.1, d.174B.

*Novaia rabochaia gazeta*, 16 (27 August 1913): 3 ; 26 (7 September 1913): 4.

"Iz zhizni soiuza" *Metallist* 7(24 Aug 1913); 8(18 Sept 1913).

Bulkin, "Rabochaia samodeiatel'nost'," *Nasha zaria*, 3 (1914): 60; "Raskol fraktsii i zadachi rabochikh" *Nasha zaria*, 6 (1914): 42-51.


Sher, "Nashe professional'noe dvizhenie za dva poseldnikh goda" *Bor'ba* 1 (22 February 1914); 2 (18 March 1914); 3 (9 April 1914); 4 (28 April 1914).

Gorev, "Demogoiia ili Marksizm" *Nasha zaria*, 6 (1914): 30-41; Rakitin (V. O. Tsederbaum), "Rabochaia massa", *Nasha zaria*, 9 (1913) 52-60.


*Bonnell uses this method to disprove the theory of a generational struggle. See Bonnell, *Roots*, pp. 395-6.*


*Metallist*, 7, 8 (1913).


Bulkin, "Departament politsiia," p. 137.

"O sobranii metalistov," *Novaia rabochikh gazeta* 75 (5 November 1913); "Iz zhizni souiza," *Metallist* 12 (5 December 1913).


"Za god.," *Metallist* 1 (11 Feb 1912): 2; S. Pskii (pseud of F. Moravskii) "K voprosu chto delat?," *Metallist* 11 (23 February 1912): 4-5.


G. Shidlovskii, "Petersburgskii komitet bol'shevikov v kontse 1913g i v nachale 1914g.," *Krasnaia letopis',* 17 (1926): 129.

*Listovki*, pp. 95-6.


The Ministry of Finance had considered introducing insurance legislation before the 1905 Revolution.


*Luch*, 80 (20 December 1912): 1; "Ptoses po strakhovaniiu rabochikh," *Nash put* 16 (1911): 5; N. Aleksandrov (Dr. Semasko) "Gosudarstvennoe strakhovanie rabochikh," *Sotsial demokrat* 23 (14/1 September 1911): 1.

*Luch* 80 (20 December 1912): 1; McKean, p. 164 citing A. Enukidze letter to S. S. Shaumia, (February 1913), f. 102, DPOO 1913 g. d. 307.1. 114.


Lenin, *CW* 18: 461-3; *Novaia rabochikh gazeta*, 57 (15 October 1913): 3.

*Strakhovanie rabochikh* was published until February 1917 then retitled *Strakhovanie rabochikh i sotsial'naia politka*


115 It should also be noted that in April 1913, Morozov became secretary of metallists' union. *Luch* 17/103 (22 January 1913): 2; Ch. Gurskii (S. S. Danilov) "Strakovaia kampania v Peterburge," *Proveshchenie* 1 (January 1913): 76; Baturskii, "Professional'nye soiuzy i strakovye kampanii." *Metallist*, 1/25 (19 April 1913): 4-6; For Menshevik statutes see E. Z. (Ezhov) "Ustav bol'nichnoi kassy," *Luch* 42 (4 November 1912): 1; 49 (13 November 1912): 1; 80 (20 December 1912): 1.


117 The eight factories were Erikson, Lessner, Nobel, Phoenix, St. Petersburg Metals, Semenov, Neva Stearine and Russian-American Rubber.


119 "Khronika," *Strakhovanie rabochikh*, 4 (March 1913) "Strakhovaia kampanii," *Strakhovanie rabochikh* 5 (April 1913); "Nekotorie itogi raboty upolnomochennikh," *Pravda* 66, 67 and 68, (20, 21 and 22 March 1913); N. Morozov, "O deitelnosti strakhovoi komissii," *Novaia rabochaia gazeta*, 24 (5 September 1913); On the conflict between *Pravda* and *Luch* in 1914 see RTsKhIDNI, f. 450, o. 1, d. 48; o. 1, d. 50.

120 "Strakhovanie kampanii," *Strakhovanie rabochikh*, 7, 8 (9 June and July 1913).
This is the only difference between the proposals see Danskii, "Strakhovanie kampanii," Prosveschenie 6 (June 1913):97 and Voprosy strakhovaniia 1 (26 October 1913):2 ; 2 (2 November 1913): 2; Pravda 68/272 (22 March 1913): 3; Lenin, following the lead of local Bolsheviks began to agitate for strengthening the Bolshevik position on the kassy. Lenin CW 19:426-7.


13 "Iz zhizni i deitelnosti obshchestva," Metallist 1 (20 September 1911); "Obshchegorodskaya i professionalnaia kassa" Strakhovanie rabochikh, 11/12 (November/December 1913).


16 Strakhovanie rabochikh, 7(1914):3.


18 Novaja rabochikh gazeta 104 (11 December 1913):3 ; 106 (13 December 1913):3 ; 110 (18 December 1913):3 ; Voprosy strakhovaniia, 9 (21 December 1913): 2 ;Baturskii, "Vybor v sovet po delam strakhovaniia rabochikh," Strakhovanie rabochikh, 5 (March 1914); "Proekt nakaza predstaviteliam rabochikh v strakovikh prisutstviiakh i strakhovom sovete," Voprosy strakhovaniia 8 (22 February 1914).


20 Tsvetkov-Prosveshchenskii, Mezhdu, p.90.

"Vybory v strakhovoi sovet," *Voprosy strakhovaniia* 10 (8 March 1914); "Vtoroi shag k raskolu," *Proletarskaia pravda*, 30 (7 March 1914); "Vpechatleniia ot vyborov v strakhovoi sovet" *Proletarskaia pravda* 32 (9 March 1914).


These ten delegates were from Erikson, Koppel', Lessner, Neva Shipyards, Putilov, Russian Society, St. Petersburg Engineering and St Petersburg Nails. *Put Prawdy* 27 (4 March 1914):2 ; Baturskii, "Vybor v sovet po delam strakhovaniia rabochikh," *Strakhovanie rabochikh*, 5 (March 1914); *Nasha rabochaia gazeta*, 13 (18 May 1914): 4.


*Strakhovanie rabochikh* 7 (April 1914): 22.

Rubstov was elected along with the Bolshevik, Iakovlev. *Voprosy strakhovaniia*, 16/26 (19 April 1914): 3; Rubstov was union secretary in 1910, and treasurer in 1914. See "Izhizni soiuza," *Metallist* 4 (1 April 1914); "Vyibory v St Peterburgskoe gubernskoe strakhovoe prisutstvie," *Put Prawdy*, 61, (15 April 1914); Sher, "Vybor v strakhovye uchrezhdienia v Peterburge i zadachi edinstva," *Bor'ba* 6 (1914): 22-3.

Sher "Vybor v strakhovayia uchrezhdeniaia v Peterburge i zadachi edinstva" *Bor'ba*, no 6 1914)p.20

McKean argues that the main purpose of the general fund slogan was to split the factions on the issue of social insurance and therefore was not "a serious proposal." McKean p.167; Swain, pp. 167-70 argues the dispute is ideological. Sally Ewing "Russian Social Insurance Movement. 1912-14: An Ideological Analysis," *Slavic Review* 50 4 (Winter 1991):914-26, reading only Shvarts' memoirs, Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev unsuccessfully argues the campaign was ideological. She does not discuss any proposals from the floor of the various electoral assemblies.
On the radicalism of the working class of Russia at this time see Haimson, ed., Strikes, War and Revolution; Bonnell, Roots, pp. 390-438; Hogan, Forging Revolution, pp. 212-17.

See Hogan, Forging Revolution, p. 236.

Lenin CW 20:502.

Gin (A.I. Usagin), "Tragediia podpolia i tragi-komediia likvidatorstva," Pravda 13 (17 January 1913); Sedov, "Mass i podpol' e," Luch 15\101 (19 January 1913): 1; Dan to Martov, 12 February 1913, 2 May 1914; Dan to Akselrod, May 1913, Dan Letters, pp. 294, 297, 299; L.Trotskii. "Pisma ob edinstve," Luch 27, 29, 30 (2, 5, and 6 February 1913); RTsKhIDNI, f.450, o.1, d.6; o.1, d.9; S. Iu. Semkovskii, Trotsky's emissary corresponded with Akselrod on this subject. See Nicolaevsky Collection, Series 16, Box 42, ff. 9.

Bonnell, Roots, p. 397, citing Bulkin, Na zare, p.265.
CONCLUSION

The praktiki's failure to unify the Party and the closure of the Metalworkers' Union in March 1914 were the final acts in the "Liquidationist controversy." In subsequent months, the advent of the First World War quelled the revolutionary fervor and readjusted the terms of the struggle. Liquidationism, the ghost of Economism, would be reincarnated in later revolutionary generations, as an heretical tendency moving against the current of the Party. The circle has repeated itself throughout the history of Russian Social Democracy, even into the present.

Since the founding of the Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party, a tension had existed between those who would make a revolution and those who would act in that revolution - between the intellectual leaders and the workers. The practical activists, or praktiki hoped to bind the Party to the workers. According to the praktiki, the Party, since it formed in emigration, had lost touch with the workers. As successive generations of Social Democrats attempted to reconnect Social Democracy with the emerging working class, Party theorists resisted, and an organizational struggle resulted. This struggle posited two
tactical programs against one another. Among workers inside Russia, before and after 1905, the praktiki attempted to weld the Russian Social Democratic Party to the labor movement in a broad independent political party. Lenin's organizational methods belonged to the rival tactical program. In his opposition to the "Economists" before 1905 and to the "Liquidators" after, Lenin held little faith in the revolutionary capability of the worker. The underground party could not be submerged in the movement, but had to retain its ascendancy. Therefore, he vehemently rejected the unity of the illegal and legal party activists after 1905. According to Lenin, Liquidationism was economism revisited in all its heretical forms.

Lenin correctly identified "liquidationism" as a long term tendency within Russian Social Democracy. Liquidationism was a tactical program adopted by party activists who maintained a belief in the independent revolutionary potential of the working class. The proponents of "so-called liquidationism" included activists whose revolutionary careers spanned the first two decades of the century such as Kolokol'nikov and Grinevich. Other revolutionaries who joined the movement during 1905, with the advent of legal work, were also drawn to the culture of the praktiki. They were activists who favored party reform, not theoreticians. Their organizational plan called for the
hegemony of the legal party workers over the illegal, locating political power inside Russia rather than abroad, and avoiding the alienation of the Party from the working class. These reforms signified the complete democratization of the Party. Liquidationism existed, but it was defined incorrectly by its opponents.

As the Liquidationist controversy developed, the players in the conflict - Party leaders, the praktiki and the workers - each developed new identities. These identities evolved through a series of events which included the organization and administration of unions and clubs, participation in social congresses, Duma elections, elections to insurance bodies and the publication and distribution of union and socialist literature. At each turn of events, the relationships between the workers, praktiki and Party leaders were altered. A contest for leadership of the emerging revolutionary movement became apparent wherein each group opposed their own marginalization and legitimized their claims to power with the weapon of discourse. The resulting power struggle placed the contenders in positions that would be revisited during 1917.

Branding opponents with contemporary derogatory labels, and in the process dredging up party heresies, was a skill Lenin perfected. Lenin used the stamp of "Economism,"
which he equated with "opportunist" and "revisionist," to discredit party members who favored agitational methods and party reform at the turn of the century. Such language allowed Lenin to transform an organizational squabble into an ideological conflict. The 1905 Revolution permitted a revival of this dialogue. Practical party activists in newly organized workers associations such as the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union refused to submit to the discipline of the underground, directed by emigres and out of touch with the working class. As the praktiki moved into the local party power structure, they replaced the old intellectual leadership. Consequently, the Liquidationist Controversy was simply a struggle between these two political groups.

Lenin's use of particular terms defined the terms of the struggle. He revitalized the disparaging terms "reformism," "opportunism," and "revisionism," which he equated with "liquidationism," to expel the reformers and place them outside the Party. The Menshevik leaders, allies with Lenin in the struggle against Economist revisionism, were now cast into the same net. When the "liquidators" called for the "unity" of the legal and illegal movements, Lenin redefined the term. Leninist "unity" was the merger of "true" party elements, against the liquidators. At each turn, the Leninists seized slogans first, and defined their opponents in relation to these slogans.
The Menshevik praktiki waged their struggle within the boundaries of this discourse. "Liquidationism" could not exist since there was no Party apparatus to liquidate. With only local success, they promoted the "unity" of the legal activists with the reemerging underground. Because they favored unity, the praktiki refused to split the Party. Instead, they hoped to defeat Lenin by condemning "factionalism." By this criticism, they hoped to place the blame for political infighting, unpopular among workers, in the Leninist camp.

The workers comprehension and use of this language was distinct. Confused by Party polemics, in the end the workers spurned both Mensheviks and Bolsheviks and promoted "non-factionalism." However, rejection of Party affiliation did not constitute a rejection of socialism. Through long term contact with the praktiki, workers viewed their world through the prism of socialism. They voted socialist and espoused Marxist slogans. In the workers' mind a "member" of an organization was an individual who identified with the concepts of an organization, joined its undertakings and, in the case of unions, occasionally paid dues. For workers, organizations did not require loyalty - people did. Therefore a vote for a Bolshevik, as in the election of the union's governing board in 1913-14, was not a vote for the Bolshevik Party. Workers voted for long term active
socialists, not for the organizations they represented. The Liquidationist controversy was a sideshow which only served to alienate the workers from the Party apparatus.

The emerging identities of the Party leaders, the *praktiki* and the workers were shaped by the Liquidationist controversy. Both Menshevik and Bolshevik Party leaders identified themselves in relation to the existing Party which they continued to associate with the underground and a centrally directed organization. Their revolutionary place had already been identified and could not be reformed. Lenin's revolutionary will was tied to the Party which would guide the proletarian movement. Although the Menshevik leaders believed the Party should be submerged in the broader workers' movement, they remained members of a conspiratorial party. They were uncomfortable in their role as party reformers and, therefore, ineffective.

Through service to the labor movement, the *praktiki* developed identities as career activists. Just as they refused to leave legal work in the years of reaction, they remained active into the Soviet period. They embraced a democratic, open, dynamic, revolutionary movement which rejected authoritarian, conspiratorial organizational methods. The new culture to which they belonged was optimistic, progressive and revolutionary.
Workers, as examined through the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union, developed new institutions and organizations through which their grievances and interests could be voiced. In clubs, unions, Duma elections, and legislative undertakings, the workers faced the dual opponents of the state and the employer. As they skirted the edge of legality to maintain the limited rights granted by the constitutional settlement of 1905, their sense of political power expanded. Evolving in these years, a concept of common class interests, coupled with a complete alienation from liberal society, the workers became politically conscious of their identity as members of the working class. It is the workers' own sense of their importance and power that transformed them from a small marginal sector of Russian society to the central core that dictated Russia's direction in 1917.

During the evolution of these new identities, the so-called liquidators and the Leninists, as representatives of competing revolutionary cultures, refused to recognize their marginalization by the workers. Lenin, in emigration, used political discourse and maneuvers to drive a wedge between his opponents and claim center stage. The Mensheviks, as they splintered into factions were unable to take the offensive, shackled not only by their ideological inheritance, but also by the very culture they hoped to
legitimize. Their faith in unity prevented promotion of political infighting. The *praktiki* succeeded in merging local party activists and the workers between the revolution, however, they failed to achieve a position in the unreformed Party. As the workers became radicalized in 1912-14, the Menshevik *praktiki*'s caution led to their marginalization. The workers moved into a place of political power, and the Mensheviks were not beside them.

From 1906-1914, the Menshevik *praktiki* fought the wrong battle. Defending themselves against false charges of liquidationism, they did not see that their work had wrought fundamental changes in the working class. The workers had already rejected the old Party while maintaining their socialist voice. For them the old factional party was dead. Unfortunately, the *praktiki* did not choose to pick up the thread of unity and once and for all, liquidate the Party.
APPENDIX A : BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

Abrosimov, V. M. Menshevik provocateur. Abrosimov also represented the St. Petersburg Initiative Group at the Vienna Conference in 1912. In 1912, he was elected secretary of the Metalworkers' Union.

Akimov, V. (born Makhnovets, Vladimir Petrovich) - Menshevik. Akimov joined revolutionary work in the 1890s and collaborated with Rabochee delo. He collaborated with Martynov and Kolokol'nikov on a newspaper for the Russian worker, Krasnoe znamia (Red Flag). Akimov opposed Lenin's organizational plan at the Second Congress in 1903. Arrested in 1911, he was given amnesty in 1913. He remained active in trade unions and cooperatives.

Aleksandrova, Ekaterina Mikhailovna (Shtein, Nadezhda Mikhailova and other pseudonyms) Menshevik. Alekandrova joined circle work in St. Petersburg in the 1890s. Later associated with Iskra, she was a member of the TsK in 1905 and secretary of the Menshevik OK. In 1910, she signed the "Open Letter" against the "liquidationist" label. She was close to Trotsky's Pravda and a member of the OK for the Vienna Conference. After 1917, she belonged to the Moscow Printers' Union.

Baturskii, Boris Solomonovich (pseudonyms Tseitlin, G.B. Georgii, G. Smolin, Gromov) Baturskii was arrested three times before 1905. He was a delegate to the Fourth Congress of the Bund and to Stockholm. Trained as a lawyer, Baturskii was associated with the liquidators. He served on the editorial board of Strakhovaniia rabochikh and on the OK in 1912. In 1914, he attended the Brussels Congress and was a defensist during the war. An active right Menshevik in 1917, he died of typhus in 1920.

Bogdanov, N. P. Bogdanov joined the movement as a student at St. Petersburg University. In 1909, the Petersburg Committee often met in his apartment. A provocateur and Vperedist, Bogdanov cooperated with Trotsky's Pravda group and organized the Central Group of Petersburg Social Democrats.
Broido, Eva L'vovna (Born Gordon) (pseudonyms Ye. L'vova, Ye. Bronskaia.) Born in 1876, Broido emigrated to Germany in the 1890s. In 1900, she organized workers' groups and translated German socialist literature for the SD workers' library. After arrest and exile, she left Russia until 1905. Active in workers' clubs in Baku and Petersburg, Broido fits the mold for "liquidationism." She was secretary of the Menshevik OK, a member of the August Bloc and the Petersburg Initiative Group. Broido published articles against defensism during the war and was an active Menshevik after October. She emigrated to Berlin, but returned to Russia illegally and was arrested in the 1930s.

Bulkin, Fedor Afanas'ebich (family name Semenov) Bulkin was born to a family of unskilled workers in 1888 in St. Petersburg. As a metalworker at Baltic Works, he joined the Mensheviks in 1904. A founding member of the Metalworkers' Union, Bulkin served on the governing board, and represented the local party at the London Congress. Closely associated with liquidationism, he was arrested with other delegates to the Anti-alcoholism Congress in 1910. From internal exile, he left Russia. He represented the Mensheviks at Brussels and held a seat on the War Industries Committee from Samara. In 1916, Bulkin was again arrested and sent to Siberia. In 1919, he joined the Communist Party in Kharkhov. He authored works on the history of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union in the 1920s.

Chervanin, N. (born Lipkin, Fedor Andreevich) A long term praktik, Chervanin joined the movement in the 1890s. Menshevik author of Organizatsionnyi vopros (1904) which opposed Lenin's organizational methods. Chervanin gave the Menshevik report on trade unions at the Stockholm Conference. Associated with Liquidationism, Chervanin was a defensist during the war. In 1917, he served on the TsK of the RSDRP, then became a leading Menshevik in the Soviet government. Arrested in 1921, he died in prison.

Chkheidze, Nikolai Semenevich An SD since the 1890s, Chkheidze was a Menshevik deputy to the Fourth State Duma. In 1917, he chaired the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets. In 1917 he was revolutionary defensist. After October, Chkheidze opposed the Bolsheviks. He served on the Constituent Assembly of Georgia until his exile. Chkheidze committed suicide in Paris in 1926.

Dan, Feodor (born Gurvich, Feodor Il'ich) (pseudonym Dan) A Petersburg native, Dan became a Marxist as a student and
joined the Petersburg Union of Struggle. After his arrest in 1896, he published legal Marxist works. In 1901, Dan lived in Berlin, where he was associated with K. Kautsky. He joined Iskra and was elected to the OK for the Second Congress. Arrested, Dan escaped Siberian exile and travelled to Geneva where he became a leading Menshevik. Dan returned to Russia after the amnesty of 1905, and attended Party Congresses at Stockholm and London. An editor of Golos sotsial-demokrata, Nasha zaria, and Luch, Dan returned to Petersburg in 1913. He worked with the SD Duma faction until his exile during the war. Although Dan adhered to the Zimmerwald manifesto, he was mobilized as a doctor and sent to Turkestan. He remained a leading Menshevik after 1917 until his arrest and exile in 1922. Dan died in New York after a prolonged illness in 1947.

Ermolaev, Konstantin Mikhailovich (pseudonym Roman) Ermolaev participated in the student movement in Odessa was arrested and emigrated in the 1890s. When he returned to Russia, he was active in workers' circles, among railwaymen, at Putilov and in the Nevskii gates district. Associated with "liquidationism, Ermolaev attended the London Congress. He refused to serve on the TsK along with Garvi and Isuf. Throughout 1917, Ermolaev was an active right Menshevik. He emigrated with Martov to Berlin.

Ezhov, V. (born S. O. Tsederbaum) Ezhov was a theorist who edited all the "liquidationist" papers including Zhivoe delo and Luch. During the insurance campaign, he agreed to participate in a joint commission with St. Petersburg Bolsheviks and drafted the original model statutes for the kassy in 1912.

Galberschchtadt, Rosaliia Samsonovna (pseudonyms Katia, Fisher) Galberschchtadt studied in Geneva and joined the Emancipation of Labor Group. She returned to carry out revolutionary work in Odessa. She attended the Second Party Congress and became a Menshevik. A liquidator, Galberschchtadt was a leading member of the Initiative Group.

Garvi, P. (born Bronshtein, Petr Abramovich; party and literary pseud. Iurii, Iu. Chatskii) Garvi joined the revolutionary movement in Odessa where he began organizing workers' circles. He escaped Siberian exile in 1903 and travelled to Paris and Geneva. Before 1905, he was among a group of praktiki being sent to Russia. In 1905, he joined SD activities in Kiev, Petersburg, Ekaterinoslav, Odessa, Rostov and Moscow. He promoted the workers' congress. At the London Congress, Garvi was elected to the TsK. In Petersburg, he took part in the workers' movement, edited
trade union journals, and became a leading "liquidator."
Along with K. Ermolaev and I. Isuv, he refused nomination to
the Russian Bureau of the TsK in 1910. Garvi was one of the
founders of the Petersburg Initiative Group and joined the
work of the August Bloc after Vienna as a member of the
Organization Committee until his arrest in 1916. In 1917,
Garvi was again a leading trade unionist in Petrograd and
after October in Odessa. He was arrested and deported in
1923. Garvi remained an active Menshevik until his death in
New York in 1944.

Ginzburg, Abram Moiseevich (pseudonyms Andrei, Grigorii,
Efim, Naum; in lit. Naumov and Veloks) Ginzburg joined the
Social Democratic movement in the 1890s. He was arrested
for printing and distributing illegal literature and was
exiled to Siberia. In 1905, he worked in Menshevik
organizations and from 1906-10 was an active "liquidator" in
Petersburg. Arrested in 1910, Ginzburg was sent to Kiev.
After October, Ginzburg served in the Ministry of Labor and
in 1922 he became active in Soviet economic planning. He
was arrested in 1930 and sentenced to ten years
imprisonment.

Ginzberg, Boris Abramovich (pseudonym D. Koltsov) Born in
1863, Koltsov was a populist before he joined Marxist
circles in St. Petersburg. After his arrest, he emigrated to
Geneva in 1893, joined the Emancipation of Labor and became
secretary of the Union of Social Democrats Abroad. A
Menshevik and editor of Iskra, Koltsov worked with the Duma,
trade unions and for Menshevik journals. He was arrested and
exiled in 1914. During the revolution, Koltsov continued to
be a trade union leader. He died in 1920.

Gorev, B.I. (family name B. I. Goldman) A Menshevik
"liquidator", Gorev served on the TsK of the Party. In
1908, he circulated a letter proposing the formation of an
"Information Bureau" rathan a Central Committee. He was a
leading "liquidator."

Goldenberg-Meshkovskii, I.P. A Bolshevik conciliator,
Goldenberg-Meshkovskii was elected to the Russian Bureau of
the TsK in 1907. He served on the Trade Union Commission
and was involved in the publication of Professionalnyi
vestnik and the Duma newspaper, Novyi den. Arrested in 1910
while trying to implement the decisions of the January
Plenum, Goldenberg-Meshkovskii became a Menshevik in 1917.
However, he joined the Communist Party in 1920.

Grinevich, Viktor A long term praktik, Grinevich joined the
movement in the 1890s and became a leading member of the
Union Abroad. Arrested and exiled in 1903, Grinevich escaped and joined the Petersburg Menshevik organization. In 1905, as Chair of the Union of Printers, he joined the Soviet and in 1906 Chaired the Second Conference of Trade Unions. He became an active trade unionist in Moscow and in 1917 attended the Third Congress of Trade Unions. After October, Grinevich remained a right Menshevik.

Gvozdev, K. A. A metalworker from Narvskii district, Gvozdev was elected to the union board from Putilov. In 1910, he became president of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union. After his arrest in 1910, he became a founding member of the Initiative Group and a leading proponent of the petition campaign. Close to the liquidators, Gvozdev served in the War Industries Committees and became a Menshevik in the Provisional Government.

Iatsinovich, A. O. A founding member of the union, Iatsinovich was a nonfactional SD who had marched with Gapon. Iatsinovich was a metalfitter and founding member of the union at Odner and Beir in 1905. He advocated a citywide metalworkers' union in 1906. Iatsinovich was the union's first treasurer and president from 1906 until his arrest in 1910.

Ikov, Vladimir Konstantinovich (pseudonyms V. Mirov, Vadim, Verov, V. Gorodetskii.) A Party member since 1901, Ikov was a delegate to both London and Stockholm Congresses. A signer of The "Open Letter", Ikov was a liquidator. After October, he remained a right Menshevik until his arrest. He was tried in 1931 for illegal Menshevik activity.

Isuv, Iosif Andreevich (pseudonym Mikhailov) Active before 1905, Isuv became a Menshevik in 1904. He was elected to the TsK in 1907 and refused to join the Russian Bureau of the TsK in 1910. Isuv signed the "Open Letter" and collaborated with Nasha zaria and Luch. In 1917, he was leading Menshevik in Moscow where he died of dysentary.

Kollontai, Aleksandra Mikhailovna Kollontai joined the revolutionary movement early in the century as a Bolshevik but became a Menshevik in 1905. She contributed to Menshevik publications and was an active trade unionist. As an emigre from 1908 to 1917, she drew closer to the Bolsheviks and joined the faction in 1917. In 1922, after the defeat of the workers' opposition, she began to work as Soviet diplomat.

Kolokol'nikov, Pavel Nikolaevich (K. Dmitriev and other pseudonyms) Kolokol'nikov joined the revolutionary movement
in Moscow in the 1890s. A member of the Union of Struggle he was close to members of the Union Abroad. In 1903, he became a Menshevik and worked in Petersburg and Kiev. During the 1905 Revolution, he assisted workers in the organization of trade unions, and in 1906 was elected to the TsK. A leading Menshevik trade unionist in Petersburg and then Kiev, Kolokol'nikov served in the Ministry of Labor and on the Party's TsK in 1917. After October he became a Right Menshevik.

Kiselev. A. S. A Bolshevik conciliator, Kiselev was one of the new workers drawn to Party activities after 1907. Elected on the Pravda slate, Kiselev served as president, and secretary in 1913-14. Under his leadership, the union rejected factional lists in 1914.

Levitskii, V. O. (also Rakitin)(Born Vladimir Osipovich Tsederbaum) Arrested for participation in the student movement in 1899, Levitskii fled to Geneva in 1903. He joined the Menshevik Party and was an active liquidator between the revolutions. Close to Potresov, Levitskii contributed to all the major Menshevik publications. After October, he remained in the opposition. He was executed in 1941.

Kanatchikov, S. I. An active Bolshevik trade unionist, Kanatchikov was secretary of the woodworkers' union and the leather workers' union. In 1908 he served on the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and on the editorial board of Professionalnyi vestnik. He attended a number of congresses including the Congress of Factory Panel Doctors and the Anti-Alcoholism conference. He was arrested in 1910. After October 1917, Kanatchikov held a post at Sverdlov Communist University and died in 1940.

Lebedev, N. I. Lebedev was president of the Textile Workers' Union. He attended the Congress of People's Universities and the Congress of Factory Panel Doctors. He was also active on the Central Bureau of Unions until his arrest in 1910. In 1913, he became active in the insurance campaign.

Maevskii-Gutovskii, E.A. (pseudonym Evgenii) A Menshevik in 1905. Maevskii was a liquidator. In 1905 he was elected to the OK and he remained a right Menshevik. During the war, Maevskii served on the War Industries Committee. He was killed by the Whites in 1918.

Magidov, B. I. Secretary of the Goldsmith Union, Magidov was a member of the Central Bureau of Trade Unions and delivered the report on alcoholism at the Congress in 1910. After his
Malinovskii, A. A Bolshevik police spy, Malinovskii was secretary of the Metalworkers' Union from 1906-1909. He attended all the social congresses until 1910 when he was arrested. After his arrest he became a member of the TsK and constantly disorganized the Party by pursuing Lenin's factionalist policies. He was elected to the Fourth Duma. In April 1914, he left the country.

Martynov, (Piker) Aleksandr Samoilovich, A long term party activist, Martynov first belong to the People's Will. He became active in workers' circles as a Marxist and was a member of the Union Abroad. He edited Rabochee delo and Lenin attacked Martynov's publication in *What is to be Done?* Along with Akimov, Martynov walked out of the Second Congress and became a Menshevik. In 1905, Martynov became a leading Menshevik publicist and defended the liquidators. In 1912 he participated in the creation of the August Blok. Active in 1917, Martynov moved to the Ukraine until 1922 when he decide to become a Communist.

Morozov, N. K. An active worker from Semenov in the insurance campaign, Morozov belonged to a Menshevik cell. In 1913 he was elected treasurer of the union and chair of the Commission of Eight. He was arrested at the end of the summer.

Nikolaev, P. N. Another worker who rose to a position of power in the Metalworkers' Union, Nikolaev belonged to the Vasileostrov branch. In 1910 he was elected to the board and became treasurer in 1911. He was elected to the Pravda union board in 1913-14 and was a member of the Mezhraionka, or Interdistrict Group.

Nogin, V. P. Nogin was a trade unionist in Moscow from 1906 to 1907. Elected to the TsK in 1907, Nogin was arrested at the Cooperative Congress in 1908. He became a Bolshevik Conciliator in 1909. In 1910, he was sent to Russia to implement the January Plenum and was arrested. He died in 1924.

Novoselov, A.M. Novoselov was a member of the Metalworkers' Vasileostrov branch. In 1910, he was elected to the board from Vyborg district. He was one of the founders of the Mezhraionka.

Portugeis, Semen Osipovich (pseudonyms Stepan Ivanovich; Solomonov) Portugeis joined workers' circles at the turn of the century and went abroad in 1901-2. He joined the
Mensheviks in 1903 and began writing for Iskra. Along with Garvi, he returned to Russia in 1904. A contributor to all the trade union and Menshevik journals, he was close to Potresov and the liquidators. After October, he joined the left Mensheviks in Odessa and in 1922 began publishing against Lenin. During World War II he traveled to New York.

Potresov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich (Starover) Potresov was one of the founders of the Petersburg Union of Struggle in 1895. A Legal Marxist, Potresov was arrested, exiled and then emigrated. An editor of Iskra and a Menshevik after 1903, Potresov was a leading liquidator. He remained a right Menshevik after 1917 was arrested and continued publish in opposition to the Bolsheviks from Paris.

Prokopovich, Sergei Nikolaevich Prokopovich was educated in Germany, Switzerland and Belgium. He joined the Marxists in the 1890s and then the Union Abroad. His work was circulated and became identified with Economism. In 1905, Prokopovich was a Liberationist and assisted workers' unions and cooperatives. During 1917, he served in the Provisional Government, the Ministry of Industry and in food rationing. In 1921, he was arrested and exiled.

Riazanov, D. B. A nonfactional SD, Riazanov held a seat on the Peterburg Central Bureau of Trade Unions. He attended the Second Congress of Trade Unions and opposed registration of unions. He also opposed party affiliation with trade union institutions.

Rubtsov, V. D. Rubtsov was a Bolshevik conciliator active in Petersburg Side and Vyborg districts. He became secretary of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union after the arrest of Malinovskii in 1910. In 1914, he was elected to the Petersburg Social Insurance Board. He was also elected treasurer of the Union and attempted to win acceptance of "unified candidate lists."

Sher, V. V. Sher was active in the Moscow Printers' Union. In 1914, he collaborated with Trotskii's Bor'ba. He joined the Provisional Government in 1917 and left during the NEP. He was tried in 1931.

Skrypnik, N.A. (Ermolaev, G.G.) During 1907, Skrypnik became a Bolshevik. He was involved in the publication of Professionalnyi vestnik and attended the Congress of Factory Panel Doctors. In 1910, he attended the Extended Meeting of the Editorial Board of Proletarii. Skrypnik was an editor of Voprosy Strakhovaniia. He committed suicide in 1933.
Smirnov, Aleksandr Nikolaevich (Rabochii Petrov) Smirnov was a metalworker who became a Populist then a Marxist in the 1890s. He was elected to the board of the Petersburg Metalworkers' Union and was a founding member of the Initiative Group. Smirnov was a delegate to the Vienna Conference in 1912 and was appointed to the Organization Commission. In 1917, Smirnov belonged to the TsK and after October he attempted to join Rabfak and the University. In 1921, he returned to Menshevism was arrested and jailed.

Sverchkov, Dmitrii Fedorovich Sverchkov joined the SDs in 1899 as a student. He was arrested, exiled and emigrated to Switzerland. He was a Bolshevik until he joined the Soviet in 1905. He was arrested again but escaped abroad. From 1908-9 he worked on the Central Bureau of the Foreign Group, was coopted into the TsK in 1909, returned to Russia and was arrested again. During February, he joined the activities of the Mensheviks and in 1920, joined the Communist Party.

Shvarts-Monoseon, Solomon Meerovich. Shvarts joined the SDs as a student and in 1903 became a Bolshevik. In 1907 after the unification congress he became a Menshevik and worked in St. Petersburg. He was arrested and went abroad. In 1912, he returned to Russia and joined the Social Insurance campaign. He edited Strakhovanie rabochikh. During the war, he continued trade union work and joined the War Industries Committees. He served in the Petrograd Soviet and became Head of the Department of Social Insurance in the Ministry of Labor. He held numerous military and party posts until his arrest in 1921. In emigration, Shvarts travelled to Germany and then New York.

Tomskii-Kopp, V.P. Before 1905, Tomskii-Kopp was active in German trade unions. In Russia, he worked on the Metalworkers' journal until his arrest in 1910. He emigrated and in Vienna worked with Trotzki's Pravda. After the revolution, Tomskii-Kopp was in diplomatic service.

Voitinskii, Vladimir Savel'evich Voitinskii joined revolutionary meetings in 1905 as a Bolshevik. He was arrested in 1908 and exiled to Siberia. From 1912-16 participated in literary work with leading Mensheviks. In February he officially joined the Menshevik Party and in October organized opposition to the Bolsheviks. Voitinskii travelled to Georgia in 1918 and then to Germany. He worked as an economist in Europe and the United States. He died in Washington, DC in 1960.
APPENDIX B : PERIODICALS

RSDRP Journals (St. Petersburg):

Bor'ba (1914) - ed. Trotsky
Delo Zhizni (biweekly 1911) Menshevik
Edinstvo (weekly 1914) - Party Menshevik
Luch (daily, September 1912- July 1913) Menshevik
Continued by: Zhivaia Zhizn' (July-August 1913)
Novaia rabochaia gazeta (1913)
Severnaia rabochaia gazeta (1913-14)
Nasha rabochaia gazeta (1914)

Nasha zaria (monthly, January 1910-September 1914) Menshevik
Contributors: Chervanin, Garvi, Isuv, Levitskii, Potresov, Maevskii

Nevskii golos (weekly, 1912) Menshevik
Novyi den' (weekly August-December 1909) Duma newspaper
Pravda (April 1912-14)
Continued by: Rabochaia pravda
Severnaia pravda
Pravda truda
Za pravdu
Proletarskaia pravda
Put' pravdy
Trudovaia pravda

Zvezda (weekly-December-1910-Oct 1912) Duma newspaper, pro-Bolshevik

RSDRP Emigre Journals:

Sotsial-demokrat (February 1909 - December 1916)
TsK journal, (Paris, Geneva) pro-Bolshevik
Golos sotsial-demokrata (monthly, February 1908-December 1911)
Menshevik eds. P.B. Akselrod, Dan, Martynov, Plekhanov (Resigned 1909)
Proletarii (weekly, December 1906 - December 1909)
(Vyborg, Geneva, Paris,) St. Petersburg and Moscow Committees of RSDRP; Bolshevik
Pravda (Vienna) (1908-12) ed. Trotsky
Dnevnik sotsial demokrata (March 1905- April 1912)
ed. Plekhanov
Rabochaia gazeta (November 1910- September 1912)
eds. Kamenev, Lenin, Zinoviev; Bolshevik
Vpered (July 1910-May 1911) eds. Lunacharskii, Bogdanov
Pokrovskii

Trade Union Press:

Professional'nyi soiuz (December 1905-July 1906) Organ of
Petersburg Central Bureau of Trade Unions
Professional'nyi vestnik (January 1907-October 1909) Revived

St. Petersburg Metalworkers' Journal:
Rabochii po metallu (June 1906-November 1907)
Kuznets (December 1907-March 1908)
Vestnik rabochikh po obrabotke metalla (1908)
Nadezhda (July-October 1908)
Edinstvo (February 1909-April 1910)
Nash put (June 1910-August 1911)
Metallist (1911-14)

Social Insurance:
Strakhovanie rabochikh (December 1912-February
1916) Menshevik
Voprosy strakhovaniia (1913-14) Bolshevik
APPENDIX C: SOCIALIST GROUPS

Conciliators - Bolsheviks who favored cooperation with local Menshevik groups and pursued all forms of legal work in the workers' associations and the Duma. They resisted Lenin's efforts to discredit the liquidators.

Initiative Group - Menshevik organization in St. Petersburg first begun after the Handicrafts Congress with the concept of uniting the illegal underground with the legal activists. By 1911, the Central Initiative Group acted as the illegal Menshevik organization in the City. Its members supported the Duma group and workers' associations.

Literary - A term referring to theorists who published polemical articles in defense of Liquidationism in this period.

Mezhraionka - The Interdistrict group was formed by Conciliator Bolsheviks and joined by non-factional SDs. The members were associated with Trotsky's campaign for Social Democratic unity.

Otsovists (Recallists) - Bolsheviks who demanded the recall of Social Democratic Duma deputies after the deputies refused to be subordinated to the Central Committee of the RSDRP. The Recallists included A. A. Bogdanov and A. A. Lunacharskii and dominated the Petersburg Committee until 1910. They were expelled from the Bolshevik faction in 1909 at the Extended meeting of the Editorial Board of Proletarii. Afterwards they formed a literary group around the journal Vpered and by 1914 were associated with the campaign for unity.

Party Mensheviks - Mensheviks who continued to support the ascendency of the underground party. Plekhanov led this group of Mensheviks although his alliance with Lenin against the liquidators was flawed.
Praktiki - This term refers to Menshevik party activists in the workers' movement and is in many ways synonymous with the term "liquidators." The praktiki were determined to have a voice in the Russian Social Democratic Party leadership after 1907 and this determination led to the "Liquidationist Controversy."
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op.1, d.6. Conflict with Trotsky
op.1, d.9. Paris Mensheviks and Luch
op.1, d.11. Trotsky and the August Bloc
op.1, d.48. Struggle between Pravda and Luch
op.1, d.50. Pravda and the Liquidators, 1914

Fond 451: Organization Commission (Mensheviks)
op.1, d.71, Conflict with Party Mensheviks

Fond 447: Fourth Conference RSDRP, April-May 1906
op.1, d.1. Bolshevik drafts
op.1, d.2. Bolshevik drafts
op.1, d.3. Menshevik drafts
op.1, d.4. Menshevik drafts

Fond 337: Fifth Congress, May 1907
op.1, d.39. Tactical platform Menshevik praktiki
Nicoiaevsky Collection, Hoover Institution, Stanford, California

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Box 47 Speeches and writings, ff.4-5

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